STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED 

PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED 

PROGRAMS 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York, Chairwoman 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

BARBARA LEE, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

NISHA DESAI, CRAIG HIGGINS, STEVE MARCHESE, MICHELE SUMILAS, and CLELIA ALVARADO, 

Staff Assistants 

PART 5 

Page 

United States Department of State ............................................................... 1 

U.S. Agency for International Development ............................................... 57 

Supplemental Request for FY09 .................................................................... 163 

Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator ........................................................ 231 

Millennium Challenge Corporation .............................................................. 285 

The Merida Initiative ....................................................................................... 339 

Africa: Great Lakes, Sudan, and the Horn .................................................. 463 

The Role of Civilian and Military Agencies in the Advancement of 

America’s Diplomatic and Development Objective ............................... 521 

Building a 21st Century Workforce .............................................................. 613 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 


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PART 5—STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1
STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED 

PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED 

PROGRAMS 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York, Chairwoman 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

BARBARA LEE, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

NISHA DESAI, CRAIG HIGGINS, STEVE MARCHESE, MICHELE SUMILAS, and CLELIA ALVARADO, 

Staff Assistants 

PART 5 

Page 

United States Department of State ............................................................... 1 

U.S. Agency for International Development ............................................... 57 

Supplemental Request for FY09 .................................................................... 163 

Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator ........................................................ 231 

Millennium Challenge Corporation .............................................................. 285 

The Merida Initiative ....................................................................................... 339 

Africa: Great Lakes, Sudan, and the Horn .................................................. 463 

The Role of Civilian and Military Agencies in the Advancement of 

America’s Diplomatic and Development Objective ............................... 521 

Building a 21st Century Workforce .............................................................. 613 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

55–951 WASHINGTON : 2010 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

MICHAEL HONDA, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

——— ——— 

JERRY LEWIS, California 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New 

Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

BEVERLY PHETO, Clerk and Staff Director 

(II)


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STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED 

PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 

THURSDAY, APRIL 23, 2009. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

WITNESS 

HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN LOWEY

Mrs. LOWEY. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, 

and Related Programs will come to order. 

I would like to welcome all guests to this hearing room. And I 

respect your right to be here and respect your views. But I would 

ask that you respect this very important hearing. 

You may certainly engage in a silent protest, but I ask that you 

be seated and not disrupt these proceedings. 

Thank you. 

Madam Secretary, I welcome you, my former Senator, my constituent, my friend, to your first hearing before the House Appropriations Committee as Secretary of State. We look forward to 

hearing the policy objectives and assumptions supporting your request for $7.1 billion in supplemental funds for State Department 

operations and foreign assistance. 

Failed fiscal policies have left our economy in shambles and the 

world on the precipice of a global financial crisis. The security challenges we face abroad demand our urgent and focused attention. 

You and the President and all of us have inherited a world in 

peril. A dangerous and power hungry Iran is aggressively pursuing 

nuclear energy and hegemonic ambitions. The insecurity and instability of Afghanistan and Pakistan have intensified, and the 

Taliban and al Qaeda have gained ground. 

From North Korea to Nangahar, from Somalia to Sri Lanka, to 

the Swat Valley, instability threatens the security of the United 

States and its allies. In Pakistan, policy decisions focused on shortterm security interests, which neglected the long-term needs to 

build civil society, empower and educate women and girls, and develop democratic institutions, have advanced neither security nor 

stability. 

Today the escalating terrorist violence in Pakistan and that government’s inability and unwillingness to confront the extremist 

threat undermine any progress we have made in Afghanistan and 

complicates future efforts there. I fear that we are losing the window of international consensus and commitment to help the region 

gain a strong foothold on its long climb out of conflict. After 8 years 


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and billions of dollars, we are no closer to improving security, solving the poppy problem, empowering credible partners to eliminate 

corruption and stabilize the government, or enabling a more tolerant society that respects the rights of women. 

Recent actions by North Korea, including its missile launch, reflect flagrant defiance and lack of interest in engaging responsibly 

with the rest of the world. Given these developments, I hope that 

you will detail how your supplemental request for resources for 

continuation of Six-Party Talks for a yet-to-be-negotiated Phase 3 

of an Action for Action plan are expected to improve the situation. 

And in the Middle East, where I met last week with Israeli, Palestinian, and Egyptian leaders, President Obama’s election and 

your leadership have generated new optimism and hope that our 

country can pursue a new direction to address the global challenges 

that threaten national and international security. But as you know, 

optimism and hope must be accompanied by smart strategies and 

tough diplomacy. 

In meetings in the region and discussions yesterday with King 

Abdullah of Jordan, concern over Iran dominated our conversations. While there continues to be a wide gulf between Israelis and 

Palestinians on further progress on the Roadmap, and questions remain on the state of the so-called unity talks hosted by Egypt, I 

am convinced that there is still a strong commitment among 

Israelis, Palestinians, Egyptians, and the Jordanians to create the 

conditions required for peace and security to take root and a determination to deal with the destabilizing role of Iran and its proxies, 

Hamas and Hezbollah. 

Israelis and Palestinians stressed the importance of the economic 

and the security assistance that you have pledged to the Palestinians and were unanimous in their praise of General Dayton’s security initiative. In-depth discussions with UNRWA provided some 

assurances of their commitment to transparency and accountability 

in the humanitarian assistance that they manage, but the State 

Department must continue to ensure that UNRWA lives up to its 

commitments. 

It is clear that Hamas will not accept the conditions defined in 

the Palestinian Antiterrorism Act or in the fiscal year 2009 State 

and Foreign Operations bill. Yet, you have requested language that 

I understand would provide a limited amount of flexibility for the 

President to support a PA government that might include individuals associated with Hamas if all the ministers in such a government accepted the conditions of PATA. 

Now, while I have great confidence in you, Senator Mitchell, and 

President Obama, concerns remain about this language. And I hope 

that you can clarify what type of government the administration 

would support and why. 

I also hope to get a better sense from you on the implications for 

the State Department of our plans to draw down U.S. military 

presence in Iraq by the end of 2010. 

And finally, let me express concern about new authorities for the 

Defense Department in the supplemental request. While I understand the need to train and equip the Pakistani military for counterinsurgency capability, such assistance should not be provided 

through Defense appropriations. We will continue to ensure approVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 055951 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A951P2.XXX A951P2

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priate coordination mechanisms and implementation agreements so 

that DOD can implement these programs effectively and efficiently. 

However, the overall policy responsibility rests with you, and so 

should the funds for the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability 

Fund. 

Similarly, this committee has appropriated $700 million for the 

Merida program to date, and frankly, I am baffled that an additional $350 million has been requested under the Defense appropriations. 

Madam Secretary, the United States is facing major challenges, 

and I look forward to your testimony. 

But first let me turn to the ranking member, Representative Kay 

Granger, for any comments she may make. And I should alert you 

to the fact that this is the only committee in Congress where there 

are two women in charge. 

And so I am delighted to turn to my ranking member, Kay 

Granger. 

OPENING REMARKS OF RANKING MEMBER GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I also want to thank and welcome Secretary of State Clinton 

to her first hearing before this subcommittee. 

I look forward to hearing your thoughts about the administra- tion’s $7.1 billion fiscal year 2009 supplemental request. 

At a time when our citizens are tightening their belts, the Congress must be certain that we are funding only the most essential 

and the most effective and the carefully examined foreign policy 

priorities. 

Let me begin by saying, there are several areas I applaud the administration’s commitment. The Chair and I of this subcommittee 

just returned from a trip to the Middle East, where we traveled to 

Israel, the West Bank, and Egypt, and we welcome this administration’s renewed focus on brokering peace and security for the countries in that region. I look forward to hearing your thoughts about 

how items in the supplemental request will support those efforts. 

I am also pleased with the attention given to Mexico and the problems there and the $66 million requested for procurement of 

helicopters. I hope that we can work together to make sure that the 

assets that Mexico needs in their fight get there as soon as possible. 

I am also reassured by the President’s demonstration that continuing the global fight to stop terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

Pakistan is a continued top priority. I believe additional oversight 

is especially needed in the military presence as it expands and foreign assistance programs are increased to make sure that we are 

using those funds effectively in that fight. 

I have concerns about the administration’s efforts to blunt the effect of the global financial crisis in developing countries. It may 

have merit, but the request lacks adequate country specificity, economic justification, and explanation of the impact of such assistance. 

I look forward to your presentation and asking some questions as 

we go along. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 


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Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

I would like to turn to Mr. Obey for any comments he may have. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. OBEY

Mr. OBEY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Madam Secretary, you have a terrifically tough job. We all know 

that. And I am sure we all wish you well. 

But you have inherited some incredible messes. And Americans 

can be funny people. I mean, it seems to be in our nature that we 

think there is a solution for everything, for every problem. Sometimes we have got solutions for problems that do not even exist. 

But we also run into some problems that, at best, can simply be 

managed, not solved. And I think you have got more than your fair 

share of those. 

I, frankly, do not know what I am going to do on your supplemental request because I am very concerned that it is going to 

wind up with us stuck in a problem that nobody knows how to get 

out of. And here is my concern. We have been at war almost eight 

years in Iraq. It is a measure of how wild things have been in the 

past that we count it a great achievement that there are only about 

100 attacks a week in Iraq. Over 52 weeks, that is a lot of attacks. 

You can imagine what would be happening in this country if we 

were experiencing the same thing. 

We are told that the situation in Afghanistan has gotten worse. 

And we are told that it is unlikely that we are going to be able to 

resolve that problem to our satisfaction unless we deal with the reality of Pakistan as well. 

And we are told that the administration has gone through an extensive review in order to try to focus its policy much more discretely and narrowly. And I think you have done that. I mean, I 

understand that the goal, rather than having some grandiose set 

of goals, the goal in Afghanistan is simply to demolish al Qaeda so 

they do not provide a threat to us. And I do not question your 

goals, and I do not question the rationale behind any of the decisions that underlie the policy that the administration intends to 

pursue. 

What I question is whether we in fact have the tools and the capacity to actually get anywhere near those goals. And I say that 

because, I have been around this place 40 years. My experience 

with Pakistan during all that time is that it has always been Pakistan, which means it is a country of dealmakers, but they do not 

keep the deals. And so, as a result, we have factions playing for 

their own interests, not focused on the real threats to that state. 

You have the insistence of the Pak Government that they continue to focus on India rather than focusing on the real threat. You 

have the central government give away a region of the country to 

the Taliban and accept the fact that the sharia is going to be the 

rule of the day there. And then you see calls to apply that across 

the entire country. 

I have absolutely no confidence in the ability of the existing Pakistani Government to do one blessed thing. And without a functioning government focused on the right issues in Pakistan, we 

cannot, we cannot achieve our goals in that region, in my view. 


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And so what I would like to know, the Chairwoman has referred 

to the sense of optimism that has accompanied President Obama’s 

election. And I share that optimism. I think the whole world does. 

But we also cannot approach problems as though we are permanent presidents of the Optimists’ Club. We have got to look at realities. And I am concerned that when I see the so-called realists 

in this town, such as Jackson Diehl, who is a perfectly fine reporter, but when he says, as so many others say, that this effort 

in Afghanistan is going to require the entire eight-year attention 

of this administration, to me that means we are stuck with a sixteen-year effort in that region. And I do not want to see all of the 

other goals of the administration, both foreign and domestic, in the 

end devoured by this insoluble problem. 

While it is nice to have goals, and it is nice to be optimistic, what 

I want to know, is whether or not the administration will have in 

its own head a defined timeline by which, if Pakistan does not perform, if that government does not get their act together, if they do 

not quit playing it every which way, if the intelligence service in 

Pakistan does not stop double-dealing, that they need to know that 

we are not going to be stuck there backing them up forever. 

No matter what you do, you are going to be criticized. No matter 

what you do, it is going to be the wrong decision in a lot of people’s 

eyes. In my view, no matter what you do and no matter what you 

try to do, the likelihood of a successful outcome is extremely dim 

because of the nature of the territory. 

I am not convinced, let me put it this way, I am convinced that 

this is one of those problems that we cannot solve; we can at best 

manage. And I want to know that we have a strategy for managing 

it if we face the fact that we just do not have the tools in that area 

in order to achieve the goals that we are talking about now. 

And my other problem, since people are also talking about the 

possibility of an IMF replenishment, during the years I chaired this 

subcommittee, I put a lot of IMF money through the Congress, but 

I have to tell you, I have great reluctance to do so given the fact 

that the Western European governments, especially Germany, are 

declining to provide the kind of economic stimulus that the world 

seems to expect of us but which they do not seem to be willing to 

deliver themselves. 

And if they do not pull their fair share of the load in the wagon 

on that score, we are going to have a prolonged worldwide recession, and the United States is not going to be exempt from that. 

So those are my thoughts. And I hope that you can reassure me 

on those points today. But frankly, I doubt it. Not because of any 

lack of ability on your part, but because I just am concerned that 

virtually every initiative this administration wants to pursue domestically and internationally in the end can be devoured by this 

problem if we are not incredibly, incredibly careful and thoughtful 

about it. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Lewis, do you have an opening statement? 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. LEWIS

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Only to say that I am 

very anxious to hear the Secretary’s statement. 


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I welcome Secretary of State Clinton, and we appreciate your 

hard work. I am very anxious to ask questions. I hope we have 

time to get to them. 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Madam Secretary, we will be happy to place your 

full statement in the record if you would care to summarize, but 

proceed as you wish. 

Thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SECRETARY CLINTON

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much. Is this on? 

I want to get to your questions. I think it might help to do a 

quick overview of what we do have in the supplemental and the 

reasons behind it. We know that we are asking for a significant 

sum, but it represents only a fraction of what we spend each year 

on national security. And we think that diplomacy and development are ever more important to safeguarding the security and 

prosperity of our people and our Nation, because after all, if we are 

successful in either managing or solving problems, we save the 

money and the lives that would otherwise have to be spent in dealing with conflict. 

You know very well on this committee the range of difficult problems we have inherited and that we are attempting to cope with. 

We have launched a new diplomacy that we believe is powered by 

partnership and pragmatism and principle. And I am very proud 

of the men and women of the State Department and USAID who 

literally work around the clock and around the world. We have requested, with respect to Iraq, $482 million in the supplemental budget for civilian efforts to partner with our military efforts as the withdrawal continues. Already the Iraqi Government 

is exceeding our spending for reconstruction and in many areas 

matching or exceeding our efforts on individual projects. We want 

to help manage that transition. And this money will enable our civilian American employees and their local counterparts to help create an environment in which we assist the Iraqi Government to 

take more and more responsibility. 

Obviously, security is our paramount concern in Afghanistan. The supplemental request of $980 million for Afghanistan is targeted to specific areas essential for security and stability. 

As a result of our strategic review, we are not trying to be all 

things to all people. We are focusing on making government institutions more accountable and effective, promoting the rule of law, 

stimulating licit economic activity, especially in agriculture. Afghanistan used to be self-sufficient in agriculture and even was an 

exporter beyond its borders. 

We are also going to be working with local communities at the 

provincial level and below to help stabilize the security situation 

through job creation. What we have determined through our analysis is that many in the Taliban are there not because of ideological commitment but, frankly, because they are paid better than 

you could be paid in the Afghan police force. So we are trying to 

unlock this puzzle about how to attract young men in particular 

into legitimate employment. Our commitment to train up the Afghan National Army and the police force will go hand in hand with 


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that effort. And we are also focused on continuing to support 

women and girls. We think that is an essential part of our foreign 

policy. 

But progress in Afghanistan, we believe, depends upon progress in Pakistan. And we do seek supplemental funding of $497 million. 

I take very seriously Chairman Obey’s comments and cautions. 

And Mr. Chairman, my view on this is that in order to manage, 

we have to make these commitments. We have to keep our pledge 

at the Tokyo Donors Conference. Other nations see Pakistan as we 

now do and therefore came forward with $5.5 billion in commitments. We have to try to strengthen civilian law enforcement, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the 

Northwest Frontier Province. 

And there are humanitarian needs that we think serve our national security interests, which we have, in my view, never sufficiently built on. Following the earthquake in Pakistan, Pakistani 

public opinion toward America improved dramatically because we 

were there with both military and civilian assets to help the people 

who had been stricken by the earthquake. 

We never followed through. We never had a strategy to say, we 

have made some progress in these areas, what more do we need 

to do to consolidate that? 

Key to our new strategy for both Afghanistan and Pakistan is to 

hold ourselves and our partners accountable. And we are committed to doing that. We obviously are going to set performance 

measures. I remember very well for six years on the Armed Services Committee trying to get accountability measures for both Iraq 

and Afghanistan, trying to get what we then called benchmarks. 

We never got them. 

We are going to prepare them. We are going to share them with 

you. We are going to work with you to try to figure out what are 

the ways we can tell whether we are successfully managing and/ 

or solving our challenges. 

We also are focused on the Middle East, as Chairwoman Lowey 

mentioned. Both she and Ranking Member Granger emphasized 

the importance of this region to our country. If we are genuinely 

interested in achieving a comprehensive and secure peace between 

Israel and its Arab neighbors, we have to remain steadfast in our 

commitment to Israel’s security. 

At the same time, we believe we should continue to help the parties find a path to a two-state solution and support efforts initiated 

by the Palestinian Authority under the leadership of Prime Minister Fayad to end corruption, promote security, and build infrastructure to demonstrate tangible benefits of peace to the people of 

the West Bank. And we think, as part of that strategy, we have 

to address the humanitarian needs in Gaza by working directly 

with carefully vetted partners. 

We have made it clear we will only work a Palestinian Authority 

Government that unambiguously and explicitly accepts the Quartet’s principles: a commitment to nonviolence; recognition of Israel; 

and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including 

the Roadmap. 

In the event of any Hamas participation of any sort in this coalition, this would apply if the government, representing all of its 


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agencies and instrumentalities, accepts these principles. At Sharm 

el Sheikh last month, I announced a U.S. Government pledge of 

$900 million that includes humanitarian, economic, and security 

assistance for the Palestinian people, both Gaza and West Bank. And Madam Chairwoman, our supplemental request of $840 million is included in that pledge. It is not in addition to it. 

And it will be implemented under the most stringent requirements we have ever put on aid going into that area. From the first 

days of this administration, we have also signaled our determination to create partnerships, partnerships with other governments, 

the private sector, nongovernmental organizations and institutions. 

This is not a moral or altruistic imperative. We believe that extreme poverty poses a grave threat to global security and certainly 

to prosperity. 

Development experts have predicted that 50 million more people 

could end up living in poverty this year. A sharp increase in global 

poverty has the potential to spark humanitarian crises, erode gains 

from a wide range of U.S. taxpayer investments in development, reverse progress toward achieving the Millennium Development 

goals, and destabilize countries that are partners and ours. 

Many responsible countries cannot raise funds to restore safety 

nets, restore financial markets, and serve the poor. And I care particularly about children and women, who are the most 

marginalized to begin with. And we think this is an important action that our government should take in our interests as well as 

to further our values. 

The $448 million requested for assistance to developing countries 

hardest hit by the global financial crisis is designed to provide a 

temporary safety net. 

And I appreciate Congresswoman Granger’s question. At this moment, we are evaluating which ones of these countries will need 

our help and how best to deliver that. 

I think the United States has to remain a world leader in providing food aid and life-sustaining support for refugees and other 

victims of conflict. And these efforts will be complemented by investments in the supplemental budget for emergency food aid. 

The food security problem is especially acute, and I am pleased 

that the President has asked the State Department and USAID to 

lead our government’s efforts in addressing this across the agency. 

We had the first meeting, Madam Chairman, ever held in our 

government to bring everybody together. So we are trying to rationalize, streamline and make more effective our efforts across the 

board. 

We also think it is important that we lead by our example when 

it comes to shared responsibility. That is why we have included 

$836 million for United Nations operations, some of which will be 

used to cover assessments in which we are already in arrears. 

Now, we are well aware that the United Nations needs reform 

and greater accountability. But I think it is fair to acknowledge 

that in many areas U.N. peacekeeping missions save lives and, 

frankly, expense for us. I was just in Haiti, where the U.N. blue 

helmets cost 75 percent less than if we had to send troops to Haiti, 

as we did, you know, 12 years or so ago. And when I was in Haiti, 

where we support those U.N. peacekeepers, I concluded, listening 


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to the Brazilian general who led them, that they have made significant gains in security and stability that are still fragile. Our continuing support for peacekeeping missions like this I strongly believe are a low-cost way for us to achieve our own goals. 

We are asking for small investments targeted to specific concerns, international peacekeeping operations and stabilization in 

Africa; humanitarian needs in Burma; the dismantlement of North 

Korea’s nuclear program, assuming they come back to the SixParty Talks; assistance for Georgia that the prior administration 

promised that we believe we should fulfill; support for the Lebanese Government, which is facing serious challenges; funding for 

critical air mobility support in Mexico as part of the Merida Initiative. 

Let me end with one final point. In order for us to pursue an ambitious foreign policy to both solve and manage problems, to address our interests and advance our values, we have to reform both 

State and USAID. And to do so, we have to create a department 

and an agency that are funded the right way, where the people 

doing this work have the tools and authorities that they need. 

This is particularly important in dangerous regions like Iraq and 

Afghanistan. I want to just end with one statistic. I asked for a review about the dangers facing aid workers. In Afghanistan, the casualty rate for USAID employees, contract employees, locally engaged employees and other international aid workers, is 1 in 10 

have been killed in the last 8 years. Our comparable percentage for 

military casualties in Afghanistan is 1 in 57. 

What we are asking people to do, which we believe is absolutely 

essential to our country’s security, is assume responsibilities so 

that we can make diplomacy and development on a par with the 

military and defense functions of our foreign policy. 

But I want to underscore to this committee, which knows this 

very well, this is not easy. It is not safe, and it is extremely difficult to get right. But I pledge to you that we are going to do everything we can as we move forward, advancing President Obama’s 

and our Nation’s vital interests, to make sure that diplomacy and 

development are well prepared to take our place at the head of our 

Nation’s foreign policy objectives. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

I will be calling on members based upon the seniority of those 

members that were present when the hearing was called to order. 

And I ask that each member please keep their questions to within 

5 minutes per round. And I will alternate between majority and 

minority. 

Madam Secretary, I thank you again for your testimony. I know 

that there are many questions. Our time is limited. I would like to 

begin by repeating three concerns that I raised in my opening remarks and that you also addressed. 

Number one, I am concerned that the Pakistani Government is 

cutting deals with extremists without getting anything in return, 

as evidenced by the recent agreement in the Swat Valley. And certainly we know about the news today. As we now know, that agreement has only emboldened the Taliban to surge into the Buner district just an hour outside Islamabad. How do we succeed in Pakistan if the Pakistanis themselves are either unwilling or incapable 

of making the tough choices and taking the tough action needed to 

confront the insurgency? 

Two, as I noted, I know that we are all in agreement on a policy 

that prohibits any funding for Hamas or any Hamas-controlled entity until Hamas is willing to agree to the Quartet principles. In 

my opinion, I must say, that day will never come. However, Madam 

Secretary, you have asked for the ability to engage with a powersharing government if that government meets these principles. I 

would like you to elaborate on why you need this language. What 

type of government would you support? 

And when you say that the power-sharing government would 

have to meet the three principles, I believe it is not enough for Abu 

Mazen and Salaam Fayad to accept the principles; it must be all 

the ministers, including any minister appointed by Hamas, that 

comply with these principles. And I would like to know if you agree 

with that. 

And lastly, I would like you to elaborate on the administration’s 

policy on Iran. While I support the President’s policy of engagement, I do not think we should be taking any options off the table. 

In fact, I believe that any diplomatic initiatives have to be coupled 

with a tightening, a real tightening of the sanctions regime. I 

would like to know if you agree with that. 

I think we need to ensure that our European allies, the Russians, 

the Indians, and others are also enforcing these sanctions. As good 

as Stuart Levy is, I hope you can share your thoughts on this. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you so much, my Congresswoman. 

Let me start with Pakistan. As I said yesterday, appearing before 

the House Foreign Affairs Committee, I and our administration are 

deeply concerned by the increasing insurgency that is destabilizing 

Pakistan. We have made those concerns abundantly clear to the 

Pakistani Government, both the civilian and the military leadership, and we have had a series of meetings with both the Pakistanis and the Afghans, going in depth about how to get the Pakistani Government to change their focus, as Chairman Obey referenced, from what they viewed as their existential threat, namely 

India, to what we view as their existential threat, namely this extremist insurgency. 


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Changing paradigms and mind-sets is not easy. But I do believe 

that there is an increasing awareness on the part of not just the 

Pakistani Government but the Pakistani people that this insurgency, coming closer and closer to major cities, does pose such a 

threat. 

I was heartened to hear that leaders of opposing political parties, 

even Islamic-based political parties, have begun to express their 

concerns about the deal in Swat. Parliamentarians are beginning 

to speak out. 

Yesterday I called for the Pakistani diaspora to also speak out. 

And we believe that there is a growing awareness on the part of 

the Pakistani Government that their strategy, which historically, 

as you know, was to leave those areas basically alone. The British 

left them alone. The Pakistani Government from its very inception 

left them alone, and the mind-set was, well, that does not really 

affect us in Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi. And now they are seeing 

that indeed it could. 

So I believe, Congresswoman, that there is a significant opportunity here for us, working in collaboration with the Pakistani Government, to help them get the support they need to make that 

mind-set change and act more vigorously against this threat. 

Now, there are no promises. They have to do it. I mean, we can 

support them. We can encourage them. The leadership of Pakistan 

will be coming for our second trilateral meeting in about two weeks 

here to Washington. Our Special Representative, Richard 

Holbrooke, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, have 

been spending countless hours in really painful, specific conversations, because I want to underscore the feeling we get, which is 

that if you have been locked in a mortal contest with someone you 

think is your principal, in fact only, real enemy, and all of a sudden 

circumstances change, but they do not change so much that you are 

still not worried about that other enemy, it just takes some time. 

And I think that there is a growing understanding of that within 

the Pakistani leadership. 

Secondly, with respect to Hamas, as I said yesterday, again before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, we will not deal with a 

Palestinian Authority unity government that includes Hamas, that 

does not meet the criteria of recognizing Israel, renouncing violence, and agreeing to all of the agreements that have already been 

entered into by the Palestinian Liberation Organization and then 

the Palestinian Authority. 

And I want to just, you know, reiterate that no aid will flow to 

Hamas or any entity controlled by Hamas. Under our supplemental 

provision, the unity government would have to be certified by the 

President as meeting the requirements that we have set forth. And 

the reason for this request is that, number one, the Palestinian Authority itself has not agreed to any such unity government. The 

discussions have focused on so-called technocrats, people who 

might go into a unity government of some sort to fulfill certain specific functions. 

But this is a critically important time in the Middle East. And 

we do not know what will come from these ongoing talks in Cairo. 

But if what emerges from these talks is a unity government that 

abides by the Quartet principles, we do want to have the authority 


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to deal with that government in the peace process or negotiations 

that might possibly develop. 

Before providing any such waiver, the Administration would consider all the relevant facts, including who these people were, what 

their role in the government was, to make sure this meets our 

standards and our national interests. And we would expect any 

unity government to meet the standards of transparency and accountability that have been set forth by Prime Minister Fayad. 

We doubt there will be such a unity agreement. There does not 

seem to be one in store. But we do not want to bind our hands in 

the event that such an agreement is reached and the government 

that they are part of agrees to our principles. 

Finally, with respect to Iran, as I also said yesterday, we have 

been working closely with our friends and partners and interested 

nations with respect to engaging with Iran. Just like you found 

when you traveled in the region, we hear about Iran from everyone. 

This unites Israel and the Arab neighbors in the region. Everyone 

is concerned, as we are, about Iran’s activities. We are concerned 

both about their pursuit of nuclear weapons and about their interference in the internal affairs of their neighbors and their support 

for terrorism and organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah. 

But we have tried the policy of total isolation for eight years, and 

it did not deter Iran one bit. The nuclear program has continued 

unabated. They were not supporting Hamas before; they are supporting Hamas now. 

So our view is we have to proceed on two tracks simultaneously 

and completely linked. As the President has said, we have said to 

the Iranians, we are willing to discuss with you a range of matters. 

We have sent our representative to the P-5-Plus-1 to be a full participant because we think we need a better approach to try to deter 

and prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons, and we continue to work on sanctions, which we intend to have available. We 

believe that pursuing this two-track approach, letting the world 

know we are willing to engage—we do not know whether they want 

to engage with us; there is no basis yet for concluding they do— 

will give us a stronger hand in getting leverage on them when it 

comes to tough, crippling sanctions. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I am over our time. 

I just wanted to clarify one point. When you talked about the 

government that you intend for us to support if in fact there is a 

government, in my judgment, all the ministers should comply with 

the Quartet principles and the principles in PATA. Would you 

agree with that? 

Secretary CLINTON. Our belief is that if the government complies 

with it, that is what we are looking for. And again, I mean, we are 

talking in such hypotheticals. We have no intention of dealing with 

Hamas unless they do what the PLO did. I mean, I was in Gaza 

when the PLO voted to recognize Israel, renounce violence. 

I was deeply involved in the peace process in Northern Ireland. 

Not everyone in Sinn Fein and not everyone in the IRA initially 

agreed to the principles. But the leadership of the government that 

was dealt with in both instances did. That is what we are looking 

for. And we think that is sufficient, given the assurances that we 

will be looking for to provide you. 


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Mrs. LOWEY. Ms. Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

In press reports this week, it appears that the new Israeli Government is not likely to move forward on peace talks with the Palestinians until it sees progress in stopping Iran’s suspected pursuit 

of nuclear weapons and limiting the increasing influence of Iran on 

the region. I would like to know how this emerging position of the 

Netanyahu government affects the prospects for peace as we are 

moving forward, and is our government encouraging Arab states to 

take any specific actions against Iran? How are we doing that? And 

what countries do you believe can be most helpful to us? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congresswoman, we are not going to 

prejudge the Israeli position until we have had face-to-face talks. 

You know, Senator Mitchell was just in the region, had intensive 

talks with the Prime Minister and members of his government. The 

Prime Minister will be coming to Washington in May. And we 

think that it is important not to prejudge what their view is and 

how that can best be approached. 

And let me just give you an example of what I mean. As I said, 

Israel is in lockstep with their Arab neighbors vis-a-vis their concern about Iran. We could argue, and many Arab countries have, 

and I think some of you met with King Abdullah in the past several days, and he has made public statements to this effect; that 

for Israel to get the kind of strong support it is looking for vis-avis Iran, it cannot stay on the sidelines with respect to the Palestinians and the peace efforts, that they go hand in hand. 

And if we can work out such an approach, and this is obviously, 

you know, up to the Israeli Government, they have to make these 

decisions, but if there is such an approach, then a lot of the Arab 

countries are saying to us there will be a sequencing of supporting 

that will strengthen the region’s response to Iran. 

But as I said, we have not had those in-depth conversations yet 

that we are looking forward to having with the Israeli Government. 

Ms. GRANGER. Have you had those conversations with Arab 

states specifically? And what kind of expectations do you have from 

them and which ones will be most helpful? 

Secretary CLINTON. I must say we have had ongoing conversations with Arab states, literally across North Africa, Israel’s immediate neighbors, and into the Gulf. The Arab Peace Initiative, 

which by the way has the same principles as the Quartet principles, which people, you know, should really give the Arab League, 

most particularly Saudi Arabia, credit for; every country with 

whom I have personally met, and that is most of them by now, 

wants very much to support the strongest possible posture toward 

Iran. They believe that Israel’s willingness to reenter into discussions with the Palestinian Authority strengthens them in being 

able to deal with Iran. So I really believe that that is their strongly 

held view. And we have to sort of get everybody together in one 

place, which has not yet happened, to figure out how that can proceed. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Obey. 

Mr. OBEY. Madam Secretary, two questions. 


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There is a lot of talk about benchmarks with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan. My problem with benchmarks is that I have always felt it is difficult, virtually impossible, to try to run a war 

from Capitol Hill. Sometimes if you have incredible obstreperousness on the part of the executive branch, that is your only choice, 

to try, but I do not have much faith in our ability to do so. 

The problem with benchmarks as I see them, if they are congressional benchmarks, is that if they are too tight, money does not 

flow, and it messes up your ability to carry out the policy. And if 

they are too loose, all they are is a cover-your-fanny program for 

Congress. And what I would like is to have something more real. 

So I am not asking you now what they would be, but what I 

want to know, within a reasonable period of time, is what will the 

administration’s own internal benchmarks be that they will use to 

determine whether or not this policy is succeeding or whether it is 

time to go in a different direction? 

Second point is this: When I came to Congress, it was 1969, middle of the war. I succeeded Mel Laird, who was then the Secretary 

of Defense. And I was against the war. But Mel convinced me that 

Nixon had inherited the war from Johnson and that he deserved 

some time to try his policies. And so I said, all right, I will keep 

my mouth shut for a year and see what happens. And that is what 

I did. And I held out for a year before I started voting for measures 

to try to shut that operation down. 

I do not want to try to shut down the administration’s ability to 

deal with a problem they inherited. But my question is this: Would 

not a year be plenty of time for us to judge whether or not the Paks 

are really willing to do what is necessary to deal with this problem? Should not we be able to determine within a year whether 

they are serious, whether they are focusing on the right problems, 

whether they actually have control of their intelligence operations 

so that we do not have a deep suspicion that they are actually financing some of the actions taken by our enemies in Afghanistan? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think your two questions are related. 

I agree with you completely that we need the internal benchmarks, measurements of performance that we are currently working to present. We would prefer they not be embodied in congressional legislation for the very reasons you just described, but we do 

think we owe you a set of measurements that we are going to try 

to judge whether we are making progress or not, and that you 

should be able to judge as well. 

So what we intend to do is to present these approaches that we 

are working on. And it is across the government. The intelligence 

community will have certain measurements; the Defense Department will; we will look as well. But we would prefer that they be 

how you hold us accountable without, you know, paralyzing our efforts to move forward. So I agree with that. 

But when we work those through and present them to you—some 

of them will be classified; most of them will not be—they will give 

us the indicators that I think you are seeking as to whether we are 

making any progress in Pakistan. 

You know, on a simple measure, is the Pakistani military still 

amassing hundreds of thousands of troops on the Indian border, or 


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have they begun to move those toward these insurgent areas? 

What kind of kinetic action are they taking? How much? Is there 

an increasing uptempo or not? Is it sporadic, so they start in and 

then they move back? 

Now, if someone representing the Pakistani military were here 

with me today, I am sure he would say, we have lost 6,000 people 

in these efforts in the last I think two, three years. And that is a 

measurement. It is a tragic measurement. But if you lose soldiers 

trying to retake part of your own country, it seems to me that is 

the army’s mission, you know, to see how they can get back the 

governing capacity. 

So we think that we will have an ability to lay out these markers. We welcome your advice about others that you think would be 

useful. And then we are going to measure it. 

Now, is it a year, 18 months? I am not prepared to say that. I 

do not know. But, obviously, we want to see progress on these 

measurements. And we want to see the progress, you know, beginning and continuing and not stopping and starting. And that is 

what we are going to look for. 

Mr. OBEY. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Lewis. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Secretary Clinton, you come to this job at a very, very critical 

time in this shrinking and volatile world. And the focus upon Pakistan and Afghanistan is very much appropriate. But it seems to me 

that that which we experienced, the world experienced, in Mumbai 

has changed the level of intensity of these challenges like one cannot hardly imagine. Indeed, I want to support a progressive policy 

to help strengthen Pakistan. I am very concerned about the 

changes that have taken place just in these last few days. I do understand, on the other hand, why Pakistan has so many troops on 

the Indian border. If indeed just a little more militancy causes a 

spark that causes India to react, if something were to happen in 

Kashmir, we could have an explosion that involves two nuclear 

powers faced off against one another. 

General Petraeus was before us yesterday in the Defense Subcommittee, and in this discussion, the fact that the Pakistani military is totally incapable of dealing with the military of India, the 

comparison just is night and day; that reality could lead to the exercise of nuclear arms. I hope that the Defense Department, the 

agencies in other words, and your people are intensely involved in 

looking at this. Could you give me some commentary about your 

concerns about India versus Pakistan? 

Secretary CLINTON. It is a very profound question, Congressman 

Lewis, because there have to be efforts to enhance confidence between India and Pakistan. 

Those are not likely to be undertaken until the Indian elections 

are over. And as you know, the Indian elections take a long time 

because they are the biggest democracy in the world, and they do 

a pretty good job, frankly, running their elections. But we are not 

going to have a government for weeks. There have been a number 

of high level discussions by members of our administration, including between the President and the Prime Minister on the sidelines 

of the G20 summit in London, raising the issue of how India can 


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do more to tamp down any reaction on any front like Mumbai could 

have provoked. 

We worked very hard, and as did the prior administration, to 

prevent India from reacting. But we know that the insurgents, and 

al Qaeda, and their syndicate partners are pretty smart. They are 

not going to cease their attacks inside India because they are looking for exactly the kind of reaction that we all hope to prevent. 

So we do have a lot of work to do with the Indian Government 

to make sure that they continue to exercise the kind of restraint 

they showed after Mumbai, which was remarkable, especially given 

the fact it was the political season. 

We are also encouraging the Pakistani Government to reach out 

to the Indian Government and to continue some of those confidence-building measures that they were doing, like opening the 

bus routes in Kashmir and other things that did have some positive effects. 

So you have put your finger on the dilemma that I was answering Chairman Obey about. If Kashmir blows up, and insurgents 

come over that line of control every day or at least every week, 

then all bets are off. But if the Pakistani Army stays on the line 

of control and on the Indian border and doesn’t turn their attention 

to dealing with the insurgents, we got a mess on our hands. 

Secretary CLINTON. So, we do have to navigate through this. 

Now, that is part of what the highest levels of our Administration 

are doing from—Director Panetta has been in both New Delhi and 

Islamabad. Our military, we are in this funny situation because 

CENTCOM stops at Pakistan and PACOM stops at India, but there 

is a lot of coordination going on to kind of keep that relationship 

strong. It is very complex. 

And one final thing I would say is why are we so concerned 

about this? One of the reasons is nuclear weapons, we spend a lot 

of time worrying about Iran; Pakistan already has them. And they 

are widely dispersed in the country. There is not a central location, 

as you know. They have adopted a policy of dispersing their nuclear weapons and facilities. So it is imperative that we do everything we can to keep India and Pakistan on a good basis so that 

when something pops up and they make an accusation and they 

fall back on what are just natural impulses to blame the other, it 

doesn’t escalate. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Schiff. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. SCHIFF

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Madam Chair. Madam Secretary, it is 

wonderful to see you, and I am so proud that my daughter can 

have a chance to watch some of your talent and capability to testify 

today. I want to make a couple of quick points and invite you to 

respond to as many as you can within my 5 minutes. 

First, I want to follow up on the comments of our Chair of the 

full committee. I share the concern he has raised over Afghanistan 

and Pakistan and the magnitude of the mission, the doability of 

what we are trying to accomplish. In 2 years, we will be approaching the tenth year anniversary of military involvement in Afghanistan. We will have been there for a decade. And I think probably 


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beyond any contemplation, we will be there in 2 years, so it will 

be a decade we have been in Afghanistan. And the questions the 

country has will intensify as they should. Where are we headed? 

Will we be in Afghanistan for a second decade? Do we have a military role here other than counterterrorism? 

And one of the flashpoints for me is we have provided a phenomenal amount of military support for Pakistan. They haven’t 

changed the paradigm, as you have pointed out, and more pernicious there are elements within the Pakistani intelligence services that ISS director asked that they be working across purposes 

with us. I don’t know how we can possibly be funding the Pakistani 

military if elements of the military or intelligence services are actually working against us and have the effect of killing our troops 

next door. 

So I wonder how can we structure or military support to Pakistan in a way that ensures they make the paradigm shift, which 

they have been telling us now for years they recognize, this is their 

work, Pakistani Prime Minister says, but have not acted yet like 

it is their war. So how do we structure our military support to force 

the paradigm shift and to ensure that the ISS not working at cross 

purposes. 

To follow up on our subcommittee Chair’s question on the Palestinian authority, I am concerned, and I think your testimony leaves 

this open that you can have a situation where Hamas is permitted 

to appoint ministers to a unity government, provided those ministers agree to quartet principles even though Hamas does not. And 

it seems to me unworkable to have Hamas organizing terrorist attacks against Israel at the same time it has the power to appoint 

ministers to a collation government. And I wonder if your testimony is leaving open that possibility and how that could be workable, because I do not see how that could be workable. 

The final question I would like to ask is about Somalia, and to 

a lesser degree, perhaps Yemen, I am concerned particularly with 

Somalia that it may become the next Afghanistan, and that we 

have been adrift in terms of our policies in Somalia for 2 decades. 

And I don’t want to see us forced to embark on an another decadelong military campaign in Somalia or Yemen. So what can we do 

now to prevent that from happening? Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Secretary CLINTON. You know, I think that each of your questions really poses a central challenge to our foreign policy and our 

security. We have had troops in Korea for 50 years, we have had 

troops in Europe for 50 years. We have made long-term commitments that were in the beginning motivated by the threat of the 

Soviet Union and the potential of a nuclear war. And it was a very 

clear threat, you know, everybody could look on a map and you 

could see the Soviet Union and you could hear their leader say they 

were going to bury us, and you could see the crisis along the way 

with Khruschev banging his shoe, and President Kennedy dealing 

with the Cuban missile crisis and the rest of it. 

There was a framework in which we could really understand and 

deal with what was ironically a conventional threat, you know. And 

we deterred it and we basically contained it and we waited for the 

Soviet Union to collapse under its own weight. We face, in my view, 


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a very serious threat, but it is of such a different nature that we 

are still trying to figure out the best way to contend with it. And 

so a lot of what we are talking about, your questions, my answers, 

our strategic reviews, you know, we are struggling with how on 

earth do we deal with people who are scattered around the world, 

concentrated in a few places, finding havens, using and perverting 

religion to motivate their followers, using modern tools like the 

Internet to wreak havoc. This is a very different challenge. And I 

think that we are still finding our way and so are the people we 

are working with who are trying to figure this out. 

Specifically Congressman, with respect to your question on Pakistan’s military. The Pakistani military has actually used F–16s in 

the tribal areas. We have agreed to a mid-life upgrade because 

without that mid-life upgrade, they can not fly at night, which is 

a pretty good time to fly if you are going after insurgents. And so 

we are saying yes, we want to see a shift toward the enemies that 

we think are posing this threat to Pakistan, and by the way, posing 

a threat to us. 

We also have a history of kind of moving in and out of Pakistan. 

Let’s remember here the people we are fighting today we funded 

20 years ago. And we did it because we were locked in this struggle 

with the Soviet Union. They invaded Afghanistan and we did not 

want to see them control central Asia and we went to work. It was 

President Reagan in partnership with the Congress, lead by Democrats, who said, you know, it sounds like a pretty good idea, let’s 

deal with the ISI and the Pakistani military, and let’s go recruit 

these Mujahideen and let’s get some to come from Saudi Arabia 

and other places, importing their Wahhabi brand of Islam so that 

we can go beat the Soviet Union. And guess what? They retreated, 

they lost billions of dollars and it led to the collapse of the Soviet 

Union. 

So there is a very strong argument, which is it wasn’t a bad investment to end the Soviet Union, but let’s be careful what we sow, 

because we will harvest. 

So we then left Pakistan. We said, okay, fine, you deal with the 

stingers that we left all over your country. You deal with the mines 

that are along the border. And by the way, we don’t want to have 

anything to do with you, in fact we are sanctioning you. So we 

stopped dealing with the Pakistani military and with ISI and we 

now are making up for a lot of lot of time. 

So this is an incredibly difficult set of issues that are all interconnected. But we can point fingers at the Pakistanis which is— 

I did some yesterday quite frankly. And it is merited, because we 

are wondering why they don’t just get out there and deal with 

these people. But the problems we face now to some extent we have 

to take responsibility for having contributed to. 

We are developing what we think to be very positive relationships with the civilian, the military and the ISI leadership. But I 

think any analyst will tell you that we can actually talk to and relate to the top leadership, but we have not had a continuing dialogue or training or contact with a lot of the middle leadership who 

have been influenced by the trends of increasing Islamitization that 

have swept the Muslim world. 


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So I put that out there because I think we have to think of the 

context in which we are dealing here. And just quickly on Hamas, 

look, I understand the sensitivity about this. I believe that we have 

a proposed policy in the supplemental that is an important way of 

our being able to encourage a unity government that does accept 

the quartet principles. And I would just underscore what I said 

about northern Ireland. There were a lot of people who weren’t enthusiastic about joining in peace talks and did so because they 

were pushed, but when they sat at the table they had to be part 

of an entity that said they were in favor of a peace. And not continuing the bombings in the UK and northern Ireland. 

And finally, I could not agree with you more on Somalia. We left 

Somalia for good reason. We said what are we doing in Somalia, 

you know? President Bush, the first President Bush had us go in 

on a humanitarian mission, we were never adequately resourced 

for that mission. We didn’t have sufficient forces there. You all 

know what happened. We withdrew, we said fine. It has been basically a failed state and al Qaeda and their allies love failed states. 

They just love them because they can set up shop and nobody is 

there to do anything to them. So we are looking at not only the piracy challenge, but how do we support this new federal transitional 

government of Sheikh Sharif, who at least has said a lot of the 

right things about how he wants to deal with al-Shabab and the 

insurgency. But I totally respect these three questions because they 

illustrate the challenges that we are confronting. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Mr. Kirk. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. KIRK

Mr. KIRK. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I am the only member 

of this subcommittee I think that served in the State Department 

and the Defense Department and the World Bank, so it is with 

great admiration I have for your career team. And I have a note 

of bipartisanship. You made tough—two tough calls on foreign policy recently. One when China confronted the USNS Impeccable in 

international waters you could have surrendered that ocean. Instead the following week you put a U.S. destroyer next to her and 

I think sending the correct message. 

You, also in the face of Vice President Biden, saying that we 

should not authorize the Afghan surge, you said that we should, 

and the President ended up agreeing with you and against the Vice 

President. And I think that was exactly the right call in Afghanistan and applaud you and the President for making that decision. 

We here have your wartime supplemental up. I would say it is not 

an $83 billion bill. I understand we just got a request for $100 billion for the IMF, and so I hope that Secretary Geithner will appear 

before our subcommittee as well since we are going to double the 

cost of this bill given the letter that was just arrived from the 

Speaker’s Office last week. 

One question I have for you is this committee has now approved 

$5.2 billion for Palestinian programs since 1992. That is more 

money than we provided to treat and cure cancer last year for the 

United States. It looks like much of that money was wasted and 

now we have got a request for $815 million more just in 1 year. 


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Much of this money obviously borrowed from China to give to the 

Palestinians and I worry about the wisdom of that. There is a lot 

of authorization language that was attached and I don’t know how 

we will work this out, whether the appropriators will write the authorization language or whether Chairman Berman will. 

But one key provision does appear that it would provide taxpayer 

subsidies to a coalition Hamas government. And you know that we 

have at least 26 American citizens that have been murdered by 

Hamas, including Tahilla Nathanson of New York, 3 years old; 

Malka Roth of New York, Mordechai Reinitz of New York, Yitzhak 

Reinitz of New York, Leah Stern of New York, Goldie Taubenfeld 

of New York, Shmuel Taubenfeld of New York, also 3 years old, 

murdered by Hamas. The list is the people killed directly on 

Hamas’ orders is clear. 

Now, the language I have it here for you to make it easy. This 

is the language provided that the chairman wrote, and I think this 

is very good language that prohibits assistance until Hamas has accepted and complies with the principals. This is actually an authorization of assistance to the government if the predecessor advises 

in writing or committees on appropriations that such government 

has accepted. Meaning that if we have 1 FATA president and 20 

Hamas ministers, you would have the right to authorize taxpayer 

subsidies of this government. 

I am worried that I met with King Abdullah yesterday who said 

that Hamas ministers all directly follow the orders of Tehran. And 

so it is a worry that we would provide taxpayer subsidies to a government with Hamas ministers. That is sort of like saying we will 

provide taxpayer subsidies to a collusion government, it only has 

a few Nazis in it, but it is okay. 

And I worry that the law that this committee drafted by the 

chairman is exactly correct. And I don’t think that this language 

should prevail. I would offer an amendment restoring the Chairman’s language if it comes up this way, because I frankly think 

this dog will not hunt and it jeopardizes the entire bill. But I leave 

it up to you to comment. 

Secretary CLINTON. Let me totally agree with the comments you 

made about Hamas and the terrorism and violence that they have 

wreaked, primarily on the Palestinian people, but then causing the 

deaths and injuries of Israelis and even Americans. I cannot stress 

strongly enough our Administration’s rejection of dealing with 

them, or in any way, supporting them or those who espouse their 

rejectionist violent attitudes. 

But you know, Congressman, we are currently funding the Lebanese government which has Hezbollah in it. And we are doing that 

because we think on balance, it is in the interest of the United 

States to support a government that is working hard to prevent the 

further encouragement of extremism. 

Mr. KIRK. If I could interrupt. King Abdullah told us yesterday 

he is concerned that Hezbollah will coup that government in July. 

Secretary CLINTON. We are all concerned about it, which is one 

of the reasons why it is important that the elections that are going 

to be held in Lebanon try to reinforce the leadership of the existing 

government, which has been standing in the way. 


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Mr. KIRK. I would just urge that you are picking up some pretty 

strong bipartisan concern here, which means that an amendment 

is coming, I would urge to you beat a strategic retreat at this point. 

And use the Congress as the bad guy, saying look, I am not going 

to be able to get taxpayer subsidy for a Hamas government in 

which King Abdullah publicly is telling people on Capitol Hill that 

all these ministers directly receive orders from the MOIS Iranian 

intelligence service in Iran. And so you are just going to have to 

either go into coalition without our money, which isn’t going to 

happen or—and use us as the bad guys. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I appreciate that advice. I mean, obviously we see it in a slightly more complex set of circumstances. In 

fact, we think there is some divisions between the Hamas leadership in Gaza and in Damascus. There is no doubt that those in Damascus takes orders directly from Tehran, there is no doubt about 

that. But we do believe that there has been some efforts to try to 

get more authority and opportunity on the part of those in Gaza. 

But nevertheless Congressman, I take your point. I take it and I 

understand exactly the point you are making. 

Let me just—— 

Mr. KIRK. Can I just end and applaud you again for the tough 

call in Afghanistan. You made the right call in Afghanistan. And 

as a Senator from New York and now as our Secretary of State, 

failure was not an option in this state. I really applaud you, because it was a hard one. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Israel. 

Secretary CLINTON. Let me just quickly add to the Congressman’s point about the IMF. The EU and Germany as part of the 

EU will contribute to the IMF. I know that Chairman Obey had expressed some concern about what these countries that weren’t 

doing stimulus would do vis-a-vis the IMF replenishment, and 

there is a commitment they will be part of the IMF replenishment. 

Mr. KIRK. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Israel. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. ISRAEL

Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. Madam Secretary, welcome, it is great to see you again. I have to apologize earlier, I had 

to step out to give a speech to a group of people who are interested 

in legislation that I proposed called Cash For Clunkers. And I explained to them that I couldn’t stay very long because I had to rush 

back to the hearing where I said Senator Clinton was testifying. 

And someone in the audience said, no, she is Secretary Clinton. I 

said, I just can’t let go. 

Secretary CLINTON. Oh, Thank you. 

Mr. ISRAEL. Madam Secretary, I am interested in having a conversation with you in the next several weeks about an idea that I 

have proposed called Solar Villages Initiative, and that is something I am anxious to engage you. 

Let me, in the next several minutes, focus on Afghanistan and 

the National Solidarity Program. Any history of Afghanistan proves 

that an attempt to impose order from top to bottom from external 

forces internally is doomed to failure. Alexander tried it, Genghis 


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Khan tried it, the Brits tried it in the great game, the Soviets tried 

it, and now in many respects, I think we are trying it. 

There is one program that is homegrown, called the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan that creates local solutions to local 

problems. It is managed by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation 

and Development, it is in 26,000 villages, 151⁄2 million Afghans 

have benefited by it, it has helped 500,000 families, it has provided 

clean drinking water, built schools, led to the empowerment of 

women. In order to be eligible for an NSP project, you have to have 

a local governing council, and that local governing council must 

elect a woman as part of the women’s empowerment initiative. And 

because it is entirely under local control and owned and operated 

by Afghans, the Taliban doesn’t view it as an effective target. They 

would rather target ISAF projects than Afghan projects. 

The problem is that it appears that there is at least $140 million 

shortfall in NSP for this year. There are 20,000 village projects 

that, to coin a phrase, are shovel ready but can’t get the funding. 

And it doesn’t mention anything about the National Solidarity Program. So I am hoping that we can work together on a program that 

is one of the few examples of proven and demonstrable success, if 

not in the supplemental, then as we go forward. And I would appreciate your perspective on that. 

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, I agree with you completely. It 

is my information that in this supplemental, we are requesting 85 

million in additional funding for the Afghan reconstruction trust 

fund, which, as you may know, is the vehicle through which we 

fund the National Solidarity Program. I think that we do agree 

with you that this has been very successful, it has gotten in to villages, it is actually producing results on the ground. And we don’t 

fund it directly, because we don’t want it to be seen as a tool of 

our policy because it is not, it is a policy of the Afghan government. 

So there is money going into the trust fund for replenishment of 

the solidarity plan. Is that right everybody behind me? Okay. 

Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you. 

Secretary CLINTON. That was so easy, Congressman, that was 

easy. 

Mrs. LOWEY. And since your green light is still on, I just want 

to agree with you, in every meeting we have had, there is a focus 

on the National Solidarity Program and it is hard to even believe 

that it is in 26,000 villages, but I have heard continuous corroboration on that, and I really appreciate your bringing it up. 

Mr. ISRAEL. And since my green light is still on. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Oh. 

Mr. ISRAEL. I would just take the opportunity, I am heartened 

about the 85 million. I will need to focus a little bit on that. The 

Afghan finance minister is due in and we are going to have a conversation about that soon. But still we need to keep in mind it is— 

at least $140 million shortfall this year, at least 140 million. If you 

ask some they say quite higher, and I am hopeful that that longterm deficiency can be addressed as we go forward. 

Mrs. LOWEY. And since there is universal agreement we can 

work together—— 

Mr. KIRK. Yes. 


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Mrs. LOWEY [continuing]. With the Secretary to see if we can 

find some more funding for that very successful program. 

Mr. KIRK. Will the gentleman yield? Especially the shortfall 

where U.S. troops are deployed. I think we can come to the idea 

that fully funding NSP in U.S. AORs would have huge support 

from this subcommittee. 

Secretary CLINTON. What we are doing in total is providing 145 

million in fiscal year 2008, 2009 funds for the NSP. So I don’t know 

if that takes into account the shortfall or not. We will find out—— 

Mr. ISRAEL. We will figure it out. 

Secretary CLINTON [continuing]. Specifically for you and get back 

to you Congressman. 

Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Mr. Crenshaw. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. CRENSHAW

Mr. CRENSHAW. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for 

being here today. You know, if anybody is listening to what goes 

on here, I think they would come to the conclusion that your plate 

is pretty full. We have touched on just about every hot spot in the 

world and so we appreciate the job that you are doing and the difficulties that you face. Since we talk about so many different things 

I want to just bring up U.S./Russia relations, because I think they 

are lurking in the background, particularly in terms of the Middle 

East. I think a week or two ago I read where the Vice President 

said we ought to punch the reset button with Russia. And it probably isn’t that easy. We still have some underlying differences, but 

I would guess that the reason he said that is because in the last 

couple of decades the U.S.-Russian relations are pretty well with 

the war in Georgia reached a new low ebb and maybe the only way 

to go is up in that sense. But with Russia all the growth that took 

place with oil revenues and then the difficulties we faced, it had 

new parameters and yet now things have changed again. 

So maybe to start with, what do you think about that in terms 

of, can you really punch or a reset button, their relationship with 

Iran, things like that? Where do you think we are in that sense? 

Secretary CLINTON. That is a great question. We have had a series of quite constructive meetings. I have met with their Foreign 

Minister Sergey Lavrov and we teed up some decisions for our 

President’s meeting in London. And the meeting between President 

Obama and President Medvedev were quite positive. I think there 

are areas where we can cooperate and rebuild a constructive relationship. We are going to engage in negotiations leading up to new 

start agreement by the end of this year because the current one expires. We are cooperating on North Korea, the North Korea as well 

as the Chinese supported a very strong statement, making clear 

that North Korea contravened the Security Council’s resolution 

about their missile launch. 

We are also beginning to cooperate in the Arctic Council about 

the Arctic, which I think I will highlight for you. I think it going 

to be a big issue in the years to come as we have more and more 

navigable water and Russia is the dominant presence in the Arctic. 

We are really looking for many areas where we can narrow the 

disagreements we have without sacrificing our principles. We are 


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continuing our work with Georgia and Ukraine on an accession 

plan to NATO. We continue to press the Russians not to support 

Iran, which we think poses a greater threat to them than it does 

to us personally. So there is lot that we are working on and we 

have actually put together a work plan, an organized approach to 

going through all of the these issues between us. Secretary Lavrov 

will be here in Washington in early May. 

Having said that, we have to do a better job of understanding 

how we can interact with the Russians so that they don’t engage 

in aggressive and threatening behavior to their neighbors. Their 

domination of energy in Europe is extremely intimidating. And I 

have appointed a special envoy for European, EuroAsian energy, 

because we have to get more pipeline roots and we have to help 

support countries to figure out how they can get our sources of energy besides depending upon Russia. So there is a lot that we are 

looking at and I think your question is really important because 

while we are dealing with all these hot spots we have long-term 

challenges. 

We have just decided in NATO to restart the NATO Russia council, which I supported. I thought that was the right decision. But 

it is complicated. You look at a map, there is such a huge land 

mass. They border all of these difficult areas that we are dealing 

with and we want to see whether we can partner with them to try 

to manage and solve some problems. 

Mr. CRENSHAW. I can’t see the light, if it is not on I just want 

to ask you about the encounter with the Czech Republic and Poland, that is a source of tension, can you comment on where we 

are? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, the proposed missile defense system in 

Poland and the Czech Republic is designed to address a threat 

from Iran. It is not designed to overwhelm the Russian arsenal. 

Even after a new start agreement, you are going to have a lot of 

nuclear weapons left. It never was intended to deter the Soviet 

Union for the Russians, we obviously don’t think that that is in the 

cards at all. But that is what we have been telling the Russians 

over and over again, this is about Iran. We think Iran is a threat 

to Europe and to you. 

We have also offered to the Russians to do research together on 

missile defense and to share information to try to provide an umbrella of security for Europe and Russia against a system that Iran 

might acquire, which is why we think it is important they don’t 

supply Iran with a defense system to guard against incoming missiles. So we have made this clear. I think the historic sensitivity 

of the Russians to their own borders, their effort to have a sphere 

of influence which we totally reject makes it a hard case, but I 

think that they are going to understand what we are trying to say 

and we will see what comes of it. 

Mr. CRENSHAW. Thank you very much. Mr. Rothman. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chandler is back. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. CHANDLER

Mr. CHANDLER. Madam Chair, thank you. 


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Madam Secretary, first of all thank you for all of your hard work 

throughout your long public career. I think you are going to make 

a terrific Secretary of State and I am awfully glad you are there. 

I have several things that I am interested in, most or a lot of 

things about Pakistan and the Middle East I know have already 

been asked, but I would like to get your ideas about the support— 

continued support for the ongoing counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan. You know, there are some observers who are concerned 

that this program to date has only managed to alienate Afghan villagers from their government and from our forces. They argue that 

perhaps counternarcotic programs should be put off until the war 

is won. I would like to hear your views on that. 

I would also be curious to hear what you think about what I am 

afraid is a developing very difficult situation in Sudan between the 

north and the south in particular. We hear an enormous amount 

about Darfur. Darfur is extremely important to everybody, but 

Darfur may actually, if you can believe it, be a minor problem in 

comparison to where Sudan may be headed in the future. I am concerned about the volatility of the whole region, the viability of 

Sudan as a state. Can it maintain itself as a complete entity or will 

it break up and can that be tolerated by states in the region, the 

volatility of that situation? 

And also if you have time your views on the future of NATO generally. Is NATO a viable organization and what can it appropriately be used for in the future. Thank you. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much, Congressman. To your 

point on counternarcotics in Afghanistan, we are certainly continuing with our counternarcotics efforts, but we are intent upon 

increasing the funding and support for alternative development 

programs. 

I was surprised when I learned some years ago that Afghanistan 

was called the garden of central Asia. It was filled with fruit trees 

and orchards and I have seen pictures from 40, 50 years ago and 

it is just unrecognizable. Anybody who has flown over Afghanistan 

now and seen the erosion and the dust and the lack of arable land, 

it was a surprising contrast. 

There are so many ways that we could support agriculture in Afghanistan and we intend upon doing that. That is one of our highest priorities. At the same time we understand the threat that 

counternarcotics or narcotic trafficking poses. It is not the main 

source of funding for the Taliban and al Qaeda but it is a source 

of funding. So we are going to emphasize agricultural and we are 

going to emphasize trying to expand programs to bring back the 

trees and the soil. 

When I was a Senator from New York I had a program between 

Cornell and one of our State universities to provide seedlings to Afghanistan. It was done on a small scale. I could never get the prior 

administration to really focus on it. And of course it does pose a 

conflict, because if you are going to aerial spray poppies, you will 

also kill fruit trees so it is complicated. So I think creating this alternative agricultural approach and then creating markets I will 

just end with this on this point because it is fascinating to me, you 

know pomegranates have now been proven, pomegranate juice to 

lower cholesterol. Afghanistan used to be and still is one of the 


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principal growers of the pomegranates. And I think there is a lot 

we can do here, we need to be smart about. 

I also agree with you about your caution concerning the north, 

south conflict in Sudan. We are very focused on Darfur for obvious 

humanitarian reasons and the continuing harassment by the Khartoum government and their militias, but we have got to keep our 

eye on the north, south. The comprehensive peace agreement that 

was reached, if that blows up again it brings in the other neighboring countries. So we have a special envoy for the Sudan, a retired two-star Air Force general and part of his mission is not just 

to focus on Darfur but to focus on the Sudanese challenge overall. 

Mr. CHANDLER. NATO. 

Secretary CLINTON. I am over my time. I took a gentle hint when 

they turned the time—— 

Mr. CRENSHAW. I think that was for me. 

Secretary CLINTON [continuing]. Clock my way so I figured I was 

supposed to follow it. 

NATO obviously we have to focus on the future for NATO. We 

are in the midst of a strategic planning effort. I think NATO still 

has a very important purpose and I am a strong supporter of 

NATO but we have to rethink how we structure it, reform its management and its administrative functioning and figure out what its 

missions are going to be. 

Mr. CHANDLER. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Rehberg. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. REHBERG

Mr. REHBERG. Thank you, Madam Chair. And welcome, I can’t 

think of anybody more highly qualified for this position than you. 

And thank you for taking the job having been First Lady and a 

Senator and now a cabinet official. By the end of this 4 years, you 

might qualify to run for the House of Representatives. 

Secretary CLINTON. John Quincy Adams did, remember. 

Mr. REHBERG. Just in a different district. Do take on Nita, we 

like her as well. 

I have a parochial issue, I will not waste time, I will like for the 

record if I could get unanimous consent to ask to submit some 

questions specifically about the directorate of defense trade controls 

and it is a defense issue where exporters of defense items are being 

charged a fee because they wanted to be 75 percent self funded and 

you have kind of wrapped up some of my small gun barrel exporters in Montana, it doesn’t make any sense to have them up against 

defense contractors when it comes to a fee. So I have some specific 

questions that I am not getting answers from the State Department, and I would like to submit those for the record if I might 

please. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I would be happy to enter it into the record. 

Mr. REHBERG. And then if I could ask two questions specifically. 

I want to get back to our role as appropriators and that is the 

Merida Initiative and the 400—and I believe it is 65 million that 

we appropriated in July 2008. Some of it is very slow in getting 

out, we had Assistant Secretary Johnson in talking about the various dates, but unfortunately some of those dates are being missed. 

I would like you to specifically speak about that. And it plays into 


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Montana surprisingly because we have a huge meth problem. And 

Mr. Sebol out there has a Montana meth project sweeping the 

country. He is helping to finance a public private partnership, but 

a lot of that is coming from Mexico and other places. I would like 

you to speak to the additional money you are requesting in relation 

to how it is not going out as timely as it could. 

And my final question is the Millennium Challenge. I happen to 

be a large supporter. I didn’t see anything specifically in your testimony about the Millennium Challenge. You do talk about 448 million for assistance to developing countries is that Millennium which 

wouldn’t go very far based upon the financial obligations? I just 

want to hear from you a little bit about your philosophy and the 

direction you kind of intend to take under the Obama administration as far as Millennium, and not doing what we did in Somalia 

walking away, Pakistan and some of the other countries, because 

it plays right into it, promises made and then promises not kept. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much, Congressman. And I 

do understand your concern about the DDTC program, and we described the current policy in a letter that we sent back to you on 

April 17, but I will also look into this and have our staff follow up 

with you. Obviously the goal is not to put anybody, any small business out of business, I mean that is not the goal here. It is to try 

to deal with the cost of running this program, which is obviously 

a facilitating program for American business. 

On the Merida Initiative, I share your frustration in how slow it 

has been getting the money out. Now, some of that reason I am 

sure David Johnson talked to you about this is we have to be sure 

we have in place the safeguard so the money goes where we intend 

it to go. But that doesn’t explain it, it is just too slow. When I was 

in Mexico, that is what I heard from both the President and the 

foreign Secretary saying, look, you say this is urgent and a big 

deal, but we are not getting the help we need even after the money 

gets appropriated. And I would like to work with this committee, 

and in general, Chairman Obey, the entire Appropriations Committee, but obviously I have a parochial interest here in my appropriating partners here. We have to figure out why this takes so 

long. 

Now if we don’t want to do it let’s just say we don’t want to do 

it, but if it is wending its way through the bureaucracy and it 

needs 900 sign-offs before a dollar is spent, we are just wasting 

time and losing ground. And because we aren’t as agile as we need 

to be in a lot of these circumstances, I am seeing other countries, 

primarily China fill that gap. 

An article today about Jamaica right here in our own hemisphere 

facing a financial shortfall because of the G–20, it goes to Congresswoman Granger’s question, came to the United States, we 

said well, we don’t have the money and we are not prepared to be 

able to help you. They want to China and they just signed a memorandum of understanding with China giving them what would be 

not very much money, I don’t remember exactly, maybe 150 million 

or something. And now they have a government to government relationship with China. 

So Mexico needs our help, we should deliver the help. In the supplemental we are providing funding for 3 Black Hawk helicopters 


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for their public security secretariat to provide them urgently needed air transport. I went down and visited their new police academy, 

they are trying hard to end the corruption, build morale. They told 

me they asked for the helicopters because they had budgeted to use 

the money on some other thing they needed in the fight against the 

drug cartels, and just haven’t gotten it and it has taken years. 

So let’s try to get to the bottom of this, because you all do your 

work and you get it appropriated. I go around talking about what 

we need to do, and it is kind of hollow. And we are losing ground 

and we are seeing particularly China come in right behind us because countries get tired of talking to our bureaucracy and decide 

they are going to cut deals with somebody else. 

Millennium Challenge grants are a very important part of our 

foreign policy. It is a new approach and it is an approach that we 

think deserves support. We have to make sure that just like anything else, it is part of our overall review of foreign aid, how it is 

working and how it can be better. But I think it has had a positive 

effect in a number of settings where it has encouraged people to 

make changes that we wanted them to make. So we are going to 

be looking closely at how to make it even better. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Before I turn to Mr. Rothman, I just want to thank 

you for your comments. This committee was in Mexico not too long 

ago. And we were so impressed with the President and the urgency 

of our assistance was repeated everywhere and yet it is just so 

slow. So we look forward to working with you and addressing that 

issue. Thank you. 

Mr. Rothman. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. ROTHMAN

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you Madam Chair and Madam Secretary. 

It is a great delight and honor to have you before us and to reiterate what my colleagues have said, what a great privilege and moment in U.S. American history to have such a qualified, intelligent, 

experienced person such as yourself with such an extraordinary 

grasp of these issues as our Secretary of State and we are delighted 

you took the job. We are very proud to have you in that position. 

We just came back from a trip to the Middle East with our chairwoman Mrs. Lowey and our ranking member, Ms. Granger, and I 

think it is fair to say as you indicated in your remarks that there 

appears to be a window of opportunity now for an agreement, a 

peace agreement between Israel and her neighbors that perhaps 

did not exist in the last several years. That opportunity is present 

and we want to make the most of it. 

The worst actors in the region all have one thing in common, 

they are connected with Iran, their Iranian proxies, whether it be 

Hezbollah or Hamas. And while we would very much enjoy a new 

relationship or a new beginning with the Iranian people given their 

present regime and its offensive policies and disruptive activity in 

the region, that is not going to happen soon. 

Here is my question: How do we balance the need to begin the 

engagement in terms of negotiations and discussions with Iran that 

I think are an important departure from the past and necessary to 

see if there is a chance to peacefully resolve our issues of conflict 

with Iran? How do we balance that need to want to talk with the 


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need for greater sanctions? What is the order of priority? Do we 

proceed with sanctions before we proceed with the discussions? 

How are you going to handle or juggle that, number 1. I have to 

get any questions in quickly. 

The other is with regards to the funds that you requested for 

Gaza. I know of your commitment that none of this money according to U.S. law it cannot, but that your commitment that none of 

the money will go to Hamas, or any of the terrorist groups, what 

kind of new mechanisms do you plan to—do you and your magnificent staff intend to put into place to make certain that no Hamas 

member gets any of that humanitarian aid that we want to provide 

to the people of Gaza. 

And finally, Egypt, the border between Egypt and Gaza, we had 

a wonderful meeting with the authorities in Egypt and I believe 

not only Egypt, but most of the Arab world in the gulf, Jordan, 

Egypt and other places or the Saudis are committed to a new day 

with regards to living together in peace with Israel, resolving the 

Israeli Palestinian conflict. The number one sticking point, Iran. 

They are making trouble, they are destabilizing the region, and 

their efforts to take over the region are very, very serious. So how 

are you going to balance the discussions and sanctions, make sure 

Hamas doesn’t get any piece of that humanitarian aid that we are 

giving in Gaza and how are we doing for helping the Egyptians secure that border with Gaza to prevent the rearming of Hamas with 

long range rockets? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, these are such important questions 

Congressman. We have sanctions and we continue those sanctions 

on Iran. We don’t yet have any real engagement so we don’t know 

how to gauge the seriousness of any effort the Iranians may agree 

to be a part of. The sanctions are a tool both for us to leverage 

pressure on the Iranian regime to change behaviors that we obviously consider serious threats. And so we are talking with our partners about additional sanctions as part of incentives, disincentives 

kind of approach to Iran. It is a delicate balancing act. It is hard 

to predict because so much of it depends in any negotiation whether you are getting something or not. You know one of the proposals 

that has been put forth by a number of people is the so-called 

freeze for freeze. We would freeze our sanctions and they would 

freeze their nuclear—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. They have been known, the Iranians, to slow walk 

the negotiations. They did that with the EU, how do we prevent—— 

Secretary CLINTON. We know that, we know that. Right now we 

are testing their willingness to have any kind of engagement, there 

is no engagement. So we have to plan all of this, think it through. 

Ambassador Dennis Ross, who is handling our southwest Asia policy including Iran is, I am sure you know him, he is extremely 

thoughtful and smart about how to sequence this. So there is no 

easy answer to your question right now. We know what our objectives are and we know that if we are not successful in moving toward those objectives that we have to impose even tougher sanctions, so it is a back-and-forth kind of assessment. 

I would reiterate what we intend to do about any aid that went 

to the Palestinian authority assuming that it complied with the 


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quartet principles. By saying that we intend to hold any entity that 

receives American aid to a very high standard we have made it 

clear to UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Work Agency that 

we intend to carefully track any aid that they receive. They have 

taken additional steps, partly at our urging to make their process 

more transparent, consistent with both United Nations commitments and U.S. legislation. 

They conduct background checks on employees, they share staff 

lists with us and with Israel. They prohibit staff participation in 

political activities. They launch investigations upon receiving information from Israel, us or anyone else about any staff member engaging in inappropriate or illicit activities. They are actually investigating staff members right now who were elected in internal elections within Gaza. And we have pressed them very hard because 

they have to earn our confidence in this. 

We are also vetting any NGOs. We have been very clear that any 

group that is a vehicle for us to give money for humanitarian relief 

in Gaza will be held to the same standards. We have a set of requirements on the Palestinian authority that they have to pay certain bills like utility companies and others because we want the 

cash transfers to be trackable. So we are putting in place a lot of 

safeguards. 

In addition, and finally on Egypt, Egypt has been very cooperative and helpful. They are doing more on the tunnels. I think that 

the plot that they uncovered involved Hezbollah was a real wake 

up call in some ways. And they understand the increasing alliance 

between Hezbollah and Hamas and their connection to groups 

within Egypt that are aiming to destabilize the government. So I 

am seeing a greater level of understanding and cooperation Congressman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Ms. Lee. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MS. LEE

Ms. LEE. Thank you. Madam Secretary, first let me just say you 

truly have the weight of world on your shoulders, but it is not 

weighing you down one bit. You are doing a wonderful job. And I 

am convinced, I really believe the world is going to be a safer place 

because of your leadership so thank you very much. 

Regarding the supplemental, I have quite naturally a serious 

concern that the military request is 75 billion and the diplomacy 

and diplomatic and development request is about 7 billion. And 

many believe that there is no military solution in Afghanistan, but 

the supplemental in terms of its balance certainly doesn’t reflect 

that reality. I was concerned when Congress authorized the use of 

force in Afghanistan in 2001 that we were given a blank check that 

provided for an open-ended military presence and the use of force 

in Afghanistan. And I couldn’t support that and I still see this happening. I am not sure where this all ends. Having said that, let me 

ask you a couple questions, just first with regard to the status of 

forces agreement. I know when you were in the Senate and Senator 

Obama was in the Senate, you offered status of forces agreement. 

I have a bill here very similar. What is the status of this now, now 


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that the Administration is looking at this, I believe under the previous status of forces agreement, does that still hold? 

Secretary CLINTON. Are you referencing Iraq or Afghanistan? 

Ms. LEE. Iraq. 

Secretary CLINTON. Iraq? 

Ms. LEE. Iraq. And then do you intend to look at one as it relates 

to Afghanistan, or have you really thought about that? 

Secretary CLINTON. Congresswoman, the Status of Forces Agreement in Iraq has been agreed to by the Obama Administration. 

There is a definite deadline, as you know, for the removal of combat troops. That is under way. There is not a comparable agreement vis-a-vis Afghanistan. 

Ms. LEE. And you are not contemplating one? 

Secretary CLINTON. That has not been part of any discussion. 

Ms. LEE. Okay. 

With regard to the global HIV/AIDS efforts, the Global Fund, as 

you know, and some of the numbers are really significant in terms 

of the results: We put over 2 million people on AIDS treatment; 5 

million have been treated for TB; and 70 million bed nets distributed to prevent malaria. And I believe this year the anticipated 

contribution is about $900 million. But I think it would have to be 

significantly increased if we expect to fully fund the anticipated 

grants and really meet the dramatic increase in anticipated demand. 

So I am not sure about the level of commitment that we can— 

or requests from the administration on this, and should it be or 

will you see a dramatic need to increase it for 2010? 

Finally, let me just mention this issue that, Congresswoman 

Lowey, I believe we were in Morocco, Ghana, Liberia, Kenya, and 

Uganda last year. During this trip, we went from location to location, and I pointed out then, and I am still concerned about this, 

the lack of minority personnel and minority contractors providing 

contractual work, services as it relates to USAID. And so I am still 

looking for some answers. 

Again, this goes back prior to this administration as to the policies with regard to the utilization of minority- and women-owned 

businesses. In my prior life, I actually was a business person, and 

I tried over and over and over again, probably for 11 years, to do 

business with the State Department, never could break through 

USAID as an AID contractor. So I am wondering, have you had a 

chance to look at that and diversity in the workforce and all of the 

issues around diversity? 

And again, thank you so much for your leadership. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, you are welcome. Let me just say on 

PEPFAR and the Global AIDS, Malaria, and TB Fund, our budget 

will come up, and I look forward to discussing the reasons behind 

our request. We believe that what we are asking for will be adequate given what is in the pipeline. And it kind of goes back to this 

problem of getting the money out and getting it where it needs. 

I mean, we just have to streamline this. We are really not doing 

ourselves or our taxpayers a service when we spend all this time, 

you know, working on our proposals to you, and then you spend so 

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sional response is, and then it just sits there. So we have got to 

kind of get on top of this. 

I take our commitment to diversity very, very seriously. And I 

will continue to emphasize the importance of us reflecting the country that we proudly represent. We have made some progress over 

the last several years. There is a wonderful program that is named 

for my friend Charlie Rangel that places young people in internships in the State Department. 

But, you know, we still have work to do. The whole contracting 

issue about USAID is one that we have got to explore together. I 

mean, it is estimated that $0.50 on the dollar never gets even into 

the program because it goes into contracting-related costs. And 

some have said, and I repeated it at my confirmation hearing, 

USAID has been turned into a contracting agency. So I would like 

to bring more of the services and the expertise inside USAID. 

But in any event, I will certainly assure you of my and the Department’s, and of USAID’s commitment to diversity in hiring and 

contracting find the very best people we can. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Madam Secretary, as you can see, there is strong bipartisan support for your leadership. You have a huge plate. There are enormous challenges. But I know this committee is honored and privileged to have the opportunity to work with you to address these 

challenges. 

Ms. Lee mentioned HIV/AIDS. If Earl Blumenauer were here, he 

would be talking about water. If someone else were here, they 

would be talking about micro enterprise. So we know the tremendous challenges, and we know that you are addressing them. 

I just want to close with one issue which I addressed in my opening statement, and that is the Pakistan counterinsurgency fund. I 

will be having conversations with our distinguished Committee 

Chairman, Mr. Obey, and Mr. Murtha. I think this decision to 

place those funds within the Department of Defense is a tremendous error. I think it undermines your authority. You are the person who has the authority to carry out our foreign policy agenda. 

And I do not say this lightly. We have been talking about this as 

soon as it was brought to our attention. 

So I urge you, because of the position you have as Secretary of 

State, to continue to work with us to make it clear that it is you 

and the Department of State that has the authority to set policy. 

And we will be keeping in touch on this issue. And I look forward 

to a positive resolution. 

So let me again say thank you. I am glad that we have been able 

to close in a timely manner, because there is a commemoration of 

the Holocaust which is beginning as we speak. 

And again, I look forward to working closely with you. Thank you 

very much. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. This concludes today’s hearing on the fiscal year 

2009 supplemental appropriations request. The Subcommittee on 

State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs stands adjourned. 


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I just did not say, Madam Secretary, if members have additional 

questions, including myself, they will submit them for the record. 

Thank you so much. 


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(57) 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009. 

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

WITNESS 

ALONZO L. FULGHAM, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN LOWEY

Mrs. LOWEY. The Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations 

and Related Programs will come to order. Today we are delighted 

to welcome Alonzo Fulgham as at the Administrator of the U.S. 

Agency for International Development. Thank you for joining us 

today. While we really do appreciate your efforts to move the agency forward during this transition, we are anxiously awaiting, as I 

am sure you are, the appointment of a USAID administrator who 

can work closely with the Secretary of State and articulate the importance of long-term development within the administration. 

As I noted last week, the President’s fiscal year 2010 budget calls 

for a dramatic increase in USAID operating expenses and provides 

for a significant boost in humanitarian and development assistance. It totals $1.438 billion for operating expenses, a $384 million 

increase over the fiscal year 2009 level, including the funding requested in the fiscal year 2009 supplemental. 

This request would support an additional 350 foreign service officers to keep us on track to double the USAID foreign service workforce by 2012. In addition, it includes $245 million for additional 

spaces in embassies and missions around the world to accommodate increased personnel. 

I hope that you can provide insight into how USAID is ensuring 

that the new hires have technical skills that reflect the program 

priorities, including climate change, agriculture, gender sensitivity 

and basic education, what training programs are being put in place 

to ensure that the new foreign service officers are oriented toward 

local engagement with nongovernmental organizations and developing country governments with a focus on building local capacity 

and providing smaller grants with more targeted goals and outcomes. 

Finally, how is USAID coordinating its projected growth with the 

State Department, and do you have a joint operations plan that 

takes into account security, space needs of the new employees requested in both the USAID and state budgets. Among significant 

increases in critical development areas, I was pleased that $1 billion was requested for basic education. that is pretty amazing. As 

you know, providing an education opens doors for young men and 

women and benefits the individual, their community and the world. 

I look forward to working with the administration to ensure that 

U.S. government resources support quality education and that 


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USAID supported schools serve as an anchor of stability and support in communities. Just last month I spoke with Queen Ranya 

of Jordan about the need to establish a new, multilateral global 

fund for education. 

During development of the 2010 budget request, did the administration consider the merits of such a fund? Can you provide me insight into those discussions? The $1.2 billion request for climate 

change initiatives includes $579 million for adaptations and clean 

energy programs, a $309 million increase over the fiscal year 2009 

level. Mr. Israel’s ears perked up with that. 

Clearly, the administration has structured its request to address 

the climate change crisis the world is facing, but USAID does not 

currently have extensive expertise in this area and the current 

staffing plan calls for only 21 new officers in the field. How, then, 

does USAID intend to provide proper oversight management of this 

new initiative? How will USAID programs be coordinated with efforts made through multilateral funds and with the State Department? Who is taking the lead on the post-Kyoto negotiations? 

As you know, I believe that successful programs have maximum impact when efforts are well-coordinated. The budget includes $1.3 

billion for food security and agriculture. How will USAID coordinate with other efforts funded by private foundations, such as the 

Alliance for a Green Revolution and a multilateral organization 

such as the International Fund for Agriculture and the World Food 

Program? How will USAID programs build upon the agriculture investments made by the Millennium Challenge Corporation? 

I am also concerned that gender considerations must be factored 

into all aspects of development assistance, especially agriculture 

programs where women often make up a majority of laborers but 

receive little outside technical assistance. What steps are you taking to ensure that gender is taken into consideration during every 

phase of USAID’s assistance programs? I noted last week my concern that health funding is not keeping pace with need. 

While I understand the President has announced his intention to 

provide $63 billion over six years, I am disappointed in the nominal 

increase for core maternal and child health, as well as family planning. I am looking forward to our discussion today and to working 

with you. Before we move to your testimony, let me turn to Ms. 

Granger, the Ranking Member, for her opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am glad to join you 

as we continue the hearings on the administration’s fiscal year 

2010 budget request. I am pleased that Mr. Alonzo Fulgham is 

here and understand just recently that you had a common career 

interest in my hometown of Ft. Worth, Texas, and was glad to meet 

and talk to you about that. The administration’s request for the 

state and foreign operations bill totals $52 billion, as you said, a 

large increase, 42 percent increase, over the fiscal year 2009 regular appropriations excluding emergency appropriation. 

Such a large increase in foreign assistance comes at a time when 

USAID is still working to hire the staff it needs to manage its existing workload. This Subcommittee appropriated the resources 

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ministration. I look forward to an update on the progress made 

thus far to hire, to train and to deploy these new officers overseas. 

The administration’s budget has been called a smart power budget. 

I have long supported the concept of smart power as a national security strategy, and I understand that USAID will play a key role. 

Thank you for being here with us today. I look forward to your testimony. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Acting Administrator Fulgham, please proceed. 

Your entire statement will be placed in the record. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. FULGHAM

Mr. FULGHAM. Madam Chair, Ranking Member Granger, and 

Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to 

appear before the Committee today in support of the President’s 

Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Foreign Operations Budget Request and to 

discuss the important role the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) will play in advancing our nation’s 

foreign assistance priorities. 

I would like to begin my testimony by thanking you for the help 

and support you have given USAID during the past few years. 

Your support has been critical to our Agency’s efforts to begin to 

rebuild and regain development leadership in the global arena. 

I am a career public servant, and a senior foreign service officer 

with over 20 years of experience serving my country at home and 

abroad. I am honored and humbled to testify in support of the 

President’s fiscal year 2010 foreign operations budget request. I 

look forward to discussing the important role the United States 

Agency for International Development will play in undertaking 

critical missions and sustainable development programs in support 

of our nation’s foreign policy and national security interests. 

As the acting Administrator, I proudly represent more than 7,000 

USAID employees who serve the Agency with honor, often under 

very trying circumstances, throughout the developing world. I also 

want to take this opportunity to recognize Secretary Clinton and 

her leadership team for their engagement with and dedication to 

development issues and USAID. 

Since her second day on the job, when she came to USAID headquarters to address our staff, Secretary Clinton had made clear her 

commitment to see development properly established as the third 

pillar of U.S. foreign policy alongside diplomacy and defense, a 

commitment that is reflected in the budget request before you. The 

President’s fiscal year 2010 budget request for USAID-managed accounts equals $36.7 billion, including food aid. 

This funding will put the U.S. government on the path to double 

U.S. foreign assistance by 2015 and to double the number of 

USAID foreign service officers over the next several years. Thanks 

to the critical support that we have received from the Congress, 

and from your Subcommittee in particular, USAID has already 

begun the process of rebuilding and regaining development leadership in the global arena. 

With fiscal year 2009 resources, USAID will add an additional 

300 foreign service officers to its total workforce under the Development Leadership Initiative. In addition, the President’s fiscal year 

2010 request also includes funding for 350 new foreign service offiVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 055951 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A951P2.XXX A951P2

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cers. As members of this committee well understand, diversity is 

central to the strength of any organization and is a high priority 

for USAID. 

I am proud to report that minorities represent 32 percent of the 

first five classes of our DLI. 

Madam Chair, let me assure you that you will begin to see positive change at USAID. We will improve our business processes— 

performing more functions in-house and using contracted technical 

services more appropriately. Overseas, USAID officers will spend 

more time with their projects in schools, and health clinics and 

small businesses in poor communities. 

A centerpiece of the fiscal year 2010 budget request is a significant increase in funding for civilian assistance programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. USAID is staffing up to serve these critical 

missions and participating fully in the whole of government approach to achieving positive results. 

It is USAID’s work to address the many complex threats confronting the world we live in: global poverty, food insecurity, pandemic disease, climate change, post-conflict instability and both 

man-made and natural disasters. 

As such, USAID will take the lead in implementing a number of 

Presidential priorities. First, basic education. The President’s request, a 60 percent increase over the fiscal year 2009 request, will 

ensure that the United States remains in the forefront of programs 

for all girls and boys in developing countries to increase access to 

basic education. 

Next, global health. The fiscal year 2010 request is $7.6 billion, part of a total effort of $63 billion over six years, to undertake a 

new integrated approach to global health. The President’s Global 

Health Initiative will build upon ongoing success in reducing 

deaths from HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. It will increase 

investment in safe motherhood and reduce infant mortality. The 

initiative will target for elimination certain tropical diseases afflicting millions and support improved healthcare services delivery. 

Moving to food security, President Obama announced at the recent G–20 summit his intention to request a doubling of U.S. funding for agriculture development in developing countries. USAID 

will support poverty reduction by boosting poor farmers’ access to 

seed, fertilizer, credit, linking small producers to markets, 

strengthening farmers’ cooperatives, working with U.S. land grant 

universities and encouraging private investment in agribusiness. 

Another key priority will be climate change. The fiscal year 2010 

budget requests $581 million for this critical issue. USAID programs will help those developing countries most vulnerable to the 

impact of climate change become more adaptive and resilient. Finally, I would like to mention the Rapid Response Fund, a $76 million initiative that will provide our government with the flexibility 

to respond quickly to unforeseen opportunities and to help shore up 

fragile democracies. 


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This fund will enhance our ability to respond to unbudgeted but 

critical windows of opportunity and demonstrate meaningful peace 

dividends to local populations. Madam Chair, with that I will conclude. Again, I thank you for your support to USAID and for this 

opportunity to brief the committee. I welcome your questions. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, and thank you again for your leadership. We will proceed with questions, five minutes each of us, and 

we will go side to side depending upon the order in which we can 

do it in. 

USAID STAFFING

In a recent hearing, Secretary Clinton lamented that lack of 

USAID capacity and adequate staffing has turned USAID into a 

‘‘manufactured agency’’. Her statement reflects the concerns that 

we have heard from nongovernmental organizations that USAID is 

moving away from indirect grants to large directed grants due to 

the lack of adequate staff to be innovative and creative in programming. 

In the past few years, as you know, the committee has worked 

with USAID to increase staffing, and as of today, Congress has provided funding to support the hiring of an additional 420 officers, 

and the fiscal year 2010 request will bring it to a total of 770 new 

foreign service officers. These young officers will all be sent to the 

field where they will be able to address some of the concerns raised 

by Secretary Clinton and the NGO community. 

A couple of questions following-up. What has USAID done to ensure that the expertise of the new officers reflects the priorities of 

the administration as outlined in the fiscal year 2010 budget? 

Where will these new employees be assigned? I understand that 

USAID has worked with the State Department to develop a construction and rehabilitation plan to ensure that these new employees have office space. Are you satisfied with the outcome of these 

discussions? Will these facilities be completed prior to the deployment of the new officers? 

Lastly, if additional staff is onboard in the field, how do you envision this impacting the operating model for USAID programs? Do 

you expect that USAID will begin to award smaller grants to local 

nongovernment organizations? 

Mr. FULGHAM. Madam Chair, thank you. I think that through 

your leadership and this committee’s leadership USAID has clearly 

recognized that the situation that we are in did not just happen 

overnight. It has been an erosion of our abilities over the last 15 

years. Thanks to the generous support of this committee we have 

started to rebuild this agency. 

The key for us right now is people. We need to get back to basics. 

Working side by side with communities, as I stated in my opening 

statement, providing assistance at the grass roots level and identifying ways to find more contracting opportunities that allow for 

smaller contracts or grants. What we are doing as an agency is hiring about 170 new project development officers, and 111 contracting officers. 

We have a significant number of compliance and development officers who will be able to manage these smaller grants and also implement those grants. That is going to be the key. We have got to 

get the workforce up to a level where we can get away from these 

large omnibus contracts. Those contracts were put in place because 

of a necessity, lack of management talent, so you had to bundle 

them. So now we are in the process of changing a lot of those processes and creating opportunities at the smaller level. 


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The key to being able to do smaller contracts is getting more officers in the field, such as compliance officers, contracting officers 

and lawyers. With respect to space overseas, we have been working 

very closely with the Department of State. 

Last week Deputy Secretary Lew issued an ALDAC, which is a 

cable worldwide to all U.S. missions, asking them to prepare for 

major staffing increases, and the doubling of USAID over the next 

three years. There is a task force that has been put together with 

USAID and State Department colleagues who are working through 

these issues to ensure that there are enough desks and training opportunities once these new officers arrive in the field. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Yellow light. Okay. I will ask just one other quick 

question that I have been concerned about. I am puzzled by the 

presence of two separate requests for flexible funding, $76 million 

for a rapid response fund through the USAID’s Office of Transition 

Initiatives, and $40 million for a Stabilization Bridge Fund to support the deployment of civilian stabilization initiative staff. These 

mandates seem very similar. I am not sure why they are both 

needed. How are they distinct from the existing OTI mandate that 

has been successful? 

Mr. FULGHAM. Our staffs have been working very closely to try 

and refine this process, but I think it is very clear, and you have 

been a strong voice in the argument that we need to get the military out of doing these quick or CERP type projects. This fund will 

allow for us on the ground when we are in crisis to be able to address issues in the short-term until we can request funding for 

these programs in the regular budget process. 

The OTI fund is a much smaller fund similar to what we used 

in Serbia, particularly in southern Serbia, to address conflict and 

instability in local communities. We had small grants that were 

put into those communities to try to bridge differences and bring 

those communities back together. What we are looking at with this 

Rapid Response Fund is a much larger capacity to be able to address critical needs on the democracy side, on the health side and 

on the economic growth side. 

Mrs. LOWEY. To be continued. 

Mr. FULGHAM. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Ms. Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. I am going to continue because on the 

rapid response fund I do not see a clear purpose or plan, so I want 

to go back to that and ask you very specifically why cannot the administration not used its existing programming authorities to meet 

these emerging needs? What criteria will be used to determine 

which countries qualify for the rapid response assistance? Give me 

a country or regional example of where such a fund would be needed. 

Mr. FULGHAM. A case in point would be, let us say, Kenya. We 

are already in the 2009 budget cycle. Things spiral out of control, 

and a new government comes into place. Our current programs 

might not address some of the issues that the new government may 

need to put into place. Maybe they are having a significant amount 

of problems on the health side or economic growth side. How could 

we immediately put in place programs until the regular budget 


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cycle could catch up in order to fund those programs? It is an emergency bridge to help countries that are in need. 

It is flexible. I know that that term ‘‘flexible’’ makes folks a little 

nervous, but in the world that we live in and the fact that we are 

trying to create space and help governments who are trying to 

move forward, we have to have the flexibility and the money available to help these countries in need on an emergency basis. The 

key here is that it is on an emergency basis and with the advice 

and consent of Congress. This fund will not be used every year. It 

is a set aside in case of emergencies. 

You have seen over the last few months the number of emergencies that we have been dealing with. Having access to a fund 

like this will allow us to have bridge funding until the regular 

budget appropriations can catch up. It also will help alleviate the 

need for additional supplementals. 

Ms. GRANGER. All right. I am going to come back to that in a few 

minutes but the other thing I want to ask you about, the Congress 

appropriated $245 million to support microenterprise and microfinance efforts. The administration’s requesting $167 million for 

2010. That is a $77 million decrease. In my experience, those funds 

have been very successful financing successful businesses and developing economies. 

Just like we have to educate people, we also have to give them 

a chance in those countries. You highlighted microfinance in your 

testimony but could you explain why the administration cut funds 

for the microenterprise by $77 million from its fiscal year 2009 

level? 

Mr. FULGHAM. In FY 2009, the previous Administration requested $103 million in funding for microenterprise. The FY 2010 

request of $167 million represents a substantial increase over the 

previous request and reflects missions’ estimates of the programming needs in the field. 

Some of our most successful programs have now spun off into 

banks. What we are trying to do is refine, improve the product and 

change some of the implementation mechanisms in some of the 

countries that we are working in, and at this point, we felt as 

though the pipeline that we had for 2010 was adequate to get us 

through that cycle. It may spike again in 2011 and go back up 

again, but the administration felt at this point in time that we 

have sufficient funding. 

Ms. GRANGER. Okay. Can you get me more information and keep 

me involved in that? 

Mr. FULGHAM. I would love to brief you again. 

Ms. GRANGER. I am going to go back to what we were talking 

about before with the rapid response fund. I have many of the 

same questions about the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. It has 

been billed as the civilian counterpart to military response, as you 

were talking about, but the details are pretty sketchy. Is there an 

adequate consultation between state and USAID on the development of CSI? When will the committee receive a joint spending 

plan that is required for the fiscal year 2009 fund? What part of 

the fiscal year 2010 request will USAID implement? Can you give 

us some more details on that? 


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Mr. FULGHAM. Yes. As you know, we have been trying to put together a civilian response corps for the U.S. government to respond 

to reconstruction and stabilization crises over the last four years. 

There has been significant consultation under CSI. The State Department, and I cannot speak for their portion completely, is set up 

as a unit that is the belly button for the civilian government so 

that the Defense Department will have someone to relate to when 

there is a crisis related to reconstruction and stabilization. They 

are responsible for coordinating the rest of the interagency. 

The fund that they have set up is basically used for deployment 

only when they deploy their forces, whereas with ours, it is set up 

specifically for operational purposes. So I see the State Department 

as the policy and coordination unit and then USAID as the implementation arm of our civilian response corps. As for the joint spend 

plan, thank you, it is currently with OMB and they are going 

through the numbers right now. We hope to have that in the next 

week or so. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Ms. Lee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MS. LEE

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, and good morning. Let me ask 

you just a couple of things. You talked a little bit about the 

debundling of the larger contracts. I asked this question and the 

former administrator, Fore was it? Fore? 

Mr. FULGHAM. Henrietta Fore. 

Ms. LEE. Fore. I asked about this issue when it came to minority 

contracting and minority hiring and one of the responses that I received was that due to the particular nature of USAID’s operation 

in developing countries, most small firms did not have specialized 

and technical experience to compete for USAID grants or contracts. 

That was the response, you know, as a result of my inquiry. 

What I wanted to find out is do you all have goals and targets 

for minority and women-owned businesses? If you do, what are 

they? How does this debungling now of contracts fit into—I understand the small business piece, but in addition, you know, we have 

the AID eight program and all of the other minority business requirements. 

Mr. FULGHAM. Ms. Lee, very good question. I have to admit, in 

the past our numbers have been woeful. Last year, after Ms. Fore 

had her meeting with you, we hired a true professional who really 

understands small business and minority businesses and what effect they could have on our business. In one year we went from 2.6 

percent up to 4.8 percent. The goal for SBA is five percent, so we 

missed it last year by .2 percentage points. 

Ms. LEE. Is this for minority, small, or what? 

Mr. FULGHAM. Yes. That is minority, small, disadvantaged businesses. 

Ms. LEE. Total. 

Mr. FULGHAM. Total. The goal is five percent. So we came pretty 

close to meeting that. I am not proud of that. I think we could do 

much better. One of the things that we are doing now is providing 

more workshops on a quarterly basis for new contractors to come 

in and get a better understanding of how USAID works and how 


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you get a contract with USAID. I think also one of the keys that 

we have been able to do is to start identifying any contract over 

$100,000 that is here in the Washington area that can actually go 

to a small business and get away from these larger contract contingencies. 

Ms. LEE. But you know what, there is a difference, though, between small businesses and then small and economically disadvantaged businesses. 

Mr. FULGHAM. That is correct. Yes. 

Ms. LEE. And so the 4.8 percent, is that small, minority, womenowned? 

Mr. FULGHAM. That is small and minority-owned disadvantaged 

businesses. 

Ms. LEE. Okay. 

Mr. FULGHAM. That is the SBA definition. 

Ms. LEE. Okay. 

Mr. FULGHAM. So, as I said, we have moved significantly further, 

we have got more work to do, but it is something that has gone on 

for a long period of time and we are slowly but surely making 

progress. I think that your senior staffer met with Mauricio Verra 

who has really moved the agency forward in this regard. 

To get back to my point, we are now putting rules and regulations in place that provide a level playing field, and that is the key, 

to provide a level playing field that will allow for small and disadvantaged businesses to compete adequately at the levels that 

they can compete at. I am very proud of what we have been able 

to do over the last year in that regard. 

Ms. LEE. Are you providing any technical expertise or any type 

of support for companies to really get into this? 

Mr. FULGHAM. Yes, ma’am. There is a maintenance program that 

we have set up. In fact, we would like to invite you. I am going 

to publicly embarrass you a little bit and ask you to come on August 6 for a monthly vendor outreach session to give a keynote address for our small and disadvantaged partnering program that we 

are putting together. There are a lot of things being put in place 

right now that are going to allow us to do a better job. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much. Madam Chair, I think it is really 

important because remember when we were in Ghana on a CODEL 

and we saw many U.S. companies, part of the Millennium Challenge Account compact efforts, other USAID project personnel, and 

many Americans there, but we saw very few minority companies 

and minority Americans. 

Mr. FULGHAM. One of the numbers I am really proud of is that 

of our task orders, which is our request for business opportunities. 

Out of $95 million in task orders awarded by USAID’s Chief Information Office, 93 percent, or $88 million, went to small businesses. 

Ms. LEE. Good. 

Mr. FULGHAM. We are also doing very well on the global health 

side. Anything over $100,000, we are trying to find opportunities 

for minorities and small and disadvantaged businesses. 

Ms. LEE. Okay, and if it is appropriate, if you could give us a list 

of the minority-owned companies that you do business with, I 

would like to see that list, and the type of contracts that they are 

doing. 


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Mr. FULGHAM. We would be pleased to do so. 

Ms. LEE. Okay. And then the other piece that I am hearing, 

rumor, is this the reorganization of the EEO office. What is going 

on? 

Mr. FULGHAM. I want to be very clear on this. We are an agency 

that is growing by 100 percent over the next three years. We have 

the same infrastructure in place that we had 30, 40 years ago. To 

me, from a logical perspective, anything we can do to provide better 

support to our employees, we should be doing. By expanding and 

creating an Office of Civil Rights similar to what the State Department has, we are not decreasing our ability to help our employees, 

we are increasing our ability to help them. 

So the change has come about because we recognize that we have 

this tremendous growth spurt and we have got to be able to better 

support our employees. Right now we have a diversity council, we 

have an EOP office. They are all spread out in different places. I 

decided to bring them all together and create an Office of Civil 

Rights. It is similar to the State Department. We are trying to do 

more for our employees versus less. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much. Good to meet you. Thank you, 

Madam Chair, very much. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. I think you raised this point and we 

had some in-depth discussions about it, and when you are talking 

about contracting, you are not just talking about contracting here, 

you are talking about abroad. 

Ms. LEE. Abroad. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Because that is where it was very evident. 

Ms. LEE. Right. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Mr. Rehberg. 

Mr. REHBERG. Thank you, Madam Chair, and welcome. 

Mr. FULGHAM. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. REHBERG. For local and regional food purchase purposes, is 

there a difference between rapid response and emergency when it 

comes to your either pilot project or your $300 million request for 

emergency assistance? 

Mr. FULGHAM. Sir, the rapid response program is a program that 

has been put together after the last couple of years. We have been 

dealing with so many different emergencies. We recognize there are 

two things that have to happen when you have an emergency. You 

have got to respond quickly, and you have to look at the cost. Purchasing goods reasonably provides for the rapid deployment of the 

food to the people who are most desperately in need. 

Mr. REHBERG. So are you suggesting there is no difference between your definition of an emergency and the rapid response? 

Mr. FULGHAM. No, there is a difference. 

Mr. REHBERG. There is a difference. 

Mr. FULGHAM. There is a difference. 

Mr. REHBERG. In looking at the list of where regional and local 

purchases have occurred I see countries like Somalia, Ethiopia, 

Kenya, Zimbabwe, Tajikistan, Kyrzykstan, Nepal and Pakistan. 

How many of those countries have had more than one year of 

emergency food purchases at the local or the regional level? 

Mr. REHBERG. Would you, please. 


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Mr. FULGHAM. Over the past five years, none of the emergency 

USAID local and regional procurements, food vouchers or cash 

transfers for food has extended for a period of more than one year. 

Mr. REHBERG. My point is I am looking at the justification of 

your budget and your budget increases and I am starting to see a 

trend of moving away from the definition of emergency or rapid response. For all intents and purposes, to one of a decision to purchase locally in an attempt to perhaps, from my perspective, I have 

to justify to my taxpayers why we are taking money out of a farmer’s pocket in Montana paying taxes to send over to USAID to purchase food products from somebody other than America and it is 

not a buy America. I have to have a justification. 

I can understand the flexibility, and I can understand an emergency, but if we start seeing a developing trend towards purchasing 

overseas, then we are going to put the red flag up. It is not just 

local agricultural producers; the unions are particularly upset from 

the maritime industries because all of a sudden they are not seeing 

their ships going overseas delivering the food in the areas, and so 

we are starting to get nervous about a trend developing. 

Mr. FULGHAM. Congressman, as a loyal American, the last thing 

I want to do is put our farmers out of business. I think when you 

look at this program, it really is for rapid response in regards to 

real emergencies where people could potentially die if we use the 

standard approach in responding to their crisis. When you look at 

the amount that we are requesting, I believe it is $300 million; it 

is a comparatively small amount. 

Mr. REHBERG. Well, it is quite an increase over the past budget 

bill and so it throws up a red flag as to why are we—and again, 

do not get me wrong. I am not suggesting we want to put any individual at risk when it comes to starvation, hunger, famine and 

such. What I am going to be looking particularly closely at is are 

we seeing that Somalia shows up one, two, three, four years in a 

row for emergency aid for local purchases when with a little planning on USAID’s part, or the Department of Agriculture’s, we just 

know it is going to occur and we get it in the pipeline and we do 

not use as an excuse rapid response or emergency. 

Mr. FULGHAM. Point well taken, Congressman. 

Mr. REHBERG. Could you tell me the coordination between the 

Department of Agriculture and USAID? In the farm bill there was 

an additional authorization. I still have not gotten an answer, and 

I did ask this question earlier from the State Department, just exactly, is the authorization a $300 million authorization for the life 

of the farm bill and how you are going to coordinate or is it anticipated it is going to be a $300 million per year authorization? 

Mr. FULGHAM. The new Farm Bill authorizes the Secretary of 

Agriculture to implement a Local and Regional Procurement (LRP) 

Pilot program (including a study and final evaluation) over five 

years at a total cost of $60 million. As part of our regular coordination with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), USAID 

shared and discussed the program criteria and implementation 

guidelines we developed for LRP this year. Moreover, USAID communicates regularly with USDA when providing assistance in the 

same country or region (e.g., Pakistan). 


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The $300 million you are referring to is found in the Administration’s FY 2010 budget request for State and Foreign Operations. As 

you know, International Disaster Assistance has typically been 

used to fund non-food emergency assistance, and provides the flexibility required to cover the local and regional procurement of food 

as well as the implementation of voucher programs when food is 

available, but not affordable for the vulnerable, at a community 

level. 

On the coordination between USAID, the State Department and 

USDA, it has never been better. I think we have a real team effort, 

especially looking at food security issues throughout the world. We 

have been working very close on a task force to deal with some of 

the issues regarding food security in some of the most troubled nations in the world right now. 

Mr. REHBERG. I appreciate that. If you could get back to me with 

the countries. Going back five fiscal years. 

Mr. FULGHAM. That is a fair request, sir. I would be happy to get 

back to you. 

Mr. REHBERG. Do you also have the data on other humanitarian 

food assistance by other countries? We cannot be the only ones 

shipping food. Or vouchers to Somalia, Ethiopia? 

Mr. FULGHAM. I could not agree more but that is a discussion 

with the Secretary at the diplomatic level on what we are doing to 

try to encourage our donor colleagues to be more supportive of 

some of these crises that we continue to address, sometimes on our 

own. 

Mr. REHBERG. You just do not have that information? 

Mr. FULGHAM. No, sir. I do not have it right now. 

[Information inserted for the record follows:] 


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Mr. REHBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Mr. Israel. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. ISRAEL

Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Fulgham, welcome. 

You have heard the Subcommittee’s concern and interest in microfinance. I believe that there is a special nexus between microfinance and renewable energy programs throughout the world. 

There are sustainable business models where microfinance is assisting in the deployment of solar lanterns, solar flashlights, solar 

cookers and other renewable technology. Can you give me a sense 

of exactly what USAID is doing, the extent to which USAID is supporting microfinance programs on renewable energy? 

Mr. FULGHAM. I think you are absolutely correct. In looking at 

our climate change strategy we are going to have to use innovation 

similar to this to get countries, especially where we have large economic issues, and with forestation, and farming and things of that 

nature, we have got to be able to bring the countryside into the 

game and get them to better understand why this is important for 

the longevity of their country. 

The overall climate change strategy is going to try to get at some 

of those things as we work closely with countries to come up with 

a strategy on adaptation and implementation of these programs. 

We have not been as creative as we could be. 

As you know, the Obama Administration is placing renewed emphasis on climate change, so now we have got to reconfigure and 

regear our operations to better address those issues. As we start 

to put together the strategies for the country, this will be an integral part of bringing especially the countryside into play and addressing this issue. 

As for the work we are undertaking in this area, USAID funds 

a number of programs linking microfinance and renewable energy. 

The Agency has given a $196,000 grant to ACCION International 

in Uganda to expand solar home lighting. USAID has also provided 

$205,000 to FINCA, a microfinance institution, to assess the market in Uganda and Afghanistan for renewable energy services, particularly in low-density rural areas that lack access to the national 

electrical grid. In November 2008, the Agency hosted a workshop 

on microfinance programs on renewable energy, which involved 

Grameen Bank and other PVOs. USAID has also funded the ‘‘Energy Links PodCast’’ series, an online resource containing interviews and information from industry leaders. 

The Agency is currently supporting two activities that focus on 

small and medium enterprises and microfinance institutions in the 

renewable energy sector. USAID is developing a toolkit and distance learning program to enable clean energy entrepreneurs to acquire business planning and technical knowledge to help them to 

develop bankable business plans. This program will support training classes in Senegal and Tanzania. In addition to the $600,000 

contribution from USAID, USAID’s implementing partner has 

raised investment funds from a socially responsible investor. The 

primary technology focus of this activity is improved cooking 

stoves. 


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USAID also plans to work with Global Village Energy Partnership International to support rural and peri-urban clean energy 

Small and Medium Enterprises in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. 

USAID anticipates spending $200,000 on this project, which will 

also leverage funding from the Developing Energy Enterprise 

Project in East Africa program. The primary focus of this activity 

will be working with microfinance institutions to increase lending 

to borrowers in the clean energy technologies sector. 

Mr. ISRAEL. Well, that is pleasing to hear. I know that you are 

seeking an increase of $309 million to fight global climate change 

in developing countries. In your testimony you talk about funding 

being used for deployment of tools for Earth observation, geospacial 

information hubs and early warning systems. I understand that. 

That is pretty sophisticated and somewhat scientific. Let me share 

with you a more basic model that I am hopeful that USAID will 

pursue. I have met with some of your folks before on this. 

This is a solar flashlight. You can buy one of these in the gift 

shop in the visitor’s center. This solar flashlight is being deployed 

throughout the developing world. There is a model that the Subcommittee has heard me talk about repeatedly, and I will not torture them anymore by repeating it again, but there is a model in 

the Sunderbans in India where you have a small, sustainable 

microfinance program. Six women have a solar panel. They are 

using that to charge solar lanterns, they are renting the solar lanterns, they are lighting the village. 

The Department of Defense would argue that to have stability, 

and security and prosperity you need a $550 billion defense budget. 

In the Sunderbans we are doing it for $35,000 with technologies 

like this. So I am very hopeful. This is my number one priority on 

this Subcommittee is working with you and other agencies to accelerate the deployment of simple technologies like this which light an 

entire village. 

I am hopeful that we can work together on that. I have not had 

the opportunity to speak with you personally about it, but at first 

blush at least, do you think that this is consistent with USAID’s 

mission, particularly with this ramp up in funding for climate 

change activities? 

Mr. FULGHAM. As I said before, the status is evolving. We are 

looking at innovative ways to address these issues. We are clearly 

going to continue to look at the ecosystems and the forest land 

usage within these countries and we have got to look at appropriate technology as well, so it is a package. I think that once the 

new political leadership is onboard, these are going to be some of 

the things that we focus on as we look to increase the climate 

change budget, I hope, in the future to address a lot of these issues. 

Mr. ISRAEL. My last question, one of the frustrations that I have, 

and I have shared this with Chairwoman Lowey, is USAID has its 

mission, we also have a Department of Energy that has an international assistance program that is meant to deploy technologies 

like this. To what extent do you actually coordinate with the Department of Energy to make sure that you are not duplicating, in 

fact, coordinating efforts to deploy technologies like this in the developing world? 


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Mr. FULGHAM. As you know, there is an interagency working 

group right now that is looking at these issues and there is more 

of a whole of government approach; there is more inclusion. As we 

begin to develop our new strategies and move forward in these particular areas, we are ensuring that there is not duplication in these 

areas. In these times of tight budgets we have to be very careful 

not to duplicate what we are doing with other agencies. 

Mr. ISRAEL. My time has expired. As the new, as you say, political leadership shapes up, I look forward to working with them to 

advance the goal. Thank you very much. 

Mr. FULGHAM. Look forward to working with you as well. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I just want to emphasize that I have had many conversations with the Secretary about the issue of coordination because wherever we go we call it stovepipes of excellence. We are 

not complaining that people are not doing excellent work, but very 

often, in fact, Ms. Lee mentioned Ghana and we asked the Ambassador to bring together everybody, whether it was the foundations, 

other countries, World Bank, everybody who is doing work in that 

area, and they were delighted because they had an opportunity to 

meet each other. 

They really did not even know each other. So I know this is a 

key priority of the Secretary—— 

Mr. FULGHAM. And deputy Secreatry Lew. 

Mrs. LOWEY [continuing]. It has been a key priority of mine, and 

the deputy for sure because it is essential, especially at a time with 

tough resources and for more effectiveness, that we coordinate the 

standard procedure. Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. CRENSHAW

Mr. CRENSHAW. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Welcome to you. 

I want to ask you a couple of questions about human trafficking. 

It is kind of a dirty little secret that goes on around the world, it 

even happens in our own country as well, and people do not talk 

about it very much because, frankly, it is pretty disgusting. It is 

just hard to believe in the 21st Century that people are being 

bought and sold for different activities. People just find it outrageous, but I guess it is something people do not want to talk 

about. 

You see it on the TV, every now and then you read a report, but 

then it goes back. As you know, I think it was in 2000 when President Clinton was in office before I came to Congress they passed 

a law to try to confront all this, and part of that law, every year 

the Secretary of State has to file a report, the so-called Tip Report, 

that looks at human trafficking as it goes around the world, as well 

as our own country. 

I understand the law allows us to sanction countries that we provide assistance to when they are not complying with the law. Do 

you know, what is being done at USAID to monitor that each year 

when that Tip Report comes out? Do we ever withhold assistance? 

Do we monitor that? Do we inform the countries that they are not 

meeting the standards? It seems to me when we will travel and I 

ask some leader, they will just say well, we are working on it. Can 

you give me some of your views on that? 


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Mr. FULGHAM. Yes. Sir, as the father of two daughters, this is 

probably one of the most reprehensible things that is happening in 

the world. I think that we recognize that this is happening mostly 

to people from vulnerable populations. It is all about political will. 

You have got to have countries and leadership in those countries 

who are willing to take the tough stance. I think our country has 

put in a tier process. If you reach Tier 3 then you are put on the 

list of no go, that your funding will stop, and that has happened 

to some countries. 

I think we have been very vigilant with the TIP program and 

with the State Department in ensuring that if a country is not living up to the tier process that we are willing to intervene and 

make a case that they should not receive any more funding from 

the United States Government. Overall, you know, we are continuing to increase and monitor these programs, we are doing more 

outreach, we are providing housing, we are trying to do more from 

a counseling and sheltering perspective, and also, one of the things 

we have to do from a development perspective is get at the root 

cause of the poverty in these communities. 

The more you can educate girls, the better off they are in understanding that there are economic opportunities out there and there 

is a better way forward for them. I think those are some of the 

basic things that we continue to do. We have worked very closely 

with international programs, the MTV program, which is a foundation, and doing lots of messaging, especially in southeast Asia and 

some of the problematic areas from transit to departure points. We 

are also trying to do a better job of forcing governments to recognize that they should not be involved in these processes. 

When I was in Serbia, this was a major transit point and we put 

a tremendous amount of pressure on the government to shut down 

the transit point between Serbia and Montenegro. There were some 

really good efforts done by the Serbian government, but then we 

had trafficking in another way from Italy, so there is always a constant pressure on these governments to try and change their ways 

but you have to continue to be vigilant at all times. It is not going 

to go away easily because it is such a profitable industry. 

Mr. CRENSHAW. So you do monitor the progress they are making 

and you actually sit down, and you do not necessarily condition the 

aid but you—— 

Mr. FULGHAM. If you go to Tier 3, your aid is cut off. Tier 2, you 

get a warning, you get a demarche, the USAID director in the foreign minister’s office saying that if you go to Tier 3, then your aid 

will potentially be cut off. 

Mr. CRENSHAW. Great. Well, that is very encouraging because, 

you know, if we have made this effort to really try to confront that. 

It is really encouraging to hear that you are making those kind of 

efforts. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Mr. Chandler. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. CHANDLER

Mr. CHANDLER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Fulgham, 

good to see you. I apologize for having to step out of the room. I 

missed some of the questions, and I hope I will not duplicate some 

of the things that have been asked of you. First of all, I want to 


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applaud you and your fellows in the foreign service and with 

USAID for everything that you do. It is utterly critical to the future 

of our country, I believe. Of course, I think you will get general 

agreement on this committee as to that notion. 

Our national defense, in my view, absolutely depends on what 

you all do. I am very pleased to see more emphasis placed on this 

area, on the whole idea of development and smart power, soft 

power, whatever you want to call it. I have a couple of questions 

that I think maybe have not been asked. One, I am curious about 

what USAID is doing in the way of developing markets. The Chair 

led us on a trip earlier this year to Central and South America and 

we were in Peru. 

I think we were all very impressed by some activities in rural 

Peru to of course work on finding alternatives for people who had 

been producing coca in the past. One of the new developments, I 

understood, was before we would just help them with crops but nobody helped them find a market. There was not any way to get 

monetary reward for the efforts that they had made. 

So if you could illuminate us a little bit on where that effort is 

going, how you are expanding it and so forth. And then the second 

question is a little bit different. USAID in the past has had a significant focus on preserving forests. This seems to have been broadened significantly in the fiscal year 2010 budget to include new 

landscapes. Can you give us a rationale behind the change in strategy there? Thank you. 

Mr. FULGHAM. Okay. On the first question, I am happy to say 

that USAID has been involved in creating markets for the last 30, 

35 years, especially on the agriculture side. I think your question 

is more specific in Latin America and the coca region. 

Mr. CHANDLER. There seems to be a little bit of an increase in 

emphasis on it, it would seem to me. 

Mr. FULGHAM. Yes. I think that if we are going to address unemployment and increase economic growth in these countries, we have 

to do a better job of creating the foundation and the infrastructure 

that is needed in order to promote economic growth in these particular areas. That means you need a market-based program that 

goes from soup to nuts basically. 

You have from the time the crop goes into the ground, it comes 

out of the ground, it is packaged, it is marketed and then there is 

a market that it is going to in a particular region. That takes infrastructure from the government; it takes private sector involvement 

and it takes donor involvement, and you need all three of those 

working together. That does not come together in a year or two. As 

you notice, we have had significant amounts of funding going into 

that region and we are really just now starting to show fruit from 

those investments. 

Now, the government is now taking over some of these activities 

and funding them themselves. That is when you know the development is really working in those communities. We are going to try 

to replicate that in Afghanistan, and in Africa, and other continents and other parts of the world as well because we see agriculture as the way to creating economic growth and job opportunities in these rural communities. 


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In regards to your question on preserving forests and broadening 

our efforts significantly, we recognize under climate change that we 

have to look at all avenues to diversify our programs to address the 

key issues that are affecting these communities that we are working in. Forestry is a huge issue for us. As you know, a lot of the 

countries we are working in, they are slashing, and burning and 

cutting down a lot of their forests, and so we are trying to provide 

additional advice and assistance. 

We are bringing in additional officers on the science side, environmental officers. We are going to hire 40 over the next three 

years. Also, one of the great things that we have right now is that 

quite a few environmental officers who have gone off to do other 

things, now want to come back to the environment sector because 

there is additional funding. We are just looking at expanding our 

horizons and our ability to affect change in these communities, and 

we are going to bring science and technology to a lot of the thinking that we are doing in this regard. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Ms. McCollum. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MS. MCCOLLUM

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you. It is good to see you again. 

Mr. FULGHAM. Nice to see you again as well. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I would like to take a second to thank all the 

employees of USAID and recognize the bravery of those Americans, 

those unarmed service men and women, who represent our country 

so valiantly. You put yourself in harm’s way to perform your missions of mercy that are vital to our national security. USAID employees take serious risks and all too often have given their lives 

for their country with little attention paid to the public sacrifice. 

So on behalf of myself, and I know other members of this committee, we thank you for your service. 

Now, turning to the budget request here for fiscal year 2010, I 

applaud the administration for making a strong and long overdue 

commitment to fight hunger around the world through agricultural 

development. You, Mr. Rehberg, had a good conversation about relief, but this is about development focus that the President is working on. We know that agriculture is a proven strategy to reduce 

hunger, it raises income and it builds broad-based economic 

growth. It is development that works. 

America has tried fighting chronic hunger with emergency assistance, as Mr. Rehberg was pointing out, and it is a flawed strategy 

and it has fallen short, so new President, new strategy. It is a 

smart investment, and I know it is going to pay huge dividends. 

I have another question, but part of what I would like you to talk 

about is how USAID plans to program the significant increases requested in the budget, and how USAID is going to fit in this whole 

role with the State Department on a new strategy. 

Then I have another issue I would like to bring up, and this is 

an issue in the budget where I have to admit I am frankly very 

disappointed, and that is the budget with this administration, their 

request for the area of child survival. I believe we are missing a 

tremendous opportunity. As we are all aware, more than six million children under the age of five die needlessly every year from 

preventable, treatable diseases. Over nine million under five deaths 


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per year. So, you know, nine million children under age five per 

year. 

During my eight years in Congress that would mean 50 million 

children have needlessly died from conditions like diarrhea, measles and pneumonia, which USAID and other partners have the experience, and you have the expertise to prevent it today if we 

choose to do so, if we choose to give you the tools you need to do 

that. Now, the impact of the global economic crisis on developing 

countries is expected to result in an additional—an additional— 

400,000 children in poor countries dying this year. 

Now, we can do something if we choose to do something about 

it. The report released in April said the U.S. saved 1.2 million lives 

with PEPFAR since 2003 with billions of dollars. I want to save 1.2 

million children’s lives every single year. I know it is not in the 

President’s budget, but I know he is concerned about maternal 

child health, so I would like you to tell us how we can work together to achieve this goal and start making a smart investment 

in the opportunity that we are missing in saving children’s lives for 

literally, as the Chair and members of this committee know, for 

pennies. Thank you. 

Mr. FULGHAM. Thank you. Those are two big questions. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. It is a big world. 

Mr. FULGHAM. Let me just try to tackle the food security question. Right now we have a billion people living in poverty and hunger in the world. This number continues to rise, and we recognize 

that. I think the President’s request to double the amount of assistance for agriculture provides the lead in trying to address that 

issue. When you look at agriculture as a productivity issue we have 

got to provide more seeds, more fertilizer and improved irrigation. 

We have got to link the producers to the markets and improve 

infrastructure in the rural areas, provide better storage and removal of the trade barriers, as I discussed previously. The other 

part of the strategy, which is equally important, is that we are coordinating for the first time as a government. There is a task force 

that is being led by Cheryl Mills, counselor to the Secretary of 

State, where all the key players in the interagency, USDA, USAID, 

the State Department, are all coming together in order to plan out 

how to move forward with our new strategy. 

One of the things that we have left out are the land grant institutions. We have got to get them back involved in this process. 

They were part of the green revolution 15, 20 years ago. We have 

got to get them back into the game. Also, it is private investment 

that is going to make a huge difference. We cannot solve this problem by government to government and funding alone. 

It is going to take involvement from the private and public sectors in order for this to move forward and work. Then, I agree, we 

have to continue to focus on nutrition for children under two. I 

think by creating a larger agricultural base in these countries we 

can get at that, but we have to work at that from a regional perspective. Then, we need to focus greater attention on the role of 

women. I could not agree more. We have got to do more to support 

women and create opportunities for them for finance and credit, 

and also a role in the agricultural sector within the country. 


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On the child survival issue, I think the administration is looking 

at this from a macro perspective. We want to get at a lot of other 

things that are important to the overall sector. We believe that the 

amount of money that has been requested by the administration 

adequately allows us in fiscal year 2010 to maintain the momentum that has been created over the last few years. 

I do not think one year makes a story. I would like to really look 

at this again two years from now, or three years from now and see 

where our numbers are. There is nobody in this room more committed to this issue than the Chair, and we have heard from her 

diligently about the fact that we want to see those numbers up. I 

really look at this budget from a holistic perspective. In the out 

years I think we will be able to provide more, but right now there 

are a lot of things crowding out some of these issues, and I think 

that in the out years we will be able to make up for it. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Madam Chair, if I could, if the gentleman from 

Illinois will indulge me just for a second to talk to the committee. 

I think we need to look, I have been a strong supporter of PEPFAR, 

but I think we need to look at the outlays and what is going on 

with PEPFAR and the billions of dollars being spent versus the 

millions of dollars that could be spent to save more lives and have 

more children being able to enter school successful and healthy 

with all the school programs that the administration is working on. 

So I think that this committee should really take a look at it. I 

know you are going to be driving for efficiencies, and I think we 

will be able to do that. For the record, I would like to enter a couple of pages from a report from Save the Children talking about 

many of the things that the acting director spoke to. Thank you, 

Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Mr. Jackson, we are delighted to accept 

the report for the record. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. JACKSON

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. Let me first begin by 

offering an apology to the Chair and to Members of the Committee 

for my tardiness, and certainly to Mr. Fulgham. This morning at 

my son’s school was a unit of discovery where he had to have his 

parents there to kind of share with his classmates and with his 

parents a little bit about himself and I just could not miss it. 

I want to follow up very quickly on Ms. McCollum’s question 

about agriculture and be a little bit more poignant. Given the 

President’s ambitious agricultural agenda globally, does USAID 

have the capacity and the agricultural experts to ramp up so dramatically across so many regions in just one year? And I wanted 

to hear your answer, Mr. Fulgham, to that question, and I also 

want to raise the question, I think I am going to get them out of 

the way at one time, about global health. 

Last week the President announced his commitment that his 

budget will provide a total of $63 billion between fiscal year 2009 

and 2014 for global health programs. In the announcement the fiscal year 2010 budget is highlighted as a down payment on this 

commitment, yet the budget only requests an increase of $406 milVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 055951 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A951P2.XXX A951P2

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lion for global health and HIV and AIDS programs, and only $106 

million if the Committee approved $300 million is ultimately approved. This represents only a 1.4 percent increase over fiscal year 

’09. 

A major obstacle to reducing maternal mortality is the shortage 

of doctors, nurses, midwives, and mid-level health workers who are 

skilled birth attendants. In Sub-Saharan Africa and large parts of 

Asia, fewer than half of births are attended by a skilled birth attendant. USAID’s maternal and child health strategy includes an 

increase of at least 100,000 in the number of community health 

workers and volunteers. What is USAID’s strategy to reach this 

goal? And further, there is a broad recognition that a volunteer 

model for community health workers is unsustainable and leads to 

high levels of attrition. What measures will USAID take to ensure 

that these 100,000 community health workers are fairly compensated? 

Mr. FULGHAM. On your first question, Mr. Jackson, earlier I 

talked about the rebuilding of the agency. We have depleted our 

agricultural staff over the last 15 years and we are now in the 

process of replenishing that staff. We are looking at hiring about 

93 agricultural officers over the next three years. We have got 

about 20 in the system right now. 

In our major programs we have adequate attention, but we cannot expand rapidly in various parts of the world because of our inability to get the officers in the right places at the right time. I 

think clearly over the next couple years you will see a significant 

ramp up in this area that will allow us to do more on the agricultural side. We will continue, however, to have contractors in place 

in countries that are in desperate need of this technical support, 

but eventually moving those contractors out with direct hire assistance. 

Mr. JACKSON. Global health. 

Mr. FULGHAM. On the global health issue, USAID will carry out 

its strategy to reach the goal of 100,000 additional community 

health workers across the 30 ‘‘MCH Priority Countries’’ during 

2009–2013. The initial approach will be to work with the approximately 15 countries that have policies and programs that include 

community workers as part of their national health strategy. In 

these countries, USAID will help upgrade and expand these community-based programs through the in-service training of workers, 

improving supervision systems, providing workers with educational 

and other technical materials, and, in some cases, with commodities to distribute to their communities. Senegal, Nepal, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda and 

the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, have recognized 

that extending high-impact interventions to greater numbers of 

families will require community-based service delivery. 

Once this approach is underway in countries with existing community-based programs, USAID will identify additional countries 

among the MCH Priority Countries that do not have such programs, but where need and readiness for them exists. In these 

countries, USAID will help governments examine the options and 

best practices for community-based programs, and will provide assistance in the development and roll-out of the programs, including 


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the training of new community health workers and the supervisory 

and logistic systems needed to support them. 

With respect to compensation USAID supports fair compensation 

and incentives for Community Health Workers by helping introduce and scale up successful experiences and approaches for health 

worker compensation. Community Health Workers receive compensation or other meaningful incentives that result in sustainability of community-based programming in a variety of ways. 

Ethiopia’s Health Extension Workers, for example, are directly 

paid by the government. In other countries, these workers receive 

remuneration by being allowed to keep a small mark-up on drugs 

and commodities they are permitted to dispense. This is the case 

with workers who provide community-based distribution of contraceptives in many countries. In some cases, CHWs receive support 

or special privileges from communities themselves. In other cases, 

non-financial benefits, such as free health services for themselves 

and family members, provide apparently adequate compensation. 

Even pure volunteer models have been successful at scale in 

some cases: For example, Nepal’s Female Community Health Volunteers—who are a key element of that country’s success in being 

on track to both Millennium Development Goals (MDG 4 and MDG 

5)—are not paid, but many have been in their positions for a decade or longer. Their compensation comes from the effectiveness of 

their actions and the regard they receive from their communities, 

along with the strong commitment and systematic support of the 

health system at all levels. 

USAID systematically analyzes and documents these approaches 

and their results, shares them with governments of countries that 

might apply them in their own community-based programs, and 

helps those countries to implement, evaluate and assure success of 

their chosen approach. 

Mr. JACKSON. I appreciate that. Let me, I wanted to raise one 

last question, I think I just have another minute or so. The lack 

of access to safe drinking water and sanitation has a significant impact on the lives of millions of people every day. Providing safe 

drinking water not only improves health outcomes, but it also has 

an economic benefit for families and communities. 

Over the past few years Congress has requested that USAID 

fund water programs in a sustainable way. Can you give us some 

sense of what USAID’s water strategy is? And in fiscal year 2010 

the MCC has requested significant funding for water and sanitation oriented compact with Jordan. Can you give us some sense of 

the role in the water sector of Jordan and tell us how the MCC 

compacts build on USAID’s prior commitment in that country? 

Mr. FULGHAM. Yes, actually I can give you a little bit on that. 

I led the delegation to the World Water Conference in Istanbul 

about six weeks ago. Clearly we recognize that water is going to 

be one of the biggest issues we face over the next ten years. There 

are going to be countries that will probably run out of water before 

we run out of oil. And we are talking about massive populations 

potentially having to move to try to find that water. 

I believe that there are over 260 water ways that more than two 

countries share in the world. So clearly this is a huge issue for us. 

We are ramping up our water program at USAID, and Jordan as 


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the example that you just gave is probably one of the more exemplary programs, but we still have problems there. It is about governance, it is about cost, it is about technology. We have been 

working very closely with the Jordanians. 

Right now out of their twelve aquifers, ten are in trouble. We 

have been working with Jordan over the last 20 years on water and 

conservation and costing. This new compact that Jordan is putting 

together with the MCC will be built on USAID programming. 

We are maximizing our investment which will allow us to create 

an environment where in Jordan they are doing the things they 

need to do to make the critical decisions to ensure that they have 

water in the future. But this is just not Jordan. We have, as I said, 

significant problems in the continent of Africa with water, and we 

have got to get back to basic programs that are identifying ways 

for governments to plan and strategize and come together with 

public-private partnerships. Once again it is not going to be just 

development dollars that make a difference in these countries, it is 

going to be the public and private sector and also donors coming 

together to come up with resources and strategies to affect the 

water in these countries. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. And thank you for your time. This concludes today’s hearing on the U.S. Agency’s International Development Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Request. The Subcommittee on 

State and Foreign Operations and Related Programs stands adjourned. 


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WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 2009. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

WITNESS 

JACOB LEW, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN LOWEY

Mrs. LOWEY. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations 

and Related Programs will come to order. Today’s hearing will examine the President’s fiscal year 2010 budget request for international affairs. And I am pleased to welcome Deputy Secretary of 

State Jack Lew, who is well known to us from his previous work 

as the Director of OMB during the Clinton administration. And in 

light of the foreign policy challenges facing our country, many of 

which require tremendous resources, Secretary Clinton was quite 

wise in selecting you as one of her deputies. And looking at the fiscal year 2010 request for the 150 account, I can see that you are 

already having a significant impact. Because we recently had a 

hearing with Secretary Clinton on Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and 

the Middle East, I would like to focus on the details of the 2010 

budget request for this hearing and take advantage of the expertise 

we have in today’s witness. 

Mr. Secretary, the President’s budget seeks an unprecedented $53.9 billion for the 150 account, including $52 billion within this 

subcommittee’s jurisdiction. And before anyone complains about 

the size of the increase I want to make it clear, let me note, that 

most of it simply is to regularize the supplemental funding for Iraq, 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, the West Bank, Gaza and humanitarian assistance. Total supplemental funding combined with the fiscal year 

2009 appropriations reflect an increase in 2010 of about $4 billion 

or 8 percent which is consistent with increases sought by former 

President Bush. 

President Obama, through honest and transparent budgeting, 

has declared up front the true costs and importance of our foreign 

policy. He is investing in diplomacy and development as our first 

line of defense by providing resources to create a 21st century State 

Department and USAID instead of relying on our overstretched 

military to run our foreign policy and implementing foreign aid 

programs. Our investments today in this approach will yield great 

dividends over time, and because as we all know, diplomacy and 

development generally are less expensive and more effective methods than military operations to achieve sustainable peace and security. In fact, the major increases in the international affairs budget 

are not for program expenses, they are for what I would call people 

expenses. With adjustments for supplemental funding, the President’s request seeks a 30 percent increase for both the diplomatic 

and consular programs account and USAID operating expenses— 


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164 

which funds the operations of the State Department, including personnel, security and training at our embassies and USAID development personnel and security costs. 

I applaud you, Secretary Clinton and the President for following 

through on your pledges to rebuild State and USAID. However, we 

do need a comprehensive strategy for spending these resources to 

achieve specific goals. I hope you can provide insight on why the 

majority of the proposed new positions will be domestic deployments instead of overseas given our understanding that the greatest needs lie in our embassies and missions abroad. 

For example, how have you integrated the new hires for which 

you seek funding into your global staffing plans, how will you accommodate these new State Department and USAID employees 

and already crowded embassies, and how long will it take you to 

recruit, hire and train these new employees for deployment? Are 

appropriate human resource policies in place to ensure the best 

people for the job are hired? I am particularly concerned that you 

are seeking significant and much needed increases for USAID 

which does not have a management team in place. 

I fear that if nominations for USAID administrators and assistant administrator positions are not forthcoming, Congress’ willingness and ability to provide the resources you seek will be compromised. Additionally, the administration needs to clarify the role 

of the civilian stabilization initiative and how it will interface with 

the operations of the rest of the State Department and USAID programs and personnel. Do you envision any differences in the concept than what was developed by the previous administration? 

Mr. Secretary, turning to the assistance programs there are relatively few major programmatic increases in the President’s budget. The key increases on development assistance are to scale up 

basic education, expand agriculture and food security assistance 

and grow climate change initiatives. I continue to believe that access to a quality education is one of our most important tools for 

channelling young people in conflict-prone regions toward a more 

productive path. And I am very pleased that Secretary Clinton has 

continued her commitment to basic education. And I look forward 

to our continued partnership on this issue. Additionally, in light of 

the economic crisis and the impact on food security, I understand 

your emphasis on agriculture. And while the grim news on global 

warming certainly warrants a more focused approach to stem carbon emissions and facilitate eco-friendly solutions to the world’s energy needs, I hope you can provide greater detail on the mechanisms and modalities for programming these increased resources. 

I am particularly concerned that there seems to be no budget detail on the $500 million requested for the Clean Technology Fund. 

I would note to my colleagues that the increases in the ESF account are largely to fund the programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 

Iraq, West Bank, Gaza. There is also a nominal increase in global 

health with the exception of malaria programs which are increased 

by $200 million. And while global HIV/AIDS funds have steadily 

increased over the past decade when many other aspects of the 

international affairs budget were cut or flat lined as we have seen 

with the H1N1 outbreak, health needs cannot be deferred. 


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Mr. Lew, you, the Secretary, your colleagues of the State Department, face a daunting set of challenges. But you have inherited a 

committed and skilled workforce, you have a Secretary and a President that have inspired millions around the world. You have my 

personal commitment and the commitment, I hope of all of us in 

Congress, to help you succeed. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Before I turn to you for your remarks, I would like 

to turn to Ms. Granger for any comments she may have. Ms. 

Granger. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank Deputy Secretary Lew for appearing today to explain the administration’s fiscal year 2010 priorities. The subcommittee has only begun 

to receive the details of this budget request. And I hope the Deputy 

Secretary and his staff will work quickly to provide the full budget 

justification so that we can better understand the items requested 

prior to us marking up the bill. We received some high level descriptions of the request. We note the accounts in the State foreign 

operations bill total $52 billion, a 42 percent increase over the fiscal year 2009 regular appropriation, excluding emergency appropriations. This large increase will bolster staffing, as the Chair has 

mentioned, for the State Department and USAID, support administration priorities like food security, climate change and global 

health, and continue support for civilian efforts to fight the war 

against terrorism, particularly in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

The administration has described this international affairs budget 

request as a smart power budget, one that balances diplomacy, development and defense in the advance of our national security objectives. I have long supported the concept of smart power, and I 

hope the Deputy Secretary will explain how the State Department 

and USAID plan to implement the amounts requested to support 

the diplomatic and development goals of this administration. 

Maintaining an appropriate level of highly trained staff is critical. It demonstrates smart power. And this committee has supported hiring efforts begun by the previous administration. I look 

forward to an update from the Deputy Secretary on the progress 

that has been made thus far to hire and deploy new foreign service 

officers. And I look forward to hearing about the new hiring expected for fiscal year 2010 and beyond. 

In closing, I should note that I am pleased the administration is 

following through with support for the Merida initiative. The $450 

million request is an important investment in Mexico’s war against 

drug cartels on our southern border. The Deputy Secretary and I 

spoke about how essential it is that the funds are provided quickly 

to the Mexican government. I thank him for the work he has done 

to expedite the funds already appropriated. I look forward to working with you and hearing from you. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Deputy Secretary Lew, your full written statement 

will be placed in the record. Feel free to summarize your oral statement so we can leave enough time to get everyone’s questions. Proceed as you wish. 


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OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. LEW

Mr. LEW. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, Ranking Member. I appreciate the warm welcome and look forward to working 

with you and the members of this committee both today and as we 

go forward. It is my honor to be here to present President Obama’s 

international affairs budget request for 2010. And I will take advantage of putting my statement in the record to summarize the 

major principles and priorities in the budget so that we can leave 

most of the time for questions. At a top line level of $53.9 billion, 

the request represents a 9 percent increase over the 2009 funding 

levels. This budget provides the detail of what we mean when we 

talk about smart power, and it provides the resources for the administration to pursue its foreign policy goals. The United States 

faces diffuse and complex threats, including terrorism, climate 

change, pandemic disease, extreme poverty and global criminal networks. 

Key to our security and prosperity is a stable and secure world, 

and we cannot achieve that through military means alone. It requires American leadership that promotes our values, builds strong 

partnerships and improves the lives of others. That is what President Obama and Secretary Clinton call smart power; harnessing 

the tools of diplomacy development and defense to help build a 

more peaceful and prosperous world. By reducing the risk that 

global poverty and instability will ultimately lead to conflict. Smart 

power will save us both dollars and lives in the long-run. We understand the economic conditions at home make this a very difficult 

moment to ask the American people to support even a modest increase in spending overseas. At the same time the American people 

understand that our future security depends on resolving current 

conflicts and avoiding future ones. When Secretaries Gates and 

Clinton testified together recently, they made a powerful case that 

investments in diplomacy and development, two of the pillars of 

our smart power strategy, are as vital to our national security as 

investments in defense, the third pillar. Smart power starts with 

people. That is why our budget puts an emphasis on increasing the 

size of the foreign service, ultimately achieving a 25 percent increase in state foreign service officers over the next four years. 

But I want to address special attention to the urgent need to rebuild the U.S. Agency for International Development. We are looking to USAID to take on some of the most difficult tasks in some 

of the world’s most challenging environments. But with its ranks 

thinned to just over 1,000 foreign service officers worldwide, 

USAID does not have the manpower it needs, which is why this 

budget includes a 45 percent increase in USAID operations and 

puts USAID on a path to doubling its foreign service officers by 

2012. All of our goals; conflict prevention, poverty reduction, food 

security, global health, climate change, come back to having the 

right people with the right training and the skills to get the job 

done. 

This budget also provides the resources to pursue critical missions in conflict areas that occupy much of our attention these 

days; Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. Our fiscal year 2010 request 

seeks $2.79 billion in nonmilitary assistance for Afghanistan and 


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$1.3 billion in nonmilitary assistance for Pakistan, substantial resources that must be coordinated and deployed effectively. Following the administration’s strategic review, State and USAID are 

implementing a comprehensive civilian program which is fully coordinated with our military and other key agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Justice, to bolster 

both security and development. 

At the same time, it is important to step back from these conflict 

areas to see clearly our broader objectives. We make investments 

to promote long-term development and human security both from 

the top down and bottom up strengthening the ability of governments to meet the basic needs of their populations, and at the 

same time, partnering with citizens and civic groups to build 

human capacity and reduce extreme poverty. Children need a basic 

education that provides skills to pursue opportunities rather than 

hatred. 

Parents need jobs to reject the appeal of extremists who too often 

offer the only way to support a family, and for many survival requires minimal access to basic health care. Overall 56 percent of 

our assistance request is targeted to development programs with 

special emphasis on economic development, good governance, global 

health, food security, education and global climate change. For example, our budget request includes $7.6 billion for a global 

health initiative, which continues the fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis and expands it to address maternal and 

child health, neglected diseases, family planning and basic health 

infrastructure. It commits $3.4 billion to a food security initiative 

aimed at addressing the root causes of food shortages by more than 

doubling the resources devoted to agricultural production and productivity. And on the climate front it seeks $581 million to help developing 

countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change adapt 

by becoming more climate resilient and developing clean energy alternatives. Our budget also invests in the strategic, bilateral and 

multilateral partnerships that are critical to global security, stability and prosperity. We focus on states that can or must be partners in regional peace and prosperity. And tipping point states 

where the potential for conflict and instability present regional and 

global threats. And we leverage our multilateral partners who represent both a force multiplier and a cost effective means for addressing global challenges. 

We are strengthening global security capabilities knowing that 

when our allies and partners can defend their territory and borders 

against external and internal threats we are more secure. Our 

strategy seeks to forge partnerships among states to help build 

global security and capacity in a number of areas, including peacekeeping, police training, counternarcotics, nonproliferation and 

combating nuclear terrorism. 

Finally, we provide the resources, over $4.1 billion to respond to 

humanitarian needs. Our humanitarian assistance programs that 

provide relief when we see human suffering are a fundamental expression of our values. At the same time leading with our values 

often strengthens our ties with other people. Our humanitarian efforts in the aftermath of the earthquake in Pakistan actually began 


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to turn the sentiment amongst many Pakistani citizens away from 

extremists and led them to see the United States as a political 

force for good in their lives. At this very moment we are taking 

steps to make sure that the United States is in the forefront of efforts to address the needs of people who are seeking safe haven as 

the government of Pakistan takes military action against extremists. There is a real possibility that in addition to the 500,000 already internally displaced another 1 million persons could need assistance. 

The challenge, in part, is providing funding and we are taking 

steps to make certain that we are able to help there. But even 

more challenging will be gaining access. And our very capable ambassador to Islamabad is coordinating with international organizations, NGOs and the government of Pakistan to determine how we 

can assist more effectively. Securing the resources to promote our 

goals is an important first step towards restoring American global 

leadership, but resources alone are not enough. We know we have 

to be better managers of our resources as well, especially in these 

difficult economic times. 

I hope my appearance before you today signals the Secretary’s 

seriousness and determination that the Department be a responsible steward of taxpayer dollars. It is the first time the position 

of Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources has 

been filled, and in only a few short months, our reform agenda is 

already robust. Even as we undertake the reviews and seek the 

necessary input to define our new approach, you have already seen 

signs of how we are going to work differently. In Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, we are bringing all agencies together under a shared set 

of objectives allowing us to benefit from the range of expertise 

available across the U.S. Government, maximizing resources 

through greater coordination and integration and recruiting rapidly 

to meet a critical and time sensitive mission. 

In food security and global health, the State Department is leading whole of government efforts creating inventories of programs, 

identifying gaps in our current programming and coordinating 

among agencies to develop a shared strategy. All of these examples 

highlight the need to develop broader mechanisms to manage by 

country and by function so that all foreign assistance programs are 

coordinated and resources can be allocated to achieve objectives 

most effectively and so that programs can be operated most efficiently. Accountability for results is another principle that will 

guide our reform efforts. We are keenly aware that with increased 

resources comes the obligation to demonstrate that we are making 

an important difference. 

Finally, we know that we need to be a more effective donor. Our 

people in the field must have the means to leverage opportunities, 

to build strong partnerships with responsible governments, and to 

support development progress by empowering partners to have 

more of a say in how aid resources are targeted in their countries. 

We look forward to consulting closely with you and other stakeholders as we consider these questions and others in the coming 

weeks and months ahead. I thank you for the opportunity to appear today and look forward to answering your questions. The 

President and Secretary’s agenda is an ambitious one, yet with the 


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right resources and good counsel, we are confident that we can 

meet these challenges. We look forward to working closely, and I 

welcome the opportunity to answer your questions. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much. 

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Mrs. LOWEY. We appreciate your wisdom and we appreciate your 

coming before this committee. And I will begin by asking some 

questions and then I will proceed from side to side giving each 

member 5 minutes. As you know, this subcommittee has supported 

efforts to strengthen USAID’s capacity over the past 2 years. In my 

judgment, USAID is the key agency with the responsibility for implementing most of our foreign assistance programs, and I agree 

with the Secretary’s objective of strengthening the agency. And I 

also agree wholeheartedly with, and we have had many discussions 

about, her focus on coordination, accountability. I have had this experience wherever we have been that people from one program 

don’t know what the other is doing. 

And so to go there and coordinate and to demand coordination 

will really bring about greater effectiveness. However, I find it difficult to comprehend that 5 months into the administration we still 

do not have any political leadership at USAID. There is no AID administrator, there are no political appointments for any of the assistant administrative positions. And as I noted, I think there is 

really a danger that unless a management team is in place to administer these resources, not that you are not very capable, that 

Congress may be reluctant to provide such significant resources. 

Can you tell us where the process is in terms of appointing a 

USAID administrator and why this is taking so long? 

Mr. LEW. Madam Chairwoman, the process of selecting cabinet 

and subcabinet level officials in the government is, as you know, 

a very difficult one and a very time consuming one. The administration began a bit ahead of other administrations. We have now 

found ourselves in the same situation that other administrations 

have found themselves in at this point. I don’t think we are particularly behind the past trends, but it is frustrating that we are 

not able to have our full team on the field. The process of selecting 

names, clearing names, bringing them forward for confirmation, 

has been very time consuming. I think the State Department is actually ahead of most other agencies at this point. Unfortunately, 

we have not been successful in moving as quickly on filling the key 

positions at USAID. There are a number of very good names that 

are in the process of review. And no one will be happier than the 

Secretary and myself when we reach the point where names are 

put forward for these positions. 

But I don’t want to leave the impression that in the absence of 

leadership at the Agency itself that there has not been a good deal 

of attention paid to USAID. I can say that I personally have been 

putting an awful lot of my time and attention into paying attention 

to the kinds of management issues that when we have an USAID 

administrator I won’t need to pay as much attention to. The Secretary has been involved as well. As we have planned for the Afghanistan effort USAID is at the core of it, and we have drawn on 

USAID at every level to be part of the strategic planning process 

and to implement effectively. As we review the priority areas, like 

food assistance and health care, USAID is at the center of it. So 

USAID is very much a part of the administration’s efforts. We will 

all be happy when we have fully confirmed leadership in place. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, I guess I expected that answer. However, I 

think it is important to note for the record that we eagerly await 


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leadership at USAID because I know that your responsibilities are 

widespread. And we both agree that having that leadership in 

place will be very helpful. 

Mr. LEW. I could not agree more. 

Mrs. LOWEY. And perhaps you can comment on the MCC. How 

close are we to having a CEO at the MCC? 

Mr. LEW. It is really largely the same answer. There are very 

good names in the review process. But again, I want to emphasize 

that Secretary Clinton is chairman of the MCC board and is engaged actively with the MCC as the person responsible for coordinating the foreign assistance programs. I have engaged actively 

with the MCC. And I think that contrary to the expectations that 

many had that we would not treat the MCC as a core program, we 

have very much been treating it as a core program and want very 

much to be able to help move it forward. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Good luck in that appointment as well. Lastly, the 

fiscal year 2010 request includes funding to hire an additional 350 

foreign service officers at USAID, 1,181 foreign service and civil 

service positions at the Department of State. This is in addition to 

the substantial increases this committee provided for staffing in 

the fiscal year 2008 emergency supplemental and in the regular 

bill for fiscal year 2009. Of the over 1,500 new positions in the fiscal year 2010 request, how many do you project will be posted overseas, how many domestically, can you explain the increased staffing, particularly for security related positions. 

Mr. LEW. Let me answer the question first in principle and then 

with some numbers. Our goal is to assign as many foreign service 

officers overseas as we can. There are domestic postings that support the efforts of foreign service officers overseas, so we will never 

be all overseas. There will be some balance. In the initial year of 

appointment, there are language training activities that have to be 

a domestic posting before someone is assigned overseas. So looking 

ahead, we see that there are roughly 180 positions that will be in 

hard language and other training at the Foreign Service Institute. 

We have a number of positions that are going to be coordinating 

with the Department of Defense, so there are about 20 positions 

that are detailed to DOD. And we have over 500 positions that are 

intended to be overseas right away. So the mix of domestic and 

overseas will be much more heavily weighted towards overseas as 

we get deeper into the training and deployment process. 

Mrs. LOWEY. My red light is on. Ms. Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. I understand that the President’s budget proposes 

removing language prohibiting or restricting funds for the Palestinians. These provisions are intended to prevent U.S. dollars from 

falling into the hands of terrorists. In the hearing with Secretary 

Clinton we had a great deal of discussion about the prohibition on 

funds going to Hamas which the administration included in its supplemental request. Now the administration seems to be reversing 

course. Is there a reason why the administration has requested 

that safeguards on funds going to Palestinians should be removed 

in the fiscal year 2010 bill. 

Mr. LEW. I am not aware of any provision that reverses the restrictions in this area. There has been some evolution of the proposal, for the provision that was in the supplemental appropriation 


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amended something that was put on in the Omnibus, and there 

may be something that is out of synchronization in terms of time. 

But I am not aware of any policy difference. And if there is something that hasn’t caught up in time we will work with you to reconcile that. Our position is very clear that we want to be in a position to support a responsible Palestinian Authority that is working 

to build stability, both in financial and security areas. We want 

there to be room for a government to form so that it can draw as 

broadly as possible to create stronger support for moderate leadership and drive a wedge in the support that extremists have. And 

we are very comfortable with the resolution in the supplemental 

which we frankly thought clarified the original intent. 

Ms. GRANGER. Okay. We will follow up on that and see if there 

is a conflict. I also want to ask you about Merida. We have visited 

and we understand the problem with Mexico. I want to make sure 

that we are on track to provide Mexico with the helicopters funded 

in 2009 by the end of this calendar year. 

Mr. LEW. We are on track. I actually just checked the other day 

to make sure that we are on track. And in general, the Merida 

money to Mexico has not moved as quickly as we would like, and 

we have been paying quite a lot of attention to why things are 

stuck in the pipeline. Some of the issues have to do with the fact 

that Mexico had not previously been a recipient of military assistance, and there was a fair amount of process they had to go 

through. That is finished now. There are now agreements in many 

areas to provide equipment where they are locked into place with 

deadlines, including for the helicopters. 

Ms. GRANGER. Good. Let’s make sure that happens also with the 

Black Hawks that are coming up. And then your fiscal year 2010 

request includes $450 million. We have not seen full details on 

what is in that request. Can you explain a little bit about the 

equipment and the programming that is being requested? 

Mr. LEW. The intention in the Merida funding was to continue 

with the program. And frankly, the addition that we made that 

stood out the most was adding the Black Hawk helicopters back in. 

That was in the supplemental. But that was the major addition. So 

I think that the approach on Merida is to give the Mexican police 

and military the equipment they need to mount an effective effort 

to stop the drug trafficking and crime. We want to work with the 

government of Mexico as we go along, and if their needs evolve, to 

work with them to evolve with them. So the precise details for the 

equipment that will be provided in the $450 million I would like 

to get back to you on. 

Ms. GRANGER. I understand. Thank you. Thank you Madam 

Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I just want to note that the President’s request does 

delete all the policy language, I believe, that is carried in our bill, 

not just the one that you referenced. So all of that language is in 

there. And I think we are in agreement with the administration, 

as you mentioned, that the additional language which we added, 

plus the other policy language that we have included, does define 

our positions, our mutual positions, very clearly. 

Mr. LEW. Going back to my former life at OMB, if I recall quickly, White House budgets always remove the language that is 


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added, and that doesn’t represent a changed policy, but it is an executive privilege issue. On the policy here, there has been no 

change and we remain anxious to work with the committee to 

make sure that there is no ambiguity about that. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Mr. Jackson. 

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Chairwoman Lowey. I want to begin 

by welcoming Deputy Secretary Lew to our subcommittee and 

thank him for his testimony. Deputy Secretary, I read with great 

interest your testimony, at least the version I received last night. 

The version I have been presented today is several pages short. 

Mr. LEW. I didn’t think you would want me to read the whole 

thing. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. JACKSON

Mr. JACKSON. It is actually not even here. It stops on page 4, and 

I think there are more pages that should be added. But during my 

tenure on the subcommittee, I have championed the countries in 

Sub-Saharan Africa and the larger African Diaspora. I fought not 

only to provide these fragile countries with emergency humanitarian assistance, but also with the resources for long-term sustainable growth. I noticed and appreciate the administration’s effort in 

its fiscal year 2010 request for migration and refugee assistance in 

that account to incorporate recent supplemental funding into the 

core budget requests. Aside from funding a much more accurate reflection of the ongoing needs of the program, I think this will help 

mitigate the operational challenges that arise from relying on 

supplementals to fund regular programming. However I noticed 

that if the President’s pending fiscal year 2009 supplemental request for MRA is approved by Congress, the fiscal year 2010 request would be slightly below the fiscal year 2009 appropriations. 

In view of the unmet humanitarian needs of many refugees and 

internally displaced persons—our ongoing special responsibility to 

displaced Iraqis and new humanitarian concerns in places like Sri 

Lanka and Pakistan—I am wondering how can the U.S. meet our 

current fiscal needs at the fiscal year 2010 request level. I would 

like to hear your thoughts on that. 

And in the interest of time, let me state also my next question. 

I noticed that our voluntary contributions to peacekeeping operations were decreased by around 25 percent. I know that the funds 

that were requested in fiscal year 2010 will support several missions in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Somalia, South Sudan, the 

DRC and Liberia. Since most of these missions have been ongoing 

for some time and will probably continue, why do we reduce our 

voluntary contributions to peacekeeping operations by 25 percent 

since we also decreased our assessed contributions to peacekeeping? Are there any missions that we might be neglecting? 

Thank you, Secretary Lew, and thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. LEW. Mr. Jackson, on the question of the funding level for 

refugee assistance, we very much have tried to take a look at the 

full year and include the resources that are likely to be needed. I 

should make the point here as in other areas that contingency 

planning is always subject to risk so you never have full knowledge 

of what will actually occur. So we would reserve the right if there 

are emergencies, even though we have planned ahead, to come 


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back and work with you. In terms of the number that we put in 

here, there are several areas that in 2009 were quite intensive in 

terms of demands for resources in Gaza and Georgia and Lebanon. 

And the change of the reduced needs in those areas we think provides a sufficient cushion that we are now funding at an historical 

level that will enable us to meet the expected needs around the 

world. As the year develops if that turns out to be an underestimate, we would work with you on it. 

But it is our best estimate that given the reduction in needs in 

some parts of the world, there is a cushion to meet the needs in 

other parts of the world. On the peacekeeping numbers, an overview that I would like to give is that we both, in the supplemental 

and this budget, have taken very seriously the need for the United 

States to fully meet its commitments to all peacekeeping accounts. 

The supplemental clears up arrears—this budget keeps us current 

and even takes a first step towards helping to deal with the problem that our fiscal year doesn’t match up with the fiscal year of 

international institutions—and will synchronize our payments a little bit more closely to the needs of the international institutions’ 

fiscal years. 

In terms of the specific numbers that you asked about, we are 

assuming that in the case of Somalia, that there will be a switch 

at least for the logistical support to be handled through assessed 

peacekeeping. We sent the notification to the committee last week 

on that. We know there is a variety of views on that issue and look 

forward to discussing that with you. We also note that the Liberia 

mission is scheduled to be completed and that will result in a lower 

level. So we think that the numbers that we have put in the budget 

will cover both the assessed and the voluntary requirements. 

Mr. JACKSON. Just a very quick follow-up if I might. The Liberian operation, for example, is scheduled to be completed, but the 

request from the Liberians themselves and the request of neighboring countries and other countries that have participated in the 

operations are also making the case that they would like to expand 

the mission to keep the stability in Liberia. And so it just appears, 

from my perspective, that reducing the voluntary contribution and 

the assessed contribution, that we are making some assumptions 

based upon dates that we think are approaching, but they may not 

necessarily be mission worthy or what the reality is on the ground. 

I thank the Chair for yielding me the time. 

Mr. LEW. Madam Chair, can I just add one further response. The 

supplemental level was actually kind of a high water mark level 

because we were kind of clearing out some arrearages. And we 

would not need to maintain funding at the 2009 level, including the 

supplemental level in order to maintain our activities. So I think 

it may exaggerate the difference. And we would be delighted to 

work with you, Mr. Jackson, to kind of go through the numbers 

and make sure that we are fully accommodating what is likely to 

be the requirement in Liberia. 

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Mr. Crenshaw. 

Mr. CRENSHAW. Thank you Madam Chair. Welcome. The Chair 

mentioned MCC. I was encouraged to hear what you had to say. 

I have been a big supporter of that. You talked about smart power. 


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I think it is smart aid where we require folks to talk about economic freedom and human rights and things like that. I was encouraged to see the request of $1.4 billion a sizable increase from 

last year. But since there is no CEO yet, I am a little concerned, 

and I think I heard you correctly say that you are trying to make 

that happen. Because my question is, do you see the MCC continuing to be an independent agency or right now you mentioned 

the Secretary is overseeing things, and I think that is good, but you 

don’t plan to move toward, away from the independent agency aspect and have it thrown in with all the foreign assistance, do you? 

Mr. LEW. I think that we view all of the different assistance programs as having important attributes that make them distinct 

from one another. But we also see there being a critical need to coordinate amongst them in a way that, frankly, they haven’t been 

in the past. There are far too few countries where all of the different streams of U.S. aid are fully coordinated. And that leads to 

duplication of effort, redundancy of capacity and not necessarily 

putting the U.S. Government forward in the best possible light. So 

I think in general, while we very much appreciate that there are 

differences in MCC with its five-year compacts, its very clear 

benchmarks, and its very unique characteristics. But on the 

ground, MCC has to draw on USAID for much of the work that it 

does, just as PEPFAR draws on USAID for much of the work that 

it does. We would like for that collaboration to be much more 

thoughtful and organic than it is. 

Right now, we are in a situation where it could work in one 

place, it might not work in another place. And when I ask for examples of where everything is coordinated, I am pointed to precious 

few countries where everything is coordinated. I don’t know that it 

requires a change in the law to accomplish what I am talking 

about. But if you think about the role of the ambassador and the 

DCM, if you think of them as a CEO with a range of programs that 

they oversee, there ought to be full knowledge by the ambassador 

and the DCM of all of the programs going on. 

And if one of the programs is undertaking an activity in an area 

where another is already present, a flag ought to go up and say 

let’s do this together, let’s not build two separate facilities that do 

the same thing, let’s not duplicate effort, let’s not send a confused 

message as to what the program of the Government of the United 

States is. 

I also think it is important that in all respects we think of our 

foreign assistance programs as being part of our foreign policy, an 

expression of our foreign policy. As we have gone through the very 

difficult discussions regarding the MCC compacts with certain 

countries where there are frankly problems, it has been very important to coordinate what is done through the MCC and what is 

done through our diplomatic channels so that we are supporting 

each other as opposed to working at cross-purposes. And I think 

that in that kind of nuanced way of managing, one can respect that 

each program has some very important characteristics that make 

them different from one another, but that doesn’t stop us from coordinating them to run an effective cross-governmental program. 


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Mr. CRENSHAW. But you don’t see any changes in the way—I 

mean, this is the fifth year they can have 5-year compacts. It is a 

pivotal year. 

Mr. LEW. I think that we do have some changes in mind. The 

MCC has proposed that the single compact versus a multiple compact issue is a serious concern that they have. And we support the 

notion of having multiple compacts. I think the whole question of 

5-year funding is something that we need to work with the Congress on. If somebody had asked me 10 years ago would Congress 

lock up money for 5 years for a program like MCC, I wouldn’t have 

believed it possible. But in fact, the commitment was made and 

there was the patience to stick with MCC long enough to give the 

program a chance to get the pipeline out into the field. I think we 

are now at the point where we all together have to evaluate the 

results, we are very pleased with the way MCC has been working 

and embrace the mission of MCC wholeheartedly. 

Mr. CRENSHAW. One thing, the time is almost up, but it is unique 

in the way the funding is planned out over several years. Most of 

the foreign assistance gets appropriately spent. And so the MCC 

money is always a target for folks to say, well, I know that is committed, but it is really not spent so why don’t we take that money 

and put it somewhere else. Do you have any ideas about how we 

can do a better job of making sure that when we enter in a compact 

and say this is what we are going to spend over a 3 to 5-year period that people don’t grab the money each year. 

Mr. LEW. I think the risk of multi-year money is one that is perennial. I think it is the right way to think about an awful lot of 

issues and we would love to work on multi-year programs and 

other areas as well. It is not always in the best interest of achieving long-term objectives to have year-to-year decisions. At the same 

time, I fully understand that the appropriations process is an annual process. I think MCC has survived through its kind of early 

years with the tolerance that it takes time to get the pipeline fully 

flowing. I think that the challenge will be for MCC to show results, 

and if it can show results, we can work together on multi-year 

funding. 

Mr. CRENSHAW. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Mr. Schiff. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. SCHIFF

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Deputy, good to see 

you. I know we did not reach a meeting of the minds last week on 

the issue of coalition government. And I want to reiterate my concerns about that. In the event there is a coalition government that 

is formed, I think we will need to revisit many of the issues that 

we discussed, and I am just going to leave it at that. I do want to 

ask you about three countries this morning: Egypt, Yemen and Somalia. Last week you may have seen a pretty powerful editorial in 

the Washington Post taking issue with unrestricted FMF, financing 

or other financial assistance to Egypt without any discussion of the 

promotion of democracy in Egypt. 

And while I don’t agree with the incompetent and condescending 

way that the previous administration sought to promote democracy 

in Egypt or elsewhere in the Arab world, the failure to impose deVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 055951 PO 00000 Frm 00190 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A951P2.XXX A951P2

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mocracy by diktat should not lead to total abandonment of a policy 

that seeks to bring more democratic rule to hundreds of millions 

of people through a process of candid engagement with current regimes, support for growth of independent civil society in the Arab 

world, support for media and unwillingness to continue turning a 

blind eye to gross violations of human rights. 

Poll after poll of Arabs taken in the last decade have shown that 

American support for authoritarian regimes is often at the heart of 

anti-American attitudes in the region. So my question, with respect 

to Egypt, is what will we be doing to promote democratic reforms 

in Egypt, notwithstanding the statements of the Secretary of Defense. And with respect to Somalia and Yemen over the weekend, 

General Petraeus told Chris Wallace we see tentacles of al Qaeda 

that connect to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, the 

elements of al Shabaab in Somalia, elements in North Central Africa, and that strive to reach all the way, of course, into Europe and 

the U.S. My principal concern is over Somalia and Yemen. And is 

there anything in the State Department’s budget or plans to try to 

create institutions in Somalia in particular, but also in Yemen, that 

will prevent either place from becoming the next Afghanistan? 

Mr. LEW. Thank you, Mr. Schiff. Let me start, if I could, on your 

first observation because I actually think we may have not reached 

agreement on words, but we have a meeting of the minds. We 

agree with you wholeheartedly in the case of U.S. support for the 

Palestinian Authority that we should not be supporting organizations or individuals who have ties to terrorist organizations. And 

we want to make sure that as we implement any appropriation bill 

that is enacted that we make sure that there is no ambiguity about 

that. Sometimes it is hard to draft the words, but I think there is 

actually an agreement on the principle. 

On Egypt, the U.S. funding for Egypt has been a source of some 

tension in the relationship with Egypt over the last few years. And 

the combination of the reduced level coming down and the earmark 

that went from $50 million to $20 million for democracy was I don’t 

think contributing to our ability to actually move Egypt forward on 

a democracy agenda. That doesn’t mean that we don’t want to support democracy activities. We do very much remain committed to 

promoting democracy in Egypt, and we understand the shortcomings that exist there. I think that in the conversations that the 

Secretary had when she was in Egypt, and the conversations that 

I have had with representatives of the government of Egypt, there 

has been an enormous appreciation that what we have said is we 

want to work together on identifying funding objectives which meet 

with our kind of bilateral approval. 

It is kind of not saying—we are not saying we won’t be promoting democracy activities, we are saying we want to have a conversation with them and engage with them in a somewhat different 

way. Egypt is an important ally. They have important challenges 

in this area. We know that we need to work with them. I think 

that they know they need to work with us. And we have tried to 

use the very small change in the way the aid is structured to create 

a relationship where you can have more influence and make more 

progress. 


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Mr. SCHIFF. If I can just say, if there is time for you to respond 

on Yemen and Somalia, I agree with that approach, and I think 

that we haven’t been very effective in our democracy assistance 

funding in Egypt, and that there may very well be room for us to 

work with the Egyptians on supporting organizations and democracy, promoting institutions that aren’t flash points in our relationship with Egypt. So I don’t think we have gone about it necessarily 

the best way. And I think there is room to work with Egyptians 

on a better approach. But I want to make sure we are not abandoning an approach, because I think it is fundamental to the concern that many in the Arab world have about the United States. 

Mr. LEW. If I might briefly just address the question you raised 

on Somalia and Yemen. In Somalia, we have a significant effort in 

the peacekeeping area. And we have put some $28 million into economic support funds that can be used for precisely the purposes 

that you inquired about: Reconciliation efforts, training government 

civic leaders and supporting initiatives that facilitate dialogue in 

civil society. 

I don’t think we disagree about the risk that is present in Yemen 

or Somalia. And we are very attentive to the fact that we have to 

keep our eye on areas of instability which could become the next 

challenge. Yet Yemen requires our attention as well and I’m happy 

to continue the conversation about Yemen. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr, Kirk. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. KIRK

Mr. KIRK. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I would note that when you left OMB, our assistance to the West Bank totaled $211 

million. And this year will be four times that at $865 million. So 

I share my colleague from California’s very deep concerns about the 

direction you are going. And I want to ask a very specific question. 

In November of 2007, the AID inspector general released a report 

entitled the Audit and Adequacy of USAID’s Anti-Terrorism Vetting Procedures. The inspector general concluded the following: 

AID’s procedures, policies and controls are not adequate to reasonably ensure against providing assistance to terrorists. These policies or procedures do not require the vetting of potential or current 

AID partners. 

Further, the sufficient management controls have not been developed to reasonably prevent aid from being inadvertently provided 

to terrorists. To decrease the risks of inadvertently providing funding and material support to terrorist entities AID should issue 

guidance on a worldwide anti-terrorist vetting program. In June 

2008, the inspector general released its own report viewing the 

State Department’s counterterrorism vetting procedures. They concluded procedures for counterterrorism vetting and whether vetting 

is conducted at all vary widely through the department. 

Different lists are consulted by different offices and few offices 

have negotiated special arrangements to conduct vetting at the terrorist screening center. The inefficiencies and potential 

vulnerabilities in these arrangements have been apparent both at 

the interagency and department level, but the interagency efforts 

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dures for counterterrorism vetting prior to awarding government 

assistance. 

In response to the 2007 report, AID developed a partner vetting 

system. I personally visited that office in Crystal City at the terrorist screening center. The final rule for the partner vetting system was published January 2, but left implementation to the new 

administration. 

Mr. KIRK [continuing]. Given the conclusions and recommendations reached by two IG reports and the very large provision of assistance now proposed for Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Egypt, 

and especially the West Bank and Gaza, will you commit to implementing the partner vetting system for the State Department and 

USAID assistance. 

Mr. LEW. Mr. Kirk, in terms of current practices on vetting of 

NGOs, you know there is a vetting process in place where NGOs 

are checked against multiple terrorist lists. 

Mr. KIRK. Can I just tell you the current system is one that the 

IGs decry? The new system that I am asking. 

Mr. LEW. And I am going to answer your question. The rules that 

you are asking about were presented for our review soon after we 

arrived and we asked a number of questions about them. Most 

prominently was why did it apply to NGOs exclusively, why did it 

not apply to contractors. And frankly I couldn’t be satisfied that 

there was a good rationale for saying that there was a difference 

that made a difference, and I asked USAID to go back and redraft 

a regulation that would be applied across the board. 

That has been sent to OMB. It is in the rulemaking process now, 

and it is on a template to become final. 

Mr. KIRK. Good. I support that you are actually going to expand—— 

Mr. LEW. I thought it was a mistake to issue a rule that went 

halfway and create confusion, when in just a few weeks we would 

be able to implement a rule that starts out in an even-handed way. 

Mr. KIRK. Great. I hope that there are no exceptions. 

Mr. LEW. I am not aware of exceptions. There obviously are 

many safeguards—— 

Mr. KIRK. The international NGO system hates this program, 

and so I would hope that you would not provide any out, given the 

very large increase and the fact that we may be, under language 

proposed by the administration, providing a taxpayer subsidy to 

Hamas-controlled ministries, the PA, this actually will protect the 

administration more than if there were—— 

Mr. LEW. Since all of my interventions have been to expand, not 

narrow the coverage, I know that it was broader than it was in 

January because it covers contractors. I will go back and check on 

that question as to whether any exceptions were in there. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I just want say that I appreciate—you will get an 

additional minute—but I just want to say I appreciate the gentleman bringing up this issue because, as you said, it certainly is 

applicable in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the administration 

has been extremely cooperative and understanding. We have to 

strengthen the requirements. There are chances that someone 

could get through a hole, but I think if we are all in agreement 


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that this is critical, we can certainly perfect the system. And I 

wanted to thank the administration, and now you can go back. 

Mr. KIRK. I take what you said as very good news. 

We have not received the formal budget justification for the De- partment. Our budgeting brief says that you will be requesting $62 

million for public diplomacy, including 20 new positions. I am concerned that we haven’t identified the Chinese speakers in that list 

of where we will be going. 

Also, last year we funded six new American presence posts for public diplomacy in China that cost about $1.5 million each in 

China. And Secretary Rice outlined a vision for 10 of these posts 

throughout China in the largest cities where we don’t have a consulate. 

In the budgeting brief we have no mention of American presence 

posts. For example, here is a list of cities with no American presence whatsoever: In Xinxiang, 8.5 million people; Tianjin, 8.2; 

Chongqing, 7.5; Nanjing, 7; Dandong, 6.5; Hengshui, 6.3. So these 

are all plus five million metropolitan jurisdictions. 

Are we going to fund the American presence posts plans of the 

Department or are we going to let these cities go. 

Mr. LEW. Well, first in terms of when the details are going to be 

forthcoming, our plan is to get the detailed budget justification up 

in about 2 weeks, which I am told is actually ahead of past schedules, which given that it is a transition year is something that we 

feel pretty good about. So I apologize it is not here yet, but we are 

trying to get it to you as soon as possible. 

In terms of the American presence posts we are looking at the 

issue, and, you know, understand that it will require some engagement with the government of China to work through what would 

be acceptable posts. We are aware that they have a desire to have 

some additional offices in the United States and look forward to engaging in a conversation with them where their interests and our 

interests can all be worked through. 

Mr. KIRK. I just say that these cities alone, which would be six 

cities, is over 40 million people where there is no U.S. Diplomatic 

presence. 

Mr. LEW. I understand the issue, and I think that as we work 

through these issues with the Chinese there will be some places 

where presence is more likely to be possible than others, and we 

will get back to you as we proceed. 

Mr. KIRK. Thank you. I see. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. In terms of the resources I would just 

say that your input is helpful, and if we could justify positions in 

every place where we would like positions, I am not sure where 

that would take us, Mr. Kirk. So I look forward to working with 

you and certainly the State Department in evaluating your requests and see what we can do to be helpful. 

Ms. Lee. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MS. LEE

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Secretary. Thank you for being here and congratulations. We certainly have a lot of work to do. 

Mr. LEW. Yes, we do. 


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Ms. LEE. War, poverty, genocide, disease, climate change, but I 

am very pleased to see that President Obama has pledged to double foreign assistance by 2015. It really begins to put us on the 

right track toward reaching some of our goals. So congratulations 

to you for being in the position to make sure that much of this happens. 

Before I ask you a couple of questions on the budget, let me just 

mention, and I mentioned this to the Secretary in terms of an inquiry with regard to a constituent of mine, Tristan Anderson, who 

was seriously injured when he was struck in the head by a tear gas 

canister in Israel and by Israeli soldiers while he was engaging in 

a nonviolent demonstration. So we will be following up, writing a 

more detailed letter because I am hoping the State Department is 

monitoring the full investigation of this very, very terrible incident. 

On the budget, let me ask about the Global Fund first of all. It 

has always been a key component in our response to the HIV/AIDS 

pandemic, TB and malaria, and in a very short period of time we 

really achieved significant results putting over 2 million people on 

AIDS treatment, 5 million are being treated for TB, and 70 million 

bed nets have been distributed to prevent malaria, and of course 

we have been a generous donor to the fund, but the anticipated 

contribution I think it is $900 million in the fiscal year 2009 budget. That will have to be significantly increased if we expect to fully 

fund all of the grants and meet the dramatically increased needs 

anticipated for 2010. 

And so I am not sure in terms of this budget, it looks like we 

are flat lining our contribution to the Global Fund, and I am wondering could you clarify that, especially given the need to actually 

increase it. 

Next, let me just congratulate you and our administration for the 

new Global Health Initiative. I think that it is a major step in the 

right direction in terms of looking at how we address our smart 

power agenda. I am concerned, though, that the $51 billion allocated to PEPFAR and malaria over the next 6 years could fall 

short, if I am reading this right, at the funding pace which we authorized, and that was about $48 billion over the next 5 years. 

So I would like to get some clarification on how we are addressing the Global Fund and PEPFAR and I want to make sure that 

we are not—or we shouldn’t—anticipate a decline in resources for 

these very important and productive and noble efforts that we are 

engaged in. 

Mr. LEW. Thank you for those questions. I think that by any estimation you know PEPFAR and the Global Fund have just done an 

enormous amount in a very short period of time to tackle a terrible 

disease—three terrible diseases with extraordinary impact. The 

President and the administration continue to support very strongly 

the funding of those programs, and as you noted, we have expanded the concept to have a broader global health focus. 

In terms of the Global Fund itself, we actually requested a higher funding level than has been requested previously, and overall we 

think we have funded both the U.S. and the Global Fund programs 

so that they can meet the need. There is obviously some interplay 

between the two, and we know that in the past there has been 

back and forth between Congress and the administration on this 


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and we look forward to continuing that conversation as we go 

through the year. 

On the global health program more broadly, the focus on the 

three diseases in PEPFAR, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, 

has been enormously valuable in terms of just tackling a problem 

that 8 years ago had no solution and now giving 2 million people 

treatment that is life saving. You know, we need to find the means 

to extend that kind of focus to a number of other areas where we 

know very well how to improve health and life extending outcomes, 

actually more easily and less expensively than in those other areas. 

Our focus is on basic health issues, things like maternal and 

child health and the neglected tropical diseases, diarrheal illness 

which takes the lives of so many children, things that are very easy 

when you have a health presence to treat them and can be done 

in a coordinated way. 

In terms of the funding level overall, the President committed to funding the PEPFAR program at $50 billion over 5 years. He has 

actually increased it to 51 in his budget and it is over 6 years. We 

think that that is a funding level that will enable us to keep pace. 

There are many issues about the projected requirements to keep 

pace with the current program and, as I think you know, there is 

a statutorily required strategic review of the program which our 

new administrator, who is going to be running the PEPFAR program when he is confirmed, will take on as a first order of business. 

Ms. LEE. Madam Chair, may I just quickly follow up? With regard to PEPFAR, I want to make sure that we are talking about 

a minimum of at least $4.8 billion a year for PEPFAR. The numbers, I am not sure, I know you have $51 billion over the next 6 

years, which falls short for the funding pace for PEPFAR alone. 

And then secondly, yes, the administration has requested more 

than previous administrations for the Global Fund, but that is part 

of the reason we are behind and there are grants now that are 

pending that won’t be funded if, in fact, we don’t significantly increase that $900 million. 

Mr. LEW. We believe the funding level that the administration 

put in meets the needs of the program. If there are shortfalls that 

you see, we would be happy to discuss those with you. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I would like to 

follow up with you on that. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Ms. Lee, and I just want to thank Mr. 

Lew as well for suggesting that there has been a conversation and 

that there will continue to be a conversation. As you know, in the 

supplemental we put an additional $100 million for the Global 

Fund, and as for the question of balancing all the tremendous 

needs we have, certainly we want to continue to see aggressive action with HIV/AIDS and the Global Fund and PEPFAR, et cetera, 

and how that balances with food security and agriculture and education. It is worthy of additional conversation, as you said. So I 

thank you for your input. 

Mr. Rehberg. 

Mr. REHBERG. Thank you, Madam Chair. Being new to the subcommittee, I am trying to create a timeline on food security and 

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modities. I notice in your presentation you have an appropriation 

request of an additional $300 million. Could you work through with 

me what you mean by famine prevention? Is that an emergency in 

the minds of those within the State Department? And the authority 

was originally granted in the pilot project and in the farm bill of 

2008, and I see a study is going to be published after 4 years. 

Work through with me a little bit, and the reason I come from 

this direction is that I fear a little bit of a shifting of intent or responsibility on the part of those of us from agricultural States. I 

have to defend my votes on foreign assistance, and let me make a 

statement then. You refute it if you should or can or wish to, and 

that is we are taking taxpayer dollars from agricultural producers 

in Montana to send over to Africa to buy food product, commodities 

from the European Union. 

Mr. LEW. Congressman, the thrust of our Food Security Initiative 

is to be able to develop in the long term sustainable food production systems so that the need for emergency assistance in the long 

run will be reduced. It is ultimately not a solution to the problems 

in those poorest countries of the world for us to either export commodities or for them to be purchased locally. Ultimately, they need 

to develop sustainable agricultural systems that can meet their 

own needs. 

Mr. REHBERG. And I clearly understand that, and you know, 

there is no way I could justify as a fiscal conservative the expense 

of the transportation of commodities from America over to a famine 

area, except that it is the taxpayer dollar that is being used to purchase the commodities in America to send to the area as opposed 

to taking the taxpayers’ dollar and sending it over to a competitor 

to buy the product somewhere else to give for the food security. 

Mr. LEW. Over the past number of years there has been an evolution of the commodity program from a U.S. Export program to a 

mix of U.S. Exports and local purchases. It has actually had beneficial effects in terms of being able to stabilize markets around the 

world and provide the commodities that are actually needed in the 

recipient countries. 

When I was in my last tour of duty at the Office of Management 

and Budget, there were more than a few circumstances when commodity exports that we were proposing didn’t meet the needs of the 

country we were sending them to, and there was food that they 

didn’t eat and didn’t know what to do with. 

Mr. REHBERG. Is that because we don’t produce that food product 

in America or it was a purchasing problem? 

Mr. LEW. I think that the challenge we have is to make sure that 

we are providing commodities that are needed at levels that meet 

the demand, get delivered to the people when they need it, and 

that as much as possible don’t cause instability in the markets that 

we are seeking to help. 

Mr. REHBERG. I can understand that in the emergency standpoint, but in an ongoing food security program it seems like somebody ought to be smart enough to get the product in the hands of 

people that they want purchasing from us so that we are not only 

teaching them to farm, which we all support, but also undercutting 

ourselves financially locally because it is our economic development 


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in the farm States. It definitely is a shift that I see. I recognize it 

from—— 

Mr. LEW. Well, I think that it is a mistake to characterize these 

as emergency and nonemergency programs because these are really 

all emergency programs, and the need that we have is to meet the 

timeliness requirements, the appropriateness of the commodities, 

and as much as possible support the local production markets so 

we don’t end up providing assistance but destroying the local agricultural market. 

There is a place for U.S. products in there. I don’t mean to be 

suggesting that it is all or nothing, but I think that the fact that 

the program has become a mix, that is not a new policy. 

Mr. REHBERG. Could your agency provide information to me of 

the changing mix? 

Mr. LEW. Sure, I would be happy to. 

Mr. REHBERG. Whether it was 90/10 and now it is 60/40 or 50/ 

50 or 30/70. 

Mr. LEW. Yes, I will. I want to underscore that the really important focus of the Food Security Initiative that we are undertaking 

is really in the area of promoting self-sufficiency, and the big increase in the budget here is in the area of promoting education and 

extension of technologies and farming practices, which is kind of 

neutral in the sense that it is not exporting or providing goods but 

helping to create a sustainable—— 

Mr. REHBERG. Real quickly then. Do you read the authorizing legislation in the farm bill that you are taking the $300 million figure for your appropriation request as $300 million per year in authorization or $300 million total over the course of the farm bill’s 

authorization? 

Mr. LEW. I will have to get back to you on that, Congressman. 

Mr. REHBERG. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. LEW. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Ms. McCollum. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MS. MCCOLLUM

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you. Mr. Lew, I would like to congratulate the administration on its budget request. I support the smart 

power strategy that you described in your testimony. I look forward 

to working with the administration on our shared priorities, global 

health, climate change and agricultural development. Congratulations. 

Mr. LEW. Thank you. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I was also encouraged to hear the strong statement from you in support of Middle East peace, a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an urgent national security priority of the United 

States, but I have serious concerns about the new Israeli Government’s failure to embrace the creation of an independent Palestinian state. 

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ability, and it is time for both the Palestinians and Israelis to be 

accountable for removing obstacles to peace. 

One of those obstacles to peace and security is the government 

of Israel’s continued support for the expansion of settlements and 

the failure to prevent the establishment of illegal outposts on Palestinian land. This land must one day be included as part of a future Palestinian state. 

Since 1967, homes have been built for 470,000 Israelis in the 

West Bank and East Jerusalem. In the past 3 years Israel has 

built over 5,000 homes in the West Bank settlements and another 

500 bids for houses were issued. 

Continued settlement expansion will only lead to one conclusion, 

a one-state solution, and this is an unacceptable solution. The continued expansion of settlements not only undermines the peace 

process but it undermines U.S. national security. In fact, the settlement expansion also undermines Israeli security and America’s investment in Israeli security, and I would like to quote Vice President Biden in his speech to AIPAC recently. 

Quote, Israel has to work for a two-state solution, not build more 

settlements, dismantle existing outposts, and allow Palestinians 

freedom of movement, end of quote. 

Now, I strongly support the Vice President’s statement. So I 

would like to ask you to help me to understand clearly where the 

administration’s position is. Does the U.S. Government oppose 

Israeli Government policy of settlement expansion in the West 

Bank and East Jerusalem? Can you assure me that none of the 

$2.8 billion in funds provided to Israel through the foreign military 

financing would be used to enable or facilitate the expansion or 

maintenance of settlements? And since settlement expansion is 

contrary to U.S. policy and undermines national security interests, 

what is our government doing to hold our partner Israel accountable if they choose to continue their policy of settlement expansion? 

And as you can tell I feel a sense of urgency to push for peace. 

Mr. LEW. Congresswoman, the administration and the President 

have, I think, taken a very clear position that we strongly support 

a two-state solution and that we feel that it is urgent for the 

United States to engage actively in the process. The President and 

Secretary Clinton have appointed Senator Mitchell as a Special 

Envoy and he has been traveling in the region, meeting with the 

parties. He has been working closely with the President and Secretary as they plan and prepare for meetings with heads of state 

from the region which are going to be held in the coming weeks. 

I think that the time is now for all the parties in the region to 

come forward and engage in this conversation constructively, and 

we have made clear that we want to be active and supportive of 

the process both diplomatically and through our financial support. 

I think that it is not the appropriate moment for me to be putting forward new administration statements on this issue. It is obviously a set of policies that are critically important in the coming 

weeks, months, and years ahead, and we very much hope that we 

reach a level of engagement that can break a logjam here. 

We are at a moment in history where in some ways there is remarkable commonality of interest among so many of the parties. 

There is a shared concern about the threat posed by Iran in the 


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region and the world. There is a shared concern about the spread 

of extremism around the region and the world. 

I think we have to move into these conversations so that the 

President and Secretary are able to pursue in each of their conversations, as effectively and aggressively as possible, the efforts to 

bring the parties to be able to have a constructive dialogue. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Well, I thank you for your really diplomatic answer, and Madam Chair, I strongly support what this committee 

has been focusing on to make sure that we support Senator Mitchell in a unity government and that we remove obstacles for people 

who want peace to be part of that government, but at the same 

time guarantee that we are not funding Hamas. But along with the 

dollars that we are providing in that area, we need to be having 

a frank discussion with a great ally in Israel, a country which 

shines brightly with democracy in that area, that we also have taxpayers who are very concerned about illegal outposts and expansion, and we as representatives of the people are starting to hear 

very loudly and clearly from people that we represent from all 

faiths, from all walks of life who support peace that the settlements 

are an obstacle and that we have to stand strongly for a two-state 

solution, and they are very concerned about lack of support that 

they are hearing from the new Israeli Government. 

Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Just briefly let me say that in addition to being a 

diplomatic response, I thought that Secretary Lew did reflect the 

observations of this delegation when we were in Israel, the West 

Bank, and Egypt just recently. And it was clear to all of us that 

there was a commonality of interests that was new. There was concern on the part of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and others about 

the danger, the threat of Iran to the region, and it was also clear 

to me that Bibi Netanyahu was in the process of evaluating the position of Israel before he came. 

In our meeting, which was very cordial, very pleasant, there was 

no clear answer to any of the questions that were posed and it was 

fairly clear to us that they were having and he was very specific 

about saying in the next few weeks that he and his cabinet were 

going to reevaluate their positions before they come to the United 

States. 

So I would hope that the conversations between Israel, between 

Bibi Netanyahu and others who may be part of it, between, I am 

not sure, I assume Abu Mazen will be coming and Salam Fayyad 

will be coming, and I hope that all the parties can work together. 

I think there is a real commitment on the part of the majority 

of the Israelis and certainly on the part of the Palestinians to a 

two-state solution. I am less optimistic in a unity government and 

a power sharing government, although we have placed many conditions in the legislation in response to Senator Mitchell’s request for 

flexibility, I think Senator Mitchell, Abu Mazen, and the Israelis 

and most of us who were there have real questions about the reality of a unity government or power sharing government. But, 

however, that is certainly on the table. It is certainly going to be 

discussed, but I think there is agreement that this is a hypothetical. 


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So let me say this. In my lifetime, having worked on this issue 

and been to the region many times, I hope that the administration, 

the President, the Secretary of State, Senator Mitchell, can bring 

the parties together and we can have two-state solution and seek 

peace. 

So I personally want to thank you and the administration for the 

commitment to this goal and hopefully again we can see it in our 

lifetime. And I thank you. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Well, Madam Chair, being Irish and having 

traveled to Northern Ireland when the peace process was started, 

I am very confident in Mr. Mitchell, but what he does is he holds 

everybody accountable. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, and I told Senator Mitchell that compared to the issues in Afghanistan and Pakistan, I think he has a 

much easier job. So we all wish him good luck. 

Mr. LEW. No shortage of hard problems. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much. I think we have votes in, 

what, about 10 minutes or so. So perhaps we can continue this discussion until the bells go off, and again I thank you for appearing 

before us. 

I want to focus for a few minutes on the Civilian Stabilization 

Initiative because the fiscal year 2010 budget requests $323.3 million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, or CSI, and in fiscal 

years 2008, 2009, this committee appropriated a total of $150 million in support of CSI, $95 million to the Department of State, $55 

million to USAID. Your request reverses this pattern of joint funding to State and USAID by requesting all CSI operations funding 

under the Department of State. Furthermore, the budget recommends the lead in language that was carried in the last 2 years 

requiring that there be coordination between State and USAID. 

Let me just say I don’t understand this at all, and so I would like 

to know, number one, what is the justification for the decision to 

request all CSI funding through the Department of State? I will 

give you a couple of questions and then you can just respond. I 

know you will remember them all. 

Mr. LEW. I am jotting them down. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Why does the request delete language carried the 

last 2 years in the bill requiring consultation between the Department and USAID and the elimination of direct funding and the deletion of the consultation requirement? I would like to know what 

role will USAID have in the decision making process. And your 

budget request more than doubles the funding for this initiative. 

What evidence is there that this capability is effective and is being 

utilized, especially without USAID being involved, and are there 

examples of successful deployments and, if so, what are they? Let me just say in addition, the request includes $76 million to 

USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives for a rapid response fund. 

So I would like to know how these resources would be used, and 

how would the Department and USAID determine whether OTI 

will be deployed to a post-conflict situation or whether the CSI 

would be deployed? 

So as you can see, I think the coordination between State and 

USAID is absolutely essential. So I don’t understand this request 

at all. 


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Mr. LEW. Well, let me start by maybe taking a step back and 

saying that while efforts have been made to date to build a civilian 

stabilization program, they are so early in implementation that we 

do not have a capacity that is large enough to deal with the very 

enormous demands that we see in the world today and expect to 

see in the years ahead. So we start out with a deep commitment 

that for the State Department to take back the responsibilities that 

have over the past number of years kind of moved over to the Defense Department, it is absolutely critical that the State Department have the capacity to quickly deploy people with the right 

skills to areas of either crisis or where there are stabilization 

needs, and the concept behind this initiative is that there need to 

be three components. 

There need to be full-time employees who work on this all the 

time. There need to be ready reserve government employees who 

can be redeployed when needed, and ultimately, there need to be 

nongovernmental outside reservists, much like the military reserve, 

and just to put into context—— 

Mrs. LOWEY. Before you go further, because I did ask you a lot 

of questions at once, I agree with you, but how do you do this? Together we want to build up USAID and you want to build up the 

State Department. So now you are saying it should all be in State 

Department. We are building up USAID with that expertise that 

I hope some day they can be transported swiftly and appropriately 

where they are needed, but now you want to move it all into State. 

Mr. LEW. Well, first, the deletion of the language I think is the 

same answer to the question before, that I think most, if not all 

of the language that was included in the appropriations bill was 

not included in the request just because that is the tradition of 

budget requests. So I think we need to separate the transmittal 

from the policy that we aim to work together on. 

I must say that I have had questions on this in my own mind 

since coming to the State Department. You know, the question of 

how to coordinate USAID and the State Department and other 

agencies of government is much more basic than C/SRS, and I 

think we need to get to the point where the dividing line that 

money was appropriated for one but not for the other, therefore 

they don’t operate as one program is something that is right at the 

top of my list of things that we have to overcome. That may make 

me perhaps not sufficiently sensitive to how important it is to people here or perhaps in the agency that when the appropriation is 

made to one place or another it matters deeply to them. 

I think the goal here is to build a capacity that is sufficiently robust that it can serve the mission. The decision to put it in State 

versus USAID is something that we are continuing to review in the 

sense that it is not obvious to me why the decision was made to 

build an expeditionary capacity in a second part of the foreign policy establishment. We do have a S/CRS. It is working at its size 

very effectively. We just deployed the resources of the civilian response team to go to Afghanistan to work on the elections in August, and it was the one resource that we could send over immediately. It demonstrates the need to have this capacity. 

Frankly, I would like to engage in a conversation within the Department and between the Department and USAID and with the 


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committee because I think that this is in some ways a cross-government effort. It is not just State and USAID. I mean when we need 

people who are experts in governance or rule of law or agriculture, 

they may or may not come from the confines of the foreign policy 

agencies and we need to have the ability to draw on the right people with the right skills to meet the tasks, and those are going to 

change over time. 

So I guess my view on this is that we have some something that 

is nascent that we want to build up. We want to work with you 

and the other committees of concern here to make sure we build 

up something that is not duplicative but that harmonizes the different parts of the foreign policy community, and the nonforeign 

policy community has a role to play here and that ultimately 

makes it less consequential where the appropriation is and more 

consequential what we are asking the people to do, and that is 

going to be how we try to manage across these boundaries. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Clearly, I appreciate your response and I know that 

we have to have further discussion, but again my concerns have 

been if you don’t have the civilian expertise at USAID and you are 

not totally focused on building up USAID, and I know you care 

very much about it, as does the Secretary, and understand the importance of it, then it is very hard to focus on the Civilian Stabilization Initiative without the investment in that expertise. We 

can certainly continue this discussion, and I also agree with you 

that there are people at the Department of Agriculture, for example, that may be called on. But I feel and I believe you share the 

commitment to building up expertise at USAID. Frankly, in my 

visiting, was it Ambassador Newman, I think former Ambassador 

Newman in Afghanistan, a place where we need staff, putting aside 

the Civilian Stabilization Initiative—you compare the strength that 

USAID had in Afghanistan when he was ambassador to what it 

has now and suddenly we are just trying to recreate everything. 

So I just want to be sure we have the basic strength before we 

try and build on other capacities elsewhere. 

Mr. LEW. We agree totally about the need to rebuild the USAID 

core base. But one point I guess I would like to add is that there 

is a disproportionate number of positions that we would like to be 

able to call on that will not be full time either State or USAID positions. In this 2010 budget we would end up with thousands of reserve civilians that we could call on and hundreds of full-time State 

and USAID employees. So it is like 10 to 1 in terms of the ratio 

of full-time versus standby reserve. 

I think the challenge we have is to design and implement a reserve system where those people are truly available to us, that they 

are pretrained, that they stay up to the standards that are required to be deployed quickly, and that to me is a huge undertaking, something the State Department has never done. USAID 

has never done. And it is something we have models of how military reserves work, but we need to develop the model for how to 

do that on the civilian side. 

I don’t believe we are going to ever be able to have enough fulltime civilians who are sitting in Washington offices waiting to be 

deployed, just as the military doesn’t have enough full-time soldiers 

waiting to be deployed. They need a reserve capacity to meet these 


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peaks and valleys of demand. I think that is a huge undertaking 

and one that we are very focused on, and we very much look forward to getting the appropriations for that so that we can build our 

capacity. 

Mrs. LOWEY. The discussion should continue. Just before I turn 

it over to Ms. Granger, I want to make it clear. I don’t foresee any 

capacity composed of people who are just sitting there with expertise waiting—— 

Mr. LEW. No, no, I understand. 

Mrs. LOWEY [continuing]. To be deployed. Now they may be in 

another country. They may have the capacity totally focused someplace else and you’ll be able to call on them. But to be continued. 

Thank you. 

Ms. Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. The administration has included another request for $98 million in economic support funds for North Korea. That is 

for fiscal year 2010. Tell me exactly what those funds will support. 

I know the news that we see is grim. Do you see a potential to restart the six-party talks? 

Mr. LEW. The funds that are requested for North Korea are all 

contingent on progress being made in the six-party talks and 

progress being made in terms of compliance with the removal of 

the nuclear capacities. The specific funding would be for the area 

of fuel oil, keeping the commitment that we have to replace fuel oil 

when nuclear capacity is taken down for energy production, but it 

only would kick in in the event that North Korea complies. So 

there is absolutely nothing that we would provide here to North 

Korea absent North Korea’s compliance. 

Ms. GRANGER. I understand. Thank you. 

Mr. LEW. And we hope that there is a return to six-party talks 

and that North Korea goes back into compliance because that is a 

hugely important policy objective that we and most of the world 

share right now. 

Ms. GRANGER. Certainly. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Ms. Lee. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much. I was very happy to see that the 

President’s budget does take significant steps towards rebuilding 

our civilian foreign assistance and diplomatic capacity. I also 

strongly believe that the State Department should really accurately 

reflect the diversity of the United States in order to accurately represent our country. So I hope that this process and what you are 

about to do will include the whole issue of diversity, people of color, 

women, individuals with disabilities in terms of advancing opportunities for these populations of people. 

Also, for a couple of years now I have been asking questions with 

regard to the minority women-owned business participation and 

utilization as it relates to contracting within USAID and the State 

Department. I guess, Madam Chair, I don’t know if I need to request a report from the Department because I still don’t have a 

good handle on how the Department is doing as it relates to minorities and women and individuals with disabilities in terms of 

total contracting dollars and what the percentages are to these 

companies. Would that be under your jurisdiction or how could I 

get that information because—and I mentioned this before preVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 055951 PO 00000 Frm 00204 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A951P2.XXX A951P2

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viously—in my last life I owned a small business and I tried to do 

business like other African American companies with the Department of State, USAID, and there were roadblocks after roadblocks 

after roadblocks, and I mean I did it the way that it should have 

been done, the proper way in terms of contracting procedures and 

not one, not one instance, and I don’t know many people of color 

who have been able to do business with the State Department. So 

I am trying to get a good handle on that and still haven’t been able 

to figure it out. 

Mr. LEW. We would be happy to work with you and pull together 

an analysis to explore both of those issues. Let me just underscore 

the Secretary’s commitment and my commitment that in the area 

of recruitment it is very important that the State Department 

broaden its base for all kinds of reasons. We can only do our job 

effectively in the 21st century if we go around the world reflecting 

the diversity of the United States and the world that we are dealing in. And historically, the diversity has not been that great. 

There has been a lack of diversity at many levels historically in the 

State Department. I think we are doing better than in the past, but 

that doesn’t mean we don’t need to go out more aggressively and 

recruit at schools and through organizations and that help us to 

build the diverse base we need. 

Frankly, we have an opportunity now with the first significant 

expansion of Foreign Service officers in a generation to go about 

doing it in what we would consider the right way and to expand 

the opportunities for individuals to come in and get information, to 

expand the opportunities for them to be interviewed, and to make 

sure that as the selection process moves forward it is fair and open. 

So we agree wholeheartedly with that and would be happy to 

work with you to go through in more detail what our recruiting 

policies are and what the record is. 

In the area of contracting, at the risk of sounding too critical of 

my own department, we are kind of nondiscriminatory in making 

the contracting process difficult. We have to fix it. We have to get 

away from these giant contracts. It is not just minority businesses 

that have a hard time doing business with the State Department. 

I hear it from NGOs. I hear it from medium size organizations, 

large organizations. There are good reasons why things evolved the 

way they have over the years, but one of the things that we need 

to do is look at it, and as we look at it, to keep in mind that one 

of the benefits of opening up contracting to smaller, more competitive contracts is that it naturally helps to ease some of the barriers 

that have kept minority firms from competing. 

I don’t have an easy answer for this, but I know that at an administration-wide level this is a goal that the President has, and 

it is certainly something we take seriously at the State Department. 

Ms. LEE. Well, thank you very much, and let me just say we 

would like to work with you. As Chair of the Congressional Black 

Caucus, we have some ideas on how we could make this happen 

in a way that would work, and so I hope that you would consult 

with not only us but those of us in the Tri-Caucus who would like 

to see this happen. 

Mr. LEW. Thank you. 


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Ms. LEE. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Rehberg. 

Mr. REHBERG. Thank you. 

As we enter into a world of identity and Real ID and the next 

generation passport, I guess as you know you have a lot of secure 

information, birth cities, passport numbers, and the like. I guess, 

could you talk to me a little bit about what you are doing within 

the Department to protect the privacy of citizens. And does this 

budget—I was going through your testimony. I see you talk a little 

bit about cyber security, but I guess I want you to expand a little 

bit beyond your testimony of what you are doing internally. And 

does this budget reflect the kinds of things that you need to occur 

in the short term, whether we are talking about immigration policy, Real ID, and protection of that information. 

Mr. LEW. Congressman, there is a natural tension between raising the bar on how we scrutinize the comings and goings of individuals and personal privacy. 

Mr. REHBERG. I am from Montana. I clearly understand that concept. 

Mr. LEW. And we are very, very attentive to the importance that 

both sides of the equation are very important. 

I think that, you know, there have been some incidents in recent 

history at the State Department that show that there was perhaps 

not a high enough level of protection of individual files, even before 

our arrival. I know that there were actions taken to try and tighten 

that up. 

As we go forward and look at the different systems that we put 

in place, the challenge is to make sure that the law enforcement 

agencies that have appropriate needs and reasons for access get access but that nobody else does, and you know, it is not a problem 

that one can just say, well, we fixed it, we move on. You constantly 

need to pay attention to it. Systems change. 

Mr. REHBERG. Does this budget then reflect—— 

Mr. LEW. I think it is part of our ongoing program, and it is more 

a question of focus than it is budget. I am not aware of the need 

for any specific resources in this area, and I am told that there is 

$2.7 million in our privacy office which is for the programs. 

Mr. REHBERG. In new money? And is that going to be part of the 

next generation passports similar to Europass or have you not 

begun that process of changing the passport? 

Mr. LEW. Well, we have a new passport. I mean, the new passport that we have has in it a substantial amount of information 

that is electronically encoded. So that is in place already. The challenge is how to make sure that the access to the information is controlled and, as I said, available for proper purposes but not for improper purposes. 

Mr. REHBERG. So there is no additional money in this budget—— 

Mr. LEW. I will get back to you in more detail. I must confess 

that in the many details of the budget, I have discussed this with 

people at a policy level, but I am not deeply familiar with the funding issues behind it. So why don’t I get back to you? 

Mr. REHBERG. I perhaps didn’t know it as well when I voted for 

Real ID, and Montana is one of those States where I have got Ted 


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Kaczynski on the left and the Freemen on the right and everything 

in between. So I am perhaps more sensitive to privacy and the 

identity crisis that we have going on with some of that information 

getting out. 

So if you could get back to me, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. LEW. I would just say more broadly there are a number of 

issues related to the bar having been raised very high on security 

that we need to reevaluate, and it is always difficult to put any interest over security. No one wants to be responsible for changing 

a protocol and then having somebody slip through who shouldn’t 

have slipped through. 

On the other hand, we have to be careful that we don’t create 

problems that are as important as the solution, and I understand 

the direction of your question, and I look forward to working with 

you. 

Mr. REHBERG. Appreciate it. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Deputy Secretary Lew, thank you again for your 

time. I certainly look forward to working with you, as I know does 

the committee, and this concludes today’s hearing on the President’s fiscal year 2010 request for the international affairs budget. 

The Subcommittee on State Foreign Operations and Related Programs stands adjourned. 

Mr. LEW. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 


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(231) 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009. 

OFFICE OF THE GLOBAL AIDS COORDINATOR 

WITNESS 

THOMAS J. WALSH, DEPUTY U.S. GLOBAL AIDS COORDINATOR (ACTING), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN LOWEY

Mrs. LOWEY. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations 

and Related Programs will come to order. I would like to welcome 

Tom Walsh, Acting Deputy U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and 

Chief of Staff, to discuss the President’s Fiscal Year 2010 request 

for global HIV/AIDS programs. 

This Committee has made global HIV/AIDS a key priority, providing $18.8 billion over the past five years, nearly $4 billion more 

than President Bush’s initial commitment of $15 billion over five 

years, to address the global AIDS pandemic. These resources have 

had impressive results, with 2.1 million people receiving 

antiretroviral treatment; 9.7 million people receiving care through 

PEPFAR, including 4 million orphans, 58.3 million people benefitting from HIV/AIDS prevention and related programs. I applaud 

the tenacity with which your office and the U.S. government as a 

whole has pursued treating and preventing this horrible disease. 

Your efforts and the complementary efforts of allies such as the 

Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria have added 

years of productive life to millions living with HIV/AIDS and have 

provided time and space for other critical development to take 

place. 

However, we have seen new challenges emerge, as life saving 

drugs have had the unintended consequence of increasing risk behavior, have increased risk behavior. As we enter the second phase 

of PEPFAR, we must evaluate our successes, examine new challenges, adjust accordingly. While new infections among children 

have dropped and younger people in some parts of the world are 

waiting longer to become sexually active, having fewer sexual partners or using condoms, we must do more to ensure that our prevention efforts reach those most at risk. I look forward to hearing how 

PEPFAR will expand prevention programs in the coming years. 

The pandemic continues to have a disproportionate impact on 

women. As you know, among young people in Subsaharan Africa, 

the HIV prevalence rate for young women is almost three times 

higher than the rate among young men. This is not a new statistic, 

and I am concerned that PEPFAR has not taken steps to address 

this challenge. The fiscal year 2010 budget includes a renewed 

focus on the needs of women and children, and I hope that 

PEPFAR will reach out to USAID which has extensive experience 


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232 

providing accessible community based services that meet the needs 

of women and their families. 

I would also like to see PEPFAR coordinate better with country 

programs and strategies developed by state and USAID. What efforts are you making to integrate PEPFAR programs into these 

country strategies? PEPFAR is entering its sixth year and sustainability is becoming a higher priority. Through partnership framework agreements, PEPFAR is building long term reciprocal relationships with developing countries. 

In addition, recent discussions with the Global Fund and developing country partners have begun the dialogue related to integrating U.S. government programs into future Global Fund grants. 

Can you provide an update on implementation of the partnership 

framework program? Also can you outline the steps PEPFAR is 

taking to empower developing countries to assume greater responsibility for fighting the pandemic? 

In order to create greater capacity in host countries, the next 

phase of PEPFAR should expand programs that build capacity and 

help infrastructure so that nations can better meet their own 

health challenges. Although the fiscal year 2009 investment of 

$734 million for health systems was significant, how will funding 

for these programs be expanded in the coming years? If these interventions are to be sustainable in the long term, developing countries must be able to shoulder more of the responsibility for the 

health of their populations. Please update your plans to invest in 

health infrastructure and the training of healthcare professionals. 

Mr. Walsh, I look forward to hearing your remarks and working 

with you on these and other issues, but first I will turn to Ranking 

Member, Ms. Granger, for her opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Chairwoman Lowey. 

I welcome you today, Mr. Walsh. I will keep my opening remarks 

very short because we have votes coming up and I want to hear 

what you have to say. Now that the PEPFAR program is authorized for an additional five years, this Committee wants to ensure 

the funds, no matter which agency implements the programs, are 

being properly managed and coordinated. Also we want to make 

sure that our multilateral contributions are subjected to high levels 

of scrutiny and oversight and would be expected as such from the 

American taxpayer of course. I thank you for appearing today, and 

I look forward to what you have to say. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. I understand that there are three votes 

that may be coming up at 11:35. So we will put your statement in 

the record, and summarize, please proceed as you wish. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. WALSH

Mr. WALSH. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Ranking Member 

Granger, and other Members here and staff. I will try to summarize very quickly under the circumstances. 

We really have appreciated the strong support and partnership 

with the Subcommittee in the years to date. We feel the bipartisan 

support here has been an important element in the success of 


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PEPFAR to date. As you see the President has put forward a request that is very significant in terms of the level of funding, and 

we do feel strongly about the need to be accountable for how that 

is spent. 

It includes both the bilateral programs which have been very 

successful and also our contribution to the Global Fund which is 

a critical piece of the overall U.S. government approach to HIV/ 

AIDS as well as malaria and tuberculosis, the other issues. So 

rather than say anything more, because you do have my statement, 

I will just throw it open for questions. 

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Mrs. LOWEY. I will save my question if I have time at the end. 

And I will turn to Ms. Granger for questions. 

Ms. GRANGER. My question has to do with the confusion surrounding whether or not the Global Fund is experiencing a $265 

million shortfall. Can you comment on that? It is often unfair the 

Global Fund does manage demand, it is a first come first served 

organization. As long as the proposals are technically sound, 10 

countries consume 50 percent of the Global Fund’s resources. Is 

this sustainable? 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you. Let me take your questions in reverse 

order because the first one is more of a big picture question. Demand management at the Global Fund is something that the Fund 

has as of two weeks ago begun to turn its attention to with the participation of the United States. As you know, we sit on the board 

of the Fund and participate in some of the committees of that 

board. 

Two weeks ago at its most recent meeting, the Fund board set 

up a working group to focus on this question. You are exactly right 

that historically the Fund’s approach has been basically to fund 

any proposal that meets technical muster without any attempt to 

prioritize the different proposals. And there are questions in an environment of tightening resources over whether that is really sustainable anymore. 

And so we were pleased to join the other members of the Fund 

in putting together this working group to focus on this and come 

up with solutions by the time of the next board meeting in November, because you are exactly right that there is an inherent conflict 

there. With respect to its current financial position, it is true that 

there are approximately $265 million worth of grants that were approved for Round Aid, or approved at the board’s meeting I believe 

last November, for which they do not yet have cash in hand. And 

thus under the rules of the Fund they cannot yet pay out those 

grants. 

That situation strikes us as quite analogous to that of our U.S. 

government PEPFAR bilateral programs which have to wait for 

funding during the course of a year. As we do different CNs during 

the year, we commit funds and they go out to the field and then 

are put into practice. At the time the Fund approved those applications, it knew that it was going to be a rolling process with several 

different tranches of approvals during the coming year, and that is 

progressing. 

On the one hand it is the case that right now they do not have 

all the money to fund all the proposals that were approved last 

year. We do anticipate that they will have that money by later in 

the year, and we see that situation is again as analogous to what 

we experience in PEPFAR on a fairly routine basis. We are working to make sure that our programs are ensuring that there is not 

going to be any gap in services or anything like that because that 

would be of concern, but right now we feel comfortable with where 

things are. 

Ms. GRANGER. Let me just ask one more question. The U.S. contribution is a third of the total contribution, right? 

Mr. WALSH. That is the statutory maximum. 


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Ms. GRANGER. Tell me what the voting structure is on the Global 

Fund. Does the U.S. have veto power like it does at the World 

Bank? 

Mr. WALSH. Not at all. In fact I am not sure I can tell you in 

its entirety the voting structure. We can get back to you on it. It 

is rather complex, but one thing I do know is, we do not have veto 

power. We are one board member among many. They have a rather 

complex structure in which the donor block and the recipient so to 

speak, blocks are kind of set up into two different blocks. We recently experienced some of the governance challenges in the attempt to elect a new Chair of the Global Fund board at the recent 

meeting. It did not work because under the rules you needed a two 

third vote of the donor block and the recipient block, and the recipient block could not within itself agree on a single candidate. So it 

is a rather complex structure and I would be happy to get back to 

you with additional details on that. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Israel. 

Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Walsh, I want to talk 

to you about pediatric treatment. Today, 1,000 children around the 

world will acquire HIV. Without proper care and treatment, 500 of 

them will die before they reach age 2, 750 of those 1,000 will die 

before they reach age 5. Seventeen percent of all new HIV infections are children, but I am told that only 9 percent of those children are on antiretroviral treatment under PEPFAR. What are 

your plans to reach the pediatric treatment targets that are contained in the reauthorization for PEPFAR? 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you, Congressman. Our goal, as you know, 

the reauthorization target was basically to have the proportion of 

children who are on treatment correspond to the proportion of children as a subset of all who are infected in programs where we 

work. This is a very challenging situation mainly because of the 

difficulty of diagnosing children at very young ages. This has been 

a long lasting problem. We believe that in the last five years we 

have begun to make some progress on a couple of the things and 

indeed are progressing in terms of rolling out pediatric treatment. 

Just to give you a sense of what some of those best practices are 

that we have learned, the lessons we have learned and that we intend to apply in the years to come. The first one is, in terms of 

early infant diagnosis, the new innovation in recent years has been 

the use of what they call dried blood spot testing, where you can 

take the blood from the infant and then transport it somewhere 

else for testing rather than have to have it in sort of a cold preserved chain. 

We are really supporting, I think we are working through the 

CDC which is one of our implementing agencies, to focus on getting 

dried blood spot testing rolled out. We are also in a number of 

countries trying to update these health cards that mothers and 

children typically have to include HIV information. In some places 

they have not included that, and that has been a gap or a place 

where people can fall through the cracks that we have been trying 

to address. 


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Another one is promoting universal provider initiated counseling 

and testing in pediatric wards. When somebody is in a health facility that is really the best time to catch anyone to test them for 

HIV. And so ensuring that pediatric wards make this a routine 

part of their pediatric care is another important thing. And then 

family centered care is another important innovation for scaling up 

pediatric services. Where possible we really like to co-locate pediatric and adult treatment so that we can get the whole family at 

once. Those are some of the things we are trying to do, but we are 

very much a learning organization. We have learned a lot, we have 

more to learn and more to do to apply what we have learned. 

Mr. ISRAEL. I actually have some additional questions but I know 

we are trying to move briskly because of votes. I will yield back 

and follow up with you. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

I will turn to Ms. McCollum. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, and I will cut down quite a bit of 

what I wanted to ask because I will submit it for the record. 

But let me focus on one part of your written testimony which I 

read, and that has to do with nutrition. As you are well aware, the 

developing world was hit with a huge food crisis in the past year, 

and it affects the same people PEPFAR is intended to serve. So 

most people have an immediate concern right now with food. And 

you know that without proper nutrition and calories, the drugs do 

not work as effectively or as efficiently. So I am wondering what 

the picture is for how you are coordinating with what is part of the 

mandate for nutrition, and it should be part of the mandate because without nutrition the drugs do not work properly. 

I have another question and I am going to put in, Madam Chair, 

for the record about how PEPFAR is going to integrate to meet all 

of its commitments that the Administration is making on maternal 

child health and other issues. Thank you. 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you, Congresswoman. Let me address the 

food issue. We are really addressing the food and nutrition needs 

that are related to HIV in two ways. One is directly through our 

PEPFAR programs, the second is by attempting to partner with 

other programs of the U.S. government and others such as the 

World Food Program, for whom food and nutrition is really what 

they mainly do. So we refer to that as wrap-around programs. And 

so we really do see a need to strengthen our linkages with these 

other programs where food is mainly what they do. 

With respect to our PEPFAR funding, we support food and nutrition for three populations. One is pregnant and expecting nursing 

mothers, a second is orphans and vulnerable children, whether HIV 

infected or not, and the third is people who are on treatment but 

meet certain clinical criteria for malnutrition. Certainly one of the 

reasons PEPFAR has been successful is because we have focused 

on HIV/AIDS. And so we do feel strongly about the need to maintain that focus. 

But as you say, if people are malnourished beyond a certain 

point then the treatment really will not work. And so we have 

some criteria that I think have been widely commended, at least 

I have not heard a lot of criticism over them, for determining when 


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somebody meets that threshold and thus needs nutritional support 

through our HIV/AIDS programs. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Tell us in more detail, thank you. 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I wanted to make sure Mr. Jackson had an opportunity. 

Mr. JACKSON. That is very kind of you, Ms. McCollum, thank 

you. I was prepared to submit my questions for the record. But 

thank you, Ms. McCollum, and thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Walsh, during my tenure on this Subcommittee—first, welcome to the Committee. 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you. 

Mr. JACKSON. I have tried to increase the capacity of developing 

countries to provide basic services like healthcare and education. 

Our bill carries from year to year two provisions that I think do 

just that. One addresses access to healthcare and education by 

eliminating—— 

Mrs. LOWEY. I just want to say the speed with which you are 

asking this question reflects the urgency of the issue. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. JACKSON. One addresses access to healthcare and education 

by eliminating user fees. And the second addresses government 

staffing levels of healthcare providers and teachers. Congress set a 

target of training and supporting the retention of at least 140,000 

new health professionals and paraprofessionals to help PEPFAR 

partner countries to develop the health work forces required to 

meet PEPFAR goals and to support long term sustainability. 

Congress intended that these be additional health workers, increasing the total number of health workers in these countries beyond the number that would otherwise have been trained, deployed, or retained. What is PEPFAR’s strategy for meeting this 

target and for ensuring that these are new, truly additional health 

workers that add to a country’s capacities and are not health workers who have been added to the workforce even without PEPFAR? 

Secondly, what level of funding does PEPFAR expect to dedicate towards achieving this goal in fiscal year 2010, and what are 

PEPFAR’s estimates for the funding required to achieve this target 

by 2013? And lastly, can you report on how these funding estimates 

are derived? 

Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Mr. Walsh. 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you, Congressman. I will do my best to answer your questions but I am afraid we are going to have to follow 

up with you with some more detailed information because some of 

your questions are a little more detailed than I am in a position 

to answer. In terms of the new health workers, yes, it is certainly 

our intention that these be 140,000 new health workers, ones who 

would not otherwise have been trained without PEPFAR efforts. 

We have come up with some guidance for the field. This is really 

going to be a challenging goal to meet. The initial proposals we got 

back from our countries in the field for this first year FY ’09 really 

did not show us on as steep a trajectory as we need to be on in 

order to meet that goal. Therefore we are working with them intensively as part of this larger effort at health system strengthening. 

That is really the context. Health workforce is part of this larger 


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issue of health systems, because, for example, if you train 

healthcare workers but there are not clinics for them to work in or 

there are not supportive systems for them, then they will not have 

the impact they need. 

So I am really going to have to get back to you on some of your 

specific budget questions about the amount we are devoting to 

training this year, but all I can say is we do agree that this is necessary not just as a goal unto itself, but it is instrumental to 

achieving the prevention, treatment, and care goals. A lot of the 

success we have had to date has been due to building health workforce and structures, and we need to do even more if we are to succeed at all across the whole range of issues we face. 

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Walsh. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I know Ms. Lee is on her way, and we have a couple 

more minutes. So I will ask a few questions. 

I want to follow up though on Mr. Israel’s comments, because to 

me that is so urgent and I am trying to understand it. We know 

that more than one child is infected with HIV every minute of 

every day, with newborns representing the vast majority of the estimated 1,000 infected each day. And even with progress, global 

coverage of prevention and mother to child transmission services is 

still unacceptably low. And looking at numbers in low to middle income countries, HIV positive pregnant women do not receive the 

medicines they need to prevent transmission of HIV to their babies. 

This is totally unacceptable. If we reached all pregnant women 

who are HIV positive, we could prevent hundreds of thousands of 

infections per year in children. So I would like you to explain, I 

have heard some of the explanations, but I would like you to explain what have been the values to scaling up PMTCT services, 

what can PEPFAR do to overcome these barriers? A majority of 

mothers we know deliver in their homes while most PEPFAR funded PMTCT programs target medical facilities. What are you doing 

to change this? Are you visiting communities? Why are you not 

reaching out in communities where most of the mothers deliver the 

babies? 

Mr. WALSH. Well thank you. We could not agree more about this, 

the severity of this issue, and share your frustration that something which we know how to do, and indeed the world really has 

developed very successful PMTCT programs, that they have not 

been scaled up to the degree we need to. The authorizers put into 

our reauthorization a requirement for an expert panel to come back 

to us with recommendations on this, and that panel is now writing 

its report because we prioritized it and told them we needed it fast. 

So we are expecting that to be sent to you and Congress in July 

which will set the agenda. 

But I can tell you a few of the things that we do know, and that 

we do need to do more on and plan to do more on in the days to 

come. Building on the success of a country like Botswana, where 

there is now mother to child transmission which is almost as rare 

as it is in the United States because their programs are so successful, and then you can contrast it with a country like Malawi where 

there is very little. 

Mrs. LOWEY. And has not Botswana’s incidents gone up? 


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Mr. WALSH. They have an extraordinarily high rate of infection, 

but the rate of transmission from the mothers to the children is 

very low because, I mean as you see with many of these countries 

they have succeeded greatly in one area, not so much in others. 

And that is a pretty extreme case. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I would like you to finish this, but also address the 

issue of Botswana, which is in a pretty good economic condition, 

and why their rates have gone up. 

Mr. WALSH. Right. 

Mrs. LOWEY. But let us finish the first. 

Mr. WALSH. Yes. Some of the practices that have been particularly successful are, first of all strong political commitment from 

the governments. That is something we have seen on mother to 

child transmission in places like Botswana, not only Botswana but 

also in Namibia, Rwanda, Kenya or some of the other ones. They 

have also decentralized services from the capitals out to the district 

and local levels. 

They have really worked successfully, and we have tried to work 

with them, to coordinate the activities of all the different donors 

rather than have one donor off doing a project in one place, another 

one in another place, they have really tried to get us all to work 

together. Identifying HIV positive pregnant women in the first 

place is critical. And so I mentioned before the importance of provider initiated counseling and testing, where it is really an increasingly routine part of healthcare, and in this case antenatal care, for 

women to be tested and to learn their status, because if they do 

not know their status then there is no way that the PMTCT interventions are going to be given to them. 

And that policy change in Botswana, by the way, is credited with 

increasing the coverage of PMTCT interventions from 75 to 95 percent. That is something we are really trying to work with other 

countries to show, you know, if you want that same kind of success 

you need to get some of these policy things lined up in the right 

way. And then it is really critical to link the mother to child transmission interventions with HIV treatment and care, and then with 

other maternal and child health. 

We really do accept that it has been an issue for the whole global 

response that there can be a tendency to silo programs, and we 

have tried to resist that and we need to do even more to break 

down the barriers between the different services because a pregnant woman in a developing country faces a whole range of issues 

of which HIV is an important one. So in addressing that one, we 

also want to link with the programs that focus on the others. What 

was your other question? 

Mrs. LOWEY. I will turn to Ms. McCollum and then we will continue. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Madam Chair, I think we are tracking so close 

to the same wavelength that we could ask each other’s questions 

at this point. 

I want to go back, the President announced the new global 

health initiative, and it is going to increase substantially the U.S. 

commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS through PEPFAR. But it also 

calls for more comprehensive, to your point where you were just 

talking about a better integrated U.S. global health strategy that 


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pays more attention to building health systems. And in fact in 

April PEPFAR had an assessment done in the Annals of Medicine, 

and the assessment found that in important respects PEPFAR has 

been extraordinarily effective. 

According to the study PEPFAR had prevented 1.2 million 

deaths, which I used in earlier testimony, in the focused countries, 

and it has reduced things by almost 10 percent. But it also found 

out that prevention efforts had largely failed, which is what the 

Chairwoman had asked earlier. It also asked questions about the 

long term cost effectiveness of the effort. So when you talk about 

building platforms, how is PEPFAR going to be integrated, or is 

PEPFAR going to look a little different as we go through and you 

are doing global healthcare reform as part of the way we deliver 

things, and not worry so much about labels now but outcomes. 

Mr. Jackson’s question about nurses and midwives and encouraging testing and being able to do testing out in communities, to 

the Chairwoman’s question, this needs to feel seamless. And so, are 

there discussions taking place? Because I think it is okay if 

PEPFAR grows and develops and looks a little different in the 

years to come because we have learned lessons. 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you. I think that is likely to be the case. As 

I said, we try to be a learning organization. The Institute of Medicine said we are, and we can do better. And clearly one of the areas 

where we need to do more is linkages and integration with other 

programs. I think that is really one thing that is behind this global 

health initiative that the administration announced, this idea that 

just as we have really focused intently on HIV/AIDS and malaria, 

we need to bring that same kind of intense focus to these other 

issues and to bring them all into a single integrated approach. 

I will say with regards to planning, and how we are going to do 

that, is still at an early stage. And so for PEPFAR’s purposes, our 

incoming coordinator if he is confirmed by the Senate, Dr. Goosby 

is certainly going to lead a strategic review of our programs and 

ask I think some of these questions that you are focusing on about 

integration. And then that strategic review of PEPFAR is going to 

feed into this larger strategic review that will inform this global 

health initiative and really focus on what are these points of intersection, what are ones that we can strengthen between PEPFAR 

and maternal child health for example, family planning, malaria, 

TB, neglected tropical diseases. I think what you are alluding to is 

definitely the coming wave, one of integration and an increasingly 

holistic approach. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Votes have not gone off. We might as well proceed 

some more. I would like to follow up on the Botswana question, and 

frankly it is the same in Uganda, we used to brag about ABC in 

Uganda, and was it in Uganda where the rates went dramatically 

down after a famous singer in that country contracted HIV/AIDS 

and then died, and that it frightened the population so it went 

down. I think it was Uganda, was it not? 

Can you explain what we are doing about that, obviously in most 

of the places that we have visited there is an urgency to focus on 

treatment because people are dying, they are lined up around the 

clinics, and many of the clinic directors frankly were very open and 


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honest and said, okay prevention is fine but we have to take care 

of people who are dying. But given the upsurge of cases in Botswana and in Uganda and other areas, Botswana in particular because the economy has been fairly strong, I wish you would address 

those issues. 

Mr. WALSH. Right, I think you are really putting your finger on 

one of the toughest challenges we have to face. AIDS is in many 

ways a uniquely terrible disease, and with treatment, somebody 

who would otherwise die stays alive. It is very apparent, there is 

no missing the impact, it is very easy to count, and it is a great 

thing. But prevention is so much more difficult to quantify. We 

never really know who would have been infected, who is now not 

infected because of a program. 

We really understand the natural tendencies of the host governments we work with to really want to focus on treatment, and we 

want to focus on treatment too, but prevention has to be first, that 

has to be the highest priority. We are in some cases finding a little 

resistance to that message, and we are trying to work with countries to say, even as we address these treatment needs which are 

so great and unfortunately rather costly to address, because once 

somebody is on treatment they are never going to be cured. Right 

now there is no cure for HIV/AIDS, so we are taking on a lifelong 

commitment. 

So the best way to address that is to prevent people from becoming infected in the first place. Every country has a different story, 

but Botswana and the other countries in far southern Africa have 

the highest rates of infection in the world, and there is a whole 

range of reasons. I think one thing we have learned is that prevention really needs to be, we take what we call a combination prevention approach, a multifocal approach where you address the many 

different drivers of behavior. You know, just because you are meeting a youth population in one place where it goes, if you are not 

meeting them in the other places where they go, then you are only 

providing partial protection. 

We really need to scale up our programs, build on what the evidence supports, do it in a way that is tailored, and then frankly 

hit the population with multiple different interventions at once. 

Botswana is certainly one of the places where we and everybody 

else who is working there needs to do more and better because they 

have got a big prevention problem on their hands. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I am pleased to turn to Ms. Lee because she certainly has been a leader, not only on this Committee, but on the 

authorizing Committee, and I am delighted that she was able to 

get here. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I apologize, there have been five things at one time this 

morning, but I am so delighted to be able to meet you and congratulate you and look forward to working with you and also Dr. 

Goosby, and I hope the Senate confirms him very quickly. It has 

been quite a job to get to this point with regard to our global HIV/ 

AIDS initiatives, but it has been worth the bipartisan cooperation, 

and I think this effort probably more than most really highlights 

how we can work together to try to really address big big humanitarian, security and public health crisis. 


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Of course I am always going to be concerned about funding, and 

I never have thought we have put forth enough funding for the 

Global Fund given the need. Also the integration with PEPFAR 

and the Global Fund, the programs and how we do that, and I 

apologize that I am being redundant, and if I am I will just talk 

to you privately about that. But on the funding request, it does not 

seem like that is much of a request, it seems very meager, and I 

am wondering if that is all you really think we need to fund the 

needs that are out there and the proposals that are pending? 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you, Congresswoman, and thank you for all 

your leadership. I read Deputy Secretary Lew’s testimony last 

week, and one point he made was, this is a conversation and this 

will be a conversation in terms of the right balances of funding 

among on the one hand multilateral approaches like the Global 

Fund, bilateral approaches that are run by the U.S. government, 

HIV/AIDS versus malaria versus tuberculosis versus all of the 

other areas that are now addressed in this global health initiative 

such as maternal and child health. 

We look forward to working with you on it. The Global Fund re- quest is a very significant request, $900 million. Compared to the 

last request of the last Administration, which was $500 million, it 

is a large increase. But all I can say about whether it is the right 

number is that we will look forward to working with you to determine whether it is or not. 

Ms. LEE. And may I ask one more question, not a final question, 

but just the whole effort with regard to commercial sex workers. 

How are we addressing programs and strategies to help first of all 

make sure they understand prevention, but also making the transition from commercial sex work to, you know, 40-hour a week job 

that they all told me when I was there they wanted but the resources just were not there to get a job. And so how are we helping 

them at this point with our programs? 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you. Our programs reflect both of the pieces 

that you describe and recognize that we really have to do both 

things. In an urgent way we need to help them stay safe from HIV, 

and so we need to get them the whole range of intervention including condoms and other prevention, interventions. If they become 

HIV positive we certainly need to get them in care and treatment 

as well. But we also do support income generation programs to try 

to offer people a way out of that way of life if they are willing. 

We have many many programs, we will be happy to send you examples of some and get you more information on it. But we certainly recognize we need both approaches for those populations. A 

big part of our emphasis under the reauthorization as you know is 

really tailoring prevention strategies to the epidemiology of particular countries. Every country is different, but in many countries 

we do have these populations you are describing who face very elevated risks. Our teams are very focused on those, and that is part 

of what is positive about PEPFAR being a largely country-driven 

program where we have people on the ground working for the U.S. 

government to assess the needs and to tailor our programs. 

Ms. LEE. But you do not see any barriers to our funding now 

given the history of the conscience clause and all of the policies 

that had been established? 


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Mr. WALSH. Right, well no I do not, not through the conscience 

clause nor through the prostitution policy requirement. That is one 

that people sometimes say, does that mean that the U.S. government cannot work with these populations in prostitution? It definitely does not. In fact the authorizing language specifically says 

that this provision is not to be read to prevent the U.S. from working with people in those populations. And so we definitely do and 

see a need to do even more of it. 

Ms. LEE. Good. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

I want to thank you and all the many people in the field around 

the world for the important work that you do. And certainly we understand that even though the Administration’s request has been 

very generous, the urgency of the situation certainly demands a 

large response, and this is why this Committee and the Secretary 

of State is focusing like a laser beam on coordination, working with 

the multilateral organizations, hopefully working with all the foundations that you do so that we can use every resource as effectively 

as we can. And I just wanted to express our appreciation to you 

again. 

And this concludes today’s hearing on the fiscal year 2010 Budget Request for Global HIV/AIDS Programs. Subcommittee on State 

and Foreign Operations and Related Programs stands adjourned. 


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WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009. 

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION 

WITNESS 

RODNEY G. BENT, ACTING CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, MILLENNIUM 

CHALLENGE CORPORATION 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN LOWEY

Mrs. LOWEY. Today, we welcome Rodney Bent, the Acting Chief 

Executive Officer of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, to discuss the President’s Fiscal Year 2010 request for the Millennium 

Challenge Account. As you may know, Mr. Bent formerly served as 

a staff member of this Subcommittee, and it is a pleasure to have 

him back today. 

The President’s budget requests $1.425 billion for the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a 63 percent increase under the Fiscal Year 2009 enacted law. The request includes funding for three 

new country compacts in Jordan, the Philippines and Malawi, as 

well as funding for two additional baseline programs. As the MCC 

enters its fifth year of operation, this is an appropriate time to take 

stock of achievements and challenges, and I believe the MCC holds 

tremendous potential to bring transformative change to countries 

in the developing world and to support sustainable long term development. 

Since its inception, the MCC has signed 18 compacts totaling 

$6.4 billion, 21 threshold programs totaling $470 million. The challenge to the MCC in the coming year is to demonstrate that its 

model is not only innovative but that it brings actual results in 

poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth to the poorest 

of the poor. I hope you will share quantifiable examples of progress 

today. The past year has brought fresh challenges to the MCC due 

to political instability. Compact implementation has been disrupted 

in Armenia, Nicaragua, Madagascar. 

At this time last year we discussed the impact of fuel costs which 

led to the scaling back of several country compacts. Today we face 

a global financial crisis, and I would appreciate it if you would provide insight into how economic and political circumstances have 

impacted MCC programs. Has the global financial crisis led the 

MCC to alter its country programs? Are participating countries expressing increased or decreased interest? 

MCC projections show that disbursements will at least double in 

all 18 of the country compacts compared to the previous year. In 

Morocco disbursements are projected to be eight times higher, rising from $21 million to $194 million. In Mozambique disbursements are projected to be 14 times higher, rising from $12 million 

to $173 million. How realistic is the projected disbursement data 


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you have provided to Congress? What project outcomes are associated with the increase in disbursements? 

Last year the MCC undertook a reorganization to focus on MCC 

implementation, which seemed to have made a difference in the 

programs. What lessons learned can you share with us in how you 

are increasing the pace of implementation? Turning to the specifics 

of the fiscal year 2010 request, it includes funding for three new 

country compacts, including one in Jordan to improve its water and 

sanitation systems, a critical need in Jordan. Can you tell us where 

you are in the compact process? And, Mr. Bent, I appreciate your 

testimony today, look forward to discussing the fiscal year 2010 

budget request for the Millennium Challenge Corporation. 

And before we hear from you, let me turn to Ms. Granger, the 

Ranking Member, for her opening statement. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Chairman Lowey. Thank you for holding this very important hearing today. 

And good morning, Mr. Bent, thank you for appearing before our 

Subcommittee. I will make a very short statement this morning because we have time constraints. Chairman Lowey talked about the 

amount of this request. I realize that the MCC was created to be 

unlike any other entity or account in the U.S. Foreign Assistance 

Budget. Primarily, the MCC was designed to be implemented in a 

way that elevates good governance as a prerequisite to funding. 

I especially appreciate the MCC’s focus on accountability and 

country-generated solutions. But it has been five years now since 

the MCC’s inception, therefore it is a good point in time to examine 

the interim results and some ongoing and arising policy challenges 

that will set the MCC’s course for the future. I have my concerns 

about the projects that are ongoing and the increase in cost that 

Chairman Lowey brought up, and I hope you will address these 

issues and answer our questions. Thank you very much. 

I yield back my time. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Bent, as you know, your full statement can be 

placed in the record, and if you wish, you may summarize. Please 

proceed, thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. BENT

Mr. BENT. Thank you, Chairman Lowey, Ranking Member 

Granger, and other Members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to discuss President Obama’s request for the MCC. I will 

definitely summarize my statement. I will try and be brief. On a 

personal note, it is a little unusual for me to be on this side, but 

nonetheless it is an honor to be here. 

Let me start with two truisms. First, the planet is a small place. 

The more countries that practice democracy, good governance, investment in people, and promote economic growth, the better for 

them and for us. Second, U.S. foreign aid will never, can never be 

a substitute for the income that households in poor countries want 

to and can produce for themselves. Helping poor households earn 

greater incomes will allow them to purchase food, buy better housing, spend more on healthcare and education, and pursue other opportunities for a better life. 

The key issue is how to make development assistance work more 

effectively. Some key lessons from the MCC experience. Select good 


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partners who share our goals, enable those partners to select and 

implement their homegrown projects but using world class standards for project success, and by that I mean economic, environmental, gender, engineering. Use incentives which change behavior, frankly and do so more effectively than rhetoric or sanctions. 

Be rigorous in using specific and measurable outputs and outcomes. And be up front and candid about what you are trying to 

do. 

The MCC has signed commitment as you noted for $6.4 billion in 18 countries. We estimate that brings $11 to $12 billion worth 

of benefits to 22 million beneficiaries. So it is definitely a program 

that works and does have metrics. We anticipate as you noted 

three compacts. You have all the detail in the budget justification, 

so I will spare you that, and let us just jump to the questions. 


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THRESHOLD PROGRAMS

Mrs. LOWEY. Okay, and we will proceed from side to side, which 

is our usual procedure. The MCC’s threshold program has become 

a topic of much debate over the past year. At its inception, threshold programming was designed to assist countries to meet the specific indicators. In practice, threshold programs have had varied results. In some cases countries have become compact eligible prior 

to the end of their threshold programs, others have received a second threshold program, others frankly received a threshold grant 

but are not likely to ever become compact eligible. 

The initial goal of the threshold program continues to have 

merit, but I am concerned that this program has truly lost its way. 

I understand that MCC is undertaking an internal review. Could 

share some of the preliminary observations or recommendations of 

that review, and while this review is going on, what steps will 

MCC take to put this program back on track, and what mechanisms do you have in place to ensure that there is appropriate coordination between the MCC and USAID and there is no duplication of effort on threshold programs? 

For example, in Peru the MCC threshold program includes a significant child health component while USAID already has a $12 

million health program in that country. And as you know there is 

considerable discussion about the need to develop whole-of-government development strategies in countries where the U.S. government is providing assistance. If this strategy was developed 

through a collaborative process that included all of the relevant 

agencies, do you believe that the threshold program would need to 

continue to be a component of the MCC portfolio? So what is happening with the threshold program? 

Mr. BENT. I did not count all the questions nested in there, but 

there were quite a few. Let me see if I can broadly explain the history and where we are going, how we are thinking about at the 5- 

year mark what the threshold program should do. The program 

was originally designed to help countries cross that threshold to become a compact. So in that sense there was I think an element of 

more risk taking. We were going to be working with partners who 

are a little further away than the compact eligible countries. 

The notion was that it would be a 2-year program, it would be 

largely administered but not entirely administered by USAID, and 

it would be the kind of program that would deal largely with issues 

like corruption that, frankly, are pretty tough to deal with. You are 

quite correct. Several of the countries have not done as well on the 

threshold program as I would have liked. I would point to the 

Ukraine as an example, but in some measure that is a good way 

of finding out whether the country is really ready to work on a 

compact. 

Other threshold programs have in fact been just brilliantly successful. I would cite the Burkina Faso Girls’ Education Program in 

which we built 130 girl friendly schools, and that is frankly covering not only the schools but drilling wells, building teacher housing, working with the government of Burkina Faso to pay for teachers and textbooks. It was such a good program in fact that Burkina 


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Faso wanted to include a second stage of that program in their 

compact. 

So I would highlight the purpose of the threshold program is to 

help countries, it is to give us some experience. But I think your 

question is really directed at, what is the future about. I think 

what we are trying to do, and it is a new board so they will have 

their own thoughts on this, we are going to present a series of 

questions: Does it make sense to have a second threshold program? 

If we have not been able to do something in two years, can we do 

it in four? What should the failure rate be like? 

Frankly, having spent a long time in government, if you are 

going to do something risky you ought to expect failures every once 

in a while. So I have no illusions that somehow the threshold program will produce 100 percent of success. But the goal is to make 

sure that the programs are well designed, that they get the beneficiaries in and of themselves, but that they do in fact lead to a 

compact. 

Having said that, I do not think every threshold program, every 

threshold country should be a compact country. It is not, and we 

make this clear when we talk about the threshold program, getting 

a threshold program just means you have an opportunity to compete. Whether you get a compact is going to depend on whether or 

not you meet the criteria and frankly how good the proposals are. 

How many beneficiaries, what is the government doing, what are 

the kinds of needs that the country has? 

Mrs. LOWEY. In Peru, why did you need an MCC child health 

program when there was already a USAID $12 million health program in the country? 

Mr. BENT. What I have seen in a lot of cases, is that the threshold program is a little more directive in the sense that we are looking at indicators. And in a lot of cases, probably 90 percent of the 

time, USAID does administer the threshold program. I think sometimes we have had a good segue, in which people will look at a program, whether it is child immunizations or girls’ education or governance, and then AID will in fact say, well look let us continue 

that program, it builds on some things that we have tried to do. 

I am afraid I cannot quite speak directly to Peru because I have 

not been there, but I would be happy to try and answer that question for the record. 

Mrs. LOWEY. That is another way to get them additional money. 

Ms. Granger. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. It is my understanding 

that most of these infrastructure projects, in both poor and rich 

countries, such as road projects, are often fertile ground for corruption ranging from petty theft to perhaps large scale collusion. As 

you know, corruption can lead to rising costs as well as decreased 

development and economic returns. In 2010 you are planning a 

compact with the Philippines, a country in the middle of a corruption scandal in which the World Bank canceled a $33 million road 

improvement project and black listed several firms they said had 

colluded in the business process. 


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First, will the Philippines pass the corruption indicator and if so 

how will the MCC compact combat the corruption challenge that 

the Philippines infrastructure sector poses? Two, please give specific anticorruption measures that MCC will include in procurement, oversight, and auditing. And how do you think the MCC is 

distinct from the World Bank in its effort to prevent and counter 

corruption? 

Mr. BENT. Great series of questions. Let me deal first with the 

corruption and then with the Philippines. On corruption you are 

quite right about infrastructure, because the large contracts could 

be lucrative opportunities for people to scam. What we have tried 

to do, because corruption for us is a key indicator, and I will come 

back to that in talking about the Philippines, is we have tried to 

take every measure that we can to worry about, okay how do you 

identify it, how do you prevent it, how do you build into place the 

systems that are going to deal with corruption, and then how do 

you have that continuous monitoring to make sure that if you see 

it you can stop it. 

What I would say is that in the case of corruption, we have a corruption policy that has been blessed by Transparency International. Fighting corruption has been our hallmark and so we pay 

a huge amount of attention to it. What we do in specific infrastructure projects, it is in our interest, it is in the U.S. taxpayers’ interest to have the most efficient, most capable companies do it. We 

hire procurement agents, we hire fiscal agents, we have twice a 

year audits. 

We try to make sure that when we look at the norms for procurement whether it is a road or a port or an airport, or, industrial 

park or building schools, what are the metrics? What are other 

companies doing? What are other donors doing? What has been the 

experience? We obviously do the checks in terms of companies and 

black lists, but that can only take you so far. What I have seen is 

that because we have engineers supervising engineers, we are really big believers in belts and suspenders in terms of looking at corruption. 

So far we have not had a major instance of corruption in an MCC 

funded project, but I will say we have had a couple of procurements 

where we looked at them, we did not feel that they smelled right, 

and we said, okay they are going back, you are going to have to 

rebid, you are going to have to resubmit. I think that kind of attention to detail is what marks us a little bit as being different. We 

spend a huge amount of time worrying about that issue and trying 

to ferret it out. 

In the case of the Philippines, they are probably the biggest program that we are likely to fund in 2010. For several years they did 

pass the corruption indicator. They are at the 47th percentile, 

which is within the margin of error, but enough to make us nervous and for us to in fact have a series of discussions with the Philippine government, with President Arroyo, with the Finance Minister Gary Teves. We have made clear to them we are concerned, 

that they must, according to the previous board policy, pass the 

corruption indicator before we will sign. 

They are well aware of that, I cannot think of any more blunt 

and direct conversations that we could possibly have had with 


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them. The new numbers will come out in August and September, 

and we will see at that point. It will also be a new board, they will 

have to decide what they want to do. What is a little bit different 

about how we operate than the World Bank is that, and if there 

were somebody from Treasury here I would probably have given 

them equal time to offer some commentary on it, but several of our 

staff came out of the World Bank. 

There is in the World Bank cultural context the desire to get 

stuff done. You get promoted by doing projects. There is a government to government relationship. We do not have that same cultural context. We look at projects and they either work and the 

beneficiaries are there, or they do not, in which case we stop. We 

do not want to have that continuing 5-, 20-year relationship with 

a country. We are willing to pull the plug. In fact in several cases 

where we saw projects that did not work, we stopped them. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Jackson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. JACKSON

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

First of all, welcome to the Committee. 

Mr. BENT. Thank you. 

Mr. JACKSON. Let me comment on at least what I understand the 

reformation of foreign aid to have been over the last decade. We 

created the MCC and the threshold program to move away from direct grants to countries who were not following certain indicators 

to help reduce poverty, to get away from the tyrants, the despots, 

the unaccountable foreign aid, really in reaction to what the American people were saying about foreign aid, but also we wanted 

greater accountability in areas like poverty reduction. 

I find it a little bit disconcerting, and maybe you could help clarify it, when we would coax a country into the threshold process and 

then after they have met the indicators, including reformation of 

their civil society and other elements that would provide greater 

transparency, to then say that once they have met the thresholds, 

made these adjustments, they may not be eligible for a compact. It 

just seems a little disingenuous from my perspective. The whole 

point of the threshold program is to make them eligible so that 

they can have the resources to do that. 

This is a thought I would like you to comment on, but before you 

do, two years ago I accompanied the Chairwoman on a CODEL to 

Subsaharan Africa, and one of our stops was to visit the Kibera 

slum in Kenya, which was quite eye-opening. The number of people 

living in poverty and slums in the developing world is about a billion, and it is expected to grow rapidly unless actions are taken to 

address the challenges and the opportunities of urbanization and 

the growth of slums. 

The International Housing Coalition in a study conducted last 

year found that only about a quarter of MCC funds were going to 

urban areas, and none to improve housing. The flexible funding of 

MCC creates the real opportunity to provide multi-sectoral assistance and fund strategic approaches to slum improvement. How can 

the MCC constraint analysis process and MCC funding better focus 


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on critical interrelated issues of slums, poor housing, and urban 

poverty alleviation? 

I would not want a country, let us say like Kenya, to meet the 

threshold, but after they meet the threshold there is no compact 

possibility. This is maybe a far-fetched example, but for a similarly 

situated country, there is no compact at the end of the threshold 

to address what the Chairwoman and Members of this Committee 

saw in that slum. 

Mr. BENT. Right. There were a couple of questions there. Let me 

see if I can parse them in the following way. For the threshold program, we do regard it as a way of getting countries to eligibility. 

But whether or not the country becomes eligible is in some measure, okay have they met the criteria? There are a couple of countries, I will use Guyana as an example, that had a threshold program, that did meet the criteria, but the previous board did not select for a compact eligibility. 

In part that is because Guyana is roughly a million people. I 

have been to the country and you could throw a stone and probably 

find 50 things that need going there, and so in some measure it is 

a good place to do development kind of work. But we have scarce 

resources. We have to look at both in terms of our staff and in 

terms of our budget what makes sense. It is a new board. Even 

though several of the private members are going to continue, it is 

a new Secretary of State, a new Aid Administrator, hopefully there 

will be one, a new VSTR, and there is a new Treasury Secretary. 

In some measure, what we are trying to tee up for the board are 

exactly those kinds of questions as part of the threshold review. 

Does it make sense if we have had a successful threshold program 

and the country now passes the criteria to make them eligible? And 

those are the kinds of decisions that I think the board needs to look 

at. In the case of Guyana, they essentially said, you have got scarce 

resources, is this a good place to put your money? On housing and 

the urban question, which is, we spend a lot of time on this, most 

of the poor in Africa and elsewhere are out in the countryside. So 

in some sense looking at those programs makes a lot of sense. 

Mr. JACKSON. I know you are going to get to the urban question 

and I know my time is up, but I want to go back to just part of 

that answer that you raised about the threshold, and that is, in 

these countries that undertake the effort to apply for the compact, 

to go through the threshold process, they reform their governments, they reform civil society, they try to create greater transparency, they shift resources in order to comply so that they might 

be part of some kind of systematic approach to addressing poverty. 

Mr. BENT. Right. 

Mr. JACKSON. Now at the end of that threshold, after they have 

made these reforms, what we are saying or the board is saying, 

and maybe we need greater clarity, is that there is a strong possibility that after all the reforms you have gone through there is 

going to be some back treading here because you may not get the 

compact? 

Mr. BENT. Well let me be clear, if you gave us the money we 

would be happy to do it. But, we do have to make choices. It is 

really the board that needs to decide where do you get the biggest 

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ficiaries, where are you going to have a good program. I frankly do 

not like to be in the position of having to explain to a country that 

has made the kind of commitments, made the resources available, 

done the tough policy reforms, met the threshold program criteria, 

and then have to go back and explain as I did to the President of 

Guyana, I am sorry not this year. 

My hope frankly is that I can make a much more positive and 

constructive phone call to say, yes, you know, we would like to do 

it. But it is a function of the resources, and I probably more than 

anybody else appreciate what this Subcommittee has to go through 

in terms of making those kinds of choices. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I think Mr. Jackson asked some really important 

questions. Maybe we can have a followup meeting on it, and I 

thank you. 

Mr. BENT. Could I just answer the one question about urbanization? Because it seems to me we really do try to pay attention to 

that. The Jordan program is hugely about urban waste water and 

use of water. So we are cognizant of it. What we are doing at airports and road and port infrastructure are really about urbanization kinds of projects. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Rehberg. 

Mr. REHBERG. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And, Rodney, nice to see you again. 

Mr. BENT. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. REHBERG. It is always with some interest I look at the Members and staff that had survived a Kolbe death march. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I was there. 

Mr. REHBERG. Yes, some of us have won the t-shirt or deserve 

that. Some of us have two death marches. I want to talk specifically about some of the things Mr. Jackson brought up because as 

you can tell we are very supportive and we want to make this 

work. And we are particularly interested in why some of the countries do not make it. One of our trips with Mr. Kolbe was to Senegal and Benin. Having been on the ground and seen their project 

and the enthusiasm of not only the public but the government at 

the time, the one thing we did notice, and I brought it up at prior 

meetings, the separation of the judiciary always seemed to be a 

problem, but more specifically I noticed in those two particular 

countries kind of two-term-itis. They wanted to change the constitution so that as president they could be president for life. Is 

that one of the things that kind of knocks a country out, when they 

start changing their constitution? Because we want to see them 

moving more towards an open democratic or whatever government 

they choose for themselves. And talk a little bit specifically about 

those two countries. What happened, is there a chance to come 

back in once they have been dropped off or are they too far gone? 

Mr. BENT. No. Let me talk about Senegal as an example. I think 

we certainly had some startup difficulties there. Part of the difficulty is explaining to the Senegalese government and the Senegalese people how we operate. A lot of time governments will come 

in and they will say, we have got these wonderful projects, we want 

you to fund them. And we have to say, well let us talk about the 

economic rates of return, let us talk about the gender, let us talk 


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about the engineering, let us talk about the environment. Do these 

make sense? What are you willing to put into these compacts? 

In the case of Senegal, I went there about 3 years ago, and 

frankly I was disappointed at the quality of the engagement we 

had. It was pretty clear to me the President just wanted to hand 

us over and say, you know, write the check, give us the money. 

And we said, no we are not going to do that, we are going to go 

through the full consultative process, it really has to make sense, 

you have to make a contribution. We had some back and forth on 

this, and for about 2 years I would have said that Senegal was on 

the do not resuscitate list. 

But in fact what happened was that I think the government, 

when they saw that Mali and Burkina Faso had compacts, countries that they regarded as less sophisticated, and speaking 

colloquially here, they were a little stunned. And they suddenly 

came back and they said, well what is it that these countries have 

done that allow them to go forward? In fact one of the key advantages of the MCC is that peer to peer pressure. 

When we see a compact that is in trouble, where things are not 

going well, we can send people, or frankly they send themselves, 

they will go to a country and say, okay you had this similar kind 

of road project, what did you do that made it work? That kind of 

peer to peer sharing is not something that shows up in our advantages, but it is major, it is real. So in the case of Senegal, they got 

wise, they came back, they put together a very good core team, 

they have now got a whole series of road projects that, depending 

on other events and funding, we are going to go forward with. 

Mr. REHBERG. Did their program or project change? 

Mr. BENT. Yes, very much. 

Mr. REHBERG. Not moving the town? 

Mr. BENT. No, the town is off our radar screen. We are working 

with roads and irrigation in Senegal. We have had several countries that have gone through peaceful transitions. El Salvador, I 

was just there a couple of weeks ago, were going from President 

Saca to President Funes, I think that will be a great success story. 

Ghana, President Kufuor handed over power peacefully. 

Mr. REHBERG. How about the changing of the constitution? 

Mr. BENT. That is, there is always a question, you know, one of 

the things that the board takes into account is what we call supplementary information. We have the indicators which, you know, we 

bore everybody with, but we have put together a huge amount of 

additional information. What is the governance like, what is the judiciary like, what is civil society like, what are people saying? What 

do businessmen say about them really, not just as measured by our 

indicators but much more texturally? Is the rate of taxation too 

high, is it stifling, what is going on? 

Those are all questions that we put to the board, and among 

them are going to be, okay is there likely to be a peaceful transition? Will there be an extra-constitutional effort? The case of Madagascar, I do not know if I want to save that as a question for later. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Done. 

Mr. BENT. Well essentially, but it is a good example of, frankly 

Madagascar had one of our better programs. I was really looking 

to it as a huge success story. We were going at great guns, and 


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then we have an extra-constitutional coup. That violates our sense 

of good policy. We sort of looked at it and we said, we have got to 

stop, you know, we are going to wind this program up. But I have 

to say it tears my heart out because that was one of our better performing programs. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Ms. McCollum. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you. 

Following up on this, and I know Mr. Berman is working on looking at the way that we put our State Department and foreign aid 

together, my problem with this is not that there should not be specialized programs within the way that we do aid, it is the fact that 

they start standing alone separate, they start competing for the 

same funds, or they use funds from other programs that we fund. 

For example a lot of USAID money has gone into PEPFAR, a lot 

of USAID money has gone into MCC to make the thresholds work. 

So as we think we are plussing up USAID to work on child survival, the child survival money gets kind of intermixed in with 

funding for threshold. I am going to make more comments and 

then I would like you to. I was always skeptical of having this be 

a standalone program, and my skepticism has not changed even 

though I have seen some good things happen. When you talk about 

threshold countries and you make it really clear, let me tell you it 

is not real clear to me that you have made it real clear with the 

number of ambassadors that line up outside of my door, literally. 

Mr. BENT. American or foreign ambassadors? 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Foreign ambassadors who line up outside of my 

door saying, we have done this, we have done that, we are a 

threshold country, we are ready to go and we expect you to fund 

it. That is the wrong way that it should work. It should be, you 

make those tough decisions early on about what the threshold 

countries are going to be based on your budget, not the other way 

around setting up expectations. It is cruel, it is wrong, and then 

it forces this Committee to make the tough choices that we had 

nothing to do with as to whether or not we want to plus up child 

survival across the board, or put in a sustainable health care platform. 

I do not disagree that you do good things, but I do disagree with 

the way that it has been structured moving up. And let me give 

you another example just even from the conversation today. I think 

it is great that we did more for education in Burkina Faso, I think 

that that is marvelous. I think USAID has a clear mission to do 

that and that they should be given the funds to fulfill that mission. 

Now where I can see MCC working is to plus up the higher education, for technical support for doing all those things that you are 

doing, not K through 12 schools. 

So I say this because I want to have an honest conversation. I 

want to see you be successful, but I want to also see us be successful in many of the other endeavors this Committee works on and 

not be in conflict and not be in competition. And I want to make 

it very clear from this Member of Congress, I am fighting back as 

an appropriator when the ambassadors from other countries are 

coming into my office saying, you know what, they should not have 

done it that way. They should not have put you on the track for 


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threshold with an expectation that you were going to get a compact 

when they had not consulted Congress about the money that was 

going to be available. 

Mr. BENT. Let me give brief responses if I can. On education, I 

think one of the advantages of the MCC is in some measure, because we require countries to also put in their contributions, so in 

the case of Burkina Faso it is looking at the teacher salaries and 

other things, that is I think above and beyond. There is no question 

that U.S. foreign aid needs a complete rethink. I would give a 

shout out to the MFAN folks and I would say, look everybody 

knows the status quo is not good, so what is the future going to 

bring? 

One of the advantages of the MCC is that we have a board that 

has AID, it has the Secretary of State as Chairman. So if you want 

to look at how to integrate programs, I think that is a great place 

to start. Everything you said about the competition for resources, 

I accept and I would be happy to talk with you at greater length 

about how we can together make sure these ambassadors have got 

the right approach to the threshold program. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Crenshaw. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. CRENSHAW

Mr. CRENSHAW. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And welcome to the Committee. Earlier I asked the acting head 

of USAID some questions about human trafficking, and I was really encouraged to hear him say that when they decide in terms of 

where that USAID assistance is going to go they monitor the way 

the countries are complying with our TIP reports that come out 

every year and they take it pretty seriously, so that was very encouraging. I wanted to ask you about that because sometimes when 

I look through, I guess one of the things I like about the compact 

and the corporation is you sign an agreement, and we have got 

those criteria that you set out. And there is not really a criteria on 

human trafficking but I imagine it falls in kind of the Ruling Justly category. 

Mr. BENT. Absolutely. 

Mr. CRENSHAW. But when I look at the chart we have 14 compacts, 12 of those 14 countries are ranked tier 2 or tier 2 watch 

list. Number 1 is minimum requirements, number 3 is not very 

good, 2 is kind of, we are working on it. 

Mr. BENT. Right. 

Mr. CRENSHAW. But here is what is interesting, 6 of the 12 that 

are on the tier 2 or tier 2 watch list, they passed 6 out of 6 of the 

criteria under the Ruling Justly criteria, which makes me wonder, 

how seriously do you take when you are grading those compacts 

the compliance with the TIP report? Because if they are still, in 

fact six of those, they were on tier 2 for three straight years so they 

did not really move, and we are pretty serious about trying to deal 

with this as you know. And so, help me understand how that plays, 

and when you look at those criteria, what kind of efforts do you 

make to say to those countries, we have got a deal here and you 

are not really meeting part of those requirements? 


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Mr. BENT. We take it very seriously. In the case of Moldova I 

think they were on the tier 3 and we essentially went and had a 

conversation saying, that will not be acceptable, you need to deal 

with that. Again it is part of the information that the board takes 

into account, it is certainly something we take very seriously just 

as I think Mr. Wolf last year asked about U.N. votes and we went 

back and we made sure that we went through that and we looked 

at it. These are all important factors. I cannot give you a mathematical weight because what we are also looking at is, okay what 

can the country do, how serious are they, is it a question of resources, is it a question of enforcement? But we do spend a huge 

amount of time on that. 

Mr. CRENSHAW. If you take these six countries that have been on 

tier 2 for three straight years, it is almost $3 billion that we are 

spending. So I just hope that somehow we can sit down with those 

folks and, you know, not year after year after year have them not 

make any progress at all. So I appreciate that, but I do think we 

can probably maybe send that message, because I will from time 

to time ask the leaders of these countries when we are visiting, and 

it never seems to be high on their priority. It is always something 

they are concerned about, in fact if you ask anybody in this world, 

they are just outraged that this goes on in the 21st century. But 

they do not seem to be making as much progress as they could if 

they were really serious about it. 

Mr. BENT. It is a question of using incentives as opposed to withholding or using sanctions. We try to say, look we are all about 

positive incentives, you know, speak softly and carry a big carrot. 

But, you have got to do the right things and trafficking in persons 

is really important to us. 

Mr. CRENSHAW. Let me ask you, do I have a minute, Madam 

Chairwoman? 

You know, when we were talking earlier about some of the contracts where our money is being used to say build a road or whatever, is there any kind of consideration given to U.S. companies if 

we have got a compact with somebody, Honduras or another country, part of that money is going to go to build some sort of facility, 

the road or some sort of equipment et cetera, is there consideration 

given to U.S. companies that are bidding on that? I do not think 

they should necessarily be favored, but do they get the same consideration? 

Mr. BENT. We actually bend over backwards to make sure that 

U.S. companies have every opportunity to bid. We make sure that 

the documents are in English, we make sure we go out and visit. 

It is in our interest to have a domestic constituency that thinks we 

are a good program. When I was in El Salvador two weeks ago and 

we just inaugurated a major road project to the north, I was delighted to see it was Caterpillar equipment there, and so I sent my 

friends at Caterpillar a picture saying, hey look I am doing my bit 

for you now you have got to do your bit for this country. 

Mr. CRENSHAW. Well thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Madam Chair. 


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Mr. Bent, I wanted to ask you about two countries, Jordan and 

Armenia. I was very happy to see that the Jordan compact will be 

ramped up in 2010, and especially pleased that we and the Jordanians will be working to address Jordan’s incredibly scarce access to water. I think the late King Hussein said the only reason 

he could see going to war with Israel in the future would be over 

water. 

In your testimony you referred to a framework for benchmarks 

that the MCC will use. Can you elaborate on what those benchmarks may be? And I would like to be kept apprised of the Jordan 

compact’s progress, so I would like to arrange to be briefed as developments warrant. And let me just get the other question out 

there in the interest of time. On Armenia, according to Armenian 

press reports last week, Armenia will request the MCC provide 

$1.6 million to rehabilitate railroad infrastructure. 

The press reports indicate that they are awaiting approval from 

the Millennium Challenge fund before the matter is forwarded on 

to the MCC. MCC already has in place a $67 million road rehab 

program, but MCC froze about 30 percent of the aid package in 

2006 following that year’s problematic elections. And I understand 

that MCC said in March that the Armenian government had still 

not addressed U.S. concerns about the status of democratic governance in the country. 

Last week Secretary Clinton wrote to President Sargsyan to ask 

him to ensure that the upcoming municipal elections in Yerevan 

are democratic. Are we awaiting the type of process that takes 

place in those elections to determine whether democratic governance has been restored sufficiently to release MCC funds? If not, 

are there other factors you are looking to in terms of the status of 

the funds? 

Mr. BENT. Let me take them in order. On Jordan we would be 

happy to brief you in more detail. We reckon that there will be 

about a million and a half beneficiaries to the project. It affects, I 

think, 90,000 households. But we would be happy to go through the 

metrics in terms of the types of pipe that we are putting in, the 

amount of water that will be saved not wasted, and what this will 

mean for frankly a very poor portion of Jordan. 

On Armenia, we had major difficulties with the election as you 

know. You are very well versed on events in Armenia. We had 

some concerns about it. With the new board, we presented those 

concerns and with a couple of other countries as well. The Secretary of State I think is directly personally interested in what is 

going on. We are going to have a board meeting in June in which 

we will again raise the issue of Armenia, as well as Nicaragua, as 

well as a briefing on Madagascar. So let me not jump ahead of 

where the board is because this is one of those cases where that 

tight coordination between the State Department, AID, and other 

government programs is hugely important to us. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I remember at the time the MCC suspended the 

funds that there were several issues, there was the problematic 

elections, there were the continued detention of political opponents, 

there were some potential media laws cracking down on free 

speech, and some concerns I think about curbing the rights of assembly as well as the opportunity for NGOs to work in the country. 


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Are you able to tell me if any, some, all of those problems have 

been sorted out or whether they are continuing to be problems? 

Mr. BENT. I cannot tell you how they have been sorted out. Let 

me back up one step. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I do remember also that the Armenian government 

decided to put their own money into the rural road infrastructure 

to get it done before the rainy season, and so that was good, that 

was a positive step, but I would love to hear what you could tell 

me. 

Mr. BENT. Well in both Armenia and Nicaragua the projects are 

great, there is no question that, a little bit like Madagascar, they 

are some of our best performing projects as projects. I was at pains 

when I was in Nicaragua to talk with the Minister of Finance and 

say, look these projects are going great. The Armenian Foreign 

Minister came two weeks ago and I had to say pretty much the 

same thing. The issue is not the projects, it is the good governance 

questions. 

Every point you just listed is in fact an issue of some concern for 

us. The Secretary of State has taken a personal interest in this— 

and as the Armenian Foreign Minister and I think the Nicaraguan 

Foreign Minister said,—she has written letters to both. I cannot 

tell you what the response has been. I figured I would get phone 

calls from both ambassadors saying how well the meetings had 

gone and then when we will be talking about this at the June 

board meeting as well. 

Mr. SCHIFF. My time is up, but if you could let me know maybe 

after the hearing, of the issues that were raised earlier that concern the MCC, on which issues has Armenia made progress and 

which issues are you waiting to see progress. 

Mr. BENT. Absolutely, and I would like to come in with the State 

Department on that because we really do try to work through our 

ambassadors. We are part of the country team and we make sure 

that there is no daylight between the two of us. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Ms. Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. Talk about the conflict in Mongolia. 

Mr. BENT. That was, every once in a while you want to try and 

do something that has not been done before. And so in the case of 

Mongolia it was frankly a pretty innovative idea to help the railroad, which is 50-50 owned by the Mongolian government and a 

Russian company, because, really, the heartbeat of Mongolia is 

going to be minerals and transportation. So we thought this is a 

great way of moving forward. But we insist on standards on accountability and transparency, and one of our conditions precedent 

for the rail project funding was that we be able to audit the company. If we are going to do an innovative lease, we want to make 

sure that we have got the financials there to back it up. 

There was a fair amount of stalling, and I can tell you more privately some of the other things that went on, but at the end of the 

day, we were not able to satisfy ourselves that that accountability 

would be there. The Mongolian government basically said, well we 

are not sure we can therefore proceed, and we said, fine. They are 

very interested in finding other projects. We are frankly in the 

mode of, well if they are good projects we will look at them but it 


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is going to have to be done within our framework of beneficiaries 

of good projects and economic growth. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you again for your time, and I look forward 

to continuing our discussion on several issues that were raised. 

This concludes today’s hearing on the Millennium Challenge Fiscal 

Year 2010 Budget Request. The Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations and Related Programs stands adjourned. 

Mr. BENT. Thank you. 


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(339) 

TUESDAY, MARCH 10, 2009. 

THE MERIDA INITIATIVE 

WITNESSES 

THOMAS SHANNON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WESTERN 

HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS (WHA) 

DAVID JOHNSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS 

(INL) 

RODGER GARNER, MISSION DIRECTOR FOR MEXICO, UNITED STATES 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID) 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN LOWEY

Mrs. LOWEY. Good morning. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs will come to order. 

Today we have two distinguished panels to review implementation of the funding Congress has provided for the Merida program 

in Mexico and the countries of Central America. 

I want to welcome our first panel: Mr. Thomas Shannon, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs; Mr. David 

Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics 

Control and Law Enforcement Affairs; Mr. Rodger Garner, USAID 

Mission Director for Mexico. And we also look forward to hearing 

our private witness panel who I will introduce later. 

Over the past decade drug trafficking and other criminal enterprises have grown in size and strength, aggressively intimidating 

and overwhelming government institutions in Mexico and Central 

America and threatening security and the rule of law. 

Recent news reports as recently as this morning have highlighted 

the surge in violence in Mexico related to drug cartels and organized crime, while homicide rates and other violent drug-related 

crimes have sharply increased in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. This trend continues to raise questions about the most effective way to confront those powerful and well organized criminal 

enterprises. 

An estimated 90 percent of the cocaine shipped from the Andes 

flows through Central America up through Mexico and into the 

United States. In fact, in 2007 approximately 563 metric tons of cocaine transited into the United States via Mexico. And the drug 

cartels have expanded into other types of drug production, with 

Mexico now a leading supplier of methamphetamines, heroin, and 

marijuana to the United States. 

This subcommittee just returned from a trip to Mexico, Colombia, 

and Peru where we examined these challenges. We met with government leaders, law enforcement, military leaders, got a firsthand 

look at counternarcotics and alternate development programs the 

United States is funding. We were impressed by the political comVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 055951 PO 00000 Frm 00339 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\A951P2.XXX A951P2

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mitment of Presidents Calderon, Uribe and Garcia, all of whom understand the level of threat posed by the narco industry and are 

marshaling the resources to fight it. 

However, this problem cannot be solved through police and military actions alone. More must be done to invest in society and to 

provide alternate livelihoods, education, and opportunities for 

youth. While enforcement by police and military is important, security forces must institutionalize mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability as well as respect for the rights of citizens. 

I know that we will continue to work together to insist that 

United States counternarcotics funding emphasizes these principles; in addition, domestically more attention on reducing demand in our own society and also on curbing the traffic of guns 

from our country into Mexico. This is required to win this war. 

Since I became the chairwoman I have been pushing for more 

comprehensive border security strategy that encompasses counterterrorism, anti-gang, and drug interdiction in the Western Hemisphere. Because counternarcotics efforts have a higher chance of 

success when implemented in the context of strong security and judicial institutions, we must also strengthen these programs. 

Finally, we must work with the governments in the region to address the underlying poverty and lack of opportunity upon which 

the drug cartels prey to gain power and influence. 

Including funding in the fiscal year 2009 omnibus appropriations, Congress has provided 700 million for assistance for Mexico 

and 170 million for Central America under the Merida program. I 

would like the panels to assess what effect the funding is having 

on the flow of illegal drugs to the United States, the type of coordination between the United States, Mexico, and the countries of 

Central America, and what additional steps are necessary to make 

this joint effort work. 

Additionally, I hope the witnesses will address the following key 

issues: First, how do we break the power and impunity of criminal 

organizations and assist the governments in Central America and 

Mexico and strengthen border, air and maritime security from our 

southwest border to Panama? How do we improve the capacity of 

justice systems in the region to protect the rights of its citizens by 

conducting fair and just investigations and prosecutions? How can 

we implement rule of law programs as well as protect civil and 

human rights while curtailing gang activity in Mexico and Central 

America? 

And again, I want to thank Secretaries Shannon and Johnson 

and Mission Director Garner for testifying today, but before I turn 

to our witnesses let me turn to my distinguished ranking member 

for her opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for having 

this hearing today. Even before our recent trip to Mexico I was certainly concerned about the violence that we are reading about literally daily in Mexico. But as a result of our trip I have grown increasingly aware that if the U.S. Government fails to act quickly 

to help Mexico in its war against the drug cartels, there may be 


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grave consequences. For this reason, bringing our subcommittee together today for this important hearing is very much needed and 

very much appreciated. 

We are all becoming painfully aware that drug-related violence 

is rampant in Mexico and places in Mexico, with almost 6,000 people killed last year, twice as many as in 2007. The rising death toll 

is in fact a sign that the Mexican Government is serious about 

cracking down on the drug trade. 

The instability that has shaken Mexico is on our doorstep. I represent Texas, where we see criminals and drugs flow into this 

country while cash and weapons that support the drug trade move 

south across the border. 

The State Department estimates that some 90 percent of the cocaine imported to the United States comes from our southern 

neighbor. In exchange, up to $23 billion a year crosses the border 

and winds up in the hands of the Mexican drug cartels. 

Fortunately, Mexican President Calderon and former President 

Bush took an unprecedented step to enhance cooperation between 

our countries to stop the scourge by announcing the Merida Initiative. The Congress supported this plan to provide Mexico with $1.4 

billion to help control drug trafficking, and as a result the U.S. 

Government is about halfway through its commitment with $400 

million appropriated last summer in the supplemental, another 

$300 million that will flow from the 2009 omnibus bill. 

From helicopters and surveillance planes to nonintrusive inspection equipment, the U.S. investment is intended to provide the 

hardware necessary for the Mexican Government to extend its authority to those remote and hard to access parts of the country ravaged by the drug trade. The funding for judicial reform will also 

help Mexico’s law enforcement community root out corruption and 

work more effectively. 

Mexico has taken its own steps forward on this front with the establishment in January of the national public safety system, which 

will increase coordination between Mexico’s three levels of government and enhance their ability to fight crime. 

I think these are very important investments to jump start the 

Mexican Government effort, yet the struggle could be long and 

painful. 

In closing, I applaud the efforts of the Calderon government to 

eliminate those powerful drug cartels. I want to acknowledge the 

leadership of the previous administration and the subcommittee in 

recognizing that the U.S. must partner with Mexico, as well as 

Central American Governments in this battle. And I encourage the 

Obama administration to continue this Merida Initiative and make 

it a top priority for the upcoming budget request to the Congress. 

I look forward to hearing from you, and thank you for being here. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Members of our distinguished panel, we thank you 

again for being here. Your entire written statement will be placed 

in the record. We are hoping to have a lively question and answer 

session and we are limiting each of us to 5 minutes. 

So if you can summarize your statement. We will make sure we 

read it very carefully if we haven’t read it already. And the order 

of recognition will be Assistant Secretary Shannon, Assistant Secretary Johnson, Mission Director Garner. 


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Secretary Shannon, thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. SHANNON

Mr. SHANNON. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Granger, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you very 

much for the opportunity to be here today. I am very happy to be 

joined by Assistant Secretary Johnson and Mr. Garner. This is a 

great opportunity for us, and we also want to thank you for your 

trip, as you mentioned, to Mexico and other countries. It is so important to gain firsthand knowledge of what is happening on the 

ground, and we deeply appreciate the effort you and your committee made. 

As you know, Mexico and the countries of Central America and 

the Caribbean are passing through a very critical period, which you 

highlighted in your opening statements. The fight among organized 

crime groups and drug cartels to control lucrative trafficking operations has unleashed appalling violence in Mexico, Guatemala, 

Honduras, and other countries in the region. And the effort by our 

Merida partner governments to attack and dismantle these criminal organizations has provoked a harsh response. 

The cartels are targeting police, military, and other security service personnel and using graphic displays of public violence to intimidate communities. This three-corner battle in which cartels 

fight each other while attacking state authorities represents a significant threat to our nearest neighbors and to our own national interests. 

The Merida Initiative recognizes the transnational nature of the 

challenge we face and provides us with a framework to collaborate 

with our neighbors to confront the criminal organizations whose activities, violence and intimidation, threaten the welfare, prosperity, 

and security of our citizens. 

I would like to briefly discuss the strategic importance of the 

Merida Initiative, what it means for the future of security cooperation in the Americas, and its potential to transform our relationships with our Merida partners. As I do so, I want to highlight that 

the urgency of our Merida assistance is heightened by the current 

financial and economic crisis. 

With public sector budgets at risk, remittances declining, and job 

loss throughout the region, the attraction that organized crime and 

cartels present is obvious. In regard to Mexico, as noted, the administration of President Calderon has expanded cooperation with 

the United States and offered to work with us in an unprecedented, 

collaborative, and coordinated fashion. We have accepted that offer 

through the Merida Initiative, but the nature of the challenge is 

daunting. As noted, authorities estimate that in 2008 alone over 

6,200 persons were killed in drug-related violence, including 522 civilian law enforcement and military personnel, and we believe that 

the transnational nature of this threat is indicated by Federal law 

enforcement estimates that elements of Mexican based criminal organizations are present in 230 American cities. 

The important steps that Mexico has taken in this fight have included deploying the military in large numbers in operations 

against organized crime, professionalizing Mexico’s police forces, 

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thorities, instituting long-term reforms to improve the effectiveness 

of the Mexican judicial institutions, and removing Mexican officials 

linked to crime syndicates and corruption. 

Working together with the Mexicans, we can address this threat, 

and our ability to cooperate with the Mexicans is going to be critical to our collaboration and our success. 

As noted, the Merida is on one hand a robust assistance package 

where we work directly with the countries of Mexico, Central 

America, and the Caribbean to address immediate needs they have, 

both institutional and with regard to their equipment. But it is premised on a partnership between our countries and our recognition 

that multifaceted problems associated with criminal organizations 

represent a shared responsibility whose solutions require a coordinated response, and this coordinated response is really at the heart 

of the Merida Initiative and at the heart of how our intra agency 

operates. 

