alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# CA2017082DE.01000101.xml

| 17.3.2017 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | CA 82/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.3.2017

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

CA 82/1

---

BERICHTIGUNG DER BEKANNTMACHUNG DER ALLGEMEINEN AUSWAHLVERFAHREN

EPSO/AD/332/16 — Rechts- und Sprachsachverständige (AD 7) für die spanische Sprache (ES)

EPSO/AD/333/16 — Rechts- und Sprachsachverständige (AD 7) für die griechische Sprache (EL)

EPSO/AD/334/16 — Rechts- und Sprachsachverständige (AD 7) für die italienische Sprache (IT)

EPSO/AD/335/16 — Rechts- und Sprachsachverständige (AD 7) für die litauische Sprache (LT)

EPSO/AD/336/16 — Rechts- und Sprachsachverständige (AD 7) für die maltesische Sprache (MT)

EPSO/AD/337/16 — Rechts- und Sprachsachverständige (AD 7) für die schwedische Sprache (SV)

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union C 457 A vom 8. Dezember 2016
  )

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union C 457 A vom 8. Dezember 2016

(2017/C 082 A/01)

Seite 6, Anhang II

Seite 6, Anhang II

Anstelle von:

Anstelle von:

„EPSO/AD/333/16 — RECHTS- UND SPRACHSACHVERSTÄNDIGE (AD 7) FÜR DIE GRIECHISCHE SPRACHE (EL)

Vorausgesetzt wird ein Bildungsniveau (siehe nachfolgender Abschluss), das einem abgeschlossenen Hochschulstudium der griechischen Rechtswissenschaften entspricht:

Πτυχίο νομικής.

Um festzustellen, ob diese Voraussetzung erfüllt ist, legt der Prüfungsausschuss die zum Zeitpunkt des Erwerbs des Abschlusses geltenden Vorschriften zugrunde.“

muss es heißen:

muss es heißen:

„EPSO/AD/333/16 — RECHTS- UND SPRACHSACHVERSTÄNDIGE (AD 7) FÜR DIE GRIECHISCHE SPRACHE (EL)

Vorausgesetzt wird ein Bildungsniveau (siehe nachfolgender Abschluss), das einem abgeschlossenen Hochschulstudium der Rechtswissenschaften in griechischer Sprache entspricht:

Πτυχίο νομικής.

Um festzustellen, ob diese Voraussetzung erfüllt ist, legt der Prüfungsausschuss die zum Zeitpunkt des Erwerbs des Abschlusses geltenden Vorschriften zugrunde.“

Seite 7, Anhang II

Seite 7, Anhang II

Anstelle von:

Anstelle von:

„EPSO/AD/337/16 — RECHTS- UND SPRACHSACHVERSTÄNDIGE (AD 7) FÜR DIE SCHWEDISCHE SPRACHE (SV)

Vorausgesetzt wird ein Bildungsniveau (siehe nachfolgende Abschlüsse), das einem abgeschlossenen Hochschulstudium der schwedischen Rechtswissenschaften entspricht:

Juridisk universitetsutbildning på svenska: jur.kand.-examen, juristexamen eller motsvarande.

Um festzustellen, ob diese Voraussetzung erfüllt ist, legt der Prüfungsausschuss die zum Zeitpunkt des Erwerbs des Abschlusses geltenden Vorschriften zugrunde.“

muss es heißen:

muss es heißen:

„EPSO/AD/337/16 — RECHTS- UND SPRACHSACHVERSTÄNDIGE (AD 7) FÜR DIE SCHWEDISCHE SPRACHE (SV)

Vorausgesetzt wird ein Bildungsniveau (siehe nachfolgende Abschlüsse), das einem abgeschlossenen Hochschulstudium der Rechtswissenschaften in schwedischer Sprache entspricht:

Juridisk universitetsutbildning på svenska: jur.kand.-examen, juristexamen eller motsvarande.

Um festzustellen, ob diese Voraussetzung erfüllt ist, legt der Prüfungsausschuss die zum Zeitpunkt des Erwerbs des Abschlusses geltenden Vorschriften zugrunde.“

---
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

**(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)**

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Flow International Corporation, a Washingtoncorporation (the “Company”), on Form 10-K for the year ending April 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Stephen D. Reichenbach, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify,pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350), that: 

 

(1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

(2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and result of operations of the Company. 

 

/s/    STEPHEN D. REICHENBACH

Stephen D. Reichenbach 

Principal Financial Officer 

August 13, 2004
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

)

)

)

)

)

) VS. ))

EDGAR M. BRONFMAN, JR., J. )

MICHAEL CLINE, STEVENN. KAPLAN, )

STANLEYN. LOGAN, DENIS J. )

NAYDEN, GEORGE P. SHULTZ, )

ARTHURH. SPIEGEL, III, MARY A. )

TOLAN, MARK A. WOLFSON ) DEFENDANTS, )

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MARVIN H. MAURRS REVOCABLE

TRUST, DERIVATIVELY AND ON

BEHALF OF ACCRETIVE HEALTH,

INC.,

PLAINTIFF,

AND

ACCRETIVE HEALTH, INC.

NOMINAL DEFENDANT.

Case No. 12-cv-03395

Judge: Hon. Gary Feinerman

Oral Argument Requested Pursuant to

Local Rule 47.1(b)

DECLARATION OF TIFFANY OLDHAM

Case: 1:12-cv-03395 Document #: 41 Filed: 08/17/12 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:428
I, Tiffany Oldham, declare under 28 U.S.C. § 1746:

1. I am an associate of Carney Wiliams Bates Pullam & Bowman PLLC,

attorneys for Plaintiff. I submit this declaration in support of Plaintiff s Opposition to

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the above-referenced action.

2. Attached hereto as Exhibits A through J are true and correct copies of the

following:

Exhibit A:

Exhibit B:

Exhibit C:

Exhibit D:

Exhibit E:

Exhibit F:

Exhibit G:

Exhibit H:

Exhibit I:

Exhibit J:

Accretive Health, Inc. 2010 Form 10-K

U.S.D.C. Dist. of Minnesota; State of Minnesota v. Accretive Health;

Second Amended Complaint

Accretive Health, Inc. 201 1 Proxy Statement

Accretive Health, Inc. 2012 Proxy Statement

Screenshot of Endeavor Global Bio

Screenshot of Zoom Info. - Michael Cline Bio and Arthur Spiegel III Bio

Screenshot of Oak Hil Capital Partners Bio

Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson's Statement to the United

States Senate HELP Committee May 30, 2012 Field Hearing

State of Minnesota Offce of the Attorney General Compliance Review of

Fairview Health Services' Management Contracts with Accretive Health,

Inc. Volumes 1-3

State of Minnesota Offce of the Attorney General Compliance Review of

Fairview Health Services' Management Contracts with Accretive Health,

Inc. Volumes 4-6

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

~£N

Executed on: August 17,2012

1

Case: 1:12-cv-03395 Document #: 41 Filed: 08/17/12 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:429
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ABEL P. REYES,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

PATRICIA ROUCH, Nurse Practitioner at Corcoran State Prison; OLIVIA BORBOLLA, Registered Nurse at Corcoran State Prison; EDGAR CLARK, Medical Doctor at Corcoran State Prison; G. RODRIGUEZ, Registered Nurse at Corcoran State Prison,

Defendants

- Appe llees. No. 22

- 15232

D.C. No. 1:19

- cv

- 01158

- DAD

- HBK

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 14, 2023 * *

Before: SILVERMAN, SUNG, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Abel P. Reyes appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 21 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 22

- 15232

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1 291. We review de novo a district

court ’ s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

. Wilhelm v. Rotman , 680 F.3d 1113,

1118 (9th Cir. 2012)

. We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Reyes’s action because Reyes failed to

allege facts sufficient to show that defendants were deliberately indifferent to

Reyes’s pain , elevated blood pressure, and withdrawal symptoms

. See Hebbe v.

Pliler , 627 F.3d 338, 341

- 42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are

construed liberally, plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a

plausible claim for relief); Toguchi v. Chung , 391 F.3d 1051, 1057

- 60 (9th Cir.

2004) (prison officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and

disregard a risk t o the prisoner ’ s health; medical malpractice, negligence or

difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not amount to

deliberate indifference) ; Hallett v. Morgan , 296 F.3d 732, 746 (9th Cir. 2002) (a

prisoner alleging deliberate indiffere nce based on delay in treatment must show

that the delay caused significant harm).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).3 22

- 15232

Reyes ’ s request for an order revoking defendants ’ medical licenses and

certifications, set forth in the opening brief, is denie d.

AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 165 Agreed to Senate (ATS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 165

Celebrating April 30 through May 6, 2017, as ``National Small Business 
 Week'' and commending the entrepreneurial spirit of small businesses 
                      owners in the United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 16, 2017

  Mr. Risch (for himself, Mrs. Shaheen, Mr. Gardner, Mr. Markey, Mr. 
  Inhofe, Mr. Coons, Mr. Enzi, Ms. Hirono, Mrs. Capito, Ms. Cantwell, 
   Mrs. Ernst, Ms. Heitkamp, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Booker, Mr. Rubio, Mr. 
   Cardin, Mr. Young, Ms. Duckworth, Mr. Rounds, Mr. Scott, and Mr. 
 Hoeven) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and 
                               agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Celebrating April 30 through May 6, 2017, as ``National Small Business 
 Week'' and commending the entrepreneurial spirit of small businesses 
                      owners in the United States.

Whereas 2017 marks the 54th anniversary of National Small Business Week;
Whereas every President for more than \1/2\ a century has proclaimed a week 
        celebrating the significance of small businesses across the United 
        States;
Whereas, as of May 2017, there are over 28,000,000 small businesses in the 
        United States;
Whereas small businesses in the United States--

    (1) employ nearly \1/2\ of the workforce of the United States;

    (2) comprise 99.7 percent of all employers in the United States;

    (3) employ veterans, and since 2007, 9.3 percent of all business owners 
have been veterans;

    (4) produce \1/3\ of all exports of the United States; and

    (5) account for nearly \1/2\ of private sector output;

Whereas, on July 30, 1953, Congress established the Small Business 
        Administration to aid, counsel, assist, and protect the small business 
        community;
Whereas 2 of every 3 new jobs are created by small businesses; and
Whereas the President designated the week of April 30 through May 6, 2017, as 
        ``National Small Business Week'': Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the Senate--
            (1) supports the designation of the week of April 30 
        through May 6, 2017, as ``National Small Business Week'';
            (2) celebrates the entrepreneurial spirit of small business 
        owners in the United States;
            (3) recognizes the importance of creating a small business 
        climate that allows for sustained, entrepreneurial success;
            (4) celebrates the invaluable contribution that small 
        businesses make to the United States as the backbone of the 
        economy; and
            (5) supports increasing consumer awareness of the value and 
        opportunity that small businesses bring to local communities.
                                 <all>
```
#### Jenkins County *v.*Dickey.

December 10, 1912.

Equitable petition. Before Judge' Bawlings. Jenkins superior court. December 9, 1911.

Benjamin Dickey brought his petition against Jenkins County, and alleged: that,'in order to allow a certain public road to be somewhat straightened, he had agreed to permit the road-working gang to run the road for a distance through his field, provided the county would build for him on either side of the road for the extent of his field a woven-wire fence, complying in all respects with the specifications of a lawful fence, and provided the county would at once erect a gate at each end of the field where the road entered and left the same, to be kept up and maintained by the county until it should build the fences above referred to; that thereupon the county placed the road through petitioners field and built the gates as per agreement; that this was done about June, 1909, and on March 28, 1910, the county authorities, without potice or warning to petitioner, and without having built the fence along the road through petitioner’s field, and still failing and refusing to do so, removed the gates and left petitioner’s field exposed to stock and cattle, it being a “fence country,” and there being a great many cattle and hogs at .large in that community; and that he had replaced the gates, but the county authorities threatened to again remove them. He prayed that they be enjoined from removing or interfering with the gates until they had erected the fences along the road through his field as they had agreed to do, or should pay to him the sum of $200, it being *92alleged, that it would cost him that sum to build the fence; and he prayed for a judgment against the count)7 in the sum of $200. The county filed a general demurrer to the petition, which the court overruled, and the county excepted.

*91Beck, J.

1. Where authorities having charge of the roads of the county accepted a conditional dedication of a strip of land to be used in laying out a public road, and actually laid out a public road, over the same, they will not be permitted to repudiate their contract with the dedicator by refusing to .discharge certain obligations undertaken by them in accepting the dedication, to the injury of the dedicator. If the conditions imposed intolerable burdens upon the public use to which the land dedicated was to be appropriated, the dedication should have been rejected entirely. The contract between the dedicator and the county authorities will not be held to be valid so far as it confers benefits upon the public and invalid so far as it 'relates to the conditions stipulated by the dedicator in order to protect and safeguard his property.

2. The court did not err in overruling the demurrers, general in their nature, to the petition.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*92
      *W. V. Tyler*and *W. TL. Davis,*for plaintiff in error.
[No. 9324.

*En Banc.*

May 12, 1911.]

#### Washington Dredging *&*Improvement Company, *Appellant,*v. The State of Washington *et al.,*Respondents.3

Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Thurston county, Mitchell, J., entered September 28, 1910.

Affirmed.

*'Thos. M. Vance*and W. *F. Hays,*for appellant.

*Ohas. A. Kinnear, Geo. B. Cole, John E. Humphries, A. A. Booth, George E. de Steiguer*and *Geo. T. Reid (Alfred Battle,*of counsel), for respondents Kinnear *et al.*

*W. P. Bell, Attorney General,*and *W. V. Tanner, Assistant,*for respondent State of Washington.

3

Reported in 115 Pac. 1135.

Per Curiam.

This is an appeal from an order and judgment sustaining the defendants’ demurrers to the plaintiff’s amended complaint, denying leave to file its proposed second amended complaint, cancelling the notice of the pendency of the action of record in the office of auditor of King county, and dismissing the action. The only question involved is the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the amended complaint and proposed second amended complaint to entitle appellant to the relief prayed for. A careful reading of the *697appellant’s allegations convinces us that the facts relied upon for relief are not materially different' from those before the court and upon which we decided the case of *Washington Dredging & Improvement Co. v. State,*53 Wash. 346, 101 Pac. 884. Indeed, this is, in substance, an attempt to again litigate questions finally determined by that decision.

The judgment is affirmed.
District Court Of Appeal Of The State Of Florida

Fourth District

July Term 2014

REYNOLDS BROOKS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D12-3949

[July 30, 2014]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Edward H. Fine, Judge; L.T. Case No. 12CF900002AMB.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ian Seldin, Assistant Public 

Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melanie Dale 

Surber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

FORST, J.

A jury found Appellant to be a sexually violent predator (“SVP”), and the 

trial court granted the State’s petition to involuntarily commit Appellant 

for treatment as a Jimmy Ryce Act SVP. Appellant argues that the trial 

court abused its discretion and erred in overruling the defense’s objection 

to brief statistical testimony about the Jimmy Ryce Act screening process. 

Although there is some merit to Appellant’s argument, we affirm the trial 

court’s involuntary commitment order.

This court has previously addressed similar testimony and found the 

“testimony regarding the multidisciplinary team’s commitment 

recommendation statistics was not relevant,” as it “had no probative value 

in determining whether [the defendant] met the statutory criteria for 

commitment as a sexually violent predator.” Marshall v. State, 915 So. 2d 

264, 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), receded from on other grounds by Special v. 

Baux, 79 So. 3d 755 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); see also Paige v. State, 962 So. 

2d 968, 969 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (testimony regarding the civil 

commitment screening process is inadmissible on grounds of relevancy); 
2

Ortega-Mantilla v. State, 898 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) 

(“[T]estimony regarding the process used in filing the petition for civil 

commitment against the [defendant] was irrelevant because the sole issue 

in this case was whether the [defendant] could be classified as a sexually 

violent predator.”). Marshall, Paige, and Ortega-Mantilla are the three 

cases relied upon by Appellant in arguing for reversal. However, in each 

of those cases, the reviewing court ultimately found the error to be 

harmless. Marshall, 915 So. 2d at 268; Paige, 962 So. 2d at 969; OrtegaMantilla, 898 So. 2d at 1167 (finding the error was harmless as "testimony 

was not made a feature of the trial, nor was it repeated by either side 

during closing arguments”). Similarly, we find any such error on the part 

of the trial court in the instant case to be harmless, and that competent 

and substantial evidence supports the trial court’s commitment order. 

Nonetheless, we caution prosecutors in future commitment trials to refrain 

from attempting to introduce this type of evidence, as it has been firmly 

established that such evidence is inadmissible under the circumstances 

found in this case.

Affirmed.

DAMOORGIAN, C.J., and TAYLOR, J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
230.201-5 Waiver. (a)(1)(A) The military departments and the Principal Director, Defense Pricing, Contracting, and Acquisition Policy (DPCAP), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Sustainment)— ( 1 ) May grant CAS waivers that meet the conditions in FAR 30.201-5(b)(1); and
( 2 ) May grant CAS waivers that meet the conditions in FAR 30.201-5(b)(2), provided the cognizant Federal agency official granting the waiver determines that— ( i ) The property or services cannot reasonably be obtained under the contract, subcontract, or modification, as applicable, without granting the waiver;
( ii ) The price can be determined to be fair and reasonable without the application of the Cost Accounting Standards; and
( iii ) There are demonstrated benefits to granting the waiver. ( B ) Follow the procedures at PGI 230.201-5(a)(1) for submitting waiver requests to the Principal Director, DPCAP.
( 2 ) The military departments shall not delegate CAS waiver authority below the individual responsible for issuing contracting policy for the department.
(e) By November 30th of each year, the military departments shall provide a report to the Office of the Principal Director, DPCAP (Contract Policy) of all waivers granted under FAR 30.201-5(a), during the previous fiscal year, for any contract, subcontract, or modification expected to have a value of $15 million or more. See PGI 230.201-5(e) for format and guidance for the report. The Principal Director, DPCAP, will submit a consolidated report to the CAS Board and the congressional defense committees. [71 FR 69495, Dec. 1, 2006, as amended at 77 FR 52254, Aug. 29, 2012; 88 FR 73237, Oct. 25, 2023; 89 FR 60832, July 29, 2024]
Exhibit 32.3

CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Alan Vituli, Chief Executive Officer of Carrols Corporation (the
Company), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Quarterly Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                         
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                         
|/s/ ALAN VITULI                                                          
|Alan Vituli Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer May 7, 2008