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H.R. 2703, THE PRIVATE SECURITY

OFFICER EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 2007

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH, 

EMPLOYMENT, LABOR AND PENSIONS

COMMITTEE ON 

EDUCATION AND LABOR

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, FEBRUARY 26, 2008

Serial No. 110–79

Printed for the use of the Committee on Education and Labor

(

Available on the Internet: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/education/index.html 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR 

GEORGE MILLER, California, Chairman

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan, Vice Chairman 

Donald M. Payne, New Jersey 

Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey 

Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, Virginia 

Lynn C. Woolsey, California 

Rube ́n Hinojosa, Texas 

Carolyn McCarthy, New York 

John F. Tierney, Massachusetts 

Dennis J. Kucinich, Ohio 

David Wu, Oregon 

Rush D. Holt, New Jersey 

Susan A. Davis, California 

Danny K. Davis, Illinois 

Rau ́l M. Grijalva, Arizona 

Timothy H. Bishop, New York 

Linda T. Sa ́nchez, California 

John P. Sarbanes, Maryland 

Joe Sestak, Pennsylvania 

David Loebsack, Iowa 

Mazie Hirono, Hawaii 

Jason Altmire, Pennsylvania 

John A. Yarmuth, Kentucky 

Phil Hare, Illinois 

Yvette D. Clarke, New York 

Joe Courtney, Connecticut 

Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire 

Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon, California, 

Senior Republican Member 

Thomas E. Petri, Wisconsin 

Peter Hoekstra, Michigan 

Michael N. Castle, Delaware 

Mark E. Souder, Indiana 

Vernon J. Ehlers, Michigan 

Judy Biggert, Illinois 

Todd Russell Platts, Pennsylvania 

Ric Keller, Florida 

Joe Wilson, South Carolina 

John Kline, Minnesota 

Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Washington 

Kenny Marchant, Texas 

Tom Price, Georgia 

Luis G. Fortun ̃ o, Puerto Rico 

Charles W. Boustany, Jr., Louisiana 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

John R. ‘‘Randy’’ Kuhl, Jr., New York 

Rob Bishop, Utah 

David Davis, Tennessee 

Timothy Walberg, Michigan 

[Vacancy]

Mark Zuckerman, Staff Director 

Vic Klatt, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH, EMPLOYMENT, LABOR AND PENSIONS 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey, Chairman

George Miller, California 

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan 

Carolyn McCarthy, New York 

John F. Tierney, Massachusetts 

David Wu, Oregon 

Rush D. Holt, New Jersey 

Linda T. Sa ́nchez, California 

Joe Sestak, Pennsylvania 

David Loebsack, Iowa 

Phil Hare, Illinois 

Yvette D. Clarke, New York 

Joe Courtney, Connecticut 

John Kline, Minnesota, 

Ranking Minority Member 

Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon, California 

Kenny Marchant, Texas 

Charles W. Boustany, Jr., Louisiana 

David Davis, Tennessee 

Peter Hoekstra, Michigan 

Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Washington 

Tom Price, Georgia 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Timothy Walberg, Michigan 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page

Hearing held on February 26, 2008 ....................................................................... 1

Statement of Members: 

Andrews, Hon. Robert E., Chairman, Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions ............................................................................ 1

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3

Additional submissions: 

Statement of the National Employment Law Project ..................... 38

Statement of the Service Employees International Union ............. 41

Kline, Hon. John, Senior Republican Member, Subcommittee on Health, 

Employment, Labor and Pensions ............................................................... 3

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 4

Statement of Witnesses: 

Campbell, Frank A.S., Senior Counsel, Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice ....................................................................................... 5

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 7

Clarke, Floyd I., member of the board of managers, Allied Security Holdings ................................................................................................................. 32

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 34

de Bernardo, Mark, Jackson Lewis LLP ........................................................ 25

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 27

Kennedy, Weldon, vice chairman, Guardsmark, LLC ................................... 21

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 23

Follow-up comments .................................................................................. 49

Ricci, Joseph, CAE, executive director, National Association of Security 

Companies (NASCO) .................................................................................... 16

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 17

Uzzell, Donna M., Director, Criminal Justice Information Services, Florida Department of Law Enforcement; Chairman, National Compact 

on Crime Prevention and Privacy Council .................................................. 27

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 29

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H.R. 2703, THE PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER 

EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 2007

Tuesday, February 26, 2008

U.S. House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions 

Committee on Education and Labor 

Washington, DC

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:32 a.m., in room 

2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert Andrews [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Andrews, Wu, Hare, Kline, McKeon, 

Davis of Tennessee, and Foxx. 

Staff present: Aaron Albright, Press Secretary; Tylease Alli, 

Hearing Clerk; Carlos Fenwick, Policy Advisor, Subcommittee on 

Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions; Brian Kennedy, General 

Counsel; Sara Lonardo, Junior Legislative Associate, Labor; Robert 

Borden, Minority General Counsel; Cameron Coursen, Minority Assistant Communications Director; Ed Gilroy, Minority Director of 

Workforce Policy; Rob Gregg, Minority Legislative Assistant; Richard Hoar, Minority Professional Staff Member; Alexa Marrero, Minority Communications Director; Jim Paretti, Minority Workforce 

Policy Counsel; and Linda Stevens, Minority Chief Clerk/Assistant 

to the General Counsel. 

Chairman ANDREWS [presiding]. Committee will come to order. 

Good morning. 

Colleagues and ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the subcommittee hearing this morning. We are dealing with an interesting issue and we have two panels of witnesses that we will proceed to expeditiously. 

As we meet this morning, a nuclear power plant or a hazardous 

waste site or an oil refinery or a chemical plant is most probably 

being guarded by a person who is an employee of a private company. And the men and women who serve in that capacity broadly, 

almost uniformly, I would say, do a very, very good job. They are 

competent, they are qualified, they are honest, they are hardworking. They are doing a very good job defending our country. 

But we don’t know if all of them fit that description because 

there are holes in the system that does background checks on people that have such a critical responsibility. 

The Department of Homeland Security has identified that 85 

percent of the critical infrastructure of our country is owned by priVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Aug 25, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 G:\DOCS\110TH\HELP\110-79\40881.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
2

vate sector firms who almost always use private sector security 

firms to provide their security. 

So how would we know if the person gathering—if the person 

who was guarding that hazardous waste site, or that person who 

is guarding that oil refiner is competent or not? How would we 

know whether he or she is perhaps even a terrorist? How would 

we know? 

Well, the answer is we might know, but we might not. If this facility is located in a state that has elected under a 2004 law to get 

access to FBI database background checks, and if the employer in 

that state has elected to gain access to the information, and if that 

employer has chosen to use that information to bar or otherwise 

limit employment for a person that doesn’t pass the background 

check—if all three of those qualifications are met, then we can be 

sure, if the information is accurate, we can be sure that the person 

working, guarding that hazardous waste plant or chemical plant, 

is not a terrorist and ought to be there. 

There are too many ifs in that equation, as far as I am concerned. I think that in order to protect the public, we need to know 

certainly that the people to whom we are entrusting this important 

responsibility are qualified, competent and safe, as the huge majority of those in that field are already doing. 

So how do you reach the point where we have that 100 degree 

certainty, or as close as we can get to 100 percent? There are many 

issues that are raised by the legislation in front of us. The purpose 

of this hearing is to begin the process of evaluating those issues 

and improving the legislation that is in front of us. 

Here are some questions that come to mind: 

Is it necessary to have a requirement that states either have 

background check standards that meet a federal standard or give 

way to a federal background check process? Is it necessary or not? 

We all have one witness, a very qualified witness, who will testify 

that we should wait for states to catch up. I think we all have 

other witnesses who will testify to the contrary. 

Next question: How can we be sure that the information that is 

being conveyed is accurate? That is a very important question. We 

certainly do not want a situation where someone is denied a job, 

or a promotion, or some other employment opportunity because 

they are inaccurately identified as someone who is a problem. 

Another important question about privacy. Once an employer has 

access to information about someone’s background, how can we be 

sure the employer will only use that information in a legitimate 

and appropriate way and not in a way that will unfairly or unduly 

harm that employee? A very important question. 

Then, finally, there is a question of whether or not employers 

who have access to the background check information should be 

compelled to use it, or simply given the discretion as to whether 

or not to use it. And there are two views on that subject as well. 

I am pretty confident that there is universal agreement on the 

proposition that we want the best system in place we can to ensure 

that private employees who are responsible for guarding the critical infrastructure of this country are worthy of that responsibility. 

I don’t think there would be much disagreement about that at all, 

if any disagreement. 

3

I am sure there will be disagreement on the panels today about 

the best way to accomplish that objective. I have a set of ideas, but 

they are a set of ideas that are subject to criticism and evaluation 

to make the underlying bill better. 

Again, the goal here is that we reach a point where we can say 

with a high degree of confidence to our constituents that the person 

who is guarding that radioactive waste dump, who is an employee 

of a private security firm, is safe and qualified and going to do his 

or her job, so that someone is not going to steal the contents of that 

waste dump and make a dirty bomb that would put the community 

at risk. 

This is a very important issue. It is one that the Congress has 

acted on in 2004, but I think we need to reconsider and review in 

this context, and I am very pleased that we have some very distinguished ladies and gentlemen who are going to help us sift through 

this issue here today. 

At this point, I will turn to my good friend, the ranking member 

from Minnesota, for his opening comments, and we all then proceed 

to our first panel, which is Mr. Campbell. 

Mr. Kline?

Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert E. Andrews, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions 

Good morning and welcome to today’s HELP Subcommittee hearing on HR 2703, 

the Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act (PSOEAA) of 2007. 

In 2004, President Bush signed into law the Private Security Officer Employment 

Authorization Act (PSOEAA). PSOEAA authorizes the security industry to request 

access to criminal history information for consenting prospective employees from the 

state. Like the banking, nursing and child care industries, it is essential for private 

security officer employers to have access to this information in order to ensure that 

applicants being considered for employment are qualified for the position. 

Four years later, many states have yet to prioritize implementation of a timely 

process for private security employers to obtain background information. These implementation issues combined with the failure of several states to even establish a 

background check process has left us vulnerable. 

To address this flaw in the protection of our homeland, I have introduced HR 

2703, ‘‘The Private Security Officers Act of 2007.’’ HR 2703 ensures that private security employers protecting our critical infrastructure conduct criminal background 

checks on all potential employees. 

Specifically, HR 2703: (1) prohibits private security employers from hiring guards 

without obtaining certain state criminal history information; (2) requires a process 

to allow private security guard employees or applicants to challenge the accuracy 

or completeness of their criminal history records; (3) specifies the crimes for which 

states must provide conviction information to such employers; (4) imposes confidentiality and recordkeeping requirements on such employers; and (5) protects such employers from liability for good faith employment determinations based upon available criminal history information. 

Since 85 percent of our critical infrastructure such as power plants, oil and gas 

refineries, chemical plants, communication networks, schools, and hospitals are 

monitored and protected by the private security industry, I believe it is imperative 

that these employers have access to an applicant’s criminal background information 

with the proper safeguards in place to protect their information. I thank all the witnesses for coming before the committee today and look forward to hearing their testimony. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding the 

hearing. 

We do indeed have two panels of terrific witnesses, and I am 

looking forward to getting into the discussion. I have a prepared 

statement, which I would like to submit for the record. 

4

Chairman ANDREWS. Without objection. 

[The statement of Mr. Kline follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. John Kline, Senior Republican Member, 

Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions 

Good morning, and welcome to our witnesses. 

In 2004, the Republican-led Congress adopted, with overwhelming bipartisan support, the ‘‘Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2004.’’ Contained within intelligence reform and anti-terrorism legislation, this law recognized 

a simple but important fact: namely, companies that employ individuals to provide 

security services should have access to information about any criminal record of 

these individuals. 

In a post-9/11 world, where the threat of terrorism can never fully be out of sight, 

it seems obvious that employers want and need to know whether the employees they 

are hiring to secure their safety and property have a criminal history. Unfortunately, because of the state-based nature of so many of our criminal records, complete information may too often be lacking. An employer checking an employee’s 

criminal history may be limited to what relevant state agencies can provide and the 

employee himself tells—or fails to tell—the employer. 

It was for that reason that Congress in 2004 adopted the Private Security Officer 

Employment Authorization Act, to provide access to federal criminal history information maintained by the FBI at the Department of Justice. Under the 2004 law, 

Congress affirmatively allowed employers to submit identifying information through 

state-based agencies for the purpose of conducting background checks against federal criminal records. 

Three years later, we will hear today whether and how the Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act has lived up to its promise. In particular, I welcome the testimony of our witnesses as to how the bill’s original intent—that federal 

criminal background checks be conducted through a state-based system—has succeeded or failed. 

Testimony today will focus on H.R. 2703, legislation introduced by Chairman Andrews, which would amend key provisions of the 2004 law. I will say that I have 

a number of questions about the bill’s intent and effect, and I welcome our witnesses’ commentary on these points. 

I look forward to a healthy discussion of these issues, and welcome today’s hearing as the forum to determine whether further legislative action is necessary, and 

if so, the scope of such action. I welcome each of our distinguished witnesses, and 

yield back my time. 

Mr. KLINE. And just make a couple of very, very quick comments, 

because, Mr. Chairman, you gave a very thorough, broad, deep, 

wide and all those sorts of things overview, and it would be very 

hard for me to disagree with any of that. 

We are really exploring to see if that 2004 law, the Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2004, is doing its job. 

And if not, what to do to make it better. Chairman Andrews has 

a bill, H.R. 2703, according to my notes, which we are clearly going 

to be talking about today to see if there are shortcomings in the 

2004 law, if 2703 meets those shortcomings, fills those gaps and 

does it in a way that is acceptable to us. 

There are certainly points to be argued on each side. This is one 

of those times, Mr. Chairman, which I am coming into this with a 

completely open mind. We want to dig to the bottom of this and 

find, as you said, Mr. Chairman, what is the best way to ensure 

that the private security guards, who we entrust for so much of our 

infrastructure’s security and personal security in many cases in 

this country, to make sure that they have the proper backgrounds, 

that they are the right people for the job. 

So I am looking forward to the hearing. I would like to get started. 

5

With that, I yield back. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Mr. Kline, thank you very much. 

The first question that we are going to address is whether it is 

plausible to set up such a system. It is a huge undertaking. Is it 

plausible to set up a system where private security companies 

across the country can have access to the best and most accurate 

data that are maintained through the FBI? And the witness is 

going to talk to that and other issues, Mr. Frank Campbell. 

Mr. Campbell is senior counsel in the Office of Legal Policy at 

the U.S. Department of Justice. He was the author of the Attorney 

General’s Report on Criminal History Background Checks, issued 

in June 2006. Mr. Campbell was central to the development of the 

fingerprint fast-capture device for criminal history checks. He also 

serves as the principal Department of Justice liaison for the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact Council, which establishes rules relating to the intrastate exchange of FBI criminal 

history for non-criminal justice purposes. 

Mr. Campbell graduated from Lafayette College, has overcome 

that liability, I say as a Bucknell graduate. And he has received 

his law degree from the George Washington University Law School. 

