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54–878 PDF 2009

HEARING AND BRIEFING ON: U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS

TO THE RESPONSE TO PAKISTAN’S HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: THE SITUATION AND THE

STAKES

HEARING AND BRIEFING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 16, 2009

Serial No. 111–39

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

GERRY E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

JACKIE SPEIER, California

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

——— ———

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois

RON STROMAN, Staff Director

MICHAEL MCCARTHY, Deputy Staff Director

CARLA HULTBERG, Chief Clerk

LARRY BRADY, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

WILLIAM MILES, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

HEARING

Hearing held on June 16, 2009 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Ahmed, Samina, South Asia project director for the International Crisis

Group; Sherry Rehman, former Federal minister for information and

broadcasting, and member, National Assembly, Pakistan People’s

Party; and Kenneth Bacon, president, Refugees International ................ 6

Ahmed, Samina ......................................................................................... 6

Bacon, Kenneth ......................................................................................... 34

Rehman, Sherry ................................................................................................ 14

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Ahmed, Samina, South Asia project director for the International Crisis

Group, prepared statement of ...................................................................... 8

Bacon, Kenneth, president, Refugees International, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 37

Rehman, Sherry, former Federal minister for information and broadcasting, and member, National Assembly, Pakistan People’s Party, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 18

Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts, prepared statement of ................................................... 3

BRIEFING

Briefing held on June 16, 2009 ............................................................................... 59

Statement of:

Gabaudan, Michel, Regional Representative to the United States and

Caribbean for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ....... 59

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Gabaudan, Michel, Regional Representative to the United States and

Caribbean for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 64

(1)

U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RESPONSE TO

PAKISTAN’S HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: THE

SITUATION AND THE STAKES

HEARING

TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN

AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:44 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Van Hollen, Welch, and Flake.

Staff present: Andy Wright, staff director; Elliot Gillerman, clerk;

Talia Dubovi and Scott Lindsay, counsels; Brendan Culley, Alex

McKnight, and Steven Gale, fellows; Adam Hodge, deputy press

secretary, full committee; Dan Blankenburg, minority director of

outreach and senior advisor; Tom Alexander, minority senior counsel; Dr. Christopher Bright, minority senior professional staff member; and Glenn Sanders, minority Defense fellow.

Mr. TIERNEY. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs hearing entitled, ‘‘U.S. Contributions to the Response to Pakistan’s Humanitarian Crisis: The

Situation and the Stakes,’’ will come to order.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and the ranking

member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open

for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee will

be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without

objection, so ordered.

We will proceed to the opening statements. Before I do, I want

to welcome our guests who are here, Mr. Bacon, of course, and our

guests who are coming quite a distance. And we really appreciate

it, for your help and for your patience.

I apologize for the fact—you know, Sherry Rehman, how legislators can be and how the votes come, and they take a while. So we

apologize to both you and Samina Ahmed for the period of time

that took us well beyond the 2 o’clock start period. Thank you for

your patience.

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I am going to waive most of my opening statement in deference

to the time that the witnesses have already spent and just say—

and set the table a little bit here for the fact that over the past

7 weeks, the Pakistani military has, of course, been involved in an

intensive offensive. The long and short of it has been, of course,

that a lot of people, because of the tactics used and the artillery,

the air strikes, have had a sizable effect on the civilian population

and led to the displacement of many, many people. The estimates

of how many vary, but I know Samina Ahmed’s estimate, I think,

was about 2.8 million. About 1.9 million have been registered and

verified, and there are a number of others who are there. Obviously

one of the issues is some are in camps, others in various other

types of establishments and homes where they are receiving hospitality from family members and friends.

This is obviously a situation for those who are still in the areas

where fighting rages, where curfews and land mines and other conflict issues leave those people frozen or not able to get out and

avoid being caught in the middle of what is happening there. There

are a number of NGO’s who are working to ensure that people have

food and shelter and adequate medical supplies, but obviously we

need more help and more people on that.

So this is a fundamental challenge. There’s a lot of work to be

done in the short term dealing with people’s needs, but also we

would like our witnesses to address what needs to be done in the

long term and who should be responsible for it and all of the aspects going forward.

This is obviously a dangerous opportunity for extremist groups to

get in and help people and try to win them over to their perspective, but it is also a chance for the Pakistani Government to step

in and organize a relief situation, win the trust of the people there

and a long-term relationship, and gather some support back from

the people in this area of Pakistan.

I want to stop at that point in time, and I will allow Mr. Flake

to make an opening statement if he wishes, and then we will just

go to our witnesses for testimony before we get back to the questions and answers. I know Members will want to ask some questions.

Thursday, both—all of you will want to know that we have Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Under Secretary of Defense Michele

Flournoy, who will be here discussing a number of related issues.

So the things that you say here today may well help us inform

some of the questioning that will go on in Thursday’s hearing as

well.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Flake.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of time,

I will just submit my statement for the record.

I want to thank the witnesses for their patience.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

Let me briefly introduce the witnesses we are going to have here

today. We are going to have this hearing, and then we are going

to proceed to a briefing—not a hearing, but a briefing—from the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, a second panel.

The testimony we are about to receive will be from Dr. Samina

Ahmed, who is the South Asia project director for the International

Crisis Group. There she oversees the ICG’s operation in Pakistan,

Afghanistan, India and Nepal. In that capacity she analyzes the political, social, economic and military factors that increase the risks

of extremism, internal conflict and war, and she makes policy recommendations to overcome those threats.

From 1999 to 2001, Dr. Ahmed served as a research fellow at

Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Prior to that,

from 1990 to 1997, she was a senior research analyst at the Institute of Regional Studies. Dr. Ahmed holds a Ph.D. from Australian

National University.

Ms. Sherry Rehman serves as a Member of Parliament in the

National Assembly of Pakistan from the Pakistan People’s Party.

From 2008 to 2009, she served as Federal Minister for Information

and Broadcasting. She currently serves as a member of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security.

Prior to joining the National Assembly, Ms. Rehman worked as

a journalist, most notably as editor of the Pakistan-based Herald

News Magazine. She is a long-time activist, advancing the cause of

better access to health and educational resources, particularly for

women and children from the lower-income sections of Pakistani

society.

Ms. Rehman holds degrees from Smith College and the University of Sussex.

Mr. Kenneth Bacon serves as president of Refugees International, a position he has held since 2001. From 1994 to 2001, Mr.

Bacon served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs,

where he was the Pentagon’s chief spokesman. Prior to that, he

worked as a reporter, editor and columnist for the Wall Street

Journal’s Washington bureau. Mr. Bacon holds a B.A. from Amherst College, as well as an M.B.A. and an M.A. from Columbia

University.

So again, I want to thank all of you for sharing your expertise

and your insight, and I want to thank Ambassador Patterson and

her staff at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad for their assistance in

facilitating this hearing. We greatly appreciate the help there.

It is the policy of the subcommittee to swear witnesses in before

you testify, so I ask you please to stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. The record will reflect that the witnesses answered

in the affirmative.

I assume that your phone has been taken off of mute. Samina

and Sherry; is that correct?

Ms. REHMAN. That’s right.

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Mr. TIERNEY. Great. Thank you.

Dr. Ahmed, would you be kind enough to start with an opening

statement?

STATEMENTS OF SAMINA AHMED, SOUTH ASIA PROJECT DIRECTOR FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP; SHERRY

REHMAN, FORMER FEDERAL MINISTER FOR INFORMATION

AND BROADCASTING, AND MEMBER, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY,

PAKISTAN PEOPLE’S PARTY; AND KENNETH BACON, PRESIDENT, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL

STATEMENT OF SAMINA AHMED

Dr. AHMED. Thank you very much, Chairman Tierney, and thank

you very much for holding this important meeting on a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions in Pakistan. You have laid out

quite clearly the dimensions of the problem and the reasons for it.

Let me just say this, that we in the crisis group have been greatly concerned not just about the peace deal that led to this particular crisis in the Malakand District of the Northwest Frontier Province, because clearly it was again a peace deal that allowed the

Taliban to expand their control. And once there was popular discontent and, of course, U.S. pressure, the military took action, but

that action, as you point out, was hasty, it was ill-thought-out and

has led to this massive exodus of people.

We are as concerned as you, sir, about the threat that is posed

by the jihadi extremists in this area with their links to al Qaeda

and the potential that they could exploit this crisis to gain access

to more recruits to try to win hearts and minds. That is why it is

so important that relief, reconstruction, and rehabilitation must

take place in a way that meets the needs and empowers the communities.

Let me say this, sir, that these are people who have fled a brutal

Taliban rule for practical purposes. They want to see an end to the

militancy, the presence of militants in their areas. They want to

lead normal lives. They want to go back home.

The United States and its assistance has been greatly welcomed

in Pakistan, but there is much more that can be done. It’s important for the United States to understand that this is not just, and

as it should be, a humanitarian operation and meeting humanitarian needs, but it also serves U.S. international security efforts.

If we see the jihadis, as we are already witnessing on the ground,

taking advantage of this situation, then we have a problem on our

hands. We will see the militants making a comeback. We will see

them expanding their control once again.

So it’s equally important for us and for the Government of Pakistan to understand the importance of not allowing band organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba’s latest reincarnation, the

Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation, from operating in these regions. It is

equally important for the Government of Pakistan to understand

that for any effective rehabilitation and reconstruction, there will

be a need for civilian law enforcement and the civilian intelligence

agencies that can best bring these militants to justice.

A reformed judiciary is essential, as are long overdue political reforms in Malakand Division and in FATA. These IDPs are not only

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from—let me stress that—from Malakand Division. The 2.8 million

or so are from Malakand, but there are 500,000 IDPs from FATA

as well. Here is an opportunity for the United States and the Pakistan Government to win hearts and minds, but to do so it will be

absolutely essential that the assistance that’s given is urgently provided, it is appropriate, it supports a civilian-led process, and it

prioritizes the needs of noncamp IDPs, since a vast majority, more

than 85 percent of these IDPs, are, in fact, living outside of government-run camps. They are living in communities that are hosting

them, among communities that are hosting them in shelters, in

schools.

It is important that we think outside the box on how this assistance should be provided, as in our report. International Crisis

Group issued a report on this, on June 3rd, that said, look, think

about cash-based assistance. For income, for education, for health,

for vocational training, it pays dividends.

Documentation is possible. There is less chance of pilferage and

wastage, and it would put a humane face by empowering the communities concerned.

It’s important that the United States also encourage the civilian

government’s desire to enact political and constitutional reform not

just in Malakand Division, but also in FATA.

Finally, and let me end with this, sir, it is equally important that

the United States warns the Pakistani military from entering into

yet another appeasement deal, such as the deal that it signed with

the Taliban and their supporters in Swat, that have led to this crisis, and that will only, not only undermine the security of the Pakistani state and its citizens, but also gravely harm U.S. national security interests.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Doctor. We appreciate that, and the report that you did on June 3rd, that was extremely helpful as well.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Ahmed follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Rehman, we will be happy to hear your testimony.

STATEMENT OF SHERRY REHMAN

Ms. REHMAN. Thank you, Chairman Tierney and members of the

subcommittee, for taking notice of the magnitude and scale of this

humanitarian crisis that Pakistan is facing today. It is certainly

the largest transfer of refugees and human—people, rather, from

one place to another in the history of this region. Pakistan has not

encountered anything like this since the migration of refugees from

undivided India in 1947.

So clearly a response to the IDPs’ challenge is of concern to you,

is more of concern to Pakistanis as well, because this challenge has

become, as I said earlier, a critical test of our response and our

ability, the Pakistan Government’s ability, to maintain public resolve and a sustained campaign against militancy and terrorism in

the name of religion.

Now, the principal challenge, Mr. Chairman, for the Pakistan

Government today is twofold: to provide urgent relief for the frontier provinces’ displaced millions, and also, obviously, to obtain

public support for our military operation with high human costs.

These two projects are inextricably linked, as noted here. Any serious lapses in coordinated relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction

efforts, which will come later, will create and will endanger the

fragile public coalition and consensus needed for powering the morale so vital for a sustained military operation and its successes.

Now, the stakes for us couldn’t be higher, Mr. Chairman. Pakistan is at a critical juncture today. Our government has been able

to use the public recoil generated by Taliban excesses in the fallout

of a flawed peace deal between the Malakand militants and the

provincial government to its advantage. Before this specific episode,

let me say that public opinion on militancy was divided down the

line, and it was muddied by religious symbolism as well as partisan

public opinion.

Even today, as we speak, many religious parties and other leaders have little hesitation—these are non-mainstream, but they are

very much in the public discourse—have little hesitation in condemning the campaign against terrorism as an American-sponsored

strategy with little gain for Pakistan. And they do conflate the suffering of the IDPs with the failure of the state to reach a consensus

through dialog with the militants.

And, as mentioned already, the peace deals that have resulted in

the Taliban regrouping, jihadist forces gathering space and momentum, have been fundamentally flawed, certainly in the Pakistan experience, and have almost always generated this kind of jihadist

counterbalance to the state’s writ.

Now, for us this is as much a project of reclaiming lost territory,

reinstalling the Pakistan flag, but also expanding the writ of constitutional rule, guaranteeing fundamental entitlements which

were seriously endangered under the Taliban rule, empowering

state institutions to function in a sovereign, democratic plurality.

Now, I have to state here at this point that time is as much an

enemy to this project as terrorism. Why I say this is because the

displacement of nearly 3 million people over a period of 3 weeks

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has caused a huge overstretch on government capacity on multiple

fronts. In fact, the figure I have today from government, which includes the earlier tribal area refugees referred to from Bajur, numbers to a staggering 3.9 million. Now, this is unprecedented in the

history of the region, and I would think, probably, the world.

The equation is, again, very compelling and simple. If the trauma

of internal migration, subhuman camp conditions, of curfews, casualties and lost family members is not mitigated and relieved soon,

we will see human anguish beginning to drain public resolve for

the military operation, which, I stated, is very essential for reclaiming the writ of Pakistan in many areas. So the longer this humanitarian crisis goes on, a space for the larger existential battle

against terrorism shrinks, and public confidence in government

also, obviously, goes down.

These camps remain hotbeds and sanctuaries for recruiting a

larger mindset toward terrorism, and we have to guard against

our—the states, right now, are overstretched and provide as much

assistance, both from civilian support and international assistance,

in terms of immediate relief and food security operations.

A concern that is emerging now is that as the theater of operations expands toward the tribal areas, which it has already, the

pressure of another wave of refugees may trigger a fresh crisis.

And a main issue of concern is that once terrorists are flushed out,

they will be able to or may be able to escape through routes via

the Iran border, especially by Waziristan. And this prospect of a return and regroup of Malakand, once they find sanctuary, perhaps

in Afghanistan, will reverse all gains made at such high human

costs.

So this is something to think about, and we feel that the United

States can and should intervene and perhaps in the Kabul—perhaps with Kabul in the Trilateral Commission to start maximizing

opportunities for border interdiction at this point, because there is

very little symmetry in terms of the effort Pakistan is putting in

on the border and the other side, especially from, obviously, Kabul.

Now, the other thing that is of concern is the sense that the

international community has been slow to respond to the crisis.

Only a small amount of $430 million pledged has actually been

translated into goods and relief. And I cannot help but reiterate the

magnitude of the crisis and the ability of government to cope at

such notice and with overstretched abilities.

The U.N. also has warned that its appeal of $543 million in

emergency aid is still unmet. And if by July, I would say in a week

or so, the deficit in international commitments continues at 80 percent, which it is right now, food supplies to the camps will be severely compromised. And, of course, this will be—represent a fresh

humanitarian disaster. Oxfam has testified to this, and so has the

World Food Programme.

The Government of Pakistan has allocated 50 billion rupees in

the budget for RRR efforts, but I feel these will be diverted to food

provisions and urgent supplies in terms of relief, again taking away

from the cash grants so badly needed for refugees and the space

needed for reconstruction and rehabilitation.

The international community can certainly provide the resources

for the Pakistan State to emerge as a major welfare agent—and obVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:50 Apr 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\54878.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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viously we are in a moment of opportunity here—to put jihadist

groups that have been using welfare activities as a cover to funnel—to carry on their aid activities, to carry on their proselytizing,

as well as other activities. And we must, obviously, use this opportunity in partnership with the United States and other members

of the international community.

But I must state here that there is a concern again on the

ground that while all governments in Pakistan have shown a

below-average ability and capacity to execute budget allocations,

there is no comparison to the aid reflux of U.S. money when it is

re-routed back through intermediaries and earmarked contractors.

Basically the sense here is that we are getting something like 40

to 50 cents to each dollar of aid money that comes through earmarked contractors, and that is something that we need to look at.

I won’t overlap with what already has been said. Clearly a largescale reform in FATA in the PATA areas, which is Malakand Division, is also the order of the day. Reconstruction of infrastructure

is a critical concern. I am told that gas, water and pipelines are

being re-laid very urgently. But, again, we must be very careful to

ensure the security of the returning refugees, returnees. When they

go back to their homes, there is an urgency, obviously, to return,

because life in camps is debilitating.

We must also look toward guaranteeing their security once they

return by insisting and working on and harnessing the capacity at

least to return back to Malakand Division, because they had initially fled. And these civilian forces, as well as Frontier Corps, levees, should form the bulwark of any future security arrangements

that are put in place for government oversight and civilian security

to the area.

One, again, area of concern that is being stated is that there is

little sense again of how much—what the cost Pakistan has incurred in terms of this ongoing battle. The budget recently announced $35 billion incurred by Pakistan. And, as you know, Pakistan’s society and urban centers most especially have been transferred—transformed, rather, into battle zones, particularly after

the operation was launched. Peshawar itself, the capital of the

Frontier Province, has witnessed 18 bomb blasts since this operation began.

So we are really concerned about enhancements of security capacity and state abilities now to carry on with what will clearly be

a long-term sustained venture. I think there has to be attention

paid to giving serious, not just inputs, but aid inflows not just to

the refugees, because that is a clear and present crisis, but also to

the next step before we send refugees back to an unprotected environment. This is essential for us to look at.

And, last, I would like to say again, to avoid overlap, there is a

great deal of concern that we are paying, as I said, a high human

cost in this battle. And if there is a troop surge in Afghanistan by

the U.S. forces, which we know is imminent, then how are we going

to protect against pressure of the Taliban coming in from Afghanistan again?

Once again, I would stress that the border must be fortified if we

are also to guard against sanctuaries on both sides of the border,

and this will address mutual concerns for both countries using each

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other to launch attacks, to allow attacks to be launched. And this

is certainly something we don’t want to countenance in Pakistan.

And we are hoping that the United States will be able to use its

good offices and leverage in the Trilateral Commission to ensure

that there is not a return of a regrouped Taliban back into our

areas.

We are looking, obviously, in the short run and medium term, to

enhance the Pakistan Government’s capacity to deliver on the basic

obligations of governance, justice and social service delivery—those

are diminished as we speak because of overstress—but on security

fundamentals as well.

Finally, I would like to say that we must enable our compact to

renew a strong state-citizen relationship that allows the government and civilian capacity more influence over the regions that

have earlier been exploited by non-state actors because of the existing constitutional and political gaps, which we feel must be filled.

I would be happy to answer questions as we proceed. I think a

lot more needs to be said, but, once again, thank you for providing

this opportunity for us to give our inputs.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much for your comments. Of

course, your written remarks and articles that you have written

have also been shared with the committee, and we will have some

questions for you after Mr. Bacon’s testimony.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rehman follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Bacon, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH BACON

Mr. BACON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this timely and

important hearing.

The Obama administration has made clear that Pakistan is one

of America’s most important strategic partners, and now that partner is afflicted by one of the world’s most rapidly growing humanitarian emergencies. Refugees International, an independent advocacy agency, has been surveying displacement in Pakistan for more

than a decade.

Pakistan generously hosted millions of Afghan refugees during

the Soviet occupation. This crisis is different because it involves the

displacement of Pakistanis, and because it has arisen so quickly.

Sadly, the current humanitarian challenges are likely to get worse

before they get better. The Government of Pakistan is expanding

its current campaign against the Taliban into South Waziristan,

which could trigger additional displacement, and the monsoon

rains are about to begin, complicating the provision of supplies and

raising new health and sanitation challenges, such as cholera.

A Refugees International team recently returned from Pakistan,

where it surveyed internal displacement. It found that, one, needs

are enormous, as most have fled without anything and sought shelter in camps or with relatives.

Two, the U.N. and aid agencies are struggling to respond to the

most pressing needs, but funding has been scarce. Furthermore,

the funding that has been pledged has not been distributed expeditiously to meet the needs that have arisen, nor in the most effective

way.

Three, relief efforts have so far been focused on camps, whereas

the vast majority of the displaced, over 80 percent, are staying with

host families, who are quickly running out of resources. One aid organization has reported that pockets of starvation and trauma

amongst the population remains a protection priority. Women and

girls are particularly vulnerable.

Four, changes in the way the United Nations and the Pakistani

military are operating could reduce displacement and improve humanitarian response.

Five, all parties, the United States, the U.N. and the Government of Pakistan, must prepare for further displacement.

And, six, it is premature to expect internal refugees to go home.

An independent team should assess the sustainability of returns.

To respond to this humanitarian emergency, the U.N. issued at

the end of May a $543 million humanitarian appeal. This latest appeal includes emergency relief projects by all U.N. agencies and a

number of international NGO’s, and calls on donors to respond generously and immediately to one of the largest displacement crises

in the world.

Despite the urgency of the situation and the strategic importance

of the region, the response has been insufficient, and the appeal remains severely underfunded with only 26 percent of it pledged to

date. The appeal for food is less than 50 percent funded. The protection cluster of the appeal is only 1 percent funded.

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To date, the United States has been by far the most generous

donor with $164 million during this fiscal year. A further $200 million request was submitted by the Obama administration to Congress for emergency funding to aid organizations, as well as to

meet traditional levels of the U.S. funding to the U.N. refugee

agency and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red

Crescent Societies.

It is encouraging that the conference report for the pending

emergency supplemental has the House and Senate agreeing to an

emergency appropriation of $225 million. Equally important, the

funding should be directed toward the International Disaster Assistance Account to assure that it is distributed efficiently to meet

the needs of internally displaced people.

I hope that Congress will quickly approve this request. The humanitarian community in Pakistan has praised the U.S. Office of

Foreign Disaster Assistance for deploying an emergency team in

the field and for responding quickly to funding requests from

NGO’s. It is crucial that Congress support these efforts and approve the supplemental request so that it can be quickly distributed.

Despite having a donor coordination group, other donors have

been noticeably absent until now or have shown limited generosity.

The European Commission’s Humanitarian Office just announced a

22 billion euro contribution, while the U.K. so far has provided 22

million pounds. But much more needs to be done if the international community wants to respond effectively to humanitarian

needs.

Today Her Majesty Queen Noor Al Hussein, a member of the

Refugees International Board of Directors, and I are sending letters

to the Office of the Islamic Conference and to foreign ministers,

Ambassadors of Arabic countries urging their generous support of

the humanitarian appeals. I have attached a copy of that letter for

the record.

The lack of sufficient assistance to the displaced is already having serious consequences. According to the UNHCR, most of the

new arrivals in the camps were previously staying with host families. They can no longer afford to do so and are, therefore, resorting

to putting up with heat—the temperature rises to about 110 degrees Fahrenheit during the day—and poor living conditions in the

camp.

The government started to distribute about 55,000 Pakistani rupees, roughly the equivalent of $300, to each IDP family, but now

it is backtracking, saying it might only distribute the sum of money

to half of those registered, as it is unclear where we will be able

to get funds. This is both a humanitarian and a security challenge.

In a development that Refugees International has witnessed elsewhere, and which my fellow witnesses have commented on, the

vacuum in assistance is being filled by politically motivated actors

to gain popular support and allegiance. According to international

and national aid agencies, political parties active in Pakistan have

set up shop in the camps and amongst host communities and provide various services from distributing fans to providing mobile

phone cards to the displaced.

36

The majority of international aid organizations and U.N. agencies work through local partners because of their expertise and

their ability to access remote areas. Many Pakistani organizations

also obtain their funding from foundations and donations in parallel to the U.N. cluster system. Local organizations are a critical

part of the overall relief effort because they have in-depth knowledge of the environment and sustained programs over an extended

period of time. From a financial perspective, they are also much

more cost-efficient than international NGO’s as their overheads are

much lower.

Once more, using local organizations helps to build local capacity

and strengthens Pakistan’s humanitarian infrastructure. I hope

that the United States will work with the U.N. to encourage greater participation and greater funding by local NGO’s.

In conclusion, while the displacement crisis in Pakistan is nearly

a year old, its magnitude, the scope of the needs and its political

implications of this crisis have not been fully grasped in foreign

capitals. The international response has been far too slow. The ongoing humanitarian operation is only the start of what will have

to be a prolonged and massive aid effort. Displaced families need

immediate relief and in time will require renewed confidence and

support to return home in safety and dignity.

The Obama administration has repeatedly stated the

geostrategic importance of the region, and it is seizing this opportunity to show concern and leadership. It is not merely a question

of funding, though the humanitarian assistance and reconstruction

efforts will need robust financial commitments. The United States

has clear national objectives in Pakistan, and these can be advanced by showing concern for the fate of civilians and for helping

Pakistanis to meet their needs and to build a more peaceful, prosperous future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Bacon.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bacon follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. We are going to go into a period of questioning

here. We generally do 5 minutes for each Member and then circle

through again. There is almost more material here than we can

cover in one hearing, but we will do the best we can.

In the International Crisis Group report that Dr. Ahmed prepared, there are comments there about the relief organs, the state

relief organs, being overly centrally localized, and an indication

that the military continues to dominate key institutions, and that

undermines the civilian capacity.

The question I would have is does the civilian government in

Pakistan have the actual capacity to take charge of this relief prospect both in the short term and in the long term, planning for a

return, and is there a willingness to try to assign to the military

a different role than that of running the relief program and instead

take that over on the civilian side? Either of our witnesses in Pakistan might want to address that in any order.

Dr. AHMED. One of the problems lies in the fact that the civilian

institutions have, as a result of almost a decade of military rule,

certainly lost some of the capacity that they originally had. This is

not to say that the bureaucracy, the civil bureaucracy, and the civilian government lacks the capacity to plan, lacks the line ministries of the civilian government, lacked the capacity to implement, and certainly—and it’s very important right now for us to

understand—you need a civilian face even more so because of the

history of this conflict and how it has unraveled.

To have the military run the show in terms of relief or plan

ahead, as it seems to indicate right now, on taking charge of reconstruction is to talk about not just a centralized approach, but to an

institution that has very little knowledge of and a very poor record

of working with civilians and with civilian institutions, this undermines that entire process of ensuring that communities are empowered and that they are part of the process.

As my fellow witness said, local NGO’s exist. They have the capacity. Local governments exist. They have the capacity. Elected

governments exist, and let’s hope that we can build that capacity

as opposed to falling back on strengthening the military’s civilian

roles, which serves neither the purposes of that institution nor the

interests of the IDPs.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Ms. Rehman, let me ask you this: Do you agree with Dr. Ahmed’s

assessment? If you do, what is the Pakistani Government, Parliament and the Prime Minister, doing in terms of asserting leadership on the relief effort?

Ms. REHMAN. Well, I think what is going on here is over the last

few weeks we have seen, again, realities literally transform, and

that really has been an effort of mostly local government in the

Frontier Province, which is done through the emergency relief unit

[ERU], and certainly there is room for expanding the civilian component of all aid and relief and rehabilitation activities. Perhaps in

reconstruction activities, yes, the military might be a better partner for the heavy-lifting part.

[NOTE.—Video link signal lost to witnesses in Pakistan.]

Mr. TIERNEY. This is not good. Well, we will work on correcting

that.

46

While that’s interesting enough, this morning we had a hearing

in the education field about technology in the classroom, and the

mics here didn’t work, but they worked fine in the classroom.

Mr. Bacon, let me ask you, while that’s being corrected, do you

see the United States making any concerted effort to actually focus

its aid to local NGO’s and more local enterprises that have, perhaps, better, more knowledgeable relationships, or are they still

moving through the military and Pakistan and other centralized

aspects where we might run into the danger of losing some 40 or

50 cents, as Ms. Rehman said earlier?

Mr. BACON. Well, it’s my understanding from talking to Ambassador Holbrooke and his staff that they are very aware of the need

to build civilian capacity. And they see this, one, as a humanitarian

challenge, but, two, as a great opportunity to help build civilian infrastructure in Pakistan.

So my hope is that they would be paying attention to this. Certainly USAID is clear on the need to deal with local NGO’s. And

there are, as Dr. Ahmed said, many capable local NGO’s in Pakistan. Many of them did very good work during the earthquake,

after the earthquake in 2005. And we need to build on that capacity and bring these people into the system in a much more effective

way.

Mr. TIERNEY. There’s apparently a problem in Islamabad, so they

are trying to call and get that back on line. We will do that as soon

as we can.

Until we can, sir, you are in the hot seat. I am sure you don’t

mind on that.

Mr. BACON. OK.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Flake, why don’t I let you ask some questions

of Mr. Bacon, and then we will allow the other witnesses to come

back.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With this increase in humanitarian aid going, as an increase—

I mean, a lot of local contractors are recognized, but there’s going

to be a greater U.S. presence, I assume. How can we assure the

safety of those who are acting on our behalf without making it

seem like a military effort, but with so many military there to protect them? How do we strike a proper balance, in your view?

Mr. BACON. Well, that’s precisely one of the reasons we are using

local NGO’s, because they are Pakistanis who live in the community, they know the people there, and they know the habits and the

risks that they face.

International contractors are harder to protect than local people.

So the advantage of the local NGO’s is that they are well-known

quantities, they are seen as providing aid and help to their neighbors, and they can do this usually with much less cost than bringing in people from American contracting firms.

So security generally is easier for locals than it is for internationals; not always across the board, but generally much easier.

Mr. FLAKE. With that comes a risk that you don’t know what you

are getting sometimes. I mean, you can vet those that you contract

with, but how do we ensure that we are not using or contracting

with some who may have sympathies with the Taliban or working—I mean, that’s an ongoing problem.

47

Mr. BACON. Well, that’s a very legitimate question. That’s a very

legitimate question.

I think, as my fellow witnesses said, there’s a great deal of antipathy to the Taliban, and what people are looking for is effective aid

and help right now.

So, I think, again, we rely on local intelligence and local capacity

to inform us on who is good and who is bad. It’s not—it’s not foolproof, but it’s a way to start.

Clearly, they know better than we know, and we just have to

build trust in them and give them a little bit of operating room and

some money and clear guidance, clear goals, a ways to evaluate

their progress, metrics, and work with them as we do with our own

contractors.

Mr. FLAKE. We obviously put restrictions and directives and

mandates on the aid that we provide.

Mr. BACON. Uh-huh.

Mr. FLAKE. Is there difficulty in aligning that with the goals of

other organizations that have broader, I guess, participation, be it

with the UNHCR or with the Red Crescent or whomever else is operating there?

For example, with legislation that we just passed, is it going to

be a problem aligning the goals that we have laid out with other

aid organizations?

Mr. BACON. I don’t think it should be. I think that we and

UNHCR and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red

Crescent Societies share the same goals. We want effective programs. We want displacement and we want poverty to end. We

want to find ways to work together.

So I don’t think this should be an issue at all.

Mr. FLAKE. It was mentioned that most of those who are displaced find refuge with family members and with others that aren’t

necessarily in camps, and it’s been advocated that we put direction

their way as well. But where is the most acute need, in your view?

Is it in these camps, or is it somewhere else?

Mr. BACON. Well, since 80 percent of the people aren’t in camps,

we have to find an effective way to get aid to people who are living

with a local population.

This is both good and bad. Camps aren’t a great place to be, but

it is easy to deliver aid, medical care, food, etc., to people in camps

when they are centralized. It’s much harder to do this in a dispersed population.

But through a good registration process, which the UNHCR has

set up, it’s possible to do that, but it’s more time-consuming, it’s

more expensive, and it’s not as easy as it is in camps. On the other

hand, people are generally much more comfortable in private

houses than they are in camps.

But there are reports of 25 people living in a room in some of

these houses, so these are not cushy conditions for the displaced

persons. It’s very, very difficult for them to be absorbed by generous host families.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Flake.

As you can see, the chairman had to go take a phone call. He

will be back shortly.

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I welcome back our witnesses who are with us from Pakistan, Dr.

Ahmed and Ms. Rehman. Are you with us? We just want to make

sure it’s all hooked up again.

Dr. AHMED. Yes, sir, we are back.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Very good. I apologize for actually joining the

hearing a little late after some of the testimony, but I think that

all of us see in recent events some positive developments, but also,

obviously, some dangerous developments.

When I speak of positive, obviously I am not talking about the

internally displaced persons, but I am talking about the fact that

the Government of Pakistan has taken the threat of the Pakistani

Taliban seriously and deployed their forces in a meaningful way to

try and address the threat. The unfortunate consequence, of course,

is you do have internally displaced persons, you have lots of refugees within Pakistan.

And the challenge for all of us is to make sure that these individuals, these families, get the support that they need from the Government of Pakistan and from local NGO’s as appropriate. And,

you know, we need to figure out the best way of deploying those

resources. Among the displaced persons, of course, are many children. In fact, according to Save the Children’s rapid assessment of

the IDPs, 54 percent are under the age of 18, and more than 16

percent are below the age of 5.

Is there anything in particular being done to address that population? Obviously that population is, you know, mixed in with their

family members, but I am interested in whether or not special efforts are being made to help the most vulnerable among them.

Mr. BACON. Well, first of all, women and children are always the

most vulnerable in displaced populations, and there is—there has

been some progress. I know that the Pakistani Ministry of Health

has, in the midst of this crisis, been able to vaccinate 500,000 children against polio, so there is special attention being paid to the

health needs of children.

They are also working on a program to improve maternal and

child health care in the midst of this as well.

So the government and its partners are paying a lot of attention

to meeting the health and nutritional needs of children.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. And this is a question for all of you. What’s

your best assessment right now as to how the Government of Pakistan, with any help they are receiving from the international community, how they are doing in terms of providing support and resources that are needed.

And juxtaposed to that, how would you assess the extent to

which some of the components of the Taliban are able to take advantage of this situation to try and provide social services as well?

Because as we all know, this is in some ways a race for the hearts

and minds and a fight for the hearts and minds of people of these

areas. And when you are hungry and displaced, you will turn to

services wherever you can get them.

So how would you evaluate, as of today, the extent to which the

government, through all its different mechanisms, is providing

those services? And to what extent did we have information about

whether or not the Taliban forces, the allied forces are providing,

49

are coming in to try and fill the vacuum and whether or not they

are successful at filling that vacuum?

Mr. BACON. Well, it’s a very comprehensive question, and probably my Pakistani colleagues could better answer.

But first I would state that I hope that the Government of Pakistan can find a less disruptive and intrusive way to launch this

military campaign, one that concentrates more on reducing or limiting displacement.

Two, I think the government is doing a good job, but it is not getting the support it deserves from the rest of the world. And it

needs far more resources than it has.

Three, I do believe that it is an opportunity to build local capacity, and they should concentrate more on doing that.

And, four, in terms of the Taliban, it’s my assessment—and I

have not been to Pakistan recently—that the government has a

great opportunity to show its concern for the people and, in fact,

to seizing that opportunity. And the Taliban is quite—has created

a lot of antipathy on the part of the people. So this, again, is another opportunity for the government.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

Dr. Ahmed and Ms. Rehman, is the Government of Pakistan——

Ms. REHMAN. Yes, the Government of Pakistan, as stated earlier,

is extremely overstretched, No. 1, because of the magnitude of the

crisis. It is very difficult to register and even track down families

that are outside camps. The UNHCR certainly has set up a process. So has the data base, the national data base in Pakistan. It

is called NADRA.

The process is difficult. Pakhtun traditions also make it a challenge for officials and a State administration, people to go inside

homes. Many may be more comfortable than they are in the camps,

but they are certainly not living in conditions that are anywhere

near optimal or what they were used to in their homes.

They are mostly situated in homesteads and patios outside on

the ground in people’s homes, 25, 50-plus are coming in to be accommodated by each family. So this is a major issue, and I think

that there will about an overstretch even on the question of hospitality. So we will—we may have to worry about a large influx into

school buildings and camps that we see overused.

Now, as far as health interventions are concerned, I think, yes,

the health ministry has been working very hard, both the provincial and the central. But here we do need a great deal of assistance. It’s not just a question of vaccinations. Women are—especially Pakhtun women remain inside their tents. They are mostly

not able to go out, except some girl children. And the temperatures

are very high. They are not—they don’t have access to lady doctors

and lady health visitors, which are sorely needed in much higher

densities, certainly at the camps. And the camps, you must understand, are a site also for daily anguish on 51 channels of Pakistan’s

television. It really does produce and refract an image of a state

that is allowing its citizens to suffer, whereas that is not the case.

But the point is that whatever the government is doing at this

point is not enough. And while civil society has stepped up to the

plate recently—and, again, the good news is that every week you

do see a change in the availability of services in each of the camps.

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The pressure on the camps in terms of sanitation and health care

remains very high. Yes, there is at least a week of food security

guaranteed, but there is—there is a much more—there is much

higher need of organized health interventions, as I said, as well as

a community participation, which is now, of course, becoming more

and more available.

But we do need to coordinate these efforts better, avoid duplication between international agencies and certainly not—to avoid

pileup and centralization in provincial hubs such as Peshawar,

where you see a lot of wasting of resources, even in the international agency offices. They are unable to cope with the numbers

and the magnitude of the refugees coming in. So, you know, to repeat the case that there is still a great deal of assistance still required, and perhaps some management emphasis on the ground

also to be addressed in terms of coordination.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Flake.

Mr. FLAKE. Since I wasn’t able to ask a couple of questions, let

me just ask, with regard to—I will ask kind of the same question

that I asked Mr. Bacon.

How do you balance the desire to use local groups and local

NGO’s with the fear that some that you might be contracting with

might have sympathies with the Taliban? Are our partners able to

discern those links, or is that something we should be concerned

about?

Dr. AHMED. I would like to answer that, because I think one of

the things we need to make very clear, when we look at the potential of the jihadis exploiting this situation, is that the IDPs have

fled from Taliban-controlled areas where they witnessed the most

brutal attacks. There were murders, public executions, women deprived of work, girl children not allowed to go to school, public

property seized. This population sees the Taliban as criminals, and

so they are.

What is important now for us is not whether local NGO’s have

sympathies to the Taliban. Other than the jihadi groups and parties that obviously have sympathies with the Taliban, you don’t see

that either with the mainstream parties or with mainstream local

NGO’s.

If anything, as Ms. Rehman stressed, there is at this point in

time in Pakistan a real opportunity, because not just in the Northwest Frontier Province but countrywide there is now an antipathy

to the Taliban and a great desire to see the state assert its writ,

to see law enforcement, to see rule of law, to see justice, and to see

these criminals brought to justice.

What is important for us now is to make sure that this opportunity that exists is exploited to the fullest, because if we don’t, the

jihadis will.

Mr. FLAKE. On that point, if I might, are there some jihadi-related relief efforts going on in some of these areas at the moment?

And I am assuming that is what we are trying to get away from.

How does the local population react when we try to ban those

jihadi-related relief efforts? Or is that not an issue?

Dr. AHMED. One of the jihadi groups that is operating there is

a banned group. This group was allegedly responsible for the

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Mumbai attacks. This jihadi group was banned once by the

Musharraf government, re-emerged under a changed name, and it

has resurfaced again under a changed name.

It is the responsibility of the Pakistan Government, and I think

it is important for the United States to point that out to the Pakistan Government, to make sure that a group that is declared a terror organization by the U.N. Security Council, that is banned as a

terror organization by Pakistan under its own laws is not allowed

to operate.

But then, when we are talking about the NGO’s and the local

community organizations, we are not talking about an organized

jihadi group such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. It is important, though,

that Islamist political parties are also there and have set up their

own activities. And, you know, that is again an exercise of attempting to win hearts and minds.

Have they succeeded thus far? I don’t think they have. The stories that are coming out—Ms. Rehman talked about the media

showing the face of the IDPs to Pakistanis every day, the human

tragedy that Pakistan is facing. But the stories that the IDPs have

come out with are also being heard countrywide about what the

Taliban are about and what the jihadis are about and how much

of a threat they pose and how un-Islamic they are.

The government’s rhetoric also helps. It has changed immensely

under the civilian government, when the Taliban are now being

called criminals and murderers who should be brought to justice as

opposed to what we heard in the past, that they are jihadis.

Mr. FLAKE. Ms. Rehman.

Ms. REHMAN. Thank you. If I may just address this question and

reinforce what Dr. Ahmed has just said, there are obviously some

groups working on the ground, and most of them are also religious

parties. Like all other political parties, people have set up camps.

But it is nothing like the jihadist intervention in terms of aide relief that we witnessed in the earthquake of 2005. I would like to

clarify that. That is not happening.

And there are fewer and fewer takers for very overt Taliban

interventions or jihadist interventions in Islamic groups. Certainly,

there are welfare boxes and charities and tents operating everywhere, and they sometimes take cover in religious parties’ tents

and offices, as well. But it is nothing like the effort you saw earlier.

This is mainly because it is swamped out by very organized state

and international aid agency efforts. Also, because interventions

are happening through the entry points of specific camps. And

there are 22 right now, mostly in the Frontier Province, which are

regulated by the ERU, which is the Emergency Response Unit. And

each camp has a different complexion to it, which is, you know, dictated largely by how the local community is partnering with the

government and international agencies.

But I must say that it is heartening to see the narrative of antiTalibanism take root in public discourse. However, I would like to

warn against complacency in accepting that, because this is something that can tip very quickly if successes on the battlefield are

not translated into sustainable relief and rehabilitation and resettlement efforts for the refugees.

52

They are an anguished picture of human suffering every day.

And every time we see groups and television crews arriving at the

camps, we do see a blow to public consensus against

Talibanization, when women are seen as destitute and children are

seen running around wild-eyed in the sun without schooling.

So one does sense that there is a huge cost that the Pakistani

people are paying. Yes, there may have been fewer intrusive ways

to conduct military operations, and we must not get complacent at

this public opinion that is building up every time.

As I said, there is public anguish over the IDPs’ suffering and

the humanitarian crisis. Questions, and hard questions, are asked

in the public domain about the efficacy and long-term gains that

we can make and hold in terms of a military operation, as well as

the political gains we make from it.

So I think this is something we have to capture and maintain

without public momentum of looking at how we resettle eventually

and provide relief in their areas is very important for the IDPs.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Let me ask each of our three witnesses a direct question that

probably doesn’t require a long answer. But in the International

Crisis Group report, there was a recommendation that so-called

jihadi groups—that is the word Dr. Ahmed used—be prohibited or

banned under the anti-terrorism law from participating in relief efforts.

Do all three witnesses believe that is a wise thing to do? And if

it is, what do you see as the impact of shutting off that type of aid

to people who may be now receiving it?

We will start with you, Mr. Bacon.

Mr. BACON. I do think it is a wise thing to do. I accept the recommendation.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Rehman.

Ms. REHMAN. I absolutely endorse that.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. And I know how you feel, Dr. Ahmed. You

wrote it.

Dr. AHMED. I endorse that.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. Now, can they do it? Do they have the power

and will to do that?

Mr. Bacon.

Mr. BACON. I think my Pakistani colleagues could speak more

about the will and the power than I could. But, yes, they should

have the power to do it.

And I think it is instrumental in building local rule of law, as

well. It fits in with that.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Rehman.

Ms. REHMAN. Yes, I think that this is a problem that we will

have to expand outside the Frontier Province. We will have to take

it to other provinces as well, mainly the Punjab.

And we will have to address provincial capacity and will to do

it. It is not something that we have been able to do overnight. It

will involve a complex interchange of interventions in terms of

legal as well as policing efforts, which, frankly, I haven’t seen our

ability on the ground to do.

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But this would be a move that we can consider as a next step,

and it is an important next step to take.

Mr. TIERNEY. And, Dr. Ahmed, I suspect that you feel it can be

done; that is why you recommended that it should be done.

Dr. AHMED. Well, we absolutely believe it can be done.

The police in Pakistan, despite the fact that its capabilities do

need to be built on, we did a report on police reform, and we were

heartened when we talked to senior police officials to find out that

they really believed the only way to go was to arrest these criminals and to prosecute them.

And that is, in fact, the only cure for militancy in Pakistan: rule

of law; you have to take them to the courts. You have to actually,

first of all, respect your own law because, after all, these groups

are banned under Pakistani law, and they are responsible for acts

of egregious violence against Pakistani citizens.

Mr. TIERNEY. I am going to read some excerpts, and then I have

a question at the end—excerpts from the ICG report.

The first one is a statement that says, ‘‘The scale of the current

IDP’’—internally displaced person—‘‘crisis is a function of failed

military policies that have enabled militancy to spread for several

years.’’

The second statement is a quote by the head of the Peshawarbased NGO, and it is, ‘‘The military is trying to improve its image

by controlling the relief process. There is, indeed, little reason to

believe that the military will be willing to work any more closely

with civilian institutions and elected representatives than it has in

its counterterrorism efforts.’’

And last, ‘‘The military’s longstanding links to jihadi networks

and its appeasement deals with militants, the latest with the Swatbased Taliban, have also understandably provoked doubts about its

intentions and the current operation. If there is a peace deal, it is

conclusive evidence that nothing has changed.’’

There are Members of Congress, I among them, who are concerned about giving U.S. military aid to Pakistan without conditioning that aid on the military’s ability and will to not cut another

peace deal but, in fact, to continue to assert themselves against the

extremist forces on that basis so that the public in Pakistan can

have justifiable confidence in them; condition it upon the military’s

allowing the civilian government to extend the writ of law to FATA

and the Northwest Frontier Province and bring the justice system

out there and the rule of law on that basis. And Members of Congress thought it was important enough to not vote for other items

in the supplemental bill because those conditions had not been put

in.

Now that is juxtaposed, of course, with the $200 million that is

in the bill for relief. I hear from each of our witnesses that they

think both of those concepts are important.

Is there a reason to think that passing the money for relief might

not be money well spent if, in fact, the military is going to cut another deal with the extremist elements and not allow the civilian

government to take over the relief effort and, in fact, not do many

of things that we talked about here today?

Ms. REHMAN. If I may address just one of those concerns, on the

ground, frankly, if you look at relief efforts, the relief efforts are

54

being run by the Emergency Response Unit and the Frontier civilian government. There is a special support group that is being run

by a member of the military. We don’t see their operations as, at

least in the field, very evident. We see everywhere the downstream

workings of the local community, which is, again, going right

through the ERU, as well as the Frontier government.

But I do feel that we have to address this issue of peace deals

with not just banned outfits but all warlords that control territory

and cutting peace deals as a result of the state’s inability to maintain its executive writ in the area. These always have shown opportunities for Taliban and jihadist and non-state actors to amass, to

find that they can regroup. And they have always resulted in critical reversals for the state, so I think these are experiments that

we need to avoid.

And I must say at this juncture that the provincial government

of the Frontier was very much involved and very forthcoming in

recommending cutting a deal with the Malakand militants. And I

think this is something that we need to learn from this experience,

has shown the whole country that such deals don’t work. And I

think we need to translate that experience into other areas, as

well.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Dr. Ahmed, how important do you think it is to condition military assistance on a more committed military effort to go after extremists and to allow the civilian government to extend its writ

and become the primary mover in relief efforts and in the rule-oflaw efforts?

Dr. AHMED. I think conditionalities on military assistance that

are very clear and confined to military assistance, that do not extend to economic/development/relief assistance would be a signal

sent to the Pakistani military.

You know, one of the things that we need to be clear about, it

is in the military’s own interest. What we have seen happen to this

country in the past 8 years as a result of peace deals, as a lack of

resolve—because of the lack of resolve of the military and because

of its failure to then allow the civilian law enforcement agencies

and intelligence agencies to act.

The groundswell of opinion that we see now against the Taliban

is an indicator that the Pakistani public doesn’t support this approach. The military has suffered casualties.

If clear conditionalities and a clear signal are sent by the U.S.

Government, I think it will benefit the Pakistani military, benefit

the Pakistani people, and benefit the United States.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

I would just make note that one of the quotes in the report was

from an official indicating that in Gulabad, in the Union Council

in Lower Dir, there was a military check post and a half a kilometer away a Taliban check post. And the question obviously was,

why doesn’t the military just take a little trip down the road and

eliminate that situation? And things like that continue to exist and

continue on.

Let me ask one last question, at least, if Mr. Flake has some

more—the nature of assistance that is going right now. We understand about the food and other commodities that have to be

55

brought to people immediately. But there was great emphasis in

the report—and Ms. Rehman also mentioned it, and I think Mr.

Bacon did, as well—about changing the nature of relief in some respects to a cash basis for certain reasons, whether job training or

to start the economy or to allow people the self-respect that is

needed to continue on.

Doctor, would you speak briefly to that? And if the other witnesses have a comment on it, that would be appreciated as well.

And particularly about the benefits of doing it and whether or not

we can have any accountability with respect to it.

Dr. AHMED. Absolutely. I think it is important that in the Pakistani context, as opposed to perhaps other such similar situations,

it is possible to do it in such a way that will not only empower the

communities that we would want to address, but also ensure that

there is actually oversight and monitoring.

The registration process might be slow, but there is a national

identity card in Pakistan. And, in fact, it brings these citizens into

the mainstream because the identity card is needed for all sorts of

purposes. There are biometric features that can be installed, not a

problem at all.

And what can the card be used for? There are multiple purposes

it can be used for. It can be used as a debit card, which is income

support. Let’s not forget, 85 percent of these IDPs aren’t living in

the camps. They are living with host communities who are, themselves, very poor. So just that ability to support the community

through simple access to find the money that they need I think is

one.

The children, we spoke about the children, half of the IDPs being

children, and half of these IDPs being out of school. Parents don’t

have the money right now, but cash for education is something that

actually the United States has used elsewhere. So cash vouchers

for education, cash vouchers for health, cash vouchers for vocational education.

Documentation is possible. There is a banking system in these

areas. It is not as though you cannot monitor this far more carefully, in fact, than transferring goods to either the camps or

through civilian-military intermediaries.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

Ms. REHMAN. Yes, I think cash transfers would be very useful at

this point, because it would empower the actual communities, as

Samina said, those especially living with host communities, as well

as those in the camps. There is a great deal of anxiety about income opportunities being lost through displacement of wealth. And

there is danger of mass destitution always at such crises points.

I would like to add that, yes, there is an income support program

and documentation process under way right now. But that, too,

needs support because we have an influx of refugees all of the way

down into the south, into the city of Karachi, which has become the

largest Pashtun city in the world. And this is something we need

to consider all of the way downstream.

All reforms, all programs that we are looking at now must now

move outside the Frontier Province, as well, and bring into their

ambit refugees disbursing all over the country, particularly the

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very volatile city of Karachi, which is beginning to see ethnic community unrest, which is unfortunate.

But I would like to just take the opportunity to speak to your

question about conditioning aid. Yes, while the U.S. experience has

been obviously difficult with all military funding and where your

coalition support funds did go and there have been issues of transparency in the past, I think right now the atmosphere is politically

very sensitive in Pakistan, with the IDP crisis. And while no one

can ignore the merits of transparency and, obviously, better governance, I am sure some structures can be built. But conditioning

aid at any level right now will be politically difficult for the government to sustain in terms of engaging strategically and suggesting

that our strategic ally is conditioning aid at a very difficult time

for Pakistan.

Mr. TIERNEY. And, Ms. Rehman, does that go if we separate out

the civilian aid money and not put conditions on that and condition

only the military money, do you still feel the same way?

Ms. REHMAN. I think that this will become a major issue in Pakistan. It will not be seen as separated, which is unfortunate. And

perhaps I would recommend some type of joint monitoring system.

Because this is a very sensitive political strategic moment in our

history, and that may just become—there may be public recoil

against any kind of conditioning. And, obviously, it will be said

that, here is an old transactional relationship reasserting itself. It

may be an irrational public outcome, but this is what may be expected. I would recommend some kind of monitoring mechanism

that you build in with the military.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you for that.

My last question, then, would just be, is there anything that either of our witnesses would care to add, since you have been kind

enough to wait as long as you did to have a chance to testify and

you are coming such a long distance? Any thoughts that you want

to leave us with before we close out the hearing that we might not

have asked?

Ms. Rehman.

Ms. REHMAN. Yes. I think we cannot stop reinforcing the issue

of the jihadists returning to these areas. I think that, yes, we will

be looking at police reform and capacity building, and we can certainly go with flushing out militants in the long run. But, again,

the word ‘‘flushing out’’ implies that we haven’t been able to either

decommission their arms or reintegrate them into society. We have

no programs for any such thing. And right now I think our experience of the militants has been that they are not able to decommission nor be reintegrated in any significant numbers.

So it is important to look at how communities will re-form. I

think we should be very clear that, once the operations are over

and citizens resettle, even the social transformations in these areas

will need change. They will need institutional accommodation. We

may not be able to go back to, say, pre-Taliban Malakand. We will

have to integrate non-elite voices and communities that have been

marginalized, including women. And the collective responsibility in

the jirga system will have to become more inclusive in terms of social justice dispensation and perhaps even the PATA regulations,

which is Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, under which

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Malakand is operated, will have to be reformed, if not incrementally then slowly.

Also, I think we have serious concerns about border interdiction.

If Pakistan is going through all this and paying such a high human

cost, then there is a lot of fear about the Taliban rejoining some

of their colleagues, and some old redoubts may be reinvigorated.

We feel that the escape routes through South Waziristan and

North Waziristan and all across the border agencies of Pakistan

and Afghanistan must really be strongly interdicted if we are not

to see a return of the Taliban and, again, reversals made both on

the battlefield and in the communities that we have displaced

today.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much for your testimony today and

for those comments.

Dr. AHMED. May I add——

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Ahmed.

Dr. AHMED. May I just add that I think it is really important for

us to remember that what we are seeing right now is the result of

a peace deal. The Taliban expanded their control not because of the

allies across the border but because they were allowed to through

a peace deal signed with the local authorities devised by the military.

There is some indication that there will be operations conducted

in the Waziristans, but there are also indications that some of the

Taliban groups might be considered more acceptable than others.

I think this is a hugely dangerous trend.

It is essential that the United States makes it clear that no

peace deal with any violent militant group that actually believes in

the jihad, not only within Pakistan but across Pakistan’s borders

into Afghanistan, in India, and even beyond India in the West, is

acceptable.

I think it is equally important to remember the other thing, the

framework of this relief reconstruction effort. If the United States

and U.S. officials stress the negative, which is, well, the civilians

have capacity, then I think they will lose the opportunity of helping

to build that capacity.

If, again, there is doubt in some official quarters about civilian

capacity of enacting political, administrative, and legal reforms,

that will bring FATA and Malakand into the mainstream, these

are not helpful. It would be far more helpful if the Obama administration and the U.S. Congress supports the process of political reform that the Pakistan Government, a young, nascent democracy,

would want to see in its territory because it sees it in the interest

of the state and of the global community.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Bacon, do you have any final words of wisdom?

Mr. BACON. Thank you.

I just would like to go back to one point I made, which is that

we need to guard against premature returns. All refugees want to

go home, and everybody wants them to go home. But we have to

make sure that, when they go home, they go home to secure and

sustainable communities. If they go home prematurely, this problem will not end.

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So what we have recommended is an independent verification

process to decide when it is safe for refugees to go home and to follow that so we don’t get premature forcebacks.

I know that this is a big issue for the Pakistanis, and it is a big

issue for the United States, as well. But I just think in the past

we have seen high costs from premature returns, and I hope we

can avoid that here.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Bacon, for your testimony today but also for the

work that you do and your organization does. We are all indebted

to you for that.

Mr. BACON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Ahmed, thank you for the work that you do in

the International Crisis Group in various places throughout the

world. It is always helpful to have insightful facts and information,

and you provide that on a regular basis. And I know members of

parliaments and congresses around the world rely on that work

and appreciate it a great deal.

The Honorable Sherry Rehman, thank you for taking your time

today. I know things are very busy over there, and you were very

nice to take your time and give us your valued opinion and insight

as to what is going on.

I know that I speak for all of my colleagues, I would suspect,

when we say how sorry we are that you have such difficult conditions in Pakistan at the moment. And we wish you only the best

in dealing with that situation, relieving the suffering of so many

people.

As you know, Congress has acted and is in the process of acting

again to try and add some relief to that. We know that everybody

working together can make it as comfortable as possible for people

in an already bad situation. And we only wish you the very best

in making that happen as quickly as possible.

So, again, thank you all very, very much for your testimony.

Thanks again for all of our witnesses. Thanks to the folks at the

Embassy our in Islamabad for helping us with the hookup on that.

And, with that, this hearing is adjourned, and we will now proceed to our second panel, which is a related briefing.

[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the hearing was adjourned and the

briefing commenced.]

(59)

BRIEFING

Mr. TIERNEY. Good afternoon.

Mr. GABAUDAN. Good afternoon.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you for joining us. I am sorry that there was

so much delay, with the votes earlier on. It pushed you back a little

bit. Now I want to make sure we get started on this, because we

have votes coming up in a little while and I don’t want to inconvenience you and make you have to wait until after those votes.

So let me just briefly say that we are receiving a briefing from

Mr. Michel Gabaudan from the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees.

I would note that the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees staff member Mr. Aleksandar Vorkapic was killed in last

week’s hotel bombing in Peshawar. On behalf of our colleagues, certainly Mr. Flake and I and the staff here, we want to express our

condolences to his family and to his coworkers at the UNHCR. It

serves as a reminder that you have many staff over there who are

in dangerous conditions repeatedly and have the bravery to put

themselves in that position and sacrifice of themselves and their

families.

Mr. Gabaudan serves as a regional representative to the United

States and the Caribbean for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. His career with UNHCR spans more than 25

years and includes service in Africa, Asia, Latin America, America,

and Australia. So the frequent flier miles are building up.

He has worked in Pakistan as a field officer there and, prior to

his posting in Washington, served as a regional representative for

UNHCR in Beijing. He attended the University of Bordeaux in

France.

I want to thank you again, sir, for making yourself available, and

would appreciate it if you have a statement that you would like to

make, and then we will have a little colloquy afterwards if that

meets your approval.

STATEMENT OF MICHEL GABAUDAN, REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES AND CARIBBEAN FOR THE

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

Mr. GABAUDAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I am

really grateful for the opportunity given by your committee for us

to brief you on our activities in Pakistan on behalf of the internally

displaced people.

I would, at the outset, like to say that our work would not be

possible without the generous contribution we have had from the

U.S. Government to our activities, but also to the very close interaction we have with Ambassador Patterson and her staff in

60

Islamabad and with our PRN colleagues here in Washington. It is

an excellent working relationship that I think contributes to whatever success we may achieve.

We have been operating in Pakistan for almost 30 years, starting

with the Afghan refugees. And through these 30 years, the success

of the operation has been due, one, to the tremendous welcome that

the Pakistani population and Government had given to the Afghans, but also to the very sustained effort by the international

community to support that project.

And throughout these years, our main implementing partner in

Pakistan was the Pakistani commissioner for Afghan refugees. So

to address myself to one of the questions you asked previously,

there is expertise in managing these sort of situations in Pakistan,

expertise that has been tested over time.

We first got involved with IDPs in August last year, with the

movements of persons taking place out of the Bajaur agency in the

federally Administered Tribal Areas and, after that, from the

Mohmand agency. And, by April, we had registered some 550,000

people who had already left.

Since the end of April and early May, we have witnessed in

speed and size the largest population movement since the exodus

from Rwanda some 15 years—not for the same conditions, I am not

trying to compare the situations, but certainly in terms of speed

and size.

As has been said, we have now about 240,000 people living in

camps, so it is a little bit over 10 percent, out of the 2 million that

have been confirmed by the verification of the registration. We do

have some 100,000 who live in camp-like situations in schools or

in public facilities that will have to be given back to their normal

use in July when the schools resume. And we have an increasing

number who are moving outside of the NWFP area and moving

into Punjab. And now it is estimated that there may be up to

300,000 people moving in this direction.

Our response is part of a broader U.N. response in which we

have assigned three responsibilities, which is protection, shelter,

and camp management. I would like to address very quickly what

we do under each of these chapters and then address myself to the

challenges we face in the coming months.

Protection is essentially registration. We are supporting the government to register IDPs for those populations who are living with

local people in villages and towns. It is the minister of social welfare who is doing the registration in the camps. He is the commissioner for Afghan refugees.

And here I would like to stress something very important, that

for a population living in the conflict area, the government has

maintained registration in the hands of civil authorities. We think

this is essential. It is not especially what happens in other areas

of the world, and we value very much this response by the Pakistani Government.

And we are all supporting NADRA in the verification exercise to

weed out double or triple registration, as may be happening. Registrations allows us to give ID cards, to identify vulnerable groups,

to start working on family reunification, particularly for children

who have lost their parents in the exodus, and to make a deterVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:50 Apr 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 U:\DOCS\54878.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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mination of who will need what sort of assistance. So it is a very

important protection tool.

We are trying to look now at other issues of protection that always happen when people flee these sort of conflicts, which is gender-based violence, which is unfortunately something that affects

populations who suffer these sort of conflicts in whatever continent

we are. We have experienced this in Europe, in Latin America, in

Africa. And Pakistan would not be exempt from these sort of

issues. But we are just at the beginning of looking into these particular delicate issues.

In terms of shelter, we have to remember that this is a mountain

population, which is coming back in low-land valleys. They are not

used to the heat, which actually is unbearable right now. And one

of our main approaches to shelter is to try to, what we call,

‘‘summerize’’ the living conditions. We have to make sure that you

have shade over the tents. We have to make sure that we double

up electricity so they can have fans, that we have lighting in the

camps for security, and that we have watercoolers. So, quite an adaptation of the conditions for these people to suffer as little as possible from a rather dramatic change of environment from the one

they are used to.

We also have to develop a privacy system, which is culturally required, the purdah mechanism, of putting walls between the tents.

But this is not just a respect for culture, it also has an important

protection impact.

The camp management function is basically identifying new

sites. Right now we have 21 camps. This is not enough. The camps

are quite congested, and we increasingly have people moving out

of the families with whom they found security in the beginning because these families are poor and they cannot help them anymore.

So we feel that, over the next weeks and months, the number of

people who want to reside in camps will just increase. And we have

to identify sites, prepare these sites, and also develop a community

approach to running the camps whereby the communities themselves are consulted in the decisions that affect the way assistance

is given in the camps.

The challenge we will face in the immediate future is to adjust

very quickly to changing weather. The monsoon is coming. With

the monsoon, we will have flooding. We need to make sure these

places are properly drained. And with the floods will come the

scourge of malaria, again, something that this mountain population

are not used to and that can have a devastating effect on this population.

And then, a few months after that, we will have the beginning

of winter, which will require the winterization of the camps.

So we have quite a few challenges in terms of adjusting the conditions in the camps to make life as bearable as possible for these

people who are in camps and who are very crowded.

The second challenge is that we need to develop a system to distribute items to the people who stay with families. As we say, it

is a majority of them. We have developed about 80 hubs so that

food and nonfood items can be distributed. We are in the process

of responding to those people who have been identified through the

registration. We are far from reaching them all at present. But this

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is certainly one of the challenges we have, to make sure that the

burden they bear on the local population is as reduced as possible.

We want to register those who have left for Sindh and Punjab.

The government is not very keen for them to receive assistance, I

suppose because they don’t want to generate the full factor, but at

least we want to be able to register them so they have this ID and

they further have a protection mechanism. So that is another

spread-out of our operations further into Pakistan.

The next major challenge will be the preparation for returns.

And I cannot subscribe more to what Ken Bacon said before: We

all want people to go back. The sooner they go back, the better, because life in camps is not something which is wished for and could

generate some symptoms of dependency. And life in local families

bears inordinate pressure on the local population.

But returns have to follow certain series of principles. They must

be voluntary. They cannot be subject to political expediency to just

demonstrate that things are better. We will have to look at issues

of unexploded ordnance in areas of return, questions of destruction

of infrastructure, whether it is roads or bridges that are required

to make sure that people can move back, and then see what support the Pakistani Government needs to reestablish services for

their health and education and certainly the rule of law, as has

been very clearly identified by our colleagues.

All that is not necessarily under UNHCR, but we must make

sure that all of this is in place before we can really make sure people go.

One of our roles in return will be to gather information to make

sure that displaced people have sufficient information on what is

happening down there, eventually help them to go and see, etc.,

but not press and urge returns, as I said, as a matter of political

expediency. We must too often suffer these sort of pressures, and

this would be dramatic because it would be reverting to the cycle

that we have just witnessed.

In this context, we have two great difficulties to overcome. One

is funding. A lot has been said about that. The response of the

international community remains rather tepid. We had initially,

within the United Nations, made this appeal for a little bit over

$500 million. Our share of that was $105 million. We got funded

for about 40 percent.

Right now we have reviewed our needs in light of the recent figures of 2 million. We need, just for UNHCR, about $140 million.

I suppose that the other agencies will send increments of the same

order. And that means we are funded to about 30 percent of our

needs. And this is not counting on possible additional outflows from

Waziristan, where we understand that an operation is just beginning, as was foreseen. So funding is a dramatic constraint.

There is in this country, I think, a proper appreciation of what

is risk in Pakistan. There certainly is on the part of the Pakistanis.

I am not sure on the part of the rest of the international community there is such a sense.

And in the very words of my High Commissioner this morning,

response to this crisis is not just a question of moral obligation because of the dire suffering of the people, it is a question of, as he

put it, enlightened self-interest, because our failure to respond carVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:50 Apr 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 U:\DOCS\54878.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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ries out security implications for Pakistan and the region which are

quite severe.

And the second big challenge we have, you alluded to it at the

beginning, Mr. Chairman, security concerns are important. And we

are in the process of trying to balance how can we develop a field

presence that is efficient in responding to the needs without exposing our colleagues to unnecessary risk. We have to take some risk,

but we have to make sure these risks are not exaggerated. And we

are right now in a review on how we should operate to reduce risk

to our staff and to make sure that we can keep on working there.

We are certainly not talking about pulling out.

I will stop here because I think much has been said before. And

thank you very much, again, for your interest.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gabaudan follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Well, thank you very much.

Mr. Flake, I would just invite you to jump in at any time, too—

we will just have a conversation here—with questions, as you

would like.

Do you see any evidence that the Pakistani Government has actually started the planning that will have to be involved for the return eventually of these folks? It would seem that they can’t be returning this summer or this winter, it is probably likely that we

are looking at next spring at the earliest, so it gives them a fair

amount of time.

But do you see anybody actually doing the planning for all that

will be necessary to bring people back in a safe environment and

one that gives them, as you mentioned, the health care and the

education and the jobs structure?

Mr. GABAUDAN. At present, I think there is more talk about returns than actual action. The government has committed itself, and

this is absolutely welcome, to re-establish public services as a basic

condition for return.

I think we have to realize that, in the past years, civilian administrators of the government have suffered from the insurgency tremendously—murders of doctors, professors, mayors, etc. So there is

a shortage of human resources that I am not quite sure how they

will address, but it will be a constraint into the re-establishment

of these services.

But if experience tells us anything, the people who moved from

Bajaur in August last year are still in the camps, and there has

been almost no return. So I think it is going to take more time

than we think, despite the talks.

Mr. FLAKE. Back on the security issue, with your colleague being

killed there just recently, do you employ private security? And are

they augmented by security from local police forces? Or how does

that work?

Mr. GABAUDAN. Well, by definition, we want the relief effort to

be de-linked from the military operations. So we cannot operate relief as part of a more militarized effort, and we want these two

things to remain quite distinct. So we have usually private security

guards in our office, etc. These are very good against thieves; they

don’t tend to be so efficient against more aggressive sorts of persons.

We have no evidence, I must say, that the bombing in the hotel

was directed at U.N. staff in particular. It is just a place where

international people do gather, etc., and it is visible.

Mr. FLAKE. I have been to Peshawar. That is a particularly hard

place to secure, I am sure.

Mr. GABAUDAN. One way we will respond—sorry, if I may—is

probably by having a lighter foot presence of international staff and

starting to work much more through Pakistani staff. And thank

God in Pakistan you do find competent and well-trained people. So

we have to review the way we operate generally and the sort of

proportion between internationals and locals.

Mr. TIERNEY. I was going to ask you about that, because we have

had a lot of recommendations about the talent that is in Pakistan,

the quality of the people there who are able, capable of doing this

work.

72

So your organization is, in fact, reaching out to many more of the

domestic Pakistani population to try and help with your efforts, as

well?

Mr. GABAUDAN. Yes. I think this is where we are going to go.

Our director for the Asian bureau, head of security, and head of

emergency services are currently in Pakistan to make a review of

our operation after the incident last week. And that will be ready

next week, but I think it is going to be in this direction.

Mr. FLAKE. Just one other question. Talking about premature return, guarding against that, unexploded ordnance or whatever else

are the issues, how do you enforce that? Or can you? I know it is

a difficult balancing act there.

Mr. GABAUDAN. Well, if people want to go, of course this is their

choice, and there is nothing you can do. And the risk, of course, is

if assistance is not good enough and their situation becomes terrible in the places where they have found refuge right now and

they go back because going back is the best alternative, then we

have a recipe for catastrophe. If they go because they really feel

they have their orchards to tend and they want to rebuild their

homes, etc., and we are convinced that their return is voluntary,

we have to help them.

What we must avoid is pressure for them to go back as a sort

of symbol that things are back to normal, when all of the premises

have not been ensured—security through the removal of ordnances,

establishment of services, recreation of infrastructure, etc.

Mr. TIERNEY. How is the urgency going to become spread to the

international community? How are they going to be impressed with

the urgency of this so that they perhaps step up and fill in some

of the gap between what the United States is providing and what

the U.N. thinks is necessary?

Mr. GABAUDAN. Well, I’m not quite sure. Right now, as I said,

the United States has been our main supporter. Europe is not

showing tremendous desire to respond. We are trying our best to

convince them. As I say, it is not just a question of moral obligation, but that we all have broader interest in helping Pakistan. And

sometimes appealing to the self-interest of a nation can help.

The High Commissioner will personally go to the Gulf States I

think in a week to try to also ask for their assistance. They should

also understand that they have immediate interest in this situation

not getting out of hand.

Mr. TIERNEY. But they haven’t been overly responsive so far,

have they?

Mr. GABAUDAN. No, they haven’t.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is interesting.

You mentioned in your remarks about the reunification of families. Can you tell us a little bit about the magnitude of that issue?

How many families are not just displaced but also separated? Are

you finding a high proportion of people in that circumstance or not?

Mr. GABAUDAN. I don’t have these figures, Mr. Chairman. And I

can look into them and forward them to the committee when I have

them. We are still trying to sort out information.

What we found out recently, certainly with some of the NGO’s

that we work with, like the International Rescue Committee, there

are lots of tents, for example, where you have children only.

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Whether they just guard the tents while their parents are doing

something or whether they have been just left there without any

indication of where the family has gone we are not sure.

And this is something that we have called the attention of the

government to, and we are working with the Commissioner of Afghan Refugees to try to sort out these issues.

Mr. TIERNEY. As more and more people either leave their host

family because the burden has just become too high or exit the

school buildings because they are going to be put back to educational use, and the hospitals or other buildings, what is your estimate right now of how many additional camp sites will need to be

constructed over and above the 21 that exist now?

Mr. GABAUDAN. I think we are looking at 10 additional sites, but

we have to make sure that these sites can be drained properly, that

we can bring electricity, etc.

So, again, I do not have the exact details, but I think we are

planning for a fairly substantial inflow from people who have already left the conflict zones and are around Peshawar and who will

have to go into camps at some point.

Mr. TIERNEY. I want to thank you, Mr. Gabaudan. The work you

do is just incredible, and all your staff and the folks that work with

you. It is greatly appreciated around the world, but particularly

here, as well as the sacrifice and the risk that we mentioned earlier, unfortunately evidenced by what happened last week. It just

brings it into too stark a relief.

Thank you for taking the time out of your day to come here and

brief us on that. This is information that we need to have to share

with our colleagues and make sure that we have the proper response.

So, again, thank you very, very much.

Mr. GABAUDAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. TIERNEY. The briefing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:33 p.m., the briefing was adjourned.]

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