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35–707PS 2008

THE STATUS REPORT ON THE

NPOESS WEATHER SATELLITE

PROGRAM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND

ENVIRONMENT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 7, 2007

Serial No. 110–36

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

JERRY MCNERNEY, California

PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,

Wisconsin

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska

VACANCY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

HON. NICK LAMPSON, Texas, Chairman

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

JERRY MCNERNEY, California

MARK UDALL, Colorado

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

BART GORDON, Tennessee, ex officio

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

RALPH M. HALL, Texas, ex officio

JEAN FRUCI Democratic Staff Director

JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member

SHIMERE WILLIAMS Democratic Professional Staff Member

AMY CARROLL Republican Professional Staff Member

STACEY STEEP Research Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

June 7, 2007

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Nick Lampson, Chairman, Subcommittee on

Energy and Environment, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S.

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 10

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12

Statement by Representative Bob Inglis, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................... 13

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14

Prepared Statement by Representative Mark Udall, Member, Subcommittee

on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S.

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 14

Witnesses:

Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy,

Executive Office of the President

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 16

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17

Biography .......................................................................................................... 20

Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues,

U.S. Government Accountability Office

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 20

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 22

Biography .......................................................................................................... 35

Brigadier General Susan K. Mashiko, Program Executive Officer for Environmental Satellites, United States Air Force

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 35

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 37

Biography .......................................................................................................... 40

Discussion

Restoring Orphan Sensors ................................................................................... 41

Risk of Cost Overruns .......................................................................................... 43

Avoiding Cost Overruns for Future Programs ................................................... 44

Data Gap Concerns .............................................................................................. 45

Interagency Collaboration: Drawbacks .............................................................. 46

More on Restoring Orphan Sensors .................................................................... 47

More on Data Gaps .............................................................................................. 49

Impact on the Earth-observation Program ........................................................ 50

Project Management ............................................................................................ 52

International Collaboration ................................................................................. 53

QuikSCAT ............................................................................................................. 53

General Mashiko’s Departure ............................................................................. 55

Program Status .................................................................................................... 56

More on General Mashiko’s Departure .............................................................. 57

Technology Transfer ............................................................................................ 58

More on Data Gap Concerns ............................................................................... 59

Page

IV

Appendix: Additional Material for the Record

Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is Under

Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain, U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 2007 ............................................................................ 64

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THE STATUS REPORT ON THE NPOESS

WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM

THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:00 p.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Nick Lampson

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

2

3

HEARING CHARTER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The Status Report on the

NPOESS Weather Satellite

Program

THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 2007

1:00 P.M.–3:00 P.M. 2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose

The Subcommittee on Energy and Environment meets on June 7, 2007, to continue oversight on the unsettled National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental

Satellite System (NPOESS). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) will release the latest report on this critical weather monitoring platform requested by the

Subcommittee, and the Program Executive Officer for NPOESS will respond to the

findings and recommendations. Additionally, the Director of the Office of Science

and Technology Policy (OSTP) will respond to questions about the status of sensors

for tracking climate and so-called ‘‘space weather’’ phenomena that were removed

during the recent program restructuring.

Witnesses

Mr. David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues,

Government Accountability Office: Mr. Powner is the head of the GAO team

continuously monitoring the NPOESS program since 2001. He will present their latest report that discusses the effort to strengthen the management of the NPOESS

program and evaluates the realistic cost estimate for the revised program. The report also examines the continuing risks that challenge the execution of the program.

Brigadier General Sue Mashiko, USAF; Program Executive Officer for Environmental Monitoring: General Mashiko has been in the post of Program Executive Officer for the NPOESS program since November 2005. The position was established in the wake of the program’s restructuring to evaluate the performance of the

Integrated Program Office (IPO) handling the system acquisition and to serve as the

arbiter for awarding performance incentives to Northrop Grumman, the program’s

contractor. General Mashiko also took on the responsibility for external relations

with the Executive Committee comprising the heads of the three agencies (NOAA,

the Air Force and NASA) contributing to the program.

Hon. John Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy: OSTP has been managing reviews by NASA and NOAA of the sensors removed

from NPOESS to identify other ways to fly the instruments and maintain the data

sets. Dr. Marburger will discuss the process involved in these reviews, the results

to date, and how these reviews will determine the alternative plan for preserving

climate and space weather observations.

Background

A Short History of NPOESS

For decades, the United States has maintained satellites in orbit, looking down

at Earth and gathering information that allows us to track and forecast weather.

These satellites operated in both geostationary orbit (where they move fast enough

to keep pace with Earth’s rotation, thus staying in the same place above the equator

and seeing an entire hemisphere at once) and in polar orbits (allowing them to pass

over all points on Earth as the planet rotated underneath). Both the Air Force and

NOAA were operating polar satellites to satisfy their diverse user needs. In 1993,

the decision was made to combine both programs into a single system, and thus the

National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) was

born.

4

In 2000, the NPOESS program anticipated purchasing six satellites for $6.5 billion, with a first launch in 2008. Following financial problems, a new program

baseline was issued in 2004, which raised the expected acquisition cost to $7.4

billion. By November 2005, the program office determined that it was likely that

NPOESS would run over that estimate by at least 25 percent, which triggered the

Nunn-McCurdy review by the Department of Defense. In order to continue the program, it was necessary to report to Congress that:

• The program is essential to national security;

• No alternative program provides the same or improved military capability at

lower cost;

• The new cost estimates are reasonable; and

• The program’s management is adequate to manage and control costs.

The NPOESS Program was recertified on June 5, 2006, but there were some significant changes. The estimate for acquisition cost rose to $11.5 billion (and, as

GAO notes in its report, there is an additional $1 billion to cover operating costs,

making the total life cycle cost $12.5 billion). Only four satellites will be built,

with the first launch now scheduled for 2013. A major sensor, the Conical

Microwave Imaging Sounder (CMIS), was removed because it seemed unlikely that

the technical issues in its design and construction could be overcome. A new competition is to be conducted for an instrument whose capabilities will fall much closer

to existing technology. The U.S. would fly satellites in only two, not three, polar orbits; data from the third orbit would now be the responsibility of European satellites.

The other major decision was to remove several sensors. Some would focus on the

study of Earth’s climate. Others monitor phenomena generated by the Sun that affect the Earth’s magnetic field and can play havoc with power lines, airline flights

over the polar regions and satellites. Scientists studying climate were particularly

concerned. Detecting the small changes in the ocean and atmosphere that signal climate changes is critically dependent on data collections that cover decades in time.

Without the climate sensors on NPOESS, some of the most basic climate data would

no longer be available. This has been the focus of articles that appeared in the last

day regarding the NPOESS program and the loss of climate sensors from the satellites.

Central to the persistent problems in the NPOESS programs are the major sensors and the program’s management. The cancellation of CMIS came about because

the weight and size kept growing as the Boeing instrument team struggled to meet

Army requirements for determining soil moisture. Even worse was the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), where sub-component deliveries were behind

schedule, testing of various items was harder and took longer than expected, ground

support equipment was not working properly, and independent reviews of Raytheon

management resulted in removal of the entire instrument management team. VIIRS

is the primary instrument on NPOESS; it will contribute data to more of the expected products than any other sensor. The Integrated Program Office, lacking sufficient reserves, attempted to deal with the problems by redeploying resources from

the other instrument contracts, upsetting their performance. Last year, the CrossTrack Infrared Sounder (CrIS) suffered a broken frame during its vibration testing.

The program has since been checking the various pieces of the test instrument to

learn if they can still be used. NPOESS managers believe that the second frame can

be substituted for the first, minimizing disruption to the program.

The Committee’s hearing in November 2005 on the NPOESS program examined

the poor performance of NPOESS management levels. This extended all the way

from subcontractors (as noted in the case of VIIRS) to the Executive Committee

(EXCOM), which comprises senior leaders of the three agencies involved in the program. Members questioned why the EXCOM failed to meet as the NPOESS program

spiraled further into crisis. Repeated analysis of alternatives often substituted for

decisions. By August 2005, the head of NOAA declared he had no confidence in the

information being reported by the Integrated Program Office. Part of the program

change instituted by the Nunn-McCurdy process was the redesign of the management structure. General Mashiko became responsible for seeking direction from the

EXCOM and assuring that those decisions were executed by the IPO. The IPO also

began hiring the technical and managerial talent needed to fill the many gaps that

left it unaware of problems or unable to respond to them. The EXCOM has been

holding quarterly meetings on the program. For the moment, at least, turmoil in

the management suites is not a primary contributor to risk in the NPOESS program.

5

Climate Change Science and the White Paper on De-manifested Sensors

NPOESS satellites, as originally designed, were to do more than support weather

forecasting needs for NOAA and the military services. Sensors were also included

to expand the type of climate data being collected by NASA’s Earth Observing System satellites, and to provide insight into the effects on Earth’s environment from

solar activity. These sensors were removed in the Nunn-McCurdy process. The loss

of these sensors was met with dismay among the affected user communities. The

National Research Council, which was completing its first Earth science decadal

survey, recommended immediate efforts to restore some of the sensors to NPOESS.

On June 26, 2006, OSTP met with NASA and NOAA to discuss a response. NASA

agreed to develop an analysis of the consequences of the removal of climate sensors.

NASA issued its first draft on August 15, 2006. NOAA added its contributions in

drafts that were completed in December 2006. The final version of the white paper

was delivered to OSTP on January 8, 2007.

In the paper, NASA and NOAA conclude that, ‘‘Unfortunately, the recent loss of

climate sensors due to the NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy Certification places the overall

climate program in serious jeopardy.’’ In the August 15 draft, NASA devised a set

of recommended actions for the canceled sensors. The main difference between the

first draft and final version was the development of a priority listing.

The white paper lists its first priorities as the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor

(TSIS) and the Earth Radiation Budget Sensor (ERBS). Together, these sensors

track the amount of energy the Sun imparts to the Earth, and how much of that

energy the Earth reflects from its surface, clouds and what is not absorbed by greenhouse gases. The difference between the values reported by these two sensors is a

critical starting point for evaluating climate effects. TSIS data extends back over 28

years, and any loss would disrupt our understanding of the ‘‘dominant, direct energy

input into terrestrial ecosystems.’’ NASA will fly part of the TSIS instrument on its Glory mission, currently scheduled to launch in December 2008. It will be a three-year mission, with hopes of two

more beyond that. The white paper recommends three TSIS sensors, with the first

to be launched on any available and suitable vehicle in time to overlap with the

Glory mission. For ERBS, the possibility of a data gap between the end of the current Aqua mission and the launch of the first NPOESS mission leads to a recommendation that the last Clouds and Earth’s Radiant Energy System (CERES)

sensor be flown on NPP, rather than wait for NPOESS. ERBS would then be flown

aboard the first and third NPOESS missions. The Decadal Survey agreed that these

sensors ‘‘should be restored on NPOESS or provided by other means to avoid a

measurement gap in the timeframe 2008 to 2012.’’ Fourth in the white paper priority list was the limb-scattering component of the

Ozone Monitoring and Profiling Suite (OMPS–Limb). The decision to remove this

particular sensor came at a point where the hardware had been completed and

would have required a significant effort to decouple from the other part of the instrument. Since the cost of completing the instrument was not that much different

from removing it, the NPOESS program decided that a full OMPS should be flown

on NPP as originally planned. It remains uncertain if the full OMPS sensor will fly

on NPOESS missions.

Of concern as this analytical process unfolds is its tenuous integration with the

NPOESS program and the possibility that it will be overtaken by events. This first

came to the Committee’s attention in March when the instrument contractor indicated that if the OMPS–Limb sensor was to be flown on NPP, a decision had to be

made by the end of that month to preserve the September 2009 launch date. Senior

Members of the Committee wrote to Dr. Marburger, NASA Administrator Michael

Griffin, and NOAA Administrator Conrad Lautenbacher to take advantage of the opportunity.

Testifying before the Committee a year ago, Admiral Lautenbacher stated:

We specifically decided that the NPOESS spacecraft will be built with the capacity to house all of the [de-manifested] sensors, and includes funding to integrate them on the spacecraft. The decision was made because the EXCOM

agreed that any additional funding gain through contract renegotiation or in

unutilized management reserve would be considered to procure these secondary

sensors, in addition to other organizations bringing money for these sensors to

the table.

Indeed, the white paper recommends taking advantage of this capability. Yet the

drafters of the analysis indicated in a briefing to staff on May 17 that they learned

the NPOESS program office would not accept any additions to the sensor complement on the first NPOESS satellite. Indeed, according to a briefing chart for the

March 2, 2007 EXCOM meeting, the ‘‘Lock-Down Dates for integration of De-maniVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:15 Jul 23, 2008 Jkt 035707 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\E&E07\060707\35707 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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fested Sensors’’ on the first satellite was already past. Yet the white paper was delivered still recommending efforts to fly some sensors on the 2013 launch.

The EXCOM briefing chart states that ‘‘C–1 requires significant additional development, integration and test time for sensors and spacecraft,’’ and General Mashiko

indicates that the NPOESS program made the decision to freeze the sensor complement to reduce risk of disruption. Yet these sensors were originally manifested

aboard the satellite, and as Admiral Lautenbacher testified, the program was directed to maintain space and funding to accommodate them. The interfaces between

sensors and satellite are already included in the requirements and specifications.

While space on the first launch is not an issue for TSIS, it was an option for ERBS,

OMPS–Limb and the Advanced Polarimetry Sensor. Is it indeed the case that there

are no chances to fill up some of those available slots aboard the first NPOESS satellite?

In contrast to the decision to restrict further changes to the first NPOESS satellite, the decision to add CERES to NPP is still open. Now just two years from

launch, making yet another change to the complement of instruments raises the risk

calculations. Arguing in favor of the change is that it would reduce the threat of

data loss, and that the contractor is willing to offer a fixed-price proposal to do the

job. The government rarely receives such offers unless the bidder is truly confident

that the task is completely understood.

Of more immediate concern for TSIS is the possible loss of the contractor’s staff

before the OSTP process reaches a conclusion on the sensor. With the decision to

terminate TSIS, the University of Colorado’s Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space

Physics (LASP) has been dealing with the possibility that the employees on the

project would disperse. LASP has proposed a follow-on mission that would update

the technology now flying on the SOlar Radiation and Climate Experiment (SORCE)

spacecraft with TSIS. This would bridge the gap between Glory and another TSIS

that would be placed aboard the second NPOESS satellite in 2016. This would be

consistent with the white paper’s recommendation, but hard to execute if the sen- sor’s builders have gone on to new jobs.

A similar situation may exist in the sensor for monitoring the effects from solar

flares and coronal mass ejections—so-called ‘‘space weather’’ phenomena. Power

companies, airlines and satellite operators have all discovered in recent decades that

the energetic particles and plasmas can disrupt critical infrastructures or increase

their costs. NOAA’s ability to provide early warning of these events, particularly as

the Sun enters the more active phases of its 11-year cycle, has been improving in

tandem with higher-capability sensors.

NPOESS was slated to carry the Space Environment Sensor Suite (SESS), a combination of five types of instruments that collected data on different aspects of the

particles and fields involved in space weather. As a result of the Nunn-McCurdy decision, these were replaced with the Space Environment Monitor (SEM) instrument

now aboard existing satellites. One of these instruments is the Thermal Plasma

Sensor (TPS). It was designed to provide data on the geomagnetic and electric fields

and plasma temperatures and fluctuations during solar events. With such information, the Air Force could quickly evaluate the loss of function in their satellites to

determine if it was the result of a natural event or some adversary’s action. In times

of crisis, this would be an extremely time-critical analysis. Massive events in October and November of 2003 and again in December 2006 affected oil drilling in the

Gulf of Mexico as the GPS signals that precisely locate drilling platforms above the

tangle of sea floor pipelines were lost for up to fifteen minutes.

The United States has only one manufacturer for TPS sensors, a university group

at the University of Texas at Dallas (UTD). The university anticipates that the

group will disband as there is no other existing requirement for these detectors.

Some of the UTD groups are expected to retire and the lack of interesting projects

is likely to cause the remainder of the team to seek other opportunities. The SEM

package will not meet the requirements assigned to the TPS sensor, and yet we may

lose the capability to obtain such instruments in the next few months. OSTP only

initiated the effort to conduct an analysis of the Nunn-McCurdy impact on the space

environment sensors in February, and there is nothing similar to the climate sensor

white paper yet available.

In its original white paper draft last August, NASA stated, ‘‘The budgets and

schedules associated with these recommendations will be incorporated in a subsequent draft of this white paper to be available in approximately one month.’’ Staff

was told in the May 17 meeting that the authors ‘‘were a bit optimistic’’ about their

ability to provide such information. A month after the white paper was delivered,

OSTP asked the agencies to begin a second study that would incorporate budget requirements and alternatives to replacing the sensors on the NPOESS satellites. The

National Research Council was asked to convene an additional panel to provide asVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:15 Jul 23, 2008 Jkt 035707 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\E&E07\060707\35707 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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sistance. However, the agencies are not anticipating a final report to OSTP before

September, and that may only include interim information from the Research Council. While Office of Management and Budget representatives are attending OSTP’s meetings to obtain updates on the analysis, there does not seem to be any discussion

about required budget actions.

Members of the Decadal Survey recommended that ‘‘OSTP. . .should develop and

implement a plan for achieving and sustaining global Earth observations.’’ This experience raises the possibility that OSTP may not be ready to take on that more

ambitious task.

GAO’s New Report

The Committee first asked the Government Accountability Office to evaluate the

NPOESS program in 2002, when concerns about NOAA’s ability to handle the data

volume expected from the satellites was at issue. In 2004, it reported that costs had

jumped by $1 billion and that launch dates for the various satellites were slipping.

In November 2005, Mr. Powner stated that cost and schedule trends were continuing to deteriorate and called NPOESS ‘‘a program in crisis.’’ In this report, GAO

focuses on the state of the NPOESS program as it starts to carry out the decisions

made by the Nunn-McCurdy process.

GAO notes that the program managers have succeeded in imposing greater discipline on the program. The program managed to achieve 156 of 166 milestones in

the interim program plan for fiscal year 2006, and has since addressed five of the

residual items. Through January of 2007, the program had reached 62 of the 222

milestones planned for fiscal year 2007—two more than planned. In a briefing to

staff, Mr. Powner stated that the IPO maintains that NPP will meet its 2009 launch

date and that the program cost estimate remains $12.5 billion. He said, though, that

NPP will launch ‘‘as-is’’ (with instrument performance at whatever level can be

achieved by launch day) and that there are still cost pressures that may push the

estimate above $12.5 billion.

a. Acquisition planning documents

In April, when it delivered its report, GAO noted that major documents necessary

for the development of program plans and renegotiation of the contract with lead

contractor Northrop Grumman are still awaiting approval. These included:

• the reworked Memorandum of Agreement defining roles and responsibilities

for NOAA, the Air Force and NASA;

• the system engineering plan;

• the test and evaluation master plan; and

• the acquisition strategy.

According to the decision memorandum that resulted from the Nunn-McCurdy

process, the Memorandum of Agreement should have been completed August 6, 2006

and the other documents by September 1, 2006. These documents define the relationships between the Integrated Program Office and the agencies and lay out the

predicted levels of resources in terms of time, money and effort that will be required

to complete the NPOESS program in the wake of the Nunn-McCurdy recertification.

The information in these documents will govern the budget requests for NPOESS

from NOAA, the Air Force and NASA for years to come. That it has taken a year

to complete these items, even though they should be little more than recording the

hard choices already taken in the Nunn-McCurdy process, indicates that interagency coordination still serves to weigh down the program.

GAO recommended in the report that the agencies have the approvals completed

by April 30. Yet in meetings with the Committee staff May 23 and 25, both GAO

and General Mashiko indicated these documents still awaited signature. The agency

comments included in the report indicate that the Department of Defense’s process

for approving the interagency Memorandum of Agreement appears to be the major

roadblock, as NOAA and NASA could not complete approvals until there was a final

consensus on the text to be approved.

From General Mashiko’s perspective, some documents are more important than

others. She emphasized that the program office prioritized development and completion of the integrated master schedule and the integrated master plan. These, she

said, were the prime tools for the program office’s day-to-day activities and are the

primary tools for the government’s control of contractor activities. These documents

are now developed to a point well beyond what the government previously had

available and, according to Colonel David Stockton (the NPOESS Program Director),

give him greater ability to measure actual performance by Northrop Grumman and

the instrument manufacturers. These two documents should be in final form before

completion of the contract renegotiation, because changes after that point will result

8

in contract modifications. Such modifications rarely result in lower costs to the government.

b. Program Office management and staffing

GAO next moved to a discussion of program leadership and program office staffing. In July, General Mashiko will be transferred by the Air Force to the

MILSATCOM program. GAO recommends that the Air Force delay the transfer

until July 2008, when all of the instruments scheduled to fly on the NPP mission

have been delivered. Before that point, GAO considers the increase in risk from

management disruption ‘‘unnecessary.’’ That recommendation has been rejected by

DOD.

General Mashiko stated to staff that change in her position is less significant to

progress in NPOESS than would be the case if the System Program Director, Colonel Dan Stockton, was to depart. The EXCOM met May 21 to discuss the transition.

According to the comments in the report, NOAA was expecting to supply the next

Program Executive Officer; apparently the deadline in the position announcement

had to be extended two weeks to attract candidates. General Mashiko indicated

eight are now being considered. The Air Force will supply a deputy. The intent is

to select the replacement quickly to allow as much time as possible to hand over

responsibilities and to allow the new Executive Officer to participate in decisionmaking.

GAO argues in its report that management turnover is a contributing factor to

the problems that have disrupted many other Air Force space system procurements.

They believe senior managers should serve until completion of development or actual delivery of their product, not simply an arbitrary period of time. The former

Chairman and CEO of the Lockheed Martin Corporation, Norm Augustine, wrote in

his book Augustine’s Laws about the problems that come from ‘‘. . .attempting to

develop major new systems with ten-year technology, eight-year programs, a fiveyear plan, three-year people, and one-year dollars.’’ GAO has lost the argument on

this recommendation, but this now becomes another issue that the Committee will

have to watch carefully as the new leadership takes over.

GAO also recommended that NOAA needed to develop plans for identifying the

staffing needs in the NPOESS program office and to initiate steps to fill vacant critical slots. The lack of systems engineering personnel and budget and cost analysts

in the Program Office has been a consistent concern of independent reviewers. As

of April, GAO found that five budget analyst positions and 15 system engineering

or technical manager positions remained unfilled; 16 were to be provided by NOAA.

That these positions remained open a year after the Nunn-McCurdy decision directive ordered expedited actions to fill vacant positions led GAO to express concern

about the government’s ability to develop an updated cost estimate for renegotiating

the contract with Northrop Grumman or to handle management tasks.

General Mashiko stated in her staff interview that staffing actions had accelerated with the hiring of a personnel specialist with the ability to assist division managers in identifying staffing needs. The Program Office also received assistance from

the human resource offices at the three agencies to find candidates with particular

skills and see them assigned to NPOESS positions. General Mashiko indicated that

there are now only six of NOAA’s 16 slots still open, and those were in various

stages of recruitment. Some positions had to be re-advertised to identify candidates

with appropriate skills. That NPOESS is competing with every other R&D agency

in the government for these skill sets also slowed the process.

c. Continuing concerns

As noted earlier, the sensors for NPOESS remain the major concern in successfully executing both the early NPP mission and the operational NPOESS program.

The VIIRS instrument was the subject of extensive discussion at the EXCOM meeting of March 2, 2007. This so-called ‘‘Gate 8’’ decision required the instrument team

to demonstrate that it had addressed design issues and that the instrument would

perform as expected. According to the briefing slides, assuming that the flight unit

performed as well as the current engineering development unit, the data would

meet or exceed what is now provided by existing satellites. However, there was one

issue—‘‘optical crosstalk’’—that remained open. It threatened to reduce ocean color

measurements below the lower limit of the specification. If NOAA decided to buy

a new filter from a different manufacturer, it might slip the delivery schedule. The

EXCOM decided to accept the recommendation to continue forward with VIIRS development while continuing to seek a solution to the crosstalk issue. General

Mashiko indicated to the staff that VIIRS delivery for the NPP mission is still

scheduled for late May next year, and there remains three months of margin in that

schedule.

9

The Failure Review Board for the CrIS flight unit vibration test mishap believes

an incorrect structural analysis of the instrument frame led to an overestimate of

the frame’s strength. The subassemblies are being tested to see if they suffered

damage; particularly the interferometer, which is the primary sensor element. The

IPO has already begun to build a second interferometer to minimize disruption if

the first is unusable. The frame for the second flight unit will be used in the first

instrument (the fixes defined by the failure analysis ‘‘will not be pretty’’ but they

will work, according to Col. Stockton). The government technical team independently analyzed and approved the frame changes. Delivery of this unit slipped from

December 2007 to February 2008; three months of margin still remains.

Loss of the CMIS sensor affected two important data items. CMIS was the prime

contributor to the measurement of soil moisture, critical to the Army as it determines whether heavy equipment can operate in a particular region. Requirements

for collecting data on ocean winds were also to be met with CMIS data, which factors into recent concerns about the possible loss of the QUIKScat scatterometer and

the resulting impact on hurricane forecasting. In the Nunn-McCurdy decision

memorandum, the NPOESS program was directed to initiate a new microwave imaging sounder that would provide an instrument at least as capable as current technology in time to fly on the second NPOESS satellite in 2016. General Mashiko stated that the specifications for this new sensor have been developed, and that the program office is consulting the user community. The Program Office hopes to have a

recommendation for Mashiko’s replacement as Executive Officer in September in

order to obtain EXCOM approval by January 2008.

GAO notes in its report that during 2006 spending for NPOESS space items exceeded the cost target by $17 million (a four percent overrun of the planned budget

for the year). Further, the contractor could not complete $14.6 million planned during the year. The problems with the VIIRS and CrIS instruments were the major

factors. These negative trends are likely to persist as the testing programs on the

instruments progress. GAO states that these issues may affect the life-cycle cost estimate.

There may also be impacts on the cost estimate from the contract modification negotiations now underway. Schedule milestones will be the primary criteria in award

fee determinations, and the award fees will be small. Northrop Grumman delivered

its proposals for the contract modification May 7. General Mashiko intends to have

the new contract signed before she leaves.

GAO concludes that ‘‘restructuring is well under way, and the program has made

progress in establishing an effective management structure.’’ There has not been

enough progress to show that the key technical risks which have bedeviled the program are being reduced, however. VIIRS flight hardware has yet to be built, and

CrIS flight hardware suffered an unexpected failure in early testing. General

Mashiko will not dispute that assessment but argues that the steps taken by the

new program management give greater confidence that we have an accurate understanding of the risks and a realistic plan to deal with them. GAO has already accepted a request from the Committee to continue its independent evaluation as execution of the restructured program advances.

10

1Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program Cost and Schedule

Changes, Government Accountability Office Report GAO–04–1054; September 30, 2004. 2 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science. Ongoing Problems and Future Plans

for NOAA’s Weather Satellites. Hearing before the Committee on Science. Serial No. 109–33; November 16, 2005. 3 10 U.S.C. 2433, et seq.

Chairman LAMPSON. This hearing will come to order, and I want

to wish all of you a good afternoon. Welcome to this hearing on the

National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, NPOESS. These satellites are the next generation of observational platforms that will allow the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Department of Defense to provide

weather forecasting services. It is not too much to say that the

United States cannot get along without them.

And this is not the first hearing the Committee has held on

NPOESS, and I am confident in saying that it won’t be the last.

This has been an area of strong bipartisan concern for several

years. When I left Congress in January of ’05 (not by choice) this

committee was already concerned about performance trends in the

NPOESS program. The Government Accountability Office had reported to this subcommittee in September, ’041, that a significant

increase in the cost estimate had occurred, there were technical

problems with the instruments, and there was strong evidence that

there would be a half-billion-dollar cost overrun at the end of the

program.

Just over a year later, Mr. Powner has testified in a hearing here

that cost and schedule trends had worsened and said that the program was in crisis.2 Soon after that testimony, Congress received

notification that there was good cause to believe NPOESS would

exceed its acquisition baseline cost by more than 25 percent—by

more than the 25 percent needed to trigger a re-certification of the

program under the Nunn-McCurdy provisions of federal procurement law.3

Today’s hearing marks the first time for the Committee to get a

sense of how the post-Nunn-McCurdy NPOESS program is faring.

Nunn-McCurdy decisions at the Department of Defense have established a track record of more expensive acquisitions for fewer satellites. Perhaps most critically, the re-certified program now lacks

most of the climate sensors that were to fly on NPOESS and were

to form the heart of our instrumentation to provide data for tracking global warming.

The Office of Science and Technology Policy started an effort to

deal with the climate sensors lost for NPOESS almost immediately

after the announcement of the Nunn-McCurdy decision. Dr. John

Marburger is joining us today to explain that process.

My concern is that the effort headed by OSTP, with analytical

support from NASA and NOAA, is lagging the pace needed to make

effective decisions. The directions to the agencies are to look at all

options for every data need rather than a direction to identify

money that could be used to fund the planned instruments that

had been de-manifested. You can study that problem and all possible options for as long as you want, but at some point the manifests for what will fly on the NPOESS satellites have to be finalized, and so decisions are not just due. I believe they are overdue.

11

4 VIIRS: Visible-Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite

5 CrIS: Cross-Track Infrared Sounder

I think that without decisive action and leadership, we will lose

continuity in the multi-decadal data sets that are sensitive—that

are central to our understanding of global warming. In fact, some

breaches in data collection may be unavoidable at this point. There

was time, just time to add money into the 2008 budget request if

the interagency exercise had been pushed harder last summer.

Now, one year later, the problem is still under study, and it may

be that answers won’t come before the 2009 budget is finalized.

As to money, I think that NASA and NOAA may not be able to

do what needs to be done without direct intervention from the

White House to give them the added resources necessary to fund

those instruments. The President just delivered another major address on climate change. Perhaps one step he could take towards

showing other nations that this proposal is a serious one would be

to identify funds to find and to fly the climate sensors.

We will also hear today from David Powner of GAO. Mr. Powner

is a frequent witness before this committee. His testimony today is

less dramatic than at some other times, prior appearances. At this

moment in time the NPOESS program does not appear to be losing

further ground.

According to GAO’s report, the ground systems for NPOESS data

handling are now running under their budget, and they have

achieved more than they had planned to accomplish at this point.

Such performances are so rare it may be that particular project

manager deserves the Congressional Gold Medal.

Unfortunately, that performance is overshadowed by the continuing risks we see with the major instruments destined to fly on

these satellites. Both the VIIRS4 and CrIS5 instruments still show

significant engineering challenges. There is little doubt that the

challenges can be overcome, but the risk attaches to how much

time and money the fixes will cost.

There are still a lot of tests for NPOESS to get through, which

means there are many opportunities for unexpected events to upset

the program. So we have asked Mr. Powner to keep up the good

work.

Air Force Brigadier General Susan Mashiko is also with us

today, and in the 20 months that she served as Program Executive

Officer for NPOESS, she has restored a semblance of order in management structure, to the management structure. Indeed, the announcement of her imminent rotation to another posting led GAO

to recommend to the Air Force that she not be spared just yet. I

think that the Air Force is going to ignore that advice, but it may

be to the detriment of the program if solid management is not put

into place immediately. NPOESS is not a program that can be allowed to drift along.

We are a year beyond the Nunn-McCurdy de-manifestation—demanifesting of both climate science and space weather instruments—and yet no decisions have been made on how to proceed.

We are a year beyond Nunn-McCurdy with the same instruments

causing us the same concerns about risk.

12

General Mashiko is a month away from her transfer and no replacement has been named.

I think progress has been made in managing the downsized

NPOESS program that the Department of Defense brought us, but

not enough progress to reduce our concerns about the future for

this satellite program or to satisfy our need to see our climate

science efforts fully supported.

I want to thank all for you for coming, and I will now recognize

the Ranking Member, Mr. Inglis, for his opening remarks.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Lampson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN NICK LAMPSON

Good afternoon, welcome to this hearing on the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). These satellites are the next

generation of observational platforms that will allow the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Department of Defense to provide weather forecasting services. It is not too much to say that the United States cannot get along

without them.

This is not the first hearing the Committee has held on NPOESS and I am confident in saying it will not be the last. This has been an area of strong bipartisan

concern for several years.

When I left Congress in January of 2005—not by choice, of course—this committee was already concerned about performance trends in the NPOESS program.

The Government Accountability Office had reported to this subcommittee in September 2004 that a significant increase in the cost estimate had occurred, there

were technical problems with the instruments and there was strong evidence that

there would be a half-billion-dollar cost overrun at the end of the program.

Just over a year later, Mr. Powner testified in a hearing here that cost and schedule trends had worsened and said the program was in crisis.

Soon after that testimony, Congress received notification that there was good

cause to believe NPOESS would exceed its acquisition baseline cost by more than

the 25 percent needed to trigger a recertification of the program under the NunnMcCurdy provisions in federal procurement law.

Today’s hearing marks the first time for the Committee to get a sense of how the

post-Nunn-McCurdy NPOESS program is faring. Nunn-McCurdy decisions at the

Department of Defense have established a track record of more expensive acquisitions for fewer satellites.

Perhaps most critically, the recertified program now lacks most of the climate sensors that were to fly on NPOESS and were to form the heart of our instrumentation

to provide data for tracking global warming.

The Office of Science and Technology Policy started an effort to deal with the climate sensors lost for NPOESS almost immediately after the announcement of the

Nunn-McCurdy decision. Dr. John Marburger is joining us today to explain that

process.

My concern is that the effort headed by OSTP, with analytical support from

NASA and NOAA, is lagging the pace needed to make effective decisions.

The directions to the agencies are to look at all options for every data need rather

than a direction to identify money that could be used to fund the planned instruments that had been de-manifested.

You can study that problem and all possible options for as long as you want, but

at some point, the manifests for what will fly on the NPOESS satellites have to be

finalized, and so decisions are not just due, I believe they are overdue.

I think that without decisive action and leadership, we will lose continuity in the

multi-decadal data sets that are central to our understanding of global warming. In

fact, some breaches in data collection may be unavoidable at this point.

There was just time to add money into the 2008 budget request if the interagency

exercise had been pushed harder last summer. Now, one year later, the problem is

still under study and it may be that answers won’t come in before the 2009 budget

is finalized.

As to money, I think that NASA and NOAA may not be able to do what needs

to be done without direct intervention from the White House to give them the added

resources necessary to fund those instruments.

The President just delivered another major address on climate change. Perhaps

one step he could take towards showing other nations that this proposal is a serious

one would be to identify funds to fly the climate sensors.

13

We will also hear today from David Powner of GAO. Mr. Powner is a frequent

witness before the Committee. His testimony today is less dramatic than at some

prior appearances. At this moment in time, the NPOESS program does not appear

to be losing further ground.

According to GAO’s report, the ground systems for NPOESS data handling are

now running under their budget and they have achieved more than they had

planned to accomplish at this point.

Such performances are so rare it may be that particular project manager deserves

the Congressional Gold Medal.

Unfortunately, that performance is overshadowed by the continuing risks we see

with the major instruments destined to fly on these satellites.

Both the VIIRS and CrIS instruments still show significant engineering challenges. There is little doubt that the challenges can be overcome, but the risk attaches to how much time and money the fixes will cost.

There are still a lot of tests for NPOESS to get through, which means there are

many opportunities for unexpected events to upset the program. So we have asked

Mr. Powner to keep up the good work.

Air Force Brigadier General Susan Mashiko is also with us today. In the 20

months she has served as Program Executive Officer for NPOESS, she has restored

a semblance of order to the management structure. Indeed, the announcement of

her imminent rotation to another posting led GAO to recommend to the Air Force

that she could not be spared just yet.

I think the Air Force is going to ignore that advice, but it may be to the detriment

of the program if solid management is not put in place immediately. NPOESS is

not a program that can be allowed to drift along.

We are a year beyond the Nunn-McCurdy de-manifesting of both climate science

and space weather instruments and yet no decisions have been made on how to proceed.

We are a year beyond Nunn-McCurdy with the same instruments causing us some

of the same concerns about risk.

General Mashiko is a month away from her transfer and no replacement has been

named.

I think progress has been made in managing the downsized NPOESS program

that the Department of Defense brought us, but not enough progress to reduce our

concerns about the future for this satellite program or to satisfy our need to see our

climate science efforts fully supported.

Mr. INGLIS. Good afternoon, and thank you, Mr. Chairman for

holding this hearing about the National Polar-Orbiting Operational

Environmental Satellite System, NPOESS. This hearing continues

close oversight of this vital weather satellite program, oversight

that started under the Republican leadership of this committee.

Under the Republican leadership in the last Congress, this committee held three high-profile hearings about NPOESS. In looking

over the testimony for today’s hearing, it appears to me that close

oversight has paid off. For the most part, the program is on track

under the new plan announced in June of 2006.

Of course, risks remain for a satellite known as ‘‘the most complex environmental satellite system ever developed,’’ but the government has plans in place to address most of the risks identified

by GAO. Also, the government is actively examining the options to

provide environmental data that we had expected from NPOESS

but under the new plan we will not receive.

But simply because things appear under control right now, I

don’t want to imply that Congress, or the Administration for that

matter, can back off from our close oversight of NPOESS. In fact,

I believe just the opposite. Lack of oversight of the management of

NPOESS, the contractor, and the many technical problems facing

NPOESS all led to the June 2006, Nunn-McCurdy certification in

the first place.

Those of us responsible for this program—Congress, NOAA, the

Air Force, and NASA—cannot sit back and relax or we will risk yet

14

another four-year delay or doubling of costs. NPOESS today is a

$12.5 billion program. That is a lot of taxpayer money. We expect

that investment to provide a series of weather satellites that are

launched on time and provide data to inform everything from decisions about our military troop operations to forecasting the path of

hurricanes.

Also, I expect that the interagency report on avoiding gaps in

other environmental data be completed as soon as reasonably possible. The longer we wait to make a final decision on this, the

greater risk we face of having a gap in data important for understanding global climate change and for seasonal forecasts of events

like El Nin ̃ o.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and yield

back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Inglis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BOB INGLIS

Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairman Lampson, for holding this hearing about

the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, NPOESS.

This hearing continues close oversight of this vital weather satellite program, oversight that started under Republican leadership of this committee.

Under Republican leadership in the last Congress, this committee held three highprofile hearings about NPOESS. In looking over the testimony for today’s hearing,

it appears to me that close oversight has paid off. For the most part, the program

is on track under the new plan announced in June 2006.

Of course, risks remain for a satellite known as ‘‘the most complex environmental

satellite system ever developed.’’ But, the government has plans in place to address

most of the risks identified by GAO. Also, the government is actively examining options to provide environmental data that we had expected from NPOESS but under

the new plan we will not receive.

But, simply because things appear under control right now, I do not want to imply

that the Congress, or the Administration for that matter, can back off from our close

oversight of NPOESS. In fact, I believe just the opposite. Lack of oversight of the

management of NPOESS, the contractor, and the many technical problems facing

NPOESS all led to the June 2006 Nunn-McCurdy certification in the first place.

Those of us responsible for this program, Congress, NOAA, the Air Force, and

NASA, cannot sit back and relax or we risk yet another four-year delay or doubling

of costs. NPOESS today is a $12.5 billion program. That is a lot of taxpayer money.

We expect that investment to provide a series of weather satellites that are

launched on time and provide data to inform everything from decisions about our

military troop operations to forecasting the path of hurricanes.

Also, I expect that the interagency report on avoiding gaps in other environmental

data be completed as soon as reasonably possible. The longer we wait to make a

final decision on this, the greater risk we face of having a gap in data important

for understanding global climate change and for seasonal forecasts of events like El

Nin ̃ o.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and yield back the balance

of my time.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Inglis. I ask unanimous

consent that all additional opening statements submitted by the

Committee Members be included in the record. Without objection

so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Udall follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE MARK UDALL

Mr. Chairman, I’m very concerned about the status of the entire NPOESS program, not only because of the critically important climate data that may be lost if

a home is not found for the de-manifested instruments, but also because the demanifesting of those instruments is having a great impact on my district.

On the plus side, I am pleased that NASA and NOAA have worked together to

find the funding needed to bring back the OMPS Limb sensor for the NPP spaceVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:15 Jul 23, 2008 Jkt 035707 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\E&E07\060707\35707 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
15

craft. OMPS Limb, which is being built by Ball Aerospace in Boulder, will provide

measurements of ozone in our atmosphere.

However, it is clear that other instruments are not faring as well. I am particularly concerned about the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS) and the Space Environment Sensor Suite (SESS).

TSIS will provide essential data on the impact that the sun has on our atmosphere and climate—and it is the number one priority instrument listed in the recent

National Research Council’s Decadal Survey on Earth Science. It was being developed by the University of Colorado’s Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics.

However, with the funding pulled for this instrument for NPOESS, the researchers and engineers working on this instrument may have to leave LASP to find other

careers, jeopardizing our ability to have this instrument available to fly when needed.

We need one agency to take responsibility for this critical instrument and its

funding. NASA and NOAA would be the logical agencies and I hope that a decision

is made about a lead agency soon. TSIS has been abandoned for too long and, unless

additional funding is found by the middle of July, we are going to lose critical

human capital.

I am also very concerned about the status of the SESS. The information that it

provides is essential for us to better understand and predict solar flares and their

impact on our economy. These flares have wide reaching impacts on everything from

airplane flights over the poles to telecommunications across the world. The Space

Environment Center in my district has been key to enabling governments and businesses prepare for increased solar activity. Yet without SESS, we will not only curb

our advances, but we may also lose the capabilities that we currently have.

I will continue to closely monitor the status of TSIS and SESS, along with the

rest of NPOESS.

Chairman LAMPSON. We are very pleased to have this distinguished panel of witnesses here this afternoon. Dr. John

Marburger, a science advisor to the President and Director of the

Office of Science and Technology Policy, OSTP, in the Executive Office of the President. Prior to his appointment as Director of OSTP,

Dr. Marburger served as Director of the Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York and as President of the State University of

New York at Stony Brook. Dr. Marburger has appeared before our

committee many times. Today he is here to discuss OSTP’s efforts

to provide continuity in our climate observing system, and I thank

you for being here. Good afternoon.

Mr. David Powner is the Director of IT Management Issues for

the U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO. Mr. Powner and

his team have been diligently tracking satellite procurement programs for this committee since 2001. He is here today to discuss

their latest report on the current status of the NPOESS program.

Your team’s work has been extremely valuable to the Members of

the Committee. We thank you for your excellent work and for being

here to testify this afternoon.

And finally we have Brigadier General Susan Mashiko. General

Mashiko is the Program Executive Officer for Environmental Satellites. She oversees the Integrated Program Office, the tri-agency

organization that is in charge of the development of the new polar

satellite system, NPOESS. General Mashiko has held a variety of

positions in the Department of Defense, including Program Manager for the Atlas V Program, Chief of the Programs Division in

the Office of Special Projects, and Executive Officer to the DOD

Space Architect. She has been overseeing the NPOESS program

since November of 2005, and we are pleased to have you here this

afternoon as well, General.

You will each have five minutes for your spoken testimony. Your

written testimony may be included in the record for the hearing.

16

6 Impacts of NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy Certification on Joint NASA–NOAA Climate Goals.

Earth Science Division, Science Mission Directorate, Headquarters, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration, and Climate Observations and Analysis Program, Climate Program Office, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. January 8, 2007.

And when all three of you have completed your testimony, we will

begin with questions. Each Member will have five minutes to question the panel, and we will rotate.

Dr. Marburger, would you please begin?

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN H. MARBURGER, III, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, EXECUTIVE

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Dr. MARBURGER. Thank you very much, Chairman Lampson, and

Ranking Member Inglis, and Members of the Committee. I am

pleased to appear today to describe the activities of OSTP and Executive Branch agencies related to the NPOESS program. My written testimony discusses the ongoing interagency assessment of the

impacts of de-manifesting several Earth-observing and space environment sensors from the NPOESS spacecraft during the 2006 restructuring of the program. My written testimony also discusses

some other related systems, and I appreciate it being included in

the record.

The background material in your charter for today’s hearing describes the history of the NPOESS program, and I will not repeat

it here. From the point of view of science impacts, it is important

to understand that in the restructuring process the agencies gave

highest priority to preserving continuity and operational terrestrial

weather forecasting capabilities, which was the original focus of the

program. And as you know the restructuring decision which was

announced on June 5, 2006, reduced the number of operating

NPOESS satellites and orbits and also removed several Earth-observing and space weather-related sensors from the baseline program budget.

When my office learned of these decisions, we convened an interagency meeting later that June, including representatives from

NASA, NOAA, and the NPOESS Integrated Program Office. We

wanted first to gain a better understanding of the projected capabilities of the revised program; second, to explore the implications

of these changes for climate and ocean research activities; and

third, to obtain agency views and information on ways to retain the

capabilities of sensors removed from the baseline. Based on discussions in this meeting we asked NASA and NOAA to provide my office, OSTP, with a joint technical assessment of the expected

science implications of the NPOESS restructuring decision and options for addressing those impacts in terms of climate research.

NASA/NOAA responded with a white paper in January of this

year.6

This initial response included a good analysis of the potential climate science impacts of the restructuring decision. It also addressed the projected impacts of eliminating each sensor and

prioritized the de-manifested sensors in terms of the importance of

their measurements.

17

7OMPS: Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite.

The options it presented for retaining the capabilities of the

eliminated sensors focused mostly on re-manifesting them back

onto NPOESS.

Because that white paper did not include the full range of options for retaining climate and ocean research capabilities and did

not make cost estimates that are essential for policy-making, OSTP

asked the agencies for more information on these issues, and NASA

and NOAA are in the process of developing that information.

Interagency discussions and follow-up questions and analyses

will continue throughout the summer and fall and feed into the fiscal year 2009 budget process. One important decision has already

been made. The sensor known as OMPS–Limb7 has been restored

to fly on NASA’s NPOESS Preparatory Project satellite, the NPP,

which is scheduled to launch in 2009. NASA and NOAA will split

the cost to re-manifest the OMPS–Limb instrument.

I want to thank this committee for its interest in this project and

its support of the program and related sensor studies. We face

more challenges in addressing these topics, but we are making

progress. We are working closely with interested agencies in devising the way forward.

And I would be pleased to respond to questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Marburger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN H. MARBURGER, III

Chairman Lampson, Ranking Member Inglis, and Members of the Subcommittee,

I am pleased to appear before you today to describe OSTP and interagency activities

related to the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System

(NPOESS) weather satellite program. As you requested, I will discuss the ongoing

interagency assessment of the impacts of removing or ‘‘de-manifesting’’ several

Earth-observing and space environment sensors from the NPOESS spacecraft during the 2006 restructuring of the program. I will also describe certain other important climate-related activities of potential interest to the Committee.

First let me briefly outline the NPOESS program and its history. The NPOESS

effort was established through Presidential Decision Directive in 1994, with the goal

of integrating the polar weather capabilities developed by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Commerce (DOC) into one next-generation program that would support both civil and military weather requirements. The role of

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was to improve the remote sensing capabilities of the operational system through the insertion of new

technologies. The idea was to have one next-generation program that would support

both civil and military weather requirements and to align overlapping and complementary capabilities to increase efficiency and data synergy. As planning evolved,

a number of other Earth-observing and space environment sensors and capabilities

were incorporated into the basic program, making NPOESS (as envisioned at that

time) a key component not only for operational weather forecasting, but also for research on climate, oceans, and space weather.

Oversight of the NPOESS program is provided jointly by the three agencies

through an Executive Committee, and funding is divided equally between DOD and

DOC. Within this tri-agency framework, DOD is responsible for major program acquisitions (conducted through the Air Force), DOC’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is responsible for satellite operations, and NASA is

responsible for developing new technologies. Development and other activities within the program are managed by an integrated program office. These arrangements

for NPOESS are unique within the Federal Government, and many consider it the

most complex environmental satellite system ever developed.

Previous communications to Congress during hearings and in Executive Branch

correspondence have reported numerous technical, developmental, and management

challenges in the NPOESS program since its inception, resulting in various cost increases and scheduling delays. In late 2005, the NPOESS integrated program office

18

determined that projected cost over-runs for NPOESS would exceed the 25 percent

threshold triggering a breach of the Nunn-McCurdy statute, thus requiring the Secretary of Defense to certify that the program meets the following criteria: it is essential to the national security, no alternatives provide equal or greater military capability at less cost, new estimates of the program acquisition unit cost are reasonable,

and the management structure is adequate to manage and control program costs.

Accordingly, DOD worked with DOC and NASA through the first half of 2006 to

restructure the NPOESS effort in order to address the significant cost over-run and

reduce program risk. In this certification process, the agencies gave highest priority

to preserving continuity in operational terrestrial weather forecasting capabilities— the original focus of the program. The ultimate decision regarding the restructuring

of NPOESS was announced on June 5, 2006.

The current restructured NPOESS program includes four NPOESS satellites operating in two orbits, augmented by data from a European weather system using several sensors provided by the United States in a third orbit. (In contrast, the program before restructuring had planned on flying six NPOESS satellites in three orbits.) To decrease costs and help maintain continuity in operational weather capabilities, the three agencies also decided to remove several Earth-observing and space

weather-related sensors from the baseline NPOESS program budget—effectively removing these sensors from NPOESS—and to de-scope certain other instruments in

terms of performance. It is important to note that NPOESS, as restructured, still

satisfies many climate data requirements. In addition, the recertified program retains funding within the NPOESS baseline for the reintegration of the de-manifested sensors should a way be found to provide them from outside the program.

Nevertheless, the potential impacts to the climate science program continue to raise

concerns. When my office (OSTP) learned of these decisions, we convened an interagency

meeting in late June 2006, including representatives from NASA, NOAA and the

NPOESS integrated program office, to (1) gain a better understanding of the projected capabilities of the revised program, (2) explore the implications of these

changes for climate and ocean research activities, and (3) obtain agency views on

ways to retain the capabilities of sensors removed from the baseline NPOESS configuration. Based on the discussions in this meeting and our sense that more work

was needed on these topics, we asked NASA and NOAA to provide OSTP with a

joint technical assessment of the expected science implications of the NPOESS restructuring decision, and options for addressing those impacts in terms of climate

research (implications for space weather research and activities will be addressed

separately). In response to our request, a joint NASA/NOAA assessment was provided to OSTP in early January 2007, in the form of a ‘‘white paper.’’ The initial NASA/NOAA response to OSTP includes an analysis of the potential

climate science impacts of the 2006 NPOESS restructuring decision. It also addresses the projected impacts of eliminating each sensor and provides prioritized

rankings of the de-manifested sensors in terms of the importance of their measurements. In addition, the white paper presents options for retaining the capabilities

of the eliminated sensors that focus largely on re-manifesting them back onto

NPOESS.

The NASA/NOAA white paper is useful for understanding the dimensions of the

problems created by restructuring, and is a helpful and important contribution to

the process of resolving them. At the same time, it does not include the full range

of options for retaining the climate and ocean research capabilities, and does not include cost estimates that are essential for policy-making. Consequently, OSTP asked

the agencies for further analysis of a broader range of options, including potential

solutions such as free-flyers, adding instruments to other U.S. Government spacecraft, or international cooperative opportunities. We also requested that NASA and

NOAA provide cost estimates for the full range of options being explored. NASA and

NOAA are in the process of developing information for OSTP and the Office of Management and Budget regarding various options and preliminary cost estimates for

those options.

Interagency discussions and follow-up questions and analyses regarding these and

other potential mitigation strategies will continue throughout the summer and fall.

Our goal is to complete this phase of the analysis in time to inform the FY 2009

budget process, where this information could be considered along with other elements of department and agency requests. One decision has already been made—

the Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) Limb has been restored to fly on the

NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite, which is scheduled to launch in 2009.

NASA and NOAA will split the cost to re-manifest the OMPS–Limb instrument.

Regarding instruments other than OMPS–Limb, there have been no decisions yet

on options, program schedules, or identification of funds. Those issues will need to

19

be addressed as the process unfolds in coming months. My priorities during this review are to promote continuity of key climate data needs while ensuring that current planned missions are not negatively impacted by payload modifications. While

much remains to be completed, I must emphasize that NASA, NOAA and members

of my staff are investing much time and effort on this difficult problem. Other portions of the scientific community are providing useful input as well. For example,

we are looking forward to the results of an NRC workshop later this month regarding these and related Earth-observation issues. The necessary work is getting done,

and OSTP will continue to monitor the process closely as it moves forward.

In addition to the NPOESS climate-related sensors that are the focus of the ongoing assessment, a suite of space weather sensors was also de-manifested from the

baseline NPOESS effort during the 2006 restructuring of the program, as noted earlier. These sensors were an important element of the Nation’s planned capabilities

for observing and predicting space weather phenomena such as solar flares, sunspots, auroras and the solar wind. The loss of such measurements could have a serious impact on a wide range of U.S. operations and research. Accordingly, and as

with the de-manifested climate sensors, we have requested that agencies with space

weather interests, including DOD, DOC, and NASA, provide a joint assessment of

the impacts of the NPOESS restructuring decision on national space weather-related capabilities and goals, followed by an assessment of potential options for addressing such impacts. This effort is in its early stages and likely will require several months to complete. Our goal in this effort is to obtain the necessary information in time to inform the FY 2010 budget process—a suitable schedule for this

analysis according to the agencies involved.

I would like to mention some other climate-related issues today that are not directly linked to NPOESS but are part of the broader context for OSTP’s ongoing

work on Earth observations. The fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) shows that great progress has been made in characterizing and understanding Earth’s climate system and how that system is changing, and U.S. Government-funded Earth observations have been critical in achieving

this progress. Earth observations are important for characterizing the impacts of climate change to natural and human systems, and for many other applications such

as improved weather forecasts, predicting and responding to natural disasters,

water resource management, characterizing air quality and assessing ecosystem

health. While current challenges to maintaining and improving U.S. Earth-observing systems exist, as noted in the recently released National Research Council

(NRC) Decadal Survey on Earth Science, I want to emphasize that this Administration is committed to supporting these capabilities.

The NRC report points out that no single mechanism currently exists for coordinating all national Earth-observing needs across agencies. Although the Climate

Change Science Program has an Observations Working Group to facilitate interagency understanding and information exchanges, it has not yet developed a national strategy for climate observations—nor has any other group. Climate observation plans have been part of individual agency program plans and budgets, or have

been assembled through mission-specific collaborative processes like the one that

produced NPOESS. This situation exists for most other observation types as well,

not just those for climate. For example, there is an Interagency Working Group on

Ocean Observations that is looking at a range of ocean-related observations, including but not limited to, those focusing on climate. Similarly, there is a NASA–NOAA

Joint Working Group on Research-Operations Transition intended to address issues

associated with the transition of observations initiated as research into operational

ones.

Several organizations including the NRC have noted the need for a plan to

achieve and sustain global Earth observations, and this issue has been taken up by

the National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee on Earth Observations

(known as the U.S. Group on Earth Observations, or USGEO). USGEO, which is

co-chaired by OSTP, NASA, and NOAA, recently reorganized to focus on a national

strategy for Earth observations that would address topics such as organizational

roles and responsibilities, data collection and sharing protocols, and sector-specific

priorities for investment. This process is ongoing, and I anticipate that at least a

year will be required to produce a strategic plan for this complex issue.

OSTP is also engaged in an emerging national coordination requirement for medium-resolution land imaging data. I have directed an interagency working group

to address the long-term continuity of Landsat-type data through an effort known

as the Future of Land Imaging (FLI) Plan. As you know, the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM) is currently in procurement in NASA and is scheduled for

launch in 2011. The Landsat interagency working group is developing the FLI plan

for extending these important systems beyond LDCM and into the future. The

20

group’s report is currently in clearance and will be published within the next two

months.

Thank you for your interest in and support for these issues, including not only

the NPOESS-related sensor studies but also the other Earth-observing topics that

I have mentioned. There certainly are further challenges ahead in addressing these

topics, but we are making progress and are working closely with interested agencies

in devising the way forward. I would be pleased to respond to questions.

BIOGRAPHY FOR JOHN H. MARBURGER, III

John H. Marburger, III, Science Adviser to the President and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, was born on Staten Island, N.Y., grew up in

Maryland near Washington D.C. and attended Princeton University (B.A., Physics

1962) and Stanford University (Ph.D., Applied Physics 1967). Before his appointment in the Executive Office of the President, he served as Director of Brookhaven

National Laboratory from 1998, and as the third President of the State University

of New York at Stony Brook (1980–1994). He came to Long Island in 1980 from the

University of Southern California where he had been a Professor of Physics and

Electrical Engineering, serving as Physics Department Chairman and Dean of the

College of Letters, Arts and Sciences in the 1970’s. In the fall of 1994 he returned

to the faculty at Stony Brook, teaching and doing research in optical science as a

University Professor. Three years later he became President of Brookhaven Science

Associates, a partnership between the university and Battelle Memorial Institute

that competed for and won the contract to operate Brookhaven National Laboratory.

While at the University of Southern California, Marburger contributed to the rapidly growing field of nonlinear optics, a subject created by the invention of the laser

in 1960. He developed theory for various laser phenomena and was a co-founder of

the University of Southern California’s Center for Laser Studies. His teaching activities included ‘‘Frontiers of Electronics,’’ a series of educational programs on CBS

television.

Marburger’s presidency at Stony Brook coincided with the opening and growth of

University Hospital and the development of the biological sciences as a major

strength of the university. During the 1980’s federally sponsored scientific research

at Stony Brook grew to exceed that of any other public university in the northeastern United States.

During his presidency, Marburger served on numerous boards and committees, including chairmanship of the Governor’s Commission on the Shoreham Nuclear

Power facility, and chairmanship of the 80 campus ‘‘Universities Research Association’’ which operates Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory near Chicago. He

served as a trustee of Princeton University and many other organizations. He also

chaired the highly successful 1991/92 Long Island United Way campaign.

As a public spirited scientist-administrator, Marburger has served local, State and

Federal governments in a variety of capacities. He is credited with bringing an open,

reasoned approach to contentious issues where science intersects with the needs and

concerns of society. His strong leadership of Brookhaven National Laboratory following a series of environmental and management crises is widely acknowledged to

have won back the confidence and support of the community while preserving the

Laboratory’s record of outstanding science.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Dr. Marburger.

Mr. Powner.

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. POWNER. Chairman Lampson, Ranking Member Inglis, and

Members of the Subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to

testify on NPOESS, a planned satellite system whose life cycle

costs will now exceed $12 billion.

NPOESS is critical to our nation’s ability to monitor changes in

weather and the environment. Over the past several years

NPOESS has experienced significant cost overruns and delays due

to sensor development problems, poor contractor performance and

21

8Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is Underway But Technical Challenges and Risks Remain. Government Accountability Office Report GAO–07–498;

April 27, 2007.

program management, and inadequate executive level involvement

that led to a June, 2006, decision to restructure the program.

This decision decreased the complexity of the program by reduc- ing the number of sensors, increased the estimated cost by $4 billion, and delayed the launches of satellites by three to five years.

Since then the NPOESS program has made progress and is currently being managed with much more rigor than we have previously seen as part of our numerous reviews for this committee.

However, we remain concerned about its remaining risks; the

interagency management of this tri-agency program, the premature

rotation of the program’s key executive, continued staffing short- ages, and whether this program can be executed within the $12.5

billion life cycle cost estimate.

Before expanding on each of these concerns, General Mashiko

and her team deserve credit for increasing program oversight, instituting more frequent and rigorous program reviews, and holding

NPOESS’s contractors more accountable. In addition, this committee’s oversight role has been instrumental in driving these management improvements. Despite these efforts, the NPOESS program is

still fraught with risks. Recent program assessments to NPOESS’s

Executive Committee rate the cost, schedule, technical and funding

status each as yellow. Our report being released today8 highlights

the major technical risks associated with two critical sensors

known as VIIRS and CrIS. Specifically, VIIRS has experienced

problems during testing with image quality and reliability, and

CrIS failed during vibration testing. Both sensors remain high risk.

We also remain concerned about the interagency coordination

and commitment required to effectively manage this tri-agency program. Following last summer’s restructuring, the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator of NASA were required

to sign a revised memorandum of agreement by August, 2006, and

revise and approve key acquisition documents a month later. To

date this has not occurred, and this executive level foot-dragging is

unacceptable.

This is more than a paper exercise since finalizing these documents is critical to insuring interagency agreements and will allow

the programs to move forward in completing a new baseline and

contract by next month.

We also remain concerned about having the right people on

board to effectively oversee and manage this program. DOD’s plans

for reassigning the Program Executive Officer (PEO) next month

increases the program’s risk. Establishing the PEO structure and

having a seasoned executive in this role has streamlined executive

decision-making and has resulted in more aggressive risk management throughout the program. The PEO has only been in this position for 19 months. Given that the program is currently still being

restructured and that significant challenges remain, this move

adds unnecessary risks to an already risky program.

In addition, the NPOESS program still lacks key staff needed to

effectively manage this program. These staff include systems engineers and budget and cost analysts. As a result the program lacks

22

1GAO, Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is Under Way, but

Technical Challenges and Risks Remain, GAO–07–498 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2007).

the staff it needs to oversee the technical aspects of the program

and assess contractor costs and progress reports.

Finally, we remain skeptical of the program’s ability to execute

within the $12.5 billion. Specifically, the costs will likely increase

due to the technical problems associated with key sensors. In addition, the contractors’ preliminary estimate of the restructured program is higher than current estimates. The extent of these increases should be known next month when contractor negotiations

are expected to conclude.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, despite some progress, NPOESS is

far from being out of the woods. Moving forward, it is essential that

the program aggressively manage its remaining developmental

risks—especially those associated with high-risk sensors—approve

key documents to assure tri-agency agreement and commitment is

in place, staff key positions to ensure the right folks are on-board—

especially in the engineering and cost areas—and strongly consider

reevaluating the reassignment of the PEO until next summer when

key sensors are to be delivered for NPOESS’s demonstration satellite. Failing to address any of these concerns will lead to additional cost increases and scheduled delays.

This concludes my statement. Thank you for your leadership and

oversight of this critical acquisition.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID A. POWNER

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss our

work on the $12.5 billion dollar National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental

Satellite System (NPOESS) program. NPOESS is expected to be a state-of-the-art,

environment-monitoring satellite system that will replace two existing polar-orbiting

environmental satellite systems. Polar-orbiting satellites provide data and imagery

that are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and

monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the environment. The

NPOESS program is considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the

continuity of data required for weather forecasting (including severe weather events

such as hurricanes) and global climate monitoring through the year 2026.

Three agencies share responsibility for the NPOESS program: the Department of

Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/United States Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration (NASA). To manage the NPOESS program, these agencies established a tri-agency integrated program office. In recent years, the program has

experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties, which led to

a June 2006 decision to restructure it. This decision decreased the complexity of the

program by reducing the number of satellites and sensors, increased the estimated

cost of the program to $12.5 billion, and delayed the launches of the first two satellites by three and five years, respectively.

As requested, this statement summarizes a report being released today that (1)

assesses the NPOESS program office’s progress in restructuring the acquisition, (2)

evaluates the program office’s progress in establishing an effective management

structure, and (3) identifies the status and key risks facing the program’s major segments.1 The report includes recommendations to NOAA, NASA, and DOD to facilitate the restructuring of the program and to reduce program risks. In preparing this

testimony, we relied on our work supporting the accompanying report. That report

contains a detailed overview of our scope and methodology. All the work on which

this testimony is based was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

23

Results in Brief

The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the acquisition

by establishing and implementing interim program plans guiding contractors’ work

activities in 2006 and 2007; however, important tasks remain to be done. Although

the program office developed key acquisition documents (including a memorandum

of agreement on the roles and responsibilities of the three agencies, a revised acquisition strategy, and a system engineering plan) the responsible executives in the

three agencies have not yet approved these documents—even though they were due

by September 1, 2006. Delays in finalizing these documents could hinder plans to

complete contract negotiations by July 2007 and could keep the program from moving forward in fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline.

The program office has also made progress in establishing an effective management structure by adopting a new organizational framework with increased oversight from program executives and by instituting more frequent and rigorous program management reviews; however, planned changes in executive management

will likely increase program risk. Additionally, the program lacks a process and plan

for identifying and filling staffing shortages, which has led to delays in key activities

such as cost estimating and contract revisions. As of June 2007, key positions remain to be filled.

Development and testing of major program segments—including key sensors and

the ground systems—are under way, but significant risks remain. For example,

work continues on key sensors, but two sensors—the visible/infrared imager radiometer suite and the crosstrack infrared sounder—have continued to experience significant difficulties. Additionally, while significant progress has been made in reducing

delays in the NPOESS data processing system, much work remains in refining the

algorithms needed to translate sensor observations into usable weather products.

Continued sensor problems could cause further cost increases or schedule delays.

Given the tight time frames for completing key sensors, integrating them with the

demonstration spacecraft (called the NPOESS Preparatory Project or NPP), and developing, testing, and deploying the ground-based data processing systems, it will

be important for the Integrated Program Office, the Program Executive Office, and

the Executive Committee to continue to provide close oversight of milestones and

risks.

In our report, we made recommendations to the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense and to the Administrator of NASA to ensure that the appropriate executives

finalize key acquisition documents in order to allow the restructuring of the program to proceed. We made recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to direct

the Air Force to delay reassigning the recently appointed Program Executive Officer

until key program risks are resolved. We also made recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce to ensure that NPOESS program authorities develop and implement a written process for identifying and addressing human capital needs and that

they establish a plan to immediately fill needed positions. In written comments, all

three agencies agreed that it was important to finalize key acquisition documents

in a timely manner, and DOD proposed extending the due dates for the documents

to July 2, 2007. In addition, the Department of Commerce concurred with our recommendation to identify and address human capital needs and immediately fill

open positions in the NPOESS program office. Commerce noted that NOAA was taking actions in both areas.

However, DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay reassigning the

Program Executive Officer, noting that the Program Director responsible for the acquisition program would remain in place for four years. While it is important that

the System Program Director remain in place to ensure continuity in executing the

acquisition, this position does not ensure continuity in the important oversight and

coordination functions provided by the current Program Executive Officer. We remain concerned that reassigning the Program Executive at a time when NPOESS

is still facing critical cost, schedule, and technical challenges will place the program

at further risk.

Background

Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate operational polarorbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series—managed by NOAA—and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP)—managed by the Air Force. These satellites obtain

environmental data that are processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized weather products. These satellite data are also the predominant input to

numerical weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for forecasting

weather three or more days in advance—including forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. The weather products and models are used to predict the potenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:15 Jul 23, 2008 Jkt 035707 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\E&E07\060707\35707 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
24

2Presidential Decision Directive NSTC–2 (May 5, 1994).

tial impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency managers can

help prevent and mitigate their effects. Polar satellites also provide data used to

monitor environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion and drought conditions,

as well as data sets that are used by researchers for a variety of studies such as

climate monitoring.

NPOESS Overview

With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the two satellite programs into

a single satellite program capable of satisfying both civilian and military requirements.2 The converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United

States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting

and global climate monitoring through the year 2026. To manage this program,

DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency Integrated Program Office, located

within NOAA.

Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain activities: NOAA

has overall program management responsibility for the converged system and for

satellite operations; DOD has the lead on the acquisition; and NASA has primary

responsibility for facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies

into the converged system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of funding NPOESS,

while NASA funds specific technology projects and studies. The NPOESS program

office is overseen by an Executive Committee, which is made up of the Administrators of NOAA and NASA and the Under Secretary of the Air Force.

NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated to cost about

$6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from its inception in 1995 through

2018. The program is to provide satellite development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based satellite data processing. These deliverables are grouped

into four main categories: (1) the space segment, which includes the satellites and

sensors; (2) the integrated data processing segment, which is the system for transforming raw data into environmental data records (EDR) and is to be located at four

data processing centers; (3) the command, control, and communications segment,

which includes the equipment and services needed to support satellite operations;

and (4) the launch segment, which includes launch vehicle services.

When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing, and development contract was

awarded in August 2002, the cost estimate was adjusted to $7 billion. Acquisition

plans called for the procurement and launch of six satellites over the life of the program, as well as the integration of 13 instruments—consisting of 10 environmental

sensors and three subsystems. Together, the sensors were to receive and transmit

data on atmospheric, cloud cover, environmental, climatic, oceanographic, and solargeophysical observations. The subsystems were to support non-environmental search

and rescue efforts, sensor survivability, and environmental data collection activities.

The program office considered four of the sensors to be critical because they provide

data for key weather products; these sensors are in bold in Table 1, which describes

each of the expected NPOESS instruments.

25

3GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites Project Risks Could Affect Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users, GAO–03–987T (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003). 4GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites Information on Program Cost and Schedule

Changes, GAO–04–1054 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004).

In addition, a demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS Preparatory Project or

NPP) was planned to be launched several years before the first NPOESS satellite

in order to reduce the risk associated with launching new sensor technologies and

to ensure continuity of climate data with NASA’s Earth Observing System satellites.

NPP is to host three of the four critical NPOESS sensors (VIIRS, CrIS, and ATMS),

as well as one other noncritical sensor (OMPS). NPP is to provide the program office

and the processing centers an early opportunity to work with the sensors, ground

control, and data processing systems.

When the NPOESS development contract was awarded, the schedule for launching the satellites was driven by a requirement that the satellites be available to

back up the final POES and DMSP satellites should anything go wrong during the

planned launches of these satellites. Early program milestones included (1) launching NPP by May 2006, (2) having the first NPOESS satellite available to back up

the final POES satellite launch in March 2008, and (3) having the second NPOESS

satellite available to back up the final DMSP satellite launch in October 2009. If

the NPOESS satellites were not needed to back up the final predecessor satellites,

their anticipated launch dates would have been April 2009 and June 2011, respectively.

NPOESS Experienced Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical Problems Over Several Years

Over the last few years, NPOESS has experienced continued cost increases and

schedule delays, requiring difficult decisions to be made about the program’s direction and capabilities. In 2003, we reported that changes in the NPOESS funding

stream led the program to develop a new program cost and schedule baseline.3 After

this new baseline was completed in 2004, we reported that the program office increased the NPOESS cost estimate from about $7 billion to $8.1 billion; delayed key

milestones, including the planned launch of the first NPOESS satellite—which was

delayed by seven months; and extended the life of the program from 2018 to 2020.4

At that time, we also noted that other factors could further affect the revised cost

and schedule estimates. Specifically, the contractor was not meeting expected cost

and schedule targets on the new baseline because of technical issues in the development of key sensors, including the critical VIIRS sensor. Based on its performance

through May 2004, we estimated that the contractor would most likely overrun its

contract at completion in September 2011 by $500 million—thereby increasing the

26

5GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, GAO–06–249T

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005). 6GA0, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases Trigger Review and

Place Program’s Direction on Hold, GAO–06–573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006). 7 10 U.S.C. §2433 is commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy. 8 10 U.S.C. §2433 (e)(2) has recently been amended by Pub. L. No. 109–163, §802 (Jan. 6,

2006) and Pub. L. No. 109–364, §213 (a) (Oct. 17, 2006). 9DOD estimated that the acquisition portion of the certified program would cost $11.5 billion.

The acquisition portion includes satellite development, production, and launch, but not operations and support costs after launch. When combined with an estimated $1 billion for operations and support after launch, this brings the program life cycle cost to $12.5 billion. 10The European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellite’s MetOp program is a series of three polar-orbiting satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp

satellites are planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years.

projected life cycle cost to $8.6 billion. The program office’s baseline cost estimate

was subsequently adjusted to $8.4 billion.

In mid-November 2005, we reported that NPOESS continued to experience problems in the development of a key sensor, resulting in schedule delays and anticipated cost increases.5 At that time, we projected that the program’s cost estimate

had grown to about $10 billion based on contractor cost and schedule data. We reported that the program’s issues were due, in part, to problems at multiple levels

of management—including subcontractor, contractor, program office, and executive

leadership. Recognizing that the budget for the program was no longer executable,

the NPOESS Executive Committee planned to make a decision in December 2005

on the future direction of the program—what would be delivered, at what cost, and

by when. This involved deciding among options involving increased costs, delayed

schedules, and reduced functionality. We noted that continued oversight, strong

leadership, and timely decision-making were more critical than ever, and we urged

the committee to make a decision quickly so that the program could proceed.

However, we subsequently reported that, in late November 2005, NPOESS cost

growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold that requires DOD to certify the

program to Congress.6 This placed any decision about the future direction of the

program on hold until the certification took place in June 2006. In the meantime,

the program office implemented an interim program plan for fiscal year 2006 to continue work on key sensors and other program elements using fiscal year 2006 funding.

Nunn-McCurdy Process Led to a Decision to Restructure the NPOESS Program

The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when a major defense acquisition program exceeds certain cost increase thresholds.7 The law requires the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress when a major defense acquisition

is expected to overrun its project baseline by 15 percent or more and to certify the

program to Congress when it is expected to overrun its baseline by 25 percent or

more.8 In late November 2005, NPOESS exceeded the 25 percent threshold, and

DOD was required to certify the program. Certifying a program entailed providing

a determination that (1) the program is essential to national security, (2) there are

no alternatives to the program that will provide equal or greater military capability

at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the program’s cost are reasonable, and (4) the

management structure for the program is adequate to manage and control costs.

DOD established tri-agency teams—made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA experts—

to work on each of the four elements of the certification process.

In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner agencies) certified

a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost $12.5 billion through 2026.9

This decision approved a cost increase of $4 billion over the prior approved baseline

cost and delayed the launch of NPP and the first two satellites by roughly three

to five years. The new program also entailed establishing a stronger program management structure, reducing the number of satellites to be produced and launched

from six to four, and reducing the number of instruments on the satellites from 13

to nine—consisting of seven environmental sensors and two subsystems. It also entailed using NPOESS satellites in the early morning and afternoon orbits and relying on European satellites for midmorning orbit data.10 Table 2 summarizes the

major program changes made under the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision.

27

11 According to program officials, although the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision specifies

that NPP is to launch by January 2010, NASA plans to launch it by September 2009 to reduce

the possibility of a climate data continuity gap.

The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision established new milestones for the delivery of key program elements, including launching NPP by January 2010,11 launching the first NPOESS satellite (called C1) by January 2013, and launching the second NPOESS satellite (called C2) by January 2016. These revised milestones deviated from prior plans to have the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the

final POES satellite should anything go wrong during that launch.

Delaying the launch of the first NPOESS satellite means that if the final POES

satellite fails on launch, satellite data users would need to rely on the existing constellation of environmental satellites until NPP data become available—almost two

years later. Although NPP was not intended to be an operational asset, NASA

agreed to move NPP to a different orbit so that its data would be available in the

event of a premature failure of the final POES satellite. However, NPP will not provide all of the operational capability planned for the NPOESS spacecraft. If the

health of the existing constellation of satellites diminishes—or if NPP data are not

available, timely, and reliable—then there could be a gap in environmental satellite

data. Table 3 summarizes changes in key program milestones over time.

In order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision

decreased the number of NPOESS sensors from 13 to nine and reduced the

functionality of four sensors. Specifically, of the 13 original sensors, five sensors remain unchanged, three were replaced with less capable sensors, one was modified

to provide less functionality, and four were canceled. Table 4 shows the changes to

NPOESS sensors, including the four identified in bold as critical sensors.

28

The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of the resulting

weather and environmental products, called environmental data records or EDRs.

In selecting sensors for the restructured program, the agencies placed the highest

priority on continuing current operational weather capabilities and a lower priority

on obtaining selected environmental and climate measuring capabilities. As a result,

the revised NPOESS system has significantly less capability for providing global climate measures than was originally planned. Specifically, the number of EDRs was

decreased from 55 to 39, of which six are of a reduced quality. The 39 EDRs that

remain include cloud base height, land surface temperature, precipitation type and

rate, and sea surface winds. The 16 EDRs that were removed include cloud particle

size and distribution, sea surface height, net solar radiation at the top of the atmosphere, and products to depict the electric fields in the space environment. The six

EDRs that are of a reduced quality include ozone profile, soil moisture, and multiple

products depicting energy in the space environment.

NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, But Key Steps Remain to Be Completed

Since the June 2006 decision to revise the scope, cost, and schedule of the

NPOESS program, the program office has made progress in restructuring the satellite acquisition; however, important tasks remain to be done. Restructuring a

major acquisition program like NPOESS is a process that involves identifying timecritical and high-priority work and keeping this work moving forward, while reassessing development priorities, inter-dependencies, deliverables, risks, and costs. It

also involves revising important acquisition documents including the memorandum

of agreement on the roles and responsibilities of the three agencies, the acquisition

strategy, the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation master plan, the integrated master schedule defining what needs to happen by when, and the acquisition

program baseline. Specifically, the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision required the

Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator of NASA to sign a revised memorandum of agreement by August 6, 2006. It also required that the program office, Program Executive Officer, and the Executive Committee revise and approve key acquisition documents including the acquisition strategy and system engineering plan by September 1, 2006, in order to proceed with the restructuring. Once

these are completed, the program office can proceed to negotiate with its prime contractor on a new program baseline defining what will be delivered, by when, and

at what cost.

29

12GAO–06–249T; U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Inspector General, Poor Management Oversight and Ineffective Incentives Leave NPOESS Program Well Over Budget and Behind Schedule, OIG–17794–6–0001/2006 (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). In addition, two independent teams reviewed the NPOESS program in 2005: A NASA-led Independent Review Team

investigated problems with the VIIRS sensor and the impact on NPP, and a DOD-led Independent Program Assessment Team assessed the broader NPOESS program. The teams briefed

the NPOESS Executive Committee on their findings in August 2005 and November 2005, respectively.

The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the acquisition.

Specifically, the program office has established interim program plans guiding the

contractor’s work activities in 2006 and 2007 and has made progress in implementing these plans. The program office and contractor also developed an integrated

master schedule for the remainder of the program—beyond fiscal year 2007. This

integrated master schedule details the steps leading up to launching NPP by September 2009, launching the first NPOESS satellite in January 2013, and launching

the second NPOESS satellite in January 2016. Near-term steps include completing

and testing the VIIRS, CrIS, and OMPS sensors; integrating these sensors with the

NPP spacecraft and completing integration testing; completing the data processing

system and integrating it with the command, control, and communications segment;

and performing advanced acceptance testing of the overall system of systems for

NPP.

However, key steps remain for the acquisition restructuring to be completed. Although the program office made progress in revising key acquisition documents, including the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation master plan, and the

acquisition strategy plan, it has not yet obtained the approval of the Secretaries of

Commerce and Defense and the Administrator of NASA on the memorandum of

agreement among the three agencies, nor has it obtained the approval of the

NPOESS Executive Committee on the other key acquisition documents. As of June

2007, these approvals are over nine months past due. Agency officials noted that

the September 1, 2006, due date for the key acquisition documents was not realistic

given the complexity of coordinating documents among three different agencies.

