7170 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 15 / Tuesday, January 26, 2021 / Notices 

1 Globally, including the United States, the deaths 

of at least 30 people are attributable to these 

rupturing Takata inflators. 

2The May 2015 Consent Order is available at: 

https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/ 

documents/consent-order-takata-05182015_0.pdf. 

3Recall Nos. 15E–040, 15E–041, 15E–042, and 

15E–043. 

4The twelve vehicle manufacturers affected by 

the May 2015 recalls were: BMW of North America, 

LLC; FCA US, LLC (formerly Chrysler); Daimler 

Trucks North America, LLC; Daimler Vans USA, 

LLC; Ford Motor Company; General Motors, LLC; 

American Honda Motor Company; Mazda North 

American Operations; Mitsubishi Motors North 

America, Inc.; Nissan North America, Inc.; Subaru 

of America, Inc.; and Toyota Motor Engineering and 

Manufacturing. 

application, and address the waiver 

criteria given in section 388.4 of 

MARAD’s regulations at 46 CFR part 

388. 

Public Participation 

How do I submit comments? 

Please submit your comments, 

including the attachments, following the 

instructions provided under the above 

heading entitled ADDRESSES. Be advised 

that it may take a few hours or even 

days for your comment to be reflected 

on the docket. In addition, your 

comments must be written in English. 

We encourage you to provide concise 

comments and you may attach 

additional documents as necessary. 

There is no limit on the length of the 

attachments. 

Where do I go to read public comments, 

and find supporting information? 

Go to the docket online at http://

www.regulations.gov, keyword search 

MARAD–2021–0003 or visit the Docket 

Management Facility (see ADDRESSES for 

hours of operation). We recommend that 

you periodically check the Docket for 

new submissions and supporting 

material. 

Will my comments be made available to 

the public? 

Yes. Be aware that your entire 

comment, including your personal 

identifying information, will be made 

publicly available. 

May I submit comments confidentially? 

If you wish to submit comments 

under a claim of confidentiality, you 

should submit three copies of your 

complete submission, including the 

information you claim to be confidential 

business information, to the Department 

of Transportation, Maritime 

Administration, Office of Legislation 

and Regulations, MAR–225, W24–220, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. Include a cover 

letter setting forth with specificity the 

basis for any such claim and, if possible, 

a summary of your submission that can 

be made available to the public. 

Privacy Act 

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), 

DOT solicits comments from the public 

to better inform its rulemaking process. 

DOT posts these comments, without 

edit, to www.regulations.gov, as 

described in the system of records 

notice, DOT/ALL–14 FDMS, accessible 

through www.dot.gov/privacy. To 

facilitate comment tracking and 

response, we encourage commenters to 

provide their name, or the name of their 

organization; however, submission of 

names is completely optional. Whether 

or not commenters identify themselves, 

all timely comments will be fully 

considered. If you wish to provide 

comments containing proprietary or 

confidential information, please contact 

the agency for alternate submission 

instructions. 

(Authority: 49 CFR 1.93(a), 46 U.S.C. 55103, 

46 U.S.C. 12121) 

* * * * * 

Dated: January 21, 2021. 

By Order of the Associate Administrator 

for Strategic Sealift in lieu of the 

Administrator. 

T. Mitchell Hudson, Jr., 

Secretary, Maritime Administration. 

[FR Doc. 2021–01653 Filed 1–25–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–81–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration 

[Docket No. NHTSA–2017–0092] 

Mazda North American Operations; 

Denial of Petition for 

Inconsequentiality 

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), 

Department of Transportation. 

ACTION: Denial of petition. 

SUMMARY: On July 10, 2017, Takata 

Corporation (‘‘Takata’’) filed a defect 

information report (‘‘DIR’’) in which it 

determined that a safety-related defect 

exists in phase-stabilized ammonium 

nitrate (‘‘PSAN’’) driver-side air bag 

inflators that it manufactured with a 

calcium sulfate desiccant and supplied 

to Ford Motor Company (‘‘Ford’’), 

Mazda North American Operations 

(‘‘Mazda’’), and Nissan North America 

Inc. (‘‘Nissan’’) for use in certain 

vehicles. Mazda’s vehicles identified by 

Takata’s DIR were designed by Ford and 

were built on the same platform and 

using the same air bag inflators as one 

of the affected Ford vehicles. Mazda 

petitioned the Agency for a decision 

that the equipment defect determined to 

exist by Takata is inconsequential as it 

relates to motor vehicle safety in the 

Mazda vehicles affected by Takata’s 

DIR, and that Mazda should therefore be 

relieved of its notification and remedy 

obligations under the National Traffic 

and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 

and its applicable regulations. After 

reviewing the petition, NHTSA has 

concluded that Mazda has not met its 

burden of establishing that the defect is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety, 

and denies the petition. 

ADDRESSES: For further information 

about this decision, contact Stephen 

Hench, Office of Chief Counsel, 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, W41–229, Washington, DC 

20590 (Tel. 202.366.2262). 

For general information about 

NHTSA’s investigation into Takata air 

bag inflator ruptures and the related 

recalls, visit https://www.nhtsa.gov/ 

takata. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

The Takata air bag inflator recalls 

(‘‘Takata recalls’’) are the largest and 

most complex vehicle recalls in U.S. 

history. These recalls currently involve 

19 vehicle manufacturers and 

approximately 67 million Takata air bag 

inflators in tens of millions of vehicles 

in the United States alone. The recalls 

are due to a design defect, whereby the 

propellant used in Takata’s air bag 

inflators degrades after long-term 

exposure to high humidity and 

temperature cycling. During air bag 

deployment, this propellant degradation 

can cause the inflator to over-pressurize, 

causing sharp metal fragments (like 

shrapnel) to penetrate the air bag and 

enter the vehicle compartment. To date, 

these rupturing Takata inflators have 

resulted in the deaths of 18 people 

across the United States 1 and over 400 

alleged injuries, including lacerations 

and other serious consequences to 

occupants’ face, neck, and chest areas. 

In May 2015, NHTSA issued, and 

Takata agreed to, a Consent Order,2 and 

Takata filed four defect information 

reports (‘‘DIRs’’) 3 for inflators installed 

in vehicles manufactured by twelve 4

vehicle manufacturers. Recognizing that 

these unprecedented recalls would 

involve many challenges for vehicle 

manufacturers and consumers, NHTSA 

began an administrative proceeding in 

June 2015 providing public notice and 

seeking comment (Docket Number 

NHTSA–2015–0055). This effort 

culminated in NHTSA’s establishment 

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 15 / Tuesday, January 26, 2021 / Notices 7171 

5See Notice of Coordinated Remedy Program 

Proceeding for the Replacement of Certain Takata 

Air Bag Inflators, 80 FR 32197 (June 5, 2015). 

The Coordinated Remedy Order, which 

established the Coordinated Remedy, is available at: 

https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/ 

documents/nhtsa-coordinatedremedyordertakata.pdf. The Third Amendment to the 

Coordinated Remedy Order incorporated additional 

vehicle manufacturers, that were not affected by the 

recalls at the time that NHTSA issued the CRO into 

the Coordinated Remedy, and is available at: 

https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/ 

documents/final_public_-_third_amendment_to_

the_coordinated_remedy_order_with_annex_acorrected_12.16.16.pdf. The additional affected 

vehicle manufacturers are: Ferrari North America, 

Inc.; Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC; 

McLaren Automotive, Ltd.; Mercedes-Benz US, 

LCC; Tesla Motors, Inc.; Volkswagen Group of 

America, Inc.; and, per Memorandum of 

Understanding dated September 16, 2016, Karma 

Automotive on behalf of certain Fisker vehicles. 

6See Coordinated Remedy Order at 15–18, Annex 

A; Third Amendment to the Coordinated Remedy 

Order at 14–17. These documents, among other 

documents related to the Takata recalls discussed 

herein, are available on NHTSA’s website at http:// 

www.nhtsa.gov/takata. 

7Zone A comprises the following U.S. states and 

jurisdictions: Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, 

Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, 

Texas, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the 

Northern Mariana Islands (Saipan), and the U.S. 

Virgin Islands. Amendment to November 3, 2015 

Consent Order at ¶ 7.a. 

8Zone B comprises the following U.S. states and 

jurisdictions: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, District 

of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 

Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, 

New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, 

Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West 

Virginia. Amendment to November 3, 2015 Consent 

Order at ¶ 7.b. 

9Zone C comprises the following U.S. states and 

jurisdictions: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, 

Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 

Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North 

Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, 

Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 

Amendment to November 3, 2015 Consent Order at 

¶ 7.c. 

10Consent Order ¶ 28. 

11Mazda has relied upon the Ford testing 

information because Mazda’s vehicles identified by 

Takata’s DIR were designed by Ford, built on the 

same platform, and used the same air bag inflators 

as MY 2007–2011 Ford Rangers. 

12See also Recall No. 17E–034. Later, under 

Paragraph 43 of the Third Amendment to the 

Coordinated Remedy Order (‘‘ACRO’’), NHTSA 

ordered each vehicle manufacturer ‘‘with any 

vehicle in its fleet equipped with a desiccated 

PSAN Takata inflator’’ (and not using or planning 

to use such an inflator as a final remedy) to develop 

a written plan describing ‘‘plans to confirm the 

safety and/or service life’’ of desiccated PSAN 

Takata inflators used in its fleet. ACRO ¶ 43. Such 

plans were to include coordination with Takata for 

parts recovery from fleet vehicles, testing, and 

anticipated/future plans ‘‘to develop or expand 

recovery and testing protocols of the desiccated 

PSAN inflators.’’ Id. 

13Recall No. 17V–449. The specific Takata 

calcium-sulfate desiccated PSDI–5 driver-side air 

bag inflators installed in these Nissan Versa 

vehicles are a different variant than those installed 

in the Ford and Mazda vehicles. There are several 

differences in design between the variant installed 

in Nissan vehicles and the variants installed in the 

Ford and Mazda vehicles, which are discussed 

further below. 

14Recall No. 17E–034. 

15 Id. 

16 Id. 

17 Id. 

18See Recall No. 17V–449. 

19Recall No. 17E–034. 

20 Id. 

21See 49 U.S.C. 30102(b)(1)(F); 49 CFR part 573; 

November 3, 2015 Coordinated Remedy Order 

¶¶ 45–46. Under 49 CFR 573.5(a), a vehicle 

manufacturer is responsible for any safety-related 

defect determined to exist in any item of original 

equipment. See also 49 U.S.C. 30102(b)(1)(C). 

of a Coordinated Remedy Program 

(‘‘Coordinated Remedy’’) in November 

2015.5 The Coordinated Remedy 

prioritizes and phases the various 

Takata recalls not only to accelerate the 

repairs, but also—given the large 

number of affected vehicles—to ensure 

that repair parts are available to fix the 

highest-risk vehicles first.6

Under the Coordinated Remedy, 

vehicles are prioritized for repair parts 

based on various factors relevant to the 

safety risk—primarily on vehicle model 

year (MY), as a proxy for inflator age, 

and geographic region. In the early 

stages of the Takata inflator recalls, 

affected vehicles were categorized as 

belonging to one of two regions: The 

High Absolute Humidity (‘‘HAH’’) 

region (largely inclusive of Gulf Coast 

states and tropical island states and 

territories), or the non-HAH region 

(inclusive of the remaining states and 

the District of Columbia). On May 4, 

2016, NHTSA issued, and Takata agreed 

to, an amendment to the November 3, 

2015 Consent Order (‘‘ACO’’), wherein 

these geographic regions were refined 

based on improved understanding of the 

risk, and were then categorized as Zones 

A, B, and C. Zone A encompasses the 

higher risk HAH region as well as 

certain other states,7 Zone B includes 

states with more moderate climates (i.e., 

lower heat and humidity than Zone A),8

and Zone C includes the coolertemperature States largely located in the 

northern part of the country.9

While the Takata recalls to date have 

been limited almost entirely to Takata 

PSAN inflators that do not contain a 

desiccant (a drying agent)—i.e., ‘‘nondesiccated’’ inflators—under a 

November 3, 2015 Consent Order issued 

by NHTSA and agreed to by Takata, 

Takata is required to test its PSAN 

inflators that do contain a desiccant— 

i.e., ‘‘desiccated’’ inflators—in 

cooperation with vehicle manufacturers 

‘‘to determine the service life and safety 

of such inflators and to determine 

whether, and to what extent, these 

inflator types suffer from a defect 

condition, regardless of whether it is the 

same or similar to the conditions at 

issue’’ in the DIRs Takata had filed for 

its non-desiccated PSAN inflators.10

In February 2016, NHTSA requested 

Ford’s assistance in evaluating Takata 

calcium-sulfate desiccated PSDI–5 

driver-side air bag inflators, to which 

Ford agreed.11 In June 2016, Ford and 

Takata began a field-recovery program 

to evaluate Takata calcium-sulfate 

desiccated PSDI–5 driver-side air bag 

inflators that were original equipment in 

MY 2007–2008 Ford Ranger vehicles in 

Florida, Michigan, and Arizona.12

Nissan also initiated a similar fieldrecovery program for its Versa vehicles 

in March 2016.13 By January 2017, a 

very limited number of samples from 

Ford had been recovered and tested.14

In March 2017, Takata and Ford met to 

review the field data collected from the 

inflators returned by Ford and Nissan.15

Between March and June 2017, 

additional Ford inflators were subjected 

to live dissection, which included 

chemical and dimensional propellant 

analyses, as well as ballistic testing.16

Also in June, Takata reviewed with Ford 

and NHTSA field-return data from Ford 

inflators.17 Ford then met with NHTSA 

on July 6, 2017 to discuss the data 

collected to date, as well as an 

expansion plan for evaluating Takata 

calcium-sulfate desiccated PSDI–5 

driver-side air bag inflators. 