In regard to Central America, in our conversations with Central 

American leaders and public security ministers we are convinced 

that the leaders of Central America have the political will that you 

found in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru. They are dedicated to eliminating violence and crime that plague our nations, but they are 

challenged by sophisticated traffickers, gangs and organized crimes 

who utilize widespread bribery, intimidation, and corruption to undermine the efforts of national law enforcement and judicial authorities. 

We have engaged with the Central Americans in unprecedented 

levels of discussion, and built I believe an initial framework in 

Merida that is going to pay big dividends, especially as we move 

forward. But we also recognize there is real concern about the Caribbean. In that sense the decision by the Congress to put funding 

in the 2008 supplemental for the Dominican Republic and Haiti 

was an important effort to understand the importance of the Caribbean and to require us to take a closer look at the Caribbean. We 

have done that. Admiral Stavridis and I have traveled in the region 

to meet with Caribbean leaders. Last September in 2008, Secretary 

Rice issued a statement committing the United States to working 

with the Caribbean to develop a security cooperation dialogue. And 

we will be meeting with Caribbean security personnel in May after 

the Summit of the Americas to begin a larger discussion about 

what that kind of security cooperation dialogue should look like. 

In concluding, I want to underscore that we appreciate the funding that the Congress has given us through the 2008 supplemental 

and the funding that is being considered at this point in time. Continued funding is essential for the well-being of Merida. Our ability 

to sustain resources over time is going to be key to the ability of 

these governments to meet the challenges they face. 

In closing, the Merida Initiative was born out of crisis. This crisis 

also provides us with a strategic opportunity to reshape our security cooperation relationship and expand dialogue with our partners on critical security and law enforcement issues. 

Thank you very much. 


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Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Secretary Johnson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. JOHNSON

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Granger, and other members of the committee. We appreciate 

the opportunity you are giving us this morning to discuss the 

Merida Initiative, our security cooperation partnership to combat 

transnational narcotics trafficking and organized crime in Mexico 

Central America and the Caribbean. 

Our partner nations are already working hard to fight 

transnational criminals. They are demonstrating unprecedented 

courage and real determination. We believe with our help they can 

do much more. 

Since his inauguration in December 2006, Mexican President 

Calderon has taken decisive action against transnational criminal 

organizations. Under his leadership counternarcotics and law enforcement operations have expanded throughout Mexico and he has 

begun the arduous task of large scale police and rule of law reform. 

His efforts to combat corruption, confront powerful criminal syndicates, improve coordination among security agencies, modernize 

law enforcement agencies and professionalize their staff are indeed 

without precedent. 

But as President Calderon confronts the transnational drug trafficking organizations that threaten his country and the region, violence has climbed markedly. 

In Central America overwhelmed police face extraordinary challenges as criminals step up their murder, kidnapping, extortion 

and robbery. Gang members migrating both within Central America and from the United States take advantage of the breakdown 

in law and order and expand the neighborhoods they exploit. Failure to act now could mean that crime becomes more entrenched 

and the consequences of dealing with these problems later will be 

greater for all of us. With a long-term effort, they can emerge 

stronger, with more resilient, democratic and law enforcement institutions and with greater capacity to respond to the needs of their 

citizens. 

Madam Chairwoman, while the situation in present day Mexico 

and indeed Central America is unique, lessons we have learned 

elsewhere in other programs are still instructive. One of those lessons is the vital role of partners political will plays in meeting the 

crisis at hand. We truly have a partner of extraordinary political 

will in President Calderon. 

Another lesson is the importance of law enforcement and judicial 

institution reform. This is the kind of reform that lies at the hard 

of the Merida Initiative. 

Finally, we have learned that law enforcement needs the mobility to extend the state’s authority rapidly to remote and inaccessible places. It is crucial that we extend credible deterrence across 

and ensure that law enforcement can reach high value targets and 

eliminate their threat to the rule of law. That is the reason helicopters play such a key role in the program for Mexico. 

Madam Chairwoman, the countries of the Caribbean, Central 

America, and Mexico face an extraordinary challenge from drug 

fueled organized crime. Merida in and of itself will not solve the 


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problems this crime wave inflicts, but it will give us and our partners crucial tools to address the challenge effectively and restore 

the rule of law in our own neighborhood. 

Thank you for your time. I would be happy to answer any questions when the time comes. 

[The statement of Mr. Johnson follows:] 


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Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Mr. Garner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. GARNER

Mr. GARNER. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Granger, 

and other distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you 

for inviting me here to appear before you today. I appreciate the 

opportunity to testify on the U.S.’s role in the Merida Initiative. 

Madam Chairwoman, I also wish to thank you for your recent 

visit down to Mexico, for the opportunity we had to discuss different parts of our programs, and I especially want to thank you 

for visiting the Trafficking in Persons Center. The young victims 

were enormously encouraged by your words of support, so thank 

you for that. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you for organizing it. 

Mr. GARNER. My pleasure. 

Criminal organizations prosper when public institutions are 

weakened by insufficient budgets, inadequate equipment, and poor 

training. Mexican civil society estimates that only 2 percent of 

criminal cases actually reach conviction. Poor coordination between 

law enforcement officials and efforts across the region also contribute to criminal success. 

The narcotraffickers have exploited our differences, they do not 

respect our borders, our laws, nor human life. USAID supports 

President Felipe Calderon’s efforts to strengthen law enforcement 

and justice sector institutions that are key in addressing crime and 

violence. One way we do this is by fostering greater collaboration 

between U.S. and Mexican states. For example, New Mexico provided technical assistance and training to the forensics labs of Chihuahua. Colorado recently trained state police investigators from 

Baja, California. 

Drawing upon the best practices of the state experiments in justice reform, the Mexican Congress last year passed historic constitutional amendments to overhaul the entire justice system of 

Mexico. USAID’s Merida programs will support the Mexican institutions as they now begin to train an estimated 1 million people 

in new, transparent, and more accountable ways of administering 

justice. 

Our Merida programs also promote greater respect for human 

rights. Mexico’s old justice system relied heavily on confessions to 

prove the guilt, leading to many charges of human rights violations 

by police and prosecutors as they sought those confessions. The 

new justice system is founded on a presumption of innocence and 

evidence is required to prove guilt. 

In addition to providing scholarships to the rural indigenous 

groups that you met while you were down in Mexico, we also sponsor cross-border, university-to-university programs. Three of the 64 

partnerships which we have fostered so far have assisted in law 

schools and helping law students retrain into the new system. 

Southwestern University Law School in Los Angeles, American 

University, and the Illinois Institute of Technology Kent College of 

Law are participating in these programs. 

We are grateful also to the U.S. Western Attorneys General of 

the States who have been very active in the program. Arizona’s Attorney General Terry Goddard hosted a meeting a year ago in 


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Phoenix between U.S. and Mexican state attorneys general. Increased interactions have fostered greater trust, cooperation, and 

identified simple practical solutions. For example, Arizona shares 

with Sonora now their database on stolen cars, which allows 

Sonora’s law enforcement officials to better trace the origin of those 

abandoned cars that may have been used to smuggle guns and 

money from Arizona into Sonora. 

Merida funds are allowing us to expand these kind of programs. 

Of course the challenges we confront in Mexico are shared and in 

fact extend into Central America. Geographic isolation and the lack 

of economic opportunities makes some communities especially vulnerable to criminal activity, to gangs, and to drugs. 

In these locations USAID will support vocational education, computer literacy, and bring together businesses to increase employment opportunities. USAID will expand community crime, and 

gang prevention programs to strengthen the role of local government officials and citizen groups in leading, organizing, and mobilizing resources to improve security. 

USAID will also expand policing initiatives that bring together 

community leaders, civil society, and police to increase the cooperation, mutual understanding and results. 

In conclusion, I would like to add my thanks for the strong bipartisan support in this committee and in the entire Congress as we 

implement this very important program. Mexico has laid out a very 

ambitious reform program for their police forces and for their entire justice system. By participating in these programs, our Federal, State and local officials will gain a broader understanding and 

build a trust that will increase regional cooperation to defeat international criminal syndicate. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Garner follows:] 


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Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much. I am going to be calling on 

members based on seniority, the members that were present when 

the hearing was called to order, and I will alternate between majority and minority and we are going to try to keep our questions 

to 5 minutes. Thank you all for your testimony. 

Some of you may have seen this article from the Los Angeles 

Times today about the raid Sunday, reporting from Tijuana. Mexican authorities on Monday announced the capture of an alleged 

lieutenant of a top crime boss along with 21 other organized crime 

suspects at a weekend party. The raid by Mexican soldiers also led 

to the arrest of 8 state police agents. And then it goes on. 

It was explained to us, as you know, Mr. Garner, about the complexity of the military, the issues that they have and that the police departments have, and they often rotate to be sure they don’t 

have infiltration. But on the other hand, how do you keep an experienced force if you can’t compete with the salaries of the gangs? 

So this was a challenge that certainly was presented to us. 

Secondly, as we know, Plan Colombia started as a three-year 

commitment when it was announced by the Clinton administration. 

Ten years later we are funding counterdrug programs in Colombia. 

Now my question is, and we all mentioned this, we are very impressed with President Calderon’s leadership and the political will 

he has shown in fighting the cartels. But I asked myself after I left 

what happens after President Calderon leaves office? How do we 

institutionalize the political commitment and capacity so that the 

progress that is being made today remains after any changes in political leadership? 

And I wonder if someone or all of you can comment, is President 

Calderon reaching out to his political opposition to create a national consensus on the war on drugs? Are we reaching out to opposition groups in civil society and to subnational governments to ensure that there is political commitment beyond President 

Calderon’s term? And related to that, I mentioned that Plan Colombia was originally designed as a 3-year program, here we are 10 

years later. I know it is difficult to commit, but I would be interested in what you foresee as the length of this program, any 

changes that you see coming from the Obama administration, and 

what would you recommend to the Obama administration. 

In other words, it was clear to all of us that we have a real major 

problem there, and I wouldn’t expect you to say well, on January 

1, 2010, everything is going to be hunky-dory. 

So if you could respond. Maybe we should begin with you, Secretary Shannon. 

Mr. SHANNON. Thank you very much. I am sure my colleagues 

will have other things they can add in response to your question. 

It is a very important question and it is an essential question. I 

would respond in a couple of ways. 

First, what President Calderon and the government of Mexico 

are trying to do now is effect deep institutional change in the national police, in the judiciary, but also driving that change through 

State and local police. They are responding at the moment in an 

emergency fashion to an urgent crisis, but they understand that in 

order to get beyond the emergency they need to build national capabilities and institutional capabilities. That is their focus, and it 


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is the primary focus of the Merida Initiative. So institutional 

change will help ensure continuity over time. 

Secondly, the fact that President Calderon was able to launch his 

initiative shows that there has been a sea change in how Mexicans 

understand the relationship with the United States and has created a political space for President Calderon to build a new type 

of relationship with the United States that can be sustainable over 

time. But for that relationship, that kind of cooperative relationship, to be sustained over time, first he needs to show success on 

the ground, he needs to show that the kinds of steps he is taking 

now will allow Mexicans to recapture their communities. And this 

is why it is so important for us to engage as quickly and decisively 

as we can. 

Also, aside from early success, the transparency of the this initiative, hearings like this, the hearings that were held in 2008, the 

hearings that the Mexican Congress has held have really created 

a broader public understanding of the challenges that Mexico faces 

and of what the Merida Initiative is, and this will allow accountability over time and will allow Mexicans to understand that their 

political leaders are attempting to address a problem in working 

with us in the course of that. 

Mrs. LOWEY. My time is up. Perhaps we can get back to some 

other responses later. Just one question about the political opposition. I understood and we understood when we were there that 

Lopez Obrador was traveling around the country speaking to large 

groups. Has he taken a position on the work that the President is 

doing? 

Mr. SHANNON. He recognizes the problem. He has been critical 

of the President on a variety of issues. I can’t give you a precise 

answer in terms of how critical he has been in terms of the Merida 

Initiative, but we can get back to you on that. 

[The information follows:] 

Mr. SHANNON. All major political parties in Mexico recognize that their country 

faces a security crisis. Political parties have expressed differing views of how best 

to confront this threat. All have been appreciative of the U.S. willingness to recognize our shared responsibility, to do our part on our side of the border to reduce 

demand for drugs, trafficking in arms, and repatriation of drug trafficking proceeds. 

However, many (including Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador) have expressed concern 

that U.S. assistance could pose a violation of Mexican sovereignty. 

Early on, senators and deputies of all parties in the Mexican legislature expressed 

a similar frustration to that of U.S. law makers that the executive branches of both 

governments had not sought early congressional input for the joint effort. As the 

Mexican legislature has become more knowledgeable about the Merida Initiative, 

this concern has subsided. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I think that is essential, because if we are looking 

at the long run, it is really important to have some cooperation 

from the opposition. 

Mr. SHANNON. I am not sure I would describe him as the opposition at this point. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Okay, well, that is—— 

Mr. SHANNON. I think the primary political opposition remains 

the old PRI. 

Mrs. LOWEY. PRI. 

Mr. SHANNON. And Lopez Obrador’s political party is actually 

split along these lines. I think there is a broad recognition of the 

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tionship with the United States to affect that crisis in a positive 

way. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Ms. Granger. Or Mr. Lewis. 

Mr. LEWIS. Hello. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Would you like to say something before Ms. Granger proceeds? 

Mr. LEWIS. I think it has already been said. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Okay, Ms. Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. I have two questions, and we may not 

get to both of them. One is sort of long term. When we took our 

trip to Colombia and Mexico, I was struck with the similarities of 

where Mexico is today and Colombia was 10 years ago or when I 

traveled there the first time. And Assistant Secretary Johnson, you 

talked a bit about lessons learned. So I would like to know, what 

do you think is transferable or helpful for Colombia to the Mexico 

situation or some comparisons we might make that are that are 

wrong or different in those two countries and the situations they 

are on. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think we can learn some lessons, although the 

situations are not by any means exactly the same. I think one of 

the lessons that we are trying to implement through this program 

is that what you need is not just addressing a specific problem, but 

you need to introduce systemic reform. And Colombia did introduce 

an adversarial justice system where oral arguments take place as 

Mexico is doing now, which is important both because of what 

Rodger was mentioning about the human rights issue, but also I 

think because it gives the public an opportunity to see justice being 

done. It is not done by closed doors with someone signing a document; it is done in an open courtroom setting. I think that is an 

important part of that. 

The change in the institutional reform in law enforcement is also 

an important element of this, and that is part of Merida as well, 

although I must hasten to add it is going to be a bigger challenge 

in Mexico because it is a federal state, as Ms. Lowey was mentioning just a moment ago about the various levels and the complexities of the law enforcement system. Colombia was able to have 

a national police service and that made it simpler, if you will, or 

more direct to make those changes. 

Merida does have elements of change that will have an impact 

on state and local, but it is not focused there. It is focused at the 

federal level. Among the things that will have a state level impact 

is an ID system for police officers throughout, up and down, all the 

way up and down to the beat cop so that they have a better grasp 

of who the police officers are and if there is a bad apple that they 

don’t move from point A to point B and get rehired. 

It also provides for a polygraph training program that gives at 

the Federal level the opportunity for a complete polygraph and 

complete vetting of their entire police service. So there is a greater 

opportunity there to limit the opportunities for corruption. It won’t 

ensure against it, but it will make it harder. 

And finally, I would say one of the things we are grappling with 

here is how to define our strategic objective. I think that is going 

to be more and more important. 


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In Colombia I think when we defined it in terms of hectarage of 

coca, with due respect to my predecessors who were trying to figure 

out how to deal with this, I think if they had to do it over again 

they would look at establishing the rule of law throughout Colombia and taking control of Colombian territory. And that has been 

successful in Colombia, and I think the GAO report and others 

have recognized that and we have as well. 

I think we need to look for some sort of strategic objective in 

Mexico that we and the Mexicans define together that is really the 

measure of merit for this program as well. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. I am on yellow. Let me ask one very 

quick question. You were talking sort of like you have a house and 

you have a foundation problem and you have to fix the foundation 

but the kitchen is on fire. Right now one of the things that has 

been mentioned, and we saw there, is the need for equipment and 

helicopters. I am very disappointed to say that my report this 

morning is that DOD said it will be 18 to 24 months before the Bell 

412s are there, the Blackhawks even longer. 

Chairman Lowey said we have this President who is absolutely 

determined to do something about this and we want to help, and 

we can’t get the equipment that we funded. What can we do about 

that? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the helicopters are the odd man out here 

in the equipment. We are moving rapidly to bring forth the nonintrusive inspection equipment that I understand President 

Calderon personally asked you or other members of the Congressional delegation about when you were there. We have agreed with 

the specifications with the Mexicans on about 60 percent of that. 

The remaining 40 percent we are working on now and anticipate 

will be agreed within the next several days. 

We anticipate the bulk of this equipment will be delivered about 

September. It is highly technical things and they have to be built 

to spec. 

The helicopters are harder, the FMF process has procedural 

issues that are associated with it that we are moving through it as 

rapidly as we can. We are in constant contact with our colleagues 

at the Department of Defense trying to figure out where the seams 

are there and push that together as much as we can. We are aiming at reducing that number that you just cited, but I can’t tell you 

what we will achieve. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Excuse me. Before I turn to Ms. Lee, we would like 

to work with you on it. If there are FMF problems, perhaps we can 

be helpful. We will certainly put language in the bill if that is helpful, but it is absurd when you have a President who is really working so hard with a target not to provide the most obvious assistance immediately. 

I would also like to address what you said about the rule of law, 

because as you probably recall, when we adjusted the monies to Colombia we put additional funding in support of the Fiscalia and we 

are pleased that it made a difference. And as we approach next 

year’s bill any advice you can give us certainly will be accepted 

with graciousness and appreciation. 


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Mr. JOHNSON. One thing, whether we are talking about Colombia 

or Mexico or any large country which has an undeveloped transportation infrastructure or hard to reach places, it is this helicopter 

lift that really makes the rule of law work, moving the security 

services to where they need to be so that they can create the umbrella under which rule of law can take place. So these are not 

competing objectives, they are things that work together. 

Mrs. LOWEY. No, I understand that. But it is pretty disappointing to me that we just came back, you have been there 

many times, and you see the urgency, bodies are being decapitated, 

people are being killed and we will get the helicopters to you, but 

you’ll get them 24 months from now. I don’t understand this at all. 

So I think we would like to have a follow-up discussion on this. 

If we are really helping them and pouring in all this money, then 

where is the product? 

Pardon me. Ms. Lee. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MS. LEE

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank you 

for this very important hearing. I want to welcome all of our witnesses. And I want to say to you, Mr. Garner, it is good to see you. 

And thank you again for all of the support you provided for our 

U.S. delegation to the International AIDS Conference last August. 

Glad you are still there. 

Let me just say, first of all, I have been skeptical on this for 

years, and I am still not hearing any response in terms of progress 

that would make me more optimistic that this is working. 

I was born in El Paso, Texas, and have many friends who constantly call me about what is taking place in Juarez and El Paso. 

So I often think about what is going on with the Merida Initiative 

in that area. So I would like to hear some feedback, if you have 

any details on that border area. 

Secondly, let me just say I recognize that strengthening the security forces to combat drug cartels is an important component, but 

it is only one component of what must be a comprehensive strategy 

to combat drug trafficking, drug use, violence, and lawlessness. I 

don’t see this as making a lot of sense yet, it doesn’t include any 

meaningful prevention initiatives such as programs that deal with 

domestic violence, that address young people at risk, criminally involved youth. It doesn’t really address job training and job creation, 

nor does it address economic alternatives. And I am trying to figure 

out how we move forward if in fact this is going to continue the 

way it has in the past. 

I believe with this kind of money that we are putting into this 

initiative it should be more comprehensive and we should look at 

it in a totally different perspective. And so I would like to hear 

some feedback on why it is not as comprehensive as it should be 

and do you believe that it should be. Because from everything that 

I have learned about what is taking place there, it is just not working the way it is structured at this point. 

Mr. GARNER. Thank you very much. I enjoyed your visit down 

there last summer when you attended the global AIDS conference. 

Thank you for coming down. 


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You are absolutely right, we do have a lot of concerns. When the 

Mexican Government and President Bush and President Calderon 

got together, actually it was 2 years ago now, in Merida, there was 

a lot of focus on the military hardware. Remember the administration had just taken office, there was a lot of fear for them to ask 

the U.S. Government for anything. And of course there is always 

the issue of sovereignty. So the Mexican Government asked primarily for hardware. 

I think that the situation has evolved greatly in Mexico since 

then, where we have worked together side by side for the last 2 

years. There is a greater comfort level that sovereignty is not 

threatened by us working together as two great nations, the U.S. 

and Mexico both making investments on both sides of the border 

themselves and then the Merida program bringing us together. 

But you are correct, as the economy has deteriorated in both 

countries, I think President Calderon initially felt that his own social programs could address the problems in Mexico, but he did not 

anticipate the economic downturn. So certainly as we look at this 

program, more and more communities that are unemployed, the 

narcos are advertising on the Internet, they are advertising with 

slogans and banners across the streets, good jobs, good benefits, 

great packages. 

So they are really going after those people that are under employed or unemployed. So certainly the economic opportunities are 

a major concern. 

Ms. LEE. What do we do? How do we do this right if that is a 

component? 

Mr. GARNER. It has not been a component in the original request. 

I think this is an evolving process where each year as we get a new 

appropriation the Mexican Government and we will sit down together, discuss our priorities and look at the situation as it currently exists. 

Ms. LEE. My concern is, is this one of our priorities, Madam 

Chair? 

Mrs. LOWEY. Yes. In fact the language was changed because of 

your input and my input, and we will continue to move in that direction. But I know we made that position very, very clear. I have 

felt not just in this last trip, but in other trips you talk to young 

girls or boys at a hotel and where do they learn their English? Not 

in school. If you have money, you can go to private school. If you 

don’t have money, you are in public school and you are not learning 

English until you get that job in the hotel. 

So because of your input and I know the concern of this committee, there has been language in the bill since we had the opportunity to draft the bill and we will continue to work in that direction, because unless you are going to provide alternatives, and we 

did see some alternative development when we were there, and unless the government is going to really focus in its schools, and 

frankly President Calderon talks about it, but I do think, again repeating myself, if people have money they are going to private 

schools, they are not going to the public schools and that has to 

change to give people opportunity. 

But one of the key concerns is in the interim it is very hard for 

the police forces and others to compete with the kind of money that 


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the narcotraffickers are spreading around. So this combination of 

giving people opportunity, investing in the schools, investing in economic development, being tough and strengthening the police and 

making sure you have a rotation system so you are not having the 

corruption is a balance. 

Ms. LEE. Also Madam Chair, that raises the question about the 

police who are notoriously, as we know, corrupt. So what is being 

done to make sure the police forces are cleaned up, in essence, if 

in fact we are going to continue to rely on them? 

Mr. JOHNSON. One of the things is what I mentioned a few minutes ago, the efforts that we have underway through this initiative 

to provide the basics of identification for the police and at the federal level a full vetting and polygraphing of the police. 

My first foreign service assignment, you mentioned you were 

born in El Paso, my first foreign service assignment was in Ciudad 

Juarez, and I think that is a special place. And I think it is pretty 

amazing that given the level of violence in Ciudad Juarez is how 

safe El Paso has maintained itself. And that is hats off to the police 

and federal agencies there. I think that is a difficult task. 

I have a team on the ground right now who are talking with the 

people in the area about what sort of things that we may be able 

to do to be of assistance, to be more focused on the border region, 

because I think that is an area that we need to give further 

thought to, but it is a work in progress at this point. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Just one other point and then we are 

going to turn to Mr. Lewis because I understand he has to leave. 

We have 73 million for civil society, 5 million for education as part 

of the program, and I would hope as a result of the reality on the 

ground when we get your request for additional monies that we can 

look at the whole picture and see if the proportions are appropriate. 

Mr. Lewis. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. LEWIS

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I really have just 

come to listen, but your comments regarding growing concern about 

the availability of equipment, a new kind of circumstance in relation to and along the border are to me a reflection of this long history of Mexico being very concerned about its sovereignty. It didn’t 

receive foreign assistance from us forever until the positive side of 

the drug challenge is that suddenly we have a new kind of contact, 

and maximizing or taking advantage of those relations and helping 

them with their problem with corruption, et cetera, is a very, very 

important part of the role we can play here. 

Having said that, I would like to, Madam Chairman, work very 

closely with you and Ms. Granger relative to this equipment question, dealing with Bill Young, et cetera. If we can’t get the Department of Defense to recognize that this is an American security 

challenge, then there is something wrong. 

So could I yield my time to Mr. Kirk? Sure. 


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OPENING REMARKS OF MR. KIRK

Mr. KIRK. Thank you. I am very happy to be here and thank the 

Chair for this hearing, because I think I am the only graduate of 

La Universidad Nacional in Mexico here and came from State, 

WHA, Secretary Shannon’s operation. I think about all that we 

have heard and remember the old Mexican phrase, ‘‘Poor Mexico, 

so far from God, so close to the United States.’’ 

We have seen now a real uptick in violence of Mexican drug 

gangs brought to the United States. AP just reported a spike in 

killings and kidnappings and home invasions in Atlanta and also 

some beheadings in Alabama, that they conducted and an uptick 

in murder for hire and kidnappings in Phoenix. 

I wonder if I could submit for the record, this is DEA’s list of 

Mexican major drug operations in U.S. Cities. There are 199 of 

them. I will just pick some random cities, Albany, Buffalo, New 

York, Chicago, Miami, Orlando, Tampa, San Francisco, Dallas, 

Houston and Helena and Billings, just for the record. 

This is also a map, if I could give that, of all the major operations, so it is covering all the large population centers. 

Also if I could submit for the record, we are seeing a tremendous 

increase in the weaponry brought in by these groups. So for example, there were average 9-millimeter hand guns, but this model 

700P LTR, light tactical rifle, 30 caliber machine gun, Fabrique 

Nationale submachine gun, Barrett sniper rifles brought in by the 

cartels to the United States. AK–47 assault rifles, AR–15s, 66 millimeter light antitank weapons, and 40-millimeter automatic grenade launchers, all brought by the cartels into the United States. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Do you have the manufacturer? 

Mr. KIRK. Well, for example, the 9 millimeters is an Italian pistol, the machine gun looks like an American one, the Fabrique 

Nationale is a Belgian rifle, the Barrett is made in the USA, AK– 

47 is made in Czechoslovakia and Russia, the AR–15 is made in 

the USA. The antitank weapon looks like a LAW, that is an American weapon, and the 40-millimeter grenade launcher also looks 

American. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Does that report detail where they were purchased? 

I think that would be helpful information. 

Mr. KIRK. No. 

Mrs. LOWEY. The information that I have received from this committee is that they were purchased in the United States and the 

gun law is so weak that the weapons are coming over the border. 

Mr. KIRK. Yes, it could be from a variety of sources. And so the 

point that I would like to ask you is where do we go—— 

Where do we go absent a helicopter end game, because it looks 

like now things are going to be quite some time but for action of 

this committee. If we are rolling in on cartels in trucks and cars, 

what does that operation look like as compared to rolling in on the 

leaders in helicopters? 

Mr. JOHNSON. First of all, I think that it helps to bear in mind 

that this program is a partnership and the reason the airframes 

that were proposed in part were proposed is because they are fleets 

that we are adding to what Mexico already has. So Mexico already 

has some capability in rotary lift in both the Bell airframe and the 


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UH–60, and they are using those to operate now against these cartels. 

So they are using trucks where trucks are more appropriate, but 

in their outward planning they wish to establish a greater range 

and a quicker reaction and the airframes that we would be providing under this initiative would enable them to do that. And so 

I think while they certainly don’t have the capability that they 

think they need and we think they need to have success, they do 

have some capability and they are using it. 

Mr. SHANNON. Mr. Kirk, you raised a very important point about 

the transnational nature of the organized crime in North America 

today and the role Mexican cartels are playing in the United States 

and their linkage with organized crime in the U.S. And other illicit 

activities. And this is going to become I think a larger focus of this 

administration as they try to link up what we are doing in our foreign assistance authority through Merida and what needs to be 

done with domestic law authority in the United States as we are 

trying to make sure there are no seams that can be exploited by 

these cartels. 

Although this is a current problem for us and Mexico, it is not 

a new problem historically. We faced a similar problem in the 

1920s and 1930s and 1940s when organized crime in the United 

States was exploiting seams between municipal governments and 

between State governments, and before we had the kind of judicial 

tools necessary to attack organized crime structures. What we are 

trying to do to a certain extent is take the lessons we learned when 

we were fighting organized crime in the United States and apply 

them on an international basis for the first time with a country 

with whom we have a border. 

Mr. KIRK. Madam Chair, may I just conclude to say we have seen 

tremendous violence in Mexico, but even in Iraq we do not see routine beheadings. We have now seen that in northern Mexico. That 

practice has come to the United States. It would appear that this 

is a clear and present danger to the security of major and medium 

sized U.S. cities, of which the list has been submitted. And so I 

think this initiative directly relates to the security of the people 

that we represent. And seeing this kind of practice come across the 

border is a real call to action for this committee. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Jackson. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. JACKSON

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. Let me begin by associating myself with the gentleman from Illinois, his comments, and 

his thoughts about interrelatedness of the weapons trafficking and 

the cartels. We thank the witnesses for coming today and thank 

the chairlady for hosting today’s hearings. 

The Merida program has always been a very ambitious program 

trying to break the impunity of criminal organizations, and I am 

sure you all can appreciate that those of us who are responsible for 

appropriating taxpayer dollars to fight these kinds of illicit and 

criminal organizations, obviously a number of questions that the 

American people want answered given the nature of what Congressman Kirk indicated, are problems that are now clearly creeping, if you will, across the border. 


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We have read reports of gun shops on the border States selling 

weapons and organizations taking advantage of very sophisticated 

weapons that could ultimately be used against our allies in these 

countries, but also used against U.S. forces. 

So my question at least initially and, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Shannon, 

it is probably more appropriately directed at you, is how can members of this committee be convinced that they are not providing assistance to individuals or units that have been previously implicated in corruption? Explain to this committee how your confidence 

and the confidence that we have in appropriating monies for this 

initiative will not be used and accepted or somehow diverted or 

somehow end up in the hands of these illicit organizations. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think first of all we have to talk about the nature of what we are providing. The services and equipment we are 

providing are not attractive to be diverted to the hands of criminals 

for the most part. It is not intrusive inspection equipment, it is not 

something that a cartel will be interested in using. It is the type 

of things that a border service agency working either in a land border or airport or seaport would use to determine whether goods 

that are coming into the country in containers, and so forth, contain illicit traffic. So that is part of it. 

The helicopters as well, while I suppose one could speculate 

about helicopters being stolen for a particular purpose, they are unlikely to fall into the hands of an illicit trafficker. 

The services that we are providing to help in the rule of law reform and to help in police service reform likewise are not the kind 

of divertable goods and services. 

In addition to that, we have an extensive program in place that 

we have had for some time, because we have had an ongoing relationship with Mexico in terms of law enforcement support so that 

we can vet individuals and units that they work with in order to 

comply with the laws that you and your colleagues have passed 

that require us to do so, and that program is quite robust in Mexico. 

Tom may want to speak to it a little more. Those are the procedures and safeguards that we have in place in order to seek to 

avoid just what you just described. 

Mr. SHANNON. More broadly your question I think also refers to 

the problem of corruption and institutional mismanagement, and 

one of the things we are trying to do through the Merida Initiative 

is work with the Mexicans to help them transform their law enforcement institutions, their public security institutions, through a 

variety of mechanisms, including creating vetting procedures, helping them develop polygraphing skills, creating inspector generals 

offices, creating a regular consultation mechanism between the 

Mexican state and civil society organizations in order to get feedback on how law enforcement institutions and the military are behaving in the pursuit of their fight against cartels. 

This is part of a broader effort by the Mexicans to unify their national police structure and then use regulatory mechanisms in law 

to build benchmarks and standards of practice at the national level 

and then translate to the state and local level. 

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Shannon, let me ask the question because I 

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ruption, is there any concern that the cartels and these illicit organizations are also engaged in democratic politics within some of 

these countries, that their destabilizing efforts aren’t just in weapons trafficking or drug trafficking or other illicit activities, but they 

themselves have candidates running for office who could very well 

end up in charge of U.S. equipment, who could very well turn the 

other eye, if you will. That is the nature of corruption, that you get 

elected or participate in legitimate processes. But then you end up 

being covered for illicit and criminal activity. Any concern about 

that at all? 

Mr. SHANNON. At the national level we have not seen candidates 

that we have been able to identify as linked to cartels. 

Mr. JACKSON. At the local levels? 

Mr. SHANNON. At the local levels. We don’t track local elections 

throughout the region closely, but I think especially in some of the 

Central American countries there probably are local officials who 

have received funding of one sort of another from drug trafficking 

organizations. I would assume that in areas where the traffickers 

have attempted to establish themselves that this is a reality that 

we are attempting to deal with. 

This is one of the reasons why journalists have been targeted in 

Mexico and in Central America. What journalists have been doing 

is talking about relationships between cartels and public figures, 

and the effort to kill and intimidate journalists is designed to shut 

that down and not bring that kind of transparency to relationships. 

We are working with all the countries in the region to build political financing laws and political financing transparency requirements that allow us some insight into who is financing operations 

or political activities. What organized crime wants to do is not so 

much control the state, but to weaken it to the point that they can 

go about their daily business. Unlike political insurgencies, their 

goal is not to capture the state and then use the state for a purpose. So the degree to which they attempt to corrupt or intimidate 

political leaders, it is to prevent whatever the entity is, municipality, state or national government, from functioning in a way 

that hurts the business interest of the cartels. 

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Rehberg. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. REHBERG

Mr. REHBERG. Mr. Kirk was speaking specifically to the involvement of the Mexicans coming across the border and getting within 

the communities. My question is do you see an interrelationship 

with organized crime in America helping in Mexico and Central 

America as well? You used a Los Angeles family as an example. 

Are they selling the weapons to the Mexican cartels, are they selling drugs in America that they get from the Mexican cartels, are 

they using their own organization as a friction between the organized crime in America and the Mexican cartels? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think in the case of the Mexican cartels I can’t 

cite you an example of what you describe. What I would say though 

is that the Central American gangs are an example of a criminal 

organization in the United States which has at the very least a cooperative relationship, if it is not the same organization as the ones 


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operating in Central America itself. And so there is a movement of 

people, as well as activities back and forth across the borders. 

Mr. REHBERG. And organized crime in America doesn’t have a 

problem with that, they are just allowing a free flow of movement 

across the borders? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think these Central American gangs, in at 

least one case, are alleged to have actually started in the United 

States and shipped themselves south, rather than the other way 

around. So there is a—— 

Mr. REHBERG. But there was already organized crime established 

in America, and they are either displacing or supplementing or creating friction. 

Mr. JOHNSON. As far as I am aware, it is a supplement, rather 

than a displacement. 

Mr. REHBERG. Okay. The second question I have is for Mr. Shannon and Johnson. And that is, does the Merida Initiative allow for 

the opportunity for the Mexican government to use their military; 

and do you endorse their use of the military, as opposed to a domestic police force? 

I know we would rather have the public involved. We would rather have domestic police involved and domestic judges involved. But 

there is a constant pressure on us to place National Guard on our 

border. We know that they are using their military in Mexico. Does 

the Merida Initiative address the military, how much they can use 

it, and is that something our government endorses or encourages 

or would oppose? 

Mr. SHANNON. The Merida Initiative is primarily focused on enhancing the capability of civilian public security institutions. There 

is a component of equipment that will go to the military, both helicopters and some interdiction equipment. 

Mr. REHBERG. This is individuals, people that they are using in 

Mexico. 

Mr. SHANNON. Well, I mean, for instance, there will be helicopters and some interdiction equipment that the military will use 

in the pursuit of its relationship with the police force. But the use 

of the military at this point in Mexico is an emergency measure, 

which highlights the urgency of the crisis that Mexico is in. 

Mr. REHBERG. How many then are they using in this emergency 

category? How many infantry? 

Mr. SHANNON. Well, I believe—for instance, I believe there is in 

the area of 9,000 troops in and around Ciudad Juarez now. The 

Mexican military has, I think, 45,000. 

Mr. REHBERG. Okay. Then the question is, does the American 

government endorse that? 

Mr. SHANNON. This is a sovereign decision of Mexico. We have 

not expressed a position on what we consider to be a sovereign decision and probably a necessary decision at this point in time. 

Mr. REHBERG. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I would just concur with that, that we are working 

with Mexico in a very challenging environment. The military was 

an organization that had the capability and the integrity believed 

to be by the Mexicans to be the most effective instrument that they 

had at their disposal now. But, as Tom was mentioning, the aim 


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they have and we have is to build sufficient capacity in their civilian police force so that they will not have to rely on this too long. 

Mr. REHBERG. Okay. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Crenshaw. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. CRENSHAW

Mr. CRENSHAW. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman; and thank you 

all for being here today. 

Having just met with the President of Mexico and then the President of Colombia, you get the impression that Mexico is just beginning this, you know, to kind of stand up and say enough is enough, 

kind of what they did in Colombia 10 years ago. And I guess that 

is step one. Once you say we are not going to tolerate it anymore, 

then things kind of blow up, and that is why we saw 6,000 people 

get killed and more and more. 

So my question really is about the money that we are going to 

spend. Because if you look at Colombia, as somebody pointed out, 

we started out with a 3-year program. It has been 10 years. It has 

been $7 billion. And so the money we are spending now in Mexico—how significant is that in light of this huge problem? Number 

one. Is it being spent the way you anticipated that it was going to 

be spent? Do we have some accountability measures there? 

And the long-run question is, as it relates to how significant it 

is, what is your view of the long-range aspect? Are we looking at 

another Colombia? Is $400 million—is that a drop in the bucket? 

Is that a one-time shot? Or is that the beginning of a long involvement together that we may spend a whole lot more down the road? 

Could you touch on that just in terms of the money aspect? 

Mr. SHANNON. Let me start and Assistant Secretary Johnson can 

address some of the accountability issues. 

But the Mexicans are making the major investment here. In 2009, President Calderon’s government will spend upwards of $5 

billion on security-related issues. And their investment is not only 

in money, it is also in blood. 

But I would say that the money we are providing is of catalytic 

importance. In other words, it is focused on providing the Mexicans 

some key training and equipment that they don’t have right now 

and that they need in short order and that this is going to allow 

them to accomplish their goal at a much more rapid pace than they 

would have been able to do previously. 

But I also think that it is a symbol of partnership that also will 

allow us to transform our relationship with Mexico, and we are seeing this already in terms of security cooperation. And, in that regard, what we are going to get out of the money we are spending 

in the short- to mid-term is a greater degree of security cooperation 

with Mexico as we address a transnational problem, which is already affecting us here in the United States. And so we will not 

only be helping Mexico with this funding, but we will also be helping ourselves in a significant way and laying a foundation of cooperation that is going to pay large dividends in the future. 

The Merida Initiative, as initially envisioned, was a 3-year program. We are going to work hard with all of you to meet our commitment to make this 3-year program what we thought it was and 

make sure it is successful. But then, we are going to have to sit 


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down with the Mexicans and determine what comes next. Because 

3 years, I think, will be a good start and a good way to get the 

Mexicans along over a critical security hump, but after that it is 

really going to be up to the Mexicans to come back and indicate to 

us what else they might need in terms of help from the United 

States. 

Mr. CRENSHAW. Do you have an example of an early success? As 

you talk about this, is there anything you can point to that this is 

what we set out to do? Is it too early to tell, or this is something 

that’s really working? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The things that we have done so far are describing 

things of inputs, if you will, rather than outputs or outcomes. We 

put in a server farm, which is not a visible police thing, but it is 

entirely necessary so that their new program to track evidence and 

police operations all the way from the scene of the crime through 

the Court system can actually work. That was done in December. 

We are working now finalizing—we finalized one set of specifications. We are finalizing a second set over the next couple of weeks 

for this nonintrusive inspection equipment. Then the contracting 

process will take place. 

We anticipate this equipment will be on the ground around September. It is highly technical gadgetry. You have to build it from 

scratch. Those sort of the step-by-step things are happening. 

And we have put in place—in terms of accountability, what we 

have concentrated on are the kinds of thing related to internal controls and decision making: Accountability for equipment, on-site inspection to make sure that it is being used for the purpose for 

which it was provided. Those sorts of things are what we are working on now. 

We are working with the Mexicans to try to describe, if you will, 

a strategic outcome; and we haven’t really come up with what I am 

comfortable with yet to come to you and say if we do this we will 

have succeeded. And I think that’s where we need to concentrate 

our efforts right now in terms of defending what we are requesting 

the American people to provide here. 

But we think it is very much in their interest to be supportive 

of Mexico. Exactly what we want to have at the end of the program 

I think we are still struggling to define clearly. 

Mr. SHANNON. But in terms of collaboration and the powerful 

symbol that Merida is in Mexico, we are seeing the Mexicans start 

to take apart some key drug trafficking organizations; and we are 

also seeing in their willingness to extradite people to the United 

States, a very important measure of success for us. And I think 

that this is going to become more evident with time. 

In fact, if we had our colleagues from DEA or FBI or ATF here, 

I think they would describe a relationship with Mexican law enforcement officials that is unprecedented in terms of its openness, 

the fluidity of flow of information, and the degree to which they 

work together. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Before I turn to the next panel, I have one additional closing 

question; and I know Ms. Granger did as well. 

For clarification, in 1997, the United States signed but never 

ratified the InterAmerican Convention Against Illicit ManufacVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 055951 PO 00000 Frm 00384 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A951P2.XXX A951P2

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turing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, 

and Other Related Materials, CIFTA. 

In 2005, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, ATF, launched its Southwest Border Initiative to attack the 

firearm trafficking infrastructure of cross-border criminal organizations. 

Congressional Quarterly’s cover story for this week relates that 

Mexican cartels have taken advantage of openings in U.S. gun control laws to stock up on military grade assault rifles, grenade 

launchers, bazookas, and even heavy machine guns, smuggling 

them back into Mexico. And when we met with President Calderon 

he spoke of the flow of weapons coming from the United States into 

Mexico. I told him I agree with him about the problem of illegal 

movement of weapons from the United States to Mexico and have 

written to President Obama that the ban on assault weapons must 

be enforced. 

So, whoever wants to respond, to what extent are arms trafficked 

from the United States into Mexico and then further trafficked to 

Central America? What cooperation exists between Central American, Mexican, and the United States officials to address this problem? How is the Merida program addressing this issue? 

Is the United States in compliance with all parts of the convention against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, 

ammunition, explosives and other related materials? What are we 

doing to fully comply with CIFTA? Will the President press the 

Senate to ratify this treaty? And what is the President’s time line 

for ratification of CIFTA? 

You can answer part or all of those questions. 

Mr. SHANNON. I will talk about CIFTA. I will leave arms trafficking and our e-trace activities to Assistant Secretary Johnson. 

But, in regard to CIFTA, we believe we are in compliance with 

CIFTA. We have signed CIFTA. CIFTA has been sent to the Hill. 

It has not been placed on a priority list yet for ratification. We understand the importance of CIFTA. We have heard the Congress 

loud and clear. The administration is in the process of reviewing 

CIFTA with an eye to being able to say clearly to the Senate that 

it is time to ratify. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Secretary Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. On the arms trafficking issue, it is clear that a 

significant portion of the arms that are used by the cartels and 

other criminal organizations in Mexico originate in the United 

States. I think that the indictment about a week ago of an arms 

trafficker who was seemingly operating legitimately but clearly not, 

based on the affidavit that was issued, is a significant move; and 

it illustrates what can be done within our legal system in order to 

deter activities by individuals who would assist these organizations 

and use legitimate commerce to do so. 

In terms of the work that we are doing within Merida and its 

companion, one of them is in Mexico last year we were able to establish e-trace facilities at all of our consulates, as well as a longstanding one at the embassy, giving Mexican law enforcement an 

opportunity to use those facilities in order to trace weapons. 

We also have a program which is outside of Merida, because it 

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ming so that this system can be used with Spanish name conventions. That program should be in place before the end of this calendar year. 

As part of that, and within Merida, we are providing that opportunity for all of the states of Central America to have access to this 

program as well so that they can trace weapons; and I think the 

combination of our police agencies working together holds the best 

promise for actually doing something about this problem and addressing the criminals that are abusing the system. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Ms. Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. Just briefly—and thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for this. 

President Calderon has asked for our help, and he is—as we 

know in this room, this is an all-out war on the drug cartels. He 

has got 21⁄2 years. He is through in January of 2012. The question 

was asked, you know, what—after 3 years, what—kind of give us 

a long term. This is Mexico, our neighbor. And there is no doubt 

of what Mr. Kirk was saying, the threat to our cities and where 

we are. So I just have great concern about the urgency, for instance, you know, when there’s that length of time. 

When we were on the trip, what we heard over and over is equipment. I am just going to use that as the example. That is not the 

whole answer, of course. But whatever we need to give that helps, 

we need to have an urgency, too, that you can’t deny when you just 

turn on the television every day or read the newspaper. So I would 

encourage you to let us help on that. But understand that 3 years 

is certainly not the end of this. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I want to thank Ms. Granger for her final comments and thank the panel for appearing before us. 

It was clear, as you know, in our activities in Mexico, meeting 

with the President, seeing some of the programs, the urgency was 

palpable. I mean, this is really a problem not just for Mexico but 

the United States of America. 

Frankly, I grew up in government hearing about hydroponic lettuce being grown. And when we had a meeting, the cartels are obviously having some trouble at the border, and so they’re moving 

in and even growing products like marijuana, hydroponically, forgetting about the border. They are just moving right in. So we 

share the sense of urgency. 

It is a bipartisan commitment, and we hope that this new administration will be evaluating the programs and presenting proposals 

to improve the program, change the program, if, in fact, that is 

what you conclude, sooner rather than later so we can move on it. 

And, again, I thank the panel for your presentations. We look 

forward to continuing the dialog. 

Thank you. We will stand in recess for a moment while the next 

panel comes up. 

[Recess.] 


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TUESDAY, MARCH 10, 2009. 

THE MERIDA INITIATIVE 

WITNESSES 

LISA HAUGAARD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE LATIN AMERICAN 

WORKING GROUP 

JOY OLSON, DIRECTOR OF THE WASHINGTON OFFICE OF LATIN 

AMERICA 

ANA PAULA HERNANDEZ, GENERAL DIRECTOR OF THE COLECTIVO 

POR UNA POLITICA INTEGRAL HACIA LAS DROGAS (CUPIHD) 

Mrs. LOWEY. The subcommittee will come to order, and I thank 

you for being here today. 

I would like to welcome our second panel: Ms. Lisa Haugaard, 

Executive Director of the Latin American Working Group; Ms. Ana 

Paula Hernandez, who is a consultant on human rights and drug 

policy; and Ms. Joy Olson, Executive Director of the Washington office on Latin America. 

I want to alert you to the fact that your written statement will 

be placed in the record; and if you would like to summarize, we certainly look forward to having a good dialogue with you. Thank you 

very much. 

Why don’t we begin with Ms. Lisa Haugaard. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MS. HAUGAARD

Ms. HAUGAARD. Thank you so much, Chairwoman Lowey and 

Ranking Member Granger and other members of the subcommittee, 

for the opportunity to share perspective on this important issue. 

As all of you have said this morning, it is very important for the 

United States to respond to the explosion of drug-related violence 

in Mexico. But it must happen in a strategic and careful way that 

addresses the underlying causes. I am going to outline some ways 

in which the United States should shoulder its own burden of responsibilities for the violence and then talk about ways in which 

the United States can make sure as it goes forward that its aid and 

policies protect human rights. 

The subcommittee is tasked with responding to damage in Latin 

America caused by the illicit drug trade, but the main solutions 

aren’t in foreign policy but in domestic policy. Each year, barely 

one-fifth of the Americans in need of treatment for drug abuse receive it. Expanding access to high-quality treatment would be the 

best single contribution the United States could make to this problem of drug-related violence in Latin America. Any aid package, 

however perfectly designed, will not solve the problem without 

that; and we are going to be back in this hearing room in another 

5 years talking about the shift to another area of Latin America. 

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ing an effective and humane public health solution to this problem 

of drugs and drug-related violence. 

I was very pleased to hear all of the talk this morning about the 

problem about arms and the contribution of the arms flow from the 

United States to Mexico. That is the piece of the problem that we 

can deal with. The solution to these problems are not easy, but 

they are pretty well defined in terms of enforcing the ban on importing assault weapons and strengthening the ATF’s inspection 

capabilities in the border region in particular, for example. 

The second point I would like to make is that, as the United 

States goes forward, it should not support and encourage a Mexican military role in domestic law enforcement, particularly an 

open-ended one, and should encourage the Mexican government to 

define its plan to withdraw the military eventually from public security and including its plans for forming strength in the civilian 

police force. And USAID should really be conceived of as helping 

to support this transition, rather than reinforcing this role. 

We are seeing that the growing role of the Mexican military in 

public security is resulting in increased human rights complaints 

against the civilian population. Complaints rose, for example, from 

182 in 2006 to 631 in 2008. If you look at the State Department’s 

recent human rights report you can see that there are no less than 

five incidents listed where soldiers killed civilians at checkpoints 

just in 2008, and these crimes are generally not effectively prosecuted. 

We know the subcommittee has been very sensitive to this issue, 

and we will really appreciate that. We are concerned still that 

there may be assistance through Defense Department authorities 

that don’t take this adequately into consideration. 

Finally, I would like to talk a little bit about some lessons. You 

had mentioned the question of the Colombia experience, and I just 

want to say some lessons from the Colombia experience for Mexico. 

And this is not to say that the two situations are comparable but, 

rather, there are some ways in which the U.S. government responds to these kinds of major aid packages and major aid relationships that could help us as we go forward. 

The first lesson is that human rights training is good but not 

enough. And U.S. government tends to have the concept that if you 

add human rights training for security forces, that will solve the 

problem. And that—we saw that going forward with Plan Colombia; and yet rights groups have documented growing violations by 

the Colombian Army, particularly killings of civilians, in which soldiers were seen taking civilians dressed in civilian clothing, they 

would later show up dead dressed in guerrilla outfits, and they 

were claimed by the army as killed in combat. And these really spiraled up. 

Why did this happen with all of this human rights training and 

all of these good intentions? There is nothing wrong with the training. The training is good. But it failed to address certain structural 

issues. 

For example, there is a body count mentality where officers 

were—soldiers were rewarded for the number of people killed. And 

that, as well as the lack of investigation and prosecution of such 

crimes, resulted in this increase. Basically, no amount of human 


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rights training can work when a justice system fails to investigate 

and prosecute crimes committed by security forces. 

Second lesson, very briefly, is just that judicial assistance is very 

good. We are very, very pleased to see the attention to judicial assistance and training in this package. But, as you move forward, 

there is kind of a standard package that DOJ provides, the transition to the adversarial justice system, all very good. And prosecutorial training. But unless you have an analysis of why there’s still 

impunity in each judicial agency, you still can give all this training 

and it won’t result in what you want. So you need to pay attention 

to that. 

And the final lesson is that, for human rights to improve, diplomacy and not just aid and training is the answer. With these kinds 

of major aid packages, what we have seen is that there is this natural human tendency to just—for our officials to really think of the 

aid recipients, the country, not just as a partner but as we are now 

kind of one entity; and that can result in not pushing on some important human rights issues. 

As this major aid package moves forward, it is really important 

for the U.S. government to maintain a little daylight between itself 

and its partner. And this is just—a healthy relationship is, you 

know, sometimes you have to say to each other, you know, well, 

you have a little flaw. It is important to maintain that kind of relationship. 

And what we found in the Colombia experience, what was very 

important was the existence of human rights language in the package and the willingness of Members of Congress, particularly of 

this subcommittee and its Senate counterparts, to look at that language and encourage the State Department to take that seriously. 

Without that, frankly, I don’t think we would have had access as 

human rights groups to the State Department to encourage them 

to talk to their Colombian counterparts and to try to address this 

issue, for example, of civilian killings by the army. 

So, as you move forward, it is very important to really think 

about maintaining that little bit of distance. That is helpful in 

order to encourage the partner, in this case, particularly, the Mexican government, to really overcome problems of impunity. 

And, finally, just as the United States needs to preserve a little 

objectivity in relationship to recipient governments in these largescale aid programs, it is also important for the Mexican government, in particular, to continue to raise its concerns with us about 

our failure, if it still is, to reduce demand for illicit drugs, to deal 

with the flow of arms, and to achieve immigration reform and 

neighborly border solutions, which brings me back to the first 

point, which is that, in this relationship going forward between the 

United States and Mexico, if the two countries are to resolve their 

joint problems, there needs to be an objective dialogue that is this 

two-way street. 

Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

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Mrs. LOWEY. Ms. Hernandez. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MS. HERNANDEZ

Ms. HERNANDEZ. Thank you very much for the opportunity, 

Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Granger and other distinguished members of the committee. 

I have been working in the promotion and defense of human 

rights in Mexico for over 12 years, and I want to focus my testimony on speaking about the current situation in Mexico as a result 

of the war on drugs but from the perspective of civil society. 

I want to talk about militarization, and militarization of public 

security and the use of the army as a means to fight the war 

against drugs has been a policy of the Mexican government since 

the 1980s. Yet, clearly, the use of the military has never been as 

evident or as intense as with President Calderon’s administration. 

Direct participation of the military in public security is increasing on all levels of government, and military presence has become 

more and more common in principal cities in Mexico. In states like 

Guerrero, where I lived for 4 years, the presence of the military is 

not only in the cities but also in the rural and indigenous communities where poppy and marijuana are cultivated. This is a problem 

that is rarely talked about in Mexico, where the growers of illicit 

crops are forgotten in the drug war and there is not even talk of 

alternative development as occurs in other countries like Colombia 

or Bolivia. 

Instead of fighting the structural causes of the situation, recognizing its social and economic implications and formulating an integral development plan for the community, the government has continued to use the military as a way to manually eradicate illicit 

crops. The situation with drug cultivation in Mexico exemplifies, for 

me, the way the Mexican government has decided to tackle the entire war on drugs: above all, short-term, often dramatic actions 

with immediate but very limited impact and not sufficient longterm strategic actions that truly combat the structural causes of 

the situation Mexico faces today: poverty, corruption, impunity, and 

weak institutions. 

The use of the military has been presented by the government 

as a temporary measure that is needed due to the uncontrollable 

violence related to organized crime and that civilian institutions 

have proven incapable of dealing with the problem in an effective 

manner. With this we turn once more to the structural causes: 

clearly, a police force on all levels that is extremely corrupt and 

that has been profoundly infiltrated by organized crime, with almost no levels of confidence on behalf of citizens. 

To illustrate this, I want to refer to a civil society organization 

operating in municipalities in the mountain region of Guerrero, one 

of the poorest in all of Mexico, called the Civil Police Monitor that 

promotes transparency through rule of law and human rights within regional police forces. 

In its first year, in 2008, the Civil Police Monitor documented 

117 cases of abuse committed by municipal police forces and judicial police, particularly arbitrary detention and extortion. At the 

same time, it received complaints by police recording the fact that 

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munition, that they worked shifts of over 24 hours, they didn’t 

have life insurance, that they were often not paid their salaries, 

which is less than $300 a month in this region. With these conditions, can we be surprised that the municipal police forces are so 

easily corruptible and infiltrated by organized crime? 

Lack of accountability, transparency, internal and external controls, and human rights abuses characterize the vast majority of 

police forces in the country. Lack of adequate training in crucial 

matters such as the use of force, few material and human resources, poor incentives, and low salaries are the police force’s 

other characteristics. The police reforms in Mexico that have taken 

place and that have been very positive have been focused almost 

all on the Federal level, leaving the state and municipal police 

forces almost untouched, in spite of the fact that these are the ones 

that are directly in contact with the majority of the population. 

If the use of the army is a temporary measure, the only answer 

is a profound democratic reform of the police force which is the civil 

institution in charge of public security. Yet this reform on all levels, particularly the state and municipal level, is not occurring sufficiently. 

There are concrete reasons why numerous international human 

rights protection mechanisms have clearly stated that the military 

should not be in charge of public security tasks. They are trained 

in the doctrine of war and confrontation, not of collaboration and 

work with the community. For this reason, as Lisa just pointed out, 

the risk for abuse of power and human rights violations is extremely high; and that is precisely what has occurred. 

When military personnel are accused of human rights violations, 

the military courts apply article 57 of the Military Justice Code in 

order to keep cases involving their members within their jurisdiction. Although the Mexican Army may not be legally immune, military jurisdiction in practice is a de facto amnesty law that guarantees impunity for military personnel who violate the fundamental 

rights of the population. 

It is imperative that Mexico abolish its military jurisdiction and 

puts an end to impunity in cases of human rights violations committed by members of the army. This is even more urgent if the 

army will continue to be on the streets and within communities in 

many states as part of this temporary or urgent measure in fighting the drug war. 

The Merida Initiative contemplates that 15 percent of the funds 

are conditioned to the progress shown by the Mexican government 

in certain key areas of human rights: transparency and accountability within the police force, consultations with civil society, investigations and prosecutions of security forces accused of abuse, 

and enforcement of Mexican law prohibiting the use of testimony 

obtained through torture. These are, in my opinion, the minimal 

things that Mexico should be held accountable for; and it is of extreme importance that the mechanism to monitor their fulfillment 

is clear and effective. 

Many of the things contemplated in the Merida Initiative, such 

as equipment and technology we have talked about a lot this morning are very important. Yet, as has also been very much talked 

about, they contribute to short-term immediate actions but not to 


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long-term structural reform. It is important to emphasize that this 

war on drugs, fight against organized crime, or however we choose 

to call it, is destined for failure unless it considers these long-term 

actions to strengthen Mexican civilian institutions on all levels, not 

just the Federal level. 

And it must be insured that this long-term reform agenda is not 

lost in the response to immediate crisis. This is not a battle that 

will be won in 4, 2, 6 years and clearly not within one Presidential 

administration; and it is important that clear benchmarks for 

short, medium, and long-term change be established in order to 

know if we are moving forward or backward. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

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Mrs. LOWEY. Ms. Olson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MS. OLSON

Ms. OLSON. Thank you, Chairwoman Lowey. It is a pleasure to 

be here. And thank you, Ms. Granger, as well. We appreciate the 

opportunity to present this morning, but we also appreciate your 

work and work with your staff. 

And I wanted to say to Representative Kirk that I thought I was 

going to be the only graduate of the UNAM here. I am so glad to 

hear that there is another. 

WOLA has followed the development of the Merida Initiative and 

consulted extensively with colleagues in Mexico with a variety of 

expertise, including human rights, constitutional law, judicial reform, policing and the military. 

We believe that the U.S. can most effectively address drug trafficking and violence in Mexico in three ways: First, by launching 

an ambitious effort to reduce drug demand at home, particularly by 

providing access to high-quality drug treatment; second, by combating the flow of arms and illicit drug profits from the U.S. back 

into Mexico; and, third, by supporting institutional reforms in 

Mexico’s police and judicial systems. 

My testimony will focus on this last point, where we think that 

the resources that are appropriated by this subcommittee might 

have the most impact. 

Since the first tranche of the money was just released, it is too 

soon to assess impact. However, WOLA is concerned about imbalances in the assistance package, which we believe focuses too heavily on hardware and equipment and not enough on support for judicial and police reform. 

Other witnesses have talked about the serious violence taking 

place in Mexico. Suffice it for me to say that President Calderon 

has enacted a series of initiatives to strengthen public safety institutions by professionalizing and purging the police and by providing financial support to over 150 municipalities most affected by 

crime and violence. Nevertheless, the predominant element of 

Mexico’s security strategy continues to be large-scale counterdrug 

operations. 

The military dominates these operations with the participation of 

approximately 45,000 troops. That is the number of troops that are 

involved in the drug war, not the total number of troops in the 

Mexican Army. And the military is increasingly involved in other 

public security tasks. 

Mexico’s counterdrug efforts are hampered by abuse, corruption, 

lack of transparency, all to varying degrees in police, judiciary and 

the military, and torture is still a problem. But Mexico didn’t get 

to this place overnight; and the tactics being used to confront the 

drug trade—purging the police, bringing in the military—are not 

new either. Efforts to purge the police go back at least to the 

1980s. And June of 2005 saw the start of something called Operation Safe Mexico, which included the deployment of large number 

of troops to Mexican cities, as well as—much similar to what we 

are seeing today. 

History is important here because past efforts to purge Mexico’s 

police and create new security agencies have all failed to put in 


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place the structural reforms needed to insure police accountability 

and the continual ferreting out of corruption. Follow-through is everything. They have also generated a serious lack of faith in the 

police and attempts at police reform. 

Military deployments have not provided lasting solutions either 

and have produced more human rights abuses. The military can occupy a city, but after a few months they go back to the barracks, 

and the fundamental dynamics have not changed. 

U.S. policymakers should explore ways for the United States to 

support and strengthen Mexico’s effort to evaluate police performance at the federal, state and local levels. One such mechanism, 

the National Police Registry, which I understand is still not fully 

functional—one is the police registry. Without a complete registry, 

there is no way to do thorough background checks and keep corrupt 

officials and human rights abusers out of the police. A functioning 

registry would be a minimal benchmark for assessing institutional 

reform. 

There is a real opportunity for the U.S. to contribute to lasting 

reforms in the justice system. Historic constitutional reforms were 

just approved in 2008. These represent a procedural revolution in 

Mexico, including oral trials and reducing the likelihood of testimony obtained through torture of being used. This reform, however, is not a quick fix. The government estimates that it will take 

8 years to fully implement. But history tells us that quick fixes 

don’t work and that the U.S. needs to invest long term. 

I know that the human rights language in the Merida Initiative 

has been controversial, but it is important and appropriate. Mexico’s police and justice institutions are known for corruption, and 

the majority of human rights violations are committed by state and 

local police. There has also been a dramatic rise in the report of 

cases against the military. Because most of the human rights 

abuses committed by the military and against civilians are remitted to military jurisdiction, those responsible are seldom punished. 

Merida engages these institutions, policing and justice institutions—the police and the military, excuse me—so, Ojo, as they say 

in Spanish, or watch out, because you are giving assistance to 

unreformed and untransparent security forces. The U.S., especially 

in Latin America, has a bad track record of providing assistance to 

unreformed security forces that in turn commit human rights 

abuses in which the U.S. is implicated. 

The 15 percent withholding that Congress has required until the 

State Department reports that Mexico is taking action on human 

rights issues is completely appropriate and important. 

There is another problem with the structure of the Merida Initiative that should be addressed. It is one-sided. Although the initiative was pitched as cooperation between the two countries, it contains no additional commitments or funds for the U.S. side of the 

border. Many studies have shown that treatment for heavy drug 

users is by far the most cost-effective way to reduce problem drug 

use, and yet these programs are chronically underfunded. Any next 

stage for the Merida Initiative should contain a truly binational 

plan. 

One last concern. While the foreign ops process is funding the 

Merida Initiative, the Defense Department also has the authority 


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to provide foreign military training for counterdrug purposes; and, 

last year, Mexico was added to the Defense Department’s authority 

to provide equipment as well. Congress needs to consider and monitor all sides of the U.S. counterdrug effort, not just the Merida Initiative funded through this committee. 

In conclusion, success in Mexico’s counterdrug effort will not 

hinge upon helicopters or ion scanners. What the U.S. decides to 

fund through the Merida Initiative signals what we think is important. Strong, effective rights respecting institutions and rule of law 

have the best chance of making a difference; and that is where the 

limited U.S. dollars should be spent. 

Thank you. 

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Mrs. LOWEY. Well, thank you very much for your testimony, and 

I hope this will be the beginning of a dialogue, because the information you have shared has been invaluable. The key here is how 

do you provide a balance between security and accountability, and 

this is what we have tried to do in our bill, and I appreciate your 

comments. 

I have found, especially after our visiting there, that it is very 

difficult to achieve that balance. Of course, it is early, as you mentioned. But achieving the balance between trying to address the security objectives of breaking the cartels, simultaneously ensuring 

that security forces do not overstep and abuse the very population 

that they are trying to protect is difficult; and it is clear that all 

three of you don’t think that Mexico has achieved that balance. 

You have mentioned various areas where you think they can do 

better, so I am not going to ask you that again. And you have also 

made suggestions about how we can do better to help Mexico. 

We know that the Merida Initiative intended to break the power 

and impunity of criminal organizations; assist the governments of 

Mexico and Central America in strengthening border, air, and maritime controls from the Southwest border of the United States to 

Panama; improve the capacity of the justice systems in the region 

to conduct investigations and prosecutions; implement the rule of 

law; protect human rights; curtail gang activity in Mexico and Central America; diminish the demand for drugs in the region. 

These are laudable goals. I think the other panel and you could 

all agree on those goals. It is difficult and probably too early to 

evaluate what has actually been accomplished by the Merida program, whether it is having the desired impact. 

I have been in the Congress for 20 years. Drug use in the United 

States is not a new challenge, exactly. I also serve on the committee that funds labor, health, human services, and education. We 

have been talking about increasing money to stop the demand for 

a very long time. We know, whether it is that committee or this 

initiative, we are not putting enough money into it; and so I certainly respect that suggestion. Hopefully, we will be more successful. 

In terms of judicial and police reform, we have addressed that in 

the bill; and I think you mentioned that. And you also mentioned 

that efforts to purge the police go way back. We know we need 

structural reform in the police. 

We know we have to address poverty. What I find difficult—and 

perhaps you can comment—to deal with now, when we were there 

and talking to President Calderon and others, because of the tremendous differences in salaries between the police and the narcotraffickers, they have even tried to keep a rotation in the police. 

But then it is hard to develop professionalism if they come in, and 

then they go out and they join a cartel. 

I appreciate your testimony. You have addressed so many of the 

issues. But keeping the corrupt officials out of the police has been 

going on in Mexico for as far back as I have been going to Mexico, 

and this issue of competing with the narcotraffickers on salary is 

really very difficult. So on all the other issues I think we just have 

to do more of the same, but on that issue we are never going to 

match their salaries. 


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And I wonder if you have any suggestions. Do you agree with the 

rotation policy? Then you don’t get the professionalism. If they are 

there too long, the President is concerned that corruption is certainly alive and well. How do you deal with that? Now. I mean, you 

are not going to solve the poverty issue overnight. We all know we 

have to do that. We have to reform the judicial system. We know 

that. How do you deal with those things now while you are dealing 

with all the other goals, protecting the population? 

Ms. OLSON. I start with the fact that this has been going on for 

a long time, the fundamental problem of corruption and the fact 

that clearly the narcos have more money than the cop on the 

street, but that is true of almost any place in the drug chain. So 

there are other problems. I mean, salaries are one thing. Salaries 

need to be raised definitely. But that is not the only component. 

I think what Mexico has failed to do in past police reforms is follow through. There is an initial reform. There is an initial vetting. 

People are pulled out. Sometimes the military are brought in to 

temporarily take on roles while the police are supposed to be built 

up again. Often the military will come in, but that second stage of 

building up the local police capacity actually doesn’t happen before 

the military leaves again. 

So, for me, the big thing on police reform is that it is continual, 

that it is consistent, and that there is follow-through. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Does the polygraph work? 

Ms. OLSON. Well, you know polygraphs are controversial. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I know. 

Ms. OLSON. They are controversial there. They are controversial 

here. I think polygraphs are a component. It is one thing that can 

be used, and it shouldn’t be the only thing. 

So as you go about vetting police forces there are other things 

you can do, you know, continual review of taxes and financing of 

local cops. There are strategies that are being put in place and 

being put in place much more at the federal level than at the state 

and local level, and where you see the biggest problems with corruption are at the state and local level. So I think that part of the 

challenge for Calderon right now is that he has made some, I 

think, really good steps on the federal level with police reform. 

How that filters down to the state and local level is really one of 

the main challenges. 

Ms. HERNANDEZ. I would agree clearly with everything that Joy 

has said; and I think it is about also having reforms on this level, 

particularly the municipal level which is so, you know, where is the 

greatest contact with both the population but also with the drug 

traffickers in certain degrees. And I think there are minimal things 

that can start to be done. It is such a huge problem. It is not something that is going to be tackled in one year or in one administration. 

But I think if at least there are better conditions for the police, 

I mean, if their rights are also respected—and this is a little bit 

of the example that I referred to. You know, they have violation of 

their labor rights if they are also within a very corrupt system. If 

they are also extorted by their own bosses within that chain, then 

if you don’t start combating those things then there is no possibility to combat the big things. 


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So it is about raising salaries, but it is also taking into consideration what they have to say. 

You know, we talk a lot about police reform, but I think it is a 

democratic police reform with the police themselves taking into account their needs and at least starting to improve those things on 

those levels, a very local level, I think, which is something that is 

almost forgotten many times. And you have got many, many very 

poor municipalities that were still working with dirt floors, with 

thin-sheet ceilings, you know, where the police don’t have life insurance. I mean, these are basic things that I think you can start 

changing and that are going to make a difference. They are not 

going to solve the full problem, but they are going to start building 

up, I think, progressive solutions. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, you probably know that we added $5 million 

for a police literacy program. It is probably too early to make them 

literate at this point, but, hopefully, it will help. 

Why don’t we just take another short comment—my red light is 

on—if you have one. Otherwise, I will turn to Ms. Granger. 

Ms. HAUGAARD. Well, just one reform that is important is this establishing of a police registry so that if someone is fired by the municipal police, they don’t get rehired by the federal or whatever. 

Mrs. LOWEY. You know, that is in the bill as well. 

Ms. HAUGAARD. That is in the bill, and it is very important to 

monitor that and make sure that that moves forward. Because that 

is an agreed-upon reform that is already going forward that could 

make a difference. But you really need to keep your eye on that. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Ms. Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Mine is a fairly short question, I think, but you talked just briefly about human rights training. Is there human rights training for 

the Mexican police as well as the Mexican military? And give me 

an idea of what it is like. 

Ms. HAUGAARD. Perhaps Ana Paula can talk more about what is 

actually taking place. 

In the case of how the United States has done it in other countries, there is a standardized human rights training about, you 

know, the laws of war and the laws of military and a democratic 

society; and it is a very standardized training. It is good. There are 

no problems with it. It can be helpful. But if you don’t couple it 

with making sure that if you actually have a police or a military 

official who violates human rights and if they never get caught, it 

doesn’t matter how many good, wonderful courses they go to. So 

the point is really that it has to be coupled but not that this isn’t 

useful in and of itself. 

Do you want to go into a little bit more about the kind of training? 

Ms. HERNANDEZ. I wouldn’t have an answer of exactly the kinds 

of training. For example, there is a recent Secretariat created within the Secretariat of Defense of Human Rights. And I mean those 

are important things. But, clearly, if you have got this contribution 

where military personnel that commit violations cannot be held accountable, you have got the military jurisdiction, I mean, how can 


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you have—I mean, what is the point of the training if they know 

that if they commit violations they won’t be held accountable? 

And these were recent recommendations made to the Mexican 

state before the Human Rights Council. They just went through 

the universal periodic review, and all the recommendations that 

they have not accepted yet have to do with military jurisdiction. 

And I think that is a key—that would be a key political, you know, 

sign of political will of really taking serious human rights issue 

within the military if this started to change. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Rothman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I have appreciated the testimony today, and I just want to put 

it in context perhaps for myself. I thought I heard someone say 

most human rights violations are occurring by the police and the 

army. Is that including the drug cartels? 

Ms. OLSON. The understanding of human rights in the context of 

international law is that human rights are crimes against individuals committed by the state and that the horrendous things the 

drug traffickers are doing are crimes. So they are not defined as 

human rights violations because of, you know, the legal framework. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay, so the comment in no way minimized the 

horror and the magnitude of the violence and slaughter and torture 

and maiming, decapitation, all those things that are being conducted by the drug cartels. 

Again, I appreciated your testimony; and I think that the chairwoman and other members of the committee have struggled and 

are trying to incorporate in our bill ways to address your concerns. 

I read a statistic that 90 to 95 percent of the guns used in Mexico’s drug violence come from the United States and a very large 

number of high-caliber automatic weapons, assault weapons. 

Any thoughts on how the U.S.’s efforts to stop that flow are 

going? 

Ms. HAUGAARD. That figure comes from the ATF, I believe; and 

it isn’t going very well, right now. One of the issues has been that 

the import or the ban on importing assault weapons in the United 

States has not been enforced, and that coincides a bit with the period of really expansion of the violence in Mexico. So that is an 

issue. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Is it your belief then that there are sufficient laws 

on the U.S. books to prevent the export of assault weapons across 

the border into Mexico? 

Ms. HAUGAARD. Enforcing that existing ban would be helpful. 

That doesn’t solve all the problems, however. It would also be important to deal with the question of the sale of assault weapons 

within the United States, and it would be very important to 

strengthen ATF resources. 

Again, this is a question more of enforcing existing laws. So that 

basically what is happening is that the drug cartels are recruiting 

Americans to go and buy weapons. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Straw purchases. 

Ms. HAUGAARD. Yeah, just a few at a time at gun shows or wherever, and the regulations are not sufficiently enforced. There also 

aren’t adequate regulations on ammunition, on sale of ammunition, 


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which is another issue, simply enforcing what is already on the 

books. 

But I think you would also have to look at what more could be 

done in order to really put a stop to this. But it is a very serious 

issue, and I don’t think enough is being done right now, yet. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And how would you judge, if you have an opinion, 

the coordination amongst Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and all the other U.S. agencies that are now 

involved, DEA and national intelligence services? Do you have an 

opinion on how that coordination is going in terms of this Merida 

Initiative? 

Ms. HAUGAARD. I don’t think I could speak to that. 

Ms. OLSON. I don’t think I can answer that. 

The one aspect of the Merida Initiative that I have looked at the 

interagency process on has been related to youth gang violence. 

And, to be honest, the interagency process is not very effective; and 

it needs work. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. How is it falling down? 

Ms. OLSON. Turf disputes and who is going to do what and who 

is responsible for what, and I think it ended up with the overall 

program not being as effective as it could be. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much. 

I just wanted to follow up with one last question. What type of 

support should we be providing to civil watchdog groups, and what 

sort of protection does Mexico make available to citizens who claim 

they have been abused or mistreated by law enforcement and security forces? And what more should Mexico be doing? 

Ms. OLSON. I am going to let Ana Paula address the issue of 

what kind of protection is provided, because I am not sure on that. 

What I do know is that, as we have looked at witness protection 

issues in Mexico, the system is really weak and needs strengthening; and I think that the farther we get into really going after 

organized crime the more important the witness protection program becomes. I think that is one important place where the committee could focus. 

Mrs. LOWEY. And perhaps you can give us some information, who 

in the Mexican government works well with you? We have made 

many changes in the bill, as you know, based upon the input you 

have given us and others. Who else should we be empowering? 

Ms. OLSON. In terms of parts of the Mexican government? 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, or in the country, there are civilian watchdog 

groups that come to talk with us. How can we make this package 

of aid, Merida package more effective? 

Ms. OLSON. That is a very good question. 

Mrs. LOWEY. You don’t have to answer it today. You can think 

about it. Because I believe you had said, Ms. Olson, that it is early 

and we can’t really evaluate. So if I am putting you on the spot, 

you don’t have to answer it. 

Let me just say to the panel, we really appreciate your input, 

your work; and, as we prepare for 2010, I do hope that you can stay 

in touch with the committee. We constantly try to fine-tune the 

package. The balance, as I said many times during this hearing, is 

very difficult to achieve. 


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Demand, for example, we have been worried about for more than 

20 years. That is as long as I have been in the Congress. So we 

really do appreciate your testimony, and I thank you again, and I 

look forward to continuing the dialogue. 

Ms. OLSON. Can I make one last comment? 

Mrs. LOWEY. You certainly can. 

Ms. OLSON. One last comment, because I think—Mr. Rothman, 

partly in response to your question, I think that when we talk 

about justice and police reform, what we are talking about is how 

you capture and prosecute criminals. I very much see the issues 

that we are talking about, police and justice reform, human rights, 

and catching and holding criminals accountable, they all go hand 

in hand. And I think that when the process starts working that 

way is when we will see the most impact. 

Lastly, because I think it is important to encourage the administration on this, is this idea of balance that you talked about, but 

balance between what the U.S. is going to do on our side of the border and what we think needs to happen on the Mexican side of the 

border. I know it runs completely counter to the budget system, because we budget in the different—the 150 account, and domestic 

demand treatment is not there. But I think, as it is conceptualized 

and presented, the different aspects of what the U.S. is going to do 

on its side of the border, it is very important that those be articulated to Mexico. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, I would hope that it would be. As these agreements are negotiated, I would expect that it’s not just our committee that is changing the balance but that Secretary Shannon 

and others are making their case as forcefully as they can for improvements in the balance. 

Why don’t I just give Ms. Hernandez and Ms. Haugaard—if you 

have any last comments, we would welcome them. 

Ms. HERNANDEZ. Well, I think, just touching on the last thing 

that Joy said, I think that is very important in terms of access to 

justice. As you were asking, Madam Chairwoman, what could we 

do and what could be most effective I think, as Ms. Olson was saying, if access to justice starts working in regards to how citizens 

denounce crimes, how they are protected—I think there is such a 

lack of confidence by the citizens, both of police institutions, of the 

justice system, that as those reforms that are currently hopefully 

being implemented, as they start working, I think that will improve and that will advance an overall thing. 

As I was just saying in my testimony, I think it is very important 

that these things, the minimal things that are established within 

the initiative in terms of things that Mexico has to report progress 

on, I think that is very important that that is effectively measured. 

Otherwise, those just fall as kind of empty words that are not—— 

Those are very important. They are the minimal things I think 

that need to be taken into account. In that sense, the possibility 

to dialogue with civil society organizations, the role that civil society can also play in that I think is also very important. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Ms. Haugaard. 

Ms. HAUGAARD. Well, along the same lines, this is a really complicated package; and the reforms we are talking about in terms of 


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the justice sector and police are really complicated issues. The 

more that you can, obviously, both as we can see from this hearing 

and listen to perspectives of civil society, Mexican civil society, the 

more that you can encourage the administration and embassy to 

meet regularly with both human rights and justice reform and police reform kinds of groups monitoring groups in Mexico. 

I think the better the analysis, the broader the analysis the U.S. 

Government will have and the better you can watch as this develops. Because I have always found if you are trying to improve a 

justice system or trying to make police or military more accountable, you will move forward in one way and then all of a sudden 

it kind of goes off in the wrong direction. And you need that good 

analysis to be able to be on top of that and to be encouraging in 

the right direction. 

So the more there is that flow of information with civil society 

experts in Mexico in particular, the sort of better the U.S. Government’s analysis will be and the more we will see this going in the 

right direction. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you again for your testimony and your time. 

This concludes today’s hearing, examining the implementation of 

counternarcotics funding associated with the Merida program. 

The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related 

Programs stands adjourned. Thank you. 


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(463) 

THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2009. 

AFRICA: GREAT LAKES, SUDAN AND THE HORN 

WITNESSES 

JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO-FOUNDER, ENOUGH PROJECT 

DAVID SHINN, FORMER AMBASSADOR, AND ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

SULIMAN BALDO, AFRICA DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR 

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN LOWEY

Mrs. LOWEY. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations 

and Related Programs will come to order. Today this subcommittee 

will examine programs and policies in Africa, specifically in the 

Great Lakes, Horn of Africa and the Sudan. 

I welcome our distinguished panel, Mr. John Prendergast, CoFounder of the ENOUGH Project; Ambassador David Shinn, Professor at George Washington University and former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso; and Mr. Suliman Baldo, Africa Director of the International Center for Transitional Justice. 

Their diverse experience will provide valuable insight to United 

States policy in these troubled regions of Africa. 

As our nation grapples with global security imperatives, including in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, we must not neglect the myriad of challenges and opportunities in Africa. 

Over the last 40 years, nearly 20 African countries or about 40 

percent of subsaharan Africa have experienced at least one civil 

war. It is estimated that 20 percent of subsaharan Africans now 

live in countries which are formally at war. Despite this grim statistic, there are glimmers of hope that some countries are emerging 

from conflicts and consolidating peace. 

Optimism—cautious optimism—is spreading from the center of 

the continent as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda 

join together to face down two rebel factions in eastern DRC. This 

joint action, which was followed by the retreat of Rwandan forces 

from the area, has weakened the rebel forces, and the people of the 

Kivus can look forward to a reduction in violence and a return to 

peace. 

I hope that the witnesses today can provide some direction on 

how the United States and the international community can help 

sustain this progress. What should the United States and other donors do to help consolidate the peace in DRC? What efforts can 

help overcome the destruction of communities as a result of the 

war and the gender-based violence used systematically as a weapon 

of war? 

Unfortunately, the news out of Sudan has not been positive. The 

actions of the Khartoum government last week demonstrate that 


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they continue to thwart every effort to resolve the conflict in western Sudan and continue to oppress the people of Darfur. 

The expulsion of 13 international NGOs, the kidnapping of five 

aid workers which you just saw on the news, the apparent disregard for the health and well being of 1.5 million people living in 

Darfur is simply genocide by another means. 

Some Members of Congress and many in the NGO community 

have called for a Presidential special envoy to marshal international attention and put pressure on the Khartoum government. 

Perhaps our witnesses can give us examples of other steps that the 

Administration must take in the next 30 days to demonstrate that 

the United States remains committed to a long-term solution in 

Sudan and Darfur. 

I am also deeply concerned about Somalia’s decades long descent 

into chaos. Since the 1990s, the country has been in the state of 

crisis. Recent actions by the people of Somalia to begin to form a 

consensus government offers some hope. However, how to deal with 

al-Shabab is a major challenge, and instability has led to increased 

piracy off Somalia’s coast. 

Joint international action seems to be addressing some of these 

concerns. Could a similar joint effort to reestablish governance in 

Somalia and collaboration with the new government offer a chance 

for peace in the country? 

Finally, let me note that my colleagues and I have long criticized 

the narrow focus that provides only health and humanitarian dollars to Africa. While these challenges certainly are great, Africa 

needs trade, agriculture, economic development to prosper and 

grow. Additionally, more security assistance in the region would 

help counter the growth and influence of al-Qaeda and the other 

terrorist cells. 

Perhaps frustrated by the lack of State Department resources, 

we have seen the Department of Defense deploy greater resources 

and personnel through Africa, yet we cannot delegate responsibility 

to the military, nor allow them to be the dominant interface for the 

nations of Africa. 

I hope that the Obama Administration will reverse the years of 

a one-dimensional Africa assistance policy and put forward a more 

comprehensive diplomatic and development strategy for the African 

continent. I look forward to working with Secretary Clinton and all 

of the officials in the Obama Administration who share my commitment to this goal and expect that we can build on the goodwill and 

successes we have had in Africa over the past few years. 

Now before I return to more impressive witnesses, let me turn 

to our distinguished Ranking Member for her statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for convening 

today’s panel on Africa, a region increasingly vital to the national 

interest of the United States. The panelists before us have extensive experience on the African continent and share our goal of 

bringing peace and stability to the region, and I appreciate your 

being here today. 

The political, economic, security and humanitarian challenges 

the United States faces in the Great Lakes, Sudan and the Horn 


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are considerable. The spread of terrorism, regional instability and 

food insecurity are real threats to U.S. interests. 

The Congress has appropriated over $6.5 billion in fiscal year 

2008 for this region to provide humanitarian aid, establish and sustain multiple peacekeeping missions, combat disease and develop 

and reconstruct nations emerging from conflict. 

The picture of this region, as the Chairwoman said, unfortunately is still mixed. In Sudan, over two million people remain displaced in the Darfur region, a conflict that is affecting neighboring 

Chad and the Central African Republic. At the same time, a fragile 

peace agreement brokered by the last Administration between 

North and South Sudan struggles to succeed. 

The announcement last week of the Sudanese Government to 

expel 12 nongovernmental organizations that are delivering life 

saving humanitarian assistance is unacceptable. 

The United Nations African Union Peacekeeping Mission in 

Darfur authorized at over 26,000 personnel only had 12,359 troops 

deployed by the end of January 2009, nearly 19 months after its 

authorization. Maritime piracy based in Somalia is an increasing 

threat to international trade. 

Conversely, the President’s emergency plan for AIDS relief, 

PEPFAR, and the Malaria and Neglected Diseases Initiative have 

made great strides in improving health care on the continent. 

The Millennium Challenge Corporation has become an innovative 

tool to combat poverty, grow economies and strengthen African democracies. To date, there have been 11 compacts signed with African nations totaling about $4.5 billion. The Congress has invested 

billions and demonstrated its concern for Africa, but these resources need to be coupled with an effective and concerted strategy 

for achieving peace and stability in this region. 

I look forward to hearing from each panelist on the approach 

needed to address these chronic challenges and your expert views 

on the resources Congress might be asked to provide. 

I thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Ambassador Shinn, why not begin with you? We are happy to 

place your full statement in the record. If you would be kind 

enough to summarize your oral statement, we want to get to the 

questions and have a real dialogue. Thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR SHINN

Mr. SHINN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, and 

Members of the committee. I will define for the purposes of this 

session the Horn of Africa as constituting Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti and Sudan. I would make the point that a problem or 

a conflict in any one of these countries has relevance for one or 

more of its neighbors. It is very important to treat this area as a 

region, not on a bilateral country-by-country basis. 

The only serious U.S. policy effort that tried to deal with the 

countries as an integrated region occurred in the mid 1990s. It was 

known as the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative. The initiative was 

a good one. Unfortunately, it did not have a lot of success for reasons spelled out in my paper, but I think it would be useful at 


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some point to review the lessons learned as to why it did not have 

more success. 

The major crises in the Horn today are the failed state of Somalia, the civil war between Southern and Northern Sudan and the 

crisis in Darfur, the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and periodic 

famines in several of the countries. There is also a second tier list 

of problems that I will not get into and even a third group of localized conflicts that deserve more attention that I will not mention 

now. 

It is also key to work with other players in the region rather 

than trying to carry out any policy on a bilateral basis. The United 

States cannot and should not be expected to solve the problems of 

the Horn on its own. 

In addition to working with traditional donors, it needs to work 

with countries like Egypt, the Arab countries and China. Russia is 

a little more problematic because of its arms sales, but even Russia 

needs to be included, also India and even Turkey, which is becoming increasingly active in the area. 

Having said that, a new or relatively new arrival to the area is 

Iran. I am not suggesting we work with Iran. I think Iran has to 

be monitored very carefully in terms of what it is doing there. 

Let me turn first to Ethiopia. U.S. policy towards Ethiopia since 

the current government took power in 1991 has been a delicate balancing act, and this will continue to be the case. On the one hand, 

Ethiopia is a strong supporter of U.S. counterterrorism policy in 

the region. It has been consistently responsive to U.S. concerns 

about stability and peacekeeping operations in the region. 

The United States must weigh very carefully these positive factors against the need for significant improvement in human rights 

issues and the democratization process. There have been the arrests of political dissidents, harassment of the private press, and 

unwillingness to allow civil society to engage in advocacy work. 

The next general elections occur in 2010, and the outlook for serious competition in these elections is frankly not very good. 

Eritrea. Relations with Eritrea have reached the lowest point 

since Eritrea became independent in 1993. There is a lot standing 

in the way of improving relations with Eritrea. Any U.S. attempt 

to improve relations with Eritrea faces huge challenges. 

A new Administration has the advantage, however, in that it can 

look at old problems in new ways. It may not be possible to improve relations with Eritrea, but I think the effort still needs to be 

made. 

On Djibouti, it hosts the only American military base in Africa. 

Its purpose is mainly to counter terrorist activity in the region. I 

think it is time, frankly, to have an independent assessment of the 

CJTF–HOA operation to find out whether it really is doing what 

it costs. Because Djibouti hosts CJTF–HOA and Ethiopia is dependent on the port, Djibouti becomes an important part of the regional policy for the Horn of Africa. 

Somalia has been much in the news of late. The situation is particularly fluid in Somalia today. The first priority is reestablishing 

security. An enlarged African Union peacekeeping force is not the 

answer, although it can help play a useful role by keeping open the 

port and the airport. 


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Somalia needs to train in the first instance a community-based 

police force, and the international community has started that, but 

it needs to put more effort into it. The United States should also 

continue to support this new government in spite of its imperfections, while remaining in the political background. 

This is not the time for the U.S. to be up front and center. Let 

Somalis work through their differences in their own way. We 

should eschew military activity in Somalia and provide humanitarian assistance and be willing to step in as quickly as possibly 

with development assistance when the security situation permits. 

Turning to Sudan, the United States has four principal goals in 

Sudan: Ensuring implementation of the comprehensive peace 

agreement, or at least avoiding a return to civil war between the 

north and the south; ending the crisis in Darfur; improving the 

overall human rights situation; and continuing to receive the support of Sudan on counterterrorism. 

Achieving these goals requires a combination of pressure, frank 

talk and acceptance of some unpleasant truths, which some of you 

will disagree on. The government in Khartoum is highly flawed— 

that is unquestioned—but I think there are two positions that need 

to be reconsidered. 

The first is that I do not think U.S. policy is being well served 

today by continuing in the present tense to refer to what is happening there as a genocide. It is terrible, yes. Genocide? I do not 

think so. 

And the second position is that the United States appropriately 

put Sudan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1993. In my 

view, the situation has changed and I think the State Department’s 

annual terrorism report substantiates that. 

I think a combination of discontinuing references to genocide in 

Darfur in the present tense and taking steps to remove Sudan from 

the list of state sponsors of terrorism just might jolt the situation 

and create some opportunities. Most, if not all, sanctions against 

Sudan would remain in place even after it is removed from the list. 

I will stop there, Madam Chairwoman. I have some comments on 

operational issues, but they are in the written record and members 

can review them. 

Thank you. 

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Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Baldo. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. BALDO

Mr. BALDO. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, other Members of 

the subcommittee, for inviting me to this hearing. I will focus my 

comments on the Great Lakes region and particularly the situation 

in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. 

The update from that is grim. There are opposing rebel groups, 

militias and the Congolese army, plus foreign armies from Uganda 

and Rwanda to be specific, that are waging wars there against different parcels of the eastern providences of Congo. 

The clashes are becoming increasingly violent from 2007 through 

late 2008, triggering the displacement of tens of thousands who are 

fleeing killings, mass atrocities and horrendous rapes and mutilations. 

In western Congo, the Kabila government demonstrates its use 

of abusive force, fronting concerns about narrowing space for democratic governance and political opinion. The mediation efforts in the 

Great Lakes region has caught only limited successes in containing 

the violence, and international pressure on President Kabila and 

his government to create a space for meaningful democratic exchange has not progressed. 

Therefore, a lot remains to be done if you want to reverse the cycles of killings and human suffering. Congo has been bleeding for 

the last two decades because of a lack of decisive policy to really 

address the root causes of the violence there. 

We believe that in the short term a policy intervention could be 

the appointment of an independent human rights and military observer mechanism, the purpose of which and in light of these ongoing atrocities by all sides in the conflicts to support the mechanisms of accountability and lead a major effort to end impunity, 

which is responsible for the repeated cycles of violence there. 

We believe that a push for a meaningful security system reform 

is essential. The international community must change its current 

approach, characterized by piecemeal and uncoordinated bilateral 

and multilateral initiatives to reform various sectors of the security 

system such as the army, the police and justice in isolation from 

each other. 

The security sector reform requires a long-term commitment. 

Further financial and technical assistance on security sector reform 

must be accompanied by political pressure and benchmarks to promote national ownership of the long-term security sector reform 

process in the country. 

Continued support for civil society in the DRC is key. The country for decades has had an implosion of central power, and in the 

vacuum alternative power sources have developed. 

These are the churches, civil society organizations, community 

groups that are providing for the needs of the populations at all 

levels, including local governments, protection of rights, and monitoring of abuses as they happen in civil society in Congo is a major 

actor in all these areas, and the struggle for accountability there 

could build on its tremendous efforts in this area. 

Now, traditional justice measures are needed. There is little political will in the Congo to really uphold members of the military, 


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for example, accountable for their role in committing abuses. It is 

the documented fact by, among others, the United Nations peacekeeping mission that most of the violations that occurred in the 

country are committed by members of the National Army and the 

police, and the mechanisms are simply not there. 

We are encouraging local actors such as civil society organizations and others to really lead in terms of advocacy. Foreign assistance programs should really make sure that this happens. Recent 

security developments in Congo demonstrate the influence that the 

donor community and the international community could help 

bring about in a positive direction. 

As you recall, in January 2009 Uganda and Rwanda agreed to 

send their forces in a joint campaign into the DRC, in eastern 

DRC, with the purpose of fighting the rebel predominantly Rwandan Hutu group, the FDLR, the Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda. 

That campaign was very much triggered by international pressures both from Rwanda and the DRC due to the revelation in the 

United Nations report of November 2008 that Rwanda was supporting a very abusive rebel group in Congo led by Laurent 

Nkunda of particular notoriety and that Congo was also using the 

FDLR in its effort to contain the forces of Nkunda and to repel attempts. 

Therefore, the establishment of the responsibility of this steps in 

backing abusive rebels has forced them to move towards some reconsideration of their previous negative relationships, and this is 

what allowed progress in terms of establishing peace. As a result 

of the reports some European countries suspended their military 

assistance to the Rwandan Government, as you recall, and this was 

a triggering factor on this. 

Therefore, any progress towards peace in the Great Lakes region 

and in Eastern Congo would require really making of this alliance 

between the government of Kinshasa and the government of Kigali 

a strategic thing with cooperation and collaboration in addressing 

the security threats in the region and trying to find solutions for 

them. 

The political and humanitarian costs for conflict in the region are 

otherwise too terrible. We know that Congo is having by default of 

its own army and the lack of political will to make of it a dependable force to defend national security for all the rebel groups from 

the region. Lord’s Resistance Army of Northern Uganda is settled 

there. 

A joint military campaign between the Congolese army and the 

Ugandan army that started in November and which is still ongoing 

has shown the costs of unprepared military campaigns in this case 

assisted by the United States military at the planning level, you 

know, that such planning for military operation, if it does not take 

the dimension of civilian protection into account, could have disastrous effects. 

That is exactly what happened. The campaign did not make any 

provisions for protecting local civilians, and the LRA vanished from 

the camps that were attacked by the Congolese and Ugandan 

army, but then retaliated against civilians, committing massacres, 

including the famous one on Christmas attacking several villages 


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in Dungu District, Northeastern Congo, as people were celebrating 

Christmas. Hundreds were killed, and LRA remains at large. 

Unfortunately, the current campaign which ended between the 

Ugandan and the Rwanda army again is the FDLR. We are expecting in the humanitarian community—the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Congo are actually planning—for a backlash 

with FDLR fighters again taking revenge on defenseless Congolese 

civilians. 

The cycles of violence continue. A key trigger for that is the 

dysfunctionality of the Congolese army, its corruption, its total absence of capability of providing protection for the population, and 

in fact it is the perpetration of violence against the population. 

Our reading of this is that no matter what effort is put in extending development assistance to a place like Congo such as in 

the areas of fighting HIV or malaria and development of building 

the micro and macro national economy, as long as there is no genuine reform at the level of the institutions of governments, the security and the judiciary, all this aid will be jeopardized by the 

dysfunctionality of the systems in the Congo. 

I will stop here and end the discussion. We may address some 

of these points in more detail. 

Thank you. 

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Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Prendergast. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. PRENDERGAST

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thank you, Madam Chair, and to all of those 

on the committee who have turned up today for this with all the 

competing priorities. By the way, for us in the independent sector 

it is refreshing not to get buried behind the Administration witnesses. It is nice to get a chance to go first. 

What are the stakes here, just to put it in very clear and sharp 

focus. The region of East and Central Africa is the deadliest war 

zone in the world since the Holocaust. There is nowhere in the 

world that is even close, a close second, to this region. 

Ten million lives have been extinguished in the context of conflicts over the last 20 years, so the stakes simply could not be higher for what we are deliberating this morning and what the Administration is going to be facing in the coming months. 

I would say that our aid and our policy, going back Administrations, has mostly focused on managing the symptoms of these conflicts rather than committing to ending the conflicts. It is a paradigm shift that is needed for U.S. policy. We need that shift in 

order for us to begin to see an end to some of these cycles of violence and impunity that Suliman just so ably described. 

Congress should demand that the Administration that we look to 

ending these conflicts rather than managing their symptoms as a 

basic strategy of our government policy. In the strictest sort of U.S. 

taxpayer term, given the committee we are in front of today, what 

is a more efficient use of our resources? 

Let us just take an example. Was it to spend billions and billions 

of dollars for 20 years in Southern Sudan on humanitarian assistance or $100,000 over the space of two or three years to invest in 

the diplomatic effort that ended that war? I think the answer is obvious and the answer then has incredible implications for today 

and tomorrow. 

Why is there no peace process right now for Darfur? Why are we 

not engaged in building the peace process for Darfur 6 years into 

what many of us believe is a genocide still ongoing? Why is it that 

we do not have, nor are we even deliberating over, a special envoy 

for Congo and the Great Lakes, which is by itself the deadliest war 

in the world since the Holocaust? 

These are urgent priorities. They are almost cost free in terms 

of our budgetary implications, and they would save literally billions 

of dollars over the course of the decade. It is not an exaggeration. 

We are squandering, in my view, U.S. taxpayers’ money with this 

approach that manages symptoms rather than ends crises and ends 

conflict. 

This is a business model for our foreign policy. If we just keep 

bailing it out with additional money for more symptom management we will see the continuing cycle of failure that we have. Let 

us put the resources and money into prevention and cure. 

Now, I was asked to focus on the two deadliest conflicts, Congo 

and Sudan. Starting very quickly with Sudan, and I am just going 

to make some recommendations about specific U.S. actions, parVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 055951 PO 00000 Frm 00488 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A951P2.XXX A951P2

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ticularly with respect to the appropriations process, hopefully that 

will have some relevance to your direct jurisdiction. 

President Obama’s first major African crisis has officially begun 

with the expulsion of these humanitarian agencies from Sudan. We 

are already getting reports from some of the agencies left behind 

of children who simply have no food. 

So we are going to see now I think a dramatic spike, if nothing 

changes, in severe malnutrition and the diseases related to it that 

will see a death toll increase fairly rapidly. Directly responsible is 

the regime that has now been implicated in crimes against humanity through the arrest warrant of the ICC. 

I think it is imperative that the President confronts Khartoum’s 

intransigence much more directly with a forceful and coordinated 

diplomatic response. We have to work with our allies and other 

countries that have leverage, but to maximize, and here comes the 

issues related to the Appropriations Committee. To maximize the 

effectiveness of such a response, it requires an adroit use of all of 

the elements of the foreign policy tool kit. 

The Appropriations Committee and its resources have a crucial 

role to play in this effort. Let me give you just a few recommendations specifically: 

Number one, funding for the Sudan special envoy and not just 

a person to go running around. A team should be in place under 

that envoy so that we have a fully developed squad that can be 

talking to Beijing, talking to the Saudis, talking to the Egyptians 

and the countries who have leverage—who if we were to work 

closely with them behind the scenes we could have an influence directly on the situation on the ground now. 

We need to be doing that. We need to be 24/7. That is what we 

do on Iran. That is what we do on Iraq and in North Korea and 

the issues that matter. We can do it on Sudan on the cheap with 

a special envoy and a small team with that person. 

Second, we need peace dividends for the people of Sudan. They 

need to see in Southern Sudan after the incredible investment of 

the United States Government in brokering that peace deal in 

Southern Sudan, maybe one of the signature accomplishments of 

the first term of the Bush Administration. The people of Southern 

Sudan need to see some measure of a peace dividend and so investing more clearly. 

We have put a lot of money in there, but not a lot is being shown 

for it. I go there fairly frequently, and you do not see it. So we need 

to put it in more visible spending on infrastructure, roads, education, health care, the kind of things that people can say okay, 

there is a benefit in peace. There is an incentive for peace, which 

will have an impact in continuing implementation in the south of 

that deal that we helped broker and in encouraging the Darfurians. 

Third is the issue of security sector reform. I think we have to 

again engage with the Southern Sudanese Government that we 

have helped in the birthing of with some very specific things with 

respect to: the preparation for election, the preparation for the referendum, and particularly with the development of military capacities, including the professionalization of their military capacities 

with respect to air defense and training, and moving from a rebel 

movement to a professional military. 


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Finally, we need support for the election. This is one of these 

make or break issues. If it goes wrong, it could go really wrong. It 

could break really badly. We could see a resumption of war in 

Southern Sudan, which makes Darfur look like a footnote in Sudan’s history, the death toll in Southern Sudan seven times as high 

as the estimates for Darfur. 

So we have to put some significant assistance into the logistics 

of making those elections work and the diplomatic muscle to work 

with the parties to ensure that there is some measure of fairness 

to the process. 

That is a very rapid shorthand of a lot of things that have to 

happen with respect to bringing about some positive direction on 

Sudan, but in the interest of time let us move on to the Congo and 

the surrounding region. 

As we have already heard from Suliman, the U.S. helped provide 

the diplomatic muscle to bring the parties together in Central Africa—the Ugandans, the Congolese and the Rwandans, countries 

that were just a few years ago at each other’s throats. That diplomatic rapprochement to some degree has helped them facilitate the 

military operations that have allowed for joint operations against 

the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Rwandan militia led by the 

former genocidaire, the FDLR. 

These are encouraging opportunities, but, as Suliman has said, 

they have resulted again in terrible human rights abuses. We own 

it because we were part of the conceptualization of the military 

strategy and military advisors are out there. We need to redouble 

our efforts to make sure. 

If we just walk away from that the repercussions for civilian populations are going to be dramatic in terms of the response by the 

Lord’s Resistance Army and the FDLR and other militias who will 

see that they are not really serious about this stuff. 

So what do we have to do? I will do just the same as I did on 

Sudan. Just a few quick things that I think some measure of appropriations might make a difference in unlocking the cycle that 

the Congo and the Great Lakes region are locked in. 

Number one, and just as important as it is for Sudan, we need 

a special envoy and a team for Congo and the Great Lakes to deal 

with both the issue of Eastern Congo, the deadliest war in the 

world, and the scourge of the Lord’s Resistance Army, which has 

gone on for 20 years with no resolution. I think a team working 

with their task being to end these twin crises could actually make 

a difference. 

Second, funding for the DDR account, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, providing an incentive for particularly 

the child soldiers who have been abducted, the younger people who 

do not want to stay in the Lord’s Resistance Army, providing incentives to bring them out that are not just military, that are not just 

the stick. We need the carrot as well. 

Programs where they can see there is a place that they can go 

back to. Many of them are afraid to go home because of the crimes 

that they were forced to commit against their own families, so we 

want to create that opportunity. 

Security sector reform. Just like with the Southern Sudan Government, the Congo Government, as Suliman was telling us, is one 


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of the worst abusers not just in Congo, but in the entire continent 

of Africa. That requires professionalization of the military, and that 

requires human rights training. 

Finally, there is the issue of funding. The Senate is now working 

on a bill to deal with the conflict minerals that are fueling the 

Congo conflict. The tantalum, the tungsten and the tin and the 

gold are four minerals that are produced in Congo which end up 

in all of our electronics products, our cell phones and our laptops 

and our iPods and all the rest of it. 

We are directly, as consumers, fueling the war in eastern Congo, 

the deadliest war in the world. So the Senate is working on that 

and are going to work with the House on this measure. We need 

a bill that goes right to the mine of origin to ensure that these companies do not purchase the minerals that actually fuel wars. 

This is the same concept as the blood diamond movement. If you 

can change the logic of the producers from war to peace you can 

have an impact on the overall stability in the country. 

Conclusion. I think Africa’s remaining wars require some thinking outside the box, which means that we have to have 24/7 diplomatic effort in this era of diminishing resources. 

The cheapest and most effective instrument we have is the vast 

experience of American peacemaking. I got a little glimpse of it 

when I worked for President Clinton for four years in his Administration. We have incredibly talented foreign service officers who 

ought to be deployed in small teams in both of these places, in the 

Great Lakes and Sudan, and could have an enormous impact. 

The cost effectiveness of ending these wars rather than continuing to manage the symptoms would be undeniable. So it is not 

an exaggeration I think in East and Central Africa to say that literally millions of lives are at stake with what we actually end up 

doing over these next four years. 

The committee’s interest in this is extremely, extremely encouraging. Thank you very much to all of you for coming today. 

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Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

I want to thank the witnesses for your outstanding testimony, 

and I personally appreciate your focus on next steps. What do we 

do now? All three of the witnesses certainly presented your observations and your suggestions. 

DRC

I would like to focus on DRC, and I know my colleagues will pursue many different lines of questioning, because in DRC you really 

see multiple challenges. Last month the DRC Government joined 

with two bordering countries to undertake joint operations to dismantle rebel groups. 

Do you think, whoever would like to answer that, that the joint 

operations represent a strengthened central government willing 

and able to collaborate with partners? Do you think that these operations represent a desperate government struggling to reclaim 

control of its own borders? 

The joint action in eastern DRC has brought some peace to the 

area, but you all had several suggestions. What needs to be done 

to maintain the peace? The United Nations has developed a redevelopment plan for the region. Do you believe that these efforts will 

make a difference? Then you can talk about MONUC, the U.N. 

force in DRC. 

Perhaps I will stop with my question at that point. Who would 

like to respond first? Mr. Baldo. Thank you. 

Mr. BALDO. It is just totally inconceivable how much the Congolese army is dysfunctional. It is not a dependable fighting force. It 

is an army where privates and officers are of the same proportion, 

53 percent, and the others in the millions are noncommissioned 

and warrant officers. 

There are people from defeated previous armies, you know, the 

ex Force d’Armee of Mobutu, defeated armies of Laurent Kabila 

and so on. What Congo is doing, because it does not have any capability to do anything on its own as an army, is it is outsourcing its 

military needs to armies of the neighborhood that are much more 

professional. 

But these armies have a long history in Congo, including during 

the deadly war from 1998 to 2002. All the eastern half of Congo 

was under occupation by the Rwandan army and the Ugandan 

army in northeastern Congo, and that was a military occupation 

which was driven by pillaging of natural resources in Congo. 

So Rwanda and Uganda are both very much obliged to assist because this interest has not disappeared. In fact, the flow of resources from Congo to the global economy passes traditionally 

through these two capitals, and there are mechanisms that are now 

ongoing whereby the two states are drawing a lot of resources from 

Congo even during this time. 

Therefore, there are no good guys in this operation. The international community and the U.S. Administration really have to 

keep a very close watch over Congo and its neighbors because of 

the history involved here. 

The key issue is to cut the most damaging driver and fueler of 

conflict in that part of the world, which is the illicit exploitation of 


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resources. There have to be put in place mechanisms to really 

make sure that these resources do not feed conflict. 

The second important component is that the Congolese army 

really needs to be reformed at a large scale, and this is a political 

decision. Pressure has to be put on the Congolese Government to 

assume the responsibility and protect its own territory and its own 

population. 

No one can do that for them. Therefore, there must be a serious 

security sector reform in Congo happening if we are to have lasting 

peace in that part of the world. 

Thank you, Madam. 

MONUC

Mrs. LOWEY. What role should the MONUC, the U.N. force play 

in this effort? They have been there for I believe ten years. 

Mr. BALDO. Yes. The United Nations mission has a mandate to 

assist the Congolese National Army in campaigning. Again, it is 

these abusive rebel groups and militias like Laurent Nkunda’s 

group, the LRA for that matter, the FDLR for that matter and so 

on. 

But MONUC is basically assisting an army that does not even 

know how to be assisted. It cannot fight in place of the Congolese 

army and it cannot fight, for example, along side the Congolese 

army when it invites armies of the neighborhood because the agenda is decidedly to keep the international community out of this bilateral arrangement. 

You know, it was a secret deal between President Kabila and 

Kagami that allowed the joint operation in Eastern Congo. So for 

the moment MONUC, and rightly so, are staying out of this campaign and are not assisting it. Why? Because none of these belligerents, state armies, militias, armed groups, care about the humanitarian cost of conflict to the local population. 

Therefore, campaigning, when it happens, is accompanied by 

massive killings, massive rapes, pillaging by all parties and no accountability for any of this. Therefore, we cannot expect the United 

Nations mission to be a party to a campaign which does not really 

aim to conduct war according to the Laws of Four. Thanks. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I am going to turn to Kay Granger and then alternate according to the order of attendance. 

We are going to try to keep to the red light because obviously because of the complexity of the issue we could all go on and on. I 

am going to turn to Ms. Granger, our Ranking Member. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Mr. Prendergast. I am sorry. I apologize for mispronouncing your 

name. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. It is not the first time. 

DARFUR

Ms. GRANGER. Okay. President Obama and Vice President Biden 

and U.N. Permanent Representative Susan Rice all called for a nofly zone for Darfur prior to assuming their current duties, but there 

are many nongovernmental organizations on the ground that said 

they do not agree with that, including the ones that were ordered 


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to leave. They oppose a no-fly zone, fearing its impact on their ability to deliver vital humanitarian assistance. 

My question to you is what is your position on a no-fly zone in 

Darfur? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. A very complicated issue. Thank you for raising it. 

First, we have to figure out our policy objectives. If our policy objective, for example, is to protect civilian populations from attacks, 

particularly aerial attacks, the principal advantage that the Sudanese Government has is its air force. On the ground they are largely neutralized, but when they add air support that is when you see 

some of the more significant damage done by ground attacks by the 

Sudanese Government. It makes sense. 

So the United Nations Security Council passed resolutions over 

and over again banning offensive military flights by the Government of Sudan, but then they have not created an enforcement 

mechanism for that, so that is why we saw Senator Biden and Senator Clinton, when they were senators, and Susan speaking on behalf of these things. 

Now, the question then for the purpose of the no-fly zone is will 

it work, or would it actually make things worse? I think it is not 

a given that it will work. If we are only prepared, for example, to 

go in, and let us just say we are not going to patrol the skies like 

this is Kurdistan. 

What we would do, though, is once they conduct one of their offensive flights we would send a plane from the Gulf or from 

Djibouti and shoot an airplane on the ground and destroy—disable 

or destroy—one of their planes on the ground, just sort of a quid 

pro quo, tit for tat. 

If the Sudanese Government said well, do you know what? 

Maybe that is all they are prepared to do and then they shut down 

all airspace to humanitarian operations for three months let us 

say, what will we have accomplished? Well, potentially we will accomplish the starvation of hundreds of thousands of people. 

So we have to be very careful that if we are going to go down 

the military road, which I think at some point may be required, we 

better be darn sure that we are going to back it up with a series 

of escalating measures perhaps, further targeted bombings, if we 

are going down that road. 

I am just worried that this sort of spurious kind of one-liner— 

let us start and try a no-fly zone—without thinking through the 

implications that we have to have a backup plan if Khartoum escalates like they escalated in response to the ICC, I think we ought 

to go down that road of significant planning with NATO now. 

And I think just doing that, by the way, just sending the signal 

that we go and we start consulting with our NATO allies about the 

possible enforcement of a no-fly zone, will I guarantee you have a 

very significant effect on the calculations of this regime in Khartoum. If they think we are finally getting serious about imposing 

a cost for the kind of things that they are doing, I think they will 

change their behavior. 

More accommodation, more statements without any meat behind 

them, is going to lead them down a further road of intransigence, 

and we are just going to see more people die in Darfur. 


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Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Jackson. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. JACKSON

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have been on this subcommittee for 10 years, and we have never had a hearing on Africa, much less the three regions we are discussing today, and so I 

want to applaud you and the subcommittee staff for holding this 

hearing, and I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony and 

for the work they have done in subsaharan Africa. 

Over the last several years I have raised concerns with Secretary 

Powell and Rice about the need for a comprehensive strategy to 

deal with failed or failing states so that they will not become havens for terrorists. Programs like the MCC that can make a huge 

difference with its infusion of capital do not address failed or failing states. What can we do? What resources do we have to mitigate 

the situation in some of these countries? 

Also during the last few years I have served in the Minority on 

this subcommittee. I was successful in securing funding for humanitarian assistance in a supplemental appropriations bill for Sudan 

and Liberia, and although I was pleased that the assistance we 

were providing was going to save lives, I wondered if it was sustainable. Could we year after year solve the fundamental problems 

that plague some of the poorest countries in the world in an ad hoc 

and a piecemeal fashion? 

I have introduced legislation that specifically deals with Liberia. 

My legislation does not attempt to provide humanitarian assistance. Instead, it identifies the root causes of Liberia’s problems and 

tries to address those problems, providing Liberia with a foundation upon which to grow and develop and lift itself out of conflict 

and poverty. 

I am not saying this is the Tao or the way to solve the myriad 

of problems affecting subsaharan African countries, but I think we 

need to think about new ways to solve these problems that are 

comprehensive and sustainable. 

Now, this is really not a question, but I am interested in the panel’s thoughts on this. In his book, The Bottom Billion: Why the 

Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, 

Paul Collier posits the circumstances of the world’s population is 

gradually improving as their countries develop economically, but 

that there are about a billion people that live in the most dysfunctional, conflict prone and stagnant countries that have experienced 

little growth since the 1980s and that they are most likely to remain stuck in poverty for the long term. 

Collier argues that this bottom billion are susceptible to radicalism, to terrorism, disease and many transnational afflictions 

that impact our global security. He attributes their lack of growth 

to several traps, including conflict, poor governance, being landlocked with bad neighbors and excessive dependence on natural resources. The populations of the DRC, Sudan and Somalia are clearly members of that bottom billion. 

For the panelists, should the donor community be taking Collier’s 

advice and reorient itself toward focusing primarily on lifting these 


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bottom billion countries out of their development traps? In whatever order you would like to address it. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. SHINN. Congressman Jackson, I am very sympathetic to the 

approach that you take, and I am also a fan of Paul Collier. 

I am not sure that it is feasible to deal with all of those who are 

at the bottom of the pecking order, but I think an effort certainly 

has to be made, if I could just bring it back to the Horn of Africa 

since that is the area I specialize in. 

I would reiterate a point that I made in my written testimony 

on something that was a little bit like what you are suggesting 

today that was tried in the mid 1990s in the Clinton Administration. That is the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, which had its 

faults, which did not achieve a great deal for a number of reasons. 

The focus of that effort was to deal with, one, improving food security through the Greater Horn of Africa, which consisted of 10 

countries and included Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya and 

Uganda, but did not include the Congo, and two, preventing conflict and mitigating conflict. 

We found that two things happened. One, new conflicts kept piling on the existing conflicts to the point that we never got ahead 

of the game. That was a pity because it just wore everyone down. 

As a result there was not the success that we had hoped to see in 

it. 

The other problem, quite frankly, was a bureaucratic one. The 

embassies in the field, some of them, were not really enthusiastic 

about this effort. They did not fully support it. They wanted to do 

their old bilateral thing. What is the United States Government 

going to do for Tanzania or going to do for Kenya? They did not 

want to look at it in terms of the 10 country concept, so it ultimately died a slow death. There was some very modest progress 

made, but it was exceedingly limited. 

I think what you say makes a lot of sense. It is the way to go. 

It requires an enormous amount of resources, which may or may 

not be available in this economic climate today. It also requires an 

approach that involves all the other major donors or interested parties outside of Africa to be supportive of it. 

The U.S. cannot do it alone. It has to be with the involvement 

of others, and if that is not going to be forthcoming then it probably 

is not going to work. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thanks, Congressman Jackson. I think the 

MCC has been for a while the flavor of the month and so it is a 

bit sacrilegious to critique it, but I think it set itself up for eventual 

failure. 

Not initially, but if you are going to just promote islands of stability in the seas of instability without addressing some of the 

issues of sometimes failed states, sometimes eroded states, and we 

have no resources left to deal with those countries then what is 

going to happen to the few jewels that people put billions of dollars 

into when nothing is going to some of the other ones who are not 

performing as well? I think it is structurally a problem. 

And so the response then, and to almost echo David’s issues with 

regard to the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, in your legislative 


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proposals with respect to Liberia we need to invest in a strategy 

that deals with the root causes. 

You know, looking at how you reform the security sector sounds 

so boring. My God, it is so fundamental to state construction. You 

know, it is so you do not have an abusive military, which is the 

source of so many problems. Not just the human rights abuses that 

that military commits, but then the rebellions that are sparked because of it that end up being the wars that we then spend billions 

of dollars to take care of the victims of. 

We have to focus our support for opportunities for young people. 

If there are not those opportunities, if there is not the educational 

and employment opportunities in places like Somalia today—we do 

not have a development assistance program there—so who do we 

leave the education to? 

Everybody knows what is going on. We are losing the game in 

the long run because we are trying to nickel and dime it right now 

and spending most of our resources on humanitarian assistance because we are not investing a little bit in prevention. This is why 

diplomacy, and I think President Obama’s campaign and what his 

Administration stands for, focus on the United States’ leadership, 

diplomatic leadership. 

You know, dealing with the fault lines in society that cause conflict and addressing those fault lines, getting at the root causes. It 

sounds like a mantra, but we do not do it. So, I mean, that is really 

what we have to do is focus—refocus—our considerable diplomatic 

and developmental capacities on the root causes of what then 

causes us to have to spend way too much money in cleaning up 

messes that could be prevented or addressed in the first place. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Kirk. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. KIRK

Mr. KIRK. Thank you. Madam Chairman, thank you for holding 

this hearing. 

John, you are uniquely positioned, as the Secretary of State is, 

to answer my questions, which require some remembering of critical decisions President Clinton made in the 1990s with regard to 

the United Nations. Let me just review the record that we see in 

Sudan. 

According to Save Darfur, of which you are a director, UNAMID, 

the peacekeeping force in Sudan, has never fired a shot in self-defense. It has never initiated any offensive action inside its Darfur 

AOR. The U.N. Secretary General reported 12 Janjaweed or government attacks in December and January, and there is no documented UNAMID response. 

UNAMID has a formal mission statement which requires it to 

confirm bombings, investigate attacks and monitor those attacks. 

In the UNAMID AOR it cannot enforce no-fly days imposed by the 

Government of Sudan to restrict humanitarian assistance. 

Now, UNAMID deployed in 2007, and from its deployment to 

date vehicle hijackings have gone from 137 to 277, a 102 percent 

increase. Since UNAMID’s deployment, abductions have gone from 

142 to 218, a 53 percent increase, and attacks have gone from 53 

prior to deployment to 192 today, a 106 percent increase. 


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This committee has provided $718 million of taxpayer money to 

UNAMID. We are approaching the $773 million this committee 

provided to UNPROFOR, the United Nations Protection Force, in 

Bosnia. 

I read the UNAMID mandate. The direct words in the UNAMID 

mandate are to deter violence, robust patrolling, establish disarmament, create security conditions—here is my favorite—ensure 

security of humanitarian workers, ensure, protect civilians and 

proactive patrolling. On Monday, four UNAMID soldiers were 

wounded. There was no response from the force. 

I recall, as you can, President Clinton’s experience with 

UNPROFOR. Many times when I talk to people who are fairly 

knowledgeable of foreign policy I say you know, we really should 

have solved Iraq like the way President Clinton did, by going to the 

United Nations and getting a mandate before we went into Bosnia. 

Everybody shakes their head yes, that is right. That is what President Clinton did. 

Actually President Clinton got no mandate from the U.N. for 

Bosnia in the Kosovo war. A lot of people say well, we relied heavily on the U.N. peacekeeping force in Bosnia, and that is what 

helped solve the problem. It was President Clinton’s decision to 

move the United Nations out of the way and move a NATO force 

into Bosnia that actually ended that conflict. 

I think a number of people in the Congress have completely forgotten the central lesson that President Clinton learned. We used 

to talk about UNPROFOR as the United Nations Protection Force 

for Bosnia. It was really the United Nations. It was neither very 

united, nor had very many nations, did not offer much protection 

and was not a force. 

And so I would ask you. Do you think that UNAMID is really 

the United Nations Accountants for Mass Internal Destruction and 

really is not adding very much value added as UNPROFOR did 

not, but at tremendous expense to the taxpayers through this subcommittee? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thank you. Well, on the surface every critique of UNAMID imaginable is probably justifiable, but I think we 

need to look at the context, the political context of the United Nations Security Council and the larger international community that 

doomed it to failure. Just a minute is all I need on this. 

Number one, we sent a peacekeeping mission, first an AU peacekeeping. We did not have the guts to even authorize a U.N. We 

sort of sent an AU peacekeeping mission out there without a peace 

deal, so we have sent an apple to deal with an orange in a crazy 

analogy. 

Secondly, we have sent this force out there to observe a peace 

deal that does not exist, but without even the requisite, the basic 

equipment necessary to allow us to have a chance of success. 

We made promises, going back three Administrations, to African 

forces all over the continent, along with our British and French allies. We said to them, and I saw it during the Bush I, saw it during 

Clinton, saw it during Bush II, that if you, Africa, will provide the 

troops, the human fodder, cannon fodder for these missions, we will 

give you the equipment and we will train you. 


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We train them because it is cheap, but when it came time to provide helicopters and air support and the kind of grounds that—— 

Mr. KIRK. If I could just interrupt you, because I do not agree 

with you. 

I have dealt with peacekeeping troops from other countries, and 

except for guard duty they are really not that capable. You need 

western military forces to execute a mission. The Government of 

Sudan knew that and so they directly forbid that to be, Part A. 

When you look at the TOE, the table of equipment, for UNAMID 

it is basically a World War I military just trucked into a place, and 

it is sitting on bases administering it itself. When I look at the key 

factor in operations in an AOR like this, it is helicopter support. 

I think UNAMID can rent two. 

The Government of Sudan has 43 helicopters, including Heinz, 

which are basically highly capable flying tanks. The danger here is 

that we claim to be doing something, and when we claimed to be 

doing something in Bosnia 300,000 people got killed. 

This committee felt very good. You know, I watched this committee as it felt very good in providing money for UNPROFOR, but 

it was a complete distraction and it was not until President Clinton 

and Madeleine Albright made the critical decision to push the U.N. 

out of the way that we actually stopped the slaughter. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. A brief, brief, brief response would be indeed 

the response of just giving a little bit more to UNAMID is not the 

answer. It means that we are just continuing to treat symptoms 

rather than causes. 

We need to do what we did in Southern Sudan, which is to work 

assiduously, the U.S. leadership, in brokering a peace deal in 

Darfur, and if it does not work or if the situation continues to deteriorate in Darfur we need to look at some other options that do not 

involve the United Nations that would involve some use of military 

force as Senator Biden, Senator Clinton and Susan Rice talked 

about in the run up to the election. 

So I actually think there are solutions. We just need to utilize 

the resources that we have. 

Mr. KIRK. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Ms. Lee. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MS. LEE

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Also thank you for this 

hearing, and thank all of you for being here. This region of the 

world has been, quite frankly, totally neglected. I think all three 

of you have absolutely laid that out once again for us. I want to 

go back to Darfur, John, since you have been on this from day one. 

It does not seem to be getting any better. 

We declared genocide, but what it took in terms of enacting the 

mechanism to make sure that our declaration of genocide was real, 

that just, quite frankly, did not happen. Now we are looking at 

President Bashir being brought before the International Criminal 

Court. I think that is long overdue. 

Wanted to ask you, what is the implication, though, of him being 

brought before the Courts as it relates to the United States not 

being a part of the ICC? So what kind of influence do we have to 

help bring this criminal to justice? Secondly, let me ask you about 


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the issue of the humanitarian workers because now, as a result of 

the arrest warrant, it is my understanding that Bashir has asked 

the humanitarian workers to leave and the humanitarian crisis is 

growing, so how do we address that? 

I am wondering if the White Paper we submitted, and you were 

part of this—Madam Chair, we worked with Majority Leader Hoyer 

and Mr. Payne and came up with a series of recommendations and 

a White Paper to submit to the new administration. We are still 

waiting to hear their response to the White Paper, but I believe 

many of the strategies that you laid out were incorporated in that 

White Paper, so I want to see if you are hearing anything from the 

administration in terms of what their overall strategy should be. 

Finally, let me just ask you about the numbers now in Darfur. 

What are the realistic numbers in terms of the people who have 

been killed? How are they going to survive through this next 

phase? Do we anticipate more people being killed, more refugees 

being run from their villages? You know, we have heard many suggestions but we cannot seem to figure out, you know, just exactly 

what to do. 

Personally, I think we need to use our chips with China. You 

know, I do not think the previous administration was ready to call 

China on the carpet, nor the Arab nations. We have talked with 

President Mubarak about this, and I know personally I have talked 

to the President of Algeria about this several years ago, but we 

cannot seem to get the world community to come down hard on 

what is taking place in Darfur. So I want to get your response and 

see what you think what else we can do. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Okay. Great. Great questions, Congressman 

Lee. First, on the influence we have at the ICC, I think even 

though we are not a signatory, we have actually more leverage because of the ICC action than any other country because on the security council we are the one country that has been stood up and 

said we are not going to provide prematurely this Article 16, which 

is the deferral of the case that the ICC charter allows in the interest of peace, we are not going to allow that prematurely. 

So we are standing in the way of President Bashir skating away 

for free. So he knows that in order for him to have to remove this 

sword of Damocles over his head, the United States has to be involved. I say it is a sword of Damocles. Look, there is no world police force. We are not going to go in and arrest this guy tomorrow. 

There is no capacity to do that. 

However, remember how Milosevic responded after he got indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. He 

laughed. What tribunal? Eighteen months later, he is in prison. 

You know, Charles Taylor laughed. That was even funnier to him. 

You mean a tribunal based in Sierra Leone, this little country I 

have been dominating for the last 10 years and exploiting and taking all their diamonds, they have indicated me and I am supposed 

to somehow take this seriously? 

Eighteen months, 20 months later after he went to Nigeria he 

was captured by the Nigerians and sent to the Hague. I would not 

be dancing in the street if I was President Bashir for much longer. 

I think he ought to be looking over his back, not only externally 

at some of his allies, but internally within the National Congress 


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Party. Who wants this millstone around their neck. They are going 

to have elections. 

The National Congress Party is going to run for president an indicted war criminal? I do not think so. I do not think it is the 

Taliban. We need to play this one very, very smartly. What that 

means is just like you are suggesting, we have got to go to Beijing 

which has an interest not in condemning, they are not going to vote 

for security council resolutions that condemn their commercial allies, but what they will do is they will support us in working towards a solution because their interests, their $8.5 billion investment in southern Sudan is at risk if the war resumes again in 

southern Sudan. 

The Egyptians are sick and tired of Bashir’s support for Hamas, 

and Mubarak has said in no uncertain terms he is done with this 

guy, and the Saudis even are starting to have enough. You see 

these little articles popping up in the Middle Eastern press comparing Bashir to Saddam, which is very, very interesting. The 

wheels are starting to grind in the Middle East about this guy, and 

so if we play our cards right, I do believe we will see some 

progress. 

We cannot give this Article 16 up prematurely. We cannot do 

megaphone diplomacy without responses. We have to get in there 

and on a daily basis be discussing with the key countries that have 

a real leverage in Sudan. Just a note about what the U.S. Congress 

has done. Congress has been a battering ram against the last three 

administrations for them to do something about Sudan. 

They would not have done this comprehensive peace agreement 

that ended the war between the north and the south if it was not 

for years and years of activism on the part of people like yourself 

and many other congresspersons on both sides of the aisle. We 

would not have had the kind of extraordinary humanitarian assistance program led by the United States. 

By the way, no other country in the world combined gives as 

much as we do. What is that? That is a symptom, but it is actually 

to make sure that millions of people have not died like they did in 

southern Sudan. So the Congress has to again, I think. Even 

though we want to give the new administration a chance, it is 

seven weeks in or whatever it is, they have got to hear in no uncertain terms that we need action now. 

You know, President Obama was able to name George Mitchell, 

he was able to name Dennis Ross, he was able to name Dick 

Holbrooke as envoys. Where is the Sudan envoy? Where is the 

Great Lakes envoy? It does not take that much energy. You get a 

person, you put them out there and say it is your job, and put a 

little team together and go to work. In terms of number dead, I 

mean, the estimates are 350,000 to 400,000. It is a wild goose 

chase to find the numbers. 

We know, what, about 2.75 million people, maybe three, have 

been displaced, so that is a more firm number, but in terms of the 

number of dead, I think the evidence has been sort of whisked 

away by the sands of the Sahara Desert. We are never going to 

know. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Chandler. 


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OPENING REMARKS OF MR. CHANDLER

Mr. CHANDLER. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for having 

this hearing. This is an area that so many of us know too little 

about, and it is very important for us to get this on our agenda as 

best we can. With that being said, I find myself mortified by what 

I hear. The information that you give leads me to believe that we 

have got a situation here that is as close to being insoluble as anything that I have heard about anywhere in the world given the history of it, the depth of the problems, the intricacy of the problems. 

I know that you put out some suggestions, but frankly, I would 

love for you all to give me an honest assessment of the need for 

or lack of need—I guess the best way to ask this is how can this 

be dealt with short of some kind of significant military intervention? I just do not know how you can get the security situation and 

deal with the governmental corruption, with these roving armed 

bands, I do not know how you can deal with all of these problems 

and then get back, get into a phase of humanitarian aid and nation 

building without some kind of military intervention from somewhere. 

Now, I am not about to suggest that we need to have a military 

intervention. Goodness knows we know what our situation is, and 

we know where we are in different places in the world, but if you 

could give me some assessment of how you get these regions in a 

situation where anything really ultimately can be done that can be 

lasting and meaningful without military intervention. Thank you. 

Mr. SHINN. Congressman Chandler, I think first my starting 

point is that there is no one out there who is going to engage in 

the kind of military intervention that you are suggesting which 

would be necessary to solve any one of these problems, not to mention the collectivity of them. Certainly the United States, in my 

view, is not prepared to do that. The United States has 43 peacekeepers in all of Africa today. 

Mr. CHANDLER. Well, can it really be solved, though, short of 

that? Do you really think it can be? I am not suggesting that it be 

done. I do not mean to say that. I am just wondering if you can 

solve it short of that. 

Mr. SHINN. If you look at history and the efforts that have tried 

to solve it up to this point one gets rather discouraged because 

there frankly have not been a lot of solutions in this part of the 

world. If you look at Liberia, Sierra Leone, or some other parts of 

Africa, there have been some solutions. The Horn is clearly the 

most conflicted corner of the world, and I agree with John on this, 

since the end of World War II. 

There is just one conflict after the other, and they are all interlinked and intermingled. That is why it is imperative to have a regional approach rather than a country-by-country approach. I must 

confess, I was very taken aback when Darfur developed as a serious crisis. Then there was very little attention to the north/south 

peace agreement in Sudan which, in my view, is potentially a much 

bigger problem than Darfur has been, although Darfur is pretty 

enormous. 

So you do have to look at it from the perspective of what is going 

on throughout the region. You do have to engage all of the partners 


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who have some interest in this area. You cannot ignore anyone, 

and that includes China and that includes Russia because it is actually the largest provider of arms to the region. Whether you are 

going to get cooperation from some of these countries, who knows, 

but I think one has to try. 

That does mean you have to give high level diplomatic attention 

to it, and I agree with John on this. We may disagree on how to 

deal specifically with what is going on in Darfur, but I agree with 

the overall approach that that is the only way to do it short of 

major military intervention, which simply is not going to happen 

because no one is willing to do it. 

You look at the failed efforts to set up a peacekeeping effort in 

Somalia, for example. The Africa Union operation there is pathetic. 

You look at the UNAMID operation, and I would agree it has been 

highly unsuccessful, and I do not see it building up to the point 

where it is going to be very successful. All the United States has 

been prepared to do is write checks and provide logistical support 

and fly people in. They are not prepared to put troops on the 

ground, and it is not going to happen. So the best you can do, and 

it may not be enough, is to make an all out diplomatic effort. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. And the diplomatic effort would—you know, 

we said the same thing, people said the same thing about southern 

Sudan. It is insoluble, it is hopeless, blah, blah, blah. When the 

United States government invested in the peace process we went 

to the core issues and the core interests of these parties, we addressed them and within the 2-year process of those negotiations, 

the peace deal, which was an enormous accomplishment of the 

United States’ foreign policy, was done. 

In Darfur, the issues are negotiable. Individual compensation, 

dismantling of this Janjaweed militia, power and wealth sharing, 

these are all issues that at the table they can be resolved. There 

is no table. Where is the United States? Where is the international 

community to do what we have actually proved can be done in 

southern Sudan, the same country with the same genocidal regime? 

It is remarkable that we have not done anything. 

This is the investment we need to make. Congo, the fuel for war 

is not there, it is here. We have got to start taking some responsibility, and that is going to be a huge role for Congress, I think, is 

to come up with that legislation that can verify that we are not 

purchasing minerals for our electronics industry that is actually 

fueling the deadliest war in the world. 

So there are many, many things that we can do in these places 

that can help. There is no magic bullet. We would have fired it a 

long time ago. There are things that we can do within our power 

as consumers, as a Congress, and as an administration and as a 

civil society like us that we can do that can actually make a difference. Sorry. Did not mean to interrupt. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I was going to say, before we get to Mr. Israel, let 

us go to Mr. Baldo. 

Mr. BALDO. Many of the solutions that are needed and not military. On the contrary. These problems are just not soluble through 

military action. If we limit ourselves to the Great Lakes region, 

first I agree with Mr. Shinn that these are all interlinked conflicts 

of a regional nature. 


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The Lord’s Resistance Army is a Uganda rebel group that is now 

causing a lot of damage in four countries, in eastern Congo, in 

southern Sudan and in southern Central African Republic and potentially with the possibility of going back home into northern 

Uganda and disrupting the progress that has been made. Therefore, there is no way of dealing with these problems country by 

country. It has to be a regional approach. 

Second, the United States is a major actor. There are other major 

actors out there. What is needed is the multilateralism. You know, 

regional approach is multilateralism, just to say. Coordinate policy 

with the other international players with influence in the region, 

mainly European Union, leading European Union member states 

and share the layer of regional actors with a lot of influence. 

Eritrea qualifies, Libya does. You know, some of them are not 

traditional diplomatic partners but we have to face the reality that 

if you want to prevent this cycle of violence either in the horn of 

Africa or in Central Africa, we must take into consideration the influence that regional powers have. South Africa is very influential 

in the region of southern Africa and in the horn and so on, and 

then the African Union is subregional organization, the EGAD and 

so on. 

Third, the issues could be resolved through leverage. All the 

countries in the region, whether Rwanda or Congo, depend on the 

international donor community to supplement, you know, their 

functioning budgets. There is direct budgetary support for the governments of Uganda, Rwanda and DRC, and some liberties, you 

know, some little pressure could help achieve a lot of development 

at the level of peacemaking, peacebuilding and addressing security 

risk. 

This is exactly what had happened in the joint campaign between Rwanda and the DRC because Netherlands, Sweden, just to 

stop their budgetary supports for the Rwandan government and 

the next day Kizani agreed with Kabila that we need to address 

the issue of these abusive rebel groups from our country who are 

there. Therefore, solutions have to come from the region but the 

international community can apply pressure and get things done. 

This is diplomacy, this is policy and it does not need military responses. The military response is actually not wise to resolve these 

issues. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I would like to continue that. Thank you. I am 

going to turn to Mr. Israel, but at some point, I know for those of 

us who have interacted with Mbeki and even Mandela, people are 

dying, starving in Zimbabwe, Sudan. We have gotten no assistance 

through the years. Let me turn to Mr. Israel and perhaps we can 

pursue that some more, I think. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. ISRAEL

Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. I would like to follow-up 

on this line of thought. I believe in muscular diplomacy and robust 

multilateralism, but I think you have got to have something to 

back that up, for as long as we delay, delay and delay, Bashir and 

others will defy, defy and defy. Let me suggest one asset that has 

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gress have given some attention to but I think it needs to be explored more fully. 

Near the border of Sudan and Chad is the Abiche airfield which 

is currently operated by, actually, the French. In 2007, I offered an 

amendment, which passed, to the Defense Authorization Bill, and 

I did this with my colleague, Ms. Lee, that asked the Department 

of Defense to do a feasibility study as to whether the Abiche airfield is feasible for humanitarian operations. 

And, in fact, once an airfield is feasible for humanitarian operation, it is feasible for other operations as well. The Department of 

Defense did a classified study, reported to Congress, and without 

going into the details of that classified study, obviously, the next 

step would be to actually fund some upgrades to the runways at 

Abiche. 

The government of Chad supports this, the government of Chad 

has indicated that it would cooperate with this, the government of 

Chad believes that that would be a very strong signal to send to 

Bashir that the world is taking this seriously, so seriously that it 

is putting money in to expand an airfield for humanitarian operations. 

We are going to pursue that in the current fiscal year Defense 

Authorization Bill, seeing if we can provide language stating that 

it is a priority of the United States Congress to see Abiche upgraded and provide those funds. My sense is you may not agree 

with this, but I would like your opinion as to whether if in a multilateral setting if France, and the United States, and Chad and 

other countries began to upgrade the capacity of an airfield that is 

within 200 miles of Darfur, what the consequences of that would 

be with the regime in Sudan. 

Mr. SHINN. I think it would require knowing a little bit more 

about what the potential use of that field is going to be. If it were 

announced as strictly a humanitarian operation, Sudan may or 

may not accept that. It may assume it has a more nefarious purpose behind it. That would probably give the Bashir government 

some pause for concern. I do not think there is any question about 

that. 

Pressure does have a role in this part of the world and with this 

government. I spent three years in Sudan, not when Bashir was in 

power but with other governments in Sudan, and I have some feel 

for how they think. It would leave a question mark in his mind. 

Let me put it that way. That might be good. If it were in the meantime carrying out legitimate, useful, humanitarian operations, that 

is for the good. 

I have been to Chad but not to Abiche. I have been to Darfur, 

but I do not know the Abiche airfield, so I do not know from a 

logistical point of view exactly what it would add to the humanitarian operation to that which is already going on. I am just not 

in a position to judge that. But if it would add in a quantitative 

sense to improving the humanitarian operation there, that is positive. 

Activating the airfield would leave a question mark in Bashir’s 

mind as to what is this airfield really for. But at some point Bashir 

is going to come to the conclusion that it is just for humanitarian 

assistance and I do not have to worry too much unless it is, in fact, 


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used for something more than that, at which point I might start 

being troubled by what we were trying to accomplish with it. I am 

just not sure that military action in this part of the world, particularly by western forces, gets us very far. I have seen too many 

cases where it did not. 

Mr. BALDO. Just to add here. What are the worst-case scenarios 

today in Darfur? With the rising tensions around the involvement 

of the International Criminal Court and the events there, we do 

have a population of victims of 2.5 million in the internally displaced camps, we do have multiple totally unaccountable militias 

that are roaming around these camps, and in the event of a worstcase scenario I could imagine, you know, militias attacking camps 

for the displaced because of some retaliation for the suspected support, for example, of the indictment of the president or because of, 

you know, there is a policy to dismantle the camps or disburse the 

displaced so that they are not so visible. 

If that happens it will be an immediate major humanitarian disaster. It is necessary to have that capability for humanitarian purposes on the Chadian end of the border to address precisely, you 

know, that kind of major humanitarian disaster. I see the likely 

scenario given that there are no viable peace efforts to resolve the 

conflict peacefully, and now the trend is actually on the contrary, 

rising tensions and rising confrontations with the international 

community. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Mr. Rothman. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. ROTHMAN

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for your distinguished service. I read your respective written 

testimonies. Ambassador Shinn, you make an argument that I 

have not heard before, your section about the Sudan, where you 

say U.S. policy is not well-served when it says that genocide is continuing today in Darfur. 

You then cite a report that says from an expert, as you describe 

him, that violent deaths in 2008 in Darfur were only relative to the 

charge of genocide of 1,550 violent deaths in Darfur, presumably 

not meeting the threshold definition for genocide. You say it is time 

to acknowledge that the situation has changed and that this label 

of continuing genocide is inaccurate and counterproductive. Have I 

summarized your view on that? 

Mr. SHINN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Can you elaborate on that? 

Mr. SHINN. Yes. I think that it is important when we are making 

policy to be making that policy on the basis of the facts that we 

have at the time they are being made. I am not talking about 2003, 

2004, or 2005 in Darfur. I am talking about today, I am talking 

about through 2008. You get into all kinds of definitional problems 

when you start talking about genocide, but genocide is very emotionally laden. 

Whenever that term is used, as awful as things have been in 

Darfur, and I would be the first to acknowledge that, I do not think 

it crosses the threshold of the definition of genocide. I would agree 

that I am one of the very few people who is willing to stand up 

publicly and make that statement. I think there are a lot of others 


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out there who may agree with me, who have looked at it from an 

academic point of view or who know the region, people like Alex 

deWaal, who has said it publicly. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. But, Mr. Ambassador, what would be the diplomatic or public policy benefit in no longer using the term genocide 

to describe what is going on in Darfur? 

Mr. SHINN. Simply a degree of honesty. That is all. Just acknowledging the situation for what it is. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So it would not have any practical benefit to the 

people of the Sudan. 

Mr. SHINN. No. That we do not know. If one is to approach the 

problem of Sudan with a greater degree of honesty—and I made 

two points that are very controversial, one was this one and one 

was the list of state sponsors of terrorism—I think you will have 

a better response from the people in the region. We do not know 

what the response would be from the Sudanese. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Are the other nations in the region offended by 

labeling what is going on in Darfur genocide? 

Mr. SHINN. Let me put it this way. Offended, probably not, but 

the United States is the only nation in the world that has ever declared what is going on in Darfur as genocide. The only nation in 

the world. Does that not raise some issues? Why is the United 

States the only country to call this genocide? 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Well, if we called it mass slaughter, would that 

be better? 

Mr. SHINN. Other nations call it crimes against humanity. I am 

not even judging what it was back in the 2003 to 2005 period, but 

I just point that out by way of fact we have to be more honest when 

we deal with these issues. That is the only point I am trying to 

make. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. I accept the academic notion of proper use 

of terms. I am just wondering what the practical benefit would be 

beyond that accuracy in the use of verbiage. On the Congo, do either of you two gentlemen have any notions—I know Mr. 

Prendergast talked about using consumer power in some way, the 

west consumer power to in some way better the situation in the 

Congo, but as I read it, this is a conflict primarily between two 

major militias, and so how would efforts as consumers address 

their conflict for power and domination? 

Mr. BALDO. Well, there are a multitude of militias very often operating at the very local level in resource-rich areas in the DRC, 

in the Congo. The land is so rich in many areas you just have to 

do some digging to find diamonds, or gold, or cassiterite which is 

a material for tin, and so on. Timber, coffee are also other forms 

of riches in that country. 

To in a way address the issue of the link between illicit resource 

exploitation and violence, because it is in the fighting at the local 

level between these militias over control of mining areas and between corrupt army officers, whether of the Congolese Army or 

during the war of occupying armies of Rwanda and Uganda, that 

most of the killing occurs and most of the violence and the sexual 

violence occur because all the fighting men have one thing in common, they all prey on civilians and they are all perpetrators of 


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mass violence against civilians. Just what you do when you have 

the gun and the civilians—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So forgive me. Would you make the connection 

then between the consumer efforts and improving the situation 

there? 

Mr. BALDO. Exactly. These resources enter into global economies 

through Kigali and Kampala. For gold, for instance, Kampala, 

Uganda, has a production of only a few kilograms of gold, but the 

Central Bank of Uganda in its official statistics gives a number in 

the tons. Similarly, it is known that Rwanda is not a producer of 

many of these special minerals that go into information technology 

gadgets, and, you know, advanced industries. 

The international community could simply mandate that no minerals are imported from countries that do not produce it. That 

would immediately have the effect of really creating a clogging of 

the system. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So the Ugandan and Rwandan forces in the 

Democratic Republic of Congo would then, you believe, withdraw? 

Mr. BALDO. Now they are not present there. They are only 

present when they go by invitation of the Congolese government as 

has happened of late. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And how would that address the local militias? 

The native militias? 

Mr. BALDO. Well, you know, if you do proper investigation, as the 

United Nations has done through its materials, you could find links 

between these militias and state access, including the Congolese 

government itself and influential people in the army financing militias, buying these resources from them, exporting them through 

contacts, you know, in the regional markets for these minerals. 

Interestingly, because of this economic interest, in the conflict, 

you know, you will find that there are business interests between 

the Congolese Army and the militia of the democratic forces for the 

liberation of Rwanda which the Congolese Army is supposed to be 

fighting. Together there have been linkages of an economic nature 

that were documented by UN investigators. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, doctor. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Before I want to turn to Mr. Schiff, Mr. Baldo you 

know that the U.S. Ambassador to Congo and the U.K. Ambassador are trying to put together a task force just to deal with the 

issue that Mr. Rothman referenced. They are working on it to deal 

with this issue that you referenced. So we can follow-up on it. You 

are probably aware of that. 

Mr. BALDO. Yes. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I am just going to another panel. 

Mrs. LOWEY. That is quite all right. Send them my best. I should 

be there, but I am not going there. Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, gentlemen, 

for being here. I wanted to turn the topic in a different direction 

to Somalia. Ambassador, you mentioned in your testimony that the 

U.S. had essentially abandoned Somalia after 1994. I think that is 

largely true. To the degree that we have been focused on Somalia, 

it has been intermittent, largely unsuccessful, uncoordinated and 

lacking in any really comprehensive policy direction. 


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The question is what should our policy be now? We have a new 

president there, we have a supposedly moderate Islamic government, we have al-Shabab in the wings, we have a limited ability 

to intervene or act there because of the dangerous situation. I am 

not suggesting that we have some kind of military action there, but 

I am asking what role can we play constructively? 

Should we try to find ways to support this new government 

based on what we know about it or would our support for a government therefore damn the government in the eyes of the people 

there? Some have suggested it is so hard to get international aid 

into Somalia that we should establish through the international 

community a form of green zone in Mogadishu. 

I know you have recommended us focusing on trying to help 

them build a police force, but given the difficulty we have had in 

Afghanistan developing a police force, we found there it is much 

easier to build an army than a police force. I think you have, you 

know, some of the same clan dynamic in Somalia that it would be 

very difficult to build a police force potentially, a national police 

force in any event. What do we do? What can we do constructively 

in Somalia? 

Mr. SHINN. Thank you very much for the question, Congressman 

Schiff. I wish there were more interest in Somalia generally. On 

the Hill there are a number of people who do have an interest in 

it but it is not a very large group. The immediate problem in Somalia today is the issue of security. 

There is a window of opportunity right now, and that is the current new government of national unity. It is a combination of the 

former Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that the United 

States supported very strongly, which has been joined by the socalled moderate group of Islamists, actually, former members of the 

Islamic Courts Union in Somalia, the people that the United States 

was once opposing. 

That grouping has divided into various factions and the more 

moderate part of it, the Sheikh Sharif portion, is now working with 

the TFG. It is not clear whether this government is going to be 

widely accepted by the Somali people. We simply do not know. It 

is clearly being given somewhat more of a chance by Somalis generally in the country than the previous Transitional Federal Government, which was not doing the right kinds of things in order to 

ingratiate itself with the people generally. 

This government may trip and fall, too, but in the meantime, I 

think there really is no good option to doing anything other than 

trying to support it. By doing so, I am not suggesting that the 

United States should be out front and center at this point. I think 

this is frankly a time for the United States to quietly step back, 

let the Somalis do what they do best, which is to talk to each other. 

Let them engage in their own dialogue in their own way and work 

things out. 

Sometimes they do not work out, and in recent years they have 

not worked them out, but give them an opportunity to see what 

they can manage by bringing into the fold some of these dissident 

elements, the most difficult one being the al-Shabab group, the 

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ment. I am not convinced that all of that al-Shabab group is that 

committed to a radical ideology. 

I think there are some who are opportunists, some who can be 

eventually brought along to the moderate side, and I think that is 

the way to go. In the meantime, I think it is important for the 

United States to have in mind some kind of support for a development program once security becomes appropriate. You cannot do 

that now. There is no way to do a development program in Somalia 

today, but you have to be able to step in quickly when that is possible. 

The police force idea, I agree it is a gamble. There is absolutely 

no guarantee a police force would work, but Somalia has one interesting thing going for it. It has a very long history of a proud and 

professional police force. It is something that Somalis have always 

felt very strongly about. So it may not be the same situation you 

had in Iraq, for example. I am not saying it will work, but I am 

saying it is worth a chance. 

That is a medium term solution. You cannot have police go in 

and try to combat heavily armed al-Shabab right now. That is not 

going to work. So I see the police force as more of a medium term 

solution, and in the meantime, one has to muddle through on the 

security side by leaving the very weak Africa Union force there to 

keep the port and the airport open. That is important to keep them 

out of the hands of al-Shabab. 

The focus now should be on the political side and supporting the 

current government and helping it behind the scenes, whatever one 

can do, perhaps bringing the Arab League more into it, to peel 

away those opponents that still do oppose that government, with 

the hope that eventually it can stand on its own two feet. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you. I do not know if you would like to add 

on to that as well? 

Mr. BALDO. Well, I am in agreement with this line definitely. It 

is the time for perhaps the new president to widen the support 

base of his government, and he is working very hard on this, coming from the background of, you know, because they were not on 

the same side, they were actually the opposition force to the previous government as the Islamic Courts, and to build a region of 

support base within Africa and in the Arab League region. 

I believe the potential is good. The outlook is that, you know, 

there is some expectation that this time Somalia may finally have 

a working government. So we are in this expectation and we will 

see where things will be heading. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you both. Before we close the hearing I have 

one additional question, and if you do, you are certainly welcome 

to ask it, Mr. Schiff. This subcommittee was in northern Uganda 

about a year and a half ago when there was still hope that Kony 

was going to sign a peace agreement. We met with some of the rescued girls and rescued boys, and there was a feeling of optimism 

that perhaps in spite of all the challenges there would be some 

movement towards a future in Uganda. 

Now, we know that the U.S. military was helpful as an advisor, 

we understand, in the recent military action which led—we saw in 

its wake murder, decapitation, rape, the ugliest scene. Over 150 


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people were either killed, or maimed, or destroyed by this recent 

action. I have a question for both of you. Do you have any comments on what, if anything, should be done now? How do you take 

action, if that is what you would recommend, to minimize or reduce 

the impact on civilians? 

Mr. BALDO. The prospects for peace have really helped create a 

real momentum in northern Uganda. Even before the conclusion of 

the UBA process there was a movement of people out of the camps 

going to their own areas and trying to revive their shattered lives 

and so on. Suspicion from Kony, in particular, was a key obstacle 

for concluding that peace process. 

He never believed the commitment of the government that once 

he had signed, then they would apply the other accountability 

mechanisms and will request the International Criminal Court to 

withdraw its arrest warrants against him. The government is committed to applying these mechanisms regardless of the fact that the 

peace has not been formally concluded. 

Therefore, they are forging ahead with the establishment of a 

special chamber in the high Court to try, you know, some of the 

war crimes out of Kenya and northern Uganda, they are preparing 

alternate mechanisms for the use of traditional justice as agreed, 

and some mechanisms for reparations for victims and to extend the 

benefit of the amnesty law to those willing to come out from the 

rebellion. 

One of the top people, deputy of Kony, who is also indicted by 

the ICC, has actually asked to be given amnesty and is negotiating 

his, you know, hand-over by an intermediary humanitarian actor 

to the government for amnesty. The government has had also as 

part of that package adopted a very ambitious reconstruction program because the problem of northern Uganda is economic and social marginalization and the lack of investment of the national 

wealth in infrastructure and development effort in north Uganda. 

The government of Uganda really has to do a lot of effort to 

bridge that gap. It has developed a program which receives a lot 

of international donor support, but the government is not doing 

much at this time to implement that program. It is a key—a key— 

prerequisite, I believe, for returning northern Uganda to stability, 

and to peace and to a sense of some belonging to their country. 

Once the people see that there is an effort to try and introduce, 

you know, a measure of compensation for many, many years of neglect from the government and many years of marginalization. I believe without that commitment from the government of Uganda, 

you know, the chances of lasting peace will be minimal. This is an 

area where again diplomacy and policy could play a major role by 

really pushing the government of Uganda to stay committed to this 

approach. Thank you. 

Mr. SHINN. Madam Chairwoman, it is an awfully good question 

and you raise yet another horrific problem in this part of the world 

of which there are far too many. I agree with what Suliman said. 

I cannot add a great deal to his comments except that my own personal view is that I do not think Kony has any intention of ever 

signing a peace agreement and abiding by it. 

We have gone through these charades so many times. How many 

times do you have that football pulled away before you decide to 


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stop kicking at it? The one thing that I would add, though, that I 

think needs to be looked at more is the degree to which you can 

use traditional methods of conflict resolution among the Acholi people. 

They have their own systems for dealing with conflict. Many in 

the West would find these systems very disagreeable because they 

do not accord with western systems of justice at all, but there has 

been some history in using them and they have actually had some 

success, at least at local levels, in the Acholi area. I think that 

there has to be some more attention given to that because I sure 

do not see anything else working out there. 

I do not think that the International Criminal Court action 

achieved anything either, quite frankly. Arguably, it worsened the 

situation in the case of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). I think 

it is time to look at some traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution. It probably is not going to solve the Kony problem, but it 

might solve some of the issues underlying the Kony problem. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Would that include military action? 

Mr. SHINN. The traditional mechanisms are very much based on 

local systems of justice, and, in some cases, letting some people off 

with a lot less than we would ever accept in a western system of 

justice. That is why we find them so disagreeable. In the context 

of the Acholi people, they have been shown on occasion to work. I 

am just arguing that there has to be more attention given to that. 

I do not want to suggest that this is going to resolve the problem 

of Kony. It will not, but if it can at least reduce the amount of violence in that region, that is a starting point. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Just one last question, Madam Chair. I wonder if 

you would mind giving us any thoughts in terms of Yemen, the status of any issues in Yemen that we should be concerned about, and 

whether you have any policy recommendations. 

Mr. SHINN. We are probably not the best people to be addressing 

Yemen. I have been there, though that does not make me an expert. I am concerned about the willingness of the Yemeni government recent many years to carry through with what it says it is 

going to do in terms of being supportive on counterterrorism and 

related issues. There have been too many occasions when they have 

not followed through, and, in some cases, have done the opposite 

of what the United States expected from them. 

This is very troubling. I was just reading a report the other day 

where it appears that some of these Somali pirates are being aided 

and abetted from: Yemeni territory. These may be private activities 

not those by the government, but if this is true, it is very disturbing because it is up to the government to stop that sort of 

thing. The government of Yemen, in theory, should be in a position 

to stop it. 

I think we are dealing with a government that is very torn between its continuing in power because of the views of the people 

that it represents, on the one hand, and wanting to maintain a decent relationship with the United States, on the other, and other 

western governments. As a result, you are getting a very ambivalent response out of that government. I am really not an expert on 

Yemen. I wish I did have a list of things that ought to be done, 

but I really do not. 


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Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I would like to thank you again for your time. This 

concludes today’s hearing on Africa. The Subcommittee on State 

Foreign Operations and Related Programs stands adjourned. 

Thank you. 


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(521) 

THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 2009. 

THE ROLE OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AGENCIES IN 

THE ADVANCEMENT OF AMERICA’S DIPLOMATIC AND 

DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES 

WITNESSES 

DR. JOHN J. HAMRE, PRESIDENT AND CEO, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC 

AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

NANCY LINDBORG, PRESIDENT, MERCY CORPS 

AMBASSADOR GEORGE MOOSE, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 

DR. GORDON ADAMS, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN LOWEY

Mrs. LOWEY. The Subcommittee on State, foreign operations, and 

Related Programs will come to order. 

My ranking member I gather will be here any minute. 

Good morning. I welcome our distinguished panel, Dr. John J. 

Hamre, President and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Ms. Nancy Lindborg, President of Mercy Corps 

and a recognized leader in the NGO community; Ambassador 

George Moose, Vice Chairman of the Board of the United States Institute of Peace; Dr. Gordon Adams, Professor of International Relations at American University School of International Service. 

We really look forward to hearing from you today on this very 

important topic. 

As you probably know, I strongly believe that foreign policy decisions rest with the Secretary of State as the principal adviser to 

the President, and this authority should neither be delegated by 

the Department of State nor superseded by any other department 

or agency in the executive branch. 

With this in mind, today’s hearing will examine the relationship 

between the civilian agencies and the military in the formulation 

and execution of foreign policy. 

Last month, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral 

Michael Mullen, told an audience at Princeton University that 

United States foreign policy has become too militarized, end quote. 

I could not agree more. I have a growing concern with how the 

lines of responsibility between civilian agencies and the military 

are increasingly blurring, with the Department of Defense playing 

a larger role in diplomacy and development. I believe in the long 

run this will have a detrimental effect not only on the civilian 

agencies and America’s reputation, but also on our military and ultimately our national security. 

Now, let me state clearly that I believe the United States military is the very best in the world, and they prove every day that 


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they are adaptive, creative, innovative and serve our country with 

distinction. Yet the fact remains that if the civilian agencies are 

not stepping up to the plate, this does not mean that the job should 

fall to our overburdened military. It means that policy makers in 

Washington must provide support for and demand more from the 

civilian agencies. 

Today’s panel of outside experts will explore with us the militarization of foreign policy and the toll being placed on the Department of State and the Department of Defense as well as on USAID. 

I would like this hearing to address several key issues. First, we 

have all witnessed the increased role that the military has recently 

played, often by necessity, in diplomacy and development, especially in insecure areas like Iraq and Afghanistan. Operationally 

what are the unintended consequences of this increased role to 

both diplomats, foreign assistance professionals, and the efforts of 

the NGO community, and what is the unintended consequence to 

United States foreign policy and how it is viewed by our friends 

and adversaries? On a practical level, what type of coordination 

and division of labor is necessary between the civilian agencies and 

the military to make any joint effort work, and is there confusion 

about who speaks for the United States? 

Additionally, there is growing consensus that the resources of the 

military and civilian elements of our national security apparatus 

are grossly out of balance. What will it take to get the civilian 

agencies in a position to fulfill their roles, particularly in nonpermissive environments? On a related note, what are the consequences of dueling security assistance authorities between the 

Department of State and Defense? 

As I said in our hearing last week on growing the diplomatic and 

development workforce, I cannot remember any other time during 

my service in Congress when diplomacy and development assistance were viewed as coequal components of defense in relation to 

our Nation’s national security. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

in July said our diplomatic leaders, be they in Ambassadors’ suites 

or on the State Department’s 7th floor, must have the resources 

and political support needed to fully exercise their statutory responsibilities in leading American foreign policy. 

I wholeheartedly agree and welcome the growing support for 

strengthening civilian capacity and believe that it is critical that 

we take advantage of this pivotal moment of consensus on this 

issue. This subcommittee has already begun to expand the capacity 

of USAID and the State Department because we all know that soft 

power is a more cost effective alternative to military interventions. 

Yet increased capacity will not materialize overnight. 

So then in the interim how do we move forward? Civilian agencies and our military have vastly different missions, and although 

they are not mutually exclusive, they cannot be substituted for or 

replace one another. So now is the time for Congress and the 

Obama administration to aggressively increase support for civilian 

agencies, strengthen our development and diplomatic capabilities, 

relieve an overburdened military, and provide the political support 

for the civilian agencies to exercise the responsibility Secretary 

Gates called for in July 2008. 


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No one would dispute that a failure to act rapidly increases the 

risk to vital United States security interests. But the Congress and 

the administration must stop taking the easy and quick-fix route 

of providing duplicative authorities and overburdening our military 

while demanding results of civilian agencies without equipping 

them with the tools or resources needed. 

So I look forward to working with Secretaries Clinton and Gates 

and the Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, to 

create the framework for the United States Government so that 

they can execute their mandated areas of responsibility in a coherent and coordinated pursuit of the United States foreign policy objective. 

I look forward to hearing from this impressive panel of witnesses 

today as we explore this critical issue. But first I look forward to 

hearing from our ranking member, Ms. Granger, for any comments 

she may have. Ms. Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for 

holding this hearing on the role of civilian and military agencies in 

advancing U.S. diplomatic and development objectives. Last week 

the subcommittee held a hearing on the 21st century workforce 

needs for the Department of State and USAID, and today we continue that discussion by examining the future of the civilian-military relationship. 

I want to thank the distinguished witnesses for coming and for 

sharing their insights on this important topic. You are the people 

we need to hear from. 

It has become clear that future threats to U.S. national security 

will require an approach that incorporates all three Ds, defense, diplomacy and development. It is also important that military and civilian agencies increase the level of cooperation in Washington and 

in the field in order to succeed. But over the last few years, civilian 

agencies have experienced difficulty carrying out their core functions, forcing the military to take up traditional civilian roles. That 

has created imbalance in the 3 Ds and strained areas of cooperation between the military and civilian agencies. 

Secretary Gates, as well as other military leaders, have acknowledged that future success in preventing conflict and stabilizing 

post-conflict situations requires a civilian component that can work 

effectively in partnership with the military. Recognizing the value 

of strengthened civilian-military cooperation, the Congress has provided resources to build the civilian agencies so they can more effectively advance U.S. interests. In addition to funding the Department of State and USAID staffing initiatives, the Congress appropriated $75 million in the fiscal year 2008–2009 supplemental and 

another $75 million is included in the fiscal year 2009 omnibus bill 

to support the standup of a civilian reserve capacity. 

Now that funding is in place and the civilian agencies are establishing civilian-military policies and programs, the Congress is 

monitoring closely whether the 3 Ds are returning to the appropriate balance. I look forward to hearing your views, the views of 

the witnesses on our progress and the prospects you see for achieving this goal. 

And I thank you for being here, Madam Chairman. 


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Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. And members of our panel, of course we 

would be appreciative if you could summarize your statement for 

the record. Your total statement will be entered in the record, and 

I want to make sure that we have plenty of time for questions. So 

the order of recognition will be Dr. Hamre, Ms. Lindborg, Ambassador Moose, and Dr. Adams. We will begin with Dr. Hamre. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. HAMRE

Mr. HAMRE. Chairwoman Lowey, Ranking Member, all of the colleagues on this committee, thank you for inviting me to participate. 

This is the first time I have had a chance to appear before this subcommittee. I have been in front of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee about 100 times, but I have never been invited here before. So I think it took 8 years of exile from the Department before 

I was invited and I do want to thank you for including me and 

thank you for taking the testimony. I am going to depart a little 

bit from it because I think the nature of the way you framed the 

discussion this morning differs a bit from my testimony, so if I 

might react to your statements and then open up for just a few observations. 

I think, Chairwoman, you highlighted the central problem when 

you talked about nonpermissive environments. I don’t think there 

is a big dispute, I know there is no dispute from a Defense Department standpoint about the leadership we expect the State Department to give us in peaceful environments, and I know that the 

State Department doesn’t have any quarrels about us being in 

charge when we are shooting. I think the question that is awkward 

is when you have difficult, compromised, insecure environments 

and we need to work together. That tends to be the problem. 

Now, unfortunately, when we are in insurgency warfare, this 

tends to be a very long and prolonged period. It is not the case for 

conventional war. You know the first Iraq war was 35 days, you 

know, it was over, and then it was a very different environment. 

We are involved in insurgencies in the last years and we are up 

against an opponent who intentionally blends into civil society, 

making it dramatically more complicated. We know we can’t win 

insurgency warfares with violence. Those are won through political 

gestures. And political gestures in a, as you say, in a nonpermissive environment blend use of force and the use of soft power 

means. And so how do we construct that in a smart strategy in a 

very complex and difficult environment? 

Now these last 6 years have not gone well. We went into Iraq 

with probably an inappropriate model for what we anticipated we 

would confront. We didn’t manage dynamically an evolving environment very effectively, and in honesty, our partners, I say ‘‘our,’’ 

I am speaking from a DOD standpoint, our partners in the civilian 

agencies didn’t have resources that they could bring to the fight. 

So the Defense Department stepped in. It isn’t a role that they 

seek. They would much prefer, frankly, they would much prefer not 

to have to do the economic engagement. But when you just didn’t 

have the resources, many years of underfunding of the State Department and candidly not an operational culture in the field 

where you have an insecure environment, where it just created a 


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highly unique circumstance that the military would prefer not to 

be in. 

Now, 7 years ago when I first went, actually, 8 years ago I first 

went to CSIS, I had just lived through the experience, I had been 

Deputy Secretary of Defense and I had lived through the challenges of Bosnia. And we knew how to get in a war. We didn’t 

know how to rebuild civil society. So we launched a project to try 

to identify what does it take to succeed in post-conflict reconstruction? And Nancy was one of our commissioners. Congressman Wolf 

was one of our commissioners. And one of our early projects we did 

was to draft a template of all the things that have to be done in 

a post-conflict, in this kind of an environment, during the initial response when they are still shooting, in the transition phase to a 

stable environment, and then in the sustainability phase, in four 

different dimensions. 

Probably only 10 percent of these tasks belong to the military. 

You know, most of them belong to the civilian agencies. But they 

don’t have the capacity to deal with it, and I would have to honestly say today they don’t really have the capacity. 

So to sum up, you need to give resources to the civilian agencies 

to do their job. 

Number two, you have got to hold them accountable for producing capability that can go into the field with the military, otherwise the military will have to do this. 

Three, we need to start developing a framework where we can 

work and regulate the business of contractors on the battlefield. 

That framework has not been in place. We are now overreacting in 

the wrong way, and we are making it more compromised and more 

difficult. We have to get this right. 

And finally, we need to work out in insurgency situations the 

working relationship between government and nongovernmental 

organizations. I think we have especially in insurgent situations 

highly compromised circumstances that we have NGO people involved with and their relationship with us. This has to get worked 

out and it doesn’t exist now. 

I would be happy to amplify during the question period. Thank 

you very much for inviting me. 

[The statement of Mr. Hamre follows:] 


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Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Ms. Lindborg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MS. LINDBORG

Ms. LINDBORG. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Lowey and 

Congresswoman Granger, and members on the committee. I echo 

the appreciation for tackling this very critical topic, and there is an 

extraordinary consensus I think emerging on the need for smart 

power and for rebalancing our three Ds and the capacity to address 

these very critical challenges, and so we do have this amazing opportunity right now. 

I speak as the head of an operational NGO, Mercy Corps. We 

work in 35 conflict affected and transitional countries around the 

world. So I really speak from that experience of being on the 

ground where often it is the NGOs, the journalists, and the military who are there. And we see firsthand the need to work out 

these systems and these approaches that enable all of our capacities to be fully harnessed. 

These are challenging and deeply critical environments where 

you have got countries burdened by a very potent brew of poverty, 

weak governance, and conflict, and it is imperative for our national 

security interests that we determine the best way to address that. 

My greatest fear against the backdrop of what we said in terms 

of the lack of resourcing for our civilian capacities is that as the 

military has stepped into this void and we all appreciate that they 

have in fact shouldered burdens that were not otherwise able to be 

addressed, that we may be learning the wrong lessons. As we have 

equipped our military with additional capacities and additional authorities, created mechanisms like AFRICOM and the PRT, that we 

risk confusing short-term insurgency fighting methods, short-term 

security goals and approaches with our longer term development 

needs and objectives. And we need to understand that there is 

value in both and that they will require different approaches to enable both to fully go forward. 

We frequently have had to figure out how to work in these very 

tough environments. I would flag that in the last decade we talked 

quite a bit about complex humanitarian emergencies. The greater 

challenge for this decade is complex development. As John mentioned, we have many environments where what the military is 

calling counterinsurgency, we are seeing insecure environments 

that are plagued by poverty and poor governance and insecurity, 

and the challenge is how do you adapt the fundamentals of good 

development to these complex development environments? But first 

and foremost among those is the need for a community-led approach, and at a recent event hosted by USIP, World Bank President Robert Zoellick in fact noticed that community-led and community ownership of development is critical for legitimacy and authority of development processes. We need that process to be able 

to move forward, even as we are looking at the shorter term security objectives. 

Mercy Corps and other colleague agencies have had that experience in places like Iraq where we have interrupted uninterruptedly 

since 2003 with support and funding from USAID, where we were 

one of five NGOs working nationwide on a community action program. And I think it shows some of the models of how we might 


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be able to construct community-based development programs even 

in the midst of a very insecure environment, where we use mechanisms such as community acceptance, where communities buy into 

these projects, they are their projects, and they vote on what 

projects will go forward. They vote on where our offices will be located. We have had no security incidents with any of the programs 

that we have conducted during our time there. Communities have 

invested significantly their own resources into these programs as 

well, and all of this has been done by unarmed civilians, the majority of whom are Iraqis. And they know full well that this is a gesture and a program funded by the U.S. Government. To the extent 

that when Katrina hit, a group of Iraqis joined voluntarily together 

to donate money to the victims of Katrina, recognizing the hand 

that the U.S. had extended to them. 

I would just sum up by saying that as we look forward to what 

we might do to help redress the balance, I would start by rethinking the PRTs. We need to create structures that allow both the 

short-term and the long-term development objectives to be pursued 

by both the military and the civilian. 

We should look at civilianizing 1207. This is an authority that 

was an inefficient workaround that is serving now to have the Pentagon fund projects through USAID. It is more efficient if USAID 

just does that for the post, the conflict prevention objectives that 

it is meant to serve. We need longer term funding that is more 

flexible, that enables the kind of flexibility that the military has 

with the CERP funds that can be deployed on the ground to move 

us quickly as these conflict environments move but through civilian 

structures. 

As has been noted, we must rebuild USAID which operates with 

less than half the staff that it had a decade ago, and I think there 

is a good start with the Obama administration’s fiscal year 2010 

international affairs budget and its request for $51.7 billion, especially with the emphasis of increasing personnel for State and AID. 

I look forward to the conversation. Thank you. 

[The statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:] 


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Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Ambassador. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR MOOSE

Mr. MOOSE. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member Granger, and members of the committee. I too am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you and for the committee’s interest, the 

subcommittee’s interest in this particular subject, which I think is 

critical to the conduct of our foreign policy as we go forward. 

I mentioned in my prepared remarks that I have benefited from 

my affiliations with several organizations that have taken a profound interest in this subject, among them USIP, Search for Common Ground, and LMI Government Consulting, but that my remarks will reflect strictly my own personal views. I thought that 

essentially my prepared remarks focused on what I believe is required to restore some semblance of balance between the military 

and civilian dimensions of our machinery for conducting U.S. and 

international security policy, and I won’t rehearse those views here. 

I do think it is important to note, partly in response to previous 

comments, that I think this rebalancing is important across the full 

spectrum of our foreign relations, not only in hot, nonpermissive 

environments or even in environments which are partially secure 

and partially insecure, but the fact of the matter is our military is 

present everywhere in the world and they are increasingly active 

across the board, and so the question becomes how do we ensure 

some effective integration of those activities with the rest of the 

foreign policy activities of our government. 

I have tried in my prepared remarks to reinforce the testimony 

of colleagues from last week; namely, the case for a major increase 

in the capacities of the Department of State and other civilian 

international agencies. But as I looked at my testimony last night 

I thought it might be helpful to try to situate my remarks, perhaps 

that of others, in a somewhat larger context that is insofar as I can 

discern that larger context from where I sit down here in the 

trenches. 

As members of the subcommittee are aware, there has been a 

rich discourse going on around this town for the last several 

months, all of it turning on the question of how to reform and restructure our national security architecture. Those conversations 

certainly have been driven by the events of 9/11 and how we might 

better organize our foreign policy national security resources to address the threats that 9/11 exposed. 

They have also been driven by our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan of trying to bring to bear the full capabilities of our government in order to accomplish our goals of reconstruction and stabilization. 

Starting with Iraq, in particular, that conversation has prompted 

precisely the question of how we better integrate the tools in the 

field, and that conversation has led to at least one construct, the 

PRT, which is an effort to try to bring together the elements of our 

military, diplomatic and development capabilities at the operational level. There have been similar kinds of conversations taking 

place at various levels of the Defense Department, both here in 

Washington but also in the field, and I would note notably at 

AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM. 


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At a more strategic level, there is the project of our national security reform which was funded by the Congress which has undertaken an examination of what might be done to achieve integration 

across Federal agencies, both military and civilian, and that study 

too starts with the assumption that the security challenges that we 

face are of such complexity that they require us to draw upon all 

the capabilities of government and to bring them together in whole 

of government approaches. 

That discussion at the Center for the Study of the Presidency has 

had a parallel at what John Hamre’s organization has been doing 

over at CSIS under the rubric of smart power, and I believe that 

those two conversations, the one on national security forum, the 

one on smart power, are very much informing the conversations 

that are taking place at the NSC these days about what the future 

organization structure authorities of the new National Security 

Council ought to look like. 

Very much related to this is the conversation that my colleague, 

Gordon Adams, has been involved in over the question of reorganizing and restructuring foreign assistance, and Nancy as well. 

And that conversation certainly got a boost from Secretary Rice 

when she arrived at the State Department and quickly discovered 

how difficult it was to array the resources of our foreign assistance 

portfolio and to align them behind what she and President Bush 

determined were their national security priorities. And I would say 

that that is a problem that faces any administration given the fragmentation and the way that we do our foreign assistance and foreign policy budgeting. 

And closely connected to that has been another conversation 

about the role of public diplomacy, how we conduct the need for 

new structures within government, but beyond that how we leverage the capabilities, the resources, the contributions of nongovernmental actors in order to achieve that. 

Now, last but not least, there is a discussion that has been taking place in some parts of town about how what we do here in the 

United States somehow gets linked to what is happening overseas. 

And that conversation stems from a recognition that at the end of 

the day these problems, national security threats, foreign policy 

issues that we address, are simply too large for us to be able to 

deal with on our own. We need to figure out how we leverage of 

resources of others. Carlos Pasqual, over at Brookings, has been 

very much a part of that conversation. 

Now, returning to my remarks, the central point I want to make 

in this hearing is that the role of the State Department is, in my 

view, central to all of those conversations, and it is because that 

is where traditionally these issues get integrated, and it is quite 

true that in cases like Afghanistan and Iraq, which are major challenges to security, the fact at that level that requires a major role 

of the NSC. But there are simply too many problems out there for 

the NSC to be able to take them all on unless one envisages moving the entire apparatus of the foreign policy of the United States 

into the West Wing of the White House. We need therefore to rebuild the State Department as the centerpiece of a model, of a paradigm, of a structure that allows for the effective coordination of 

all aspects of our foreign and international security policy, which 


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includes not only again the hot situations, the nonpermissive environments, but how we integrate those things across the board. And 

my experience is in Africa, and I can tell you that the security challenges in Africa require contributions from diplomats, development 

experts, and the military if we are to solve, help Africans solve the 

challenges that pose threats to their security, but which if 

unaddressed also pose long-term threats to our security. That begins with rebuilding the State Department, but I also think it goes 

to the question of the authorities and the mandates which have 

been eroded over time and which need to reviewed and restored. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

[The statement of Mr. Moose follows:] 


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Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Dr. Adams. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. ADAMS

Mr. ADAMS. Thank you, Madam Chair, Congresswoman Granger, 

and committee members, for having this hearing. I think it is critically important and quite unusual, I think a very unique precedent 

to have this subcommittee hold a hearing on this wide a topic, 

which is of course in the end structure and process and institutions 

are all going to be central to the decisions you have to make in this 

subcommittee. So I congratulate you for having the hearing, and I 

am happy to join the rest of my panelists in saying well done and 

a good start. 

What I am going to say will be very brief because we have a 

lengthy statement. I am not going to try to lumber you with the 

whole thing, but I wanted particularly to point out that much of 

what I say is based at least on two pieces of work with which I 

have been associated with other people both here at the table and 

on the dais. Congressman Kirk, who had to leave, was a member, 

a co-chair of a task force at CSIS which I sat on, on nontraditional 

security assistance which informed my thinking in this area greatly. And we have, as you know, and I have made copies available, 

done a report with the American Academy of Diplomacy at the 

Stimson Center on what we need to do to strengthen the tool kit 

of statecraft on the civilian side for the United States Government. 

So those two experiences plus my own experience at OMB and in 

the research world have influenced what I have to say. 

I am not a doctor and I don’t play one on television but I thought 

I might cast my oral statement somewhat in the framework of diagnosis, prognosis and cure, to see if that at least lays some steps 

toward discussion in the question and answer. 

Diagnosis, I think quite simply we have, as you stated, a growing 

imbalance between our military and civilian tools of statecraft. And 

I would argue that is not healthy, hence the medical metaphor. It 

is not healthy for our military, it is not healthy for our civilian instruments, and it is not healthy for the American role in the world. 

And I will come back in terms of prognosis to what I mean by that. 

But the diagnosis I see in such areas as five new spigots and programs for security and foreign assistance in the Defense Department under DOD authorities over the last 8 years, which have cost 

us now as taxpayers a total of $50 billion in expenditure directly 

through the Department of Defense. And I see it in the seven spigots and programs that we have for stabilization and reconstruction 

operations across the government, many of them new and many of 

those in the Department of Defense. 

I see the diagnosis in the increasing tendency to develop civilian 

engagement capacities in military commands, AFRICOM, 

SOUTHCOM, whose commander is a fine man, basically describe 

SOUTHCOM as a giant velcro cube to which other parts of the government could attach itself. And increasingly I was quite struck, 

for example, that General Petraeus was leading an across-theboard, governmentwide review of our CENTCOM policy, particularly with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan. And my question, 

coming back to George’s question, was why is that review not being 


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led in the State Department? Why is it being led by a military command? And that results in a yawning imbalance. 

We see other areas of activity that you are not less concerned 

with today, but public diplomacy, which George mentioned, is another one of them where there is a growing area of activity at DOD 

that is not well understood or even well studied. 

Prognosis. I think there are three consequences of this that do 

not bode us well for the future of American national security and 

foreign policy. Consequence number one is in fact an overstressed 

military, that we are asking an institution in uniform to perform 

an increasing number of functions which are not central to their 

core capacities, but we are asking them to do them nonetheless. Occupations, the civilian side, as Dr. Hamre mentioned, of counterinsurgency warfare, public diplomacy activities, economic development, building health clinics, schools and the like, all of which are 

wonderful things in high stress combat environments to have the 

military try to do, but have real severe consequences for the overall 

capability of our military in combat terms. 

Second consequence, a weaker civilian tool kit because to the extent that we rely on the military as the default position, we are increasingly saying to the civilian side let’s not bother because we 

now have the military assuming the role. 

And third consequence, a message to the world, and this to me 

is perhaps the most serious, that to the rest of the world the American international engagement increasingly wears a uniform and 

however much we may respect our uniformsists and the jobs that 

they do, that is not always welcome in other parts of the world. 

In addition to that, we are sending to some parts of the world, 

Latin America, for example, a message that says we have spent 

decades asking you to keep your military in its barracks and out 

of politics and governance; meanwhile, we are inserting our military more and more into politics, governance, economic development and other activities in your countries. It is a mixed message 

that we are sending. 

Cure. I think it is important, and I think it was Nancy Lindborg 

who suggested it, that we not learn the lessons of the last post war. 

We often learn the lessons of the last war. Well, we are learning 

some lessons of the last post war. And there are real dangers in 

learning those lessons or taking Iraq or Afghanistan as the template for the capacities and structures that we need to build. 

Issue number one, strategy, what is it we intend to do? And 

Nancy raised that question. If what we are looking at is how we 

deploy civilian forces alongside a major U.S. military deployment, 

that is going to give you one kind of capacity. If what we are looking for is smaller scale international interventions where the primary responsibilities are civilians and the military is there as a security force, that is a different kind of capability. If what we are 

concerned about is strengthening governance in fragile and failing 

states or helping restore it in recovering states, that may be a third 

kind of capability. 

And in my testimony, and I am happy to discuss it more in Q 

and A, I talk about how we need to strengthen State, how we need 

to strengthen USAID, much of it drawn from the report that we did 

with the Academy, and particularly, and that is part of the focus 


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of my testimony, is what we need to do to move transition, some 

of these authorities that have been created in the Defense Department over to the State Department as we build capacity in the 

State Department to take them on and perform them. 

And I will take questions happily. Thank you very much for the 

hearing. 

[The statement of Mr. Adams follows:] 


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Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much for your praise. As you can 

see, this committee is very interested in this topic, and in fact so 

is every think tank in town, as Ambassador Moose mentioned. 

I am just going to try to keep us all to 5 minutes, including myself, so that we can talk quickly and then perhaps have several 

rounds. Before I begin a line of questioning, Dr. Hamre, you said 

something and I wondered if I heard it correctly, and the White 

House has been talking about it, you said we need a framework to 

regulate contractors. 

To hear that from you as a military person is really shocking to 

me. We know what Stuart Bowen did as the SIGIR. Now are you 

saying there is no system? Or we need people at the Defense Department who are going to do what they should be doing? You can 

answer that quickly if you would like. It is shocking to me there 

isn’t a system in place. 

Mr. HAMRE. I think the system has become quite confused—— 

Mrs. LOWEY. Is it the people who are confused or the system is? 

Mr. HAMRE. I think the system is, and let me give you an example. How can we acquire technical services to support the government? This is a fundamental question. And we could acquire it, but 

we have decided that we can’t afford that. And so we have chosen 

to go into the private sector to buy it. Should that be in the profit 

seeking side of the private sector or the nonprofit seeking side? It 

is very unclear. We have profit seeking organizations that are operating policy positions inside the government. We have nonprofit organizations that are running profit making operations. It is completely confused. 

It has become confused in recent years for several reasons. One 

is our personnel system for civil servants is obsolete. We do not 

hire the right people to manage contractors. It is a very profound 

problem. 

I would like to come back to you on another day. It is a much 

bigger issue than people realize. And it is not superficially the 

question we have evil people doing wicked things in the government. That is not the case. They are struggling with obsolete systems, obsolete policies, and we have been trying to make it work 

under very changing and dynamic circumstances. 

So I would be pleased to come and talk with the committee at 

another time. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I would be interested in that and certainly our 

ranking member, Mr. Rothman, currently serves on the Defense 

Subcommittee. We do have expertise here on this committee. But 

it is shocking to me. You make some very good points but, boy, we 

could use some of those billion dollars here, and I would hope we 

would be able to figure out what to do with them at State and 

USAID. So we will get back to that issue. 

Ms. Lindborg, I just would like to follow up on a couple of things 

you had said. Will the NGOs first of all accept assistance from military sources? Is humanitarian space still a concept that the United 

States should try to ensure? Or is it your observation that 

insurgencies are deliberately targeting aid workers regardless of 

who provides the funding and therefore makes the concept irrelevant? 


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Ms. LINDBORG. Those are all the critical questions that our community is facing and struggling with. The majority of NGOs as a 

matter of policy do not accept funding directly from the Department of Defense. There are exceptions, but most of the interaction—— 

Mrs. LOWEY. I didn’t necessarily mean funding, assistance. For 

example, in Afghanistan the military met with us and they are 

building schools. And AID was saying by the time—that is a matter 

of staff, too—by the time they contract the military already built 

the schools. But then there are those who will tell us that they, as 

you mentioned with the CAP program in Iraq, that they can operate perfectly well without the military assistance. I mean assistance from, work with. 

Ms. LINDBORG. The greatest value that the military can provide 

in complex development environments is everything possible to increase security, ambient security, security that enables both the 

people to invest in their own future who are living there and development actors, including NGOs, to assist them to do that. And the 

challenge in insecure environments is that, especially when you 

have got U.S. troops playing both a combat role and a counterinsurgency role, is that it can actually undermine our ability to 

work by being associated with military troops. 

There is an example recently in Afghanistan with a colleague 

agency where they built a clinic and, despite efforts to stop it from 

happening, the PRTs built a clinic a kilometer or so away. And 

those are not about development needs. Those are about hearts and 

mind needs. But by not having better coordination and by not having the primacy of the development objective, you undercut the 

ability to move towards longer term development objectives, and 

you make more likely that the targeting will happen. 

Your question is that will you be targeted anyway whether you 

are associated with the troops or not? We think that, you know, we 

have to go into these situations eyes wide open. But increasingly 

there are methods, remote management approaches, ensuring that 

you—— 

Mrs. LOWEY. What does that mean, remote management approaches? 

Ms. LINDBORG. In places like Somalia and Iraq and Afghanistan, 

you can still provide development assistance where you are using 

primarily the local communities to drive their own development 

forward, which is the most important aspect of actually accomplishing those longer term development goals. There are numerous 

studies that show that it is this deep poverty, the deep illiteracy 

that is connected to conflict and keeps a lot of these countries from 

being able to advance more quickly, combined with many of the 

other factors. 

Mrs. LOWEY. So are there ever any benefits of military-NGO coordination? 

Ms. LINDBORG. The benefits are if you are able to stop that clinic 

from being built in a way that undercut the clinic that was just 

built by an NGO, communication, yes, for them to come visit our 

sites can be terribly undermining if we are then associated with 

the military. Our greatest value as NGOs is to be able to communicate that people-to-people support for communities to develop 


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based on their vision, so that they own the development process. 

The military is inherently constrained from doing that by virtue of 

being associated with their own objectives. That doesn’t translate 

into a community looking forward to its own future. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Last year, I know that DOD in cooperation with 

USIP published a set of guidelines for relations between U.S. 

Armed Forces and NGOs in nonpermissive environments. And I 

have heard that a similar project to establish clear guidelines for 

relations between the military and NGOs in permissive environments may be forthcoming. 

So in just a couple of minutes, if you can just clarify for us again 

what is the role of the military in your judgment, if any, in providing foreign assistance in permissive or friendly environments, 

now that I have less than a few seconds. 

Ms. LINDBORG. The guidelines which were produced, which were 

extraordinarily helpful and I think advanced the understanding 

and mutual respect and knowledge of the military and the NGO 

communities, were specifically in nonpermissive environments. The 

challenge that we have is they were addressing humanitarian action, lifesaving action. As we look at this complex development environments, that is yet a different set of goals. The third is the permissive environments, the kinds of activities that go on in 

AFRICOM that Gordon mentioned, where it is 100 percent hearts 

and minds approaches, there is no—there are plenty of civilian capacity in places like Uganda and parts of the Horn of Africa where 

you at the same time have AFRICOM actors digging wells and 

building schools. 

I would argue that we need to rethink the role of the military 

doing any kind of development assistance in permissive environments because it fundamentally undercuts the long-term objectives 

that are an important goal for supporting fragile countries. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I am going to turn to Ms. Granger. But I think the 

question still is the nonpermissive environments and how do you 

coordinate effectively, and what are the guidelines. So we can get 

back to that. 

Ms. Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. There are so many questions. But I think that everyone up here and I think you all agree that there needs to be a 

rebalancing, that we would all agree with that. In that rebalancing, 

what priorities do we begin with? In other words, we could start 

arguing over, that the military should do this or not, but what are 

the priorities? And Dr. Hamre, I will start with you but anyone can 

answer that. 

Mr. HAMRE. Well, forgive me for taking people back to this 

framework that we developed, but would you put this in the record, 

please? I think you should, and the reason why, have somebody go 

through and say who does these various boxes? I mean they all 

need to be done. 

Mrs. LOWEY. So ordered. 

Mr. HAMRE. There are several hundred tasks that need to be 

done in the transition from a nonpermissive environment to a permissive environment. And who should be doing these things? Department of Defense shouldn’t be doing these things. Department 

of Defense doesn’t want to do these things. And the problem is this 


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very long extended nonpermissive environment that has evolved 

with insurgency wars. Nancy and I are very good friends, and I respect what she said. I do want to say one thing. 

The military has a very valid role to play in using construction 

things during a nonpermissive environment to start establishing 

working relationships with local leaders. It is part of what they 

have to do. It is getting out of this kinetic world into a nonkinetic 

solution. And there is a role for that. That is why the commander’s 

response funds are so important. And so the priority would be, ask 

people to sit down, ranking member, and look through all the tasks 

and say, who is doing these things? And I think what you are going 

to find is too many people arguing about authorities and not 

enough people saying what do we do? Let’s try to figure out what 

do we have to get done and who is really doing these things? I 

think you will be surprised to find we have got gaping holes in the 

government. 

Mr. MOOSE. Thank you. I have a slightly different take on this, 

but it begins with I think the core of the problem is one of lack 

of capacity in the civilian agencies to manage the kinds of tasks 

that we would like them to perform. What we have seen in consequence is kind of a downward spiral; that is to say, in recognition 

of the lack of capacity in the State Department, USAID, political 

leaders eager, desperate sometimes to find solutions to problems, 

have looked to the places where there are resources and what better place but the Defense Department, which has billions of dollars. 

And that has become a downward kind of a spiral in terms of the 

response of the political leadership. 

It has to begin, I think as our colleagues last week said, with the 

effort to rebuild the capacity of the State Department. As one of 

Gordon’s colleagues from the Stimson Center said yesterday, the 

construct is a three-legged stool. We have one leg on that stool that 

is like 4 feet tall and the others are like nubs. And so we have to 

begin to rebuild those capacities. 

If you were to turn to the State Department today and say, assume responsibility for the management of the $50 billion in programs that have been developed under the Defense Department 

over the last decade or so, they could not do it. They don’t have the 

personnel resources. They don’t have the staff. 

I will give you a particular example, which is AFRICOM. In my 

conversations with my colleagues at State as well as with General 

Ward and his colleagues out in the field, one of the things that is 

absent in that construct is somewhere, some place back here in 

Washington that actually brings together these various capabilities 

that AFRICOM has said it wants to incorporate into its structure. 

Now I happen to think that is probably not a bad idea for them 

to do that, but I also happen to believe that absent some mechanism back here in Washington that ensures that the activities of 

the command are indeed fully integrated and fully consistent with 

our overall policy goals, that is not going to happen. But the State 

Department currently has no means, no capacity, no staff, no structure to undertake that important coordination function. It is not a 

function the NSC realistically should be asked to assume. It is a 

function that I believe belongs in the State Department, but until 

and unless there is the staffing, and frankly going into the report 


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that Gordon referred to, you know, I strongly endorse the recommendations in that report but I frankly think it understates the 

actual capacity needs and staffing needs and training needs of the 

Department if indeed the Department is to resume its responsibility, reassume its responsibility for the central coordinating and 

integrating function. 

Mr. ADAMS. I have my little checklist here, what to start with 

and where to go, because and I agree very much with what George 

has just said. Number one priority, oddly enough, is a relatively 

small one, and this is a congressional responsibility in part as well, 

as well as an executive branch responsibility, and that is to act 

now to ensure that whatever authorities are in place do not become 

part of permanent law, an absolutely critical, near term step because if the Department of Defense comes up in this administration, I have no idea whether they will or not, and seeks, as they 

have for the past 3 years, permanent law status for things like 

CERP and section 1206, then you have institutionalized the problem that we are focused on in your hearing today. 

So it is a relatively small step but a very important signal that 

says we understand that there is a problem of capacity in State, 

in USAID. We understand that we have military deployed forward 

in the field and cooperating NPRTs. What we want to do though 

is figure out what the right rebalanced relationship needs to be, not 

institutionalize those authorities. So that would be my number one 

near-term, relatively small but important to buying the time for 

figuring out two other things. 

Second, what are we doing? As I suggested earlier, if the question is an operational one, and I put John Hamre’s statement in 

the operational category, how do we associate civilians with U.S. 

military operations in combat environments, that is a particular 

type of dilemma. It may not be of the size of Iraq or Afghanistan, 

but it may be a real problem that we need to solve in which Department of Defense needs permanent authorities to do very specific kinds of things, but very specific in very specific environment, 

not very broad, with a lot of funding and a lot of people doing 

things they probably shouldn’t be doing. 

So we need to answer the strategic question in order to know 

what it is we are trying to solve. If the problem is, as an alternative, what goes within the range of what Nancy Lindborg does 

for a living to problems of government, failed states, fragile states, 

and development, then what we really need to focus on is the civilian capacity, to upgrade that capacity. So that is a second priority. 

Third priority is human resources at State. George has been eloquent on this subject. But both State and USAID need human resources. John’s contracting problem is rampant at USAID where 

many of the staffers are now contract managers because most of 

the actual in-the-field work has been handed to contractors given 

the weakness of the institution. That is a trend that we argue in 

the report that George referred to needs to be reversed in the State 

Department. 

Fourth, the highest priority needs—I think this is longer term I 

would say, I don’t know if George would agree with me on that, but 

revamping and reforming the Foreign Service of the United States. 

Our civilian engagement needs to be populated, in my view, with 


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people who know more than report, negotiate and represent. Those 

are very important skills. They also need to know about program 

development, program management, program implementation. 

They also need to know about strategic planning, about budgets. So 

there is a training and recruitment issue, and there is a question 

of ensuring that the career path for those people takes them to Department of Defense, takes them to Justice, takes them to the NSC 

so that they have actually populated different experiences, takes 

them to AID as a development officer so they learn those skills and 

can walk and chew gum at the same time. 

And finally, I think the appointment of a second Deputy Secretary of State here is a critical first step on this one, is integrating 

strategic planning and budgetary planning professionally at the 

senior level in the State Department so you can build the kind of 

capacity that George is calling for but you can do it right at the 

top of the building with somebody responsible for it. The absence 

of strategic and budget planning capacity at the top of the State 

Department is one of the biggest weaknesses that undergirds some 

of these other institutional problems. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you all for 

being here. I wanted to just share some thoughts and get your reaction because, Dr. Adams, I might put the order of what you suggested in a different form, and that is I would think the first thing 

that we have to do is build State Department’s capacity. Because 

right now the capacity to do a lot of things in terms of our government only inhabits the Defense Department because we have allowed State to atrophy and we are not going to be able to turn responsibilities over to State if they don’t have the capacity. So I 

would think the first thing we need to do is build up the State Department’s capacity, Foreign Service, USAID. 

Then I think we need to redefine Department of Defense’s mission. I think you are right. Department of Defense doesn’t want to 

do a lot of things we are asking them to do, and I don’t think it 

is good for the DOD to do them because it overstresses and strains 

the military. They do some things extraordinarily well, and I think 

we have some tough questions to answer about whether we want 

to try to develop a parallel capacity at State for some things that 

the military does really well. The immediate relief in the face of 

the tsunami, for example, in Indonesia. They have the logistical capability to move in quickly to remote areas and provide aid in a 

way that may be prohibitively expensive to develop at State, but 

you may not need to develop it at State as long as you define the 

military’s mission in the initial stages of disaster relief and figure 

out what is most appropriately done, what is most cost effectively 

done. And I think we need to look at all these things. 

Authorities that you mentioned, 1206, I am a little concerned by 

the DOD Directive 1404, which is as of last month, and that seems 

to be continuing potentially down the wrong direction. 

And I think we have an opportunity to do that in the context of 

the budget for the Defense Department. The President has indicated, you know, nothing is going to be sacrosanct anymore. We 

have some hard fiscal choices to make, and maybe the best way to 


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approach redefining DOD’s mission is to do it in the budget context 

when they need to find money to do the things that are more part 

of the core military mission and can’t afford to be doing the State 

Department’s job as well. 

The other aspect that was brought to my attention when I had 

a meeting at the State Department last year is that while we need 

to expand State Department’s capacity, there are other departments that need to be deeply involved also. And we don’t necessarily want to replicate at the State Department what the Department of Agriculture does. But right now there isn’t a career 

path for people at the Department of Agriculture to go and spend 

a couple of years in Afghanistan and come back to ag and know 

that their job is still not only there but has been advanced by being 

in Afghanistan. 

Other departments have that tradition. Department of Agriculture may not, and the Department of the Treasury may not and 

Department of Commerce may not and other people that we may 

need to pull into this. So it may not just be rotating State Department through other agencies as in tapping the expertise of other 

agencies. 

Probably the hardest part of this I think, Madam Chair, is going 

to be our own responsibility and trying to wrestle with our friends 

at the Defense Subcommittee and so we have our own jurisdictional difficulties. But anyway I would love to get your reaction in 

the remaining time I have left. 

Mr. ADAMS. I will take the first cut and others will certainly respond. 

Since you suggested that our order of priorities is different, the 

only reason I put the authorities first is that I think it is right now 

timely to stop the trend in order to buy the time for what was my 

second order of priority, and I fully agree with you on that, which 

is building the capacity at State and USAID because it takes time 

to build the capacity. You have to recruit, you have to change the 

recruitment process, you have to recruit the right people. We have 

to do more with mid career accessions which is not always favored 

by the career people who are currently in the Foreign Service. We 

have to look at how we assign people on rotations that incentivize 

them to gain a wider range of experience. We have to look at the 

Foreign Service human resources process to ensure that that is 

right. We have to look carefully, and this I would definitely emphasize, we have to look carefully at what capacity we are building. 

I think you are right at State. I have my own doubts that building the capacity we are now building through SCRS is the right capacity in the right place at State and USAID. And as I say in my 

testimony, I would urge very strongly a step back and a relook at 

the balance between NSC, SCRS, regional bureaus and USAID 

with putting a reinvigorated USAID much more in the role of being 

the recruiters, trainers, deployers and operators of the civilian capacity, properly sized for the kinds of strategic decisions we made. 

I think you are quite right. There are a lot of things that need 

to happen. 

I also agree with you that the military very clearly has a role. 

The military has done remarkably effective work in disasters, as 

you underlined, and should because they have the lift and supply 


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capacity. There is no reason to build an airlift capacity at State and 

USAID to do what the Department of Defense does. 

What begins to concerns me is when we look at the humanitarian and disaster relief authorities in the Department of Defense 

and note that as part of its legislative package, the Defense Department seeks to expand that humanitarian and disaster relief 

authority to cover stabilization. 

That is an issue that I think the committee, both the authorizers 

and appropriators, need to take a close look at, because that is a 

further extension of mission in that capacity that they do so well, 

adding to burdens, detracting from responsibilities on the civilian 

side, and with implications on how we engage overseas, as I said 

in my statement. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Mr. Israel. 

Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Like the ranking 

member, I don’t know where to begin. 

Let me first commend to the subcommittee’s attention a statement that Ms. Lindborg made in her testimony that really stood 

out for me, and that is there are more service members in military 

bands than there are Foreign Service officers at the Department of 

State and USAID. That is a pretty compelling indicator of where 

we are. 

I served for 4 years on the House Armed Services Committee, 

and I had to give that up to come to the State Foreign Ops Appropriations Subcommittee. So I have my own perspective on this, 

having been a defense authorizer and now a State Department appropriator. 

I just want to share one of the more insightful experiences that 

I had as a lead-in to my question. Congressman Jim Marshall from 

Georgia and I when we were on the HASC visited two very remote 

fire bases in Afghanistan in the Helmand Province, fire base Ties 

and fire base Robinson. These fire bases were near a small village 

called Musikalia. Musikalia had changed hands between the 

Taliban and Coalition Forces three or four times. While we were 

there, Special Forces was planning yet another operation to take 

Musikalia back. 

So I was meeting with a small group of special forces personnel. 

I asked is Musikalia supportive of the Taliban, are they supportive 

of us? How come it keeps switching hands? 

The answer was, sir, they are not supportive of the Taliban, they 

are not supportive of us, they are good betters. They hedge their 

bets. Here is the problem, Congressman. The problem is we are 

going to go into Musikalia tomorrow, and we are going to go in 

shooting. We are either going to kill the enemy or send him into 

the mountains. We are going to build a bridge and a health clinic. 

We are going to help construct a local governing council, and then 

we will leave. And then the bad guys are going to come back in and 

blow up the bridge and the health clinic, and kill the people on the 

governing council that we helped elect. 

Then somebody said we talk a lot about hearts and minds. That 

is something that I heard in your testimony. We hear a lot about 

hearts and minds as a strategic doctrine of the United States, and 

I say this as a good friend and strong supporter of General 

Petraeus. But one of the actual fighters said, sir, people’s hearts 


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harden and their minds change. And until we can get used to the 

notion of permanence, give people an alternative and then protect 

the alternative through NGOs and security, we are never going to 

get where we want to be. 

Here is my question. In the 1960s and 1970s and 1980s there 

was a lot of talk about joint rivalries in the service departments, 

and we finally had something called Goldwater and Nichols, and 

the byword was jointness, jointness, jointness. 

This hearing has focused on the details of what we need to do 

in order to promote coordination and whether the military has the 

right mission or the NGOs have the right mission or the State Department has the right mission. But those are details. In terms of 

permanence, do we need a new Goldwater II that sets a new architecture of interagency coordination between the military and the 

NGOs and the Department of State? Jump ball for anybody who 

wants to take it. 

Mr. MOOSE. With all due respect to Nancy, I think the first time 

I heard the anecdote used about the military bands and the size 

of the State Department was actually from my boss, Ron Spiers 

back in 1986 when he had been charged with George Schultz to do 

exactly what the committee is trying to do today, which is make 

the argument for a substantial reinforcement of the capabilities of 

the State Department. So one of his anecdotes was 7,000 members 

in the band outnumbering the number of State Department people, 

and the other was the cost of two B–2 bombers was roughly the 

equivalent of the operational budget of the State Department. 

I think we do need perhaps not a Goldwater Nichols II, but clearly it seems to me even if you say that Iraq and Afghanistan are 

the exceptions to the kinds of operations that we are going to be 

dealing with in the world in the future, I think there is clear recognition that the kinds of security threats and foreign policy challenges that we face require us to have a better way of integrating 

our military, our diplomatic and our development capabilities. That 

is going to require some thought how you structure that. I think 

that is what general Jones is trying to do as he is thinking through 

right now how he structures the national Security Council. 

And one of the challenges is how do you ensure a model that not 

only draws on the traditional security and foreign affairs agencies, 

but admits to the need to involve other agencies of our government 

so that they can, in fact, contribute to the solution to these challenges. 

Now I have not a clue as to what that solution might be. That 

is something ultimately that this committee and others in Congress 

are going to have to address. But I do think within that construct 

if one does not focus on the role, the central role in my view of the 

State Department handling the traditional responsibility that it 

has had for serving as that focal point for coordination with the 

military and other agencies of government, building their capacity 

to do that, and I absolutely agree with Gordon, it is going to require not only more people, it is going to require different kinds of 

people with different kinds of skillsets and different kinds of 

mindsets about how you do that. But that to me is key to the whole 

problem. 


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Mrs. LOWEY. I am now going to turn to Mr. Kirk and then Mr. 

Jackson and Mr. Rothman to see if we can get the first round in 

before the vote. I think the problem with this hearing is we can all 

talk about it for 6 hours. 

Mr. Kirk, I have been trying to keep everyone to the 5 minutes. 

Mr. KIRK. Thank you. 

I really want to echo my friend Mr. Israel’s comments that I 

think we do need a Goldwater Nichols for the State Department. 

I think I have a unique perspective since I am one of the only 

Members of Congress that was in the State Department, in the 

World Bank, in the military, and in the Congress, sometimes all at 

the same time. 

The Assistant Secretary of State should be basically the de facto 

pollad for the combatant commander, that their empires should be 

aligned exactly alike so these two people have to get along. We 

have reoriented things. We finally moved AID into the State Department. That was from our experience from El Salvador when 

one of the factions of the rebel movement, the RN, came out the 

bush and said we are going to bag this war, just bring in some electrification into the village of Santa Marta. And so our ambassador 

went to the AID mission director and said I need an electrical line 

into Santa Marta, and the AID mission director told him to go to 

hell, it wasn’t in his budget, it wasn’t in his program to end a war. 

So it was off that experience that we rolled AID into State. I 

think AID should work for Secretary Clinton, but the AOR lines 

are not properly aligned, and should. 

I have a lot of friends in here. We have 150 billion years of experience in foreign aid in this room because I see everyone that I 

have worked with in the past. We have a lot of expertise. 

Secretary Hamre and I coauthored this report taking on this, and 

I know how difficult the environment is. Nancy at Mercy Corps, we 

lost Dr. Kastani just the other day in Afghanistan, showing just 

how difficult this environment is. 

And I just finished an active duty tour in Afghanistan in December in which I was in Kandahar and Lash Kagar. And I think 

southern Afghanistan is the center of gravity for the Obama administration on conflict. It is the war the President has signed up 

to. He has committed 17,000 troops, and every national media organization is going to send reporters there, so this is the key focal 

point. 

I think it was in 2004 the Taliban as it reconstituted saw a 

weakness and attempted to whack an employee of Kamonics who 

was leading the counternarcotics effort for Helmand, Helmand 

being the end all to be all to narcotics in Afghanistan. Half of the 

entire crop is produced in that one river valley. When Kamonics 

saw the threat, they bugged out. 

Under the old organization of the State Department, U.S. Foreign Assistance Agency, the moment the contractor bugged out, the 

mission stopped for a year. So obviously the U.S. military had to 

step in because AID couldn’t deploy its contractors in the area. But 

having just come out of the big green machine, we do things in a 

pretty dumb way. We roll people in there for an 11-month deployment, and then lobotomize the command as everyone rotates out. 

It is better than what AID wanted to do which is not be there at 


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all. I think there is a crying need, one, to realign the AORs exactly 

along DOD lines, and that would actually increase the authority of 

the State Department; and, two, to develop a civilian corps that 

brings technical expertise that is there a lot longer than a combat 

tour and most importantly doesn’t bug out. People are going to get 

hurt and some people are going to get killed. But if you let that 

collapse the mission, then that is the first person that the Taliban 

is going to whack, is the contractors to collapse the program, and 

that can’t happen. 

John, I remember in Kosovo when we had this problem under 

your watch. 

Mr. HAMRE. If I may just say one thing. The great problem that 

we have and the reason DOD gets a lot of these missions is it has 

mobilizable capacity. The civilian organizations have no mobilizable 

capacity. 

Mr. KIRK. And they also bug out. 

Mr. HAMRE. It is a tough situation, and a lot of the people in the 

civilian agencies don’t feel that they have signed up to for an insecure situation. I agree that we need to provide the security for an 

environment like that, but we need to have partners that will stay 

with us, too. But we need mobilizable capacity. 

Mr. KIRK. If we look at the Fatwa in north and south Yurgistan 

right now, and I believe the hunt for Osama bin Laden is a theological mission of the United States, but if you talk to the mission 

director in Islamabad right now and say tell me your assets and 

your programs going on right now, he can’t deploy anything in that 

AOR. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Can you answer in 30 seconds? 

Ms. LINDBORG. I think that greater coordination between the civilian and military sides of the house is critical particularly in 

those kinds of area. Mercy Corps has worked in Helmand and Lash 

Kagar and Kandahar for 15 years. Who doesn’t bug out are the 

local communities. The degree to which you can build local community capacity to continue their development as a part of the solution is critical, and better focus the military capacities to do what 

we need them to do, the security sector reform, to do a better job 

of the interdiction of the poppy crops. 

Early on there was an abdication of any role of the military in 

helping on that. And not to focus your civilian capacities on the 

poppy trade, but rather on the development of alternatives. It is a 

long term goal to get the poppy eradicated and to provide alternatives. So you need to have mechanisms that can stay, can continue past a shorter term mission or past the possible threat of instability. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Jackson. 

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman for holding this 

hearing. I also want to build upon the very thoughtful analogy of 

my colleague Mr. Israel, who I think touched upon the crux of the 

problem, at least in the field. That is the analogy of the tug of war 

between our military power in a specific village pushing the 

Taliban back and building the infrastructure, withdrawing the 

military power, the Taliban or some force regaining control and undermining the infrastructure that was put in place, and this kind 

of tug of war that actually takes place in the battlefield. 


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It appears to me that some of this discussion, Madam Chairman, 

is the appropriate balance between our hard power and soft power, 

and that soft power almost can’t exist unless it is surrounded by 

the bubble of hard power. The civilian agencies can’t enter to engage in the kind of civilian reconstruction that needs to occur unless it is occurring in a secure environment, and then how do you 

maintain that secure environment so that State Department and 

other agencies under its auspices can secure sustainable development in a country or in a region so that the efforts are not undermined and we find ourselves engaged in this tug of war. 

With that said, I wanted to raise a question about AFRICOM. 

The White House’s stated mission for AFRICOM is that it ‘‘will 

strength our security cooperation with Africa, and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. 

AFRICOM will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to 

the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, 

health, education, democracy and economic growth in Africa.’’ 

More narrowly, AFRICOM’s own mission statement states that 

‘‘it will conduct sustained security engagement through a range of 

military-to-military programs and military activities and in concert 

with interagency and international partners in support of U.S. policy and a stable and secure Africa.’’ 

I certainly think that it makes sense to have AFRICOM conduct 

and manage security assistance, but do you have a sense of the rationale behind AFRICOM’s support to humanitarian and development assistance? And do you believe that this is an example of 

something more rationally implemented through USAID and does 

this exhibit a lack of clarity about the command’s mandate? 

Secondly, in your observation of AFRICOM to date, do any of you 

have any sense that it fits into a broader strategy for foreign policy 

in Africa? And lastly, AFRICOM has a 1,300 person command in 

Stuttgart, Germany, while USAID has just under 279 technical experts employed across the entire continent of Africa. What is your 

assessment of this balance? 

Mr. MOOSE. If I might begin, I have spent a fair amount of time 

thinking about, talking about and engaging with people at 

AFRICOM. 

I do think that the original statement of AFRICOM’s mission 

which actually took place a year and a half before it got its new 

commander, was an extraordinarily ambitious mandate for the 

command. I don’t think there was any ill-intention about it, but I 

think that statement of AFRICOM’s mission was informed by a desire to better integrate the capabilities of our diplomacy and our 

development and our military. 

Unfortunately, however, and this goes to something that Gordon 

said earlier, the impression that was left here in the United States 

and I would say particularly abroad was that somehow AFRICOM 

was going to become the new face and the new voice and the new 

center for the formulation of U.S. policy towards Africa, and I think 

that has enormous negative consequences. 

To his credit, I think General Ward has tried to if you will reframe the nature of AFRICOM’s mission and in particular to recognize that in those areas where the military clearly lacks competency and capability, that the intent is to put AFRICOM’s capaVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 055951 PO 00000 Frm 00590 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A951P2.XXX A951P2

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bilities in the service of our broader foreign policy and development 

goals. That, I think, in terms of a philosophical orientation is the 

right formulation. The further issue, however, is how you actually 

achieve that. 

And how given, and I know that Jim Kunder mentioned this last 

week, this imbalance in resources. I have been to Stuttgart, and I 

have seen the resources there and you do have this large establishment, and an establishment relative to State Department and AID 

resources is huge and cannot help but impress people when the 

general gets on his plane and flies off, and it does give a distorted 

perception of who is in charge of American foreign policy and who 

is in charge of achieving this sort of balance and coordination and 

integration of the instruments of our policy. That is the challenge 

that I think remains. 

I believe AFRICOM, and that the military generally, has important capabilities and capacities that they need to be contributing 

to the solutions of the problems that we face in places, many places 

across Africa. There was the mention of the military’s potential 

contribution to security sector reform. If you look across Africa, 

there are many opportunities for that to happen. So there is a role, 

but that role needs to be carefully defined, carefully targeted, and 

it needs to be done in a way that it is at the service of our larger 

foreign policy and development agendas. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Rothman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. This is a very 

important hearing. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I apologize in advance for cutting everyone off, including myself. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I have read everybody’s testimony and I agree 

with your conclusions about rebalancing, focus and resources, et 

cetera. But let me make you a little uncomfortable. I haven’t read 

all of the studies that were cited in the footnotes to some of the 

remarks, but with that in mind, you say that the military does not 

have the core competency to carry out some of these missions that 

State and NGOs can do better, that there is an inherent negative 

in having a ‘‘military face’’ on reconstruction efforts and other 

things. 

Now I do get my friend and colleague’s story about the failure 

of the military, building the infrastructure but not having sufficient 

local population ownership to survive and defend the infrastructure 

reconstruction from the insurgents. But the main argument was 

this is different than the past when State and NGOs had responsibilities, that there is an inherent negative quality to a military 

face on things. And I agree with a rebalance, but here is the uncomfortable part. 

Was there any problem that was a source of legitimate motivation to the Defense Department and past administrations in terms 

of the reliability of the State Department in cooperating and identifying with the goals and mission established by the respective administrations and the Department of Defense? Or was it simply an 

accidental reduction in resources to the State Department that 

then had to be made up by the Defense Department? Do you follow 

my question? Was there any ‘‘there’’ there? Was there any good 


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reason why the Defense Department decided to crowd out the State 

Department? 

Mr. ADAMS. My view on that is yes, indeed. We have a lack of 

capacity, and we have had a lack of capacity and declining capacity 

for some time at State and at USAID. See, the Cold War was different than the hot war. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Let me make it more pointed. Some of my colleagues to the right of me would say that there was resistance on 

the part of the State Department to following the goals that they, 

when they were in power, wanted to pursue. Therefore, they reduced the funding. 

Mr. ADAMS. I would rather let George address that specifically, 

but when you are dealing with deployment of a kind of Iraq and 

Afghanistan, you are not working in the Cold War environment 

and the fold the gap. You are working where insurgencies are real, 

and response time requirements are real. And, frankly, in Iraq, we 

ended up going in with no plan and no-built capacity. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I get all that. So you are saying these preconceptions were out of date by the time we got to Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Mr. ADAMS. Yes. What I am saying is this is the danger of fighting last post war. The risk in fighting last post war is to say okay, 

what we are going to do throughout the future is deploy at the 

speed and with the mission that we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan, and so what we need to build on the civilian side is the capacity to do that. That is what I am raising the question about. 

Mr. MOOSE. I wanted to say that I addressed this briefly in my 

testimony, but there has been an assault, a rather sustained assault on the State Department and Foreign Service alleging that 

the department and its members were not reliable partners in the 

administration in the execution of the President’s foreign policy. I 

defy anybody to come up with any kind of objective analysis that 

would demonstrate that. I think it has been a canard. I think it 

has done a tremendous disservice to the people at the State Department. 

If anything, I find that my colleagues in the State Department 

are too malleable, too eager to serve, and too eager to carry out the 

instructions and the guidance from the White House. That is what 

they exist for. They like nothing better than to be used. 

Mr. HAMRE. There was a decision made before the war that DOD 

would have the soul responsibility for the after action, assuming it 

was going to be a sweet and short. 

I don’t think DOD properly understood what they were getting 

in for, and I think State Department was offended and frankly sat 

back. And I think both of those things happened at the same time. 

That sentiment was then, I think, distorted when the security 

environment deteriorated. And DOD, you know, didn’t really have 

the capacity to do all of the things that it was trying to do and 

didn’t really have a viable and up to date security model about 

what they were facing. And State, at that stage, was overwhelmed 

and couldn’t get into a much less secure environment than existed 

for the first 3 months. 

So I think there were unique historical circumstances that made 

this worse. Now are people in the State Department cowards? No, 


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not at all. The implications some people would like to give that is 

the case, that is wrong. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Clearly that was not mine. 

Mr. HAMRE. I know, sir. But I have heard it from other people. 

I think that is absolutely wrong. 

Does State have an operational culture and do a plan in the kind 

of cycle, no, it doesn’t. I think this is one of the problems. 

We need to have in that kind of a tough environment the same 

kind of operational dynamic as a partner in the field, and they 

don’t currently have it. They do not have the resources to do the 

kind of training for this kind of operation. 

There is only a half of one percent overhead float of personnel 

in the State Department. We have 10 percent in the officer corps. 

So a lot of this is resources. 

But we need to step past this anger of the last 6 years that is 

distorting clear thinking about this problem that we are facing, and 

you brought that up very appropriately. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I was going to what the ambassador hit on the 

nose, and there was no there there. It was a canard, as you say. 

Mr. MOOSE. The State Department does have some pedigree here 

in dealing with difficult situations. I started my career in Vietnam. 

I spent 3 years in Vietnam. Some of us think that we were doing 

transformational diplomacy for a very long time, and doing it in 

some very hard places. 

Some of the places where I have served in Africa are as difficult, 

not as dangerous as Iraq and Afghanistan, but it is not as if there 

is not a tradition, but there is a need to bolster the capacity to do 

that and to train the people in the Department to assume that responsibility. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. I just want to follow up before we have 

to go on a similar line of questioning. You said there is the expertise at the State Department. Let’s talk about the field for a 

minute. Now the ambassador has overall responsibility for the programs. The military follow their own chain of command, so I guess 

my question would be now is it that the chief of mission ambassador provides the overall strategic leadership in a host country, 

and is this really the case? 

As things currently stand, the ambassador is the final decider on 

issues of U.S. Government policy in a host country; is that really 

the case? 

And how does the mix of roles between the military and the civilian leadership and development of diplomacy translate to the application of United States foreign policy? What should the chain of 

command be? Is there a chain of command right now, or is the 

military doing their thing and the ambassador and the chief of mission doing their thing? What comes down from Washington? Perhaps you can comment on that. 

Mr. MOOSE. I think this again illustrates one of the core problems we have at the moment because I think the reality is that the 

chief of mission authority in both its concept but also in its operation has been eroded significantly over the past decade. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Comment on the work around, too. I guess that is 

the lingo that the people are using at the embassy. 


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Mr. MOOSE. I don’t know that I can do that directly, but let me 

say what I can say. We certainly saw in the aftermath of 9/11 a 

situation where the perceived nature of the threat, and I am again 

speaking mainly from my knowledge and experience of Africa, the 

perceived nature of the threat, and in that situation political leadership called for extraordinary solutions and responses. Part of that 

was to give authorization, whether legally or not, in writing or not, 

to our military commands to expand their activities and their operations in order to identify, root out, perceived terrorist threats in 

Africa. 

That was done in a way that had little coordination and little 

cognizance of chief of mission authority, and one of the battles that 

the State Department waged in 2003 and 2004 was to reestablish 

the primacy of the chief of mission in knowing about and then having some authority over activities that were taking place in his or 

her country. 

I would argue that in the best of circumstances that still is inadequate because if you look at our missions in Africa, they are small 

missions. They have very few people. They have limited capacity 

really to appreciate not only what is happening in their country, 

but many of these activities are regional. And they have no say nor 

authority about what is going on next door; although what is happening next door may have tremendous affects on what they are 

doing. 

That is why I think it requires a different kind of paradigm construct back in Washington to ensure that the Department, and particularly the regional affairs bureaus, have some visibility as to 

what these activities are. Under the current circumstances, I don’t 

have any reliable assurance that is taking place. 

Mr. HAMRE. Just briefly, the legal situation is this: The State Department and the ambassador is the authoritative representative of 

the President in every country unless there is a deployment order 

signed by the President that puts the chain of command through 

the military. And we have that in certain circumstances. 

In the days after 9/11 there was kind of a global war on terrorism deployment order that created this ambiguous situation. 

The Defense Department is not trying to take over control from the 

State Department. It does want to have chain of command when 

it has a deployment order, when it has a task that is assigned to 

it. I think this is a very easy problem to fix, and I think the historic model is valid. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Do you have any closing comments? 

Ms. GRANGER. I have just one. I want to thank Nancy Lindborg 

for appearing today. With the expulsion in Sudan, I know there is 

great concern about your staff and their safety, and I want you to 

know that we understand that also. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. LOWEY. In closing, I had the former head of the F process 

before our subcommittee, and I had just opened the Wall Street 

Journal that day and none of us on the committee nor the staff 

that knows everything was aware of what General Abizaid was 

doing throughout Africa, and it was upwards of $700 billion. I remember turning to the gentleman and I said what is the coordination because he was just doing development work, typical USAID 


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work, upwards of $700 billion throughout Africa. That’s not my responsibility, we were told. 

Mr. MOOSE. I would like to make it mine. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Let me say that on behalf of all of us we truly appreciate your input, and we know that we just scratched the surface so we hope that the dialogue will continue between this committee and all of you. I know the dialogue is continuing in the community and in the White House. We really appreciate your appearing here before us today. 

This concludes today’s hearing on the Role of Civilian and Military Agencies in the Advancement of America’s Diplomatic and Development Objectives. The subcommittee on State foreign operations and related operations stands adjourned. 


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(613) 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2009. 

BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY WORKFORCE 

WITNESSES 

HON. THOMAS PICKERING, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE 

ASSOCIATION 

PRUDENCE BUSHNELL, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLICS 

OF KENYA AND GUATEMALA, RETIRED FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, 

AND MEMBER OF THE 2006 COMMISSION ON ‘‘THE EMBASSY OF THE 

FUTURE’’ 

JAMES KUNDER, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN LOWEY

Mrs. LOWEY. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, 

and Related Programs will come to order. 

Before we begin, I would like to welcome my colleague Kay 

Granger as the Ranking Member of this committee, and I do believe it is the first time not just on Appropriations but in the Congress where there are two women as Chair and Ranking Member 

of a subcommittee. So I am delighted to welcome Ms. Granger. We 

look forward to all working together on the many challenges that 

we have ahead. 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The subcommittee on 

State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs has come to 

order for our first hearing of the session. I am pleased to open our 

first hearing of the year on a subject that is very much on everyone’s mind: the need to strengthen the capacity of our diplomatic 

and development personnel of the Department of State and the 

U.S. Agency for International Development. 

Strong leadership and expertise are necessary to confront the extensive global challenges facing our Nation and the world, and we 

have much to be concerned about. As Admiral Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence recently noted, ‘‘The primary near-term 

security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis 

and its geopolitical implications,’’ which include growing instability 

and extremism. 

For the first time in my 20 years in the Congress, diplomacy and 

development are considered key components of our national security. In a November 2007 speech at Kansas State University, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, ‘‘What is clear to me is that 

there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian 

instruments of national security, diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction 

and development.’’ 

I wholeheartedly agree, and I welcome the growing support for 

civilian capacity. However, we need to do more than just add dipVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 055951 PO 00000 Frm 00613 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\A951P2.XXX A951P2

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lomats, development staff and foreign aid dollars to truly transfer 

our foreign policy institutions to meet the challenges of the 21st 

century. We must increase and enhance the skills and knowledge 

of our diplomatic and development staffs to effectively interact with 

the communities in which they serve. They must get outside the 

embassy walls, engage in people-to-people diplomacy, work handin-hand with partner governments and civilian society as part of a 

comprehensive, integrated U.S. Government strategy to meet the 

diplomatic and development needs of the host nations. 

This committee has already begun to expand and strengthen the 

Foreign Service, and with the resources provided in the 2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act and in the Omnibus Appropriations 

Act for 2009, USAID and the Department of State will be able to 

hire approximately—I am going to interrupt myself to welcome 

Ambassador Pickering, and I apologize for keeping you waiting on 

those long lines. 

Mr. PICKERING. I apologize to you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Next time, call and one of us will come and get you. 

I thought you were so important they would understand immediately they needed to let you through. 

The committee has already begun to expand and strengthen the 

Foreign Service and with the resources provided in the 2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act and the Omnibus Appropriations Act 

for 2009, USAID and the Department of State will be able to hire 

approximately 450 new core development workers and 638 diplomatic personnel. 

However, as our witnesses—and again I thank you for being 

here—will testify today, there is still much more to be done and we 

must ensure that both agencies have the capacity to effectively and 

rapidly absorb, deploy, and manage this expanded workforce. This 

need to rebuild our diplomatic and development capabilities has 

been recognized and embraced by the Obama administration, and 

Secretary Clinton reiterated this message during her confirmation 

hearing earlier this year when she stated, ‘‘I don’t think there is 

any substitute for having seasoned, experienced professionals and 

experts leading our efforts on diplomacy and development and 

working, where possible, in partnership and coordination with the 

private sector and the not-for-profit sector.’’ 

A quick review of the facts clearly demonstrates the weaknesses 

that have developed in our civilian agencies since the end of the 

Cold War. And as the October 2008 American Academy of Diplomacy report entitled ‘‘A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future’’ observed: Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the diplomatic capacity of 

the United States has been hollowed out. A combination of reduced 

personnel, program cuts, and sharply increased responsibilities has 

put maximum pressure on the capacity of those U.S. agencies that 

are responsible for the missions of core diplomacy, public diplomacy, foreign assistance, reconstruction and stabilization under the 

150, the international affairs account. 

By September 11, 2001, the overseas staffing shortfall in the 

State Department had approached 20 percent, with a larger gap at 

USAID. USAID currently has 8,000 employees, half the number 

the agencies had at its peak in the 1970s. Only 1,000 are Foreign 


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Service officers, the technical experts and voice of the U.S. Government in missions around the world. 

While USAID has experienced staffing ups and downs over the 

past 20 years, foreign assistance funding has increased dramatically. In 1998, USAID conducted approximately 2,990 transactions, 

obligating a total of $2.5 billion. And in 2007, USAID conducted 

10,613 transactions obligating a total of $10.3 billion, a fivefold increase. And to manage this workload, USAID has turned to new 

funding mechanisms—as we know, contractors—often transferring 

oversight responsibility, vetting and implementation to its contractors. It is clear we need to expand the number of qualified Foreign 

Service officers at USAID. 

Today, we are fortunate to have with us several individuals who 

have examined and led reform efforts to address the lack of core 

development and diplomatic personnel. A report entitled ‘‘A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic 

Readiness’’ was released by the the American Academy of Diplomacy in October 2008, and we are pleased to have with us the 

chairman of the advisory group, former Ambassador Thomas Pickering. 

A year earlier, the Center for Strategic and International Studies 

began the dialogue on the need to strengthen civilian agencies, 

with the publication of the findings of the Embassy of the Future 

Commission, and today we are also joined by former Ambassador 

Prudence Bushnell who served on that Commission following a distinguished career in the Foreign Service. 

Finally, USAID began efforts to strengthen its internal capacity 

with the launch of the Development Leadership Initiative in 2008, 

and former USAID Deputy Administrator Jim Kunder, who supported this important effort, will provide perspective on this important initiative, as well as recommendations for future staffing 

growth at USAID. 

All of these reports call for increased support and focus on the 

civilian agencies that champion our foreign policy priorities. Now 

is the time for Congress and the Obama administration to respond 

to these calls. We must strengthen our development and diplomatic 

capability in order to relieve the stress on an overused and overburdened military. My efforts to halt the erosion of the Department 

of State and USAID’s diplomatic and development capacity, to 

build up a robust reconstruction and stabilization capability, and to 

expand USAID and Department of State’s staffing are just the first 

steps in what must be a multiyear effort to rebuild the civilian instruments of national security that Secretary Gates called for in 

November 2007. 

So I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today as we explore this critical issue, and to working with Secretary Clinton to 

rebuild our foreign policy infrastructure with a workforce prepared 

and equipped to address the global challenges of the new century. 

But before I turn to our witnesses, I would like us to hear from 

our new Ranking Member of the committee, Congresswoman Kay 

Granger. 


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OPENING REMARKS OF MS. GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Madam Chair, for your warm welcome 

and also for holding this hearing today, the first in our subcommittee of the 111th Congress, and it is a topic that is so important in building the USAID and State Department’s workforce of 

the future. This is critically important for our U.S. diplomacy. This 

is my first hearing as the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, 

so I want to thank the Chair for convening this panel and look forward to working closely with her. 

We just returned from a very productive visit to Mexico, Colombia and Peru. I applaud that wonderful trip and the information 

that we got as we move forward. I also want to thank Ranking 

Member Jerry Lewis for putting me in this position, and I look forward certainly to hearing from a very distinguished panel this 

morning. 

There is a growing recognition that emerging threats to U.S. interests around the world must be confronted with smart power, a 

combination of military strength and civilian engagement. I have 

been serving on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and so 

I look forward to seeing how that works and how we arrive at what 

is the right balance in our military strength and civilian engagement and smart power. 

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan certainly have demonstrated the importance of building a civilian capacity to quickly 

respond to post conflict situations. Developing a civilian response 

capacity to rapidly bring stability to these very volatile situations 

is a topic that we will be examining in upcoming hearings. 

Our civilian agencies, the Department of State and USAID, are 

experiencing difficulties carrying out their functions, let alone 

emerging challenges such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and we will 

have to work on this together, and that is how we will be successful. As a result, some of the traditional roles of development and 

diplomacy have been taken up by the military, placing a burden on 

our armed services and Armed Forces that may undermine their 

ability to focus on their primary security responsibilities, and 

Chairman Lowey talked about the numbers. They speak for themselves. 

In 1990, USAID had 3,500 personnel to administer approximately $5 billion in development assistance. Today that number is 

over $8 billion, but they only have 2,200 staff. 

The State Department and the Congress recognize the need for 

additional staff, and in 2001 we supported the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative launched by Secretary Powell by adding more than 

a thousand new personnel. Additional staff increases were provided 

for critical diplomatic security and consular affairs initiatives. And 

we supported Secretary Rice’s transformation diplomacy effort, 

which further bolstered the Department’s ability to shift personnel 

resources to the most complex and highest-priority regions and 

issues. 

All of these State Department staffing initiatives were made in 

the context of heightened security risks and the increased costs of 

placing more American staff overseas. 


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As we move forward and as we listen, I say to this very distinguished and experienced panel, I look for guidance as a new member on this subcommittee as to how we can arrive at the right numbers so that we can be most effective. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Congresswoman Granger. 

Ambassador Pickering, we are delighted you are here and we are 

happy to place your full testimony into the record. And if you 

would like to summarize your statement, I am sure many of my 

colleagues have questions and we would like to have time to put 

the questions forth and get as much information from you as possible. Please proceed. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. PICKERING

Mr. PICKERING. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

It is a pleasure to be here and I will attempt to provide a summary. Thank you, Congresswoman Granger, as well, for your statement and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

I am pleased and honored to join Ambassador Prudence Bushnell 

and former Deputy Administrator James Kunder on this panel to 

provide you our views on this critical and important issue which 

both of you have so well outlined. 

I come before you at a time when funding for the conduct of diplomacy is obviously something less than the only budget priority 

we face as a country. I also come before you, I realize, against the 

background of relatively recent jurisdiction of this subcommittee in 

some of this territory and the competing demands with supportive 

U.S. constituencies across the board. 

Indeed, I apologize for being late here today. I had an opportunity to meet with the Foreign Minister and Defense Minister of 

Colombia, and the Congress has become so popular that the lines 

outside, while not rivaling the Super Bowl, do make it harder to 

get in than I normally expected. My deep apologies to all of you. 

I also come before you as a committed internationalist with what 

I believe is a very clear message. We urgently need to begin rebuilding our diplomatic capacity, and we can either pay the financial price of doing that now, or pay a much higher price later in 

the likely costs of humanitarian, reconstruction and perhaps even 

military responses. 

Events of the past decade have produced obvious shifts in U.S. 

national security posture. One of these in particular now merits urgent reconsideration. Our post Cold War equation of military deterrence, diplomatic activism, foreign aid and human intelligence 

work has become seriously and, I think, counterproductively distorted. Rebalancing this formula rates a place among the early action items for the new administration and the 111th Congress, and 

that is why we are here. 

In fact, the period since the fall of the Berlin Wall has seen U.S. 

diplomatic staffing constraints in most countries abroad, as the 

chart over here clearly illustrates. You too have recognized in your 

opening statements this particular point. But these findings were 

a key output of the recent report to which you all referred, ‘‘A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future,’’ and which I believe you are 


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familiar with, in which the American Academy of Diplomacy cooperated with the Henry L. Stimson Center in producing. I was 

very privileged to chair the advisory group for this report, and we 

would request that a copy of the report be placed in the record. 

The report’s principal findings include the fact that during the 

1990s, overseas diplomatic staffing has been consistently constrained. 

Second, more than 1,000 new State Department diplomatic positions were established between 2001 and 2004 by Secretary Powell. 

These increases, however, were quickly absorbed by the diplomatic 

surges in Iraq, Afghanistan, and neighboring countries. 

Third, since 2004, core diplomatic staffing deficits have in effect 

returned to pre-2000 levels. 

There will be an increasing need for pre- and post-conflict stabilization efforts in many parts of the world, which we believe 

should be managed by civilian leadership, and that puts again an 

additional burden on current staffing. 

Finally, effective implementation of U.S. foreign policy will require, in the words of the report, 4,735 direct hire American staff 

increases by 2014, and the increased funding for function 150, totaling $2 billion above the fiscal year 2014 CBO current services 

estimate by the end of the 5 years to support that increase. 

As the subcommittee considers its priorities for the 111th Congress, I would strongly recommend support for the more field-first 

staffing orientation that has been developed in the report and was 

begun under Secretary Rice’s tenure. 

In compiling the report referred to, we believe its conceptual 

owners saw that the following principles ought to be central to the 

end of our diplomacy and, indeed, to the staffing requirements for 

the future. 

First, what we call universality. Simply that the U.S. should 

have resident presence in every country with which it maintains a 

national government-to-government relationship and at every multilateral organization of which it is a member. 

Second, expanded engagement. That the State Department will 

need significantly to expand interaction with nongovernmental actors, requiring concomitant staffing increases across the board. 

This includes academia, the NGO community, and the private sector. 

Third, location and configuration. To this end, the Department 

will need to extend the U.S. presence in capitals and outside of capitals. We have to get out of the compound. To quote the report of 

the Embassy of the Future Commission, of which Ambassador 

Bushnell was a member, this extension would be manifested by, 

among other things, the establishment of branch offices, American 

presence posts, American centers and by the use of traveling circuit 

riders, among other techniques. 

Fourth, security. To speak plainly, it can be anticipated as we 

proceed that physical threats to U.S. Government personnel abroad 

will continue. They will likely grow with dispersal, and they may 

grow in any event. In our opinion, this is a risk which now comes 

with the territory. It is part of the job, unfortunately. The alternative is starkly inadequate management of U.S. global policy demands, and the report makes some important recommendations on 


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moving to be able to find ways to deal with risk rather than totally 

submit ourselves to compoundization as a way to deal with the 

problem. 

Specific to core diplomacy, State Department staffing remained 

static during the 1990s at a time when workload demands were 

growing significantly. My next chart illustrates these trends. 

Again, specific to core diplomacy, the report we referred to recommended staffing increases in the core area totaling 1,099. In 

other words, staffing growth averaging 4 percent a year for the 

next 5 years, and a total underlying budget growth of $510.5 million by fiscal year 2014 to sustain this effort. 

One uplifting thing I can say about core diplomatic capacity is 

that it has fared marginally better than its public diplomacy counterpart. A number of significant analyses have documented public 

diplomacy’s declining fortune in the post-Cold War era, notably the 

report of the Smart Power Commission of the CSIS, of which I had 

an honor to be a member, which cited a 30 percent real dollar decline in spending between 1994 and 2008, illustrated in the chart 

again to your left. It is interesting that this chart shows a real decline in real money terms between 1994 and 2008 as depicted on 

the chart by the yellow line. 

At the admitted risk of stating the obvious, we noted the not uncommon 1990s’ assumption that a strong public diplomacy effort 

was no longer needed after the fall of communism and, in fact, the 

end of the division of the world. To some, public diplomacy in those 

days looked like an easy kill during a time of overall U.S. Government fiscal constraint. 

At the risk of stating something that is obvious, I think it is safe 

to say that this represented a really bad job of looking around corners. The plain fact was that there was a new generation of hearts 

and minds in the world to win, a new competition for them in a 

technologically exploding new Information Age with new technologies, new techniques and new opportunities. 

At the same time, our reaction to physical security threats and 

budget constraints has included closing on a serious bases of facilities abroad, many of which were important to public diplomacy efforts, and the concentration of personnel in compounds which I just 

talked about sometimes really distant from the centers of our interest and the centers of population. 

Whatever one’s views are regarding the validity of the U.S. policy 

message in recent years, I would argue that shooting the public diplomacy messenger served no one’s interest. The fact remains that 

more than in any other nation, the U.S. is looked to for ideas, innovation and opportunity. In most of the world, the U.S. is viewed as 

the society that recognizes individual initiative and rewards talent. 

We need to do a far better job of capitalizing on that outlook. 

Our report for public diplomacy staffing shows an increase of 

487,000 U.S. citizen direct hires, and 369 locally employed staff, 

with an underlying budget growth of $155.2 million over the 5 year 

period. 

We further propose expansion of public diplomacy programs, 

something that was beyond the initial scope of our report but considered so important in our minds that we had to include it in the 

document. This includes doubling of international exchange proVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 055951 PO 00000 Frm 00619 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A951P2.XXX A951P2

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grams, a 50-percent increase in international visitor grants, and a 

25 percent plus-up for youth exchanges at a further cost of $455.2 

million over the baseline during the same time frame. 

Significantly, our public diplomacy recommendations also comprise the proposed opening or reopening of 40 freestanding American cultural centers and three new media hubs abroad. This is of 

course something that returns us to the question again of physical 

security which I touched on earlier. 

The past year has seen an unusual set of milestone anniversaries 

in the ongoing evolution of international terrorism, some largely 

unmarked, but all of them significant. Among these were the 30th 

anniversary of the onset of the Iranian revolution in 1978 and 

1979; the 25th anniversary of the bombings of the U.S. embassies 

in Beirut and Kuwait; the 10th anniversaries of the attempted 

bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in which 

Ambassador Bushnell played a major role. 

The terrorist activity of which these events are emblematic has 

produced, obviously and continuingly, shifts in U.S. diplomatic deployment. Secretary Rice some time ago recognized the downside 

impact of these changes, committing to move our diplomatic presence out of foreign capitals and to spread it more widely across 

countries to work on the front lines of domestic reform. 

Reinforcing this 2 weeks ago, Senator Lugar introduced a bill 

specifically citing the budgetary and security pressures which have 

resulted in the drastic downsizing or closure of most American cultural centers and endorsing the goal of their reestablishment. 

Former Secretary Albright in my view had it right 10 years ago 

when she said that job one is to ensure effective promotion of U.S. 

interests and values around the world. 

Expanding diplomatic activity is imperative to this work, and entails a greater risk to diplomatic personnel which I, and I believe 

most of us will say, is worth the return as long as we take the necessary steps to ensure that our people are well prepared, well 

trained, knowledgeable and understand not only the risks but the 

adequate steps that have to be taken in every way to avoid those 

risks and to identify them. 

Madam Chairwoman, as I mentioned earlier, our report also 

comprised significant findings and recommendations in areas relevant to training and assistance diplomacies, issues which my copanelists are with me here today to address but which our report 

strongly supports. 

It is my understanding that an upcoming hearing will examine 

issues relevant to security assistance authorities and staffing, at 

which our report’s principal contributor in this particular area, 

Gordon Adams, will testify. But simply stated, we believe that 

some $780 million worth of security assistance, currently supervised and allocated by the Department of Defense, should be reallocated to the traditional pattern of behavior; that is, that the Secretary of State would be responsible for defining the amounts in 

the budget and signifying the countries to which it is devoted, 

while the Secretary of Defense, as always, carries out those programs. 

I realize, of course, that some of our recommendations, specifically in the area of expanded training, will likely be partially adVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 055951 PO 00000 Frm 00620 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A951P2.XXX A951P2

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dressed in fiscal year 2009 appropriations as the cycle is now concluded, and I am heartened by your signification of the fact that 

it does include some significant personnel for the State Department. I am also aware that the outline of the President’s budget 

for the 2010 fiscal year is expected to be before you in a day or two. 

It is my hope, based on what the administration has been saying 

publicly, that the President’s request for overall State Department 

operations will be ambitious and we hope in line with the recommendations we are making. 

I also realize that prioritizing among request components has 

never been what one would call the strong point of the State Department. What our report has put forth is a collection of what we 

consider to be the top operational priorities for consideration by 

your subcommittee. We do so humbly, but we do so on the basis 

of lots of experience and knowledge and we strongly urge their favorable consideration by your committee. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I, along with the others, look 

forward to your questions. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Ambassador Pickering. 

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Mrs. LOWEY. I am going to turn to Ambassador Bushnell, but I 

just want to say when we get to the questions, you talked about 

hope and optimism, and I would like to know, and, if you don’t 

have the figure, get the information as to what all of your hopes 

and dreams reflected in your statement will cost. 

Mr. PICKERING. It is $3.286 billion. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Everything? 

Mr. PICKERING. Yes. Chump change. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Now we will turn to Ambassador Bushnell and we will place your 

statement into the record. Welcome. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR BUSHNELL

Ms. BUSHNELL. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman, and Congresswoman Granger. I appreciate the opportunity to be here and 

to follow up on Ambassador Pickering’s testimony. 

My name is Prudence Bushnell. I am a retired Foreign Service 

officer and former Ambassador to the Republics of Kenya and Guatemala, and member of the 2006 Commission on the Embassy of 

the Future. My remarks will reflect those experiences, and I hope 

that the Commission’s report can be placed in the record. 

The Foreign Service attracts people who are fiercely patriotic and 

deeply committed to making a difference. While their capacity to 

perform remains outstanding, their jobs have become increasingly 

complex and dangerous. According to a 2004 survey, over 87 percent of those with 15 years of service had confronted significant crises, and that number is probably much higher today. 

Having experienced the impact of the Rwanda genocide, suffered 

the wounds of the al Qaeda attack in Kenya, and witnessed the violent legacy of the 35-year conflict in Guatemala, I understand the 

difficulties in balancing security concerns and policy objectives. 

Over the past few years, the former has trumped the latter in 

our efforts to keep people safe. I applaud the impulse, but I also 

believe that it is possible to accomplish both: the work of our Nation overseas and manage risk sensibly. It requires more staff, better technology, innovative strategies, and training, and a greater 

emphasis on taking care of people. 

We could, for example, staff and operate embassies according to 

strategic interests instead of past tradition, limiting the presence 

to agencies and Americans who really need to be at a post. Foreign 

Service nationals and locally employed staff could be trained, delegated and rewarded to assume more professional roles. Everyone, 

including family members, could be prepared through training, crisis exercises, and vigilant leadership to confront danger. 

As Ambassador Pickering suggested, we could put a virtual 

American presence, without risk to people, in all kinds of new 

places through American corners, resource centers operating in libraries and other venues. We already know that with adequate resources these centers work very well. We could also increase our 

influence and outreach through more American presence posts, operations staffed by a single Foreign Service officer and local employees to accomplish specific and limited objectives in cities other 

than the capital. 


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With the capabilities to produce video conferences, pod casts, 

blogs and other virtual links, Foreign Service personnel could reach 

people, NGOs, and businesses across time, distance, and danger. 

Program management and greater language skills could bolster 

these opportunities even further. With appropriate, secure, handheld communications equipment, written work could be accomplished outside the confines of our embassy fortresses. 

Imagine the possibilities were our embassies to have the backup 

of department-run centers to implement innovations, state-of-theart technology, and modern business practices. Think of the new 

ideas employees could conceive if they had access to more sophisticated information and research links, formal communities of practice, and interagency blogs. Consider how much better embassy decisions regarding security would be if ambassadors and emergency 

action committees were privy to intelligence analyses still too often 

confined to Washington and the few considered in the need to 

know. 

Should the worst happen, think of what we could learn if our accountability review boards sought lessons and not just blame. And 

suppose we considered post-traumatic stress and other psychological wounds to be just that, wounds to be healed instead of 

weaknesses to be suppressed or stigmatized. What a more healthy 

and better-prepared workforce we would have. 

A recent Foreign Service Association poll noted employees’ willingness to work in dangerous and difficult places. In return, they 

would like greater attention to family concerns and single sex partners, equitable assignments and salaries, and improved leadership. 

By that they mean bosses who care about people as well as policy, 

with the courage to stand up for them to secure the necessary resources and programs they need to do their jobs effectively. 

I witnessed the extraordinary performance of which they are capable during the difficult months following the al Qaeda attack on 

our Embassy in 1998. A thousand pounds of explosives detonated 

in a small, confined area, left half of the occupants of our chancery 

dead or severely wounded. Outside, hundreds more were killed and 

thousands were injured. With no 911, or any of the services we 

take for granted in the United States, Kenyan and American employees had no choice but to move from victim to rescue force. In 

later weeks and months, notwithstanding the deaths, destruction 

and trauma, this community stayed in place, overcoming one challenge after another to reconstruct their organization, assist Kenyan 

victims and businesses, and help one another to heal. Despite the 

toll on themselves and their families, they put the U.S. Government back in business within hours of the bombing and never lost 

sight of its interests. Not for one day were we closed, and it showed 

in the policy objectives we achieved against great odds. 

Now, imagine what people of this caliber could achieve if they 

were given the kinds of resources, technology, training, innovations 

and leadership we discussed today. 

Thank you for listening. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. Aren’t we fortunate to have people of 

your caliber here, and we thank you again. 

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Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Kunder, we will be happy to place your full testimony into the record. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. KUNDER

Mr. KUNDER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I made four basic points in the testimony, and I would like to 

summarize them briefly. Just to put some meat on the bones of this 

personnel issue for the committee, the committee asked me to draw 

a little bit on my field experience, and I would like to make a couple of comments. 

Why is it important to have these folks? Why is it so critically 

important to our national security? I would like to give you a quick 

example at the tactical level and at the strategic level. 

When I was in Afghanistan in 2002, immediately we started creating these provincial reconstruction teams to reach out and assist 

with the reconstruction of Afghanistan. We followed on in Iraq with 

the same approach. 

Our military colleagues learned very quickly that when they 

were out in the hinterlands in Afghanistan and Iraq, they needed 

exactly this kind of diplomatic personnel that the ambassadors 

have been talking about, or the development specialists at AID. 

You needed health officers and agricultural officers, and you needed folks who knew how to rebuild a government that had been torn 

apart. And we simply ran out of bodies. 

As one report pointed out, there are shortages in filling these 

provincial reconstruction teams even today in Iraq and Afghanistan, not because folks don’t want to serve or because they lack 

courage, but simply, practically, we have run out of bodies to meet 

our country’s national security interests. 

If you move to the strategic level, it is more of an invisible effect 

but equally critical to our national security. All of you know about 

the so-called ‘‘Green Revolution’’ where American technology during the 1960s and 1970s allowed—through the application of technology and new agricultural techniques, we had agricultural production around the world growing at 3 or 4 percent a year. So we 

were able to stay ahead of population growth around the world. 

During the 1980s and 1990s, we cut back on American investment in teaching people how to grow food abroad. We cut back on 

the number of technical experts at USAID, as both the Chairman 

and Ranking Member have said. And what happened? Agricultural 

growth, agriculture productivity growth in the developing world, in 

the poor countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, stopped growing at 3 or 4 percent a year and started growing at 1 percent a 

year, which doesn’t keep up with population growth in those countries. 

So what do you have over 20 years? You have less and less food, 

prices going up. And for the so-called ‘‘bottom billion,’’ the bottom 

billion of our fellow citizens in the world who live on less than a 

dollar a day and who spend almost all of their money on food, all 

of a sudden they can’t afford food. And also, I might add, they are 

not very good customers for American exports when they can’t afford a basic livelihood. 

So what happens, you have a billion potential recruits. A billion 

hungry people who no longer have faith in the future. 


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I think both at the tactical level and at the strategic long-term 

level, it is not just some abstract question of ‘‘State needs more 

people’’ or ‘‘USAID needs more people;’’ our country really needs 

these kinds of strategic effects in our national security interest. 

I make four points in my statement, and you all have a copy of 

this PowerPoint called ‘‘USAID in 2012’’ that summarizes USAID’s 

staffing needs and its plans. I would just call your attention to 

slide number 7, which is the one that shows the growth in our nation’s foreign aid dollars over the last 20 years, the blue vertical 

bars, and then the little yellow triangles are the decline in our nation’s technical experts overseas. 

So, one, we are not getting the kind of bang for the buck that 

we should be getting with our foreign aid dollars and the taxpayers 

are not getting the kind of oversight that they deserve when we 

spend this kind of money overseas without enough staff. 

I do want to thank the committee very much for the support that 

it has given to USAID for this ‘‘Development Leadership Initiative,’’ and we are starting to rebuild that technical capacity that 

served America well over the decades. We hope that the committee 

will sustain that effort in the coming years. 

Second, reinforcing what Ambassador Pickering’s and Ambassador Bushnell’s studies have said, it is not just a question of hiring more people. These numbers for our diplomats and our development experts abroad are so small compared to our military forces 

that we ought to look at these folks as ‘‘Special Forces troops’’ that 

need to be maximally equipped with the best technology America 

has to offer. 

I like to give the example that our nation recently reemphasized 

the importance of instability and possible terrorism in Africa. We 

created AFRICOM at the Department of Defense. I have served in 

uniform and I have nothing against the U.S. military, and I have 

the greatest respect for our uniformed services. We have 1,300 people at AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. We have 

279 technical experts working for USAID, scattered across all of Africa. Something is wrong with these numbers. We need to rebuild 

the numbers and we need to equip these folks with the best technical capacity and communications capacity that they could possibly have. 

I say this as a former military officer. By the time folks reach 

the ambassadorial level that Ambassador Pickering and Ambassador Bushnell received, if you were a military-equivalent general 

officer, you would have achieved, as I know Mrs. Granger knows, 

you would have had 21⁄2 years of training provided by the U.S. 

military, cohort training at the lieutenant colonel level, at the 

Army War College or Navy War College level, 21⁄2 years of training. 

A similar State or AID officer would be lucky if over a 20-year career they had 21⁄2 weeks of organized training. 

We have got to carve out the training ‘‘float’’ for State Department and USAID so people are going off to school to learn Arabic 

and Urdu and Farsi and the critical languages. And I have to tell 

you that our senior State and AID officers are not being given the 

computer skills and the management skills that our military officers are being given. And it is not because they are not smart. 

They are smart and highly educated. But we are not carving out 


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the training, because as these numbers show you, there is no training float. If I have a warm, sentient, competent body, I send that 

person to Anbar Province. 

I point out in my testimony, there are some hidden assets in this 

system. At USAID, we have about 8,000 employees. About 5,500 of 

those are Foreign Service Nationals. Ms. Granger was just in Peru 

and probably saw this. If you go to a place like Lima, we probably 

have 10 American AID employees and about a hundred Peruvian 

experts who speak Spanish and know the culture. We don’t allow 

those folks to be transferred internationally and we don’t really 

give them the kind of compensation needed in terms of the value 

they provide to the United States of America. 

So I suggest one of the things that this committee might look at 

in terms of the title of this hearing, ‘‘Creating the Workforce of the 

21st Century,’’ we need to hire more folks who are Americans and 

give them technical skills, but we also need to look at maximizing 

our Foreign Service National workforce at State and USAID and 

see if we can’t get more productivity out of these folks as well. 

Third, I address security. I cannot rival what Ambassador 

Bushnell said, but I believe we are on a collision course. By law 

we are still compacting our platforms abroad. We say we want to 

grow our diplomatic presence and our development presence, but I 

don’t believe the lines cross. We are continuing to solidify, compact 

our diplomatic platforms, and we are continuing to shut down 

USAID offices and bring them within the embassy compounds. And 

then we are trying to figure out, as Ambassador Pickering said, 

how to do better public diplomacy. 

It is very hard if you are a farm cooperative leader in some Third 

World country, or a women’s group or a lawyer’s group leader, it 

is very hard to get into a U.S. embassy. You used to be able to 

walk over to the AID office and talk to your American colleagues. 

But today it is very hard to get through security. 

I would request that the committee take a hard look at this area 

because, driven by these horrible events that Ambassador Bushnell 

experienced firsthand in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam 10 years ago, 

our platforms are shrinking. Instead, we have to grow and meet 

and reach out to more people, and the lines are just not crossing. 

We have all of these wonderful projections of more people and I 

don’t know where we are to put them. It is a great idea, but it 

doesn’t comport with the law in terms of embassy security. 

My fourth point is somewhat abstract but I think is the single 

most critical one. 

All of us on State and USAID have worked on what kind of formula do we need to build our staff. And there has been some good 

work done. But I argue here that we are nowhere near where we 

should be in creating a mechanism something like the Department 

of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review. We need a ‘‘quadrennial 

diplomatic review’’ and a ‘‘quadrennial development review.’’ We 

need to link our staff explicitly with the threat we are trying to address. 

The Quadrennial Defense Review is not a perfect document, but 

at least it attempts to lay out our nation’s strategic threat and then 

build a force that will meet that threat. This is hard stuff to do. 

It is similarly hard to do this in the diplomatic or development 


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work, but it can and must be done. And I believe the Congress 

should mandate that State and USAID develop such quadrennial 

reviews that identify clearly our development objectives over the 

next 4 years, and then force the personnel planners at State and 

USAID to present you with these kinds of numbers to accomplish 

the mission that we have been assigned. 

Those are the four points I have made. I appreciate the committee taking on this difficult task. And again, as Ambassador 

Pickering said, we are all American citizens and taxpayers, and we 

understand that a lot of our fellow citizens are hurting in the current economic crisis, and we very much appreciate the courage of 

the committee in recognizing that reforming foreign aid is also an 

important part of meeting the taxpayers’ priorities. 

Thank you. 

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Mrs. LOWEY. First of all, let me thank you all for your incredibly 

valuable testimony. We really are so appreciative and we certainly 

know that the Secretary of State and her staff is focused on thinking through many of these issues. I am hoping that you all have 

input and you have certainly made some recommendations because 

we appreciate it on this committee. 

Before we proceed to questions, I just want to say that I have 

received written testimony from the American Foreign Service Association. The Association represents the members of the U.S. Foreign Service, an important voice as we examine workforce issues at 

the Department of State and USAID, and I ask unanimous consent 

that their written statement be made part of the record. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mrs. LOWEY. I would also like to make it clear that I will be calling on members based on seniority of the members present when 

the hearing was called to order, and I will alternate between majority and minority. Each member is requested to keep questions 

to 5 minutes per round. 

I would like to follow up, and again I want to thank you on your 

expert testimony. I would like to follow up with Ambassador 

Bushnell. I can’t believe it. I was not aware of it, that the intelligence analysis is confined to Washington, so you as an ambassador in the field do not have access to the whole picture. Is that 

what I heard you say? 

Ms. BUSHNELL. At the time I was Ambassador, that was correct. 

We had an al Qaeda cell in Nairobi. I was aware of that fact. I was 

also aware of the fact that our Intelligence Community was intercepting telephone calls both in Nairobi and with Osama bin Laden. 

We took, that is to say the FBI and CIA, took the computers of the 

head of the cell in Nairobi, and I never received any information 

as to what was on the computer because—and this gets back to 

what my colleagues have been saying, is we continue to follow the 

tradition of the Cold War which is ‘‘You will know if you need to 

know it.’’ 

But if it is about Osama bin Laden and we think his activities 

are in the Near East, you, Ambassador in Kenya, don’t need to 

have that information. 

I think things have gotten somewhat better, but I don’t believe 

that ambassadors are in the information chain because the Intelligence Community and the State Department still see Washington 

as the client, not overseas chiefs of mission. 

Mrs. LOWEY. That is extraordinary. This is a basic question, that 

the ambassadors have the highest clearance but the intelligence officers just choose not to provide you the information. So it is not 

that you don’t have the highest clearance, they are just choosing 

not to give you the information? 

Ms. BUSHNELL. I don’t want to leave you with the impression 

that chiefs of station or others are choosing not to give ambassadors information. The fact of the matter is that ambassadors are 

not privy to the information that goes from a station chief back to 

Washington because of issues of methods and sources. So yes—— 

Mrs. LOWEY. So yes, you do not have access? 

Ms. BUSHNELL. Correct. But it is not because anyone is saying 

I don’t think I am going to give my ambassador the information; 

it is because they are not allowed to give the ambassadors the information. 

Mrs. LOWEY. By whose law are they not allowed? 

Ms. BUSHNELL. You know, I don’t know. 

Do you know, is it a law or a regulation? 

Mr. PICKERING. I think we are getting into a sensitive subject, 

but the Intelligence Community’s internal directives are such that 

they are required to protect sources and methods in situations 

where individuals either have a need to know because they are directly engaged in the case; that is, how and in what way and from 

whom they collected information, and individuals who don’t in the 

view have a direct role in the collection need to know. 


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Now I, as Ambassador, was briefed by my station chief very frequently on activities and operations that they were conducting because when they blew up, they inevitably knew I would be on the 

hot seat. And so they gave me prior warning. And the best of them 

did that for me. 

I think in Prudence Bushnell’s case, the failure to provide information on the operation of the cell as opposed to just the presence—and she is in a better position to judge this—was a huge 

error because it didn’t permit her to take the active steps she 

would have to in defense of the embassy to deal with the issue at 

hand. 

I am not sure that is generalized, but it happened; and it 

shouldn’t happen again, in my view. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Let me just say as a member of the Intelligence 

Committee, I am very aware of the need to know. If you don’t ask 

the question, you are not going to get the information, and you 

need the information often to ask the question. 

But I will follow up. I think it is important that we have a classified briefing on this very essential issue. 

Ms. BUSHNELL. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I have 15 seconds left. 

I just wanted to follow up on the technology issue as well. Do you 

currently—whoever wants to answer—do you currently have the 

technology to support your work outside the embassy? Is it a 

money issue or you don’t have the technology? Do you need the 

technology? Can you comment on that as well? 

Ms. BUSHNELL. Very briefly, we have some technology. We do not 

have adequate technology, particularly compared to the private sector. And yes, we need it; and yes, it requires resources. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much, and I will turn to Ms. 

Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. I am intrigued by the suggestion of a 

quadrennial review type of program because I think it could help 

guide us as we look at these personnel, equipment, and other 

issues. Doubling the number of Foreign Service officers by 2012 

can’t be a goal itself. What do they do? What do we accomplish? 

What are our goals? So I would ask you as a panel what specific 

goals do you think that State and USAID should establish that 

would more clearly justify the request that we are getting? 

Mr. PICKERING. Perhaps I could take the first shot at that, and 

I know the others will have it. With respect to the point that Mr. 

Kunder made, I would recommend that you look at this report 

called ‘‘Forging a New Shield’’ done by the Project on National Security Reform. The central piece of this report, but it covers the 

wide inadequacies of our Washington-based national security system, is precisely the points he made. And in fact, a fairly elaborate 

system of preparing both guidelines and budgets for the longer 

term in the national security area, and it makes recommendations 

with respect to those, as well as a lot of other recommendations 

which I think would be important for the committee to know about 

in terms of the future organization of national security. 

Two of the current new appointees, General Jones, the National 

Security Adviser, and Admiral Blair, were on the report staff that 


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did this. It was not exclusively an ex-military staff. There were a 

lot of the rest of us who worked on it. 

I think in addition, let me if I can, cover what the people in the 

core diplomatic area will be doing. The others we have to—Mr. 

Kunder recommended doubling AIDS Foreign Service officers. We 

are not recommending doubling across the board, but we are recommending the increases I had in my statement. 

But some examples are, for example, to deal with multilateral diplomacy, an additional 100 staff. To deal with international law, 

which we see as a major asset to the United States, that the international rules can be made in an open and fair basis, which is obviously very much in harmony, in tune with our system; the creation 

of an additional staff of 20. 

Economics, where we have very few people, 8 percent of our people are expert in economics. And I don’t have to tell you the number one crisis today is economics; an additional 80 officers to deal 

with economics. 

Science and technology, something we have left behind. We currently have 35 people around the world dealing with science and 

technology. We recommend an additional 70 staff, public-private 

partnerships that outreach, that I talked to you all about, in terms 

of one of the principles that we have adopted as guidance for this 

report. We think an additional 100 people are needed to deal with 

those. 

Interagency coordination, again back to Mr. Kunder’s very, I 

think, salient point. Planning, developing and executing policies 

and budgets in Washington and across the board and staffing regional planning hubs overseas, we recommend 175 additional staff. 

In addition, there is, as you all know, no allocation of people to 

do training, certainly not in the core diplomatic area, so that everyone we train is pulled out of the front line. We don’t have any units 

at rest. We don’t have one up and two back. Everybody is in a fulltime job. In order to train, we have to take people out of a full time 

job. That means other people have to cover that person’s full-time 

job. So we are recommending a significant number, up to 1,000 

training spots and spots for people who are in movement, so in the 

end we don’t leave critical positions in the front line of diplomacy 

uncovered. 

And that basically constitutes the bulk of the 1,099 core people 

I recommended, and some of the 4,735 that the report recommends 

as a total in public diplomacy, in aid, in stabilization and reconstruction, in addition to core diplomacy. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. KUNDER. May I point out briefly this gets into—I reread the 

CRS, latest CRS report on foreign aid reform, and your question 

gets into I think the fundamental question that all of us are grappling with, which is, what do we want our foreign aid program to 

accomplish? We are spending $25 billion across all agencies. What 

do we hope to get for that? 

And this requires a much larger hearing, and I don’t want to 

take a lot of your time now, but the question of whether we are 

essentially doing this because America is good-hearted and we 

want to keep starving people alive, or whether we are doing this 

for national security interest or whether we are doing it for comVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:41 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 055951 PO 00000 Frm 00657 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A951P2.XXX A951P2

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mercial interest. The short answer is, for those of us who read the 

Foreign Assistance Act and try to follow the law, we are told to do 

all of the above. And hence, when you layer in additional earmarks—I am not here to insult the committee, I’m here at your request, but obviously we are told to do a lot of very specific things 

in malaria, in AIDS, and a whole bunch of other topics. And at the 

end of the day, the very bright officers we send off to carry out our 

nation’s foreign policy are torn in 100 different directions in terms 

of what they are supposed to accomplish in Malawi or Peru or Bangladesh. And so, this is a fundamental question. If we were a corporation we would have gone out of business a long time ago because we are in every line of business known to mankind. 

And so this question of should we do something similar to what 

DOD does every 4 years, and refresh the system and say what we 

really want to do the next 4 years out there in these 85 developing 

countries is focus on democracy or agriculture or women’s rights, 

whatever it is, and give them some honest guidance. They will do 

the job you tell them to do. But right now they are just pulled all 

over the place by trying to read a 45-year-old law that is now very 

thick. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Before I turn to Mr. Israel, I just have to follow up, 

if I may, because your comments are puzzling. And I wonder, with 

my great respect for you, whether it is a matter of who is the leader at the top. Is it really working so that the country team puts 

together a plan? 

Look, we all work. I work on food allergies and then I work on 

asthma and then I am chair of this committee and then I do homeland security. Life is complicated. And it is more complicated when 

you have to deal with a whole range of issues in a country. But 

that is what you are supposed to do in establishing a country team 

plan. 

And it is frankly it would seem to me any new leader is going 

to put together a plan and give some directives. And if the procedure works with the country team putting together a plan with an 

ambassador, and staff knows what they are going to do, they are 

going to send a plan up. And then, obviously, the Secretary of State 

and the President have the responsibility to say, Well, I think you 

should do it this way or I think you should do it that way. 

But it is hard for me to believe—I don’t want to say there hasn’t 

been really strong leadership—but it is hard to believe that you 

need a Foreign Assistance Act to determine goals and priorities 

and get the job done. So if I can take the liberty and give you a 

minute or two to answer and then turn to my colleague, Mr. Israel, 

because your comment was just confusing to me. 

Mr. KUNDER. The world is a complex place. And I am not going 

to suggest there are only three things we ought to do or we ought 

to use. As we don’t need what the military calls a 6,000 mile screwdriver from Washington, and tell our staff in Malawi precisely 

what they should do. But I think the system suffers, honestly 

Madam Chair, from the lack of an overall conceptual framework 

globally that says ‘‘our goal is to do the following.’’ If you told us 

our goal was to meet the Millennium Development Goals, eliminate 

illiteracy in the next 20 years, and AID was told I don’t care if you 

give the money to Pakistan or Cameroon; there is not going to be 


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any pressure to put more money in Pakistan; and I don’t care if 

you put the money in the Ministry of Education or build schools 

with it, I don’t care if you help the poorest people or get the technical experts paid, you eliminate illiteracy in the next 20 years, I 

believe that the State Department and USAID working with our 

international partners would eliminate illiteracy in the next 20 

years. But as soon as somebody comes in with a plan to eliminate 

illiteracy, we say I am sorry, we don’t have money in that category; 

would you like some AIDS money or malaria money, because that 

is what he have. 

Mrs. LOWEY. This is a long discussion and I don’t want to deprive 

my colleagues of asking questions, but I think we should have more 

discussion on this issue. Mr. Israel. 

Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you Madam Chair. 

Mr. Kunder, I was actually going to ask the panel about the Civilian Response Corps, but you triggered something and so I am 

going to address something that you said and ask for your comments. You talked about the Green Revolution of the sixties and 

seventies and how that was an effective promotion of American 

strategic policy through agriculture. I want to ask you about a different kind of diplomatic Green Revolution. I will tell you about a 

model I heard of and ask you whether you believe it should be integrated more fully into the State Department and USAID. 

I spend most of my time on energy issues and was in India several years ago and met with Dr. Pachauri who runs the Energy Research Institute of Delhi and received the Nobel Peace Prize, and 

shared it with Vice President Gore for his work on climate change. 

And he was showing me, he was torturing me with an abundance 

of PowerPoint slides on energy resources. And I was with our colleague, Congressman Tim Ryan, and just as we were on the verge 

of falling asleep, I respectfully asked Dr. Pachauri if he could put 

the PowerPoints aside and give me one game changer in U.S. foreign policy on green energy, something that was really changing 

the game. 

And he said to me, ‘‘Well that would be the six women of the 

Sunderbans.’’ I said, ‘‘What is that?’’ He said, Well, the Sunderbans 

is a delta in a delta region, no connectivity, no infrastructure, but 

there are six women who have a solar panel and they use the solar 

panel to charge solar lanterns and they rent the solar lanterns to 

the population. And that in the global war on terror, we have everything we need, we have the empowerment of women, we have 

the development of a sustainable small business, we have light. 

And I said, ‘‘Well what State Department program funds that? Is 

that a USAID program?’’ He said, ‘‘Oh no, that is a $35,000 grant 

from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory in Boulder, Colorado.’’ 

Do you believe that that kind of program would be more suitable 

as a USAID function or somewhere in the State Department? Do 

you believe that the State Department, in order to effectuate good 

national security policy and foreign policy, are to be embracing 

more of those clean energy micro-financing programs? Is that the 

modern day Green Revolution? 

Mr. KUNDER. I am sure Ambassador Pickering and Ambassador 

Bushnell will want to comment on this as well. The point you make 


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is an example of what is happening, the transformation of the development field. Fifty years ago, the only people really who cared 

about what was happening in the small villages of the developing 

world were a few folks at State and AID. But now we have a large 

NGO community, we have large private sector investment, we have 

many parts of the U.S. Government, as you just suggested, that are 

involved. And part of what is behind these PowerPoints in the 

training recommendations I am making is the notion that our diplomats and our aid professionals have got to be less operators and 

more ‘‘symphony directors’’ of the many, many players who are out 

there. Private sector investments from America and remittances 

from America, American immigrants, exceed our foreign aid account in most countries of the developing world. 

So the answer is yes, it is more than just micro-enterprise, I 

would argue. It is mobilizing all of these private sectors, for-profit 

and not-for-profit resources, because there is a lot going on out 

there, more than just our technical experts. But they have got to 

be trained to think that way and to be seen as synergistic players 

in the broader arena. I hope that is helpful. 

Mr. PICKERING. Mr. Israel, it is nice to see you again and thank 

you for asking what I think is a very trenchant question, and I certainly would echo the ‘‘yes.’’ I think Mr. Kunder has pointed out 

that he is engulfed in a sea of legislative restrictions. And, indeed, 

the history of the aid program is that we have passed 20 restrictions to stop every mistake we ever made. And when we do that, 

of course, we end up with no aid program. And he has shown you 

some of the frustration in his comments that the legislative boundaries or the legislative bindings are very difficult. 

We do need I think new foreign assistance legislation. We need 

to find a way for you to tell us, in general terms, go and do something that is innovative that will help people lift themselves out of 

the mire and the morass of poverty and get engaged in growth. Use 

technology, which is something I think we are very weak on. Aid 

over the years has generally shied away from technology or contracted it out. But technology is very important because it is the 

wave of the future and we do see how things like technology in 

your example, the six women of the Sunderban, or indeed how we 

see innovative ideas, micro-lending, can provide empowerment and 

innovation. 

Now, we don’t have to do it all. I agree with Mr. Kunder entirely. 

There is a huge community out there. But one of the things that 

has happened in our own government is we now have 22 or 26, 

whoever counts, different centers of aid activity. And one of the 

problems is that they all might be simply splendid, but who is coordinating and where are the priorities? And so in some sense we 

need to find a way to pull this together. 

I would be strongly in favor, if it looks like aid and involves aid, 

pull it in; but keep the mission agencies with their innovative skills 

and with their technology linked to the process so we don’t end up 

finding a kind of single solution that eliminates the innovation. 

And we have to find ways to think about that. 

I will just make one other point because I could go on forever. 

Mrs. LOWEY. We all could. 


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Mr. PICKERING. One of the ideas in this report is that we do not 

use what I would call empowered network task force activities in 

our national security ideas, writ broad, to pull together and develop 

the kind of ideas, whether they are policy ideas or development 

ideas or public diplomacy ideas, that we could. We have a very 

rigid structure, and the same people consider everything, and we 

are not well linked up and we have lots of bureaucratic stovepipes 

that don’t work well together. 

And so moving in a cross-cutting whole-of-government approach 

to some of these problems is, in my view, something that is very 

important in the wave of the future. And I think it fits with what 

we are talking about now. And it certainly fits with AID and its 

focus and where we are going. 

And for goodness’ sake, let’s adopt, adapt, and use and empower 

people outside who have all these wonderful ideas, who could make 

these happen, and we need new ways to do that. So we are on the 

cusp, I think, of discovering that we have a striking series of very 

interesting capabilities out there from all over. And our job together is how do we empower this and get it working in our common interest to do the kinds of things that obviously you and the 

Congress tell us are high priorities for you as we move ahead. 

And on one final point, don’t change the priorities every 5 years. 

Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I am tying to figure out, how many minutes? 

In the meantime, Mr. Crenshaw, do you want to begin while we 

are figuring out? I see there is a vote—how many more minutes? 

I just have to say, Mr. Ambassador, you haven’t convinced me, 

and I support the rewrite of the act, and Howard Berman is aggressively working on it, and we consult. But I still believe with 

strong leadership and direction you can get the message out. But 

I don’t want to take Mr. Crenshaw’s time. 

Let me ask my distinguished witnesses—I am willing to come 

back. We still have a question from Mr. Chandler and Mr. 

Crenshaw. What is your time like? We have three votes. Mr. Chandler, do you want to come back or submit a question for the record. 

Mr. CHANDLER. I hate to make them wait just for my questions. 

Mr. CRENSHAW. Same. 

Mr. CHANDLER. I have a lot of questions but I hate to make them 

wait for them. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Why don’t we do this, then, because I think your 

input is so valuable. Perhaps we can orchestrate an additional—not 

an additional hearing, but additional discussions so that we can 

pursue this, because I hate to keep you waiting a half hour, I 

guess, while we go and vote. 

So I am going to, instead of recess—this is very difficult for me 

because I would like to hear more of your outstanding advice and 

testimony—I am going to adjourn the hearing so we don’t keep you 

waiting a half hour. And I do hope—I know you have all been in 

to see many of us—we have the opportunity to continue this discussion. 

So thank you so much. The hearing is adjourned. 


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smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1109 here 55951B.213
683 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1110 here 55951B.214
684 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1111 here 55951B.215
685 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1112 here 55951B.216
686 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1113 here 55951B.217
687 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1114 here 55951B.218
688 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1115 here 55951B.219
689 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1116 here 55951B.220
690 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1117 here 55951B.221
691 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1118 here 55951B.222
692 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1119 here 55951B.223
693 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1120 here 55951B.224
694 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1121 here 55951B.225
695 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1122 here 55951B.226
696 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1123 here 55951B.227
697 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1124 here 55951B.228
698 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1125 here 55951B.229
699 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1126 here 55951B.230
700 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1127 here 55951B.231
701 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1128 here 55951B.232
702 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1129 here 55951B.233
703 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1130 here 55951B.234
704 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1131 here 55951B.235
705 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1132 here 55951B.236
706 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1133 here 55951B.237
707 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1134 here 55951B.238
708 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1135 here 55951B.239
709 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1136 here 55951B.240
710 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1137 here 55951B.241
711 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1138 here 55951B.242
712 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1139 here 55951B.243
713 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1140 here 55951B.244
714 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1141 here 55951B.245
715 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1142 here 55951B.246
716 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1143 here 55951B.247
717 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1144 here 55951B.248
718 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1145 here 55951B.249
719 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1146 here 55951B.250
720 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1147 here 55951B.251
721 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1148 here 55951B.252
722 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1149 here 55951B.253
723 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1150 here 55951B.254
724 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1151 here 55951B.255
725 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1152 here 55951B.256
726 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1153 here 55951B.257
727 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1154 here 55951B.258
728 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1155 here 55951B.259
729 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1156 here 55951B.260
730 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1157 here 55951B.261
731 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1158 here 55951B.262
732 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1159 here 55951B.263
733 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1160 here 55951B.264
734 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1161 here 55951B.265
735 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1162 here 55951B.266
736 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1163 here 55951B.267
737 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1164 here 55951B.268
738 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1165 here 55951B.269
739 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1166 here 55951B.270
740 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1167 here 55951B.271
741 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1168 here 55951B.272
742 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1169 here 55951B.273
743 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1170 here 55951B.274
744 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1171 here 55951B.275
745 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1172 here 55951B.276
746 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1173 here 55951B.277
747 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1174 here 55951B.278
748 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1175 here 55951B.279
749 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1176 here 55951B.280
750 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1177 here 55951B.281
751 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1178 here 55951B.282
752 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1179 here 55951B.283
753 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1180 here 55951B.284
754 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1181 here 55951B.285
755 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1182 here 55951B.286
756 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1183 here 55951B.287
757 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1184 here 55951B.288
758 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1185 here 55951B.289
759 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1186 here 55951B.290
760 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1187 here 55951B.291
761 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1188 here 55951B.292
762 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1189 here 55951B.293
763 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 1190 here 55951B.294
764 


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(i) 

W I T N E S S E S 

Page 

Adams, Dr. Gordon .................................................................................................. 521 

Baldo, Suliman ......................................................................................................... 463 

Bent, R. G ................................................................................................................. 285

Bushnell, Prudence .................................................................................................. 613 

Clinton, Hon. H. R ................................................................................................... 1 

Fulgham, A. L .......................................................................................................... 57 

Garner, Rodger ......................................................................................................... 339 

Hamre, Dr. J. J ........................................................................................................ 521 

Haugaard, Lisa ........................................................................................................ 387 

Herna ́ndez, A. P ....................................................................................................... 387 

Johnson, David ......................................................................................................... 339 

Kunder, James ......................................................................................................... 613 

Lew, Jacob ................................................................................................................ 163 

Lindborg, Nancy ....................................................................................................... 521 

Moose, Ambassador George .................................................................................... 521 

Naland, J. K ............................................................................................................. 650 

Olson, Joy ................................................................................................................. 387

Pickering, Thomas ................................................................................................... 613 

Prendergast, John .................................................................................................... 463 

Shannon, Thomas .................................................................................................... 339 

Shinn, David ............................................................................................................ 463 

Walsh, T. J ............................................................................................................... 231 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1