Finalizing these documents is critical to ensuring interagency agreement and will

allow the program office to move forward in completing other activities related to

restructuring the program. These other activities include completing an integrated

baseline review with the contractor to reach agreement on the schedule and work

activities, and finalizing changes to the NPOESS development and production contract. Program costs are also likely to be adjusted during upcoming negotiations on

contract changes—an event that the Program Director expects to occur by July

2007. Completion of these activities will allow the program office to lock down a new

acquisition baseline cost and schedule. Until key acquisition documents are finalized

and approved, the program faces increased risk that it will not be able to complete

important restructuring activities in time to move forward in fiscal year 2008 with

a new program baseline in place. This places the NPOESS program at risk of continued delays and future cost increases.

Progress Has Been Made in Establishing an Effective NPOESS Management

Structure, But Executive Turnover Increases Risks and Staffing

Problems Remain

The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective management structure, but—almost a year after this structure was endorsed during the

Nunn-McCurdy certification process—the Integrated Program Office still faces staffing problems. Over the past few years, we and others have raised concerns about

management problems at all levels of the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor management, program office management, and executivelevel management.12 Two independent review teams also noted a shortage of skilled

program staff, including budget analysts and system engineers. Since that time, the

NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective management

structure—including establishing a new organizational framework with increased

oversight by program executives, instituting more frequent subcontractor, contractor, and program reviews, and effectively managing risks and performance.

However, DOD’s plans for reassigning the Program Executive Officer in the summer

of 2007 increase the program’s risks. Additionally, the program lacks a staffing process that clearly identifies staffing needs, gaps, and plans for filling those gaps. As

a result, the program office has experienced delays in getting core management activities under way and lacks the staff it needs to execute day-to-day management

activities.

30

13GAO–06–249T.

NPOESS Program Has Made Progress in Establishing an Effective Management Structure and Increasing Oversight Activities, But Executive

Turnover Will Increase Program Risks

The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective management structure and increasing the frequency and intensity of its oversight activities.

Over the past few years, we and others have raised concerns about management

problems at all levels of management on the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor management, program office management, and executivelevel management. In response to recommendations made by two different independent review teams, the program office began exploring options in late 2005 and

early 2006 for revising its management structure.

In November 2005, the Executive Committee established and filled a Program Executive Officer position, senior to the NPOESS Program Director, to streamline decision making and to provide oversight to the program. This Program Executive Officer reports directly to the Executive Committee. Subsequently, the Program Executive Officer and the Program Director proposed a revised organizational framework

that realigned division managers within the Integrated Program Office responsible

for overseeing key elements of the acquisition and increased staffing in key areas.

In June 2006, the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision approved this new management structure and the Integrated Program Office implemented it. Figure 1 provides an overview of the relationships among the Integrated Program Office, the

Program Executive Office, and the Executive Committee, as well as key divisions

within the program office.

Operating under this new management structure, the program office implemented

more rigorous and frequent subcontractor, contractor, and program reviews, improved visibility into risk management and mitigation activities, and institutionalized the use of earned value management techniques to monitor contractor performance. In addition to these program office activities, the Program Executive Officer

implemented monthly program reviews and increased the frequency of contacts with

the Executive Committee. The Program Executive Officer briefs the Executive Committee in monthly letters, apprising committee members of the program’s status,

progress, risks, and earned value, and the Executive Committee now meets on a

quarterly basis—whereas in the recent past, we reported that the Executive Committee had met only five times in two years.13

Although the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective

management structure, this progress is currently at risk. We recently reported that

DOD space acquisitions are at increased risk due in part to frequent turnover in

leadership positions, and we suggested that addressing this will require DOD to

31

14GAO, Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Acquisitions and Keys to Achieving

Them, GAO–06–626T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006).

consider matching officials’ tenure with the development or delivery of a product.14

In March 2007, NPOESS program officials stated that DOD is planning to reassign

the recently appointed Program Executive Officer in the summer 2007 as part of

this executive’s natural career progression. As of June 2007, the Program Executive

Officer has held this position for 19 months. Given that the program is currently

still being restructured, and that there are significant challenges in being able to

meet critical deadlines to ensure satellite data continuity, such a move adds unnecessary risk to an already risky program.

NPOESS Program Has Filled Key Vacancies but Lacks a Program-wide

Staffing Process

The NPOESS program office has filled key vacancies but lacks a staffing process

that identifies program-wide staffing requirements and plans for filling those needed

positions. Sound human capital management calls for establishing a process or plan

for determining staffing requirements, identifying any gaps in staffing, and planning to fill critical staffing gaps. Program office staffing is especially important for

NPOESS, given the acknowledgment by multiple independent review teams that

staffing shortfalls contributed to past problems. Specifically, these review teams

noted shortages in the number of system engineers needed to provide adequate oversight of subcontractor and contractor engineering activities and in the number of

budget and cost analysts needed to assess contractor cost and earned value reports.

To rectify this situation, the June 2006 certification decision directed the Program

Director to take immediate actions to fill vacant positions at the program office with

the approval of the Program Executive Officer.

Since the June 2006 decision to revise NPOESS management structure, the program office has filled multiple critical positions, including a budget officer, a chief

system engineer, an algorithm division chief, and a contracts director. In addition,

on an ad hoc basis, individual division managers have assessed their needs and initiated plans to hire staff for key positions. However, the program office lacks a program-wide process for identifying and filling all needed positions. As a result, division managers often wait months for critical positions to be filled. For example, in

February 2006, the NPOESS program estimated that it needed to hire up to 10 new

budget analysts. As of September 2006, none of these positions had been filled. As

of April 2007, program officials estimated that they still needed to fill five budget

analyst positions, five systems engineering positions, and 10 technical manager positions. The majority of the vacancies—four of the five budget positions, four of the

five systems engineering positions, and eight of the 10 technical manager positions—are to be provided by NOAA. NOAA officials noted that each of these positions is in some stage of being filled—that is, recruitment packages are being developed or reviewed, vacancies are being advertised, or candidates are being interviewed, selected, and approved.

The program office attributes its staffing delays to not having the right personnel

in place to facilitate this process, and it did not even begin to develop a staffing

process until November 2006. Program officials noted that the tri-agency nature of

the program adds unusual layers of complexity to the hiring and administrative

functions because each agency has its own hiring and performance management

rules. In November 2006, the program office brought in an administrative officer

who took the lead in pulling together the division managers’ individual assessments

of needed staff and has been working with the division managers to refine this list.

This new administrative officer plans to train division managers in how to assess

their needs and to hire needed staff, and to develop a process by which evolving

needs are identified and positions axe filled. However, there is as yet no date set

for establishing this basic program-wide staffing process. As a result of the lack of

a program-wide staffing process, there has been an extended delay in determining

what staff is needed and in bringing those staff on board; this has resulted in delays

in performing core activities, such as establishing the program office’s cost estimate

and bringing in needed contracting expertise. Additionally, until a program-wide

staffing process is in place, the program office risks not having the staff it needs

to execute day-to-day management activities.

In commenting on a draft of our report, Commerce stated that NOAA implemented an accelerated hiring model. More recently, the NPOESS program office reported that several critical positions were filled in April and May 2007. However,

we have not yet evaluated NOAA’s accelerated hiring model and, as of June 2007,

over 10 key positions remain to be filled.

32

Major Program Segments Are Under Development, But Significant Risks

Remain

Major segments of the NPOESS program—the space segment and ground systems

segment—are under development; however, significant problems have occurred and

risks remain. The program office is aware of these risks and is working to mitigate

them, but continued problems could affect the program’s overall cost and schedule.

Given the tight time frames for completing key sensors, integrating them on the

NPP spacecraft, and developing, testing, and deploying the ground-based data processing systems, it will be important for the NPOESS Integrated Program Office, the

Program Executive Office, and the Executive Committee to continue to provide close

oversight of milestones and risks.

Space Segment—Progress Made, But Key Sensors Continue to Face Major Risks

The space segment includes the sensors and the spacecraft. Four sensors are of

critical importance—VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS—because they are to be

launched on the NPP satellite in September 2009. Initiating work on another sensor, the Microwave imager/sounder, is also important because this new sensor—re- placing the canceled CMIS sensor—will need to be developed in time for the second

NPOESS satellite launch. Over the past year, the program made progress on each

of the sensors and the spacecraft. However, two sensors, VIIRS and CrIS, have experienced major problems. The status of each of the components of the space segment is described in Table 5.

Program officials regularly track risks associated with various NPOESS components and work to mitigate them. Having identified both VIIRS and CrIS as high

risk, OMPS as moderate risk, and the other components as low risk, the program

office is working closely with the contractors and subcontractors to resolve sensor

problems. Program officials have identified work-grounds that will allow them to

move forward in testing the VIIRS engineering unit and have approved the flight

unit to proceed to a technical readiness review milestone. Regarding CrIS, as of

March 2007, a failure review board identified root causes of its structural failure,

identified plans for resolving them, and initiated inspections of sensor modules and

subsystems for damage. An agency official reported that there is sufficient funding

33

in the fiscal year 2007 program office’s and contractor’s management reserve funds

to allow for troubleshooting both VIIRS and CrIS problems. However, until the CrIS

failure review board fully determines the amount of rework that is necessary to fix

the problems, it is unknown if additional funds will be needed or if the time frame

for CrIS’s delivery will be delayed. According to agency officials, CrIS is not on the

program schedule’s critical path, and there is sufficient schedule margin to absorb

the time it will take to conduct a thorough failure review process.

Managing the risks associated with the development of VIIRS and CrIS is of particular importance because these components are to be demonstrated on the NPP

satellite, currently scheduled for launch in September 2009. Any delay in the NPP

launch date could affect the overall NPOESS program, because the success of the

program depends on the lessons learned in data processing and system integration

from the NPP satellite. Additionally, continued sensor problems could lead to higher

final program costs.

Ground Segment-Progress Has Been Made, But Work Remains

Development of the ground segment—which includes the interface data processing

system, the ground stations that are to receive satellite data, and the ground-based

command, control, and communications system—is under way and on track. However, important work pertaining to developing the algorithms that translate satellite

data into weather products within the integrated data processing segment remains

to be completed. Table 6 describes each of the components of the ground segment

and identifies the status of each.

The NPOESS program office plans to continue to address risks facing IDPS development. Specifically, the IDPS team is working to reduce data processing delays by

seeking to limit the number of data calls, improve the efficiency of the data management system, increase the efficiency of the algorithms, and increase the number of

processors. The program office also developed a resource center consisting of a logical technical library, a data archive, and a set of analytical tools to coordinate, communicate, and facilitate the work of algorithm subject matter experts on algorithm

development and calibration/validation preparations. Managing the risks associated

with the development of the IDPS system is of particular importance because this

system will be needed to process NPP data.

Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce Program Risks

Because of the importance of effectively managing the NPOESS program to ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical weather and environmental

34

15GAO–07–498.

observations, in our accompanying report15 we made recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and to the Administrator of NASA to ensure that

the responsible executives within their respective organizations approve key acquisition documents, including the memorandum of agreement among the three agencies,

the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation master plan, and the acquisition strategy, as quickly as possible but no later than April 30, 2007. We also recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force to delay reassigning

the recently appointed Program Executive Officer until all sensors have been delivered to the NPOESS Preparatory Program; these deliveries are currently scheduled

to occur by July 2008. We also made two additional recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce to (1) develop and implement a written process for identifying

and addressing human capital needs and for streamlining how the program handles

the three different agencies’ administrative procedures and (2) establish a plan for

immediately filling needed positions.

In written comments, all three agencies agreed that it was important to finalize

key acquisition documents in a timely manner, and DOD proposed extending the

due dates for the documents to July 2, 2007. Because the NPOESS program office

intends to complete contract negotiations by July 4, 2007, we remain concerned that

any further delays in approving the documents could delay contract negotiations

and thus increase the risk to the program.

In addition, the Department of Commerce agreed with our recommendation to develop and implement a written process for identifying and addressing human capital

needs and to streamline how the program handles the three different agencies’ administrative procedures. The department also agreed with our recommendation to

plan to immediately fill open positions at the NPOESS program office. Commerce

noted that NOAA identified the skill sets needed for the program and has implemented an accelerated hiring model and schedule to fill all NOAA positions in the

NPOESS program. Commerce also noted that NOAA has made NPOESS hiring a

high priority and has documented a strategy—including milestones—to ensure that

all NOAA positions are filled by June 2007.

DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay reassigning the Program

Executive Officer, noting that the NPOESS System Program Director responsible for

executing the acquisition program would remain in place for 4 years. The Department of Commerce also noted that the Program Executive Officer position is

planned to rotate between the Air Force and NOAA. Commerce also stated that a

selection would be made before the departure of the current Program Executive Officer to provide an overlap period to allow for knowledge transfer and ensure continuity. However, over the last few years, we and others (including an independent

review team and the Commerce Inspector General) have reported that ineffective executive-level oversight helped foster the NPOESS program’s cost and schedule overruns. We remain concerned that reassigning the Program Executive at a time when

NPOESS is still facing critical cost, schedule, and technical challenges will place the

program at further risk.

In addition, while it is important that the System Program Director remain in

place to ensure continuity in executing the acquisition, this position does not ensure

continuity in the functions of the Program Executive Officer. The current Program

Executive Officer is experienced in providing oversight of the progress, issues, and

challenges facing NPOESS and coordinating with Executive Committee members as

well as the Defense acquisition authorities. Additionally, while the Program Executive Officer position is planned to rotate between agencies, the memorandum of

agreement documenting this arrangement is still in draft and should be flexible

enough to allow the current Program Executive Officer to remain until critical risks

have been addressed.

Further, while Commerce plans to allow a period of overlap between the selection

of a new Program Executive Officer and the departure of the current one, time is

running out. The current Program Executive Officer is expected to depart in early

July 2007, and as of early June 2007, a successor has not yet been named. NPOESS

is an extremely complex acquisition, involving three agencies, multiple contractors,

and advanced technologies. There is not sufficient time to transfer knowledge and

develop the sound professional working relationships that the new Program Executive Officer will need to succeed in that role. Thus, we remain convinced that given

NPOESS current challenges, reassigning the current Program Executive Officer at

this time would not be appropriate.

In summary, NPOESS restructuring is well under way, and the program has

made progress in establishing an effective management structure. However, key

steps remain in restructuring the acquisition, including completing important acquiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:15 Jul 23, 2008 Jkt 035707 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\E&E07\060707\35707 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
35

sition documents such as the system engineering plan, the acquisition program

baseline, and the memorandum of agreement documenting the three agencies’ roles

and responsibilities. Until these key documents are finalized, the program is unable

to finalize plans for restructuring the program. Additionally, the program office continues to have difficulty filling key positions and lacks a program-wide staffing process. Until the program establishes an effective and repeatable staffing process, it

will have difficulties in identifying and filling its staffing needs in a timely manner.

Having insufficient staff in key positions impedes the program office’s ability to conduct important management and oversight activities, including revising cost and

schedule estimates, monitoring progress, and managing technical risks. The program faces even further challenges if DOD proceeds with plans to reassign the Program Executive Officer this summer. Such a move would add unnecessary risk to

an already risky program.

In addition, the likelihood exists that there will be further cost increases and

schedule delays because of technical problems on key sensors and pending contract

negotiations. Major program segments—including the space and ground segments—

are making progress in their development and testing. However, two critical sensors

have experienced problems and are considered high risk, and risks remain in developing and implementing the ground-based data processing system. Given the tight

time frames for completing key sensors, integrating them, and getting the groundbased data processing systems developed, tested, and deployed, continued close oversight of milestones and risks is essential to minimize potential cost increases and

schedule delays.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any

questions that you or Members of the Committee may have at this time.

Other key contributors to this testimony include Colleen Phillips (Assistant Director), Carol Cha, and Teresa Smith.

BIOGRAPHY FOR DAVID A. POWNER

Experience

Twenty years’ experience in information technology issues in both public and private sectors.

Education

Business Administration, University of Denver

Senior Executive Fellows Program, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of

Government

Dave is Director of IT Management Issues at the U.S. Government Accountability

Office. He is currently responsible for a large segment of GAO’s information technology (IT) work, including systems development, IT investment management,

health IT, and cyber critical infrastructure protection reviews.

In the private sector, Dave has held several executive-level positions in the telecommunications industry, including overseeing IT and financial internal audits, and

software development associated with digital subscriber lines (DSL).

At GAO, Dave has led teams reviewing major IT modernization efforts at Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, the National Weather Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service. These reviews covered many

information technology areas including software development maturity, information

security, and enterprise architecture.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Powner, for your testimony

and for being here.

General Mashiko, you are recognized for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL SUSAN K. MASHIKO,

PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITES, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Chairman Lampson, Ranking Member Inglis, and Committee Members, thank you for this opportunity

to address you today.

I am responsible for a portfolio of a program that includes the

orbital operations of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

and the development of the NPOESS program. I report to the AdVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:15 Jul 23, 2008 Jkt 035707 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\E&E07\060707\35707 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
36

9 EXCOM: Executive Committee Members of the NPOESS Program.

ministrator of NASA, the Under Secretary of the Air Force, and the

Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you the status of the

NPOESS program and thank you for your continued interest and

support.

In response to the questions that you sent in your letter of invitation concerning the latest status of the program, the first question was when will the new program baseline be finalized, and

when will the contractor renegotiations be completed. A new program baseline is finalized. The integrated baseline review, our final

step, was completed last week, and the restructure proposal was

received from the contractor, and fact finding is, in fact, complete.

Negotiations should conclude with a contract in July.

Your second question was what is the current status of the key

NPOESS sensors, and when will the flight units be delivered for

incorporation on NPP. The two key sensors as mentioned by David

Powner, are, in fact, the Visible/Infrared Radiometer Suite, or

VIIRS, and the Cross-track Infrared Sounder, or CrIS. Let me address the VIIRS first.

I commissioned an independent review team to look at the sufficiency of the VIIRS design. The team came back—when they reported out—that said the design was basically sound and will

produce operational weather data to the expected levels. The flight

unit has recently completed the test readiness review, and we will

soon initiate acceptance testing leading to its delivery in the summer of 2008, for NPP.

With respect to the Cross-track Infrared Sounder, or CrIS, it experienced a structural failure in the final seconds of vibration testing in October. A Joint Failure Review Board has determined the

root cause of this failure, and a systemic exoneration of all components is ongoing. This thorough process has produced confidence in

the flight unit, and this unit will resume testing at the system level

upon receipt of a strengthened frame, supporting delivery in the

summer of 2008.

Your third question was what progress has been made on defining the microwave sensor that replaces the canceled CMIS instrument. A Request For Information, or RFI, was released to industry

late last year and based upon the data received from that data call,

a detailed specification is being developed that will meet or exceed

the threshold requirements for this instrument. A new microwave

sensor program will be reviewed by my replacement and the

EXCOM9 in September and, with the EXCOM’s concurrence, a request for proposal will be released in FY 2008.

Your final question was are the program and instrument contractors currently meeting the milestones set out in the fiscal year

2007 interim program plan. In short, yes. The contractors are doing

well in meeting their cost and schedule commitments for the fiscal

year 2007 interim program plan. Northrop Grumman Space Technology (NGST) is currently slightly ahead of plan, having completed 122 milestones, where only 120 were scheduled.

With respect to the GAO report, it should be noted that the GAO

staff has maintained a close vigilance of the NPOESS program and

37

attends my monthly program management reviews. Their understanding of the program was evident in their recent report, and we

completely agree that technical challenges and risks remain. And

we are gratified to see that the GAO notes that management

changes put in place over the last year are paying dividends. Management changes that we and the NPOESS prime contractor,

NGST, have undertaken are widespread and affect every aspect of

the execution of this complex satellite development. In fact, it is a

complete change of approach as we move ‘‘back to basics.’’ This is as the government assumes a far more active role in the

verification of all data and test results. This required significant

staff additions that have been strongly supported by all three agencies. They are looking for truly talented and experienced space people, and they are truly hard to come by. We currently have a few

vacancies in work but all necessary actions are progressing.

In conclusion, NPOESS is one of the most complex environmental satellite systems ever developed. The management changes

that the Government and our prime contractor have put in place

are making a difference. But please remember we are building

some truly complex instruments. We have structured a stringent

test program to uncover problems on the ground rather than in

orbit. We are structuring the program to respond rapidly to any

problems with sufficient margin to accommodate the difficulties

that will arise.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today.

[The prepared statement of Brigadier General Mashiko follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL SUSAN K. MASHIKO

Introduction

Chairmen Lampson and Miller, Ranking Members Inglis and Sensenbrenner, and

Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to provide an update of our

progress on the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System

(NPOESS) and to comment on the recommendations of the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report.

I am Brigadier General Susan K. Mashiko, Program Executive Officer for Environmental Satellites. I report to the Executive Committee of the NPOESS Program

which is comprised of the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, and the Under Secretary of the Air Force. I oversee the day-to-day operations

of the NPOESS Program and interface with other government agencies and departments and international partners. I am here today to give you an update on the program status and to address the recent GAO report.

Program Background

First let me review what NPOESS is for the new Committee Members. In 1994,

after a thorough review and serious consideration, President Clinton directed the

merger of the military and civilian operational polar satellite programs. This new

program, NPOESS, is responsible for developing the next generation of polar satellites and sensors. The program was designed as a series of six satellites and a

total of 10 environmental sensors, five of which represent significant advances over

current operational satellite technology. The new NPOESS sensors will provide

higher quality data than the current operational meteorological satellites leading to

more sophisticated environmental models for weather, climate and the oceans.

The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) is a joint mission involving the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the NPOESS Integrated Program Office (IPO). The NPP mission will collect and distribute remotely-sensed

land, ocean, and atmospheric data to the meteorological and global climate change

communities as the responsibility for these measurements transitions from NASA’s

existing Earth-observing missions (e.g., Aqua, Terra and Aura) to the NPOESS.

NPP also provides risk reduction by testing several new sensors in space, ensure

the ground control systems work properly, and allow us time to assimilate the new

38

data into computer weather models before launch of the first operational NPOESS

satellite. NPP will provide atmospheric and sea surface temperatures, humidity

sounding, land and ocean biological productivity, and cloud and aerosol properties.

NPOESS is being acquired using DOD acquisition authorities and is managed by

an Integrated Program Office (IPO). In 2002, Northrop Grumman was selected as

the NPOESS prime contractor for spacecraft development, ground systems, sensor

integration, and operations.

As many on this committee are aware, in December 2005, the IPO notified the

Air Force that projected cost overruns would exceed the 25 percent threshold triggering a breach of the Nunn-McCurdy statute. In June 2006, following the NunnMcCurdy certification and resulting restructure of the NPOESS program we are

moving forward with two fewer satellites, fewer sensors, less risk, cost increases,

but also with increases in our confidence levels for timely delivery of core weather

forecasting capabilities, accompanied by a significant reduction in its climate monitoring capabilities.

The GAO report properly notes that the NPOESS program has made progress

since the June 2006 Nunn-McCurdy certification and we completely agree that technical challenges and risk still remain. The three agencies involved in the NPOESS

development, the Department of Commerce (DOC), the Department of Defense

(DOD), and NASA continue to regularly monitor the development of the NPOESS

program. They commit their best talent and participate in the decision-making process through the NPOESS Executive Committee (EXCOM). The significant management changes and the reduced risk profile resulting from the Nunn-McCurdy certification and subsequent restructure have had major positive impacts on the program.

NPOESS still remains, however, the most complex environmental satellite system

ever developed.

Over the last eighteen months, the program has taken a disciplined acquisition

approach to the simultaneous execution of the development program and program

restructure. Through the creation of discrete, measurable, development milestones

the NPOESS IPO has fundamentally revamped their management style to one of

aggressive oversight of the contractor. This ‘‘back-to-basics’’ approach facilitated the

reorganization of both government and industry management teams while permitting risk reduction to move apace. Most metrics for cost and schedule goals have

been achieved for this period. As in all developmental programs, NPOESS has uncovered and addressed new challenges.

Program Status

The Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS) is intended to provide improved measurements of the temperature and moisture profiles in the atmosphere allowing forecasters to improve both global and regional predictions of weather patterns, storm

tracks, and precipitation. In October, 2006, CrIS experienced a challenge when a

structural component broke in the final moments of its vibration test. The failure

was fully analyzed by a Tri-Agency and industry team and corrective actions are

underway. This instrument has sufficient schedule margin to ensure that the projected 2009 launch of the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) and the first NPOESS

satellite in 2013 will not, at this time, be affected.

The Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) collects high resolution atmospheric imagery and generates a variety of applied products, including visible

and infrared imaging of hurricanes and detection of wildland fires, smoke, and atmospheric aerosols. The VIIRS instrument, which was one of the principal contributors to the Nunn-McCurdy breach, has completed extensive reviews by both a government team from the NPOESS program and an independent team of outside experts. Corrective actions for all identified VIIRS instrument problems are underway.

One major technical issue, optical cross talk, remains and we are pursing several

potential solutions. The VIIRS product most at risk at this point is ocean color, but

there are also concerns about the atmospheric aerosol products should the cross talk

problem not be resolved. This key instrument will continue to be the focus of intense

management attention for the foreseeable future.

The NPOESS IPO has issued a request for information for a Microwave Imager/

Sounder (MIS), a smaller, less complex sensor than the original Conical-scanning

Microwave Imager/Sounder (CMIS). The MIS is still intended to provide data for a

variety of products including sea surface winds. The MIS is scheduled to first fly

on the second NPOESS spacecraft and then on all subsequent missions. A final acquisition strategy decision is anticipated by September 2007, at which time cost and

schedule information will be available.

A number of sensors were de-manifested from NPOESS as a result of the NunnMcCurdy process, especially those oriented towards climate measurements. At the

initiative of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), NASA and NOAA

39

are working together to identify what might be required to provide flight opportunities for the de-manifested sensors—either on NPOESS platforms or some other

method—to assure continuity of key climate parameters such as Earth radiation

budget, solar irradiance, sea surface topography, ozone vertical profile, and aerosol

optical properties. OSTP will work with the agencies and the Office of Management

and Budget to determine if the required resources can be identified in the time

frame required to protect the climate data records.

The ground and data processing system continues to make excellent progress. The

NOAA Satellite Operations Facility is up and running and flying the heritage

NOAA and DOD satellites. The command and control software has been fully tested.

Early versions of the operational data processing system are being tested with real

data delivered from satellites currently in orbit.

The program restructure proposal, which culminates 10 months of intensive government and industry effort, details all aspects of the NPOESS program and has

been received from Northrop Grumman Space Technology. This proposal provides

detailed planning, scheduling and resource allocation for the next ten years. The

proposal is presently in the negotiation process and is on track for a late summer

2007 award. Concurrently, the government is conducting an Integrated Baseline Review (IBR), which will provide the government with additional confidence in the

Northrop Grumman scheduling and resource allocation process.

The Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) Limb instrument will measure the

vertical distribution of stratospheric ozone with high resolution; and it will complement observations from existing NPOESS sensors most notably the column and

low resolution profile measurements from the OMPS Nadir instrument. In response

to the climate science community, NOAA and NASA recently announced that the

OMPS–Limb will be re-manifested with the OMPS Nadir onto the NPP in time to

meet the scheduled 2009 launch date. NOAA and NASA have agreed to equally

share the cost of restoring the OMPS–Limb onto the NPP spacecraft. The OMPS–

Limb will measure the vertical distribution of ozone and it will complement observations from existing NPOESS sensors.

Government Accountability Office (GAO) Recommendations

I would like to commend the GAO staff for their collaborative approach to the

NPOESS audits. I appreciate their commitment to providing recommendations and

findings that will assist the NPOESS partners. While official comments have been

provided to GAO, I’d like to take the opportunity to provide a synopsis of our responses and the status of addressing the recommendations.

The GAO report emphasizes the need to expeditiously complete the documentation directed by the Acquisition Decision Memorandum for the NPOESS program.

The staffs of the three parent agencies have been fully consulted during the development of these documents. These Tri-Agency documents will be fully executed by late

summer. In the interim, administration of the NPOESS program and the contract

is not being adversely affected.

The GAO report also recommends that the Secretary of Defense delay the reassignment of the NPOESS PEO. While I cannot speak for the DOD, I can state that

the NPOESS PEO position has long been planned to rotate between the Air Force

and NOAA. As part of this planned rotation, the next NPOESS PEO will be a

NOAA employee. A selection is planned prior to my departure in summer 2007 and

is being timed to provide a transition period that will facilitate knowledge transfer

and ensure continuity.

The GAO report recommends that NOAA address the human capital needs for the

NPOESS program and that it immediately fill needed positions. NOAA has implemented an accelerated hiring model and corresponding schedule to fill all NOAA positions identified in the GAO report and all positions needed by the NPOESS program. All three agencies are working in concert and we have identified the positions

to be filled, the hiring strategy, and other program human capital needs. Regular

progress reporting on the status of filling these positions occurs, and the NPOESS

System Program Director reports at monthly meetings with the PEO. NOAA has established a complementary, documented strategy with milestones to ensure that all

needed positions are filled. We are working very closely with the NOAA Workforce

Management Office to ensure obstacles to the hiring process are identified and addressed immediately. The five additional NASA positions were identified as needed

following the Nunn-McCurdy certification have since been filled.

The NPOESS Tri-Agency partners are working very hard to ensure the actions

required to address these recommendations are implemented in a timely manner to

improve our ability to successfully manage the program.

40

Summary

In summary, the management changes that were established over the last year

have taken hold and are working at both the government and contractor program

management offices. The test program is identifying problems and that is just what

it is designed to do. We have added one of the de-manifested instruments onto the

NPP; this type of add-back, if continued onto the NPOESS platforms as envisioned

by the Nunn-McCurdy analysis. The NPOESS program will continue instrument development to meet the 2009 NPP launch and the 2013 launch of the first NPOESS

satellite.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today and I am prepared to answer your questions.

BIOGRAPHY FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL SUSAN K. MASHIKO

Brig. Gen. Susan K. Mashiko is Program Executive Officer for Environmental Satellites, which includes the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System Integrated Program Office in Silver Spring, Md. The NPOESS IPO is

a Presidentially-directed unit reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the Under Secretary of Commerce, and the Deputy

NASA Administrator. NPOESS provides a single national capability to provide global environmental data, meeting military and civil operational needs of the Department of Defense and Department of Commerce. The NPOESS program office develops, acquires and operates space and ground systems valued more than $7 billion.

This portfolio also includes the operations of the Defense Meteorological Satellite

Program, which provides environmental data to the joint warfighter.

General Mashiko was born in Glendale, Calif., and entered the Air Force as a

graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy where she earned a Bachelor’s degree in

aeronautical engineering. Her career has spanned a wide variety of space and acquisition assignments, including Chief of the Programs Division in the Office of Special

Projects, executive officer to the DOD Space Architect and Program Manager for the

Atlas V Program. She has also served as Director of the Evolved Expendable

Launch Vehicle System Program, Deputy Director of the NPOESS Program and

Vice Commander of Air Armament Center.

EDUCATION

1980—Bachelor of Science degree in aeronautical engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.

1982—Squadron Officer School, by correspondence

1986—Master of Science degree in electrical engineering, Air Force Institute of

Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

1993—Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

1998—Master of Science degree in national resource strategy, Industrial College of

the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

1998—Senior Acquisition Course, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J.

McNair, Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. June 1980–May 1984, Chief, Anti-Satellite Payload Avionics Branch, Directorate

of ASAT Systems, Headquarters Space Division, Los Angeles Air Force Station,

Calif.

2. May 1984–April 1986, graduate student, Air Force Institute of Technology,

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.

3. April 1986–March 1989, Chief, Systems Implementation Branch, Directorate of

Applied Technology, Office of Special Projects, Office of the Secretary of the Air

Force, Los Angeles AFB, Calif.

4. March 1989–August 1992, Chief, Programs Division, Directorate of Applied

Technology, Office of Special Projects, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force,

Los Angeles AFB, Calif.

5. August 1992–June 1993, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell

AFB, Ala.

6. June 1993–December 1994, special assistant, Space Policy and Plans, Directorate of Space Programs, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition,

Washington, D.C.

41

7. December 1994–January 1996, executive officer, Directorate of Space Programs,

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Washington, D.C.

8. January 1996–May 1996, executive officer, Department of Defense Space Architect, Washington, D.C.

9. May 1996–August 1997, policy and issues analyst, Secretary of the Air Force

Staff Group, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.

10. August 1997–June 1998, student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort

Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

11. July 1998–March 2000, Program Manager, Atlas V Program, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle System Program Office, Space and Missile Systems Center,

Los Angeles AFB, Calif.

12. March 2000–May 2002, Deputy Director, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle

System Program, Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles AFB, Calif.

13. May 2002–December 2003, Director, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle System Program, Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles AFB, Calif.

14. January 2004–February 2005, Chief, Director’s Special Action Staff, Office of

the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Washington, D.C.

15. February 2005–August 2005, Deputy Director, National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Systems Program, Air Force Element, Silver

Spring, Md.

16. August 2005–January 2006, Vice Commander, Air Armament Center, Eglin

AFB, Fla.

17. January 2006–present, Program Executive Officer for Environmental Satellites,

Silver Spring, Md.

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Legion of Merit

Defense Meritorious Service Medal

Meritorious Service Medal

Joint Service Commendation Medal

Air Force Commendation Medal

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

1998, John J. Welch Award for Excellence in Acquisition Management, Secretary of

the Air Force

1998, Strategic Acquisition Reform Award for Contracting Excellence, Secretary of

the Air Force

1999, David W. Packard Award for Acquisition Excellence, Department of Defense

2003, Unit of the Year (Director), Air Force Association

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant—May 28, 1980

First Lieutenant—May 28, 1982

Captain—May 28, 1984

Major—Oct. 1, 1991

Lieutenant Colonel—Nov. 1, 1996

Colonel—March 1, 2001

Brigadier General—Sept. 7, 2006

DISCUSSION

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you very much. We will now go into

the questioning, the first round of questions, and I will recognize

myself for five minutes.

RESTORING ORPHAN SENSORS

Dr. Marburger, as you note in your testimony we have restored

OMPS–Limb to the Preparatory Project. The Limb sensor is an imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:15 Jul 23, 2008 Jkt 035707 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\E&E07\060707\35707 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
42

portant component in monitoring the recovery of the ozone layer,

which may require collecting data out until 2050. Are we prepared

to put the full ozone sensor back aboard the satellites: according to

the information given to the Committee, removing them from the

program had a $57 million impact or affect?

Dr. MARBURGER. The short answer to that question, Congressman, is yes. We are committed. It is rated as an important sensor,

and that is the reason it was put back onto the NPOESS mission.

Chairman LAMPSON. Will be on. Okay. Your report recommends

doing so. It recommends flying a full OMPS sensor aboard the

NPOESS satellite in 2013.

General Mashiko, we have been told that the program office will

not accept any new instruments for that satellite. Is that true?

Brigadier General MASHIKO. The manifest for Charley 1 or the

first flight version of NPOESS is locked down. Clearly, I understand how to take direction, but the reason why we locked down

the configuration of the Charley 1 bird was to reduce the overall

risk to that particular vehicle. If you take a look at the satellite

that flies in the afternoon orbit versus the satellite that flies in the

early morning orbit, that is the most complex. It actually has eight

instruments on it, and as such it will be the most complex integration. And we are clearly biting off the most complex integration. In

order to assure operational data continuity, which is my driving

priority, I locked down that configuration. I briefed that, got

EXCOM concurrence, and I also got the Milestone Decision Authority, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and

Logistics, to concur with that recommendation of locking down that

configuration as soon as possible so that we could keep the configuration of that particular satellite as simple as possible.

Chairman LAMPSON. The United States has obligations under the

1987 Montreal Protocol on ozone, and the OMPS–Limb helps us

meet those obligations. We were assured that NPOESS was maintaining the ability to fly these orphan sensors if someone else built

them and delivered them. The lead time for doing so seemed to be

about two years before launch. We are six years away from

NPOESS. Can we or can we not do this?

Dr. MARBURGER. There may be confusion about which flights the

OMPS sensor is being restored to. My understanding is it would be

restored to the NPOESS Preparatory Project satellite, the NPP, not

the C1. It is a different satellite and which we do understand is

locked down. I just wanted to make sure we are talking about the

same satellite and that there is no conflict between my testimony

and General Mashiko’s.

Chairman LAMPSON. But is there not a desire to fly a full set of

sensors on C1?

Dr. MARBURGER. The idea is to minimize data disruption and

data gaps. We believe that it is appropriate to fly the OMPS–Limb

sensor on the NPP satellite, which will be launched in 2009. My

understanding is that that will address the problem that we foresaw with the data for that satellite and that the, that obviates the

need to fly it on C1.

If I am mistaken in that, I will be glad to stand corrected, be corrected.

Chairman LAMPSON. The idea——

43

Dr. MARBURGER. But that is my understanding.

Chairman LAMPSON.—from my understanding was to fly another

sensor on C1.

Did you want to make a comment, General Mashiko?

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Sir, I would like to make a comment. We do—will, in fact, have the OMPS–Nadir sensor on Charley 1, which will, in fact, provide the necessary data in order to

meet the Kyoto protocols.

Chairman LAMPSON. If we want to put OMPS 1 back on, can we

do it?

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Physically, it can be done, but it

will be done at added risk to the on-time launch of the first operational NPOESS satellite, and it is a risk-benefit equation.

Chairman LAMPSON. And obviously more cost, more time.

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Yes, sir.

Chairman LAMPSON. The second priority listed in the January report is the Earth Radiation Budget Sensor for it measures how

much of the sun’s radiation gets absorbed by the land. Well, let me

tell you. I am down to my time. Let me—I am going to stop and

ask that question in a minute, because I would like to get the

Ranking Member in with his first round of questions.

So, Mr. Inglis.

RISK OF COST OVERRUNS

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Powner, you said

that there is some concern about whether this can really be done

for $12.5 billion. Will you elaborate on that? What are the risk factors there?

Mr. POWNER. A couple key risk factors. One would be the technical risks associated with key sensors, in particular VIIRS.

Mr. INGLIS. Uh-huh.

Mr. POWNER. That is one reason why we might see increased

costs over time. We have a contract renegotiation coming up here

in July. There is indications that costs could be higher based on

that contract renegotiation, and we say that based on some preliminary estimates from the contractor that are higher than original

estimates, which when you combine all that, that pushes you over

the $12.5 billion threshold.

Mr. INGLIS. Dr. Marburger, General Mashiko, do you have any

comment on that about those risks? What do you think about that,

the chance of overruns from here?

Dr. MARBURGER. I am certainly not going to argue with GAO

about risks of cost overruns. These are expensive, high-risk

projects, and undoubtedly GAO’s assessment needs to be attended

to. Our concern here is that we move ahead with projects that are

essential for the Nation’s weather forecasting capabilities and for

the science missions, whether they are performed using the

NPOESS set of satellites or some other satellite approach.

Mr. INGLIS. Uh-huh. General Mashiko.

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Well, I do agree with the GAO with

respect to the risks. There is something that should give yourself

and the other Members of the Committee some feeling of confidence. There are some major cardinal changes that were, in fact,

made to the program as part of the restructure, so there are fewer

44

unknowns in the program—I guess—is the easiest way to look at

it. Colonel Dan Stockton, who is the System Program Director, and

his team laid out a program that took a six-month rolling wave— traditional way of operating a program, you only have detailed

planning for six months—and laid out detailed planning from the

start of the contract modification all the way to the conclusion of

the contract. So they know in detail everything that needs to be

done on the program between now and 2016. There is no task in

that program plan that is longer than 66 days, and they know it

with the assurity by having the right people laying out and reviewing those program plans.

So that should give the Committee some level of confidence that

while there is still risk associated with the program, it is certainly

better understood than it ever has been in the past.

AVOIDING COST OVERRUNS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS

Mr. INGLIS. You know, I guess we could point out that it is not

unusual for space acquisition programs to experience significant

cost growth. You know, we have had the Space-Based Infrared Satellite and NASA’s Webb telescope are a couple that were over. Is

there something that is systematically wrong or any explanation,

any thoughts about what the Government should be doing to control these costs, or is this just something you’ve got to expect with

the first-of-a-kind kind of programs?

Brigadier General MASHIKO. They are looking my direction. It is

not something that you should necessarily expect, but there are

certain ground rules that need to be adhered to that we used to do

in the old days of program management, and that is why we often

refer to going back to basics. It is truly understanding where you

stand with respect to technology maturation. You don’t hold your

design review too soon. When you put together your initial budgets

for a program, you put together the initial budgets from the perspective of an independent cost estimate rather than a purely program office estimate or an agency estimate. You bring somebody

else in to take a look at what you are doing and give you an independent assessment as to what you think it is going to cost.

And when you do the traditional things like that, the cost

growths, while they still occur, tend to be smaller, and they are not

quite as large, and you don’t end up in a Nunn-McCurdy certification situation as this program did in late 2005.

Mr. INGLIS. All right. Mr. Powner.

Mr. POWNER. If I can just comment, in terms of NPOESS, what

happened clearly with this, Ranking Member Inglis, is we greatly

underestimated the complexity with NPOESS. We tried to address

three agencies’ requirements. That is a difficult thing to do. Clearly, a lot of the climate requirements have lost recently. We are trying to restore those, and you know, when you have three agencies

involved, we try to put 13 sensors on a satellite, that is a lot. The

complexity here was huge. I mean, one of the things we did with

Nunn-McCurdy, the decision was to reduce the complexity, and you

know, there are winners and losers here, and you know, with some

of the losers we are trying to reinstate that now. But clearly underestimating the complexity and trying to do too much was a major

misstep with this program.

45

Mr. INGLIS. Dr. Marburger, any thoughts about how we can improve on this?

Dr. MARBURGER. Well, clearly, many of the climate sensors that

were de-manifested were added during the growth of the program,

and one of the reasons that we have asked for additional information from NOAA and NASA about alternatives other than

NPOESS—and not immediately rush to put these instruments back

on NPOESS—is that we, too, are concerned about the complexity

that they added to the project and the likelihood that putting them

back would just cause more trouble. So we are looking at a wider

range of possibilities than simply adding them back into NPOESS.

That is why the analysis takes a certain amount of time.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LAMPSON. I thank the Ranking Member.

We have been called for two votes. We don’t know exactly how

much time. It is probably about five or six minutes remaining for

the first one. A second vote will come shortly thereafter. Probably

be 15 to 20 minutes before we get back.

We will recess to go vote and ask your patience with us. Thank

you, and we are in recess.

[Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the Subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2:12 p.m., the same day.]

Chairman LAMPSON. The Subcommittee on Energy and Environment is reconvened, and we left off in the middle of our first round

of questions.

At this time I would recognize Ms. Biggert for five minutes.

DATA GAP CONCERNS

Ms. BIGGERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my first question

is for Dr. Marburger.

I am concerned about the gaps in data that we are currently collecting, and this data provides us with a historical content that is

very important as we try to understand the current changes in the

weather and the climate. Does the refigured program lead to any

gaps in the data?

Dr. MARBURGER. Well, the—as I understand it, the restructuring

occurred—Nunn-McCurdy occurred with the data continuity as one

of the high priorities for consideration. And that has also been the

highest priority that we have had in mind in considering what to

do with the sensor capabilities that were lost in the restructuring.

I think it is important to understand that while the sensors that

are under discussion in this hearing are very important, they actually represent a small fraction of our climate science and ocean

science research capabilities. There are many other ways of getting

at some of these data. So we have to consider it in the context of

the literally dozens of other Earth-observing satellites. There are

approximately 25 satellites up there that are collecting Earth

science data, nearly all of which are useful for climate science research and some for ocean research and some for solar research

and for monitoring the space weather.

So I think perhaps our focus on the instruments on NPOESS has

been somewhat misleading to the public who may not be aware of

this vast array of other Earth-observing capabilities.

46

So it is primarily because of this complex context of capabilities

that we have that we asked NOAA and NASA to perform these

analyses that they gave to us in their white paper and are continuing to analyze because we do have other opportunities.

Ms. BIGGERT. Is it more important, then, to ensure that we get

the sensors into space to avoid the gaps in the weather and climate

data that is currently being collected or the sensors that collect

new weather and climate data, since you say there are others.

Shouldn’t we wait until we find another way to test those new

ones?

Dr. MARBURGER. Well, I think clearly we want to prioritize these

and we want to make sure that the highest priority sensors for covering any potential data gaps are flying, either to be re-manifested

on subsequent NPOESS missions, the ones that are not yet shut

down, or on free-flying missions of their own. And we are committed to minimizing these data gaps to the extent possible, but it

has to be done in the context of all of these other capabilities that

we have.

But we undoubtedly will have to fly one of these sensors that has

been de-manifested one way or another, and how we go about doing

that is what is at issue here. We need to study that.

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION: DRAWBACKS

Ms. BIGGERT. Then, Mr. Powner, when this project was originally

started, it was a weather project, wasn’t it? I mean, did we have

the climate included in that?

Mr. POWNER. Well, weather was clearly the focus, but there was

climatological information to be provided from NPOESS early on.

Correct.

Ms. BIGGERT. Okay. Do you think that we might have proceeded

at a faster pace if we had had just one agency that was in charge

of this?

Mr. POWNER. Well, I think clearly if you look at the lessons

learned on NPOESS, I mean, you can go back to where there was,

you know, one of three, one of the agencies didn’t fully fund it. It

resulted in another agency decreasing funding. Yeah. Having a single agency program is far less complex, not only from some of the

administrative and executive level management issues, but in

terms of trying to meet everyone’s requirements. That is very difficult. And then when you start prioritizing, as an example, you

know, we had 55 environmental data records associated with

NPOESS, and we asked time and time again what are the priorities, and we were always told 55, all 55 were needed. But after

Nunn-McCurdy we go down to 39, and you even hear discussions

now that there are some that are more important than others. So

there still is a prioritization, but everyone wants everything when

you have three agencies involved, and it makes it very complex.

Ms. BIGGERT. Well, doesn’t every time they make a change or decide something, then three agencies having to go back and each of

them to make a decision and then come back and see if they

agreed. It seems that it is such a complex project that it would take

awhile.

And would that increase the costs then, too? I mean, was that

one of the things that made it so much more costly?

47

10Stan Schneider, ‘‘Non-Manifested Sensors and Planning for Next Generation,’’ Presentation

at the 2006 Polar Max Conference. October 25, 2006; Silver Spring, Maryland. See slide 18.

Accessed from http://www.ipo.noaa.gov/polarmax/2006/day03/4.4schneiderPolar-Max

SchneiderFinal.2006.ppt

Mr. POWNER. Well, yeah. Clearly if you look over time with the

increase in costs, this started as a $6 billion program, and you

know, now we are at 12.5, so it is doubled, and that was a contributing factor.

Ms. BIGGERT. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Ms. Biggert.

Mr. Baird, if you are not ready to ask a question, then I will give

myself five minutes.

MORE ON RESTORING ORPHAN SENSORS

Let me go back to what we had talked about toward the end of

my questioning a while ago. OMPS has two pieces; Nadir and

Limb. The Nadir piece is intended to go on NPOESS 1. My question was: if we wanted Limb to go back as well, and we would do,

and as I understand General Mashiko’s answer, we can, but it increases the risk, and that is correct.

Now, is that just the situation with the first satellite? If we ask

to put Limb on the other satellites, would there be lower risks or

higher risks in doing so?

Brigadier General MASHIKO. In a pure sense the risk equation—

clearly any time you add something to a satellite, you have added

risk—but what you have the virtue of in Charley 2, 3, 4, all the

subsequent vehicles, you have already built one. You have already

integrated the most complex, greatest number of sensors onto your

satellite. So you know what you are adding to. So while it increases

the risk, it is a smaller increase in risk when you add it to the subsequent units when you have already flight-demonstrated your first

bird.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you very much.

The second priority listed in the January report is the Earth Radiation Budget Sensor for it measures how much of the sun’s radiation gets absorbed by the land, by oceans, and by atmosphere.

Continuity in measuring this is considered so important that the

report wanted to take our last existing sensor and put it on Preparatory Project, put it on the Preparatory Project mission. Then

build ERPS for the NPOESS satellites. Yet according to a presentation at last year’s Polar Max conference, the team for this sensor

is disbanded—‘‘CERES team at NGST would have to be reconstituted.’’ 10 The cost impact of canceling ERBS was $73 million. We

are going to need this data I think, Dr. Marburger, if we are to understand climate change. NASA and NOAA recommend putting it

on the first NPOESS satellite. What do we do?

Dr. MARBURGER. What do we do with that instrument is one of

the questions that we have asked NASA and NOAA to give us

more information on so that we can determine whether it makes

sense to put it on one of the subsequent NPOESS satellites or on

a free-flier of its own. Because there are options, obviously, to get

this data from space missions other than NPOESS, and so the

question is one of assessing the impact of possible schedules

48

stretch—of increasing the risk of NPOESS versus the benefits associated with putting it on its own separate mission.

Those are the kinds of questions that take the experts to analyze

and the context of all of our other Earth-observing missions and

give us some advice, and we expect that decisions like that will be

made in time to inform the budget process so that the President

can ask Congress for the appropriate funds to resolve these questions.

Chairman LAMPSON. Why can we fly it on a free-flier if we took

it off NPOESS because it cost too much? Cost differential? Same,

more, less?

Dr. MARBURGER. We have already heard that the costs of

NPOESS has escalated. It was multiplied by a factor of two since

it originally was planned, and indeed, if additional cost increases,

or worse, the loss of capability for weather prediction for the military is a consequence of putting it on, then we would certainly consider alternatives at—even at significant costs.

So the cost-benefit equation here has some pretty big numbers in

it, and indeed it does make sense to consider free-flying missions

for some of these other Earth-observing satellites.

I want to emphasize again the very large number of missions

that we do fly for Earth observation. We have approximately 25 active Earth-observing satellite missions at the present time, and the

NPOESS sensors represent a small portion of our capability for

making these measurements. So the future of our Earth-observing

program that supports climate and ocean science, it really needs to

be considered in a much broader context than NPOESS.

Chairman LAMPSON. I understand that, but it just seems to me

that making some of these decisions to, for example, stop work on

one, cancel it, and then come back and put it, whether it is on a

free-flier or back in the same place, adds so much more money.

Why can’t we make better decisions the first time around?

Dr. MARBURGER. Well, I think we have heard that question answered before. These are big, high-risk projects, and the management of them is very difficult, especially when more than one agency is involved. We are talking about big numbers, and we are talking about major costs associated with delays and lack of access to

critical operational data. So in my view it is a part of the expense

of doing business in this very high-tech, high-risk game that we are

in.

Chairman LAMPSON. NPOESS has a history of taking really long

to make those decisions, and, in my opinion, not following the plan

that was put together in the first place, and perhaps if that plan

had been followed on some more of these, perhaps there may have

been some smaller amount of money spent. I will never, ever forget

the project that was canceled at Johnson Space Center that costs,

we made the decision to cancel that particular project, and it cost

$12 million more to mothball it than it would have cost to complete

it. And those are the kinds of decisions that I think we all ought

to be ashamed of and make an attempt to do a much better job.

My time is up, and I now recognize Mr. Inglis for five minutes.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

49

11GOES: Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite. 12 John Heilprin, ‘‘U.S. Cuts Back Climate Checks From Space,’’ The Associated Press, June

4, 2007; 6:59 P.M. EDT. Accessed at: http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2007/06/04/

ap378087.html (June 6, 2007).

MORE ON DATA GAPS

Dr. Marburger, if we could go to that redundancy question I

think you were just answering from the Chairman and also earlier

from Ms. Biggert. As soon as redundancy for weather observation

and for climate change, are there other units up there that are

gathering both types of information?

Dr. MARBURGER. Well, certainly weather information and climate

information are coupled, and some instruments are dual-purpose as

it were. In fact, even with the loss of the sensors in the restructured NPOESS program, there is still a significant climate change

and ocean research-related capability on NPOESS. I would say

about half of the climate-related science capability has been lost in

the restructured programs.

But in addition to the NPOESS instruments, both those that are

retained and restructured programs and those that were lost, there

are literally dozens of other instruments that we have in space,

and some on the ground, that are contributing data to the overall

climate science effort. And that is what I was referring to, that we

have a large number of satellites. We have the GOES11 program,

which is also weather, and it gives climate, but we have a number

of other sensors on other satellite programs.

And this is part of an integrated Earth-observation system that

the U.S. manages that a number of agencies participate in.

Mr. INGLIS. Sir, there is a recent article that said that, I quote,

‘‘Most of the climate instruments needed to collect more precise

data over long periods of time are being eliminated.’’ 12 Your response to that?

Dr. MARBURGER. I would say that that is a misleading statement.

First of all, it is misleading if it is taken to, applied to all climate

sensors that the U.S. has in space. That is totally incorrect. It is

only a small fraction of the climate science sensors that we fly in

our total climate science program.

With respect to the climate science capabilities of specifically the

NPOESS program, it is probably half right, but I would say that,

as I said in response to an earlier question, my impression is from

the briefings that I have had and from the reports that I have read

that about half of the climate science capability of NPOESS has

been lost in the restructuring.

Mr. INGLIS. Yeah. The Director of Climate Science Watch said in

that same article, was quoted in that same article as saying that,

‘‘We are going to start being blinded in our ability to observe the

planet.’’

Dr. MARBURGER. That is a grossly misleading statement. We will

by no means be blinded in our ability to observe the planet by the

decisions that were made in the restructuring of the NPOESS program.

Mr. INGLIS. And that is because of all the other sensors.

Dr. MARBURGER. Right.

50

Mr. INGLIS. Now, what if time goes on, and we don’t meet the

timelines from here for the launch of these, the new NPOESS satellites. Is there enough redundancy with the life expectancy of the

existing satellites to continue to collect data?

Dr. MARBURGER. It would be, it would represent a serious problem for NOAA and the Department of Defense if the NPOESS mission were stretched out indefinitely. I mean, this is, in fact, a very

important satellite program. It provides basic weather capabilities

for operational weather forecasting for the National Weather Service and for the military. So it is important for NPOESS to survive,

and that is one of the reasons that such drastic decisions were

made to remove these important science sensors so that the remaining sensors could be launched on time.

And it is also one of the reasons that we are being so careful

about making decisions to put things back, recommend to put

things back on. You don’t want to jeopardize those fundamental

operational missions. We need to have the ability to track hurricanes and make weather forecasts for a variety of purposes.

So this is a program that got in trouble. It is very important. Priorities had to be set, reconfigurations had to be designed, and we

are now facing the questions, the problem of what do we do next.

How do we maintain as much capability as we can for these important missions and not lose the essential capabilities that NPOESS

was designed for.

It doesn’t mean that we are diminishing the science or that we

don’t think that the science is important. Indeed, we do, and we are

committed to making our capabilities strong enough to continue to

provide leadership in science, in climate science, as we have been.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LAMPSON. Mr. Baird, you are recognized for five minutes.

IMPACT ON THE EARTH-OBSERVATION PROGRAM

Mr. BAIRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am interested in the

interface between the manned missions and the Earth-observatory

missions, and actually the President’s call for eventually trying to

get to Mars and how that may have impacted some of the Earthobservational missions in a variety of possible ways, which I will

put out but then ask for your comment.

You could imagine it impacts it budgetarily, you could imagine

that personnel are drawn from one mission to another, you can

imagine that the perceived priority for advancement status of people working on one project versus another drops as some new, more

glamorous or politically sexy thing comes in. What is—any insights

into that, how this manned effort may have possibly adversely, or

possibly complimentarily, impacted this; not just NPOESS but

other Earth-observation missions?

Dr. MARBURGER. Well, there is no question that NASA operates

in a pretty tight budget envelope, and in each request to Congress

for funding for NASA the President, Office of Management and

Budget, my office, and the agencies get together, we try to figure

out what is going to work. And I must say that it would be easier

to do the things that we ask NASA to do if Congress did, in fact,

51

fund the requests that were made by, as a result of this planning

project. It doesn’t always happen, and it didn’t happen this time.

For example, it would be a lot easier for the NASA Administrator

to make these tough decisions if he had—if his budget were funded

according to the plans that were developed during the budget process, which are embedded in the President’s request to Congress.

Congress did not fund NASA by half a billion dollars within the

targets that the President had requested.

So things like that make it difficult. So we always have to go

back and ask for impact statements and so forth to inform the next

round of budgeting. But I believe that the American people support

both space exploration and space science. They are exciting. The

space science is just as exciting as the exploration. We have got

these, it is not only photographs, but we have got really remarkable information about our universe that the American people and

people around the world are excited about. So we are committed to

both. This Administration has mapped out a space exploration vision that from the beginning was pitched as a step by step, not

a——

Mr. BAIRD. I am going to interrupt you, Dr. Marburger. I hate

to do that because——

Dr. MARBURGER. Sorry.

Mr. BAIRD.—I have a lot of respect for you, but if we recap the

Administration’s mission to Mars, we will not really get to the

question I asked, and it would be delightful to do the other more

fun, but the question I really asked was how does the very mission

you are talking about impact the Earth-observational programs

that we are, that are before us today.

Mr. Powner, would you care to comment on that or Dr.

Marburger or General Mashiko?

Dr. MARBURGER. Let me add first of all, the NPOESS mission

was funded through the Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce, not NASA. It certainly—NASA—some important space weather and Earth-observing missions are funded

through NASA but——

Mr. BAIRD. Yeah. When I said NPOESS, I meant——

Dr. MARBURGER.—I believe——

Mr. BAIRD.—the broader Earth-observational plan.

Dr. MARBURGER. Yeah. I believe that this is not primarily a

money problem. I believe the problem associated with NPOESS,

the program we are talking about today, is not primarily a money

problem. I believe it is a management problem.

Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Powner or General Mashiko, any comments on

that?

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Certainly. To provide some insight

at a purely tactical level, NASA has been very supportive of the

program to the extent that while we have ten dedicated personnel,

NASA-badged personnel working in my office or in Colonel Stockton’s integrated program office, I have an additional 90 people that

are supporting the program either full- or part-time out of NASA

Goddard or out of Headquarters, and those people are provided

based on being the subject-matter experts that we needed to work

on either sensors or specific types of problems. And those were

52

brought to bear by the chief engineer’s office as well as the center

director out at Goddard.

Mr. BAIRD. Was there any borrowing? In other words, were people moved from this mission or other related Earth-observational

missions to focus on the manned exploration side at any point?

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Sir, these people—the areas of expertise were primarily in the types of sensors that are flying on the

polar satellites as well as the GOES satellites. So it is that type

of background that we are exploiting.

Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Powner, any comments?

Mr. POWNER. We clearly did not look in terms of, you know,

where those folks came from to supplement Colonel Mashiko’s staff.

Mr. BAIRD. I think whether or not the particular issue on this

particular mission lead to a conclusion that the Moon/Mars exploration has impacted Earth observation in this particular case may

be ambiguous. I don’t think it is ambiguous. My read of the information is it is not ambiguous in a broader case of Earth observation. Would that be a fair statement? In other words, that there is

fairly—there is a fairly clear potential adverse impact of the increased focus on the manned mission to the Moon and Mars, and

we may choose to make that decision, but making that decision has

impacts in a finite world with $2 billion a week going to Iraq, a

$9 trillion budget deficit, a $450 billion operating deficit, et cetera,

et cetera. Is that a fair statement that we are making a decision

if we pursue these manned explorations to other planets to possibly

give shorter shrift to our Earth observational?

Dr. MARBURGER. We always have to have priorities, and if there

is limited funds, then you have to make priorities in each area, and

everybody suffers. I believe that both sides of the NASA house, the

exploration side and the science side, are operating under pretty

severe budget constraints at the present time.

Mr. BAIRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LAMPSON. You are welcome, Mr. Baird.

I will now recognize Ms. Biggert for five minutes.

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Ms. BIGGERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me go back.

Dr. Marburger, you suggested that it was not a money problem

but a management problem. Is that because of three agencies, or

is there a different problem?

Dr. MARBURGER. I believe that the management issues have been

outlined pretty well in the reports that you have available. The

GAO has followed this for a long time, and you know, the management of big, technically-advanced programs is always difficult. It is

hard to know where the technology will be by the time you are

ready to launch or in the cases I am more familiar with, building

particle accelerators. You really have to guess where the technology

will be when you are ready to install it. And I think there is a special kind of management that goes with technically-intensive

projects. This is the kind of management that General Mashiko is

an expert in, and she referred to some of the things that one does

in managing these types of programs.

So it isn’t just a question of paying attention and keeping the

books correctly. It is also a question of doing project management,

53

to take into account the technical risks that you know are going to

be there, and to have large contingencies and so forth that will prevent surprises.

Ms. BIGGERT. Well, as you know, as this progresses, do you think

then that there should be just one agency involved? And if so,

which one?

Dr. MARBURGER. Now we are getting into a matter of opinion

here about the management. When it comes to space projects, there

are two parts. One is the infrastructure associated with launching

and operating in space, and there is quite a substantial infrastructure that is somewhat independent of the instruments. The other

is the instrumental and scientific context. So very frequently you

will have an agency like the National Science Foundation or the

Department of Energy that has a project that needs to be launched

in space. They almost have to work with NASA in order to couple

the space expertise with the instrumental and science expertise.

So I believe that we will continue to see projects that are managed—that require multi-agency coordination, and we just have to

learn lessons about how to do that from NPOESS and from the

other projects, some of which have gone sour, too. We have to learn

how to do that, because we are going to be doing more and more

of it as time goes on.

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

Ms. BIGGERT. How would you then characterize the international

community’s interest in remote sensoring, and should we be looking at opportunities to engage them with us and, again, this would

be costs?

Dr. MARBURGER. We certainly should be, and one of the features

of the restructured NPOESS program is to take advantage of European weather satellites in two of the orbits that were de-manifested. So prior to restructuring, there were six satellites in three

different orbits associated with this program. After restructuring,

there were four satellites in two orbits, and the third orbit would

be provided by the Europeans, so that we are already taking into

account the possibility that other countries will have capabilities

that we can use. And we absolutely must be building those into our

plans, those capabilities into our plans.

Ms. BIGGERT. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Ms. Biggert.

Mr. Diaz-Balart, five minutes.

QUIKSCAT

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want

to talk a little bit about the QuikSCAT satellite. I was in the Hurricane Center just last week for obvious reasons, and I was able to

see firsthand—and which I had seen before, the actual passes of

the QuikSCAT satellite that provides some information that frankly, is extremely valuable to, you know, to figure out where the centers of the storms are, et cetera. And we all know that it was supposed to have a five-year lifespan. It is on its eighth year. It may

be on its way out. We don’t know. And what was supposed to reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:15 Jul 23, 2008 Jkt 035707 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\E&E07\060707\35707 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
54

place that was taken out of the ones that are supposed to come up

shortly, and now the replacement doesn’t go up to 2016.

Frankly, that is a little worrisome. Yes, they are looking at ways

to tap into other satellites, European satellites, but what I have

heard is that what that satellite provides is frankly something that

is not totally replaceable with what is out there right now.

And the question is why 2016, if we know that we have a satellite that is, you know, on its eighth year of what is supposed to

be a five-year lifespan. And after knowing that, you know, we are

in an elevated cycle of storms that about a 30-year cycle history

will show us, and we know the cost of those storms, I don’t quite

understand why that is not a higher priority.

Dr. MARBURGER. Mr. Congressman, the QuikSCAT information is

clearly important for tracking hurricanes. We understand the importance of that program and are watching it.

The problems that have been publicized associated with

QuikSCAT have not appeared in any priority documentation that

has reached me or my office. My understanding is that the satellite

continues to be very functional, all of its instruments are functioning, it has switched over to a back-up telemetry system, which

is functioning very well. I presume it is at least as robust as the

original telemetry system with which there was a problem, but it

is not, it has not been rated as requiring urgent attention at this

time. And as soon as an agency that has responsibility for this,

these types of measurements notifies us that it is an urgent priority, we will certainly pay attention to it. But it simply hasn’t

risen to that level of priority that we have seen fit to intervene on.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. If I may, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LAMPSON. Yes.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I bring this up because obviously if we were to lose that satellite, that capability, it

is about a 16 percent reduction in the actual forecasting, you know,

coverage.

Chairman LAMPSON. Right.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Or efficiency or whatever you want to call it.

Chairman LAMPSON. An important piece. Right.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Right. Right. Now, if you would be so kind, sir,

if you would have somebody look into that, because I do know, I’m

not the smartest guy in the world, but it seems to me that if it is

a five-year lifespan, and you are on the eighth year, and now we

are looking at until 2016, I don’t know how many years you can

milk out of something like this. But I would like somebody to get

back to me and tell me they have looked at that. If, in fact, there

is absolute confidence that it is going to be there, working well

until then, and if not, what are the alternatives. Because I just, I

am a little concerned as you can well know, you can imagine, the

hurricane season comes, and I represent South Florida and the

only hurricanes we like are the football team from the University

of Miami.

Dr. MARBURGER. Well, despite the fact that this hasn’t come up

in our discussions and briefings, when we heard about the concerns

we began to look at them. We will get back to you.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Great.

Dr. MARBURGER.With whatever we find.

55

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Great. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Diaz-Balart.

I yield myself five minutes.

GENERAL MASHIKO’S DEPARTURE

Dr. Marburger, your testimony about management just a minute

ago obviously referred to also what General Mashiko said earlier

about it is hard to find talented space people. But is that not exactly the reason why she ought to be considered to be kept as the

director, or as the person over this program, rather than changing

horses at this time?

Dr. MARBURGER. That is not my decision to make. That is the

Department of Defense’s decision. They have the responsibility for

managing this program, and they are one of the principle beneficiaries of the results from NPOESS, and I believe that—— Chairman LAMPSON. Would you agree with me that is something

that they certainly ought to consider?

Dr. MARBURGER. I have the highest respect for General

Mashiko’s talents, and I wish she were working for me.

Chairman LAMPSON. All right. Mr. Powner, would you comment,

and so would you, General Mashiko, would you, I don’t want to put

you on the spot, both of you. Start with Mr. Powner.

Mr. POWNER. Well, clearly that was one of the recommendations

in our report. You are at a point in this program where there is

still a lot of risks involved, VIIRS in particular. They need to be

aggressively managed. She does a very good job holding contractors

accountable, picking up the phone, talking to executives, with the

various contractors and subcontractors, getting them to the table.

We don’t believe now is the time to rotate someone like General

Mashiko. She does a very good job, and an important part of this

program is continuity of executive leadership. That has been a

problem leading up to the Nunn-McCurdy issue, and now you have

a key executive, and you are about to rotate her off. We don’t think

that is wise.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you. Now I will put you on the spot.

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Let me address it a couple ways, sir.

The upcoming period—because we are going to have the program

restructured and in place in the beginning of July, is going to be

primarily execution. Now that there is a—there will be a contract

in place, so it is going to be primarily execution; where you are

going to need the critical continuity is, in fact, at the program director level. The way you separate the area of responsibility, if you

will, the program director is the one that truly makes the contactor

execute on a day-to-day fashion. The program executive deals up

and out, and with respect to my job, which is up and out, clearly

sitting here and dealing with various other agencies, the Department of Commerce has the responsibility to replace me. They have

been using the standard OPM process in order to do that. They got

a reasonable number of candidates. They were screened. The candidates have, in fact, been interviewed, and as soon as we get the

EXCOM, all three members on the telephone to do the actual ratification of the selection, the name will go forward to OPM for approval.

56

13OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense.

And I have been informed that we do have a viable candidate for

my replacement, and so once that happens we will be more than

happy to let the Committee know who that is, in fact, going to be.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you very much.

PROGRAM STATUS

Is the NPOESS program as currently constituted on track to deliver four satellites in orbit to operate between the years 2013 and

2036—2026, excuse me—for an acquisition cost of $11.5 billion, and an additional $1 billion in operating costs?

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Sir, until the contract is negotiated,

all I can tell you is that is what the plans are. At the present time

we believe that the program will, in fact, meet the total acquisition

cost of $11.5 billion with the additional billion dollars for operations and support.

To give you additional confidence and to give myself additional

confidence, I asked the OSD13 cost group who did the original independent cost estimate that the Nunn-McCurdy was based on, I

asked them to do an independent cost estimate as to what operations and support will be in the future, and the allocation of those

dollars and which year should they be so that we can do the necessary flow of money to get everything correctly lined up.

So that is in work. That, in parallel with the negotiation of the

actual modification, will solidify what the final cost of the program

should be, and then we can then make any adjustments to the

budget. But any adjustments to the budget will be in the out years,

not the years of execution.

Chairman LAMPSON. Okay. You believe right now it is on track?

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Yes, sir.

Chairman LAMPSON. I hesitate to ask this. My time is—— Mr. POWNER. Mr. Chairman, can I just add something to that?

Chairman LAMPSON. Please.

Mr. POWNER. You know, that is fine that we are making that

statement, but I just want to be clear that GAO’s opinion on this,

there are still a lot of risks, and until that contract’s inked, you

know, I think we need to remain very cautious with that estimate

until that contract is solidified. And that is to be next month.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you. I know my time is up. Bear

with me for just a second, please, because this is a short question,

and maybe rhetorical.

The report from NASA and NOAA did not include financial data

that was necessary—that deal with a lot of this. Along the way has

anyone been fired or censored because of actions that they have

taken, or has any contract been terminated? Anybody, please.

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Sir, let me ask you what timeframe

do you mean, and then I will—— Chairman LAMPSON. At any time.

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Okay. Let me back all the way up

to August of 2005. At that point the system program director resigned. That was the government system program director. At the

contractor, the contractor program director was removed. Most of

his management staff was, in fact, changed at the contractor at the

57

Northrop Grumman level. If you go to Raytheon, Santa Barbara,

which was responsible for the VIIRS contract, we have done, over

time, almost two full management shifts and change-outs in order

to find the right management team to actually execute the program. As a result we have a vice-president out at Raytheon literally running the VIIRS program. He is a Navy nuke guy, so he

comes from a zero-defect kind of background, and that is the type

of management rigor that has been put in place out at Santa Barbara. The management team at Northrop Grumman—what we

have done there, in addition to doing the change of the program

manager—originally that program manager was a direct report to

the sector president, totally bypassing the functionals, if you will,

within the Northrop Grumman campus. We have changed that

such that NPOESS is not treated as a normal program, and the

functional vice presidents at Northrop Grumman are now fully engaged in the program, bringing that level of expertise and experience to the program as well.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you very much. Were you responsible

for most of that?

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Sir, myself and my team.

Chairman LAMPSON. I hate to see you go. Thank you for your

good service.

I yield five minutes to Mr. Inglis, the Ranking Member.

MORE ON GENERAL MASHIKO’S DEPARTURE

Mr. INGLIS. General Mashiko, based on your departure coming

up in a month, I think it is, is there going to be enough time for

you to bring the replacement up to speed, or is that a concern that

you have?

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Sir, in all honesty it is going to depend on who the individual actually selected is. And we will make

the necessary adjustments. The Air Force is prepared to allow me

to split my time in order to do a correct transition if it is somebody

who is being brought in from the outside.

Mr. INGLIS. Right. Because it does sound like, particularly based

on your last entry, the last question, that there is an awful lot of

information that you will be taking with you that needs to be imparted to your replacement. So I hope there is some flexibility on

how it is that you will be able to bring them up to speed.

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Yes, sir. There is a great deal of

flexibility with my new boss, and the other thing is, is the new job

that I am going to I will be spending considerable time in the

Washington, D.C. area, so that will also facilitate any additional

overlap that is required after my departure.

Mr. INGLIS. Nice to be so indispensable, isn’t it? That is a good

thing, you know.

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Yes, sir. Job security is a wonderful

thing.

Mr. INGLIS. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LAMPSON. Mr. Baird. Five minutes.

58

15 AAAS: American Association for the Advancement of Science.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Mr. BAIRD. The gentleman from Florida raised an interesting

issue that highlights a broader question which has to do with the

research operations process. So you set up, buy something for research purposes, you come back with some interesting data. How

then do you translate that instrumentation or the analogs that develop out of that or whatever data you get into actual usage, sustainable information feedback? And this research to operations gap.

Could anybody comment on that and what is being done to address

that? So we don’t just go out, find something interesting, and then

not actually apply it down the road. And sometimes you find something that is not applicable, but if you find something useful, what

are we doing to follow up on that?

Dr. MARBURGER. On the science side most of the data analyses

that lead to discoveries are published in the open literature, and

that is the medium of communication at the basic level that the

science community relies on to get these ideas out and have them

discussed in conferences. And there are usually teams of people

sometimes from multiple federal laboratories and universities that

manage these so that they appear at conferences.

Mr. BAIRD. I have read many of the special issues of Science from

these very things.

Dr. MARBURGER. You know how that works.

Mr. BAIRD. I am a long member of AAAS15 and subscribed—— Dr. MARBURGER. So the next steps are usually rather complicated and not terribly well defined. Most institutions, both federal labs and universities have technology transfer offices that are

alert for ideas that their scientists have that might be turned into

commercially-significant applications, and they work with the faculty and or with the scientists who protect the intellectual property.

Mr. BAIRD. Now, what about NASA and NOAA, that interface?

You know, you send up a research flight, find something interesting. Do you then incorporate that in terms of a long-term observational system or something stable that becomes part of your regular routine?

Dr. MARBURGER. When it comes to the instrumentation, absolutely. The discoveries that are made, for example, by a contractor

developing an advanced sensor are typically made available to

other projects. And I would say that some of the technology that

we find on our cell phones and our digital cameras came from early

work and early experience with NASA imaging requirements. And

particularly from military imagining requirements. So we have—— Mr. BAIRD. I appreciate, I know there are spin offs in the general. I am told that this is a recurring problem or perceives to be

a recurring problem, that we sort of do one slight thing but they

don’t necessarily translate into long term in the NASA–NOAA

interface.

Dr. MARBURGER. Well, I don’t think the NASA–NOAA interface

is unique. I believe that this problem exists with almost every scientific application, but the, you know, what makes the communications work is that the scientists and the engineers talk to each

59

other about whether there are stovepipes in agencies or not. The

good ideas do tend to get translated.

So my view is it is a complex press. There may be cases where

interagency communications aren’t ideal, but in this scientific community and the technical community, there is a great deal of interchange of ideas.

I would be glad to respond to it to more specific or detailed questions about this because it is an important issue that my office

watches. And we specifically are charged by Congress to do interagency coordination and sometimes it is not easy. So if problems

arise that you are aware of that you would like to have more feedback on or just—— Mr. BAIRD. I guess one example I could imagine, you know, you

build these things and so it is an interactive process. So you send

up a flight, gather some data. For sure then somebody else wants

to send their flight up, and they want to gather their data.

Dr. MARBURGER. Right.

Mr. BAIRD. But the question for me is to what extent do you— is there a prioritization that says, ‘‘Okay, we sent this up. We

learned this from this.’’ Now, maybe our next test flight is not— whoever happens to be next in the queue of putting something

from the first one we learned permanently because, lo and behold,

it was actually useful instead of having—okay. Shelve that. Publish

your special issue of Science magazine. We all read it, and—or

most people don’t, but then we go to the next, publish a special

issue of Science, and somewhere along the line that cumulative

benefit gets lost.

Dr. MARBURGER. In general that kind of intelligence that is

brought to the sequence of scientific explorations is provided by the

scientific community through the National Academies of Science,

and the decadal surveys and the special reports that are commissioned both by NOAA and by NASA are taken very seriously by

those agencies as they plan their projects and programs. And we

watch that process at OSTP. We force the agencies to come together and make strategic plans together that provide guidance for

all the agencies that might participate in these. And we frequently

ask the agencies to go to the National Academy or to their own external advisory panels of scientists to get advice on what to do next

and how to take advantage of that data that already exists.

Mr. BAIRD. Anyone else care to comment on that?

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Baird.

MORE ON DATA GAP CONCERNS

General Mashiko, GAO states that the cost analysts are about 90

percent confident that there will be—that they are 90 percent confident that there will be no weather coverage gap. What is the

basis for that confidence?

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Sir, when we went through the

Nunn-McCurdy process, that was the driving priority, and it was

the operational data continuity. What we did was in order to assure approximately a 90 percent operational data continuity, which

the GAO refers to, we had to pull risks out of the first NPOESS

bird in order to increase the likelihood of it being able to be

60

16 CMIS: Conical Microwave Imaging Sounder. 17DMSP: Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. 18POES: Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite.

launched on the date specified, which is why the CMIS16 sensor

was canceled and taken off of the first Charley bird and put on the

second Charley bird. Because that was going to be the critical path

for that, the first operational NPOESS, and we needed to get the

risk equation down such that we increased the likelihood that that

satellite would, in fact, be able to be delivered and launched when

it was going to be needed in the afternoon orbit. Because if you

take a look at the heritage satellites, which are DMSP17 in the

early morning and mid-morning in orbit and then POES18 in the

afternoon orbit, they actually run out of POES in the afternoon

orbit, and there would be an operational data gap such that we

wouldn’t be able to do standard weather forecasting that we have

all gotten used to on the Weather Channel, unless we were able to

get the NPOESS bird up there in the timeframe.

And that is what is generally referred to as the 90 percent schedule.

Chairman LAMPSON. Mr. Powner, could you comment also?

Mr. POWNER. Well, I think what this, what came out of NunnMcCurdy really highlights the importance of staying on schedule

now. I mean, we have pushed a lot of these birds, extending their

useful lives. I mean, fortunately, we have been able to push off

some of the launches of POES and DMSP, but it is important from

this point forward that we really do stick to the schedule going forward so that we may maintain that continuity.

And I think the General brings up a very important balancing

act here in terms of, you know, what we add to C1 and when we

lock that down to keep it simple so that we can hit that date.

Chairman LAMPSON. Okay. The GAO also paraphrases the cost

analyst as saying that they are highly confident acquisition costs

will not exceed $11.5 billion, but a lower level of confidence that

the sensor configuration will remain unchanged. The lower level of

configuration and the sensor configuration suggests to me that the

program is prepared to accept further changes that will decrease

the observational capabilities of this satellite system to maintain

this budget. Is that the case, first, General Mashiko? And then Mr.

Powner, would you comment?

Brigadier General MASHIKO. Sir, I believe what the cost analysts

are referring to—to put it very simply, normally I always have a

program schedule where I have a triangle on it that I don’t generally publish, and that is the day I shoot the engineers, because

literally you need to stop doing the changes, you button up what

you have got, and you go with it. Because you are better off getting

what you have on orbit and getting the utility of out it and then

making step wise changes or improvements on the next serial number.

And that is I believe what the cost analysts were referring to. It

is not a matter of taking sensors off. It is being able to make the

decision of go with what you have got, get it on orbit, and get the

end-to-end data chain up and operational. And then make stepwise improvements if necessary to subsequent serial numbers.

Chairman LAMPSON. Mr. Powner.

61

Mr. POWNER. That is a fine approach to mitigate risks. I think

the key question, though, going forward, and one example is NPP

with the preparatory satellites that is currently in place. You know,

it will fly. The game plan now is to fly it on schedule, but it is

going to fly in a degraded mode where there are certain environmental data records that will not be available.

In particular, the way we measure ocean color and aerosol measurement, and what does that mean to users so we can button down

and hit schedule and that type of thing, but there is an impact on

users, and that needs to be clearly articulated.

Chairman LAMPSON. Well, thank you. Thank all of you very, very

much. We appreciate your being here and for your testimony before

the Committee today and at other times.

The record will remain open for additional statements from the

Members and for answers to any follow-up questions the Committee may ask of the witnesses.

The witnesses are excused, and the hearing is now adjourned.

Thank you all.

[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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