IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2013 WY 20

 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2012

February 20, 2013

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF 

LNP, A Minor Child:

KC,

Appellant

(Respondent),

v.

CC and EC,

Appellees

(Petitioners).

No. S-12-0155

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County

The Honorable Michael Davis, Judge

Representing Appellant:

John M. Burman, Director, and Christopher Sherwood, Student Intern, University of 

Wyoming, College of Law Legal Services Program. Argument by Mr. Sherwood.

Representing Appellees:

Aaron J. Lyttle, Long, Reimer, Winegar, Beppler, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument 

by Mr. Lyttle.

Before KITE, C.J., HILL, VOIGT, BURKE, JJ., and GOLDEN, J., Retired.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers

are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming

82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in

the permanent volume.

1

BURKE, Justice.

[¶1] Appellant, KC, (“Mother”), challenges the district court’s decision to appoint CC

and his wife, EC, (“Grandparents”), as permanent guardians for Mother’s daughter, LNP.

Mother contends the guardianship proceedings were subject to the requirements of the

Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and that the district court violated the provisions of

the Act in establishing a plenary guardianship. Mother also contends the district court

erred in concluding, under the ICWA, that returning LNP to Mother would likely result in

serious emotional or physical damage. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Mother presents the following issues:

1. Whether the district court failed to comply with the Indian 

Child Welfare Act’s ten day notice requirement.

2. Whether the district court received testimony from a 

“qualified expert witness” as required by the Indian Child 

Welfare Act.

3. Whether the district court received clear and convincing 

evidence that shows LNP’s return to the Appellant would 

likely result in serious emotional or physical damage as 

required by the Indian Child Welfare Act.

Grandparents state the issues in a substantially similar manner.

FACTS

[¶3] Appellant is the mother of LNP, who was born in Oklahoma in 2006.

1 During the

summer of 2010, Grandparents travelled to Oklahoma to attend the funeral of a family

member. Mother told Grandparents that she was struggling to make ends meet and was

having trouble finding shelter for herself, LNP, and her two other children. Grandparents

offered to let LNP live with them in Cheyenne, and Mother agreed.

[¶4] LNP began living with Grandparents in September, 2010. On September 8, 

 

1 LNP’s father has had no contact with LNP for several years and did not participate in the guardianship

proceedings.
2

Mother executed a handwritten letter consenting to Grandparents’ “guardianship over”

LNP. The letter stated that “I [KC] give permission to [Grandparents’] guardianship over

my daughter [LNP] while I’m away. For Schooling, Medical Assi[s]tance, Emergency

Assi[s]tance or any other things that needs [sic] to be done while I’m away.” When LNP

came into Grandparents’ care she was underweight and was “sick all the time.”

Grandparents also discovered welts on LNP’s buttocks, which turned out to be symptoms

of impetigo.

[¶5] Soon after taking LNP into their care, Grandparents became concerned by LNP’s

behavior. LNP had nightmares and a hard time sleeping in her bed. She often chose to

sleep on the floor. LNP was visibly afraid of men and exhibited sexualized behavior.

Eventually, LNP told Grandparents that she had been “honeyed” by her “mean daddy”

while in Mother’s care. In response, Grandparents sought professional counseling

services for LNP. Sherri Rubeck, a licensed professional counselor, diagnosed LNP with

disruptive behavior disorder and concluded that she had been sexually abused. 

[¶6] On June 17, 2011, Grandparents filed a Petition for the Appointment of 

Emergency Temporary Guardians in Laramie County District Court, seeking temporary 

guardianship of LNP. Grandparents attached Mother’s handwritten consent to the

guardianship. The court issued an ex parte order granting Grandparents’ petition and set

the matter for hearing on June 22. After holding a hearing, the court issued an order

appointing Grandparents as temporary guardians of LNP. 

[¶7] On September 30, 2011, Grandparents filed a motion to convert the temporary 

guardianship to a plenary guardianship, asserting that a plenary guardianship was in the 

best interests of LNP. Grandparents attached a “Consent to Appointment of Guardian,”

which was signed by Mother on June 25. Two weeks later, Mother filed a motion to

terminate the temporary guardianship. She also objected to the conversion of the

temporary guardianship to a plenary guardianship. The motions were set for hearing on

November 29, 2011. 

[¶8] On November 21, eight days before the scheduled hearing, Mother filed a motion

to vacate the temporary guardianship, alleging that LNP was an “Indian child” as defined

by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and asserting that the court had failed to

comply with the provisions of the Act in granting the temporary guardianship. The

motion stated that the court’s temporary guardianship order had failed to make a finding,

supported by the testimony of a qualified expert witness, that Mother’s custody of LNP

was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to LNP, as required under

Section 1912(e) of the ICWA. At the beginning of the hearing on November 29, the

court addressed Mother’s motion to vacate and decided that it would consider the

applicability of the ICWA at that hearing. The court proceeded to receive testimony from

Mother, Grandparents, LNP’s counselor, and various individuals acquainted with Mother

and LNP.
3

[¶9] Evidence introduced at the hearing indicated that LNP may have descended from a 

Cherokee ancestor. As a result, the court ordered Grandparents to provide notice of the 

proceedings to the Cherokee Nation and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In response to 

Mother’s claim that adequate notice had not been given in accordance with the ICWA,

the district court did not close the record at the hearing. The court stated that it would

permit receipt of additional evidence if the Cherokee Nation decided to intervene. The

court continued the temporary guardianship pending notification from the Cherokee

Nation as to whether LNP was, in their view, an Indian child under the ICWA. The court

noted that it would refrain from issuing a final decision until the tribe had a chance to

respond.

[¶10] On January 23, the Cherokee Nation issued a letter stating that LNP had been 

determined to be an Indian child as defined under the ICWA. The letter noted that the 

tribe “will be staffing this case to determine what action, if any, will be taken in this

matter.” At a status hearing on January 25, 2012, the court asked Mother whether she

would prefer that the court issue a decision as to guardianship of LNP, or whether she

would prefer to wait to see if the Cherokee Nation would intervene. Mother stated that

she preferred to wait, and the court continued the temporary guardianship pending further

input from the Cherokee Nation.

[¶11] At a subsequent status hearing on February 29, the court was advised by the 

parties that the Cherokee Nation had decided not to intervene or take other action relating 

to the case, and that the matter was ripe for decision. The district court issued an opinion 

and order concluding that Mother was unfit to parent under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104(b),

based on the evidence presented at the hearing held on November 29. The district court

also determined, pursuant to Section 1912(e) of the ICWA, that returning LNP to Mother

was “likely to cause serious emotional damage to L.N.P.” The court entered an order

granting the guardianship petition and denying Mother’s motion to terminate the

guardianship. The court noted, however, that “Both Wyoming law and the ICWA

contemplate that a guardianship under these circumstances should continue only so long

as necessary to prevent further harm to L.N.P., and that the guardianship must end if

there is no longer risk of serious emotional harm.” Mother appeals the district court’s

order.

DISCUSSION

I. Notice of Guardianship Hearing under ICWA § 1912(a)

[¶12] In Mother’s first issue, she claims Grandparents did not provide the ten-day notice

of the guardianship hearing to LNP’s Indian tribe in compliance with the requirements of

the Indian Child Welfare Act. She contends that the failure to provide adequate notice

constitutes reversible error, and requests that this Court terminate the guardianship.
4

Grandparents do not dispute that LNP is an “Indian child” as defined under the ICWA.

2

They contend, however, that the ICWA’s notice requirement was not triggered because

the district court did not “know or have reason to know” that LNP was an “Indian child”

at the time of the November 29 hearing. They assert that the district court “had no

reliable evidence that LNP was an Indian child before the hearing.” Grandparents further

contend that, even if notice was required, the failure to provide such notice constitutes

harmless error.

[¶13] The relevant provision of the Indian Child Welfare Act provides as follows:

§ 1912. Pending court proceedings

(a) Notice; time for commencement of proceedings;

additional time for preparation. In any involuntary

proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has

reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party

seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of

parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or

Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe, by registered

mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings

and of their right of intervention. If the identity or location of

the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe cannot be

determined, such notice shall be given to the Secretary in like

manner, who shall have fifteen days after receipt to provide

the requisite notice to the parent or Indian custodian and the

tribe. No foster care placement or termination of parental

rights proceeding shall be held until at least ten days after

receipt of notice by the parent or Indian custodian and the

tribe or the Secretary: Provided, That the parent or Indian

custodian or the tribe shall, upon request, be granted up to

twenty additional days to prepare for such proceeding.

25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (emphasis in original). The Bureau of Indian Affairs, the agency

charged with the responsibility to implement the ICWA, has issued “Guidelines for State

Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings,” representing the Interior Department’s

interpretation of certain provisions of the Act. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 et seq. (Nov. 26,

1979). Although the BIA Guidelines note that they do not have “binding legislative

 

2 The ICWA defines an “Indian child” as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either

(a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological

child of a member of an Indian tribe.” 25 USC § 1903(4).
5

effect,” the Guidelines state that an administrative interpretation of statutory language is

given “important but not controlling significance.” Id. (citing Batterton v. Francis, 432

U.S. 416, 424-25, 97 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 53 L.Ed.2d 448 (1977)). With respect to the

notice requirements of the Act, the BIA Guidelines provide that a state court “has reason

to believe a child involved in a child custody proceeding is an Indian” in five

nonexclusive circumstances. The first circumstance identified in the Guidelines is

satisfied when “Any party to the case, Indian tribe, Indian organization or public or

private agency informs the court that the child is an Indian child.” 44 Fed. Reg. 67,586. 

[¶14] In Mother’s petition to vacate the temporary guardianship, Mother asserted that

“The minor child is an Indian child because she is unmarried, under 18, and based on the

information and belief of [Mother], is a member of the Cherokee Nation due to the listing

of a linear ancestor of the minor child on the Dawes Commission Rolls.” Consistent with

the BIA Guidelines, we find that this communication was sufficient to give the district

court “reason to know” that LNP was an Indian child under the ICWA, thereby triggering

the notice requirement contained in Section 1912(a) of the Act. Accordingly, despite

Mother’s late assertions of LNP’s Indian heritage, we find the district court erred by

failing to require that adequate notice be provided to the Cherokee Nation prior to the

guardianship hearing. However, we are unable to discern any harm Mother may have

suffered as a result of the error.

[¶15] In order to warrant reversal, an error must be injurious or prejudicial to the 

appellant. Spilman v. State, 633 P.2d 183, 185 (Wyo. 1981). Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 9.04, 

“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall

be disregarded by the reviewing court.” The burden of establishing that an error is

prejudicial rests with the appellant. In re Claim of Taffner, 821 P.2d 103, 107 (Wyo.

1991). Although this Court has not had the opportunity to apply W.R.A.P. 9.04 to

ICWA’s notice requirement, we have previously held that notice which is deficient due to

untimeliness is subject to review for harmless error. In Conner v. Board of County

Comm’rs, 2002 WY 148, ¶¶ 15-18, 54 P.3d 1274, 1280-81 (Wyo. 2002), we held that

failure to provide timely notice of a show cause hearing pursuant to W.R.C.P. 71.1(e)(1)

was error. We noted, however, that the appellants had “not addressed the nature of any

harm they may have incurred” and, consequently, we held that the error was harmless.

Id. See also In re Cheyanne F., 164 Cal. App. 4th 571, 576-77 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2008)

(disagreeing with the contention that the “ICWA mandates reversal, without regard to

prejudice, if there is any deficiency in the notice given to the tribe or the BIA” and

holding that omission of information in notice to the appellant’s tribe constituted

harmless error). As in Conner, we find the deficient notice in this case is subject to

review for harmless error.

[¶16] Mother has made no attempt to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by the failure 

to provide notice prior to the guardianship hearing. At the hearing, the district court 

acknowledged the ICWA’s notice requirement and determined that the Cherokee Nation
6

and the BIA were entitled to notice of the proceedings based on the information presented

at the hearing. The court ordered Grandparents to provide such notice, finding that notice

was a “prerequisite to reaching the merits of the case.” In conjunction with this order, the

court held the record open to allow for additional evidence in the event that the tribe

decided to intervene. The Cherokee Nation, after determining that LNP qualified for

membership in the tribe, ultimately decided not to intervene in the case. In light of these

circumstances, we find that the error was harmless.

II. Testimony of Qualified Expert Witness under ICWA § 1912(e)

[¶17] In her second issue, Mother contends the district court did not receive testimony 

from a “qualified expert witness” supporting LNP’s placement outside of the natural

parents’ home, as required under the ICWA. The determination of whether a witness

qualifies as an expert is vested within the discretion of the trial court and that

determination will be overturned only when an abuse of discretion is shown. Seivewright

v. State, 7 P.3d 24, 31 (Wyo. 2000). In determining whether there has been an abuse of

discretion, the ultimate question is whether the court could reasonably have concluded as

it did. DLH v. JLA (In re AMP), 2012 WY 132, ¶ 9, 286 P.3d 746, 748 (Wyo. 2012).

[¶18] Mother claims that Ms. Rubeck was not a qualified witness because she “does not

have the professional qualifications regarding, experiences or expertise with, or

substantial knowledge of Indian children, tribal customs, or Indian childrearing norms

and standards, nor did she ever consider the child’s ancestry before making her

conclusion.” Grandparents respond that the tribal customs and prevailing social and

cultural norms of the Cherokee Nation have no bearing on the facts of this case. They

claim that such knowledge was not required in order to qualify Ms. Rubeck as an expert

witness under the ICWA.

[¶19] Section 1912(e) of the ICWA provides that

No foster care placement may be ordered in [a foster care

placement] proceeding in the absence of a determination,

supported by clear and convincing evidence, including

testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued

custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely

to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.

Mother acknowledges that the ICWA “does not expressly define the qualifications

necessary to be considered a qualified expert witness.” Nonetheless, she asserts that the

ICWA requires “heightened qualifications over those normally required of experts

testifying under state statutes.”

[¶20] Mother directs our attention to the BIA Guidelines interpreting the Act’s
7

requirement that a court receive testimony from a qualified expert witness. The

Guidelines provide as follows:

D.4. Qualified Expert Witnesses

(a) Removal of an Indian child from his or her family must be

based on competent testimony from one or more experts

qualified to speak specifically to the issue of whether

continued custody by the parents or Indian custodians is

likely to result in serious physical or emotional damage to the

child.

(b) Persons with the following characteristics are most likely

to meet the requirements for a qualified expert witness for

purposes of Indian child custody proceedings:

(i) A member of the Indian child’s tribe who is

recognized by the tribal community as knowledgeable

in tribal customs as they pertain to family organization

and childrearing practices.

(ii) A lay expert witness having substantial

experience in the delivery of child and family services

to Indians, and extensive knowledge of prevailing

social and cultural standards and childrearing practices

within the Indian child’s tribe.

(iii) A professional person having substantial

education and experience in the area of his or her

specialty.

44 Fed. Reg. 67,593.

[¶21] The district court determined that Ms. Rubeck was a qualified witness, reasoning 

that “There is no evidence whatsoever that L.N.P. has been raised any differently than

any child of a non-Indian family. . . . [Ms. Rubeck] was adequately qualified to offer the

opinions she did in this case even though she has not worked extensively with Indian

children.” We agree with the district court. First, we note that neither the ICWA, nor the

relevant BIA Guidelines, require a “qualified expert witness” to possess expertise in

tribal customs. Second, we agree with the notion, expressed by other courts that have

addressed this issue, that “special knowledge of Indian life is not necessary where a

professional person has substantial education and experience and testifies on matters not

implicating cultural bias.” Rachelle S. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 191 Ariz. 518,
8

520, 958 P.2d 459, 461 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998); see also In Interest of C.W., 239 Neb. 817,

825, 479 N.W.2d 105, 112 (Neb. 1992) (“Dr. Melton possesses substantial education and

experience in his area of specialty, and his lack of experience with the Indian way of life

in no way compromised or undermined the value of his testimony. The assignment of

error as to the use of his testimony at trial is therefore without merit.”); K.E. v. State

(State ex rel. S.A.E.), 912 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (“We note that

professionals having substantial education and experience in child welfare might well

qualify as expert witnesses under ICWA, even though their experience with Indians is

limited.”) (citing cases).

[¶22] As noted by the district court, there was no evidence presented at the guardianship 

hearing relating to Native American customs or childrearing practices, and no evidence

indicating that Mother had raised LNP according to such norms or practices. Tribal 

customs simply had no relevance to the facts of this case. Rather, the decision in this 

case was based primarily on Mother’s inability to provide a stable home for LNP, as well

as the likelihood that returning LNP to Mother would trigger future emotional harm as a

result of past sexual abuse. We find that the nature of past and potential future harm to

LNP indicated in this case transcends cultural norms and values. Because testimony

relating to tribal customs was not relevant in assessing the danger to LNP in remaining

with Mother, there was no need for the expert to have knowledge of such customs.

Accordingly, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that

Ms. Rubeck was a qualified expert witness.

III. Likelihood of Serious Emotional or Physical Damage to LNP

[¶23] In its order appointing Grandparents as permanent guardians, the court 

determined, first, in compliance with Wyoming law, that Mother was not a fit parent. KO

v. LDH (In re MEO), 2006 WY 87, ¶ 55, 138 P.3d 1145, 1161 (Wyo. 2006). The court

then proceeded to determine that returning LNP to Mother was “likely to cause serious

emotional damage to L.N.P.” under Section 1912(e) of the ICWA. Mother does not

contest the district court’s finding of parental unfitness. Rather, Mother claims there was

insufficient evidence to establish that LNP would likely be subject to serious physical or

emotional harm if she were returned to Mother’s care. When reviewing the sufficiency

of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing

party, assume all favorable inferences to be true, and disregard conflicting evidence

presented by the unsuccessful party. ZMETS v. State, 2012 WY 68, ¶ 8, 276 P.3d 392,

394-95 (Wyo. 2012).

[¶24] Mother contends that Ms. Rubeck provided “no testimony that LNP’s return to the

Appellant’s custody would likely result in any serious emotional or physical damage to

LNP,” and that Ms. Rubeck was not sufficiently informed to develop an opinion as to the

likelihood of future harm to LNP. Mother also claims that police investigations have

revealed “no clear proof that any sexual or physical abuse occurred,” and she notes that
9

she no longer has any contact with the alleged abuser.

[¶25] At trial, Grandparents testified without objection that LNP had reported that she 

had been sexually abused by her “mean daddy” while in Mother’s care. LNP told

Grandparents that she had been “honeyed” by her “mean daddy,” causing her to bleed in

her groin area. When CC confronted Mother about LNP’s reports of abuse, Mother

expressed concern that she would be blamed for the abuse. In her testimony, Mother

acknowledged that she suspected LNP’s father of abusing LNP after finding blood in

LNP’s bed. Mother stated, however, that she did not contact the police about the

incident, and that she dropped the matter after receiving assurances from the father’s

family that “he wouldn’t do that.” 

[¶26] Ms. Rubeck testified that LNP’s behavior in therapy was consistent with that of a

victim of sexual abuse. She noted that LNP was “a very anxious little child, very

hypervigilant . . . , very watchful of her surroundings,” and that she was angry and

aggressive in daycare, hitting and fighting with other children. Ms. Rubeck further

testified that LNP would likely regress if she were returned to Mother. Ms. Rubeck

stated that “We would probably see more bed wetting, more hitting, more fighting. . . .

There would [probably be] flashbacks and some recurrent triggers to her memory that

would cause her to act out.” According to Ms. Rubeck, LNP feels safe in Grandparents’

home and does not want to live with Mother.

[¶27] In addition to the testimony concerning LNP’s sexual abuse, the court also

received testimony relating to Mother’s inability to provide a stable home for LNP. CC

testified that Mother had lived with four different men since her relationship with LNP’s

father had dissolved, and that she had been thrown out of her living quarters by several of

these men, leaving her without a place to stay. Mother acknowledged that, before asking

Grandparents to take care of LNP, she had placed LNP in the care of a friend for an

extended period “because at the time I was not stable.” When Grandparents travelled to

Oklahoma during the summer before receiving LNP into their care, Mother was living

with her boyfriend in a shed behind her boyfriend’s parents’ house. The shed had no

running water, and electricity was provided by an extension cord running to the house.

[¶28] During cross-examination, Mother offered conflicting testimony in response to 

several different lines of inquiry. For example:

 In response to questioning regarding the suspected

sexual abuse of LNP, Mother initially stated that she

had never seen any signs of sexual abuse and that she

had no reason to think that LNP had been harmed.

Mother subsequently acknowledged, however, that she

had found blood in LNP’s bed and had accused LNP’s

father of abuse.
10

 When asked about LNP’s untreated skin condition,

Mother initially stated that she had sought treatment

for LNP’s impetigo while LNP was in her care, but she

later testified that LNP had not been diagnosed with

impetigo until LNP was out of her custody.

 In response to questioning about her criminal history,

Mother initially denied that she had any criminal

background. However, she subsequently stated that

“I’ve been arrested, one for following too close with

no license. And then the last one was whenever I hit

the old lady in the mouth. That’s the only two I’ve

had.” Mother explained that she had hit the “old

lady,” whom she was living with at the time, because

she had accused Mother’s friend of molesting LNP.

 When asked whether she had ever threatened to

commit suicide, an inquiry prompted by EC’s

testimony, Mother stated that she had not. Mother

subsequently admitted she had told her father that she

was going to kill herself because she was “stressed

out.”

Ultimately, the district court found that Mother was not a credible witness. We defer to

that finding. See DLH, ¶ 20, 286 P.3d at 753.

[¶29] Based on the evidence presented at the guardianship hearing, the district court 

concluded that LNP would likely suffer serious emotional or physical damage if she was 

returned to Mother. In its opinion, the district court stated:

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

continued custody by [Mother] is likely to cause serious 

emotional damage to L.N.P. . . . The record establishes 

beyond all doubt that L.N.P. has already suffered serious 

emotional damage as the result of sexual abuse. 

[Ms. Rubeck] convincingly testified that to return her to her 

mother, at least at this time, would result in what the Court 

concludes would also be serious emotional damage. She 

predicted that the child would regress, with more bedwetting, 

hitting, fighting. She was concerned about flashbacks and 

recurrent memory triggers which would cause her to act out. 

[Mother’s] historical inability to provide a stable living
11

environment, and her ever-shifting associations with the men

on whom she depends, create a near-certainty of future severe

emotional damage to a child who has already suffered far too

much.

The Court does not perceive ICWA to require a

finding that L.N.P. will suffer such serious damage that she

may be emotionally crippled for life before it intervenes. The

consequences predicted by [Ms. Rubeck] and those

reasonably to be inferred from the evidence are severe enough

to allow intervention.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Grandparents, we find clear and

convincing evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that returning LNP to

Mother’s care would likely result in serious physical or emotional damage under Section

1912(e) of the ICWA.

[¶30] Under the same issue heading, Mother devotes a single paragraph of her brief to a 

claim that Grandparents failed to show that “active efforts have been made to provide

remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the

Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful,” as required under Section

1912(d) of the ICWA. Mother does not provide any citation to relevant legal authority

defining or interpreting the “active efforts” requirement in the context of guardianship

proceedings or otherwise, and does not suggest any remedial services that should have

been, but were not, offered to her. Rather, Mother simply asserts that “no such efforts

have been made with or even offered” to her.

[¶31] Mother’s failure to provide appropriate context and legal authority to support her

claim of error prevents adequate review by this Court on this issue.

3 We would point out,

however, that the guardianship proceedings in this case did not result in the permanent

breakup of the Indian family, and Grandparents did make active efforts to reunify Mother

with LNP. EC testified that they had repeatedly sent Mother money to allow her to

purchase food and clothing and to buy gifts for LNP. Mother acknowledged that she had

received monetary support from Grandparents, as well as child support from LNP’s

father. However, she admitted that she had not contributed any money to support LNP

while in Grandparents’ care, stating that “I have not gave them any money for the fact is I

don’t want to do it[.]” Grandparents also encouraged Mother’s contact with LNP through

 

3 The guardianship proceedings in this case were initiated by Grandparents, not the State. Mother has 

offered no authority interpreting the “active efforts” requirement as it relates to the obligations of private 

parties to provide rehabilitative services.
12

phone conversations and video chat, but Mother’s communications eventually “tapered

off.” Additionally, CC invited Mother to live with LNP in Cheyenne, and sent money so

that she could visit. However, Mother visited LNP only once. Because Mother did not

accept invitations to live with Grandparents or visit LNP, she was unable to participate in

LNP’s counseling sessions with Ms. Rubeck.

[¶32] The district court acknowledged that Mother had viable prospects for 

rehabilitation, but noted that, as of the time of the hearing, she was unable and unwilling 

to engage in necessary rehabilitative efforts:

Nothing in her current behavior demonstrates that [Mother] 

could not be salvaged as a parent if she would go through the 

process for family reunification normally followed in abuseneglect proceedings. The evidence just shows that, at this 

time, [Mother] has placed L.N.P. in a position which led to 

horrific abuse, and that she is unwilling to take the steps 

necessary to protect her in the future and to help her heal. 

She seems unable to appreciate the importance of the most 

basic of human needs – to be safe – and that she is currently

incapable of providing it to L.N.P. without making some

changes in her lifestyle.

Importantly, however, the proceedings in this case did not result in the permanent

breakup of the family in the form of a termination of Mother’s parental rights. Although

the district court determined that Grandparents’ guardianship would be “permanent,” the

court noted that it would terminate the guardianship in the future if Mother became a fit

parent pursuant to its authority under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-3-1101(a)(v), which provides

that a guardianship may be terminated if the court determines that it is no longer

necessary. In consideration of this authority, the court stated that it would “review the

guardianship appointment in six months if requested to do so by any party.” Finally, the

court concluded by noting the possibility that Mother could be rehabilitated:

The Court urges [Mother] to work with L.N.P.’s therapists to

develop an understanding of her needs and to thereby achieve

fitness and remove the currently existing risk of serious

emotional harm. The Court also admonishes the Petitioners

that if this were a child protection proceeding, the working

permanency plan would in all likelihood be family

reunification of L.N.P. with her natural mother, and that they

should not confuse these proceedings with those necessary to

terminate parental rights. Both Wyoming law and the ICWA

contemplate that a guardianship under these circumstances

should continue only so long as necessary to prevent further
13

harm to L.N.P., and that the guardianship must end if there is

no longer risk of serious emotional harm.

Based upon the foregoing, we do not find reversible error.

[¶33] Affirmed.