SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3503-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

FRANCISCO VILLEGAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Submitted October 2, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino and Sumners.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 93-02-0399.

Francisco Villegas, pro se appellant.

Jill S. Mayers, Acting Camden County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Linda Anne Shashoua, Special 

Deputy Attorney General/ Acting Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 19, 2019
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A-3503-17T4

In 1995, a jury found defendant Francisco Villegas guilty of first-degree

murder and unlawful possession of a weapon. He was sentenced under N.J.S.A. 

2C:11-3(b)(1), to life in prison with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility.1 

Almost twenty-three years later, he filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Judge John T. Kelley denied the motion on February 6, 2018. In a succinct

one-paragraph letter opinion, the judge found defendant's sentence was 

consistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1). The judge reasoned, "the statute does 

include 'life imprisonment' as a lawful term within the applicable sentencing 

range. In this situation, the word 'between' is inclusive, not exclusive, of the 

end points of the range as understood by the New Jersey State Legislature."

Defendant now appeals arguing:

THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN DENYING 

APPELLANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT AN 

ILLEGAL SENTENCE AS THE SENTENCE 

IMPOSED OF LIFE WITH A 30-YEAR PERIOD OF 

PAROLE INELIGIBLITY IN THIS INSTANCE IS 

NOT AUTHORIZED BY N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1) AND 

IS THEREFORE AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE.

a. The Plain Language Of A Statute Controls.

b. A Life Sentence Is Not Between 30 Years And 

Life

1

 He also received a five-year prison term for unlawful possession of a weapon

to run consecutive to his life sentence.
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We disagree and affirm with only a brief discussion in this opinion because 

defendant's argument is so lacking in merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1) states: "a person convicted of murder shall be 

sentenced . . . to a specific term of years which shall be between [thirty] years 

and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve [thirty] years before being 

eligible for parole." The comment following adds: "[m]urder has always been a 

crime of the first degree, and, as amended in 2007, the statute provides for only 

three sentences: [thirty] years without parole; a specific term of years between 

[thirty] years and life imprisonment, with [thirty] years required to be served 

before the person is eligible for parole; and life imprisonment without parole." 

Cannel, N.J. Criminal Code Annotated, cmt. 4 on N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 (2018); see

also State v. Scales, 231 N.J. Super. 336, 340 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that, as 

the result of 1982 amendments to the Criminal Code, "three alternative sentences 

for murder could be imposed: (1) death; (2) a sentence of 30 years without 

parole; and (3) a sentence between thirty years and life, with a 30-year term of 

parole ineligibility.").

Defendant seems to be arguing that his sentence must be lower than a life

term, because the statute uses the term "between." That argument has no basis 

in the law or in logic. Thirty years is a number. The sentence in this case is 
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within the statutory range for first-degree murder and is therefore not illegal. 

See State v. King, 372 N.J. Super. 227, 243-44 (App. Div. 2004).

None of the cases defendant cites in his brief support a contrary result. 

The "life" component of his sentence is lawful and did not require a numeric 

designation of years. See Scales, 231 N.J. Super. at 340. (modifying a life 

sentence with a forty-year parole disqualifier to a life sentence with a thirty-year 

parole disqualifier); see also State v. Carroll, 242 N.J. Super. 549, 566, (App. 

Div. 1990) (modifying a life sentence with a fifty-year parole disqualifier to a 

life sentence with a thirty-year parole disqualifier). If defendant's argument is 

that the upper range of life is unlawful—that argument too misapprehends the 

law. Life imprisonment is available as an ordinary sentence that may be 

imposed for murder. King, 372 N.J. Super at 244. Because defendant's sentence 

does not exceed the maximum penalty provided by the Code or include a 

disposition that is not authorized by the Code, it is not an illegal sentence that 

can be challenged after entry of the judgment of conviction. State v. Acevedo, 

205 N.J. 40, 45-47 (2011).

Affirmed.