IG-02-021

AUDIT 

REPORT CONTRACTING ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH 

THE NASA SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM 

July 29, 2002

 National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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Audits at (202) 358-1232, or visit www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oig/hq/issuedaudits.html.

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Acronyms 

ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

COTR Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative 

CO Contracting Officer 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

GSA General Services Administration 

NSRS NASA Safety Reporting System 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OSMA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 

RPI Research Planning, Inc. 

SBA Small Business Administration 

USC United States Code 
July 29, 2002 

W 

TO: HQ/Q/Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance 

HQ/H/Assistant Administrator for Procurement 

FROM: HQ/W/Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

SUBJECT: Final Report on Audit of Contracting Issues Associated With the 

 NASA Safety Reporting System 

 Assignment Number A-02-006-00 

 Report Number IG-02-021 

The subject final report is provided for your information and use. Please refer to the 

Executive Summary for the overall audit results. Our evaluation of your response is 

incorporated into the body of the report. NASA’s completed corrective actions for 

recommendations 1 through 3 were responsive. Although we have concerns about the 

action taken regarding recommendation 4 (see page 10 of the report), we consider all the 

recommendations closed for reporting purposes. The final report distribution is in 

Appendix F. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the audit staff. If you have questions 

concerning the report, please contact Ms. Sandy Massey, Program Director, Safety and 

Technology Audits, at (321) 867-4057, or Ms. Kathleen M. Kirby, Auditor-in-Charge, at 

(281) 483-4773. 

[Original Signed By] 

Alan J. Lamoreaux 

Enclosure 
2 

cc: 

HQ/AI/Associate Deputy Administrator 

HQ/AA/Chief of Staff 

HQ/AB/Associate Deputy Administrator for Institutions 

HQ/B/Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

HQ/B/Comptroller 

HQ/BF/Director, Financial Management Division 

HQ/G/General Counsel 

HQ/HK/Director, Contract Management Division 

HQ/JM/Director, Management Assessment Division 

HQ/QS/Director, Safety and Risk Management Division 

GSFC/100/Director, Goddard Space Flight Center 
Contents 

Executive Summary, i

Introduction, 1

Findings and Recommendations, 2

Finding A. Timeliness of Contract Administration, 2 

Finding B. Cost-Effective Contracting, 7 

Appendix A - Objectives, Scope, and Methodology, 11 

Appendix B – Summary of Prior Audit Coverage, 13 

Appendix C. Our Analysis of the NSRS Contractor Reports, 15

Appendix D – Management’s Response, 16

Appendix E – OIG Comments on Management’s Response, 20

Appendix F - Report Distribution, 23 
NASA Office of Inspector General 

IG-02-021 July 29, 2002 

 A-02-006-00 

Contracting Issues Associated With the 

NASA Safety Reporting System 

Executive Summary 

Background. The Office of Inspector General has performed an audit of the NASA 

Safety Reporting System (NSRS.) The NSRS is a confidential, voluntary, and responsive 

reporting system for NASA employees and contractors to notify the Office of Safety and 

Mission Assurance (OSMA) of safety hazards affecting NASA-related activities. The

system is intended to supplement safety-reporting channels by allowing employees to 

confidentially report safety concerns using a standardized form. Once completed, the 

form is forwarded to the NSRS contractor who analyzes the concern and forwards it to 

the OSMA for response. Although NASA and contractor employees are encouraged to 

initially use the local reporting mechanisms available at their work sites to report safety 

concerns, the NSRS is available to report safety concerns (1) if an individual believes that 

no action was taken on the initially reported concern; (2) an individual is dissatisfied with 

the action taken; or (3) extenuating circumstances, such as fear of reprisals, prevent an

individual from using standard reporting channels. 

Objectives. Our overall objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of the NSRS. The 

specific objective related to this report was to determine whether NASA and the NSRS 

contractor effectively performed contract requirements. This report identifies conditions 

regarding the NSRS contract that warrant timely action by NASA because the Agency 

did not promptly act on the Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) recommendation to 

terminate the NSRS contract after ownership transferred to a non-8(a) company.1

 Details 

on the audit objectives, scope, and methodology are in Appendix A. Other reports 

addressing the NSRS are summarized in Appendix B. 

Results of Audit. The NASA contracting officer (CO) did not terminate the NSRS 

contract in accordance with laws and regulations or Agency guidance for the SBA’s 8(a) 

Business Development Program (8(a) program). As a result, NASA will have to take 

action to avoid a break in NSRS coverage until a new contract can be established. 

Further, NASA’s actions are not in compliance with the Small Business Act, Title 13, 

 1

The Small Business Act established by 15 United States Code (U.S.C.) 637(a) authorizes the Small 

Business Administration (SBA) to enter into all types of contracts with other agencies and to award 

subcontracts to firms eligible for program participation. The SBA refers to the 8(a) Business Development

Program as the 8(a) program because it is under Section 8(a) of the Act. 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 124,2 and the Federal Acquisition Regulation 

(FAR) requirements because the lack of contract termination denied 8(a) opportunities to 

eligible, disadvantaged small businesses (Finding A). We also found that NASA’s use of 

a cost-reimbursement contract for the initial and follow-on 8(a) contracts was not costeffective. Consequently, NASA paid more than $9,500 a month to process one to two 

reports each month for the last 35 months and assumed risks that could have been shared 

or transferred to the contractor to lower NSRS costs (Finding B). 

Recommendations. NASA should take immediate action to ensure it has coverage for 

the NSRS until a new NSRS contract or other reporting system can be established. In the 

interim, NASA should coordinate with the current NSRS contractor to complete a 

transition plan that addresses how the documents and equipment, including any software, 

databases, and the NSRS Web site will transition to NASA or a new NSRS contractor. In 

addition, NASA should emphasize the Small Business Act, the FAR, and the Agency 

Procurement Information Circulars relating to the 8(a) program to ensure that CO’s and 

Contracting Officer’s Technical Representatives (COTR’s) are aware of the requirements 

for establishing and administering contracts with 8(a) businesses. Finally, NASA should 

award a fixed-price contract for the NSRS or consider potentially more cost-effective

alternatives, such as the Aviation Safety Reporting System or an Agency Hotline office to 

administer the NSRS program. 

Management’s Response. NASA either concurred or partially concurred with the four 

recommendations and has taken responsive actions to close recommendations 1 through 

3. Although we recommended a fixed-price contract for the NSRS reporting 

requirement, NASA has awarded a time and materials contract using the General 

Services Administration Federal Supply Schedules. Notwithstanding our concerns with 

this approach, since NASA has already awarded the contract, recommendation 4 will also 

be closed. NASA also provided general comments related to our findings. Our responses 

to the general comments are in Appendix E. 

 2

Title 13, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 124, “Business Development-Small Disadvantage

Business Status Determinations” is the implementing regulation for the 8(a) program. 

ii
Introduction 

In 1987, NASA established the NSRS because of criticism by the Rogers Commission3

that the Agency was operating a silent safety program. During that time, Battelle 

Memorial Institute (Battelle) was operating a confidential safety information system

developed by NASA for the Federal Aviation Administration called the Aviation Safety 

Reporting System (ASRS).4

 NASA considered using the ASRS to report safety hazards 

affecting NASA-related activities, but on March 18, 1987, elected to award Battelle a 

separate, sole-source contract to design, develop, implement, and operate the NSRS. 

In 1994, NASA determined that the NSRS could be performed by a small business 

pursuant to the Small Business Act. On May 19, 1994, NASA awarded the NSRS 

contract, valued at $663,350, to Research Planning, Inc. (RPI), a small business concern 

in Falls Church, Virginia, under the 8(a) program. The contract required RPI to perform

the following NSRS activities: manage and operate a single NSRS office; operate a mailin safety reporting system that ensures correspondents’ concerns will be communicated to 

NASA safety personnel within 1 business day; perform the initial review of reports and 

contact correspondents by telephone, if necessary; sanitize and transmit reports to NASA 

representatives while maintaining confidentiality of correspondents; update and maintain 

the NSRS database to track reports; conduct a report trend analysis; promote NSRS 

through an awareness program; and prepare and transmit monthly reports to NASA 

representatives. The period of performance, which included 1 base year and 4 option 

years, ended May 18, 1999. 

On May 19, 1999, NASA awarded RPI a follow-on 8(a) program contract of 1 base year 

and four 1-year options. In April 2001, BTG, Inc. acquired RPI, and in November 2001, 

Titan Systems Corporation (Titan) acquired BTG, Inc. Neither BTG, Inc. nor Titan 

qualified as a small business company under the 8(a) program, thereby making them 

ineligible to continue the NSRS contract. 

 3

President Reagan appointed a special commission to conduct a formal inquiry into the 1986 NASA 

Challenger accident. The Rogers Commission was named after its chairman, former Secretary of State, 

William P. Rogers. 4

The ASRS collects, analyzes, and responds to voluntarily submitted aviation safety incident reports in

order to lessen the likelihood of aviation accidents. The ASRS was established in 1975 under a 

Memorandum of Agreement between the Federal Aviation Administration and NASA. While the Federal 

Aviation Administration provides most of the program funding, NASA administers the program and sets its 

policies in consultation with the Federal Aviation Administration and the aviation community. 
Findings and Recommendations 

Finding A. Timeliness of Contract Administration

NASA and the NSRS contractor did not comply with the Small Business Act, the FAR, 

or Agency guidance relating to the change of 8(a) ownership and termination 

requirements under the 8(a) program. This occurred because the NSRS contractor (RPI) 

did not formally notify NASA prior to the company’s acquisition by BTG, Inc., a non8(a) company. In addition, the CO stated that there was insufficient time to perform

contract duties. A lack of awareness of the 8(a) program requirements and inadequate 

oversight of the NSRS contract by procurement and technical personnel also contributed 

to the noncompliance. As a result, NASA will have to take immediate action to ensure 

continuous NSRS coverage until the Agency can establish a new NSRS contract. 

NASA’s actions also denied contract opportunities to eligible, disadvantaged businesses. 

Federal Law and Regulation and NASA Guidance for 8(a) Contracting 

United States Code Guidance. The Small Business Act requires that a contract awarded 

under the 8(a) program be performed by the concern that initially received the contract. 

If the owner(s) upon whom eligibility was based subsequently relinquishes ownership or 

control or enters into any agreement to relinquish ownership or control, the contract shall 

be terminated for convenience.5

 The 8(a) awardee is required to notify the SBA 

immediately in writing of any agreement transferring ownership or control of the firm 

and may request the SBA to waive the requirement that its 8(a) contract(s) be terminated 

for convenience. The procuring agency may also request a waiver to this requirement 

when termination of an 8(a) contract would severely impair an agency from meeting its 

program objectives or mission. Only the SBA Administrator may waive the termination 

requirement. 

Code of Federal Regulations. Title 13, CFR, Part 124, is the guidance on the 

applicability of the SBA’s 8(a) program. The CFR implements the Small Business Act 

and is organized as a series of questions from an 8(a) program applicant’s point of view 

and answers to the questions according to what the law allows. 

FAR Guidance. FAR 19.8, “Contracting with the Small Business Administration (The 

8(a) Program),” paragraph (f) states, “When SBA has delegated its 8(a) Program contract 

execution authority to an agency, the contracting officer must refer to its agency 

supplement or other policy directives for appropriate guidance.” 

 5

FAR Clause 52.249-6 allows the Government to terminate contracts for its convenience by refusing to 

continue with contract performance. Such termination does not necessarily result from any fault on the part

of the contractor. FAR 19.812 implements 8(a) contract administration procedures, including the 

requirement to terminate a contract if the concern that was originally awarded the contract transfers 

ownership or control or if the contract is transferred or novated, unless the Administrator of the SBA 

waives the requirement for contract termination. 

2
NASA Guidance. NASA issued Procurement Information Circular 98-1 on 

January 14, 1998, to provide guidance for terminating 8(a) contracts when ownership or 

control of the 8(a) concern is transferred. The circular states: 

If the SBA instructs the CO [contracting officer] in writing to terminate the 8(a) 

contract(s) and the CO determines that an agency request for waiver is not warranted, or 

if the SBA Administrator has denied, in writing, NASA's request for a waiver, then the 

CO should initiate action to terminate the 8(a) contract(s) for convenience as soon as 

possible after receiving such written instruction from the SBA. 

Procurement Information Circular 99-21, issued in November 1999, updated NASA 

guidance to require “the contracting officer to terminate the contract for convenience 

upon receipt of a written request by the SBA.” 

NASA’s Compliance with 8(a) Program Requirements 

NASA and the SBA signed a Memorandum of Understanding in May 1998, granting the 

Agency direct award authority and contract execution on 8(a) program contracts.6

 As a 

result, NASA directly contracted with RPI in 1999 to administer the NSRS program in 

accordance with the Agency’s Memorandum of Understanding with the SBA. However, 

NASA did not comply with Federal law and regulations or Agency guidance to terminate 

the NSRS contract after ownership of RPI transferred to a non-8(a) company. 

Contractor’s Sale Notification. RPI did not formally notify NASA or the SBA of the 

sale of RPI to a non-8(a) company prior to the April 2, 2001, sale. The notification is 

required by the Small Business Act. The Small Business Act requires that the 8(a)

contractor request, in writing, a waiver to the termination requirement prior to the change 

of ownership and control, except in the case of the owner’s death or incapacity. NASA 

received RPI’s letter of sale notification on April 10, 2001, or 8 days after the sale was 

completed on April 2, 2001. RPI’s sale notification stated that RPI had requested the 

SBA to waive termination of the contract because the “termination would severely impact 

attainment of the agency’s [NASA’s] program objectives or mission.” RPI also 

requested that NASA certify to the SBA that termination of its contract would impair 

attainment of NASA’s program objectives. Because RPI did not notify NASA prior to its 

sale, neither NASA nor RPI was in a position to certify or request a waiver of termination 

from the SBA prior to the change in ownership as required by the Small Business Act. 

The NASA CO asked the SBA whether it intended to approve RPI’s waiver request on 

May 1, 2001, or 2 weeks before the contract’s first option period expired on 

May 18, 2001. Because the SBA did not respond prior to the contract expiration and 

 6

The memorandum was in effect when NASA awarded the RPI follow-on contract. A Partnership

Agreement that is in effect until 2003 replaced the memorandum granting NASA the same direct award 

authority and contract execution responsibilities. Direct award authority allows NASA to enter into 8(a) 

contracts and arrange for the performance of the contract with an eligible 8(a) contractor without going 

through the SBA. Contract execution gives NASA responsibility for compliance with all applicable 

provisions of the FAR and other acquisition regulations, unless a FAR deviation is obtained. 

3
because NASA had not made other provisions to continue the NSRS program, the CO 

exercised the second 1-year contract option period on May 19, 2001, to prevent a break in 

service in the NSRS contract. 

Agency Administration of the NSRS Contract. In July 2001, the SBA notified NASA 

to terminate the NSRS contract based on 13 CFR 124.515(a)(1), which states that a non8(a) company cannot continue contracts initially awarded to an 8(a) company. However, 

the CO did not terminate the contract because he stated that he was serving on a 

negotiations board for another contract and did not have the time. In addition, the CO

stated that he was unaware of NASA’s procurement information circulars relating to 

termination of 8(a) contracts. 

NASA officials informed us in December 2001 and again in March 2002 that they 

intended to recompete the contract with another 8(a) company, which would be obtained 

through the Federal Supply Schedules administered by the U. S. General Services 

Administration (GSA).7

 As of April 15, 2002, the contract specialist had just begun to 

work with the COTR to prepare the statement of work. If NASA had begun working on a 

re-competition in July 2001 when notified by the SBA to terminate the contract, or in 

December 2001, the Agency would have had sufficient time to properly plan for and 

award another contract through either competitive means or the Federal Supply 

Schedules. Because NASA did not begin working on a replacement for the NSRS 

contract until April 2002, the Agency will be unable to award a new contract by the 

expiration date of the second contract option period on May 19, 2002. Therefore, NASA 

will have to take other actions to prevent a break in the NSRS pending re-competition 

and award of a new contract. 

Ninety days prior to contract completion, the NSRS contractor is required to provide the 

CO and COTR a plan to turn over all NSRS system resources to a successor. The COTR 

knew that RPI had been negotiating with another company, Science Applications 

International Corporation, about 9 months before RPI was sold to BTG, Inc. The COTR 

requested information from the CO regarding the Small Business Act requirements for 

continuance of an 8(a) contract upon the sale of an 8(a) company to a non-8(a) company. 

However, neither the CO nor the COTR requested a transition plan as required by the 

contract or made provisions for a replacement contract during the 9-month period from

July 18, 2000, to April 2, 2001 when RPI sold to BTG, Inc. 

NASA orally informed Titan8

 on April 9, 2002, and by letter on April 11, 2002, that the 

Agency would not exercise the next option at contract expiration on May 18, 2002. 

However, the CO did not request a contract-required transition plan. NASA received a 

transition plan from Titan on April 23, 2002. 

 7

GSA administers the Federal Supply Schedules by negotiating contracts with both large and small 

contractors offering a wide variety of services. FAR 8.001 establishes the “Priorities for use of

Government supply sources.” The Federal Supply Schedules are the second priority for obtaining services. 

The first priority for obtaining services is from the Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or

Severely Disabled. 8

 Titan acquired RPI in November 2001. 

4
Agency NSRS Hotline 

On February 10, 1998, the NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG) recommended9

 that 

the OSMA establish an Agencywide hotline, on a pilot basis, for reporting safety hazards. 

The OSMA responded that an Agencywide safety hotline could be part of the overall 

NASA safety program but would not be appropriate for the NSRS. However, the OSMA 

never established the hotline. If an Agencywide hotline had been established as 

recommended, NASA would have had, at a minimum, a backup process on which to rely 

for receiving safety hazard reports until a new NSRS contract could be put into place. 

The NSRS is the only anonymous hazard reporting system available to NASA and 

contractor employees in addition to their normal reporting channels. 

Conclusion 

Because NASA did not establish a reporting hotline as recommended by the NASA OIG 

in 1998, the Agency will have to take immediate action to assure continuous NSRS 

coverage from May 19, 2002, until the Agency can establish a new NSRS contract. 

Additionally, NASA allowed two non-8(a) companies, BTG, Inc. and Titan, to 

improperly carry out the NSRS contract for about 10 months (from July 2, 2001, through 

May 18, 2002.) By allowing contractors to continue in the 8(a) program when they were 

not entitled to do so, NASA did not comply with the Small Business Act, the CFR, and 

FAR requirements to ensure that agencies provide small businesses with the maximum 

practicable opportunities to participate as prime or subcontractors in contracts awarded. 

Further, NASA denied 8(a) program opportunities to eligible, disadvantaged firms. 

Recommendations for Corrective Action 

1. The Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance should take 

appropriate action to avoid a break in NSRS service when the contract option 

expires on May 18, 2002. 

Management’s Response. Concur. NASA awarded a purchase order to Titan on 

May 17, 2002, to serve as a bridge contract until the contract competition is completed 

and awarded. 

Evaluation of Response. Management’s corrective action is responsive to the 

recommendation. We consider the action sufficient to disposition the recommendation, 

which will be closed for reporting purposes. 

The Assistant Administrator for Procurement should: 

2. Request the NSRS contractor to provide NASA with a transition plan that 

addresses how NSRS documents and equipment, including any software and 

 9

The Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Administrative Investigations, and Assessments made 

recommendations in a letter to the OSMA to improve the NSRS. 

5
databases, will transition to NASA or an NSRS successor contractor and that 

addresses when the NSRS Web site will be updated to reflect the new contractor.

Management’s Response. Concur. The transition plan was submitted and approved on 

April 23, 2002.

Evaluation of Response. Management’s corrective action is responsive to the 

recommendation. We consider the action sufficient to disposition the recommendation, 

which will be closed for reporting purposes 

3. Emphasize to procurement personnel and contract technical 

representatives the requirements in the Small Business Act, the CFR, FAR 19.8, and 

the Agency’s Procurement Information Circulars relating to the 8(a) program 

requirements. 

Management’s Response. Concur. The Assistant Administrator for Procurement will 

send a reminder by June 28, 2002, to all procurement personnel at the affected Center, 

emphasizing the regulations applicable to 8(a) companies that are bought out by non-8(a) 

companies. Additionally, the Associate Administrator will request that 8(a) regulations 

be emphasized in the COTR classes taught periodically throughout the year. 

Evaluation of Response. NASA notified us on July 2, 2002, that the Goddard Space 

Flight Center Acquisition Support Procurement Office had reminded procurement 

personnel of the requirements of FAR 19.812(d) and of PIC 98-1. The reminder stated 

that personnel should be aware of the requirements of FAR 19.812(d) and should refer to 

related NASA Procurement Information Circular 98-1, "Termination of 8(a) Contracts." 

We consider the action sufficient to disposition the recommendation, which will be 

closed for reporting purposes. 

6
Finding B. Cost-Effective Contracting

NASA’s selection of a cost-reimbursement contract for the 1999 NSRS follow-on 

contract award with RPI may not have been cost-effective. Specifically, NASA awarded 

a cost-reimbursement type contract for the NSRS when it had cost and reports history 

from the Battelle and RPI initial contracts. The CO used a cost-reimbursement type 

contract as the most advantageous to the Government because the CO stated that the 

NSRS scope of work could not be sufficiently defined in advance to allow for the precise 

costing necessary to permit performance on a fixed-price contract. In addition, NASA 

did not consider an alternative to the NSRS such as the Federal Aviation 

Administration’s ASRS or an Agency hotline prior to the award of the follow-on RPI

contract. As a result, NASA paid the contractor an average of $9,500 a month for the 

follow-on contract to process only one to two reports a month for the last 35 months and 

continued to assume all the risks under a cost-reimbursement contract. These risks could 

have been shared and the costs potentially lowered through either a different type 

contract or an alternative reporting vehicle. 

Federal Guidance on Cost-Effective Contracting 

FAR Subpart 16.1, “Selecting Contract Types,” states there is a wide selection of contract 

types available to the Government and contractors to provide needed flexibility in 

acquiring the large variety and volume of supplies and services required by agencies. 

Contract types vary according to: 

(1) the degree and timing of the responsibility assumed by the contractor for the 

costs of performance; and 

(2) the amount and nature of the profit incentive offered to the contractor for 

achieving or exceeding specified standards or goals. 

The FAR groups contract types into two broad categories: fixed-price and costreimbursement contracts. Fixed-price contracts, for which the contractor has full 

responsibility for the performance costs and resulting profit (or loss), should be used 

when the risk involved is minimal or can be predicted with an acceptable degree of 

certainty. Cost-reimbursement contracts, for which the contractor has minimal 

responsibility for the performance costs, should be used when a reasonable basis for firm

pricing does not exist. Cost-reimbursement type contracts can have different fee 

structures. The NSRS contract was a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, which means that 

NASA negotiated a fixed fee (profit). 

Changing circumstances may make a different contract type more appropriate for later 

periods. In fact, the FAR warns that contracting officers should avoid protracted 

7
use of a cost-reimbursement or time-and-materials10 contract after experience provides a 

basis for firmer pricing. Changing from a cost-reimbursement to a fixed-priced type 

contract generally results in lower costs and less risk to the Government. 

Award of NSRS Contracts 

Available Reporting History. NASA awarded cost-reimbursement contracts for the 

initial and follow-on NSRS contracts to RPI when other alternatives may have been more 

cost-effective. Specifically, NASA had an established 12-year11 reporting history under 

Battelle, and procurement officials could have used that data to establish a fixed-price 

contract for the follow-on contract to RPI. When NASA awarded the follow-on contract 

to RPI, the Agency could have taken into consideration RPI’s reporting history under the 

initial award as well as Battelle’s reporting history. 

Previously Reported NSRS Data. As reported by the NASA OIG in February 1992,12

the NSRS reporting level had been declining since its inception in 1987. Specifically, the 

NSRS had been designed to handle 86 reports a month. Actual NSRS reports never 

reached the designed capability. In fact, the number of reports peaked at 15 in September 

1988. As of August 1991, the NSRS had produced a total of 254 safety hazard reports -- 

an average of 5 reports a month over 4 years of program operation. During the first 

8 months of 1991, however, the average number of reports dropped to 3 a month. In 

more recent years (1999-2002), the number dropped to about 2 reports a month. 

Selection of the NSRS Contract Type 

The CO considered using a cost-reimbursement type contract in 1999 when the initial 

RPI contract was about to expire. The CO determined that a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract 

was the most advantageous to the Government because the scope of work could not be

sufficiently defined in advance to allow for the precise costing necessary to permit 

performance on a fixed-price contract. However, the CO had a total of 12 years of cost 

and reporting history for use in establishing a more cost-effective fixed-price contract. 

Additionally, RPI was not at risk to design or develop the NSRS. Battelle had designed, 

developed, and implemented the NSRS in 1987. The 1999 RPI statement of work 

provided two phases of work content: Phase I – operational and Phase II – closeout. 

There were no significant changes in the scope of work for the follow-on contract. 

 10A time-and-materials contract provides for acquiring supplies or services on the basis of (1) direct labor

hours at specified fixed hourly rates that include wages, overhead, general and administrative expenses, and

profit; and (2) materials costs. A time-and-materials contract may be used only when it is not possible at 

the time of contract award to estimate accurately the extent or duration of the work or to anticipate costs

with any reasonable degree of confidence. 11The 12 years is the time between the Battelle contract awarded in 1987 and the RPI follow-on contract 

award in 1999. 12“Audit of the NASA Safety Reporting System,” A-LE-89-005, showed that although the NSRS program

augmented internal safety reporting, the system’s limited scope and poor visibility by NASA and contractor

employees prevented NASA from achieving the full benefits of the program. 

8
Therefore, RPI administered a system that was fully operational under a costreimbursement contract for which there was minimal risk to the contractor. 

Alternative Sources for Reporting 

NASA could have considered establishing a new contract with Battelle or using the 

ASRS as an alternative reporting system. NASA helped develop and currently 

administers the ASRS at the Ames Research Center. Additionally, the Agency could 

have considered establishing an Agency hotline, particularly due to the low volume of 

reports received. NASA should examine the costs associated with these alternatives prior 

to awarding a new NSRS contract. 

The OSMA expressed concerns about using the ASRS because Ames Research Center 

personnel administer the ASRS. Because Ames personnel report to the Office of 

Aerospace Technology, NASA and contractor employees would not consider the ASRS 

as separate and independent. The OSMA also expressed concerns about using an Agency 

hotline because it could inadvertently increase risks under certain circumstances. The 

present paper-based system requires a more rigorous process of documenting and

substantiating concerns, which aids the OSMA in quickly addressing alleged safety 

problems. 

We believe that the OSMA could consider using a support contractor to operate either the 

ASRS or an Agency hotline and still maintain the independence and rigorous process that 

is in place today. In addition, NASA policy requiring employees to report safety hazards 

initially at the local level and the OSMA’s comments that “very few safety concerns 

reported through NSRS are completely unknown to local management” further support 

our position.

NSRS Reports Data and Contract Costs 

NASA received 60 reports during a 34-month period from May 19, 1999, when the 

follow-on contract was awarded to RPI, through March 27, 2002. For the 34-month 

period, NASA received one to two reports a month. As of April 30, 2002, the total 

contract funding, including fee, was $334,500. The average cost to process each report 

over the approximate 3-year period was about $5,575 ($334,500 divided by 60 reports). 

NASA paid RPI more than $9,500 ($334,500 divided by 35 months as of April 2002) to 

collect and summarize one to two safety reports each month for 35 months. Our analysis 

of the 60 NSRS contractor reports is summarized in Appendix C. 

Conclusion 

NASA awarded a cost-reimbursement type contract to an 8(a) firm, even though the 

Agency could have awarded a fixed-price contract because NASA had an established 

reporting history for the NSRS program. Alternatively, NASA could have considered 

using the ASRS or establishing an Agency hotline based on the low volume of reports it 

received. Instead, NASA has paid more than $9,500 a month to process one to two 

9
reports a month for the last 35 months. Additionally, NASA assumed all risks associated 

with a fully operational safety-reporting program when those risks could have been 

transferred to the contractor. 

Recommendation for Corrective Action 

4. The Assistant Administrator for Procurement and the Associate Administrator 

for Safety and Mission Assurance should pursue a fixed-price contract for the next 

NSRS contract based on more than 15 years of data collected from May 1987 

through May 2002 or should consider cost-effective alternatives, such as the ASRS 

or an Agency hotline to meet NSRS requirements. 

Management’s Response. Partially Concur. A time and materials contract will be 

awarded from the GSA Federal Supply Schedule by June 30, 2002. This cost-effective 

alternative will result in the Agency paying only for the time that is actually expended on 

this NSRS requirement. 

Evaluation of Response. NASA provided us a copy of the new NSRS contract on 

June 28, 2002. Although a time and materials contract is an allowable alternative to a 

cost-plus type contract, we believe there are some disadvantages to that alternative. 

According to procurement guidelines, a time and materials contract is used for 

engineering and design services, repair, maintenance and overhaul work, or work to be 

performed in emergencies. None of these types of services are consistent with the work 

to be performed for the NSRS program. Additionally, there is no incentive for efficient 

management or cost control under a time and materials contract. Because the 

contractor’s overhead costs, general and administrative expenses, and profit are all 

incorporated into a fixed hourly rate, the greater the number of hours charged on the 

contract, the greater the profit to the contractor. Further, lack of a cost incentive makes 

Government surveillance a necessity to assure effective contractor performance and cost 

control methods. Based on these disadvantages, we continue to believe that NASA could 

have effectively fulfilled the NSRS requirement using a fixed-price contract. Further, we 

encourage NASA to review the results of the base year contract, prior to exercising the 

first option year in June 2003 to determine whether the current contract is more favorable 

to NASA than a fixed-price contract. Notwithstanding our concerns with a time and 

materials contract and the fact that NASA has already awarded the time and materials 

contract, this recommendation will be closed for reporting purposes. 

10
Appendix A. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Objectives

The overall objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of NASA’s Safety Reporting 

System (NSRS.) The specific objective related to this report was to determine whether 

NASA and the NSRS contractor effectively performed contract requirements. This report 

identifies conditions regarding the NSRS contract that warrant timely action by NASA 

management because NASA may experience a break in service on the NSRS contract 

when the current contract option period expires on May 19, 2002. 

The remaining objectives, which will be discussed in a separate report, are to determine 

whether NASA: 

• effectively notified the appropriate NASA authorities of safety concerns and 

• appropriately addressed, dispositioned, and resolved safety concerns. 

Scope and Methodology 

We reviewed applicable Federal laws and regulations as noted below and NASA 

guidance related to the 8(a) program and the NSRS requirements as follows: 

• Title 15, United States Code, Part 637(a), “The Small Business Act” 

• Title 13, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 124, “8(a) Business 

Development/Small Disadvantaged Business Status Determinations” 

• Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 8, “Required Sources of Supplies and 

Services” 

• FAR 16.1, “Selecting Contract Types” 

• FAR 19.8, “Contracting with the Small Business Administration (The 8(a) 

Program)” 

• NASA Procurement Information Circular 98-1, “Termination of 8(a) Contracts” 

• NASA Procurement Information Circular 99-21, “Extension of the NASA and 

SBA [Small Business Administration] Memorandum of Understanding to Allow 

Direct Contracting with 8(a) Firms” 

Additionally, we did the following: 

11
Appendix A 

• Interviewed NASA procurement officials including the Contracting Officer, 

Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative, and the Contract Specialist as 

well as the NSRS contract program manager. 

• Interviewed NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance officials including 

the Director, Safety and Risk Management Division and Chairman of the NSRS 

Management Technical Advisory Group. 

• Reviewed the contract file, including the basic contract and funding 

modifications, statement of work, and correspondence relating to contract 

administration. 

We did not assess the reliability of computer-processed data because we did not rely on it 

to achieve our objective. 

Management Controls Reviewed 

We reviewed management controls related to the administration of 8(a) program13

contracts including the United States Code, the FAR, NASA Procurement Information 

Circulars, and the Memorandum of Understanding and Partnership Agreement between 

NASA and the Small Business Administration. 

Audit Field Work 

We performed field work from October 2001 through May 2002 at NASA Headquarters, 

Goddard Space Flight Center, and the NSRS contractor office in Virginia. We performed 

the audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 13See footnote 1. 

12
Appendix B. Summary of Prior Audit Coverage 

The NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG) has issued two reports relating to the 

NASA Safety Reporting System (NSRS). In addition, the General Accounting Office 

(GAO) has issued a report relating to the administration of 8(a) contracts.14

 “Modifications to the NASA Safety Reporting System,” Inspections and 

Assessments Letter, February 10, 1998. The OIG reviewed selected aspects of the 

NSRS during a review of issues related to the safety of the NASA/Mir missions.15 The 

OIG suggested that the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance enhance the NSRS to 

help ensure that all NASA and contractor employees are aware of the various safety 

mechanisms available to quickly report safety concerns and to modify the NSRS Web 

site to include hyperlinks to all Centers’ safety reporting processes, the OIG hotline, or 

the safety office telephone numbers. The OIG proposed that the Web site, brochure, and 

NSRS standard reporting form include statements to clarify that: (1) the NSRS reports 

should not contain classified information; (2) reports containing allegations of potential 

criminal activities be referred to the NASA OIG; and (3) the Web site, brochure, and the 

NSRS form include the OIG hotline number. The OIG also requested that NASA 

consider establishing and monitoring an Agencywide safety hotline, if only on a pilot 

basis. Management did not agree to include a reference to the OIG hotline number on the 

Web site or to state that the NSRS reports containing allegations of potential criminal 

activities should be referred to the OIG in NSRS material. Management stated that the 

recommendation to establish a hotline would be reviewed. 

“NASA Safety Reporting System (NSRS),” Report Number A-LE-89-005, 

February 14, 1992. Since its inception, the NSRS Office has processed 254 confidential 

referrals to management. Many of the referrals dealt with concerns that otherwise may 

not have reached the attention of Agency managers. Although the program has 

augmented internal safety reporting for the Space Transportation System, the full benefits 

to be gained through the program are not being realized. Problems with the program

include its limited scope and poor visibility and exposure. The OIG found that internal 

controls, while generally adequate to protect correspondents’ identities, could be 

improved. NASA agreed to implement corrective actions on nine of the report 

recommendations, and the OIG withdrew one recommendation.

“SBA Could Better Focus Its 8(a) Program16 to Help Firms Obtain Contracts,” 

Report Number GAO/RCED-00-196, July 2000. Access by firms to 8(a) contracts—

long considered the program’s biggest benefit—remains a problem. A long-standing 

concern, cited in previous GAO and Small Business Administration Inspector General 

reports, is that a few firms receive most of the 8(a) contracts, effectively limiting the 

developmental opportunities available to other firms in the program. For example, in 

 14 See footnote 1. 15In 1992, NASA and the Russian Space Agency signed a Joint Statement on Cooperation in Space 

detailing a Space Shuttle mission to visit Mir, the Russian space station, and subsequently expanded the

cooperation to extend the NASA/Mir program for 10 Shuttle flights. 16See footnote 1. 

13
Appendix B 

fiscal year 1998, 209 firms received 50 percent of the 8(a) contract dollars. The Small 

Business Administration acknowledged this problem and made some changes in the 

program to address it, but stated that because of differences in firms’ skills, experience,

and other factors, not all 8(a) firms receive program contracts. In addition, Federal 

procuring officials are confronted with the competing objectives of accomplishing their 

agencies’ missions at a reasonable cost and achieving the 8(a) program’s business 

development goals. 

14
Appendix C. Our Analysis of the NSRS Contractor Reports 

Category of Reported Data Number of Reports

Urgency/Criticality of Report: 

 -Immediate Urgency

 -Routine 

 Total 

Concern Previously Reported: 

 -Previously Reported 

 -Not Previously Reported 

 Total 

Topic Area of Report: 

 -Building/Facilities 

 -Space Shuttle and 

 International Space Station 

 -Industrial Safety

 -Aeronautics/Aviation 

 -Vehicle/Passenger Safety

 -Miscellaneous 

 Total 

 7 

53 

60

50 

10 

60

27 

14 

11 

 4 

 3 

 1 

60

Our analysis of the reports showed the following: 

• Fifty-three (88 percent) of the 60 reports received were considered routine, while only

7 (12 percent) reports were considered an immediate urgency, that is, needing immediate 

attention. 

• Fifty (83 percent) of the 60 correspondents indicated they had reported the hazard 

elsewhere, for example, to their supervisor or their Center Safety Office. Based on 

NASA’s 14 years of NSRS operations, the Agency acknowledged that very few safety

concerns that rise through the NSRS are completely unknown to those at the local level. 

Only 10 (17 percent) of the 60 reports indicated that the correspondent had not previously

reported the hazard to anyone. 

• Twenty-seven (45 percent) of the 60 reports showed that most of the reports related to 

buildings and facilities hazards. 

• Fourteen (23 percent) of the 60 reports related to Space Shuttle and International Space 

Station hazards. 

• Eleven (18 percent) of the 60 reports related to industrial safety hazards. 

• Four (7 percent) of the 60 reports related to aeronautics/aviation hazards. 

• Three (5 percent) of the 60 reports related to vehicle/passenger safety hazards. 

• One (2 percent) of the 60 reports did not fall into any available category and was 

considered a miscellaneous report. 

15
Appendix D. Management’s Response 

16
Appendix D

See 

Appendix 

D, 

OIG 

Comment

1 

See 

Appendix 

D, 

OIG 

Comment

2 

17
Appendix D

See 

Appendix 

D; 

OIG 

Comment 3 

See 

Appendix 

D, 

OIG 

Comment 4 

18
Appendix D

19
Appendix E. OIG Comments on Management’s Response 

NASA Headquarters provided the following comments in its response to a draft of this 

report. Our responses to the comments are also presented. 

Management Comments. The NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance wants 

the following statement (page 4, paragraph 3) expunged from the Office of Inspector 

General (OIG) report: 

However, neither the CO [Contracting Officer] nor the COTR [Contracting Officer’s 

Technical Representative] requested a transition plan as required by the contract or made

provisions for a replacement contract during the 9-month period from July 18, 2000, to 

April 2, 2001, when RPI sold to BTG, Inc. 

As the report correctly notes, the COTR did know that Research Planning, Inc. (RPI) was 

negotiating with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and discussed 

this with the CO and the ramifications with respect to the Small Business Administration 

(SBA). Subsequently, the negotiations betweens RPI and SAIC ended; thus there was no 

longer an issue. However, regarding the RPI negotiations with and sale to BTG, Inc., 

neither the CO nor the COTR knew that negotiations were in progress until after the sale. 

Therefore, there was no reason to request a transition plan or consider a replacement 

contract during that period. 

1. OIG Comments. Based on the information we obtained regarding the negotiations 

with SAIC, RPI planned to sell the company, even though the negotiations with SAIC 

were unsuccessful. Although RPI did not inform NASA of the sale to BTG, Inc. in a 

timely manner, NASA had knowledge that a sale was likely. However, NASA did not 

adequately plan for a replacement contract. Further, when NASA was officially notified 

of the sale in April 2001, Agency officials did not take steps to plan for a replacement 

contract until April 2002. The lack of planning forced the Agency to award a sole-source 

“bridge contract” (or purchase order) until competition could be completed on a new 

NSRS contract. Issuing a sole-source purchase order based on an unusual and 

compelling urgency was not justified when the Agency's lack of planning led to the 

urgency. The U.S. Code (USC) states that the Competition in Contracting Act permits 

noncompetitive acquisitions in specified circumstances, such as when the agency's need 

for the services is of an unusual and compelling urgency and they are available from only 

one responsible source according to 10 USC Section 2304(c)(2)(1994). For example, in a 

similar case, the U. S. Comptroller General reiterated in his decision in TeQcom, Inc., 

86-2 CPD paragraph 700 (1986) that, “under no circumstances may noncompetitive 

procedures be used due to a lack of advance planning by contracting officials” as cited in 

10 USC, Section 2304(f)(5). 

Management Comments. The CO initially contacted the SBA (by telephone) on 

April 12, 2001, concerning the RPI buyout. This was 2 days after NASA received RPI's 

letter of sale notification. As stated in the audit report, the CO contacted the SBA (in 

writing) on May 1, 2001 (2 weeks after receiving notification from RPI of the sale 

20
Appendix E 

to BTG, Inc.) to determine the status of the waiver submitted by RPI. Additionally, the 

CO requested that the SBA Representative (at Goddard Space Flight Center) send a 

follow-up message to the SBA on May 3, 2001, expressing the urgency of this matter. 

After receiving no response from the SBA, the CO sent another message on May 11, 

2001, stating that no response had been received, and the CO intended to initiate action to 

exercise the next available 1-year option on May 14, 2001. Because this was a missioncritical requirement dealing with NASA's number one initiative—safety, the CO had no 

choice but to exercise the option to the contract. The SBA's faxed denial of the waiver 

was not received until July 31, 2001. The CO had no reason to terminate the contract 

during that 3-month period while awaiting SBA's response. 

2. OIG Comments. We maintain that NASA should have terminated the contract upon 

transfer of RPI ownership to a non-8(a) company in accordance with the Small Business 

Act, the agreement with the SBA, and NASA’s internal policy. In addition, we believe 

that the SBA’s denial of a waiver could have been reasonably expected because neither 

RPI nor NASA complied with the requirements for requesting a waiver. Specifically, (1) 

RPI did not request a waiver from the SBA prior to RPI’s sale to BTG, Inc., a non-8(a) 

company; and (2) NASA did not request a waiver from the SBA stating, “termination of 

the contract would severely impair attainment of the agency’s program objectives or 

missions,” as allowed by the Small Business Act. 

Even after the SBA denied the waiver and directed NASA to terminate the contract, the 

CO still did not terminate the contract. This resulted in a non-8(a) company improperly 

performing the contract requirements of an 8(a) set-aside contract for an additional 

10 months. 

Management Comments. The transition plan for terminating all functions by the 

contractor and transferring the daily operations and physical material to a successor 

company in charge of the NSRS operations was submitted/approved on April 23, 2002. 

3. OIG Comments. We based our recommendation on information initially provided by 

the COTR, who told us that although NASA received a transition plan on April 23, 2002, 

it was not approved. The COTR suggested changes to the plan and gave it back to the 

contractor for correction. 

Management Comments. The report indicates that NASA is paying $9,500 a month to 

have the contractor process one or two safety reports. The report fails to mention that the 

requirements listed below are also included in the Statement of Work and were 

performed by the contractor: 

• Analyze, prepare, process, and transmit all reports regardless of the amount 

• Update, operate, and maintain the NSRS database 

• Conduct trend analysis 

21
Appendix E 

• Conduct an awareness program that includes: design and distribution NSRS 

posters each year, provide promotional materials, support NSRS at all Centers 

• Attend management/coordination and Technical Advisory Group meetings 

• Support Space Shuttle launch/mission activities 

• Maintain Technical Advisory Group operational procedures documents 

• Design, print and distribute the annual Planning Guide

Additionally, a fixed-priced instrument has programmatic and business drawbacks. A 

fixed-price award may create windfall profits for a contractor or put the contractor at risk 

if the volume or complexity of the reports change, which, in turn, would reduce NASA's 

service level on this mission-critical effort that safeguards lives and national assets. No

cost benefits or risk analysis was evident in the report to support the conclusion that the 

cost-reimbursement contract was the incorrect contract type. In fact, the contract was 

underrunning the originally negotiated costs, which could be an indicator of effective 

program and cost management. 

4. OIG Comments. We believe that NASA’s use of a time and materials contract is not 

the best alternative to a cost-reimbursement contract. Rather, we maintain that NASA 

could have negotiated a fixed-price contract to fulfill the NSRS requirement based on 15 

years of cost and reporting history to price and negotiate the new contract. We encourage 

NASA to review the performance and associated cost of the time and materials contract 

before exercising future option periods to determine whether this contract alternative is, 

in fact, in NASA’s best interest. 

The findings and recommendations in this report are based on the audit work performed 

to date. We plan to continue audit field work on NASA’s Safety Reporting System under 

a new assignment number, A-02-006-01, and we will evaluate other requirements in the 

Statement of Work to determine whether NASA and the NSRS contractor are performing 

those tasks effectively. 

22
Appendix F. Report Distribution

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Headquarters 

HQ/AI/Associate Deputy Administrator 

HQ/AA/Chief of Staff 

HQ/AB/Associate Deputy Administrator for Institutions

HQ/B/Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

HQ/B/Comptroller 

HQ/BF/Director, Financial Management Division 

HQ/G/General Counsel 

HQ/H/Assistant Administrator for Procurement 

HQ/HK/Director, Contract Management Division 

HQ/J/Assistant Administrator for Management Systems 

HQ/JM/Director, Management Assessment Division 

HQ/L/Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs 

HQ/M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight

HQ/Q/Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance 

HQ/QS/Director, Safety and Risk Management Division 

NASA Advisory Officials 

HQ/K/Chair, Minority Business Resource Advisory Committee 

HQ/Q-1/Chair, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 

HQ/RX/Chair, Aerospace Technology Advisory Committee 

HQ/UG/Chair, Biological and Physical Research Advisory Committee 

HQ/Y/Chair, Earth System Science and Applications Technology Advisory Committee 

NASA Centers 

ARC/D/Director, Ames Research Center 

DFRC/X/Director, Dryden Flight Research Center 

GRC/0100/Director, John H. Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field 

GSFC/100/Director, Goddard Space Flight Center 

JPL/1000/Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

JSC/AA/Director, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 

KSC/AA/Director, John F. Kennedy Space Center 

KSC/CC/Chief Counsel, John F. Kennedy Space Center 

LaRC/106/Acting Director, Langley Research Center 

MSFC/DA01/Director, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 

SSC/AA00/Director, John C. Stennis Space Center 

23
Appendix F

Non-NASA Federal Organizations and Individuals 

Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Policy 

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division, Office of Management and 

 Budget 

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch, Energy and Science Division, Office 

 of Management and Budget 

Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team, General Accounting 

 Office 

Senior Professional Staff Member, Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and 

 Space 

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member – Congressional Committees and 

Subcommittees 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Senate Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space 

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 

House Committee on Appropriations 

House Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies 

House Committee on Government Reform

House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and 

 Intergovernmental Relations 

House Subcommittee on Technology and Procurement Policy 

House Committee on Science 

House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

Congressional Member 

Honorable Pete Sessions, U.S. House of Representatives 

24
NASA Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

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