Takata analyzed 423 such inflators 

from the Ford program—as well as 895 

such inflators from the Nissan 

program.18 After a review of field-return 

data, on July 10, 2017, Takata, 

determining that a safety-related defect 

exists, filed a DIR for calcium-sulfate 

desiccated PSDI–5 driver-side air bag 

inflators that were produced from 

January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2012 

and installed as original equipment on 

certain motor vehicles manufactured by 

Ford (the ‘‘covered Ford inflators’’), as 

well as calcium-sulfate desiccated 

PSDI–5 driver-side air bag inflators for 

those same years of production installed 

as original equipment on motor vehicles 

manufactured by Nissan (the ‘‘covered 

Nissan inflators’’) and Mazda (the 

‘‘covered Mazda inflators’’) 

(collectively, the ‘‘covered inflators’’).19

As described further below, the 

propellant tablets in these inflators may 

experience density reduction over time, 

which could result in the inflator 

rupturing, at which point ‘‘metal 

fragments could pass through the air bag 

cushion material, which may result in 

injury or death to vehicle occupants.’’ 20

Takata’s DIR filing triggered Mazda’s 

obligation to file a DIR for its affected 

vehicles.21 Mazda filed a corresponding 

DIR, informing NHTSA that it intended 

to file a petition for 

7172 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 15 / Tuesday, January 26, 2021 / Notices 

22 Mazda Motor Corporation Petition for 

Determination of Inconsequentiality of Takata’s 

Defect Information Report filing under NHTSA 

Campaign Number 17E–034 for PSDI–5 Desiccated 

Driver Air Bag Inflators (dated August 17, 2016) 

(Mazda appears to have inadvertently dated its 

letter August 17, 2016, instead of August 17, 2017) 

(enclosing ‘‘Mazda submission copy of Part 573’’). 

23Ford also submitted a petition to the Agency, 

with a cover letter dated August 16, 2017. This 

petition was not a ‘‘joint petition’’ with Mazda. 

Ford’s petition is addressed in a separate decision. 

24See Petition at 11–16 and cover letter thereto. 

The Petition also suggests differences in ‘‘vehicle 

environment’’ between affected Ford and Nissan 

vehicles as a potential explanation for inflator 

degradation-risk differences between the covered 

Ford inflators and the covered Nissan inflators. See 

Petition at 2. However, this suggestion is not 

elaborated on elsewhere. See id. at 14–16 (focusing 

on design differences between the covered Ford 

inflators and covered Nissan inflators). 

25Petition (cover letter). 

26See 82 FR 53558. 

27Comments at 2. 

28CAS’s comments collectively addressed the 

covered Ford and Mazda inflators. 

29Comments at 2. 

30 Id. at 2–3 (emphasis in original). 

31See NHTSA docket No. 2017–0093 (regarding 

Ford’s petition). 

32Ford submitted an accompanying slide deck, 

hereinafter ‘‘October 2018 Presentation.’’ This 

presentation is available on NHTSA docket No. 

2017–0093. The written materials Ford submitted 

do not explicitly identify one of these third parties, 

which his hereinafter referred to as ‘‘Third Party.’’ 

33Ford submitted an accompanying slide deck, 

hereinafter ‘‘November 2020 Presentation.’’ This 

presentation is available on NHTSA docket No. 

2017–0093. 

34Petition at 1. 

35Specifically, the petitioned vehicles had a 

production range of February 21, 2006 to June 18, 

2009. Id. 

36 Id. 

37 Id. Covered inflators with the prefix ZN were 

installed in these Rangers. 

38Recall No. 17E–034. 

39 Id. 

40 Id. 

41 Id. 

42 Id. 

43 Id. 

44 Id. 

inconsequentiality.22 Mazda then 

petitioned the Agency, under 49 CFR 

part 556, via letter including an 

enclosed purported ‘‘joint petition’’ 

with Ford 23 (‘‘Petition’’) for a decision 

that, because Takata’s analysis of the 

covered Ford inflators does not show 

propellant tablet-density degradation, or 

increased inflation pressure, and certain 

inflator design differences exist between 

the covered Ford inflators and the 

covered Nissan inflators, the equipment 

defect determined to exist by Takata is 

inconsequential as it relates to motor 

vehicle safety in the Mazda vehicles 

affected by Takata’s DIR.24 In addition, 

Mazda requested that NHTSA allow 

Ford until March 31, 2018 to complete 

an ‘‘expanded inflator field study, aging 

assessment, and testing on additional 

samples’’ before NHTSA made a 

decision on the Petition.25 Mazda sent 

its Petition via UPS on August 17, 2017, 

scheduled to arrive the following day 

via next-day air. However, because the 

Petition was incorrectly addressed, 

NHTSA did not receive this copy of the 

Petition until August 23, 2017. NHTSA 

did, however, receive a copy via email 

on August 22, 2017. 

In a Notice published in the Federal 

Register on November 16, 2017, NHTSA 

acknowledged its receipt of Mazda’s 

Petition, opened a public comment 

period on the Petition to expire on 

December 18, 2017, and denied Mazda’s 

request that the Agency allow Ford until 

March 31, 2018 to complete certain 

testing and analysis before the Agency 

decided on the Petition.26 NHTSA 

received three comments in response to 

this Notice, none of which advocated 

granting Mazda’s Petition. 

Two individual commenters 

expressed general opposition to granting 

the Petition. The third commenter, the 

Center for Auto Safety (‘‘CAS’’), 

emphasized the dangers that Takata air 

bag inflators can pose, including the 

PSDI–5 inflators at issue in Mazda’s 

Petition. CAS also stated a concern that 

granting Mazda’s Petition ‘‘would 

effectively serve as a decision that these 

inflators are exempt from future recall 

should additional PSAN testing prove a 

danger.’’ 27 Specific to the substance of 

Mazda’s Petition,28 CAS commented 

that it ‘‘contains unsupported assertions 

as fact, and . . . no corresponding data 

or scientific studies confirming the 

safety of the PSDI–5 airbag inflators,’’ 

and stated that ‘‘[w]here the petition 

does reference the testing conducted by 

Takata on Ford inflators, there is little 

evidence provided to suggest that these 

inflators will continue to perform after 

years of exposure.’’ 29 CAS concluded 

that, ‘‘[a]t best, the testing performed by 

Takata suggests that propellant 

degradation and inflator chamber 

pressure have not yet developed the 

potential to harm occupants after ten 

years in service,’’ and that NHTSA 

should deny Mazda’s Petition.30

On October 26, 2018, at an in-person 

meeting with NHTSA, Ford shared 

additional information in support of its 

own separate petition for the covered 

Ford inflators,31 including internal 

analyses, test methodologies, and results 

of tests performed by Ford and outside 

parties on behalf of Ford or at Ford’s 

request.32 At a subsequent virtual 

meeting with NHTSA on November 4, 

2020, Ford shared further information in 

support of its Petition related to 

additional work done by a third party 

since October 2018.33

II. Classes of Motor Vehicles Involved 

Mazda’s Petition involves 5,848 

vehicles that contain the covered Mazda 

inflators.34 Those vehicles are MY 

2007–2009 B-Series pickup trucks,35

which Mazda explains were built on the 

same platform and using the same air 

bag inflators as Ford MY 2007–2011 

Rangers.36 Accordingly, Mazda states 

that although ‘‘Takata has not tested 

PSDI–5 inflators with calcium sulfate 

from Mazda vehicles,’’ data from those 

Ford Rangers is representative of 

Mazda’s MY 2007–2009 B-Series 

vehicles.37 Ford also stated in its 

October 2018 and November 2020 

presentations to the Agency that the 

information therein was ‘‘also 

representative of airbag inflator 

performance in shared platforms with 

Mazda.’’ 

III. Defect 

The defect is present in Takata 

calcium-sulfate desiccated PSDI–5 

driver-side air bag inflators.38 According 

to its DIR, Takata produced 2.7 million 

of these defective inflators from January 

1, 2005, to December 31, 2012.39 These 

inflators are the earliest generation of 

Takata desiccated PSAN inflators, and 

were installed as original equipment in 

vehicles sold by Ford, Mazda, and 

Nissan.40 The evidence makes clear that 

these inflators pose a significant safety 

risk. In these inflators, ‘‘[t]he propellant 

tablets . . . may experience an 

alteration over time’’—specifically, 

‘‘some of the inflators within the 

population analyzed show a pattern of 

propellant density reduction over time 

that is understood to predict a future 

risk of inflator rupture’’—‘‘which could 

potentially lead to over-aggressive 

combustion’’ when the air bag in which 

they are installed deploys.41 This 

‘‘could create excessive internal 

pressure, which could result in the body 

of the inflator rupturing upon 

deployment.’’ 42 In the event of such a 

rupture, ‘‘metal fragments could pass 

through the air bag cushion material, 

which may result in injury or death to 

vehicle occupants.’’ 43 Rupture 

potentiality may be influenced by 

‘‘several years of exposure to persistent 

conditions of high absolute humidity,’’ 

as well as other factors, including 

‘‘manufacturing variability or vehicle 

type.’’ 44

IV. Legal Background 

The National Traffic and Motor 

Vehicle Safety Act (the ‘‘Safety Act’’), 49 

U.S.C. Chapter 301, defines ‘‘motor 

vehicle safety’’ as ‘‘the performance of a 

motor vehicle or motor vehicle 

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 15 / Tuesday, January 26, 2021 / Notices 7173 

45 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(9). 46 Id. 30118(c)(1). ‘‘[A] defect in original 

equipment, or noncompliance of original 

equipment with a motor vehicle safety standard 

prescribed under this chapter, is deemed to be a 

defect or noncompliance of the motor vehicle in or 

on which the equipment was installed at the time 

of delivery to the first purchaser.’’ 49 U.S.C. 

30102(b)(1)(F). 47 Id. 30118–20. 48 Id. 30118(d), 30120(h); 49 CFR part 556. 49See, e.g., Food Mktg. Institute v. Argus Leader 

Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2363 (2019) (quoting Perrin 

v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 50See Public Law 93–492, Title I, § 102(a), 88 

Stat. 1475 (Oct. 27, 1974); Webster’s Third New Int’l 

Dictionary (principal copyright 1961) (defining 

‘‘inconsequential’’ as ‘‘inconsequent;’’ defining 

‘‘inconsequent’’ as ‘‘of no consequence,’’ ‘‘lacking 

worth, significance, or importance’’). 

The House Conference Report indicates that the 

Department of Transportation planned to define 

‘‘inconsequentiality’’ through a regulation; 

however, it did not do so. See H.R. Rep. 93–1191, 

1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6046, 6066 (July 11, 1974). 

Instead, NHTSA issued a procedural regulation 

governing the filing and disposition of petitions for 

inconsequentiality, but which did not address the 

meaning of the term ‘‘inconsequential.’’ 42 FR 7145 

(Feb. 7, 1977). The procedural regulation, 49 CFR 

part 556, has remained largely unchanged since that 

time, and the changes that have been made have no 

effect on the meaning of inconsequentiality. 

51https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/ 

english/inconsequential. 

52https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=

inconsequential. 

53https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 

inconsequential. 

54See, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 

566 U.S. 560, 569–72 (2012) (considering ordinary 

and technical meanings, as well as statutory 

context, in determining meaning of a ‘‘interpreter’’ 

under 28 U.S.C. 1920(6)). 

55 49 U.S.C. 30118(d), 30120(h). 

56 Id. 30102(a)(9) (emphasis added). 

57 Id. 30101. 

58 Id. 30118(d), 30120(h). 

59 Id. 30118(c)(1). 

60NHTSA notes that the current petition is 

different in that the inflators were declared 

defective by the supplier of the airbag, and that 

Mazda’s defect notice was filed in response to the 

supplier’s notice. 

61Letter from J. Glassman, NHTSA, to V. Kroll, 

Adaptive Driving Alliance (Sept. 23, 2002), https:// 

www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/ada3. 

equipment in a way that protects the 

public against unreasonable risk of 

accidents occurring because of the 

design, construction, or performance of 

a motor vehicle, and against 

unreasonable risk of death or injury in 

an accident, and includes 

nonoperational safety of a motor 

vehicle.’’ 45 Under the Safety Act, a 

manufacturer must notify NHTSA when 

it ‘‘learns the vehicle or equipment 

contains a defect and decides in good 

faith that the defect is related to motor 

vehicle safety,’’ or ‘‘decides in good 

faith that the vehicle or equipment does 

not comply with an applicable motor 

vehicle safety standard.’’ 46 The act of 

filing a notification with NHTSA is the 

first step in a manufacturer’s statutory 

recall obligations of notification and 

remedy.47 However, Congress has 

recognized that, under some limited 

circumstances, a manufacturer may 

petition NHTSA for an exemption from 

the requirements to notify owners, 

purchasers, and dealers and to remedy 

the vehicles or equipment on the basis 

that the defect or noncompliance is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle 

safety.48

‘‘Inconsequential’’ is not defined 

either in the statute or in NHTSA’s 

regulations, and so must be interpreted 

based on its ‘‘ordinary, contemporary, 

common meaning.’’ 49 The 

inconsequentiality provision was added 

to the statute in 1974, and there is no 

indication that the plain meaning of the 

term has changed since 1961—meaning 

definitions used today are substantially 

the same as those used in 1974.50 The 

Cambridge Dictionary defines 

‘‘inconsequential’’ to mean ‘‘not 

important,’’ or ‘‘able to be ignored.’’ 51

Other dictionaries similarly define the 

term as ‘‘lacking importance’’ 52 and 

‘‘unimportant.’’ 53

The statutory context is also relevant 

to the meaning of ‘‘inconsequential.’’ 54

The full text of the inconsequentiality 

provision is: 

On application of a manufacturer, the 

Secretary shall exempt the manufacturer 

from this section if the Secretary decides a 

defect or noncompliance is inconsequential 

to motor vehicle safety. The Secretary may 

take action under this subsection only after 

notice in the Federal Register and an 

opportunity for any interested person to 

present information, views, and arguments.55

As described above, the statute 

defines ‘‘motor vehicle safety’’ to mean 

‘‘the performance of a motor vehicle or 

motor vehicle equipment in a way that 

protects the public against unreasonable 

risk of accidents . . . and against 

unreasonable risk of death or injury in 

an accident . . . .’’ 56 This is also 

consistent with the overall statutory 

purpose: ‘‘to reduce traffic accidents 

and deaths and injuries resulting from 

traffic accidents.’’ 57

The statute explicitly allows a 

manufacturer to seek an exemption from 

carrying out a recall on the basis that 

either a defect or a noncompliance is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle 

safety.58 However, in practice, 

substantially all inconsequentiality 

petitions have related to 

noncompliances, and it has been 

extremely rare for a manufacturer to 

seek an exemption in the case of a 

defect. This is because a manufacturer 

does not have a statutory obligation to 

conduct a recall for a defect unless and 

until it ‘‘learns the vehicle or equipment 

contains a defect and decides in good 

faith that the defect is related to motor 

vehicle safety,’’ or NHTSA orders a 

recall by making a ‘‘final decision that 

a motor vehicle or replacement 

equipment contains a defect related to 

motor vehicle safety.’’ 59 Until that 

threshold determination has been made 

by either the manufacturer or the 

Agency, there is no need for a statutory 

exception on the basis that a defect is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. 

And since a defect determination 

involves a finding that the defect poses 

an unreasonable risk to safety, asking 

the Agency to make a determination that 

a defect posing an unreasonable risk to 

safety is inconsequential has heretofore 

been almost unexplored.60

Given this statutory context, a 

manufacturer bears a heavy burden in 

petitioning NHTSA to determine that a 

defect related to motor vehicle safety 

(which necessarily involves an 

unreasonable risk of an accident, or 

death or injury in an accident) is 

nevertheless inconsequential to motor 

vehicle safety. In accordance with the 

plain meaning of ‘‘inconsequential,’’ the 

manufacturer must show that a risk 

posed by a defect is not important or is 

capable of being ignored. This 

appropriately describes the actual 

consequence of granting a petition as 

well. The manufacturer would be 

relieved of its statutory obligations to 

notify vehicle owners and to remedy the 

defect, and effectively to ignore the 

defect as unimportant from a safety 

perspective. Accordingly, the threshold 

of evidence necessary for a 

manufacturer to carry its burden of 

persuasion that a defect is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety 

is difficult to satisfy. This is particularly 

true where the defect involves a 

potential failure of safety-critical 

equipment, as is the case here. 

The Agency necessarily determines 

whether a defect or noncompliance is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety 

based on the specific facts before it. The 

scarcity of defect-related 

inconsequentiality petitions over the 

course of the Agency’s history reflects 

the heavy burden of persuasion, as well 

as the general understanding among 

regulated entities that the grant of such 

relief would be quite rare. The Agency 

has recognized this explicitly in the 

past. For example, in 2002, NHTSA 

stated that ‘‘[a]lthough NHTSA’s 

empowering statute alludes to the 

possibility of an inconsequentiality 

determination with regard to a defect, 

the granting of such a petition would be 

highly unusual.’’ 61

Of the four known occasions in which 

the Agency has previously considered 

7174 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 15 / Tuesday, January 26, 2021 / Notices 

62See id. 

63Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd.; Grant of Petition for 

Inconsequential Defect, 47 FR 41458, 41459 (Sept. 

20,1982) and 48 FR 27635, 27635 (June 16, 1983). 

64 Id. 

65Nat’l Coach Corp.; Denial of Petition for 

Inconsequential [Defect], 47 FR 49517, 49517 (Nov. 

1, 1982). NHTSA’s denial was erroneously titled 

‘‘Denial of Petition for Inconsequential 

Noncompliance’’; the discussion actually addressed 

the issue as a defect. See id.; see also Nat’l Coach 

Corp.; Receipt of Petition for Inconsequential 

Defect, 47 FR 4190 (Jan. 28, 1982). 

66 Id. at 49517–18. 

67 Id. at 49518. 

68 Final Determination & Order Regarding Safety 

Related Defects in the 1971 Fiat Model 850 and the 

1970–74 Fiat Model 124 Automobiles Imported and 

Distributed by Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc.; Ruling 

on Petition of Inconsequentiality, 45 FR 2134, 2137, 

41 (Jan. 10, 1980). 69 Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc.; Receipt of Petition 

for Determination of Inconsequential Defect, 44 FR 

60193, 60193 (Oct. 18, 1979); Fiat Motors Corp. of 

N. Am.; Receipt of Petition for Determination of 

Inconsequential Defect, 44 FR 12793, 12793 (Mar. 

8, 1979). 70See, e.g., 45 FR 2134, 2141 (Jan. 10, 1980). 71 Final Determination & Order Regarding Safety 

Related Defects in the 1971 Fiat Model 850 and the 

1970–74 Fiat Model 124 Automobiles Imported and 

Distributed by Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc.; Ruling 

on Petition of Inconsequentiality, 45 FR 2137–41 

(Jan. 10, 1980). Fiat also agreed to a recall of certain 

of the vehicles, and NHTSA found that Fiat did not 

reasonably meet the statutory recall remedy 

requirements. Id. at 2134–37. 

72 Id. at 2139. 73 Id. 74 Id. at 2140. 75 Gen. Motors LLC, Denial of Consolidated 

Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Defect, 85 

FR 76159 (Nov. 27, 2020). 

76 Id. at 76161–164, 76167. 

77 Id. at 76173. 

78 Id. 

79 49 U.S.C. 30118(d), 30120(h). 

80See, e.g., Gen. Motors, LLC.; cf. Grant of 

Petition for Decision of Inconsequential 

Noncompliance, 81 FR 92963 (Dec. 20, 2016). By 

contrast, in Michelin, we reached the opposite 

conclusion under different facts. There, the defect 

was a failure to mark the maximum load and 

corresponding inflation pressure in both Metric and 

English units on the sidewall of the tires. Michelin 

N. America, Inc.; Denial of Petition for Decision of 

Inconsequential Noncompliance, 82 FR 41678 

(Sept. 1, 2017). 

petitions contending that a defect is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety, 

the Agency has granted only one of the 

petitions, nearly three decades ago, in a 

vastly different set of circumstances.62

In that case, the defect was a 

typographical error in the vehicle’s 

gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) that 

had no impact on the actual ability of 

the vehicle to carry an appropriate load. 

NHTSA granted a motorcycle 

manufacturer’s petition, finding that a 

defect was inconsequential to motor 

vehicle safety where the GVWR was 

erroneously described as only 60 lbs., 

which error was readily apparent to the 

motorcycle operator based upon both 

common sense and the fact that the 330 

lbs. front axle rating and 540 lbs. rear 

axle rating were listed directly below 

the GVWR on the same label.63

Moreover, the error did not actually 

impact the ability of the motorcycle to 

carry the weight for which it was 

designed.64

On the other hand, NHTSA denied 

another petition concerning a vehicle’s 

weight label where there was a potential 

safety impact. NHTSA denied that 

petition from National Coach 

Corporation on the basis that the rear 

gross axle weight rating (RGAWR) for its 

buses was too low and could lead to 

overloading of the rear axle if the buses 

were fully loaded with passengers.65

NHTSA rejected arguments that most of 

the buses were not used in situations 

where they were fully loaded with 

passengers and that there were no 

complaints.66 NHTSA noted that its 

Office of Defects Investigation had 

conducted numerous investigations 

concerning overloading of suspensions 

that resulted in recalls, that other 

manufacturers had conducted recalls for 

similar issues in the past, and that, even 

if current owners were aware of the 

issue, subsequent owners were unlikely 

to be aware absent a recall.67

NHTSA also denied a petition 

asserting that a defect was 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety 

where the defect involved premature 

corrosion of critical structure 

components (the vehicle’s 

undercarriage), which could result in a 

crash or loss of vehicle control.68 Fiat 

filed the petition preemptively, 

following NHTSA’s initial decision that 

certain Fiat vehicles contained a safetyrelated defect.69 In support of its 

petition, Fiat argued that no crashes or 

injuries resulted from components that 

failed due to corrosion, and that owners 

exercising due diligence had adequate 

warning of the existence of the defect.70

NHTSA rejected those arguments and 

both finalized its determination that 

certain vehicles contained a safetyrelated defect (i.e., ordered a recall) and 

found that the defect was not 

inconsequential to motor vehicle 

safety.71 NHTSA explained that the 

absence of crashes or injuries was not 

dispositive: ‘‘the possibility of an injury 

or accident can reasonably be inferred 

from the nature of the component 

involved.’’ 72 NHTSA also noted that the 

failure mode was identical to another 

population of vehicles for which Fiat 

was carrying out a recall.73 The Agency 

rejected the argument that there was 

adequate warning to vehicle owners, 

explaining that the average owner does 

not inspect the underbody of a car and 

that interior corrosion may not be 

visible.74

Most recently, the Agency denied a 

petition asserting that a defect in nondesiccated Takata PSAN air bag inflators 

was inconsequential to motor vehicle 

safety, where the defect involved the 

degradation of inflator propellant that 

could cause the inflator to overpressurize during air bag deployment— 

causing metal fragments to penetrate the 

air bag and enter the vehicle 

compartment toward vehicle 

occupants.75 In support of this petition 

and its argument that the inflators at 

issue were not at risk of rupture—being 

‘‘more resilient’’ to rupture than other 

Takata PSAN inflators—General Motors 

made arguments and submitted 

evidence regarding inflator design 

differences and vehicle features, testing 

and field data analyses, inflator aging 

studies, predictive modeling, risk 

assessments, and potential risk created 

by conducting repairs.76 The Agency 

rejected these arguments and, among 

other things, observed the severe nature 

of the safety risk and that the defect 

could not be discerned even by a 

diligent vehicle owner.77 The Agency 

also specifically noted the heavy burden 

on General Motors to demonstrate 

inconsequentiality, stating that ‘‘[t]he 

threshold of evidence necessary to 

prove the inconsequentiality of a defect 

such as this one—involving the 

potential performance failure of safetycritical equipment—is very difficult to 

overcome.’’ 78

Agency practice over several decades 

therefore shows that inconsequentiality 

petitions are rarely filed in the defect 

context, and virtually never granted. 

