NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES CORNFIELD; et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

MICHAEL THOMPSON, an individual 

acting under the color of law; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-16968 

D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00924-ROS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 17, 2019

**

Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Charles Cornfield, Benjamin Robert Flynn, Bernard Linser, William J. 

O’Hayer, and Matthew V. Parker appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging First Amendment retaliation and 

employment discrimination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 23 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-16968 

review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim and its 

dismissal on the basis of a statute of limitations. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. 

U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 847 F.3d 1075, 1084 n.7 (9th Cir. 2017). We may affirm 

on any basis supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 

(9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the retaliation claims brought by 

Cornfield, Flynn, Linser, and Parker because these plaintiffs failed to allege facts 

sufficient to state plausible claims. See O’Brien v. Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 932 (9th 

Cir. 2016) (elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 

F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (a plaintiff must present factual allegations 

sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).

The district court properly dismissed O’Hayer’s Rehabilitation Act claim as 

barred by the statute of limitations. See Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 

F.3d 812, 823 n.11 (9th Cir. 2001) (for Rehabilitation Act claims, courts apply the 

statute of limitations for the most analogous state law); Madden–Tyler v. Maricopa 

County, 943 P.2d 822, 829 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (Rehabilitation Act claims are 

subject to Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions). 

Contrary to O’Hayer’s contentions, the district court did not err in concluding that 
3 17-16968 

this claim, which was alleged for the first time in the Third Amended Complaint,

did not relate back to the filing of any earlier complaint.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Parker’s state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c)(3); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (the district court 

may in its discretion “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related 

state-law claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding a portion of 

defendants’ attorney’s fees as a sanction against plaintiffs after their counsel 

withdrew. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) & advisory committee’s notes to 1993 

Amendment (the court has significant discretion in determining what sanctions, if 

any, to impose); Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1126-28 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(setting forth standard of review and grounds for Rule 11 sanctions). We reject as 

meritless plaintiffs’ contentions that sanctions were inappropriate because they did 

not have an opportunity to respond orally to defendants’ Rule 11 motion at an 

evidentiary hearing or trial, and that imposing sanctions on them was inappropriate 

because they were represented by counsel when the pleading was prepared and 
4 17-16968 

filed. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding a portion of the 

costs incurred by defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). See In re Online DVDRental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 914, 924-28 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth standard 

of review and factors for determining whether costs for making copies are 

recoverable). 

AFFIRMED.