IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

)

TILLMAN LIGGINS, III, )

) 12 C 4010

 Plaintiff, )

) Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys

)

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of )

Social Security, )

)

 Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the court on Tillman Liggins’ motion 

for summary judgment. He seeks a reversal or remand of the 

Commissioner’s decision to deny his application for a period of 

disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). Cross 

motions for summary judgment are before the Court, and for the 

reasons set forth below, Mr. Liggins’ motion is denied and the 

Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. 

Background

On June 29, 2010, Tillman Liggins applied for DIB, alleging 

that he became disabled as of June 10, 2010 due to a back injury 

and left leg and arm numbness. (R. at 95.) Mr. Liggins’ claim 

was denied initially and after reconsideration. (R. at 95, 

103.) Mr. Liggins requested a hearing before an Administrative 
2

Law Judge (“ALJ”), and the case was assigned to ALJ Patricia 

Witkowski Supergan, who held the hearing on September 14, 2011. 

(R. at 104, 44)

I. Plaintiff’s Hearing Testimony

During the hearing, Mr. Liggins testified to the following:

He was born on February 16, 1969. (R. at 49.) He graduated 

from twelfth grade. (R. at 49.) At the time of the hearing, he 

was seventy-five inches tall and weighed approximately three 

hundred and seventy-four pounds. (R. at 49.) 

With regard to work history, he worked as a security member 

and manager for a nightclub and an auto mechanic. (R. at 50.) 

While working at the nightclub, he had to stand and walk for 

most of the workday and be able to pick up a person. (R. at 

50.) His auto mechanic job was performed as an amateur 

enthusiast for supplemental income. (R. at 50-51.) He spent 

two years working as a construction worker, which required him 

to perform heavy lifting, including lifting items that weighed 

more than fifty pounds. (R. at 51.) He had an arrangement with 

a friend that he could work with the local union without paying 

any dues. (R. at 72-73.) He also spent two years working with 

a friend as a television installer. (R. at 71-72.) He was paid 

in cash. (R. at 72.) 

He had not worked since February of 2010. (R. at 50.) He

was forced to stop working due to lower back pain, numbness in 
3

his left leg, and numbness in the fingertips of both of his

hands. (R. at 51-52.) The pain in his back is constant and is 

consistently at an eight and one half or a nine on a scale of 

one to ten with medication. (R. 52.) He lays down to relieve 

the pain in his back, but sitting, standing and walking all 

aggravate the pain. (R. at 52.) The numbness in his leg is a 

constant, numb, shooting-pain from his hip to his foot. (R. at 

52-53.) He uses pain medication to try to relieve the pain in 

his leg. (R. at 53.) The numbness in his hands is constant and 

predominant in his little fingers. (R. at 53.) He can only 

walk for fifteen minutes, and can only sit or stand for thirty 

minutes. (R. at 59-60.) He lays down for most of the day. (R. 

at 60.) He is unable to put on his shoes or socks, and has 

difficulty manipulating things with his hands, but can lift a 

gallon of milk. (R. at 60-61.) 

With regard to medication, he was using a 50 milligram 

fentanyl patch to help with his pain. (R. at 53-54.) He uses 

the patch for three days at a time. (R. at 54.) He also takes 

Norco, flexural, gabapentin, ibuprofen, amitriptyline, and 

another medication to help alleviate his constipation. (R. at 

54-56.) He has also received two epidurals but they were 

ineffective. (R. at 56.) His physician has increased the 

prescribed dosage of various medications over time. (R. at 56-

57.) He was also prescribed the use of a cane. (R. at 57.) 
4

The medications also make him drowsy, and he falls asleep four 

or five times a day. (R. at 58.) His naps range from fifteen 

minutes to three hours in length. (R. at 58). He is not in 

physical therapy, as his physicians are still in the process of 

controlling his pain. (R. at 59.) The constant pain also makes 

it difficult for him to concentrate. (R. at 61.) He used to 

consume alcohol, smoke cigars and hookah, but stopped in June of 

2010. (R. at 73-74.) 

With regard to his home life, he lives in a house with his 

wife and two children. (R. at 62.) There are two stairs 

leading into the house that he avoids using by entering another 

way. (R. at 63.) He has to go up fifteen stairs to get into 

his room. (R. at 62.) He has trouble going up the stairs, and 

it takes him twenty to thirty minutes to go up. (R. at 63.) 

He does not cook, clean, do laundry, or walk his children

to the bus due to the difficulty he experiences moving about. 

(R. at 64-65, 67.) Additionally, he only drives about twice a 

week. (R. at 65.) His five year old daughter puts on his socks 

and his nine year old daughter helps him put on his pants. (R. 

at 66.) He no longer has hobbies. (R. at 67.) 

II. Vocational Expert Testimony

Grace Gainforte, a vocational expert (‘VE’), testified at 

the hearing. (R. at 47.) The VE acknowledged that she had no 

prior contact with Mr. Liggins, and that she would advise the 
5

ALJ if his testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles. (R. at 75-76.) The VE testified that Mr. 

Liggins’ work as a material handler for the plastics company, 

was a semi-skilled job, with an SVP of three and an exertion 

level of heavy. (R. at 78.) The DOT designation is 929.687-

030. (R. at 78.) Mr. Liggins’ work as a construction worker 

was a semi-skilled job, with an SVP of four, and an exertion 

level of heavy. (R. at 79.) The DOT designation is 869.664-

014. (R. at 79.) Mr. Liggins’ work as an automobile 

lubrication and servicer has an SVP of four and an exertion 

level of medium. (R. at 79.) The automobile lubrication and 

servicer DOT number is 915.687-018. (R. at 79.) Mr. Liggins’

work as a lounge manager was skilled, has an SVP of six, and an 

exertion level of light. (R. at 79.) The lounge manager DOT 

number is 187.167-126. (R. at 79.) Mr. Liggins’ work as a 

television installer has an SVP of 6 and an exertion level of 

medium. (R. at 79.) The television installer DOT number is 

823.361-010. (R. at 79.) 

The ALJ posed a hypothetical asking the VE to “assume an 

individual of the claimant’s age, education, and work 

experience,” who could, “perform light work . . . occasionally 

climb ramps and stairs but never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds,” 

but “would need to avoid concentrated exposure to hazards.” (R. 

at 79.) The ALJ asked if the described hypothetical person 
6

could perform Mr. Liggins’ prior work. (R. at 79.) The VE 

stated that the person could perform Mr. Liggins’ work as a 

lounge manager. (R. at 79.)

The ALJ amended the hypothetical to state that the 

“individual could occasionally balance and stoop but never 

kneel, crouch, and crawl” and could “frequently reach in all 

directions . . . frequently handle, frequently finger, and then 

constantly feel with the upper extremities.” (R. at 79-80.) 

The VE again testified that there was nothing prohibiting the 

hypothetical person from performing the duties of the lounge 

manager. (R. at 80.) 

The ALJ again amended the hypothetical to restrict the 

person to sedentary level work. (R. at 80.) This time the VE 

testified that the hypothetical person would not be able to 

perform any of Mr. Liggins’ prior work. (R. at 80.) The VE 

testified that the hypothetical person could, however, work as 

an automobile locator. This job has an exertion level of 

sedentary, and an SVP of three. (R. at 80-81.) The DOT number 

is 296.367-010. (R. at 81.) The VE testified that there are

roughly 1,100 automobile locator jobs in the Chicago 

Metropolitan Area and roughly 11,000 in the national economy. 

(R. at 81.) 

The VE also testified that the hypothetical person could 

work as a repair order clerk, which has an SVP of 3. (R. at 
7

81.) The repair order clerk DOT number is 221.382-022. (R. at 

81.) There are 1,000 repair order clerk jobs in the Chicago 

area and 10,000 in the national economy. (R. at 81.) 

The VE testified that the hypothetical person could also 

work as a food and beverage industry order clerk. (R. at 81.) 

