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54–776 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–105] 

DEFEATING THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE 

DEVICE (IED) AND OTHER ASYMMETRIC 

THREATS: REVIEWING THE PERFORMANCE AND OVERSIGHT OF THE JOINT 

IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 
(II) 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SEAN MCDONALD, Professional Staff Member 

THOMAS HAWLEY, Professional Staff Member 

TREY HOWARD, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, October 29, 2009, Defeating the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 

and Other Asymmetric Threats: Reviewing the Performance and Oversight 

of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) .............................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, October 29, 2009 .................................................................................... 39 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2009 

DEFEATING THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) AND OTHER 

ASYMMETRIC THREATS: REVIEWING THE PERFORMANCE AND 

OVERSIGHT OF THE JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO) 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman, Oversight 

and Investigations Subcommittee ....................................................................... 1 

Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ............................................................. 2 

WITNESSES 

Metz, Lt. Gen. Thomas F., USA, Director, Joint Improvised Explosive Device 

(IED) Defeat Organization .................................................................................. 6 

Schear, Dr. James A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership 

Strategy and Stability Operations, Department of Defense ............................. 3 

Solis, William M., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Metz, Lt. Gen. Thomas F. ................................................................................ 55 

Schear, Dr. James A. ........................................................................................ 48 

Solis, William M. .............................................................................................. 68 

Wittman, Hon. Rob ........................................................................................... 43 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mrs. Davis ......................................................................................................... 93 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Dr. Snyder ......................................................................................................... 97 

(1) 

DEFEATING THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) 

AND OTHER ASYMMETRIC THREATS: REVIEWING THE 

PERFORMANCE AND OVERSIGHT OF THE JOINT IED 

DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO) 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, October 29, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Dr. SNYDER. Good morning. The hearing will come to order. Welcome, gentlemen. I think for most of you this is your first time in 

our temporary hearing room here, but this lovely room is here in 

the Capitol. 

This is the second hearing that this subcommittee has had in the 

last couple years on the performance and oversight of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization, known as 

JIEDDO. This hearing follows last year’s hearing, which I believe 

was in September of last year, and will explore the question: Is current oversight of JIEDDO within the Department of Defense (DOD) 

sufficient for an organization receiving funding of such considerable 

size, flexibility, and importance? 

IEDs remain the number one cause of casualties to coalition 

forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although IEDs are not a new 

threat, they have been used with unprecedented frequency in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. While the decrease in successful attacks in Iraq 

is encouraging, that success has not been replicated in Afghanistan, which has seen an increase in the success and lethality of attacks with our increase in forces there. 

Since former U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander 

General Abizaid called for a Manhattan Project-like effort 5 years 

ago to defeat IEDs, Congress has provided nearly $17 billion to 

DOD’s efforts. This effort has grown from a 12-man Army task 

force to the Joint IED Defeat Organization, or JIEDDO, which currently employs a staff of about 3,600 dedicated government, military, and contract personnel. 

There is no doubt that despite the complexity and difficulty of its 

mission, JIEDDO and its predecessor organizations have made significant contributions to the counter-IED effort. But we should still 
2 

ask, is this effort as successful as it could be? Have the financial 

controls of oversight kept pace with an organization of this size? 

One thing we want to learn today is whether DOD’s own oversight over the JIEDDO functions has evolved to an appropriate 

level and with sufficient controls. Last year this subcommittee recommended that JIEDDO reexamine whether JIEDDO’s reporting 

arrangement to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) 

was appropriate. Has this been done and what were the conclusions? 

As the subcommittee noted in last year’s report on JIEDDO, having such a high-ranking, high-level senior boss can easily lead to 

little senior attention during this very, very busy time for our 

forces in the Pentagon. For this hearing, as last year, the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has had difficulty deciding on a 

witness who could comment on OSD oversight of JIEDDO. 

I look forward to this hearing today. We very much appreciate 

all of your efforts, appreciate the efforts of JIEDDO and all the personnel, both military, civilian, and contract, who work in this organization. 

I now turn to Mr. Wittman for any comments he would like to 

make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Chairman Snyder. 

And good morning to our witnesses. Thank you so much for taking time out of your busy schedule to join us today. 

As the gruesome events that unfolded in Baghdad earlier this 

week prove, improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, remain a deadly 

threat, especially in the Middle East and South Asia. In fact, the 

number and lethality of IED incidents in Afghanistan continues to 

grow and the nation of Pakistan is suffering frequent IED attacks 

also. 

Even the United States is not immune to this threat and our deployed troops cannot ever let their guard down. Despite the best efforts of JIEDDO and others, it is still far too easy for evildoers to 

make and deploy bombs that indiscriminately kill and maim scores 

of innocent people. 

If there were an easy human or physics problem here we would 

have had the solution already. I know we have made progress, but 

I would like to know how we can do better and what it will take 

to get there. 

Today we are following up on the subcommittee’s excellent report 

in November 2008, which quoted General Metz, who is here as a 

witness today, as saying that the IED threat would never be completely removed from the battlefield. And I am sure General Metz 

is correct. The enemy will always seek vulnerabilities to attack, 

and we cannot harden everything and still be effective in counterinsurgency operations. 

Even so, I am disturbed by the negative trends in Afghanistan. 

A year ago this subcommittee noted that effective attacks against 

coalition forces were increasing compared to previous years. Since 

then the number of effective attacks has continued to climb, and 
3 

climb at a rate well beyond the increased number of coalition forces 

deployed in country. 

Despite this ever-worsening operational threat to our troops, 

funding for JIEDDO has been significantly reduced. Maybe this 

funding reduction reflects better conditions in Iraq and doesn’t reflect a reduced effort in Afghanistan. It is difficult to tell from here, 

since DOD continues to request JIEDDO funds as colorless money 

that can be spent as command wishes without informing Congress 

how the work is prioritized. 

The subcommittee expressed concern with this funding mechanism in last year’s report, and our concern was not addressed and 

as you can see has now led to real questions about JIEDDO’s priorities. With attacks in Afghanistan increasing, I asked for General 

Metz to provide us some detail on efforts being made in support of 

Operation Enduring Freedom. In addition, I ask all witnesses 

today, as they are able, the status of the issues raised in our November 2008 report. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for calling this hearing, and 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Wittman. 

Our witnesses today are Dr. James Schear, the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations in the Department of Defense; Lieutenant General Thomas 

Metz, the U.S. Army director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, JIEDDO. 

General Metz, you are leaving soon, are you not at some time? 

We appreciate your service. 

And Mr. William Solis, the Director of Defense Capabilities and 

Management, the Government Accountability Office (GAO). 

Dr. Schear, we’ll begin with you. The clock will be for five minutes; if you see the red light and you have some more things to tell 

us feel free to carry on. So, Dr. Schear. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES A. SCHEAR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY 

AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. SCHEAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Members of the committee—of the subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen, it is my great pleasure to testify here today about the important work that the U.S. Department of Defense is doing in countering the threat of improvised explosive devices, and it is a particular honor to be able to appear here this morning with Lieutenant General Tom Metz, who has provided superb leadership for this 

effort over the past two years. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that my 

written testimony be submitted—— 

Dr. SNYDER. Yes. All statements will be made part of the record. 

Dr. SCHEAR. Thank you. Let me also begin by thanking you, and 

along with you Congressman Wittman and the members of this 

committee, and indeed the full committee, for your unwavering 

support for our armed forces service personnel who serve courageously in hostile environments in today’s irregular warfare battle 
4 

space. The wars of the past decade have challenged our military 

greatly to adjust and adapt rapidly to deadly tactics devised by our 

enemies on the battlefield, and your unstinting support has been 

critical in meeting those challenges. 

Clearly, as Mr. Wittman has said, sir, one of the biggest challenges we face is the IED. It remains, without question, the violent 

extremist’s weapon of choice against U.S. armed forces. Over the 

past year we have seen an increase in the use of IEDs against U.S. 

forces in Afghanistan not only as a standalone weapon but also increasingly part of complex attacks involving more conventional direct-fire weapons. The IED is the weapon responsible for inflicting 

the most casualties on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. 

Although we have seen on the Iraq side a decrease in the number of attacks and IEDs have become less effective against U.S. 

personnel there, the insurgents continue to use IEDs to attack and 

destabilize the Iraqi government. 

Additionally, IEDs have become a major source of concern in 

parts of Africa, other parts of the Asia Pacific region, and Latin 

America. In this time of growing asymmetric threats we believe the 

use of IEDs will remain the most likely weapon of choice for violent 

groups because they are low-cost, high-impact weapons that inflict 

maximum casualties at minimum risk and expense. 

Within the Defense Department the Joint IED Defeat Organization has the responsibility, as you know, to lead, focus, and advocate all counter-IED efforts. Secretary Gates and his leadership 

team strongly support JIEDDO and the institutionalization of its 

beneficial impact throughout our large and diverse defense community. 

The unique authorities and capabilities of JIEDDO enable us to 

rapidly experiment, develop, and field both material and non-material solutions to the grave and persistent threat of IEDs. Perhaps 

most important, JIEDDO is delivering for our customers. Our combatant commanders continue to confirm that it provides a unique 

and vital capability to counter IEDs. 

As this committee knows, JIEDDO is truly a joint organization 

that relies on inputs from across the Department. In my written 

testimony I provide more detail on JIEDDO’s three-tiered governance structure, but let me summarize its key features quickly. 

JIEDDO first presents its initiatives to the Joint Resource and 

Acquisition Board, so-called JRAB, which is composed of O–6 and 

senior civil service members from across the Department. After 

that analysis the initiative is then briefed to the Joint Integrated 

Process Team, the JIPT. This board includes general and flag officers as well as civilian senior executive service members. 

Finally, issues that are approved by the JIPT for senior-level review go to our DEPSECDEF-chaired senior resource steering 

group, which includes the deputy as well as three- and four-star officers, including the vice chiefs of staff of each of the services. And 

it is drawn from the same organizations that support the effort at 

lower levels. When recommendations are teed up in a written form 

for the deputy he makes a final decision on whether to fund a proposed initiative. 

I appreciate how complex this oversight structure may appear. It 

is, indeed, multifaceted. It remains a work in progress. JIEDDO ex-
5 

pects to publish a revised governance structure by the end of November and the applicable DOD Directive 2000.19E is due for revision next year. 

In terms of the distinctive role played by the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, let me provide a bit more detail— 

and I realize I am already overstepping my time, sir. Our Under 

Secretary of Defense, Miche`le Flournoy, serves as the principal 

staff assistant to DEPSECDEF and a principal advisor to JIEDDO 

regarding DOD policy and plans to ensure that the organization’s 

activities are fully supportive of our larger defense and national security strategies. 

When OSD Policy meets within—serves on the governance structure we typically ask six questions: First, has the combatant commander requested this specific IED capability? That is usually easy 

to determine but sometimes we have to do some special digging. 

Secondly, has the capacity been appropriately tested for both 

field uses and to ensure that it will work as expected? While we 

are acutely conscious of the need to ensure fast fielding of systems 

we also want to keep defective or non-performing items out of the 

field. 

Question three: Does the initiative fit within other DOD or U.S. 

Government policies? And in cases where issues do arise, how are 

we to resolve actual or potential conflict? 

Question four: Does the initiative provide a comprehensive approach that includes a plan for acquisition, training, and sustaining 

the capability over time? While JIEDDO initiatives rely upon the 

services to take on these tasks after the first two years of funding, 

it is essential that the basics for those first two years be well laid 

out. 

Question five: Is JIEDDO maintaining a balanced portfolio? That 

is, are we doing everything we can to balance short-term acquisition and medium-term research and development investments? 

And how well are we balancing high-risk, big-return efforts against 

lower-risk, moderate-return efforts? And are we providing defensively-focused force protection in relation to our ability to work on 

the offensive side, on the attack-the-network priority? 

And finally, the last question: What can we do to improve our coalition counter-IED efforts, including especially with members of 

the coalition who operate alongside of or in lieu of our service members in today’s irregular warfare environment? 

I would say, sir, of all those questions I would lay special emphasis on the last one. OSD Policy works with JIEDDO to assist our 

partners and allies in developing compatible counter-IED technology and training. We have worked to provide the necessary authorizations and funding so that counter-IED equipment, like the 

SYMPHONY system, and tactics can be provided to our coalition 

partners. 

In the future we have, regrettably, high confidence that the use 

of IEDs by terrorists, insurgents, and criminals will continue across 

the globe and probably increase. And while the need to have an organizational steward like JIEDDO for this critical mission may be 

affected by changes in the size of our expeditionary deployments 

over time, the requirement itself will not disappear. 
6 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to testify. 

We look forward to working closely with members of this committee on this important task in the future. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schear can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Schear. 

General Metz. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. THOMAS F. METZ, USA, DIRECTOR, 

JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) DEFEAT ORGANIZATION 

General METZ. Chairman Snyder and Congressman Wittman, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today and report on the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, which I am indeed 

honored to lead. 

Since our last meeting in September there have been over 10,000 

IED incidents in Iraq. These incidents are diverse, and the devices 

that were used reflect a wide range of arming and firing switches 

ranging from relatively simple command wire to sophisticated 

radio-controlled and passive infrared switches. Yet in spite of the 

large volume and the diversity of the IED attacks the number that 

are effective against our forces continued to decline for the second 

straight year. 

While I am pleased with the progress in Iraq, our work is not 

yet done. Our organization is poised to support our continuing diplomatic mission and U.S. forces as the drawdown proceeds in accordance with the security agreement. 

In addition, while we have learned an enormous amount from 

our experience in Iraq, not all of these lessons translate to our efforts in Afghanistan. The environment and the enemy in Afghanistan pose many different and difficult challenges. 

Although initially slower to develop in Afghanistan, the IED has 

now replaced direct-fire weapons as the enemy’s weapon of choice. 

Furthermore, Afghanistan local insurgents, tribal faction, and the 

Taliban enjoy a greater freedom of action to emplace large numbers 

of IEDs in movement corridors such as the Ring Road, which are 

so vital to our success. 

Our challenge is further compounded by these groups’ intimidation of the local populace. To ensure the most comprehensive support to this complex theater, JIEDDO is deploying over 100 initiatives to Afghanistan. 

IEDs also pose a significant threat outside of CENTCOM. Nearly 

300 IED incidents every month around the globe confirm that the 

dangers from this weapon reach far beyond the borders of Afghanistan and Iraq. Since September of 2008 there have been more than 

3,500 total IED incidents outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 

number is growing. Able to rapidly exploit readily available commercial technology, violent extremists easily share the results of 

their efforts across the near real-time global communications grid. 

We support all the combatant commanders as they respond to 

these IED threats through a rapid acquisition process that we call 

the Joint IED Capabilities Approval and Acquisition Management 

Process, the acronym JCAAMP. Congressionally-directed funding 
7 

allows us to act with a sense of urgency inside 24-month period 

where the Department’s budget processes cannot normally operate. 

As a result, over the past three years the JIEDDO has evolved as 

the Department’s premier agency for rapid development and delivery of capabilities in the hands of warfighters. 

The JCAAMP is not perfect, but it allows us to bypass current 

cumbersome, risk-adverse processes associated with the service acquisition efforts in support of their force modernization programs. 

The exploitation and use of information is one of the greatest asymmetric advantages we have. The Counter-IED Operations Integration Center, or the acronym COIC, establishes this for JIEDDO by 

fusing near real-time information from over 100 databases and delivering requests for support back to warfighters in record time for 

use at the tactical level of targeting. 

However, I continue to believe the ultimate key to our success 

has been and will always be world-class training. Unfortunately, no 

one anticipated the sheer amount and complexity of the training 

required to successfully counter IEDs. 

JIEDDO’s mission is to grab emerging and hard training problems and find ways for the services and our partners to overcome 

them. We are making great progress but much remains to be done. 

Since our last meeting I have become more convinced than ever 

that we live in an era of persistent conflict. I agree with Secretary 

Gates that the clear lines that distinguish conventional and irregular forces have blurred. 

We now confront complex hybrid forms of conflict ranging from 

near-peer competitors who will use irregular and asymmetric tactics to non-state and rogue state actors capable of generating violence across a broad spectrum. These weapons range from IEDs to 

weapons of mass destruction. 

We have been in this fight for eight years, and I believe this 

enemy will continue to fight us for the foreseeable future and probably beyond my lifetime. Violent extremists will continue to wage 

conflict against human targets, and their weapon of choice will continue to be the IED. 

As a result, we can never be satisfied with the results we have 

achieved until we have diminished the strategic effects of the IED, 

reducing their appeal for increased and global employment. We 

must strive for an ever greater impact on the continued aggressive 

developments of new, innovative ways to make this weapon system 

too costly to produce and too risky to employ. While we will never 

completely chase this weapon off the battlefield, we must continue 

to eliminate its ability to affect us strategically. 

A permanent JIEDDO, funded in the base budget, sends a clear 

signal that we understand the complexities of the challenge. We 

must be willing to invest the money, the time, the energy, and the 

talent to make sure we win. This is not an easy task, but I believe 

that it is necessary. 

In closing, allow me to point out that I have proudly worn the 

uniform of the United States Army for over 43 years. As I near retirement, I could not have asked for a better assignment. I could 

not be more proud of the men and women who are helping me defeat the IED as a weapon of strategic influence. They are passionate about our mission, and they display a sense of urgency as 
8 

they work to defeat the device, attack the networks, and train the 

force. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the Members of Congress and the subcommittee for your continued support 

of JIEDDO, the sincere interest in making sure that our 

warfighters have an agile, responsive, passionate organization focused on providing them the best counter-IED capabilities the Nation has to offer. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss 

the issue I feel most passionate about, and I look forward to your 

questions. And I apologize for going—— 

Dr. SNYDER. You are fine. Thank you, General Metz. 

[The prepared statement of General Metz can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Solis. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. SOLIS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. SOLIS. Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here 

today to discuss DOD’s management and oversight of its efforts to 

defeat improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. As mentioned earlier, 

these devices continue to be the number one threat to troops in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. 

