UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DONNA M. SLICK )

) No. 12 C 2562

PLAINTIFF, )

)

v. ) Judge Thomas M. Durkin

)

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC )

)

DEFENDANT. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Donna M. Slick alleges that defendant Portfolio Recovery Associates, 

LLC (“PRA”) violated various provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

(“FDCPA”) when it attempted to collect a delinquent debt. The Court previously 

granted Slick’s motion for partial summary judgment, and denied PRA’s crossmotion for summary judgment, with respect to Slick’s claim that PRA violated 15 

U.S.C. § 1692e(5) and e(10). See R. 109 (Slick v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC, 12 C 

2562, 2014 WL 4100416, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2014)). The Court concluded that 

this was a sufficient basis to award Slick statutory damages of up to $1,000, making 

it unnecessary to address the parties’ arguments addressing other FDCPA 

provisions. See id. at *4 n.6 (Because statutory damages are available per case, not 

per violation, it “does not matter in what way, or how many times, PRA violated the 

FDCPA . . . .”); see also id. at *5 n.7. In preparation for what the Court believed 

would be a limited trial on Slick’s claim for actual damages, Slick stated that she 

intended to seek judgment on the claims that the Court did not rule on. The Court 
then invited the parties to supplement their summary judgment motions with 

respect to the undecided claims, and that briefing is now complete. For the following 

reasons, the Court grants Slick’s motion in part, denies it in part, and grants PRA’s 

motion in part, and denies it in part.

BACKGROUND

The Court will assume that the reader is familiar with its memorandum 

opinion addressing the parties’ original cross motions for summary judgment. 

ANALYSIS

I. PRA’s Motion for Reconsideration

PRA’s supplement to its cross-motion for summary judgment is essentially a 

motion to reconsider the Court’s prior ruling. See R. 140 at 3-4. “Motions for 

reconsideration under Rule 54(b) serve the limited function of correcting manifest 

errors of law or fact.” Ace Hardware Intern. Holdings Inc. v. Masso Expo Corp., No. 

11 C 3928, 2012 WL 182236, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2012). The Court previously 

held that PRA’s dunning letters were misleading because they implied that PRA 

could legally report Slick’s failure to pay the debt to a credit reporting agency and 

that the failure could appear on her credit report. See Slick, 2014 WL 4100416, at 

*5. The FDCPA provides that a consumer report may not contain “[a]ccounts placed 

for collection or charged to profit and loss which antedate the report by more than 

seven years.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(4). This seven-year period

shall begin, with respect to any delinquent account that is placed for 

collection (internally or by referral to a third party, whichever is 

earlier), charged to profit and loss, or subjected to any similar action, 

upon the expiration of the 180-day period beginning on the date of the 
commencement of the delinquency which immediately preceded the 

collection activity, charge to profit and loss, or similar action.

Id. at § 1681c(c)(1). The “effective result [of the statute] is a seven and one-half year 

period from the original delinquency.” Gillespie v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 484 

F.3d 938, 940 (7th Cir. 2007). Capital One reported Slick’s account as “delinquent” 

on December 2, 2003, meaning that it became unreportable (or “obsolete”) on June 

3, 2011. Slick, 2014 WL 4100416, at *6. The Court rejected PRA’s argument that 

the reporting period commenced when Capital One charged-off Slick’s account on 

December 3, 2004, which would have rendered her debt still reportable. Id. The 

reporting period is measured from the “commencement of the delinquency”

immediately preceding the triggering event (i.e., the “collection activity, charge to 

profit and loss, or similar action”). The delinquency in this case occurred on 

December 2, 2003. Id.

In its supplemental brief, PRA contends that the relevant dates are instead: 

(1) December 3, 2004 (the date Capital One charged-off Slick’s account); and (2) July 

28, 2011 (the date PRA purchased the account). R. 140 at 5. Capital One charged-off 

Slick’s account before PRA purchased it, so—according to PRA—the limitation 

period started running on December 3, 2004 and expired on June 3, 2012. Id. In 

support of this argument, PRA contends that the Court “incorrectly relied on a 

partial quote in [Gillespie]” in ruling that the delinquency date triggered the 

limitation period, “whereas the full quote supports [PRA’s] position.” Id. at 3. Here 

is the relevant language from Gillespie:
The FCRA prohibits a consumer reporting agency from providing a 

consumer report containing “accounts placed for collection or charged 

to profit and loss which antedate the report by more than seven years.” 

15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(4). The seven year period begins to run 180 days 

after the account is placed in collection or charged off by the creditor so 

the effective result is a seven and one-half year period from the 

original delinquency.

Id. at 4 (quoting Gillespie, 484 F.3d at 940 (footnote omitted; emphasis in PRA’s 

brief)). The plaintiffs in Gillespie claimed that the “Date of Last Activity” field in 

their Equifax credit reports violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1), which requires such 

reports to “clearly and accurately disclose . . . all information” in the consumer’s 

credit file. Gillespie, 484 F.3d at 939-41. In the “Last Activity” field, Equifax listed 

“both positive payment information and negative delinquency data”:

Equifax lists the date of the consumer’s last activity for the reported 

account in the Date of Last Activity field. If the account is delinquent, 

with no subsequent activity, then the Date of Last Activity reflects the 

date of delinquency. If the consumer has been paying the account, the 

Date of Last Activity reflects the last payment. In the case of a 

previously delinquent account in which the consumer has started to 

make subsequent payments, the last payment by the consumer 

replaces the delinquency date in the Date of Last Activity field.

Id. at 939, 942. In a separate disclosure, Equifax explained that “Collection 

Accounts” remain in a debtor’s credit file for seven years “measured from the date in 

your credit file shown in the ‘date of last activity field’ accompanying the particular 

credit or collection account.” Id. at 940. The plaintiffs argued, and the Seventh 

Circuit agreed (construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs 

on appeal of the district court’s order granting Equifax’s summary judgment 

motion), that this language was unclear because it suggested that an intervening 

payment on a delinquent account would reset the limitation period. Id. at 942. As 
such, “the negative credit history relating to the prior delinquency would 

presumably remain within the consumer’s credit file despite the fact that the 

consumer faces a new seven and one-half year period before the information is 

removed from her file.” Id.

Viewed in the context of the entire decision, it is clear that the Seventh 

Circuit did not hold that the 7-year reporting period limitation is measured from the 

date that the creditor charges off the account. On the contrary, the statute plainly 

measures the reporting period from the account’s delinquency date, whether the 

triggering event is: (1) collection activity; (2) a charge to profit and loss; or (3) a 

“similar action.” In this case, the delinquency immediately preceding PRA’s 

collection activity (and Capitol One’s decision to charge-off the account) occurred on 

December 2, 2003. The reporting period expired on June 3, 2011. PRA’s letters to 

Slick in August and September 2011 implied that it could legally report her 

delinquent account and that the account would appear on her credit report, which 

was “both false and misleading.” Slick, 2014 WL 4100416, at *7. The Court denies 

PRA’s motion to reconsider its order granting Slick’s motion for summary judgment 

on her § 1692e(5) and e(10) claims. See id. at *5.

II. The Parties’ Cross Motions For Summary Judgment on Slick’s § 

1692e(2) Claim

In her supplemental brief, Slick argues that PRA’s letters violated § 1692e(2), 

which prohibits debt collectors from making a “false representation of . . . the 

character, amount or legal status of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). In McMahon 

v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the Seventh Circuit held that “an unsophisticated 
consumer could be misled by a dunning letter for a time-barred debt, especially a 

letter that uses the term ‘settle’ or ‘settlement.’” 744 F.3d 1010, 1022 (7th Cir. 

2014). McMahon involved consolidated appeals challenging letters seeking to collect 

time-barred debts. Id. at 1012-13. The plaintiff in McMahon received a letter from 

the defendant stating, “We are pleased to extend to you an offer to settle your 

account in full for $233.99. This represents savings of 60% of your balance.” Id. at 

1013. “The letter said nothing about when the debt was incurred, and it contained 

no hint that the four-year statute of limitations applicable in Illinois had long since 

expired.” Id. The district court in McMahon dismissed the plaintiff’s claim as moot 

in light of a settlement offer from the defendant. In the other case, Delgado v. 

Capital Management Services, LP, the plaintiff received a letter from the defendant 

stating that the defendant “is authorized to accept less than the full balance due as 

settlement of the above account. The settlement amount of $721.24, which 

represents 30% of the amount presently owed, is due in our office no later than 

forty-five (45) days after receiving this notice. We are not obligated to renew this 

offer.” Id. at 1014. The district court in Delgado denied the defendant’s motion to 

dismiss, after which the Seventh Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal. Id. The 

Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order in McMahon dismissing the 

complaint as moot, see id. at 1019, and affirmed the district court’s order in Delgado

denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, id. at 1022.

The Seventh Circuit reasoned that “if the debt collector uses language in its 

dunning letter that would mislead an unsophisticated consumer into believing that 
the debt is legally enforceable . . . the collector has violated the FDCPA.” Id. at 

1020. The court rejected the requirement, adopted by the Third and Eighth Circuits, 

that the letter must threaten litigation to be actionable. Id. To illustrate the 

grounds for its disagreement with those circuits, the Seventh Circuit posited the 

following hypothetical:

In [the Third and Eight Circuits’] view, if a dunning letter on a timebarred debt states that the collector could sue but promised not to, that

letter would not violate the FDCPA, since no litigation was actually 

threatened (and indeed was expressly rejected). On its face, that may 

seem reasonable, but closer examination reveals why it is not. The 

plain language of the FDCPA prohibits not only threatening to take 

actions that the collector cannot take, but also the use of any false, 

deceptive, or misleading representation, including those about the 

character or legal status of any debt. If a debt collector stated that it 

could sue on a timebarred debt but was promising to forbear, that 

statement would be a false representation about the legal status of 

that debt.

Id. at 1020-21. The court reasoned that the defendants’ letters were more 

misleading than the hypothetical letter promising not to forbear. Id. at 1021 (“In 

any event, the case before us is nowhere near that line.”). “Neither LVNV nor CMS 

gave a hint that the debts they were trying to collect were vulnerable to an ironclad 

limitations defense.” Id. The fact that the letters “contained an offer of settlement 

makes things worse, not better, since a gullible consumer who made a partial 

payment would inadvertently reset the limitations period and made herself 

vulnerable to a suit on the full amount. That is why those offers only reinforced the

misleading impression that the debt was legally enforceable.” Id.

Judge Gettleman relied on McMahon in a recent decision granting summary 

judgment against PRA in case involving a letter similar to the McMahon court’s 
hypothetical. See Pantoja v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC, No. 13 C 7667, 2015 WL 

848568, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2015). PRA’s letter in that case stated that 

“[b]ecause of the age of your debt, we will not sue you for it and we will not report it 

to any credit reporting agency.” Id.; cf. McMahon, 744 F.3d at 1020-21. Judge 

Gettleman held that this language was clearly misleading “because it does not tell 

the consumer that the debt is time-barred and defendant cannot sue plaintiff to 

collect it, rather, it implies that defendant has chosen not to sue. Nor does it tell 

plaintiff that the effect of making (or agreeing to make) a partial payment on a 

time-barred debt is to revive the statute of limitations for enforcing that debt.” Id.

PRA’s letters in this case do not contain the same disclaimer, but they likewise fail 

to disclose that the debt was time-barred under Maryland’s three-year statute of 

limitations, see Md. Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, § 5-101, and that a 

partial payment would revive the debt. See Columbia Ass’n, Inc. v. Poteet, 23 A.3d 

308, 320 (Md. App. Ct. 2011) (“Maryland law has long recognized that an 

acknowledgment of a debt barred by the statute of limitations removes the bar and 

revives the remedy.”); see also R. 31 ¶¶ 54-57.

PRA opposes Slick’s § 1692e(2) claim on two grounds, one procedural and the

other substantive. Procedurally, PRA points out that Slick did not seek judgment on 

that claim in her original motion, and contends that her complaint does not provide 

adequate notice of that claim. R. 152 at 3-4. The Court gave the parties leave to 

supplement their summary judgment motions because it might narrow the issues 

for trial. Thus, the fact that Slick did not seek judgment on her § 1692e(2) claim in 
her original motion is irrelevant. PRA’s claim that it lacked notice of Slick’s claim is 

meritless. Slick alleged in her First Amended Complaint that: (1) any lawsuit on 

her Capital One debt would be barred by the three-year statute of limitations, R. 27 

¶¶ 54-55; (2) PRA’s August 9, 2011, letter did not disclose “the date of the 

transactions giving rise to the alleged debt” or that “the debt is barred by the 

statute of limitations,” id. ¶¶ 56-57; and (3) it was PRA’s “policy and practice” to 

send debt-collection letters omitting this information. Id. at ¶¶ 58-59. Also, PRA 

previously argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on Slick’s claim that it 

violated “Section 1692e, e(2), e(5), e(10), and f by failing to inform her that it could 

no longer file a collection suit against her.” R. 96 at 10 (emphasis added). PRA was 

clearly on notice of Slick’s claim.

Substantively, PRA argues that Slick has failed to provide extrinsic evidence

to support her claim that its communications would mislead an unsophisticated 

consumer. The Seventh Circuit has established three categories of FDCPA cases: (1) 

“cases involving statements that plainly, on their face, are not misleading or 

deceptive”;1 (2) cases “involv[ing] statements that are not plainly misleading or 

deceptive but might possibly mislead or deceive the unsophisticated consumer”; and 

(3) cases “involving plainly deceptive communications.” See Ruth v. Triumph 

P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 800-01 (7th Cir. 2009). FDCPA claims in the second category 

must be supported by “extrinsic evidence, such as consumer surveys, to prove that 

unsophisticated consumers do in fact find the challenged statements misleading or 

1 The Court concludes that PRA’s communications are not “plainly, on their face . . . 

not misleading,” and PRA has not argued otherwise.

 
deceptive.” Id. at 800. Whereas, plaintiffs alleging claims that fall into the third 

category need not produce extrinsic evidence “to prove what is already clear.” Id. at 

801. As PRA points out, McMahon did not hold that a letter that is silent regarding 

the statute of limitations, and the consequences of a partial payment on a timebarred debt, is so clearly misleading that extrinsic evidence is unnecessary. On the 

other hand, that issue was not before the court because McMahon and Delgado were 

still at the pleadings stage.

The Court concludes that extrinsic evidence is unnecessary in this case to 

show that PRA’s communications would mislead an unsophisticated consumer. In 

Pantoja, the court persuasively reasoned that PRA’s letter in that case was plainly

misleading on its face, and therefore extrinsic evidence was unnecessary. 2015 WL 

848568, at *3 (“Upon receipt of the letter the only reasonable conclusion that an 

unsophisticated consumer (or any consumer) could reach is that defendant was 

seeking to collect on a legally enforceable debt, even if defendant indicated that it 

chose not to sue.”). And as the Seventh Circuit suggested in McMahon, a letter that 

is completely silent on the subject is even more misleading. See McMahon, 744 F.3d 

at 1021 (“Neither LVNV nor CMS gave a hint that the debts they were trying to 

collect were vulnerable to an ironclad limitations defense”). The McMahon court 

expressly declined to hold that “it is automatically improper for a debt collector to 

seek re-payment of time-barred debts; some people might consider full debt repayment a moral obligation, even though the debt has been extinguished.” 744 F.3d 

at 1020. But there is nothing in PRA’s first letter to indicate that the debt was not
legally binding, and it strikes the Court as far-fetched to suppose that 

unsophisticated consumers assume that debt-collection agencies asking for payment 

are really just appealing to the consumers’ sense of moral duty. As the Seventh 

Circuit noted in McMahon, the Federal Trade Commission and the Consumer 

Financial Protection Bureau “have found to the contrary that most consumers do 

not understand their legal rights with respect to time-barred debts.” 744 F.3d at

1021. In subsequent discussions over the telephone, PRA employees used the words 

“settle” or “settlement” with respect to payments on the debt, see R. 106 ¶ 35, and

PRA’s September 7, 2011 letter is similar. See R. 27-1 at 18 (“This letter confirms 

your arrangement to make the following payment(s) to settle this account.”) 

(emphasis added). The letter goes on to state that “[s]hould you miss any of the 

payments described herein, this payment plan may become null and void.” Id.; see 

also id. (“We are not obligated to renew this offer.”). In fact, the real risk for the 

consumer is making any payments on the debt and thereby reviving it. See Pantoja, 

2005 WL 848568, at *3 (“Nor would a consumer, sophisticated or otherwise, likely 

know that a partial payment would reset the limitations period, making that 

consumer vulnerable to a suit on the full amount.”).2

2 PRA argues that, “as explained in Pantoja, Defendant does not revive the statute 

of limitations; it owns the accounts it collects upon, and it does not sell or transfer 

its accounts. If the plaintiff had made a payment (which she did not and which she 

never intended to do), she would not have owed the full balance she incurred.”

Judge Gettleman characterized this argument as “pure sophistry,” Pantoja, 2015 

WL 848568, at *2, and the Court agrees. “The debt is revived by operation of law, 

not at defendant’s election.” Id.

 
In sum, the Court concludes that PRA’s communications with Slick were 

plainly misleading. Thus, Slick is entitled to summary judgment on her claim that 

PRA violated § 1692e(2)(A) by falsely representing the legal status of the debt.

III. The Plaintiff’s § 1692g Claim

The parties also seek summary judgment on Slick’s § 1692g claim. Within 30-

days after an initial communication from a debt collector, a consumer may dispute 

the debt and/or request the name and address of the original creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 

1692g(b). After receiving such a dispute/request, the debt collector must “cease 

collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until [it] obtains verification 

of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, 

and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original 

creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.” Id. It is undisputed that 

PRA sent the September 7, 2011 letter to Slick after it received her August 30, 2011

verification request letter and after it had entered her letter in its computer system.

Nevertheless, PRA argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because this 

claim is “manufactured.” R. 96 at 17. The fact that Debi Louden asked for the letter 

(albeit five days before PRA sent it) is an extenuating circumstance, but it isn’t 

grounds to excuse a clear violation of the statute. The FDCPA contemplates

communications between the debt-collector and the consumer during the 30-day 

verification period. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (“Collection activities and 

communications that do not otherwise violate this subchapter may continue during 

the 30-day period referred to in subsection (a) of this section . . . .”). During that 
time, a consumer may initially indicate his or her intention to pay the debt. But 

once the debt collector receives a verification request, it must “cease collection of the 

debt.” Id. There is no basis in the statute’s language to create an exception under 

these circumstances. 

In the alternative, PRA argues that it is not liable because it committed a 

good-faith mistake. Section 1692k(c) of the FDCPA creates an affirmative defense 

for “bona fide errors”:

A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this 

subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence 

that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide 

error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably 

adapted to avoid any such error.

15 U.S.C. §1692k(c). In order to prevail on this defense, PRA must show that: (1)

the “FDCPA violation was not intentional”; (2) the violation “resulted from a bona 

fide error”; and (3) “it maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such 

error.” Kort v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., 394 F.3d 530, 537 (7th Cir. 2005). 

With respect to the first element of the defense, a “debt collector need only show 

that its FDCPA violation was unintentional, not that its actions were 

unintentional.” Id.

PRA’s argument is devoted almost entirely to the third element of the 

defense. See R. 96 at 17-19. It trains its employees to comply with the FDCPA, see

R. 106 ¶¶ 17-20, and specifically trains them to make a notation in the consumer’s 

file if the consumer asks for verification. “Upon receipt of a written request for 

validation of an account from a debtor, the collector is to note the account with the 
result code ‘DSP’ and to change the status of the account to ‘DISP.’” Id. ¶ 21. After 

the collector applies the “DSP” result code, “the account is placed with PRA’s 

dispute department, and PRA’s collector cannot initiate any written or verbal 

communication with the debtor on that account until the Disputes department’s 

investigation is complete.” Id. ¶ 28; see also R. 91-2 ¶ 37 (Decl. of Tara Privette). In 

this instance, the collector did not update Slick’s file with the result code “DSP.” R. 

96 at 19.

PRA essentially collapses the three elements of the bona fide error defense 

into one; i.e., because it provides training and guidelines to its collectors, any

deviation from that guidance must be unintentional and undertaken in good faith. 

It has not provided testimony from anyone with firsthand knowledge of the way 

that PRA handled Slick’s account. And it concedes that this person would have 

known that Slick had made a verification request. See R. 90 ¶ 37. It would be pure 

speculation to conclude that PRA’s employee (or employees): (1) did not 

intentionally violate § 1692g; and (2) made a good-faith mistake. Speculation is not 

enough to survive summary judgment. See Herzog v. Graphic Packaging Intern., 

Inc., 742 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014) (the nonmoving party is entitled to all 

reasonable inferences in its favor, but “inferences that are supported by only 

speculation or conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion”) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Slick’s motion for summary judgment on her § 

1692g claim is granted, and PRA’s motion for summary judgment on that claim is 

denied.
IV. Slick’s Other Claims

Slick’s complaint also alleges that PRA violated § 1692c(b), by sending the 

September 7, 2011 letter to Louden without plaintiff’s consent (see R. 27 ¶ 53), and § 

1692f, which bars debt collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means to 

collect or attempt to collect any debt.” See R. 27 ¶¶ 63, 65-66. Slick has abandoned 

her § 1692c(b) claim by failing to respond to PRA’s arguments addressing that 

claim. See R. 96 at 3; R. 105; R. 107 at 2. She has likewise failed to develop any 

argument supporting her claim under § 1692f. See R. 107 at 2. Thus, the Court 

grants PRA’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Slick’s § 1692c(b) and § 

1692f claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Slick’s renewed motion for 

summary judgment (R. 73) in part and denies it in part. Her motion is granted with 

respect to her claims that PRA violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2) and 1692g. Her 

motion is denied insofar as she sought summary judgment on her 15 U.S.C. § 1692f 

claim. The Court grants PRA’s renewed cross-motion for summary judgment (R. 96) 

in part and denies it in part. The motion is granted with respect to Slick’s claims 

that PRA violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b) and 1692f. The motion is denied with 

respect to Slick’s claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2) and 1692g. The Court also 

denies PRA’s motion to reconsider its memorandum opinion and order dated August 

20, 2014, R. 140. At the status hearing set for July 1, 2015, a trial date will be set to 
hear plaintiff’s complaint as to damages under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2), e(5), e(10), 

and 1692g. 

ENTERED:

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

Dated: June 30, 2015