UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID C. STEINHAUER, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 12 C 01481

 )

v. )

)

JOHN T. ELSNER, Chief Judge, ) Judge Edmond E. Chang

LINDA E. DAVENPORT, Associate )

Judge Circuit Court of the Eighteenth )

Judicial Circuit, SCOTT WALTHIUS, )

Attorney at Law, and CYNTHIA L. )

STEINHAUER, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff David Steinhauer, representing himself pro se, brought this lawsuit

against his ex-wife Cynthia Steinhauer (to avoid confusion, she will be referred to by

her first name), her lawyer Scott Walthius, Judge Linda Davenport, and Chief Judge

John Elsner, alleging fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and malicious prosecution.1

Specifically, Steinhauer alleges that Cynthia Steinhauer and Scott Walthius conspired

with Judge Davenport during his divorce proceeding to obtain certain rulings on

marital property. Steinhauer also alleges that the Defendants violated his right to due

process under 18 U.S.C. § 241. Finally, Steinhauer claims that Judge Davenport

maliciously prosecuted him during the divorce proceedings. Scott Walthius and Judge

Davenport now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

1

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Chief Judge Elsner on June 4, 2012, R. 22, 23. Thus,

only Walthius, Davenport, and Cynthia Steinhauer remain as defendants. 

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Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). R. 12, 25. Walthius moves for sanctions against

Plaintiff under Rule 11. R. 33. For the reasons stated below, the Defendants’ motions

to dismiss are granted in their entirety, but Walthius’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions

is denied.

I.

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the complaint’s

factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in Steinhauer’s favor. Ashcroft v.

al-Kidd, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011). Plaintiff David Steinhauer was

married to Defendant Cynthia Steinhauer for around 20 years before the couple filed

for divorce in 2007. R. 1, Compl. Arg. and Exh. at 1. On May 2, 2007, David and

Cynthia Steinhauer appeared before Judge Davenport in DuPage County Circuit Court

for their divorce proceeding. Compl. ¶ 1. During the proceeding, Cynthia testified that

only two mortgages existed on certain real property owned by her. Compl. Arg. and

Exh. at 1. Steinhauer claims that in reality, he was named on three other mortgages

that were purposefully not disclosed in court. Id. at 3-4. Steinhauer alleges that

Cynthia and her attorney, Scott Walthius, knew that other mortgages existed on the

property but failed to identify the other mortgages in an effort to defraud Steinhauer

of his rightful portion of the marital property. Id. at 2. 

Steinhauer also accuses Judge Davenport of conspiring with Walthius and

Cynthia Steinhauer to defraud him of his property. According to the Complaint, Judge

Davenport’s role in the conspiracy is “a matter of circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 4.

Steinhauer alleges that Judge Davenport’s rulings during the divorce proceeding—such

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as improperly characterizing Steinhauer’s improvements to the marital property as

“repairs,” and excluding Steinhauer’s evidence of his role in the management and

upkeep of the property—contributed to the conspiracy to defraud and deprived him of

his property interest under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 6, 14.

Finally, Stienhauer claims that Judge Davenport “assume[d] the role of auditor and

prosecutor” and maliciously prosecuted Steinhauer when she falsely charged him with

“dissipation of marital funds” where no charges were in order. Id. at 10-11. 

II.

The dismissal motions challenge the complaint on both subject matter

jurisdiction grounds and for failing to state a claim. With regard to subject matter

jurisdiction, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides the procedural vehicle

by which the defendant may move a federal court to dismiss a claim or suit on the

ground that the court lacks jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Apex Digital, Inc.

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009). 

With regard to failure to state a claim, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only include “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short

and plain statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation

and citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule “reflects a

liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a

claim’ rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v.

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Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

506, 514 (2002)). 

“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police

Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[W]hen a ruling on a

defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations

contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56); McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2010)

(courts accept factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in

plaintiff’s favor). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). These allegations “must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The

allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual,

rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

III.

Walthius advances two theories under which Steinhauer’s complaint must be

dismissed. First, he argues that Steinhauer’s complaint should be dismissed for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. Second, he argues that dismissal is warranted because

Steinhauer has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. As explained

below, each of these theories offers an independent grounds for dismissal.

A. 

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Walthius argues that Steinhauer’s complaint should be dismissed because the

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

to adjudicate his claims. R. 12, Def.’s Mot. Dismiss ¶¶ 1, 7. Specifically, Walthius

contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits lower federal courts from

reviewing state court decisions, and thus the Court must dismiss Steinhauer’s

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts do not have subject

matter jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state court judgments. See Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983). The doctrine applies not only to claims that

were actually raised before the state court, but also to claims that are inextricably

intertwined with state court determinations. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16 (“By

failing to raise his claims in state court a plaintiff may forfeit his right to obtain review

of the state-court decision in any federal court.”). Rooker-Feldman thus requires a

party seeking review of a state court judgment or presenting a claim that a state

judicial proceeding has violated their constitutional rights to pursue relief through the

state court system and ultimately the Supreme Court.2 See Centres, Inc. v. Town of

Brookfield, 148 F.3d. 699, 701-02 (7th Cir. 1998). The doctrine stems, in part, from

recognition of the fact that “a decision by a state court, however erroneous, is not itself

2

It appears that Steinhauer did first pursue relief through the Illinois state courts

before filing the current complaint in federal court; eventually, the Illinois Supreme Court

denied his petition for leave to appeal. See Steinhauer v. Steinhauer, 938 N.E.2d 531 (Ill. 2010)

(No. 110553).

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a violation of the Constitution actionable in federal court.” Homola v. McNamara, 59

F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1995). “At its core, the doctrine is a recognition of the principle

that the inferior federal courts generally do not have the power to exercise appellate

review over state court decisions.” Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506,

509 (7th Cir. 1996). 

Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional in nature, its applicability

must be determined before considering the defendants’ other affirmative defenses. See

Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996). In determining whether the RookerFeldman doctrine applies in a particular case, “the fundamental and appropriate

question to ask is whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the

state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment.” Id. “If the injury alleged

resulted from the state court judgment itself, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine dictates

that the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction, even if the state court judgment

was erroneous or unconstitutional.” Centres, 148 F.3d at 702 (footnote omitted). On the

other hand, “if the alleged injury is distinct from the state court judgment and not

inextricably intertwined with it, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply, although

the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion may be applicable.” Id. The pivotal inquiry

is “whether the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court judgment or whether

he is, in fact, presenting an independent claim.” Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 510; see also

GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993). 

Here, Steinhauer contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply

because he is bringing an independent action against Defendants for their allegedly

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illegal activities in the state court proceedings. R. 28, Pl.’s Rebuttal at 6. This

argument is meritless. That Steinhauer seeks to have this Court review the state court

ruling in his divorce proceedings in violation of Rooker-Feldman is apparent from his

complaint, where he asks the Court to vacate Judge Davenport’s judgment and, on top

of that, remand the state case to a new state judge in a different jurisdiction. Compl.

at 3. It is true that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is narrow, and that it applies only to 

“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Crawford v. Countrywide Home

Loans, 647 F.3d 642, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotation and citations omitted)

(challenge to mortgage foreclosure judgment was precluded by Rooker-Feldman

doctrine). But Steinhauer is not seeking vindication of some independent claim or right

separate and apart from the divorce proceedings. Rather, he is requesting that the

Court throw out the state court’s ruling entirely and grant him a new trial. The RookerFeldman doctrine forbids this Court from doing so.

The analysis of very similar facts in Davit v. Davit, 366 F.Supp.2d 641 (N.D. Ill.

2004), is helpful in drawing the distinction between injuries resulting from state court

judgments and independent claims that fall outside the ambit of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. In Davit, the plaintiff brought suit under the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., alleging that his ex-wife,

her attorney, and state judges involved in his divorce proceedings had conspired to

achieve illegal rights to the marital residence, child support, and maintenance. The

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court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding

that the RICO claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 651. The

plaintiff argued that Rooker-Feldman did not apply because he was not challenging the

state court judgments; rather, the state court orders were evidence of the RICO

violations. Id. at 652. The court rejected this argument, pointing out that “[i]f the state

proceedings had gone in [plaintiff’s] favor many—if not effectively all—of the injuries

that he alleges that he suffered in this suit would not have occurred.” Id. In other

words, because the plaintiff would not be claiming injuries in federal court but for the

fact that he lost in state court, the plaintiff’s federal claims arise directly from the state

court judgment for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Davit’s reasoning is applicable to Steinhauer’s federal court claims. Like Mr.

Davit, Steinhauer would have no claim of conspiracy but for the fact that he lost in the

underlying divorce proceedings. If the outcome of the state court proceedings had been

favorable to Steinhauer, he would not have suffered an injury. This conclusion, as

observed in Davit, is especially appropriate in light of the Seventh Circuit’s teaching

that “[t]he focus upon injury at the hands of a state court is particularly apparent in

cases where the federal plaintiff is actually suing the state court or state court judges.”

Garry, 82 F.3d at 1367-68 n.10. Accordingly, this Court concludes that it lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over Steinhauer’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and

Steinhauer’s complaint must be dismissed in its entirety. 

B. 

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Walthius argues that in the alternative, Steinhauer’s complaint should be

dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The Court agrees. Even if the Court were to broadly consider the allegations in

Steinhauer’s “motion for relief from judgment” [R. 5] in conjunction with his complaint,

Steinhauer has not alleged enough facts to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

First, Steinhauer claims that Judge Davenport, Cynthia Steinhauer, and Scott

Walthius acted under color of law to violate his civil rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241. See

Compl. Arg. and Exh. at 8. This claim must be dismissed because 18 U.S.C. § 241 is a

federal criminal statute defining civil rights violations that confers no private right of

action. See Pawelek v. Paramount Studios Corp., 571 F.Supp. 1082, 1083 (N.D. Ill.

1983). However, because Steinhauer is a pro se plaintiff, this Court is obligated to

consider whether there are other viable claims that are alleged in the complaint.3

 Id.

at 1083. Thus, to the extent that Steinhauer intended to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, the Court will analyze his claim under the § 1983 framework.

But even if we construe Steinhauer’s complaint as bringing a § 1983 claim, he

still fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. To state a cause of action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) some person has deprived him

of a federal right; and (2) the person who deprived him of the right acted under color

of state law. Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, Steinhauer

3

Indeed, district courts have a special responsibility to construe complaints liberally and

to allow ample opportunity for amending a complaint when it appears that by doing so pro se

litigants will be able to state a meritorious claim. See Donald v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept.,

95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996).

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claims that Walthius and Cynthia Steinhauer conspired with Judge Davenport to

deprive him of his civil rights under color of state law. The Supreme Court has held

that private parties who conspire with a judge to violate a plaintiff’s federal rights are

acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,

29 (1980). But to establish § 1983 liability through a conspiracy theory, Steinhauer

must plead that (1) a state official and private individuals reached an understanding

to deprive him of his constitutional rights; and (2) those individuals were willful

participants in joint activity with the state or its agents. Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452,

457 (7th Cir. 1998). 

Here, Steinhauer has alleged insufficient facts to show that Walthius and

Cynthia Steinhauer acted under color of state law. Steinhauer’s complaint and “motion

for relief from judgment” do not specifically allege that Walthius and Cynthia

Steinhauer had an understanding with Judge Davenport to deprive him of his

constitutional rights. Instead, the complaint merely states that Judge Davenport’s role

in the conspiracy was “a matter of circumstantial evidence.” Compl. Arg. and Exh. at

4. Moreover, in his motion for relief from judgment, Steinhauer asserts that because

none of the facts presented in the divorce proceedings supported Judge Davenport’s

final decision, the only plausible explanation is that Judge Davenport was abetting

Walthius and Cynthia Steinhauer’s conspiracy. R. 5, Pl.’s Mot. Relief J. at 10. The

conspiracy theory is not a plausible inference from a disagreement over the merits of

the divorce proceedings. Because both the complaint and the “motion for relief from

judgment” are bereft of any factual allegations that Walthius and Cynthia Steinhauer

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had some sort of agreement with Judge Davenport to deprive Steinhauer of his

constitutional rights, Walthius and Cynthia Steinhauer could not have been acting

under color of state law. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, “merely resorting to

the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a [private] party

a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.” Dennis, 449 U.S. at 28. Accordingly,

Steinhauer’s § 1983 claim is dismissed.

Second, Steinhauer claims that he was defrauded of his rightful interest in the

marital property by Walthius and Cynthia Steinhauer. Compl. Arg. and Exh. at 2. To

the extent that Steinhauer’s complaint alleges common law fraud against Walthius,

dismissal is also warranted. To make out a claim of fraud under Illinois law,

Steinhauer must plead that (1) there was a false statement of material fact; (2) the

statement was intentionally made; (3) the party to whom the statement was made had

a right to rely on it, and in fact did; (4) the statement was made for the purpose of

inducing the other party to act; and (5) the party reasonably relied on the statement

to its detriment. Connor v. Merrill Lynch Realty, 581 N.E.2d 196, 200 (Ill. App. Ct.

1991). Here, even if we assume that Cynthia made a false statement of material fact

during the divorce proceeding (namely, by testifying that there were only two

mortgages on the marital property), Steinhauer’s fraud claim still fails because the

party to whom the statement was made was the state court itself, not Steinhauer.

Under the fifth element, the court relied on Cynthia Steinhauer’s statements in

making its decision, but not to the court’s own detriment. Rather, Steinhauer’s fraud

claim is predicated on the notion that Cynthia’s false statements caused the state court

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to render the decision it did—to Steinhauer’s detriment. Thus, because the harmed

party of Defendants’ alleged fraud is not the same party who relied on the fraudulent

statements, Steinhauer’s claim for fraud must be dismissed. 

Third, although it is unclear whether Steinhauer intended this, the Court also

construes the complaint liberally to allege a common law claim for conspiracy to

commit fraud. Compl. Arg. and Exh. at 2-4. Because Steinhauer has failed to state a

claim for the underlying fraud, however, his claim for conspiracy must also fail. See

Indeck N. Am. Power Fund v. Northweb, PLC, 735 N.E.2d 649, 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)

(when a plaintiff fails to state an independent cause of action underlying its conspiracy

allegations, the claim for conspiracy also fails.). Accordingly, Steinhauer’s substantive

claims against Walthius are dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can

be granted.4

IV. 

Defendant Cynthia Steinhauer has not brought any motions to dismiss. But

because this Court is obligated to raise on its own motion issues of subject matter

jurisdiction, see Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 2005), Steinhauer’s

claims against his ex-wife—for the reasons discussed above—are also barred under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Moreover, to the extent that any claims against Cynthia Steinhauer survive

4

In Walthius’s motion to dismiss, he also argued that claim preclusion is a basis for

dismissal. However, because the Court has already agreed with two other independent grounds

for dismissal, there is no need to address claim preclusion. 

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Rooker-Feldman, they are dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

See Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Sua sponte 12(b)(6)

dismissals are permitted, provided that a sufficient basis for the court’s action is

evident from the plaintiff’s pleading.”) (internal citations omitted). This is because any

legal arguments Cynthia Steinhauer could raise in favor of dismissal would be the

same as those already made by her attorney, Scott Walthius. Because this Court has

determined that dismissal of all claims against Walthius is warranted under 12(b)(6),

the Court also dismisses all claims brought against Cynthia Steinhauer. 

V.

Judge Davenport’s motion to dismiss adopts and incorporates the arguments

raised in Walthius’s motion to dismiss—namely, that the complaint against her should

be dismissed under Rooker-Feldman and 12(b)(6). R. 25, Def’s Mot. Dismiss ¶ 3. Thus,

for all the reasons already discussed, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Rule 12(b)(6)

provide sufficient grounds for dismissing the claims against Judge Davenport. But

even if Rooker-Feldman did not apply, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity

provides an independent basis for dismissing Steinhauer’s claims against Davenport. 

The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity shields judges from civil liability for

their judicial acts unless they have acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump

v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (internal quotations omitted). The doctrine

stems from “a long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial exercise

of judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages

liability.’” Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 286 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Antoine v. Byers

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& Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993)). Thus, a judge will not be deprived of

immunity because the action she took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in

excess of her authority. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. This is true even if the judge’s

exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors. Id. at 359. 

Two limits exist on the rule of absolute judicial immunity: first, judges are not

immune from suits that challenge an action that is not judicial in nature; and second,

a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, are taken in the complete

absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). With respect to

the second exception, the relevant inquiry is whether the judge in question acted in the

complete absence of subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. See Homola v.

McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). 

Neither of the limits is applicable here. First, Steinhauer’s claims arise from

Judge Davenport’s actions during the divorce proceedings and were unquestionably

judicial in nature. Second, Judge Davenport is a judge in the Circuit Court of DuPage

County, Illinois, which has original subject matter jurisdiction over all justiciable

matters, including divorce proceedings, subject to limited exceptions that are not

applicable here. See generally Employers Mut. Cos. v. Skilling, 644 N.E.2d. 1163, 1165

(Ill. 1994) (internal citations omitted); see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,

704 (1992) (noting that “state courts are more eminently suited to work [related to

domestic relations] than are federal courts, which lack close association with state and

local government organizations dedicated to handling issues that arise out of conflicts

over divorce, alimony, and child custody degrees”). Because the court over which Judge

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Davenport presides is one of general jurisdiction, she properly exercised subject matter

jurisdiction over the Steinhauers’ divorce proceeding, and any procedural errors she

may have committed do not render her personally liable for her judicial actions. See

Stump, 435 U.S. at 359-60. Accordingly, Judge Davenport is shielded from liability by

absolute judicial immunity, and all claims brought against her are dismissed.

VI.

Finally, Walthius brings a motion to impose Rule 11 sanctions on Steinhauer.

R. 33, Def.’s Mot. Sanctions. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires anyone

presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court to certify that the

documents (1) are not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,

cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims,

defenses, and other legal arguments are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous

argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new

law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support; and (4) denials of factual

contentions are warranted on the evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). If, after notice and an

opportunity to respond, a court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court

may impose appropriate sanctions on any attorney, law firm, or party that violates the

rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). Walthius contends that sanctions are appropriate here

because Steinhauer’s complaint is frivolous and Steinhauer brought this suit with the

intent to harass those involved in the divorce proceedings. Def.’s Mot. Sanctions at 7.

For purposes of Rule 11, a complaint is “‘frivolous’ where a party or his attorney

fails to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts or the law.” Kelly v. Mercoid Corp., 776

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F.Supp. 1246, 1258 (N.D. Ill. 1991). In light of Steinhauer’s status as a pro se litigant,

we find that not to be the case here. As a lay person who is not trained in the law,

Steinhauer cannot be held to the same expectations as a lawyer for making reasonable

inquiries into his legal claims. It is clear from Steinhauer’s briefs that he has spent a

significant amount of time researching his legal arguments. Indeed, Steinhauer claims

to have spent the last five years litigating his case by himself, and has had to drive 30

miles to the nearest district court law library to conduct legal research. R. 38, Pl.’s

Resp. Br. at 12-13. That his efforts have yielded faulty results is no reason to find his

inquiries unreasonable. See, e.g., Leistikow v. Mangerson, 172 F.R.D. 403, 407 (E.D.

Wis. 1997) (fact that plaintiff’s complaint did not state a claim for relief did not

automatically mean that his claims also failed to pass Rule 11 scrutiny, especially in

light of plaintiff’s pro se status).

This is all the more true in light of the discretion a court must exercise when

imposing sanctions on pro se litigants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes

(1983 Amendments) (“Although the standard [for imposing Rule 11 sanctions] is the

same for unrepresented parties, who are obliged themselves to sign the pleadings, the

court has sufficient discretion to take account of the special circumstances that often

arise in pro se situations.”). The Seventh Circuit has adhered to the principle that pro

se parties should be sanctioned under Rule 11 only after successive attempts to press

a wholly frivolous claim. See Ricketts v. Midwest Nat’l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1182 n.4

(7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he district court is authorized to impose sanctions against a pro se

plaintiff who successively seeks to press a wholly frivolous claim.”) (emphasis added);

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Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1985) (sanctions imposed for

filing identical complaint to that previously dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). Here,

there is no evidence that Steinhauer has made successive attempts to press his claims

in federal court, even if his claims are frivolous. Accordingly, the Court holds that Rule

11 sanctions are unwarranted. 

VII.

For the reasons stated above, Steinhauer’s complaint—including those claims

brought against Cynthia Steinhauer—is dismissed with prejudice in its entirety.

Defendant Walthius’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions [R. 33] is denied. 

ENTERED:

___________________________

Honorable Edmond E. Chang

United States District Judge

DATE: November 5, 2012

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