J-A08041-15

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

ERIK ALEXANDER CLARK,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 913 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 29, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002682-2013 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, WECHT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MAY 29, 2015

Erik Alexander Clark (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered following his convictions for robbery and receiving stolen 

property. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant factual history of this case as 

follows.

On October 27, 2011, three black males entered the Fulton 

Bank at 3183 Susquehanna Trail, Manchester Township in York 

County around 11:20 a.m. All three males appeared to be armed 

with guns. Two of the men approached the counter and 

demanded money from the bank tellers. The third male acted as 

a lookout for the other two and stood watching the entrance/exit 

to the bank. The men wore bandanas over their faces to conceal 

their identit[ies], and one of the men demanding the money 

carried an orange bag. After getting the money, the three black 

males fled the bank and jumped into a vehicle traveling down 

Susquehanna Trail. Witnesses identified this vehicle as a gold 

Dodge with Maryland license plate 5AK6030. These witnesses 

also observed the vehicle flashing its lights, and the driver 

picking up three masked individuals running away from the 
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Fulton Bank. Police ran this tag and found that the car was 

registered to Wendy Melissa Brown Clark. Wendy Clark is 

[Appellant’s] mother.

Around 1:00 p.m. on the same day as the bank robbery, 

Officer Michael Davis of the York City Police Department 

discovered the suspect vehicle being towed on Market Street. 

Officer Davis pulled over the tow truck and discovered that the 

vehicle was being taken to InTown Motors. The vehicle had been 

towed from 581 West Clarke Avenue in York city. Officer Davis 

contacted Northern Regional, and Northern Regional Police 

Department took custody of the vehicle.

Later that day, Chris Ness, the owner of the property from 

which the suspect vehicle was towed, was contacted by a male 

seeking to find his vehicle. Mr. Ness directed him to InTown 

Motors and also contacted police. The same individual made 

contact with InTown Motors inquiring about the vehicle, and 

InTown Motors informed police that a man was coming to pick 

up the suspect vehicle. Officer Davis responded to InTown 

Motors and hid in the shop area until the man arrived. Once the 

man arrived and inquired about the suspect vehicle, Officer 

Davis took him into custody. The man was identified as 

[Appellant].

After taking [Appellant] into custody, he was searched. 

Officer Anderson testified that he found car keys to the suspect 

vehicle, a Maryland drivers license, a wallet, and a thick wad of 

cash with a rubber band wrapped around it. When counted, the 

wad of cash totaled $1,291.00, which Officer Anderson 

calculated to be almost exactly one-fourth of the amount taken 

from Fulton Bank. Officer Anderson also interviewed [Appellant] 

after taking him into custody. [Appellant] denied all involvement 

in the bank robbery and denied that his vehicle was at the Fulton 

Bank. [Appellant] also stated that he had his vehicle all morning 

and that no one else had used his vehicle.

Corporal Jack Asper testified that he conducted the search 

of the suspect vehicle. A search warrant for the vehicle was 

obtained regarding the robbery investigation before any search 

was conducted. The search was conducted 4 to 5 hours after the 

robbery occurred. Corporal Asper found the missing front license 

plate in the trunk of the vehicle. Maryland law requires a plate 
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on both the front and back of the vehicle. An orange, nylon bag 

was also located inside the vehicle, which seemed to match the 

description of what the armed robbers were carrying. Corporal 

Asper noted that the nylon bag was soaking wet; however, the 

interior of the vehicle was completely dry. He also noted it was 

rainy and wet all day, including the time of the robbery. Finally, 

Corporal Asper found five ends of marijuana cigarettes in the 

vehicle’s ashtray.

On June 19, 2012, [Appellant] entered a plea of guilty to 

possession of a small amount of marijuana under 35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(31). On November 19, 2012, Officer Anderson filed 

formal charges against [Appellant] for the robbery of Fulton 

Bank. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/3/2014, at 2-4.

On May 31, 2013, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion seeking 

to suppress the items found during his search incident to arrest and to 

dismiss his case under the compulsory joinder rule. That motion was 

denied, following a hearing, on September 10, 2013. On March 10, 2014, 

the morning of trial, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600, which was denied following a 

pre-trial hearing. The matter proceeded to a jury trial. On March 13, 2014, 

Appellant was convicted of the aforementioned charges. On March 27, 

2014, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 3 to 6 years’ 

incarceration. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial 

court complied with the mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises three issues on appeal.
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1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to 

suppress challenging his arrest and [the] search incident to that 

arrest?

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to 

dismiss pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.[] §110?

3. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Rule 600?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

In his first question, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

denying the portion of his omnibus pretrial motion in which he sought to 

suppress evidence recovered following his arrest. Appellant’s Brief at 12-14. 

Specifically, Appellant contends that he was arrested without probable 

cause; therefore, all evidence recovered after his illegal arrest should be 

suppressed. Id.

We have discussed our review of suppression claims as follows:

When considering the denial of a suppression motion, this 

Court’s review is limited to determining whether the 

[suppression] court’s factual findings are supported by the 

record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts 

are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed in the 

suppression court, we consider only the Commonwealth’s 

evidence and so much of the appellant’s evidence as is 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the record supports the suppression court’s factual 

findings, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if 

the legal conclusions drawn from them are erroneous.

Commonwealth v. West, 937 A.2d 516, 527 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal

citations omitted). 
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At the suppression hearing, Appellant, through counsel, stipulated to 

the following facts.

On October 27th, 2011, Sergeant Anderson with the 

Northern York County Regional Police Department responded to 

3183 Susquehanna Trail Fulton Bank for report of an armed 

robbery. [W]itness Cheryl Hoke, reported seeing three black

males fleeing the bank getting into a gold Dodge with the license 

number 5AK6030 and identified the driver as possibly being 

female. Surveillance video showed three black males committing 

the robbery. Sergeant Anderson placed a general alert on the 

vehicle. 

[A]t approximately 1300 hours, Officer Davis with the York 

City Police Department observed the suspect vehicle with a 

matching tag number being towed in the area of East Market 

Street in York City and stopped the tow truck with the vehicle in 

that area. [T]he tow truck driver advised that the vehicle had 

been towed from 581 West Clark Avenue at the request of 

property owner Chris Ness where the vehicle was illegally parked 

with the front license plate removed.

[]Officer Anderson responded to the scene of the tow truck 

vehicle stop and impounded the vehicle taking it to the Northern 

Regional Police Department. Sergeant Anderson then responded 

to 581 West Clark Avenue where he made contact with David 

Tauser who informed him that the vehicle had been found 

parked in front of his garage when Tauser came to work at 

approximately 1200 hours. At 1428 hours Chris Ness, the 

property owner at 581 West Clark Avenue, contacted the York 

City Police Department to inform them that a subject had called 

to claim the vehicle and that that subject was in route to 

[In]Town Motors. Based upon this information, Officer Davis with 

the York City Police Department, responded to [In]Town Motors 

where [Appellant] was found to be present and claiming the 

vehicle. Officer Davis took [Appellant] into custody[.]

N.T., 7/2/2013, at 7-9 (reformatted into paragraphs). 

Following the hearing and after consideration of the parties’ briefs, the 

trial court denied Appellant’s motion, holding as follows.
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[T]he police had probable cause to take [Appellant] into custody 

at InTown Motors after [Appellant] arrived to retrieve his vehicle. 

The [c]ourt must consider the facts and circumstances known by 

[Sergeant] Anderson at the time [Appellant] was placed in 

custody. First, [Sergeant] Anderson knew that a bank robbery 

occurred at Fulton Bank, and he had surveillance footage of the 

incident taking place. Second, he gathered that three black 

males entered the bank and one suspect drove the getaway 

vehicle. Third, eyewitnesses informed [Sergeant] Anderson of 

the make, model, color and license plate number of the getaway 

vehicle. Lastly, when this vehicle was later found by the police 

and taken to InTown Motors, it was [Appellant] who inquired and 

arrived at InTown Motors to pick up the vehicle. This fact alone 

links [Appellant] to the getaway vehicle used in the armed 

robbery. All these facts taken together warrant a person of 

reasonable caution to believe that [Appellant] participated in the 

robbery of the Fulton Bank. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/3/2014, at 5-6.

We evaluate the trial court’s reasoning mindful of the following.

It is well-established that there are three categories of 

interaction between citizens and police officers. As our Supreme 

Court has clearly articulated:

The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request 

for information) which need not be supported by any 

level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion 

to stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative 

detention” must be supported by a reasonable 

suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a 

period of detention, but does not involve such 

coercive conditions as to constitute the functional 

equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or 

“custodial detention” must be supported by probable 

cause.

Commonwealth v. Ranson, 103 A.3d 73, 76-77 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations omitted). In point of fact, “law enforcement authorities must have 

a warrant to arrest an individual in a public place unless they have 
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probable cause to believe that 1) a felony has been committed; and 

2) the person to be arrested is the felon.” Commonwealth v. Dozier, 

99 A.3d 106, 112 (Pa. Super. 2014) (emphasis in original).

The facts to which Appellant stipulated, when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, reveal that Sergeant Anderson and Officer 

Davis had probable cause to believe that the individual inquiring about the 

suspect vehicle was involved in the robbery that had occurred earlier that 

day. Accordingly, the arrest and the search incident to that arrest were 

justified. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Powers, 398 A.2d 1013 (Pa. 1979) 

(holding that the police had probable cause to arrest three men who were in 

the general area and fit the description of suspects in an assault that had 

occurred 15 minutes before); Commonwealth v. Saab, 409 A.2d 437 (Pa. 

Super. 1979) (holding that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant 

a half-hour after the crime occurred and three and one-half blocks from the 

scene, based on the victim’s general description). Thus, applying the above 

standards, we discern no error in the trial court’s decision to deny 

Appellant’s motion to suppress. 

In Appellant’s second issue, he contends that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to dismiss brought pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. 

Appellant’s Brief at 14-17. Specifically, Appellant argues that, because he 

was charged separately with, and pled guilty to, possession of the marijuana 

recovered during the search incident to his arrest on the date of the robbery, 
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his criminal liability for his actions that day had been decided and the district 

attorney was precluded from trying him for the robbery under Section 110. 

Id.

It is well-established that

Section 110 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 

Procedure governs when a prosecution is barred by a former 

prosecution for a different offense, and thus serves as a 

statutory enforcement mechanism for protecting a defendant’s 

Double Jeopardy rights in Pennsylvania’s criminal courts. In 

Commonwealth v. Pries, 861 A.2d 951 (Pa. Super. 2004), we 

held that:

the compulsory joinder rule, set forth at [18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 110], bars a subsequent prosecution if all prongs 

of the following test are met:

(1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or 

conviction [as defined by 18 Pa.C.S. § 109] ; (2) the 

current prosecution was based on the same criminal 

conduct or arose from the same criminal episode; 

(3) the prosecutor in the subsequent trial was aware 

of the charges before the first trial; and (4) all 

charges were within the same judicial district as the 

former prosecution.

Commonwealth v. Miskovitch, 64 A.3d 672, 686 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

When dealing with an issue arising under section 110, our scope of review is 

plenary. See Commonwealth v. M.D.P., 831 A.2d 714, 717 (Pa. Super. 

2003). 

It is undisputed that Appellant’s drug possession charges ended in a 

conviction. At issue here is whether the robbery was based upon the same 

criminal episode as the drug possession. As both parties and the trial court 
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point out, the facts of this case are similar to those presented to this Court 

in Commonwealth v. Lane, 658 A.2d 1353 (Pa. Super. 1995). The victim 

in Lane, Anthony Whiting, was robbed at gunpoint in April of 1992. Id. at 

1354. Approximately four months later, Whiting identified Lane as one of his 

attackers. Id. Lane was arrested and, following a search incident to that 

arrest, was discovered to be in possession of crack cocaine, cash, and a gold 

chain belonging to Whiting. Id. Lane was charged with the April robbery 

and with drug possession at separate criminal indictments. Id. The 

Commonwealth did not move to consolidate the charges. Lane was 

ultimately acquitted of the robbery and subsequently moved to dismiss the 

drug possession charges under Section 110. Id. The trial court granted

Lane’s motion. This Court reversed the trial court’s order dismissing the 

drug possession charges, reasoning that “the robbery and the drug charges 

were not temporally or logically related, nor did they have common issues of 

law or fact. The only similarity was that [Lane] was arrested for the crimes 

at the same time and [Lane] coincidentally possessed one of the robbery 

items at the time of the arrest.” Id. at 1357.

Appellant herein argues that Lane is distinguishable, primarily because 

of the four-month time frame between the robbery and Lane’s arrest. 

Appellant’s Brief at 15-17. Appellant contends that the six-hour difference 

between the robbery and his arrest creates a temporal, logical, and factual 

correlation between the two crimes. Id. at 16. We disagree. 
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Several factors are considered when determining whether 

a number of criminal charges arose from a single criminal 

episode: (1) the temporal sequence of events; (2) the logical 

relationship between the acts; and (3) whether they share 

common issues of law and fact. Two separate offenses may 

constitute the same criminal episode if one offense is a 

necessary step in the accomplishment of a given criminal 

objective or if additional offenses occur because of an attempt to 

secure the benefit of a previous offense or conceal its 

commission.

Lane, 658 A.2d at 1355 (quotations and citations omitted). 

“Robbery and possession of a controlled substance are not the same 

criminal act.” Id. at 1356. As in Lane, the two crimes at issue here do not 

share common issues of law or fact such that Section 110 would bar 

prosecution of the robbery. Moreover, Appellant has failed to convince us 

that the temporal relationship between the robbery and the drug possession 

is anything but coincidental. Regardless of how much time elapsed between 

the burglary and Appellant’s arrest, “[t]he two offenses [are] not part of the 

same criminal episode simply because evidence pertinent to both cases was 

found during the same search.” Id. at 1357. Accordingly, we find no error in 

the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to dismiss under Section 110. 

See also Commonwealth v. Stewart, 465 A.2d 161 (Pa. Super. 1984) 

(holding that Section 110 did not bar prosecution for drug possession 

offense filed after Stewart’s arrest for theft, stating “there is no basis in the 

evidence here presented for finding that [Stewart’s] possession of controlled 
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substances commenced at the time of the theft or at the time when 

appellant came into possession of the stolen property.”).

In his final issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his 

motion to dismiss under the “speedy trial rule,” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.1

Appellant’s Brief at 17-19.

 

1 Rule 600 sets forth the speedy trial requirements and provides in pertinent 

part:

Rule 600. Prompt Trial

(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial

(1) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to 

commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial, or 

the defendant tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.

(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint 

is filed against the defendant shall commence within 

365 days from the date on which the complaint is 

filed.

* * *

(C) Computation of Time

(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay 

at any stage of the proceedings caused by the 

Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed 

to exercise due diligence shall be included in the 

computation of the time within which trial must 

commence. Any other periods of delay shall be 

excluded from the computation.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
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“In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a trial court’s

decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. 

Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Further, we note:

The proper scope of review . . . is limited to the evidence on the 

record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings of 

the trial court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party. Additionally, when 

considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court is not permitted to 

ignore the dual purpose behind Rule 600. Rule 600 serves two 

equally important functions: (1) the protection of the accused’s 

speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society. In 

determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has 

been violated, consideration must be given to society’s right to 

effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those 

guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However, the 

administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not designed to insulate

the criminally accused from good faith prosecution delayed 

through no fault of the Commonwealth. 

* * *

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of 

the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental 

speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be 

construed in a manner consistent with society’s right to 

punish and deter crime.

Id. at 1238-39 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 

added). 

Instantly, for Rule 600(A)(2) purposes, the Commonwealth was 

required to bring Appellant to trial on or before November 19, 2013. 

Appellant was ultimately tried on March 10, 2014. Thus, a total of 477 days 

elapsed from the time the complaint was filed until the date of trial. While 

he concedes the 102 days between the filing of his omnibus pre-trial motion 
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and the trial court’s denial of that motion constitute excludable time, 

Appellant maintains that the Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence 

at various points during the remaining 375 days, resulting in a violation of 

Rule 600. Appellant’s Brief at 18-19. 

Appellant takes issue specifically with the nine days that elapsed 

between the filing of the criminal complaint and Appellant’s arraignment on 

November 28, 2012, and the six days between the issuance of a bench 

warrant for Appellant on September 13, 2013, and the subsequent return of 

that warrant on September 19, 2013. Id. Finally, Appellant disputes the 

Commonwealth’s contention that the unavailability of his co-defendant 

rendered certain time excludable. Id. 

The Commonwealth must do everything reasonable within 

its power to guarantee that a trial begins on time, and the 

Commonwealth has the burden of demonstrating by a 

preponderance of the evidence that it exercised due diligence. As 

has been oft stated, [d]ue diligence is fact-specific, to be 

determined case-by-case; it does not require perfect vigilance 

and punctilious care, but merely a showing the Commonwealth 

has put forth a reasonable effort. We must therefore determine 

whether the aforesaid violation occurred because of the 

Commonwealth’s failure to exercise due diligence in bringing 

Appellant’s case to trial, or whether it was the result of factors 

beyond the Commonwealth’s control, despite its exercise of due 

diligence.

Commonwealth v. Colon, 87 A.3d 352, 359 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations 

and quotations omitted).

With respect to the nine-day delay outlined above, the Commonwealth 

argued at the Rule 600 hearing that such time was excludable because the 
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Commonwealth proceeded with due diligence in extraditing Appellant, a 

resident of Maryland, following the issuance of the criminal complaint and 

arrest warrant. N.T., 310/2014, at 15-16. The trial court agreed. Id. at 19, 

20-21. We discern no error in the trial court’s assessment. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 

Comment (“For purposes of paragraph (C)(1) and paragraph (C)(2), the 

following periods of time, that were previously enumerated in the text of 

former Rule 600(C), are examples of periods of delay caused by the 

defendant. . . . In addition to any other circumstances precluding the 

availability of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney, the defendant 

should be deemed unavailable for the period of time during which the 

defendant contested extradition, or a responding jurisdiction delayed or 

refused to grant extradition[.]”). 

The record reflects that Appellant was present in Maryland at the time 

the complaint was filed. An arrest warrant was issued, and Appellant was 

extradited to York County the following week.2 We disagree with Appellant’s 

claim that the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence in returning 

Appellant to Pennsylvania. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s 

determination that those nine days constituted excludable time.

Further, we agree with the trial court’s assessment that the six-day 

delay following the issuance of a bench warrant for Appellant due to his bail 

 

2 This Court notes that Appellant’s arrest warrant was issued the day before 

Thanksgiving.
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violations was not attributable to the Commonwealth’s lack of due diligence. 

N.T., 3/10/2014, at 14. See Commonwealth v. Gorham, 491 A.2d 1368 

(Pa. Super. 1985) (holding that delay following defendant’s violation of the 

conditions of his bail was not attributable to the Commonwealth). 

Finally, we reject Appellant’s argument that the time his joined codefendant was unavailable for trial was not excludable under the Rule. See 

Commonwealth v. Kimbrough, 872 A.2d 1244 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding 

that delay caused by joined co-defendant is not attributable to the 

Commonwealth when separate trials would have required the duplication of 

testimony and evidence, and would have imposed the burden of two lengthy 

trials on the trial court). Although Appellant argues that the cases were 

eventually severed, at the time of the delay the parties were properly joined, 

thus any delay caused by the joined co-defendant’s absence from the 

jurisdiction is not attributable to the Commonwealth.

Computing the time as required by Rule 600(C)(1) reveals that the 

Commonwealth brought Appellant to trial within 365 days. Accordingly, we 

discern no error in the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s Rule 600 motion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/29/2015