alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Roberta Macheras Drapanas, Deceased. Shea’s O’Connell Preservation Guild, Ltd., Respondent; Marylou Roberts, as Executrix of Roberta Macheras Drapanas, Deceased, Appellant, and Andrew M. Cuomo, as Attorney General of State of New York, Respondent.

[832 NYS2d 856]—

Appeal from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court, Erie County (Barbara Howe, S.), entered December 14, 2005. The decree granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment on the petition to determine the validity, construction and effect of the last will and testament of decedent.

Now, upon reading and filing the stipulation of discontinuance signed by the attorneys for the parties on March 26, 2007,

It is hereby ordered that said appeal be and the same hereby is unanimously dismissed without costs upon stipulation. Present—Scudder, PJ., Hurlbutt, Green and Pine, JJ.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

LEE MOMIENT

 Plaintiff 

-v1:12-cv-04540

HARRIS AND HARRIS

EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLTIONS

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR VOLUNTARY DISMISAL PURSUANT TO FRCP 41

Now Comes the Plaintiff, Lee Momient and he moves this court to dismiss the case pursuant to FRCP 

41(a)(1)(A)(i) against ONLY Defendant HARRIS AND HARRIS and in support of which he states as 

follows:

1. There have been no answers or responsive pleadings filed by the defendants HARRIS AND 

HARRIS.

2. Voluntary dismissal is proper under the rule FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

Wherefore the Plaintiff, Lee Momient, prays this court enter and order dismissing the instant 

case against ONLY Defendant HARRIS AND HARRIS .

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ LEE MOMIENT

Case: 1:12-cv-04540 Document #: 14 Filed: 07/04/12 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:41
P.O. BOX 608082

CHICAGO, IL 60660

773-712-3989

Case: 1:12-cv-04540 Document #: 14 Filed: 07/04/12 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:42
FY 2015 Annual Performance Report and FY 2017 Annual Performance Plan: PDF (2,6M)

**APR Individual Sections:**

- Mission and Organizational Structure PDF (514KB)
- Overview PDF (320KB)
- Performance Results Details PDF  (1.26MB)
- Performance Plan Summary PDF (2.27MB)
Goal 1 PDF (897KB)
Goal 2 PDF (774KB)
Goal 3 PDF (698KB)
Goal 4 PDF (928KB)
Goal 5 PDF (705KB)
Goal 6 PDF (703KB)

- Appendix A: Data Validity and Verification PDF (673KB)
- Appendix B: Changed Performance Goals PDF (518KB)
- Appendix C: Summary Data Table PDF (877KB)
- Appendix D: Additional Programs by Goal PDF (277KB)
- Appendix E: Summary of Performance Evaluations Conducted During FY 2015 and Expected During FY 2016–17 PDF (515KB)
- Appendix F: Selected Department Web Links and Education Resources PDF (188KB)
- Appendix G: Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations PDF (221KB)

 

President's FY 2017 Budget Request for the U.S. Department of Education
The Department's Office of Legislation and Congressional Affairs (OLCA) primarily acts as the liaison between the Department and Congress, coordinating all Department matters relevant to Congress. OLCA has a leadership role in planning, developing, and implementing the Department's legislative goals and strategies; notifying Congressional offices of grant awards and Department initiatives; addressing appropriations and budget matters; and monitoring the status of legislative proposals.

OLCA's organizational structure consists of political leadership who work to effectively communicate the Administration's position on education issues, career staff for policy that advise on legislation, and Congressional affairs staff that aid in resolving constituent concerns.

OLCA also works with employees throughout the Department to respond to written and oral inquiries from individual members of Congress, prepare for legislative hearings, and facilitate meetings between members of Congress and Department senior officials.

OLCA receives and tracks inquiries through the Department's correspondence control system. Each Congressional inquiry is assigned to the appropriate principal office within the Department for response.  The Department typically provides responses between two and six weeks, depending on the complexity of the inquiry.

OLCA is in daily contact with members of Congress and their staff. This interaction ensures that the initiatives of Congress and the Department are achieved. To ensure appropriate coordination on Congressional matters, please remember to refer all Congressional inquiries to OLCA for appropriate coordination and response.

Congressional members can contact OLCA through its main telephone line at 202-401-0020. Correspondence can be mailed to 400 Maryland Ave. SW, Washington, DC 20202-3100.

|Last Modified: 06/09/2014
|-------------------------
On  November 26, 2012, OCR closed the part of a complaint against the Indian  Prairie Community Unit Sch. District (IL) that alleged the District discriminated  on the basis of race and national origin by operating a race-themed high school  mentoring program, known as UPward, at Neuqua Valley High School. These  programs were created because the District had been concerned that its usual  efforts to recruit students to take academically rigorous classes in high  school had not been successful in recruiting minority students. The UPward  program consisted of direct outreach to African American and Latino students,  positive peer support, and dialogue with parents.  Guidance counselors encouraged African  American and Latino students to participate in the program, if the students’  grades suggested that the students would be successful in more rigorous  courses. The District also began recruiting broadly, encouraging students of  all races to participate in Upward and the District expanded efforts to  encourage all students who showed potential to be successful to take more  rigorous courses.  OCR stated that it is  not a violation of Title VI, in and of itself, for a school district to operate  a race-themed mentoring and support program. Such programs must be open to all  and recruit broadly, although  race-targeted recruiting may be a permissible part of this. OCR  determined that there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion of  noncompliance with Title VI regarding the current operation of the UPward  program.

***Read the Resolution Letter***PDF (168K)

  

Top
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, December 30, 2019.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, December 30, 2019

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A20D0202. PARAMOUNT CAPITAL INVESTMENTS, LLC v. APEX BANK .

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

2017GC04051
# Philadelphia Hearing
#### Virginia L. Snyder, Respondent, v Barry E. Snyder, Jr., Appellant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

[834 NYS2d 820]—

*1282Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Frederick J. Marshall, J.), entered December 13, 2006. The order, among other things, found defendant in contempt for having willfully disobeyed a prior order.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed with costs.

Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from an order that, inter aha, found him in contempt for having willfully disobeyed a prior order requiring him to make certain payments to plaintiff pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement, which was incorporated but not merged in the parties’ judgment of divorce. In appeal No. 2, he appeals from an order committing him to the Erie County Correctional Facility until he complies with the prior order.

Contrary to the contention of defendant, Supreme Court was not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing before finding him in contempt. “[Plaintiff’s moving papers established that defendant violated a clear and unequivocal order of the court” *(Lamb v Amigone,*12 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2004]), and defendant failed to raise any issue of fact that would require a hearing *(see Data-Track Account Servs. v Lee,*291 AD2d 827 [2002], *lv dismissed*98 NY2d 727 [2002], *rearg denied*99 NY2d 532 [2002]). We further reject defendant’s contention that the court failed to make the requisite finding that plaintiff had exhausted her other remedies before finding defendant in contempt. Before issuing the contempt order, the court had required that defendant present documentary evidence of his current financial situation, including the current financial state of his former business. The court was not satisfied with the documentation submitted by defendant, however, and thus could not determine whether there were in fact other remedies available to plaintiff. Finally, we conclude that, by admitting at a hearing conducted subsequent to the issuance of the contempt order that he had failed to purge himself of the contempt, defendant waived his present contention that the provisions in the contempt and commitment orders affording him the opportunity to purge himself of the contempt were not sufficiently specific *(see generally Gresser v Princi,*128 AD2d 752, 752-753 [1987], *lv dismissed*70 NY2d 693 [1987]). Present—Martoche, J.P., Smith, Centra, Lunn and Peradotto, JJ.
----

----

----

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|                                                                                   |   |                      |   |                                        |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                   |   |                      |   | BORROWER:                                   |
|                                                                                   |   |                      |   |                                        |
|              Address: |   | 147 Keystone Drive        |   | PHOTOMEDEX, INC.                            |
|                                                                                   |   | Montgomeryville, PA 18936 |   |                                        |
|                                                                                   |   | Attention: CEO and CFO    |   | By: /s/ Dennis M. McGrath    |
|                                                                                   |   |                      |   | Name:  Dennis M. McGrath          |
|                                                                                   |   |                      |   | Title: Chief Executive Officer              |

|                                                                                   |   |                                        |   | LENDER:                                   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                   |   |                                        |   |                                      |
|              Address: |   | 200 Public Square, Suite 2910               |   | CLUTTERBUCK FUNDS, LLC                    |
|                                                                                   |   | Cleveland, Ohio  44114            |   |                                      |
|                                                                                   |   | Attention:  Robert T. Clutterbuck |   | By: /s/ Robert T. Clutterbuck   |
|                                                                                   |   |                                        |   | Name:  Robert T. Clutterbuck    |
|                                                                                   |   |                                        |   | Title: Managing Partner                   |

----

----

----

----
2415.606 Agency procedures. ( a ) The contact points shall ensure that unsolicited proposals are controlled, evaluated, safeguarded, and disposed of in accordance with FAR subpart 15.6. Proposals, as used in this section, shall mean proposals for procurement contracts with the Department and shall not include proposals or applications for assistance, including grants or cooperative agreements.
( b ) Unless otherwise specified in a Federal Register announcement, unsolicited proposals should be submitted to: ( 1 ) For research: Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, PD&R Correspondence Unit, 451 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20410-0001.
( 2 ) For all others: Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, 451 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20410-0001.
( c ) Individuals or organizations interested in submitting unsolicited proposals should contact the appropriate office in paragraph (b) of this section for additional information on proposal requirements.
[71 FR 2435, Jan. 13, 2006]
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21
- 6183

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. DARIUS DEMARCO PRAYER , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk

. Raymond A. Jackson , District Judge. ( 2:11

- cr - 00058

- RAJ

- FBS

- 7 ; 2:20

- cv - 00261

- RAJ )

Submitted : June 24, 2021 Decided: June 29, 2021

Before KING and THACKER , Circuit Judges , and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Darius Demarco Prayer , Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Darius Demarco Prayer se eks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 225 5 motion

. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)( B ). A certificate of appealability wi ll not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists c ould find the d istrict court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v.
Davis , 137 S. Ct. 759, 773

- 74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 140

- 41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000))

. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Prayer has not made the requisite showing. * Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions ar e adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED

* We observe that the district court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the merits of Prayer’s § 225 5 motion because it was an unauthorized second or successive § 225 5 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)

.
#### Town of Huntington et al., Respondents, v. Fenix Sand and Gravel Corp., Appellant.

Motion by appellant for a stay of the order appealed from, pending appeal, denied. Cross motion by respondents to strike the second ordering paragraph from the order appealed from or for other relief, denied. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Kleinfeld, Brennan, Hill and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-09-00661-CV

TUESDAY MORNING, INC.,

and Tuesday Morning Corp. d/b/a Delaware TMC Corp.,

Appellants 

v.

Rosalinda LIBERATORE,

Appellee

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2008-CI-21120

Honorable Larry Noll, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 11, 2010

REVERSED and REMANDED

The parties have filed a “Joint Motion to Set Aside Judgment Pursuant to Settlement”

stating they have reached a settlement, and requesting that we set aside the trial court=s default 

judgment without regard to the merits and remand the cause to the trial court for rendition of 

judgment in accordance with the parties’ settlement agreement. The motion is granted. The 

judgment of the trial court signed on June 23, 2009 is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the 
04-09-00661-CV

- 2 -

trial court for further proceedings. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(2)(B), 43.2(d). Costs of appeal 

are taxed against the parties who have incurred them.

PER CURIAM
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Samuel Santoro, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, rendered April 19, 1978, convicting him of murder under former subdivision 2 of section 125.25 of the Penal Law, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed. Defendant was indicted and convicted of the "depraved mind” murder of Anthony Aiello, the three-year-old son of his paramour. The victim’s mother, Sadie Aiello, was the principal witness for the prosecution. She testified that defendant had moved in with her in January, 1970, and had taken charge of the feeding and "discipline” of Anthony. The "discipline” included frequent beatings which resulted in serious injuries and the infant’s hospitalization on two occasions. In February, 1971 she moved out with her children because of her concern about Anthony’s well-being. However, she returned with the children to live with defendant on March 1, 1971. On March 11th Anthony died after being beaten and strangled by the defendant. Defendant and Sadie Aiello initially told the police that Anthony’s death was caused by his fall down a flight of stairs. Six years later she appeared at the District Attorney’s office and reported the truth about the events of March 11, 1971. In our opinion, the trial court correctly charged the jurors that they were to decide, as a matter of fact, whether Sadie Aiello was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration (see CPL 60.22). We cannot agree with defendant that Sadie Aiello was an accomplice as a matter of law. Neither her decision to return to live with defendant nor her conduct in concealing from the police the true facts concerning her son’s death constituted participation in the offense charged or an offense based upon the same or some of the same facts or conduct which constitute the offense charged (see CPL 60.22; *People v Le Grand,*61 AD2d 815). Since the evidence did not conclusively establish that Sadie Aiello was guilty of such an offense by virtue of her conduct on March 11, 1971, the issue of her complicity was properly submitted to the jury (see *People v Basch,*36 NY2d 154). We agree with defendant that the court’s charge on the definition of "recklessly” was misleading. However, since no exception to the charge was taken, the *940question was not preserved. Moreover, the court, in a response to an inquiry from a juror subsequently correctly charged the definition of "recklessly” and thus cured any ambiguity. The trial court properly, admitted evidence of defendant’s prior assaults on the victim to negative the defense of "accident” (see *People v Henson,*33 NY2d 63). Defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Damiani, J. P., O’Connor, Lazer and Gulotta, JJ., concur.
#### Amerada Hess Corporation, Appellant, v Town of Southold et al., Respondents.

[833 NYS2d 232]

In an action for a judgment declaring, inter aha, that the Zoning Code of the Town of Southold is unconstitutional as applied to certain premises owned by the plaintiff, and that the classification of the zone in which the premises are located as a “Marine 1” district effects an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Jones, J), dated March 3, 2006, as denied those branches of its motion which were to dismiss the second through seventh affirmative defenses.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and those branches of the plaintiffs motion which were to dismiss the second through seventh affirmative defenses are granted.

Upon a motion to dismiss a defense, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable intendment of its pleading, which is to be liberally construed. If there is any doubt as to the availability of a defense, it should not be dismissed *(see Warwick v Cruz,*270 AD2d 255 [2000]; *Abney v Lunsford,*254 AD2d 318 [1998]). Applying these standards, the second through seventh affirmative defenses, alleging, inter alia, that the action was barred by estoppel, laches, the statute of limitations, and the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies should nonetheless have been dismissed, as they are unavailable to defeat the plaintiffs causes of action *(see Matter of Friends of Lake Mahopac v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Carmel,*15 AD3d 401 [2005]; *Skrodelis v Norbergs,*272 AD2d 316 [2000]; *Amerada Hess Corp. v Acampora,*109 AD2d 719 [1985]). Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Krausman and Balkin, JJ., concur.
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#### 1803.901 Definition.

*Abuse of authority,* as used in this subpart, means an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority that is inconsistent with the mission of NASA or the successful performance of a NASA contract.