1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

United States of America ex rel. )

Reginald Boclair, ) No. 12 C 4554

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Judge Thomas M. Durkin

)

)

Rick Harrington, Warden,1 )

Menard Correctional Center, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner Reginald Boclair, a state prisoner serving a natural-life sentence 

for first degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm, seeks a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.2 Respondent Warden Rick Harrington 

responded to the petition, arguing that the petition should be dismissed as untimely 

because Boclair failed to comply with the one-year statute of limitations imposed by 

 1 Boclair initially named as respondent Michael Atchison, the warden of Menard 

Correctional Center, where Boclair was incarcerated when he filed his § 2254 

petition. See Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Rick Harrington 

is now the warden of Menard Correctional Center where Boclair continues to reside. 

Accordingly, Warden Harrington is substituted as the proper respondent. See 

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (“[T]he proper respondent is the 

warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held.”); see also Bridges v. 

Chambers, 425 F.3d 1048, 1049 (7th Cir. 2005). 

2 With this § 2254 petition, Boclair challenges the conviction entered in case 90 CR 

25621. Boclair was also previously convicted of first degree murder in case 89 CR 

24879. The trial court in case 90 CR 25621 ordered that Boclair’s natural-life 

sentence in that case run concurrently with the sentence entered in Boclair’s 89 CR 

24879 case. See R. 20, Exh. O. 
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§ 2244(d)(1) or, alternatively that the petition should be denied because the claims 

raised in the petition are either procedurally defaulted or without merit. R. 20. 

Because the petition is untimely, the Court need not reach the merits of Boclair’s 

claims. The petition is dismissed, and a certificate of appealability is denied.

Analysis

Section 2244(d)(1) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 provides that a “1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This limitations period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence.

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Because Boclair’s petition was filed more than a year after 

the conclusion of direct review, § 2244(d)(1)(A),3 the petition is untimely. 

 3 Boclair does not allege a state-created impediment to filing, assert a newly 

recognized and retroactively applicable constitutional right, or point to a factual 

predicate of a claim that could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. Accordingly, §§ 2244(d)(1)(B), (C), and (D) are inapplicable. 
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Boclair’s state court conviction became final on December 31, 1996. This date 

was 90 days after the Illinois Supreme Court denied Boclair’s direct appeal petition 

for leave to appeal (“PLA”) on October 2, 1996, R. 20, Exh. E, when the time to file a 

certiorari petition in the United States Supreme Court passed. See Gonzalez v. 

Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653 (2012) (holding judgment of conviction became final 

“when the time for pursuing direct review in [the Supreme] Court” expired). Boclair 

argues that the finality of his conviction should be calculated by using the date that 

the Illinois Supreme Court issued its mandate (November 19, 1996), not the date 

that the court actually issued its decision denying the PLA (October 2, 1996). R. 25 

at 2-3. Boclair’s proposed method of calculation, however, has been squarely 

rejected by the Seventh Circuit. See Griffith v. Rednour, 614 F.3d 328, 329 (7th Cir.

2010) (citing Wilson v. Battles, 302 F.3d 745, 747-48 (7th Cir. 2002) (review by 

Illinois Supreme Court ends on its decision date, rather than on date of issuance of 

mandate)).4

Boclair’s properly filed April 21, 1997 state postconviction petition, R. 20, 

Exh. F at C20, immediately tolled the limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). See Wilson, 302 F.3d at 747. At this point, 111 days of untolled time had 

elapsed. The limitations period remained tolled until October 2, 2002, when the 

Illinois Supreme Court denied Boclair’s postconviction PLA. See also Lawrence v. 

 4 Boclair also suggests that the limitations period in each of his state postconviction

rounds was tolled until the Illinois Supreme Court issued its mandate. R. 25 at 2-3. 

But Wilson forecloses this argument as well. The limitations period therefore 

immediately began running the day after the Illinois Supreme Court entered its 

decision denying Boclair’s PLAs in each of his state postconviction rounds. 
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Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 332 (2007) (providing for no tolling while certiorari petition 

following conclusion of state postconviction proceedings was pending); Tucker v. 

Kingston, 538 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 2008) (indicating no tolling available during 

90-day period where habeas petitioner could have, but did not, seek certiorari 

following conclusion of state postconviction proceedings).

More untolled time elapsed—134 days—before Boclair mailed his third 

postconviction petition to the state circuit court on February 13, 2003.5 R. 20, Exh. 

P at C44. That petition was pending for over eight years until November 30, 2011, 

when the Illinois Supreme Court denied Boclair leave to appeal the state appellate 

court’s judgment affirming the denial of postconviction relief. R. 20, Exh. W. An 

additional 159 days of untolled time elapsed between November 30, 2011 and May 

7, 2012, when Boclair mailed his § 2254 petition to this Court.6 See R. 1-2 at 15. 

 5 Boclair’s second postconviction petition—which was mailed in February 2001 and 

remained pending until April 12, 2002—had no independent tolling effect. See R. 20, 

Exh. M at C16; Exh. O. At the time Boclair mailed that petition, the statute of 

limitations was already tolled because his first postconviction petition was still 

pending in state court. 

6 The Warden indicates that Boclair’s § 2254 petition should be deemed filed on 

June 8, 2012, the date that the mailing envelope was received by the prison 

mailroom and the date that the envelope was postmarked. Attached to Boclair’s § 

2254 petition is a notice of filing and certificate of service, which indicates that he 

deposited his § 2254 petition in the prison mailroom with postage prepaid on May 7, 

2012. R. 1-2 at 15. This is sufficient to comply with Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases. (“A paper filed by an inmate confined in an institution is timely 

if deposited in the institution’s internal mailing system on or before the last day for 

filing . . . . Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 

U.S.C. § 1746 or by a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of 

deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.”). Accordingly, the Court 

gives Boclair the benefit of the mailbox rule and the earlier May 7, 2012 filing date. 

Boclair’s § 2254 petition is nevertheless untimely applying this earlier filing date.
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Calculating the total number of days of untolled time (111 + 134 + 159), 404

days in total elapsed between the date Boclair’s judgment became final and the date 

on which he filed his § 2254 petition in this Court. The petition is therefore 

untimely under § 2244(d)(1)(A) because it was filed more than one year after 

Boclair’s judgment of conviction became final.

There is no basis for equitable tolling of the limitations period. Indeed,

Boclair has not even requested that such tolling be applied. “[A] ‘petitioner’ is 

‘entitled to equitable tolling’ only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’

and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) 

(quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); see also Griffith, 614 F.3d 

at 331. Nothing in the record indicates that some extraordinary circumstance stood 

in the way of a timely filing. Rather, the late filing appears to have resulted from 

Boclair’s decision to pursue numerous collateral attacks in state court. Should 

Boclair argue that his untimeliness is due to his misunderstanding of the law—

Boclair appears to have misunderstood how to calculate the running of the 

limitations period—such misunderstanding does not permit tolling. See, e.g., Arrieta 

v. Battaglia, 461 F.3d 861, 867 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Mistakes of law or ignorance of 

proper legal procedures are not extraordinary circumstances warranting invocation 

of the doctrine of equitable tolling.”) Because Boclair’s untimely filing was

ultimately attributable to his own litigation strategy and not any extraordinary 
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circumstance outside of his control, the application of equitable tolling is not 

warranted. 

Boclair makes fleeting mentions—in the context of excusing the procedural 

default of his habeas claims—to his actual innocence. R. 25 at 4, 13, 17, 21. To the 

extent that he argues that his actual innocence excuses his untimeliness, that claim 

fails. Long-standing Seventh Circuit precedent established that a showing of actual 

innocence did not excuse untimeliness under § 2244(d). See, e.g., Griffith, 614 F.3d 

at 331; Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868, 872 (7th Cir. 2005). The Supreme 

Court, however, recently concluded to the contrary, holding that “actual innocence, 

if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass . . . [to excuse] 

the expiration of the statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 

1928 (2013). The Court, however, reiterated the very high hurdle that habeas 

petitioners must clear to pass through the actual innocence gateway to excuse the 

statute of limitations bar: “tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare,” and 

the standard by which actual innocence gateway pleas are judged is “‘demanding’ 

and seldom met.” Id. (quoting House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006)). Confirming 

the standard for judging actual innocence gateway claims set forth in Schlup v. 

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995), the Court held that “‘a petitioner does not meet the 

threshold requirement [to excuse claims untimely due to the expiration of the 

statute of limitations] unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new 

evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329).
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Boclair fails to offer any “‘new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy or eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence—that was not presented at trial’” to make out a claim of actual innocence. 

House, 547 U.S. at 537 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). He instead rests his claim 

of innocence on (1) his challenge to the evidence that was presented at trial as 

inconsistent and contradictory and thus wrongly interpreted by the state trial court; 

and (2) the testimony of two witnesses whom he alleges trial counsel was ineffective 

for not calling: Assistant State’s Attorney (“ASA”) Borowitz and Edwina Allen. 

Following a bench trial, Boclair was convicted of shooting and killing Walter 

Deramus. The evidence at trial included three eyewitnesses identifying Boclair as 

the shooter, Boclair’s confession to committing the crime, and the testimony of a 

disinterested witness who could not identify Boclair as the shooter but corroborated 

the eyewitnesses’ accounts of the events in question. In finding Boclair guilty, the 

trial court rejected Boclair’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Absent 

clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, which Boclair has not presented, the 

trial court’s factual findings are therefore presumed correct under § 2254(e)(1). 

Morgan v. Hardy, 662 F.3d 790, 797-98 (7th Cir. 2011). 

As to Boclair’s new proposed evidene, that is insufficient as well to establish 

Boclair’s actual innocence. The substance of ASA Borowitz’s proposed testimony—

she would testify that she initially decided to charge another individual with the 

victim’s murder but later dropped those charges in exchange for that individual’s 
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testimony against Boclair—moreover was already known to the trial court.7

Another witness at trial testified to this fact. Moreover, the substance of Allen’s 

testimony, the Court finds, was not probative on the key issue at trial: the shooter’s 

identity.8 Allen would have testified that she saw two men running after she heard 

noises that sounded like gunshots. This testimony, however, does not indicate that 

she could have identified anyone as the shooter. At best, Allen’s testimony could 

have contradicted one of the witness’ testimony on a collateral issue—what 

direction one of the witnesses’ fled after the shooting. 

Accordingly, when considering the entirety of the evidence presented at trial 

and the proposed testimony of ASA Borowitz and Edwina Allen, the Court finds 

that Boclair’s evidence in support of his actual innocence is not so “‘strong that a 

court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 

1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316 (approving of district court’s evaluation and 

rejection of habeas petitioner’s new proffered evidence in support of actual 

innocence-gateway claim)); cf. Woods v. Schwartz, 589 F.3d 368, 377 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(“[I]t is black letter law that the testimony of a single eyewitness suffices for 

 7

 Boclair asserts in his § 2254 petition that ASA Borowitz would testify as he 

proposes. For purposes of the actual innocence analysis, the Court assumes this 

witness would testify in the manner that Boclair suggests she would. 

8 Following Boclair’s trial, trial counsel moved to set aside the guilty verdict on the 

basis that Edwina Allen’s testimony constituted newly discovered evidence. In 

support of this motion, trial counsel made an offer of proof regarding the substance 

of Allen’s proposed testimony to the trial court. R. 20, Exh. Y at G4-6. After 

considering counsel’s summary of Allen’s proposed testimony, the trial court 

concluded that there was no basis on which to grant Boclair’s motion. Id. at G6.
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conviction even if 20 bishops testify that the eyewitness is a liar.”) (quoting Hayes v. 

Battaglia, 403 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2005)). Accordingly, Boclair cannot excuse his 

untimeliness.

For these reasons, Boclair’s petition is untimely, and it is dismissed.9 Rule 

11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases provides that the district court “must 

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant.” To obtain a certificate of appealability, a habeas petitioner must make “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); 

see also Lavin v. Rednour, 641 F.3d 830, 832 (7th Cir. 2011). And where a petition is 

disposed of based on a procedural bar, without reaching the merits of the 

underlying constitutional claims, a certificate of appealability should issue only if 

reasonable jurists would find the adjudication of the antecedent procedural ruling

“debatable.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000); see also Lavin, 641 

F.3d at 832. Because the untimeliness of Boclair’s petition is not debatable, a 

certificate of appealability is denied. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 584. (“Where a plain 

procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of 

the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in 

dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further. 

In such a circumstance, no appeal would be warranted.”).

 9 Because the petition is untimely, the Court need not reach the Warden’s 

additional arguments that the petition should be denied because the claims are 

either procedurally defaulted or barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Boclair’s § 2254 petition is dismissed with 

prejudice as untimely, and a certificate of appealability is denied. 

ENTERED:

__________________________

Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

Dated: October 21, 2013