United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit 

No. 16-1770 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

 v. 

SHAYNE PARKER, 

 Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. F. Dennis Saylor IV, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Thompson, Selya, and Barron, 

Circuit Judges. 

 John A. Amabile for appellant. 

Alexia R. De Vincentis, Assistant United States Attorney, 

with whom William D. Weinreb, Acting United States Attorney, was 

on brief, for appellee. 

September 19, 2017 
- 2 -

THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. 

PREFACE

Sometime on or around March 22, 2014 — all dates here 

are in that year, by the way — Shayne Parker committed two legal 

no-nos: he possessed 50 rounds of 38-caliber ammo while being a 

convicted felon, and he transported a SCCY Model CXP 9-mm pistol 

into his state of residence without a license. Or so a federal 

grand jury in Massachusetts alleged in an indictment charging him 

with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and (a)(3). Parker pleaded 

not guilty. But a trial jury found him guilty as charged. And a 

district judge sentenced him to 60 months in prison and 3 years of 

supervised release. 

Parker now appeals only his conviction, arguing that the 

judge triply erred — first, by not individually voir diring 

prospective jurors about their feelings toward race; then, by 

admitting evidence of other gun and ammo purchases (what we will 

call "other-acts evidence"); and, finally, by instructing the jury 

on willful blindness.1 Concluding that none of his challenges 

rises to the level of reversible error, we affirm. 

 1 As relevant to our dispute, voir diring is a process through 

which "a judge or lawyer" examines "a prospective juror" to see if 

"the prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury." See 

Voir Dire, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
- 3 -

HOW THE CASE GOT HERE2

On March 21, Parker drove with Ronald Scott from 

Massachusetts (their state of residence) to New Hampshire and 

checked into the Keene Inn in Keene, New Hampshire. The room was 

registered in Parker's name. There they hooked up with Mitchell 

Riddell, a drug customer of Scott's. And Riddell talked to Scott 

— in Parker's presence — about buying guns. 

The trio got together again the next day, March 22, this 

time joined by Melanie LaMott. Turns out LaMott could legally buy 

firearms in the Granite State and had agreed with Riddell to act 

as a straw buyer.3 Parker and Scott are African-American; Riddell 

and LaMott are white — why this matters will become clear in the 

next section of this opinion. 

The foursome first went to the Alstead Gun Shop in 

Alstead, New Hampshire. They checked out some handguns but left 

because Scott became uncomfortable with someone in the shop. 

 2 Because Parker does not attack the sufficiency of the 

evidence against him, we describe the pertinent facts as neutrally 

as possible. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 851 F.3d 113, 118 

n.1 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Rodríguez–Soler, 773 F.3d 

289, 290 (1st Cir. 2014). 

3 See Straw Purchase, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) 

(defining "straw purchase" as "[s]omeone's buying of a firearm for 

another who is prohibited to make such a purchase because of a 

prior conviction, an order of protection, or some similar 

judicially imposed proscription"). 
- 4 -

The gang then headed to the Sporting and Hunting Depot 

in Charlestown, New Hampshire, with Parker driving Scott in a 

Subaru and Riddell driving LaMott in a Toyota. After they all 

entered the store, LaMott bought a bunch of firearms, one of which 

was a SCCY Model CXP 9-mm pistol. Satisfied with the purchases, 

the group went to LaMott's Keene apartment, where Scott gave 

Riddell and LaMott crack cocaine as a partial payment for their 

services. Parker and Scott handled the firearms and said how 

pleased they were with them. 

The quartet set out for Boston, Massachusetts — Riddell 

and LaMott in Riddell's car, and Parker and Scott in the Subaru — 

but stopped en route at Dick's Sporting Goods Store in Keene so 

Scott and LaMott could buy ammunition, including the 38-caliber 

ammunition. Once in Boston, Parker and Scott examined the guns 

and ammo. And Scott gave Riddell and LaMott the rest of the drugs 

they were owed for helping out. 

At some point, the police caught wind of what was going 

on. And Parker's arrest, indictment, and conviction followed 

apace. As we said, his brief on appeal advances three claims of 

error — though all are without merit, for reasons we explain in 

the pages that follow.4

 4 We will note additional details as needed in discussing 

Parker's issues. 
- 5 -

INDIVIDUAL VOIR DIRE 

Background 

After Parker elected to go to trial, the parties geared 

up to select an impartial jury. As part of that process, Parker's 

counsel asked the judge if he planned on conducting any individual 

voir dire. "Only at sidebar, if someone raises [a] hand" in 

response to a group question, the judge said — though, he stressed, 

"we're not going to do individualized voir dire in the sense of 

. . . doing it in the lobby or doing it segregated." But Parker's 

lawyer believed the judge's proposed approach would not do enough 

to uncover potential jurors holding racist views. And so he pushed 

for individual voir dire, arguing to the judge as follows: 

 As a statistical matter, the criminal-justice system treats 

African-Americans much harsher than others. 

 The race of the cooperating straw buyers added a "crossracial component" to the case. 

 The charged ammo/firearm "offenses" also "play[ed] into a 

stereotype." 

 One could not "realistically expect jurors to respond in 

the audience in front of all of the[] other prospective 
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jurors to questions about whether they are biased or 

prejudiced against people based on their race." 

 And individual voir dire would better help him assess a 

potential juror's demeanor and thus better help him decide 

whether he or she had answered the judge's questions 

truthfully. 

Relying on these reasons — offered without any evidence 

(like, say, a social-science study) to back them up — counsel asked 

the judge to ask these five questions (the bracketed numbers are 

ours): 

[1] Do you have any feelings or opinions about black 

people that would cause you to question your ability to 

be impartial in evaluating the evidence in this case? 

[2] Would the fact that Mr. Parker is a black man make 

it more difficult for you to decide a verdict in his 

favor than if he were white? 

[3] Do you believe that black men are more likely to 

commit a crime than others? 

[4] Have you had any experiences with black people that 

might make you unable to be fair and impartial in this 

case? 

[5] Can you honestly assure the court that the race of 

the defendant will not affect your ability to be fair 

and impartial? 

Responding to counsel's request, the judge said that it 

is "by no means clear" that "people will be inhibited from simply 

raising their hands in a crowd full of strangers without uttering 

a word for fear of being shamed into admitting racial prejudice," 
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but "will freely admit racial prejudice to a judicial officer in 

a black robe with lawyers and court reporters and law clerks 

present." So he denied the call for individual voir dire. "This 

is a relatively routine case," the judge then stressed — "not a 

death penalty case, not a murder case, not a highly publicized 

case." Because "[t]here's no racial angle to it" — "like a victim 

and a perpetrator being of different races" — and because 

"[n]othing about it particularly w[ould] evoke a strong emotional 

response or a racially charged response," the judge saw no reason 

"to take the highly unusual and time-consuming and resourceconsuming step of individual voir dire." Asked by the defense to 

reconsider, the judge adhered to his ruling — despite counsel's 

insistence that Donald Trump's recent victory in the Massachusetts 

Republican primary had "engendered serious racial polarization" 

and that individual voir dire would add only "a couple of extra 

hours" to the process. 

The judge proceeded to empanel the jury. And per his 

usual practice, the judge told the prospective jurors that "[i]t 

is very important that you give truthful responses." And then the 

judge said: 

Ladies and gentlemen, when I ask a question if you think 

your answer is yes or your answer is yes, please raise 

your hand. If you raise your hand, I'm going to call 

you over here to the sidebar one-by-one. I'll find out 

what the issue is. I might explore it with you a little 

bit. 
- 8 -

 The judge started voir dire off with some basic 

icebreaking questions. For instance, after mentioning the names 

of the potential witnesses, the judge asked, "Do any of you know 

or are you related to . . . or acquainted" with "any of those 

people?" A few potential jurors raised their hands, just like the 

judge had asked them to do. And after calling them to sidebar, 

the judge asked some probing follow-up questions. 

Before turning to the issue of racial bias, the judge 

noted that "it can be difficult sometimes for people to talk openly 

about [race] or to be honest or open about whatever feelings they 

may have on [that] subject[], but your duties and obligations as 

citizens and as potential jurors require you to be completely 

honest with me." Having said that, the judge asked the group if 

anyone had "any feelings of any kind that may affect your ability 

in any way to be fair and impartial in the trial of an AfricanAmerican defendant because of his race." No one raised a hand. 

At sidebar, Parker's lawyer restated his position that 

group questions answered with a show of hands did not suffice 

because "there's no way anybody is going to come forward on that." 

"All right," the judge said, "[o]ther than individualized voir 

dire, is there any particular question you want me to ask that I 

have not asked to the group?" Defense counsel identified two, 

which the judge posed to the group: "[D]o any of you believe that 
- 9 -

it is more likely that the defendant is guilty of the crime because 

he is African-American?" And "[h]ave any of you had an experience 

of any kind with African-Americans that would affect your ability 

to be a fair and impartial juror in the trial of this case?" No 

one raised a hand in response to either question. The judge 

empaneled a jury of twelve, plus two alternates. And as seated, 

the jury had at least one African-American member (Parker's lawyer 

told us at oral argument that he "believe[d] there was one or two 

African-Americans" on the jury). 

Arguments 

As Parker sees it, the judge not only had to voir dire 

potential jurors about possible racial prejudice, but he also had 

an obligation to question them individually rather than 

collectively — and to speak with each one outside the presence of 

the others. For support, Parker's brief talks about 

 the "cross racial" makeup of the persons involved in the 

charged offenses — i.e., an African-American defendant and 

white straw buyers; 

 the "nature" of the crime, which "created inherent 

stereotyping with [an] African American . . . from Boston 

. . . preying on [white] drug addicted" New Hampshirites; 

 "the statistical evidence of bias against African Americans 

in the criminal justice process"; 
- 10 -

 how the trial took place in a racially-charged atmosphere 

caused "by the then ongoing presidential election campaign"; 

and 

 how one cannot expect a potential juror to cop to being a 

racist in front of other potential jurors. 

