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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BRENDA GRISSOM,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 11-1604 (JEB)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,

 Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On September 8, 2010, Plaintiff Brenda Grissom triggered the alarm on a metal detector 

she was passing through while entering the Reeves Center in the District of Columbia. Officer 

Rockwell Phillips, an employee of AlliedBarton Security Services who appeared to be following 

the instructions of District of Columbia Protective Services Police Officer Sharpe (Plaintiff has 

provided no first name), then proceeded to run a hand-held metal detector all over her body. 

While a crowd of people waiting to pass through security and other security officers looked on, 

Officer Phillips allegedly used the wand to repeatedly rub Grissom’s genitals and instructed her 

to pull up her blouse. After doing so, she was permitted to enter the building. 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contends that both officers, AlliedBarton, and the District 

violated her First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights, committed various common-law torts, 

and violated a D.C. law prohibiting public-accommodation discrimination. The claims against 

Officer Phillips have been dismissed without prejudice for failure to effect service. The District 

and Officer Sharpe have now filed a Motion to Dismiss, which Allied Barton has joined, 

contending that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead her federal claims. Although it finds that 

Plaintiff has not made out federal claims against the District and AlliedBarton, the Court 
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concludes that her Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against Officer Sharpe in his personal 

capacity survive Defendants’ Motion. It will therefore grant the Motion in part and deny it in 

part.

I. Background

According to her Amended Complaint, the veracity of which must be presumed for the 

time being, Grissom entered the Reeves Center on September 8, 2010. Am. Compl., ¶ 10. She 

was wearing “a pair of shorts with a buckled belt, a sleeveless blouse and open-toed sandals.” 

Id., ¶ 11. Intending to visit the federal credit union on the second floor, Grissom triggered the 

alarm on the metal detector while passing through the building entry’s security station. See id., 

¶¶ 11-12. Working security at that time were Officer Sharpe, “a supervisor and member of the 

District of Columbia Protective Police Department,” id., ¶ 7, and Officer Phillips, an employee 

of AlliedBarton Security Services – a corporation that provides security services at the Reeves 

Center under a contract with the District of Columbia. See id., ¶¶ 4, 6. “[O]ther unknown 

security and/or protective service officers” were also “standing at the security checkpoint and in 

the lobby.” Id., ¶ 14. 

Officer Phillips, who was standing next to Officer Sharpe and appeared to be receiving 

instructions from him, id., ¶ 13, instructed Grissom to hold out her arms and spread her legs. See

id., ¶ 15. Officer Phillips then began to run a “wand” – presumably a hand-held metal detector –

“across the front of her body, . . . across both of her arms[,] . . . down the front of her body, down 

the front of her legs inside and up touching her vaginal area, rubbing her genitals.” Id., ¶ 16. 

After instructing her to turn around, he “continued with the same process across her arms and 

down her back and up her legs, again touching her vaginal area, rubbing her genitals and 

buttocks.” Id., ¶ 17. By this point, a “crowd” of individuals waiting to proceed through security 
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had gathered and was watching. See id., ¶ 18. Grissom told the officers that she felt degraded 

and wanted Officer Phillips to stop, but the officers did not respond. See id., ¶¶ 18-19. “Officer 

Sharp [sic] then instructed Officer Phillips to have Plaintiff pull up her blouse. In fear and 

apprehension, Plaintiff pulled up her blouse.” Id., ¶ 20. There is no allegation as to whether 

such action exposed any of her flesh or undergarments. She was then permitted to enter and

walked away. Id., ¶ 21. 

Grissom filed a Complaint – which has since been once amended – initiating the instant 

suit on September 6, 2011. Her Amended Complaint names as Defendants Officers Sharpe and 

Phillips in their individual and official capacities, AlliedBarton, and the District of Columbia. 

Grissom seeks to recover for violations of her First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights via 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, see id., ¶¶ 22-37, as well as for various common-law torts and publicaccommodation discrimination under the D.C. Human Rights Act. See id., ¶¶ 38-68. Because 

Plaintiff was unable to locate and serve Defendant Phillips, the case against him has been 

dismissed without prejudice. See Minute Order, March 19, 2012. The District of Columbia and 

Officer Sharpe have now filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which AlliedBarton has 

joined. See Line of Defendant AlliedBarton Joining in Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 14. These 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to adequately state her federal claims and, as a result,

that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action where a 

complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In evaluating Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss, the Court must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true . . . and must 

grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow 
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v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United 

States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (internal citation omitted); see also Jerome Stevens 

Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The notice-pleading rules are “not 

meant to impose a great burden on a plaintiff,” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 

(2005), and she must thus be given every favorable inference that may be drawn from the 

allegations of fact. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 584 (2007). 

Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion, id. at 555, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plaintiff must put forth “factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Id. The Court need not accept as true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor an 

inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the Complaint. Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 

456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Though a plaintiff may survive a 12(b)(6) motion even if 

“recovery is very remote and unlikely,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 

416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)), the facts alleged in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level.” Id.

III. Analysis

The instant Motion – originally filed by the District and Sharpe and later joined by 

AlliedBarton – seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims. If the Court dismisses those claims, 

Defendants further argue, it must dismiss the remainder of the case for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. The Court will first address Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff has failed to 
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adequately plead her federal causes of action. After concluding that the only federal claims that 

survive the instant Motion are Grissom’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against Sharpe in 

his personal capacity, the Court will then address what is to be done with the state-law claims 

that remain. Because the state-law claims are “part of the same case or controversy,” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(a), as the surviving federal claims, the Court ultimately will retain jurisdiction over the 

entire case.

A. Federal Claims

Plaintiffs’ federal claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides for 

a cause of action against:

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to 

establish 1) “the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United 

States” and 2) “that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of 

state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In addition, to hold a municipality liable 

under § 1983, a plaintiff has to plead facts that demonstrate that the municipality’s “policy or 

custom” caused the constitutional injury. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs, 

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1357-58 (2011); Baker v. 

District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

Grissom has pled – and Defendants do not appear at this juncture to dispute – that the 

named Defendants, including the private Defendants, were acting under color of state law during 

the incident in question. The second element, accordingly, is not now at issue. Rather, it is to 
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the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleadings with respect to the first element and to municipal liability 

that the instant Motion is addressed. 

Instead of proceeding claim-by-claim, however, the Court will evaluate Plaintiff’s claims 

Defendant-by-Defendant, beginning with the District, then turning to AlliedBarton, and finally 

addressing the allegations against Officer Sharpe in both his official and individual capacities. 

Ultimately, only Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against Sharpe in his individual 

capacity survive the instant Motion.

1. District of Columbia

A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of its employees on a 

theory of respondeat superior. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92. Instead, § 1983 only imposes 

liability on a municipality when its own illegal action – i.e., “‘action [taken] pursuant to official 

municipal policy’” – “‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be 

subjected’ to such a deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (quoting 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92); see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). 

In other words, “a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only where its policies [or customs] 

are the ‘moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.’” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 

U.S. 378, 388-389 (1989) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 

312, 326 (1981)). This “affirmative link,” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 

(1985), between a municipal policy and a plaintiff’s injury may take any of several forms:

the explicit setting of a policy by the government that violates the 

Constitution, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95; the action of a 

policy maker within the government, City of St. Louis v. 

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123–30 (1988); the adoption through a 

knowing failure to act by a policy maker of actions by his 

subordinates that are so consistent that they have become 

“custom,” id. at 130; or the failure of the government to respond to 

a need (for example, training of employees) in such a manner as to 
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show “deliberate indifference” to the risk that not addressing the 

need will result in constitutional violations, Harris, 489 U.S. at 

390; Daskalea v. Dist. of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441 (D.C. Cir.

2000).

Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306-07.

Here, Plaintiff has pled that the District’s “customs and practices, such as encouraging 

sexual misconduct by failing to adequately supervise, discipline or train its employees and/or 

agents, that were in place enabled its agents and employees to act with deliberate indifference to 

the constitutional rights of Plaintiff.” Am. Compl., ¶ 24. She also avers that the District “had 

actual notice and knowledge of Defendant[s] Phillips, Sharpe and AlliedBarton’s noncompliance 

with the program statements, policies and procedures and failed or otherwise refused to take 

corrective or punitive action against said AlliedBarton and/or security officers/protective 

officers.” Id., ¶ 29. She alleges that “it was and remains” the District’s “custom, practice, 

written and unwritten policy and procedure to knowingly permit Officers Phillips and Sharp to 

unlawfully touch and sexually harass females during the search process.” Id., ¶ 30. At the same 

time, she contends that “Defendant failed or otherwise refused to create, maintain and or enforce 

written policies, procedures, practices and instructions relative to the proper and accepted 

method of conducting a wand or pat down search.” Id., ¶ 33. For good measure, Plaintiff adds 

that the District, along with AlliedBarton, “failed to perform proper and adequate criminal 

background searches” on the individual Defendants and other employees. Id., ¶ 31.

While Plaintiff may certainly plead alternative theories of liability – e.g., that the 

District’s policy caused the alleged violations and that the District’s failure to promulgate a 

policy demonstrated deliberate indifference – these contentions are merely “legal conclusions 

cast in the form of factual allegations.” Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 677 (D.C. Cir. 

2008). Plaintiff has not pled any facts that support an inference that the District’s policy or 
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deliberate indifference caused the constitutional violations she alleges. See Atchinson v. District 

of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“section 1983 complaint alleging municipal 

liability must include some factual basis for the allegation of a municipal policy or custom”). If

filling a Complaint containing the appropriate legal terms were sufficient, every plaintiff could 

state a claim against a municipality merely by throwing in the necessary keywords. In order to 

state a claim against the District, Plaintiff must identify supporting facts, not simply restate the 

required elements. 

The only facts Plaintiff identifies are those relating to the single incident that forms the 

basis of her suit. “[P]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to 

impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by 

an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy . . . .” Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24. Though our 

Circuit has held that a plaintiff need not identify multiple instances of unconstitutional conduct in 

order to prove an unconstitutional municipal policy, see Atchinson, 73 F.3d at 423, she still 

“must include some factual basis for the allegation of a municipal policy or custom.” Id. at 422. 

This is not, moreover, the unusual situation in which misconduct is “sufficiently serious and 

obvious” that the misconduct, “on its face, raises doubts about a municipality’s training 

policies.” Id. at 422-23 (noting that it is “possible for a section 1983 plaintiff to satisfy Rule 8 by 

alleging both a failure to train and an unusually serious instance of misconduct” (emphasis 

added)). 

Because Plaintiff has not identified facts sufficient to support her § 1983 claims against 

the District, therefore, the Court will grant its Motion with respect to those claims and dismiss 

them without prejudice.

2. AlliedBarton
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Although AlliedBarton has not filed its own Motion to Dismiss, it joined in the District’s 

Motion and “incorporate[d] by reference the arguments raised” therein. See Line of Defendant 

AlliedBarton. While AlliedBarton may not be a municipality, the arguments the District raised 

concerning municipal liability are also relevant to AlliedBarton. Specifically, just as the District 

can only be held liable under § 1983 for its own actions and not under a respondeat superior

theory, so too can AlliedBarton only be held liable for constitutional violations affirmatively 

precipitated by its policy or practice. See Maniaci v. Georgetown Univ., 510 F. Supp. 2d 50, 62 

(D.D.C. 2007) (collecting cases and explaining the applicability of Monell to claims against 

“private institutions” that “employ quasi-state actors”); see also, e.g., Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck 

& Co., 984 F.2d 972, 975–76 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[A] corporation acting under color of state law 

will only be held liable under § 1983 for its own unconstitutional policies. The proper test is 

whether there is a policy, custom or action by those who represent official policy that inflicts 

injury actionable under § 1983.”); Rojas v. Alexander's Dep't Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 408–09 

(2nd Cir.1990) (“Although Monell dealt with municipal employers, its rationale has been 

extended to private businesses.”); Iskander v. Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982) 

(“[J]ust as a municipal corporation is not vicariously liable upon a theory of respondeat superior

for the constitutional torts of its employees, a private corporation is not vicariously liable under § 

1983 for its employees' deprivations of others' civil rights.”); Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 

F.2d 504, 505–06 (4th Cir. 1982) (private employer of security guard cannot be held liable on

principle of respondeat superior). 

For the same reason that it dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the District, 

therefore, the Court will dismiss those claims against AlliedBarton. The single incident of 

allegedly unconstitutional conduct and bald legal conclusions simply do not suffice to support an 
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inference that AlliedBarton’s policy or other actions were responsible for the claimed 

constitutional violations. 

3. Officer Sharpe

Having disposed of the § 1983 claims against the District and AlliedBarton, the Court 

now turns to Officer Sharpe, whom Grissom purports to sue in both his individual and official 

capacities. “A § 1983 suit for damages against municipal officials in their official capacities,” 

however, “is . . . equivalent to a suit against the municipality itself.” Atchinson v. District of 

Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1996). “‘Based upon the understanding that it is 

duplicative to name both a government entity and the entity’s employees in their official 

capacity[,]’ courts routinely dismiss claims against the officials to conserve judicial resources 

when the entity itself is also sued.” Trimble v. District of Columbia, 779 F. Supp. 2d 54, 58 

n.3 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Robinson v. District of Columbia, 403 F. Supp. 2d 39, 49 (D.D.C. 

2005)). The Court will thus dismiss Grissom’s § 1983 claims against Officer Sharpe in his 

official capacity as redundant to her claim against the District.

The individual-capacity claims, however, remain. With respect to these claims, Sharpe’s

only argument appears to be that Plaintiff has not adequately pled the constitutional violations 

that underlie them. Specifically, he maintains that Grissom has failed to sufficiently plead each 

of the three constitutional violations on which she purports to base her § 1983 claims. Because 

Plaintiff expressly “concede[s] her First Amendment claim” in her Opposition to Defendants’ 

Motion, see Opp. at 6, the Court will dismiss that claim with prejudice. The Fourth and Fifth 

Amendment claims, however, merit further discussion. 

a. Fourth Amendment
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The Fourth Amendment requires the government to respect “[t]he right of the people to 

be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. 

amend. IV. Sharpe contends that Grissom has failed to properly plead a Fourth Amendment 

violation because she was not seized within the meaning of the Amendment. See Mot. at 10; 

Reply at 8. This argument, however, does not respond to Grissom’s allegation that she was 

unlawfully searched. Cf. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) (distinguishing 

searches, which implicate “the individual interest in privacy,” from seizures, which interfere with 

an individual’s “dominion over his or her person or property”). Regardless of whether Grissom 

was seized at the Reeves Center, Sharpe does not appear at this juncture to seriously challenge 

her claim that she was subjected to a search. Cf. Electronic Privacy Information Ctr. v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec’y, 653 F.3d 1, 10-11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (use of advanced imaging 

technology at airport is search); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972) 

(“We agree that the use of the magnetometer in these circumstances was a ‘search’ within the 

meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).

The Fourth Amendment, however, does not prohibit all warrantless searches; it only 

prohibits unreasonable ones. See United States v. Proctor, 489 F.3d 1348, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 

2007); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 327 (2001). The “unreasonableness” inquiry is a 

particularized one, taking into account the facts and circumstances of the particular case. See

Proctor, 489 F.3d at 1352 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375 (1976)). In 

deciding whether Plaintiff has pled a Fourth Amendment violation sufficient to support her §

1983 claim, then, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged in her Complaint could 

support an inference that the search in this case was an unreasonable one.
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Although it is a close question, in the absence of an argument by Sharpe concerning the 

reasonableness of the search to which Grissom was subjected, the Court cannot find as a matter 

of law that the search was reasonable. If Grissom is able to provide evidence supporting her 

allegations that the magnetometer was used to rub her genitals and that the search continued after 

she asked the officers to stop, she might succeed in proving that the search was unreasonable

under the circumstances. 

Finally, Sharpe briefly suggests that Grissom cannot maintain her Fourth Amendment 

Complaint against him because he “was a security officer rather than a law enforcement 

official.” Mot. at 10. Insomuch as Sharpe does not appear to contest Plaintiff’s allegations that 

he was “a supervisor and member of the District of Columbia Protective Police Department”

who “has police authority throughout the District of Columbia,” Am. Compl., ¶ 7, however, the 

Court is not clear what is intended by this argument. In any event, Plaintiff has pled that Officer 

Sharpe, who appears to be a police officer (unlike Officer Philips, who is an employee of 

AlliedBarton), acted “under color of state law” when he instructed Officer Philips to conduct the 

allegedly unconstitutional search. Id., ¶ 23.

The Court, therefore, concludes that Grissom’s Fourth Amendment claim against Sharpe 

in his personal capacity survives Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, if just barely. 

b. Fifth Amendment 

Plaintiff’s Complaint suggests that Defendants also violated her Fifth Amendment “due 

process and equal protection” rights. Am. Compl., ¶ 37. Her Complaint, however, provides no 

further details about the nature of any intended due-process claim. Nor do her briefs, which 

include both an Opposition and a Surreply. Instead, Grissom’s pleadings advance only a sex-
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based equal-protection theory. As Plaintiff has not articulated a due-process claim, it is thus

solely to the equal-protection question that the Court need turn its attention.

The Equal Protection Clause, which applies to the District of Columbia via the Fifth 

Amendment, see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (applying Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to D.C. through Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 

Clause); see also Dixon v. District of Columbia, 666 F.3d 1337, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2011), requires 

state actors to treat similarly situated persons alike. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 

Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “Differential treatment on the basis of sex may violate the 

Equal Protection Clause.” Konah v. District of Columbia, 815 F. Supp. 2d 61, 73 (D.D.C. 2011) 

(citing Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 1996)); see also, e.g., Reed 

v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).

Sharpe seeks to dismiss this claim solely on the ground that Plaintiff has “not plead [sic] 

any discriminatory intent or disparate treatment.” Mot. at 7. This, however, is not entirely 

accurate. Plaintiff states that Officer Phillips twice used the hand-held metal detector to “touch[ 

] her vaginal area” and “rub[ ] her genitals” as he ran the wand over her body, and also that she 

was asked to “pull up her blouse.” Id., ¶¶ 16-17, 20. That the genital touching, which she labels 

“sexual misconduct,” id., ¶ 24, was related to her sex is a fair inference. She explicitly contends, 

moreover, that the officers were “unlawfully touch[ing] and sexually harass[ing] females during 

the search process,” id., ¶ 30, and improperly searched “female individual [sic] particularly.” Id., 

¶¶ 30, 32 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff’s allegations relating to her equal-protection claim are undoubtedly sparse. Read 

in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, however, they suffice to survive Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss.
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B. Non-Federal Claims

Only two federal claims thus remain: the Fourth and Fifth Amendment-based § 1983 

claims solely against Officer Sharpe in his individual capacity. Defendants’ argument that the 

Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s common- and local-law claims on the 

ground that she failed to establish any federal claim, see Mot. at 8-9, is, accordingly, moot. The 

Court has federal-question jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331; John Doe 

v. Metropolitan Police Dept. of Dist. of Columbia, 445 F.3d 460, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(“[S]ection 1983 itself provides the basis for federal question jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1331 

. . . .”), and has supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims because they are part of the 

same case or controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Court’s supplemental jurisdiction, 

moreover, includes “claims that involve the joinder . . . of additional parties.” Id.; see also ABF 

Freight System, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 645 F.3d 954, 963 (8th Cir.

2011) (as court had original jurisdiction over action against one defendant, it had supplemental 

jurisdiction over claims against another defendant “as the claims against all defendants arose 

from the same facts”). 

As a result, because federal claims remain and all of Plaintiff’s non-federal claims are 

sufficiently interrelated, the Court retains jurisdiction over the entire suit. As Defendants have 

proffered no arguments regarding the merits of those common-law claims, they will remain to be 

decided in subsequent proceedings.

IV. Conclusion

The Court, accordingly, will issue a contemporaneous Order consistent with this 

Memorandum Opinion, which will dismiss all federal claims against all Defendants, with the 
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exception of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims based on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments against Officer 

Sharpe in his individual capacity.

 /s/ James E. Boasberg 

 JAMES E. BOASBERG

 United States District Judge

Date: April 6, 2012