DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, LINDA PAGELSEN, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, 

ADAM HARRIS, ANN REESE, BROOKE BOYER, TIM PRINCE, MATT WASHINGTON, B G WRIGHT, 

CHRIS WHITE, CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, Administrative Aide 

PART 2 

Page 

Marine Corps Ground Equipment ....................................... 1 

Soldier Equipment, Ergonomics and Injuries .................. 47 

Army and Marine Corps Readiness .................................... 139 

Army and Marine Corps Force Protection ....................... 191 

Air Force Military Personnel ................................................ 281 

Military Personnel—Army ..................................................... 367 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 


sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with HEARING
PART 2—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 


sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with HEARING
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, LINDA PAGELSEN, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, 

ADAM HARRIS, ANN REESE, BROOKE BOYER, TIM PRINCE, MATT WASHINGTON, B G WRIGHT, 

CHRIS WHITE, CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, Administrative Aide 

PART 2 

Page 

Marine Corps Ground Equipment ....................................... 1 

Soldier Equipment, Ergonomics and Injuries .................. 47 

Army and Marine Corps Readiness .................................... 139 

Army and Marine Corps Force Protection ....................... 191 

Air Force Military Personnel ................................................ 281 

Military Personnel—Army ..................................................... 367 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

56–260 WASHINGTON : 2010 


sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with HEARING
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

MICHAEL HONDA, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

JERRY LEWIS, California 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New 

Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

BEVERLY PHETO, Clerk and Staff Director 

(II)


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(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2010 

TUESDAY, MARCH 10, 2009. 

MARINE CORPS GROUND EQUIPMENT 

WITNESS 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE J. FLYNN, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF 

THE MARINE CORPS, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION 

MR. MURTHA’S OPENING STATEMENT

Mr. MURTHA. The committee will come to order. 

I want us out of here by 11:00, General. I hope your answers 

won’t be too long. The thing that I wanted to talk about mainly is 

the cost of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) and how you 

are going to get this program under control. 

We spent $4 billion up to this date, and you just took over the 

program, but we need to have some recommendation from you for 

the subcommittee so that we will be able to follow this program 

more closely. We keep putting money into research, and we keep 

finding you need more and more money. You save money by cutting 

down on the numbers, but I am not sure how much research you 

are saving. But the money you have asked for this year—we have 

got to know as you go along exactly where we are so that we can 

cut the thing off, we can come to an agreement to cut this thing 

off, because you have got a lot of good programs, and usually you 

run those programs very well, but I am just worried about this particular program. 

It started when I was Chairman before. I went to see it down at 

Dumfries, and it looked like it was going to be a program we needed. We have done very few amphibious operations under duress, 

and I believe the Marine Corps needs a capability of landing 

against a threat. 

But having said that, we have got to get this program under control. It is just so expensive, and when I went back and looked, I 

had the staff go back and find the World War I—you see this, Bill, 

a World War I tank. Bill, see this World War I tank? It looks like 

their EFV. 

Mr. YOUNG. They used a lot of imagination. 

Mr. MURTHA. Yeah. This is today’s vehicle, and that one probably 

costs less than $1,000 apiece. But at any rate, we look forward to 

hearing your testimony, and I will see if Mr. Young has any comments. 


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OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I want to 

welcome the general to be here this morning. 

Having the Marines able to move lightly and quickly, I think, is 

extremely important. And probably we have seen in Iraq the Marines have gotten a little heavier. And I know that in some conversations and meetings, the case was made for a faster, lighter vehicle that would be more secure and more effective. So, General, we 

are just anxious to hear what you have to tell us about that, because I think we all want to provide whatever it is the Marine 

Corps needs to be an effective fighting force, which the Marines 

have always been. 

Mr. MURTHA. General, summarize your statement. We will put 

the full statement in the record, without objection. 

General FLYNN. I understand, sir. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL FLYNN

General FLYNN. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young and members of the committee, it is an honor and a privilege to appear before you today. 

We share a common passion, and that is that all of us are committed to providing the men and women in uniform the best leadership, training, equipment, family support and quality of life possible. With this in mind, I am prepared to discuss your Marine 

Corps’ ground equipment requirements today. 

Our requirements are the results of detailed and a disciplined 

process that is informed by several things: first of, all our legislative roles and missions in Title 10; the guidance we received from 

the Secretary of Defense; the Commandant’s guidance, to include 

the core competencies contained in our recently published Vision 

and Strategy; the combatant commanders’ needs; and also requirements that are generated from the bottom up by our warfighters. 

Additionally, as the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness, we 

must also consider the need for both amphibious and land-based 

operations, and the requirement for a balance in capability across 

the range of military operations that we are likely to see so that 

we can gauge in everything from presence to crisis response to conventional operations. 

Our requirements must be able to respond to threats we see 

today while guarding against surprise in the future. It is my belief 

that our ground requirements reflect the balance that is needed for 

the current threat and any potential threats in the future by our 

Nation from your Marine Corps. 

I thank the Committee for all their support, sir, and I am ready 

to answer your questions, sir. 

[The statement of General Flynn follows:] 


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REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. There are a couple of programs that worry us. Out 

in the field the troops are concerned about how heavy the armor 

is; body armor I am talking about. And, of course, we worry about 

the size and the weight of the vehicles, because getting them to 

wherever we are going to go. But we are fighting a war 8,000 miles 

away, so we have got to get the equipment and the troops there. 

And the complaints I hear in the field are the deployments over 

and over again and the fact that the troops have what they consider equipment that is too heavy. But this particular EFV, flat 

bottom, aluminum bottom, worries us. 

I know you took over the command, and you are going to give 

us some guidelines, and we need some recommendations of how we 

can follow research and development better. We have been remiss 

ourselves in spending $4 billion. It seems to me we should have 

caught this earlier, and I know you have revised it. I saw an article 

where you turned the corner. But the problem is it costs a lot of 

money to turn the corner for 600 vehicles which will cost approximately $20 million apiece. So we have got some real problems here, 

but working with you, we hope that we can get this thing in the 

right direction. 

And I mentioned to you earlier, let’s look at alternatives. For instance, most of this is not going to be spent in the water; most of 

it is going to be spent on land. And that is why the vulnerability 

is so important, and that is why I worry about the flat bottom, aluminum bottom so much. But we know we can work it out. I know 

when General Gray came here as a Commandant, he said, just give 

us as much as you can, we will work it out. Well, this program has 

gone a little bit more than ‘‘as much as you can.’’ 

Mr. Young. 

PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, one of the first questions that comes 

to my mind is why are you able to reduce your requirement for the 

EFV from over 1,000 vehicles to just under 600? 

General FLYNN. Congressman Young, the reason why we are able 

to do that is because we have taken a comprehensive look at our 

ground vehicle strategy, and what we have tried to do is we tried 

to build a flexible strategy that just had about the minimum 

amount of capability that we needed to do the operations that we 

are expected to execute either today or in the future. Key components of that strategy are the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, the 

Up-Armored Humvees, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (EFV), the 

Marine Personnel Carrier and also the Internal Transportable Vehicle. Those have all been sized not so much to give you three Marine Expeditionary Forces’ (MEFs’) worth of capability, but to give 

you sufficient capability to respond to operations from the various 

combatant commanders. And that is how we have been able to do 

it. The EFV program has been reduced to provide us with two brigades’ worth of forcible entry lift, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Will the requirement be filled by other vehicles that 

are either in development or that you are planning to develop? 


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General FLYNN. Yes, sir. The rest of the capabilities will come 

from the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), which has just started the technology demonstration phase, and that will go on for 

about 24 to 27 months. We will continue to upgrade our Humvees 

that we have right now, our Up-Armored Humvees, and we will 

also take advantage of technology to try to make them lighter along 

the way. There are some promising things out there that we are 

looking at to make the vehicle lighter. We are also looking, in conjunction with the Army, at an all-terrain-type Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle, and at the same time we are also 

increasing our capabilities. Our Logistics Vehicle Systems (LVSs) 

are going to be replaced by the logistics—a new variant of the logistics vehicle. And we are also going to be upgrading some of our Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacements (MTVRs) as well, sir. 

So it is a holistic strategy that is designed to provide a variety 

of capabilities at the right level, maybe not for every MEF to have 

the same level, but a reservoir that we could do balanced operations across a wide spectrum of operations, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. General, let me go to the EFV. And I am wondering, 

are you expecting too much out of that vehicle? I understand that 

it is a flat-bottom aluminum hull that is basically meant to bring 

the Marines onshore with the possibility of bolting armor on the 

bottom of it once the marines reach the beach. Is that practical? 

General FLYNN. Sir, this goes to the issue of having balanced capability. One of the things as a sea-based force that we have to be 

concerned with is our ability to also operate from amphibious shipping. And one of the things that General Conway has given me 

marching orders on is to find ways to lighten the weight of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Part of our ability to do that, we will 

be able to take a look at what missions we are going to have to 

perform and be able to, if you will, scale the armor on our vehicles 

based on the threat and the operating area where these vehicles 

are likely to operate. It is not meant for you to take an operational 

pause in operations. There are a whole number of ways that we 

protect our Marines as we accomplish our mission, and one of those 

ways would not be to stop in the middle of operations to bolt on 

your armor. But it is going to be a consideration in your planning 

and in your load planning. 

One of the things I am concerned about, sir, is the weight of our 

vehicles and where we are going. We could become too heavy to 

come from the sea. And everything we are seeing in the future is 

that we are going to have to have that capability, and we are going 

to have to look at technology, we are going to have to look at 

science to tell us how to lighten that vehicle. And one of the simple 

ways of doing it right now is having the capability to bolt on and 

bolt off armor. 

Mr. YOUNG. General, explain to me—we have the Landing Craft 

Air Cushion (LCAC), which is supposedly what I have—I think we 

have all been on it, so we know that it moves quickly, it is fast, 

it will come up over the beach. It will go inland until there is some 

kind of a barrier that stops it. What is the difference in the projected use of the EFV versus the LCAC? 

General FLYNN. Sir, the LCAC, first of all, unarmored coming in. 

You then would have to land at the beach, stop, offload your fightVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:11 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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ing vehicles. And in the face of an opposed landing, you would be 

at a disadvantage there. So it is not armored. And when we have 

looked at the operational constraints on it, it really doesn’t work 

for us. 

The EFV, you know, hits the beach and continues fighting inland. Again, the EFV is one tool in the kit. We are looking at alternatives, as the Chairman suggested. We will continue to look at alternatives to see what makes operational sense. But our initial look 

at the LCAC option, sir, was that it was not practical at this time, 

sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. The EFV would be carried in the same type of ship 

that carries the LCAC? 

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. The EFV would be carried in an amphibious ship, but then we would have to preload the different 

spaces and the different load plans on the amphibious ships, which 

you are very familiar with. It does change that load plan significantly, sir. And it does change the capability, our ability to build 

combat power ashore quickly, sir. It does change the way that we 

do things. And based on our initial operational look on it, it wasn’t 

feasible with an unarmored like LCAC. So right now we don’t have 

an armored LCAC under development, sir, but like I said, all options are being looked at, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. General, thank you very much. I look forward to the 

rest of your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Bishop. 

EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (EFV)

Mr. BISHOP. Sir, we have been tasked with looking very, very, 

very closely at all of our weapons systems and determining what, 

if any, are not the most efficient use of taxpayers’ dollars, while at 

the same time maintaining our mission of the most effective weapons for our men and women who are in harm’s way. And, of course, 

it is very difficult, and it is a tough job. Some tough decisions are 

going to have to be made. And this particular project, the EFV, 

seems not to be proving cost-effective based upon the amount of 

time, the dollars and the effective outcomes. 

Several liabilities have been demonstrated. Most prominent to 

me is the fact that once it has landed, about to embark upon a 

landing, it is 90 seconds of time when you have got marines that 

are packed in with all of their equipment that they actually are immobile and sitting ducks, and to the extent that that exposes them, 

that is a problem. 

You also have the difficulty in being able to justify continuing to 

spend the dollars on this when right now it is not meeting all of 

the expectations that we have. 

And so my concern is why shouldn’t we consider eliminating or 

looking at cutting back on this particular weapons system? How 

much is it costing us per year? 

General FLYNN. Sir, there are a number of questions that you 

asked. As the EFV transitions from planning where it is going 

about 25 to over 25 knots inshore, it has to transition to get the 

track back down. It continues to move forward at roughly the same 

speed that the current Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) does, 


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and then it can engage to continue to come ashore. So there isn’t 

an operational pause. 

Mr. BISHOP. Don’t you have to bolt on the armor? 

General FLYNN. No, sir. That would be a situational dependent 

on the armor protection for the EFV. Right now the underbelly protection on the EFV is the same as that of a Stryker. So based on 

the mission that we would be using, the protection of the EFV and 

that type of situation would come from the speed of the EFV, and 

better tactics, better training of our marines and procedures. There 

is protection in mobility all by itself. 

Mr. BISHOP. Maybe I misunderstood. I thought that I understood 

that the bottom of it was aluminum. 

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. It is a flat hull. 

Mr. BISHOP. It does not have sufficient strength or heavy enough 

armor initially without the extra bolt that—bottom on to withstand 

the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and certainly the Explosive Formed Projectiles (EFPs). 

General FLYNN. Again, the idea would be in your tactics to avoid 

the IEDs and EFPs and be able to move forward. The EFV is not 

designed to perform a role, say, that you see the MRAP performing 

in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) right now. We will not use it for 

that. 

The other part of your question that you asked is why are we 

doing multiple types of vehicles is because we are trying to create 

a family of capabilities to have capabilities in a wide range of environments. 

On the performance of the program, sir, I can’t justify the previous performance of the program. When it went through its recent 

certification in 2007, one of the things that came out of that requirement was we came up with five knowledge points where that 

the program has to perform. If at any point in one of those five 

knowledge points it does not perform, you know, they are called offramps for a reason. And we have those five performance knowledge 

points right now. It just passed its first knowledge point, and it is 

being monitored very closely, as the Chairman mentioned, to make 

sure that we continue to do that, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

WEIGHT OF EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am afraid many of our questions are Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle-centric here. First of all, obviously the 

Marines are like a favored nation. We would like to give you whatever punch you need. I was out to take a ride in one of these vehicles about 3 years ago. I think it was then Colonel Brogan, and 

now it is General Brogan. A lot of enthusiasm. 

How much does it weigh right now, the EFV? 

General FLYNN. Sir, I think the weight of the vehicle is about 50 

tons, I believe, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The weight concerns me just as a lay person. It is remarkable that you could have something that goes into 

the water, comes out and could be a land vehicle. You put 17 Marines in the back of it; isn’t that what the game plan is? 

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. 


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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. With all their gear, how much is that? How 

much weight does that add to it? 

General FLYNN. Sir, every combat Marine carries about 100 

pounds of gear, 80 to 100 pounds. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. A lot of gear. 

The issue here, if you have bad weather, I mean, we were out 

there, and I am sure they wouldn’t have taken us out unless the 

weather was fairly mild. I mean, I wondered whether we would 

ever come up—I won’t say for air, but it wasn’t rough seas, and, 

you know, there is a lot of weight in that vehicle. If we are 50 or 

60 miles offshore, let’s say off Korea somewhere, you know, who 

has done the homework in terms of its, let’s say, survivability in 

bad weather? Can you talk a little bit about that? 

General FLYNN. Sir, all of the—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I think it is a neat idea, and I am supportive of it, but I am concerned about the weight and, you know, 

just the view of maybe this could be sort of a sitting duck out 

there. 

General FLYNN. Sir, the vehicle has the survivability to launch 

from over the horizon and to get safely to the shore. We have plenty of experience doing amphibious operations and launching 

even—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The history of the Marines in terms of amphibious, I think, is remarkable. But, I mean, with this new fighting vehicle, 50 miles from shore in bad weather—— 

General FLYNN. Sir, those are the considerations that an operational commander would have to take into account on the timing 

of the operation. They have existed forever, and they will continue 

to exist. And that is one of the things that commanders decide is 

what risk they can take. But the vehicle is capable to launch from 

over the horizon and to get safely ashore, sir. There is no doubt in 

my mind about that capability, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Hinchey. 

JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE (JLTV)

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you very much. I am sorry I got here a little bit 

late. I wasn’t able to hear the things that you opened up with. 

I was wondering, however, about the situation in Afghanistan, 

which is likely to be different than the situation in Iraq, and the 

fact that the President is moving 17,000 additional troops over 

there, particularly marines. And I am wondering whether about 

the JLTV, this new vehicle, and how likely that is to be useful, perhaps more useful than other vehicles, particularly in the circumstances that we have to deal with in Afghanistan. And I was 

wondering what you might think about that and if it is something 

that we should focus attention on, what we might do successfully 

to move it forward as quickly and effectively as possible. 

General FLYNN. Sir, we are excited about the JLTV within the 

Marine Corps. For all the reasons that some of the Members have 

already said, we would like to get lighter. And we see in the JLTV 

the possibility based on what we think is possible with technology 

to get a vehicle that is more mobile and is lighter. 


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One of the things that attracts us to why we are trying to keep 

the JLTV within weight parameters is we want it to be helicopter 

transportable with the ability of—to be able to go where the enemy 

may not think you are capable of going. Plus the ability of a lighter 

vehicle allows us more flexibility on being able to load on ship, and 

also there is a degree of mobility that comes on the ground by just 

being lighter and having the ability to go into areas where we may 

not have the right trafficability. 

So the current status of the program is it has just started its 

technology demonstration phase. I think there are three variants 

that are being done by three different companies. And what we are 

doing is we are going to see what comes out of that technology 

demonstration phase, sir, and our key thing that we are pushing 

for is we need the vehicle to remain light. And we need it to be 

mobile both on the ground and also transportable from the sea and 

from the air. 

Mr. HINCHEY. I have been spoken to by some company that is in 

the process of developing a security material which is much lighter, 

but apparently much stronger, to surface around the bottom or 

elsewhere on vehicles like this. It is amazingly light, but very, very 

strong. Is that something that makes sense particularly for the 

LTV? 

General FLYNN. Sir, any material that is a leap ahead in technology that makes us lighter is something that we would be interested in. And we are seeing a lot of things that come out of science 

to offer potential to be lighter and at the same time get the same 

level of protection. 

Mr. HINCHEY. So this is something that is getting attention 

and—— 

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. We are always looking at new materials 

through our research labs, and our R&D efforts are to get lighter. 

Mr. HINCHEY. General, thank you very much. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Kingston. 

ACQUISITION LESSONS

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I wanted to talk to you about the MRAPs, and we had 

recently heard from the inspector general’s report on—basically it 

was Defense-wide procurement problems. But he had focused in on 

the Marine Corps and the MRAP purchasing and just kind of 

bouncing around said that contracting officers, officials used inappropriate contract approaches, ignored acquisition regulations, used 

ineffective pricing tools resulting in prices that could not have been 

determined to be fair or reasonable. The Marines did not use the 

Truth in Negotiations Act to obtain costs or pricing data to ensure 

fair and reasonable price, thus concluding that the contracting officials did not adequately evaluate prices during the source selection, 

resulting in the Marine Corps having no assurances that prices 

paid were fair and reasonable, and likely paid more than it should 

have for the vehicles. The IG estimated that for one contractor, 

there was about $45 million in lost potential savings because of the 

failure to obtain volume discounts. I am sure you are familiar with 

that. 


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But those are some of the things that we had from that hearing. 

And I was wondering, first of all, it is just so disappointing to think 

that that would happen. So I would like to know, how did it happen, in your estimation? And then, what are you doing about it? 

And, you know, I mean, I have been in Washington for a while, and 

government agencies are always telling you what they are going to 

do about something. And if what they are going to do about things 

were all done, then none of these testimonies would have happened. 

So I guess my bigger question is I would rather look back than 

hear the forward, because I have heard the forward so many times. 

And as Mr. Frelinghuysen says, everybody in this Committee is 

very, very pro-Marine. So it is even a little bit more disappointing 

to think that this would happen to you guys. But it certainly did 

happen, and, in my opinion, it was a very scathing report. So tell 

me your side of the story. And I will yield. 

General FLYNN. Sir, I am not a procurement specialist. I am the 

requirements guy. And I have read the report. And I will tell you 

this: The MRAP, we were the lead. The Marine Corps was the lead 

procurement agency for the entire Department of Defense. And 

what we were trying to do was in a very short period of time meet 

the needs of the warfighter, both Soldiers and Marines and Sailors 

and Airmen, on the ground in Iraq. We went out to, I think, initially 10 companies and asked them to provide prototypes that 

were immediately thrust into testing, and we went and got best of 

breed. And based on who could produce what, contracts were 

awarded. 

I am not taking exception to the report, sir. There is some disagreement that I could give you additional information for the 

record as to what we agree with and what we don’t agree with in 

the report. But one of the things with an IG report, there are always lessons learned, sir. This was a unique procurement program 

that did deliver, I think, in almost record period of time. And there 

are lessons to be learned from that, and we have taken those lessons to heart, and you will see that we will apply those lessons to 

future activities. 

But this was, I very much believe, a unique effort, sir, that did 

deliver capability pretty quick. And could it have been done better, 

sir? I am not going to argue with that. It could have. But we have 

learned from that, sir, and we will make it better in the future. 

Mr. KINGSTON. The IG report did say that you did do everything 

very, very quickly, which was maybe the first call-in on this, and 

perhaps some of the dollars that were lost were made up for in 

lives that were saved, because I know that we in Washington were 

very excited about MRAPs, and everybody was pushing for them. 

General FLYNN. As you know, sir, there were many models and 

many companies to produce that, and there was the ability to get 

the industrial base to produce as many vehicles and three different 

variants of those vehicles as quickly as possible, sir. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, thank you, General. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Information provided to Mr. Kingston.] 


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Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

READINESS

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, it is good to see you again. Thank you for your help in 

getting me ready for understanding what we do here. 

I noticed by your testimony, you are calling it the Marine Corps 

ground equipment. My question, having heard some of my illustrious colleagues talk to you about the readiness of our Marine 

Corps—and I like the multitype vehicles that you use. EFV is what 

I have been reading about the last few hours, 24 hours or so. Two 

questions: Is the Marine Corps ground equipment ready, capable, 

up to par as we move into this new conflict? And not new, but Afghanistan, as we are moving out of Iraq into Afghanistan? Is the 

multitype vehicles, including the EFV and the—I was in Stryker, 

by the way. I went to see Stryker in Michigan a couple weeks ago 

and was there and found—you mentioned it this morning in terms 

of part of this multifleet that you have. How does it compare to the 

EFV? And are we ready in general as we move forward out of Iraq 

into Afghanistan with this terrain and all that goes with that? 

General FLYNN. Ma’am, one of the things that we are doing 

based on the support over the years that we have received from the 

committee is we have been resetting the force. We have been recapitalizing our equipment. Right now what we are doing is we 

have our feet in two canoes almost. And what we are doing is we 

are preparing the equipment that is coming out of Iraq, and we are 

taking equipment out of storage in the United States and sending 

that to Afghanistan. And then we will take the equipment from 

Iraq and put it through our maintenance depots, and we will also 

do some triage on the equipment when it is coming out of theater. 

So we have a pretty detailed, solid plan to make sure that we 

maintain readiness through this transition and to also reset the 

force where possible. 

Basic difference between an EFV and a Stryker is one is a track 

vehicle designed to be able to also swim in from 25 to 40 miles off 

the coast. Stryker is a wheeled vehicle, and it doesn’t have that capability. They have similar capabilities in terms of mobility. But 

again, we are looking for both type vehicles in our inventory. We 

are looking for the EFV, and we are also looking for a Marine Personnel Carrier, one of the vehicles that has a lot of similar characteristics to what a Stryker has. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And will we meet this kind of R&D for the 

EFV? I mean, are we going to make it? I know they are back end. 

General FLYNN. Ma’am, right now what has happened with the 

EFV, it has gone through its first knowledge point right now a couple of months ago, and it performed better than the requirement. 

We were looking for 43.5 hours between failures and we predict 61 

hours. We have other knowledge points coming up that are required for the program to meet. At the same time, components now 

are actually undergoing testing now, heat, vibration testings, to 

make sure that when we put the prototypes together, that we are 

not going to be surprised by any issues with components. So we 

have the message of the importance of monitoring the performance 

of the program while it goes through this critical phase. 


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Ms. KILPATRICK. And then finally, Lima, Ohio, is where you 

make the EFV. You also make the Stryker there. I am from Michigan. We are hurting bad. When you get it right, we want you to 

also make it in Michigan. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

MARINE HELICOPTER

Mr. MURTHA. Well, I appreciate the indulgence of the Committee. 

As I said, I wanted to be out of here as soon as we could today. 

But let me just caution General Flynn, I went out to visit the 

armed helicopter last year, and when I came back, I sent the staff 

out, and we cut it in half. Even though we have a member of the 

Committee that is from that area, we felt it couldn’t carry the 

weight. It was already excessive weight for the engine. They paid 

no attention to what I said. The Army agreed with me, and we 

eliminated the program. 

Helicopter One. Long before anybody else said anything, this Committee said, we cut $200 million. We are not going to spend 

that kind of money, the requirements the Secret Service put on 

that helicopter. And so we cut $200 million out of that program. 

This program is on the bubble as far as I am concerned, General. I mean, this program, we spent $4 billion. And I am prepared to 

recommend to the subcommittee that we continue the program 

with your assurance that you are going to give us some responsible 

recommendations about what is happening and guidelines about 

what is happening as it goes down the road. And you are going to 

look at alternatives. And this is so important, the alternatives to 

this vehicle. You know, $4 billion we spent. The rest of the money 

we spend—if we have spent it, it would be $20 million per vehicle. 

I think some changes need to be made in it. And on the other hand, 

you are the guy that is going to run the program. You are going 

to make the requirements. 

But I have a great concern about this program going forward. I 

know the Commandant personally is taking an interest in it, and 

that reassures me that we will be able to recommend that it go forward and spend a little more research money this year as you give 

us quarterly reports about how the program is going. So I appreciate your indulgence and look forward to trying to work out these 

programs with you for the rest of the year. 

Any questions, Bill? 

INTERNALLY TRANSPORTABLE VEHICLE

Mr. YOUNG. I guess I have one quick question. On the Internally 

Transportable Vehicle (ITV), General, the overcost has been very, 

very substantial. Can you tell us why? 

General FLYNN. Sir, I would like to answer that question for the 

record for you if I could, sir. I couldn’t give you that answer right 

now, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Okay. 

General FLYNN. And I would like to answer it for the record for 

you, sir, to make sure I have it correct. 

Mr. YOUNG. Okay. The reason I asked the question, the average 

cost for the ITV has risen from $94,000 to $209,000 for the vehicle, 

and if you add the mobile ammunition trailer, it has risen from 


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$579,000 to over $1 million. So this gets my attention. So if you 

could provide us some information on that, I would appreciate it. 

Thank you. 

General FLYNN. Sir, I will, sir. Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur, we are trying to adjourn the Committee. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Go right ahead, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky, unless you have some questions, we 

are going to adjourn the Committee. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am fine, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you very much. The Committee will adjourn 

until tomorrow at 10 a.m. Thank you very much. 

General FLYNN. Thank you, sir. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

CONTRACTING MRAPS

Question. Congress has appropriated over $22 billion for procurement of MRAPs 

DoD-wide. These funds were made available to respond to a critical need—and did 

so. 

However, a Department of Defense Inspector General report, (dated 26 Feb 2009) 

states that contracting officials used inappropriate contracting approaches, ignored 

acquisition regulations, or used ineffective pricing tools resulting in prices that could 

not always be determined to be fair and reasonable. 

The IG did compliment the Marine Corps because they took effective actions to 

accelerate delivery of MRAP vehicles and addressed material shortfalls. In addition, 

the Army and Marine Corps developed MRAP requirements based on theatre commander assessments. 

The IG report on the Procurement and Delivery of Joint Service Armor Protected 

Vehicles, found that the Marine Corps Systems Command did not properly determine that contract prices were fair and reasonable when they awarded nine firm 

fixed price contracts for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. As of 

June 30, 2008, the contracts were valued at $9.1 billion. Contracting officials relied 

on competition as the basis for price reasonableness even though the awards were 

made for dissimilar vehicles with a wide range of prices. 

Generals, is this true? Were common procurement practices vitiated in order to 

speed the process? 

Answer. While expediency is a hallmark trait of the MRAP program, all necessary 

procurement and acquisition procedures were considered and utilized. The mode for 

achieving the speed and effectiveness of placing MRAPs in the hands of the 

warfighter was to run many processes in a compressed and simultaneous manner. 

At no point did we ever consider that our approaches made any of the steps ineffective or invalidated in any manner the required federal, DoD, and service-unique acquisition regulations and policies. 

Question. If so, have your services done an analysis of cost savings that might 

have been realized? For example, for Category I vehicles, the prices ranged from 

$306,000 to $1,089,000. The current lead contracting officer could not explain how 

the price and evaluation team concluded that prices were fair and reasonable. 

Answer. We believe the price range in the DoD IG report on page 25 is misleading. In January 2007, nine vendor proposals demonstrated potential to meet the 

program’s overarching objective, which was to field the maximum number of survivable, safe, sustainable MRAP vehicles in the shortest period of time. Contracts were 

awarded to each vendor to deliver two CAT I and two CAT II vehicles for initial 

test and evaluation. We believed from the onset that ‘‘some’’ of the vehicles may not 

pass production verification and survivability tests, but we could not tell that definitively from the paper proposals. For that reason, it was decided that leaving any 

high potential producer that ‘‘could possibly’’ manufacture a survivable vehicle on 

the sidelines was an unacceptable risk when the Joint Forces had an urgent need 

for these vehicles. 

Of the nine vendors, Oshkosh Truck (OTC), at $306,199, was the least expensive, 

but failed Limited User Evaluation (LUE); General Purpose Vehicles (GPV) was the 

most expensive at more than $1 million per vehicle, but was terminated for convenience because the company failed to deliver any test vehicles. GPV’s paper proposal 

offered an enhanced maneuverability and mobility solution (the only vendor to offer 

this capability). GPV’s contract award was terminated, and the entire $5.1 million 

was de-obligated. The unit prices on page 25 of the report reflect unit pricing for 

a procurement order quantity of 1 to 200 vehicles. Approximately 95% of the MRAP 


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vehicles actually procured were purchased at higher step ladder quantity pricing 

where unit price ranges did not range so greatly among the vendors. 

Question. According to the IG, ‘‘For $1.2 billion of non-vehicle items, (the IG) 

found no corresponding independent government cost estimates for evaluation. The 

Marine Corps also did not obtain volume pricing discounts from two contractors for 

orders in excess of 1,500 vehicles.’’ Can you respond to this? Answer. We believe that MCSC netted actual savings of $127 million by negotiating bilateral contract modifications to produce more than the 1,500 vehicles that 

were originally contracted for in the base year. We purchased those vehicles at baseyear price rather than option-year pricing. The difference between ordering at baseyear rather and option-year pricing of 4,186 vehicles was $127 million. We understand the approach suggested by DoD IG. The DoD IG method suggests potential 

savings of $45.6 million by using volume discounts. We do not believe we would 

have received both discounts. We believe our method was a better investment for 

the government, as reflected in net actual savings of $127 million versus a hypothetical savings of $45.6 million. 

Question. General, have actions been taken to identify why this happened, who 

is responsible, and how to preclude this from happening in the future? 

Answer. The Marine Corps has incorporated the DoD IG report recommendation 

that future procurements for MRAP vehicles are properly competed or justified on 

a sole-source basis. Our acquisition strategies included this consideration for the 

MRAP II and sole-source award of MRAP CAT III procurements. MRAP-All Terrain 

Vehicle (M-ATV) prices for each part of the competition will be negotiated separately. 

MCSC has communicated to its contracting officials the importance of making 

price reasonableness determinations and ensuring cost or pricing data are requested. MCSC is building a framework for the price reasonableness determination 

that will be used for the M-ATV procurement. This procurement, though part of the 

overall Joint MRAP Vehicle Program, is being conducted by the U.S. Army TankAutomotive and Armaments Command (TACOM). 

We have attempted to build sufficient flexibility into the production contract to 

deal with both planned and potential quantities. We also sought both step and cumulative quantity discounts as part of the Request for Proposals for the M-ATV procurement. An OSD Peer Review was conducted before the request for proposal 

(RFP) release, and a second Peer Review is being conducted during M-ATV source 

selection. 

JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE (JLTV) 

Question. Since the initiation of the JLTV program, the military departments 

have procured over 16,000 Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. 

Now, the MRAP Joint Program office is in the process of procuring 400 light 

variants of the MRAP for duty in Afghanistan, and a more mobile MRAP All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) is being considered. Still, the JLTV program—a quite similar 

vehicle, is still under development. 

Given the similar requirement and specifications for the M-ATV and the JLTV— 

combined with the immediate need for mine resistant protected vehicles in Afghanistan, is it necessary for BOTH of these programs to continue? 

Answer. The M-ATV program will rapidly procure, in 2009–10, vehicles to meet 

the combatant commander’s immediate requirement to overcome the mobility deficiency of previous versions of MRAP in Afghanistan and to provide a more robustly 

armored vehicle than the Up-armored HMMWVs. The narrow set of requirements 

that define M-ATV are focused on armor protection and increased off-road mobility 

in the Afghanistan terrain. The requirements do not take into account limitations 

posed by shipboard or tactical aviation transportability requirements. The requirements that define the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program are heavily influenced by lessons learned from the MRAP program. The JLTV program is currently 

in the technology development phase of the acquisition process where vehicle prototypes and requirements will be evaluated, assessed and adjusted for the purpose of 

controlling risk and unneeded cost growth. Unlike the narrow focus of the MRAP 

program, JLTV seeks to achieve an appropriate balance of protection, payload, and 

performance (mobility and transportability) to support Joint warfighter requirements across the range of military operations and in a wider variety of operational 

environments and terrain. 

Question. Could you describe where each of these programs are in terms of development? 

Answer. JLTV—The Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) approved the Milestone 

A Decision in December 2007. A Request for Proposals was released in February 


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2008 and three contracts were awarded in October 2008 to Lockheed Martin/BAE, 

GTV (Joint Venture between GDLS & AMG) and BAE/International Navistar, which 

was followed by protests submitted to the GAO on behalf of Northrop Grumman and 

Textron. The protests were recently denied and the program started the 27 month 

TD Phase in March 09. TD phase results will inform and support finalization of the 

Capabilities Development Document (CDD). 

M-ATV—A non-developmental item (NDI) solution for the M-ATV is sought in response to a U.S. Central Command Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement 

(JUONS). After a first round of armor, ballistic and mobility testing, the Government awarded five indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts Thursday, 

30 April 09 for three additional production representative vehicles. These 15 vehicles are now at Aberdeen for additional mobility and ballistic testing and all other 

evaluation. The Government anticipates down-selecting to one offeror for production 

delivery orders, but may not limit itself to one vendor. A production contract may 

occur by the end of June 2009. 

Question. Do you think it is feasible to combine this effort to produce one good 

machine? If so, what would that cost in terms of time? 

Answer. No. M-ATV is an immediate solution to address concerns about protection 

and off-road mobility for the emerging theater requirements. JLTV is intended to 

be a long term solution that balances the ‘‘Iron Triangle’’ of protection, performance, 

and payload, while maintaining expeditionary transportability. While M-ATV will 

provide protection and limited mobility, it trades expeditionary transportability and 

provides limited payload. 

EFV PROGRAM NECESSITY

Question. Granted, there are scenarios that would justify any program, but given 

the fact that the U.S. has not conducted a beach assault landing in 59 years, is it 

possible that the EFV is no longer necessary? 

Answer. The Marine Corps has conducted more than 100 amphibious operations 

in the last 25 years; operations such as Liberia, Somalia, Grenada and the amphibious demonstration during Desert Storm which tied up numerous Iraqi divisions 

during the liberation of Kuwait. EFV will provide the necessary capabilities to meet 

the security challenges across the quadrants of conflict (Irregular, Traditional, Catastrophic and Disruptive) not available in any other platform. EFV remains crucial 

to Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, important 

concepts in today’s anti-access environment. Anti-ship cruise missile lethality was 

demonstrated when Hezbollah struck an Israeli warship during the Lebanon crisis 

in 2006; we need to keep ships over the horizon. A surface amphibious assault platform that self-deploys from a ship at high speed provides the joint commander mass 

combat power ashore. Keeping amphibious ships 25 nautical miles from the beach 

reduces the threat from cruise missiles and mines. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated the characteristics for effective amphibious assault. The 

EFV uniquely provides such essential characteristics. 

Question. It has been suggested that the fleet might need to operate at least 100 

miles from shore—beyond EFV’s range. What is the possibility of this occurrence? 

Answer. All of the current planning and doctrine projects that the Navy will be 

able to maneuver within 25 nautical miles, a distance that allows it to react and 

respond to a potential missile threat. A surface amphibious assault platform that 

self-deploys from a ship at high speed provides the joint commander the ability to 

mass combat power ashore. Keeping amphibious ships 25 nautical miles from the 

beach reduces the threat from cruise missiles and mines. The Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council validated the characteristics for effective amphibious assault. 

Question. Are we to the point where we debate whether or not this program 

should go forward? 

Answer. We are extremely confident that the EFV program is on the right track 

to produce a very effective combat vehicle, one that is vital to the Corps’ ability to 

conduct ship to objective operations. 

The EFV was certified to Congress in June 2007 (following a Nunn-McCurdy 

Breach) as: 

— Essential to national security. 

— No alternative will provide equal or greater capability at less cost. 

— New cost estimates are reasonable. 

— Management structure for program is adequate to manage program and costs. 

During the Nunn-McCurdy certification process (2007) an IPT concurred with earlier AoA findings and indicated there are no alternatives to the (Fix EFV) alternative which will provide equal or greater military capability at less cost. 


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— A key takeaway is that initiating a (New Start) would increase operational 

risk due to later deliveries (nearly 5 years), and pursuing the (Upgrade AAV) alternative, while entailing lower costs, would provide less military capability due to the 

slow speed of the AAV. 

COST/BENEFIT OF EFV DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Question. Exactly how much have we spent in research and development costs for 

this program? 

Answer. The following is a break-out of RDT&E costs: 

RDT&E 

— Program Value at Recertification (OSD–09)—$3,304.7 

— Expended To Date—$2,291.5 

Question. What are the projected development costs to complete this program? Answer. The costs to complete SDD–2 are approximately $728M. 

Question. Have any studies been undertaken to determine the cost of a redesign 

that would take into consideration a more resistant shaped hull? 

Answer. The safety and survivability of our Marines is paramount to our mission 

success. An EFV Mine Protection feasibility study was completed in late 2007 along 

with a study from The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) which assessed external 

V-Hull, Internal V-Hull and applique ́ configurations for survivability and performance impacts. The CNA study concluded that the applique ́ configuration provides increased mine blast protection with minimum performance impacts. While restricted 

to a flat-bottomed hull by the design requirements of a high-speed tracked amphibian, the underbelly survivability design of the EFV has taken a critical approach 

to integrate proven survivability attributes. A Level ‘‘A’’ kit matches or exceeds the 

upgraded underbelly protection offered to the LAV–25/LAV III and Stryker by their 

survivability kits, and the Level ‘‘B’’ kit matches or exceeds the upgraded protection 

offered by the Bradley M2/M3 (BUSK) upgrade kit. 

Question. Because of costs, the Marine Corps has reduced the previously planned 

number of units by one-half. This program is far from over. Do you think that number will be reduced again? 

Answer. The Marine Corps did not reduce the program due to cost per vehicle but 

rather as a result of a self-assessment of the future battle field and the need for 

a better mix of vehicles to overcome future threats. In early 2007, The Defense Department’s Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) directed the Marine Corps to look at 

its entire mix of vehicles for providing mobility across the spectrum of conflict. The 

Marine Corps has proposed reducing its requirement from 1,013 EFVs to 573 in 

order to procure larger quantities of other vehicles and provide protected ground 

mobility to the greatest possible portion of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

(MAGTF). By accepting risk in strategic flexibility (prepositioning), and reinvesting 

resources to enhance irregular warfare mobility capabilities, the Marine Corps will 

field a balanced vehicle fleet to support all assigned missions. In some ways the Marine Corps conducted its own QDR to better position itself as the nation’s force of 

choice. 

EFV’S RESISTANCE TO LAND MINES AND IEDS

Question. According to the EFV website: The EFV design mitigates the damage 

caused by IED and RPG threats similar to those encountered by US forces in Iraq. 

How is that possible given the flat bottom design? 

Answer. The safety and survivability of our Marines is paramount to our mission 

success. While restricted to a flat-bottomed hull by the design requirements of a 

high-speed tracked amphibian, the underbelly survivability design of the EFV has 

taken a critical approach to integrate proven survivability attributes. A study conducted by Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) concluded that current bolt on applique ́

configuration provides increased mine blast protection with minimum performance 

impacts. A Level ‘‘A’’ kit matches or exceeds the upgraded underbelly protection offered to the LAV–25/LAV III and Stryker by their survivability kits, and the Level 

‘‘B’’ kit matches or exceeds the upgraded protection offered by the Bradley M2/M3 

(BUSK) upgrade kit. Additionally, the EFV is equipped with specifically designed 

blast shock absorbing seats for the crew and the embarked infantry and staff which 

provide protection from mine blast shock. 

Question. Your plan proposes that once ashore, armor could be applied to the underside of the EFV. Initially, how will armor get to a beach landing and secondly, 

who is going to stop, crawl under that 16′′ clearance and bolt on armor while being 

fired upon? Is this a realistic scenario? 


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Answer. The maneuver and lethality of the EFV will allow the combatant commander to conduct continuing operations through the initial phases of an operation. 

The bolt on of additional armor would not take place until the security environment 

allowed it and at a location that is equipped for the support (i.e. a rear logistics operating base with appropriate support). 

Question. Would a V-shaped V-Hull force a total redesign of the EFV? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. If the EFV fails its second Systems Development and Demonstration 

(SDD), would it not be difficult to justify a third SDD phase? 

Answer. There are various review and oversight processes in place which will 

monitor the progress of the program, as required by the EFV Nunn McCurdy Certification restructure. In addition to these reviews and oversight opportunities, the 

program has established ‘‘Knowledge Points’’ which will help ensure that the program stays on course to successfully meet its reliability requirement. 

— The first such Knowledge Point (KP–1) was successfully completed in December 2008 as the EFV program successfully released a Critical Design Review (CDR) 

during a capstone event that assessed the EFV design as mature with a predicted 

reliability estimate of sixty-one (61) hours Mean Time Between Operational Mission 

Failure (MTBOMF) greatly exceeding the exit criteria of forty-three point five (43.5) 

hours. 

Remaining Knowledge Points to occur in FY11/FY12&FY13 are: 

— KP–2 New Demonstrated Reliability after redesign (22–27 hour MTBOMF) 

— KP–3 New Projected Reliability after reliability growth mods (on curve) 

— KP–4 New Demonstrated Reliability after reliability growth mods (on curve) 

— KP–5 New Projected Reliability Meets KPP Requirement 

THE ACQUISITION PROGRAM/AMBITIOUS SCHEDULE

Question. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) alleges that: ‘‘The program 

did not allow enough time to demonstrate maturity of the EFV design during Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD). The original SDD schedule of about 

three years proved too short to conduct all necessary planning and to incorporate 

the results of tests into design changes. Specifically, the original schedule did not 

allow adequate time for testing, evaluating the results, problems, and retesting to 

make certain that problems are fixed before moving forward.’’ Have these problems 

been addressed? 

Answer. The failure of the initial System Development and Demonstration phase 

(SDD) prototypes to demonstrate acceptable reliability during 2006 Operational 

Analysis (OA) was the primary reason the program was restructured in 2007. A focused Design For Reliability (DFR) effort ensued where best practices in reliability 

engineering, including the utilization of an Industry Standard software suite, and 

robust Systems Engineering processes were instituted to improve the EFV’s design 

and performance. At the culmination of the DFR effort, System Critical Design Review (CDR), the EFV design is predicted to have a reliability of 61 hours mean time 

between operational mission failure (MTBOMF), which exceeds the reliability 

growth curve threshold allocation of 43.5 hours established for the CDR during the 

program restructure. 

Question. Do you see improvements in the program that will allow it to move forward in an efficient manner? 

Answer. The EFV program successfully passed a Defense Acquisition Board Review following the Preliminary Design Review in Feb 2008. USD (AT&L) approved 

the award of the SDD–2 contract for the construction of seven EFV prototypes to 

be manufactured at the Joint Services Manufacturing Center in Lima, Ohio. The 

first new EFV prototype is expected to roll off the assembly line in March 2010. 

The EFV program held a successful Critical Design Review (CDR) in December 

2008 which assessed the EFV design as mature with a predicted reliability estimate 

of sixty-one (61) hours Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failures 

(MTBOMF) greatly exceeding the exit criteria of forty-three point five (43.5) hours. 

Question. The EFV Approval was granted for the purchase of seven more EFV 

prototypes—because the originals were worn out. The vehicles have incurred a 168 

percent per-vehicle cost increase, and the Marines will now procure only half as 

many (573) as originally planned. Combined with the need to purchase even more 

prototypes, and the cost growth, both factors appear to be excessive. Can you elaborate on why both situations have occurred? 

Answer. In early 2007, The Defense Department’s Strategic Planning Guidance 

(SPG) directed the Marine Corps to look at its entire mix of vehicles for providing 

mobility across the spectrum of conflict. The Marine Corps has proposed reducing 

its requirement from of 1,013 EFVs to 573 in order to procure larger quantities of 


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other vehicles and provide protected ground mobility to the greatest possible portion 

of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The current SDD prototype vehicles 

have been vigorously tested and have now reached the wear and tear equivalent of 

a 20-year service life which is adversely impacting the ability to distinguish inherent vehicle reliability performance from age-induced failures. In order to continue 

to grow reliability, new test assets are necessary to verify new design changes. 

EFV TRANSFORMATION FROM SEA TO LAND MODE

Question. Is the EFV not a sitting duck while waiting to transform to a shore 

mode? 

Answer. Under the Ship to objective maneuver (STOM) concept, there is no operational pause at the beach. Although the EFV must reduce its operational speed 

during transition from sea to shore it does not come to a stop but rather it can 

maintain speeds in excess of 5 knots. The EFV seamlessly transports Marines from 

ships located beyond the horizon to inland objectives without a pause in movement. 

Question. Are there efforts to enhance this transformation time—or eliminate it 

altogether by making the transformation on-the-move? 

Answer. The EFV can transition on the move from high water speed of 25 kts 

to land mobility. Although the EFV must reduce its operational speed during transition from sea to shore it does not come to a stop but rather it can maintain speeds 

in excess of 5 knots that is Equivalent to or better than the legacy Assault Amphibious Vehicle. 

EFV DESIGN

Question. General, have you seen the interior of an EFV? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Wouldn’t you find it difficult to fit a Marine, and all his equipment on 

either side of the engine, and then the remaining crew in the passenger compartment? 

Answer. Each Marine has an individual seat that has been ergometrically designed. Testing has demonstrated that not only can the EFV carry 17 combatequipped Marines but it does so in a way that makes them a more effective fighting 

force at the objective. When compared to the current AAV, Marines who spent three 

hours inside each vehicle performed much better in accomplishing various combat 

tasks following their ride on an EFV. 

MARINE PERSONNEL CARRIER (MPC) 

Question. General, other than financial constraints, the Committee understands 

that the Marine Corps believes that a shift to the right could better synchronize it 

with fielding of the EFV. We’ve discussed EFVs. Is this the ‘‘real’’ reason? 

Answer. The Marine Corps announced in May 2008 it was deferring Milestone A 

(MS A) for the MPC program to the FY10 time-frame to allow the Marine Corps 

to effectively prioritize near-term investment decisions, in order to provide a synchronized mobility strategy with respect to the capabilities MPC, the EFV and JLTV 

offer for the future. 

Question. General Flynn, General Brogan, also in the room with us today, said, 

‘‘The Marine Corps wants that vehicle, (referring to the MPC) the requirement is 

definitely there.’’ General, what amount of time is reasonable for Congress to extend 

such programs? 

Answer. The two-year investment period will allow for the maturation of Government Furnished Equipment and armoring technologies the Marine Corps plans to 

integrate onto the vehicles once produced. In addition, an MPC Technology Demonstration effort has been initiated to inform CDD development on achievable capabilities and integration risks. 

Question. Also, it is the understanding of the Committee that, in the interim, the 

Marines will continue to use MRAP vehicles and older assault amphibious vehicles. 

Realizing that the Marine Corps did an analysis of alternatives over a year ago, and 

considering the research and development costs, and by your own admission, the 

MPC was ‘‘out-prioritized in . . . terms of budget,’’ did the Marine Corps consider 

the Army’s Interim Armored Vehicle, the Stryker, a vehicle with very similar requirements? 

Answer. The MPC AOA identified a medium armored personnel carrier as the solution to the MPC requirement. The initial Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) included 

Stryker ‘‘legacy’’ but it did not meet the MPC requirements. 

When the Army was moving toward a Stryker upgrade we saw an opportunity to 

collaborate on a joint material solution. Since that time, we understand that the 


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Army has limited their Stryker work to product improvement on same basic Stryker 

chassis, thus limiting the scope of Stryker improvements. For the record however, 

it’s fair to say Stryker will necessarily be considered in its current and Product Improvement Program (PIP) configuration as we update the AOA in the future. 

The MPC program office is closely monitoring Stryker MOD and that it could likely compete as a MPC candidate. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 2009. 

SOLDIER EQUIPMENT, ERGONOMICS AND INJURIES 

WITNESSES 

GENERAL PETER W. CHIARELLI, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED 

STATES ARMY 

GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE 

CORPS 

INTRODUCTION

Ms. KAPTUR [presiding.] The Committee will be in order. We 

would ask our special guests to take their place. 

I want to welcome everyone this morning. Today our Committee 

will hold a hearing on the causes and possibly some solution for the 

injuries suffered by our soldiers and marines due to the very heavy 

equipment loads carried by our infantry. 

We are pleased to welcome General Peter W. Chiarelli, the Vice 

Chief of Staff of the Army, and General James F. Amos, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Thank you, gentlemen, so 

very much. These two gentlemen are well qualified to address the 

problems and some potential solutions to how we, simply put, are 

breaking down our soldiers and Marines. Thank you both for being 

here and for your many years of service to our Nation. 

General Chiarelli, you have stated that the Army has over 20,000 

soldiers in a nondeployable status, many of them nondeployable 

due to injuries received by carrying a very heavy combat load over 

rugged terrain for an extended period. The load that our soldiers 

and Marines carry over extended distances, over rough terrain, and 

often at high altitudes frequently exceeds 100 pounds. Body armor 

alone can weigh 30 pounds. The personal weapon, ammunition, 

water, possibly a radio, spare batteries, all add to the load that 

must be carried. 

The Committee is looking forward to your statements and answers to our questions on how we can provide better load-carrying 

devices, how we can take some gear out of the rucksack, possibly 

by more frequent and more forward resupply, and how we can 

make gear lighter while still achieving the desired capabilities. 

Before we turn to the opening statements from our witnesses, I 

would like to recognize the distinguished Ranking Member of our 

Committee on Defense Mr. Young for any remarks that he might 

have. Thank you so much, Bill. 

Mr. YOUNG. Madam Chairman, thank you very much. And I 

want to share in the welcome, your welcome, to the two very distinguished military leaders. 

The men and women who serve in our uniform are the best part 

of our national defense. All of the technology in the world isn’t 

going to work right without the right people handling it. This subVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:11 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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committee has a very, very strong feeling toward anyone who 

serves in our military. 

The interesting subject today talking about lightening the load is 

a good idea, because I have seen some of the soldiers in the field 

trying to handle those 100-pound and more loads of equipment, 

weapons, whatever. And that is a pretty tough load to begin with, 

let alone when you get up to an altitude up to 10,000 feet or more, 

which is some of the Afghan territory. So the subject of today’s 

hearing is really, really important, and we look forward to your testimony. Thank you for being here today. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Young, very much. 

And now, General Chiarelli, you may proceed with your summarized statement, and your entire statement will be placed in the 

record. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHIARELLI

General CHIARELLI. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member 

Young, distinguished members of the Committee, I thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the impact 

of combat loads on soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. This 

is my first occasion to appear before this esteemed Committee, and 

I pledge to always provide you with an honest and forthright assessment. I have also submitted a statement for the record, and I 

look forward to answering your questions at the conclusion of my 

opening remarks. 

First, on behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable Pete Geren, and 

our Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, I would like to take 

the opportunity to thank you for your strong support and demonstrated commitment to our soldiers, Army civilians and family 

members. I and the other senior leaders of our Army care deeply 

about them. 

A soldier’s well-being is our foremost priority in everything we 

do. Over the past several years, the Army has fielded numerous 

technologies that have greatly improved a soldier’s capability and 

the survivability of the force. However, the further challenge effected by this progress has been more and more weight added to 

a soldier’s load, and the wear and tear on soldiers demonstrated by 

the increases we have seen in musculoskeletal issues has had significant impact on our deployability rate. 

This is a challenge, and it needs to be addressed; however, we 

must also recognize that there is no simple solution. The realty is 

there is a trade-off to be made between the force protection and effectiveness. Certainly we could outfit a soldier with every piece of 

body armor and equipment available, essentially encasing him or 

her in a cocoon of protective technology; however, doing so would 

diminish his or her effectiveness and his or her ability to maneuver 

on the battlefield, thus putting him or her at even greater risk. A 

cumbersome load, for example, could cause heat injury or hamper 

a soldier’s ability to take cover quickly from enemy fire in the event 

of an attack. 

So the challenge cannot be solved simply by developing, procuring and fielding lighter technology and equipment, although 

that is a critical part of the solution. Instead, to properly address 


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issues requires a comprehensive approach that focuses on improving soldier training and conditioning, as well as finding alternate 

ways to transport equipment and supplies on behalf of soldiers. 

And I ensure the members of this Committee that it is what our 

Army senior leaders are focused on doing. We are exploring shortterm solutions, as well as those that will meet ground force needs 

well into the future. 

First, we are in the process of changing the Army’s physical fitness doctrine and training programs to better prepare soldiers to 

the demand of military operations. Individual evaluations suggest 

that soldiers who train and condition properly are much less likely 

to sustain an injury after deployment. Therefore, we believe the 

best way we can help our soldiers to avoid injury due to excessive 

load is by preparing them as well as possible for the physiological 

demands of their mission, and the results today have been very, 

very positive. 

A concerted effort is also being made to reduce the heaviness and 

bulkiness of combat gear and body armor required on the battlefield. Right now this can be accomplished by reducing the area of 

coverage and/or the level of protection in certain areas. And we rely 

on commanders on the ground to make correct decisions on behalf 

of soldiers on mission parameters such as climate, environment, 

time and mission duration. Let me be clear that this is absolutely 

where and by whom these decisions should and must be made: by 

commanders on the ground who are well trained and fully understand the various considerations and the current enemy situation, 

not by those of us removed from the battlefield, back in Washington. 

Our job is to make sure commanders have everything they need 

to be successful. And a variety of research, development and engineering organizations are currently assisting the Army in tackling 

the challenge of soldier load. The challenge of equipping soldiers on 

the battlefield with the right technology and level of protection 

without overloading them is a difficult one; however, I am confident 

that we are taking the correct actions to reduce the burden on soldiers by making adjustments to the Army’s physical training and 

conditioning programs, by finding ways to reduce the weight of integral pieces of equipment and body armor, and by pursuing improved new technologies and methods for carrying or delivering 

part of the load. 

I assure the members of this Committee that there is no greater 

priority for me and the Army senior leaders than the safety and 

well-being of our soldiers. The men and women who wear the uniform of our Nation are the best in the world, and we owe them and 

their families a debt of gratitude for their service and many sacrifices. 

Chairwoman Kaptur and members of the Committee, I again 

want to thank you for your continued and generous support of the 

outstanding men and women of the United States Army and their 

families, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you very 

much. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you very much, General Chiarelli. Thank 

you for your testimony. 

[The statement of General Chiarelli follows:] 


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Ms. KAPTUR. General Amos, why don’t we proceed with you. 

Good morning. Welcome. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL AMOS

General AMOS. Chairwoman Kaptur, and Ranking Member 

Young, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you 

for this opportunity to share what the Marine Corps is doing to 

mitigate combat load injuries and to lighten the load for our 

warfighters. On behalf of all Marines, Sailors and their families, I 

extend my appreciation for the continued support that this Committee and Congress provides to our Marine Corps. I will take this 

opportunity to highlight just a few things that the Marine Corps 

is doing with regards to lightening the load. 

Over the last 4 years, the Marine Corps has not seen a significant increase in injuries directly related to changes in the weight 

or the type of equipment. A delicate balance exists between mission 

accomplishment and force protection. Numerous tactics, techniques 

and procedures have been developed to mitigate the distances dismounted Marines must traverse and, therefore, the amount of gear 

they must carry. 

The fact remains, however, that current military operations ultimately require Marines to dismount and engage the enemy in close 

combat. To do so necessitates Marines that are agile and 

unencumbered enough to carry the day, but protected enough to 

survive. This is a delicate balance. 

The most significant part of the individual Marine’s load is his 

or her body armor. At least 30 percent of a Marine’s load is his personal protective equipment. The technology to protect Marines is 

better than in previous generations, but comes with significant cost 

and weight. Please know that your Marines are the best protected 

force on the battlefield. We have ensured that they have the very 

latest technology has to offer. Because we are constantly engaged 

in fluid combat operations, we understand that our commanders on 

the battlefield are in the best position to determine the most effective combat load for any given situation. Operational commanders 

determine how best to equip their Marines based on their analysis 

of mission requirements, the enemy situation and environmental 

conditions. 

To enable this flexibility we provide a range of options in personal protective equipment that can be configured to meet varying 

levels of threat. You will see some of that here demonstrated this 

morning shortly. 

We believe conditioning is a major contributing factor to the success of mitigating combat load injuries. Physical fitness is an essential part of the Marine Corps and has been rooted in our most basic 

levels of training. Marines are renowned for their being physically 

ready for the challenges of austere and demanding environments, 

but there is always room for improvement. 

As part of our lessons learned process, we determined that we 

needed to tailor Marine physical training to the realities of weight 

and combat missions. In October of 2008, the Marine Corps added 

a new combat fitness test to its longstanding physical fitness test. 

The combat fitness test is actually a training regimen that specifically addresses movements typical of combat operations and seeks 


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to improve a Marine’s ability to perform them while decreasing associated injuries. 

The best weapon and most precious asset in the Marine Corps 

is the well-trained and -equipped and -conditioned Marine. With 

your continued support your Marine Corps will remain the Nation’s 

force on readiness and continue to fulfill its mission of being ready 

when the Nation is the least ready. 

Thank you. I request my written testimony be accepted for the 

record, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of General Amos follows:] 


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WEIGHT OF BODY ARMOR

Mr. YOUNG. Madam Chairman, I wonder if you could invite the 

soldiers with their heavy equipment to take a seat and lighten 

their load a little bit. 

General CHIARELLI. If it is okay with you, sir, could we, before 

they sit down, explain what you see here very quickly? I will use 

the soldier, Staff Sergeant Fred Rowe. Fred is from Greenville, 

Kentucky. He is married and currently doesn’t have any kids. He 

has been assigned to both the 82nd and is currently assigned to the 

101st preparing for a deployment to Afghanistan. He has been to 

Iraq twice on two deployments. This will be his first to Afghanistan. And on his second deployment to Iraq, he took three rounds 

to the chest and got up and completed the mission, which shows 

you the quality of protection provided by these plates. 

We asked Staff Sergeant Rowe to wear the full-up, what the 

Army calls the improved outer tactical vest with the SAPI plates 

front and rear, plus SAPI plates on the side. His, without all the 

other accoutrements, because it is a size medium, weighs 30 

pounds. To give you an example, if we were to move up to a size 

large, like I would wear, I would be carrying an extra 3.2 pounds, 

because of the extra weight of the plates, up to 33.2 pounds. But 

this is the full-up gear right here that provides the best protection 

over the largest portion of the body that both the Marines and the 

Army have at this time. 

Ms. KAPTUR. General Chiarelli, what is the total weight of equipment that Sergeant Rowe is carrying right now? I notice he doesn’t 

have on the optical scanner and some of the other things. 

General CHIARELLI. I did not totally weigh his ruck. 

Sergeant ROWE. Depending on the mission, ma’am, my kit has 

weighed up to about 98 pounds at one time, depending on the mission. Sometimes it is about 70 pounds. But with ammunition, grenades, flashbangs and all the other equipment, it is going to be 

over 70 pounds every time that you go outside the wire. On an extended mission during a surge, my kit weighs just shy of 100 

pounds. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. Thank you for that. 

To your knowledge, Sergeant Rowe, have the soldiers ever been 

asked about equipment loads in your career? Do you ever get a survey or anybody talk to you about what could we do to lighten your 

load? 

Sergeant ROWE. Yes, ma’am. I have actually taken a survey multiple times. I think in the survey it asked if you would accept the 

responsibility of having like a plate carrier or something lighter 

that doesn’t have as much flak protection from the shrapnel and 

9-mils. And as far as I know, every person that has ever worn the 

kit that we had to wear has checked ‘‘yes’’ in their block. 

Mr. YOUNG. Sergeant, your experience in Iraq when you were 

hunting down or pursuing a terrorist, he was moving pretty light, 

I understand, he didn’t carry the heavy load because he hit and 

run. How much restriction is there on you in pursuing that bad guy 

and hunting him down? 

Sergeant ROWE. Most of the time I was in Iraq, sir, I was a sniper, and we weren’t actually chasing people down. But when I was 


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an infantry squad leader, we would react to contacts, and if the individual is not in your line of sight, basically if you can’t just see 

him right away in the street within 100 yards or so, you can’t pursue. You would have to go ahead and stand your ground and maintain what you have, because there is no way that you will ever 

catch them. 

Mr. YOUNG. I bet you couldn’t do the 100-yard dash in 10 seconds, could you? 

Sergeant ROWE. No, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you for what you have done and what you 

will continue to do. We appreciate your service to our country. 

Sergeant ROWE. I am happy to do it, sir. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Would it be possible for the soldier to describe 

from bottom to top what he is wearing? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Certainly, certainly. 

Sergeant ROWE. Well, we start out with the desert boot, sir. And 

depending on the terrain, we have five different pairs of boots that 

you can wear, and some of them can actually be pretty heavy. If 

you are walking on concrete, they are going to have a thicker sole. 

They are about a pound heavier each. 

Then you go to the pads. We have insert pads that we could be 

wearing, but we have the outer knee pads and elbow pads that are 

mandatory for you to wear. They have better protection, but it gets 

a little restrictive. He was talking about chasing down someone. 

Whenever you can’t even move your arms or legs it is pretty hard 

to run. When you move up, then you have your groin protector, 

which is a 9-mil flak, as well as around your neck, and pretty much 

everything around the plates. 

When you move up the vest, you have usually some kind of a 

harness that holds all your magazines and pouches over top of your 

armored vest; and, depending on the mission, what ammo you are 

going to take, how many grenades you are going to take, or whatever equipment you are going to have. Always your survivability 

kit, first aid. And then you also have your vest which has—as the 

general was saying, depending on your size it can go up between— 

probably about 5 pounds, sir. And then lastly you have your ACH 

helmet, which is a lot lighter than the ones we had in the past. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And what is on your back? 

Sergeant ROWE. This is an over daypack, sir. This is what we call 

an assault bag. You can’t really fit a whole lot more than just a 

MRE and maybe a little water or extra ammunition in it. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. How much water do you carry? 

Sergeant ROWE. Depending on how long you are going to go out, 

sir. Normally we have to have at least 4 quarts on us at any time. 

But if you are going to go out for a day or 2 days or a week, then 

you are going to have to pack up your trucks and carry more water 

in your bags, just depending on the mission and how long you are 

going to be out. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

SCALABLE BODY ARMOR

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Rothman, very much. 

I was going to ask, Sergeant Rowe, if you step a little bit to your 

right we are going to ask General Amos to introduce your guest 


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from the Corps, and I know Congressman Frelinghuysen has the 

next question. 

General AMOS. Sergeant Harres, come on up here. 

Ma’am, this is Sergeant Harres, Infantry Marine and squad leader, two combat tours, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, both of them in 

Iraq. And he is wearing what we call the scalable armor. Now, we 

did our best to try to put the same equipment on the vest itself, 

but you will notice that the vest that he is wearing provides him 

a lot more opportunity to move. And so what this has done, this 

was an attempt about a year and a half ago to develop an opportunity to divest yourself of some of the heavy equipment and protection, and recognizing up in the mountains of Afghanistan, in the 

hot temperatures and high attitude, you need to be able to move 

just exactly for the very reason that Congressman Young talked 

about. 

So this is a scalable vest. It is called a plate carrier. It has the 

same enhanced small-arms protective plate in the front, one in the 

back, just the same way as his vest does. It has the plates on the 

side. If you would point to the side SAPI plates. Those just attach 

off and on, and that is an outshoot of about the last 3 years of combat in Iraq, understanding that the snipers would shoot at the 

sides. So we put those on there. This thing is significantly lighter. 

It is about another 10 to 15 pounds lighter than what we have over 

here, and we are issuing that now to the Marines in Afghanistan. 

And again, we are allowing the commander to make the call. 

We have a full vest that we did not bring, very, very similar to 

this vest. It weighs 331⁄2 pounds. It looks exactly like this except 

it has got Marine tan. So we have that capability, and we provide 

that protection. 

Most of our Marines in Iraq right now are wearing a heavier 

gear. This an acknowledgement that if we can scale and allow the 

commander to pick the right armor, depending on what the situation is, then he is more apt to be able to maneuver in high attitudes and high temperatures. 

Sergeant Harres, do you have anything you want to talk about 

about your personal—— 

Sergeant HARRES. When I was in Iraq, we had the full flak, 

which when we were able to adapt to it, I thought it was fine. Once 

I moved to the plate holder, like the General said, you are able to 

move freely. On our recent trip to Iraq and Afghanistan we had to 

use them. It doesn’t offer necessarily as much protection, but up in 

the hills of the Afghanistan mountains, it will definitely will be a 

lot better to use, I think. 

FIRE-RESISTANT ORGANIZATIONAL GEAR

General AMOS. One of the things that you will see, you will notice on Sergeant Harres, he has got kind of a strange-looking shirt 

on. That was developed about 2 years ago as a result of our Marines being burned when the IEDs would go off. And we ended up 

with a lot of Marines on their hands, neck, body being burned. And 

you would see it down at Brooke Army Hospital. So the Marine 

Corps Systems Command developed and did a rush. We really 

worked very quickly to develop what they call FROG gear, which 

is fire-resistant organizational gear, and it now has it for the shirt. 


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We have got a thing we put over our—a balaclava we put over our 

head. And we have got Nomex gloves. And the whole idea is to reduce the burning in the event of a vehicle IED mishap. 

So we have gone to that. And, in fact, you will find a lot of Marines wearing aviation flight suits right now, because they are 

Nomex, on patrol in Iraq. They like them because they are fire resistant. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Congressman Frelinghuysen. 

ADJUSTING LEVELS OF PROTECTION

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is 130 degrees in Iraq, and you are an 

Army sniper, and let us say you are a Marine sniper. Do you have 

the flexibility on your own to reduce the amount of gear you have 

so you can actually maneuver? It is pretty damn difficult to fire a 

rifle if you can barely move your arms. I just wondered do you have 

that flexibility, or is there some greater God in terms of a unitary 

policy that you have to obey, both the Marines as well as the 

Army? Do you have some ability to adapt? 

Sergeant ROWE. No, sir. You are not allowed to shed gear, so to 

speak. In the past I have done it to adapt to the mission and to 

get on my belly, hide on the desert to be able to make that shot. 

I have done that. It is not allowed. 

You can’t shed gear because, as the general was saying, the commander is trying to protect their soldiers, and they don’t want to 

have to answer for that. That is why we as soldiers would like to 

go to something like that that allows us to be more mobile and 

versatile so that we wouldn’t have to shed our gear. We would wear 

everything at the same time to accomplish position. 

General CHIARELLI. And that is exactly what we want to go to 

is that same capability to do that. But I will tell you, in 2006, since 

we are talking about snipers, the snipers were, in fact, aiming for 

the femoral artery of the leg even wearing this gear in order that 

they could get a soldier to bleed out. So the thought in 2006 of 

shedding this kind of protection for something less, you would be 

putting your soldiers’ lives at risk. I think most commanders would 

power this down to company commanders, particularly in Afghanistan, to make that call based on an enemy situation as to when 

they can shed gear and go to a plate carrier because the situation 

allows it. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you both for your service. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

EQUIPMENT WEIGHT

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. 

I think I would like to hold questions for the moment. We would 

like to ask our guests to please be seated. And while they are doing 

that, General Amos and General Chiarelli, what is the total potential weight that each soldier or marine would have to carry; what 

is the potential total weight? 

General AMOS. I have got some actual figures here. We have a 

battalion that just came back from Afghanistan about 3 months 

ago, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines. And in an effort to try to capture 

what their weights were, we sent a Marine Corps lessons learned 

team over to Afghanistan and actually weighed these guys and say, 


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okay, put them on a scale with what they typically wore. And the 

lightest was the squad leader. So that was the Marine that was in 

charge, typically a sergeant like Sergeant Harres, that was wearing 

78.94 pounds of gear. The mortarman was the heaviest in that 

squad, and he was wearing 142.26 pounds of gear. 

Now, there is an old military historian by the name of S.L.A. 

Marshall, who many, many years ago said an infantryman should 

never wear more than 50 percent of his body weight. So this 

mortarman that is wearing 142.26 pounds, when you think about 

how much he probably typically weighed, maybe 170, 180 pounds, 

and you go back to what S.L.A. Marshall talked about, this has 

been a problem for infantrymen, to be honest with you, all the way 

back to the days of Alexander the Great, and it is a problem, and 

it is something we are struggling with. 

But I will tell you from the services side of the house, there is 

no slack in effort to try to capture as much advanced technology 

that is out there to lighten the load. And we can talk about this 

in this hearing, we can talk about initiatives that are under way 

right now to lighten a load, but there is no shortage of money being 

spent from the science and technology in the developmental world 

to try to get our Marines’ and soldiers’ loads down. And there are 

several initiatives which we can talk about. 

Ms. KAPTUR. General Amos, do you want to proceed with any additional statement at this point? 

General AMOS. I don’t, ma’am, but I will be happy to answer any 

questions. 

Pete, do you have anything on the weight? 

General CHIARELLI. Our doctrinal fighting load is 48 pounds, and 

it can range from 48 pounds up to 120 pounds. We have done some 

looking at Afghanistan. The average fighting loads in Afghanistan 

are 63 pounds. I think that is basically what Sergeant Rowe indicated, maybe a lot lighter than in Afghanistan than they are in 

Iraq. And they vary from that 63 pounds up to 130 pounds. 

I took a look at World War II fighting loads, and the difference 

between World War II fighting loads and the fighting loads I just 

cited just now is about the weight of the tactical vest you see right 

there. So what we have added since World War II in the amount 

of weight is basically in that IOTV with SAPI plates, but additional 

capabilities that our soldiers didn’t have in World War II. So we 

are looking at an average load of 63 pounds in Afghanistan today. 

REDUCING EQUIPMENT WEIGHT

Ms. KAPTUR. General Chiarelli, in your testimony submitted to 

the record, you indicate that in one study infantry soldiers carrying 

a load of 101 pounds for 12.5 miles had a decrease of 26 percent 

in marksmanship, being the number of targets that were hit; a 33 

percent increase in the distance from the target center; and an increase in back pain compared to preload and march scores. And 

then a little bit later on it indicates in your testimony that a 72- 

pound load increased energy required by 40 percent on behalf of 

the soldier. And the time required to complete an obstacle course 

increases 10 to 15 percent for every additional 10 pounds carried. 

My question to you really is what are we doing? I look down the 

list that every Member has gotten of equipment that is being carVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:11 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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ried by our soldiers, and we put all this money into research, but 

the optical scope and illuminator, that is almost 9 pounds itself. 

What kind of dispatch is there to try to look at each piece of equipment and to try to halve its weight? 

General CHIARELLI. We are working very hard at finding ways 

to lighten the load, I can promise you that. One of the things we 

are looking at is civilian off-the-shelf solutions to many of the 

things we do. And our rapid-equipping force is leading the way in 

the Army at finding some of those things that will lower the 

weight. 

But I have to tell you, the advent of the SAPI plate is the mid1990s. We fielded the first SAPI plates, ceramic plates, in early 

2000. And the protection that they have provided and their ability 

to stop rounds is such that we have offered a level of protection to 

soldiers that they have never had on the battlefield. Our sergeant 

here would not be alive today if he did not have those SAPI plates 

on. 

I made a trip up to ARL, our Army Research Laboratory, to see 

what they were doing to try to lighten those plates even further, 

and they told me, quite frankly, that it is going to take a lot more 

time given the improvement in ballistics which they have to stay 

up on. 

We have come up with two improvements to the SAPI plates. We 

are on E–SAPI today, which provides more ballistic protection. It 

did not increase the weight, but it has more ballistic protection. 

But the technological chances of being able to cut that weight in 

half are still many years down the road when it comes to the plates 

themselves. But we are looking for other ways that we can do that. 

I might mention, I totally agree with General Amos. Physical 

conditioning and—what we are finding through the University of 

Pittsburgh study that is being conducted—nutrition are key elements in helping soldiers when they have to carry these loads in 

avoiding the kind of musculoskeletal issues that we are seeing 

today. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Could you please provide for the record, and then 

I am going to call on Mr. Young, a brief summary of each piece of 

equipment that the soldier is carrying or the Marine is carrying 

and the research under way to lighten that piece of equipment? I 

would be very grateful for that. 

[The information follows:] 

For over a half decade, the Army has initiated a number of programs to transform 

how individual Soldiers are equipped given their unique size, weight, power, and environmental considerations. There are well over 300 items that could be issued to 

the Soldier depending on their mission and where they would be deployed. Army 

investments impacting Soldier load include the following and are not all inclusive 

of Army efforts. 

1. Clothing and Individual Equipment—There are numerous Army initiatives like 

rucksacks, flashlights, and sleeping bags. By using some Commercial Off the Shelf 

(COTS) items we are already lightening the Soldier’s load by as much as 70% on 

individual items. Other clothing enhancements such as Extended Cold Weather 

Clothing System (ECWCS) provide cold weather protection made from light weight 

material that makes the ECWCS 7 lbs lighter than previous versions. 

2. Lethality—There are numerous initiatives that will lighten the Soldiers load. 

Among the highlights are: The M240L lightweight machinegun which will reduce 

the weight of the M240B machinegun by 7.1 lbs, a savings of 26%. The use of the 

XM806 lightweight .50 caliber machinegun and tripod lessens the load by 64 lbs 

over the M2 machinegun and tripod, a savings of 50%. The switch from the M122 


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machinegun tripod to the M192 tripod will reduce the weight by 6.5 lbs, a savings 

of 34% on the M249 and M240B. The combination of optic sights and laser pointers 

will provide as much as a 34% savings (1.42 to .56 lbs) in Soldier load weight. Another area of Soldier load savings has been obtained in sensors and lasers, where 

the medium Thermal Weapons Sight was reduced 44% (5.0 lbs to 2.8 lbs). 

3. Ammunition—Lightweight steel cased ammunition currently in development 

has demonstrated a weight savings of 25% over current 7.62mm ammunition. The 

Lightweight Small Arms Technology project is investigating new case telescoped 

ammunition which promises to save between 35 to 40% over current ammunition 

weight. Caseless telescoped ammunition is also under development and promises to 

save up to 50% (∼7 lbs to ∼4 lbs) of the ammunition weight along with 40% reduction in volume. 

4. Soldier Protection—Technology development efforts are working toward weight 

reductions for body armor (vests and plates) and helmets through advances in fibers, textiles, and ceramics. High performance fibers with significantly increased 

tensile properties have the potential to provide weight savings of 30–40% of the fabric components of body armor. Lightweight ceramics is focused on increased multiple 

hit capability, improved durability, and the ability to form the ceramic plate into 

more complex shapes that can better conform to body shape and provide for increased mobility. Within the past 24 months alone, the Army has made improvements to the Soldier’s Interceptor Body Armor system with the introduction of the 

Improved Outer Tactical Vest which reduces system weight by over 16% (18.6 lbs 

to 15.7 lbs). In addition, there are ongoing actions to evaluate a lighter tactical vest 

(plate carrier) for Soldier use. The purpose of the evaluation is to provide the operational commander with flexibility to use a plate carrier to adjust Soldier loads 

based on terrain conditions (patrolling in and around mountainous regions). Additionally, development of the new Enhanced Army Combat Helmet has the potential 

to provide another 10% reduction in weight from its predecessor while providing improved ballistic protection. The overall goal for the Army’s S&T effort is to reduce 

body armor Soldier load by an estimated 10 lbs. 

5. Power—Technology development efforts will achieve weight reductions for 

power sources through improved battery technology, hybrid power sources and battery charging systems. Lithium carbon monofluoride primary batteries have demonstrated a 2X reduction in weight through improvements in energy density compared to current primary batteries. Wearable, rechargeable Lithium-polymer batteries will conform to and mate with body armor and will achieve improved 

fightability. Hybrid power sources based on methanol fuel cells will reduce the number of batteries required for multi-day Soldier missions. 

6. Combat Rations—The recently developed First Strike Ration, a compact, eaton-the move, assault ration for consumption during initial periods of high intensity 

conflict, provides a 49% weight savings over a one day supply of MREs. Technology 

development efforts will achieve additional weight reductions for combat rations 

through the use of novel lightweight packaging materials and improvements on specialty rations. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Young. 

ROBOTIC VEHICLES

Mr. YOUNG. I want to thank the Chair. And we had discussed at 

a prior meeting the possibility of devising a system or procedures 

to provide UAV support or some robotic-type support for the fighter. For example, in here, what the sergeants are wearing, it doesn’t 

include their weapons; it doesn’t include a whole lot of ammunition; 

it doesn’t include water that they might need for a couple of days; 

it doesn’t include communications equipment, radios, night vision 

goggles, things of this type. 

Is there any work being done by the Army Materiel Command 

in trying to devise a strategy or procedure or a method where the 

troops on the ground could be helped with some of this extra heavy 

load, what they need when they get to the fight, but they might 

not need getting to the fight? 


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AIRDROPS

General CHIARELLI. There is. First of all, we are looking at 

robotic vehicles as a way of being able to transfer that load from 

the soldier to a vehicle that would travel along with the soldier and 

carry a good piece of that. That technology is something we are 

looking at and testing right now. 

But currently in Afghanistan—I will let Jim talk about UAVs 

and what they can do—we are using as a primary way to take this 

load off the soldier’s back by use of airdrops. We deliver 26,000 

pounds a day using airdrops, different airdrop technologies. And we 

have come up with technologies that are very, very accurate at half 

the cost of what they used to be and don’t require soldiers to recover the components of the airdrop. Basically those things which 

bring that load to ground are discarded after the drop is made. So 

this is going a long way in helping us to get some of those pounds 

off our soldier’s back. And we see the increase in airdrops as something that is proven to be very, very helpful in Afghanistan. 

General AMOS. Sir, we also are using the airdrops, TRANSCOM 

General McNabb and all his airmen have done some remarkable 

work with precision airdrops using parafoils to try to get the stuff 

out so you don’t have to either carry it along the highways of Afghanistan, which are becoming more and more IED-laden. I mean, 

that is an effort that is under way right now and works quite well. 

About a year and a half ago, the Marine Corps commissioned a 

study by the Naval Research Advisory Committee on the issue of 

lightening the load, and after about 6 months of effort by some 

very renowned ladies and gentlemen across our country going into 

industry and into all the S&T developmental parts of the world and 

then going back into history, they came out and they said, look, we 

are probably right now at about as far along as we can be with current technology as we know it today with regards to being able to 

lighten things like the SAPI plate, small-arms protective plate. We 

need new technology to be able to get that thing lighter. But they 

said, there is other ways that you can lighten a load. One is weight 

redistribution; in other words, the actual weight. It is a bit of a 

ruse, but it actually works. You can redistribute the weight and get 

it more over your hips and therefore feel like you can actually lift 

yourself better and maneuver better. So that is one way. 

The other piece of it was get it off the Marine or the soldier and 

get it onto something else that actually can carry it for you. The 

front cover of our Marine Corps Gazette this month has a picture 

of a Marine up in the mountains of eastern California at our Mountain Warfare Training Center loading up mules. Now, I realize that 

is not new technology, but we actually teach a course for Marines 

how to load mules, and we use it in places like Afghanistan. So at 

the very bottom of the food chain, that would be the basic way you 

would transfer loads. 

CARGO UNMANNED AIRVEHICLE

But what we are looking at right now, and what is a near-term 

requirement is the whole idea of a cargo UAV. And if you can 

imagine, we are pretty successful with UAVs now. We like them. 


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We have got little ones, and we go all the way up to the big ones. 

But nothing is out there to haul stuff around the battlefield. 

A year ago we had a battalion engaged in Afghanistan, and a 

company got into a heck of a fight, and it was in the summertime, 

it was hot. We had one opportunity to resupply them. And I remember reading the report, the spot report, from the company commander, and he had a choice between getting—being resupplied 

with water or being resupplied with ammunition. And it was at 

that point we said, we have got to do better than this. And so the 

concept of a cargo UAV was born. 

And right now the whole idea would be we are going to get something off the shelf within the next—hopefully the next 3 to 4 

months. We had an Industry Day last week within the Marine 

Corps and brought in folks that had these commercial off-the-shelf 

UAVs that are out there, and can it be modified to carry cargo, 

somewhere anywhere between 500 pounds to probably 1,250, 1,500 

pounds. Take off vertically, precision, set it down, drop it off, then 

go to the next stop. Redo it all day, all night. UAVs aren’t afraid 

to fly at night. They just go up by themselves and do it. 

That is where we are headed. We want to get a solution now to 

get into Afghanistan this summer. And then we have a program 

where we are looking for something that would be optimum for the 

future; an expendable, low-cost, precision UAV to be able to carry 

an unmanned aerial vehicle—excuse me, logistics. So you are going 

to hear more of that as we find out what we are going to do, but 

we are committed to getting that for this coming summer. 

ROBOTIC CARGO VEHICLES

The other thing is what General Chiarelli was talking about is 

DARPA has a project they call Big Dog, and it was a robot. It 

looked about the size of a Great Dane, and it had robotic legs, and 

it had a gasoline-powered motor on it, and it had gyro-stabilized 

legs, and it could climb up. And the whole idea is to shed weight 

on this thing. They have taken that now to the next level, and I 

was briefed on it about 2 weeks ago, and I think there is great potential. 

We won’t see that this month, but we hopefully will see that 

sometime in the next 24 months where you can imagine a squad 

with one of those robotic dogs, quiet, completely self-contained, 

where you can put 300 or 400 pounds on this thing, and it will just 

follow you along, like my Labrador Retriever does today. So there 

is a lot of effort going on to try to shed the weight onto something 

else. 

Mr. YOUNG. General, thank you very much for enlightening us 

about the newest technology of the mules. Whatever works. 

Madam Chairman, you have got a good attendance today, so I 

am going to yield back my time so other Members can take part 

in this hearing. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Young. 

Mr. Visclosky. 

INJURIES DUE TO WEIGHT

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Madam Chair. Just two questions. 

There is a wide range as far as the weight a troop carries. Is there 


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a weight beyond which frequency of injuries grows dramatically? Is 

there some threshold where suddenly you are seeing a lot more injuries to our troops because of the weight? 

General AMOS. Sir, I don’t have that information. I would say intuitively obviously the higher we get up these weights that I talked 

to you about in the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, 140 pounds, there 

is absolutely no question that you might be able to carry that 

around the street, but when you start going up mountains, you 

can’t do it. You stop hopping in and out of MRAPs, step down from 

an MRAP that sits 21⁄2 to 3 feet high off the ground. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And you get shot at. 

General AMOS. Absolutely. 

Intuitively there is a threshold, but I don’t know precisely what 

it would be. I don’t know that we have that kind of information. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I assume there would be some variation between 

the size of the actual soldier, airman and the load they are carrying, too. I was just wondering if suddenly you are seeing some 

incremental increase along a certain threshold. 

One other question. For those who are our enemies, what is their 

basic load, if there is such a thing? My impression is it is relatively 

light, but I do not know. 

Mr. MORAN. It is the weight of a weapon. That is about it. 

General CHIARELLI. That is about it, the weight of the weapon. 

They do not have protective gear. But their casualties are much 

higher than ours, and their effectiveness is not as great as ours because of their lack of the equipment and the protection we are able 

to provide our soldiers and Marines. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I assume there is some advantages. Understanding they have higher casualties, and there are other things 

we can do to compensate for the lack of mobility because of the 

amount of weight our troops are carrying, what advantage do they 

have because they are so light? 

General CHIARELLI. I think that is why we are both looking at 

it different ways, so we can lighten the load, and particularly move 

to a plate carrier where the enemy situation allows you to do that 

without putting the soldier or Marine at greater risk than you are 

willing to accept and that he is willing to accept given the enemy 

situation. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I wish you well. I just can’t imagine how terrifying it is. You are in combat, you are risking your life, you are carrying this, and then to find that right adjustment. And I honest to 

God wish you well, and whatever we can do to help. I appreciate 

it. 

General AMOS. And it is a balance, sir. The flip side of it is if 

you talk to our staff sergeant and the sergeant that were in heavy 

combat, they would tell you that there were times when they absolutely would not have wanted to shed any of the stuff that they 

were wearing because the threat dictated that if you are riding 

around in the back of an MRAP or an up-armored Humvee in an 

area that is known for IEDs, most of the soldiers and Marines, I 

would say, would rather have that stuff on than a plate carrier, because a plate carrier covers significantly less of your body. So there 

are times when they absolutely want to have that kind of coverage. 


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And as General Chiarelli was talking about, in 2006, General 

Brogan, who is sitting behind me, as a result of an Urgent UNS, 

developed ARB, what we now wear, our big vest, a modular tactical 

vest. And the whole idea was countersniper. It was the shots coming in the neck, the shots coming in under the arms, the shots coming into the hips. And so we did a rapid turnaround to develop this 

thing. Now it is bigger and bulky. It is just like their vest, but it 

had a purpose. And the whole idea now is if we can give the commander on the ground the opportunity to make decisions on how 

much or how little, then I think that is absolutely where we need 

to go. But we value life a lot more than our enemy does, and the 

last thing we want to do is send a young soldier or Marine home 

because of maybe a lack of irresponsibility or a lack of responsibility on our part. So it is a balance. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much for your service. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

WEIGHT OF MACHINE GUNS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Gentlemen, we have made some progress in 

terms of the weight of soldier weapons. I respect Picatinny Arsenal. 

They just lowered the weight of the .50-caliber machine gun, doing 

some things relative to the weight of barrels, the ammo, the clips 

for ammo, I guess they call it plasticize, use of titanium. Are you 

satisfied we are making enough progress in that area? Perhaps 

General Chiarelli. 

General CHIARELLI. I think that is one of the areas that really 

shows a tremendous opportunity to make some real reductions in 

weight. We found in the Special Operations community an M240 

machine gun, which I think most of you know is a pretty good-size 

machine gun. Special Operators had had this weight problem. With 

the standard one we issue our soldiers, they had developed, and I 

believe it came out of Picatinny, a weapon that was 9 pounds lighter. When you can shed 9 pounds on a machine gun like that, that 

is a tremendous weight savings. We have issued 100 of them and 

have another 500 on order to get out to our soldiers in Afghanistan. 

The same thing with the M249, commonly called the SAW. They 

have been able to shave off an additional 2 pounds off of it and 

make it much lighter. 

Picatinny is working on caseless ammo, I know, and that shows 

a great future, because if you could get rid of that brass on every 

single round of ammunition you carry, you could shed more load. 

The issue with that, of course, is we will have to move to something other than the M4, because it, as I understand it, will not 

fire caseless ammo. But those are the kinds of things that I see 

that show great promise for helping us lighten that load. 

CARGO UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. On just getting back to the use of UAVs, 

the cargo, I assume the larger the UAV, perhaps the greater opportunity for the enemy to detect what we are using. How are we dealing with those types of issues? And I assume you get the conditions 

on the ground. I am talking more about Afghanistan here where 

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tion, whether you have the opportunity to bring in water or ammo. 

I just wonder what sort of progress are we making with the UAVs. 

General AMOS. Sir, right now we don’t have one in theater right 

now. We have UAVs, but we don’t have a cargo UAV. And as a result of this Industry Day that we had a week ago, we are trying 

to sort out, okay, what is out there now that is already made so 

that we can capitalize on that. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Sir, one has to assume obviously the Special Operators are getting stuff in, but they are using conventional 

airdrops. 

General CHIARELLI. I think they are using most of the airdrops 

and some of the airdrop technology that has been brought on board 

in Afghanistan. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. UAVs are on the drawing board, the cargo? 

General AMOS. Sir, they are from the sense of what we would 

really like to have in the future. That is the one that is—those are 

kind of under development. But the near-term itch, which is the 

forces in Afghanistan right now, I am looking for something more 

than a developmental solution, I am looking for something now. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We can’t wait. 

General AMOS. We can’t wait, and for all the reasons we talked 

about. We don’t know how big this is. We don’t what we are going 

to decide on. I have seen pictures of ones, I have seen them, that 

are as big as this room, and I have seen smaller ones. 

Ideally what you would like to have is something that is small, 

that is quiet, that can carry this load of 500 to 1,200 pounds. And 

that is where we are going for right now. We just don’t know. 

There are some small commercial helicopters, some very small 

ones, that we have companies looking can they modify that to fly 

it remote control, just like we do all our other UAVs, hand them 

off as it moves into theater, moves farther downrange, and then 

take control at the receiving station and then just land the thing. 

And the good thing about that is even in a dust storm, a UAV can 

land by itself. It is not like me as a pilot where you get nervous 

in a brownout. We don’t have it yet, but we hope to have it and 

introduce it this coming summer. That is where we are headed. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Excellent. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Mr. Moran. 

COMBAT LOAD

Mr. MORAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Kaptur. And we thank 

you for chairing a meeting from two such distinguished military 

leaders, and I have great respect for both of you. In fact, General 

Amos, I was pretty impressed. 

I mentioned to General Amos late in the afternoon yesterday 

that my nephew, who is in the Marine Corps, was complaining because he was sent to New River on financial management because 

of some dumb Appropriations Committee that wanted more financial management people in the Marines, so he got stuck with that. 

So I mention it, and today he is in Iraq fighting. You know, it is 

conceivable it could be coincidence, but I just gave all the credit to 

you. I was really impressed. 


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In our briefing where we are told that we have about 20,000 soldiers that are nondeployable—I think that was in your testimony, 

General Chiarelli—largely because of bone and muscle injuries, 

and it is increasing, it seems fairly dramatically, about 10 percent 

annually, it appears. Now, the explanation, it says that you are 

planning on lessening equipment loads, improving conditioning, 

providing new load-carrying capacity, technology, et cetera. 

I don’t think any of us think that the problem is one of the 

human endurance of the soldiers, but it is probably more the 

human judgment of their superiors that—yourselves excluded, obviously. I wouldn’t say it because I know you do a fine job. But I 

think over time we have loaded them up. And I suspect I am not 

alone in this. It is too much; 100 pounds is too much to be carrying 

on a regular basis, let alone 140. In terms of maneuverability, 

adaptability and just what the human body is capable of bearing 

over long period of time, it is too much. 

And I believe you when you say we are working on lightening it, 

but we have been in Afghanistan for 7 years, we have been in Iraq 

for almost 6, and it seems to be going in the other direction. Now, 

maybe we are part of the problem. I mean, I have got a question 

here about are you trying some of the new sniper technology that 

is put on vehicles but could be put on soldiers individually that detects where sniper fire came from? I mean, that is new technology. 

But gosh, in this context of that much weight having to be carried 

by individual soldiers, I can’t imagine adding anything to it no 

matter how helpful that technology was. And yet we are talking 

about radios, we are talking about any number of other things that 

just seem at some point counterproductive. 

You wonder in a platoon if we couldn’t share some of the load, 

that if everybody has to—I mean, if we come up with radios, obviously not everybody needs to carry the radio. If you were to use 

sniper technology, not everybody needs to have that, et cetera. 

I know you have thought about this, and I don’t want to belabor 

the point, and it has been pretty much the thrust of everybody’s 

question, but we are concerned, I think legitimately so. 

RECRUITING STANDARDS

Let me ask a question, though, about the Army fitness levels, 

General Chiarelli, because that is where we read the articles. They 

apply primarily to the Army apparently. We have made accommodations for prior, I don’t want to say—I guess felony records, although I don’t think it is so much felony, but brushes with the law 

and so on. We apparently have relaxed those standards. We have 

relaxed some of our educational standards we read. But we have 

too many soldiers who are being rejected for reasons of obesity. 

Now, I was asking some of the folks about that, and they said, 

well, one of the problems is not just obesity, but we have a cookiecutter approach. We take the weight and the height, and that determines whether somebody is eligible or not. 

One of the things that disturbed me, a young man I know who 

is a ballplayer, really well conditioned, he can run a sub-5-minute 

mile, but he was rejected because he was too heavy even though 

it was all muscle. Now, that was ROTC, so I don’t know that that 

applies to regular standards, but if it does, it seems to me we need 


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some flexibility; that the Body Mass Index, the conditioning, that 

needs to really be what we are looking at and not just some standard criteria, simplistic criteria really. My son is 6–6, he weighs 290 

pounds, but he has got a 33-inch waist. You can’t pinch his skin 

anyplace, but he is over your criteria. He would be labeled as 

obese, and he is anything but. 

General Chiarelli, do you have that kind of flexibility in determining how we define obesity? 

General CHIARELLI. We do. And the regulation uses height and 

weight as a screening tool only. Body fat is the final determinant 

on whether or not we feel that you are obese and do not meet Army 

standards. So anyone who would only use height and weight and 

use that alone to disqualify an individual from service, that would 

not be in keeping with the regulation as I last read it, which requires that only as a screening tool. But body fat is the final determinant on whether or not you are obese. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, maybe ROTC has different criteria that are 

not wholly consistent with regular enlistment. But you guys are 

doing a great job. This is not a hearing to be critical, but it is an 

opportunity to register concern. We are asking too much of our soldiers when they are having to carry that much heavy equipment. 

It is wrong, it has got to change, we have got to figure out a way 

to lighten their load. Thanks. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Moran. 

General CHIARELLI. May I apologize and just make a qualification? 

NONDEPLOYABLE STATUS

Ms. KAPTUR. General, please. 

General CHIARELLI. On our statement that we have 20,000 

nondeployable soldiers, that is correct on any given day, plus or 

minus. But if I in any way inferred that those are all due to musculoskeletal issues, I apologize, because that is not my intent. We 

currently have 10,000 soldiers in warrior transition units who are 

nondeployable who are injured in combat or have very complex 

medical cases. And then we have another 10,000 soldiers who, for 

whatever reasons, are nondeployable, and a small fraction of those 

are musculoskeletal issues we are seeing coming out of Afghanistan. We just see that as a portion that we need to attack to get 

at this issue of nondeployability. But even if we were able to eliminate all of those, it would be a small fraction of the 20,000 that we 

have that are nondeployable. 

Mr. MORAN. I think our testimony said many of these 20,000, so 

I thank you for that clarification. 

REDUCING EQUIPMENT WEIGHT

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you for the clarification. 

Both generals, can we assume that the contractors who provide 

all this equipment are under direction by each of you to reduce the 

weight, that there is ongoing effort, in each piece of equipment? 

Can we assume that or not? 

General AMOS. Ma’am, we, the contractor will respond to the 

amount of pressure directly applied to them. And what we do when 

we are, when we are developing a piece of equipment, for instance 


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the scalable plate carrier, we sit down, and we will work with them 

when the contractor—we actually particularly go out and we will 

say, okay, this is the requirement, and then we will get some bids 

in and then we will pick the prime contractor. And the prime contractor then will have to meet the specifications of the contract. So 

we actually work with them. 

For instance, we have got kind of a warfighting lab, but we have 

got a Marine Expeditionary Rifle Squad Group of folks, kinds of a 

skunks works that deals specifically with making sure the stuff we 

buy is as light as we possibly can get it, and it fits well where it 

is supposed to fit on the body. And we try that out on Marines. 

So the answer is, they are. They are not actually just turned 

loose to just give us what they have and we accept it. We force the 

issue on trying to get the very latest amount, everything from just 

shedding pieces of this kind of Kevlar web gear to get it down to 

a weight that we think is the very least but yet provides the minimum amount of protection that was required. So we do that, 

ma’am. We don’t turn the contractors loose on this thing. They actually have to live up to our standards. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, I would hope that in communications with 

them, that, you know, you would reemphasize in written form your 

strong efforts to try to reduce the weight, whether it is the material, whether it is metals, whatever it is, I would think that that 

would be a very useful effort. 

General. 

General CHIARELLI. We, too, are looking for solutions to this, not 

only in our laboratories but with commercial off-the-shelf pieces. 

I was given two charts prior to the hearing where we are down 

to, as Sergeant Rowe talked about his knee pads, we are looking 

at a brand new knee pad now that will save 8-ounces over the current knee pads that he wears. I have got two pages of all those 

items, from boots to knee pads to compasses to sights to flashlights, 

where we are looking at different ways that we can procure equipment, both developed in our labs but also commercial off-the-shelf 

that will lighten that load. And we are literally looking at reductions of ounces to try to, in the smallest pieces of equipment, to try 

to get a cumulative good for the soldier. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you both. That is very encouraging. 

Mr. Kingston. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General, you mentioned earlier that you were looking at an offthe-shelf solution in some of those equipment. What would be some 

of those items that you were talking about? 

General CHIARELLI. Boots, sir, knee pads, flashlights, angle-head 

flashlights, assure-fire magazines. You can reduce weight quite a 

bit with magazines. We have found a magazine that over the load 

8.8 ounces possibility. 

Mr. KINGSTON. And you are referring to retail purchasing? 

General CHIARELLI. Some of this is commercial off-the-shelf that 

is produced. 

Mr. KINGSTON. And that is a fairly attractive product to you 

then, right? 

General CHIARELLI. It is. 


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RAPID EQUIPPING FORCE

Mr. KINGSTON. And what kind of procurement problems does 

that create? 

General CHIARELLI. We have the Rapid Equipping Force established at the beginning of the war that we use extensively to go 

and find those technologies. They have individuals down range. 

And I think, as Sergeant Rowe mentioned, he indicated he filled 

out some surveys. I would bet that some of those surveys were 

from our Rapid Equipping Force, asking soldiers what are the 

pieces of equipment that you would like to see lightened? How can 

we help you out? What do you need that is better? 

And they go to our labs to look for solutions, and many times 

they find them there. They go to the Special Operations community. They go cross service to make sure that there is not something in another service that we are not aware of. I gave you the 

example of Special Operations and the 240 machine gun. That was 

found by our Rapid Equipping Force. And they look for commercial 

off-the-shelf items to lighten that load. 

Mr. KINGSTON. If you found a commercial flashlight that was better than the one you are using and it was universally accepted 

among the soldiers, how hard is it for you to move towards, let’s 

just get rid of the old flashlight and buy this new one? How difficult is that to do? How much red tape do you encounter? 

General CHIARELLI. Today that is something we can do rather 

rapidly with the Rapid Equipping Force. 

Mr. KINGSTON. So the Rapid Equipping Force, it is working fairly 

well? 

General CHIARELLI. Very well. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Are there any suggestions for changes and improvement? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, I worry at times that, with the loss of 

supplementals, that we will not have the funds that we need sometimes to ensure that they have the money that they need. And believe me, they follow all the procurement rules. They even have a 

PEO that oversees what they are doing. But they can move rather 

rapidly through the system. So I worry that, at times, unless we 

look at some procurement reform, organizations like our Rapid 

Equipping Force and the Army Asymmetric Warfare Group may 

have problems doing their job. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I haven’t read your testimony. I have scanned 

bits and pieces of it, but I don’t see that in here as you are underscoring the importance of that kind of flexibility. Is it in here? 

General CHIARELLI. I believe it is, sir. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. 

General CHIARELLI. We talk about the REF. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. Because I think it is very important for 

Members of Congress to know that you do need to have that flexibility, because I remember one time General Meigs, when he was 

in charge of the Joint IED Task Force, he said that you have got 

to keep in mind we are competing against every Radio Shack product that is out there in the commercial world, and we have to stay 

ahead of them. Only we have to buy through the government and 

sometimes that slows us down. And so I think that we need to unVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:11 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00095 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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derstand that in order for you to have as many choices of products 

as possible, you have to consider these commercial things and have 

the flexibility to move on them. 

General CHIARELLI. It is absolutely amazing what this task force 

has been able to do. They are able to fill 60 percent of those things 

that soldiers ask for in less than a year, 60 percent. And 40 percent, the other 40 percent is under 2 years. That is 90 individuals 

I have in that task force. We purposely kept it small. And most of 

them are forward in the field collecting data from soldiers and finding out how we can get them the things that they need. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, if there is anything else you want to add 

to your testimony, you certainly can do that for the record. What 

page is it on? 

General CHIARELLI. Thank you, sir. I promise you I will review 

my testimony, make sure I have given you a fair explanation of 

REF, and if there is more information I can provide, I will provide 

it and get it to the Committee as soon as I can. 

[The information follows:] 

The REF helps address specific capability shortfalls by canvassing government, 

industry, academia, and the scientific community for existing or emerging technologies. It provides limited quantities of the best available off-the-shelf equipment 

to the Warfighter as quickly as possible. 

Among the many items REF has provided to units in theater are remotely-operated cameras that assist with force protection at Forward Operating Bases and 

Combat Operating Posts; IED and other explosive material detectors that help our 

Soldiers defeat IED threats; improved ballistic protection for military vehicles that 

increases survivability; and lighter machine guns in Afghanistan that are helping 

to reduce the weight of a Soldier’s Load. 

To give you a perspective of recent initiatives coming out of the REF: in September 2008, during a visit to a brigade combat team (BCT) in Operation Enduring 

Freedom (OEF), the REF received requests to lighten the load of Soldiers operating 

in extreme elevations greater than 6,000 feet. REF formed an Integrated Product 

Team (IPT) in October 2008 with Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier, the 

Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), 

and the Army Infantry Center to develop solutions. Within 47 days, the IPT identified, coordinated, and obtained from U.S. Special Operations Command 104 lightweight machine guns and delivered the weapons to the requesting BCT in OEF with 

user training provided by Crane Naval Surface Center and the AWG. These weapons decreased the Soldier’s load by up to 9 pounds. Concurrent to this effort, an 

AWG field team helped the BCT craft an Operational Needs Statements (ONS) focusing on lighter body armor. 

Simultaneously, AWG developed a formal assessment plan in partnership with 

Johns Hopkins University to prove or disprove the hypothesis that weight impacts 

on a Soldier’s performance with regard to suitability, survivability, lethality, and 

maneuverability. The assessment takes a holistic look at the Soldier as a system 

and focuses on the implications and effects of lightening the Soldier’s load, rather 

than assessing individual pieces of equipment. 

When REF received the approved ONS from the warfighting commander, the organization coordinated with PEO Soldier and the Army Staff; and, REF is now 

working with AWG and the IPT to provide a BCT in OEF with lightweight body 

armor and 14 additional pieces of equipment. These items, combined with the lightweight machine guns and lightweight body armor, have the potential to decrease a 

Soldier’s load further by 14 to 23 pounds. Once completely employed, this equipment 

will be assessed in OEF by AWG, ATEC, and BCT personnel and the results—good 

or bad—will inform future REF equipping actions and Army fielding decisions. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. Thank you, General. 

Thank you. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Rothman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 


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Generals, thank you for your service. I have lots of questions. 

Just to put some of this in context, is there a better equipped fighting force in the world than ours? 

General AMOS. Sir, that is absolutely a resounding no. There is 

not. 

General CHIARELLI. Totally agree. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Next. Just to put this in context, additional context, it is really critical, General Chiarelli, for us to receive that 

percentage of nondeployed units who are there because of these 

kind of stress and ergonomic injuries, so if we could get that for 

the record, that is critical, because we are here. And listen, we are 

all parents or concerned people who care about our kids and 

grandkids and certainly our soldiers and Marines and everyone 

fighting for us. We don’t want them to carry any more than they 

need to do their mission and survive. But the balance is between 

flexibility of force, survivability, and mission accomplished. So how 

badly are our forces suffering, so to speak, because of this great 

burden of equipment? And how is it being manifested, either in, or 

rather, reflected in failure of mission, compromise of mission, and 

nondeployed units? 

So we have to know what we are giving up because, obviously, 

if we have a finite sum in our budget, should we be pouring it all 

into a cheaper, lighter rucksack or some other training, pay, benefits, whatever other need we have to address. So if we can get that 

for the record, sir, that would be great. Unless you have a better 

answer than you just gave Mr. Moran. 

General CHIARELLI. I don’t believe I do. And I don’t believe at 

this time I am going to be able to provide you the level of precision 

you want in trying to determine that. I was briefed last night about 

work being done by the University of Pittsburgh with the 101st 

where Sergeant Rowe will go. It is work like that that is going to 

get us to that finite number, and I promise that as soon as it is 

available, I will give it to the Committee. Everything I have now 

is anecdotal. 

[The information follows:] 

Currently, there is no scientific evidence to support a cause and effect relationship 

between the musculoskeletal injuries being incurred in Theater and load carriage. 

Clinical presumption and anecdote are driving current discussions. In pursuit of reliable data we have begun to submit protocol proposals to the newly established 

CENTCOM Institutional Review Board (IRB) for approval to deploy US Army Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM) investigators to both Theaters. There 

has been some data collected on types of musculoskeletal injuries and conditions inTheater. Investigators in one study showed that of the 48% of Soldiers who wore 

Individual Body Armor for 4 hours or more, 70% had neck and back pain. Another 

study queried Soldiers deployed in 2003 and 2004. The back was the most common 

site of injury (32% low back, 9% mid back and 6% neck). In addition, 68% of medical 

evacuations to pain management centers from Iraq were for spine pain. From Jul 

04 to Oct 08, low back, mid/upper back, and neck pain were the chief complaints 

of Soldiers seeking care from physical therapists (Combat Support Hospital: 22%, 

7%, and 5%, respectively, and Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) 23%, 8%, and 6%, respectively). Still, other data from a physical therapist assigned to a BCT reveals the 

following breakdown of musculoskeletal injuries: 22–25% low back, 6–10% mid back, 

4–10% neck, 19–22% shoulder, and 25–44% lower extremity. It is imperative that 

future research studies focus on the prevalence of injuries that can be attributed 

to the weight of the load that our service men and women must carry. If there is 

a direct cause and effect link, then specific factors must be studied (i.e., the amount 

of weight, gender, and the duration and frequency of load carries). 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Generals. 


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I apologize. I am trying to get through as many questions as I 

can. How big a problem is this for your forces, for you, as commanders, in terms of your strategic objectives or the mission objectives for you? Has it compromised your ability to get your jobs done 

in the respective theaters, for example, Iraq and Afghanistan. 

General AMOS. Sir, it hasn’t within the Marine Corps. I will just 

speak for my community. It has not. And again, go back to how we 

began here with the recognition by both services that we need the 

scalable, you know, the opportunity to do the scalable body armor. 

And if you remember kind of where we began several years ago 

with a lot of casualties in 2005, heavy casualties, a lot of public interest generated, rightfully so, by parents and by Members of Congress and by Marines. We began looking for ways where we can 

provide that ultimate protection. 

BATTERIES

Mr. ROTHMAN. So you feel we have made tremendous progress, 

the survivability of injuries on the battlefield and less injuries than 

before, given the activity every single day and exposure of our 

forces to harm. We have done extraordinarily well. 

One other fast question. Batteries. What does the average soldier 

or Marine carry in terms of batteries? 

I will tell you why we are asking. We are working with different 

folks in R&D about battery technology to lighten the weight of batteries. Would that make a significant dent in the weight that a Marine or soldier would carry? 

General CHIARELLI. Yes, it would. And we are already seeing 

great advances in battery technology that is pushing that weight 

down. If you talk about our ground soldier ensemble, that we have 

been able to drop the weight of it by a pound and a half in newer 

models because of batteries, improvement in battery technologies. 

We now have batteries that are scaled for the mission. Short mission, smaller battery, lighter battery. Longer mission, larger battery, more power for a longer period of time so battery technology 

is something that is definitely working to lighten the load. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And finally, your request in the 2010 budget will 

incorporate what you believe is the dollar figure necessary to, in 

the context of all your needs, address this issue to the extent that 

you feel is appropriate? Or are you going to be underfunded in this 

2010 budget in this area? 

General AMOS. Sir, it is yet to be seen because we haven’t seen 

what has been approved by the Department of Defense, and you 

know that. So not only can we not comment, I really don’t know 

what that is. But I will tell you that, from the Marine Corps side 

of the house, the research and development dollars, which are 

mostly paid for out of supplementals right now, but we have put 

3 percent, we have increased our R&D money in the budget by 3 

percent. It doesn’t sound like a lot, but it is a significant amount 

of money in the baseline. 

But the R&D piece of this thing is yes, the answer is yes. And 

as long as we get that, then we will be able to continue because 

this is science and technology stuff. This is DARPA working on 

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ing about today. This is stuff that costs money to experiment with. 

So the answer is yes from the Marine Corps side. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. R&D. Very important. Thank you, Generals. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Rothman. 

The Committee has just been great this morning. It has been a 

very easy job. Very respectful of one another. 

INJURIES

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. I have to follow up on Mr. Rothman 

because what we are talking about is balance, how do we balance 

protection of our troops, effectiveness, all of that. And you are looking at equipment and redistribution. But we also have a responsibility to our troops that it is one decision you will make when you 

are in the field and you are there in the action and you are 27 

years old. 

The other thing, responsibility, we have talked on this subcommittee so long, is what our responsibility is to those troops for 

their lifetime for the service they gave. So maybe because I took 

two pain pills when we are sitting here for my back, that may be 

the reason that I focus on this. But I know that this weight literally can contribute to a lifetime of difficulties and pain. So we 

have to keep that in account also, too. It is our responsibility for 

all of you who serve and to do the best we can for you now and 

for the rest of your lives. So this is a very important issue. And I 

think we should be looking at everything. 

I happen to know at the University of North Texas Health 

Science Center, which is in my district, it has been a lot of, given 

a lot of attention to that. And part of it can be some treatment in 

the field by medics to give some relief, as well as the training that 

you are talking about and nutrition. So I think we really need to 

focus on through this all the time, whatever science we need, research, give you the right equipment at the lowest weight, but keep 

that responsibility in mind of when you leave the service or you retire that we have left you in the best physical shape we can. 

General AMOS. Ma’am, if I could comment on that. There is recognition that if you go back to boot camp in the Marine Corps 15 

years ago, we issued recruits flat-bottom sneakers, Converse sneakers. And then we went out, and we couldn’t understand why they 

twisted their ankles and why they had flat feet and why we had 

all these shin splints. So now we brought in athletic trainers, and 

we actually have them at all our recruit depots. We have them at 

our entry level training, like Schools of Infantry (SOI), and we have 

athletic trainers now out in the fleet at the major headquarters to 

help us understand how you better condition Marines and what 

kind of equipment we can get for them that would help prevent the 

kinds of injuries that we saw 15 years ago. 

We actually have, on the onset of injuries at some of our entry 

level training, that recruit gets whisked off, finds himself or herself 

in front of a bona fide athletic trainer doing rehabilitation kind of 

exercises, so there is a recognition of just exactly what you are 

talking about, that we need to bring that piece of it in here. It is 

not just equipment lightening; it is the whole thing. It is the balance on your body and then how you condition your body. 


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General CHIARELLI. If I might add, we, in Afghanistan, are assigning physical therapists down to the brigade and battalion level 

so that we have that doctor down there that is able to work that 

injury, should that injury occur and be a musculoskeletal. I think 

your comments were so correct. 

I would also argue that when I was 19 years old, I felt I was a 

lot more bulletproof than my parents felt that I was. And I would 

do probably some things that, in my older age, I question why I did 

that. 

I think we always have to remember that when we are shedding 

protection, that at 19, you probably feel that I can outrun that bullet, whereas someone with a little more experience, a little more 

time in combat, realizes that that is not something you can always 

do. So I think it is important to give our leaders the ability to make 

that important call. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Bishop. 

WEIGHT OF WEAPONS

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

And again, welcome gentlemen. Again, this is a very, very, very 

pertinent subject area, and this Committee is very concerned about 

it. One of the things that we have been doing over the last 3 or 

4 years with regard to equipment weight, we funded research on 

new weapon systems to reduce the load. And one of the requirements was that the weapon and ammunition be reduced for the 

very reasons that we are here today. The XM–8 was a weapon system that has been looked at by the Army, and of course, it has 

been tested in part at Picatinny. But the key was reducing the 

weight of the ammunition, using the polymer, as opposed to brass 

casings, and that preliminary research indicated it would reduce 

the weight by two-thirds. The average weight would go from 15 

pounds to 5 pounds for the ammunition and the weapon, which was 

seen to be an improvement, but somehow that was moved from the 

Army to the Joint Committee for study for use across the services, 

and somehow that has bogged down. But that certainly goes to emphasize what we are talking about here. 

The other thing is, I have not heard anybody mention Kevlar for 

the body armor, which, around the beginning of the deployments 

to Iraq, parents were going to sporting goods stores or various 

places and mailing Kevlar vests to their children over there, which 

spurred this committee to try to accelerate the acquisition and the 

procurement of the body armor. Kevlar, I was told, and I am not 

an expert on it, is a lot lighter and would give more flexibility. And 

if you could comment on that, that would be fine. 

But the other thing I want to touch upon, which I think is extremely important today is I am told by staff that the military is 

not making informed decisions for improving the tactical combat 

casualty care or the body armor because you are not collecting sufficient data. We are told that 67 percent of the wounded are returned to duty in theater, and many of them are not treated in a 

hospital, and as a result, we have almost no information on what 

medical care was provided at the point of the injury. And the Secretary of Defense’s Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care 


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says that less than 1 percent of all wounded has complete documentation. 

It seems that without a systematic data collection and analysis, 

far forward medical care can’t improve, and we also can’t learn 

about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the body armor that 

protects our troops. Is there a way that you can get data at the 

level of the first responders, rather than trying to collect it at the 

surgical center, at the medical center, at some point later, so you 

know where it was that the body was penetrated, what kind of 

body armor was worn, was it was properly positioned, and all of 

those kinds of things, so that the changes that we make at this 

committee that we fund that you ask us for are not based on anecdotal information but on systematically collected and studied data? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, as far as the current plates that we 

use, our SAPI plates, I am confident that they are the finest piece 

of equipment available today. We have made movement forward in 

Kevlar, and both General Amos and, Marines and the Army are 

looking at a new helmet, Kevlar helmet that will provide additional 

protection. 

When it comes to providing care forward on the battlefield, after 

spending 2 years in Iraq, I can tell you that I feel that one of the 

things that has led to the high survivability rate of our soldiers is 

our combat lifesaver program where your buddy is trained in emergency medicine and can immediately render aid. I don’t know of 

anyone who has a penetrating wound that would not be transferred 

where the kind of data that you are talking about, sir, could be collected. I mean, any kind of a penetrating wound, you are going to 

get immediate aid by a combat lifesaver, and then you are going 

to be moved to that location. But I am sure there are things that 

we could do to better collect that data when it comes to our ability 

to electronically provide it. But I will have to take a look and see 

exactly what we are doing. 

STRESS INJURIES

Mr. BISHOP. The stress fractures, the orthopedic type injuries 

that result from the load carrying, or the load shifting, which generally are not documented, according to the Secretary of Defense’s 

Tactical Committee, don’t get any documentation, less than 1 percent, which means that we really don’t have data. We know that 

there are some injuries from these loads, but we don’t have real 

documentation of it. 

General CHIARELLI. That is why I am excited about what the 

University of Pittsburgh is doing for. They are in, I believe, the second year of a long term study to collect just that kind of data. Both 

before the rotation, and once the soldier returns, and providing the 

soldier the tools he needs to work on his physical strength while 

he is deployed. 

DEPLOYMENT TIMES

Mr. BISHOP. If the Chairwoman will allow me to ask one more 

question, I will be grateful. It has to do with the deployment times. 

For the Army, it is 12 to 15 months, and the Marines it is 7 

months. Someone carrying 100 pounds in 110-degree weather 

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ments than with, for example, with the Marines, the shorter deployments. And of course, the better dwell time would give the 

body a much better time to recuperate. Is that also a contributing 

factor to the injuries that we are talking about with the load carrying, the fact that they have extended deployments? 

General CHIARELLI. There is no doubt in my mind. I think you 

have stated that absolutely correct. It is both a function of dwell 

time and the opportunity to recover from the injuries. But it is also 

a function, I think, why we are seeing more effect of this than the 

Marines are because of 12- to 15-month deployments. 

Mr. BISHOP. And nutrition. 

General CHIARELLI. And nutrition. 

[The information follows:] 

Documentation of medical care by first responders at the Point-of-Injury (POI) is 

problematic. Not all first responders are medics who are trained to document medical care. Every squad, platoon, and company has Soldiers who are trained as combat lifesavers who may be the first responder rendering emergency life-saving first 

aid. In a September 2007 report, the Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care 

(CoTCCC), Sub-committee on First Responders, examined this issue. Of over 30,000 

Wounded-in-Action reviewed in the report, less than 10% of records had pre-hospital 

documentation and in only 1% of cases was the information available found to be 

adequate. This lack of information flow from POI does not meet the CoTCCC standard which states that critical data elements of health care information must be reliably communicated along the evacuation chain to ensure optimal care. Also, reliable 

first responder information is critical to inform improvements to tourniquets, hemostatic dressings, needle length for decompression of tension pneumothorax and airway management, as several examples. 

The Office of the Army Surgeon General, in conjunction with the Army Medical 

Department Center and School, is piloting a prototype First Responder Card for use 

in the Improved First Aid Kits. A minimum set of documentation must be recorded 

and transferred up the evacuation chain as a standard of care. Working with the 

US Army Medical Materiel Agency, our goal is to build an easy to use, easy to train, 

rugged, low cost paper-based tool for first responders, combat lifesavers, and combat 

medics. We will train Soldiers to ensure that this does not detract from the focus 

of applying the immediate emergent medical care that can save a Soldier’s life. 

Upon arrival to higher levels of care, this information must be subsequently captured in AHLTA–T, the theater electronic medical record. Handheld devices such as 

the Battlefield Medical Information System Tactical—Joint are useful for acute care 

(e.g. sick call) documentation, but impractical for documenting care at the POI. It 

is not reliable as a consistent, DoD-wide method to capture combat casualty care. 

There is some aid station combat casualty care data available, but it is sparse. 

The Combat Theater Registry (Navy, San Diego) does capture aid station (Level 1) 

data which is integrated with the Joint Theater Trauma Registry, which also captures a minimal amount of Level 1 data. An improvement in capturing Level 1 data 

is critical to fully inform improvements to first responder devices and lifesaving 

interventions. 

The data that we currently receive from Level 1, but predominantly from higher 

levels, have been put to use in developing improved materiel solutions and tactics. 

The DoD Medical Research Program for the Prevention, Mitigation and Treatment 

of Blast Injuries was established in July 2006 and since its inception, has made significant improvements in the way we protect our warfighters from blast-related injuries, in the way we treat injured warfighters, and in the way we rehabilitate injured warfighters for return to duty or to healthy civilian life. Among many noteworthy contributions was the establishment of the Joint Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury in Combat (JTAPIC) Program. 

The JTAPIC Program links the DoD medical, intelligence, operational and materiel development communities with a common goal: to collect, integrate, and analyze 

injury and operational data in order to improve the understanding of our 

vulnerabilities to threats and enable the development of improved tactics, techniques, and procedures and materiel solutions that will prevent/mitigate traumatic 

injuries. 

The JTAPIC program is a multi-lateral and multi-community partnership sharing 

and analyzing data in order to provide actionable information to improve Warfighter 

survivability. Partners include the Army National Ground Intelligence Center; OfVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:11 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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fice of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner; PM-Soldier; Army Research Lab; Army 

Aeromedical Research Lab; Army Institute of Surgical Research; Army Infantry 

Center, Naval Health Research Center; and Marine Corps Systems Command. 

JTAPIC has made a significant difference in the way we protect our Warfighters 

from combat injuries by: 

• Providing actionable information to combat vehicle program managers leading 

to modifications and/or upgrades to vehicle equipment and protection systems, (seat 

design, blast mitigating armor, and fire suppression systems). 

• Establishing a near-real time process for collecting and analyzing combat incident data that confirmed the presence of threat weapons of interest 

• Analyzing combat incident data to identify vulnerabilities in operational procedures, and rapidly conveyed those vulnerabilities to commanders in theater 

• Assisting PEO-Soldier in establishing a process for collecting and analyzing 

damaged personal protective equipment (PPE), such as body armor and combat helmets, to provide PPE developers with the information they need to develop enhanced protection systems. 

The JTAPIC Program received the 2008 Department of the Army Research and 

Development Laboratory of the Year Award for Collaboration Team of the Year in 

recognition of these accomplishments. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. 

Ms. Kilpatrick. 

PREPARATION FOR COMBAT

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Generals, it is good to be with you this morning. The best part 

of our military are the men and women, soldiers, sailors, Marines 

and Air Force, who commit their lives every day to defending our 

country. I served on the Air Force Academy board for about 4 

years, and visiting Colorado and watching them and hearing them, 

and now having gone to see some Marines and Navy and also 

Army, it is the troops who really defend us. And they are so young. 

And as a grandmother, I am just always moved by their dedication. 

The two sergeants, both having been deployed to Iraq, and one, 

if not both, on their way to Afghanistan, lessening the load is paramount. And I know there is only two or three ways to do it. Either 

you reduce the area that is covered, or you develop technological 

kinds of things you are both working on. And the testimony you 

provided this morning has been very helpful. Or you transport by 

some other means, unmanned vehicle or others, some of the equipment so that they have it when they need it. I like the fact that 

you said air dropping. And sometimes when you air drop some of 

it disintegrates or goes somewhere, so you don’t have to worry 

about it. And they still have what they need to defend themselves, 

as well as their brigades and the like. 

I am real concerned. I love what you said, too: We value life more 

than many of our enemies. And because of that, and I heard a little 

squabble over here when one of my colleagues asked, does our—I 

am saying enemy; you all might call them somebody else—take 

care of their soldiers and Marines like we do in terms of their body 

armor. And the answer was no. They sometimes just have a weapon or two, so they are lighter, and they can move around. You also 

mentioned they are skillful enough where they know our body 

armor, so they try to shoot where they know it is not. I don’t know 

how you defend against that. And the technology you discussed 

about it. 

Their fitness. One thing I have found on my travels is the men 

are small, men and women. And having just come from Chairman 


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Norm Dicks’ district and having been on an aircraft carrier as well 

as a couple of submarines, going up and down the steps and all of 

that, it is very important, in combat as well as they do their fitness 

training. And you have talked about that this morning, that they 

be prepared for what is before them. 

Iraq is one war, and I thank God I have always been an opponent and looking forward to the drawing down of some of our 

troops there. But some of those same troops are now on their way 

to Afghanistan. Different terrain. Different war. I come from Michigan, where 25 different sets of Arabs have been living with us all 

our lives. Friendly, all of that, in Michigan. So when we go to another country with a different kind of social values, religious beliefs 

and all of that, we are really, in addition to fighting the physical 

war, we are also fighting culture, religion and all of that. So we 

come to a situation where the soldiers and Marines and sailors and 

all are in a difficult situation. 

I am very concerned about Afghanistan, very concerned. All my 

Arab friends say it is a different kind of people there, even than 

Iraq. The two sergeants, both sergeants, yes, have dedicated their 

lives, have come back healthy. They are now about to be deployed 

somewhere else. Is lessening the load as paramount as the Stryker 

Brigades or the other brigades that they have to fight with, the 

comprehensive coordination of the various military services? 

You know, in this Committee, and chairman—all our chairmen 

really in our Committee, the men and women come first. And whatever they need, I don’t care what OMB says, you have to let us 

know that. And I am not real sure that enough of that is being 

done, number one. Are we ready for Afghanistan as we uptroop 

there and diminish the numbers in Iraq? 

Generals, are our men and women prepared? Would you say that 

yes, we have done all we can as this committee and their supervisors and commanders, that they are ready to fight this war? I 

know that was a lot. 

General AMOS. Ma’am, give me the opportunity to answer first 

here. A resounding yes. I appeared before this subcommittee last 

year several times as the head of requirements for the Marine 

Corps. And as Pete and I began our verbal statement this morning, 

we began with a thank you. And the honest to goodness truth is, 

thank you, because I can’t think of one thing, and I am not making 

this up, I can’t think of one thing that the Marine Corps said, hey, 

we really need, that this Committee said, I am sorry, we can’t afford it. That has not happened one time. So the answer to that is, 

you have given us everything we need. We anticipate that that will 

continue as we go into the fiscal year 2010 and we get the FYDP 

bill for POM 10. So I am optimistic about that. 

The training piece is pretty amazing because you take, I will give 

you an example of a young battalion, Second Battalion, Seventh 

Marines. Excuse me, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, right in 

the middle of Ramadier, in heavy kinetics. And things changed instantly. Almost within about 2 weeks, that battalion, who had gone 

out and losing Marines, they had lost a bunch of Marines. All of 

a sudden the Sunni awakening finally came from east, excuse me, 

west to east and hit Ramadi. And when that happened the, 

Sheikhs in Ramadi began to change. And so here are 19- and 18- 


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year-old men that lost their best friend 2 weeks ago, that are now 

being asked to change their mind set. It is like reprogramming a 

new Windows application in their brain going, hey, listen, we have 

to treat these people differently. We have to approach them completely differently. And they did it. They were able to change. So 

that is, first of all, that is a testimony to the kind of young men 

and women we have. 

And the second piece of it is that, which gets to your question, 

is the training that they get before they go, in both our services, 

I promise you that it is focused, it is absolutely drilled into culture, 

language. It is not just kinetics. It is not just, how bad can we be? 

In many cases, it is, how good can we be? So the training is very 

specific. We are putting in 8,000 Marines right now into Afghanistan over the next 90 days. Every one of those Marines have gone 

through about 3 or 4 months of extensive training to prepare them 

for the culture, the physical fitness part of this thing, the language 

and their mission. So that is the Marine Corps. 

First of all, you have done a remarkable job taking care of us. 

Second of all, your Marines, your young men and women are prepared. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, General. 

General CHIARELLI. I can’t add anything to that. All I can say is 

thank you, thank you for everything the Committee has done. You 

have given us everything we need and I know of no time that there 

has been something that you have told us no, I am sorry we can’t 

do. And for that, we are grateful. And I know I speak for the 1.1 

million soldiers and their families in thanking you for all that you 

have done and will continue to do. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. It is important, the data. I was going to say 

something about the data. And I see Congressman Bishop did that. 

Very important. It has got to be scientific as we go forward, whatever we need to lighten the load and to win the war and to bring 

all of our soldiers and sailors and all of that home. Thank you for 

your service. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Dicks. 

NONDEPLOYABLES

Mr. DICKS. General Chiarelli and General Amos, sorry I wasn’t 

here, but we had to have a hearing with the Forest Service this 

morning before my other committee. But I want to thank you both 

for your good work and your efforts to help our troops. 

Let me ask you something. You know, we now say we have 

20,000 who are nondeployable. What happens to those 

nondeployables? What do they do? 

General CHIARELLI. 10,000, or just under 10,000, Congressman, 

are currently in our Warrior Transition Units, and they are on a 

regimen of care that will either see them leaving the service or possibly returning back to their units. That number has dropped from 

a high of 13,000 in July down to now less than 10,000, somewhere 

in the vicinity of 9,700 or 9,800. The other 10,000 that I speak of 

are normally left in units. They have injuries that are not as severe, that do not require that they be seen in a WTU, and they reVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:11 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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main with the rear and heal, making their medical appointments 

and hopefully, before too long, returning to their unit. 

Mr. DICKS. It would seem, you know, that some of these people 

would be, as you have suggested, be able to do other, have other 

roles in logistics or support or whatever. And I take it that is what 

you are doing. 

General CHIARELLI. That is exactly what we are doing. That is 

why they are not all in a WTU. If you are in a Warrior Transition 

Unit, your number one goal is to get better and make a determination whether or not you are going to remain with the service because that is what you and your family want to do or whether you 

have made a decision to leave the service. Those that are left with 

their units, the rear detachments in their units, they are doing 

other tasks in that rear detachment and getting better. 

Mr. DICKS. Every time I go out there at Madigan to see the Warrior Transition Unit at Fort Lewis, all these troops want to do is 

get back to their unit. So I don’t detect that this is, you know, that 

anybody is taking, maybe there are a few, but the vast majority 

want to get well and return to service. I mean, I take it that is how 

you view this as well. 

General CHIARELLI. That is exactly right. I can’t state that any 

better. 

EXTENSION BONUSES

Mr. DICKS. General Amos, what about the Marines? What are 

you doing with your nondeployables? 

General AMOS. We don’t have, because our deployment schedule 

is a little bit—nondeployables make up Marines that are fixing to, 

at the end of their service, some are wounded and they are attached to our Wounded Warrior Battalions. Our numbers are significantly smaller. Those that are in our Wounded Warrior Battalions are just exactly like General Chiarelli talked about. Their primary focus on life is to get well, and we work with them and care 

for them. That number is reasonably small. But because of the 7- 

month deployments, what this allows us to do to those Marines 

that would normally be towards their end of service and maybe not 

deployable for a lengthy deployment, the 7 months allow us actually some more flexibility and allows us to harvest out and get 

those Marines and put them in. 

We have also offered bonuses for Marines that will stay and extend. In other words, if you have only got 5 months left on your 

contract, and instead of becoming a non deployable, if you want to 

stay with your unit, which is exactly what most soldiers and most 

Marines want to do, they want to deploy. They may not want to 

re-enlist, but for a small amount of money, we can afford them the 

opportunity to stay and complete that deployment. So we are trying 

to be creative to keep a lot of those. There is a portion of them, 

now, that we actually put in the training pipeline. In other words, 

they are back at Lejeune and Pendleton and out at 29 Palms, and 

because of their combat experience they have become role players, 

they become mentors, they become trainers for the Marines for the 

units that are actually going through. So there is nobody sitting 

around lamenting the fact that—we are actually using them. 


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LAND WARRIOR

Mr. DICKS. Okay. I have another quick question for General 

Chiarelli. Tell us about the land warrior equipment. When I was 

out at Fort Lewis, they told me that this was, that they had I guess 

it was one of the Stryker Brigades had used it, and everybody 

thought it was a huge success. Tell us about this. What is this, I 

guess as I understand it is technology that enhances communications and situational awareness. 

General CHIARELLI. It is an amazing piece of kit. And I think it 

is going to be revolutionary. And I think that the Stryker Brigade, 

the first one that used it came back and indicated that they were 

much more effective in this kind of fight that we are in. I will tell 

you that, for this Committee, that that first piece of kit that we 

issued and what it does do is it provides situational awareness and 

allows you to provide down to that soldier level through an eyepiece that he looks into, where all his buddies are and anybody else 

who is approaching his position that is using this kind of gear. So 

it gives him unbelievable situational awareness and ability to pass 

down information. It comes at a total weight of 10 pounds. We have 

improved that through battery technology down to 8.5 pounds. And 

we are coming out with a new system called ground soldier ensemble which will get even lighter. But this is one of those instances 

where we have added to the soldiers weight but the soldier is more 

than happy to carry it because of the extra capability it gives them 

in the fight. 

And I agree with you, it was the soldiers at Fort Lewis who used 

the very first models of this who came back and said, this is something we just have to have. 

Mr. DICKS. And what about, how will this play out in Afghanistan? Is this something that we are going to need in Afghanistan? 

General CHIARELLI. We will have it in Afghanistan with one of 

the units we are sending over now, Congressman, from Fort Lewis. 

Mr. DICKS. Yeah. Five Two. 

General CHIARELLI. Five Two will go over with it and we are 

very, very excited about collecting the data to see how effective it 

is in that kind of environment. 

General CHIARELLI. Thank you. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you very much. I have to say in listening 

this morning, certainly thinking about Afghanistan, the relationship between weight and endurance in a mountainous terrain concerns this Member. And I know we have talked a lot about alternatives to carrying all that weight and not knowing all of the encounters that our soldiers will have. Some of the information in the 

record here about, or in the testimony relating to upper body endurance decreasing 60 percent for periods during which that soldier 

has to walk 10 to 15 miles is a pretty stark figure. And I know the 

generals are more aware than anyone what this actually means. 

Congresswoman Granger talked about back injuries, and for the 

individual body armor, it states here in the testimony, actually of 

General Chiarelli, that 48 percent of the soldiers who wore that for 

4 hours or more, 70 percent had neck and back pain, and that from 

the years 2004 to 2008, low back, mid upper back neck pain were 

the chief complaints of soldiers seeking care, and that injury is 


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likely to be greater in Afghanistan, given the higher elevations and 

steep rugged terrain. So I am asking myself here, you know, you 

generals have really incredible responsibility here to try to provide 

our soldiers with the greatest ability for success in their mission 

with this incredible weight. 

I mean, it is unbelievable what they are doing. But this is just 

a huge burden and we worry about, I worry about maneuverability. 

I worry about endurance. I mean, each of us have been at places 

in our lives where you knew you were at the edge of your endurance, and that is not a very good feeling. And so I just wish you 

well in your efforts. And this committee stands ready to support 

you in any way that we can. 

I was going to ask Mr. Young if he had any concluding comments 

at this point. 

Mr. YOUNG. Madam Chairman, I want to thank General 

Chiarelli and General Amos for being here today and for working 

so hard on this issue. But I especially want to thank the two sergeants who came in carrying their heavy load to demonstrate for 

the members of the Committee just exactly what it is we are talking about. We can talk about it a lot. But we understand it a lot 

better when we really see it. So thank you very much for inviting 

the two sergeants in. 

And Madam Chairman, it has been a good hearing and thank 

you very much. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Young. 

And we would like to thank, again, General Chiarelli and General Amos formally this morning for your appearance. For the sergeants who so ably represented your services, thank you. Thank 

you for your commitment to our country. For all those who have 

attended, and I want to thank the subcommittee this morning. You 

have been fantastic. Thank you very much. 

The Committee will adjourn until 1:30 this afternoon, Wednesday, March 11. At that time the Committee will hold a hearing in 

closed session on the readiness of the Army and the Marine Corps. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

COMBAT LOADS CONTRIBUTING TO INJURIES

Question. In a February 1st, 2009 article in the Washington Post, the Marine 

Corps Commandant General James Conway is quoted as saying ‘‘We are going to 

have to lighten our load.’’ In the same article, General Chiarelli, referring to the fact 

that injuries are forcing more soldiers to stay at home, making it very hard for the 

Army to fill units for upcoming deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, you are 

quoted saying ‘‘There is no doubt that [in] our non-deployable rates, we’re seeing 

an increase. I don’t want to see it grow anymore.’’ General Chiarelli, you indicated 

that the number of total non-deployables, for the Army, has risen by an estimated 

2,000 to 3,000 since 2006, putting the current number of non-deployables at about 

20,000. 

Just how much total weight are our Soldiers and Marines asked to carry on foot 

patrol including body armor, food, water, weapon, ammunition, and communications 

gear? 

Army Answer. Today, the average Soldier load consists of a rucksack, weapon, 

ammunition, helmet, and other gear; the total weight can range from 63 to 130+ 

pounds depending on the variables of mission type, duration, and environment. On 

patrols in Afghanistan, the Soldier’s load is approximately 125 pounds. In addition, 

the individual components of Individual Body Armor (IBA) worn by Soldiers ranges 

from 2.5 pounds (side plate carriers) to 9.6 pounds (outer tactical vest) to 10.5 

pounds (front and back Enhanced-Small Arms Protective Inserts (ESAPI) ballistic 


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plate inserts); the total weight for a full set of IBA range in weight from 26 pounds 

to over 41 pounds. These extra pieces not only add more weight, but the cumbersome gear often hinders Soldier movement. 

Marine Corps Answer. Marines carry equipment based on their billet, mission, environment, and enemy threat. The Marines and sailors load is composed mainly of 

equipment that is basic to all billets and then unique equipment associated with the 

specific billets and missions. The basic equipment is usually in the 75–90 pound 

range depending upon the individual Marine’s size. However, additional equipment 

and ammunition is usually required based on the task organization requirements 

and duration of the missions. 

A survey was conducted with 2nd Battalion 7th Marines deployed to Afghanistan 

from April 2008 to November 2008. This post deployment survey was conducted in 

January 2009. The battalion did not have any trends of weight related injuries. 

Enclosure/Table 1 graphically illustrates the weight carried by each Marine by billet and the variance in weight by billet. 


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Infantry equipment can be consolidated into six basic categories: personal protective equipment, weapons, ammunition, optics and sensors, and sustainment miscellaneous equipment (i.e., water). Enclosure/Table 2 illustrates the weight per individual broken out into the six categories. 

The load a Marine or sailor carries varies, but this data set represents the range 

of loads that are actually carried by Marines and sailors in Afghanistan. 

Question. General Amos and General Chiarelli, what is the prevalence of injuries 

that can be attributed to the weight of the load that our Marines and Soldiers must 

carry? 

Army Answer. Currently, there is no scientific evidence to support a causal relationship between Soldier load and the musculoskeletal injuries being incurred in 

theater. Clinical presumption and anecdotes are driving current discussions. In pursuit of reliable data we have begun to submit protocol proposals to the newly (2009) 

established CENTCOM Institutional Review Board (IRB) for approval to deploy US 

Army Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM) investigators to both theaters. To date, there has been some data collected on types of musculoskeletal injuries and conditions in-theater. Investigators in one study showed that of the 48% 

of Soldiers who wore the Individual Body Armor (IBA) for 4 hours or more, 70% had 

neck and back pain. Another study queried Soldiers deployed in 2003 and 2004. Responses indicated that the back was the most common site of injury (32% low back, 

9% mid back and 6% neck). In addition, 68% of medical evacuations to pain management centers from Iraq were for spine pain. From Jul 04 to Oct 08, low back, mid/ 

upper back, and neck pain were the chief complaints of Soldiers seeking care from 

physical therapists (Combat Support Hospital: 22%, 7%, and 5%, respectively, and 

Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) 23%, 8%, and 6%, respectively). Still, other data collected by a physical therapist assigned to a BCT reveals the following breakdown 

of musculoskeletal injuries: 22–25% low back, 6–10% mid back, 4–10% neck, 19–22% 

shoulder, and 25–44% lower extremity. It is imperative that future research studies 

continue to focus on the prevalence of injuries that can be attributed to the weight 

of the load that our service men and women must carry. Meanwhile, we must continue to pursue ways to reduce the heaviness of the combat loads being carried by 

Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Marine Corps Answer. Our data indicates that a large percentage of non-battle 

injuries are due to musculoskeletal injuries (approximately 40%). Weight load may 

play a role in some of these injuries but its exact contribution is not certain as the 

Marine Corps has not been systematically collecting the necessary data elements to 

perform an appropriate analysis. Going forward, the Marine Corps is currently evaluating what data elements are essential to better address this topic. 

Question. Are the type of injuries that are caused by heavy loads generally the 

sort that heal fairly quickly or are we facing large numbers of long-term rehabilitation and permanent disability? 

Army Answer. Soldiers have only been wearing this load in a prolonged repetitive 

manner during combat conditions or approximately 5 years (short-term). Therefore 

it is difficult to draw any scientifically valid conclusions about long-term effects and 

rehabilitation. However, the Army is in the process of conducting studies to examine 

the short- and long-term impact of load carriage on the musculoskeletal system as 

well as studying preventive interventions that may be helpful. For instance, the 

Military Performance Division of the US Army Research Institute for Environmental Medicine (USARIEM) has several ongoing dies addressing these issues to include studying the ‘‘Effectiveness of Core Stabilization on a Soldier’s Ability to Carry 

a Load’’, ‘‘Effects of the New Plate Carrier System on Body Mechanics and Physiological Responses to Carrying a Load.’’ In an effort to address injury prevalence and 

activities associated with injuries, USARIEM and the Center for Health Promotion 

and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) is surveying a group of Soldiers deploying to 

Theater. This study proposes to survey injured Soldiers in a support battalion as 

well as an infantry battalion to determine the cause of injury and identify potential 

risk factors with a goal of creating a predictive model that allows one to identify 

or predict the types of injuries Soldiers may encounter by military occupational specialty and activity. Finally, the University of Pittsburgh in collaboration with the 

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) is attempting to link the demands of training 

and military operations to injury and performance outcome testing by analyzing the 

biomechanics, musculoskeletal, physiological and nutritional profiles of Soldiers at 

the 101st. The bottom line is that the Army is addressing this issue in a multifaceted manner by conducting research, improving physical conditioning to optimize 

performance, incorporating injury’s prevention methods, and pursuing lighter protective equipment. 

Marine Corps Answer. Most injuries are temporary in nature and heal fairly 

quickly. By definition, sprains, strains and stress fractures fall into this category. 


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There will certainly be service members who will experience more serious injuries, 

however we have not seen a significant change in the referral pattern to the Physical Evaluation Board that would imply that large numbers of these types of injuries 

are occurring. 

Question. Is there a basic load weight beyond which the frequency of injuries 

grows dramatically? 

Army Answer. There are currently no known scientific studies that can confirm 

the causal relationship between load weight and the frequency and severity of injuries. However, multiple studies illustrate how carrying a heavy load can cause pain, 

reduce performance, and increase fatigue. In one study, Special Forces Soldiers carried loads of 75, 106, and 134 pounds for 12.5 miles (as fast as possible) with three 

days of rest between trials. Results indicated that Soldiers complained of 37% more 

back discomfort with the 134 pound pack than with the 106 pound pack. Additionally, their marksmanship performance declined 66% for the first minute after the 

march, but at two minutes post-exercise their performance was similar to pre-march 

performance. In another study, infantry Soldiers carrying a load of 101 pounds for 

12.5 miles had a decrease of 26% in marksmanship (number of targets hit), a 33% 

increase in distance from the target center and an increase in back pain compared 

to pre-load and march scores. Other studies showed that after wearing Individual 

Body Armor (IBA) and walking for 30 minutes on a treadmill, upper extremity muscle endurance decreased 60% and lower extremity muscle endurance decreased 15%. 

As muscle endurance decreases, the risk of injury increases. This factor is further 

compounded when Soldiers are then asked to conduct operations in uneven or 

mountainous terrain or conduct lengthy urban operations. 

Marine Corps Answer. Individual tolerances to load weight occur along a continuum. We have no data that points to a specific load at which injuries become significantly more likely. 

Question. How many Marines and how many Soldiers are currently in a nondeployable status due to injuries that can be linked to the weight of the individuals’ 

basic load? 

Army Answer. Although we are seeing an increase in musculoskeletal injuries related to deployments, there are currently no scientific studies available that can confirm this causal relationship between Soldier load and musculoskeletal injury. 

Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps does not currently have a method in 

place to track the number of Marines that are in a non-deployable status due to 

sustained injuries related to their combat load. 

BODY ARMOR

Question. When anyone attempts to address the problem of reducing the weight 

of the load the individual soldier or Marine must carry, the first thing that comes 

to mind is usually body armor. For many soldiers and Marines, body armor is also 

the heaviest single item in the load. Body armor has saved many lives. But it is 

very heavy and any weight that can be taken out of body armor without sacrificing 

protection is worth pursuing. 

What are the various types of body armor, including for the Special Forces? 

Army Answer. The Army issues Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) to all of its Soldiers. IBA has a modular capability and can be reconfigured by the commander to 

meet their mission and threat requirements. As of 11 May 09, the Army will issue 

a plate carrier to one battalion in 4th ID, which is the same plate carrier that 

SOCOM issues to US Army Soldiers in its units. 


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Marine Corps Answer. The four types of body armor currently in use by the Marine Corps are the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV), Outer Tactical Vest (OTV), Scalable Plate Carrier (SPC), and Full Spectrum Battle Equipment (FSBE). The MTV 

offers the greatest area of soft armor coverage, and is used by Marine units deployed to the MARCENT Area of Operations (AO) in support of both Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The MTV was fielded in 

response to an Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS) issued by in-theater 

units. The OTV remains the Program of Record body armor system for the Marine 

Corps and is issued to Marines and units that are not deploying to the MARCENT 

AO. The OTV is issued to Marines in between deployments to the MARCENT AO 

for use in training. The SPC is the lightest set of body armor utilized by the Marine 

Corps. The reduction in weight is made possible by a decrease of the soft armor area 

of coverage. The SPC was also initiated through the submission of an UUNS. It is 

intended for use by infantry units deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), as well as Combat Vehicle Crewmen deployed to any theater in support 

of combat operations. FSBE is a specialized body armor variant used by U.S. Marine 

Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), Reconnaissance units, Air 

and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), Explosive Ordnance Disposal 

(EOD), Marine Security Forces Battalion, Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams 

(FAST), and the helicopter assault company from within the Battalion Landing 

Team (BLT) assigned to a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). 

Question. What comprises a set of body armor? 

Army Answer. A set of Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) consists of the Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) or the Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV), a set of Enhanced 

Small Arms Protective Inserts (ESAPI), the Deltoid Auxiliary Protection (DAP) and 

the Enhanced Side Ballistic Inserts (ESBI). The Army is in the process of 

transitioning from OTV to IOTV. The IBA provides protection against fragmentation 

and small arms ammunition. 

Marine Corps Answer. Body armor consists of the carrier, ‘‘soft armor’’ Kevlar inserts, and ‘‘hard’’ ceramic plate inserts. The carrier is the frame, and holds the soft 

and hard armor inserts. ‘‘Soft’’ Kevlar inserts provide ballistic protection against 

fragmentation and 9mm caliber ammunition, and when inserted into the carrier, 

protect a large portion of a Marine’s torso. ‘‘Hard’’ ceramic plates, called Enhanced 

Small Arms Protective Inserts (ESAPI) provide protection against higher caliber 

ammunition. They cover the most vital areas of a Marine’s torso: front, back, and 

sides. 

Question. What do the various parts weigh, such as side armor and deltoid armor? 

Army Answer. The weights of Interceptor Body Armor components for size large 

are as follows: The Outer Tactical Vest weighs 10.6 lbs + Deltoid Auxiliary Protector 

at 5.5 lbs + the Side Plate Carriers at 2.5 lbs gives the set a total weight OTV of 

18.6 lbs. 

The Improved Outer Tactical Vest weighs 13.2 lbs + Deltoid Protector at 2.5 lbs 

brings the total weight IOTV of 15.7 lbs. The Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts weigh 12.5 lbs and Enhanced Side Ballistic Inserts (ESBI) weigh 5.0 lbs. 

Marine Corps Answer. The Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) is composed of the carrier with soft armor inserts (15.5 lbs), front and back ESAPI plates (12.5 lbs combined weight for size large), and two Side-ESAPI plates (combined 4.6 lbs). The system, in size large, weighs a total of 32.6 lbs. 

The Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) is composed of the carrier with soft armor inserts 

(12.3 lbs), front and back ESAPI plates (12.5 lbs combined weight for size large), 

and side ESAPI plates (4.6 lbs). Total system weight in size large is 29.4 lbs. 

The Scalable Plate Carrier (SPC) is composed of the carrier with soft armor inserts (8.8 lbs), front and back ESAPI plates (12.5 lbs combined weight for size 

large), and side ESAPI plates (4.6 lbs). Total system weight in size large is 24.9 lbs. 

The Marine Corps does not use deltoid armor. 

Question. What is the total weight of each type of body armor currently in use? 

Army Answer. The charts below shows the weight comparisons of body armor currently in use by US Army Soldiers: 


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Marine Corps Answer. The total weight of each type of body armor currently in 

use is as follows: 

• Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) = 32.6 lbs 

• Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) = 29.4 lbs 

• Scalable Plate Carrier (SPC) = 24.9 lbs 

Question. Apparently, some commanders have requested a type of body armor 

called ‘‘Plate Carrier’’, which is considerably lighter than regular body armor. Do 

you favor ‘‘Plate Carrier’’ as an alternative to regular body armor? 

Army Answer. Yes. I am in favor of plate carriers as an additional capability for 

commanders when conditions, e.g. enemy and/or terrain, means weight savings and 

requirements for mobility outweigh the extra protection provided by the Outer Tactical Vest/Improved Outer Tactical Vest. In order to develop an operational requirement, the Army will evaluate selected plate carriers in a Soldier Protection Demonstration in May 2009. 

Marine Corps Answer. We are fielding the Scalable Plate Carrier (SPC) in addition to the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV). This provides commanders in the field 

with the flexibility to equip Marines based on operational requirements in consideration of the threat, environmental and operating conditions. The SPC is not a replacement for the MTV, which is our primary protective body armor. The SPC is 

roughly seven pounds lighter than the MTV but provides less coverage. It is used 

with the same Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (E–SAPI) as the MTV and 

in the body areas covered by the E–SAPIs, the protection is identical. The SPC allows for greater mobility with reduced thermal stress in high elevations, thick vegetation and tropical environments than the MTV. 

Question. Is the wearing of body armor ever optional? 

Army Answer. There is no DA policy mandating the wear of body armor. Decisions regarding body armor are left to Commanders at the appropriate level based 

on sound tactical and operational requirements. When making decisions regarding 

body armor, the overriding concern of Commanders is the welfare of Soldiers. 

Marine Corps Answer. Yes. The intent of the Marine Corps’ policy defining Armor 

Protection Levels (APL) is to establish standards to enable commanders at the Lieutenant Colonel-level and above to tailor protective postures for their units based on 

the threat, climatic or other conditions, and based on guidance or direction from 

Service or theater combatant commanders. The lowest level of protection does not 

require body armor. Higher levels of protection require the Scalable Plate Carrier 

(SPC) or the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) to be worn. The highest level adds the 

the Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (E–SAPI) to either the SPC or the 

MTV. 

Question. In the near term and long term, what is within the reasonable art of 

the possible for body armor? How can we achieve better protection with less weight? 

Army Answer. The Army’s Science and Technology (S&T) programs are pursuing 

performance enhancements through advances in high performance ballistic fiber and 

textile technologies, transparent polymers, composites, nanotechnology, and materials systems integration. The goal of this research is to produce lighter materials 

that will provide the same level of protection at significantly reduced weights. Efforts will continue to focus on collaboration with the medical S&T community to understand the effects of body armor designs on the human body. This collaborative 

approach seeks to provide holistic ballistic and blast protection to enhance Soldier 

survivability. 

Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps uses a combination of continuous strategic market research, Quarterly Industry Days, and the Small Business Innovation 

Research (SBIR) program to leverage both Industry and the Research and Development communities. As it relates to body armor and reducing weight, the Marine 

Corps is currently pursuing SBIR efforts in the areas of developing a lighter weight 

Enhanced-SAPI (E–SAPI) plate. Within the current technology, lighter weight can 

only be achieved by trading off areas of coverage within the overall design of the 

system. Long term efforts to reduce the overall weight of body armor is likely to 

be contingent upon the development of a revolutionary new material that can meet, 

or exceed, current performance requirements. 

Question. Are adequate inventories of body armor available for training and combat operations in the Army and Marine Corps? 

Army Answer. The Army has procured sufficient quantities of Interceptor Body 

Armor (IBA) for combat operations and training requirements. The Army is currently procuring an Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV) for the IBA to replace the 

older Outer Tactical Vests. The priority for fielding of the IOTV is deployed and deploying Soldiers. The Marine Corps will respond to you directly regarding their inventory and availability of body armor for training and combat operations. 


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Marine Corps Answer. Yes, the Marine Corps has adequate inventories of body 

armor available for training and combat operations. 

LAND WARRIOR

Question. For a number of years the Army experimented with a technology designed to take communications and situational awareness to the level of the individual soldier. However, size, weight and power supply concerns eventually resulted 

in program termination. At approximately the same time one battalion set of equipment was put into service on an experimental basis in Iraq, in a Stryker unit. The 

Land Warrior equipment was found to be very desirable. Army equipment developers have resurrected the Land Warrior technology in the Soldier Ensemble program. 

How much weight does the Land Warrior component that included in the Soldier 

Ensemble add to the load the individual soldier must carry? 

Army Answer. The Land Warrior capability currently fielded to the 5/2 Stryker 

Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) adds approximately 13.3 lbs to the Soldier’s load. The 

Land Warrior program was terminated in FY07 and is fielded to the 5/2 SBCT as 

an interim solution. The Ground Soldier Ensemble (GSE) program was established 

as a program of record in FY09 and passed Milestone A in January 2009. The GSE 

program is undergoing engineering development prototyping and design refinement 

that will determine the final weight of the ensemble. The threshold weight requirement is 14 lbs and the objective weight requirement is 10 lbs. 

Question. As research and testing continue, what is the objective weight for this 

communications technology? 

Army Answer. The Ground Soldier Ensemble (GSE) is the program of record that 

replaces the Land Warrior capability that has been fielded to the 5/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) as an interim solution. The GSE program is undergoing 

engineering development prototyping and design refinement that will determine the 

final weight of the ensemble. The threshold weight requirement is 14 lbs and the 

objective weight requirement is 10 lbs. 

Question. Does the radio in the Soldier Ensemble replace any other radio that is 

currently carried? 

Army Answer. The radio in the Ground Soldier Ensemble (GSE) will not replace 

any other radio that is currently carried. The initial versions of the GSE will use 

the Combat Net Radio System (CNRS) as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) 

and replace the CNRS with the rifleman radio of the Joint Tactical Radio System 

(JTRS) family of radios as GFE when it is available. 

Question. What is the weight of the spare batteries for the Soldier Ensemble that 

a soldier must carry? 

Army Answer. The Land Warrior program was terminated in FY07. There are two 

battery sizes used for the current Land Warrior system fielded to 5/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team as an interim solution. The LI–145 weighs 2.25 lbs and the LI– 

80 weighs 1.15 lbs and are used as the mission (long or short) dictates. The current 

program of record, Ground Soldier Ensemble (GSE), may use these batteries, but 

the GSE is currently undergoing engineering development prototyping and design 

refinement. Advances in battery technology that provide lighter more powerful energy sources may be applied to GSE when they become available and other techniques to reduce battery weight may be used, such as improved power management 

and components that consume less power. 

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES (TTPS) TO REDUCE INJURIES DUE TO HEAVY

LOADS

Question. The Army has formal and informal Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 

for doing about everything. Often the best, most effective way of doing something 

in the Army is figured out by the soldiers and sergeants and later is adopted by 

the Army and taught in the school house. 

What Tactics, Techniques and Procedures have been developed to help foot Soldiers and Marines deal with all the gear they have to haul with them, including 

their own personal gear and the Soldiers’ share of platoon equipment such as climbing gear or various weapons, ammunition, and sensors? 

Army Answer. The Army has formal and informal Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP). New TTPs that are adopted by the Army and taught in Army schools 

are often developed by Soldiers and sergeants at the lowest levels. Over the course 

of a deployment, Soldiers become more astute at cross-loading gear between patrol 

members. Soldiers identify multifunctional equipment to reduce redundant items. 

They emphasize carrying only mission essential items, leaving behind non-essential 

equipment. Soldiers conceal and cache water and food at forward locations for use 


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at a later date and for re-supply. Soldiers have effectively planned and used helicopter sling load operations and aerial resupply operations. Currently in Afghanistan an average of 11.7 short tons of supplies—to include liquids—are delivered per 

day to Soldiers via air drop. Over the past 12 months this averages roughly 750,000 

to 800,000 pounds of air-dropped supplies per month. Some extraordinary situations 

permit Soldiers to incorporate the use of pack animals, such as the regular resupply 

efforts for several austere Observation Posts in Afghanistan and the use by US 

Army Special Forces in Afghanistan since 2001. Even when these TTPs are incorporated into missions, Soldiers often carry three days of supplies for a 24-hour patrol. 

Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps is proactive in its approach to lightening 

the combat load that Marines carry in the field. We are pursuing solutions and exploring future initiatives that range from using new, lightweight materials, to policies designed to tailor armor protection levels that match threat conditions, to the 

use of robotics to assist in carrying unit equipment. We are keenly aware that the 

heavy loads carried by our Marines impact their endurance, effectiveness, mobility, 

and lethality as they fight lightly equipped irregular forces in places like Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

The Marine Corps has invested heavily in ‘‘Lighten the Load’’ initiatives through 

the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and the Marine Corps Systems Command 

through the Program Manager, Marine Expeditionary Rifle Squad (PM MERS). It 

is important to note though, that many of the best tactics, techniques, procedures, 

and equipment ideas have been developed by individuals and small units during 

training and while deployed. The Marine Corps is committed to finding and following the best methods to ‘‘lighten the load,’’ improve individual mobility, and 

thereby enhance the survivability of our Marines in combat. 

The Marine Corps completed an extensive survey of individual Marines from December 2007 to February 2008, which determined that most survey participants believed that excessive combat loads negatively impacted their performance. Many of 

the lessons learned in this survey have been successfully addressed, and continue 

to impact the design, procurement, and testing of individual equipment. 

The Marine Corps focuses on incorporating high performance, lighter-weight materials for individual weapons, ammunition, personal protective equipment (PPE), 

and uniform items. This focus has resulted in the development of such items as the 

Scalable Plate Carrier (SPC) for Marines deploying to Afghanistan. The SPC offers 

the same level of ballistic protection as the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) in a configuration well-suited for the difficult terrain of Afghanistan. The SPC has achieved 

a 7.7 pound, or 24% reduction in weight from the MTV, which significantly increases individual mobility and maneuverability. Surveys and After Action Reports 

have told us that Marines have a strong preference for this system over the MTV. 

As a result, we have transitioned the SPC to be a program of record and are expanding the Acquisition Objective (AO) to 65,000 systems to equip the Marine 

Corps’ entire Ground Combat Element (GCE). 

Another item that Marines have expressed their support for is the Enhanced 

Combat Helmet. The Commandant recently made the decision to pursue the new 

helmet, which will be made of a new material that improves ballistic protection 

without increasing the weight of the helmet. In fact, the new helmet, which is 

shaped like the Army Combat Helmet, will actually weigh slightly less than a current helmet. 

Other examples of reductions in equipment weight help illustrate the success the 

Marine Corps is achieving in this critical area. In response to comments from Marines deployed to Afghanistan, we are now developing the 3 Season Sleep System 

(3S). There is a compelling need in Afghanistan for a sleeping bag that increases 

thermal protection and comfort at reduced weight and volume. The 3S gains 15 degrees fahrenheit of protection, reduces weight by one pound, and reduces volume by 

15 percent as compared to the existing Modular Sleep System. 

Question. Are Soldiers trained and inspected on how to pack gear for the best distribution of weight? 

Army Answer. Yes, soldiers are trained and inspected on how to pack gear in 

basic training and when they get their unit of assignment. The Soldier is taught 

the importance of packing his gear beginning in Basic Training, focusing on weight 

distribution to prevent injury and accessibility. This training is constantly reinforced in our operational units. Prior to going out on mission, leaders conduct inspections to ensure their Soldiers have the right equipment and it is packed properly. Our modular (molle-system) packs and required equipment can be modified for 

each mission. Leaders balance the benefit of reducing the weight our Soldiers carry 

with the risk of not having necessary equipment available if needed. During precombat inspections, Soldiers are inspected on the packing of their gear for the best 


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distribution of weight. Our current Army Combat Uniform (ACU) rucksacks and 

ballistic vests are designed to assist the Soldiers by allowing for a more effective 

distribution of weight based on mission requirements. 

Marine Corps Answer. During entry-level and throughout their career progression 

courses, Marines are taught that it is a unit leaders’ responsibility to plan for and 

conduct inspections prior to every tactical evolution. The Marine Corps includes precombat checks and inspection tasks for individuals, unit leaders, and small units in 

our Training and Readiness Manuals. Inspections of all types receive close attention 

by unit commanders and the pre-combat checks focused on the proper preparation 

and fit of individual equipment are among the most important of these inspections. 

Because of the rapid fielding and improvement of individual combat equipment, 

the Marine Corps has also produced a number of media tools and training opportunities that help train individual Marines and their leaders on the proper adjustment, fit, and wear of the individual body armor. Many of these tools are available 

online and are accessible from Marines’ home computers. Experience has shown us 

that training is a key component of ensuring Marines wear their equipment for optimal fit, function, and weight carriage. The use of New Equipment Training Teams 

(NETT) has also allowed us to go directly to the Marines to support the fielding of 

new equipment. 

Question. Is there a hierarchy of what gear is left behind beyond a certain load 

weight? 

Army Answer. There is not an Army-wide standardized hierarchy of what gear 

is left behind beyond a certain weight. After considering the mission profile and the 

anticipated threat level, commanders exercise command judgment to strike an appropriate balance between the dual imperatives of ensuring maximum feasible individual force protection and the requirement to accomplish the mission. In addition 

to individual protective equipment, the commander must also identify mission critical unit equipment to bring on the operation. Once these decisions are made and 

approved by the higher level chain of command, noncommissioned officers then enforce this load discipline and monitor Soldier well-being and safety. 

Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps emphasizes the conduct of mission analysis and estimates of the situation. This essential leadership step allows unit leaders to appropriately plan for their mission, which includes planning to bring the 

gear and equipment necessary to accomplish their assigned tasks, and to plan for 

contingencies such as emergency resupply and requesting support from adjacent 

units. This planning evaluates guidance from unit commanders, environmental conditions, and the enemy threat. 

Many individual Marines surveyed by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab indicated they believed the authority to designate appropriate levels of personal protective equipment should be delegated to unit commanders. Consequently, the Commandant of the Marine Corps recently adopted a service policy granting the authority to determine the appropriate level of individual armor protection to unit commanders, lieutenant colonel and higher. This policy, which does not interfere with 

Joint or Theater Combatant Commanders’ established policies, allows Marine commanders to appropriately scale personal protective equipment to meet the mission, 

environment, and threat in order to achieve optimum individual combat loads. 

Question. Do units sometimes bring along extra soldiers in order to carry mission 

critical equipment? 

Army Answer. When the Army develops combat systems, we integrate the materiel solution with doctrinal concepts, organizational design, training programs, leader development, personnel requirements, and, if necessary, facilities in order to create the required combat capability. Many items of combat equipment require multiple soldiers not only to carry but also to employ the system effectively. For example, we often cross load ammunition among multiple soldiers for unit weapons systems not only to lighten individual loads but also to ensure adequate quantities of 

ammunition make it to the objective. Likewise, an assistant gunner for a machinegun crew will not only assist with target location but will also carry the tripod to 

lighten the gunner’s load. Our process for developing combat capabilities accounts 

for these soldier load and system employment considerations in determining organizational designs and personnel requirements. Therefore, it would not be correct to 

state that units sometimes bring along extra soldiers in order to carry mission critical equipment. If the equipment is mission critical, then the soldier is also critical 

to the unit’s ability to accomplish the mission. 

Question. Do units sometimes bring along extra Marines in order to carry mission 

critical equipment? 

Marine Corps Answer. Units conduct pre-mission planning to determine the number of personnel, weapons, equipment, and logistics required for a particular task. 


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In the event that a unit leader determines he requires additional personnel, it is 

up to them to identify their requirement up their chain-of-command for resolution. 

I should point out that the Marine Corps rifle squad is a 13-man unit, whereas 

an Army squad is composed of 9 men. The greater size of Marine rifle squads allows 

a unit to spread their combat and mission-specific equipment across a greater number of individuals. In addition, the Marine Corps is procuring the Infantry Automatic Rifle to replace the M–249 Squad Automatic Weapon. This new lighter, more 

portable accurate weapon will consume less ammunition while making the individual Marine lighter and more lethal. 

Question. What lessons have been learned thus far from operations in Afghanistan 

about dismounted, backpack operations in rugged and high altitude terrain? 

Army Answer. The: leaders of the Army units operating in this rugged terrain 

have recognized that in order to defeat a highly mobile adversary, who is familiar 

with the terrain and often carries 75–100 pounds less in gear than our Soldiers, 

that operational changes and a lightened load were needed in the execution of missions. Over time these units have increased small unit operations that use a variety 

of patrol and infiltration routes, and create a smaller signature and a reduced resupply burden. These units have learned to conserve ammunition, food, and water, 

and to use clandestine cache sites and other resupply techniques such as helicopters, sling loads, and air drops. Brigade Combat Team and Battalion Commanders have authorized changes to the equipment posture to reduce weight and 

to match the load to the mission and the threat. Junior leaders in these units have 

adapted planning methods to identify multifunctional equipment and tailor loads 

based on the mission and the environment while also cross-loading mission essential 

equipment within the patrol. The Army recognizes the importance of replicating this 

demanding environment at the Combat Training Centers and home station pre-deployment training. 

Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned is the repository of lessons learned from combat and is available to all Marines on the unclassified NIPR network. Each deploying infantry battalion produces lessons learned 

briefs that address a range of topics, but nearly always include observations about 

the impact of terrain and climate on individuals. 

Units deploying to Afghanistan report that individual combat loads can often exceed 110 lbs. The earliest lessons learned from Afghanistan have directly impacted 

the decision and design of the Scalable Plate Carrier and Enhanced Combat Helmet. 

Operations are best conducted by small units, who are able to move more effectively than larger units. These operations are often conducted for durations of up 

to a week because of the physical toll of moving in mountainous terrain. 

In conducting estimates of the situation, it is necessary for units at all levels to 

conduct risk vs. mobility calculations. Small unit experiences in Afghanistan have 

established new movement rate factors for both dismounted and vehicle operations. 

Both dismounted and vehicle operations are significantly impacted by the difficult 

terrain. Across the board, unit commanders point to the training of their small unit 

leaders, Corporals and Sergeants, as one of the best investments that can be made 

to ensure successful operations in Afghanistan. 

Question. What if anything has been done to improve the physical fitness of Soldiers to enable them to endure the weight of the pack? 

Army Answer. The Army Physical Fitness School at Fort Jackson, South Carolina 

has drafted a new doctrine called Army Physical Readiness Training (Field Manual 

3–22.20 / near-final draft) that aligns our physical fitness doctrine with our current 

operations and training doctrine. The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command has 

already posted the draft manual on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) for implementation and use by our leaders and Soldiers. The new Army Physical Readiness 

Training focuses on improving Soldiers’ aerobic endurance, muscular strength, muscular endurance, power, and movement proficiency which physically prepares Soldiers and units to meet the physical demands of full spectrum operations. 

Prior to the release of our new doctrine, many units across the Army, with the 

assistance of subject matter experts, had adopted a variety of injury prevention and 

performance enhancement physical fitness programs. For example, Special Forces 

and many Brigade Combat Teams have implemented programs that, in addition to 

traditional aerobic exercise, emphasize core strengthening, short term bursts of 

power, and speed and agility drills. 

Additionally, prior to deployment, Soldiers wear their gear with increasing frequency to build physical endurance for long-duration missions. 

Question. What if anything has been done to improve the physical fitness of Marines to enable them to endure the weight of the pack? 

Marine Corps Answer. In MARADMIN 579/06 the Marine Corps announced a 

Concept for Functional Fitness designed to provoke debate within the Marine Corps 


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on the most effective approach for preparing Marines physically and mentally for 

the demands on combat. 

The Functional Fitness Program is the commander’s program. This program allows flexible, adaptive training that is focused on individual and unit requirements. 

Unit commanders preparing their units for operating in mountainous terrain of Afghanistan, for example can tailor their program to the specific physical rigors they 

expect to face. Marines, as combat athletes, need a comprehensive fitness program 

that will develop the physical skills necessary for combat; including core strength, 

endurance, speed, and coordination. The Marine athlete should be prepared for the 

physical challenges of combat with a program that develops both General and Specific Physical Preparedness—a program that integrates strength training based on 

functional, compound movements with multi-disciplinary speed, agility, and endurance training. The program should be intense and infinitely varied. The program 

must also be interesting—we want Marines to stick with it, and from all indications, 

it is working. Marines are excelling in the most demanding combat environments 

because of their preparation, training, and focus on injury prevention. 

The Marine Corps Combat Fitness Test (CFT) is being implemented as a means 

of evaluating functional fitness by replicating a variety of physical challenges that 

Marines face in combat. The CFT measures readiness by requiring Marines in boots 

and utilities to sprint a timed 880 yards, lift a 30-pound ammunition can overhead 

from shoulder height repeatedly for two minutes, and perform a maneuver-underfire event. The maneuver-under-fire event is a timed 300-yard shuttle run that requires Marines to pair up by size and perform a series of combat related tasks. 

TRAINING

Question. The Committee understands that Soldiers and Marines carry combat 

loads often exceeding 100 pounds which limits their mobility and over time may 

cause stress injuries. The Committee also understands that to be ready for tough 

combat, the Soldiers and Marines must receive tough training. 

While training at home station, do Soldiers and Marines carry the same equipment and weight that they will carry when deployed to Afghanistan? 

Army Answer. Yes. Based on their anticipated mission, unit pre-deployment training plans routinely include activities such as road marches or negotiating stairs and 

obstacles with weighted vests and rucksacks to simulate combat load equivalent 

weights. 

Unit commanders seek all reasonably available means to simulate the environmental conditions anticipated during the deployment. An individual Soldier’s equipment weight is often determined by whether operations are mounted or dismounted, 

the duration of the operation, the frequency that the Soldier wears all of his equipment, and by individual duties. 

Some unique items of equipment, such as special radios, are provided in the theater of operation. The units simulate the weight of the items when wearing their 

equipment for physical conditioning. 

Marine Corps Answer. Marines train with the same individual equipment that 

they will deploy with. They will also train with the same type of major end items 

(i.e. Humvees, mortars, etc.), but will fall in on the equipment sets already in theater when they arrive in Afghanistan. This is the same procedure as Iraq. 

Question. What sort of physical conditioning is done to prepare Soldiers and Marines for the heavy loads they will have to carry in Afghanistan during home station 

training? 

Army Answer. Units most apt to carry heavy loads will invest additional time in 

more comprehensive physical fitness opportunities such as weight training, obstacle 

courses, combative activities, and timed distances marches over uneven terrain with 

their equipment. For example, Special Forces and many Brigade Combat Teams 

have implemented programs that, in addition to traditional aerobic exercise, emphasize core strengthening, short term bursts of power, and speed and agility drills. 

Exercise periods are conducted with sufficient intensity, frequency, and duration 

to maintain adequate cardio-respiratory endurance, muscular strength and endurance, flexibility, and body composition. 

Rather than just emphasizing aerobic and muscular endurance, the new draft 

Army doctrine, Army Physical Readiness Training (Field Manual 3–22.20 / nearfinal draft), focuses on improving Soldiers’ aerobic endurance, muscular strength, 

muscular endurance, power, and movement proficiency which physically prepares 

Soldiers and units to meet the physical demands of full spectrum operations. 

Marine Corps Answer. A combination of strength, mobility and anaerobic/aerobic 

endurance training is conducted by Marines prior to deployment. A typical week’s 

physical training plan includes load bearing conditioning hikes, weight lifting using 


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compound functional movements and agility training such as sprint workouts with 

changes of directions and jumps. The goal of pre-deployment physical training is to 

enhance a Marine’s physical capacity across a broad spectrum of physical skills. All 

training is done in a progressive manner with controls applied such as programmed 

rest to allow for adaptations and to mitigate injuries. 

Question. How is physical fitness maintained once the unit has deployed to Afghanistan? 

Army Answer. Many Soldiers maintain fitness through the routine execution of 

rigorous combat operations on difficult terrain and under various, often heavy loads. 

Physical Training (PT) programs vary by location and mission. Most locations offer 

access to a variety of physical fitness equipment and facilities. Units have a variety 

of PT plans based on mission, time, and troops available. Soldiers have also demonstrated remarkably innovative methods of constructing PT equipment and facilities in austere conditions. In addition, much of the Army’s Physical Fitness Training 

Manual (FM 21–20) is dedicated to exercises that can be performed without the use 

of equipment, such as partner resisted exercises and calisthenics. 

Marine Corps Answer. During deployment, Marines remain fit through the conduct of rigorous missions under demanding operational conditions, augmented by 

the continuous unit and individual physical fitness training which is a vital element 

of our Marine Corps regimen. 

Question. How do the Army and Marine Corps prepare soldiers for high altitude 

operations such as those they will perform in Afghanistan? 

Army Answer. The Army prepares Soldiers to conduct high-altitude operations by 

ensuring they are in the best physical condition possible prior to deploying. Soldiers 

conducting rigorous physical fitness training will more readily adapt to the demands 

of high-altitude operations. While units may not have the opportunity to train in 

mountainous areas, Soldiers can and do conduct physical training wearing their 

combat gear and incorporate road marches over uneven terrain and negotiate obstacles while wearing their equipment. High-altitude oxygen levels are difficult to replicate prior to arriving in theater, but the Soldiers adjust their physical conditioning 

activities upon arrival in theater to further improve themselves prior to assuming 

mission. 

Marine Corps Answer. Fortunately, our Marine Air Ground Task Force Training 

Center (MAGTFC) in 29 Palms, California and our Mountain Warfare Training Center (MWTC) in Bridgeport, California closely approximate the environmental conditions (to include altitudes) found in Afghanistan Regional Commands (RC) South 

and East. Marine units deploying to RC South conduct their mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) at 29 Palms prior to deploying. Marine Embedded Training Teams 

(ETTS) deploying to RC East in Afghanistan conduct their pre-deployment training 

at the Mountain Warfare Training Center (MWTC) in Bridgeport, California, where 

the altitude ranges from 6,800 to 11,300 feet and there is significantly complex, 

compartmentalized terrain. At these two operational venues, Marines conduct a 

number of tactical exercises while exposed to Afghanistan-like environmental conditions. 

DATA COLLECTION AT POINT OF INJURY

Question. The Military is not making informed decisions on improving Tactical 

Combat Casualty Care or body armor because currently the Department is not collecting the data. 67% of the wounded are returned to duty in theater, and many 

of those are not treated in a hospital. As a result, we have almost no information 

on what medical care was provided at point-of-injury. The OSD Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care states that less than 1% of all wounded has complete 

documentation. 

Changes to training and equipment for first responders are the result of anecdotal 

‘‘lessons learned’’, not data-based best practices. Without systematic data collection 

and analysis, far-forward medical care cannot improve. 

What data would be beneficial in your minds to lighten or alter current body 

armor? 

Army Answer. The following data would be important when assessing possible 

modifications to body armor: type and frequency of injury, activity that resulted in 

the injury, content of combat load carried, type of body armor, location (distance 

traveled, speed, grade), environment/climate conditions, length of patrol (days), prior 

training history with current equipment/load, fitness level (aerobic capacity, muscle 

strength, Army Physical Fitness Test), anthropometrics (body weight, height), medical history for previous injuries and predisposing conditions, job duties, physical activity within country and demographics (number of deployments, gender, age, eduVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:11 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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cation, etc). It would also be beneficial to know how well the body armor fits, if it 

is comfortable, and the frequency and duration that it is being worn. 

Data are being collected from numerous sources: the Army Joint Theater Trauma 

Registry and the Navy Trauma Registry collect extensive medical data on wounded 

in action service members and tracks combat injury patterns, general wound trends, 

treatments and outcomes. The Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner 

(OAFME) collects medical injury data, to include full-body CT scans on every returning killed in action service member and has received over 900 pieces of personal 

protective equipment (PPE). PEO-Soldier analyzes PPE received by the OAFME and 

has implemented PPE collection teams in Iraq to collect body armor from woundedin-action personnel. The data collected includes the PPE and the available operational and intelligence data surrounding the event. The Army National Ground Intelligence Center tracks operational and intelligence data that surrounds fatal and/ 

or wounding incidents. The Army Research Laboratory analyzes selected injury-producing fragments to identify new or unique characteristics. 

The Joint Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury in Combat program combines the analysis of operational/intelligence, material performance (PPE and vehicular), and medical outcome data from combat incidents and integrates the data into 

actionable information. Equipment Analysis characterizes damage to the PPE from 

the wounding incident and drives requirements and design decisions and to develop 

biomedical standards. Threat and Operational Analyses look at weapon and material performance, threat trends, and incident lessons learned. Medical injury and 

outcome analyses lead to evidence-based changes in clinical practice and treatment. 

Actionable information derived from these analyses have led to direct feedback to 

combatant commanders to alter tactics, techniques, and procedures; confirmed the 

presence of weapons of interest; and guided program managers as they make equipment and vehicle modifications and upgrade decisions. 

Marine Corps Answer. Optimally, we would like to lighten the service member’s 

combat load without compromising protection from injury from every weapon system, including IED devices. This is a complex risk/benefit analysis that requires 

careful study. Lighter armor that does not adequately protect a Marine from known 

hazards is not acceptable but neither is armor that is unnecessarily heavy. 

Question. Changes in force protection issues (e.g. body armor, eye protection) are 

not informed by point-of-injury medical information. Without this data it is impossible to know if recalled body armor performed to standard, and what changes are 

needed to improve body armor. Additionally, data on body armor success are lost 

when service members are treated and returned to duty, so the Army may 

accidently decrease protection. Data collected on body armor use at the hospital is 

error-prone and incomplete—it is something best collected by the first responder, 

not the surgeon. 

If data is not collected adequately, how will increasing/decreasing the weight of 

body armor alter protection of the soldiers? 

Army Answer. Battlefield point-of-injury medical information is valuable in helping to inform Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) decisions. However, point of injury data is difficult to collect due to the constraints of time and distance on the 

battlefield while working to keep wounded Soldiers alive. Arguably, point of injury 

data is not the only source of information for helping DoD in making these important PPE-related decisions. PPE development, fielding, and recall decisions should 

be informed by data collected from all available sources to include point of injury 

data, ballistic testing, research and development and experimentation data, intelligence analysis, operational risk analysis, and modeling and simulation programs. 

Point of injury data provides the developers and managers of PPE with valuable 

information, however, is often insufficient to fully inform PPE decisions. For example, the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) developed a project to provide lightweight 

plate carriers to infantry units operating in the mountains of Afghanistan. The plate 

carriers would lighten the physical load and reduce thermal load on Soldiers as they 

fight an unencumbered enemy at elevations of 6,000 to 8,000 feet. To inform Senior 

Army Leadership decisions, the REF sought point of injury data from Joint Trauma 

Analysis and Prevention of Injury in Combat (JTAPIC) and U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) to help inform the decision for a plate carrier. Specifically, REF requested all gunshot wound data for all US Soldier combat casualties 

in Afghanistan for the year 2008. Data provided included only the gunshot wound 

points of entry for Soldiers killed in action during 2008. While information provided 

tremendous insight to the Army in their equipment selection process, collecting data 

took extensive man-hours and provided a limited data set. Furthermore, the data 

provided did not include the key information requirements of caliber of munitions 

and wounds that caused Soldier mortality. 


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Bridging the gap of information, REF requested extensive ballistic testing 

throughout the decision-making process, including Army standard protocol ballistic 

testing and special follow-on ballistic testing. REF also sought significant intelligence information from the warfighting J2 and the National Ground Intelligence 

Center (NGIC). In addition, REF requested the Army Research Lab’s (ARL) support 

in conducting modeling and simulation to characterize the risk to the Soldier wearing a smaller vest know as the Modular Body Armor Vest (MBAV). ARL modeled 

injury analysis based on NGIC threat information and the characteristics of the 

MBAV. 

Testing and analysis included actual threat ammunition and specialized gel 

frames that simulate human soft tissue and the actual MBAV coverage area. ARL 

conducted additional ballistic testing and extensive modeling to reliably predict both 

the severity and probability of injury to the Soldier based on both the Enhanced 

Small Arms Protective Insert (ESAPI) and soft armor coverage of the Soldier 

against threats the Soldier would likely face in this specific area of operations. The 

ARL data included several thousand gunshots against virtual Soldiers using specifically controlled variables to include muzzle velocity, caliber, point of aim, and 

human vital organ location relative to the edge of the MBAV, to name just a few. 

Again, while point of injury data is valuable in making PPE decisions, it is not as 

complete in comparison to using point of injury data used in conjunction with the 

data collected through ballistic testing, intelligence and modeling and simulation. 

In summary, the REF utilized 2008 JTAPIC gunshot casualty data and additional 

ballistic, intelligence and modeling/simulation data to assist in determining the impact of the reduction in level III a (soft armor) coverage area of the MBAV. Additional gunshot ‘‘wound’’ data would have strengthened the analysis, but it was not 

available. The advantages of the approach used by the REF include: 

(1) Infinite number of data points: ARL was able to simulate 15000 shots in three 

hours; JTAPIC data only included double digit (actual number classified) shots 

throughout 2008. 

(2) Wide Range of threat: Using AMSAA data, ARL was able to conduct analysis 

simulating fragmentation (grenade), Assault Rifle (AK–47), Machineguns (PKM) and 

sniper weapons. JTAPIC casualty data did not identify threat weapon or caliber of 

threat round 

(3) Experimental Control: Variables can be isolated; confidence in results can be 

increased through repetition; and results can be more precisely documented. 

Additional potential improvements that should be considered: Although the modeling data provided greatly informed the decisions by Army Leadership, both ARL 

and Natick Soldier Research Development and Engineer Center have identified a 

shortcoming with the existing Soldier performance models. The models do not take 

into account the degradation and optimization of Soldier performance based on load 

or other enhanced capabilities relative to the risks of threats. A modeling tool that 

incorporates the threat modeling with soldier performance modeling would best 

show tradeoffs in protection and Soldier performance. 

Also, the medical and intelligence communities would benefit from new tools that 

assist care providers in quickly collecting vital information about Soldier wounds. 

Medical professionals must quickly triage, stabilize, treat and evacuate our wounded 

Soldiers in combat. The tools available to medical professionals today lack sufficient 

capability to clearly and quickly collect detailed point of injury data. Such tools that 

help medical care providers quickly characterize our Soldiers’ wounds would be invaluable in informing PPE decisions in the future. NGIC recently approached the 

REF with the concept of a tool that can assist first responders with the capability 

to collect wound data and associated threat data at the point of injury. This tool, 

if developed, could potentially allow more complete battlefield point-of-injury medical information collection that will not interfere with care provided to the injured 

Soldier. 

Marine Corps Answer. Data on the effectiveness of body armor against a particular threat or set of threats is analyzed extensively before body armor is procured 

and fielded. Additionally, it is tested continuously as part of the acquisition process. 

If that test and evaluation did not happen then we would run a very probable risk 

of fielding body armor without truly understanding what capability we are or are 

not providing to our Marines, regardless of its weight. Additionally, when equipment 

such as body armor is fielded, we routinely conduct user surveys and follow-up evaluations to ensure that equipment is meeting mission requirements. 

DATA COLLECTION AT POINT OF INJURY

Question. Limited medical intelligence on the effectiveness of enemy weapons is 

being gathered because of the lack of data collection. U.S. forces are unable to detect 


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minor changes to enemy weapons and tactics, they can only respond to major 

changes in hospitalization trends—which means a missed opportunity to prevent the 

injury. 

What data are currently being collected to determine what body armor would benefit a soldier in a specific AOR or theater? 

Army Answer. Data is being collected from numerous disparate sources: the Army 

Joint Theater Trauma Registry and the Navy Trauma Registry collect extensive 

medical data on wounded in action service members and tracks combat injury patterns, general wound trends, treatments and outcomes. The Office of the Armed 

Forces Medical Examiner (OAFME) collects medical injury data, to include full-body 

CT scans on every returning killed in action service member and has received over 

900 pieces of personal protective equipment (PPE). PEO-Soldier analyzes PPE received by the OAFME and has implemented PPE collection teams in Iraq to collect 

body armor from wounded-inaction personnel. The data collected includes the PPE 

and the available operational and intelligence data surrounding the event. The 

Army National Ground Intelligence Center tracks operational and intelligence data 

that surrounds fatal and/or wounding incidents. The Army Research Laboratory 

analyzes selected injury-producing fragments to identify new or unique characteristics. 

The Joint Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury in Combat program combines the analysis of operational/intelligence, material performance (PPE and vehicular), and medical outcome data from combat incidents and integrates the data into 

actionable information. Equipment Analysis characterizes damage to the PPE from 

the wounding incident and drives requirements and design decisions and to develop 

biomedical standards. Threat and Operational Analyses look at weapon and material performance, threat trends, and incident lessons learned. Medical injury and 

outcome analysis lead to evidence-based changes in clinical practice and treatment. 

Actionable information derived from these analyses have lead to direct feedback to 

combatant commanders to alter tactics, techniques, and procedures; confirmed the 

presence of weapons of interest; and guided program managers as they make equipment and vehicle modifications and upgrade decisions. 

Marine Corps Answer. No specific data collection is underway at this time. The 

Marine Corps has three principal means to collect data and/or identify operational 

deficiencies. The first is through the Urgent Needs Process, whereby Marine units 

can identify deficiencies utilizing and Urgent Universal Need Statement (UUNS). 

The value of the UUNS is that it is submitted via the chain of command so that 

everyone can rapidly be informed of the deficiency and can take immediate steps 

to validate it and correct it. The second is through ongoing collection efforts at the 

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL). MCCLL archives all collected 

information, analyzes it, creates and distributes reports throughout the Marine 

Corps. These reports often provide the basis for making equipment decisions. Thirdly, individual Marines may submit suggestions and recommendations or identify deficiencies, via Email, telephone or mail, to the Marine Enhancement Program 

(MEP). The MEP serves to rapidly address requirements, particularly in infantry 

units. 

PREVENTATIVE CARE AND OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS

Question. The military departments have been focusing on identifying and mitigating health risks associated with heavy combat loads, through preventive and protective measures associated with deployments. 

What specific preventative measures are being taken? 

Army Answer. In general, carrying excessive loads may cause injuries or pain to 

the spine, lower extremities, and shoulders. Proper strengthening, conditioning, and 

training can help mitigate the risks associated with heavy combat loads. Many units 

use physical therapists to assist them in injury surveillance, data collection and injury prevention, as well as developing performance enhancement programs. The 

Ranger Regiment, Special Forces and several brigade combat teams (BCTs) have 

programs that emphasize core strengthening, muscle power, speed, and agility drills 

which not only strengthen the muscles that protect the spine, lower and upper extremities, but also improve the physiological responses to exercise. The Center for 

Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) worked with the Army Physical Fitness School from 2001–2005 to develop, improve, and test the new Army 

Physical Fitness doctrine called Physical Readiness Training (PRT). They evaluated 

the PRT concept for its injury reduction potential at Individual Entry Training, Advanced Individual Training and operational Army infantry training (Fort Polk, 4th 

Bde of the 10th Mountain (MTN) Div). The program for 10th MTN involved PRT 

exercises, core strengthening, a decrease in running to three days a week or less 


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and aggressive strength training in multiple planes using pull-up bars, dip bars, etc. 

This resulted in a 20% reduction in overuse injury rates. The Rangers also used a 

performance enhancement program and had similar results. BCTs use their physical 

therapists to develop performance enhancement programs that reduce injury rates 

and improve overall fitness. 

Marine Corps Answer. To prevent musculoskeletal injuries, Marines remain fit 

through the conduct of rigorous missions under demanding operational conditions, 

augmented by the continuous unit and individual physical fitness training which is 

a vital element of our Marine Corps regimen. Appropriate Operational Risk Management (ORM) procedures have been established to assess and mitigate risk with 

physical training while deployed. 

Question. How do you sustain the programs that have been created to ensure a 

healthy force? 

Army Answer. The Army Physical Fitness School at Fort Jackson, in collaboration 

with the Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM), researched our physical fitness doctrine and found our current model that emphasizes 

aerobic and muscular endurance does not correlate well with the physical fitness requirements of current combat operations. To fill this gap, the Physical Fitness 

School designed a new doctrine called Army Physical Readiness Training (Field 

Manual 3–22.20) that aligns with our current operations and training doctrine. 

Army Physical Readiness Training focuses on improving Soldiers’ aerobic endurance, muscular strength, muscular endurance (anaerobic endurance), power, and 

movement proficiency (incorporates balance, flexibility, coordination, speed and agility) which physically prepares Soldiers and units to conduct full spectrum operations. In addition, physical therapists assigned to the brigade combat teams, Special Operations units, and Initial Entry Training, serve as subject matter experts 

in injury prevention and performance enhancement. In this role, they assist unit 

leaders in developing programs that, in addition to traditional aerobic exercise, also 

emphasize core strengthening, muscle power, and speed and agility drills. Physical 

therapists also spend significant time educating the leadership on proper training 

techniques, conducting injury surveillance and reporting the trends back to the leadership who then modify the training based on the injury data. There are multiple 

injury prevention and performance enhancement programs across the Army, run by 

unit leaders with the advice and assistance of physical therapists. Proper injury surveillance, injury prevention and performance enhancement necessitates a concerted 

effort between the unit leadership, physical therapists, other medical personnel, 

CHPPM personnel, clinical researchers, and other Army proponents such as the 

Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. This requires an investment in research 

protocols that help identify best practices and assist in standardizing these programs across the Army. 

Marine Corps Answer. Effective sustainment is accomplished by adequately 

resourcing and managing programs. Periodic program review and inspection are 

other program quality controls. 

Question. How have changes in the school house been implemented based on injuries sustained during deployments? 

Army Answer. Lessons learned from current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 

and research conducted by the United States Army Center for Health Promotion 

and Prevention Medicine (USACHPPM), the Army Physical Fitness Research Institute (APFRI), and the U.S. Army Physical Fitness School (USAPFS) have resulted 

in significant changes in physical readiness training in the Institutional Army 

(school house). The training base has placed greater emphasis on physical conditioning to prepare our Soldiers for the rigorous demands of combat. These changes 

are most evident in Initial Military Training—Basic Combat Training, One Station 

Unit Training, Advanced Individual Training, and the Basic Officer Leadership 

Course. A key difference is placing less emphasis on the Army Physical Fitness Test 

and greater emphasis on physical conditioning and readiness. In basic combat training, Soldiers wear body armor, helmets, and carry their weapons to a much greater 

extent. Soldiers do more marching with rucksacks and other loads. The physical 

readiness program places greater emphasis on nutrition and lessons learned from 

sports medicine on how to avoid injury. Drill Sergeants and other IMT Cadre have 

modified their physical conditioning programs to account for the overall lower physical fitness of the teenage population volunteering to serve. They have changed fitness readiness training with a number of initiatives including a program called 

‘‘Four for the Core’’ which focuses on the core muscles groups as they are actually 

used in the Army. Strengthening these core muscle groups helps to reduce injuries. 

Additionally, Drill Sergeants and other Cadre train proper lifting and loading techniques. The Army is staffing a new manual—FM 3–22.20 Army Physical Readiness 

Training. The new manual—based on the best practices of physical fitness training 


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and sports medicine includes greater emphasis on all the components—muscular 

strength, muscular endurance, aerobic endurance, anaerobic endurance, and mobility. 

In our officer and noncommissioned officer courses, the Army is educating its leaders how to plan and conduct physical readiness training, teach nutrition, and train 

Soldiers to be ‘‘Tactical Athletes,’’ who are prepared for the rigorous physical demands of combat. Officers and noncommissioned officers learn that improved physical fitness can lessen the chance of injury but there are physical limits to how much 

weight a Soldier can safely carry. Junior leaders learn how to plan patrols and other 

operations to limit the loads placed on their Soldiers. They further learn the importance of supervision and pre-combat inspections to prevent Soldiers from adding unnecessary weight to their loads. 

Marine Corps Answer. A comprehensive review of USMC fitness programs began 

in Nov 2006. Key outputs of this review resulted in the following changes to Physical Training (PT) programs in Entry Level Training (ELT) and in guidelines for 

commanders in designing unit PT programs: Greater emphasis on anaerobic (short 

burst) capacity, de-emphasis of long distance running, increase in body movement 

skills (agility) and increase in progressive load bearing capacity. These changes are 

reflected in PT application, testing, and also in education of Marine leaders in the 

Training and Education continuum. Nutrition education begins in boot camp conducted by Semper Fit and continues in the T&E continuum as well. 

Question. How have physical fitness tests been updated to reflect the current conflicts ‘‘lessons learned’’? 

Army Answer. The lessons learned from the operational environment have been 

applied to physical fitness training. Army training policy states, ‘‘Commanders will 

conduct physical training programs that enhance Soldiers’ abilities to complete Soldier or leader tasks that support the unit’s Mission Essential Task List . . . .’’ This 

focus ensures that Soldiers can accomplish their assigned tasks in combat versus 

pass a physical fitness test. 

Lessons learned from the current operating environments in Iraq and Afghanistan 

led to a thorough review of physical fitness training and testing. This caused a shift 

from physical fitness training and testing to physical readiness training and assessment in support of full spectrum operations that we are conducting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, commanders have increased emphasis on total body muscular strength, flexibility, and anaerobic training to increase operational effectiveness and reduce the risk of injury associated with load carriage. 

Marine Corps Answer. In May 2008, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) 

approved the Combat Fitness Test (CFT) which was implemented in Oct 2008. It 

is designed to be a complement to the USMC semi-annual Physical Fitness Test 

(PFT) which includes a 3 mile run, abdominal crunches and pull-ups for males/ 

flexed arm hang for females. CFT events are: Movement to Contact (880 yd run), 

Ammo Lift (repetitive overhead lift of a 30 lb ammo can for two minutes), and Maneuver Under Fire. The last event is a 300 yd shuttle run which includes sprints, 

numerous changes of direction, a fireman’s carry, buddy drag, ammo can carries and 

a simulated grenade throw. The CFT has helped shape USMC fitness programs, 

which will serve to enhance combat-related conditioning. 

AIRDROP LOGISTICS SYSTEMS

Question. Soldiers and Marines on field operation must either carry their supplies 

with them or receive periodic resupply in the field. The Committee is aware that 

due to Afghanistan’s rugged terrain and lack of infrastructure the Army frequently 

uses parachutes to resupply units in the field. Such airdrops use a variety of equipment and tactics to accomplish the resupply mission. 

What are the factors that influence the decision to resupply a unit by airdrop? 

Army Answer. Airdrop is a field service that can provide additional flexibility to 

commanders. It makes it possible to support ground operations that would otherwise 

be logistically infeasible. Airdrop enables forces to rapidly resupply critical items 

over extended distances directly to or near forward units when ground resupply is 

otherwise impractical or cost/risk prohibitive. 

Airdrop is often militarily advantageous because it permits sustainment deliveries 

to units operating away from airfields and landing zones or in remote, difficult to 

access terrain. Airdrop also permits sustainment deliveries to units operating in 

hostile territory where ground sustainment convoys become a combat power intensive operation in their own right. Airdrop also allows the timely delivery of combat 

forces and materiel, concentrated and in mass, in minimum space and time (often 

with the element of surprise). Finally, some airlift aircraft can accurately airdrop 


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personnel and materiel in conditions of poor visibility that would otherwise preclude 

air/land operations (e.g., using the adverse weather aerial delivery system). 

Marine Corps Answer. The factors influencing decisions to resupply a unit by airdrop are: 

1. Urgency. How fast does the unit need to be resupplied? 

2. The distance between the unit needing resupply and the resupplying base. 

3. Surrounding terrain. 

4. Air and ground threats to aircraft. 

5. Rigging time of gear and equipment. 

6. Availability of parachute riggers. 

7. Aircraft availability. 

Question. How many airdrop resupply operations occur on average in a month in 

Afghanistan? 

Army Answer. On average, there are approximately 40 resupply operations during 

the winter months and 50 resupply operations during the summer months. There 

are more during the summer months because there are more operational missions 

during the summer. 

Marine Corps Answer. On average, resupply air drops occur 40 times during winter months and 50 times during summer months in Afghanistan. Quantity difference is attributed to higher operational tempo in the summer months. 

Question. What is the tonnage of supplies delivered by airdrop in a typical month 

in Afghanistan? 

Army Answer. In Afghanistan, we currently average 366 tons of supplies delivered 

via airdrop per month. 

Marine Corps Answer. The typical monthly tonnage of supplies delivered by airdrop averages 366. 

Question. Please describe for the Committee the type of airdrops that are used, 

such as high altitude vs. low altitude, and the advantages and disadvantages of 

each. 

Army Answer. During typical high altitude airdrop missions using fixed wing aircraft, we drop supplies from between 1500′–3000′ above ground level (AGL). We can 

drop supplies from as high as 6000′ AGL. We base the use of high altitude airdrops 

mostly on terrain and/or threat level. For low altitude airdrops, we can use Low 

Cost Low Altitude parachute systems during which supplies are dropped from 150′– 

200′ AGL. 

High velocity (HV) parachutes are smaller in diameter and descend at a faster 

rate. We use HV parachutes to target small drop zones (DZ). We use HV parachutes 

on an average of six missions a month to deliver durable commodities such as water 

and MREs. For example, two DZs are only accessible through the use of HV parachutes because they are so small in size (one has a 300 yard radius; the second 

measures 380 yards × 110 yards). HV parachutes provide the ability to strike small 

areas with greater accuracy, but HV parachutes tend to ‘‘steal’’ air causing a few 

not to inflate thus destroying the load or just landing hard. A 10% loss using this 

method is considered an acceptable loss. 

Low velocity (LV) parachutes are larger and descend at a slower rate. We use the 

LV parachute most often. LV parachutes provide greater survivability of loads. A 

disadvantage of using LV parachutes is they are a less precise method of delivery; 

strong winds can cause the parachute to overshoot the DZ making it impossible to 

recover either parachute or load. 

Marine Corps Answer. Aerial Delivery Specialists speak in terms of high velocity 

(HV) versus low velocity (LV) air drops. 

Conventional high velocity (HV) parachute air drops are conducted at altitudes of 

1,500–3,000 ft above ground level (AGL). High velocity (HV) parachute air drops are 

conducted an average of six times per month. High velocity (HV) parachutes are primarily used with durable cargo. 

Advantage: 

Conventional high velocity (HV) parachute air drops are more accurate compared 

to conventional low velocity (LV) air drops. 

Disadvantage: 

It’s possible that 30% of the cargo being air dropped will be damaged. 

Conventional low velocity (LV) parachute air drops are conducted at altitudes of 

150–1,250 ft above ground level (AGL). Low velocity (LV) air drops are preferred 

for precious cargo. 

Advantage: 

The survivability of cargo being air dropped is higher compared to high velocity 

(HV) air drops. 

Disadvantage: 


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It’s possible that 10% of the cargo being air dropped will be damaged. 

Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) air drops are conducted at altitudes of 

4,000–24,500 ft mean sea level (MSL). The current Joint Precision Air Drop System 

(JPADS) being utilized in Afghanistan is the Joint Precision Air Drop System 

(JPADS) 2K Screamer, a system fielded through rapid acquisition. However, the 

Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) 2K Firefly is the system of record and is 

currently being fielded throughout the Department of Defense (DoD), and will replace the Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) 2K Screamer and Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) 2K Sherpa. 

Advantages: 

It allows the aircraft to stand off at a greater distance, minimizing ground 

threats. 

The aircraft stand-off will also enable clandestine resupply of reconnaissance 

forces without giving away their positions. 

Increased survivability of load. 

The Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) allows multiple loads to be dropped 

from the same aircraft on one pass with different drop zones programmed into the 

Airborne Guidance Unit (AGU). 

Increased accuracy of desired point of impact. 

Disadvantages: 

Cost of system compared to conventional parachute systems. 

The Airborne Guidance Unit (AGU) will need to be recovered. 

Question. What types of parachutes are available for airdrop logistics missions? 

Are they precision or non-precision parachutes? 

Army Answer. We use five different types of non-precision parachutes in Afghanistan. Three Low Velocity (G–11, G–12, Low Cost Low Velocity) and two High Velocity (Low Cost High Velocity, 26 foot High Velocity). The Firefly is the only precision 

parachute currently used in Afghanistan. 

Marine Corps Answer. 

Non-Precision Parachute Systems (Conventional Parachutes): 

1. G–11B 

2. G–12E 

3. G–14 

4. A family of Low Cost Air Delivery System (LCADS), Low Cost Low Velocity 

(LCLV) and Low Cost High Velocity (LCHV) parachute systems. 

5. 26 Ft high velocity (HV) 

Precision Parachute Systems: 

1. JPADS 2K Firefly 

2. JPADS 2K Screamer (current system being utilized in Afghanistan) 

Question. Are the parachutes recovered after use? 

Army Answer. The Low Cost Low Altitude parachutes are not recovered after use. 

The receiving unit disposes of them. Less than 1% of the parachutes returned are 

reusable. 

Marine Corps Answer. 

Parachutes are normally recovered; however, recovery can be waived by units, depending on the tactical situation. 

The Joint Precision Air Drop System Airborne Guidance Unit (JPADS AGU) will 

need to be recovered. 

Question. Are any airdrop operations accomplished by contractor support? 

Army Answer. Contractors do not build or inspect the loads. Product Manager 

Force Sustainment Systems’ Forward Service Representative (FSR) at Bagram Airfield, provides technical support (maintenance, packing, software updates to the 

GPS system, etc.) to the 95 Firefly parachutes. Blackwater Aviation pilots fly the 

CASA 212/235 aircraft from which military personnel drop loads using Low Cost 

Low Altitude parachutes. Only military personnel are responsible for pushing the 

load out of the aircraft. Blackwater Aviation employees are based out of Bagram 

Airfield. 

Marine Corps Answer. Xe (formerly known as Blackwater Company) conducts a 

large percentage of the Low Cost Low Velocity (LCLV) air drops out of CASA 212 

aircraft. They currently conduct these air drops three days a week, mostly to the 

Army Special Operations Forces. 

Question. What is the cost of the various airdrop parachute systems? 

Answer. Costs vary from $539 to $36,000, as shown following. 

Parachute System Cost 

G–11 ............................................................................................................................................................................. $8,721 

G–12 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 3,769 


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Parachute System Cost 

Low Cost LV .................................................................................................................................................................. 1,680 

Low Cost HV ................................................................................................................................................................. 539 

26ft Ring Slot (High V) ................................................................................................................................................ 911 

Firefly precision parachute ........................................................................................................................................... 36,000 

Marine Corps Answer. 

1. Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) 2K FireFly—$65,000 

2. Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) 2K Screamer—$30,000 

3. G–11B—$8,721 

4. G–12E—$3,769 

5. G–14—$595 

6. 26 Ft High Velocity (HV)—$911 

7. Low Cost Low Velocity (LCLV)—$1,680 

8. Low Cost High Velocity (LCHV)—$539 

MULTIFUNCTION UTILITY/LOGISTICS AND EQUIPMENT VEHICLE

Question. The foot soldier has always carried a substantial load including weapon, 

water, food and shelter. With advances in warfighting technology the soldier’s load 

has added body armor, batteries, mines and platoon equipment. The Army may add 

to the soldier’s load an individual communications device such as Land Warrior, 

micro unmanned air vehicles, various sensors, small robots, and more batteries. Soldiers and Marines that fight on foot are experiencing increasing numbers of stress 

injuries related to the heavy loads they carry. However, one of the 14 systems of 

the Army’s Future Combat Systems is the Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle (MULE). It is essentially a small robotic truck. The ‘‘MULE’’ is being 

developed in three variants: armed, countermine, and transport. 

Please explain for the Committee how the transport variant might somewhat lessen the load for the foot soldier. 

Answer. The MULE–T has the primary mission of supporting dismounted infantry by transporting 1900 lbs, which is the equivalent of two squads of equipment. 

Equally important, the MULE–T provides the commander flexibly to support many 

missions. The MULE–T provides other options or capabilities such as transporting 

other provisions necessary to the mission: ammo, food, water, batteries; short-term 

emergency casualty evacuation; integrated battery recharger; Chemical, Biological, 

Radioactive, Nuclear detection systems; and Ground Mobile Radio, which can provide a communications relay for dismounted operations; and utilization as a resupply vehicle, to send back to supply points. 

The MULE–T is a force multiplier. It reduces potential injuries and eases the 

wear and tear on the Soldier by shouldering much of the Soldier’s basic load. The 

MULE–T will enhance the dismounted Soldiers’ ability to engage the enemy after 

long marches over difficult terrain. 

The MULE–T has demonstrated the mobility to keep pace with the dismounted 

Soldier. The MULE Engineering Evaluation Unit (EEU) has accomplished the following: climbed a Jersey barrier, traversed a 1-meter step, negotiated a 1.8 meter 

gap and achieved speeds of 55kph. This mobility supports the rigors faced by the 

dismounted Soldier, and with a maximum speed of 65kph, the MULE can support 

and keep pace with the mounted force. 

Question. How useful would such a vehicle be in rugged, mountainous terrain as 

encountered in Afghanistan? How useful would such a vehicle be for the type of operations ongoing in Iraq? 

Answer. Based upon the ability to negotiate 60 degree slopes, the Tweel technology and the six-wheel independent articulating suspension, the MULE would be 

very useful in both theaters of operation (Afghanistan and Iraq). The MULE is a 

diverse platform, with three variants: Armed Reconnaissance Vehicle-Assault 

(Light) (ARV–A (L)), MULE–T and MULE-Countermine (MULE–CM). Employment 

in an operational environment (OE) is dependent upon Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, Time Available and Civilians (METT–TC). Tactically, ARV–A (L) can be employed to establish support by fire positions in all OEs, and it can be utilized as 

the first asset to engage enemy combatants with its firepower capabilities, thereby 

forcing the enemy to commit its position, giving friendly forces the ability to maneuver and engage the enemy out of contact. 

The MULE-Transport can be used to carry two dismounted infantry squads’ combat equipment, or provide logistical support to mounted and dismounted forces by 

carrying 1900 lbs of resupply, repair parts, squad equipment, or perform emergency 

Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) to a casualty evacuation point. 


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The MULE–CM, together with Ground Standoff Mine Detection System 

(GSTAMIDS) capability, will support mounted force’s movement through mine detection and neutralization situations. The MULE–CM will have the capability to detect, mark lanes, and neutralize anti-tank mines while mitigating the warfighter’s 

exposure to life-threatening situations by placing an unmanned ground system in 

danger first. 

Question. How is the MULE powered? 

Answer. The MULE is powered by a diesel electric system. This engine, when coupled with the generator, is capable of generating 116KW (mech)/100KW (Elec) 610 

Volt power. Power is generated to articulate each of the six suspension arms independently on the platform. The power also provides 610 Volts DC to power the mission equipment package for the ARV–A (L) and MULE–CM. The 28 Volts DC is provided to run all of the computers and electronic systems. 

Question. Please explain how the autonomous navigation system works. 

Answer. The autonomous navigation system (ANS) has four basic modes of operation: waypoint navigation or route following, leader-follower (vehicle), leader-follower (soldier), and teleoperations. The ANS is a unique combination of hardware 

(sensors), global positioning satellite/inertial navigation system (GPS/INS), and 

navigation software that takes sensor input and derives a safe and efficient path 

for the unmanned platform to travel. 

In the teleoperations mode the ANS provides situational awareness and driver’s 

aids to the operator including obstacle cueing and vehicle orientation. The ANS is 

the primary driving and awareness sensors. The sensors provide capability for daytime, low-light conditions, and infrared sensors for nighttime operations. 

Semi-autonomous operations are handled in several different modes. In the leader-follower (vehicle) mode, the ANS receives position and route information from the 

leader vehicle and commands the MULE to essentially follow the same positions. 

The ANS also provides local awareness and obstacle detection/avoidance in this 

mode, modifying the route as required. 

In the leader-follower (Soldier) mode, the ANS provides the same services, as well 

as maintaining a safe distance from the followed Soldier. 

In the route-following mode, the ANS receives global information from the network. The ANS develops routes and alternative routes, utilizing models to select the 

best route to meet the mobility plan, and then generates a route plan. 

Question. Has the transport MULE demonstrated technology readiness sufficient 

for fielding as part of the early spin out of FCS equipment to light infantry forces? 

Answer. No, the MULE is not ready for fielding under the early spin out. The 

MULE is an integrated platform requiring not only its mobility but the ANS, network communications (radio and waveforms) and the Common Controller with its 

Battle Command Software to control the platform. The MULE–T, as an integrated 

platform with all of the supporting subsystems, is preparing for Integrated Qualification Test (IQT) in May 2011. 

The MULE Early Evaluation Unit has demonstrated the following mobility: 

climbed a Jersey barrier, traversed a 1-meter step, negotiated a 1.8 meter gap and 

achieved speeds of 55kph. The ANS, which provides the critical sensors/software to 

conduct unmanned operations, has demonstrated similar success during the summer 

of 2008 with prototype testing at White Sands Missile Range. The ANS prototype 

platform accomplished speeds of 36 kph with waypoint following with obstacle 

avoidance, 40 kph under leader-follower conditions with obstacle avoidance, and a 

maximum speed of 54 kph with waypoint following but no obstacle avoidance. 

Question. Will the MULE be part of the first FCS equipment spin out? If so, what 

is the distribution plan? 

Answer. No, the MULE is not part of the first FCS spin out effort to the Early 

IBCTs. Currently, the MULE program will conduct a dual Critical Design Review 

(CDR): the MULE–T CDR is scheduled for January 2010, and the ARV–A (L) and 

MULE–CM CDRs will be conducted in May 2010. The MULE–T Individual Qualification Test (IQT) will start May 2011, followed by the ARV–A (L) and MULE–CM 

IQT in November 2011. The MULE is currently scheduled to be fielded as part of 

the Spin Outs to the Threshold IBCTs in 2015. 

RESEARCH IN NEW CARGO CARRYING DEVICES

Question. The Committee understands that the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency is conducting research projects in search of a robotic pack mule. 

One project is referred to by the nickname ‘‘Big Dog.’’ The device is about the size 

of a large dog. It has mechanical legs, and can carry up to 340 lbs. 

Has the Army or Marine Corps participated in the development phase for this or 

a similar program? 


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Army answer. The Tank Automotive Research, Development, Engineering Center 

(TARDEC), as part of the U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command, has executed $2 million since 2003 to develop a perception module for the 

‘‘Big Dog.’’ TARDEC is actively participating in DARPA’s Source Selection Board for 

a follow-on effort to the ‘‘Big Dog.’’ 

Marine Corps answer. The Marine Corps supported the most recent development 

phase of Big Dog through a Memorandum of Agreement between the Marine Corps 

and DARPA with a total Marine Corps investment of $750,000. During this phase, 

the Marine Corps established a military utility assessment of a legged robot carrying a 81mm mortar, bi-pod, base plate, and support equipment (approximately 

200 lbs) at the pace of a walking Marine over a representative cross-compartment 

hiking trail and for five miles on a flat surface. This assessment was completed satisfactorily in August 2008. 

Question. Does the Army or Marine Corps plan to transition this device, or a similar device to a service program to develop a system to move logistics with the soldier, and to take some of the weight out of the soldiers back pack? 

Army answer. The FCS MULE-Transport (approved in the FCS Operational Requirements Document) is currently the Army program which will provide robotic logistics support to the dismounted Soldier with a Milestone C in 2013 and first unit 

equipped slated for 2014, but not all units will be fielded the system. Because the 

FCS MULE effort pursues a mounted formation construct and the Soldier load problem is also associated with dismounted Infantry units not utilizing vehicle support, 

the FCS MULE may not be suitable for all formations. 

The Army and Marine Corps are assessing a variety of unmanned ground vehicles 

to lighten the Warfighter’s load, but outside of the FCS MULE system, there are 

no other currently validated requirements to support the initiation of a Service program. 

The Army and Marines did assess the ‘‘Big Dog’’ and will assess its follow-on 

Legged Squad Support System (LSSS) for military utility and effectiveness through 

a series of Warfighter assessments. Currently, there is no agreement on ‘‘Big Dog’’ 

in place between DARPA and the Army on transition to program of record, acquisition, fielding and sustainment. To entertain transition, the Army would have to endorse a development path that DARPA constructs that would give confidence that 

a reasonable Technical Readiness Level (TRL) could be achieved such that the 

Robotic System Joint Program Office could complete development. ‘‘Big Dog’’ is currently assessed at TRL 6 (System Prototype Demonstration in a relevant environment) and this assessment usually translates to several years required to mature 

to a producible system, if fully funded. Currently, there is no plan to endorse the 

development path. Based on current assessments, the potential for operational employment of ‘‘Big Dog’’ is not viable in the foreseeable future. 

One system currently being assessed that shows promise is the Squad Mission 

Support System (SMSS). A Limited User Test (LUT) is being executed in 1st Quarter, FY10 with a follow on assessment in OEF during 2nd Quarter, FY10. The 

SMSS Technology Readiness Level (TRL) is 7/8 and targets the immediate problem 

of robotic soldier load solution integration. The Capabilities Production Document 

(CPD) will provide a full and open competition solution within three years. The Subsequent Product Improvement Program will reflect lessons learned. 

Marine Corps answer. There is currently no plan to transition the Big Dog or any 

similar legged robot to a service program of record. The technology still requires 

considerable refinement before it has operational utility. In view of the technological 

immaturity, DARPA has developed a proposed follow-on project called the Legged 

Squad Support System (LS3) which would build on the technical advancements 

made during the Big Dog program. Should this program be approved, the Marine 

Corps Warfighting Laboratory has expressed the intent to continue involvement in 

the development and assessment of the military utility of such technology in reducing the load of dismounted Marines and in logistically supporting infantry units. 

Question. What would be the desirable characteristics of a small mechanical device to assist the dismounted soldier or Marine in carrying essential gear? 

Army answer. The following are the desirable characteristics of a small mechanical device to assist the dismounted Soldier or Marine in carrying essential gear: 

—follow dismounted operator semi-autonomously (follow a designated soldier’s 

path) 

—200 meters line of sight (Threshold); 1000 meters line of sight (Objective) 

—1.8 miles per hour steady march 

—15 miles per hour burst speed for 200 meters 

—capable of autonomous navigation to preprogrammed waypoints on command; 

high mobility, agility and dexterity; laterally traverse—30% slope; climb/descend— 

60% slope 


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—ability to avoid same obstacles as a Soldier 

—sustainable/maintainable 

—maintain operational readiness rate of 92% 

—meantime between system abort—110 hours 

—meantime between essential function failure—37 hours 

—meantime to repair—not to exceed 30 minutes; 

—maximum time to repair—10.5 hours 

—place into operations within 7 minutes with no special tools; 700 lbs (Threshold); 1300 lbs (Objective) payloads 

—low noise signature—operate at a noise level that will not compromise the location of a squad 

—Endurance—24 hours (Threshold); 72 hours (Objective) using standard military 

batteries 

—transportable/deployable—deployable by air, sea, and rail; capable to be 

airdropped 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command began formal staffing of the capabilities document for the Squad Multipurpose Equipment Transport at the end of April 

2009, focusing on leader/follower and some semiautonomous movement (threshold 

payload—700 lbs) to lighten Soldier load. The objective is approval of the capabilities document no later than 1st Quarter, FY10 with a projected date for Initial Operating Capability of 3rd Quarter FY12. 

Marine Corps answer. There is currently no comprehensive Marine Corps list of 

key performance parameters for mechanical devices. However, several ‘‘mechanical 

device’’ approaches may have utility in assisting the dismounted Marine in carrying 

essential gear: (1) exoskeleton to assist the individual’s innate strength and endurance, and (2) a robotic ground vehicle. For the first approach to be feasible would 

require that the system provide load bearing capability for a representative militarily useful period of use (2 to 4 hours) across a variety of terrain at a pace at least 

equal to dismounted forces, using on-board power. For a vehicle to be useful, it 

would have to carry a minimum of 450 pounds, be capable of keeping up with and 

following in trace of dismounted forces in typical cross country terrain, and have the 

capability of conducting a typical 24-hour profile with on-board power or fuel. Ideally, a robotic ground vehicle would also be capable of ‘‘supervised autonomy’’ following a designated Marine at an assigned distance, following a roadway or trail, 

following GPS waypoints, and be capable of obstacle avoidance. Both technology approaches must be capable of operation with minimal sound signature and be maintained and supported by infantry Marines with minimal training and without detracting from their tactical responsibilities. Because of ongoing experimentation, the 

Marine Corps is not prepared to formalize the list of requirements or establish key 

performance parameters at this time. 

Question. What are the obstacles facing current efforts to field a mechanical mule? 

Army answer. The biggest issues facing a mechanical MULE are balancing a solution to various performance requirements for both Army and Marine Corps units 

and unit types that provide military utility for a MULE. These range from as simple 

as vehicle size (i.e. does it support a team, Squad, platoon, Airborne, Air Assault?); 

mobility requirements (i.e. should it support only dismounted Soldiers, should it 

support both mounted and dismounted, what are the terrain profiles it has to navigate?); technical supporting requirements (i.e. what level of autonomy/control should 

it have, what level of anti-tamper should be built into the system, what are its 

maintenance and repair requirements, should it be air droppable?). Each of these 

requirements can drive a drastically different material solution impacting both technical and cost risks. The Army is developing a common MULE chassis that will be 

used to support the Soldier logistics of two squads, mine detection, and unmanned 

armed reconnaissance. These UGVs are designed to support Soldiers in a following 

mode both when they’re mounted and dismounted. 

Marine Corps answer. The Marine Corps has not developed a specific requirement 

for a ground vehicle—a ‘‘mechanical mule’’—to logistically support or lighten the 

load of dismounted Marines. Further study to define the key performance parameters needed for such a capability is necessary before the Marine Corps can determine if this approach is supportable, affordable, and the best solution to the identified problem. 

Question. Are there any other technologies or devices that the Services are looking 

into as well? 

Army answer. The Army is pursuing multiple technologies that would enable the 

Soldier to carry greater loads. The technologies fall into two categories, (a) Soldier 

borne load carrying technologies and (b) autonomous unmanned ground vehicles 

(UGV) technology similar to the robotic pack mule. 


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The Natick Soldier Research Development Engineering Center (NSRDEC) is pursuing two technologies to enhance a Soldier’s ability to carry heavy loads in the future. The eXOSkeleton (XOS) for logistic support project is a powered, full body 

wearable robot for human performance augmentation. XOS is expected to assist Soldiers by augmenting manual handling/materials handling capacities up to 200 

pounds (lbs). NSRDEC’s Enhanced Load Carriage for the Lower Body effort is focused on the development of a simple lightweight, low-power, wearable leg brace 

type device to increase Soldiers’ load carrying capacity to 150 lbs with reduced biomechanical stress to the user. 

The Army is also developing the Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment 

(MULE) Vehicle, a 2.5-ton Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) that will carry 1,900– 

2,400 pounds of equipment and rucksacks for dismounted infantry squads. 

Additionally, there are a number of smaller eXperimental Unmanned Ground Vehicle (XUGV) efforts that Army Science and Technology (S&T) uses as test beds for 

the purpose of developing and maturing technologies for unmanned ground vehicles. 

Technologies under development and/or maturation include safe operations (detect/ 

track moving objects), obstacle avoidance, and platform control ranging from teleoperation to semi-autonomous (platform autonomy with Soldier-in-the-loop). 

Marine Corps answer. The Marine Corps has been observing Army experimentation using robotic ground vehicles at Fort Benning and the robotic vehicle being 

explored by the US Special Operations Command sponsored Combat Autonomous 

Mobility System (CAMS) Joint Concept Technology Demonstration. In addition, the 

Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory is exploring the utility of both autonomous 

ground and air systems for sustaining dismounted forces in planned experiments 

during July–August 2009 and has solicited industry response to a Request For Proposal for current unmanned air delivery systems capable of demonstrating tactical 

utility as early as this summer. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 2009. 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS READINESS 

WITNESSES 

GENERAL PETER W. CHIARELLI, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED 

STATES ARMY 

GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE 

CORPS 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. This afternoon’s hearing is on the readiness of the 

Army and the Marine Corps. 

I am going to put my whole statement that the staff prepared in 

the record, but the meat of it is that only 8 percent of the Army 

is C–2 or better. Only 50 percent of the Marine Corps is C–2 or 

better, and we know that is substantially lower than it was just a 

few years ago. So our problem is, what do we have to do in order 

to help you fix that problem. 

I know you are under orders from the White House. You can only 

talk about certain things; you don’t know exactly what the White 

House is going to propose. But we have been working on this subcommittee for years, putting reset money in, putting all kinds of 

things in the budget which we think are so important to the troops 

out in the field. 

And there is a very small percentage of people who are actually 

doing the fighting and very small percentage of families that are 

actually involved. And we know how hard it is on them. We want 

to help alleviate that as much as we can. 

I know you are going to present us a better picture than we see. 

But when I was in the field at Fort Carson, I haven’t seen as many 

complaints as I heard since 1974. And I talked to 12 people at Parris Island in 1974; I talked to 12 people at Fort Carson just a few 

weeks ago. So as I have said over and over again, our intelligence 

hadn’t predicted anything, so none of us know. But if we continue 

to stress guerilla warfare and wear our troops down, if some other 

contingency happens, we are not going to have what we need in 

order to meet that contingency. 

So we appreciate your coming before the committee; we appreciate your dedication. And you inherited a very difficult job, both 

of you. And so I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

But we have a motion from Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the 

hearing today which involve classified material be held in executive 

session because of the classification of the material to be discussed. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young, comments? 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comments that you 

made. And I think it might be helpful to the committee if we had 


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some examples of why the C–2 level, C–3 level, what actually 

causes degradation of the standing, because sometimes I understand they are not really that big a deal, but maybe they are. 

So I think it would be helpful for us to know that. 

Mr. MURTHA. General Chiarelli. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHIARELLI

General CHIARELLI. Well, sir, as you know, we have and we are 

moving to a readiness system that will take us in two directions. 

One is, we will give you our rating on what our core mission is— 

that mission for which the unit was designed, as opposed to our deployment mission; that mission which the unit is about ready to 

embark on. 

Because of the demand on the force, a majority of our forces are, 

in fact, training to and equipping to that mission they are going to 

deploy on, which is much different than that mission which they 

were designed for. And I think when you see those low C–2 numbers in the Army—in fact, I know when you see those low C–2 

numbers—that is for core mission rather than the mission they are 

about to deploy on. 

And we deploy differently for that deployment mission with 

much of the equipment that you pick up when you deploy, what we 

call TPE, theater-provided equipment, that you fall in on when you 

arrive. 

A good example would be MRAP. We have only 25 MRAPs back 

in the States today that we are training on. We are bringing back 

another 26. We have one full motion simulation training at Camp 

Shelby, and we will have another 13 fielded by October of this year. 

So the training on MRAP right now, for the most part, has to take 

place downrange, a conscious decision that we made. 

Why? We made it because we felt it was more important to put 

soldiers going into harm’s way in MRAPs rather than bring them 

back and be part of the training base. 

So I think the C numbers you are seeing are because we, with 

the demand on the force, with only having 1 year deployed, 1.3 

months back at home, units are neither equipping nor training for 

their C mission; they are training for that mission they are about 

ready to deploy on, which is different than that C-rating you read. 

[The statement of General Chiarelli follows:] 


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Mr. MURTHA. General Amos. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL AMOS

General AMOS. Sir, we have exactly the same system. 

The C-ratings, of course, are a function of training and personnel 

and equipment. As we talked before the hearing, we ended up with 

people that are being pulled out of, and equipment being pulled out 

of, units back in the rear, moving forward. So all our forward deployed units, and I have got the numbers here, are—94 percent of 

our units that are forward deployed are what you would call C–1 

or C–2. 

But for that specific mission that they have overseas, we have in 

Afghanistan a couple of units that are not C–1 or C–2, and it is 

just simply a function of, they don’t have enough manpower. A couple of battalion, logistics battalion in Afghanistan, it is not C–1 and 

C–2, but we are fleshing that out with the advent of the forces or 

the influx of the forces coming up. 

But what you really have is, you have the sorts of this C-rating 

which is the design mission of that unit. And we have, for instance, 

two artillery battalions right now in Iraq, one doing civil/military 

ops, the other doing security force operations securing the bases, 

and they are not doing anything with regard to artillery. They are 

C–1 and C–2 for the mission assigned in Iraq, but they are C–3 

and C–4 for their assigned mission, which is their constant, everyday wartime mission. 

So we have the same situation, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement of General Amos follows:] 


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REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. Well, we want to help you. When Bill Young was 

the chairman we put a lot of money—and how much did we put 

in there, Bill? We put $40 billion or $50 billion in—do you remember—for reset and so forth over the last few years. 

But we need some help. You get all kinds of rumors, which systems are the most important. But we need you to tell us so we can 

negotiate with the Defense Department about what we need to do. 

And we are going to have a supplemental here; we don’t have the 

exact schedule, but it has to be done before May or June, or the 

Army will have a real difficult time. We want to make sure we do 

the right thing in the supplemental in order to increase readiness 

not only for the core mission or not only for the mission that you 

have in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also for the core mission, which 

is some contingency that happens down the road. 

But I appreciate what you are going through. And we talked before this hearing started. I have a great concern about getting back 

to where we should be with the forces, and you need to give us a 

little bit of an idea. 

What I would suggest you do—and I suggested this before the 

meeting started—you need to go out and look at what I have just 

looked at. You need to talk to the troops in the field and see what 

they say. You need to hear about this equipment and so forth, not 

just telling me that, Well, everybody says the same thing; they 

complain a lot. 

We know that. I have heard it before. I heard it in 1974 and 

1975, and we got rid of thousands and thousands of people. It was 

an indication that there was a problem. 

I am saying, there is an indication that there is a problem right 

now, and we need to look at it. Whether it is inadequate recruiting, 

whether it is people being recruited, whether there are too many 

waivers, I don’t know what the hell it is. 

But we want to help you, and we can’t help you if you don’t really give us the details of what you suggest we need to do. 

Mr. Young. 

RESET ISSUES

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have any further opening 

statement, but I do have some questions. I would like to get into 

the issue of reset. 

This committee has dealt with reset issues quickly and effectively once we were made aware of the need, and I would like to 

hear from you what the reset requirements are today and what you 

expect they might be in the future. 

Also, I have a concern about what equipment—when we leave 

Iraq, what equipment will we bring back from Iraq, if any? Will we 

be sending any of that equipment to Afghanistan or just what happens there? And what kind of a reset issue will we be considering 

for you when all this happens? 

General CHIARELLI. I can’t give you a dollar figure on reset because, as you know, we are in the middle of putting together the 

budget—or other people are putting together the budget. And I am 


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in a position right now, I can tell you, that we are going to need 

to reset. And reset is absolutely critical. 

The problem we are having today is the amount of time we have 

back home to both reset equipment and reset personnel. As I was 

explaining to the chairman earlier this afternoon, we are currently 

1 year deployed, 1.3 years back at home. We are just over 1 year, 

almost a 1-to-1, with some units 1.3 being the average. So that 

puts a pressure on not only resetting people, but resetting equipment. 

We are moving a lot of our theater-provided equipment from Iraq 

into sets that are available for forces going into Afghanistan. As 

you know, our numbers aren’t as great in Afghanistan today, nor 

will they be based on current plans, than they are in Iraq right 

now. But we are freeing up some sets and beginning to set the theater for additional Army forces that are flowing into Afghanistan. 

So some of that theater-provided equipment will move over to Afghanistan. 

AFGHANISTAN

Mr. YOUNG. So what about Marine Corps equipment, bringing 

back home or sending to Afghanistan? 

General AMOS. Sir, right now we have got a little over 45,000, 

what we call principal end items in Iraq. And our schedule for 

drawing down in Iraq is over the next 12 months. There is an effort—we just stood up kind of a blue ribbon team in to join the 

staff in Iraq, in the Anbar Province for General Tryon, to help him 

develop the plan for the retrograde over the next 12 months. So we 

are going to have to start pulling some of that equipment out. 

We are at eight or nine battalions of Marines 3 or 4 years ago. 

By May, we will be down to three infantry battalions, an LAR battalion and a security battalion. So a lot of that equipment is still 

in Iraq. There is a natural reluctance by the commanders on the 

ground to say, ‘‘Well, I just might need that, you know.’’ I don’t 

want to be the commander that says, you know, I sent it home and 

now I need it. 

But those are days that have gone; the commander on the 

ground now understands that. So we are retrograding that stuff 

out over the next 12 months. 

There is going to be—I asked the question, ‘‘How much of that 

is going to find its way over to Afghanistan?’’ And roughly 15 percent—excuse me, roughly 13 percent of the equipment in Iraq right 

now is going to migrate over to Afghanistan. And this is stuff that 

is quality. I don’t want you to think we are taking it from the junkyard in Iraq and we are going to send it to Afghanistan; this is 

stuff in what we would call class A condition. In other words, it is 

ready to go. 

Some of it is what we would call forward in stores equipment, 

equipment that has been sitting there. So an up-armored Humvee 

or an MRAP, in case one gets blown up, now I don’t have to order 

one, I just pull it off the lot. That is the kind of stuff that is going 

to find its way into Afghanistan. 

So we have got a plan to get the stuff out of Iraq over the next 

12 months. And that is going to be very difficult because we are 

all going to be in competition for the same highways, the same 


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heavy equipment transport, the same airports, the same ship 

berths down at Kuwait, the same wash-down racks. So all this like 

a great ballet. 

We are going have to start getting that stuff out. We have a 

plan, we are marching towards it, and then we are going to take 

a piece of that stuff right now, and it is moving into Afghanistan. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you. 

CONTRACTORS

Mr. MURTHA. I asked President Obama the other day, I said, you 

have 150,000 contractors in Iraq, 274,000 in the theater in 

CENTCOM. He was surprised at that. 

He said, turning to the Secretary of Defense or the Chief of the 

Joint Chiefs, he said, How are we getting them out? Can you tell 

me how you are getting those contractors out? Are they coming out 

at the same speed the troops are coming out. 

Mr. MORAN. Is that a question to the Generals? 

Mr. MURTHA. Yes. 

General CHIARELLI. Intuitively, I would say, yes, sir. I have not 

checked on those numbers. The last I looked, when you took the 

whole contractor population, we have 1.1 contractor for every soldier currently in Iraq and Afghanistan today. 

I think you are going to find far fewer contractors in Afghanistan 

than you do in Iraq, albeit we are still relying on contractors to do 

much of our maintenance. And part of the reason we have been 

able to keep equipment reliability in theater so high—we have seen 

the highest numbers we have seen in the Army in a long time, over 

90 percent on track and wheel vehicles and over 75 percent on 

aviation aircraft—is because of those contractors and because we 

are rebuilding and resetting some of that equipment right in theater. 

Mr. MURTHA. It costs $44,000 more, on average, for a contractor 

than it does for a direct hire. We need a schedule. Somebody needs 

to give us a schedule of how we are bringing the contractors out 

as we are bringing the troops out. If we bring out another 20,000 

troops and you leave 25,000 contractors there, we haven’t made 

much progress. So we need, this committee needs to see what you 

are leaving there and how you are bringing them out. 

General CHIARELLI. I owe you that, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department of Defense, U.S. Central Command, and to a lesser extent the 

Department of the Army, continually assess the Iraqi personnel requirement to ensure the appropriate personnel strength to accomplish the mission. Logistics planning is in full swing to weigh the requirements for contracted support during redeployment, considering declining troop strength as well as increased need for some 

services, for example transportation, base closure and remediation support, and 

property management. The timeline for contractor redeployment may not mirror 

that of the Warfighters and may not be proportional. Additionally, as troop numbers 

grow in Afghanistan, some contractors may shift rather than redeploy. Redeployment timelines for combat forces and contractors are not discussed in non-secure forums due to operational security. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

TRAINING

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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As I understand it, because the Army is rotating so fast going 

back into Iraq, that will change somewhat now. That is why—they 

are only training, as I understand it, for a counterinsurgency mission. 

Is anybody training for anything other than that? 

General CHIARELLI. At lower levels, they are, sir. But I think you 

are exactly correct in indicating when you have got only one—— 

Mr. DICKS. One year. 

General CHIARELLI. One year or a little bit more than one year 

at home, you are focusing after your reset period almost totally on 

that deployment mission. Now, I think General Petraeus and General Liarno would argue that we have not lost the ability to synchronize kinetic effects on the battlefield; and we do that every single day for shorter periods of time than you would see if we were 

training for our core mission, but we still have the ability to do 

that. So sometimes I think we may overstate the degradation in 

those capabilities, but they are definitely degraded. 

Mr. DICKS. But we would definitely have the most combat 

trained force, probably, in American history. I mean, more people 

have been in combat, both Guard and Reserve and active forces 

than in any other time, I would think. 

General CHIARELLI. There has never been a more battle-tested 

force than you have today; that is correct, sir. 

READINESS RATINGS

Mr. DICKS. Now, tell me about these D ratings which would 

measure readiness against a directed mission. We understand that 

this is something the Army is going to do and it is going to do rather soon. 

General CHIARELLI. We begin in May. We are going to get rid of 

what you used to see was a PCTEF rating. A PCTEF rating went 

from 1 to 4. You would be PCTEF–4 prepared for the next mission, 

but you didn’t even know why. It just said PCTEF–4. 

Not only will we provide a D-rating, and that is going to be the 

rating, the readiness rating, for the mission you are about to deploy 

on; but we are going to require commanders to tell us, what is. 

your rating in personnel, what is your rating in training, what is 

your rating in equipment, so that you can see how they are doing 

in those three critical areas and really have an opportunity to 

judge their readiness. 

Commanders will not have the ability to subjectively upgrade 

those individual ratings. They will have the ability to subjectively 

upgrade the overall rating on D, but you will be able to see what 

the actual ratings are and can judge where they are in those three 

critical areas. 

Mr. DICKS. On December 1—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me—— 

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me just say, we don’t want you to hide from 

us the real readiness capability of the Army. I hope that is not 

what you are trying to do. We need to know if there is a problem, 

so we can fix it. 

I mean, I hear what you are saying, but I get very nervous when 

you are going to come up with a rating other than an overall ratVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:11 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00167 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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ing. You explained the difference, but I hope you don’t send over 

here and start to degrade the C-ratings. 

General CHIARELLI. That will not happen. 

Mr. MURTHA. All right. 

Mr. DICKS. It would be good, though, that we could assess, I 

think, the readiness to do the mission that they are going to be 

having to do. I think that—I think the more information we have, 

the better off we are. Just, that is my impression. 

Let me also ask you about this. On December 1, 2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued guidance elevating the importance 

of irregular warfare to be strategically important as traditional 

warfare. 

Can you tell us what the Army is doing in this core? What does 

this mean or what does it mean for the future? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, sir, I could give you all kinds of examples. I think that both General Amos and myself would say that 

I think we are proud of both of our services’ ability to adapt to this 

new kind of warfare, the kind of warfare that I believe is going to 

dominate our future. 

I will tell you, if you look at how we have restructured our 

force—I think you know we have gone to a modular force. We have 

gone to a readiness system that is based on the Army force generation model, which basically says, every unit goes from deployment 

to a reset period of 180 days, then, as long as we can, in a trainand-ready phase that gets ready for that next deployment. We hope 

it can be longer than 6 months, sometimes it is 8 months, sometimes it is 9 months right now. We would like to get it out to a 

year and a half or even greater. And then it goes into a deployment. That is what we have been able do with a modular force. 

When it comes to force structure, besides modulizing the force, 

we have grown five battalions of special operations additional over 

what we had in 2001. We have grown 50 companies of civil affairs, 

3,000 contractors. 

STABILITY OPERATIONS

Mr. DICKS. Let me just add one thing; my time is quickly running out. 

Secretary Gates recently wrote that the United States needs a 

military whose ability to kick down the door is matched by its ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward. 

What do you think that means. 

General CHIARELLI. In my 2 years in Iraq, I saw that every single day, the ability to go in, apply kinetic effects and follow up immediately with those kinds of things that you would consider part 

of a stability operation. It was an absolute requirement. And when 

we did that, we provided for the safety of our forces; when we 

didn’t do that, the neighborhoods became much more dangerous for 

us. 

So Soldiers have to be able to—as Charles Krulak said a long 

time ago, they have to fight that three-block war. One minute they 

are applying kinetic effects, the next minute they are ready to go 

into stability operations; and it can change with a snap of your fingers. 


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Mr. DICKS. General, do you have anything else you want to add 

to that? 

General AMOS. Sir, I think the kind of warfare we are in right 

now, and the Secretary has talked about, is going to be around for 

at least the next several generations. I think he is right. 

But he also uses the terminology ‘‘a balanced force,’’ and the net 

balanced force, we think the interpretation is, okay, our focus can 

be on this thing called ‘‘hybrid warfare.’’ 

This kind of warfare that General Chiarelli is talking about is, 

one day you are playing in cowboy stadium; the next day you are 

playing in the parking lot; and the day after that, or maybe that 

same day, you are playing in the Winn-Dixie parking lot over 

there, and you are playing different kind—and it all happened at 

the same time. So that is that hybrid warfare. 

But the balance that we owe our Nation is the ability to be able 

to do that. And I think we have proven that we can do that really 

well. And we are doing it, by the way, with young men and women 

that are just good, solid soldiers and Marines; and we are training 

with those skills through all the different training regimens we 

have. 

But we also owe our country the ability to be able to do those 

other things that represent the balanced force. In the case of Marine Corps, that is that forcible entry from a naval sea base or a 

naval operation. We are the only force that can do that. That 

doesn’t mean the Army can’t join us and do that; I am just saying 

that is a responsibility, that is core competency for the Marine 

Corps, and we owe that to our Nation. 

So we need to be able to train and do those things as well. The 

growth of the Marine Corps, the drawdown in Iraq and the reasonable approach to Afghanistan are going to provide us that opportunity. But I think it is a balanced force; that, I think, is what we 

are talking about. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for the doubleheader today, this morning’s 

hearing as well as the one this afternoon. 

Last week we had some of the Air Force brass in here from 

TRANSCOM and the Air Mobility Command, and we obviously had 

extended discussion on airlift needs, the whole tanker issue. I don’t 

want to get into that, but I would like your take on aviation readiness in a theater where we are going to be putting a lot more soldiers, and Marines particularly. 

What is the state of aviation readiness in terms of choppers? And 

both the chairman and I have a keen interest in the aeromedevac 

in Afghanistan, given there is some estimate that if someone is 

wounded, obviously the sooner you get them to safety and to a surgical tent or whatever they might need for medical purposes. 

Can you sort of talk to us about your general aviation readiness 

and the specific thing which affects the soldier’s well-being, the 

ability to evacuate soldiers and Marines that are wounded? 

General AMOS. From the Marines’ perspective, both in the Anbar 

Province, we have had a pretty sizeable air combat element on the 

ground in Iraq for some time. And we have got a very small air 

combat element on the ground in Afghanistan right now, and we 


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are about to blow that balloon up. We, are going to put a pretty 

good-sized piece of both rotary wing and fixed wing and tactical air 

in Afghanistan. 

CASUALTY EVACUATION

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How many choppers do you have in country? 

General AMOS. We have four CH–53Es in Afghanistan and four 

attack helicopters right now in Afghanistan for 2,300 Marines. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And, General Chiarelli, how-many choppers 

does the Army have? 

General CHIARELLI. We will have—we are adding another combat 

aviation brigade for our 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade in Afghanistan, which will take us up somewhere in the vicinity, depending 

on the exact table of organization of that 2nd Brigade, over 220 

helicopters. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Aero medevac, where do we stand in our 

ability to get our soldiers out on an expedited basis? 

General AMOS. Sir, I was there a month ago. And again this is 

the southern part for the Marine Corps. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. This is sort of the dedication to CSTAR, to 

some extent? 

General AMOS. Sir, it is. And I primarily think it is not so much 

CSTAR as much as casualty evacuation, and the ability to do a 

medevac or a casualty evacuation for a wounded soldier or Marine. 

Again, it is a bit of an immature theater down in the Helmand 

Province right now, and it is about to become more mature with 

the advent of the, or the influx of forces. And we, too, are going to 

bring in a bunch of helicopters, along with the Army. 

But right now, when we were there a month ago, the Marine battalion commander said it takes about 2 hours and 20 minutes, on 

average, to get a casualty evacuation moved from the point of being 

wounded to what we call Level II care. 

Now, I will tell you, the Department of Defense, the Secretary of 

Defense, has taken that on. And to rearrange assets—and that is 

part of the reason why we are bringing in more assets, as well as 

the Army, to take care of that, but part of that is relying on our 

allies. In other words, having to rely on some of our allies to provide a casualty evacuation at 2:00 in the morning to a country that 

doesn’t fly on low-light NVGs at 2:00 in the morning, they won’t 

do it. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. These are the same allies in some cases 

who are not joining the battle in the same way our people are, but 

they have assets to contribute to this getting our soldiers and Marines to get medical help? 

General AMOS. Sir, they do in some cases. I will tell you that 

there are—from my personal opinion, there are not enough down 

in the southern part of Afghanistan, but that is about to change. 

And the Secretary of Defense is taking this on personally. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So the 2-hour thing here is going to be 

measurably shortened? 

General AMOS. Sir, our goal is—when it comes to where the Marines are and anybody operating in a Marine zone is to get back 

to what we call ‘‘the golden hour,’’ and that is, from the time you 


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are injured to the time you reach the first medical (Level) II treatment facility is inside 60 minutes. 

We did that very well. The Army and the Marine Corps did that 

side by side in Iraq, and it saved an untold number of lives. 

We have a lot of motivation to get back to that in Afghanistan. 

We are just not there yet. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We have a keen interest in that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me just say, the figure we have is a 72-minute 

average. Twice as many people die in Afghanistan, because they 

don’t get the medical help, as die in Iraq—not quite that; it is 19 

percent versus 11 percent. But this committee sent staff, and I 

went out to Nellis to look at the assets there, and we put $100 million into those assets. 

If we don’t know the problem we can’t fix it. If you don’t have 

the assets, you can talk about trying to put those assets out there, 

but if we don’t know soon enough, we can’t put the money in and 

get the assets there. This committee is concerned about that, but 

you have got to tell us when there is a problem. 

I am surprised that you say that it takes 2 hours and 20 minutes 

to get them in. That is a revelation to me, because 72 minutes is 

the average. 

General AMOS. Sir, that was a battalion commander. That is me, 

looking a lieutenant colonel in the eye and talking about the casualty evacuation. I said, ‘‘How long is it taking you?’’ ‘‘On average,’’ 

he said, ‘‘2 hours and 20 minutes.’’ 

Mr. MURTHA. That is unacceptable. 

General AMOS. I agree with you, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. No questions. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

MISSION CAPABLE

Mr. MORAN. Thank you. 

I have to say, boy, the Committee has a good staff. They do terrific work. For example, they bring to our attention that in 2003— 

and these are numbers I know that both generals are familiar 

with—50 percent of the Army was C–2 or better, and now we are 

down to 15 percent. And when you account for deployment, only 8 

percent of Army units, both C–2 or better and available to address 

a contingency operation. And of that 8 percent only 4 percent are 

C–1, fully mission capable. 

So this is something the Chairman has been harping on for basically 5 years, but every year it just seems to get worse. And, of 

course, it is the critical issue that we are bringing, that we are discussing today. The Marine Corps is in better shape in that situation. 

And we are concerned. I share the concern of the chairman and 

the vice chair about subjective ratings. Of course, this D category 

is a concern. 

STOP LOSS

But the first thing I want to ask you specifically about is stop 

loss. I don’t know about my colleagues, but it may just be that 


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when somebody is subjected to stop loss, those are the ones you 

hear about. But, boy, I hear a lot about folks that have been kept 

in a voluntary service through what you consider to be stop loss. 

And the subcommittee provided money, $72 million, to deal with 

that, yet none of it has been used? Why might that be? 

And a stop loss is more an issue with the Army, so let me ask 

General Chiarelli. 

General CHIARELLI. Well, sir, both the United States Army and 

Department of Defense are working on a comprehensive stop loss 

plan that will be complete very, very soon that will look at all of 

stop loss, not only those soldiers that are stop loss, but stop loss 

as an instrument that the Army uses in the future. And I expect 

that before too long you will have the opportunity to see—I know 

they are putting the final touches on that, and I know it has the 

personal interest of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary 

of the Army and the Secretary of Defense. 

I do, and I know that no one cares about soldiers more than the 

members of this Committee. And I know we are focused on that 1 

percent of the Army, less than 1 percent the Army, that is stop 

loss—6 to 7 percent in any one time. And I know that this Committee knows that every one of those soldiers signs a contract that 

indicates that that might happen. 

But I will tell you that when we start paying that money, you 

need to understand that stop loss numbers are going to go up. Because when Private Chiarelli can reenlist in February 2 months 

into a deployment, he is not going to; he is going to collect whatever that final amount is until the last month before he goes home; 

and then, if he plans to reenlist, he will reenlist. 

Mr. MORAN. So you are afraid they are going to game the system 

if you make that incentive available? 

General CHIARELLI. Sir, I am not saying we can’t make the incentive—I am just—— 

Mr. MURTHA. We have solved this thing. We have put $500 per 

person in for 160,000, whatever it is. We don’t want any argument 

from the Army. I have heard all the arguments. The Secretary of 

Defense talked to me about it, and he rejected your proposal. 

We expect you to work something out. 

General CHIARELLI. Sir, I will do whatever we are told. I just 

wanted to give you—— 

Mr. MURTHA. I heard all the arguments. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, it sounds like we are not going to pursue this 

any further, General. I think the Committee is—on the policy is 

pretty clear. Secretary Gates did say publicly that he is going to 

end it. And there must be a way that you can deal with the potential gaming of the system. 

The IRR is a problem with the Marine Corps, though, more than 

the Army. Do you want to address that issue, General Amos? 

General AMOS. Sir, it is actually not a large issue now. Some 

time ago the Secretary of Defense authorized us to, authorized the 

Marine Corps to involuntarily recall up to 2,500 Marines. To date, 

we have recalled, involuntarily, 1,779 of those. Right now, in Iraq 

we have 463 members on this current deployment in Iraq out of 

22,000 Marines that are over there on IRR involuntary recall. That 

will end after the end of this year. We don’t like it. 


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But here is the real truth with the IRR recall. A lot of these 

young men and women want to come back on active duty, but they 

can’t volunteer because they will lose their jobs. And so the agreement we have had with Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) are, 

when you do this and you are about to call somebody back on active duty involuntarily, ask them if they are covertly a volunteer. 

And in the clear majority of the cases they are. There are some, 

I am sure, that are not, but most of them are; and they say, ‘‘But 

we can’t do that, we can’t volunteer, so you tell us, and we will be 

happy to come.’’ 

So we have very small numbers, and we are going to cut that, 

off at the end of the year. 

Mr. MORAN. Good. Because the fact that it is such small numbers, I think, is probably an even greater argument that it doesn’t 

need to exist. Because if there is anybody that is involuntarily serving, it diminishes our confidence and pride that this is a voluntary 

Army. So you understand that. 

Mr. MURTHA. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Kingston. 

DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Amos, you have—27 percent of your equipment is in theater right now? 

General AMOS. I am sorry, I can’t hear you. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Twenty-seven percent of your equipment is in 

theater; is that what I heard? 

General AMOS. I would have to take a look at that. I think that 

is probably—I may have said that in my statement. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I think it was in there. 

General AMOS. It probably is. That number sounds right, sir. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, you only have two depots. Is that enough 

to take care of all your stuff? 

General AMOS. I only have two what? 

Mr. KINGSTON. Depots. 

General AMOS. It is. It is. In fact, right now, both in Albany and 

Barstow they are working—at least at Albany, I am not sure about 

Barstow, but Albany is working one shift. They have the capability 

through contractors, through temporary hires, through overtime, to 

easily go to two shifts; and they are prepared to do that. 

In fact, the plan is under way right now, as we retrograde that 

equipment out of Iraq, that I talked about earlier, that will find its 

way to Blount Island and from Blount Island it will get dispersed 

to either Albany or Barstow for rework. And I have been assured 

that there is plenty of space, head space, to be able to rework all 

the equipment we have. 

Mr. KINGSTON. So there is actually maybe even a little more capacity in Albany than you are utilizing. 

General AMOS. There is, sir. In fact, I can tell you, I have got it 

in here, we are doing a significant amount of work right now for 

other companies, other services at Albany. 

Mr. KINGSTON. In fact, as I recall, about 5 years ago you uparmed the Humvees for the Army at Albany. 


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General AMOS. I can’t tell you specifically. I can tell you how 

many Humvees we did at Albany. 

But I will give you an example. Last year, fiscal year 2008, we did $392 million worth of business at Albany for the Marine Corps. 

The other services we did $85 million, and for commercial contracts 

we did another $26 million. 

So it really becomes a business at Albany. And the commander 

there, Major General Williams, looks for business wherever he can 

get it. He has the capacity to blow that up to two shifts a day and 

take all that stuff in. 

So we do business for the Army, I am sure, but I just can’t tell 

you. I don’t have those figures in my data. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Bishop knows more than I, but I am 90 percent sure that they did start up-armoring the Humvee for the 3d 

Infantry in maybe 2004 or something like that. 

General AMOS. I will tell you, we took 934 Humvees in fiscal year 

2008 and rehabilitated them there at Albany. 

Mr. KINGSTON. With all the reset that is needed, is there more 

that the depots can do for you right now? 

General AMOS. When you say, ‘‘Is there more they can do,’’ I 

mean, right now, they are doing everything that we have asked 

them to do with regards to equipment. Where the more comes in 

is, we have got to get them the equipment to be able to work on 

and to be able to rehabilitate. And that goes back to what Congressman Young said earlier, How much of that stuff are you going 

to bring out of Iraq? And we never really answered that question. 

We are going to bring everything out of Iraq unless it is sitting 

over in a junk pile because it has been blown up, or the U.S. Government has authorized a foreign military sale to Iraq, the country. 

But we are going to bring everything back, and it will be triaged 

there at Blount Island. And if it is good or it is cost effective to rehabilitate it, then we are going to send it to other depots. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I appreciate that. And I don’t know if Mr. Bishop 

has any questions that we can yield on our time. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I would yield back. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rothman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would be willing to yield to Mr. 

Bishop now since he represents Albany. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Bishop. 

RESET FUNDS

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, my colleague, and thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome again, gentlemen. Reset funding and prepositioning 

equipment sets, two issues that are very important to me, very important to Albany as far as the Marine Corps is concerned, but let 

me deal with the Army first. 

This Committee over the past few years has appropriated about 

$8 billion to the Army for reset; and as I understand it, about $3.7 

billion of that has been obligated. But the Army’s equipment on 

hand continues to be an inhibiting factor in the readiness status 

of the forces. 

And it is expected that the Army is going to request additional 

reset funds in the 2009 supplemental. But, of course, we don’t 


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know what, because I think the Secretary is not willing to have 

that discussed while the budget is still being formulated. 

But are you facing any major capacity problems? Is the fact that 

production challenges that are facing the Army reset in terms of 

depot capacity and industry—because I know we were doing some 

of your depot work in Albany, as Mr. Kingston alluded to—and do 

you still have equipment in depots, like in Anniston, still sitting 

out or waiting for repair? And what will this supplemental funding 

request do to your reset requirements? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, I can tell you there are depots who are 

just doing a magnificent job on reset. And the capacity and ability 

of the depots to reset our equipment, particularly given our short 

dwell time back at home, has been one of the true success stories 

of this conflict. 

Mr. BISHOP. I don’t mean to interrupt you, but they are telling 

me that lined up outside the depot in Anniston are tons and tons 

of these damaged vehicles that have been sent back. 

General CHIARELLI. Let me take that for the record, sir, and go 

and check on the exact conditions in Anniston. 

[The information follows:] 

In order to provide a comprehensive response regarding equipment backlog at 

ANAD, we have verified our depot capacity and programs for critical systems at 

ANAD and the remaining four maintenance depots: Corpus Christi, Letterkenny, 

Red River, and Tobyhanna Army Depots. We continue to have ample capacity to 

meet Army requirements. 

The few cases where our depots have not been able to meet the Army-directed 

production schedules have been the result of supply chain issues or lack of unserviceable assets, and not the capacity of our depots. For example, at Anniston, our 

slower-than-required production of M2 machine gun production during the first part 

of fiscal year 2009 (FY09) was the result of nonconforming parts in the supply system. Army Materiel Command, Defense Logistics Agency, Headquarters, Department of the Army and parts suppliers worked together to resolve these problems. 

Once acceptable parts were available in sufficient supply, ANAD was able to quickly 

increase its production of M2 machine guns from 400 per month in 1st Quarter 

FY09 to 700 per month to meet the Army requirements. An example of unserviceable asset shortfall is the M1114 HMMWV program at Red River Army Depot. Currently there is a shortfall of several hundred vehicles scheduled to be shipped from 

Southwest Asia that have not yet arrived, therefore, impacting the production 

schedule. 

Our depots have the capacity to accomplish additional workload in all areas, especially considering the additional capability we have available through partnering arrangements and national maintenance contracts with original equipment manufacturers such as Oshkosh, Raytheon, and Boeing Aerospace Engineering. 

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. You may continue. 

Sir, were you done? 

General CHIARELLI. I will tell you that some of that equipment 

readiness that you allude to is masked by the fact that when a 

commander doesn’t have his equipment and it is in reset, when he 

is reporting against equipment on hand, of course that equipment 

is not on hand, it is in reset, which makes his C-rating or D-rating 

go down, particularly his C-rating. His D-rating really never 

catches up to get up to where we want him to be at D–1 until he 

gets over and falls in on the theater-provided equipment that is 

only available in Iraq and Afghanistan for him to fall on. 

And all our units that are in Iraq and Afghanistan are C–1—or 

D–1 for its equipment. 


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PERCENT EFFECTIVENESS

Mr. BISHOP. You haven’t implemented the D-ratings as yet; you 

are just in the process of implementing those. 

You haven’t fully implemented the D-ratings yet, have you? 

General CHIARELLI. We have not, but we have the percent effectiveness ratings. And a large majority, or lower percent effectiveness ratings you see now, although you can’t see it because we 

have never provided that specificity that I talked about earlier, a 

large reason why those percent effectiveness ratings stay low until 

it gets over there is because it falls in on that theater-provided 

equipment. 

Mr. BISHOP. Exactly. And that gets us to the question of other 

contingencies. 

If the unit is ready when it is deployed, but the part of the unit 

that is not deployed, that is back home, is in a state of unreadiness, a very, very low state of readiness; is that not correct? Because the equipment is deployed, the personnel is deployed, and basically the unit is depleted except for the stay-at-home portions. 

General CHIARELLI. At the current demand for our units our ratings are lower than they would be if we were able to get more 

dwell time. But right now we have over 32 units when you figure 

in the friction deployed brigade combat teams around the world, 

32. That is a huge number. And that is why you have that dwell 

time, that 1 year deployed, 1.3 at home. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rothman. 

FORCES OUT-OF-BALANCE

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you again gentlemen. Good to see you again. And thank 

you for your service, really outstanding. 

You each in your respective written testimony, and I am sorry 

I was late for your oral testimony, so if you covered this the answer 

to this question, I apologize. 

Talk about your forces out of balance. Does that sound familiar? 

And the question is, given the present trend in funding that you 

reasonably anticipate in the upcoming supplemental and in the future, how long before it will be before the Army and, respectively, 

the Marines are in balance? 

General CHIARELLI. My in balance number is a factor of demand, 

and that is what is causing me to be out of balance. It takes me 

time to reset both people and equipment. And with only a year plus 

a couple of months between deployments, that is what has put me 

out of balance. 

We expect and we hope—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So, General, it is not about funding then, per se? 

General CHIARELLI. My out-of-balance problems right now are 

primarily because of demand, and we hope to be in balance where 

we are 1 year deployed, 2 years at home, or close to—or 18 months 

at home; I am sorry, 1 year and 18 months at home. We hope to 

be there by 2011. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. 

General. 


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General AMOS. Sir, I put in my written statement the estimate that $20 billion—and I am not getting out ahead of OSD on this, 

but $20 billion today is the rough reset cost for the Marine Corps. 

There are a couple of points I would like to make. If the war ended 

today and we said, this is it, everybody come out of Iraq, come out 

of Afghanistan, it would probably take 5 years for the Marine 

Corps to get rebalanced or readjusted. And that is not because Congress isn’t being generous. 

It is a function of production lines and contracts and some things 

that have gone out that they aren’t even making anymore, legacy 

systems, and being placed with a newer generation of equipment. But $20 billion is a rough assessment. I am told that my predecessor, General Magnus, when he sat here last year, when asked 

that question, said it would be about $15 billion. 

I asked my staff. I said, well, so far this Committee has gener- ously given the Marine Corps a little over $12 billion for reset. So 

I said, What have we done with it? 

Well, we have gone and we have bought new Humvees, we have 

bought new LAVs, we have bought the stuff that has been blown 

up, the stuff that you see on TV, we are wearing stuff out at six 

times the rate that it was built for. The Humvee, I think, has typically averaged 7,000 miles. We are wearing them, out. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I get it. We have got to grow the force, but that 

all depends on demand on even a growing force, and then replace 

the burned-out equipment. 

I want to make sure I ask one last question, General Chiarelli, 

and I apologize if I am the only one who doesn’t know the answer 

to this question. You said in your statement only three out of ten 

applicants are even eligible for military service—three out of ten 

applicants, people applying. Could you explain that, please? 

General CHIARELLI. They have disqualifying conditions, everything from schooling to health problems to obesity, that make it 

impossible for that portion of the population to join the Army. So 

out of every ten Americans that are in that population only three 

qualify. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Three applicants. That is amazing. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. I don’t have any questions. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Hinchey. 

TRAINING, CAPABILITIES, AND EQUIPMENT

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Generals. Thank you very much for your leadership 

and the very important work you are doing for this country. Thank 

you all very much. I appreciate it. 

But reading through the information, I just get the impression 

that your job is getting more difficult and has gotten more difficult 

over the last several years. The condition of many people in both 

the Army and the Marine Corps, their capability, the capability of 

dealing with issues, has declined substantially since the invasion 

of Iraq. 

According to the information that we have, at least 50 percent 

of the Army was C–2 or above, and 80 percent of the Marines was 


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C–2 or above. Now 15 percent of the Army is C–2 or above, and 

about 50 percent of the Marine Corps is about C–2 or above. 

And what you were just answering about the qualifications, also, 

I think, has something to do with that, because the qualifications 

for enrollment in the military declined over the last several years. 

And I think that that has put the military in a rather rough situation, in a more difficult set of circumstances. 

What do you think should be done about this? Do you have any 

plans? I know you are thinking about it. But do you have any ideas 

about what should be done, how we should handle this, how we can 

deal with the effectiveness of the military now that we have 17- 

going in, 7- of the 17,000 going into Afghanistan, particularly in 

dealing with a different kind of complex situation there, different 

than the circumstance that they have been dealing with in Iraq? 

General AMOS. Sir, I will take it on first. 

Back to the—kind of the beginning of what you said, Congressman, I want to assure you that the C–3 and C–4 ratings, especially 

when it comes to personnel, are not a function—and it comes to 

training—are not a function of the quality of the young man or 

woman we have in, because that young man or woman is better 

today than they were when we crossed the border in March of 

2003. The quality is there; I can assure you of that. 

The Marine Corps hasn’t lowered its standards on anything. In 

fact, just by virtue of the numbers have increased in their recruiting. So the quality of it is more than bravery. It is that young man 

or woman making those decisions that we talked about in the very 

last hearing that we were in here. So I want to assure you of that. 

The second piece of it is that the training part, when it comes 

to the lower rating of C—50 percent for us, and I really think it 

is 47 percent of our deployed; our nondeployed units are at C–3 

and C–4—that is strictly a function of the fact that we have 

stripped out those principal players that we need back home, to 

train, and have deployed them in the way of individual augments, 

joint manning documents. 

We have taken a large percentage of the Marine Corps, and I 

think I speak for the Army, and put them forward along with the 

combat forces. So you don’t have the leadership back home in some 

cases. It is not willy-nilly. It is not, the prisoners are running the 

battalions. That is not it. But you lack some of those unique skills 

back in the rear. 

The other thing I will tell you is that the equipment piece of this 

thing, we have the bulk of the equipment we need. Now, we are 

wearing it out, blowing it up and whatever, and it is in pretty good 

shape; but we have taken a larger percentage of that stuff back in 

the rear and moved that forward. So now the folks in the rear don’t 

have all the equipment that they need to train on. 

It is not a function of, you didn’t give us the money. We have 

been buying everything that we could get our hands on. But the 

fact of the matter is that the requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan 

are significantly greater equipment-wise for an individual unit. 

I will give you an example. A typical infantry battalion in the 

Marine Corps has about 40-plus Humvees. The ones in Iraq right 

now are running around about 160 and 180 Humvees, because they 

are spread out. 


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So that is where the equipment has gone. It is in good shape. We 

just don’t have enough of it back in the rear to get the training levels of—to be able to increase the C-ratings that we are talking 

about. 

General CHIARELLI. I have very little to add to what Jim says. 

The number one thing to improve those C-ratings for the United 

States Army would be to increase the time at home between deployments. It just has such an effect; it has an effect on equipment. 

But what we are seeing and what I am faced with right now, 

since the Secretary of the Army has put me in charge of taking a 

look at this whole problem we have with the stress of the force and 

the suicides, the increase in suicides that we are seeing, is the 

stress on individuals. And there is no doubt in my mind that when 

you are on deployments, third and fourth time on 12-month deployments—— 

I did mention to the chairman just before we started, and I think 

it is noteworthy, that we won’t get our last combat brigade off of 

15-month deployment until June of 2009. We will not get our last 

combat service support and combat service unit off of a 15-month 

deployment until September of 2009 because they all deployed before August of 2008 when we went to 12-month rotation. So that 

is very, very difficult. 

Those units will come home after a 15-month deployment, and if 

demand stays the same and we are at 1.3, they won’t even get a 

1-to-1 dwell log ratio. 

So many of the problems that we see today, I believe, will be well 

on their way to being solved if we can extend that amount of period. And that is what General Casey talks about: Get the units 

back in balance, so they can both train on their deployment medal, 

their core medal, and you will see improvements there; and then 

help recover people and equipment. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you. 

Mr. BISHOP. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. HINCHEY. I think my time is up. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mrs. Kilpatrick. 

DEPLOYMENTS

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The title of this closed hearing is Readiness—I think the last two 

or three, and we are getting around the corner. 

We are not ready. I don’t feel like you are ready. 

The 1 to 1.3, which I believe is mandatory, you had two young 

sergeants here earlier today that have been deployed twice. Using 

them as an example, did they get the 1.3? Are we about to send 

them back to Afghanistan without it? 

There was one of each. I know that is an average, so maybe one 

did and one didn’t. 

General AMOS. Sergeant, the Marine sergeant got 1-to-1 dwell 

between. He is working for me right now, so he is into his dwell. 

But between deployments he was gone 7 months and home for 

probably 7 months, maybe even 6 months. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And is that in the States or was he with his 

family for those months? 

General AMOS. Yes, ma’am. 


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Ms. KILPATRICK. Yes, ma’am, what? I mean, was he back here? 

General AMOS. He was back here. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Here in the U.S.? 

General AMOS. He was back here in the United States. He was 

back at Camp Lejeune between the deployments. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I guess I am asking, in that 1.3 or 1.8 that you 

talk about that is out of the theater, back in the States, is that also 

included with their family or is that not included? 

General CHIARELLI. I would be more than happy to take that on, 

because I get beat up every time I go to a spouse group of deployed 

spouses. I say, Well, we are giving your husband 1 year at home, 

and I get fingers in my face saying, No, you are not, General; don’t 

tell me that, General. My husband comes home, he has to go to a 

noncommissioned officer course for 2 or 3 months. He comes back, 

he is now in his train-ready phase, he goes to the field to train up 

because we have to train before we deploy. 

They say, Don’t tell me, General, that my husband is home for 

12 months; he is not with me for 12 months. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. But is he in the house for 12 months? 

General CHIARELLI. No, he is not, when he deploys from Fort 

Campbell to Fort Knox before he goes to the field, and his wife is 

back at home. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And back at home is in another State? 

General CHIARELLI. No, it is probably right there, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I think that makes a difference. And you all 

have said that over in everything we read—family contact, children 

contact is so important. 

So I think we are ready because you said so, and I wouldn’t second-guess that. But I think not because of the suicides, the tension, 

how we are sending, we are sending you to a new terrible terrain 

for another increase in the war that we have been in before we 

even started in Iraq. 

And you talked about the demand, General. Demand is going to 

be more, it is not going to be less. And your men, particularly in 

the Army men and women, are going to be more tired and more 

worn out because of the short times home, because of the toughness of their assignment. 

The chairman said over and over again that we want to help. 

And I know you all are good stewards, and I appreciate your service and all that you are doing. But we can’t help if we don’t know. 

And our number one goal is to save and serve the men and women 

that you command, that they can be whole and well and alive when 

they come back. 

And this is a closed hearing, so I just expected to hear something 

more closed. I am kind of hearing the same thing. And I know that 

is what you are supposed to do, you are in my range absolutely and 

all that. 

But having said that, I don’t feel good that we are protecting our 

men and women who commit their lives to our country. You are 

doing the best you can with what you have, but I just don’t feel 

like we are helping enough and you are not giving it to us enough. 

Nothing to take away from you. It is just that since I am a lay 

and new and all of that. They deserve everything they need, much 


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of which is home with their families and that wife you just described. 

Being out of theaters is three-fourths of the battle; that is good. 

And of course they have to keep training. But they also need time 

so their children can be healthy and their wives can be. Do you 

know what I mean? That unit and that extended family, I don’t 

think anything substitutes for that. 

And whatever we have to do to get you there, which may be more 

enlisted. I mean, let us up the numbers. Nobody has talked about 

that in any of the meetings I have been in yet and how we do that. 

Is that necessary? No one has spoken to that. 

So thank you for your service. I don’t even want you to answer 

unless you feel compelled to do so. I have got a raw feeling right 

here. And the demands are going to increase; war is not going to 

end. 

Arbitrarily bringing them home this October or this June, that 

is too arbitrary. And I don’t know, Joint Chiefs of Staff, they must 

say something to the President. But together we have got to make 

it better. Ending both of the wars and bringing all of the soldiers 

home is my first wish in life. 

But what you do is major, and it is also tragic. And it is war; 

we are at two wars, so nothing is the same. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young. 

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR)

Mr. YOUNG. Just one question. On the IRR, as you deal with all 

these personnel issues, how often have you had to use call-ups from 

the IRR? 

And the second part of that question, how long is a person considered to be a member of the IRR or subject to call-up from IRR? 

General CHIARELLI. Any numbers I would give you, sir, would be 

swags right now. If you would let me take that for the record, I will 

get you the exact numbers we are calling up right now and try to 

give you some historical data on the number of IRR that we, the 

United States Army, have called up. And I am not sure what the 

age restriction or time out of the service is for calling up the IRR, 

but I will find out and get it to you. 

Mr. YOUNG. That would be fine. Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 

Over the past eight years, the Army has used the Presidential Reserve Call-up 

Authority twice: once for operations in Kosovo and also for operations in Bosnia. 

Ready Reservists are currently called to active duty pursuant to title 10, US Code, 

Section 12302, for a period not to exceed 400 days: 365 days involuntary mobilization, plus 35 days authorized for out-processing and post-mobilization leave. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

STANDARDS FOR RECRUITS

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In December—excuse me. 

In addition, for 2008, 83 percent of the active Army met the high 

school diploma benchmark. The Marine Corps, on the other hand, 

attracted highly qualified recruits; 96 percent of the Marine Corps 

recruits are high school graduates, and 66 percent score in the top 


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three categories in the Armed Service Vocation Aptitude Battery 

Test. 

General Chiarelli, with the state of the economy and people more 

willing to join, will the Army be able to raise its standards of recruits from what it has been? 

General CHIARELLI. We already have, sir. We have already 

stopped giving the waiver for adult major misconduct. It is no 

longer given. So if you are considered an adult in a State and conduct some kind of major misconduct and are found guilty of that 

major misconduct, you cannot join the United States Army. That 

is no longer a waiver. 

I have been following the recruiting figures here in the last couple of months. And I think you know that it is very, very hard, at 

least for the United States Army, to get over 90 percent of the high 

school graduates in January. Those numbers usually go up when 

you get near the school time and people come out of school. 

We have seen our numbers up over 90 percent in the last 2 

months that I have checked, in high school graduates. We are because of—and I think it should be, you would all understand—seeing a tremendous improvement in the quality that we are able to 

attract to the United States Army because of, I am sure, the economic situation our Nation finds itself in. 

Mr. MURTHA. Could you be more specific? Exactly what is the difference? 

I mean, when you went to a volunteer Army, the reasoning was, 

you would have more high school graduates, the standards would 

be higher, we don’t want draftees. That was where you were, and 

where are you going now? 

General CHIARELLI. I don’t have those figures right in front of 

me, but I know we were down as low as 79 percent. I expect those 

numbers to steadily increase; I know they are already up in 

months. 

Mr. MURTHA. Send it for the record. 

General CHIARELLI. I will. I will provide you those Mr. Chairman. 

[The information follows:] 

In fiscal year (FY) 2005, the regular Army’s Tier 1 Education recruiting accomplishment (i.e., high school graduates and above) fell below DoD’s Standard of 90% 

for the first time since FY83. Specifically, the Army’s Tier 1 Education recruiting 

percentage fell to 87% in FY05, decreased to 81% in FY06, and reached a 79% nadir 

in FY07 before rebounding to 83% in FY08. 

In response to this problem, Army leaders implemented programs and policies to 

attract more new recruits with a Tier 1 Education credential. Currently, the Regular Army’s New Recruit Tier 1 Education percentage is 94% and the Army is expecting to close-out FY09 close to that percentage. 

Mr. DICKS. General Amos, even though the Marine Corps is 

growing to an end strength of 202,000, the Marine Corps has always been very successful at maintaining a high level of recruits. 

Can you explain why? 

General AMOS. Sir, the quality of recruits, even from last year, 

has gone up from 96 percent, 96.2 percent high school graduates, 

to 97.2 right now. So I will tell you, I think we have it a little bit 

easier. And I mean that because we recruit to a very narrow slice 

of the American society—the clear majority of young men and 


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women don’t want to join the Marine Corps—and we have an attraction to that very narrow band. We promise them—— 

Mr. DICKS. Like Mr. Murtha and Mr. Young. 

General AMOS. And his brothers and his nephews. But we do, 

and so we have a very narrow band. 

Our numbers, we are going to recruit about 42,000 this year. We 

are well on our way. In fact, we are having to slow down the recruiting a little bit. It has been very successful. 

But I do think we have it a little bit easier. And I tell you that 

the young men and women, the athletes, they come out and they 

say, I want to be a part of that organization. It is attractive to 

them. So it has been good to us. 

Mr. DICKS. What about—how do you do your recruiting? Do you 

have professional people that are officers or not NCOs? Who do you 

use to recruit. 

General AMOS. Sir, we use NCOs. We have officers that are the 

commanding officers; the recruiting stations, we have officers to recruit officers; but the clear majority of our recruiters are young sergeants and staff sergeants. 

And the recruiting screen team goes out once a year and they 

pick the best that we have out there. We force them, in many cases 

against their will, to come in to become a recruiter. We train them, 

and then we send them out for 3 years, and we hold them accountable. 

So it is our NCOs. These kids are ripe. Half of them, in fact, 

probably almost all of them, are wearing combat ribbons with multiple deployments. The only reason they don’t want to go become 

a recruiter is because it is probably the hardest job in the United 

States Marine Corps. They would rather be in combat than have 

to go around and try to recruit two, three recruits every single 

month per man. 

TRAINING EQUIPMENT

Mr. DICKS. That is a good point. 

Going back to just one thing, and I will be done, Mr. Chairman. 

To both of you, what has been the greater hindrance to full spectrum readiness—equipment on hand or trained personnel or both? 

It is the equipment that is the problem, right? We don’t have 

enough equipment at home to train the people when they come 

back? 

General CHIARELLI. My number one problem, sir, is time at home 

to get to those C-ratings that you are looking at. It is time at home 

to do that training in addition to your deployment training, because 

they are two different training sets. 

Mr. DICKS. But we do have a lack of equipment? 

General CHIARELLI. We are able to get—— 

Mr. DICKS. I know the Guard and Reserve—the Guard does, for 

sure. What about the Army? 

General CHIARELLI. We are making great improvements. Thanks 

to the work of this committee, we are making great improvements 

on Guard equipment also, sir. 

It is time at home for the active component force rate. 

Mr. DICKS. That is your biggest problem. 

General Amos. 


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General AMOS. Sir, there is equipment shortfall back home. 

Again, the aggregate number of pieces of equipment are in the Marine Corps. There is just a disproportional amount of it forward deployed because of the increased requirement in theater, which 

means we don’t have as much we need back at the home station 

to train. So that is absolutely correct. 

The other thing that we lack back home is the time to train. 

Even if we had the equipment back here to be able to do the other 

full spectrum operations, that other piece of the balanced core capabilities that you expect of your Marine Corps, we don’t have 

enough time to do those kinds of things. 

We are going to get there. I think we are headed in the right direction. And I would like to be able to come back a year from now 

and say, I think things are—I think we are getting back, I think 

our dwell is getting better, I think we are able to do some of the 

amphibious kinds of things that you expect your Marine Corps to 

be able to do. 

We just can’t do all of that right now. We do pieces of it, but we 

can’t do it universally across the Marine Corps. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me add the recruiting of the Marine Corps. 

Now, when I joined, my mother cried the whole way to the recruiting station. And she cried and cried and cried. She wanted me 

to finish college. Then, when my second brother went, she cried; 

the third brother went, she cried. 

The fourth brother, she joined me and said, I am afraid he is 

going to join the Army. So the information the Marine Corps puts 

out has something to do with recruiting people. 

Ms. Kaptur. 

General AMOS. Sir, you have got to remember this guy to my 

right is my blood brother right now. 

General CHIARELLI. That is okay, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, I arrived late, so I prefer just to listen for awhile. 

Mr. MURTHA. We have reached the end. 

TRAINING

Ms. KAPTUR. Since I haven’t heard all the questions, I want to 

thank both Generals for appearing today, and I am sure someone 

else has asked about where and how irregular warfare training will 

be done. 

Has somebody else asked that question? 

Mr. DICKS. We just barely got into it. I think it could be followed 

up on. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I was very interested in Secretary Gates’ statements back in December. And I am just curious at this point, for 

the Corps and the Army, how you are thinking about this irregular 

warfare proposal and where such training would be done and how 

it would be done. 

General AMOS. Ma’am, if I can just answer for the Marine Corps, 

it is already being done. It has been done now for the last several 

years, and that is the reason why we have met with such success 

in Iraq. 


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We are doing that through not only our professional military 

education, the actual in-house schools that Marines go to, but also 

the training out on 29 Palms, the desert training, the things that 

we call home station training. We do language training, we do immersion language training back at the units before they even go to 

the advanced training before they deploy. 

We have stood up a Center for Irregular Warfare in the Marine 

Corps. We have stood up a Marine training and advisory group 

which deals with that kind of—that hybrid warfare, kind of helping 

other nations train their military and their police. We are doing 

that right now and we are doing it quite well. 

So we have actually—if you were to say, Marine Corps, start irregular warfare training today, I would look at you, ma’am, and I 

would say, ‘‘Ma’am, we are already doing it.’’ 

When I say, ‘‘There is nothing else that needs to be done,’’ I don’t 

mean it to sound arrogant, like. I am just saying that we have invested a significant amount of the Marine Corps training and 

retorqued it so that we take those young men and women and just 

train them in hybrid warfare. 

Ms. KAPTUR. But—your focus is on training your own force, but 

then transferring those skills from a security standpoint to the host 

nation? It does not involve the development of civilian systems? 

You stop at the security mission, correct? 

General AMOS. Actually, what we do is capitalize on the civilian 

mission. 

For instance, we have police forces. It started with the Los Angeles police force, and the Army has it, and we actually bring policemen in. A lot of them are Reserves. And we bring these law enforcement teams in and they help us; they help teach us how to 

train Iraqis and Afghanis. 

So there are skill levels that are out there that we bring in to 

be able to train other countries. Law enforcement is a good example. 

I will tell you one that we need to bring in and develop, and that 

is probably agriculture. When you start thinking about trying to 

transition the poppy fields in southern Afghanistan, we are going 

to need that help. 

Now, I will be honest with you, we have had some talent within 

our services. We have got farmers, but we are going to need some 

help from the other agencies to come in and try to give the 

Afghanis an alternative to growing poppies. 

But there is a good example of some stuff that really needs to 

come into our service to help us. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What about Army? 

Thank you, General. 

General CHIARELLI. Just to build on that, Jim’s last point, we 

have since stood up agriteams. They are National Guardsmen from 

farm States. I just visited one at Camp Atterbury here a couple of 

weeks ago. It was an amazing sight to see, 60 men—farmers with 

guns, so to speak—who had been partnered with Purdue University for a 9-month period. They were learning the exact dialect of 

Urdu that they would be deploying into in Afghan and, at the same 

time, learning farming techniques that could apply in Afghanistan—not the ones that would be used here in the United States 


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in Nebraska or Iowa, but the ones that could be used in Afghanistan. 

These teams are strategic in nature. They have strategic impact. 

It is one of the most successful programs that we have going. We 

are doing the same kind of thing in our national training centers 

and have been doing it now since 2003–2004. 

I might just add, when I took the 1st Cavalry Division to Iraq 

in 2004, I had to drag my officers kicking and screaming to cultural 

awareness classes and try to get them to pick up on their own a 

little bit of Arabic. When we left, I did an AAR, after action review, 

with young captains and lieutenants. I didn’t do it, I had a major 

do it, so I would get through. 

The two things that they said that they would have changed in 

their training program before coming over would have been, number 1, ‘‘I would have had more cultural awareness training,’’ and 

number 2, ‘‘If you would have brought me to the level of language 

proficiency I was on day 90, I would have been there on day 1. If 

you are all forced to learn the language, you just want to have 

those skills on day 1, rather than day 90.’’ 

I am proud of all our forces and how we have done that. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Granger. 

TIME AT HOME

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Today, we have talked about training and equipment, recruitment, meeting your recruitment goals, and contractors. But you say 

the biggest problem is time at home. 

It does go back to Ms. Kilpatrick’s question. It is obvious to me, 

you either need more people or you need less mission. So is it more 

people or are you doing—for instance, when you talked about, it 

was quoted, ‘‘rebuilding the house,’’ well, is it the military who 

should be rebuilding the house or less of that mission? 

General AMOS. Ma’am, this Committee 2 years ago, when the 

Marine Corps said, ‘‘We need to grow to 202,000 to increase the 

dwell time’’—in other words, to give us that breather in between 

so we can do the things that we have just talked about—this Committee supported it in money, in spirit and right on up to the fact 

that we are just about there. So it is a function of, you need more 

people. 

But what has happened in that same period of time, the demand 

in many cases has increased. In other words, when the Marine 

Corps said, ‘‘We need to grow to 202,000,’’ the Marine Corps was 

sitting with about 23,000–24,000 Marines on deck in Afghan and 

Iraq. We had nobody on deck in Afghanistan. 

Today, we have about 22,000 Marines in Iraq; 2,300 on deck in 

Afghanistan, putting another 8,000 in there. 

So what has happened is we have begun to eat some of that elasticity that we hope to be able to provide our forces back home. 

Now, that is the bad news. 

The good news is that I think the way we are going with a drawdown in Iraq and what I hope is a right approach in Afghanistan, 

I think we are going to be able to see what you are talking about. 

But you are not going to see it right now. You won’t see it in the 

Marine Corps for probably another 18 months. 


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General CHIARELLI. I can control just about everything but demand, ma’am. And that is the problem I have right now. The demand for Army forces is so great. 

As I indicated, we have 26 brigades deployed worldwide, not just 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in other places. The brigade that is 

sitting in Korea today might as well be sitting in the middle of 

Baghdad because I can’t get at it. It is deployed. 

And in addition to that, replacing those brigades takes me another six brigades’ worth of friction at any one time, because for a 

period of time, I have two brigades doing the job of one. 

So when you get up in numbers of over 30 that is where I am 

seeing the stress on the forces, in that short period of time they 

have back home, that dwell time, in order to meet this demand. 

And that is the only thing I can’t control right now. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

AIR REFUELING

Mr. DICKS. General Amos, whe the Air Force acquires a new 

tanker, would you like it to be able to refuel the Marine Corps Osprey, as a personal matter? 

General AMOS. Sir, I think you asked me that question last year, 

didn’t you? 

Mr. DICKS. Yeah. I think you said ‘‘yes’’ last year, too, as I recall. 

General AMOS. As a matter of fact I believe I took that for the 

record because I didn’t really know. 

I know the MV–22 Osprey tanks behind Marine C–130s and Air 

Force C–130s and airplanes like that. 

I don’t know that—I think the answer I got; I had better be careful here—I don’t think we tank the V–22 off of Air Force C–135. 

In fact, I know we don’t. 

Mr. DICKS. Wouldn’t it be in terms of just flexibility, if you would 

be able to have the ability to do it? 

General AMOS. Sir, I am a pilot and I have tanked off of every 

kind of airplane airborne and you can never have enough gas. 

So does that—— 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. The hearing is adjourned until 10:00 a.m., Thursday, March 12th. 

Thank you very much, Generals. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Boyd and the answers thereto follow.] 

SINCGARS

Question. When does the Army expect to make an award on the Request for Proposal for SINCGARS? 

Answer. The Army expects to make an award at the end of May 2009. The Army 

delayed the award due to Section 113 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, (Public Law 110–417). Section 113 restricts obligation or expenditure of not more than 75 percent of the Fiscal Year 2009 funding 

until 30 days after the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 

Integration provides Congress a report on Army Tactical Radio Fielding Plans. The 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration provided 

the report in April 2009. 


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Question. Is the $87M that was fenced in the FY09 Defense Appropriations bill 

included in this RFP award? 

Answer. Yes. The funding will be released to the Program Management Office 

once the following two items are completed: (1) 30 days after Congress received the 

Army Tactical Radio Fielding Plan from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration in April and (2) The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 110–329), 

page 244, provides that none of the funds in this Act shall be used for procurement 

of Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radios until the 

Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense committees that any such 

procurement of SINCGARS radios will use full and open competition to provide the 

best value for the Army radio requirements including consideration of multi-band, 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) solutions. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has given the Secretary of the Army the 

responsibility to address this issue because the Army has responsibility for procuring the SINCGARS radio and this certification was provided to the Congressional 

Defense Committees in April. 

Question. How many suppliers are eligible to compete for this RFP? 

Answer. The RFP is open to all manufacturers that can supply a tactical radio 

meeting the minimal requirements listed in the RFP. The Army’s market research 

indicated at least two potential suppliers. 

Question. What is the Army’s plan for acquiring Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) 

radios that can meet Operational needs per the FY07 GWOT directive? 

Answer. The Army responded on June 21, 2007 to the FY07 GWOT language provided in House Report 110–60, page 126. 

The Committee directed the Army report to the Congressional Defense Committees explaining the strategy to leverage available and qualified industrial capacity 

to produce the needed SINCGARS at a significantly faster rate. 

The Army discussed the matter with ITT Corporation who at the time was under 

a competitively awarded contract to produce SINCGARS radios. ITT committed to 

increasing production up to 10,000 SINCGARS per month in order to meet Army 

fielding requirements. A copy of ITT’s formal commitment to support this increased 

production capacity was enclosed with the original response. Therefore, the surge 

in ITT production capability met SINCGARS fielding requirements and significantly 

reduced delivery times of the needed radio systems. 

The Army also conducted a market survey to determine if other qualified vendors 

could meet SINCGARS requirements to the specifications of the SINCGARS Operational Requirements Document (ORD). Only ITT was able to meet the full ORD 

requirements at that time. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Boyd. Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

REDEPLOYING CONTRACTORS FROM IRAQ

Question. General Chiarelli, the Defense Department has a greater number of deployed contractors in Iraq than deployed Military servicemembers. How will you ensure that contractors will be redeployed proportionately to redeploying 

servicemembers? What is your schedule for redeploying contractors from Iraq? 

Answer. The Department of Defense, U.S. Central Command, and to a lesser extent the Department of the Army, continually assess the Iraqi personnel requirement to ensure the appropriate personnel strength to accomplish the mission. Logistics planning is in full swing to weigh the requirements for contracted support during redeployment, considering declining troop strength as well as increased need for 

some services, for example transportation, base closure and remediation support, 

and property management. The timeline for contractor redeployment may not mirror that of the Warfighters and may not be proportional. Additionally, as troop numbers grow in Afghanistan, some contractors may shift rather than redeploy. Redeployment timelines for combat forces and contractors are not discussed in non-secure forums due to operational security. 

MEDICAL CASUALTY EVACUATION TIMEFRAMES

Question. General Chiarelli, how long (in hours and minutes) has it taken to 

MEDEVAC personnel from Iraq to medical treatment facilities? How long (in hours 

and minutes) has it taken to MEDEVAC personnel from Afghanistan to medical 

treatment facilities? What is the MEDEVAC timeline goal? What is the Army doing 

to achieve MEDEVAC goals? 


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Answer. Army analysis (data from Jun 08–Dec 08) shows that the average time 

to evacuate a wounded Soldier to a hospital in Iraq is 45 minutes and the average 

time in Afghanistan is 1 hour and 20 minutes. Analysis continues, but preliminary 

numbers show an improving trend in OEF (during Oct 08–Dec 08 the average time 

was 1 hour and 11 minutes). The timeline standard for MEDEVAC is one hour. In 

fact, there is an ongoing joint effort to improve the MEDEVAC system to achieve 

the 1 hour standard. The Army, as part of this effort, has sourced a forward surgical 

team and four UH60 MEDEVAC helicopters/crews. The Air Force and the Navy 

have also provided additional assets as part of this joint effort. In addition, the 

Army will deploy an additional forward surgical team, a medical brigade command 

and control headquarters, and an additional 12-ship MEDEVAC company as part 

of a combat aviation brigade deployment. We expect that the employment of these 

assets will move the MEDEVAC time to less than 60 minutes in MND-East and 

South. 

BACKLOG AT ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT

Question. General Chiarelli, please describe the depot maintenance backlog for 

equipment to be repaired at Anniston Army Depot (ANAD). 

Answer. In order to provide a comprehensive response regarding equipment backlog at ANAD, we have verified our depot capacity and programs for critical systems 

at ANAD and the remaining four maintenance depots: Corpus Christi, Letterkenny, 

Red River, and Tobyhanna Army Depots. We continue to have ample capacity to 

meet Army requirements. 

The few cases where our depots have not been able to meet the Army-directed 

production schedules have been the result of supply chain issues or lack of unserviceable assets, and not the capacity of our depots. For example, at Anniston, our 

slower-than-required production of M2 machine gun production during the first part 

of fiscal year 2009 (FY09) was the result of nonconforming parts in the supply system. Army Materiel Command, Defense Logistics Agency, Headquarters, Department of the Army and parts suppliers worked together to resolve these problems. 

Once acceptable parts were available in sufficient supply, ANAD was able to quickly 

increase its production of M2 machine guns from 400 per month in 1st Quarter 

FY09 to 700 per month to meet the Army requirements. An example of unserviceable asset shortfall is the M1114 HMMWV program at Red River Army Depot. Currently there is a shortfall of several hundred vehicles scheduled to be shipped from 

Southwest Asia that have not yet arrived, therefore, impacting the production 

schedule. 

Our depots have the capacity to accomplish additional workload in all areas, especially considering the additional capability we have available through partnering arrangements and national maintenance contracts with original equipment manufacturers such as Oshkosh, Raytheon, and Boeing Aerospace Engineering. 

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

Question. General Chiarelli, how many times has the Army used the Presidential 

Reserve Call-up Authority over the past eight years? What is the period of obligation once a Ready Reserve service member has been called up? 

Answer. Over the past eight years, the Army has used the Presidential Reserve 

Call-up Authority twice: once for operations in Kosovo and also for operations in 

Bosnia. 

Ready Reservists are currently called to active duty pursuant to Title 10, US 

Code, Section 12302, for a period not to exceed 400 days: 365 days involuntary mobilization, plus 35 days authorized for out-processing and post-mobilization leave. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2009. 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS FORCE PROTECTION 

WITNESSES 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL N. ROSS THOMPSON III, MILITARY DEPUTY TO 

THE ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ACQUISITION LOGISTICS 

AND TECHNOLOGY, UNITED STATES ARMY 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES D. THURMAN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF 

STAFF, G–3/5/7, UNITED STATES ARMY 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE J. FLYNN, DEPUTY COMMANDANT, 

COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. VISCLOSKY. This morning the Committee will hold a hearing 

on force protection in the Army and Marine Corps. 

We are pleased to welcome Lieutenant General James D. Thurman, the Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Lieutenant General N. 

Ross Thompson III, Military Deputy to the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army; and Lieutenant General George J. Flynn, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, United 

States Marine Corps. 

Also in attendance, but I am told by General Flynn not allowed 

to speak because he is a Notre Dame graduate, Brigadier General 

Michael M. Brogan, Commander of Marine Corps Systems Command, who is with us as well. 

And I would be remiss at the beginning if I did not again congratulate General Flynn on Navy’s recent victory over Notre Dame 

in football. 

OPENING STATEMENT

Today we will explore a broad range of topics related to force protection, ranging from individual equipment, to MRAP trucks, to 

avoiding fratricide, to countering IEDs and snipers, to security of 

base camps. 

Over the Thanksgiving break, Chairman Murtha visited 

Landstuhl Hospital in Germany and had the opportunity to talk to 

some of our soldiers and Marines hospitalized there. One of the 

conversations dealt with maintenance and recovery of the MRAP. 

During today’s hearing, in addition to other items of interest, the 

committee wishes to address specifically maintenance and recovery, 

scheduling design change, and contracting of MRAPs. In addition, 

it has been suggested that the MRAP, as design and fielded for the 

fight in Iraq, may not be suited to fight in Afghanistan. 

Gentlemen, we are looking forward to your opening statements. 

But first let me recognize my good friend, the distinguished rankVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:11 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00191 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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ing member of the subcommittee, Mr. Young, for any remarks he 

may have. 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And I want to again welcome our distinguished guests back. This 

is beginning to be a habit so far this year. But we are always 

happy to see you. 

We are going to have a series of votes around 11 o’clock, which 

are going to probably interrupt severely the hearing. So I am going 

to forgo any opening statement in the interest of time so that we 

can hear the testimony of the distinguished witnesses. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much, Mr. Young. 

And, gentlemen, all of your statements will be entered into the 

record. And I believe, General Thompson and General Flynn, you 

have prepared remarks. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMPSON

General THOMPSON. Well, Congressman Visclosky, Congressman 

Young, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf 

of both myself and General Thurman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss Army force protection programs. 

Along with the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7, I have a joint 

written statement that I will respectfully request be made part of 

the record for today’s hearing. 

Our highest priority is the protection of our warfighters in an 

operational environment that today is both ambiguous and unpredictable. Over the last 8 years, we have successfully adapted our 

institutional processes to expedite the development and delivery of 

the latest force protection equipment to our deployed forces. 

With the support of Congress and the American people, the Army 

has invested heavily in new equipment and technologies to enhance 

soldier survivability and lethality. We recognize that our enemy is 

highly adaptive, and we established systems, enabled by your funding and support, to responsibly and rapidly procure equipment and 

promising technologies to protect the force. 

Today’s soldiers are better equipped and better protected than 

ever before. The Army’s framework for force protection is a systems-of-systems approach that integrates layers of protection to reduce vulnerability to attacks. These layers—situational awareness, 

individual protection, vehicle protection, and countermeasures—are 

integrated through the development of appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures based on lessons learned and rehearsed 

through realistic training. 

As you know, today’s battlefield has no front lines and poses 

threats throughout the entire area of operations. We have equipped 

our soldiers with precision lethality and advanced situational 

awareness systems required to defeat the asymmetric threats. We 

have developed and fielded extensive equipment for soldier survivability, including individual protection programs ranging from the 

advanced combat helmet, to life-saving body armor, to clothing that 


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allows our warfighters to adapt to varying mission requirements 

and environmental conditions. 

MINE-RESISTANT AMBUSH-PROTECTED VEHICLES

Soldier survivability has also increased in the area of vehicle protection. The Army worked closely with the Marine Corps to field 

the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicle, or MRAP, in record 

time. Presently we have over 9,000 MRAP vehicles in use in theater, providing enhanced crew protection and saving lives. 

Our industry partners challenged the limits of technology, guiding off of our requirements, and evolved the MRAP vehicles from 

providing only improvised explosive device, or IED, protection to 

providing both IED protection and explosively formed projectile 

protection. 

JAMMERS

In the area of countermeasures, all MRAP vehicles have CREW 

jammers integrated before deployment. ‘‘CREW’’ stands for 

‘‘Counter Radio-controlled IED Electronic Warfare’’ jammers. We 

devised joint strategies to keep our current fleet of jammers relevant to the constantly evolving threat. And we firmly believe that 

the success of the CREW program has led to significant reduction 

in the radio-controlled IED threat. 

Likewise, the counter-rocket artillery and mortar, or C-RAM, capability is an acquisition success, where joint efforts enabled the 

rapid development and fielding of a capability to detect, engage, 

and destroy in-flight rocket artillery and mortar rounds. 

Soldier survivability has increased dramatically with the provision of force protection solutions. And we thank you all for your 

strong support of our efforts. Your commitment to our men and 

women in uniform is widely recognized throughout our ranks. 

Sir, this concludes my opening remarks, and General Thurman 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint statement of General Thompson and General Thurman 

follows:] 


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Mr. VISCLOSKY. General Flynn. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL FLYNN

General FLYNN. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young, and members of the Committee, it is again an honor and privilege to be with 

you all today. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our force protection requirements with you today. 

Make no mistake about it, taking care of our Marines in harm’s 

way is our number-one priority. The Marine Corps’s approach to 

force protection is balanced and integrated. The three key parts are 

training; better tactics, techniques, and procedures; as well as 

equipment. 

This approach is needed to make sure that we maintain the initiative in dealing with a thinking and adapting enemy, that we do 

not rely on a single approach that limits our operational flexibility 

and effectiveness, and that we maintain both our individual and 

operational agility across the range of military operations. 

Additionally, we are always searching for and evaluating new 

concepts and technologies to see if they can provide us with operational advantage and enhanced force protection. And we field 

them as rapidly as we can. 

I look forward to answering your questions, and I thank the 

Committee for all its support that it has provided us. 

[The statement of General Flynn follows:] 


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Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Young. 

COMMON ACCESS CARDS

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, the issues of force protection, of 

course, are primary because we have to give our soldiers the best 

protection we can in order for them to carry out the mission that 

is important. And I am sure that a lot of the members will be discussing specific force protection measures. 

But I want to ask you about the common access cards that are 

made available to contractor personnel, and that so many are unaccounted for. Do you see this as a problem? And if so, what can you 

do about it, or what are you doing about it? 

Because having unauthorized personnel have access to sensitive 

areas where our American lives can be threatened is a worrisome 

situation. So I just wonder where we are on the issue of these common access cards. 

General THURMAN. Congressman Young, first off, the forward operating base commander in all the forward operating bases, whether it be in Iraq or Afghanistan, control access into the base. What 

we do, to get to your specific point, is we use the biometrically enabled card system through the biometrics system to screen personnel before they come in to make sure that that data on that 

card is who that person is. And we have been working a lot to 

make sure that we control that access, but the commanders do 

that. 

The other thing that we have is the surveillance systems in and 

around the base, plus the detection screening devices when folks 

come in and out of the base camp. 

General FLYNN. Sir, one other thing, based on my experience in 

being able to get around Camp Victory or even down at the British 

camp down in Basra, is we had to have extra additional cards, 

other than the common access cards, to get access to different 

areas. In fact, I carried around four ID badges with me, depending 

on where I was going. 

So I realize the sensitivity of the common access card, but we 

have taken some mitigation things in practice that do mitigate it. 

But I understand your message about having control over the 

cards. 

Mr. YOUNG. Information that the staff has provided us says that 

the Department has approved an estimated 39,000 contractor employees for cards without verifying that background checks had 

been initiated or completed. Is this accurate information? 

General THURMAN. Congressman Young, we can take that information and go back and verify that. I don’t have knowledge of that 

right now. But I would be more than happy to go back from the 

Army and tell you what we know, working with General Thompson, and provide you what the Army has. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I do have a real concern about this because access to sensitive areas where American lives can be threatened by 

people who—we might not even know who they are, whether they 

have ever been vetted for security, is worrisome and bothersome. 

So I hope you all pay attention to that. 


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Am I talking to the right people? Should I be talking to someone 

else about this issue? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir, I think you are talking to the right 

people here. 

From the standpoint of procedures, the people do have to go 

through background checks. To your specific question about contractors, contractors have to go through background checks to participate in any of the work that they do for the government. And 

those procedures are in place. 

The other way to control that, and one of the things that we have 

just put in place in the Army recently, is another additional step 

with the country clearances. To make sure that when somebody 

has to go through the process to get a country clearance to go into 

theater, we run the joint checks to make sure that person doesn’t 

come up as a convicted felon or has any issues that we would be 

concerned about. 

BIOMETRICS

From an acquisition perspective, I think that we are really going 

in the right direction, and it was touched briefly on with General 

Thurman, with biometrics. Leveraging the database and the use of 

biometrics, you know, the fingerprint data, the eye scans, is really 

an area that has great promise in the threat environment that we 

are in theater right now and has a great promise for law enforcement. And that is a jointly-run program, the Biometrics Task Force 

for the Department of Defense is run by the Army as the executive 

agent, but all of the materiel solutions, from a database to the 

scanning devices, are all jointly developed and jointly worked. 

General FLYNN. Congressman Young, I will owe you an answer 

back on our procedures for issuing the card, as well as our access 

procedures. And we will give you that as a record response, sir, if 

that is okay. 

[The information follows:] 

The Army does not prescribe guidance or overarching policy on installation or 

base access. This would fall under the auspices of The Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense and U.S. Central Command for bases on theater. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Young. 

Mr. Moran. 

COMMON ACCESS CARDS

Mr. MORAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Visclosky. 

This is a shared concern, I think, on both sides of the aisle, this 

issue of common access cards. We had some testimony from the Inspector General that was very disturbing. And I would like to 

know, what has happened to all of these common access cards that 

were issued by contractors? 

There were, I think we were told, about 24,000 issued for the employees alone; 303 contractors, as I recall, were given the authorization to issue common access cards. They were issuing them to 

their employees. And, as Mr. Young has suggested, they were givVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:11 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00223 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with HEARING
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ing them to people without requiring that they go through the vetting process. 

Are we getting those cards back? You know, you are telling us 

what you are doing in the future, although it seems like this has 

been going on for 6 years now. But what are we doing about the 

cards that exist out there now? 

General THURMAN. Congressman Moran, I know that the procedures that we just more or less talked about here have been implemented. And I know that, in theater, working with the contracting 

office down there, that they are going back and attempting to try 

to regain control of those. 

I think what is important is what we have done with the biometrics, with the biometrics identification system and how that 

interfaces with the automated FBI database. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. General, if you could move your mike up, please. 

Thank you. 

General THURMAN. And so what I can do is I can go back to the 

theater and get you exactly the answer to that question. And I 

would be more than happy to do that. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, I think it would be useful because, until you 

can respond to the IG’s findings, now that we know the extent of 

this, we have some culpability as well if we don’t deal with it. 

They said that about 93 percent of the cards that had been 

issued to foreign nationals had a government Internet access code 

on them. In other words, they could pass as government employees. 

A large number of the cards mistakenly, erroneously, perhaps deliberately, misidentified people as government employees rather 

than contractors. And while the IG can do these surveys and give 

us this information, we need to know the extent to which our security has been compromised by people getting on the base without 

proper authority. 

I mentioned a time when I was in Baghdad and there were these 

folks flashing—while we were waiting in line, they were going 

through another entrance. And I asked if he was Army, and one 

of the MPs—I said, ‘‘Who are all of those guys?’’ And he said, ‘‘Well, 

they are Halliburton. They run the place.’’ Well, they had their 

common access cards that had been issued by other Halliburton 

employees. And, you know, they never should have been issued. 

So it is one thing to say you are tightening up, you are bringing 

in more technology. I don’t think our concern was so much the 

cards that were issued by the military; they were the cards issued 

by contractors to contractors. 

The Chairman has time and again talked about the fact that the 

contractors are really taking over many of our efforts to perform 

what used to be inherently governmental services. When we saw 

the number of contractors in Iraq, it was as many as we had military people. All of them have common access cards. 

The IG also said that 93 percent of those cards have an inaccurate expiration date on them. You don’t have to write all this 

down; it is in the IG’s report. 

We need to follow up on this stuff. You know, if he gives us this 

information, we are made aware of it. If we don’t follow up and 

then there is some very serious breach of security, as I say, we 

share some culpability. 


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So I am glad Mr. Young raised this. Common access cards is— 

I think that is something that we are going to have to put some 

emphasis on until it is corrected. 

I will assume that you are no longer issuing—letting any contractors issue those cards. Is that true? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, is—I agree with you, there 

should not be any loose cards out there that are floating around. 

And we owe you the detailed procedures and what we are doing 

about the cards that was in the IG report. And we will bring that 

back to you. We need to go back to theater and get their current 

status of that, and I would be more than happy to take that for 

the record and bring it back. 

[The information follows:] 

The Army does not prescribe guidance or overarching policy. This would fall under 

the auspices of The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence and U.S. 

Central Command. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would be interested for the record to know who it was that gave 

the authorization to the contractors to be issuing these cards to 

other contractors. Who is responsible for the policy itself, and who 

actually allowed that to occur? 

It doesn’t matter who the contractor was. That was an inherently 

governmental function, and it does compromise our security. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I do know that the procedures today, if 

you are a government employee, military or civilian, you get a common access card and a personal identification number. And that is 

how you get access into or onto a base. 

If you are not a government employee, your access is based on 

the biometrics data, the fingerprint or the iris scan, the eye scan. 

And that is checked against both the FBI database and the Advanced Battlefield Information System (ABIS) database, which is 

another database. And that database is both here but there is also 

the local database that is there. 

So we have really tightened up the procedures on access to all 

the bases based on what I just described. 

Mr. MORAN. So just having that common access card doesn’t get 

you onto the base anymore? 

General THOMPSON. Doesn’t get you onto the base. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, they didn’t mention that to us. 

General THOMPSON. Without a pin or, if you are a nongovernment employee, without a biometrics scan of some kind, either fingerprints or the iris scan. 

Mr. MORAN. But not what is on the card. They have to put their 

own fingerprint in, and then they have to check it against a database. It is not dependent upon what card they happen to be carrying. 

General THOMPSON. Right. And the database is both local and 

global. And so they update the local database. And if there is any 

doubt, then that individual doesn’t get on the base. 

We can go back, like General Thurman said, and detail out the 

exact specific procedures that we go through. But I do know that 

that is the broad description of how they do that today. 


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Mr. MORAN. Well, if that policy is being followed, it is not as 

much of a concern, but that is not what we were led to believe by 

the IG. Thank you. 

Thank you. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Moran, we will get back to you on the authorization and the sequencing too. I think that is a very important 

question. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

ELECTRONIC FRATRICIDE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, welcome back. In a hearing like this, you never know 

what might get thrown at you. I have some questions relative to 

electronic fratricide on the battlefield. 

A couple of years ago, I was at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. And since it is on the Air Force Web site, the Rivet Joint 

aircraft has some pretty remarkable capabilities. One of the things 

I heard from the crews—I asked them how many missions they 

were flying over Iraq. And I was surprised—this was a couple of 

years ago—when they said none. And it was interesting, they explained that the sensors on the aircraft were, in effect, being 

jammed by all the devices deployed on the ground. I don’t know 

whether there has been some improvement, but I would like your 

take on what is happening there. 

I read in the New York Times, General Thompson, that the 

Army is setting up its own teams for electronic warfare. What is 

the battlefield out there like now? And what should we anticipate 

in this sort of area as we move troops from Iraq into Afghanistan? 

What sort of problems are there? Either from a Marine or Army 

perspective. It is pretty important. 

General FLYNN. Sir, one of the things is, there is no doubt that 

the electronic spectrum is getting pretty crowded. And one of the 

key things that we are doing—and I know we are doing this in the 

Marine Corps, and I am sure the Army is—is we are deconflicting 

the frequency spectrum and what has been going on in the airwaves based on what missions are being performed. Because there 

are some issues with—some of the devices countering out another 

device. 

So it is almost very similar to what you do in fire support coordination. You deconflict based on the mission that you are doing. And 

we have built the expertise at the operational planning unit to do 

frequency deconfliction, and that is what we are doing. We have to 

do it not only for our transmissions but also for some of our collection efforts and all those things. We do deconflict now, sir, and it 

is an active part of our operational planning and execution matrices. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And you are also obviously, both your service and the other services, are involved in the IED task force. And 

that, obviously, has—— 

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. In fact, we took a lot of our electronic 

warfare pilots and we trained them. Actually the Navy deployed 

some of them, with both Army and Marine forces, to help us with 

the management of the frequency spectrum. 


sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with HEARING
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So it is something that we actually have to manage and we have 

to deconflict, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yeah. Well, I am sure. 

I want to hear the Army, where do you stand. I wonder whether 

the issue is being managed here. Obviously, our enemy knows of 

this, sort of, situation, and they can actually potentially make it 

worse. 

General Thurman. 

SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT

General THURMAN. Congressman Frelinghuysen, what I would 

tell you, sir, is, similar to the Marine Corps, one of the things that 

I learned—and I learned this the hard way going into Iraq initially—is how crowded the frequency spectrum is getting. When 

you add things such as our friendly devices as Blue Force Tracking, 

the Force XX1 Battle Command Brigade and below systems that 

we have that shows us where everybody is on the battlefield, your 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), the full motion video—all of 

that takes spectrum. And then you put in our jammers. 

What we had to do on my second tour was make sure that before 

every combat operation that you are constantly deconflicting the 

spectrum. 

And so we have learned a lot about this. It is going to be the future. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, the spectrum is shared. You know, in 

Afghanistan we have our NATO ‘‘allies,’’ I say in quotes, and they 

obviously have, you know, their own set of electronics. 

General THURMAN. Right. And you are absolutely right, we have 

established electronic warfare as a specialty in the Army. We 

learned a lot from the Navy. The Navy helped us with this. And 

we see that as one of the things that we have to continue to develop in the future so we can get at those sorts of things that you 

see to make sure our systems are more effective. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But, historically, tell me if I am wrong, the 

Army has been relying on the expertise of the Air Force and Navy, 

is that right? 

General THURMAN. Sir, initially, we had to go to the Navy to help 

us with the counter-IED effort because that is where a majority of 

the expertise was. And now we are developing our own capability 

in the Army, and we share joint assets. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I just want to know whether there is a 

game plan here. 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir, there is. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Is there a task force? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. We are documenting electronic warfare specialist into the Army force structure. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We have—the higher level is obviously ongoing cyber attacks. 

General THURMAN. Right. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And you have other assets which could be, 

you know, compromised. 

General THOMPSON. What General Thurman, Congressman 

Frelinghuysen, is pointing out is that we did rely, initially, heavily 


sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with HEARING
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on the Navy and the Air Force, because they had electronic warfare 

specialists as part of their force. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And you are training some of them up, according to what I am reading. 

General THOMPSON. We have created that capability in the 

Army. We are starting to train soldiers from a force structure perspective, which is the process that General Thurman controls. We 

are growing that capability inside the Army. 

And from a systems perspective, we look to deconflict that spectrum before we field something to a unit. So, in a lot of the labs 

and the chambers that we have, we put CREW devices with Blue 

Force Tracking, as an example, to make sure that there is not spectrum deconfliction. When we get a threat and we know the threat 

is using a different part of the spectrum, based on the intelligence 

reports, we adjust. 

When you see upgrades to things like the CREW system, the 

anti-jam system, it is based on the threat moving to a different 

part of the spectrum. So we update the system and we do that 

deconfliction as much as possible. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. This is a huge issue. It is a moving target. 

And you are giving us some pretty good clear assurance here across 

the services that you have this issue in hand? 

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. 

General THURMAN. I would just caveat one thing. We just have 

to continue to be adaptable to the threats as they emerge and as 

we field more systems to make sure, from a joint perspective, that 

we fully understand what we are doing in the joint domain of the 

spectrum. The spectrum is a huge, complicated issue. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The enemy has been looking over our 

shoulder, you know. 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Not only in Iraq, but obviously there are 

other adversaries. And I assume they know there is a certain degree of—I won’t say chaos, but some difficulty in this issue of 

deconflicting. 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Is that accurate? 

Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Ms. Kaptur. 

MRAP MAINTENANCE

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome. Good to have you before us this morning. 

I just wanted to focus on MRAPs and the maintenance of those 

and how they are being received by soldiers and Marines in the 

field. 

Our chairman, Mr. Murtha, has on several occasions spoken 

about encounters he has had, one in particular with a Marine in 

Germany at Landstuhl who commented that when they had a 

breakdown in theater that the Marines really weren’t trained to fix 

it. And, in fact, the MRAP had to be winched and put on a flatbed 

and then hauled in to a repair site where contractors worked on 

it. 


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And my question is, is the field repair of MRAP vehicles beyond 

the training level of our Marines and soldiers? And are these repairs now being handled by contractors, or are you integrating this 

into the training of our regular force? 

General FLYNN. Ma’am, I think there are two parts to your question there. 

Out in the field, if an MRAP loses its mobility, the ability to recover that by another vehicle—for example, if it can still roll, you 

can self-recover with another MRAP, meaning you can hook up to 

it and you can tow it back into the operating base. If it has a severe mobility loss, meaning lost wheels, axles, we have to send out 

a pretty heavy vehicle, normally a tank retriever, to bring it back 

just because of the weight of this vehicle. 

When the program was fielded, we did contract for 2 years at the 

operating bases for contractors to do that maintenance. That is not 

necessarily a bad thing for us, because it meant that we could keep 

Marines focused on doing other things, and we just bring it in to 

the garage to get fixed. 

We don’t do repairs on the road. We recover and bring them back 

to the operating base. And the issue there—and I understand 

where that Marine was coming from—is it is a heavy vehicle, and 

the only way you can bring it back really is with a vehicle of equal 

size and equal power to bring it back in, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. So you are telling me that the repairs right now, 

General, are being done by contractors then? 

General FLYNN. In the forward operating bases, yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Are you considering transitioning contracts to 

insourcing rather than outsourcing the repairs? 

General FLYNN. Ma’am, when the vehicle was fielded, we had a 

2-year maintenance contract that was part of how the program was 

developed. And right now we are looking at the way ahead on how 

to continue on with the maintenance of the vehicle. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Who handles that? Is it just one contract with one 

major company? 

General FLYNN. Ma’am, I would like to take that for the record. 

I am not sure how many companies are involved in that. 

[The information follows:] 

The following companies have contracts to perform maintenance on MRAPs in the 

Forward Operating Bases: (1) MANTECH (Afghanistan/OEF contractor logistics 

support only); and (2) MRAP Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) provide 

Field Service Representatives (FSRs) as technical support to both OIF and OEF. 

The OEMs include BAE, Navistar Defense, General Dynamics Land Systems—Canada, and Force Protection Industries, Inc. Additionally, government mechanics from 

Red River Army Depot provide sustainment-level maintenance support in Iraq and 

Kuwait. 

General THOMPSON. I can add to that a little bit. And the real 

expert on MRAP is sitting behind us here. But, from a broad standpoint, it is not atypical to do contractor logistics support for the 

first couple of years a system is fielded. And MRAP is no different. 

The emphasis on MRAP initially was getting the most vehicles 

out there as fast as possible. And although you like to bring the 

logistics package and the sustainment package along, we took conscious, purposeful decisions to field more systems. And we are 

catching up a little bit on the sustainment packages. But we do 

have the contract logistics support. Because there are different 


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variants of the systems, it is with the contractors that built those 

systems, for the most part. 

We did the same thing with Stryker a number of years ago when 

we fielded the Stryker vehicles. We made a decision to field those 

with mostly contract logistics support. And we are now bringing 

that capability to maintain the Strykers back in and training the 

soldiers to do that and putting that force structure into the Stryker 

formation. 

And so, as we go forward on MRAP, ma’am, depending on how 

many and what variants we keep in the force structure, we will 

train soldiers and Marines on how to take care of those things and 

not rely exclusively on the contractors. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I am glad to hear that, because we have some information here. For instance, a soldier doesn’t know how to release 

the air brakes prior to the vehicle being towed, or they can’t do 

simple repair like headlights. This is according to information that 

we have. 

So I am just curious, I mean, you would think the soldier would 

be at one with their equipment, or at least there would be people 

trained in theater to handle whatever might occur since these are 

so essential. We have had over 60 percent of our injuries due to explosive devices-related—— 

General THOMPSON. When those soldiers and Marines that are 

using those vehicles get those vehicles fielded to them, they get 

new equipment training. So they are taught the things that they 

need to be taught in order to operate those vehicles safely and to 

do the operator-level maintenance. We call it ‘‘Dash 10’’ level maintenance, but it is the operator-level maintenance. So it would surprise me that we didn’t take that soldier through the training to 

know how to release that brake on the system, because that is part 

of operator-level training. 

MRAP VEHICLE IMPROVEMENTS

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, time has probably expired, but I 

also wanted to ask questions for the record dealing with the actual 

comfort of the soldier or Marine in the vehicle and any after-market changes that have been made so that they are not bumping 

their head or it is easier for them to get down. 

I know that, when we were over there, we looked at several 

pieces of equipment; we talked to the soldiers and the Marines who 

were using them. And what changes have been made or are you 

considering making in the after-market arena to make it more 

functional? 

For instance, they were complaining that when they had to sit 

in the back, they were facing inward rather than outward, so that 

they could see the field. And I don’t know whether that has been 

changed or not. 

Do you have any comments you want to make on after-market 

changes? 

General THOMPSON. We continue to take feedback from the soldiers and the Marines in the field and make improvements to those 

vehicles. We do that not just on MRAPs but on all systems. 

To the specific question about the soldiers facing inward, I mean, 

one of the issues there—— 


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GUN PORT ON MRAPS

Ms. KAPTUR. They can’t fire through the ports. That is the issue. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, ma’am. But gun ports on the sides of 

the vehicles were something that was looked at initially, and we 

elected not to go with the gun ports—and I can ask Mike Brogan 

to correct me if I am wrong—because a port is a hole in the side 

of the vehicle, and that creates a seam, if you will, or an area of 

vulnerability. And so the vehicles are being used as transport—we 

don’t necessarily want to fight from those vehicles. And so, having 

gun ports on the vehicles is not something that we want. 

And because of the protection from the undermine, the vehicle 

has got a V-shaped hull. So the configuration that the manufacturers did—we left it up to them, based on our requirements. But if 

you can imagine a V-shaped hull, where the space is, the leg room, 

if you will, is in the center where the V goes down. And so a lot 

of the seats facing to the center are because of leg-room considerations and space considerations inside the vehicle. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Kingston. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

HUSKY MINE DETECTING VEHICLE

General, I wanted to ask on the Army side of things—and I am 

not sure if the Marines are using the Husky or not. But I actually 

did not know about the Husky until the National Guard brought 

it to my attention and they wanted funding for it, the Georgia National Guard. 

But, as you know, since 1979 the USDA has been using groundpenetrating radar to study soil samples and archaeological and cultural resources and things like that, but that the Husky puts this 

to use for IED detection. And yet—I have to confess full ignorance, 

there may be a lot of money in the budget already for it, but I have 

never heard about it from the Army. I heard about it from the 

Army Guard. 

So I was just wondering, is this something that is very useful? 

Somewhat useful? Does it have problems? And do we need to support more money for it? 

General THURMAN. Congressman Kingston, the Husky, what our 

experience has been, it is a good vehicle. It is good to look at shallow buried IEDs. We have those in our route clearance teams operating in Iraq today. We are going to be putting some into Afghanistan. They have asked about those. 

And what it does, it looks for nonmetallic and metallic IEDs and 

for underbelly threats. That was one of my biggest complaints, as 

a division commander, is having some type of ground-penetrating 

capability that you can find deep-buried IEDs. And we are still 

working through that. The Joint IED Task Force has been working 

that. But this is an important system to keep in our route clearance teams. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, why is it, just to kind of explain it to me, 

that the National Guard is asking for it as opposed to, say, the 

MRAP? 


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And this Committee, as you know, got very excited about MRAPs 

2 or 3 years ago. And you hear so much about the reduction in fatalities and injuries because of MRAPs, but we don’t hear about 

ground-penetrating radar systems like the Husky as one reason 

that the fatalities have decreased. 

How many are there in there? How wide is the use, for example? 

And is it something that this committee should really be more enthusiastic about? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, what I would tell you, as a guy 

that takes the requirements into the Army, is we look at a myriad 

of route clearance capabilities. And Husky is one of those that we 

have in the system—or in our route clearance capability. And we 

can give you the full lay-down of all of those capabilities and show 

you the importance of each one of those. And I would be happy to 

lay that down for you. 

But, yes, right now Afghanistan has asked for 80 of them to go 

in there. And the 48th Brigade, who I have been working very 

closely with, out of Georgia, they will fall in on the MRAPs that 

are over there. But we are going to put more route clearance capability into Afghanistan. 

Mr. KINGSTON. So if we request an earmark for more of that, 

that would be something that we would get Pentagon support for? 

General THURMAN. Sir, I will take the requirement and I will 

pass that up once we validate that, depending upon the other balance of capabilities they are asking for in Afghanistan. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I think that the 48th got—is Kentucky Guard—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Excuse me, if I could. General, if you could move 

the mikes closer to you? Thank you. That would be terrific. 

Mr. KINGSTON. But they seem to have gotten, you know, fired up 

about it from the Alabama National Guard. But as they were about 

to go over there, they said, ‘‘We really would like to have these.’’ 

And so—— 

General THOMPSON. I think what we should do, Congressman, is 

go back and look at what we have as the total requirement, which 

is the purview of the G–3. How many of those do we think we need 

in the force structure? And I, frankly, don’t have that information 

right in front of me, and how many we have bought to date and 

the distribution of those assets in theater. 

If the Guard is asking for them, there is no preference to give 

them to, active soldiers versus Guard soldiers. Whatever soldier 

needs that capability is going to get that capability. 

And we do look at the balance of those. And Huskies, like General Thurman said, are part of the dedicated route clearance and 

convoy clearance teams that go out there in advance of a convoy 

or a mission to do whatever they can to eliminate the IEDs that 

could be out there in the force. And Husky is a great system. And 

from a requirements perspective, we should take that number back 

to you and lay that out. 

Mr. KINGSTON. All right. 

[The information follows:] 

The total Army Program of Record requirement for Huskies is 710. This is based 

on a Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E) requirement for 672 

Huskies in 28 Route Clearance Companies and for 38 Huskies to support Table of 

Distributions and Allowances (TDA) units. In addition, the Army has a validated 

Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for a total of 286 Huskies in both the Iraq 


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(222) and Afghanistan (64) Theaters. We have fielded 201 to U.S. forces in Iraq and 

44 to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. We will begin fielding systems to fill MTO&E requirements in FY10. 

General Flynn. 

General FLYNN. Sir, my experience, I have actually been on route 

clearance with the Husky. I was with the Alabama National 

Guard. So it is a valuable capability for the IED. 

But it goes back to the larger issue, that the way to defeat the 

IED is through multiple platforms. There is no one silver bullet. 

And this capability is one of those capabilities. Just like, right now 

we are looking at other capabilities that we would like to take into 

Afghanistan to enhance our counter-IED capabilities. So all these 

are pieces to the puzzle of putting the enemy on his back heels and 

us maintaining the advantage. But it is an effective capability. 

And my understanding of this equipment is, when units deploy 

into the theater, they fall in on it. So it was a key part of the 20th 

Engineers Brigade route clearing teams, no matter what area of 

Iraq they were operating in. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, we certainly want to work with you guys on 

this, because we want to make sure everybody—you know, where 

it is practical, that we can support the effort together. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you. 

Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. Why don’t we go ahead with the regular order? I will 

come in at the end. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Bishop. 

BODY ARMOR

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Dicks. 

Gentlemen, welcome. I am interested to explore body armor. 

General Thurman, recent news articles in the Army Times and 

Defense Review, along with your testimony, indicate that the X 

Small Arms Protective Insert XSAPI plates will provide better protection than the current Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts. 

And in your testimony you state that the Army is going to procure 

120,000 sets of the X Small Arms Protective Inserts in 2009. And 

you say that the plates will be shipped to Kuwait as a contingency 

stock, and they will be available for use by the theater commander. 

If the X Small Arms Protective Insert plates are better than the 

other plates, why are you storing them as a contingency stock rather than getting them out to the soldiers immediately? 

And wouldn’t you say that there is a greater need for the X 

Small Arms Protective Insert plate in Afghanistan, particularly 

where, according to news accounts, the enemy is using the Chinese 

armor-piercing rounds, which are copycat rounds of our armorpiercing rounds? So wouldn’t you think that it would be urgent to 

get that out to the soldiers immediately as opposed to stocking 

them in Kuwait as a contingency? 

General THURMAN. Congressman Bishop, we made that decision, 

on the 120 sets, to go ahead and move those into theater contingency stocks, because the theater had not asked specifically for 

those to be issued. And that is why we positioned those forward. 


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Now, in a classified sense, we can show you the data that we 

have on the threat. And we would be more than happy to show you 

that, with the penetration capability and all of that and what that 

defeats. 

[The information follows:] 

The Army G3 and ASA(ALT) have worked in conjunction with SAFM–BUL to arrange a classified briefing for Congressman Bishop on the topic of the current threat 

level in Afghanistan and how it relates to body armor. 

Mr. BISHOP. But you do, in summary, think that it is better than 

the ones currently used? 

General THURMAN. I will let General Thompson address from the 

perspective of body armor, because he works that every day. But 

I would tell you I think the body armor we have today is very good, 

the Interceptor Body Armor that we have. 

Mr. BISHOP. I was just trying to understand if one was superior 

to the other. And according to Army Times and Defense Review, 

the X Small Arms Protective Inserts are better than the enhanced. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I would answer the question this way, 

if I could: ‘‘Better’’ is in the eyes of the beholder. So does XSAPI 

provide a higher level of protection? Yes, or we wouldn’t have procured it. 

Do we need that level of protection based on the threat? And that 

is what General Thurman is referring to. That is something that 

we cannot discuss here. 

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. I understand now. 

General THOMPSON. But the XSAPI is heavier. And so it is the 

balance, it is the better—from the commander’s perspective, do I 

want something that is maybe high level of protection, but if it is 

heavier, how does that impact my soldier or Marine’s ability, especially in a place like Afghanistan, to carry all that extra weight and 

be able to do his mission. 

Mr. BISHOP. Yeah, we had a hearing on that yesterday, so I appreciate it. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. And so it was part of the decision 

calculus. And that is why having it available in theater so, if the 

threat materializes or the commander thinks he needs that, then 

it is available to them. So that is where I leave that question at 

that point. 

BODY ARMOR TESTING

Mr. BISHOP. That is understandable. 

Do the Army and the Marines collaborate in the process of improving the body armor? 

The DoD Inspector General (IG) recently reported that there 

were some deficiencies in the Army’s data recording process for the 

testing of the body armor. Can you, kind of, tell us in terms of 

those deficiencies that the Inspector General discovered? 

And describe for us the stages that body armor is actually tested. 

And tell us—and Ms. Kaptur has stepped out, but the subcommittee is very, very concerned about—well, very, very interested in, I should say, the extent to which the testing is contracted 

out. 

General THOMPSON. There are a couple parts to your question. 


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Do the Army and the Marine Corps collaborate on personal protection equipment for soldiers and Marines? The answer is, absolutely. That data is shared. 

The standardization of test processes and test criteria is something that is ongoing right now. And that was one of the subjects 

of the DoD IG report. And that effort, not just with the Army and 

the Marine Corps but also with the Special Operations Command, 

is ongoing right now. 

We have addressed, well before the IG report was written, the 

systemic issues and the test processes and the test procedures on 

all personal protective equipment at multiple levels inside of the 

Army and the Marine Corps. We have a process called the Army 

and Marine Corps Board where we look at these requirements and 

look at how do we develop those joint solutions so if, for example, 

if we go to a higher level of protection on a combat helmet, is it 

just the Marines that are going to do that or are the Army and the 

Marines going to do that together? And those are the kinds of discussions we have all the time. 

The body armor that the soldiers have is the best in the world. 

The body armor protects the soldiers against the threats that are 

out there. We test the body armor through multiple means. You 

can’t even begin to produce body armor unless you go through a 

first article test to go into production. And then, when you are in 

production, every production manufacturer has lot acceptance tests, 

where we test the individual lots before they are issued, even after 

they have gone into production. 

And then we have a very detailed surveillance testing program, 

where we pull plates out of the inventory and test them with nondestructive test equipment. We X-ray them, and then we bring 

them back and shoot them to make sure that, depending on how 

long they have been out there in the field, they are still providing 

a level of protection. 

So I am very confident that the overall testing process that we 

have in place makes sure that the plates are good when they are 

issued and that they are good after they have been in the field for 

a while. 

Mr. BISHOP. Is that process contracted out, or do you do that inhouse? 

General THOMPSON. Part of the testing has been done by National Institute of Justice-certified lab facilities in the past, with 

the appropriate government oversight. And this is an issue we are 

working through right now. 

From a policy perspective, we have elected to bring in-house the 

testing of body armor, because we think it is an inherently governmental thing. If the capacity is not there to do it in-house in a government facility, we may do some of that in the contractor facility, 

but it will have the appropriate inherently governmental oversight 

of that process from the standpoint of the program office and the 

Defense Contract Management Agency. 

And even if it was done in the contractor facility in the past or 

could be done in the contractor facility in the future, it will be done 

against the standard test protocol and process. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Ms. Granger. 


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HELICOPTER SURVIVABILITY UPGRADES

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

My question has to do in Afghanistan with the consideration of 

our airborne assets, specifically helicopters. And we have had hearings and know that the Army and Marines both are increasing the 

number of helicopters. 

My concern is the leftover missiles from the Soviet-Afghan conflict. And my report said there could be as many as 2,000 Stinger 

missiles and portable surface-to-air missile systems that I know are 

outdated, but how do we—what do we specifically know about their 

capability and the danger to our helicopters, particularly with, like, 

the SAM–7, the Stinger assets in there left by Iran? And can you 

address that, please? 

General THURMAN. Yes, ma’am. What I would tell you, as far as 

the specifics of what we know about that, that is classified information. And we could do that in a closed hearing with you on that. 

[The information follows:] 

The Army G2 has worked in conjunction with SAFM–BUL and OCLL to arrange 

a classified briefing for Congresswoman Granger on the topic of leftover missiles 

from the Soviet-Afghan conflict. 

I would tell you that is a concern of ours. And that is why it is 

so important to continue to upgrade our countermeasures systems 

on all of our aviation assets as we put more airframes into Afghanistan. But we can tell what you we know about that in a classified 

sense. 

Ms. GRANGER. We will make sure that happens. 

General THURMAN. All right, ma’am. 

General FLYNN. Ma’am, from the Marine side of the house, too, 

since the beginning of our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we 

have continually been upgrading the aircraft survivability measures that are on the airframes. So we can give you the capabilities 

of those systems in a classified forum, as well as what we think 

the threat we are going to face. And that is the best forum to do 

that, and we will be happy to do that. 

Ms. GRANGER. We will do that. 

Thank you. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Hinchey. 

JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Generals. Thanks very much. I very much appreciate what you are doing and very much appreciate the answers 

that you are giving to these questions. It is very informative, and 

I think it helps us a lot. 

One of the things I wanted to mention to you is the focus of attention that you give on the safety and security of the military operations, the vehicles and things of that nature. And, as I understand it, there is a new vehicle that is under development, the 

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. The focus of attention for this vehicle 

apparently is on the circumstances that are known and, to some 

extent, anticipated in Afghanistan rather than Iraq. And, as I understand it, this vehicle is still undergoing analysis, or it hasn’t 


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gotten to the point of development yet. And I would appreciate anything that you could tell us about that. 

In addition, I understand also that there is a possibility that 

there may be a requirement for a hybrid in that Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. Is that the case? Or is something else as sophisticated 

as that moving forward? 

General FLYNN. Sir, we are very interested in the Joint Light 

Tactical Vehicle. It is a joint program. And, as I read the other day, 

the Australians are also interested. So also some of our allies are 

interested. 

One of the things on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is, it is in 

the technology demonstration phase right now. And that phase will 

last about 24 to 27 months. There are three different manufacturers, with three variants each, that are going to go through this 

demonstration phase for us to find the best possible alternative. 

The key part about this vehicle is what we are seeking to do in 

the development of the vehicle is we are seeking to get the right 

balance between what we call the iron triangle—to balance payload, performance, and protection—and to get the best out of all 

three. Because there is protection in mobility, and there is also, you 

know, the ability to payload. The heavier you armor the vehicle, 

the less payload you have. So in this vehicle we are trying to balance all three. And we are trying to get back some of our battlefield 

mobility in this. 

And also the transportability of the vehicle, we want to be able 

to have it to be helicopter transportable by the CH–47 and by our 

heavy lift assets as well. And I know that, as we are looking at the 

vehicle, we are going to press technology to deliver the best they 

can in terms of the power train, in terms of the engine. All those 

things are things that we are going to look at, as this goes through 

its technology demonstration phase right now, sir. 

General THOMPSON. And, sir, if I could just add to that from an 

acquisition perspective, where MRAP is led by the Marine Corps 

program office with full Army participation, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is led by the Army with full Marine Corps participation. So these are two great examples, I think, where we look together at what the requirements are and try to develop joint solutions. 

And everything that General Flynn just described is exactly correct. We are at the first part of the technology demonstration phase 

for the three contractors that were competitively selected. And 

there was a protest to the GAO by two contractors that weren’t 

part of the three that were competitively selected to go into source 

selection. And the GAO ruled in favor of the government and said 

our source selection process was done fairly. And so we will evaluate those three contractors over the next 27 months. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Is the hybrid issue going to be included in this? 

General THOMPSON. The three designs that are in the technology 

demonstration phase do not include a hybrid solution. But at the 

end of the technology demonstration phase, those three and any 

other competitor out there that wants to propose against our requirements will be fairly evaluated and taken forward. So if somebody has a hybrid solution in a vehicle that meets the other reVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:11 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00237 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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quirements, they will have an opportunity to compete again and be 

selected. 

FORWARD OPERATING BASE SECURITY

Mr. HINCHEY. Thanks very much. 

If I have time for just one more brief question about the situation 

that is developing in Afghanistan, last July there was an attack in 

eastern Afghanistan against our military forces. And I think that 

there were a number of military forces at that time who were 

killed. I think that number was nine or something in that neighborhood. There were something in the neighborhood of 200 people 

that caused that attack, and they were very well armed with a variety of materiels. And I think that it is to be expected that something similar to that is going to happen again; we are going to experience those kinds of things coming up in the future. 

Can you now, under these circumstances, tell us how many operations there are in eastern Afghanistan, anticipating what is going 

to happen in the future? And what kind of technology is about to 

be used or is in the process of being used to try to determine when 

those kinds of attacks are likely to occur? Is there anything like 

that that you can talk about right now? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, I know exactly what you are 

talking about, about the attack that you referred to. 

The theater commander, General McKiernan, in Afghanistan, 

working with CENTCOM over there, can tell you, you know, from 

an operational perspective what they are doing. 

As far as technologies, what we are trying to do is to give them 

the surveillance capabilities, the sensors, the cameras. They have 

asked for that to protect those combat outposts and forward operating bases. And we are pushing some of those capabilities forward. 

As a matter of fact, recently I saw some of it in use. So you have 

that around the base perimeter or the combat outpost to provide 

that early warning and sensors. 

But it goes back to what General Flynn said a while ago. There 

is no silver bullet with the way they are operating, and it requires 

training and constant awareness of the enemy and the threat you 

are facing. 

General FLYNN. One thing I would like to add to what General 

Thurman said: This all starts back in the United States when we 

do our predeployment training. Right now, what we are focusing on 

is developing at the company level, which is a new twist of how we 

are operating now, intelligence cells and operation cells at the company level because of how we are spreading out on the battlefield 

to deal with this threat. 

We are also providing them with the ability then to integrate the 

intelligence that they are getting from various sources, to include 

human intelligence, on the ground. Like General Thurman said, we 

have developed for Afghanistan for our forward-operating bases a 

new ground-based surveillance system that they can use, both— 

some that are—you have the big version that you need a tractor 

trailer to move; you have a medium one that can move with a 

Humvee-type vehicle; and then we also have one that is man-portable. 


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So we are not only equipping Marines and soldiers with the 

things that they need to be safe, but we are training on how to do 

it. And we need to make sure that they know how to do it before 

we deploy them. So that is all a key part of doing the things and 

to make sure we are not surprised out in the field, sir. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Dicks. 

MRAP ALL TERRAIN VEHICLE

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Generals. 

Maybe you have covered this, but I am just going to ask it one 

more time. We understand that some of the MRAPs are too heavy 

and would have a problem going offroad. And now going into Afghanistan, you know, you are talking about the all-terrain vehicle, 

or there is another one, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. 

Are we in a situation where we are buying too many of the 

MRAPs that are too heavy and are not as flexible? There has been 

a concern about that. Or are we adapting and going with the lighter vehicle? And can you give us the status on it? 

General FLYNN. Sir, from the Marine Corps perspective, what we 

developed last summer was a comprehensive ground tactical 

wheeled vehicle strategy, or a ground tactical vehicle strategy. And 

what we are trying to do in that strategy is to field the number 

of vehicles that have different capabilities in the right numbers 

that gives us balance, that we could use vehicles where they could 

best be used situationally dependent. For example, the current 

MRAP we have does very well in certain areas of Iraq; it wouldn’t 

do so well in some areas in Afghanistan. 

We are looking for a lighter vehicle. We are looking for vehicles 

with more flexibility so that we could use them over a wider range. 

And we do have that plan to do it, and we are actively pursuing 

it. 

The key thing for us to do is to balance the needs of each of those 

vehicles, that we get the right number and have just the right 

amount of capability and not excess capability in any one area, sir. 

And that is our approach. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

What is the Army’s approach? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, it is the same. The total requirement for 

MRAPs to date has been over 16,000 vehicles. About 12,000 of 

them are for the Army. 

Mr. DICKS. Are we buying ones that we don’t need? 

General THOMPSON. No, sir. We are at the end of the requirement and the production for the MRAP. The MRAP all-terrain vehicle is a requirement to get a lighter vehicle that can handle some 

of the offroad mobility with the levels of protection that we seek. 

We are in the source selection process right now to get a lighter 

MRAP to handle some of the challenges in Afghanistan. 

Mr. DICKS. So how many have we bought so far? 

General THOMPSON. The total requirement and buy for MRAPs 

has been 16,238. 

Mr. DICKS. But how many have we bought now? 

General FLYNN. We have bought them, sir. 


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Mr. DICKS. This is for both the Marine Corps and the Army? 

General THOMPSON. And the Navy. 

Mr. DICKS. So the light ones are on top of the 16,000? 

General THOMPSON. That is correct. 

Mr. DICKS. Are there going to be extra ones that are not used 

in Iraq or Afghanistan that are going to be deployed in the United 

States back to the units? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. What the services have done is, we 

have looked at the enduring requirement for MRAPs. A lot of those 

type of vehicles will be in route clearance companies. 

But we know what we think the requirement is for MRAPs and 

the MRAP all-terrain vehicles in Afghanistan. From an Army perspective, for Afghanistan it is about 2,670 MRAPs. And we think 

the requirement right now today is for about 2,000 of the lighter 

MRAP all-terrain vehicles. None of the MRAP all-terrain vehicles 

have been bought yet because we are just now in the evaluation 

process. 

Mr. DICKS. So you need 4,600? 

General THOMPSON. No, sir. The Army requirement right now is 

2,080 for the MRAP all-terrain vehicle. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. But you are not going to use any of the regular 

MRAPs? 

General THOMPSON. No, we are, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. How many of those? 

General THOMPSON. The requirement for Afghanistan is 2,675. 

That is a subset of the 16,000 that have already been bought. So 

we are going to use them in Afghanistan and are looking—if we 

have a viable solution against the requirement for a lighter vehicle, 

we will put some of them on contract as we go forward. 

Mr. MORAN. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. DICKS. I yield. 

MRAP PROCUREMENT

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, sir. 

The IG also told us that, with regard to these purchases, oftentimes you don’t seek out quantity discounts, and, in one case, spent 

$90 million more than needed to be spent because no quantity discount was requested or provided. 

Mr. DICKS. That was the Marine Corps that did that. 

General FLYNN. Sir, let me answer that, sir, if I could. 

Mr. MORAN. There was a 1,500 MRAP order, I grant you. But 

they also talked about the fact there was a disparity in the price 

of MRAPs from $300,000 to $1.1 million. And that applied to the 

Army, as well as the Marine Corps. 

But go ahead. 

General FLYNN. Sir, the best way I can answer that was the Marine Corps was the program lead for the entire Department of Defense. And we have reviewed the IG report, sir. And keep in context that when the MRAP program was under way then, and we 

were trying to field those vehicles as quickly as we could. We went 

out to nine or 10 different manufacturers of those vehicles to ask 

them to give us the best that they could give us and that we would 


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push them through so that we could get these vehicles as quickly 

as we could to the soldiers and the Marines who needed them. 

And, as the IG reviewed that, you know, we understand what is 

in the report, sir. We took the lessons learned and we will apply 

that to procurements in the future. But, again, sir, this was one 

where speed was important, and that is what we did, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Dicks, would you yield for a question here? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes, I yield. 

MRAP DISPOSITION

Mr. YOUNG. The issue of MRAPs in Iraq is a bookkeeping item 

here. As we withdraw from Iraq, we won’t be using nearly as many 

MRAPs in Iraq. The MRAP is not the ideal vehicle for Afghanistan 

because of the terrain, because of the lack of paved highways, because of the mountains, et cetera. 

So the MRAP ATV is, as Mr. Dicks has been discussing—what 

is the plan for the MRAPs that we will no longer use in Iraq, that 

we will not send to Afghanistan? Are we going to bring them home? 

Are we going to leave them in Iraq? Are we going to sell them to 

somebody? What is the plan. 

General FLYNN. Sir, from the Marine Corps, we own about 2,225 

MRAPs. And our plan right now is to keep about 800 operational, 

and we would put the remainder into our prepositioned stocks for 

use in an area that they would be well-suited to be operated, sir. 

So that is what we are looking at right now. It is not finalized. 

But some would remain in the operational inventory, depending on 

where they were needed, and then the rest would be put in our 

prepositioned stocks. And some could even be put in our sea-based 

prepositioned stocks. But we are still working through the plan, 

but that is the general approach right now, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Can the MATV be transported on a C–130? 

General THOMPSON. I am just checking with General Brogan. 

The requirement is to be able to. So that is one of the things that 

we will be able to evaluate from the offerors that are in the source 

selection right now, is can they meet the C–130 transportability. 

Mr. YOUNG. Can we get General Thompson’s response to the 

question, what do we do with the MRAPs? 

Mr. DICKS. Yeah, of course. I yield. 

General THOMPSON. I am going to let General Thurman answer 

that one, because it is more of a requirements issue, sir. And so 

he is going to give you that answer. 

General THURMAN. Congressman Young, what we have looked at 

is, right now there is a need right now for 702 training vehicles to 

eliminate some of the training concerns that we have had with soldiers going over, you know, getting new equipment fielding. There 

is a requirement right now. We are trying to fill that. So there is 

a training requirement to put that at our combat training centers 

in our training centers so we get that training. 

The Army is much like the Marines. We are going to put some 

forward stations in our Army prepositioned stocks. We are going to 

put some of them in our other formations to enable them—or maneuver enhancement brigades or sustainment brigades. There is a 

requirement for command and control vehicles in some of our 

logistical units. 


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So what we have looked at is how we use all those. We intend 

to integrate the MRAPs in a lot of our force structure in the Army. 

So they are not going to be sitting being wasted. We don’t see that. 

And that is what we are undergoing right now as we look at all 

our force structure. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I thank you. 

Thank you, Norm. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

REMARKS OF MS. KILPATRICK

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, Generals, one more time. 

That is where I was going with some of that, but let me ask you 

this. From the discussion I have heard this morning and the reading, the Marines service is in charge of the MRAPs procurement, 

the coordinating and all of that. 

General FLYNN. That is correct, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And the JLTV, which is another joint operation, 

the Army is going to be in charge of that. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Similar vehicles, right? MRAP and the JLTV, is 

it a different vehicle, is it similar? 

General FLYNN. Yes, ma’am, it is different in a number of ways. 

The MRAP vehicle—for example, the MRAP all-terrain vehicle that 

we are looking at developing, as General Thurman said, it is going 

to be C–130 transportable. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And is that the same, when you talk about the 

MRAP vehicle, the ATV vehicle, is that the JLTV? 

General FLYNN. No, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. That is a third. 

General FLYNN. They are two different vehicles. And primarily 

you can distinguish them by weight and capability. The MRAP allterrain vehicle, we are hoping that that weight is going to be somewhere around 22,000 pounds. On the JLTV we are looking for a vehicle that—I would hope, optimistically, is transportable by helicopter, so you have got to be in about the 15,000-pound range. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. ATV’s weight, what is that? 

General FLYNN. An all-terrain vehicle, 22,000 pounds is about 

where we are look at. I think max on a C–130 is about 25,000 

pounds. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And both of those are anticipated to be used in 

Afghanistan? 

General FLYNN. I think the JLTV, because it is going through 

the technology demonstration phase right now, we are not going to 

see that vehicle until, I think, 2015, is when we are going to have 

that. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. So it won’t be immediately in Afghanistan. I 

hope we are out of there long before that. 

General FLYNN. That is what we are looking at, ma’am, is we are 

not seeing complete fielding of the vehicle until 2015. 


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FORCE PROTECTION

Ms. KILPATRICK. So do we have the force protection available as 

we move into Afghanistan, in terms of the equipment and all? Not 

just the body armor, but the whole arena. Are we ready to protect 

the forces with what we have today? 

General FLYNN. Ma’am, I think if you go back to what I said a 

little bit in the beginning, is that force protection is a combination 

of a number of things. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Sure. 

General FLYNN. We have made tremendous, I think, progress in 

how we train the force before it deploys. We are using new techniques. We are using new observation techniques. We are using 

new tracking techniques. Our goal at times is to always be the 

hunter and never be the hunted. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Except we are being hunted at the moment. 

General FLYNN. And we are the hunters now. And we give Marines that mindset. And part of that is knowing the environment 

that you are operating in, anticipating changes in that environment, and knowing exactly when that changes. And that allows us 

to spot IEDs. That allows us to figure out people who don’t belong. 

ARMORED TRUCKS

Ms. KILPATRICK. Okay. Let me stop, because—thank you, General. And I appreciate it. Thanks for that dedication. 

So, therefore, if the JLTV is not going to be ready, and you said 

the MRAP ATV might be ready, will we have the quantity we need 

in the terrain of Afghanistan to protect the troops and win the 

war? Now, ‘‘win the war’’ is a whole philosophical thing, but protect 

the troops is—is it enough? I mean, do we have enough to go in 

there? The President has already announced that we are sending 

so many thousand into Afghanistan. Are my troops going to be protected? 

General FLYNN. Ma’am, the short answer is your troops are going 

to be protected. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And will they have what they need to fight? 

General FLYNN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. All right, General, please. 

General THURMAN. Ma’am, if I could, every single day and week 

we look at the requirements through a process inside the Army of 

meeting the needs of the commanders to make sure not only do 

they have what they need in theater but also the next deployers. 

I look at that every single day in the Army over there to make sure 

that we are meeting those needs. 

And I would just say what General Flynn said. We have a combat-experienced force now, and we are leveraging everything we 

learn every day in terms of what we are seeing on the battlefield. 

But I can assure you that we are going to make sure, from an 

Army sense and a Marine Corps, that we provide the best equipment we have. 

COMMON ACCESS CARD

Ms. KILPATRICK. Okay. And if the President announces and we 

are not ready, will the services speak out and say, ‘‘Mr. President, 


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we may need a little bit of time to get ready for this’’? We were 

not ready when we went into Iraq, and consequently we went in 

there with the wrong vehicles and too many IEDs and all of that. 

I am hopeful we don’t repeat, and it sounds like we are more ready 

for this one. 

Which is that common access card. It is not the combat vehicle, 

but it is just as important. And it would help today, General 

Thompson, when you talked about the other two lines of 

verification being biometrics, because that is important. The last 

time I think we heard just the card, and contractors were issuing 

the card to contractors. And we didn’t feel like the monitoring— 

which is why some of my colleagues spoke about that today. It is 

so important. 

And you are going to get back with us with some more information. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Contractors issuing cards to other contractors 

with little monitoring, that is not a good thing. 

Thank you. Please protect the troops. Do your jobs. We love you 

and appreciate your service. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

FORCE PROTECTION CHALLENGES

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, I would like to talk to you about force protection 

challenges for logistics units. It certainly received national attention in March of 2003, during the second Gulf War, when a convoy 

of the U.S. Army’s 507th Maintenance Company and elements 

made a wrong turn and were ambushed. 

Could you provide us an overview of the organizational training 

and equipment improvements made to improve force protection for 

Army and Marine Corps logistics units? 

And the other question would be, how have any doctrine or training programs been changed to try to improve circumstances? 

General THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer 

that. I am very familiar with 2003. 

What we have done is—it is not one piece of kit, if you will, that 

protects a convoy. First off, it is the training that we have done at 

our combat training centers. But convoy protection has been improved in what I would classify in about four distinct areas. 

It is improved situational awareness. And what am I talking 

about there? I am talking about having the right communications 

gear in the vehicles: the blue force tracking system, which tells everybody where they are at and exactly the location. We have issued 

satellite communications. The use of also our normal onboard 

SINCGARS radio. 

IED detection is a second component that we have had, that we 

have talked about with CREW devices. Vehicle survivability; the 

individual soldier protection. The convoys that move back and forth 

are either in an up-armored Humvee or they are in an MRAP. The 

commanders decide the distribution of that. The other thing that 

we have done is we have put the armored security vehicle out 

there, in helping escort these convoys. 


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So, you know, soldier protection, the vehicle survivability and 

IED detection, and just having a knowledge of what is going on on 

the battlefield of the threats. 

And, last, it is training. And you can never be satisfied with your 

training levels. That is what I have learned as a professional. And 

you never can believe your own publicity. And you have to constantly take those lessons learned and integrate them in our training centers. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And how has the training evolved, General? 

General THURMAN. Sir, what we have done, at least in the Army, 

at our three major combat training centers at Fort Irwin and at the 

Joint Readiness Training Center down at Fort Polk and the Joint 

Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, 

our joint multinational training center, we do extensive convoy live 

fire, role players, use of contractors against uncooperative irregular 

threats, if you will. And we have issued a lot of convoy planning 

tools that have been distributed widely across the Army. 

I think we have done a lot. And we learned a lot, making sure 

that we have the right basis of issue in terms of equipment, how 

we equip our logistics formations. 

General FLYNN. Sir, the key thing is, it all starts first with individual training and combat skills, and then we move to unit training. The key part is all our units, before they deploy, have to get 

certified through their predeployment training. You actually get a 

report card, if you will, or an evaluation of how effective your unit 

is in an immersive environment. And we actually do it all live-fire, 

so we know if you can handle the situations. 

Like General Thurman said, improve situational awareness on 

the battlefield, knowing where everybody is, and also knowing 

what threats you are likely to face. Better mission planning before 

you go outside the wire and execute those logistics support missions. And improve survivability on the vehicles, and also enhancements to those vehicles in terms of not only survivability but also 

our weapons mix in that, and also the addition of CREW devices 

to the systems that counter the IEDs. 

So it has been a comprehensive approach, and it is one that we 

test before they leave here to make sure they have what it takes 

to survive. 

COUNTER SNIPERS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. If I could ask about countering snipers, too, 

which obviously can disrupt operations, could you address what 

technology-based solutions are currently being used? And, again, 

getting to the issue of training, situational awareness, any changes 

in evolution that has taken place, as far as countering snipers? 

General FLYNN. Sir, there are two approaches to countering snipers. One is pre-shot, and the other one is post-shot. The best 

counter to a sniper is another sniper. And we make sure that we 

train our snipers to be the best and most deadly on the battlefield. 

And they are. The pre-shot deals with enhanced optics for your observation skills. Post-shot, we are looking at technology for muzzle 

flash and also for different acoustic devices on the battlefield. 

So it is a multiple approach to counter sniper but one that, 

again, starts with the basics of training and basic observation 


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skills. But we leverage technology in the areas of optics and acoustics. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Could I just ask, is it a growing problem? Has 

it always existed? Is it static, as far as incidence? Is it diminishing 

in Iraq and Afghanistan? I don’t want to make an assumption either way. 

General FLYNN. I am not sure if it is—I think snipers on the battlefield will always be a challenge. And I think it will be situational-dependent. And one type of area where you are operating 

could be the best place for a sniper to operate. So the enemy is 

going to try to take advantage of that situation. And we have to 

do all that we can to maintain the advantage over the enemy 

where we think snipers are likely to operate, sir. 

General THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, what I would tell you is, for 

counter-sniper, what we have done in the Army, similar to the Marine Corps—it is just something I think we will have to see in the 

future and on any battlefield—but what we have done is we have 

employed the acoustic gunshot detection system Boomerang and 

the gunshot detection C2 system on some of our platforms. We 

have used closed circuit televisions. 

And I agree that, in order to defeat a sniper, you need to have 

more snipers on the battlefield and awareness of the enemy. The 

SWAT system, which is individual gunshot detection, we have 

fielded in Iraq right now today roughly 350 sets. We just put 100 

sets with the 56th National Guard Brigade Stryker that deployed. 

The use of binoculars, thermal imagery magnifiers. The measures 

such as just veils and protection. 

The other system that we have put in theater is a Common Remotely Operated Station (CROWS) system, which is to protect the 

gunners on our combat platforms. It has been integrated on the 

M1, the up-armored Humvee. I had the opportunity to test that, 

when it first came out in Baghdad. So you can mount, obviously, 

all your machine guns or your MK–19 grenade launcher. 

So it is a combination of those types of technologies. But, more 

importantly, it gets back to training levels and awareness of the 

environment you are operating in. And I can’t overemphasize that. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you. 

Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. No more questions. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. No further questions. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

BLUE FORCE TRACKING

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

That CROWS system is pretty neat and pretty important. Thank 

you for mentioning it. 

Just a comment. On the blue force tracking, this is sort of a work 

in progress, isn’t it? You invoked the blue force tracking system as 

if it was complete. Hasn’t it been worked on for 4 or 5 years? 

General THURMAN. Well, I will let General Thompson talk about 

the system itself. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I sort of got the feeling that it is not totally 

mature. 


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General THOMPSON. That is correct, Congressman. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I think it is important to know. I mean, we 

have issues of the enemy doing things to us, but, in reality, we 

have so much of our own equipment over there, we are potentially 

jamming our own ability to communicate. 

General THOMPSON. But on all our systems, not just blue force 

tracking. But we are constantly upgrading those systems based on 

the changes, if the technology is available, the threat materializes. 

We go through a change proposal, an engineering change proposal 

process. We do software upgrades for software-intensive systems. 

And so, depending on what system you are talking about, you could 

be in multiple versions of software. But that is just part of the normal acquisition process in response to the requirements. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. For the record, I would like to get for the 

Committee a description of where we stand relative to the various 

technologies that are included in that system. 

General THOMPSON. In the blue force tracker? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

The Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) Blue Force Tracking (BFT) system has been a major combat multiplier since its introduction to our 

combat formations in 2003. Since first use in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Program 

Management FBCB2 has fielded over 70,000 BFT systems to Active, Guard, and Reserve components. FBCB2–BFT is the primary ground and air platform battle command system for our joint forces. It provides Situational Awareness (SA) information (where am I, where are the friendly forces, where is the enemy?), and Command and Control (C2) messaging between our platforms, remote tactical operation 

centers, and headquarters locations. 

There are several reasons why our Soldiers and Marines continue to request more 

systems: (1) ease of use, (2) supports their mission across extremely large operational areas, and (3) provides reliable communications, even with all the other electronic equipment on the platform. Feedback from Soldiers and commanders in theater indicates that BFT is often the only means they have to communicate beyond 

line-of-sight while on the move in remote, high threat environments. PM FBCB2 implemented an accelerated design, development, production, and fielding of a BFT capability that does not interrupt existing Counter IED capabilities. The key to ensuring these remain an enduring capability is close collaboration with the organizations 

that provide Counter Remote Controlled IED (RCIED) Electronic Warfare (CREW) 

capabilities. Furthermore, BFT provides the ability to communicate using free text 

messaging with anyone else who has BFT, regardless of whether they are different 

units, ground or air, Army or USMC—it does not matter. 

While BFT is a critical enabler in its form today, there are additional critical 

areas that are addressed in our Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) software development. The FBCB2 JCR software will include the application that incorporates these 

capabilities in the following paragraphs. Government acceptance testing commences 

early May 2009. In August 2009, we will conduct testing to ensure software interoperability with other Army and joint warfighting systems. The FBCB2 JCR will be 

postured to begin fielding after a successful operational evaluation in April 2010. 

Capability will include but not be limited to the following improvements: 

1. Simplifying the Database. FBCB2 JCR will allow users to start up and join a 

network with minimal pre-configured information, and then to send ‘‘Self Descriptive SA’’ to share address book information with others (like address, role name, 

alias, map symbol code and task organization) to support SA and C2 messaging. 

With JCR, networks will no longer be related by hierarchy, are extremely simple 

to plan, and are not affected by task reorganization. 

2. Securing the network: Achieving a Secret L-band capability is one of the most 

sought after improvements requested by our Soldiers. We have developed a technical solution to achieve this using the Programmable In-line Encryption Device 

(short title KGV–72). This capability prevents unauthorized exploitation of BFT 

data while in transit over the network, and is scheduled to be fielded with the JCR 


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software as part of the Army’s Battle Command Capability Set beginning in 

FY11/12. Fielding will be in accordance with Department of the Army priorities. 

3. Improving the speed of the L-Band network. PM FBCB2 will complete the development and testing of the Blue Force Tracker 2 (BFT 2) satellite network/transceiver in FY 10, and will insert this widely-requested capability into the Battle Command Capability Set FY11/12 baseline once ready. BFT 2 will provide update rates 

(increased position accuracy) and enable the distribution of more tracks to meet the 

additional FBCB2 fielding density. This greatly improved bandwidth (over 10 times 

greater) opens the possibility of pushing other types of data down to our platforms 

across the battlefield. The BFT 2 Satellite Network Upgrade Program will expand 

the performance, capacity and capability of the FBCB2 satellite communications 

network. 

4. Improving the hardware. PM FBCB2 has had great success with maintaining 

a reasonable pace with the commercial computer market. We have started fielding 

ruggedized platform computers with dual core processing capability, two times the 

random access memory, and four times the hard drive capacity. We continue to improve the performance of our system while continuing to reduce the cost per platform. Furthermore, we are engaged with other project offices, exploring ways that 

we can leverage common computers, and looking for ways to reduce the number of 

unique systems on our tactical platforms. 

MRAP TRAINNG

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I, sort of, wanted to get a question on—you 

know, everybody loves the MRAPs, and obviously they have done 

a remarkable job in saving lives—the training aspect. 

I think before testimony before the House Armed Services Committee back in January, I understood that the Army had only filled 

4 percent of its vehicle requirements for training. Was that accurate? And if that is accurate, has that been improved considerably? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. First off, that was accurate. We 

made a conscious decision to push all the MRAPs forward, so we 

had the protection first. And then we knew all along we would 

have to make up a training requirement. 

Currently, the requirement is for 702 full-up MRAPs to do training. We have also—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But in terms of actually—those who are 

qualified. You know, this isn’t driving a Humvee. You know, this 

weighs a billion tons. There are not too many people that are capable of doing that. I just sort of wondered where the Army stands 

relative to those that are qualified to actually run the vehicles. 

General THURMAN. Well, we license those soldiers to make sure 

that—obviously, they have had the required training. That is documented. It is documented with the units. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I asked the question, if we are sending 

1,800 into Afghanistan—and the picture I have is MRAPs stuck in 

the mud, and then you have to use a vehicle of a similar weight 

to pull them out, because there are so few roads over there. And 

then there is the issue of rollovers here. There have been considerable rollovers. I assume that has something to do with lousy infrastructure, either in Iraq or Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, you virtually don’t have any, other than the roads we have built. 

Are the people trained that are using these vehicles, as well as 

the new ones? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. Currently, the Army is fielding a 

drivers trainer, a common drivers trainer with interchangeable 

cockpits, if you will. And then we are doing a rollover egress trainVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:11 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00248 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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er that we will push forward, that, if the vehicle rolls over, there 

will be a trainer. And that will be in Iraq and in Afghanistan. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The issue for me is training requirements. 

How many people are qualified? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, we won’t let—not just on MRAPs, but 

we go through a licensing process for every type of vehicle in the 

Army’s inventory. And so you get the training that you need to be 

able to operate that vehicle, whether it is a tank, an MRAP, a 

Humvee, a Bradley fighting vehicle. 

To the specific numbers on MRAPs, we have, because of what 

General Thurman said, we pushed the vehicles forward because we 

wanted the protection there as much as possible. We now have 25 

of those vehicles in the training base in the United States, another 

25 en route. And the total requirement of the training base is the 

702 that General Thurman alluded to. 

We have got common driver training, simulators. The requirement is for 20 of those; seven of those have been fielded to date. 

Rollover trainers, the requirement is for 25; five of those were 

shipped to theater this month. And we know where we want to put 

the other 20. So we are putting them where the soldier population 

is greatest, and so that the soldiers that are on orders to deploy 

get to learn and experience that vehicle in a simulation training 

environment. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So there is some lagging in training. And 

do the training hours match what the Marines are doing? Marines 

are required to drive 125 training miles. I mean, do you match 

what the Marines are doing, in terms of their training requirements? 

General THOMPSON. I don’t know the answer to that question. 

We would have to go back and look at the hours and the types of 

training. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The bottom line for me—you know, we may 

be exiting from Iraq. We are moving more MRAPs into Afghanistan, and their use is limited because of the lack of anything to 

drive on. And I just wondered whether the people that are going 

to be using those MRAPs are—if you have enough backup. Can you 

get it for the record, if we don’t have it here? 

General THOMPSON. From my perspective, the way I would answer that is that you want to do more training rather than less 

training. And so the availability of vehicles and the availability of 

the simulator trainers and the rollover trainers is lagging a little 

bit from what we would like to see. You want more actual handson training done and more simulation training done. And we have 

both the systems being fielded and the money to be able to do that 

today. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You have the money? 

General THOMPSON. We have the money to do that. That is the 

issue. 

General THURMAN. Congressman, if I may, also we did field some 

surrogate trainers at our combat training centers. We took some of 

the five-ton vehicles and we modified them to try to get ahead of 

the training issue. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. Is the training done in Kuwait? Or where is it done? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, for the folks going into Iraq, 

they train in Kuwait, and then we do new equipment training in 

Afghanistan. That is why it is important, at least that is from the 

Army. As we get more trainers, we want to put them out at certain 

installations so we can catch up with this. 

Mr. DICKS. So they are in Kuwait, and then they go into Iraq. 

Are you going to use Kuwait for Afghanistan, as well? Did I hear 

you say that? 

General THURMAN. They need to do the new equipment training 

in Afghanistan. 

Mr. DICKS. And then we are going to get some so we can do some 

equipment training in the United States? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir, that is how we are doing. 

JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Let me ask you this: How do you work with 

JIEDDO, with General Meigs? 

General FLYNN. Sir, I work very closely with them, sir. The Marine Corps warfighting lab works for me, and we are directly linked 

to JIEDDO on a daily basis. 

Mr. DICKS. It looks like, when I just saw the briefing, the numbers in Iraq are coming down rather dramatically, of IED attacks, 

but they are going up in Afghanistan. Is that how you see it? 

General FLYNN. Sir, in the latest data I saw this week, that is 

true. But, also, our force levels are going up. And when you track 

the data, because our force levels are going up, there is a relationship. For example, the Marine Corps, we just went back to Afghanistan, so our encounters with IEDs are going up right now. And it 

is on an upward trend, and it is on an almost near-zero trend in 

Iraq right now. So, as we are meeting with the enemy, sir, we are 

seeing them employing IEDs. 

Mr. DICKS. General Thurman, do you have anything you would 

like to add to that? 

General THURMAN. I would just add to that, Congressman, that 

is exactly what we are seeing in the Army. And what you have to 

worry about are those areas that maybe you haven’t been in. 

Mr. DICKS. Yeah. 

General THURMAN. And that is where you really have to pay attention there, because you will stumble onto something there if you 

are not careful. But that is what I would tell you. But I have been 

watching—you know, I watch IEDs every day. But we work very 

close with General Meigs. 

Mr. DICKS. I liked what the General said here earlier, that it 

takes a multitude of technologies. It isn’t just one silver bullet on 

this in this IED world. And I think the JIEDDO thing has been 

a big success. 

And the other thing that was interesting about the briefing, this 

isn’t just Iraq and Afghanistan. This now is a worldwide event that 

we are going to have to work with our allies and friends around 

the world in adapting to. We have been very fortunate that we 

haven’t had attacks like this in the United States, but in other 

parts of the world, it is a pretty common occurrence. 


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General THURMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Kingston. 

CH–47F CHINOOK

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I wanted to ask you about the CH–47F Chinook helicopters, again, that the Guard uses. I understand they are 28 

short. And I was wondering what a statistic like that really means, 

when they say 28 short. They are asking for a plus-up in the budget of six, and I just wanted to get your opinion on that. 

General THURMAN. From the requirement perspective, we are 

short some aircraft. One thing, since the start of the war, in terms 

of the combat losses, actual combat losses, we have lost 112 aircraft. That was my latest account. And then you add on the attrition, so it takes you up to about 100. That is not CH–47s. That is 

all aircraft. And, to date, for the combat losses, we have had about 

28 return—we have had 28 returned, for an all total of 40 when 

you look at what has been washed out or from a safety standpoint. 

We do not have all the aircraft we need right now, due to losses 

and that. And when we went through the aviation transformation, 

we reorganized inside the reserve components and the Army to 

make our combat aviation brigades more capable. So what we have 

done is we make sure that the units that are going into the theater 

are full up. That is how we manage aircraft. And we work close 

with the National Guard Bureau and the Army National Guard to 

make sure that they have what they need. 

We can get you the complete laydown on CH–47s, and I would 

be happy to do that, of the total requirement of where we are headed with the CH–47F. And I can take that and show you by State. 

[The information follows:] 

The Army has a requirement for 489 CH–47 aircraft. It is now modernizing from 

the CH–47D to the CH–47F and will complete this by 2018. Today, the Army has 

457 CH–47 on hand. This includes 56 MH–47 for Special Operations, 63 CH–47F, 

and the remaining 338 aircraft being CH–47D. Of the 338 CH–47D, 29 are currently 

inducted to the remanufacturing line and will be returned as new CH–47F. Seven 

CH–47D aircraft are at Corpus Christi Army Depot and will be returned as recapitalized, like-new, CH–47D. 

The Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve have a requirement for 195 CH–47 aircraft. This includes 159 aircraft in the National Guard and 

36 in the Army Reserve. Both the Army National Guard and the United States 

Army Reserve requirements are authorized for units that in many cases are spread 

across several states. 

The Army National Guard maintains CH–47 units in 24 states. The Guard resources units to 100% of authorization one year prior to mobilization. Deployed 

units have their full complement and this includes Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Illinois and South Carolina with six on hand of six required; Texas and Oklahoma deployed with one extra aircraft above their 6 required to meet mission requirements. 

Alabama, Georgia and Washington have 6 of 6 as they prepare for deployment. California and Hawaii have 10 of 12. Oregon and Mississippi have five of six. Nebraska, 

Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio, Michigan, Nevada, and Montana have 

four of six. Maryland and New York have three of six. 

The United States Army Reserves maintains three CH–47 companies: one in Fort 

Lewis, WA, one in Fort Eustis, Virginia, and one company split between Olathe, 

Kansas and Fort Carson, Colorado. Currently, the company from Fort Lewis is deployed with eight of its 12 aircraft. Two of its remaining four aircraft are at Corpus 

Christi Army Depot and Fort Carson, Colorado. 


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Mr. KINGSTON. If we requested the plus-up of six in the fiscal 

year 2010 budget, is that something you would support? Or how 

would you feel about that? 

General THURMAN. Sir, as a G–3, I need to go back, because the 

budget from DoD has not been sent out on fiscal year 2010. And 

so I would have to go back and just look at what the total requirement is on what you are asking specifically, on the six. 

Mr. KINGSTON. One reason why their request caught my attention is yesterday we had a hearing where we discussed the average 

weight of an infantry soldier right now is 93 pounds, in terms of 

the fully equipped rucksack and everything that goes on him. And, 

you know, particularly in Afghanistan where you have such rugged 

terrain and mountains and so forth, it would appear that those 

Chinooks would be very helpful in terms of lightening the infantry 

load. 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. And we are, in fact, increasing aviation in Afghanistan just for those reasons. Helicopters are one of 

the most high-demand items that comes in to me as a requirement. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, I would love to get your opinion on it, particularly the fiscal year 2010 budget. 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Bishop. 

MEDEVAC

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

I would like to talk about medevac, if you will, for a moment. In 

January, before the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary 

Gates addressed the difference in medevac response times in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. And of course he said the goal in Iraq was to 

have a wounded soldier at a hospital in an hour and, in Afghanistan, close to 2 hours. And he directed that there would be an increase in the number of medevac helicopters and medical professionals that would be assigned to Afghanistan. 

What were the shortages in medevac assets in Afghanistan that 

he identified? And what additional assets, both medical and aircraft, have actually arrived in Afghanistan since that time, and 

what is on the way? What is the average time to evacuate a soldier 

now in Afghanistan? 

And we understand that certain combat search and rescue aircrews have been reconfigured to help with the medevac problem 

and the shortfall. What are the pitfalls of taking the combat search 

and rescue aircrews and assigning them to this medevac, as opposed to their search and rescue functions? And that would be of 

interest, of course, to Mr. Kingston. He represents Moody Air Force 

Base, which does significant search and rescue. And have those 

search and rescue operations been helpful in Afghanistan to solving 

the medevac shortfall? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, we have done extensive work 

with the Marine Corps, as well as the other services. You know, 

this is a joint war, down in Afghanistan, and we need to use all 

joint assets that are available to extract our people off the battlefield in a timely manner. 


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We are going to put more medevac aircraft, at least from the 

Army side, into Afghanistan. You are correct, we were not meeting 

the standard. But, you know, it is the size of that country, as compared to Iraq, is considerably different. I equate it to Texas versus 

West Virginia, about that size. 

That said, what we are trying to do is look, also, with our forward surgical team capability, to put more of those assets in, so 

you can quickly treat a soldier, Marine, airman, sailor, or whoever 

is out there, contractor, in a quick manner. We are not there yet, 

on dropping that down to an hour. But we are serious about this. 

We need to use all assets that we have in there, is what I would 

tell you in this environment. 

General THOMPSON. I think the exact numbers, I mean, the forward surgical teams, is about a 40 percent increase that is going 

to go into Afghanistan. And the numbers of medevac aircraft that 

we plan on putting over there is about a 75 percent increase over 

there today. 

Mr. BISHOP. What is the timeline on that? 

General THURMAN. Sir, we are working that right now. We are 

talking in the next 30 days, as we work that. 

General FLYNN. Sir, on the medevac, we have changed our force 

deployment posture. At the beginning of the year or just prior to 

the beginning of the year, we only had an infantry battalion over 

there. We have now since changed, and we are actually deploying 

our air assets with it. 

And, just like General Thurman said, it is not just the air assets. 

It is also the level-two surgical care. So we are doing a number of 

things. 

And, you know, for the record, in a classified setting we can give 

you the medevac laydown of where are all the different aspects of 

the care, is I think is the best way to answer the question for you 

now, sir, as well as what is going on now and what is projected for 

the future to be in theaters. 

[The information follows:] 

This is a more complex situation than we have faced in Operation Iraqi Freedom; 

and as such, we are ensuring that we get it right on behalf of our Soldiers. I will 

have my staff coordinate with your office to provide you a detailed classified briefing 

on MEDEVAC operations in Operation Enduring Freedom at first opportunity. 

Mr. BISHOP. But basically medevac for Marines is provided by 

the Navy. 

General FLYNN. No, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. You are doing it jointly? 

General FLYNN. Army, Marine, Air Force, you know, sir, they are 

all part. When you see the medevac laydown, it is a number of assets that do it, just like the hospitals. 

Also, it is coalition, as well, too, sir. Because in the areas we are 

working, a lot of the areas that we work are under the control of 

our NATO allies. And, in some cases, that is where the medevac 

and the medical treatment facilities are, as well, sir. 

General THOMPSON. A wounded service member is a wounded 

service member. So they get cared for or medevac’ed, if necessary, 

by whatever asset is available. 

General THURMAN. Congressman, we would be very happy to 

come over and give you a complete medevac briefing, and to any 


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of the other members, on exactly what we are doing in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

Mr. BISHOP. I would love to have that, sir. 

General THURMAN. But particularly in Afghanistan. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

Thank you, sir. 

STRYKERS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, the Army recently notified the Committee that the 

Stryker order was being modified and that 270 medevac variants 

would be changed to other variants, such as infantry combat vehicles, in order to establish a Stryker brigade combat team equipment set in Afghanistan. 

I would have two questions on the situation. The first is, will the 

Army request funds to replace the 270 Stryker medevac vehicles 

that were deleted from the order? And secondly, what is the Army’s 

overall strategy and timeline for replacing the M–113s and heavy 

brigade combat teams with updated vehicles? 

General THURMAN. First off, Mr. Chairman, we did do that, because, to answer the Stryker question upfront, you know, we are 

moving a Stryker brigade combat team into Afghanistan. We have 

not done that before. So what we are doing—you know the Lines 

of Communication, the ground LOCs? It takes longer to get equipment into Afghanistan rather than coming in from Kuwait and 

driving into the next country over. So to cut down on the need for 

a strategic area, we need to establish a theater-provided equipment 

base, because we see Strykers being replaced in Afghanistan. That 

was requested by the theater commander. 

So we needed more Strykers, in this case. We believe we can use 

the MRAP amulets and integrate that in the Strykers. So that is 

what we think we need to do so we can establish theater-provided 

equipment over there. And we can get you the exact requirement 

on that, in terms of funding, of what that would be. 

We do have a strategy to replace—we do need to replace the M– 

113s. And that is part of our overall strategy in the Army, that we 

would be happy to lay that down for you, too, and show what you 

we are trying to do here with that. Because that vehicle, frankly, 

will not survive in this environment. 

[The information follows:] 

We are working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a strategy 

to replace our aging fleet of combat vehicles, which includes the M113. When the 

budget is released, we will be able to discuss where we are in the deliberations to 

date. More generally however, the Army’s modernization strategy is focused on 

building a versatile mix of mobile, networked BCTs that can leverage mobility, protection, information, and precision fires to conduct operations across the spectrum 

of conflict. As part of that effort, we will institutionalize a full spectrum set of Mine 

Resistant-Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles that incorporates MRAP and Up-armored HMMWVs (UAH) into our formations. We are also conducting a holistic review of the capability requirements for our combat platforms, focusing on the wartime lessons learned by Soldiers, commanders and the Joint community that are applicable to our current and near future operations. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. So you will have a request for funds? 


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General THURMAN. That is being worked in the building right 

now. And I don’t have all that with me right now, exactly what 

that would be. 

General THOMPSON. If I can just add to that just a little bit, so 

what General Thurman is describing, if you are going to put a 

Stryker brigade into Afghanistan, very difficult to get vehicles into 

theater. So once you get them there, you would like not to have to 

send another Stryker brigade in and send it in with its vehicles. 

So the vehicles that will go there will be left behind in the theater 

and maintained in the theater. 

The diversion of assets from the planned production of 200 medical vehicles to something else—and that is the plan that is being 

worked for approval inside the Pentagon right now—is to then convert those vehicles to the other vehicle configurations, so when that 

unit that is going over there comes back, they can come back and 

have an equipment set that they can train on. Because it is our 

plan that there will be an equipment set that is left in theater for 

a while for Stryker units to fall into. 

We will integrate that into the force structure. There is going to 

be battle damage and losses to those vehicles. But that is being 

worked right now. And that was the genesis or the reason for the 

request to divert those assets from one type of vehicle to another. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And for the record, you will provide more information on the replacement program for the 113s then? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. If the chairman would yield? 

Everybody likes to be in the Stryker brigade, but Stryker vehicles like roads as well. They prefer, you know, what we call normal 

roads. 

What are their capabilities in Afghanistan, given what we have 

with the weight problems with MRAPs? And, obviously, the 

Stryker vehicles have a degree of vulnerability, as remarkable as 

they are, that the MRAPs don’t have. 

So on the issue—and maybe you want to put it in for the 

record—you know, what are the limitations if we are going to 

move, you know, the Stryker brigade in there on these vehicles, 

given just the topography, terrain, and lack of infrastructure? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, we can give you more information on this. But what I would tell you is, the theater commander 

asked to use those in certain areas, because he felt he needed the 

mobility and the infantry capability. 

[The information follows:] 

Like MRAPs, or any other heavy vehicle, Strykers have mobility limitations. 

Steep mountainous terrain with unimproved roads present challenges to the 

Stryker’s maneuver capability. Aware of these limitations, the theater commander 

requested that a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) be deployed specifically to 

Regional Command South in Afghanistan where the terrain is more suitable for 

Stryker maneuver. 

The SBCT is a full-spectrum, wheeled combat force designed and optimized primarily for confronting low-end and mid-range threats that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities—like the threat we are facing in Afghanistan. 

The SBCT’s capabilities differ significantly from those found in traditional brigades. 

In addition to its three infantry battalions, the SBCT has a cavalry squadron for 

reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA), a brigade support battalion, a field artillery battalion, a military intelligence company, an engineer company, a signal company, an anti-tank company, and a headquarters company. This 

mix of capabilities allows the SBCT to cover a larger operational area and to provide 


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greater firepower than an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). Additionally, because of the common chassis in its formation, the SBCT allows a smaller 

sustainment footprint than a Heavy Brigade Combat Team or an Infantry Brigade 

Combat Team outfitted with multiple variants of MRAPs. This is vitally important 

considering limitations on our lines of communications in Afghanistan. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. They sure are. I am just worried about the 

ability of vehicles getting from point A to point B. 

General THURMAN. Yeah, I think the terrain—and I don’t want 

to get into the operational employment of what he intends to do. 

I think we will support what he is trying to do over there for that 

particular capability. It is a valid concern, with the concerns you 

brought up. But we can show you that. 

All of them have slat armor on there. We will equip them the 

same way we do in Iraq. But there are mobility challenges, depending on where you are in Afghanistan. But we can show you that 

in more detail, if you would care to have that. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Okay. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General THOMPSON. And I think—and I am not the operator 

here; I am the acquisition representative. But I think that the theater commander asked for that Stryker brigade and will put that 

Stryker brigade in places in Afghanistan where the unit capability 

is maximized. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I want you to strut your stuff. But, in reality, I want to make sure, if we get Stryker vehicles over there, 

that they can be, you know, as best we can, widely used. And since 

we don’t own the whole country, you know, we are somewhat limited in the areas which we have responsibility for. It would be interesting to know how we are matching, you know, our ability to 

maneuver on what you and I would call roads, of which they have 

very few, and what they call, you know, highways. 

Thank you. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Bishop. 

MRAP COMPATIBILITY TO AFGHANISTAN

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, we have talked a lot about MRAPs today. But one 

thing for sure is that they are pretty huge vehicles. And throughout the services, I think about 11,000 of them being used in Iraq, 

2,000 to 3,000 in Afghanistan, and a lot more being used for training. 

For each of the services, could you tell me, with the troop levels 

coming down in Iraq in the coming year and the lack of MRAP 

compatibility to the Afghanistan terrain, and since they are expensive to transport and operate, what are you going to do with the 

MRAPs in Iraq following our withdrawal over there, or, I should 

say, our redeployment from there? Will they be kept in Kuwait to 

be a part of our prepositioned equipment set? 

Will the U.S. retain all of the remaining MRAPs, or will a portion of them be allocated to foreign military sales? I know that 

there are some plans on the shelf, ready for execution on command, 

for moving some of the equipment back. 

But, you know, for each of you, what is it that you are going to 

be doing? And how much is going to stay? How much is coming 


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back? And is it possible, fiscally, for us to move all of this expensive 

equipment back, logistically? 

General FLYNN. Congressman Bishop, we own about 2,200 

MRAPs. What we are going to do is we are going to take about 800 

of them and they will remain in the operating forces. And then the 

remainder we are going to return to our prepositioned stocks. 

So that is our basic plan right now. It is still being refined. But 

that is where we are right now in the planning process, sir. 

General THURMAN. Congressman Bishop, depending upon how 

long we are deployed, obviously there is a requirement for MRAPs 

as long as we are deployed, whatever those troop levels end up 

being. So they will stay forward with the units. 

What we are going to do if the demand drops down, we have already documented 1,400 into our route clearance companies that 

we intend to document in the force structure. 

Mr. BISHOP. What does that mean? That means preparing them 

to bring them back home? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. We are going to bring a number of 

these back, and we intend to integrate them into our force structure. And we are working that right now inside the Army, in our 

force structure. 

There is a requirement right now for approximately 702 MRAP 

training vehicles. And then there is another requirement to be 

pushed into our—and replenish our Army prepositioned stocks that 

we have that would be forward deployed in Kuwait, in this case. 

And then we have looked to put some in the enabling formations, 

our logistics formations, to include, like, the sustainment brigades 

for command and control purposes. We have fires brigades, C2. So 

we can give those the level of protection in there that they would 

need. 

And so we are working right now, working with our Training and 

Doctrine Command, and seeing how we document these vehicles 

and put them in the actual force structure as a requirement. 

Mr. BISHOP. What about Guard and Reserve? For training purposes? Is that included in the 700 that you put in for training? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. There are X number going to Camp 

Shelby, Camp Atterbury, around to our mobilization sites that we 

have in the Army. 

But when I speak of total Army requirement, I talk for the Army, 

the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. 

Mr. BISHOP. One of the concerns that the National Guard, in particular, has is that they have not, in the past, had sufficient equipment on which to train and, when they were called up, were only 

able to get abbreviated training on the equipment that would be 

used. And, of course, the MRAPs were fairly recent. And initially, 

when they were deployed, they didn’t have those, didn’t have training on them. The result was a lot of accidents, rollovers and the 

like, because they weren’t adequately trained on it. 

How will the Guard be assured of getting the actual equipment 

on which to train so that, in the future, we don’t have those kinds 

of injuries and accidents? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, we will make sure that, for instance, we have done extensive work and improvements on Guard 

equipping. First off, we will make sure that they have the required 


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equipment and not outdated equipment to do the homeland defense 

mission that they have to do with their Title 32. We call that dualuse equipment. I think you are familiar with that. 

Mr. BISHOP. Right. 

General THURMAN. And then what we make sure of on every unit 

that is going to deploy, we treat them no different from an active 

unit. We make sure that they have every piece of equipment that 

they need prior to deploying. We make sure of that in the Army. 

So they can do the required training. 

Mr. BISHOP. Because even the active-duty Army, as far as the 

most recent engagement with Iraq, have not had the actual equipment, the most updated equipment for their pretraining, and they 

didn’t get it until they went to the desert, just prior to deployment. 

And that was limited, because that was a limited exposure. Whereas if the back sets were at home, they could train on them constantly as a part of their reset and their dwell time. 

General THURMAN. What we are doing in the Army today, we 

manage on our equipment readiness through the Army force generation process. And we have established an equipping strategy 

that we are going to equip units to a certain level as they flow 

through this force deployment model. And we can show you how we 

are thinking about doing that, and we would be more than happy 

to do that. 

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. You did not mention—you mentioned the 700 

and several thousand. But you have about 11,000 all together. You 

didn’t respond to the foreign military sales. Are you going to put 

some of them up for foreign military sales? 

General THOMPSON. I think that the planning right now is of the 

roughly 12,000 MRAPs, Army MRAPs, that, with the training and 

the prepositioned sets and in the force structure, we have accounted for using about 9,500 of those 12,000 MRAPs. 

So we haven’t gotten to the end-state yet on how we would use 

the other 2,500. Maybe some more of those would go in the force 

structure. But that is the ongoing analysis. So that is the rough 

math. 

Foreign military sales or leaving some of them behind with the 

Iraqi forces is certainly a possibility. We haven’t done any of that 

yet. There are no foreign military sales cases pending today that 

I am aware of related to MRAPs. 

But that is the rough math. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Kingston. 

COMMENTS OF MR. KINGSTON

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to make a statement as much as anything. But, you 

know, this whole hearing, of course, has been about equipment, 

which, of course, that was its purpose. But we all know that the 

number-one asset is the individual soldier. 

But one thing that frustrates me about today’s military—and I 

understand the ‘‘Army of one’’ culture, which is, you know, a great 

concept. But sometimes you need a Chesty Puller or an Audie Murphy or a Jimmy Doolittle or a Eugene Fluckey to get a message 

across to people. And we don’t ever talk about individual soldiers 


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in Iraq or Afghanistan unless they have done something wrong or, 

you know, there was a tragedy involving them. 

Who are the school kids going to read about? When you are recruiting a 19–year-old, who do you get them to be inspired by if 

they don’t know somebody personally who has been in Iraq or Afghanistan? 

And does that bother you at all? Because I have talked to people 

about it, and they have said, you know, ‘‘Army of one, everybody 

is a hero,’’ which is right. But I think, for all of us, when we go, 

you know, not just to Walter Reed but people who have not been 

injured—you know, there is a lot of heroes and a lot great stories 

out there, but we never get them out to the public. And I think 

that would be useful in terms of putting a face on the soldier. 

And I know that is not your job description and not the purpose 

of the hearing, but I just wanted to mention it. I don’t know if you 

can comment or not. 

General FLYNN. Sir, like you said, I think all the men and 

women who wear the uniform of the United States are heroes in 

their own right. And I think they are an example for all of us, you 

know, for all citizens. 

Just within the last month, I had the privilege of going to the 

Navy and Marine Corps Museum at Quantico. And the Secretary 

of the Navy awarded two Navy Crosses posthumously to the families of two Marines who manned their post in the face of a suicide 

vehicle coming to their checkpoint, which saved the lives of well 

over 50 individuals. And they stayed until they stopped the vehicle. 

When you looked around in the audience there, there were a lot 

of Marines there, there were soldiers there, there were sailors 

there, and there were a lot of individuals who had served in the 

military. It was a publicized event, but that is who came. 

So I think there is a message in what you are saying, is, you 

know, we do have heroes out there. Just this week I read in the 

newspapers about the Air Cross being awarded to an airman. I 

think it is one of the few times that the Air Cross has been awarded, you know, in recent times for heroism on the battlefield. 

So those things are happening. It is just that sometimes they just 

don’t seem to get the publicity that they should. 

Mr. KINGSTON. If we can get it outside of the circle of those who wear the uniform and get it inside those who buy $2 coffees at the 

coffee shop, that would really, I think, be very helpful. And I 

don’t—I mean, we all have a responsibility on that, I think. 

General THURMAN. You know, Congressman, I think that is a 

very good point that you bring up. We can cite similar acts of bravery and actions on the battlefield of what our men and women do. 

And, as I always say, there is nothing more important than a soldier. You know, the experiences that I personally had in Iraq, as 

I walked in—just this morning, I got an e-mail from a soldier, specialist, who said, ‘‘Do you remember me? You came in the operating 

room and gave me a coin, and I have lost my coin. Can you get me 

another one?’’ And I said, ‘‘Give me your address, and it will be out 

today.’’ 

But the commitment that we have in this war, I think we need 

to probably make sure that everybody is aware of that. And, you 

know, we are all modest people because we care about this country. 


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And I think it would probably help this country more if we got that 

information out more. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I thank the members. 

Generals, thank you very much, each one of you, for your service 

and for those you command. 

And we are adjourned. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

COUNTER-ROCKET, ARTILLERY AND MORTAR (C–RAM) 

Question. Starting in 2005 the Army began to deploy a land version of the Navy’s 

20 mm Phalanx Close-In Weapon System. The Army’s version, the Counter Rocket, 

Artillery, and Mortar or C–RAM is a system used to destroy incoming artillery, 

rockets and mortar rounds in the air before they hit their ground targets. The system has been deployed to protect large fixed facilities in Iraq such as the Green 

Zone and Camp Victory. 

Do both the Army and Marine Corps use the Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar System (C–RAM)? 

Army Answer. No. C–RAM systems have been fielded to multiple Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (Army, USMC, coalition) by 

the Army. FOBs with C–RAM Sense and Warn are manned Army personnel, and 

FOBs that also have the Phalanx Intercept capability are operated by a combination 

of Army and Navy personnel. 

C–RAM Sense and Warn capability was initially fielded to 4 United States Marine 

Corps (USMC) FOBs in Iraq where it was operated by U.S. Army personnel but integrated into the USMC Base Defense Operations Centers. Available USMC sensors 

at these FOBs (AN/TPQ–46 Firefinder radars) were integrated into the C–RAM system. As the threat was reduced, the 4 C–RAM systems at the USMC FOBs were 

relocated to different FOBs in OIF. 

Additionally, while not fielded in Afghanistan, C–RAM has completed integration 

and testing with the USMC Hostile Artillery Locator (HALO), an acoustic detection 

system for mortars and artillery, and with the USMC SCAN EAGLE, an unmanned 

aerial vehicle with an electro optical sensor. 

Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps does not currently have a capability 

similar to C–RAM or a shoot down capability against enemy indirect fire. In Iraq 

and Afghanistan the U.S. Army has responsibility for Forward Operating Base 

(FOB) counter indirect fire interdiction. The Marine Corps provides radar and sensor support for Army C–RAM at a number of FOBs. Currently there is no requirement for C–RAM in the Marine Corps. 

Question. Please provide an overview of where C–RAM is deployed and describe 

its operation. 

Army Answer. C–RAM is deployed to 15 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Iraq. 

Three of these FOBs (Two U.S. and one coalition) have Intercept capability along 

with Sense and Warn capability. The remaining 12 have Sense and Warn capability 

only. 

Sense. The operation of the C–RAM system is initiated by Sensing (detection) of 

a rocket or mortar round directed toward a C–RAM protected FOB by U.S. Army/ 

Marine Corps indirect fire sensors: Lightweight Counter Mortar Radars (LCMR); 

Firefinder Radars (AN/TPQ–36, 37 or 46); Giraffe radars (foreign system); or the 

radar on the Land based Phalanx Weapon Systems (LPWS). Sensing of rocket and 

mortar rounds is performed at both C–RAM Sense and Warn FOBs and C–RAM 

Intercept FOBs. 

Warn: Warning is the action controlled and implemented by C–RAM to warn personnel within the hazard area of incoming rockets and mortar rounds. Warnings are 

dependent on detection of incoming threats by the indirect fire radars. The Army/ 

Marine Corps indirect fire radars report both the Point of Origin (POO) of the rocket 

or mortar round and its projected flight path. The POO and projected flight paths 

from the indirect fire radars are correlated by the C–RAM Command and Control 

(C2) system. To reduce the probability of false warnings that might be issued based 

on a false detection by an Indirect fire radar, correlation of data from two or more 

indirect fire sensors is required to validate that there is in fact a rocket or mortar 

round inbound (The radars on a large base may produce as many as 500 false detects a day). This correlation normally occurs within 6–8 seconds. If C–RAM C2 validates that there is an inbound threat, it calculates the predicted Point of Impact 

(POI), then identifies all of the audible and visual alarms required to warn perVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:11 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00260 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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sonnel within the hazard area in the vicinity of the POI, and initiates a warning 

with just these essential warning devices. This localized warning ensures that personnel who are not within the hazard area can continue their work, while those in 

the hazard area seek protection. Warnings are typically initiated 10–20 seconds 

prior to expected impact. Warning is performed at both C–RAM Sense and Warn 

FOBs and C–RAM Intercept FOBs. 

Response. Response is action taken to respond to an insurgent rocket or mortar 

launch crew with either lethal or non-lethal effects. Response is coordinated by the 

C–RAM systems through its integration with Army, U.S. Air Force (USAF) and 

USMC Battle Command Systems. Concurrent with validation of an inbound rocket 

or mortar round, C–RAM C2 reviews the POOs reported by the indirect fire radars 

and if necessary calculates a new POO. C–RAM C2 then provides the new POO to 

Army, USAF and USMC Battle Command systems. This information enables the 

Battle Captain to review the possible means for response (counterfire, quick reaction 

force, UAV, Army aviation, AF fixed wing aircraft, Electro-Optical/Infrared Sensors 

for Positive Identification, etc.) and then to select the optimum method of either lethal or non-lethal Response. Response is performed at both C–RAM Sense and Warn 

FOBs and C–RAM Intercept FOBs. 

Intercept. For those FOBs that are equipped with an Intercept capability, the C– 

RAM C2 will also receive the location and track of any friendly aircraft in the vicinity from Sentinel radars. Concurrent with initiating Warnings and with providing 

POO to Battle Command systems, C–RAM C2 will calculate the location of the incoming round and send this information to those Land Base Phalanx Weapon Systems (LPWS) that are in a position to acquire, track, and destroy the threat. Those 

LPWS then acquire and track the round with their own fire control radars. The location and velocity of any friendly aircraft in the area is provided to LPWS, which 

use the location of friendly aircraft to calculate a dynamic ‘‘Do Not Engage Sector.’’ 

This establishes a volume around each friendly aircraft location as it moves that 

precludes any firing that might endanger the aircraft. If the incoming round comes 

within range of the LPWS and engaging the incoming round will not endanger any 

friendly aircraft, the Engagement Control Officer will view the imagery from the 

LPWS Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) camera and visually verify that the target 

is in fact a rocket or mortar round and that there are no friendly aircraft within 

the field of view of the FLIR. If he confirms this, the Engagement Control Officer 

will direct engagement of the incoming round by LPWS. The rounds used by the 

LPWS that do not impact with the rocket or mortar round self destruct, precluding 

lethal effects and minimizing effects on the ground. Intercept of rockets and mortar 

rounds is performed only at C–RAM Intercept FOBs. 

Marine Corps Question. Please provide an overview of where C–RAM is deployed 

and describe its operation? 

Answer. The Marine Corps does not have C–RAM. The Army should answer. 

Question. Is C–RAM deployed to Afghanistan as well as Iraq? 

Army Answer. Currently C–RAM systems are only deployed by the U.S. Army in 

Iraq. However the U.S. military headquarters in Afghanistan is reviewing a draft 

requirement requesting the fielding of C–RAM systems to multiple Forward Operating Bases in Afghanistan. 

Additionally, a partner in the NATO command in Afghanistan has deployed a limited C–RAM Sense and Warn capability to one NATO Forward Operating Base in 

Afghanistan. There are currently no C–RAM systems deployed in Afghanistan by 

U.S. Forces. 

Marine Corps Answer. Marine Corps does not have C–RAM. The Army should answer. 

Question. How has C–RAM performed in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Army Answer. The C–RAM System-of-Systems has performed well in Iraq with 

over 800 timely and accurate warnings of incoming rockets or mortar rounds, with 

a success rate over 70 percent and over 100 successful intercepts of rockets or mortar rounds without endangering any aircraft. 

C–RAM systems deployed in Iraq have averaged a greater than 90 percent operational availability rate. 

The CENTCOM Deputy Commander identified C–RAM as a force multiplier that 

is saving lives and has recommended that C–RAM be transitioned from supplemental funding to the base budget. 

There are currently no C–RAM systems deployed in Afghanistan. 

Marine Corps Answer. Marine Corps does not have C–RAM. The Army should answer. 

Question. Given that our fixed facilities are sometimes located in densely populated urban areas, how is collateral damage avoided? 


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Army Answer. Multiple procedures/hardware systems have been incorporated to 

prevent collateral damage by the C–RAM intercept systems fielded to three Forward 

Operating Bases in Iraq. 

First, the C–RAM Interceptor, the Land Based Phalanx Weapon System (LPWS), 

uses ammunition that self-destructs after a fixed time of flight. Thus, rounds that 

are fired at a rocket or mortar round that do not strike the target self-destruct into 

small fragments. 

Second, the C–RAM system has established minimum firing elevation limits (both 

physical and software) for each LPWS position. This ensures that any rounds fired 

that do not intercept the intended rocket or mortar round, detonate in the air at 

an altitude sufficient to ensure that any fragments falling to the earth do not cause 

any lethal collateral damage. The minimum altitude for this self-destruction was established based on testing by an Army test agency. 

Third, physical and software cut-outs have been established and incorporated for 

each LPWS position, which precludes firing in directions where structures or other 

obstructions do not allow sufficient range for the bullet fly-out and safe self-destruction. 

The Sense and Warn systems at 12 FOBs in Iraq are passive, thus there is no 

potential for collateral damage. 

Question. Are sufficient C–RAM systems available for our deployed forces and for 

training purposes? 

Army Answer. There are sufficient C–RAM systems to meet current requirements 

of the Warfighter in Iraq and to support training. We have and must continue to 

enhance system-of-system capabilities of deployed and training systems to address 

changing enemy tactics and evolving threats. 

If C–RAM Sense and Warn requirements are validated for Afghanistan, procurement of additional C–RAM Sense and Warn systems will be required. 

Marine Corps Answer. Marine Corps does not have C–RAM. The Army should answer. 

DOD IG FINDINGS CONCERNING THE MARINE CORPS’ PROCUREMENT OF MRAPS 

Question. In his testimony before this subcommittee on February 26th, the DoD 

Inspector General stated the Marine Corps Systems Command did not properly determine that contract prices were fair and reasonable when they awarded nine firm 

fixed price contracts for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. The per 

vehicle price that the Marine Corps paid for Category I vehicles ranged from $300 

thousand to $1.1 million. He further stated that the Marine Corps also did not obtain volume discounts from two contractors for orders in excess of 1,500 vehicles at 

an additional cost to the taxpayer of $90 million. The Director, Defense Procurement 

and Acquisition Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics, agreed with the IG’s conclusions. 

General Flynn, are you aware of the DoD IG’s findings that the Marine Corps 

failed to establish fair and reasonable prices on MRAPs and failed to request quantity discounts? Would you comment? 

While we understand that the Marine Corps sought to procure MRAPs swiftly, 

how do you justify the omission of an independent cost analysis? 

Answer. Provided below: 

1. Purpose. Provide the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee Defense (HAC–D) with information, for the record, as to the Marine Corps’ position 

on the Procurement and Delivery of Joint Service Mine Resistant Armor Protected 

(MRAP) Vehicles DoD IG Report—29 January 2009 (Report No. D–2009–046). On 

10 March, LtGen George Flynn, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Combat 

Development and Integration, served as a witness before this committee. LtGen 

Flynn stated, he would provide ‘‘additional information, for the record, as to what 

we agree with and what we don’t agree with in the report.’’ 

2. Take Away. Both the ASN(RDA) and the Marine Corps provided written comments to the DoD IG report and disagreed with a number of assertions in Finding 

C. 

3. Key Points 

The Marine Corps agrees with the following: 

Finding A. Actions Taken to Accelerate Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle 

Delivery 

• DoD IG concluded that the combination of actions executed to address the urgent need for accelerating the delivery of MRAP vehicles to theater was innovative 

and effective. 


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• The DoD IG found that Marine Corps System Command (MCSC) implemented 

aggressive contractual delivery schedules to meet the theater demand for MRAP vehicles as directed by the Secretary of Defense. 

4. Recommendations 

• The Marine Corps has incorporated the DoD IG report recommendation that future procurements for MRAP vehicles are properly competed or justified on a solesource basis. Our acquisition strategies included this consideration for the MRAP 

II and sole-source award of MRAP CAT III procurements. MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle 

(M-ATV) prices for each part of the competition will be negotiated separately. 

• MCSC has communicated to its contracting officials the importance of making 

price reasonableness determinations and ensuring cost or pricing data are requested. MCSC is building a framework for the price reasonableness determination 

that will be used for the M–ATV procurement. This procurement, though part of the 

overall Joint MRAP Vehicle Program, is being conducted by the U.S. Army TankAutomotive and Armaments Command (TACOM). 

• We will attempt to build sufficient flexibility into the production contract to deal 

with both planned and potential quantities. We also sought both step and cumulative quantity discounts as part of the Request for Proposals for the M–ATV procurement. An OSD Peer Review was conducted before the request for proposal 

(RFP) release, and a second Peer Review is being conducted during M–ATV source 

selection. 

The Marine Corps disagreed with the following: 

Finding C. Price Reasonableness Determination 

• We disagree with the DoD IG report conclusion that the MCSC contracting officer chose an inappropriate contract type for the MRAP procurement. The Director 

of the Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy and Strategic Sourcing (DPAP), also 

agreed that firm fixed price was the correct contract type. He stated ‘‘The use of 

firm fixed price contracts would be perfectly appropriate if buttressed with the appropriate analysis to determine fair and reasonable prices.’’ We believe our approach, vetted with OSD, was appropriate. We believe that the contracting officer 

reasonably determined that a fixed-price contract was appropriate for the MRAP 

procurement. 

• We believe that MCSC netted actual savings of $127 million by negotiating bilateral contract modifications to produce more than the 1,500 vehicles that were 

originally contracted for in the base year. We purchased those vehicles at base-year 

price rather than option-year pricing. The difference between ordering at base-year 

rather than option-year pricing of 4,186 vehicles was $127 million. We understand 

the approach suggested by DoD IG. The DoD IG method suggests potential savings 

of $45.6 million by using volume discounts. We should have asked for an additional 

volume discount. We do not believe we would have received both discounts. We believe our method was a better investment for the government, as reflected in net 

actual savings of $127 million versus a hypothetical savings of $45.6 million. 

• We believe the price range in the chart on page 25 is misleading. In January 

2007, nine vendor proposals demonstrated potential to meet the program’s overarching objective—field the maximum number of survivable, safe, sustainable 

MRAP vehicles in the shortest period of time—received contract awards to each deliver two CAT I and two CAT II for initial test and evaluation. We believed from 

the onset that ‘‘some’’ of the vehicles may not pass production verification and survivability tests, but we could not tell that definitively from the paper proposals. For 

that reason, it was decided that leaving any high potential producer that ‘‘could possibly’’ manufacture a survivable vehicle on the sidelines was an unacceptable risk 

when the Joint Forces had an urgent need for these vehicles. 

Of the nine vendors, Oshkosh Truck (OTC), at $306,199, was the least expensive, 

but failed Limited User Evaluation (LUE); General Purpose Vehicles (GPV) was the 

most expensive at more than $1 million per vehicle, but was terminated for convenience because the company failed to deliver any test vehicles. GPV’s paper proposal 

offered an enhanced maneuverability and mobility solution (the only vendor to offer 

this capability). GPV’s contract award was terminated, and the entire $5.1 million 

was de-obligated. The unit prices on page 25 reflect unit pricing for a procurement 

order quantity of 1 to 200 vehicles. Approximately 95% of the MRAP vehicles actually procured were purchased at higher step ladder quantity pricing where unit 

price ranges did not range so greatly among the vendors. 

• As of 16 March 09, MCSC has ordered 16,242 vehicles to meet DoD requirements. Of the five vendors that produced significant quantities of vehicles, the top 

vehicle unit price paid by the Government was $629,800 (for 75 vehicles); the lowest 

was $443,000, representing an average base variant cost of $507,860 with an average unit price variance across vendors of $112,891.* 


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*The actual average cost of a CAT I = $507, 728; the actual average cost of a CAT 

II = $508,472 

• Ultimately, MCSC ordered large quantities of CAT I and CAT II vehicles from 

five fully qualified vendors. These manufacturers proved their ability to produce vehicles with the required production numbers and to deliver within established 

timelines. 

JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLES

Question. In response to an operational need and an aging fleet of light tactical 

wheeled vehicles, the Joint Services developed a requirement for a new tactical 

wheeled vehicle platform that would provide increased force protection, survivability, and improved capacity over the existing up-armored HMMWV (UAH) while 

balancing mobility and transportability requirements with costs. 

Since the initiation of the JLTV program the military departments have procured 

over 16,000 Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. Over 13,000 have 

been delivered to the combat theaters. Currently the MRAP Joint Program office is 

in the process of procuring 400 light variants of the MRAP for duty in Afghanistan, 

and a more mobile MRAP All Terrain Vehicle is being considered. Meanwhile, the 

JLTV program continues. 

How have the requirements for JLTV changed based on the experiences of U.S. 

forces in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Army Answer. The Army and Marine Corps will continue to refine their requirements as the JLTV program progresses through its Technology Development Phase. 

Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan provide a wealth of insight into user requirements and the challenges of balancing the sometimes competing or contradictory requirements of performance (mobility and transportability), protection, and 

payload, with protection having the most negative effects on other requirements. 

Operations in both locations, as in most other places in the world, indicate a need 

for more of all three of these major requirements. The JLTV requirements have 

been heavily influenced by our experiences with improvised explosive devices while 

at the same time realizing that the heavy armor used in the MRAP program to mitigate that threat has severely limited the off-road utility and payload capability of 

those vehicles while at the same time creating significant air and shipboard transportation challenges. The combination of MRAP testing results (understanding of 

underbody blast phenomenon for specific hull designs) and medical analysis of occupant injury (understand injury mechanisms of all sources) is informing a more comprehensive and effective description of protection/survivability requirements to define the JLTV requirement for the next phase. The resulting JLTV requirements 

seek a balance in the required capabilities through modular, selective, and scalable 

protection. 

Marine Corps Answer. The Army and Marine Corps will continue to refine their 

requirements as the JLTV program progresses through its Technology Development 

Phase. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan provide a wealth of insight into 

user requirements and the challenges of balancing the sometimes competing or contradictory requirements of performance (mobility and transportability), protection, 

and payload, with protection being the most difficult to balance against the other 

requirements. Operations in both locations, as in most other places in the world, indicate a need for more of all three of these major requirements. The JLTV requirements have been heavily influenced by our experiences with improvised explosive 

devices while at the same time realizing that the heavy armor used in the MRAP 

program to mitigate that threat has severely limited the off-road utility and payload 

capability of those vehicles while at the same time creating significant air and shipboard transportation challenges. The combination of MRAP testing results (understanding of underbody blast phenomenon for specific hull designs) and medical analysis of occupant injury (understanding injury mechanisms of all sources) is informing a more comprehensive and effective description of protection/survivability requirements to define the JLTV requirements and the resulting requirements will 

seek a balance in the required capabilities through modular, selective, and scalable 

protection. 

Question. On 29 October 2008, the Pentagon narrowed the field of vendors to the 

Lockheed Martin, General Tactical Vehicles and BAE Systems/Navistar teams to 

compete for the final version and contract for the JLTV. However, there have been 

media reports of a new requirement to develop a hybrid electric propulsion capability, a technology that none of the three chosen teams offered. Requirements creep 

has driven up the cost and extended the schedule for many programs. Please explain the late decision regarding hybrid electric propulsion. 


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Army Answer. There is no requirement to develop a hybrid electric propulsion capability. The JLTV Purchase Description (PD) is a performance based document. 

The PD specifies requirements for fuel efficiency, mobility, carrying capacity, etc. 

The vendors propose their solution to meet these requirements. The media report 

was incorrect. 

Marine Corps Answer. There is no new requirement to develop a hybrid electric 

propulsion capability. The JLTV Purchase Description (PD) is a performance based 

document. The PD specifies requirements for fuel efficiency, mobility, carrying capacity, etc. The vendors propose their solution to meet these requirements. The 

media report was incorrect. The JLTV program requirements are unchanged. 

Question. Two of the losing bidders, teams that were not chosen to go forward 

with the development effort, filed protests. What is the status of resolving the protests? 

Army Answer. Northrop Grumman and Textron Marine and Land Systems filed 

protests with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) following the contract 

awards for the JLTV Technology Development effort. GAO denied both protests on 

February 17, 2009 and contract performance has resumed. 

Marine Corps Answer. Northrop Grumman and Textron Marine and Land Systems filed protests with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) following the 

JLTV TD contract announcement. The Army responded in accordance with GAO 

guidelines. GAO denied both protests on February 17, 2009 and contract performance, which was stopped during the protests, has now resumed. 

DISPOSITION OF MRAPS 

Question. Throughout the services, there are some 11,000 MRAPs being used in 

Iraq, with some 2,000 to 3,000 in Afghanistan, and even more used for training. 

I would like each service to respond: 

With troop levels drawing down in Iraq in the coming year, and with the lack of 

MRAP compatibility to the Afghan terrain, and since they are expensive to transport and operate, what will the US military do with MRAPs in Iraq following a US 

withdrawal from that conflict? 

Army Answer. We are exploring the long term placement of all Army MRAPs in 

the force structure, not just the ones in Iraq. As a first step, the Army is 

retrograding some of the early model MRAPs out of Iraq. The first 126 of these vehicles will be used to fill operational requirements of support units based in Kuwait. 

An additional 702 MRAPs will be cascaded out of theater to train units preparing 

to deploy. There will also be 167 MRAPs kept in Kuwait to provide additional training opportunities for these units as they enter theater. Finally, approximately 150 

vehicles will be held in Kuwait as Theater Sustainment Stocks. 

Question. Will MRAPs be kept in Kuwait to serve as part of prepositioned equipment sets? 

Answer. Initial indications are that a number of MRAPs will be placed in Army 

Prepositioned Stocks (APS). HQDA G–3/5/7, Army Materiel Command, Army Training and Doctrine Command and Army Central Command are currently reviewing 

required quantities and variants to be placed in APS. 

Question. Will the US retain all of the remaining MRAPs, or will a portion of 

these items be allocated for foreign military sales? 

Answer. The Army is analyzing possible roles for MRAP once they are no longer 

needed in theater, but has not made final decisions on the disposition of all MRAPs 

and plans to make decisions on this matter by the start of FY10. Some of the issues 

that will influence future decisions are: the number of vehicles available at the end 

of the conflict; the condition of the vehicles, lessons learned concerning reliability 

mobility, and suitability of each variant. In the event that some variant(s) are 

deemed unsuitable for placement in the force structure, they could be made available for FMS. 

TASK FORCE ODIN 

Question. Please describe Task Force ODIN, including its mission and capabilities, 

and structural components. 

Answer.——— 

Question. How effective has Task Force ODIN been in countering IED bomb makers and placers? 

Answer. Overall IED Activity in Iraq has significantly declined since the Army 

made a combination of changes. We deployed Task Force ODIN, MRAP vehicles and 

conducted a Surge of forces in a short period of time. The specific reduction in Army 

casualties from IEDs and changed enemy tactics because of these changes cannot 

be identified. 


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Question. What, if any, relationship does the Army have with JIEDDO with regard to the task force? 

Answer. The Army Aviation Directorate works closely with JIEDDO on many 

projects that support Task Force ODIN. JIEDDO funded many of the sensors and 

technologies that are employed by Task Force ODIN and we continue to leverage 

their technology enhancements as they support Army requirements. 

Question. What is the relationship of Task Force ODIN to ongoing Secretary of 

Defense efforts to increase ISR assets available in theater? 

Answer. The Army proposed many of the technological solutions for Task Force 

ODIN Afghanistan to the Secretary of Defense ISR Task Force for funding support. 

Beyond funding, the ISR Task Force also helped ensure rapid integration with combat support agencies and accelerated the OEF theater ISR architectures, improving 

dissemination of Task Force ODIN information. 

MEDICAL EVACUATION

Question. On January 27th, 2009, in testimony before the House Armed Services 

Committee, Secretary of Defense Gates addressed the difference in medevac response times for Iraq and Afghanistan. He noted that the goal in Iraq is to have 

a wounded soldier in a hospital in an hour. However for Afghanistan the time is 

closer to two hours. Secretary Gates has directed increases in the number of 

medevac helicopters and medical professionals assigned to Afghanistan. 

What are the factors that cause medevac to take significantly longer in Afghanistan than in Iraq? 

Army Answer. From the Army’s perspective several factors affect operations. Afghanistan’s geography differs significantly from Iraq. A combination of size, mountains, and weather directly contribute to increased response times in Afghanistan. 

The array, or geometry, of evacuation assets across the area of operations is a second factor that varies between theaters and cause increased response time. This 

array is tactically determined by the challenging terrain, limited operating bases, 

and a finite number of operating assets. Thirdly, the lack of parity in operating assets between theaters also contributes to the increase response time in OEF. Since 

the two areas of operation pose different challenges and characteristics, Multi National Forces Iraq (MNF–I) and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) Afghanistan until recently applied different planning standards for acceptable risk— 

one hour in Iraq and two hours in Afghanistan. The differing standards were based 

on terrain, mission assessment, medical assets, and maturity of the infrastructure. 

Additionally, in Afghanistan, the participating NATO countries operate using their 

own countries rules which differ from those in the U.S. Military. 

Question. What are the factors that cause medevac to take significantly longer in 

Afghanistan than in Iraq? 

Marine Corps Answer. This response is a collaborative effort involving the Joint 

Staff J–4 HSSD, HQMC I&L, Offices of the Army and Air Force Surgeons General, 

and OPNAV N–931. 

At the time of SECDEF January, 2009 testimony, there were a number of factors 

causing significantly longer MEDEVAC mission times in Afghanistan as compared 

to Iraq. Factors were geographic/weather related and also included the actual force 

lay down locations which supported the asset. Additionally, in Afghanistan, U.S. 

forces were required to operate under NATO business rules which differ from our 

own rules as it relates to MEDEVAC procedures. This situation has been remedied 

and U.S. forces are now able to launch MEDEVAC helicopters and provided the required NATO information when requested/required after the fact. 

Question. What additional medevac assets, both medical facilities and aircraft 

have actually arrived in Afghanistan, and what additional assets are on the way? 

Army Answer. Army MEDEVAC assets, both medical facilities and aircraft, form 

part of the joint effort to increase MEDEVAC assets in Afghanistan. One Army forward surgical team has arrived. Additional Army assets scheduled to arrive include 

one forward surgical team, a medical brigade command and control headquarters, 

four additional MEDEVAC aircraft and crews, and one 12 ship MEDEVAC company. These Army assets are part of a joint effort to increase overall MEDEVAC 

capability in Afghanistan. The Joint Staff has oversight of all joint additional assets 

supporting Afghanistan. 

Marine Corps Answer. This response is a collaborative effort involving the Joint 

Staff J–4 HSSD, HQMC I&L, Offices of the Army and Air Force Surgeons General, 

and OPNAV N–931. 

Naval Service forward medical facilities and CASEVAC capability along with 

Army and Air Force MEDEVAC assets, both medical facilities and aircraft, form 

part of the joint effort to increase MEDEVAC capability in Afghanistan. At this 


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time, one direct support Marine Corps forward surgical team and one general support Army forward surgical team has arrived. Additional forward Naval Service and 

Army assets are scheduled to arrive including three direct support Marine Corps 

forward surgical teams, one general support Navy forward surgical team, one additional general support Army forward surgical team, four additional Army 

MEDEVAC aircraft and crews, and one 12-ship Army MEDEVAC company. This 

joint effort will increase overall MEDEVAC capability in Afghanistan. 

Question. Are there remaining shortages of medevac aircraft; aircrews; and Forward Surgical Teams in Afghanistan? 

Army Answer. The Army has not identified any remaining shortages of 

MEDEVAC assets in Afghanistan for Regional Commands (RC)—East or South. 

Army MEDEVAC assets, both medical facilities and aircraft, form part of the joint 

effort to increase MEDEVAC assets in Afghanistan. One Army forward surgical 

team has arrived. Additional Army assets scheduled to arrive include one forward 

surgical team, a medical brigade command and control headquarters, four additional 

MEDEVAC aircraft and crews, and one 12-ship MEDEVAC company. These Army 

assets are part of a joint effort to increase overall MEDEVAC capability in Afghanistan. The Joint Staff has oversight of all joint additional assets supporting Afghanistan. 

The additional assets will achieve parity between OIF and RC—East and South. 

The Joint Staff is leading efforts to improve the evacuation system in RC—North 

and West. 

Marine Corps Answer. This response is a collaborative effort involving the Joint 

Staff J–4 HSSD, HQMC I&L, Offices of the Army and Air Force Surgeons General, 

and OPNAV N–931. 

The Marine Corps and Army have not identified any remaining shortages of 

MEDEVAC assets in Afghanistan for Regional Commands (RC)—South or East. The 

additional assets described in the answer to Question 2 above will achieve parity 

between OIF and OEF RC—South and East. In addition, the Joint Staff is leading 

efforts to improve the evacuation system in RC—North and West. 

Question. Today, what is the average time to evacuate a wounded soldier to a hospital in Afghanistan? 

Army Answer. Army analysis shows that the average time to evacuate a wounded 

Soldier to a hospital in Afghanistan was 80 minutes with data from Jun 08–Dec 08. 

Analysis continues, but preliminary numbers show an improving trend in OEF (Oct 

08–Dec 08 the average time was 71 minutes). 

Marine Corps Answer. This response is a collaborative effort involving the Joint 

Staff HSSD, HQMC I&L, Offices of the Army and Air Force Surgeons General, and 

OPNAV N–931. 

Army analysis shows that the average time to evacuate a wounded service member to a hospital in Afghanistan was 80 minutes with data from Jun 08–Dec 08. 

Analysis continues, but preliminary numbers show an improving trend in OEF (Oct 

08–Dec 08 the average time was 71 minutes). As of today, USCENTCOM will reassess evacuation times after receiving the additional assets described in Question 2. 

Question. The Committee understands that certain Combat Search and Rescue 

aircrews have been reconfigured to assist with the medevac shortfall. What are the 

pitfalls of this alternative? 

Army Answer. From the Army’s perspective, the challenge is the standardization 

and integration of the U.S. Air Force Combat Search and Rescue aircraft into the 

Army evacuation structure and standards. Differing equipment, medical protocols, 

training, aircraft configuration, procedural standardization, control, reporting, and 

resourcing integration are all potential pitfalls to this alternative. 

Marine Corps Answer. This response is a collaborative effort involving the Joint 

Staff J–4 HSSD, HQMC I&L, Offices of the Army and Air Force Surgeons General, 

and OPNAV N–931. 

The Marine Corps does not employ Combat Search and Rescue aircrews. Through 

conversations with and documentation from the Army, the challenge is the standardization and integration of the U.S. Air Force Combat Search and Rescue aircraft 

into the Army evacuation structure and standards. Differing equipment, medical 

protocols, training, aircraft configuration, and procedural standardization are all potential pitfalls to this alternative. In addition, procedural, command and control, reporting, and resourcing integration are also possible pitfalls. Air Force emphasized 

that HH–60G Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) helicopters are conducting ‘‘when 

requested’’ OEF MEDEVAC missions. The main adverse impact of utilizing Air 

Force CSAR assets for MEDEVAC is the decreased availability of assets for other 

potential missions, such as humanitarian assistance and other unplanned scenarios. 

The Air Force has temporarily ceased advanced training at the HH–60G Weapons 

School (Nellis AFB, NV) to support the MEDEVAC mission. The Navy is currently 


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manned at 54% (75/139) with Search and Rescue Medical Technician (Navy Enlisted 

Code 8401) making it difficult to maintain inLieu-Of sourcing solutions for 

MEDEVAC. 

Question. What if any are the significant limitations of our medevac helicopters 

that are in use in Afghanistan? 

Army Answer. For Army MEDEVAC helicopters, the significant limitations are 

degraded performance during high altitude operations, communications, and night 

illumination. MEDEVAC helicopters performance starts degrading at altitudes of 

approximately 5000 feet and above and worsens with increasingly high altitudes. 

The Army has mitigated this risk by installing more powerful engines in the 

MEDEVAC aircraft going into theater. The 701C and 701D engines increase performance and improve high altitude operations. These engines are part of the Army 

mission equipment package for MEDEVAC aircraft going into Afghanistan. Line-ofsight air-ground and air-to-air communications are significantly impacted by the 

high terrain. To improve communications in MEDEVAC aircraft, the Army fields 

satellite communication radios to improve the non-line of sight, or over-the-horizon, 

communications capability. Finally, low night illumination severely limits night vision goggle MEDEVAC operations. Commanders developed control measures for 

night flying to mitigate the risk associated with this limitation. The control measures are the use of flight corridors and elevation of risk approval authority for missions not flown on designated corridors. Although the Army has fielded a forward 

looking infrared system (FLIR) to MEDEVAC helicopters, this system is used to 

identify personnel at the landing zone. 

Marine Corps Answer. This response is a collaborative effort involving the Joint 

Staff J–4 HSSD, HQMC I&L, Offices of the Army and Air Force Surgeons General, 

and OPNAV N–931. 

The Army has determined that its MEDEVAC helicopters significant limitations 

are related to: degraded performance during high altitude operations, communications, and night illumination. MEDEVAC helicopters performance starts degrading 

at altitudes of approximately 5000 feet and above and worsens with increasingly 

high altitudes. The Army has mitigated this risk by installing more powerful engines in the MEDEVAC aircraft going into theater. The 701C and 701D engines increase performance and improve high altitude operations. These engines are part of 

the Army mission equipment package for MEDEVAC aircraft going into Afghanistan. Line-of-sight air-ground and air-to-air communications are significantly impacted by the high terrain. To improve communications in MEDEVAC aircraft, the 

Army fields satellite communication radios to improve the non-line of sight, or overthe-horizon, communications capability. Finally, low night illumination severely limits night vision goggle MEDEVAC operations. Commanders developed control measures for night flying to mitigate the risk associate with this limitation. The control 

measures are the use of flight corridors and elevation of risk approval authority for 

missions not flown on designated corridors. The Army has fielded a forward looking 

infrared system (FLIR) to MEDEVAC helicopters in order to enable location of personnel at pick up sites. 

Question. How have Air Force Combat Search and Rescue helicopters and crews 

contributed to solving the medevac shortfall in Afghanistan? 

Army Answer. From the Army’s perspective the Air Force Combat Search and 

Rescue (CSAR) helicopters have provided an acceptable ‘‘in lieu of solution to the 

Combatant Commander’s need for MEDEVAC helicopters. The U.S. Air Force has 

six dual mission (MEDEVAC and Combat Search and Rescue) CSAR aircraft operating in Afghanistan. An additional six CSAR aircraft have been deployed as a 

bridging solution until the Army’s Combat Aviation Brigade arrives with its organic 

twelve UH–60 aircraft MEDEVAC Company. However, the additional six CSAR aircraft will redeploy out of Afghanistan in late summer 2009. The USAF is best able 

to provide the specific contributions of its CSAR helicopters during MEDEVAC operations in Afghanistan. 

Marine Corps Answer. This response is a collaborative effort involving the Joint 

Staff J–4 HSSD, HQMC I&L, Offices of the Army and Air Force Surgeons General, 

and OPNAV N–931. 

Dating back to 2006, the Air Force Combat Search and Rescue helicopters and 

crews have been contributing to the MEDEVAC missions in Afghanistan. In a 

contributable effort to solving the MEDEVAC shortfall in Afghanistan, all Air Force 

HH–60G helicopters in Afghanistan are tasked to perform the MEDEVAC. This includes the six additional helicopters received in early 2009. U.S. Army MEDEVAC 

capability arrives in Afghanistan in mid-2009 at which time U.S. Air Force 

MEDEVAC employment will be reassessed. 


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IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE (IFF) 

Question. The range and lethality of modern weapon systems can result in accidental or friendly fire or fratricide situations. The Army long sought technology to 

assist with the battlefield identification of friendly forces on the ground and in the 

air. During the first Gulf War, during the hours of darkness, an Army Apache helicopter fired an anti-tank missile on a U.S. armored personnel carrier mistakenly 

identifying the M113 as Iraqi. In April of 2004 former professional football player 

Pat Tillman was mistakenly engaged and killed by small arms fire from his fellow 

Army Rangers. In both cases the only means of identification was visual. 

What technology is currently available to U.S. forces to positively identify friend 

from foe? 

Army Answer. Since the first Gulf War we have made significant investments in 

improved sensors, optics, battle command systems, and markings that have enhanced overall combat effectiveness while significantly improving our capability to 

identify friend from foe. Technologies available during the first Gulf War consisted 

of Optical Sights, Thermal Integrated Sight Unit, a limited number of Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and various rudimentary markings, such as the Korean War 

vintage VS 17 Cloth Panel and inverted ‘‘V’’ markings. Today, most of our Stryker 

Vehicles, Abrams Tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and Apache helicopters are 

equipped with Second Generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sights and Soldiers are being equipped with improved thermal sights and night vision goggles 

(NVG). These devices have greatly extended the range at which battlefield entities 

can be identified, particularly during hours of darkness and during limited visibility. 

In battle command, we have fielded thousands of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below/Blue Force Tracking Systems. These systems, combined with the 

proliferation of GPS, have given commanders much better battlefield situational 

awareness, enabling them to avoid situations, such as incidental contact between 

friendly units, that could lead to fratricide. The Land Warrior and future Ground 

Soldier Ensemble capabilities provide unparalleled dismounted combatant location 

fidelity and situational awareness, greatly reducing the chance of fratricide with 

small units. The fielding of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) with a variety of sensor packages and the Long-Range Advance Scout Surveillance System has also 

added greatly to overall improvement in battlefield situational awareness and target 

identification. Regarding markings, we have fielded thousands of the Joint Combat 

Identification Marking System (JCIMS) kits that provide a relatively inexpensive, 

and low technology capability to assist in identifying friend from foe. JCIMS kits 

include metal and cloth panels covered with a special film that produces a unique 

thermal signature visible by FLIR and thermal sights and a small infrared beacon 

that emits a unique strobe that can be seen by ground platforms, helicopters, and 

dismounted combatants using NVG. Collectively, these investments, combined with 

improved training, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, and rules of engagement have essentially mitigated the types of fratricide incidents experienced during 

the first Gulf War. 

Marine Corps Answer. The ability to positively identify friend from foe requires 

a complex interaction of training, doctrine, tactics techniques and procedures (TTP) 

and rules of engagement (ROE), and information derived from command and control/blue force tracking (C2/BFT) and cooperative target identification (CTI) systems. 

Within the current available technologies there is not a capability that would allow 

for the positive identification of friend from foe at the shooter level. However there 

has been a great deal of Joint and Coalition effort completed that will, at the platform level, provide the capability to identify a like equipped platform as a friend 

and a non-equipped platform as an unknown. C2/BFT systems support the reporting 

and display of friendly position location information (PLI) on digitized map displays 

that provide a commander-focused general knowledge of friendly forces on the battlefield to facilitate C2 and mission execution requirements. At the individual platform/shooter level, CTI systems are required to provide real-time information to facilitate force sorting and enable a ‘‘shooter-focused’’ shoot/don’t shoot decision for detected entities in a weapon sight. 

• Ground-Ground Operations. In ground-ground operations, we’ve made significant investment in the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), 

Data Automated Communications Terminal (DACT), and Mini Transmitter (MTX) 

C2/BFT technologies to improve a commander’s situational awareness (SA) of friendly force locations on the battlefield. We’ve also invested in improved optics and visual marking systems to better enable the visual identification at the shooter level 

of detected ground platforms and individual combatants. While the investment in 

C2/BFT, optics, and JCIMS partially address the Combat Identification (CID) technology gap in the ground-ground environment, they do not negate the need for a 


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positive CTI capability. At the shooter level in direct-fire ground engagements, SA 

(blue icons on a digitized map) is not sufficient—there will always be a data correlation problem between the gun sight and the SA tool—regardless of the accuracy of 

the friendly force SA data. OEF/OIF friendly fire data validate the continued need 

for a CTI (interrogation and reply) capability to support ‘‘force sorting’’ and fratricide mitigation for detected entities in the gunner’s sight. 

• Joint Fires Operations. In the Joint Fires arena, we’ve fielded the Target Location Designation Handoff System (TLDHS), Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) technologies to support Digitally-aided Close Air Support (DaCAS), 

and the LITENING advanced targeting pod to better enable the visual acquisition 

and identification of ground targets at the terminal control node. These technologies, 

combined with significant improvements in standardized Joint Tactical Air Controller ( JTAC) training, and the development of Joint TTP for DaCAS have significantly mitigated the likelihood of repeating early OEF and OIF air-ground fratricide 

events—but do not by themselves negate the need for an air-ground CTI technology. 

• Surface-Air and Air-Air Operations. In surface-air and air-air arena, the Mark 

XII Mode 4 IFF system continues to be the primary system for the identification 

of U.S. and Coalition friendly aircraft. 

Question. What advancements in technology are in development by the Army and 

Marine Corps? 

Army Answer. Over the next two years we plan to invest resources in Science and 

Technology to mature battlefield identification technologies that will enable us to 

address remaining capability gaps in the areas of dismounted combatants, air-toground, and light vehicles. Promising technology options in development for these 

applications include the following: Radio-Based Combat Identification/Situational 

Awareness for dismounted combatants, air-to-ground, and light tactical vehicles; 

Millimeter Wave Question and Answer technology for air-to-ground and light tactical vehicles; Laser/Radio Frequency for light tactical vehicles, Reverse Mark X11A 

Mode 5 Identification Friend or Foe and Radio Frequency Tags for air-to-ground and 

dismounted combatants; Optical Combat Identification System for dismounted combatants; Combat Identification Server for dismounted combatants and air-to-ground; 

and Joint Battle Command-Platform for improved and increased battlefield situational awareness. These efforts are underway to reduce the cost of Millimeter Wave 

Question and Answer technology for use on heavy turreted platforms, such as the 

Stryker, Abrams tank, and Bradley Fighting Vehicle. We are working with the Marine Corps in all of these endeavors. 

Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps is continuing its pursuit of Cooperative 

Target Identification technologies providing our shooters with a capability to positively identify and sort friends from potential enemies at the point they are detected 

on the battlefield. The following technologies were assessed at the Coalition Combat 

Identification Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (CCID ACTD) Urgent 

Quest and were identified as technologies warranting further investment: 

Battlefield Target Identification Device (BTID). A STANAG 4579 compliant, coalition interoperable, millimeter wave-based ground-ground CTI technology providing 

a shooter-focused interrogation-reply capability supporting the identification of 

friendly vehicles in a gunner’s sight in less than 1 second. BTID also provides an 

inherent Digital Data Link (DDL) and Data Exchange Mode (DEM) to mitigate SA 

latency of equipped coalition vehicles in the immediate vicinity of the host platform. 

Current applications of C2/BFT technologies do not allow for the update rate that 

is provided by BTID resulting in latent data unsuitable for split second decisionmaking. BTID will mitigate this problem. BTID is the only interrogation and reply 

technology with proven military utility and effectiveness in the ground-ground operational domain. While not formally assessed, air-ground BTID technologies have 

been demonstrated at past ACTD events and are scheduled for formal assessment 

at the CCID ACTD Bold Quest Demonstration scheduled for October 2009. Additionally, private industry has demonstrated a capability to track dismounted combatants through portable, miniaturized BTID transponders. Based on a successful military utility assessment at the 2005 CCID ACTD Urgent Quest demonstration, the 

Marine Corps has resourced an Army-led joint BTID acquisition approach endorsed 

by the Army Marine Corps Board, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and Service Secretaries for the ground-ground BTID technology. Recent reprogramming of 

FY10 and FY11 BTID funding by the Army have caused an OSD-directed internal 

Army review of its strategy to bring itself back into compliance with the joint BTID 

acquisition strategy. Along with the U.S., the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Sweden, France, and Canada have obtained or procured BTID devices for testing and 

demonstration purposes, but are awaiting a decision by the United States as to 

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tive. The Marine Corps continues to support and fund a Joint effort with the Army 

identified as Component Lead. 

Radio Based Combat Identification (RBCI). A software waveform upgrade to the 

SINCGARS radio providing an interrogation/reply capability for an operator selectable geographic point. RBCI provides an ‘‘area clearance’’ capability for indirect fires 

(i.e. artillery, mortars, naval gunfire, etc) and CAS—it is not designed to provide 

a point-to-point interrogation/reply CTI capability for ground direct-fire weapons. 

Based on the results of the 2005 CCID ACTD Urgent Quest demonstration, the 

AMCB directed the Services fund the integration of RBCI transponder (reply) software on all U.S. SINCGARS radios (Army and Marine Corps) and subsequently the 

Marine Corps integrate an RBCI interrogation capability into its Target Location 

Designation Handoff System (TLDHS) for indirect fires and CAS area clearance. 

Joint and Coalition Technology Development (Air-Ground). In air-ground operations, the CCID ACTD Bold Quest 09 demonstration scheduled for October 2009 

will assess and/or demonstrate air-ground technologies with significant joint and coalition interest. Bold Quest 09 will include five aircraft air-ground CTI technologies 

(Pod-mounted BTID, Pod Mounted RBCI, Reverse IFF (Mode 5), Reverse IFF (Mode 

S), and the CID server—a net-centric tactical service oriented architecture using existing equipment and infrastructure to provide requesting aircraft with 5 closest 

ground friends in the vicinity of an identified target or geographical point of interest. Bold Quest 09 assessment results will be used by the Joint community to support a follow-on Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to inform the way-ahead for a joint/ 

coalition air-ground CTI capability. Joint and Coalition Technology Development 

(Surface-Air and Air-Air). In surface-air and air-air operations, U.S and Coalition 

forces are currently developing a MARK XII Mode 5 IFF capability as a replacement 

for the existing MARK XII Mode 4 capability which is currently providing a friendly 

identification capability in the surface-air and air-air operational environments. 

Within the U.S. Joint Services, a Joint Mode 5 fielding schedule has been coordinated through the JFOCM-chaired Combat Identification-Blue Force tracking Executive Steering Committee and endorsed by the JROC to establish an Initial Operating Capability in 2014 and Full Operational Capability in 2020 for the Joint Services. 

Question. Is there a technology solution that can be easily shared with allied military and police forces? 

Answer. We continuously share information on our identification friend or foe 

technology efforts with the Five Power Senior National Representatives—Army 

countries and with our NATO Allies through active participation in the Working 

Groups and as a party to NATO Standardization Agreements. We also work closely 

with various allies in Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) projects. 

The Coalition Combat Identification ACTD is an example of successful cooperation 

and sharing of technology with our allies. This U.S.-led ACTD included the United 

Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, and Australia, and 

its goal was to evaluate the military utility of various identification friend or foe 

technologies to minimize fratricide incidents and provide increased combat effectiveness in Joint, Allied and Coalition operations. The capstone event for this ACTD 

was a force-on-force operational demonstration conducted in fall of 2005 at the 

United Kingdom’s Salisbury Plains Army Training Facility. On a case-by-case basis 

friend or foe solutions developed for U.S. forces may be shared with allied military 

forces through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. This is particularly true 

with allies who participate as coalition members with the U.S. in combat operations 

in order to achieve interoperability. Recent examples include the transfer or lease 

via FMS of numerous night vision devices, Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and 

Below/Blue Force Tracking, Joint Combat Identification Marking Systems, Ground 

Laser Target Designators, Unmanned Aerial Systems (RAVEN), and Forward Looking Infrared technology. Recipient countries include Canada, Australia, Spain, Croatia, Albania, Bosnia, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, 

Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, and Slovakia. In addition, Section 1202 

of the National Defense Authorization Act allows Combatant Commanders to provide command and control technologies on a loan basis provided directed provisos 

for such loans are met. Upon completion of coalition combat operations these articles 

are returned to the Combatant Command. Technology sharing with police forces is 

much more difficult due to proprietary, export control, and security classification restrictions. 

Marine Corps Answer. The following technologies can be shared with allied military and/or police forces—Joint Combat Identification Marking Systems (STANAG 

2129 compliant). 

Question. Is any such technology now in use by the security forces of Iraq and 

Afghanistan? 


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Army Answer. U.S. friend or foe technologies are not currently in use by Iraqi and 

Afghan security forces. Some export variant night vision equipment and basic Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) technologies have been or will be transferred to Iraqi 

and Afghan security forces. The main purpose of these transfers is to build night 

fighting capability for these forces. Identification of battlefield entities as friend or 

foe during hours of darkness is a secondary benefit to these transfers. U.S. forces 

are well trained in fratricide avoidance involving Iraqi and Afghan security forces. 

Marine Corps Answer. The following technologies are now in use—Joint Combat 

Identification Marking Systems (STANAG 2129 compliant). 

BIOMETRICS

Question. Biometrics is the science and technology of measuring and analyzing biological data. It can be used to identify humans by their fingerprints, hand prints, 

DNA, facial shape or eye scan. 

How is biometric technology employed to assist with force protection in Iraq and 

Afghanistan? 

Army Answer. With respect to force protection, Army forces fundamentally use 

biometrics capabilities to account for and facilitate population management within 

an area of operations. 

At detainee facilities, host nation police academies, forward operating bases, and 

within battlespaces, Soldiers collect biometrics data on individuals within those 

areas using both fixed-site base access systems and handheld devices. Soldiers then 

transmit those collections to the DoD biometrics database for potential matching 

and subsequent intelligence exploitation. Once vetted, Army forces use that biometrics data to verify an individual’s identity with certitude. If a biometrics identity 

is not flagged within their devices following the vetting process, Soldiers can confidently and safely grant access and privileges (e.g. training, hiring). If the biometrics identity is flagged within their devices, Soldiers take the appropriate action 

against the flagged individual (e.g. detain, deny access, deny training) upon encounter. 

Marine Corps Answer. Biometric tools are used in combat patrols, detainee 

screening, vehicle checkpoints, entry control points, and for the screening and 

badging of Iraqi and Afghan Security Forces. Aggressive employment of biometric 

systems has restricted the enemy’s freedom of movement appreciably, aiding in the 

disruption of enemy operations. 

Question. Does the Army employ biometric identification in other places? 

Answer. Yes, Army Special Operations Command (ARSOC), under the operational 

control of the joint regional Special Operations Commands (SOCs), actively employs 

biometrics worldwide in conjunction with host nation military forces. In addition, 

Army conventional forces have employed biometrics in a force protection capacity 

during operations in Bosnia. 

Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps is running a pilot project at MCB Camp 

Pendleton to determine the utility of biometric technology for base access. PP&O 

(PS) is leading this effort. 

Question. Looking to the future, what are the additional applications to use biometrics to contribute to force protection? 

Army Answer. Critical to the DoD and Army’s biometrics advancement is the development of ‘‘stand-off’’ technology that will allow Army forces to verify identities 

from afar. This technology and approach is more proactive in nature and will allow 

Soldiers to identify enemy prior to their advances at check points or gates. 

In the future, biometrics employment will also extend to the protection of Army 

forces at CONUS and OCONUS home stations. A biometrically-enabled approach to 

physical and logical access to installations, facilities, and networks would provide 

greater protection than the badge-based approach that is currently employed. In 

conjunction with local and federal law enforcement partners, even those non-DoD 

individuals with access to home stations (e.g. deliverers, contractors) would be biometrically vetted prior to entry. 

Marine Corps Answer. As DoD biometric technology and employment matures, 

and as global collection of biometric signatures expands, DoD will realize an unprecedented capability to positively identity, track, and locate persons of intelligence and 

security interest. 

Question. Does the Army and Marine Corps currently employ any long range biometric devices? (For example at automobile check points?) 

Army Answer. No, Army forces do not currently employ any long-range biometrics 

devices. Of course, Army forces possess various long-range surveillance systems but 

none are currently equipped with facial recognition or iris technology. However, on 


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a limited scale, the DoD Biometrics database does have the capability to match facial images extracted from video and still photography. 

With respect to automobile check points, the Government of the Islamic Republic 

of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is currently working with the Combined Security Transition 

Command—Afghanistan (CSTC–A) to field a long-range camera system within 

Kabul that will have an Automatic Number Plate Capability, but the system has 

no biometrics capability. 

At the forefront of DoD and Army Research and Development efforts is the development of ‘‘stand-off’’ biometrics systems that will allow for increased collection, 

screening, and targeting using facial recognition and iris technology. 

Marine Corps Answer. No, the Marine Corps is closely watching this technology 

evolve, however. In particular, iris-on-the-move and at-a-distance could enable faster 

throughput at checkpoints. 

COUNTERING SNIPER

Question. One sniper can seriously disrupt a unit’s operation and mission accomplishment. Countering the efforts of enemy snipers is accomplished both through 

material solutions and through better tactics and training. 

What are the technology-based solutions currently in use to detect and counter 

snipers? 

Army Answer. The materiel solutions currently being fielded as part of the Army’s 

ongoing Counter Sniper equipping effort are: 

• Boomerang III Acoustic Gunshot Detection System 

• SWATS (Soldier Wearable Acoustic Targeting Systems) 

• Vanguard (Remote Weapon Station integrated with a Gunshot Detection System) 

• Handheld Thermal Imagers (Mini Thermal Monocular) 

• Stabilized and Ruggedized Binoculars 

• 3x Magnifier for the Close Combat Optic 

• Security Veils (for Guard Towers) 

• Perimeter Security Veils 

• Turret Nets 

• Fast Obscurant Grenades 

Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps has and is investigating several technologies to combat snipers. Currently, there are over 100 Boomerang acoustic 

counter sniper systems being used by Marines in theater. This is not a USMC program of record, but one that the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF) has allowed 

us to use. In addition, we have investigated a variety of Optical Augmentation devices, and the Ground Wearable Acoustic Counter Sniper (GWACS) system. 

Question. Who in the Army and Marine Corps has the responsibility for organizing, manning, and equipping the forces in the field for the counter-sniper fight? 

Army Answer. The Secretary of the Army is responsible for the Title 10 functions 

of Organizing, Supplying, Equipping, and Training Army Forces. As a general rule, 

the VCSA approves and the DCS, G–3/5/7 implements organizational design 

changes proposed by the Commander, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 

for all Army Operating Forces including incorporating a counter-sniper capability 

based upon current and emerging doctrine and an approved requirements determination. To accomplish this, TRADOC has established the Sniper Defeat Integrated Capabilities Development Team at the Maneuver Center of Excellence 

(MCOE) which consists of representatives from across TRADOC to include the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), the Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN), and the Intelligence Center. This team also coordinates with the ASA(ALT) and Army Materiel Command for materiel solutions 

to counter-sniper operations. 

Marine Corrps Answer. Currently there is not a dedicated Program Manager for 

counter-sniper operations within the Marine Corps Systems Command, nor has a 

formal requirement been defined. Within the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and 

Combat Development Directorate, there are counter-sniper programs that work 

closely with each other, and both also stay in contact with the relevant Program 

Managers in the Marine Corps Systems Command, such as PM MERS, ICE, Small 

Arms, and Optics. 

Question. Currently, what are the sniper detection devices fielded to deployed 

units for individuals, vehicles and fixed bases? 

Army Answer. The materiel solutions currently in use that are designed to detect 

the location of snipers are: 

Boomerang III Acoustic Gunshot Detection System—a vehicle mounted system 

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tic signature made by the passing bullet and the muzzle blast from the rifle which 

fired it. Since October 2008, the Army has fielded over 700 Boomerang IIIs to units 

in Iraq and Afghanistan and plans to field over 2000 more this year. Boomerangs 

are being installed on Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and 

M1151 Up-Armored HMMWVs. 

Soldier Wearable Acoustic Targeting System (SWATS): a lightweight, Soldier portable system which locates hostile rifle fire in the same manner described above. 

Since November 2008, the Army has fielded over 1000 SWATS to units that have 

requested the system through the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF) or via an 

Operational Needs Statement (ONS). 

Fixed location gunshot detection was not part of the Counter Sniper equipping effort. The few fixed site gunshot detection systems that have been employed and assessed in theater did not meet the criteria for inclusion on the Counter Sniper 

equipment list. 

Marine Corps Answer. Through the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, the Marine 

Corps has and is investigating several technologies to combat snipers. Currently, 

there are over 100 Boomerang acoustic counter sniper systems being used by Marines in theater. This is not a USMC program of record, but one that the Army’s 

Rapid Equipping Force (REF) has allowed us to use. In addition, we have investigated a variety of Optical Augmentation devices, and the Ground Wearable Acoustic Counter Sniper (GWACS) system. Early Attack Reaction System (EARS), a more 

technologically mature system manufactured by QinetiQ, has been employed by the 

Army as Soldier Wearable Acoustic Targeting System (SWAT). The Marine Corps 

Combat Development Command, Combat Development Directorate is currently investigating if the requirement the Army has generated for that program could be 

used by the Marine Corps as well. We also continue to actively investigate potential 

new systems through industry, academia, and other agencies within the government 

and Department Of Defense in our efforts to find the most cutting edge technology 

to protect our Marines from the sniper threat. 

Question. Please describe the current threat to U.S. forces in Afghanistan and 

Iraq due to snipers. 

Answer. ———. 

Question. Is sniper detection equipment available for training at home station? 

Army Answer. Optical-based sniper detection equipment, such as hand-held thermal imagery devices and stabilized and ruggedized binoculars, are part of unit 

equipment when authorized by their modified table of organization and equipment, 

and as such, are available for use during a unit’s home station tactics training. 

However, the more advanced acoustics-based sniper detection equipment systems 

currently being used in Iraq and Afghanistan are not yet available in sufficient 

quantities to support training at home station. 

To date, all initial commercial-off-the-shelf purchases of acoustics-based vehiclemounted and individually-worn sniper detection equipment systems were fielded directly to tactical units in Iraq and Afghanistan. Initial training on the systems fielded to date is accomplished through new equipment training teams. For all subsequent training, it is conducted by outbound units training inbound units prior to 

their transition of authority for the mission. 

Marine Corps Answer. Yes, boomerang acoustic counter sniper systems currently 

being utilized and tested by Marines are available for training. In addition to technology the Marine Corps has implemented a program that identifies and teaches 

skills to make Marines more efficient ‘‘hunters’’ in all environments, especially 

urban. The goal is to improve operational effectiveness, while reducing casualties. 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command directs the development of the Combat Hunter Program to ‘‘be the hunter, not the hunted’’. The Marine Corps War 

fighting Lab brought in Subject Matter experts such as hunters and police officers 

to teach Marines to become more efficient ‘‘Hunters’’. Civilian experts with big game 

hunting, tracking, and profiling experience supported the experiments. 

The mission of Combat Hunter, which is now a training program available for deploying units, is the creation of a mindset through integration of enhanced observation, combat profiling, and combat tracking in order to produce a more ethically 

minded, tactically cunning, and lethal Marine better prepared to succeed across the 

range of military operations. 

Marine snipers are used as counter-snipers and as such are well suited for detecting and engaging enemy snipers. One of the 0317 Marine Sniper Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) tasks in the Training and Readiness (T&R) manual is to conduct counter sniper operations. This is taught as a learning objective in the USMC 

Weapons Training Battalion Scout Sniper Team Leader Course, and it is an advanced 2000 level skill. 


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Question. Please explain how the Army coordinates the efforts of urgent war time 

fielding efforts and regular order procurement programs. 

Army Answer. The Army has two processes which act as linkages between the 

equipping efforts required for current operations and the institutionalized acquisition programs which are focused on modernization and transformation. 

The Senior Budget Requirements and Program Board (BRP) is focused on coordinating Army staff elements in identifying and resourcing equipping solutions to 

meet the validated requirements of currently deployed and future deploying units 

to Iraq and Afghanistan. The resourcing decisions made by the BRP involve numerous ongoing acquisition programs and items that are in sustainment. The Army’s 

acquisition community and the Army Materiel Command (AMC) work very closely 

with the BRP to ensure all war time equipping requirements are met. 

The Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) process identifies nonstandard systems (commercial-off-the-shelf and non-developmental items) which 

were inserted for limited use in current operations that should become standard 

Army equipment and transition into institutionalized acquisition programs via the 

Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS). The CDRT monitors 

the nonstandard equipment which is inserted into Iraq and Afghanistan in order to 

bridge capability gaps identified by the requesting unit(s). Based on the feedback 

of the unit and other operational assessments, the CDRT council makes recommendations to senior Army leadership on whether the technology should remain 

in theater as a sustainment item, terminate, or transition into a formal acquisition 

program. 

For example, there are two potential acquisition programs that involve Sniper Detection technology which came about as a result of the CDRT process. The Gunshot 

Detection System and the Individual Gunshot Detector programs now have JCIDS 

compliant requirements documents and will compete for funding in the FY12–17 

Program Objective Memorandum (POM). These programs were the result of the 

CDRT council carefully evaluating the feasibility of earlier versions of acoustic gunshot detection systems and recommending to Army decision makers that it become 

an enduring capability. 

Marine Corps Answer. In addition to close coordination with Army for countersniper solutions. We also continue to actively investigate potential new systems 

through industry, academia, and other agencies within the government and Department Of Defense in our efforts to find the most cutting edge technology to protect 

our Marines from the sniper threat. Both the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and 

the Marine Corps Systems Command work closely with the Army as well as other 

DoD organizations to investigate, test and procure technologies to help combat the 

enemy sniper threat. 

Question. Is there a plan to issue sniper detection equipment to all Army and Marine Corps units including National Guard and Reserve units? 

Army Answer. Yes. The equipment which is being fielded to units in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the ongoing Counter Sniper equipping effort is fielded in accordance with the priority established by the local command. Thus, the units which 

receive the equipment may be an Active, National Guard, or Reserve unit if the 

local command determines that unit meets the criteria for receiving Counter Sniper 

equipment. Furthermore, Counter Sniper equipment is accounted for as Theater 

Provided Equipment (TPE) and will therefore transfer from losing unit to gaining 

unit during Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (regardless of what component the 

units are). The Marines have counter-sniper equipment in the. field for assessment 

but have not yet begun to issue these items across their deployed force. 

Marine Corps Answer. Currently, there are over 100 Boomerang acoustic counter 

sniper systems being used by Marines in theater. We are also investigating a man 

wearable acoustic counter sniper system called the GWACS. A more technologically 

mature system manufactured by QinetiQ called EARS has been adopted by the 

Army as a program of record. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 

Combat Development Directorate is currently investigating if the requirement the 

Army has generated for that program could be used by the Marine Corps as well. 

LOST WEAPONS

Question. In recent testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security and 

Foreign Affairs, of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the 

House of Representatives, a witness from the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) reported on the weaknesses in the system to maintain accountability for 

weapons provided to the Afghan National Security Forces, (the Afghan National 

Army and Afghan National Police). From 2002 to 2008 the United States Government, with the U.S. Army and Navy as action agents, purchased and transferred 


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to the Afghan Security Forces over 242,000 light weapons and small arms, at a cost 

of about $120 million. Other countries have provided another 130,000 weapons for 

the Afghan National Security Forces. However, lapses in accountability occurred 

throughout the supply chain. The GAO found that the Army and Combined Security 

Transition Command—Afghanistan did not maintain complete records for an estimated 87,000 of the 242,000 weapons, and that it is impossible to determine their 

disposition or location. 

General, can you explain for the Committee the loss of accountability for 87,000 

weapons that were provided to the Afghan security forces? 

Army Answer. There are two accountability issues regarding the 87,000 weapons 

reported in the Jan 2009 GAO audit (GAO–09–267). The first is serial number accountability and the second is physical accountability of the weapons in Afghanistan. The Army can only address the serial number accountability as the physical 

accountability of weapons is not under the control of the Army Acquisition Community and should be addressed by Central Command and the Combined Security 

Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC–A). 

In the case of some 46,000 weapons acquisitions for Afghanistan, the requirement 

for serial number accountability and tracking was not included in Army contract 

provisions let by the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC). Due to 

this oversight, serial numbers were not provided by the commercial brokers with 

shipments of these weapons, and not entered to the DoD Small Arms Serialization 

Program (DODSASP) registry. USASAC has since gone back to the contractors and 

received all the missing serial numbers for the Afghanistan contracts. All future 

contracts will contain, as a condition of the contract, a requirement for the vendor 

to provide serial numbers at time of shipment. USASAC is providing CSTC–A with 

all serial numbers and is working to ensure the entry of all serial numbers into the 

DODSASP registry as required by regulations. 

Question. Is it likely that some of these weapons may now be in use by the 

Taliban and others who regularly strike at our Soldiers and Marines and our allies? 

Answer. The Army does not have that data. 

Question. How have U.S. forces improved accountability for weapons transferred 

to Afghan Security Forces? 

Answer. The Army does not have oversight accountability of weapons provided to 

the Afghan Security Forces. As we understand, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC–A) is currently recording and tracking the serial numbers of all U.S. procured weapons. For any additional information, Commander, U.S. 

Central Command can provide the most current data. 

SENSORS

Question. The Army is proceeding with plans to take technology that is ready now 

in the Future Combat Systems program, and ‘‘spin it out’’, that is, field it ahead 

of the rest of FCS to Infantry Brigade Combat Teams. One of the items to be spun 

out is ‘‘Unattended Sensors’’, both tactical and urban. 

What is the difference between a tactical sensor and an urban sensor? 

Answer. The Tactical-Unattended Ground Sensors (T–UGS) can be used to perform various mission tasks including perimeter defense, surveillance, target acquisition, situational awareness and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear early 

warning. The gateway nodes organize and maintain the cluster; collect, process, and 

correlate sensor data; and automatically report preprocessed contact and hazard 

data to the Common Operating Picture (COP) via Joint Tactical Radio Systems 

(JTRS) links to the network. The T–UGS clusters will be distributed initially 

through soldier emplacement and ultimately via unmanned ground and air platforms. 

The Urban-Unattended Ground Sensors (U–UGS) is a network-enabled reporting 

system that brings force protection into an urban setting and residual protection for 

cleared areas or for other Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). U–UGS 

will be hand employed by Soldiers or by robotic vehicles to monitor and provide 

early warning and situational awareness. U–UGS provide remote monitoring and 

warning capability to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and small unit (platoon) in 

a MOUT environment for securing areas such as tunnels, caves, sewers, structures, 

and buildings. The U–UGS system will be used by the BCT to support dismounted 

operations in urban environments via intrusion alerts for closed areas that have 

been cleared of enemy soldiers, by monitoring urban congestion points such as corridors and stairwells; and guarding other avenues of approach such as sewers, culverts, and tunnels. Consisting of small, lightweight, and inexpensive sensors and associated processing and networked communications assets, the U–UGS system will 

support BCT operations by providing efficient, economical, and persistent coverage 


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1Source: Investigation of an Unattended Wireless Ground Sensor System; George F. Hahn Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand. 

of areas of special interest to the BCT commanders. Inexpensive local networked 

communications will be interoperable with the JTRS network at the U–UGS gateway node to provide the urban situational awareness. 

Question. How are the new FCS sensors different from the unattended sensors 

used during the Vietnam War? 

Answer. There are significant differences between FCS sensors and those used 

during the Vietnam War. The drivers for these differences revolve around the advances in technology development, computer processing, and Battle Command software being used in the development of the FCS network. Rather than a standalone 

sensor, the FCS sensors are networked and provide the Soldiers with enhanced situational awareness. 

UGS systems were developed to monitor the movement of enemy personnel. The 

original sensors were actually air-dropped radio sonobouys that were adapted by the 

U.S. Navy for ground use by replacing existing hydrophones with microphones and 

geophones (seismic sensors). These seismic/acoustic sensors were the only type to receive widespread deployment during the Vietnam War; these were produced in hand 

implanted and air-dropped versions, both containing common modules. Without 

modern electronics these sensors were easily susceptible to background noise. While 

able to detect footsteps and vehicles at ranges in excess of 30 meters, false alarms 

were often generated by events such as aircrafts overhead, wind, thunder and rain. 

To combat these problems the several sensors were planted in strings (lines), real 

targets would be expected to set off the sensors in sequence, while background interference would set off all the sensors simultaneously.1

The FCS sensors include: Ground Sensor Suite, Air Sensor Suite and UGS. Combinations of these sensors provide the FCS (BCT) with the ability to ‘‘see first’’ and 

provide the warfighter with actionable information. 

The FCS UGS will provide a variety of remote sensing capabilities intended to 

enhance the commanders’ tactical situational awareness and intelligence picture. As 

an integral component of the FCS layered sensor network, the remotely deployable 

UGS will provide enhanced threat warning, situational awareness and force protection in both tactical and urban environments for extended periods. FCS UGS provides Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance/Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (ISR/CBRN) awareness to the BCT of areas not covered by 

manned/unmanned ground/air vehicles. It also detects and locates intruders, monitors cleared rooms during structure clearing operations (protecting the rear), and 

monitors cleared structures for re-entry. 

Question. Are these sensors in use in Iraq or Afghanistan? 

Answer. Currently FCS UGS are not used in Iraq or Afghanistan. While there are 

other UGS systems currently employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom, FCS UGS are designed to meet the FCS Net-Centric Key Performance Parameter as part of the overall FCS System of Systems solution. Critical command and control, fusion, and other FCS Battle Command functionality built on the 

FCS-unique System of Systems Common Operating Environment are an integral 

part of the FCS UGS systems. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence has determined that FCS UGS are the Army’s UGS Program of Record, and that all UGSrelated requirements should be provided to and synchronized within the FCS program. 

Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager FCS in conjunction with 

Program Manager FCS have been actively involved in applying lessons learned from 

Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom UGS. Consequently, the FCS 

T–UGS program has adopted a new form factor (NFF) design that is a smaller hand 

emplaced variant of the original T–UGS design. These NFF T–UGS will also incorporate increased battery life technology and radio range extension nodes. This 

smaller design is a result of lessons learned in theater. 

Question. How will these new sensors contribute to force protection in the field 

or in base camp? 

Answer. U–UGS provides the BCT enhanced situational awareness and force protection in urban environments. The U–UGS provides remote monitoring and warning capability for the current force small unit (section) in caves and in urban environments such as tunnels, sewers, structures, and inside of buildings. The U–UGS 

will be used by the BCT to support dismounted operations in urban environments. 

The U–UGS network will support current force operations by providing efficient, economical, and persistent coverage in urban areas and caves. 


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Utilization of both the T–UGS and U–UGS systems greatly enhances the Soldiers 

force protection by denying enemy forces freedom of maneuver and early detection 

capabilities. 

Question. When will the first Army Brigade Combat Team receive fielding of these 

tactical and urban unattended sensors? 

Answer. Fielding of T–UGS/U–UGS to Spin Out Infantry Brigade Combat Teams 

begins in FY11. 

Question. What prevents enemy forces from picking up our sensors, or booby trapping them so as to harm our soldiers when they are recovering a sensor? 

Answer. The UGS sensor will send an alert to the Common Operating Picture 

identifying the approach of enemy forces or individuals into a sensor field by various 

acoustic, seismic, magnetic and imaging sensors. These sensors are also used to 

characterize the approach of the target. However, if disturbed, the FCS UGS incorporates anti-tamper technology alerting the FCS network and renders the ‘‘disturbed’’ node useless. The disturbed node must be recovered and sent back to a 

Depot/Contractor repair facility for rework before it can be re-issued for a future employment. 

COMMON ACCESS CARDS

Question. One of the key components of force protection is controlling access to 

military bases or sensitive facilities within the bases. An area of special emphasis 

is controlling the access of non-federal, contractor employees. Access control becomes 

a critical area of force protection at forward deployed bases where the majority of 

contractor employees may be host country or third country nationals. Gentlemen, 

how do you rate your service for base access control both in the United States and 

at forward deployed locations? 

Army Answer. The Army does not prescribe guidance or policy on installation or 

base access. This would fall under the auspices of The Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense, Intelligence and US Central Command. 

Marine Corps Answer. Marine Corps forces that are forward deployed maintain 

a strong security posture at bases and outposts. The combination of manpower, technology, tactics and Military Working Dogs give base security forces a demonstrable 

capacity to control access and screen personnel and equipment. Marines employ 

technology with proven performance, including biometric systems, surveillance systems, personnel and cargo scanning systems and barrier systems. The continuous 

application of Random Antiterrorism Measures by commanders ensures that: 1) Marines keep terrorists and insurgents tactically off-balance and 2) we remain ‘‘hard 

to kill’’. 

USMC installations in the United States have also used the same security capabilities. The continuous application of Random Antiterrorism Measures present a 

number of security challenges to those who may wish to harm us. That said, there 

are a number of challenges for USMC installations in CONUS. These include, but 

are not limited to, the age of the entry control facilities, continued growth in and 

around our installations that limits expansion and the requirement for substantial 

infrastructure investment in order to implement the most effective access control 

procedures. 

Question. The primary access control tool in use at our military bases throughout 

the world to include forward based facilities and outposts in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

is the Common Access Card (CAC). The Department of Defense Inspector General, 

in recent testimony before this Committee, reported serious concerns about the use 

of the CAC Card. Thousands of cards were not affiliated with a contract and thousands more did not have expiration dates linked to contract completion. The IG testified that contractors could approve and issue a CAC card which grants an individual unfettered access to military bases with no government oversight. One of the 

contractors who had issued CAC cards is KBR. The Inspector General reported that 

39,000 applications for a CAC had been approved without the required background 

checks and about 212,000 contractor personnel had email addresses that 

misclassified the contractor personnel as U.S. Government personnel. The IG testified that an individual who had no affiliation to DoD (as either an employee or contractor) obtained a CAC and stole 10 million gallons of fuel from Iraq. This 

misidentification is also a potential security risk because individuals who obtain 

CAC cards could misrepresent themselves both in person and on DoD networks to 

improperly obtain sensitive information. 

Gentlemen, are you familiar with the various problems the Inspector General 

identified with the issuing, use, and termination of Common Access Cards? 


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Army Answer. Yes. The Army was briefed regarding the DoD Inspector General 

Audit, Project No. D2007–D000LA–0199.001, Controls Over the Contractor Common 

Access Card Life Cycle. 

Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps is aware of the findings with regards 

to issuance, use and termination of CACs to contractors. The Marine Corps has 

found no evidence that the Inspector General findings have occurred within the Marine Corps, however in light of these findings we have undertaken an aggressive 

audit and training initiative to ensure that those government personnel in positions 

to sponsor and issue CACs are abiding by and understand DoD and Marine Corps 

policy. 

Question. What is your service doing to get control of Common Access Cards and 

base access control? 

Army Answer. The Army does not prescribe guidance or policy on installation or 

base access. This would fall under the auspices of The Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense, Intelligence and US Central Command. 

Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps has consistently applied DoD, DoN and 

Marine Corps policy with regards to the CAC program and in doing so has maintained program control. The Marine Corps has implemented internal program reviews (audits) to ensure that: 

1. The Marine Corps has appropriate policy for the issuance, use and termination 

of CACs, which is aligned with DoD policy. 

2. All Marine Corps Contractor Verification System (CVS) Trusted Agents (TA) 

are government civil servant or Marines, as sponsorship for a CAC is an inherently 

governmental responsibility. 

3. The Marine Corps applies consistent and effective corrective action. The Marine 

Corps has a wide range of possible corrective actions that may be taken, including 

training, revocation of credentials/access, and punitive action for non-compliance 

with DoD and Marine Corps policy. 

With regard to base access control policy, the Marine Corps established a standard baseline installation access control policy throughout the Marine Corps. 

MARADM1N #533/08 identifies the Common Access Card (CAC) as the primary 

token for all Marine Corps installation access control systems. While access control 

systems must use the CAC as the primary token, possession of a CAC does not automatically equate to installation access. The CAC, as an authentication credential, 

identifies the individual and should be used in conjunction with access control policy 

and procedures to implement a comprehensive installation access control program. 

Question. Do you agree that the best fence and most fortified entry points are rendered useless is access if given to, or perhaps sold to, an adversary? 

Army Answer. Yes. 

Marine Corps Answer. And in light of that threat, the Marine Corps continues 

to look for technological solutions that will enhance the capabilities of the staff at 

our access control points in an effort to effectively screen persons attempting to 

enter our bases, deny unauthorized access/entry, and simultaneously maintain safe 

and efficient movement of authorized personnel. 

Question. Should there be service-wide, or Department of Defense-wide, guidance 

for the issuance, use and termination of contractor Common Access Cards? 

Army Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) DTM 08–003, ‘‘Next Generation Common Access Card (CAC) Implementation 

Guidance’’, dated 1 Dec 08 provides guidance for the issuance, use and termination 

of contractor Common Access Cards. This guidance will be further amplified when 

DoD publishes the required DODI. 

Marine Corps Answer. Both the DoD and Marine Corps have published policy for 

the issuance, use and termination of contractor CACs. The Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)) has published Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 08–003, ‘‘Next Generation Common Access Card (CAC) Implementation Guidance’’ provides the overarching directive for the DoD. In conjunction with 

the USD (P&R) DTM 08–003, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps has published Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN) 624/08 ‘‘MCBUL 5512. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 Compliance Within the Marine 

Corps’’ detailing the requirements for issuance of CACs to contractors within the 

Marine Corps. 

Question. Did someone in the US Military give KBR authority to decide who 

would receive Common Access Cards? 

a. If so, who was that person? 

Army Answer. The Army Human Resources Command provided the Army Material Command (AMC) Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) the capability to issue Common Access Cards (CAC) to DoD Contractors deploying in support 

of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF). This authority was 


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given under the stipulation that CAC issuance would be in accordance with DoD 

policies in effect at the time and under government supervision and oversight. 

b. When was the decision made? Has anyone been reprimanded for this decision 

to hand over the CAC vetting process to KBR? 

Answer. The decision to provide a CAC issuance capability to LOGCAP was made 

following a formal request of 19 June 2003 from the Program Manager for LOGCAP. 

LOGCAP program management was responsible for ensuring that background vetting was accomplished in accordance with policies in effect at the time. 

Marine Corps Answer. We have found no evidence that the Marine Corps gave 

KBR the authority to decide who would receive CACs. The Marine Corps follows 

DoD policy as issued by OUSD P&R with regard to the vetting and issuance of the 

common access card (CAC). Issuance of a Common Access Card to a contractor requires sponsorship by a Marine or government civilian employee. Issuance of the 

CAC at a Marine Corps ID Card Facility is accomplished by military, civil service 

or contracted employees supporting that facility. The issuance process requires a 

minimum of a two (2) person validation: 

1. The government official acting as the sponsor through the Contractor 

Verification System (CVS) (CVS Trusted Agent (TA)), 

The Real-time Automated Personnel Identification System Verifying Official, who 

validates the identity documentation and issues the CAC. 

The CAC can only be issued to individuals who meet the vetting requirements; 

have a government sponsor; have a valid record in the Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System (DEERS), and presents two forms of valid identification, one 

being a government issued picture ID, to the Verifying Official for validation and 

scanning as part of the card issuance process. 

Question. Are KBR employees still approving CACs independent of DoD review? 

Answer. No. Eligibility and verification for contractor CACs issued at KBR’s 

Houston, TX deployment facility are processed by a government Trusted Agent (TA) 

via the Contractor Verification System (CVS). 

Marine Corps Answer. We have found no evidence that KBR employees are approving CACs independent of DoD review within the Marine Corps. 

Question. If no formal DoD decision was made to give KBR authority to issue 

CACs, has anyone from KBR been held accountable for overstepping their approved 

role in granting the cards? 

Army Answer. KBR never had the authority to issue CAC independent of 

LOGCAP management and oversight. 

Marine Corps Answer. This question is not applicable to the Marine Corps. 

Question. If KBR did not have DoD approval to decide who would receive CACs, 

were DoD personnel in the field aware that KBR employees were issuing the cards 

in violation of their contract and DoD security guidelines? 

Army Answer. The Army Human Resources Command provided the Army Materiel Command (AMC) Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) the capability to issue Common Access Cards (CAC) to DoD Contractors deploying in support 

of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF). This authority was 

given under the stipulation that CAC issuance would be in accordance with DoD 

policies in effect at the time and under government supervision and oversight. 

The decision to provide a CAC issuance capability to LOGCAP was made following a formal request of 19 June 2003 from the Program Manager for LOGCAP. 

LOGCAP program management was responsible for ensuring that background vetting was accomplished in accordance with policies in effect at the time. 

Marine Corps Answer. This question is not applicable to the Marine Corps. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 2009. 

AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL 

WITNESSES 

HON. CRAIG W. DUEHRING, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR 

FORCE, MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICHARD Y. NEWTON, III, DEPUTY CHIEF OF 

STAFF, MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. ROTHMAN. The Committee will come to order. This morning 

the Committee will discuss Air Force Personnel. We are pleased to 

welcome the Honorable Craig Duehring, Assistant Secretary of the 

Air Force For Manpower and Reserve Affairs; and Lieutenant General Richard Newton, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel. 

The realities of the world have changed dramatically and continue to change daily. In response to these changes, the Air Force 

is embracing a collaborative and supportive role in the types of 

ground operations being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 

general, Air Force leaders have adjusted quickly by developing efforts to meet challenges not traditionally borne by Air Force personnel. 

The Air Force has stepped up to meet these challenges. However, 

this places a greater demand on its personnel. Unlike the Marines 

and Army, which are both expanding, the Air Force has a forceshaping plan in effect to reduce personnel. 

However, the Air Force ended the reductions to meet these new 

requirements. Air Force leaders are working toward the right mix 

of airmen, and the committee is very interested in what force-shaping measures the Air Force will use to recruit the right people, 

train them properly, maintain high standards, and grow experience 

in a manageable way. 

We look forward to the testimony and to a spirited and informative question-and-answer session. 

And now, before we hear your testimony, gentlemen, I would like 

to call upon Congressman Frelinghuysen, my colleague from New 

Jersey, who was the senior member here on the Republican side. 

REMARKS OF MR. FRELINGHUYSEN

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The record should note that both the ranking and the chairman, 

probably for the first time in history, are leading the debate on this 

public hearing. So thank you very much for the recognition. 

And welcome to both of our distinguished guests. 


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Secretary Duehring, I note, from looking at your resume, your 

distinguished career. You were awarded the Silver Star; flew over 

800 missions in Vietnam, that is one hell of a lot of missions. 

And I want to recognize your long public service, as well, General 

Newton, thank you for your service. 

I am told that the Air Force has been in a continual global combat engagement since 1990, and I am sure that, over the years, it 

has been to differing degrees of severity, but it is an extraordinary 

fact nonetheless. Despite this unprecedented operation tempo, the 

Air Force continues to reach most of its recruiting and retention 

goals, an impressive achievement. Yet I know that several areas remain difficult, such as medical professionals and certain enlisted 

retention zones. 

I look forward, knowing that there is a renewed focus on the nuclear enterprise and additional Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) mission that have caused you to reserve planning 

reductions to your end-strength numbers, a process that is neither 

quick nor cheap. 

But like the Chairman this morning, I welcome you here for this 

very important hearing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Congressman Frelinghuysen. 

Now, Secretary Duehring, we understand that you and General 

Newton will each make a brief opening statement. You may proceed. Your entire statement will be placed on the record. And let 

me echo my friend and colleague from New Jersey, we are honored 

to have such two distinguished gentlemen and heroes here today. 

We hope that your service in your present capacities will be the 

crowning jewels of each of your respective distinguished and remarkable careers. 

Mr. Secretary. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY DUEHRING

Mr. DUEHRING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You set a very high 

standard now. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to speak with you today about our United States Air 

Force’s military personnel. 

I want to take this opportunity to thank the members of this 

Committee and the entire House of Representatives for your unwavering support of our men and women in uniform and their families. 

Our Airmen have been continuously deployed and globally engaged in combat missions for over 18 straight years. While we remain committed to winning today’s fight in preparing for tomorrow’s challenges, we have further refined our priorities. We are focusing on reinvigorating the Air Force nuclear enterprise; 

partnering with the joint and coalition team to win today’s fight; 

developing and caring for Airmen and their families; modernizing 

our air and space inventories, organizations, and training; and recapturing acquisition excellence. 

In order to continue engaging both current and emerging global 

threats, our recruiting mission goes beyond simply finding the right 

numbers. It includes ensuring the right quality and the right skills 


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are present in potential candidates so they can effectively support 

the Air Force’s diverse mission. 

We also continue to invest in retaining the high caliber men and 

women that we recruited. In fiscal year 2008, overall active duty 

enlisted and Air Force reserve, enlisted and officer retention rates 

finished below annual goals. While the active duty officer corps and 

the National Guard met or exceeded all of other aggregate of retention goals. 

The first quarter of fiscal year 2009 shows overall active duty retention is trending slightly upward. But some of our critical 

stressed specialties continue to experience significant shortfalls. 

And we continue to rely heavily on bonuses and quality-of-life initiatives to resolve these shortages. 

With the heightened operations tempo we are experiencing, we 

remain mindful of the increased stressed placed on our Airmen and 

their families. The Air Force employs a variety of screening tools 

to monitor Airmen’s health, to enhance detection of psychological 

issues, and provide for early intervention when required. Almost 13 

years ago, we created the Air Force Suicide Prevention program, 

which centers on effective education, detection and treatment for 

persons at risk. While we are making significant progress on suicide and mental health issues within the Air Force, we continue to 

work with our sister services to make our programs more effective. 

Today’s Airmen are clearly in this fight. As Air Force leaders, we 

are committed to doing our part to manage end-strength efficiently 

to maximize capability, recruiting and retaining the highest quality 

and diverse Airmen, while continuing to focus on the health, wellbeing and readiness of our Airmen and their families. We appreciate your continued support to the men and women of our Air 

Force, and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

General. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL NEWTON

General NEWTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of 

the committee, I also want to thank you for this opportunity to discuss our efforts to ensure we attract and recruit and develop and 

retain a high quality and diverse fighting force. 

Today Airmen are fully engaged in joint operations across the 

globe and stand prepared for rapid response to asymmetric as well 

as to conventional conflicts. 

The Air Force is totally committed to winning today’s fight with 

the innovative combat spirit our airmen demonstrate on a daily 

basis regardless of the task. As of this morning, we have approximately 38,000 Airmen, active duty, Guard, and Reserve, deployed 

in support of global operations, and approximately 217,000, total 

force airmen supporting all 10 combatant commanders. 

These airmen are doing amazing things for the joint warfighting 

team. Our aim is to improve capability by tapping into all available 

recruiting and retention sources so we do not lose the war on talent. As we prepare for an uncertain future, we are transforming 

the force to ensure we are the right size and shape to meet emerging global threats with joint- and battle-trained airmen. This reVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:11 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00283 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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quires a commitment to invest in our people and our quality-of-life 

programs. 

This commitment includes continued support for special paying 

allowances to address specific recruiting and retention concerns. 

And for example, the Air Force continues to develop both accession 

retention incentives to ensure the right mix of health professionals. 

Additionally, our most critical warfighting skills require special 

focus on retention due to the demands of the high operations tempo 

placed on Air Force airmen who perform such duties as para rescue 

and combat controller, tactical air control party and explosive ordinance disposal. 

Just as important, we are committed to taking care of families 

and wounded warriors as an essential piece of retaining a highly 

effective force. Special emphasis has been placed on our reintegration efforts for our returning deployers and their families to ensure 

that we practically tackle any difficulties that they may experience. 

Our airmen and family readiness centers along with professionals 

in the medical community work together as a seamless team at the 

base level to meet the needs of our airmen and their family members. 

In conclusion, our airmen are integral to the success of the joint 

warfighter while executing the Air Force mission and keeping the 

Air Force on a vector for success against any potential threats. 

Again, thank you for your unfailing support to the men and women 

and our families in our Air Force, and I look also forward to your 

questions. 

[The joint statement of Secretary Duehring and General Newton 

follows:] 


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END-STRENGTH NUMBERS

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, General. 

I think, if one reads the biography of each of these distinguished 

gentlemen, they will be extremely impressed. It was noted that the 

secretary flew 800 missions, but I just thought I would mention 

that Lieutenant General Newton was a command pilot with over 

2,900 flying hours in aircraft such as the B–2, B–1B, B–52 and T– 

38 as well. 

But now you gentlemen have different responsibilities. 

If you could, Secretary Duehring, explain what the end-strength 

number is that you project and the budget projects for the 2010 fiscal year and how you got there. 

Mr. DUEHRING. Yes, sir, I will give you some history as to how 

we got there. A few years ago, I believe it was in 2005, when the 

previous secretary and chief of staff determined that the Air Force 

would reduce 40,000 people, and our new goal then was 316,600 

people. We began ramping down at that time. 

About this time last year January, February, the Army and then 

the Marine Corps announced that they were increasing their numbers. And of course, because we are tied so closely to what they do, 

we have to provide the air lift and a lot of other support, we reassessed what our bottom line should be. And our best guess at that 

point started building on some of the missions, cyber mission, cyber 

mission came back up; we had the incident with the nuclear weapons, of course, we needed to get our arms around again, just regular support for the Army and Marine Corps caused us to reevaluate exactly where we were. 

They took this discussion to the Secretary of Defense, and in 

June of last year he said, okay, you are now pretty close to 330,000, 

and why don’t you stop right in here? What happens when you 

have taken actions to decrease total end strength is, you can’t turn 

it off overnight. It is sort of like an airplane in the descent; you 

have to pull back, and it is still going to go down a little ways, so 

we did. We are back up to about 329,000 plus change right now. 

It caused a little problem in that we needed to fund that, and we 

needed to find funding out of the existing budgets at that time, because we were planning on going down, and we had always spent 

those dollars. 

The final answer to your question, Mr. Chairman, is really in the 

fiscal year 2010 Presidential budget, which will be coming out very 

shortly, but we are pretty close to where we will probably end up. 

I do want to make the point that we didn’t add back people that 

we had planned on removing. We built up in these other areas because of new missions that we saw. So it as an adjustment like 

that. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. In my opening remarks, I mentioned that there 

were activities that the Air Force was providing that were not part 

of its traditional mission. We spoke earlier, but I think, for the 

record, I would like to hear the numbers of Air Force personnel 

doing those nontraditional things and what those constitute. 


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NON-TRADITIONAL MISSION

Mr. DUEHRING. Yes. I have some of those at my fingertips. The 

average over the last 5 years of the numbers of Airmen who have 

been deployed for OIF-OEF tasking has been about 80,000 per 

year. Now we do a check, we checked it this morning again to 

make sure we had the latest information. About 38,000 deployed at 

any given time, and if you are talking about CENTCOM, of that 

number, 28,000 are in CENTCOM. 

And you have to remember that we have a lot of commitments 

around the world in other areas as well. We have about 4,000 people who are involved in what we call Joint Expeditionary Tasking 

(JET). JET used to be called in-lieu-of tasking. In-lieu-of tasking 

doesn’t really tell what we are doing. In-lieu-of tasking sounds like 

we are there for a moment and we are pulling back out. That is 

not the impression we want to give, because we are very much part 

of the joint team, the combined team, the allied team. And so we 

are going to stay as long as we have to. 

Now, in addition, what people don’t see is that we have a lot of 

folks who, in effect, fight from home station. The Army has to deploy if it is going to go fight a battle. The Marine Corps deploys. 

The Navy takes the fleet and goes over the horizon. The Air Force, 

in many, many, many cases, to the tune of about in 217,000 people, 

actually fight to one degree or another from their home station. 

Now this could be folks in the space business who are monitoring 

or keeping the satellites, the global-positioning satellites, in proper 

orbit. This could be the new Global Strike Command that we are 

setting up. This could be the cyber programs that we are setting 

up as well. And we discussed earlier some of the intelligence programs that, because of the capabilities we have now, allow us to 

bring information back here to be evaluated. It is just an increase 

in technology, which by the way is good for us, because we don’t 

have to deploy more people. It is cheaper, plus they like sleeping 

in their own beds every night. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. That includes operation of the UAVs from here. 

Mr. DUEHRING. It does. We have a number of bases. That is 

going on as we speak. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. 

General, did you want to respond to something. 

General NEWTON. Sir, if I may, just quickly, again, as the secretary alluded to, our 217,000 Airmen as they are directly in line 

in support of providing capabilities to all 10 combatant commands, 

keep in mind that, again, as we are engaged, we are engaged 

across a spectrum from Operation Noble Eagle which began on the 

morning of September 11th, 2001, we have flown 54,000 Operation 

Noble Eagle missions since then; to providing capabilities to General Petraeus in the Central Command region, as we have highlighted as well; all the way to the high end with regard to providing strategic deterrence for this Nation. 

So it is, again, as our Airmen, we are an expeditionary force, 

again, with the challenges that we face in the 21st century, we see 

ourselves not only fighting from in garrison or in place but also 

from a deployed location as well. So it spans again across a spectrum of capabilities but also conflicts for this Nation. 


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Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. 

Congressman Frelinghuysen. 

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One of the other hats I wore, I was ranking on Energy and 

Water, and I have a keen interest in the Air Force nuclear enterprise. In his report on the state of the military nuclear enterprise, 

former Secretary Jim Schlesinger said, ‘‘The decision that junior officers assigned initially to ICBMs will spend the remainder of their 

careers in the space mission area, and thus outside the broader Air 

Force, both devalue the mission area and have the effect of reducing the depth of Air Force nuclear experience, especially among 

mid-career and senior officers.’’ 

I would say, with apologies to General Newton, I think everybody 

who joins the Air Force wants to fly via a fighter pilot. What are 

we doing relative to changing the attitude that many felt has been 

somewhat current about getting into those parts of the nuclear and 

space enterprise which are very essential to our national security? 

General NEWTON. Chairman, if I may, I am speaking as an experienced bomber pilot from our Strategic Air Command days, and 

also the son of a bomber pilot, as well. But our chief of staff and 

our secretary have put as a top priority reinvigorating the nuclear 

enterprise of the U.S. Air Force. As we discussed previously, when 

we had the unauthorized weapons transfer back in the summer of 

2007, August 30th specifically, of 2007, if you recall from Minot to 

Barksdale and so forth— 

Again, stemming from that instant back in August of 2007 that 

was, from my personal view, a significant wake up came from the 

United States Air Force. And as we refocused on a nuclear enterprise, and we have taken, not only from a commander-directed investigation but all the way through a Blue Ribbon Review that the 

Air Force undertook, through Dr. Schlesinger’s report and so forth, 

we have come a long way. We still have a ways to go. 

We are planning on setting up an Air Force Global Strike Command. We have already set up Air Force Global Strike Command 

Provisional. We plan on again bringing that command up to 

strength here soon. We have assigned both, the plan is to assign 

both B–52s and B–2 bombers, for instance, as well as intercontinental ballistic missile forces to that Global Strike Command. We 

are also taking a look at how we, not only from an equipment 

standpoint, but how we are organized and trained as well, but also 

how we develop our force. In your question, you alluded to the fact, 

I take license with your comment, that some of the experience and 

the capabilities in our airmen perhaps atrophied away. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Institutional memory is important. 

General NEWTON. Yes, sir. As Secretary Schlesinger reported on, 

we are going to, again, take a lot of the insights that Secretary 

Schlesinger and the Commissioner provided us and put more emphasis and more focus on nuclear duties. For instance, an ICBM 

officer serving at Minot Air Force Base today will serve there perhaps in the capacity as a lieutenant and a captain, but can also, 

will continue to develop one’s career across the nuclear enterprise, 


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where many of our men and women just like we have done in the 

past can serve in a variety of—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So how are you proceeding to attract and 

retain the people you have and, more importantly, get ready shall 

we say to incentivize those who would enter the Air Force to get 

into the nuclear enterprise? How are you identifying people that 

are highly capable who you want on your nuclear and space team? 

General NEWTON. Part of that is a recruiting effort, but it is also 

how we assess, particularly within our officer ranks, also how we 

retain—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How are you doing it now? The wake-up 

call was delivered. 

General NEWTON. It was. We are meeting most of the requirement with the nuclear enterprise. We are short in the bomber pilot 

and the bomber navigator force; that has been an issue to deal with 

not only within the nuclear enterprise but also across the rated 

community, particularly in the bomber and the navigator ranks 

and so forth. We are going to provide, again, many opportunities 

not only for them to serve but for them to also reach their full potential with a career in the United States Air Force, those who 

have come from the nuclear ranks. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So, as you go out there to attract and retain the people you need, where are you getting the money to do 

it? 

General NEWTON. Yes, sir, with regard to recruiting and retention, we are large across the Air Force. We feel confident we will 

meet our recruiting goals as well as our retention goals certainly 

through fiscal year 2009. We feel that we have at this point the resources to do that as well as to provide the opportunities to get 

back to the nuclear issue and provide them the opportunity for not 

only duties in a nuclear enterprise but also for them to advance 

their careers. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you turned the corner in terms of making sure that this part of the Air Force is indeed a career path and 

is of value? 

General NEWTON. Yes, sir, it is. I go back to my initial comment 

by the Chief of Staff General Schwartz and our Secretary, Secretary Donley making this absolutely a top priority. Part of reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise is not necessarily just with equipment, but I think more focused on our Airmen and giving them the 

opportunity to reach their full potential in the nuclear enterprise. 

And that is where we believe we have indeed turned the corner, 

but we still have work do. I am confident that we will again provide for those opportunities and for the career development. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Let me just say, for the record, my chairman has come in, Chairman Visclosky, we are asking about the Air 

Force’s role on the nuclear enterprise, and we have been assured 

that there has been a huge about-face here. And whatever the cultural roadblocks that were there have been removed, and indeed, 

you are making some considerable progress. 

General NEWTON. Yes, sir, we are. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. 

Now Congressman Dicks, please. 


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OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE

Mr. DICKS. What is the status of Operation Noble Eagle? To date, 

how many combat air patrol missions supporting Operation Noble 

Eagle has the active Air Force flown? 

Mr. DUEHRING. Sir, we have that information. There are quite a 

few numbers involved. If I could, I would like to just take it for the 

record and give it to you in a document, but I can tell you the status right now is that we still participate in Operation Noble Eagle. 

In fact, that is the oldest mission we have on the war on terrorism. 

I would like to highlight the Air Force’s roles for those of us who 

were here on September 11th and remember that when the first 

aircraft approached the East Coast, the first response was by the 

United States Air Force. Specifically it was the Air National Guard. 

It was a unit from North Dakota, the Happy Hooligans, who happened to be flying out of Langley Air Force Base, Virginia at that 

time, were vectored and diverted from their mission toward the aircraft and then, after that, the tankers from Bangor, Maine, one on 

the runway and one getting ready to taxi out. We had the Air National Guard from D.C., followed by the Marine Corps Air Reserve 

flying F–18s out of Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland at that 

time. So that is our oldest mission. We continue to fly it. It has 

changed the number of Combat Air Patrols (CAPs), more people on 

alert rather than CAP, depending on the need at the time. I am 

happy to give you a better—— 

Mr. DICKS. Give us an update. That would be great. 

We understand that the Air National Guard is not flying these 

patrols anymore, that they are just on alert status at a number of 

installations. Is that correct? 

Mr. DUEHRING. The Air National Guard still has the primary 

role for the Air Sovereignty Mission, but the Air Sovereignty Alert 

status is what they are in when they are on the ground, and as 

soon as they raise off the ground and become Operation Noble 

Eagle, and I would say as requirements dictate and I am thinking 

in terms of political conventions, the inauguration, other events 

where we may want to have people a little closer to the action, 

those aircraft can easily be put into a CAP. 

Mr. DICKS. I just was curious because our staff here says that 

the Air National Guard is not flying these patrols. 

Mr. DUEHRING. When they wouldn’t be—— 

Mr. DICKS. But is on alert status at a number of installations. 

So are you saying that, unless there is some reason, they are not 

doing these patrols? 

Mr. DUEHRING. That is largely correct, yes, sir. Because you are 

using up the air frames, of course, and somebody has to decide, you 

know, when is the threat great enough to have people airborne? We 

can get them up there pretty darn fast. For example, the Air National Guard performed 481 ONE CAP sorties during 2007 and 304 

during January through August of 2008 in addition to their ASA 

missions. 

Mr. DICKS. You will give us an update on that? 

Mr. DUEHRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. The Navy has individual augmentees that are serving 

in Iraq. What about the Air Force? 


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Mr. DUEHRING. We do, too. It is a Reserve program. These are 

people who differ from your traditional drilling reservist in that 

they would not have a Reserve unit. With an intelligence unit, I 

belong to the 153rd Intelligence Squadron. My unit gets called up, 

and away I go. Individual Mobilization Augmentees are more assigned to a specific job against an active Duty billet with an active 

Air Force unit, wing, WIA Team or other headquarters position. 

Mr. DICKS. How many Air Force augmentees are serving either 

in Iraq or Afghanistan? 

Mr. DUEHRING. I would have to get that for you. 

[The information follows:] 

The Air Force Reserve has 138 Individual Mobilization Augmentees serving in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Mr. DICKS. The Navy number was like 12,000 down to 10,000. 

General, do you have any idea? 

General NEWTON. I believe you are referring to our Joint Expeditionary taskings. We provide capability in the U.S. Central Command (US CENTCOM) region, for instance, either by unit or by individuals. Right now, we have—— 

Mr. DICKS. But these were people who were actually serving in 

Iraq, they were volunteers. I know the Navy people call it, they 

were not part of—they would be part of a unit but—— 

General NEWTON. Like you said, individual augmentees. We task 

ours to do Joint Expeditionary taskings. We have approximately 

3,500 of them serving under these Joint Expeditionary taskings. 

Mr. DICKS. Is that affecting readiness in any way? 

General NEWTON. Sir, it is not. Again, we have Airmen tasked 

to provide capabilities to the joint warfighter from, 120 days to 179 

days to 365 days. But, again, part of what you alluded to in terms 

of these individual taskings. 

Mr. DICKS. So you guys are going to reduce your overall personnel by what 20,000 or what I think the number was or 40,000. 

Mr. DUEHRING. 40,000, yes sir. 

Mr. DICKS. But now Secretary Gates has said, no, don’t do that. 

So how will this affect your ability to go out and buy equipment? 

That was the reason you were going to reduce manpower. 

Mr. DUEHRING. No. Well, what we did was, when we made the 

decision to reduce by 40,000, that took us back to 316,000, which 

was still our goal, but because of the new missions, including the 

nuclear mission which we had to reevaluate, the cyber works, some 

Special Operations requirements and, of course, associated maintenance, other programs that evolved because the Army is increasing 

their numbers and the Marine Corps is increasing their numbers, 

we have built up from that point. It looks like we are buying back, 

but that is not really what we are doing. 

These are missions we didn’t know about in 2005 when we made 

the decision to draw down. So the Secretary said, level off at about 

330,000; you have my approval to do that, and let’s reassess exactly 

what you need. We had to ask the Army and Marine Corps for 

their numbers. And where we are going to actually give you a finite 

amount will be in the President’s budget for fiscal year 2010, which 

is coming very soon. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. 


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Congressman Tiahrt. 

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is nice to see that the sun is shining in New Jersey with both 

the ranking member and the chairman here in control. 

I wanted to talk a little bit about this National Guard thing because I think there has been some effort in the Air Force to sort 

of take the teeth away from the Guard. I know, at McConnell Air 

Force Base, our Air National Guard unit had done a lot of fighter 

training over the years. We eventually went to B–1s and we had 

the B–1 wing for a while, and it had the highest readiness rate and 

did an excellent job responding to everything that was thrown their 

way. And we had a great place for them. They only, even during 

midnight launches, only received one call from Derby, Kansas, 

which is right south of the base and that is the flight path. And 

it was a lady who wanted to know when you were going to quit 

launching the B–1s so she could let her dog out because she was 

worried that her dog might bark at the planes and disturb the 

neighbors. She wasn’t worried about the B–1s, but she was worried 

about her dog barking. 

I do think that there has been some shift to move the Guard to 

a more of a transport and tanker command rather than having 

them fly fighters, and I think they have a very important role in 

having teeth in the Guard. So I wanted to let you guys know, as 

part of the Air Force, that we think the Guard plays a very important role, and we are very proud of the job they do. And we ought 

to keep them active in flying jets and bombers. 

PROCUREMENT SPECIALISTS

Now I want to talk about procurement as a career path. I know 

that General Shackleford now is somehow heading up procurement, 

and I am confident that he is competent, but are you familiar with 

the Gansler Commission from 2007? It was done by the Army, and 

it looked at sort of the procurement problems that they were facing, just to refresh your memory. If you haven’t seen it, you ought 

to go look at it. It said basically that we ought to set up a career 

path within the services for procurement. 

Now if you look outside the Defense industry and you look outside the Department of Defense, you will find that many companies 

have specialists that focus on this area. And it is a career path 

where they can specialize in buying other things. The Boeing Company, for example, they call it materiel. It is the people within Boeing responsible for getting supplies lined up and providing resources to that company. Other companies have different names for 

it. 

But, basically, it is a career path where you have specialty, people who specialize in dealing with contractors and dealing with engineers and dealing with finance people, dealing with all those 

items necessary to bring services and hardware on line. But it 

seems like, within the services that we are having a hard time setting up that career path. We will have people come in for a couple 

of years and go out. It is part of the checking a box to get this overall career path satisfied. And it really doesn’t give people an opporVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:35 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00315 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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tunity to focus on this very essential part of what Department of 

Defense does. 

If you think about the billions of dollars that we spend every 

year and compare that to the private sector, and we really need 

some specialists. We have people who specialize in this, and they 

are buying a whole lot less dollar wise, and when it comes to national security, a whole lot less important. So here we have the Department of Defense and, in particular, the Air Force, where we are 

looking at the next-generation bomber; where we are going to replace the tankers with KC67s eventually, hopefully this year, and 

C–17s and kinds of these high dollar items, yet we don’t have 

somebody who has this extensive knowledge in, how do you stabilize a design? How do you stabilize requirements? How do you 

stabilize the price? And I think what happens is, we get a user who 

comes in and takes over the top procurement, and he has his own 

views of what would be nice add-ons to a product, and we never 

hold a baseline. And the result is that we have a longer development and procurement and development process. It becomes less 

and less popular, and then we start cancelling product. Like the F– 

22, at some point in the past, we should have drawn a baseline and 

said, this is what the plane is going to look like; we will build it; 

and then at the first PDM, we will add on these things. My point 

is, I think a specialist would save money. I think they would save 

us schedule, and these very important hardware items would come 

on line and would do so in a timely fashion. 

What consideration is the Air Force giving today to setting up a 

career path in procurement? 

General NEWTON. Sir, if I may, your points are well taken. 

Our Chief, General Schwartz, and our Secretary, Secretary 

Donley have set forth a number of priorities, from reinvigorating 

the nuclear enterprise, as we previously discussed, to developing 

our men and women and their families, but also they have put a 

premium on acquisition excellence. And that is not only from a 

process standpoint, as you alluded to, from determining requirements all the way to delivery of the capability of the joint 

warfighter, but also making sure that we are properly organized, 

trained and developing our people. And therefore, I know, having 

had many conversations with General Schwartz, our Chief of Staff, 

about this is making sure as we return to an acquisition excellence 

effort within the United States Air Force, that the premium has to 

be put on how we develop our people. We give them the training, 

and we give them the education, but we also need to give them the 

career development that would not just be a touch-and-go opportunity within the acquisition community. We have to put a premium on their service, not only from building experience but also 

building relationships across the entire DoD enterprise. 

I have not read the Gansler Report but am least being familiar 

with it, and I know one of the tenants was that relationship, in 

terms of that acquisition excellence across not only Service but the 

DoD, is absolutely critical. And so that is where we are placing a 

premium and significant amount of importance to a new tanker 

and new capabilities within a new designed bomber and so forth. 

Sir, may I retack on the teeth part of your comment, if I may? 

Mr. TIAHRT. Yes. 


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General NEWTON. Again, this is a total force capability we have 

in the United States Air Force, regardless of whether it is from a 

fighter platform, a space platform, or from a bomber or a tanker. 

But if I may, I think one thing that really makes us a world class 

premium United States Air Force across any air force in the world, 

it is our tanker capability. It is our ability to put people, equipment 

and, quite candidly, bombs on target is not necessarily just from a 

shooter perspective but from a tanker capability as well. And the 

men and women who serve the total force, particularly in the 

Guard, do that every day, and they do it wonderfully. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Well said. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I would associate my words with Mr. Tiahrt and 

pay respect to the State of New Jersey. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Bless you. 

Mr. DICKS. May I have one second? I understand that 43 percent 

of the acquisition spots in the Air Force are vacant; is that correct? 

General NEWTON. Sir, let me take that one for the record. 

AIR FORCE ACQUISITION

Mr. DICKS. It is a big number, and I think Congress is responsible. The former chairman of the Armed Services Committee, who 

no longer serves, he used to call the acquisition people ‘‘shoppers’’ 

in a very derogatory attention to it. Now we don’t have enough people to do these programs, and we have the kind of scandalous result that occurred on the tankers, which is, in my judgment, was 

a, with eight different grounds of reversal by the GAO and many 

generals outside of the Air Force retired were shocked to see this 

happen. And so something is wrong with Air Force acquisition. If 

it is a lack of personnel or whatever, we have got to got this 

straightened out. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Surely. I just want to exercise the rare privilege 

of me being the Chair. Do you acknowledge and accept the notion 

that the failure in the tanker situation was as a result of insufficient acquisition personnel? 

General NEWTON. Mr. Chairman, rather than alluding to that 

particular tanker issue, what I do acknowledge is the absolute necessity that we provide the opportunities for men and women to 

serve in the acquisition career field, that we nurture their development and that we give them the opportunity to reach their full potential in the acquisition community. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I understand that. But is there a deficiency in 

that area now? 

General NEWTON. Sir, I believe we can improve that area. I believe that we, as part of the top priorities that the Chief of Staff 

has as to how we go about ensuring that we provide acquisition excellence within the United States Air Force, that it starts with our 

people. And again, we give them every opportunity. It is the due 

diligence, just like was referred to in the previous comments with 

regard to the nuclear enterprise, the same level of effort or a similar level of effort needs to be provided to our professionals. 


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Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Moran. 

CONTRACT SERVICES

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Rothman. 

The National Defense Authorization Act last year required each 

of the services to come up with a full inventory of all of the contracted services, the number of contractors, the number of contracts, et cetera. The Army did that, and obviously, the Army had 

the biggest task ahead of them. It is the largest of the services that 

we know, but the Air Force hasn’t. Why would you not have complied with that authorization requirement to come up with the full 

inventory to have contract services? 

Mr. DUEHRING. I am sorry, sir, I honestly don’t know why they 

didn’t. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, it is a concern of this Committee, and it is 

something that the Appropriations Committee wanted as well as 

the authorizing committee. We found out that much of the combat 

effort, at least the support of the combat effort, was contracted out. 

And we had as many contractors over in Iraq as we had military 

and civilian personal. 

Do you consider the contract workforce part of the total Air Force 

workforce? 

General NEWTON. Sir, if I may ask, I think I understand what 

you are asking, are you talking about the—— 

Mr. MORAN. The number of people contracted who are not Air 

Force civilian or military personnel. 

General NEWTON. This is a reduction of reliance on contractors 

and now part of the civilian workforce. If I may provide, I will take 

the question for the record in terms of providing specific numbers, 

but I do believe that we are, based on the NDAA specific, abiding 

by that, and we have reduced our contractors by approximately 

500. And we are starting to see some savings in terms of how we 

are actually increasing because of the reduction in civilian contracts. We are seeing an increase in our civilian workforce to nearly 

approximately 800 to 850 civilians. What I see is a growth through 

the out-years of increasing that number to perhaps 2,500 in terms 

of adding to our civilian workforce. 

Let me, please, if I may, provide specific numbers for you. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, I don’t doubt that you made some efforts in 

bringing back some of those inherently governmental jobs that 

have been contracted out, but the committee wanted to know what 

the inventory is. How many contractors do you have? How many 

contracts? And we haven’t gotten that. And we need that to make 

our decision with regard to the proper allocation and the like. The 

Army did it. As I say, we haven’t gotten that information from the 

Air Force, and it raises red flags. If you don’t know how many contractors or contracts, that is a problem in and of itself. 

General NEWTON. Sir, I am not prepared to answer that now, but 

I will certainly take the question for the record and get back with 

you. 


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EXPAND TRADITIONAL AIR FORCE ROLE

Mr. MORAN. I notice that there is a new initiative within the Air 

Force to expand your traditional Air Force role. For example, some 

of the Air Force personnel are conducting ground combat operations, which was not a traditional Air Force role, but you have 

been doing that in Iraq and Afghanistan. Normally, when people 

are recruited, that is not what they are necessarily recruited for. 

And then there are other roles that most people would not have 

originally assumed were traditional Air Force missions and requirements. And it is a change, as has been mentioned, to the Air 

Force culture. What we wonder about is, how are they trained? 

Who does the training? Do you sort of contract out the training to 

the Army and Marine Corps for roles that traditionally had been 

performed by them? How do you go about doing this? 

Mr. DUEHRING. For those who come into basic training, last year 

we increased our time in basic training by 2 weeks, from 6 and a 

half to 8 and a half weeks. This was to introduce combat skills 

training. I think the first graduate came out last fall in the October 

time frame. That still is not going to prepare them for the roles. 

They will go from there to the skills training, and they still get 

combat skills training throughout this time, but once they get to 

their base, and they get into the AEF rotation. Or if they are in 

one of the career fields that goes more often than that, quite frankly, for longer periods, like civil engineers, the vehicle operations 

who very often go out in the convoys with the Army, we will send 

them, yes, to schools. 

We started initially, as I recall, about 2004 when the Army first 

said it could use a little help in some of these areas, and vehicle 

operations I remember very clearly because the first group who 

went over there wasn’t prepared very well. They were pretty good 

drivers and could fix the trucks. We took them into Kuwait, and 

I was in DoD at that time; I wasn’t in the Air Force. But I watched 

what happened. They got their top-off training there. We don’t do 

that anymore. Well, there is still training there, of course, but we 

have schools back here, whether it is in New Jersey at Fort Dix; 

we have a lot of folks come through Fort Dix. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Good. 

Mr. DUEHRING. More coming I am sure. We have also some 

places in Texas that we have been going to, near San Antonio. I 

have been to Fort Hood and seen some of the work there. I have 

seen Air Force people at Fort Bragg, but now, to the degree that 

we can, we are trying to do some of that training ourselves, realizing that, because the threats change, the types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that they might encounter, the attacks, however they are doing it this week, can change, they still will get 

some top-off training even as they go into country. 

So it is a joint program. Some of it is ours, and some is the 

Army’s. I go on the road every month. I visit two to five bases a 

month; I say, do you feel trained, or do you feel comfortable in 

what you are doing? I always hit the forces. I always hit Explosive 

Ordnance Disposal (EOD). I always hit the vehicle operations guys, 

and I say, how comfortable are you? I am getting very positive responses, and that was not true back in 2004. 


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Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Kingston. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, thank you. 

Mr. Chair, let me underscore the fact that we want this information. We are asking for it from all the services: What is the extent 

of the contracting out? Where is it? What roles are contracting? We 

want to know the total number of contract personnel, number of 

contracts, that kind of thing. We are trying to get our hands 

around what is the real total workforce here, how it is being distributed, who is fighting the wars, et cetera. Thank you. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Kingston. 

PHYSICAL FITNESS

Mr. KINGSTON. I want to follow-up on Mr. Moran’s questions in 

terms of the physical fitness. We had a hearing last week with the 

Army about the amount of equipment a soldier carries, which can 

weigh up to 93 pounds. Are you having the same problem with particularly against your security forces because they would be the 

ones carrying the most on the ground, right? 

General NEWTON. Yes, sir, we are very much committed to a fitto-fight total force, specifically within the security forces community. Again, nothing has come to my attention in terms of any type 

of inadequacy in terms of physical fitness amongst our security 

forces. 

However, I can tell you I have been to the schoolhouse down at 

Lackland Air Force Base outside of San Antonio, Texas, and I can 

tell you, it is a very fit training regimen. It goes also back to emphasis with regard to fit-to-fight starting in basic military training. 

But our airmen are, as we focus not only on their fitness but in 

terms of their health and wellness as well, but again, to go back 

more to your point, nothing that I had knowledge of relates to what 

you just described the Army may be having. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, what my question is, do you know how 

much their equipment weighs? And for the infantry soldier in the 

Army, it was about 93 pounds. 

General NEWTON. Yes, I recall seeing that information for the 

Army. I will have to get back to you in terms of specifically. 

Mr. KINGSTON. You probably don’t have the same problem because, otherwise, you would probably have been asked this several 

times, I would imagine. 

General NEWTON. Yes, sir, but I can, not only within our security 

forces, but we also have a number of Airmen who are assigned to 

providing capabilities to Army or ground units engaged, for instance, our tactical air control party and so forth, because they are 

tasked to carry the same capabilities with them as they deploy 

with their counterparts, even within the ground forces or Special 

Operations Forces. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, if they are at Lackland training, then the 

altitude is going to be a lot different in Afghanistan. And I wonder 

if you have problems with altitude sickness, or is that something 

that takes about a week to get adjusted to, and then for the guys 

on the ground, they are okay with it? 

General NEWTON. Yes, sir. That is part of any unit that is being 

deployed, particularly from a garrison force that, as you alluded to, 


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is not at altitude; it takes a period of time for them to be acclimated to the theater or the local operation that they happen to be 

engaged with. 

If I may also say when you deploy to places like Afghanistan or 

any other place around the world, as we find our Airmen deployed 

globally, it does take some time to get acclimated. Also there can 

be varying degrees of training that you can start in garrison to be 

deployed in. 

Mr. KINGSTON. What do you do for that? Is it mostly the key 

time on the ground before they really go out in full engagement, 

so that their bodies can get use to it? Or do you take a pill or drink 

lots of liquid? How do we get a guy jumping out of a plane to hit 

the ground running? 

General NEWTON. Yes, sir, we have a commander’s program, particularly when they deploy to a variety of, in many cases, austere 

locations to get their Airmen fit. I do not have a specific regimen 

for you. It is not only your physical activity, but one must ensure 

you are not dehydrated, having flown long durations, sorties for instance and so forth. It is a type of diet that allows you to be fully 

engaged. 

And the last point I would make is that it is not necessarily the 

training, but it is also the duration of mission that they are tasked 

to do, extended hours and so forth, so there was a lot of physical 

regimen involved. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Another question. Some Army Non-Commissioned 

Officers (NCOs) had said that some of the new recruits are able unable to pass the physical readiness test. Is the Air Force finding 

that to be true? 

Mr. Secretary, you are shaking your head. 

Mr. DUEHRING. That is true, because I think the number that we 

hear very often is, only 27 percent of the high school graduates are 

actually eligible, qualified to join the military. And that includes, 

of course, not only physical fitness, but lifestyle decisions and 

things like this. But this is something that is in the papers a lot. 

We get feedback from the recruiters that kids just aren’t as tough 

as they once were. 

Another problem, doesn’t affect us too much, but it does affect 

the SEALs, and I have some friends in that business, is the kids 

coming in don’t know how to swim, because we don’t take our kids 

off to a Red Cross beginners course like they did when we were 

kids. It is a real challenge, and we have to work with them. 

Mr. KINGSTON. How about kids on Ritalin, is that a problem? 

Mr. DUEHRING. I have heard something about this. I would like 

to take that back before I misspeak, because it has been quite some 

time since I have heard that discussed. But I don’t think you can 

come in—I am thinking now that you can’t come in if you are on 

Ritalin, of course, as an 18-year-old or 19-year-old. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I don’t think you can. 

Mr. Chairman, this is my last question, if I could finish it. 

From time to time, we get calls from kids who want to join the 

services, but they are unable to because they are on Ritalin. It is 

a widespread use, as you know, particularly I think in private 

schools where the parents are saying, oh my kid is not going to get 

in med school because he is in 6th grade right now and doesn’t 


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have a 3.5 average, and so they panic and put them on Ritalin. 

What happens to them is, they play football and soccer; they have 

a full high school experience, full college experience. And then one 

day they want to get into the military, and they find out that if 

you have been taking Ritalin, it is considered a disability, and it 

is a shock to them. And I was just wondering. So if you can go back 

and look at that. 

Mr. DUEHRING. I would like to get a medical opinion on that. We 

are happy to provide that for you, sir. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Ms. Kaptur. 

DEPLOYMENT AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I apologize for being late. I had a conflict this morning and will 

have to leave shortly after the questioning to go back to the other 

committee as well. 

Thank you for your service, and I want to focus my questions on 

the psychological health of warriors. I wanted to just ask, General, 

whether you would consider F–16 units that are based at Guard 

bases under your command? 

General NEWTON. I am sorry, would you rephrase that question? 

I am sorry. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Yes, I am just curious as to whether war-ready 

units that are under the auspices of the Guard in a given State like 

Ohio, F–16 units that are under Army Air, and whether you consider them under your command because they are war-ready units. 

General NEWTON. Yes, ma’am. In the United States Air Force, it 

is a total force perspective, regardless of units, our Airmen, for that 

matter, serve in a capacity of inactive duty or Guard or Reserve. 

And so we very much approach how we organize training equipped 

from a total force perspective. So, yes, we would consider them a 

part of the total force Air Force. However, Air National Guard 

units fall under active Air Force command when they are activated 

to title 10 Status. Otherwise, ANG units remain under their respective State governor’s control. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I thank you very much for that, because I am interested in the portions of your testimony. I am interested in it all, 

but the part dealing with deployment and psychological health. 

We in Ohio, over several cycles now, have been attempting to 

work with the Guard there, Army and Army Air, including our 

F–16 units, but many other units around the State, to test the returning veterans through the Guard. 

Is it difficult in Ohio because we have so may Guard and Reserve 

based units, plus we have Wright Pat for active duty, and we have 

many soldiers returning home and Airmen returning home where 

there is no base. And we have a very extensive psychological testing program that we are undertaking. 

One of the issues we have confronted, and I would like to give 

you a piece of paper on this, and we are working with several universities, Case Western University, Western Reserve University, 

University of Toledo Medical University, University of Michigan. 

So it is a region-wide consortium that are trying to embrace these 


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returning vets and to follow them through their life to see when 

PTSD might onset and so forth. Of all of services, the Air Force is 

the least prevalent. I mean, Army and Marines are much more 

than Air Force in general. But one of the difficulties we have had 

with the Ohio Guard, and we are not sure what level this decision 

is being made, we wanted voluntary genetic testing. We want to 

create a DNA profile of susceptibility to these illnesses. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And at some level they are saying, well, you know, 

we cannot do this. And we cannot figure out whether it is at the 

national level, whether it is the Guard bureau, whether it is some 

commander at some level that we do not know, somebody at DoD. 

I am wondering if you could help us with that, because we really 

want to—we know all medical conditions have genetic markers, 

whether it is Alzheimer’s, whether it is PTSD; and the goal is to 

create the largest epidemiological profile ever done, with over 3,000 

returning soldiers and airmen who voluntarily agree to be tested. 

Then there is a real, you know, sophisticated sampling technique 

that they use and so forth. But this has proven to be a bit of a 

stumbling block. And I would just like to have the right person contact me because it is nettlesome. 

I told these people, I said before, when we get started on this I 

want a Nobel prize out of you; I do not want anything less. We are 

going to understand this and we are going to treat it. We are going 

to identify it and we are going to treat it, and we have got to have 

this. 

So I would like to know if you could help us with that, work with 

our Guard bureau, work with whoever at DoD is responsible for 

this. And let’s get a really excellent research profile that will yield 

the results that we need. 

Mr. BISHOP. Would the gentlelady yield? 

Ms. KAPTUR. I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

In that regard, I would like to remind the gentlelady—there was 

at some point some research being done by the Army with regard 

to PTSD and some genetic markers and some DNA that would be 

predictable. And at some point there was some controversy about 

the study because there was a need for high recruitment, and they 

were afraid, some say, that these genetic markers would prevent 

their reaching the recruitment goals because it would predict who 

was likely to be susceptible to PTSD, which was a very interesting 

thing, and the study was stopped for some other supposedly unrelated reasons. 

We touched on that last year in Committee. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I thank you. Well, maybe we are running into the 

same speed bump here. I do not know. But it is a very important 

speed bump. And I would like to have a discussion with whoever 

is involved in the decision-making chain. General Wayt, the Ohio 

Guard commander, is very involved in these issues, but I am not 

sure that this is not above his pay grade. 

General NEWTON. If I may, your points are well taken, and certainly I will take that back. But we in the United States Air 

Force—regardless, active duty, Guard, Reserve, civilian, family 

members and so forth—are very much concerned and/or focused on 

the health and wellness of our airmen and their families. And in 


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a high operations tempo environment, we are seeing stresses that 

again are imparted by either duty deployed in such places as Iraq 

or Afghanistan or 135 other locations around the world where we 

find Airmen serving, as well as stresses that we have back home 

in garrison at our bases as well. 

So I take your point, and again—the focus is on the health and 

wellness of the men and women who serve, as well as their family 

members. It is absolutely essential that we not be in a reactive 

mode, but we get ahead of this and we focus on it as well. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I thank you, General, and I look forward to hearing 

from you. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Ms. Granger. 

DEPLOYMENTS

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. We have heard from the Army that 

their deployments are down to 1 year—they were at 15 months— 

and the Marines Corps is at 7 months. And my question to you is, 

going back to what Mr. Moran said about combat roles and an increase in difference in your role, will this change the deployment 

time? And how will it affect it? 

Mr. DUEHRING. Let me give us a little background on how we got 

to where we are and what I think is going to happen in the future. 

The Air Force had a continuing commitment starting before 9/11. 

I remember working for OSD at the time, watching, you know, all 

the Services. And because the Services were all being committed, 

the Air Force obviously had to play its role. And the Guard and Reserve, for example, going back to pre-first Gulf War, maybe fewer 

than a million man-days a year on active duty. And by the time 

we got up to around the end of the century, shall we say, it was 

13.1 million man-days a year, so you could see that this workload 

was increasing. 

What the Air Force did was establish the AEF rotation policy, 

the Aerospace Expeditionary Force rotation policy. Very simply, it 

put all of the forces, with the exception of a few that we kept in 

reserve, into groups, of which there were—well, actually five basic 

groups that went for three months at a time, and they just kept 

rotating. And what this meant was that if you, as a member of the 

first group, went for three months—first of all, you were going to 

know well in advance when you were going and you knew when 

you were coming back—very good for the Guard and Reserve right 

away, because they could tell their employers as well. 

And you knew that when your turn came, it would not be on 

Christmas again. If you had missed Christmas or missed somebody’s birthday, you were going to be pushed three months down 

the road. 

Well, this served us well. We then pushed it to—that was not 

quite long enough to be in theater. So we voluntarily moved it to 

120 days, 4 months, and it just—the cycle just got a little bit bigger 

and longer. I remember when General Blum, who had recently 

taken over as the chief of the National Guard Bureau, came up 

with—he called it the hurricane charts, which is how he wanted to 

move the Army National Guard; and it was the same type of idea, 

to give predictability. This idea now has really spread throughout 

all of the Department. 


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The Army, of course, likes—they move large units. They like to 

have them on the ground for a year. So that meant, whatever action has to go ahead of time and then there is some action on the 

back side, that is, in addition to it. 

And then they moved up to 15 months, because as you may recall, the threat—it peaked about a year or two ago, and we started 

keeping people longer and longer and longer, okay? 

The Air Force tried tenaciously to stick to its AEF rotation cycle, 

but we found in certain career fields we could not do it. And remember, I talked about vehicle ops; those guys went and they 

drove with the Army. We talked about EOD, and still, to this day, 

our EOD people are embedded in Army units. You go out there you 

will see them; in fact, sometimes they wear Army uniforms. There 

is a whole laundry list of ones that we have talked about, these 

joint expeditionary taskings. 

These folks, the Army wanted to keep for a year. We honestly do 

not think that is a good idea. We find that the stress after about 

eight, nine months—by the way, you noticed the Marines stayed at 

seven months. They have always stayed at seven; they believe in 

that. 

But we found if we stayed longer, the stress starts going up dramatically and all these other issues take place. If we can get them 

back after six months, let them calm down, let them get back with 

their families and adjust, we can call them up again. They will be 

ready to go again. 

So what we did is, we took the 12-month rotation that the Army 

wanted and divided it in half and said, Mr. Army, would you accept 

that? And they have, by and large, accepted that. There are some 

exceptions to it. Usually people volunteer if they want to stay 

longer than that, okay? 

So we knew that civil engineering, we knew EOD, we knew that 

some of the medical people, intelligence, stress career fields were 

going six months, and this messed up our AEF rotation cycle. So 

we said, okay, let’s identify those people and say they are going to 

go for six months. And what that did was, it allowed us to clearly 

identify who was stressed, which career fields we just did not have 

the right number of people in for this new mission. 

And the other thing it gave our people was predictability. And 

we said, okay, we admit you are going for six months now, 179 

days, whatever the case may be. And at least, you know, next August you will probably go again. And that helped tremendously. 

To answer your question, long answer to a short question is, 

about 52 percent of our deployments now, by counting people, is six 

months or greater. As long as we are in the program, the Joint Expeditionary Force, we are going to have units that are going to be 

committed at six-month intervals. 

We would still like to stay with the AEF rotation cycle, and the 

greatest pressure comes from the Guard and the Reserve. Example: 

If you are an airline pilot and you are flying F–16s in Ohio, wherever the case may be, and you go downrange and you are flying a 

767 back home, you are going to run out of currency in 90 days. 

And it is extremely expensive for the airline to requalify you in 

that airplane. So what we have worked out with the airline industry is, if you take them for six months—I am sorry, I am sorry— 


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two months, 60 days, bring them back, get a few flights in the 767, 

you can have them back again because you have just reset the 

clock. 

So in cases like this where it works to our advantage, we would 

like to stay with the AEF rotation cycle. But we recognize in probably a dozen career fields it is just not possible. But at least our 

folks know what is happening when. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Bishop. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. And again welcome, gentlemen. And I appreciate it very much, the enlightenment you have 

shared with us. 

With regard to the increased stress level that I heard you discussing, the last suicide prevention study by the Air Force was 

done in 2005. And you have talked about the additional missions 

and the impact that has had on your personnel. 

Do you think that it is time now to upgrade that, considering the 

fact that the Army and the Marine Corps, because of their missions, have experienced a tremendous challenge with regard to 

suicide- and PTSD-related to the extended deployments and the 

new missions? That is the first question. 

The second question relates to the high operational tempo, which 

has put a real strain on your personnel accounts, causing the funding to run out before the end of the fiscal year. Talking about the 

2009 fiscal year execution, can you tell me what the monthly burnout rate for your personnel costs are and when, in this fiscal year, 

you expect that your personnel accounts will run out of money? 

Three quick questions. 

Mr. DUEHRING. Let me start with the second one because it is 

the easiest one to answer. 

The monthly burnout rate is 2.2 billion. And the going broke date 

right now we estimate is around 12 September; and we are hoping 

that the supplement will pick up in there. 

The suicide issue, I will give you the simple answer first, which 

is, we can give you whatever you would like on suicides any time. 

We do review it in house. We do a review of the suicide rates at 

the Air Force level, the major command level, and the wing level; 

for those more oriented towards the Army, think of it as a base 

level. 

We have what we call a Community Action Information Board— 

I think it is at each one that reviews this—twice a year. And, of 

course, commanders, we at our level see it a lot more frequently 

than that. We get a summary every week, and if there is an incident—— 

Mr. BISHOP. Do you see any trends? 

Mr. DUEHRING. Trends, we have—I have got a couple of figures 

here. 

Mr. BISHOP. That you can relate particularly to the op tempo? 

Mr. DUEHRING. We are kind of holding our own. 

Let’s see, pre-1996, in our comments we talked—in my comments 

I talked about the new holistic program that we had adopted in 

1996. And our rate prior to that was 13.5 percent, and since then 

it has been 9.8 percent, although it is—— 


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Mr. BISHOP. That is the suicide rate? 

Mr. DUEHRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thirteen percent? 

Mr. DUEHRING. Yeah, we are below the national average. Yes, 

13.5, I am sorry, 13.5 based on 100,000. 

Mr. BISHOP. Oh, okay. 

Mr. DUEHRING. I got talking. I got so wrapped up in it, I am 

sorry, sir; 13.5 per 100,000? 

Mr. BISHOP. Out of 100,000? 

Mr. DUEHRING. Yes, sir. And then, after that, 9.8. 

Mr. BISHOP. And you attribute that to your 1996 program? 

Mr. DUEHRING. Yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. But you have not really been keeping up with it 

since 2005? 

Mr. DUEHRING. No, we do. Within the organization we have. 

There has not been a request from Congress to provide that information. We can certainly give it to you any time that you would 

like to have it. 

Mr. BISHOP. I think it would be very helpful to us, because we 

have got the information from the Army and the Marine Corps, 

and with the increased tempo of the Air Force, particularly as you 

describe the high stress level, we probably need to know that also. 

Because there might be something we may need to look into with 

regard to what is happening with your Air Force personnel—— 

Mr. DUEHRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP [continuing]. And their families. 

General NEWTON. Sir, may I add just a brief comment? 

From a commander standpoint or previous commander standpoint, one suicide is one too many, and we are always striving to 

prevent the next. And so what we have in place through the years 

is a very focused, engaged commanders program at the unit level 

or at the base level all the way up to our Chief of Staff and our 

Secretary of the Air Force as well. 

And so, we are constantly engaged. We are not only engaged 

within the United States Air Force, but are looking for successes 

perhaps in other programs that the United States Army, United 

States Marine Corps, and United States Navy have engaged with 

as well. 

So it is not just the Air Force, isolated. In fact, I have engaged 

with Lieutenant General Mike Rochelle, who is the Chief of Personnel for the Army on the Army suicide program and what they 

are doing. So it is a matter of us also integrating and understanding what other Services are going through. 

Mr. BISHOP. So is that because you have seen some trends and 

you expect that that might increase and so you are trying to anticipate it? 

General NEWTON. Yes, sir. We are obviously—as the Secretary 

referred to, it still remains a very high operations tempo environment. We do not want to put ourselves in a reactive mode; we want 

to be proactive. 

And to go back to my first point, one suicide is one too many, 

and we are always striving to prevent the next one as well. 

Mr. BISHOP. Just one follow-up with respect to the search and 

rescue missions of the Air Force, I know at Moody Air Force Base 


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in Georgia there was a period, particularly at the beginning of the 

Iraq war, where they had been called upon pretty heavily; and of 

course, that was a lot of stress there among families and there 

were some suicide attempts there. And, of course, there was a lot 

of family disruption and family violence on return, and divorces. 

That seemed to have been at the beginning, and I don’t know 

how it has developed since 2001–2002. But I certainly would like 

to have that information. 

General NEWTON. Yes, sir, I’d be delighted to provide you with 

that information. We could spend a lot of time talking about some 

of the preventive measures and programs we have engaged. 

[The information follows:] 

During 2001 and 2002 the rate of substantiated child maltreatment at Moody 

AFB, GA was significantly higher than the Air Force average rate (FY01: 14.72 vs. 

7.35 per 1,000; FY02: 15.25 vs. 7.32 per 1,000). Substantiated spouse maltreatment 

was elevated in 2001 (19.15 vs. 16.12 per 1,000). From 2002 to 2008 the child and 

adult maltreatment rates dropped to a rate at or below the Air Force average. Variation between Family Advocacy Officers (FAO’s) substantiation rates was a concern 

in family advocacy at all bases. In 2004, the Central Registry Board was implemented and helped reduce variation in the substantiation rates among different 

bases. The Central Registry Board implementation accounts for part of the decrease 

in the substantiation rates during 2002–2008. Additionally, FAO’s and their staff received robust training to address their basic processes, to include variation of substantiation rates. This training improved the quality of the FAO’s, their staff, and 

the overall program capabilities. 

From January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008 there were three completed suicides 

at Moody AFB, GA. The deaths occurred in 2001, 2006, and the last in 2007. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

FAMILIES OF SERVICEMEMBERS

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, Secretary, thank you. Good morning. Thank you for 

your service. It has been very interesting, the discussion here. 

And I notice from what I read, health care, health professionals 

within the Air Force, is down from where you would like it to be. 

You have several incentive programs, including scholarships and 

the like, to help get that number up. In light of the last discussions 

we have had in this room this morning talking about health care, 

but I think I want focus on the children of service people, because 

I think there might be some relationship between being in theater, 

and I think Ms. Granger talked about the time between that in 

their tours, as well as when they come home, and suicide. Somewhere is some correlation. 

And whatever reports you would provide, I would like to see 

some of that if there is some correlation on that, health care in the 

services and your need for—what you have for the enlisted as well 

as for the families. How adequate is it? How short are we? What 

needs to be done? And children particularly. 

In my own district, children of service people who come home between deployments, not long enough because it is probably never 

long enough when you are fighting two wars, the children seem to 

suffer mental stress. 

General NEWTON. Yes, ma’am. 

If I may add, I am the son of an Air Force officer, and recall, 

when my dad was in Vietnam for a year and so forth, I candidly 

experienced some of the—certainly the separation between myself 


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and my father and saw the stresses that my mom had. Of course, 

that was a different era, different war, and so forth. 

And being the father of two daughters we talk a lot about this 

in terms of the stresses that we see in our force. 

I am very confident of the health care that the United States Air 

Force is providing to our members, as well as the family members. 

I certainly agree with you that the stresses that the members, particularly those serving in deployed locations, but also back home at 

bases, the stresses that they are undergoing, it does have an impact on our Air Force children, if I may call them that; and that 

we go into this knowing and understanding that a stressed force 

has impacts on family members as well. 

And, therefore, we are striving to understand what those stresses 

are—we are not accepting the fact that they do not exist; they do— 

that we need to be proactive in dealing with family stresses as 

well. And so I would be delighted to provide you much more information on these programs. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And how we can help to make sure we meet 

those goals of health care professionals. 

General NEWTON. Absolutely. 

[The information follows:] 

The Air Force supports Airmen and their families from the front line to the home 

front by offering proactive services and programs that assist in identifying and resolving concerns that bring about family stress, and to provide a variety of avenues 

to reduce stress. 

At home station, information and referral services are offered directly to spouses 

and families, such as: pre-deployment briefings for members and families, free 

weekly morale calls to keep families connected and help reduce their sense of isolation, reintegration briefings for 22,000 spouses that prepared them for changes during the separation and to improve the quality of the reunion–22,000 reintegration 

briefings were conducted over the last year alone. The Air Force also offers communication/life skills development workshops, free oil changes funded by Air Force Aid 

Society for each deployed family, and financial counseling at home station and at 

deployed locations. The Airman Readiness Center at Al Udeid provided over 8,000 

consultations on topics that covered financial readiness, reintegration, and reunion 

with families and workplaces. Over the last year, the Air Force also provided employment and career education assistance for 40,000 spouses to prepare for portable 

careers. 

The Air Force offers many other programs to help our Airmen and their families 

through stressful periods. For instance, the Extended Duty Child Care program provides 16,000 hours of free child care each month, and is designed to assist Airmen 

who have to work longer hours, evenings, overnight, and weekends. The Give Parents a Break program provides parents with a few hours break each month from 

the stresses of parenting—and the Air Force partners with the Air Force Aid Society 

to provide free child care to parents who are subject to unique stressors due to the 

nature of military life such as deployments, remote tours of duty, and extended 

hours. The Air Force Aid Society provides invaluable support to our Airmen and 

families, and funds 5,000 hours of respite child care annually. Department of Defense funded Military and Family Life Consultants are also available at all Air 

Force locations to provide non-medical counseling to Airmen and their families and 

help resolve some of the stressors associated with the military lifestyle. 

Also, Air Force Youth Programs partner with the National Military Family Association Operation Purple Camps to provide 7–10 free, week-long camps to help military kids experience fun while learning coping skills to deal with war-related stress. 

Children of deployed members receive priority to participate in the Youth Camping 

Program, which offers residential and specialty camp opportunities and experiences 

for more than 20,000 youth annually. This year, the Air Force Reserve Command 

hosted a Deployment Camp for children of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Airmen. 

Additionally, the Air Force has made great efforts to expand or create fitness programs and facilities that cater specifically to parents and families. It is hard to find 

a fitness center in the Air Force that does not have a family-oriented fitness room 


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that allows parents to workout with their children. At Ramstein Air Base in Germany, fitness professionals show their commitment to families by creating programs 

such as Mommy and Me, Yoga for Kids and Strollerobics. Through innovative approaches like these, family members have an avenue to reduce stress during spouse 

deployments as well as to help reduce the stresses of post-partum depression and 

weight gain. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Then my other question relates to, last session 

the Congressional Black Caucus met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

regarding flag officers and the lack thereof of minorities—all minorities, I might add. Has there been any report or anything out 

on how that is going, from one star up and how the pipeline is? Are 

there people being prepared for that? I mean, do we need to do 

something? 

General NEWTON. Yes, ma’am. Again, under the leadership of our 

Secretary Donley and, particularly, General Schwartz, our Chief of 

Staff, we are making sure that we provide the opportunity for 

every Airman to reach his or her potential. The fact that our Nation—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. We found last year that sometimes they transfer out before they—got to stay in the stream. Sometimes they 

transfer out. 

General NEWTON. Yes, ma’am. It is not only an issue with regard 

to recruiting and accessions, but also retention. It is a matter of 

mentoring our men and women, who want to strive to meet their 

potential, that they have the opportunity to do that. 

Our Nation is evolving in terms of, the talent that it has. As your 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel for the United 

States Air Force, there is a war for talent out there. Certainly General Schwartz feels that we need to go to every community that 

this Nation has to offer to be able to take the talent that every man 

and woman who is eligible to come into the United States Air 

Force—not just a recruiting effort, though. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. It is retention and it is about those being in 

now. Because you have to start somewhere; we understand that. 

General NEWTON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. In the pipeline now, have we done anything 

over the last couple years? Is there any reporting where really the 

flag officers, one star and up, can—— 

General NEWTON. We have a number of general officers who are 

certainly African American and other demographics as well. 

Again, I believe we need to diversify our capabilities and diversify our force, I believe that is a mission imperative, that is a national strategy imperative. It is the right thing to do, but it is 

about mission effectiveness. 

I could probably provide you numbers off line if you would like 

to. 

[The information follows:] 

Current Air Force general officer demographics break down into six categories; 

women, black, Asian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, American Indian and white. Based 

on the most recent numbers, our total general officer population is 299 of which we 

currently have 27 women (1 lieutenant general, 5 major generals and 21 brigadier 

generals), 13 African Americans (1 lieutenant general, 5 major generals and 7 brigadier generals), 3 Asian/Pacific Islanders (1 major general and 2 brigadier generals), 

4 Hispanics (1 lieutenant general and 3 brigadier generals) and 1 American Indian 

serving as a brigadier general. 


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Ms. KILPATRICK. And I read about that 27 percent, and I think 

this is related to that. I think when you have flag officers who are 

of those very multiethnics, then you get a stronger force. Our retention and recruitment may be down, but all that plays into getting where we want to be, I believe. 

General NEWTON. A couple weeks ago I attended the Black Engineer of the Year award in Baltimore, for instance. And you have 

got a number of youngsters in this case who are steeped in math, 

technology, engineering and sciences who come to Baltimore on an 

annual basis. I want to make sure that we have an opportunity to 

go—again, recruit across the entire U.S. population, but perhaps to 

communities that we have not focused on very effectively in the 

past. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Perhaps Members of Congress can be of assistance in that. 

General NEWTON. I would be delighted to have that discussion. 

I know my Chief would as well. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you. 

General NEWTON. And also for your insights and support. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Appreciate that, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Call on the ranking member, Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Newton, ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—what are its manning requirements? 

General NEWTON. Yes, sir, based on the requirement of the joint 

warfighter, particularly in the U.S. Central Command region, we 

have been tasked to provide an increase in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that are particularly borne 

out in our unmanned aerial vehicles program, the Reaper and the 

Predator. We have been tasked by the Department’s leadership 

that we provide 50 combat air patrol capability. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The CAPs? 

General NEWTON. CAPs, yes, sir. 

Therefore, as we look to the proposed active duty end strength 

of 330,000, the number that we have discussed previously that we 

put as a priority towards that end strength, we also put a high priority to providing those ISR, particularly in the platform of—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You have put a high priority on it. Are you 

providing incentives, financial incentives? 

General NEWTON. Yes, sir. 

For instance, our men and women who fly or who operate the unmanned aerial vehicles out of Creech Air Force Base just outside 

of Las Vegas, they are our bomber pilots and fighter pilots and 

navigators and so forth, we provide them aircrew continuation pay 

or aircrew incentive pay. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you are meeting that obligation? 

General NEWTON. Sir, we are. There is a very high operations 

tempo environment at Creech Air Force Base, as you well know, 

because of the demand—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Some remarkable things are going on there. 


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General NEWTON. Yes, sir. And we are meeting the demands and 

capabilities of the joint warfighter, and see increased demands on 

the horizon. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. There are some jobs that are, should we 

say ‘‘down and dirty,’’ some pretty tough areas, which if you look 

at recruiting and retention, EOD, explosives, combat air controllers, pararescue of securities, how are we doing in those areas? 

This sort of gets back to our previous discussion here. A lot of 

people sign up for things and then, you know, these are part of 

your overall mission. How are we doing in those types of areas? 

I remember at, I think, Offutt Air Force Base you had a pretty 

good linguists school. You know, how are we doing in those areas— 

EOD, rescue, combat air controllers? 

Mr. DUEHRING. Some of those, of course, have an increase in the 

requirements, which is a challenge in that, as soon as the requirement comes down and we have to fill it—and you cannot just fill 

it overnight. So we use the bonus authority that we have been 

given, very often to encourage people to come into those career 

fields. 

Now, EOD has some problems in the middle level. We would try 

to retain those people. We would emphasize retaining those folks 

because of the stress. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You retain them with bonuses and 

other—— 

Mr. DUEHRING. We do. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And there has been some level of success 

in that area? 

Mr. DUEHRING. There has. 

Also we are trying to reduce the stress; you know, we look—are 

there other people who can do the job? We work with the other 

Services in trying to space out the deployments, actively—very, 

very actively looking at who is available to do what. 

In the ISR program last fall we felt we were getting pretty thin 

in the number of people that we had available to actually fly these 

CAPs day in and day out. And what we did is, we looked at each 

of the bases. In this case, North Dakota found that they had a couple extra folks who were not that heavily tasked, and we moved 

them in temporarily, or we gave the CPA to another base to do it. 

It is a lot of creative work to try to take the stress off as well 

as put people in from the bottom. 

Talking ISR, we are looking at some Navy assets, people who— 

you know, the Navy is closing down a lot of their P–3 operations, 

and certainly on the Reserve side of the house, the FA–18s are 

going away, others. We have got pilots there: We would love to 

have you; we have got this great job if you would like to come over. 

So we look everywhere we can to try to take the pressure off, as 

well as to build the force up from the bottom. 

RECRUITING AND RETAINING

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The last question I have: What are you 

doing about recruiting and retaining civilian and military people 

that are, shall we say, knowledgeable about mental health? 

Mr. DUEHRING. Well, of course there has been a significant increase in the requirement, the whole medical career field. 


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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I sort of remember where some of the other 

services are, but quite honestly I cannot remember what your percentages were. How do they stand? 

There is a lot of competition out here—— 

Mr. DUEHRING. Absolutely. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN [continuing]. From the civilian side, just in 

the general population. But how about on the Air Force side of 

things? 

Mr. DUEHRING. I will give you just a tidbit, and then I am probably going to have to take the rest to give you an answer back. 

But I know that we have 600 active duty mental health providers 

now. And we added 200 civilians to that recently. I just got that 

information as we were preparing for this hearing. 

But as far as the overall numbers, I would be happy to send 

those to you if I could. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I would like to have those for the record. 

Again, thank you both for your testimony. 

[The information follows:] 

Air Force active duty and reserve/guard components are using all accession and 

retention pay authorities established by 37 USC Chapter 5. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) sets rates for medical specialties in each 

military component, with input from medical departments of all three services. Pays 

for a particular specialty are generally level across the three Services. 37 USC Sec 

335, Consolidation of Special Pays, will allow accession and retention pays for mental health specialties that previously had been ineligible for these pays. It is anticipated this guidance will allow each Service the authority to better focus available 

funds to support accession and retention of critically short specialties. 

Air Force active duty and reserve components also use 10 USC Chapter 105 and 

10 USC Sec 16302 for the Health Professions Scholarship Program and Health Professions Loan Repayment Program with regards to these accession and retention 

programs. The Active Component also uses Department of Defense Instruction 

6000.13 for implementation guidance for many of our accession and retention programs. 

Our civilian component has multiple tools to attract and retain civilian mental 

health providers: 

• Recruitment bonuses for new accessions (up to 25% of base salary) 

• Retention allowances to sustain high caliber employees (up to 25% of base salary) 

• Credit for non-federal and Uniformed Service experience for annual leave accrual for new employees 

• Student Loan Repayment for new accessions ($10K per year with $60K max 

payment) 

• Superior Qualification Appointments (for GS employees only) provides an advance in-hire rate up to Step–10 of assigned grade 

MENTAL HEALTH SPECIALTIES 

Specialty 

Civilian 

auth/assigned 

Civilian 

percent 

manned 

Active duty 

auth/assigned 

Active duty 

percent 

manned 

Retention 

rate * at 

mid-career 

(10 YOS) 

(percent) 

Psychologist ..................................................................... 18/18 100 256/205 80.1 6 

Social Worker ................................................................... 168/165 98.2 199/209 105.0 53 

Psychiatrist ...................................................................... 1/1 100 87/94 108.0 25 

Mental Health Nurse ** .................................................. 1/1 100 47/55 117.0 39 

Mental Health Technician ............................................... 11/12 109 763/695 91.1 22 

Table taken from 2008 HMPDS Report. 

* Retention Rate added by AF/A1I based on current data. Mid-career (10 yr point) used as commonality among career fields with differing 

educational obligations and requirements. 

** Mental health Nurse: Due to small population size, Retention Rate may have high error rate. 


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RETENTION RATES

The average career length (ACL) for mental health providers is as follows: 

(Time is in Commissioned Years of Service (CYOS)) 

ACL—Social Worker—12.78 CYOS 

ACL—Mental Health Nurses—11.22 CYOS * 

* Mental Health Nurse (46P) authorizations are extremely small (<100); data 

based on 3–yr average (FY06–FY08) 

ACL—Psychiatrists—8.78 CYOS 

ACL—Psychologists—5.47 CYOS 

The decision point is where all military and educational obligations have been fulfilled and the individual is first able to separate. Based on historical data, retention 

for Mental Health Providers is as follows: 

Clinical Psychologists—20% after their military obligation is complete (4yrs) 

Mental Health Nurses—58% after their military obligation is complete (4 yrs) 

Psychiatrists—25% after their military obligation is complete (9 yrs) 

Social Worker—88% after their military obligation is complete (4yrs) 

PILOTS AND NAVIGATORS

Mr. ROTHMAN. I am going to ask a couple of follow-up questions. 

General, you mentioned briefly that there was some additional 

need for bomber pilots and navigators. Could you describe that a 

little bit? 

General NEWTON. Yes, sir, I can. Again, it is not just within the 

bomber community per se in terms of our what we call ‘‘rated community,’’ those who are trained specifically for flight duties on the 

officers’ side. 

There is—throughout our Air Force, some needs that need to be 

met across the rated community. It is not just Airmen who are flying aircraft, but those who are assigned particular duties that may 

be outside the cockpit. For us, it is staff that requires their expertise at a staff level. 

And so, as we focus on reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise as 

our very top priority, we are making sure that we have the appropriate number and quality of air bomber pilots and navigators to 

fulfill those tasks. Again, we see that as an increased requirement, 

and we are going to make sure that we fulfill those requirements. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And is it fair to say that the 2010 budget submission will reflect your attention in that area? 

General NEWTON. Sir, our plan is to make sure that we indeed 

fulfill those requirements. 

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

Mr. ROTHMAN. Let me ask you, if you were sitting up here, what 

question would you ask? What should we know that we have not 

asked about with regard to Air Force personnel and readiness? 

General NEWTON. I will save the last for you. 

But, sir, if I may, I believe the discussion—if I could take a reflection on the last hour and a half or so: The discussion with regard to all things people in the United States Air Force is, first, 

a very top priority of ours. We are an Air Force that provides total 

force capabilities to the joint warfighter, as I mentioned, to nearly 

over 135 locations around the globe. 

As we meet the demands of today, the issue is not necessarily 

just an end strength issue in terms of what the number is, but in 

terms of how we are going to shape that force, how we are going 


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to shape that force for the joint warfighter today, but also for tomorrow. 

That compels us to put our priorities, sir, as our previous discussion with regard to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 

capability. It requires us to put a priority into the nuclear enterprise, to reinvigorate the nuclear enterprise. It also compels us to 

make sure this growing cyber capability with regard to network attack and network defense is at an absolute premium. It is to make 

sure that we continue to maintain a capability to provide acquisition excellence to this Nation and to this Department. 

Also we have to do effective maintenance with our aircraft. It is 

all based on priorities, from reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise, 

and partnering with the joint and coalition team to winning today’s 

fight. 

It is certainly about taking care of our Airmen and their families. 

It is making sure that we continue to modernize our aircraft, and 

space inventory as well, and recapturing acquisition excellence. 

The last point I would raise, what I could have described to you 

would have been in terms of platforms, things, aircraft, space capabilities. What we focus on is our people. We provide opportunities 

for development and take care of our Airmen and their families. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. DUEHRING. You know, I started out in the Air Force a long 

time ago and retired, and then fortunately came back after working 

for a while with OSD. And my Air Force has changed quite a bit. 

I was a fighter pilot—and we talked about that a little bit in the 

beginning—but that is not necessarily where most of the work is 

being done today. You know, that may well be more tomorrow’s 

mission. And right now, I do not think that the American public 

realizes how much we are in the fight every single day because we 

do not deploy to do it. 

If you go to Minot Air Force Base, if you go to North Dakota, the 

Guard unit up there, the Predator Guard unit, if you go to Creech, 

if you go to any of the missile career fields, if you go to the space 

folks out in Colorado Springs or if you go up to Fort Dix and watch 

the people who are going through—on their way over, of course— 

you then would get some sense of the day-in-and-day-out participation, seven days a week. And this brings about some problems that 

we have to watch out for. 

The stress is not always associated with deployments. The stress 

could well be the individual sitting there in a secure environment 

at Creech who is actually launching missiles on targets and then 

has to decompress as he walks out the door, get into his car, go 

home and listen to how little Johnny did in first grade. That is difficult for the human mind to do. You do not have the time that we 

used to have, that we had when we came back from Southeast Asia 

just to kind of heal and get back into the flow. 

It is a different kind of stress, and so that is why I think we have 

to watch our folks from all aspects, but appreciate the contributions 

they make. 

And I want to put in a pitch for the Guard and Reserve. Many 

people still think of the Guard and Reserve as a strategic reserve; 

and in fact, we have lost all the people who I think signed up for 

the 39 days a year and the education benefits they could get for 


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it. Folks coming in today know that if they are going to be working 

in the Guard or Reserve it is going to take more time than 39 days 

a year, and they are willing to do it. If we meet their needs, they 

meet ours. And this is true of the employers as well. 

We did not talk about employers. Very, very critical to this huge 

part of our family. And yet after eight years in this war on terrorism, the employers, the Guardsmen, the Reservists, their families as well as our active duty people keep coming back, coming 

back, coming back. 

I am astounded, frankly. I thought we were going to go off a cliff 

years ago. We did not go over that cliff. It is amazing that these 

people still come, and it is a tribute to some very good programs 

that I think we have going. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you very much. And I just want to conclude my part with what our illustrious chairman always says. We 

are in the appropriating business. We want to make sure that we 

appropriate to meet the needs that you have. And so it is up to you 

to let us know what needs you have. And again, our assumption 

is going to be that the 2010 budget submission addresses all the 

needs that you have. And if not, you will let us know. 

Mr. Kingston. 

SERVICE ACADEMIES

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I was at West Point this summer, and one of the 

things I was shocked to learn is that there are 18 Members of Congress who do not utilize appointments to West Point. 

Is that number, 18, also true for the Air Force Academy. 

Mr. DUEHRING. I do not know the exact number, but I know this 

is a topic of discussion at our Board of Visitors meetings. And what 

they did—I am in an oversight position, so it is up to them to do— 

is, our members—I think you could talk to Congressman DeFazio, 

Congresswoman Sanchez, would be good people to talk to, they and 

their staffers are working laterally within the organization, within 

Congress, because we found that in many cases the staffers do not 

understand the program. 

And they are the first people that someone would come to look 

for information. How do I do this? I am interested. Where do I go? 

And to make sure that they are aware of it. Because we found at 

the last meeting that the Members are interested, but you get involved in a lot of other subjects, a lot of other priorities. And so 

they have instituted a program to kind of help give a boost, the 

input. 

And this touches on the diversity issue that Congresswoman Kilpatrick talked about earlier, too, which is a big concern for us at 

the Academy. So I would perhaps mention that those people are 

available to whittle down that number. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Jack, would you yield? 

Mr. KINGSTON. Yes. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I serve on the Board of Visitors for the 

Naval Academy. And they have turned the whole issue around. 

They have gone after, you know, I think in a very comprehensive 

way, all those Members of Congress that for one reason or another 

have not been, you know, fulfilling their appointment obligations. 


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They have a very comprehensive plan. And I assume most of the 

service academies are doing something similar. 

But I feel a lot better, certainly, on the diversity side. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I wanted to give you an opportunity to make sure 

everybody in the room realized that was going on, that there are 

18 Members, and yet people have—you know, will stand up and 

smack you around. I cannot believe a Member of Congress would 

not know about this or would—let staffers get away with not knowing the process. 

So Members of Congress need to step forward and say, Look, I 

disagree with the whole system, and that is why I am not going 

to do it instead of feigning ignorance about the process. 

But I am glad you guys are taking steps forward, because I think 

it is just something people need to know here as we talk about recruitment, that we have Members that are not giving young men 

and women in their own district an opportunity to participate in 

one of the best educational opportunities in the world. And it is not 

necessarily a career in the Air Force. And so if you do not want 

to go full-time career, you can still get that education. 

LASIK SURGERY

But the second question I had on LASIK surgery. You know, we 

are all taught from youth on that you have to have great eyes to 

be a pilot. Has LASIK surgery changed that for those of us who 

do not have that gift? 

Mr. DUEHRING. I know that there is a difference in the accession 

policy for pilot training between the Air Force and the Navy, and 

it may well be on this. I am getting into a gray area that I do not 

know a whole lot about. 

Would you like for us to give you the latest policy on that? I am 

sure that is readily available. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I think people it would be good for us to know, 

because I am assuming that if Air Force or Navy pilots are allowed 

to have corrective eye surgery, then it is really a strong endorsement of the procedure, and that is why I am asking it. 

Mr. DUEHRING. I would be guessing at this point, sir. And I 

would like to just give you a straight answer, if I could, by going 

back to our Surgeon General. 

Mr. KINGSTON. There is probably a lot of data out there now that 

was not out there 10 years ago, I would imagine. 

Mr. DUEHRING. We could look at it. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information follows:] 

The USAF-Refractive Surgery (USAF–RS) Program permits both advanced surface ablation (ASA) and intra-stromal ablation (ISA) procedures in eligible Air Force 

active duty and Air Force Reserve Component members including pilots and pilot 

applicants. ASA approved procedures include photorefractive keratectomy (PRK), 

laser in-situ epithelial keratomileusis (LASEK), epi-LASIK and wave-front guided 

photorefractive keratectomy (WFG–PRK). ISA approved procedures include standard laser in-situ keratomileusis (LASIK) and its variants, wave-front guided laser 

in-situ keratomileusis (WFG–LASIK), and technological advances in the basic 

LASIK procedure, such as femtosecond technology. The incorporation of WFG treatments into refractive surgery is expected to improve visual outcomes, particularly 

in low light and low contrast situations. 

Other refractive surgery procedures, such as a radial keratotomy, intracorneal 

rings, hyperopic (>+0.5 diopters) PRK and hyperopic LASIK are less predictable, are 


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associated with more complications and may not achieve acceptable levels of stabilization. Therefore, these procedures are not allowed for either trained flight personnel or applicants. In addition, monovision treatments (one eye corrected for distance and the other eye corrected for near) are not allowed for aircrew. 

The Air Force Medical Service can authorize both PRK and LASIK for aircrew. 

PRK is currently preferred due to its proven track record and issues regarding corneal flap healing. The Navy allows both LASIK and PRK. Pre-refractive surgery refractive error limits are similar for both Air Force and Navy, though the Navy will 

accept a greater degree of far-sightedness (most refractive surgery candidates are 

near-sighted). 

Data from the USAF–RS Registry to date shows the clinical results after PRK 

have been excellent with nearly 100% of flying duty personnel returned to full operational activity. Following PRK, about 1% of pilots and 5% of other aircrew are required to wear spectacles to achieve distant 20/20 vision. Only 1% cannot achieve 

pre-op best corrected level of vision after surgery. Average duty not to include flying 

time is currently 13 weeks for PRK. Statistics on LASIK are not available due to 

the few numbers of aircrew that have undergone this treatment. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Ms. Kaptur. 

SUICIDES

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the second 

round. 

I wanted to go, General Newton, back to my interest, one of my 

interests here. Out of the 208,000, according to your testimony, 

total force Airmen, do I read it correctly that 189 committed suicide 

since 2003? Is that right, based on the numbers that are in your 

testimony? 

General NEWTON. Yes, ma’am. I would have to refer to the written record. 

Ms. KAPTUR. One hundred fifty—it is page 14. Do I just add 

those up and I get the total? Is it 39—from 2003 to 2008, 39 suicide 

victims had deployed in the previous 12 months, but 150 victims 

had never deployed? 

Is that a subset of the total or is that the total if you add those 

two numbers together, please? 

My question is, since 2003, how many Airmen have committed 

suicide. 

General NEWTON. Let me get back to you take that for the 

record. 

[The information follows:] 

Since 2003 the Air Force has had a total of 234 active duty suicides through the 

end of 2008. This equals an average of 39 suicides per year and an average rate 

of 11 per 100,000. This compares to an average rate from 1987 to 1996 of 13.5 per 

100,000. 

Suicides/Suicide Rate: Calendar Year 2008: 39/12.1* (rate per 100,000) 

Calendar Year 2007: 34/10 

Calendar Year 2006: 42/12.1 

Calendar Year 2005: 31/8.9 

Calendar Year 2004: 49/13.1 

Calendar Year 2003: 38/10.2 

* Calendar Year 2008 data has changed since original report to Congress as the 

Armed Forces Medical Examiner recently determined a death in July 2008 to have 

been a suicide. 

RETENTION OF HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. 

In your testimony on another page you talk about the Air Force’s 

inability to retain experienced health care personnel. For the 10- 

year point minus 27 percent for physicians; minus 40 percent for 


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dentists, page 11; minus 31 percent for nurses; minus 33 percent 

for biomedical; am I reading that correctly? 

General NEWTON. I think that is not necessarily a negative factor. I think that is short of our goals that we are trying to—either 

from recruiting or retention. We are only retaining at the 10-year 

point is approximately 27 percent for physicians, approximately 40 

percent for dentists, 31 percent for nurses and 33 percent, biomedical; within the health professionals. 

Ms. KAPTUR. So if they leave, you hire someone else? You are 

just saying they are not staying 10 years; is that what that says? 

General NEWTON. We would like to retain more. And again, we 

are only meeting 27 percent of our retention goals for physicians 

over that 10-year period. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Would nurses be your largest category of total personnel? Physicians, dentists, nurses, biomedical science, administrators, what would be your largest category there? 

General NEWTON. It may be administrators, but let me take that 

back. But nurses would be a significant part. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Pretty high? 

General NEWTON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Could you get back to me on what percentage of 

those would be psychiatric nurses? 

General NEWTON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And specifically with that training? 

General NEWTON. Yes, ma’am. 

[The information follows:] 

The Air Force Medical Service consists of five corps. After training numbers are 

removed, the largest is the Nurse Corps at 3,132 personnel. Of the personnel identified in the 2008 Health Manpower and Personnel Data System (HMPDS) Report, 

1.7% (55 personnel) of the Nurse Corps is identified to have specialized training as 

‘‘psychiatric nurses’’. This designation includes two specialties, the ‘‘Mental Health 

Nurse’’ and the advanced practice ‘‘Psychiatric Nurse Practitioner’’. The ‘‘Mental 

Health Nurse’’ primarily works as a mental health provider in the outpatient setting. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Then on page 18 of your testimony you state that 

there is a central database that you maintain that tracks suicide 

events and facilitates the analysis of potential risk factors. 

Do you maintain such a database for PTSD, for other 

neuropsychiatric conditions? For flashbacks? What kind of database 

do you maintain for neuropsychiatric conditions? 

General NEWTON. Let me get back with you on that because 

again I think that has a lot to do with how we prevent and treat 

and so forth. And that is very essential. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What data are you collecting and how have you 

interacted with it? What is it teaching you? 

General NEWTON. And perhaps what you do with the data. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What you are collecting, and then how are you 

interacting as a service with that. 

And then I am very interested in the architecture at DoD, because we have been fighting to get it, and I am not sure we are 

there yet. We met with the Surgeons General; and frankly, the 

Navy was the most articulate of all the services we met with. We 

will see what they are like this year when they come up before us. 

But to try to get all of you to work together—you know, what is 

your overarching perspective on this subset of illnesses as a part 


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of total force, and what are you doing about it? It seems to be different in each department. And do you assign someone to participate in an agency-wide, a department-wide approach to dealing 

with this set of illnesses? 

General NEWTON. Actually, we do participate with the other 

Services. And as I refer to my comments earlier, I personally met 

with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for their personnel. 

As you have heard, I am sure, the Army has gone through some 

challenges, as well, with regard to suicides. He and I have had 

lengthy conversations and discussions and interacted directly in 

terms of the programs that they are putting forth in terms of what 

we can share amongst our Services. That is absolutely essential, 

the integration of the data, the understanding of the nature of 

what the data is telling us, how it is not necessarily just kept within one Service, but we integrate that with the other Services is important. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I know my time has expired, but I would very much 

appreciate an answer back explaining to me how Air Force participates at DoD with the other services, at what level you participate 

in discussions about this set of illnesses, and what kind of architecture currently exists at the Department of Defense for these illnesses. 

General NEWTON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General NEWTON. Thank you. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Ms. Granger? 

Ms. GRANGER. I have no questions. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Bishop? 

Mr. BISHOP. Nothing. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. The Committee is adjourned until 10:00 a.m. tomorrow. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, and you, General Newton. 

A wonderful presentation. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

MISSIONS AND REQUIREMENTS

Question. The Air Force is now embracing a collaborative and supportive role in 

the types of operations being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. In general, Air 

Force leaders are attempting to change the Service’s culture to meet new challenges. 

While the Air Force has always provided mission support in the struggle against 

extremism, these missions were designated ‘‘In Lieu Of’’ (ILO). ILO is defined as a 

standard force and equipment that is deployed to execute missions and tasks outside of its core competencies. The Air Force now views these missions as core responsibilities and now refers to ILOs as Joint Expeditionary Tasking (JET). However, to support all JET requirements there are some fundamental realities associated with the impact of increased deployment tempo and requirements. These requirements are filled at the expense of traditional missions. 

General Newton, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force has stated he wants to change 

the Air Force’s culture. Please elaborate what types of changes we can expect to see 

in the Air Force? 

Answer. The Air Force is committed to the Joint fight. We are an equal member 

of the Joint team as indicated by our common ethic ‘‘Send me.’’ In December 2008 

the Air Force used Joint Expeditionary Taskings as an all-inclusive action and term 

connoting the spirit of ‘‘All in’’ and denotes our role as joint partners. Additionally, 

we reinforce newly established Air Force Priorities as a part of the culture shift: 


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1. Reinvigorate the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise; Accountability, precision, and 

reliability in Air Force processes 

2. Partner with the Joint and Coalition team to win today’s fight; joint capabilities, interoperability, trust (C2, ISR, non-traditional roles) 

3. Develop and care for Airmen and their families; reinforce our Warfighting 

Ethos, expeditionary combat mindset 

4. Modernize our aging air and space inventories; reset and build a balanced force 

for the future...no litmus tests 

5. Recapture Acquisition Excellence; process, people, performance 

Question. General Newton, what new missions and requirements will the Air 

Force take on as we move forward? Of those, how many were once performed by 

the Army and Marine Corps? 

Answer. The Air Force has been involved in the performance of joint expeditionary tasking (formally termed In-lieu Of) missions since 2002. The Air Force 

began with approximately 1,500 total requirements. We have experienced an increase in such taskings by 10 percent per fiscal year up to a total of 6,500 in Fiscal 

Year 2008. The majority of the original non-standard taskings were Army shortfalls; 

however, more recently the growth in these requirements has been for training 

teams. While these teams don’t require the Air Force to work out of its core competencies none of the Services actually organize, train, and equip to perform this 

mission. While the Air Force does expect some continued growth in training team 

requirements, we don’t anticipate any new missions. 

Question. Mr. Duehring, how many Airmen are currently deployed in the Central 

Command Area of Responsibility, and of that, how many are used for Joint missions? 

Answer. The Air Force currently has 27,119 Airmen deployed to the U.S. Central 

Command Area of Responsibility. Of those, 4,240 Airmen are deployed in support 

of Joint Expeditionary Taskings. 

Question. General Newton, the mission to conduct intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance for combatant commanders is vital. It is our understanding that the 

Air Force is currently playing a critical role in this mission, a role that is expected 

to continue expanding to match 50 unmanned Combat Air Patrols. Will this expanded role affect Air Force intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance manning 

requirements and, if so, how is the Service addressing these needs? 

Answer. The Air Force is working with Office of Secretary of Defense on the Fiscal 

Year 2010 President’s Budget request to fund active duty end strength to just over 

332,000 to support new/emerging missions and robust existing missions, such as 

providing manpower to increase Predator/Reaper/Distributed Common Ground Systems operational capability to 50 Combat Air Patrols. 

Question. Mr Duehring, since the ISR mission is a growing field, are there plans 

to provide a special pay for this? 

Answer. No. The Air Force does not plan to offer a special pay for the Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance mission. A majority of the career fields within the 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance mission already receive additional 

compensation through existing special and incentive pay programs (e.g., Selective 

Reenlistment Bonus, flight pay, etc). 

Question. Gentlemen, what is the Air Force’s nuclear manning requirement and 

how are they sourced? Are you able to fully source all your requirements for this 

field? If not, what are your shortfalls? 

Answer. The Air Force manning requirements to support the nuclear mission differ from the Joint Expeditionary Taskings, in that nuclear mission requirements are 

funded permanent party authorizations. The Air Force sources these requirements 

from core career fields. We actively manage the career fields to ensure we’re able 

to meet mission requirements. 

Currently, the only career fields supporting the nuclear enterprise which are projected to have chronic shortages are the bomber pilots and combat systems operators. However, these shortages are part of larger rated management issues and not 

limited to the nuclear force. 

AIR FORCE SUICIDE PREVENTION

Question. To prevent suicides the Air Force relies on the Air Force Suicide Prevention Program (AFSPP). The Air Force believes the AFSPP has highlighted community awareness of suicide and suicide risk factors. In addition, it has created a safety net that provides protection and adds support for those in trouble. This program 

is a population-oriented approach to reducing the risk of suicide. In addition, the 

program has implemented eleven initiatives aimed at strengthening social support, 

promoting development of social skills, and changing policies and norms to encourVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:35 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00341 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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age effective help-seeking behaviors. AFSPP’s eleven initiatives include: Leadership 

involvement, Suicide prevention in professional military education, Guidelines for 

use of mental health services, Community preventive services, Community education and training, Investigative interview policy, Critical incident stress management, Integrated delivery system (IDS), Limited privilege suicide prevention program, Behavioral health survey, and Suicide event surveillance system. 

Mr. Duehing, does the Air Force have any program for Airmen and their families 

to prepare them for the stressors of war? 

Answer. The Air Force supports Airmen and their families from the front line to 

the home front. At home, information and referral services are offered directly to 

spouses and families. 

Over the past year, the following programs and services were offered: Pre-deployment briefings for 100,000 members and families; free weekly morale calls to keep 

families connected and help reduce their sense of isolation; reintegration briefings 

for military spouses that prepared them for changes during the separation; free oil 

changes for each deployed family; and non-medical counseling sessions for families. 

Airmen are also kept informed through Professional Military Education where suicide is addressed as a leadership issue with a focus on knowing, recognizing, coping 

and dealing with pre- and post-deployment stressors. 

The Airmen Center in Al Udeid, Iraq provided numerous consultations on financial readiness, reintegration, and reunion. Air Force provides 16,000 hours of free 

child care each month to assist Airmen with longer hours on evenings, overnight, 

and weekends. Air Force also partners with the Air Force Aid Society to provide free 

child care to parents during circumstances such as deployments, remote tours of 

duty, and extended hours. The Youth Camping Program offers camp experiences for 

military children annually. The Air Force Reserve Command also hosted a deployment camp for children of guard and reserve members. 

Additionally, the Air Force united with the National Military Family Association 

Operation Purple Camps to provide free, week-long camps to help military kids experience fun while learning coping skills to deal with war-related stress. 

Question. What screening process does the Air Force use to detect possible mental 

health issues before and after deployment? In addition, please explain what services 

are available to Airmen in theater. 

Answer. All Airmen are screened for mental health concerns upon accession and 

annually via the Preventive Health Assessment. Before deploying the Pre-Deployment Health Assessment is conducted and the mental health clinic screens medical 

records for those who may require a personal interview. While deployed there are 

combat stress facilities that are available to monitor the health of deployed Airmen 

and assist when needed. The Air Force operates two large combat stress facilities 

and has many other smaller clinics attached to our medical facilities in deployed locations. All of these teams are active in prevention and outreach while taking selfreferrals and primary care referrals when treatment is required. At the end of the 

deployment Airmen are again screened using the Post-Deployment Health Assessment and appropriate referrals are made in theater or upon redeployment. After returning home Airmen are screened once again with the Post-Deployment Health ReAssessment. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. In fiscal year 2008, overall active duty Air Force retention rates finished 

below annual retention goals, while the Air Guard and Reserve officer and enlisted 

rates met or exceeded all aggregate retention goals. Active duty retention should 

trend slightly upward due to the poor state of the economy during fiscal year 2009. 

However, the Air Force will still continue to see shortfalls in critical and stressed 

specialties in officer and enlisted career fields of security forces, combat control, operations intelligence, and air field operations. To address this problem the Air Force 

has targeted retention bonuses to include Selective Reenlistment/Initial Enlistment 

Bonuses and Critical Skills Retention Bonuses for officers. Selective Reenlistment 

Bonuses are the most effective, responsive and measurable tool for targeted retention. Additionally, the Air Force has instituted voluntary and involuntary retraining 

for officers and enlisted targeting career fields with overages into career fields with 

identified shortages. 

Gentlemen, since the Air Force is very close to its planned end strength goal what 

force shaping measures will the Air Force use to get the right mix of personnel it 

needs? 

Answer. The Air Force will adjust accession levels by career field, offer initial enlistment bonuses (to recruit into particular career fields), retrain from skills with 


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inventory surpluses to skills with inventory deficits, and offer Selective Reenlistment Bonuses to skills where we need to boost retention. 

Question. General Newton, now that the Air Force is embracing a role in ground 

combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, will you start to recruit more for ground 

combat forces or will you retain the current recruiting model? 

Answer. The Air Force is substantially increasing authorized strength levels and 

therefore recruiting for 1C4X1 (Tactical Air Patrol Party) Airmen who are embedded 

with Army ground troops to call in air strikes and for 1T2X1 (Pararescue) Airmen. 

Question. General Newton, what areas are causing challenges (i.e., stressed career 

fields) and what specific efforts are being undertaken to address them? What bonus 

programs are in place? 

Answer. We currently have nine enlisted and seven officer specialties that we 

characterize and monitor as stressed career fields. The stressors for each of the specialties are unique to each specialty leading to a tailored approach to aid them to 

mitigate the stressing factors. The initiatives, programs and bonuses we use to help 

these stressed specialties include increased accessions, cross-training, special duty 

assignment pay, enlistment/reenlistment bonuses, critical skills retention bonuses, 

aviator continuation pay, and increased promotion opportunity. The following is our 

current list: 

ENLISTED STRESSED SPECIALTIES

1C2 Combat Control 

1C4 Tactical Air Control Party 

1T2 Pararescue 

3E2 Pavement/Construction Equipment 

3E3 Structural 

3E6 Operations Management 

3E8 Explosive Ordnance Disposal 

3P0 Security Forces 

6C0 Contracting 

OFFICER STRESSED SPECIALTIES

12S Special Operations Navigator 

13D Control & Recovery 

13M Airfield Operations 

31P Security Forces 

32E Civil Engineer 

35P Public Affairs 

64P Contracting 

Question. Gentlemen, the Committee understands that the Air Force has instituted voluntary and involuntary retraining for officers and enlisted targeting career 

fields with overages into career fields with indentified shortages. Can the Airmen 

decline this retraining? 

Answer. Retraining of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) is in two phases. Phase 

I is purely voluntary, but NCOs are advised of their vulnerability for selection in 

Phase II so that they may decide to take advantage of the wider selection of available specialties. In Phase II, NCOs in specific specialties, grades and years of service are directed to submit retraining applications for remaining retraining opportunities. They may decline retraining, however, doing so makes them ineligible to reenlist and they will be required to separate at the completion of their current enlistment. 

Retraining of first-term Airmen is voluntary in connection with reenlistment for 

a second term—as an incentive to reenlist. 

Retraining of commissioned officers is voluntary at this time. Current requirements are small enough to satisfy with voluntary retraining. 

Question. Please explain how the Air Force chooses the personnel to retrain. Is 

there a screening process to determine skills and aptitude for their new specialty? 

Answer. Retraining of commissioned officers is currently only voluntary. This is 

because the requirements are small enough to satisfy with voluntary retraining. Officers in overage specialties and year groups are solicited to apply for available specialties. 

Retraining of first-term Airmen is voluntary in connection with reenlistment for 

a second term—as an incentive to reenlist. As they near the end of their first enlistment, the Airmen may submit applications for published retraining opportunities. 

Retraining of non-commissioned officers is in two phases. Specific eligibility requirements are established—grade, years of service, current specialty—along with 

disqualifying factors from their record like disciplinary actions. NCOs in targeted 


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overage specialties are individually identified based on these criteria and informed 

of their vulnerability for retraining. They may apply for available specialties in 

Phase I or wait to see what requirements remain in Phase II. If directed to apply 

for retraining in Phase II, they must apply for an available specialty or become ineligible to reenlist, separating at the end of their current enlistment. 

All officer and enlisted Airmen are screened to ensure they meet the qualifications 

of the specialty for which they apply, including a physical examination if necessary. 

Enlisted Airmen may also retake the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery 

to try to improve their scores so as to increase the number of specialties for which 

they are qualified. 

Question. Mr. Duehring, what is the average cost to the Air Force to retrain these 

Service members? 

Answer. The total cost per Airman is on average $3,500 for specialties with short 

training pipelines (approximately $2,700 in travel and per diem plus approximately 

$800 in schoolhouse operating costs), not including military personnel costs, base operating support tail, construction of facilities and acquisition of major training systems. Specialties with longer training pipelines also require a permanent change of 

station for training, with associated costs. The relative proportion of retraining requirements with short and long training pipelines varies from year to year, but in 

Fiscal Year 2009, approximately 1,750 out of 2,600 have short pipelines. 

Question. The Committee remains concerned regarding the recruiting and retention for mission-critical occupational specialties. What steps are being taken to fill 

the specialty occupations? 

Answer. Once a mission critical specialty is identified with manning or retention 

issues, steps are taken to increase accessions, modify or introduce enlistment and 

reenlistment bonuses and cross-training to help mitigate the problems. Roughly 65 

percent of recruits enter the Air Force with guaranteed specialties in their enlistment contracts. The other 35 percent are enlisted in one of four aptitude areas— 

mechanical, administrative, general, or electronics. The aptitude areas provide the 

Air Force flexibility to classify these recruits into a specific field just before they 

graduate from Basic Military Training, allowing for attrition in Basic Military 

Training and changes in the accession plan. We are currently on track to fill 100 

percent of all enlisted specialty occupations for Fiscal Year 2009. 

Question. Mr. Duehring, has the Air Force analyzed why these occupational specialties have consistently been under filled? What is the operational impact of these 

shortages? What resources are needed to fill these positions? 

Answer. Yes. The Air Force has analyzed why these occupational specialties have 

consistently been under filled. High operational demand, rapid mission growth, and 

technical training constraints are common reasons. The operational impacts of these 

shortages are; increased work tempo and potential for mission degradation. To address these shortages increased end strength to 332,000 is focused on supporting 

emerging mission growth and existing mission critical shortages. 

Question. Mr. Duehring, recruiting and retention goals are often relayed to Congress in the aggregate providing little or no visibility into how each occupational 

specialty is staffed. Please provide the Committee on recruiting and retention by Air 

Force specialty code. 

Answer. The Air Force is on track to complete Fiscal Year 2009 at 100 percent 

in each enlisted specialty (Tab 1). 

Line officers are not recruited by specialty. Our commissioning sources produce 

officers in rated (pilot, combat systems operator, air battle manager), technical (scientists, engineers and weather officers), non-technical (non-rated operations, logistics, support and acquisitions), and judge advocate categories, who are then classified to meet Air Force needs. For Fiscal Year 2009, we expect to meet or exceed requirements for all line officers except electrical engineers, special tactics officers and 

combat rescue officers (Tab 2). The Air Force reclassifies eliminees from other training pipelines (for example, pilot training) and solicits officers who have completed 

initial assignments in other specialties to fill shortfalls in these areas. 

Non-line officers (health professions and chaplains) are recruited by specialty and 

continue to be a recruiting challenge (Tab 3). 

Retention is better than expected and healthy for most specialties (Tab 4 and Tab 

5). 

Tab 1—Enlisted Accessions 

Tab 2—Line Officer Accessions 

Tab 3—Health Professions/Chaplains 

Tab 4—Enlisted Retention 


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ENLISTMENT AND RETENTION BONUSES

Question. The military services offer a variety of enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses to attract new recruits into the military specialties that are considered ‘‘hard 

to fill,’’ as well as to encourage experienced military members in ‘‘shortage jobs’’ to 

stay in past their first enlistment period. 

Mr. Duehring, what was the total dollar amount spent on Air Force recruiting and 

retention bonuses for Fiscal Year 2009? 

Answer. Bonuses are payments the Air Force makes to individuals in exchange 

for a commitment to multiple years of service or to encourage enlistment or commissioning in specific skills. For recruiting purposes, we expect to spend $27.7 million 

in new bonuses and $7.4 million in anniversary payments for previous multi-year 

contracts, for a total of $35.1 million. 

For retention purposes, we expect to spend $200.2 million in new bonuses and 

$71.8 million in anniversary payments, for a total of $272 million. 

Question. Mr. Duehring, what is the range of individual bonuses for recruiting? 

For retention? Please explain why there are differences. 

Answer. The differences in bonus amounts are based on Air Force assessment of 

what it takes to recruit and retain the various specialties. 

Initial enlistment bonuses are provided for nine Air Force Specialty Codes. They 

range from $1,000 to $3,000 for 4–year and $2,000 to $13,000 for 6-year enlistments. 

Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) are a monetary incentive to encourage reenlistments in certain skills to sustain career force objectives. SRBs are offered in 

certain skills by zones (based on years of service) when retention factors indicate 

a need. Based on retention health, a multiplier (0 to 7) is assigned to determine the 

dollar amount of the bonus. Bonuses are computed by multiplying one month base 

pay by the SRB multiple and the number of years reenlisting. Currently, individual 

bonuses range from $1,000 to $90,000. Individuals receive 50 percent of the bonus 

upon reenlistment and the remaining balance is paid in equal installments on the 

anniversary of the reenlistment over the contract period. 

Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRBs) is an Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD)-driven requirement geared at retaining eligible Airmen in specific skills and 

supplements the SRB program. The goal is to increase retention and facilitate an 

increase in Special Forces. OSD has designated two Air Force specialties (Combat 

Controllers and Pararescue) to receive the CSRB. Individuals must have at least 19 

years, but not more than 24 years, and reenlist or extend for a period of 1 to 6 years 

to qualify for the CSRB. The contract period (number of years) of the reenlistment/ 

extension determines the individual amount of the bonus, but ranges between 

$8,000 and $150,000. 

Question. Gentlemen, have you found any imbalances or inequities in your recruiting and retention bonus structure? 

Answer. No. Our initial enlistment bonus program is meeting the intended purpose of attracting qualified applicants into ‘‘hard-to-fill’’ Air Force specialties. Our 

retention bonus programs are continuously reviewed in order to target the right 

population and to combat retention problems. These reviews ensure the structure 

of our programs remain equitable and balanced within the Air Force. 

Question. Mr. Duehring, does the Air Force plan to review its recruiting and retention bonus program? 

Answer. Yes. Initial enlistment bonuses are reviewed and adjusted annually based 

on Air Force requirements and difficulty to recruit. We continuously review all retention bonus programs to ensure we are targeting the correct skills and years of 

service. Adjustments to the program are made when retention needs dictate and/ 

or when affected by budgetary constraints. 

Question. Mr. Duehring, is the Air Force going to promote non-monetary bonuses 

such as tuition assistance and the new G.I. Bill? 

Answer. The Air Force continues to use non-monetary incentives, such as tuition 

assistance and the Post-9/11 GI Bill, to attract and retain highly qualified applicants, to include those in ‘‘hard to fill’’ and ‘‘shortage’’ career fields. The Air Force 

promotes military tuition assistance and the various GI Bill programs at numerous 

points in an Airman’s career. 

Recruiters brief potential applicants on these programs as they compete with the 

other Services, civilian employers, and academic institutions for the same eligible 

population of Americans. During Basic Military Training and Officer Training 

School, Airmen are briefed on the military tuition assistance and GI Bill programs. 

Additionally, when enlisted Airmen arrive at their first duty station they are again 

briefed on tuition assistance and GI Bill programs during the mandatory First Term 

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tion. As an Airman continues in his/her career, the installation Career Assistance 

Advisor and Education and Training Section personnel provide follow-up counseling 

on education options to include military tuition assistance and GI Bill programs. It 

is also mandatory that Education and Training Section counselors brief all Airmen 

who are registering for courses on applicable tuition assistance and GI Bill programs and policies. The Air Force has also created the Air Force Virtual Education 

Center to reach our Internet-savvy Airmen. Airmen can research benefit policy, 

identify academic institutions, and apply for tuition assistance on-line. Finally, education is inculcated in our Air Force culture and commanders and supervisors at all 

levels stress the benefits of the tuition assistance and GI Bill programs. This focus 

on education helps explain the fact that Air Force enlisted personnel have earned 

approximately 69 percent of all degrees awarded to the Department of Defense enlisted personnel since Fiscal Year 2001. 

The Air Force is also aggressively preparing for the August 1, 2009, Post-9/11 GI 

Bill effective date. Subject matter experts on the Air Staff and at the Air Force Personnel Center are developing and executing a Strategic Communication plan as the 

Department of Veterans Affairs and Office of the Secretary of Defense make details 

available. Base Education and Training Sections are currently conducting Post–9/ 

11 GI Bill spread the word briefings. These same briefings, along with frequently 

asked question and answers, are posted on the previously mentioned Air Force Virtual Education Center. Finally, Air Education and Training Command and Basic 

Military Training subject matter experts are updating the current lesson plan to ensure the Post-9/11 GI Bill is briefed to all trainees starting on the August 1, 2009 

effective date. 

Question. Mr. Duehring, can you provide the Committee with a complete list of 

all recruitment and retention bonuses for each specialty code that is eligible for a 

bonus? Can you also provide the average bonus for each specialty code? 

Answer. Initial Enlistment Bonus: Bonuses are offered in nine Air Force Specialty 

Codes with options for six or four year contracts. 1A8X1—Airborne Linguist ($12K 

6/YR/$3K 4-YR), 1N3XX—Crypto Linguist ($12K 6-YR/$3K 4-YR), 1C2X1—Combat 

Controller ($13K 6-YR/$3K 4-YR), 1C4X1—Tactical Air Command and Control 

($10K 6-YR/$3K 4-YR), 1T2X1—Para Rescue ($13K 6-YR/$3K 4-YR), 1T0X1—Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape ($12K 6-YR/$3K 4-YR), 1W0X2—Special Operations Weather Team ($5K 6-YR/$1K 4-YR), 3E8X1—Explosive Ordnance Disposal 

($13K 6-YR/$3K 4-YR), 3PDX1—Security Forces ($2K 6-YR) 

Title 

SRB Average 

Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone E 

In-Flight Refueling ............................... — 26.5K 25.5K — 

Flight Engineer .................................... 20K 26.5K 12.2K — 

Aircraft Loadmaster ............................. — 52.9K 12.2K — 

Airborne Mission System ..................... 9.5K 30K 12.2K — 

Airborne Battle Mgt System ................ — 33.9K 25.5K — 

Aerial Gunner ....................................... 47.3K 49.5K 12.2K — 

Airborne Cryptologic Linguist .............. 57.3K 71.2K 59.5K — 

Aviation Resource Mgmt ...................... 9.5K 11.6K — — 

Air Traffic Control ................................ 57.3K 74.5K 76.2K — 

Combat Control .................................... 68.5K 77.4K 83K — 

Command Post .................................... 9.5k 11.6K — — 

Tactical Air Control Party .................... 68.5K 77.4K 83K 35.5K 

Aero Con & Warn Sys .......................... 37.1K 26.5K 25.5K — 

Space System Operations .................... 42K 11.6K — — 

Airfield Management ........................... 47.3K — 25.5K — 

Operations Intelligence ........................ 44.5K 74.5K 68.3K — 

Imagery Analysis .................................. 57.3K 77.4K 80.1K — 

Comm Signals Intelligence .................. 30.2K — — — 

Cryptologic Linguist ............................. 47.3K 71.2K 25.5K — 

Network Intelligence Analysis .............. 20K 59.1K 25.5K — 

Elect Signals Intel Exploitation ........... — 49.5K 24K — 

Surv, Evas, Res, Escape ...................... 42K 49.5K 59.5K 52.2K 

Pararescue ........................................... 68.5K 77.4K 83K — 

Weather ................................................ 30.2K 26.5K 12.2K — 

Combat Operations Weather ................ 30.2K 26.5K 12.2K — 

Av Test, Comp, Av Sens Sys & Elec 

War (shreds only).

9.5K — — — 


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Title 

SRB Average 

Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone E 

A–10, F–15 & U–2 Avionic System .... 42K 26.5K — — 

Tactical Aircraft Maintenance ............. 15K — — — 

Aerospace Maintenance (shreds only) 26.3K — — — 

Int Av Sys, Comm, Nav, Misn ............. 20K — — — 

Int Av Sys Inst & Flt Control ............... 30.2K 11.6K — — 

Int Av Sys, Elec Warfare ...................... 30.2K — 12.2K — 

Int Av Sys, Air Surv Rad Systems ....... 9.5K — — — 

Acft Fuel Systems ................................ — 26.5K — — 

Acft Hydraulics Sys .............................. 9.5K 11.6K — — 

Aircraft Metals Technology .................. 9.5K 26.5K 12.2K — 

Nondestructive Inspection ................... — 11.6K 12.2K — 

Aircraft Structural Maintenance .......... — 11.6K 12.2K — 

Low Observable Aircraft Structural 

Maintenance.

— 11.6K 12.2K — 

Ground Radar Systems ........................ 26.3K — — — 

Logistics Plans .................................... 20K 33.9K — — 

Msl & Space Sys Elect Maintenance .. — — 12.2K — 

Msl & Space Sys Maintenance ............ — — 25.5K — 

Msl & Space Facilities ........................ 9.5K — — — 

Precision Meas Equipment .................. 20K 17K — — 

Maintenance Mgmt Analysis ............... 20K — — — 

Maint Mgmt Production ....................... 9.5K — — — 

Material Mgmt ..................................... 9.5K — — — 

Vehicle Operations ............................... 9.5K 11.6K — — 

Air Transportation ................................ — 11.6K 12.2K — 

Vehicle & Equip Maintenance ............. 9.5K — — — 

Vehicle Mgmt & Analysis .................... 26.3K 26.5K — — 

Munitions Sys ...................................... — 26.5K — — 

Comm—Computer Sys Ops ................. 20K — — — 

Comm—Computer Sys Cont ............... 30.2K 11.6K 12.2K — 

Heat, Vent, A/C & Refrig. .................... 15K — — — 

Pavement & Const Equipment ............ 44.5K 52.9K — — 

Structural ............................................. 44.5K 52.9K 12.2K — 

Utilities Systems .................................. 9.5K 26.5K — — 

Pest Management ................................ 9.5K — 12.2K — 

Engineering Assistant .......................... 9.5K — 12.2K — 

Operations Management ...................... 30.2K — 25.5K — 

Explosive Ord Disposal ........................ 64.5K 71.2K 68.3K 80.5K 

Emergency Management ...................... — 26.5K 45.4K — 

Public Affairs ....................................... 9.5K — — — 

Elect Signals Intel Exploitation ........... — 49.5K 24K — 

Surv, Evas, Res, Escape ...................... 42K 49.5K 59.5K 52.2K 

Pararescue ........................................... 68.5K 77.4K 83K — 

Weather ................................................ 30.2K 26.5K 12.2K — 

Combat Operations Weather ................ 30.2K 26.5K 12.2K — 

Av Test, Comp, Av Sens Sys & Elec 

War (shreds only).

9.5K — — — 

A–10, F–15 & U–2 Avionic System .... 42K 26.5K — — 

Tactical Aircraft Maintenance ............. 15K — — — 

Aerospace Maintenance (shreds only) 26.3K — — — 

Int Av Sys, Comm, Nav, Misn ............. 20K — — — 

Int Av Sys Inst & Fit Control ............... 30.2K 11.6K — — 

Int Av Sys, Elec Warfare ...................... 30.2K — 12.2K — 

Int Av Sys, Air Surv Rad Systems ....... 9.5K — — — 

Acft Fuel Systems ................................ — 26.5K — — 

Acft Hydraulics Sys .............................. 9.5K 11.6K — — 

Aircraft Metals Technology .................. 9.5K 26.5K 12.2K — 

Nondestructive Inspection ................... — 11.6K 12.2K — 

Aircraft Structural Maintenance .......... — 11.6K 12.2K — 

Low Observable Aircraft Structural 

Maintenance.

— 11.6K 12.2K — 

Ground Radar Systems ........................ 26.3K — — — 

Logistics Plans .................................... 20K 33.9K — — 


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Title 

SRB Average 

Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone E 

Msl & Space Sys Elect Maintenance .. — — 12.2K — 

Msl & Space Sys Maintenance ............ — — 25.5K — 

Msl& Space Facilities .......................... 9.5K — — — 

Precision Meas Equipment .................. 20K 17K — — 

Maintenance Mgmt Analysis ............... 20K — — — 

Maint Mgmt Production ....................... 9.5K — — — 

Material Mgmt ..................................... 9.5K — — — 

Vehicle Operations ............................... 9.5K 11.6K — — 

Air Transportation ................................ — 11.6K 12.2K — 

Vehicle & Equip Maintenance ............. 9.5K — — — 

Vehicle Mgmt & Analysis .................... 26.3K 26.5K — — 

Munitions Sys ...................................... — 26.5K — — 

Comm—Computer Sys Ops ................. 20K — — — 

Comm—Computer Sys Cont ............... 30.2K 11.6K 12.2K — 

Heat, Vent, A/C & Refrig. .................... 15K — — — 

Pavement & Const Equipment ............ 44.5K 52.9K — — 

Structural ............................................. 44.5K 52.9K 12.2K — 

Utilities Systems .................................. 9.5K 26.5K — — 

Pest Management ................................ 9.5K — 12.2K — 

Engineering Assistant .......................... 9.5K — 12.2K — 

Operations Management ...................... 30.2K — 25.5K — 

Explosive Ord Disposal ........................ 64.5K 71.2K 68.3K 80.5K 

Emergency Management ...................... — 26.5K 45.4K — 

Public Affairs ....................................... 9.5K — — — 

Radio & TV Broadcast ......................... 20K 11.6K — — 

Security Forces—Only Slick ................ 9.5K — — — 

Security Forces Mil Work Dog .............. 30.2K 11.6K — — 

Security Forces Combat Arms ............. 30.2K 11.6K — — 

Medical Materiel .................................. — 11.6K — — 

Bioenvironmental Engineer .................. 9.5K — 12.2K — 

Mental Health Services ........................ 30.2K 26.5K — — 

Public Health ....................................... 9.5K — — — 

Cardiopulmonary Lab ........................... 15K 11.6K — — 

Physical Medicine ................................ 9.5K — — — 

Aerospace Medical Services ................ 9.5K — — — 

Aerospace Med Serv, Neurology ........... 9.5K — — — 

Aerospace Med Serv, IDMT .................. 20K 26.5K — — 

Surgical Services, Urology ................... 9.5K 11.6K — — 

Surgical Services, Orthopedics ............ 9.5K 11.6K — — 

Surg Serv, Otorhinolaryngology ............ 9.5K 11.6K — — 

Diagnostic Imaging (shreds only) ....... 26.3K — — — 

Dental Laboratory ................................ 20K 26.5K — — 

Paralegal .............................................. 9.5K — — — 

Contracting .......................................... 57.3K 59.1K 68.3K 35.5K 

Financial Mgt & Comptroller ............... 9.5K 26.5K — — 

Special Investigation ........................... — 30K 45.4K — 

Interpreter/Translator ........................... 47.3K 59.1K 38.1K — 

Technical Applications Specialist ........ 9.5K 11.6K — — 

21 months to 6 years in service 

6 to 10 years of service 

10 to 14 years of service 

18 to 20 years in service 

*** All avgs based on current FY takers 

AIR GUARD AND AIR FORCE RESERVE ISSUES

Question. General Newton, describe the Air Guards’ participation in Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) mission. What percent of the air defense mission is being flown 

by the Air Guard? 

Answer. There are currently eighteen designated steady-state Air Sovereignty 

Alert sites in the United States. The Air National Guard provides personnel and 

equipment at sixteen of the eighteen Air Sovereignty Alert sites while the active 

duty Air Force provides personnel and equipment at the remaining two sites. AlVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:35 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00362 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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though exact numbers are not readily available, the mission percentage share for 

Air National Guard and Air Force is relative to this break-out. In keeping with the 

recommendations of the Congressional Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, the Air Force emphasizes the total force aspect of Air Sovereignty Alert mission and every other operation supported by the Air Force to prevent any institutional prejudice for duty status that might arise from disparate designations. 

PERSONNEL TEMPO 

Question. The increase of deployments in the past few years for domestic disasters, contingency operations, or Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), 

clearly stresses military personnel and their families. 

Gentlemen, what is the average time Airmen are away from home during the year 

for training, exercises or deployments other than Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. Our Airmen averaged about 72 days temporary duty in Fiscal Year 2008 

to places other than Iraq/Afghanistan (100,405 Total Force Airmen). Airmen attending training for various reasons to maintain readiness in addition to deployments 

averaged about 28 days temporary duty in Fiscal Year 2008 (combat skills training, 

civil affairs, mobile training teams, etc.) (7,176 Airmen—most of these Airmen deploy to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. 

Question. Mr. Duehring, please explain how the Air Force manages personnel 

tempo so it does not have an adverse impact on individual unit readiness and training. What systems are in place to track perstempo information? 

Answer. Air Force personnel tempo policy is that ‘‘A day away is a day away’’. 

The Air Force Personnel Center maintains a secure web site that hosts all Air Force 

personnel tempo data. Personnel tempo data is a collection of TDY time regardless 

of purpose (deployment, Professional Military Education, etc) and is captured from 

Travel and Military Personnel Data Systems. Data is collected by individual but aggregated by unit, specialty and weapon systems. Collectively this data helps commanders at all levels manage readiness, determine equitable distribution of TDY 

days, and/or identify capability limitations. 

Question. General Newton, are there certain units or mission skills that are being 

continually stressed with either normal deployments, training, exercises, or for contingency operations? If so, describe which skills or units are being ‘‘stretched thin’’. 

Answer. Yes. We have mission skills (capabilities) that are heavily in demand for 

operational and other deployments. Air Force operations in support of global combatant commander requirements have required the surge of numerous capability 

areas since late 2001. Several of our capability areas may be considered ‘‘stretched 

thin’’ or worse. We manage these in-demand capabilities through a series of ‘‘tempobands’’ that set their operational deployments based on dwell—time away versus 

time at home. 

The specialties that are more severely effect are: Aerial Port Operations, Air Field 

Operations (Air Traffic Control & Combat Airspace and Senior Supervision), B-1 

Squadrons, Chaplains (Islamic), Civil Engineering (Prime Beef and Red Horse), 

Combat Weather, Command Post, Communications (Airlift Systems and Communications Officers), Contracting, Explosive Ordinance Disposal, Intelligence, Logistics Readiness Officers, Medical (Behavioral Health), OSI, Para rescue, Public Affairs Officers, Security Forces, Space Weapons Officers, Supply, Theater Space Operations, Traffic Management and Vehicle Operations and Management. 

We also track total force operational demand that considers seven individual 

measures aggregated into a single tool (Operations Demand Meta metric) to express 

overall operational demand, vice just deployment dwell. Besides the specialties listed above, the capabilities with very high ops demand are: Helicopter Pilot, Special 

Operations Navigator, Control & Recovery, Civil Engineering (Pavement & Construction and Structural), In-Flight Refueling, Tactical Air Command & Control and 

Operations Management. 

Question. General Newton, personnel tempo also affects those personnel who remain behind at the home station when units deploy. Describe some of those impacts? For instance, are they working more hours per week? 

Answer. Personnel tempo does have an effect on those not deployed. In some instances it does mean that home station personnel are working longer to make up 

for those who are deployed, especially in mission-critical areas. In other instances, 

lower priority work simply gets deferred until deployed members return; this is 

more often the case for less critical areas. Either situation increases anxiety and 

frustration among home station personnel. 

Question. Mr. Duehring, please explain the personnel policies that are in place 

which minimize the redeployment of an individual or a unit soon after returning to 

their home stations. 


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Answer. The Air Force relies on the Air & Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) force 

generation construct to establish a predictable, standardized battle rhythm ensuring 

rotational forces are properly organized, trained, equipped, and ready to sustain capabilities while rapidly responding to emerging crises. Air Force capabilities are postured in blocks/pairs scheduled for utilization during specific periods; Airmen are assigned a corresponding AEF indicator. While the baseline AEF postures capabilities 

at a 1:4 deploy-to-dwell (120–days deployed/480–days dwell), modifications were 

made to the construct to meet Secretary of Defense planning objectives for sustainable utilization of capabilities at 1:2 deploy-to-dwell for Active Component personnel 

(179–days deployed/365–days dwell) and 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell (up to 1–year mobilized/5years dwell) for Reserve Component personnel. Capabilities with limited 

supply or high-demand can be utilized at a 1:1 deploy-to-dwell (179–days deployed/ 

179–days dwell). 

Air Force policy directs that ‘‘Airmen will only deploy during their assigned vulnerability period except for reaching forward.’’ The need to ’reach forward’ is a function of combatant commander requirements exceeding postured capability in any 

given vulnerability period. We also have policy in place to preclude an Airman’s deployment vulnerability being increased when they move from base to base. Upon arrival to a new unit, Airmen are to be assigned to a position providing appropriate 

time to train/reconstitute prior to their next AEF deployment opportunity. 

Question. General Newton, can you please explain the current C–17 aircrew personnel tempo and the reasons behind the C–17 personnel tempo? 

Answer. C–17 line qualified aircrews were TDY an average of 99.4 days over the 

last 12 months as of December 2008. This number includes days TDY for contingency/deployed operations. The highest TDY average is for Travis AFB, CA pilots 

at 155.4 due to their recent return from a desert rotation. The C–17 deploy-to-dwell 

ratio is currently 1:6.7. This deploy-to-dwell ratio does not include non-contingency 

TDYs. 

AMC is using C–17s in both intra-theater and inter-theater airlift roles. C–17s fly 

inter-theater missions globally and sometimes pass through the area of operations. 

C–17s forward deployed to bases in theater normally operate within the area of operations and provide direct, intra-theater support. 

OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE 

Question. Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) is a North American Aerospace Defense 

Command (NORAD) initiative to aid in the defense of North American skies. The 

ongoing operation began September 14, 2001, in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. ONE includes air patrols over and around cities and the mobilization 

of thousands of National Guard and Reserve troops to perform security missions on 

military installations, airports, and other potential targets such as bridges. 

Mr. Duehring, what is the status of Operation NOBLE EAGLE? To date, how 

many combat air patrol missions supporting Operation NOBLE EAGLE has the active Air Force flown? 

Answer. Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE) is a continuing Secretary of Defense 

approved air defense mission conducted by the North American Aerospace Defense 

Command and US Pacific Command for the protection of the United States and 

Canada. The Air Force has employed a variety of aircraft to fly over 54,000 ONE 

missions since September 11, 2001. Of the 54,000 ONE missions, the active Air 

Force has flown approximately 25% of these missions while the National Guard and 

Reserve have flown the remaining 75%. 

Question. What is the monthly personnel cost of this operation? Is this consistent 

each month, or do changes to the mission cause the cost to fluctuate? 

Answer. Monthly military personnel costs for Operation Noble Eagle for October 

2008–March 2009 have been between $3.3 million to $3.88 million, so the majority 

is consistent with slight fluctuations depending on North America Aerospace Defense Command taskings. In addition, the Air National Guard’s Air Sovereignty 

Alert steady-state personnel costs average an additional $16.1 million per month. 

Question. General Newton, the Committee understands that the Air National 

Guard is not flying these patrols, but is on alert status at a number of installations. 

What are those installations, and what is the mission of the Air National Guard? 

Is this on a rotational basis? If so, what is the amount of time for the rotation? 

Answer. There are currently 18 designated steady-state Air Sovereignty Alert 

sites supporting Operation NOBLE EAGLE. The Air National Guard provides the 

personnel and equipment at 16 of the 18 Air Sovereignty Alert sites while the active 

duty Air Force provides the personnel and equipment at the remaining 2 sites. The 

alert site requirement is normally fulfilled by specific tasked units. However, when 

these units fulfill deployment missions in other operations, the alert site requireVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:35 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00364 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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ment is satisfied by another unit. All of these operations fall under the global force 

management construct process which the Joint Forces Command created to ensure 

force availability based on national priorities. The amount of rotation varies by unit 

mission, aircraft type and operational tempo. The Air Combat Command and Air 

National Guard cooperate to provide the Joint Forces Command with air forces to 

fulfill worldwide commitments, and Operation NOBLE EAGLE assignments are a 

part of that larger construct. While the alert sites provide coverage for the entire 

United States, during National Security Special Events, additional coverage may be 

directed by Commander, NORAD and then combat air patrols may be flown at various locations over and around cities. In keeping with the recommendations of the 

Congressional Committee on National Guard and Reserve, the Air Force continues 

to emphasize the total force aspect of this and every mission to erase any institutional prejudice for duty status that might arise from disparate designations. 

Question. Mr. Duehring, what is the cost of the homeland defense mission to the 

Reserve components? 

Answer. The total projected Fiscal Year 2010 Air National Guard cost (manpower 

and operations) to support Operation NOBLE EAGLE and Air Sovereignty Alert is 

$307.7 million. This total can be broken out between command and control and execution costs. The cost for command and control (which includes 1st Air Force, Headquarters Air Force staff, Air Operations Center, Western Air Defense Sector, Eastern Air Defense Sector, and the Alaska and Hawaii regions) is approximately $204 

million. The cost for executing the Air Sovereignty Alert portion of the Operation 

NOBLE EAGLE mission for the Air National Guard (e.g., the 24/7 ground alert) is 

projected to be $103.7 million for Fiscal Year 2010. That cost covers the manpower 

requirements for the mission at the Air National Guard bases currently selected by 

the North American Aerospace Defense Command. Of that $103.7 million, $12.5 

million is funded in the Future Years Defense Plan for those units that were already executing a smaller version of ground alert missions before September 11th, 

2001. The remaining amount of $91.2 million is the amount of money requested in 

the budget for fiscal year 2010 to continue the increased post-September 11th, 2001 

alert requirement. 

Question. General Newton, how is Operation NOBLE EAGLE different from the 

Air Sovereignty Alert mission? 

Answer. The Air Force supports the commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command in the execution of the Operation NOBLE EAGLE and Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) missions. ASA operations consist of ground operations that 

take place before fighter aircraft take off, including those activities that may take 

place after a unit receives an alert from North American Aerospace Defense Command but before the aircraft are airborne. Once aircraft take off, the ASA operation 

ends and becomes a homeland defense air mission under Operation NOBLE 

EAGLE. 

MISSION TRAINING

Question. During a recent interview, several Army non-commissioned officers 

(NCOs) advised that they believe sub-standard soldiers end up in units and cannot 

be utilized, making it harder on that unit to accomplish its mission. In addition the 

NCOs indicated that some new recruits are unable to pass a physical readiness test. 

The NCOs feel that basic training course needs to be updated to provide the recruits 

skills they will need upon deployment to theater. Now that the Air Force is embracing a collaborative and supportive role in the types of operations being conducted 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Air Force training must meet the new mission requirements. Airmen need to be properly trained and ready for combat. 

General Newton, please explain Initial Entry Training (IET) for Airmen. What are 

the basic skills that Airmen learn while at IET? What training is required beyond 

IET? Are Airmen coming to units fully trained to meet the needs for deployment 

or does training take place there as well? 

Answer. The basic skills Airmen learn while at Initial Entry Training (IET) are 

designed to mirror an Air Expeditionary Force cycle; prep, train, deploy, and reconstitute. More specifically, M–16 trainer weapons are issued at the start of Basic 

Military Training (BMT) to reinforce the warrior identity. Airmen receive substantial warrior-expeditionary classroom training (e.g., Role of Warrior, Mental Prep for 

Combat, Combat Recovery, Basic Situational Awareness, etc.) and small field training rehearsal exercises with key classes taught during field training. In addition, 

Airmen gain knowledge on joint warfare, M–9 pistol, public relations and the media, 

information protection and the Code of Conduct. 

In November 2008, BMT was lengthened by two weeks in order to incorporate additional expeditionary training through a concept titled ‘‘Basic Expeditionary AirVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:35 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00365 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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man Skills Training’’ (BEAST). BEAST affords trainees a mentally, physically and 

skills challenging expeditionary experience, promoting trainee teamwork, responsibility, and leadership. Beyond IET, Airmen receive expeditionary training through 

a tiered training approach: 

Tier 1: Foundational Expeditionary Skills Training: Airmen gain foundational expeditionary skills through accession venues and, to some degree, Initial Skills Training. Completion of this training alone does not produce a deployable Airman. Once 

an Airman reaches his/her unit they continue to build upon foundational expeditionary skills development. 

Tier 2: Deployment-Ready Expeditionary Skills Training: Completion of this training is a requirement to maintain mission-ready status to produce a deploymentready Airman, up to and including a major combat operation. All Airmen must complete tier 2 training. 

Tier 3: Advanced Expeditionary Skills Training (Mission Specific): Training for select Airmen as determined by factors such as deployment location, threat assessment, specific mission, duty assignment, role, operation, or special requirement. 

Tier 4: Advanced Expeditionary Skills Training (Expeditionary Center Assigned): 

Advanced training programs that are unique to a specific major command and/or 

functionally specific. 

Question. General Newton, if an Airman is deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan, does 

he train with the same equipment he will use when deployed? 

Answer. The Air Force is dedicated to providing Airmen with the appropriate 

training and equipment they need to accomplish the mission at home station and 

when deployed. In many cases, our Airmen train with the exact equipment they 

carry with them to their deployed location. This primarily includes Airmen expected 

to have significant exposure to the ground combat threat in their deployed environment. In other cases, though Airmen may not train with the exact equipment with 

which they will deploy, much of our equipment is pre-positioned at deployed locations so Airmen are issued identical equipment of the same type, make and model 

of that used for training immediately upon arrival—this saves on transportation 

costs. When identical equipment is unavailable, then similar equipment is issued— 

the differences are not significant and do not require additional training. We continue to implement strategies and improve our processes to minimize equipment 

and training inconsistencies. 

Question. What sort of physical conditioning is done to prepare Airmen for deployment? 

Answer. Pre-deployment physical conditioning includes unit physical training programs and personal fitness training programs. These programs include cardiovascular training such as sprint work, running, as well as using cardiovascular fitness equipment, such as treadmills, elliptical machines, and stationary cycles. Unit 

and personal physical training also includes a focus on muscular strength, muscular 

endurance, and agility conditioning using free weight equipment, weight machines, 

calisthenics, agility drills, and small fitness apparatus such as fit balls, jump ropes, 

and balance boards. Each Airman is assessed annually through a physical fitness 

test that includes a 1.5 mile run, push-ups, sit-ups and waist measurement. 

Question. How is physical fitness maintained once the unit has deployed? 

Answer. Physical fitness is maintained in a variety of ways, tailored to the environment and bed-down. In hostile environments, outside running is limited; therefore, fitness-related activities are conducted indoors. To support personal and unit 

fitness training, fitness facilities in many deployed locations have cardiovascular 

and strength conditioning equipment and fitness programs comparable to those 

available in garrison/home station. Depending on the location, unit mission and individual duty schedules, Airmen maintain their physical fitness through a combination of unit and/or individual fitness workout routines. 

Question. How does the Air Force prepare for high altitude operations as those 

those will perform in Afghanistan? 

Answer. The Air Force does not currently offer any specialized training to prepare 

members deploying to Afghanistan. It is an Airman’s professional obligation to ensure they are physically fit and prepared for duty at all times. However, specialized 

career fields may have a specific requirement and training opportunities based on 

their unique mission as within the Special Operations, Para-Rescue or Tactical Air 

Control-Party. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 2009. 

MILITARY PERSONNEL—ARMY 

WITNESSES 

HON. RONALD JAMES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL ROCHELLE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF 

STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY, G1 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. We want to welcome General Rochelle, Deputy 

Chief of Staff of the Army for Personnel, and Secretary James, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 

I just visited Ft. Carson and Ft. Benning. I got some pretty different views on what I get sometimes from up here in Washington, 

and so I’m looking forward to hearing your testimony and then asking some questions about some of the problems that they’re having 

out in the field. 

I know I think we got this stop loss thing worked out, at least 

Secretary Gates tells me he’s going to make an announcement this 

week about it. We’re going to take care of the problem down the 

road, and this year we are going to put the amount in the supplemental. The Subcommittee is already way ahead of the military on 

that issue. We’re concerned about the stress that is impacting our 

Soldiers, and you just told me that by April of this year or next 

year, the 15-month deployments will end. 

General ROCHELLE. We think all of our 15-month deployers will 

be back, the latest by June, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Okay. Well, we welcome you to the Committee. 

Look forward to hearing your testimony. Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I just 

wanted to say welcome to our guests. We expect an awful lot out 

of our troops, and they have a right to expect a lot out of us, and 

so that is what we are here for. We are here to do whatever we 

can to support our troops. Thank you for being here today. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Can you summarize, and I understand the Secretary is the only one who will have a statement, is that right, or 

both of you will have a statement? 

Mr. JAMES. Sir, we both have statements, but they will be very, 

very brief. 

Mr. MURTHA. If you will summarize then, and we will get right 

to the questions, thank you. 


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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY JAMES

Mr. JAMES. Thank you, sir. Chairman Murtha and members of 

the Committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before you today, and I am particularly proud to be here with General Rochelle on behalf of America’s Army and the 1.1 million men 

and women who are proudly serving our Nation around the globe. 

As the Army is growing to meet today’s demands, we are grateful 

to this Committee for the authorities, for incentives and bonuses 

that have helped us attract and retain the very best Soldiers. As 

the stewards of the Army’s all-volunteer force, I am proud of this 

source and all of its accomplishments. 

As I speak today, over 167,000 soldiers are currently deployed in 

support of the global war on terrorism. Soldiers from every State 

and territory, Soldiers from every corner of this country serve the 

people of the United States with honor and distinction. We are one 

Army with active and Reserve forces serving together around the 

globe. We are truly Army strong. 

Our recruiting and retention success is directly attributable to 

the support gained from Congress. The most effective retention incentive for junior officers in fiscal year 2008 was the cash bonus. 

Over 94 percent of the 15,000-plus officers who took the incentive 

last year opted for the cash bonus. DoD analysis of the survey data 

showed that most officers intended to separate or were uncertain 

about staying in the service took the incentive and committed to 

further Army service. 

We are committed to supporting our Soldiers, civilians and families, wounded warriors, recognizing critical contributions to the allvolunteer force. To maintain a high standard of living, the Army 

is caring for Soldiers and their families through several initiatives, 

which include the Army soldier family action plan, Army family 

covenant, as well as the transportability and transferability of portions of the GI benefits to family members. 

We have, on direction of the Secretary of the Army and the 

Chief, implemented a new suicide intervention program, including 

but not limited to a stand-down for the entire Army. Even one suicide is too many. We are grateful to the Congress for your concern 

and attention paid to soldiers. 

I ask you for your continued support to encourage all who are 

qualified to answer the Nation’s call to duty, and once again thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before this Committee today, and 

I look forward to a dialogue and answering your questions, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. General Rochelle. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROCHELLE

General ROCHELLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished 

members of the Committee. I will summarize my oral statement 

and ask that the joint written statement on behalf of Mr. James 

and myself be accepted for the record, and I will summarize my 

oral statement with 3 points. 

First of all, I am deeply honored to, once again, appear before 

this committee representing the men and women of the United 

States Army. They are proud, they are strong, and they are proud 

and strong largely due to the phenomenal support that this comVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:35 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00368 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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mittee has ensured America’s Army has received in the appropriations side, most especially for the care for our wounded. On behalf 

of those wounded men and women, several of whom we hosted in 

the Pentagon last Friday, I say thank you to the members of this 

Committee. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint statement of Secretary Jams and General Rochelle follows:] 


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BODY ARMOR

Mr. MURTHA. Well, let me start off. We have a few people here 

so a couple of things that I found and I just want to make it clear. 

I went to Ft. Carson and asked to meet with 12 enlisted people and 

I went to Benning and did the same thing. 

Almost unanimously, the first complaint was the heaviness of the 

armor, and this committee’s been concerned about the armor being 

so heavy for a long time. I know you are working on it. At Carson, 

they were almost willing to do without armor because in Afghanistan in particular, they felt like it was so cumbersome. One woman 

said she will have a handicap the rest of her life because the armor 

is so heavy that it jammed her spine. That is only one story. There 

are a lot of people who have been saved because of the armor, but 

that was the single biggest complaint that I got with both places. 

LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENTS

The second complaint was the length of the deployments and the 

fact that they didn’t have enough dwell time. And I know we have 

talked about this over and over again, and rightly you say about 

this committee, there is no question we have done everything we 

could. When Bill Young was chairman, when Jerry Lewis was 

chairman, we have always worked in a bipartisan way to make 

sure the troops had what they needed, and we have added billions 

of dollars to the budget to make sure that you had what you needed. Even though in many cases there was inadequacy when you 

started out, you didn’t have the equipment you needed, and we 

made sure we put it in and got it out there. 

MRAPS

MRAP is a perfect example. Now, I had some complaints about 

the MRAP is not working well in Afghanistan and I know they are 

not working well in Afghanistan, because there are no roads. I 

found out there is no railroad at all in Afghanistan, which surprised me. So we have obviously got a lot of problems that are different in Afghanistan than anyplace else. 

UNIFORMS

The other thing that came up in Benning and not in Carson is 

that the uniforms are completely inadequate, not only the ones who 

are wearing them not only the 12, 13 enlisted people I talked to, 

but also the sergeant major agreed that the uniforms were inadequate. 

QUALITY OF THE FORCE

The other thing that every one of them complained of—they are 

all NCOs—the quality of the force—you say you have increased the 

recruiting, but the quality of force is less than it should be. We are 

taking people in who are inadequate. High school graduates are 

down. They mentioned physically not fit, and when they finish 

basic school they are not fit. I am telling you what they told me. 

I know I saw some figures where it is a little bit better than it 

was last year, but what worries me is we are going to get back to 

the same situation in the seventies and eighties where we had to 


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get rid of a lot people that were inadequate and then rebuild the 

whole Army and then the long term consequences of taking people 

who are inadequate means they are going to have more PTSD. We 

are going to have more health problems down the road. There are 

going to be more emotional and physical problems for the military, 

and it is going to be a lot more expense for the military. 

DISTRIBUTION OF BONUSES

The bonuses have always been a bone of contention with me. I 

always think people enlisted in the military in order to defend this 

great country, to serve this great country. The bonus program is up 

over $1 billion now. I think the only service giving bonuses now is 

the Army. I think all the rest of them have quit doing it. 

But the balance you should look at because they are saying that 

the enlisted people getting in, in some cases, getting more than the 

ones who have been in combat and reenlisting. I don’t know if that 

is true, but that is what some of these folks said. So I would appreciate if you would give the committee a report on how you distribute the bonuses and how that works. 

[The information follows:] 

The Army allocates bonuses based on Army requirements, the strength and criticality of the skill, and the recruiting or retention difficulty with the particular Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Some specialties are extremely difficult to recruit but are more easily retained; in addition, more senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) tend to stay until retirement without cash bonus incentives. As a result, it is entirely possible that a new recruit may have a higher bonus than a Soldier in a higher pay grade in the same specialty. Bonuses are used only as needed 

to fill MOS vacancies at the skill level needed. NCOs with over 10 years of service 

have a higher tendency to reenlist than those with less than 10 years of service or 

Soldiers serving on an initial term of service and thus typically receive little or no 

bonus money. The necessity to manage the force, by MOS and level of responsibility 

requires a detailed process that is further impacted by outside factors such as the 

economy, quality targets, and ongoing global mission requirements. 

All enlistment and reenlistment bonuses are evaluated at a minimum of once per 

quarter. Each MOS is scrutinized by level of responsibility to determine if an enlistment or reenlistment incentive is necessary to attain MOS targets that support 

readiness and mission requirements. In January 2009, the Army achieved its authorized end strength and bonuses were reduced in order to stay within authorized 

strength ceilings. Currently, only 45 of 161 entry level skills have a bonus for new 

recruits. The Army anticipates further bonus reductions based on the economy and 

the demonstrated increased propensity to enlist or reenlist. 

EQUIPMENT

One other thing they talked about: night vision goggles. They say 

the 14s are much better than the sevens and that most of the people only have the sevens. M–4’s are unreliable. Now, I heard two 

stories about the M–4s and the M–16. One is that it was unreliable 

from all the troops there, and they were unanimous down at 

Benning about that, but the sergeant major said they just don’t 

clean them. I don’t know—I don’t know about that. I don’t know 

what the problem is but each—all the enlisted people were upset 

about the M–4 which I have heard so much about when they first 

deployed it. 

They all said the equipment that they train on is not the same 

equipment that they have when they go to combat. They have to 

be retrained on different equipment when they go to combat. They 

say resupply in Afghanistan is horrible. Soldiers have limited 


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training time between missions because of ammunition shortages. 

That is what these 12 people are telling me. 

A unanimous comment was that the POR, which is the counseling they get before they go overseas, should be extended to the 

families. They thought because there is so much more money they 

are making overseas and some of the families spend it, and then 

when they come home, the money’s not available, and they were 

pretty unanimous about that the families ought to all have the 

same support. 

But those are basically what I found and I would be interested 

in hearing not necessarily—well, in hearing from either of you 

about the complaints that I have gotten from people. I didn’t pick 

them. You folks—you know, your folks gave me the NCOs that I 

talked to. 

General ROCHELLE. First of all, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the 

opportunity to comment on a number of those and I will. 

First of all, we can always count on our great Soldiers, men and 

women to tell it just like it is. That is one reason why the American people respect them so highly and that respect has continued, 

if not risen. It has continued very solidly. 

On the aspect of armor, the Chief of Staff for the Army, the Sergeant Major of the Army, the Secretary of the Army, the weight of 

the armor, that is, have heard the same plea from our Soldiers, and 

as you stated in your comment, we are looking at that to try to 

lighten it without of course jeopardizing safety for our soldiers at 

the same time. 

We clearly know that the length of deployment on the second 

point, if I may, the length of deployment is longer than our Soldiers 

would like them to be. This Committee fully understands that that 

is a function first and foremost of the demand for Army boots on 

the ground around the globe, not just in the OIF and OEF theaters 

of war. 

The Chief just this morning mentioned that he was receiving 

from Special Forces Soldiers in particular comments, adverse comments or negative comments on the uniform and we are looking at 

that. 

But the final point I would like to make is, perhaps, in my estimation, the most critical one certainly for this Committee, and that 

is the quality of the force. We can measure the quality of the force 

in multiple ways and there is an ongoing, and has been an ongoing, 

debate in my more than six years involved with recruiting with 

accessioning and now as the Army G1. You can measure it on the 

front end by the somewhat abstract notions of high school degree 

completion, one to three A, whether they score in the upper middle 

category of the same Armed Services vocational aptitude battery 

Elvis Presley took, or one can measure it on the output side, once 

completed training, notwithstanding the comments of non-commissioned officers that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. 

I submit two points in closing. One, that the quality of the force 

has really never been better because every young man or woman 

who raises his or her hand today realizes that they are doing so 

with almost a certainty of going into combat in today’s environment. 


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The second point and final point is simply that when we take a 

look at how these young men and women are stepping forward, less 

than one percent of American society, according to the Census, 

fewer than one percent, we should give them credit not only for 

that as an aspect of quality but for their patriotism. I think my 

comment also, in some ways, alludes to your discussion earlier, Mr. 

Chairman, about bonuses and incentives, with only three out of ten 

young people eligible to serve today without a waiver, once again, 

it is a question of supply and demand and that demand is Army 

boots on the ground. 

ATTRITION RATE

Mr. MURTHA. The only thing I would add to my comments was 

the fact that your attrition rate has dropped significantly in the 

basic training, which means you’re either keeping people in that 

should—traditionally you lose 14 or 15 percent. It is down to 8 percent. So I think you need to look at this. I know General Casey is 

out in the field. You are out in the field. But you really need to 

sit down with these young NCOs and find out how serious is this 

problem of quality because in the end, we are all going to pay a 

heavy price if the quality has dropped. 

No question about it, you folks do a marvelous job. All of us have 

the greatest respect for the people in the military. I am inspired 

by the families and the people who are serving, but that doesn’t 

mean we don’t have to continue to look at the quality. So you need 

to take a look at it. 

General ROCHELLE. Wise counsel, Mr. Chairman, and your numbers are correct in terms of historical attrition and current rates 

of attrition and I acknowledge that. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young. 

OFFICER RETENTION

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I think the 

Army’s to be congratulated on the ability to reach your end 

strength, your increased end strength, and I think it is important 

that the issues that Mr. Murtha has mentioned, I think we all 

agree those are areas of concern to us, and I am satisfied they are 

to you as well. 

But as the Army grows and you maintain your retention and recruitment goals for enlisted personnel, where do we stand with officers? I mean you have got to have your officer you have to have 

your leaders and I am just wondering I am hearing that there is 

a little bit of a problem in the Army retaining officers. Could you 

comment on that, sir? 

General ROCHELLE. I would be happy to comment on that, Ranking Member Young. The Army’s shortfall in officers is first and 

foremost attributable to modularity which increased the total requirements for officers. The most significant point I would like to 

make is that our ten-year average for officer retention remains unchanged. We are not hemorrhaging officers. We have some small 

specialties where we are challenged in retaining that higher average rate among those being aviation for which there is a significant 

demand. Significant demand and a significant growth I might add. 


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In recent years, however, we have increased our officer retention 

through, as Mr. James mentioned in his oral statement, an officer 

selection critical skills retention bonus. Over 15 thousand officers 

agreed to retain with the Army out beyond to fiscal year eleven as 

a result of that program. I think our officer requirements are reasonable given a modular force. I think our retention rates are extraordinary given the stress that our total force is under. 

Mr. YOUNG. And General, you had a program that expired in November of 2008 called the ‘‘captain’s retention incentive menu pilot 

program.’’ Is that why you have been successful in retaining officers? 

General ROCHELLE. That is the—officer critical skills retention 

bonus by another name that I just addressed, Representative 

Young. That is one of the factors. One of the other factors, of 

course, and we don’t want to misconstrue this nor give it an insignificant level of emphasis. Army officer just like Army non-commissioned officers are exceedingly proud of what they are contributing 

on behalf this Nation today and more than anything else that represents the reason why our retention rates remain at high levels. 

I would also like to just comment, though, that the captain’s retention bonus that you referred to or the officer critical skills retention 

bonus did yield us 15,000 officers who are going to stay with us beyond fiscal ten and the authority for that program was given to us 

by the Congress as a pilot authority to allow us to apply innovative 

techniques to be able to for both officer and enlisted retention, a 

critical capability, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Why do we allow it to expire? 

General ROCHELLE. Sir, we actually hit the number that we were 

able to, the population that we were targeting in captains, we don’t 

think that we will need that going forward. 

ROTC PROGRAMS

Mr. YOUNG. What about ROTC programs? I understand that 

most of your officers come through ROTC as opposed to going to 

the Academy. That is accurate, isn’t it? 

General ROCHELLE. That is accurate, Representative Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Are the ROTC programs as robust today as they 

need to be? 

General ROCHELLE. Interestingly, I had a session with two outstanding RAND analysts yesterday on this very subject, a fairly 

lengthy session with them. For the foreseeable future, we will continue to receive most of our officers, the majority of our officers as 

you said, through the Army ROTC program. We do find that we 

are not receiving what we are looking for in terms of the diversity 

from that program, both in terms of ethnicity, language diversity, 

et cetera, and the Congress once again has given us some pilot authorities there with which we are exercising aggressively. 

We will continue to receive the majority of our officers from the 

Army ROTC program. We are studying whether or not, with the 

help of RAND, whether those programs are located geographically 

speaking, optimally, to be able to give us the talent and the officers 

we need for the future, diversity being one of the factors. 

Mr. YOUNG. I would like to give you something to think about 

and offer an invitation. A couple of years ago, we established a proVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:35 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00388 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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gram at the University of South Florida because we have Army 

ROTC, Air Force ROTC and Navy ROTC. In view of all of the joint 

activities that we have seen in recent combat, with all of the services working together and actually putting sailors and airmen on 

the ground as infantry, we started this program of having joint 

training to teach the ROTC students how they would work together 

in a joint operation and it worked very well, and one of the incentives was the fact is we were so very close to MacDill Air Force 

base with central command and Special Operations command, and 

those folks are very, very helpful and very cooperative, and they 

really like the program. 

I would like to invite you to come take a look at it. I think you 

would be impressed with what this is doing, not only to maintain 

the spirit of the ROTC students but also to give them a great understanding of the importance of working together. I know when 

we stood this up, I spoke to the assembled crowd and said look, it 

is really important that you maintain the pride of your service and 

the identity of your service, but it is also important to understand 

you guys have to work together when you get into the battle, you 

are going to be working together. Well, I can suggest that you take 

a visit there and if you need something else to do while you are 

there, you have MacDill Air Force Base, Central Command and 

Special Ops. So I think you would be impressed with this program. 

General ROCHELLE. I will pay it a visit. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

COMPREHENSIVE SOLDIER FITNESS EXAM

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk a little bit 

about the increase in the suicide rate. The figures were released recently, January. The new figure of more than 128 compares to 115 

in 2007, 102 in 2006 and is the highest since recordkeeping began 

in 1980. The Army’s report calculates to a rate of 20.2 per 100,000 

Soldiers, which is higher than your adjusted civilian rate for the 

first time since the Vietnam War. 

In addition to the suicide data being released, the Army has 

plans for units to conduct a stand-down within a 30-day window 

between February 15th and March 15th, 2009. The stand-down will 

include training for peer level recognition of behaviors that may 

lead to suicidal behavior and intervention at the buddy level. The 

stand-down will follow, will be followed by a chain teaching program focused on suicide prevention from March 15th to June 15th, 

2009. 

Can you give us a little—can you explain what the Army is trying to do here? 

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir. The Secretary and the Chief of Staff have 

insisted that the entire enterprise, that the entire Army, get involved in the stand-down in order to raise awareness. In addition 

to that, the Vice Chief of Staff has been put in charge of the senior 

review group to take a look at this. In addition to that, the Surgeon 

General has been developing what we call a physical health exam 

that takes into account the mental side of these issues. It is called 

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thing that we need to learn more about. We need to do better in 

this regard. 

We have contracted with the National Institutes of Mental 

Health to do a longitudinal study to take a look at some of the 

other underlying causes or at least get better understanding about 

how we can be more effective in intervening early. How we can, in 

fact to use my previous life’s jargon, how we can get the frontline 

supervisors, the sergeants, the battle buddies, the specialists, in 

fact, to be aware and to also to get the families to be sensitive to 

the issue about how to identify the warning signs because we are 

convinced that this is a public health tragedy. It is an issue that 

can be prevented, and the Army is aggressively taking steps to do 

this, and we have not done enough. We plan to do more, but I 

would be happy to invite General Rochelle to give any additional 

comments. 

Mr. DICKS. Can I just add one point, does the Army believe this 

is a crisis or not? 

Mr. JAMES. The Army believes that this is unprecedented, and 

the reason why I am not going to respond to that because, as we 

have looked at this, we have tried to figure out whether there is 

a correlation between multiple deployments. As we have looked at 

these we have been trying to find trends, and basically the kind of 

trends we have found is issues like financial issues, marital issues, 

divorce issues, relationship issues. Are deployments a factor? I cannot sit here and tell you that the deployment is the but-for factor. 

We hope that the National Institutes of Mental Health can, in fact, 

help us get the answers so that we can make policy decisions based 

not on my speculation but based on some factual information and 

from public health experts. 

Mr. DICKS. We understand this is a very sensitive matter, and 

I think the Army takes it very seriously. I know out at Ft. Lewis 

and Madigan, I know they take it very seriously, and it sounds like 

these sessions that you are going to have over the next few weeks 

will help. You know, it seems to me that we ought to keep talking 

to General Chiarelli about this, but we ought to be looking at other 

possibilities and doing pilot projects. 

Our Committee provided resources last year and we find that 

they are using yoga and they are using Reiki and they are using 

this and that, but trying to let the troops go online to get help if 

they felt they needed it, or is this especially for the Guard and Reserve where they don’t have—they don’t come back to a place and 

they disband and go back into the community—might be something 

that—and we have had outside people come in and talk to us about 

this. But you know, we have to go through all the competitive rules 

and all the other things that are and it takes quite a long while 

to get, to finally ever get something done. 

And we had General Sutton in here the other day and everything 

seems to be a study, and you know, when the people are losing 

their lives, I just hope there is, and I know and I am certainly not 

putting any of this on you all, but to me, there needs to be a sense 

of urgency here, and if there are options that haven’t been utilized 

or considered, let’s do pilot programs, let’s at least look at these 

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tion find some answers you know rather than just doing studies 

that will give us something 5 years from now. 

We had the same issues in, I remember in Desert Storm, Desert 

Shield, about all the illnesses and the people came, witnesses came 

up and said well, we don’t think there is anything to this, you 

know, and then years later, we find out oh, yes, there was problems there in exposure to things that go back to Agent Orange. I 

mean, it doesn’t do any good to have a study that comes in 5 years 

from now, I guess it will help the people and I know there are some 

people who it takes a year or so before these signs become apparent. 

But I just hope there is a sense of urgency. I feel that we should 

be doing more and it sounds like you are really getting to it now 

but I hope we just don’t do studies. That kind of leaves me cold. 

General ROCHELLE. Sir, if I may, I would never be able to forgive 

myself if I didn’t—if I allowed the Committee or anyone to think 

that we were standing still in the blocks here on this. Let me point 

to one aspect. On the fourth of March, the Vice Chief of Staff, General Pete Chiarelli, convened a worldwide secure VTC with every 

commander, senior commander who lost a Soldier in the month of 

January. That session was a 2–hour session, which included senior 

leaders from Iraq, Afghanistan, the Military Academy and installations flung far and wide. And he reviewed in detail some 35 critical 

items that he constructed that he wanted the field commanders to 

report out to him on. It was not accusatory. It was not a condemnation, but it was an attempt to absolutely demonstrate the focus at 

the senior level of the Army on this matter, is it a crisis? Sir, I 

would tell you, one suicide is a crisis. That would be my response. 

We are absolutely moving out on this. And we have, we are investing $50 million in the National Institute of Mental Health effort, 

which is the largest in the history of NIMH to help us get after 

this, at the same time. 

Mr. DICKS. Will there be interim reports, not just a report from 

5 years from now, where will there will be interim reports like a 

year from now or six months from now? Here’s what we know now, 

here’s what we are looking at? 

General ROCHELLE. There is a draft report right now, sir. 

Mr. JAMES. Sir, if I could just emphasize, this is an issue we are, 

in fact, taking very seriously, and I want to clarify. 

We view the study and the initial stand-down as critical courses. 

In addition to the stand-down, we see that there will, in fact, be 

a chain teach second phase. We were hoping that chain teach—that 

the Soldiers on the ground, the sergeant NCOs, in fact, once they 

are given a curriculum and once they are given some parameters, 

that they will, in fact, experiment and try to reach out and try to 

do things that are, in fact, innovative and try to identify and look 

for best practices. So at the time we are doing the study we will, 

in fact, be doing the chain teaching. 

The third phase of the program, which the Secretary has admonished us and the Chief of Staff has weighed in on, is absolutely 

critical is sustainment, is that there has to be a sustainment period 

with or without the study to continue the sensitivity, and we have 

talked about issues like doing this every six months or doing it for 


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every new group of inductees into the Army or graduates of basic 

training courses or graduate of the NCO schools. 

A lot of that is still to be planned, but we want to give the folks 

on the ground a place like Ft. Carson the maximum flexibility, in 

fact, to do the chain teaching phase two, do the sustain phase 

three, and do it around a core competency that is incorporated, and 

at the same time, in fact, be able to use their experiences to improve on the ground and then share that across the enterprise. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

SUICIDE

Mr. MURTHA. Seems like some of the suggestions Mr. Dicks was 

talking about when you talk about divorce, marital problem, financial problem, fits in line with what these enlisted men and women 

suggested to making sure you counsel the spouses before people go 

overseas so that when they are overseas they’ll know exactly what 

is going on. 

And the one thing, the stigma which we place on a person that 

has an emotional problem I think we have gotten to the general officers. I think we have gotten to the Secretaries. 

I brought this up to the group at either Carson or Benning, this 

guy said, well, I ran into that in Iraq, and he said—the guy said 

he wanted to commit suicide. I said I gave him a gun. I said go 

commit suicide. Well, you can see we have got some work to do. 

That obviously wasn’t the appropriate reply, and none of us would 

expect that to happen. The guy didn’t commit suicide. He thought 

he was a malingerer. It is a delicate thing. We know that. We appreciate what you are doing, but it is a big problem. It is going to 

be a big problem down the road. 

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Chairman, I will personally take your counsel to 

heart about the need for the counseling. It is an issue that we are 

grappling with, and we may need to get back to you for some help, 

because with regard to our geographic disbursed workforce, particularly the Guard and the Reserve, that is a difficult issue. We 

are doing a much better job on both posts, camps and stations 

issue, but I will tell you in candor with regard to those folks who 

are in the hinterlands, we are not doing as well as we should. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, if you will yield on that issue, just 

a quick story. My son served in the military and during his time 

there he said you know, Dad, a lot of these kids could use some 

counseling. He said there are some serious issues out here and they 

are not being dealt with. But after his time was up and he got out, 

he went back to school and he became a psychologist. 

Well, he—he will be a psychologist in, I think, 4 weeks from now. 

You are all invited to the graduation and he said his motivation 

was to get this degree to get this certification to be a psychologist 

and go back into the military to help with these kids because he 

said there were so many just in his unit that needed that kind of 

help. I am just wondering if we have enough qualified personnel 

available to counsel in a case like this and the issue that the chairman raised about here is a gun go do it, that is something wrong 

with that and the suicide rate has gotten us all really concerned. 

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tration had a number of hearings already this year on that issue 

and it is frightening, and so I just raise that issue. 

I am not sure you have got the qualified personnel to do what 

has to be done. 

Mr. MURTHA. What Mr. Young is saying if you need money, you 

know, make the suggestion because that is a perfect fit for the supplemental, if you need money to expand this program. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

FORCE GENERATION PROGRAM

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Most of our 

States have sent National Guard units to Iraq and obviously are 

prepared to do it into Afghanistan. New Jersey has 3,200 in Iraq, 

around the Baghdad area. It is the single largest deployment since, 

I think, in New Jersey’s history and half of our Guard is overseas. 

General Rochelle—first of all, thank you for your service. You 

mentioned supply and demand. I understand what that is, but 

what happened to the Army force generation program? Where does 

that stand? We know these Soldiers are ready to do whatever they 

need to do. But what happened to the whole plan of one year deployed, five years back, you know, in States? What happened to 

that plan? Where are we? 

It has a lot to do with obviously issues of psychology and moral 

and your ability to retain soldiers. 

General ROCHELLE. General Casey has said that the Army will 

be back in balance in fiscal 2011. The shorthand definition of what 

that means is that the Army will be at its rotational balance under 

Army force generation model of one year deployed three years back 

for a total of four on the active component, one year back, one year 

deployed, four years back for a total of five for the Reserve components. We are not there. That is the equation of supply and demand that I mentioned. The demand right now for Army forces will 

not permit us to achieve that level of balance. The objective is to 

be there in fiscal 2011, and lots of energy is being placed into getting us there. 

GUARD DEVELOPMENT

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So the Guard units that are over there 

now, and come back in the case of our Guard from New Jersey, 

what would be their potential for going out again? Obviously there 

could be, we could considerably raise the stakes and in Afghanistan. That might sort of change the overall equation but what 

would be the likely scenario for a Guard unit that is finishing up 

what would be the likelihood of their going back again what would 

be the rotation. 

General ROCHELLE. With the exception of very low density and 

high demand Guard and Reserve units, military police as an example, with the exception of those, the likelihood that they would deploy in less than three–years dwell, beginning in fiscal ten is low 

fray, and how about the capability of some of those coming back? 

I mean, you know, we obviously don’t deploy people unless they are 

fully capable but there have been obviously some evidence when 

some of these soldiers come back, their units are less than fully capable. 


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Obviously there will be a period of reset for reserve component 

units, no different, except in length, than the reset period for active 

component units. That includes the post deployment health assessment, post deployment health risk assessment. That includes an infusion of equipment, training and people and then back into the 

four General cycle ideally which is your question to deploy in about 

three or four years. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So this continues to be a work in progress? 

General ROCHELLE. Very much a work in progress. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So even though you have set a goal of 2011, 

it is very much subject to change? 

General ROCHELLE. Well, it is, yes, absolutely subject to change. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I understand that, but in reality, we sort 

of set forth here a goal to give the soldiers some feeling that they 

would have, you know, a good idea what their obligation would be 

on the battlefield. 

General ROCHELLE. Indeed, and Soldiers tell us in surveys that 

we conduct routinely that this one thing they are seeking is predictability and our fortune is the vehicle. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is the vehicle but we are not there. 

General ROCHELLE. We are not there. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. There is not the degree of predictability. 

General ROCHELLE. That is a correct statement. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The model is there, but in reality, we are 

far from fulfilling it. 

General ROCHELLE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky. 

CONTRACTORS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank 

you very much. I want to ask about contractors. In October of last 

year Nelson Ford, the Under Secretary of the Army, said we really 

don’t know the number of contractors to that we have, and the 

quote goes on. What steps is the Army taking to understand the 

role of the contractors, to understand how many contractors you 

have and what the right mix is? Contractors aren’t inherently bad, 

but it does seem like the Army doesn’t have a good handle on it 

at that point. 

General ROCHELLE. Sir, I am vaguely familiar with Secretary 

Ford’s comment. I have read it. Your question about what is the 

Army doing, the one thing I can speak to authoritatively is that the 

Army is attempting to account for our contractors in much the 

same way that we account for Soldiers, with an information technology system that is, today, under the auspices of our Army materiel command, the largest deployer of our contractors, to account 

for contractors both in theater as well as in other deployed environments, Korea, et cetera. Beyond that I am afraid I can’t—elaborate 

on the Secretary’s comment. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. In the 2007 budget, more moneys were spent on 

contract services than military and civilian pay combined in the 

Army, and again, I don’t want to be judgmental. That may not be 

bad. But that is not the way it was seven years ago. You are continuing to see this increase of payment to contractors as to opposed 


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to what you are actually paying people in uniform and civilian. Is 

that trend going to continue unabated? Is there a change in the 

composition of the types of contractors you are hiring? Was it food 

services before? Is it security personnel now? I would just like to 

have some sense of why that has continued to escalate. What is different today than 2000? 

General ROCHELLE. Well, I think a number of things are different. First of all, I can’t validate the numbers that you mentioned 

in terms of the relative pay for contractors versus military personnel. But among other things that have changed is the demand, 

back to the dialogue with Representative Frelinghuysen, the demand is such that the forces, all the forces are inadequate to address the level of the demand. Therefore, the contractors are a viable alternative. 

I should add, though, that in a number of instances, we are insourcing those contractor support requirements with Department of 

the Army, and I will only speak for the Army, Department of the 

Army civilians, and I would offer for the record a clearer view of 

just what that looks like. 

[The information follows:] 

To date, the Army has in-sourced 1,164 positions formerly performed by contractors to an average savings of $46,000 per position per year. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Okay. General, if I could follow up some more, 

I mean, I would not argue the point that you are underforced, or 

the demands that are placed on the Army, and I absolutely agree 

with that. To the extent a lot of the contractors who are serving 

next to military or civilian personnel are paid multiples of what 

that person in uniform is being paid, I guess you’d have the tension 

between well, if you are in uniform, you are a member of the Army, 

we are paying you to fight as opposed to doing some type of 

logistical duty. But if money is part of the problem and we are paying contractors much more per person than we are somebody in 

uniform, wouldn’t it still be more cost effective if somebody is in 

a uniform to pay them and pick up more people? Are we paying 

somebody in that depot two, three, four times than we are paying 

that military personnel, couldn’t I pick up some more personnel 

and get the job done? 

General ROCHELLE. That may be—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Oversimplied? 

General ROCHELLE. Thank you, sir. I was trying not to be disrespectful. That may be an overly simplistic analogy, I think one 

that would require a little bit more study. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am very concerned about it. Mr. Frelinghuysen 

and I serve on Energy, and again, you are the Army. You are not 

Energy, but we are running nine to one contractors versus Federal 

employees and contractors running the Department. And we have 

had hearings previously here as far as the ability of various departments, including the Army, to control the contractors. And in the 

end, you are in charge. They are not, and that is one of my great 

concerns over and above the money is making sure we are running 

the government. So it is an area of deep concern for me. 

General ROCHELLE. I understand, sir. 


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Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand that the 

Army has found an average savings of $44,000 per person for insourcing. 

General ROCHELLE. I have seen that figure. I do not know what 

is behind the figure. 

Mr. DICKS. Would that be a civilian worker or a military worker? 

CONTRACTORS

Mr. MURTHA. Let me clarify this whole thing. You have 144,000 

contractors in Iraq, 274,000 in Central Command. It costs an average of $44,000, according to the study that you folks have given to 

us, per person. Last year, this committee tried to increase direct 

hires so that you could hire civilians to do the same job these contractors are doing because you not only pay the contractor, you 

have to pay the contracting people a percentage and so forth and 

so on, and so that is where the $44,000 comes in. We cut 5 percent 

out of contracting. We added $1 billion for direct hire. It fell by the 

wayside in the Senate because the Defense Department objected to 

it. 

Now, I asked the President himself. I said, Mr. President, what 

is the schedule for reducing the contractors in Iraq? How are we 

going to get them out while we are getting the troops out? Well, 

he turned to the Secretary of the Defense and Admiral Mullen, and 

none of them could give me an answer. We are asking the Defense 

Department to give us an answer so that we have some semblance 

of order. The troops are coming out. Are the contractors coming out 

because it costs more to keep the contractors there. 

Now, I see Ronald Marrow says okay, we are going to reduce the 

contractors. Well, we ought to know. He shouldn’t be making an 

announcement. We should find out what is going on over there 

about these contractors. 

So this Committee, the first hearing we had was on contractors. 

So we are concerned about the number of contractors we have. So 

we need up to speed on contractors and there is no more important 

part of readiness than contracting. 

Mr. Rothman. 

IN-SOURCE SAVINGS

Mr. ROTHMAN. Gentleman, I notice on the written testimony of 

the gentlemen that on page 6, it says of their testimony that the 

results are $48,000 per person in-source saving. This is your written testimony? 

General ROCHELLE. That is correct. 

What I said was I do not have the details—the depth of details 

behind that statement. I am unfamiliar with it. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me just say we have got to get this under control. We have got to find—when we put money in for direct hires 

and we take money out of contracting, the Defense Department objects to it because we did it because it wasn’t something we thought 

this thing through. Now this year, we are going at it a little differently but you should think about this for the base bill so we can 

save some money here, how we get these contractors out. Mr. Kingston. 


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ATTRITION

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Rochelle, I 

wanted to follow up on conversation we had with the Air Force yesterday about some observations of NCOs that a lot of the soldiers 

were physically up to where they needed to be and I see that in 

June of 2003, the initial entry training attrition rate was almost 

15 percent, but by 2007, it had dropped to about 8–1/2 percent. 

What do you attribute that change to? 

General ROCHELLE. Well, among other things, I attribute the 

change in the attrition, the initial entry attrition rate to a concerted effort on the part of our training and doctrine command to 

assist every single individual to make it through basic training. 

That is not reducing standards, but it is a change in philosophy. 

If I may, back in 2001, 2001 to be precise, there was a similar 

change in philosophy under leadership in the then-recently activated accessions command. Rather than crossing one’s arms and 

saying to a young recruit prove to me that you are good enough to 

be a soldier, the philosophy in 2001 was let me assist you in meeting the standard, and what I attribute the rate and the decrease 

you are referring to is that—revisiting that philosophy. 

RECRUITING

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, these NCOs also are saying that the Army 

needs to get harder and the new recruits lack discipline. 

General ROCHELLE. First of all, I accept that. I accept that statement on the part of our non-commissioned officers. We see that, a 

similar statement in our surveys that we do of non-commissioned 

officers and their perceptions. The interesting phenomenon, 

though, sir, is that the further one moves away from the immediate 

soldier, the better one’s perception meaning elevated in rank and 

elevated in distance from the immediate soldier, that perception 

changes. So perhaps the sergeant major would give you a different 

perspective than would the buck sergeant than would the staff sergeant. 

One other point, if I may—— 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, General, I want you to finish that point, but 

I want to revisit that because just because the perception changes 

that doesn’t make it factual. 

General ROCHELLE. No, sir, it doesn’t. It doesn’t, nor does it add 

significant credibility to the other perception would be my point. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, what was your other point because I interrupted you? 

General ROCHELLE. My other point is that today we have to realize that again, as I mentioned to the chairman, only three out of 

10 young people are eligible to serve in our Army today, for one of 

three reasons, the absence of academic credentials, a high school 

diploma, overweight and obesity is becoming epidemic in America; 

and then third, the background, the ability to pass a background 

screen to serve in our force. When you extrapolate that to what is 

the correlation for officers, the number becomes even more startling. It is one out of 10 are eligible. 


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So there is a problem. And even before this very committee, Mr. 

Chairman, I believe you would recall, I have said in the past, there 

is a challenge and there is a problem and it is a national problem. 

Mr. KINGSTON. In terms of that obesity rate, do you have any 

recommendations, some of us have served currently or in the past 

on the Agriculture Committee and we are always studying school 

nutrition and exercise and one of the frustrations is that the nutrition school lunch program is the USDA and the Department of 

Education really does the physical education stuff and they are almost seems to be a firewall in terms of the two talking to each 

other and sharing data and I was wondering if the Department of 

Defense or the Army had any observations or any clues to put in 

that. 

General ROCHELLE. Sir, I am unqualified to comment on that, 

grossly unqualified to comment on that, but I will offer a bright 

spot and that is that as a Nation, we appear to be addressing the 

issue of obesity openly and in a national way with respect to a debate on this subject that I see is encouraging. 

Mr. KINGSTON. But obesity is the number two reason, academics 

and the obesity were the first two? Were these all in an order 

or—— 

General ROCHELLE. Obesity would be the second or third. The 

first would be behavioral or disciplinary issues in terms of waiver 

reasons, reasons for a waiver. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur. 

OFFICER SHORTAGE

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country. This has been a most interesting hearing. 

I wanted to comment on page three of your testimony. General 

you mentioned officer shortage in the Army continues to keep the 

officer corps out of balance. I am wondering if your own experience 

you think there is any relationship between the officer shortage 

and the exponential rise in the number of contractors serving in 

the Armed Forces? Serving the Armed Forces and the pecuniary interests that seem to drive involvement in military matters today, 

as opposed to patriotic? 

General ROCHELLE. I would attribute no rise in the number of 

contractors to the current officer shortage. The current officer 

shortage grows out of a decision in the 1990s to downsize the 

Army, and we put the Army on that track toward a much, much 

smaller level force. We are still living with the consequences of that 

decision in the 1990s to this very day. 

The second contributing factor, as I mentioned earlier in my comments, is modularity, which brings a higher concentration of officers with it. 

But point number one, the pecuniary issues you mentioned, I 

don’t really have a notion about that. I am not, I don’t believe there 

is a relationship. 


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BUDGET

Ms. KAPTUR. Do you know how much the Army has spent on bonuses in the current budget that is being submitted? What are we 

spending, compared to 10 years ago? 

General ROCHELLE. I can’t tell you where it is relative to 10 

years ago, but our recruiting and retention costs for fiscal 09, I am 

speaking the current year budget, not 10, $2,029,000,000. This includes recruiting and retention bonuses, education incentives, marketing and advertising and recruiter support costs for the Army Active Component. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And I think for the record, it would be very interesting how that compares to 5 years ago and then 10 years ago. 

That is a sizeable, my guess that is on an ascending path. 

General ROCHELLE. That would be true if one looked, I am confident that that trend would prove accurate ma’am, if you want to 

look back five years ago, but in the recent years, 2008 to 2009 and 

what we are projecting for 2010, it would begin to turn downward. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. Can you provide for the record a—the enlistment bonus, the—when they are reenlisted in theater, whatever, all these different bonuses that have been tacked on, maybe 

I am not aware of some of them, that would accrue to the individual soldier. 

General ROCHELLE. We would be happy to. 

[The information follows:] 

Specifically focusing on the recruiting and retention bonus programs for the Army 

Active Component, we spent or anticipate spending: 

[In millions of dollars] 

FY 2000 FY 2005 FY 2008 FY 2009 

$200.3 $671.5 $1,206.8 $1,170.2 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you very much. I want to turn to your testimony and Congressman Dicks did a great job on this this morning, 

the whole issue, you have got suicide prevention, page 10 of your 

testimony and other issues relating to soldier well-being and 

health, and I am interested in the way that the architecture of 

what you have presented in your testimony. I think it is very interesting you focused on suicide as opposed to Soldier well-being. For 

example, the issue of PTSD in this type of, the types of engagements we are in you have 98 percent of your time is total boredom 

and 2 percent of your time is utter terror. We know that the nature 

of PTSD is that you know upwards of five different incidents like 

that, and you have got it, 20 percent of your Soldiers also have it. 

If America had consciousness of this, we would be better able to 

articulate it in testimony. Half the homeless in our country are veterans. They are testifying testimony to our failure to have understood this in prior conflicts. Hundreds and hundreds of thousands 

of people wandering all over this country and they are veterans. 

This tells us in living color that we failed in the past. I am really 

glad to hear that you are thinking about this, but only to address 

suicide, which is the ultimate act of hopelessness doesn’t deal with 

the reality of what the rest of the force is dealing with. And my 


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concern is, as hard as we have worked to try to get a service, a department wide, every single department, Army, Air Force, we had 

Air Force in here yesterday, Navy and Marine Corps, to get them 

all to have a coordinated program in this. I can’t tell you how difficult it has been to deal with the Department of Defense on this 

issue. If our chairman hadn’t taken a leadership role on this, if Mr. 

Young hadn’t been a strong partner in the efforts we wouldn’t be 

anywhere but I am concerned that other issues you don’t address, 

you don’t address fully the PTSD, you don’t really report back on 

what has been done today, you just talk about the study with 

NIMH. 

MENTAL HEALTH

One of the other Members discussed Guard and Reserve. I come 

from a nonbase community. The problems of PTSD with our returning Guard and Reserve are huge and as a result over the last 

five cycles, I have put money in this bill and forced it down the 

throat of DoD, and they wanted to spit it out, they tried to spit it 

out every year and what we are trying to do in Ohio and we had 

the agreement of our Adjutant General to examine every returning 

vet to Ohio, including the majority that don’t go back to a base and 

there are many Army MPs in that group and combat engineering 

units and what have we learned? We have learned that working 

with DoD is an impossibility. That as hard as we try to roll out this 

assessment of our returning troops, one of the key elements which 

is a genetic profiling of predisposition to some of these illnesses, 

and in a certain part of the brain, somewhere between the units 

in Ohio, the Adjutant General and the Secretary of Defense, genetic profiling, the testing that they need to do on a volunteer basis 

has been rejected. 

We are trying to find out who did that, all right. What I would 

really appreciate and I know my time has expired, Mr. Chairman, 

I would appreciate your helping me, and I said this to the Air Force 

yesterday, to find me the genius over there at DoD, that is, in 

charge of mental health, and all they do is bring us, this service 

has this one, that service has this one, it is not well coordinated, 

and I want to sit them down with the researchers and with our Adjutant General and I want to solve this problem so we can do the 

assessment and treatment of our veterans. It is really frustrating. 

And we don’t deal—Congressman Dicks talked about a study. We 

want to look to your study in Ohio. We want to be a part of the 

whole. It shouldn’t be this hard, and it tells me that something is 

really messed up over at DoD. One of our top research doctors, brilliant human being, said to me, Marcy, in my whole life, my worst 

experience with any Federal department is with the Department of 

Defense, what is wrong over there. This is one of the 

neuropsychiatrists. This guy could win a Nobel Prize with what we 

are trying to do, and he keeps running into these walls at DoD. 

So can you help me solve this problem of the assessment we 

want to do in Ohio by connecting our Guard to whoever is in 

charge over there and it is Army by the way, over at DoD so we 

can get this done right? 

Mr. MURTHA. I think I could probably answer this better than 

they can, Ms. Kaptur. I think Secretary Kasells and Dr. Emery 


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have been working this. We gave them money to do this. In January of this year, they just started to come up with a plan, which 

they briefed me on. We had a hearing about it, but they aren’t far 

enough along to give us the details. But the Guard is still—I had 

a young fellow commit suicide that was in Iraq, came home and 

worked for a year and then committed suicide. So we aren’t there 

yet, but I do think the Defense Department is addressing it because of the direction we gave them, and I think we are starting 

down a trail. We told them to hire psychologists and psychiatrists. 

We told them to go in that direction and to counsel troops that 

needed it. 

We changed the sensitivity of people. I think it is a very complicated process, but I think that Dr. Emery’s the one to talk to, 

and I think she can help you with the Guard. She’s just not there 

yet, even with the Defense Department, let alone the Guard. But 

if you talk to Sarah, and Sarah Young and Dr. Emery, I think you 

can get to where you want to go. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I would 

hope that our study could understand there is something going on 

in Texas. I read about it in some magazine article. Mr. Chairman, 

I think a number of us have pieces of the whole but we can’t seem 

to connect it. We need an architecture to do that. 

Mr. MURTHA. We haven’t gotten there yet. That is the problem. 

As you say it takes so long for them to get anything done, but we 

are I think moving step-by-step in the right direction, we hope. 

The gentlewoman’s time has expired. Ms. Granger. 

EDUCATION

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. General, I want to return to your response about the requirement of a high school diploma and I will 

admit, I have got a bias: I am a former high schoolteacher and may 

not have been something I taught in my class that made some 

someone a better Soldier, but there is often a commitment and a 

discipline coming from finishing something, but my main experience which as a mayor when we were trying to recruit companies 

to come in my city or maintain those companies and time and time 

again, the CEO or the training director would say, we have to have 

a basic level of education and knowledge in order to train those employees, oftentimes for entry level jobs, but became very good jobs, 

and we wanted to keep them. 

Today’s Army, I mean, this is the Committee that funds the 

equipment and the technology and it is very sophisticated technology and equipment, and I am proud to serve and be a part of 

that but to be able to train, I think that that is extremely important. So I have some questions around that. 

WAIVERS

One thing you talked about waivers, and I want to know how 

many waivers are granted to recruits, but you talked about you 

said the number one, the most common waiver, the way I understood was a—had to do with discipline and behavior and three was 

obesity. 

General ROCHELLE. I believe that is correct. 


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Ms. GRANGER. So where does—where do they drop out and what 

kind of waivers are allowed having to do with education or learning? Second, what is the attrition rate for recruits without a high 

school diploma and the third one would ask you to say how does 

this economy affect your recruiting? There are a lot of well-trained 

good people that are without jobs or will be without jobs that will 

be wonderful to serve in the military, and how do you think that 

will be affected? 

General ROCHELLE. First of all, let me take the latter question 

first, if I may. How does the economy affect it? It affects it very 

positively in terms of the numbers of individuals seeking entrance 

into the military. I commanded U.S. Army recruiting command 

from January of 2001 until October of 2005 and relative to that period, we are currently in a heyday in terms of individuals seeking 

to serve in the military. The difference is, and this is why twice I 

hit the qualifications because none of the effects of the economy impact the number of individuals who are qualified. So out of the 

those who are coming to the front door of a recruiting station still, 

three out of ten are qualified to serve without a waiver, still only 

one in ten is qualified to be commissioned as an officer. That 

doesn’t change. 

On the point of waivers, in 2008, let me make two points. In 

2008, our waivers decreased over the previous year. Total waivers, 

17,079 out of 80,000 assessions. In 2007, that number was 18,234. 

And comparing fiscal year 2009 current month to date to fiscal year 

2008, we see a 4.5 percent decrease in the number of total waivers. 

So we are using this as an opportunity to elevate the quality, two 

more data points, if I may. 

As a former high school teacher, the total number of enlistees 

that we categorize as DoD would categorize as tier one, high school 

diploma, not a GED, but a high school diploma and are able to 

score in the upper half of the Armed Services vocational aptitude 

battery increased 2008 over 2007 by 2.1 percent, at the same time 

that for that very same period, the total number of lowest mental 

category we are allowed to enlist decreased by 1.2 percent. 

Ms. GRANGER. You gave me, you gave me total numbers but 

what I asked for is those without high school diplomas, and I think 

you are giving me total numbers. 

General ROCHELLE. Of waivers, I gave waivers. 

Ms. GRANGER. Were you giving me total waivers or waivers without high school education? 

General ROCHELLE. I gave you total waivers. 

Ms. GRANGER. Do you have those without a high school education? 

General ROCHELLE. I do not have those. 

Ms. GRANGER. Can you get them to me? 

General ROCHELLE. I can get those for the record. 

Ms. GRANGER. And the other thing, in giving this and you say 

it is still the same percentage or the same numbers but when you 

are talking about there is total, you are choosing from a larger 

group now because of the economy. 

General ROCHELLE. We are. 


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Ms. GRANGER. So is it possible to raise those standards back to 

where they were as far as a high school diploma, given the numbers? 

General ROCHELLE. If, indeed, my point about the increase in the 

numbers of high school tier 1 did not communicate that that is precisely what I was attempting to communicate, that we are raising 

the bar. 

Ms. GRANGER. And you will come back to me with the numbers? 

General ROCHELLE. I will. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 

1. Below are the annual number of non-prior service (NPS) recruits enlisted in 

the Army’s Active Component who did not possess a Tier 1 Education Credential 

(typically a high school diploma) and required an enlistment waiver: 

Fiscal Year 

Non-prior service 

recruits without a tier 

1 ed credential 

requiring a waiver 

FY03 ........................................................................................................ 1,196 

FY04 ........................................................................................................ 751 

FY05 ........................................................................................................ 1,545 

FY06 ........................................................................................................ 4,374 

FY07 ........................................................................................................ 5,308 

FY08 ........................................................................................................ 5,043 

FY09 YTD ............................................................................................... 1,400 

Total ............................................................................................. 19,617 

2. During this period, the Army enlisted more than 464,400 new Soldiers into the 

Active Component resulting in approximately 4.6% of its new recruits falling into 

the above mentioned category. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rothman. 

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (PTSD)

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to speak 

to my colleague and friend, Ms. Kaptur, because I did want her to 

know that and you gentlemen, Secretary General as well, that I respectfully disagree with her on the notion of DNA testing. Either 

of you gentlemen could you tell me the percentage of soldiers who 

return from service with PTSD. 

General ROCHELLE. I cannot tell you that percentage. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Is it 1 percent? Is it 99 percent? Somewhere in 

between? 

General ROCHELLE. I would not speculate. I have heard different—I have heard different estimates from our Surgeon General 

who is testifying here today. And I would like to take that for the 

record in order—— 

[The information follows:] 

The Army’s ground-breaking Mental Health Advisory Teams have found that 15– 

20% of Soldiers redeploying from Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring 

Freedom (OEF) have symptoms of post-traumatic stress, anxiety, and/or depression. 

However, not all of these cases develop into post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 

According to the Military Health System’s medical data repository, 4.8% of all Soldiers (all Components) ever deployed to OIF/OEF have been diagnosed with PTSD. 

We recognize, however, that some Soldiers with PTSD do not seek treatment within 

our Military Health System. Thus, although 4.8% of Soldiers are diagnosed with 

PTSD, we acknowledge that a larger number of redeploying Soldiers likely suffer 

from the disorder we are working hard to reduce the stigma associated with seeking 

help for behavioral health concerns. 


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Mr. ROTHMAN. What are the different estimates you have heard? 

General ROCHELLE. They vary. They vary. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Chairman, you don’t know whether it is 1 

percent or 99 percent of your forces who are returning who have 

PTSD, General? 

General ROCHELLE. No, sir. What I am saying, sir, is that I don’t 

wish to speculate. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Well, give me a ballpark, sir. 

General ROCHELLE. No, I don’t think I would like to do that, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. The figures that the committee has are 300,000 or 

more that they project. Now I don’t know how accurate those are, 

but why we need to know this obviously is we have to prepare for 

the future and prepare for the health care costs, which have increased so significantly. So that is the figure that we have. 

General ROCHELLE. I clearly understand, Mr. Chairman, and as 

I believe you pointed out, those numbers and the estimates change 

because we are constantly finding out that individuals who have 

shown no post-traumatic stress or traumatic brain injury subsequently will indeed—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So the number is probably higher? I find it—— 

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman would yield just to make a point 

briefly, I think and I heard Mr. Young say that a lot of times this 

doesn’t show up until a year after the person is back. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. No, but I am saying I am looking for the bottom 

line, the lowest figure you have, and then we can assume it comes 

up. I will tell you why. If we start testing for DNA, there is lots 

of brave new world fears and realistic fears and concerns that I 

have about that—brave new world being the name of a book—if for 

example 20 percent of our forces come back with PTSD or then in 

the future have PTSD, if we have a genetic test that prevents these 

people from serving, that means the force structure will be 20 percent less. 

Now, the general tells us the force is out of balance and I believe 

that it is. So do we remove 20 percent or we change the circumstances of the service? I think probably addressing the circumstances and nature of the service would be more important but 

I don’t believe that the Army could sustain 20 percent cut in forces 

right off the top, plus there are other dangers to society in ruling 

people ineligible to serve because of a psychiatric weakness as it 

would be undoubtedly described or worse. 

General, you talk about behavioral or discipline deficiencies in 

the, in those that you are seeing as, who are applying to be members of the force. Could you describe what those behavioral, as the 

father of five to my own and three step kids, I think they are almost all out of danger, God willing, but tell me what those behavioral and logistic problems are. Is it they smoke marijuana? Is it 

that they have committed armed robbery? What is the nature of 

the behavioral or discipline problems that they present to you? 

General ROCHELLE. Thank you for the question, sir. It runs the 

gamut, everything from petty theft up to possession of controlled 

substances, all the way up to individuals who present and who are 

not admitted into the military for crimes that would be categorized 

as felonies, given the level of punishment that would attribute to 

it. 


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RETENTION

Mr. ROTHMAN. Felonies? That is significant. There is a figure 

that I saw that the captain retention program were $443 million 

was spent. This is from your written testimony. 

General ROCHELLE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Produced an increase in retention from 88 percent 

to 89 percent. So basically that 1 percent arguably got us or—rather, $443 million got us a 1 percent improvement in officer retention. Do you think that is a good use of that money? 

General ROCHELLE. I do. I think it is an extraordinarily good use 

of the money. Department of Defense estimates of the numbers of 

the individuals who were uncertain or had already indicated a desire to leave the military, up to 50 percent of that number were actually retained by that bonus. That is a DoD estimate and study. 

Second point, we don’t know what retention would have looked 

like in that, over that 18-month period had we not employed using 

the authorities granted us by this committee, to offer that incentive 

pilot and it was a pilot and it is a very successful one. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Does a percentage of 50 percent square with your 

figure that it was only a 1 percent increase in retention? 

General ROCHELLE. It does. We are measuring two different 

things. The 1 percent gain was over basic historical projections of 

retention. So we moved the needle by 1 percent. The 50 percent is 

a survey given to individual officers, what is your potential. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I get it. 

Mr. JAMES. If I may, let me just add that when you talk about 

the 15 thousand captains, we are talking about four years of college 

by and large. You are talking about four to six years of experience. 

To replace that human capital, the price General Rochelle is absolutely correct, the price was absolutely on the money. To replace 

ten years of, to rebuild that and to retain and to be able to retain 

that clearly was worth the money. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I think what the General is saying—which I understand, is that the 1 percent increase may seem modest but given 

the tremendous historical pressures and stresses on the force, not 

only wouldn’t have gone up at all it would have dropped significantly. So that. 

General ROCHELLE. Yes. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me get this clear. Why would only 50 percent 

get the bonuses? 

General ROCHELLE. No, Mr. Chairman, that is not what I said. 

50 percent of the individuals surveyed by DoD, captains in the 

Army who were surveyed by DoD who indicated their intent to either separate from the military or uncertain of their intent to remain in the military, changed their minds as a result of that incentive program, 50 percent. 

Mr. MURTHA. When—— 

General ROCHELLE. And were retained. 

Mr. MURTHA. I am sitting here and I am saying to myself, I am 

going to stay in, but I might as well say I am getting out so I get 

a bonus. 

General ROCHELLE. I can’t account for that phenomenon. 


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Mr. MURTHA. You see what I am talking about. 

General ROCHELLE. That is the potential, Mr. Chairman. I can’t 

account for that phenomenon, nor the DoD. 

Mr. MURTHA. And what other percentage of officers get a bonus? 

General ROCHELLE. May I take that for the record, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. MURTHA. Yes. Mr. Bishop. 

[The information follows:] 

The recent Army officer retention bonus program for Regular Army captains targeted officers in the Army Competitive Category and select administrative Medical 

Service Corps specialties. Of the 23,000 captains eligible for the program, we had 

14,500 who accepted bonuses, which equates to an acceptance rate of over 65%. We 

have offered no bonus to Army Competitive Category officers at any grade other 

than captain. These numbers do not include officers serving as medical health care 

professionals in the Army Medical Department or attorneys in the Judge Advocate 

General’s Corps, who may be eligible for other incentives. 

ANTIDEFICIENCY ACT

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome gentlemen, 

General Rochelle and Mr. James. I want to ask you about something that was somewhat disturbing to me as I was reading 

through the notes here, and it has to do with the Antideficiency Act 

exiting fiscal year 2008. I am looking at my materials here, and it 

says in September of 2008, the Army obligated $200 million more 

of military pay than was available in the Military Personnel, Army 

account, and that it subsequently asked to transfer funds in the account to cover the difference. 

Of course, the committee staff is of the opinion that the Army 

violated the Antideficiency Act, and of course, we are told that the 

Army lawyers say that that is not the case. But the Antideficiency 

Act makes it clear that an officer or employee may not make an 

obligation exceeding the amount that is available in the appropriation. 

On what basis did the Army determine that the obligation of the $200 million did not violate the Antideficiency Act? And I don’t 

know if you can give us what your general counsel said on it, 

whether that was an investigation and who conducted it and what 

kind of findings there were, but if the money was available in the 

military personnel account, why was a subsequent reprogramming 

request of that $200 million made in the personnel account. 

And we are also told that for fiscal year 2008, and we are looking 

at 2010 now, that the Army is going to send up a reprogramming 

request of up to $2.3 billion for the fiscal year 2008 appropriation, 

and if that is true, how is it possible and how is that not a violation 

of the Antideficiency Act? Do you have any internal controls to detect this kind of overbudgeting, and if you don’t, if you do now, how 

is that going to be prevented in the future? 

General ROCHELLE. I would be happy to address that, Representative Bishop. First of all, Army lawyers had ruled that and general 

counsel has ruled that there was not an Antideficiency Act in that 

$200 million underestimation, which is exactly what it was. It was 

a technicality that required us to come back to the committee for 

reprogramming and I will describe that technicality very simply. 

The obligations on the military personnel account for fiscal 2008 

were closed at the end of the fiscal year and they were based on 


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known obligations at the time for all manpower costs to include 

transportation, promotions, pay raises and salaries, of course. Once 

that is closed, we realized then that other obligations, not known 

at the time, came in higher and we estimated too low. It is a technicality that requires us to then come back to the committee to request a reprogramming, in spite of the fact that the military personnel account for Army in fiscal year 2008 still had sufficient 

funds in it to cover those additional costs. 

Mr. BISHOP. If it had sufficient funds, why would you need to get 

reprogramming and does that relate to what the committee’s been 

concerned about with regard to the failure to pay the stop loss payments that the committee had authorized and had appropriated. 

General ROCHELLE. Well, the stop loss payments were in fiscal 

year 2009, sir, and no, the fiscal year 2008 underestimation does 

not represent neither a failure on the part of the Army to be responsible with the funds appropriated by this committee nor to 

have the appropriate controls in place. 

I might add one final point if I may. We have also asked the 

AAA, the Army Audit Agency, to look into in addition to the ruling 

on the part of the general counsel, look into our estimating processes and procedures to make sure that we don’t have a repeat of 

this. 

Mr. BISHOP. Okay, and because at the close of fiscal year 2007 

the MPA appropriation had a surplus, and at the close of 2008, you 

were projected to have exhausted all your funds, and of course, it 

was a second budget cycle in a row that this had occurred and so 

that is troubling to the subcommittee and certainly to our staff and 

we want to have some attention placed on that so we don’t have 

to deal with this on a recurring fashion. 

General ROCHELLE. Well, please allow me to assure the committee that we are concerned as well, hence the review by the AAA, 

the Army Audit Agency. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

CONTRACTORS

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, General, Mr. Secretary. The Chair mentioned 144,000 contractors in 

Iraq. What percent of those are Army or are they all Army? Are 

they from other branches of service? Do we know? 

General ROCHELLE. I don’t. If we assume speaking all of Iraq, 

they are clearly not all Army. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. How many are Army going there? 

General ROCHELLE. I am going to have to take that for the 

record, if you don’t mind, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Do you know what percent of those are compact 

infantry on the ground sort of soldier with ours? Do you know what 

percent of them would be? 

General ROCHELLE. None. None would be performing that type 

of function. 

[The information follows:] 


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CURRENTLY DEPLOYED CONTRACTORS FOR CONTRACT AGENCY U.S. ARMY 

[As of 4/22/2009] 

LN/FN/US U.S. Army Total 

Percentage of 

U.S. Army 

against Total 

Personnel 

Local National ......................................................................................................... 13,937 24,686 56.46 

Foreign National ...................................................................................................... 55,329 80,373 68.84 

United States .......................................................................................................... 42,165 55,184 76.41 

Total ............................................................................................................... 111,431 160,243 69.54 

(Please note that this is a head count as opposed to a full-time equivalent calculation.) 

Ms. KILPATRICK. So they’ll be servicing in some other kind of capacity? 

General ROCHELLE. Services, maintenance, logistics, transportation, there are some security as the chairman mentioned. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Yes, yes, okay. That helps a bit. Are you familiar with the common access card? 

General ROCHELLE. I am quite familiar with the common access 

card. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Has the Army seen any problems with that 

card? This committee, we have had much testimony on it this year, 

and this Member’s not sure that it is really safe or that it is 100 

percent sure. Is the Army experiencing any improprieties with it? 

General ROCHELLE. Well, I am aware that there is a problem 

with accountability with common access cards in theater, and I 

think that is a matter that is being investigated, or, I should say, 

looked into by the Inspector General of the Army. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Okay. Contractors issue common access cards— 

are you familiar—— 

General ROCHELLE. They are, they issue. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And contractors are not monitored. We want an 

Army-Army, or military-military. We don’t want a contractors’ military, particularly—— 

General ROCHELLE. I understand your point, ma’am. 

SEXUAL ASSAULTS/SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Ms. KILPATRICK. Okay. There is been a lot of discussion in the 

last 24 hours about the sexual assaults that are occurring, and in 

your testimony, you mentioned a bit about it on page 10 and 11. 

I am familiar with the programs, the I Am Strong, Intervention 

Act, and motivate—I like that. Sounds good—Sexual Harassment 

Assault Response Program, which is the SHAR program, how effective are they? And I do understand that probably being a female 

and have been reported, you don’t get 100 percent of the people responding to being sexually assaulted, be it a man or woman. Do we 

know what percent do respond and these programs service? Do we 

know what percent—I guess you have to speculate if you don’t 

know, if it doesn’t come to you. Any idea? 

General ROCHELLE. In fact, there has been a great deal of study 

done on this in the public sector. Sexual assault is the most underreported crime in America. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. In America? Not only in the military. 


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General ROCHELLE. Not just the military. The estimates are that 

30 to 40 percent of victims actually report. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. You are speaking Army, not U.S.—not country? 

General ROCHELLE. U.S. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. It is higher than that in the military, I assume. 

General ROCHELLE. Perhaps. Now we don’t have data to actually 

peg it as lower reporting than the national average, nor higher, but 

two points I would like to make. 

The Army’s strategy, which was rolled out last April by the Secretary of the Army and General Casey, is the envy right now of all 

of DoD because it does, as you say, focus on—— 

Mr. MURTHA. What is that, envy—something’s the envy of all the 

rest of the service? What is this now? 

General ROCHELLE. I am very proud to repeat that. The Army’s 

sexual assault strategy, which was rolled out last April by the Secretary Geren and—General Casey, is the envy of all of DoD, unquestionably so. And it is because it focuses on our Army corps values and the absolute inconsistency, the absolute intolerability of 

those core values with the simple act of sexual assault or sexual 

harassment. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And by your own numbers, the Army’s numbers 

are going up? 

General ROCHELLE. They are. This may surprise you, but when 

the strategy was rolled out, phase one of the strategy which was 

to secure senior leader conviction and then publicize across the entire Army the commitment to this from the top all the way down, 

our numbers would go up and that is a measure of success of the 

strategy, because women are more inclined to come forward. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I assume that for men as well. You have men? 

General ROCHELLE. Men as well, indeed. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And then do they have the health services necessary even while in the military, as well as out, to deal with that, 

which goes back, I think, to suicides. My last point was going to 

be the multiple tours, the time home, back touring, suicides, all of 

that, is anything done where we can take a look at that to see what 

else we need to do help it? 

General ROCHELLE. Well, make no mistake about the fact that 

our medical forces and our medical capabilities are stretched pretty 

thin after seven years of combat, but we have placed into position 

collateral duty sexual assault response coordinators who serve in a 

counseling role. That addresses one aspect of it. Unit victim advocates who assist in reporting, who assist in guiding a victim, man 

or woman, through the process for reporting and, of course, seeking 

help, but to your fundamental question, our medical facilities behavioral health in particular are stretched pretty thin. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Not only Army, but I remember Jane Harman 

brought this to my attention earlier about sexual assault. I went 

to Admiral Mullen. He’s very interested. So you are absolutely 

right. I just didn’t hear what the subject was but the Army has 

done a good job. 

General ROCHELLE. I appreciate your repeating that, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 


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CIVILIAN CORPS

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you—Mr. Chairman, thank you for yielding. 

Civilian personnel in your statement on page 5 says currently 

Army civilian core is over 313,000 strong. I mean is that all civilians that work for the Army in total? 

General ROCHELLE. That is correct, sir. That does not include 

contractors. 

Mr. DICKS. Then, of those, over 4,000 are serving in harm’s way 

in the U.S. Central Command area of operations. According to the 

chairman, we have 144,000 contractors and 274,000 contractors 

working in Central Command, and why is it that we only have 

4,000 of these civilians in harm’s way? Is this the same problem 

that the State Department has of getting people to go, to go to the 

theater or why would we use contractors when you have $48,000— 

why wouldn’t we increase our civilian force and then send more of 

the civilians there and less of the contractors in order to save 

money? 

General ROCHELLE. There is a slight relationship with the challenge that the State Department has, but ever so slight, and I simply say that because at the point—— 

Mr. DICKS. They are all volunteers? 

General ROCHELLE. They are all volunteers. And at the point 

when State Department was asked to provide cultural change—civilians to support cultural change it was DoD through its volunteers, many of them among those that you just cited, who stepped 

up to the plate. There is a relationship, but it is not the same 

issue. 

Mr. MURTHA. Wait a minute. You are talking about the CERT 

teams, they are IRR. They pulled Navy people in from IRR. What 

are you talking about? 

General ROCHELLE. I am not talking CERT teams, sir. I am talking transition, civilians on transition teams, police—military police 

teams and the like—cultural, teams. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, you called this the Army’s civilian corps. Now, 

what is the plan for the Army’s civilian corps? Are you going to 

build it up? 

General ROCHELLE. Sir, the Army civilian corps speaks to the 

team of 313,000 civilians in its entirety. 

Mr. DICKS. Only which 4,000 are deployed. 

General ROCHELLE. That is correct. The term civilian corps refers 

to the larger population. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, you talk about the Army’s civilian university. 

Can you tell us about that? 

General ROCHELLE. The Army civilian university was activated 

last year, 2008, beginning of 2008 as the central coordinating element and coordinating body for all leader development and civilian 

human resource development training and education for the civilian corps, 313,000. It resides within our training and doctrine command. 

Mr. DICKS. Where it is located physically? 

General ROCHELLE. Ft. Belvoir. 

Mr. DICKS. Go ahead, I didn’t mean to interrupt. 


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General ROCHELLE. That is it, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. The ACU will prepare civilians for new demands and 

fully engage the Army in meeting the objectives of the Department 

of Defense civilian human capital strategy plan. I guess my question is why—are we going to try to get more of the civilians to go 

to Iraq and Afghanistan so that we can reduce the number of contractors? Or has anybody thought about that? 

General ROCHELLE. Well, I am certain—— 

Mr. DICKS. I mean, it would be like in-sourcing, wouldn’t it, if we 

were going to turn this over to civilians? 

Mr. MURTHA. Direct hire is what we call them. 

Mr. DICKS. Or direct hire as the chairman calls it, so there is no 

strategy to do that. 

General ROCHELLE. In point of fact, the number of civilians who 

are currently serving in Iraq are all volunteers. 

Mr. DICKS. But I would like to see if we could get more volunteers and then use that as a way to reduce the contractors. Now, 

wasn’t it one of the Generals Nelson Ford, then the Under Secretary then I am certain, who stated, We really don’t know the 

number of contractors that we have, and we really haven’t thought 

about the appropriate role of contractors on the battlefield. We still 

don’t understand that. That is October of 2008. That is not a very 

reassuring comment from the Under Secretary. Is that still the 

case? We still don’t have handle on this. 

Mr. JAMES. I serve with—Dr. John Anderson with our force management group is, in fact, looking at that. We have, in fact, reported and I want to take this for the record, but I believe that to 

date we have confirmed that we have 139,000 contractors working 

State side, and as the chairman has already noted we have a number of other contractors working in CENTCOM. Let me be absolutely clear. The number I get you will be computed in ‘‘person 

years’’ so that 139,000 means there is actually more in terms of 

bodies more than 139,000, but I will get that for you for the record. 

Mr. DICKS. You say there is 139,000 contractors in the United 

States? 

Mr. JAMES. I am saying there is the equivalent, sir—and I want 

to confirm the number—there is the equivalent of 139,000 manyear contractors in the Pentagon, yes, for the Army. 

[The information follows:] 

The Army’s Contractor Manpower Reporting Application (CMRA) inventory of 

service contracts indicates that there are 82,929 contractor manpower equivalents 

(CMDs) in theater (Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE), and 128,280 CMEs 

outside theater—both inside the continental United States and outside the continental United States. 

CONTRACTORS

Mr. MURTHA. One of the things that we thought contractors was 

supposed to be was be temporary for a surge. Now, I see contractors on gates. I see contractors out at Bethesda Hospital admitting—not admitting people but showing people around and so forth. 

They certainly could be direct hire. I mean, they are going to be 

there permanently as far as I can see. I think we ought to get this 

contracting thing under control. I mean the budget is, we have 

been harping on it we are trying to get figures and even Secretary 


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Gates and Admiral Mullen haven’t been able to give us a plan for 

how we hire people rather than contract out. I know there is 

guards on the gates. Somebody, they are not only paying them, 

they are paying the contractor a percentage so we have got to look 

at this thing. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. If the gentleman would yield, Mr. Chairman, in the theater, and we did have testimony I don’t know last 

week, differentiating the number of foreign nationals, just the single—I mean the figures are in some ways so high and even as we 

sort of have a larger footprint in Afghanistan, I assume we are hiring up all sorts of contractors that sort of work under the control 

of the Army Corps of Engineers on these bases, but it would be 

good to sort of know you know whether these are foreign nationals 

of that country that we hire, as well as other foreign nationals and 

if each person is a contractor, I mean that would certainly spike 

the figures up. There are contractors and there are contractors. 

Mr. MURTHA. What Mr. Frelinghuysen is talking about, food 

service and so forth, we understand that. But what we are concerned about is the person that could be direct hire, which would 

save us a lot of money and give people a permanent position, rather than going to a contractor. I see they got rid of one contracting 

outfit there in Iraq, and said they are going to reduce them, but 

it is money, as well as direct hire working for the government. We 

appreciate your testimony very—— 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Bishop. 

ROTC/JROTC

Mr. BISHOP. May I just ask one question. I ask them to provide 

for the record. With regard to the quality of recruits, one of the 

concerns that has been raised, I think I have mentioned it to you, 

General Rochelle, previously, is the lack of ROTC units and junior 

ROTC units. You mentioned the lack of discipline, the lack of physical fitness as problems for the people who are being recruited and 

those who are even offering themselves. 

Again, do you agree that an increase in the number of junior 

ROTC units in high schools as well as ROTC units in the colleges 

would help the Army as well as the other services in getting high 

quality recruits. 

General ROCHELLE. Well, I would certainly agree, sir, that junior 

ROTC is a program that more than pays for itself in terms of citizenship, patriotism, and at least an understanding of what military 

service across all the branches really is. It is a wise investment. 

And there is pent-up demand as you and I have spoken of in recent 

past. There is pent-up demand across America, every State, for 

more representation of junior ROTC. It is just, it is expensive. 

Mr. BISHOP. But you say that more than pays for the investment, 

are you exploring the possibility of expanding the number of junior 

ROTC units? I know. 

General ROCHELLE. Continuously under review, continuously. 

Mr. BISHOP. What is it that you need, do you need more do you 

need us to put in an appropriation to increase appropriation for 

that purpose. 


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General ROCHELLE. Let me come back to you with a more comprehensive answer to that part of the question, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

Army JROTC is a proven citizenship program, but there is no expectation that 

JROTC cadets will necessarily serve in the military—either as a cadet joining the 

SROTC program at the college level or as an enlisted member joining the ranks of 

the US Military. The quality of the recruits joining the Army is not a function of 

JROTC/SROTC, but of the overall quality of students leaving our high schools. 

Additional Army JROTC units, as well as other service JROTCs, will result in 

better quality high school students, but should not be considered as the solution to 

improving military recruits. Any improvement in the quality of high school students, 

regardless of the source of that improvement, will improve the quality of military 

recruits. 

Section 548 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (FY09 

NDAA) required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretaries of the 

military departments, to develop and implement a plan to establish and support not 

less than 3,700 JROTC units by September 30, 2020. As a result, the Army plans 

to expand the number of Army JROTC units over the next three years from the current count of 1,645 to 1,910; an increase of 265 units. In order to reach the stated 

goal of 265 new units, Army JROTC will establish 86 units in FY10, 86 units in 

FY11, and 93 units in FY12. 

Currently, there are over 259 schools with applications on the U.S. Army Cadet 

Command’s Order of Merit List (OML) from schools requesting an Army JROTC 

unit. On average, the command receives three applications a month from schools 

seeking JROTC units. Given the number of applications received each month, the 

command expects there will be 86 schools ready to open in FY10 and 86 more in 

FY11. Due to the current financial constraints impacting state and local school districts, the command will aggressively market and campaign the Army JROTC program in order to meet the FY12 goal of an additional 93 units. 

In February 2008, U.S. Army Cadet Command requested program objective 

memorandum (POM) funding to establish 265 new schools starting in FY10. The 

Army’s FY10 budget submissions adequately support the expansion of the JROTC 

program. Therefore, no further adjustments are necessary. 

The National Defense Act of 1916 established ROTC on college campuses. Army 

ROTC is the largest officer-producing organization, having commissioned more than 

half a million second lieutenants since its inception. Today, Army ROTC has a total 

of 272 programs located at colleges and universities throughout the 50 states, the 

District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico with an enrollment of more than 20,000 cadets. It produces approximately 60 percent of the second lieutenants who join the 

active Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve. More than 40 

percent of current active duty Army General Officers were ROTC commissionees. 

The purpose of this program is to produce officers, not enlisted recruits, for the US 

Army. As a result, there is no direct relationship between the number of SROTC 

programs and the quality of recruits. 

Mr. KINGSTON. If you will yield a minute, you said junior ROTC. 

What about college level? 

General ROCHELLE. Well, sir, the question was would the junior 

ROTC and Army ROTC—senior ROTC contribute to more recruits 

for the military. 

Mr. BISHOP. High quality recruits. 

General ROCHELLE. High quality recruits. Senior ROTC, probably 

not. That is why I didn’t address it. Junior ROTC for all services, 

I think it would help, and quite frankly, junior ROTC is not a military recruiting vehicle. It is a citizenship vehicle. 

Mr. JAMES. If I could just add, I think one of the places where 

the committee could be of invaluable assistance in terms of making 

ROTC more competitive and helping us attract more officers is to 

think about if we could make the bed and board portion of the 

scholarship system much, much more attractive, because currently 

we are so much handicapped—— 

Mr. BISHOP. You are talking about the senior ROTC now? 

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir, the senior ROTC, yes, sir. 


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Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. General, you had mentioned there is about 4,000 

civilian employees in Iraq, if I remember your figure correctly, and 

they are all volunteers. Is there a problem as far as number of people you can get to volunteer on a civilian side? Is there some ceiling 

that necessitates more contractors? 

General ROCHELLE. I am not aware of any difficulty we are having with our Department of Army civilians willing to volunteer to 

serve in Iraq, none whatsoever. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. General, I can see you are recruiting great because 

you are adamant about these bonuses. Bonuses up to $2 billion. I 

can tell that you defend the bonuses with passion and I appreciate 

that. What I can’t understand is why everybody doesn’t. Don’t we 

have categories where we say, okay, this certain category gets a 

bonus, this category doesn’t? 

General ROCHELLE. We absolutely do, and I made a commitment 

to Ms. Kaptur to provide that, and I will provide that. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you very much. The Committee will adjourn 

until tomorrow at 10. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

INVOLUNTARY SERVICE

Question. There are several means that the Armed Forces use to retain personnel 

including stop loss authority. Stop loss is a management program that retains 

servicemembers beyond their contractually agreed-to separation date. Stop loss is 

most often invoked to stabilize unit integrity until the end of a combat tour. There 

are currently over 12,000 soldiers in the Army, Army Reserve and Army National 

Guard who remain on active duty beyond their scheduled separation date as a result of stop loss. To help ease the burden of those affected by stop loss, the FY2009 

Defense Appropriations Act established and funded a new special pay of $500 per 

month for all servicemembers extended by stop loss during FY2009. To date no payments have been made and DOD officials concede that the Army will need to continue using stop loss through the end of 2009 or longer. Another method to retain 

personnel is the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). An individual assigned to the IRR 

receives no pay and is not obligated to drill, conduct annual training, or participate 

in any military activities (except for periodic Muster activities) until activated by 

Presidential Reserve Callup Authority. Upon being called up, servicemembers will 

usually be screened for their medical and personal status in order to qualify or disqualify them for activation. During the process, IRR members who seek to delay, 

defer, or exempt their activations have the opportunity to present their case to the 

mobilization authority for a decision. The Army has used this policy as well. 

Mr. James, Secretary Gates has been quoted several times stating that he would 

like to end stop loss completely. What policy steps are being taken to meet this goal? 

Answer. The Army has recently announced its plan to reduce and eventually discontinue the use of Stop Loss. Key components of this plan include the following: 

Active Army units deploying on or after 1 January 2010 will not be subject to Stop 

Loss. Army National Guard units mobilizing on or after 1 September 2009 will not 

be subject to Stop Loss. U.S. Army Reserve units mobilizing on or after 1 August 

2009 will not be subject to Stop Loss. 

Effective with units redeploying on or after 1 July 2009, the post-deployment stabilization period for Active Army units will be reduced from 90 days to 60 days. Soldiers will be released from Stop Loss 60 days after redeployment. 

Units currently deployed and deploying prior to the above dates will remain subject to Stop Loss until they return from deployment and complete the post-deployment stabilization period. Soldiers subject to Stop Loss will be eligible for Stop Loss 

Special Pay, at a rate of $500 per month, once they are past their contractual Expiration Term of Service or approved retirement/separation date. Stop Loss Special 

Pay will be paid monthly until the Soldier is released from active duty, the Soldier 


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is retired or separated, or the Soldier takes action to reenlist or extend his or her 

service obligation. These payments began on October 1, 2008. 

Question. Mr. James, in addition to the use of stop loss there was a recent article 

in the Washington Post (3/03/2009) regarding a mother who was recalled to active 

duty four years after separation from service. How many times has the Army used 

the Presidential Reserve Callup Authority in the past 5 years? 

a. Mr. James, how many Soldiers has the Army recalled to service and what is 

their time commitment? 

Answer. The Army has not used the Presidential Reserve Callup Authority in the 

past 5 years. The Army is mobilizing Reserve Soldiers under the Partial Mobilization Authority (10 U.S.C. 12302). 

a. The Army has issued involuntary mobilization orders to 955 Soldiers as Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA). Additionally, the Army has issued involuntary mobilization orders to 13,718 Soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). 

Of these, 9,710 have reported for duty. The remaining Soldiers are waiting to report, 

have been granted a delay, have an exemption case pending, or have failed to report. The Army has not recalled any retired members to active duty involuntarily. 

IMA Soldiers may be mobilized for 90 to 365 days, depending on the mission requirement. Prior to December 2006, the Army mobilized IRR Soldiers for a maximum length of 545 days. Beginning in December 2006, the Army reduced the maximum period of mobilization for IRR Soldiers to 365 days, which was then consistent 

with the Secretary of Defense’s formal January 2007 mobilization guidance. 

Question. Mr. James, do stop loss and IRR Soldiers count towards the end 

strength goal? 

a. If so, what is the Army’s current end strength minus those Soldiers? 

Answer. Stop Loss Soldiers generally count against the overall strength for all 

components, unless they are members of a reserve component who have been called 

to active duty involuntarily. 

IRR Soldiers who are mobilized involuntarily pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 12302 do not 

count against the active duty end strengths for any component; however, IRR Soldiers who are voluntarily ordered to active duty pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 12301(d) 

count against the maximum number of reserve component Soldiers who are permitted to be on active duty at any given time for the purpose of providing operational support. In addition, IRR Soldiers who are voluntarily ordered to active duty 

will count against the active duty end strengths if they are mobilized for a period 

of greater than three years or they serve cumulative periods of active duty that exceed 1,095 days in the previous 1,460 days. 

a. As of the end of March, the active component strength was 548,894, with 6,420 

Soldiers in a Stop Loss status. The Army’s end strength minus these Soldiers is 

542,474. 

The United States Army Reserve (USAR) had strength of 204,716, with 685 Soldiers in a stop loss status and 4,262 involuntarily mobilized IRR Soldiers. The 

USAR’s end strength minus these Soldiers is 199,769. 

The Army National Guard (ARNG) had strength of 368,379, with 4,417 Soldiers 

in a stop loss status. The ARNG’s strength minus these Soldiers is 363,962. 

ANTI-DEFICIENCY ACT VIOLATION EXITING FY 2008 

Question. In September 2008, the Army obligated $200 million more of military 

pay than was available in the Military Personnel, Army (MPA) account, and subsequently asked to transfer funds into the account to cover the difference. The Committee staff believes that the Army violated the Anti-deficiency Act (31 USC 1342). 

However, Army lawyers have opined that this is not the case. 

The Anti-deficiency Act states: 

‘‘An officer or employee of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia government may not—(A) make or authorize an expenditure or obligation 

exceeding an amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or 

obligation.’’ 

In September 2008, was $200 million more obligated than available from the military personnel account? 

Answer. There was no time, including September 2008, when obligations exceeded 

funds available in the fiscal year 2008 military personnel account. This determination is based on accounting reports prepared by the Defense Finance and Accounting 

Service. 

Question. The Anti-deficiency Act is clear. It states that an employee may not 

make an obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation. On what 

basis did the Army determine the obligation of $200 million did not violate the Antideficiency? 


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a. What has your General Counsel written on this matter? 

b. Has there been an investigation into this matter? If so, who conducted the investigation and what were the findings? 

Answer. The Army did not make an obligation exceeding the amount available in 

the appropriation. 

a. At no time did obligations exceed funds available in the fiscal year 2008 military personnel account. Consequently, there is no need for an Anti-deficiency Act 

investigation or General Counsel comment on this matter. The Army’s internal review office reviewed bonus payments paid during the first quarter of fiscal year 

2009 charged to the fiscal year 2008 account, and determined the charges were correct. These bonus payments were not visible to the Army Budget Office (ABO) 

through any automated system because payment procedures for enlistment bonuses 

are paper-driven and rely on soldiers to present proper paperwork upon arrival at 

the first duty station. This process resulted in some lagging payments that did not 

obligate and disburse until after 30 September 2008. The Army Audit Agency is currently performing an audit to determine the propriety of permanent change of station (PCS) obligations charged to the account. Audit results will be available in 

June. Similar to enlistment bonuses, PCS disbursements, in some cases, are not 

visible until after close of the FY. Although ABO recorded miscellaneous obligation 

documents (MODS) each month for PCS charges based on the number of moves anticipated multiplied times historical execution rates, actual charges from household 

goods vendors came in higher than anticipated starting in September 2008. Disbursement patterns closely mirrored FY 2007 levels until September 2008, at which 

point charges spiked and continued to remain above anticipated levels for several 

months. This spike was not visible until September accounting results posted in October 2008. 

b. As there were no indications a violation occurred, an investigation has not been 

conducted; however, the Army is fully cooperating with the Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House Committee on Appropriations, which is making an inquiry 

into this matter. 

Question. If the money was available in the Military Personnel account, why did the Army require a subsequent reprogramming of $200 million into the Military 

Personnel account? 

Answer. Our outlay model assumed the 26 September payroll file contained all 

bonus payments, and pay-related adjustments applicable to the fiscal year 2008 account; however, payrolls processed after 26 September continued to include fiscal 

year 2008 bonus payments and pay adjustments. Additionally, the actual cost of permanent change of station (PCS) travel claims exceeded previous estimates. Although 

funds were available to cover outlays in the near term, these unanticipated charges 

required that an additional $200 million be provided to maintain the appropriation’s 

solvency beyond December 2009. 

Question. Gentlemen, the Committee hears that the Army will send a reprogramming request of up to $2.3 billion for the MPA appropriation for FY 2008. Is this 

true? If so, how is this possible? How is this not an ADA violation? 

Answer. No. While the MPA appropriation may require an additional modest reprogramming for FY 2008 related to permanent change of station charges, a $2.3 

billion reprogramming request has no factual basis. 

Question. At the close of fiscal year 2007, the MPA appropriation had a surplus 

of funds and at the close of fiscal year 2008 the MPA appropriation was projected 

to exhaust all available funding. This was the second budget cycle in a row where 

the Army has failed to properly estimate its resource needs while preventing waste. 

Please explain the Army’s budgeting practices and internal controls to monitor disbursements across the MPA appropriation. 

a. Why were these internal controls unsuccessful in detecting this over obligation? 

b. What actions is the Army taking to ensure that there is not a reoccurrence? 

Answer. 

a. There was no over obligation in FY2007 or FY2008. The surplus in FY 2007 

was primarily attributable to the subsistence-in-kind account, which had no automated system in place to properly obligate food requisitions. 

b. Since then, the Army has implemented the Army Food Management Information System (AFMIS) to obligate food requisitions at the point of order; however, 

there is still some risk in this account as AFMIS has not been deployed to theater 

sites. We manage this risk using a workaround process to manually obligated food 

orders received from theater. The issue in FY 2008 was unrelated to the subsistence-in-kind account. Rather, payroll cost modeling efforts failed to properly capture 

payments made during the 5th and 6th quarters (after fiscal year-end-close). The 

payroll cost model now has been properly adjusted. The MPA appropriation strives 

to close each fiscal year with as little unexpended balance as possible. 


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Question. The Army admitted recruits in 2005 through 2007 that were below 

standard. Interviews with Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) revealed that they believe sub-standard soldiers end up in units and cannot be utilized, making it harder 

on that unit to accomplish its mission. In addition, the NCOs indicated that some 

new recruits are unable to pass a physical readiness test. The NCO’s feel that the 

basic training course needs to be updated to provide the recruits skills they will 

need upon deployment to theater. Essentially, the NCOs believe the Army needs to 

get ‘‘harder’’ as new recruits lack discipline. In addition the NCOs feel that their 

influence to train and shape recruits has eroded. Data supports the NCOs assessment of overall quality. In June 2003 initial entry training (IET) attrition rates 

were 14.78%. In December 2007 the attrition rate for IET was 8.49%. In addition, 

for fiscal year 2008 only 83% of the Active Army recruits had high school diplomas, 

up from 79% the previous year. All recruit quality benchmarks were met by the active duty Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. 

General Rochelle, please describe the training process for new Soldiers. At what 

point do Soldiers start to prepare for their combat mission? 

a. Please explain the role of the NCOs in shaping Soldiers? 

b. What recourse is available to Non Commissioned Officers (NCO) when Soldiers 

fail to reach the minimum standard? 

Answer. Soldiers go through a training program that prepares them for duties in 

their first unit of assignment. The majority of Soldiers attend Basic Combat Training (BCT) or One Station Unit Training (OSUT) at one of four training centers within the Training and Doctrine Command. While at BCT, the individual receives physical training, military indoctrination, and training in universal Soldier skills, such 

as small arms and crew-served weapons, small unit tactics, combatives, and combat 

life saving measures. BCT is followed by Advanced Individual Training (AIT) to develop the Soldier’s Military Occupational Specialty. AIT is branch specific skill 

training for a specialty, such as artillery, military police, signal, ordnance, personnel 

management, transportation, medical, or quartermaster. OSUT is unique because it 

combines both BCT and AIT at one training center and is focused on the combat 

arms branches, such as infantry, armor, or combat engineers. 

Soldiers with recent prior military experience do not attend BCT or OSUT. Instead, these Soldiers attend the Warrior Transition Course at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, 

where the skills they previously learned and used are refined, updated, and oriented 

toward current Army tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

Soldiers begin to prepare for combat in the institutional training base where they 

are taught basic individual Soldier skills. When they arrive at a unit, they continue 

to prepare themselves for future combat missions by maximizing their opportunities 

for self-development in terms of mental, physical, and professional development. Additionally, Soldiers continue to train on the required individual skills and begin to 

train on collective tasks. 

Soldiers prepare for their combat mission as part of a unit, based on their unit’s 

Core Mission Essential Task List and/or Directed Mission Essential Task List, ultimately attaining the status of being ready for their combat mission. 

a. Our non-commissioned officers are the linchpin in the development of our 

young Soldiers as individuals, as team or squad members, and as junior leaders. 

They mentor young Soldiers, inspire leadership, and instill discipline and professionalism. Non-commissioned officers are the principle trainers in our units. They 

take our young Soldiers from OSUT, BCT and AIT and transform them into members of teams and squads. 

b. It is incumbent on NCOs to train their Soldiers to the established standards 

required for success on the battlefield. NCOs are required to counsel and administer 

corrective training to a Soldier who does not attain or maintain these standards. If 

a Soldier is unable to overcome performance shortfalls, the NCO can recommend to 

the chain of command that the Soldier be separated from the service or reclassified 

to another military occupation specialty. In some instances, retraining or disciplinary action may be sufficient to assist the Soldier in attaining and maintaining the 

minimum standards. 

Question. Mr. James, what is the current percentage of Army recruits with high 

school diplomas? 

a. How many waivers were granted to recruits and what is the most common 

waiver granted? 

b. What is the attrition rate for recruits without high school diplomas? 

c. Mr. James, has the Army performed any analysis on the conduct of these recruits? Are discipline issues more frequent in this group? 

Answer. In FY08 the percentage of Regular Army Non-Prior Service recruits with 

Tier I (High School Diploma Graduate) credentials was 82.8%. 


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a. In FY08 the Army granted 19,202 Regular Army Non-Prior Service waivers; the 

most common waivers granted were for conduct (9,229). When reviewing waiver requests, the Army considers evidence of the applicant’s character and potential for 

service. This evidence might include employment history, school records, and references from teachers, coaches, clergy, or others who know the person well. Most 

waivers are needed to address a single instance of immaturity that the applicant 

has overcome. Evidence of remorse and changed lifestyle weigh heavily in waiver 

decisions. 

b. A recent Tier II Attrition Screen (TTAS) report completed by the United States 

Army Accessions Command indicated the Tier II (Non-High School Diploma Graduate/Alternate Credential Holder) 36-month attrition rate was 33.5% and the Tier 

I 36-month attrition rate was 20.1% for the FY05 cohort. 

c. A longitudinal study is being conducted. In general, recruits granted waivers 

are high quality and perform well. Their education and aptitude are higher on average. Soldiers who enlisted with a conduct waiver in recent years train and perform 

better than those without waivers initially. Indiscipline rates and first term attrition are slightly higher for recruits with conduct waivers. 

Question. General Rochelle, please explain Initial Entry Training (IET) for soldiers. What are the basic skills that soldiers learn while at IET? 

a. What training is required beyond IET? 

b. Are Soldiers coming to units fully trained to meet the needs for deployment or 

does training take place with the unit as well? 

Answer. Soldiers go through a training program that prepares them for duties in 

their first unit of assignment. The majority of Soldiers attend Basic Combat Training (BCT) or One Station Unit Training (OSUT) at one of four training centers within the Training and Doctrine Command. While at BCT, the individual receives physical training, military indoctrination, and training in universal Soldier skills, such 

as small arms and crew-served weapons, small unit tactics, combatives, and combat 

life saving measures. BCT is followed by Advanced Individual Training (AIT) to develop the Soldier’s Military Occupational Specialty. AIT is branch specific skill 

training for a specialty, such as artillery, military police, signal, ordnance, personnel 

management, transportation, medical, or quartermaster. OSUT is unique because it 

combines both BCT and AIT at one training center and is focused on the combat 

arms branches, such as infantry, armor, or combat engineers. 

Soldiers with recent prior military experience do not attend BCT or OSUT. Instead, these Soldiers attend the Warrior Transition Course at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, 

where the skills they previously learned and used are refined, updated, and oriented 

toward current Army tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

A few of the basic skills taught include warrior skills, such as marksmanship, 

communications, urban operations, small unit tactics/techniques/procedures, first 

aid, hand-to-combat, basic survival skills, and battle drills. Other tasks include drill 

and ceremony, how to wear a uniform, physical training, values and ethos training, 

leadership cooperation, chains of command, equal opportunity, and Military Occupational Skill specific training. 

a. Usually, no additional training is ‘‘required’’ after IET before assigning Soldiers 

to units. However, certain specific duty positions may require additional training 

after IET before a Soldier is assigned, e.g., airborne duty positions. 

b. Soldiers departing the Training Base for their first unit of assignment possess 

most of the basic universal and technical skills necessary to begin the process of integrating into any unit across the Army, refining their individual skills, and learning their collective tasks. No matter how good a new Soldier is when he or she arrives at the Soldier’s first unit, training must take place to integrate the new Soldier into the unit and make the Soldier a part of a team before deployment. This 

process occurs with every move that a Soldier makes between units. 

Question. General Rochelle, if Soldiers are deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan do 

they train with the same equipment they will use when deployed? 

Answer. Soldiers generally train with the same equipment they will use when 

they deploy, provided that the items were already assigned to the unit. However, 

there are instances where certain low-density, high-demand items specific to Iraq 

or Afghanistan, or unique to particular missions in theater, were fielded directly to 

theater. In these instances, either new equipment training teams conducted training 

with the incoming unit as it took possession of equipment, but before it began conducting missions with the new equipment, or the incoming unit received training 

on the new equipment from the outgoing unit prior to assuming the mission. Examples of equipment that was fielded directly to theater include mine-resistant armored protected vehicles, special armored security and route-clearing vehicles, vehicle-mounted counter remote-controlled improvised explosive device systems, special 


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radios, the most recent versions of the Army Battle Command system (Command 

Post of the Future), and intelligence and biometric systems. 

To the extent supportable, the Army brings newly fielded items back to home stations and Combat Training Centers to make them available to units prior to their 

next deployment. 

Question. What sort of physical conditioning is done to prepare Soldiers for deployment? 

Answer. The Army Physical Fitness School at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, has 

researched our physical fitness doctrine and found our current model, which emphasizes aerobic and muscular endurance, does not correlate well with the physical fitness requirements of current combat operations. To address this shortcoming, the 

Physical Fitness School drafted a new doctrine called Army Physical Readiness 

Training (Field Manual (FM) 3–22.20) that aligns with our current operations and 

training doctrine. The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command has already posted 

the draft manual on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) website for use by our leaders and Soldiers, and expects final approval to occur later this year. 

The new Army Physical Readiness Training focuses on improving Soldiers’ aerobic 

endurance, muscular strength, muscular endurance (anaerobic endurance), power, 

and movement proficiency, which physically prepares Soldiers and units to meet the 

physical demands of full spectrum operations. As this new doctrine is inculcated 

throughout the Army, we will adjust our physical fitness test to reflect this change. 

Prior to the release of our new doctrine, many units across the Army, with the 

assistance of subject matter experts, have adopted a variety of injury prevention and 

performance enhancement programs. For example, Special Forces and several Brigade Combat Teams have implemented programs that, in addition to traditional 

aerobic exercise, emphasize core strengthening, short term bursts of power, and 

speed and agility drills. Army training policy continues to highlight that commanders are the primary training managers and trainers for their organization, and 

are responsible for building readiness for mission requirements. Although the Army 

no longer designates a unit fitness trainer, unit commanders rely on non-commissioned officers (NCOs) as primary unit fitness trainers since they are the primary 

trainers of enlisted Soldiers, crews, and small teams. This responsibility is also outlined in our new doctrine. 

Additionally, prior to deployment, Soldiers actually wear their gear with increasing frequency to build physical endurance and fortitude for long-duration missions. 

Question. How is physical fitness maintained once the unit has deployed? 

Answer. Many Soldiers maintain fitness through the routine execution of rigorous 

combat operations on difficult terrain and under various, often heavy loads. Physical 

Training (PT) programs vary by location and mission. Most locations offer access to 

a variety of physical fitness equipment and facilities. Units have a variety of PT 

plans based on mission, time, and troops available. Soldiers have also demonstrated 

remarkably innovative methods of constructing PT equipment and facilities in austere conditions. In addition, much of the Army’s Physical Fitness Training Manual 

(FM 21–20) is dedicated to exercises that can be performed without the use of equipment, such as partner resisted exercises and calisthenics. 

Question. How does the Army prepare for high altitude operations such as those 

they will perform in Afghanistan? 

Answer. The Army prepares Soldiers to conduct high-altitudes operations by ensuring they are in the best physical condition possible prior to deploying to Afghanistan. Soldiers conducting rigorous and holistic physical fitness training will more 

readily adapt to the demands of high-altitude operations. While units may not have 

the opportunity to train in mountainous areas, Soldiers can and do conduct physical 

training wearing their combat gear, conduct road marches over uneven terrain, and 

negotiate obstacles while wearing their equipment. High-altitude oxygen levels are 

difficult to replicate prior to arriving in theater, but the Soldiers adjust their physical conditioning activities upon arrival in theater to further improve themselves 

prior to assuming their mission. 

Question. What sort of physical conditioning is done to prepare Soldiers for the 

heavy loads they will have to carry in Afghanistan and Iraq during home station 

training? 

Answer. Mission and mission circumstances vary considerably. The Army relies 

on unit leaders to prepare their Soldiers for the demands of their assigned missions. 

To condition Soldiers for the rigors of carrying heavier loads, most units will invest 

additional time in more comprehensive physical fitness opportunities, such as 

weight training, obstacle courses, combative activities, and timed distance marches 

over uneven terrain with equipment. For example, Special Forces and several Brigade Combat Teams have implemented programs that, in addition to traditional 

aerobic exercise, emphasize core strengthening, short term bursts of power, and 


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speed and agility drills. Army policy (Army Regulation 350–1) directs unit commanders to conduct regularly scheduled (at least 3 to 5 times per week), vigorous 

physical fitness training during the unit’s normal duty day. Army policy also requires that exercise periods be conducted with sufficient intensity, frequency, and 

duration to maintain adequate cardio-respiratory endurance, muscular strength and 

endurance, flexibility, and body composition. Additionally, rather than just emphasizing aerobic and muscular endurance, the new draft Army doctrine, Army Physical 

Readiness Training (FM 3–22.20), which is already posted on Army Knowledge Online (AKO) website, focuses on improving Soldiers’ aerobic endurance, muscular 

strength, muscular endurance (anaerobic endurance), power, and movement proficiency, which physically prepares Soldiers and units to meet the physical demands 

of full spectrum operations. 

GROW THE ARMY

Question. In January 2007, the President requested, from Congress, an increase 

of 74,200 in Army end strength across the Active, Guard and Reserve components. 

The main goal of ‘‘Grow the Army’’ was to provide additional ground forces to meet 

strategic demands and mitigate persistent capability shortfalls, and reduce stress on 

soldiers and their families due to ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the Committee’s support ($2.1 billion since 2007 (including both Army 

and Marine Corps funding), the Army has been extremely successful in achieving 

this growth. The Army anticipates that this growth should be achieved two years 

ahead of schedule. However, recent news articles have reported that the Army believes it needs an additional 30,000 troops to meet the current demands. This is a 

daunting number since the fiscal year 2009 personnel costs (all services) are a staggering $153 billion. 

What is the number of Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers currently 

on active duty in support of the mobilization and what is the Army’s current mobilization cap? 

Answer. As of 31 March 2009, the USAR had 25,527 Soldiers in a mobilized status. Of this total, the USAR had 9,542 Soldiers in an Active Duty for Operational 

Support (ADOS) status, with a statutory cap of 13,000. The ARNG had 62,944 Soldiers in a mobilized status. Of this total, the ARNG had 17,562 Soldiers in an ADOS 

status, with a statutory cap of 17,000. 

Question. Currently, what is the monthly ‘‘burn rate’’ for your personnel costs? 

Answer. The MPA appropriation burn rate for October 2008 through March 2009 

is $3.9 billion. The burn rate from January 2009 through March 2009 is $4.1 billion, 

which includes pay raises. 

Question. When do you anticipate the military personnel accounts will exhaust all 

funds? 

Answer. The base and bridge MPA appropriations has adequate funding to cover 

payroll that will disburse on 1 July 2009; however, we do not expect to have adequate funding to cover payroll that will disburse on 15 July 2009. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. A key principle of the U.S. Armed Forces is to attract and retain competent personnel to assure readiness and operational effectiveness. The Army has 

generally met its aggregate recruiting and retention goals. In some cases, the Army 

has lowered recruiting standards and increased the amount of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. However, with the deteriorating economy many troops are electing 

to stay in the Army and more civilians are looking to join the Army. Recruiting always remains a challenge, but a tighter job market provides more opportunities for 

the Army to appeal to young men and women. Many factors beside bonuses are appealing to soldiers and recruits, such as a 32 percent increase in military pay since 

2001, compared to 24 percent for the general population, the new GI bill and job 

security. This appears to be a good time to reduce enlistment and reenlistment bonuses as well as return standards back to higher levels. 

The Committee remains concerned regarding the recruitment and retention for 

mission-critical occupational specialties. Has the Grow the Army recruitment helped 

fill the critical specialties. 

a. If not, what steps are being taken to fill the specialty occupations? 

Answer. The Grow the Army initiative has had a minimal impact on filling critical 

specialties. The Army has garnered its greatest success using targeted incentives to 

fill critical specialties. Incentives help the Army channel quality recruits to required 

critical MOS’s by offering seasonal and targeted bonuses to fill training seats at the 

right time. With OSD approval, the Army recently launched a pilot program entitled 


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Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI), which could prove beneficial in filling critical shortages in health care professions and language specialties. 

Question. Has the Army analyzed why these occupational specialties have consistently been under-filled? What is the operational impact of these shortages? What 

resources are needed to fill these positions? 

Answer. The Army routinely analyzes the health of every Military Occupational 

Specialty and the determinants affecting our ability to recruit and retain. Recruitment and Retention incentives are periodically adjusted to influence fill rates of critical specialties. The protracted conflict has resulted in shortages in certain critical 

occupational specialties, which impacts our ability to offer optimal levels of dwell 

time to our troops. To remedy this, the Army will require continued funding of enlistment bonuses and educational incentives to attract quality applicants into critical occupational specialties. 

Question. Recruiting and retention goals are often relayed to Congress in the aggregate, providing little or no visibility into how each occupational specialty is 

staffed. Please provide the Committee with details on recruiting and retention by 

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). 

a. Can you also provide the average bonus of each MOS? 

Answer: 

Recruiting: The model the Army uses to determine staffing levels of the 149 occupational specialties the Army currently recruits for, are staffed based on priority. 

Priority is largely driven by propensity for deployment and utilization. Not all specialties are filled to 100% of authorizations. Some are filled above 100% to support 

the ongoing contingency operations. The attached report provides specifics on each 

MOS. Specialties, strength and organizational structure drive the level of staffing; 

this in turns drives recruiting, retention and training requirements. The average enlistment bonus for a minimum term of service in each named skill at the start of 

fiscal year 2009 is attached. 

Retention: The Army’s retention mission is not based on MOS; Army missions by 

category*. The mission is distributed among eighteen separate commands according 

to their percentage of the eligible population. The Army utilizes individual career 

branches at Human Resources Command to manage MOS strength in conjunction 

with nonmonetary and monetary reenlistment options. 

* The three categories are: 

Initial Term: Soldier serving on an initial term of active federal military service, 

or a Soldier who has previously served less than 180 cumulative days on active 

duty. 

Mid Career: Soldier on a second or subsequent period of active Federal military 

service who will have 10 or less years of active federal military service on his or 

her separation date or at ETS. 

Careerist: Soldier on their second or subsequent enlistment who will have more 

than 10 years active federal military service at ETS or on their separation date. 

The Army’s FY09 Retention mission by category and command is: 

Command Initial Mid Career Total 

AMC ................................................................................................ 2 14 22 38 

ARCENT ........................................................................................... 31 66 65 162 

ARSOUTH ........................................................................................ 19 49 30 98 

ATEC ............................................................................................... 0 3 8 11 

CIDC ............................................................................................... 25 56 65 146 

EUSA ............................................................................................... 293 609 333 1,235 

FORSCOM ....................................................................................... 12,561 13,796 6,395 32,752 

INSCOM ........................................................................................... 403 515 203 1,121 

MDW ............................................................................................... 151 134 57 342 

MEDCOM ......................................................................................... 641 1,359 723 2,723 

NATO ............................................................................................... 7 62 48 117 

NETCOM .......................................................................................... 345 607 257 1,209 

TRADOC .......................................................................................... 397 1,837 2,481 4,715 

USAREUR ........................................................................................ 1,693 1,754 762 4,209 

USARPAC ........................................................................................ 1,608 1,253 546 3,407 

USASOC .......................................................................................... 1,071 978 650 2,699 

USMA .............................................................................................. 3 8 5 16 

OTHER ............................................................................................ 0 0 0 0 

ARMY .............................................................................................. 19,250 23,100 12,650 55,000 

Average reenlistment bonus by MOS: 


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MOS Avg SRB MOS Avg SRB MOS Avg SRB MOS Avg SRB 

09L ................ $12,833 19D $9,828 35G $15,392 68W $10,257 

11B ............... 10,533 19K 10,028 35H 13,140 74D 10,384 

11C ............... 10,235 21b 10,215 35L 12,522 79R 11,905 

13B ............... 9,862 21C 11,765 35M 17,373 89A 9,700 

13D ............... 10,312 21D 15,500 35N 15,304 89D 15,029 

13F ................ 10,423 21P 14,068 35P 14,828 92F 9,417 

13M ............... 9,576 21Y 8,432 35S 16,153 92W 10,085 

13P ............... 10,049 25B 10,864 37F 17,433 94A 11,517 

13R ............... 11,479 25L 9,092 38B 19,290 94H 10,533 

13S ............... 7,878 25N 10,238 42R 9,628 94S 14,938 

14J ................ 10,115 25P 12,388 46Q 8,907 94T 12,714 

14S ............... 11,505 25Q 11,012 46R 9,579 

15D ............... 7,780 25R 10,550 51C 9,500 

15J ................ 10,215 25S 13,188 62B 9,935 

15Q ............... 10,344 25U 10,261 63H 10,372 

18B ............... 18,963 25V 8,865 63J 9,256 

18C ............... 17,625 27D 10,392 63M 9,881 

18D ............... 17,813 31D 18,371 68K 13,245 

18E ............... 18,691 31E 12,146 68S 9,689 

18F ................ 20,000 35F 13,612 68T 9,395 

Ave ENL BONUS MOS Title 

20000 .................................. INTERPRETER/TRANSLATOR FT. JACKSON 

2000 .................................... INFANTRY RECRUIT 

10000 .................................. CANNON CREWMEMBER 

20000 .................................. FIELD ARTILLERY AUTOMATED TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM SPECIALIST 

2000 .................................... FIRE SUPPORT SPECIALIST 

2000 .................................... (MLRS) HIGH MOBILITY ARTILLERY ROCKET SYS (HIMARS) CREWMEMBER 

10000 .................................. MULTIPLE LAUNCH (MLRS) OPERATIONAL FIRE DIRECTION SPECIALIST 

20000 .................................. FIELD ARTILLERY FIREFINDER RADAR OPERATOR 

2000 .................................... FIELD ARTILLERY SURVEYOR 

FA METEOROLOGICAL CRMBR 

15000 .................................. PATRIOT FIRE CONTROL ENHANCED OPERATOR MAINTAINER 

10000 .................................. AIR DEF CMD, COMMO, COMPUTER, INTEL TAC OPS CENTER OPER/MAINTAINER 

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE (AMD) CREWMEMBER 

10000 .................................. PATRIOT LAUNCHING STATION ENHANCED OPERATOR/MAINTAINER 

AIRCRAFT POWERPLANT REPAIRER 

AIRCRAFT POWERTRAIN REPAIRER 

AIRCRAFT ELECTRICIAN 

AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL REPAIRER 

AIRCRAFT PNEUDRAULICS REPAIRER 

10000 .................................. OH–58D ARMAMAENT, ELECTRICAL, AVIONIC SYS REPAIRMAN 

AVIONIC MECHANIC 

AVIATION OPERATIONS SPECIALIST 

10000 .................................. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL OPERATOR 

AH–64 ATTACK HELICOPTER REPAIRER 

OH–58D HELICOPTER REPAIRER 

UH–60 HELICOPTER REPAIRER 

CH–47 HELICOPTER REPAIRER 

AH–64D ARMAMENT, ELECTRICAL, AVIONIC SYSTEMS REPAIRMAN 

.............................................. 20000 SPECIAL FORCES RECRUIT 

CAVALRY SCOUT 

2000 .................................... M1 ABRAMS ARMOR CREWMAN 

2000 .................................... COMBAT ENGINEER 

2000 .................................... BRIDGE CREWMEMBER 

DIVER 

4000 .................................... HEAVY CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT OPERATOR 

PLUMBER 

FIREFIGHTER 

INTERIOR ELECTRICIAN 

TECHNICAL ENGINEERING SPECIALIST 

CONCRETE AND ASPHALT EQUIPMENT OPERATOR 

CARPENTRY AND MASONRY SPC 

15000 .................................. TERRAIN DATA SPECIALIST 

4000 .................................... NETWORK SWITCHING SYSTEMS OPERATOR/MAINTAINER 


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Ave ENL BONUS MOS Title 

CABLE SYSTEMS INSTALLER MAINTAINER 

MULTIMEDIA ILLUSTRATOR 

4000 .................................... NODAL NETWORK SYSTEMS OPERATOR 

25000 .................................. MICROWAVE SYSTEMS OPERATOR MAINTAINER 

20000 .................................. MULTICHANNEL TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS OPERATOR MAINTAINER 

5000 .................................... VISUAL INFORMATION EQUIPMENT OPERATOR/MAINTAINER 

25000 .................................. SATELLITE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS OPERATOR/MAINTAINER 

15000 .................................. SIGNAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS SPECIALIST 

COMBAT DOCUMENT PRODUCTION SPECIALIST 

10000 .................................. PARALEGAL SPECIALIST 

MILITARY POLICE 

RADIO OPERATOR-MAINTAINER 

2000 .................................... INTERNMENT RESETTLEMENT SPECIALIST 

2000 .................................... MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS MANITAINER/INTEGRATOR 

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OPERATOR 

4000 .................................... PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SPECIALIST 

HUMAN RESOURCES SPECIALIST 

HUM RES INFO SYS MGT SPEC 

BAND MEMBER 

METAL WORKER 

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT TECHNICIAN 

MACHINIST 

SMALL ARMS ARTY RPMN 

4000 .................................... FIRE CONTROL REP 

ARMAMENT REP 

20000 .................................. JOURNALIST 

5000 .................................... BROADCAST JOURNALIST 

UTILITIES EQUIP RPMN 

POWER GENERATOR EQUIPMENT REPAIR 

CHAPLAIN ASSISTANT 

CONSTRUCTION EQUIP REP 

ABRAMS TANK SYSTEM MNTNR 

LIGHT WHEELED VEHICLE MECHANIC 

SP FLD ARTY SYS MECH 

TRACKED VEHICLE REPAIRER 

10000 .................................. QM AND CHEM EQUIP REPAIR 

10000 .................................. BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE SYSTEM MAINTAINER 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SPECIALIST 

2000 .................................... CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) SPECIALIST 

CARGO SPECIALIST 

WATERCRAFT OPERATOR 

WATERCRAFT ENGINEER 

20000 .................................. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION OPERATOR 

TRANSPORT MGMT COORD 

AMMUNITION STOCK CNTRL 

AMMUNITION SPECIALIST 

25000 .................................. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE SPEC 

BIOMEDICAL EQUIPMENT SPECIALIST 

OPERATING ROOM SPECIALIST 

DENTAL SP 

PATIENT ADMINISTRATION SPECIALIST 

OPTICAL LAB SPC 

MEDICAL LOGISTICS SPECIALIST 

5000 .................................... MEDICAL LABORATORY SPECIALIST 

NUTRITION CARE SPECIALIST 

RADIOLOGY SP 

PHARMACY SPECIALIST 

VETERINARY FOOD INSP SPEC 

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE SP 

ANIMAL CARE SPECIALIST 

4000 .................................... HEALTH CARE SPECIALIST 

MENTAL HEALTH SPECIALIST 

AUTOMATED LOGISTICAL SPECIALIST 

20000 .................................. PETROLEUM SUPPLY SPECIALIST 

10000 .................................. FOOD OPERATIONS SPECIALIST 

PETROLEUM LAB SP 


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Ave ENL BONUS MOS Title 

MORTUARY AFFAIRS SP 

10000 .................................. PARACHUTE RIGGER 

SHOWER, LAUNDRY AND CLOTHING REPAIR SPECIALIST 

2000 .................................... WATER TREATMENT SPECIALIST 

UNIT SUPPLY SPECIALIST 

20000 .................................. LAND COMBAT EL MSL SYS RP 

ATC EQUIPMENT REPAIRER 

20000 .................................. RADIO COMSEC REPAIRER 

15000 .................................. COMPUTER DETECTION SYSTEMS REPAIRER 

5000 .................................... TMDE MAINT SUPPORT SPEC 

4000 .................................... APACHE ATTACK HEL SYS REP 

10000 .................................. AVIONIC COMM EQUIP REP 

5000 .................................... RADAR REPAIRER 

4000 .................................... MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEMS REPAIRER 

AVIONIC AND SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT REPAIRER 

20000 .................................. PATRIOT SYSTEM REPAIRER 

AVENGER SYSTEM REPAIRER 

10000 .................................. INT FAM TES EQUIP OPER 

2000 .................................... INTELLIGENCE ANALYST 

2000 .................................... IMAGERY ANALYST 

15000 .................................. COMMON GROUND STATION (CGS) ANALYST 

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR 

10000 .................................. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST 

30000 .................................. ELECTRONIC WARFARE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE RECRUIT 

2000 .................................... SIGNALS COLLECTOR ANALYST 

ENLISTMENT AND RETENTION BONUSES

Question. The military services offer a variety of enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses to attract new recruits into military specialties that are considered ‘‘hard to 

fill,’’ as well as to encourage experienced military members in ‘‘shortage jobs’’ to stay 

in past their first enlistment period . The Army has more enlistment incentives than 

any of the other military services. Programs include Enlistment, Overseas Extension, and Reenlistment bonuses. Bonus levels are in constant flux. 

Mr. James, what was the total for Army recruiting and retention bonuses for FY 

2009? 

Answer. The Army anticipates $2.2 billion in FY09 Recruiting and Retention for 

all three Components. 

Question. Mr. James, what is the range of individual bonuses for recruiting? 

a. For retention? Please, indicate why there are differences? 

Answer. Recruiting bonuses range from as low as $2,000 up to the statutory limit 

of $40,000. Bonuses for skills vary greatly depending on shortages in the particular 

skill and mission requirements. As of March 1, 2009, 45 of 149 skills receive a cash 

incentive. 

a. The Army uses monetary incentives to retain quality Soldiers in critical and 

hard-to-fill skills as a means to manage and shape the force. Bonus amounts are 

adjusted based on the criticality of an MOS. The Army currently uses the following 

bonuses as part of the Army’s Retention Program: 

Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB): Currently the SRB is used for skills identified as critical Army-wide. The program offers from $1K to $12K for Soldiers in select skills, while Soldiers in special critical skills can receive up to $27K. 

SRB-Deployed: The SRB Deployed program offers Soldiers deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait up to a maximum of $9.5K. 

Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB): The CSRB currently targets seasoned, 

combat veterans to stay in the ranks beyond retirement eligibility offering a lump 

sum bonus based on the Soldier’s length of commitment to serve. The program is 

currently paying Soldiers in SOF skills a maximum payment of $150K for a six-year 

commitment. 6 additional skills can receive a maximum payment of $50K to $100K 

for a six-year commitment (The total number of CSRB takers averages less than 700 

per year). 

Question. Gentlemen, have you found any imbalances or inequities in your recruiting and retention bonus structure? 

Answer. The Army has not identified any inequities or imbalances in our recruiting and retention bonus structure. The recruiting incentives structure is reviewed 

quarterly to determine if imbalances or inequities exist and to correct any problems 

found. The Army makes a concerted effort to target high quality recruits and to inVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:35 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00424 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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sure marketing efforts are targeted to diverse populations of potential applicants in 

urban, suburban and rural areas. 

The Army continually measures the effectiveness of retention incentives offered 

and makes adjustments as necessary. As the strength of a critical MOS improves, 

bonuses tend to be reduced. While Soldiers who reenlist may perceive inequities between recruiting and retention bonuses, it is important to keep in mind that the 

Army uses recruiting and retention incentives to shape the force and improve 

strength in critical MOSs. The SRB Program is reviewed quarterly to adjust retention incentives as necessary. The end result is an effective and efficient balance of 

resources to support the retention mission and manpower requirements. 

Question. Gentlemen, since the Army is about to reach the Grow the Army end 

strength goal and more people seem to be willing to join the Army because of the 

state of the economy, will the Army reduce the amount it provides for bonuses? 

Answer. 

Recruiting: Through refinement of the Active Army enlistment bonus payment 

schedule, bonuses for specialties that had received bonuses during fiscal years 2005– 

2007 were reduced approximately 20% for fiscal year 2009 and 2010. The savings 

resulting from this precision bonus management tool will be approximately $65M 

per year through fiscal year 2011. Reliance on seasonal bonuses which were required to fill short term training seats has been curtailed in favor of building a long 

term Delayed Entry pool. Seasonal bonuses, which previously ranged up to $20,000 

per new recruit have been cut nearly in half and will be used less frequently. The 

savings from this change will result in nearly $35M per year in expected bonus savings in fiscal year 2010 and beyond. 

Retention: The Army continues to measure the effectiveness of retention incentives offered. While the economy plays a part in a Soldier’s decision to reenlist, it 

is not the only reason. The reenlistment bonus not only provides an incentive to Soldiers in shortage critical skills MOSs to reenlist; it also encourages them to reenlist 

earlier and for longer periods of service. Accordingly, the Army has steadily decreased the SRB amounts paid per Soldier for the past year that reenlistments increased. The Army has reduced maximum SRB payments from a high of $40,000 

to $27,000. The average SRB payment has been reduced from $12,900 to $10,387. 

The Army’s newest SRB message reduces bonus amounts by 23% across all bonus 

zones and removes an additional 15 skills form the bonus list. 

Question. Mr. James, at a time when the Army is having unprecedented success 

at retaining its soldiers, especially in view of the new, flexible GI Bill and the job 

security that military service holds, is the Army reviewing its recruiting and retention bonus program? 

Answer. 

Recruiting: The Army, with the assistance of researchers from RAND and the 

Army Research Institute is working to refine and integrate bonus prediction models 

that will enhance current bonus payment procedures. The goal is precision recruiting in key critical skills and demographic areas needed to effectively man the force. 

Existing internal models are also undergoing revision to provide a more precise and 

cost effective methodology in filling critical training seats and to attract prospects 

in higher mental and educational categories. The Army expects to implement the 

new and refined methodology in late fiscal year 2009 for fielding during fiscal year 

2010 and beyond. 

Retention: Reenlistment options and bonuses are used as incentives to shape the 

force. Current incentives are achieving mission success in every category. The Army 

conducts quarterly reviews of retention incentives. The strength and criticality of 

each MOS is reviewed in detail during the quarterly reviews. Current and projected 

strengths, as well as future requirements, are carefully considered. While the 

strength and criticality of each MOS is reviewed in detail, the overall retention incentive program is also reviewed to ensure the Army is leveraging all available incentives to achieve cost savings while at the same time meeting Army requirements. 

The Army will fully incorporate the transferability aspect of the Post 9/11 GI Bill 

into all retention incentive reviews. 

Question. Mr. James, is the Army going to promote non-monetary bonuses such 

as tuition assistance and the new G.I. Bill? 

Answer. The Army plans to fully promote the new GI Bill, tuition assistance, and 

other non-monetary incentives to the maximum extent feasible. 

Question. Mr. James, can you provide the Committee with a complete list of all 

recruitment and retention bonuses for each MOS that is eligible for a bonus? 

Answer. 

Recruiting: Current Recruiting Bonuses: 

The Army pays enlisted recruiting bonuses at 4 bonus levels. Each bonus level 

varies by years of service. 


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Level 1 

3 Years: $15K, 4 Years: $20K, 5 Years: $25K, 6 Years: $35K 

MOS: 09L, 13R, 25P, 25Q, 25S, 35W, 89D (7 MOS) 

Level 2 

3 Years: $10K, 4 Years: $15K, 5 Years: $20K, 6 Years: $25K 

MOS: 13D, 13P, 35H, 46Q, 88M, 92F, 94A, 94E (8 MOS) 

Level 3 

3 Years: $3K, 4 Years: $10K, 5 Years: $15K, 6 Years: $20K 

MOS: 13B, 13F, 13S, 14E, 14J, 14T, 21Y, 25F, 25U, 27D, 35N, 42R, 94M (13 MOS) 

Level 4 

3 Years: $2K, 4 Years: $4K, 5 Years: $5K, 6 Years: $10K 

MOS: 11X, 18X, 19K, 21E, 25N, 35G, 35T, 63J, 63M, 68K, 92G, 92R, 92W, 94D, 

94F, 94S, 94Y (17 MOS) 

Retention. Current Retention Bonuses: The Army pays reenlistment bonuses by 

zone and grade. 

SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT BONUS 

Up to $9,500 ....... Deployed SRB: Soldiers regardless of MOS or ETS serving on active duty in Afghanistan, 

Iraq, or Kuwait in support of Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

$12,000 ............... Critical Skill SRB: Soldiers in the following MOS: 11B, 11C, 13B, 13D, 13F, 13M, 13P, 

13R, 13S, 14J, 14S, 15D, 15J, 15Q, 19D, 19K, 21B, 21C, 21D, 21Y, 25B, 25L, 25N, 

25P, 25Q, 25R, 25S, 25U, 25V, 27D, 31D, 31E, 35F, 35G, 35H, 35M, 35N, 42R, 46R, 

62B, 63H, 63J, 63M, 68K, 68S, 68T, 68W, 74D, 79R, 92F, 92W. 

$15,500 ............... Location SRB: Soldiers reenlisting for all Airborne Positions, Special Ops Command, 

75th Ranger Regiment, 160th SOAR, Guantanamo Bay Cuba, 4TH BCT 25ID, and in 

the following MOS: 11B, 13F, 15U, 25B, 25C, 25N, 25R, 25U, 27D, 31E, 35F, 42A, 

46R, 56M, 68S, 68W, 74D, 88M, 92F, 92G, 92Y. 

$27,000 ............... Special Critical Skill SRB: Soldiers in the following MOS: 09L, 11B, 18B, 18C, 18D, 18E, 

18F, 21D, 21P, 25L, 25R, 25S, 27D, 35G, 35H, 35L, 35N, 35P, 35S, 37F, 38B, 46Q, 

51C, 79R, 89A, 89D, 94A, 94H, 94S. 

CRITICAL SKILLS RETENTION BONUS 

Up to $50,000 21P, 25S, 37F, 38B. 

Up to $100,000 35P (AD, AQ, AZ, DG, CM, PF, JN, PU, PV, PW, RU), 89D. 

$150,000 18B, 18C, 18D, 18E, 18F, 18Z, SQI ‘‘T’’. 

ARMY EXPERIENCE CENTER/VIRTUAL ARMY EXPERIENCE

Question. There are two entities where the Army uses video games to attract recruits: the Virtual Army Experience (VAE) and the Army Experience Center (AEC). 

The VAE is a traveling exhibit that has been touring the country stopping at 

amusement parks, air shows and county fairs. The AEC is located in Philadelphia 

and is a two-year pilot program focused on transforming the Army’s marketing and 

recruiting business model. The AEC opened its doors on August 29, 2008. The Army 

uses both the VAE and the AEC to collect information from people who play the 

games. The Army believes this is an innovative way to reach a new audience. But 

critics do not like the idea of the military using videogames as a recruiting tool. 

To participate in the VAE and AEC, visitors must be at least 13 years old, which 

is 4 years below the legal recruitment age of 17. Many of the gaming activities are 

rated T for Teen by the Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB). Visitors 

must register and provide their age and basic contact information which the Army 

says will be used to send information about upcoming AEC and VAE events. What 

is not clear is whether these updates include recruitment information to those who 

register. 

Gentlemen, the AEC is a two year pilot. Does the Army have plans to make the 

AEC permanent? 

a. What has the AEC done to help recruiting? 

Answer: The Army will continue to evaluate the AEC over the remainder of the 

pilot period to determine which elements are most appropriate for wider deployVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:35 May 21, 2010 Jkt 056260 PO 00000 Frm 00426 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A260P2.XXX A260P2

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ment. We intend to retain the AEC in Philadelphia as an experimental marketing 

and recruiting platform. 

a. The AEC is designed as an experimental platform to pilot alternative marketing and recruiting techniques and tools. There are many innovations developed 

at the AEC, including interactive touch screen career and benefits exploration displays; a state of the art recruiter automation software application that promises to 

improve recruiter productivity while substantially reducing IT costs; and a blended 

civilian/military workforce that relieves Army Soldiers of administrative workload, 

resulting in significantly improved recruiter productivity. These innovations have 

the potential to significantly change the Army’s recruiting business model to make 

it less labor intensive and more efficient. In addition to these business process improvements, the AEC has developed innovative community outreach programs that 

may have potential for replication in other locations. For example, the AEC hosts 

a high school credit recovery program in partnership with the School District of 

Philadelphia. The program is currently at capacity with 96 students enrolled and 

hundreds more waiting for space. The AEC also hosted an African American History 

Month leadership forum that brought 150 inner city youths into dialogue with African American leaders from the community and the Army. The AEC is also piloting 

the use of social networking to build a community of interest in a local market. 

Question. The minimum age requirement for both the AEC and VAE is 13. What 

steps are taken to verify the age of those who wish to take part in the activities? 

Answer. The AEC requests photo identification to verify age. If photo ID is unavailable the AEC requests parental verification, either in person or telephonically. 

Question. The VAE and AEC both collect information from those who visit for updates regarding the VAE and AEC. Please explain how the Army uses this information? 

a. How is the information provided by those under the recruitment age used? 

b. Please explain what type of information is included in the updates that are sent 

to those who are registered. 

Answer. The VAE and AEC operate under the same procedures as all Army recruiting activities. All visitors register to enter the VAE or AEC. This registration 

data is forwarded to Army Accessions Command where registration information for 

visitors age 17 and older may be employed, depending upon visitor interests and attributes, as contact information for a mailing, phone contact or email regarding 

Army career opportunities. In some cases, this information may also be used to forward visitor photos or other visitor requested information. 

a. Information for visitors age 13 to 16 is saved until visitors reach age 17, at 

which time this information may be used as discussed above. The AEC has recruiters on staff, but they do not operate according to traditional recruiting business 

practices. The AEC tests the hypothesis that raising awareness of Army opportunities is sufficient to generate enlistments so the recruiters in the AEC do not engage 

in traditional telephone or face-to-face prospecting. They only follow up with prospects who specifically request additional information. For those who are under the 

recruitment age, their information is used strictly to notify registrants of upcoming 

activities in the AEC. 

b. During registration at the AEC we ask visitors if they would like to receive 

information about upcoming events, such as technology displays, guest speakers, or 

Local Area Network (LAN) tournaments. Those registrants who indicate a desire to 

receive such communications will typically receive an email notifying them about 

upcoming activities. They will not be contacted by a recruiter. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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W I T N E S S E S 

Page 

Amos, General J. F ................................................................................................ 47, 139 

Chiarelli, General P. W ......................................................................................... 47, 139 

Duehring, C. W ........................................................................................................ 281 

Flynn, Lieutenant General G. J.............................................................................. 1, 191 

James, Ronald .......................................................................................................... 367 

Newton, Lieutenant General R. Y., III .................................................................. 281 

Rochelle, Lieutenant General Michael ................................................................... 367 

Thompson, Lieutenant General N. R., III ............................................................. 191 

Thurman, Lieutenant General J. D ....................................................................... 191 

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