The government counters that "the circumstances" of 

Parker's "case" did not require the judge to question prospective 

jurors about racial bias. So, the government adds, the judge 

actually went above and beyond what was required because he did

quiz them on prejudice. And, the government insists, Parker has 

not shown that the judge's decision to question collectively rather 

than individually infracted any constitutional command. 

Standard of Review 

Our review of the judge's voir dire decision looks only 

for abuses of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Gelin, 712 

F.3d 612, 621 (1st Cir. 2013). The key "question under this 

standard . . . is not whether we, if sitting as a court of first 

instance, would have weighed the relevant considerations 

differently," but instead "whether our review of the record leaves 

us with a definite and firm conviction that the court below 

committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached 

upon a weighing of the relevant factors." Id. (quotations and 

citations omitted). 
- 11 -

Analysis 

A defendant has a constitutional right to trial by an 

impartial jury, see U.S. Const. amend. VI — something voir dire 

helps safeguard by giving "the court and counsel" a chance "to 

examine" potential jurors "for impartiality," see Peña-Rodriguez 

v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 866 (2017). And when it comes to 

describing the judiciary's role here, the Supreme Court has pulled 

no punches: "to ensure that individuals who sit on juries are 

free of racial bias," our "Constitution at times demands that 

defendants be permitted to ask questions about racial bias during 

voir dire." Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868 (emphasis removed). 

That is so because "discrimination on the basis of race, 'odious 

in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of 

justice.'" Id. (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 

(1979)). 

Ever-faithful to controlling precedent, we have said 

that "[t]he possibility of racial prejudice" creates "special 

concerns" — concerns that in "certain limited circumstances" 

require the asking of "special voir dire question[s]." United 

States v. Brown, 938 F.2d 1482, 1485 (1st Cir. 1991); see also 

Gelin, 712 F.3d at 621. By way of example, Brown pulled two 

"special circumstances" cases from the U.S. Reports. One 

"involv[ed] a black civil rights activist whose defense to a 
- 12 -

marijuana possession charge was that he had been framed by local 

white police." 938 F.2d at 1485 (citing Ham v. South Carolina, 

409 U.S. 524 (1973)). And the other "involv[ed] a sentencing of 

a black defendant who had been convicted of [the] capital offense" 

of killing a white storekeeper. See id. (citing Turner v. Murray, 

476 U.S. 28 (1986)). Both are cases where "[r]ace was . . . 

'inextricably bound up with the conduct of [defendant's] trial.'" 

See id. (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 (1976)). But 

we have also said that voir dire "[o]rdinarily . . . need not 

include questions regarding racial prejudice" and that "[t]he mere 

fact that a defendant is black does not alone" activate "the 

special questioning requirement" — though we (echoing the Supreme 

Court) have stressed too that the better approach "'generally is 

to propound appropriate questions designed to identify racial 

prejudice if requested by the defendant,'" even in situations where 

it is not constitutionally required. See id. (quoting Ristaino, 

424 U.S. at 597 n.9).5

 5 To the extent Parker claims that Peña-Rodriquez overruled 

these just-cited cases, his claim is off base. Peña-Rodriguez is 

not a jury-selection case, but is instead a case involving "the 

no-impeachment rule" — i.e., a "general rule" saying that once the 

jurors' "verdict has entered, it will not later be called into 

question based on the comments or conclusions they expressed during 

deliberations." 137 S. Ct. at 861. Peña-Rodriguez's holding is 

"that where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or 

she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal 

defendant, the [Constitution] requires that the no-impeachment 
- 13 -

Having said all this, however, we need not referee the 

parties' duel over whether the judge had to ask voir dire questions 

to smoke out possible racial bias. And this is because even if we 

assume (without deciding) that he had to explore the issue during 

the jury-selection process, the judge did exactly that — asking 

(as we detailed above) the group of potential jurors not one but 

three questions designed to weed out racial bias (including two 

questions suggested by defense counsel). Fairly viewed, the 

judge's questions during group voir dire captured the essence of 

what Parker wanted asked during the hoped-for individual voir dire, 

even if they did not match up word for word — certainly they showed 

the judge's sensitivity to racial-prejudice concerns. Perhaps 

that is why Parker spends most of his time arguing that the judge 

should have done an individual voir dire, talking to each potential 

 

rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the 

evidence of the juror's statement and any resulting denial of the 

jury trial guarantee." Id. at 869. Sure, as Parker notes, PeñaRodriguez made powerful points aplenty, like: while "[a]ll forms 

of improper bias pose challenges to the trial process[,] . . . 

there is a sound basis to treat racial bias with added precaution." 

Id. But none of the cases in the above paragraph says anything to 

the contrary — actually, they are on the same page as PeñaRodriguez when it comes to discussing the poisonous effects of 

racial prejudice on the justice system. So we may — no, must — 

follow them. 
- 14 -

juror outside of the others' earshot. Though forcefully presented 

by able counsel, his argument does not persuade. 

Trial judges enjoy much discretion about how to conduct 

voir dire, including whether to conduct individual voir dire. See, 

e.g., United States v. Pérez-González, 445 F.3d 39, 46-47 (1st 

Cir. 2006). And certainly there are situations where individual 

voir dire makes sense. See generally Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 

75, 80-83 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that defense counsel had not 

acted ineffectively by joining the prosecutor in requesting that 

the trial judge ask prospective jurors during a closed individual 

voir dire "about the effect that racial prejudice and pretrial 

publicity could have on their ability to decide the case 

impartially"). But no authority exists to support Parker's theory 

— floated during oral argument — that if the case facts suggest 

the judge should voir dire on race, then only an individual voir 

dire will do. On the contrary, in cases where "the subject of 

possible racial bias must be 'covered' by the questioning of the 

trial court in the course of its examination of potential jurors," 

the Supreme Court has been "careful not to specify the particulars 

by which this could be done" — noting, for example, that it has 

"not . . . require[d] questioning of individual jurors about facts 

or experiences that might have led to racial bias." See Mu'Min v. 

Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991). And as the government tells 
- 15 -

us — without contradiction from Parker — the only circuit to 

squarely consider the issue before us held that, "ordinarily, 

questioning jurors as a group" is constitutionally sufficient, 

"even when the defendant belongs to a racial, ethnic, or religious 

minority and juror bias on one or more of these grounds might be 

a concern." See United States v. Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544, 555 (7th 

Cir. 2012). 

Trying to convince us that his case is anything but 

ordinary, Parker turns to a concurrence in a nearly 30-year-old 

Eleventh Circuit opinion, Berryhill v. Zant, 858 F.2d 633 (11th 

Cir. 1988) — a habeas case involving a crime that caused a torrent 

of pretrial publicity. Unfortunately for Parker, the Berryhill 

concurrence is not a difference-maker here. 

To over-simplify (slightly) for present purposes, the 

district judge there concluded that a state court's decision to 

deny Berryhill's request "for a sequestered" individual voir dire 

violated his fair-trial rights. Id. at 640-43. In taking this 

issue on (the majority did not speak to that subject because it 

affirmed the grant of habeas relief on other grounds), the 

concurrence quoted the district judge, who said — and this is the 

money quote as far as Parker is concerned — that the "inhibiting 

effect of a large audience . . . made a careful and probing voir 

dire all the more important." Id. at 641 (Clark, J., specially 
- 16 -

concurring) (emphasis added). Agreeing with the district judge 

that the state court's voir dire had not done enough to uncover 

the possible influence of pretrial publicity, the concurrence 

suggested that at any new trial, the state court should do a 

general group voir dire on the pretrial-publicity issue (asking 

them whether they had read or heard anything about the case, for 

example) and then do "an individualized segregated voir dire" if 

necessary. Id. at 642-43 (Clark, J., specially concurring). A 

"sequestered individual voir dire," the concurrence stressed, 

would prevent "those prospective jurors who had not read or heard 

about the case" from being "contaminat[ed]" by "the responses of 

those who had." Id. at 642 (Clark, J., specially concurring). 

As we understand his brief, Parker is claiming that the 

"inhibiting effect" concept gives some oomph to his core contention 

that people will not answer race questions honestly during a group 

voir dire. Like the concurring judge in Berryhill, we do not doubt 

that the "inhibiting effect" concern makes a diligent and 

thoughtful voir dire a must. But again, that is precisely what 

our judge did here. And his voir dire procedure — questioning 

jury prospects about race as a group (prospects who had already 

shown a willingness to raise their hands, mind you) and allowing 

for individualized follow-up questions at sidebar if necessary — 

jibed with the procedure recommended by the Berryhill concurrence. 
- 17 -

Which is why this out-of-circuit opinion is not the game-changer 

that Parker thinks it is. 

Summarizing succinctly, given the particulars of 

Parker's case, we believe that the tack taken by the experienced 

judge passes the abuse-of-discretion test with room to spare. See 

generally Pérez-González, 445 F.3d at 46 (noting that "[w]hile we 

have endorsed the concept of individual questioning in high profile 

cases, we have approved 'group' questioning of potential jurors 

about bias as within the district court's broad discretion in 

conducting voir dire" (citations omitted)). Enough said on the 

voir-dire issue. 

OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE 

Background 

Before the trial kicked off, the government moved in 

limine seeking permission to introduce evidence of gun and ammo 

purchases beyond the ones that formed the bases of the indictment's 

counts. Zeroing in on other straw buys that went down on March 

22, as well as buys that occurred on March 10 and 16 (more on these 

in a bit), the government argued, first, that this other-acts 

evidence showed Parker's "knowledge and intent to transport and 

receive the firearms in the state of Massachusetts," and, second, 

that the other-acts evidence's probative worth outweighed any 

unfairly prejudicial effect. Parker opposed the motion. 
- 18 -

Having gotten the green light from the judge, the 

government introduced evidence at trial that on March 10, Parker 

and Scott got the straw purchasers to buy multiple firearms at the 

Alstead Gun Shop: Parker drove Scott in the Subaru to New 

Hampshire, where they met with Riddell and a woman named Sandra 

Egbert. Scott gave Riddell money and general instructions on what 

guns to buy. The four — Parker, Scott, Riddell, and Egbert — 

entered the store. Egbert bought three guns. At some point, the 

guns ended up in the Subaru. And Parker said that he really liked 

one of them — "a silver and black SCCY 9 millimeter handgun" — and 

that he wanted to buy "more like it." 

The government also introduced evidence of the straw 

purchases that happened less than a week later, on March 16: 

Before the buy, Parker and Scott headed to New Hampshire and stayed 

at the Keene Inn in a room registered to Parker. They met with 

Riddell and LaMott. Parker again said that he wanted more "SCCY" 

guns. And using Scott's money, LaMott then bought three firearms 

(one of which was an "SCCY" handgun) at the Sporting and Hunting 

Depot in Charlestown. After stopping at LaMott's Keene apartment, 

the group drove to Boston (Riddell drove LaMott in his car). 

Parker handled the guns back at the Boston apartment. And Riddell 

and LaMott returned to New Hampshire after getting crack cocaine 

as payment for their services. 
- 19 -

And, finally, the government introduced evidence of the 

March 22 gun buy — one that occurred contemporaneously with the 

purchase of the SCCY Model CXP 9-mm pistol that was the subject of 

the indictment: At the Sporting and Hunting Depot, Parker told 

Riddell that he and Scott wanted an assault rifle hanging on the 

wall. And Parker and Scott then gave Riddell money to buy the 

weapon. LaMott made the purchase (again, at the same time she 

bought the SCCY Model CXP 9-mm pistol). And later that day, LaMott 

and Scott bought ammo at Dick's Sporting Goods Store in Keene. 

Importantly, at various points in the trial the judge 

instructed the jury regarding the purposes for which the otheracts evidence was introduced. Here is a perfect example of the 

kind of instructions he gave (the judge gave this one the first 

time he admitted the evidence): 

I'm permitting you to hear evidence of . . . transactions 

[beyond those underlying the indictment] for the purpose 

of permitting you to evaluate that evidence for whatever 

weight you choose to give it in considering [Parker's] 

intent, motive, knowledge, whether he had a particular 

plan, but, again, this is not charged conduct. 

. . . [Y]ou must take special care to ensure that 

you do not consider this evidence as evidence that 

[Parker] has a bad character or somehow is a bad person, 

and, therefore, committed the crime. 

You must evaluate the charged crime[s] according to 

their own evidence and not because of whatever character 

[Parker] does or does not have. 
- 20 -

Hard on the heels of this instruction, the judge — at defense 

counsel's request — told the jury that "another way of framing 

. . . the same concept is you may not conclude that [Parker] had 

a propensity to commit a crime and, therefore, committed the crime, 

that he acted in accordance with bad character, so to speak." And 

to give another example, in his final jury charge the judge gave 

this reminder: 

You've heard evidence that [Parker] may have 

committed acts similar to those charged in this case on 

one or more different occasions. You may consider that 

evidence only for the limited purposes of deciding: 

Whether [he] had the necessary intent, knowledge, 

or state of mind to commit the crimes charged in the 

indictment; 

Whether [he] had a motive or opportunity to commit 

the crimes charged; or 

Whether [he] acted according to a plan to commit 

the crimes charged. 

You may not use that evidence for any other purpose. 

In particular, you may not use it to infer that, because 

of his character, or because he has a propensity to act 

in a certain way, [he] committed the crimes charged. 

Arguments 

Parker thinks the judge reversibly erred here because 

(by his lights) the "uncharged crimes" evidence constituted 

"prejudicial" other-acts evidence that the government used to fill 

lots of trial time merely to portray him as bad man, thus "creating 

[a] significant risk" that the jury convicted him "based on his 
- 21 -

propensity to commit a crime."6 The government thinks the 

opposite, saying the judge rightly ruled that the evidence had 

non-propensity purposes, chiefly to establish Parker's knowledge 

and intent. And, the government writes, the evidence "was also 

not unfairly prejudicial" to Parker — particularly given the 

judge's "deftly and timely deployed limiting instructions," which 

"eliminated any potential for unfair prejudice." Wrapping up, the 

government says that if error occurred it was harmless given the 

considerable "uncontested evidence of Parker's guilt." 

Standard of Review 

Our review of the judge's decision to admit other-acts 

evidence is for abuse of discretion only.7 See, e.g., United 

States v. Munyenyezi, 781 F.3d 532, 539 (1st Cir. 2015); United 

States v. George, 761 F.3d 42, 58 (1st Cir. 2014). And convincing 

us that the judge abused his discretion takes no small effort. 

See United States v. Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987, 995 (1st Cir. 1990). 

We say that because "[o]nly rarely — and in extraordinarily 

 6 Parker calls the evidence "irrelevant" in part of a sentence 

buried in the summary-of-the-argument section to his brief, but 

then does nothing to elaborate on it. So we hold any potential 

relevance-based argument waived for lack of development. See, 

e.g., United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). 

7 The parties agree (at least implicitly) that Parker's 

counsel did enough below so that this issue gets abuse-ofdiscretion (and not simply plain-error) review. And we have no 

basis to conclude otherwise. 
- 22 -

compelling circumstances — will we, from the vista of a cold 

appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment 

concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair 

effect." Id. (quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 

1340 (1st Cir. 1988)). 

Analysis 

No one doubts that prosecutors can offer evidence of 

uncharged crimes so long as the evidence goes to proving something 

other than the defendant's bad character, like proving his intent 

or knowledge. See Munyenyezi, 781 F.3d at 539 (citing Fed. R. 

Evid. 404(b)(2)); see also Rodríguez-Soler, 773 F.3d at 297 (noting 

that the list of permissible purposes "is illustrative, not 

exhaustive"). But even then, the judge can keep the evidence out 

if its potential for unfair prejudice "substantially outweigh[s]" 

its probative worth. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; see also United States 

v. Zeuli, 725 F.2d 813, 816 (1st Cir. 1984) (explaining that if 

other-acts evidence is probative of some issue other than 

character, "it is admissible, subject only to the rarely invoked 

limitations of Rule 403"). With these preliminaries out of the 

way, we can dispose of Parker's claim quickly enough. 

The government is exactly right that prosecutors used 

the other-acts evidence not to show Parker's bad character but to 

show his intent and knowledge. Take the other-acts evidence of 
- 23 -

the March 22 purchases. Parker's expressing an interest in the 

assault-style rifle, giving money to help buy it, and handling it 

back in Boston (on the very day of the charged criminal purchases) 

showed his awareness of — and his participation in — the group's 

gun/ammo-purchasing project. Ditto for the other-acts evidence of 

the March 10 and 16 purchases, since those other acts not only 

occurred just before the charged acts, they also closely allied 

with the types of crimes Parker was on trial for — similarities 

include stays at the Keene Inn, in a room registered to Parker; 

the shuttling of guns and ammo from New Hampshire to Massachusetts; 

and the giving of drugs to straw buyers as payment for their 

services. All of this showed that Parker was a knowledgeable 

scheme member and not simply an "unknowing" innocent. See United 

States v. Aguilar-Aranceta, 58 F.3d 796, 798-99 (1st Cir. 1995) 

(stressing that if the evidence might admit of an innocent 

"explanation" and the parties dispute the defendant's "intent and 

knowledge," the judge has the "discretion to permit the government 

to introduce evidence of prior similar offenses to demonstrate the 

unlikeliness that the defendant was merely an innocent and 

unknowing bystander"); see also Hadfield, 918 F.2d at 994 

(collecting cases upholding the admission of a defendant's prior 
- 24 -

involvement in similar illegal activities "to prove knowledge and 

intent").8

And prejudicial though it was — nearly all evidence is 

prejudicial, "by helping one side and hurting the other" — the 

complained-of other-acts evidence (admitted for the perfectly 

permissible purpose of showing Parker's knowledge and intent) was 

not unfairly prejudicial. See Rodríguez-Soler, 773 F.3d at 296 

(discussing how Rule 403 works). Parker tries to establish unfair 

prejudice by suggesting that the other-acts evidence ate up too 

much court time. But the record shows that in this 5-day trial 

involving 15 witnesses, testimony about the gun-and-ammo purchases 

came from just 2 testifiers, Riddell and LaMott. Also, the judge's 

limiting instructions on the proper use of the other-acts evidence 

— crafted with defense counsel's input, mind you — did enough to 

reduce any possible prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Moon, 

 8 Parker talks up a non-binding (and un-appealed) district 

court opinion, United States v. Da Lin, 707 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. 

N.H. 2010), hoping against hope that we might see the other-actsevidence issue his way. Among other things, the district judge in 

Da Lin found "insufficient evidence to determine whether the prior 

conduct" at issue there "was 'sufficiently similar' to that alleged 

in the pending charges to 'allow a juror to draw a reasonable 

inference probative of knowledge and intent.'" Id. at 162 (quoting 

United States v. Landrau–Lopez, 444 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2006)). 

Compare Da Lin to our case and the difference is night and day, 

given our conclusion that the similarity between the uncharged and 

charged conduct here had probative value in establishing Parker's 

knowledge and intent. So Da Lin helps Parker not at all. 
- 25 -

802 F.3d 135, 144-45 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 830 

(2017); United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 217 (1st Cir. 1996). 

The long and the short of it is that the judge did not 

abuse his discretion by admitting the other-acts evidence.9

Two issues down, one to go. 

WILLFUL-BLINDNESS INSTRUCTION 

Background 

At a charge conference held before the close of evidence, 

the judge asked the parties if he should give a willful-blindness 

instruction and if so, why. 

The prosecutor responded that yes, the judge should give 

the charge. For support, the prosecutor pointed to Parker's postarrest statement to law enforcement that Scott had paid him $200 

"like three times" to drive him to New Hampshire but that "each 

time, when we stayed in the hotel, when we came back to Boston, 

the only thing we came back with was marijuana." Parker added 

that he "didn't want to know" what else Scott was up to — and 

though Scott once went to the car to get "stuff," a word Parker 

took to mean guns, Parker claimed that he left the room because he 

"didn't want to know about nothing." According to the prosecutor, 

Parker's comments show "that he's willfully blind by attempting to 

 9 Given this conclusion, there is no need for a harmlesserror analysis. 
- 26 -

close his eyes to the conduct." "I think it's fairly presented in 

the evidence or it certainly will be when the government introduces 

[the] statement tomorrow," the prosecutor stressed. 

Parker's lawyer saw things differently, to put it 

mildly. The government does not "have to" put Parker's statement 

in evidence, counsel said. "We're not putting any evidence in" on 

the lack-of-knowledge issue, he added. And, he noted, the 

prosecutor "can't put [the statement] in and then say I want to 

get a particular instruction that otherwise would be 

inappropriate." Focusing on the proposed instruction's language, 

counsel complained that the judge could not use it because it would 

have "the effect of shifting the burden of proof" on the questions 

of Parker's knowledge and intent. 

The judge reserved ruling on the matter, saying he wanted 

to see what Parker said, "assuming [the statement] comes in." "I'm 

going to go back and look at the case law on willful blindness, 

when it's appropriate and when it isn't and give some more thought 

to it," the judge added. The next day, the judge told the parties 

that he intended to give a willful-blindness instruction. 

Regardless of whether Parker claims a lack of knowledge, the judge 

ruled, his statement — if it is as represented by the government 

— "suggest[s] a conscious course of deliberate ignorance," and the 

charge "as drafted does not suggest in any way that an inference 
- 27 -

of knowledge is mandated." Later that morning, the government — 

without objection — introduced the statement. 

The government rested its case that same day. The 

defense, in turn, rested too — without calling any witnesses. The 

attorneys then made their closing arguments. And the judge gave 

the final charge to the jury. 

Pertinently for our purposes, the judge instructed the 

jury that it "may infer" Parker "had knowledge of a fact if" it 

found Parker "deliberately closed his eyes to a fact that otherwise 

would have been obvious to him." "[T]o make such an inference," 

the judge explained, the jury had to "find two things: [f]irst, 

that [Parker] was aware of a high probability of the fact in 

question; and, [s]econd, that [he] consciously and deliberately 

avoided learning that fact — that is to say, he willfully made 

himself blind to that fact." And, the judge emphasized, whether 

Parker "deliberately closed his eyes to [a] fact, and, if so, what 

inference, if any, should be drawn," was "entirely up to you." 

Also, the judge cautioned the jury that Parker "must have 

consciously and deliberately avoided learning the fact" — neither 

"[m]ere negligence, recklessness or mistake in failing to learn 

the fact," nor "[t]he fact that a reasonable person in [Parker's] 

position would have known the fact," sufficed. Plus, the judge 

warned that a finding that Parker "made himself willfully blind to 
- 28 -

one or more facts" was not alone "sufficient to find him guilty of 

a crime." Rather, the prosecution had to "prove[] all of the 

elements of the crimes as charged in the indictment" — something 

the judge stressed after referring to Parker's presumption of 

innocence and the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt the elements of each offense. 

Parker's attorney renewed his objection to the willfulblindness instruction after the judge gave the charge. 

Arguments 

Parker writes that the judge should not have given a 

willful-blindness instruction because (a) he "introduced no 

affirmative evidence" of his "lack of knowledge"; (b) the evidence 

"did not suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance" on 

his part; and (c) the charge relieved the government of its burden 

to prove his "knowledge" of the illegal scheme. For its part, the 

government argues that Parker waived the claim by not properly 

developing it in his appellate papers. If not waived, says the 

government, his argument is dead wrong on each front. And on top 

of that, the government claims that even if the evidence did not 

justify a willful-blindness instruction, any error was harmless 

because "the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that 

Parker had actual knowledge of the firearms purchase scheme." 
- 29 -

Standard of Review 

Some older cases — as the government suggests — imply 

that uncertainty surrounds what standard of review applies in 

assessing a judge's decision to give a willful-blindness 

instruction. See United States v. Appolon, 695 F.3d 44, 63 (1st 

Cir. 2012). But recent cases have brought clarity to this area, 

explaining, for example, that the standard of review depends on 

the nature and circumstances of the particular claim of error. 

See United States v. De La Cruz, 835 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2016). 

Here, as we said a second ago, Parker's claims turn on whether the 

trial evidence supported a willful-blindness instruction and on 

whether the issued instruction relieved the government of its 

burden to prove his knowledge. And given our current caselaw, 

these claims demand de novo review. See id.; see also United 

States v. George, 841 F.3d 55, 65 (1st Cir. 2016). 

Analysis 

Because we can uphold the judge's willful-blindness 

charge on the merits, we need not decide whether Parker waived the 

issue because of inadequate briefing. To the merits then. 

Lots of "criminal statutes require proof that a 

defendant acted knowingly," our judicial superiors tell us. 

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011). 

But willful blindness is tantamount to knowledge. See United 
- 30 -

States v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 318 F.3d 268, 272 (1st Cir. 2003). 

And when applied, the so-called willful-blindness doctrine lets 

prosecutors prove a defendant's knowledge by showing that he 

"deliberately shield[ed] [himself] from clear evidence of critical 

facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances." GlobalTech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 766. An oft-repeated rationale 

for the doctrine is that one who acts like that is "just as 

culpable" as one who has "actual knowledge" — in other words, 

"persons who know enough to blind themselves to direct proof of 

critical facts in effect have actual knowledge of those facts." 

Id. 

A willful-blindness instruction is appropriate only when 

(a) the defendant alleges he lacked knowledge, (b) the evidence — 

examined in the light most flattering to the prosecution — shows 

he deliberately closed his eyes to the true facts, and (c) the 

instruction, viewed in context, does not suggest that an inference 

of knowledge is required rather than permitted. See, e.g., United 

States v. Azubike, 564 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2009); United States 

v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2000). We address each part of 

this test in turn. 

As for part (a), Parker's big argument is that he offered 

"no affirmative evidence" of his "lack of knowledge." True, Parker 

never testified at trial and so did not put his lack of guilty 
- 31 -

knowledge directly in issue. But "that circumstance is not 

dispositive." Singh, 222 F.3d at 11. Our cases have made crystal 

clear that part (a) "of the test for a willful blindness 

instruction does not depend on a showing of an explicit denial of 

guilty knowledge out of the defendant's own mouth" — what matters 

is whether "a practical evaluation of the record reveals that the 

defense was pitched in that direction." Id. And that is the case 

here. 

To begin, Parker's post-arrest statement — admitted into 

evidence without objection — suggests an attempt on his part to 

convince the authorities that he had no idea what the people around 

him were doing. And Parker offers no developed argument as to why 

the judge could not rely on this evidence in his willful-blindness 

ruling. More, the trial transcript shows that Parker staked his 

defense on convincing the jury that he did not personally buy or 

transport the firearms, and was not there when others bought or 

talked about them — a defensive theme reflected by his counsel's 

questions on cross-examination and by his counsel's comments 

during closing arguments.10 And as the government's brief notes, 

 10 To take only one of the examples, defense counsel said 

during closing that Parker "didn't buy any firearm, he didn't 

transport it, it was never at his home." And even though a 

fingerprint matching Parker's was found on an ammunition package, 

counsel claimed that "[t]here's no credible evidence" that Parker 

ever "touched" the ammo — or for that matter, the gun. Riddell 
- 32 -

Parker's team implemented this strategy in the hopes of persuading 

jurors that he had zero knowledge of what Scott, Riddell, and 

LaMott were up to — a point Parker does not contest in his reply 

brief. 

Parker fares no better under the part (b) of the test. 

The government offered direct evidence that he consciously averted 

his eyes to the group's illegal escapades. We are again talking 

about Parker's post-arrest statement in which he claimed that he 

"didn't want to know about nothing" and that he left the room when 

Scott went to the car to bring the guns into the Boston apartment 

(Scott had said that he was going to get "stuff," but Parker knew 

"stuff" meant "guns"). That is enough to satisfy this part of the 

test. See United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 452 (1st Cir. 

1994) (finding no error in giving a willful-blindness instruction 

where the defendant said he "didn't want to know anything about" 

a "scheme to fraudulently represent the existence of down 

payments"). 

Finally, regarding the test's part (c), Parker makes no 

effort to explain why he thinks the judge's willful-blindness 

instruction mandated an inference of knowledge. Maybe that is 

because the judge took care to avoid giving the impression that 

 

made "stuff up" — saying Parker did "this" or "that" — to curry 

favor with the authorities, counsel stressed. 
- 33 -

such an inference was mandatory rather than permissive. Recall, 

for example, how the judge told the jurors that it was "entirely 

up to you to determine whether [Parker] deliberately closed his 

eyes to [a] fact, and, if so, what inference, if any, should be 

drawn." Add to this the other parts of the judge's final charge 

(highlighted above) and we think Parker's claim that the 

instruction improperly implied that a guilty-knowledge inference 

was obligatory is a no-go. See Singh, 222 F.3d at 11 & n.4 

(approving a nearly identical willful-blindness instruction); 

United States v. Gabriele, 63 F.3d 61, 66-67 & n.6 (1st Cir. 1995) 

(same); Brandon, 17 F.3d at 451-52 & n.72 (same). 

The bottom line is that we see no reversible error with 

this aspect of the case.11 

FINAL WORDS 

Our work over, we affirm Parker's conviction. 

 11 Given our holding, we need not take on the government's 

other theories for why we should affirm the judge's instruction.