IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

Precision Dose, Inc., )

) Case No. 12 C 50180

Plaintiff, )

)

 vs. )

)

United States of America, )

) Judge Philip G. Reinhard

Defendant. )

ORDER

For the reasons stated below, defendant’s objection [126] to Magistrate Judge Mahoney’s

order [120] is denied. 

STATEMENT - OPINION

Defendant objects [126] to Magistrate Judge Mahoney’s order [120] granting plaintiff’s

motion [114] to quash defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) notice of deposition. 

“Section 636 of the Federal Magistrates Act and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) 

govern district court review of nondispositive magistrate judge decisions. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(A) (providing that a district judge “may reconsider any pretrial matter ... where it has

been shown that the magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law”); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(a) (“The district judge ... must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any

part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.”) In short, the district judge

reviews magistrate-judge discovery decisions for clear error. See Weeks v. Samsung Heavy

Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7 Cir. 1997).” Domanus v. Lewicki, No. 13-2435, 2014 WL th

408723, * 2 (7 Cir. Feb. 4, 2014). “The clear error standard means that the district court can

th

overturn the magistrate judge’s ruling only if the district court is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made.” Weeks, 126 F.3d at 943. 

Defendant argues Magistrate Judge Mahoney’s ruling was clearly erroneous or contrary to

law because the magistrate judge misunderstood defendant’s argument and the particular issues

before the court. Defendant noticed a 30(b)(6) deposition of plaintiff with one of the designated

topics for the deposition being “all aspects of [plaintiff’s] business activities.” Plaintiff moved to

quash on the basis this designated topic was overly-broad. Defendant acknowledges that in most

cases such a designation would be overly-broad but that it is not so in this case because plaintiff’s

own Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(I) disclosures – for each of the potential witnesses it may use to support its

claims and the subjects of potentially discoverable information those individuals may have –

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used the same language. (“All aspects of [plaintiff’s] business activities, with primary emphasis

on, but not limited to [certain specified matters].”)

Rule 30(b)(6) requires the notice of deposition to “describe with reasonable particularity

the matters for the examination.” The notice of deposition at issue listed the designated topics of

the deposition to be: 1) all aspects of [plaintiff’s] business activities; 2) all aspects of [plaintiff’s

responses to [defendant’s] discovery requests in this action and the factual bases underlying those

responses; 3) all aspects of [plaintiff’s] claims in this suit, and the factual bases underlying such

claims.” Magistrate Judge Mahoney reviewed the notice and observed that “[t]o avoid liability,

the noticed party must designate persons knowledgeable in the areas of inquiry listed in the

notice. When the responding party cannot identify the outer limits of the area of inquiry noticed,

compliant designation is not feasible.” He then stated: “based on the notice I have in front of me,

it’s impossible for the plaintiff to comply with the notice.”

Defendant does not cite any case law or other authority in support of its claim Magistrate

Judge Mahoney’s ruling was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Defendant makes a reasonable

enough argument based on plaintiff’s Rule 26(a) disclosures that it had a reason for drafting what

it admits would normally be an overly-broad notice for this deposition. However, the magistrate

judge was free to disagree. This is the kind of ruling that occurs in the normal give and take of

the discovery process. Nothing in the record indicates the magistrate judge misunderstood

defendant’s argument. Magistrate Judge Mahoney is in a much better position to evaluate where

to give and where to take based on his ongoing familiarity with the parties and their conduct of

pretrial matters in this case. The question is not whether this court would have reached the same

or a different conclusion but whether the court “is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been made.” Weeks, 126 F.3d at 943. The court does not have such a “definite and

firm conviction.”

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s objection [126] to Magistrate Judge Mahoney’s

order [120] is denied. 

DATE: 2/28/2014 ENTER:

 

 United States District Court Judge

Electronic Notices. (LC)

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