alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2
                      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
             SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Modern Technology
Corp. (the "Company") for the year ended June 30, 2004, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, being Anthony Welch, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
    15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;

and

2.  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
    material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
    of the Company.



    Robert Church
    Chief Financial Officer and Director
    October 19, 2004
##### 






Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
OF

DOLE FOOD COMPANY, INC.


This certification is provided pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
18 U.S.C. § 1350, and is filed with respect to
the quarterly report on Form 10-Q (the
Form 10-Q) for the quarter ended
October 9, 2004 of Dole Food Company, Inc. (the
Issuer). I, David H. Murdock, Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Issuer, certify that to
the best of my knowledge:



| |                                                                                                                                                                              
| | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (i) the Form 10-Q fully complies with
    the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of
    the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or
    78o(d)); and
|
| | (ii) the information contained in the
    Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the
    financial condition and results of operations of the Issuer.          



| |                                     
| | ------------------------------------
| | /s/ DAVID H. MURDOCK                
| |                                     
| | David H. Murdock                    
| | Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

November 18, 2004
### Would you like more information?

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**Contact Information:**Office of the Chief Information Officer400 Maryland Avenue, SWWashington, DC 20202Phone: (202) 245-6400Fax:   (202) 245-6621FAQs and Ask a Question  Last Modified: 04/26/2023
Case: 1:12-cv-02982 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/23/12 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:1
Case: 1:12-cv-02982 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/23/12 Page 2 of 5 PageID #:2
Case: 1:12-cv-02982 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/23/12 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:3
Case: 1:12-cv-02982 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/23/12 Page 4 of 5 PageID #:4
Case: 1:12-cv-02982 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/23/12 Page 5 of 5 PageID #:5
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

James Owen Winchester

, * From the 1 19 th District Court

of Tom Green County,

Trial Court No. B

- 12

- 0120

- SB

.

Vs. No. 11

- 14

- 00083

- CR * August 31 , 2016

The State of Texas

, * Memorandum Opinion by Willson, J

. (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson , J. , and Bailey, J. )

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that

there is no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with th is

court ’ s opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
#### 225.7019-1 Definitions.

As used in this section—

*Covered military installation* means a military installation in Europe identified by DoD as a main operating base.

*Furnished energy* means energy furnished to a covered military installation in any form and for any purpose, including heating, cooling, and electricity.

*Main operating base* means a facility outside the United States and its territories with permanently stationed operating forces and robust infrastructure.
#### In the Matter of Jamal Grant, Petitioner, v Brian S. Fischer, as Acting Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents.

[831 NYS2d 904]

Cross motion to dismiss application for an order pursuant *310to article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules against Brian S. Fischer granted to the extent of transferring the matter to Supreme Court, Albany County, for further proceedings, without costs or disbursements. The application for an order pursuant to article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules against Hon. Charles Tejada, Justice of the Supreme Court, New York County, denied, the cross motion granted and the petition dismissed, without costs or disbursements. No opinion. Order filed. Concur—Andrias, J.P., Marlow, Nardelli, Sweeny and McGuire, JJ.
2509.405-1 Continuation of current contracts. ( a ) The NSF Deputy Director will decide whether to continue NSF contracts or subcontracts in existence at the time a contractor is debarred, suspended, or proposed for debarment.
( b ) The NSF Deputy Director will decide whether to renew or otherwise extend the duration of NSF contracts, or consent to subcontracts, with contractors debarred, suspended, or proposed for debarment. He or she will prepare a written statement of the compelling reasons for renewal and extension.
#### 252.211-7002 Availability for examination of specifications, standards, plans, drawings, data item descriptions, and other pertinent documents.

As prescribed in 211.204(c), use the following provision:

# Availability for Examination of Specifications, Standards, Plans, Drawings, Data Item Descriptions, and Other Pertinent Documents (DEC 1991)

The specifications, standards, plans, drawings, data item descriptions, and other pertinent documents cited in this solicitation are not available for distribution but may be examined at the following location:

(Insert complete address)

(End of provision)

[56 FR 36479, July 31, 1991. Redesignated and amended at 60 FR 61600, Nov. 30, 1995]
#### Piedmont Canning Company *v.*American Can Company.

January 22, 1913.

Complaint. Before Judge Jones. Habersham superior court. August *22,*1911.

*McMillan é Erwin,*for plaintiff in error.

*J. 0. Edwards,*contra.

Atkinson, J.

Under the pleadings and evidence, a verdict was demanded in favor of the plaintiff for the amount sued for, and there was no error in directing such a verdict.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Atl the Justices concur.*
22.1803 Contract clause. Insert the clause at 52.222-54, Employment Eligibility Verification, in all solicitations and contracts that exceed $150,000, except those that— ( a ) Are only for work that will be performed outside the United States;
( b ) Are for a period of performance of less than 120 days; or
( c ) Are only for— ( 1 ) Commercially available off-the-shelf items;
( 2 ) Items that would be COTS items, but for minor modifications (as defined at paragraph (3)(ii) of definition of “commercial product” at 2.101;
( 3 ) Items that would be COTS items if they were not bulk cargo; or
( 4 ) Commercial services that are— ( i ) Part of the purchase of a COTS item (or an item that would be a COTS item, but for minor modifications);
( ii ) Performed by the COTS provider; and
( iii ) Are normally provided for that COTS item.
[73 FR 67703, Nov. 14, 2008, as amended at 85 FR 40067, July 2, 2020; 86 FR 61028, Nov. 4, 2021]
Exhibit 31.1
 SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Camco Financial Corporation;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this quarterly report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of Camco as of, and for, the periods presented in this
quarterly report;4.
    
    Camcos other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining
disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e))
and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange
Act Rules 13a-15(f) and
15d-15(f))for Camco and have:
 a.
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure
that material information relating to Camco, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;b.
    
    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such
internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and
the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles;c.
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of Camcos disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusion about the effectiveness of
the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluations; andd.
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in Camcos internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during Camcos fiscal quarter that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, Camcos internal control
over financial reporting.
 5.
    
    Camcos other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation,
to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of Camcos board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):
 a.
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely
to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; andb.
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in Camcos internal control over financial
reporting.
 Date: November 4, 2008
    

/s/ Richard C. BaylorRichard C. Baylor, Chief Executive Officer
#### Joe H. E. Ward, Appellant, v. J. William Smallwood et ah, Copartners Doing Business under the Name of Carl H. Peorzheimer & Co., Respondents. ents.—

Order, entered on September 12, 1960, granting defendants’ motion, pursuant to rule 103 of the Rules of Civil Practice, to strike from the complaint paragraph 15 and the last sentence of paragraph 17, unanimously affirmed, on *917the law and on the facts, with $20 costs and disbursements to the respondents. The matter stricken was evidentiary, or eonelusory and argumentative in some instances; and, in any event, it was unnecessary to a proper statement of plaintiff’s alleged cause of action. Thus, the exercise of discretion by Special Term to strike the same should not be disturbed. The plaintiff is not prejudiced thereby in that, nevertheless, such evidentiary matter as is contained in the stricken allegations may be received in evidence upon the trial if material and relevant to plaintiff’s alleged cause of action. *(Gluck*v. *Pickel,*286 App. Div. 1071; *Security Nat. Bank of L. I.*v. *Heaney,*20 Misc 2d 653.) Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Rabin, Eager and Bastow, JJ.
#### 249.110 Settlement negotiation memorandum.

Follow the procedures at PGI 249.110 for preparation of a settlement negotiation memorandum.

[71 FR 27645, May 12, 2006]
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-7446

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus ANTONIO GILLIAM, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (CR03-124-JFM; CA-05-1564-JFM) Submitted: March 3, 2006 Decided: March 14, 2006 Before NIEMEYER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Antonio Gilliam, Appellant Pro Se. Stephanie Agli Gallagher, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Antonio Gilliam seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Gilliam has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED
19.804-5 Basic ordering agreements and blanket purchase agreements. ( a ) The contracting office shall submit an offering letter for, and SBA must accept, each order under a basic ordering agreement (BOA) or a blanket purchase agreement (BPA) issued under part 13 (see 13.303), in addition to the agency offering and SBA accepting the BOA or BPA itself.
( b ) SBA will not accept for award on a sole-source basis any order that would cause the total dollar amount of orders issued under a specific BOA or BPA to exceed the competitive threshold amount in 19.805-1.
( c ) Once an 8(a) participant's program term expires, the participant otherwise exits the 8(a) program, or becomes other than small for the NAICS code assigned under the BOA or the BPA, SBA will not accept new orders under the BOA or BPA for the participant.
[88 FR 69525, Oct. 5, 2023]
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-6952

BRIAN P. ENGEL,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

HAROLD CLARKE,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Senior 

District Judge. (3:12-cv-00586-JRS)

Submitted: October 8, 2014 Decided: October 15, 2014

Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian P. Engel, Appellant Pro Se. Alice Theresa Armstrong, 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Brian P. Engel seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012)

petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice 

or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Engel has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
228.307-1 Group insurance plans. The Defense Department Group Term Insurance Plan is available for contractor use under cost-reimbursement type contracts when approved as provided in department or agency regulations. A contractor is eligible if— ( a ) The number of covered employees is 500 or more; and
( b ) The contractor has all cost-reimbursement contracts; or
( c ) At least 90 percent of the payroll for contractor operations to be covered by the Plan is under cost-reimbursement contracts.
223.7106 Contract clause. Use the basic or the alternate of the clause at 252.223-7006, Prohibition on Storage, Treatment, and Disposal of Toxic or Hazardous Materials, in all solicitations and contracts which require, may require, or permit contractor access to a DoD installation. ( a ) Use the basic clause, unless a determination is made under 223.7104(a)(10).
( b ) Use the alternate I clause when the Secretary of the military department issues a determination under the exception at 223.7104(a)(10).
#### Harrell *v.*Avera, sheriff.

IIxll, J.

1. The writ of habeas corpus can not be substituted for a motion for a new trial, writ of error, or other similar remedial procedure, or be used as a remedy for the review of alleged errors in the trial court. Only in eases where the judgment of conviction is void can it be attacked by habeas corpus. If the defendant has had his day in court, the judgment of conviction is not void for the reason that the evidence may show the defendant guilty of some crime other than that for which *341he was convicted and sentenced. *Davis*v. *Smith,*7 *Ga. App.*192 (66 S. E. 401). And see *Yeates*v. *Roberson,*4 *Ga. App.*573 (62 S. E. 104); *McFarland*v. *Donaldson,*115 *Ga.*567 (41 S. E. 1000); *Yancy*v. *Harris,*9 *Ga.*535.

January 23, 1913.

Habeas corpus. Before Judge Thomas. Berrien superior court. November 12, 1912.

*Hendricks & Christian,*for plaintiff.

*J. A. Wilkes, solicitor-general,*for defendant.

*2.*The defendant was indicted for a “felony,” and the evidence tended to show incestuous adultery and fornication with his own daughter. On the trial of the case it was agreed between the State and counsel for the defendant, after a plea of not guilty was signed by the defendant, that the defendant was the father of the female alleged to have been injured, that the defendant was a married man, and that the girl was not married and was seven years old. There was evidence tending to show sexual intercourse between the father and the child. On conviction by the jury, the court sentenced the defendant to three years in the penitentiary. While in the custody of the sheriff, confined In jail awaiting transportation to the penitentiary, the defendant filed his application for a writ of habeas corpus, against the sheriff, on the ground that the conviction under the evidence was void. It is insisted that the child was only seven years old, and could not consent to the act of adultery and fornication, and that if guilty of any offense the defendant is 'guilty of rape and not incestuous adultery, and the proceedings were therefore void. *Held,*that the trial judge did not err in denying the writ of habeas corpus and refusing to discharge the defendant from the custody of the sheriff.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed January 15 , 201 3

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 12

- 00051

- CR NO. 14

- 12

- 0005 2

- CR

KENNETH EARL BRUNSON , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 262nd District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . 1284376 and 1295225

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant entered a plea of guilty to aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. On June 27, 2012, the trial court sentenced appellant to confinement for fifteen years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a brief in which he concludes the appeal2

is wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the re quirements of Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for
relief

. S ee Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974 ). A cop y of counsel’s brief was delivered to appellant. Appellant was advised of the right to examine the appellate record and file a pro se response. See Stafford
v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). As of this date, no pro se response has be en filed. We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and agree the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Further, we find no reversible error in the record. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

Pan el consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Boyce and Donovan

. Do Not Publish

— Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
#### 226.7104 Other considerations.

When planning for contracts for services related to base closure activities at a military installation affected by a closure or realignment under a base closure law, contracting officers shall consider including, as a factor in source selection, the extent to which offerors specifically identify and commit, in their proposals, to a plan to hire residents of the vicinity of the military installation that is being closed or realigned.

[60 FR 61598, Nov. 30, 1995]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

CONTINENTAL VINEYARD LLC, )

etc., et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 3375

)

VINIFERA WINE CO., LLC, )

etc., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This action by two limited liability companies engaged in

the production and marketing of wine charges Randy Dzierzawski

(“Dzierzawski”) and his competing winery with breaches of

fiduciary relationships running to plaintiffs. Because federal

subject matter jurisdiction is invoked in diversity-ofcitizenship terms, plaintiffs’ counsel must cure one gaffe in the

Complaint.

Complaint ¶¶4 through 7 properly speak to the relevant

states of citizenship of the three limited liability company

litigants: two plaintiff companies and a defendant company. But

Complaint ¶8 erroneously refers to Dzierzawski’s Michigan

residence, not to his state of citizenship. In that circumstance

our Court of Appeals has said repeatedly that “the district court

must dismiss the suit” (see, e.g., Adams v. Catrambone, 359 F.3d

858, 861 n.3 (7th Cir. 2004)).

This Court is loath to act in such Draconian fashion,
especially because a person’s residence and his or her state of

citizenship so frequently (though not always) coincide. 

Accordingly this Court is contemporaneously issuing its customary

initial scheduling order--but if plaintiffs fail to cure the flaw

identified here on or before May 18, 2012 this Court will be

constrained to comply with the Adams mandate.

________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: May 9, 2012

2