IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

WAIL SALEM, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) No. 12 CV 3141 

 ) 

v. ) Judge Robert W. Gettleman 

 ) 

SHERIFF PAUL KAUPAS, and ) Magistrate Judge Maria Valdez 

WARDEN MICHAEL O’LEARY, ) 

 ) 

Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff Wail Salem sued defendants Paul Kaupas and Michael O’Leary for 

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count I, plaintiff alleges that, while he was a pretrial 

detainee at Will County Adult Detention Facility (“the Jail”), the Jail violated the Eighth 

Amendment by conducting too many lockdowns. In Count II, plaintiff alleges that the 

Jail also violated the Eighth Amendment by having 24-hour lighting in cells. Defendants 

have moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 for summary judgment on both counts, 

arguing that the lockdowns and cell lighting are not violations of plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights. For the reasons stated below, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 

granted. 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at the Jail. Kaupas is the sheriff of Will County, 

Illinois. O’Leary is the warden of the Jail. Plaintiff alleges that there were 15 lockdowns 

on an average day, two to five of which were random. He claims that the lockdowns 

interfered with sleep. 
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The Jail’s policy is to put inmates on lockdown status when performing inmate 

counts to ensure that the counts are orderly, thorough, and safe. Throughout the day 

when inmates are out of their cells, the Jail has both scheduled and unscheduled inmate 

counts to confirm that the record of inmates and their locations is current and accurate. 

There are scheduled inmate counts at each of the three shift changes and before each of 

the three meals. In addition to these schedule counts, officers are required to have 

random inmate counts to ensure the quality of the inmate records. 

Inmates are also put on lockdown status for safety reasons. Such lockdowns may 

occur when there is a fight, a need to search a housing unit, or a medical emergency. 

Lockdowns are also ordered when the staffing levels are too low, the staff needs to train, 

or the staff needs to conduct an investigation. 

Plaintiff also alleges that large fluorescent lights were kept on in his cell twentyfour hours a day. He alleges that he had no control over the lights. There are four light 

bulbs in each jail cell. The inmate can choose to turn off two of the bulbs at his 

discretion. The third bulb is controlled by correctional officers. Jail policy dictates that 

this bulb be turned off from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. The final bulb is 9-watts and 

remains on at all times. This bulb is kept on at night so correctional officers can see in 

the cell. 

Officers on the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift are required to visually inspect every 

cell during routine security checks of each inmate. These routine checks must be 

conducted every thirty minutes. Visual observations allow staff to prevent inmates from 

concealing weapons, contraband, or escape devices. The observations also discourage 
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theft, waste, or destruction of Jail property; encourage adherence to Jail rules; and 

identify “at risk” inmates who demonstrate self-destructive or suicidal behavior. 

DISCUSSION 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The movant bears the burden of 

establishing both elements, Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Associates, Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 

110 (7th Cir. 1990), and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-movant, 

Jones v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 2013 WL 5781814, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2013) (citing 

Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1992)). The 

court, though, “must distinguish between inferences relating to disputed facts and those 

relating to disputed matters of professional judgment[.]” Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 

529, 534 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006)). In matters of 

professional judgment, even if they are disputed, the court must give “deference to the 

views of prison authorities.” Id. (citing Beard, 548 U.S. at 530). If the movant satisfies 

his burden, then the non-movant must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine 

issue for trial. Nitz v. Craig, 2013 WL 593851, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2013). In doing 

so, the movant cannot simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 

material facts. Pignato v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 2013 WL 995157, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 

Mar. 13, 2013) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

586 (1986)). 

Plaintiff alleges that the lockdowns and cell lighting violate the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants correctly note 
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that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment actually governs plaintiff’s 

claims. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). “[T]he protection afforded by 

the Due Process Clause is broader than that afforded under the Eighth Amendment.” 

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 2014 WL 806956, at *5 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2014) (citing Lewis v. 

Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 474 (7th Cir. 2009)). However, “courts frequently consider the 

[Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment] standards to be analogous.” Byron v. Dart, 825 F. 

Supp. 2d 958, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (quoting Washington v. LaPorte Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 

306 F.3d 515, 517 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in analyzing 

condition-of-detention Due Process claims, courts “use Eighth Amendment case law as a 

guide[.]” Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Rice ex rel. Rice v. 

Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 664 (7th Cir. 2012)). 

A condition of confinement that constitutes “any kind of punishment” or is 

“arbitrary or purposeless” may violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 

81 F.3d 1422, 1427 (7th Cir. 1996). Consistent with both the Eighth and the Fourteen 

Amendments, however, a detention facility may impose non-arbitrary conditions or 

restrictions on pretrial detainees so long as they “do not amount to punishment, or 

otherwise violate the Constitution.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 536-37. “[N]ot every disability 

imposed during pretrial detention amounts to ‘punishment’ in the constitutional sense.” 

Kingsley, 2014 WL 806956, at *5 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 537). “We must ask 

whether a particular action was taken ‘for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but 

an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.’” Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. 

at 538). “[I]f a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related 
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to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to 

‘punishment.’” Bell, 441 U.S. at 540. 

“We must accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison 

administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a 

corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them.” 

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). Clearly, maintaining institutional 

security is a legitimate goal. Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 596 (7th Cir. 1986). 

The Jail seeks to further its legitimate penological goals by putting inmates on 

lockdown status at certain times. Roughly six scheduled lockdowns are conducted each 

day at shift changes and meal times. Unscheduled lockdowns are ordered to facilitate the 

orderly, thorough, and safe completion of mandatory random inmate counts. Additional 

lockdowns are ordered when necessary to respond to unexpected or unusual 

circumstances that threaten the safety of the inmates or the staff. Command staff also 

orders lockdowns to facilitate staff training, conduct investigations, or accommodate for 

low staff levels. The lockdowns are clearly conducted to improve the safe and orderly 

operation of the Jail and, thus, are reasonably related to its legitimate goals, including 

institutional security. 

Because the lockdowns are reasonably related to a legitimate goal, plaintiff bears 

the burden to present “something more” that shows that the lockdowns constitute 

“punishment.” “The Due Process Clause itself does not create a right for prisoners to . . . 

not to be subjected to lockdowns; only the Eighth Amendment limits these restrictions.” 

See Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Smith v. Shettle, 946 

F.2d 1250, 1252 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1430 (citing Smith, 946 
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F.2d at 1252) (dismissing an inmate’s claim for arbitrary and capricious lockdowns 

because inmates have “no general liberty interest in movement outside of his cell 

guaranteed by the Due Process Clause”). Thus, to show that the lockdowns constitute an 

unconstitutional punishment, that “something more” must amount to a showing of 

“atypical and significant hardship.” Id. 

Plaintiff attempts to satisfy this burden by claiming that the lockdowns interrupted 

his sleep. To prove unconstitutional sleep deprivation, plaintiff must “adduce evidence 

that he is being deprived of his sleep on a regular and sustained basis and that the sleep 

deprivation has affected his physical health.” Williams v. Berge, 2002 WL 32350026, at 

*4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 30, 2002). Plaintiff has provided no evidence about how often he 

was deprived of sleep. Plaintiff has provided no evidence about how long he was 

deprived of sleep in each instance. Plaintiff has provided no evidence of any physical 

injury. Thus, plaintiff has failed to show that any sleep deprivation imposed an “atypical 

and significant hardship.” 

Plaintiff attempts to create a genuine issue of material fact by claiming that two to 

five random lockdowns occurred each day for no reason, and that lockdowns arbitrarily 

punished one prisoner for the actions of another. As discussed above, the lockdowns 

were not actually conducted for irrational or arbitrary reasons; they occurred in 

compliance with Jail policies that furthered legitimate goals. The Jail’s decisions to order 

lockdowns is a matter of professional judgment which is due deference even at the 

summary judgment stage, Singer, 593 F.3d at 534. Thus, plaintiff’s assertion of his own 

uninformed belief that lockdowns were arbitrary or capricious is insufficient to create a 

genuine issue of material fact. 
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Plaintiff also attacks the Jail’s lighting. Each inmate’s cell has one 9-watt light 

bulb that remained on 24/7. These lights allow correction officers to conduct visual 

inspections every thirty minutes, even during the night. The visual inspections prevent 

inmates from concealing weapons or contraband, discourage theft or destruction of Jail 

property, encourage adherence to Jail rules, and identify inmates at risk of suicide or 

other self-destructive behavior. Thus, the cell lighting is reasonably related to the Jail’s 

legitimate goals, including institutional safety. See Vasquez v. Frank, 290 F. App'x 927, 

930 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he undisputed evidence in this case shows . . . that the refusal to 

turn off the light in Vasquez's cell had a valid penological purpose”). See also Sims v. 

Piazza, 462 F. App'x 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing O’Donnell v. Thomas, 826 F.2d 788, 

790 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Continuous lighting has been held to be permissible and reasonable 

in the face of legitimate penological justifications, like the need for security and the need 

to monitor prisoners.”). 

Because the cell lighting is reasonably related to a legitimate goal, plaintiff bears 

the burden to present “something more” that shows the cell lighting imposes an “atypical 

and significant hardship” that constitutes “punishment.” Plaintiff attempts to satisfy this 

burden by again claiming sleep deprivation. As described above, plaintiff has failed to 

even allege how often or for how long he was deprived of sleep or how that deprivation 

harmed him. Thus, he has not presented any evidence to show that the deprivation 

imposed an atypical and significant hardship. See also Maddox v. Berge, 473 F. Supp. 2d 

888, 898 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (citing King v. Frank, 371 F. Supp. 2d 977 (W.D. Wis. 

2005)) (noting that the court previously found “that a 9–watt fluorescent light, even 

burning 24 hours a day, was not bright enough to violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment 
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rights” and that plaintiffs could prevail only with a showing that the wattage and health 

effects of the lighting were serious enough to elevate the lighting to a constitutional 

violation). 

Plaintiff attempts to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the lighting 

by again citing his own deposition. Plaintiff claims that the 9-watt light in his cell was 

bright and impaired his ability to sleep. As discussed above, these are insufficient to 

create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the lighting constituted punishment. 

These assertions are also insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether the lighting was arbitrary or capricious. The assertions relate neither to the 

legitimacy of the Jail’s goals nor to the reasonable relationship between the lighting and 

those goals. Even if they did, the decisions to light cells during the night is a matter of 

professional judgment which is due deference even at the summary judgment stage, 

Singer, 593 F.3d at 534. Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that 

precludes summary judgment. 

Because plaintiff has failed either to show the lockdowns and cell lighting were 

punitive or arbitrary or to create a genuine issue of material fact, the court need not reach 

defendants’ other arguments. 

Having failed to satisfy his burden on the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff 

asks that the court, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1), (2), deny consideration of the 

motion or allow time to take discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) requires that the 

nonmovant show “by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present 

facts essential to justify its opposition[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Plaintiff has failed to 

attach such an affidavit or declaration. This is fatal to his request. More importantly, 
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plaintiff has failed to explain with specificity why he needs additional discovery. 

Plaintiff generally asserts that he “cannot present facts essential” to his case, but this 

assertion does not satisfy the requirement for “specific reasons.” Thus, plaintiff has 

failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) and his request is denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. 

The court wishes to extend its appreciation to attorney Robert C. Keck, who ably 

represented plaintiff in this case pursuant to his obligation as a member of this court’s 

Trial Bar. Local Rule 83.11(g). 

ENTER: June 13, 2014 

 

 

 Robert W. Gettleman 

 United States District Judge