IG-00-009

AUDIT

REPORT STAFFING OF THE EXPENDABLE LAUNCH

VEHICLE PROGRAM OFFICE AT THE

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER

February 23, 2000

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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Acronyms

ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle

FMFIA Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act

FY Fiscal Year

GAO General Accounting Office

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

NMI NASA Management Instruction

NPG NASA Procedures and Guidelines

OIG Office of Inspector General

OSF Office of Space Flight

PCA Program Commitment Agreement

SELVS Small Expendable Launch Vehicle Services
W February 23, 2000

TO: A/Administrator

FROM: W/Inspector General

SUBJECT: INFORMATION: Staffing of the Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Office at the

 Kennedy Space Center

Report Number IG-00-009

The NASA Office of Inspector General has completed an audit of Staffing of the Expendable Launch

Vehicle (ELV) Program Office at the Kennedy Space Center (Kennedy). We found that Kennedy

adequately planned and managed the award of the Small ELV Services contracts. However,

management oversight of staffing plans during and following the consolidation of the ELV Program

Office to Kennedy was inadequate and will affect Kennedy’s ability to meet strategic goals and may

adversely affect the cost and scheduling of future Earth Science and Space Science missions.

Background

On October 1, 1998, Kennedy assumed full responsibility as the Program Office for the Acquisition and

Management of ELV services contracts, which includes full contract and budget authority. Kennedy

managed the procurement and resulting follow-on contracts awarded on October 28, 1998. Prior to

the consolidation, NASA’s ELV Program had been distributed across multiple NASA Centers. This

distribution of ELV Program office responsibility, prior to the consolidation, caused a number of

mission-critical skills to be decentralized and duplicated among the Centers. On October 24, 1997, the

Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight, with the concurrence of the NASA Deputy

Administrator (Technical), issued a letter that authorized the establishment of a Lead Center for the

Acquisition and Management of ELV Launch Services at Kennedy.

The ELV Program Office at Kennedy, provides a single focus for the acquisition and management of all

ELV launch services while affording NASA the benefits of consolidated and streamlined technical and

administrative functions. The reduction of program interfaces and resulting consolidation of insight of

commercial launch services was intended to merge NASA technical management and enable a single

organization to rebuild technical expertise and increase efficiency and effectiveness.
2

Recommendations

We recommended that the Associate Administrator for Space Flight (1) establish clear, realistic staffing

goals that align with the strategic performance goals of the ELV Program Office at Kennedy and (2)

develop strategic human resources management strategies to ensure continuity of needed skills and

abilities. We also recommended that the Chief Engineer incorporate in the NASA Procedures and

Guidelines 7120.5A (3) a clear link between strategic performance goals and the resources that will

accomplish those goals and the strategic human resources management strategies needed to ensure

continuity of needed skills and abilities.

Management Response and OIG Evaluation

Management concurred with the findings and recommendations. The Associate Administrator for

Space Flight authorized Kennedy to hire 15 additional engineers in support of the ELV Program Office

with additional hires anticipated in fiscal year 2001, pending the outcome of the ongoing budget process.

The Office of Space Flight has authorized immediate additional hiring at all Office of Space Flight

Centers to address workload requirements and to ensure continuity of needed skills and abilities to meet

the expected increased pace of activity. The Chief Engineer agreed to make revisions to the NASA

Procedures and Guidelines 7120.5A, “NASA Program and Project Management Processes and

Requirements.”

We consider two of the four recommendations dispositioned and closed for reporting purposes. We

are monitoring recommendation three and four pending implementation of agreed-to corrective actions.

[original signed by]

Roberta L. Gross

Enclosure

Final Report on Audit of Staffing of the Expendable

 Launch Vehicle Program Office at Kennedy Space Center
FINAL REPORT

AUDIT OF STAFFING OF THE EXPENDABLE LAUNCH

VEHICLE PROGRAM OFFICE AT THE KENNEDY SPACE

CENTER
W February 23, 2000

TO: M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight

AE/Chief Engineer

FROM: W/Assistant Inspector General for Auditing

SUBJECT: Final Report on the Audit of Staffing of the Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Office

at the Kennedy Space Center

Assignment Number A9904400

Report Number IG-00-009

The subject final report is provided for your use. Our evaluation of your response is incorporated into

the body of the report. The corrective actions completed on recommendations 1 and 2 were

responsive, and those recommendations are considered closed for reporting purposes. The responses

to recommendations 3 and 4 are not fully responsive to the intent of our recommendation. NASA

management needs to take additional corrective actions to resolve these issues, which are provided in

our evaluations of your responses. Accordingly, recommendations 3 and 4 will remain open for

reporting purposes pending implementation of agreed-to corrective actions. Please notify us when

action has been completed on recommendations 3 and 4.

If you have questions concerning the report, please contact Mr. Daniel J. Samoviski, Program Director,

Earth and Space Science Audits, at (301) 286-0497, or Ms. Esther A. Judd, Program Manager, at

(301) 286-3359. We appreciate the courtesies extended to the audit staff. See Appendix G for the

report distribution.

[Original signed by]

Russell A. Rau
2

cc:

B/Chief Financial Officer

B/Comptroller

BF/Director, Financial Management Division

G/General Counsel

JM/Director, Management Assessment Division

S/Associate Administrator for Space Science

Y/Associate Administrator for Earth Science
NASA Office of Inspector General

IG-00-009 February 23, 2000

 A9904400

Staffing of the Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Office

at the Kennedy Space Center

Introduction

The NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed a survey of the Small Expendable Launch

Vehicle Services. This survey was initiated to address issues identified during a previous OIG review.1

The overall objective was to determine whether Kennedy Space Center (Kennedy) appropriately

planned and effectively managed the Small Expendable Launch Vehicle Services (SELVS II – KSC)

contract awards. In addition, we evaluated the impact of the consolidation2 of the Expendable Launch

Vehicle (ELV) Program at Kennedy. See Appendix A for details on our scope and methodology.

The SEVLS II – KSC procurement was to award multiple, indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity

contracts to provide launch services for NASA and NASA-sponsored small class payloads.3 The small

class payloads generally will support the goals and objectives of NASA’s Earth Science and Space

Science Enterprises. NASA anticipates launching 16 missions over the 5-year period of contract

performance with a total contract value not to exceed $400 million. On October 28, 1998, Kennedy

awarded contracts to Orbital Sciences Corporation (contract NAS10-99005) and Coleman Research

Corporation (contract NAS10-99010). To date, NASA has issued two launch service task orders to

Orbital Sciences Corporation, but no missions have been launched.

Results in Brief

In general, Kennedy appropriately planned and effectively managed the award of the SELVS II – KSC

contracts. The contracts were designed to ensure mission performance and, at this point, are meeting

the customer’s needs. However, management oversight of staffing plans during and following the

consolidation of the ELV program to Kennedy was inadequate and will affect Kennedy’s ability to meet

strategic goals and may adversely affect the cost and scheduling of future Earth Science and Space

Science missions.

 

1

 The previous review was the Launch Services for Earth Science Missions (Assignment Number AHA98048),

completed February 16, 1999.

2

 On October 1, 1998, Kennedy assumed responsibility for ELV services. This work was previously distributed across

NASA as described in the Background section of the report.

3

 Small payloads require the entire lift capability of a Pegasus, Athena I, or Taurus rocket. The estimated payload

capacity each vehicle is able to deliver into low-Earth orbit is as follows: Pegasus, 500 pounds; Athena I, 1,700

pounds; and Taurus, 3,000 pounds.
2

Additionally, long-term agreements between Marshall Space Flight Center (Marshall) and Kennedy for

vehicle engineering have not yet been completed. See Appendix B for details on this issue.

Background

On October 1, 1998, Kennedy assumed full responsibility as the Program Office for the Acquisition and

Management of ELV services contracts, which includes full contract and budget authority. Kennedy

managed the procurement and resulting follow-on contracts (SELVS II - KSC) awarded on October

28, 1998. Prior to the consolidation, NASA’s ELV Program had been distributed across multiple

NASA Centers by vehicle class4 and program function. Goddard Space Flight Center (Goddard)

performed the acquisition and management of Ultra-Lite, Small, Medium-Lite, and Medium class ELV

launch services. Glenn Research Center (Glenn) performed the acquisition and management of

Intermediate/Large class ELV launch services. Kennedy managed the NASA launch site activities for

launches from Cape Canaveral Air Station, Vandenberg Air Force Base, and Wallops Flight Facility.

Marshall was, and still is, responsible for vehicle engineering and insight5 for development vehicles that

lack a flight history. The distribution of ELV Program office responsibility prior to the consolidation

caused a number of mission-critical skills to be decentralized and duplicated among the Centers. On

October 24, 1997, the Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight, with the concurrence of

the NASA Deputy Administrator (Technical), issued a letter that authorized the establishment of a Lead

Center for the Acquisition and Management of ELV Launch Services at Kennedy.

The ELV Program Office at Kennedy, which was established in response to the NASA Strategic Plan,

provides a single focus for the acquisition and management of all ELV launch services while affording

NASA the benefits of consolidated and streamlined technical and administrative functions. The

reduction of program interfaces and resulting consolidation of insight of commercial launch services was

intended to merge NASA technical management and enable a single organization to rebuild technical

expertise and increase efficiency and effectiveness.

Strategic Human Resources Management

Finding. The Office of Space Flight (OSF) did not integrate strategic human resources management

into the staff planning of the ELV Program Office at Kennedy. Neither the NASA strategic planning

process nor NASA Procedures and Guidelines (NPG) 7120.5A, “NASA Program and Project

Management Processes and Requirements,” specifically addresses the use of strategic human resources

management to align the staffing with the goals of the program. As a result, the ELV Program Office

may be unable to meet current customer demand without the use of overtime and compensatory time.

The future launch demand is expected to increase, which will affect Kennedy’s ability to meet strategic

goals and may adversely affect the cost and scheduling of future Earth Science and Space Science

missions.

 

4

The classes are Ultra-Lite, Small, Medium-Lite, Medium, and Intermediate/Large.

5

 Insight is a process of gathering a minimum set of product or process data that provides adequate visibility into the

integrity of the product or process. Insight does not constitute control or management of the process.
3

Strategic Human Resources Management is Essential

As required by the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982, the General

Accounting Office (GAO) issued standards for internal control in government.6 The standards define

the minimum level of quality acceptable for internal control in government and provide the basis against

which internal control is to be evaluated. GAO recognizes that effective management of human

resources is essential to achieving results and is an important part of internal control. As a part of

workforce planning, management should consider how best to retain valuable employees, plan for their

eventual succession, and ensure continuity of needed skills and abilities.

A renewed focus on internal control was prompted by the Government Performance and Results Act

(GPRA) of 1993, which requires agencies to clarify their missions, set strategic and annual performance

goals, and measure and report on performance toward those goals. Internal control plays a significant

role in helping managers achieve those goals.

If the government is to continue to successfully and effectively improve its operations, agency heads

must make a conscious effort to integrate strategic human resources management into their agency’s

planning and decision-making process.7

NASA’s Performance Plans and Guidance Lack Strategic Human Resources Management

Emphasis

NASA’s Performance Plans do not show a clear linkage between its strategic goals and the human

resources needed to accomplish the goals. GPRA requires a description of how goals and objectives

are to be achieved, including a description of the operational processes, skills, and technology, and the

human, capital, information, and other resources required to meet those goals and objectives. GAO

reviewed and reported on NASA’s Fiscal Year 1999 and 2000 Performance Plans8 and determined

that the plans complied with the requirements of GPRA, but noted that the plans could be improved by

linking the strategic goals to specific resources rather than NASA’s higher level presentation of

identifying funding requirements by Enterprise.

NPG 7120.5A is intended to support the accomplishment of NASA’s programs and projects,

consistent with established Agency strategic planning. While there is a clear link between the NPG and

the Strategic Plan, neither document emphasizes the link between human resources and the

accomplishment of strategic goals. The focus of the NPG is delivering products on schedule, and within

budget, while satisfying the requirements of multiple stakeholders and customers. NASA has no

assurance that staffing is aligned with strategic goals and that the workforce is

 

6

 GAO issued the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government GAO/AIMD-99-21.3.1.

7

 The publication on Strategic Human Resources Management: Summary Report of a Roundtable Discussion,

October 22, 1998, U.S. Office of Personnel Management Office of Merit Systems Oversight and Effectiveness,

provides detailed reasons for this type of integration.

8

 The GAO reports were Managing for Results Observations on NASA’s Fiscal Year 1999 Performance Plan,

GAO/NSIAD-98-181, dated June 1998; and Observations on the NASA’s Annual Performance Plan for Fiscal Year

2000 (still in draft), dated April 1999.
4

used appropriately and managed effectively without including strategic human resources management in

its strategic planning process and in its guidance on the management of programs and projects.

Headquarters ELV Office Staffing Assessment

The Program Management Plan assigned OSF the responsibility for defining top-level ELV Program

requirements as well as program oversight, evaluation, and assessment. This responsibility includes an

assessment of program implementation, program content, schedule, and changes necessary to meet

requirements and available resources (see Appendix C). The OSF, in fulfilling its responsibilities,

established a staffing level of 1249 for the Kennedy ELV Program Office. Table 1 shows the level of

actual (fiscal year (FY) 1998 and prior) and OSF projected

(FY 1999 through FY 2002) civil servant support for the ELV Office.

Table 1. Civil Servant Support for the ELV Office

Civil Servant Workforce

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Prior

FY97FY98FY99FY00FY01FY02

Year

Employees*

ELV OFFICE

OSF

 *See footnote number 9.

The Director, ELV Requirements, NASA Headquarters, based the staffing level on 6 to 8 launches a

year. The staffing level did not include missions in work.10 The launch rate from 1997 to 1998 was less

than 5 per year (Table 2) with 18 to 25 missions in work (Table 3). The launch rate for 1999, and

beyond, is 10 or more (Table 2) and the numbers of missions in work is about 40 per year (Table 3).

 

9

 Staffing levels are based on “full-time equivalents,” which is equal to a work-year of 2,080 hours.

10 “Missions in work” refers to the 24- to 36-month lead time prior to a launch when work is being performed.
5

Table 2. Launch Rate

Table 3. Missions in Work

Missions in Work

0

1 0

2 0

3 0

4 0

FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02

Year

Missions

The Director's estimated staffing level also assumed a downsizing of the number of employees needed to

perform the mission of the ELV Program Office based on: (1) economies of scale that have not

materialized and (2) the anticipation that qualified staff would transfer from Goddard and Glenn. Less

than half of the expected staff from Goddard and from Glenn transferred to Kennedy. Table 4 shows

the staff that transferred from each Center.

Launch Rate

0

5

1 0

1 5

FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02

Year

Launches
6

Table 4. Staff Transferred From Other Centers

From

Goddard

From Glenn From

Marshall

From Other

ELV Technical 8 8 3 2

Procurement 1 1 0 0

Budget/Accounting 3 0 0 0

Totals 12 9 3 2

The staffing assessment the OSF performed does not describe how the 124 staffing level would

accomplish the strategic goals of the ELV Office or discuss human resources planning issues such as the

retention and recruitment of staff as discussed in the FMFIA and GPRA.

Kennedy ELV Program Office Staffing Assessment

The Kennedy ELV Program Office performed a “bottoms-up” staffing assessment to (1) determine the

staffing level needed to address the current launch rate/missions in work (Tables 2 and 3) and (2) meet

the insight and approval requirements of NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 8610.23, “Technical

Oversight of ELV Launch Services” (Appendix D). The ELV Program Office used launch experience

to determine the staffing level required to meet its current launch schedule, but believes it needs an

additional 20 to25 employees to accomplish its mission and lacks lead engineers on the mission

integration teams. Similar to the OSF assessment, the Kennedy ELV Program Office assessment did

not consider how the staffing level would accomplish the strategic goals of the ELV Program Office or

the issues of human resources planning such as retention or recruitment of staff as prescribed by the

FMFIA and GPRA.

Impact of Not Aligning Staffing of the ELV Program with Strategic Goals

The ELV Office is unable to meet current customer demand without the use of overtime and

compensatory time, and future launch demand is expected to increase (Tables 1 and 2). If the Kennedy

ELV Program Office does not align its staffing with its strategic goals, the lack of staffing could

adversely impact the ELV Program’s ability to provide highly reliable, on-time, cost-effective launch

services that meet or exceed customer requirements. The cost and scheduling of Earth Science and

Space Science missions could also be adversely affected. In addition, the ELV Program Office will not

have adequate staff to fulfill the government approval and insight requirements of NMI 8610.23

(Appendix D). The ELV Office Deputy Program Manager stated that the understaffing is not a safety

concern, but that it has affected employee morale. He further stated that the fiscal year 1999 Kennedy

buy-outs are expected to further deplete the number of staff with required skills and abilities. The ELV

Program Office Integration Manager stated that Kennedy has already moved staff from other program

areas to the ELV Office to help alleviate the staffing concerns, but that additional staff is still needed.
7

After the completion of our field work in August 1999, we learned that the OSF established

an independent review team to assess the technical oversight process employed by the Kennedy ELV

team for the Terra Mission11 and to identify any areas that could enhance the probability of mission

success. This team focused on the Terra launch service, but provided OSF an independent opinion on

broader management issues that, in our opinion, supports our conclusion that the Kennedy ELV

Program Office is not appropriately staffed to meet its current launch schedule (Appendix E).

Conclusion

NASA must incorporate strategic human resource management into all aspects of strategic planning to

ensure that Agency goals can be achieved. The understaffing of the Kennedy ELV Program Office is an

example of the impact that human resources can have not only on the understaffed program, but also on

the other NASA programs from which staff was moved to help alleviate the staffing concerns of the

ELV Program Office. In addition, NASA can strengthen its Performance Plan by fully portraying how

NASA’s strategies and resources will help it achieve its performance goals.

Recommendations, Management’s Response, and Evaluation of Response

The Associate Administrator for Space Flight should:

1. Establish clear, realistic staffing goals that align with the strategic performance goals of

the ELV Program Office at Kennedy Space Center.

Management’s Response. Concur. The OSF authorized Kennedy to hire 15 additional engineers in

support of the ELV Program Office. An additional augmentation of as many as 14 civil service hires are

anticipated in FY 2001, pending the outcome of the ongoing budget process. The complete text of

management’s response is contained in Appendix F.

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Management’s actions are responsive to the

recommendation. The recommendation is resolved and dispositioned.

2. Develop strategic human resources management strategies to ensure continuity of needed

skills and abilities.

 

11 Terra is the flagship of the Earth Observing System, a series of spacecraft that represent the next landmark steps in

NASA's leadership role to observe the Earth from the unique vantage point of space. Focused on key

measurements identified by a consensus of U.S. and international scientists, Terra will enable new research into the

ways that Earth's lands, oceans, air, ice, and life forms function as a total environmental system. Terra was launched

December 18, 1999, from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
8

Management’s Response. Concur. The OSF has authorized immediate additional hiring at all OSF

Centers to address workload requirements and to ensure continuity of needed skills and abilities to meet

the expected increase pace of activity.

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Management’s actions are responsive to the

recommendation. The recommendation is resolved and dispositioned.

3. The Chief Engineer should incorporate the following into the NPG 7120.5A:

• A clear link between strategic performance goals and the resources that will accomplish

those goals.

Management’s Response. Concur. The Program Commitment Agreement (PCA) is the agreement

between the Administrator and the Enterprise Associate Administrator that documents the Agency’s

commitment to execute the program requirements within established constraints. Appendix E.2 of the

PCA describes NASA documentation in NPG 7120.5A that addresses this requirement.

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Partially Responsive. Although the document described in

Appendix E.2 was used by the ELV Program Office at Kennedy, the human resources needed to

accomplish the goals of the program were not available. We believe that

the Program Commitment Agreement should be expanded to include staffing levels/skill mixes in the

cost commitments section. Recommendation 3 is resolved, but considered undispostioned pending

implementation of agreed-to corrective actions.

• The strategic human resources management strategies needed to ensure continuity of

needed skills and abilities.

Management’s Response. Concur. The OIG should provide language, with a proposed reference

location in the NPG that would address this concern. The language would be referred to the Program

Project Management Working Group for consideration and disposition.

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Partially Responsive. We believe that OSF should work

with the Human Resources and Education Functional Office Leadership Plan to develop policy to

implement this recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but considered undispostioned

pending implementation of agreed-to corrective actions.
9

Appendix A. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Objective

The overall objective was to determine whether the SELVS II – KSC contracts were appropriately

planned and managed effectively. Specifically, we determined whether:

• management oversight was adequate during and following the consolidation of the ELV Program

Office at Kennedy,

• the SELVS II - KSC contracts were properly designed to ensure mission performance, and

• the SELVS II - KSC contracts are meeting the customer’s needs.

Scope and Methodology

During the survey, we reviewed the following documents:

• Transition Plan for the Lead Center for the Acquisition and Management of ELV Launch Services

at the John F. Kennedy Space Center, dated January 14, 1998

• Draft Program Commitment Agreement Acquisition and Management of ELV Launch Services

Mission Support, dated May 20, 1999

• Implementation Plan, dated June 19, 1998, for Transferring Medium, Medium-Lite, Small, and

Ultra-Lite Class Launch Services from Goddard Space Flight Center to Kennedy Space Center,

• Transition Plan, dated July 17, 1997, for Transferring Program Management of Intermediate ELV

Launch Services form Lewis Research Center to Kennedy Space Center,

• Program Management Plan, dated November 10, 1998, for the Lead Center for the Acquisition

and Management of ELV Launch Services at the John F. Kennedy Space Center

• Kennedy ELV Office Staffing Plans, not dated

• Charts, dated June 15, 1999, that showed revised OSF Staffing Plans beginning on July 3, 1997

• NPG 7120.5A, NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements

• NASA Terra Independent Assessment Team Report, June 15, 1999

During the survey, we interviewed the following personnel:

• NASA Headquarters, Kennedy, and Goddard program and contract officials.

• Orbital Sciences Corporation and Coleman Research Corporation contract officials.

• NASA Headquarters Associate General Counsel.
10

Appendix A

Management Controls Reviewed

We reviewed the following management controls: program management plans, transition plans,

implementation plans, and commitment agreements.

We considered controls adequate except for the lack of integration of strategic human resources

management into the NASA planning process and the specific effects it has had and will have on the

ELV Program Office at Kennedy. Details are in the finding section of the report.

Audit Field Work

We performed the audit field work from April through September 1999 at NASA Headquarters,

Goddard Space Flight Center, and Kennedy Space Center. We conducted the audit in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
11

Appendix B. Other Matters of Interest

Marshall Long-Term Agreements

The Transition Plan for the Lead Center for the Acquisition and Management of ELV Launch Services

at the John F. Kennedy Space Center, dated January 14, 1998, establishes Marshall’s responsibilities

as:

• Establishing qualification criteria for NASA’s acceptance of commercially available

launch services to meet NASA’s needs.

• Supporting procurement development team and source evaluation board activities.

• Providing launch vehicle and propulsion engineering, including necessary assessments

to confirm readiness for flight.

• Development of qualification criteria for new and future launch vehicles and vehicle

configurations.

The transition plan also states that Kennedy intends to have long-term agreements with Marshall for

vehicle design engineering support functions. To date, Marshall and Kennedy officials have not

completed long-term agreements. Although we did not identify adverse conditions that occurred due to

the lack of the agreements, the ELV Program Office Program Manager should ensure that the long-term

agreements are completed to fulfill the requirements of the transition plan and his responsibilities under

NPG 7120.5A.
12

Appendix C. Program Management Plan

Section 5 Program Requirements, “Program Management Plan for the Lead Center for the Acquisition

and Management of Expendable Launch Vehicle Launch Services at the John F. Kennedy Space

Center (NASA Expendable Launch Vehicle Program), dated November 10, 1998,” establishes the

following:

The ELV Program Office is responsible for effectively and efficiently satisfying the

program requirements of NASA Headquarters operating through OSF. The Headquarters

Office of Space Flight is responsible for definition of top-level program requirements and

ELV Program oversight, evaluation, and assessment. This responsibility includes

development, coordination, and update of top-level requirements consistent with the

strategic plan and customer requirements; external advocacy for the program and

broadening of the customer base; and recommendation and allocation of ELV budgets.

Responsibility for program oversight, evaluation, and assessment includes assessment of

program implementation, program content, schedule, and changes necessary to meet

requirements and available resources. OSF also manages and provides status to the

Headquarters-level Program Management Council (PMC); establishes and tracks program

metrics; and chairs the ELV Flight Planning Board. The Director, ELV Requirements has

been assigned these responsibilities for OSF.

The Director, ELV Requirements, OSF, addresses issues related to policy, direction, and

guidance of NASA’s ELV Program. The Director, through the Flight Planning Board,

approves class of service, vehicle configuration, and launch date by letter of authority.

Upon receipt of the letter of authority, the ELV Program Office acquires and manages the

launch services. Currently, these launch services, which are defined as projects, include

Ultra-Lite, Small, Med-Lite, Medium, and Intermediate class services for launch of NASA,

NASA-sponsored, and other government payloads.
13

Appendix D. Required Approval and Insight

NASA Management Instruction 8610.23, “Technical Oversight of ELV Launch Services,” establishes

the following requirements:

Government Approval is required for the following specific areas:

• Spacecraft-to-launch vehicle interface control documents/drawings

• Decisions/resolutions of action items as determined by joint NASA/contractor

Mission Integration working groups

• Mission-unique hardware design analysis, manufacture, and test

• Mission unique software design, analysis, and test

• System Effectiveness Plan (SEP), which shall reflect latest revisions of NASA

Handbooks (NHB) 5300.4 (lA), 5300.4 (1B), and 1700.1 guidelines

• Changes to the SEP

• Top-level test plans, requirements, and success criteria for Integrated Vehicle

Systems Tests and Launch Site Vehicle assembly and test

• Launch Commit Criteria

• Closeout of actions from NASA chaired Mission, Launch, and Flight readiness

reviews

• Spacecraft handling procedures and deviations

• Integrated spacecraft/vehicle mate, test, and closeout procedures and deviations

• Integrated spacecraft/vehicle mate, test, and closeout as-run procedures and

deviations

• Launch countdown procedures and deviations that affect spacecraft/vehicle

integrated assembly

• Launch Go/No-Go

Government Insight is required for the following specific areas:

• Baseline vehicle design, analyses, and configuration management

• Production program reviews, plans, and schedules

• Production and systems test Material Review Boards

• Critical flight hardware pedigree

• Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) compliance

evaluations

• Pre-ship reviews

• Design reviews

• Qualification reviews

• Major/critical problems

• Major system and integrated systems tests

• Post-test data

• Anomaly resolutions/Failure analysis

• Vehicle/ground support equipment procedures

• Launch site support work schedules and plans

• Launch site vehicle preparations and closeout data

• Vehicle walkdown inspections

• Operations and procedures discipline

• Work practices and documentation

• Conduct of contractor chaired Mission, Launch, and Flight Readiness Reviews

• Postflight vehicle, tracking, and range data

• Postflight anomaly investigations/closeouts
14

Appendix E. Independent Review Team

“NASA Terra Independent Assessment Team: Report to NASA Headquarters, June 15, 1999,”

provided recommendations that, if implemented, will enhance the probability of launch success.

Although the team focused on Terra, it became clear that Terra could not be viewed as an isolated

mission. Broader management issues, although not unique to Terra, could affect the reliability of the

Terra launch. These issues are associated with the ELV program transition. The Independent

Assessment Teams’ observations included the following:

• The ELV staff appears not to be a high priority in terms of Kennedy management

attention.

• There is an apparent lack of planning for future viability of the ELV organization.

• No succession planning exists to account for loss of critical personnel.

• The current ELV program complement is inadequate for maintaining pre-transition

levels of Insight/Approval across assigned missions.

• Staff reductions are planned.

• Kennedy ELV personnel will eventually burn out, be threatened by negative

personal/family consequences and, either literally or functionally, abandon the

program.

• The performance level of people working under such conditions eventually declines.

• Without implementation of a staff development plan, post-transition shortfalls in

experience will not be rectified.

• The near-term, inevitable attrition of current staff members will seriously degrade

Kennedy’s ability to perform value-added Insight.
15

Appendix F. Management’s Response
16

Appendix F
17

Appendix F
18

Appendix F
19

Appendix G. Report Distribution

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Headquarters

A/Administrator

AE/Chief Engineer

AI/Associate Deputy Administrator

B/Chief Financial Officer

B/Comptroller

BF/Director, Financial Management Division

G/General Counsel

H/Associate Administrator for Procurement

J/Associate Administrator for Management Systems

JM/Director, Management Assessment Division

L/Associate Administrator for Legislative Affairs

M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight

S/Associate Administrator for Space Science

Y/Associate Administrator for Earth Science

NASA Centers

Director, Kennedy Space Center

Non-NASA Federal Organizations and Individuals

Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Policy

Deputy Director of Management, Office of Management and Budget

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division, Office of Management and Budget

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch, Energy and Science Division, Office of

 Management and Budget

Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs Division, Defense Acquisition

 Issues, General Accounting Office

Professional Assistant, Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member - Congressional Committees and Subcommittees

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Senate Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies
20

Appendix G

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member - Congressional Committees and Subcommittees

(Cont.)

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

House Committee on Appropriations

House Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies

House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology

House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations

House Committee on Science

House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

Congressional Member

Honorable Pete Sessions, U.S. House of Representatives
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