IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

EDDIE WHITE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHICAGO POLICE OFFICER KELLIE

DOYLE (Star No. 4419), CHICAGO

POLICE OFFICER M. HERNANDEZ

(Star No. 17970), CHICAGO 

POLICE OFFICER R. AGUINAGA

(Star No. 15), CHICAGO POLICE

OFFICER D.E. WARD (Star

No. 12288), and CHICAGO POLICE

OFFICER E. REYES

(Star No.13185)

 Defendants.

Case No. 12 C 2084

Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 

For the reasons stated herein, the Motion is granted in favor of

Defendant Reyes on all counts in which he is named. Summary

judgment is granted in favor of all Defendants on Counts I and

IV. The Motion is denied as to Count VI. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Eddie White’s (the “Plaintiff”) claims arise out

of his arrest and detention on June 17, 2011. That morning,

Plaintiff went to the Cook County Jail (the “Jail”) and inquired

with a Cook County Sheriff’s Officer about obtaining employment

with one of the Jail’s construction contractors. On the
Officer’s instructions, Plaintiff proceeded around the Jail to a

different location, where construction trucks were entering and

leaving. Plaintiff walked into a fenced-in parking lot near

“Post 10,” an entrance to the Jail, where a trailer was located

because he believed that the contractor was using the trailer. 

Inside the trailer, Plaintiff talked to a Cook County Deputy

Sheriff, who told Plaintiff that he could not apply for a job at

that site. Plaintiff then left the trailer. Although the

parties dispute precisely what happened next, it is undisputed

that a Sheriff’s Officer handcuffed Plaintiff, accused him of

trespassing, and called the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) for

assistance.

Chicago Police Officers Kellie Doyle (“Doyle”) and M.

Hernandez (“Hernandez”) responded to the call. When they arrived

at the Jail, Doyle and Hernandez spoke to one or more Cook County

Sheriff’s Officers, who accused Plaintiff of trespassing on Jail

property. Plaintiff could not hear the conversations, but every

deponent who testified about the conversations said that Doyle

and Hernandez were told that Plaintiff was trespassing. The

record reveals some inconsistencies regarding the details of

exactly what happened, such as which Sheriff’s Officers were

present at the site, which ones talked to Doyle and Hernandez,

what was said, and how long Doyle and Hernandez remained at the

Jail. 

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Shortly thereafter, around 10:40 a.m., Doyle and Hernandez

arrested Plaintiff and drove him to the District 10 Police

Station. Upon their arrival, Doyle and Hernandez completed

various administrative tasks before White was received in lock-up

at 12:45 p.m. Plaintiff was interviewed, inspected,

fingerprinted, and photographed by CPD Officer Dannye Ward, the

on-duty “lockup keeper.” These intake procedures were completed

by 1:00 p.m., at which point Plaintiff was placed in a cell and

his fingerprints were sent to the CPD’s “identity section.” The

identity section checks for warrants associated with

fingerprints, a process that often takes between three and eight

hours. At this time, no other detainees were in the District 10

lock up. Officer Ward’s shift ended at 2:00 p.m. 

CPD Captain Richard Aguinaga (“Aguinaga”), whose shift

started at 1:30 p.m. that day, was the on-duty watch commander

and the only person with authority to release arrestees from the

District 10 lockup. Defendants assert that, per department

policy, arrestees usually are not released from custody until

their fingerprints have cleared the identity section. However,

the CPD has a “General Order” that allows, but does not require,

release before fingerprints have cleared, when three requirements

are met: (1) the detainee was arrested for a misdemeanor that

was not upgradable to a felony, (2) the detainee is not wanted by

the CPD nor has any outstanding warrant that could be identified,

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and (3) the detainee’s identity has been established, such as

with a driver’s license. These requirements were met by 1:00

p.m. Pursuant to this order, Captain Aguinaga decided to release

Plaintiff before his fingerprints cleared; he gave final approval

of Plaintiff’s charges at 7:16 p.m. At that point, CPD Officer

E. Reyes (“Reyes”) processed the paperwork so that Plaintiff

could be released, and Plaintiff was released at 7:34 p.m.

On June 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint

that asserted six counts against fourteen individual Defendants. 

R. 43. Claims against the Sheriff’s Officers and several other

Defendants have been dismissed voluntarily. The five remaining

defendants – Doyle, Hernandez, Aguinaga, Ward, and Reyes – are

all CPD Officers. Three counts remain: Count I, a § 1983 false

arrest claim asserted against Doyle and Hernandez; Count IV, an

Illinois false imprisonment claim asserted against all remaining

Defendants; and Count VI, a § 1983 excessive detention claim,

also asserted against all remaining Defendants. All five

Defendants have moved pursuant to Rule 56 for summary judgment on

all three counts.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a). The Court construes all facts and draws all reasonable

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inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Ricci v. DeStefano,

557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Probable Cause

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot prevail on both

Count I for false arrest and Count IV for false imprisonment

because they had probable cause to arrest him. Probable cause is

“an absolute bar” to both a § 1983 claim for false arrest and a

claim of false imprisonment under Illinois Law. McBride v.

Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2009); Poris v. Lake Holiday

Prop. Owners Ass'n, 983 N.E.2d 993, 1007 (Ill. 2013). “A police

officer has probable cause to arrest if a reasonable person would

believe, based on the facts and circumstances known at the time,

that a crime had been committed.” McBride, 576 F.3d at 707. 

“[W]hen a police officer receives information sufficient to raise

a substantial chance of criminal activity from a person whose

truthfulness he has no reason to doubt, that information is

sufficient to establish probable cause.” Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d

680, 685 (7th Cir. 2003). 

In this case, the alleged crime was complete and Plaintiff

already was handcuffed when Doyle and Hernandez arrived at the

Jail. Doyle and Hernandez talked with Cook County Sheriff

Sergeant James Moran (“Moran”) and one or more additional Cook

County Sheriff’s officers. Although it is not clear which

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Sheriff’s Officers spoke with Doyle and Hernandez, it is

undisputed that Doyle and Hernandez were informed that Plaintiff

had trespassed. Correctional Officer Jesse Lopez testified that

he told Doyle and Hernandez that Plaintiff “had been standing in

front of the Post 10 sally port and refused to move.” Ex. B, pp.

39:23-40:2. Moran testified that he informed Doyle and Hernandez

that Plaintiff “was standing in the middle of the driveway

blocking all the traffic trying to get into the [jail] complex.” 

Ex. C, p. 53:14-16. Doyle testified that Moran told her and

Hernandez that Plaintiff had been trespassing. Ex. D, p. 22:6-7. 

Doyle also testified that Moran provided to her alone a more

detailed description of Plaintiff’s actions and statements. Ex.

D, p. 24:24-27:7. Hernandez similarly testified that she and

Doyle were told that “[Plaintiff] had trespassed . . . after

being told several times to leave.” Ex. E, p. 21:7-9. Doyle and

Hernandez arrested Plaintiff over his protest that he had done

nothing wrong. 

This uncontroverted evidence shows that Officers Doyle and

Hernandez were informed multiple times, by Sheriff’s Officers

whose credibility they had no reason to question, that Plaintiff

had trespassed. In these circumstances, a reasonable officer

could have concluded that a crime had been committed. See,

Gramenos v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir.

1986) (holding that a supermarket guard’s statements to police

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established probable cause even when the accused denied

shoplifting and noting that “[p]olice have reasonable grounds to

believe a guard at a supermarket”). 

Plaintiff concedes that he could not hear Doyle’s and

Hernandez’s conversations with Moran and the other Sheriff’s

Officers. Also, Plaintiff fails to identify any evidence

indicating that Doyle and Hernandez were not told that Plaintiff

was trespassing. Instead, Plaintiff claims that a material

question of fact exists because of discrepancies between the

deponents’ testimonies: they disagree over how many officers

interacted with Doyle and Hernandez, with whom Doyle and

Hernandez spoke, exactly what was said, how long the incident

took, and what investigation was conducted before Plaintiff was

taken into custody. 

These factual disputes are not material because they do not

affect the probable cause analysis in this case. Even the report

of “a single witness . . . generally is sufficient” for probable

cause, as long as there is no reason for an officer to be

suspicious of the witness or information. Beauchamp v. City of

Noblesville, Ind., 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2003). So Doyle

and Hernandez had probable cause regardless of whether they spoke

to one Sheriff’s Officer or several. As to other minor

discrepancies, the report of a single witness, much less several,

need not be “unfailingly consistent to provide probable cause.” 

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Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 725 (7th Cir. 1999). The

essential inquiry remains whether “a reasonable person would

believe, based on the facts and circumstances known at the time,

that a crime had been committed.” McBride, 576 F.3d at 707. 

Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence tending to show that a

reasonable person would have doubted the Sheriff’s Officers’

accusations against Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff’s reliance on Washington v. Haupert, 481 F.3d 543

(7th Cir. 2007) is misplaced. In Haupert, a husband and wife

were arrested for domestic battery even though they protested to

the arresting officer that they had been merely “play-fighting.” 

Id. at 548. The police officers saw evidence of what they

believed was domestic violence, but no witness could corroborate

the police officers’ version of events. Id. Faced with

conflicting evidence, the Seventh Circuit refused to “make

credibility determinations” and denied the defendant officers’

motion for summary judgment. Id. at 550. In this case, however,

two deponents, Lopez and Moran, corroborated Doyle’s and

Hernandez’s story, and there is no evidence that conflicts

because Plaintiff concedes that he does not know what they were

told. Plaintiff also fails to cite any other deponent who

testified contrary to Doyle, Hernandez, Lopez, and Moran. Thus,

Haupert has no bearing on this case.

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Finally, the discrepancies regarding the extent of prearrest investigation are immaterial. After probable cause is

established, law enforcement is not responsible for testing an

arrestee’s claims of innocence. Spiegel, 196 F.3d at 724. “It

does not matter . . . whether the accused person denies the

allegations. Police need not conduct an investigation but may

arrest and let prosecutors and courts determine who is telling

the truth.” Askew v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 894, 895 (7th

Cir. 2006). After hearing Moran’s report, Doyle and Hernandez

had no duty to investigate further. Of course, “[a]n officer

should pursue reasonable avenues of investigation and may not

close his eyes to facts that would clarify the situation.” 

McBride, 576 F.3d at 707. But there is no evidence that Doyle

and Hernandez closed their eyes to any facts that would have

shown that Plaintiff was not trespassing. The factual disputes

regarding what investigation took place are over how long Doyle

and Hernandez spent and the Jail and whether they saw the ground

upon which Plaintiff was alleged to have trespassed. Regardless

of the how these factual disputes are resolved, the Defendant

Officers reasonably could have believed that Plaintiff had

committed a crime. Because the Officers had probable cause to

arrest, summary judgment is granted in favor of all Defendants on

Counts I and IV.

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B. Excessive Detention

Defendants seek summary judgment on Count VI, Plaintiff’s

claim for excessive detention. The Fourth Amendment requires a

prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite

to an extended detention following a warrantless arrest. 

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). A determination of

probable cause within forty-eight hours is presumptively

reasonable, but “unreasonable delays, even within the forty-eight

hour period, may be constitutionally troublesome.” Chortek v.

City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 2004). “A person

arrested without a warrant,” such as Plaintiff, “may be held

prior to a judicial determination of probable cause for a brief

period to carry out the administrative steps incident to arrest.” 

Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 2011)

(internal quotation omitted). But “the length of time taken to

complete administrative steps incident to arrest must be

reasonable,” and police must provide “an explanation for the

length of the . . . detention.” Chortek, 356 F.3d at 746-47. 

Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff was arrested by

Defendants Doyle and Hernandez at 10:40 a.m. for a nonviolent

misdemeanor and taken to the District 10 police station. By 1:00

p.m., Plaintiff had fulfilled all of the requirements for him to

be released before his fingerprints cleared: his identity had

been established, his misdemeanor arrest would not be upgraded to

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a felony, and there were no outstanding warrants for his arrest. 

Plaintiff was not released from police custody until 7:34 p.m.,

more than six-and-a-half hours later, and nearly nine hours after

he was first arrested by the CPD. 

Defendants have not offered any explanation why Plaintiff

was detained for so long except to say that it took that long to

complete the necessary administrative tasks. But they do not

identify a single task that they completed after 1:00 p.m. and

they have provided no justification for the six-and-a-half hour

delay that followed. Plaintiff was arrested for a nonviolent

misdemeanor – a circumstance that increases the burden on the

police to expedite his release. Gramenos, 797 F.2d at 437

(indicating that the crime of arrest and the nature of the

alleged misconduct affect what actions the police must take after

arrest, which informs the excessive detention analysis). In

addition, Plaintiff’s detention spanned the entire afternoon and

there were no other arrestees in the lock-up demanding

Defendants’ attention. The Supreme Court has explained that a

delay can be justified for “late-night bookings where no

magistrate is readily available” or where a necessary officer is

“busy processing other suspects or securing the premises of an

arrest.” Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57

(1991). But those circumstances are not present here. 

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As the Seventh Circuit has explained, “detention must be

justified, especially where, as in this case, there has been no

independent appraisal of probable cause to arrest prior to the

detention.” Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d

1336, 1350 (7th Cir. 1985). In Moore, the court concluded that

a four-hour delay could have been unreasonable, depending on the

justification for the delay (an issue left for the district court

on remand). Id. at 1350-51. A year later, the Seventh Circuit

concluded again that detention for “four hours requires

explanation.” Gramenos, 797 F.2d at 437. Defendants have

explained the first two and a half hours that Plaintiff spent in

their custody, but the record lacks any justification for the six

and a half that followed. The Court, therefore, cannot say as a

matter of law that the detention was reasonable. Rather, the

question must be left to a jury. Lewis v. O’Grady, 853 F.2d

1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1988) (reversing directed verdict for police

where “a reasonable jury could find that the administrative delay

in [the plaintiff’s] release was unreasonable”). 

C. Defendant Reyes

Defendant Reyes has moved for summary judgment on the ground

that he had no personal involvement in the alleged liberty

deprivation. “An individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983

action unless he caused or participated in an alleged

constitutional deprivation.” Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d

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864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983). Defendant Reyes processed Plaintiff’s

paperwork after the on-duty watch commander granted Plaintiff’s

release. There is no indication that Defendant Reyes

participated in or caused the alleged excessive detention by

performing this ministerial task. In his response brief,

Plaintiff does not oppose this portion of the Motion. Thus, for

both of these reasons, the Court grants summary judgment in favor

of Defendant Reyes on all counts. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Summary

judgment is granted in favor of Defendant Reyes. Summary

judgment is granted in favor of all remaining Defendants on

Counts I and IV. Summary judgment is denied on Count VI. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge

United States District Court

Date:9/22/2014

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