IN IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ESTATE OF LYVITA GOMES, Deceased, )

by Alfredo Miranda, Administrator, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Court No. 12 C 4439

)

CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, ) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

DR. ELAZEGUI, DR. SINGH, JENNIFER )

BIBBIANO, RUTH MUURU, and )

EDITH JONES, ) 

)

Defendants. )

Parties’ Proposed Jury Instructions

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AGREED

FUNCTIONS OF THE COURT AND JURY

Members of the jury, you have seen and heard all the evidence and arguments of the 

attorneys. Now I will instruct you on the law.

You have two duties as a jury. Your first duty is to decide the facts from the evidence in 

the case. This is your job, and yours alone.

Your second duty is to apply the law that I give you to the facts. You must follow these 

instructions, even if you disagree with them. Each of the instructions is important, and you must 

follow all of them.

Preform these duties fairly and impartially. Do not allow sympathy, prejudice, fear, or 

public opinion to influence you. You should not be influenced by any person’s race, color, 

religion, national ancestry, or sex.

Nothing I say now, and nothing I said or did during the trial, is meant to indicate any 

opinion on my part about what the facts are or about what your verdict should be.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 1

_______Given

______ Rejected

______Withdrawn

______ Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.1 (modified to include all categories)

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DISPUTED

ALL LITIGANTS EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW

In this case, one of the Defendants, Correct Care Solutions is a corporation. Defendants

Elazegui, Singh, Bibbiano, Muuru and Jones are medical professionals. Lyvita Gomes was a 

person detained at the Lake County Jail. All parties are equal before the law. All parties in this 

case are entitled to the same fair consideration. You are not to afford any more credibility to 

statements made by a witness or a party because they are a medical professional, and you are not 

to afford any less credibility to statements made by a witness or a party because they are an 

individual person. 

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 2

_______Given

______ Rejected

______Withdrawn

_______ Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.3 (modified)

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Defendants Object and propose Defendants’ Instruction 2 which follows form jury 

instruction Fed. JI 7

th Cir 1.03:.

In this case one of the defendants is a company. All parties are equal before the law. A 

company is entitled to the same fair consideration that you would give any individual person.

Plaintiff’s objections: This instruction does not follow the Seventh Circuit Pattern 1.03 in 

substituting “company” for “corporation.” Moreover, Plaintiff’s Proposed No. 2 is more 

appropriately modified to the facts of this case. See Committee Comments: “A court may choose 

to modify the first and third sentences of this instruction for other types of litigants.” (Emphasis 

addeded).

Defendants’ No. 2 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 1.03” (2005 rev.)(modified) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

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AGREED

EVIDENCE

The evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted in 

evidence, and stipulations. 

A stipulation is an agreement between both sides that certain facts are true.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 3

_______Given

______ Rejected

______Withdrawn

_______ Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.4 (modified)

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AGREED

DEPOSITION TESTIMONY

During the trial, certain testimony was presented to you by the reading of a deposition(s) 

or the showing of a video of a deposition. You should give this testimony the same consideration 

you would give it had the witness[es] appeared and testified in court.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 4 (if necessary)

_______Given

______ Rejected

______Withdrawn

_______ Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.5 (modified)

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AGREED

WHAT IS NOT EVIDENCE

Certain things are not to be considered as evidence. I will list them for you:

First, if I told you to disregard any testimony or exhibits or struck any testimony or 

exhibits from the record, such testimony or exhibits are not evidence and must not be considered.

Second, anything that you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence 

and must be entirely disregarded. This includes any press, radio, Internet or television reports 

you may have seen or heard. Such reports are not evidence and your verdict must not be 

influenced in any way by such publicity.

Third, questions and objections or comments by the lawyers are not evidence. Lawyers 

have a duty to object when they believe a question is improper. You should not be influenced by 

any objection, and you should not infer from my rulings that I have any view as to how you 

should decide the case.

Fourth, the lawyers’ opening statements and closing arguments to you are not evidence. 

Their purpose is to discuss the issues and the evidence. If the evidence as you remember it differs 

from what the lawyers said, your memory is what counts.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 5

_______Given

_______Rejected

______ Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.6

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AGREED

NOTE-TAKING

Any notes you have taken during this trial are only aids to your memory. The notes are 

not evidence. If you have not taken notes, you should rely on your independent recollection of 

the evidence and not be unduly influenced by the notes of other jurors. Notes are not entitled 

to any greater weight than the recollections or impressions of each juror about the testimony.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 6

_______Given

_______Rejected

______ Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.7

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AGREED

CONSIDERATION OF ALL EVIDENCE

REGARDLESS OF WHO PRODUCED

In determining whether any fact has been proved, you should consider all of the

evidence bearing on the question regardless of who introduced it.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 7

_______Given

_______Rejected

______ Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.8

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AGREED

LIMITED PURPOSE OF EVIDENCE

You will recall that during the course of this trial I instructed you that I admitted certain 

evidence for a limited purpose. You must consider this evidence only for the limited purpose for 

which it was admitted.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 8

_______Given

_______Rejected

______ Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.9

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AGREED

WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE

You should use common sense in weighing the evidence and consider the evidence in

light of your own observations in life.

In our lives, we often look at one fact and conclude from it that another fact exists. In law

we call this “inference.” A jury is allowed to make reasonable inferences. Any inference you

make must be reasonable and must be based on the evidence in the case.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 9

_______Given

_______Rejected

______ Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.11

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AGREED

DEFINITION OF “DIRECT” AND “CIRCUMSTANTIAL” EVIDENCE

You may have heard the phrases “direct evidence” and “circumstantial evidence.”

Direct evidence is proofthat does notrequire an inference,such asthe testimonyofsomeone who

claimsto have personal knowledge of a fact.Circumstantial evidence is proof of a fact, or a series

of facts, that tends to show that some other fact is true.

As an example direct evidence that it is raining is testimony from a witness who says, “I

was outside a minute ago and I saw it raining.” Circumstantial evidence that it is raining is the

observation of someone entering a room carrying a wet umbrella.

The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to either direct or

circumstantial evidence. You should decide how much weight to give to any evidence. In

reaching your verdict, you should consider all the evidence in the case, including the

circumstantial evidence.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 10

_______Given

_______Rejected

______ Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.12

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AGREED SUBJECT TO EDIT

TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES

(DECIDING WHAT TO BELIEVE)

You must decide whether the testimony of each of the witnesses is truthful and

accurate, in part, in whole, or not at all. You also must decide what weight, if any, you give to

the testimony of each witness.

In evaluating the testimony of any witness, [including any party to the case,] you may

consider, among other things:

- the ability and opportunity the witness had to see, hear, or know the

things that the witness testified about;

- the witness’s memory;

- any interest, bias, or prejudice the witness may have;

- the witness’sintelligence;

- the manner of the witness while testifying;

- and the reasonableness of the witness’s testimony in light of all the

evidence in the case.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 11

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.13

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Defendants agree subject to the inclusion of the bracketed language

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AGREED SUBJECT TO EDIT

PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS [OR ACTS]

You may consider statements given by [Party] [Witness under oath] before trial as

evidence of the truth of what he said in the earlier statements, as well as in deciding what

weight to give his testimony.

With respect to other witnesses, the law is different. If you decide that, before the trial, one

of these witnesses made a statement [not under oath] [or acted in a manner] that is

inconsistent with his testimony here in court, you may consider the earlier statement [or

conduct] only in deciding whether his testimony here in court was true and what weight to give

to his testimony here in court.

[In considering a prior inconsistent statement[s] [or conduct], you should consider

whether it was simply an innocent error or an intentional falsehood and whether it concerns an

important fact or an unimportant detail.]

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 12

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.14

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Defendants agree subject to the inclusion of the bracketed language. See Defendants 

instruction # 3 Fed. JI 7th Cir. 1.14:

You may consider statements given by a party or witness under oath before trial as 

evidence of the truth of what he said in the earlier statements, as well as in deciding what weight 

to give his testimony. 

With respect to other witnesses, the law is different. If you decide that, before the trial, 

one of these witnesses made a statement not under oath or acted in a manner that is inconsistent 

with his testimony here in court, you may consider the earlier statement or conduct only in 

deciding whether his testimony here in court was true and what weight to give to his testimony 

here in court. 

In considering a prior inconsistent statement or conduct, you should consider whether it 

was simply an innocent error or an intentional falsehood and whether it concerns an important 

fact or an unimportant detail.

Plaintiff’s objection: Same as Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction 12. 