Mr. Campbell, welcome to the committee. We thank you for your 

testimony. 

STATEMENT OF FRANK CAMPBELL, SENIOR COUNSEL, OFFICE 

OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Chairman Andrews, Ranking Member Kline and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address you on the implementation of the Private Security Officer 

Employment Authorization Act. 

The act was passed as a means of prompting states without private security officer licensing systems to set up programs that 

would allow private security companies to attain FBI criminal history background checks to screen prospective and current private 

security officers. 

Under current law, access to FBI-maintained criminal history information is governed by a patchwork of state and federal statutes. 

The main vehicle for providing such access has been state statutes 

approved by the attorney general under Public Law 92544 that 

allow criminal background checks using FBI information in certain 

licensing and employment decisions. 

These checks are processed through state identification bureaus 

and in order to provide more complete information, include a check 

of state records. The results of these checks are supplied to public 

agencies that provide their own suitability criteria or those established under state law. 

Currently there are approximately 1,200 Public Law 92544 state 

statutes. Other access has been authorized by federal statutes allowing particular industries to go directly to the FBI for a criminal 

history check without going through a state identification bureau, 

including, for example, discretionary access granted to the banking, 

securities and nuclear energy industries. 

According to the FBI, 41 states plus the District of Columbia and 

Puerto Rico have passed 92544 statutes in connection with licensing and employment of individuals as private security guards. 

6

Some of the statutes only cover background checks for armed security guards. Many of the statutes permit but do not mandate such 

checks. 

The Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act authorized private security companies to submit fingerprints of employees or applicants to a state identification bureau, have an FBI 

check done, and have the results returned to a state agency that 

would apply either existing state standards for employment of private security guards, or when no state standards exist provide notice to the employer whether the individual has a criminal history 

record for an offense specified in the act. 

Under the act, private security companies are permitted, but not 

required, to request these checks. The act does not compel an adverse or a favorable employment determination based on the results of the check. The act specifies that states may opt out of the 

background check system authorized by enacting a law or issuing 

an order by the governor providing that the state is declining to 

participate. 

To date, only one state, Wyoming, has notified the FBI that it 

has opted out of the act’s background check system. While the act 

provides that states are considered to be participating in the system if they have not opted out, the law provides no enforcement 

mechanism to compel participation by states that have neither 

opted out, nor taken steps to make these checks available to the 

private security industry. 

The Department expects in the near future to send an additional 

communication to the states, reminding them of the act’s expectation that they participate in the background check system if they 

have not opted out, as specified in the law. 

We understand that Chairman Andrews has introduced a bill, 

H.R. 2703, to amend the Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act. The Department does not have at this point a position developed on that bill, so I am unable to comment on the bill’s 

provisions today. 

I can note, however, that in response to a provision in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Department sent to Congress in June 2006 the Attorney General’s Report 

on Criminal History Background Checks. The report made recommendations on how the law governing access to FBI criminal 

history can be changed to provide broader and more uniform access 

to such information for use by private, unregulated employers. 

The report recognized that the current approach of enacting separate authorizing statutes has resulted in inconsistent access 

across states and industries. The report also acknowledged that the 

competing interests involved in criminal history checks, including 

the interest in facilitating the reentry and continued employment 

of ex-offenders. 

To account for these interests, the report states that if broader 

access were to be allowed, it should be subject to a number of rules 

and conditions. The rules should include privacy protections for individuals to help ensure that the information is accurate, secure 

and only used for authorized purposes. The rules should require 

record screening in accordance with federal and state laws that 

limit access to criminal records for employment purposes. In addiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Aug 25, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 G:\DOCS\110TH\HELP\110-79\40881.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
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tion, the rules also should require an employer’s acknowledgment 

of legal obligations under federal and state equal employment opportunity laws. 

To avoid government agencies acting as suitability clearinghouses for private employers, the report recommends authorizing 

the determination of records to the employer or to a consumer reporting agency acting on the employer’s behalf. The report also suggests that Congress consider providing employers guidance on suitability criteria to be used in criminal record screening and offering 

opportunities to individuals to seek a waiter from a disqualification. 

To take advantage of the more complete records, the access 

should be through states that agree to participate and that meet 

minimum standards for processing these checks. The attorney general would establish a means of doing the checks in states that do 

not opt into the program. 

Finally, the report emphasized that the attorney general must be 

able to prioritize private sector access to enable the scaling of the 

system to meet the demand in a way that does not interfere with 

the use of the system for criminal justice and national security purposes. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee 

today. I would be happy to answer your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Campbell follows:]

Prepared Statement of Frank A.S. Campbell, Senior Counsel, Office of 

Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice 

Chairman Andrews, Ranking Member Kline, and Members of the Subcommittee: 

My name is Frank Campbell and I serve as Senior Counsel in the Office of Legal 

Policy in the United States Department of Justice. I appreciate the opportunity to 

address you on the issues relating to the implementation of the Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act (PSOEAA). The law was enacted as section 

6402 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) and 

provided authority for states to perform fingerprint-based checks of state and national criminal history records to screen prospective and current private security officers. 

Existing Authorities for Access to FBI Criminal History Background Checks 

Under current law, access to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) maintained 

criminal history information is governed by a patchwork of state and federal statutes. The main vehicle for gaining access for non-criminal justice purposes has been 

state statutes that take advantage of the provisions of Public Law (Pub. L.) 92-544 

(enacted in 1972), which allow sharing of FBI-maintained criminal history records 

in certain licensing and employment decisions, subject to the approval of the Attorney General. These checks are processed through state identification bureaus and, 

in order to provide more complete information, include a check of state records. 

These statutes generally require background checks in certain areas that the state 

has sought to regulate, such as persons employed as civil servants, day care, school, 

or nursing home workers, taxi drivers, private security guards, or members of regulated professions. The results of these checks are supplied to public agencies that 

apply their own suitability criteria or those established under state law. There currently are approximately 1,200 state statutes that are approved by the Attorney 

General under Pub. L. 92-544. The National Child Protection Act/Volunteers for 

Children Act (NCPA/VCA) allows state governmental agencies, without requiring a 

state statute, to conduct background checks and suitability reviews of employees or 

volunteers of entities providing services to children, elderly, and disabled persons. 

In addition, as noted below, the PSOEAA allows states to do FBI background checks 

on private security officers without passing a state statute under Pub. L. 92-544. 

Other access has been authorized by federal statutes allowing particular industries or organizations to go directly to the FBI for an employment, licensing, or volunteer check, without first going through a state repository and also checking state 

8

1The National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact Council, whose members are appointed 

by the Attorney General from state and federal agencies, promulgates rules and procedures governing the exchange and use of criminal history records in the FBI-maintained Interstate Identification Index for non-criminal justice purposes. The Department’s regulations under the 

PSOEAA encouraged States to consider using channeling agents to transmit fingerprints to the 

FBI and the results of the criminal history checks to the States. Channeling agents are generally private entities that contract with authorized recipients of criminal history information 

records. These laws, some of which were passed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, seek to promote public safety and national security by either authorizing access to a check by certain industries or affirmatively regulating an industry or activity by requiring background checks and risk assessments by government agencies. They include authority for discretionary access by the banking, nursing home, securities, and nuclear energy industries, as well as required security 

screenings by federal agencies of airport workers, HAZMAT truck drivers and other 

transportation workers, persons seeking access to nuclear facilities and port facilities, and aliens visiting the United States. 

Pub. L. 92-544 State Statues Relating to the Private Security Industry 

According to the FBI, currently 41 states, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, have passed 92-544 statutes authorizing FBI criminal history checks in connection with licensing or employment of individuals as private security guards, 

watchman, or private investigators or detectives or for permits to carry or possess 

a firearm in connection with such activities. Some of the statutes only cover background checks or licensing for armed security guards. Many of the statutes permit, 

but do not mandate, such checks. 

The Provisions of the PSOEAA 

The PSOEAA was passed as a means of encouraging and prompting states without private security officer licensing systems to set up a program that would allow 

private security companies to obtain FBI background checks on prospective and current private security officers. The PSOEAA allowed authorized employers of private 

security officers to submit fingerprints to a state identification bureau for a state 

and national criminal history check. State identification bureaus serve as the criminal justice information record repositories in each state. Upon receiving a background check request under the PSOEAA, a state identification bureau is authorized to submit the fingerprints to the Attorney General for a check of the FBI’s national criminal history record information databases, with the results of the FBI 

check to be returned to the state identification bureau. 

Upon receipt of the results of the FBI check, a state that has not opted out of 

the background check system authorized by the Act is required to provide a qualified employer notice as to (1) whether the applicant fails existing state standards 

(such as licensing requirements) relating to criminal history background for qualification to be a private security officer, or (2) if the state has no such standards, 

whether the applicant has been (a) convicted of a felony, (b) convicted within the 

last 10 years of an offense involving dishonesty or false statement or an offense involving the use or attempted use of physical force against another person, or (c) 

charged with a felony with no resolution within the preceding 365 days. 

The checks under the Act are permissive, not mandatory, for private security companies. An employer may forego requesting a check or may provide interim employment while a check is pending. The Act does not compel an adverse or favorable 

employment determination based upon the results of the check. The Act specifies 

that states may decline to participate in the background check system authorized 

by enacting a law or issuing an order by the Governor (consistent with state law) 

providing that the state is declining to participate. States that have not opted-out 

under this subsection are considered to be participating in the background check 

system established under the Act. 

To date, only one state, Wyoming, has notified the FBI that it has opted out of 

the PSOEAA background check system. While the PSOEAA provides that states are 

considered to be participating in the Act’s background check system if they have not 

opted out through state legislation or an executive order, the Act provides no enforcement mechanism to compel participation by states that have neither opted out 

nor taken steps to make these checks available to the private security industry. Nor 

did the law provide carrot-and-stick incentives for state participation, such as federal funding or federal grant penalties. The Department, however, expects in the 

near future to send an additional communication to the states on their obligations 

to participate in the background check system established under the PSOEAA if 

they have not opted-out under the Act. We will also make the states aware of the 

option under the Compact Council’s outsourcing rule1 to use contractors or chanVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Aug 25, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 G:\DOCS\110TH\HELP\110-79\40881.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
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to perform routine non-criminal justice administrative functions relating to the processing of 

criminal history information. The Compact Council issued an outsourcing rule and standard in 

December 2005 governing the non-criminal justice use of FBI criminal history information. The 

outsourcing standard specifies that among the functions that can be outsourced to a contractor 

or channeler are making fitness determinations or recommendations, obtaining missing dispositions, and disseminating the information as authorized by federal law or a Pub. L. 92-544 state 

statute. See The National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact Council, Notice, Security and 

Management Control Outsourcing Standard, 70 Fed. Reg. 74373, 74375 (Dec. 15, 2005). 

neling agents to implement the suitability review requirements under the Act. The 

PSOEAA, however, does not provide the Department with authority beyond such exhortation to obtain the cooperation of the states in performing these background 

checks. 

The Attorney General’s Report on Criminal History Background Checks 

As you know, in June 2006, the Department of Justice sent to Congress ‘‘The Attorney General’s Report on Criminal History Background Checks.’’ The report responded to a provision in IRPA, section 6403, which was a companion to the 

PSOEAA. We understood the reporting requirement to be based on congressional interest in developing a more uniform and rational system for accessing and using 

FBI criminal history records for employment suitability and risk assessment purposes. The current access scheme has created a patchwork of statutes, including 

over 1,200 state statutes under Public Law 92-544. This patchwork allows access 

to FBI criminal history information inconsistently across states, inconsistently 

across industries, and even inconsistently within industries. The resulting inconsistent access authority often affects critical infrastructure industries—for example, 

while the banking and nursing home industries have access authority, the chemical 

industry does not. This approach frequently leaves those without access authority 

with what they consider less than adequate information for efficient and accurate 

criminal history checks. 

The Report attempted to account for the range of interests involved in criminal 

history background check in recommending ways to provide broader private sector 

access to FBI criminal history information. We agree that there is a need to revisit 

the authorities under which checks of this information can be made for non-criminal 

justice purposes. Many employers can and do seek criminal history information from 

other public and commercial sources, but frequently find those sources to be inefficient, incomplete, or inaccurate. FBI criminal records would add significant value 

to such checks by providing a nationwide database of records based on the positive 

identification of fingerprints. The framework for broader access authority suggested 

in the Report seeks to avoid the need to enact separate statutes that create inconsistent levels and rules for access to these records. The basic question we considered 

is: How can this be done in a way that allows the responsible use of this information 

to protect public safety while at the same time protecting privacy and minimizing 

the negative impact criminal screening may have on reasonable efforts to help exoffenders reenter and stay employed in the work force? 

We answered that question by recommending that access be authorized for all employers, but that the access be made subject to a number of rules and conditions. 

We emphasized that private sector access to FBI criminal records must be 

prioritized by the Attorney General to enable the scaling of the system to meet the 

demand in a way that does not interfere with the use of the system for criminal 

justice and national security purposes. To avoid government agencies having to 

make suitability decisions for private employment, the report recommends authorizing dissemination of the records to the employer or a consumer reporting agency 

acting on the employer’s behalf. The access would be under rules protecting the privacy interests of individuals in ensuring that the information is accurate, secure, 

and used only for authorized purposes. The rules also would require record screening to account for federal and state laws that limit access to criminal records for 

private employment purposes. In addition, the rules would require an employer’s acknowledgment of legal obligations under federal and state equal employment opportunity laws. Consideration also should be given to providing employers guidance on 

suitability criteria to be used in criminal records screening. When possible, the access should be through states that agree to participate and that meet minimum 

standards for processing these checks, including a response time of no more than 

three business days. The Attorney General would establish a means of doing the 

checks in states that do not opt into the program. 

The report’s recommendations are forward-looking. Given the competing law enforcement and national security demands on the FBI’s system and resources, all-employer access under the proposed rules would likely take many years to implement. 

10

However, the report recommends that the Attorney General should be authorized 

to provide access to priority employers as FBI system capacity and other necessary 

resources allow. 

Several key points underlie the Report’s recommendations: 

• FBI criminal history information, while not complete, is one of the best sources 

available—it covers all 50 states and, even when missing final disposition information, it can provide leads to complete and up-to-date information. FBI statistics 

show an annual hit rate for its civil fingerprint submissions of 11.62 percent. • To enhance data quality, state repositories should be checked whenever possible, so that the states’ more complete disposition records can be part of the response to authorized users. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, approximately 70 to 80 percent of state-held arrest records have final dispositions, as compared to the approximately 45 to 50 percent of FBI-maintained arrest records with 

final dispositions. • Use of FBI criminal history information can enhance privacy through positive 

identification. Fingerprint checks reduce the risk of the false positives and false negatives produced by name checks. With FBI fingerprint checks, it is less likely that 

another person’s record would be wrongly associated with an applicant. It is also 

less likely that an applicant’s criminal record will be missed. • It would be reasonable to provide a means for access to FBI records for criminal 

background checks for private security officers when such checks are not available 

through a state, if two conditions are met: first, that private employers satisfy requirements for privacy protection and fair use of the information, and second, that 

the FBI have the necessary resources and infrastructure to service the increased demand for civil fingerprint checks without compromising, delaying, or otherwise impeding important criminal justice and national security uses of the information system. • If expanded access is allowed, the FBI and state repositories should be authorized to disseminate the records directly to employers. The general limitation on disseminating FBI criminal history information only to governmental agencies that do 

the suitability determinations has meant that many types of authorized checks 

(such as those under the PSOEAA) do not get done. State repositories and government agencies do not have the resources, nor, in most cases, do they see it as part 

of their mission, to perform suitability reviews for unregulated private employment. • The role of the state and federal record repositories should be limited to that 

of record providers, leaving the suitability determinations to the users or their 

agents. The access process must avoid federal and state agencies acting as clearinghouses that make employment or volunteer suitability determinations for unregulated private employers or entities. Repositories should be allowed to continue to 

focus on their mission, with the support of user fees, of maintaining and updating 

criminal justice information and efficiently delivering that information to authorized 

users. 

• Under certain conditions, the existing private sector infrastructure for background screening, including consumer reporting agencies subject to the Fair Credit 

Reporting Act (FCRA), should be allowed to access these records on behalf of enrolled employers. Consumer reporting agencies also could assist in finding final dispositions of arrest records since the FCRA requires them to ensure that the information they report is complete and up to date. Consumer reporting agencies allowed 

such access, however, should meet minimum standards for data security and training in applicable consumer reporting laws. 

• Detailed privacy and fair information practice requirements should be imposed 

as part of expanded access authority, including protections similar to those in the 

FCRA. These requirements include user enrollment, use limitations, Privacy Act 

compliant consent and notice, rights of review and challenge, a newly streamlined 

and automated appeal process, limits on redissemination, information security procedures, compliance audits, and statutory rules on the use, retention, and destruction of fingerprint submissions. The Report also recommends giving an individual 

the option to review his or her record before applying for a job and before it is provided to a private employer. The latter recommendation is something that goes beyond current FCRA requirements and helps to address the fact that many FBImaintained arrest records are missing final dispositions. 

• Most FBI civil fingerprint submissions typically are collected by law enforcement agencies, such as police departments and jail facilities. These locations are not 

the appropriate venues for fingerprint submissions for private sector criminal history screening. Fingerprints for these checks should be collected through an unobtrusive electronic means, such as flat prints, in non-law enforcement settings. 

• When providing FBI criminal history information to private employers, we 

should not undermine the reentry policies that state and federal consumer reporting 

11

laws seek to promote by limiting the dissemination of certain kinds of criminal 

record information by consumer reporting agencies. Expanded private sector access 

to FBI criminal history information should therefore include record screening in accordance with consumer reporting laws. This screening should be done to respect 

the limits those laws place on the dissemination of certain criminal histories for use 

in employment decisions. Congress and the state legislatures may change those restrictions from time to time, depending on the balance they wish to strike between 

promoting privacy and reentry and allowing the free flow of public record information to users making risk assessments to promote public safety. Our recommendations in this area include suggestions to consider changes in the FCRA to provide 

some greater uniformity and predictability in access to criminal history information 

among the states. • Finally, suitability criteria can play an important role in the screening process 

by helping guide a determination by an employer of the relevance of criminal history to the duties or responsibilities of a position. For that reason, the report recommends that Congress consider whether guidance should be provided to employers 

on appropriate time limits that should be observed when specifying disqualifying offenses and on allowing an individual an opportunity to seek a waiver from the disqualification. Federal and state equal employment opportunity laws and regulations 

bear on the use of criminal records in deciding an individual’s job suitability. Therefore, as required by the FCRA, private employers allowed expanded access to FBI 

criminal history information should certify that information under this expanded access authority will not be used in violation of those laws. 

The Report concludes that if the information is handled properly, allowing dissemination of FBI criminal history records to private employers can not only provide 

more accurate and reliable information for use in suitability screening, but also enhance individual protections for privacy and fair use of the information. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee today. I would 

be happy to answer your questions. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Mr. Campbell, thank you very much for 

your longstanding work on this issue and for your testimony today. 

I notice on Page 5 of your written testimony, which without objection will be made a part of the record——

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you. 

Chairman ANDREWS [continuing]. You reference the 2006 report 

that you played such an important role in, and say, ‘‘The current 

access scheme has created a patchwork of statutes, including over 

1,200 state statutes under P.L. 92544. This patchwork allows access to FBI criminal history information inconsistently across 

states, across industries, even inconsistently within industries. The 

resulting inconsistent access authority often affects critical infrastructure industries. For example, while the banking and nursing 

home industries have access authority, the chemical industry does 

not.’’

Could you expand on that point? Does that mean that throughout 

the country the chemical industry is not included in this? Or is it 

just in certain places? What does that mean? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. There may be certain states that have passed 

92544 laws that allow criminal history checks for chemical companies in their states, but today there is no federal law that provides 

authority for the chemical industry to get FBI background checks. 

I know that the Department of Homeland Security recently 

issued guidelines to the chemical industry on security and they do 

require criminal background checks for certain types of access to 

those facilities. And in those regulations, they indicate that they 

can use commercial sources or whatever other sources are available. 

Chairman ANDREWS. How would you characterize the report’s 

recommendation, the 2006 report’s recommendation, with respect 

12

to whether or not all people working as security guards in critical 

infrastructure industries have background checks? What does the 

report say about that? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, the report didn’t address specifically the 

private security guard industry. But when we issued our regulations under this law, we did acknowledge that the private security 

industry is growing rapidly and performing an increasingly vital 

role in protecting the public from violent crime and terrorism, and 

we stated that the key to preserving the trust placed by the public 

in private security guards performing their protective duties are 

background checks that include a criminal history check of FBI information. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Now, the other point is I think I heard you 

say that the recommendations of the report say that in states that 

opt out of access to the background check, federal background 

check system, that the attorney general should establish a means 

through which this information is available to employers. Is that 

what you said? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. That is part of our recommendation. And I think 

what we were acknowledging there is the reality that it is going 

to be very difficult to expect all 50 states to provide uniform access 

to these kinds of checks. And if we are interested in providing access to employers, there needs to be some kind of federal mechanism to allow that access so that it is more uniform and there is 

more rationality in the——

Chairman ANDREWS. And did I hear you say that that mechanism of access for states that opt out should be some third-party 

purveyor of the information? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. One of the key recommendations that we make 

is that rather than having state and federal agencies act as suitability clearinghouses for private, unregulated employers, that we 

find a way that we can disseminate the information to the users. 

And that is the private employers. 

Right now, 92544 requires that they only go to a state agency. 

The fact that a state agency has to look at the record and examine 

it and make a decision whether it falls within certain categories 

and then give a red light or a green light to the user has meant 

that many of these authorities have not been implemented. So that 

is the reason for our recommendation that we find a way to——

Chairman ANDREWS. I also note that one of the recommendations 

that you make is that it is important that there be privacy criteria, 

that employers and third parties handling this information adequately safeguard the records of employees. Could you just briefly 

expand on what you think those privacy considerations should look 

like? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. We have detailed privacy recommendations, 

which include that users enrolling in the system give them the authority to do it, that they agree to limitation of the use of that information for only that purpose, that there be privacy act comply 

and consent notice, that there be rights of review and challenge of 

the information, that a newly streamlined automated appeal process be developed for individuals who want to challenge that information, that there be limits on redissemination of the information, 

13

that there be information security procedures and compliance audits. It is a very detailed recommendation. 

Chairman ANDREWS. What kind of enforcement mechanism do 

you think should exist to enforce those requirements? And then my 

time is up. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, we do recommend that there be a criminal 

penalty for misuse of the information or for using the information 

for other than the purposes authorized. And of course, if users are 

enrolled in the system, we can withdraw their right if they abuse 

it to have access to this information. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Thank you very much, Mr. Campbell. 

Mr. Kline? 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Campbell. 

Under the current law, which you went through very carefully, 

92544 and the 2004 act, not under the proposals of the chairman’s 

bill or your report, but under current law as we sit here today, who 

is able to get access to the federal criminal history record and 

under what circumstances, as we are today? Who has access to 

that? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, if a state has passed a state statute that 

will authorize particular employers to get access or if there is a licensing scheme, those employers have the right to access. 

There are certain federal statutes. For example, the banking industry can come directly to the FBI and get an FBI rap sheet, and 

they do that through a channeling agent that is the American 

Bankers Association. The ABA collects the fingerprints, submits 

them to the FBI, and then they channel the records back to the 

banking institution. 

Mr. KLINE. So the banker, or the bank, goes to the ABA, goes to 

get the information, comes back down the same channel? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. That is right. And similar authority is allowed for 

the nursing home industry. They have to go through state identification bureaus, but there is a law that allows the dissemination 

of the criminal history information directly to a nursing home facility. So there is another precedent for providing the records back to 

the actual user as opposed to having a governmental agency screen 

or review the records for suitability. 

Mr. KLINE. Or even a nongovernmental agency in the case of the 

ABA, for example. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. That is right. And the ABA, they don’t look at 

the records. They just pass the records back down to the bank. 

Mr. KLINE. Ah. Okay. 

We are going to explore so many aspects of this, but clearly one 

of the things that has come out, we talked about Wyoming, came 

up earlier, but just in your opinion, as an informed observer, why 

are so many states apparently failing to meet the obligations of the 

2004 law? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. We don’t have specific information on why states 

aren’t necessarily implementing the Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act. We did, however, get general information on the attitude of the states with respect to doing background 

checks when we were doing the report. We got input from state reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Aug 25, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 G:\DOCS\110TH\HELP\110-79\40881.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
14

positories and others involved in background checks at the state 

level. 

And most of them indicate that the biggest hurdle to getting 

checks done is the fact that the limitation on dissemination of the 

record to the user, and that when you require that, that means 

that the state has to designate an agency and the resources along 

with it to receive the criminal history information, examine it and 

make suitability determinations, and that is one of the reasons we 

recommended in our report that we find a way to authorize the dissemination and the information down to the user. 

The states also indicated that they support dissemination to the 

user, because they believe the individual company is in the best position to make a decision about the relevance of a particular record 

to the position in question. 

Mr. KLINE. So in your opinion, then, it is fundamentally not 

some sort of philosophical issue, it is a question of resources, manpower and money. The states would rather not be in that business. 

Is that right? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. That was certainly one of the factors that was indicated to us when we were preparing this report. 

Mr. KLINE. And so the other way to do that would be to have the 

individual employer, small business, medium business, something, 

somebody who is employing these private security guards, to go directly to the FBI, to the federal agency, to get the information. Presumably, that would mean personnel and resources on the part of 

the FBI to answer these questions. Is that right? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. It would, and one of the things that we would 

want to do in looking at any proposed amendment is to consider 

the resource impact of any proposed changes. 

We made recommendations that some authority ought to be provided for allowing an authorized recipient to go to the FBI if a 

state doesn’t make the records available. 

But as far as particular proposals, we have to take a look and 

provide specific feedback on particular language. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Kline. 

Mr. Hare, do you have any questions? 

Mr. HARE. No, I don’t, Mr. Chairman. I just want to thank you 

for having the hearing. It is a wonderful piece of legislation. I look 

forward to working with you on it. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Campbell, we really appreciate your testimony. If we can 

prevail upon you, I am sure we all be calling upon you again as 

we go through the process of refining this idea. Your work has really been exemplary and your wealth of information is very much 

needed by us, so thank you. 

And I was only kidding about Lafayette College. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Bucknell is a great school. 

Chairman ANDREWS. What did you say about Bucknell? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Bucknell is a great school. 

Chairman ANDREWS. You are welcome back any time, then. Some 

day, when you are attorney general, you can come back. That is 

great. Thank you, sir. 

15

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ANDREWS. We all ask the second panel to come forward, and I will start to introduce the members of the second panel 

as they take their seats. 

Joe Ricci is executive director of the National Association of Security Companies, the nation’s largest private security trade association. He is also the founder and owner of Ricci Communications, 

which implements and manages communications efforts for corporations. 

Mr. Ricci has worked with many international security companies, including ASIS International, ICX Technologies and Securitas 

Security Services. 

Welcome, Mr. Ricci. 

Mr. Weldon Kennedy is vice chairman of Guardsmark LLC, a 

private security company, a position he has held since 1997. After 

serving as a naval intelligence officer, Mr. Kennedy joined the FBI 

in 1963 and stayed with the bureau for 33 years. He rose through 

the ranks, eventually serving as its deputy director, the FBI’s second highest position and its highest nonpolitical appointment. 

Welcome, Mr. Kennedy, we are glad that you are here. 

Mark de Bernardo enjoyed his time with us so much 2 weeks 

ago, he came back today. 

Mark is a partner with the law firm of Jackson Lewis, a labor 

and employment law firm. In the past, Mr. de Bernardo has served 

as special counsel for domestic policy and director of labor law for 

the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 

He received his B.A. from Marquette University in 1976 and his 

J.D. from the Georgetown University Law Center in 1979. 

Welcome back. Glad to have you with us. 

Donna Uzzell is the chair of the National Crime Prevention and 

Privacy Compact Council. Ms. Uzzell is also director of criminal 

justice information systems for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, a position she has held since 1996. She was instrumental in the creation and maintenance of Florida’s sexual offender 

and sexual predator registration and notification program. 

Ms. Uzzell was an officer with the Tallahassee Police Department from 1981 until 1993. She earned her B.S. from the Florida 

State University School of Criminology. 

Welcome. We are glad to have you with us. 

And finally, we are honored to have Floyd Clarke with us today. 

Mr. Clarke is former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and testifying on behalf of Allied Security Holdings, the parent 

company of Allied Barton Security Services, where he holds a position on its board of managers. 

Mr. Clarke joined the FBI as a special agent in 1964, working 

in Birmingham, Boston, Philadelphia and Kansas City. He progressed to be the supervisor, assistant special agent in charge, special agent in charge, assistant director, executive assistant director 

and deputy director before finally being named acting director in 

1993. 

He obtained both his B.A. and J.D. from the George Washington 

University. 

Director Clarke, nice to have you with us this morning as well. 

16

So we are going to begin with Mr. Ricci. We note that there is 

a box in front of you. It has lights on it. You have 5 minutes to 

summarize your excellent written testimony, which is going to be 

made a part of the record permanently for the committee. 

When the yellow light goes on, it means you have 1 minute left. 

When the red light goes on, it means the 5 minutes are up and we 

would ask you to expeditiously summarize and complete your testimony. 

Mr. Ricci, welcome to the committee. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH RICCI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY COMPANIES 

Mr. RICCI. Chairman Andrews, Ranking Member Kline and 

members of the committee, my name is Joseph Ricci and I am the 

executive director of the National Association of Security Companies, or NASCO. 

NASCO is the nation’s only organization dedicated to representing private contract security companies and NASCO members employ nearly 500,000 highly-trained security guards serving 

throughout the government and commercial sectors. 

NASCO is committed to initiating and supporting efforts at the 

federal, state and local levels to raise standards for the licensing 

of private contract security firms and the registration, screening 

and training of security guards. 

In 2004, Congress passed the Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act, which authorized contract security companies to obtain FBI criminal history records checks for screening private security guards in every state. While several states conducted 

these checks based on state statutes, most did not. 

Unfortunately, now 3 years after the passage of the law, the situation remains relatively unchanged. Given public policy and the 

compelling reasons for the existing law, we believe efforts to increase the facilitation of FBI records checks cannot be ignored. 

NASCO welcomes the congressional attention to this problem 

and we are particularly grateful to Chairman Andrews for his continuing interest in improving the background screening of security. 

NASCO supports any attempts to improve the facilitation of FBI 

CHRI checks, including legislation, education and dialogue. 

NASCO and its members look forward to working with Representative Andrews and other concerned legislators to improve access to the FBI checks, including amending the PSOEAA to access 

checks through a third-party DOJ authorized entity or channeler to 

process the FBI checks in states without established processes. 

Employers of private security guards could use these channelers 

to access and screen employees based on existing state screening 

standards or suitability determinations; in the absence of state 

standards, using federal standards established by the PSOEAA. 

When the PSOEAA was considered by the House of Representatives in 2004, it was reported that approximately half the states 

were not conducting FBI criminal records checks for private security. While only 40 states license private security firms and guards, 

only 31 of these states require or facilitate FBI records checks. And 

in seven of these states, the FBI check is only done for armed 

guard applicants. 

17

More recent estimates have put the state numbers that offer FBI 

checks at 16 states. Regardless of the exact number of states conducting FBI checks on security guards, it is clear that despite the 

authority and a law directing states to facilitate these checks, the 

majority of the states do not conduct FBI federal criminal history 

checks. 

In trying to find a solution, it is important not to lose sight of 

the urgent national security and public safety concerns associated 

with conducting criminal history checks and NASCO is hopeful a 

solution can be fashioned as soon as possible. 

Today, nearly 2 million people are employed with the private security industry domestically, protecting businesses, public offices, 

schools, hospitals, business districts, residential communities, nursing homes, day care centers and shopping centers. And as Representative Andrews said earlier, they protect 85 percent of the 

critical infrastructure, including public utilities, pipelines, ports, 

reservoirs, bridges, tunnels and many others. 

If this is a policy argument, empirical evidence further highlights 

the importance of FBI checks, including results from several states, 

including California, that when they implemented their FBI checks 

in 2003 it resulting in nearly 15 percent of guard applicants being 

denied licenses based on criminal convictions for sex-related offenses, burglary, robbery and battery outside of the state. Similar 

results in other states substantiate these figures. 

The use of channelers to facilitate criminal background checks is 

a well-developed concept and was recommended in the 2006 DOJ 

Report on Background Checks. It specifically addressed the issue of 

employers getting FBI checks from non-state parties. 

NASCO has specifically discussed the problems of obtaining FBI 

CHRI checks and the use of channelers with DOJ officials and believes this approach would increase the facilitation of these checks. 

NASCO has reviewed H.R. 2703 and looks forward to the opportunity to discuss the legislation in detail with the drafters and the 

committee staff. As noted, NASCO supports the primary element 

of H.R. 2703, which authorizes the use of non-state channelers or 

any designated by DOJ to conduct FBI checks on security guard 

employers when a state is not performing these checks. 

I want to thank the committee for holding today’s hearing and 

paying attention to the problem associated with a lack of FBI 

CHRI checks for private security guards pertaining to the existing 

law. We believe these checks, combined with NASCO’s continued 

efforts to raise standards at the federal, state and local level for 

private security are vital to our national homeland security and the 

issue of public safety and protection. 

We look forward to working with you to find a solution to the 

problem. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Ricci follows:]

Prepared Statement of Joseph Ricci, CAE, Executive Director, National 

Association of Security Companies (NASCO) 

Chairman Andrews, Ranking Member Kline, and members of the Committee, my 

name is Joseph Ricci, and I am the Executive Director of the National Association 

of Security Companies (NASCO). NASCO is the nation’s only organization dedicated 

to representing private contract security companies, and NASCO member companies 

18

employ nearly 500,000 highly trained security guards serving throughout the government and commercial sector. NASCO is committed to initiating and supporting 

efforts at the federal, state and local levels to raise standards for the licensing of 

private contract security firms and the registration, screening and training of security guards. 

In 2004, Congress passed the Private Security Officer Employment Authorization 

Act (PSOEAA) which authorized contract security companies to obtain FBI Criminal 

History Records Checks (CHRI) through the states for screening private security 

guards in every state.1 While some states were already conducting these checks pursuant to state statues, most were not. Unfortunately, now three years after the passage of the PSOEAA and two years after the implementing regulations were published by the Department of Justice (DOJ), the situation remains relatively unchanged. NASCO knows of no states facilitating contract security company access 

to FBI CHRI checks for the screening of private security guards pursuant to the 

PSOEAA. Given public policy and the compelling reasons for passing the PSOEAA, 

conducting criminal records checks for security guards can no longer continued to 

be ignored.2

NASCO welcomes the congressional attention to this problem, and we are particularly grateful to Chairman Andrews for his continuing interest in improving the 

background screening of security guards and H.R. 2703 is one attempt to solve this 

problem. NASCO supports all efforts that improve the facilitation of FBI CHRI 

checks including legislation, education and dialogue. NASCO and its members look 

forward to working with Rep. Andrews and other concerned legislators pursue activities to improve the facilitation of these checks including amending the PSOEAA 

to access checks through a third-party DOJ authorized entity (‘‘channeler’’) to process FBI CDHRI checks in states without established processes pursuant to the 

PSOEAA. Employers of private security guards will be able to utilize a ‘‘channeler’’ 

to access and screen employees based on existing state screening (‘‘fitness determination’’) standards or in absence of such standards pursuant to the federal standards in the PSOEAA.3

The regulation and licensing of private security guards has traditionally been the 

domain of the states, and as mentioned, for many years states—pursuant to state 

statutes passed after a 1972 federal law authorizing state use of FBI CHRI for employment regulation—have been conducting FBI checks on security guards as part 

of that state’s security guard licensing process.4 However, when the PSOEAA was 

being considered by the House of Representative in 2004, it was reported that approximately half the states were not conducting FBI criminal record checks for private security guards. While 40 States were licensing private security officers, only 

31 of those states permitted or required an applicant to undergo a FBI fingerprint 

check for prior criminal history, and in seven of those states, an FBI check was done 

only when a person was applying for an armed guard position.5 More recent estimates have put the number of states that offer FBI checks for security guards at 

16.6

Regardless of the exact number of states that are currently conducting FBI checks 

on security guards, it is abundantly clear that at this moment—despite the prePSOEAA authority states possessed to conduct FBI checks on security guards, and 

despite the enactment of PSOEAA directing states to facilitate these checks—the 

majority of states do NOT conduct these checks. 

As mentioned, NASCO supports amending the PSOEAA so that employers of security guard could alternatively use a ‘‘channeler’’ to obtain FBI criminal history 

checks in states not doing check. Furthermore, NASCO believes such legislation is 

strongly justified by Congress’ passage of the PSEOAA, public policy, and current 

federal and state background check practices and realities. 

The PSOEAA and Public Policy 

First, and foremost, when Congress passed the PSOEAA in 2004, the purpose of 

the law was clear—to provide the authority for security guard employers in states 

not doing FBI checks to get these checks per request. At the time, directing employers to go through state identification bureaus made sense since many of the states 

not conducting FBI checks were regulating security guards and states were already 

familiar with and conducting FBI checks on other classes of employees. However, 

for a variety of reasons, it is now very apparent that processing the FBI checks 

through the state identification bureau is not sufficient or workable. 

In trying to find a solution to the current FBI check ‘‘processing’’ problem, it is 

very important not to lose sight of the urgent national security and public safety 

concerns that lead to the passage of the PSOEAA and NASCO is hopeful a solution 

can be fashioned as soon as possible. 

19

Today, nearly two million people are employed in private security domestically 

compared to less than 700,000 law enforcement personnel. Security officers are on 

duty protecting businesses, public offices, schools, hospitals, nursing homes, day 

care centers, shopping centers and housing communities. In addition, private security officers are stationed at many of the nation’s critical infrastructure sites and 

facilities including nuclear plants, public utilities, oil pipelines, ports, bridges, tunnels and many other places. 

Recent estimates indicate that 85% of the nation’s infrastructure is owned and operated by private industry and private security officers protect the vast majority of 

these assets. Similarly, the overwhelming majority of ‘‘first responders’’, who are 

first on the scene in the case of an attack or other emergency situation in our manufacturing plants, office buildings, banks, public utilities, shopping malls, are, more 

often than not, private security officers. 

In addition to the policy arguments much empirical evidence was also provided 

to Congress on why FBI screening was needed for security guards during the consideration of the PSOEAA. Here are three examples provided at the 2004 House hearing on the PSOEAA. 

(1) In California, in 2003 there were over 69,000 ‘‘Guard Card’’ applicants. Of 

those applicants, almost 18,000 had an FBI ‘‘rap’’ sheet indicating some sort of a 

prior criminal history. Thanks largely to a new law that went into effect in California in 2003, over 9,000 or 51% of those applicants with a rap sheet were denied 

a guard card. The three most common reasons for denial were for sex related offenses, burglary/robbery and battery convictions. Other data also showed that registered sex offenders frequently attempted to obtain a guard card in California.7

(2) In Illinois, a 2004 review showed that the FBI criminal history records check 

eliminated four times as many applicants as the Illinois State Police check for 

crimes committed within the State. Put another way, Illinois State Police clear 87% 

of all applicants while the FBI check clears only 64%—a 23% difference.8

(3) Rep. Shelia Jackson-Lee asked one of the witnesses, Westchester DA Jeanine 

Pirro, ‘‘Has there been difficulty in hiring private security officers and finding that 

they have criminal backgrounds?’’ Ms. Pirro replied, ‘‘It is difficult to identify those 

individuals who have a criminal history from another State in New York. That is 

the problem and just recently in Westchester there were several security guards 

that my office indicted for sexual assault of students who had criminal histories in 

other States that we had no way of knowing and that the schools had no way of 

knowing.’’ 9

Given the importance of private security to protecting our nation’s critical infrastructure, as well as people and property, and given the implicit trust that people 

have, and should have, in private security guards, it made complete sense when 

Congress passed the PSOEAA in order to better ensure that persons who are convicted of serious crimes are identified and prevented from employment in these positions of trust. It also makes sense now that Congress pursues opportunities to facilitate these FBI CHRI checks as authorized in PSOEAA. 

Background Check Developments and Realities 

While the Department of Justice and the FBI can best describe the processes necessary to set up a system for facilitating FBI CHRI checks through an authorized 

entity or channeler, the use of a private entity or a ‘‘channeler’’ to facilitate criminal 

background checks is a well developed concept. In 2006, pursuant to a request from 

Congress, DOJ produced a comprehensive ‘‘Report on Background Checks’’ that specifically addressed the issue of employers getting FBI checks from non-state parties, 

and the use of private third party channelers was recommended.10

NASCO has specifically discussed the PSOEAA checks problems with DOJ officials and we have not received any indication that, if authorized by Congress, the 

use of private parties or channelers to conduct PSOEAA FBI checks on security 

guards would not work. Furthermore, the DOJ Report states that ‘‘there already 

exist standards to govern management of records’’ by channelers.11

Of course, such a screening entity or ‘‘channeler’’ would be fully governed by applicable laws and regulations regarding the handling of FBI records. In fact, the use 

of private channelers to obtain FBI CHRI is already authorized and regulated by 

DOJ. 

In the DOJ Background Report, it is recommended that ‘‘existing private sector 

infrastructure for background screening’’ (such as a ‘‘consumer reporting agency’’) be 

used to obtain FBI checks in state not conducting such checks. As mentioned in 

Footnote 1, if a state is not regulating an industry, there are a variety of reasons 

complicating any efforts to facilitate these checks and prompting states to not want 

to conduct FBI checks, screening or fitness determinations for employee in that industry. When a state is not willing to do FBI checks on certain employees, DOJ recVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Aug 25, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 G:\DOCS\110TH\HELP\110-79\40881.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
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ommends that the FBI be able to send the CHRI; (1) directly to an authorized employer (direct access is currently not legal for security guard employers under the 

PSOEAA or other statutes and is a much bigger issue) or, (2) to a third party who 

could do the required state or federal screening for the employer. 

As mentioned, there are already standards in place that would safeguard the FBI 

CHRI when received by a channeler, and the authorization for third parties to conduct FBI screening when a state is not doing it as DOJ recommends, is precisely 

what security guard employers need from Congress in legislation to address the current problem with implementation of the PSOEAA. 

This solution is especially needed to facilitate checks in those ten states where 

there are no regulations governing security guards. The DOJ Report explains why 

FBI records should go to non-state parties; 

‘‘* * * (t)he FBI should be authorized to disseminate FBI-maintained criminal 

history records directly to employers or entities authorized to request a criminal history background check, or consumer reporting agencies acting on their behalf, subject to screening and training requirements and other conditions for access and use 

of the information established by law and Attorney General regulations behalf, subject to screening and training requirements and other conditions for access and use 

of the information established by law and Attorney General regulations. EXPLANATION: A major limitation in the background check scheme under Public Law 92-

544 is the requirement that the records be disseminated only to a governmental 

agency that applies suitability criteria and provides the results of its fitness determination—qualified or not qualified—to the employer or entity involved. This makes 

sense when the state is affirmatively regulating employment in a particular area 

and a government agency is designated as responsible for reviewing the records and 

making suitability determinations according to specified criteria. This model does 

not necessarily make sense in industries where employment is not being regulated 

by the government. Requiring suitability screening by a government agency when 

there is no regulation generally has meant that the screening does not get done. 

This has been the true in the case of the NCPA/VCA. Notwithstanding the authority 

provided under those statutes, most states have not created means for the screening 

of employees or volunteers for entities providing services to children, the elderly, 

and disabled persons.12

DOJ has made it clear, and state agencies have confirmed, that unless a state is 

already conducting fitness determinations or suitability screening for employers as 

part of a licensing or regulatory regime for a particular class of employees, it is not 

likely that states will affirmatively undertake setting up a process to conduct further checks or screening—despite federal legislation such as the PSOEAA authorizing and encouraging such checks. For states to start doing new FBI checks, it will 

involve the need for additional state resource and administrative support, and such 

a system cannot be set up simply because there is also authority to collect user fees. 

In fact, in those states where there is no regulation of security guards, it has been 

suggested that state legislation would be necessary to set up an FBI check system 

pursuant to the PSOEAA, thus putting security guard employers in the same difficult situation they were in before the passage of the PSOEAA. 

NASCO will continue to work state agencies and organizations, state representatives and support all efforts to improve the facilitation of FBI CHRI checks pursuant 

to the implementation of the PSOEAA. However, given the inaction of the past several years, the observations of DOJ on such situations and state level budget and 

administrative hurdles, NASCO clearly believes congressional authorization to use 

third parties to obtain FBI checks is a solution definitely worth pursuing. 

Regardless of the process to conduct these checks, NASCO recognizes and supports the authority of states to regulate the security guard industry. If Congress allows third parties to conduct FBI checks for employees in states where such checks 

are not available, NASCO fully supports the DOJ Report’s recommendation ‘‘that 

the law of the state of employment should be applied in the screening’’ when an FBI 

check is done for an employee in a that state.13 NASCO is very concerned about 

any implication, which could be received negatively by the states, that legislation 

to facilitate FBI checks for security officers in every state will permit federal screening standards to supersede existing state standards. 

Comments on H.R. 2703

NASCO has reviewed H.R. 2703 and looks forward to the opportunity to discuss 

the legislation in detail with the drafters and Committee staff. As noted, NASCO 

supports the primary element of H.R. 2703 which authorizes the use of a non-state 

‘‘entity designated by DOJ’’ to conduct PSOEAA checks for security guard employers 

when a state is not doing such checks. NASCO believes this notion should be the 

foundation of any legislative effort to address to the current situation. 

21

There are some elements of H.R. 2703 which raise issues that require more clarification and discussion including the structure and processes for the DOJ authorized 

entity, the list of disqualifying offenses, mandatory checks and temporary hires, as 

well as clarification regarding application of standards for fitness determinations 

and safeguards to prevent superseding of state authority to regulate private security. 

Conclusion 

Thank you for holding today’s hearing and bringing attention to the problem associated with the lack of FBI CHRI checks for private security guards pursuant to the 

implementation of PSOEAA. We believe these checks, combined with NASCO’s continued efforts to raise standards at the federal, state and local level for the licensing 

of private security companies and the registration, screening and training of private 

security guards, is vital to our national security and an issue of public safety and 

protection. We look forward to working with you to find a solution to this problem. 

ENDNOTES

1Pub. L. No. 108-458 § 6402 (2004), 28 USC § 534

2The term ‘‘check’’ and ‘‘screen’’ are used interchangeably. Both denote a party—such as a 

state agency or a DOJ designated entity—obtaining a person’s complete FBI CHRI or ‘‘rap 

sheet’’ and then screening or checking the rap sheet for arrests and/or convictions that may or 

not under applicable law disqualify the person from employment or a license or may or may 

not have to be reported to an employer. This screening/checking process is also referred to as 

a ‘‘fitness determination’’. It is also important to note, that under pre-existing federal law that 

authorized states to access FBI CHRI for certain types of employees including security officers, 

and also under the PSOEAA, a security officer employer is never allowed to be given the FBI 

‘‘rap sheet.’’ Thus any state currently doing FBI checks on security guards obtains the rap sheet 

and then uses it as a part of a fitness determination (e.g. licensing application decision). Any 

new state doing an FBI check pursuant to the PSOEAA would also have to get the FBI rap 

sheet and then review it against any employment or licensing standards the state may have, 

or if the state did not have such standards, then against the reportable offense standard in the 

PSOEAA. The administrative burden and cost of making fitness determinations is cited in several sources as major reasons why states are not and will not do security officer FBI background 

checks. 3 NASCO ‘‘Background Screening Resolution’’ October 17, 2007 APPENDIX 1

4PL 92-544

5Prepared Statement of Mr. Don Walker, Chairman, Securitas Services USA, ‘‘Legislative 

Hearing on S.1743 the ‘‘Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2003,’’ Before 

the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 108th Cong., 

Serial No. 108-89 (March 30, 2004). http://judiciary.house.gov/HearingTestimony.aspx?ID=59 6 January 30, 2008 Letter to Attorney General Michael Mukasey from Senators Joseph 

Lieberman, Carl Levin, Lamar Alexander, and Representative Steve Cohen. 7See Footnote 2, Statement of Don Walker, Chairman Securitas Services USA. 

8 Ibid. 

9Legislative Hearing on S.1743 the ‘‘Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act 

of 2003,’’ Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 108th Cong., Serial No. 108-89 (March 30, 2004). Transcript at Page 68. http://

commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju92829.000/hju92829—0f.htm 10 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General ‘‘THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 

REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS’’ June 2006. 11 Ibid at 102 12 Ibid at 90. 13 Ibid at 120. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Mr. Ricci, thank you for your testimony. We 

appreciate your constructive approach to this, and we know that is 

something shared by each of the witnesses. 

Mr. Kennedy, welcome to the committee. 

STATEMENT OF WELDON KENNEDY, VICE CHAIRMAN, 

GUARDSMARK, LLC 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Kline and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to present the views of Guardsmark concerning H.R. 2703. 

I am Weldon Kennedy, as previously introduced, the vice chairman of Guardsmark, and I was previously the director of the FBI. 

An experience in these capacities, I hope, to be useful to this committee. 

22

Guardsmark appreciates the chairman’s interest in the common 

goal that we all share, increasing the access of the private security 

industry to a nationwide criminal history record information. This 

interest will undoubtedly promote U.S. homeland security and we 

thank you for your willingness to help in this regard. 

Guardsmark has concerns about H.R. 2703 that led us to recommend that it not be enacted. We certainly share your objective 

of obtaining proper access for our industry to nationwide criminal 

history record information. 

Guardsmark has two principle concerns with 2703. First, it federalizes a regulatory system that is currently based in over 40 

states. And, No. 2, it pulls the FBI into the employment process 

much further than I believe that the bureau or the Department of 

Justice would be comfortable. 

On this first point, we observe that the private security industry 

is regulated in over 40 jurisdictions in the United States. Regulation of who may enter a profession is a classic state function and 

the PSOEAA made no fundamental changes to this regime in 2004. 

H.R. 2703, however, would shift the system to one of much greater federal intervention, which could prompt the states to reduce 

their scrutiny of companies and individuals working in our industry. We think that this unintended result would be adverse to the 

industry and inconsistent with improving homeland security. 

Our second main point is that the FBI would not likely be comfortable in taking an enhanced role in the regulation of the security 

industry. While sharing criminal history record information is certainly acceptable to the FBI, H.R. 2703 goes well beyond the sharing function, imposing expanded regulatory responsibility upon the 

FBI and imposing expanded regulatory responsibility on the FBI is 

unlikely to lead to positive results for the industry. 

Some in our industry may expect that the FBI alone can solve 

our criminal history record access problems, but I believe those expectations are unrealistic and that disappointment is inevitable. 

The states simply have to be a part of the solution because it is 

information on state criminal convictions to which we need access. 

We also have a number of additional drafting concerns with H.R. 

2703 that I will simply identify now and ask that the subcommittee 

review our written statement for all the details. 

In summary, the bill will unwisely create a new federal precondition to employment of a private security officer. It establishes 

a federal employment eligibility standard that could conflict with 

certain state standards. Three, it allows for a federally designated 

entity to assess the standards that have traditionally been reserved 

to the states. Four, it requires the states to respond in 3 days, 

which could provoke some of them to opt out of the bill altogether. 

And, five, it significantly expands the list of disqualifying offenses 

in a manner that could encourage opposition from the employee 

rights perspective, a criticism that the 2004 law worked hard to 

avoid. 

Mr. Chairman, we are happy to work with you in a constructive 

manner to improve our industry’s access to CHRI. Let me repeat 

that we appreciate your interest and your objectives. We reluctantly oppose the legislation you have introduced, but we desire to 

23

work constructively and closely with you and this committee to devise suitable alternative approaches. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. 

[The statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]


kennst-1.eps
24


kennst-2.eps
25

Chairman ANDREWS. Mr. Kennedy, thank you for the spirit of 

your testimony and very worthy suggestions. We really do appreciate your constructive approach to this. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Mr. de Bernardo, welcome back. 

STATEMENT OF MARK DE BERNARDO, JACKSON LEWIS LLP 

Mr. DE BERNARDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Kline, members of the subcommittee. 

I appreciate this opportunity to testify in support of criminal 

background checks and in support of H.R. 2703. 


kennst-3.eps
26

The Council for Employment Law Equity, which I represent, and 

Jackson Lewis, which is a 450-lawyer, 34-city employment law firm 

representing management, we support employers’ interests, the 

users of criminal background checks. And let me say, I think the 

role of criminal background checks in employment is strong, appropriate and necessary, and it is particularly necessary in such industries and in such employment categories as the use of security 

guards in private sector employment. 

We feel that employment use of criminal background checks is 

not only pro-employer, it is pro-employee and, ultimately, it is in 

the interest of the ex-offenders themselves. They have a better 

chance of being reintegrated into society and into employment by 

those employers who actually use criminal background checks. In 

fact, studies that are cited in my testimony uniformly say that 

those employers who use criminal background checks are more 

likely to hire ex-offenders than those employers who do not. In fact, 

three and a half times more likely. 

So that societal interest of having those people coming out of 

prison, getting them reintegrated in society, is actually served in 

this regard. 

But more information is better than less information, and I think 

the spirit and thrust of H.R. 2703 is that we would have more consistent information, we would have more information that is available to employers on a regular basis. Right now it really is a patchwork at the state level. There are great inconsistencies. You know 

the old saying, ‘‘garbage in, garbage out.’’

You know, as employers we want to know whether or not the job 

applicants that are coming before us are qualified, and we particularly want to know this for those positions where there are highrisk populations, where there are people that are particularly vulnerable, whether they be customers, workforce or certain job positions that are discussed in my testimony, job positions in hospitals, 

day care centers, elder care. Certainly any jobs involving youth, 

school districts, youth camps, counseling programs, certainly any 

jobs involving national security or the defense industry. 

You know, if we are going to have defense contractors that are 

employing employees on military bases, we want to have every opportunity to know as much as we possibly can about those job applicants and do the screening. And the jobs go on and on. If you 

have access to financial securities or large amounts of cash, certainly those situations. Pharmaceutical companies, drug stores, 

anywhere where there would be access to drugs on the open market are going to be valuable. 

So what we want is more information, more consistent information, more readily available information. What we have now is information that comes from the states, which talks about conviction 

in that state. 

But, you know, so often those being released from prison are 

crossing state lines. Los Angeles County, 47,000 people released 

from prison are going to be in Los Angeles County last year. Onethird of the 23 percent of those people being pulled from prison in 

California will be in Los Angeles County itself. Well, California has 

11 percent of the nation’s population. They have 23 percent of the 

27

nation’s former prison inmate population, again concentrated in 

Southern California. 

So there are people crossing state lines with the inconsistency of 

what is going on at the state levels with the exclusion of those people who are serving out federal offenses. Sure, I am in favor of a 

system by which we can identify and have better information, more 

consistent information, more accurate information, and I applaud 

you, Chairman Andrews, for approaching this in one segment with 

H.R. 2703. 

[The statement of Mr. de Bernardo may be accessed at the following Internet address:]

http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/2008-02-26-MarkdeBernardo.pdf 

Chairman ANDREWS. Mr. de Bernardo, thank you very much for 

your contribution today. 

Ms. Uzzell, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF DONNA UZZELL, CHAIRWOMAN, NATIONAL 

CRIME PREVENTION AND PRIVACY COMPACT COUNCIL 

Ms. UZZELL. Thank you. 

Good morning. I am Donna Uzzell and I work for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. I am currently, as the chairman 

mentioned, the chairman of the National Crime Prevention and 

Privacy Compact Council. 

The council is a federal rule-making body that works in partnership with states, end-users and policy-makers like yourselves to inform or to regulate and facilitate the sharing of criminal history 

record information to non-criminal justice users to enhance public 

safety and still address privacy rights. To date, 27 states have ratified the compact and 11 have signed our MOU. 

I am delighted to be here today. I represent my fellow states. I 

do need to say that my comments reflect the practices in my state 

and the individual opinions of several of our members and not our 

official position as a council, since this is a federal rule-making 

body. 

This council fully agrees that persons who are placed in any position of trust should be appropriately screened. Clearly, individuals 

such as private security guards are vital to the nation’s domestic 

security. In Florida, I am proud to say that these checks have been 

done by our Division of Licensing for over 20 years. We average 

30,000 checks a year. But as we heard, not all states do participate. 

In my handout I have expressed the concerns with the existing 

law and would be glad to expand on that during any Q&A. In regards to solutions, though, I would like to reference not only my 

testimony provided earlier on the AG Report on Criminal History 

Background Checks, but I would like to share with you firsthand 

experience from a proven model that is also referenced in the AG 

report. 

Several years ago in Florida volunteer agencies were considering 

implementing the National Volunteers for Children Act to protect 

children, the disabled and the elderly. There are a number of volunteer organizations, such as Boys & Girls Clubs and churches, 

28

that fall within this category, as well as large employers in our 

state, such as Universal Studios and Disneyworld. 

The dilemma was that no one agency could take on the workload 

of screening and no one criteria was appropriate. The solution, 

through an amendment to the act, was to allow the qualified entity, with the presence of a waiver, to receive the criminal history 

information and to make their own suitability determinations. 

This allowed us to implement this law in our state and the entities are subject to state audits to address privacy and security concerns. It has been working in our state since 1999 and we have 

conducted over 140,000 criminal history checks since, using this 

model. 

Another model that is applicable, as Frank Campbell mentioned, 

was Public Law 105277, which was passed in 1998, allowing nursing home facilities to receive national criminal history information 

from the state in the event that a state statute was not in place. 

Three states take advantage of this law and in 2007 alone over 

27,000 checks were done under that act. 

One more model that was recently enacted by Congress via Section 153 of the Adam Walsh Act is the ability for private schools 

to now receive the results of criminal history information to make 

suitability determinations for persons they employ. Similar to the 

private security guard industry, private schools across the country 

were receiving varied assistance in obtaining checks of their employees. When Congress passed the act in July of 2006, it enabled 

private schools to directly receive national criminal history information if the provision is requested by the governor and the checks 

are fingerprint based. 

In that same act, Congress made this provision available to private companies that contract with child welfare agencies for licensing of foster and adoptive parents. These models could be applied 

to the private security guard industry and would allow the states 

that wish to regulate the industry to continue doing so, but not 

hold hostage the companies in states where regulations do not 

exist. 

Several states that I have spoken to indicated they would be able 

to begin processing these checks if the information was passed 

down to the employing company. And I might add that the Florida 

Association of Security Companies emailed me and said they supported this approach. 

Privacy issues? Well, let me just say this: at least 25 states already make criminal history information in their state available on 

the Internet. Private data companies compile this information and 

sell it around the country. Information provided by the FBI is at 

least fingerprint based and eliminates some of the harm done from 

someone mistakenly identified by name. And caveats could be put 

in place, like were mentioned in the AG report, to protect privacy. 

Rap sheets can be read. It is a myth that they can’t. With minimum training, we have evidence of that across the country. 

If it is true that security guards do protect 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure, and I am glad to hear that—that is a 

number I have heard and I am glad to hear you say that, Mr. 

Chairman—and we trust them with tremendous responsibility, 

then why wouldn’t we trust them to receive criminal history inforVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Aug 25, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 G:\DOCS\110TH\HELP\110-79\40881.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
29

mation to ensure that the right person is placed within these sensitive positions and allow public safety to take precedent? 

So, consistent with past congressional precedents, if legislation is 

enacted I would strongly consider allowing private security guards 

to receive the information. Despite what you may have been told, 

there are companies that would like to police themselves and are 

willing to step up to the plate and take on the responsibilities. 

And just one more thing, Mr. Chairman. I have heard anywhere 

from 16 to 32 to 40, just in preparing for this I pulled 17 states 

and 14 of the 17 actually do these checks. So what I will do as 

Compact Council chairman is I will be glad to work with the security guard industry, but I will do a poll and survey, and I would 

be glad to share the information not only of what states conduct 

the checks, but states that have any limitations, so I can share 

those with you as well. 

[The statement of Ms. Uzzell follows:]

Prepared Statement of Donna M. Uzzell, Director, Criminal Justice Information Services, Florida Department of Law Enforcement; Chairman, National Compact on Crime Prevention and Privacy Council 

Good Morning, I am Donna Uzzell and I am the Director of Criminal Justice Information Services for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. I am here representing the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact Council and I currently hold the position as Chairman. On October 9, 1998, President Clinton signed 

into law the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact (Compact) Act, establishing an infrastructure by which states can exchange criminal records for noncriminal justice purposes according to the laws of the requesting state, and provide 

reciprocity among the states to share records. The Compact became effective April 

28, 1999, after Montana and Georgia became the first two states to ratify it, respectively. To date, 27 states have ratified the Compact and 11 states have signed the 

Council’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in voluntary recognition of the 

Council’s authority to adhere to the rules and procedures of the Compact. The remaining states are represented by the FBI who has a designated member to the 

Council. Therefore, between the states who have ratified the Compact and established MOUs, 38 states are now under the purview of the Compact. 

Goal and Mission of Compact Council 

The Goal of the Compact Council is to make available the most complete and upto date records possible for noncriminal justice purposes. Our mission, is to work 

in partnership with criminal history record custodians, end users, and policy makers 

to regulate and facilitate the sharing of complete, accurate, and timely criminal history record information to noncriminal justice users in order to enhance public safety, welfare and security of society while recognizing the importance of individual 

privacy rights. 

Because our members are federally appointed by the United States Attorney General and federal agencies are represented on the Council, the council does not lobby 

or take a position on any specific legislation. However, I am delighted to be here 

today, representing my fellow member states and extremely pleased that the committee recognized the role of the Council and our subject matter expertise on issues 

such as the one before you today. My comments are reflective of the practices in 

my state and the individual opinions of several of our members and are not an official position of the Council. 

Implementation of the Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act 

(PSOEAA) 

Let me begin by emphasizing that the Council members fully recognize the importance of ensuring that persons who are placed in any position of trust (whether it 

be persons with direct contact with children, the disabled and the elderly, or persons 

who work in nuclear regulatory plants, or in airports or drive hazmat materials) are 

appropriately screened and that a criminal history background check be performed 

on the individual before he or she is placed in that position. The information that 

has been relayed to the Council is that 85% of the nation’s critical infrastructure, 

including power plants, water treatment facilities, and telecommunications facilities 

30

are protected by the private security industry. Clearly, these individuals are critical 

to the nation’s domestic security initiatives and serve in trusted positions. 

In Florida, private security guards, both armed and unarmed, receive a state and 

national criminal history check and the industry is regulated and licensed by our 

Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Licensing. These 

checks have been done for over 20 years and we average around 30,000 applications 

a year. 

I continue to hear a range of numbers as to how many states are actually performing criminal record checks on private security guards. I have heard numbers 

ranging from 16 to 25 to 32 states. Since the Private Security Officer Employment 

Authorization Act was passed, I am aware that several states have indicated they 

have enacted or broadened their own state statutes. Last week at a Council committee meeting, when I had learned that I would be testifying today, I conducted 

a quick poll of a few of my counterparts and found that the states of California, 

Texas, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Arkansas, Virginia, New Hampshire, 

Texas, Louisiana and Vermont also conduct state and national checks on private security guards armed and unarmed. In fact, according to the FBI there are 41 states, 

the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico that have requested and received authorization under Public Law 92-544 to perform national criminal history checks on private security guards. Some, like Georgia, the regulatory agency has authorization 

to do both armed and unarmed but regulates only armed security guards, some like 

Kansas and Oklahoma are permissive in their checks and are not mandatory. 

Because it appears that a current accurate accounting state by state does not 

exist, I am going to do a formal survey with the Compact Council and hope to enlist 

the support of the National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics 

(SEARCH) and the National Association of Security Companies (NASCO) to fully 

understand how many states are actually performing these checks, the limitations 

within the state and any point of contact. I would be more than happy to share with 

the committee the results of that survey when completed. However, I think most 

will agree that one thing we do know is that there are approx. approximately 8 to 

10 states that do not have any legal authority whatsoever to conduct national 

checks on security guards. Idaho is one of those states. Idaho does not have a state 

statute authorizing these checks. Last week, in a discussion with a representative 

from this state, I did learn that there has not been a demand by the industry within 

that state to enact legislation or implement the PSOEAA. The state representative 

in Idaho, welcomes the opportunity to work with members of the industry although 

admits that implementation presents a set of challenges. 

Current Problems with PSOEAA Implementation 

While implementing the PSOEAA checks without a 92-544 statute may appear to 

be a simple solution, such a task has certain obstacles that would need to be overcome. First of all, the state would need to not only submit the fingerprints and receive the criminal history results but would also be required to perform the suitability determinations based on the federal criteria. The volume of those checks 

could be significant. Although a fee could be assessed for this purpose, the state 

would need to have state authority via legislation or executive order to assess the 

fee, receive the money, hire the necessary resources to perform the task of adjudicating the results, handle appeals and process approvals and denials. Even if the 

state chose to outsource some of these functions, the state cannot outsource something it is currently not authorized to do, so the infrastructure would still need to 

be in place for the state to take on the responsibility for these checks. 

If the state does not have the ability to participate based on the concerns previously mentioned, the state may ‘‘opt out’’ to enable a ‘‘participating state’’ to do 

these checks for them. While this may also sound reasonable in theory, once again, 

it is a complex undertaking. A state that is performing the checks usually has a 

licensing or regulatory function with specified criteria used within that state for 

screening. Even though a fee for services is authorized, it would be very difficult 

for the state to justify requesting additional resources to accommodate other states, 

and to ask them to screen to the federal standard for these checks and their own 

standards for checks within their state. 

I can speak personally for the state of Florida in saying that we are continually 

being asked to scale down our budget and limit the hiring of additional resources. 

Even if we could collect a fee for that service, expanding our government to provide 

services outside our state would be questioned. We continue to be told to stick to 

our core missions and I am sure since you also represent the states that this is 

something you can certainly understand. 

How do we make this work? 

31

So you ask yourself, well what would work. The USAG was tasked in Section 6403 

of Intelligence Reform Bill and Terrorism Prevention Act to conduct a study on the 

issue of background checks. The Compact Council was specifically mentioned in the 

law as a reference group for the topic. The Council posted notes to the Federal Register as comments and worked closely with USDOJ’s Office of Legal Policy in the 

development of the final report. It is important to note that the report to Congress 

is very much aligned with the recommendations of compact council members. It is 

also very much aligned with the comments from SEARCH. The part of the report 

that may be specifically relevant to Congress is in Section V Recommendations for 

Standardizing Non-Criminal Justice Access Authority. 

Suggested Models for Consideration 

Let me share with you firsthand experience from a proven model that is referenced in the AG report in Section III, Examples of Programs Implementing Criminal History Check Authorities. In Florida, several years ago there was a similar situation concerning the ability to perform state and national checks on persons employed or volunteering around children, the elderly and the disabled. There are a 

number of agencies that fall under this category in Florida to not only include volunteer organizations such as Boys and Girls Club, churches, and universities, but 

large employers in our state such as Universal Studios, and Disney World. The dilemma was that no ‘‘one’’ agency in the state could take on the workload of screening for these entities and there was not ‘‘one set of criteria’’ that would be appropriate for all. The United Way was concerned about the impact on volunteerism and 

that persons with criminal offenses that would still make them suitable for some 

jobs could be ultimately screened out. For instance, an agency may want to allow 

someone with multiple driving violations including Driving While Intoxicated to volunteer in a facility with the elderly as long as they are not driving the patients but 

may not want someone with a history of fraud, with an elderly person who could 

be vulnerable to fraudulent scams. The solution, through an amendment to the Volunteers for Children’s Act was to allow the qualified entity, with the presence of a 

waiver, to receive the criminal history information and make their own suitability 

determinations. The entities are subject to state audits to ensure that they are 

maintaining all security requirements in the maintenance and dissemination of the 

information. This program has been in place since 1999, and in 2006/2007 Florida 

conducted 144,693 criminal history checks using this model. 

Another model that is applicable to this situation is the Public Law 105-277 which 

was passed in 1998 allowing Nursing home facilities to receive national criminal 

history information from the state in the event that a state statute was not in place 

to provide for these checks. Three states take advantage of this law and in 2007 

alone over 27,000 checks were done under this statute. 

One more model that was recently enacted by Congress via the Adam Walsh Act 

is the ability for private schools to receive the results of criminal history information 

to make suitability determinations for persons they employ. Similar to the Private 

Security Guard Industry, private schools across the country were receiving varied 

assistance in obtaining criminal history checks for their employees. Some state laws 

only authorized criminal history checks for public schools and some included private 

schools but required them to fall under the state board of education for regulation. 

In states, where the state did not want to regulate private schools or where the private schools wanted separation from the state board there was little to no avenue 

for them to receive the information and do the right thing. When Congress passed 

the Adam Walsh Act in July 2006, you enabled private schools to directly receive 

national criminal history information if the provision was requested by the Chief 

Executive Officer of the state and the checks were fingerprint based. In the same 

act, Congress made this provision available to contracted entities of Child Welfare 

Agencies for the licensing of Foster and Adoptive parents. 

In each of the models, a group was defined as having a specialized need for persons in trusted positions to be background checked, there was no consistency nationwide, and the decision as to whether to conduct the checks was based on the states 

ability to provide resources to adjudicate the results and apply criteria for suitability. These models could be applied to the Private Security Guard Industry and 

would allow the states that wish to regulate the industry to continue doing so, but 

not hold hostage the companies in states where regulations do not exist. In Georgia, 

the state has indicated that it will continue to license armed guards and that if the 

records could be pushed back to the employing agency they would be willing to proceed with all security guards. Other states have indicated the same. In Florida, even 

though security guards are licensed by the state, many of the guard companies 

would like to receive the results of screening to determine if they would want to 

apply their own standards for persons they hire to ensure that they are approVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Aug 25, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 G:\DOCS\110TH\HELP\110-79\40881.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
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priately placing persons in positions. Today, they must do a private company search 

of these records or a state only search of these records in order to accommodate that 

need. 

Privacy Concerns 

The privacy issues surrounding this information should not deter you from taking 

this type of action for the following reasons: 

• In at least 25 states, the states information is already available on the internet 

by a name based check. 

• Private data companies compile criminal record information from courts, corrections and other databases from around the country and sell to their customers. 

• At least, the information provided by the FBI is fingerprint based and limits 

the harm done from someone being mistakenly identified by name. 

• Caveats, like those mentioned in the AG report could be put in place to protect 

privacy. 

• Rap sheets CAN be read and we have examples at the state level of numerous 

organizations that are screening criminal history records today with minimum 

training, to say otherwise is a myth. 

If it is true that security guards do protect 85% of the nation’s critical infrastructure, and we trust them with that tremendous responsibility then why wouldn’t we 

trust them to receive the criminal history information to ensure that the right person is placed within these sensitive positions and allow public safety to take precedence. 

Recommendations 

This recommendation is consistent with past congressional actions as previously 

mentioned and could be enhanced by placing minimum criteria in place that the 

agencies would need to adhere to. 

I urge you to do the following: 

Prior to passing legislation, ensure that you have received accurate information 

and in those states that are already regulating the industry and conducting these 

searches allow them to continue as appears to be recommended in this legislation. 

If legislation is enacted, strongly consider allowing the private security guard industry to receive the results of the criminal history information. If these individuals 

are truly guarding areas that are critical to our nation’s domestic security, then do 

not tie their hands to enable them to employ the right person in these sensitive jobs. 

Despite what you may have been told, there are security guard companies that 

would like to police themselves and are willing to step up to the plate to take on 

this responsibility. 

In doing so you will: 

• enable persons who currently cannot be checked to receive the screening, and 

• enable more states to participate. 

The USAG report recommendation on access to criminal history records indicates 

that when a state agrees to participate in processing these checks and passing them 

down to the employer the state should be able to do so with certain protections in 

place. If the state opts out, then the employing entity should be able to go directly 

to the FBI. Critical Infrastructure is listed as one of the first priorities in determining who should be able to avail themselves of this service. Consider implementing the recommendations of the USAG report. 

Chairman ANDREWS. We would be eager to receive that information. Thank you. 

Ms. UZZELL. Thank you for letting me be here today. I appreciate 

it. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Our privilege. 

Mr. Clarke, welcome to the committee. Glad to have you with us. 

STATEMENT OF FLOYD CLARKE, MEMBER, BOARD OF 

MANAGERS, ALLIED SECURITY HOLDINGS 

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you, Chairman Andrews and Ranking Member Kline and the rest of the committee. 

It is a pleasure and I appreciate the opportunity to appear before 

you today to offer some comments about H.R. 2703. 

33

As you mentioned, I am a member of the board of managers of 

Allied Security Holdings, the parent company of Allied Barton Security. And previously I spent 30 years in the FBI, leaving in January 1994 as the acting director. So I approach this issue with the 

benefit of the perspective from both the FBI and private sector. 

Allied Barton is the largest American-owned security services 

company. We have more than 52,000 security officers in over 100 

offices and we service approximately 3,500 clients across the 

United States. 

Let me begin, Mr. Chairman, by commending you for your commitment to this issue over the years. As Congress recognized in the 

legislation that you were instrumental in helping to pass in 2004, 

there is a homeland security imperative for having professional, reliable and responsible security officers for the protection of people, 

facilities, institutions, and ensuring that these officers are thoroughly screened and trained. 

In an effort to achieve this objective, Congress enacted the Private Security Officers Employment Act to allow private security officer companies to submit requests through the states to screen employees against the FBI’s criminal history records. Unfortunately, 

for a variety of reasons, states have generally not exercised the authority that they have been given and employers still cannot regularly screen perspective employees against the national database. 

And I want to again commend you, Mr. Chairman, for recognizing the need to strengthen this earlier legislation. 

Private security officers, as you mentioned, provide a primary 

line of defense for much of our country, securing countless lives, 

tens of thousands of important facilities from coast to coast. The 

threat of additional terrorists acts requires the cooperation between 

the public and the private sectors. 

The private sector, as you mentioned, controls 85 percent of the 

critical infrastructure in this nation, and unless a terrorist target 

is a military or other secure government facility, the first first responders most likely will be civilians. Those civilians will include 

private security guards. We want to do all that we reasonably can 

to ensure that the officers that we hire are trustworthy and not 

likely to commit criminal acts or aide or support terrorists. 

At a minimum, this requires that our company have a reliable 

and timely way of learning about any serious criminal history of 

our applicants. 

Congress directed the attorney general to examine the issue related to non-law enforcement access to federal criminal history 

records and the AG concluded that reliable criminal history background check cannot be accomplished without timely access to the 

records of the FBI. 

Without access to the federal records, the only records available 

to an employee are those in the states, where the records are typically kept in the courthouse in each county. Since there is no practical way to check all 3,000 clerks of court around the country for 

every employee, employers will usually only request a check in the 

counties in which the applicant says that they have recently lived 

or worked. This leaves the employer blind to any criminal history 

in states for which the applicant failed to disclose contacts. 

34

Congress acted in 2004 to provide employers access to that federal database. Unfortunately, in doing so Congress required that 

the employers always go through the state identification bureaus 

in order to get that access. In other words, we must submit the employee information to the state bureau, which then decides whether 

to forward the request to the federal level. 

An employer in a state that cannot or chooses not to provide 

timely background check results that incorporate both state and 

FBI data should be able to make requests for criminal history 

records to the FBI either directly or through an entity designated 

by the attorney general. 

We strongly support this recommendation and applaud you, Mr. 

Chairman, for incorporating this provision in H.R. 2703. 

I understand that there may be concerns that this legislation bypasses states. As I read it, however, it clearly requires employers 

to go through the states in every instance where the states are 

willing and able to respond. The only instance in which employers 

can make a request other than through the state is where the state 

has chosen not to establish a mechanism for getting prompt federal 

records checks accomplished. 

We fully support efforts to get more states to adopt such mechanisms. However, that will take time, time during which we will 

continue to have a dangerous gap in the screening. 

H.R. 2703 does not preclude continuing efforts to work with the 

states and ensures that as those states come into compliance with 

the AG’s standards, employers will be required to go through them 

for their record checks. 

Our experience indicates that the protections afforded to employees under Congress, which Congress included in 2004, are appropriate and that the legislation that is being suggested and offered 

here builds upon those and even strengthens those. 

I would be more than happy to answer any questions that you 

might have. 

[The statement of Mr. Clarke follows:]

Prepared Statement of Floyd I. Clarke, Member of the Board of Managers, 

Allied Security Holdings 

Chairman Andrews, Ranking Member McKeon, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about HR 2703, the Private Security Officers Employment Authorization Act of 2007 and the experience of 

AlliedBarton Security Services in attempting to use the criminal history database 

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to help screen applicants for these positions of trust, 

I am the Vice President for Corporate Compliance of MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. and a Member of the Board of Managers for Allied Security Holdings LLC, 

the parent company of AlliedBarton Security Services. Previously, I spent 30 years 

working at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, ending in January 1994 as Acting 

Director of the Bureau. Thus, I approach this issue with the benefit of the perspective of both the FBI and the private sector. 

AlliedBarton Security Services, headquartered in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, 

is the largest American-owned security officer services company. Established in 

1957, AlliedBarton is a trusted leader with proven expertise in providing highly 

trained security officers to a number of markets, including manufacturing and industrial, financial institutions, colleges and universities, commercial real estate, 

government services, healthcare, residential communities, and shopping malls and 

other retail facilities. AlliedBarton has more than 52,000 security officers and over 

100 offices located across the United States from which we help protect the facilities, employees, and customers of our approximately 3,500 clients. 

35

Mr. Chairman, let me begin by commending you for your commitment to this 

issue over the years. As Congress recognized in legislation that you were instrumental in helping to pass in 2004, there is a homeland security imperative for having ‘‘professional, reliable, and responsible security officers for the protection of people, facilities, and institutions’’ and ensuring that these private security officers are 

‘‘thoroughly screened and trained.’’ 1

In an effort to achieve this objective, as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Congress enacted the Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act (PSOEAA) to allow Allied-Barton and other private security officer firms to submit requests through the states to screen employees2

against the FBI’s criminal history records. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, 

states have generally not exercised this authority and private security officer employers still cannot regularly screen prospective employees against the national 

database. I want to again commend you, Mr. Chairman, for recognizing the need 

to strengthen that earlier legislation. 

I know from my experience at the FBI how important it is to obtain timely criminal history record checks. In my years with AlliedBarton, I have seen how important it is in the private security officer context as well. My testimony today briefly 

discusses why this access is so important, how it has worked—and not worked—for 

AlliedBarton over the last two years, and why the changes made by HR 2703 are 

important for both applicants and employers. 

Reliable Private Security Officers are Crucial to our Nation’s Security 

Private security officers provide a primary line of defense for much of our country, 

securing countless lives and tens of thousands of important and valuable facilities 

from coast to coast. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

(Pub. L. No. 108-458) found that ‘‘the threat of additional terrorist attacks requires 

cooperation between public and private sectors and demands professional, reliable, 

and responsible security officers for the protection of people, facilities, and institutions.’’ Noting that the private sector controls 85% of the critical infrastructure in 

the nation, the 9/11 Commission concluded that, ‘‘unless a terrorist’s target is a military or other secure government facility, the ‘first’ first responders will almost certainly be civilians.’’ 3

Those civilians are likely to include private security guards, counted on as the 

prime protectors of homes (apartment buildings, dormitories, and private communities), offices, financial institutions, factories, public sector facilities, hospitals and 

other critical elements of the infrastructure of our nation. For the safety of the people at these locations and the facilities involved, the companies employing these private security officers want to do all that we reasonably can to ensure that the officers we hire are trustworthy and not likely to commit violence or, at worst, aid or 

support terrorists. At a minimum, this requires that our companies have a reliable 

and timely way of learning about any serious criminal history of our applicants and 

employees. 

Reliable Criminal History Checks Require Access to FBI-Maintained Records 

When Congress enacted the PSOEAA, it also directed the Attorney General to examine the issues related to non-law enforcement access to federal criminal history 

records and report back. The Attorney General’s Report4 concluded that a comprehensive and reliable criminal history background check cannot be accomplished 

without timely access to the records of the Criminal Justice Information Services 

Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We agree. Let me explain why this 

is so important. 

Without access to federal records, the only records available to an employer are 

those in the states and their political subdivisions, where the records are typically 

kept at the courthouse in each county. Since there is no practical way to check all 

3,000 clerks of court around the country for every employee, employers usually will 

request a record check in the counties in which the applicant says they have recently lived or worked. This leaves the employer blind to any criminal history 

records in states for which the applicant failed to disclose contacts. How can employers rely on a system to weed out untrustworthy or dangerous applicants when that 

process necessarily depends on the honesty and forthright nature of every applicant? 

There are commercial databases that aggregate criminal history information from 

multiple states but, as the AG Report found, these are not truly national in scope 

because not all states, courts, or agencies make their records available to such compilers. Moreover, these databases are only updated occasionally and, thus, may lack 

current data. These commercial databases, therefore, are not adequate substitutes 

for screening against the FBI-maintained database. 

36

Congress acted in 2004 to provide private security officer employers with access 

to that federal database. Unfortunately, in doing so, Congress required that the employers always go through the state identification bureaus in order to get that access. In other words, we must submit the employee information to the state bureau, 

which then decides whether to forward the request to the federal level. 

We work closely with state regulators of private security officers and, for the most 

part, they fully and competently fulfill their state role. However, the states with 

which we work have not prioritized the next step of seeking an FBI records check, 

despite the 2004 statute permitting them to do so. In addition, several states have 

no background check process at all. Thus, without another way to access the FBImaintained database, AlliedBarton and other security officer employers have no way 

to verify applicants’ backgrounds in these states. 

It is equally important that record checks be completed in a timely manner. Significant delays in getting responses to criminal history record requests are unfair 

to employers and applicants, and present potential security risks. Hiring needs are 

typically time-sensitive, which means either passing over the applicant because the 

records are not in, or, where permitted, placing a private security officer applicant 

‘‘on the job’’ pending the results of a state background check—leaving potentially 

unreliable and dangerous persons as the protectors of loved ones and valuable sites 

for weeks. 

The Attorney General’s Report found that the processing time for states, from the 

date of the fingerprint capture to the date of submission to the FBI ranged up to 

42 days.5 This is consistent with AlliedBarton’s experience over the last 2 years 

under the current statute. 

Recommendations: Protecting Our Nation 

To address these problems, the AG’s Report recommends that private sector employers be able to screen job applicants against the FBI’s criminal history records, 

with the states serving as employers’ primary access point for criminal background 

checks only if they can meet standards set by the Attorney General. The Report recommends, ‘‘In order to participate, states must meet standards specified by the Attorney General, within parameters set by statute, for the scope of access and the 

methods and time frames for providing access and responses for these checks.’’ 6

Specifically, the Attorney General concluded, ‘‘A participating state or the FBI 

should be required to respond to an enrolled employer, entity, or consumer reporting 

agency within three business days of the submission of the fingerprints.’’ 7

Importantly, this means that an employer in a state that cannot, or chooses not 

to, provide timely background check results that incorporate both state and FBI 

data should be able to make requests to the FBI, either directly or through an entity 

designated by the Attorney General, for criminal history records. The Attorney General’s Report stated it this way: ‘‘Access to FBI-maintained criminal history records 

should be available to employers when states do not opt to participate, either because they lack the authority, the resources, or infrastructure (such as system capacity) to process such checks, or because the access they can offer is limited in 

scope or does not meet the national standards set for this system.’’ 8

Based on our experience, we strongly support this recommendation and applaud 

the Chairman for incorporating it in HR 2703. Ensuring timely and accurate record 

checks is in the best interest of both employers and employees. 

The best way to ensure accuracy is to combine federal and state records, which 

the proposed legislation authorizes. There are sound reasons for employers seeking 

comprehensive criminal histories to also check state repositories. The Attorney General’s Report noted that the ‘‘rationale for requiring the submission of fingerprints 

through a state record repository is based on the fact that the FBI-maintained 

records are not as complete as the records maintained at the state level.’’ 9 The FBI’s 

records also have more limited information regarding disposition of arrests, with 

only 50 percent of its arrest records containing final dispositions, compared to the 

states that range from 70 to 80 percent.10 HR 2703 provides a process for ensuring 

that screening is not based on incomplete records by requiring that when records 

are incomplete, the government shall provide notice of any state(s) in which such 

records may be completed or verified. 

Thus, even if employers are permitted to submit requests without first going 

through the state, they will use the federal response as an indicator of which states 

contain records regarding the employee, and then they will check the records in 

those states. This process, however, will avoid the delays involved in having to go 

through the states just to get the FBI response. 

Mr. Chairman, I understand there may be concerns that this legislation by-passes 

the states. As I read it, however, it clearly requires employers to go through the 

states in every instance where the states are willing and able to respond. The only 

37

instance in which employers can make a request other than through the state is 

where the state has chosen not to establish a mechanism for getting prompt federal 

records checks accomplished. AlliedBarton fully supports efforts to get more states 

to adopt such mechanisms. However, that will take time; time during which we will 

continue to have a dangerous gap in screening. HR 2703 does not preclude continuing efforts to work with the states and ensures that, as those states come into 

compliance with AG standards, employers will be required to go through them for 

the record checks. 

Guaranteeing Employee Protections 

AlliedBarton’s experience indicates that the protections afforded to employees that 

Congress wisely included in the Private Security Officer Employment Authorization 

Act have worked well to protect important privacy rights, ensure the fairness of the 

process, and support essential policies to promote appropriate re-entry of ex-offenders. These protections are consistent with the recommendations in the Attorney 

General’s Report and include: 

• Written, informed consent of the employee 

• The opportunity for the employee to review the information received 

• Specific qualifying crimes, where states do not have their own standards 

• Criminal penalties for misuse of the criminal history information 

In addition, Allied supports the additional safeguards in HR 2703 to protect applicant rights and improve accuracy of NCIC records. HR 2703 adds a new section requiring the Attorney General to ensure that there is a process whereby an employee 

subject to a request for a National Crime Information Center criminal history 

records check will have the opportunity to provide to the head of the National Crime 

Information Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation information concerning 

the accuracy or completeness of such results. 

The bill also imposes strict record management requirements to protect confidentiality. Under these amendments, employers would be required ensure that the results of the records search are maintained confidentially and are not misused or disseminated to any person not involved in the employment decision. It also requires 

that the results of the search request are destroyed with one year unless a claim 

is pending. 

Moreover, HR 2703 limits reporting to convictions only. It deletes the current language in the PSOEAA that allows employers to consider arrests for which there has 

been no resolution for 365 days. In addition, this version provides greater specificity 

in offenses, ensuring their direct relevance to the position of private security officer, 

replacing current broad language that includes any ‘‘offense involving dishonesty or 

a false statement.’’

Conclusion 

In conclusion, I want to thank you again for the opportunity to testify today in 

support of HR 2703. It provides essential improvements to the PSOEAA and I’m 

confident that these improvements in the screening of private security officers—specifically by insuring employers’ timely access to FBI criminal records while preserving employee rights—will make our nation safer. 

ENDNOTES

1P.L. 108-458, section 6402. 

2 References to ‘‘employees’’ in this statement should be understood to also include applicants. 

3The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (‘‘9/11 Commission’’), 

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on 

the United States, 397-98 (July 2004). 4 United States Department of Justice, The Attorney General’s Report on Criminal History 

Background Checks (June 2006). 5 Id at 22. 

6 Id at 87. 

7 Id at 94. 

8 Id at 88. 

9 Id at 27. 

10 Id. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Well, thank you, Mr. Clarke. 

And thank each of the witnesses for very edifying and instructive 

testimony. 

We do have issues and concerns about employee privacy issues, 

and I would ask unanimous consent at this time to have letters enVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Aug 25, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 G:\DOCS\110TH\HELP\110-79\40881.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
38

tered into the record from the National Employment Law Project 

and the Service Employees International Union, so that we may 

have their views, which will clearly be taken into consideration if 

this process goes on, without objection. 

[The statement of the National Employment Law Project follows:]


nelp-1.eps
39


nelp-2.eps
40

[The statement of the Service Employees International Union follows:]


nelp-3.eps
41


seiu-1.eps
42

Chairman ANDREWS. Mr. Clarke, I think that you answered a 

question I was about to ask, but I want you to reiterate it. Mr. 

Kennedy speaks of his concerns about the federalization of the 

process of hiring private security guards, and the rule in our country is that we don’t have federal rules—federal rules are the exception, not the rule. And it take exceptional circumstances to have 

federal regulation in order to solve a perceived problem. 

What are the exceptional circumstances here that in your view 

justifies a greater federal role in this process? 

Mr. CLARKE. Well, it is a varied rationale, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, that there is inconsistency within which the states 

apply these standards. As Mr. Kennedy mentioned, there are 40 

states that have some type of process, but that process varies from 

record checks to nothing more than a licensing process that does 

not include record checks. 

So when we were considering what is at risk and what the American public expects when they go to a shopping mall or they have 

their students enroll in a university or we have critical petrochemical or pharmaceutical industries where private security people are employed, that there should be some national, some basic 

threshold that governs whether or not we put people in these positions of trust. 

So in the areas where states have regulations, we work with 

those states and use those as the standards. It is only in the places 

where states don’t do the record checks or don’t have standards 

that we need to have some additional help to govern what those 

standards should be. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Mr. Ricci, is it my understanding that of 

the nine companies that are a part of the association, you represent 

that eight of them essentially agree with Mr. Clarke’s position? Is 

that correct? 

Mr. RICCI. NASCO did not vote particularly on the H.R. 2703. 

What we did is, we passed a resolution by majority in the fall that 


seiu-2.eps
43

look at the issues associated with the bill and really supporting the 

idea of creating a third party entity as approved by DOJ. And I am 

looking at things such as disqualifying offenses and mandatory 

turnaround times and really working with your office and with 

other legislators to handle those issues. 

So there were some votes done, but we usually have 17 members 

and they were not involved in that. 

Chairman ANDREWS. I understand. 

Mr. Kennedy, I want to ask you a question, and I very much appreciate the constructive spirit of your testimony. 

Let us take the scenario of hazardous medical waste, which is 

generated a lot of different places around the country, hospitals, research labs and whatnot. And almost always the institutions that 

generate this waste use private security guards to guard their facilities. 

The theft of a fairly small amount of hazardous medical waste 

could make a dirty bomb. It is a very real and present concern. 

In a state that has opted not to be part of the federal system and 

that has opted not to require security companies to do background 

checks on their security guards, why shouldn’t we pass a federal 

law that requires that hospital or that medical institution to have 

background checks of the security guards that are guarding that 

hazardous medical waste? Why shouldn’t we do that? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, that is an extremely complex 

issue, as I am sure you understand. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Yes. 

Mr. KENNEDY. There are some states that have been long involved in administration of their own internal processes with regard to licensing, et cetera. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Right. 

Mr. KENNEDY. It is true, of course, that we have 10 states that 

do not currently have a licensing procedure for private security individuals. 

Our company and many others in our industry—however, not 

unanimously—conduct extremely thorough background investigations on the individuals being employed. We believe at our company we have the most comprehensive system to do that. 

Mr. Clarke mentioned that there are 3,000 counties in the 

United States and that there is no current system to have a check 

of all 3,000 counties to determine whether or not a criminal record 

may exist on an individual throughout the United States. 

Your bill would cure that problem, but it would impose federalization of those standards on states, all of the states, all 50. 

Chairman ANDREWS. But how about the specific question I 

asked. Is it your answer that we shouldn’t impose the requirement 

to get that background check done because it is too complicated? 

Because it can’t be done? What is the answer? Is your answer yes 

or no? 

Mr. KENNEDY. My answer is no, we should not, because it imposes on the states’ rights. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Okay. 

Mr. KENNEDY. In England, for example, they have a statute that 

you are talking about. It is a very——

44

Chairman ANDREWS. England is not a perfect world in any sense 

of——

Mr. KENNEDY. No, it isn’t. But they have a very——

Chairman ANDREWS. Look, what we could tell you to do here is 

to balance these concerns. And clearly, as I said a few minutes ago, 

the general rule in American law is that states decide things under 

the 10th amendment. The exception is that we do. 

I am more inclined to agree with Mr. Clarke, that this is one of 

those exceptional circumstances because of the relationship between guarding the critical infrastructure. But certainly we do understand that cost, the complexity, the other balancing issues, and 

we all take them into consideration. 

Mr. Kline? 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen and lady, for your testimony, it is excellent, as we try to make sure we are approaching what appears to 

be a shortfall in the 2004 law in a reasonable way. 

Mr. de Bernardo, you seem in your testimony, written and oral 

here, to support mandated background checks for security personnel. Am I right in that reading? 

Mr. DE BERNARDO. You are correct, yes. 

Mr. KLINE. So let us explore that a little bit here to make sure 

we don’t overreach. 

In the examples that the chairman has given today, I don’t think 

there is any question that we want those security guards to have 

a pretty thorough background check, armed guards at nuclear 

power plants, perhaps people where there is hazardous waste, 

whether it is nuclear or medical or something. 

But the term ‘‘security guard’’ is pretty broad. There are people 

involved in security that are in parking lots, maybe they are making sure that thinks aren’t pilfered from dressing rooms and so 

forth. We are talking about a lot of people here. 

Is it your testimony and your view that all of those people should 

have mandated background checks? Every employer who hires anybody who could be involved in that security business would be required to have a background investigation? 

Mr. DE BERNARDO. Well, Mr. Kline, we would find that acceptable. 

Normally, the CELE, the employer community in general, is not 

going to be in favor of mandates, as you well know. But, you know, 

there are some issues that are so important and as a practical matter, two things. 

Number one, I think the overwhelming majority of employers are 

doing criminal background checks for people who are in security 

positions. And, secondly, if they are not, they should, you know, 

given the potential liabilities. In our litigious society, one of the 

things that is discussed in our testimony, is the fact that negligent 

hiring, negligent retention lawsuits, there has been explosive 

growth in this regard. 

I think that it is unwise for employers to hire people in security 

positions, or any positions where there are at-risk populations that 

would be affected by having a criminal in that position. 

One of the long sections of our testimony discusses criminal recidivism. There is absolutely no question that someone who has a 

45

criminal conviction in their background, no matter when it was, is 

more likely to commit a crime again than a normal citizen. Those 

getting out of prison are 53 times—no matter what their conviction 

was for—are 53 times more likely to commit a homicide than a normal American citizen. 

In fact, the recidivism rate, unfortunately, it is a tragedy in 

America, is as high as 80 percent. Eighty percent of those people 

who have had criminal convictions in the past, as many as 80 percent, are likely to be convicted of a crime again. 

Mr. KLINE. You are not arguing, though, if I may interrupt, you 

are not arguing for mandated background checks on every employee? Is that right? Or are you? Somebody who works a cash register——

Mr. DE BERNARDO. No, absolutely not. 

Mr. KLINE. There is liability there. You know, greeters. 

Mr. DE BERNARDO. I think it should be up to the employer, okay, 

in the——

Mr. KLINE. That is what I am getting at. If it is going to be up 

to the employer, who is determining who gets the background investigation? Is this somebody who is responsible for making sure 

that things aren’t taken from dressing rooms or is this somebody 

who is guarding nuclear waste? Or does it matter? Again, in your 

view, does it matter? 

Mr. DE BERNARDO. I think that is a sort of simplistic approach. 

You——

Mr. KLINE. I am not a lawyer. I am kind of a simplistic guy, Mr. 

de Bernardo, so that happens. 

Mr. DE BERNARDO. No offense intended. 

We are not talking about people that are guarding restrooms. We 

are talking about people who——

Mr. KLINE. I am trying to get at, should we be careful about how 

we define security guard in this legislation. You know, it is our job 

to do a balance here, as the chairman says, and to make sure that 

we are not overreaching and we are not creating something that is 

going to turn out to be very, very difficult for employers to enforce. 

So I am just asking, should we pull in the definition of security 

guard, or not? 

Mr. DE BERNARDO. If there is a sensible definition of security 

guards that makes sense, then we would favor that, sure. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Mr. Hare? 

Mr. HARE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ricci, in your testimony you were citing findings from a 2004 

review of records for applicants that applied for guard positions in 

my home state of Illinois. The review found that the FBI criminal 

history checks provided serious criminal information four times 

more frequently than the state-wide check. 

I wonder, what information could be overlooked when private security employers have access to state criminal history records only 

and what limitations the state checks in providing a complete 

record of applicants criminal history are involved here? 

Mr. RICCI. I think you are referring to, typically, when a state 

licenses security, much like Illinois does, they check the state 

46

record. So they will check any criminal activity that may be in the 

state record depositories as well as looking at where an applicant 

may say they lived within that state. 

But the information that is lacking is anything that may have 

happened in another state. It could be a neighboring state. It could 

be a state that they used to live in. It could be a state they vacation in, perhaps. Or it could be a federal offense. And none of those 

would be reported through the state process. 

So when you refer to that Illinois study, what it said was when 

they started to implement these checks, they started to uncover 

people that had cleared through the state check but were getting 

results from the federal check, and I think that is really important. 

I cited California as well, that since that time those percentages 

of security officers that have been denied based on criminal activity 

have gone done, because some of it is deterrent, if they know the 

federal checks are going to be done in those particular states, as 

they are also done in the state of New Jersey and the state of Minnesota, in a different form. They all check federal criminal records 

checks, and so there is a form of deterrence there as well. 

Mr. HARE. And just for the panel, and anybody is welcome to respond to this, a lot of you acknowledged that states face considerable challenges in efforts to implement timely processing of criminal background checks, such as lack of financial resources, adequate staff, combined with large volumes of request. 

I am wondering, A, has this interfered with the compliance of the 

Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act? And/or 

how can the federal government ease the burden of the states? 

Ms. UZZELL. From the states that I have spoken to, as I said in 

my testimony, the suitability criteria and making that determination and adjudicating the results at the state repository, if you 

don’t mind my expression, is the gorilla in the middle of the room. 

It is difficult for them to have the resources, not only—they all 

process the fingerprint cards. That is their job. They will send the 

information up to the FBI and get the results back. And then the 

office will get—40 percent of the records in 2009 will be decentralized at the state. They will no longer be kept at the FBI, because 

that is the rule of the compact. 

But I think the other piece to this is that when they get the 

records back, it is not really the state repository’s role to review the 

records, locate missing dispositions and suitable screen, handle appeals and process that function. So if the records were allowed to 

be passed back to the entity that was making the decision, closest 

to the decision-making authority, then I think the states would 

more likely say, yes, more states that do not regulate, and you pass 

the records back, we all do these checks. 

We all get the records through the state repository first and get 

a better check, and then we all give the records back to the employment agency so they can screen under the criteria that you, as 

Congress, determine, with privacy protections in place. 

So I do truly believe that if that was put in as part of this legislation, that I think it would be a help to the states to actually do 

it. 

Mr. HARE. Anybody else? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

47

In the past, when the FBI was trying to modernize the criminal 

history system and go from the card, the fingerprint, 10-point print 

card, submitting that hard card to the FBI and switching over to 

an electronic method, many, many states chose to do that immediately because it was more efficient, they had the resources to do 

it. 

But there were a number of states—in fact, I would want to suggest that it might be the same 10 states we are talking about here, 

who chose not to do that initially. There were statutes enacted, enabling a federal funding process for states that chose to make such 

an application in order to build and construct that capability within their state system. 

I would suggest something along those lines might be attractive 

to the states. Again, that suitability issue still is the big gorilla in 

the room, but at least that would possibly encourage those states 

who do not do any regulatory processes on security guard personnel, they might be encouraged to do so. 

Mr. HARE. Thank you. 

Mr. Ricci? 

Mr. RICCI. As we mentioned in our testimony, we support the 

creation of a third-party entity to assist with both the transaction 

of the electronic fingerprint, but also in the suitability screening. 

We believe that a third-party agency could help in the screening. 

Part of the complication there, as we mentioned, there are 40-

plus states that have some type of licensing or registration criteria. 

Those disqualifying offenses vary by state. So it would be incumbent upon this third-party channeler to be involved in that process 

of looking through those criteria and assisting with the screening 

and suitability studies. 

Mr. HARE. Thank you very much. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ANDREWS. I thank the gentleman for yielding. 

Mr. Kline, do you have any concluding comments for today? 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to say thanks. Excellent two panels, real expertise 

here. It is always a pleasure when we have a panel of witnesses 

like this as we are really trying to dig into the bottom and make 

sure we are producing good law here. So thanks to all of you very 

much. 

And thanks to you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ANDREWS. Thank you. 

I would like to associate myself with Mr. Kline’s remarks. This 

was an excellent panel, as was Mr. Campbell’s testimony in the 

first panel. 

Our objective is to learn more about this issue and write a good 

law, should one be necessary. And is usually the case, an excellent 

panel raises more questions than it answers, which is good for us. 

We are going to call upon each of the six of you that testified 

today for further input. 

Here is where I would like to see us go, to go back to my hypothetical scenario of the person guarding the hazardous medical 

waste. I would like to be sure that he or she has passed a background check, that the person is not a felon or a terrorist. I would 

48

like to be 100 percent sure that is the case, to the extent that we 

can be. 

I would also like to be sure that we are sure that that record is 

about that person, that there wasn’t a mistaken record that unfairly deprives someone of a job or of an employment opportunity 

because the record was wrong. I would also like to be sure that the 

person holding that background check information is under very 

strict legal requirements not to share it with someone unlawfully 

or unfairly. I would like to be sure that employers are given meaningful and practical ways of accessing this information that are not 

unduly costly. I would like to be sure that states are given similar 

flexibility and reasonableness as well. 

So all of this is easier said than done, but I think that you have 

given us a roadmap to answer those questions and get this done. 

Look, one of the many lessons that I learned from 9/11 is that 

we have an adaptive enemy who is looking for our vulnerabilities, 

and you know we focused on our vulnerability after we have been 

attacked. And we spent a lot of time on the airline industry in this 

Congress since then, as we well should have. 

But I suspect that we are dealing with a terrorist enemy that is 

spending time in areas that we are not spending time in. And I do 

think it is incumbent upon all aspects of our national governance 

to think that through. Not in an environment of paranoia, but in 

a careful, methodical way that gets several steps ahead of those 

who would do us harm. 

I am glad we live in a country where 85 percent of the critical 

infrastructure is guarded by private concerns. I don’t want to live 

in a state economy where the government owns and controls everything of any value. I am glad that we live in such a country. But 

I do acknowledge that in such a system, because we have grown 

up in peace in this country, the idea that we would have this kind 

of organized attack on our soil was incomprehensible to us just a 

few years ago. The fact that we have a patchwork quilt of laws, 

that we clearly have gaps in our system, I think imposes upon us 

to take a rational, careful approach to fixing the problem. 

Ms. Uzzell, I would compliment your colleagues in particular for 

the work you are doing in the states on this issue. And by no 

means do I mean today’s hearing to suggest that we think the 

states have failed. That is not true at all. A more accurate statement is we want every state to hit the level of success that the best 

states have hit. We want every private security company to hit the 

level of success that the representatives of the two companies here 

have hit and I think the association has largely hit. 

I just want to make one final comment, that this is obviously not 

a hearing getting a huge amount of press attention. I am glad. And 

the reason I say that is that I assure you, if, God forbid, we had 

a terrorist attack that could trace its roots to stolen medical waste 

that made a dirty bomb and that the material was stolen because 

we had coconspirators working on the inside as private security 

guards, we would fill the room. I never want the room to be filled. 

I want us to think ahead, to use the most intelligent, legal methods 

available to us to prevent that from ever happening. 

So you have made an excellent contribution to this today, each 

of the six of you. We appreciate that. 

49

I now want to read my little script here, that says, ‘‘As previously 

ordered, members will have 7 days to submit additional materials 

for the hearing record.’’ That also includes witnesses, should you 

choose to do so. And any member who wishes to submit follow-up 

questions in writing to the witnesses should coordinate with the 

majority staff within 7 days. 

With that said and without objection, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Follow-up comments from Mr. Kennedy follow:]


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[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

Æ


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