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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GEORGE SILER

(AC 43351)

Elgo, Suarez and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo

contendere, of the crimes of possession of narcotics with intent to sell

and criminal possession of a firearm, appealed to this court, claiming

that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain

evidence that was seized from his residence by the police. Relying on

information from a confidential informant, the police executed a search

and seizure warrant at the defendant’s residence, where they recovered

drugs, firearms and other contraband. The police affidavit that accompanied the warrant application had described two controlled purchases

of heroin and stated that the police surveilled the defendant’s residence

while the confidential informant contacted the defendant and arranged

to meet him at a specific location to complete the transaction. The

confidential informant had given the police a description of the defendant, whom he knew as G, and the car that he drove as well as G’s

telephone number and the location of his residence. The police thereafter

identified the defendant as the person described by the confidential

informant through a check of law enforcement databases and the Office

of Adult Probation after the police learned that he was on probation in

connection with a prior robbery. Prior to the controlled drug purchases,

the police also conducted surveillance at the defendant’s residence,

where they saw a male who matched the description provided by the

confidential informant enter the same type of vehicle that had been

described by the confidential informant. Thereafter, when shown an

unmarked photograph of the defendant by the police, the confidential

informant immediately identified the individual in the photograph as G.

On appeal, the defendant urged this court to overrule our Supreme

Court’s decision in State v. Barton (219 Conn. 529), in which the court

adopted a totality of the circumstances analysis for the determination

of probable cause under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution

and rejected the rigid analytical standards previously required by State

v. Kimbro (197 Conn. 219). The defendant further claimed that the police

affidavit in support of the application for a search warrant did not

establish probable cause because it lacked the necessary nexus between

his residence and the criminal activity alleged in the warrant application. Held:

1. This court declined the defendant’s invitation to overrule our Supreme

Court’s decision in Barton to adopt a totality of the circumstances

analysis for the determination of probable cause under article first, § 7;

this court, as an intermediate appellate tribunal, was not at liberty to

modify, reconsider or overrule the precedent of our Supreme Court, a

bedrock precept that the defendant misconstrued in arguing that this

court nonetheless could conduct its own thoughtful review of Kimbro

and Barton, and, apart from that fundamental deficiency, the defendant

provided no federal or state precedent to support his contention that

the test adopted in Barton should be overruled, and his failure to provide

an independent state constitutional analysis in accordance with State

v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672) rendered his claim with respect to the state

constitution abandoned.

2. The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, as

the police warrant application contained sufficient information from

which a judge reasonably could conclude that there was a fair probability

that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the defendant’s

residence: the affidavit contained a detailed description of the alleged

heroin dealer that matched the defendant’s physical attributes, shared

his home address and indicated that the heroin dealer drove the same

type of vehicle as did the defendant, the affidavit indicated that the

confidential informant positively identified the defendant immediately

from a photograph he was shown of the alleged heroin dealer, and

surveillance conducted at the defendant’s residence confirmed that he
and the vehicle at issue were at the residence prior to and after the

controlled drug purchases; moreover, although the trial court acknowledged that the affidavit did not identify with any specificity the time

period of the first controlled drug purchase, the court made a practical,

commonsense decision in concluding that the affidavit’s phrase, ‘‘prior

to the buy taking place,’’ could have been found by the court that issued

the warrant to be a period of time in very close approximation to

the arrangements made for the first controlled buy, and the affidavit’s

statement that surveillance showed that the defendant had arrived at

his home just prior to the second buy permitted the inference that

narcotics were stored at the residence.

Argued January 13—officially released April 27, 2021

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

two counts of the crime of criminal possession of a

firearm, and with one count each of the crimes of possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who

is not drug-dependent and possession of narcotics with

intent to sell within 1500 feet of a day care center,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Fairfield, where the court, Russo, J., denied the defendant’s motion to suppress certain evidence; thereafter,

the state filed a substitute information charging the

defendant with two counts of the crime of criminal

possession of a firearm and with the crime of possession

of narcotics with intent to sell; subsequently, the defendant was presented to the court, Devlin, J., on a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charges of criminal

possession of a firearm and possession of narcotics

with intent to sell; thereafter, the court, Alexander, J.,

rendered judgment of guilty, from which the defendant

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

W. Theodore Koch III, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

C. Robert Satti, supervisory assistant state’s attorney,

with whom were Joseph T. Corradino, state’s attorney,

and, on the brief, John C. Smriga, former state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

ELGO, J. The defendant, George Siler, appeals from

the judgment of conviction rendered following a conditional plea of nolo contendere to two counts of criminal

possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-217 (a), and to violating the state dependency

producing drug laws; see General Statutes § 21a-277

(a); for possession of narcotics with intent to sell. On

appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain evidence

seized from his residence. We affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

On December 12, 2017, members of the Stratford

Police Department conducted a search of the residential

property known as 943 Success Avenue in Stratford

(residence) pursuant to a search and seizure warrant

signed by a judge of the Superior Court. They recovered,

inter alia, 84.7 grams of suspected heroin, 5.8 grams of

suspected marijuana, 188 wax paper folds secured by

rubber bands, a digital scale, a ski mask, two firearms,

293 rounds of ammunition, an article of mail addressed

to the defendant, and a credit card issued to the defendant. The defendant thereafter was arrested and charged

with the aforementioned offenses.

On January 17, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to

suppress all evidence discovered during the December

12, 2017 search for lack of probable cause. Following

a hearing, the court denied that motion. The defendant

then entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to

all charges, thereby preserving his right of appeal.1 On

July 31, 2019, the defendant was sentenced to a total

effective term of fourteen years of incarceration, execution suspended after eight years, with five years of probation. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant contends that the court

improperly denied his motion to suppress. His claim is

twofold in nature. First, he urges us to reconsider the

precedent of our Supreme Court in State v. Barton, 219

Conn. 529, 544, 594 A.2d 917 (1991), in which the court

adopted a totality of the circumstances test for determining whether an affidavit sufficiently establishes

probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. The defendant then asks us to depart from that precedent and

conclude that the affidavit submitted in support of the

search warrant in the present case did not provide the

requisite probable cause. We address each claim in turn.

I

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

In this appeal, the defendant asks this court to revisit

the precedent of our Supreme Court with respect to

the legal standard applicable to probable cause determinations pursuant to article first, § 7, of the state constitution when a search warrant is requested by law
enforcement.2 As our Supreme Court has explained,

article first, § 7, ‘‘like the fourth amendment to the federal constitution that it closely resembles, safeguards

the privacy, the personal security, and the property of

the individual against unjustified intrusions by agents of

the government.’’ (Footnote omitted.) State v. Barton,

supra, 219 Conn. 540.

In State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 236, 496 A.2d 498

(1985), overruled in part by State v. Barton, 219 Conn.

529, 594 A.2d 917 (1991), a divided Supreme Court3

concluded, as a matter of state constitutional law, that

article first, § 7, required application of ‘‘the more specific standards of the Aguilar-Spinelli test’’;4

see

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed.

2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,

89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969); rather than ‘‘the

amorphous [totality of the circumstances] standard’’

adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois

v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527

(1983). State v. Kimbro, supra, 236. In his dissenting

opinion, Justice Callahan opined that ‘‘making Aguilar

and Spinelli the test for determining probable cause

under the state constitution is a step backward into

that labyrinthine body of hypertechnical rules concerning the criminal law from which I thought we were

gradually beginning to emerge.’’ Id., 246 (Callahan, J.,

dissenting).

The Supreme Court reconsidered that precedent six

years later. In State v. Barton, supra, 219 Conn. 529,

the court noted that ‘‘the case law applying the AguilarSpinelli test has come to be encrusted with an overlay

of analytical rigidity that is inconsistent with the underlying proposition that it is the constitutional function

of the magistrate issuing the warrant to exercise discretion in the determination of probable cause. That discretion must be controlled by constitutional principles and

guided by the evidentiary standards developed in our

prior cases, but it should not be so shackled by rigid

analytical standards that it deprives the magistrate of

the ability to draw reasonable inferences from the facts

presented.’’ Id., 534–35. The court further observed that

‘‘application of the standards mandated by Kimbro has

resulted at times in unduly technical readings of warrant

affidavits, and we reject such an inappropriate methodology.’’ Id., 534.

The court also explained that a totality of the circumstances analysis is ‘‘more consistent with traditional

assessments of probable cause. . . . [It] permits a

judge issuing a warrant greater freedom to assess the

relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability

(and unreliability) attending an informant’s tip. . . .

[T]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make

a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all

the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,

including the veracity and basis of knowledge of per-
sons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be

found in a particular place.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 537. The court thus concluded, ‘‘upon careful reconsideration, that the totality

of the circumstances analysis adopted [by the United

States Supreme Court in] Gates will continue to guarantee the people of Connecticut the full panoply of rights

that they have come to expect as their due. . . . We

accordingly depart from the more rigid analytical structure imposed in Kimbro in order to restore the proper

constitutional authority of magistrates to weigh the sufficiency of the information presented to them in warrant

affidavits and to balance the legitimate needs of law

enforcement officers against the highly prized rights of

privacy and personal security afforded by our constitution.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 546. The appellate courts of this state have

adhered to that precedent in the thirty years since Barton was decided. See, e.g., State v. Nowell, 262 Conn.

686, 697, 817 A.2d 76 (2003); State v. Velasco, 248 Conn.

183, 189–90, 728 A.2d 493 (1999); State v. DiMeco, 128

Conn. App. 198, 204, 15 A.3d 1204, cert. denied, 301

Conn. 928, 22 A.3d 1275, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1015, 132

S. Ct. 559, 181 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2011); State v. Cabezudo,

92 Conn. App. 303, 305, 884 A.2d 1033 (2005), cert.

denied, 277 Conn. 901, 891 A.2d 3 (2006).

The defendant now asks this court to reconsider the

wisdom of the Supreme Court’s decision in Barton.

5

We refuse to do so. As an intermediate appellate tribunal, this court is not at liberty to modify, reconsider,

or overrule the precedent of our Supreme Court. See

Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s & Cos. Collective, 121 Conn. App.

31, 48–49, 994 A.2d 262, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 918,

996 A.2d 277 (2010). Whether to alter the applicable

legal standard governing probable cause determinations when a search warrant is requested remains the

prerogative of this state’s highest court. See Reville v.

Reville, 312 Conn. 428, 459 n.29, 93 A.3d 1076 (2014)

(‘‘once [the Connecticut Supreme Court] has finally

determined an issue, for a lower court to reanalyze and

revisit that issue is an improper and fruitless endeavor’’

(internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Fuller, 56

Conn. App. 592, 609, 744 A.2d 931 (‘‘[i]t is not within our

function as an intermediate appellate court to overrule

Supreme Court authority’’), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 949,

748 A.2d 298, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 911, 121 S. Ct. 262,

148 L. Ed. 2d 190 (2000).

In his appellate reply brief, the defendant misconstrues that bedrock precept. The defendant argues that,

although this court is bound by Supreme Court precedent, it ‘‘certainly may nonetheless conduct its own

thoughtful review of Kimbro and its rationale, and of

[Barton] and its results.’’ He is mistaken. This court is

not permitted to reconsider or reevaluate the precedent
of our Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 73

Conn. App. 751, 756, 809 A.2d 546 (2002) (‘‘Our Supreme

Court is the ultimate arbiter of the law in this state.

We, as an intermediate appellate court, cannot reconsider the decisions of our highest court.’’); State v.

Rodriguez, 63 Conn. App. 529, 532, 777 A.2d 704 (‘‘we,

as an intermediate appellate court, do not reevaluate

Supreme Court decisions and are bound by those decisions’’), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 936, 776 A.2d 1151

(2001).

Apart from that fundamental deficiency, the defendant has provided no federal or state precedent to support his contention that the totality of the circumstances

test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in

Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. 213, and by our Supreme

Court in State v. Barton, supra, 219 Conn. 529, should

be overruled. Furthermore, although both Kimbro and

Barton were predicated on the protections of article

first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution, the defendant

has failed to provide this court with an independent

state constitutional analysis in accordance with State

v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992),

rendering any claim with respect to our state constitution abandoned. See State v. Bennett, 324 Conn. 744,

748 n.1, 155 A.3d 188 (2017). For all those reasons, we

decline the defendant’s invitation to revisit our Supreme

Court’s decision in Barton.

II

PROBABLE CAUSE

We next turn to the question of probable cause. The

defendant claims that the court improperly denied his

motion to suppress because the affidavit submitted in

support of the search warrant did not establish probable

cause. More specifically, he contends that the necessary

nexus between the residence and the criminal activity

alleged in the warrant application was lacking. We do

not agree.

‘‘The standards for upholding a search warrant are

well established. We uphold the validity of [the] warrant

. . . [if] the affidavit at issue presented a substantial

factual basis for the magistrate’s conclusion that probable cause existed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Batts, 281 Conn. 682, 699–700, 916 A.2d 788,

cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1047, 128 S. Ct. 667, 169 L. Ed.

2d 524 (2007). ‘‘Probable cause to search exists if: (1)

there is probable cause to believe that the particular

items sought to be seized are connected with criminal

activity or will assist in a particular apprehension or

conviction . . . and (2) there is probable cause to

believe that the items sought to be seized will be found

in the place to be searched.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Respass, 256 Conn. 164, 173, 770 A.2d

471, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1002, 122 S. Ct. 478, 151 L.

Ed. 2d 392 (2001). ‘‘[I]t is axiomatic that [a] significantly
lower quant[um] of proof is required to establish probable cause [rather] than guilt. . . . [P]robable cause

requires only a probability or substantial chance of

criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.

By hypothesis, therefore, innocent behavior frequently

will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause;

to require otherwise would be to sub silentio impose

a drastically more rigorous definition of probable cause

than the security of our [citizens] . . . demands. . . .

In making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or guilty, but the degree of suspicion that attaches

to particular types of noncriminal acts.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Batts,

supra, 701.

Our determination of whether an affidavit sufficiently

establishes probable cause is governed by the ‘‘ ‘totality

of the circumstances’ ’’ test enunciated in State v. Barton, supra, 219 Conn. 544. That test requires the judge

issuing the warrant ‘‘to make a practical, nontechnical

decision whether there is a fair probability of finding

contraband or evidence of a crime in a particular place.

In coming to that decision, the [judge] must consider

all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including

the factual circumstances from which the ‘veracity’ and

the ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay

information can be determined.’’ Id., 552.

When the decision of a judge to issue a search and

seizure warrant is challenged, the reviewing court

‘‘must determine [whether] the affidavit presented a

substantial factual basis upon which the [judge] could

conclude that probable cause existed. . . . Although

in a particular case it may not be easy to determine

when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases

in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘Whether the

trial court properly found that the facts submitted were

enough to support a finding of probable cause is a

question of law. . . . The trial court’s determination

on the issue, therefore, is subject to plenary review

on appeal.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Batts, supra, 281 Conn. 701. In conducting that review, ‘‘[w]e consider the four corners of

the affidavit and, giving proper deference to the issuing

[judge], determine whether the issuing [judge] reasonably could have concluded that probable cause

existed.’’ State v. Rodriguez, 163 Conn. App. 262, 266,

135 A.3d 740, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 934, 134 A.3d 622,

cert. denied, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 167, 196 L. Ed. 2d

140 (2016).

The warrant affidavit in the present case was executed by two detectives with the Stratford Police

Department, who, at that time, were assigned to its
narcotics, vice and intelligence unit. In that affidavit,

the detectives averred that they had spoken with a

confidential informant (informant) in October, 2017,

who indicated that an individual known as ‘‘George’’

had been ‘‘supplying amounts of heroin within the town

of Stratford for approximately [one] year.’’ The informant described George as ‘‘a black male with dreads

who is in his late twenties’’ who was selling ‘‘heroin

to street level and mid-level narcotics dealers.’’ The

informant also provided George’s telephone number,

which the informant used to call or text him. In addition,

the informant stated that George ‘‘lives in the area of

Success Avenue and operates a silver Nissan Maxima

with Maine plates.’’

The detectives explained that they subsequently identified the defendant as the person described as George

by the informant through a check of various law enforcement databases. They recited the defendant’s criminal

record and stated that the defendant currently was on

probation for an incident that transpired in 2011, for

which he was charged with robbery in the first degree

with a deadly weapon and reckless endangerment. The

detectives also stated that the residence was listed as

the defendant’s address on file with the Office of Adult

Probation, and his phone number matched the one provided by the informant.

The detectives stated that they then conducted surveillance at the residence and observed a male who

matched both (1) the description provided by the informant and (2) probation and booking photographs of

the defendant. They also observed that male enter a

silver Nissan Maxima with Maine license plates parked

in the driveway of the residence. The informant thereafter was shown ‘‘a colored unmarked photo’’ of the

defendant; the informant ‘‘immediately stated that the

individual in the photograph was the person that he/

she knows as ‘George.’ ’’

The affidavit then described two controlled purchases of heroin that were conducted ‘‘[d]uring the

week ending [November 26, 2017],’’ and the ‘‘week ending [December 3, 2017],’’ respectively. On both occasions, the surveillance was conducted at the residence,

where the defendant was observed operating the Nissan

Maxima with a Maine license plate and then entering the

residence. Each time, the informant contacted ‘‘George’’

by calling the defendant’s phone number and arranged

to meet at a specific location in Stratford to purchase

heroin from him. The informant then met with ‘‘George’’

to complete the narcotics transaction while under surveillance by law enforcement. When the transaction

concluded, the informant ‘‘confirmed that the black

male that sold him/her the heroin was the male that

he/she knows as ‘George’ and was the person he/she

[previously] identified in the photograph’’ provided by

law enforcement. Furthermore, after both controlled
purchases concluded, the detectives averred that ‘‘[s]urveillance showed that [the defendant] and the Nissan

Maxima bearing [Maine license plates] were both at the

residence immediately after the buy occurred.’’

The affidavit also indicated that ‘‘[s]urveillance shows

that [the defendant] continues to reside at [the residence]’’ and that the defendant ‘‘has been seen at the

aforementioned residence during various day, evening

and night hours.’’ The detectives further stated that,

‘‘based on training and experience, the affiants know

that individuals who traffic illegal drugs will store their

drugs in their homes, basements, garages, vehicles and

other residences to avoid law enforcement detection.

. . . They will use various weapons, including but not

limited to firearms for protection. They will maintain

a supply of bullets for those firearms. . . . These drug

traffickers commonly retain these photographs and/or

video. They utilize various materials including, but not

limited to paper, plastic and glassine bags to package

their illegal drugs for street sale. Various types of measuring devices are utilized by drug traffickers to measure the amount of illegal drugs that they are selling.’’

The affidavit concluded by stating that, ‘‘based on the

aforementioned facts and circumstances, the affiants

have probable cause to believe that evidence of possession of heroin with intent to sell [in violation of General

Statutes §] 21a-278 (b), is located within [the residence].’’

On appeal, the defendant claims that the nexus

between the residence and the criminal activity alleged

in the warrant application is lacking. We disagree. As

our Supreme Court has explained, the ultimate question

‘‘is whether there was a fair probability that the contraband was within the place to be searched.’’ State v.

Smith, 257 Conn. 216, 223, 777 A.2d 182 (2001). The

affidavit in the present case contains a detailed description of an alleged heroin dealer that matched the defendant’s physical attributes, that shared the defendant’s

home address and telephone number, and who—like

the defendant—drove a silver Nissan Maxima with

Maine license plates. The affidavit also indicates that

when the informant was shown a photograph of the

alleged heroin dealer, the informant positively identified the defendant ‘‘immediately.’’ Law enforcement

observed the defendant at the residence, where a silver

Nissan Maxima with Maine license plates was parked

in the driveway. Surveillance conducted at the residence also confirmed that the defendant and that vehicle were at the residence ‘‘[p]rior’’ to the two controlled

purchases and ‘‘immediately after the buy occurred.’’

On that basis, the issuing judge reasonably could have

concluded that probable cause to search the residence

existed. As our decisional law demonstrates, narcotics

dealers commonly store evidence of that illegal activity

in their homes. See, e.g., State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530,
544, 482 A.2d 300 (1984) (‘‘at the time of the issuance

of the warrant it was reasonable for the [issuing judge]

to infer that the defendant’s residence was the logical

place to conceal not only the fruits but also the instrumentalities of the crime’’), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192,

105 S. Ct. 967, 83 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1985); State v. Castano,

25 Conn. App. 99, 104, 592 A.2d 977 (1991) (‘‘[i]n the

case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found

where the dealers live’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Vallas, 16 Conn. App. 245, 262, 547 A.2d

903 (1988) (noting that ‘‘it is reasonable to conclude

that the participants [in the drug trade] will maintain

. . . supplies in their homes’’ and that ‘‘[w]hen a suspect has been carrying on an illegal activity for an

extended period of time without detection, it is reasonable to conclude that evidence of his activity will be

secreted in his home’’), aff’d sub nom. State v. Calash,

212 Conn. 485, 563 A.2d 660 (1989).

Although the defendant relies on State v. DeChamplain, 179 Conn. 522, 427 A.2d 1338 (1980), for the

proposition that a likely nexus between his residence

and criminal activity did not exist, that case is readily

distinguishable. Unlike the present case, in which the

residence is described in the warrant application as

a ‘‘[two-story, single-family] residence,’’ DeChamplain

involved an apartment building. More importantly, the

court in DeChamplain ‘‘found a lack of probable cause

to believe that drugs were located in [that] apartment,

because the only [fact] establishing a nexus to the apartment was a single telephone call to the defendant at

his apartment in which he received an order for the

purchase of drugs.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Brown,

14 Conn. App. 605, 619, 543 A.2d 750, cert. denied, 208

Conn. 816, 546 A.2d 283 (1988). By contrast, the affiants

here observed multiple controlled narcotics transactions involving the defendant, and each time the defendant and his silver Nissan Maxima with Maine license

plates were observed at the residence prior to the transactions and immediately thereafter.

In ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress, the

court acknowledged that, in describing the first controlled purchase, the affidavit does not identify the time

period with any specificity other than stating that the

defendant was observed at the residence ‘‘prior to the

buy taking place . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) As our precedent instructs, the task of the

judge in issuing a search warrant ‘‘is simply to make a

practical, commonsense decision’’ based on the totality

of the circumstances presented in the warrant affidavit.

State v. Barton, supra, 219 Conn. 537. Applying that

precept, the court concluded that ‘‘[t]he logical and

reasonable inference that could have been drawn by

the issuing court is that the language [in question] . . .

helped explain when the surveillance may have been

conducted. The practical and nontechnical translation

of ‘prior to the buy taking place’ in terms of time, for
purposes of probable cause analysis, could have been

found to be a period of time in very close approximation

to the arrangements made for the first controlled buy.’’

We concur with that assessment. We further note that,

with respect to the second controlled purchase, the

affiants stated that ‘‘[s]urveillance showed that just

prior to the buy taking place [the defendant] arrived at

[the residence],’’ from which it may be inferred that

narcotics were stored at the residence.

‘‘Probable cause does not depend upon the incantation of certain magic words.’’ State v. Barton, supra,

219 Conn. 549. Moreover, we are mindful of our obligation to ‘‘evaluate the information contained in the affidavit in the light most favorable to upholding the issuing

judge’s probable cause finding.’’ State v. Shields, 308

Conn. 678, 691, 69 A.3d 293 (2013), cert. denied, 571

U.S. 1176, 134 S. Ct. 1040, 188 L. Ed. 2d 123 (2014).

Having carefully examined the record before us, we

conclude that the warrant application contained sufficient information from which the judge reasonably

could infer that there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the

defendant’s residence. For that reason, the court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 54-94a provides in relevant part: ‘‘When a defendant,

prior to the commencement of trial, enters a plea of nolo contendere conditional on the right to take an appeal from the court’s denial of the defendant’s

motion to suppress or motion to dismiss, the defendant after the imposition

of sentence may file an appeal within the time prescribed by law provided

a trial court has determined that a ruling on such motion to suppress or

motion to dismiss would be dispositive of the case. The issue to be considered in such an appeal shall be limited to whether it was proper for the

court to have denied the motion to suppress or the motion to dismiss. . . .’’

The trial court in this case made such a determination at the defendant’s

May 16, 2019 plea hearing.

2 Article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution provides: ‘‘The people

shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to

seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly

as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.’’

3

Justices Dannehy and Santaniello joined Justice Healey’s majority opinion. Justices Shea and Callahan issued dissenting opinions.

4

‘‘The Aguilar-Spinellitest provides a method for evaluating the existence

of probable cause . . . when a search warrant affidavit is based upon information supplied to the police by a confidential informant. . . . Under the

Aguilar-Spinelli test, [t]he issuing judge must be informed of (1) some of

the underlying circumstances relied on by the informant in concluding that

the facts are as he claims they are, and (2) some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer seeking the warrant concluded (a) that the

informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, was credible, or (b) that

the information was reliable. . . . When the information supplied by the

informant fails to satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli test, probable cause may still

be found if the warrant application affidavit sets forth other circumstances—

typically independent police corroboration of certain details provided by

the informant—that bolster the deficiencies.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Respass, 256 Conn. 164, 174 n.12, 770

A.2d 471, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1002, 122 S. Ct. 478, 151 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2001).

5

In his principal appellate brief, the defendant insists that ‘‘our Supreme

Court’s rejection of Kimbro should be revisited’’; that ‘‘Kimbro should be

revived’’; that ‘‘[t]he ‘‘loosening of the Aguilar-Spinelli test was unneces-
sary’’; and that, ‘‘[i]t is, therefore, now, more than ever, time to revisit’’

Barton . . . .’’