Capability of the People’s Republic of China to 

Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network 

Exploitation 

Prepared for 

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission 

 

Project Manager 

Steve DeWeese 703.556.1086 steve.deweese@ngc.com 

Principal Author 

Bryan Krekel 

Subject Matter Experts 

George Bakos 

Christopher Barnett 

Northrop Grumman Corporation 

Information Systems Sector 

7575 Colshire Drive 

McLean, VA 22102 

October 9, 2009 
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Report on the Capability of the People’s Republic of China to 

Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation 

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Table of Contents 

Scope Note ................................................................................................ 4

Executive Summary ................................................................................... 6

Chinese Computer Network Operations Strategy .................................... 10

Chinese Computer Network Operations During Conflict .......................... 23

Key Entities in Chinese Computer Network Operations ........................... 30

Cyber-Espionage ..................................................................................... 51

Operational Profile of An Advanced Cyber Intrusion ................................ 59

Timeline of Significant Chinese Related Cyber Events 1999-Present ...... 67

Chronology of Alleged Chinese Computer Network Exploitation Events 

Targeting US and Foreign Networks ........................................................ 68

Commonly Used Acronyms ...................................................................... 75

Glossary of Technical Terms .................................................................... 76

Bibliography ............................................................................................. 82
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Scope Note 

This paper presents a comprehensive open source assessment of China’s capability 

to conduct computer network operations (CNO) both during peacetime and periods of 

conflict. The result will hopefully serve as useful reference to policymakers, China 

specialists, and information operations professionals. The research for this project 

encompassed five broad categories to show how the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) is pursuing computer network operations (CNO) and the extent to which it is 

being implemented by examining: 

a) The PLA‘s strategy for computer network operations at the campaign and 

strategic level to understand how China is integrating this capability into overall 

planning efforts and operationalizing it among its field units; 

b) Who are the principal institutional and individual “actors” in Chinese CNO and 

what linkages may exist between the civilian and military operators; 

c) Possible targets of Chinese CNO against the US during a conflict to 

understand how the PLA might attempt to seize information control over the 

US or similar technologically advanced military during a conflict; 

d) The characteristics of ongoing network exploitation activities targeting the US 

Government and private sector that are frequently attributed to China; 

e) A timeline of alleged Chinese intrusions into US government and industry 

networks to provide broader context for these activities. 

The basis for this work was a close review of authoritative open source PLA writings, 

interviews with Western PLA and information warfare analysts, reviews of Western 

scholarship on these subjects, and forensic analysis of intrusions into US networks 

assessed to have Chinese origins. The research draws heavily from journals and 

articles published by the Chinese National Defense University and the Academy of 

Military Sciences, the military’s highest authority for issues of doctrine, strategy, and 

force modernization. Many of these publications offer substantive insights into 

current thinking on strategy and doctrinal issues related to information warfare and 

CNO. Additional insights into the role of information warfare in broader campaign 

doctrine and strategy came from The Science of Military Strategy, The Science of 

Campaigns, two of the most authoritative sources on the subject available in the open 

press. The military’s official newspaper, The PLA Daily, and a range of Chinese 

military journals, official media, provincial and local media as well as non-PRC 

regional media, all provided data on information warfare (IW) training events. 
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Technical assessments of operational tradecraft observed in intrusions attributed to 

China are the result of extensive forensic analysis and discussions with information 

security professionals who follow these issues closely. A review of Chinese technical 

journal articles on computer network attack and exploitation techniques also aided 

this study. This research was obtained from online Chinese databases accessible in 

the US. 

A regular review of the contents and discussions posted on Chinese hacker Websites 

contributed to the analysis of these groups’ activities and capabilities. The focus of 

this effort was to identify possible interactions between members of these groups and 

the government. Conversations with Western information security analysts who 

closely follow these groups and actors contributed immensely to focusing the 

research and greatly aided our understanding of China’s hacker communities. 

This study was not scoped to include research in China, consequently, the authors 

focused on the materials and insights presently available outside of China. Additional 

in-country research on this subject is an avenue of future effort that can—and 

should—supplement the work presented here. 
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Executive Summary 

The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a decade into a 

sweeping military modernization program that has fundamentally transformed its 

ability to fight high tech wars. The Chinese military, using increasingly networked 

forces capable of communicating across service arms and among all echelons of 

command, is pushing beyond its traditional missions focused on Taiwan and toward a 

more regional defense posture. This modernization effort, known as 

informationization, is guided by the doctrine of fighting “Local War Under 

Informationized Conditions,” which refers to the PLA’s ongoing effort to develop a 

fully networked architecture capable of coordinating military operations on land, in air, 

at sea, in space and across the electromagnetic spectrum. 

This doctrinal focus is providing the impetus for the development of an advanced IW 

capability, the stated goal of which is to establish control of an adversary’s 

information flow and maintain dominance in the battlespace. Increasingly, Chinese 

military strategists have come to view information dominance as the precursor for 

overall success in a conflict. The growing importance of IW to China’s People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) is also driving it to develop more comprehensive computer 

network exploitation (CNE) techniques to support strategic intelligence collection 

objectives and to lay the foundation for success in potential future conflicts. 

One of the chief strategies driving the process of informatization in the PLA is the 

coordinated use of CNO, electronic warfare (EW), and kinetic strikes designed to 

strike an enemy’s networked information systems, creating “blind spots” that various 

PLA forces could exploit at predetermined times or as the tactical situation warranted. 

Attacks on vital targets such as an adversary’s intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) systems will be largely the responsibility of EW and 

counterspace forces with an array of increasingly sophisticated jamming systems and 

anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. Attacks on an adversary’s data and networks will 

likely be the responsibility of dedicated computer network attack and exploitation 

units. 

The Chinese have adopted a formal IW strategy called “Integrated Network Electronic 

Warfare” (INEW) that consolidates the offensive mission for both computer network 

attack (CNA) and EW under PLA General Staff Department’s (GSD) 4th Department 

(Electronic Countermeasures)1

 while the computer network defense (CND) and 

 

1

 The General Staff Department is the highest organizational authority in the PLA responsible for the 

daily administrative duties of the military. It is comprised of seven functional departments: operations, 

intelligence, signals intelligence, electronic countermeasures, communications, mobilization, foreign 

relations, and management. 
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intelligence gathering responsibilities likely belong to the GSD 3rd Department 

(Signals Intelligence), and possibly a variety of the PLA’s specialized IW militia units. 

This strategy, which relies on a simultaneous application of electronic warfare and 

computer network operations against an adversary’s command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 

networks and other essential information systems, appears to be the foundation for 

Chinese offensive IW. Analysis of this strategy suggests that CNO tools will be 

widely employed in the earliest phases of a conflict, and possibly preemptively 

against an enemy’s information systems and C4ISR systems. 

The PLA is training and equipping its force to use a variety of IW tools for intelligence 

gathering and to establish information dominance over its adversaries during a 

conflict. PLA campaign doctrine identifies the early establishment of information 

dominance over an enemy as one of the highest operational priorities in a conflict; 

INEW appears designed to support this objective. 

The PLA is reaching out across a wide swath of Chinese civilian sector to meet the 

intensive personnel requirements necessary to support its burgeoning IW capabilities, 

incorporating people with specialized skills from commercial industry, academia, and 

possibly select elements of China’s hacker community. Little evidence exists in open 

sources to establish firm ties between the PLA and China’s hacker community, 

however, research did uncover limited cases of apparent collaboration between more 

elite individual hackers and the PRC’s civilian security services. The caveat to this is 

that amplifying details are extremely limited and these relationships are difficult to 

corroborate. 

China is likely using its maturing computer network exploitation capability to support 

intelligence collection against the US Government and industry by conducting a long 

term, sophisticated, computer network exploitation campaign. The problem is 

characterized by disciplined, standardized operations, sophisticated techniques, 

access to high-end software development resources, a deep knowledge of the 

targeted networks, and an ability to sustain activities inside targeted networks, 

sometimes over a period of months. 

Analysis of these intrusions is yielding increasing evidence that the intruders are 

turning to Chinese “black hat” programmers (i.e. individuals who support illegal 

hacking activities) for customized tools that exploit vulnerabilities in software that 

vendors have not yet discovered. This type of attack is known as a “zero day exploit” 

(or “0-day”) as the defenders haven't yet started counting the days since the release 

of vulnerability information. Although these relationships do not prove any 

government affiliation, it suggests that the individuals participating in ongoing 

penetrations of US networks have Chinese language skills and have well established 
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ties with the Chinese underground hacker community. Alternately, it may imply that 

the individuals targeting US networks have access to a well resourced infrastructure 

that is able to broker these relationships with the Chinese blackhat hacker community 

and provide tool development support often while an operation is underway. 

The depth of resources necessary to sustain the scope of computer network 

exploitation targeting the US and many countries around the world coupled with the 

extremely focused targeting of defense engineering data, US military operational 

information, and China-related policy information is beyond the capabilities or profile 

of virtually all organized cybercriminal enterprises and is difficult at best without some 

type of state-sponsorship. 

The type of information often targeted for exfiltration has no inherent monetary value 

to cybercriminals like credit card numbers or bank account information. If the stolen 

information is being brokered to interested countries by a third party, the activity can 

still technically be considered “state-sponsored,” regardless of the affiliation of the 

actual operators at the keyboard. 

The US information targeted to date could potentially benefit a nation-state defense 

industry, space program, selected civilian high technology industries, foreign 

policymakers interested in US leadership thinking on key China issues, and foreign 

military planners building an intelligence picture of US defense networks, logistics, 

and related military capabilities that could be exploited during a crisis. The breadth of 

targets and range of potential “customers” of this data suggests the existence of a 

collection management infrastructure or other oversight to effectively control the 

range of activities underway, sometimes nearly simultaneously. 

In a conflict with the US, China will likely use its CNO capabilities to attack select 

nodes on the military’s Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) 

and unclassified DoD and civilian contractor logistics networks in the continental US 

(CONUS) and allied countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The stated goal in targeting 

these systems is to delay US deployments and impact combat effectiveness of troops 

already in theater. 

No authoritative PLA open source document identifies the specific criteria for 

employing computer network attack against an adversary or what types of CNO 

actions PRC leaders believe constitutes an act of war. 

Ultimately, the only distinction between computer network exploitation and attack is 

the intent of the operator at the keyboard: The skill sets needed to penetrate a 

network for intelligence gathering purposes in peacetime are the same skills 

necessary to penetrate that network for offensive action during wartime. The 

difference is what the operator at that keyboard does with (or to) the information once 
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inside the targeted network. If Chinese operators are, indeed, responsible for even 

some of the current exploitation efforts targeting US Government and commercial 

networks, then they may have already demonstrated that they possess a mature and 

operationally proficient CNO capability. 

 
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Chinese Computer Network Operations Strategy 

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is actively developing a capability 

for computer network operations (CNO) and is creating the strategic guidance, 

tools and trained personnel necessary to employ it in support of traditional 

warfighting disciplines. Nonetheless, the PLA has not openly published a CNO 

strategy with the formal vetting of the Central Military Commission (CMC), China's top 

military decisionmaking body, or the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), its leading 

body for doctrine and strategy development . The PLA has however, developed a 

strategy called “Integrated Network Electronic Warfare” that is guiding the 

employment of CNO and related information warfare tools. The strategy is 

characterized by the combined employment of network warfare tools and electronic 

warfare weapons against an adversary’s information systems in the early phases of a 

conflict. 

Chinese information warfare strategy is closely aligned with the PLA’s doctrine for 

fighting Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions, the current doctrine that seeks 

to develop a fully networked architecture capable of coordinating military operations 

on land, in air, at sea, in space and across the electromagnetic spectrum. China’s 

military has shifted from a reliance on massed armies of the Maoist Era People’s War 

doctrine and is becoming a fully mechanized force linked by advanced C4ISR 

technologies. 

Informationization is essentially a hybrid development process, continuing the trend 

of mechanization and retaining much of the current force structure while overlaying 

advanced information systems on it to create a fully networked command and control 

(C2) infrastructure.2

 The concept allows the PLA to network its existing force 

structure without radically revising current acquisition strategies or order of battle. 

• PLA assessments of current and future conflicts note that campaigns will be 

conducted in all domains simultaneously—ground, air, sea, and 

electromagnetic—but it is the focus of the latter domain in particular that has 

driven the PLA’s adoption of the Informationized Conditions doctrine.3

 

 

2 China's National Defense in 2008, Information Office of the State Council of the People's 

Republic of China, Beijing, 29 December 2008. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-

01/20/content_74133294.htm

3 China's National Defense in 2004, Information Office of the State Council of the People's 

Republic of China, Beijing, 27 December 2004, available at: 

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/defense2004/defense2004.html | China's 

National Defense in 2006, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of 

China, Beijing, 29 December 2006, available at http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/newschannels/2006-12/29/content_691844.htm
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This doctrine is also influencing how the PLA approaches its military campaigns, 

attempting to shift from the traditional combined arms operations to what the PLA 

refers to as “integrated joint operations under informationized conditions.” The former 

is characterized by large mechanized formations fighting in tandem but without a 

shared common operating picture and the latter stresses the dominance of 

information technology and its ability to shape ground, sea, air, and space into a 

multi-dimensional battlefield. In the integrated joint operations framework, the PLA 

uses information network technology to connect its services and warfighting 

disciplines into an integrated operational whole, a concept that is also shaping the 

PLA’s approach to information warfare. 

Achieving information dominance is one of the key goals for the PLA at the 

strategic and campaign level, according to The Science of Military Strategy and 

The Science of Campaigns, two of the PLA’s most authoritative public 

statements on its doctrine for military operations. 4 Seizing control of an 

adversary’s information flow and establishing information dominance (zhi xinxi quan) 

are essential requirements in the PLA’s campaign strategy and are considered so 

fundamental that The Science of Military Strategy considers them a prerequisite for 

seizing air and naval superiority.5

• The Science of Military Strategy and The Science of Campaigns both identify 

enemy C4ISR and logistics systems networks as the highest priority for IW 

attacks, which may guide targeting decisions against the US or other 

technologically advanced opponents during a conflict. 

• The Science of Campaigns states that IW must mark the start of a campaign 

and, used properly, can enable overall operational success.6

The seeming urgency in making the transition from a mechanized to an 

informationized force is driven by the perception that winning local wars against 

adversaries with greater technological advantages, such as the United States, may 

not be possible without a strong information warfare capability to first control enemy 

access to its own information.7

 

4

 Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, chief editors, The Science of Campaigns, Beijing, 

National Defense University Press, May 2000. See chapter six, section one for an overview of 

information warfare in campaign settings. | Peng Guangqiang and Yao Youzhi, eds, The 

Science of Military Strategy, Military Science Publishing House, English edition, 2005, p. 338 5

 Peng and Yao, p. 336. 

6

 OSC, CPP20010125000044, “Science of Campaigns, Chapter 6, Section 1,” 1 May 2000 7

 OSC, CPP20081112563002, “On the Trend of Changes in Operations Theory Under 

Informatized Conditions,” by Li Zhilin, China Military Science, Winter 2008; | OSC, 
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• PLA discussions of information dominance focus on attacking an adversary’s 

C4ISR infrastructure to prevent or disrupt the acquisition, processing, or 

transmission of information in support of decisionmaking or combat operations. 

The goal is to combine these paralyzing strikes on the command and control 

architecture with possible hard kill options using missiles, air strikes, or Special 

Forces against installations or hardware. 

• Degrading these networks potentially prevents the enemy from collecting, 

processing, and disseminating information or accessing information necessary 

to sustain combat operations, allowing PLA forces to achieve operational 

objectives such as landing troops on Taiwan in a cross-strait scenario before 

the US can effectively intervene.

The PLA has also come to recognize the importance of controlling space-based 

information assets as a means of achieving true information dominance, calling it the 

“new strategic high ground,” and many of its advocates consider space warfare to be 

a subset of information warfare.8

 The PLA is seeking to develop the capability to use 

space for military operations while denying this same capability to an adversary. PLA 

authors acknowledge that space dominance is also essential for operating joint 

campaigns and for maintaining the initiative on the battlefield. Conversely, they view 

the denial of an adversary’s space systems as an essential component of information 

warfare and a prerequisite for victory. 9

The PLA maintains a strong R&D focus on counterspace weapons and though many 

of the capabilities currently under development exceed purely cyber or EW options, 

they are nonetheless, still considered “information warfare” weapons.10 Among the 

most high profile of China’s ASAT capabilities are kinetic weapons, which rely on 

projectiles or warheads fired at high speed to impact a satellite directly. The 

successful January 2007 test of this capability against a defunct Chinese weather 

satellite demonstrated that the PLA has moved past theoretical discussions of this 

option and toward an operational capability. Directed energy weapons, such as 

lasers, high power microwave systems and nuclear generated electromagnetic pulse 

 CPP20081028682007, “A Study of the Basic Characteristics of the Modes of Thinking in 

Informatized Warfare,” by Li Deyi, China Military Science, Summer 2007. 

8

 Dean Cheng, PLA Views on Space: The Prerequisite for Information Dominance,” Center for Naval 

Analysis, CME D0016978.A1, October 2007, p. 7 9

 Integrated Air, Space-Based Strikes Vital in Informatized Warfare | OSC, CPP20081014563001, “On 

the Development of Military Space Power,” China Military Science, March 2008 10 OSC, CPP20080123572009, “PRC S&T: Concept of Kinetic Orbit Weapons and Their 

Development,” Modern Defense Technology, 1 Apr 05 
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attacks (EMP), are under development. The perceived benefits are the immediacy, 

and in the case of EMP, the broad scope of the effect.11

While the use of any of these weapons against US satellites could quickly escalate a 

crisis, detonating a nuclear device to create an EMP effect runs an especially high 

risk of crossing US “red lines” for the definition of a nuclear attack, even if the attack 

is carried out in the upper reaches of the atmosphere. Additionally, EMP is nondiscriminatory in its targeting and though the PLA is training and preparing its force to 

operate under “complex electromagnetic conditions,” many of its own space-based 

and possibly terrestrial communications systems may be damaged by either high 

altitude or more localized EMP attacks. At a minimum, EMP and other types of ASAT 

attacks expose the PLA to retaliatory strikes against China’s own burgeoning satellite 

constellation, potentially crippling its nascent space-based C4ISR architecture. 

A full discussion of Chinese capabilities for space information warfare is beyond the 

scope of the present study’s focus on computer network operations, however, the 

subject is becoming central to the PLA’s discussions of information warfare and in its 

analysis of informationization in the Chinese force structure. 

Integrated Network Electronic Warfare 

The conceptual framework currently guiding PLA IW strategy is called “Integrated 

Network Electronic Warfare” (wangdian yitizhan) a combined application of computer 

network operations and electronic warfare used in a coordinated or simultaneous 

attack on enemy C4ISR networks and other key information systems. The objective 

is to deny an enemy access to information essential for continued combat operations. 

The adoption of this strategy suggests that the PLA is developing specific 

roles for CNO during wartime and possibly peacetime as well. 

• PLA campaign strategy also reflects an intention to integrate CNO and EW 

into the overall operational plan, striking enemy information sensors and 

networks first to seize information dominance, likely before other forces 

engage in combat. 

• The INEW strategy relies on EW to jam, deceive, and suppress the enemy’s 

information acquisition, processing, and dissemination capabilities; CNA is 

 

11 Kevin Pollpeter, Leah Caprice, Robert Forte, Ed Francis, Alison Peet, Seizing the Ultimate High 

Ground: Chinese Military Writings on Space and Counterspace, Center for Intelligence Research and 

Analysis, April 2009, p. 32. 
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intended to sabotage information processing to “attack the enemy’s 

perceptions.”12 

Consistent references to various elements of INEW by PLA authors in authoritative 

publications strongly suggest that the PLA has adopted it as its dominant IW strategy, 

despite the apparent lack of any publicly available materials indicating that the 

principle has received official vetting from senior PLA leaders. 

• The originator of the INEW strategy, Major General Dai Qingmin, a prolific and 

outspoken supporter of modernizing the PLA’s IW capabilities, first described 

the combined use of network and electronic warfare to seize control of the 

electromagnetic spectrum as early as 1999 in articles and a book entitled An 

Introduction to Information Warfare, written while on faculty at the PLA’s 

Electronic Engineering Academy.13

• An uncorroborated Taiwan media source claims that Major General Dai 

drafted a 2002 internal PLA report stating that the PLA adopted an IW strategy 

using integrated network and electronic warfare as its core.14

• A July 2008 analysis of PLA information security architecture requirements by 

a researcher from the Second Artillery College of Engineering in Xian noted 

that “electronic warfare and computer network warfare are the two primary 

modes of attack in information warfare....By using a combination of electronic 

warfare and computer network warfare, i.e., "integrated network and electronic 

warfare," enemy information systems can be totally destroyed or paralyzed.”15 

• A 2009 source offered what may be the most succinct illustration of how INEW 

might be employed on the battlefield, stating that INEW includes “using 

techniques such as electronic jamming, electronic deception and suppression 

to disrupt information acquisition and information transfer, launching a virus 

attack or hacking to sabotage information processing and information 

utilization, and using anti-radiation and other weapons based on new 

mechanisms to destroy enemy information platforms and information 

facilities.”16

 

12 OSC, CPP20020624000214, “On Integrating Network Warfare and Electronic Warfare,” China 

Military Science, Academy of Military Science, Winter 2002 13 OSC, FTS20000105000705, “Fu Quanyou Commends New Army Book on IW,” 

PLA Daily, 7 December 1999. 

14 OSC, CPP20071023318001, “Taiwan Military Magazine on PRC Military Net Force, Internet 

Controls,” Ch'uan-Ch'iu Fang-Wei Tsa-Chih 1 March 2007. 

15 OSC, CPP20090528670007, “PRC S&T: Constructing PLA Information System Security 

Architecture, Computer Security, (Jisuanji Anquan), 1 Feb 2009. 

16 OSC, CPP20090528670007, “PRC S&T: Constructing PLA Information System Security 

Architecture, Computer Security, (Jisuanji Anquan), 1 Feb 2009. 
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In 2002, Dai published An Introduction to Integrated Network Electronic Warfare,

formally codifying the concepts behind what would become the guiding strategy for 

the use of CNO during wartime.17 He argued in a seminal article that same year that 

the growing importance of integrated networks, sensors, and command structures 

makes the destruction and protection of C4ISR systems a focal point for Chinese 

IW.18

• Both works were published with a strong endorsement from Chief of the 

General Staff, Gen Fu Quanyou, who lauded the groundbreaking nature of the 

ideas in both books; his endorsement suggests that Dai may have had 

powerful allies supporting this approach to IW who perhaps enabled his 

eventual promotion to head the General Staff Department’s 4th Department, 

which is responsible for electronic countermeasures and it seems, the PLA’s 

offensive CNA mission, as well. 

• Dai’s promotion in 2000 to lead the GSD 4th Department likely consolidated 

both the institutional authority for the PLA’s IW mission in this organization and 

INEW as the PLA’s official strategy for information warfare.19

Proponents of the INEW strategy specify that the goal is to attack only the key 

nodes through which enemy command and control data and logistics 

information passes and which are most likely to support the campaign’s 

strategic objectives, suggesting that this strategy has influenced PLA planners 

toward a more qualitative and possibly effects-based approach to IW targeting. 

Attacks on an adversary’s information systems are not meant to suppress all 

networks, transmissions, and sensors or to affect their physical destruction. The 

approach outlined by Dai and others suggests that the INEW strategy is intended to 

target only those nodes which the PLA’s IW planners assess will most deeply affect 

enemy decisionmaking, operations, and morale. 

• The PLA’s Science of Campaigns notes that one role for IW is to create 

windows of opportunity for other forces to operate without detection or with a 

lowered risk of counterattack by exploiting the enemy’s periods of “blindness,” 

“deafness” or “paralysis” created by information attacks. 

 

17 OSC, CPP20020226000078, “Book Review: 'Introduction to Integrated Network-Electronic' 

Warfare,” Beijing, Jiefangjun Bao, 26 February 2002. 18 OSC, CPP20020624000214, Dai Qingmin, “On Integrating Network Warfare and Electronic 

Warfare,” China Military Science, Academy of Military Science, Winter 2002 19 Regarding the GSD 4th Department’s leadership of the IW mission, see James Mulvenon, 

“PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, Doctrine, Organizations, and Capability,” in 

Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, Andrew 

Scobell, eds., Strategic Studies Institute, April 2009, p. 272-273. 
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• Dai and others stress that the opportunities created by the application of the 

INEW strategy should be quickly exploited with missile assaults or other 

firepower attacks in a combination of “hard and soft attacks” that should 

dominate in the early stages of a campaign.20 

• A December 2008 article in the AMS journal, China Military Science, asserts 

that the PLA must disrupt or damage an enemy’s decisionmaking capacity 

through a combined application of network warfare and other elements of IW 

to jam and control the movement of an enemy’s information to achieve 

information superiority.21

Integrated Network Electronic Warfare in PLA Training 

PLA field exercises featuring components of INEW provide additional insights 

into how planners are considering integrating this strategy across different 

units and disciplines in support of a campaign’s objectives. IW training featuring 

combined CNA/CND/EW is increasingly common for all branches of the PLA and at 

all echelons from Military Region command down to the battalion or company and is 

considered a core capability for the PLA to achieve a fully informationized status by 

2009, as directed by PRC President and CMC Chairman Hu Jintao. 

• President Hu Jintao, during a speech at the June 2006 All-Army Military 

Training Conference, ordered the PLA to focus on training that features 

“complex electromagnetic environments,” the PLA’s term for operating in 

conditions with multiple layers of electronic warfare and network attack, 

according to an authoritative article in Jiefangjun Bao.22

• During a June 2004 opposed force exercise among units in the Beijing Military 

Region, a notional enemy “Blue Force” (which are adversary units in the PLA) 

used CNA to penetrate and seize control of the Red Force command network 

within minutes of the start of the exercise, consistent with the INEW strategy’s 

emphasis on attacking enemy C2 information systems at the start of combat. 

 

20 OSC, CPP20030728000209, “Chinese Military's Senior Infowar Official Stresses Integrated 

Network/EW Operations,” Beijing China Military Science, 20 April 2003. | OSC, CPP20020624000214, 

“Chinese Military's Senior Infowar Official Explains Four Capabilities Required,” Jiefangjun Bao, 01 Jul 

2003 | OSC, CPP2003728000210, “PLA Journal on Guiding Ideology of Information Operations in 

Joint Campaigns,” 20 April 2003 | OSC, CPP2003728000210, Ke Zhansan, “Studies in Guiding 

Ideology of Information Operations in Joint Campaigns,” China Military Science, Academy of Military 

Science, 20 April 2003. 

21 OSC, CPP20090127563002, Shi Zhihua, “Basic Understanding of Information Operation 

Command,” China Military Science, 27 January, 2009. 22 OSC, CPP20060711715001, “JFJB Commentator on Promoting PLA's Informatized Military 

Training” 10 July 2006. 
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The PLA may be using training like this to evaluate the effects of targeting 

enemy tactical or theater command center networks.23

• In October 2004, a brigade from the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps, responsible 

for the conventional and nuclear missile forces, conducted training that 

featured INEW elements and relied upon a networked C2 infrastructure to 

maintain multi-echelon communications with a variety of supporting units and 

command elements while defending against EW attacks, according to PLA 

reporting.24

• A Lanzhou Military Region division, in February 2009, conducted an opposed 

force information warfare exercise featuring computer network attack and 

defense scenarios while countering electronic warfare attacks, a common 

feature of much informationized warfare training, according to a PLA television 

news program.25

The PLA’s 2007 revised Outline for Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE) 

training guidance directed all services to make training under complex 

electromagnetic environments (CEME) the core of its campaign and tactical 

training, according to the director of the General Staff Department's Military 

Training and Arms Department.26 The focus on developing capabilities to fight 

in informationized conditions reflects much of the core of the INEW strategy 

and continues to shape current and future training, suggesting that despite 

Dai Qingmin’s retirement from the PLA, this strategy continues to serve as 

the core of Chinese IW. 

 

• The PLA has established a network of at least 12 informationized training 

facilities that allow field units to rotate through for exercises in 

environments featuring realistic multi-arms training in which jamming and 

interference degrade PLA communications. The flagship facility at Zhurihe 

in the Beijing Military Region also features the PLA’s first unit permanently 

designated as an “informationized Blue Force,” likely a Beijing Military 

Region armored regiment from the 38th Group Army’s 6th Armored Division, 

according to open source reporting.27 The blue force unit serves as a 

 

23 OSC, CPP20040619000083, “Highlights: Chinese PLA's Recent Military Training Activities,” 

June 6, 2004

24 OSC, CPM20041126000042 “Military Report" program on Beijing CCTV-7, October 31, 

2004, 

25 OSC, CPM20090423017004, “Lanzhou MR Division Conducts Information Confrontation 

Exercise,” from “Military Report" newscast, CCTV-7, 2 February 2009. 26 OSC, CPP20080801710005, “PRC: JFJB on Implementing New Outline of Military Training, 

Evaluation”, 1 August 2008. 

27 Asian Studies Detachment, IIR 2 227 0141 09, “6th Armored Division, Beijing Military Region 

Information Systems Modernization,” 26 January 2009, (U) 
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notional adversary employing foreign tactics and making extensive use of 

information technology.28

• The PLA’s large multi-military region exercise for battalion level units, 

named Kuayue 2009 (Stride 2009) featured the first-ever simultaneous 

deployment of units from four military regions and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 

units. The exercise focused on implementing the 2007 Training Outline for 

informationized training and included multiple mission scenarios—

amphibious landing, air assault, close air support—under complex 

electromagnetic environments.29

The emphasis of the 2007 training directive on operating in complex electromagnetic 

environment and under informationized conditions may drive an expansion of 

personnel training in IW specialties—including offensive network warfare skills—to 

meet the demand among field units for skilled personnel. The PLA maintains a 

network of universities and research institutes that support information warfare 

related education either in specialized courses or more advanced degree granting 

programs. The curriculum and research interests of affiliated faculty reflect the PLA’s 

an emphasis on computer network operations. 

• The National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) in Changsha, Hunan 

Province is a comprehensive military university under the direct leadership of 

the Central Military Commission. NUDT teaches a variety of information 

security courses and the faculty of its College of Information Systems and 

Management and College of Computer Sciences are actively engaged in 

research on offensive network operations techniques or exploits, according to 

a citation search of NUDT affiliated authors.30 

• The PLA Science and Engineering University provides advanced information 

warfare and networking training and also serves as a center for defense 

related scientific, technological, and military equipment research.31 Recent IWrelated faculty research has focused largely on rootkit design and detection, 

 

28 OSC, CPF20081205554001, “Beijing MR Base EM Training Upgrade Advances PLA 

Capabilities,” 5 December 2008 | OSC, CPF20080912554001001, “PLA Blue Force Units 

Bolster Training Realism,” 12 September 2008 | Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today,

Routledge, 2006, p. 78. 

29 OSC, CPP20090908088006,” Lanzhou MR Division in ‘Stride-2009’ Exercise Boosts Fighting 

Capacity,” Jiefangjun Bao, 7 September 2009. 30 Profile of NUDT available at http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2007-

06/26/content_858557.htm

31 OSC, FTS19990702000961, “PRC Establishes New Military Schools Per Jiang Decree,” 

Xinhua, 2 July, 1999 | “China Establishes New Military Schools,” People’s Daily, 7 March 

1999, available at: 

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/199907/03/enc_19990703001001_TopNews.html
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including rootkit detection on China’s indigenously developed Kylin operating 

system. 

• PLA Information Engineering University provides PLA personnel in a variety of 

fields advanced technical degrees and training in all aspects of information 

systems, including information security and information warfare.32 

Deterrence and Computer Network Operations 

The Chinese government has not definitively stated what types of CNA actions 

it considers to be an act of war which may reflect nothing more than a desire to 

hold this information close to preserve strategic flexibility in a crisis. With the 

exception of the Taiwan independence issue, the PRC leadership generally avoids 

defining specific “red lines” for the use force; this is likely true for its CNA capabilities.

• Effective deterrence requires capable and credible force with clear 

determination to employ it if necessary and a means of communicating this 

intent with the potential adversary, according to the Science of Military 

Strategy.

33

• The Science of Military Strategy also stresses that deterrent measures can 

include fighting a small war to avoid a much larger conflict. Tools like CNA and 

EW, which are perceived to be “bloodless” by many PLA IW operators, may 

become first choice weapons for a limited strike against adversary targets to 

deter further escalation of a crisis. 34 This concept may also have implications 

for PRC leadership willingness to use IW weapons preemptively if they believe 

that information-based attacks don’t cross an adversary’s “red lines”. 

The PLA may also use IW to target enemy decisionmaking by attacking information 

systems with deceptive information to shape perceptions or beliefs. The Science of 

Military Strategy highlights this as a key contribution that IW can make in support of 

the overall campaign. Data manipulation or destruction may be perceived as a 

valuable tool to aid broader strategic psychological or deception operations or to 

support perception management objectives as part of a deterrence message. 

• A 2003 article by the Deputy Commander of Guangzhou Military Region, 

entitled “Information Attack and Information Defense in Joint Campaigns," 

 

32 “China Establishes New Military Schools,” People’s Daily, 7 March 1999, available at: 

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/199907/03/enc_19990703001001_TopNews.html 33 The Science of Military Strategy, p 213-215. 34 The Science of Military Strategy, p 213-215 | OSC, CPP20000517000168, “Excerpt from “World 

War, The Third World War--Total Information Warfare,” Xinhua Publishing House, 1 January, 2000.
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published in an AMS journal, noted that information attack requires targeting 

both an enemy’s information systems and “cognition and belief system.” The 

primary techniques for attacking information systems, he argues, are network 

and electronic attack and the primary techniques for attacking people's 

cognition and belief system are information deception and psychological 

attack, which will also be implemented by CNO units.35

• AMS guidance on the formation of IW militia units directed that they include 

psychological operations elements to support perception management and 

deception operations against an enemy. 

Some PLA advocates of CNO perceive it as a strategic deterrent comparable to 

nuclear weapons but possessing greater precision, leaving far fewer 

casualties, and possessing longer range than any weapon in the PLA’s arsenal. 

China’s development of a credible computer network attack capability is one 

component of a larger effort to expand and strengthen its repertoire of strategic 

deterrence options that includes new nuclear capable missiles, anti-satellite 

weapons, and laser weapons. 

• Major General Li Deyi, the deputy chair of the Department of Warfare Theory 

and Strategic Research at the Academy of Military Sciences, noted in 2007 

that information deterrence is rising to a strategic level and will achieve a level 

of importance second only to nuclear deterrence.36 

• China has developed a more accurate, road mobile ICBM, the DF-31A that 

can range the continental United States and a submarine launched variant, the 

JL-2 that will eventually be deployed on China’s new Jin-class nuclear 

powered submarine. 37

• In 2007, China successfully tested a direct ascent ASAT weapon that used a 

kinetic kill vehicle to destroy an aging Chinese weather satellite38 and in 2006, 

the US military accused the Chinese of using a laser dazzling weapon that 

temporarily blinded a reconnaissance satellite.39

 

35 OSC, CPP20080314623007, “JSXS: Information Attack and Information Defense in Joint 

Campaigns,” Beijing Junshi Xueshu [Military Art Journal] 1 October 2003. 

36 OSC, CPP20081028682007, Li Deyi, “A Study of the Basic Characteristics of the Modes of 

Thinking in Informatized Warfare,” China Military Science, Summer 2007, p.101-105. 37 Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006, US 

Department of Defense, p. 3. 

38 Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, US 

Department of Defense, p. 14. 

39 Warren Ferster and Colin Clark, “NRO Confirms Chinese Laser Test Illuminated U.S. 

Spacecraft,” Space News Business Report, 3 October 2006, available at: 

http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive06/chinalaser_1002.html
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• Chinese researchers are working on a variety of radio frequency weapons with 

the potential to target satellites and other components of the US C4ISR 

architecture, according to US Department of Defense analysis.40

PLA Information Warfare Planning 

An effective offensive IW capability requires the ability to assess accurately the likely 

impact on the adversary of a CNA strike on a given node or asset. These 

assessments, in turn, depend upon detailed intelligence on the adversary’s network, 

the C2 relationships, and the various dependencies attached to specific nodes on the 

network. 

• The Science of Military Strategy directs planners to “grasp the operational 

center of gravity and choose the targets and sequence for strike...arrange the 

enemy’s comprehensive weaknesses on the selective basis for a list of the 

operational targets, according to the degree of their influences upon the whole 

operational system and procedure.”41

• Mission planners must also understand the explicit and implicit network 

dependencies associated with a given node to avoid undesired collateral 

damage or the defensive redundancies that may exist to enable the targeted 

unit or organization to reroute its traffic and “fight through” the attack, 

effectively nullifying the Chinese strike. 

• CNA planning also requires a nuanced understanding of the cultural or military 

sensitivities surrounding how a given attack will be perceived by an adversary. 

Failure to understand an enemy’s potential “red lines” can lead to unintentional 

escalation of the conflict, forcing the PLA to alter its campaign objectives or 

fight a completely new campaign for which it may be unprepared. 

PLA IW planners and leaders have noted that CNO is blurring the separation that 

military planners maintained between the hierarchy of “strategy,” “campaign,” and 

“combat” (or “tactics” in Western usage) so that CNO or EW weapons employed by 

tactical-sized units can strike strategic targets deep in the adversary’s own territory 

beyond the range of most conventional weapons, possibly changing the course of the 

conflict.42 This changing perspective on IW and especially CNO tools may impact the 

senior leadership perspective on targeting, particularly if the use of these tools is 

 

40 Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006, US 

Department of Defense, p. 34. 

41 Science of Military Strategy, p. 464 42 OSC, CPP20081229563002,“Relations Between Strategy, Campaigns And Battles, China Military 

Science, 29 December 2008. 
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perceived to have plausible deniability for Beijing or complicates an adversary’s 

ability to counterattack. 
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Chinese Computer Network Operations During Conflict 

Like the use of missile or air power, CNO is one of several increasingly capable 

warfighting components available to PLA commanders during a conflict, however, the 

PLA rarely discusses CNO as a standalone capability to be employed in isolation 

from other warfighting disciplines. Understanding how it may be used in support of a 

larger campaign requires Western analysts and policymakers to consider China’s 

overall campaign objectives to understand CNO in its proper context. The current 

strategy for fighting a campaign in a high tech environment, reflected in the doctrinal 

guidance to “strike the enemy’s nodes to destroy his network,”43 directs commanders 

to attack the adversary’s C2 and logistics networks first and exploit the resulting 

“blindness” with traditional firepower attacks on platforms and personnel. This 

strategy suggests that the PLA may strike with CNO and EW weapons in the 

opening phases of a conflict to degrade enemy information systems rather 

than attempt a traditional force-on-force attack directly where the PLA is at a 

disadvantage against more technologically advanced countries like the US. 

• Denying an adversary access to information systems critical for combat 

operations is influenced by principles of traditional Chinese strategic thought, 

but the strategy is also the result of extensive contemporary PLA analysis of 

likely adversaries’ weak points and centers of gravity. 

• While Chinese military leaders are almost certainly influenced by their strategic 

culture and traditions of stratagem, much of China’s contemporary military 

history reflects a willingness to use force in situations where the PRC was 

clearly the weaker entity. Scholarship on the subject suggests that PRC 

political leaders often determined that conflict in the short term would be less 

costly than at a later date when strategic conditions were even less favorable 

to China. This logic often seems counterintuitive to the casual Western 

observer but reflects a nuanced assessment of changing strategic conditions 

and how best to align with them for a favorable outcome. PLA and PRC 

leaders capture this idea often when discussing the use of strategies, 

stratagem, or weapons that enable the weak to overcome the strong.44

 

43 Science of Military Strategy, p. 464. 44 There is a growing record of contemporary scholarship on strategic culture, deterrence, stratagem, 

and China’s propensity to use force. While it is beyond the scope of the present study, a more 

extensive discussion of the relationship of these topics to contemporary computer network operations 

is essential, particularly one that moves the discussion beyond comparisons of China’s military 

classics and toward a broader context for understanding the complexity of modern Chinese 

perceptions of IW and the value of CNO. For a small representative sample of some of the excellent 

research done on China’s calculus for the use of force see: Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: 
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission 

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• The PLA’s employment of CNO reflects an intention to use it (with EW 

weapons) as one element of an integrated—and increasingly joint—campaign 

capability. Campaign doctrine calls for using CNO as a precursor to achieve 

information dominance, providing “openings” or opportunities for air, naval, 

and ground forces to act. 

CNO in any military crisis between China and the US will likely be used to mount 

persistent attacks against the Department of Defense’s NIPRNET nodes that support 

logistics, and command and control functions. Attacks such as these are intended to 

degrade US information and support systems sufficiently for the PLA to achieve its 

campaign objectives before the US and its Allies can respond with sufficient force to 

defeat or degrade the PLA’s operation. In a Taiwan scenario, for example, PLA 

planners likely consider the opening days as the critical window of opportunity to 

achieve military objectives on the island. CNO and other IW weapons that delay a 

US military response only increase the PLA’s possibility of success without requiring 

direct combat with superior US forces. 

• Delaying or degrading US combat operations in this Taiwan scenario 

sufficiently to allow the PLA to achieve lodgment on Taiwan or force the 

capitulation of the political leadership on the island would present the US with 

a fait accompli upon arrival in the combat operations area. 

• The majority of US military logistics information systems is transmitted or 

accessed via the NIPRNET to facilitate communication or coordination 

between the hundreds of civilian and military nodes in the military’s global 

supply chain. 

Logistics Networks and Databases 

 

In a conflict, NIPRNET-based logistics networks will likely be a high priority 

target for Chinese CNA and CNE. Information systems at major logistics hubs 

 The Decision to Enter the Korean War, Stanford University Press; 1960 | Allen S. Whiting, “China’s 

Use of Force 1960-1996, and Taiwan,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 103–131 | 

Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949-1992: A First Cut at the 

Data,” The China Quarterly, 1998, No.153 (March 1998), pp. 1-30 | Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural 

Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton University Press, 1998 | 

M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises 

in Territorial Disputes,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 46–83 | Thomas J. 

Christensen, “Windows and War: Trend Analysis and Beijing’s Use of Force,” in New Directions in the 

Study of China’s Foreign Policy, Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds. Stanford University 

Press, 2006. 
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either in the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of operations (AOR) or CONUSbased locations supporting USPACOM operations will likely be subjected to Chinese 

CNA and CNE operations during a conflict. The Chinese have identified the US 

military’s long logistics “tail” and extended time for force build-up as strategic 

vulnerabilities and centers of gravity to be exploited. 

• PLA assessments of US campaigns in Iraq (both Desert Storm and Operation 

Iraqi Freedom), the Balkans, and Afghanistan identify logistics and the force 

deployment times as weak points, the interruption of which will lead to supply 

delays or shortages. These assessments in aggregate do not seem to 

suggest that defeating the logistics systems will lead to a de facto US military 

defeat (PLA professionals likely assume that the US will implement work 

around and ad hoc solutions to these obstacles), but rather that these 

disruptions will “buy time” for the PLA as noted above. 

• Logistics data of interest to PLA planners are likely areas such as specific unit 

deployment schedules, resupply rates and scheduled movement of materiel, 

unit readiness assessments, lift availability and scheduling, maritime 

prepositioning plans, air tasking orders for aerial refueling operations, and the 

logistics status of bases in the Western Pacific theater. 

• US Joint Publication 4-0: Joint Logistics notes that “the global dispersion of the 

joint force and the rapidity with which threats arise have made real-time or 

near real-time information critical to support military operations. Joint logistic 

planning, execution, and control depend on continuous access to make 

effective decisions. Protected access to networks is imperative to sustain joint 

force readiness and allow rapid and precise response to meet JFC 

requirements.”45

• Potential Chinese familiarity with the network topology associated with US 

Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) or related logistics units on 

NIPRNET could aid CNE missions intended to access and exfiltrate data 

related to the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) of a specific 

contingency or operations plan. A TPFDD is the logistics “blueprint” for the 

sequence of movement of supplies and is based on a commander’s 

expression of priorities for personnel and materiel to move into a combat 

theater. 

The Chinese may attempt to target potentially vulnerable networks associated 

with strategic civilian ports, shipping terminals, or railheads that are 

 

45US Joint Publication 4-0: Joint Logistics, 18 July 2008, US Department of Defense, p.I-5 available 

at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp4_0.pdf
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supporting the military’s movement of critical supplies and personnel. 

Maintaining effective movement control during a major mobilization is inherently 

complex. Disruptions of information systems at key nodes, particularly “downstream” 

at shipping terminals or airports, while not catastrophic, could create major delays as 

the traffic en route to the affected destination is forced to slow or halt, similar to the 

cascading traffic delays that can result from a minor accident at rush hour. 

• US Joint Publication 4-0: Joint Logistics also points out that “inventory 

management capitalizes on authoritative information (accurate, real-time, and 

widely visible) and performance trends to inform decisions about attributes of 

the materiel inventory throughout the supply chain. Maintaining optimal 

stockage levels and accountability of materiel throughout the supply chain 

enables the joint logistician to manage the flow of materiel between strategic 

and tactical supply nodes to meet warfighter requirements.” 46 

• Many logistics databases on NIPRNET have Web-based interfaces to enable 

ease of access, but may only require PLA operators to compromise one weak 

password via keystroke logging or to exploit SQL injection vulnerabilities on 

the Website to gain user-like access. 

• Long term access to NIPRNET via CNE techniques—and to logistics 

information supporting the TPFDD for various warplans in particular—also 

allows the PLA to assemble a detailed current intelligence picture of the 

intended US force deployment packages for specific contingencies. 

The PLA’s basic CNE/CNA strategy against NIPRNET logistics databases is 

likely a combination of attacks on selected network segments to limit both the 

flow and possibly corrupt the content of unencrypted data. An attack on 

logistics information systems may begin by exploiting previously compromised hosts 

on the network held as a kind of war reserve in the event of a crisis.47 

• If PLA operators target a unit or network segment that does not authenticate 

HTTP traffic (common Internet traffic) through a proxy server before leaving 

the network, they will be able to operate much more freely on the network. An 

attacker in this environment can connect out to a remote C2 node and 

download additional tools or exfiltrate (and infiltrate) data without a 

requirement for valid user credentials. 

 

46 US Joint Publication 4-0: Joint Logistics, p. JP-40 47 The attack techniques may shift as changes to US INFOCON levels limits accessibility of some 

applications or external connections and prioritization on network traffic affects the types of inbound 

traffic permitted through firewalls. 
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Reporting of attacks on US networks attributed to China suggests that these 

operators possess the targeting competence to identify specific users in a unit 

or organization based on job function or presumed access to information. 

Access that exploits legitimate user credentials can allow the attacker to review file 

directories and potentially target specific files for exfiltration or alteration, depending 

on the mission requirements and the US INFOCON levels. Alternately, these 

operators can use this access for passive monitoring of network traffic for intelligence 

collection purposes. Instrumenting these machines in peacetime may enable 

attackers to prepare a reserve of compromised machines that can be used during a 

crisis. 

• Chinese CNO operators likely possess the technical sophistication to craft and 

upload rootkit and covert remote access software, creating deep persistent 

access to the compromised host and making detection extremely difficult. 

• An “upstream” attack on the networks of civilian contractors providing logistics 

support to operational units also has potential for great impact and is 

potentially easier against smaller companies that often lack the resources or 

expertise for sophisticated network security and monitoring. 

• Many of the vulnerabilities outlined above can be greatly minimized if the 

network uses a proxy server, implements firewall blocks of unproxied access, 

blocks proxy access without valid user authentication, and prevents user 

credentials from being exposed to the attackers. 

Chinese CNO operators may also attempt to attack US perceptions of the 

validity of data in these networks by uploading false records or corrupting 

existing records, possibly for intentional detection. This discovery may generate 

a manpower and resource intensive review of the targeted unit’s database records or 

other files against a known good back up copy before the unit resumes normal 

operations, creating potentially costly operational delays. If this type of attack is 

staged against several large or critical supply nodes, the impact could be significant. 

• Uploading files or accessing existing records in NIPRNET-based logistics 

databases would require PLA operators to compromise a computer on the 

targeted LAN and be able to operate with the local users’ credentials, a 

capability observed in past intrusions of US networks that are attributed to 

China. 

• The discovery of this type of attack may have a greater impact on US forces 

from a perception management or psychological operations perspective than 

the more localized targeting to redirect supplies. 
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• Only a limited number of actual compromises may be required to have a 

disproportionate impact on US operational tempo if information security 

concerns require time consuming validation of logistics or other databases by 

systems administrators and logistics personnel across the theater or in 

CONUS. 

Command and Control Data 

Much of the operational traffic between command entities and subordinate units such 

as unit location, status, situation reports, and deployment orders, is transmitted via 

classified systems both in peacetime and wartime. Conducting CNO to penetrate 

and compromise the encryption and defensive layers built into the architecture of 

these systems is a resource intensive and time consuming process for Chinese IW 

units or the civilian researchers likely supporting them. The Chinese doctrinal 

orientation toward attacking an enemy’s information flow suggests that if a 

classified network is attacked, it will likely be intended to impede encrypted 

traffic flow if it moves across an unclassified backbone rather than attempting 

to decrypt data or penetrate into the actual network.

• Even if a sensitive encrypted network is not compromised, focused traffic 

analysis of encrypted communications via computer network exploitation may 

still yield useful information. 

• If PLA CNO operators are tasked with targeting the networks or databases of 

specific US military units, then basic network reconnaissance conducted 

during peacetime can support offensive operations during wartime. 

• Once these units or databases are identified, an attacker can use common 

techniques or tools to affect a denial of service attack against any server or 

router. The sophistication of this type of attack is within the assessed technical 

capabilities of many individuals in China’s hacker community and likely of PLA 

units with trained CNO operators. 

• Some CNE operations may be designed for purely reconnaissance purposes 

to map out network topologies and understand the command and control 

relationships of specific areas of US military or commercial networks rather 

than exfiltrate data or emplace “sleeper” malicious software on targeted 

machines. 

PLA CNO commanders and operators likely recognize that a capability for peacetime 

compromise is not a guarantee of wartime access. US INFOCON levels will increase 

during a crisis, blocking access to some or all of an adversary’s pre-instrumented 
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machines. Ongoing probes and compromises designed to elicit changes in US 

defensive posture may, however, provide some insights into how the network 

environment will change during periods of heightened threat. Chinese operations, 

therefore, could also include efforts designed to create intentional “noise” on the 

network that elicits a reaction, allowing the attackers to gather intelligence on how the 

US defensive posture will change under select circumstances. This is a cyber 

parallel to US Cold War-era electronic warfare operations that were designed to 

provoke a reaction from Soviet air defense networks to collect intelligence on their 

responses to various types of threats. 
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Key Entities in Chinese Computer Network Operations 

General Staff Department Fourth Department 

The GSD 4th Department’s traditional offensive EW mission, Dai Qingmin’s 

leadership of the department during the first half of this decade, and open 

source reporting that references the Department’s role in implementing INEW, 

all suggest that it has the primary authority for offensive IW in the PLA. 

• The 4th Department, also referred to as the Electronic Countermeasures 

Department (ECM) Department, oversees both operational ECM units and 

R&D institutes conducting research on a variety of offensive IW technologies. 

• The 4th Department’s oversight of IW dates to at least 1999 and probably 

earlier. Recent scholarship notes that Dai Qingmin’s seminal work, On 

Information Warfare, was vetted by the 4th Department prior to its publication in 

1999 indicating that it had organizational oversight of this topic even at that 

time.48 

• The GSD’s decision in 2000 to promote Dai Qingmin to head the 4th

Department—vetting his advocacy of the INEW strategy—likely further 

consolidated the organizational authority for the IW—and the CNA mission 

specifically—in this group. Dai’s promotion to this position suggests that the 

GSD probably endorsed his vision of adopting INEW as the PLA’s IW strategy. 

General Staff Department Third Department 

The GSD Third Department’s longstanding signals intelligence (SIGINT) focus, 

historical lack of an offensive role, and its large staff of trained linguists and 

technicians makes it well suited for oversight of the CND and CNE missions in 

the PLA. The 3rd Department maintains an extensive system of signals collection 

stations throughout China with collection and processing stations co-located with 

each of the PLA’s Military Region headquarters.49 It is tasked with the foreign signals 

collection, exploitation, and analysis and also communications security for the PLA’s 

voice and data networks. This latter responsibility may encompass network defense 

 

48 Mulvenon, PLA Computer Network Operations, p. 272. | See also OSC, 

FTS20000105000705, “Fu Quanyou Commends New Army Book on IW,” Jiefangjun Bao, 7 

December 1999. 

49 Desmond Ball, “Signals Intelligence In China” Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 August, 1995. 
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as well, though little information is available to confirm this role.50 Some Western 

analyses of the 3rd Department claim it maintains a staff of more than 130,000, 

though this figure cannot be independently confirmed. Regardless of the specific 

figure, accessibility to a large staff of highly skilled linguists and technical analysts 

would provide significant depth for a computer-based intelligence collection and 

exploitation mission. 

Figure 1: General Staff Department of the People's Liberation Army51

 

50 OSC, CPP20060110510011, “HK Journal Details History, Structure, Functions of PRC Intelligence 

Agencies,” Hong Kong Chien Shao, No 179, 1 January 2006. | Mark A. Stokes, China's Strategic 

Modernization: Implications for the United States, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, September 

1999, p. 34. 

51 Organizational chart from “The General Staff Department Of The Chinese People's Liberation Army: 

Organization, Roles, & Missions,” by David Finkelstein, in The People's Liberation Army as 

Organization Reference Volume v1.0, James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds, RAND Corp., 

2002. 
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Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus 

The PLA maintains at least six technical reconnaissance bureaus (TRB) located 

in the Lanzhou, Jinan, Chengdu, Guangzhou, and Beijing military regions that 

are responsible for SIGINT collection against tactical and strategic targets and 

have apparent CNO duties, though few details are available on the exact role or 

subordination of these units.52 The TRB’s probable subordination under the 3rd

Department suggests that their CNO responsibilities are likely focused on defense or 

exploitation of foreign networks. While the TRB appear largely focused on traditional 

SIGINT missions, oblique references to staff from these units conducting advanced 

research on information security or possibly related topics suggests a possible CNO 

or EW role that augments their SIGINT collection mission.53 

• TRB affiliated staff have also performed information assurance certification for 

other PLA units, according to reporting from a Party affiliated newspaper.54

• In 2002, the Third TRB, described as a “technical rapid reaction unit,” received 

its fifth consecutive award for outstanding “research in information warfare 

theories,” and the development of new technical means of operation, 

according to a local Party affiliated media outlet. These dates and numbers 

suggest that as early 1997, this TRB possibly began including IW in its 

mission.55

• The First TRB in Chengdu received a series of military commendations for 

“substantial achievements in informatization building,” academic research 

 

52 Dennis Blasko, “PLA Ground Force Modernization and Mission Diversification: Underway in all 

Military Regions,” in Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s 

Military, Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, eds., Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007, p. 366-

372 | Ellis L. Melvin, A Study Of The Chinese People's Liberation Army Military Region Headquarters 

Department Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, June 19, 2005 | Virtual Information Center, People’s 

Republic of China Primer, 04 August 2006, available at: http://www1.apaninfo.net/Portals/45/VIC_Products/2006/08/060804-P-China.doc. 

53 OSC, CPP20071011318004, “Chengdu MR Unit 78006 Praised for Breakthroughs in 

'Cutting-Edge' IT Research,” Chengdu Zhanqi Bao, 20 August 2007 | OSC, 

CPP20070122478002, “Shenyang MR Unit 65016 Members: Information Warfare is not 

Informationized War,” 22 January 2007. 

54OSC, CPP20081211478016, “PLA Unit 65016 Network Security Team Conducts 'Blanket' Security 

Check,” Shenyang Qianjin Bao 18 October 2008, p. 1. 

55 OSC, CPP20030411000212, “Roundup of C4I Activities in PRC: 5 Nov 2002-12 Mar 2003,” 

5 November 2002” | Ellis L. Melvin, Ibid. 
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awards, and a computer network defense project that was vetted for use by a 

GSD level technical appraisal, according to PLA reporting.56

PLA Information Warfare Militia Units 

Since approximately 2002, the PLA has been creating IW militia units57

comprised of personnel from the commercial IT sector and academia, and 

represents an operational nexus between PLA CNO operations and Chinese 

civilian information security (infosec) professionals.58 The PLA has established 

militia units directly within commercial firms throughout China to take advantage of 

access to staff with advanced education, modern commercial-grade infrastructure, 

sophisticated software design capabilities, and the greater likelihood of finding 

“politically reliable” operators.59

• A political commissar for the Guangzhou People’s Armed Police (PAP) 

garrison advocated in 2003 the direct involvement of urban militia units in 

information warfare, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare; He also 

proposed that militia reform efforts should focus on making information warfare 

one of the Guangzhou militia’s primary missions.60

• A Tianjin-based militia garrison restructured subordinate units in 2004 to 

increase capabilities for operations under informationized conditions, including 

the creation of a dedicated information operations unit, according to the PLA 

Daily.61

 

56 OSC, CPP20081113563001, “China: PLA Activities Report 1-15 Oct 08,” 13 November 

2008 

57 The PLA’s 8 million strong militia system, under the control of the State Council and the 

Central Military Commission (CMC), is an active reserve system comprised of males 18-35 

who are not currently serving in the PLA; the militia system augments active duty PLA units in 

virtually every area of military operations. See: China's National Defense in 2004, Information 

Office of China's State Council, December 2004, 

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/defense2004/defense2004.html | China's 

National Defense in 2006 ̧ Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of 

China, December 2006, Beijing, available at: http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/newschannels/2006-12/29/content_691844.htm

58 OSC, CPP20031002000138, “Telecom Experts in Guangzhou Doubling As Militia 

Information Warfare Elements,” Guofang, Academy of Military Science, 15 September 2003 | 

OSC, “PLA C4ISR Activities Roundup, 1 April-30 May 2006. 

59 OSC, CPP20031002000138, Ibid. 

60 Lu Qiang, “Focus On The Characteristics Of Information Warfare To Strengthen The City 

Militia Construction” China Militia Magazine, August 2003, available at: 

http://www.chinamil.com.cn/item/zgmb/200308/txt/16.htm

61 OSC, CPP20050301000186, “Roundup of C4I Activities in PRC, 13 November 2004-15 

January 2005,” 15 January 2005. 
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• A Henan province military sub-district in 2007 organized militia units for 

communications and network warfare; starting in 2008, an Anhui Province unit 

recruited militia personnel from large private enterprises for specialized 

technical training, according to PLA media sources.62

 Figure 2: The Yongning District Information Figure 3: Meeting to Establish the Yongning 

Operations Militia Unit office, Lanzhou County IW Militia. 

Military Region. 

PLA media reporting indicates that IW militia units are tasked with offensive and 

defensive CNO and EW responsibilities, psychological warfare, and deception 

operations, though the available sources do not explain the lines of authority, 

subordination, or the nature of their specific tasking.63 

• A militia battalion in Yongning County (Ningxia Province, Lanzhou Military 

Region) established an IW militia group in March 2008 and tasked it to conduct 

network warfare research and training, and to “attack the enemy’s wartime 

networks” according to the unit’s Website. 64 

 

62 OSC, CPP20080601711001, “Table of Contents Report: China Militia (Zhongguo Minbing)”, 

10 March 2008. | OSC, CPP20080615711001, “Table of Contents Report: China Militia” 10 

April 2008. 

63 “Minbing Wangluo Zhan Fendui Zhize (Duties of the Network Warfare Militia Unit), 16 

March, 2008, available at: 

http://old.chinayn.gov.cn/info_www/news/detailnewsb.asp?infoNo=26366. | China And 

Northeast Asia,” Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment , April 3, 2009. | OSC 

CPP20090102670001, “PRC S&T: Ezhou Militia Establishes Network Presence,” Guofang, 

Academy of Military Science, May 2001. | OSC, CPP20031002000138 “Telecom Experts in 

Guangzhou Doubling As Militia Information Warfare Elements,” Guofang, Academy of Military 

Science, 15 September 2003. 

64 “Yongning is the First to Set Up Information Warfare Militia Units,” 19 March, 2008, available 

at: http://old.chinayn.gov.cn/info_www/news/detailnewsb.asp 
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• The Yongning unit is composed of an information warfare center detachment 

(xinxi fendui zuozhan zhongxin), information gathering detachment (minbing 

xinxi souji fendui), militia network warfare unit (minbing wangluo zhan fendui), 

and a militia network protection unit (minbing wangluo fanghu fendui), 

suggesting that this unit is responsible for the full range of CNO missions.65

In early 2003, AMS published an account of a probable proof of concept 

initiative in the Guangzhou Military Region to establish IW militia units using 

local telecommunications companies as a base from which to draw personnel, 

financial support, and infrastructure access, suggesting that the PLA was 

tapping its growing pool of civilian commercial IT expertise to aid military 

information warfare requirements. The Guangzhou Garrison created four “Militia 

Information Technology Battalions” in local firms comprised of CNO and offensive 

and defensive EW units.66

• The officers conducted a detailed census of Guangdong’s Dongshan District, 

where the IT sector is concentrated, to identify people with specific 

backgrounds, such as advanced degree holders, people who had studied 

overseas, people credited with major scientific research achievements, and 

computer networking experts, suggesting that this unit is tasked with more 

sophisticated network operations that require both advanced technical 

expertise and knowledge of foreign languages or cultures.67

• The battalion included a headquarters unit, a computer network operations 

company with attack and defense platoons, and an EW company with 

electronic reconnaissance and deception platoons. 

• No unit level training materials existed prior this, according the officers 

responsible for creating this unit, forcing them to draft a “Training Plan for 

Militia Information Technology Elements,” with input from Guangzhou military 

region headquarters units and an unspecified “electronic countermeasures 

regiment,” a likely reference to a GSD 4th Department subordinate unit. This 

lack of training materials suggests that it may have been one of the earliest 

such units, possibly a proof of concept that the AMS was vetting. 

 

65 Minbing Wangluo Zhan Fendui Zhize (Duties of the Network Warfare Militia Unit), 16 March, 

2008, available at: http://old.chinayn.gov.cn/info_www/news/detailnewsb.asp?infoNo=26366. 66 OSC, CPP20031002000138, Ibid. The exact date of creation for this unit is not specified in 

this article, published in late 2003, however, the authors make reference to a series of these 

units’ technical accomplishments that suggest the battalions were operational at the time of 

writing. 

67 OSC, CPP20031002000138, Ibid. 
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Research responsibilities for this battalion included operational methods for 

“launching hacker attacks, propagating viruses, jamming information channels, and 

disrupting nodes of enemy networks” indicate that this particular unit was responsible 

for offensive R&D in addition to operational CNE duties.68 

Within three years of the Guangzhou unit’s creation, the AMS published a second 

article on the concept that explicitly endorsed the formation of IW militia and directed 

the PLA to make the creation of these units a priority.69 The model presented 

followed closely what the Guangzhou Garrison created three years earlier, 

suggesting the idea was now fully vetted and had a senior leadership mandate. 

• The AMS authors directed garrison level commands to establish these units 

with personnel from local commercial IT industries and universities and train 

them in simulated network warfare environments to develop their skills in all 

aspects of IW and to create a mix of specialized units skilled in electronic 

warfare, network warfare, and psychological warfare.70 

• Garrison commanders were also instructed to relax the militia’s standard age 

and physical fitness requirements, likely to ensure that individuals with highly 

valued technical skills are not eliminated unnecessarily. 

Authoritative PLA writings on these units display a clear sensitivity to the 

potential diplomatic impact resulting from the exposure of these units’ 

targeting of foreign networks or the potential proliferation of their tools outside 

the units’ control. Possibly as a result of this sensitivity, the AMS authors 

recommend unusually strict security precautions for militia units—particularly in 

vetting and monitoring personnel—likely a reflection of their highly sensitive work. 

• The 2006 AMS article notes that many countries view network 

reconnaissance, electronic jamming, and “network invasion” as serious issues 

that may even be considered acts of war, one of the few such explicit 

acknowledgements by the PLA. 

• Garrison commanders are urged to ensure that “individual behavior is 

monitored and work results do not proliferate,” a possible reference to 

guarding against leaks of classified information or software tools developed by 

unit members. 

 

68 OSC, CPP20031002000138, Ibid. 

69 OSC, “PLA C4ISR Activities Roundup, 1 April-30 May 2006. 70 OSC, “PLA C4ISR Activities Roundup, 1 April-30 May 2006.” 
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• Open source reporting on these units is limited to descriptions of their creation 

and general organization. Research did not uncover materials outlining details 

of their peacetime operations. These units may be focused on supporting 

purely military operational requirements such as gathering intelligence on 

foreign military networks to support contingency planning for CNA missions. 

Regardless of the specifics of the mission, the PLA is clearly turning to its civilian IT 

workforce as this resource base continues to grow. While traditional hackers offer 

unique skill sets in some cases and may have a niche role for PLA or state 

intelligence collection, the PLA clearly is looking to its increasingly mature base of 

civilian IT expertise to round out its IW ranks. 

The Chinese Hacker Community 

China’s hackers, active in thousands of Web-based groups and individually, 

represent a mature community of practitioners that has developed a rich knowledge 

base similar to their counterparts in countries around the world. A review of these 

Web communities reveals many layers of interest groups: malware tool developers, 

legitimate security researchers, and novices and experts alike in search of training. 

The tools or techniques that these groups post are often used by true black hat 

practitioners. 

China’s hacker community gained early notoriety for member willingness to engage in 

large-scale politically motivated denial of service attacks, data destruction, and Web 

defacements of foreign networks, known as hacktivism. Between 1999 and 2004, 

the Chinese hacker community was defined by its regular use of large scale, 

politically motivated attacks against foreign networks or Websites. Chinese hackers 

traded Web defacements and distributed denial of service attacks with their 

counterparts in the United States, Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, and South Korea and 

operated with relative immunity from Chinese law until strongly worded 

condemnations issued from Beijing eventually reigned in the attacks. Motivated by 

nationalist fervor, often resulting from a perceived insult to China by a foreign country, 

the leaders of hacker groups unified their members, identified targets, and often 

disseminated attack tools via their Websites to ensure mass participation. 

• In May 1998, anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia sparked a series of Chinese 

hacker attacks on multiple Indonesian Websites. 

• Following the accidental bombing of the PRC embassy in Serbia in May 1999, 

Chinese hackers mounted their first large scale attack on the White House led 

by the group Javaphile according to one of its founding members, who uses 

the “screen name” CoolSwallow.

71

 

71 Scott Henderson, The Dark Visitor, January 2007, p. 36. 
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• The 1999 comments by then Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui that Taiwan 

deserved to be treated as an equal state by the PRC catalyzed massive PRC 

hacker attacks on the Taiwan National Assembly, Presidential Executive Office 

and many additional government Websites, according to Western press 

reports of the exchange.72

• In May 2001, the Honker Union of China claimed that it had attacked over 

1,000 US Websites—approximately the same number that US hackers 

claimed they attacked in the PRC—following the collision between a US EP-3 

surveillance aircraft and a Chinese fighter.73 

PRC government reaction to Chinese hacker group participation in the various 

“hacker wars” from 1999 to 2002 was initially encouraging, lauding the efforts of the 

various Chinese groups involved. By mid 2002 and after, however, this sentiment 

changed and official Party media sources published editorials discouraging further 

mass actions online, suggesting that hacking activities in any country were illegal and 

would not be tolerated.74 The groups interpreted the editorial as state opposition to 

future planned attacks and gradually stood down. 

• In 2001, following a large scale denial of service attack against the White 

House, the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party, 

issued an editorial in its online edition that decried the Chinese attacks as 

“Web terrorism,” and said that the attacks by the Honker Union of China on US 

Websites were “unforgivable acts violating the law," effectively withdrawing 

Beijing’s tacit and explicit support from the hacker groups’ campaigns.75

• As government tolerance for large scale attacks against foreign networks 

waned, many of the most prominent Chinese hacker organizations active in 

the US-China and cross-Strait exchanges at the beginning of the decade 

appear to have evolved into formal information security research companies 

offering professional information security services. Many others simply 

disbanded, or reorganized. Some of these groups or individuals have 

developed relationships with companies close to PRC security organizations 

or to the government itself. 

 

72 Damon Bristow, “Cyber-warfare rages across Taiwan Strait,” Jane's Intelligence Review,

Vol. 12, Issue 2, February 1, 2000. 

73 OSC, CPP20010510000031, “Chinese Hackers Call for Ceasefire in Sino-US Hacker War,” 

AFP, 10 May 2001. 74OSC, CPP20010508000067, “SCMP Report on PRC Officials Condemning Hacker Attacks,” 

by Vivien Pik-kwan Chan, South China Morning Post, 8 May 2001. 75 OSC, CPP20010508000067, Ibid. 
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The government’s position on these activities created a dynamic of self-censorship,76

and effectively deterred a general resurgence of similar large scale hacker wars. 

Some groups, rallying around politically “safe” topics such as anti-Tibetan 

independence, however, still attempt politically driven attacks on foreign Websites. 

• In December 2008, Chinese hackers associated with the Web group 

hack4.com staged politically motivated Web defacements on French 

Embassies in the US, United Kingdom, China, and Canada after French 

President Sarkozy’s December 2008 visit with the Dalai Lama. 

• Chinese hackers attempted unsuccessfully to stage a large scale distributed 

denial of service (DDoS) attack against CNN’s Website in April 2008, with 

purpose-built malware that ordinary Internet users could employ in a crude but 

potentially effective attack. The planning for the attack was exposed by a USbased information warfare expert on his blog and the volume of traffic against 

CNN generated from this effort barely registered among Internet security 

analysts as a denial of service attack.77

A February 2009 National People’s Congress expansion of China’s anti-hacking law, 

coupled with a series of high profile arrests and harsh sentences for hacking crimes, 

will possibly subject China’s online hacker communities to greater scrutiny and 

possibly discourage some of the overt exchange of tools and hacking advice in open 

online forums. 

• Previously China’s anti-hacking law only prohibited intrusions into PRC 

government computer systems, technically leaving China’s hackers extremely 

wide latitude for cybercriminal activities. The amendment also added a section 

criminalizing the creation and dissemination of malicious software.78

• Security authorities have already used the law for several high profile arrests 

and convictions of both amateur and well-established hackers. 

 

76 Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations,” p. 279. 77 See Scott Henderson’s Dark Visitor blog at http://www.thedarkvisitor.com/2008/04/new-kinda-lazychinese-hacker-attack-on-cnn-scheduled-for-tomorrow/; and security researcher Jose Nazario’s blog 

at Arbor Networks, at http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2008/04/cnn-attacks-inside-two-dedicated-ddostools/; Mr. Henderson first detected the discussion threads on the attack planning and notified CNN. 

Both he and Mr. Nazario maintained an ongoing watch on the developments via their respective blog 

sites, publicizing the plans while attempting to update CNN system administrators. 78 “China Toughens Cybercrime Rules,” Computerworld, May 19, 2009, available at: 

www.computerworld.com/china_toughens_cybercrime_rules. | “Chinese Lawmakers Consider 

Tough Penalties on Hackers,” Xinhua, December 22, 2008, available at: 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/22/content_10544179.htm. | OSC 

CPP20090404718012, “Law Revision Tars "Patriotic" Hackers With Same Brush as Thieves 

And Troublemakers,” South China Morning Post Online, 4 April 2009. 
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Hacktivist Support to the State 

Little in the internal writings on Chinese INEW strategy or other writings on IW 

theory or strategy suggests that the PLA or state security bureaus intend to 

use hacktivist attacks as a component of a CNO campaign and there is little 

compatibility between the principles of the INEW strategy as they are known 

from open sources and the common characteristics of most hacktivist attacks. 

While the simple absence of PLA discussions of the topic—or the absence of sources 

in which it is discussed—does not prove an unwillingness to engage hacker groups in 

these types of attacks, several factors argue against formal PLA plans to include 

hacktivism as part of a CNO campaign in wartime. 

• Command and Control: The lack of an easily implemented command and 

control structure from the PLA to the hacker community at large makes guiding 

or directing attacks extremely difficult. Once initiated, hacktivist attacks have 

the potential develop their own momentum and begin operating beyond the 

PLA’s or civilian government’s ability to easily control the participants or their 

targeting. Self-generating hacktivist attacks also have the potential to interfere 

with sensitive CNO missions by inadvertently disrupting the PLA’s own 

computer network attacks. Hacktivist attacks on a Chinese adversary may 

also risk shutting down lines of communication in use for intelligence collection 

or accidently overwhelm channels the PLA is using as feedback loops to 

monitor the effectiveness of their network attacks. 

• Precision Targeting: The core principles that seem to guide the INEW strategy 

are based on precision targeting and disciplined coordination to strike carefully 

selected nodes of an enemy’s information systems judged to have maximum 

operational impact. The goal is to establish control over the adversary’s ability 

to access or disseminate information. Hacktivist target selection, in contrast, is 

generally based on political or nationalist symbolism and not on an alignment 

with real or perceived PLA campaign objectives and may actually hinder PLA 

operations or intelligence gathering. Chinese hackers reportedly destroyed 

large volumes of data on the US Web servers they attacked during the US EP3 crisis in April 2001.79 Similar data destruction against US military servers 

during a conflict may eliminate valuable intelligence sources for the PLA or 

destroy data already altered by the PLA as part of a larger deception or 

perception management operation. Large scale distributed denial of service 

attacks or high profile Web defacements can also potentially undo 

 

79 OSC, CPP20010510000031, “Chinese Hackers Call for Ceasefire in Sino-US Hacker War,” Agence 

France Presse, 10 May 2001. 
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backchannel or even overt diplomatic efforts to resolve a crisis or negate the 

effects of carefully crafted psychological operations. 

• Indications and warning: Surprise and deception are central to the INEW 

strategy and Chinese hacktivist attacks generally lack both. Online mass 

organization is inherently public and while many hacker groups may implement 

nominal vetting of members or attempt to close their discussion threads, there 

is still a need to publicize the cause, announce the targets and if necessary, 

disseminate tools; all of which greatly increases the likelihood that the plans 

will be detected and successfully countered. The organizers of the attempted 

CNN DDoS attack rescheduled their attack and changed Websites in part 

because of publicity generated by the US-based researchers noted previously 

who monitored the attack preparations on the Chinese hacker Websites and 

alerted CNN. 

Hacker-State Collaboration 

While the PRC government appears reluctant to use hacktivism as a CNO tool, 

there may be a willingness to establish direct relationships with highly skilled 

individuals or small groups in the hacker community. The PRC government may 

also be able to engage commercial firms comprised of experienced hackers and 

operating as nominally legitimate information security groups. This engagement 

ranges from simple job recruitment by government security ministries on hacker 

Websites to possible support from blackhat code developers for organized intrusions 

into US Government and commercial networks. 

Commercially-based white hat information security researchers (i.e. those 

pursuing overt legal research in the field) are developing extensive government 

customer bases for hardware and possibly software support. Many of the most 

prominent groups from earlier in the decade and their leaders have either disbanded 

or transformed themselves into seemingly legitimate security firms. Large groups like 

Xfocus and Black Eagle Base have reshaped themselves into commercial operations, 

albeit in close alignment with state security and information security objectives. 

• NSFocus, a prominent commercial information security firm, evolved out of the 

Green Army Alliance, an early—and prominent—hacker group active from 

1997 through 2000; the NSFocus Website still retains logos of the Green Army 

Alliance and the list of its founding members features some of the most 

prominent hackers in China.80

 

80 Scott Henderson, The Dark Visitor, p.29 
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• XFocus, a commercial information security company that grew from a hacker 

group, annually co-sponsors XCon, one of the largest “hacker conferences” in 

China in partnership with NSFocus and Venus Technology. 

• Henan Provincial Public Security Bureau authorities shutdown The Patriot 

Hackers-Black Eagle Base Website and arrested its members in February 

2006. The group, however, was operational again six months later under the 

name Black Eagle Honker Base when its members released a statement 

claiming that the group vowed to focus its efforts on training people for the 

state and working to improve the state’s network security industry, suggesting 

a possible cooperative relationship with state authorities as a condition of their 

release.81

• The Black Eagle leadership also expressed appreciation to the State Security 

Bureau (guojia anquan ju) and the Commission of Science and Technology in 

National Defense (COSTIND, and now renamed SASTIND82) for the 

educational guidance they provided to members while in custody. The latter, 

entity, charged with overseeing national defense industry policy, is not typically 

referenced in connection with hacker groups or their activities.83

Individuals, or possibly groups, engaged in computer network exploitation 

against US networks have obtained malicious software developed by Chinese 

underground or black hat programmers. The ability to obtain this custom code 

indicates that these operators have ties to select members of the hacker 

underground. 

In one demonstrated instance, black hat programmers affiliated with Chinese hacker 

forums provided malicious software to intruders targeting a US commercial firm in 

early 2009. The techniques and tools employed by this group or individual are similar 

to those observed in previous penetration attempts against this same company in the 

previous year, according to their forensic analysis. 

• Forensic analysis also suggests this group is comprised of multiple members 

of varying skill levels, operating with fixed schedules and standard operating 

procedures and is willing to take detailed steps to mask their activities on the 

targeted computer. 

 

81 OSC, CPP20060810443001, “Patriot Hacker Website 'Restored' After ‘Guidance,” 10 August 2006 82 In March 2008, the Commission on Science and Technology for National Defense 

(COSTIND) was reorganized and subordinated to the Ministry of Information Industry and 

Technology (MIIT) and is now called State Administration on Science and Technology for 

National Defense (SASTIND). 

83 OSC, FEA20060811026153, “PRC Patriot Hacker Website Restored After Guidance,” 10 

August 2006. 
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• Open source research on the screen name of the coder who created the 

malware used in the early 2009 attack revealed that the individual is likely a 

native Chinese speaker who posted a keystroke logging program with rootkit 

elements to a discussion board on a prominent Chinese hacker group 

Website known as EvilOctal. 

• The coder created the PDF document used as the attachment to carry the 

malicious software with a tool that is only available in Chinese called 

FreePic2Pdf, version 1.26; this document was modified to covertly install a 

zero day exploit that targeted a previously unknown vulnerability in Adobe 

Acrobat.84

• Upon successful installation on the victim system after the user opened the 

attachment, the Trojan horse malware began periodically attempting to 

connect with another machine overseas, essentially sending a beacon to let 

the attackers know that a machine had been successfully attacked. The 

intruders only completed this connection when they were ready to commence 

the next phase of the operation via encrypted communications with the victim 

computer. 

• The operators worked in a three shift, 24 hour cycle issuing reconnaissance 

commands identical to those observed in previous attacks. 

• When significant differences were recognized between this computer and 

previously compromised systems on the same network, the attack team 

extracted small amounts of data to determine the configuration of security 

software installed and their ability to access targeted data on the company’s 

network. 

• The operators installed a rootkit, which gives the attacker privileged access to 

a victim computer while remaining undetectable, suggesting the attackers 

intended long-term covert use of the victim computer. The attackers 

configured the rootkit to execute upon the next system reboot, effectively 

hiding the operators’ files, programs, network connections and registry 

settings, however, operator error caused a problem in the rootkit execution 

and locked the attackers out of the targeted computer, ending the operation, 

according to forensic analysis. 

 

84 See details on this vulnerability at: http://www.adobe.com/support/security/advisories/apsa09-

01.html and http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/905281. 
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• The rootkit code is still not publicly available, suggesting that the attacker 

obtained it directly from the coder or someone with direct access to this 

individual. 

The creator of another zero day exploit used to target US companies in the fall 

of 2008 developed the code in Chinese and on a machine with Chinese set as 

the default language indicating that this individual was also likely a native or 

fluent speaker. Little additional detail about the developer’s identity is available from 

forensic analysis but it reinforces the assertion that a relationship exists between 

Chinese black hat programmers and individuals responsible for intrusions into US 

networks. 

• US companies began receiving small waves of spam-like emails with a 

Microsoft WordPad (.wri) file attachment containing a small piece of malicious 

software that acted as a Trojan, enabling the attackers to gain complete 

access to the targeted computers, a hallmark of the computer network 

exploitation tradecraft attributed to China. The malware exploited a zero day 

vulnerability in Microsoft’s WordPad application.85 

• The attachment sent in these email attacks contained two components: an 

English language carrier document that appears to be a generic contract 

template for a defense firm to use with a sub-contractor, and the Chinese 

language exploit code inserted inside the carrier document. 

• When the recipient of the apparent spam email attempted to open the attached 

.pdf file, the file installed both the malware and a backdoor service on the 

targeted machine that was designed to execute the next time the user logged 

in. 

The malware, sent in a wave of spearphishing attacks against various US 

companies, was intended to provide the intruder with the ability to remotely 

access and control the targeted computers, another common characteristic of 

computer network exploitation activities attributed to China. 

• The newly installed service connects to an external host outside of the 

targeted company’s network and allows the intruder to take control of the 

victim's machine remotely with the same access and operational capabilities 

as though they were sitting at the user’s keyboard. 

Programming bugs in the malware used during the fall 2008 campaign and the 

intruders’ ability to quickly obtain an earlier version as a replacement program, 

 

85 See Microsoft Security Advisory 960906. 
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strongly suggests this was the first time the newer version was being used by these 

attackers. Their ability to obtain a replacement version quickly may be the result of 

having access to the developer or someone managing a repository of the developer’s 

work. If the latter is true, it implies the existence of a support infrastructure for the 

individuals targeting US Government and commercial networks. However, this is still 

speculative and requires further research to corroborate. 

• The initial version of the malware was compiled in late October 2008 and used 

within weeks by the intruders. This short time interval between the date of 

creation and first use implies that the intruder (or intruders) had the means to 

obtain customized zero-day malware quickly. 

• When they encountered operational problems with the code, the intruders 

quickly obtained an older version of the malware, compiled in January 2008 

and resumed their work with little delay. 

Government Recruitment from Hacker Groups 

Government efforts to recruit from among the Chinese hacker community and 

evidence of consulting relationships between known hackers and security services 

indicates some government willingness to draw from this pool of expertise. It does not 

imply that authorities have established many such relationships or intends to enlist 

whole groups for large attacks on US systems. 

• Between July 2007 and November 2008, an individual using the screen name 

“City_93” posted job vacancy announcements for the Ministry of Public 

Security’s First Research Institute (posting a Web address www.fri.com.cn) on 

the discussion board for EvilOctal.com and XFocus.net, two of the largest and 

in the case of XFocus, most established hacker forums in China. 

• “City_93” eventually posted 10 vacancy notices on Evil Octal between 2007 

and 2008 and on both sites engaged in lengthy discussion threads on the 

application procedures and nature of the job with interested users. The job 

postings were for entry level programmers with experience in the development 

and implementation of network security system projects. 

• The MPS First Research Bureau provides a variety of science and technology 

research and development to operational elements of the MPS. The Institute 

has an information security research group according to its Website. 
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Figure 4: Job posting on hacker Website EvilOctal by a Ministry of Public Security 1st Research 

Institute representative looking for applicants with information security and programming 

backgrounds. The post was made by a user with the screen name “City_93” who self-identified as 

a MPS employee and used an MPS email for follow up contact. 

The founding member of the influential Chinese hacker group Javaphile has a 

formal consulting relationship with the Shanghai Public Security Bureau and 

researcher credentials at the information security engineering institute of one 

of China’s leading universities, according to an analysis of academic 

publications, media reporting, and research done by an independent IW 

analyst. Javaphile has an established history as a hacktivist group, leading attacks 

on the White House and other networks during the hacker wars in 2001-2002 and is 

still considered an active and influential group. 

• The co-founder of Javaphile, Peng Yinan, using the screen name 

Coolswallow, created Javaphile while a student at Shanghai Jiaotong 

University’s School of Information Security Engineering in 2000 according to 

posts he made in 2003 on a Shanghai Jiaotong student online forum that has 

since been removed.86 The group initially functioned solely as a java language 

user group until the EP-3 incident catalyzed the members to convert Javaphile 

into a hacker group. The members focused on developing tools, sharing 

 

86 For the full analysis of the linkage between Coolswallow, Ericool, and Peng Yinan, see Scott 

Henderson’s analysis and research posted on his blog, The Dark Visitor, available at: 

http://www.thedarkvisitor.com/2007/12/javaphile-buddhism-andthe-public-security-bureau/. 
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techniques and carrying out attacks on US Websites, according to postings the 

group made on a student online forum.87 

• Independent research by a US IW specialist, Scott Henderson, linked Peng to 

two screen names, CoolSwallow and Ericool, that he used regularly either on 

his Javaphile Website or to publish essays on Buddhism on a separate 

Website devoted to the subject where he was a member. 

• Henderson later identified Peng’s Shanghai Public Security Bureau consultant 

credentials from a Shanghai Jiaotong University student newspaper story 

about a lecture that Peng, an alumni of the Information Security Engineering 

Institute, had given to students there called “Hacker in a Nutshell.” These 

accounts and publicity posters also described Peng as an “experienced 

hacker” (see Figure 5).88 

• Following this exposure on Henderson’s blog, the Coolswallow and Buddhist 

society sites were taken down and little was heard in online hacker forums 

from Coolswallow or Ericool for over a year. 

Figure 5: Poster advertising Javaphile member and Public Security Bureau 

consultant, Peng Yinan’s 2007 lecture, “Hacker in a Nutshell” at Shanghai Jiaotong 

 

87 Scott Henderson, The Dark Visitor, April 2007, p. 36 88 Scott Henderson, The Dark Visitor blog. The Shanghai newspaper article is available at: 

http://jd.sjtu.edu.cn/BKPG/xsyd/xywh/2007-11-05/1194245625d7507.html
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University. His name is circled and his hacking and PSB credentials are underlined 

above.89 

• Peng later published two articles in 2008 on computer network exploitation 

techniques under his own name and listed as an affiliated researcher at 

Shanghai Jiaotong University’s Information Security Engineering Institute.90 

• The Institute is currently headed by Peng Dequan, a former Director of the 

Science and Technology Commission of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), 

China’s primary foreign intelligence service.91

The PLA in 2005 reportedly held a series of regional or provincial hacker 

competitions to identify talented civilians who could support military CNO 

requirements, according to an uncorroborated Taiwan media source referencing an 

article from a Sichuan university student newspaper. 

• Chinese hacker, Withered Rose (aka Tan Duilin), the former leader of the 

prominent NCPH hacker group, allegedly won the competition in Sichuan, a 

story which has been repeated often in Western media reporting but is difficult 

to verify. 

• The accounts claim that representatives from the Sichuan Military Command 

Communication Department apparently contacted Tan in 2005 directly and told 

him to participate in the network attack and defense training event organized 

by the provincial military command, in preparation for the coming Chengdu 

Military Command Network Attack and Defense Competition later that year, 

according to an interview conducted with him by the Sichuan University of 

Science and Technology student newspaper.92 If true, the story implies that 

the PLA was engaged in “talent scouting” within the hacker community and 

organizing formal events such as this contest to aid the effort. 

 

89 See: http://jd.sjtu.edu.cn/BKPG/xsyd/xywh/2007-11-05/1194245625d7507.html

90 The articles entitled “An Analysis of Blind SQL Injection Techniques” and “Feed Injection 

and Defenses in Web 2.0” published in the journal Information Security and Communication 

Security identified Peng and his co-authors (also former Javaphile members) as researchers 

at Shanghai Jiaotong University’s Information Security Engineering Institute. Citation drawn 

from the Wanfang database, available at: 

http://d.wanfangdata.com.cn/Periodical_xxaqytxbm200805032.aspx 91 “Computer Security Urged to Be Tightened,” PLA Daily Online, English edition, August 14, 

2000; available at 

http://english.peoplesdaily.com.cn/english/200008/14/eng200008_48117.html | OSC, 

CPP20060908425001001, “Wuhan University State Key Laboratory of Software Engineering,” 

28 August 2006. 

92 OSC, CPP20071115310002, “Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao: China Employs 30,000 Internet Soldiers,” 

10 November 2007| Simon Elegant, “Enemies at the Firewall,” Time Magazine, December 6, 

2007; available at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1692063,00.html 
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• Interestingly, Tan was recently arrested on hacking charges when he attacked 

the websites of rival hacker groups. 

Commercial Support to Government CNO R&D 

China’s long term investment in its high technology sectors is paying dividends for the 

PLA as they have access to increasing numbers of domestic firms able to design, 

build, and service advanced IT systems in support of PLA C4ISR and CNO 

requirements. The ability to recruit these employees into militia units is only one 

benefit that the government is deriving from the growth of the IT sector in China. 

Some firms, such as Huawei, are well known in the West and occupy significant 

market share in both China and abroad, but a host of other smaller firms like Venus 

Technologies, also provide increasingly sophisticated platforms and technology to the 

PLA and government security organizations. 

• Huawei is a well established supplier of specialized telecommunications 

equipment, training and related technology to the PLA that has, along with 

others such as Zhongxing, and Datang, received direct funding for R&D on 

C4ISR systems capabilities. All of these firms originated as state research 

institutes and continue to receive preferential funding and support from the 

PLA.93

• ZTE Corp, another of China’s large telecommunications manufacturers, and 

Huawei, also provide certification training and related engineering training to 

PLA personnel assigned to communications and IW related positions, 

according to provincial level Communist Party military newspapers.94

• Civilian IT companies have provided personnel to staff IW militia units that are 

tasked with both CNA and CND missions during wartime and extensive CNE 

missions during peacetime.95

• Venus Technologies Inc, which has close ties to the hacker groups XFocus 

and NSFocus, is also a well known provider of information security and 

computer network operations expertise to the PLA and dozens of other entities 

 

93 Evan Medeiros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, James Mulvenon, A New Direction for China’s 

Defense Industry, RAND Corp, 2005, p. 213. 94OSC, CPP20090430682010, “Network ‘Spiderman’ – Remembering Wang Jianguo, Class 6 

NCO from Certain Main Communications Station,” by Gong Yun, Xia Hui, Zheng Xisheng, 

Guangzhou Zhanshi Bao, March 5, 2009, p.4. 95 OSC, CPP20031002000138, “Building a High-quality Militia Information Technology 

Element,” by Ye Youcai and Zhou Wenrui, PLA Guangzhou Garrison District, Academy of 

Military Science, Guofang, September 15, 2003. 
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in the PRC government. Venus’ customer list published on their Website 

includes all PLA service branches, all PLA Staff departments (i.e. the General 

Staff, Armaments, Logistics, and Political Departments) and the defense 

consortiums China North Industries Group (NORINCO, a well documented 

arms exporter), China Aviation Industry Corp I (AVIC I), China Aerospace 

Science and Technology Group (CASIC), China Shipbuilding Industry 

Corporation, and the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Base, China’s oldest space 

launch facility located in Inner Mongolia.96

To date, the evidentiary record regarding the PLA’s or other state security groups’ 

use of Chinese hackers to conduct network exploitation activities against US 

networks remains highly anecdotal. Western media reports that claim that the PRC 

government has recruited an “internet army” from among the millions of Chinese 

hackers, are spurious at best. The limited reporting available from open sources, 

however, does suggest that some precedent exists for state security organizations to 

seek computer network operations expertise from individuals with sophisticated 

hacker skill sets. How these organizations are using the talent they recruit, the 

numbers of individuals involved in possible state sponsored CNO activities, and how 

these individuals are integrated—if at all—into ongoing cyber intelligence operations 

all bear careful scrutiny and continued research. 

 

96 List is available on Venus Tech’s website located at: http://www.venustech.com.cn/aboutitem/189 
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Cyber-Espionage97

Foreign intelligence services have discovered that unclassified US government and 

private sector information, once unreachable or requiring years of expensive 

technological or human asset preparation to obtain, can now be accessed, 

inventoried, and stolen with comparative ease using computer network operations 

tools. The return on present investment for targeting sensitive US information in this 

way (the intelligence gain) can be extraordinarily high while the barriers to entry (the 

skills and technologies required to implement an operation) are comparatively low. 

Many countries are in the process of developing capabilities to either respond 

defensively to this threat or build their own offensive network operations programs, 

however, China is most frequently cited as the primary actor behind much of the 

activity noted in media reporting, and US officials are increasingly willing to publicly 

acknowledge that China’s network exploitation and intelligence collection activities 

are one of this country’s most consuming counterintelligence challenges. 

China’s development of its computer network operations capability extends beyond 

preparations for wartime operations. The PLA and state security organizations have 

begun employing this capability to mount a large scale computer network exploitation 

effort for intelligence gathering purposes against the US and many countries around 

the world, according to statements by US officials, accusations by targeted foreign 

governments, and a growing body of media reporting on these incidents. 

A long term, persistent campaign to collect sensitive but unclassified information from 

US Government and US defense industry networks using computer network 

exploitation techniques, long attributed to China, has successfully exfiltrated at least 

10 to 20 terabytes of data from US Government networks as of 2007, according to 

US Air Force estimates and that figure has possibly grown in the past two years, 

though no figure is publicly available. 

 

97 The content of the following section is based upon analysis of media but also upon the deep 

experience and insights that Northrop Grumman Corporation has gained as a major provider of 

information security services and its own experience defending a large, geographically dispersed 

enterprise. Northrop Grumman's appreciation of the nature of cyber threats directed at the United 

States is grounded in deep, real world experience, and the incidents and insights presented here are 

derived from open source research and the company's familiarity in the aggregate dealing with a 

variety of advanced cyber security issues. The incidents and adversary patterns of operation 

presented here should not be construed to refer to any specific company or government 

agency unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
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General James Cartwright, while serving as the Combatant Commander of US 

Strategic Command, testified before a Congressional commission that China is 

actively engaging in cyber reconnaissance by probing the computer networks of U.S. 

government agencies as well as private companies. He further noted that the 

intelligence collected from these computer reconnaissance campaigns can be used 

for myriad purposes, including identifying weak points in the networks, understanding 

how leaders in the United States think, discovering the communication patterns of 

American government agencies and private companies, and attaining valuable 

information stored throughout the networks.98

A review of the scale, focus, and complexity of the overall campaign directed 

against the United States and, increasingly, a host of other countries around 

the world strongly suggest that these operations are state-sponsored or 

supported. The operators appear to have access to financial, personnel, and 

analytic resources that exceed what organized cybercriminal operations or multiple 

hacker groups operating independently could likely access consistently over several 

years. Furthermore, the categories of data stolen do not have inherent monetary 

value like credit card numbers or bank account information that is often the focus of 

cybercriminal organizations. Highly technical defense engineering information, 

military related information, or government policy analysis documents are not easily 

monetized by cybercriminals unless they have a nation-state customer, making the 

activity “state-sponsored” by default, regardless of the affiliation of the actual 

operators at the keyboard. 

The scope of operational activities, deep knowledge of the targeted networks, and 

volume and topics of data exfiltrated suggest that the attackers are supporting 

consumers involved in defense related engineering research, policy specialists 

interested in US-China relations, and military planners gathering intelligence on US 

military information systems and operations. 

US Government officials assess that this activity, in the aggregate, has the potential 

to erode the United States’ long term position as a world leader in S&T innovation 

and competitiveness and the collection of US defense engineering data has possibly 

saved the recipient of the information years of R&D and significant amounts of 

funding.99

 

98 “China’s Military Modernization And Its Impact On The United States And The Asia-Pacific,” 

Hearing before The U.S.-China Economic And Security Review Commission, March 29-30, 2007, p. 

7; Available at 

http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/transcripts/mar_29_30/mar_29_30_07_trans.pdf

99 Jeff Bliss, ‘‘China’s Spying Overwhelms U.S. Counterintelligence,’’ Bloomberg, April 2, 2007. | 

Shane Harris, “China’s Cyber-Militia,” The National Journal, Saturday, May 31, 2008, available online 

at: http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/cs_20080531_6948.php
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These operations are succeeding in part because current industry and US 

government information security paradigms are largely based on reactive 

controls such as traditional signature-based anti-virus vendor models, 

common host and network defensive measures that are often inadequate 

against advanced attackers. When a product vendor or the research community 

discloses new security vulnerabilities, security software vendors rapidly analyze it and 

produce “signatures,” or encoded representations of the anticipated effects of an 

attack against this new vulnerability. These signatures are applied to network control 

devices such as Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) and firewalls, 

and on individual computers as anti-virus rules or host IDS/IPS signatures. Adding 

signatures proactively to these systems without prior knowledge of a vulnerability or 

possibly an observed or lab-generated sample attack, is difficult and often 

discouraged. 

• Many organizations are reluctant to patch systems and software against 

vulnerabilities for which there have not been publicly released exploits. Larger 

organizations with more mature security practices or resources often use 

complex behavioral signatures, or models, applied to Security Event and 

Information Management (SEIM) or Network Behavioral Analysis (NBA) 

systems but these techniques are usually fed by component signature-based 

systems, they, too, suffer the same shortcomings. 

• NBA systems show greater promise when tuned to look for anomalous 

behavior, however, there is generally much greater administrative overhead 

and a high false alarm rate in this mode. 

• Traditional network and system management is a balancing act of 

performance, expense and security and common wisdom dictates a certain 

hesitance to make changes on functioning, often critical, systems. 

These operators exploit this reactive defense model and they have the 

resources necessary to develop and exploit previously unknown vulnerabilities 

that are often are missed by signature-based IDS/IPS and endpoint protection 

software. The Chinese academic community and hacker groups—like many hacker 

groups around the world—are heavily focused on researching new zero-day 

vulnerabilities. 

• Anecdotal reporting from information security industry sources suggest that 

Chinese researchers are also willing to purchase zero day attack tools from 

third party sources, though this has not been independently corroborated. 
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• Zero day exploits are bought and sold in numerous public and private markets 

without the involvement of the victim software's vendors, often for tens of 

thousands of dollars per vulnerability.100

The overall effort likely consists of multiple groups and skilled individuals 

operating against different targets given the high operational tempo and 

diversity of targeting observed to date (see Timeline of Alleged Chinese 

Intrusions below). These operators, some possibly affiliated with PRC government 

or military organizations and others probably freelance hackers, have access to 

software developers capable of developing zero day exploits and using tools that are 

often created on computers with Chinese language settings or Chinese language 

developer kits. 

• The adversaries associated with this issue are successful because they are 

able maintain a presence on a targeted network for extended periods enabling 

them establish a connection to a compromised computer on the network when 

operationally required for activities such as reconnaissance of the network 

topology, determining where high value information resides, or to conduct 

social and professional network analysis to support future spearphishing 

campaigns. 

• This latter information is exploited most frequently to craft specific, seemingly 

legitimate-looking, emails to targeted users often referencing a current project 

or meeting with which the recipient is involved. The emails usually contain 

either malicious software embedded in an attachment or links to malicious 

Websites.101

• The scale and complexity of targeting associated with this effort suggests that 

it is probably backed by a mature collection management bureaucracy able to 

collate and disseminate collection priorities to diverse teams of operators, 

intelligence analysts, and malware developers. These individuals are likely a 

mix of uniformed military personnel, civilian intelligence operators, and 

freelance high-end hackers. 

These types of attacks often begin with an email message with a file attached 

containing both the exploit code and another small piece of software which will give 

the attacker control of the victim's computer. When this file, usually an image, 

 

100See for example: http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/470 and 

http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Hackers-Selling-Vista-ZeroDay-Exploit/ for additional background. 101 Brian Grow, Keith Epstein and Chi-Chu Tschang, “The New E-spionage Threat,” BusinessWeek, 

April 10, 2008, available online at: 

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_16/b4080032218430.htm
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document, or spreadsheet is opened by the vulnerable program on the victim's 

computer (e.g. Powerpoint, Wordpad, Adobe Acrobat, etc), the backdoor program 

executes. Email is the most common entry vector because the operators are often 

able to learn an employee’s (or group of employees’) trust relationships (i.e. their 

professional networks) by analyzing who they frequently email. The intruders then 

craft credible looking emails from members or groups within an individual’s network 

that the target will likely open. 102 

Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2008 06:58:13 -0700 (PDT) 

From: John Doe <john.q.googdguy@yahoo.com> 

To: employee.name@companyname.com 

Subject: 7th Annual U.S. Defense Conference 

7th Annual U.S. Defense Conference 

1-2 Jan 2009 

Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center 

Washington, DC 

Download 2009 Conference Preliminary Program (PDF) 

http://conferences.satellite-stuff.net/events/MDA_Prelim_09.zip 

Download 2009 Conference Registration Form (PDF) 

http://conferences.satellite-stuff.net/events/MDA09_reg_form.zip 

Contact: John Doe 

Contractor Information Systems 

(703) 555-1234 

john.doe@yahoo.com 

Figure 6: A sample of an attack email that was sent simultaneously to many US commercial 

firms. The identifying information and the conference have been modified from the original. 

The conference referenced in the email sample in Figure 6 was legitimate, but the 

linked download site was not. The registration form and program files, when 

downloaded and unzipped, gave the attacker complete remote control of the targeted 

user’s computer. The operators tasked with targeting had previously identified this 

company’s employee and all of the other recipients, as someone likely to be 

interested in the subject of the email and download the form by surveying his or her 

online presence: conference attendee lists, subscriptions to newsgroups, social 

networking sites such as Facebook and Linkedin, and corporate public affairs 

releases. 

 

102 Brian Grow, Keith Epstein and Chi-Chu Tschang, “The New E-spionage Threat,” BusinessWeek, 

April 10, 2008, available online at: 

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_16/b4080032218430.htm
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• The operators often reuse the employee’s profiles generated by this 

reconnaissance in multiple targeting attempts either because the user failed to 

open the attachment the first time or simply because they are an “easy mark” 

who usually opens these emails and thus represent a reliable entry vector for 

the intruders. 

• This initial penetration with email and malicious attachment is frequently only 

the first phase of an advanced operation as the users targeted first and the 

data on their computers are often not the actual target of collection. Targeting 

the data owners of the attacker’s actual collection objective increases the risk 

of detection and possible implementation of tighter controls around the data 

they are seeking to exfiltrate, making later attempts more difficult. 

Analysis of forensic data associated with penetrations attributed to 

sophisticated state sponsored operators suggests that in some operations 

multiple individuals are possibly involved, responsible for specific tasks such 

as gaining and establishing network access, surveying portions of the targeted 

network to identify information of value, and organizing the data exfiltration. 

One role is an entry or “breach team” tasked only with gaining entry and maintaining 

a flexible, redundant presence in the target network (essentially “picking the lock” and 

ensuring not only that the door stays open, but that there are multiple doors available 

if the one being used is “closed”). Once the breach team has successfully 

established access to the network, a possible second team or individual conducts the 

data reconnaissance and ultimately locates and exfiltrates targeted data. 

Reasons for using different individuals or groups could be due to the specialized skills 

required for each phase of an intrusion or perhaps for “compartmentation” reasons: 

the first team or operator does not need to know the details of what is being targeted 

by the second team or operator, thus ideally, improving overall operational security. 

These explanations are, however, largely speculative as the fidelity of data on these 

incidents almost never provides insight into the internal communications, identity, or 

relationship dynamics of the actual people behind these intrusions. 

• This type of task oriented structure requires multiple skill sets, possibly 

requiring several individuals to complete one operation. This model, if 

accurate, also implies some means of recruiting, organizing, and managing a 

team like this and ensuring proper completion of a given mission. If this model 

is indeed accurate and it is being replicated across dozens of intrusions over 

time, then that oversight structure must be proportionately larger and more 

complex as well. 
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• Once the breach team or individual has secured a foothold on the first victim’s 

computer, they also continue to collect information about this machine’s 

security configuration, settings, and related system information to solidify their 

presence, sometimes by sniffing and stealing passwords from authentication 

systems, collecting user email to support future deceptive attacks, gather 

network usernames, group membership information and directory listings of 

network shared folders. 

• Operators have also attacked mobile users’ virtual private network (VPN) 

software, which allows employees of a company to access their corporate 

network while outside of the office. Operators have modified VPN software to 

allow access back into the network through the remote user's systems. 

Attackers have on occasion installed additional network software to mask their 

remote control communications, such as encryption rootkits that hide the 

attackers’ presence from legitimate system administrators. 

• All of these steps help ensure long-term access to the target organization's 

network and help provide freedom of movement to the attackers once inside 

the network. 

These attackers have also demonstrated an awareness of a targeted 

organization’s information security measures according to forensic analysis of 

attacker activity, and appear able to alter their operations to avoid detection, 

reflecting the highly detailed reconnaissance that they—or others on their 

behalf—conduct. The attackers in these operations likely use tools or techniques 

that are only as sophisticated as they need to be for the environment in which they 

are operating, holding their more capable tools in reserve until genuinely required. 

• Attackers have demonstrated some ability to respond to adjustments in 

security configurations to ensure maximum time “on station” to accomplish 

their collection mission. These responses include, but are not limited to, 

shifting to stealthier communications channels, jumping to different C2 servers, 

the rapid deletion of toolkits upon detection of defender presence and the 

harvesting of configuration files to support further target analysis. 

• The individuals responsible for maintaining access have demonstrated 

flexibility in responding to unexpected changes in network defenses by the 

targeted organization, suggesting they prepare for these contingencies in 

advance, similar to conducting an “enemy course of action” analysis. 

Generally, this preparation has involved the pre-placement of redundant 

communication channels, C2 nodes on multiple external servers, and multiple 

breach points in a targeted network (usually other computers in the targeted 
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network that have already been compromised and are held in reserve until 

needed). 

• The malware that these operators employ often tries to communicate with (or 

“beacon” to) a pre-established command and control server located in a 

variety of countries. This beaconing can continue for extended periods of time 

before the operators are ready to engage, establish a connection with and 

then take control over the victim system. 

Additional individuals or teams probably tasked with the collection of the 

actual targeted information, have demonstrated greater skill and highly detailed 

knowledge of the targeted networks. Their efforts to locate and move data off of 

the network often involves techniques that place a premium on redundancy, stealth 

and comprehensiveness of preparation and attention to detail. 

• Using network intelligence likely gathered during earlier reconnaissance 

efforts, these collection teams have in some cases copied the data from the 

servers and workstations to a second server that acts as a “staging point” 

where they compress, encrypt, segment and replicate it before distributing it 

through encrypted channels out of the targeted organization to multiple 

external servers that act as “drop points.” 

• These drop points may also play an obfuscation role, ensuring that 

investigators are unable to identify the data’s final destination. 

China’s defense industry is producing new generations of weapon platforms with 

impressive speed and quality, and while these advancements are due to a variety of 

domestic factors, Chinese industrial espionage is providing a source of new 

technology without the necessity of investing time or money to perform research. 

Computer network exploitation in support of these collection requirements has 

possibly expanded the range and detail of information available for collection in a way 

that previously required close HUMINT-enabled access to obtain the data (e.g. an 

agent inside or close proximity to a US citizen and their laptop or other electronics). 

Chinese espionage in the United States, which now comprises the single greatest 

threat to U.S. technology, according to US counterintelligence officials,103 is straining 

the U.S. capacity to respond. This illicit activity both from traditional techniques and 

computer-based activity are possibly contributing to China’s military modernization 

and its acquisition of new technical capabilities. 

 

103 2007 Report to Congress of the US China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 

2007, p. 7., available at: http://www.uscc.gov
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Operational Profile of An Advanced Cyber Intrusion 

The following case study is based wholly upon an internal post-incident forensics 

investigation and discussions with information security specialists from a single 

affected firm following a penetration and data exfiltration by intruders likely 

associated with a state sponsored operation. The company’s internal analysis of 

the incident indicates that the attacks came through, or originated from, China and 

many of the techniques are consistent with the operational profile attributed to other 

attacks believed to originate from China. This case study reflects the details of only 

a single incident. Private sector firms—even within a given industry—frequently 

employ a variety of information security tools and strategies based on their unique 

network architecture and approaches to risk management. 

Information security analysts at a large US commercial firm several years ago 

detected a high volume of data being sent from their network to multiple computers in 

the US and overseas, with many aspects of the activity matching the profile often 

associated with other state sponsored attacks. The analysts quickly began putting 

blocks in place on their network to halt the data loss but not before significant 

volumes of data were lost to the intruders. 

The scale of this operation, which also targeted other large US companies within a 

several week period suggests a disciplined command and control structure, a means 

of sharing specific data collection requirements for various targeted companies and 

the capability to collate and process extremely large volumes of data once exfiltrated. 

Additionally, in this specific incident at least, the attackers selected the data for 

exfiltration with great care. Though they had the opportunity, they did not simply 

“take what they could get” and leave, rather, they chose specific files, often ignoring 

related information in adjacent directory locations, activity which suggests these 

attackers were disciplined and operating from a specific list of collection 

requirements, a characteristic usually only found in highly professional operations. 

During the incident described below, the attackers did not open and review file 

contents—though they had the required file permissions—but instead navigated 

immediately to the files or folders they wanted and began the steps necessary to 

exfiltrate them, suggesting that they had reviewed the directory contents offline and 

that they had already gained access to this firm’s network to conduct detailed 

reconnaissance, including the possible exfiltration of file directory listings. 

These types of operational techniques are not characteristic of amateur hackers 

operating in widely dispersed geographic areas. While the affiliation of the individual 

operators is impossible to establish, the coordination required to stage this operation 

suggests that even if these were freelance operators not directly affiliated with a state 

or military organization, they had professional quality organization and discipline and 

a specific set of collection objectives, evidenced as much by what they didn’t take—
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despite having easy access to the data—as what they did take. The type and 

specificity of data stolen in this case also suggests that the end users were already 

identified and that they likely had deep science and technology resources at their 

disposal to make use of the stolen information. 

While attribution is always the most difficult component of information security 

investigations, hackers—individuals and groups alike—tend to operate in a consistent 

manner, exhibiting a preference for specific tools, possess a unique keyboard 

presence,104 and often tend to target the same types of data across their targets. 

This case is consistent with other incidents attributed to Chinese intrusions into US 

networks though no firm attribution data was available from this case. 

Over a multi-day period during this incident, intruders staged a complex data 

exfiltration operation and while the activity associated with this incident 

occurred within a relatively short span of time, the preparations and 

reconnaissance necessary to support it had likely been ongoing for months. 

The teams or individuals who carried out this operation displayed discipline and a 

deep knowledge of the network architecture they targeted, suggesting that these 

operators had likely spent months patiently assembling a detailed picture of this 

network.

• Identical remote communication and administrative tools and operational 

techniques were used in earlier incidents with this and other companies; they 

operated at times using a communication channel between a host with an IP 

address located in the People’s Republic of China and a server on the 

company’s internal network, a technique observed consistently in similar 

intrusions at other commercial firms. 

• Analysis of the operation suggests that the adversaries previously identified 

specific directories, file shares, servers, user accounts, employee full names, 

password policies, and group memberships on the network, likely during their 

detailed reconnaissance phase. 

• They did not open any files to review the contents prior to exfiltration, 

suggesting they already knew the contents or at a minimum, the file names of 

the data they were tasked with stealing. 

 

104 An individual’s “keyboard behavior” in the context of computer network intrusions refers to the 

specific habits that a hacker might develop over the course of performing certain functions many times. 

The sophistication, frequency, combination of commands, and elapsed time between keyboard entries 

can all help in the creation of a “forensic profile” an individual attacker. 
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The adversary used at least two groups in the operation; a breach team (referred to 

by these information security analysts as “Team One”) and a collection team (known 

as “Team Two”), responsible for gathering and exfiltrating the targeted data. 

• Each team employed distinct toolkits and used them in unique ways 

suggesting not only different operational goals but also different individuals at 

the keyboard. 

• The teams maintained a base of instrumented hosts on the company’s 

network that they held in reserve for use as required at external locations to 

support their covert communications for an extended period of time. 

Prior to this data exfiltration, the company’s information security analysts had 

detected activity attributed to these types of sophisticated attackers, but it was 

generally characterized by low volumes of traffic through compromised hosts and 

appeared primarily focused on maintaining access and presence. The company’s 

information security staff detected and countered these compromises in the months 

prior to the final data exfiltration, however, the attackers’ appear to have simply 

created new entry vectors or reverted back to other pre-established means of 

accessing the company’s network. The reconnaissance phase seems to have been 

sufficiently methodical and quiet to permit the compilation of an accurate map of the 

network over time. The adversary identified servers, file shares, individual 

employees, user groups, and the credentials necessary to support a complex data 

exfiltration operation later. 

Figure 7: Diagram of the data exfiltration operation attributed to a sophisticated—possibly state 

sponsored—intrusion into a US commercial network. 

External Collection Points

Exfiltration Hosts

(Internal Hosts)

Corporate File Servers

Staging Systems Accessed by 

Windows Remote Desktop

Compromised User Workstations

Command and Control Session with 

External Controller C2

Workstation 

Staging

File Server

Exfiltration 

Host

External Host

Staging

File Server

Exfiltration 

Host

External Host

Workstation

Staging

File Server

Exfiltration 

Host

External Host
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Intruder Command and Control Infrastructure 

Analysis of the intruders’ activity prior to, and during, the exfiltration 

operation indicates that their command and control architecture relied upon 

previously stolen valid user accounts to authenticate to the company’s 

internal servers. Once authenticated, they established communications with a 

variety of previously compromised computers inside the company’s network. The 

operators then tunneled Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) within their existing 

communication channels to establish contact with the targeted hosts for purposes 

ranging from maintaining basic access to the control of the eventual data 

exfiltration. Additional stolen account names and passwords were used as needed 

to gain access to otherwise protected resources such as computers, network 

shares, folders and files. 

• Analysis of proxy logs and forensic data revealed that the operators used 

dozens of employee accounts on almost 150 occasions to access the 

network in the days leading up to the exfiltration. 

• At times, they used highly privileged administrative accounts and passed 

NTLM hashes in lieu of passwords directly to the proxy authentication 

mechanism.105 The use of password hashes, which were harvested directly 

from compromised domain controllers, appears designed to defeat any twofactor authentication (T-FA) techniques that may have been in place to 

defend against brute-force password cracking tools. 

• The use of NTLM hashes, which were harvested from domain controllers 

using password collection tools, appears designed to defeat any multifactor 

authentication techniques that may have been in place to defend against 

brute-force password cracking tools. 

• The adversary also repeatedly enumerated group membership of accounts 

in the organization’s primary domain, which assisted them in the identifying 

which employee accounts to use when trying to access files restricted to 

certain users. 

 

105 Many proxy servers can be configured to require an NTLM challenge/response authentication 

before access is granted to the protected resource, such as Internet/WWW/FTP access. If an 

attacker is in possession of the authentication hashes, they can use the hash directly, rather than 

first “crack” the password, then re-hash it for the authentication service. 
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Movement of Targeted Data to Intermediate “Staging Servers” 

During the first several days of this incident, the adversary transferred the data 

selected for exfiltration from company file servers (where it normally resided) to 

Microsoft Exchange email servers that acted as intermediate staging points (See 

Figure 7, the transfer occurred between the Staging Systems and the Corporate 

File Servers in this diagram). Their reconnaissance of the network enabled them to 

select servers that offered the highest performance and network throughput. The 

identification and selection of these servers, again, underscores the adversary’s 

precise knowledge of this network’s architecture, gained from detailed 

reconnaissance prior to this operation. 

The attackers began the preparations for moving data from the files servers to the 

staging points by establishing clear lines of command and control and identifying 

the appropriate hosts to use for the staging and exfiltration phases of the 

operation. Analysis of the available data indicates that the adversaries, using 

standard Windows file transfer tools, moved targeted data from the shares to the 

staging servers. 

• Operators likely associated with the collection team (Team 2), using an 

internal host as a C2 node, established multiple connections through 

encrypted RDP sessions to various internal email servers prior to staging 

data on these machines. 

• Forensic data revealed an increase of short duration communications 

between the internal hosts used as C2 nodes and email servers in the days 

prior to the staging operation. This process was likely to identify and 

confirm the resources that would be used in all phases of the subsequent 

operation. 

• Concurrent with this activity, the adversaries also established 

communications between the email servers used for the exfiltration 

operation and an external Website that was likely under their control. The 

attackers used this as their primary C2 channel to control at least seven of 

the internal email servers while they prepared their operation (see the 

external drop points in Figure 7). 

After moving data to staging servers, the operators renamed all targeted files with 

nondescript labels to resemble a legitimate Windows application likely selected to 

appear innocuous on the staging servers. 

• Once the transfer to staging servers was complete, the attackers encrypted 

and compressed the files into numbered volumes of RAR archives—all 
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exactly the same size—in preparation for exfiltration.106 

• Information security analysts within the company noted that the tools and 

techniques used for this process closely matched that used in previously 

detected activity on the organization’s network, confirming either that this 

was the same entity or that operators responsible for different intrusions 

have a means of sharing data about their targets or activities. 

Exfiltration of Data from the Internal Network 

Reflecting their methodical preparations, these operators used seven 

servers almost in tandem to move data out of the company’s network, 

suggesting that speed was a priority during this phase of the operation. The 

movement of data out of the internal network is the most vulnerable phase of the 

entire operation because of defensive tools the company had in place on its 

network perimeter and was the only point that they were detected during their 

multi-day presence in the network in preparation for this action.

The final stage of the exfiltration operation began in the evening (local time for this 

firm), after all of the targeted data was staged on the intermediate hosts. Prior to 

starting the exfiltration, the operators prepared with characteristic care: 

establishing an overarching C2 channel, testing their connections, possibly 

rehearsing their procedures, and checking their available bandwidth before 

beginning the actual exfiltration. 

• After the commencement of the exfiltration from a single email server, 

operators enumerated all of the email servers in the targeted areas. This 

was significant because their request used the company’s standard internal 

naming convention for these servers in the geographic area where the 

servers were located, knowledge that is obtained only through highly 

detailed reconnaissance of the network.107 The command returned a list of 

several dozen servers, 75 percent of which they used in the operation as 

either staging or exfiltration points. 

• The teams involved in the operation prepared for the actual exfiltration by 

 

106 Of note, the RAR archives were all exactly 650MB in size, the maximum capacity of a standard 

CD ROM, indicating a possible future storage or transfer medium. 

107 Organizations with networks dispersed over large geographic regions often use a naming 

convention for their servers that identifies the physical location of the server, followed by internal 

company organizational details or a code to represent the server’s role, e.g. a print server located in 

Montana in the XY Division may be internally named “MTXYP012.” In this case, the attackers knew 

the exact convention that their target used and searched for all of the servers in the geographic 

area where their targeted data was located. 
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directing each of the servers that would be used to move data out of the 

company to access a large video file (over 20MB) from an internal server 

not otherwise targeted or involved in the overall operation. In each case, 

the connection was terminated by the attackers after receiving only a short 

portion of the video. This truncated downloading suggest they were not 

attempting to view the contents of the file itself, but likely testing the 

available bandwidth for transporting large volumes of data. 

The attackers, operating with a valid user account, controlled one of the company’s 

desktop machines which they used as a C2 node to direct the multiple servers 

involved in the overall exfiltration operation (the company’s analysts identified a 

total of four desktop machines used as C2 nodes). This particular C2 node 

connected to multiple internal servers, including one staging server, two other 

known intermediate hosts, and an external IP address located in the United States. 

• One of the internal C2 hosts established a connection to a DSL customer of 

a commercial US-based Internet service provider. This proxy connection 

remained open for the entire exfiltration phase. During that time, this node 

connected via RDP into at least eight external hosts, one of which was 

located in Hong Kong.108 

• Forensic analysis of the traffic flow in this incident indicates that the 

attackers moved large volumes of data from the staging servers to those 

used as a forwarding point for exfiltration out of the company’s networks 

(the connection between “Exfiltration Hosts” and “External Drop Points” 

Figure 7). 

The Team One operators responsible for penetrating the information security 

defenses possibly rehearsed their portion of the operation using innocuous files 

prior to actually commencing the data exfiltration, then attempted to send three 

RAR archive files via independent FTP sessions. 

Analysis of the operators’ command channel activity indicates that they 

encountered serious problems with two external hosts intended to receive data 

exfiltrated from this company’s network. They also attempted custom FTP client 

and server software, but it failed for unknown reasons. The operators abandoned 

one of these servers and the custom FTP software, likely due to the slow and 

unreliable data transfer rates, and continued with standard FTP server software 

running on five more reliable remote hosts for the remainder of the data exfiltration. 

 

108 The Hong Kong connection was unsuccessful and probably accidental given the careful steps 

taken to use US-based servers to receive the data once it started flowing. The probable accident 

does potentially identify one of the adversary’s external resources, possibly used to receive data 

from the US servers once the operation was complete. 
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• On the final day of the operation, at approximately the same time in the 

evening that they started each day previously, the operators established an 

FTP connection from one of the internal exfiltration servers to an external 

host. They verified that their communication channel was working properly 

by uploading a zero byte file followed by a much larger file. Apparently 

satisfied that this connection functioned properly, the operators logged out 

of this internal server. 

• The operators reconnected within half an hour to this same internal server, 

and using the same credentials attempted to move the first encrypted RAR 

file containing the company’s proprietary data. Two minutes later, they 

attempted to move another file, and then logged out. Minutes later, they 

reconnected and attempted to move a third file. In each instance, the FTP 

connections terminated prematurely for unknown reasons. It appears that 

while small file transfers were successful across this channel, large file 

transfers caused it to fail. 

• They then attempted to transfer files to a new remote FTP server using 

custom FTP software that provided an additional layer of encryption. The 

attacker’s FTP software implemented a custom command, “SORT”, issued 

by the client and recognized by the server as a signal to receive encrypted 

communications in lieu of a normal, unencrypted, file transfer. This same 

software was then tried almost immediately on a new remote host, and 

again it failed to complete a test transfer. In a final test, they connected back 

to their first remote server which was now running their custom FTP server 

software, and attempted a transfer; it too failed. 

• They then connected to a second US university and succeeded in manually 

moving large RAR files using unmodified FTP server software. Shortly 

thereafter, the operators established a series of automated, redundant, 

transfers to five remote hosts, all running this same server software, in an 

effort to maximize the success rate of this main data exfiltration effort. 

The information security staff eventually detected and blocked the exfiltration in 

mid-stream but not before significant amounts of company data left the network. 

Intrusion prevention systems on the company’s network were then tuned to alert 

and block further activity and for the next five hours these systems continued to 

detect attempts by the operators to return, suggesting that they were interrupted 

before completing the full exfiltration as planned. Information security analysts with 

this firm have no means of determining the total intended size of this exfiltration 

operation. 

 
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Timeline of Significant Chinese Related Cyber Events 

1999-Present 
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Chronology of Alleged Chinese Computer Network 

Exploitation Events Targeting US and Foreign Networks 

1999 

May 1999: The accidental US bombing of China's Serbian embassy in May 1999 

draws angry protest from China’s hacker community and leads to a series of 

defacements of US government Websites by Chinese hackers.109

August 1999: The “Taiwan-China Hacker War” erupts after then-President of 

Taiwan Lee Teng-hui recommended Taiwan’s relationship with the People’s 

Republic of China be on a “state-to-state” basis. Chinese hackers defaced 

numerous Taiwan government, university and commercial sites. Taiwan hackers 

attacked back, defacing Chinese government Websites with pro-Taiwan 

language.110

2000 

May 2000: Chinese hackers deface Taiwan government Websites with anti-Taiwan 

political statements in protest over the swearing in of Chen Shui-bien.111

October 2000: Chinese hackers threaten a denial of service attacks and Web 

defacement against Taiwan government and private Websites in protest over 

Taiwan’s celebration of National Day.112

2001 

April 2001: The collision of a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a People’s 

Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) F-8 fighter and the subsequent detention of the EP-3 

crew members for eleven days on Hainan Island sparked the first “Sino-US Hacker 

 

109 Ellen Messmer, “Kosovo Cyber-War Intensifies: Chinese Hackers Targeting US Sites, 

Government Says,” CNN.com, May 1999. 110 Fred Jame, “China, Taiwan in Web Hacking ‘War’,” MacWeek.com, August 1999. 111 “Chinese Plan To Hack Into Taiwan Websites,” The Straits Times, October, 2000. 

112 Ibid 
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War,” with denial of service attacks and Web defacements launched from both 

sides against government and private sites.113

2002 

May 2002: To mark the one year anniversary of the first Sino-US Hacker War, 

Chinese civilian hackers begin to plan a large scale attack of US Websites. Their 

planned attacks end after the Communist Party issues a strongly worded 

condemnation of patriotic hacking against foreign networks.114

2003 

August 2003: Hackers operating from sites in mainland China’s Hubei and Fujian 

Provinces penetrate thirty Taiwan government agencies and at least twice as many 

Taiwan companies. The attacks focus on the Defense Ministry, Election 

Commission, and the National Police Administration among others. This is part of 

an ongoing series of attacks against the Taiwan government and private industry 

that continue through 2004 against other notable Websites such as Taiwan’s 

Ministry of Finance and the Kuomintang Party.115

2004 

June-July 2004: Attacks against Taiwan continued in 2004 targeting Websites 

belonging to Taiwan's Ministry of Finance, the Kuomintang Party, the Democratic 

Progressive Party (DPP) and the Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) Military 

News Agency.116

 

113 Tang, Rose, “China Warns of Massive Hack Attacks,” CNN, May 2001 114 Pamela Hess, “China Prevented Repeat Cyber Attack on US,” UPI, 29 October 2002. 

115 Wendell Minnick,“Taiwan Faces Increasing Cyber Assaults,” Army Times Publishing, June 2006. 

116 Ibid. 
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November 2004: US media reports that Chinese hackers attacked multiple 

unclassified US military systems at the U.S. Army Information Systems 

Engineering Command at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, the Defense Information 

Systems Agency in Arlington, Virginia, the Naval Ocean Systems Center in San 

Diego, California and the United States Army Space and Strategic Defense 

installation in Huntsville, Alabama.117

2005 

May 2005: A series of attacks believed to have originated from China and South 

Korea hit numerous Japanese university and industrial Websites. The attacks may 

have been caused by a rise in tensions between the countries over the Japanese 

Education Ministry‘s alleged omission of key historical facts pertaining to Japan’s 

actions in World War II and China’s opposition to Japan’s attempt to be a 

permanent member of the UN Security Council.118

August 2005: Media reporting first covers the story of a Chinese computer network 

exploitation operation codenamed “Titan Rain,” alleging the intrusions into DoD 

systems date back to 2003. 119

September 2005: According to Taiwanese media, the Taiwan National Security 

Council is targeted via socially engineered emails containing malicious 

attachments, infecting the recipient hosts and possibly installing a backdoor 

through which the intruders can return undetected. Subject lines include "arms 

procurement" and "freedom."120

2006 

June 2006: Taiwan media reports that Chinese hackers attacked Taiwan’s Ministry 

of National Defense (MND) and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). The attacks 

may have been launched using socially engineered email and attempted to spread 

misinformation about the MND in an apparent smear campaign. Attackers also 

 

117 Tom Espiner, “Chinese Hackers US Military Defenses,” Silicon,com, November 2005. 

118 Anthony Faiola, “Cyber Warfare: China vs. Japan,” MSNBC News, May 2005. 

119 Bradley Graham, “Hackers Attack Via Chinese Web Sites,” The Washington Post, August 2005. 120 “NSC Computers Targeted in Hacker Email Attack,” Liberty Times, September 2005. 
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stole account login credentials from Chunghwa Telecom’s Web mail system, the 

MND’s telecommunications provider.121

July 2006: US media reports that intruders penetrate the US Department of State 

(DoS) networks, stealing sensitive information and user login credentials, and 

install backdoors on numerous computers, allowing them to return to the systems 

at will. DoS systems administrators are forced to limit Internet access until the 

investigation is completed. While China’s involvement is not obvious, problems 

were especially acute at the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, responsible 

for policy coordination on China, North Korea and Japan.122

August 2006: Pentagon officials state hostile civilian cyber units operating inside 

China have launched attacks against the NIPRNET and have downloaded up to 20 

terabytes of data.123 

August 2006: A Member of Congress who is a vocal critic of China’s human rights 

record claims Chinese hackers penetrated his office computers and those of their 

staff.124 

November 2006: Chinese hackers attack the US Naval War College computer 

infrastructure, possibly targeting war game information on the networks. The 

College’s Web and emails systems are down for at least two weeks while the 

investigation takes place.125 

2007 

June 2007: Media reports indicate approximately 1,500 computers are taken offline 

following a penetration into the email system of the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD). 

 

121 Wendell Minnnick, “Taiwan Faces Increasing Cyber Assaults,” Army Times Publishing, June 

2006 

122 “Large-Scale Hacking Discovered at State Department,” Buzzle Staff and Agencies, 

July 2006 

123 Dawn Onley, Dawn and Patience Wait, “Red Storm Rising: DoD’s Efforts to Stave Off NationState Cyber Attacks Begin with China,” Government Computer News, August 2006. 124 Steven Schwankert, “US Congressmen Accuse China of Hacking Their Computers,” IDGNS, 

June 2008. 

125 Ibid. 
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August/September 2007: German media reports that Berlin authorities believe 

Chinese hackers, with ties to the PLA, installed backdoor applications in various 

systems using Microsoft Word and PowerPoint documents. Targeted German 

government entities include the Federal Chancellery, the Ministry of Economics 

and Technology and the Federal Ministry for Education and Research. German 

officials estimate that 60 percent of cyber attacks hitting Germany emanate from 

China, many from the cities of Lanzhou, Guangdong, and Beijing.126

September 2007: UK media reports on Chinese hacker attacks against 

government offices of the United Kingdom, including the Foreign Office. The 

attacks did not lead to major adverse effects, according to officials, though the 

constant, ongoing activity of China’s cyber attackers is acknowledged as a 

constant problem. 127

September 2007: New Zealand’s secret service suggests possible Chinese 

government involvement in the recent cyber attacks. China’s government denies 

any involvement. This follows similar reporting regarding attacks against United 

States allies. 128

October 2007: US media reports that China is suspected as the source of at least 

seven versions of socially engineered email targeting 1,100 employees at the Oak 

Ridge National Lab in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Eleven staff possibly opened the 

malicious attachment, allowing the attackers to gain access to, and potentially 

steal, sensitive data, including a database at the nuclear weapons laboratory 

housing personnel records going back to 1990.129 

December 2007: The British domestic intelligence service, MI5, issues a 

confidential alert to 300 chief executives, accountants, legal firms and security 

chiefs warning of cyber attacks and electronic espionage sponsored by Chinese 

state organizations. Included is a warning that the PLA is targeting businesses 

working in China and using the Internet to steal confidential business 

information.130

2008 

 

126 Ulf Gartzke, “Outrage in Berlin Over Chinese Cyber Attacks,” The Weekly Standard, August 

2007. 

127 Richard Norton-Taylor, “Titan Rain: How Chinese Hackers Targeted Whitehall,” The Guardian, 

September 2007. 128 Liam Tung, “China Accused of Cyber Attacks on New Zealand,” CNET News, September 2007. 129 “China Suspected in Hacking Attempt on Oak Ridge National Lab,” Homeland Security 

Newswire, December 2007. 

130Rhys Blakely, Jonathan Richard, James Rossiter, and Richard Beeston, “MI5 Alert on China’s 

Cyberspace Spy Threat,” The Times, December 2007. 
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March 2008: Australian security agencies acknowledge that they have been the 

victim of ongoing cyber attacks, but stop short of accusing China.131

April 2008: Indian officials claim China is behind “almost daily attacks into the 

networks belonging to the government and Indian’s private sector.”132

May 2008: The Belgian Government reports government systems have been 

targeted multiple times by hackers operating from China.133

May 2008: U.S. authorities investigate claims that Chinese officials surreptitiously 

copied the contents of a US government laptop during then- Commerce Secretary 

Carlos Gutierrez’ visit to China.134

November 2008: Media sources report that Chinese hackers penetrate the White 

House information system on numerous occasions, penetrating for brief periods 

before systems are patched.135

November 2008: Business Week magazine publishes a report on significant cyber 

intrusions dating back several years at some of NASA’s most critical sites including 

the Kennedy Space Center and Goddard Space Flight Center. The operations to 

prevent the attacks from China are codenamed, “Avocado.” Attacks included 

socially engineered emails launched at top officials. Among the data stolen are 

operational details of the Space Shuttle including performance and engine data.136

December 2008: Chinese hackers associated with hack4.com stage politically 

motivated Web defacements on French Embassies in the US, United Kingdom, 

China, and Canada after French President Sarkozy’s December 2008 visit with the 

Dalai Lama.137

2009 

 

131 Ross Peake, “Australia Confirms Cyber Attacks,” Canberra Times, March 2008. 

132 Dan Goodin, “India and Belgium Decry Chinese Cyber Attacks,” The Register, May 2008. 133 Ibid. 

134 Steven Schwankert, “US Congressmen Accuse China of Hacking Their Computers,” IDGNS, 

June 2008. 

135 Ibid 

136 Keith Epstein and Ben Elgin, “Network Security Breaches Plague NASA,” BusinessWeek, 

November 2008. 

137 Asian News International, “French Embassy Web Site in China Hacked,” HT Media Limited, 

December 2008. 
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March 2009: A Canadian research team publishes a study of the GhostNet cyber 

espionage network that targeted over 1,300 hosts around the world including those 

at the German, Indian, Pakistani and Portuguese embassies around the world and 

the Tibetan Government in Exile in India. The Canadian-based Information 

Warfare Monitor (IWM) notes the compromise of numerous government and 

private information processing systems across 103 countries. The operators 

responsible for the network all operated from Hainan Island in China. The Chinese 

government denies all accusations of responsibility or state sponsorship.138

March 2009: The Philippine Daily Inquirer publishes a report citing the GhostNet 

study’s assertion that the computer network of the Philippines’ Department of 

Foreign Affairs (DFA) has been hacked by cyber spies based in China.139

April 2009: Media reports the German government records daily attacks against its 

networks, many from Chinese based operators. the German Foreign Office is 

heavily targeted the reports note and are penetrated via socially engineered 

email.140

April 2009: Australian media reports that Chinese cyber spies are targeting the 

Australian Prime Minister via email and mobile phones. The Chinese government 

denies all accusations.141 

April 2009: Media sources report that hackers based in China infiltrated the 

Intranet of South Korea’s Finance Ministry, causing concern over the potential theft 

of sensitive government data. The cyber attackers used socially engineered emails 

to target ministry staff. The email, disguised to look as though sent from one or 

more trusted officials, executed malicious software when opened allowing the 

attackers to access the systems.142

 

138 John Markoff, “Vast Spy System Loots Computers in 103 Countries,” New York Times, March 

28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/technology/29spy.html. 139 Aning, Jerome and Olchondra, Riza T., “RP Gov’t Websites Vulnerable to Hacking,” Philippine 

Daily Inquirer, March 2009 

140 John Goetz, and Marcel Rosenbach, “Cyber Spies: ‘GhostNet’ and the New World of 

Espionage,” Speigel Online, April 2009 141 The Australian Online. “Chinese Diplomat Dismisses Australian ‘Cyber Espionage’ Claims,” April 

2009 

142 “China-Based Hackers Access S. Korean Finance Ministry’s Intranet,” AsiaPulse News, April 

2009. 
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Commonly Used Acronyms 

AMS Academy of Military Science 

ASAT Anti-Satellite 

C2 Command and Control 

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, 

 Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and 

 Reconnaissance 

CEME Complex Electro-Magnetic Environment 

CMC Central Military Commission 

CNA Computer Network Attack 

CND Computer Network Defense 

CNE Computer Network Exploitation 

CNO Computer Network Operations 

CONUS Continental United States 

EW Electronic Warfare 

GSD General Staff Department 

INEW Integrated Network Electronic Warfare 

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

IW Information Warfare 

NIPRNET Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network 

PLA People’s Liberation Army 

TRB Technical Reconnaissance Bureau 

USPACOM US Pacific Command 

USTRANSCOM US Transportation Command 
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Glossary of Technical Terms 

Backbone – A primary transit network or series of networks, designed to carry 

data between different local area networks. A backbone generally has greater 

data carrying capacity, or “bandwidth”, than the networks connected to it. The 

Internet Backbone is the interconnection of high-speed networks, primarily 

government, commercial telecommunications and academic networks that 

route data for public Internet users. 

Backdoor – A method of regaining remote control of a victim’s computer by 

reconfiguring installed legitimate software or the installation of a specialized 

program designed to allow access under attacker-defined conditions. Trojan 

horse programs and rootkits often contain backdoor components.

Black hat - A computer hacker who is intent on causing damage or taking other 

unauthorized or illegal actions against a victim. 

C2 – Command and control. The term, in the context of computer network 

operations, often describes a communications method or a component thereof 

to maintain remote control of an operational asset, such as a compromised 

computer. 

Coder – A computer programmer or one who writes computer programming 

language code. 

Computer Network Attack (CNA) – Actions taken through the use of computer 

networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in 

computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. 

(See: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf). 

Computer network defense (CND) – Actions taken through the use of computer 

networks to protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to unauthorized 

activity within information systems and computer networks (See: 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf). 

Computer network exploitation (CNE) – Enabling operations and intelligence 

collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to 

gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or 

networks (See: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf). 

Computer network operations (CNO) - Comprised of computer network attack, 

computer network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling 

operations (See http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf). 
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Distributed denial of service (DDoS) – A class of attacks that results in the 

exhaustion of computing or communications resources by engaging many 

intermediate computers to simultaneously attack one victim. These 

intermediate attack systems are often previously compromised and under the 

control of the attacker. 

Electronic Warfare (EW) – Any military action involving the use of 

electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or 

to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare 

are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. 

File Transfer Protocol (FTP) - A standard Internet protocol implemented in FTP 

server and client software, including most web browsers. It is used to “transfer 

data reliably and efficiently.” http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc959.txt 

Hacker – An individual who uses computer technology in ways not originally 

intended by the vendor. Commonly the term is applied to people who attack 

others using computers. 

For the purposes of this discussion, hackers are subdivided as follows: 

• Script kiddies: Unskilled attackers who do not have the ability to discover new 

vulnerabilities or write exploit code, and are dependent on the research and 

tools from others. Their goal is achievement. Their sub-goals are to gain 

access and deface web pages. 

• Worm and virus writers: Attackers who write the propagation code used in the 

worms and viruses but not typically the exploit code used to penetrate the 

systems infected. Their goal is notoriety. Their sub-goals are to cause 

disruption of networks and attached computer systems. 

• Security researchers and white hat operators: This group has two subcategories: bug hunters and exploit coders. Their goal is profit. Their subgoals are to improve security and achieve recognition with an exploit. 

• Professional hacker-black hat: Individuals who get paid to write exploits or 

actually penetrate networks; this group also falls into the same two subcategories as above. Their goal is also profit (See: http://www.uscert.gov/control_systems/csthreats.html).

Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) – The message format and exchange 

standard used by web browsers and web servers. 
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Hacktivism – Computer hacking intended to communicate a social or political 

message, or to support the position of a political or ideological group. Hactivism 

activities include data theft, website defacement, denial of service, redirects 

and others. 

Hacktivist – An attacker who practices hacktivism. 

INFOCON - Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) classifications mirror 

Defense Conditions (DEFCON) Alert System and are a uniform system of five 

progressive readiness conditions– INFOCON 5 thru INFOCON 1 with 

INFOCON 5 being a level of normal readiness and INFOCON 1 a level of 

maximum readiness, implemented because of severe threat or attack. As the 

INFOCON levels increase, elements of network functionality or services 

deemed lower priority or at high risk of attack may be temporarily suspended. 

Thus, CNA tools that work during a normal state of readiness may be rendered 

ineffective if the services or applications they exploit are turned off.

Information Warfare (IW) – Actions taken to achieve information superiority by 

affecting adversary information, information-based processes, information 

systems, and computer-based networks while defending one’s own information, 

information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based 

networks (See: http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/packs/DocHandler.ashx?DocId=3712) 

Intrusion Detection System (IDS) – A computer or network monitoring system 

that matches observations against patterns of known or suspected 

unauthorized activity. 

Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) – An inline system or software that applies 

IDS-style logic and approves or rejects network traffic, program and data 

access, hardware use, etc. 

Network Behavioral Analysis (NBA) – An intrusion detection system that models 

network traffic and alerts on violations of known acceptable activity. Rules can 

include data volume, time of day, traffic rate, communication partners, content, 

and other elements. 

NIPRNET – Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network. The unclassified 

network of the US Department of Defense which provides Internet access as 

well as interconnectivity to DoD users and facilities. 

NTLM - A Microsoft authentication protocol that uses cryptographic hash 

representations of account passwords. (See: http://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/aa378749(VS.85).aspx) 
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PDF – File format and filename extension for Adobe Portable Document Format 

documents. 

Phishing – The practice of enticing a victim to visit a website or other online 

resource with the intention of stealing credentials, financial information such as 

bank accounts, or credit card numbers. Phishing attacks generally involve an 

email claiming to come from a trusted entity such as a bank or ecommerce 

vendor, with a link to a website and the instructions to click the link and take 

actions once at the website. 

RAR or Roshal Archive - A compressed file format similar in use to the more 

popular ZIP format. It is used to conserve storage and network resources and 

simplifies the movement of large sets of files. Optional encryption is available 

using the NIST Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm. Just as ZIP archives 

are created with software such as WinZip (http://www.winzip.com) and zip 

(http://www.info-zip.org), RAR archives are created with WinRar and RAR 

(http://www.rarlab.com) 

Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) - The communication protocol used to provide 

remote viewing and control of Microsoft Windows computers and applications. 

For additional information (See http://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/aa383015(VS.85).aspx). 

Rootkit - A piece of software that can be installed and hidden on the victim 

computer without the user’s knowledge. It may be included in a larger software 

package or installed by an attacker who has been able to take advantage of 

vulnerability on the victim machine. Rootkits are not necessarily malicious, but 

they may hide malicious activities. Attackers may be able to access information, 

monitor user actions, modify programs, or perform other functions on the 

targeted computer without being detected (See: http://www.uscert.gov/cas/tips/ST06-001.html). 

Security Event and Information Management (SEIM) – Centralized collection 

and management of security event records from many different systems such 

as firewalls, IDS/IPS, antivirus software, authentication systems, etc. SEIMs 

may provide complex multifactor rules to alert on patterns of behavior not easily 

identifiable by one of the component systems alone.

Spearphishing – A targeted phishing attack against a select group of victims, 

usually belonging to a single company, school, industry, etc. “Spearphishing” is 

commonly used to refer to any targeted email attack, not limited to phishing. 
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Trojan horse - An apparently useful program containing hidden functions that can 

exploit the privileges of the user (running the program), with a resulting security 

threat. A Trojan horse does things that the program user did not intend. Trojan 

horses rely on users to install them, or they can be installed by intruders who 

have gained unauthorized access by other means. Then, an intruder 

attempting to subvert a system using a Trojan horse relies on other users 

running the Trojan horse to be successful (See: www.cert.org/advisories/CA1999-02.html). 

Tunneling - A technique to encapsulate one communication data stream inside of 

another, in order to extend the advantages of the latter to the former. Attackers 

will often tunnel a network protocol that would not be allowed to cross network 

boundaries inside of another that is allowed, defeating perimeter defenses 

(See: http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/projects/devglossary/_tunneling.html). 

Two-factor Authentication (T-FA) - Existing authentication methodologies involve 

three basic “factors”: 

• Something the user knows (e.g., password, PIN); 

• Something the user has (e.g., ATM card, smart card); and 

• Something the user is (e.g., biometric characteristic, such as a fingerprint). 

T-FA requires that a user present two of the three possible factors to the 

authentication mechanism. A known flaw in some T-FA systems is the server 

storage of a hash representation of the credentials contained on the smart card 

or token. With this in hand, the attacker can replay that data to the 

authentication system; in this case, that of the proxy server, without needing the 

physical card or token (See: 

http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf). 

USPACOM – United States Pacific Command is one of six Unified Combatant 

Commands of the United States Armed Forces with an area of responsibility 

encompassing all territory from the US West Coast to the western border of 

India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole. The command presently has 

approximately 325,000 US service personnel. 

USTRANSCOM - United States Transportation Command provides intermodal 

transportation across the spectrum of military operations. USTRANSCOM is 

comprised of three component commands -- the Air Force's Air Mobility 

Command, the Navy's Military Sealift Command, and the Army's Military 

Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. 

Zero day exploit – An attack against a software vulnerability that has not yet been 

addressed by the software maintainers. These attacks are difficult to defend 
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against as they are often undisclosed by the vendor until a fix is available, 

leaving victims unaware of the exposure. 
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