IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-11352

JEREMY DALE REESE, also known as Monster, 

Plaintiff-Appellant 

v. 

STAFENY SHEARWOOD, Head Nurse, Tom Green County Jail, Individual 

and Official Capacity; THOMAS FREEDEN, Doctor, Center for Disease 

Control and Prevention, Individual and Official Capacity; SANDRA LNU, Case 

Manager, Individual and Official Capacity; SHANNON MEDICAL CENTER; 

ZACH O'NEAL, Physician Assistant, Individual and Official Capacity; LA 

ESPERANZA CLINIC; ANTHONY MIKESH, Texas Commission, Individual 

and Official Capacity; RAFAEL HURTADO, Lab, Tom Green County Jail, 

Individual and Official Capacity; FNU BRIONES, Deputy, Individual and 

Official Capacity; DALE PEARCE, Chief Deputy, Individual and Official 

Capacity; TODD ALLEN, Captain, Individual and Official Capacity; AMY 

WRIGHT, Lieutenant, Individual and Official Capacity, 

Defendants-Appellees 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas 

USDC No. 6:16-CV-8 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 8, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 16-11352

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Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Jeremy Dale Reese moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) to 

appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint pursuant 

to the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A prisoner may not 

proceed IFP in a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action if he has, on 

three or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in a facility, 

“brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed 

on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury.” § 1915(g).1

Reese does not dispute that he has three strikes but instead argues that

the exception to the § 1915(g) bar should apply because he is under imminent 

danger of a serious physical injury. In support of this contention, he alleges 

unpleasant symptoms and speculates that he has an undiagnosed contagious 

disease, although his submissions establish that he has received medical 

examination and treatment. On this record, Reese has failed to demonstrate 

that he was under imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time that 

he filed his complaint in the district court, proceeded with his appeal, or moved 

to proceed IFP. See id.; Baños, 144 F.3d at 884-85; Arvie v. Tanner, 518 F. 

App’x 304, 305 (5th Cir. 2013). His motion is therefore denied. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 Reese’s release from incarceration while his IFP motion was pending does not relieve 

him from the requirements of § 1915(g). See Baños v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 884-85 (5th Cir. 

1998); see also Torns v. Miss. Dep’t of Corr., 421 F. App’x 316, 317 (5th Cir. 2010). His release 

also does not moot his § 1983 claim for damages. See Cruz v. Estelle, 497 F.2d 496, 499 (5th 

Cir. 1974)

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The facts surrounding the IFP decision are inextricably intertwined with 

the merits of Reese’s appeal. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 & n.24 

(5th Cir. 1997). The appeal presents no nonfrivolous issues and is dismissed 

as frivolous. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. 

 IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS. 

 Case: 16-11352 Document: 00514106615 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/08/2017