FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MARZAN WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

) Case No. 12-cv-3514

THOMAS DART, WILLIAM BURRUS, )

SGT. DARNICE WIGGAMS, SGT. RICARDO )

HOWER, and MANISHA PATEL, )

)

Defendants. ) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Marzan Williams, originally filed this action pro se on May 8, 2012, alleging violation 

of his civil rights for injuries incurred to his Achilles’ tendon while in custody with the Cook County 

Sheriff.1 Following several attempts by Williams to amend his complaint to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted, this Court appointed counsel to represent Williams. Appointed counsel filed a 

Fourth Amended Complaint [69] on October 7, 2013, alleging violations of his constitutional rights 

under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants in both their individual and official capacity, except Sheriff 

Thomas Dart. Williams only seeks liability against Sheriff Dart in his official capacity. Defendants 

filed an Answer with affirmative defenses to the individual claims and now move to dismiss [74] the 

official capacity claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated 

herein, this Court grants the motion and dismisses the official capacity claims with prejudice. 

Background

Marzan Williams was a pretrial detainee at Cook County Jail with a pre-existing injury,

consisting of a partial tear to his Achilles tendon when, on May 10, 2011, he was transferred to the 

1 Since the filing of this case, plaintiff has been transferred to the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections.

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Division 10 medical unit. Williams used a wheelchair during the transfer. Defendant Burrus took 

custody of Williams upon his arrival and allegedly instructed Williams to get out of the wheelchair 

and, using crutches, carry a 100-pound bag with his belongings. Williams showed Burrus a medical 

order with the doctor’s instructions not to walk. Disregarding the medical orders and Williams’ 

condition, Burrus stated he was under the intake sergeant’s orders, and made Williams walk through 

a tunnel, which was wet, slippery, and had large puddles. Williams slipped in a large puddle of water 

and fell on his injured leg. He heard a “pop” and yelled from the severe pain. Burrus called his 

superiors to report Plaintiff’s injury. Burrus attempted to obtain a cart to transfer Williams, but none 

were available. Following the call, Burrus took Williams’ bag, helped him to his feet, and told him he 

had to walk in spite of the serious injury and pain. Burrus told Williams that he should write up the 

incident. 

Williams’ leg swelled up and turned black and blue after being forced to walk. Instead of 

receiving immediate medical attention, Williams was told to write a request to see a doctor. He was 

in pain and continued requesting help and medical assistance. The tier Officer sent him to Cermak 

Hospital to receive medical attention. While at Cermak Hospital, Williams was told his Achilles 

tendon was now a complete tear. Williams was taken to Stroger Hospital, where an MRI was 

performed, his pain medication was increased, and he received a new cast. 

After the fall and resulting injury, corrections officers continued to disregard medical orders. 

Defendant Hower took Williams’ crutches, and told him to balance and hop on one leg to take a 

shower. Williams showed Hower the medical order, to no avail. During a transfer to Division 5, 

defendant Wiggans escorted Williams in a wheelchair, but told him to get out of the wheelchair and 

walk. Williams showed Wiggans the medical order, but she ignored it. As a result of these incidents, 

Williams’ injury was further aggravated, the swelling of leg and pain increased, and his cast was 

damaged. 

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At Cermak Hospital, defendant Patel attended to Williams’ injuries. Patel provided medical 

orders regarding Williams’ mobility restrictions and pain medications. However, Patel allegedly

unduly delayed Plaintiff’s medical treatments, as Williams waited for over six months before 

undergoing surgery on his torn Achilles heel. Patel allegedly disregarded Williams’ serious medical 

needs, including inadequate pain management and denial of physical therapy following the surgery. 

Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) sets forth the basic pleading requirement of a “short and plain statement of 

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although Rule 8 does 

not require a plaintiff to plead particularized facts, the factual allegations in the complaint must 

sufficiently raise a plausible right to relief above a speculative level. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 

751–52 (7th Cir. 2011). When ruling on a motion to dismiss a court must accept all well-pleaded 

factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Discussion

As an initial matter, this Court dismisses Count II of the Fourth Amended Complaint as 

duplicative. The constitutional rights of a pretrial detainee are derived from the Due Process Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment as opposed to an inmate’s rights under the Eighth Amendment. 

Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16, 99 S. 

Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applies the same standard 

to claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment for pretrial detainees as it does to claims 

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brought by convicted prisoners under Eighth Amendment. See Farnham, 394 F.3d at 478 (citing 

Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 845 n.2 (7th Cir. 1999)).

Next, defendants move to dismiss Williams’ claims against the defendants in their official 

capacity. Courts treat an official capacity claim against a government official or an individual officer 

as a claim against the municipality itself. Pourghoraishi v. Flying J. Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 765 (7th Cir. 

2006). A municipality can have no liability under § 1983 simply because it employs the alleged 

wrongdoer. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). 

To state a claim against a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must identify a municipal policy or 

custom that caused the injury. Id. Municipal liability arises in three instances: “(1) an express policy 

that causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is permanent 

and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional 

injury was caused by a person with final policymaking authority.” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 

645, 656 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Williams alleges in his Fourth Amended Complaint three separate incidents with individual 

Cook County Sheriffs’ Deputies: Burrus, Wiggans, and Hower. Each incident is alleged as isolated. 

There are no factual allegations to support a policy or widespread practice of forcing pretrial 

detainees to walk or hop when they have presented medical orders prohibiting such activities. 

Williams also fails to allege that any of the named deputies is a person with final policymaking 

authority. Indeed, as alleged in the complaint, they are correctional officers with Cook County Jail. 

Williams does name Thomas Dart, Cook County Sheriff, as a defendant, but without some factual 

basis supporting a policy or widespread practice, Williams cannot sufficiently state a Monell claim for 

municipal liability. Accordingly, Williams’ official capacity claims against defendants Burrus, 

Wiggans, and Hower are dismissed with prejudice.

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Williams’ official capacity claim against defendant Dr. Patel fails for the same reasons. There 

are no allegations in the complaint supporting a policy or practice of delaying medical care. Indeed, 

Williams alleges that extent of medical care, including surgery that was ordered by Dr. Patel. While 

the Court does not want to minimize Williams’ injury, his individual claims against the defendants 

are viable, defendants have answered those claims, and Williams can proceed on those claims. 

Taking as true all allegations in the complaint, Williams fails to state a claim under Monell for liability 

in any defendants’ official capacity. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: April 15, 2014

Entered: _______________________________

 United States District Judge

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