Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge

JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL Sitting Judge if Other

than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 12 C 4530 DATE June 15, 2012

CASE

TITLE

Christopher A Triplett, Sr. (#2012-0119179) vs. Sheriff Tom Dart, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

The plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [#3] is granted. The court authorizes and orders

Cook County Jail officials to deduct $10.00 from the plaintiff’s account, and to continue making monthly

deductions in accordance with this order. The clerk shall send a copy of this order to the Supervisor of Inmate

Trust Fund Accounts, Cook County Dept. of Corrections Administrative Office, Division V, 2700 S. California,

Chicago, Illinois 60608. On the court’s own motion, Sheriff Tom Dart is dismissed as a defendant on initial

review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The clerk is directed to issue summons for service on defendant Krurek

only. The clerk is also directed to send the plaintiff a magistrate judge consent form and filing instructions along

with a copy of this order. The plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel [#4] is denied, without prejudice.

O [For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT

The plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections, has brought this

pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff claims that a Cook County Sheriff’s Deputy

violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by using excessive force against him. More specifically, the plaintiff

alleges that the officer broke his arm after being warned that there were pins and screws in the arm from a past

injury. 

The plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(1), the plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $10.00. The supervisor of inmate trust accounts

at the Cook County Jail is authorized and ordered to collect, when funds exist, the partial filing fee from the

plaintiff’s trust fund account and pay it directly to the Clerk of Court. After payment of the initial partial filing

fee, the trust fund officer at the plaintiff’s place of confinement is directed to collect monthly payments from the

plaintiff’s trust fund account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the account. 

Monthly payments collected from the plaintiff’s trust fund account shall be forwarded to the Clerk of Court each

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the full $350 filing fee is paid. All payments shall be sent to

(CONTINUED)

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STATEMENT (continued)

the Clerk, United States District Court, 219 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, Illinois 60604, attn: Cashier’s Desk, 20th

Floor, and shall clearly identify the plaintiff’s name and the case number assigned to this action. The Cook County

inmate trust account office shall notify transferee authorities of any outstanding balance in the event the plaintiff

is transferred from the jail to another correctional facility. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court is required to conduct a prompt initial review of prisoner complaints

against governmental entities or employees. Here, accepting the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, the court

finds that the complaint states a colorable cause of action under the Civil Rights Act. The complaint does not make

clear whether the plaintiff was an arrestee or an inmate at the time of the events giving rise to this action, but under

either scenario, the plaintiff’s allegations are actionable. Police officers may use only “reasonable” force when

effecting an arrest. See, e.g., Padula v. Leimbach, 656 F.3d 595, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, unjustified

force against a pretrial detainee violates the inmate’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Rice ex

rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650, 667-68 (7th Cir. 2012). While a more fully developed

record may belie the plaintiff’s claims, defendant Krurek must respond to the allegations in the complaint. 

However, Sheriff Tom Dart is dismissed as a defendant on preliminary review. The plaintiff has alleged

no facts suggesting Dart’s direct, personal involvement, as required by J.H. ex rel. Higgin v. Johnson, 346 F.3d

788, 793 (7th Cir. 2003), inter alia. Nor has the plaintiff indicated that the alleged violation of his constitutional

rights occurred at Dart’s direction or with his knowledge and consent. Id. Section 1983 creates a cause of action

based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, “to be liable under § 1983, an individual defendant must

have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th

Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009). The doctrine

of respondeat superior (blanket supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See,

e.g., Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008). Because the plaintiff has failed to state any facts

indicating that Dart was personally involved in–or even aware of–the alleged circumstances giving rise to the

complaint, Dart is dismissed as a defendant in this matter.

The clerk shall issue summons for service of the complaint on defendant Krurek. The United States

Marshals Service is appointed to serve the defendant. Any service forms necessary for the plaintiff to complete

will be sent by the Marshal as appropriate to serve the defendant with process. The U.S. Marshal is directed to

make all reasonable efforts to serve the defendant. If Officer Krurek can no longer be found at the work address

provided by the plaintiff, the Cook County Department of Corrections and/or the Cook County Sheriff shall furnish

the Marshal with the defendant’s last-known address. The information shall be used only for purposes of

effectuating service [or for proof of service, should a dispute arise] and any documentation of the address shall be

retained only by the Marshal. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the

Marshal. The Marshal is authorized to mail a request for waiver of service to the defendant in the manner

prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2) before attempting personal service. 

(CONTINUED)

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STATEMENT (continued)

The plaintiff is instructed to file all future papers concerning this action with the Clerk of Court in care of

the Prisoner Correspondent. On this single occasion, the court has made judge’s and service copies for the

plaintiff; however, the plaintiff is advised that he must provide the court with the original plus a complete

judge’s copy, including any exhibits, of every document filed. In addition, the plaintiff must send an exact copy

of any court filing to the defendant [or to defense counsel, once an attorney has entered an appearance on behalf

of the defendant]. Every document filed with the court must include a certificate of service stating to whom exact

copies were mailed and the date of mailing. Any paper that is sent directly to the judge or that otherwise fails to

comply with these instructions may be disregarded by the court or returned to the plaintiff.

Finally, the plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied. There is no constitutional or statutory

right to counsel in federal civil cases. Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851 (2010); see also Johnson v.

Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, the district court has discretion under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(1) to request counsel for an indigent litigant. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007), citing

Johnson, 433 F.3d at 1006. When a pro se litigant submits a request for appointment of counsel, the court must

first consider whether the indigent plaintiff has made reasonable attempts to secure counsel on his own, or

conversely, if he has been precluded from doing so. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654. Next, the court must evaluate the

complexity of the case and whether the plaintiff appears competent to litigate it on his own. Id. at 654-55. Another

consideration is whether the assistance of counsel would provide a substantial benefit to the court or the parties,

potentially affecting the outcome of the case. Id. at 654; Gil v. Reed, 381 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2004); see also

Local Rule 83.36(c) (N.D. Ill.) (listing the factors to be taken into account in determining whether to appoint

counsel). 

After considering the above factors, the court concludes that appointment of counsel is not warranted in

this case. First, the plaintiff has failed to show either that he has made reasonable efforts to retain private counsel

or that he has been effectively precluded from making such efforts. In any event, although the complaint sets forth

cognizable claims, the plaintiff has alleged no physical or mental disability that might preclude him from

adequately investigating the facts giving rise to his complaint. Neither the legal issues raised in the complaint nor

the evidence that might support the plaintiff’s claims are so complex or intricate that a trained attorney is necessary. 

The plaintiff, whose submissions to date have been coherent and articulate, appears more than capable of presenting

his case. It should additionally be noted that the court grants pro se litigants wide latitude in the handling of their

lawsuits. Therefore, the plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied at this time. Should the case

proceed to a point that assistance of counsel is appropriate, the court may revisit this request. 

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