Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 33 / Monday, February 22, 2021 / Proposed Rules 10501 

identified in paragraph (j)(2) of this AD. 

Information may be emailed to: 9-AVS-AIR730-AMOC@faa.gov. Before using any 

approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 

principal inspector, or lacking a principal 

inspector, the manager of the responsible 

Flight Standards Office. 

(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any 

requirement in this AD to obtain instructions 

from a manufacturer, the instructions must 

be accomplished using a method approved 

by the Manager, Large Aircraft Section, 

International Validation Branch, FAA; or 

EASA; or Airbus SAS’s EASA Design 

Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by 

the DOA, the approval must include the 

DOA-authorized signature. 

(3) Required for Compliance (RC): Except 

as required by paragraph (i)(2) of this AD, if 

any service information contains procedures 

or tests that are identified as RC, those 

procedures and tests must be done to comply 

with this AD; any procedures or tests that are 

not identified as RC are recommended. Those 

procedures and tests that are not identified 

as RC may be deviated from using accepted 

methods in accordance with the operator’s 

maintenance or inspection program without 

obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided 

the procedures and tests identified as RC can 

be done and the airplane can be put back in 

an airworthy condition. Any substitutions or 

changes to procedures or tests identified as 

RC require approval of an AMOC. 

(j) Related Information 

(1) For information about EASA AD 2020– 

0234, contact the EASA, Konrad-AdenauerUfer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone 

+49 221 8999 000; email ADs@

easa.europa.eu; internet 

www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this 

EASA AD on the EASA website at https://

ad.easa.europa.eu. You may view this 

material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products 

Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 

South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. This 

material may be found in the AD docket on 

the internet at https://www.regulations.gov 

by searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2021–0014. 

(2) For more information about this AD, 

contact Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace 

Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, 

International Validation Branch, FAA, 2200 

South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; 

telephone and fax: 206–231–3229; email 

vladimir.ulyanov@faa.gov. 

Issued on January 21, 2021. 

Gaetano A. Sciortino, 

Deputy Director for Strategic Initiatives, 

Compliance & Airworthiness Division, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2021–01744 Filed 2–19–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2020–1180; Project 

Identifier MCAI–2020–00517–E] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Safran 

Helicopter Engines, S.A. (Type 

Certificate Previously Held by 

Turbomeca, S.A.) Turboshaft Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a 

new airworthiness directive (AD) for 

certain Safran Helicopter Engines, S.A. 

(Safran Helicopter Engines) Arriel 2B, 

2B1, 2C, 2C1, 2C2, 2S1 and 2S2 model 

turboshaft engines. This proposed AD 

was prompted by reports of nonconforming fuel filter pre-blockage 

pressure switches. This proposed AD 

would require repetitive visual 

inspections of the fuel filter by-pass 

indicator pop-up, a one-time operational 

test of the fuel filter pre-blockage 

pressure switch and, depending on the 

findings, replacement of the fuel filter 

pre-blockage pressure switch with a part 

eligible for installation. The FAA is 

proposing this AD to address the unsafe 

condition on these products. 

DATES: The FAA must receive comments 

on this proposed AD by April 8, 2021. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 

11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12 140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail 

address above between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this NPRM, contact Safran Helicopter 

Engines, S.A., Avenue du 1er Mai, 

Tarnos, France; phone: +33 (0) 5 59 74 

45 11. You may view this service 

information at the FAA, Airworthiness 

Products Section, Operational Safety 

Branch, 1200 District Avenue, 

Burlington, MA 01803. For information 

on the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call (781) 238–7759. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket at 

https://www.regulations.gov by 

searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2020–1180; or in person at Docket 

Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

NPRM, the mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI), any 

comments received, and other 

information. The street address for 

Docket Operations is listed above. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Wego Wang, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

ECO Branch, FAA, 1200 District 

Avenue, Burlington, MA 01803; phone: 

(781) 238–7134; fax: (781) 238–7199; 

email: wego.wang@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites you to send any 

written relevant data, views, or 

arguments about this proposal AD. Send 

your comments to an address listed 

under ADDRESSES. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2020–1180; Project Identifier 

MCAI–2020–00517–E’’ at the beginning 

of your comments. The most helpful 

comments reference a specific portion of 

the proposal, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. The FAA will consider 

all comments received by the closing 

date and may amend this proposal 

because of those comments. 

Except for Confidential Business 

Information (CBI) as described in the 

following paragraph, and other 

information as described in 14 CFR 

11.35, the FAA will post all comments 

received, without change, to https://

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. The 

agency will also post a report 

summarizing each substantive verbal 

contact received about this NPRM. 

Confidential Business Information 

CBI is commercial or financial 

information that is both customarily and 

actually treated as private by its owner. 

Under the Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt 

from public disclosure. If your 

comments responsive to this NPRM 

contain commercial or financial 

information that is customarily treated 

as private, that you actually treat as 

private, and that is relevant or 

responsive to this NPRM, it is important 

that you clearly designate the submitted 

comments as CBI. Please mark each 

page of your submission containing CBI 

as ‘‘PROPIN.’’ The FAA will treat such 

marked submissions as confidential 

under the FOIA, and they will not be 


tkelley on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS
10502 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 33 / Monday, February 22, 2021 / Proposed Rules 

placed in the public docket of this 

NPRM. Submissions containing CBI 

should be sent to Wego Wang, Aviation 

Safety Engineer, ECO Branch, FAA, 

1200 District Avenue, Burlington, MA 

01803. Any commentary that the FAA 

receives which is not specifically 

designated as CBI will be placed in the 

public docket for this rulemaking. 

Background 

The European Union Aviation Safety 

Agency (EASA), which is the Technical 

Agent for the Member States of the 

European Community, has issued EASA 

AD 2019–0180, dated July 25, 2019 

(referred to after this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to 

address the unsafe condition on these 

products. The MCAI states: 

Occurrences have been reported of nonconforming fuel filter pre-blockage pressure 

switches, manufactured before December 

2016. The non-conformity of the fuel filter 

pre-blockage pressure switch can cause its 

non-activation in case of fuel system 

contamination, with consequent opening of 

the by-pass without indication in the cockpit. 

This condition, if not detected and 

corrected, and in case of fuel contamination, 

could lead to an uncommanded in-flight 

shut-down, possibly resulting in an 

emergency autorotation landing on a single 

engine helicopter, or to a double 

uncommanded in-flight shut-down on a twin 

engine helicopter. 

To address this potential unsafe condition, 

SAFRAN issued the MSB, providing 

inspection instructions. 

For the reasons described above, this 

[EASA AD] requires repetitive daily visual 

checks of the fuel filter by-pass indicator 

pop-up. This [EASA] AD also requires a onetime operational check of the affected part 

and, depending on findings, replacement of 

that part, which constitutes terminating 

action for the repetitive daily checks as 

required by this [EASA] AD. 

You may obtain further information 

by examining the MCAI in the AD 

docket at https://www.regulations.gov 

by searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2020–1180. 

FAA’s Determination 

This product has been approved by 

EASA and is approved for operation in 

the United States. Pursuant to our 

bilateral agreement with the European 

Community, EASA has notified us of 

the unsafe condition described in the 

MCAI and service information 

referenced above. The FAA is proposing 

this AD because the agency evaluated 

all the relevant information provided by 

EASA and determined the unsafe 

condition described previously is likely 

to exist or develop in other products of 

the same type design. 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

The FAA reviewed Task 73–23–01– 

750–801–A01—Pre-Blockage Pressure 

Switch of the Fuel Filter Tests 

(Electrical), dated November 30, 2012, 

from the Turbomeca Arriel 2 S1 

Maintenance Manual. Task 73–23–01– 

750–801–A01 provides instructions for 

performing an operational test of the 

fuel filter pre-blockage pressure switch. 

This service information is reasonably 

available because the interested parties 

have access to it through their normal 

course of business or by the means 

identified in ADDRESSES. 

Other Related Service Information 

The FAA reviewed Safran Helicopter 

Engines Mandatory Service Bulletin 

(MSB) No. 292 73 2869, Version B, 

dated December 2018. The MSB 

describes procedures for identifying and 

securing pre-blockage pressure switches 

of fuel filter part number P/N 9 550 17 

200 0, which are potentially nonconforming. 

Proposed AD Requirements in This 

NPRM 

This proposed AD would require 

repetitive visual inspections of the fuel 

filter by-pass indicator pop-up, a onetime operational test of the fuel filter 

pre-blockage pressure switch and, 

depending on the findings, replacement 

of the fuel filter pre-blockage pressure 

switch with a part eligible for 

installation. 

Justification for Allowing Pilot To 

Perform Visual Inspection 

This proposed AD would allow the 

visual inspections required by 

paragraph (g)(1) of this NPRM to be 

performed by an aircrew member 

holding at least a private pilot 

certificate. Performing a visual 

inspection to determine if the fuel filter 

by-pass indicator pop-up has been 

activated is not considered an action 

that must be performed by a certified 

person under 14 CFR 43.3. This 

authorization is an exception to our 

standard maintenance regulations. 

Differences Between This Proposed AD 

and the MCAI or the Service 

Information 

EASA AD 2019–0180 defines ‘‘Group 

1’’ engines as Safran Helicopter Engines 

Arriel 2B, 2B1, 2B1A, 2C, 2C1, 2C2, 2S1 

and 2S2 model turboshaft engines with 

an affected a fuel filter pre-blockage 

pressure switch and ‘‘Group 2’’ engines 

as the same Safran Helicopter Engines 

Arriel turboshaft engines not equipped 

with an affected fuel filter pre-blockage 

pressure switch. This AD does not 

define or use ‘‘Group 1’’ or ‘‘Group 2’’ 

and identifies both the affected engines 

and the affected fuel filter pre-blockage 

pressure switch in the Applicability 

paragraph. This AD does not include 

Safran Helicopter Engines Arriel 2B1A 

model turboshaft engines since these 

engines are not type certificated in the 

United States. 

Costs of Compliance 

The FAA estimates that this AD, if 

adopted as proposed, would affect 775 

engines installed on helicopters of U.S. 

registry. 

The FAA estimates the following 

costs to comply with this proposed AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Visual inspection of fuel filter by-pass indicator.1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ................. $0 $85 $65,875 

Operational test of the fuel filter pre-blockage 

pressure switch.

3 work-hours × $85 per hour = $255 ............. 0 255 197,625 

The FAA estimates the following 

costs to do any necessary replacement 

that would be required based on the 

results of the proposed inspection. The 

FAA has no way of determining the 

number of aircraft that might need this 

replacement. 


tkelley on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 33 / Monday, February 22, 2021 / Proposed Rules 10503 

ON-CONDITION COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Replace fuel filter pre-blockage pressure switch ......... 2 work-hours × $85 per hour = $170 ........................... $225 $395 

The FAA has included all known 

costs in its cost estimate. According to 

the manufacturer, however, some of the 

costs of this proposed AD may be 

covered under warranty, thereby 

reducing the cost impact on affected 

operators. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701: General requirements. Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with promoting safe flight of civil 

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on products identified in this 

rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

The FAA determined that this 

proposed AD would not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This proposed AD would not 

have a substantial direct effect on the 

States, on the relationship between the 

national government and the States, or 

on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this proposed regulation: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Would not affect intrastate 

aviation in Alaska, and 

(3) Would not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

Safran Helicopter Engines, S.A. (Type 

Certificate Previously Held by 

Turbomeca, S.A.): Docket No. FAA– 

2020–1180; Project Identifier MCAI– 

2020–00517–E. 

(a) Comments Due Date 

The FAA must receive comments on this 

airworthiness directive (AD) by April 8, 

2021. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to Safran Helicopter 

Engines, S.A., (type certificate previously 

held by Turbomeca, S.A.) Arriel 2B, 2B1, 2C, 

2C1, 2C2, 2S1 and 2S2 model turboshaft 

engines with a fuel filter pre-blockage 

pressure switch, part number 9 550 17 200 

0, and serial number (S/N) 00001 to 12753, 

inclusive, and S/N A0001 to A0247, 

inclusive, installed. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 

Code 7321 Fuel Control/Turbine Engines. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by reports from the 

manufacturer of non-conforming fuel filter 

pre-blockage pressure switches manufactured 

before December 2016. The FAA is issuing 

this AD to prevent the non-conformity of the 

fuel filter pre-blockage pressure switch, 

which can cause its non-activation in case of 

fuel system contamination, with consequent 

opening of the by-pass without indication in 

the cockpit. The unsafe condition, if not 

addressed, could result in uncommanded inflight shut-down of the engine, an emergency 

autorotation landing on a single engine 

helicopter, or an uncommanded in-flight 

shut-down of both engines on a twin engine 

helicopter. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Required Actions 

(1) After the effective date of this AD, 

during the pre-flight inspection for the first 

flight of each day the engine is operated, 

perform a visual inspection of the fuel filter 

by-pass indicator to determine if the fuel 

filter by-pass indicator pop-up has been 

activated. 

(2) Within the next 300 hydro-mechanical 

metering unit (HMU) operating hours or 180 

days after the effective date of this AD, 

whichever occurs first, perform an 

operational test of the fuel filter pre-blockage 

pressure switch in accordance with Task 73– 

23–01–750–801–A01—Pre-Blockage Pressure 

Switch of the Fuel Filter Tests (Electrical), 

dated November 30, 2012, (the Task) from the 

Turbomeca Arriel 2 S1 Maintenance Manual. 

(3) During any visual inspection required 

by paragraph (g)(1) of this AD, if the fuel 

filter by-pass indicator pop-up has been 

activated or, during the operational test 

required by paragraph (g)(2) of this AD, any 

discrepancy is detected as described by the 

Task, before next flight, replace the fuel filter 

pre-blockage pressure switch with a part 

eligible for installation. 

(4) The actions required by paragraph (g)(1) 

of this AD may be performed by the owner/ 

operator (pilot) holding at least a private pilot 

certificate, and must be entered into the 

aircraft records showing compliance with 

this AD, in accordance with 14 CFR 

43.9(a)(1) through (4) and 14 CFR 

91.417(a)(2)(v). The records must be 

maintained as required by 14 CFR 91.417, 

121.380, or 135.439. 

(h) Terminating Action 

Passing the operational test (no failure 

detected) of the fuel filter pre-blockage 

pressure switch, as required by paragraph 

(g)(2) of this AD, or replacement of the fuel 

filter pre-blockage pressure switch with a 

part eligible for installation, constitutes a 

terminating action for the repetitive visual 

inspections required by paragraph (g)(1) of 

this AD for that engine. 

(i) Definition 

A part eligible for installation is a fuel filter 

pre-blockage pressure switch that is not 

listed in the Applicability, paragraph (c), of 

this AD, or a fuel filter pre-blockage pressure 

switch that has passed the operational test 

(no discrepancies detected) required by 

paragraph (g)(2) of this AD. 

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, ECO Branch, FAA, has 

the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, 

if requested using the procedures found in 14 


tkelley on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS
10504 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 33 / Monday, February 22, 2021 / Proposed Rules 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ECO Branch, send it to 

the attention of the person identified in 

Related Information. You may email your 

request to: ANE-AD-AMOC@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(k) Related Information 

(1) For more information about this AD, 

contact Wego Wang, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, ECO Branch, FAA, 1200 District 

Avenue, Burlington, MA 01803; phone: (781) 

238–7134; fax: (781) 238–7199; email: 

wego.wang@faa.gov. 

(2) Refer to EASA AD 2019–0180, dated 

July 25, 2019, for more information. You may 

examine the EASA AD in the AD docket at 

https://www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating it in Docket No. FAA–2020– 

1180. 

(3) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Safran Helicopter Engines, 

S.A., Avenue du 1er Mai, Tarnos, France; 

phone: +33 (0) 5 59 74 40 00. You may view 

this referenced service information at the 

FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 1200 District 

Avenue, Burlington, MA 01803. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call (781) 238–7759. 

Issued on January 22, 2021. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2021–01780 Filed 2–19–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[FAA Rules Docket No. 90–CE–35–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Textron 

Aviation Inc. (Type Certificate 

previously held by Cessna Aircraft 

Company) Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; withdrawal. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is withdrawing a 

notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) 

and supplemental notice of proposed 

rulemaking (SNPRM) that proposed to 

supersede airworthiness directive (AD) 

72–14–08 R1 for Cessna Aircraft 

Company (now Textron Aviation Inc.) 

Models 310, 320, 401, 402, 411, and 421 

airplanes. AD 72–14–08 R1 requires 

repetitively inspecting the fuel and oil 

flexible hose lines for leakage or 

evidence of any damaged or deteriorated 

hose assembly on the above-referenced 

airplanes and replacing any discrepant 

part. Since issuance of the SNPRM, the 

FAA has not received any reports of fuel 

and oil flexible hose lines that leak or 

are damaged and has determined that 

the repetitive inspections required by 

AD 72–14–08 R1 address the unsafe 

condition. Accordingly, the NPRM and 

SNPRM are withdrawn. 

DATES: As of February 22, 2021, the 

proposed rules, which published in the 

Federal Register on October 23, 1990 

(55 FR 42726), and October 22, 1998 (63 

FR 56579), are withdrawn. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff 

Janusz, Supervisory Aviation Safety 

Specialist, Wichita ACO Branch, FAA, 

1801 Airport Road, Wichita, Kansas 

67209; phone: 316–946–4148; fax: 316– 

946–4107; email: jeff.janusz@faa.gov or 

Wichita-COS@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

The FAA issued an NPRM that 

proposed to amend part 39 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

part 39) to supersede AD 72–14–08R1, 

Amendment 39–4215 (46 FR 45597, 

September 14, 1981) (AD 72–14–08 R1), 

which applies to Cessna Aircraft 

Company Models 310, 320, 401, 402, 

411, and 421 series airplanes. The 

current type certificate holder for these 

airplanes is Textron Aviation Inc. The 

NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on October 23, 1990 (55 FR 

42726). The FAA subsequently issued 

an SNPRM, which published on October 

22, 1998 (63 FR 56579). The NPRM and 

SNPRM proposed to: 

• Initially retain the requirement of 

repetitively inspecting the fuel and oil 

flexible hose lines for leakage or 

evidence of any damaged or deteriorated 

hose assembly on all of the affected 

airplanes, and replacing any discrepant 

part; and 

• eventually require, regardless if 

damage or deterioration was found, 

replacing the fuel and oil flexible hose 

assemblies in the engine compartment 

with an improved design hose assembly 

as terminating action for the repetitive 

inspection requirement. For some 

models, the replacement would have 

been mandatory and for others it would 

have been an option instead of 

continuing the repetitive inspections. 

Actions Since the SNPRM Was Issued 

Since issuance of the SNPRM, FAA 

has not received any reports of fuel and 

oil flexible hose lines that leak or are 

damaged and has determined that the 

repetitive inspections required by AD 

72–14–08 R1 address the unsafe 

condition. Therefore, the FAA 

determined that further AD action is not 

warranted and the proposals should be 

withdrawn. 

Withdrawal of the NPRM and SNPRM 

constitutes only such action and does 

not preclude the agency from issuing 

future rulemaking on this issue, nor 

does it commit the agency to any course 

of action in the future. 

Regulatory Findings 

Since this action only withdraws an 

NPRM and SNPRM, it is neither a 

proposed nor a final rule and therefore, 

not covered under Executive Order 

12866 or the Regulatory Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Withdrawal 

■ Accordingly, the notice of proposed 

rulemaking, which published in the 

Federal Register on October 23, 1990 

(55 FR 42726), and the supplemental 

notice of proposed rulemaking, which 

published in the Federal Register on 

October 22, 1998 (63 FR 56579), are 

withdrawn. 

Issued on January 20, 2021. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2021–01771 Filed 2–19–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2011–0099; Product 

Identifier 2010–SW–085–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky 

Aircraft Corporation Model S–76A, S– 

76B, and S–76C Helicopters Modified 

by Supplemental Type Certificate 

SR09211RC 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; withdrawal. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is withdrawing a 

notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) 

that proposed to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) that would 

have applied to all Sikorsky Aircraft 

Corporation (Sikorsky) S–76 model 

helicopters with a certain life raft 


tkelley on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS