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STRENGTHENING OUR ECONOMY: FORECLOSURE 

PREVENTION AND NEIGHBORHOOD PRESERVATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

FORECLOSURE PREVENTION AND NEIGHBORHOOD PRESERVATION 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

( 

Available at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate05sh.html 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut, Chairman 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

ROBERT P. CASEY, Pennsylvania 

JON TESTER, Montana 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

SHAWN MAHER, Staff Director 

WILLIAM D. DUHNKE, Republican Staff Director and Counsel 

DAWN RATLIFF, Chief Clerk 

SHELVIN SIMMONS, IT Director 

JIM CROWELL, Editor 


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C O N T E N T S 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 2008 

Page 

Opening statement of Chairman Dodd .................................................................. 1 

Opening statements, comments, or prepared statements of: 

Senator Shelby .................................................................................................. 5 

Senator Menendez ............................................................................................ 7 

Senator Bennett ................................................................................................ 8 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement ................................................................................... 65 

Senator Dole ...................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement ................................................................................... 67 

Senator Tester .................................................................................................. 10 

Senator Bunning ............................................................................................... 11 

Senator Reed ..................................................................................................... 12 

Senator Allard ................................................................................................... 13 

Senator Schumer .............................................................................................. 14 

Senator Corker .................................................................................................. 16 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 16 

Senator Martinez .............................................................................................. 17 

Senator Casey ................................................................................................... 19 

WITNESSES 

Sheila C. Bair, Chairman Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ..................... 21 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 70 

Response to written questions of: 

Senator Bennett ........................................................................................ 125 

Senator Tester ........................................................................................... 126 

Robert K. Steel, Under Secretary of Treasury for Domestic Finance, Department of the Treasury ........................................................................................... 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 89 

Response to written questions of: 

Senator Tester ........................................................................................... 130 

Wade Henderson, President and Chief Executive Officer, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights ......................................................................................... 46 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 94 

Michael S. Barr, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress, and Professor 

of Law, University of Michigan Law School ...................................................... 48 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 100 

Response to written questions of: 

Senator Dodd ............................................................................................. 127 

Alex J. Pollock, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute ....................... 50 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 110 

Doris W. Koo, President and Chief Executive Officer, Enterprise Community 

Partners, Inc. ........................................................................................................ 53 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 118 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUPPLIED FOR THE RECORD

Statement of Thomas Bledsoe, President and CEO, The Housing Partnership 

Network ................................................................................................................ 131 

Statement of Douglas Duncan, Ph.D., Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Mortgage Bankers Association .................................................................. 136 


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IV 

Statement of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition ......................... 149 

Statement of Jan DeMarines, Executive Director, National Alliance of Community Economic Development Associations ..................................................... 151 


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STRENGTHENING OUR ECONOMY: FORECLOSURE PREVENTION AND NEIGHBORHOOD PRESERVATION 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met at 11:03 a.m., in room SD–538, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Christopher J. Dodd (Chairman of the 

Committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CHRISTOPHER J. DODD 

Chairman DODD. The Committee will come to order. Let me welcome everyone here this morning. 

Let me apologize to our witnesses and to our colleagues here and 

to the audience as well. Obviously, the stimulus package is a subject of important debate, and this morning the Democratic Majority 

Leader wanted to caucus with Senators to talk about where we are 

with regard to the stimulus package. And that is the reason for the 

delay this morning. I don’t know, Dick, if there was a similar meeting with the Republicans on the side, but obviously it is an important issue, and we are trying to resolve it and move quickly on it. 

So I normally would not have held up a hearing like that, but given 

the importance of that subject matter, hopefully the witnesses and 

others will understand the reason for the delay. And I again apologize. 

What I would like to do here is make an opening statement, turn 

to any of my—obviously Senator Shelby for any opening comments 

he would like to make this morning, as well as my colleagues, and 

then we will get right to our witnesses here. You are all fairly familiar with the practice and how we proceed here. 

This morning, we have a very good panel, I think. The subject 

matter, ‘‘Strengthening Our Economy: Foreclosure Prevention and 

Neighborhood Preservation,’’ is obviously a critically important subject matter, the most important in many ways. I have tried to 

make the case over the last number of months that to the extent 

this economic crisis has a face, it is housing; and to the extent 

there is a face on the housing crisis, it is a foreclosure crisis. And 

so we need to address this in a thoughtful manner, obviously, but 

also in an aggressive manner. The problem is getting worse not 

better, as I think we all know. 

The title of this Committee, of course, is the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. And if you take the title of this 


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Committee, every single one of those institutions is affected by the 

subject matter of the hearing here this morning—banking, housing, 

and the condition of our communities and neighborhoods as well. 

So I welcome everyone here this morning. Let me also welcome— 

he is not here yet, but I want to welcome Senator Corker of Tennessee, who is going to be joining the Committee, and express our 

good wishes to John Sununu, who is leaving the Committee and 

going to Finance as a result of a change. And Senator Corker has 

a very strong background in issues relevant to the Committee. We 

welcome his participation. He started and ran his own construction 

company as well as a number of other real estate concerns, and he 

helped to create the Chattanooga Neighborhood Enterprise, a nonprofit group designed to get low-income families into affordable 

housing. So we look forward to his constructive participation in the 

Committee’s proceedings. 

Let me also thank Senator Shelby once again and other colleagues for their work over the past year. We had a good year, a 

productive year. I am not going to dwell on this, but we had some 

35 hearings in this Committee; 17 pieces of legislation moved out 

of this Committee; more than half of them are now the law of the 

land, adopted as well by the full Senate and the House. Several are 

pending, such as FHA, where we are trying to work out the differences on that bill. But that one passed 93–1 out of the Senate. 

Flood insurance as well, to get that done as well. 

In his State of the Union Address, the President called this a 

‘‘period of economic uncertainty.’’ And while I agree that we are in 

an uncertain period, what we know with some certainty is that the 

current economic situation is more than merely a slowdown or a 

downturn—at least it is in my view. In many respects, it is a crisis 

of confidence. Consumers are fearful of borrowing and spending. Investors are fearful of lending. 

Current economic data show how serious the problem is. Retail 

sales were down and unemployment up in December. Credit card 

delinquencies are on the rise. Inflation increased by 4.1 percent 

last year. Industrial production is falling. And we have been hemorrhaging jobs in the manufacturing sector. Our economy is clearly 

facing more than uncertainty. It is facing significant challenges to 

our Nation’s future economic growth and prosperity. 

If I can, let me just share some of the additional data that I 

think paints the picture more clearly than any specific language. 

The housing market is wisely considered to be the worst since 

the Great Depression. Housing prices have declined by 8.4 percent 

in November. According to the Case-Shiller Index, this follows a 6.7 

fall in October. A recent Merrill Lynch mortgage report predicts a 

15-percent drop in housing prices this year and another 10-percent 

decline in 2009. The inventory of existing homes for sale stands at 

nearly 4 million units—almost double the number in January of 

2005. This is equal to about 10 months of supply. The number of 

vacant homes for sale equals 2.6 percent or 2.1 million units of the 

stock of owner-occupied homes compared to the longstanding historical rate of 1.6 percent. 

In 2007 as a whole, single-family home sales fell 13 percent. New 

home sales fell 40.7 percent year over year in December, the weakest performance since 1981. With over 1 million subprime and AlVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:53 Mar 12, 2010 Jkt 050366 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A366.XXX A366

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ternative-A borrowers that are 60-plus days delinquent in their 

mortgages, with about 1.8 million subprime ARMs, the adjustable 

rate mortgages, resetting to higher rates in the next 18 months, 

there is no doubt that this problem will deepen. Not surprisingly, 

we are experiencing historic highs in the rate of foreclosure starts, 

according to the Mortgage Bankers Association. Mark Zandi, an 

economist at Moody’s, estimates that 3 million loans will default 

between 2007 and 2009, of which 2 million will end in foreclosure 

and sale. 

Foreclosures, of course, tend to be concentrated, devastating 

whole neighborhoods. In addition to the losses suffered by homeowners who lose their homes, foreclosures lead to the loss of wealth 

surrounding homeowners, neighborhoods, and localities. According 

to the Center for Responsible Lending, the 2.2 million projected 

foreclosures will lead to a decline in house values and tax base of 

over $200 billion. Studies in Chicago and Philadelphia have found 

that for each foreclosed home, property values of nearby homes 

drop approximately 1 percent. In low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, this decline is over 1.4 percent for each foreclosed home. 

Decreases in property values result in lost tax revenues for State 

and local governments. The Joint Economic Committee found that 

approximately $917 million will be lost in property tax revenues as 

a result of the loss in housing wealth as a result of foreclosures, 

and this is based on a conservative estimate of 1.3 million foreclosures. The Center for Responsible Lending estimates that $4.5 

billion will be lost by localities. In addition, the Woodstock Institute 

found that violent crime increases as foreclosures increase as well. 

As with subprime lending, foreclosures, while occurring in many 

areas, tend to be concentrated in low-income and minority neighborhoods. According to the Federal Reserve in Minneapolis, in the 

Twin Cities the incidence of foreclosures is highest in our core cities, especially in neighborhoods where minority homeownership 

rose in the 1990s. Analyses done by the New York Times and the 

San Francisco Chronicle find similar patterns. In the Bay Area as 

well as in Cleveland, Chicago, Atlanta, minority neighborhoods are 

hit the hardest and minority homebuyers are lost significant equity. I would just share with my colleagues that background data 

and how important it. 

The epicenter of this economic crisis is, as I said at the outset, 

the housing crisis. Housing starts are at the lowest levels in a 

quarter of a century. The housing sector has declined eight straight 

quarters, shaving 1.2 percent out of GDP in the last quarter alone. 

Home prices declined last year nationwide by 6 percent and are expected to decline again this year. To my knowledge, that will be the 

first time since the Great Depression that national home prices 

have dropped 2 years in a row. 

The virtual collapse of the housing market, of course, was triggered by what Treasury Secretary Paulson has accurately described, in my view, and I quote him, ‘‘bad lending practices.′′ 

These are practices that no sensible banker would have engaged in. 

Reckless, careless, and sometimes unscrupulous actors in the mortgage lending industry allowed loans to be made that they knew 

that hard-working, law-abiding borrowers would not be able to 

repay. And they did this in the full view of our financial regulators, 


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who acted much too late and far too timidly in my view. Even now, 

the Federal Reserve is not taking the strong steps I think we ought 

to be taking to protect consumers here. As a result, foreclosures are 

at a record level, the value of people’s homes are declining, and the 

tax base for State and local governments is shrinking. 

The catalyst for our economic problems is the housing crisis, and 

the face of this housing crisis is the historic increase in foreclosures. Therefore, in my view, any serious effort to address our 

economic woes must include an effort to take on the causes and 

symptoms of the foreclosure crisis. This morning’s hearing is the 

beginning of that process. A number of very important steps have 

already been taken. 

After what I regret to say was months of denial and delay, the 

administration finally put together the Hope Now Alliance, which 

has developed a set of standards by which homes can be more readily financed or modified. It is my hope that these standards will be 

applied quickly and in a broad, systemic way, as FDIC Chairman 

Sheila Bair has been advocating, and I commend her for it. 

Unfortunately, the results to date have been disappointing. 

Moody’s reports that only 3.5 percent of subprime ARMs were 

modified in the first 8 months of 2007. And while industry data 

paint a more optimistic picture, the Washington Post pointed out 

that even the industry’s data shows, and I quote them, ‘‘delinquent 

borrowers are almost twice as likely to lose their homes as they 

were to reach an agreement with their lender.’’ 

For that reason, I believe we need to give serious consideration 

to other ideas. One such approach, which we will hear about later 

this morning, is the creation of an entity we are calling the Homeownership Preservation Corporation. Its general outline, such as an 

entity would capture the discount for which delinquent and neardelinquent loans are trading in the marketplace through a transparent, market-based process and transfer the discounts to the 

homeowners through new lower-balance loans so that more families could stay in their homes. Rather than a case-by-case approach, such an entity would purchase and restructure these loans 

in bulk to help many borrowers as quickly as possible. In my view, 

this entity could make use of existing institutions such as FHA and 

the GSEs to expedite the process and maximize the efficiency of 

this idea. 

Every day that goes by without action means that more families 

are losing their homes. Obviously, many details would need to be 

worked out here. I understand that. That is one of the purposes of 

this hearing this morning. But the fact that this idea has been embraced by highly respected leaders of both the conservative American Enterprise Institute and the more progressive Center for 

American Progress tells me it is worth pursuing and looking at seriously. And while we continue to seek out ways to prevent foreclosure, we need to take other measures as well. These include enacting comprehensive FHA reform, which can give homeowners a 

chance to trade in foreclosure loans for stable, affordable, 30-year 

fixed-rate mortgages. This bill passed the Committee 20–1, and it 

passed the Senate, as I mentioned earlier, 93–1. 

We should also help local communities cope with the rising number of foreclosed and abandoned homes that litter their commuVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:53 Mar 12, 2010 Jkt 050366 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A366.XXX A366

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nities. To that end, I believe we need to increase funding for the 

Community Development Block Grant Program by some $10 billion 

so that States and localities could acquire, renovate, and sell foreclosed and abandoned homes. These properties lead to a cycle of 

disinvestment, crime, falling property values and property tax collections, thereby leading to service cuts and further disinvestment. 

An increase in the CDBG Program I think could help reverse this 

vicious cycle. 

In the long term, we also need to end the predatory lending practices that led to this problem. I introduced a piece of legislation last 

fall that I believe would crack down on these practices and help restore consumer and investor confidence in the market. That will be 

the subject of a future hearing and I hope a markup of this Committee. 

Today and in the coming weeks, we need to work together to help 

American families keep their homes and their dreams alive, and I 

think that is a common goal that all of us share. And my hope is 

this morning we can explore some of those ideas and begin to move 

aggressively on how we can play a very critical, important role, as 

this Committee must, in providing some answers to these questions. 

With that, let me turn to my colleague, Senator Shelby. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling today’s hearing on foreclosure prevention and neighborhood 

preservation. 

Mr. Chairman, as you and many others have alluded to, in recent months there has been considerable volatility in our Nation’s 

housing, mortgage, and financial markets. It is critical at this time 

for our financial regulators to maintain close and extensive oversight of the financial soundness of our banking system. It is also 

a critical time to find effective solutions for dealing with foreclosures. 

I encourage you in the ongoing efforts to mitigate the harm of 

foreclosures and to help deserving families remain in their homes. 

These efforts have been ongoing and at times successful when met 

by a willing homeowner. I believe, however, that these efforts 

should be targeted at those most in need and those most able to 

maintain homeownership. Efforts at foreclosure prevention should 

not reward speculators or those who freely choose to live beyond 

their means. Nor should foreclosures prevention efforts reward 

lenders or investors who willingly took on the risks associated with 

mortgage lending and investing. 

Losses in the mortgage market have so far been borne by lenders 

and investors. With that in mind, I believe we should take every 

precaution to ensure that these losses are not transferred to the 

American taxpayer. 

I have repeatedly stated my opposition to any taxpayer bailout 

of lenders or borrowers. It is not the responsibility, I believe, of the 

American taxpayer to bail out those who, for whatever reason, have 

found themselves unable to meet their financial obligations. It is, 

first and foremost, the responsibility of the borrower and the lender 

to work toward a mutually agreeable resolution. In the event that 


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is not possible, foreclosure may be an unavoidable though necessary step in the process. 

Whether foreclosures have reached an unacceptably high level requiring some sort of Federal intervention is something we need to 

examine very closely, and I think we will today. While some have 

argued that direct Federal intervention is needed immediately, others have said that we should allow the market to run its course. 

Mr. Chairman, I tend to favor the latter because I believe that 

choices have consequences, and those consequences, although painful, may serve us far better than attempting to avoid them. 

These are not circumstances that are wholly new to this Committee, or this Nation, for that matter. In a letter to President 

Washington regarding a Federal bailout of another kind, thenTreasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton said, and I quote, ‘‘The 

general rules of property frequently involve particular hardships 

and injuries, yet the public order and general happiness require 

steady conformity to them. It is perhaps always better that partial 

evils be submitted to than that principles should be violated.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, there may be a lesson in there for us to examine 

the entirety of the American mortgage market over the next several weeks, and I hope you will. And as we move forward, I hope 

that we can all agree that this is a time for serious thought and 

not precipitous action. We owe that to the millions of Americans 

who pay their bills on time, make wise financial decisions, and 

send their tax dollars to us every year with the hope that we will 

spend them as wisely as they spend the dollars they are allowed 

to keep. 

I welcome all of today’s witnesses to the Committee, and I look 

forward to your testimony. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much. 

Following the ancient practice of this Committee, we will recognize Members in the order in which they appeared here, and it is 

a longstanding tradition. By the way, Senator Corker, I welcomed 

you earlier before your arrival, and thank you for joining the Committee. Delighted to have you with us. 

Senator SHELBY. May I say something? 

Chairman DODD. You certainly may. 

Senator SHELBY. I also welcome him. Glad he is here. I think he 

will add a lot. As Chairman Dodd said before you got here, your 

background and your experience in housing and banking will help 

us a lot. We need all the help we can get in this Committee. 

Thank you. 

Senator CORKER. I thank you both, and I certainly look forward 

to working with you. And I love your longstanding history of acknowledging people when they come, and I know I will be last. But 

thank you very much. 

Chairman DODD. You will get over that enjoyment as you move 

up in seniority. 

[Laughter.] 

I thought it was a wonderful idea 20 years ago. 

Well, Senator Schumer was here, but he is not here right now, 

so Senator Menendez. Bob. 


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STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by 

thanking you and Senator Shelby for holding what I think is not 

only a very important but very timely hearing on strengthening our 

economy. And I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your leadership 

throughout this subprime crisis, which has been very commendable 

in looking to find ways to soften the blow both on our economy and 

families. 

Since this is the first time you are back since your candidacy, I 

just want to take a moment. While it may not have ended up how 

you would have liked it, I really appreciate the issues that you 

drove, the manner in which you ran your candidacy, and the dignity which you brought to the race. So my commendations on the 

way in which you ran that race, and the issues that you drove, I 

think they are incredibly important. 

Each Banking Committee that we have had on the subprime crisis and the ripple effect on it reminds me of our first hearing in 

March of last year when, though it is almost embarrassing to think 

of now, some had some doubt about the intensity of what I think 

then called a ‘‘tsunami of foreclosures.’’ Some had doubt about the 

need for action, and some had doubt about the effect the crisis 

would have on our economy. 

I do not know that we can pretend that we would have predicted 

where we are today, but many of us felt the tsunami real and knew 

action was needed and feared for the effect it would have. And I 

think some of our worst fears are coming true. Our economy is tinkering on the edge of a recession, and we should be taking every 

step possible to help turn the tide. We should be helping as many 

families as possible stay in their home. And in my mind, this is not 

the time for baby steps. Families across the country are scared to 

open their mail for fear of foreclosure notices, scared of looming interest rate hikes, and scared for their financial security. This is not 

an American dream. In many respects, it is an American nightmare. And the only way we can end the nightmare is to take real 

action to curb the crisis. 

Now, I believe, as many others, that the market is a very important economic principle, but I also know that history teaches us 

that when there is totally unfettered markets, there is also the reality for excesses and abuses. And we certainly have seen some of 

that in this process. 

I am looking forward to hearing the witnesses’ testimonies today 

to hear about what currently is and is not working and to hear new 

ideas about how we can further help America’s homeowners. And, 

Mr. Chairman, I am very intrigued about your proposal for a 

Homeownership Preservation Corporation. It is an idea that could 

be the turning point to help our families stay in their homes and 

get our economy back on track. 

Finally, the President said earlier this week in his State of the 

Union address that our economy is undergoing a ‘‘period of uncertainty,’’ I think were his words. But to me there is nothing uncertain about our situation. We are in trouble. American homeowners 

are in trouble. And unless we want to sink deeper into this crisis, 

we have to take bold steps in order to save our families’ homes and 

their neighborhoods. 


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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Bennett. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Last weekend, I was in Davos where the whole question of the 

American economy and what ripple effect it might have on the rest 

of the world dominated all of the discussion. But the comment that 

was made in one of the panel’s I attended strikes me here. One of 

the gentlemen said, ‘‘When I heard my cab driver tell me he had 

three houses, I knew we were in trouble.’’ And we have had a bubble where speculation combined with genuine enthusiasm and hope 

that was not speculative but was overoptimistic, the two combined 

to create a bubble from which we must now recover. And the challenge we have in the Congress is to find a way to cushion the blow 

in such a way as to be compassionate and intelligent, and at the 

same time not become an enabler for those who would take advantage of the enthusiasm that was there. 

We have got to let the market work its way through. The only 

way we are going to get out of this is to sell off the 10-month inventory. The only way we are going to get out of this is to let the law 

of supply and demand catch up with the oversupply that is there. 

And the rising American population will eventually start to demand new homes. 

We have a classic recession situation. It used to be in automobiles where there were too many automobiles, and the car companies would shut down until the inventory was sold off. And then 

they would call the steel companies and the glass companies and 

the labor unions and say, ‘‘Come back to work because we don’t 

have any cars and people want to buy them.’’ 

Now we need to do what we can to cushion the blow, but recognize that the real way out of this is to see the inventory get sold 

off, see the demand for housing occur, and eventually people start 

coming back to need shelter. 

I am happy to say that in my home State of Utah, which has the 

highest birth rate of any State in the country, we are doing our 

very best to create demand for those houses. [Laughter.] 

Chairman DODD. That large Irish Catholic population there. 

Senator BENNETT. Yes, yes. We have that challenge as a Congress to balance the need to cushion the blow with the need to let 

the market forces work us through this. And it is a difficult balance. It is a difficult needle to thread. And I thank you for calling 

this hearing so that we can discuss ways to try to thread it. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much. 

Senator Johnson. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM JOHNSON 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, to move things along, I will 

submit my statement for the record. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Senator. I appreciate it. 

Chairman DODD. Senator Dole. 


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STATEMENT OF SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE 

Senator DOLE. Thank you, Chairman Dodd, Ranking Member 

Shelby, for holding this important hearing on foreclosure prevention and neighborhood preservation. 

Let me first start by saying a few words about Sheila Bair. Sheila has a long history of public service that includes working as 

Deputy Counsel and Counsel when my husband was Senate Majority Leader. Sheila, thank you for your continued service to the public and the vital role that you are playing now to assure competence and confidence in this volatile housing and financial market. It is a real pleasure to see you this morning. 

During my time in the Senate, I have made homeownership, Mr. 

Chairman, one of my top priorities. It is amazing how getting keys 

to one’s own home is like getting the keys to a better quality of life 

and a brighter future. Parents who own their own homes provide 

more stable environments for their children. These children do better in school, and they become more involved in the community, as 

the studies show. These families are able to build wealth, many of 

them for the first time, thereby helping secure funds for retirement, for higher education for their kids. Families who own their 

own homes also are more likely to spend the money necessary to 

properly maintain the home and, thus, improve the neighborhood. 

So these positive results have a ripple effect throughout the community and the economy. 

The homeownership rate is still close to 70 percent, and minority 

homeownership is around 50 percent. While these numbers are 

promising, we know there is trouble in the U.S. housing market. 

According to RealtyTrac, a mortgage researcher, in 2007 there were 

2.2 million foreclosure filings, up 75 percent nationally from the 

year before. In my home State of North Carolina, foreclosures in 

2007 rose to approximately 50,000 last year, a 9.4-percent increase. 

Furthermore, according to the Triangle Business Journal, Wake 

County, which includes Raleigh, our capital, had 4,461 foreclosures 

during 2007, up 20.2 percent from the 3,711 posted in 2006. 

These statistics point to the alarming fact that foreclosure filings 

were on the rise in 2007, and it appears that this trend may not 

end in the near future, the near term. One of the ways that we can 

help combat increasing foreclosure rates is the modernization of the 

Federal Housing Administration, the FHA. Updating the FHA program will be of vital assistance to folks who are in risky mortgages 

and will help them find safer products. And I want to thank Chairman Dodd and Ranking Member Shelby for taking up this important piece of legislation last fall and also for working with me to 

resolve the issue of credit score risk-based pricing, which our Senate-passed bill addresses by placing a 1-year moratorium on this 

practice. 

I hope the differences between the House and Senate versions of 

FHA modernization legislation will be worked out as soon as possible so we can get a finished product to the President for his signature. 

In December, Chairman Dodd introduced the Homeownership 

Preservation and Protection Act of 2007, which has helped jumpstart a discussion surrounding the issue predatory lending. It is my 


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hope that this Committee will work in a bipartisan fashion as we 

roll up our sleeves and dig in to tackle a difficult yet timely issue. 

When we start talking about predatory loan legislation, we must 

strike a careful balance between protecting Americans from faulty 

loans while maintaining legitimate financial options for qualified 

individuals to become homeowners. I look forward to working with 

Members of the Committee concerning this important subject. 

Last, let me reiterate my support for comprehensive GSE reform 

legislation early this year. As the President mentioned during his 

State of the Union address, this reform is all the more urgent now 

that it appears that the conforming loan limits for Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac will be lifted temporarily as part of a congressionally 

enacted economic stimulus package. I know this is also an issue of 

concern for Senators Hagel and Martinez and former Committee 

Member John Sununu. I welcome the comments that you have 

made in recent days, Chairman Dodd, indicating your commitment 

to comprehensive GSE reform, and I look forward to working with 

you, with Ranking Member Shelby, and other interested Committee Members to finally get this bill done. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Tester. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JON TESTER 

Senator TESTER. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to also 

start out by welcoming Senator Corker to the Committee. I always 

look forward to Bob’s perspective, and I look forward to his perspective here on the Banking Committee. 

I also want to thank you, Chairman Dodd and Ranking Member 

Shelby, for calling this hearing today. It is critically important. As 

the Senate talks about an economic stimulus package based on rebates to taxpayers, I think that this hearing is not only timely but 

it is of critical importance. 

Economic pressures over the last 18 months were first felt a year 

and a half ago by Americans from Montana to Connecticut, and 

they felt it in local housing markets. In the months that have followed, foreclosures have skyrocketed, their rates, and communities 

in all 50 States have suffered. 

I think it is imperative that we today start the discussion on solutions to minimize further damage to affected homeowners and 

also to homeowners who live in neighborhoods where the foreclosure rate has taken off. 

As other folks on this Committee have given their speeches, I 

tend to agree. I am not inclined to bail out speculators. They have 

made their own bed. I am not inclined to bail out folks who were 

overzealous and made bad decisions. I will tell you, though, that 

I have empathy for the folks who were led astray and put into situations that were bad loans, particularly the elderly, and I think we 

need to figure out ways that we can help those in a reasonable way 

without busting the budget. 

Economists have told us that we really have no reason to believe 

that the rising rate of foreclosures and corresponding declines in 

housing markets will level off in the near future. But the fact there 


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is uncertainty, how far we have to go before these housing markets 

levels off, is of great concern to me. 

I look forward to hearing from the panel today. I think that your 

ideas on public private partnerships and solutions that will help 

protect our families from financial difficulties are critically important at this point in time, and how we deal with folks who dishonestly steered folks into risky loans is also a problem that we are 

going to have to deal with and tackle. 

So I want to thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, once again, 

and I look forward to the hearing. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you, Senator, very much. I should have 

mentioned this after Senator Dole’s comments. We will have a 

hearing next Thursday on GSE reform, so we are going to—I have 

told the Secretary and others and Senator Shelby that we are going 

to move ahead and have the hearing. There are some differences, 

obviously, as we all know, but there are some things we all agree 

on. There are some other areas we are going to have to work out, 

but my hope is to get something done on that as well. 

Senator Bunning. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM BUNNING 

Senator BUNNING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am very disappointed that we need to hold this hearing today. 

The problems in the housing market were foreseeable and preventable. Some of us have been sounding alarms for a long time. In 

2006, Senator Allard and myself, with Senators Reed and Schumer, 

held hearings on the housing bubble and the coming problems in 

the housing market. But we were not the first to raise concerns. 

At least as early as 2002, former Fed Chairman Greenspan was 

warned by one of the other Fed Governors to rein in the subprime 

lending by nine bank lenders, but he did nothing. As he cut interest rates after the last recession, Chairman Greenspan knew it 

would cause a credit bubble, but he did nothing. As the top bank 

regulator, he sat back and watched as lenders wrote more risky 

mortgages and borrowers dug deeper holes for themselves. 

Chairman Bernanke took action last month to put an end to abusive lending practices. But it took him nearly 2 years to get around 

to it. As usual, the Fed has been asleep at the switch. 

The proposed Fed regulations go a long way to addressing the 

problems in the mortgage market going forward. That leaves the 

question of what, if anything, can be done to clean up the mess. 

As with any asset bubble, home prices got out of line with real 

values of the asset. Before things can get better, prices have to 

come back in line with value, and that can be a lengthy and painful 

process. 

Industry is taking steps to help ease borrowers’ pain through voluntary actions, and the administration is refinancing some borrowers into FHA loans. Interest rates have also fallen, enabling 

some to refinance into more affordable mortgages. 

I am concerned that further Government action will expose taxpayers to excessive risk or be a bailout for borrowers and investors 

who made bad decisions. I do not think anyone here wants to do 

that, and any Government meddling could only make matters 

worse or prolong the pain. 


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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Senator. I appreciate it. 

Senator Carper, I guess. Senator Reed is not here. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. It is great to have you 

back. 

Chairman DODD. Oh, Senator Reed, you are here. I am sorry. I 

apologize. I looked down at your normal seat. You were down two 

seats. You were sitting down two seats down earlier, so I apologize. 

Sorry, Jack. 

Senator REED. I will sit up taller. 

[Laughter.] 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening 

this hearing. It is good to have you back. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

The housing crisis obviously is a growing threat to every community in America. In my home State of Rhode Island, we are seeing 

a record number of foreclosures and mortgage delinquencies, and, 

moreover, this contraction of the housing market is impacting our 

entire economy and the global economy. 

We all know it is a complicated and multifaceted problem. There 

are no simple solutions. I am particularly pleased that Chairman 

Bair is here with us today because she has demonstrated great 

foresight with respect to remedies in the subprime market as well 

as other financial issues like the Basel Accords. Thank you, Madam 

Chairman. 

In addition, I look forward to hearing from Secretary Steels and 

the other panelists about what they believe is currently happening 

both in the markets and our neighborhoods today and how existing 

initiatives are working. 

In December, months after the subprime crisis hit with full force, 

President Bush finally announced a proposal to deal with the rising 

tide of foreclosures. The central focus of his agenda is a voluntary 

public-private partnership called the Hope Now Alliance. However, 

there are many indications that the President’s program is providing assistance to only a small fraction of people facing foreclosure, and I remain concerned that it will not be sufficient to deal 

with the massive scale of the housing crisis that we face. In part 

due to these ongoing concerns, I have introduced along with colleagues a number of bill, in particular the HOPE Act and the GSE 

Mission Improvement Act, which I believe could be helpful. 

We are always endeavoring to strike a balance between private 

action, regulatory action, and legislative action. For their part, regulators have repeatedly assured the Committee that they have 

been working with market participants and were on top of this developing crisis. But, frankly, if we do not have the evidence that 

their efforts are achieving acceptable results, then we must consider additional legislative solutions to such an urgent situation. 

The current number of modifications are unacceptable, and it is 

clear that the industry needs to significantly step up its efforts 

both in terms of real modifications but also in terms of meaningful 

reporting. 


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Today we are here again seeking answers to basic questions and 

practical and timely ideas about how to deal with the deflation of 

the housing bubble so that liquidity can return to the real estate 

sector, and at the same time we can restore confidence in American 

capital markets. 

To be sure, it is possible that the latest rate cuts by the Federal 

Reserve could eventually rejuvenate the mortgage market if refinancing opportunities become more widely available. However, we 

must not forget to identify and heed the lessons of this chapter in 

our economic history. If the markets bounce back before we correct 

the regulatory gaps and systemic weaknesses that caused this situation, then any perceived recovery could be an illusion. 

The way we deal with these problems will have profound domestic and global implications, and again, I thank the Chairman and 

look forward to the witnesses’ testimony. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Allard. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD 

Senator ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and 

Senator Shelby both for holding this hearing today. Now, homeownership has long been an American dream, and over the last 

decade, numbers of families were able to become homeowners. Unfortunately, too many homeowners—some knowingly, some unknowingly—bought homes they could not afford. Many of them took 

out exotic mortgages that made wildly unrealistic assumptions 

about the housing market, namely, that housing values would continue to dramatically increase. These few people were moved from 

the American dream into what we should refer to as the American 

nightmare. 

As we all know now, home price growth was unsustainable. Unfortunately, too many families are now facing the possibilities of 

foreclosure. Just as ownership brings many benefits to families and 

neighborhoods, foreclosures have dramatic negative consequences 

for both individual homeowners and the economy as a whole. We 

have seen a rapid increase in the number of foreclosures, and many 

experts predict that the number will continue to climb in the near 

future. 

Accordingly, Congress is currently considering various proposals 

to help prevent foreclosures. I have been listening closely to a number of those proposals, and I have to admit that the one that has 

the most appeal to me is what I would refer to as the Isakson proposal. Senator Isakson, an individual who has been involved in 

home sales and homeownership as a realtor, reminded us of what 

happened in 1972, and the solution that proposed at that particular 

time is that there be a tax credit for homes that are sold. At that 

time the tax credit was $3,000. He is proposing $5,000—and that 

would be spread out over a 3-year period—to reduce the home inventory. 

I agree with Senator Bennett that we have a problem now with 

the home inventory, and we have a problem with supply and demand. And you have to then decrease that supply in order to see 

the economy begin to respond. So I would have to admit that that 

has one of the strongest appeals that I have heard so far. 


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This hearing will be an important step toward better understanding some of the suggestions to assist struggling homeowners. 

As part of any proposal, though, I think we must be careful not to 

reward irresponsible behavior. Borrowers have a responsibility to 

understand the terms of their loan, and lenders have a responsibility to provide them with clear, accurate information in order to 

help them understand the terms. Borrowers have a responsibility 

to only borrow what they can repay, but lenders have a responsibility to only lend to those who can repay. 

Should Congress choose to provide relief, it should not do so in 

a manner that is simply a bailout for either lenders or borrowers 

who acted irresponsibly. We should also not set a broad precedent 

that the Government will simply bail people out whenever they 

lose money or face tough times in the housing market. 

I also believe that any efforts to address foreclosure should be 

done in a thoughtful, comprehensive manner. Any effort to provide 

foreclosure relief must carefully address any risks to taxpayers. 

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Under Secretary Steel on behalf of the Treasury Department and Chairman 

Bair on behalf of the FDIC for their work to address foreclosures. 

Some have condemned Treasury and FDIC for too little, too late, 

and I appreciate their work. And I suspect the homeowners assisted under the agreements they negotiated would thank them as 

well. Foreclosures have been prevented because of them, and that 

makes their work a success. 

While this agreement may not represent the full response to foreclosures, it is important to have the private sector actively involved 

in preventing foreclosures. Without their participation, any future 

Government-based solutions will be far less effective. 

I would like to thank the witnesses for being here today, and I 

look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much. 

Senator Schumer has joined us. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHARLES E. SCHUMER 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

holding this timely and important hearing. I thank our witnesses. 

You know, we hear the word ‘‘crisis’’ thrown around a lot, often 

haphazardly. But when you talk about housing in America in 2008, 

the word ‘‘crisis’’ is indeed accurate. And, fundamentally, the housing crisis has spread like outward circles in a pond and damaged 

our entire economy. The failure to deal with the housing crisis 6 

months ago has certainly made the economy worse. We must deal 

with it now. 

I am glad we have a stimulus package on the floor. I think that 

is very important. But that is not going to deal with the housing 

problems, by and large, except for lower interest rates. And if we 

do not deal with it, we have a problem because foreclosures have 

decreased housing values. Housing values decrease and the consumer spends less, and that creates a recession. It is outward circles. And foreclosures and the inability to evaluate credit has created a credit freeze as well. 


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So housing is at the center of our economic problems, and the 

way to fix something when you have a problem is not just nibble 

around the edges but go right to the heart of the problem, and that 

is housing. And I hope, Mr. Chairman, we will do a few things that 

are very, very important. 

First is money for mortgage counseling. There are literally hundreds of thousands of those who do not have to go into foreclosure 

but will because there is no one on the scene to help them refinance. The good old days when a bank was always there are gone 

because the mortgage market has changed. And while we were 

able, Senators Brown and Casey and myself, with the help of Patty 

Murray, Senator Dodd, Senator Bond, to get money into the omnibus bill for counseling, and that money—Bob Casey organized a 

call where we let the people know that the money is already available even though it only passed a month ago—is not enough. We 

put in $180 million. We need approximately another $500 million. 

Second, we need money to help. Once the counselors are there 

and the people who might go into foreclosure can be refinanced, 

you need money. Fannie and Freddie is the place. And, you know, 

I have been a big defender, Mr. Chairman, of Fannie and Freddie, 

but I am getting a little tired of them. They are not just a private 

agency, and when they say, ‘‘We cannot do this because it is not 

as profitable as other things,’’ or ‘‘We cannot do this because our 

stock might go down,’’ well, if that is their only criteria, then they 

should not have a Government guarantee. Now, I think they should 

have a Government guarantee, but they ought to be stepping up to 

the plate in many more ways than they are and not resisting those 

calls to step up to the plate and provide the kind of mortgage 

money in large amounts that we need on a temporary basis. 

Third, we do have to, as the Chairman has put in legislation— 

I am proud to cosponsor it; I had very similar legislation. We need 

to regulate mortgage brokers who are not now regulated to avoid 

the crisis in the future. 

And, fourth, we must look at the credit rating agencies who have 

really missed the ball here. And the fact that there is very little 

confidence in the credit rating agencies—it started with the mortgage crisis, but now is spreading throughout our entire economy. 

And so those are the four things, I think, that must be immediately done. I think the Chairman’s proposal for some kind of new 

Federal agency is important and is certainly worth looking at, and 

I really salute him for bringing it up. But the key issue there, one 

of the key issues, is timing. If you put something in place before 

the housing market has reached its bottom, it is not going to do 

much good. And so we just have to be focused on the timing there 

and not move it too quickly, and then they try to create a floor and 

you fall through the floor and it ends up costing much more than 

it should without doing the correction that it should. But, overall, 

I think it is an idea very much worth exploring, and I am glad we 

are here. 

I want to thank both of our witnesses for the good work. We have 

worked together on this crisis since—I have been involved over the 

last year. But, in short, Mr. Chairman, what has happened in 

housing is one of the great, great bad marks against this Government because we should have been doing a lot more sooner, and 


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we could have avoided a lot of pain. Realizing that should importune us on to act, and act quickly. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Corker. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOB CORKER 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, I very seldom make opening 

comments. I like to listen to the witnesses, although I think this 

has been interesting. And, again, I want to thank, like everyone 

else, you for having this hearing. And one of the reasons I want 

to be on this Committee is I knew you were going to be very active, 

returning back to the Senate with tremendous energy. And I am 

glad to serve with you and Senator Shelby. 

Chairman DODD. You know, I never left the Senate. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CORKER. But I saw you took up residence in Iowa, and 

I just did want to make reference to that. 

Mr. Chairman, I will say I am interested in all the jurisdictions 

of this Committee. When I was a young businessman and knew I 

was probably going to do OK, I began working in the inner city and 

saw that we had a lot of citizens there without housing, and it led 

to the creation of a nonprofit that has helped about 10,000 families 

there. And like everybody on this panel, I have tremendous compassion for people who, especially at the lower end of the economic 

spectrum, are dealing with foreclosures. 

I do want to associate, on the other hand, myself with the comments by Senators Shelby and Bennett and know that we need to 

be careful not to be hyperactive, distort the markets, and in essence, create a moral hazard that will reap the bad dividends down 

the road. 

And so I look forward to this hearing, and I thank you for your 

activity here. But I do hope that we will keep things in perspective 

as we go ahead. 

I would also like to say that I am glad to hear that Senator Schumer mentioned that our economic stimulus package was not going 

to affect housing in anyway. There is no question it will not. I still 

do not know what it is going to do, and I hope we will debate that 

on the floor. But I hope we will look at some targeted ways of dealing with this housing crisis in a way that does not distort the market. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Well, thank you very much. Actually, there are 

a couple of items in the stimulus package dealing with FHA, the 

loan limits as well, that we think could arguably have some positive impact on the housing issue, I might add as well. 

Senator Carper. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMAS R. CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks again, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, I want to say Senator Corker was talking to me a 

week or two ago about whether or not he might want to try to get 

on this Committee as opposed to some other committee. And just 

listening to him for the last few minutes, I am very pleased that 

you have made this decision. I think not only are the issues before 


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us many and interesting and important, but I think you are going 

to bring a lot of experience and wisdom to the table. So we are delighted that you are here. And we are delighted that you are here 

to welcome back Senator Dodd, even though he never was really 

away. 

But we have got a lot before us, Mr. Chairman, and I for one 

am—and I think we all feel this way. We are just happy you could 

be here full-time and provide the leadership that we very much 

need. 

We are getting started late. I am going to ask that my full statement be submitted to the record. 

I will say to our witnesses, Ms. Bair, Mr. Steel, thank you very 

much for your exemplary leadership; especially, Ms. Bair, you have 

been ahead of the curve trying to get us to where we need to be 

as a Nation, and I thank you for your just really exemplary leadership on this front. 

Mr. Steel, with whom I worked about a year ago on GSE reform 

to try to put together a little bit of a consensus package, I think 

the time has now come, and I am happy to hear, Mr. Chairman, 

that we are having a hearing next Thursday to get us started. 

The only other thing, we are getting started late, as our witnesses know, because our caucus, the Democratic Caucus, was 

meeting today to talk about a stimulus package. I wish that we 

could take the entire FHA bill that we have passed, which brings 

the FHA into the 21st century and makes it relevant for the 21st 

century, I wish it could be in the entire stimulus package. It is not. 

But some pieces of it are, and we are going to raise, at least for 

a period of time, the conforming loan limits for GSEs. They need 

a strong regulator, and it is all well and good that we do this on 

a temporary basis, raising the loan limits, but we need to get started on making sure they have the kind of strong regulator that they 

need. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Martinez. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MEL MARTINEZ 

Senator MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I think 

this is a very timely hearing, and I appreciate your bringing it 

about, and Ranking Member Shelby as well. The next time you run 

for President, move to Florida. The weather will be much more 

pleasant. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MARTINEZ. And maybe the outcome would also be, but 

anyway—— 

Chairman DODD. Well, I will start in Iowa if I do it again. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MARTINEZ. Anyway, but I want to also welcome my colleague, Senator Corker, to the Committee. I am delighted to have 

him here, and I am delighted to have him covering my left flank 

here and not putting me in danger of falling off the platform. But 

he is going to make a great contribution. I am delighted that he 

is a part of our Committee. 


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I think a lot of good comments have been made around the table, 

and I particularly want to also say that, in my view, the stimulus 

package is great and is tackling a lot of symptoms of a bad economy. We need to move ahead, though, to tackle the root cause of 

what is ailing this economy, which is the housing problem. So I 

hope we do not feel that when we do this stimulus that we have 

finished with our work. We really have to pursue some other things 

to work on what could be a worsening housing crisis from what we 

have even today. 

New data reported earlier this week puts Florida in the dubious 

category of being No. 2 in the country in foreclosure filings. Last 

year, more than 2 percent of Florida households entered some stage 

of foreclosure. That is a 124-percent increase from 2006. The statistics are staggering, and I am afraid that they are only going to get 

worse during the coming year. 

As we know, a million-eight subprime loans are prepared to reset 

in the next 18 months, and with more and more families facing the 

reality of foreclosure, we must use the resources of the Federal 

Government in a reasonable and responsible way in order to mitigate future losses and put our housing market on a pathway to recovery. 

I would like to commend the industry for being proactive and 

working on a national solution to the foreclosure crisis and promoting steps that will help a great number of Floridians who are 

finding themselves in serious financial trouble. The Hope Now Alliance, 370,000 struggling homeowners have been assisted. I am 

eager to hear more about how this program is working and what 

we can expect from it in the coming weeks and months. However, 

despite all the current efforts to prevent foreclosures, data indicates that foreclosures are still outpacing loan modifications and 

repayment plans. Foreclosures hurt more than just families. They 

really hurt entire communities because abandoned properties become magnets for decay, for crime, and for home devaluations. And 

so this is something that not only destroys families but also neighborhoods and entire communities. 

We cannot just sit back as a Congress and ignore what is happening, and we need to continue to move forward in proactive steps 

that will help this housing market and look for a long-term recovery. I believe we do need to get the FHA reform bill signed into 

law. I am encouraged that a piece of it is going to be in the stimulus. We should have the whole bill in the stimulus. But FHA reform cannot be lagging far behind. We need this modernization to 

FHA. 

I also believe we need to facilitate better coordination between 

regulators to prevent unscrupulous mortgage originators from continuing to snare unsuspecting people into predatory loans. And I 

support efforts to establish uniform professional standards and a 

national registry for all residential mortgage loan originators. This 

is one of the problems that has been out there, and I know Senator 

Menendez from time to time has spoken about this problem with 

the broker industry, many good brokers out there. Not to condemn 

a whole industry, but we have got to get those bad operators that 

are out there, too. 


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We also need to do something about our Nation’s growing housing stock, and I agree with Senator Allard that Senator Isakson 

has come up with a wonderful idea, one that I fully support. I think 

it would be a really interesting approach because one of the serious 

problems that we have in a place like Florida is not only the number of bank-owned properties now and foreclosed properties, but it 

is also the number of unoccupied properties. We had an overbuilding situation in many of our urban areas with condominiums, 

and these need to be brought down so that the inventory of housing 

can be back to something that resembles normal, and we can get 

this industry back functioning. 

The economy is weak because the housing economy has become 

weak, and so I think ideas like Senator Isakson’s are the type that 

we need to be entertaining to engage the private market and get 

us back into a healthy housing economy so that we can then have 

a healthy economy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez. 

Senator Martinez, as all of us know here, was the Secretary of 

Housing in his previous life and did a very good job in that capacity. He brings a great deal of knowledge to the subject matter, so 

we welcome your participation. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SHELBY. He also knows how to deliver votes in Florida. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman DODD. We will leave Presidential politics out of this 

here. 

Senator Casey. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thanks 

for bringing us together. I will try to be as brief as I can. 

First of all, I want to reiterate a lot of what has been said already about your leadership here of this Committee this year and 

last year. We had, I am told—I think it was in your statement the 

other day—some 35 hearings last year, 17 pieces of legislation. So 

this Committee worked very hard last year and got a lot done on 

a whole range of issues from housing to currency to financial matters. So a lot done, and a lot more to do this year, but I want to 

thank you and Ranking Member Shelby for leading this Committee. 

Chairman Bair and Secretary Steel, we welcome you here, and 

we do welcome a new Member, Senator Corker, a member of our 

freshman class. We are now second year, so we may change the 

word from ‘‘freshman.’’ But we are grateful for your presence on the 

Committee, a good Committee and a Committee that has gotten a 

lot done already. 

On this issue, I guess I wanted to focus on what the goal ought 

to be of any legislation that pertains to housing, but especially to 

the foreclosure crisis. And there is no other way to describe it. I 

was criticized by a journalist the other day for using that word, I 

think in the context of the stimulus and the housing challenge we 

have. But it is a crisis in the life of a lot of families. It is not some 

far off, esoteric problem. This is a real crisis. 


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In Pennsylvania, whether you look at delinquencies or full-blown 

foreclosures, it is going through the roof. There is a report that will 

be issued today about our State. We are No. 4 on the list. I could 

cite a lot of data. I won’t. But across our State and across the country. 

And here is the goal, here is what the goal has to be: keeping 

people in their homes and stabilizing neighborhoods. That is the 

bottom line here. And I know there is some concern about 

overdoing things. We have heard some of that expressed this morning. But, look, some of this is very simple. When you have a mortgage broker who is committing fraud or misleading people, we 

should take their head off. And legislation to do that—and I speak 

figuratively, but we have got to crack down on people that do that. 

And a lot of these people have been unregulated for years—unregulated cowboys in the market who could do whatever the hell they 

wanted. And it is about time we brought the law down on them to 

help families. The $180 million for counseling that is in this year’s budget is 

one of the best and most immediate ways to help people right 

now—not 6 months from now, not a year from now. Right now. We 

are in the process as we speak, as of last Friday, the application 

process is out there. So nonprofits from across the country, experts 

who know how to do this, are going to be applying for that money. 

The money will start to be spent in March of 2008. It is one of the 

best ways we can help on this. 

I think Senator Schumer, who worked so hard on this, Senator 

Brown and I, Patty Murray and the appropriators did as well, we 

should add more to that. The $180 million is a great start, but we 

need more to do that. It is an immediate way to help. 

Long term, I think we have got to get behind Senator Dodd’s legislation, the Homeownership Preservation and Protection Act, a 

great way to deal with this in a global way down the road, and especially just in the next year or two. So I applaud the work that 

Senator Dodd has done to bring together a lot of good ideas under 

the umbrella of one act. He has worked very hard on this already. 

But I think the goal here ought to be to elicit information in 

these hearings, to support legislation which will have as its goal to 

keep people in their homes and to stabilize our neighborhoods, 

however we get there and whomever we have to offend along the 

way to get that done. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Senator Casey, and I 

thank our witnesses for their patience this morning, but you get an 

indication of the feelings and the importance of the issue here by, 

one, the level of participation but also the desire of our Members 

to be heard on this subject matter. We are all, to one degree or another, facing this issue. We had the mayors in town a week or so 

ago, and we have a new mayor in Bridgeport, Connecticut. There 

are three cities in Connecticut of 100,000 people. He is facing 6,000 

foreclosures in a city of 100,000 people. And this is not a community of speculators. These are people with single-family homes. A 

thousand foreclosures would be devastating, in a city that is already suffering from difficulties economically over the years. So all 

of us can tell anecdotal stories about this, and I think Senator 


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Casey got it correct here. I hope for this we will not get into—there 

are clearly some clashes ideologically and philosophically about 

how we approach some of these issues. And to the extent we can 

step away from that and think about some solid ideas that will 

allow us to address this in a comprehensive, bipartisan fashion, it 

is going to mean a huge amount. 

This Committee has a wonderful history—and Senator Shelby 

just pointed out to me a minute ago, talking privately here. One 

of the reasons we had 17 bills come out of this Committee last year 

is because we worked together here. I think we had two negative 

votes on 17 bills, and they were really more questions of people just 

had a different point of view. But other than that, we really worked 

things out together. And my hope is we will carry that spirit forward in this year—obviously more difficult always in Presidential 

election years to do it. We all know that sitting around this table. 

We have got to put that aside here and obviously focus our attention on how we can do some intelligent, thoughtful things that will 

make a difference. 

And we have got two very good people here and a wonderful second panel as well to offer some ideas and thoughts. They represent 

some views across the spectrum ideologically as well as politically 

here, so we thank all of them for coming. And, again, I apologize 

for the delay, but, of course, all of us know Sheila and the wonderful work she does at the FDIC, and you heard Senator Dole obviously talk about earlier how many of us here knew of her work 

when she was up in the Senate working with Senator Bob Dole, 

where she was counsel to the majority. She has really been a leader in the effort to get the industry to adopt an aggressive posture 

regarding loan modifications, and we commend you for that. And 

we have worked since last year on that, and we sat down together 

just about a year ago on these issues. So I commend you for it. 

Secretary Steel comes with a great deal of background and 

knowledge as well. He serves as the principal adviser to the Secretary on matters of domestic finance, leads the Department’s activities with respect to the domestic financial system, fiscal policy 

and operations, governmental assets and liabilities, and related 

economic and financial matters. Prior to that he was for 20 years 

at Goldman Sachs with the Secretary, and so he has a wonderful 

background and experience in these areas, and we thank him for 

being here this morning as well. 

And let me just say here that your statements will be included 

in the record fully. Members who were not here or who want additional information to be included in the record, that will be conformed with and allowed. And we would ask you to try and keep 

your remarks relatively brief so we can get to the Q&A period, if 

we can. 

Chairman Bair, please. 

STATEMENT OF SHEILA C. BAIR, CHAIRMAN, 

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 

Ms. BAIR. Good morning, Chairman Dodd, Senator Shelby, Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today. 


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As you know, the FDIC has been a strong proponent of voluntary, systematic loan modifications to address current problems 

in the housing market. We have been dealing with the mortgage 

problem for nearly a year, and there has been some progress. But 

too many people are losing their homes. Through September, there 

were over 1 million foreclosures, a 60-percent jump from a year 

earlier. And according to RealtyTrac data, the foreclosure filings 

are up 75 percent for the year. 

Given the falling housing prices and the sheer volume of 

unaffordable resets in subprime mortgages, foreclosures will likely 

continue to rise. More than 1.7 million subprime borrowers will see 

their adjustable rate loans reset at much higher rates by the end 

of next year, most with monthly payments that they cannot afford. 

I have proposed that, for owner-occupied homes where subprime 

borrowers are making timely payments at the initial rate but clearly cannot afford the reset payments, servicers should extend the 

starter rate for 5 years or more. Such a streamlined approach can 

be much faster than a loan-by-loan restructuring process. It makes 

economic sense, and it is an appropriate proactive response to rapidly changing market conditions. 

Modifying loans before reset will avoid negative credit consequences for borrowers, permit borrowers to keep their homes 

while making payments that they can afford, preserve neighborhoods, and provide investors with an above-prime return that exceeds any return they would receive from a foreclosure. A systematic approach for this broad category of borrowers frees up servicer 

resources to help other, more distressed homeowners, including 

those who may already be delinquent or have more complex loans 

to restructure. 

Last month, Treasury Secretary Paulson announced that the 

American Securitization Forum and the Hope Now Alliance had developed a set of standard guidelines for the mortgage industry to 

follow in achieving subprime adjustable rate loan modifications. 

Pulling together the competing interests was no small feat, and 

Secretary Paulson as well as Under Secretary Steel should both be 

commended, strongly commended for their efforts. This initiative, 

if fully embraced and implemented by the industry, has the potential to greatly accelerate loan modifications for hundreds of thousands of borrowers. 

Lately, there are signs that major mortgage servicing companies 

are accelerating their loan modification activity. It is my hope that 

this is an initial sign of a widespread industry effort to streamline 

loan modifications where possible. However, the work has just 

begun. Mortgage lenders and servicers must aggressively pick up 

the pace of subprime loan modifications and do it systematically. 

And this also must be accompanied by prompt and transparent reporting that permits independent analysis of their efforts. 

Speed is crucial. Our initial focus has been on subprime hybrid 

ARMs where unaffordable resets have been building and will peak 

this year. However, we must also anticipate additional credit distress from payment resets on non-traditional mortgages which will 

begin in earnest in 2009. Non-traditional mortgages include interest-only or payment option mortgages that typically require no payments of loan principal or that can increase the size of the loan 


dcolon on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
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through negative amortization during the first 5 years. In short, 

when the option to make a minimum payment expires, you face a 

significantly higher monthly payment. Most of these loans were 

made to borrowers with higher credit scores. As interest rates drop, 

we hope that many will be able to refinance out of these mortgages. 

One problem is that many of these loans were made in areas experiencing significant declines in home values. As a result, many 

may have difficulty in refinancing because their home is worth less 

than their mortgage debt. Our analysis indicates that as of October 

there were over 1.7 million of these non-traditional mortgages with 

balances of some $600 billion securitized in so-called Alt-A pools. 

Other studies say that three in four of these borrowers have been 

making only the minimum payment. And, again, the bulk of these 

loans will start adjusting in 2009. These are sobering facts and 

well known to the industry. Waiting to confront them in a declining 

real estate market would be counterproductive. 

I urge the industry to apply systematic strategies such as standardized methods for measuring debt-to-income ratios to determine 

if these mortgages are affordable. And if a costly foreclosure can be 

avoided, it will require the servicer to consider creative solutions. 

For some borrowers, these may include writedowns of loan principal. In today’s market, this is often a better option than foreclosure or short sales of the loans to third parties. Congress has 

made this a more viable option by approving the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act in December. By taking the tax liability issue 

off the table, principal writedowns are now a more realistic alternative. 

In the coming months, many subprime borrowers will face resets 

to higher monthly payments. Many will face default and possible 

foreclosure. And many borrowers with non-traditional mortgages 

will face increasing challenges. Congress, the Treasury Department, and Federal financial regulators have worked to assure that 

industry has the tools it needs under tax and accounting rules to 

modify unaffordable loans. To work our way out of our current 

problems, the industry must use these tools systematically and aggressively. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT K. STEEL, UNDER SECRETARY OF 

TREASURY FOR DOMESTIC FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF THE 

TREASURY 

Mr. STEEL. Chairman Dodd, Ranking Member Shelby, Members 

of the Committee, good morning. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to present the Treasury Department’s perspective on ‘‘Foreclosure Prevention and Neighborhood 

Preservation.’’ These are important and challenging issues, and I 

look forward to hearing your perspectives and working together. 

The Administration recognizes the importance of housing to our 

economy, and we have said that this housing decline is the most 

significant current risk to the economy. But this is about more 

than just economic statistics. It is about individuals, families, and 

homeowners. We recognize that many families will experience 


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strain due to resetting mortgage rates and home price depreciation. 

Too many American homeowners face the frightening prospect of 

losing their home, and a significant number of families already 

have. 

The latest data indicate that 2007 was on track for a foreclosure 

rate of approximately 2.7 percent. But to give that number a bit 

of perspective, many homes end up in foreclosure every year, even 

when housing markets are strong. Between 2001 and 2005, more 

than 650,000 homeowners began the foreclosure process every year. 

This baseline rate of foreclosure can result from job loss or other 

such family events. 

Over the next 2 years, we expect the foreclosure rate to remain 

elevated above its historic level. 

In total, approximately 1.8 million subprime mortgages are expected to reset over the next 2 years, but not all will end in foreclosure. The challenge is to identify homeowners who are troubled 

but with a bit of assistance can stay in their home. 

The Administration’s response is based upon a three-point plan: 

first, to identify those homeowners facing challenges and connect 

with counselors those at-risk borrowers who can be helped; two, to 

develop additional products for homeowners; and, three, to increase 

the speed and efficiency of moving these at-risk homeowners into 

affordable and sustainable solutions. 

Whenever facing a challenging public policy issue, the first step 

is full understanding. While we are continuing to learn, our response to date represents months of listening to outside experts to 

understand the best ways to help people keep their homes. 

Last March, in a meeting hosted by Chairman Bair at the FDIC, 

we heard from several housing experts to help us understand the 

seriousness of these challenges. In April and May, Treasury hosted 

two large meetings where all relevant regulators were invited. And 

over the course of the summer months, we sought the sound counsel of dozens of outside experts, including leading counselors, mortgage servicers, academics, housing and consumer advocates, and 

other specialists, such as the late Ned Gramlich, a former Federal 

Reserve Governor and prescient housing scholar who predicted the 

significance of these challenges before anyone else. 

On August 31st, President Bush announced a comprehensive 

plan to help at-risk homeowners stay in their primary residences. 

The President charged Secretaries Jackson and Paulson to lead 

this effort. 

On October 10, Hope Now was formed as an alliance among 

mortgage market participants to maximize the outreach efforts to 

at-risk homeowners. The alliance grew and today servicers participating in Hope Now comprise over 94 percent of the subprime market. Hope Now adopted a centralized hotline for telephonic foreclosure prevention counseling. 

Additionally, Hope Now servicers are contacting all adjustable 

rate mortgage borrowers 120 days prior to their mortgage reset. 

Furthermore, Hope Now members are reaching out to at-risk 

borrowers and offering help. A direct mail campaign began in November to contact all borrowers 60 days or more delinquent on 

their loans. On December 6, President Bush announced a new private sector framework to streamline the process for modifying and 


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refinancing subprime mortgages for eligible homeowners. These 

guidelines, issued by the American Securitization Forum, created 

an efficient process for identifying borrowers who qualify for refinancing or loan modifications. This, in turn, will also free up resources to focus on those borrowers who require more analysis. 

Last, Hope Now servicers and counselors have finalized best 

practices that will increase efficiency in communication among 

servicers, counselors, and homeowners. 

As Secretary Paulson has said, we are committed to measuring 

the success of this program as it is being implemented. Today the 

alliance is standardizing a variety of measures needed in order to 

monitor performance. These metrics will allow us to gauge successful treatments and outcomes. 

Early numbers have already been reported, and they demonstrate that material progress is being made. In August, Hope 

Now hotline was receiving an average of 625 phone calls a day; the 

Hope Now hotline is now receiving 4,000 new phone calls a day, 

a 540-percent increase. And over 16 percent, or 77,000 borrowers, 

have called for help in response to the 483,000 letters that Hope 

Now members mailed to delinquent homeowners who had previously avoided contact. 

We also have made a great deal of progress in increasing the 

speed and efficiency of moving borrowers into affordable solutions. 

The ASF program announced just last month is helping fast-trackeligible borrowers into a refinancing or modification, and it is freeing up resources, allowing servicers and counselors to focus on 

those who need case-by-case help. The ASF streamlined plan is 

only one part of our effort, but we expect the results to show a 

meaningful increase in the number of modifications as reporting 

begins. 

Hope Now reported that the industry helped 370,000 homeowners with subprime loans in the second half of 2007; 120,000 of 

these homeowners received modifications. Moreover, the rate of 

modifications of subprime loans tripled from the third to the fourth 

quarter of 2007, with even better progress expected in 2008. 

The Administration also has requested that Congress do its part, 

and we are appreciative that significant progress has been made to 

date. As you know, the Congress appropriated an additional $180 

million to fund counselor networks. We also applaud the swift action taken by Congress to pass the President’s tax relief proposal, 

which was signed into law in December. 

FHA modernization is moving through the Congress, and we are 

hopeful that it will reach the President’s desk soon. Additionally, 

GSE reform has cleared the House of Representatives, and we look 

forward to working with this Committee as Members consider legislation on this subject. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, let me thank you for holding this 

hearing. Under the President’s leadership, the Administration is 

working diligently to help mitigate the impact of rising foreclosures 

on homeowners and the economy. We have made substantial 

progress since August, but there is much work to do. We will continue to learn as we move forward and look for additional measures 

to help avoid preventable foreclosures. 

Thank you so much. 


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Chairman DODD. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. And 

why don’t we give ourselves, say, 7 minutes here per Member. As 

I look around, we have got a pretty good participation here. We will 

try to move along so everybody gets a chance to raise some issues 

with you. 

Let me just ask you off the bat, you have heard Chairman Bair 

talk about this idea that she has raised before, and that is, of 

course, freezing these adjustable rates where you have people who 

are in that distressed category here. What is your attitude, what 

is the administration’s attitude about that idea? 

Mr. STEEL. Well, I think that Chairman Bair was an initial and 

important clarion to raise this issue, when she began to discuss it, 

and we have had lots of conversations together, and we at Treasury 

have benefited from her advice. I think the key issues are twofold: 

One is that there needs to be a systematic approach. The number 

of people who are going to be facing this challenge is much higher 

than the normal flow of people, so we need to have a systematic 

approach to deal with those and put people in categories so they 

can be dealt with in an organized way. Hope Now has taken on 

this idea for certain groups of people to maintain the starter rate 

for an extended period of 5 years. And the 5 years is important, 

too, and that was the advice of Chairman Bair, because it allows 

us to find a sustainable solution where people can be successful in 

their homes and not have them fall back. And that has become a 

part of the process of Hope Now. 

Chairman DODD. Well, let me just, because obviously this goes 

back, the January 7, 2007—I guess according to Secretary Paulson, 

we expect most services to begin fast-tracking borrowers—2008, excuse me. We expect to begin fast-tracking borrowers in the next 

few weeks. Most servicers are not yet fast-tracking borrowers. 

Mr. STEEL. Sir, the process as of this year, all the different issues 

have been dealt with, and right now this is the protocol that the 

Hope Now Alliance of servicers representing 95 percent—— 

Chairman DODD. You may not recall this, but a year ago I met 

in this room—Senator Shelby was there for a while—with all the 

stakeholders around the table. We developed some principles that 

were adopted in May to do exactly what you are talking about. So 

it is almost a year. 

Senator SHELBY. Right there. 

Chairman DODD. Right there. And it did not happen. I mean, 

this is not—you know, we are talking about listening, and I am a 

great believer in listening, but this has been a year now, and 

Moody’s and others are telling us we are just not getting the traction on this area. And even looking at your own data on this stuff, 

I mean, of the—let me just use Hope Now’s data. Of the 370,000 

homeowners assisted, one-third—only one-third—were able to modify their loans on a long-term basis; and two-thirds were put into 

short-term repayment plans, which actually increased the cost to 

these borrowers in the short term; and 25 to 30 percent had re-entered into a default situation. 

It seems to me we are fiddling around here in a way where there 

are some ideas. I do not know, Sheila, if you want to comment on 

this idea of a systemic answer to the Secretary’s point here, but it 

seems to me to be able to put something out there that freezes this 


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thing so we get a handle on it and you do not have people falling 

into this foreclosure area. And listen, believe me, that is why a 

year ago when I was asked whether or not we are going to write 

some legislation on this, my reaction was no. I think if the market 

can deal with this thing, the market ought to deal with this. That 

is the best way for this to happen. And nothing would have pleased 

me more than to see that happen. 

And I know it is difficult. I realize that finding the borrowers is 

difficult in some cases. They do not step up. They do not return the 

calls. Many of them hired Acorn and other groups to assist them 

so that there was a bridge between the lender that would actually 

communicate with the borrower. But it is not working, it seems to 

me. 

Mr. STEEL. I think with all respect, Senator, that your observations about history are correct, and I do not disagree with what you 

have described. But I can tell you that the Hope Now Alliance has 

got the protocols, and right now this is happening. And we are committed to measures where they will be giving us the results on a 

monthly basis, with a 1-month lag, beginning February and March. 

And we will be able to measure the success. And if they are not 

successful, as they begin to roll this out, then certainly we will 

know that for sure. 

Chairman DODD. Madam Chairman, do you have a comment on 

this at all? 

Ms. BAIR. Yes. I was here. I heard the same assurances. The first 

really hard data we got was the Moody’s report in the fall, and that 

is when it became clear this was not happening. 

I think everybody is working in good faith here. I think a couple 

things have been going on. One is there were some accounting 

issues that needed to be worked through that took some time. I 

also think that there was more investor pushback than some of the 

servicers initially anticipated. And I think one of the advantages of 

the protocols that have been developed is to provide somewhat of 

an insulation against certain security holders wanting to sue because they feel that they would be better off with a foreclosed loan 

than a modified loan. 

Those are very difficult issues to work through, but I do think 

that it is helpful and it should be emphasized. I also think, though, 

that the investor liability issue has perhaps been somewhat overstated. My personal view is that servicers can be sued for not modifying because a foreclosed loan in this kind of down housing market is usually going to cost the investment pool more than a modified loan. 

Chairman DODD. Right. 

Ms. BAIR. So I think that has been somewhat overstated, but it 

has been a perception. I think one of the helpful things about the 

ASF protocol was trying to develop a framework that provides some 

additional insulation, if they followed the protocols, and it was 

worked out between the servicers and investors. I think there were 

some complications, but I also think that servicers just need to do 

a better job. I think what they are telling us at senior management 

levels is not necessarily getting down to the people who are actually interacting with the borrowers. They need to do a better job 

staffing up. I think that is happening, and I think a lot of that is 


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because of the strong encouragement the Treasury Department has 

been giving. But industry needs to do more, and they have raised 

expectations. They told us they could do it. We went to a lot of 

trouble to clarify accounting rules and tax rules to make sure they 

have authorities. And they need to do this much, much more aggressively than what we have seen statistically so far. 

Chairman DODD. It occurs to me that, you know, looking for a 

silver-bullet solution to this is kind of the mistake. It seems to me 

there can be a variety of things we could be doing, some of which 

will respond. And I think that—I cannot speak for everyone on this 

Committee, but I suspect what I am about to say, almost all of us 

would agree with. Ideally, we would like to see a market solution 

to this. That could be the answer. That is the best answer in many 

ways if that would happen. That would save us all a lot of going 

through and trying to come up with ideas here to avoid what at 

least many of us feel here is a very deep and very serious problem. 

Secretary Steel, I listened to you, I heard your comments, and I 

appreciate trying to sort of modify what you think may happen. 

There are a lot of very serious people who think this is going to 

have huge implications not just at home here, but globally. And I 

listened to Senator Corker. Listen, I do not disagree. The stimulus 

package, I am going to be supportive of it because I think just the 

signal we are trying to do something here. But the reality of a $160 

billion proposal here in a $14 trillion economy—and that is narrowly—because I think it is a global issue, not just a U.S. issue. 

But I think it is at least worthy of trying to get things going and 

to build some confidence. 

So I still want to see the industry respond to this thing, but I 

cannot sit around necessarily, having watched a year of this, and 

not getting the kind of answers we should have had when it was 

clear a year ago in this very room people understood the dimensions of it. And so the idea that Chairman Bair has raised here I 

think is worthy of a lot more serious and more immediate reaction 

than sort of waiting a bit longer here as this is getting worse. 

You are going to hear from a couple of witnesses coming up in 

a few minutes, Alex Pollock and Michael Barr. They usually come 

with very different perspectives economically, from AEI and the 

Center for American Progress, that really have given me the idea 

in a sense, and others going back historically, this idea of a Home 

Preservation Corporation idea with highly distressed mortgages. 

You are going to have people in the private sector in your previous 

life, Mr. Secretary, who will go out and are going to try to buy this. 

I had dinner two nights ago with a very successful financial operator globally, and he said, ‘‘Look, of course we are going to buy this. 

The difference is we are going to sit on it for a long time until the 

market improves, and we are not just going to let the homeowner 

stay there. We will foreclose on them here, maybe improve it a little bit, and wait a year, 2 years, 3 years. We can afford to do it, 

and then put it back out on the market and make a profit.’’ 

The problem is that homeowner loses in the process, and so the 

idea, in addition to the other things we are talking about of coming 

up with a vehicle that has worked historically, at no cost except administrative cost to the taxpayer, where everyone takes a hair 

cut—the lender does, the borrower does, obviously, but we do exVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:53 Mar 12, 2010 Jkt 050366 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A366.XXX A366

dcolon on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
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actly what Senator Martinez talked about: stabilizes neighborhoods, stabilizes the tax base locally where you do not end up, as 

you might in Bridgeport, Connecticut—6,000 homes in a city that 

size, not to mention the ripple effect in values of houses there—you 

have got a major economic catastrophe, not just in that town but 

in that region of one State. 

So I wonder if you might—I do not know if you have read the 

testimony or taken a look at Alex Pollock’s ideas or not. What were 

you comments on that idea? 

Mr. STEEL. I think that in your announcement last week, you basically said some of the same things you have just described. 

Chairman DODD. Right. 

Mr. STEEL. But you used some important words. You said it is 

time for people to be creative, think outside the box. 

Chairman DODD. Right. 

Mr. STEEL. And I hear that loud and clear. 

I think when we began to think about this, we tried to incorporate that perspective, and we basically used some of the existing 

platforms for delivery and also used some new ideas. And let me 

try to elaborate. 

Basically, FHA exists, it is a tool we should use, and people have 

alluded to today what FHA has done and can do. It exists, it is 

fast, it is to market. 

Second of all is that we believe and have proposed that the 

States, if we adjust the rules that allow municipal bonds to affect 

not just new housing but existing housing, it is a mechanism where 

money can be targeted to areas as you just described so that that 

can be helpful, too. So those were existing platforms where things 

could be delivered. 

The third thing, Hope Now, was something that was created 

from whole cloth, and basically that group of servicers have come 

together, and we think in an industry-organized way—and whether 

it is the contact, the telephone, the letters, and the modification, 

we are optimistic on that. 

Now, let me get to the issue that you are describing. I have read 

the testimony and read about the idea of this. I think it is something that warrants study and will look forward to hearing the testimony today and the questions that come out. But I would just 

caution you that times were different. At that time, the foreclosure 

rate was 50 percent and the unemployment rate was 25 percent. 

And so the question really is to get the right tool for the task with 

the right time perspective, and so I will look forward to hearing 

and learning more about this. But we are driving hard on FHA and 

the other tools that we have for now. 

Chairman DODD. Madam Chairman, do you have any comment 

on that? 

Ms. BAIR. We are still learning, and we have had some discussions with Professor Barr, who I think is one of the more creative 

minds in financial services. We are still learning. I am afraid I cannot give you much more of a reaction than that. I think, short 

term, we need to absolutely keep the pressure on for loan modifications because this is happening—it is now. And so there are questions about how long it would take to set this up. Senator Schumer 

alluded to the fact that if you do it now with home prices falling, 


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the collateral that is purchased is going to keep going down. So 

that is an issue, I think, that we need to think through. And also 

how securitization structures will work with this. So I think it is 

good thinking. We need to learn more, and learn more about some 

of the outstanding issues. 

I would just note that another tool I talked about—writing down 

principal amounts of mortgages—this was something we did not 

encourage before because of the tax liabilities for the borrower. Previously, before Congress passed this relief, there would be a tax liability to the borrower if the servicer wrote the principal down. But 

they have current authorities now to write down the principal 

amount on the loan to get the loan-to-value ratio below where it 

would qualify for an FHA loan, or perhaps simply refinancing. So 

if the investment pool is willing to take the discount now through 

a writedown, they can write down those loans far enough to make 

a lot of them GSE eligible. 

So that tool is there already—that could be used right now. But 

the question is, are the economic incentives there? Do they understand this is going to be in their interest or not? But I think that 

would also be a question to be dealt with in working through something like this. 

I think we need to explore all options because we have a very, 

very bad situation now, and the more foreclosed homes go on the 

market, the more they are competing with the excess inventory we 

already have. It is a bad situation all the way around. 

Chairman DODD. Well, I want to invite—because I know the 

Treasury is doing it, but also you, Madam Chairman, and others— 

not another hearing. We could have hearings, but I would like to 

make sure we are getting the information to staff up here and others on these ideas so that we can actually develop them as quickly 

as we can to move forward. There is a sense of urgency about this. 

And, again, I am not—we are going to be careful, obviously, and 

balanced to make sure we are not overreacting. But, nonetheless, 

I do not want to be sitting around another year from now watching 

a situation even further deteriorating where the ability to respond 

to it is too late because people are out, and we have really done 

great damage because we just were so cautious that we refused to 

understand the depth of the problem, the seriousness of it. And 

there are serious people who believe this problem is not going away 

and going to get a lot worse and cause a lot more problem for our 

country—and basically outside the country as well. 

Senator Shelby. 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Chairman Dodd. I just want to pick 

up on—before I get into questions—Senator Dodd talked just a 

minute ago about the stimulus package. It sounds good. It is kind 

of like a political response to a strong economic problem. But somebody said to me the other day it is like pouring a glass of water 

in the ocean. If the economy is $14 trillion and we are going to borrow $150 billion, will it really help the economy? Maybe. Maybe 

not. Are we adding that debt? 

So along those lines, I think, Senator Dodd, we ought to be very 

careful—and you mentioned this, too—not rushing ahead of this 

problem, but being on top of it. Because we do not know if this has 

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tinue to burn, our neighborhoods burn, and we have no other avenue to go down. 

I have a few questions. I will start with—well, I will ask you 

both this. Bond insurance. Because bond insurers have guaranteed, 

as you well know, more than $2.4 trillion of securities, there is a 

great concern that further downgrades of bond insurers by the rating agencies may trigger a wave of writedowns by banks holding 

securities guaranteed by bond insurers. A lot of the bond insurers 

are very thinly capitalized, as you well know. 

Under Secretary Steel, would you provide your assessment from 

your perspective, 20 years on Wall Street, very involved, of the 

likely impact of both the financial system and the economy were 

additional bond insurers to lose their AAA ratings, which has been 

threatened? A lot of people are really concerned. And what impact 

would it have on the availability of credit? I think this is a serious 

question out there. 

Mr. STEEL. Yes, sir, it certainly is. And it is something that is 

on our mind, too. 

I think that the way I would start the answer to this question 

is that, first of all, as you know, these organizations are State regulated, and the good news is that the State regulators are engaged 

and seem to be working with them, with the different companies, 

and it is a fairly concentrated industry with a handful of firms providing the majority of the coverage that you described that has 

been underwritten. 

From our perspective at Treasury, we have basically worked 

closely to stay involved and to monitor and be vigilant with regard 

to the situations. There are, as Senator Schumer suggested earlier, 

ripple effects to these types of securities. 

Senator SHELBY. Absolutely. 

Mr. STEEL. And I think that people are watching this and monitoring it, and that would be where we are today. 

Senator SHELBY. Chairman Bair, if bond insurers—if more of 

them lose their AAA ratings, what would be the impact on the 

value of the securities that are held by banks? You know, investment grade securities. And would any writedowns materially affect 

bank capital levels, as some suggest? 

Ms. BAIR. Well, we are closely monitoring this, obviously. That 

would depend on whether the bonds were held to maturity, held for 

sale, or in the trading book. If they are held to maturity, they do 

not have to mark them down. But the other two categories, they 

would have to be marked to market—and if in the trading book, 

that will have repercussions for their capital. 

I think there are some other things to point out, though. Unlike 

the kind of distress we are seeing in the CDO market where there 

are problems with the underlying assets, in the municipal bond 

market the underlying assets are still fine. This is really just a 

knock-on effect from the bond insurer being downgraded. So I think 

there are some positive features that differentiate this from CDOs. 

Senator SHELBY. Their fundamentals are probably fine, but what 

would be the psychological effect? 

Ms. BAIR. Well, I think that is something—— 

Senator SHELBY. There has got to be a negative—I hope there 

will not—— 


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Ms. BAIR. ——that a lot of people are thinking through right 

now. This is not something we have really confronted. 

Senator SHELBY. And, Secretary Steel, you say you are on top of 

that? 

Mr. STEEL. I think we are doing our best to monitor and be vigilant, sir, because as you say, it is an important issue. As Chairman 

Bair said, 75-plus percent of these assets are municipal bonds of 

the very highest quality, which makes you comfortable that the 

asset is a solid one in those cases. 

Senator SHELBY. But it could be the lack of capital. A lot of guarantees out there and a run on the capital, same thing. 

Mr. STEEL. Yes, sir. 

Senator SHELBY. That you have seen all your life. 

Senator Dodd brought this up, Secretary Steel. Logistic problems 

with securitization, especially the banking system’s change. I would 

think it can be difficult to determine the specific owner of a mortgage given that multiple investors have ownership stakes in the 

same mortgage or pool of mortgages, because the mortgages have 

been packaged and repackaged through securitization. 

In the old days, the banks made a loan, and they carried it on 

their books, real estate. They don’t do that anymore. Very seldom. 

They pick and choose. 

How does this affect the ability to proceed with an orderly 

unwinding or modification of the underlying mortgage note? It has 

got to compound that. 

Mr. STEEL. Senator Shelby, it creates challenges, and you describe the engineering of the process right. There is a servicer who 

is responsible for acting on behalf of all of the investors—— 

Senator SHELBY. But they don’t own the mortgage, do they? 

Mr. STEEL. They do own the mortgage. The servicer has a contract called a PSA, or pooling and servicing agreement, and that 

gives guidelines as to what the servicer can do legally on behalf of 

all of these different investors. 

Senator SHELBY. Can they modify the mortgage? 

Mr. STEEL. Yes, sir. 

Senator SHELBY. OK. That is good. 

Mr. STEEL. But there are specific categories by which they can 

related to the value of the overall mortgages. And so part of this 

complicatedness that Chairman Dodd alluded to and Chairwoman 

Bair relate to having the ability to do that. 

Senator SHELBY. OK. This was mentioned earlier, and I want to 

pose this question to you, Secretary Steel. GSE reform, we talked 

about this. I have worked on it, Senator Dodd has, Secretary 

Paulson, yourself. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as we all know, 

are among the largest non-bank financial institutions in the world. 

They play a sizable role in the mortgage markets. Their outstanding debt in mortgage-backed securities are held by banks, 

pension funds, and foreign governments. In addition, their hedging 

activities link them to many other large financial institutions. 

Secretary Steel, there will likely, more than likely only be a single chance of GSE reform legislation, and, therefore, the substance 

of such reform I believe is crucial, not only to this Committee but 

to the country. 


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I don’t think we can accept just any old deal for a deal’s sake. 

I believe that we have a responsibility in this Committee to pass 

meaningful reform in which we create a world-class regulator with 

the authority to address the full range of risks associated with GSE 

operations, including systemic risk. 

Do you believe we need a world-class regulator, as Secretary 

Paulson has told us many times? 

Mr. STEEL. Completely, sir, and I have worked hard in the House 

with Chairman Frank and look forward to engaging as Chairman 

Dodd has the same ambition here. And that is completely the view 

of the Secretary of the Treasury. 

Senator SHELBY. What would be your basic conception of what 

would constitute a world-class regulator? 

Mr. STEEL. Well, I think that—— 

Senator SHELBY. That would be more than what we have today, 

would it not? 

Mr. STEEL. Yes, sir. I think that the construct should be viewed 

as we should have all the tools that a normal regulator would 

have—— 

Senator SHELBY. Like Chairwoman Bair, for example. 

Mr. STEEL. Yes, plus even possibly more because of, as you describe, the large effect—things such as single source for both terms 

and conditions and mission, and safety and soundness, bringing 

them together, things like that. But basically exactly all the tools 

that you would want for a world-class regulator. 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

both for your testimony. 

Mr. Secretary, I heard you, in answer to Senator Dodd’s questioning and in your testimony, paint what I might refer to as a rosy 

picture to some degree of what is the response. But 3 days ago, the 

Center for Responsible Lending put out a document that is far less 

rosy. Let me read from it. It says, ‘‘Wall Street analysts estimate 

that there will be 3.5 million foreclosures over the next 3 years, resulting in losses of $350 billion to financial institutions. An estimated 3.5 million families are trapped in exploding adjustable rate 

mortgages that are due to increase to unaffordable interest rates 

in the next 2 years. And on many of these loans, the debt owed is 

more than the value of the house.’’ 

They go on to say, talking about the Paulson plan, ‘‘However, recent industry data, coupled with an updated analysis of who will 

qualify for the Paulson plan, clearly shows that voluntary initiatives are and will fall far short of the effort needed. Existing modification efforts are insufficient. The Mortgage Bankers Association 

data shows that foreclosures are outstripping modifications 7 to 1. 

For the subprime ARMs at the root of the current crisis, foreclosures outnumber modifications 13 to 1.’’ And while they go on 

to say that the Paulson plan is welcome, only 3 percent of subprime 

ARM borrowers are likely to receive streamlined modifications 

under its terms. 


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That is not too rosy, as far as I am concerned. It is not the type 

of response I think we need to the crisis that we face. Do you want 

to comment on that? 

Mr. STEEL. Sure. I have certainly seen the report that you suggest that came out last week, and basically it describes what has 

happened to date. As I said in response to Chairman Dodd, the 

process and the protocols are just beginning to be applied by the 

Hope Now Alliance, so we are just starting to see the progress. 

Progress to date is inadequate in terms of the results we wish 

to have, and so now the efforts have been organized, and we should 

see significant progress from here. And we have committed to providing the information that showed the success that can be 

achieved. 

Senator MENENDEZ. What has fundamentally changed? What has 

fundamentally changed that is going to give us a much different set 

of realities? And what do you expect that—what you are now telling the Committee is going to take place, what do you expect that 

its results will be in terms of the percentage of people who will be 

helped? 

Mr. STEEL. Well, the way I would look at it, first of all, what has 

changed was your first question, and what has changed is that as 

of the 1st of the year, these protocols are being applied, that people 

are being fast-tracked and dealt with so that you can get those 

done more quickly. And second of all, that also allows more capacity for people that have more challenging situations that need individual attention and don’t fall into the fast-track category. They 

can be considered also. So that has changed. That is just starting 

now. And we will be reporting back to you and to everyone as to 

the success with that program. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you have any estimates of what do you 

project based upon your new protocols and the enforcement of those 

protocols? Which it seems we have waited on too long for and that 

the industry has waited on too long for. But what is your projection 

of what we are going to be able to achieve as a result of it? 

Mr. STEEL. Well, the answer, what we have said, sir, is that of 

the 1.8 million resetting mortgages, 1.2 million should be the goal 

for trying to help, half of which would be a modification and half 

of which would be refinancing. 

Senator MENENDEZ. That should be the goal. Let me just say I 

think that there are those who I hear, as we heard back in March 

when many of us were defining what was coming as a tsunami of 

foreclosures, we heard the counsels of patient and delay and study. 

We are now nearly a year later and hear many voices of the counsel of patient, delay, and study. And certainly for those who are losing their homes, for those who own homes around the neighborhoods where foreclosed properties are taking place and are losing 

value in their homes, and as a former mayor in communities which 

are having substantial reductions of ratable bases as a result of the 

reduction in values, this is an enormous consequence. So I have a 

real problem with the counsels of patient and delay as we continue 

to face a rising number of foreclosures here. 

Let me ask Chair Lady Bair, in your statement, you say that, 

‘‘Progress in achieving actual loan modifications has been unacceptably slow.’’ And I would ask you to elaborate on that. And, also, 


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you said in your statement that hopefully the lenders, the holders 

of these documents, would come to understand that a foreclosure 

is far less valuable to them than even continuing the present loan 

rate. 

Do you think that that is being captured by the industry as a 

principle that they accept? Or is it different? 

Ms. BAIR. I think that it is, and I think one of the major accomplishments of the ASF agreement, which Secretary Paulson and 

Under Secretary Steel facilitated, was a recognition that fast track 

modifications or refinancing is appropriate for this large category 

of subprime hybrid ARMs, if they are current at the starter rate. 

I cannot overemphasize, these starter rates are high. They are 7 

to 9 percent, over 8 percent, for most of the 2006 originations. So 

the starter rates themselves are high. They cannot make the reset, 

and I think there is general agreement that most will not be able 

to make the reset because of weak underwriting. They should either get a fast-track modification or refinancing. And there is a lot 

of technical detail in the ASF protocol basically trying to differentiate who can refinance and who needs a modification. But the 

point is, those loans should not be foreclosed upon. They should be 

refinanced or they should be modified, and it should be a longterm, sustainable modification of at least 5 years. 

So that is what we understand the agreement to be. That is what 

we are expecting to see in the reporting that is going to go forward. 

