[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-17256

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:16-cv-02587-MSS-MAP

MELVIN BLOUGH, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

NICK NAZARETIAN, 

individually and in his official capacity as a Justice within the 

Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough County, State of Florida, 

TRACY SHEEHAN, 

individually and in her official capacity as a Justice within the 

Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough County, State of Florida, 

LAUREL M. LEE, 

individually and in her official capacity as a Justice within the 

Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough County, State of Florida, 

MARY ELIZABETH KUENZEL, 

individually and in her official capacity as Clerk of the Court in the 

District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida Second District, 

JOHN A. TOMASINO,

individually and in his official capacity as Clerk of the Court in the 

Supreme Court of the State of Florida, 

JAMES S. MOODY, JR., 

individually and in his official capacity as a Justice within the 

United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida Tampa Division, 

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 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(August 21, 2017)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Melvin Blough, proceeding pro se, sued federal District Judge James S. 

Moody, Jr.; Florida Circuit Court Judges Tracy Sheehan, Laurel Lee, and Nick 

Nazaretian; Florida Second District Court of Appeal Clerk of Court Mary 

Elizabeth Kuenzel; and Florida Supreme Court Clerk of Court John Tomasino, 

asserting claims against them in their individual and official capacities under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971), for violations of his federal civil 

rights. The district court dismissed Blough’s complaint for failure to state a claim 

against the defendants on which relief could be granted. This is Blough’s appeal.

I.

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Blough’s claims arise from events surrounding his Florida state court 

divorce proceedings.1

 While that divorce case was pending, Blough filed a lawsuit 

in federal court requesting that the district court issue a declaratory judgment 

ordering two state court judges to enforce, among other federal statutes, the 

Uniformed Services Former Spouse’s Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408. Judge 

Moody presided over that federal case, found that the two state court judges were 

entitled to judicial immunity, and dismissed Blough’s claims against them.

Meanwhile, in the state court divorce proceeding, Blough filed a motion for 

the court to take judicial notice of the federal statutes (including the Uniformed 

Services Former Spouse’s Protection Act) that he contended preempted Florida 

divorce law, which Judge Sheehan denied without comment. Blough then filed a 

motion requesting that Judge Sheehan recuse herself, and she granted that motion.

The divorce case was reassigned to Judge Lee, and Blough filed a motion 

requesting that Judge Lee reconsider Judge Sheehan’s denial of his request for a 

hearing on his judicial notice motion. Judge Lee denied his motion for 

reconsideration, and then later recused herself from the case. After the case was 

reassigned to Judge Nazaretian, Blough filed an emergency motion for 

 1 Because this is an appeal from a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal, 

“we draw the facts from [Blough’s] complaint, accepting those facts as true and construing them 

in the light most favorable to [him].” Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1263 

n.2 (11th Cir. 2012).

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reconsideration of Judge Sheehan’s and Judge Lee’s denials of his requests for a 

hearing. Judge Nazaretian denied that motion. 

When Judge Nazaretian presided over hearings in the divorce proceeding, he 

limited the discussion to Florida divorce law and would not permit Blough to argue

that federal law preempted state divorce law. At the final hearing in the divorce 

case, Blough elected to submit written narratives and exhibits in lieu of making a 

closing argument. When Judge Nazaretian issued the final judgment in the case, 

the judgment order did not refer to Blough’s written narratives or exhibits and it 

resolved all of the issues under Florida divorce law despite Blough’s contentions 

that federal law governed the case. 

II.

Blough then sued the defendants asserting claims under § 1983 and Bivens

for violations of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The 

district court sua sponte dismissed those claims after finding that it lacked 

jurisdiction over the claims against Judges Sheehan, Lee, and Nazaretian and that 

Judge Moody was entitled to judicial immunity.2

 2 It appears that the district court did not give Blough notice of its intent to dismiss his 

complaint before it entered the dismissal order. While the district court should have first given 

Blough notice of its intent to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, that failure does 

not require reversal. The legal inadequacies of Blough’s claims against the defendants are

apparent from the complaint’s allegations and could not be remedied by amending the complaint. 

See Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1127 n.99 (11th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by

Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 128 S. Ct. 2131 (2008) (noting that 

“reversal of a sua sponte dismissal without notice may not be mandated if amendment [of the 

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III.

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine the district court (and we) lack 

jurisdiction over Blough’s claims against Judges Sheehan, Lee, and Nazaretian. 

See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983); 

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923). “The doctrine is 

a jurisdictional rule that precludes the lower federal courts from reviewing state 

court judgments.” Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. for Fla., 679 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 

2012). It is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 

judgments.” Id. The doctrine “operates as a bar to federal court jurisdiction where 

the issue before the court was inextricably intertwined with the state court 

judgment” such that “the federal claim would succeed only to the extent that the 

state court wrongly decided the issues.” Id. at 1262–63 (quotation marks omitted). 

Blough’s claims against Judges Sheehan, Lee, and Nazaretian rely on their

alleged failure to recognize that federal law preempted Florida divorce law, which 

led them to erroneously apply Florida law in his divorce proceedings. Blough

asserts in his complaint that as a result of the judges’ application of Florida law, he

 

complaint] would be futile or if it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail”) 

(alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). 

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was denied his “Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural and 

substantive due process.” Those claims are brought by Blough (a state court loser) 

who complains of injuries caused by the state court divorce judgment, and those 

claims would succeed “only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided” the 

preemption issue. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 1262–63. As a result, the district court 

properly found that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine it lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over those claims.

3

As for Blough’s claims against Judge Moody, “[j]udges are entitled to 

absolute judicial immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting 

in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” 

Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 

435 U.S. 349, 356–57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1105 (1978)). “This immunity applies even 

when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her 

jurisdiction.” Id. Blough’s claims against Judge Moody arise from Judge 

Moody’s finding that Blough’s claims against the two state court judges were 

barred by judicial immunity. Judge Moody acted in his judicial capacity when he

made that finding and dismissed Blough’s claims against those two state court 

 3 While Blough contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to his claims 

against Judges Sheehan, Lee, and Nazaretian because those judges lacked jurisdiction to enter 

the orders that he is challenging on appeal, he is wrong. See Fla. Stat. § 26.012; see also

Dressler v. Dressler, 967 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“There can be no dispute that 

the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving dissolution of marriage.”). 

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judges, and his actions were not taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” As 

a result, the district court properly found that Judge Moody was entitled to judicial 

immunity.4

 

AFFIRMED.

 4 Blough also asserted claims against Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel and John Tomasino, which 

the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. He concedes on appeal that the district 

court properly dismissed his claims against Kuenzel and Tomasino. 

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