The order clerk DOT number is 209.567-014. (R. at 81.) The 

order clerk has a SVP of two. (R. at 81.) There are

approximately 2,000 order clerk jobs in the Chicago area and 

20,000 in the national economy. (R. at 81.) The order clerk 

position could be performed even if the hypothetical person were 

limited to unskilled work activities. (R. at 81-82.) The use 

of a cane however, would prohibit working in a manufacturing or 

industrial setting. (R. at 82.) 

The VE testified that another available job would be 

surveillance monitor, DOT number 379.367-010. (R. at 82.) The 

job is performed at the sedentary level and has an SVP of two. 

(R. at 82.) There are 3,000 jobs in the Chicago area and 30,000 

in the national economy. (R. at 82.) The VE testified to one 

final applicable job, document preparer. (R. at 82.) The 

document preparer DOT number is 249.587-018. (R. at 82.) This 

job has an SVP of two and there are 1,500 jobs in the Chicago 

area, and 15,000 in the national economy. (R. at 82.) 
8

III. Medical Evidence

An MRI report from 6/1/10, indicated that Mr. Liggins had 

multiple disk hydrations and protrusions. (R. at 469.) On 

1/13/11, Dr. Osafo completed a questionnaire presented by Mr. 

Liggins’ attorney and indicated that Mr. Liggins could ambulate 

normally. (R. at 467-68.)

By 6/6/11, Mr. Liggins had an active problems list which 

included paresthesias/ numbness, morbid obesity, wellness 

examination, folic acid deficiency, hyperlipidemia, joint pain 

in multiple locations, lower back pain, lumbosacral plexus 

lesion, lumbosacral radiculitis, bronchial plexus lesion, pain 

in limb, and epigastric abdominal pain. (R. at 494-95.) His 

past medical history included morbid obesity, borderline 

hyperlipidemia, folic acid deficiency, and chronic back pain. 

(R. at 495.) Mr. Liggins also suffered from moderate 

obstructive sleep apnea, restless leg syndrome, and degenerative 

disk disease. (R. at 448, 451, 514.) He received an epidural,

but only obtained a limited amount of relief. He did not 

participate in physical therapy. (R. at 458.) 

IV. Agency Filings

On 8/23/10, in an RFC assessment, a non-examining agency 

physician reported that Mr. Liggins could occasionally lift 

twenty pounds and frequently lift ten pounds. (R. at 360-61.) 

The agency physician also determined that Mr. Liggins could 
9

either sit or stand for six hours of every eight hour work day 

with normal breaks. (R. at 361.) The agency physician 

determined that Mr. Liggins would have certain occasional 

postural limitations, including, using stairs, ladders, ropes, 

scaffolds, or stooping and crouching. (R. at 361.) The agency 

physician found that Mr. Liggins had no communicative, visual or 

manipulative limitations. (R. at 363-64.) The agency physician 

determined that Mr. Liggins’ statements were only partially 

credible. (R. at 367.) An Illinois Request for Medical Advise 

form was filled out by Dr. Richard Bilinsky on 12/2/10. (R. at 

464, 466.) Dr. Bilinsky determined that Mr. Liggins’ medical 

condition had not significantly changed, and that the initial 

assessment was adequate. (R. at 466.) 

Mr. Liggins completed a work history report for the SSA. 

(R. at 251.) Mr. Liggins reported that he had worked as a night 

club manager (8/87-95), construction worker (2/98-7/01), worker 

at a plastics company (8/03-11/03), night club security manager 

(9/03-9/04), and an automotive mechanic (11/07-2/10.) (R. at 

251.) Mr. Liggins reported that, as a night club manager, he 

would supervise others, count money and open the club. (R. at 

256.) Mr. Liggins reported that, as a construction worker, he 

had to lift and move heavy materials and clean. (R. at 255.) 

Mr. Liggins reported that, as a plastics worker, he had to lift, 

open and carry bags, and load and clean machines. (R. at 254.) 
10

Mr. Liggins reported that, as a night club security manager, he 

would supervise twenty-six people, made schedules, talked to 

people, and attend a weekly meeting. (R. at 253.) Mr. Liggins

reported that, as an automotive mechanic, he would work on cars 

and perform some lifting. (R. at 252.) 

On 7/28/10, Mr. Liggins completed a daily living report. 

(R. at 250.) Mr. Liggins reported that he could not walk long 

distances, and had difficulty bending over. (R. at 240.) He 

reported numbness in his left leg, as well as hand and back 

pain. (R. at 240.) He also reported that he could not sit, 

stand or hold a tool for an extended duration. (R. at 240.) In 

regards to his daily routine, Mr. Liggins stated that the first 

thing he does after waking is take his medication. (R. at 241.) 

He stated that he watches television and will talk on the phone. 

(R. at 241.) He stated that he watches his children until his 

wife gets home. (R. at 241.) He stated that he will sit on the 

deck after dinner and then go to bed. (R. at 241.) 

Mr. Liggins reported that, since he became impaired, he has 

difficulty dressing himself, specifically, he reported needing 

help to put on his socks and shoes. (R. at 241.) Mr. Liggins

reported that he cannot make himself meals because of his 

difficulty standing and bending. (R. at 242.) He reported that 

he does not do chores, but does go outside daily to keep from 

being in bed. (R. at 242-43.) He reported that when he needs 
11

to travel he drives a car. (R. at 243.) However, he also 

reported that he cannot drive because of his medication. (R. at 

243.) Mr. Liggins reported that he can only walk for ten to 

fifteen minutes, and cannot sit for two full hours. (R. at 243, 

250.) Mr. Liggins reported that he is unable to reach overhead. 

(R. at 249.) 

In 11/2010, Mr. Liggins completed a subsequent daily living 

report. (R. at 274.) Mr. Liggins reported that his medications 

make it difficult to stay awake. (R. at 267.) He reported that 

he cares for his wife and children by feeding and clothing them. 

(R. at 268.) He reported that he did not prepare his own meals 

or cook. (R. at 269.) He stated that he drove and went to the 

store to do some of his shopping, but that he now no longer

shops. (R. at 270.) 

V. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ issued her decision on November 2, 2011, finding 

that, based on Mr. Liggins’ application for a period of 

disability and disability insurance benefits, he was not 

disabled under 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act. 

(R. at 32.) The ALJ applied the five-step sequential analysis 

as required by the Act, under 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a). At step 

one, the ALJ determined that Mr. Liggins had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity between February 1, 2010 and March 

31, 2011. (R. at 25.) 
12

At step two, the ALJ determined that Mr. Liggins suffered

from severe impairments which included: degenerative disk 

disease, sleep apnea, and morbid obesity. (R. at 25.) The ALJ 

also noted that Mr. Liggins suffers from a folic acid 

deficiency, but that this does not more than minimally impair 

his ability to work. (R. at 26.) 

At Step three, the ALJ determined that Mr. Liggins did not 

have an impairment that met or medically equaled any of the 

listed impairments in 20 CFR 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 

26.)

At Step four, the ALJ determined that Mr. Liggins was 

unable to perform any of his past relevant work, but had the RFC 

to perform sedentary work as long as he only occasionally 

climbed ramps and stairs, occasionally balanced or stooped, 

never knelt, crouched or crawled, never climbed ropes, ladders, 

and scaffolds, but should avoid concentrated exposure to 

hazards. (R. at 26.) 

In making her final determination, the ALJ noted that Mr. 

Liggins’ testimony regarding the pain and limitations of his 

condition were not fully credible. (R. at 27.) Specifically, 

the ALJ determined that there is no medical evidence that 

supports any claims of difficulty walking or standing. (R. at 

27.) The ALJ noted that Mr. Liggins’ physician counseled him to 

lose weight and exercise. (R. at 28.) The ALJ explained that 
13

the clinical findings had been relatively benign. (R. at 28.) 

The ALJ noted that the record does not indicate that Mr. Liggins

needs to lie down for half of the day. (R. at 28.) The ALJ 

also stated that Mr. Liggins was not credible as he claimed his 

wife helped with most of the daily activities, yet his wife 

worked six days a week. (R. at 29.) 

Further, the ALJ stated that Mr. Liggins was not 

consistently employed for the prior ten years, which implied 

that medical reasons were not the reasons for his unemployment. 

(R. at 29.) The ALJ also discussed that Mr. Liggins was 

inconsistent when providing information, and even if not 

attempting to mislead, he still may not be a reliable source of 

information. (R. at 29.) 

The ALJ also explained that, when evaluating Dr. Osafo’s 

medical opinion, she did not give controlling weight to the 

treating physician, as the opinion was based on the subjective 

assertions by Mr. Liggins, vague in regards to the limiting 

effects of Mr. Liggins’ pain, and lacking a function-by-function 

analysis. (R. at 29-30.) 

The ALJ found that the agency physicians’ opinion, while 

appropriate at the time, needed to be altered due to the 

inclusion of additional evidence by the time of the hearing. 

(R. at 30.) Therefore, the ALJ reduced Mr. Liggins’ functional 

capacity level from light to sedentary. (R. at 30.) 
14

At step five, the ALJ determined that, based on Mr. 

Liggins’ age, education, work experience, RFC, and the VE’s 

testimony that he had transferable experience that would allow 

him to find work in the regional economy. (R. at 30-31.) The 

ALJ determined that Mr. Liggins would be able to work as an 

automobile locator (1,100 regionally/11,000 nationally), a 

repair order clerk (1,000 regionally/10,000 nationally), and an 

order clerk (2,000 regionally/20,000 nationally). (R. at 31.)

Mr. Liggins requested review by the Appeals Council, but 

was denied on March 19, 2012. (R. at 1.) Thus, the ALJ’s 

decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Mr. 

Liggins filed a complaint with the court, seeking review of the 

decision. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of this 

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Thereafter, cross-motions 

for summary judgment were filed. 

Standard of Disability Adjudication

An individual claiming a need for DIB must prove that he 

has a disability under the terms of the SSA. In determining 

whether an individual is eligible for benefits, the social 

security regulations require a sequential five-step analysis. 

First, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is currently 

employed; second, a determination must be made as to whether the 

claimant has a severe impairment; third, the ALJ must determine 

if the impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed 
15

by the Commissioner in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 

1; fourth, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC, and must 

evaluate whether the claimant can perform his/her past relevant 

work, and fifth; the ALJ must decide whether the claimant is 

capable of performing work in the national economy. Knight v. 

Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir.1995). At steps one through 

four, the claimant bears the burden of proof; at step five, the 

burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id.

Standard of Review

A district court reviewing an ALJ’s decision must affirm if 

the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free 

from legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); Steele v. Barnhart, 920 

F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir.2002). Substantial evidence is “more 

than a mere scintilla”; rather, it is “such relevant evidence as 

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 

1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). In reviewing an ALJ’s decision for 

substantial evidence, the Court may not “displace the ALJ’s 

judgment by reconsidering acts or evidence or making credibility 

determinations.” Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th 

Cir.2007) (citing Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th 

Cir.2003)). Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds 

to differ, the responsibility for determining whether a claimant 
16

is disabled falls upon the Commissioner, not the courts. Herr 

v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir.1990).

An ALJ must articulate her analysis by building an accurate 

and logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusions, so that 

the Court may afford the claimant meaningful review of the SSA’s 

ultimate findings. Steele, 290 F.3d at 941. It is not enough 

that the record contains evidence to support the ALJ’s decision; 

if the ALJ does not rationally articulate the grounds for that 

decision, or if the decision is insufficiently articulated, so 

as to prevent meaningful review, the Court must remand. Id. 

Discussion

I. Treating Physician’s Opinion

Mr. Liggins argues that the ALJ should have given 

controlling weight to the opinion of Mr. Liggins’ treating 

physician. (Pl.’s Brief at 8.) Generally, an ALJ “give[s] 

more weight to opinions from [] treating sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(2). “If [the ALJ] find[s] that a treating source's 

opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a 

plaintiff’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is 

not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your 

case record, [the ALJ] will give it controlling weight.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). The ALJ “will always give good reasons 

in [his or her] notice of determination or decision for the 
17

weight [given to a] treating source's opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(2). 

Herein, the ALJ did not give controlling weight to the 

opinion of Mr. Liggins’ treating physician. (R. at 29.) The 

ALJ pointed out that the treating physician’s analysis, that Mr. 

Liggins could ambulate unassisted with pain, conflicted with his

report that Mr. Liggins could ambulate normally. (R. at 29, 

467-68.) The ALJ’s reasoning shows that the treating 

physician’s opinion is not consistent with the rest of the 

record. 

The Court finds the ALJ’s decision to be sound, as

inconsistencies between medical opinions is not something to be 

ignored. “‘[W]hile the treating physician's opinion is 

important, it is not the final word on a claimant's disability.’ 

We previously have noted, ‘[t]he patient's regular physician may 

want to do a favor for a friend and client, and so the treating 

physician may too quickly find disability.’” Schmidt v. Astrue, 

496 F.3d 833, 842 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). 

The ALJ found discrepancies in the medical record and rightfully 

decided against giving the treating physician’s opinion 

controlling weight. Further, the ALJ determined that the 

treating physician’s opinion was vague and lacked a function by 

function analysis. (R. at 29-30.) However, a finding that the 

plaintiff was not credible does not end the analysis. 
18

“When [the ALJ] do[es] not give the treating source's 

opinion controlling weight, [the ALJ] apply[s]” various factors 

to “determin[e] the weight to give the opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(2). These factors include: (1) “[l]ength of the 

treatment relationship and the frequency of examination,” 

“[n]ature and extent of the treatment relationship,” (3) medical 

supportability, (4) medical consistency, (5) medical 

[s]pecialization, and (6) any other relevant factors. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c)(2), (2)(i-ii), (3-6). 

An ALJ is not required to address every issue but must

“articulate some legitimate reason for [her] decision.” 

Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000). Here the 

ALJ did not neatly list her reasoning behind every factor, 

nonetheless, there is no indication that the factors were not 

meaningfully examined. Further, the ALJ specifically addressed

the medical supportability of the treating physician’s opinion 

when stating that they were partly based on Mr. Liggins’

subjective assertions. (R. at 29.) There is no evidence that 

the ALJ did not do all that was necessary to properly evaluate 

and determine the weight to be giving to Mr. Liggins’ treating 

physician. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err 

when not giving controlling weight to the opinion of the 

treating physician.

 
19

II. RFC Determination

Mr. Liggins argues that the ALJ improperly determined Mr. 

Liggins’ RFC because of a lack of medical support,

understanding, and proper interpretation. First, Mr. Liggins

argues that the ALJ erred by not articulating substantial 

evidence to support her decision, and only making a cursory 

examination of the medical evidence. (Complaint at 11, 13.) 

“While the ALJ is not required to address every piece of 

evidence, he must articulate some legitimate reason for his 

decision.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 

2000). “Even if enough evidence exists in the record to support 

the decision, [the court] cannot uphold it if the reasons given 

by the trier of fact do not build an accurate and logical bridge 

between the evidence and the result.” Worzalla v. Barnhart, 311 

F. Supp. 2d 782, 788 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (internal citations 

omitted). 

Here, the ALJ discussed the impact that various impairments

have on Mr. Liggins’ ability to work, including his sleep apnea, 

obesity, and back problems, as well as the lack of credibility 

given to Mr. Liggins’ statements. (R. at 27-29.) The ALJ was 

not required to list every reason supporting the outcome, but 

the ALJ did give various reasons for reaching her outcome. The 

ALJ discussed Mr. Liggins’ lack of credibility, obesity, 

musculoskeletal back issues, sleep difficulties, and hand 
20

numbness. (R. at 27, 28.). The ALJ properly articulated her 

reasoning by discussing the impact of Mr. Liggins’ various 

impairments. The Court finds no indication that the ALJ was 

anything less than thorough in her evaluation. 

Mr. Liggins also claims that, because the ALJ’s opinion 

suggested the level of work was more limited than the agency 

physicians recommended, she must have been playing doctor. 

(Complaint at 11.) “[A]n ALJ must not substitute his own 

judgment for a physician's opinion without relying on other 

medical evidence or authority in the record.” Clifford v. 

Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000). The ALJ’s adjustment 

of the agency physicians’ RFC shows that the ALJ was giving 

meaningful weight to the opinion of Mr. Liggins’ treating 

physician, as she stated that she would give some weight to the 

opinion. (R. at 29.) It is no surprise that, when evaluating 

two inconsistent medical opinions, the most reasonable outcome 

would lie somewhere in the middle. This RFC adjustment suggests 

that the ALJ gave meaningful consideration to all medical 

evidence rather than just the agency physicians’ opinions. 

Mr. Liggins finally claims that the ALJ mischaracterized 

the medical evidence and fabricated medical support for her own 

determination. (Complaint at 12.) Specifically, Mr. Liggins

claims that the ALJ improperly drew conclusions from a medical 

report that Mr. Liggins’ condition would not continue to be a 
21

problem. (Pl.’s Brief at 12.) While the court agrees than an 

ALJ should not determine Mr. Liggins’ specific prognosis for 

every ailment, that is not what occurred here. Rather, the 

ALJ’s opinion indicates that she came to her conclusion by 

examining Mr. Liggins’ subsequent medical records, not by trying 

to determine future conditions. (R. at 28-29.) The ALJ did not 

err when reaching her RFC determination. 

III. Credibility Determination 

Mr. Liggins asserts that the ALJ improperly determined that 

he was not entirely credible. (Complaint at 13.) He argues, 

specifically, that the ALJ’s reasoning was vague and not 

supported by substantial evidence. (Pl.’s Brief at 14.) The 

Seventh Circuit has made clear that “[w]hen evaluating 

credibility, the ALJ must consider the entire case record and 

give specific reasons for the weight given to the individual's 

statements.” Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 

2012) (internal quotations omitted). “On review, we merely 

examine whether the ALJ's determination was reasoned and 

supported.” Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 

2012) (internal quotations omitted). 

While Mr. Liggins claims that he was more credible than the 

ALJ determined, the Court finds that the ALJ adequately 

supported her determination. The ALJ noted various 

inconsistencies which could raise a red flag to the critical 
22

eye. One concern was that Mr. Liggins was performing strenuous 

activity after claiming to be disabled. (R. at 29.) He also 

testified that he did not smoke, yet the contrary was recorded 

in a medical report. (R. at 29.) Further, he claimed that his

wife helped him with daily living, yet she was out of the house 

working six days a week. (R. at 29.) These various issues show 

that what Mr. Liggins says and does are different. It indicates 

that, whether purposely misleading or not, his testimony and 

claims may not be accurate or trustworthy. Finally, the ALJ 

noted that Mr. Liggins’ work history was sporadic. (R. at 29.) 

The ALJ noted that “this detracts credibility from the 

allegation that his unemployment is due to his medical 

condition.” (R. at 29.) The ALJ’s concern is reasonable, as 

such information may indicate that Mr. Liggins’ being unemployed 

was not based on his alleged disability. 

Since “the ALJ is in the best position to determine a 

witness's truthfulness and forthrightness ... this court will 

not overturn an ALJ's credibility determination unless it is 

patently wrong.” Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310-11 (7th 

Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “It is 

only when the ALJ's determination lacks any explanation or 

support that we will declare it to be patently wrong.” Elder v. 

Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal 

quotations omitted). The court will not second guess her 
23

analysis in light of the substantial amount of evidence 

supporting her decision. Therefore, the Court finds that the 

ALJ did not err in making her credibility determination. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Mr. 

Liggins’ motion for summary judgment [#11]. The Commissioner’s 

decision is affirmed. 

Date: December 17, 2013

E N T E R E D:

_________________________________

MAGISTRATE JUDGE ARLANDER KEYS 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT