AUDIT REPORT IG-04-011 

Report Recipients: 

SSC/AA00/Director, John C.

Stennis Space Center STENNIS SPACE CENTER’S 

PRESSURE VESSEL AND 

PRESSURIZED SYSTEM 

PROGRAM NEEDS SIGNIFICANT 

IMPROVEMENTS 

February 4, 2004 

cc: 

M/Associate 

 Administrator for 

 Space Flight 

Q/Associate 

 Administrator for 

 Safety and Mission 

 Assurance

O/Management 

 Systems 

 National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Released by: _[original signed by]_______________

David M. Cushing, Assistant Inspector General for Auditing 
IG-04-011 February 4, 2004 

 A-02-020-01 

Stennis Space Center’s Pressure Vessel and Pressurized 

System Program Needs Significant Improvements

Stennis Space Center (Stennis) did not properly manage its pressure vessels and 

pressurized systems (PV/S) program. We found that Stennis did not follow NASA 

requirements and guidelines for recertifying, maintaining and repairing, and documenting 

its PV/S to ensure safe and reliable operation (Appendix B contains appropriate 

definitions including certification and recertification; Appendix D describes NASA’s 

PV/S program policy and guidelines). Proper management of the PV/S program is 

important because of the risks associated with the pressurized and volatile contents used 

in the Center’s aging systems. At least 175 of Stennis’ 344 operating pressure vessels are 

more than 35 years old. Although it has had minor accidents with its PV/S, Stennis has 

had no major accidents. However, failure to perform adequate recertifications and 

maintenance and to make needed repairs puts Stennis at high risk for accidents that could 

result in loss of or harm to personnel, flight hardware, and vital test facilities and 

equipment. For example, an exploding pressure vessel could potentially propel metal 

shards and shrapnel in a variety of directions. 

Because Stennis’ first priority was to meet propulsion test schedules, PV/S users would 

not schedule systems outages to perform PV/S recertifications, maintenance and repairs. 

In addition, the organizational reporting structure limited the Pressure Systems 

Manager’s ability to correct problems. Specifically, the Pressure Systems Manager 

reported directly to the Propulsion Test Directorate and lacked the authority to suspend 

propulsion testing to perform recertification, maintenance, and repairs. Finally, Stennis’ 

use of numerous PV/S databases that often contained conflicting and unreliable data 

made effective PV/S management extremely difficult. 

Stennis conducted an assessment of the PV/S program concurrently with our audit and 

confirmed the problems that we identified. As a result, Stennis is taking steps to address 

its pressure systems management structure and to determine other needed corrective 

actions. For example, in February 2003, the Stennis Center Director appointed a new 

Pressure Systems Manager within the Center Operations Directorate, and Stennis is 

developing a risk-based inspection approach to pressure vessel management. 

PV/S Recertifications Were Mismanaged 

Stennis recertified many of its cryogenic barge vessels and test stand run-tanks without 

performing required visual inspections and nondestructive tests on the inner pressure 

vessels (barge vessels and run-tanks are composed of an inner and outer vessel). Many 

pressure vessels were also being operated with expired certifications. 

 

1 
Recertifications of Cryogenic Barge Vessels and Test Stand Run-Tanks Were 

Incomplete. Stennis’ policy of partial recertification of its cryogenic barge vessels and 

test stand run-tanks eliminated required visual inspections and nondestructive tests that 

ensure the structural integrity of vessels and run-tanks used to support Space Shuttle 

Main Engine and other rocket engine tests. A recertification consists of a procedure by 

which a previously certified (documented status that qualifies a vessel or system to 

operate in the service for which it is intended) vessel or system, by appropriate tests, 

inspections, examinations, and documentation, is qualified to continue or be returned to 

operations at the designed pressure. To avoid rocket engine test delays from downtime 

required for a complete recertification of the outer and inner vessels of the barge vessels 

and run-tanks, Stennis adopted a policy of recertifying the outer vessels based on results 

of visual inspections and nondestructive tests, and only partially recertifying the inner 

vessels using engineering analyses (stress calculations, fracture mechanics, and 

operational load history). For example, the liquid hydrogen run-tanks at the “A” test 

stands require recertification every 5 years. Although Stennis was not always meeting 

the 5-year recertification requirement, Stennis had partially recertified the run-tanks 

based primarily on engineering analyses at various times since their installation in 1974. 

Stennis routinely used engineering analyses to partially recertify the barge vessels and 

run-tanks until systems outages made the inner vessels available for the visual inspection 

and nondestructive testing required for a complete recertification. However, because 

Stennis rarely took the barge vessels and run-tanks out of service, pressure vessel 

inspectors were unable to perform complete recertification. As a result of performing 

only partial recertification, Stennis is operating its barge vessels and test stand run-tanks 

with limited assurance that they are safe and reliable. 

 

Liquid 

hydrogen 

run tank 

Figure 1. The arrow shows the liquid hydrogen 

run-tank on test stand A2. 

 

During 2002, Stennis removed the A2 test stand from service for refurbishment. In 

December 2002, the PV/S inspector visually inspected the inner vessel of the liquid 

hydrogen run-tank and found darkened welds. Darkened welds are an indicator that 

2 
nondestructive (acoustic emissions) testing should be performed to determine the 

structural integrity of the run-tank. The Center Configuration Control Board did not 

initially approve the nondestructive tests. However, based on our audit observations that 

many of Stennis’ PV/S were out of certification, the Board ordered that nondestructive 

tests be performed prior to putting the A2 test stand back in service. As a result, Stennis 

recertified the run-tank in May 2003 after performing acoustic emissions testing to 

determine that the tank was structurally sound. 

Prior to a May 2002 inspection of liquid hydrogen barge vessel V-138, Stennis had not 

internally tested its three liquid hydrogen barge vessels (V-138, V-139, and V-140) for 

recertification since being placed in service in the mid-1960s. In 1990, Stennis waived 

the requirement to recertify the liquid hydrogen barges’ inner vessels due to adverse 

impact to the Space Shuttle Main Engine test schedule. The waiver stipulated that 

Stennis could recertify the inner vessels during fiscal years 1991 and 1992 with minimum

impact to the test schedule. However, Stennis did not recertify the inner vessels. Instead, 

Stennis changed its recertification procedure in September 1991 to exempt the liquid 

hydrogen barge vessels from the recertification requirements. The exemption allowed 

Stennis to inspect and recertify the vessels as prescribed by engineering analysis and at 

time intervals determined by the analysis. Stennis’ justification for the change was that 

the liquid hydrogen barge vessels were critical systems to the Space Shuttle Main Engine 

program, and the time required to perform internal inspections for recertification was 

rarely available. Stennis did not recertify any inner vessels until May 2002 when it 

performed an internal inspection and acoustics emissions test on liquid hydrogen barge 

vessel V-138 while it was out of service for refurbishment. A final recertification report 

was issued in April 2003. The inner vessels of the remaining two liquid hydrogen barge 

vessels (V-139 and V-140) have not been recertified. 

 Figure 2. One of Stennis’ three 270,000-gallon 

liquid hydrogen barges shown docked at the 

B1/B2 test facility. 

Since being put into service in the mid-1960s, Stennis’ six liquid oxygen barge vessels 

have been partially recertified using engineering analyses on the inner vessel. Unlike the 

liquid hydrogen barge vessels, Stennis did not waive the recertification requirement for 

the liquid oxygen barge vessels. Further, Stennis did not exempt the liquid oxygen barge 

vessels from the recertification requirements of its operating procedure for recertifying 

3 
pressure vessels. As a result, Stennis does not have adequate assurance based on 

inspections and tests that the six liquid oxygen barge vessels are being operated in a safe 

and reliable manner. 

Stennis also discovered in 1969 that the liquid hydrogen barge vessels (V-138, V-139, 

and V-140) had sustained significant damage to the baffles that separate the inner vessel 

into three parts. The baffles were reversed in direction, which was considered major 

structural damage. A 1969 engineering evaluation by General Electric Company of 

vessel V-138 states “damage to the vessel is major and complete repairs including 

removal of the existing baffles and installation of new baffles will be necessary to return 

the vessel to a condition suitable for permanent use.” The report further states that with 

minor repairs, the vessel could be used on a temporary basis to complete the present 

testing program, preferably on a stand-by basis. Subsequent inspections of V-139 and 

V-140 identified that these vessels also had inverted baffles. Although it made some

minor repairs to the vessels, Stennis never replaced the damaged baffles and has 

continued to use the damaged vessels on a regular basis. Stennis recertified V-138 in 

April 2003 after a comparison of 1969 photographs to photographs that were taken in 

May 2002 showed no further damage to the baffles, and acoustic emissions tests showed 

no significant findings in the structural integrity of the inner vessel. Although Stennis 

has not performed inspections and acoustic emissions tests to determine whether the 

inner vessels of V-139 and V-140 are structurally sound, the vessels continue to be used 

regularly. 

Pressure Vessels Operated Without Recertification. Stennis did not recertify its 

pressure vessels within the intervals established by NASA guidelines. As of April 2003, 

Stennis was operating 117 (34 percent) of its 344 active pressure vessels in an uncertified 

condition. Past-due recertifications ranged from about 1 month to about 8 years. Of the 

117 uncertified vessels, 24 were less than 1 year past due for recertification, 15 were 

from 1 to 3 years past due, and 78 were from 3 to almost 8 years past due. 

From October 2000 through March 2003, Stennis inspected and tested some pressure 

vessels, but it did not prepare recertification reports that finalized the recertification 

process by notifying managers of vessel inspection and test results. For example, in 

October 2001, Stennis inspected and tested 60 of the 78 vessels that were more than 3 

years past due for recertification. However, Stennis did not issue until June 2003 the 

required final recertification report verifying the inspection results. Stennis inspected 

and tested three additional vessels in 2002 for which final reports were issued in April 

and May 2003. NASA standards require that recertification reports be prepared 

immediately following inspections and tests of pressure vessels. Stennis management 

needs to have prompt knowledge of vessel inspection and test results so it can mitigate 

risks that could jeopardize safe and reliable operation of pressure vessels or discontinue 

operations. 

Stennis has 55 other pressure vessel certifications expiring before October 2004. 

Consequently, Stennis faces a surmounting problem to ensure safe and reliable operation 

of its pressure systems. Stennis plans to address this problem by implementing a risk4 
based inspection program to base pressure vessel recertification on risk rather than the 

current time-based approach to vessel recertification. With the risk-based program, 

Stennis can evaluate the circumstances of each of its vessels and tailor an inspection and 

test program accordingly. 

PV/S Maintenance and Repairs Were Not Performed 

 

Stennis had not adequately maintained or repaired its PV/S. PV/S inspectors reported 

deficiencies such as system leaks; corrosion; set pressures of relief devices beyond 

tolerances; paint breakdown; missing or disconnected ground wires; and missing 

identification, certification, and proof test tags. The general condition of PV/S showed 

that preventive maintenance and corrective actions were often not performed. 

The primary reason maintenance and repairs were not performed was because PV/S 

program officials were unable to obtain systems outages from users. Also, PV/S 

problems were unresolved because the Pressure Systems Manager and the Pressure 

Systems Committee did not assign corrective actions for reported problems. Finally, the 

contractor responsible for repairs routinely cited Stennis’ Allowable Leak Standard as 

justification for not making needed repairs for problems reported by inspectors. The 

standard allows Stennis to continue operations with leaks that do not pose a safety or 

operational hazard and are uneconomical to fix. However, the lead PV/S inspector told 

us that his primary concern is with the safety of continuing operations rather than the cost 

associated with loss of product and system repairs when he reports a problem on a 

discrepancy and correction report (document used to identify and control the disposition 

and correction of significant problems). For example, following an October 2001 

inspection of a high-pressure air system, inspectors prepared a discrepancy and correction 

report for an audible leak from a severely corroded component that was caused by 

contact of dissimilar metals. In January 2003, we observed inspectors as they identified 

the same leak and corrosion reported in 2001. When the problem was reported in 2001, 

Stennis’ contractor cited provisions of the Allowable Leak Standard as justification for 

continuing operations with the leak. Because the deficiencies were not repaired, Stennis 

risked system failure for more than 1 year. The lead PV/S inspector informed us that 

corrosion caused by dissimilar metals is an ongoing problem at Stennis and would 

eventually result in system failures if left uncorrected.

PV/S Program Databases Were Unreliable

Stennis did not effectively manage its PV/S program because Stennis used numerous 

independent databases containing similar data that was not shared and concurrently 

updated, and was not reliable. As a result, Stennis could not depend on its databases for 

complete and accurate PV/S information needed for scheduling and performing 

inspections and recertifications, and for overall PV/S program management. The NASA 

Safety Policy for PV/S requires that each Center establish a configuration management 

system for PV/S and update documentation for any new and modified PV/S. The policy 

further requires that the configuration management system ensure that the documentation 

always shows the most recent, as-operated configuration of the PV/S. 

5 
Stennis maintained the official PV/S configuration database (drawings) in the Sitewide 

Operation and Repair Documentation system maintained in the Central Engineering Files 

Office, but PV/S inspectors used systems drawings from a different database to perform

in-service inspections. The Pressure Systems Design Engineer did not update the 

drawings in either database to reflect changes reported by inspectors. For example, in 

September 2001, inspectors reported that several valves and other components had been 

added to a liquid hydrogen system. Despite the reported changes, the Pressure Systems 

Design Engineer did not update either database. Consequently, databases containing the 

drawings of this liquid hydrogen system are inaccurate. The lead inspector informed us 

that drawings used to perform inspections were inaccurate for about 75 percent of the 

inspections performed. 

Obtaining an accurate PV/S drawing was further complicated because Stennis maintained 

at least three other configuration management databases for drawings at the Component 

Test Complex, the High Pressure Gas Facility, and the “A” and “B” test stands. 

Modifications to PV/S drawings in these three databases were not always recorded in the 

Sitewide Operation and Repair Documentation system. Consequently, the accuracy of 

the official PV/S configuration management database was questionable. 

Stennis also had other databases for managing requirements such as scheduling 

inspections of pressure relief valves, calibrating pressure gauges, managing inventories of 

spare parts, managing pressure vessel inspections and recertifications, and tracking 

discrepancy and correction reports. In many cases, Stennis used multiple databases to 

manage each requirement. In 2001, Stennis purchased a system software package to 

manage its PV/S program and to eliminate the use of some PV/S databases. However, 

PV/S officials could not use the software to effectively manage the program because they 

did not (1) plan for enough system users when acquiring the software license, 

(2) implement the software Centerwide, (3) use all of the data elements needed, and 

(4) validate system data and correct errors after the initial data input. Although the 

Pressure Systems Manager told us that the software could be a viable management tool, 

he had neither the resources to address system shortcomings nor the authority to require 

Centerwide system use. Stennis cannot effectively manage and operate its PV/S program

without a system capability that provides ready access to reliable data supporting all 

PV/S requirements.

6 
Recommendations, Management’s Response, and Evaluation of Management’s 

Response 

To improve PV/S management, the Stennis Center Director should: 

1. Plan and schedule systems outages for recertification of the inner vessels of 

the aging cryogenic barge vessels and test stand run-tanks that never 

received a complete recertification. Priority in scheduling the 

recertifications should be given to liquid hydrogen barge vessels V-139 and 

V-140. 

Management’s Response. Concur. Stennis recertified all test stand run-tanks with the 

exception of the test stand A-1 run-tanks, which were taken out of service pending 

recertification. Stennis has identified all uncertified pressure vessels, established a 

recertification plan, and prepared a recertification budget. Pending recertification of the 

vessels, Stennis waived the recertification requirements until November 2004. Stennis 

will remove from service those vessels that have not been recertified by the waiver 

expiration date. The complete text of management’s response is in Appendix E. 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Management’s planned actions are responsive 

to the recommendation. Although we did not evaluate Stennis’ justification for waiving 

recertification requirements until November 2004, we will evaluate whether Stennis has 

complied with its recertification plan as part of the audit follow-up process. The 

recommendation is resolved, but will remain undispositioned and open for reporting 

purposes until corrective actions are completed. 

2. Plan and schedule PV/S outages to recertify, maintain, and repair systems 

according to NASA requirements. 

Management’s Response. Concur. Stennis will schedule pressure system outages in 

conjunction with each system’s pressure vessel recertification outage. While systems are 

down, Stennis will perform maintenance, make repairs, and identify discrepancies that 

will be corrected during periodic inspections (see Appendix E). 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Management’s planned actions are responsive 

to the recommendation. The recommendation is resolved, but will remain 

undispositioned and open for reporting purposes until corrective actions are completed. 

3. Update the official Sitewide Operation and Repair Documentation system to 

reflect the current as-operated PV/S status, require that all PV/S 

modifications become part of the official drawings, and direct Center 

officials to use these drawings for inspections and recertifications. 

Management’s Response. Concur. Stennis chartered a Tiger Team to study the 

accuracy of the documentation associated with Test Stand Operational Systems, 

7 
including PV/S, and recommend to management how to improve the Configuration and 

Documentation Control Program. The PV/S Program will incorporate the team’s 

recommendations and will require PV/S modifications to become part of the official 

drawings that will be used for all PV/S inspections and certifications (see Appendix E). 

 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Management’s planned actions are responsive 

to the recommendation. The recommendation is resolved, but will remain 

undispositioned and open for reporting purposes until corrective actions are completed. 

 

4. Select software for Centerwide PV/S management, and consolidate or 

electronically link databases when practical. 

Management’s Response. Concur. Stennis has selected MAXIMO as its PV/S 

management software and will consolidate its PV/S databases into MAXIMO where 

practical for maintenance, inspection, and certification management (see Appendix E). 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Management’s planned actions are responsive 

to the recommendation. The recommendation is resolved, but will remain 

undispositioned and open for reporting purposes until corrective actions are completed. 

Appendixes 

Among the appendixes, note Appendix B, which contains background information on 

Stennis PV/S including applicable definitions and Appendix D, which identifies the 

NASA requirements for managing PV/S. 

8 
List of Appendixes 

Appendix A – Status of Recommendations 

Appendix B – Background 

Appendix C – Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Appendix D – NASA Policy, Procedures, and Guidelines for Pressure 

 Vessel and Pressurized Systems Management 

Appendix E – Management’s Response 

Appendix F – Report Distribution 

Acronym Used in the Report 

PV/S – Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems 

9 
Appendix A. Status of Recommendations 

Recommendation No. Resolved Unresolved Open/ECD* Closed 

1 X 11/07/2004

2 X 11/07/2004

3 X 04/30/2004

4 X 05/31/2004

* ECD – Estimated Completion Date. 

10 
Appendix B. Background 

The Stennis Space Center (Stennis) Propulsion Test Directorate mission is to provide 

safe, efficient, and responsive rocket propulsion test services to NASA, other 

Government agencies, and the commercial propulsion development community. These 

services include testing and flight certifying rocket propulsion systems for the Space 

Shuttle and future generation space vehicles at Stennis’ three test complexes. Stennis 

uses various pressure systems to handle the gaseous and/or liquid materials (such as 

hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, helium, air) needed for its testing program. Stennis’ 

pressure systems, by the very nature of their contents and operating parameters, create 

hazards to people and the surrounding environment. For example, liquid hydrogen, an 

asphyxiant, can cause severe burns at cryogenic temperatures, is highly flammable, and 

easily ignited. Liquid oxygen, also an asphyxiant that causes severe burns, is not 

flammable, but accelerates the ignition of materials that are normally considered 

noncombustible. Liquid and gaseous nitrogen are asphyxiants that can cause death if 

inhaled. 

The Propulsion Test Directorate relies on a Pressure Systems Manager, a Pressure 

Systems Committee, and other NASA and contractor experts to manage the Center’s 

pressure vessels and systems according to Agency policy, procedures, and guidelines. To 

ensure structural integrity of its pressure systems and prevent mishaps from occuring, 

Stennis is required to certify and periodically inspect and recertify its systems. 

NASA Policy Directive 8710.5, “The NASA Safety Policy for Pressure Vessels and 

Pressurized Systems (PV/S),” requires that PV/S be operated, inspected, maintained, 

repaired, and certified/recertified in accordance with applicable codes, standards, and 

regulations. NASA Procedures and Guidelines 1700.6A, “Guide for In-service 

Inspection of Ground-Based Pressure Vessels and Systems,” defines certification, inservice inspection, and recertification as follows: 

• Certification – The documented status that qualifies a vessel or system to operate 

in the service for which it is intended. 

• In-service Inspection – Inspection performed after a system has been initially put 

into service. These inspections are necessary to ensure that a system maintains its 

certification status. 

• Recertification – The procedure by which a previously certified vessel or system, 

by appropriate tests, inspections, examinations, and documentation, is qualified to 

continue or be returned to operations at the designed pressure. 

11 
Appendix C. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Objectives

The audit objective was to determine whether Stennis Space Center (Stennis) effectively 

managed its pressure vessel and pressurized systems (PV/S) program to ensure safe and 

reliable operation of its pressure systems. 

Scope and Methodology 

We reviewed NASA and Stennis policy, procedures, and guidelines for managing PV/S. 

We interviewed representatives from Stennis’ Propulsion Test Directorate, Center 

Operations Directorate, and Safety and Mission Assurance Office; the facility operating 

services contractor; and the test and technical services contractor. We performed visual 

PV/S inspections, researched inspection and recertification reports, and accompanied 

Stennis inspectors during an in-service inspection of a high-pressure air system. We

determined that computer-processed data were unreliable as a result of data errors and 

inconsistencies; therefore, we did not rely on computer-processed data during the audit. 

Management Controls Reviewed 

We considered Stennis’ failure to adequately recertify, maintain, and repair its PV/S to be 

a significant management control weakness. 