Defendants’ No. 3 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 1.14” (2005 rev.) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

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AGREED

LAWYER INTERVIEWING WITNESS

It is proper for a lawyer to meet with any witness in preparation for trial.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 13

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.16

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AGREED

NUMBER OF WITNESSES

You may find the testimony of one witness or a few witnesses more persuasive than the

testimony of a larger number. You need not accept the testimony of the larger number of

witnesses.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 14

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.17

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AGREED

ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE

The law does not require any party to call as a witness every person who might have

knowledge of the facts related to this trial. Similarly, the law does not require any party to

present as exhibits all papers and things mentioned during this trial.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 15

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.18

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AGREED

EXPERT WITNESSES

You have heard witnesses give opinions about matters requiring special knowledge or

skill. You should judge this testimony in the same way that you judge the testimony of any

other witness. The fact thatsuch person has given an opinion does not mean that you are required

to accept it. Give the testimony whatever weight you think it deserves, considering the reasons

given fortheopinion,thewitness’squalifications, andalloftheother evidence in the case.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 16

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.21

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RESERVED 

DEMONSTRATIVE EXHIBITS

Certain [describe demonstrative exhibit, e.g., models, diagrams, devices, sketches]

have been shown to you. Those [short description] are used for convenience and to help

explain the facts of the case. They are not themselves evidence or proof of any facts.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 17

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.24

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Defendants Reserve but agreed to form, subject to formulation of descriptions of 

demonstrative exhibits.

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AGREED

BURDEN OF PROOF

When I say a particular party must prove something by “a preponderance of the

evidence,” or when I use the expression “if you find,” or “if you decide,” this is what I mean:

When you have considered all the evidence in the case, you must be persuaded that it is more

probably true than not true.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 18

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.27

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DISPUTED

PARTIES AND CLAIMS

The Plaintiff in this case is the Estate of Lyvita Gomes, by its representative Alfredo 

Miranda. I will refer to him as the Plaintiff. The defendants in this case are Correct Care 

Solutions and members of its medical staff Dr. Rozel Elazegui, Dr. Hargurmukh P. Singh, 

Jennifer Bibbiano, Ruth Muuru and Edith Jones. I will refer to them as the defendants.

The Plaintiff claims that the defendants failed to protect Lyvita Gomes and provide her 

necessary medical and mental health care while she was detained at the Lake County Jail in 

violation of her rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Plaintiff also claims the defendants are responsible for Ms. Gomes’ wrongful death and 

committed professional malpractice in violation of her rights guaranteed by Illinois state law.

The defendants deny each of the Plaintiff’s claims.

You must give separate consideration to each claim and to each defendant, except that if 

you find a defendant employee liable on a state law claim you must also find Correct Care 

Solutions liable as the defendant’s employer.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 19

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: General, Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.25 (Multiple Defendants)

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Defendant Objects to this instruction and proposes Defendant # 6 which follows the form 

instruction Fed. JI 7th Cir. 1.25:

You must give separate consideration to each claim and each party in this case. Although 

there are six (6) defendants, it does not follow that if one is liable, any of the others is also liable

except that if you find a defendant employee liable for medical malpractice you must also find 

Correct Care Solutions, LLC liable as the defendant’s employer.

Plaintiff’s objection: This paragraph is included in Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction No. 19, see 

last paragraph.

Defendants’ No. 6 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 1.25” (2005 rev.)(modified) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

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DISPUTED

PLAINTIFF’S FEDERAL CLAIM

Under the law, a person may file a lawsuit seeking an award of damages from a 

defendant who has violated a constitutional right. Plaintiff’s federal claims are brought pursuant 

to this law. 

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 20

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Instruction Given Awalt v. Marketti, Dkt. 515, p. 17; Instruction Given, Fox v. Hayes,

No. 04-7309, Dkt. 588, 12/18/07, N. D. Ill. J. Darrah (modified to case).

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Not necessary in light of other pattern jury instructions that provide that t plaintiff can 

bring claims pursuant to federal law.

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DISPUTED

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

The 14th Amendment to the Constitution provides that all persons who are arrested and 

jailed are entitled to due process of law. That requires that no pre-trial detainee be denied 

necessary protection and medical and psychiatric care, including protection from harming 

herself.

A pretrial detainee who has not been convicted of a crime has a right under the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be protected from impermissible 

punishment like the denial or of delay in providing certain medical care. 

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 21

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: First paragraph: Instruction Given in Woodward v. Myres, N.D. Ill. J. Gettleman 99 CV 

00290. Second paragraph: 5

TH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CIVIL 

RIGHTS, §10.10, ¶2 (2014); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015); Castro v. Cnty. 

Of L.A., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14950 (9th Cir. 2016). 

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Defendants Object as this is an improper statement of the law relating to 28 USC §1983 

claims based on medical care. The Seventh Circuit continues to use the deliberate 

indifference standard for inadequate medical care claims. Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 

785, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17616 (7th Cir. Ill. 2015); Nielsen v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 2016 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37567, 2016 WL 1161328 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2016); Anderson v. Davis, 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90492, 2016 WL 3742860 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2016).

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DISPUTED

GOVERNMENT DUTY TO PRETRIAL DETAINEES

The government has an obligation to provide medical and mental health care to those 

whom it detains in a County jail awaiting resolution of a pending criminal charge. A person is 

presumed to be innocent under the law until proven guilty. A detainee must rely on jail 

authorities to treat her medical and mental health needs.

If an individual defendant knew of Ms. Gomes’ serious medical and/or mental health 

needs and failed to take reasonable steps to address those needs, that defendant’s conduct was 

objectively unreasonable and that defendant is liable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 22

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Constitution of the United States, 4

th

, 5

th, 6th and 14th Amendments; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Kingsley v. 

Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015); Castro v. Cnty. Of L.A., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14950 (9th

Cir. 2016)(substitute “objectively unreasonable” for “deliberate indifference.”)

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Defendants Object as this is an improper statement of the law relating to 28 USC §1983 

claims based on medical care. The Seventh Circuit continues to use the deliberate 

indifference standard for inadequate medical care claims. Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 

785, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17616 (7th Cir. Ill. 2015); Nielsen v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 2016 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37567, 2016 WL 1161328 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2016); Anderson v. Davis, 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90492, 2016 WL 3742860 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2016).

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DISPUTED

CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY OF CORPORATE AND MEDICAL DEFENDANTS

The Defendant Correct Care Solutions entered into a contract to provide medical and 

mental health services to the detainees at the Lake County Jail. As a result of that contract, the 

United States Constitution imposes upon the defendant and its employees, Defendants Elazegui, 

Singh, Bibbiano, Muuru and Jones the responsibility to perform their duties in conformity with 

the Constitution.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 23

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Given in August of 2015, Awalt v. Marketti, Dkt. 515, p. 15; August 10, 2015; No. 11-

6142 (N.D. Ill.)(modified to case); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988); Rodriguez v. Plymouth 

Ambulance Service, 577 F. 3d 816 (7th Cir. 2009).

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Defendants are not disputing that their provision of care was under color of state law. The 

information in this instruction is set out in other pattern instructions.

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DISPUTED

PLAINTIFF’S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM

Plaintiff claims pursuant to the U.S. Constitution that each defendant either failed to 

provide medical or mental health care or attention to Lyvita Gomes or that each defendant failed 

to protect Lyvita Gomes from harming herself.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 24

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: 7th Circuit Proposed Instructions 7.17 (current Instruction 7.12); 7.19 (no current 

instruction) (modified to case and multiple defendants).

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Defendants object. See Defendant’s motion in limine on failure to protect claims. There are 

no allegations of failure to protect in the plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Failure to protect 

is a separate theory and is the subject of a motion in limine.

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DISPUTE

14TH AMENDMENT: FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEDICAL ATTENTION

In order to prove that a defendant failed to provide medical or mental health care or 

attention, Plaintiff must prove each of the following things as to the particular defendant you are 

considering, by a preponderance of the evidence:

First, that Lyvita Gomes had a medical or mental healthcare need; 

Second, that the defendant was aware of that need;

Third, that the defendant was objectively unreasonable in dealing with that need ; and

Fourth, that as a result of defendant’s conduct or inaction Lyvita Gomes was harmed or 

subjected to a significant risk of harm

If you find that Plaintiff has proved each of these things as to the particular defendant you 

are considering by a preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for Plaintiff, and go on 

to consider the question of damages.

If, on the other hand, you find that Plaintiff has failed to prove any one of these things by 

as to the particular defendant you are considering by a preponderance of the evidence, then you 

must find for that particular, and you will not consider the question of damages as to that 

defendant. 

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 25

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: 7

th Circuit Proposed Instruction 7.17 (current Instruction 7.12)(modified to case and 

multiple defendants; substituted “things” for “elements”); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 

2466 (2015); Castro v. Cnty. Of L.A., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14950 (9th Cir. 2016); Castro v. 

County of Los Angeles, No. 12-56829 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2016) (en banc); Court’s Instruction No. 

13 given in Jordan v. Ortiz, No. 04-7423 (N.D. Ill.), Dkt. 669, 11/4/13, p. 25. 

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Defendants Object Defendants Object as this is an improper statement of the law relating 

to 28 USC §1983 claims based on medical care. The Seventh Circuit continues to use the 

deliberate indifference standard for inadequate medical care claims. Burton v. Downey, 805 

F.3d 776, 785, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17616 (7th Cir. Ill. 2015); Nielsen v. Sheriff of Cook 

Cnty., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37567, 2016 WL 1161328 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2016); Anderson 

v. Davis, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90492, 2016 WL 3742860 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2016). 

Defendants propose their instruction # 11 Fed. JI 7th Cir. 7.12 combined with IPI 20.01:

The plaintiff's complaint consists of two Counts for you to consider as to each defendant named 

in that Count. 

The issues to be decided by you under Count I of the complaint are as follows: 

The plaintiff claims that the defendants violated Lyvita Gomes’ civil right to medical 

care. The plaintiff must prove each of the following propositions by a preponderance of the 

evidence:

1. Lyvita Gomes had a serious medical need;

2. The Defendant(s) was deliberately indifferent to Lyvita Gomes’ serious medical 

need by failing to send Lyvita Gomes to the hospital sooner. 

3. The Defendant’s conduct caused harm to Lyvita Gomes;

The defendants deny that they did any of the things claimed by the plaintiff, deny that 

they were deliberately indifferent in doing any of the things claimed by the plaintiff, and deny 

that any claimed act or omission on the defendants’ part was a proximate cause of Lyvita 

Gomes’ death. 

If you find that the Plaintiff has proved each of these things by a preponderance of the 

evidence, then you should find for Plaintiff on Count I and go on to consider the question of 

damages.

If, on the other hand, you find that the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one of these things 

by a preponderance of the evidence, then you should find for the Defendant, and you will not 

consider the question of damages for Count I.

Turning now to Count II of the complaint, the issues to be decided by you under Count II are as 

follows: 

The plaintiff claims that Lyvita Gomes was injured and sustained damage as a result of 

the defendants’ professional negligence in one or more of the following respects: 

a) Failed to timely send Lyvita Gomes to the hospital sooner.

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The plaintiff further claims that one or more of the foregoing was a proximate cause of 

Lyvita Gomes’ injuries. 

The defendants deny that they did any of the things claimed by the plaintiff, deny that 

they were negligent in doing any of the things claimed by the plaintiff and deny that any claimed 

act or omission on the part of the defendants was a proximate cause of Lyvita Gomes’ claimed 

injuries. 

The defendants claim that Lyvita Gomes was contributorily negligent in one or more of 

the following respects: 

(a) refusing to talk to CCS’ healthcare providers even though Lyvita Gomes knew 

that the medical providers were trying to help and assist her;

(b) refusing to eat even though Lyvita Gomes knew that by doing so, she may 

cause harm to herself;

(c) refusing to drink sufficient water or other fluids even though Lyvita Gomes

knew that by doing so, she may cause harm to herself;

(d) refusing to allow CCS’ healthcare providers to check her vital signs and to 

otherwise assess her health even though Lyvita Gomes knew that CCS’ 

healthcare providers were trying to help and assist her;

(e) refusing to allow CCS’ healthcare providers to take blood and other bodily 

fluid samples so that laboratory tests could be run even though Lyvita Gomes

knew that CCS’ healthcare providers were trying to help and assist her;

(f) refusing to cooperate with CCS’ healthcare providers even though Lyvita 

Gomes knew that CCS’ healthcare providers were trying to help and assist 

her;

(g) refusing to follow the directions from CCS’ healthcare providers even though 

Lyvita Gomes knew that CCS’ healthcare providers were trying to help and 

assist her; and

(h) finally, after she was transferred to Vista East Medical Center, Lyvita Gomes

refused to eat, drink, speak to, or cooperate with the healthcare professionals 

at Vista. 

The defendants further claim that one or more of the foregoing was the sole proximate 

cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 

The plaintiff denies that Lyvita Gomes did any of the things claimed by defendant, denies 

that Lyvita Gomes was negligent in doing any of the things claimed by defendant, and denies 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 38 of 96 PageID #:9931
that any claimed act or omission on Lyvita Gomes’ part was a proximate cause of Lyvita Gomes’ 

claimed injuries. 

Plaintiff’s objection: Misstates the law of the federal constitutional claim even if the court 

determines to use the deliberately indifferent standard. Plaintiff’s claim may lie in both denial of 

medical care and failure to protect from selfharm. See Plaintiff’s Proposed Instructions Nos. 25-

27 for federal claim and 29-30 for state claim. 

The use of the term “count” is confusing as it is not used anywhere else in these instructions and 

the phrase “defendant named in each Count” is confusing because all defendants are included in 

all claims. The use of the term “decedent” is confusing, rather Ms. Gomes’ name should be 

identified. 

Defendants repeated denials are redundant and improper. Contributory negligence is not 

appropriately considered particularly in the context of the federal claim. 

Defendants’ No. 11 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 7.12” (2005 rev.)(modified) Given as modified 

Combined with Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 20.01 Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 39 of 96 PageID #:9932
DISPUTE

FAILURE TO PROVIDE CARE – DEFINITION

Plaintiff does not have to show that a defendant provided no care. If a defendant provided 

some care, Plaintiff must show that defendant knew his or her actions likely would be ineffective 

or that defendant’s actions or inactions were objectively unreasonable. 

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 26

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: 7th Circuit Proposed Instruction 7.17 (current Instruction 7.12)(parenthetical after 3.);

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015); Castro v. Cnty. Of L.A., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 

14950 (9th Cir. 2016); Castro v. County of Los Angeles, No. 12-56829 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2016) 

(en banc). 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 40 of 96 PageID #:9933
Defendants Object Defendants Object as this is an improper statement of the law relating 

to 28 USC §1983 claims based on medical care. The Seventh Circuit continues to use the 

deliberate indifference standard for inadequate medical care claims. Burton v. Downey, 805 

F.3d 776, 785, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17616 (7th Cir. Ill. 2015); Nielsen v. Sheriff of Cook 

Cnty., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37567, 2016 WL 1161328 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2016); Anderson 

v. Davis, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90492, 2016 WL 3742860 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2016). 

Defendants propose their instruction # 12 & 13 Fed. JI 7th Cir. 7.13 and 7.14:

When I use the term “serious medical need,” I mean a condition that a doctor says 

requires treatment, or something so obvious that even someone who is not a doctor would 

recognize it as requiring treatment. In deciding whether a medical need is serious, you should 

consider the following factors:

- the severity of the condition;

- the harm, including pain and suffering, that could result from a lack of medical 

care;

- whether providing treatment was feasible; and 

- the actual harm caused by the lack of medical care. 

Plaintiff’s objection: The proper standard of care should be “objectively unreasonable” as 

stated in Plaintiff’s motion and memorandum which is separately filed. See Plaintiff’s Proposed 

Instructions Nos. 25-27.

Defendants’ No. 12 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 7.13” (2005 rev.) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

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When I use the term “deliberately indifferent,” I mean that the Defendant actually knew of a 

substantial risk of serious harm to the Plaintiff and that the Defendant consciously disregarded 

this risk by failing to take reasonable measures to deal with it. In deciding whether a Defendant 

failed to take reasonable measures, you may consider whether it was practical for him to take 

corrective action.

If the Defendant took reasonable measures to respond to the risk, then he was not 

deliberately indifferent.

Plaintiff’s objection: The proper standard of care should be “objectively unreasonable” as 

stated in Plaintiff’s motion and memorandum which is separately filed. See Plaintiff’s Proposed 

Instructions Nos. 25-27. In the alternative, the Seventh Circuit also suggests that the specific 

harm to Lyvita Gomes should be identified, i.e. the failure to eat and adequately drink. The 

second sentence is inappropriate given the facts of this case. It is not the contemplated harm to 

the “Plaintiff” but to Lyvita Gomes as to each Defendant not “the Defendant.” 7th Cir. Pattern 

Instruction 7.14.

Defendants’ No. 13 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 7.14” (2005 rev.)(modified) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 42 of 96 PageID #:9935
DISPUTE

14TH AMENDMENT: FAILURE TO PROTECT FROM SELF HARM

The Constitution requires medical staff contracted to provide medical and mental health 

care at a jail to protect detainees from harming themselves under certain circumstances. In order 

to prove a defendant failed to protect Lyvita Gomes from harming herself, Plaintiff must prove 

each of the following things by a preponderance of the evidence as to the particular defendant 

you are considering:

First, that there was a strong likelihood that Lyvita Gomes would seriously harm herself;

Second, that the defendant was aware of this strong likelihood or it was obvious that 

Lyvita Gomes would seriously harm herself in the near future;

Third, that the defendant failed to take reasonable measures to prevent Lyvita Gomes 

from seriously harming herself; and

Fourth, Lyvita Gomes would have survived or suffered less harm if defendant had acted 

in an objectively reasonable manner. 

If you find that Plaintiff has proved each of these things by a preponderance of the 

evidence as to a particular defendant, then you must find for Plaintiff, and go on to consider the 

question of damages.

If, on the other hand, you find that Plaintiff has failed to prove any one of these things by 

a preponderance of the evidence as to a particular defendant, then you must find for that 

defendant, and you will not consider the question of damages as to that particular defendant. 

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 27

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: 7th Circuit Proposed Instruction 7.19 (no current instruction)(modified to case and 

multiple defendants; substituted “things” for “elements”); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 

2466 (2015); Castro v. Cnty. Of L.A., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14950 (9th Cir. 2016); Castro v. 

County of Los Angeles, No. 12-56829 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2016) (en banc).

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 43 of 96 PageID #:9936
Defendants object. See Defendant’s motion in limine on failure to protect claims. There are 

no allegations of failure to protect in the plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Failure to protect 

is a separate theory and is the subject of a motion in limine.

Defendants Object as this is an improper statement of the law relating to 28 USC §1983 

claims based on medical care. The Seventh Circuit continues to use the deliberate 

indifference standard for inadequate medical care claims. Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 

785, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17616 (7th Cir. Ill. 2015); Nielsen v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 2016 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37567, 2016 WL 1161328 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2016); Anderson v. Davis, 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90492, 2016 WL 3742860 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2016).

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 44 of 96 PageID #:9937
DISPUTE

SUBJECTIVE INTENT

The fact that a defendant had no specific intent or purpose to deprive Lyvita Gomes of 

her constitutional rights will not absolve him or her from liability if he or she did in fact deprive 

her of those rights.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 28

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Instruction Given, Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F. 2d 1134 (7th Cir. 1970)

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 45 of 96 PageID #:9938
Defendants Object Defendants Object as this is an improper statement of the law relating 

to 28 USC §1983 claims based on medical care. The Seventh Circuit continues to use the 

deliberate indifference standard for inadequate medical care claims. Burton v. Downey, 805 

F.3d 776, 785, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17616 (7th Cir. Ill. 2015); Nielsen v. Sheriff of Cook 

Cnty., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37567, 2016 WL 1161328 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2016); Anderson 

v. Davis, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90492, 2016 WL 3742860 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2016). 

Defendants propose their instruction # 13 Fed. JI 7th Cir. 7.14:

When I use the term “deliberately indifferent,” I mean that the Defendant actually knew of a 

substantial risk of serious harm to the Plaintiff and that the Defendant consciously disregarded 

this risk by failing to take reasonable measures to deal with it. In deciding whether a Defendant 

failed to take reasonable measures, you may consider whether it was practical for him to take 

corrective action.

If the Defendant took reasonable measures to respond to the risk, then he was not 

deliberately indifferent.

Plaintiff’s objection: The proper standard of care should be “objectively unreasonable” as 

stated in Plaintiff’s motion and memorandum which is separately filed. See Plaintiff’s Proposed 

Instructions Nos. 25-27. In the alternative, the Seventh Circuit also suggests that the specific 

harm to Lyvita Gomes should be identified, i.e. the failure to eat and adequately drink. The 

second sentence is inappropriate given the facts of this case. It is not the contemplated harm to 

the “Plaintiff” but to Lyvita Gomes as to each Defendant not “the Defendant.” 7th Cir. Pattern 

Instruction 7.14.

Defendants’ No. 13 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 7.14” (2005 rev.)(modified) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

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Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 47 of 96 PageID #:9940
DISPUTE

PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE – WRONGFUL DEATH - DUTY

A medical professional must possess and use the knowledge, skill, and care ordinarily used 

by a reasonably careful medical professional.

The failure to do something that a reasonably careful medical professional would do, or the 

doing of something a reasonably careful medical professional would not do, under circumstances 

similar to those shown by the evidence, is “professional negligence.”

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 29

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______ Objected to

Source: IPI 105.01 Professional Negligence.

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Defendants object. This is incomplete and inaccurate use of IPI 105.01 that attempts to 

group all medical professionals together. Defendants propose their instruction # 16-19 IPI 

105.01:

A correctional family practice physician must possess and use the knowledge, skill, and 

care ordinarily used by a reasonably careful correctional family practice physician. 

The failure to do something that a reasonably careful correctional family practice 

physician would do, or the doing of something that a reasonably careful correctional family 

practice physician would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence, is 

“professional negligence”. 

The phrase “deviation from the standard of care” means the same thing as “professional 

negligence”. 

The law does not say how a reasonably careful correctional family practice physician 

would act under these circumstances. That is for you to decide. In reaching your decision, you 

must rely upon opinion testimony from qualified witnesses. You must not attempt to determine 

how a reasonably careful correctional family practice physician would act from any personal 

knowledge you may have.

Plaintiff’s objection: There is no different standard of care for a correctional health provider 

than a health provider in any other context. IPI 105.00 Professional Negligence. Moreover, 

there is no evidence that anyone was a “correctional family practice physician.” See Plaintiff’s 

Proposed Instruction Nos. 29 and 30. 

Defendants’ No. 16 Given 

Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 105.01 Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

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A correctional psychiatrist must possess and use the knowledge, skill, and care ordinarily 

used by a reasonably careful correctional psychiatrist. 

The failure to do something that a reasonably careful correctional psychiatrist would do, 

or the doing of something that a reasonably careful correctional psychiatrist would not do, under 

circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence, is “professional negligence”. 

The phrase “deviation from the standard of care” means the same thing as “professional 

negligence”. 

The law does not say how a reasonably careful correctional psychiatrist would act under 

these circumstances. That is for you to decide. In reaching your decision, you must rely upon 

opinion testimony from qualified witnesses. You must not attempt to determine how a 

reasonably careful correctional psychiatrist would act from any personal knowledge you may 

have.

Plaintiff’s objection: There is no different standard of care for a correctional health provider 

than a health provider in any other context and all health providers are held to the same 

standard. IPI 105.00 Professional Negligence. See Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction Nos. 29 and 

30. 

Defendants’ No. 17 Given 

Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 105.01 Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

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A correctional licensed social worker must possess and use the knowledge, skill, and care 

ordinarily used by a reasonably careful correctional licensed social worker. 

The failure to do something that a reasonably careful correctional licensed social worker 

would do, or the doing of something that a reasonably careful correctional licensed social worker 

would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence, is “professional 

negligence”. 

The phrase “deviation from the standard of care” means the same thing as “professional 

negligence”. 

The law does not say how a reasonably careful correctional licensed social worker would 

act under these circumstances. That is for you to decide. In reaching your decision, you must rely 

upon opinion testimony from qualified witnesses. You must not attempt to determine how a 

reasonably careful correctional licensed social worker would act from any personal knowledge 

you may have.

Plaintiff’s objection: There is no different standard of care for a correctional health provider 

than a health provider in any other context and all health providers are held to the same 

standard. IPI 105.00 Professional Negligence. See Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction Nos. 29 and 

30. 

Defendants’ No. 18 Given 

Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 105.01 Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 51 of 96 PageID #:9944
A correctional licensed professional counselor must possess and use the knowledge, skill, 

and care ordinarily used by a reasonably careful correctional licensed professional counselor. 

The failure to do something that a reasonably careful correctional licensed professional 

counselor would do, or the doing of something that a reasonably careful correctional licensed 

professional counselor would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the 

evidence, is “professional negligence”. 

The phrase “deviation from the standard of care” means the same thing as “professional 

negligence”. 

The law does not say how a reasonably careful correctional licensed professional 

counselor would act under these circumstances. That is for you to decide. In reaching your 

decision, you must rely upon opinion testimony from qualified witnesses. You must not attempt 

to determine how a reasonably careful correctional licensed professional counselor would act 

from any personal knowledge you may have.

Plaintiff’s objection: There is no different standard of care for a correctional health provider 

than a health provider in any other context and all health providers are held to the same 

standard. IPI 105.00 Professional Negligence. Moreover, no defendant is a “correctional 

licensed professional counselor.”See Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction Nos. 29 and 30. 

Defendants’ No. 19 Given 

Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 105.01 Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 52 of 96 PageID #:9945
DISPUTE

PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE – WRONGFUL DEATH 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Elazegui, Singh, Bibbiano, Muuru and Jones are liable 

under Illinois state law for professional negligence. 

To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must prove that the particular defendant you are 

considering failed to conform to the applicable standard of care of his or her profession, unless you 

find that the particular defendant’s negligence was grossly apparent or obvious to a lay person. 

If you find Plaintiff proved either of these things by a preponderance of the evidence as to a 

Defendant you must find in favor of Plaintiff’s professional negligence claim. 

If you find Plaintiff has not proved either of these things by a preponderance of the evidence 

as to a Defendant you must find in favor of that Defendant on Plaintiff’s professional negligence 

claim. 

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 30

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______ Objected to

Source: IPI 105.00 Professional Negligence.

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 53 of 96 PageID #:9946
Defendants object. There is no IPI 105.00. This fails to accurately state the law of medical 

negligence

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 54 of 96 PageID #:9947
DISPUTE

CAUSE

When I use the term “[proximate]cause,” I mean a cause that, in the natural or ordinary 

course of events, produced the Plaintiff’s injury. It need not be the only cause, nor the last or 

nearest cause. It is sufficient if it combines with another cause resulting in the injury.

A defendant caused or contributed to the death of Lyvita Gomes if that defendant played 

a part – no matter how small – in the failure to provide her medical or mental healthcare to 

Lyvita Gomes or the failure to protect her from injuring herself. 

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 31

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______ Objected to

Source: First paragraph: IPI 15.01 Proximate Cause – Definition; Second paragraph: 7

TH Circuit 

Pattern Instruction 9.02 FELA Definition of Causation.

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Defendants Object as this is an improper statement of the law in the Seventh Circuit. 

Defendants propose their instruction # 7 Causation Instruction based on Whitlock v. 

Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567:

When I use the term "cause," I mean:

 (1.) that the injury would not have occurred absent the defendant's conduct; and 

 (2.) that the injury is of the type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of her 

conduct. 

The plaintiff must prove both requirements of "cause" to prevail on his claim.

Plaintiff’s objection: This instruction is a misstatement of the law, particularly that it infers there 

must be one and only one cause. Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction No. 31 is a more accurate 

statement of the law. In fact, in the case below cited by Defendants the Seventh Circuit relying on 

the Restatement of Torts clarified “multiple proximate causes are often present and there is no 

rule demanding that every case have only one proximate cause.” Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 

F.3d 567, 583 (7th Cir. 2012). The Seventh Circuit Committee Comments on Proximate Cause 

specifically caution courts to “use only the correct definition for the issues before it.” 7th Cir. 

Pattern Instruction 1.30.

Defendants’ No. 7 Given 

Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 582 (7th Cir. 2012) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

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AGREED

DAMAGES

If you find in favor of the Plaintiff on any claims, then you must determine what amount 

of damages, if any, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover.

If you find in favor of the defendants on all of the Plaintiff’s claims, then you will not 

consider the question of damages.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 32

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 7.22.

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 57 of 96 PageID #:9950
RESERVED

WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION BROUGHT BY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

The Plaintiff Alfredo Miranda brings this action in a representative capacity by reason of 

his being administrator of the estate of Lyvita Gomes, deceased. He represents her siblings 

Lyemia Fernandes, Oyd Steven Gomes and Lynette Gomes and the estate of the deceased. They 

are the real parties in interest in this lawsuit, and in that sense are the real plaintiffs whose 

damages you are to determine if you decide for Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 33

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______ Objected to

Source: IPI 31.09 Action for Wrongful Death Brought by Personal Representative

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Defendants agree to substance of this instruction but dispute the listed beneficiaries as set 

forth in their motion in limine.

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 59 of 96 PageID #:9952
DISPUTED

DAMAGES: COMPENSATORY

If you find in favor of Plaintiff on one or more of Plaintiff’s claims, then you must 

determine the amount of money that will fairly compensate Plaintiff for any injury sustained by 

Lyvita Gomes as a result of the Defendants’ wrongful conduct. These are called “compensatory 

damages.”

Plaintiff must prove compensatory damages by a preponderance of the evidence. Your 

award must be based on evidence and not speculation or guesswork. This does not mean, 

however, that compensatory damages are restricted to the actual loss of money; they include both 

the physical and mental aspects of injury, even if they are not easy to measure.

You should consider the following types of compensatory damages:

- Lyvita Gomes’ loss of her life;

- The physical pain Lyvita Gomes experience prior to the time of her 

death;

- The physical suffering that Lyvita Gomes experienced prior to the time of 

her death;

- The emotional pain that Lyvita Gomes experienced prior to the time of 

her death;

- The emotional suffering that Lyvita Gomes experienced prior to the time 

of her death

No evidence of the dollar value of physical or mental and emotional pain and suffering, 

or disability, or loss of a normal life has been or needs to be introduced. There is no exact 

standard for setting the damages to be awarded on account of these factors. You are to determine 

an amount that will fairly compensate Plaintiff for the injuries sustained. 

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 34

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Proposed Pattern Jury Instruction 7.26, replacing Instruction 7.23 

(modified to case); Instruction Given, Awalt v. Marketti, No. 11-6142 (N.D. Ill.), Dkt. 515, p. 24; 

August 10, 2015.

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Defendants Object. Defendants have filed a motion in limine seeking to bar the damages set 

forth in this instruction. In addition, the damages are duplicative as physical pain and 

physical suffering are the same damage. Further Illinois law is clear that there is no 

recovery for the decedent for death.

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 61 of 96 PageID #:9954
AGREED

DAMAGES: PECUNIARY

If you decide for the Plaintiff on the question of liability as to any defendant, you must 

then fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate the family of Lyvita 

Gomes for the pecuniary loss proved by the evidence to have resulted to them from the death of 

Lyvita Gomes. “Pecuniary loss” may include loss of money, benefits, goods, services and 

society.

In determining pecuniary loss, you may consider what the evidence shows concerning the 

following:

1. What money, benefits, goods and services Lyvita Gomes customarily contributed in the past;

2. What money, benefits, goods and services Lyvita Gomes was likely to have contribu

3. Lyvita Gomes’ personal expenses and other deductions;

4. Her age;

6. Her sex;

7. Her health;

8. Her physical and mental characteristics

Her habits of industry, sobriety and thrift;

9. Her occupational abilities;

10. The grief, sorrow and mental suffering of [collateral next of kin];

11. The relationships that existed between [collateral next of kin] and Lyvita Gomes.

Whether pecuniary loss has been proved by the evidence is for you to determine.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 35

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 31.05

DISPUTE

DAMAGES: PUNITIVE

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If you find for Plaintiff on the federal claim, you may, but are not required to, assess 

punitive damages against any defendant. The purposes of punitive damages are to punish a 

defendant for his or her conduct and to serve as an example or warning to defendants and others 

not to engage in similar conduct in the future.

Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that punitive damages should be 

assessed against a defendant. You may assess punitive damages only if you find that his or her

conduct was malicious or in reckless disregard of Lyvita Gomes’ rights. Conduct is malicious if 

it is accompanied by ill will or spite, or is done for the purpose of injuring (in this case) Lyvita 

Gomes. Conduct is in reckless disregard of a person’s rights if, under the circumstances, a 

defendant simply did not care about the person’s rights.

If you find that punitive damages are appropriate, then you must use sound reason in 

setting the amount of those damages. Punitive damages, if any, should be in an amount sufficient 

to fulfill the purposes that I have described to you, but should not reflect bias, prejudice, or 

sympathy toward any party. In determining the amount of any punitive damages, you should 

consider the following factors:

- The reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct;

- The impact of defendant’s conduct on Lyvita Gomes or her heirs;

- The relationship between Lyvita Gomes and a defendant;

- The likelihood that a defendant would repeat the conduct if an award of 

punitive damages is not made;

- The relationship of any award of punitive damages to the amount of 

actual harm Lyvita Gomes and her heirs suffered.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 36

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Proposed Pattern Jury Instruction 7.28, replacing current Instruction 

7.24. [Defendant’s financial condition omitted from factors unless evidence is admitted on that 

topic.]

Defendants object. The decedent’s heirs should not be considered in considering punitive 

damages. The heir’s claims are solely related to the state law claim for medical negligence. 

Illinois law does not allow punitive damages in medical negligence cases.

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Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 64 of 96 PageID #:9957
AGREED

SELECTION OF PRESIDING JUROR; GENERAL VERDICT

Upon retiring to the jury room, you must select a presiding juror. The presiding juror will 

preside over your deliberations and will be your representative here in court. 

Forms of verdict have been prepared for you.

[Forms of verdict read.]

Take these forms to the jury room, and when you have reached unanimous agreement on 

the verdict, your presiding juror will fill in and date the appropriate form, and all of you will sign 

it.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 37

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.32.

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AGREED

COMMUNICATION WITH COURT

I do not anticipate that you will need to communicate with me. If you do need to 

communicate with me, the only proper way is in writing. The writing must be signed by the 

presiding juror, or, if he or she is unwilling to do so, by some other juror. The writing should be 

given to the marshal, who will give it to me. I will respond either in writing or by having you 

return to the courtroom so that I can respond orally.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 38

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.33.

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 66 of 96 PageID #:9959
AGREED

DISAGREEMENT AMONG JURORS

The verdicts must represent the considered judgment of each juror. Your verdicts whether 

for or against the parties must be unanimous.

You should make every reasonable effort to reach a verdict. In doing so, you should 

consult with one another, express your own views, and listen to the opinions of your fellow 

jurors. Discuss your differences with an open mind. Do not hesitate to reexamine your own 

views and change your opinion if you come to believe it is wrong. But you should not surrender 

your honest beliefs about the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinions of other 

jurors or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict. 

All of you should give fair and equal consideration to all the evidence and deliberate with 

the goal of reaching an agreement that is consistent with the individual judgment of each juror. 

You are impartial judges of the facts. 

Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 39

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.34.

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 67 of 96 PageID #:9960
DISPUTE

VERDICT FORM

We, the jury, find as to each of the claims of Plaintiff Estate of Lyvita Gomes, in this case as 

follows:

Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claim:

for each, check one and only one of the two choices, i.e., 

for Plaintiff or for Defendant

FOR PLAINTIFF FOR DEFENDANT

as to Defendant Elazegui: ______________ ________________

as to Defendant Singh: ______________ ________________

as to Defendant Bibbiano: ______________ ________________

as to Defendant Muuru: ______________ ________________

as to Defendant Jones: ______________ ________________

Plaintiff’s State Professional Negligence - Wrongful Death Claim:

for each, check one and only one of the two choices, i.e., 

for Plaintiff or for Defendant

FOR PLAINTIFF FOR DEFENDANT

as to Defendant Elazegui: ______________ ________________

as to Defendant Singh: ______________ ________________

as to Defendant Bibbiano: ______________ ________________

as to Defendant Muuru: ______________ ________________

as to Defendant Jones: ______________ ________________

as to Defendant CCS ______________ ________________

(If you find for Plaintiff on this claim against any individual Defendant

you must find also against Correct Care Solutions CCS)

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 68 of 96 PageID #:9961
We award the following compensatory and pecuniary damages to Plaintiff, Estate of Lyvita 

Gomes:

(To be filled in only in the event you find for Plaintiff):

$____________________________________________

Punitive Damages: (to be awarded only if some compensatory damages are awarded to 

Plaintiff):

as to Defendant Elazegui: $__________________________

as to Defendant Singh: $__________________________

as to Defendant Bibbiano: $__________________________

as to Defendant Muruu: $__________________________

as to Defendant Jones: $__________________________

________________________ _________________________

Presiding Juror

________________________ _________________________

________________________ _________________________

________________________ _________________________

________________________ _________________________

________________________ ________________________

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 69 of 96 PageID #:9962
Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 40

_______Given

_______Rejected

_______Withdrawn

_______Objected to

Source: Washington v. City of Chicago, No. 10-1952, N. D. Ill., J. Kocoras, 3/29/16. 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 70 of 96 PageID #:9963
Defendants Object as this is instruction fails to consider the contributory negligence of Ms. 

Gomes.

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 71 of 96 PageID #:9964
During this trial, I have asked a witness a question myself. Do not assume that because I 

asked questions I hold any opinion on the matters I asked about, or on what the outcome of the 

case should be.

Plaintiff’s objections: Plaintiff has no objection, if this instruction becomes necessary as a result 

of questions from the court.

Defendants’ No. 1 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 1.02” (2005 rev.) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 72 of 96 PageID #:9965
In this case one of the defendants is a company. All parties are equal before the law. A 

company is entitled to the same fair consideration that you would give any individual person.

Plaintiff’s objections: This instruction does not follow the Seventh Circuit Pattern 1.03 in 

substituting “company” for “corporation.” Moreover, Plaintiff’s Proposed No. 2 is more 

appropriately modified to the facts of this case. See Committee Comments: “A court may choose 

to modify the first and third sentences of this instruction for other types of litigants.” (Emphasis 

addeded).

Defendants’ No. 2 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 1.03” (2005 rev.)(modified) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 73 of 96 PageID #:9966
You may consider statements given by a party or witness under oath before trial as 

evidence of the truth of what he said in the earlier statements, as well as in deciding what weight 

to give his testimony. 

With respect to other witnesses, the law is different. If you decide that, before the trial, 

one of these witnesses made a statement not under oath or acted in a manner that is inconsistent 

with his testimony here in court, you may consider the earlier statement or conduct only in 

deciding whether his testimony here in court was true and what weight to give to his testimony 

here in court. 

In considering a prior inconsistent statement or conduct, you should consider whether it 

was simply an innocent error or an intentional falsehood and whether it concerns an important 

fact or an unimportant detail.

Plaintiff’s objection: Same as Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction 12. 

Defendants’ No. 3 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 1.14” (2005 rev.) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 74 of 96 PageID #:9967
Defendants contend that the Plaintiff at one time possessed evidence of documents, notes 

and writings Lyvita Gomes created prior to or around the time of her December, 2011

incarceration. However, Plaintiff contends that evidence never existed. 

You may assume that such evidence would have been unfavorable to the Plaintiff only if 

you find by a preponderance of the evidence that:

(1) The plaintiff intentionally destroyed the evidence; and

(2) The plaintiff destroyed the evidence in bad faith.

Plaintiff’s objection: There is absolutely no evidentiary basis for this instruction. There is no 

evidence that any materials relevant to this case were intentionally destroyed in bad faith. See, 

e.g. Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F. 3d 1012, 1018-19 (7th Cir. 2013).

Defendants’ No. 4 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 1.20” (2005 rev.) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 75 of 96 PageID #:9968
The parties agree that the transcriptions of CCS Progress Notes and Physician Orders 

accurately transcribe the contents of the hand written CCS Progress Notes and Physician Orders. 

You should consider these transcriptions just like all of the other evidence in the case.

Plaintiff’s objection: Plaintiff has not and cannot stipulate to the accuracy of all transcripts 

created by Defendants.

Defendants’ No. 5 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 1.23” (2005 rev.)(modified) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 76 of 96 PageID #:9969
You must give separate consideration to each claim and each party in this case. Although 

there are six (6) defendants, it does not follow that if one is liable, any of the others is also liable

except that if you find a defendant employee liable for medical malpractice you must also find 

Correct Care Solutions, LLC liable as the defendant’s employer.

Plaintiff’s objection: This paragraph is included in Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction No. 19, see 

last paragraph.

Defendants’ No. 6 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 1.25” (2005 rev.)(modified) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 77 of 96 PageID #:9970
When I use the term "cause," I mean:

 (1.) that the injury would not have occurred absent the defendant's conduct; and 

 (2.) that the injury is of the type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of her 

conduct. 

The plaintiff must prove both requirements of "cause" to prevail on his claim.

Plaintiff’s objection: This instruction is a misstatement of the law, particularly that it infers there 

must be one and only one cause. Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction No. 31 is a more accurate 

statement of the law. In fact, in the case below cited by Defendants the Seventh Circuit relying on 

the Restatement of Torts clarified “multiple proximate causes are often present and there is no 

rule demanding that every case have only one proximate cause.” Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 

F.3d 567, 583 (7th Cir. 2012). The Seventh Circuit Committee Comments on Proximate Cause 

specifically caution courts to “use only the correct definition for the issues before it.” 7th Cir. 

Pattern Instruction 1.30.

Defendants’ No. 7 Given 

Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 582 (7th Cir. 2012) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 78 of 96 PageID #:9971
More than one person may be to blame for causing an injury. If you decide that a 

defendant was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of injury to Lyvita 

Gomes, it is not a defense that some third person who is not a party to the suit may also have 

been to blame. 

However, if you decide that the sole proximate cause of injury to Lyvita Gomes was the 

conduct of some person other than the defendants, then your verdict should be for the 

defendants. 

Plaintiff’s objection: This instruction is a misstatement of the law, particularly regarding the 

constitutional claims. Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction No. 31 is a more accurate statement of the 

law. Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 583 (7th Cir. 2012)( “multiple proximate causes 

are often present and there is no rule demanding that every case have only one proximate 

cause.”) The Seventh Circuit Committee Comments on Proximate Cause specifically caution 

courts to “use only the correct definition for the issues before it.” 7th Cir. Pattern Instruction 

1.30.

Defendants’ No. 8 Given 

Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 12.04 Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 79 of 96 PageID #:9972
Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 80 of 96 PageID #:9973
If you decide that a defendant was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate 

cause of injury to Lytvita Gomes, it is not a defense that something else may also have been a 

cause of the injury. 

However, if you decide that the sole proximate cause of injury to Lyvita Gomes was 

something other than the conduct of the defendants, then your verdict should be for the 

defendants. 

Plaintiff’s objection: This instruction is a misstatement of the law, particularly regarding the 

constitutional claims. Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction No. 31 is a more accurate statement of the 

law. Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 583 (7th Cir. 2012)( “multiple proximate causes 

are often present and there is no rule demanding that every case have only one proximate 

cause.”) The Seventh Circuit Committee Comments on Proximate Cause specifically caution 

courts to “use only the correct definition for the issues before it.” 7th Cir. Pattern Instruction 

1.30.

Defendants’ No. 9 Given 

Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 12.05 Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 81 of 96 PageID #:9974
If you decide for the defendants on the question of liability, then you should not consider 

the question of damages.

Plaintiff’s objection: Unnecessary. This instruction duplicates Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction 

No. 32. 

Defendants’ No. 10 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 1.31” (2005 rev.) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 82 of 96 PageID #:9975
The plaintiff's complaint consists of two Counts for you to consider as to each defendant named 

in that Count. 

The issues to be decided by you under Count I of the complaint are as follows: 

The plaintiff claims that the defendants violated Lyvita Gomes’ civil right to medical 

care. The plaintiff must prove each of the following propositions by a preponderance of the 

evidence:

1. Lyvita Gomes had a serious medical need;

2. The Defendant(s) was deliberately indifferent to Lyvita Gomes’ serious medical 

need by failing to send Lyvita Gomes to the hospital sooner. 

3. The Defendant’s conduct caused harm to Lyvita Gomes;

The defendants deny that they did any of the things claimed by the plaintiff, deny that 

they were deliberately indifferent in doing any of the things claimed by the plaintiff, and deny 

that any claimed act or omission on the defendants’ part was a proximate cause of Lyvita 

Gomes’ death. 

If you find that the Plaintiff has proved each of these things by a preponderance of the 

evidence, then you should find for Plaintiff on Count I and go on to consider the question of 

damages.

If, on the other hand, you find that the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one of these things 

by a preponderance of the evidence, then you should find for the Defendant, and you will not 

consider the question of damages for Count I.

Turning now to Count II of the complaint, the issues to be decided by you under Count II are as 

follows: 

The plaintiff claims that Lyvita Gomes was injured and sustained damage as a result of 

the defendants’ professional negligence in one or more of the following respects: 

b) Failed to timely send Lyvita Gomes to the hospital sooner.

The plaintiff further claims that one or more of the foregoing was a proximate cause of 

Lyvita Gomes’ injuries. 

The defendants deny that they did any of the things claimed by the plaintiff, deny that 

they were negligent in doing any of the things claimed by the plaintiff and deny that any claimed 

act or omission on the part of the defendants was a proximate cause of Lyvita Gomes’ claimed 

injuries. 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 83 of 96 PageID #:9976
The defendants claim that Lyvita Gomes was contributorily negligent in one or more of 

the following respects: 

(i) refusing to talk to CCS’ healthcare providers even though Lyvita Gomes knew 

that the medical providers were trying to help and assist her;

(j) refusing to eat even though Lyvita Gomes knew that by doing so, she may 

cause harm to herself;

(k) refusing to drink sufficient water or other fluids even though Lyvita Gomes

knew that by doing so, she may cause harm to herself;

(l) refusing to allow CCS’ healthcare providers to check her vital signs and to 

otherwise assess her health even though Lyvita Gomes knew that CCS’

healthcare providers were trying to help and assist her;

(m)refusing to allow CCS’ healthcare providers to take blood and other bodily 

fluid samples so that laboratory tests could be run even though Lyvita Gomes

knew that CCS’ healthcare providers were trying to help and assist her;

(n) refusing to cooperate with CCS’ healthcare providers even though Lyvita 

Gomes knew that CCS’ healthcare providers were trying to help and assist 

her;

(o) refusing to follow the directions from CCS’ healthcare providers even though 

Lyvita Gomes knew that CCS’ healthcare providers were trying to help and 

assist her; and

(p) finally, after she was transferred to Vista East Medical Center, Lyvita Gomes

refused to eat, drink, speak to, or cooperate with the healthcare professionals 

at Vista. 

The defendants further claim that one or more of the foregoing was the sole proximate 

cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 

The plaintiff denies that Lyvita Gomes did any of the things claimed by defendant, denies 

that Lyvita Gomes was negligent in doing any of the things claimed by defendant, and denies 

that any claimed act or omission on Lyvita Gomes’ part was a proximate cause of Lyvita Gomes’ 

claimed injuries. 

Plaintiff’s objection: Misstates the law of the federal constitutional claim even if the court 

determines to use the deliberately indifferent standard. Plaintiff’s claim may lie in both denial of 

medical care and failure to protect from selfharm. See Plaintiff’s Proposed Instructions Nos. 25-

27 for federal claim and 29-30 for state claim. 

The use of the term “count” is confusing as it is not used anywhere else in these instructions and 

the phrase “defendant named in each Count” is confusing because all defendants are included in 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 84 of 96 PageID #:9977
all claims. The use of the term “decedent” is confusing, rather Ms. Gomes’ name should be 

identified. 

Defendants repeated denials are redundant and improper. Contributory negligence is not 

appropriately considered particularly in the context of the federal claim. 

Defendants’ No. 11 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 7.12” (2005 rev.)(modified) Given as modified 

Combined with Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 20.01 Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 85 of 96 PageID #:9978
When I use the term “serious medical need,” I mean a condition that a doctor says 

requires treatment, or something so obvious that even someone who is not a doctor would 

recognize it as requiring treatment. In deciding whether a medical need is serious, you should 

consider the following factors:

- the severity of the condition;

- the harm, including pain and suffering, that could result from a lack of medical 

care;

- whether providing treatment was feasible; and 

- the actual harm caused by the lack of medical care. 

Plaintiff’s objection: The proper standard of care should be “objectively unreasonable” as 

stated in Plaintiff’s motion and memorandum which is separately filed. See Plaintiff’s Proposed 

Instructions Nos. 25-27.

Defendants’ No. 12 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 7.13” (2005 rev.) Given as modified 

Refused 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 86 of 96 PageID #:9979
Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 87 of 96 PageID #:9980
When I use the term “deliberately indifferent,” I mean that the Defendant actually knew of a 

substantial risk of serious harm to the Plaintiff and that the Defendant consciously disregarded 

this risk by failing to take reasonable measures to deal with it. In deciding whether a Defendant 

failed to take reasonable measures, you may consider whether it was practical for him to take 

corrective action.

If the Defendant took reasonable measures to respond to the risk, then he was not 

deliberately indifferent.

Plaintiff’s objection: The proper standard of care should be “objectively unreasonable” as 

stated in Plaintiff’s motion and memorandum which is separately filed. See Plaintiff’s Proposed 

Instructions Nos. 25-27. In the alternative, the Seventh Circuit also suggests that the specific 

harm to Lyvita Gomes should be identified, i.e. the failure to eat and adequately drink. The 

second sentence is inappropriate given the facts of this case. It is not the contemplated harm to 

the “Plaintiff” but to Lyvita Gomes as to each Defendant not “the Defendant.” 7th Cir. Pattern 

Instruction 7.14.

Defendants’ No. 13 Given 

“Fed. JI 7th Cir. 7.14” (2005 rev.)(modified) Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 88 of 96 PageID #:9981
Evidence of negligence, or even gross negligence, is not sufficient to establish deliberate 

indifference.

Plaintiff’s objection: The proper standard of care should be “objectively unreasonable” as 

stated in Plaintiff’s motion and memorandum which is separately filed. See Plaintiff’s Proposed 

Instructions Nos. 25-27. In the alternative, this is not a pattern instruction and is unnecessary. 

The phrase “gross negligence” may also confuse the jury without a definition and without any 

relevance to this case. 

Defendants’ No. 14 Given 

Given as modified 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S. Ct 1970 Refused: 

(1994); Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 1987); Withdrawn 

Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir.1994); 

Zackery v. Mesrobian, 299 Fed. Appx. 598 (7th Cir. 2008); 

Jonson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1012-13 (7th Cir. 2006).

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 89 of 96 PageID #:9982
In considering the Plaintiff’s complaint of deliberate indifference against the defendants, 

you may consider the totality of the medical care provided to Lyvita Gomes.

Plaintiff’s objection: The proper standard of care should be “objectively unreasonable” as 

stated in Plaintiff’s motion and memorandum which is separately filed. See Plaintiff’s Proposed 

Instructions Nos. 25-27. In the alternative, this is not a pattern instruction and is unnecessary. 

Should the court determine nonpattern instructions are appropriate, Plaintiff would submit the 

following additional instructions:

“A detainee need not be literally ignored in order to establish deliberate indifference.”

Petties v. Carter, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15524, *10 (7th Cir. 2016) 

“An inexplicable delay in treatment that serves no penological interest may support an inference 

of deliberate indifference.” 

Petties v. Carter, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15524, *14 (7th Cir. 2016) 

Defendants’ No. 15 Given 

Given as modified 

Guitierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1375 (7th Cir. 1997); Refused: 

Dunigan v. Winnebago County, 165 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 1999) Withdrawn 

Petties v. Carter, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15524, *10 (7th Cir, 2016)

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 90 of 96 PageID #:9983
A correctional family practice physician must possess and use the knowledge, skill, and 

care ordinarily used by a reasonably careful correctional family practice physician. 

The failure to do something that a reasonably careful correctional family practice 

physician would do, or the doing of something that a reasonably careful correctional family 

practice physician would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence, is 

“professional negligence”. 

The phrase “deviation from the standard of care” means the same thing as “professional 

negligence”. 

The law does not say how a reasonably careful correctional family practice physician 

would act under these circumstances. That is for you to decide. In reaching your decision, you

must rely upon opinion testimony from qualified witnesses. You must not attempt to determine 

how a reasonably careful correctional family practice physician would act from any personal 

knowledge you may have.

Plaintiff’s objection: There is no different standard of care for a correctional health provider 

than a health provider in any other context. IPI 105.00 Professional Negligence. Moreover, 

there is no evidence that anyone was a “correctional family practice physician.” See Plaintiff’s 

Proposed Instruction Nos. 29 and 30. 

Defendants’ No. 16 Given 

Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 105.01 Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 91 of 96 PageID #:9984
A correctional psychiatrist must possess and use the knowledge, skill, and care ordinarily 

used by a reasonably careful correctional psychiatrist. 

The failure to do something that a reasonably careful correctional psychiatrist would do, 

or the doing of something that a reasonably careful correctional psychiatrist would not do, under 

circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence, is “professional negligence”. 

The phrase “deviation from the standard of care” means the same thing as “professional 

negligence”. 

The law does not say how a reasonably careful correctional psychiatrist would act under 

these circumstances. That is for you to decide. In reaching your decision, you must rely upon 

opinion testimony from qualified witnesses. You must not attempt to determine how a 

reasonably careful correctional psychiatrist would act from any personal knowledge you may 

have.

Plaintiff’s objection: There is no different standard of care for a correctional health provider 

than a health provider in any other context and all health providers are held to the same 

standard. IPI 105.00 Professional Negligence. See Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction Nos. 29 and 

30. 

Defendants’ No. 17 Given 

Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 105.01 Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 92 of 96 PageID #:9985
A correctional licensed social worker must possess and use the knowledge, skill, and care 

ordinarily used by a reasonably careful correctional licensed social worker. 

The failure to do something that a reasonably careful correctional licensed social worker 

would do, or the doing of something that a reasonably careful correctional licensed social worker 

would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence, is “professional 

negligence”. 

The phrase “deviation from the standard of care” means the same thing as “professional 

negligence”. 

The law does not say how a reasonably careful correctional licensed social worker would 

act under these circumstances. That is for you to decide. In reaching your decision, you must rely 

upon opinion testimony from qualified witnesses. You must not attempt to determine how a 

reasonably careful correctional licensed social worker would act from any personal knowledge 

you may have.

Plaintiff’s objection: There is no different standard of care for a correctional health provider 

than a health provider in any other context and all health providers are held to the same 

standard. IPI 105.00 Professional Negligence. See Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction Nos. 29 and 

30. 

Defendants’ No. 18 Given 

Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 105.01 Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 93 of 96 PageID #:9986
A correctional licensed professional counselor must possess and use the knowledge, skill, 

and care ordinarily used by a reasonably careful correctional licensed professional counselor. 

The failure to do something that a reasonably careful correctional licensed professional 

counselor would do, or the doing of something that a reasonably careful correctional licensed 

professional counselor would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the 

evidence, is “professional negligence”. 

The phrase “deviation from the standard of care” means the same thing as “professional 

negligence”. 

The law does not say how a reasonably careful correctional licensed professional 

counselor would act under these circumstances. That is for you to decide. In reaching your 

decision, you must rely upon opinion testimony from qualified witnesses. You must not attempt 

to determine how a reasonably careful correctional licensed professional counselor would act 

from any personal knowledge you may have.

Plaintiff’s objection: There is no different standard of care for a correctional health provider 

than a health provider in any other context and all health providers are held to the same 

standard. IPI 105.00 Professional Negligence. Moreover, no defendant is a “correctional 

licensed professional counselor.”See Plaintiff’s Proposed Instruction Nos. 29 and 30. 

Defendants’ No. 19 Given 

Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 105.01 Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 94 of 96 PageID #:9987
When you retire to the jury room you will first select a foreperson. He or she will preside 

during your deliberations. 

Your verdicts must be unanimous. 

Forms of verdicts are supplied with these instructions. After you have reached your 

verdicts, fill in and sign the appropriate forms and return them to the court. Your verdicts must 

be signed by each of you. You should not write or mark upon this or any of the other instructions 

given to you by the court. 

The parties in this case are: 

Plaintiff: Estate of Lyvita Gomes

Defendants: Correct Care Solutions, LLC; 

Rozel Elazegui, M.D.; 

Hargurmukh Singh, M.D.; 

Jennifer Bibbiano; Ruth Muuru; 

and Edith Jones

If you find for the plaintiff and against any of the defendants and if you further find that 

plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, then you should use Verdict Form A, writing in "0%" 

on Line "(a)" of Paragraph "Second" of Verdict Form A. 

If you find for the Estate of Lyvita Gomes and against one or more of the defendants, and 

if you further find that Lyvita Gomes' injury was proximately caused by a combination of the 

negligence of that defendant or defendants and Lyvita Gomes' contributory negligence, and that 

Lyvita Gomes’ contributory negligence was 50% or less of the total proximate cause of the 

injury or damage for which recovery is sought, then you should use Verdict Form A, writing in 

the percentage of the Lyvita Gomes’ contributory negligence on Line "(a)" of Paragraph 

"Second" of Verdict Form A. 

If you find in favor of all defendants or that Lyvita Gomes’ contributory negligence was 

more than 50% of the total proximate cause of the injury or damage for which recovery is 

sought, then you should use Verdict Form B. 

Plaintiff’s objection: This instruction is confusing and cumbersome. This instruction also 

misstates the law. See Plaintiff’s motion regarding contributory negligence. See Plaintiff’s 

Proposed Instruction No. 40.

Defendants’ No. 20 Given 

Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 45.03 Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 95 of 96 PageID #:9988
VERDICT FORM B

We, the jury, find for all of the defendants and against the plaintiff.

Please sign and date below and return the entire Verdict Form to the marshal (Each juror must 

sign the form).

Date: 

Foreperson Juror

Juror Juror

Juror Juror

Juror Juror

Juror Juror

Juror Juror

Plaintiff’s objection: This instruction is confusing and cumbersome. This instruction also 

misstates the law. See Plaintiff’s motion regarding contributory negligence. See Plaintiff’s 

Proposed Instruction No. 40.

Defendants’ No. 21 Given 

Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 45.01B Given as modified 

Refused 

Withdrawn 

Case: 1:12-cv-04439 Document #: 190 Filed: 09/16/16 Page 96 of 96 PageID #:9989