J. S02015/19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

DARRYL JENKINS, : No. 981 EDA 2018

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, September 22, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Criminal Division at Nos. CP-09-CR-0004817-2017,

CP-09-CR-0005615-2016

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 23, 2019

Darryl Jenkins appeals from the September 22, 2017 judgment of 

sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County following his 

conviction of unlawful contact with a minor; corruption of minors, indecent 

assault – person less than 16 years of age; and default in required 

appearance.1 The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 111⁄2 to 

23 years’ imprisonment. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:

A.B. first had contact with [appellant] in 2002, when 

she was three years old. At that time, A.B.’s mother, 

[T.P.], became romantically involved with 

[appellant]. . . .

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6318(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(i)-(ii), 3126(a)(8), and 5124(a), 

respectively.
J. S02015/19

- 2 -

[Appellant] began to sexually assault A.B. when she 

was seven years old. Over the years, [appellant] 

routinely rubbed and touched her vagina, breasts and 

buttocks and digitally penetrated her vagina. 

[Appellant] also forcibly placed A.B.’s hand on his 

penis. [Appellant] told A.B., in vulgar and graphic 

terms, that he wanted to have sexual intercourse with 

her. 

The sexual assaults occurred in multiple rooms in the 

residences where A.B lived and occurred when she 

was alone as well as when others were in the home. 

A.B. testified that [appellant] even groped her in the 

presence of other people describing how he put his 

hands on her buttocks while pretending to be 

engaging in a fatherly hug. The inappropriate 

touching was so frequent, A.B. perceived it as 

happening every day he was in the home. 

A.B. did not initially report the abuse fearing her 

mother’s and [appellant]’s reactions. However, when 

she was 14 years old, A.B. wrote a letter to her mother 

telling her that she was being sexually abused by 

[appellant], whom she referred to as “dad.” A.B. 

handed the letter to her mother and went into her 

bedroom where, shortly thereafter, she was 

confronted by her tearful mother who wanted to know 

if A.B. was “sure this happened.” A.B. told her mother 

she was sure. [T.P.] then, in the presence of A.B., 

asked [appellant] if anything had occurred. 

[Appellant] denied touching A.B., turned to A.B. and 

asked, “Am I a monster?” A.B. responded, “Yes. I’m 

scared of you.” That same night, convinced by her 

mother’s reaction and conduct that her mother did not 

believe her, A.B. told her mother that she “made up” 

what she had written in her letter. A.B.’s mother did 

not keep the letter and the subject was not discussed 

again until approximately two years later when A.B.’s 

younger sister, [appellant]’s daughter D.P. observed 

[appellant] sexually assaulting A.B. in the basement 

of their Morrisville home in 2016.[Footnote 4]

[Footnote 4] After Children and Youth 

began its investigation in this case, case 
J. S02015/19

- 3 -

worker Lisa Gardner asked [T.P.] for the 

letter. [T.P.] later told Ms. Gardner that 

she could not find it.

On that occasion, A.B. was in the basement washing 

clothing. [Appellant] came into the basement, picked 

her up and put her down on a bin of clothes and then 

inserted his finger inside of her vagina. The assault 

was interrupted when D.P. appeared on the basement 

steps. When D.P. saw [appellant] and A.B. on the bin 

of clothes, she ran upstairs and told her mother what 

she had seen. [T.P.] reported that D.P. told her that 

she had seen her father’s hands “on or near” A.B.’s 

“behind.” [Appellant] quickly followed D.P. out of the 

basement. [T.P.] asked him what he had done to her 

daughter. He told her “nothing” had happened. [T.P.]

then stated that D.P. had seen what he did. 

[Appellant] then told [T.P.] that A.B. had put his hand 

down her pants. No one spoke to A.B. about the 

incident and [appellant] continued to live in the home 

as if nothing had happened.

[Appellant] continued to have unrestricted access to 

A.B. until June 1, 2016. On that date, 

Officer Christopher Reardon of the Morrisville Borough 

Police Department was working as the school resource 

officer assigned to the Morrisville High School and 

noticed that A.B., a student he knew, appeared to be 

upset. When he asked her what was wrong, she told 

him that her stepfather had been sexually abusing her 

for the past several years.

Bucks County Children and Youth Social Services 

Agency was immediately contacted and case worker 

Lisa Gardner responded to the school that same date. 

When Ms. Gardner and Officer Reardon attempted to 

conduct a joint interview of A.B., A.B. indicated that 

she didn’t want to talk about it anymore. 

Officer Reardon then left the room to allow 

Ms. Gardner to speak with A.B., hoping that A.B. 

would be more willing to confide intimate details to a 

woman. Ms. Gardner was then able to complete the 

interview. When the interview concluded, 

Ms. Gardner told Officer Reardon that A.B. reported 
J. S02015/19

- 4 -

[appellant] began sexually abusing her when she was 

seven years old, that he digitally penetrated her 

vagina and touched her breasts and buttocks. A.B. 

also told Ms. Gardner that if she wanted something 

from [appellant], such as food, [appellant] would ask 

her, “What are you going to do for me?” and then 

forced A.B. to touch his penis.

Upon receiving this information, Officer Reardon went 

to A.B.’s home and spoke to [T.P.], confronting her 

with the information A.B. had provided to 

Ms. Gardner. [T.P.] initially denied having any 

knowledge of wrongdoing. When asked, she denied 

receiving the letter from [sic] A.B. had written to her 

regarding [appellant]’s sexual abuse. In response to 

continued questioning, [T.P.] remembered receiving 

the letter in 2015. Upon further questioning, [T.P.]

also admitted that D.P. had told her about seeing 

something.

On that same date, [appellant] was interviewed at the 

Morrisville Borough Police Department. During the 

initial audio and video recorded interview, [appellant] 

denied any wrongdoing. He claimed that he was 

merely “playing” and “wrestling” and stated that A.B. 

initiated a lot of that physical contact. When asked if 

he was ever confronted about his behavior with A.B., 

he stated that on one prior occasion he had been told 

by [T.P.] that she was uncomfortable because he and 

A.B. were being “too friendly” and “too playful.” 

[Appellant] stated that he then asked A.B. if she was 

“scared” of him and that she said she was not. He 

made no mention of A.B.’s letter. [Appellant] claimed 

that thereafter he stopped “playing” with A.B. He 

claimed however, that A.B. continued to “play” and 

“roughhouse” with him, bumping, pushing and 

grabbing him. When confronted about the incident in 

the basement that D.P. had interrupted, [appellant] 

claimed that A.B. had grabbed his arms and that he 

had to push her away. He stated that he picked her 

up, placing his hand on her thigh, and put her down 

on top of the laundry. He stated that D.P. “could have 

perceived” this as his having his hands between A.B.’s 

legs.
J. S02015/19

- 5 -

[Appellant] was placed in a holding cell pending 

criminal charges being filed. Later that evening, 

[appellant] indicated he wished to speak with the 

investigating officers and a second audio and video 

recorded interview was conducted. In this interview, 

[appellant] accused A.B. of dressing inappropriately in 

front of him beginning at an early age. He stated that 

on one occasion she only had on a shirt and 

underwear. He also described her as wearing “skin 

tight pants.” He claimed that A.B. found him 

attractive, that she “teased” him, and that she 

touched his “private area.” He stated that she 

wouldn’t stop “playing” with him and that he touched 

her pelvic area by mistake. After additional 

questioning, [appellant] admitted that he intentionally 

rubbed A.B.’s vagina and breasts. He continued, 

however, to blame A.B. for the sexual encounters 

stating, “she always approached me” and “she came 

on to me.” At the conclusion of the interview, 

[appellant] admitted that he had, in fact, digitally 

penetrated A.B.

. . . . 

. . . . Jury selection [took place on March 29, 2017,]

and the trial commenced that afternoon. A.B. was the 

second witness called that afternoon. Upon taking the 

witness stand, A.B. immediately denied that she had 

been sexually abused by [appellant]. She testified 

that the statements she made to Officer Reardon and 

Ms. Garner were untrue. This Court then took a recess 

to allow the Commonwealth to prepare to examine 

A.B. as a hostile witness and entered an order 

precluding the Commonwealth and the defense from 

speaking to A.B. since she was still in the process of 

testifying.

. . . .

The following morning, March 30, 2017, A.B. 

appeared for trial at 9:30 a.m. as 

required.[Footnote 7] [Appellant] did not appear. At 

9:51 a.m., twenty-one minutes after trial was 
J. S02015/19

- 6 -

scheduled to recommence, [appellant] sent a text 

message to his attorney stating, “To hospital. Don’t 

feel very good at all. Going to sign myself in for 

mental health.” At this Court’s direction, counsel for 

[appellant] sent a text message to [appellant] at 

10:15 a.m. asking for information regarding his 

condition, the name of the hospital and the name of 

the treating physician. [Appellant] did not respond to 

the text message. He did not respond to counsel’s 

follow-up text message or counsel’s five follow-up 

calls to his cellphone.[Footnote 8] Neither [appellant] 

nor anyone on his behalf provided any further 

information as to [appellant]’s whereabouts or his 

condition.

[Footnote 7] Due to a conflict in schedule, 

Deputy Public Defender Nicholas J. 

Williamson, Esquire, replaced Mr. Hone.

[Footnote 8] Defense counsel advised the 

Court that he had reliably communicated 

with [appellant] via cellphone over the 

prior two months and that the only phone 

number he had for [appellant] was his 

cellphone number.

Based on the fact that [appellant] did not 

communicate with his attorney in a timely fashion and 

that he did not provide any specific information as to 

his condition or location so as to allow this Court or 

counsel to determine if there was in fact good cause 

for his failure to appear, this Court issued a bench 

warrant for his arrest. Counsel for [appellant] and the 

Commonwealth were then directed to use any means 

available to advise [appellant] that a warrant had 

been issued and that he was to surrender himself to 

the nearest law enforcement agency. A recess was 

taken to allow counsel for [appellant] and the 

Commonwealth to continue to investigate 

[appellant]’s whereabouts.

That afternoon, a hearing was held to determine 

whether [appellant] should be tried in abstentia. 

The Commonwealth’s evidence established that 
J. S02015/19

- 7 -

[appellant] was present on the evening of March 29, 

2017 when it was announced in open court that the 

trial would reconvene at 9:30 a.m. the following day. 

After [appellant] failed to appear on the morning of 

March 30, 2017, attempts by investigators to reach 

[appellant] and his family were unsuccessful. Calls to 

[appellant]’s cellphone went immediately to 

voicemail. None of the calls to family members were 

returned. All of the local hospitals in Trenton and 

Bucks County were contacted. Each hospital reported 

that [appellant] was not at their facility. [Appellant]’s 

current and former residences were checked with 

negative results. [Appellant]’s employer was 

contacted and reported that [appellant] had not 

reported for work. [Appellant]’s best friend was 

contacted and told police that he had not had any 

contact with [appellant] over the previous twenty-four 

hours and had no information as to his whereabouts. 

The county correctional facilities in Bucks County or 

Trenton reported that [appellant] was not in their 

custody.

Defense counsel introduced a portion of [appellant]’s 

statement to police prior to his arrest wherein he 

stated that he had suffered from severe panic attacks 

in the past. Defense counsel also introduced a text 

message he had received from [appellant] at 

4:36 p.m. the previous evening, while the court was 

in recess.[Footnote 9] In that text message, 

[appellant] advised counsel that he was trying to find 

a Rite Aid pharmacy to get medication claiming that 

he was having “very bad chest pains” and “severe 

anxiety.” Counsel responded, via text message, 

advising him not to leave the area. At 5:01 p.m., 

after court was recessed for the day, counsel sent a 

text message to [appellant] informing him that he was 

free to leave and that court would start at 9:30 a.m. 

the following day.

[Footnote 9] At 3:44 p.m., after a fifteen 

minute recess, the jury was released for 

the day. Court was adjourned at 

5:35 p.m.
J. S02015/19

- 8 -

Based on this information, this Court directed the 

Commonwealth to obtain an update from Capital 

Health Medical Center, the hospital used by 

[appellant] and where he had been treated for 

anxiety, to determine if [appellant] had appeared 

since the Commonwealth’s initial inquiry earlier that 

morning. The Court also directed the Commonwealth 

to determine whether [appellant] had contacted 

Bucks County or Trenton police radio requesting 

emergency medical assistance. After yet another 

recess, the Commonwealth presented evidence that 

Capital Health Medical Center had confirmed that 

[appellant] was not at that facility and that neither 

Bucks County nor Trenton police radio had received a 

request for emergency assistance from [appellant] or 

from [appellant]’s Trenton residence.

Based on the evidence presented, this Court 

determined that [appellant] was voluntarily absent 

without cause and therefore ruled that the trial would 

continue in his absence. This Court also directed that 

the notes of testimony be transcribed as the trial 

proceeded so that the testimony taken in his absence 

would be available to him should he surrender himself 

or be apprehended prior to the conclusion of trial. 

Prior to taking any further testimony, the jurors were 

instructed that they were not to speculate as to why 

[appellant] was not present in the courtroom and that 

they were not to hold his absence against him.

Late in the afternoon of March 30, 2017, A.B. retook 

the stand and testified that [appellant] had in fact 

sexually abused her as she had previously reported to 

her mother, Officer Reardon and Ms. Gardner. She 

told the jury that she had not been truthful the day 

before because she, her sister D.P. and her mother 

were worried about what would happen to their family 

if [appellant] were to be convicted since he financially 

supported their family.

. . . . 

[Appellant] remained a fugitive throughout the 

remainder of the trial. On April 3, 2017, he was 
J. S02015/19

- 9 -

convicted of Unlawful Contact with a Minor, Corruption 

of Minors and Indecent Assault - person less than 

16 years of age.[Footnote 10]

[Footnote 10] [Appellant] was found not 

guilty of Aggravated Indecent Assault 

(person less than 13 years of age), 

18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3125(a)(7), and 

Indecent Assault (person less than 

13 years of age), 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] 

§ 3126(a)(7), The jury did not reach a 

verdict on Aggravated Indecent Assault of 

a Child, 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3125(b), and 

Aggravated Indecent Assault (person less 

than 16 years of age), 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] 

§ 3125(a)(8). The Commonwealth chose 

not to retry [appellant] on the charges 

upon which the jury was deadlocked.

After the verdict, [appellant] was charged with Default 

in Required Appearance. The investigation into 

[appellant]’s whereabouts revealed that, after leaving 

the courthouse, [appellant] disconnected his cell 

phone service, thereby preventing law enforcement 

from locating him through his phone, and that he 

withdrew $15,000 from his Wells Fargo account 

between the evening hours of March 29, 2017, the 

night before his failure to appear for trial, and the 

afternoon of Sunday, April 2, 2017, the afternoon 

before the jury’s verdict. [Appellant] made a personal 

withdraw [sic] at a bank in Trenton, New Jersey, on 

March 30, 2017, at 9:25 a.m., five minutes before he 

was to appear in Doylestown for trial and 

approximately twenty-five minutes before he sent a 

text message to his attorney informing him that he 

did not “feel very good at all” and was on his way to 

the hospital.

[Appellant] remained a fugitive until June 27, 2017, 

when he was arrested by the U.S. Marshalls in 

Trenton, New Jersey. . . . 

. . . . 
J. S02015/19

- 10 -

. . . . This Court imposed a sentence of three and 

one-half to seven years for Unlawful Contact with a 

Minor, graded as a felony of the third degree, three 

and one-half to seven years for Corruption of Minors, 

graded as a felony of the third degree, and one to two 

years for Indecent Assault - person less than 16 years 

of age, graded as a misdemeanor of the second 

degree. For the crime of Default in Required 

Appearance, graded as a felony of the third degree, 

this Court imposed a sentence of three and one-half 

to seven years. All of these sentences were ordered 

to be served consecutive to one another.

On October 2, 2017, [appellant] filed post-sentence 

motions. A hearing on those motions was held on 

October 19, 2017. . . .

On October 19, 2017, [appellant] was granted leave 

to file additional post-sentence motions. [Appellant] 

filed additional post-sentence motions on 

February 27, 2018. By Order dated February 28, 

2018, this Court denied [appellant]’s requests for 

post-sentence relief.

Trial court opinion, 6/8/18 at 1-14 (citations to record omitted).

Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this court on March 23, 2018. The 

trial court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and appellant timely complied. 

On June 8, 2018, the trial court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

I. Did the Trial Court commit an abuse of 

discretion when imposing a sentence, outside 

the standard and aggravated ranges, to the 

maximum sentence possible for each charge?

II. Did the Trial Court err when it stopped and 

prevented the direct testimony of the 

Commonwealth’s witness [A.B.], and declared 
J. S02015/19

- 11 -

that witness as hostile, without any motion or

request by either the witness or the 

Commonwealth?

III. Did the Trial Court properly admit prior 

consistent statements of the witness [A.B.], 

where statements were admitted prior to [A.B.] 

testifying and where the repetitive and 

cumulative statements were prejudicial?

IV. Did the Trial Court err by allowing the trial to 

continue in the absence of [a]ppellant?

Appellant’s brief at 8.

I.

In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it imposed the statutory maximum sentence for each count 

of which appellant was convicted. Specifically, appellant contends that by 

imposing a statutory maximum sentence for each count and then running 

those sentences consecutively, the trial court “applied an unreasonable 

sentencing scheme.” (Appellant’s brief at 22.)

[T]he proper standard of review when 

considering whether to affirm the 

sentencing court’s determination is an 

abuse of discretion. . . . [A]n abuse of 

discretion is more than a mere error of 

judgment; thus, a sentencing court will 

not have abused its discretion unless the 

record discloses that the judgment 

exercised was manifestly unreasonable, 

or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill-will. In more expansive terms, our 

Court recently offered: An abuse of 

discretion may not be found merely 

because an appellate court might have 

reached a different conclusion, but 
J. S02015/19

- 12 -

requires a result of manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of 

support so as to be clearly erroneous.

The rationale behind such broad 

discretion and the concomitantly 

deferential standard of appellate review is 

that the sentencing court is in the best 

position to determine the proper penalty 

for a particular offense based upon an 

evaluation of the individual circumstances 

before it.

[Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 

2007)].

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing 

do not entitle an appellant to review as of right. 

Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 

(Pa.Super. 2000). An appellant challenging the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this 

Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to 

determine: (1) whether appellant has 

filed a timely notice of appeal, see 

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the 

issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider 

and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 

[720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a 

fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and

(4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from 

is not appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 

(Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, [] 909 A.2d 303 

([Pa.] 2006) (internal citations omitted). Objections 

to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are 

generally waived if they are not raised at the 

sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify the 
J. S02015/19

- 13 -

sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 

A.2d 788, 794 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, [] 

831 A.2d 599 ([Pa.] 2003).

The determination of what constitutes a substantial 

question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 

Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825, 828 

(Pa.Super. 2007). A substantial question exists “only 

when the appellant advances a colorable argument

that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: 

(1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the 

Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental 

norms which underlie the sentencing process. Sierra, 

supra at 912-913.

As to what constitutes a substantial question, this 

Court does not accept bald assertions of sentencing 

errors. Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 

1247, 1252 (Pa.Super. 2006). An appellant must 

articulate the reasons the sentencing court’s actions 

violated the sentencing code. Id.

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 169-170 (Pa.Super. 2010).

Here, we begin our analysis by determining whether appellant has 

complied with the procedural requirements of challenging his sentence. First, 

appellant timely filed his notice of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903. 

Second, he properly preserved the issue in post-sentence motions that were 

filed on October 2, 2017 and February 27, 2018. The sentencing court denied 

appellant’s motions on February 28, 2018.

Third, appellant included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief, in which 

he avers that the “trial court’s imposition of sentence is far beyond the 

aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines and was prejudicial on its face 

in that the [trial court] obviously believed [a]ppellant should have been 
J. S02015/19

- 14 -

convicted of more than he was.” (See appellant’s brief at 19.) Specifically, 

appellant notes that the minimum sentence imposed by the trial court was in 

excess of the maximum sentence in the aggravated range of the sentencing 

guidelines. (Id. at 21-22.) As the trial court noted on the record, the 

maximum term of incarceration in the aggravated range of the sentencing 

guidelines for unlawful contact with a minor is 18 months, indecent assault is 

18 months, corruption of minors is 18 months, and default in required 

appearance is 6 months. (Notes of testimony, 9/22/17 at 66-67.) The trial 

court’s minimum aggregate sentence of 111⁄2 years is clearly in excess of the 

guidelines.2 Finally, in light of appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement, we find 

that appellant has advanced a substantial question. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9781(c)(3).

In every case where the court imposes a sentence 

outside the sentencing guidelines . . . the court shall 

provide a contemporaneous written statement of the 

reason or reasons for the deviation from the 

guidelines. Failure to comply shall be grounds for 

vacating the sentence and resentencing the 

defendant.

Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa.Super. 2015), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Rodda, 723 A.2d 212, 215 (Pa.Super. 1999), citing 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). A trial court satisfies this requirement “when the 

 

2 The trial court’s sentence breaks down as follows: 31⁄2 to 7 years’ 

imprisonment for unlawful contact with a minor; 31⁄2 to 7 years’ imprisonment 

for corruption of a minor; 1 to 2 years’ imprisonment for indecent assault; and 

31⁄2 to 7 years’ imprisonment for default in required appearance, all of which 

were to run consecutively. (Id. at 78-79.)
J. S02015/19

- 15 -

judge states [her] reasons for the sentence on the record and in the 

defendant’s presence.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760 

(Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 667 A.2d 215, 223 (Pa.Super. 1995), rev. on 

other grounds, 689 A.2d 211 (Pa. 1997).

When sentencing appellant, the trial court made the following notation 

for the record:

I agree with [the Commonwealth’s] characterization 

of those factors. I think -- I think [the 

Commonwealth] accurately and succinctly stated 

where the sentencing guidelines do not apply based 

on the facts and circumstances of this case. But the 

message I hope the community gets out of these 

proceedings is that when children are victimized, 

when children are hurt, that they will receive justice if 

they report.

Sometimes I say I am amazed that any child ever 

reports sexual abuse ever when they face being called 

a liar and when they face being called a horrid [sic] 

and face being attacked and losing their family and 

losing their mom and losing their home. I am 

surprised anyone ever comes forward when we can’t 

even guarantee that we keep custody of those who 

have been convicted of abusing them. That if they 

come forward, if they have the bravery to come 

forward, that they will receive justice, that there will 

be a time in their life where they get to sleep at night 

without worrying about a perpetrator, a predator, that 

they can know that they will be protected to the best 

of this court’s ability.

One of the things that [appellant] is not aware of, 

because he wasn’t here, was the extreme steps the 

court and [the Commonwealth] took to make sure 

[A.B.] had a place to live and stay. And immediately 

following the verdict when [appellant was] on the 
J. S02015/19

- 16 -

loose and [A.B.’s] mother was clearly conspiring with 

[appellant] to interfere in the prosecution and to 

interfere in [appellant’s] apprehension, that [A.B.] 

had somewhere safe to go.

So after all this, at the end of the day after this jury 

came back and you told us the truth -- and we 

appreciate it. Thank you. You told us the truth -- that 

she didn’t get to go home to her own bed. She had 

to go to some strange people, with strange people and 

some -- laying down in some strange bed, and that’s 

what you did to her.

Based on all of those circumstances, based on the 

factors as set forth by [the Commonwealth], with 

regard to the sentencing guidelines, based on the 

course of conduct, based on the complete devastation 

of a young life both while the crimes were being 

committed, while the case was being prosecuted, and 

then after the conviction was finally won, I find that 

the sentencing guidelines are not in any way reflective 

of the facts and circumstances of this case and I am 

going to exceed the sentencing guidelines.

Notes of testimony, 9/22/17 at 75-77.

Here, the record reflects that the trial court provided the reasons for its 

deviation from the sentencing guidelines and did so on the record and in 

appellant’s presence. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion when it sentenced appellant in excess of the maximum sentence 

of the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines.

II.

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred when it “stopped and 

prevented the direct testimony of [A.B.] and declared that witness as hostile, 

without any motion or request by either the witness or the Commonwealth.” 
J. S02015/19

- 17 -

(Appellant’s brief at 28.) Specifically, appellant avers that the trial court 

exceeded its authority under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 611(a), which 

directs a court to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of 

examining witnesses and presenting evidence as to make those procedures 

effective for determining the truth[.]” (Id. at 31; Pa.R.E. 611(a)(1).) The 

Commonwealth argues that appellant failed to preserve the issue at trial, 

thereby waiving the issue on appeal. (Commonwealth’s brief at 26-27.)

It is well settled in this Commonwealth that a party must raise a timely 

objection to an evidentiary ruling by the trial court in order to preserve the 

issue for appellate review. Commonwealth v. Wanner, 158 A.3d 714, 717 

(Pa.Super. 2017), citing Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower 

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

The record reflects that appellant did not raise any objection to the trial 

court’s ruling declaring A.B. to be a hostile witness. (See notes of testimony, 

3/29/17 at 58-72; 3/30/17 at 78-144.) Accordingly, appellant’s second issue 

is waived on appeal.

III.

In his third issue, appellant argues that the trial court “improperly 

admitted prior consistent statements of [A.B.], where statements were 

admitted prior to [A.B.’s] testifying and where the repetitive and cumulative 

statements were prejudicial.” (Appellant’s brief at 36.) In his brief, appellant 

specifically avers that the trial court’s admission of testimony from both 
J. S02015/19

- 18 -

Officer Christopher Reardon (“Officer Reardon”) of the Morrisville Borough 

Police Department3 and Lisa Gardner, a caseworker with the Bucks County 

Children and Youth Social Services Agency (“Children and Youth”) was in error 

because their testimony was cumulative and prejudicial. (Id. at 41.) 

Additionally, appellant avers that a portion of Officer Reardon’s testimony 

violated the rule against hearsay. (Id. at 38.)

The Commonwealth raises a partial waiver argument. Specifically, the 

Commonwealth contends that appellant’s claims regarding Ms. Gardner’s 

testimony and the inappropriate admission of hearsay evidence via 

Officer Reardon’s testimony are waived on appeal because appellant failed to 

include these issues in his Rule 1925(b) statement. (Commonwealth’s brief 

at 31.) Based on our review of appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement, we agree.

The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure require appellants to 

“concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge 

with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). Issues that are not included in an appellant’s 

Rule 1925(b) statement are waived on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).

Here, appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement reads, in relevant part: 

“Whether the trial court properly admitted prior consistent statements of 

witness [A.B.], where the statements were admitted prior to [A.B.] testifying 

 

3 Officer Reardon was assigned to Morrisville High School as the school’s 

resource officer. (Notes of testimony, 3/29/17 at 26-27.) 
J. S02015/19

- 19 -

and where the repetitive and cumulative statements were prejudicial?” 

(Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement at 1.)

This issue did not specifically challenge Ms. Gardner’s testimony, which 

occurred after A.B.’s testimony, or Officer Reardon’s alleged hearsay 

testimony. Accordingly, appellant waives these challenges on appeal.

Appellate review of a trial court’s admission of evidence is governed by 

the following standard:

Our standard of review regarding the admissibility of 

evidence is an abuse of discretion. “[T]he 

admissibility of evidence is a matter addressed to the 

sound discretion of the trial court and . . . an appellate 

court may only reverse upon a showing that the trial 

court abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. 

Weiss, [] 776 A.2d 958, 967 ([Pa.] 2001) (citations 

omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not a mere error 

in judgment but, rather, involves bias, ill will, 

partiality, prejudice, manifest unreasonableness, or 

misapplication of law.” Commonwealth v. Hoover, 

16 A.3d 1148, 1150 (Pa.Super. 2011).

Commonwealth v. Cox, 115 A.3d 333, 336 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 124 A.3d 308 (Pa. 2015), quoting Commonwealth v. 

Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1251-1252 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 80 A.3d 

774 (Pa. 2013).

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court states that it admitted 

Officer Reardon’s initial testimony regarding Ms. Gardner’s summary of the 

interview she conducted with A.B. and provided to Officer Reardon, which 

served as the basis of Officer Reardon’s decision to interview A.B.’s mother 

and to bring appellant in for questioning. (Trial court opinion, 6/8/18 at 17.) 
J. S02015/19

- 20 -

As noted by the trial court, our supreme court has held that such statements 

are properly admitted in order to explain a police officer’s subsequent course 

of conduct. Commonwealth v. Weiss, 81 A.3d 767, 805 (Pa. 2013), citing 

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 532 (Pa. 2005) (“[i]t is well 

established that certain out-of-court statements offered to explain the course 

of police conduct are admissible because they are offered not for the truth of 

the matters asserted but rather to show the information upon which the police 

acted.”). Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it admitted Officer Reardon’s testimony.

Appellant further argues that the trial court erred because it unilaterally 

expanded the scope of Officer Reardon’s testimony and, by so doing, admitted 

cumulative evidence. (Appellant’s brief at 39.) Specifically, appellant takes 

exception to the trial court’s instruction to the jury that, following A.B.’s 

testimony, Officer Reardon’s testimony could be used by the jury to determine 

A.B.’s credibility.4 (Id., citing notes of testimony, 3/31/17 at 16.) Appellant 

failed to preserve this issue for appellant review in the trial court, therefore,

waiving this argument on appeal.

The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure prohibit an appellant 

from raising an issue for the first time on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Failure 

 

4 Previously, the trial court instructed the jury that Officer Reardon’s testimony 

could only be considered to explain his course of conduct during the 

investigation. (Notes of testimony, 3/29/17 at 38.)
J. S02015/19

- 21 -

to preserve an issue before the trial court results in waiver of the issue on 

appeal. Id. Indeed, our supreme court has held:

[I]t is axiomatic that issues are preserved when 

objections are made timely to the error or offense. 

See Commonwealth v. May, [], 887 A.2d 750, 761 

([Pa.] 2005) (holding that an “absence of 

contemporaneous objections renders” an appellant's 

claims waived); and Commonwealth v. Bruce, [], 

916 A.2d 657, 671 ([Pa.Super.] 2007), appeal 

denied, [], 932 A.2d 74 ([Pa.] 2007) (holding that a 

“failure to offer a timely and specific objection results 

in waiver of” the claim). Therefore, we shall consider 

any issue waived where Appellant failed to assert a 

timely objection.

Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 960 A.2d 59, 73 (Pa. 2008), cert. 

denied sub nom. Baumhammers v. Pennsylvania, 558 U.S. 821 (2009).

The record reflects that outside of the presence of the jury, the trial 

court notified the parties of its intention to alter its instructions to the jury in 

regards to Officer Reardon’s testimony:

THE COURT: Yes. All right. 

The other thing I wanted to say is that I need to 

instruct -- I need to instruct the jury that when -- that 

the prior out-of-court statements that Officer Reardon 

testified to, at the time that he testified to her prior 

statements, I indicated that they could only consider 

that at that stage of the proceedings for purposes of 

why the officer did what he did.

[Appellant’s counsel]: Correct.

THE COURT: Everybody remembers that.

[Appellant’s counsel]: Yes

[The Commonwealth]: Yes, Your Honor.
J. S02015/19

- 22 -

THE COURT: Now they may consider it for purposes 

of determining her credibility for prior consistent 

statements.

[The Commonwealth]: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

Notes of testimony, 3/31/17 at 13-14. The record reflects that appellant failed 

to raise a contemporaneous objection to the trial court’s supplemental jury 

instruction. Accordingly, this particular argument is waived on appeal.

IV.

Appellant finally contends that the trial court erred when it conducted 

his trial in absentia because at the time the trial court made its ruling, “all 

that was known for certain was that [a]ppellant had twice communicated with 

his attorney that he was in some sort of distress and that [a]ppellant was 

seeking help.” (Appellant’s brief at 47.)

The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure require a criminal 

defendant to be present at every stage of the trial. Pa.R.Crim.P. 602(A). 

However, “[t]he defendant's absence without cause at the time scheduled for 

the start of trial or during trial shall not preclude proceeding with the trial, 

including the return of the verdict and the imposition of sentence.” Id. In 

those cases, the Commonwealth has the burden to prove, by a preponderance

of the evidence, that the defendant’s absence is without cause and that the 

defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to be present for his 
J. S02015/19

- 23 -

trial. Commonwealth v. Hill, 737, A.2d 255, 259 (Pa.Super. 1999). Our 

supreme court has held, however, that a review of the sufficiency of the 

Commonwealth’s evidence is not necessary if the record, taken as a whole, 

establishes that the defendant had notice of trial and nonetheless “willfully 

decided to absent himself without cause or justification.” Commonwealth v. 

Sullens, 619 A.2d 1349, 1352-1353 (Pa. 1992). Indeed, in Sullens, the 

defendant admitted during sentencing that he knew of his trial date and 

knowingly absconded. Id. at 1353.

Here, appellant admitted to knowingly absenting himself from trial when 

he pled guilty to one count of default in required appearance. The record 

reflects the following admission:

THE COURT: Do you admit that those facts are 

correct; that you, in fact, left the trial that was 

referred to, that you continually left that trial, that you 

intentionally fled to avoid prosecution and conviction 

and sentencing?

[Appellant]: Yes.

Notes of testimony, 9/22/17 at 21.

Due to appellant’s admission on the record that he intentionally 

absented himself from trial in order to avoid prosecution, conviction, and 

sentencing, we find that the trial court did not err when it conducted 

appellant’s trial in absentia.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
J. S02015/19

- 24 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/19