alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JACQUES RIVERA,

Plaintiff,

v.

REYNALDO GUEVARA, et al., 

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 12 C 4428

Hon. Joan B. Gottschall,

District Judge

Hon. Mary M. Rowland,

Magistrate Judge

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PLAINTIFF’S SUPPLEMENTAL DEFINITION

FOR INCLUSION IN THE DUE PROCESS INSTRUCTION

Plaintiff JACQUES RIVERA, by his attorneys, respectfully submits the following 

SUPPLEE:

1. With apologies to the Court for the last-minute submission, Plaintiff respectfully 

proposes that the Court add a sentence to the definition of “material” in the due process 

instruction. 

2. Specifically, Plaintiff submits that a second sentence should be added to that 

definition reading: “You should consider whether evidence was material by considering all 

evidence that was suppressed cumulatively, rather than examining each piece of evidence 

in isolation.”

3. The Supreme Court has stressed recently that this cumulative examination of 

evidence is important to Brady claims. Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2016); Kyles v. 

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441 (1995). Plaintiff thinks the instruction is important in this case.

4. Plaintiff has conferred with Defendants, and Defendants object to this addition on 

the ground that the Court already determined it will use the pattern instruction, and because the 

Case: 1:12-cv-04428 Document #: 661 Filed: 06/26/18 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:34868
additional definitional language is not part of the pattern instruction, is cumulative, and is 

unnecessary.

Respectfully submitted, 

JACQUES RIVERA

By: /s/ Jon Loevy

One of Plaintiff’s Attorneys 

Arthur Loevy Locke E. Bowman

Jon Loevy David Shapiro 

Russell Ainsworth Alexa Van Brunt

Anand Swaminathan RODERICK MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER

Steven Art Northwestern University School of Law

Rachel Brady 375 E. Chicago Avenue

Sean Starr Chicago, Illinois 60611

LOEVY & LOEVY (312) 503-0844

311 N. Aberdeen St., Third Floor

Chicago, IL 60607 J. Samuel Tenenbaum 

(312) 243-5900 BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC

Northwestern University School of Law

375 E. Chicago Avenue

Chicago, Illinois 60611

(312) 503-8576

Case: 1:12-cv-04428 Document #: 661 Filed: 06/26/18 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:34869
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Jon Loevy, an attorney, hereby certify that on June 26, 2018, I filed the foregoing via 

the Court’s CM/ECF system and thereby served a copy on all counsel of record. 

/s/ Jon Loevy

One of Plaintiff’s Attorneys 

Case: 1:12-cv-04428 Document #: 661 Filed: 06/26/18 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:34870
246.408-70 Subsistence. ( a ) The Surgeons General of the military departments are responsible for— ( 1 ) Acceptance criteria;
( 2 ) Technical requirements; and
( 3 ) Inspection procedures needed to assure wholesomeness of foods.
( b ) The contracting office may designate any Federal activity, capable of assuring wholesomeness and quality in food, to perform quality assurance for subsistence contract items. The designation may— ( 1 ) Include medical service personnel of the military departments; and
( 2 ) Be on a reimbursable basis.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Theodore Rhodes, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered August 5, 1963 on his plea of guilty, convicting him of assault in the second degree, with intent to commit rape, and sentencing him to serve an indeterminate term of one day to life [see 40 Misc 2d 108], Judgment affirmed. The psychiatric report did not state that the defendant was psychologically a sex deviant or that he .was a menace to society. It was recommended that the psychiatric facilities of the prison should be made available to the defendant should he be sent to prison. After the court had obtained a current and pertinent report of a psychiatric examination, it was discretionary with the court as to whether it should impose a sentence of one day to life or such other punishment as was authorized by statute (Penal Law, §§ 243, 2189-a, 2189; *People ex rel. Lawson*v. *Denno,*9 N Y 2d 181; Public Papers of Governor Thomas E. Dewey, 1950, p. 159 *et seq.).*After the defendant commenced to serve the sentence, he made a motion to be returned for resentence. While the motion was denied as a matter of law, the sentencing Judge said that, in the light of the additional information and details presented to Mm, he would impose a sentence of 2% to 5 years were the matter before him *de novo.*He recommended that the Parole *907Board consider the sentence as one of 2% to 5 years unless the conduct of the defendant, while in custody, revealed that it would not be either in his or the public interest to do so *(People*v. *Rhodes,*40 Misc 2d 108). In our opinion, the information furnished to the sentencing Judge after the defendant began to serve his prison term — information which is not in the record before us—does not require a determination that this information should operate retrospectively, nor require a declaration that the sentencing court exercised its discretion improvidently at the time it imposed sentence. Beldoek, P. J., Kleinfeld, Brennan, Hill and Rabin, JJ., concur.
#### 237.173-2 Definitions.

As used in this subpart—

*Detainee* means any person captured, detained, held, or otherwise under the effective control of DoD personnel (military or civilian) in connection with hostilities. This includes, but is not limited to, enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, and retained personnel. This does not include DoD personnel or DoD contractor personnel being held for law enforcement purposes.

*Interrogation of detainees* means a systematic process of formally and officially questioning a detainee for the purpose of obtaining reliable information to satisfy foreign intelligence collection requirements.

[75 FR 67633, Nov. 3, 2010]
#### (A) The People of the State of New York ex rel. George V. Cudmore, Appellant, v. Edward M. Fay, as Warden of Green Haven Prison, Respondent. (B) The People of the State of New York ex rel. Frank McManus, Appellant, v. Edward M. Fay, as Warden of Green Haven Prison, Respondent.

[In each action] Motion by appellant to dispense with printing and for assignment of counsel. Motion denied. We have examined the record and find that there is no merit in -the appellant’s contentions. Nolan, P. J., Beldock, Kleinfeld, Christ and Pette, JJ., concur,
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-40450

Summary Calendar

 

JOHN JULIAN DAYSE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JOHN E. STICE et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:95-CV-626

- - - - - - - - - -

August 14, 1996

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

John Julian Dayse, #498384, appeals the dismissal of his

civil rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the

relevant portion of which has been redesignated as

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) by § 804 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). Dayse contends that

the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to

protect him from mentally unstable inmates who are allowed to
No. 96-40450

- 2 -

roam freely in general population and allowed access to razor

blades. We have reviewed the record and Dayse’s brief and AFFIRM

the district court’s dismissal for essentially the same reasons

set forth by the district court. Dayse v. Stiles, No. 6:95-CV626 (E.D. Tx. April 15, 1996).
225.903 Exempted supplies. ( b ) ( i ) For an explanation of the term “supplies,” see PGI 225.903(b)(i).
( ii ) The duty-free certificate shall be printed, stamped, or typed on the face of, or attached to, Customs Form 7501. A duly designated officer or civilian official of the appropriate department or agency shall execute the certificate in the format provided at PGI 225.903(b)(ii).
[70 FR 73155, Dec. 9, 2005]
USGS HomeContact USGSSearch USGS
U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2009-1001

Geological Interpretation of the Sea Floor Offshore of Edgartown, Massachusetts

Title | List of Figures | Conversion Factors | Abstract | Introduction | Setting | Methods | Bathymetry | Sidescan Sonar | Seismic Profiles | Sediments | Bottom Photography | Data Catalog | Summary | Acknowledgments | References Cited | Contacts

Figure 19. Digital terrain model of the sea floor produced from       the single-beam and multibeam bathymetry collected during National Oceanic       and Atmospheric Administration survey H11346 and gridded to 25 m. Image is       sun-illuminated from 46° and vertically exaggerated 10X. Hotter colors are       shallower areas; cooler colors are deeper areas. See key for depth ranges.       

AccessibilityFOIAPrivacyPolicies and Notices

U.S. Department of the Interior | U.S. Geological SurveyURL: http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2009/1001/html/fig19.htmlPage Contact Information: GS Pubs Web ContactPage Last Modified: Thursday, 22-Apr-2010 15:21:02 EDT
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-6061
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus LEROY SCOTT, JR., a/k/a Roy, Defendant - Appellant.
No. 07-6563
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus LEROY SCOTT, JR., a/k/a Roy, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr., Senior District Judge. (2:03-cr-00052-HCM; 2:04-cv-000469-HCM) Submitted: June 15, 2007 Decided: June 20, 2007 Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.- 2 - Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Leroy Scott, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Laura Marie Everhart, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 3 - PER CURIAM: Leroy Scott, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Scott has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeals. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
USGS HomeContact USGSSearch USGS
U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2009-1001

Geological Interpretation of the Sea Floor Offshore of Edgartown, Massachusetts

Title | List of Figures | Conversion Factors | Abstract | Introduction | Setting | Methods | Bathymetry | Sidescan Sonar | Seismic Profiles | Sediments | Bottom Photography | Data Catalog | Summary | Acknowledgments | References Cited | Contacts

Figure 10. Conductivity-temperature-depth (CTD) profiler. Data       derived from frequent deployments of this device were used to correct       sound velocities for the multibeam data. 

AccessibilityFOIAPrivacyPolicies and Notices

U.S. Department of the Interior | U.S. Geological SurveyURL: http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2009/1001/html/fig10.htmlPage Contact Information: GS Pubs Web ContactPage Last Modified: Thursday, 22-Apr-2010 15:28:06 EDT
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-15-00199-CV

WILLIAM WINDSOR,

Appellant

v.

JOEYISALITTLEKID, ET AL,

Appellee

From the 378th District Court

Ellis County, Texas

Trial Court No. 88611

ORDER

Appellant’s motion for rehearing filed on July 27, 2015 is denied.

PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Motion denied

Order issued and filed August 6, 2015
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edward Colombani, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered February 1, 1963 on his plea of guilty, convicting him of attempted grand larceny in the second degree and imposing *957sentence. The defendant’s only contention is that his motion to suppress evidence against him, which the court denied, should have been granted. Judgment affirmed. It appears from the record that the defendant was not present in court at the hearing on October 15, 1962 on his motion to suppress the evidence against him. It also appears, however, that the defendant was represented by counsel both in the making of the motion and at the hearing thereon, and that defendant’s counsel made no request for an adjournment by reason of defendant’s absence. Nor did such counsel register any protest or objection to proceeding without the defendant. It is thus a fair inference that defendant’s counsel concluded that the defendant’s absence would in no way be prejudicial to his position at the hearing or to his rights. Under such circumstances, it is our opinion that the defendant’s right to be present, if any, was waived; that he was not substantially prejudiced, if at all, by his absence; and that he was in no sense denied due process. While it is true that “ A defendant in a felony case has an absolute constitutional and statutory right to be present at all stages of the trial” *(People ex rel. Bartlam*v. *Murphy,*9 N Y 2d 550, 553), such right, in a noncapital case, may be waived by an absent defendant whose counsel voluntarily proceeds without him in the apparent belief that his absence will not prejudice his position or his defense (cf. *People*v. *La Barbera,*274 N. Y. 339, 343-344; *People ex rel. McBride*v. *Fay,*19 A D 2d 712, affd. 14 N Y 2d 843; see, also, *People*v. *Brighenti,*22 A D 2d 956). Ughetta, Acting P. J., Christ, Hill, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
BF

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 19-0689

CITY OF MISSOULA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

FATON SADIKU,

Defendant and Appellant.

GRANT OF EXTENSION

Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30-day extension of time, 

and good cause appearing therefor, Appellee is granted an extension of time to and

including May 8, 2021, within which to prepare, serve, and file its response brief.

Electronically signed by:

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of the Supreme Court

April 7 2021

04/07/2021

Case Number: DA 19-0689
OCIO provides the technological solutions that enable the Department of Education to deliver world-class service to schools, students and their families.

To accomplish its mission, OCIO advises and assists the Secretary and other senior officers in acquiring information technology (IT) and managing information resources. OCIO helps these leaders comply with the best practices in the industry and applicable federal laws and regulations, including the Clinger Cohen Act, the Government Paperwork Reduction Act and the Federal Information Security Management Act. In addition, the agency's Chief Information Officer is charged with establishing a management framework that leads the agency toward more efficient and effective operations, including improved planning and control of IT investments.
<PAGE>





                                                                  EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Federal Screw Works (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2004, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Quarterly Report"),
I, Thomas ZurSchmiede, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)  The Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or
78o(d)); and

         (2) The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.





                                         /s/ Thomas ZurSchmiede
                                         ---------------------------------
                                         Thomas ZurSchmiede, President and
                                         Chief Executive Officer of
                                         Federal Screw Works

  May 14, 2004
  ------------
216.405-2-71 Award fee reduction or denial for failure to comply with requirements relating to performance of private security functions. ( a ) In accordance with section 862 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, as amended, the contracting officer shall include in any award-fee plan a requirement to review contractor compliance with, or violation of, applicable requirements of the contract with regard to the performance of private security functions in an area of contingency operations, complex contingency operations, or other military operations or exercises that are designated by the combatant commander (see 225.370).
( b ) In evaluating the contractor's performance under a contract that includes the clause at 252.225-7039, Defense Contractors Performing Private Security Functions Outside the United States, the contracting officer shall consider reducing or denying award fees for a period if the contractor fails to comply with the requirements of the clause during such period. The contracting officer's evaluation also shall consider recovering all or part of award fees previously paid for such period.
[76 FR 52135, Aug. 19, 2011, as amended at 78 FR 73450, Dec. 6, 2013; 81 FR 42560, June 30, 2016]
#### 223.107-4 Products that contain, use, or are manufactured with ozone-depleting substances or products that contain or use high global warming potential hydrofluorocarbons.

No DoD contract may include a specification or standard that requires the use of a class I ozone-depleting substance or that can be met only through the use of such a substance unless the inclusion of the specification or standard is specifically authorized at a level no lower than a general or flag officer or a member of the Senior Executive Service of the requiring activity in accordance with section 326, Public Law 102-484 (10 U.S.C. 3201 note prec.). This restriction is in addition to any imposed by the Clean Air Act and applies after June 1, 1993, to all DoD contracts, regardless of place of performance.
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998
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<CASH>                                         2,223,071
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