Filed 10/8/20 P. v. Navarro CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANTONIO NAVARRO,

Defendant and Appellant.

B296251

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BA457180

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.

John Lanahan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael 

Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted appellant and defendant Antonio Navarro 

of one count of first degree murder of Uziel Sandoval, two counts 

of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and one count of 

shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. On appeal, Navarro argues 

the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the audio

recordings of a witness’s two interviews with police conducted in 

Spanish, as well as the transcripts of the recordings. The 

transcripts contained Spanish transcriptions of the interviews 

and English translations. Navarro contends: (1) the admission of 

the transcripts’ English translations violated his rights under the

Confrontation Clause pursuant to Crawford v. Washington (2004) 

541 U.S. 36 [125 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177] (Crawford) and its 

progeny1; and (2) the court abused its discretion under Evidence 

Code section 352 when it allowed the prosecution to play the 

recordings for the jury and provided them with the transcripts. 

The Attorney General responds Navarro has forfeited his claims 

on appeal because he did not object on these grounds at trial. 

We agree with the Attorney General and conclude Navarro 

forfeited the claims of error raised in this appeal. Accordingly, the 

judgment is affirmed. 

1 Under Crawford, “[w]here a hearsay statement is 

‘testimonial,’ the confrontation clause bars the prosecution from 

using it against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is 

available to testify at trial, or the defendant had a previous 

opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” (People v. Sisavath 

(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1401 [citing Crawford, supra, 541 

U.S. at pp. 49-57].) In this case, Navarro contends the translator

is the “declarant” and the translator was not present at trial for 

cross-examination.
3

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Los Angeles County District Attorney filed an 

information charging Navarro with one count of first degree 

murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)2; count one), two counts of 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); 

counts two and four), and one count of shooting at an occupied 

motor vehicle (§ 246; count three). The information alleged a 

principal personally discharged a firearm causing death in the 

commission of counts one and three, (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & 

(e)(1)), discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (e)(1)), and 

used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)(1)). The information 

further alleged Navarro committed the crimes for the benefit of a

criminal street gang with intent to promote gang members’ 

criminal conduct (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(A) & (C)), and Navarro 

sustained two prior prison term convictions. (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). 

Navarro admitted the allegations regarding his prior felony 

and prison term convictions, and the jury found Navarro guilty 

on all counts. The jury found true the street gang allegations on 

counts one, two, and three. On count one, the jury found true all 

three firearm allegations. On count three, however, the jury 

found true only the allegations that a principal discharged and 

used a firearm in the commission of the offense.

The court sentenced Navarro to a total term of seven years 

and eight months plus 50 years to life in state prison, consisting 

of: (1) a term of 25 years to life with an additional consecutive

term of 25 years to life due to a principal’s discharge of a firearm 

causing death, for a total of 50 years to life, on count one; (2) a 

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.
4

two-year middle term with a three-year street gang 

enhancement, for a total of five years, on count two; (3) a term of 

eight months (one-third the mid-term of two years) on count four; 

and (4) two one-year terms based on Navarro’s prior convictions.

3

Navarro timely appealed. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the late afternoon of November 23, 2016, Sandoval was

driving from Monterey Park to South Gate in his truck with a

friend. They passed through the intersection of Whittier 

Boulevard and Alma Street in East Los Angeles where the 

Bartolo bar is located. The area around the intersection is 

claimed by a street gang known as the Laguna Park Vikings. 

Video surveillance footage was recovered from the Bartolo bar. 

The footage shows Navarro inside the bar on that date with a

large and heavy black object in his front right pocket. 

As Sandoval and his friend were passing by the Bartolo

bar, they stopped the truck, exited the vehicle, and got into a 

fight with several individuals outside the bar. Sandoval ran back 

to his truck, got into the driver’s seat, and started driving away.

As the truck was turning the corner, a bartender working at the 

bar saw Navarro take a gun out from his waist, yell “‘Laguna 

Park’” and fire two shots at the truck. Thirty seconds later, the 

bartender heard two more gunshots fired by an unknown person.

3 With respect to count one, the court also imposed and 

stayed two additional firearm enhancements and a street gang 

enhancement. Additionally, the court imposed and stayed a life

term with a minimum of 15 years along with two firearm 

enhancements on count three. 
5

The truck crashed into a tree on Alma Street, just north of 

Whittier Boulevard. 

Upon arrival at the crash site, police found Sandoval dead 

in the driver’s seat of the truck. He was killed by a single gunshot 

wound to the chest. The bullet that killed him was fired by a 

nine-millimeter gun. Police found a .45 caliber bullet casing next 

to the driver-side door of a white van parked nearby and 

recovered a bullet from the truck’s dashboard. 

Later that evening, the police interviewed the bartender at 

the police station. The interview was conducted in Spanish and

recorded. The bartender related what she observed during the 

fight outside the bar. She identified Navarro as a member of the 

Laguna Park Vikings known as “Psycho.” She also picked 

Navarro out of a photographic line-up as the individual who fired 

two gunshots at Sandoval’s truck. 

The police again interviewed the bartender at her home in 

Spanish on January 25, 2017. During the second interview, which 

also was recorded, the bartender told police Navarro had visited 

her home and asked her about what she had previously told 

them. The police informed the bartender that Navarro was going 

to be prosecuted for Sandoval’s murder. They offered to help her

and her family move to a different home for their safety.

Police searched Navarro’s residence on February 28, 2017. 

They found a loaded .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol with a 

black handle in his bedroom. Ballistics tests revealed the pistol 

fired the casing found next to the white van parked near the 

crash site. Due to the damage to the bullet recovered from the 

truck’s dashboard, ballistics tests could only confirm it “was 

consistent with bullets loaded in .45 auto caliber cartridges.”
6

DISCUSSION

At trial, the bartender professed not to recall details of the 

incident or what she had said about it during her interviews with 

police. She also stated she felt “pressured” to answer police

questions. The prosecution confronted the witness using the 

recordings, the Spanish language transcriptions, and the English 

translations of her police interviews. Navarro contends this 

constituted error. In support of his position, Navarro advances 

two arguments. First, he argues the admission of the transcripts’ 

English translations violated his rights under the Confrontation 

Clause pursuant to Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36, and its 

progeny, because the translations constituted testimonial 

hearsay statements by the translator, who Navarro complains he 

did not have the opportunity to cross-examine. Second, Navarro 

argues the court abused its discretion under Evidence Code 

section 352 by admitting the interview recordings, transcripts, 

and translations.

The Attorney General responds Navarro forfeited these 

claims on appeal by failing to raise them at trial as evidentiary 

objections or in any other fashion. We agree with the Attorney 

General. 

In general, “‘“questions relating to the admissibility of 

evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a 

specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground 

sought to be urged on appeal.’” [Citations].” (People v. Alvarez 

(1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 186 (Alvarez); Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) 

“‘The reason for the [objection] requirement is manifest: a 

specifically grounded objection to a defined body of evidence

serves to prevent error. It allows the trial judge to consider 

excluding the evidence or limiting its admission to avoid possible 
7

prejudice. It also allows the proponent of the evidence to lay 

additional foundation, modify the offer of proof, or take other 

steps designed to minimize the prospect of reversal.’ [Citation.]” 

(People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434.) 

At trial, the bartender testified she did not remember 

telling the police she saw Navarro fire two shots at Sandoval’s 

truck while yelling “‘Laguna Park . . . .’” In response, the 

prosecution informed the trial court they intended to “confront” 

the bartender with the recording of her first interview, along with 

the transcript thereof. Relying on an unidentified “de-published 

case,” the trial court stated it would not admit the interview 

recording or transcript because “[t]he case held that it was 

structural error for a court to allow the jurors to translate 

themselves the Spanish language audio of the witness’s 

interview.” Instead, the court stated it would permit the 

prosecution to play the recording for the bartender outside the 

jury’s presence. If the bartender maintained she did not make 

certain statements to the police, the prosecution could call “a 

witness who was present to testify as to the contents strictly in 

English.” Alternatively, the court would allow the prosecution to 

call the translator to provide a certified translation of the 

bartender’s interview.

Before the prosecution could confront the bartender with 

the recording, however, she testified she felt “pressured” to 

answer the police’s questions during the interviews. Based on

this testimony, the trial court reversed its ruling in light of People 

v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442 (Mora and Rangel). In 

response, defense counsel argued Mora and Rangel was 

inapplicable. The trial court rejected defense counsel’s argument.

Thereafter, the court allowed the prosecution to play the 
8

recordings of the bartender’s two police interviews for the jury. 

The trial court also allowed the prosecution to distribute the 

transcripts containing both the Spanish transcription and the 

English translation to the jury. 

The record thus reflects defense counsel did not object to 

the prosecution’s use of the recordings and transcripts of the 

bartender’s police interviews based on the Confrontation Clause 

or Evidence Code section 352. Accordingly, we conclude the 

claims Navarro raises on appeal have been forfeited. (Alvarez, 

supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 186; Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) 

In addition, we reject Navarro’s argument that he did not 

forfeit his Confrontation Clause claim because an objection to the 

translated transcripts on that ground would have been futile 

under Correa v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 444 (Correa).

4

As discussed below, Correa would not necessarily have required

the trial court to overrule a Confrontation Clause objection to the 

English translations of the bartender’s statements, as Navarro 

suggests.

In Correa, our Supreme Court adopted the “languageconduit theory,” holding that “if a contemporaneously translated 

statement fairly may be attributed to the declarant under the 

particular circumstances of the case . . . the translation does not 

add a layer of hearsay.” (Correa, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 457,

463.) Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 

Nazemian (9th Cir. 1991) 948 F.2d 522 (Nazemian), the Correa

court held trial courts must decide whether a translated 

statement may be fairly considered a statement by the original 

4 In his Reply Brief, Navarro does not dispute his Evidence 

Code section 352 claim has been forfeited. 
9

declarant on a case-by-case basis, by considering a number of 

factors, “‘such as which party supplied the interpreter, whether 

the interpreter had any motive to mislead or distort, the 

interpreter’s qualifications and language skill, and whether 

actions taken subsequent to the conversation were consistent 

with the statements as translated.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 457-

458.)

Courts applying the same analysis embraced in Correa

have arrived at different conclusions based on the specific facts 

presented in each case. (See, e.g., United States v. Orm Hieng

(9th Cir. 2012) 679 F.3d 1131, 1138-1139 (Hieng) [applying multifactor language-conduit theory test to conclude translated 

statements by the defendant in an interview with FBI agents 

were properly attributed to him, and therefore the Confrontation 

Clause was not implicated]; United States v. Gutierrez-Salinas 

(9th Cir. 2016) 640 Fed.Appx. 690, 692-693, cert. den. (2016) 136 

S. Ct. 2528 [195 L.Ed.2d 855] [applying multi-factor languageconduit theory test to conclude a form affidavit written in English

and signed by a Spanish-speaking defendant could not be fairly

attributed to the defendant and was therefore a separate hearsay 

statement by the form’s author, and further concluding admission 

of the form violated the Confrontation Clause because it was 

testimonial in nature and the defendant had no opportunity to 

cross-examine its author].) Accordingly, we are not persuaded

that a Confrontation Clause objection to the translated 

transcripts necessarily would have been futile under Correa.

Navarro also argues the translations of the bartender’s 

statements should be considered hearsay statements by the 

translator because Correa’s language-conduit theory test “no 

longer survives” post-Crawford. According to Navarro, Nazemian, 
10

supra, 948 F.2d 522, the case from which the Correa court 

adopted its multi-factor test, is irreconcilable with Crawford.

(See, e.g., United States v. Charles (11th Cir. 2013) 722 F.3d 

1319, 1327-1329 [rejecting the language-conduit theory in light of 

Crawford and its progeny and concluding admission of a Creolespeaking defendant’s translated statements made in an 

interrogation by a Customs and Border Protection officer violated 

the Confrontation Clause because the defendant did not have an 

opportunity to cross-examine the interpreter].)5 Because Navarro 

failed to raise this argument at trial, it has also been forfeited.

(See Franz v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 31 

Cal.3d 124, 143 [appellate courts generally will not consider 

arguments raised for the first time on appeal].)

Moreover, even if we chose to address Navarro’s

Confrontation Clause claim on the merits, we would be unable to 

resolve it in an intelligible manner because the record was not 

adequately developed at trial. As noted, defense counsel did not 

object to the translated transcripts of the bartender’s interviews 

on Confrontation Clause grounds. No evidence or arguments were 

presented on whether the translated statements fell within the 

language-conduit theory under the Correa test.

6 And neither the 

5 In contrast with the Eleventh Circuit, the Ninth and Fifth 

Circuits have held the language-conduit theory remains valid and 

can still apply in the wake of Crawford and its progeny. (Hieng, 

supra, 679 F.3d 1131, 1138-1141; United States v. Budha (5th 

Cir. 2012) 495 Fed.Appx. 452, 454.) Additionally, the Fourth

Circuit has continued to apply the language-conduit theory postCrawford. (See, e.g., United States v. Vidacak (4th Cir. 2009) 553 

F.3d 344, 352.) 

6 The Attorney General suggests the language-conduit theory 

should apply here because the English translations of the 
11

prosecution nor Navarro offered evidence or argument at trial 

about whether the translations were “testimonial” within the 

meaning of Crawford and its progeny. The lack of information 

essential to resolving Navarro’s Confrontation Clause claim 

further supports our conclusion that the claim has been forfeited, 

and may not be considered for the first time on appeal.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, J. 

We concur: 

MANELLA, P.J. 

COLLINS, J.

transcripts were prepared by a “court-certified translator.” So far 

as we can tell, however, the record reflects the name of the 

translation service, but does not indicate whether the translator 

was court-certified. Indeed, although the parties (and therefore 

we) refer to the English language version of the interviews as a 

translation, the record does not reveal whether it was based on 

the recording or its Spanish language transcription.