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United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

vie Magia dee Charles R. Norgle “Than Assigned Jue
CASE NUMBER 12 C 3849 DATE 2/19/2013
CASE Justin Haskett vs. Village of Frankfort, et al.
TITLE
DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

sss

Defendant Village of Frankfort’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiffs First Amended

Complaint [10] is denied.
Littanbee flog

Wi For further details sce text below.] Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT

Before the Court is the Village of Frankfort’s (the “Village”) Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff
Justin Haskett’s (“Haskett”) First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
For the following reasons, the motion is denied.

Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain a “short plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must provide the
defendant with fair notice of the claim and the grounds for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (citation omitted). The allegations must provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. In other words, a plaintiff's complaint “must actually suggest that the
plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations that raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). The Court construes the complaint “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
accept[s] well-pleaded facts as true, and draw[s] all inferences in [his] favor.” Kolbe & Kolbe Health &
Welfare Benefit Plan v. Med. Coll. of Wis., 657 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted),

In Count I, Haskett alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Village. A municipality or
other local government may be liable under § 1983 “if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a
deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 131
S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690
(1978)). To state a § 1983 Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) the City had an express policy that,
when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) the City had a widespread practice that, although not
authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a
custom or usage within the force of law; or (3) plaintiff's constitutional injury was caused by a person with
final policymaking authority.” McCormick v. City of Chi., 230 F.3d 319, 323-24 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing
McTigue v. City of Chi., 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995)). “It doesn’t matter what form the action of the

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“Poot STATEMENT

responsible authority that injures the plaintiff takes. It might be an ordinance, a regulation, an executive
policy, or an executive act (such as firing the plaintiff). Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 274
F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added); see also Mootye v. Dotson, 73 F. App’x 161, 171 (7th Cir.
2003) (“A municipality can be liable under Section 1983 only for acts taken pursuant to its official policy,
statement, ordinance, regulation or decision, or pursuant to a municipal custom.” (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at
690 (emphasis added)).

Haskett alleges that the Village violated his constitutional rights by enforcing a local Frankfort
ordinance for public intoxication, that is, as an unconstitutional policy. According to Haskett, the ordinance
violates the equal protection and due process clauses of both the United States and Illinois Constitutions; the
First, Fourth and Twenty-First Amendments to the United States Constitution; and the search and seizure
clause of the Illinois Constitution. The Village argues that Haskett fails to allege any facts to establish how
the ordinance violates the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution. Haksett, however, need not
put all of the essential facts in his complaint; and, may add any facts that could be proved consistent with the
allegations in the complaint by filing a brief. See Hrubec v. Nat’ R.R. Passenger Corp., 981 F.2d 962, 963-
64 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see also Geinosky v. City of Chi., 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir.
2012) (“[A] party opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may submit materials outside the pleadings to illustrate
the facts the party expects to be able to prove.” (citations omitted)); Flying J Inc. v. City of New Haven, 549
F.3d 538, 542 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[R]ecognizing the early procedural stage of this case and the need to give
the plaintiff the benefit of the broad Rule 12(b)(6) standard, the additional facts can be presented as long as
they are consistent with the complaint.” (citing Hrubec, 981 F.2d at 963-64)).

In his response brief, Haskett provides sufficient factual details to support his allegation that the
ordinance is unconstitutional. Contrary to the Village’s contention, Haskett provides fair notice of the Monell
claim and the grounds for relief. “Instead of insisting that the parties perfect their pleadings, a judge should

bypass the dross and get on with the case.” United States ex rel. Garst, 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003).
Accordingly, the Village’s motion is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

12C3849 Justin Haskett vs. Village of Frankfort, et al. Page 2 of 2