Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 33 / Monday, February 22, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 10447 

Manager, Seattle ACO Branch, FAA, to make 

those findings. To be approved, the repair 

method, modification deviation, or alteration 

deviation must meet the certification basis of 

the airplane, and the approval must 

specifically refer to this AD. 

(4) For service information that contains 

steps that are labeled as Required for 

Compliance (RC), the provisions of 

paragraphs (k)(4)(i) and (ii) of this AD apply. 

(i) The steps labeled as RC, including 

substeps under an RC step and any figures 

identified in an RC step, must be done to 

comply with the AD. If a step or substep is 

labeled ‘‘RC Exempt,’’ then the RC 

requirement is removed from that step or 

substep. An AMOC is required for any 

deviations to RC steps, including substeps 

and identified figures. 

(ii) Steps not labeled as RC may be 

deviated from using accepted methods in 

accordance with the operator’s maintenance 

or inspection program without obtaining 

approval of an AMOC, provided the RC steps, 

including substeps and identified figures, can 

still be done as specified, and the airplane 

can be put back in an airworthy condition. 

(l) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Susan L. Monroe, Aerospace 

Engineer, Cabin Safety and Environmental 

Systems Section, FAA, Seattle ACO Branch, 

2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 

98198; phone and fax: 206–231–3570; email: 

susan.l.monroe@faa.gov. 

(m) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

26A1122, Revision 3, dated January 31, 2020. 

(ii) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

26A1137, Revision 2, dated January 27, 2020. 

(3) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data 

Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., 

MC 110–SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740–5600; 

telephone 562–797–1717; internet https://

www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th 

St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

206–231–3195. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, 

email fedreg.legal@nara.gov, or go to: https:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued on December 30, 2020. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2021–01823 Filed 2–19–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2020–0855; Project 

Identifier MCAI–2020–00909–T; Amendment 

39–21385; AD 2021–02–02] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Saab AB, 

Support and Services (Formerly 

Known as Saab AB, Saab Aeronautics) 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all Saab 

AB, Support and Services Model SAAB 

2000 airplanes. This AD was prompted 

by a report of inadvertently reversed 

connections of the outboard and inboard 

channel harnesses of the wheel speed 

transducers in the main landing gear 

(MLG) wheel axles. This AD requires an 

inspection for correct installation of the 

MLG anti-skid system harnesses and 

corrective actions if necessary, as 

specified in a European Union Aviation 

Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is 

incorporated by reference. The FAA is 

issuing this AD to address the unsafe 

condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective March 29, 

2021. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of March 29, 2021. 

ADDRESSES: For material incorporated 

by reference (IBR) in this AD, contact 

the EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 

50668 Cologne, Germany; phone: +49 

221 8999 000; email: ADs@

easa.europa.eu; internet: 

www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this 

IBR material on the EASA website at 

https://ad.easa.europa.eu. You may 

view this IBR material at the FAA, 

Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 

216th St., Des Moines, WA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. 

It is also available in the AD docket on 

the internet at https://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2020– 

0855. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the internet at https://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2020– 

0855; or in person at Docket Operations 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

The AD docket contains this final rule, 

any comments received, and other 

information. The address for Docket 

Operations is U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Shahram Daneshmandi, Aerospace 

Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, 

International Validation Branch, FAA, 

2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 

98198; phone and fax: 206–231–3220; 

email: shahram.daneshmandi@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

The EASA, which is the Technical 

Agent for the Member States of the 

European Union, has issued EASA AD 

2020–0137, dated June 18, 2020 (EASA 

AD 2020–0137) (referred to after this as 

the Mandatory Continuing 

Airworthiness Information, or the 

MCAI), to correct an unsafe condition 

for all Saab AB, Support and Services 

Model SAAB 2000 airplanes. 

The FAA issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to all Saab AB, Support and 

Services Model SAAB 2000 airplanes. 

The NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on October 1, 2020 (85 FR 

61877). The NPRM was prompted by a 

report of inadvertently reversed 

connections of the outboard and inboard 

channel harnesses of the wheel speed 

transducers in the MLG wheel axles. 

The NPRM proposed to require an 

inspection for correct installation of the 

MLG anti-skid system harnesses and 

corrective actions if necessary, as 

specified in an EASA AD. 

The FAA is issuing this AD to address 

inadvertently reversed connections of 

the outboard and inboard channel 

harnesses of the wheel speed 

transducers in the MLG wheel axles, 

which could lead to wrong inputs to the 

anti-skid function, whenever activated, 

with consequent reduced braking 

capability, and possibly result in 

damage to the airplane and loss of 

control during landing. See the MCAI 

for additional background information. 


tkelley on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with RULES
10448 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 33 / Monday, February 22, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 

Comments 

The FAA gave the public the 

opportunity to participate in developing 

this final rule. The FAA received no 

comments on the NPRM or on the 

determination of the cost to the public. 

Conclusion 

The FAA reviewed the relevant data 

and determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting this 

final rule as proposed, except for minor 

editorial changes. The FAA has 

determined that these minor changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM for 

addressing the unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the NPRM. 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

EASA AD 2020–0137 describes 

procedures for a one-time inspection for 

correct installation of the outboard and 

inboard left-hand and right-hand MLG 

anti-skid system harnesses and 

corrective actions if necessary. 

Corrective actions include troubleshooting and verification of the 

installation of inboard and outboard 

anti-skid harnesses on the left-hand and 

right-hand MLG; and removal, 

inspection, and repair of any incorrectly 

installed inboard and outboard anti-skid 

harnesses. This material is reasonably 

available because the interested parties 

have access to it through their normal 

course of business or by the means 

identified in the ADDRESSES section. 

Costs of Compliance 

The FAA estimates that this AD 

affects 11 airplanes of U.S. registry. The 

FAA estimates the following costs to 

comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS FOR REQUIRED ACTIONS

Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

4 work-hours × $85 per hour = $340 .......................................................................................... $0 $340 $3,740 

The FAA has received no definitive 

data that would enable providing cost 

estimates for the on-condition actions 

specified in this AD. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701: General requirements. Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with promoting safe flight of civil 

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on products identified in this 

rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

2021–02–02 Saab AB, Support and Services 

(Formerly Known as Saab AB, Saab 

Aeronautics): Amendment 39–21385; 

Docket No. FAA–2020–0855; Project 

Identifier MCAI–2020–00909–T. 

(a) Effective Date 

This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective March 29, 2021. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to all Saab AB, Support 

and Services Model SAAB 2000 airplanes, 

certificated in any category. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 32, Landing gear. 

(e) Reason 

This AD was prompted by a report of 

inadvertently reversed connections of the 

outboard and inboard channel harnesses of 

the wheel speed transducers in the main 

landing gear (MLG) wheel axles. The FAA is 

issuing this AD to address inadvertently 

reversed connections of the outboard and 

inboard channel harnesses of the wheel 

speed transducers in the MLG wheel axles, 

which could lead to wrong inputs to the antiskid function, whenever activated, with 

consequent reduced braking capability, and 

possibly result in damage to the airplane and 

loss of control during landing. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Requirements 

Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this 

AD: Comply with all required actions and 

compliance times specified in, and in 

accordance with, European Union Aviation 

Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020–0137, dated 

June 18, 2020 (EASA AD 2020–0137). 

(h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2020–0137 

(1) Where EASA AD 2020–0137 refers to its 

effective date, this AD requires using the 

effective date of this AD. 

(2) The ‘‘Remarks’’ section of EASA AD 

2020–0137 does not apply to this AD. 

(i) Other FAA AD Provisions 

The following provisions also apply to this 

AD: 


tkelley on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 33 / Monday, February 22, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 10449 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, Large Aircraft 

Section, International Validation Branch, 

FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs 

for this AD, if requested using the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 

14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your 

principal inspector or responsible Flight 

Standards Office, as appropriate. If sending 

information directly to the Large Aircraft 

Section, International Validation Branch, 

send it to the attention of the person 

identified in paragraph (j) of this AD. 

Information may be emailed to: 9-AVS-AIR730-AMOC@faa.gov. Before using any 

approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 

principal inspector, or lacking a principal 

inspector, the manager of the responsible 

Flight Standards Office. 

(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any 

requirement in this AD to obtain instructions 

from a manufacturer, the instructions must 

be accomplished using a method approved 

by the Manager, Large Aircraft Section, 

International Validation Branch, FAA; or 

EASA; or Saab AB, Support and Services’ 

EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA). 

If approved by the DOA, the approval must 

include the DOA-authorized signature. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Shahram Daneshmandi, Aerospace 

Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, 

International Validation Branch, FAA, 2200 

South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; 

phone and fax: 206–231–3220; email: 

shahram.daneshmandi@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA) AD 2020–0137, dated June 18, 2020. 

(ii) [Reserved] 

(3) For EASA AD 2020–0137, contact the 

EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 

Cologne, Germany; phone: +49 221 8999 000; 

email: ADs@easa.europa.eu; internet: 

www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this 

EASA AD on the EASA website at https://

ad.easa.europa.eu. 

(4) You may view this material at the FAA, 

Airworthiness Products Section, Operational 

Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des 

Moines, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

206–231–3195. This material may be found 

in the AD docket on the internet at https:// 

www.regulations.gov by searching for and 

locating Docket No. FAA–2020–0855. 

(5) You may view this material that is 

incorporated by reference at the National 

Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA). For information on the availability 

of this material at NARA, email fedreg.legal@

nara.gov, or go to: https://www.archives.gov/ 

federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html. 

Issued on January 4, 2021. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2021–01824 Filed 2–19–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2020–1037; Project 

Identifier 2019–SW–077–AD; Amendment 

39–21407; AD 2021–03–04] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Helicopters Deutschland GmbH 

Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH 

Model EC135P1, EC135P2, EC135P2+, 

EC135P3, EC135T1, EC135T2, 

EC135T2+, and EC135T3 helicopters. 

This AD requires removing certain 

Titanium (Ti) bolts from service and 

prohibits installing these Ti-bolts in a 

critical area. This AD was prompted by 

a report of a broken Ti-bolt. The actions 

of this AD are intended to address an 

unsafe condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective March 29, 

2021. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this final rule, contact 

Airbus Helicopters, 2701 N Forum 

Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; 

telephone 972–641–0000 or 800–232– 

0323; fax 972–641–3775; or at https://

www.airbus.com/helicopters/services/ 

technical-support.html. You may view 

the referenced service information at the 

FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 

Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood 

Pkwy., Room 6N–321, Fort Worth, TX 

76177. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the internet at https://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2020– 

1037; or in person at Docket Operations 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

The AD docket contains this AD, the 

European Union Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA) AD, any comments received, 

and other information. The street 

address for Docket Operations is U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 

20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Katherine Venegas, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, Los Angeles ACO, FAA, 3960 

Paramount Blvd., Lakewood, CA 90712; 

telephone 562–627–5353; email 

katherine.venegas@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

The FAA issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to Airbus Helicopters 

Deutschland GmbH Model EC135P1, 

EC135P2, EC135P2+, EC135P3, 

EC135T1, EC135T2, EC135T2+, and 

EC135T3 helicopters with a Ti-bolt part 

number (P/N) L535M2001203 marked 

with manufacturer monogram ‘‘D’’ or 

with an illegible manufacturer 

monogram installed on the forward tail 

rotor (T/R) drive shaft. The NPRM 

published in the Federal Register on 

November 30, 2020 (85 FR 76490). The 

NPRM proposed to require removing 

any affected Ti-bolt installed on the 

forward T/R drive shaft from service 

and prohibit installing an affected Tibolt on the forward T/R drive shaft of 

any helicopter. The proposed 

requirements were intended to prevent 

failure of an affected Ti-bolt installed in 

a critical location, possibly resulting in 

reduced control of the helicopter. 

The NPRM was prompted by EASA 

AD No. 2019–0199, dated August 16, 

2019, issued by EASA, which is the 

Technical Agent for the Member States 

of the European Union, to correct an 

unsafe condition for Airbus Helicopters 

Deutschland GmbH (AHD), formerly 

Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH, 

Eurocopter Espan ̃ a S.A., Model EC135 

P1, EC135 P2, EC135 P2+, EC135 P3, 

EC135 T1, EC135 T2, EC135 T2+, EC135 

T3, EC635 P2+, EC635 P3, EC635 T1, 

EC635 T2+, and EC635 T3 helicopters. 

EASA advises of a report of a broken Tibolt. Subsequent investigation revealed 

that an improper heat treatment process 

was accomplished on a batch of Tibolts, which can lead to hydrogen 

embrittlement. The investigation also 

identified the critical location where 

these Ti-bolts are installed on 

helicopters. According to EASA, this 

condition, if not detected and corrected, 

could lead to failure of an affected Tibolt installed in a critical location, 

possibly resulting in reduced control of 

the helicopter. Accordingly, the EASA 

AD requires a one-time inspection of Tibolt P/N L535M2001203 marked with 


tkelley on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with RULES