Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge

John J. Tharp Jr. Sitting Judge if Other

than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 12 C 2633 DATE 8/2/2012

CASE

TITLE

Anthony Jackson (M-06206) vs. City of Aurora, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application [8] is granted. The complaint, however, is dismissed with prejudice

as untimely. The dismissal shall not count as one of Plaintiff’s three allotted dismissals under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g). This case is closed. 

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Anthony Jackson, an inmate incarcerated at Hill Correctional Center, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983

civil rights action against Kane County, the City of Aurora, its police department, and three Aurora police officers.

Plaintiff claimsthat on March 10, 2010, the three officers, after receiving a report of gunshots, unjustifiably stopped

Plaintiff, arrested him, and, after cuffing him, beat him about his head and face and threw him against the police

car, causing him to lose a tooth. Because the complaint was received on April 10, 2012, a month after two years

from the date of the incident, and because Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application was incomplete, the

Court instructed Plaintiff to submit both a completed IFP application and a pleading demonstrating that his

complaint was timely to proceed with this case. Plaintiff has submitted both pleadings, and it is now clear that this

case must be dismissed as untimely.

In actions filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts look to the statute of limitations for personal injury

in the state where the injury occurred. Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Rivera,

272 F.3d 519, 521-22 (7th Cir. 2001). In Illinois, personal injury actions are subject to a two-year statute of

limitations. 725 ILCS 5/13-202. The limitations period began at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest. See Wallace v.

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Brooks v. City of Chicago, 564 F.3d 830, 832 (7th Cir. 2009). Barring any

interruption of the limitations period, Plaintiff had to file his § 1983 action by March 12, 2012 (March 10, 2012,

fell on a Saturday). The only explanation offered by Plaintiff for this Court’s receipt of his complaint on April

10, 2012, is that he submitted the complaint to prison officials for filing on March 6, 2012, but that the mail at

Logan Correctional Centeris very slow. (Dkt. Entry #10, Plaintiff’s Declaration.) Plaintiff’s declaration actually

does not say even this much; Plaintiff states that he was at Logan on March 6 and “while at Logan,” he put the

complaint in the mail. Read literally, this statement does not establish that the Plaintiff mailed the complaint

on March 6 (that is plainly not the only day he was at Logan, which is the facility to which he has been assigned

since at least that time, but fairly construed, that is what the Court understands Plaintiff to represent.

Although the date a pleading is given to prison officials for mailing is generally considered to be the date

the pleading is filed in this Court, see Simmonds v. Ghent, 970 F.2d 392, 393 (7th Cir. 1992), in this case,

Plaintiff’s representation is plainly incorrect. Plaintiff’s original IFP application, which was included with his

complaint, was dated April 4, 2012, which coincides with the post-marked date of April 5, 2012, on the envelope

containing his initial pleadings. (See Dkt. Entry #1 and Dkt. Entry #3 p.2.) Plainly, Plaintiff’s complaint was

12C2633 Anthony Jackson (M-06206) vs. City of Aurora, et al. Page 1 of 2
STATEMENT

not mailed on March 6, but on April 4 or 5, 2010. The complaint is thus four weeks late and must be dismissed. 

Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 2002) (when the affirmative defense of time-bar is clear

from the face of a plaintiff’s pleadings, the case may be dismissed without requiring a response). Although

Plaintiff’s representation as to the date of the mailing is incorrect, the Court cannot and does not conclude, on

this record, that the representation was knowingly false.

Although Plaintiff cannot proceed with his complaint, he must still pay the filing fee for having brought this

action. His IFP application indicates that he cannot prepay the $350 filing fee. The Court thus grants his IFP

motion and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $54.00. The trust fund account officer at Plaintiff’s current place

of confinement is authorized to collect, when funds exist, the partial filing fee from Plaintiff’s account and pay it

to the clerk of court. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the trust fund officer is directed to collect

monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the

account. Monthly collected payments shall be forwarded to the clerk of court each time the amount in the account

exceeds $10 until the full $350 filing fee is paid. All payments shall be sent to the Clerk, United States District

Court, 219 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, Illinois 60604, attn: Cashier’s Desk, 20th Floor, and shall clearly identify

Plaintiff’s name and the case number assigned to this action. Plaintiff shall remain responsible for this filing fee

obligation, and Hill officials shall notify transferee authorities of any outstanding balance in the event he is

transferred.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to file his complaint IFP, but

dismisses the complaint as untimely. The dismissal shall not count as one of Plaintiff’s three allotted dismissals

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

If Plaintiff seeks to appeal this dismissal, he may file a notice of appeal with this Court within thirty days

of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). If he seeks to proceed IFP on appeal, he must submit another

IFP motion, which should set forth the issues he plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). 

If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $455 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome

of the appeal. Evans v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 150 F.3d 810, 812 (7th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, if the

appeal is found to be non-meritorious, Plaintiff may also accumulate a strike under § 1915(g). 

12C2633 Anthony Jackson (M-06206) vs. City of Aurora, et al. Page 2 of 2