### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE N ove m be r 2, 200 4 S es sio n LOUI S HUDSON RO BERTS v. MARY ELI Z ABETH TODD, ET AL 

### .

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 03-809-II Car ol L. McCoy, Chancellor

No. M2003- 02594-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Dece m ber 21, 2004

Th is i s a n a

pp e a l f ro m a tr ia l c ou rt ’s de nia l of

a mot ion to s e t a sid e a

de fa ult jud g me nt. We a ff

ir m.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t A ffirm e d; and Rem anded
D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in whic h A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J . and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined. Connie Reg uli, Bre ntwood, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Mary

Eliz abeth Todd.
Jon S. Jabl on sk i, N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lle e , L ou is H ud so n Ro be rt s. OP IN ION
Fac ts a nd P

ro c e dur al H ist or y On Fe bruary

28, 2002, L ouis Hud s o n R o berts (“ Husband” ) and Ma ry Eliz abeth Todd (“Wife” ) we re divorc ed in Davidson County Circuit Court. P u rs uant to a marital dissolut ion ag ree ment (“ M DA”), the parties ag ree d to own the marital re sidence as joint tenants, with Wi fe ha vin g so le po sse ssi on wh ile Hu sb a nda ssu me d r e sp on sib ili ty fo r the mortg a g e indebte dn e ss. Specifica lly , the M DA provided that “Wife shall have sole and exclusive use and posse ssion of the marital re sidence until such tim e as it is sold, either by ag ree ment of the pa

rties or by

Orde r of the Court.”
On Marc h 21, 2003, Husband filed a Complaint for Partition in t he chancery court. After Wife failed to file a n answe r, Husband f iled a motion for def

ault judgme nt on May 2, 2003. Wife also failed to respond to Husband’s motion for de fault judg ment. On J une 5, 2003, the tria l court enter ed an or der g ranting Husband a default judgment. The trial court r efe rre d the matter to the Clerk and Ma ster (the “Master ”), dire cting her to de termine matter s reg arding the partiti o n of the property , such as owne rship interests, encumbranc es, and the m anner of sale. On J une 30, 2003, theIt a p p e a rs fro m th e r e c o rd th a t th e h e a rin g b e fo re th e C le rk a n d M a ste r m a rk s the fi rs t ap p e a ra n c e o f W ife in 1
t hi s m at t er.

R ule 6 0 .02 p ro vid es, i n p erti ne nt p art, as f o l l o w s: 2

O n m o tio n a n d u p o n s u c h ter m s a s a re ju st, t h e c o u rt m a y re liev e a p a rty o r th e p a rty’s
r epre s ent at i ve f

r om a f i nal j udgment , order or procee di ng fo r the f ol l owi ng r eas ons : ( 1) mi s t ake , i n adv er t en ce , s u r pr i s e, or ex cu s abl e n eg l ec t ; (2) f r au d ( wh et h er h er et ofor e den omi n at ed i n t r i n s i c or ex t r i n s i c) , mi s r epr es en t at i on , or ot h er mi s con du ct of a n a dv er s e par t y ; ( 3) t h e j u dg men t i s v oi d; ( 4) t he j udgment ha s b een sat i s f i ed, rel eas ed or di s cha r ged, o r a pri or ju dgment upo n whi ch i t i s bas ed ha s b een revers ed or o t he rw is e vacated, or i t i s no l o nger equit ab l e t hat a judgm ent s ho ul d have p ro sp e c tive a p p lica tio n ; o r (5 ) a n y o the r re a so n ju stif ying re lief fro m the o p e ra tio n o f t h e ju d g m e n t.

T enn. R

. C i v. P

. 60

. 0 2 (20 0 4 ). -2- pa rt ie s a tte nd e d a

he ari ng be fo re the Ma ste r, wh e re Wif e app e are d u nr e pr e se nte d b y c ou ns e l. 1 During the hea

ring befor e the Master, Wife e x presse d her be lief that she wa s entitled to the marital residenc e as p ar t o f h er divorc e settlement. Wife and the Master the n eng ag ed in the following colloquy reg arding Wife’s lack of repr esentation in thi s matter: [ W i f e ] : I c a n ’ t a f f o r d t o g e ta

l a w ye r
. B u ti ts e e m s l i k e i t ’ s —i t ’ s t o o l a t e , a n yw a y. I t seems like my

house is g oing to be taken a way from me. [Master]: Until the case is over, it’s neve r [too] late. [W ife]: W hether

I , y ou know, s pend all the m oney I have in sa vings on a

lawy er or no t. A ndthi s is no t fair

. Th is was — this is w hat I wa s su pp os e d to g e t f

ro m my divorce

. The Maste r filed her report w ith the trial court on July2, 2003. The re port indicated, a nd the master inf orme d th e pa

rt ie s d uring th e hea

ri ng , th a t, p ur su a nt t o Ru le 53 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Procedur e, the pa

rties would have ten (10) day s from the filing of the re port to file objections. No objections wer e ever filed, and the tria l court ente red a n order confirming the re port on Aug ust 12, 2003. At some point shortlyafte r the Maste r filed her report, Wife reta ined counsel. On J uly 11, 2003, Wife filed a motion to set aside the default judgme nt pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure. As support for he r motion, W ife a sserted that she did not retain counse l 2 sooner be cause she did not fully understand the impact of the partition action; her rig hts would be pr e jud ic e d if sh e we re no t e nti tle d th e op po rtun ity to b e re pr e se nte d; s he be lie ve d s he c ou ld pu t f orth a valid def

ense to the complaint; her counse l neede d ample time to revie w the ca se and pr epar e a defe nse; and he r fa ilure to obtain repres entation was ex cusable neg lect as she had a limited understanding of the law

.-3-

The trial c ourt conduc ted a he aring on Wife’s motion during whic h counsel for Wife raised the following as def

enses to the pa

rtition action:
I do be lie ve my cli ent doe s h a ve so me de fe ns e s th a t ne e d to be pr op e rl y broug ht before [t ]he Court on thi s matter. I think t h e i ntent of the pa rties in the orig inal contra ctual ag ree ment - - I think there migh t even be a jurisdictional question, since this was a F ourth Circuit M.D.A., . . . . And I th i n k , t h at as we g et into the di scovery , we will also show that ther e re ally was not prope r consider ation within that M.D.A. for the pa rtition to occur . . . . Also, there’ s questions about whet h er she has a ny liabilityon the indebtedness . . . .
F urthe r i nto the he ari ng , Wif e ’s c ou ns e l ma de the fo llo wi ng state me nt:
J u d g e , j u s tt w o t h i n g s t h a t

- - a l s o , e q u i t y ab h o r s a d e f a u l t a g a i n s tt h e p ar t y. And, as I said this morning

. . . I believe the intent of the parties, and whe ther or not this is the proper jurisdiction, ne ed to be e x amined by [t ]hi s Court in a defe nse. And as to the i ntent of t he parties in that contra ct, Ican’ t tell what that is until we’ ve had the op po rtun ity to do dis c ov e ry
. An d so .

. . that is a big pa rt of the de fe ns e that Ms

. Todd would prese nt to [ t] his Court.
I n is su ing its ru lin g fr om the be nc h, the tr ia l c ou rt fo un d a s f

oll ow s:
I have no ide a . . . what would be the re sponse if the de faul t we re s et asi de. And wh ile y ou sa y y ou ha ve to d o s ome dis c ov e ry , w hat ha s b e e n f ile d in thi s c ou rt

re a lly ref lects that Ms. Todd has not, in any way , acte d timely . And, in fac t , abdicated participating, whe n she said she c ouldn’t aff ord to g et a law y er, a nd that she didn’t want to spend all of her money she had in sa vings on a lawy er. That’s not say ing she couldn’t g et a law y er, she just chose not to ge t a lawy er.

. . . .

. . . . when I ’m asked to se t [ the def ault judgme nt] aside, I

have no g ood rea son, other than she wa nts to ge t a lawy er; that’s n o t a s u fficie nt justi fica tion for setting aside default. I need to f eel that, in some way , there ’s an error that’s bee n committed. And h a v in g lo o k e d a t w h a t th e Cl e rk a n d M a s te r h a s d o n e , it s e e ms ap p r o p r iate

. And the re we reno ob

je c tio ns to the Cle rk

a ndMa ste r’ s r e po rt

. I n its order de ny ing Wife’ s motion t o set aside the de fault judg ment, the trial court found that Wife had shown no meritorious defe nse t o the partiti on action; s he had made a conscious dec ision n o tt o h i re l ega l co u n s el p ri o r t o t h e m o t i o n fo r d ef au l t j u d gm en t an d C l er k

an d M as t er ’s h ea ri n g;-4-

the Ma ste r’ s r e po rt

wa s c on fi rm e d w ith ou t ob je c tio n b y e ith e r p art y ; a nd

Wif e ha d s ho wn no ba sis upon which to set aside the default judgment.
Wif e ha s a pp e a le d f ro m th e trial court ’s or de r d e nying he r m oti on to s e t a sid e the de fa ult judgme nt and pre sents, as we perc eive them, the f ollowing issues for

our re view: (1) Whether

the trial court err ed in denying Wife’ s motion t o set aside the default judgment, and (2) Whether

the trial court lacke d subject matter jurisdiction ove r the suit for partition.
Stan dard of Revie w We review a trial c ourt’s denia l of a Rule 60.02 motion for re lie f fr om a def ault judgme nt under an abuse of discretion st andar d of re view. Rey nolds v. Battles , 108 S.W .3d 249, 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Under an abuse of di scre tion standard, this Court will not rever se the de cision of the trial court “unless it affirmatively appea rs that the lower

cour t ’s d ecision wa s ag ainst logic or rea soning and cause d injusti ce to the complaining party .” State ex re l. Jones v . Looper , 86 S.W .3d 189, 193 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). “[T] he trial court is in the best position to assess the various factor s that sh ou ld b e c on sid e re d i n det erm in ing wh e the r a de fa ult jud g me nt s ho uldbe va c a te d a ndits finding is entitled to g reat weig ht.” Tennessee Dep’ t of Human Serv . v. Barbee , 689 S.W .2d 863, 86 7 (T e nn
. 19 85 ). Th e tr ia l c ou rt sh ou ld g rant re lie f un de r Rul e 60 .0 2 “ wh e ne ve r any re a so na ble doubt exi sts c oncerning whether the def ault judgme nt should be set aside.” Nelson v. Simpson , 826 S

. W

. 2 d 4 8 3 , 4 8 6 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 1 ) ( ci t i n g Keck v. Nationwide Sys., Inc. , 499 S.W .2d 266, 267 (Tenn Ct. App. 1973))

. Sub je c t matte r jurisd ic tio n co nc e rn s a cou rt ’s po we r t o a dju dic a te a pa rt ic ula r c la ss o f c a se s. See State v . Cawood , 1 3 4 S

. W

. 3 d 1 5 9 , 1 6 2

– 6 3 (T en n
. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Nor thl an d I ns . Co . v . S tat e , 33 S.W. 3d72 7, 72 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ). Whe the r a c ou rt ha s jurisd ic tio n o ve r the su bje c t matte r o f a c a se is a question of l aw, whic h we r eview de novo without a presumption of cor rec tness aff

orded to the trial court’ s conclusions in that reg ard. Id

. Rule 60.02 Motion
Un de r R ule 55 .0 1 o f the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e du re , w he n a defe nd ant f a ils to respond to a c omplaint, the plaintiff may move the trial court for entry of a de fault judg ment without a hea ring on the merits. See Te nn . R. Civ. P. 55.0 1 ( 20 04 ); He nr y v. Goins , 104 S.W .3d 475, 481 (Tenn. 2003)

. Rule 55.02 of t he Tennessee Rules of C ivil Procedur e provides that “the court may s et aside a

judgme nt by

default in accor dance with Rule 60.02.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.02 (2004). Under Rule 60.02(1), the trial co u rt m ay relieve a party from a f inal judgme nt for “mistake , inadvertance , surprise or

excusable neg lect.” T enn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(1).-5-

I t is well e stablished that courts clea rly pref er a trial on the merits. He nr y ,104 S.W .3d at 481; Barbee , 689 S.W .2d at 866. There fore , when a default judgment is involved Rule 60.02 should be construed liber ally

. He nr y , 1 04 S.W. 3da t 48 1. Ho we ve r, Rul e 60 .0 2 r e lie f s ho uldno t be lib e ra lly ap p l i ed where the defaulting party has not established prope r g rounds for r elief. B owers v. Gutterguard of Tenn., Inc. , N o. M2 00 2- 02 87 7- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 3 WL 22 99 43 02 , at *3 (T e nn . Ct

. App. Dec . 17, 2003)( no perm. app. filed ). Th e re fo re , “ [t]he pa

rt y se e kin g to s e t a sid e a

de fa ult judgme nt has the burde n of demonstra ting that it is entitled to relief.” Nelson v

. Simpson , 826 S.W .2d 483, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973). T hat burde n can be met by “set[ting] forth in a motion or pe tit ion a ndsu pp ortin g a ff ida vit s f a c ts e xpla ini ng wh y

the mov a nt w a s ju sti fi e d in fa ili ng to a vo id the mis t ak e, i nadvertence , surprise or neg lect.” Tenn. State Bank v . Lay , 609 S.W .2d 525, 527 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 8 0 ) ( ci t i n g Hopkins v. Hopkins , 572 S.W .2d 639 (Tenn. 1978). I n determining whether to gr ant re lief fr om a def

ault judgme nt under Rule 60.02 for “excusable ne g lect,” the court should consider the f

ollowing f

actor s: (1) whe ther the de fault was willful; (2) whether the def endant has a me ritorious defe nse; and (3) whether g ranting relief from the default would result in prejudice to the non-def

aulting pa rty

. Henry v. Gains , 1 04 S.W. 3d47 5, 48 1 ( Te nn .2 00 3) ; see also Reynolds v. Battles , 108 S.W .3d 249, 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
I n apply ing the He nr

y fac tors, we f

irst turn to whether

Wife has shown “e x cusable neg lect,” o r, in other words, w hether Wife has shown that her default was not “willful.” Se e He nr y , 104 S.W. 3da t 48 1. I n th is c a se , th e re c or d de mon str a te s th a t, w he n s e rv e d w ith Hu sb a nd ’s c omp la int , Wif e fai led to r e ta in c ou ns e l or fi le a n a ns we r. Whe n Wif e wa s se rv e d w ith a

mot ion fo r d e fa

ult judgme nt, she ag ain fa iled to respond. Wife made her first appea ranc e in this matter at the hea ring befor e the Ma ster, twenty -fiv e (2 5 ) day s after the entry of def ault judgme nt. At that hearing, the Master state d to Wife, in r esponse to Wife’ s conce rns about not re taining c ounsel, that “[u] ntil the case is over, it’s neve r too late [to hire an attorney ].”
I n her brief to this Court, W ife a ppear s to contend that the Maste r’s stateme nt that it was

“ ne ve r t oo la te ” to h ir e c ou ns e l w a s so me ho w a n in a c c ur a te state me nt t hat mi sl e d Wif e int o b e li e v in g s h e c o u ld s ti ll d e f e n d th e p ar ti ti o n a c ti o n
. T h e r e f o r e , Wi f e c o n te n d s th a t th e Master ’s statement should serve as a g round for vacating the default judg ment. Wit hout addre ssing the le g al acc urac y of the Maste r’s stateme nt, we find that Wife’s a rg ument lacks merit. As the Henry court explained, “ relief under Rule 60.02 is a vailable ‘ from a fina l judgment.’ ” He nr y , 104 S.W .3d at 480. There fore , “the g rounds for r elief a sserted unde r Rule 60.02(1) must have occur red at or befor e the entry of t he fina l judgment a nd must have re sulted in the judgme nt’s entry .” Id

. The fina l judgment at is s u e h ere is the default judgment ente red on June 5, 2003. I n this case, the he aring befor e the Ma ste r t oo k p la c e tw e nty -f ive (2 5) day s a ft e r the e ntry of the de fa ult jud g me nt. Th us , s ta te me nts made during that hearing c ould not provide a g round for relief under Rule 60.02.
Wife conce des that she wa s “neg ligen t ” in failing to hire c ounsel and failing to file a responsive pleading

. Wife, howeve r, cites our decision in Lay for the pr oposition t hat “[n]eglig ence on the part o f t h e m o v i n g party is precise ly

the type of e rror

[R ule 60.02] is designed to re lieve.” Tenn. State Bank v . Lay , 6 0 9 S

. W

. 2 d 525, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). A lthough Wife may char acte rize her unr esponsiveness a s neg lige nt, she has not bee n able to demonstrate, either in the-6-

trial court or

on appea l, how her inaction was “excusable.” After thoroug hly

revie wing the re cord, we are un able to f

inda ny jus tif ic a tio n o r “ e xcu sa

ble negle ct” fr om w hic h to se t a sid e the de fa ult judgme nt. I n s t ea d , i t appea rs from Wife’s ina ction and testimony during the hea

ring befor e the Master that, for whatever

rea son, she simplychose not to hire an attorney or participate in this matter without one. Clearly , Wife’s failure to participate in this m atter w as “willful.” There fore , having de te rm ine d th a t Wif

e ha s d e mon str a te d n o b a sis un de r R ule 60 .0 2 fo r va c a tin g the de fa ult jud g me nt, we a ffirm the tria l court on this issue. Subj ect Matter Jurisdiction
I n this case, the p ar t i es were divorc ed in circ uit court, and Husba nd broug ht the partition action in cha ncery

court. Wife conte nds that the cha ncery court lac ked subjec t matter jurisdiction over the p ar t i t i o n matter. Wife asse rts that her right to sole possession of the ma rital home along with Husband’s a ssumption of the mortg ag e indebtedne ss were in consideration for her waiver of a lim on y un de r the MD A. Th e re fo re , Wif e c on te nd s that he r po sse sso ry int e re st in the mari ta l ho me was e ssentially

spousal support, and this partition action was e ffe ctively an action to modify

spousal su pp ort. As su c h, Wif

e arg ue s tha t the c ha nc e ry c ou rt la c ke d sub je c t matt e r jurisd ic tio n o ve r this partition action bec ause jurisdiction to modify spousal support rema ins e x clusively with the court that issued the divorce

. I t is true that section 36-5-101(a) (1)( A) of the Tennessee Code provides that, wher e a divor ce decr ee inc ludes provisions for spousal support, the de cre e shall “r emain in the court ’s control.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101 (a)(1)( A) (Supp. 2004). The ref ore, a ny petition to modi fy

spousal support must be brought in the court that orig inally issues the di vorce
. Rider v. Ride r , No. M2002- 00556-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22345475, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2003) ( no perm. app. fi led). Howeve r, a division of prope rty pursuant to an MDA , once merg ed int o a divorc e dec ree , become s a fina l order and is ge nera lly not subject to modification. Johnson v. J ohnson , 37 S.W .3d 892, 895 (Tenn. 2001) ; Va na tta v . V an att a , 701 S.W .2d 824, 827 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). J urisdiction to hear partition actions i s g overne d by section 29-27- 106 of the Te nnessee Code. Tenn. Code A nn § 29-27- 106 (2000). Unde r sec tion 29-27-106 , county , chanc ery , and cir cuit courts have concur rent jurisdiction to hear pa

rtition actions. Id

. I n o rd e r f or thi s Co urt to de te rm ine wh e the r the c ha nc e ry c ou rt ha d ju ri sd ic tio n to he ar this partition matter, we must fir st de termine whether Wife’s rig ht to reside in the home was a form of pr op e rt y div isi on or sp ou sa l supp ort. Th e pa rt ie s her e pr ov ide d in the ir MD A that H us ba ndwo uld pay the mortg ag e, while “ Wife s h al l have sole and exclusive use and posse ssion of the marital residenc e until such time a s it is sold, e ither by ag ree ment of the parties or Orde r of the Court.” A la te r p ro vis ion in theMD A s ta te d th a t “ [t]he pa rt ie s a c c e pt the pr ov isi on s of thi s A g re e me nt i n f ull and fina l settlement and satisfac tion of any and all cla ims and rig hts which either or [sic] them have had or ma y

now have ag ainst the other pa rty with respec t to alimony , m ai n t enanc e and support.” Nothing in the r ecor d, howeve r, indicate s that Wi fe r elea sed an y p o t ential claim for alimony specific ally

in consideration for the right t o rema in in the m arital home. O n the contra ry , the MDA c le arl y state s th a t th e pa

rt ie s c on te mpl a te d th a t th e pr op e rt y wo uldind e e d be so ld at so me po int

.-7-

Moreove r, there is nothing in the rec ord to r efle ct that Husband would nece ssarily have any alimony obligation.
Wi f ed ire c ts o u r

att ention to Mc

A l ex a n der

v. Mc A l ex a nder , No. W2001-02550-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22204527 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2003) ( no perm. app. filed ), to support her c ontention that h er p o s s es s ory

interest in the prope rty

is spousal support. Our dec ision in McAle xander , howeve r, is disti ng uishable fr om the fac ts in thi s case . First, the pa rties in Mc

Al ex an de r a g re e d in their MDA that the wife would c ontinue to work in a mana g ement position in the husband’s two businesses, but, afte r continued ha rassment, the w ife wa s forc ed to re sign. McAle xander , 2 0 0 3 WL 22204527, at *6. The husband conce ded that he would have incurre d an alimony obligation had the w if e n o t r e tain e d h e r e mp lo y me n t w ith h is b u s in e s ses. Id. Th e pa rt ie s a g re e d to arb itr a te the ir d i s p u t e, an d t h e a rb i tra t o r i s s u ed a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e w i fe wa i v ed h ercl ai mt o al i m o n y i n ex ch an ge for c ontinued employ ment in the hus band’s businesses. Id . at *7. The a rbitrator f urther f ound that there was a

failure of consider ation for the w i fe’ s waiver of alimony

and that the MDA should be modified to require the hus band to pay alimony

. Id

. Apply ing a very defe rential standard of re view, this Court upheld the arbitrator’ s decision, as there was “ample evidenc e [i n the re cord] to support the Arbitrator’s finding that there was a failure of consideration f or [t he wife’ s] agr eeme nt to waive alimony in the MDA.” Id . at *1 4. As state d a bo ve , in the c a se a t ba

r the re is a

bs olu te ly no thi ng in the re cord to support Wife’s a rg ument that the parties intended that Wife’s possessory interest in the m ar i t a l h o m e b e i n l i e u o f H u s b a n d ’ s o b l i g a t i o n t o p a y a l i m o n y.
I n Va na tta , u nd e r f

a c ts v e ry sim ila r t o th is c a se , th is C ou rt

he ld that “ mortg a g e pay ments wer e a c ontrac tual obligation voluntarilyassumed by the husband a s a part of a prope rty settlement ag ree ment and made a part of the p ro p er t y d i vision provisions of the divorce de cre e.” Vanatta v. Va na tta , 701 S.W .2d 824, 827 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). In view of the plain lang uag e of the divorc e de c re e , w e c on c lud e that th e pr ov isi on s in the MD A de a lin g wi th the mari ta l re sid e nc e we re pu re ly in the nature of prope rty

division and not spousal support. There fore , we c onclude that the c hance ry court ha d concur

rent jurisdiction to hear

Husband’s pa

rtition action.
Conclu sion
Husband c ontends that Wife’s appea l in this matter is frivolous and re quests reimburse ment fo r atto rn e y ’s fe e s, mortg a g e pa y ments, a ndoth e r e xpe ns e s in c ur re d d uring the pe nd e nc y

of thi s app e a l. We are dis inc lin e d to ho ld that th is a pp e a l is frivo lou s. Ac c or din g ly , H us ba nd ’s re qu e st i s de nie d. We a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s or de r d e nying Wif e ’s mo ti on for rul e 60 re lie f. Cos ts o f this appea l ar e t ax ed t o the Appellant, Ma ry Eliz abeth Todd, a nd her sur ety , for whic h execution may issue if nec essary
.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE