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i 

52–148 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–58] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 14, 2009 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, May 14, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request from the Department of the Navy ................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, May 14, 2009 .......................................................................................... 43 

THURSDAY, MAY 14, 2009 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT— 

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Conway, Gen. James T., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps .................. 9 

Penn, Hon. B.J., Acting Secretary of the Navy ..................................................... 5 

Roughead, Adm. Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations ..................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Conway, Gen. James T. .................................................................................... 78 

Penn, Hon. B.J. ................................................................................................. 47 

Roughead, Adm. Gary ...................................................................................... 59 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 115 

Mr. Skelton ....................................................................................................... 115 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 119 

Ms. Shea-Porter ................................................................................................ 119 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 119 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, May 14, 2009. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Today, we meet to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2010 budget request for the United States 

Navy and Marine Corps. Appearing before the committee are the 

Honorable B.J. Penn, Acting Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Gary 

Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO); and General James T. 

Conway, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. 

We welcome you and thank you for being with us today. 

I should note that Secretary Penn is the permanent Assistant 

Secretary for Installations and Environment. We have asked him 

to walk into the proverbial briar patch this morning, and we hope 

you don’t mind doing that, sir, and we welcome you. 

Our sea services are this Nation’s fast response force, and they 

continue to perform magnificently. Our marines have brought a 

level of security to the Anbar Province of Iraq with a balance of 

might and diplomacy. Our sailors have gone ashore in both Iraq 

and Afghanistan, bringing needed skills to the joint force. 

Now we are increasing our force in Afghanistan, a long-overdue 

effort. Our Nation has again asked our marines to respond, and 

again they are answering the call. And in the midst of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, our Navy continues a worldwide 

global presence, as they have always done, ready of course to respond to any contingency, be it combat operations on the one hand, 

counter-piracy efforts or disaster relief on the other. 

We remain committed to provide our marines and sailors with 

the equipment they need to accomplish the tasks set before them. 

The wear and tear of years of combat operations will require a significant investment to reset our forces. However, the Navy must, 

and I repeat must, come to terms with the number of ships they 

need to construct, develop a reasonable plan to construct them, and 

then execute the plan. 

Whatever happened to the 313 Navy goal that we had? You must 

build your ships more efficiently. 
2 

We will not be able to increase the size of our fleet until you and 

your contractors agree on the capital investments necessary. I 

know that you are moving in the right direction. So we urge you 

to continue. 

Some shipbuilding programs are making progress, notably the 

Virginia class submarine program. I would be remiss if I did not 

mention that the new USS Missouri is several weeks ahead of 

schedule and several millions of dollars in savings. 

This committee will closely watch your progress with the littoral 

combat ships (LCS). These vessels are too expensive. We must get 

the program on track. 

And the progress of the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, 

which will be installed in the Ford class carriers, is also of great 

concern. It joins just another list of vital programs behind schedule 

and far over budget. 

Then there is the Strike Fighter shortfall, and yet the budget request reduces the procurement of F/A–18 aircraft from the projected number submitted last year. 

On the movement of marines to Guam, the heavily encroached 

Marine Corps basing structure in Okinawa represents continued 

risk for a stable Marine Corps presence in the Pacific. Moving some 

forces to Guam is a smart move, but it is expensive, costing at least 

$10 billion, and must be done right. We will be looking carefully 

at this year’s request for $673 million. Further costs associated 

with expanded training opportunities in Guam are still being evaluated. 

On Navy readiness issues, the Navy today has more officers and 

sailors on the ground as individual augmentees than it has at sea 

in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). 

We are pleased the Navy has halted its drawdown to maintain an 

end strength that allows for this mission as well as improving the 

manning of the fleet. 

However, the Navy intends to extend the operational life of its 

ships five years or more beyond their designed service life at a time 

when the Navy is experiencing a series of incidents, which raises 

concerns regarding possible systemic problems with the Navy’s 

manning, training, and maintenance. 

Moreover, even though U.S. Forces are withdrawing from Iraq, 

Navy operational tempo is expected to remain high because demand for the Navy’s services is up, including anti-piracy and ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations, as well as operations in 

support of Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Pacific Command 

(PACOM), and in Afghanistan and the Arctic. 

Despite the efforts of U.S. and coalition forces in the surrounding 

waters, the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf 

of Aden remains. The Navy and Marine Corps can date their involvement with these types of conflicts through the history of the 

services. 

As history has shown us, these types of attacks will continue 

until we commit to a clear short- and long-term policy that deals 

with the pirates on the water as well as on the shore. While the 

policy decisions on this issue will reside with the President and the 

broader Department of Defense, there is no doubt that naval and 

Marine forces are critical tools in any strategy to counter piracy. 
3 

These are just a few of the challenges facing the Navy and the 

Marine Corps. I am sure we will explore others here today. I thank 

you for being here with us. 

And I might note that this is the birthday for a special lady who 

represents the Marine Corps. Molly Schwab is with us today. We 

wish you a happy birthday and thank you for being with us. 

I yield to my colleague, the ranking member from New York, 

John McHugh. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I am going to try to be as quick as I can. I know 

we have a series of votes coming up here in a few moments. But 

I certainly, gentlemen, want to add my words of welcome to you. 

Mr. Secretary, as the distinguished chairman said, thanks for 

stepping into the breach. We hope you don’t regret that decision too 

greatly, but we are very honored and pleased that you are here. 

Admiral, good to see you again. The last time we saw each other 

we were under the polar ice cap with some of your finest on that 

great submarine, the Annapolis. And, Commandant, welcome to you as well. Like so many on this 

committee, I have had a chance to travel with you and your good 

folks to Iraq and Afghanistan, and I know collectively all of you are 

rightfully proud, as we are, of the amazing job the men and women 

in your charge do day in and day out to keep us safe. And as the 

chairman said, please carry our deepest appreciation and thanks to 

them on behalf of not just this committee but all Americans in this 

Nation. 

Yesterday, we had what would diplomatically be described as a 

spirited discussion with Secretary Gates on balance and requirements and the way forward. And I know that in an article that Secretary Gates had written some time ago he made the observation 

that, as much as the U.S. Navy has shrunk since the end of the 

Cold War, for example, in terms of tonnage, its battle fleet is still 

larger than the next 13 navies combined, and a lot of those 13 navies are U.S. allies or partners. That, at a very minimum mathematically, is a correct statement. 

But I think it is mindful, and we would be mindful to recall as 

well, though, that this current Navy is as small as it has been 

since the 19th century, and certainly the joint maritime strategy 

released just a year ago emphasizes the importance of forward 

presence. In fact, it talks about that particular phrase no fewer 

than four times. 

Maritime forces have the unique ability to maintain persistent 

presence, with minimal footprint, which we have discovered has 

benefits for both humanitarian as well as combat operations, and 

forward presence can only be translated, as you have said repeatedly, Admiral, into both quantity and capability. 

Just this past January, you told the Naval War Association that, 

quote, last year I came in telling you that 313 ships were the floor 

that I believe we needed when it comes to the capacity of the fleet. 

While that statement holds true today, 313 is still the floor when 
4 

it comes to the size of the fleet we need to carry out our maritime 

strategy. 

It would appear, though, that something may have changed, at 

least in the past few months. Because earlier this week when I 

asked if 313 ships were still the minimum threshold for the fleet, 

Rear Admiral Blake told reporters, quote, as it stands right now, 

what you are going to have is the Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR), and one of the significant pieces in the QDR is force structure. So that was the last number that was put out. Those discussions will take place with its leadership later this summer as to 

what the right number is. 

And Admiral and Commandant, what new analysis or new strategy may have been completed that would suggest 313 may not now 

be needed if that is the case? 

Likewise, there has been a lot of discussion about acquisition reform. This committee, under the leadership of our very able chairman, passed unanimously on the House bill yesterday an acquisition reform bill that we are all very proud of and indebted to Mr. 

Andrews and Mr. Conaway. 

And, clearly, we need to save costs in shipbuilding. This budget 

requests three additional littoral combat ships, despite the lack of 

an acquisition strategy and a complete lack of real transparency regarding the costs in the last two ships awarded. 

As well, this budget extends aircraft carrier construction, even 

though this will lead to inefficiencies that will increase the total 

cost of these expensive platforms. 

And we have also made some pretty darn expensive decisions 

with respect to destroyer construction. Apparently, from a capability perspective, the Navy could make do with one DDG–1000 but 

will support the construction through in consideration of industrial 

base issues. 

I understand that reasoning. I truly do. But given that the Navy 

intends to return DDG–51 construction to add both more to Grumman and Bath Iron Works (BIW), how much more will taxpayers 

eventually spend to resume construction of DDG–51s at BIW after 

a several-year hiatus? 

At the same time, there is balance to be struck between new construction and funding maintenance. I won’t go into the details of 

the hundreds of millions of dollars of shortfall that the Navy has 

been experiencing amongst its fleet, but obviously, that is an area 

of some concern. 

But those balance issues are not just limited to shipbuilding. The 

chairman mentioned Strike Fighter aircraft, and for years your 

Navy and Marine Corps have been briefing this committee about 

shortfalls there, and the Department of the Navy currently has a 

fiscal year 2009 Strike Fighter inventory shortfall of about 110 aircraft against a resource requirement of 390 aircraft and predicts a 

peak Strike Fighter shortfall of 212 fighter aircraft in fiscal year 

2018. That is eight carrier air wings worth of aircraft, and it rests 

on the dubious assumption that the Joint Strike Fighter delivers 

on time. 

So we have got some serious concerns and questions as well in 

that area. 
5 

With respect to the Marine Corps, finally, Secretary Gates has 

put off making a decision on the expeditionary fighting vehicle program until the completion of the QDR; and, frankly, I commend the 

Secretary for not rushing to judgment in regards to the Marine 

Corps forcible entry requirement. I would add that as part of this 

discussion it is important to keep in mind that amphibious assault 

doesn’t necessarily mean another Normandy-like invasion. Amphibious assault can be a smaller action, say off the coast of Somalia 

to provide humanitarian assistance or evacuation procedures off 

the coast of West Africa. 

And, General Conway, the Marine Corps has looked at the requirements for joint forcible entry for some time, and the QDR— 

I should say the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review—did not 

dispute the Corps’ responsibility for this capability. Yet these requirements will be reviewed as a part of the QDR. 

I realize you can’t talk about the QDR since it is just getting 

started, but if you could share any perspective you might have on 

the need for amphibious assault and the direction you believe the 

Marine Corps is headed, we would be most grateful. 

Finally, I personally would like to hear your assessment on how 

the V–22 performed. This committee stepped forward and made 

some decisions that weren’t always popular. I have been on that 

aircraft in several visits to Iraq. It impressed the heck out of me, 

but I would like to hear from an operational perspective how you 

felt it performed for your men and women in theater. 

But, again, thank you all, gentlemen, for your service. We look 

forward to your testimony and a greater understanding of the difficult decisions facing you in your leadership roles, and we thank 

you for taking on that challenge. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from New York. 

Secretary Penn. 

STATEMENT OF HON. B.J. PENN, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE 

NAVY 

Secretary PENN. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McHugh, distinguished members of the committee, it is truly an honor to appear before you on behalf of the more than 800,000 men and 

women of the United States Navy and Marine Corps. I have submitted written testimony, and I ask that it be included in the 

record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Secretary PENN. Two months ago, I assumed the responsibilities 

as Acting Secretary of the Navy. Since that time, I have had the 

unique pleasure of meeting more of our troops and focusing the Department of the Navy as a whole, rather than simply upon the 

world of installations and the environment. This experience has left 

me with two lasting impressions. 

First, we have phenomenal people. Our active duty, reserve and 

civilian personnel are dedicated and impressive. Today, our sailors, 

marines and civilians are deployed, providing the entire spectrum 

of action from combat operations in the mountains of Afghanistan 

to humanitarian assistance in Africa. The Navy has nearly 10,000 

individual augmentees and over 6,000 mobilized reservists de-
6 

ployed on the ground around the world in support of overseas contingency operations. Seventy-six percent of our ships and over 50 

percent of our attack submarines are underway. 

At the same time, more than 25,000 marines are deployed in 

support of Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom 

(OEF). Nearly 5,700 marines are deployed to various regions 

throughout Afghanistan, where they face an enemy and operating 

environment that is different than that in Iraq. Our marines are 

adapting superbly. 

In short, for our combatant commanders and our Nation, no force 

is as capable, flexible, and ready to deploy than your sailors and 

marines. 

The second impression I have been left with is how instrumental 

your help has been in providing our Navy and Marine Corps the 

capabilities our people need to perform their demanding duties. On 

behalf of all our men and women, I thank you for your continued 

support. 

Today, I am here to discuss the budget for the Department of the 

Navy. This budget reflects our view of the best balance between 

our most important resource, our people, and our need to maintain 

the current force while preparing for the future through careful investment in science and technology and in military construction. 

We have invested prudently in the most important programs while 

deferring investment in others. Our reviews, in conjunction with 

the Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review, will inform our investment decisions in future years. 

Our budget request demonstrates our sustained commitment to 

our Navy and Marine Corps family by investing in the infrastructure, housing, and family programs that make our Department an 

employer of choice. Our budget also provides continual support for 

both medical and nonmedical care for all seriously wounded, ill, 

and injured service members. Our gratitude to the dedication of 

our service members can best be demonstrated in the compassion 

and care we provide to them and their families for their service 

and sacrifice. 

A single event this week demonstrated tragically the devastating 

effect of combat stress on the force. Navy commander Charles 

Springle of Wilmington, North Carolina, died this past Monday at 

the combat stress clinic where he served with the Army in Camp 

Liberty in Iraq. The thoughts and prayers of our Navy and Marine 

Corps family and our entire Nation go out to his wife and family 

in this time of great loss. 

His tragic death serves as reminder of our unending commitment 

to promote psychological resilience and health among marines, sailors and their families. A resilient warrior knows there is no shame 

in seeking help. We are committed to removing the social stigma 

of seeking help as we remember the sacrifice of Commander 

Springle. 

Finally, the Department of the Navy budget reflects our commitment to pursue acquisition reform and cost control measures as responsible stewards of the taxpayers’ resources and to relieve the 

stress on our procurement accounts. We support your efforts to promote acquisition reform and look forward to implementing these 

measures to produce the best results for our country. 
7 

Once again, on behalf of our sailors, marines, civilian employees 

and their families, I thank you for all you have done. I ask for your 

continued support as we try to balance the resources necessary to 

defend our great Nation. I look forward to addressing your questions, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Penn can be found in the 

Appendix on page 47.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Roughead. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF 

NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McHugh, 

distinguished members of the committee, it is indeed an honor to 

appear before you today representing the more than 600,000 sailors 

and civilians and their families of the United States Navy. I ask 

that my prepared remarks be submitted for the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Our sailors and Navy civilians are making 

a difference at sea, in the air, and on the ground in support of operations in the Central Command and around the globe. We have 

40,000 sailors on station around the world as part of our ever-deployed Navy, the value of which was once again demonstrated by 

the rescue of Captain Richard Phillips of Maersk Alabama, a few 

weeks ago. 

Our Navy is more versatile and agile than it has ever been. We 

have more than 13,000 sailors on the ground in Central Command 

supporting Navy, Combatant Commander, and Army and Marine 

Corps requirements. That contribution is unique and is making a 

difference, as reflected in the service of Commander Springle who 

lost his life just this past week. 

I appreciate greatly your continued support to our Navy as we 

sail in defense of our Nation’s global interests and responsibilities. 

As CNO, I focus on current operations, the future fleet, and our 

people to ensure that we are a properly balanced Navy, ready to 

answer the call now and in the decades to come. 

Our fiscal year 2010 budget aligns our plans with the course our 

maritime strategy set a year ago. However, we are progressing at 

an adjusted pace. Our risk is moderate today, trending toward significant in the future, because of challenges associated with fleet 

capacity, increasing operational requirements, and growing manpower, maintenance, and infrastructure costs. 

As I articulated last year, our Navy must have a stable shipbuilding program that provides the right capability and capacity 

while preserving our Nation’s industrial base. The balance among 

capability, capacity, affordability, and executability in our procurement plans, however, is not optimal. We require additional capacity 

to meet Combatant Commander demands. 

Our Navy’s operational tempo over the past year reaffirms our 

need for necessary capacity and a minimum of 313 ships with a 

mix of capabilities that includes more ballistic missile defense, irregular warfare, and open ocean anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Accordingly, this year’s restart of the DDG–51, the truncation 
8 

of the DDG–1000, and three littoral combat ships puts us on the 

right path. 

The Navy remains committed to a force of 11 carriers for the next 3 decades. However, to avoid a bill of $2.8 billion and significant technical risks, we seek legislative relief to decommission and 

take USS Enterprise out of service, service that has spanned 47 

years and everything from the Cuban Missile Crisis to Vietnam, 

the Balkans, Afghanistan, and 2 conflicts in Iraq. 

Along with our ships, we are addressing our aviation by investing in both new and proven technologies. Timely delivery of the 

Joint Strike Fighter is needed as we approach a projected decrease 

in the number of carrier-capable Strike Fighters, which is due to 

the continued high pace of operations of our aging F/A–18 A–Ds. 

I have focused on our need to control procurement and total ownership costs. We are addressing these costs by maturing new ship 

designs before commencing production; controlling requirements 

throughout the process; pursuing common hull forms, common components, and proven designs; and, finally, repeating builds of ships 

and aircraft to permit longer production runs and lower construction costs. 

Our Navy is operating at its highest levels in recent years; and 

while we remain ready and capable, we are stretched in our ability 

to meet additional operational demands while balancing our obligation to our people and to building the future fleet. The Fleet Response Plan has provided a strong mechanism to keep our force 

ready, and our base budget, augmented with contingency funding, 

provides the means to meet the increased operational requirements 

of the Combatant Commanders while remaining the Nation’s strategic reserve. 

Our talented and dedicated sailors and Navy civilians are what 

make possible all that we do. I am committed to providing the necessary resources and shaping our personnel policies to ensure our 

people and their families are personally and professionally supported and fulfilled. While reducing end strength, we have increased operational availability, supported new missions for the 

joint force, and introduced the maritime strategy. To minimize 

stress on the force and meet increased demands with minimal risk, 

we are stabilizing the force this year. Navy continues to provide 

support to all sailors and their families through a continuum of 

care that covers all aspects of individual medical, physical, psychological, and family readiness. We have provided additional care 

managers and ambulatory care clinics for our 1,800 wounded warriors and their families. Our goal is reintegrating the individual 

sailor with his or her command, family, and community. 

Achieving the right balance within and across my priorities is 

critical as we meet the challenges of today and prepare for those 

of tomorrow. We have seen more challenging times, and we as a 

Navy and as a Nation have emerged prosperous, secure, and free. 

I ask Congress to fully support our fiscal year 2010 budget and 

identified priorities. 

Thank you for your continued support and commitment to our 

Navy and for all you do to make the United States Navy a force 

for good today and in the future, and I look forward to your questions. 
9 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead can be found in 

the Appendix on page 59.] 

The CHAIRMAN. We just learned that there are five votes that 

have just begun: one 15-minute vote, two 5-minute votes, 10 minutes of debate on a motion to recommit, and then a 10-minute vote 

and then a 5-minute vote, but we will continue as far as we can. 

General Conway, we will go to you, sir, and maybe we can also 

get a question or two in. But let’s go ahead, sir. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC, COMMANDANT 

OF THE MARINE CORPS 

General CONWAY. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McHugh, and 

distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to report to you on the posture of 

your Marine Corps. My pledge, as always, is to provide you with 

a candid and honest assessment, and it is in that spirit that I appear before you today. 

Since testimony before your committee last year, progress in the 

al Anbar Province of Iraq continues to be significant. Indeed, our 

Marines are in the early stages of the most long-awaited phase of 

operations, the reset of our equipment and redeployment of the 

force. 

In February, we had a change of command of the multi-national 

forces west in Anbar Province. The commander of the multi-national corps, who was present for the event, commented that he believed this will be the last rotation of marines in Iraq. We tend to 

agree. 

Having recently returned from a trip in theater, I am pleased to 

report to you that the magnificent performance of our marines and 

sailors in al Anbar continues across a whole spectrum of tasks and 

responsibilities. 

In Afghanistan, however, we have substantially another story, as 

in 2009 the Taliban have again increased their activity. The Second 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), a force that will number 

more than 10,000 marines and sailors, is en route and will be 

ready for tasking by the end of this month. The Second MEB is deploying as a Marine Air Ground Task Force. They will operate 

under Regional Command South (RC-South), primarily in Helmand 

Province, where 93 percent of the country’s opium is harvested and 

where the Taliban have been most active. This part of the country 

also includes a wide-open stretch of the border with Pakistan, 

where drugs and fighters flow without interdiction. 

That said, we consider the operating environment in Afghanistan 

as well suited to our expeditionary ethos of being fast, austere, and 

lethal, with emphasis on the austere. 

As our numbers grow in Afghanistan, marines and their families 

have refocused their resolve to yet another crisis area. There are 

many challenges ahead, but your marines understand the effects of 

their operations will make this country safer. 

We are maintaining an effort to get every marine to the fight, 

and today 73 percent of your Marine Corps has done so. Yet our 

force remains resilient in spite of an average deployment to dwell 

tempo that is somewhat better than one to one in most occupa-
10 

tional specialties. For instance, we believe retention is a great indicator of the morale of our force and the support of our families. Although we are only halfway through the fiscal year, we have already met our annual reenlistment goals for our first-term marines 

and for our career force. 

Our growth in the active component by 27,000 marines has proceeded two-and-a-half years ahead of schedule. We have reached 

the level of 202,000 marines and have found it necessary to throttle 

back our recruiting efforts. 

We have not changed our standards. Indeed, more than 96 percent of the young men and women who enlisted in the Marine 

Corps during fiscal year 2008 had earned their high school diploma, a rate that exceeded the standard for the Department of Defense (DOD) at 90 percent and our own self-imposed higher standard of 95 percent. 

We attribute our accelerated growth to four factors: quality of recruiting, exceptional retention levels, reduced attrition, and, not 

least, a great young generation of Americans who wish to serve 

their country in wartime. 

We are deeply committed to the care and welfare of our wounded 

and their families. Our Wounded Warrior Regiment reflects this 

commitment, through all phases of recovery. To assist in the rehabilitation and transition of our wounded, injured, or ill and their 

families, we have a Wounded Warrior Battalion on both coasts, at 

Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton. The headquarters of our 

Wounded Warrior Regiment is in Quantico. 

I would like to thank those of you on the committee who have 

set aside your personal time to visit our wounded warriors across 

the globe. 

The Marine Corps we are shaping for the future is a balanced 

force, equally adept at irregular warfare and contingency operations on the low end, yet ready to operate as a key element of the 

joint force in a major contingency. We believe we need to be able 

to go both ways, to be a, quote, two-fisted fighter. Our equipment 

and major programs reflect that commitment to be flexible in the 

face of uncertainty. That is to say, 100 percent of Marine Corps 

procurement can be employed in both hybrid conflict or major combat operations. Moreover, we seek to remain good stewards of the 

resources provided by Congress through innovative adaptation of 

our equipment to both defeat the enemy and counter the environment. 

On behalf of your Marine Corps, I extend my gratitude for your 

enduring support and that of the American people. Our great 

young patriots have performed magnificently and have written 

their own page in history. They know as they go into harm’s way 

that our country is behind them. We pledge to spend wisely every 

dollar you generously provide in ways that contribute to the defense of this great land. 

Thank you once again for the opportunity to report to you today, 

and, sir, I look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Conway can be found in the 

Appendix on page 78.] 
11 

The CHAIRMAN. We will see if we can get a few questions in before we break for these votes. 

Admiral, early this morning, Congressman Solomon Ortiz and I 

were musing over the Ronald Reagan aim of having a 600-ship 

Navy. You were probably just an ensign at the time—that was a 

day or two ago—but that was a goal and a serious attempt to do 

so. You have a goal, as you stated a few moments ago, of 313 ships. 

How many do we have right now? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Two hundred and eighty-three, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Two hundred and eighty-three? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. What’s the lowest we have had in the last 10 

years? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I would say 279, but I will take that for the 

record. But 279 is where I would say we are. This is the smallest 

fleet that we have had since 1960. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 115.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Two hundred and eighty-three right now? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. And your goal is still 213? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Three hundred and thirteen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, 313. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. As a floor, I might add. The minimum is 

what I believe we need. 

The CHAIRMAN. You will take more than 313? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The floor I would say right now is 313, yes, 

sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. And how many are you retiring? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I will get back on the exact number for this 

year, but it will be important for us to minimize our retirements 

by fully funding our maintenance and putting those—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I want to get a number if I can. Does anyone on 

your staff know how many you are retiring? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. I don’t have that number, sir, but 

I will get that for you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 115.] 

The CHAIRMAN. My staff says how many? My staff says five. 

Does that sound correct? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. That sounds like a good number, yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. And how many are you requesting? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. In this year’s budget, we have eight, in 

2010; and we have advanced procurement for seven in this budget. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is a pretty slow climb to 313; am I correct? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The eight ships is not the largest number I 

would like to see, no, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. You have a USS Enterprise challenge coming up. 

The law says we should maintain 11 operational aircraft carriers, 

and with that retirement and before the Ford comes on, there will 

be a gap of 10 aircraft carriers. Am I correct? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. That is correct, yes, sir. 
12 

The CHAIRMAN. And then there is also the challenge of enough 

Strike Fighters to man all of the aircraft carriers. And I know 

those numbers are somewhere out there, but I heard something 

somewhat disturbing that we can get into a little bit later, but am 

I correct on that? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. As our older Hornets age out, how 

we address that issue of the adequate number of Strike Fighter is 

writ large for the Department of Defense. But, for me, my interest 

is in those that are capable of operating on and off of our aircraft 

carriers, and amphibious ships is key and how we move forward 

with that. Whether it is through extension or other options is yet 

to be addressed, and I would say that key to all of this is the timely 

delivery of the Joint Strike Fighter to the Navy in 2015. That is 

an absolute critical addition to our fleet for more than just number 

purposes. It is capability as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand, we are supposed to have some 

13 Joint Strike Fighters today. You know, in the research and development (R&D) phase, we only have three; is that correct? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The exact number of what is in there, I will 

get back to you, Mr. Chairman. Because there is some Air Force 

variance, Marine Corps variance. We have not yet begun to get into 

our variant, which is the last to be delivered. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 115.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let’s just probe that a little bit further, Admiral. 

Now, I will certainly state for the record I fully recognize that 

you come here in support of this budget. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Absolutely, yes, sir. 

Mr. MCHUGH. And that is natural, and I don’t for a moment suggest you shouldn’t. But I mentioned yesterday to the Secretary of 

Defense I am concerned about the scope of some of these individual 

decisions absent what we would call regular order, QDR, particularly, and let me just give you a couple of examples there. 

The decision has been made that the Air Force and the Navy are 

going to require fewer Strike Fighter aircraft to accomplish their 

missions. That is certainly an effective outcome of some of the 

choices that have been made on the Strike Fighter aircraft. 

At the same time, on the other hand, we have got a proposal in 

here that will call for the replacement of the Ohio class ballistic 

missile submarine and the Ticonderoga class cruiser. Those aren’t 

yet validated requirements. They may be absolutely appropriate 

decisions, but they are not validated requirements. 

So, forgetting about the budget for a moment, I would like your 

personal opinion. Is funding over a half a billion dollars in R&D 

for the DDG–1000 program, which is an ongoing program in production that is going to be truncated at three ships, is that more 

important than, say, making a different choice of procuring nine 

additional F/A–18 Super Hornets, which is consistent with last 

year’s budget? 

That is a tough choice. I am not saying which is right and which 

is wrong. I am curious. 
13 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. I think the choice is not as tough 

as it may appear on the surface. Because even though that money 

for the DDG–1000 is research and development and that may conjure up a particular forward look that we are aspiring to, that 

money completes the computer software for the computing environment of the DDG–1000. So even though it is R&D money, if that 

computing software is not developed, that is the combat capability 

of that ship and also is money that is in support of the advance 

combat capability in the new aircraft carrier that is coming along. 

So even though it is R&D, it really is going to build the capability 

of the DDG–1000, and that must be resident in the first DDG– 

1000. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Okay. 

The CHAIRMAN. If you will let me interrupt, Mr. McHugh, to continue to your questioning after we continue voting. 

Thank you. We will be in recess. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The votes took longer than we had anticipated. 

Mr. McHugh was in the middle of his inquiries, and he will be 

delayed, but we will proceed from this. 

Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate, if it is 

okay, if I can sit way down here. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral Roughead, sir, DOD announced the final decision on 

whether to permanently home port an aircraft carrier at Mayport 

will be made during the 2010 QDR. And will the QDR in fact be 

able to make this in time for the fiscal year 2011 submission? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Sir, I believe that the Secretary and the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense have committed to a review of the disposition of our aircraft carriers in each case, and I am confident 

that those decisions will be made in the Quadrennial Defense Review. 

Mr. MILLER. In time for the fiscal year 2011 budget cycle? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I believe that the decision will not impact 

any plan should the outcome be to put a carrier there because the 

period of time that would be required to prepare Mayport spans a 

couple of years. So I believe that the decision that would be made 

in the QDR will be adequate for anything that would have to be 

done in Mayport. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, sir. 

And also a question to anybody that would choose to answer in 

regards to Navy and Marine Corps shortage of doctors and nurses 

because of our op tempo, the shortage impacts both for deployed 

sailors and marines as well as their families back home. What are 

our plans to increase the numbers of Navy doctors and nurses and 

other medical personnel? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I will comment on the plan and let General 

Conway comment. 

As the Marine Corps is growing its force, we have increased the 

number of medical personnel commensurate with that growth, and 

we are on the path to provide the required numbers for the Marine 

Corps which are in the hundreds of additional medical personnel. 

And I will let General Conway talk about the adequacy of medical support for his troops. 
14 

General CONWAY. Sir, it is marvelous forward both in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, and we understand that is the Navy emphasis, as 

well it should be. What has happened as a result of that, of course, 

is somewhat what you cite, and that is that there is then a shortfall at some of the hospitals and clinics in some of our bases and 

stations. I do believe the Navy is attempting to contract to satisfy 

some of those shortfalls. 

It is easier to contract someone to live in San Diego than it is 

in Havelock, North Carolina, and so I think that is where we see 

our biggest concerns right now as we go about our town hall discussions with families and so forth, is trying to make sure they have 

got sufficient care and, more importantly, specialized care that prevents them from having to drive great distances that TRICARE 

would otherwise provide for. 

Mr. MILLER. Sticking with the medical issue, we have all talked 

a lot about electronic medical records in recent hearings. Navy 

medical personnel have testified to the challenges of the Armed 

Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application, or HLTA. 

What is our plan with the Navy in regards to improving the effectiveness of electronic medical records in the future? 

Secretary PENN. We are still doing a complete analysis of the 

records. There is a lot that has to be done. The Privacy Act and 

other things, that just requires that we go into it with our eyes 

wide open. There would be some secondary effects, and we want to 

make sure they are addressed up front. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask, before I call Mr. Ortiz, General, as 

you know, several of us visited Okinawa and Guam recently regarding the proposal of moving some 8,000 marines from Okinawa 

to Guam. And shortly before we made our visits, the Secretary of 

State visited Japan, and my understanding is she signed the agreement again. And could you in 25 words or less bring us to date on 

where the proposal is and what needs to be done in the immediate 

future? 

General CONWAY. Sir, if I can—and I am afraid I might have to 

take a few more than 25 words. But I want to say in general terms, 

because there have been articles that may have presented otherwise, the Marine Corps is in favor of the move to Guam. There are 

issues associated with that move, but I have the personal assurance of the Under Secretary of Defense for policy that she is going 

to work with us directly to solve those concerns. 

Currently, sir, the Japanese government will be voting soon on 

a portion of their allocation for the funding that is required. In the 

meantime, we are going forward with an EIS, Environmental Impact Study, on Guam to determine what training can take place 

there. We think we have a pretty good feel for that at this point, 

just because of the availability of training areas, and Guam is not 

going to satisfy the entirety of the training concerns that we have 

there. So at the same time that the EIS is under way for Guam, 

we are looking for an EIS on other portions of islands in the area. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is my next question. You are looking for— 

is there a formal request or a requirement for looking at the other 

nearby islands, particularly Marianas? 
15 

General CONWAY. Sir, we have made known our requirement to 

be able to train the types of troops that we think we are going to 

put on Guam, and we believe that we can gain proper access to 

those other islands, although they are some miles distant from 

Guam, that we can satisfy the training requirements to keep those 

troops viable. 

Secretary PENN. There is an issue, as you know, with the EIS. 

If we start one and try to add to it, that is called segmenting. 

The CHAIRMAN. It is called what? 

Secretary PENN. Segmenting, and then we have to start the entire process over again. 

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, you are kidding? 

Secretary PENN. We want to complete the Agreed Implementation Plan Environmental Impact Statement (AIP EIS), and we have 

been working with the Marine Corps to come up with an entire 

training area, and that would be the EIS for all the training on the 

outer islands. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, thank you. 

John McHugh, the bells cut you off, and we return to you. 

Mr. MCHUGH. I have been cut off by worse, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, though, and, gentlemen, I appreciate, as we all do, your 

patience. 

Admiral, you and I were speaking before we left and I posed one 

philosophical or theoretical change to you with respect to DDG– 

1000, the $500 million on R&D, which you answered. There are 

some other components to that. I am not sure I will get a chance 

to pursue those. 

Let me pose another question for you on a similar train. On R&D 

we have got about $800 million for the replacement of the Ohio 

class submarine and the Ticonderoga cruiser development as I 

spoke earlier, and that is not yet a validated requirement. Again, 

it may be the right thing to do, but the question I would ask again, 

in terms of the fact that any budget is a chain of choices, would 

we not spend that $800 million of R&D on those two unvalidated 

as yet requirement platforms for, say, addressing the strike fighter 

shortfall on the eleventh amphibious transport ship? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Mr. McHugh, on the sea-based strategic deterrent and the research and development money that we are putting into that, as we look back on the Ohio class SSBN that we 

have, we are about at the same time where we had to begin development of that ship, and the investments that we are making in 

research and development for a sea-based strategic deterrent are 

the initial work on a propulsion plant and a missile compartment. 

It is not an entire ship but just on those two things. 

Because I believe that, as we have seen since the inception of the 

sea-based strategic deterrent, it remains a key part of our national 

deterrent, and, therefore, we believe, given the length of time that 

it requires to develop this type of a submarine, we are in that window and we believe that the investment is prudent at that point. 

Mr. MCHUGH. How do you respond to the issue these aren’t validated requirements? I mean, they may well be in the near future 

based on future QDR, et cetera, but I mean it is a valid point of 

discussion. 
16 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. The way I would respond is, even 

though the requirements may not have been validated by the posture review, the centrality of the sea-based strategic deterrent and 

the fact that submarines cannot be extended as easily as some of 

our surface ships may be, we believe it is prudent to begin to make 

the investments so that as we move through the Nuclear Posture 

Review (NPR) we will not risk the continuation of that important 

deterrent. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Have there been—and this was a point of discussion yesterday with the Secretary, and I think he failed to totally 

grasp the central point they were trying to make, not taking issue 

necessarily with some of the major issue decisions he made but the 

lack of availability to some of the analyses that I would imagine 

I would hope certainly went into these decisions and this someone 

as well. Can you help us understand what the analysis might have 

been or is there an available document that we can look at that 

makes that kind of choice? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. For example, in the case of the 

DDG–1000, that ship has its genesis in 1992. There is more analysis on DDG–1000 than I think we could sift through for the rest 

of this fiscal year. 

So when I came in and made the recommendation with regard 

to the DDG–1000, I had the benefit of being able to look at campaign analysis and other attributes of the ship, and I felt very comfortable with that, with the demands from combatant commanders 

in being able to put forward a recommendation to the Secretary of 

the Navy and then to the Secretary of Defense that resulted in the 

truncation and then the restart of the DDG–51. 

With regard to the sea-based strategic deterrent, based on what 

we know about our submarine development programs, we are in 

the window where we need to begin that process of developing that 

replacement capability. So with regard to the refinement that will 

come in the review that will get at the question of force structure 

and the particulars that may apply to the numbers of those submarines and missile inventories, I think we can get to that, but the 

work of designing this replacement submarine we know we have to 

get on with it. 

Mr. MCHUGH. So with respect to the latter two, the Ohio class 

particularly but also on the Ticonderoga class cruiser, those were 

your recommendations. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. We get going with that program because of the importance that this Nation places on this nuclear deterrent. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Than you, Admiral. 

Commandant, tell me a little bit about V–22. 

General CONWAY. Sir, V–22 has had a checkered past, but I have 

to say that we accepted some risk putting it into combat as soon 

as it was ready, and we have been very well pleased with the performance of the aircraft ever since. 

We have finished now three rotations in Iraq. We have seen that 

aircraft demonstrate what we knew to be its capability in terms of 

flying farther, faster, higher, and being able to carry a lot more 

than the aircraft it is replacing, principally the CH–46. 
17 

In the words of one of my commanders, it turned the Anbar Province from a state the size of Texas into a state the size of Rhode 

Island with the speed and capacity of the aircraft. 

We have had, speaking frankly, some reliability issues in terms 

of the availability of the aircraft, but I would suggest not greater 

than other new aircraft, especially new aircraft that were tossed 

into such an austere environment. So we are working those issues, 

and we are very optimistic about the future of this aircraft for us 

for decades to come. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, again, thank you for your leadership and thank you 

most of all for bringing together under your commands some amazing men and women of the United States Marine Corps, United 

States Navy. We are all in your debt. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, thank you for your service. We really appreciate your 

service and your commitment to our country and to keep it safe. 

Admiral, you recently determined that in-service inspections 

should be classified rather than available to the public. Having 

thoroughly reviewed one of these inspection reports, I was alarmed 

at the detail available in the public realm that could potentially be 

utilized by our enemy, by our adversaries, and thus support your 

decision. 

However, I want to ensure that the committee staff and its members, of course, would receive access to information in order to effectively do our job. Please elaborate on your decision to classify 

these inspection reports and how you will ensure the committee 

will be able to have, not only the member but the committee as 

well, all this information. Can you elaborate a little bit on that? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, and thank you for that question. 

The reports of the inspection and survey team is something that 

we do to ourselves to assess ourselves. This is something that we 

do to determine our programs, our maintenance, the adequacy of 

designs, the sufficiency of the systems that we put on our ships. It 

is a very frank, it is a very detailed process. The report that is produced from that can shed significant light on readiness, design. It 

can also provide insight into vulnerabilities of systems and of ships 

and airplanes themselves. 

And in my mind, having that information available to someone 

who wants to see where we may have vulnerabilities is not a prudent thing to do, and, for that reason, I directed that we again classify them. They had been classified up until I believe it was about 

2001. 

With that said, it is in no way an attempt to not make information available to this committee and other committees and members who may be interested in that, and I commit to you that at 

any time when we have the report compiled, because it is something we do every year, that we will bring it to you. I will do that 

proactively, and we will make that information available to the 

members and to the staff. 
18 

And, moreover, what I will also like to be able to do is to show 

where we believe the root causes of some of the deficiencies that 

we discover may be. I welcome that opportunity, and I make that 

commitment to you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

Another question that I have is that the use of sailors to augment certain Central Command (CENTCOM) requirements is not 

expected to decrease even as our course as we withdraw from 

Iraq—because now we see some of the Navy personnel doing our 

groundwork. What impact does the augmentation mission have on 

the Navy’s ability to perform its core mission? Because you are taking Navy people that may be in other missions—they were on a 

ship. Now they are in Iraq or Afghanistan, boots on the ground. Is 

this causing a problem? 

Because we have had some complaints about the maintenance of 

the vessels and this is why they deteriorate, and I just want to be 

sure. 

And then there was a report that came out the other day about 

health services provided to our troops, where a lot of the contractors are utilizing the health services that I guess we should give 

our troops first choice to. They are in harm’s way. 

But these two questions maybe you can elaborate a little bit. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, I could not be more proud of the 

role and the contribution that our sailors are making to the fight 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. That contribution is going to continue. 

And in fact, I believe our numbers will increase as we increase our 

forces in Afghanistan. What our sailors bring are some unique 

skills and talents and capabilities that are a great addition to the 

joint force. And when I visit our sailors, whether they are performing duties on staffs, whether it is our construction battalions, 

intelligence officers, those who are leading and being part of the 

provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), they are making a difference, and I am very, very proud of them. 

We have put in place a different way of assigning sailors. We 

have increased our oversight of their training. We have increased 

our ability to provide counseling to the increased number of sailors 

that we have deployed and their families, in particular, their families. We have increased our ability to maintain track of where the 

families may be when a sailor deploys individually, their family 

may go back to their hometown. We have put in place all of those. 

The other thing that has become clear as we have continued our 

support to the ground forces is those sailors who go and do this 

have a higher probability of promotion than those who do not. And 

accordingly, that makes it a very attractive assignment. 

We monitor the readiness of the rest of the force very carefully. 

We have not had to adjust our deployment schedules. In fact, we 

have increased the level of activity. For example, the Africa partnership station in Africa, the hospital ship to South America that 

is down there now, a ship that is about ready to leave to go into 

the South Pacific to do humanitarian work, and we are able to do 

all of that, and we have not missed a commitment in the United 

States Navy. And I cannot be more proud of the contribution our 

sailors are making. 
19 

Mr. ORTIZ. I know my time is up. Maybe my next question will 

be to the next panel, the Army, about health care for our troops 

on the ground, especially the Army and the Marine troops. I saw 

where the contractors were using the facilities and the doctors and 

the nurses to take care of the contractors. And I don’t know what 

kind of impact this is having on our troops. But I know my time 

is up. 

The CHAIRMAN. We can save it for General Casey, who will be 

here at 2:30. We are going to go until 2:00. Is that correct, gentlemen? You will be here till then? And I am sorry the vote interrupted. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, General, Mr. Secretary 

and Admiral, thank you so much for being here. And Admiral, in 

the few minutes that I have I would like to ask you just a couple 

of questions. If you can’t answer them, please feel free to say you 

need to get back to us and get it in the record, whatever. 

Yesterday the Secretary was here and basically indicated that 

any individual that came over to testify was free to give us their 

personal opinions as well as anything else now to do it. 

One of the things that concerns me is I heard the chairman ask 

you earlier today about our shipbuilding goals. And you talked 

about the 313 ship minimum that we would need. But that is a 

goal, it is not a plan. And one of the things Congress recognized 

long ago is that for us to reach where we need, from a national security point of view, we needed to have a shipbuilding plan, and 

we literally put in law that each year when the budget came over, 

the Secretary would need to give us that shipbuilding plan, so it 

wasn’t just theory floating around, we could get our hands around 

it and see the plan. 

Secondly, that the Secretary was to certify that the budget that 

was sent over was sufficient to reach that plan. And if it wasn’t, 

that we were to be told what the risks were of that disconnect. 

The question I would ask you this afternoon is, if members of 

this committee wanted to go find that plan, since the Secretary did 

not send it and indicates he is not going to send one, where would 

we go to find what the existing shipbuilding plan is for this Nation? 

And if so, if you could tell us where we would go, or get us a copy 

of that so we have that for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 115.] 

Mr. FORBES. But secondly, if we ask you today, are you comfortable certifying that this budget will get us to that shipbuilding 

plan, could you do it? And if not, what are the risks that we are 

exposed to by not being able to meet it? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Sir, and thank you. With regard to the shipbuilding plan, as you mentioned, in previous years, we had submitted the shipbuilding plan which we did for 2009. The budget 

that we have put forth today, and I am very pleased with the eight 

ships that we have and the seven ships that we have advance procurement for. That defines the path for our future, the restart of 

the DD 51, truncation of the 1,000, commitment to the littoral combat ship, but we are going to in the Quadrennial Defense Review 
20 

get into the issue of amphibious lift, the pre-positioned force, and 

those are questions that have to be answered in the Quadrennial 

Defense Review, which will have an effect on what the plan will 

be. 

So what this budget does is it defines what we are asking to have 

authorized and appropriated this year, lays in advance procurement, and if I may say it, and to get back to an earlier question 

on the decommissionings, we are going to decommission seven 

ships this year, five in 2010. But at the end of fiscal year 2010, our 

fleet size will go up by four ships. So I do believe that what we 

have done with this budget and the progress of growth, that this 

puts us in a good position to realize the growth of the fleet that 

is necessary for our missions. 

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, again, with all respect, please don’t 

think I am trying to ask a question that is embarrassing or difficult. If we say the QDR is going to outline our plan, do we not 

basically have to say then, as of today, when the budget came over, 

we don’t have a shipbuilding plan? I mean is, that what we are 

saying until the QDR comes out? Because the goal of this statute, 

as I understand it, was to be able to look to our budget and say, 

this budget will reach this plan. And if it won’t, here is the risk 

that we have. And I realize that we have to constantly modify that 

plan, and the QDR may modify it. But as of today, do we have a 

shipbuilding plan anywhere in the Nation today? And if we do, 

does this budget reach that plan? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. What I would say, Mr. Forbes, is that what 

we have done with this budget is we have made some fundamental 

decisions in the direction where we are going with the plan. And 

part of a plan is not just how much you are buying, but what you 

are going to buy. And I believe that 2010, more than any other recent budget, really did some affirmation and reaffirmation of what 

we are doing, and that the Quadrennial Defense Review will further define and refine, and after the QDR, coupled with this 2010 

budget, I believe we will have a plan that sees our future more 

clearly than we have had in the past. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank our 

guests for being with us. And I want to thank my colleagues for 

pressing the CNO and others on the importance of shipbuilding. I 

welcome your help on that. 

Chief, last month we had an American flag vessel hijacked by 

some thugs with AK–47s. It is my understanding that when we 

send an American flag vessel that has military cargo to that part 

of the world, they pick up either a Navy team to protect it or a 

Blackwater-type team to protect it. We make a distinction though 

when we send an American flag vessel that is carrying American 

purchased foodstuffs or humanitarian goods to that part of the 

world, and we don’t protect it. 

I am going to ask you to rethink that strategy based on what has 

happened. It has still got an American flag on it. We know that our 

enemies like to attack symbols of America. That is why they went 

after the Pentagon. That is why they went after the Twin Towers. 

That is why we presumed the flight that crashed in Pennsylvania 

was going after the Capitol. 
21 

And I have got to believe, and I know you have got two simultaneous wars going on. But I have got to believe between the special 

boats units, the Navy Reserve, the United States Marine Corps Reserve, the Special Operation troops that are within the National 

Guard, the 20th Special Ops group and others, that either as units 

or individual augmentees, that you could, with one call for volunteers, put together enough teams to protect every American flag 

vessel that is transiting that area. Whether it is carrying foodstuffs 

or weapons, it is our stuff. 

It is fair to say the only thing that travels on American flag vessels anymore is something that the taxpayers have paid for. So it 

is our stuff. It is not like we are protecting the cargo for an individual company. It is something that our Nation has purchased. It 

is a symbol of America. And quite frankly, when ship owners from 

around the world who I know to be Americans re-flag their vessels 

foreign, and they say why should I stay? You charge me more for 

taxes. You make me buy an American flag vessel. I have got to pay 

an American more than I would pay a Panamanian? And my answer to them all along has been, but guess what, when this vessel 

gets attacked we are not going to send the Panamanian U.S. Navy 

Sea, Air, and Land Forces (SEALs) to rescue it. And as we just saw 

off of Somalia, we did send the American SEALs to rescue it. 

Now, we tried to do water side security on the Cole on the cheap 

and we lost 20 sailors and we almost lost a billion dollar warship. 

We tried to do airport security on the cheap and we lost people in 

the Twin Towers, we lost people at the Pentagon, we lost people 

in Pennsylvania. 

I think we are trying to transit that area on the cheap. And I 

think we ought to have learned. I think your team did a magnificent job. I think we should have learned a lesson that if it has got 

an American flag on it, it has got a cargo that our taxpayers have 

paid for that we are sending somewhere in the world, that it is our 

stuff and that it would be cheaper to put a team of trigger pullers 

on there than to have to go through what we went through last 

time. And I would welcome your thoughts on that. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. As you said, we are dealing with 

some thugs. They are criminals, they are pirates. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Who, by the way, are represented in London by 

guys with three-piece suits. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. I do not believe that they are ideologically driven. They are going to jump on a ship that looks to be 

a lucrative target regardless of what the flag may be. The fact that 

they elected to jump on an American flagship ended in the demise 

of three of them, and an extraordinary performance on the part of 

our Navy. 

I also believe that those shipping conditions that make the investments in protecting their ships is an important aspect of the 

entire counter-piracy process. We, and our friends and partners, 

are patrolling an area four times the size of Texas. And just last 

night, an example of a shipping company that had security guards 

on board, in my opinion, contract security guards, made a difference. They held the ship off. They held the pirates off the ship 

until a Korean destroyer and a Korean helicopter disrupted it until 
22 

the USS Gettysburg closed and captured 17 pirates and right now 

the USS Gettysburg has 17 pirates board. 

And that was stymied by contract guards that the shipping company elected to make the investment in. And yet, we, as navies, responded. And I believe that that scheme is something that needs 

to be pursued, as opposed to putting sailors, Marines, soldiers, onboard ships. I believe that the shipping companies have to address 

the security issues in that area as well. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral, you and I both know we deal with, I don’t 

know a handful of shipping lines to deliver our stuff. So one of 

them is doing it right. To what extent are you or someone from 

your organization going to sit down with Maritime Administration 

(MARAD), with the Coast Guard, with all the players and come up 

with a set of rules. Or again, we can do it legislatively. I would 

rather have the professionals do it in-house so that it is done right, 

but it does have to be addressed. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, Mr. Chairman, just this past Monday, 

that is exactly what happened. Shipping companies, to include the 

union, to include my commander from the Middle East, to include 

the Commandant of the Coast Guard, to include officers from my 

staff, came together to address exactly what has to be done. Last 

Friday the Commandant of the Coast Guard issued a bulletin 

specifying the steps that the shippers needed to take. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Actually in fairness, I read it yesterday. It basically 

said you must prepare a plan. It didn’t outline any steps. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. And that is exactly what some of 

the shipping companies are doing, and they are finding that it is 

working to their benefit. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will have further 

discussions on this. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much 

gentlemen for being here. 

Admiral, it has been a pleasure working for you for these last 

few years, and General, a pleasure working for you these last few 

decades. 

Clearly, the Marine Corps is pouring lots of troops into Afghanistan. They are there. They are in Iraq. They are fighting, and we 

could talk all day about those tactics and procedures and problems 

that those Marines might be facing. And I would like to do that. 

But my time seems already to have run out, so it is going to be 

a little bit tough. 

I want to talk about vehicles for a change. General, the expeditionary fighting vehicle (EFV) is, there is no procurement for that 

in the budget. There seems to be some R&D, some $293 million, 

and it looks like, as near as I can tell, that we are moving forward 

for a procurement in four years or something like that. Can you 

just kind of give us an update on that vehicle? I know the Marine 

Corps has been important to them since I was a junior officer. Tell 

us what is going on. 

General CONWAY. Sir, you are right in your analysis of the budget. It is R&D at this point. Procurement dollars follow. We look at 

the initial operating capacity of the vehicle at about 2014 but really 

sometime after that before we are at full operational capacity. 
23 

The vehicle, within the last 18 months or so, had its non maturity breach. There was a force function in inside the building for 

both the Department of the Navy and the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD) to examine the vehicle. But in fact, it was determined to be suitable for continuation. And we have since had some 

reliability estimates done and were encouraged by all of that. 

The vehicle got into trouble with the reliability test that showed 

that it was not very reliable at all, not the vehicle that we thought 

we were about to procure. So improvements in the vehicle in a 

number of ways, and greater reliability lead us to be cautiously optimistic that it is going to be precisely what we need to be able to 

close that 25 miles from where the amphibs will lay off and any 

foreign shore. 

Now, all that said, the EFV is a tool in the kit bag for the discussion, I believe, that will occur in the QDR on amphibious capability. And so I think that the numbers of ships and that capability 

writ large is going to, at least in part, determine the future of the 

EFV. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you. I am really looking forward to that. 

We have been missing a whole lot of analysis here and the QDR 

is certainly going to be an important part of our looking at these 

programs. I am getting concerned that we are not moving out as 

quickly as I had hoped on that EFV. But something we are moving 

out on, and I know something you have put a lot of attention into, 

General, is the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle (MRAP). 

And I am looking at the dollars in the budget for that, and a combination according to the paper I have here, from the 2009 base request and the supplemental is $6.5 billion. And I am sure that you 

agree that it has proven to be an extraordinarily effective and helpful vehicle that no doubt saved the lives of many Marines. 

I don’t yet understand how it fits into the Marine Corps. We 

have sort of always known where the High Mobility Multipurpose 

Wheeled Vehicles (HUMVEEs) were going to go and we have truck 

companies and we have Armored Vehicles (AVs) and we have Light 

Armored Vehicles (LAVs), and they fit into the battalions and 

things. What is the MRAP? What is its role in this thing? 

General CONWAY. Sir, at present, and we are talking now about 

what I would call the unimproved MRAP, the MRAP that we essentially sent into Iraq. We have about 2,200 of those vehicles. The 

immediate utility that we see in our exercising is with our road 

clearance detachments. We think that it will be our future engineer 

vehicle. In the past, they have sort of ridden into conflict in the 

back of a dump truck, and we think we owe them something better 

than that. And should we get into any future Improvised Explosive 

Device (IED) environments, and I think there is a high probability 

of that, based upon the cheap, inexpensive weapon that it is, then 

we have those MRAPs available. 

Our experience to date in Afghanistan has been that it is not a 

good transfer. That MRAP that works well for our functions in Iraq 

is not serving as well off-road in Afghanistan. So we have embarked on a program. There are two programs really. One that 

would develop what is called an MATV, an MRAP/all-terrain vehicle. We have a separate program where we have, through innovation and adaptability, put the suspension of an Medium Tactical 
24 

Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) 7-ton truck on to our Cat I MRAPs 

and we are pretty encouraged by that. The off road capability is apparently equal to that of the MTRV which, by the way, is the favorite vehicle of our troops in Afghanistan at the present, we think we 

can, if the continuation of these tests and we will know by about 

this time next month, but if it proves out as successfully as we 

hope, we will have those vehicles to Afghanistan sooner. And we 

will have more protection. 

Mr. KLINE. If I might. My time really is about to expire here. But 

it is that point I guess I am trying to get at here, is you have got 

the MRAP that has worked in Iraq. It is an on-road vehicle largely, 

you talk about using it for engineers. And now we are talking 

about Marines getting around, moving around in Afghanistan. And 

clearly, the IED threat could go up there, as it went in Iraq. And 

so, I see my time is expired, but the question is, will we have vehicles that our Marines need to ride in in Afghanistan? 

General CONWAY. The answer, sir, is absolutely, through one program or the other. 

Mr. KLINE. All right. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen for 

being here today. We lost two fine young Marines in a helicopter 

crash outside of San Diego a week or so ago, Captain Jessica 

Conklin and First Lieutenant Aaron Cox. Lieutenant Cox was from 

my district and, in fact, I had nominated him for the Naval Academy and he chose the Marine Corps. I talked to his parents a couple of days after he died, and they are very, very proud of what 

he had done, very, very proud of his performance, not only at the 

Naval Academy but as a Marine, and we certainly regret their loss 

but celebrate their service. 

I wanted to direct my questions to the Marine Corps here. I don’t 

know how long it has been now, General, two or three years ago, 

I think you first began talking about the fact that we did not have 

adequate troop strength in Afghanistan. I think you described it as, 

if you are going to do a program of clear, hold, and build, you have 

got to do more than just be able to clear. You have got to have the 

troops to hold and allow the people to build the country. We are 

clearly moving in that direction. And I think your Marines are very 

excited at the prospects of increased numbers of troops. 

My concern is, and we will probably see this discussion today and 

in the next week or two on the supplemental and then as the year 

goes on, my concern is that the American people may not be prepared for the length of time, that even with additional troops there 

is not something magical that is going to occur. And I wanted to 

give you the opportunity to explain how you see things happening 

over the next one, two, three, four, and five years. I asked the question yesterday to Secretary Gates, when the recent study came out 

that thought we needed to prepare at some level of a five- to tenyear involvement. 

But would you take my time to just talk about what you see as 

where we may be in a year or two or three and why we need to 

look over the long time. 

General CONWAY. I will indeed. I think it is fair to say that up 

until this time, almost right now, we have been in an economy of 
25 

force operation in Afghanistan with the emphasis being Iraq. We 

now see the opportunity to change that out, and the chairman has 

said recently that Afghanistan is now his new focus. 

We believe that, at least for now, the influx of 10,000 Marines 

and 2 brigades of Army troops, in the south in particular, is going 

to give us the ability to start to achieve stability and security. How 

well that will go will be determined by how emphatically the 

enemy responds. The enemy gets a vote in this whole arrangement. 

But lesser numbers of troops in the past, witness two form U going 

in and second battalion 7th Marines have had some pretty significant impact and have driven these people into our locations and to 

lesser numbers of engagement. 

I think we need to examine what happens over this next year 

with regard to our kinetic activity and how successful we will be. 

But there are other issues. I mentioned we are going into the 

Helmand River Valley where 93 percent of the drugs are produced 

in Afghanistan. And when I was there about a month and a half 

ago now, the estimates of resources to the tally began ranged somewhere between $80 million and $400 million a year that they can 

turn around and put against foreign fighters and explosives and 

those types of things. So we have got to work the drug issue simultaneous to increasing the level of security for the Afghanis who live 

in the region. 

At the same time, sir, we can be wildly successful in Afghanistan, I think, and not solve this Nation’s worst problem, which is 

the al Qaeda, if the forces in Pakistan aren’t having parallel or 

similar success across the border. 

Now, we are encouraged of course by recent events happening in 

the Swat Valley. Nothing like that has extended yet down to 

Balujistan opposite Regional Command (RC) south where we are 

operating. But it seems to me that the Pakistani government realizes there is a greater threat here and is now taking steps to deal 

with that. 

So I could not begin to put a timeline on how long all that is 

going to take. It is going to be evolutionary. It is going to be 

against some tried and true practices that come from our small 

wars manuals and some doctrine that the Army has developed. A 

large part of it will be something other than military force. We 

think that we need a larger civil involvement in that region to 

raise the quality of life of the people of Afghanistan to a degree 

where they see that we are not their enemy but the al Qaeda and 

the related Taliban are. That will take time. 

Dr. SNYDER. I think I will stop there. Thank you for your comments. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I welcome 

the panelists as everyone else has done. And I really wasn’t going 

to—I am not going to ask you a question. I am going to make a 

statement, then I have a question about a totally different subject. 

But Secretary Penn, you know, it has always bothered me that 

the Secretaries before you, you come before us with the fighting 

team, the fighting team is known as the Navy and the Marine 

Corps. And yet, it says witnesses: The Honorable B.J. Penn, Acting 

Secretary of the Navy. What happened to the team? 
26 

Now I am not asking you that question. Let me get to the point. 

Then I am looking at, in 2002, Marine Corps Commandant General James Jones, United States Naval Institute annual meeting 

April 4, 2002, Question: Legislation has been introduced to rename 

the Department of the Navy. What is your view? This is the answer from the Commandant. The Secretary of the Navy, Gordon 

England, has no objection. The CNO, Chief of Naval Operations, 

Admiral Vern Clark, has no objection. I have no objection. It is 

what it is. So if it passes, we are happy with that. Maybe that is 

something that is an idea that lawmakers believe whose time has 

come. 

Well, I am not going to ask the CNO. I am not going to ask the 

Acting Secretary. I am not going to ask the Commandant. I am not 

going to put anyone on the spot. But I will tell you that one of the 

things that has bothered me greatly with all that is being done by 

the fighting team, Navy and Marine Corps, that when a Marine 

dies, and the Secretary of the Navy sends a condolence letter to the 

wife of a Marine who gave his life for this country, there is nothing 

in the heading but the Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., 

and then the first sentence is The Navy family extends its condolences. 

It is time that the Department of Navy and Marine Corps become one fighting team. And I am pleased to tell you today that 

many people here and that are not here, we have 249 Members of 

the House that have signed legislation to rename the Department 

of Navy, Navy and Marine Corps. And I want to thank Senator Pat 

Roberts on the Senate side has dropped the same type of bill. 

I am not going to ask you today how you feel. I have got another 

question. But, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, as I have 

thanked Duncan Hunter, Sr., and now Mr. Skelton, our new chairman, for putting this language in the bill. And I believe sincerely 

that the American people want to see the stepchild become part of 

the family. And that would be the Department of Navy and Marine 

Corps. This is my question. 

The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman would yield. 

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir I will yield to the chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I want to assure you that the chairman of the 

seapower subcommittee, as well as the chairman of the full committee, will include that in the base bill this year. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. You are welcome. 

Mr. JONES. And I thank the subcommittee chairman as well. 

Yesterday, I praised Secretary Gates, I praised Admiral Mullen 

for their concern for the injured. And I want to praise you both, as 

well as the Secretary of the Navy and Marine Corps sitting here 

today. And I want to say to you, Commandant Conway, you and 

your wife have earned the love and respect of the Marine team. I 

heard this as frequently as yesterday. I spoke to a couple of ladies 

down, Marine wives down at Camp Lejeune. What I want to bring 

to you very quickly is that there is a process and a treatment to 

help our soldiers and our Marines and our Navy when they have 

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), when they have Traumatic 

Brain Injury (TBI), and it is called hyperbaric oxygen treatment. 

I would like to ask you both, and maybe the Secretary of the Navy 
27 

and Marine Corps sitting there today, I would like to ask you both 

your opinion, because I will tell you, I was pleased with Admiral 

Mullen, he is going to have someone to come meet with me. He 

wants to see what we can do to move this study quicker than what 

it is taking now. 

Admiral, are you familiar with this process? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, I am. And the Commandant and I 

have talked about this in the past. And the comment that I made 

to him, and even though there may be some who can question the 

efficacy of it, my comment, if I recall, and Jim, if you want to add 

to it, was if it can help, if it may help, I am in. So that is where 

I am. I believe that we should, for our people, explore every avenue 

that we can to help them recover from what are really becoming 

some signature wounds of this war that we are in. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. 

General CONWAY. Sir, as I travel about, you can imagine, a lot 

of people approach me with this idea or that in terms of how to 

treat TBI or PTSD. But I will tell you, I have seen none out there 

that I am more encouraged by than what I would call at this point 

the ad hoc results of hyperbaric treatment, to the point where we 

have put the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps in charge 

of trying to speed the process of the protocol that the Navy medicine must necessarily accomplish in order to rapidly bring this to 

treatment level for our Marines that we think are affected. 

In the meantime, there is a doctor down in New Orleans who 

treats people, and through some of our charitable organizations 

and so forth, we have sent forward those Marines suffering that we 

thought might be suicidal to get people in a treatment regimen because it can’t hurt. It can only help. And so even in those cases we 

are encouraged by some of the things that we are seeing. So we 

think that we are on to something here. 

Mr. JONES. Well, I want to thank, Mr. Commandant, you and the 

Admiral for your statement. I wanted to get that on the record because I intend to work with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle 

to push this treatment for those in the Army and the Marine 

Corps, and I would really appreciate your commitment to our men 

and women in uniform. And thank you for those statements. And 

with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back and thank you again for 

your statement earlier. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you so much 

for being here and for your extraordinary leadership to all of you. 

Thank you. 

As you know, the Vice President and Mrs. Biden are in San 

Diego today on the Ronald Reagan talking to military families, and 

it is one of those days when you really want to be in two places 

at once, of course. And my schedule didn’t permit me to go, but I 

am delighted that they are focusing and highlighting our military 

families. 

We had a chance to meet with a group as well recently, a group 

of spouses, particularly who represent a large number of military 

families, and one of the concerns that they expressed and it was 

reflected in a poll that basically says about 94 percent of military 

families believe that the country does not understand or appreciate 
28 

their sacrifices. That is a pretty high number. We know how resilient they are, but we also know that they are really burned out. 

And so I am just wondering your reaction to that. 

Yesterday in our discussion with Chairman Mullen and with Secretary Gates, they really alluded to the fact that there are some 

differences in commands and the way that families are treated and 

taken into account. And I asked about promotions and, you know, 

where do we factor that in to promotions and, you know, getting 

back to the question of how they feel about the rest of the country, 

outside the military community and their understanding of their 

sacrifice is how can we impact that when it comes to our commands? 

General CONWAY. Ma’am, I will start and say that it doesn’t totally surprise me because, as you can imagine, over time, and with 

the frequencies of our deployments, that a number of our spouses 

have gone home to be with their natural families for the period of 

time of the deployment. And what we hear almost routinely is that 

they are an anomaly back in their community. People do not understand their concerns with a child growing up without the other parent, or the worry that goes every time the phone rings, those kinds 

of things. So it doesn’t surprise me that that would be the reaction 

to, let’s say, the rest of America. 

It would be interesting to hear what they say about their service 

or the military or the DOD on a larger scale. I would hope that the 

response would be dramatically different, and that they are seeing 

the things that we are trying to do as services. They are bearing 

a tremendous load. And although we try to do as much as we can, 

I have to say, and I think it would be readily apparent, that the 

repetitiveness of it does get difficult. Our service culture helps 

some, in that we have seven-month deployments and that we rotate people out of the operating forces to what we call B billets, 

three-year billets elsewhere in a headquarters or training command 

or perhaps recruiting to try to give them time to recover before 

they might come back and do it again. But our families are the 

most brittle part of our equation. We accept that, and therefore we 

are putting a lot of the generosity you all have given us against 

those family service programs at the bases to try to raise the quality of life, show them psychologically that we do care, and make it 

better when the military member is gone. 

Mrs. DAVIS. If I could shift for a second. And I am sure, Admiral, 

that you would be concerned about this as well. And we talked 

about it yesterday also, is that when we are looking to budgets, and 

there are some concerns about fleet maintenance right now and 

trying to capture some dollars for that, that we may also be making it more difficult on families when it comes to their permanent 

duty stations and when they are actually transferred and how we 

deal with this. And it is an ongoing tough question. I mean, do you 

take dollars out of personnel or out of fleet maintenance? And I 

know that when I first came to Congress, one of the things I heard 

from a lot of the sailors is that, you know, they ended up doing a 

lot of make work because, you know, the maintenance was so poor. 

That changed over the last number of years when there were a lot 

more dollars, but there is a concern that we are relying too much 

on supplementals to kind of cover some of those costs. So I am ask-
29 

ing about that tough question. And could you respond. What goes 

into making those decisions because the families are saying, hey, 

you know, it is affecting us. And plus we have this whole issue 

about how we treat our families. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, that is my world, Ms. Davis. And how 

do we balance and get the right balance in the fleet of current 

readiness, the personnel programs and the future Navy that we 

know is important for our country. And as I do that, I weigh all 

of those factors. But we have used the base budget and supplemental funding to provide the maintenance and operating funds 

that we need. There is no question that this year, because of the 

higher retention rates that we are experiencing, lower attrition 

rates, which I think speaks volumes about the fulfillment that our 

sailors get about being in the Navy, is pressurizing our manpower 

account. 

And I have had to throttle way back on permanent change of station moves until the supplemental funding is provided to us because I don’t want to be in a position where I overspend the budget 

that you hold me accountable for. So we have had to do that. I 

await the supplemental coming, but those are just some of the decisions that we have to make. My commitment and what I told my 

leadership was that I won’t break a promise to a sailor, and I won’t 

take money out of their pockets, and I am holding to that. But we 

have had to make some adjustments in other areas to manage to 

our budget. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, 

Secretary Penn, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway. You 

know, it is always hard to know what to say to people like you that 

do what you can to keep the homeland safe and to continue to protect freedom for all of us. I never want to miss an opportunity to 

thank you for that. 

Admiral Roughead, you know, because Aegis ships are multi-mission platforms, I know that you have a lot of operational trade offs, 

some mission optimization, and opportunity cost decisions that you 

have to make when you are deciding how and when and where to 

deploy those ships. And I guess one example would be that an 

Aegis ship deployed to focus on missile defense may be deployed in 

a location that is sub-optimal for its support to anti-surface warfare. And I guess I have got three questions here if I can squeeze 

them all in if you can help me with that. 

First, some have proposed using the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) to provide missile defense protection of Europe. And 

where would be the optimal locations to deploy Aegis ships to meet 

that challenge if the decision were made? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. The versatility that you get with an 

Aegis ship in a ballistic missile defense mode is pretty unique. You 

can place them wherever you need them. You can move them 

around. It will be a—— 

Mr. FRANKS. For Europe, in particular. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. For Europe, in particular, you would want 

to have them in the Mediterranean for the tracking and the potential targeting of countries in the southern tier or in the eastern 

Mediterranean, and then also, the potential to deploy them up in 
30 

the northern waters around Europe. Where, exactly where is a 

function of how many you have, and so that is a calculus that has 

to be made. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, if the Aegis ships should be deployed, whether 

it is the Black Sea or the north or the Baltic Sea or, as you say, 

and I think that is the right answer, is the Mediterranean, Eastern 

Mediterranean. What other missions can’t it support? In other 

words, you know, what would be the planning and lead time? What 

would be the time required to deploy Aegis and what amount of 

threat warning time would be required to allow Aegis to move into 

theater or in these right locations? And what other missions might 

have to suffer because of it? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, the beauty of being a forward deployed 

Navy with that type of capability is you can move it around very 

quickly and respond literally within hours or days, depending on 

other things you have going on. The ship from which Captain Phillips was rescued was an Aegis ship that could just as easily have 

been swung into the Arabian Gulf for missile defense, into the Arabian Gulf for surface warfare. The fact is that even though someone would look at that ship and see it as a high-end capability, it 

can do lower-end missions. If you spend money on low-end ships, 

you can’t go high. And that is why I believe our Aegis ships are 

a great investment for the Nation. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I couldn’t agree with you more, Admiral. I 

really, I guess the point I am trying to get at here is that there 

are always operational trade-offs when you have to have lead time, 

these ships are not jets, and you have to have the time to move 

them around. And of course, there are operational trade-offs for 

other requirements that they have. And I know that you are fully 

aware of all that. But there have been those who have suggested 

that, you know, the European site could be easily replaced by Aegis 

and land based SM3. And of course, one of my big concerns about 

that is that those, the Aegis doesn’t protect the homeland of the 

United States. 

It would be potentially able to protect Europe, but it is the tradeoff and the operational trade-offs that we would have to make to 

do that, and it could not only pull these ships away from other necessary functions, but that the costs involved, can you speak to the 

cost of, you know, the disadvantage of in terms of costs of the Aegis 

ship having to be deployed there in the region, as opposed to landbased interceptors. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, I would say one of the solutions, sir, 

is you buy more ships. That is always an option. But anyway, it 

is always a trade-off. But even the Aegis ships when they are forward provide for other defense. For example, it was a series of 

Aegis ships in the Western Pacific that, when the North Koreans 

launched their missile, it was those Aegis ships that were providing the information that our leadership needed to make decisions. So you get a lot of coverage from the ships and a lot of value. 

Mr. FRANKS. I am a big believer in them, Admiral. I guess the 

point I am hoping that we can all keep in mind here is that when 

we do suggest that Aegis be a central component of protecting Europe we have got to keep the two things in mind. We have got operational trade-offs and it costs a lot to keep them there and they 
31 

don’t protect the homeland of the United States and I hope that 

that can continue to be part of the debate. And thank you all for 

the great work you do. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Courtney, the gentleman from Connecticut. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again, thank you 

to at all the witnesses for your patience also this morning. 

First of all, I just want to publicly state, Secretary Penn’s sonin-law is leaving the Groton sub-base after his excellent service for 

the submarine Group 2, and I just want to again, publicly acknowledge that, as well as his daughter Emily graced the state for the 

time that they were there and we will miss them but I know they 

are going to do great things when they return here to Washington. 

So please, Chairman Taylor has a hearing scheduled tomorrow 

morning, so I won’t be able to attend the ceremony, so please blame 

him and thank them for their great time in Connecticut. 

I also, again, want to salute Admiral Roughead for the great balancing act that I think you have done in this budget. I mean, when 

you think of the issues that you defuse with this plan in terms of 

the destroyer, you know, sort of contest that was out there six 

months ago, again, the work that you have done with the carrier 

plan, which just really seems to have satisfied all stakeholders and 

parties, you know, again, it is not easy doing what you have done 

and I think it really should be noted. 

Your testimony, written testimony included a comment which I 

wanted to at least share publicly. The chairman referred to it in 

his opening remarks, but your statement, I consider the Virginia 

class cost-reduction efforts a model for all our ships, submarines, 

and aircraft. Something that certainly the folks back in Connecticut appreciate. And again, we are very excited about the fact 

that the Missouri is going to be ready earlier and cheaper than all 

the predecessors, and I think that is a trend line that is going to 

continue. 

I wanted to just address a point though, which does still sort of 

fester out there, and despite the fact that the Virginia class program was designed and planned post-Cold War and is truly, in my 

opinion, a post-Cold War platform, there still seems to be a perception lingering out there that, you know, this is program that 

doesn’t fit within our national security plans. And I just wonder if 

you could comment on that. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. And my perspective goes beyond 

just being the Chief of Naval Operations. As a fleet commander, as 

a battle group commander, the utility that we get from our nuclear 

submarines or our attack submarines is extraordinary. They are 

the most effective weapon that we have in sea control. They are 

versatile in being able to project power with the missiles that they 

can launch. And they give our commanders insight and information 

that cannot be gained with any other platform that we have in our 

military. 

Their ability to stay submerged, to operate at great distances 

from the country is unmatched by any other country in the world. 

And I refer oftentimes in Naval warfare if you are a chess player, 

submarines are the invisible queens. They do everything. You can 

put them anywhere, and no one knows when they are going to ap-
32 

pear. And that is why our submarines are so important to our security and our safety and our prosperity. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. That is very well put. And I think 

also again it is important that people have to put it in context in 

terms of what the building plan is, is that in many respects it is 

partially replacing a declining fleet, but again, what you propose I 

think stabilize and balance it at an adequate number. And I guess 

that is the question I just want to confirm. I think I know the answer is that again, the budget that you proposed really is going to 

stay on target for the block three contract that was signed last December and that will get us to two a year in 2011; is that correct? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. That is correct, sir. In fact, the 2010 budget 

has a submarine in it and the advance procurement for the 11 

boats. And I am very, very pleased that we were able to do that. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And on the Ohio, which I know you referred to 

when I was outside of the room. Again, the notion that somehow 

we are getting ahead of the Quadrennial Review and the Nuclear 

Posture Review, I mean, the fact is that this is an issue that has 

already been analyzed deeply, both by the Navy and the Pentagon, 

and we really are not, the proposal that you have before us is not 

really jumping ahead of what I think is adequate analysis to justify 

it. Is that your position? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. That is my position, sir, that we are in the 

same timeframe that we were with the Ohios when we began the 

design of that boat. And now is the time to begin the design of the 

propulsion plant, the common vessel compartment, so that we don’t 

suffer a gap in that important part of our strategic deterrent force. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Admiral. I yield back. 

Mr. TAYLOR. [presiding.] The Chair thanks the gentleman. The 

chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin, for 

five minutes. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral, I am going 

to ask a question I have asked you to before. I asked it yesterday 

and I am just one of these slow learners. I am having a hard time 

putting this all together in my mind. But let me try and explain 

my problem. 

I hear you talking about we are going to have 11 aircraft carriers. We may take, go down to 10 temporarily when the Enterprise 

is moved out, but still 10 or 11. And aircraft carriers seem to work 

better when there are airplanes on them. It seems like that works 

that way. And we are talking about 44 airplanes per aircraft carrier. Now, a year ago we were looking at taking the F/A–18s and 

running them to, I believe it was 10,000 hours, to see if we could 

do that and stretch them a little longer before we retired them. 

And I think the information came back, no, you can’t because you 

have got to stay at the 8,600 or something, which means, according 

to the numbers that I have seen we have got a potential or projected shortfall of about 240 some fighter aircraft on these aircraft 

carriers. 

Now, you do the math and that comes out to more than five aircraft carriers. We are looking at almost 50 percent down on the 

number of fighter aircraft on aircraft carriers. 

Now I am hearing this Quadrennial Review and everything, but 

I don’t know if the Quadrennial Review is going to say we only 
33 

need five aircraft carriers. No one has suggested that particularly. 

It seems like we have got just a couple of choices. One, you have 

less aircraft carriers, or the other, you put a lot less airplanes on 

the aircraft carriers you have, to the point of almost two-to-one 

ratio. So I guess the question I am having is, and joint strike fighter may be a better aircraft, and if it is I will be the first one to 

say let’s get the right product or the best product we can for our 

money. 

On the other hand, the F/A–18s, you can get five-and-a-half of 

them for one joint strike fighter, and you can get them in a time 

period that you know, and we have the shortfall, which you can’t 

make up with GSM from what I am seeing. So I guess my question 

is, please explain to me, why aren’t we looking at a multi-year and 

at least supplementing some of that downside on the F/A–18s. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, thank you, sir. And what we have 

done in the 2010 budget is we have put in above what we understand is the sustaining rate for the line of the 18. And in this budget we have 18 electric network frequency (ENF), the Growler, and 

then we also have a number of Es and Fs in there, 9 Es and Fs, 

which is above the sustaining line or sustaining rate for the line. 

Mr. AKIN. There were originally 18 and you cut them back to 9? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. And as the Secretary mentioned 

yesterday, in the Quadrennial Defense Review we are going to have 

a very thorough and thoughtful discussion of tac air. And then, as 

we do that, we will look to what are the best options to continue 

to provide the type of Naval tactical aviation that the Nation 

needs. And there are, there is potential in buying some extra life 

on our As through Ds, as you well know, sir, for at least part of 

that fleet. And then we are going to have to look at the entire tac 

air issue. I look forward to that. You are absolutely right. The 18 

E and F is an extraordinary airplane. It is serving us well everywhere we operate it, and it is providing tremendous support to our 

troops on the ground in Afghanistan. Great airplane, but we, and 

I welcome the discussions that we are going to have in the Quadrennial Defense Review on tactical aviation. 

Mr. AKIN. I think what I am hearing you say is yeah, there are 

not maybe that many alternatives, but we are going to basically be 

cracking that nut at that particular time in history. I mean, I don’t 

understand there is much you can do other than either have less 

aircraft carriers or have less airplanes on the carriers or get the 

planes. I mean, it seems like there are not too many ways to wiggle. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. Those are the discussions that I am 

sure the Quadrennial Defense Review will take us through. 

Mr. AKIN. Right. Well I certainly appreciate your being patient 

with some of the slow learners here among us. Thank you very 

much. And I appreciate your good work. And General, I enjoyed our 

discussion the other day. Don’t have any questions. I am all ready 

to get another ride in one of your high-speed boats over there. So 

thank you. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman and would note 

that staff is not allowed to ask questions, but to the CNO, the gentleman to my immediate left is the former commanding officer of 

the SSBN 74, the USS Louisiana, who has asked that in the future 
34 

if the CNO could refer to his former force as something other than 

the invisible queens, if you could use another analogy for that force 

as something other than the invisible queens. I thought that Captain Ebbs made a good point, and I have relayed that message. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Obviously, he is not a chess player, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Having said that, the Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Nye. 

Mr. NYE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to 

thank all of you here today for your tremendous service to our 

country. 

First of all, Admiral Roughead, you said very well today that it 

behooves us to minimize our ship retirements by fully funding our 

maintenance account. And I would just like to make sure I am up 

to speed on where we are in terms of our backlog on maintenance 

and repair. I am trying to keep up with the math. I have got us 

somewhere between $425 and $450 million on our backlog for 

maintenance and repair. Am I in the right vicinity there? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, what I would say, Mr. Nye, is that as 

we go through this year, we have not cancelled any availabilities. 

There have been none that have been cancelled. We have held to 

that. And as you know, we make the most of our base budget and 

our supplemental money or contingency funding, but I have not 

cancelled any availabilities this year. 

Mr. NYE. So where are we in terms of our requirements and 

what we have got in terms of our maintenance funds? Are you saying that we are up to date on those accounts? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Where we are with regard to, at least for 

the Fiscal Year 2010 budget, we are funding that account to about 

96 percent, which is consistent with where we have been in years 

past, and what it allows us to do is to accept some risk as we try 

to balance all of the competing demands that we have in the Navy. 

I am comfortable with where we are. But it is important that the 

supplemental and also our base budget reflect the request. 

I would also say that as we try to make that balance and optimize those funds, losing money because of a peace time training 

offset, as we did last year, is not helpful in us being able to meet 

the requirements and meet the plans that we had in place, so your 

support in that would be greatly appreciated, sir. 

Mr. NYE. Thank you. I think you made a great point about balancing a long list of demands and requirements that we have right 

now. Secretary Penn, you sent me a letter on April 24 where you 

mentioned that the Navy had decided to postpone a final decision 

on home-porting a nuclear carrier at Mayport until we have a 

chance to go through the QDR process this year and take a look 

at balancing these priorities, vis-a`-vis our scarce defense dollars. 

And I appreciate your comments in that letter. 

You mentioned also that DOD would be requesting and indeed 

has requested in the 2010 budget some $75 million for dredging 

and dock upgrades at Mayport in case of an emergency for a location of a nuclear carrier there in Mayport under emergency circumstances. What I wanted to ask you is, have you considered, 

given the fact that besides Norfolk, for instance, commercial ports 

at Baltimore, Corpus Christi, Charleston, and some others that 
35 

have deep draft depths of between 47 and 50 feet might be appropriate for the use, not for a home port, but for in the case of an 

emergency, docking, a nuclear carrier. Have you guys looked at the 

notion of using a commercial port just in case of an emergency? 

Secretary PENN. I think that in the case of emergency we would 

use whatever port available, but our choice would be to go to military, a Navy port just for the security and so forth. 

Mr. NYE. Okay. So you have looked at the idea of potentially 

using a commercial port in case of an emergency? 

Secretary PENN. In case of emergency. 

Mr. NYE. Okay. Do you have a contingency plan in place for all 

of our ships for emergencies, for disasters, for where you would 

move them and put them? Is that something you have developed 

already? 

Secretary PENN. I think the operational side would like to—— 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. What I believe we do not have—well, I know 

we don’t have on the east coast of the United States—is a place 

where we can put a nuclear aircraft carrier and be able to conduct 

the type of support and maintenance that we would need in any 

other place other than Norfolk. 

On the west coast, we have three ports, gives us great strategic 

flexibility, and that is why I made the recommendation to upgrade 

the carrier port of Mayport, which has been a carrier port since 

1952, to accommodate a nuclear aircraft carrier and be able to take 

care of it there, should Norfolk be lost for any reason. I believe that 

that remains a good strategic option, and we will get into that further during the Quadrennial Defense Review as to the pros and 

cons of that. 

Mr. NYE. I thank you. 

I would be interested in seeing what a full plan looks like for all 

of our different types of ships and what we do in case of emergencies. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Mr. Nye, we have options for our combatants and for our submarines on both coasts, and we can bring up 

to you what those options are. But on the east coast there is no 

other place to put an aircraft carrier other than Norfolk, Virginia. 

Mr. NYE. Understood. 

I see that my time has expired. Let me just close by saying that 

I look forward to continuing to have this very important discussion 

about the use of our scarce defense dollars and priorities over the 

course of the upcoming year. So thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman, Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, and I would like to address my question 

here to the Commandant of the stepchild of the Department of the 

Navy here. 

Could you just fill me in—and you can have all of my time here. 

First question, do you know who is going to be in control of RC 

South for you? Who is going to be ground commander for the marines in RC South? 

General CONWAY. Right now, it is being wrapped up, the senior 

command, by a general from the Netherlands. The Brits have the 

next rotation. So for the vast majority of this next calendar year 

it is going to be the Brits. 
36 

Mr. HUNTER. Who is going to be in charge of the marines there 

in RC South? 

General CONWAY. Well, there is a Brigadier General, Larry Nicholson, who has already arrived in theater who is the expeditionary 

brigade commander. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. 

Next question—and this is what you can have the rest of the 

time for. Are you satisfied that you are able to meet the challenges 

of the IED surge that is going to happen as we go in, as we surge? 

I, probably better than anybody else up here, know that we are 

going to take casualties because we are going to go out and we are 

going to fight. But, on the other hand, when it comes to IEDs, without the infrastructure we have in Iraq right now, are you happy? 

Are you satisfied that the counter-IED infrastructure that we have 

there right now is where you want it to be for this Marine surge 

to take place? 

General CONWAY. Well, sir, it is never as good as we would like 

it to be, and you again of all people realize that they can build an 

IED that will be big enough to take out anything that we have got. 

Happily, right now we are not seeing that so much in Afghanistan. 

The level of sophistication, the size of the IEDs that we are seeing 

are not what we have witnessed in Iraq, but it is also on a progression, and it is getting more sophisticated. They are getting bigger. 

They are using the culverts and those types of things. 

So the answer is, no, we are never satisfied until we have found 

a way to detect and defeat the device at range, and of course, agencies work to be able to do that. We work to attack the entire chain 

all the way from the person with the money to the bomb maker to 

the bomb layer to the person that detonates, with mixed success 

along that whole continuum, but we are never satisfied. 

Mr. HUNTER. The Marine Corps doesn’t have any organic 

counter-IED Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaisance (ISR). It 

doesn’t have a Predator that can actually strike. You have Pioneers, and you have some other International Security Organizations (ISOs). You don’t have the task force—you don’t have something like that. Are you satisfied that the other services are going 

to be able to cover for you as you go in? 

General CONWAY. I think so. You are right. We have organic ISR 

but nothing that is armed that can strike, say, a half a dozen guys 

that are obviously laying an IED. 

That said, General McKiernan has said—I suspect General 

McCrystal will continue the thought process—that the real fight is 

going to be in RC South. That is going to be his main effort. When 

that happens, you are allocated these other national assets, if you 

will, in large measure, and we do think that we will have plenty 

of those to be able to strike a target if we identify some nefarious 

activity. 

Mr. HUNTER. You can’t foresee any Army, Marine Corps, RC 

East, RC South, not turf war necessarily but kind of trying to gain 

assets back and forth between RC South and RC East, trying to determine who has the most need for them? 

General CONWAY. Well, we think that that is going to be in the 

south, just based upon the fact that, again, things are relatively 

more stable in the east and up north. We do think, as you indicated 
37 

by your question, there is going to be a larger fight down south. 

So when that happens and you become the priority of effort, you 

get the priority of ISR support. So we are guardedly optimistic that 

those commanders are going to have those downlinks and be able 

to vector these aircraft where they need to go. 

Mr. HUNTER. Are you going to be driving the upgraded seventons? Because the MRAPs aren’t going to work on the road. That 

is what we went over earlier. The MRAPs aren’t going to work, and 

we are not going to have the next-generation armored vehicle by 

the time you guys—we are talking about it now, but how we are 

going to fund it and what we are going to do? So are you satisfied 

in your ability to be armored and drive on the roads? I am just getting Iraq flashbacks pre-MRAP on this stuff where we were talking 

lots of casualties. We didn’t have enough armor. 

General CONWAY. Frankly, two things. We want to get off the 

road, okay, because that makes us predictable and that is how you 

get in trouble with IEDs. 

Right now, the most popular vehicle in Iraq is the Light Tactical 

Vehicle Replacement (LTVR), the seven-ton, because it can get offroad. It has got the mobility and so forth. 

As I started to indicate to Mr. Kline, we are putting that suspension on our smaller MRAPs with pretty good success, we believe, 

to date. So at some point, I think in the very near future, we may 

well have both, a heavy MRAP in the range of 35,000 pounds that 

can get off-road in ways that it never did in Iraq. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General. 

Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Ms. Bordallo from Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Penn, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, I 

thank you all for your testimonies this morning. 

And, Secretary Penn, I believe this may be one of your last hearings before this committee, so I want to go on record to thank you 

for your steadfast leadership and unwavering support of the military buildup on Guam, and I appreciated the opportunity to work 

closely with you and your staff over the last few years. I certainly 

wish you good luck in the future. 

Secretary PENN. Thank you so much, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. First, I would like to direct my question to General Conway. 

Yesterday, we heard testimony from the Secretary of Defense, 

and he reaffirmed the United States Government’s commitment to 

the military buildup on Guam. However, your recent comments to 

an Appropriations Committee hearing seem to indicate otherwise. 

So can you please clarify your position on the military buildup on 

Guam? Are you supportive of moving marines from Okinawa, 

Japan, to Guam? 

Now, I understand, General, that there are concerns, and we will 

get to those in my second question, but my first question: Are you 

supportive of executing the Secretary of Defense’s directive to make 

the buildup a success? 

General CONWAY. Yes, ma’am. You weren’t in the chamber earlier, but the chairman asked essentially that same question, and 
38 

my preamble was that the United States Marine Corps does support the move to Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Now, I know there is a concern about 

training requirements in the Pacific region overall, but let me ask 

you this question. What comes first, the realignment or the training? And if you feel it is both, then why haven’t you formally developed your training requirements requested in EIS or an amended 

MRIC? 

General CONWAY. Ma’am, we have long since before developed 

our EIS requirements. We have grave considerations for our ability 

to train on Guam and in the adjacent islands and the ability to 

keep those marines ready to go in response to a national contingency. So the requirements, as Mr. Penn can validate, are wellknown. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. Secretary? 

Secretary PENN. Yes, ma’am. As you know, if we start another 

EIS, that is called segmenting, which means we have to go start 

over again, and we would lose the three years we have been working on this and probably push it out to five years. So we want to 

go ahead do the AIP EIS, and then we will go back and pick up 

the training EIS for the other islands. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I further understand that there are concerns 

about—this is again for you, General. I understand there are concerns about the local infrastructure on Guam. Can you comment 

on, one, actionable and concrete steps that you have taken to address the local infrastructure concerns? 

I have in my hand a letter from Secretary Penn expressing support for a U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) loan for the closure of the Ordot landfill. Now, can I expect a letter from you as 

well attesting to the need for these improvements on Guam in 

order to better fulfill the Marine Corps mission? 

General CONWAY. Ma’am, we identified the requirements that 

our force will have on Guam. It is more a naval facilities concern 

to ensure that those requirements are met in some form or fashion, 

and, once again, we have identified those requirements for what we 

think is going to be the mix of both our bachelor marines and our 

families on the island. There are issues with land purchase, land 

lease, those types of things, training ranges, and those type of 

things, but it is all rolled up in the requirement documents. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. And on the landfill? 

General CONWAY. I am not familiar with that one, to be honest 

with you. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Secretary, do you want to comment on that? 

Secretary PENN. Yes, ma’am. As you know, we have gone so far 

as to meet with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 9 

almost two years ago talking about the landfill, and you have my 

letter. We are working with all the interagencies trying to get their 

support on the infrastructure requirements of Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I am just expecting something, General, because 

it will be a joint use, the Ordot landfill, and so if at all possible 

we would like to have some kind of assurance. 

General CONWAY. I will certainly check into it, ma’am, and see 

how it affects our presence on Guam, and if there is a requirement 
39 

there, it will be forwarded. But, again, to date, we have not identified that as an issue. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman, please. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Conway, I think we are in—to focus the main effort of 

where you are putting marines in in southern Afghanistan, if I 

think back to Iraq in 2005, they launched—in al Anbar Province 

they launched Operation Rivergate, which was to establish I think 

a battalion-sized blocking position just beneath the Haditha Dam, 

and then Operation Stillgate I think was in the Al Qaim area toward the Syrian border. 

Prior to having that larger troop presence, marines I think were 

just doing operations along what they called the ‘‘rat line’’ every 

now and then, and then pushing—the insurgents kind of knew to 

just leave the area, and then when the marines were done with the 

operation they would come back and kill anybody who they suspected cooperated with the marines while they were present there. 

And so with that larger presence, instead of having just a company 

reinforced, having a battalion reinforced in both positions made a 

world of difference. 

Are you concerned that—I mean, do you have the kind of concentration that is needed in this area in Kandahar Province to 

make a difference, or are you going to be spread too thin? 

General CONWAY. Sir, I will go back to the requirements that 

General McKiernan has established for forces in the south, and, 

frankly, one of them goes back to the two-star headquarters that 

would relieve the Brits. That is scheduled at this point to be U.S. 

Headquarters, and he has a request for force out there that would 

accomplish that. Those, at least at this point, portend to be marines. 

The other thing that is not yet satisfied is another regiment or 

brigade combat teams (BCTs) worth of troops that he would request at some point later on in 2010, and, at this point, the determination by the Secretary of Defense is to wait and see progress 

in the country before there is, say, the meeting of that Request for 

Forces (RFF) and the assignment of troops. 

At this point, I believe that there is enough to make a difference. 

Whether there is enough to do what our campaign strategy would 

call for remains to be seen, and that will be based on enemy action. 

I can tell you, based upon a recent visit there, there is about 

three places in our sector now that I think are going to constitute 

some fairly significant fighting. For whatever combination of reasons, the enemy has dug in in these three locations, at least the 

one instance we know to protect his drug money, but we are going 

to have to root them out of there if we are truly going to be the 

strongest tribe yet again and be able to say that we are creating 

stability and security for the population in the whole of the province. 

Mr. COFFMAN. A central objective is certainly to destroy those 

poppy fields. Is there a robust enough plan enough to do that without unnecessarily alienating the farmers? Although I know some of 
40 

them are cooperating with the Taliban, but how do you bridge 

that? 

General CONWAY. Sir, right now, there is not enough. They have 

the right design, the right concepts that work to be able to provide 

alternative crops, education to the farmers on how to grow those 

crops, infrastructure plans to get the product to market after harvest, and so forth. The problem that we see is the drug problem 

is that large. The solution set being put against it is like that on 

a comparative basis. So it needs much more scope to be able to 

overcome the size of the drug problem in Helmand. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Are we creating a new class of enemy by virtue 

of having the objective—and I think the objective is a good one, because those are resources that are going to the Taliban in some 

form—but I mean without a robust plan to help those farmers, are 

we unnecessarily creating a new class of enemy? 

General CONWAY. Sir, there is every possibility for that. If we go 

in and destroy a man’s ability to feed his family based on what he 

has been doing now for a decade, we may turn him against us. 

That is the value of having this alternative means readily available 

to assist him in doing something now that is legal. So we are concerned about that, and the commanders are fully attuned to let’s 

not create more enemy in the process here of poppy destruction. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I wonder if the Secretary could comment on that. 

Secretary PENN. Going on with what the General said, this is 

strictly about the hearts and minds of our enemy, and we are doing 

everything in our power to destroy the fields. We have to deprive 

al Qaeda (AQ), Taliban of their resources, and this is how we do 

it. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Right, but I don’t see a robust enough plan. I understand that objective, and I think that is a good objective and 

that needs to be done, but I don’t see we are—there is a robust 

enough plan to do that where we are not creating a new class of 

enemy and we are not taking unnecessary casualties as a result of 

that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. We have three votes: one 15-minute vote and two 

5-minute votes. We have two members who have not asked questions, and we are going to try to squeeze them both in. 

Mr. Sestak. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, I wanted to ask you at this time two questions. Both 

of them have to do about the Navy’s contribution to an asymmetric 

threat. The first is what I guess we used to call a rogue nation, 

Iran, and the ballistic missile threat it portends. In Secretary 

Gates’ speech about how we were going to reform the military, embedded in it was a line that said we are going to have an Aegis 

upgrade by software for about—well—that many ships. 

The President allegedly wrote a letter to the president of Russia, 

second data point, that said we would kind of consider giving up 

our missile site in Poland if you help us with the Iranians not to 

get a nuclear weapon. 

When he spoke on proliferation in Prague, third data point, he 

talked about a missile defense system of Europe—not in Europe 

but of Europe—in a cost-effective way. 
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So my fourth point is, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) has 

said that a sunk—and I ask this in the sense of, as we allocate national treasure, we don’t want to have a redundant capability out 

there, that is, if we don’t have to—that three or four Aegis ships 

give an equivalent and even a broader but equivalent de minimis 

capability the same as the missile sites in Europe. It is a sunk cost. 

It needs some software upgrade, but it is there. 

How do you look at that trade-off, that you can assume that responsibility not just for the defense of Europe but an equivalent capability, de minimis, that a land site in Poland would give? Is that 

the correct way to look at this shift that you desire between the 

DDG–1000 and the DDG–51? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, and I would say that our ability to 

use our Aegis fleet—our existing Aegis fleet and at minimal cost 

upgrade them into very capable missile defense assets, not just for 

search and track but also to equip them with the interceptors that 

are required, is a good investment, and, in fact, this year’s budget, 

the 2010 budget, has six more upgrades included in there. 

Mr. SESTAK. How many Aegis ships now do you have? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Right now, we have 18. 

Mr. SESTAK. And how many Aegis ships that could be upgraded? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. We can upgrade all but the first few cruisers that we have. 

Mr. SESTAK. I am sorry, Admiral, what is that number roughly? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. That number, if we wanted to do the whole 

fleet, would be around 70 ships, if we wanted to do the entire fleet. 

Mr. SESTAK. So if this political-military tradeoff were to be done, 

in a sense, these are 70 or 80 ships already purchased, some de 

minimis upgrade, that you could move around off North Korea, 

Iran and give, according to IDA, the same capability as more sunk 

costs of missiles ashore; is that correct? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. I believe the investments that we 

can make in Aegis ships give the Nation a very versatile and capable ballistic missile defense system, obviously optimized regionally, 

but also that can contribute to the broader intercontinental equation as well. 

Mr. SESTAK. And potentially even help us move with a nation 

like Iran, if you can get a Russia that doesn’t like the missile sites 

in Europe. 

The second question has to do with another asymmetric set at 

the other end of the spectrum: piracy. This isn’t your responsibility. 

This is Central Command’s responsibility or African Command’s responsibility of how many ships and all. But last week you had I 

think, according to the Web site, 105 ships forward deployed, four 

or so off the coast of Africa. We have convoyed ships north and 

south in the Persian Gulf. Fifty at a time go north—past north Somalia on the way north; 50 come the way south. The arguments 

that seem to come out is, boy, it is the size of Texas. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Four times. 

