alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-30382

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

KEVIN RAY,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 6:09-CR-103-1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Kevin Ray appeals his conviction and sentence for attempting to entice a

minor to engage in criminal sexual activity and attempting to produce child

pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(b) and 2251(a). Ray was sentenced

to concurrent terms of 151 months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised

release on count one and 180 months of imprisonment and 10 years of

supervised release on count two.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

May 13, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 10-30382 Document: 00511477096 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/13/2011
No. 10-30382

Ray argues that it was legally impossible for him to have committed the

charged offenses because the purported minor was actually an undercover adult

agent. We rejected this argument in United States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510 (5th

Cir. 2001), explaining that the legal impossibility defense does not apply when

the defendant’s scheme would be an offense “if fully carried out as he ‘desired’

or ‘planned,’” even if that plan is mistaken about the facts. See id. at 513.

Ray also asserts that he never believed the purported minor was actually

a minor. The Government presented evidence that the purported minor stated

in the chat sessions she was 15 years old; that Ray stated in the chat sessions

that he would get in trouble because of her age; and that Ray stated after his

arrest that he had gone to the park to meet the minor to warn her of the dangers

of meeting strangers on the internet, a concern he stated he would not have had

if he thought the minor was an adult. By finding Ray guilty, the jury resolved

this issue against him.

Ray’s argument that the sentence was greater that necessary to achieve

the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 is also unavailing. Ray could not have

been sentenced below the mandatory minimum penalties of 120 months for

count one or 180 months for count two. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(b), 2251(e); see

also United States v. Krumnow, 476 F.3d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 2007). To the extent

Ray argues that the district court abused its discretion by not departing

downward to 120 months of imprisonment for count one, he has not rebutted the

presumption of reasonableness that applies to his 151-month guidelines

sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009),

cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1930 (2010).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

2

Case: 10-30382 Document: 00511477096 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/13/2011
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                      5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     Canadian Dollars
       
<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                .6628
<CASH>                                         4,991,080
<SECURITIES>                                   741,001
<RECEIVABLES>                                  430,874
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               6,447,954
<PP&E>                                         19,040,838
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (8,937,066)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 16,551,726
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          619,793
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       14,234,740
<OTHER-SE>                                     1,461,148
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   16,551,726
<SALES>                                        77,724
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               161,082
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  1,105,072
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (943,990)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (943,990)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (943,990)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (0.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.07)
        


</TABLE>
#### Harold V. Engle, Respondent, v. Yankee Realty Corporation, Appellant.

Motion by appellant to extend time to serve its answer to the complaint granted; time extended until 20 days after the entry of the order determining the appeal herein. Beldoek, Acting P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Christ and Pette, JJ., concur. .
# C_2016412EN.01000401.xml

| 9.11.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 412/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.11.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 412/4

---

Euro exchange rates (1)

1

8 November 2016

(2016/C 412/04)

1 euro =

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,1038 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 115,66 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4418 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,89088 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 9,9185 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,0778 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 9,0753 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 27,021 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 305,57 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,3283 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,5073 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 3,4993 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,4332 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,4756 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 8,5597 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,5060 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,5347 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 253,75 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 14,7318 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 7,4919 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,5100 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 14 456,30 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,6562 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 53,684 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 70,4040 |
| THB | Thai baht | 38,589 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 3,5364 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 20,4890 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 73,5085 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,1038

JPY

Japanese yen

115,66

DKK

Danish krone

7,4418

GBP

Pound sterling

0,89088

SEK

Swedish krona

9,9185

CHF

Swiss franc

1,0778

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

9,0753

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

27,021

HUF

Hungarian forint

305,57

PLN

Polish zloty

4,3283

RON

Romanian leu

4,5073

TRY

Turkish lira

3,4993

AUD

Australian dollar

1,4332

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,4756

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

8,5597

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,5060

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,5347

KRW

South Korean won

1 253,75

ZAR

South African rand

14,7318

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

7,4919

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,5100

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

14 456,30

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,6562

PHP

Philippine peso

53,684

RUB

Russian rouble

70,4040

THB

Thai baht

38,589

BRL

Brazilian real

3,5364

MXN

Mexican peso

20,4890

INR

Indian rupee

73,5085

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

1

Source

---
#### 243.204 Administration.

Follow the procedures at PGI 243.204 for administration of change orders.

[75 FR 48277, Aug. 10, 2010]
227.7107-2 Contracts for construction supplies and research and development work. Use the provisions and clauses required by 227-7103-6 and 227.7203-6 when the acquisition is limited to— ( a ) Construction supplies or materials;
( b ) Experimental, developmental, or research work, or test and evaluation studies of structures, equipment, processes, or materials for use in construction; or
( c ) Both.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-22-00276-CR

Efren MORENO,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2021CR10602

Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice 

Delivered and Filed: September 14, 2022

PERMANENTLY ABATED

On August 30, 2022, appellant’s attorney notified this court appellant died on August 1, 

2022 while in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The death of an appellant 

during the pendency of an appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction. Molitor v. State, 862 S.W.2d 

615, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Marez v. State, No. 04-05-00651-CR, 2006 WL 118384, at *1 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 18, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication.) Here, 

the appeal was perfected before appellant’s death, and this court has not yet issued a mandate. 
04-22-00276-CR

- 2 -

Under these circumstances, the appropriate disposition is the permanent abatement of the appeal. 

TEX. R. APP. P. 7.1(a)(2). Accordingly, we order the appeal to be permanently abated. See id. 

PER CURIAM

Do Not Publish
216.603-4 Contract clauses. ( b ) ( 2 ) See 217.7405(a) for additional guidance regarding use of the clause at FAR 52.216-24, Limitation of Government Liability.
( 3 ) Use the clause at 252.217-7027, Contract Definitization, in accordance with its prescription at 217.7406(b), instead of the clause at FAR 52.216-25, Contract Definitization.
[61 FR 7743, Feb. 29, 1996, as amended at 71 FR 58537, Oct. 4, 2006; 72 FR 69159, Dec. 7, 2007; 76 FR 76319, Dec. 7, 2011]
EXHIBIT 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of EMEX Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Joy K.
Moseley, acting Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


         /s/  Joy K. Moseley
         ---------------------------------------------
         Acting Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
         August 19, 2002
#### 1419.602 Procedures.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                       9
<MULTIPLIER>                    1000
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                    DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<CASH>                                  41,478
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                       0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                             0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                             0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>            586,523
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                   4,018
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                     4,001
<LOANS>                              1,063,949
<ALLOWANCE>                             (9,854)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       1,744,706
<DEPOSITS>                             997,899
<SHORT-TERM>                           361,758
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                    138,112
<LONG-TERM>                             68,389
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        0
<PREFERRED>                                  0
<COMMON>                                29,515
<OTHER-SE>                             149,033
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>       1,744,706
<INTEREST-LOAN>                         91,587
<INTEREST-INVEST>                       20,952
<INTEREST-OTHER>                         4,403
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                       116,942
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                      33,513
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                      51,982
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                   64,960
<LOAN-LOSSES>                            3,451
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                          24
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                         48,507
<INCOME-PRETAX>                         31,701
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>              31,701
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              0
<CHANGES>                                    0
<NET-INCOME>                            22,375
<EPS-BASIC>                             2.11
<EPS-DILUTED>                             2.08
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                            4.48
<LOANS-NON>                              1,551
<LOANS-PAST>                             2,290
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                           811
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                         16,721
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                         9,010
<CHARGE-OFFS>                            3,030
<RECOVERIES>                               423
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                        9,854
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                     9,854
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                          0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                      0

</TABLE>
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 11009 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

–

Appellee ,

v.
REYNALDO RENDON, JR., also known as Rey Reynold, also known as Rey Rendon , Defendant

– Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 5:17

- CR

- 19

- 1

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Reynaldo Rendon, Jr. pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition

. H e appeals his conviction, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affi rmance arguing that Rendon ’s challenge is foreclosed by circuit precedent or, alternatively, requesting an extension of time to file its

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set f orth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED April 26, 2018 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 17-11009 Document: 00514448159 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/26/2018No. 17

- 11009

2 brief on the merits. The Government does not invoke the waiver provision contained in the plea agreement. See United States v. Story , 439 F.3d 226, 230

- 31 (5th Cir. 2006)

. Rendon’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is foreclosed. See United States v. Alcantar , 733 F.3d 143, 145

- 46 (5 th Cir. 2013); United States v. Daugherty , 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
De Leon , 170 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1999). He concedes as much and raises the argument to preserve it for further review. Accordingly, the Government’s
motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, the alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED as unnecessary, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Case: 17-11009 Document: 00514448159 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/26/2018
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, October 22, 2018. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, October 22, 2018 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A19I0051. JOHN DINOS et al. v. RICHFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al. . Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby DENIED.
LC NUMBERS: 2016CV02027
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO MIRAGE RESORTS, INCORPORATED
                     DIRECTORS' DEFERRED FEE PLAN

WHEREAS,  Mirage Resorts, Incorporated maintains a Directors' Deferred
Fee  Plan  effective  as of February 1, 1997, as amended  by  a  First
Amendment  thereto  effective  as of   February  28,  1997,  a  Second
Amendment  thereto  effective  as of February  1,  1998  and  a  Third
Amendment  thereto effective as of February 15, 1999 (as  so  amended,
the  "Deferred Fee Plan"); and

WHEREAS, the Board of Directors desires to amend further the terms  of
the  Deferred Fee Plan in certain respects as permitted by Section 8.4
of the Deferred Fee Plan;

NOW, THEREFORE, it is declared as follows:

      1.        AMENDMENT TO SECTION 6.5.  Section 6.5 of the Deferred
Fee  Plan is amended to add, following the word "appointment"  at  the
end of the last sentence thereof, the following:

          ",  or  (iii)  Mirage  Resorts, Incorporated  consummates  a
          merger with a wholly owned subsidiary of MGM Grand, Inc.,  a
          Delaware  corporation ("MGM"), pursuant to an agreement  and
          plan  of  merger  approved by the Board of Directors,  as  a
          result  of  which  Mirage Resorts,  Incorporated  becomes  a
          subsidiary of MGM."

      2.    OTHER  CAPITALIZED TERMS.  Except as  otherwise  expressly
provided,  all  capitalized terms used herein shall have  the  meaning
assigned to such terms in the Deferred Fee Plan.

      3.    CONFIRMATION.  In all other respects,  the  terms  of  the
Deferred Fee Plan are hereby confirmed and shall remain in full  force
and effect.

           IN  WITNESS  WHEREOF,  Mirage  Resorts,  Incorporated   has
caused  this  document to be executed by its duly  authorized  officer
effective as of March 4, 2000.

                              MIRAGE RESORTS, INCORPORATED

                              JAMES E. PETTIS
                              ----------------------------------------
                              By:  James E. Pettis
                              Title:  Vice President - Risk Management









                              EXHIBIT 10.2
From: Marni Karlin

To: Sharrow, Michelle - AMS

Subject: Re: Clarifying question re. Exemption of Organic Products From Assessment Under a Commodity Promotion Law

Date: Monday, December 22, 2014 2:19:36 PM

Thank you. Can you clarify what that language does mean?

Thanks.

On Dec 22, 2014, at 2:08 PM, Sharrow, Michelle - AMS <Michelle.Sharrow@ams.usda.gov>

 wrote:

Marni:

Your question concerns language that appears in the Executive Order 12988, Civil

 Justice Reform, analysis of the organic exemption proposal published in the

 December 16th Federal Register at 79 FR 75006. The preemption language,

 discussed in the referenced promotion laws, does not prevent the organic

 exemption proposal from going forward. Please submit any comments that you

 have on the proposed rule, as provided therein. Your question and response will

 be placed on the record.

Sincerely,

Michelle P. Sharrow

Marketing Order and Agreement Division

Agricultural Marketing Service

U.S. Department of Agriculture

On Dec 18, 2014, at 5:59 PM, Marni Karlin <mkarlin@ota.com> wrote:

Hi Michelle,

Thanks for taking the time to respond to my clarifying question! On page

 75006, under “Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985”, there is

 language that reads “Section 11 of the Beef Promotion and Research Act

 of 1985 (7 U.S.C. 2910) provides that it shall not preempt or supersede

 any other program relating to beef promotion organized and operated

 under the laws of the United States or any State.” There is similar

 language under the Generic Act, Dairy Production, Hass Avocado,

 Mushroom, Popcorn, and Soybean.

I do not understand what this language means. It concerns me that

 perhaps it means that the exemption for organic operations “shall not

 preempt or supersede” any other program – which would make the
 exemption ineffectual. Can you help me understand what the language

 means? Thanks!

________________________________________________

Marni Karlin

Vice President of Government Affairs / General Counsel

Organic Trade Association (OTA) | www.ota.com

Direct: (202) 403-8511

Follow OTA on:

<image001.png><image002.png><image003.png><image004.png>

This electronic message contains information generated by the USDA solely for

 the intended recipients. Any unauthorized interception of this message or the use

 or disclosure of the information it contains may violate the law and subject the

 violator to civil or criminal penalties. If you believe you have received this

 message in error, please notify the sender and delete the email immediately.
On October 26, 2012, OCR resolved this Title IX  athletics compliance review, which examined whether Hingham Public Schools  (District) discriminated against female students by denying them an equal  opportunity to participate in its interscholastic athletics program and by  failing to provide them with benefits equivalent to those provided to male  students.  Information obtained during  OCR’s investigation revealed a large disparity between the enrollment of female  high school students and their participation in interscholastic athletics and  that the District had not conducted any recent district-wide assessment of  student athletic interest.  OCR did not make a determination as to whether the  District was in compliance with Title IX with respect to athletic participation  because, prior to the conclusion of its investigation of the interests and  abilities of female students, the District requested to enter into a voluntary  resolution agreement. Regarding the benefits and services the District provided  to its athletes, OCR found the District in violation of Title IX for not  ensuring the provision of equivalent benefits and services to its male and  female athletes, in part because OCR determined that the District’s booster  clubs were providing benefits and services to the boys’ teams across several  components of its athletics program, resulting in greater benefits and services  for the boys’ teams than the girls’ teams.   Under the agreement the District will: (1) provide an equal opportunity  for female students to participate in the athletics programs at its high  school; (2) conduct an assessment to determine whether there are unmet  interests and abilities among female students; and (3) take steps to increase  athletic opportunities for female students, in accordance with the results of  the assessment. The District will also: (4) develop, implement and publicize a  procedure to use in requesting the addition of new sports or levels of sports  at the high schools; (5) provide annual notice to students, coaches, and other  District staff of all of the sports offered at each high school; and (6)  immediately assess the scope of the booster club problem and develop a new  policy and practice to oversee booster club involvement with the District’s  interscholastic athletics program. ***Read  the Resolution Letter***PDF (295K) ***| Read    the Resolution Agreement***PDF (130K)

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