DOD created JIEDDO in January 2006 to focus its counter-IED 

efforts and positioned it to report directly to the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense rather than through traditional lines of authority and 

oversight. Since that time we have issued several reports on 

JIEDDO’s management and operations, including one we are going 

to issue today. 

My testimony today will draw on this latest report plus ongoing 

work to discuss: one, steps JIEDDO and DOD have taken to improve the management of counter-IED efforts; and two, challenges 

affecting DOD’s ability to oversee JIEDDO. 

Since its creation JIEDDO has taken several steps to improve 

management of counter-IED efforts. These actions include developing an overarching framework for Department-wide counter-IED 

efforts, which delineates specific roles and responsibilities for organizations involved in those efforts, and working with the services 

to improve visibility over their counter-IED efforts. 

While these actions represent some progress, we have identified 

several challenges that continue to affect DOD’s ability to oversee 

JIEDDO. First, JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility over 

counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD even though many officials told us that such visibility would be of great benefit in coordinating and managing the Department’s counter-IED programs. 

For example, although JIEDDO was mandated to focus all DOD 

actions to help defeat IEDs, most of the organizations engaged in 

the counter-IED efforts prior to JIEDDO have continued to develop, 

maintain, and in some cases expand their own counter-IED capabilities. Although JIEDDO and several service organizations have 

developed their own counter-IED databases, there is no comprehensive database to combine this information. Further, these service 

databases do not capture all the counter-IED efforts, limiting their 
9 

ability to provide JIEDDO with timely and comprehensive summary of their existing initiatives. 

Second, JIEDDO continues to face difficulties coordinating the 

transition of funding responsibilities for counter-IED efforts to the 

services. Transition is hindered by funding gaps between JIEDDO’s 

transition timeline and DOD’s base budget cycle. It is also hindered 

when JIEDDO does not fully consider service requirements in the 

acquisition process. 

For example, in 2007 JIEDDO funded a fielded man-portable 

IED jammer. Although the system was developed in response to a 

Central Command requirement, the Army and Marine Corps have 

no formal requirement for it, casting doubts as to which DOD organizations will be required to pay for the continued procurement and 

sustainment of the system. This could delay the transition of the 

program, forcing JIEDDO to continue to fund it at the expense of 

new initiatives. 

Third, JIEDDO lacks clear criteria for defining what counter-IED 

training initiative it will fund. As a result, JIEDDO has funded 

training activities that have primary uses other than defeating an 

IED, such as role players and simulated villages to replicate Iraqi 

conditions at various combat training centers. 

Fourth, JIEDDO lacks the means as well as reliable data to 

gauge the effectiveness of counter-IED efforts. For example, we 

found that JIEDDO lacks key data needed to evaluate the effectiveness of its counter-IED initiatives. 

Fifth, JIEDDO has not consistently applied its counter-IED initiative acquisition process, which was referred to earlier as 

JCAAMP. For example, we found that 48 of the 56 JIEDDO 

counter-IED initiatives we reviewed have been excluded from all or 

part of JIEDDO’s review and approval process, including 16 that 

required approval by the DEPSECDEF or the JIEDDO director. 

Sixth, JIEDDO lacks adequate internal controls required to provide DOD assurance that it is achieving it objectives. In July 2009 

JIEDDO reported that a material weakness has existed in its internal controls since the organization was established. Such a weakness could adversely affect JIEDDO’s ability to meet its objectives. 

In conclusion, although JIEDDO has taken important steps, the 

Department continues to face a number of challenges that, if 

unaddressed, may result in the potential duplication of effort, 

unaddressed capability gaps, and inefficient use of resources in a 

fiscally-challenged environment. Further, the Department will lack 

the basic confidence that it has retained the necessary capabilities 

to address the IED threat for the long term. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to 

take any answers from you or the subcommittee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Solis can be found in the Appendix on page 68.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Solis. 

We have been joined by some members who are not members of 

the subcommittee, and they will be allowed to participate in—— 

You will get bumped down the line if we have some other subcommittee members come in, but we will give everyone a chance 

to—— 
10 

Mr. Solis, you said DOD concurred with your recommendations. 

Who specifically concurred—what person? 

Your microphone is not on, sir. 

Mr. SOLIS. I would have to see, but it was not—we have that? 

It was JIEDDO for the Department. 

Dr. SNYDER. I am sorry? 

Mr. SOLIS. JIEDDO for the Department. 

Dr. SNYDER. JIEDDO. That is not really a person, though, is it? 

Mr. SOLIS. I would have to look. 

Dr. SNYDER. I was actually wondering who the individual person 

was. 

General Metz, I want to go through some of the criticism that 

GAO made and give you a chance to respond, and I am going from 

the draft I was given a day or two ago—I am going to read from 

their conclusions. First, JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility 

over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. First, JIEDDO and 

the services lack a comprehensive database of all existing counterIED initiatives, limiting their visibility over counter-IED efforts 

across the Department. 

Although JIEDDO is currently developing a management system 

that will track initiatives as they move through JIEDDO’s acquisition process, the system will only track JIEDDO-funded initiatives, 

not those being independently developed and procured by the services and other DOD components. What is your response to that 

criticism? 

General METZ. Well, sir, I appreciate the report including that 

we are working on that database. It was obvious to me when I 

came in that the pace at which business had been done, that sense 

of urgency was needed. 

When General Meiggs stood up the organization the IEDs in Iraq 

were about 1,500 a month and they were to grow to 2,500 a month 

and remain there for most—the last of 2006 and the first of 2007. 

So I am sure his priorities were to help the warfighter. Knowing 

that we needed that data, we have worked on developing our internal database effort. 

Now, as it relates to us not having the visibility of the other services or agencies that are doing things, I think we do. I think there 

are multiple—— 

Dr. SNYDER. So you don’t agree? You do not agree with Mr. Solis’ 

criticism? 

General METZ. I do not agree that we don’t have any awareness 

of what is going on across the Department because there are 

enough forums that—— 

Dr. SNYDER. I think his criticism was not that you didn’t have 

‘‘any awareness.’’ His criticism is you lack a comprehensive database. You agree you lack a comprehensive database? 

General METZ. I agree that we lack a comprehensive database 

and we are working on not only ours but to work out how we interface with others to ensure that we don’t have those—a duplicative 

effort. I think, however, that an overlapped effort may be wise to 

ensure gaps and seams are covered, but we do need to work to create that database. 

Dr. SNYDER. To assess that you have an overlapped effort, 

though, implies that you would actually have a database that you 
11 

could look at and say, ‘‘Yes, they are working on that too and we 

are working on it, but that is okay.’’ 

Second—this is again from the GAO—the services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO’s 

acquisition process. With limited visibility both JIEDDO and the 

services are at risk of duplicating efforts. What is your comment 

about that? 

General METZ. Sir, the services participate in our JCAAMP process, which includes ‘‘A’’-level assessments of initiatives, flag-level, 

and if it is—and now in almost every case the cumulative efforts 

are above $25 million, which our directive says I have got to go to 

the Secretary. So the senior resource steering committee gets a 

four-star and above-level look at all those initiatives. 

And I think your concerns are those initiatives that don’t go 

through the JCAAMP process—— 

Dr. SNYDER. This is a specific criticism that you have—that there 

are initiatives that are funded by JIEDDO that, in the words of 

GAO, ‘‘bypass JIEDDO’s acquisition process.’’ They would not come 

before the groups that you referred to. 

General METZ. Yes, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. Do you agree that GAO’s criticism is—— 

General METZ. Well, I agree that there are some initiatives that I have approved below the $25 million level that I have moved 

quickly to the warfighters because I saw the urgency and made 

that decision. I believe that we have, during that process, tried to 

be as transparent as we possibly could, and we certainly aren’t hiding data from anyone. 

But we could be rightfully criticized if indeed someone says that 

we did not fully disclose. But my efforts to be transparent in the 

leadership of this organization is one of the very high priorities—— 

Dr. SNYDER. My time is about to run out, but I think you talk 

about in your—everyone wants you to have speed at moving things 

to the warfighter, but the criticism is that the services who oversee 

the warfighters directly, that they lack full visibility over things 

that you fund. I mean, that is their criticism. It is either accurate 

or it is not. 

But you are saying if things move the warfighters and services 

do indeed know about it. Is that what you are saying? 

General METZ. I think that we cross over in so many forms 

throughout the Department—— 

Dr. SNYDER. Right. 

General METZ [continuing]. That I believe that the knowledge is 

there, and I would have to work carefully with each piece of data 

that the GAO has collected. 

Dr. SNYDER. Yes. My time is expired. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, gentlemen, thank you for joining us today. 

General Metz, I want to go back and talk a little bit about 

JIEDDO funding. And you had spoken about the number of attacks, and acknowledging that the threat is growing, alarmingly so, 

and especially here on the home front. If you look at the funding you see in 2008 $4.3 billion allocated for JIEDDO; in 2009 $3.1 billion; in 2010 $2.1 billion. As we are 
12 

seeing the attacks on our troops overseas and the worldwide threat 

growing my question is, why was your funding cut almost in half 

during that period of time? 

General METZ. Sir, I think that that cut reflects the fact that we 

have harvested many of the low-hanging fruit efforts. For example, 

pushing the enemy off of radio-controlled arming and initiation devices in Iraq was a very expensive effort to proliferate those 

jammers—develop them, ensure that they were interoperable, get 

them to the force—that was a huge amount of money, in a couple 

of those years close to $1 billion. Now that we have that technology 

and we have that capability there was no need for a continued 

funding line for that particular initiative, the remote control improvised explosive device (CREW) initiative. 

Also, many of the material solutions that were expensive have 

been invested in and are being used. It is interesting to me, and 

it may be counterintuitive to many, but many of the non-material 

solutions are not as expensive, yet they have been able to allow us 

to aggressively attack the networks and actually cost us less. And 

so over time we are working on some very, very hard physics problems, but that investment has not required as much money. 

So I think the energy and the focus is absolutely still there, but 

we have been able to maintain the pace of what we do in defeating 

the device, attacking the network, and training the force with less 

funds. And we want to be prudent with those funds, and we do not 

want to ask for more than would be wise for us to use in fighting 

the IED at the level we think we can. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. I wanted to ask you a little bit about 

things going on in Afghanistan. We are looking at the rates of attacks going up; we are also looking at an increase in lethality of 

those attacks. Can you give me some indication about that, and 

then what are we doing to reverse those trends? 

General METZ. Well, certainly as we—as over the past year we 

have pushed more soldiers and Marines into Afghanistan and into 

places where we had not been before the enemy was ready with a 

very thick array of IEDs, and so those soldiers or Marines ran into 

those IEDs and it was what we predicted. 

I think we are seeing that the enemy is having a difficult time 

replacing those IEDs, and that the fight is on, and I am confident 

in the training and capabilities of those forces to continue to manage the level and begin to bring it down as they become accustomed to worked, especially in Regional Command (RC) South. 

We have seen the enemy—and this is warfare—he looks at the 

solutions we have put on the battlefield, and he works to counter 

those. And he has really upped the total volume and explosive 

power of his IEDs, and that is probably the main trend that I 

would report to you in Afghanistan, is that his increased size of his 

IED increases its—well, obviously its lethality, and then challenges 

some of the solutions we had, mainly the Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected Vehicle (MRAP) and MRAP-like vehicles that we bought 

in order to protect our troops. 

Mr. WITTMAN. One last question: I was impressed when I visited 

COIC about the efforts to get information back to the front in real 

time. And when I visited there obviously the focus was on Iraq. 
13 

Now with this growing threat of lethality in Afghanistan my 

question is, are you able to communicate as effectively with our 

Combatant Commands (COCOMs) in Afghanistan as you were in 

Iraq? And are you able to support the troops at the same level as 

we have supported them in Iraq? 

General METZ. The only thing that limits us duplicating our effort in—well, there are several things—in Iraq and Afghanistan 

with the COIC, there are some outlying operation bases that may 

not have a secure internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) to 

them and may have limited bandwidth. That would cause us some 

difficulty to get the information out. But at the headquarters level 

I think that we have got the full capability and bandwidth to get 

the information there. 

What is really different in the two theaters is that over time in 

Iraq, as we were experiencing 1,500, 2,500 IEDs a month and finding and clearing half of them we were gaining an enormous 

amount of forensics and biometrics information. We use that in the 

COIC to our advantage; it is our asymmetric advantage, as you 

witnessed. 

The IED was not an important—was not a well-used and important weapons system for many years in Afghanistan. We have seen 

that increase and we are—just like Iraq we are finding and clearing about half of the IEDs. 

We will continue to build the data on Afghanistan but it is just 

less now. And over time I am confident that our great tool of the 

COIC will be ever more important to the commanders in Afghanistan. In fact, I have got the director of the COIC here who is just 

back from Afghanistan, and we have kept that flow of leadership 

to ensure that we are as up to date as possible with the needs of 

the commanders in Afghanistan and we meet their request for support in what we call the latest time of value, just as we did in Iraq. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, General Metz. We are going to move 

on to Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And General Metz, thank you for your lifetime of service. You 

know, it is so easy, sometimes, to forget the incredible sacrifice that 

all of the people in uniform make, but when a person gets stars on 

their shoulders it really reflects a profound contribution to human 

freedom, and thank you very much. 

And I know that your success at JIEDDO has direct results on 

the ground in counted and saved lives, so it is a big job that you 

do. I also know that the IED is at once simple and monstrously 

complex, and with an adaptable enemy that is always changing 

things and looking at what we do, and it is a very, very difficult 

thing to handle. 

How do you stay ahead of this adaptability that the enemy has? 

How do you keep trying to get ahead of them and what is your 

mechanism to do that? It is sort of an ethereal question, I guess, 

but what methods do you employ to try to stay one step ahead of 

them? 

General METZ. Well, certainly one method is to collect the data 

and work hard at developing the metrics so we can understand not 

just the inputs that we have done in this organization and not just 

the outputs, but what are the outcomes that we are producing? 
14 

And the only way to really know that is to spend time in the theater. 

As a three-star I will cost a lot of time and energy, so I limit my 

trips to twice a year. My sergeant major that is with me today, as 

I mentioned Mr. Larkin and others, spend time in the theater so 

we can ensure that we are connected with the commanders and understand what their problems are and what they see coming. 

On the other hand, back here inside of the Washington area, inside my headquarters we have created what we call the Competitive Strategies Group. I am a firm believer from my career that you 

must look at yourself through the enemies’ eyes, and that is a welldefined program called red teaming. 

And my competitive strategies effort is red teaming and more; in 

addition to red team efforts we include a technical gaming staff 

that are looking at the technologies that are available to the enemy 

that he could use. So each initiative is bounced against the red 

team and the technical gaming team to ensure we understand what 

the counters are going to be and begin already to develop the 

counter to the counter. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes. 

General METZ. This is, I think, absolutely critical in today’s warfare because there are not just good guys and bad guys on the battlefield. There is an enormous domain in between. And it is a cultural domain, it is a social domain, it is a technical domain, and 

you need to understand that. 

For example, when I was visiting U.S. Pacific Command 

(PACOM) I stressed to them that the telecommunications industry 

is not going to go into an austere environment and put copper cables and plug into my belt. The telecommunications industry—and 

it may be Asian—will put in the very best that they can to make 

money. And we need to understand those systems and be able to 

compete and operate inside those systems because the enemy is. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes, sir. 

General METZ. And so for that reason, inside my organization the 

Competitive Strategies Group, in a tight link with what is going on 

in the theater and understanding the commanders’ concerns about 

the future, helps us do what you ask us to do. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, General, I also read in an article just recently 

that it discussed how your—how JIEDDO is expanding its role to 

include examining the broad networks of insurgents necessary to 

sustain an IED campaign, like, you know, the people who finance 

it, and the couriers, and those who ferry the explosives, the bomb 

assembly technicians, all of the—sort of the upstream. And, you 

know, in Iraq, Iran was providing a lot of the explosive formed 

penetrators (EFPs), and they were some of the really most dangerous ones that we were facing. 

So I guess my question is twofold. I know some criticism has 

come that says this perhaps diverts you from your primary purpose, but it occurs to me that if you can prevent the source and the 

advancement of some of these it is a very wise thing. So I would 

like for you to touch on that and also tell us what role Iran continues to play in any IED or explosive formed penetrator supply in 

Afghanistan. 
15 

General METZ. The first part of your question, I would tell you 

that we—I apologize, sir. I have concentrated on the Iranian part 

too much and—— 

Mr. FRANKS. No, that is all right. Just the fact that I know that 

you have expanded JIEDDO recently, or at least the indications 

are that puts kind of verbal responsibility on getting to the sources. 

General METZ. Well, sir, the term that we would use in my organization would be ‘‘left of boom.’’ We spend a lot of time initially 

working to defeat the device and give the soldiers, sailors, airmen, 

and Marines the protection that they rightfully deserve if they got 

inside that explosion. 

We are constantly working more and more left of boom, and that 

gets into attacking the networks. That gets into getting involved in 

the financing of them, the supplies, the techniques of how the bomb 

is made and emplaced, and in some cases very unique arming and 

triggering devices. 

We work that because the payoff is enormous to work yourself 

left of boom because what you are essentially doing is not just attacking an almost infinite array of ways to present the bomb and 

arm it and ignite it, but you are moving upstream so that you can 

get a bigger bang for your buck. 

And we really do—as I have mentioned before, those non-material solutions to attack the network are paying significant dividends, all the way back to working with Commerce, Justice, and 

Treasury, and finding those that either inadvertently or directly 

are supplying the components to our enemies. 

Most of that that I would like to talk about Iran I think we need 

to take to a closed session, or I can answer in a classified for the 

record. But we do, because of the lethality of the EFP, look very 

closely at where it may be coming from. Fortunately we have seen 

only what we think are homemade platter-charged kind of directional attacks in Afghanistan and have not seen the very sophisticated EFPs that we saw in Iraq, and the ones in Iraq have dropped 

in effectiveness. And so I think that the close link that we did see, 

there is some problem there, and fortunately our troops aren’t facing the very lethal EFPs that we faced a couple years ago. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Rogers for five minutes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Last year I went down to Alabama, and we had a field hearing, 

and they showed us where the Marines were using off-leash canine 

assets that they had deployed to Iraq, and I understand they have 

18 of these teams, and not one of those teams has suffered a loss 

that is using those. Are you familiar with that technology? 

General METZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is it limited in what it is useful for or is it something we could expand? Because when they showed them to us the 

dogs went out ahead of the convoy, and they meandered around the 

road, and they were just great. 

General METZ. Yes, sir. I have seen likewise. I visited the Army’s 

maneuver support center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and they 

are working an initiative for off-leash dogs. 

I think that the combatant—I mean, the commanders know this 

capability. If they want more of this capability I think that that 
16 

would come to us—maybe not directly to JIEDDO, but the joint urgent operational need that they would submit for more canine support would arrive at the Joint Staff and be validated, and OSD may 

not give it to us but may turn that joint urgent operational need 

to the services. 

But I do know of the capability. I do know of the success. And 

I am confident that the commanders know of it, so I think that we 

are on top of that one. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you. 

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Hunter for five minutes. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, first off for what you do and what 

JIEDDO is doing. You are saving lives, and that is the most important thing. 

My problem is this: If the President came to you today or Secretary Gates came to you today and said, ‘‘I want you to mobilize 

right now. I don’t want one more IED dug into the ground, buried, 

between Helmand and Nangarhar, as of one week from today not 

a single IED to be dug in,’’ and you were to mobilize America’s industrial base, our contractor base, all the former Special Forces 

(SF) guys that are now doing contractor stuff for us and doing it 

really well—basically, if you were to mobilize this country to stop 

what is the number one way that the enemy is taking American 

lives right now, you could do it. We would not have another IED 

buried. 

And what I have seen is as the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) exponentially increases and gets sent over to 

Afghanistan, as the money spent in JIEDDO goes up and up and 

up, and as we have great programs—and they are great programs, 

and I am looking forward to all of them coming to fruition—the 

numbers of assets, the numbers of programs, and the dollars spent 

is almost in an inverse proportion to the IED deaths in Afghanistan, meaning the more money JIEDDO gets, the more ISR—and 

the ISR, as you know, has gone up at 100 percent in Afghanistan 

over the last year, and it is going to go up more—so have our 

American deaths due to IEDs. There is no correlation right now between money spent, programs, or ISR in theater, so what we are 

missing is the execution. 

And what I don’t understand is this: You have one window— 

when you talk about getting left of that boom, you have one window to catch an IED emplacer, when he is bigger than the IED. 

When I was in Fallujah in 2004 things were going crazy, you had 

guys using backhoes to dig in holes to put 155 shells in; it took like 

4 or 5 hours. 

So we let guys use backhoes—enemy terrorists use backhoes in 

our area of operation (AO) because we didn’t have eyes in the sky 

watching the roads 24/7. The only window of opportunity that you 

have is when they are emplacing the IEDs. You can attack the network, go after finances, and everything else, but the window where 

you see them putting it in, that is when you can kill them. 

And if the President came to you tomorrow and said, ‘‘I don’t 

want one more IED dug in. You need to watch every road 24/7 

where our operations are,’’ and that is a very small area. I have 
17 

seen the maps where all the IED hits are. It is a very small area. 

It is under 100 clicks [kilometers] if you want to put it all together 

where 90 percent of the IEDs go off—100-click area. 

So my question is, what are we doing tomorrow—what are you 

going to implement tomorrow to make sure that no more IEDs go— 

and once more, all the different programs that we have had, that 

JIEDDO does, I have been briefed on them. They are all fantastic— 

Project Liberty, Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize (ODIN), everything is going in, and it is going to be set up 

at some point in the near future. We have been being told that 

since I got into office in January, ‘‘It is going to be there soon, sir. 

It is going to be there soon. It is going to be there soon.’’ 

It isn’t there now, and we are losing guys every day. So what are 

we going to do tomorrow to defeat IEDs so that we don’t have any 

more IED deaths? Where is the Task Force ODIN of Afghanistan? 

General METZ. Sir, please let me take that. And first of all, I 

want to thank you for initiating your efforts. We are recognizing 

that is that indeed the loss of life that is the bottom line metric, 

and it is those lives and those limbs and serious burns and eyesight that I work to try to prevent every day because I think they 

indeed map to the strategic influence that the IED is having on us. 

We are an enabling organization. We answer those needs from 

the commanders. We look for the gaps and seams that we can help 

them fill. And we fan out across industry and academia and the 

federal labs, the federally-funded research corporations to find 

those solutions. 

We do our very best to get them there, but the commanders use 

those tools to fight their fight. And as you very accurately describe, 

Task Force ODIN-like efforts really have an impact on the enemy. 

And I think that one of the things that we do via the COIC is to 

show them where those hot spots are, where the enemy is concentrating, and help the commanders concentrate their own ISR capability. 

Just this morning I left two days—the third day of a technical 

outreach conference where we are indeed tapping the capabilities 

of the country to look at the transportation networks and work to 

give those route clearance companies and the land owner commander the capabilities to keep those roads and transportation 

means free of IEDs. I may not go as far with you as just 100 kilometers are important, but you are right, there are hot spots we 

need to focus on, and we work hard to guide the commanders to 

that. 

But having been a commander, I am not going to try to become 

the 12,000-mile screwdriver. I am going to give them every capability I can. I want to stay in touch with them. They have got a 

very tough fight to fight. 

I think we can do more, and that was one of the things that I 

was working with industry this week on. We will work with anybody I can to improve the capability. 

I think there is—we have got some excellent potential ideas, as 

you have mentioned, and particular initiatives. We need to net 

those together. We need to help the commander with the architecture that brings them together. And, sir, you make great points, 

and we will continue to work hard to meet your points. 
18 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General, for your service. 

And Sergeant Major, great to see you. Thank you for being here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would just like to bring up one more thing—I thank you for 

that. There is an article here about the Marines in Helmand 15 in 

particular. I will just read from it: ‘‘But some of the Marines operating in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province say they have only seen 

one part of their drones in the past two or three months, leaving 

the fight against IEDs largely in the hands of ground troops.’’ This 

article came out today—NPR article. 

The Marines frequently patrol with handheld minesweepers, a 

version of what people use on a beach to find coins. General 

Mickelson says his best weapons against the bombs is what he 

calls the mark-one eyeball—that is Marines being over there, soldiers being over there, being there for six months, noticing that 

strange carcass that wasn’t there yesterday is shaped funny with 

red wire coming out of it, that is the IED. 

This doesn’t make me feel really comfortable that we are truly 

doing everything that we can right now. Once more, if Secretary 

Gates said, ‘‘No more IEDs to be buried’’—I understand that there 

are tons in the ground right now in Afghanistan, and they could 

be turned on like that at any point in time—but we could do that. 

We could stop IEDs from being buried if we mobilized to do it. 

And we want to talk politically about this war too—it would fall 

off the map if nobody was dying. Iraq is not in the paper anymore 

because nobody is dying. One reason is we have knocked off IEDs 

huge in 2007 and 2008 with ODIN by killing over 3,000 IEDemplacers. 

Project ODIN, with IEDs, killed more people than every single 

other person in Iraq put together with all the offensive operations—ODIN killed more, and they were all bad guys, not one single civilian. They were all inputting an IED. 

If we can do that—and we have done it—I don’t understand the 

stopping point—and you are truly the only organization whose only 

mission is to stop IEDs. So I understand we don’t want to meddle 

with what those ground commanders want to do, but it is only you. 

The buck has to stop with you because we don’t have anybody else; 

there is no other IED defeat organization in Washington or anywhere else in the U.S. Government that I know of whose sole mission is to stop IEDs. 

And Congress—we will give you anything, and we have, I 

think—billions upon billions of dollars, as much manpower as you 

want, anything that you need. I just think we could do more. And 

if we have to say, ‘‘You are using the assets wrong, General Whoever, you are using the assets wrong. We are going to go in with 

an ODIN.’’ And one of the things about ODIN, too, it was ODIN— 

it was purely for IED defeat. We don’t have that in Afghanistan, 

meaning other ground commanders can task out those ISR assets 

that you send over there purely for IED defeat, they can put those 

into kinetic operation oversight so they can have them watching 

ops. Whereas you could step in maybe—I don’t know how this 

chain works—you could step in and say, ‘‘This is here and we are 

going to take back the roads in Afghanistan. That is our number 

one mission.’’ 
19 

That is the number one killer of Americans right now and maiming of Americans right now in coalition forces. It is IEDs. It is all 

IEDs. So let us just stop them. 

Why not put 24/7 eyes in the sky? I have been approached by 

contractors—and I know contractors get a bad rap—from all over 

who say, ‘‘For $10 million we can cover 100 clicks of road 24/7. We 

need night vision goggles (NVGs) and a satellite (SAT) phone. We 

don’t need a one-year project to make all these special things so we 

can intercept phone calls. We need NVGs, and we are going to call 

into the chain of command (COC) and say there are guys digging 

in 155 shells on the corner of Fifth and Main,’’ because they are 

there 24/7. 

There are people out there to do it; we have the assets to do it; 

we have C–12s. Shoot, you could use crop dusters. 

I am just not seeing what is stopping us from doing it right now, 

tomorrow, going out there and saying, ‘‘Let us stop them. Let us 

really stop them.’’ 

Anyway, thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Hunter. 

You see, gentlemen, I think—here is the issue that we have, and 

it is why I was reading through Mr. Solis’ cumbersome language, 

and that is what the Congress and the American people think is 

what is motivating you all, it is what the American people want us 

to work on is what Mr. Hunter is talking about. The concern of this 

subcommittee for the last 18 months or so is that we think there 

are some things going on within the processes of government that 

may be interfering with our ability to do exactly what Mr. Hunter 

wants to do. 

And it seems obtuse, it seems convoluted, it seems bureaucratic 

that we are asking these questions, but your guys on the ground 

are not yet satisfied with where they are at despite all the efforts 

and the absolute commitment I know that you all have to doing 

this. 

So General Metz, I will give you a chance to respond to anything 

that Mr. Hunter said. And then I am going to go back to the laborious nature of reading the GAO criticisms because I think that the 

only way we get to where Mr. Hunter wants to be is we have got 

to be sure everything is functioning as well as it can be in lines 

of authority, in funding streams. And that is how human beings get 

things done is to be as efficient as they can be so that the ultimate, 

you know, final product is what they want it to be. 

So, General Metz, is there any response you have to Mr. Hunter—— 

General METZ. The main thing I would like to respond to Congressman Hunter’s comments and just underline his accuracy with 

the fact that the soldier, Marines, sailor, and airmen’s vision and 

sense is still the best sensor on the battlefield, and that tells me 

that the more realistic training we can give them the better they 

will be at this business. So it does give us the opportunity to underline the value of realistic training. 

I think it also gives us the opportunity to underline the need to 

help the commanders understand how they can fuse their information, use the ISR, the abundance that we are trying to push there, 

to better focus it and better use the assets, and then when they 
20 

need more assets we need to supply them. But those are the main 

comments and—— 

Dr. SNYDER. One specific question with regard to Mr. Hunter’s 

comments: You all define IED much broader than just things getting buried in the ground, correct? You include things strapped on 

to suicide bombers, car bombs, things thrown from windows, I 

mean things—— 

General METZ. Yes, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. I mean, in fact the September 11th attack was an improvised explosive device. I mean—— 

General METZ. Yes, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. It is much broader than that. 

All right, back to the GAO comments, General Metz, quoting 

now, ‘‘JIEDDO faces difficulties with transitioning joint IED defeat 

initiatives to the military services in part because JIEDDO and the 

services have difficulty resolving the gap between JIEDDO’s transition timeline and DOD’s budget cycle. As a result the services are 

mainly funding initiatives with supplemental appropriations rather 

than their base budget. Continuing to fund transferred initiatives 

with supplemental appropriations does not ensure funding availability for those initiatives in future years, since these appropriations are not necessarily renewed from one year to the next.’’ 

What are your comments on that? 

General METZ. Sir, there—— 

Dr. SNYDER. And this is a topic we talked about last year also. 

General METZ. Yes, sir. And because we talked about it last year 

it has been up front and one that I have worked closely with men 

and women I have known my whole career. 

We were set up in order to work inside that very quick trade 

space probably inside two years. Now, having said that, we do 

spend some money, and we do look forward to some technical efforts that we could pull forward, but basically I want JIEDDO to 

be in the trade space of helping warfighters. 

And as you do that there will be, I think, a natural friction between the services who are operating in the normal budget cycle 

and we that are operating with the tremendous resources that the 

Congress has given us. But I believe that the process is maturing, 

and we are dampening out the problems of the services because 

they know what we are working on, they know as we do the operational assessments the initiatives that are looking good and may 

come to them. 

Dr. SNYDER. But that relates back to the previous criticism, 

though, doesn’t it, in my last round, which was that GAO says the 

services lack full visibility. When you say they know what you are 

doing—— 

General METZ. Well, sir, I think that we—— 

Dr. SNYDER. You are trying—— 

General METZ [continuing]. There are enough forums that we 

are—that there are not black boxes that no one knows anything 

about but a particular office. 

Dr. SNYDER. Let me go to this next one. This transition also is 

hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during the development of joint funded counter-IED initiatives, as evidenced by two counter-IED jamming systems. As a result, JIEDDO 
21 

may be investing in counter-IED solutions that do not fully meet 

existing service requirements. What is your comment about that 

GAO criticism? 

General METZ. Well, sir, it was interesting when I took over from 

General Meiggs, he said, ‘‘The good part about your tenure is you 

are going to be out of the jamming business.’’ The problem is the 

enemy votes, and the enemy has stayed adaptive in his use of the 

electromagnetic spectrum. So although we thought we had done 

enough in the jamming business that it would then transition to 

the services, we needed to stay in the jamming business because 

the enemy decided to move to different frequencies and make 

things more complex. 

I recognize that this was a friction point between us and the 

services, and so I went to my experiences, and I went to General 

Cartwright, the Vice Chairman, and said, ‘‘I think this needs to be 

a Joint Requirements Oversight Council issue.’’ A little over a year 

ago we took it to that process, came out with clear definitions of 

what we would do, what the single manager—the Navy as a single 

manager for electronic warfare (EW) would do, and what the services would do. 

But the enemy keeps voting, and we keep having to keep up, and 

we think we are the organization that needs to watch the threat. 

And as needed, we need to offer the technical updates. The services 

will continue and should continue to define their requirements out 

into their programs. There has been friction but I think it, especially in the CREW, is beginning to dampen out, and we are really 

understanding where these programs are and how they have 

messed with each other. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman for five minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Metz, I think what you are hearing today is just—is concern about coordination of efforts, effective communication, and I 

know that it is a very complex process. There are lots of things 

going on and timing this is of the issue there. 

My question goes back to I guess the synthesis of what you are 

hearing today from Mr. Hunter and Chairman Snyder. You know, 

Mr. Hunter is, I think, bringing up a great point about how do you 

really get assets to the field that our warfighters would be effective 

to them, looking at that in an application setting, also some of the 

criticisms brought up by the GAO. 

Is there a way that you can bring all those things together? And 

secondly, is it an issue—and I may have asked this question a little 

bit earlier—is it an issue of resources? Is it an issue of—and when 

I say resources I am talking about dollars—or is it an issue of 

human resources? Is it an issue of trying to coordinate things in 

a more timely fashion and make sure that you have those internal 

controls there? You are also looking externally, you are getting that 

information from the warfighters, from the combatant commanders 

in a way that you can get to the point like Mr. Hunter brings up 

and get out there and try to provide the assets to find these folks 

that are placing these IEDs, in addition to, obviously, other threats 

that are out there? 
22 

Is it an issue of resources or placement of those resources? Can 

you give us an idea about how you would collectively respond to, 

I think, some of the things that are coming up here? 

General METZ. My first comment is that as I see the plans of Fiscal Year 2010 and the plans for 2011 I don’t think that it is an 

issue of resources. I think it is the complexity of being able to put 

the architecture in place and put the sensors, the training, the entire complex spectrum of things that have to be done to really focus 

the force on what is the most strategic problem, which is the IED. 

Having said that, the commanders in the field are facing the 

complexities of fighting a counterinsurgency battle inside of which 

the IED has probably most significantly limited their ability to 

work with the population and the mobility, and so counter-IED—— 

And General McChrystal clearly expressed to me his understanding that we have got to fight the IED when I visited him in 

June. I think what we have got to do is continue to use the resources that come together in the Joint IED Defeat Organization 

to do just as Congressman Hunter says, focus the effort so that 

that focus turns out to reduce the loss of life. You map that back 

to the—you force the enemy to have less wherewithal, less supplies, less money to do it. 

Congressman Hunter is right—the last time you really get to affect it is when he is putting it in. And so commanders make decisions whether or not they kill the person putting it in, which they 

have got the rules of engagement to do, or they follow him to understand his leadership or understand where his cache is, or understand where the bomb maker is. So we can help in that because 

we can sit back in the comfort of—and the protection of where we 

are and work for the commanders to help them produce the netcentric capability that I think our Nation can offer to fight this 

weapons system. 

Mr. WITTMAN. One follow-up: How capable is JIEDDO of responding to suggestions from our warfighters and combatant commanders that may be outside of what—the stock set of conditions 

that we have been used to dealing with? So in other words, if somebody came up and said, ‘‘Hey, why don’t we do this?’’ and it is 

something outside of what we normally look at about countering 

these devices, jamming them, trying to stop their placement, I just 

want to make sure that that adaptability and flexibility is there 

within JIEDDO. 

So if you have something that is sort of outside the box it can 

be incorporated or is at least looked at with an open mind to say, 

‘‘Yes, maybe that is something we haven’t thought of. We ought to 

incorporate that in our thought about how we look at the overall 

threat.’’ How capable is JIEDDO of considering those suggestions 

and then putting them into place as far as defeat measures? 

General METZ. Sir, I think that that is one of our real strengths. 

We have enough expertise now, having a couple years at it, to understand what has worked and what has not worked. And I think 

the passion and sense of urgency that my workforce has, we are 

constantly seeking those new and good ideas. 

Having said that, there are some that come to us with to them 

what is a new and good idea that we have tried before. So I think 
23 

we have got a good pulse of the technology that will work and we 

need to pursue. 

But as I mentioned before, much of the low-hanging fruit has 

been harvested so we are left with some real tough physics problems. In order to build a radar that can look underneath the 

ground as you are traveling 40 miles an hour down the road in 

your MRAP and do it with a low false positive rate in order soon 

enough for you to stop is a tough physics problem. But I do think 

that we—that is what we can offer. 

Now, we also have enough tentacles out in the force to understand what their needs are. And the advantage to having the Joint 

IED Defeat Organization is that we can begin to work the solutions 

to the problems they are seeing as the process begins to take place. 

We are working in tandem and not in sequence so that we are 

not waiting for everything to come through out of Afghanistan, 

through CENTCOM, to the joint staff and OSD, and finally maybe 

get to us. We know what they need, and we are working on those 

gaps and seams, and we will certainly marry-up the joint urgent 

operational needs statement as it comes, but I think what you have 

touched upon is one of the things I am very proud of the organization. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to associate myself 

profoundly with Mr. Hunter’s previous comments and yield back. 

Dr. SNYDER. See, it is easier for us to associate ourselves with 

this Mr. Hunter since he was in the Marine Corps than the previous Mr. Hunter since he was an Army Ranger. So I associate—— 

Mr. Hunter? 

General Metz, continuing the GAO summary questions—by the 

way, I am just reading from kind of their key one. They go in quite 

detailed in some other—quoting again from GAO, ‘‘JIEDDO’s lack 

of clear criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund 

has impacted its counter-IED training investment decisions. As a 

result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. 

‘‘In March 2009 JIEDDO attempted to update its criteria for joint 

training initiatives by listing new requirements. However, these 

guidelines also could be broadly interpreted. Without specific criteria for counter-IED training initiatives, DOD may find that it 

lacks funding for future initiatives more directly related to the 

counter IED mission.’’ 

That is the end of the GAO comment. Do you have a response 

to that? 

General METZ. First of all, sir, I would say that upon arriving at 

the organization it was clear to me that—and I have talked with 

General Abizaid, and I know him well—that the Manhattan-like 

Project effort, which was initially focused on the device that General Meiggs had worked up to ensure that it was broad, and we 

were fighting the networks, and I came with the experience that 

told me I needed to make sure the force was trained to do both. 

And I have worked hard to ensure that the Joint Center of Excellence out at Fort Irwin, California, and the Services Center of Ex-
24 

cellence—the Marines, for example—at 29 Palms are as aggressively helping the force train as possible. 

And as those training initiatives can be, in my mind, linked with 

winning the IED fight I have been in full support of them. And an 

example would be that realistic training that I think we owe our 

young men and women we have invested in and have transferred 

to the—in the larger case—to the Army and the Marine Corps insurgents on the battlefield. 

And in some cases you don’t need just a role player; you need 

someone that is technically and culturally educated to the position. 

For example, when a young Marine company commander or an 

Army company commander has got to work with a village, he needs 

to train working with someone that is replicating the mayor, the 

senior imam, the tribal leaders, the police, the army, so that he 

gets that experience before he goes. 

Now, that is not razor sharp focused on counter-IEDs, but that 

training will help him with the network—the fight of the IED network in that training environment. So that is one of the examples, 

I think, that we developed insurgents on the battlefield and have 

now handed that off to the Army. 

Does that put a burden on the Army? Yes, sir, it does. And the 

Army has got to decide how much of that insurgent on the battlefield funding that they will accommodate. 

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Schear and Mr. Solis, we have let you off pretty 

easy so far this morning. 

But Dr. Schear, we appreciate you being here, and as I alluded 

to briefly in my opening comments, it is our understanding that the 

Defense Department was scrambling a little bit to figure exactly 

who on the civilian side should come, that there—was that your 

impression, I mean, that the lines of authority were perhaps not 

as clear and defined as maybe they would like, given how mature 

the JIEDDO organization is now? Do you have any comments on 

the DOD structure with regard to the management and oversight 

of JIEDDO? 

Dr. SCHEAR. Sir, you raised a fair question. Oversight is a challenge because of how broadly this effort draws from almost every 

stakeholder constituency in this Department, from the acquisition 

community to the intel community, policy community, cost and program evaluation communities. That is, in part, the reason why this 

effort plugs in at such a high level. 

Now, there is a span of control challenge for our deputy, and 

even farther down the echelon. The problem we face is that if the 

oversight plugs in at a lower level than we have fractionated oversight, and there is a cost associated with working those problems 

out. 

So, sir, in particular response to your question, I don’t think 

there was an issue about identifying the individuals involved; it 

was just a question of schedules and here-and-now priorities, given 

other challenges. 

But I obviously cannot carry the full portfolio that Bill Lynn 

would here, as the deputy, and I understand last year we offered 

up a range of views and a very large panel from these various constituencies, which probably sort of symbolized how broad-gauged 

this is. But it is a challenge, and I take your point. 
25 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Platts, would you like to be recognized for five 

minutes? 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No questions, and I 

apologize coming from two other hearings. Challenge of being on 

seven subcommittees right now. 

But I want to just appreciate your efforts and would echo the 

final question there, or the concern about the oversight and the 

management. For four years I had the privilege of chairing the 

Subcommittee on Financial Management and Overall Management 

under Oversight and Government Reform and worked closely with 

GAO, and I know in my years of chairmanship, as we worked with 

agencies and departments, that GAO was often seen as an adversary instead of an assistant. And I would encourage the Department and all the military, and especially in the important mission 

you have, to really embrace GAO as an ally, as they try to use their 

expertise to improve your operation. Because ultimately the beneficiary will be not just the taxpayers here at home but the men and 

women in harm’s way. So just to encourage that partnering with 

GAO and their recommendations as you go forward. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. SNYDER. Gentlemen, we have three votes but we will come 

back and have—I don’t think we will keep you a long time after 

that, but we do have several more questions. So we are in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Dr. SNYDER. We will resume here. I think Mr. Wittman will be 

coming back, but—— 

I appreciate, men, you waiting. 

Dr. Schear, I wanted to continue the discussion we were having 

about complexity, and on page four, which you read, you stated, ‘‘I 

appreciate how complex this overall structure may appear. It is indeed a multifaceted undertaking, and it remains a work in 

progress. JIEDDO expects to publish a revised JCAAMP procedure 

by the end of November and DOD Directive 2000.19E is also due 

for revision in 2010,’’ and that was the end of your statement. 

That gets to it, doesn’t it, I mean, how complex, and we are asking a lot out of General Metz and his organization in terms of all 

these different activities. Let us see, how long have you had your 

job now? 

Dr. SCHEAR. Mr. Chairman, I have been in six months. 

Dr. SNYDER. Six months. 

Dr. SCHEAR. I consider myself still a newbie, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. Well, that is all right. When you were a newbie, 

what was your understanding at the time of what was to be your 

interaction with JIEDDO and how many times have you and General Metz met? 

Dr. SCHEAR. I have had the pleasure to meet General Metz several times since I have been—and his staff, most notably a daylong deep dive we did a couple of months ago that Vice Chairman 

Cartwright appeared at. And it has been part of the—within Policy—part of the larger stability operations portfolio for some period 

of time within Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC) under ASD Michael Vickers. So it has been a clear priority. 
26 

That said, as we have heard here today, sir, it is a very complicated portfolio, and it involves, from the policy standpoint, some 

stewardship for Title 10-like capabilities, responsibilities in addition to the operation and support. So it puts us in an interesting 

position with the services as well as combatant commanders. 

Dr. SNYDER. The JIEDDO structure was set up—and General 

Metz talked about it, and I think you talk about it—to kind of go 

around what are perceived as some of the cumbersome processes 

that the normal Pentagon structure was intended to help us get 

things to the warfighter as quickly as possible. And this structure 

does fine when we think it is doing fine. 

Human activities don’t always go well. So GAO has made some 

criticisms, Mr. Hunter—perhaps it wasn’t a criticism, but it was an 

expectation. So who within the Pentagon organization is going to 

say—you know, the new Duncan Hunter made a very passionate 

view of the perspective of an infantryman on the ground that 

things need to be done better. Who is the point person for the 

President to go to and say, ‘‘We need to do better’’? 

What is the line of authority? Is it clear to you what the line of 

authority is? Our impression was that it is not, given that there 

was some scrambling around to figure out who to have testify 

today. But I don’t think it is clear. What do you think, Dr. Schear? 

Dr. SCHEAR. Sir, at the level you are suggesting in your hypothetical that would come directly to the Deputy Secretary, and at 

that point we would pull together in a small group and decide on 

a course of action. It would involve—— 

Dr. SNYDER. This is Mr. Lynn? 

Dr. SCHEAR. Yes. Yes, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. General Metz, how many times have you met with 

Mr. Lynn? 

General METZ. Sir, I meet with Mr. Lynn in a very routine way 

every single month, and I have had additional particular subjects— 

one that comes to mind is the special access programs. But we have 

never missed a monthly update. And so since he has been in office 

I have seen him each month and there have been two or three— 

I can check for the record, but—times that I have met him on special projects. 

May I engage in this discussion a little bit? 

Dr. SNYDER. Sure. 

General METZ. Because I anticipated this question I put some 

thought to it. And as I look back through my career this job I have 

now has more supervision than any that I have ever had, and I 

look at it maybe a different a way, because I plug into the Deputy 

Secretary. If the Joint IED Defeat Organization has got a coalition 

engagement challenge or we want to get some disclosure authority 

or anything in the policy arena, I have got oversight from the 

Under Secretary for Policy and the staff that does that business for 

her, Secretary Flournoy. 

In all of our technical business Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) helps foster us through that process. Dr. Keesee 

here, my vice director, sits with the Director of Defense Research 

and Engineering (DDR&E) and all of the service research and development councils, and therefore that is another venue that we get 

oversight. 
27 

In the intelligence business—we are not an intelligence organization. All I am seeking is their IED information, and I get plenty 

of oversight and help from OSD Intelligence and the agencies. 

We have had an internal process for the Department of Defense 

advisory working groups. We have had several of those meetings 

focused at JIEDDO’s business. 

You know, we are coming up on our fourth birthday and we are 

on our fifth topic in the GAO looking at us. I have used, as Congressman Platts suggested to us, I do exactly what he suggested. 

I use these great eyes to help me mature this organization in the 

right way, and when they have been critical of our personnel accounting I took that aboard, and I think we have got a very robust 

and accurate accounting of people now. We have built out a comptroller organization and developed the tracking of the financial expenditures. 

And I can list a number—a long list of all the different things, 

but I think we are well overseen. Nevertheless, we do plug into a 

very high level of the Department, so if the President wanted something to happen he would tell the Secretary of Defense and the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense and it would come directly to me, and 

I would execute it, but I would have plenty of very senior people 

watching their pieces of the Department as they relate to me. 

Dr. SNYDER. My time is up. We will go another round. Let us go 

to Mrs. Davis for five minutes, just joined us, and then we will go 

to Mr. Wittman. 

Mrs. Davis for five minutes. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for being here. I am sorry I wasn’t able to hear the 

earlier testimony, but I think one of the big questions—and excuse 

me if this has already been answered—but how does JIEDDO actually measure its effectiveness in achieving its mission to defeat the 

IED? 

General METZ. I will take that down three avenues. One avenue 

would be that we collect for the Department the data about IEDs— 

location, size, switching, kinds of bombs. There is a lot of data information that once collected—and of course we are somewhat dependent on the theater forward to collect that data for us—but we 

are able then to understand what is happening with the IED and 

associate or—and understand how effective our initiative may be. 

An example would be, as the enemy went away from radio-control devices to command wire, we believe the enemy did that in direct response to the fielding of jammers. And so there is a whole 

series of in-theater data that we collect. 

Based on the GAO’s earlier report, this metrics effort—we took 

our entire outcomes from each part of the JIEDDO, developed what 

those metrics would be, and I have taken two very deep dives quarterly now to look very carefully at those metrics. Are we creating 

the outcomes that we need to be creating? 

And the third avenue would be, as we put those initiatives into 

the theater, putting an assessment behind those initiatives so we 

can measure their effectiveness in the counter-IED fight. 

So those are, you know, three major ways that we have responded to the GAO report to get it metrics, but the metrics are 

very tough for two reasons: We have got a thinking enemy who 
28 

wants to counter us, and we are dependent on the warfighter forward to use or not use the initiative we are trying to help him 

with. And so there are a lot of humans in this piece and the 

metrics are indeed difficult to—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Are there some areas in which you have actually 

been surprised by those results? You know, where you expected 

that you would have certain outcomes which just have not materialized, that whatever it is that you are doing just hasn’t been effective? And how, then—where do you shift in that case, then? 

General METZ. I will give an example. We felt that in East Baghdad there was a concentrated effort by the enemy to use explosively 

formed projectiles, so we deployed an initiative that we thought 

would focus on those networks. We called it FOX. It was a very robust—a number of things from canines to soldiers that were 

trained in detailed tracking. 

We put a lot of assets into the FOX initiative. And it was very 

successful, we think, and we took it to the conclusion that as the 

tremendous off-ramp of IEDs occurred in Iraq, and the great reduction of explosively formed projectiles, that we didn’t need that initiative anymore, and so I was able to terminate it. 

I am trying to think of an example where we—one didn’t turn 

out as we expected it would turn out. I can tell you that there is 

often a significant delta between the testing environment, for example in Yuma Range, and as it turns out in Afghanistan or Iraq. 

Something that can test marginally in Yuma, and you take it to the 

theater and it tests very well. 

Copperhead is a sensor that we have deployed into Afghanistan 

that did not seem—that tested very well in Yuma and has had a 

tough time in Afghanistan. On the other hand, a sensor Desert 

Owl, a very similar technology that will see a changed detection, 

marginally tested in Yuma and has been a gangbusters success in 

Iraq. 

So I think what I am reporting to you is this is a very dynamic 

and often not intuitive business that we are in, and it requires a 

constant alertness to what is happening and being able to shift in 

order to support the warfighter. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. And let me just shift for a second because I know that on National Public Radio (NPR) there have been 

a series of discussions about this, and I am just—have you had a 

chance to review any of that? Do you think that the public is getting the information that they need about this? And are there any 

misperceptions that are out there as a result of those reports that 

you have had to counter? 

General METZ. I have not heard all of them. I participated in an 

interview for that particular program. What I have heard is accurate and beneficial to the public. 

I think they are properly articulating the complexity of the IED 

problem, of some of the solutions, and—but I must admit I haven’t 

listened to each one of the segments by NPR. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
29 

General Metz, I want to kind of go back to the whole issue of 

communications and just get your overall candid opinion. Looking 

at the whole system of communications within Afghanistan, within 

Iraq, back and forth, providing information based on the IED 

threats, are there any weaknesses either in the communication systems that you see within theater or the communication systems 

that exist within JIEDDO, the COIC, or the TCOIC, as far as how 

information is traded back and forth, to make sure that we are, in 

the best manner possible, getting these solutions to the challenges 

and problems that our commanders face in the theater? 

General METZ. Sir, I think that we have good communication, 

and I think it can get better. And one of the things we are taking 

a new look at is our Web site that was kind of our premier outlet 

for information on IEDs. It was managed down at Joint Forces 

Command. I am taking another look at it because I think in this 

quick, dynamic environment we really need to have that Web capability that has got the latest deaths, and I am taking another look 

at how it should be managed. 

I am not as concerned about where the servers are located or 

who necessarily the technical people that manage it, but I want to 

make sure that we have a very tight loop between what is happening in the theater—and quite frankly around all the world and 

the COCOMs—and what is posted so that our warfighters have the 

very latest and best information. So I am taking a look at that capability. 

But nothing comes to mind very quickly that we have got a real 

fault in the overall flow of information and communication. 

Mr. WITTMAN. It was mentioned earlier that in certain areas of 

Afghanistan there is lack of bandwidth, maybe even lack of capacity to be able to communicate in some of those remote areas there. 

It seems like to me in those situations, where there are certainly 

challenges there, that that lack of communications could certainly 

have a potential impact on the ability of the combatant commanders there to get the things they need or to get information 

back. Do you see that—give me your estimate or what you know 

about the communication system there in Afghanistan as it relates 

to getting information from the combatant commanders back 

through the chain of command back to JIEDDO. 

General METZ. As I mentioned earlier, I think that there probably are some very small forward operating bases in very remote 

locations that probably have limited bandwidth and some limited 

communication. In those cases I do know that the commanders— 

we work hard to allow them to go in with much of the data so that 

they don’t have to get streams of all the data, they just need to get 

the updates. And so there is some compression and techniques that 

are far beyond my information technology (IT) background. 

But again, I think as the lessons are learned we are plugged in 

to a deep enough level that we are absorbing them and in as quick 

a fashion as we possibly can get them back. But there is no substitute for personally going, and so I go, and as I have mentioned 

Mr. Larkin here, that runs the COIC, has spent a lot of time recently in the theater. Sergeant Major just got back last night—yesterday—from the theater. So keeping the pulse is important, as is 
30 

the hardware technical communication, and I think there is the 

personal piece that we are trying to do too. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Dr. SNYDER. Maybe at this point—I have got several other questions—but Mr. Solis, you have been very patient there. Any comments that you have on anything you have heard, particularly 

about General Metz’s response to your report or anything else you 

want to—— 

Mr. SOLIS. I think first off I just want to reiterate, we have had 

a good working relationship with JIEDDO. I mean, I think they 

have been very open and transparent with us, and I think they are 

listening. That being said, I think a number of things that you 

have mentioned in our report and that we were reporting today as 

well as our testimony are significant issues that are going to have 

to be dealt with as JIEDDO goes forward. 

JIEDDO was created because of the growing IED problem in 

Iraq, as everybody has mentioned. That was created back in 2006, 

and it was put at the DEPSECDEF level to lead, advocate, and coordinate all activities at the Department. 

I think, again, it is important to note that it is not only JIEDDO 

that is doing IED countermeasures. I think if you look at some of 

the programs of record, most notably like MRAP, some of these 

other things that have been brought to the floor because of the— 

problem are not necessarily within the confines of JIEDDO, which 

fits into what we were saying before in terms of our very first 

point. 

In terms of understanding all the different things that the Department is doing so that the warfighter, at the end of the day, and 

the Department has assurances that what is being fielded is the 

best in terms of the problem set that is being faced by the 

warfighter out in the field. And I think to understand all the different solutions that are out there, all the different things that 

folks are working on in different organizations are critical. 

I think the other thing—and you have talked a little bit about 

the transition issues—I think there are close to almost 500 different initiatives out there. At some point they are going to have 

to be transitioned and funded, and asked for funding. If there is 

still a disconnect between what the services want, what the 

COCOMs want, I think it is going to be a problem in terms of transition. And as I pointed out, more of these staying with the 

sustainment under JIEDDO, that is potentially less dollars that 

they may have for other new or creative solutions to the problem 

in the field. 

But I think, again, this is going to take not just JIEDDO. It is 

going to take a Department effort to really address the things that 

we are doing here. And I think it is also important—and we 

haven’t talked a lot about institutionalization—and I think all 

these things are important to deal with before we think about institutionalization of JIEDDO, because I think until these issues are 

dealt with it is going to be very hard for this organization to continue in the vein that it is. 

Dr. SNYDER. Then you have also made the point if you don’t deal 

with institutionalization as we move away from supplementals as 

being a primary funding source for what goes on in Afghanistan 
31 

and Iraq then JIEDDO is at risk of being left out somehow. Is that 

a fair statement? 

Mr. SOLIS. That is a fair statement. That is a fair statement. 

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Schear, you went into some detail about the 

three-tier system, the Joint Resource and Acquisition Board, you 

say JRAB, and then the second part was the Joint Integrated Process Team, and then the third, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense, the Senior Resource Steering Group (SRSG). That is for 

funding decisions. 

What kind of advisory process, decision process is used for decisions other than funding decisions—decisions about what to do 

about a new approach in Afghanistan, decisions about organizational structure, discussions of how to respond to GAO? Who makes 

those kinds of—what is the process for decision-making aside from 

funding decisions? And maybe I am reading it wrong but I think 

in your statement you very clearly said this is the mechanism set 

up for funding decisions—— 

Dr. SCHEAR. Right. 

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. But don’t refer to other decisions. 

Dr. SCHEAR. You are absolutely right, Chairman. The threetiered structure is programmatically focused in on funding. The 

larger corporate issues you have identified work within a small 

leadership group that covers the range of issues that the Deputy 

Secretary, Mr. Lynn, would feed into that, given his role as the 

steward for JIEDDO. 

But that is not a—there is no designated structure—and General 

Metz may correct me if I am wrong on this—but there is no corporate structure that provides that focused guidance that you are 

referring to outside the programmatic vein that I described. 

Dr. SNYDER. General—— 

General METZ. Well, as I said a year ago I had the quick opportunity to make a decision if I was going to take this job or not, and 

I obviously did. And I think the first thing is that the Department 

looks to me and the experiences I brought to this directorship as 

one that is responsible for the whole effort. And therefore, I don’t 

do this effort in a vacuum. And I really have the entire Secretary’s 

staff to help me make sure. 

So yes, what was articulated were funding decisions. But I will 

give you an example: We realized as we have made our shift and 

focus into Afghanistan that, given a coalition fight, we really needed to share the information with the coalition in a much more 

transparent way. 

That required me to go to Dr. Schear’s boss, Secretary Flournoy, 

and ask for the disclosure authorities to begin to train a contracting officer’s technical representative (COTR) that can do the 

disclosures properly in order to release information to the coalition. 

So there was a non-funding decision that I had tremendous help 

from the Secretary’s staff to allow me to get the job done. And 

those kind of things, outside of the funding, are frequent but it allows me to take my experience and not have to bother the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense to go work in action with one of his major 

staff officers. 

They certainly cascade the problem to the level at which the 

work gets done with my staff, but I think we get tremendous over-
32 

sight that way and ensure that we are moving forward in those 

non-financial decisions that have to occur as we do this holistic 

fight. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thought perhaps you had dealt with this issue, but maybe not. 

Could you help us understand, where are you in terms of interagency work and coordination on these issues? How many other 

agencies are involved? Where is there a lack of that involvement 

where there should be? What can you tell us that can push this 

further on? 

General METZ. Well, let me use a couple examples. One example 

would be, we help chair a supply chain working group for the purposes of understanding with all the forensics information we get 

out of IEDs that we find and clear, and so we bring together much 

of the interagency—for sure Commerce, Justice, and Treasury—in 

order to take that forensics information—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Department of Homeland Security? FBI? 

General METZ. Yes, ma’am. And inside of the organizations like 

the Counter-IED Operations Integrations Center there is a long list 

of liaison officers that the interagency has given us to ensure that 

we are in sync with many of the activities that they are doing. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there an area that, you know, you have been a 

little frustrated feeling that we need to bring them along to a 

greater extent, or some piece of this that—— 

General METZ. My initial reaction—— 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. Where there is so much duplication it 

is not helpful? 

General METZ. Well, I think my initial reaction is not only in the 

Department of Defense but across the government the IED is recognized as that weapons system of choice of the enemy now. They 

recognize its strategic impact and we have good coordination. 

Homeland Security is very concerned about the IED in the homeland. They know that we are the nexus of information about the 

IED. We use U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) as our military link back into Homeland Security, but we work closely with 

a number—with FBI because they are doing some of that forensics, 

tearing down and allowing that to be evidential data and information. So we are close to a number of the interagency, and to my 

knowledge it is a pretty smooth, good working relationship. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Dr. Schear, do you agree? 

Dr. SCHEAR. Yes, ma’am, very much. We have heard good things 

about the give and take, especially on the Homeland Security side, 

and now that is actually a very explicitly stated concern in terms 

of the DOD directive and how that apportions responsibility to the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. So the link to Homeland Security is very—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. And you think it has improved—by what degree 

would you say it has improved? 

Dr. SCHEAR. Ma’am, I am not in a position to give you a good 

answer on that, but I would be happy to take that and provide a 

response. 
33 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 93.] 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. 

Mr. Solis, would you—— 

Mr. SOLIS. We haven’t looked at that issue. We are aware that 

there are interagency efforts going on but we have not looked at 

that as of yet. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes, okay. Great. Thank you. 

Is there any area in terms of rapid acquisition that you feel you 

don’t have the authority to move forward? 

General METZ. No, ma’am. I think that the DOD Directive 

2000.19E that governs us, and as we hope to update it in 2010, we 

have the authorities we need to support the warfighter in a very 

rapid way. As the GAO has indicated, we are not perfect. We can 

learn; we can get better. 

But I think that especially in the use of the funds that the Congress has given us to rapidly produce solutions we are getting pretty good at that. We have gained a lot of experience. 

It is keeping that workforce passionate is one of the leadership 

challenges I have got, to have a sense of urgency. We have got to 

get this done. And that is my challenge as a leader to do. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much. I appreciate that because, you 

know, we can talk here about the physics of it but the reality is 

to thousands of families and our men and women serving in theater this is very personal. 

Thank you. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Solis mentioned at some point the institutionalization of some of these activities and at some point within the 

budget structure of your whole process or organization, General 

Metz. 

Dr. Schear, your last sentence in your written statement is: We 

look forward to working closely with your committee and with Congress more generally to develop ‘‘an enduring structure,’’ which is 

yet undefined. 

Let me ask both you, General Metz, as at some point we will be 

leaving this duty, what is your advice as we look forward to what 

the enduring structure should be for JIEDDO? 

And any comment, Dr. Schear, that you might have, too. 

General METZ. Sir, in the almost two years I have been the director it has become very clear to me that the weapon of choice of the 

violent extremists is the IED and will remain the IED for some 

time. I think that we need to continue to work to develop the Joint 

IED Defeat Organization as a permanent organization. I think that 

the amount of funding will certainly, as Congressman Wittman 

brought up, will go down somewhat because we have harvested the 

low-hanging fruit, but we will still need to be able to react to the 

changes the enemy makes and work hard to move into that domain 

of being proactive instead of reactive. 

I think the size of the organization is heavily dependent on the 

number of initiatives we have out and the pace at which we are 

doing business. So as that ebbs and flows over the next decade or 

so we will be able to reduce the numbers of people based on the 

energy and efforts that we have. 
34 

But because the threat is—I don’t think is going to go away, and 

because we will want—in my opinion we will want to deter it in 

other combatant commander areas, we should institutionalize and 

make permanent for the Department, and then that would call 

upon us to place in the base budget funding for those enduring 

things and then recognize that there will be operational needs that 

will come with inside the budget cycle. And there will be some historical knowledge, and it will dampen out to a more and more accurate figure over time. But there will be those things that occur on 

short notice that we will need to be able to react to. 

But I just see the enduring nature of the threat and the need to 

counter that and bring the Department together in a joint way for 

joint solutions. 

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Schear. 

Dr. SCHEAR. Sir, I would strongly subscribe and support—subscribe to and support what General Metz has just said. One of the 

big challenges in any transition—institutional one—is to maintain 

that sense of urgency. We don’t want to simply rely on the enemy 

to convey that; we want to be anticipatory and look ahead where 

we need to be, you know, making our investments. 

My leadership would certainly want to look holistically at this to 

take the insights that our senior officers who have been directly involved in JIEDDO could bring to this as well as our combatant 

commanders to assess, collectively, their input as we chart a way 

ahead. It is a challenge. 

Advocacy organizations convey urgency; they are also a constructive irritant in the larger system, which I think is valuable. But 

how you sustain that over time is an open question, and we would 

certainly seek opportunities to draw in your views and comments 

as we proceed. 

Dr. SNYDER. Isn’t the goal of having an enduring structure to 

guarantee that all the good things that we want to have done will 

continue so you have the agility to respond, but we want to do it 

in such a way that you have—you know you are going to have a 

funding stream, you don’t depend on supplementals, that there is 

the appropriate oversight when things go wrong? But because we 

talk about an enduring structure doesn’t mean that somehow it has 

to take on kind of all the dark side of what we think about when 

we think about government funding streams or government approval processes, or one of your words, cumbersome. 

I mean, we want to maintain your agility but have the good 

things that come from being part of a more institutionalized structure. Isn’t that the goal? 

General METZ. Absolutely, sir. I think we—again, as we approach 

our fourth birthday we have learned a lot, and I think a year from 

now and four years from now we will have learned more, we will 

have continued to mature and settle in, but settle in—as I talk 

with my workforce, settle in for a marathon run but not settle in 

for being a slow, bureaucratic, not responsive to the warfighter. 

We have got to settle in for the marathon because I think it is 

a long fight against IEDs in a world that is going to have a lot of 

instability, but settle in to understand what are the techniques 

that can really move an idea to the warfighter in a rapid way and 

be transparent with the Congress and with everybody involved— 
35 

except the enemy—and ensure that we all understand how we are 

moving and the value of that quick movement against a very agile 

enemy. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman, I have used another five minutes—— 

One of the comments, General Metz, in your written statement 

you say no one could have anticipated the sheer amount and complexity of the training required to successfully counter IEDs. I always get a little bit jumpy when I hear someone say ‘‘no one could 

have anticipated.’’ It takes me back to when the 9/11 Commission 

issued their report and in their—a lot of the public discussion that 

went on after they issued their report, the phrase ‘‘a failure of 

imagination.’’ A failure of imagination that anyone could have—no 

one could have foreseen this. 

In fact, Floyd Spence, who is now dead, and I mean for months 

before he was, here in our committee hearings, was saying, ‘‘This 

can happen right now.’’ Now, he didn’t say there were going to be 

people in the airline pilot programs and they were going to get on 

planes and hijack them, but he was very much a believer that we 

were at risk as a country right then. 

And in fact, I suspect we could find people who could have anticipated that. I mean, we have had wars for a long time in which people have had improvised devices, whether it is punji sticks or other 

kinds of things Duncan Hunter’s—Congressman Hunter’s dad had 

to deal with as an Army Ranger. I mean, it is not a surprise that 

people take what is laying around and make weapons out of it. 

But I appreciate your comment, but we should not be surprised 

that enemies are agile also. Is that a fair comment? 

General METZ. Sir, that is a very fair comment and maybe I 

was—went too far in that statement because, as you have already 

articulated, our definition of an IED has been—that thing has been 

around for a long time. I think what was surprising to us was the 

enemy recognizing its strategic value. I think the ambush and lethal ambush has been around the battlefield for a long time, and 

it is certainly very effective in a tactical sense. 

And the enemy moved it to the operational sense because he 

knew that he could counter the—our strategies and doctrine for 

counterinsurgency by limiting our mobility. And he also realized 

that it had the strategic effect—and I think that I would hold to 

the argument that that was probably a surprise that the enemy 

would use a weapons system like the IED to try to get back to the 

homeland to try to affect our coalition partners from a strategic 

point of view. 

Dr. SNYDER. The last question I wanted to ask is with regard 

to—Mrs. Davis talked about how do you measure success? And I 

think for a year or two or maybe even a little bit longer we were 

seeing the drop in IED attacks go down perhaps as a reflection of 

both your work and also the improvement of the security situation 

in Iraq, and—in fact, I think we talked about that some last year 

during the hearing, that that was a sign of success. 

Well, if we say that then we also have to say, don’t we, as we 

see the attacks go up in Afghanistan, that maybe things aren’t 

going the direction we want with regard to JIEDDO? It is probably 

fair to say that we shouldn’t look at either one of those as how we 

measure. I mean, we are not satisfied—as Mr. Hunter so passion-
36 

ately and eloquently pointed out, we can’t be satisfied with what 

is going on now. 

But I think we do have to have, perhaps, some better metrics for 

measuring, do we think we are doing the right thing by our men 

and women in uniform? What are your thoughts about metrics? Is 

it a bottom line business—as long as we see one attack in Afghanistan and Iraq as too many, or what do you think is a fair way of 

measuring how the American taxpayer should be putting these resources? 

Should we ever make decisions about more drones, less drones, 

more sniper teams, less sniper teams—what should be the things 

by which we measure your success? 

General METZ. Sir, as I lead this organization the real bottom 

line is the loss of life or limb, serious burns, the loss of eyesight. 

And I think each day that I pull up the data and I see that loss, 

I know that there has been some failure somewhere along the line 

because we lost that soldier, that sailor, that airman, or Marine. 

Having said that, when a commander comes out of the theater 

and we do our back briefs and that commander says that the training you gave me better enabled me to fight the IED, to me that 

is an outcome affirmation or metric that we were successful. When, 

for example, we shut down a company and indict someone for sending components through Iran to the enemy in Iraq to bomb our— 

IED our forces, that, to me, is a measurement of success. 

And there are a number of those, and the problem in this—the 

other bottom line is, how many lives and limbs were saved? And 

I don’t think we will ever be able to measure that. 

And so this metric business is very difficult. It eludes us in some 

ways, and in others may work against you when you talk about life 

or limb. In other words, last year when I was here I was praising 

our movement from when I was the corps commander and every 

IED caused a casualty to going in Iraq now to—we are up 9 or 10. 

We forced the enemy to put a whole lot more out. That is a whole 

lot of effort. 

But when you have to put the colors of the Nation into the next 

of kin’s hands because of an IED that is—to that person, to that 

family we didn’t make it. We didn’t meet the bar well enough. As 

Congressman Hunter said, we let an IED get through the system. 

And so I admit that this metric business is tough, and it doesn’t 

let me off the hook. We are constantly looking for ways to measure 

how well our initiatives supported the warfighter, what are the 

outcomes that my staff is producing, what are the assessments of 

those initiatives, so we can guarantee, or to the very best of our 

ability, that the resources the Nation gives us are properly used for 

the force. 

Dr. SNYDER. And that probably is a good place to stop today. 

I know that you are interested, I know the Administration is interested, and the Congress is certainly interested in making sure 

our men and women have everything that they need and that we 

can give to them. And all of this discussion about lines of authority 

and funding sources and institutionalization—it is ultimately about 

achieving what Mr. Hunter wants to achieve and what you just— 

well, what we talked about, which is to help people stay alive and 
37 

keep from getting injured while they are pursuing the national security objectives of this country. 

We will continue this discussion. 

Thank you all for being here today. I apologize for the votes. We 

are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

(93) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS 

Dr. SCHEAR. During my testimony on 28 October 2009 on oversight of the Joint 

IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), Representative Davis requested additional information on actions taken by the Department of Defense and JIEDDO to increase 

cooperation among the other Departments of the U.S. government with respect to 

homeland defense. 

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security and America’s Security Affairs (OASD (HD&ASA)) and JIEDDO are working with other U.S. 

government agencies to ensure a whole of government approach both to support deployed forces and homeland defense. 

Specific examples of recent and ongoing partnerships between JIEDDO and the 

interagency include: 

• Coordination with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Bombing 

Prevention (OBP) and Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI), to fulfill the Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-19 requirement to create a Joint Program Office (JPO) for Combating Terrorist Use 

of Explosives (TUE) in the homeland. JIEDDO will continue active participation 

in this JPO to ensure implementation of tasks directed within HSDP–19. 

• The OASD(HD&ASA) and JIEDDO attend the monthly TUE Joint Program Office meeting at FBI HQ where they continue to work with DHS, FBI, Bureau 

of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), and others to make progress on the 

various tasks and actions assigned to federal departments and agencies in the 

HSPD–19 Implementation Plan. 