Mr. SESTAK. But the Atlantic Ocean, as we convoy it and protect 

it, it was a mission. What are the other 109 ships doing that they 

can be assisting us off that coast? 
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Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, as you know, we maintain a healthy 

presence in the Arabian Gulf itself. Our ability to operate in the 

Western Pacific, Indian Ocean to assure and deter—— 

Mr. SESTAK. But what threat are they facing that they couldn’t 

be moved over? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I would say that it is not always the issue 

of countering a threat but the ability for the United States to be 

present, to be able to influence, and the impact and the assurance 

and deterrence that our fleet provides globally is significant and to 

walk away from other places of the world will—I believe has the 

potential to create problems. Our presence in the Southern Hemisphere, in the Western Pacific, in the South Pacific, indeed even in 

the areas around Africa, I believe is a powerful symbol of American 

interest and American capability and power that assures friends 

and deters those who wish us ill. 

I would say that in the area off Somalia we have been very successful in bringing together a coalition, an international force, that 

adds to our capability there. Just last night, the Koreans and us 

stopped a hijacking and seized pirates. That in and of itself is also 

very valuable. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman, there is about two-and-a-half minutes left on the vote. Do you think you can squeeze a quick question? 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will cut 

right to the chase. 

Admiral Roughead, Secretary Penn, General Conway, thank you 

so much and thanks for your service to this Nation. I will cut right 

to the chase. 

General Conway, I understand there are a number of challenges 

that the Marine Corps faces, one of them obviously being in the 

area of training. I understand there is a requirement for a venue 

to create the capacity for a marine expeditionary brigade level of 

training. Can you tell me a little bit about the Marine Corps’ plan 

to meet that challenge to provide that capability and what that 

means as far as your operational capacity and readiness? 

General CONWAY. Sir, we do see a need to be able to train a brigade-size unit at one time in one location with live fire, and we are 

examining, therefore, tracts of land at our largest military base in 

the States, the Twenty-Nine Palms to see what that entails. 

There is a couple of different ways to skin that cat. One is with 

a land purchase. That is 450,000 acres plus. Another one might 

work if we go something closer to about 195,000 acres. 

There is an issue of some civilian use of some of that land. There 

are environmental issues. All of this has expense associated with 

it. All these things are being looked at in studies right now to see 

if we can’t both train and at the same time provide some level of 

joint use for our fellow Americans. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman, we think we better go vote; and, 

gentlemen, thank you for your presence and your excellent testimony. 

[Whereupon, at 1:49 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MAY 14, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MAY 14, 2009 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MAY 14, 2009 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The lowest number of ships we have had in the last 10 years 

is 279 in 2007. 

The Navy baseline budget does not include allowances for unplanned, extensive 

repair work such as that required for USS HARTFORD and USS PORT ROYAL. 

This would be true in either a mission funded or Navy working capital fund environment. When unforeseen incidents occur that require extraordinary shipyard repair 

efforts, manpower resources are realigned to the highest priority work and if required, previously scheduled work is deferred. The Navy goes to great lengths to 

schedule the emergent work to minimize impacts to shipyard efficiency and overtime. [See page 11.] 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. We will retire seven ships in FY 2009: 

• USS KITTY HAWK (CV63) 

• USS TARAWA (LHA 1) 

• USS JUNEAU (LPD 10) 

• USS NASHVILLE (LPD 13) 

• USNS CONCORD (T–AFS 5) 

• USNS SATURN (T–AFS 10) 

• USNS HAYES (T–AG 195) [See page 11.] 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. In the current Systems Development and Demonstration 

(SDD) phase of the JSF program, 19 aircraft will be built, 13 flight test articles and 

six static test articles. To date nine aircraft have been completed. Of the nine aircraft, three flight test articles are currently flying, three flight test articles are in 

the run station preparing for first flights, and three static test articles are testing 

in the labs. The remaining aircraft will be delivered through the remainder of this 

year and the first half of calendar year 2010 to begin flight and lab testing. The 

19 SDD aircraft consist of multiple variants: seven short take-off and vertical landing variants for the Marine Corps, six conventional take-off variants for the Air 

Force, five carrier variants for the Navy, and one non-production, representative 

conventional take-off variant. [See page 12.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The FY 2009 Shipbuilding Plan, submitted with the President’s 2009 Budget, is the Navy’s current long-range shipbuilding plan. The FY 

2009 plan provides a detailed program for the construction of combatant and support vessels for the Navy over the next 30 fiscal years and represents currently estimated levels of required annual funding and related procurement strategies. 

Title 10 USC 231 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an Annual Long 

Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels, the shipbuilding plan must reflect 

the U.S. National Security Strategy or the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR). The 2009 QDR and concurrent Nuclear Posture Review are underway now 

and due for submission with the FY 2011 budget. These efforts will likely have a 

substantive impact on the Navy’s force structure requirements; therefore, the Navy 

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense decided to defer the FY 2010 shipbuilding 

plan and submit a revised plan concurrent with the President’s FY 2011 budget. 

The FY 2010 President’s Budget fully funds the construction of naval vessels requested for FY 2010. [See page 19.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MAY 14, 2009 

(119) 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. The EP–3E ARIES II is the Navy’s only land-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) reconnaissance aircraft. As you know, the Navy’s fleet of EP–3 aircraft has been heavily engaged in support of operations in Bosnia, Korea, Iraq, and 

Afghanistan, and the planes are wearing out. I understand that the Navy has been 

reviewing options to replace the EP–3 fleet. With that in mind, what is the Navy’s 

plan, including any acquisition timeline, for replacing these critical assets? 

Secretary PENN. EP–3 transition plan is scheduled to start in 2019 and end in 

2024. Special Structural Inspection-Kits (SSI–K) will be added to scheduled 

sustainment efforts and are planned for all 16 EP–3E aircraft. These sustainment 

efforts ensure 12 primary mission aircraft inventory (PMAI) through EP–X IOC 

(2021). EP–3 aircraft mission systems are being upgraded to a Multi-Intelligence 

configuration, which started in 2007. 

The Navy is committed to the EP–X program to recapitalize the EP–3 ISR&T 

(Targeting) capability, which will incorporate Multi-Intelligence, data fusion and 

cue-to-kill targeting capabilities. 

EP–X is a pre-Milestone (MS) A program that is awaiting a Material Development 

Decision (MDD), anticipated to occur in October 2009. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD, AT&L) on 18 Dec 2008 approved guidance for the conduct of an EP–X Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). The AoA 

results will guide development of a recommended material solution, acquisition 

strategy, and cost estimate leading to MS A. The AoA is scheduled to complete in 

the 3rd quarter FY 2010. Funding for the Technology Development and Engineering 

and Manufacturing Development phases of the program will be provided in POM– 

12. The Navy’s anticipated EP–X timeline includes: 

• MS A in FY 2011 

• MS B in FY 2015 

• MS C in FY 2019 

• Initial Operational Capability in FY 2021 

• Full Operational Capability in FY 2023 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. In the last several years, submarine accidents have led the 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to have to do unplanned and extensive repair work. 

Due to mission funding, the Shipyard is not allocated any extra funds to deal with 

such unanticipated repairs, and must take both workers and funds away from 

planned work. This impacts Shipyard efficiency, strains a limited budget, and can 

cause additional overtime. Given that unforeseen incidents will continue to occur, 

what plans does the Navy have to provide funds and manpower to the Shipyard to 

allow it to do this emergency repair work without reducing Shipyard efficiency and 

its budget for scheduled work? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Navy baseline budget does not include allowances for 

unplanned, extensive repair work such as that required for USS HARTFORD and 

USS PORT ROYAL. This would be true in either a mission funded or Navy working 

capital fund environment. When unforeseen incidents occur that require extraordinary shipyard repair efforts, manpower resources are realigned to the highest priority work and if required, previously scheduled work is deferred. The Navy goes 

to great lengths to schedule the emergent work to minimize impacts to shipyard efficiency and overtime. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Can you please elaborate on how the FY 10 budget assures that 

the Marines that are deploying to Afghanistan as part of the current ramp-up have 

the necessary equipment and facilities they need when they arrive there? 
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General CONWAY. The Marine Corps’ FY 10 budget continues to provide the necessary support to Marines deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The budget provides continued support for training Marines in conventional and irregular warfare and provides the necessary equipment and facilities 

needed to conduct operations in Afghanistan. 

Training: The FY 10 budget continues support of advanced training programs 

such as Enhanced Mojave Viper which is designed to serve as the culminating mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) for all units that attend. The critical element of the 

EMV is that attending units are able to horizontally integrate with other elements 

of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). While the driving factor behind the 

development of EMV was Afghanistan, it also serves as a significant step forward 

in core competency training, as it reestablishes combined-arms tactical integration 

of the elements of the MAGTF. 

Equipment: The Marine Corps will continue to rotate our forces in Afghanistan 

and fall in on equipment sets maintained in theater. Our force deployment and 

equipping strategy is no different in Iraq, and will be even more appropriate in Afghanistan. The 2d MEB’s equipment set has been globally sourced from four different sources; 55% from new procurement, 27% from equipment already forward 

deployed in the Central Command Area of Responsibility, 14% from home station 

units, and 4% from in-stores at Marine Corps Logistics Command. The 2d MEB 

equipment set was built off of lessons learned in OIF/OEF based on counterinsurgency, and security and stability operations. It is heavy in armored motor transport 

and command and control type equipment, but light on the more traditional ‘‘high 

end’’ items such as tanks, amphibious assault vehicles, and artillery normally associated with Phase III (combat operations) type equipment set. 

Facilities: While the Army and Air Force provide the necessary facilities needed 

to support ground operations in Afghanistan, the Marine Corps’ FY 10 baseline request continues to support new construction and replacement of existing facilities 

for the Marine Corps’ increase in end strength. The requested funding will provide 

permanent barracks, mess facilities, operations centers, training ranges, Bachelor 

Enlisted Quarters (BEQs), and other supporting facilities on existing Marine Corps 

installations. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. What is the Marine Corps’ long-term plan for MRAP vehicles? a. 

Will MRAPs become an official program of record and be moved out of the war funding budget? b. What is the Marine Corps’ requirement for MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles? 

General CONWAY. a. Yes, MRAPs will become an official program of record and 

moved out of the war funding budget. 

The Marine Corps’ enduring requirement for MRAP vehicles was presented to and 

approved by the senior leadership of the Marine Corps during July 2009. The approved course of action proposed that all MRAPs presently allocated to the Marine 

Corps and determined to be in an appropriate operational condition, will be retained 

and designated for one of three purposes: 

— A small portion, 745 vehicles, will be maintained in the operating forces. 

— An additional number of the remaining MRAPs, 733 vehicles, will be placed 

in prepositioned short-term storage (accessible within 30 days worldwide). This 

would potentially place MRAP vehicles on Maritime Preposition Shipping, War 

Reserve, Albany, GA, Depot Maintenance Float Allowance and Norway. 

— The remaining MRAP vehicles, 1,024 vehicles, will be placed in long-term storage (accessible within 90 days worldwide) at existing Marine Corps Depot locations, most likely Barstow, CA based on cost and climate. 

Location of 25 MRAP Ambulance variants will be determined by operational requirements. 

b. The Marine Corps and U.S. Army have also embarked on developing a MRAP 

All-Terrain Vehicle (MATV) which will be a more maneuverable off-road vehicle for 

use in Afghanistan and incorporates MRAP-like level protection. A six-month selection effort was just completed and the first order for vehicles was placed on contract 

with Oshkosh Corporation, Oshkosh, WI on 30 June 2009. The Marine Corps’ current M–ATV requirement is approximately 1,565 vehicles. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Can you please detail the Marine Corps’s efforts to reduce the 

weight of body armor systems? What are your thoughts about establishing a task 

force similar to the MRAP Task Force and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force to accelerate these efforts? 

General CONWAY. The Marine Corps is actively pursuing efforts to reduce body 

armor weight. Several recent load reduction efforts have positively affected the individual Marine operating in Afghanistan today. While the Marine Corps would be 
121 

eager to collaborate in any effort to accelerate weight reduction, we believe the establishment of a task force is unnecessary. A significant reduction in the weight of 

body armor plates requires a technology breakthrough. 

Current Efforts 

As part of our response to an urgent need from Marines operating in Afghanistan, 

Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) conducted the rapid acquisition of Scalable Plate Carriers (SPC). The SPC uses the same soft body armor and 

hard armor plates used in the Modular Tactical Vests (MTV), while reducing the 

area of coverage to improve mobility and reducing the load by approximately 8–10 

lbs. The SPC illustrates a successful weight reduction in body armor provided to 

Marines in less than 90 days of the urgent request through the use of current products and technologies. MARCORSYSCOM developed the SPC as a complementary 

body armor product to the MTV. Today, Marines are issued both SPCs and MTVs 

prior to deploying to Afghanistan. 

Concurrently, on 10 July 09, the Marine Corps published MARADMIN 415/09 

which describes the Marine Corps Armor Protection Level (APL) concept. APL encourages a risk-based approach by enabling the Commander on the ground to choose 

options for the wear of vests and plate carrier body armor components alike. 

Current Coordination and Collaboration to the Future 

With the Science & Technology community, the Marine Corps is exploring various 

new technologies and integration concepts to reduce the weight of body armor systems in an effort to increase mobility and survivability. Marine Corps Research and 

Development funding efforts are designed to yield material solutions that can reduce 

the weight and volume of equipment being used today while also increasing performance. Inclusive in these studies are projects being sponsored under the Department of Defense’s Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program, as well as 

Marine Corps funded projects through the Naval Research Labs (NRL), and the Office of Naval Research (ONR). 

In addition, we are collaborating with our industry partners, academia, sister 

Services, and other Departments and Agencies. Several forums facilitate Army-Marine Corps cooperation, including the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board, 

the Army-Marine Corps Board, and the Cross-Service Warfighter Equipment Board. 

The Marine Corps and Navy are also collaborating more closely than ever. The 

Naval Logistics Integration initiative (NLI) will ensure that the Navy is able to take 

advantage of technological developments on the part of the Marines, while having 

their own requirements fulfilled. 

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