[Cite as State v. Everette, 129 Ohio St.3d 317, 2011-Ohio-2856.] 

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. EVERETTE, APPELLANT. 

[Cite as State v. Everette, 129 Ohio St.3d 317, 2011-Ohio-2856.] 

Postconviction relief — Definition of “transcript” — The written transcript 

constitutes the “transcript” under App.R. 9 and R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) when 

both a videotape recording and written transcript of proceedings are 

available — Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 

(No. 2010-1325 — Submitted April 5, 2011 — Decided June 16, 2011.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 23585, 

2010-Ohio-2832. 

__________________ 

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

For purposes of determining when the 180-day time period for filing a 

postconviction-relief petition shall accrue, only the certified, written 

transcript constitutes a “transcript” under App.R. 9 and R.C. 

2953.21(A)(2) when both a videotape recording and the written form of 

the proceedings are available. 

__________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J. 

{¶ 1} In this appeal, we decide whether a videotape recording of the trial 

court proceedings filed in the court of appeals constitutes a “transcript” pursuant 

to App.R. 9(A) and R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) so as to trigger the 180-day time 

requirement for filing a petition for postconviction relief under the statute. For 

the reasons stated below, we hold that for purposes of determining when the 180-

day time period for filing a postconviction-relief petition shall accrue, only the 

certified, written transcript constitutes a “transcript” under App.R. 9 and R.C. 

2953.21(A)(2) when both a videotape recording and the written form of the 
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proceedings are available. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of 

appeals and remand the cause to the court of appeals for consideration of 

appellant’s second assignment of error. 

Relevant Background 

{¶ 2} In June 2008, a jury found Thomas E. Everette Jr., appellant, guilty 

of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and grand theft of a motor vehicle, all 

with firearm specifications. The trial court found him guilty of having a weapon 

while under disability and sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility 

of parole after 28 years. 

{¶ 3} Everette appealed his conviction on July 16, 2008. That same day, 

Everette’s trial counsel requested preparation of the trial transcript. On August 1, 

2008, Everette’s appellate counsel filed a praecipe in the appellate court, 

requesting a transcript of a suppression hearing. On August 26, 2008, six 

videotapes—including videotapes of the trial, the hearing on Everette’s motion to 

suppress, and the sentencing hearing—were filed. A summary of the docket was 

filed two days later. That same day, the clerk of courts issued its App.R. 11(B) 

notification that the appellate record was complete and that the transcript of 

proceedings had been filed on August 26, 2008. Written transcripts of the 

suppression hearing and the trial were filed on October 15, 2008. 

{¶ 4} On April 8, 2009, Everette submitted a petition for postconviction 

relief, claiming that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing 

to call a detective as a witness, failing to gather and present telephone records at 

trial, and failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct. Everette supported his 

petition with his own unsworn statement and indicated that he needed the 

transcripts to further support his claims. 

{¶ 5} On April 20, 2009, the state, appellee, moved to dismiss Everette’s 

petition as untimely because it had been filed more than 180 days after the filing 

of the transcript of proceedings (the videotapes) in violation of R.C. 2953.21 
January Term, 2011 

3 

(petition for postconviction relief) and 2953.23 (time for filing petition; appeals). 

Alternatively, the state argued that Everette had not shown that there were 

substantive grounds for relief, and therefore his petition should be summarily 

denied. 

{¶ 6} Everette opposed the motion, arguing that his 180-day time 

limitation did not begin until October 15, 2008, when the written transcripts were 

filed. Consequently, he argued, his petition was due on April 13, 2009, not 

February 23, 2009, as the state asserted, and was timely. 

{¶ 7} The trial court dismissed Everette’s petition, holding that it was 

untimely under R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) because Everette had not established that this 

filing met any of the exceptional circumstances listed in R.C. 2953.23(A) that 

excuse untimely filings and because he had “not shown the existence of 

substantive grounds for relief, which would render his petition subject to 

dismissal without a hearing, even if timely.” Everette appealed to the Second 

District Court of Appeals, which was also hearing his direct appeal. 

{¶ 8} The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of 

Everette’s petition for postconviction relief. State v. Everette, Montgomery App. 

No. 23585, 2010-Ohio-2832, ¶ 39. In overruling Everette’s assignments of error, 

the Second District held that the videotaped recordings that were filed on August 

26, 2008, constituted the transcript of proceedings. Id. at ¶ 33. Consequently, the 

180-day time period for filing Everette’s petition for postconviction relief began 

on August 26, 2008, and expired on February 23, 2009. Id. at ¶ 26. 

{¶ 9} Everette appealed to this court for discretionary review, which this 

court granted, 126 Ohio St.3d 1597, 2010-Ohio-4928, 935 N.E.2d 44, to clarify 

what constitutes a “trial transcript” for purposes of filing a petition for 

postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). We hold that in cases in 

which a videotape recording of the proceedings and a written form of the trial 

court proceedings is certified by a reporter, only the certified, written transcript of 
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the trial court proceedings constitutes a “transcript” under App.R. 9 for purposes 

of calculating the 180-day period in which an appellant may timely file a petition 

for postconviction relief in accordance with R.C. 2953.21. 

Analysis 

R.C. 2953.21 and App.R. 9 Provide Little Guidance as to the Definitions of 

“Trial Transcript” or “Transcript of Proceedings” 

{¶ 10} R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) sets forth the time by which a petition for 

postconviction relief must be filed. That statute provides: 

{¶ 11} “Except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised 

Code, a petition under division (A)(1) of this section shall be filed no later than 

one hundred eighty days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the 

court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication 

or, if the direct appeal involves a sentence of death, the date on which the trial 

transcript is filed in the supreme court.” 

{¶ 12} Although R.C. 2953.21 does not define “trial transcript,” App.R. 

9(A), which governs the record on appeal, is instructive: 

{¶ 13} “The original papers and exhibits thereto filed in the trial court, the 

transcript of proceedings, if any, including exhibits, and a certified copy of the 

docket and journal entries prepared by the clerk of the trial court shall constitute 

the record on appeal in all cases. A videotape recording of the proceedings 

constitutes the transcript of proceedings other than hereinafter provided, and, for 

purposes of filing, need not be transcribed into written form. Proceedings 

recorded by means other than videotape must be transcribed into written form. 

When the written form is certified by the reporter in accordance with App.R. 

9(B), such written form shall then constitute the transcript of proceedings. When 

the transcript of proceedings is in the videotape medium, counsel shall type or 

print those portions of such transcript necessary for the court to determine the 
January Term, 2011 

5 

questions presented, certify their accuracy, and append such copy of the portions 

of the transcripts to their briefs. 

{¶ 14} “In all capital cases the trial proceedings shall include a written 

transcript of the record made during the trial by stenographic means.” 

{¶ 15} Although App.R. 9(A) is helpful in determining what constitutes a 

“trial transcript” or a “transcript of proceedings,” in and of itself, the rule does not 

provide sufficient clarity to resolve this issue. Thus, our analysis does not end 

here. 

In the Absence of a Statutory Definition, “Trial Transcript” and “Transcript of 

Proceedings” Should be Given Their Usual, Normal, and Customary Meanings

{¶ 16} The legislature has not defined “trial transcript.” See State v. 

Hollingsworth, 118 Ohio St.3d 1204, 2008-Ohio-1967, 886 N.E.2d 863, ¶ 2 

(Moyer, C.J., concurring in decision to dismiss the cause as having been 

improvidently accepted). However, we are not left without guidance. The 

General Assembly has directed that words not defined by statute “shall be * * * 

construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” R.C. 1.42. In 

accordance with that statutory mandate, we have held repeatedly that “[i]n the 

absence of a specific statutory definition, words used in a statute must be 

interpreted in their usual, normal, or customary meaning.” State ex rel. Brenders 

v. Hall (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 632, 634, 646 N.E.2d 822; State ex rel. Cassels v. 

Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 220, 631 N.E.2d 

150. 

{¶ 17} In accordance with the directive of R.C. 1.42, we proceed to define 

“trial transcript” and “transcript of proceedings” by giving them their usual, 

normal, and customary meaning. 

Common Usage of “Trial Transcript” and “Transcript of Proceedings” 

{¶ 18} Black’s Law Dictionary defines “transcript” as “[a] handwritten, 

printed, or typed copy of testimony given orally; esp., the official record of 
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proceedings in a trial or hearing, as taken down by a court reporter.” Black’s Law 

Dictionary (9th Ed.2009) 1636. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 

defines “transcript” as “a written or printed copy”; “a usu. typewritten copy of 

dictated or recorded matter”; “an official or legal and often published copy or 

engrossment of a decree, testimony, or proceedings.” Webster’s Third New 

International Dictionary (1986) 2426. 

{¶ 19} Black’s Law Dictionary defines “transcript of proceedings” as “[a] 

compilation of all documents relating to a bond issue, typically including the 

notices, affidavits of notices, a bond resolution (or bond ordinance), official 

statement, trust indenture and loan agreements, and minutes of meetings of all 

authorizing bodies.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 1636. 

{¶ 20} Based on these definitions of “transcript” and “transcript of 

proceedings,” we hold that a “transcript” or “transcript of proceedings” must be in 

written, typed, or printed form. 

{¶ 21} Our holding is consistent with the usual, normal, and customary 

meanings of the words and also in harmony with the proposed amendments to 

App.R. 9. According to the Staff Note for the July 1, 2011 amendment to App.R. 

9, “[t]he amendments * * * are designed to strike a balance between the trial 

court’s autonomy in determining how to record proceedings in the trial court and 

the appellate court’s preference for official transcripts in lieu of video recordings 

transcribed by counsel or counsel’s assistants. Under App.R. 9(A), trial courts 

may choose to record proceedings through the use of a stenographic/shorthand 

reporter, an audio-recording device, and/or a video-recording device, except in 

capital cases, in which a stenographic/shorthand reporter is required. Regardless 

of the method of recording the proceedings, a transcript is required for the record 

on appeal; a videotaped recording of the trial court proceedings is no longer 

adequate.” (Emphasis added.) 
January Term, 2011 

7 

{¶ 22} As stated in the Staff Note, appellate courts prefer written 

transcripts, because portions of the proceedings are required to be cited on appeal. 

While modern technology has advanced how proceedings before a trial court may 

be recorded and documented, the written, typed, or printed version remains the 

ideal way of citing the record on appeal. In fact, in many courtrooms, 

proceedings are recorded by audio or video devices rather than by stenographic 

reporters. Despite these technological advances, a written document with page 

numbers is much easier to cite than a transcript in another medium, such as a 

videotape or audio recording, and avoids subjective interpretation of the words 

uttered by witnesses. In addition, a written transcript provides all parties and the 

courts with an objective source from which all concerned can refer to the same 

information. 

Parties’ Interpretation of “Trial Transcript” and “Transcript of Proceedings” 

{¶ 23} The state argues that we need look no further than App.R. 9(A) to 

reach a determination: “A videotape recording of the proceedings constitutes the 

transcript of proceedings other than hereinafter provided, and, for purposes of 

filing, need not be transcribed into written form.” The state contends that because 

videotape recordings are the transcript of the proceedings, we need not look 

beyond this single sentence to resolve this issue. 

{¶ 24} We are not persuaded. 

{¶ 25} The state’s myopic focus on a single sentence in App.R. 9(A) 

ignores the other language in the rule and is contrary to a tenet of statutory 

interpretation: “A guiding principle of statutory interpretation is that the statute 

must be construed as a whole and each of its parts must be given effect so that 

they are compatible with each other and related enactments.” Brookwood 

Presbyterian Church v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 127 Ohio St.3d 469, 2010-Ohio-5710, 

940 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 26 (Brown, C.J., dissenting), citing Humphrys v. Winous Co.

(1956), 165 Ohio St. 45, 49, 59 O.O. 65, 133 N.E.2d 780. 
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{¶ 26} Everette correctly argues that App.R. 9(A), looked at as a whole, 

identifies a certified, written transcript as the transcript of proceedings when one 

is filed. The second sentence of App.R. 9(A) provides that a “videotape recording 

of the proceedings constitutes the transcript of proceedings other than hereinafter 

provided, and, for purposes of filing, need not be transcribed into written form.” 

(Emphasis added.) The phrase “other than hereinafter provided” is instructive 

generally because it signals that there is an exception that follows later in the rule. 

{¶ 27} Significantly, the rule later states: “When the written form is 

certified by the reporter in accordance with App.R. 9(B), such written form shall

then constitute the transcript of proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, although 

it is true that a videotape recording of the proceedings constitutes the transcript of 

the proceedings when a written transcript is not provided, pursuant to this 

exception, when a written transcript is certified by the reporter, it constitutes the 

“transcript of proceedings” under App.R. 9(A). We thus hold that whenever a 

written transcript is certified by the reporter in accordance with App.R. 9(A), the 

written transcript shall constitute the trial “transcript” or “transcript of 

proceedings” for purposes of calculating the time by which to file a petition for 

postconviction relief. A videotape recording constitutes the trial transcript or 

transcript of proceedings only when there is no written transcript certified by the 

reporter. 

{¶ 28} To hold otherwise would render the exception in the rule 

meaningless. Under the state’s view, whenever a videotape recording of the 

proceedings is filed, the clock for purposes of appeal would begin to run. That 

would mean that the 180-day time limit does not begin to run until the videotape 

recording is filed even if a certified, written transcript is filed first. That result is 

not only contrary to the language of App.R. 9(A), but defies logic. 

Application to this Case 
January Term, 2011 

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{¶ 29} Here, the videotapes were filed first on August 26, 2008. The 

certified, written transcripts were filed on October 15, 2008. Under our holding, 

the clock for calculating the timeliness of Everette’s petition did not begin to run 

until October 15, when the certified, written transcripts were filed. Thus, Everette 

had 180 days from October 15, 2008, to file his petition for postconviction relief 

pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. Because Everette filed it within this 180-day time 

period, his petition for postconviction relief was timely. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 30} In cases in which a videotape recording of the proceedings and a 

written form of the proceedings is certified by a reporter, only the certified, 

written transcript of the trial court proceedings constitutes a trial transcript or 

transcript of proceedings under App.R. 9 so as to start the clock for the 180-day 

period to file a petition for postconviction relief in accordance with R.C. 2953.21. 

Therefore, the 180-day period to file a petition for postconviction relief does not 

begin to run until the certified, written transcript of the proceedings is filed. 

Because the trial court and court of appeals erred in holding that the petition for 

postconviction relief was untimely, we reverse the judgment of the court of 

appeals and remand to the court of appeals for consideration of appellant’s second 

assignment of error. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

 PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 

 O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 

__________________ 

LANZINGER, J., dissenting.

{¶ 31} I respectfully dissent. 

{¶ 32} The statute that relates to timely filing states, “Except as otherwise 

provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, a petition under division (A)(1) 
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of this section shall be filed no later than one hundred eighty days after the date 

on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of 

the judgment of conviction or adjudication or, if the direct appeal involves a 

sentence of death, the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the supreme 

court.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). In either situation, it is the trial 

transcript’s filing in the appellate court that begins the running of the 180-day 

time frame. 

{¶ 33} Although the Supreme Court Rules of Practice do not discuss the 

meaning of a trial transcript, App.R. 9(A) does: 

{¶ 34} “The original papers and exhibits thereto filed in the trial court, the 

transcript of proceedings, if any, including exhibits, and a certified copy of the 

docket and journal entries prepared by the clerk of the trial court shall constitute 

the record on appeal in all cases. A videotape recording of the proceedings 

constitutes the transcript of proceedings other than hereinafter provided, and, for 

purposes of filing, need not be transcribed into written form. Proceedings 

recorded by means other than videotape must be transcribed into written form. 

When the written form is certified by the reporter in accordance with App.R. 

9(B), such written form shall then constitute the transcript of proceedings. When 

the transcript of proceedings is in the videotape medium, counsel shall type or 

print those portions of such transcript necessary for the court to determine the 

questions presented, certify their accuracy, and append such copy of the portions 

of the transcripts to their briefs. 

{¶ 35} “In all capital cases the trial proceedings shall include a written 

transcript of the record made during the trial by stenographic means.” (Emphasis 

added.) 

{¶ 36} Thus, the “transcript of proceedings if any” constitutes part of the 

record on appeal. A videotape recording of the proceedings is the transcript and, 

unlike proceedings recorded by other means, need not be transcribed into written 
January Term, 2011 

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form for filing. Capital cases must have a written transcript of the record made by 

stenographic means. The language of App.R. 9(A) specifies that videotaped 

proceedings are different and need not be transcribed for purposes of filing. 

{¶ 37} Although the majority wishes to adopt language of the proposed 

rule that would make videotape recordings no longer adequate as transcripts for 

purposes of appeal, those rule amendments have not yet been adopted. When 

App.R. 9 is looked at in its entirety, in its current form, the state’s position is 

correct. On August 26, 2008, six videotapes—including videotapes of the trial, 

the hearing on Everette’s motion to suppress, and the sentencing hearing—were 

filed. Consequently, the 180 days to file his petition for postconviction relief 

began that day and expired on February 23, 2009. I would affirm the judgment of 

the court of appeals in dismissing this appeal as untimely. 

 O’DONNELL and CUPP, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 

__________________ 

 Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Andrew T. French, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Jeremy J. Masters, Assistant 

Public Defender, for appellant. 

______________________