Filed 11/1/21 In re L.A. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re L.A. , et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law

, B 3 10329 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP0457 4 )

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent

v.

R

. A.

, Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from order s of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Emma Castro

, Judge Pro Tempore

. Affirmed

. Jacob I. Olson , under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rodrigo A. Castro

- Silva, County Counsel , Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and David Michael Miller , Deputy County Counsel , for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 R.A. (Mother) challenges the case plan the juvenile

court ordered for her in dependency proceedings regarding her three adopted children. We conclude the court did not abuse
its discretion by requiring R.A. to participate in both individual and anger management counseling

. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND
In 2014, Mother an d her husband 1 adopted L .A. (born 2004), J.A. (born 2005), and A.A. (born 2009) following dependency proceedings and failed reunification efforts with the children’s biological parents. Mother is the children’s biological great aunt. In August 2020, the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received two referrals regarding
then

- 16

- year

- old L.A. The first referral alleged that Mother
searched for a cell phone Mother believed L.A. was hiding by puttin g her hands in L.A.’s underwear and putting her finger s in L.A. ’s vagina. It further alleged that when Mother eventually found the phone, she grabbed L.A

. ’s h air, threw her to the floor, and permitted Mother’s adult son to kick L.A. in the back. Following the incident, L.A. r an away to her unc le’s home in
San Diego. The second referral alleged that L.A. feared for her safety after returning to Mother’s home and was contemplating ru nning away again. It further alleged that Mother had been coaching L.A. and her siblings not to tell anyone, especially social workers and police, about what wa s going on in the home.

1 Mother’s husband is not a party to this appeal.3 In August 2020, DCFS initiated dependency proceedings by filing a Welfare a n d Insti tut ions Code section 300 2 petition alleging that M other had been physically abusing the children
for years. Specifically, the petition alleged the events reflected
in the first referral, as well as that Mother reg ularly abused
L.A. “ by striking the child’s face, grabbing the child by the hair and dragging the chi ld by her hair on to the floor[,]” that Mother

“ struck the child’s face and caused the child to sleep on the floor without a blanket[,]” and that Mother had on numerous occasions

“ pulled the child’s hair, struck the child’s arms, legs and feet with objects incl uding spoons, a pan and a broom” and “ forced the
children to kneel for extended periods of times, up to six hours. ” The petition alleged Mother similar ly abused L.A.’s si blings,
J.A. and A .A.

, on a reg ular basis. Mother submitted to DCFS’s
recommendation that the childr e n be detained from her (and her husband’s) care. At the combined jurisdictio n / disposition hearing, t he

court sustained the petition

. Neither Mother nor any other party has challenged the c ourt’s jurisdictional findings

, and DCFS presented extensive evidence at the hearing to support
tho se findings . This evidence included consistent reports from
all three children that Mother’s physical abuse had been regular and ongoing for years. The children were initially hesitant to

spe ak with DCFS about Mother’s abuse, and only shared it when interviewed in private, explaining that they fear ed retaliation by
Mother

. In addition, Mother told J.A. that, if he reported w hat

2 All further statutory references and citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.4

was happening, he and his si blings would be placed in separa te fo ster homes

. Mother’s physical abuse sometimes left injuries on the children, such as bruises or welts on their heads where Mother

st r uck them with a pan or a broomstick, and bleeding scabs

on J.A.’s ears from Mother pulling on them

. As to the incident
of M other inappropriately touching L .A.’s vagina and breasts, several witnesses described how Mother, in an effort to find and
retriev e a cell phone from L .A., placed her hands und er L .A.’s clothing and ul timately placed her fingers in L .A.’s vagina and

“ continued moving her hand in and around the child’s vaginal

area , ” all whi le yelling and cursing at L.A. L .A. repeatedly asked Mother to stop and tried to move away during this incident, but
Mother “ forcibly held [L .A.]” In addition to evidence of physica l abuse, DCFS p resented
extensive evidence of Mother degrading and being cruel to the children in various ways. For example

, when L.A. was crying
after the incident during which Mother inappropriately touched
L .A.’s vaginal area, Mother ridiculed her for cry ing and took photographs of L .A. in distress. Mother regularly told all three
children she had never wanted to adopt them, excluded them from family events, called them names and yelled at them

, blamed and punished them for things Mother’s biological c hildren had done, and told them they were only part of t he family as a
source of income. On one occasion, when M other believed the
children had eaten some candy, Mother instructed J.A. to lie
down on the kitchen floor w hile Mother was holding a knife
and told him she was going to cut him open to retrieve the candy.
On this same occasion, Mother ran a knife along A .A. ’s chest and5

stomach and poked A.A. with the knife while making similar
threats

. D uring interviews and in her testimony (which the juven ile court expressly found was not credible ) , Mother consistently deni ed all allegations against her

— and any form
of corporal punishment whatsoever

— claiming that maternal relatives had conspired with the children to falsely accuse her
of abuse, and that L.A

. ’s “behavioral problems” were the source of the family’s dysfunction

. Nevertheless, as noted, Mother
has not challenged the court’s jurisdictional findings based

on physical abuse

. At disposition, the juvenile court declared the children dependents of the court , removed them from Mother, and
ordered Mother to participate in family reunification services.
T hese included parenting classes, individual counseling,

anger management couns eling, and conjoint counseling with
the children. The court denied Mother’s request that she be
allowed to participate in either individual counseling or anger management counseling instead of both

. The court explained
that the nature of the abuse

— includ ing specifically, “[t] he use
of implements to strike children and leave marks on children’s bodies on a regular and ongoing basis, [and] the use of physical punishment by having children kneel outside on hard surfaces such as cement or patio floors for ext ended periods of time ”

— indicated Mother had anger management issues “towards these
children ” that could not be addressed wit h individual counseling
alone.
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal challeng ing the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional order s.6 DISCUSSION On appeal

, Mother challenges only the case plan contained in the dispositi onal order s . “ We review the juvenile court’ s disposition case plan for an abuse of discretion. ” ( See In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 522 .) Mother contends the court
abuse d its discretion by order ing her to participate in both anger management and individual counseling , because the order s w ere

“ overly burdensome and contrary to her family ’s needs.” We disagree and affirm.
S ection 362, subdivision (d) authorizes t he juvenile court

to “direct an y reasonable orders to the parents” of a dependent child as the court deems necessary and proper to ensure appropriate care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child

, including orders containing “a direction to participate in a counseling or education program,” provided
that the “program in which a parent or guardian is required to participate shall be designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s find ing that the child is a person described by Section 300.” (§ 362, subd. (d). ) Thus, although section 362 grants juvenile court s broad discretion to fashion family case plan orders, such orders must be both “reasonable” and tailored to addressing the issu es leading to juvenile court jurisdiction. ( Ibid. ; see In re D.P

. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1071; In re
Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1229.) A case plan “ ‘ “ must be appropriate for each family and be based on the unique facts relating to that famil y. ” ’ ” ( In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 172
, superseded by statute on another point in In re
Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239

− 1242 .)
Mother contends that requiring her to participate in anger management counseling was “ not [a requirement] designed to7

eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s jurisdiction ” (boldface omitted), beca u se the abuse leading to juvenile court jurisdiction “did not appear to be fueled by uncontrollable anger, but rather, was the result of po or parenting skills that appear ed to have gone on for too long

. . . . While appellant was likely often angry when enacting poor parenting decisions, anger issues were not a condition that led to dependency jurisdiction in this case.”
Mother offers no basi s for this characterization of the record,
with which we disagree. The record evidences consistent acts of phys ical abuse, the violent and cruel nature of which alone provide s a bas is on which the court reasonably could have
concluded that these acts were at least in part the result of Mother’s inability to manage her anger towards the children

. Further supporting this conclusion is evidence that Mother constantly yelled at the children and called them names

. Mother further argues that the case plan requi rement that she participate in both anger management and counseling was “overly burdensome” because counseling alone would be

“ sufficient to assist [her] in eliminating the conditions that
led to dependency j urisdiction.” T his argument fails for the reasons discussed above, as the court did not err in concluding
individual counseling alone would be in sufficient . Mother
identifies no other reason why the court

- ordered case plan was overly burdensom e. I n any event, although “[j]uvenile courts
should b e mindful of the burdens their disposition orders impose on parents already grappling with difficult conditions and
circumstances [,]

. . . the paramount c oncern always must be
the child’ s best interests, and we cannot reverse a disposition order reasonably fashioned to eliminate the conditions that
led to dependency jurisdiction, no matter how burdensome its8

requirements may seem from the parent’s perspective.” ( In re
D.P.

, supra , 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1071

− 1072.)
The court acted within its discretion in ordering Mother participate i n anger management in addition to individual counseling as part of her case plan.

DISPOSITION

The court’s dispositional order s are affirmed

. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

.

R OTHSCHILD, P. J. We concur:

CHANEY

, J.

CRANDALL , J. *

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.