IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

AMIR ELMORE, §

§ No. 597, 2014

Defendant-below, §

Appellant. § Court Below: 

§ Superior Court of the

v. § State of Delaware, in and for

 § Kent County

STATE OF DELAWARE, §

§ Cr. I.D. No. 1404013039B

Plaintiff-below, §

Appellee. §

Submitted: May 13, 2015

Decided: June 9, 2015

Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and VALIHURA, Justices. 

O R D E R

This 9

th day of June 2015, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the 

record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Appellant Amir Elmore (“Elmore”) was convicted of Possession of a 

Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”) and Possession of Ammunition by a 

Person Prohibited (“PABPP”). Elmore was sentenced to a total of fifteen years at 

Level V incarceration, suspended after ten years for one year of Level III 

probation. On appeal, Elmore argues that the Superior Court erred as a matter of 

law when it denied his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal as to the element of 

possession in both of the charges against him. We disagree, and for the reasons 

stated herein, AFFIRM the judgment below.
2

(2) On April 18, 2014, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Dover Police Officer 

Rankin responded to a call about a possible domestic dispute in room 201 at the 

Capital Inn Motel. When Officer Rankin arrived at the Capital Inn, he observed a 

black male dressed in black clothing, later identified as Elmore, on the balcony of 

the second floor of the motel -- the same floor on which room 201 is located.

(3) Officer Rankin proceeded to the second floor of the Capital Inn, but 

the individual he observed earlier was no longer present. Officer Rankin and 

Delaware State University Officer Johnson knocked on the door of room 201 

several times, but no one answered. The officers observed a woman, later 

identified as Aisha Legrand (“Legrand”), poking her head out of a different room 

down the hall. Officer Rankin escorted Legrand down to the lobby of the Capital 

Inn to conduct a field interview.

(4) Soon thereafter, Dover Police Officer Wood arrived on the scene, and 

began checking the area for Elmore. While Officer Rankin was interviewing 

Legrand, Elmore appeared in the lobby of the motel, and admitted to hitting 

Legrand, stating “Stop beating around the bush. Tell them I hit you.”

(5) Officers Rankin and Wood removed Elmore from the lobby. A search 

of Elmore’s person revealed contraband. Elmore was then handcuffed and taken 

into custody. Elmore was placed in the back of Officer Wood’s police car and 

driven to the location of Officer Rankin’s vehicle. During the drive, Officer Wood 
3

did not question Elmore. However, Officer Wood testified that Elmore made an 

unprovoked statement, asking “to have his gun back that he left in the hotel room.” 

Elmore told Officer Wood that the gun was “under the first bed as you entered the 

hotel room.” Officer Wood testified that Elmore “just asked that he have it back. 

He stated that the victim and the children didn’t know the firearm was in the room 

under the bed, didn’t want to leave it in there with them.” Later, Officer Rankin 

looked under the first bed in room 201, and “found a loaded sawed-off shotgun, 

one round in the chamber, one round beside it.”1

(6) When Elmore was taken to the Dover Police Station, his criminal 

history revealed that he been convicted of the felony offense of Robbery Second 

Degree in June 2010. As a convicted felon, Elmore was prohibited from 

possessing a firearm or ammunition under 11 Del. C. § 1448(a)(1).

2

 On September 

29, 2014, a one-day bench trial was held in the Superior Court. After the State 

 

1

Elmore’s sawed-off shotgun was admitted at the bench trial as State’s Ex. 1. The two shotgun 

shells were live rounds and were also admitted into evidence at trial as State’s Ex. 2. 

2

11 Del. C. § 1448(a)(1) (“Except as otherwise provided herein, the following persons are 

prohibited from purchasing, owning, possessing or controlling a deadly weapon or ammunition 

for a firearm within the State: (1) Any person having been convicted in this State or elsewhere 

of a felony or a crime of violence involving physical injury to another, whether or not armed 

with or having in possession any weapon during the commission of such felony or crime of 

violence.”). 
4

presented its case, Elmore moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the Trial 

Court denied. The Superior Court found Elmore guilty of PFBPP and PABPP.

3

(7) We review “de novo a trial judge’s denial of a criminal defendant’s 

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal to determine whether any rational trier of fact, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the 

essential elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”4

(8) Section 1448(b) of Title 11 provides that “[a]ny prohibited person as 

set forth in subsection (a) of this section who knowingly possesses, purchases, 

owns or controls a deadly weapon or ammunition for a firearm while so prohibited 

shall be guilty of possession of a deadly weapon or ammunition for a firearm by a 

person prohibited.”

5

 A firearm is a deadly weapon within the meaning of the 

Criminal Code.6 To prove constructive possession of a firearm, the State must 

show that the defendant “(1) knew the location of the gun; (2) had the ability to 

exercise dominion and control over the gun; and (3) intended to exercise dominion 

 

3 App. to Appellant Opening Br. at A26. 

4 White v. State, 906 A.2d 82, 85 (Del. 2011) (emphasis removed). 

5

11 Del. C. § 1448(b); Triplett v. State, 2014 WL 1888414, at *2 (Del. May 9, 2014). 

6

See 11 Del. C. § 222(5) (“‘Deadly weapon’ includes a ‘firearm’, as defined in paragraph (12) of 

this section. . . .”); 11 Del. C. § 222(12) (“‘Firearm’ includes any weapon from which a shot, 

projectile or other object may be discharged by force of combustion, explosive, gas and/or 

mechanical means, whether operable or inoperable, loaded or unloaded. It does not include a BB 

gun.”).
5

and control over the gun.”7 Circumstantial evidence may prove constructive 

possession.8 As we have previously stated, establishing possession of a deadly 

weapon by a person prohibited “does not require presenting evidence that a deadly 

weapon was physically available and accessible at the specific time of arrest.”9 

The requirements for establishing PABPP are the same as those for establishing 

PFBPP.

10

(9) Elmore argues that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that he 

had constructive possession of the gun and ammunition in the motel room. Elmore 

relies on Lecates v. State to argue that the State must establish physical availability 

and accessibility in addition to proving constructive possession. Elmore misstates 

the law, because in Lecates we held that “[p]hysical availability and accessibility 

are not essential to establishing [possession of a deadly weapon by a person 

prohibited].”11

 

7

Triplett, 2014 WL 1888414, at *2.

8

See id.

9

Lecates v. State, 987 A.2d 413, 420-21 (Del. 2009). 

10 See 11 Del. C. § 1448(b).

11 Lecates, 987 A.2d at 421 (emphasis added). In Lecates, we clarified that possession of a 

deadly weapon by a person prohibited and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission 

of a felony are analyzed differently. “We apply a more limited definition of possession to 

[possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony] than [possession of a deadly 

weapon by a person prohibited] because, unlike establishing [possession of a deadly weapon by a 

person prohibited], establishing [possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a 

felony] requires evidence of physical availability and accessibility.” Id. at 418
6

(10) Next, Elmore contends that there was an insufficient nexus linking 

him to actually or constructively possessing the gun and ammunition. The Trial 

Court concluded that there was a sufficient nexus established by the State based on 

Elmore’s statement, the dispatch concerning room 201, and overall circumstances 

that led to Officer Rankin retrieving a gun and ammunition from the exact spot 

where Elmore said the gun was located. Further, the Trial Court held that 

Elmore’s possession of the sawed-off shotgun and the two live shotgun shells was 

“knowing” as required by 11 Del. C. § 1448 in view of Elmore’s statement to 

Officer Wood about where to find the gun, and not wanting the gun to remain in 

the room.12

(11) Our decision in Triplett v. State is instructive on this point. There, the 

police found a loaded Colt .38 revolver in a man’s jacket in an unoccupied house

that the defendant was earlier seen leaving.

13

 The gun was wrapped in a direct 

deposit slip, dated eight days before the date of the search, bearing the defendant’s 

name and the address of the unoccupied house. Another pocket of the jacket 

contained a Delaware identification card also bearing the defendant’s name and the 

 

12 11 Del. C. § 231(c) (“A person acts knowingly with respect to an element of an offense when: 

(1) If the element involves the nature of the person’s conduct or the attendant circumstances, the 

person is aware that the conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (2) If the 

element involves a result of the person’s conduct, the person is aware that it is practically certain 

that the conduct will cause that result.”).

13 Triplett, 2014 WL 1888414, at *1. 
7

address of the unoccupied house. Although no fingerprints or DNA linked the 

defendant to the gun, the circumstantial evidence in the case was sufficient to 

convict him of PFBPP.

14

 

(12) Here, Elmore contends that he never indicated the specific room 

where the gun was located, and thus there is an insufficient nexus linking him to 

the gun and ammunition. Elmore’s argument is misplaced. Officer Wood testified 

that when Elmore indicated where the gun was stored, “he was referencing to 

Room 201.” Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a 

reasonable trier of fact could find that Elmore knew the location of the gun because 

he told police exactly where to find it. Further, a reasonable trier of fact could find 

that Elmore had the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over the 

weapon since he had placed the gun and ammunition under the bed, and had 

requested that police return his gun to him. That Elmore was not directly observed 

by police officers entering or leaving room 201 of the Capital Inn does not defeat 

the circumstantial evidence that the State did in fact present.

(13) Thus, the Trial Court properly concluded that, viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find that Elmore 

did have constructive possession of both the firearm and the ammunition, and that 

 

14 Id. at *2.
8

he was guilty of PFBPP and PABPP beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we 

find no error in the Trial Court’s denial of Elmore’s Motion for Judgment of 

Acquittal.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the

Superior Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura

Justice