There was some pick-up in modification activity toward the end of 

2007. However, we saw far too many repayment plans, which just 

delay the inevitable. They are just capitalizing deferred interest. 

They are deferring the interest and principal to try to collect at a 

later date, which is just going to make the payment shock even bigger once you get to the end of the repayment plan. 

So these are not long-term, sustainable modifications. This is just 

kicking the can down the road. And these loans are unaffordable 

for the vast majority of subprime hybrid ARM borrowers. They are 

going to be unaffordable 18 months from now, and they are going 

to be even more unaffordable if they just defer the principal and 

interest. 

So that was what I was referring to when I expressed my disappointment in these numbers. We need modifications, real modifications. Repayment plans for certain categories of borrowers may 

be appropriate, but for the broad categories we are talking about, 

that is not what we are looking for. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your continuing diligence in this hearing. I find it interesting there are 

those who rabidly pursue the Federal Reserve to instigate and to 

act. Of course, we want it to act so that we do not have the economic consequences and the broad base of what is happening in the 

housing market to our overall economy. But those are ultimately 

at the end of the day about strengthening confidence and helping 

investors. 

It seems to me that at the same time that we seek for economic 

forces to be unleased by a governmental entity to strength that, we 

should be looking at the governmental entities that can ensure that 

people don’t lose their homes on an equal footing. And I look forward to the Chair’s initiative in that regard. 


dcolon on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
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Thank you very much. 

Chairman DODD. I thank you for your comments and thoughts, 

and I could not agree with you more. So much of this actually— 

you talk about ripple effects. The optimism and the sense of confidence that is engendered as a result of these kinds of activities 

as well, has its own economic impact here. And in the absence of 

these things, the wait, look, and hope mentality has a certain appeal, except when it doesn’t work and then you have created a massive problem, which I am worried about. I really am. Serious people 

think this is a problem that is growing, not shrinking, and that the 

hour is getting very late here. The listening period in my view 

ought to be over with here. We have watched and listened now for 

a year at this and hoped that certain activities would happen. And 

I am certainly going to watch very carefully, Mr. Secretary, how 

this proceeds. But I am very uneasy about the likelihood you are 

going to produce the kind of results we are looking for here, and 

I am fearful that we are going to find ourselves at a point where 

we are acting too late to deal with an awful lot of people where, 

had we acted more quickly, we could have avoided some of the 

problems we are looking at. 

Senator Bennett. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I agree 

with you about the seriousness of it and that it could spread, and 

as I indicated, there are a lot of people overseas who are very concerned about the implications of this throughout the financial system of the world. 

I am, however, a little concerned that we do not have as much 

data about what is really happening as we would like. Let me drill 

down a little bit to discuss an aspect that I have not heard discussed at all, not only not by this panel but by any of the experts. 

And I realize my experience coming at this is entirely anecdotal, 

but I have seen people lose their homes in housing bubbles that 

have no—on a basis that has nothing to do with mortgage rates. 

I lived in California, and California was going through a housing 

bubble, and the property tax levels went up so dramatically that 

people who had been in their homes long enough probably to have 

paid the mortgage off were finding that the property tax was driving them out. And I have personal experience with a woman who 

lost her home because she could no longer afford the property tax. 

And shifting the anecdote to my own property tax report that 

comes in from Arlington County, it was going up in a fairly steady 

basis every year, 5 percent, 10 percent. Suddenly it went up 50 percent, and the next year it went up another 20-some percent. I have 

forgotten the number because I do not even want to think about 

it. 

All right. Last year, it came down—very slightly. If I were to 

draw a historic graph of the previous pattern of increase in property tax, I would say that the property value that that represents 

is now still, even with the drop, substantially above where it would 

have been if we had been on that steady pattern before the bubble 

came. 

I am obviously not complaining about what is happening. I can 

handle it. But I wonder if we have any data, talking about people 

losing their homes, of the impact of the double whammy of the adVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:53 Mar 12, 2010 Jkt 050366 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A366.XXX A366

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justment in the ARM and the increase in property tax. Because if 

we had the bubble, the property tax people were there to pick it 

up. We have former mayors on this Committee. Senator Dodd has 

talked about the impact of a mayor in his community. And this is 

an aspect of it that I have seen happen in very real terms. 

Is there any data about the impact of property tax as a consequence of this bubble? 

Ms. BAIR. No. I have our chief economist right behind me, and 

he tells me that, no, we have not looked—we have certainly seen 

property taxes going down now as the home values are going down. 

But, no, in terms of this feeding in and being part of the problem— 

the delinquency and default problem—no, we do not have that kind 

of data. 

Senator BENNETT. They are going down, but they are going down 

from a bubble high. 

Ms. BAIR. Absolutely. 

Senator BENNETT. And so they are probably still significantly 

higher than they would have been at the time the loan was taken 

out. 

Ms. BAIR. We will look into that. No, we do not have data at this 

point, but we will see if we can get it. 

Mr. STEEL. No, sir. 

Senator BENNETT. OK. Second, I made reference to the cab driver 

who had three homes. Do we have any idea what percentage of this 

universe that you are dealing with is represented by people who 

have no interest whatsoever in staying in the loan, it is in their 

self-interest to simply walk away? Because they are not living 

there, they never intended to live there, they were either going to 

flip it or in some other way make some killing on it. Are they going 

to benefit by virtue of what we are doing and then still turn around 

and walk away? And how many of them are there? Do we have any 

idea? 

Mr. STEEL. Well, sir, I will comment and then Chairman Bair 

can add. From our perspective, first of all, with the Hope Now 

group, as they are managing their process, all of their protocols 

only apply to owner-occupied single-family homes. So those people 

that are speculating or in second or third homes are not able to 

avail themselves of the fast-tracking of the other protocols. 

In terms of the numbers, this is something that people pursue, 

and I will defer to Chairman Bair, but I think something like 15 

to 20 percent are some of the estimates that people say of the 1.8 

million resetting, that would be a reasonable number. But I would 

not apply a huge amount of precision to that estimate. 

Ms. BAIR. There is some percentage of what is called the ‘‘unsympathetic borrower,’’ that there is some fraud or they are just in it 

for speculative purposes. One of the reasons we targeted our proposal to subprime hybrid ARMs is that those overwhelmingly are 

owner-occupied. 

Senator BENNETT. OK, good. 

Ms. BAIR. The Alt-A market, where you get the really low teaser 

rates and payment options—those seem to be more perhaps the 

product of choice for more speculative types because they are more 

highly leveraged. 


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Senator BENNETT. It may be an oversimplification, but if you 

look at the top four States that have been hit the hardest—Nevada, 

Florida, Michigan, and California—Michigan is the only one that 

has significant economic problems in the State. The others are 

clear candidates for flippers and people who want to get into condominiums and speculation. 

Ms. BAIR. Well, but I think that is true. But they were also, because of home prices, ripe markets for so-called affordability products. 

I think it is important to differentiate between Alt-A and 

subprime hybrid ARMs. The hybrid ARMs tend to be disproportionately found in working-class neighborhoods and minority neighborhoods. These have starter rates of between 7 and 9 percent, resetting to 11 and 12. It is tagged off of LIBOR. It is actually a complex 

formula they have to reset. But these high initial rates are not, I 

think, generally going to be the product of choice for a lot of speculative investment activity. There is some of that in the subprime 

hybrid ARMs, but these tend more to be owner-occupied, workingclass families. 

And, again, we thought by targeting loan modifications to those 

that were owner-occupied, where they had been making timely payments for that first 2- to 3-year initial period, that you would have 

a pretty good, sympathetic borrower. 

Senator BENNETT. I agree with that, and I commend you for that. 

My only comment is if we try to get our arms around this whole 

thing and we start quoting universal statistics to each other, we 

run the risk of having included in those universal statistics information from borrowers that distort the picture and that we do not 

particularly want to help. 

Ms. BAIR. It is difficult, and that is why I think going forward 

it is so important to get strong underwriting standards that apply 

across the board, because there are unsympathetic borrowers. 

There is a lot of unsympathetic lending going on here, people not 

documenting income, assuring ability to repay, just basic underwriting. 

Senator BENNETT. Yes. OK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Steel, most observers suggest that FHASecure has had 

a limited impact to date. In addition, the Hope Now program is 

moving forward, but not with the speed, I think, and the results 

we would all like, which begs the question: Other than continuing 

to adjust these programs, what is Plan B? What are the next steps 

if these programs do not deliver a significant improvement, which 

at this juncture they do not seem to be doing? 

Mr. STEEL. Well, if I could just observe, I think with FHA, with 

FHASecure, already there have been 70,000 mortgages made, and 

so that seems to have been working already. And if FHA modernization comes through, there is potentially more for FHA to do 

pretty quickly. So I would be a bit more constructive about the success of that. 


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With regard to Hope Now, we are now getting to the point where 

we should see results, and if we don’t, we will drive this harder. 

When you were away, sir, I said that we were committed to metrics 

monthly. We should get them beginning within the next 30 to 45 

days on a monthly basis. And beginning in January, we have the 

full power of these modification capabilities as were outlined by 

Chairman Bair. So I am optimistic. And we can do more with regard to these same tools, and so I think that is really where we 

are on this for now. 

Senator REED. So you believe that these two basic approaches exhaust what can be done and will be successful? 

Mr. STEEL. No. I think in my testimony I tried to say that we 

are open to suggestions. We are here to learn. This has been helpful to date to engage, and the second panel will give us ideas, also. 

So there is no ideological trap that we are stuck in, but instead we 

are open to ideas. These are the ones we are driving, and we think 

that they have gotten out of the gate pretty quickly, FHA was an 

existing program since 1935. We have used State and local governments to distribute and target the idea of adjusting the mandated 

municipal bonds so they are not just for new homes but for existing 

homes. And then we are driving with Hope Now. 

So those were three areas where we think we have made good 

progress. We are committed to measuring our results, and we have 

no closed mind with regard to other ideas. 

Senator REED. Well, I am glad you do not have a closed mind, 

but I think I would be comfortable if you also had a Plan B. 

Chairman Bair, what is your observation? And thank you for 

your comments, Mr. Secretary. 

Ms. BAIR. Well, I think we need to keep the pressure on for the 

systematic modifications, to free up resources for loans that need 

to be addressed on a loan by loan basis. I think this money you 

have appropriated for counseling—I would not understate the importance of that. I think empowering counselors and empowering 

borrowers to negotiate loan modifications is an important part of 

this. 

We are open to talking—you know, encouraging creative ideas 

and talking and working with Congress on additional approaches 

that could be used. Another area you might want to take a look at 

is this issue of investor liability. I know the House—Congressman 

Castle has been looking at doing a bill to clarify a servicer’s legal 

obligations to help protect against investor suits for responsible 

loan modification activity. That might be another thing to look at. 

Senator REED. In your testimony, Chairman Bair, you talked 

about the Alt-A as being potentially more difficult in terms of loss 

mitigation issues. And that is a problem that has not exploded to 

the degree of the subprime, which begs the question. What are we 

doing now to anticipate what is likely going to happen? Is this market crumbling also? 

Ms. BAIR. Well, I think the scope of the problem hopefully will 

be smaller because these are non-traditional, high-risk products, 

but a lot of them were made to people with stronger credit records. 

So we are hoping that the refinancing capability will be stronger 

than it has been in subprime. But for those who are in 


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unaffordable Alt-A mortgages, it will be much more difficult to use 

systematic approaches because the product terms vary so much. 

I think that the Hope Now group is another one. I am hoping 

that they are starting to take a look at this. I think one thing you 

can do is use systematic approaches, for instance, debt-to-income 

ratios, you know, have a standard rule of thumb to lower a payment below a certain DTI standard. The FDIC and the Conference 

of State Banking Supervisors have suggested a 50-percent DTI— 

anything above a 50-percent DTI strongly suggests increased 

chance of default. So keeping it under that, you can use systematic 

benchmarks to aid in the modification process. But I think Alt-A 

is going to be more difficult. I am hoping the problems will not be 

as severe because there are stronger credit backgrounds with a lot 

of these borrowers. But this is going to start escalating in 2009, 

and so that is why—one of the reasons I am talking about it now 

to try to make sure you are aware of it, and we have been talking 

with Hope Now and others about it as well to try to get ahead of 

it. 

Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, your comments on this? 

Mr. STEEL. I would second Chairman Bair’s comments. 

Senator REED. Chairman Bair, we are drawing lessons from 

around the globe because this problem is spreading around the 

globe. With Northern Rock, the British bank which required assistance of the Bank of England, I understand the bank reported the 

Basel II advanced approach that allowed it to lower its risk-weighted average by 44 percent, and their CEO described this as ‘‘the 

benefits of Basel.’’ 

Can you comment on the bank capital rules? And can they continue to provide safety and soundness as we look at this new world 

of Basel? 

Ms. BAIR. Well, I think that is true. Their own reports indicated 

that this bank—which, of course, as you know, now has cost the 

British Government around $49 billion—the risk-weighted assets 

were going to go down 44 percent. They were planning on paying 

a dividend because of their reduced capital requirements. So I 

think one of the key concerns we had, the quantitative impact studies showed that the Basel II—the advanced approaches of Basel 

II—would result in dramatic reductions in minimum risk-based 

capital for mortgages. And I am very glad that we did not institute 

it before we hit what we are in now, because if we had lowered 

those minimums, the industry would not be as strong as it is now 

to absorb what we are experiencing. 

So I am glad that we used a cautious approach. I do think it is 

important to emphasize that there are positive aspects of the Basel 

II framework, but their use of external ratings as well as their use 

of models to drive regulatory capital I think are things that require 

a lot of thought. 

Another issue that we are looking at now, which I think would 

be an unacceptable result, is the use of external ratings. For instance, AAA-rated CDOs—those are the structured finance instruments that have been responsible for some of the big writedowns 

you have been reading about. The capital charge is currently 20 

percent under Basel I for a AAA-rated security. That would go 

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work. Well, that is obviously far too low for that type of what we 

know now is a very high-risk instrument. 

So we do need to make adjustments going forward, and I think 

the U.S. should be commended for taking a very slow, gradual implementation process so we can make adjustments as we go along. 

We are doing a parallel run beginning sometime this year. That 

will have to happen a whole year before we actually start setting 

capital under the advanced approaches. And then there are 5 percent per year floors for a 3-year transition period. And, of course, 

we are keeping the leverage ratio too, so we have a lot of safeguards to make sure we don’t get ourselves in trouble with this 

new framework. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, thank you. 

Chairman DODD. I see Senator Schumer has arrived. Just one 

question I wanted to raise—actually, two fast ones. And you may 

not have the direct answer, but Senator Shelby asked a very important question that could be the subject of just a hearing, and that 

is the bond insurance issues and how we are going to deal with 

that or what the administration is thinking about in dealing with 

that. And are you going to be looking to us to do anything? It 

would be helpful in the short term to get some more specific answers to the issues that have been raised here. It is a very, very 

important question that has been raised. 

And, last, just having gone back and learning more about mortgage-backed securities and how they function and operate, more 

than I ever intended I would have to learn, but trying to understand the difference between a contract and a trust arrangement 

and where in the contract arrangements, is it your understanding, 

Mr. Secretary, that there is enough flexibility in these contract arrangements with the various ideas we are talking about including 

the modification efforts, are allowable under most of these or all of 

these contract arrangements? Or is there going to be some—I know 

the trust arrangement, for us to change the trust would require, I 

think, some legislative action, as I understand it. I am not sure exactly what we need to do, but those are fairly few. Again, the bulk 

are contracts. 

Mr. STEEL. We believe that the bulk of the pooling and service 

agreements gives the alliance the flexibility to be able to work with 

modifications on these terms. But there will be disputes, but we believe that the flexibility exists to exercise this. 

Chairman DODD. Great. Senator Schumer. 

Senator SCHUMER. Yes, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to follow up a little on the Hope Now initiative. I 

have been skeptical of it, and I have not seen really the results, 

because when you chop up mortgages into so many places and you 

go tell the mortgage servicer you can rearrange it unilaterally, it 

usually does not work. And I think that is what we have seen happen so far. 

So my first question to Secretary Steel is: I am concerned, only 

one-third of the borrowers who have received Hope Now assistance 

got long-term modifications, and that is really what we are shooting for in all of this. Why aren’t servicers and counselors in this 

program giving borrowers help that solves their problems over the 


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long term? Because if it is short term, we are just going to be back 

again a year from now or 2 years from now. 

Mr. STEEL. Well, I think, sir, you are correct. We should be developing affordable, sustainable solutions, and that is why the 5- 

year stabilization of the existing rate was suggested. We consulted 

with Chairman Bair on this issue, and the 5 years was thought to 

ensure that we had the right time for a sustainable, crucial solution. 

Second is that we are just getting started on the Hope Now. We 

have gotten accounting approval, and just beginning in January 

are we beginning the efforts, and we should see results. I have said 

that we are committed to providing metrics and results and sharing them with you so that we can all keep the pressure on to get 

the most done. And I pledge to you that is our commitment. 

Senator SCHUMER. Right. No, I realize that. I just think basically 

the administration’s sort of ideological allergy to getting the Government involved leads to all of these voluntary solutions, and instead of drawing a straight line to the heart of the problem. You 

sort of beat around the bush because of ideological problems. And 

even the projections of Hope Now were disappointing as to how 

many actual mortgagors it would reach, and I think—I know it is 

in its early stages, but I am not encouraged by the early returns. 

Now, you both stated, you know, that current servicer actions 

have been inadequate. I will address this to Ms. Bair first. Why 

would a voluntary program be different? They could do this on 

their own right now. Now, I know you are giving them certain possible protections. But if I am a servicer, it is a lot easier for me 

and a lot better for me to just keep doing what I am doing rather 

than stick my neck out when the Government’s sort of protection 

is not tested and hardly certain. And it relates to the second question to Ms. Bair. You mentioned servicer liability earlier. I mean, 

if I were a servicer, I do not care what the Government said. I 

would be worried that one of my 30 investors would sue me, you 

know, the one at the bottom of the line who is going to be cut out 

by this. And I think that is the major obstacle to Hope Now. 

Could you, Ms. Bair, talk about the second question first, 

servicer liability? And then both of you talk about the general reason why this new program should work when it has not worked on 

its own, when, you know, the servicers have not been able to do 

things on their own. Ms. Bair. 

Chairman DODD. As you pointed out, about a year ago, a set of 

principles were worked out, hoping that would be the answer. 

Senator SCHUMER. Right. Exactly. Again, my view, Mr. Chairman, is they have come up with a plan that does not work very 

well because they just do not want to see Government involvement. 

That has been one of the big problems for this administration from 

the get-go in this crisis. 

But, Ms. Bair, talk about liability first and then the general 

issue. 

Ms. BAIR. Well, I think that investor liability is an issue. My personal view is it has been overblown. I think that the servicers’ legal 

obligation is to the pool as a whole, not to individual tranche holders. And, clearly in the kind of housing market we are in with 

home prices going down, it is almost always going to be the case, 


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if you have an able and willing borrower to stay in that home and 

pay a modified mortgage, the value of that mortgage is going to be 

worth more than the foreclosure value. 

So I think two things. One is there needs to be some investor 

education. As I indicated before, I think Congress might want to 

consider some legislation clarifying the servicers’ responsibilities to 

remove this as kind of an issue. I think also, though, there have 

been operational issues that perhaps the servicing industry has not 

been as willing as they should have been to acknowledge. They are 

just not equipped to do this in scale. I mean, usually loan modifications are a very, very small, if any, minute portion of the loans that 

you service. They are not equipped to do it in this scale. They need 

to staff up. They need to get the word out to the people who are 

actually interacting with the borrowers that this is the plan—this 

is the 5-year modification—if they cannot refinance. 

So I think those things have been lagging, but we are trying to 

save servicers money by doing systematic approaches so they don’t 

have to go one-off one by one. But operationally, they are not—they 

have not been equipped and they are not in the mind-set to do this 

in scale, and I think we have had trouble overcoming that. 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you. 

Secretary Steel, just one other question, and you can answer 

them all at once, and that will be my last one. FHA. The administration has pushed—Secretary Paulson has talked to me about it, 

you have on numerous occasions—FHA reform. Yet the administration in the stimulus package did not want to put it in. The House, 

I think Barney Frank and others, wanted to put it in, and the administration did not. Can you comment on that as well? 

Mr. STEEL. I will start with the first questions about Hope Now. 

Senator SCHUMER. Right. Yes. 

Mr. STEEL. I think you are pointing to the right issues, that we 

need to have real success here. This is crucially important, and we 

are committed to doing so. Hopefully—as Chairman Bair said, historically this was a one-by-one, hand-to-hand combat issue on 

modifications. What the Hope Now procedure, which was originally 

outlined by Chairman Bair in the fall of a more systematic approach to deal with the increased scale, will allow for things to 

happen at a much faster rate and give guidelines to the servicer 

on how this can happen. 

In addition to the efficiency that generates for those, it also allows more time for the more difficult situations that require more 

of a one-by-one approach. And so hopefully it will complement that, 

and we will see a good increase in the success. 

I understand your perspective. We are committed to sharing the 

results, and we will see how it plays out, and we will make adjustments. 

Senator SCHUMER. Do you agree that there needs to be ramping 

up? And how long is that going to take? 

Mr. STEEL. Right now it is happening, and basically as fast as 

we can, and we will get the monthly results on just a 1-month lag, 

and exactly what is happening. And we will come back to talk 

about them with you as much as you like. 

Senator SCHUMER. Then FHA. 


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Mr. STEEL. I really think that I do not have anything to add to 

the debate. The President charged Secretary Paulson. He dealt 

with the negotiations on a bipartisan, bicameral basis. And for me 

to have an opinion about one ingredient in this stew I think would 

be a good way for me to get in big trouble. 

Senator SCHUMER. That is why I asked the question. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. STEEL. I know that. 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. I am impressed, Mr. Secretary. You have 

learned that rather early in your tenure here. Normally a person 

spends years here before they understand the importance of that 

question. Thanks very much, Senator, for your questions. 

We raised in this very point here, getting away from the ideological box, I mean, I think a lot of this has to do with whether or 

not you accept the magnitude of the problem. And I fall down on 

the side that this is a growing and larger problem, and it is going 

to contaminate the entire economy here if we do not address it. 

And if you accept this as being something that just happens from 

time to time, we are just going to have to wait it out, then you 

probably come at a different point of view on this. 

But there is a growing number of people, I think serious-minded 

people, who really do believe that we have got to be more proactive 

here if we are going to stem what could be a far deeper and more 

serious set of economic issues. And the issue is housing, and the 

issue is foreclosure here. And if you do not accept that notion, then 

it seems to me you are going to dance around this thing continually. So I subscribe myself to the same views that Senator Schumer has raised as well, and hopefully we can start to deal with 

this, as we have on this Committee with Senator Shelby and others, who historically we have different points of view about the role 

of Government in all of this. But I think if we come to the same 

conclusion about this and think of some common ways to address 

it, we can be well served. 

Any closing comments, Dick? 

Senator SHELBY. I will be brief, but I have talked with some of 

the heads of our rating agencies, and without calling their names, 

one of them told me—I asked him, I said, ′′What is the bottom of 

this?′′ Senator Dodd alluded to this. It is very important to find the 

bottom before we find the solution because the solution that we 

think we have found will not work. But I asked him. He said he 

did not know. He did not know. And if he does not know, do we 

know? 

I think it is very important working with you, and others, that 

we find the bottom of this, because I agree with Senator Dodd, it 

is going to get worse probably before it gets better. But we need 

to figure out what can we do and how best to do it. 

Chairman DODD. I have one additional question I meant to raise 

here. There are probably a lot more I will think of later, but I 

meant to ask you about the FICO scores. You have talked about 

this to some degree. 

As I understand it, you are going to exclude people from these 

workouts who have FICO scores below—above, rather, 660. And I 

do not—Chairman Bair, I do not know how you feel about that, but 


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my concern is—and I understand the point, and again, you have 

got people who should be in better shape on these things. But there 

can be a lot of different other circumstances. There can be a major 

health problem. There are all sorts of things that can throw a person into a very different category than just relying on sort of a 

bright line here, everything above and below. I wonder if you might 

comment on that. 

Ms. BAIR. Well, I also had this question. This was an industrydeveloped protocol. But if you have a FICO score above 660 you can 

still get a fast-track modification. As I understand it, based on the 

conversations that we have had with ASF, if your FICO is above 

660, that will trigger some additional income verification. But if the 

income verification analysis indicates that you cannot refinance 

and you cannot make the reset, you will still get a streamlined 

modification. But if you are below the 660, then they can basically 

just send a letter automatically and say, ‘‘You qualify. You get the 

5-year extension.’’ And that helps because the FICO is something 

that can be independently verified without talking to the borrower. 

There have been problems with servicers and borrowers connecting, but by relying on a FICO, which can be verified without 

actually having to talk with the borrower, it can basically just trigger automatically a letter being sent to the borrower saying that 

they qualify. 

Chairman DODD. There are also problems with FICO. 

Ms. BAIR. I agree. I agree. It is, again—but I think the reasoning 

of ASF—and, Bob, you might want to add to this—was that this 

was just something they could do without having to have actual 

borrower contact and go ahead and make a modification. 

Mr. STEEL. You are always having this tension, Mr. Chairman, 

of basically wanting to make this so that it is as systematic and 

as successful as it can be. But this is a guideline not a rule, to let 

the Hope Now group get as much done as they can as quickly as 

they can. 

Chairman DODD. I thank you both. It has been a long morning 

for you and into the afternoon here, and I apologize again for the 

delay. And I am going to keep this record open because I am very 

confident other Members will have additional questions and comments they would like to raise as well. And I want to go to the second panel. You have been very patient. 

So we thank you for coming, and we will follow up with you, but 

the record will stay open. Thanks very much. 

I will invite our second panel to come right up here and join us. 

Wade Henderson is a longstanding friend of mine and someone I 

have a high regard for. He is the President and CEO of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. Wade, thank you for being here. 

Michael Barr, Senior Fellow with the Center for American 

Progress, and Professor of Law at the University of Michigan. Alex 

Pollock is a Resident Fellow with the American Enterprise Institute. And Doris Koo is President and CEO of the Enterprise Community Partners, Inc. 

I am going to ask our witnesses to join us here at the table, and 

I thank you for that. We are getting people squared away here. 

These gentlemen all have very—and ladies, have distinguished careers and records, and I am going to put all of that in the record. 


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So I want you to know you will be well served in your introductions 

here, but for the purposes of moving right along, I am just going 

to turn right to your testimony, and we will start with you, Wade, 

if I can, and then go to Mr. Barr—we will go right down the line, 

if that is all right. And I apologize again to you about the delay 

in all of this. Hopefully the conversation may have been of some 

value as well to you as you have listened to some of the conversation here. I have been invoking the name of Mr. Barr and Mr. Pollock here with some—I hesitate to use the word ‘‘liberally,’’ Mr. Pollock. [Laughter.] 

Chairman DODD. But I have been using your name liberally here 

in conversation, and I am deeply impressed with what you have 

both been talking about, and I would be interested in hearing you 

maybe modify your own prepared statements in light of some of the 

comments that were raised earlier about some of these suggestions. 

Wade, good to see you and thank you for being here. 

STATEMENT OF WADE HENDERSON, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 

Mr. HENDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to appear before you today. 

I want to begin by saying why the growing number of mortgage 

foreclosures is a critically important issue to the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and the constituencies we represent. Simply 

put, the right to the American dream of home ownership has always been an important goal of the civil rights movement. Home 

ownership is the means by which most Americans build wealth and 

improve their lives and it is essential for stable, healthy communities. 

For decades the civil rights community has been struggling not 

only to break down the barriers to access to housing itself, but also 

to the credit that most Americans need to obtain housing. The institutionalized resistance that racial and ethnic minority communities have faced in obtaining this credit, from redlining to the 

scourge of predatory lending, lies very much at the root of the crisis 

in which we now find ourselves. 

And indeed, after years of denial by many, most Americans now 

agree that we clearly do face a crisis. The rampant use of reckless 

and irresponsible, as well as blatantly discriminatory lending practices in widely unsustainable housing markets has stretched millions of homeowners far beyond their means. Too many families 

now see their American dream slipping away, and it is profoundly 

disappointing that the end result of the subprime lending debacle 

has been less home ownership, not more. 

It is clear that Congress must craft a swift, pragmatic, multifaceted response to the problem. At the same time, it is important 

to avoid steps that saddle future generations with debt, increase 

the costs of credit, or resort to bailouts that encourage more irresponsible lending in the future. 

I am glad the Administration and the industry have ramped up 

their efforts. The so-called Paulson Plan and the Hope Now Alliance rightly deserve praise. Every home that is saved from foreclosure is a step in the right direction. 


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But these voluntary efforts alone are woefully inadequate. The 

Paulson Plan will only cover 3 percent of subprime adjustable rate 

mortgages and a substantial number of homeowners will inevitably 

fall through the cracks of any other program, including the Home 

Now Alliance. 

The importance of preserving home ownership to our communities and to our Nation demands that more be done. So I want to 

discuss additional proposals. 

Last spring the civil rights community proposed a voluntary moratorium on subprime foreclosures. We argued it would give the industry time before the occurrence of irreparable damage of more 

foreclosures to put homeowners into more affordable loans. While 

it is true that some borrowers used subprime loans to speculate 

during the recent housing boom, a moratorium would provide time 

to find and assist borrowers who truly deserve help. 

Unfortunately, the response we received from the industry was 

underwhelming. Lenders and servicers pointed out their desire to 

minimize foreclosures but it was also clear that a comprehensive, 

industry-wide effort to do so had not taken shape. 

Last summer the Leadership Conference and other civil rights 

and consumer groups then turned to Federal Reserve Chairman 

Ben Bernanke. In our meeting, it was clear the Chairman was 

looking at ways to prevent future abusive lending practices. But he 

was short on solutions for addressing the current wave of foreclosures. 

Since then, the mortgage industry has begun to make progress. 

But it is also clear that the extremely complex nature of mortgage 

securitization and other issues, such as conflicts between primary 

and junior mortgages, continue to pose barriers to meaningful relief. 

Given these difficulties and the high and unacceptable number of 

foreclosures, I believe that the idea of a foreclosure moratorium 

should be revisited. And indeed, I believe this Committee, Mr. 

Chairman, should explore methods beyond voluntary participation 

in which Congress should also take steps to greatly improve loan 

modification practices, including requiring meaningful loss mitigation prior to foreclosure, requiring detailed reporting on loan modification activities, and improving protection for loan servicers from 

investor lawsuits. 

And while I recognize that this would be a step that some would 

be reluctant to make, the Nation is clearly facing a situation unlike 

any other in modern time. A forced cooling off period would give 

the industry time to further improve its own solutions and greatly 

ease public concern about the devastating toll the growing number 

of foreclosures is taking. 

Now, even if a moratorium is imposed, it is also clear that these 

efforts will not help everyone in need. And that is why I want to 

associate myself with the remarks of my colleagues on the panel 

in support of your proposal, Mr. Chairman, for the Federal Homeownership Preservation Corp. We think that is an important step 

and we believe it is necessary to help provide the kind of additional 

relief that is required. 

And finally, I want to recognize that while this issue is not properly before your Committee’s jurisdiction, the idea of letting homeVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:53 Mar 12, 2010 Jkt 050366 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A366.XXX A366

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owners seek relief in Chapter 13 proceedings still merits discussion 

here. I believe that as a matter of last resort, it is one of the best 

solutions available, and that this simple but important step should 

be included in the stimulus package that the Senate is now debating. And I hope, indeed, we will make progress in that regard. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to close by saying that this is a 

complex and deepening crisis and it is going to require using every 

tool at our disposal to bring needed relief to families and communities and to stabilize the housing market and the entire economy. 

While I give credit to the voluntary foreclosure preservation efforts, 

homeowners simply cannot afford to wait for an industry that collectively created this mess and is now being devoured by it to take 

the lead in cleaning it up. 

I want to thank you for your leadership in finding solutions to 

this problem, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very, very much. 

Mr. Barr, thank you for being here. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL BARR, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER 

FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS AND PROFESSOR OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL 

Mr. BARR. Chairman Dodd, it is an honor to be here today to discuss with you measures to strengthen our economy, to help prevent 

foreclosures, and to preserve our neighborhoods. 

My testimony today is based on work with the Center for American Progress and a team of experts from a wide range of public 

and private institutions. We have been working closely with your 

staff, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate the Chairman’s strong leadership on this issue. 

I would like to join my fellow panelists also, as I am sure they 

will, in applauding the work of FDIC Chairman Bair and her leadership on this issue. And all of us, I know, lament that the late 

Ned Gramlich is no longer here to help us through this difficult crisis. 

Today, our economy is facing a real and growing crisis, threatening the longest, severest liquidity crisis and period of economic 

stagnation since the Great Depression. 

Nowhere is that problem more evident than in the wave of home 

foreclosures, with foreclosures up by more than 60 percent over last 

year. More than 1 percent of U.S. households entered the foreclosure process just last year, up by more than 75 percent over the 

previous rate. 

In addition to the pain caused by individual homeowners, there 

are significant spillovers to neighborhoods and to communities. 

And foreclosures are further depressing house prices which have 

dropped, according to the recent index, by 8 percent over last year. 

Further declines significantly and predictably increase defaults, 

and the vicious cycle continues. 

It is generally agreed, Mr. Chairman, that we are not close to 

seeing the bottom. Many homeowners are under water and drowning fast, with loans far larger than their homes are now worth. Our 

neighborhoods and communities are suffering and contagion from 

the housing crisis is drying up credit markets, from prime housing 

to commercial paper, to State and local government bonds. 


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We risk a vicious downward spiral, not just in housing prices but 

also in credit markets more broadly and in the real economy. 

Strong government policy is what we need and we need it now. 

We need a plan that will solve two problems. First, how can the 

market move rapidly and transparently to reprice existing mortgage pools, build capital, and restore financial stability? Second, 

how can the market renegotiate millions of home mortgage loans 

in a timely manner to avoid widespread default, foreclosure, and 

broader contagion? Both problems must be addressed to get us out 

of this crisis. 

The thrust of our suggestion is to provide new authorities to existing public and private institutions to help resolve the mortgage 

crisis, restore confidence and liquidity to America’s financial markets and provide a needed boost to the economy. For shorthand, we 

have been calling the approach Saving America’s Family Equity, or 

the SAFE, loan program. This program could be run by your proposed corporation, which is providing the avenue to move forward 

on this kind of approach. 

The proposal calls for a Treasury pricing platform that would enable FHA lenders, Ginnie Mae issuers, and the Government Sponsored Enterprises to buy out existing mortgage pools at a marketdetermined steep discount. The Treasury process would bring all 

key industry participants to the table, providing a platform for 

broad, large-scale restructuring with a standard industry practice 

and transparency in price discovery. 

Investors would take a hit. They would get liquidity and certainty in exchange for reduced principle value and lower yield. 

Once the mortgage pools have been repriced SAFE participants, 

the GSEs and FHA, would be able to sort the loan pools into buckets, using core criteria set in advance: loans that ought not to be 

restructured, loans that can be restructured, and loans that can 

continue on a sustainable path without restructuring. 

As Senator Shelby suggested, some of these loans should and are 

going to go into foreclosure. But many of them can and should be 

restructured. The core criteria would include debt-to-income ratio, 

loan-to-value ratio, and payments made to date. Only owner-occupied homes would be refinanced. Sorting the pools in advance 

would reduce the cost of refinancing. And the loans would be refinanced through existing origination channels on terms that would 

reduce the likelihood of default, foreclosure, and costly liquidation. 

SAFE loans would have a maximum loan-to-value ratio of 80 percent, fixed interest rates, and 30-year terms. Prepayment penalties 

would be waived. SAFE mortgages would be pooled into securities 

and sold into the secondary markets. Loans originated through 

FHA-insured lenders and Ginnie Mae issuers would be FHA insured and Ginnie-Mae guaranteed. And other SAFE loans would be 

securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 

Over time, our expectation is that market liquidity will be restored and the SAFE loan program would include an automatic 

shut-off valve to end the program once discounts offered are not 

sufficiently steep. 

While important details would need to be worked out regarding 

the SAFE loan plan, one should be able to rely on existing Government agencies, mortgage market institutions, delivery systems, and 


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instruments if authorized and required to do so by this institution, 

not on a voluntary basis. We need legislation. 

In addition, the SAFE plan focuses on moving forward on a broad 

scale basis. In this manner, implementation would occur relatively 

quickly, in comparison to models that would rely on creating a 

wholly new institution. 

Our policy is decidedly not a bailout, either fore investors or for 

mortgage holders who made unwise or speculative decisions. Investors and speculators will take a hit. The SAFE plan, on the other 

hand, can help to keep families in their homes, clean up the credit 

markets, contain the contagion, and avoid a vicious downward spiral that drags down the economy. 

I agree with Mr. Henderson and the other panelists that other 

steps are needed as well, that they have talked about and will talk 

about in more detail. 

As you said in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, monetary 

and fiscal policy alone, while important, cannot restore liquidity, 

stability, and confidence to our credit markets. If we fail to take 

action now to facilitate private sector resolution of the crisis we 

face a serious prospect of continued deterioration and the risk and 

the need for more aggressive Government intervention later, a risk 

that none of us want to face. 

We have a shared responsibility for setting things right, and 

thanks to your leadership, we have a shared opportunity to act 

swiftly, decisively, and wisely to help American families through 

these trying economic times. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much. Appreciate your testimony. 

Mr. Pollock, good to have you with us this morning. Thank you 

for being here. 

STATEMENT OF ALEX J. POLLOCK, RESIDENT FELLOW, 

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. POLLOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the opportunity to be here. And thanks very much for referring to me liberally. As many conservatives say, I am a classic liberal, with a 

general belief in the superiority of markets over Government interventions. But I am also a student of financial history and a student 

of the many severe busts that have taken place and what might be 

done about them, which inspires the thoughts we have having here. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you. 

Mr. POLLOCK. We all know that the housing and mortgage bust 

continues its panicky downward course. I want to stress the panicky part, because the key risk is a major downside overshoot. We 

had a giant upside overshoot in the bubble of the new 21st century, 

and the risk is we will have a downside overshoot that is just as 

bad. We need a correction. We need repricing. But we do not need 

the needless destruction of a major overshoot on the downside. 

Now bubbles are notoriously hard to control. I take Senator Shelby’s points—and maybe you could mention this to him since he has 

left—very seriously about the responsibility for decisions taken by 

both lenders and borrowers. 


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I have a view that to encourage better decisions and better financial behavior in the future, that there is an essential long-term reform we have to make. It is clear and straightforward disclosure 

to borrowers of what loans really mean to them, really mean to 

their household income. That ought to be done in one page. 

Senator Schumer has introduced S. 2296 with this goal in mind. 

I hope its provisions would be included in any legislation adopted 

by this Committee, because it will definitely mean fewer foreclosures in the next cycle. 

As for this cycle, our recent bust and the bubble which preceded 

it display all of the classic patterns of recurring overexpansions 

and their painful aftermaths, many of which I have studied and a 

good many I have actually lived through as part of my financial career. 

Once the bubble has happened, the deflation of the bubble is inevitable. And once that is happening, there are no choices that we 

really like; we have to choose what is most sensible under the circumstances. 

Unfortunately, we face the possibility of a self-reinforcing downward spiral of defaults, losses, and credit contraction. Chairman 

Bernanke has called this a ‘‘financial accelerator’’ which can accelerate in the downward direction. To use a different economics term, 

there is a risk of a debt deflation in this huge housing and mortgage sector. As I see it, this needs to be addressed. 

As a classic liberal, my view is that 90 percent of the time such 

intervention is not a good idea. But about 10 percent of the time, 

in financial crises, it is. And we are in that 10 percent period right 

now, in my judgment. 

At a recent discussion of the mortgage bust, a senior economist 

intoned, ‘‘What we have learned from this crisis is the importance 

of liquidity risk.’’ ‘‘Yes,’’ I replied, ‘‘that’s what we learn from every 

crisis.’’ 

Can we learn anything from the history of mortgage crises? As 

you know, my view is that we can. In particular, there is a very 

suggestive analogy to our present foreclosure issues presented by 

the history of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, which I think 

worked quite well under the circumstances. The circumstances 

were different, as Under Secretary Steel pointed out, but they are 

analogous. I think Professor Barr’s program actually takes its inspiration from this same experience. 

The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation was created by Section 4 

of the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933. I do like to point out that 

it took only three and a half pages of statutory text and was written, I believe, in a very clear and forceful manner. 

It was understood from the beginning as a temporary, emergency 

intervention. The fundamental idea was that for 3 years, and only 

3 years, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation would acquire defaulted residential mortgages from lenders and investors in voluntary transactions to avoid foreclosure and avoid dumping properties onto already overburdened markets, which is exactly what 

we have today. 

The lender did not just have a modification. It was actually relieved of a nonperforming asset, but in exchange took a loss on the 

principal of the original mortgage. Chairman Bair previously pointVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:53 Mar 12, 2010 Jkt 050366 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A366.XXX A366

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ed out the importance of the ability to reduce the principal. The realization of the loss of the principal in the 1930s program was an 

essential element of the reliquification program, as it should be 

now. 

This was a refinancing program that started off with a new permanent loan, not just a modification of an old loan. A similar, temporary refinancing function, in my opinion, would make sense now, 

given the risk that I mentioned of a downward, self-reinforcing 

cycle. 

Home Owners’ Loan Corporation was a Government corporation. The Treasury was authorized to invest $200 million in its stock. 

Now $200 million 1933 dollars as a proportion of GDP would be 

equivalent to about $46 billion today. 

If I were thinking about what we need today, I would say about $20 billion to $25 billion of capital. If leveraged 16 times, that 

would give a financing capability of about $300 billion to $400 billion, which strikes me as a reasonable size if we are looking at an 

ultimate default rate of something like 4 or 5 percent of total mortgages. 

During its life, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation made more 

than 1 million loans, which were about 20 percent of the mortgages 

in the country. It owned, by 1937, 14 percent of the dollar value 

of mortgage loans outstanding. If you translate those percentages 

to today, that would be 10 million loans and $1.4 trillion of loans 

outstanding. Fortunately, we do not need this scale of operations, 

since our own mortgage bust, while it is very serious, as you pointed out, does not approach the collapse of the 1930s, thank goodness. 

An important factor in all of this is that such an organization, 

as an at-risk lender, will inevitably experience redefaults and credit losses. That has to be simply part of the plan and has to be understood as part of the program. 

An essential provision of the Home Owners’ Loan Act was its unambiguous direction that the directors of the corporation ‘‘shall proceed to liquidate the corporation when its purposes have been accomplished and shall pay any surplus or accumulated funds into 

the Treasury.’’ As you know, of course, they did do that. I recommend a similar provision for any Home Owners’ Loan Corporation II or home ownership preservation idea. 

A number of specific design issues naturally arise in thinking 

about this idea. One central one I will mention is whether a new 

organization should be created or you want to expand an existing 

one, such as for example the FHA. The advantage of using an existing organization is you have infrastructure already in place. 

That can also be a disadvantage if the infrastructure does not work 

the way you might want it to. 

A new organization has the advantage of clarity of purpose, a 

temporary nature, and more ready enforcement of the sunset when 

its purposes have been accomplished. My written testimony discusses a number of other such issues. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for taking an interest in 

the possibility of creating such a refinancing capability to help address the ongoing mortgage and foreclosure problems obviously so 

prominently facing us. 


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On the House side, I have also been working with Congressman 

Mark Kirk along similar lines. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here. 

Chairman DODD. Thanks very, very much. We appreciate it immensely. 

Ms. Koo, thank you for being here, too. 

STATEMENT OF DORIS W. KOO, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

ENTERPRISE COMMUNITY PARTNERS, INC. 

Ms. KOO. Thank you, Chairman Dodd. 

And I want to applaud the other panelists, especially the Center 

for American Progress, for the SAFE plan and for working with 

Enterprise on the Neighborhood Stabilization Fund. 

I come before you today to discuss a very silent aspect of this 

foreclosure crisis, and that is about the impact this crisis will have 

on low and moderate neighborhoods. 

You said earlier, Chairman Dodd, as did Senator Mel Martinez, 

that this is about saving neighborhoods. And a whole aspect of our 

discussion today did not touch on the silent victims and the innocent bystanders in this crisis are those families who work hard, 

who paid up on their mortgages, who are not involved in subprime 

borrowing, who are paying up on their mortgages and yet have now 

witnessed a wholesale depression of their own home values and 

have to live among vacant and abandoned homes in increasingly 

depressing neighborhoods. 

As you know, Enterprise is a national provider of development 

capital and expertise to create decent affordable homes and stabilize neighborhoods. In the last 25 years, we have raised and invested $8 billion in equity loans and grants to support the creation 

and preservation of 225,000 homes around the country. 

I am sorry Senator Corker has to leave because he came during 

the very early days of Enterprise and asked Jim Rouse, our founder, to help him set up the Chattanooga Neighborhood Enterprise 

which, to this day, continues a very important work in the Chattanooga neighborhood. 

So far I think Congress has rightfully focused on helping individual homeowners from losing their homes. But as we mentioned 

before, the rising number of vacant foreclosed homes are threatening the health and stability of many low and moderate income 

communities. And without Federal intervention and resources, 

these foreclosed properties will destabilize neighborhoods, erose tax 

base, and bring down property values of neighboring homes as we 

struggle to deal with the rising tide of foreclosures. 

Enterprise wholeheartedly support legislators, responsible lenders, and counseling organizations in their efforts to prevent foreclosures. Our contribution in this effort will be in the area of neighborhood preservation and stabilization. 

In my written testimony, I detailed several models to deal with 

the serious challenges of neighborhood destabilization and offered 

some policy recommendations on how the Federal Government can 

play a pivotal role in restoring these neighborhoods. They generally 

fall in three categories. 

First is to build on existing models that work, like the Federal 

Asset Control Area program. Second, we should pilot new and creVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:53 Mar 12, 2010 Jkt 050366 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A366.XXX A366

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ative local effort such as the foreclosure response pilots taking 

place in Cleveland, in Columbus, Ohio, and in a number of other 

cities and States. Third, the enormity of the situation tells us that 

we have to create new financing mechanisms to take solutions to 

scale. 

In the interest of time, I am going to focus on this last approach. 

Enterprise supports the creation of a neighborhood stabilization 

fund to provide immediate and flexible capital to remove troubled 

properties from holders of foreclosed mortgages and place them in 

the hands of local agencies, qualified nonprofits, and responsible 

entrepreneurs whose mission and interests are to preserve neighborhood viability and turn community liability back into community assets. 

This fund ought to provide flexible capital to buy, sell, fix, and 

whatever is necessary—including temporary rent out—vacant, foreclosed homes. Each local fund should provide some of the following 

needed funding mechanisms, including startup capital for land 

banks or land trusts to hold foreclosed properties for redevelopment; construction loans; affordable second mortgage loans that 

can leverage prime first mortgages, loan loss reserves, and funds 

for local governments to board up or demolish abandoned blighted 

structures in targeted redevelopment neighborhoods. 

Whatever the method, the ultimate goal is to get owner-occupants back to these neighborhoods hardest hit by foreclosures. A 

$10 billion investment in a neighborhood stabilization fund, one 

that can easily stream through an existing source like the Community Development Block Grant Program, will not only stop neighborhood deterioration but also generate significant national economic benefits. 

Using construction activity multipliers developed by Texas A&M 

University and the National Association of Home Builders, we estimate that a $10 billion investment into this fund would generate 

at least 2.5 times, or $25 billion, in direct and ripple effect economic activity nationwide; will employ 80,000 people; generate 

more than $2 billion in a one-time revenue for all levels of government; and restore nearly $150 million per year in local government 

real estate tax collection. 

These funds can also leverage other development finance resources, including tax and accounting incentives. 

Once acquired, these homes would immediately be rehabbed and 

reoccupied by income qualified families using affordable and appropriate fixed-rate mortgage products. And in many cases, substantial repairs will be required. 

Where stagnant market conditions preclude home ownership as 

a viable option, these homes may then be rented in a short period 

of time through a lease purchase program until demand for home 

purchases improves. 

These resources should be income targeted with equal emphasis 

to help low and moderate income families as well as very low income families that include seniors living on fixed incomes who are 

now trapped in negative equity or facing foreclosure themselves. 

In conclusion, I thank you for your leadership, Chairman Dodd, 

and we urge Congress to include a neighborhood stabilization fund 

in the economic stimulus package as a bold response to the 


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blighting and economically disastrous impact of over 1 million foreclosed homes sitting vacant. 

I look forward to answering your questions and embarking on 

some further dialog. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very, very much. And I thank all of 

our witnesses here again for your valuable, very valuable, testimony and ideas and thoughts. 

I would just say, Ms. Koo, I raised the issue, by the way, of the 

Community Development Block Grant proposal on numerous occasions over the last couple of weeks as the stimulus package has 

been emerging different ways. And people have been receptive, but 

I cannot say I have had any success at this point in having anything like that included. Which I think is unfortunate because it 

is a quick way to begin—if you target it. 

I mean, I get nervous about CDBG money being so fungible, it 

ends up being used for a lot of other different purposes here. But 

if you target it specifically so it is explicitly to be used to deal with 

foreclosed properties and allows communities to more immediately 

address these questions, you can offer some real help and it can be 

important in the short term. 

Let me begin by asking you to respond, all of you, if you would. 

You heard, and I apologize, they are not here, very patient for 

members again with the late start this morning and busy schedules 

around here. But how would you respond to the number of colleagues who raised the issue, including my good friend from Alabama, the former chairman of this committee, that you have got to 

wait for this, this thing has not bottomed out yet. And if we end 

up coming up with some ideas here ahead of that—I do not want 

to put words in his—try to frame his question. But that notion that 

this has a way to go yet and we would be acting prematurely with 

some of these ideas if we did not wait until this issue bottomed out. 

My own reaction—you never know when things have bottomed 

out until after the fact. It is always in retrospect when you say that 

was when it happened. But you rarely have ever heard anyone say 

this is the moment. We are here now, at the bottom, or near the 

bottom. 

But nonetheless, in fairness to him and others who have raised 

that, it seems to me it is a legitimate question, that we should let 

the bubble deflate, I guess, on its own. 

There was also a similar point that was made, that the market 

can really address this issue. My sense of it was Secretary Steel, 

while he was receptive to a lot of these ideas, I think underlying 

his comments were basically this is an issue that the market can 

address. And it is not as serious as others would make it suggest, 

that these numbers, 600,000 foreclosures a year, are pretty standard. And while this is above that, we do not know it is even going 

to be that much above it, let us not get ahead of ourselves. 

How do you respond? Maybe we will begin with you, just quickly, 

on this question? 

Mr. HENDERSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Look, I strongly believe that there is an urgency to this problem. 

That view is obviously not shared by those who believe that market 

forces alone can address the issue. 


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There is also a troubling racial and ethnic dimension to this 

problem that cannot be ignored, nor can it be explained by market 

forces alone. African Americans and Latinos, even given similar 

credit profiles with white borrowers, are three times more likely to 

hold subprime mortgages than their white counterparts. And the 

only explanation for that appears to be, at this point, some mechanism of steering the market in that direction. 

Here is the consequence—— 

Chairman DODD. I raised this, you may recall, a year ago. 

Mr. HENDERSON. I know you did. 

Chairman DODD. This very issue, because it comes out—— 

Mr. HENDERSON. And you were right on target in terms of identifying what we see as a central problem in the crisis that has largely traveled under the radar and has not been addressed by the 

issue. 

Here is the consequence. I mentioned in my testimony that we 

believe that home ownership has always been a goal of the civil 

rights movement. In 2005, home ownership among Blacks and 

Latinos was roughly 42 percent of the population—I’m sorry, in 

1995. In 2005, which was the peak period in the housing market, 

according to HMDA data, home ownership among that same community was roughly 49 or 50 percent. So there had been a significant increase between 1995 and 2005 in home ownership opportunities among Blacks and Latinos. 

The truth is that the percentage of purchase money mortgages 

that, in fact, were used to fund that growth were largely found in 

the subprime market. About 55 percent of African Americans held 

subprime paper and about 46 percent of Latinos held subprime 

paper. 

The foreclosures that we are anticipating will occur over the next 

2 years will have devastating impact both on the communities in 

which these individuals live, but on the individuals themselves. 

And from our perspective, it represents potentially the greatest single loss of wealth ever recorded among African Americans and 

Latinos in the country. 

From our perspective, this has an urgency that cannot be ignored. And when you leave it exclusively to market forces to address the problem, you will likely lose a number of individuals who 

would otherwise be saved by a myriad of programs that we have 

talked about today. 

Chairman DODD. Mr. Barr. 

Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman, I agree with you. I do not think we can 

afford to wait. I think that the easy trap in financial crisis is to 

wait too long and do too little and watch the bad news dribble out 

and not be on top of it. 

I think we have seen that, as your opening statement and the 

statements of the other members indicated, we have seen that 

process from the private sector certainly over the last several 

years. Every quarter there is a statement that says everything is 

just fine or everything is going to be just fine. And then the next 

quarter there is an additional adjustment required for capital, additional write-downs, and additional evidence of a worsening crisis. 

I think if you look at the evidence of intervention in financial crises in the past, in serious financial crises, they are far more—those 


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interventions are far more successful if they are done rapidly and 

at scale, rather than dribbled out and slowly. 

Your leadership on the international financial crisis in the 1990s, 

I think, demonstrates that. And that is the kind of leadership that 

we need today. 

The market solution here, in normal economic times, is the right 

answer. Markets correct, markets go up, markets go down. In normal times, I agree that is completely the right way of thinking 

about the problem. But I share Mr. Pollock’s concern that we are 

not in those normal economic times right now. 

And I think it really—the evidence is mounting that the United 

States is at a serious risk of a long-term recession and stagnation 

if we do not see the leadership now to break the vicious cycle and 

restore stability to our financial markets. 

Chairman DODD. Mr. Pollock. 

Mr. POLLOCK. Mr. Chairman, you ask a very good question. Of 

course, I tried to address this a little bit in my notion of the 90 percent and 10 percent, which I draw from Charles Kindleberger, by 

the way, the great economic historian. When asked who is right, 

Adam Smith and the invisible hand or Keynes and intervention, 

said ‘‘Both, depending on the circumstances.’’ 

Chairman DODD. The kind of thought Harry Truman liked to 

talk about. 

Mr. POLLOCK. Just as we don’t know the bottom, as you so correctly point out, Mr. Chairman, we don’t know the tops either, 

until after the fact. As bubbles are expanding, there is always 

someone who can write a book like ‘‘Dow 40,000’’ or in this current 

bubble, a book about why the real estate boom will not end so you 

can always make money on houses. 

If you have had a bubble, which is a far departure from trend 

in price, financed by what becomes clear in retrospect to have been 

overexpansionary credit, what always happens is that leverage 

grows greater. Of course, leverage is the snake in the market Garden of Eden. 

One way to think about all of the structured financing we have 

seen, is as ways to increase leverage in clever ways, including the 

bond insurance companies that Senator Shelby so rightly asked 

about, all ways to increase leverage. 

So typically, as the bubble expands, leverage is increased. Now 

what should happen, if you were really doing this right and you 

were a philosopher king, is that you should be lowering your loanto-value ratios as prices increase in the boom. 

On the other side, as you are coming down, everybody grows conservative, credit contracts, we de-leverage. And at a certain point, 

just in mirror image, you ought to be stepping up to more credit 

as the prices fall. But it is very hard for people to do it. And that 

is where I think this kind of Home Owners’ Loan Corporation type 

analogy actually makes a lot of sense. 

So where will the bottom be? Well, you have the risk that the 

bottom will be far worse and far further down than it needs to be 

if the panic psychology and the self-reinforcing cycle goes like this. 

Defaults, of course, result in credit withdrawal, as we have already 

seen. Credit withdrawal reduces demand for properties. The price 

of properties is falling. The price of properties falling, with great 


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statistical regularity, causes higher defaults, less credit available, 

higher standards, more deleveraging, further price declines, further 

defaults, and foreclosed inventory dumped on the market. That is 

the downward cycle in the 10 percent of the not-so-well functioning 

times. 

That is where I think these ideas, that at least three of us here 

believe are worth thinking about, really can come into play. 

Chairman DODD. And so when I was saying earlier the question, 

I guess it is how you look at all of this. If you see this thing exactly 

as you have just described this, where this could be headed—and 

that is not to be an alarmist at all. We always try to be careful 

about language that we use, particularly as I sit in this chair here, 

knowing that my language and the words that I use can have their 

own self-fulfilling prophecy to them. 

But I carefully thought this morning about whether or not I had 

expressed my deep concerns about where this is going. And I really 

am concerned about where it is going and the failure to understand 

and accept that. Hopefully I am wrong. I am not wishing this. But 

understanding that all the keys and all of the evidence point to 

that. Then it seems to me this is a time when you have got to step 

up and talk about—and I agree with Mr. Barr and I am confident 

you do, as well, Alex. And that is that under normal cycles here 

you would not even be thinking about something like this, at all, 

the need for it. 

And that was my reaction a year ago when this began to happen, 

saying let’s try this. Last year I went out with a piece of legislation 

here and, in fact, if you can get the kind of modifications and so 

forth that seem natural enough that the lending institutions would 

want, clearly the borrowers want, why not let that work? But obviously, that has not produced the desired results. 

Under the question of the—when I asked Secretary Steel about 

it, he made some historical comparisons between the very modest 

amount—and you talked about earlier, that is where I draw the 

1930s when a similar idea was surfaced. And it worked pretty well. 

But he said then you had 50 percent foreclosure rates and the 

economy was in much deeper trouble than the one we are talking 

about today. 

How do you respond to that? What would your answers be to his 

historical analysis that this is nowhere near a situation that would 

warrant that kind of an action? 

Mr. POLLOCK. In my paper that the American Enterprise Institute was kind enough to publish on this historical experience, I go 

to some lengths to point out what the 1930s situation was, including the numbers that the Under Secretary cited. It was actually at 

50 percent of the loans in default. They were also in default on 

their property taxes, unsurprisingly. Those property tax liens were 

something they had to clean up along the way. 

I think the analogy is clear. It is our good luck, and we hope we 

never have to face as total a collapse as our grandparents did and 

try to figure out what to do. But the analogy of the downward selfreinforcing cycle, I think, is quite close—on a less intense scale, but 

still a large, important and very worrisome scale. 

When we talk about where we are going, we know house prices 

are going down. It was only 6 months ago that people were still 


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making speeches about ‘‘this is a contained problem, it will not be 

that bad.’’ And they were very well-informed, smart people. It is always hard to know where we are headed. 

But we do know that when everybody gets scared at once and 

uncertainty premiums become very high, you get in this danger of 

the big downside overshoot. And that is where these ideas, I think, 

can be useful. 

Mr. BARR. I would just agree with Mr. Pollock on the importance 

of the historical analogy. I do think that if you look back at the 

time period, in the year of the creation of the Home Owners’ Loan 

Corporation, you had 1 percent of Americans in foreclosure. We do 

not have that yet, but we have 1 percent of Americans who have 

entered the foreclosure process. And I think that is really a striking example of the historical analogy. 

I should also say, just repeating the emphasis of the urgency of 

this, if we fail to act now we really risk serious downside stagnation of the kind that Japan went through that this committee is 

fully aware of in the 1990s of stagnation because of the combination of having expended all its fiscal tools and expended all its 

monetary tools and having significant overhang of non-performing 

loans. And we are beginning to look a lot like that. 

So I think the Committee is absolutely correct and the Chairman 

is correct that now is the time to really take this up. 

Chairman DODD. Let me be the devil’s advocate of my own—my 

idea, your idea, our ideas on this thing, and just raise some questions that I tried to think of that I presume I will get, and probably 

a lot more than these, but ask you the questions and see how you 

would respond to them, as well. 

One of the concerns that we are told we can face here is that so 

many of the subprime loans include piggyback second mortgages. 

And that while you are dealing with the subprime problem here, 

how do we address—can we address the piggyback loan? Because 

a substantial number of the people in the situations are exactly in 

that situation, that these were refinances that are occurring here. 

What is the answer to that? 

Mr. BARR. Well, I think that, as you saw from this morning’s 

panel discussion, this is an enormously complicated problem. The 

second mortgages complicate things further. I do not think that we 

should prevent the existence of second mortgages on some aspects 

of the loans to prevent us from addressing the loans that we can 

address with only first liens that have been refinanced, and that 

is the whole mortgage. 

I do think that there are ways of addressing second mortgages. 

They are likely to involve even deeper investor pain than those involving first mortgages and I think that is, you know, again a result of really horrible, weak underwriting standards that were conducted not just on first liens but on second liens. 

Mr. POLLOCK. Mr. Chairman, the first answer to that point is 

you are absolutely right. There are second liens in this issue, and 

second liens are a problem. That is another positive analogy to the 

1930s, by the way. Second liens were very popular in the real estate—— 

Chairman DODD. Yes, tax liens and others you talked about. 

Mr. POLLOCK. No, I am talking about second mortgages. 


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Chairman DODD. Second mortgages. All right, I am sorry. 

Mr. POLLOCK. Of course, you also have tax liens. But second 

mortgages were very popular in the 1920s and were one of the 

problems that the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation faced. 

One of the good things about foreclosure, if I can put it this 

way—and foreclosure, of course, is right in some instances—is that 

it takes care of the second mortgages by wiping them out. You do 

not want to have a program which redounds to the benefit of the 

second lien holders while you are giving a haircut to the first lien. 

And any program like this, I think you have to settle out the second liens in some fashion. 

And that is what the 1930’s experience was. There was a negotiation as part of the purchase of the mortgage by the Home Owners’ 

Loan Corporation. They had to settle out the second liens. And the 

second liens will have some negotiating power, maybe for a couple 

pennies on the dollar. 

Chairman DODD. And of course, the other question, I think, and 

I do not have any fast answer for you. There were people here who 

obviously did not go into this stuff. All their antenna went up and 

they said if it sounds too good to be true, it usually is, and I am 

staying away. Or I think I will buy a more modest place than the 

one I would like to get here. 

And you can almost hear people saying all of a sudden now I am 

stuck with that mortgage. I am eating it, but I am doing it. And 

here people often did not do their homework enough here. You are 

rewarding them, I am stuck here in this situation. 

I guess the answer to that is you are right, and again but you 

are not helping me solve the problem. I have got a problem here 

that is causing a bigger issue. 

But the moral hazard issue of another one, you can see someone—again, this is a harder question, I suppose, to answer—that 

there are people who the mortgage is not quite distressed. You 

have got hard times. You are trying to hold on. And you are saying 

to yourself, sitting around that kitchen table at night after the kids 

have gone to bed, look, there is a new program out here. And if this 

mortgage becomes distressed, we get a whole new deal. Why not 

just stop payments here for a couple of months, get into that program. We will get a lower price, get a fixed rate mortgage. We will 

save ourselves a lot of money here. And we are fools not to take 

advantage of this. 

Mr. BARR. I think, Mr. Chairman, those are legitimate concerns. 

I think, again, in normal economic times you would not want to set 

up a program—although we do all the time. But you would not 

want to try and set up a program that makes some homeowners 

eligible and others not. 

I would say there are three answers to that. The first is that 

homeowners who are not in the program are suffering harm now. 

Those homeowners, the neighbors are suffering harm. And they are 

going to suffer harm unless you help their neighbors out. So this 

program is going to, in its narrowest sense, help some homeowners 

and not others. But in the broader sense it means my neighbor’s 

home is not being foreclosed on. There is not crime in my house 

next door. My kids can walk to school without going past the crack 


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dealers. This is a program for all Americans. It is not a program 

just for the people who are narrowly helped in the program. 

I think the second level of response is, in terms of the program 

structure and moral hazard, you would want to be careful not to 

set eligibility rules so that people who are defaulted are the ones 

eligible and people who are paying are not. And you will see in the 

program description that we have suggested, there are ways to go 

forward so that you are not focusing on defaulted loans, although 

they would also be in. You are focusing also on loans that are at 

risk of default. 

Because the borrower is doing just what you have said. They are 

trying to keep up with their payments. They are working hard. 

They are trying to make the payment. But the house prices for 

their neighbors are declining and they have nothing they can do. 

I think both those elements are critical. 

I guess I would say the last thing is you would want to set up 

a program that does not create moral hazard for the investors and 

for the securitizers and that part of the industry. And that is why 

I think it is really critical, whatever route that the Committee and 

the Congress decides to go, that investors take a substantial haircut as part of that process. There is shared responsibility along 

with shared opportunity. 

Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I do think that we should require some meaningful loss mitigation efforts in advance of allowing borrowers to take advantage of a newly created program. I 

think you have to be able to document what steps are actually 

taken on the part of the borrower as well as the mortgage company 

that holds the note. 

And in the final analysis, if you are not protecting borrowers or 

loan servicers from investor losses, then you are simply inviting a 

real problem. I agree with Mr. Barr that again, those who hold the 

notes have to share in some of the responsibility. 

My concern right now though is that when you hear—and going 

back to your earlier question about those who are concerned about 

intervening in the market—we have been hearing that now, as you 

pointed out, for over a year. And in the process, we have seen hundreds of thousands of borrowers, some who could legitimately have 

been saved, who have lost their homes and have been forced into 

bankruptcy. 

We are not advocating, for example, using Chapter 13 as a 

wholesale bailout. But we are saying that as a matter of last resort, 

when all else has failed and when good faith steps have been 

taken, there does have to be some resort at the end of the day that 

can allow borrowers to hold onto their homes if possible. And we 

think, for that reason, that the Durbin bill, which looks at using 

Chapter 13 in that way, is an appropriate response to the problem. 

So it is really about combining a number of the solutions we have 

heard today in a meaningful way. 

Chairman DODD. What I want to do is submit for you, I will not 

keep you longer today on this one, but the mechanics—I have some 

mechanical questions I would like to ask on how the auction process would actually work and setting price and so forth. Those are 

the obvious questions we are going to have people raise as we try 


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to move forward with this idea and develop some strong bipartisan 

support for this idea and concept along the way. 

I wonder if anybody would comment, there was the article by 

William Gross in today’s Washington Post. I do not know if you 

had a chance to look at this or not. But he argues that we are 

headed toward a Japanese-type property market crisis. He says 

that an expanded FHA program is needed, a program that offers 

below market 30-year mortgages to people. 

Other private sector firms have approached us about making it 

easier for delinquent borrowers to get FHA loans. That was raised 

earlier, Sheila Bair raised that. FHA Secure has apparently not 

achieved that goal. 

What are your thoughts about that? Do you have any comments 

on that? Ms. Koo, do you have any comments on that? 

Ms. KOO. I do not think I am qualified to comment on that particular question. But I do want to talk about the timing of the market later. 

Chairman DODD. I will come back to you on that question. 

Mr. POLLOCK. Just as a preface on the issue of people going into 

default to get advantage from a program, you are going to have 

some of that. I found an article written in 1935 by Morton Bodfish, 

who was the then head of the U.S. League for Savings. He said oh, 

these people are just defaulting so they can get in this government 

program. 

That is part of the cost I think you have to reckon with. And the 

answer is: well, you have a bigger problem, just as you said, Mr. 

Chairman. 

On the FHA, these Bill Gross ideas, as you mentioned, functionally sound very much like creating a refinancing opportunity at a 

loss in principal to the original lender and a permanent loan on a 

sustainable basis for the borrower. So it sounds to me like a very 

similar functional idea. Then you can have a discussion, as I mentioned in my testimony, about what vehicle you might try to use 

for that. 

I do not think we ought to be about creating a government housing bank on a permanent basis. The universal experience in the 

world is those are a disaster. 

Chairman DODD. I agree with you on that. 

Mr. POLLOCK. And so that is why I focus on the temporary nature. 

Chairman DODD. And I am more inclined to go with existing 

platforms to the idea you can do this. I appreciate your point that 

you get more clarity. It is more difficult to sunset something if it 

is built into an operation where all of a sudden it becomes part of 

your portfolio and you want to keep it around. But I think the 

tradeoff is better that you get something, expertise built into an 

FHA, the GSEs in some way, that you can allow that—you do not 

have to go around hiring a bunch of people. You can probably use 

existing personnel to make it work. 

So there are, I think, some obvious advantages of—and that 

would be appealing, I think, to people who are concerned about you 

are going to create a whole new entity here that—yes, you all talk 

about sunsets. Nothing ever goes away in Washington once you create something. 


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Mr. BARR. I agree with that very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would just add the key is, on using these existing institutions, 

FHA and the GSE, to be sure that the program rules work in such 

a way that the investor is taking a haircut that permits the writedown of principal value. There is some talk in this policy discussion 

behind the scenes about programs that, in my judgment, would be 

simply transferring the investor risk to the Government through 

FHA programs. And I think we ought to be quite cautious about 

ensuring that in the process of restructuring and refinancing these 

loans, the investor takes the appropriate haircut so that the new 

loan is affordable and the risk is not simply transferred to the Government or to the GSEs. 

Chairman DODD. I agree with that, too. 

Ms. Koo, you wanted to make a comment? 

Ms. KOO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The whole question you asked earlier about should we time the market, to me is a very academic 

question right now. When you hear all the disproportionate suffering that is hitting low and moderate income communities. 

And I want to posit that in this day and age we know better how 

to hold public/private partnerships together. I, by no means, am 

supporting bail out or supporting the notion that any Government 

effort will essentially be letting investors go free. But I think there 

are mechanisms that the Federal Government can take, such as 

tightening the whole—offering CRA credit for banks that would donate properties at this time, that you require the haircut before the 

neighborhood stabilization fund investment would come in. 

But there is now a community development industry of nonprofits such as the Hope Now Alliance on the rebuilding side that 

involve philanthropy, involve corporations, that are ready and willing to put money in to help resolve the situation. And all they are 

looking for right now is a clear and decisive signal from the leadership of this country, from the Government, to say we have a crisis, 

let’s help resolve it. And not use the wait and see attitude. 

Because in that sense, you are going to abandon a lot of the lessons that we have learned in 20, 30, 50 years to correct the crisis 

before it goes too far. 

We have also learned about the moral hazard debate when we 

went to the Gulf Coast to try to help rebuild the devastation caused 

by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. And there are some homeowners 

who would like to try to claim assistance that they do not deserve. 

But the bulk of the homeowners need that support. And I do not 

think this is the time to debate that question. 

Chairman DODD. Well, listen, this has been very—this hearing 

has gone 3 hours, three and a half hours. Literally, we could spend 

the rest of the day on this. You all understand the demands on 

other Senators up here and the fact that they stayed and listened 

as long this morning and had some good questions, I thought. Your 

testimony will be valuable to their staffs. 

There will be some additional questions they would like to ask. 

I would like to invite you to stay very involved with this. The idea 

was not just to have a hearing today to sort of say we’ve talked 

about the issue. But I have the sense of urgency about this. We are 

going to be reaching out now to members on both sides of this dais 

up here to find out whether or not there is some common ground 


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we can work on here to begin to move on this. And I will be soliciting your advice and counsel, if I can, to help us work our way 

through this and answer the kinds of questions that I am sure others will raise here about whether or not something like this can 

work. 

And again, I do not think there is any one silver bullet. I think 

there are a variety of things that can be done here. 

I have often said, and I felt this, and again I hesitate to say this 

in front of an economic historian, but I suppose it depends on who 

is writing the book. But it always occurred to me, reading back, I 

have always been fascinated by this 100 days that everyone has lionized between March 1933 and June 1933. I just finished reading 

a biography of Henry Wallace. He happened to be from Iowa. I do 

not know why I read a biography of Henry Wallace about Iowa. 

But nonetheless, with all due respect to the history, the historical parts about Iowa were fascinating. But the real fascinating history begins when he goes to Washington as the Secretary of Agriculture in the first Roosevelt Administration in March 1933. And 

then that wild period that goes on that has been, as I say, sort of 

a lot of mythology about it. 

But one of the things that struck me about it is not so much 

what they did. And they did some things. But it was the level of 

movement. It was the confidence building action that people were 

stepping up and trying to help out. 

Again, I think you can over-exaggerate the importance of that, 

because clearly things have to be done. But I do not think you can 

over-exaggerate the importance that people out there see leaders in 

their country rolling up their sleeves, going to work, and understanding what people are going through and trying to make a difference. 

It does not solve the problem. But the thing I worry more is the 

intangible lack of optimism, the intangible lack of confidence that 

tomorrow this is going to get OK. And I know that is not working 

or this is not working particularly, but there are people who are 

going to make a difference. 

Again, I am sounding like I am exaggerating the importance to 

that. But I have a feeling that had an awful lot to do with people’s 

sense of hope here. And I think that we are in a critical moment 

here with a lot of bad news out there, that we demonstrate to people in this country that despite all of the other differences here, 

just as a Michael Barr and an Alex Pollock can come from a different perspective to a common conclusion, that this is maybe one 

idea we ought to consider. 

And I am not trying to lionize it, but nonetheless, this is what 

is needed desperately in the country, that they are looking for that 

kind of leadership. I think we have got to try and go that, meet 

that goal here. So I am deeply grateful to all of you to follow on 

additional conversations and leave the record open. 

I thank you very much. 

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. The Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:21 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Prepared statements, responses to written questions, and additional material supplied for the record follow:] 


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RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR BENNETT 

FROM SHEILA C. BAIR 

Q.1. Do property taxes affect mortgage default and foreclosure 

rates? 

A.1. There is limited evidence directly linking property taxes to 

mortgage default and foreclosure rates. Also, it is uncertain what 

impact property taxes will have in the current environment, in 

which many loans reflect high debt-to-income (DTI) and low loanto-value (LTV) ratios. 

The limited evidence suggests that property taxes are one of 

many contributing factors to mortgage default and foreclosure rates 

during periods of high home price appreciation. However, property 

taxes appear to have less of an impact than other factors. 

There are very few research studies that discuss the impact of 

property taxes on mortgage default and foreclosure rates. The conclusion from the few studies that exist is that property taxes alone 

do not contribute to default under ordinary market conditions. 

However, during periods of high home price appreciation, the resulting increase in property taxes may strain marginally-solvent 

homeowners and may contribute to mortgage default and foreclosure rates. 

A December 2007 study from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston focuses on home price appreciation and concludes that the subsequent increase in property taxes may contribute to foreclosure. 

However, this study has only one mention of tax delinquency as a 

contributing factor. (Kristopher Gerardi, Adam Hale Shapiro, and 

Paul S. Willen, ‘‘Subprime Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures,’’ Federal Reserve of Boston 

Working Papers 07–015, December 3, 2007.) 

A December 2007 report by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 

evaluates potential factors influencing state-level differences in 

foreclosure rates. This report finds that property taxes do not contribute to foreclosure rates, after controlling for market conditions. 

(Lesllie McGranahan, ‘‘The Determinants of State Foreclosure 

Rates: Investigating the Case of Indiana,’’ Federal Reserve Bank of 

Chicago ProfitWise News & Views, December 2007.) 

Two additional reports briefly mention property taxes in the context of overall home ownership costs. They conclude that excessive 

homeownership costs may trigger default. (John Tatom, Why is the 

Foreclosure Rate So High in Indiana?, Networks Financial Institute at Indiana State University, NFI Report 2001–NFI–04, August 

2007; and Christopher Herbert, The Role of Trigger Events in Ending Homeownership Spells: A Literature Review and Suggestions 

for Further Research, Abt Associates, Inc., prepared for U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, February 12, 2004.) 

A dated study from 1992 finds that tax assessment rates in New 

York City were a major determinant in the widespread abandonment of residential buildings in the city between 1970 and 1984. 

(David Arsen, Property Tax Assessment Rates and Residential 

Abandonment: Policy for New York City, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 51, no. 3, July 1992, pp. 361–377.) 


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RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR TESTER 

FROM SHEILA C. BAIR 

Q.1. Do you believe the housing crisis is going to spread further 

into other finance industries? Credit cards, Student loans, Auto finance, etc. . . . ? 

A.1. Consumer loan performance peaked in first quarter 2006 due 

to generally favorable economic conditions, including factors such 

as strong job growth and strength in the housing sector. Since 

then, broader economic and financial conditions have weakened 

causing delinquency rates and the dollar amount of credit outstanding to increase on most types of consumer loans, such as credit card debt, auto loans, and home equity lines of credit. 

Data from FDIC-insured institutions show that the noncurrent 

rate on credit card debt increased from 1.81 percent in second 

quarter 2007 to 2.22 percent in the fourth quarter. The net chargeoff ratio increased only slightly from 4.03 percent to 4.08 percent, 

while the dollar amount of credit card debt outstanding increased 

from $374.0 billion to $422.5 billion. For other types of consumer 

loans, the noncurrent rate rose from 0.75 percent in second quarter 

2007 to 1.01 percent in the fourth quarter. The net charge off ratio 

increased from 1.31 percent to 1.89 percent, and the dollar amount 

outstanding increased from $552.8 billion to $573.3 billion. For 

home equity lines of credit (HELOC) at FDIC-insured institutions, 

the noncurrent rate increased from 0.50 percent in second quarter 

2007 to 0.86 percent in the fourth quarter, and the net charge-off 

ratio nearly tripled from 0.31 percent to 0.85 percent. The dollar 

amount of HELOCs outstanding increased from $576.7 billion to 

$607.4 billion. 

The FDIC does not maintain separate data on auto loans or student loans. However, the latest Consumer Credit Delinquency Bulletin from the American Bankers Association shows that delinquencies on auto loans obtained directly from banks increased from 

1.69 percent in June 2007 to 1.81 percent in September, and that 

delinquencies on student loans obtained directly from banks, which 

may be through a federally guaranteed program, increased from 

4.73 percent to 5.30 percent over the same period. 

FDIC analysts have evaluated regional differences between delinquencies in mortgage debt and credit card debt. Using data on 

mortgage and credit card delinquencies at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level from third quarter 2005 through third quarter 2007, FDIC analysts have found a high correlation between increases in mortgage delinquencies and increases in credit card delinquencies. 

Although the credit distress that is evident in subprime: and Alt– 

A mortgage portfolios is not affecting every U.S. household, there 

is no question that this is one of the factors helping to push consumer loan delinquencies upward. We expect that problems in the 

housing sector will continue to adversely affect consumer loan performance in the near future. How much of an increase we see in 

problem consumer loans will continue to depend on a wider range 

of economic factors, including unemployment, wage growth and energy prices. 


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RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR DODD 

FROM MICHAEL S. BARR 

Q.1. The Home Owership Preservation Corporation that is being 

discussed sounds like a novel approach at prevention. However I 

have questions about the auction process that has Treasury financing the purchase of delinquent mortgages in bulk by issuing securities and then selling them off via an auction process to be shifted 

into more secure loans. 

1. What do you anticipate will be the appetite for the auctioned 

off loans in the market? 

2. Will $10–$20 billion of start up capital be sufficient or will the 

cost to the Treasury be determined by the success of the auction 

process? 

3. It took almost twenty years to pay off a similar corporation of 

this nature that was formed in response to the Great Depression— 

how long do you think a new corporation will need to be in existence? And when would it return its investment in full? 

4. What type of loans do you see as ideal to be purchased and 

modified? 

5. Please describe the process of sorting out the deserving loans 

vs. speculators who may have made a bad investment? 

A.1. 

INTRODUCTION

Legislation passed by the Senate Banking Committee providing 

for a Federal Reserve auction to permit bulk sales of loan pools to 

private sector participants and new authorities to FHA to insure 

restructured mortgages would provide a key to broad scale restructuring of troubled home mortgages and the restoration of stability 

to mortgage markets. For more than a year, financial institutions 

and the complex legal entities that hold the bulk of troubled 

subprime and Alt-A mortgages have failed to slow the pace of foreclosures—despite exhortation by the Bush administration for mortgage servicers, lenders, and investors to provide voluntary relief. 

Foreclosure action was taken on almost one million properties in 

the second half of 2007, with more in the fourth quarter of last 

year than in the previous quarter, notwithstanding the voluntary 

efforts by the HOPE NOW alliance to curtail foreclosures. Divided 

ownership, conflicts of interest, and the tax consequences of mortgage restructuring further complicate the process. 

The crisis in confidence and liquidity coupled with escalating 

foreclosures are likely to drive over-corrective declines in home and 

asset prices. Only by removing the sick assets and restructuring 

them into healthier assets can the effects be contained. 

The Senate Banking Committee legislation is designed to solve 

two problems. First, it would facilitate the refinancing of millions 

of mortgage loans in a timely manner, to avoid unnecessary defaults, foreclosure and more severe home price declines. FHA insurance would be available for the new loans to encourage private 

lenders to act. 

At the same time, the legislation would help to restore liquidity 

and stability to the capital markets. A Federal Reserve-organized 

auction would permit the private sector quickly to reprice existing 


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mortgage pools and restore financial stability. Existing pools of 

troubled loans would be swapped for cash and Treasury securities, 

at a steep, auction-determined discount. Current investors will take 

a haircut, exchanging their uncertain and declining-value assets for 

the liquidity and reduced market risk of Treasury securities or 

cash. Purchasers would have bought at a discount, and eligible 

loans could be refinanced with FHA insurance. 

Currently many subprime mortgages are serviced on behalf of investors in securitization trusts whose interests are not identical. 

The servicers/trustees’ unclear obligations to the investors, along 

with certain provisions of the Pooling and Servicing Agreements 

(PSAs), make it difficult for servicers to make beneficial modifications to at-risk mortgages and to prevent unnecessary foreclosures, 

and nearly impossible to sell such mortgages. A policy that encouraged the trusts, on a voluntary basis, to sell the loan or a pool of 

loans to a new owner, without the complex duties to various investors, would make it far more likely that beneficial modifications occurred at a rapid pace, especially if accompanied by policies providing federal credit enhancement for appropriate modified loans. 

Unfortunately, provisions of the PSAs may preclude the servicer 

from selling individual mortgages or pools of mortgages to new 

holders in many circumstances when such a sale would be beneficial—both to investors and to homeowners. This problem can be 

readily addressed, however, through modification of the tax code 

governing Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs). 

REMIC provisions can be enacted to make continued tax benefits 

contingent on PSA modifications that would permit servicers to sell 

loans under the program when it would be beneficial to the trusts. 

Modifications to REMIC would facilitate the sale of loans and/or 

loan pools to new owners and help to stabilize housing markets. 

THE SENATE LEGISLATION LOAN PLAN WITH AN AUCTION: HOW IT

WOULD WORK

Transfer, triage, and restructure at-risk loans 

The overarching goal is to transfer, efficiently and transparently, 

large numbers of existing loans from the current holders of the 

mortgages, stymied by conflicting interests, to new owners, who 

will, as needed to avoid unnecessary foreclosures on owner-occupants, refinance them on affordable and responsible terms. 

The auction and transfer 

• The Federal Reserve would organize auctions, through which 

existing loans could be efficiently sold in bulk to FHA lenders. The 

government would not purchase any loans. The loans would be sold 

and bought by market participants. 

• The auction would determine the price the new lenders would 

pay (with assurance that loans meeting certain criteria would be 

eligible for credit enhancement) and the price at which the current 

holders would sell, establishing a market price. 

• The ‘‘haircut’’ will ensure there is no bailout of the financial institutions and existing investors, many of whom uncritically and irresponsibly created the bubble. 


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• Servicers could receive cash or Treasury bonds for the loans, 

allowing them to mimic, at a market-determined discount, the income stream anticipated by investors for a loan pool. 

• Investors would take a hit, trading a reduction in asset value 

and yield. However, the widespread swap of now-illiquid pools of 

mortgage-backed securities for liquid Treasuries or cash could alleviate the credit crisis that has spread beyond housing-related securities. 

• The resulting transfer also will help to unfreeze the capital 

markets. Current investors will exchange the mortgage-backed securities they hold, whose value is uncertain, for the liquidity and 

reduced market risk of Treasury securities or cash. Restoration of 

liquidity and transparency will help to restore financial stability to 

credit markets. 

• When the auction-determined price for loan pools gets within 

a predetermined margin to the face value of the loan, the auction 

program will automatically shut off because the close-to-par pricing 

will indicate that it is no longer needed. 

Portfolio triage 

• Under program rules, purchasers of the pools of mortgages 

would refinance eligible loans for owner-occupants into new, FHAbacked loans. 

• Loans that were currently performing and not at imminent 

risk would remain intact. 

• Loans that would be unsustainable even if restructured would 

be foreclosed, or otherwise terminated, under program rules designed to prevent unnecessary adverse impacts. 

Loan restructuring 

• Responsible originators working with the Federal Housing Administration would restructure loans, when restructuring would reduce the likelihood of default, foreclosure, and liquidation. 

• Only loans on owner-occupied homes, with currently 

unaffordable loans, would be eligible for refinance. Speculators 

would be excluded. 

• Most of the refinanced loans would take the form of new fixedrate 30-year mortgages underwritten to 90% of current home value. 

• New loans would be originated with sound, individualized underwriting, based on the current value of the property and real income verification. 

• The legislation provides for strict anti-abuse rules. 

• The Senate legislation provides for adequate funding of the 

loan restructuring whether conducted through auctions or on an individualized basis. Funds for the program come from the GSEs as 

well as loan fees from lenders and borrowers. No taxpayer funds 

would be used for credit enhancements in the loan restructuring. 

The specialized loan program will not be needed once stability 

is restored to the markets and the legislation provides for a cutoff of new authority in 2011. 


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RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR TESTER 

FROM ROBERT K. STEEL 

Q.1. How far into the housing crisis are we at this point? When do 

you believe foreclosure rates will reach their apex? 

A.1. The housing correction began in early 2006, and the housing 

sector is likely to remain weak well into 2008. Inventories of unsold 

new and existing homes are elevated and look to remain high 

through the year. This will weigh on both housing prices and construction going forward. Some regions that experienced the highest 

house price increases during the boom are now seeing substantial 

home price depreciation. Housing starts overall are down more 

than 50 percent from their peak in early 2006. The number of permits for single-family homes remains lower than housing starts, 

pointing to continued future weakness in residential investment. 

Residential construction subtracted nearly a percentage point from 

GDP growth in both 2006 and 2007, and we expect it to remain a 

drag on growth into 2008. 

The housing market downturn and broader economic weakness 

have contributed to an increase in mortgage delinquencies and 

foreclosures. Through Q3 of last year, we were on track for around 

a million and a half foreclosures started in 2007, however, many 

of these will not end up sold at a foreclosure auction or as a lenderowned property. It is unclear when foreclosures will peak, as that 

will depend on regional and overall economic conditions going forward. We expect the foreclosure rate to remain elevated above its 

historical average through 2008 and into 2009. 


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