Audit Field Work 

We performed audit field work at Stennis from July 2002 through October 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

12 
Appendix D. NASA Policy, Procedures, and Guidelines for Pressure 

Vessel and Pressurized Systems Management 

NASA and Stennis Space Center (Stennis) have policies, procedures, and guidelines for 

managing the Agency’s pressure vessels and pressurized systems (PV/S). NASA Policy 

Directive 8710.5, “NASA Safety Policy for PV/S,” March 17, 1998, outlines NASA’s 

program policy for ensuring the structural integrity of PV/S and minimizing associated 

mishap potential. NASA Procedures and Guidelines 1700.6A, “Guide for In-service 

Inspection of Ground-Based PV/S – with changes 1-8,” July 13, 2000, establishes an 

outline of in-service inspection and recertification procedures for ground-based, unfired 

PV/S; provides baseline inspection and recertification time intervals; and identifies 

documentation requirements for PV/S certification and recertification. 

NASA Policy Directive 8710.5. The directive requires that NASA Centers: 

• Establish a certification/recertification process for all ground-based PV/S to 

ensure their safe and reliable operation. 

• Ensure that all pressure vessels, pressurized components, and pressurized systems 

are operated, periodically inspected, maintained, repaired, and certified/recertified 

in accordance with applicable codes, standards, guides, and Federal and State 

regulations. 

• Prepare and periodically update the certification documentation for each PV/S in 

accordance with an established schedule. 

• Establish a configuration management system for PV/S, and maintain and update 

PV/S documentation as modifications are made and as new systems come online. 

The configuration management system shall ensure that the documentation 

always reflects the current as-operated configuration of the PV/S. 

The Directive assigns responsibility to the Pressure Systems Manager for 

(1) implementing the requirements of NASA Policy Directive 8710.5; (2) establishing 

and maintaining cognizance of all requirements and activities for PV/S in-service 

inspection and analysis, certification, and recertification; (3) establishing requirements 

for PV/S in-service inspection and analysis, certification, recertification, repairs, 

modifications, and configuration management; and (4) serving as the authority and 

technical expert for all PV/S matters. 

NASA Procedures and Guidelines 1700.6A. The guide states that through surveillance 

and correction of in-service deterioration, NASA will maintain a safe working 

environment for Agency and contractor personnel, safety for the public sector, and 

protection against loss of capital investment. 

13 
Appendix E. Management’s Response 

14 
Appendix E 

15 
Appendix E 

16 
Appendix F. Report Distribution 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters 

A/Administrator 

AD/Deputy Administrator 

ADI/Associate Deputy Administrator for Institutions and Asset Management 

ADT/Associate Deputy Administrator for Technical Programs 

AA/Chief of Staff 

AB/Associate Deputy Administrator 

B/Deputy Chief Financial Officer for Financial Management 

B/Deputy Chief Financial Officer for Resources (Comptroller) 

BF/Director, Financial Management Division 

G/General Counsel 

H/Assistant Administrator for Procurement 

HK/Director, Contract Management Division 

HS/Director, Program Operations Division 

J/Assistant Administrator for Management Systems 

JM/Director, Management Assessment Division 

L/Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs 

M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight 

Q/Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance 

NASA Advisory Officials 

Chair, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 

NASA Centers 

ARC/D/Director, Ames Research Center 

DFRC/X/Director, Dryden Flight Research Center 

GRC/0100/Director, John. H. Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field 

GSFC/100/Director, Goddard Space Flight Center 

JPL/Director, NASA Management Office 

JSC/AA/Director, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 

KSC/AA/Director, John F. Kennedy Space Center 

KSC/CC/Chief Counsel, John F. Kennedy Space Center 

LaRC/106/Director, Langley Research Center 

MSFC/DA01/Director, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 

SSC/AA00/Director, John C. Stennis Space Center 

17 
Appendix F 

Non-NASA Federal Organizations and Individuals 

Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Policy 

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division, Office of Management and 

 Budget 

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch, Energy and Science Division, Office 

 of Management and Budget 

Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team, General Accounting 

 Office 

Senior Professional Staff Member, Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and 

 Space 

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member – Congressional Committees and 

Subcommittees 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Senate Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space 

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 

House Committee on Appropriations 

House Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies 

House Committee on Government Reform

House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management 

House Committee on Science 

House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics 

Congressional Member 

Honorable Pete Sessions, U.S. House of Representatives 

18 
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Major Contributors to the Report 

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