• Establishment of a memorandum of agreement (MOA) formalizing partnership 

with Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) for the 

use of contacts, data bases, and industry expertise to help interrupt the supply 

chain necessary to create IEDs and to assist industrial partners with the rapid 

deployment of emerging counter-IED technologies and systems. 

• Establishment of a MOA to deploy ATF bomb specialists to Iraq and Afghanistan to assist DoD in exploiting IEDs, enable ATF explosive forensics experts 

to train DOD personnel in explosive-related crime scene procedures, and put 

ATF Liaison Officers at the DoD Counter-IED Joint Center of Excellence 

(JCOE) and JIEDDO HQ. 

• DoD has worked with the FBI’s Terrorist Explosive Device Analytic Center 

(TEDAC) to create a weapons technical intelligence process. All IED components, after in country exploitation by DoD, are evacuated to the TEDAC at 

Quantico, for additional exploitation. 

• The JIEDDO Science Advisor chairs the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDRE) C–IED Science & Technology (S&T) Working Group which 

brings together S&T representatives from the Services and several agencies including DARPA and DHS. The working group’s objective is to coordinate and 

de-conflict counter-IED S&T programs across the interagency. 

• JIEDDO’s Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) Interagency 

Partnership Team (IAPT) includes a senior executive council of full-time government liaison officers (LNO) who work on-site to coordinate and integrate relevant C–IED information. These LNOs provide rapid access to both time-critical 

information and long-term analysis that the JIEDDO COIC uses to tailor C– 

IED support for forward deployed units. Participating agencies include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department of Justice (DOJ), National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Geospatial 

Intelligence Agency (NGA), Department of Energy (DOE), and the National 

Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). 

Please let me know if I may be of any additional assistance in this matter. [See 

page 33.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

(97) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER 

Dr. SNYDER. Is the level of oversight appropriate for an organization of this size, 

with this level of funding, and with such unique flexibility in its funding and mission? Specifically, can the Deputy Secretary of Defense provide sufficient management oversight of JIEDDO? 

Dr. SCHEAR. The fact that JIEDDO reports directly to the Deputy Secretary is indicative of the importance the Department of Defense places on this mission. The 

Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process assists 

the Deputy Secretary in his oversight role through its three-tiered structure of advisory boards that review, evaluate, and coordinate on specific initiatives prior to a 

final decision on funding. This governance structure cuts across institutional lines 

to provide a broad and balanced look at JIEDDO initiatives. It consists of: 

• A Joint IED Defeat Requirement, Resources, and Acquisition Board (JR2AB) 

composed of O6/GS–15 members from across the Department, including representatives from the Services, various sections of the Joint Staff, and Office of 

the Secretary of Defense. The JR2AB meets weekly to review initiatives and 

highlight any issues that need to be resolved. 

• A Joint Integrated Process Team (JIPT), composed of military flag officers or 

civilian senior executive service members from the same organizations as the 

JR2AB, that also meets weekly. The members of the JIPT provide written recommendations to the Director of JIEDDO. For proposed initiatives costing less 

than $25 million, the JIEDDO Director can approve the funding. For those costing more than $25 million, the initiative is staffed through the Senior Resource 

Steering Group. 

• The Senior Resource Steering Group is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and consists of three and four star military officers (including the Vice 

Chief of Staff for each military service) and equivalent senior executive service 

personnel, again from the same organizations. These high ranking defense officials provide written recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who 

then makes the decision on whether to fund the proposed initiative. 

The Deputy Secretary is able to provide the appropriate level of oversight for 

JIEDDO. In fact, it would be difficult for anyone at a less senior level to provide 

adequate oversight given that JIEDDO’s work touches components throughout the 

Department. The Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process ensures that the Deputy Secretary’s decisions take into account concerns from across the Department. 

Dr. SNYDER. How effective are the coordination mechanisms between JIEDDO, 

the Services, Defense Agencies, and geographical combatant commands? What 

might be done to improve coordination? 

Dr. SCHEAR. JIEDDO works across the Department to support our deployed 

warfighters against the IED threat. 

• The Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process, a three-tiered structure of advisory boards composed of representatives 

from across the Department, provides for senior departmental stakeholder participation in the validation and funding decisions that JIEDDO executes in responses to urgent warfighter needs. 

• This same process also helps manage the counter-IED technology development 

portfolio; in conjunction with the Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, JIEDDO ensures the integration of DoD’s counter-IED science and technology efforts. 

• JIEDDO’s Counter-IED Operations Integration Center draws both on in-house 

expertise and, through liaison officers from various federal agencies, expertise 

across the U.S. Government to give warfighters unprecedented capability to attack networks by delivering near real-time fused information in support of tactical unit targeting of human networks. 
98 

• In conjunction with the Joint Center of Excellence at Ft. Irwin, JIEDDO rapidly 

incorporates feedback from its deployed field teams, unit debriefing teams, and 

in-theater surveys into Service training programs. In addition to funding substantial modifications to combat training centers and home station training programs, JIEDDO provides pre-deployment battle staff training for brigade and 

regimental combat teams, as well as division and corps headquarters. 

• JIEDDO is working with the United States Joint Forces Command to publish 

capstone counter-IED doctrine for Joint Forces. 

JIEDDO continues to identify further steps it can take in improving these processes and supporting the warfighter. DoD Directive 2000.19E, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, is scheduled for revision next year. The review 

process will provide the opportunity for Departmental review, coordination, and consideration of modifications to C–IED authorities and processes. 

Dr. SNYDER. When and how (through what mechanism) did OSD approve the expansion of JIEDDO’s charter, mission, and organization? 

Dr. SCHEAR. JIEDDO’s charter, roles, and missions are established in DoD Directive 2000.19E. There has been no expansion of its charter. JIEDDO continues to 

focus on its core mission areas of rapid acquisition, operations and information fusion, training support, and strategic planning to defeat the IED threat. While 

JIEDDO’s charter and mission have not changed, its organizational structure has 

changed to increase JIEDDO’s effectiveness and efficiency. 

Dr. SNYDER. What is unique about JIEDDO for rapid acquisition, as opposed other 

rapid acquisition authorities DOD has? 

Dr. SCHEAR. There are three elements that distinguish JIEDDO from the Department’s other rapid acquisition organizations. 

• First, dollars appropriated through the Joint IED Defeat Fund are three-year, 

‘‘uncolored’’ funds. This flexibility allows JIEDDO and its supporting solution 

developers the flexibility to commit funds quickly in response to rapidly emerging requirements. 

• Second, JIEDDO reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, allowing 

for timely interaction with senior leadership and greater responsiveness to the 

warfighter. 

• Finally, JIEDDO staff includes a number of individuals with first-hand knowledge of the dangers posed by IEDs, including coalition officers who bring their 

unique perspectives to the organization’s efforts. 

Dr. SNYDER. Some think that some JIEDDO capabilities such as the COIC might 

be redundant with in-theater capabilities, and that its training initiative runs 

counter to Title X authorities of the Services and COCOMs. What will you do about 

duplicative capabilities? 

Dr. SCHEAR. JIEDDO works with both theater commanders and the Intelligence 

Community (IC) to fuse their intelligence products in near real time and deliver the 

knowledge the warfighter needs for tactical targeting against IED networks. 

Several intelligence working groups, liaison officers embedded in the COIC, and 

formalized working relationships keep all C–IED organizations aware of each other’s 

efforts. Fusion cells in Afghanistan under the command of GEN McChrystal include 

COIC representatives who work with in-theater members of the Intelligence Community. 

All training eventually becomes a Title X authority issue. However, no one anticipated the sheer amount and complexity of the training required to counter IEDs. 

JIEDDO’s mission is to capture those emerging, hard training problems and find 

ways for the Services and partners to overcome them. The Services still retain their 

basic Title X training role. JIEDDO provides a capability to adapt training rapidly 

across DoD in order to counter changing enemy technologies, tactics, techniques, 

and procedures. 

Dr. SNYDER. What actions have been taken to address any of the findings and recommendations that this committee made in its report on JIEDDO from November 

2008? 

Dr. SCHEAR. JIEDDO has taken, and continues to take, steps to improve, streamline, and build accountability into its operations and processes. It has undertaken 

several actions that address the recommendations from the November 2008 committee report. 

JIEDDO is streamlining its budget estimation process and has implemented procedures that will provide a better analysis capability in building future requests. 

JIEDDO is working to establish the appropriate budget for JIEDDO along with the 

necessary contingency funds to meet our operations and development initiatives. 
99 

As the November 2008 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations report indicates, our tolerance for risk is a function of urgency. JIEDDO uses the Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition 

Management Process to manage and mitigate risk, with the expectation that not all 

initiatives will bear fruit. JIEDDO has recently revised this process to address 

issues of risk tolerance, risk assessments, areas of oversight, and coordination with 

Services and DoD components. 

JIEDDO has improved its transition, transfer, or terminate process. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is now briefed on initiatives requiring transition or 

transfer to the Services, adding a critical oversight function to the process. What 

is most important is that JIEDDO continues to demonstrate that DoD can respond 

to urgent warfighter needs collaboratively with transparency and comprehensive 

oversight. 

DoD Directive (DoDD) 2000.19e, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, February 2006, is scheduled for its periodic update by February 2010. DoD 

began review and coordination of this directive in October 2009. The review process 

will provide the opportunity for departmental review, coordination, and consideration of modifications to C–IED authorities and processes. 

Although measuring effectiveness is challenging, evidence clearly suggests that 

JIEDDO has had a positive impact on the IED fight by saving lives. JIEDDO measures its effectiveness by continuing to publish DoD metrics that monitor overall 

trends in the C–IED fight; by dedicating analytical assets to explore new techniques 

to isolate and link JIEDDO’s contribution to these DoD metrics; and by implementing a set of component-based performance measures within the organization focused on outcomes. 

Dr. SNYDER. Should we use the Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) as the model for rapid acquisition throughout DOD? 

Dr. SCHEAR. Although JIEDDO was established to address a particular wartime 

threat, many of its attributes and authorities are applicable to rapid acquisition organizations within DOD, particularly those responding to Joint Urgent Operational 

Needs Statements or other urgent wartime requirements. 

Dr. SNYDER. Who is the chair of the Joint Resource and Acquisition Board? Does 

it consider initiatives other than JIEDDO? 

Dr. SCHEAR. The Joint IED Defeat Requirement, Resources and Acquisition Board 

is co-chaired by the Chief, Technology & Requirements Integration Division, Captain Brian Brakke, and the JIEDDO J8/Comptroller, Captain Douglas Borrebach. 

The board considers only initiatives requesting JIEDDO dollars. Although the board 

receives information on other initiatives and programs related to counter-IED, it 

does not formally endorse or manage those initiatives or programs. 

Dr. SNYDER. Who is the chair of the Joint Integrated Process Team? Does it consider initiatives other than JIEDDO? 

Dr. SCHEAR. Dr. Robin Keesee, JIEDDO’s Vice Director, is the chair of the JIPT, 

the higher approval level for those initiatives approved by the JR2AB. The board 

receives and reviews information on initiatives and programs related to counterIED. It formally endorses those initiatives costing less than $25 million; those costing more $25 million must be approved by the Senior Resources Steering Group, a 

Deputy Secretary of Defense-level advisory board. 

Dr. SNYDER. What process is being used to examine and decide on what enduring 

structure(s) will host/house which enduring C–IED capabilities? 

Dr. SCHEAR. JIEDDO transitions those initiatives that are expected to provide an 

enduring capability for the joint force to a Service, Combatant Command or agency 

to be established a program of record funded through the President’s budget. Those 

initiatives that are serving the current conflict but not expected to fulfill a longer 

term requirement are transferred to a Service or Combatant Command and sustained through that components Overseas Contingency Operations supplemental request. 

JIEDDO’s Transition Working Group, whose members include Service representatives, meets monthly to present initiatives when approved for funding and again as 

they reach subsequent transition points. The group’s members provide input to 

JIEDDO’s transition and transfer recommendations, and forward these recommendations to their respective leadership. In this manner, the Services and agencies have visibility over the initiatives moving through the rapid acquisition process 

and can assess the enduring potential of each initiative. 

JIEDDO updates the Joint Staff’s Protection Functional Capabilities Board quarterly on initiatives that it plans to transition and transfer. It informs the Joint Capabilities Board, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and Senior Resource Steer-
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ing Group of its final recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on an 

annual basis. 

Dr. SNYDER. How does JIEDDO measure its effectiveness in achieving its mission 

to defeat the IED as a weapon of strategic influence? How can this be demonstrated? 

General METZ. We measure our impact in three distinct ways. First, we continuously examine, analyze and publish the approved Department of Defense (DoD) 

metrics that monitor overall trends in the Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C– 

IED) fight. These metrics are intended to evaluate trends in the use of IEDs by 

type, location, effectiveness and other characteristics of concern and, when possible, 

to correlate trends in IED use to efforts and capabilities of the deployed forces. 

Second, we continue to implement and mature a set of component-based performance measures that are focused on outcomes and are designed to measure the Joint 

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization’s (JIEDDO) effectiveness as an organization. For example, these measures attempt to evaluate how rapidly we meet 

warfighter requirements, how efficiently we utilize our resources to develop new solutions, and how effective JIEDDO-funded training prepares deploying forces. To 

date, JIEDDO has completed two thorough performance reviews, and we continue 

to refine our measures after each one. 

Finally, we continue to conduct focused operational assessments of individual C– 

IED capabilities to evaluate how well those proposed solutions support the deployed 

warfighter in the face of an adaptive threat. 

Clearly demonstrating JIEDDO’s effectiveness is no simple task and defining the 

clear causal linkage from a JIEDDO-funded initiative to a measureable outcome in 

the C–IED fight has proven to be elusive. JIEDDO is an enabling organization and 

the employment of its deployed initiatives is a function of the decisions made by the 

recipient unit in the face of tactical demands and operational requirements. But 

even more challenging, those units face an aggressive and adaptive threat that has 

quickly recognized and understood the capabilities of the fielded C–IED initiatives 

and has rapidly modified their techniques and procedures to minimize or neutralize 

those deployed capabilities. 

Certain trends do, however, suggest that JIEDDO has made an impact and have 

reinforced my confidence that JIEDDO is constantly making a difference. When unit 

commanders report that their pre-deployment training has postured them to be effective in the C–IED fight, then JIEDDO has had an impact. When the enemy abandons a particular technique in the face of a JIEDDO-provided capability, for example the enemy’s migration from Radio-controlled IEDs to command wire initiated 

IEDs in the face of JIEDDO’s C–IED Radio Controlled Electronic Warfare capability, then JIEDDO has had an impact. When the number of IEDs that the enemy 

must employ in order to generate one United States casualty increases, then 

JIEDDO has had an impact. When specific initiatives are cited for their ability to 

defeat IEDs and save warfighters’ lives, for example vehicle mounted rollers, then 

JIEDDO has had an impact. When warfighters report that the fused information 

provided by the JIEDDO Counter IED Operations Integration Center enabled them 

to eliminate a threat IED cell, then JIEDDO has had an impact. When JIEDDO’s 

efforts have enabled the detection and elimination of actions by commercial companies who are inadvertently or intentionally supplying the enemy with IED components, then JIEDDO has had an impact. 

Dr. SNYDER. In your letter of 15 Sept 2009 to Sen. Carl Levin, you urged the Senate to oppose a provision in the FY2010 NDAA passed by the House that would 

have moved $100M from JIEDDO to the Irregular Warfare Support Program. In 

this letter you note that, ‘‘. . . specifically on the rise in Afghanistan, IED incidents 

have more than doubled from August 2008 to August 2009 and are now at the highest levels that we have experienced to date.’’ After $17B over more than five years 

and still we’re seeing a doubling of IED incidents in Afghanistan, why shouldn’t we 

give what amounts to less than 5% of JIEDDO’s FY2010 funds to another organization and see if they can provide effective solutions? 

General METZ. The doubling of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incidents in Afghanistan is based on several factors. In Afghanistan, local insurgents, tribal factions, and the Taliban enjoy a greater freedom of action to emplace large numbers 

of IEDs in movement corridors vital to our success. Our challenge is further compounded because these groups intimidate local populaces, preventing their cooperation with the often suspiciously viewed Afghan government and, in turn, with us. 

This is why the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) 

is focused on attacking the enemy’s network. Diverting $100 million away from Attack the Network Counter-IED (C–IED) solutions at this time would have a detrimental impact on the C–IED fight. 
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In response to last year’s National Defense Authorization Act authorizing $65 million out of the Joint IED Defeat Fund to support Irregular Warfare Support Program (IWSP), my staff diligently worked with IWSP for more than 11 months to 

vet C–IED focused proposals. Out of the dozens of proposals initially vetted, and the 

final 11 submitted to the Social Dynamics Awareness Broad Agency Announcement, 

five were funded. At the end of FY09, there was only $35.33 million of C–IED programs in the IWSP portfolio. While JIEDDO is eager to partner with IWSP on C– 

IED solutions, the majority of submitted proposals were not C–IED focused, and 

were therefore outside of JIEDDO’s mission and charter. 

Dr. SNYDER. Are there C–IED activities that should be funded but aren’t, for example Gen. Stanley McChrystal recently requested money for the Irregular Warfare 

Support Program (IWSP), which seems involved in many of your same mission 

areas. How is the IWSP mission distinct from JIEDDO’s? 

General METZ. The Irregular Warfare Support Program’s (IWSP) mission is to 

support Joint, interagency, and international partners who conduct irregular warfare. This mission is not counter-improvised explosive device (C–IED) focused. They 

seek to do this primarily by supporting the Theater Special Operation Commands. 

As the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), our mission is to focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in 

support of Combatant Commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts 

to defeat improvised explosive devices as weapons of strategic influence. 

IWSP submitted 12 proposals to JIEDDO’s Social Dynamics Analysis Broad Area 

Announcement (BAA), five of which were found to be C–IED in nature and were 

funded by JIEDDO in fiscal year 2009. Of these five projects, only one operates in 

Afghanistan, while none operate in Iraq. The remaining seven proposals submitted 

to the BAA were not funded by JIEDDO and to JIEDDO’s knowledge, none operated 

in Iraq or Afghanistan. 

JIEDDO is not aware of a request by General McChrystal to specifically support 

the IWSP. JIEDDO has received one request for an IWSP program from the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan. That program 

has been funded and is now being assessed for effective application in Theater. 

Dr. SNYDER. What actions have been taken to address any of the findings and recommendations that this committee made in its report on JIEDDO from November 

2008? 

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO) continually seeks to improve, streamline, and build accountability into 

our operations and processes. We benefit from the numerous and ongoing audits and 

reviews of JIEDDO’s operations and I think the oversight level of JIEDDO as it currently stands is effective and appropriate. As a maturing organization we continue 

to develop a greater understanding of our capabilities and those areas where improvement is required. Reports provided to JIEDDO by the Government Accountability Office, Department of Defense Inspector General, and other oversight entities 

provide a context for JIEDDO to evaluate our progress. We have undertaken several 

actions that address the recommendations from the November 2008 committee report. 

Currently, our budget authorities allow JIEDDO the freedom to execute our programs and achieve rapid acquisition. We face an extremely agile and adaptive 

enemy who would love nothing more than for us to be pulled into the normal budgetary process. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund’s three-year 

colorless money provides us great flexibility in supporting our Combatant Commanders’ Joint Urgent Operational Needs. 

We are working with the Department to establish an appropriate base budget for 

JIEDDO along with the necessary contingency funds to rapidly develop and deliver 

Counter-IED (C–IED) initiatives to the warfighter. We have improved our budget 

estimation process to provide a more accurate forecast of budget requirements as 

well as implemented procedures that will provide a better analytic capability to develop future budget submissions. 

As the November 2008 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations report indicates, our tolerance for risk is a function of urgency. JIEDDO is willing and able to assume a high level of risk on initiatives that 

show promise in the early development process. We do not underwrite undue risk, 

but conduct assessments on initiatives to rapidly appraise system maturity and effectiveness. JIEDDO mitigates risk during the development and delivery process 

through assessments that involve key stakeholders in the Department of Defense 

(DoD), including the warfighter. We use the Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval 

and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) to manage and mitigate risk, with 

the expectation that not all initiatives will bear fruit. A revised version of JCAAMP, 

signed on 6 November 2009, addresses the issues of risk tolerance, risk assessments, 
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areas of oversight, and coordination with services and DoD components. The 

JCAAMP also provides a transparent, collaborative, analytically driven set of processes that operate at the Department’s most senior level to oversee the process. 

JIEDDO is the only organization in the United States government solely focused 

on IEDs by supporting all 10 Combatant Commands with rapid development and 

delivery of C–IED capabilities. JIEDDO operates across many domains—both in the 

DoD, across government agencies, and with our international partners. While this 

may cause some of our efforts to overlap with other organizations pursuing other 

missions, they don’t have our focus and don’t deliver our results. Some duplication 

is healthy in time of war to ensure the seams are always covered. This is not an 

area where we want to assume too much risk by seeking efficiencies that may put 

men and women in harm’s way. 

JIEDDO is responsible for integrating all of DoD’s C–IED technology efforts—we 

accomplish this with regular meetings of working groups that conduct horizontal integration on a vast array of efforts. However, further improvement is required to 

develop a comprehensive Department-wide data base to better inform these efforts. 

JIEDDO has improved its transition, transfer, or terminate process. Beginning in 

2009, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is now briefed on initiatives requiring transition or transfer to the Services, adding a critical oversight function to the 

process. What is most important is that JIEDDO continues to demonstrate that DoD 

can respond to urgent warfighter needs collaboratively with transparency and comprehensive oversight. 

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2000.19E, Joint Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Organization, February 2006, is scheduled for its periodic update by 

February 2010. DoD began review and coordination of this directive in October 

2009. The review process across DoD will provide the opportunity for departmental 

review, coordination, and determination of modifications to C–IED authorities. The 

proposed updates to our authorities laid out in DoDD 2000.19E will result in process 

refinements intended to reduce the inherent tensions between rapid acquisition and 

capability development and DoD programming requirements, which have been identified since JIEDDO’s inception. 

Defining success in the IED fight is dependent on the adaptive enemies we face. 

Although measuring our effectiveness is challenging, evidence clearly suggests that 

JIEDDO has had a positive impact on the IED fight by saving lives. We measure 

our effectiveness through DoD metrics that monitor overall C–IED trends; by dedicating analytical assets to explore new techniques to isolate and link JIEDDO’s contribution to these DoD metrics; and most recently by implementing a set of internal 

performance measures within my organization focused on outcomes. These performance measures cover key efforts of the organization. To date, JIEDDO has completed 

two thorough performance reviews, and we continue to refine our measures after 

each one. 

Regarding the recommendation to consider expanding JIEDDO’s portfolio to other 

asymmetric threats, when I first arrived in JIEDDO I may have had a different answer, but I am more convinced than ever that we need to keep a laser focus on 

IEDs. We live in an era of persistent conflict where violent extremists will continue 

to wage conflict against human targets and the weapon of choice will continue to 

be the IED. We need to make an enduring commitment to this effort. JIEDDO sits 

at the center of that commitment. A permanent JIEDDO—funded in the base budget—is the clear signal that we understand our challenges for the foreseeable future 

and that we are willing to invest the money, the time, the energy, and the talent 

to make sure we win. 

Dr. SNYDER. How is the Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) different from other intelligence gathering and fusion entities? 

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (JIEDDO COIC) focuses on the 

Counter-IED (C–IED) problem at the tactical level. This focus is complementary to, 

but substantially different from, other organizations in the Department of Defense 

(DoD) and the Intelligence Community (IC) that also may focus on parts of the C– 

IED network structure. The JIEDDO COIC possesses capabilities that no other 

United States government entity provides with regard to the coordination and rapid 

dissemination of C–IED information to deployed forces at the tactical level of battalion and below within the broad spectrum of C–IED capabilities and analyst tools. 

The capabilities that reside solely at the JIEDDO COIC include focused data fusion 

efforts that draw on information and expertise from across the spectrum of military, 

IC, and interagency partners. 

One of the most unique aspects of the JIEDDO COIC is its focus on providing 

tactical-level C–IED products to deployed forces that meet rigid Latest Time of 

Value (LTOV) requirements from local commanders. The LTOV is the latest time 
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when crucial data can be effectively integrated into a commander’s planning and 

execution cycle. LTOV is a crucial aspect of tactical operational planning. Without 

meeting the LTOV time parameters, C–IED information would not be integrated 

into operational plans, heightening the threat to forces on the ground. While many 

organizations within the IC and Combatant Commands (COCOMs) have the capability to produce detailed analytical products, there is no other organization in the 

United States government focused on time-sensitive C–IED tactical support to deployed forces engaged in ongoing combat operations. 

The advanced all-source data fusion and network analysis is also a unique 

JIEDDO COIC capability that has the ability to access all-source intelligence, 

human terrain (i.e. environmental, ethnic, social factors, etc) and other C–IED data 

at one location using resident C–IED Subject Matter Experts. This is unmatched 

anywhere else in the IC, Services, or COCOMs. 

The Advanced Network Analysis attacks IED networks with three unique analytical teams. First, the Network Analysis Cell is a National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) entity collocated with the JIEDDO COIC, representing a single IC focal 

point for maintaining the IED network knowledge base. Second, the Network Dynamics Analysis (NDA) cell is a unique analytical team focused on effects-based targeting of IED networks. The NDA cell integrates traditional intelligence analysts 

supplemented by social network analysis, former law enforcement professionals, a 

psychologist, and a center of gravity analyst. Third, the Social Network Analysis 

(SNA) Cell applies a unique methodology that addresses shortfalls in typical network analysis by combining mathematical and qualitative assessments to multi-intelligence discipline datasets collected by military units deployed globally. Current 

IC assessments typically focus on first-order relationships between enemy combatants without regard for second- and third-order factors such as social-cultural dynamics of the networks, similarities between node profiles, and the impact of friendly operations on the importance of nodes within the network. The SNA Cell addresses these unique variables and applies them to IED networks. 

The JIEDDO COIC is committed to limiting duplication of its capabilities through 

effort coordination with partners across the IC, the military Services, and governmental organizations. Currently, the JIEDDO COIC has 19 Liaison Officers from 

various agencies and organizations including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), NGIC, National 

Reconnaissance Office, Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center, Joint Training 

COIC, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. In addition to these agencies, the Department of Energy has an embedded staff officer performing a liaison 

function between the JIEDDO COIC and the National Labs. 

Additionally, the Director of JIEDDO conducts quarterly Senior Intelligence Leader Advisory Board (SILAB) meetings with senior leaders from across the IC to focus 

on technical solutions; identify tactical gaps, methodologies, and analytical approaches; and address policies and governance in an effort to foster communication 

between participating organizations regarding C–IED and Attack the Network 

issues. 

The SILAB provides a forum for leaders to discuss topics relevant to C–IED efforts, including ongoing initiatives at the JIEDDO COIC. The JIEDDO COIC benefits from SILAB executive-level discussions and forums to gain information on other 

agency C–IED programs and initiatives, as well as share the JIEDDO COIC efforts 

with the IC. Members of the SILAB are leaders (e.g. Directors and Deputies) from 

across the IC, military, and interagency partners including the CIA, DIA, NSA, 

NGIC, Service Intelligence Divisions, and the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

Creating C–IED support products is a process that inherently minimizes redundancy and duplication due to the origin of the requests coming directly from the 

field to the JIEDDO COIC. Units deployed through Iraq and Afghanistan submit 

Requests For Support (RFS) that drive the JIEDDO COIC workload. Products are 

requested from the JIEDDO COIC directly by warfighters for use immediately in 

the field. The JIEDDO COIC teams forward in Iraq and Afghanistan ensure the 

highest support and least redundancy possible. 

The JIEDDO COIC currently provides 106 support professionals embedded with 

units across the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom 

(OEF) battlespaces. In OIF there is a total of 55 personnel, 22 of which make up 

seven teams serving at the Division and Brigade Combat Team (BCT) levels. There 

are 51 JIEDDO COIC personnel deployed in OEF. Of these 51 personnel, 24 are 

serving 12 teams at the Division/Regional Command and the BCT levels. These critical support positions ensure that warfighters receive the requested information, 

clarify the JIEDDO COIC questions regarding the requests, and serve as a direct 

link to JIEDDO in theater. In addition, JIEDDO conducts after action reports with 
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returning BCTs and Regimental Combat Teams to discover how adequately the 

JIEDDO COIC support products reach the field, and further ensure that critical information has been provided and filtered down to appropriate levels. Finally, quality 

is indicated by the prevalence of units that have used the JIEDDO COIC support 

in the past and continue to request additional support over time. Since January 

2007, the JIEDDO COIC has answered 5,334 RFSs. 

Dr. SNYDER. The GAO noted that transfer of initiatives to the Services was an 

ongoing problem. How are you working to solve this problem? 

General METZ. With few exceptions such as Counter-Improvised Explosive Device 

Radio Controlled Electronic Warfare (CREW) 3.1 and CREW 3.2, every JIEDDO effort slated to transfer to the Services has transferred when planned. We conduct 

monthly Transition Working Group (TWG) meetings to vet the proposed initiatives 

for transition, transfer, or termination. The TWG is comprised of action officer-level 

Service representatives. In addition, we conduct quarterly briefings to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Protection Functional Capabilities Board, and an annual brief 

to the Joint Capabilities Board, Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and 

Senior Resource Steering Group of our final transfer proposals prior to forwarding 

the recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for a decision. Endorsement from the JROC in the form of a JROC memorandum adds weight to our transfer recommendations, and our decision to advance the process by six months greatly 

increased the opportunity for the Services to consider these initiatives during their 

Program Objective Memoranda developmental cycle. Through these various boards 

consisting of members from the Services, JCS, and offices of the Under Secretaries 

of Defense, we have improved coordination and transparency of our processes and 

initiatives. 

Further, I recently updated our JIEDDO Capability Approval and Acquisition 

Management Process (JCAAMP) that ensures JIEDDO-funded efforts do not bypass 

this process. Furthermore, in early 2009 I instituted requirement to brief all development efforts to our Joint IED Defeat (JIEDD) Requirements, Resources & Acquisition Board and the JIEDD Integrated Process Team. 

These measures will ensure Service visibility on JIEDDO-funded efforts as early 

as possible and will provide updates as efforts mature into proven capabilities. 

These measures increase the time available to the Services to assess the enduring 

nature of the initiative and develop a funding strategy to integrate the capability 

represented. 

Dr. SNYDER. How does JIEDDO work with other agencies to get a comprehensive 

view of Counter IED challenges and solutions? Give specific agency (domestic and 

international) examples. 

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO) continues to expand contact with a myriad of United States government 

agencies to ensure a whole of government approach to support our deployed 

warfighters in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom 

(OEF), as well as homeland defense and, by extension, the broader global Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat. JIEDDO is both enabling and leveraging other 

federal agencies to meet Counter-IED (C–IED) capability requirements. JIEDDO’s 

Counter-IED Operations Integration Center’s (COIC) Interagency Partnership Team 

program embeds Liaison Officers (LNO) from federal agencies to help the JIEDDO 

COIC access information, supply warfighters with multi-source C–IED support 

packages, and minimize any duplication of effort with the rest of the Department 

of Defense (DoD), the Intelligence Community (IC), and the interagency. Additionally, JIEDDO headquarters has established formal partnerships with several federal 

agencies in direct support of the warfighter, including the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (DoCBIS); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC). 

A recent example of ongoing partnerships between JIEDDO and the interagency 

is JIEDDO and ATF’s Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to deploy ATF bomb specialists to the Central Command theater to assist DoD warfighters exploit IEDs, enable ATF explosive forensics experts to train DoD personnel in explosive-related 

crime scene procedures, and put ATF LNOs at the JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence and JIEDDO headquarters. Additionally, the FBI’s TEDAC processes Level III 

cases supporting theater exploitation efforts in OEF and OIF. 

Another example is JIEDDO’s coordination with the Homeland Defense Combatant Commander, North American Air Defense-Northern Command, to assist with 

Federal prevention, protection, response, and recovery operation efforts concerning 

potential use of IEDs in the North American Area of Responsibility (AOR). 

A third example of partnering is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Bombing Prevention (OBP) and FBI’s coordination with JIEDDO in the cre-
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ation of a Joint Program Office (JPO) for combating terrorist use of explosives in 

the homeland. JIEDDO will continue active participation in this JPO to ensure implementation of tasks directed within the Homeland Security Presidential Directorate-19. 

JIEDDO has also partnered with DoCBIS to create a MOA that formalized the 

use of contacts, data bases, and industry expertise to help interrupt the supply 

chain necessary to create IEDs and to assist industrial partners with the rapid deployment of emerging C–IED technologies and systems. 

JIEDDO has also encouraged the United States Agency for International Development to collaborate on efforts that would defeat IEDs through nongovernment organization (NGO)-run early education programs. This relationship has connected several NGOs with appropriate JIEDDO divisions and teams, including the JIEDDO 

Science Advisor as Chair of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering C– 

IED Science & Technology (S&T) working group. This working group enabled 

JIEDDO to share understanding of gaps and broader S&T efforts in C–IED S&T 

programs with key S&T representatives from Services and several agencies, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and DHS. 

Finally, JIEDDO’s Weapons Tactical Intelligence Task Force is currently involved 

in multiple material and non-material solution initiatives to solve current information sharing gaps and a lack of standardized reporting both within the United 

States Joint Force/Interagency environment, as well as with our Coalition Partners 

operating throughout Afghanistan. Our goal is to achieve a streamlined approach 

to information sharing, with coalition partners within the Afghanistan theater of operation to communicate on one system. 

Dr. SNYDER. How does the COIC work with the U.S. Air Force Intelligence Wing 

at Langley Air Force Base? 

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO) Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) installed two Federated Nodes (FEDNODEs) at 480th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(ISR) Wing’s Distributed Ground Stations (DGS) at Langley Air Force Base (AFB) 

(DGS–1) in Langley, VA and Beale AFB in Sacramento, CA (DGS–2) to increase the 

ability to share ISR across all Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and with specific 

elements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Installation of FEDNODEs at Ramstein AFB in 

Germany (DGS–4) and Hickman AFB in Hawaii is underway. The JIEDDO COIC 

plans to begin installation of a FEDNODE at Osan AFB in the Republic of Korea 

(DGS–3) during fiscal year 2010. 

The FEDNODE architecture provides a significant increase in web-based data access, information sharing, and analysis capabilities for operations against IED networks and other asymmetric threats world-wide. With each additional site added to 

the federation, the additional architecture enhances the combined situational awareness, timely decision making, and collaborative analysis for all users that can gain 

access through any standard computer connected to a Secure Internet Protocol Router or Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System. 

The JIEDDO COIC uses the 480th Intelligence Wing’s Imagery Access Server to 

download imagery for Defense Common Ground System (DCGS) platforms as well 

as the 480th Intelligence Wing’s Unicorn target database which is an end-to-end 

mission, collection, and dissemination management system that automates the entire processing, exploitation and dissemination cycle for DCGS platforms including 

Global Hawk, U2, and Predator. The data from these servers are layered with the 

JIEDDO COIC’s other data sources to build products for COCOMs related to ISR 

optimization. 

Dr. SNYDER. Specifically which agencies or organizations have liaison offices at 

JIEDDO headquarters, at COIC, or in theater? Do they include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; state and local law enforcement; FBI; or the Joint Terrorism Task Force? 

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO) Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) Interagency Partnership Team includes full-time government liaison officers (LNO) who work on-site to 

coordinate and integrate relevant Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C–IED) information. Participating agencies include the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC), National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, and the National 

Ground Intelligence Center. The JIEDDO COIC LNO from TEDAC is an Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives agent who informally links with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). 

There are currently no formal FBI or ATF LNOs at the JIEDDO COIC; however, 

there are LNOs from ATF and Joint Forces Command located at JIEDDO’s head-
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quarters. When certain military units are deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan an LNO 

from that unit is located at the JIEDDO COIC. Currently, there are six LNOs from 

deployed military units located at the JIEDDO COIC. 

While there is no Joint Terrorism Task Force liaison at JIEDDO COIC, both the 

Joint Interagency Task Force for Counterterrorism and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency have offices co-located with the JIEDDO COIC. The Army Law Enforcement Program has an element embedded at the JIEDDO COIC that performs liaison with Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. 

JIEDDO is working to establish one North American Air Defense-Northern Command Integrator. Additionally, efforts to locate one ATF LNO at the JIEDDO Joint 

Center of Excellence in Ft. Irwin, CA are underway. In theater, representatives 

from several United States government agencies other than the Department of Defense (DoD) are committed to the C–IED effort and work with JIEDDO elements; 

however, none are assigned as LNOs to JIEDDO. 

Dr. SNYDER. Which office at NORTHCOM is lead for IEDs? 

General METZ. The North American Air Defense-Northern Command (NORAD– 

NORTHCOM) NC34, Office of Current Operations, is involved in most of the 

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C–IED) tasks, but is not designated as the 

C–IED lead. All C–IED tasks are directed to the NORTHCOM Chief of Staff, who 

delegates them to the appropriate staff sections. 

Dr. SNYDER. How ‘‘joint’’ is the Joint Training COIC (JTCOIC), specifically which 

Services/organizations have a presence or which send people for training? What is 

TRADOC’s role? Do any other Services/organizations have training COICs? 

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization’s 

(JIEDDO) Joint Training Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations and Integration Center (JTCOIC) was formed in early 2009, with JIEDDO serving as its parent organization and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) as 

its executive agent. As executive agent, TRADOC provides the facilities and personnel required to execute the mission. The proof of concept phase will last for two 

years, concluding at the end of fiscal year 2010. As such, JTCOIC is still evolving 

in its efforts to best support the warfighter. 

The ‘‘jointness’’ of the JTCOIC derives from the support it provides to Service and 

Joint Forces in the use of COIC tools. JTCOIC’s specific mission is to support Army, 

Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force on Service-identified, COIC-related training requirements. JTCOIC provides support to service institutional training with teams 

in support of the Marine Corps’ Training and Education Command, the Air Force’s 

Air Education Training Command, the Navy’s Expeditionary Training Command, 

and the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command. Through these teams, the 

JTCOIC is now working with all of the Services to institutionalize Attack the Network methodology at their centers and schools. The JTCOIC has training teams 

working for each of the services and Special Operations Command preparing Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines for deployment. JTCOIC also provides direct 

support to the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) for exercise support to units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. As part of this support, JTCOIC plays an important 

role in the Joint Event Life Cycle process that prepares units for deployment to Iraq 

and Afghanistan. JTCOIC also participates in JFCOM scenario development for 

Counter-IED (C–IED) exercise planning for units that are deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. JTCOIC’s use of operational data to provide each of the Services and 

JFCOM with modeling, simulation and gaming solutions that are the most accurate 

and current representations of enemy tactics, techniques and procedures is a unique 

and highly beneficial contribution to C–IED training. 

The individual Services do not maintain their own training COIC. The JTCOIC 

is the only organization that trains the COIC’s Attack the Network tools. Its training support teams tailor the training to fit the unique needs of each Service. For 

example, a Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit might use COIC specific tools 

for trend analysis, while Marine combat engineers might use those and others for 

their Attack the Network situational awareness prior to a route clearing operation. 

Dr. SNYDER. How joint is the Joint Center of Excellence (JCE) at Ft. Irwin? Specifically which Services/organizations have a presence or send people for training? 

What is TRADOC’s role? Why is the JCE not at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Ft. Polk? 

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO) Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) is joint in its organizational structure, 

personnel complement, execution of funds, and execution of training. Its headquarters, located at Fort Irwin, is supported by four distributed Centers of Excellence (COE): Air Force COE at Lackland Air Force Base (AFB), TX; Army COE at 

Fort Irwin, CA; Marine Corps COE at Twentynine Palms, CA; and Navy COE at 

Indian Head, MD. These centers link various Counter-Improvised Explosive Device 
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(C–IED) training support programs such as electronic warfare, biometrics, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) across the Services. There are 

total of 32 Service members, representing all four Services assigned to the JIEDDO 

JCOE and subordinate COEs. 

Coalition partners and United States Federal Law Enforcement have representatives at the JCOE. A Sergeant Major from the United Kingdom trained in Tactical 

Site Exploitation/Search, and a Senior Special Agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives gives a depth of knowledge and expertise required 

to face the C–IED training support challenge. Military personnel assigned to the 

JIEDDO JCOE are not service specific to their posted location. As an example, the 

Air Force COE has representatives from all four services at their Lackland AFB location. 

JCOE funds initiatives benefitting all Services in its support to C–IED training. In fiscal year 2009 it provided $38 million to Marines, $99 million to Army, $5 million Navy, and $5 million to the Air Force. 

When the Services send their troops to the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) for 

pre-deployment training the JIEDDO JCOE has personnel and courses of instruction in place to execute. In addition, home station pre-deployment training for Joint 

forces is conducted with assistance from the JIEDDO JCOE Mobile Training Teams. 

The JIEDDO JCOE also provides an in-theater training support presence with 

seven man teams in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The total number of service members trained this year is: 63,000 Army; 3,188 Marines; 1,317 Navy; and 47,306 Air 

Force. 

The JIEDDO JCOE is aligned with the service training commands, such as the 

Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), USMC Training and Education 

Command (TECOM), USAF Air Education and Training Command (AETC), and the 

Navy School Explosive Ordnance Disposal, which is a joint service command. The 

JIEDDO JCOE has a liaison representative at TRADOC. Additionally, members 

from the JCOE attend the TRADOC Integrated C–IED Development Team General 

Officer Steering Committee and other quarterly meetings. The JIEDDO JCOE also 

has a contractor representative at TECOM and has a relationship similar to that 

of TRADOC. JCOE’s other liaison locations include: 1st Army in Ft. Gillem, GA; the 

Maneuver Support Center in Ft. Leonard Wood, MO; and at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. The AFCOE is located at the same AFB as the headquarters for AETC. This has 

resulted in C–IED training improvements to Air Force Basic Military Training as 

well as predeployment training for Security Forces and Individual Augments. The 

NCOE actively coordinates with the Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 

School and the Navy EOD Technical Division for development, test, and fielding of 

Radio Controlled IED and EOD training equipment. 

The JIEDDO JCOE was headquartered at Ft. Irwin in 2006 because of the large 

throughput of military personnel trained, existing training support infrastructure 

and desert terrain. The Commanding General of the National Training Center 

(NTC) at Ft. Irwin also serves as the Director of the JIEDDO JCOE. 

The relationships between the JCOE and the Services are enhanced through its 

component locations: ACOE is at the NTC, the Army’s leading Combat Training 

Center; MCOE is located at Twentynine Palms CA, where Marine units undergo 

predeployment training; AFCOE is at Lackland AFB for coordination with AETC; 

and the NCOE is located at Indianhead MD, where it has daily interaction with the 

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. 

JCOE has also established C–IED training teams at the Joint Readiness Training 

Center in Ft. Polk, LA, as well as the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in 

Hohenfels, Germany. 

Dr. SNYDER. It seems the term ‘‘IED’’ is becoming all inclusive. Discuss what the 

definition of an IED should be—road, house (booby trap), person (suicide bomber), 

vehicle (car bomb), airborne (9/11), ship borne (U.S.S. Cole), etc. What have we 

learned from the British (mail borne IEDs, etc.) and the Israelis? 

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO) Weapons Tactical Intelligence (WTI) Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 

Lexicon defines an IED as: ‘‘A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner 

incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and 

designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military 

stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. Refers to a type of 

IED incident that involves a complete, functioning device.’’—WTI IED Lexicon, Second Edition (Dec 2008) 

Additionally, there are definitions within the Lexicon for water-borne IED, person-borne IED, under vehicle IED, aerial-borne IED, vehicle-borne IED, and large 

vehicle-borne IED. While these further refine the methods of employment of the IED 
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weapons system, they are considered ‘tactical design’ designators of a device, and 

are not included in one overarching definition for an IED. 

All of the examples cited have been improvised devices that explode, and JIEDDO 

is actively pursuing a defeat of those devices. More specifically, JIEDDO’s mission 

is to eliminate the strategic effect of such devices. Thus, a letter bomb probably does 

not have substantial strategic effect as there are extensive mail handling facilities 

that have been effective at stopping letter bombs. 

JIEDDO is in ongoing consultation with all of our allies, and conducts extensive 

discussions with the British and Israelis multiple times throughout the year. We 

regularly meet with Israelis to discuss ongoing issues and have worked with them 

to share technology that they have found helpful in the past and improved upon it 

for current uses in the field. 

JIEDDO’s information sharing with our British partners is constant and ongoing. 

In addition to regular working group meetings, conversations and conferences, 

JIEDDO has a number of expert British officers embedded within JIEDDO to ensure constant sharing of best practices and lessons learned. 

Dr. SNYDER. Your testimony focuses on brigade and regiment through corps level. 

Is this what is meant by the tactical level rather than battalion and below? 

General METZ. At the tactical level, operations are planned and conducted by Brigade (Army) and Regiment (Marine Corps) and below. In the current conflict, Division and Corps headquarters link tactics and strategy by establishing operational 

objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to 

achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring 

about and sustain these events. 

We differentiate between Division and above and Brigade and below because they 

have distinctly different employment mission sets and therefore require different 

training. 

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization’s (JIEDDO) training has 

a powerful impact on Counter-IED (C–IED) success at both the tactical and operational levels. The training provided by the JIEDDO Joint Training Counter Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC) focuses on Division and Corps staffs. A Division 

is a tactical headquarters while the Corps serves as the seam between tactical and 

operational level warfare. Training provided at the JIEDDO Center of Excellence focuses on training at the Brigade and Regiment level and below—the tactical level. 

Tactical level training by the JCOE is further supported by the various Service 

Centers of Excellence: the Marine Corps at Twentynine Palms, CA; Army at Fort 

Irwin, CA; Navy at Indian Head Naval Surface Warfare Center, MD; and Air Force 

at Lackland AFB, TX. Training at the tactical level also takes place at the 57 home 

station training lanes located at 55 military installations throughout the United 

States, and in Germany and Korea. 

Dr. SNYDER. Your testimony for ‘‘Train the Force’’ mentions ‘‘signatures and social 

dynamics.’’ Please describe and explain. Which agencies and organizations are 

trained by JIEDDO or through JIEDDO funding—State, USAID, contractors, NGOs, 

UN, or foreign partners? 

General METZ. There are basically two types of ‘‘signatures’’ training. The first 

type deals with Homemade Explosives (HME). The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) funded a 

HME Mobile Training Team (MTT) that provides home station training support to 

teach troops at the Brigade Combat Team and below level on how to identify HME 

observables. The HME MTT also provides training to Combat Training Centers and 

Home-station Train-the-Trainer personnel. The JIEDDO Joint Training CounterIED Operations Integration Center does the same at the Division and above level, 

concentrating on training leadership and staff planners. HME detection packages 

are being deployed to the field to assist ground forces institute this signatures training. JIEDDO is working with Central Command to begin training collection managers and analysts on the use of HME signatures. The JIEDDO JCOE also teaches 

HME detection and signatures to Explosive Ordinance Disposal and Engineer units 

via mobile training teams. These courses of instruction emphasize HME indicators, 

precursors and ingredients, explosive hazards and immediate actions. They are 

‘‘train the trainer’’ focused and have had participation from all services, as well as 

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Central Intelligence 

Agency, and the Department of Homeland Security. 

The second type of ‘‘signatures’’ training focuses on the scientific research being 

conducted in the area of visual detection of IEDs. As assessed by our criterion measures, both inherent traits and experience-related characteristics proved essential to 

IED detection performance. Our results suggest that IED detection is largely a cognitive task, relying on visual, attentional, and memory processes. One significant 

finding that emerged indicates certain hobbies are relevant to successful IED detec-
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tion. Specifically, participation in hunting, puzzles, art, and music predicted superior performance, as did time in service, deployment experience, and age. 

JIEDDO is currently reviewing proposals and ideas which would address the issue 

of cultural and social dynamics in training, but none have reached the implementation stage yet. A social dynamics trainer, or training program, will probably never 

be a stand-alone initiative. It will more likely be incorporated into other CounterIED efforts, particularly for the intelligence capability within battle staffs for HME 

signature detection and for maneuver units for visual detection of IEDs. 

Dr. SNYDER. What percentages of the JIEDDO workforce are military, reserve 

component military, contractors, and government civilians? 

General METZ. As of 1 October, the JIEDDO workforce requirements totaled 3,685 

military, government civilians and contractors. Of the 3,685 personnel, 134 are military personnel (comprising 3.6% of the total JIEDDO workforce), 135 are government civilian personnel (comprising 3.6% of the total work force), 0 reserve component military personnel, and 3,416 contract personnel (comprising approximately 

92.7% of the total JIEDDO workforce). In addition to the current JIEDDO workforce, JIEDDO has received approval from the Department of the Army for 119 additional Army reserve component military positions; however, these 119 positions 

were not included as part of the 1 October 2009 personnel numbers. On 6 November 

2009, the Department of the Air Force approved 13 Air Force reserve component 

military positions. The additional 119 Army reserve and 13 Air Force reserve positions brings the total JIEDDO approved manpower requirements to 3,717 (3,685 

plus 119 Army reserve and 13 Air Force reserve positions). As of 6 November, the 

JIEDDO reserve component military positions comprise 3.5% of the JIEDDO total 

workforce. JIEDDO has requested an additional 23 reserve component military positions from the USMC and 30 reserve component military from the USN. If these 

are approved, the JIEDDO will have a total reserve component military of 185 (all 

Services), increasing the total JIEDDO workforce requirements to 3,770 (3,717 plus 

23 USMC reserve and 30 USN reserve positions), and the total JIEDDO reserve 

component military personnel requirements will comprise 4.9% of the total JIEDDO 

workforce. These personnel calculations are based on JIEDDO’s 1 October 2009 

baseline personnel numbers. 

Dr. SNYDER. Describe some specific instances or examples of how the Deputy Secretary of Defense has provided management oversight to JIEDDO. 

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization’s 

(JIEDDO) high impact is due to its direct reporting chain to Deputy Secretary of 

Defense (DEPSECDEF) and to special Congressional funding. Both are vital—they 

give JIEDDO unimpeded access anywhere it needs to go to solve the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) problem. 

Through my reporting chain I have a direct line of communication to the 

DEPSECDEF and I am updating the Deputy Secretary on the IED threat and 

JIEDDO’s countermeasures on a monthly basis. As our force strength migrates to 

Afghanistan where the IED threat is on the rise, this JIEDDO reporting chain 

should be retained to interact with our most senior leaders in the Department. 

I meet with the DEPSECDEF at least monthly on JIEDDO matters to ensure that 

he has a complete understanding of our requirements and activities. Furthermore, 

all JIEDDO initiatives that are equal to or above $25 million require approval from 

the DEPSECDEF prior to the obligation of those funds. 

Additional oversight is provided to proposed JIEDDO Counter-IED efforts by Flag 

or SES-level representatives from the Offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense, 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, the 

Department’s General Counsel, and Director Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office (CAPE) through their participation on our Joint IED Defeat (JIEDD) Integrated Process Team. Efforts requiring funding that exceeds $25 million are reviewed by the JIEDD Senior Resource Steering Group (SRSG), an advisory body to 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense. SRSG membership consists of the Principal Deputies of the Under Secretaries of Defense, the Principal Deputy ASD, Principal Deputy General Counsel, the Deputy Director CAPE, and Director Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, as well as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Assistant Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff J–8. 

Finally, since JIEDDO’s establishment there have been five Deputies Advisory 

Working Group meetings at the Deputy Secretary of Defense level to grapple with 

key problems requiring a decision from the Department. 

Dr. SNYDER. Some think that some JIEDDO capabilities such as the COIC might 

be redundant with in-theater capabilities and that its training initiative runs 

counter to Title X authorities of the Services and COCOMs. How will you integrate 

acquisition plans with the Services and COCOMs? 
110 

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO) works with both theaters and the Intelligence Community (IC) by fusing 

their intelligence products in near real time and delivering the results as knowledge 

to the warfighter, enabling tactical targeting against Improvised Explosive Device 

(IED) networks. It is a highly refined use of intelligence products. 

Several intelligence working groups, Liaison Officers embedded in the JIEDDO 

Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC), and formalized working relationships keep all involved organizations situationally aware of each other’s efforts. 

Fusion cells in Afghanistan under the command of GEN McChrystal include COIC 

representatives who work with other in-theater members of the IC. 

JIEDDO constantly strives to raise the bar on behalf of the Services by rapidly 

countering changing enemy technologies tactics, techniques, and procedures and infusing our cutting edge responses into our training base across the Department of 

Defense (DoD). Home Made Explosive training at the Joint Center of Excellence is 

a perfect example of this. 

Unfortunately, no one could have anticipated the sheer amount and complexity of 

the training required to successfully counter IEDs. JIEDDO’s mission is to capture 

those emerging, hard training problems and find ways for the Services and our partners to overcome them. To guarantee our continued success in this area, we are in 

the process of developing a comprehensive DoD-wide Counter-IED (C–IED) training 

architecture that will give us an evolutionary jump forward by federating all ongoing C–IED training across the Services, the interagency, and our partner nations. 

Proven training capabilities will transition or transfer (T2) to the Services for 

sustainment and further integration. Six such initiatives T2’d this fiscal year and 

13 more are currently slated to T2 during both FY11 and FY12. These numbers are 

subject to modification pending the FY10 Appropriations bill. By sharing our resources, insights, and practices, we plan to achieve a level of training synergy never 

seen before. The key to our success has been, and always will be, world-class training. 

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