UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

GREG WINSKI, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner, Social Security 

Administration,1 

 Defendant. 

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No. 12 CV 4130 

Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim 

May 30, 2013 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

 Greg Winski seeks disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), see 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 416(i), 423, based on his claim that he is unable to work because of debilitating 

back pain related to degenerative disc disease. After his application was denied in a 

final decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Winski 

filed this suit seeking judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Currently before the 

court is Winski’s motion for summary judgment seeking reversal of the 

Commissioner’s decision. For the following reasons, the motion is denied: 

Procedural History

 Winski applied for DIB on July 7, 2009, claiming that he became unable to 

work on March 1, 2009. (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 125.) After his claims were 

denied initially and upon reconsideration, (id. at 54-58, 61-64), Winski sought and 

 

1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Carolyn W. Colvin—who 

became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013—is 

automatically substituted as the named defendant. 
2

was granted a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), (id. at 66-67). 

The ALJ held a hearing on November 4, 2010, at which Winski and a vocational 

expert provided testimony. (Id. at 25-43.) On December 17, 2010, the ALJ issued a 

decision finding that Winski is not disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act and denying his DIB claim. (Id. at 9-18.) When the Appeals Council 

denied Winski’s request for review, (id. at 1-4), the ALJ’s denial of benefits became 

the final decision of the Commissioner, see O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 

614, 618 (7th Cir. 2010). On May 26, 2012, Winski filed the current suit seeking 

judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The parties 

have consented to the jurisdiction of this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

Facts 

 For 26 years Winski worked as a machinist foreman, performing heavy 

maintenance work on railroads. (A.R. 173.) Winski suffers from degenerative disc 

disease and claims that the pain stemming from that condition forced him to stop 

working in March 2009 at the age of 51. (Id. at 125.) At his November 2010 

hearing before an ALJ, Winski presented both documentary and testimonial 

evidence in support of his claim. 

A. Medical Evidence 

 The medical record tracing Winski’s back issues includes the results from a 

series of diagnostic tests conducted to evaluate the condition of his spine. Two 

MRIs taken in May 1997 showed “minimal” disc space narrowing at the L5/S1 level 

and moderate disc protrusion at L4-L5. (Id. at 237, 240.) An MRI conducted in July 
3

1997 revealed that Winski’s nerve roots were “symmetrical” and that the moderate 

disc protrusion at L4-L5 suggested “the possibility of a central disc herniation.” (Id. 

at 239.) There is a six-year gap until the next evaluation, an x-ray taken in June 

2003 in response to Winski’s complaints of hip pain. (Id. at 349.) The x-ray showed 

“preservation of the joint spaces” and no fractures or soft tissue issues. (Id. at 349-

50.) The reviewing physician characterized the lumbar spine radiographs as 

“unremarkable.” (Id. at 350.) 

 Winski’s next MRI took place in May 2004. (Id. at 347.) This test revealed 

moderate central herniation and mild disc degeneration at L4-L5, minimal 

compression at L5-S1, and severe disc degeneration at L5-S1. (Id. at 347.) Three 

days later, Winski visited a chiropractor and reported that he was experiencing 

sharp pain in his lower back which was aggravated by prolonged sitting. (Id. at 

345.) Winski reported a pain level of eight out of ten and said that the pain was 

interfering with his daily activities. (Id.) The chiropractor recommended that 

Winski engage in physical therapy. (Id. at 346.) 

 Four years after visiting the chiropractor, in July 2008, Winski sought 

emergency-room treatment after exacerbating his back pain while pulling weeds. 

(Id. at 344.) The attending physician noted that Winski was limping on arrival but 

was able to walk without assistance. (Id. at 261-62.) The doctor gave Winski an 

epidural injection and prescriptions for three pain medications, Flexeril, Norco, and 

Ibuprofen. (Id. at 262.) Winski was discharged in stable condition with the 
4

recommendation that he seek follow-up treatment with his regular doctor. (Id. at 

264.) 

 Winski next sought treatment for his back pain in the spring of 2009, after he 

stopped working. That April, Winski underwent another MRI which revealed mild 

to moderate changes at the L5-S1 level. (Id. at 248.) The report states that the 

degeneration at that level had only “slightly increased” since the June 2003 x-ray. 

(Id.) Two weeks later a physical therapist evaluated Winski, noting that he had 

not undergone physical therapy in six years. (Id. at 243.) The physical therapist 

recommended that Winski engage in bi-weekly stretching and strengthening 

sessions for four to eight weeks. (Id. at 244.) At the end of May 2009 Winski had 

another MRI, which revealed normal alignment but shallow disc bulging and 

moderate bilateral foraminal narrowing at L5-S1 and mild bilateral foraminal 

narrowing and mild central canal stenosis at L4-L5. (Id. at 246.) Between May 

and June 2009 Winski went to three physical therapy appointments before he 

stopped attending, reporting that the sessions were not helping him. (Id. at 273.) 

 Winski also saw his treating physician, Dr. Mark Reiter, three times during 

the spring of 2009. (Id. at 315-16.) Dr. Reiter’s specialty is internal medicine and 

geriatrics. (Id. at 286.) His hand-written reports from these visits are difficult to 

read, but Dr. Reiter notes that Winski reported low-back pain radiating down his 

left leg. (Id. at 316.) Dr. Reiter gave him prescriptions for two pain medications, 

Voltaren and Soma. (Id. at 315.) In August 2009 Dr. Reiter penned a letter in 

support of Winski’s disability application stating that Winski had suffered from 
5

back pain for 15 years, with the most recent severe exacerbations in 2003 and 2004. 

(Id. at 286.) Dr. Reiter reported that “currently he has significant problems with 

walking, bending, lifting, carrying and travelling” and that “[h]e cannot sit for 

prolonged periods without developing sciatica.” (Id.) Four months later, in 

December 2009, Dr. Reiter submitted a second report on behalf of Winski’s claim—

this time a spinal disorder form prepared by the state disability agency. (Id. at 

298.) Dr. Reiter checked a box stating that there is evidence of nerve root 

compression and noted that Winski exhibited positive straight leg raising results at 

45 degrees sitting and at 20 degrees supine. (Id.) He wrote that Winski is 

ambulatory with a mild limp on the left side and that he can stand and walk for 

approximately five minutes but for less than one block. (Id. at 300.) Dr. Reiter 

noted that his treatments—physical therapy, epidurals, and medication—had been 

minimally effective. (Id. at 301.) 

 Two state consulting doctors also provided opinions with respect to the 

limiting effects of Winski’s disc disease. In September 2009 consulting physician 

Dr. Charles Wabner reviewed the medical record and opined that Winski is capable 

of sitting, standing, or walking with normal breaks for about six hours a day with 

some postural limitations. (Id. at 288.) Dr. Wabner found Winski’s complaints to be 

only partially credible, noting that his “statements about his back pain are 

consistent with the medical evidence and are credible, but his degree of limitation is 

not fully consistent with the evidence as [sic] his ability to function.” (Id. at 294.) 

Four months later, consulting physician Dr. Reynaldo Gotanco reviewed the file and 
6

agreed with Dr. Wabner that Winski is capable of performing light activity. (Id. at 

308.) 

 The latest treatment records are from the fall of 2010 when Winski 

underwent yet another MRI. (Id. at 309.) That October 2010 exam revealed 

moderate degenerative disc space height loss at L5-S1 that appeared “mildly 

progressed” since the April 2009 exam. (Id.) Winski received a new referral for 

physical therapy. In a report from an initial assessment in November 2010, 

Winski’s physical therapist reported that he was able to walk without an assistive 

device, but demonstrated a left lateral trunk lean, entalgic and trendelenburg 

patterns, forward flexed posture, and decreased trunk rotation and arm swing. (Id. 

at 319.) She rated his prognosis as “good” and developed a plan for 18 sessions of 

physical therapy. (Id.) 

B. Winski’s Testimony 

 During the hearing Winski described the nature of his pain and its limiting 

effects. He testified that his back pain radiates into his buttocks and thighs and 

makes his legs feel weak. (Id. at 29.) It feels like “constant pressure,” as if someone 

were pushing knuckles into his back. (Id. at 31.) Winski said that the pain got 

worse in March 2009, so beginning in May of that year, he attended three or four 

physical therapy sessions. (Id. at 34.) He said that he stopped going because the 

sessions were painful. (Id.) He testified that from June 2009 until October 2010 he 

treated the pain with over-the-counter pain medication like Aleve and Tylenol 

because his prescription medications made him feel dizzy. (Id. at 29, 34-35.) 
7

Winski noted, though, that he had recently seen Dr. Reiter after a 16-month hiatus 

and had received a new prescription for Meloxicam. (Id. at 29-30, 34.) He did not 

think the new medication was helping. (Id. at 30.) He reported that he was 

enrolled to start physical therapy again, but that he wanted to avoid back fusion 

surgery—which his doctor had put on the table—because he had heard “horror 

stories” about unsuccessful surgeries. (Id. at 30-31.) 

 Winski testified that on a typical day he gets up at three or four in the 

morning because that is when the over-the-counter medication he takes before bed 

wears off. (Id. at 31.) He goes downstairs and lies on the couch until his wife gets 

up. (Id.) Winski testified that he does not do many activities during the day, but 

might help with dishes or go shopping with his wife, leaning on the shopping cart 

for support while walking through the store. (Id. at 32-33.) He testified that he 

visits with friends and his mother, but does not have any hobbies. (Id. at 33.) 

Winski explained that when he sits down he has to brace himself right away to ease 

the pain, that he can stand for only five to seven minutes before he has to lean over, 

and that he can only walk for half a block. (Id. at 36.) He said that over the course 

of a waking day, he lies flat on his back for eight to ten hours, because that position 

gives him the most pain relief. (Id. at 37.) 

C. Vocational Expert’s Testimony 

 Vocational Expert (“VE”) Rubin Luna answered the ALJ’s questions 

regarding the kinds of jobs someone with certain hypothetical limitations could 

perform. (Id. at 38.) The VE described Winski’s past work as a machinist foreman 
8

as having a heavy physical demand. (Id. at 39.) The ALJ asked him to assume 

someone of Winski’s age and work experience with a capacity to perform light work 

with certain limitations such as only occasionally balancing, stooping, kneeling, 

crouching, and crawling. (Id. at 39.) The VE testified that such a person could not 

perform Winski’s past work, but could perform unskilled light jobs, such as room 

service clerk, stock checker, and routing clerk. (Id. at 40.) The VE testified that 

Winski does not have any skills that would be transferrable to sedentary work. (Id.) 

When Winski’s attorney asked whether someone who can walk only five minutes at 

a time and for less than a block would be limited to sedentary work, the VE testified 

that he would. (Id. at 41.) He also testified that someone who had to lie down for 

an hour or more a day on an unscheduled basis would not be able to perform any 

work. (Id.) 

D. The ALJ’s Decision 

 After hearing the proffered evidence, the ALJ concluded that Winski is not 

disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act. (Id. at 18.) In 

so finding, the ALJ applied the standard five-step sequence, see 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4), which requires her to analyze: 

(1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) whether the 

claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s 

impairment is one that the Commissioner considers conclusively 

disabling; (4) if the claimant does not have a conclusively disabling 

impairment, whether he can perform his past relevant work; and (5) 

whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the 

national economy. 
9

Kastner v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2012). If at step three of this 

framework the ALJ finds that the claimant has a severe impairment that does not 

meet or equal one of the listings set forth by the Commissioner, she must “assess 

and make a finding about [the claimant’s] residual functional capacity based on all 

the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The ALJ then 

uses the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to determine at steps four and five 

whether the claimant can return to his past work or to different available work. Id. 

§ 404.1520(f),(g). 

 Here, the ALJ found at steps one and two of the analysis that Winski has not 

worked since March 1, 2009, and that he has a severe impairment in the form of 

degenerative changes of the lumbar spine. (A.R. 11.) At step three, the ALJ 

concluded that Winski’s impairment does not meet or equal Listing 1.04, which 

covers disorders of the spine. (Id. at 11-12.) In explaining her step-three conclusion 

the ALJ noted that Winski’s impairment “does not result in a compromise of a nerve 

root with nerve root compression” nor “result in an inability to ambulate 

effectively.” (Id. at 12.) Moving on to the RFC analysis, the ALJ determined that 

Winski is capable of performing “less than the full range of light work,” with certain 

additional limitations including only occasionally climbing ramps or stairs, 

balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, or crawling. (Id.) In reaching this 

conclusion the ALJ pointed to what she characterized as Winski’s minimal 

treatment and infrequent doctor visits, as well as her finding that his description of 

his pain and its limiting effects is only partially credible. (Id. at 12-15.) The ALJ 
10

also credited the opinions of the state consulting physicians above the opinion of 

Dr. Reiter. (Id. at 15-16.) 

 Turning to steps four and five, the ALJ determined that Winski is not 

capable of carrying out the heavy physical demands of his past work as a machine 

foreman, but she concluded that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in 

the national economy that he can perform. (Id. at 16-17.) Relying on the VE’s 

testimony, the ALJ decided that Winski could work as a stock checker, room service 

clerk, or routing clerk. (Id. at 17.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Winski is 

not disabled and denied his application for DIB. (Id. at 18.) 

Analysis

 In his motion for summary judgment, Winski argues that this court should 

reverse the ALJ’s decision because according to him, the ALJ improperly evaluated 

whether he is presumptively disabled under Listing 1.04 and made several 

reversible errors in evaluating his credibility and crafting his RFC. This court’s role 

in disability cases is limited to reviewing whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence and free of legal error. See Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 

699 (7th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence is that which “a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 889 

(7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). The 

substantial evidence standard requires the ALJ to build a logical bridge between 

the evidence and her conclusion, but not necessarily to provide a thorough written 

evaluation of every piece of evidence in the record. See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 
11

351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013). In asking whether the ALJ’s decision has adequate 

support, this court will not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for 

the ALJ’s. Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012). 

A. Listing 1.04 

 Because a claimant with an impairment that meets or equals a listing is 

presumed to be disabled (ending the need for further inquiry), see Sullivan v. 

Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 525 (1990), this court will begin with Winski’s argument that 

the ALJ improperly evaluated whether he meets Listing 1.04, which lists the 

criteria for a disabling spinal disorder, see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 1.04. 

A claimant’s condition meets or equals Listing 1.04 if there is evidence of “nerve 

root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, limitation of 

motion of the spine, motor loss . . . accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and, if 

there is involvement of the lower back, positive straight-leg raising test.” (Id.) 

Alternatively, a claimant’s condition may meet Listing 1.04 if it involves lumbar 

spinal stenosis resulting in, among other things, an “inability to ambulate 

effectively.” Id. § 1.04(C). The ALJ considered whether Winski meets these criteria 

but concluded that he does not, noting that “[n]o treating or examining physician 

has identified findings equivalent in severity” to Listing 1.04. (A.R. 11-12.) She 

also determined that his back impairment neither results “in a compromise of a 

nerve root with nerve root compression” nor causes “an inability to ambulate 

effectively.” (Id. at 12.) 
12

 In challenging the ALJ’s step-three analysis, Winski argues that the ALJ’s 

explanation is overly cursory and ignores evidence that he does have nerve root 

compression and an inability to ambulate effectively. (R. 13, Pl.’s Br. at 11-12.) 

Although Winski is correct that a perfunctory or superficial analysis at step three 

may require reversal, see Kastner, 697 F.3d at 648, it is his burden to show that he 

meets each of the listing’s criteria, see Ribaudo v. Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580, 583 (7th 

Cir. 2006). The only support Winski gives to his assertion that the record contains 

evidence of nerve-root compression is a citation to the spinal disorder form that 

Dr. Reiter completed on his behalf. (See R. 13, Pl.’s Br. at 11 (citing A.R. 298, 300).) 

There, Dr. Reiter checked the “yes” box for “[e]vidence of nerve root compression 

(straight leg raising results while sitting and supine)?” (A.R. 298.) He noted that 

Winski had positive straight leg results at 45 degrees sitting and 20 degrees supine. 

(Id.) But even taking Dr. Reiter’s opinion at face value, it is unclear that his 

checking the “yes” box supports a finding of listings-level nerve root compression. 

That is because the form appears to consider only positive straight leg raising 

results as pertinent evidence of nerve-root compression, while the listings require 

positive straight leg raising results along with several other criteria, including 

neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, limited spinal motion, and motor loss 

characterized by muscle atrophy accompanied by sensory or reflex loss. See 20 

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 1.04(A). Dr. Reiter left unmarked the box on the 

form where he could have reported that Winski has “muscle weakness” and made 

marks indicating that he does not have atrophy in his arms or legs. (A.R. 298, 300.) 
13

Again, Winski must show that he meets all of the criteria for Listing 1.04 to qualify 

for presumptive disability at step-three. See Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 369 

(7th Cir. 2004). 

 It also must be noted that later in her analysis the ALJ explained that she 

gave little weight to Dr. Reiter’s opinion because she considered his view of Winski’s 

limitations to be out of proportion to the objective evidence and based more on 

Winski’s subjective complaints than on any clinical findings. (A.R. 15.) It is proper 

for this court to consider the ALJ’s decision as a whole—taking into account the 

more thorough discussion that often accompanies the RFC analysis—in deciding 

whether the listings decision has sufficient support, see Rice, 384 F.3d at 370 & n.5; 

Molnar v. Astrue, 395 Fed. App’x 282, 287 (7th Cir. 2010). Winski argues that Dr. 

Reiter’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight because, he says, it is consistent 

with radiology reports that chronicle the progression of his degenerative disc 

disease. A treating physician’s opinion regarding the severity of a medical condition 

is entitled to controlling weight “if it is (1) supported by medical findings; and (2) 

consistent with substantial evidence in the record.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 

415 (7th Cir. 2008); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). But an ALJ may discount a 

treating physician’s opinion if it is internally inconsistent, contradicts the opinion of 

a consulting physician, or rests entirely on the claimant’s subjective complaints, as 

long as the ALJ minimally articulates her reasons for doing so. See Ketelboeter v. 

Astrue, 550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2008); Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 503 

(7th Cir. 2004). That is because the treating physician’s opinion may “be unreliable 
14

if the doctor is sympathetic with the patient and thus ‘too quickly find[s] disability.’” 

Ketelboeter, 550 F.3d at 625 (quoting Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 289 (7th 

Cir. 1985)); see also Scheck, 357 F.3d at 702 (noting that “it is not unheard of that a 

personal physician might have been leaning over backwards to support the 

application for disability benefits” (internal quotation omitted)). 

 Here the ALJ gave several reasons for discounting Dr. Reiter’s view of 

Winski’s condition, all of which find support in the record. She noted that the most 

recent objective test showed that there had been minimal deterioration in Winski’s 

condition between 2003 and 2009 and yet Winski worked doing a heavy job until he 

retired from his job in March 2009. (A.R. 14-15.) She also pointed out that 

Dr. Reiter’s opinion is not consistent with the physical therapy reports, a view 

echoed in Dr. Gotanco’s opinion. (Id.) The ALJ further noted that Dr. Reiter’s view 

appears largely based on Winski’s subjective complaints. (Id.) Because she 

articulated her reasons for giving Dr. Reiter’s opinion little weight, and because 

those reasons are supported by the record, the ALJ did not err in giving little 

weight to the spinal disorder form. See Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 842 (7th 

Cir. 2007); Skarbek, 390 F.3d at 503. 

 As for Winski’s argument that he meets Listing 1.04 because he says he is 

unable to ambulate effectively, not even Dr. Reiter agrees with that 

characterization. On the spinal disorder form that supports the majority of 

Winski’s arguments here, Dr. Reiter checked the “no” box next to the question “Nonambulatory?” and noted that although Winski has a “mild limp” on his left side, he 
15

is able to walk without an assistive device. (A.R. 300.) The listings definition of 

“inability to ambulate effectively” requires an “extreme limitation of the ability to 

walk.” See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 1.00(B)(2)(b). That generally 

means “having insufficient lower extremity functioning . . . to permit independent 

ambulation without the use of a hand-held assistive device.” Id. Although 

Dr. Reiter also wrote that Winski can walk for less than five minutes and for less 

than a block, that report appears to be based on Winski’s subjective reports, and so 

for the reasons just discussed, the ALJ was entitled to give it little weight. See 

Ketelboeter, 550 F.3d at 625. Winski relies heavily on the November 2010 physical 

therapy report describing his limp and forward flexed posture, but even that report 

notes that he is ambulatory without an assistive device. (A.R. 319, 328.) In short, 

Winski has not pointed to record evidence that supports his argument that the ALJ 

erred in evaluating whether his condition meets or equals Listing 1.04. 

B. Credibility Analysis 

 Winski also argues that the ALJ improperly assessed his credibility by 

relying on boilerplate language and by failing to build a logical bridge between the 

evidence and her conclusion that his testimony regarding the limiting impact of his 

impairment was exaggerated. Winski has a particularly high hurdle to overcome 

here, because this court may only overturn an ALJ’s credibility assessment if it is 

“patently wrong.” See Skarbek, 390 F.3d at 504-05. That means that this court will 

not substitute its judgment regarding the claimant’s credibility for the ALJ’s, and 

Winski “must do more than point to a different conclusion that the ALJ could have 
16

reached.” Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1162 (7th Cir. 2010). Put simply, this 

court will not disturb the ALJ’s credibility determination unless it is “unreasonable 

or unsupported.” See Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2008). 

 Winski first attacks the ALJ’s use of the following standard, but oft-criticized 

boilerplate language: 

After careful consideration of the evidence, I find that the claimant’s 

medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to 

cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these 

symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the 

above residual functional capacity. 

 

(A.R. 14.) This language has been criticized by the Seventh Circuit as getting 

“things backwards,” because an ALJ is required to make an independent credibility 

determination before assessing the claimant’s ability to work. See Bjornson v. 

Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2012). This boilerplate suggests that the ALJ 

disregarded the claimant’s testimony because it did not conform to her preconceived 

view of the RFC. See id. But the Seventh Circuit also has made it clear that an 

ALJ’s use of this objectionable language does not amount to reversible error if she 

“otherwise points to information that justifies [her] credibility determination.” See 

Pepper, 712 F.3d at 367-68. In other words, there is no need to reverse based on an 

ALJ’s use of this boilerplate where she gave other reasons, grounded in evidence, to 

explain her credibility determination. See Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th 

Cir. 2012). 

 Contrary to Winski’s argument, here the ALJ’s use of boilerplate does not 

result in reversible error because she gave a number of supported reasons to explain 
17

her conclusion that his testimony is less than fully credible. In accordance with 

SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *3 (July 2, 1996), the ALJ considered alongside 

Winski’s statements factors such as his daily activities, treatment, medications, and 

the objective medical evidence. She correctly noted that there is a “huge gap” in the 

treatment record between June 2009 and October 2010 during which time he 

treated his pain with only Tylenol and Aleve. (A.R. 14.) The ALJ reasoned that 

someone who is as limited as Winski claims he is would likely make more of an 

effort to see a doctor or obtain stronger pain medications. (Id.) The ALJ also found 

suspicious that Winski never sought treatment from an orthopedist or a pain 

specialist and attended “limited therapy sessions.” (Id.) Additionally, she noted 

that someone who truly spent ten hours of his waking day lying flat on his back 

would show more weakness and deconditioning than that described in his limited 

physical therapy reports. (Id.) Because the ALJ justified her credibility 

determination with these supported reasons, her inclusion of the unhelpful 

boilerplate in her decision does not warrant reversal. See Pepper, 712 F.3d at 367-

68. 

 Winski next argues that the credibility determination lacks the support of 

the requisite “logical bridge” because, he says, the ALJ’s discussion of his 

medication history is “illogical.” (R. 13, Pl.’s Br. at 9-10.) Specifically, he attacks 

the following excerpt from the ALJ’s decision: 

The ability of the claimant to take over the counter pain medications of 

Tylenol and Alleve [sic] without more potent pain relief supports that 

his pain is not as severe as indicated. I recognize that claimant had 

used some prescription pain medications in early 2009 but ceased their 
18

use after side effects. He recently started Meloxicam a week prior to 

hearing. However, the claimant never returned for treatment to obtain 

new medications that may have worked better. 

(Id. (quoting A.R. 14).) According to Winski, the ALJ contradicted herself by saying 

that Winski “never” returned for medication after 2009 when she also acknowledged 

that he started a new medication a week before the hearing. But this argument 

calls for the kind of “nit-picking” of the ALJ’s decision that the substantial evidence 

standard of review requires this court to avoid. See Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, 

811 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that the court must give an ALJ’s decision “a 

commonsensical reading rather than nit-picking at it” (quotation omitted)). A 

common-sense reading of the ALJ’s (perhaps poorly worded) explanation is that she 

intended to say that Winski did not return for treatment between 2009 and late 

2010, not that he “never” returned at all. The gist of the paragraph lies in the ALJ’s 

determination that the more than year-long gap in treatment that started a few 

months after Winski stopped working and ended the week before the hearing 

suggests that he exaggerated the extent of his pain.2 Given an ordinary reading, 

the paragraph provides the requisite logical bridge between the evidence and the 

ALJ’s credibility determination. 

 

2 To the extent Winski intended to argue that the ALJ erred in failing to consider 

the side effects of his medication, this argument warrants little attention. Winski 

testified that he had side effects like dizziness in connection with the medications 

he stopped taking in 2009. (A.R. 35.) He points to no evidence that he has on-going 

dizziness or that the Meloxicam he started taking a week before the hearing causes 

any significant side effects that the ALJ should have incorporated into the 

credibility analysis. On the contrary, the only side-effect he attributed to 

Meloxicam at the hearing is one that he described as being “positive.” (Id. at 36-37.) 
19

C. The RFC Determination 

 Winski also challenges the ALJ’s finding that he is capable of performing 

light work with certain postural limitations. He argues that he is capable of 

performing no more than sedentary work, and that given his age and skill set, a 

limitation to sedentary work would result in an award of benefits pursuant to the 

vocational grid. (R. 19, Pl.’s Reply at 3.) Winski’s main objection to the RFC 

appears to rest on his contention that the ALJ erred in failing to give controlling 

weight to Dr. Reiter’s opinion that Winski can sit, stand, and walk for only short 

periods of time. (R. 13, Pl.’s Br. at 14.) For the reasons set forth above in section A, 

this court concludes that the ALJ properly explained why she discounted his 

opinion. Winski also argues that the ALJ assigned too much weight to the opinions 

of the consulting physicians who, according to him, did not have the “benefit of later 

radiology and examinations available to Dr. Reiter.” (Id.) But Dr. Gotanco filled 

out his RFC evaluation a month after Dr. Reiter filled out the spinal disorder form 

and Winski has not pointed to any other opinion that Dr. Reiter developed based on 

the later MRI. (A.R. 300, 308.) In other words, there is no reason to think 

Dr. Reiter’s opinion is based on newer evidence than that relied on by the consulting 

physicians. Moreover, the newer evidence Winski references is the October 2010 

MRI, which shows only mild progression in Winski’s disc space height at L5-S1. (Id. 

at 309.) Winski has not developed any argument nor pointed to any evidence to 

explain how that mild progression renders him unable to perform light work or 

would alter the consulting physicians’ analysis. Indeed, a month after the October 
20

2010 MRI a physical therapist described Winski’s prognosis as being “good” if he 

complies with prescribed therapy. (Id. at 319.) Accordingly, Winski has not shown 

that the ALJ committed reversible error in assigning significant weight to the 

consulting physicians’ opinions. 

 Winski also attacks the ALJ’s RFC determination by arguing that she gave 

short-shrift to important evidence and impermissibly “played doctor” in evaluating 

his limitations. In particular, Winski considers the November 2010 physical 

therapy report to provide important evidence of the limiting effects of his pain, 

because it describes his limp and his reduced range of motion. Winski 

acknowledges that the ALJ considered this report, but argues that her two-sentence 

summary of its findings is “extremely laconic” and thus amounts “to a 

mischaracterization.” (R. 13, Pl.’s Br. at 8-9.) But this argument rubs up against 

the well-settled principle that an ALJ does not need to discuss every piece of record 

evidence in detail, especially where, as here, the ALJ’s discussion is sufficient to 

assure that she took into account the physical therapist’s findings. See McKinzey, 

641 F.3d at 891. And although Winski is correct that an ALJ may not “play doctor” 

by making her own independent medical findings, see Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 

970 (7th Cir. 1996), the ALJ’s decision here did not cross the line into that 

impermissible territory. Winski asserts that the ALJ made her own determination 

that he could have returned to work had he engaged in more treatment, but the 

ALJ did not say that. Instead, she found that Winski’s descriptions of his pain were 

harder to credit because he did not see a doctor more frequently or seek out 
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prescription-strength pain medications for more than a year in the lead-up to his 

hearing. See Jones, 623 F.3d at 1161 (recognizing that “discrepancies between the 

objective evidence and self-reports may suggest symptom exaggeration”); see also

SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *5 (July 2, 1996) (tasking the ALJ with evaluating 

the frequency and duration of treatment in determining the RFC). Winski also 

faults the ALJ for noting that someone who lies on his back for ten hours a day 

would likely exhibit a level of muscle deconditioning that is not borne out in the 

physical therapy reports. But making that common-sense observation—especially 

in the context of a larger discussion describing why the treatment records are 

consistent with the RFC—does not amount to the kind of diagnostic speculation an 

ALJ must avoid. In the end, this court is satisfied that the ALJ gave adequate 

consideration to the record evidence and reasonably explained how that evidence is 

consistent with an RFC for light work. Accordingly, Winski has not shown that the 

RFC determination should be reversed. 

Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, Winski’s motion for summary judgment is denied 

and the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. 

 ENTER:

 

 ____________________________________ 

 Young B. Kim 

 United States Magistrate Judge