Nonetheless, in light of the importance 

of the issues here, and the fact that 

Mazda’s defect notification was filed in 

response to the notification provided by 

Mazda’s supplier, the Agency also 

considered the potential usefulness of 

the Agency’s precedent on 

noncompliance. The same legal 

standard—‘‘inconsequential to motor 

vehicle safety’’—applies to both defects 

and noncompliances.79

In the noncompliance context, in 

some instances, NHTSA has determined 

that a manufacturer met its burden of 

demonstrating that a noncompliance 

was inconsequential to safety. For 

example, labels intended to provide 

safety advice to an occupant that may 

have a misspelled word, or that may be 

printed in the wrong format or the 

wrong type size, have been deemed 

inconsequential where they should not 

cause any misunderstanding, especially 

where other sources of correct 

information are available.80 These 

decisions are similar in nature to the 

lone instance where NHTSA granted a 

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 15 / Tuesday, January 26, 2021 / Notices 7175 

81Cf. Gen. Motors Corporation; Ruling on Petition 

for Determination of Inconsequential 

Noncompliance, 69 FR 19897, 19899 (Apr. 14, 

2004) (citing prior cases where noncompliance was 

expected to be imperceptible, or nearly so, to 

vehicle occupants or approaching drivers). 

82See Gen. Motors, LLC; Grant of Petition for 

Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 78 FR 

35355 (June 12, 2013) (finding noncompliance had 

no effect on occupant safety because it had no effect 

on the proper operation of the occupant 

classification system and the correct deployment of 

an air bag); Osram Sylvania Prods. Inc.; Grant of 

Petition for Decision of Inconsequential 

Noncompliance, 78 FR 46000 (July 30, 2013) 

(finding occupant using noncompliant light source 

would not be exposed to significantly greater risk 

than occupant using similar compliant light 

source). 

83See Combi USA Inc., Denial of Petition for 

Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 78 FR 

71028, 71030 (Nov. 27, 2013). 

84 Morgan 3 Wheeler Ltd.; Denial of Petition for 

Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 81 FR 

21663, 21666 (Apr. 12, 2016). 

85United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 

754, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding defect poses an 

unreasonable risk when it ‘‘results in hazards as 

potentially dangerous as sudden engine fire, and 

where there is no dispute that at least some such 

hazards, in this case fires, can definitely be 

expected to occur in the future’’). 

86See Mercedes-Benz, U.S.A., L.L.C.; Denial of 

Application for Decision of Inconsequential 

Noncompliance, 66 FR 38342 (July 23, 2001) 

(rejecting argument that noncompliance was 

inconsequential because of the small number of 

vehicles affected); Aston Martin Lagonda Ltd.; 

Denial of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential 

Noncompliance, 81 FR 41370 (June 24, 2016) 

(noting that situations involving individuals 

trapped in motor vehicles—while infrequent—are 

consequential to safety); Morgan 3 Wheeler Ltd.; 

Denial of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential 

Noncompliance, 81 FR 21663, 21664 (Apr. 12, 

2016) (rejecting argument that petition should be 

granted because the vehicle was produced in very 

low numbers and likely to be operated on a limited 

basis). 

87See Gen. Motors Corp.; Ruling on Petition for 

Determination of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 

69 FR 19897, 19900 (Apr. 14, 2004); Cosco Inc.; 

Denial of Application for Decision of 

Inconsequential Noncompliance, 64 FR 29408, 

29409 (June 1, 1999). 

88Petition at 11. Covered inflators with the prefix 

ZN were installed in these Rangers. 

89See NHTSA docket No. 2017–0093. 

90For several years, Takata has inspected, tested, 

and analyzed inflators returned from the field. The 

compiled and summarized test results for hundreds 

of thousands of inflators are contained in the Takata 

MEAF, which is updated on an ongoing basis. 

Takata’s MEAF file was available to the Agency in 

making its determination, and it is from this file 

that some of the information considered by the 

Agency was derived, and discussed herein. 

91November 2020 Presentation at 11; October 

2018 Presentation at 14. 

92November 2020 Presentation at 7; October 2018 

Presentation at 10. 

93This appears to be the level at which Ford 

considers an abnormal deployment to be a 

potentiality. This 92.37 figure is used throughout 

the materials. 

94November 2020 Presentation at 8; October 2018 

Presentation at 11. 

petition for an inconsequential defect, 

as discussed above. 

However, the burden of establishing 

the inconsequentiality of a failure to 

comply with a performance requirement 

in a standard—as opposed to a labeling 

requirement—is more substantial and 

difficult to meet. Accordingly, the 

Agency has not found many such 

noncompliances inconsequential.81

Potential performance failures of safetycritical equipment, like seat belts or air 

bags, are rarely deemed inconsequential. 

An important issue to consider in 

determining inconsequentiality based 

upon NHTSA’s prior decisions on 

noncompliance issues was the safety 

risk to individuals who experience the 

type of event against which the recall 

would otherwise protect.82 NHTSA also 

does not consider the absence of 

complaints or injuries to show that the 

issue is inconsequential to safety.83

‘‘Most importantly, the absence of a 

complaint does not mean there have not 

been any safety issues, nor does it mean 

that there will not be safety issues in the 

future.’’ 84 ‘‘[T]he fact that in past 

reported cases good luck and swift 

reaction have prevented many serious 

injuries does not mean that good luck 

will continue to work.’’ 85

Arguments that only a small number 

of vehicles or items of motor vehicle 

equipment are affected have also not 

justified granting an inconsequentiality 

petition.86 Similarly, NHTSA has 

rejected petitions based on the assertion 

that only a small percentage of vehicles 

or items of equipment are actually likely 

to exhibit a noncompliance. The 

percentage of potential occupants that 

could be adversely affected by a 

noncompliance does not determine the 

question of inconsequentiality. Rather, 

the issue to consider is the consequence 

to an occupant who is exposed to the 

consequence of that noncompliance.87

These considerations are also relevant 

when considering whether a defect is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. 

V. Mazda’s Petition and Information 

Before the Agency 

Mazda contends that ‘‘[Ford] Ranger 

data is representative of B-Series’’: The 

‘‘2007–2011 Ford Ranger and 2007– 

2009 Mazda B-Series vehicles are built 

on identical platforms and use identical 

airbag inflators’’ and, therefore, ‘‘Ford’s 

discussion of Takata’s testing and 

analysis on 2007–2008 MY Ford Ranger 

vehicles should apply with equal force 

to 2007–2009 MY Mazda B-Series.’’ 88

Similarly, as noted above, Ford states in 

its October 2018 and November 2020 

Presentations that information therein is 

‘‘also representative of airbag inflator 

performance in shared platforms with 

Mazda.’’ Mazda did not separately 

submit the subsequent analyses to the 

Agency, but those submissions do 

contain information about the ZN 

variant inflators found in 2007–2011 

Ford Rangers, which Mazda (and Ford) 

contends is representative of the 2007– 

2009 Mazda B-Series vehicles at issue 

here. Therefore, NHTSA has considered 

the information derived from the 

covered Ford inflators pertaining to the 

Ford Rangers (prefix ZN)—upon which 

Mazda relies—as part of the evidence 

supporting this decision. 

Taking into account Mazda’s Petition 

and the information presented by Ford 

to the Agency in October 2018 and 

November 2020,89 several arguments 

underpin Mazda’s Petition. In sum: 

There is a difference in expected 

performance between desiccated and 

non-desiccated Takata PSAN inflators; 

that there are design differences 

between the covered Mazda inflators 

and another variant of the same type; 

that although there are signs of aging in 

field returns, there is no indication of 

propellant degradation that could lead 

to rupture and no imminent safety risk; 

and that no ruptures of the covered 

inflators are expected to occur for at 

least over twenty-six years of 

cumulative exposure in the worst-case 

environment, for the worst-case vehicle 

configuration, and worst-case customer 

usage. These arguments are supported 

by analyses recited in the joint petition 

with Ford, additional subsequent 

analyses done by Ford, results of 

inflator testing and analyses conducted 

by three outside entities, and predictive 

modeling. 

A. Statistical Analysis of MEAF Data 

Ford undertook a statistical analysis 

of data in the Master Engineering 

Analysis File (‘‘MEAF’’),90 which it and 

Mazda contend ‘‘shows a clear 

difference in expected field performance 

between desiccated and non-desiccated 

inflators,’’ and ‘‘suggests that the factors 

causing degradation in the nondesiccated population of inflators are 

not currently affecting’’ the inflators at 

issue.91 Four charts underpin these 

assertions. 

The first chart is of box plots of 

primary-chamber pressures of covered 

Ford inflators by age, for which it is 

asserted that there is ‘‘[n]o significant 

trend of primary pressure increase with 

inflator age.’’ 92 The second chart is a 

lognormal histogram illustrating the 

frequency of maximum values of 

primary-chamber pressure of covered 

Ford inflators, which Ford and Mazda 

assert shows that the probability of a 

covered Ford inflator exceeding a 92.37 

MPa ‘‘threshold’’ 93 is estimated as less 

than 1 × 10¥15.94 A third chart 

7176 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 15 / Tuesday, January 26, 2021 / Notices 

95November 2020 Presentation at 9; October 2018 

Presentation at 12. 

96November 2020 Presentation at 10; October 

2018 Presentation at 13. 

97 Id. 

98Mazda noted in its Petition that twenty of these 

inflators were from salvage yards ‘‘where the 

conditions used to store the parts cannot be 

determined.’’ Petition at 11. 

99November 2020 Presentation at 12; October 

2018 Presentation at 7. Takata also analyzed 895 

inflators from Nissan Versa vehicles. See Recall No. 

17V–449; Petition at 11 (‘‘approximately 1,000’’). 

100November 2020 Presentation at 12; October 

2018 Presentation at 15; see Petition at 14. 

101November 2020 Presentation at 12; October 

2018 Presentation at 15. 

102Petition at 14. Twenty of the inflators from 

Ford Rangers were from salvage yards ‘‘where the 

conditions used to store the parts cannot be 

determined.’’ Id. at 11. 

When Mazda filed its Petition, Takata had 

analyzed over 1,300 of its calcium-sulfate 

desiccated PSDI–5 driver-side air bag inflators: the 

approximately 423 inflators from Ford Rangers, and 

the remainder from Nissan Versa vehicles. Id. at 14. 

103The term ‘‘generate’’ is utilized throughout the 

Petition. See, e.g., Petition at 3 (‘‘generate system’’) 

& 6 (‘‘generate’’). In the Agency’s experience, 

‘‘generate’’ is not among nomenclature commonly 

used with respect to air bag inflators—NHTSA is 

more familiar with the term ‘‘generant.’’ In context, 

however, it appears that this is referring to an 

inflator’s function generating gas to inflate the air 

bag, or the air bag inflator’s propellant itself. See id.; 

see also id. at 15 (referring to ‘‘Generate—2004,’’ 

indicating a reference to a particular type of 

propellant produced by Takata). 

104 Id. at 11–12. 

105 Id. at 12. 

106 Id. 

107The exact size of this ‘‘vast majority’’ was not 

provided. 

108Petition at 12. 

109 Id. 

110 Id. 

111Mazda did not state the exact size of this 

sample. 

112Petition at 12–13. 

113 Id. at 13. 

114 Id. at 12–13. 

115 Id. at 14. 

116 Id. 

117 Id. at 14–15. 

118 Id. at 15–16 (providing table). 

119 Id. at 14–15; see also November 2020 

Presentation at 31; October 2018 Presentation at 29– 

30. 

illustrates predicted primary-chamber 

pressure for covered Ford inflators with 

probability curves for three module 

ages—15, 20, and 30 years old, for 

which it is contended shows that the 

probability of a module with thirty years 

in service exceeding a 92.37 MPa 

threshold is 6.56 × 10¥6.95 And a fourth 

chart consists of probability plots (log 

normalized, 95% confidence) 

comparing primary-chamber pressure 

maximum values between Ford modules 

with desiccated Takata PSAN inflators 

and Ford modules with non-desiccated 

Takata PSAN inflators.96 Ford and 

Mazda contend that this shows that the 

probability of exceeding a 92.37 MPa 

threshold for desiccated parts ‘‘is 

several orders of magnitude lower than 

that of non-desiccated parts.’’ 97

B. Takata’s Live Dissections and 

Ballistic Testing 

According to Ford and Mazda, Takata 

analyzed 1,992 calcium-sulfate 

desiccated PSDI–5 driver-side air bag 

inflators returned from the field from 

Ford vehicles, which included 1,008 

inflators from Ford Ranger vehicles 98

and 984 from Fusion/Edge vehicles.99

Analysis involved both live dissections 

and ballistic testing, with 1,257 inflators 

subject to ballistic testing, and 735 

inflators subject to live dissection.100

Ford and Mazda conclude from the 

results that while ‘‘no indication of 

degradation that could lead to a rupture 

and no imminent risk to safety has been 

identified,’’ Takata’s analysis did 

‘‘identif[y] signs of aging’’ in the 

inflators.101

The nature or results of this ballistic 

testing and live dissection were not 

much further explained in the October 

2018 or the November 2020 

Presentations. The Petition does, 

however, further describe such analyses 

with respect to the approximately 423 

inflators from Ford Rangers that Takata 

had analyzed at that point.102

The Petition asserts that about 360 

live dissections of the Ford Ranger 

inflators demonstrated ‘‘consistent 

inflator output performance’’— 

specifically, that measurements of 

ignition-tablet discoloration, ‘‘generate’’ 

density,103 and moisture content of 

certain inflator constituents did not 

indicate a reduction-in-density trend.104

The Petition describes that during visual 

inspection of the inflators, ‘‘Takata 

observed slight discoloration of the 

propellant tablets in the primary and 

secondary chambers,’’ but that such 

discoloration ‘‘is not an indicant by 

itself that the propellant has 

degraded’’—only that the propellant had 

been exposed to elevated 

temperatures.105 Takata also observed 

changes in color in the primary and 

secondary booster auto-ignition 

tablets.106 On a scale of 1–10, with a 

discoloration of 10 ‘‘indicating severe 

exposure’’ to elevated temperatures, the 

Petition states that ‘‘the vast 

majority’’ 107 of observed discoloration 

in inflators obtained from vehicles in 

certain high-heat-and-humidity states 

‘‘was within the 1–3 range after seven to 

eleven years of vehicle service,’’ while 

acknowledging that ‘‘[s]even samples 

were in the 5–6 range.’’ 108 Accordingly, 

the Petition asserts, the results of visual 

inspection ‘‘evidence time-in-service, 

but not tablet density loss.’’ 109 The 

Petition also states that Takata took 

density measurements of propellant 

tablets in the primary and secondary 

chambers of covered Ford inflators.110

‘‘[A] small number of samples 111 were 

measured with a density slightly below 

the minimum average tablet production 

specification,’’ although it was noted 

that ‘‘a nearly equal number . . . 

measured densities higher than the 

maximum average tablet production 

specification.’’ 112 The Petition argues 

that such data does ‘‘not support a 

conclusion that tablet density is 

degrading in the inflators designed for 

Ford after 10 years of service.’’ 113

The Petition contends that the 

conclusions therein are further 

supported by forty-seven ballistic 

deployment tests that showed no 

inflator exceeding the production 

primary-chamber pressure performance 

specifications.114 The results of these 

tests are, according to the Petition, 

consistent with data from newly 

manufactured PSDI–5 inflators in Ford 

vehicles.115 The Petition also 

emphasizes that Takata did not observe 

pressure vessel ruptures or pressure 

excursions on any desiccated PSDI–5 

inflator, and that ‘‘[t]he maximum 

primary chamber pressure that Takata 

measured’’ in covered Ford inflators 

was about 15 MPa lower than that 

measured in a covered Nissan inflator 

(which exhibited primary chamber 

pressure exceeding 60 MPa).116

C. ‘‘Design Differences’’ in Inflators 

Equipped in Ford Vehicles 

The Petition contends that ‘‘[t]here are 

significant design differences’’ in the 

covered Ford inflators when compared 

to the covered Nissan inflators, and that 

such differences may explain 

differences observed between the 

inflator variants in generate properties 

and during testing.117 The Petition cites 

the Ford inflator variants as having 

‘‘fewer potential moisture sources’’ 

because the inflators contain only two, 

foil-wrapped auto-ignition tablets 

(instead of three that are not foilwrapped), contain divider disk foil tape, 

and utilize certain EPDM generate 

cushion material (instead of ceramic) 

that ‘‘reduces generate movement over 

time, maintains generate integrity, and 

leads to consistent and predictable burn 

rates.’’ 118 The Petition posits that such 

differences may explain differences 

observed between the two inflator 

variants’ generate material properties, 

and ballistic-testing results.119

D. Northrop Grumman’s Analysis 

Northrop Grumman (‘‘NG’’) analyzed 

covered Ford inflators, results of which 

were presented to the Agency 

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 15 / Tuesday, January 26, 2021 / Notices 7177 

120November 2020 Presentation at 13; October 

2018 Presentation at 16. 

121November 2020 Presentation at 14; October 

2018 Presentation at 17. 

122November 2020 Presentation at 22. 

123 Id. 

124November 2020 Presentation at 15–16; October 

2018 Presentation at 18–19. 

125Although not explained, this assertion appears 

to be derived from NG’s ballistic modeling, which 

found that ‘‘[a]n equivalent low press tablet density 

below 1.631 g/cc was required to produce sufficient 

augmented burning.’’ See November 2020 

Presentation at 17; October 2018 Presentation at 20. 

126The ITC is funded by a consortium of vehicle 

manufacturers. 

127November 2020 Presentation at 17; October 

2018 Presentation at 20. 

128 Id. 

129 Id. 

130 Id. 

131 Id. 

132 Id. 

133 Id. 

134 Id. 

135NG previously submitted this report to the 

Agency, which contains information regarding the 

Continued 

subsequent to Mazda’s filing of its 

Petition. According to Ford and Mazda, 

NG’s assessment of field-return parts 

and modeling ‘‘identified expected signs 

of aging but no indication of 

degradation that could lead to rupture,’’ 

and the assessment ‘‘identified clear and 

significant differences between 

desiccated and non-desiccated inflators 

of similar age and design.’’ 120

Specifically, NG undertook 58 

dissections, 138 tank tests, MEAF 

analysis, design comparisons, CT scans, 

and ballistic modeling. The inflators 

subject to dissection and tank tests 

included inflators from Ford Rangers 

(2006–2007, prefix ZN) and Fusions 

(2006–2008, prefix ZQ) in South 

Florida; Edges (2006–2008, prefix ZQ) 

in South Florida and Georgia; Rangers 

(2006–2007, prefix ZN) in Arizona, 

Rangers in Michigan (2006–2008, prefix 

ZN); and virgin inflators (prefixes ZN 

and ZQ).121

NG also completed probability-offailure projections for the covered Ford 

inflators under its inflator aging model, 

on which Ford and Mazda updated the 

Agency in November 2020.122 The 

results of those projections were 

considered in conjunction with 

anticipated vehicle attrition and the 

probabilities of crashes with air bag 

deployments.123

1. Live Dissections 

According to Ford and Mazda, NG 

performed various assessments related 

to live dissections of inflators: 124

• Propellant health analysis. 

According to Ford and Mazda, the 

covered Ford inflators are susceptible to 

energetic disassembly when tablet 

density is at 1.64 g/cc or lower,125 and 

the densities of the tablets from such 

returned inflators were measured ‘‘well 

above’’ 1.63–1.64 g/cc. 

• AI–1 analysis. NG measured the 

propellant tablets for outer diameter 

(‘‘OD’’), weight, and color. Ford and 

Mazda state that the OD and weight of 

field returns were ‘‘similar’’ to virgin 

inflators. Also according to Ford, ‘‘[i]n 

older undesiccated inflators, the AI–1 

tablet color is an indicator of age based 

on humidity and temperature exposure 

in the field, and the returned inflators 

retained a 0–2 color (10 the darkest),’’ 

which was ‘‘similar’’ to virgin inflators. 

Ford and Mazda further note that 

thermogravimetric analysis ‘‘indicated 

similar weight loss to virgin samples.’’ 

• Moisture content. According to 

Ford and Mazda, the propellants from 

the returned inflators were lower in 

moisture content than non-desiccated 

PSDI–5 inflators (prefix ZA) and 

desiccated PSDI–5 (prefix YT) inflators. 

• X-ray micro-computed tomography 

(micro-CT scan). Ford and Mazda assert 

that ‘‘[n]o definitive trend was observed 

with respect to void count, size, or total 

volume, and tablet density.’’ According 

to Ford and Mazda, ‘‘[t]ypically, 20,000 

voids were identified ranging in size 

from 1 × 10¥5 to .3 cubic millimeters.’’ 

• Scanning electron microscope 

(SEM). NG processed 2004 tablets from 

non-desiccated PSAN inflators (prefix 

ZA) through the Independent Testing 

Coalition’s (‘‘ITC’’) aging study (1920 

cycles).126 Those had ‘‘higher surface 

roughness than tablets from Ford 

desiccated inflators.’’ Propellant in 

desiccated PSDI–5 inflators (prefixes GE 

and YT) aged at 1920 cycles, according 

to Ford and Mazda, also had higher 

surface roughness than propellant in the 

field-returned Ford PSDI–5 inflators 

(prefixes ZN and ZQ)—which had 

surface roughness ‘‘similar’’ to 

propellant in virgin inflators. 

• Burn rate (closed bomb). According 

to Ford and Mazda, ‘‘[n]o significant 

differences were observed between 2004 

propellant from virgin and returned 

inflators,’’ and ‘‘[n]o anomalous 

pressure traces were observed.’’ 

• O-ring. Ford and Mazda state that 

‘‘[a]lthough a significant decrease in [O]- 

ring squeeze is observed in the 2006–8 

PSDI–5D inflator igniter assembly 

sealing system, the remaining squeeze is 

deemed acceptable to prevent moisture 

leakage around the O-ring.’’ According 

to Ford and Mazda, older O-rings have 

a loss of resiliency from a decrease in 

the horizontal diameter that occurs with 

increasing age. 

• Inflator Tank Testing. Ford and 

Mazda state that results showed one 

Ford PSDI–5 inflator (ZN prefix) with a 

chamber pressure approximately 20% 

higher than the average of the other 

tested inflators. According to Ford and 

Mazda, ‘‘[a]ll other PSDI–5 ZN curves 

were grouped tightly with the virgin 

inflators,’’ as were the ZQ prefix 

inflators. Ford and Mazda also note that 

the inflator with the higher pressure was 

from a vehicle in Michigan, and that the 

pressure ‘‘was well below any expected 

inflator rupture pressure.’’ 

2. Ballistic Modeling 

NG developed ballistic models ‘‘to 

investigate the observed performance 

behavior of Ford PSDI–5 ZN and ZQ 

inflators and to evaluate the potential 

sensitivity of the inflators to certain 

design deviations.’’ 127 Representative 

performance models were anchored to 

measured pressure data from virgin 

inflators.128 ‘‘The models simulated 

inflator ignition, chamber volumetric 

filling, burst tape rupture, ignition delay 

between chambers and steady state 

combustion.’’ 129 According to Ford and 

Mazda, the PSDI–5 design required 

‘‘significant degradation of the 2004 

propellant tablets’’ to obtain failure 

pressures.130 Specifically, ‘‘[a]n 

equivalent low press tablet density 

below 1.631 g/cc was required to 

produce sufficient augmented 

burning.’’ 131 Ford states that such 

degradation was not observed in the 

field returns of covered Ford 

inflators.132

3. MEAF Assessment 

NG analyzed MEAF data up to 

February 2018 to determine whether 

covered Ford inflators had energetic 

deployment (‘‘ED’’) rates were 

dependent on platform, inflator age, 

climate zone, or other factors.133 Among 

the ‘‘key’’ findings according to Ford: 

For non-desiccated PSDI–5 inflators, 

abnormal deployments began to occur 

after 10.5 years, and EDs after 11.5 

years; inflator variants with calciumsulfate desiccant experienced normal 

deployments up to 12.5 years (which at 

the time were the oldest inflators 

contained in the MEAF); the calciumsulfate desiccant ‘‘appear[ed] to be 

largely saturated after 8 years;’’ and the 

covered Ford inflators contained less 

moisture in the 3110 booster propellant 

than the non-desiccated inflators.134

4. Probability-of-Failure Projections 

In the November 2020 Presentation to 

the Agency, Ford and Mazda cite NG’s 

PSAN Inflator Test Program and 

Predictive Aging Model Final Report 

from October 2019 (‘‘NG Model’’),135

7178 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 15 / Tuesday, January 26, 2021 / Notices 

safety of desiccated Takata PSAN inflators. The 

report is available at https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/ 

nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/ngis_takata_

investigation_final_report_oct_2019.pdf. 

136November 2020 Presentation at 23. T3 refers 

to a ‘‘temperature band.’’ Under NG’s report, there 

are three temperature bands—T1, T2, T3. T3 is the 

highest temperature band, representing vehicles 

with maximum inflator temperatures near or 

slightly above 70 °C. NG Report at 18–19; see 

November Presentation at 24. The ‘‘1% usage 

vehicle’’ refers to a vehicle with the most severe 

environmental exposure based on customer usage. 

See November 2020 Presentation at 24. 

137November 2020 Presentation at 25. 

138 Id. 

139 Id. at 26. 

140 Id. 

141 Id. 

142 Id. 

143Ford and Mazda note this was ‘‘[a]djusted for 

the population attrition & accident probabilities 

using vehicles currently registered in Florida (not 

all of which have always been registered in 

Florida).’’ Id. 

144 Id. at 26–27. 

145 Id. at 27. 

146 Id. 

147 Id. at 18; October 2018 Presentation at 21. 

148 Id. 

149 Id. 

150 Id. 

151 Id. 

first observing that this report indicates 

that for another OEM’s PSDI–5 inflator 

with a calcium-sulfate desiccant (prefix 

YT), a T3 vehicle in Miami with the 

most severe aging (top 1%, hereinafter 

a ‘‘1% usage’’ vehicle), may reach a 

probability of failure of 1 in 10,000 

(.01%) in less than thirty years.136 Ford 

and Mazda then state that under the NG 

model, for the Ford covered inflators 

prefixes ZN and ZQ, a 1% usage T3 

vehicle in Miami has an expected 25.7 

and 25.6 years, respectively, to a .01% 

probability of failure.137 Ford further 

states that this is an additional two 

years when compared to the YT prefix 

version of the inflator (of another 

OEM).138

Ford and Mazda then assert that the 

earliest Fusion/Milan/MKZ vehicles 

equipped with the covered Ford 

inflators were built in 2005, and that if 

those vehicles perform as T3 vehicles, 

the earliest calendar year for a 1 in 

10,000 probability of failure is 2031 for 

a 1% usage vehicle.139 Similarly, Ford 

and Mazda assert that the earliest 

Ranger, Edge/MKX vehicles equipped 

with the covered Ford inflators were 

built in 2006, and that if those vehicles 

perform as T3 vehicles, the earliest 

calendar year for a 1 in 10,000 

probability of failure is 2032 for a 1% 

usage vehicle.140

Ford and Mazda build on these 

assertions by stating that ‘‘for a rupture 

to occur the vehicle must be in service 

and experience a crash resulting in 

airbag deployment,’’ and that based on 

vehicle attrition and crash statistics, 

Ford and Mazda do not project a field 

event at twenty-six years of service.141

The below data is provided in 

support:142

Vehicle Model year Volume 

(Florida) 

Probability of 

inflator 

rupture 143 at 

26 years in 

service 

Expected 

cumulative 

events at 26 

years in 

service 

Fusion .............................................................................................................. 2006–2012 75,232 5.08E–07 0.038 

MKZ ................................................................................................................. 2006–2012 

Milan ................................................................................................................ 2006–2011 

Edge ................................................................................................................. 2007–2010 39,161 6.34E–07 0.025 

MKX ................................................................................................................. 2007–2010 

Ranger ............................................................................................................. 2007–2011 

Ford and Mazda therefore state that 

the earliest a vehicle in a Miami-type 

environment may reach a .01% 

probability of failure is over a decade in 

the future for a 1%-usage T3 vehicle and 

that, in other words, ‘‘the predictive 

model suggests that no inflator ruptures 

are expected to occur for at least 26 

years of cumulative exposure in the 

worst case environment, worst case 

vehicle configuration, and worst case 

customer usage’’ (i.e., 2031 for the oldest 

vehicles).144

Ford and Mazda also make several 

other observations, including that: 145

• ‘‘[s]tudying parts prior to 

approximately 16–18 years in service 

would not identify meaningful inflator 

aging information’’ (i.e., 2023 for the 

oldest vehicles); 

• the ITC, in coordination with NG, is 

conducting a surveillance program for 

desiccated Takata PSAN inflators, and 

data gathered from that program can 

validate the NG models; 

• ‘‘[w]ith newer inflators that have 

not yet shown signs of aging, there is a 

significant opportunity for improving 

the fidelity and accuracy of the model 

with enhanced anchoring data’’; and 

• there is time for a separate 

surveillance program for the covered 

Ford inflators ‘‘well before any potential 

risk is projected’’ after the results of 

NG’s surveillance program that are 

expected in 2021. 

Ford and Mazda conclude that they 

‘‘believe[] that the current data indicates 

that the subject inflators do not present 

an unreasonable risk to safety and that 

it supports granting the petition.’’ 146

E. Additional Third-Party Analysis 

According to Ford and Mazda, an 

additional Third Party found that no 

pressure excursions were detected in 

the covered Ford inflators analyzed to 

date.147 The Third Party also found that 

some field inflators experienced 

porosity growth greater than virgin 

inflators with 2004 propellant, ‘‘but not 

to a level sufficient to cause pressure 

excursions in bomb testing.’’ 148 In 

addition, ‘‘[n]o significant increase in 

tablet ODs was observed for field 

populations’’ of covered inflators.149

These findings were derived from live 

dissections performed on 39 inflators 

and deployment tests on 65 inflators.150

The inflators were field-return parts 

obtained from Florida, Michigan, and 

Ohio.151

VI. Response to Mazda’s Petition and 

Supporting Information and Analyses 

Mazda’s seeks through its Petition and 

supporting analysis to show that the 

covered Mazda inflators are not at risk 

of rupture such that the defect is 

inconsequential to safety. First, as noted 

above, when taking into consideration 

the Agency’s noncompliance precedent, 

an important factor is also the severity 

of the consequence of the defect were it 

to occur—i.e., the safety risk to an 

occupant who is exposed to an inflator 

rupture. Mazda did not provide any 

information to suggest that result would 

be any different were a covered Mazda 

inflator to rupture in a Mazda vehicle. 

Second, as a general matter, at various 

points Mazda’s Petition implicitly 

appears to adopt the covered Nissan 

inflators as a standard for 

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 15 / Tuesday, January 26, 2021 / Notices 7179 

152Ford’s comparisons might carry more 

evidentiary weight if, for instance, the Agency had 

previously granted an inconsequentiality petition 

from Nissan for its covered inflators. Nissan did not 

petition the Agency for an inconsequentiality 

determination for its covered inflators. See also 49 

CFR 556.4(c) (requiring such a petition is submitted 

not later than thirty days after defect or 

noncompliance determination). 

153Petition at 14–15 (emphasis added). 

154Moreover, as described further below, based 

on recent MEAF data, one covered Ford inflator has 

the highest chamber pressure tested for Takata 

calcium-sulfate desiccated PSDI–5 inflators. 

155United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 

754, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 

156See Comments at 3. 

157The exact number of ballistic tests conducted 

on the ZN-variant inflators installed in Rangers (and 

therefore the percentage of that population of which 

that number is comprised) is difficult to discern 

from the materials submitted to the Agency. 

158See November 2020 Presentation at 8. 

159Moreover, twenty of the inflators (from Ranger 

vehicles) were from salvage yards, ‘‘where the 

conditions used to store the parts cannot be 

determined.’’ Petition at 11. Further highlighting 

the significance of this shortcoming, Mazda noted 

in its Petition the potential importance of ‘‘vehicle 

environment’’ with respect to inflator-degradation 

risk but did not elaborate on this suggestion 

elsewhere in its Petition. See id. at 2; id. 14–16 

(focusing on design differences between the covered 

Ford inflators and covered Nissan inflators). For 

purposes of its arguments related to the NG Model, 

Ford and Mazda presented a worst-case scenario, 

where it was assumed for purposes of that scenario 

that the vehicles at issue would be in the T3 

temperature band. 

160 Id. at 11. 

161See id. at 12. 

inconsequentiality. However, 

differentiating the covered Mazda 

inflators from the covered Nissan 

inflators, e.g., through ballistic-testing or 

live-dissection results, does not directly 

answer the question of whether the 

defect in the covered Mazda inflators is, 

on its own merits, inconsequential to 

motor vehicle safety. Even assuming 

that the covered Mazda inflators 

compare favorably to the covered Nissan 

inflators, NHTSA has not made an 

inconsequentiality determination for the 

covered Nissan inflators—nor will it be 

doing so.152 It was similarly argued in 

subsequent materials, for example with 

regard to NG’s live dissections and 

predictive-model results, as well as 

Ford’s statistical analysis of the MEAF, 

that the covered Ford inflators 

compared favorably to other inflator 

variants, and even to non-desiccated 

inflators. Merely demonstrating that 

one’s own defective product compares 

favorably to another’s defective product 

does not suffice for an 

inconsequentiality determination. 

Relatedly, the argument regarding 

‘‘design differences’’ between the 

covered Ford and covered Nissan 

inflators appears to be more of an 

identification of areas for further study 

or potential explanation—not a 

standalone argument in support of an 

inconsequentiality determination. 

Design differences are identified ‘‘that 

may account for the difference in 

material properties of the generate’’ and 

differences in pressures measured 

during ballistic testing of the 

inflators.153 These design differences 

were not persuasively connected to 

meaningful improved performance in 

generate-properties and pressure 

differences 154 and, even if they were, 

the covered Nissan inflators are not a 

proxy standard for inconsequentiality. 

In addition to these issues, signs of 

aging were observed in the covered Ford 

inflators; the sample sizes used for the 

analyses were limited; and there are 

shortcomings regarding various analyses 

that undermine their conclusions— 

including some information that was 

missing or unclear. The probability-offailure projections are also 

unpersuasive, and notably belied by the 

limited evidence available from ballistic 

testing and analysis on real-world field 

returns of the covered Ford inflators. 

These additional issues are discussed 

below. 

A. Signs of Aging 

Ford and Mazda admit that signs of 

aging were observed in the covered Ford 

inflators. While this is indirectly 

dismissed as a non-issue—with the 

conclusion that there is no degradation 

‘‘that would signal either an imminent 

or developing risk to safety’’—aging 

leads to degradation, which leads to risk 

of inflator rupture. Further, the 2004 

propellant that is present in the covered 

Mazda inflators degrades until, at some 

point, it no longer burns normally, but 

in an accelerated and unpredictable 

manner that can cause an inflator 

rupture. ‘‘The purpose of the Safety Act 

. . . is to prevent serious injuries 

stemming from established defects 

before they occur.’’ 155 And as CAS 

commented, ‘‘tests demonstrating that 

inflators are ‘OK for now’ in no way 

ensures safety throughout the maximum 

useful life of these vehicles.’’ 156

B. Samples 

The Agency finds shortcomings in the 

sample sizes utilized in the analyses. 

The total field-return sample (for ZN 

and ZQ collectively) was, across the 

Takata, NG, and the additional Third 

Party analyses, less than 3,000 inflators 

for an affected population of over 3 

million (Ford) vehicles. Ford and Mazda 

presented analysis from Takata of fewer 

than 2,000 inflators, while NG analyzed 

only 196, and the additional Third Party 

analyzed just over 100. In total, 1,460 

ballistic tests are cited, which is 

approximately .05% of the total 

population in which the covered Ford 

and Mazda inflators were installed. 

Specific to the Ford Ranger, the exact 

sample size of ZN inflators for all 

analyses is less than 1,250.157 This 

figure is approximately .25% of the 

combined Ranger and B-Series 

population (approximately 495,000). By 

comparison, for example, those 

percentages are much smaller than the 

percentage of inflators tested as of 

November 2019 in a mid-sized pick-up 

vehicle population equipped with nondesiccated PSAN inflators—1.81%— 

with one observed test rupture. Ford’s 

statistical analysis of the MEAF 

regarding Pc Primary Max Value 

frequency 158 was also based on only 

1,247 inflators.159

C. Additional Underlying Information 

Other shortcomings regarding various 

analyses presented here—including 

some information that was missing or 

unclear—further undermine the 

associated conclusions. These are 

identifiable in both Mazda’s Petition 

and in the subsequent Presentations to 

the Agency. 

1. Mazda’s Petition 

As an initial matter, Mazda submitted 

little of the underlying data, and did not 

fully explain the underlying 

methodologies and results, associated 

with the arguments in its 2017 Petition. 

More specifically, one of the arguments 

in Mazda’s Petition is that Takata’s live 

dissections of covered Ford inflators 

does not show tablet-density 

degradation or increased inflation 

pressure, and therefore, Takata ‘‘did not 

identify a reduction in density trend’’ in 

the covered Ford inflators.160 Tablet 

discoloration was graded on a 

qualitative 1–10 scale, but to what 

discoloration characteristics each level 

of this scale corresponds is not 

explained. And the conclusion that a 

‘‘vast majority’’ of discoloration in 

certain inflators was within a certain 

low range of discoloration (with seven 

samples in a certain mid-range) is 

vague, and information about the 

specific distribution of the results (e.g., 

the number of inflators receiving each 

discoloration value or the number of 

inflators in each Zone) was not 

provided.161

Mazda also provides little information 

about the specific inflators tested and 

associated results with regard to density 

measurements—such as actual 

dimensions, mass, and densities, among 

measurements—instead largely relying 

7180 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 15 / Tuesday, January 26, 2021 / Notices 

162See id. at 12–13 (‘‘[A] small number of 

samples were measured with a density slightly 

below the minimum average tablet production 

specification, while a nearly equal number of 

samples measured densities higher than the 

maximum . . . .’’). 

163See id. at 13. 

164The presentation of the results of these 

analyses did not distinguish between ZN and ZQ 

inflators. 

165The presentation of the results of these 

analyses did not distinguish between ZN and ZQ 

inflators. 

166While it may be possible to age an inflator 

artificially in a manner that replicates aging 

characteristics in the field (and then test those 

inflators), Mazda did not attempt to do this for the 

covered Mazda inflators (nor did Ford for the 

covered Ford inflators). 

167Also notable is that all three results are over 

three standard deviations above even the 

averagefield-return results for ZN and ZQ inflators 

collectively (for which Agency would expect a 

higher average than virgin inflators). 

Ford and Mazda also noted a ZN inflator tested 

by NG with a chamber pressure approximately 20% 

higher than the average of the other inflators in tank 

testing. The specific measurement (and 

measurements of other NG tests) does not appear to 

have been provided to the Agency. 

168These results regard recently tested ZQ 

inflators with greater field ages than previously 

tested ZN inflators, although it should also be noted 

that one ZN inflator with a field age of about 10 

years measured a primary-tablet density just above 

1.66 g/cc—lower than any result for a ZQ inflator. 

on general descriptions of the results.162

For inflation pressure, Mazda offers 

evidence of ballistic tests, although the 

breakdown of this sample with regard to 

vehicle model year and location, as well 

as how many of these inflators were 

obtained from salvage yards with 

unknown environment exposures (and 

the associated results) was not 

provided.163

2. Subsequent Submissions to the 

Agency 

The statistical analysis of the MEAF 

contains several shortcomings in the 

first two charts 164—box plots of 

primary-chamber pressure by age of 

inflator, and a lognormal histogram of 

maximum values illustrating the 

frequency of maximum values of 

primary-chamber pressure of covered 

Ford inflators. In the box plots, it is not 

specified or illustrated what a ‘‘normal’’ 

or ‘‘expected’’ primary-chamber 

pressure would be. Nor is there 

information showing how many 

inflators each age group comprises— 

although the lack of whiskers in the box 

plot for inflators aged thirteen years 

suggests that, at least for that age group, 

the sample size is small. There are also 

outlier pressure values observed in the 

nine- to twelve-year age groups, which 

concern the Agency. And in the 

histogram, results among different 

inflator ages are not distinguished— 

which would have highlighted any 

trends in primary-chamber pressure 

maximum values based on age. 

There are also several shortcomings 

with the second two charts 165—the 

probability curves for module ages, and 

probability plots comparing primarychamber pressure maximum values of 

Ford modules with desiccated and nondesiccated inflators, respectively. As to 

the probability curves, while details 

were not provided, this analysis appears 

to assume that degradation will proceed 

linearly. However, researchers that have 

been most closely involved in analyzing 

Takata inflators, including NG, all seem 

to agree that the degradation process is, 

at the very least, complex, and does not 

follow a linear trajectory. Instead, the 

2004 propellant that is present in the 

covered Mazda inflators degrades until, 

at some point, it no longer burns 

normally, but in an accelerated and 

unpredictable manner that can cause an 

inflator rupture. As to the probability 

plots, while a comparison between 

desiccated and non-desiccated inflators 

is somewhat informative from a broad 

perspective, it is too general to lend 

much support to Mazda’s Petition, and 

as noted above the performance of nondesiccated Takata PSAN inflators is not 

a sound benchmark for whether the 

defect in the covered Mazda inflators is 

inconsequential to safety. 

Regarding NG’s analysis, as an initial 

matter, over a quarter of the 196 

inflators analyzed were non-aged/virgin 

inflators and, further, degradation 

would not be expected in the inflators 

from Michigan (from which, 

collectively, 55 of the inflators were 

obtained). Aging in inflator O-rings from 

this analysis is also acknowledged. In 

addition, there are several particular 

issues with NG’s live dissections worth 

noting. Findings regarding moisture 

content are of limited value, and 

important information on the 

comparator prefix ZA and YT 

inflators—e.g., age and the geographic 

region in which they were used. As to 

the SEM results, it is not explained how 

the concept of surface roughness relates 

to the long-term safety of the inflators at 

issue here. Similarly, regarding the 

additional Third Party’s analysis, OD 

growth for the tablet grain form has not 

been found to be reliable indicator of 

propellant health, and it is not 

demonstrated otherwise. 

D. Probability-of-Failure Projections 

The probability-of-failure projections 

are also unpersuasive. As previously 

described, these projections, submitted 

in support of Ford’s Petition in 

November 2020, are based on the NG 

Model. While the projections are 

informative in various respects, NHTSA 

does not view the Model’s outputs for 

the inflators at issue as fully squaring 

with the evidence available for those 

inflators from real-world field 

returns 166—which renders what is 

provided here unpersuasive for the 

purposes of Mazda’s Petition. Even with 

the limited testing evidence available, 

ballistic testing of field returns of the 

covered Ford inflators includes three 

inflator deployments with primarychamber pressures between 60 and 70 

MPa—coming from two ZQ inflators 

with a field age between 12 and 13 years 

(one of which exhibited a pressure of 68 

MPa), and one ZN inflator with a field 

age between 10 and 11 years.167 In the 

Agency’s experience, such primarychamber pressure results are indicative 

of propellant degradation and potential 

future rupture risk. The nature of these 

results, in addition to causing concern, 

undercuts one of the notable arguments 

in Mazda’s Petition: That ‘‘[t]he 

maximum primary chamber pressure 

that Takata measured’’ in covered Ford 

inflators was about 15 MPa lower than 

that measured in a covered Nissan 

inflator (which exhibited primary 

chamber pressure exceeding 60 MPa). 

Indeed, at least three covered Ford 

inflators have now exceeded 60 MPa in 

ballistic testing (one ZN, two ZQ), and 

according to recent MEAF data, one of 

these inflators (of the ZQ variant) has 

the highest chamber pressure tested for 

Takata calcium-sulfate desiccated PSDI– 

5 inflators. 

Data from the MEAF also may suggest 

the beginning stages of notable density 

changes in propellant tablets in the 

covered Ford inflators with increasing 

field age. Recent results from primary 

tablets in inflators with field ages 

between 12 and 14 years show four 

inflators with density measurements 

near (or below) 1.68 g/cc; according to 

Ford, 1.64 g/cc is the point at which the 

PSDI–5 inflators with 2004 tablets are 

susceptible to energetic disassembly.168

Similarly, there are a number of field 

returns measured with secondarychamber tablet densities under 1.66 g/cc 

(mostly ZN, although one ZQ inflator), 

including ZN inflators under 1.64 g/cc— 

one of which was measured as low as 

1.62 g/cc. This undermines the 

contention that the densities of the 

tablets from returned covered Ford 

inflators were measured ‘‘well above’’ 

1.63–1.64 g/cc, as well as assertions 

regarding the results of visual 

inspections that it contends ‘‘evidence 

time-in-service, but not tablet density 

loss.’’ 

The above results from real-world 

field returns signal that propellant 

degradation in the covered Ford 

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 15 / Tuesday, January 26, 2021 / Notices 7181 

169See also Exhibit A (Report of Dr. Harold 

Blomquist) to Gen. Motors LLC, Denial of 

Consolidated Petition for Decision of 

Inconsequential Defect, 85 FR 76159 (Nov. 27, 

2020) at para.272 (indicating that—in assessing a 

similar model with regard to a petition for 

inconsequentiality—apparent inconsistencies 

between that model’s predictions and high-pressure 

ballistic test results of field returns (of inflators not 

at issue here)—‘‘suggest caution should be used’’ in 

applying the results of that model). 

170See November 2020 Presentation at 26. 

171These figures, which appear based on the 

twenty-sixth year of service (the point at which, 

under the NG Model and according to Ford and 

Mazda, there is a 1% probability of failure for a 

covered Ford inflator in a T3 vehicle with the most 

severe (top 1%) usage factors in Miami), were 0.038 

for a population of approximately 75,000 Fusion, 

MKZ, and Milan vehicles, and 0.025 for a 

population of approximately 39,000 Edge, MKX, 

and Ranger vehicles. See November 2020 

Presentation at 26. 

172Evidence was not submitted demonstrating 

that none of the vehicles subject to the Petition 

would be in service after 26 years—in Florida or 

otherwise. And while relevant metrics were 

adjusted for attrition and crash probabilities, 

specific information about how these adjustments 

were made was also not submitted. 

173Although 26 years is—under the NG Model 

and according to Ford and Mazda—the point at 

which there is a 1% probability of failure for a 

covered Ford inflator in a T3 vehicle with the most 

severe (top 1%) usage factors in Miami, Ford and 

Mazda do not explain why this is an appropriate 

point at which to end the analysis of the expected 

number of cumulative field events. 

174Similarly, no such calculation was provided 

specific to the Ford Ranger population installed 

with ZN inflators. 

175See Nat’l Coach Corp.; Denial of Petition for 

Inconsequential [Defect], 47 FR 49517 (Nov. 1, 

1982); Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd.; Grant of Petition for 

Inconsequential Defect, 48 FR 27635 (June 16, 

1983). 

176See Final Determination & Order Regarding 

Safety Related Defects in the 1971 Fiat Model 850 

and the 1970–74 Fiat Model 124 Automobiles 

Imported and Distributed by Fiat Motors of N. Am., 

Inc.; Ruling on Petition of Inconsequentiality, 45 FR 

2134 (Jan. 10, 1980). 

177See Gen. Motors LLC, Denial of Consolidated 

Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Defect, 85 

FR 76159 (Nov. 27, 2020). 

178See id. at 76173; cf. Gen. Motors, LLC; Grant 

of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential 

Noncompliance, 78 FR 35355–01, 2013 WL 

2489784 (June 12, 2013) (finding noncompliance 

inconsequential where ‘‘occupant classification 

system will continue to operate as designed and 

will enable or disable the air bag as intended’’). 

179See Gen. Motors LLC, Denial of Consolidated 

Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Defect, 85 

FR 76159, 76173 (Nov. 27, 2020); Final 

Determination & Order Regarding Safety Related 

Defects in the 1971 Fiat Model 850 and the 1970– 

74 Fiat Model 124 Automobiles Imported and 

Distributed by Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc.; Ruling 

on Petition of Inconsequentiality, 45 FR 2134 (Jan. 

10, 1980) (rejecting argument there was adequate 

warning to vehicle owners of underbody corrosion, 

as the average owner does not undertake an 

inspection of the underbody of a vehicle, and 

interior corrosion of the underbody may not be 

visible). 

180See Nat’l Coach Corp.; Denial of Petition for 

Inconsequential [Defect], 47 FR 49517 (Nov. 1, 

1982) (observing, inter alia, that other 

manufacturers had conducted recalls for similar 

issues in the past, and that, even if current owners 

were aware of the issue, subsequent owners were 

unlikely to be aware absent a recall). 

181See Gen. Motors LLC, Denial of Consolidated 

Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Defect, 85 

FR 76159, 76173 (Nov. 27, 2020). 

inflators (and analogous covered Mazda 

inflators) is occurring. While the 

predictive model (and its applicable 

results) is informative in certain 

respects, the specific metrics cited 

cannot be sufficiently squared with the 

actual testing that has been completed 

on real-world field returns to be 

persuasive for Mazda’s Petition.169

Further, there are shortcomings 

particular to the metrics on which 

Mazda relies regarding the Model. 

Notably, Ford and Mazda contend that 

‘‘there are no expected field events 

projected at 26 years of service.’’ 170

However, the figures for an expected 

number of cumulative field events 171

were cut off at 26 years in service and 

limited to an analysis of vehicles in 

Florida—a combined volume of 114,393 

vehicles, which is less than 4% of the 

total population of Ford vehicles at 

issue (the specific volume of Rangers in 

Florida is not clear from the submitted 

information).172 While such vehicles 

may be among the highest risk 

populations, unless it is assumed that 

there is a cumulative zero probability of 

inflator rupture (through 26 years in 

service) for every vehicle in every other 

State (including States other than 

Florida with high heat and 

humidity),173 these calculations do not 

reflect the expected cumulative events 

for the entire population of 3.04 million 

vehicles installed with calcium-sulfate 

desiccated Takata inflators through 26 

years in service 174—thereby 

understating the risk, as suggested by 

the Model, for the vehicles at issue. In 

other words, there is not a fleet-level 

assessment here—the total number of 

cumulative events expected to occur in 

the coming years. And in any case, these 

metrics are undercut by the ballistic 

results and analysis of field-returned 

inflators showing elevated pressures 

and propellant density changes 

discussed above. 

VII. Decision 

The relief sought here is 

extraordinary. Mazda’s Petition is quite 

distinct from previous petitions 

discussed above relating to defective 

labels that may (or may not) mislead the 

user of the vehicle to create an unsafe 

condition.175 Nor is the risk here 

comparable to a deteriorating exterior 

component of vehicle that—even if an 

average owner is unlikely to inspect the 

component—might (or might not) be 

visibly discerned.176 Rather, similar to 

the defect at issue in NHTSA’s recent 

decision on a petition regarding certain 

non-desiccated Takata PSAN air bag 

inflators installed in General Motors 

vehicles, the defect here poses an unsafe 

condition caused by the degradation of 

an important component of a safety 

device that is designed to protect 

vehicle occupants in crashes.177 Instead 

of protecting occupants, this propellant 

degradation can lead to an uncontrolled 

explosion of the inflator and propel 

sharp metal fragments toward occupants 

in a manner that can cause serious 

injury and even death.178 This unsafe 

condition—hidden in an air bag 

module—is not discernible even by a 

diligent vehicle owner, let alone an 

average owner.179

NHTSA has been offered no 

persuasive reason to think that without 

a recall, even if current owners are 

aware of the defect and instant petition, 

subsequent owners of vehicles equipped 

with covered Mazda inflators would be 

made aware of the issue.180 This is not 

the type of defect for which notice alone 

enables an owner to avoid the safety 

risk. A remedy is required to address the 

underlying safety defect. 

As discussed above, threshold of 

evidence necessary to prove the 

inconsequentiality of a defect such as 

this one—involving the potential 

performance failure of safety-critical 

equipment—is very difficult to 

overcome.181 Mazda bears a heavy 

burden, and the evidence and argument 

it provides suffers from numerous, 

significant deficiencies, as previously 

described in detail. In all events, the 

information that Mazda presents in its 

Petition and that which is in the 

subsequent Presentations to the Agency 

is inadequate to support a grant of 

Mazda’s Petition. 

As noted above, at various points, 

Mazda’s Petition appears to focus on 

differentiating the covered Ford 

inflators from the covered Nissan 

inflators—not directly answering the 

question of whether the defect in the 

covered Ford inflators (and the covered 

Mazda inflators) is, on its own merits, 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. 

It was similarly argued in subsequent 

materials that the covered Ford inflators 

compared favorably to another inflator 

variant of the same type, and even to 

non-desiccated inflators. These 

comparisons do not suffice for an 

inconsequentiality determination. 

Relatedly, the argument regarding 

design differences does not suffice to 

support an inconsequentiality 

determination. This argument, 

furthermore, was not persuasively 

connected to meaningful improved 

performance in generate-properties and 

pressure differences (and even if it had 

7182 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 15 / Tuesday, January 26, 2021 / Notices 

been, the covered Nissan inflators are 

not an appropriate proxy standard for 

inconsequentiality). The sample sizes 

used for the analyses were also limited, 

and there are shortcomings regarding 

various analyses that undermine their 

conclusions—including some 

information was missing or unclear. 

As a general matter, signs of aging 

were observed, which leads to 

propellant degradation, which leads to 

inflator rupture—and the 2004 

propellant that is present in the covered 

Mazda inflators degrades until, at some 

point, it no longer burns normally, but 

in an accelerated and unpredictable 

manner that can cause an inflator 

rupture. Perhaps most importantly, even 

with the limited testing evidence 

available, ballistic testing of field 

returns of the covered Ford inflators 

includes three inflator deployments 

with primary-chamber pressures 

between 60 and 70 MPa—coming from 

two ZQ inflators with a field age 

between 12 and 13 years (one of which 

exhibited a pressure of 68 MPa), and 

one ZN inflator with a field age between 

10 and 11 years. Data from the MEAF 

also appears to indicate the beginning 

stages of density changes in propellant 

tablets in the inflators with increasing 

field age. These results from real-world 

field returns signal that propellant 

degradation is occurring, and belie the 

probability-of-failure projections 

provided in November 2020 (which 

have their own additional shortcomings 

that would lead to an understatement of 

the potential risk). 

Given the severity of the consequence 

of propellant degradation in these air 

bag inflators—the rupture of the inflator 

and metal shrapnel sprayed at vehicle 

occupants—a finding of 

inconsequentiality to safety demands 

extraordinarily robust and persuasive 

evidence. What Mazda presents here, 

while valuable and informative in 

certain respects, suffers from far too 

many shortcomings, both when the 

evidence is assessed individually and in 

its totality, to demonstrate that the 

defect in covered Mazda inflators is not 

important or can otherwise be ignored 

as a matter of safety. 

In consideration of the forgoing, 

NHTSA has decided Mazda has not 

demonstrated that the defect is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. 

Accordingly, Mazda’s Petition is hereby 

denied, and Mazda is obligated to 

provide notification of, and a remedy 

for, the defect pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 

30118 and 30120. Within 30 days of the 

issuance of this decision, Ford shall 

submit to NHTSA a proposed schedule 

for the notification of vehicle owners 

and the launch of a remedy required to 

fulfill those obligations. 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30101, et seq., 30118, 

30120(h), 30162, 30166(b)(1), 30166(g)(1); 

delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.95(a); 49 

CFR parts 556, 573, 577. 

Jeffrey Mark Giuseppe, 

Associate Administrator for Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2021–01539 Filed 1–25–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration 

[Docket No. PHMSA–2019–0151] 

Pipeline Safety: Request for Special 

Permit; Natural Gas Pipeline Company 

of America, LLC 

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous 

Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA); DOT. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: PHMSA is publishing this 

notice to solicit public comments on a 

request for special permit received from 

the Natural Gas Pipeline Company of 

America, LLC (NGPL). The special 

permit request is seeking relief from 

compliance with certain requirements 

in the Federal pipeline safety 

regulations. At the conclusion of the 30- 

day comment period, PHMSA will 

review the comments received from this 

notice as part of its evaluation to grant 

or deny the special permit request. 

DATES: Submit any comments regarding 

this special permit request by February 

25, 2021. 

ADDRESSES: Comments should reference 

the docket number for this special 

permit request and may be submitted in 

the following ways: 

• E-Gov Website: http://

www.Regulations.gov. This site allows 

the public to enter comments on any 

Federal Register notice issued by any 

agency. 

• Fax: 1–202–493–2251. 

• Mail: Docket Management System: 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: Docket Management 

System: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590, between 9:00 

a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

Instructions: You should identify the 

docket number for the special permit 

request you are commenting on at the 

beginning of your comments. If you 

submit your comments by mail, please 

submit two (2) copies. To receive 

confirmation that PHMSA has received 

your comments, please include a selfaddressed stamped postcard. Internet 

users may submit comments at http://

www.Regulations.gov. 

Note: There is a privacy statement 

published on http://

www.Regulations.gov. Comments, 

including any personal information 

provided, are posted without changes or 

edits to http://www.Regulations.gov. 

Confidential Business Information: 

Confidential Business Information (CBI) 

is commercial or financial information 

that is both customarily and actually 

treated as private by its owner. Under 

the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 

(5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from 

public disclosure. If your comments 

responsive to this notice contain 

commercial or financial information 

that is customarily treated as private, 

that you actually treat as private, and 

that is relevant or responsive to this 

notice, it is important that you clearly 

designate the submitted comments as 

CBI. Pursuant to 49 Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR) 190.343, you may ask 

PHMSA to give confidential treatment 

to information you give to the agency by 

taking the following steps: (1) Mark each 

page of the original document 

submission containing CBI as 

‘‘Confidential’’; (2) send PHMSA, along 

with the original document, a second 

copy of the original document with the 

CBI deleted; and (3) explain why the 

information you are submitting is CBI. 

Unless you are notified otherwise, 

PHMSA will treat such marked 

submissions as confidential under the 

FOIA, and they will not be placed in the 

public docket of this notice. 

Submissions containing CBI should be 

sent to Kay McIver, DOT, PHMSA– 

PHP–80, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590–0001. Any 

commentary PHMSA receives that is not 

specifically designated as CBI will be 

placed in the public docket for this 

matter. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

General: Ms. Kay McIver by telephone 

at 202–366–0113, or by email at 

kay.mciver@dot.gov. 

Technical: Mr. Steve Nanney by 

telephone at 713–272–2855, or by email 

at steve.nanney@dot.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: PHMSA 

received a special permit request from 

NGPL, a subsidiary of Kinder Morgan, 

Inc., seeking a waiver from the 

requirements of 49 CFR 192.611(a) and 

(d): Change in class location: