alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. William Daniel PICKETT, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-40201

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 11, 2008.

John Albert Craft, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jimmy D. Hamm, Burbank & Hamm, Beaumont, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

William Daniel Pickett, Jr., has appealed his jury convictions of possession of cocaine and cocaine base with intent to distribute. Pickett contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to continue the trial. A district court’s denial of a motion for a continuance “will be reversed only when the district court abused its discretion and the defendant suffered serious prejudice.” *United States v. Dupre,*117 F.3d 810, 823 (5th Cir.1997).

*362Pickett contends that the district court’s ruling prejudiced the defense because his attorney did not have enough time to prepare to cross-examine Kyle Ogden and Sergeant Kevin Odom. Pickett complains that he did not have an opportunity to discover prior to the trial that Ogden’s criminal history report reflected erroneously that Ogden had been arrested for misdemeanor possession of crack cocaine during the period when he was cooperating with the Government, when, in fact, the arrest was for a felony offense. Pickett complains also that he did not have time to prepare to cross examine two other cooperating witnesses, Russell Collins and Raymond Abram.

The fact that Ogden’s prior arrest was for a felony offense rather than a misdemeanor was before the jury. Collins’s and Abram’s testimony went to a conspiracy count, of which Pickett was acquitted. Pickett has not shown that he was seriously prejudiced because his attorney did not have an opportunity to investigate further the facts related to the criminal histories of the cooperating witnesses. *See id.; United States v. Castro,*15 F.3d 417, 422-23 (5th Cir.1994).

Because the parties do not contend that Pickett should be resentenced because of recent amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines with regard to crack cocaine offenses, we do not reach that question. The judgment is

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edward J. Childs, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, rendered January 31, 1963 after a jury trial, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed on the law and the facts and a new trial granted. The defendant was charged with shooting and killing one Moore. It appears that a barbecue was being held in the backyard of a house in which the defendant occupied one of several apartments on the third or top floor. Defendant and Moore engaged in a fist fight. Upon intervention of bystanders, defendant left the barbecue and thereafter appeared with a shotgun on the back porch of the top floor. Moore advanced from the barbecue table to an outer stairway leading to the second and third floors which he ascended toward the defendant, who thereupon shot and killed Moore as the latter approached. Although the court correctly charged the jury as to the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution even with respect to the defense of justification (Penal Law, § 1055), the court in effect also gave the contradictory instruction that self-defense, or some aspects thereof, had to be proved by defendant to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This constituted reversible *810error (cf. *People*v. *Lopez,*238 App. Div. 619). It was also error to charge the jury that, should they find that the pointing of the gun by defendant was sufficient to provoke Moore (the decedent) into ascending *the*stairs toward defendant, the jury could find that defendant could not be heard to justify himself for firing the gun. Under the undisputed testimony adduced at the trial, the conduct of Moore in ascending the stairs was not an act of self-protection from the gun held by defendant; it was an act of aggression. In any event, provocation in the form of possession of a gun could not in itself serve to strip defendant of his claim of justification, whatever the other attendant circumstances. Not only do we regard as correct the charge with respect to the duty of the defendant to retreat, but we also deem it to be more favorable to the defendant than the charge to which he was entitled. It was charged that, if the jury found that the porch was part of his home, the defendant was under no duty to retreat. The apartments on the floor led to a common hallway which, in turn, opened onto the back porch. The-latter was not part of the defendant’s home as a matter of law (cf. *People*v. *Tomlins,*213 N. Y. 240, 244; *People*v. *Sullivan,*7 N. Y. 396). Beldock, P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Christ and Brennan, JJ., concur.
## State of N ew York Su p reme Cou rt, A p p ellate Division Third J u dicial Dep artment Decided and Entered: February 5, 2015 5 19082

________________________________ In the Matter of ALVELCIO NUNEZ, Appellant, v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, Respondent.

________________________________ Calendar Date: December 2, 2014 Before: Lahtinen, J.P., Garry, Devine and Clark, JJ.

__________ Avelcio Nunez, Wallkill, appellant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jonathan D. Hitsous of counsel), for respondent.

__________ Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (DeBow, J.), entered May 9, 2014 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Central Office Review Committee denying petitioner's grievance. On February 12, 2008, while on parole for crimes he was convicted of in 2005, petitioner was charged with additional crimes and incarcerated, but no parole violation proceedings were commenced. On July 1, 2008, petitioner's adjusted maximum sentence on his 2005 convictions expired and he was discharged from parole on those charges while still incarcerated and awaiting trial on the new charges. He was convicted on the new charges and sentenced in February 2010 to an aggregate term of 81⁄2-2- 519082

years in prison. He was received into respondent's custody on February 12, 2010 and credited with 731 days of jail time, including the 141 days from February 12, 2008 to July 1, 2008. However, petitioner's jail time credit was subsequently reduced to 590 days after it was determined that the subject 141 days should have been credited against the 2005 sentence. Petitioner filed a grievance challenging the recomputation of his jail time credit, and his grievance was ultimately denied by the Central Office Review Committee. He then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding, which was dismissed by Supreme Court following joinder of issue. This appeal by petitioner ensued and we now affirm. The 141 days of jail time earned from the date of incarceration on the new charges (February 12, 2008) until the maximum expiration date of the 2005 sentence (July 1, 2008) was properly credited toward the 2005 sentence (see Penal Law § 70.30 [3]; Matter of Booker v Laffin, 98 AD3d 1213, 1213-1214 [2012]), and petitioner is not entitled to have that same credit applied toward the sentences imposed on his 2010 convictions (see People ex rel. Moultrie v Yelich, 95 AD3d 1571, 1573 [2012]). Lahtinen, J.P., Garry, Devine and Clark, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger Clerk of the Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>
  <ARTICLE> 5  
<CIK> 0000016104  
<NAME> CAGLE'S, INC.  
<MULTIPLIER> 1000  
         
<S>                             <C>  
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS 
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-03-1999 
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-29-1998 
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-03-1998 
<CASH>                                             379 
<SECURITIES>                                         0 
<RECEIVABLES>                                    20056 
<ALLOWANCES>                                       972 
<INVENTORY>                                      29613 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 49944 
<PP&E>                                          106974 
<DEPRECIATION>                                   46501 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  139143 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            27674 
<BONDS>                                          36278 
<COMMON>                                          4784 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0 
<PREFERRED>                                          0 
<OTHER-SE>                                       58184 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    139143 
<SALES>                                          92802 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 92802 
<CGS>                                            77826 
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    82527 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                (1849) 
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0 
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 792 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  11332 
<INCOME-TAX>                                      3996 
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               7336 
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0 
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0 
<CHANGES>                                            0 
<NET-INCOME>                                      7336 
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.49 
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.49 
         

</TABLE>
Exhibit 23  Consent of Independent Auditor



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITOR



Board of Directors and Stockholders

United Financial Banking Companies, Inc. and Subsidiaries



We consent to the use of our audit report, dated February 10, 2004, on the consolidated financial statements of United Financial Banking
Companies, Inc. and Subsidiaries (Company) for the year ended December 31, 2003, incorporated by reference into the Companys Registration Statement on Form S-8 dated October 7, 1999, and included in the Companys Form 10-KSB for the year
ended December 31, 2003.



|                             
|-----------------------------
|/s/ Goodman & Company, L.L.P.
|                             
|Norfolk, Virginia            
|April 13, 2004
#### EVANS, Respondent, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

November 13, 1903.)

Action by Esther Evans against the city of New York.

No opinion. Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                          5
       
<S>                                <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                      12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  NOV-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                       NOV-30-1997
<CASH>                             906,667
<SECURITIES>                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                      0
<ALLOWANCES>                       0
<INVENTORY>                        0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                   0
<PP&E>                             28,283,346
<DEPRECIATION>                     11,223,921
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                     18,075,385
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>              482,826
<BONDS>                            8,292,972
<COMMON>                           0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>              0
<PREFERRED>                        0
<OTHER-SE>                         9,299,587
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>       18,075,385
<SALES>                            3,593,135
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                   3,632,056
<CGS>                              0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                      0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                   3,091,166
<LOSS-PROVISION>                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                 736,373
<INCOME-PRETAX>                    0
<INCOME-TAX>                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                0
<DISCONTINUED>                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                    0
<CHANGES>                          0
<NET-INCOME>                       (195,483)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                      (2.42)
<EPS-DILUTED>                      (2.42)
        

</TABLE>
225.7004-4 Implementation of restriction on certain naval vessel components. ( a ) The statute at 10 U.S.C. 4864(h) prohibits the use of contract clauses or certifications to implement the restriction at 225.7004-2(b) for naval vessel components.
( b ) Agencies shall accomplish implementation of the restriction at 225.7004-2(b) through use of management and oversight techniques that achieve the objectives of this section without imposing a significant management burden on the Government or the contractor involved.
[89 FR 46813, May 30, 2024]
204.1601 Policy. ( a ) *Establishment of a Procurement Instrument Identifier (PIID).* Do not reuse a PIID once it has been assigned. Do not assign the same PIID to more than one task or delivery order, even if they are issued under different base contracts or agreements.
( b ) *Transition of PIID numbering.* Effective October 1, 2016, all DoD components shall comply with the PIID numbering requirements of FAR subpart 4.16 and this subpart for all new solicitations, contracts, orders, and agreements issued, and any amendments and modifications to those new actions. See also PGI 204.1601(b).
( c ) *Change in the PIID after its assignment.* When a PIID is changed after contract award, the new PIID is known as a continued contract. ( i ) A continued contract— ( A ) Does not constitute a new procurement;
( B ) Incorporates all prices, terms, and conditions of the predecessor contract effective at the time of issuance of the continued contract;
( C ) Operates as a separate contract independent of the predecessor contract once issued; and
( D ) Shall not be used to evade competition requirements, expand the scope of work, or extend the period of performance beyond that of the predecessor contract.
( ii ) When issuing a continued contract, the contracting officer shall— ( A ) Issue an administrative modification to the predecessor contract to clearly state that— ( 1 ) Any future awards provided for under the terms of the predecessor contract (*e.g.,* issuance of orders or exercise of options) will be accomplished under the continued contract; and
( 2 ) Supplies and services already acquired under the predecessor contract shall remain solely under that contract for purposes of Government inspection, acceptance, payment, and closeout; and
( B ) Follow the procedures at PGI 204.1601(c).
On January 30, 2015, OCR and  the Jersey City Public School District (District) reached an Agreement  to ensure that English Language Learner (ELL) students are not discriminated  against on the basis of national origin by being denied equal educational  opportunities in the District’s programs and services. The Agreement also  ensures that Limited English Proficient (LEP) parents  are provided with meaningful access to information the District provides to  parents.  The District agreed to: develop and implement policies  and procedures that appropriately identify and assess students who may need ELL  services; ensure that ELL students get sufficient and appropriate ELL services;  ensure that ELL students have an equal opportunity to participate in the  District’s gifted and talented, Advanced Placement (AP) and other higher  learning programs, as well as in the District’s special education  program; ensure that students are not exited prematurely from the ELL  program; provide notice of the placement options for ELL students and the  benefits derived from participation in the ELL program to students’ parents/guardians  in a language LEP parents can understand; and ensure that its ELL programs have  sufficient qualified staffing and other resources, including instructional  materials.  Additionally the Agreement requires the District to revise and  implement its policies and procedures to ensure that LEP parents are notified,  in a language understood by the parents, of school activities and other  information and matters that are called to the attention of other parents.

***Read the Resolution Letter PDF**(417K)**|******Read the Resolution Agreement PDF** (206K)*****

  

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##### 



Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report of Maxtor Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-K for
the year ended December 25, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the Report), I, Duston M. Williams, Executive Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 906), that: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. /s/ Duston M. WilliamsDuston M. WilliamsExecutive Vice President,
Finance and Chief Financial
Officer Date: March 10, 2005 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form
within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided
to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
On November 5, 2014, OCR issued its Title IX resolution letter regarding the sexual harassment/violence complaint filed against Princeton University and the resolution agreement obtained to resolve the complaint.  The complaint examined whether the University responded promptly and equitably to complaints, reports and any other notice of incidents of sexual harassment and sexual violence, and whether any failure to respond appropriately allowed for the creation and/or continuation of a sexually hostile environment.  OCR determined that the University complied with Title IX requirements regarding the notice of non-discrimination and with Title IX requirements regarding the designation and notice of a Title IX Coordinator.  OCR determined that the University’s prior grievance procedures failed to comply with the requirements of Title IX. OCR also determined that the University failed to provide a prompt and equitable response to complaints of sexual harassment, including sexual assault/violence, as required by Title IX. OCR further determined that for one student, this failure allowed for the continuation of a hostile environment that limited and denied her access to the education opportunities at the University. On October 12, 2014, the University provided OCR with a signed Resolution Agreement, and in accordance with the Agreement, it submitted revised grievance procedures to address complaints of sexual misconduct (including sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual assault/violence). The school has also committed to take campus safety seriously and respond to complaints promptly and equitably. In addition, as part of its monitoring of the agreement, the University has agreed to a comprehensive education and prevention program about the school’s policies and procedures regarding sexual assault/violence, as well as the support services and resources available to students, annual climate checks, tracking of its responses and handling of all sexual assault/violence allegations, improved University communication and coordination with local law enforcement agencies, and reexamination of complaints filed from academic year 2011-2012 to Sept. 1, 2014, and specific remedies for students identified in the complaint.

***Read the Press Release | Read the Resolution Letter PDF**(464K)**| Read the Resolution Agreement PDF**(170K)*

  

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#### In the Matter of Wellington Importers Ltd., Petitioner, v State Liquor Authority, Respondent.

— Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review so much of a determination of the respondent, dated April 18, 1978, as, after a hearing, found that petitioner violated section 101 (subd 1, par (cj) and section 101-b (subd 2, par [b]) of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law and suspended its liquor license for a period of 10 days or, in the alternative, imposed a bond claim of $20,000. Petition granted to the extent that the determination is modified, on the law, by deleting therefrom (1) the finding that petitioner violated section 101 (subd 1, par [c]) of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law and (2) the penalty imposed. As so modified, determination confirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements, charge two is dismissed and the matter is remanded to the respondent for the imposition of a new penalty. There is no violation of section 101 (subd 1, par [c]) of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law unless the oifense is accomplished through the medium of a gift or service rendered. The evidence presented does not support the finding that such a violation occurred here (cf. *Matter of Carmelo Bambace, Inc. v State Liq. Auth.,*48 AD2d 834; *715
      *Matter of Pennsylvania Whiskey Distr. Corp. v Bruckman,*256 App Div 781, affd 282 NY 665). Regarding petitioner’s claim that the hearing officer was required to issue a subpoena duces tecum, we hold that the petitioner should have sought the subpoena from a Justice of the Supreme Court (see CPLR 2307, subd [a]; cf. *Matthr of Irwin v Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y.,*27 NY2d 292; *Matter of Silverman v State Liq. Auth.,*47 AD2d 226). As to petitioner’s first contention, that it was denied a fair hearing by the "pretrial” publicity surrounding the charges, we do not agree that the publicity was of such nature or extent as to have affected the fairness of the hearing. We point out, however, by way of caveat, that in view of respondent’s position as complainant, prosecutor and Judge, publicity releases which tend to prejudge cases arising before it, may, under other circumstances, lead to a vacatur of its determination. Gulotta, J. P., Shapiro, Cohalan and Margett, JJ., concur.