IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joseph Pilchesky, :

: No. 38 C.D. 2015

Appellant : Submitted: June 19, 2015

:

v. :

:

Mayor William Courtright, David :

Bulzoni, Business Administrator, :

The City of Scranton and Scranton :

City Council :

BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge

HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN FILED: August 11, 2015

Joseph Pilchesky appeals, pro se, from the December 9, 2014, order of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County (trial court) sustaining the 

preliminary objections filed by Mayor William Courtright, David Bulzoni, Business 

Administrator, the City of Scranton, and Scranton City Council (together, 

Defendants) and dismissing Pilchesky’s complaint with prejudice. We affirm.

On July 1, 2014, Pilchesky filed a complaint against Defendants seeking 

a writ of mandamus and injunctive relief. Pilchesky alleged that Defendants violated 

section 6-13(A) of the Administrative Code of the City of Scranton (Scranton Code) 

by entering into a four-year contract with The PFM Group (PFM) for financial 
2

planning services on May 9, 2014, without first appropriating the funds for such 

services.

1

 Before entering the contract, Scranton City Council (Council) passed 

Resolution No. 50, which authorized Mayor Courtright to enter into the professional 

service contract with PFM.

On August 21, 2014, Defendants filed preliminary objections to the 

complaint, which Pilchesky answered on September 5, 2014. After briefing by the 

parties, the trial court heard argument on December 4, 2014. Thereafter, the trial 

court: (1) dismissed Defendants’ objection to Pilchesky’s standing because they 

failed to raise the issue in their preliminary objections;

2

(2) sustained Defendants’ 

objections in the nature of a demurrer; and (3) dismissed Pilchesky’s complaint with 

prejudice. The trial court concluded that Pilchesky’s complaint was legally 

insufficient because it challenged Defendants’ performance of a discretionary act and, 

 

1

Section 6-13(A) of the Scranton Code provides in relevant part:

No monies shall be paid out of the City Treasury except upon appropriation 

previously made by Council and upon warrant pursuant thereto, which warrant shall 

explicitly state the purpose for which the money is to be drawn. No work shall be 

hired to be done, no materials purchased, no contracts made and no order issued for 

the payment of any monies in any amount which will cause the sums appropriated to 

specific purposes to be exceeded. Council may make supplemental appropriations 

for any lawful purpose from funds on hand or estimated to be received within the 

fiscal year and not appropriated to any other purpose. Such supplemental 

appropriations shall be considered by Council as an ordinance amending the annual 

budget. 

(Scranton Code, §6-13(A); R.R. at 18-A.)

2 Defendants raised the standing issue for the first time in their brief in support of their 

preliminary objections. Defendants do not challenge the trial court’s ruling on that issue on appeal.
3

therefore, mandamus relief was inappropriate. Pilchesky now appeals from that 

decision.3 

On appeal, Pilchesky argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the 

demurrer and dismissing his complaint. Pilchesky asserts that Defendants breached 

their ministerial duty as public officials by entering into an illegal contract with PFM

and, thus, mandamus relief is appropriate. We disagree. 

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that compels a public official to 

perform a ministerial act or a mandatory duty. Nickson v. Pennsylvania Board of 

Probation and Parole, 880 A.2d 21, 23 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). A mandamus action will 

not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary act. See Chadwick v. Dauphin 

County Office of the Coroner, 905 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).

4

 Mandamus 

will be granted only “where the plaintiff establishes a clear legal right to relief, a 

corresponding duty to act by the defendant, and a lack of any other appropriate and 

adequate remedy.” Bright v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 831 A.2d 

775, 777 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). To succeed in a mandamus action, “the plaintiff must 

 

3 Our review of an order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is 

limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. 

Braun v. Borough of Millersburg, 44 A.3d 1213, 1215 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). In ruling on 

preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, the court must accept as true all well-pled 

allegations of material fact and all reasonable inferences therefrom. Nickson v. Pennsylvania Board 

of Probation and Parole, 880 A.2d 21, 23 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). The court “need not accept as true

conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. 

The test is whether the facts ple[d] are legally insufficient to establish a clear right to relief.” Id.

4 A writ of mandamus can be used to compel a public official to exercise discretion where he 

or she has a mandatory duty to perform a discretionary act but refuses to do so. Seeton v. Adams, 50 

A.3d 268, 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (en banc). Pilchesky, however, does not allege that Defendants 

failed to exercise their discretion here.
4

show an immediate, specific, well[-]defined and complete legal right to the thing 

demanded.” Equitable Gas Company v. City of Pittsburgh, 488 A.2d 270, 273 (Pa. 

1985). If any doubt exists as to the plaintiff’s right to relief or the defendant’s duty, 

mandamus is inappropriate. Id.

In his complaint, Pilchesky seeks an order compelling Defendants to 

rescind their professional service contract with PFM. However, it is well settled that 

“[m]andamus may not be used to direct [the] retraction or reversal of an action 

already taken in good faith and in the exercise of legitimate jurisdiction.” Walker v. 

Lawrence Township, 791 A.2d 458, 460 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); see also Pennsylvania 

Dental Association v. Pennsylvania Insurance Department, 516 A.2d 647, 652 (Pa. 

1986) (stating that mandamus cannot be used to compel the undoing of a public 

official’s action taken in good faith, even if the decision is wrong). Here, Defendants

assert that they entered into the PFM contract for the purpose of assisting the City of 

Scranton in managing its fiscal affairs. Pilchesky does not allege that Defendants 

acted in bad faith. Therefore, Pilchesky has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right 

to relief.

Moreover, a writ of mandamus “is rarely issued and never where the 

plaintiff seeks to interfere with a public official’s exercise of discretion.” Seeton v. 

Adams, 50 A.3d 268, 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (en banc). The Scranton Code 

authorizes Council to enter into professional service contracts and permits Council to 

make supplemental budget appropriations as needed “for any lawful purpose.” 

(Scranton Code, §§6-13, 6-14; R.R. at 18-A, 18-B.) As the trial court correctly 

determined, Defendants acted within their discretion in passing Resolution No. 50 

and entering into a professional service contract with PFM. Because Pilchesky’s 
5

complaint challenges the manner in which Defendants exercised their discretion, 

mandamus relief is improper. See Seeton, 50 A.3d at 274; Chadwick, 905 A.2d at 

603.

Pilchesky’s complaint also fails to state a claim for injunctive relief. A 

plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must establish that the right to relief is clear, an 

injunction is urgently necessary to avoid an injury that cannot be compensated by 

damages, and greater injury will result if injunctive relief is denied. P.J.S. v. 

Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 669 A.2d 1105, 1112-13 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). 

Here, Pilchesky merely avers that he will suffer “irreparable harm” and “more harm 

than good” if injunctive relief is denied. (Compl., ¶¶ 33-34.) We agree with the trial 

court that Pilchesky’s vague allegation of “irreparable harm” fails to state a claim for 

injunctive relief.5

Accordingly, we affirm.

___________________________________

ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge

 

5 We note that Pilchesky’s answer to Defendants’ preliminary objections contains little more 

than “irrelevant and colorful averments sounding in opinion and political commentary,” (Trial Ct. 

Op. at 5-6), which we cannot consider. See Nickson, 880 A.2d at 23.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joseph Pilchesky, :

: No. 38 C.D. 2015

Appellant : 

:

v. :

:

Mayor William Courtright, David :

Bulzoni, Business Administrator, :

The City of Scranton and Scranton :

City Council :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 11

th day of August, 2015, we hereby affirm the 

December 9, 2014, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County.

___________________________________

ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge