FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH M. ARPAIO, Sheriff,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10448

D.C. No.

2:16-cr-01012-SRB-1

ORDER

Filed April 17, 2018

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, William A. Fletcher,

and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

Order;

Dissent by Judge Tallman
2 UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

In an appeal from the district court’s denial of former

Maricopa CountySheriff Joseph Arpaio’srequest—following

a Presidential pardon—for vacatur of his criminal-contempt

conviction, a motions panel issued an order appointing a

special prosecutor to defend the district court’s decision after

the United States informed this Court that it does not intend

to defend it.

The panel held that it has authority to appoint counsel

under Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a)(2); and that, independently, it

has inherent authority to appoint a special counsel to

represent a position abandoned by the United States on

appeal.

Dissenting, Judge Tallman wrote that it is unwise for this

Court to use its authority to appoint a private attorney at this

late stage to “prosecute” the appeal of a case the Government

already won, in the face of the Government’s continued

willingness to participate, and to countenance a surreptitious

use of the vacatur appeal to pursue an untimely attack on the

President’s constitutional authority to pardon.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO 3

COUNSEL

John Wilenchik and Dennis I. Wilenchik, Wilenchik &

Bartness P.C., Phoenix, Arizona; Mark D. Goldman,

Goldman & Zwillinger PLLC, Scottsdale, Arizona; for

Defendant-Appellant.

John D. Keller, Deputy Chief; James I. Pearce, Trial

Attorney; United States Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C.; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

ORDER

This case is on appeal from the district court’s denial of

Defendant-Appellant’s request for vacatur of his conviction

for criminal contempt. The validity of the district court’s

denial will be addressed by the merits panel assigned to this

case. We address only the question of whether to appoint a

special prosecutor to defend the district court’s decision in

light of the United States’ letter informing this Court that

“[t]he government does not intend to defend the district

court’s order.” For the reasons discussed below, we will

appoint a special prosecutor to provide briefing and argument

to the merits panel.

I. Background

Defendant-Appellant former Maricopa County Sheriff

Joseph M. Arpaio (“Sheriff Arpaio”) was referred for

criminal contempt on August 19, 2016. The United States

prosecuted Sheriff Arpaio and obtained a conviction on July

31, 2017. On August 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump
4 UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO

pardoned Sheriff Arpaio, noting that Sheriff Arpaio’s

sentencing was “set for October 5, 2017.”

On August 28, 2017, Sheriff Arpaio moved for two forms

of relief. First, Sheriff Arpaio moved “to dismiss this matter

with prejudice.” Second, Sheriff Arpaio asked the district

court “to vacate the verdict and all other orders in this matter,

as well as the Sentencing on October 5th.”

The district court granted Sheriff Arpaio’s first request. 

On October 4, 2017, the district court dismissed with

prejudice the action for criminal contempt. No timely notice

of appeal from the dismissal order was filed. We denied a

late-filed request for the appointment of counsel to “crossappeal the District Court’s Order dismissing the charges.”

The district court denied Sheriff Arpaio’s second request. 

On October 19, 2017, the district court denied vacatur and

refused to grant “relief beyond dismissal with prejudice.” 

That same day, Sheriff Arpaio filed a timely notice of appeal. 

In response to a request for the appointment of counsel to

“defend the District Court’s Order denying Arpaio’s request

for vacatur,” we ordered the United States to “file a statement

indicating whether it intends to enter an appearance and file

an answering brief in this appeal.”

The United States responded that it “does not intend to

defend the district court’s order from October 19, 2017 . . . ;

instead, the government intends to argue, as it did in the

district court, that the motion to vacate should have been

granted.” The United States took “no position on whether the

Court should appoint counsel to make any additional

arguments.”
UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO 5

II. Discussion

Because the United States has abandoned any defense of

the district court’s decision with respect to vacatur, the merits

panel of our court that will decide this appeal will not receive

the benefit of full briefing and argument unless we appoint a

special prosecutor to defend the decision of the district court. 

For the reasons that follow, we will appoint a special

prosecutor.

First, we conclude that we have the authority to appoint

counsel under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42, which

prescribes procedures for dealing with criminal contempt. 

Rule 42(a)(2) provides:

Appointing a Prosecutor. The court must

request that the contempt be prosecuted by an

attorney for the government, unless the

interest of justice requires the appointment of

another attorney. If the government declines

the request, the court must appoint another

attorney to prosecute the contempt.

In Rule 42(a)(2)’s most common application, the district

court appoints a special prosecutor to investigate and try a

criminal contempt when the government declines to perform

that function. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S.

693, 725 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 42(a)(2) allows a court to appoint a

private attorney to investigate and prosecute potential

instances of criminal contempt.”).

But the operation of Rule 42(a)(2) is not confined to

investigations and trials in the district court. A private
6 UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO

attorney appointed under the rule has the authority to act as

a special prosecutor not only in the district court but also in

the court of appeals. See, e.g., Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton

et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 808–09 (1987) (invalidating the

appointment of special prosecutor because he was an

interested party, not because he prosecuted an appeal); United

States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 827, 831–32 (2d Cir. 1995)

(accepting without comment a special prosecutor’s briefing

and argument in an appeal by a contemnor); Matter of

Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1345 (1st Cir. 1986)

(same). Our attention has not been directed to, nor have we

found, a case in which a special prosecutor was appointed by

a court of appeals after the government declined to oppose the

contemnor’s arguments on appeal. However, we see no

reason why such appointment should not take place under

Rule 42(a)(2).

Second, independent of any authority under Rule

42(a)(2), we have inherent authority to appoint a special

counsel to represent a position abandoned by the United

States on appeal. “[I]t is long settled that courts possess

inherent authority to initiate contempt proceedings for

disobedience to their orders, authority which necessarily

encompasses the ability to appoint a private attorney to

prosecute the contempt.” Young, 481 U.S. at 793. “The fact

that we have come to regard criminal contempt as a crime in

the ordinary sense does not mean that any prosecution of

contempt must now be considered an execution of the

criminal law in which only the Executive Branch may

engage.” Id. at 799–800 (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

The long-standing practice of the United States Supreme

Court is to use its inherent authority to appoint disinterested
UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO 7

counsel to represent the position taken by the United States

below when the United States refuses to defend its prior

position. See United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 693

(4th Cir. 1982) (“When the government confesses error in the

Supreme Court, and thus abandons a position taken in a lower

court, the Court commonly appoints an amicus to assert the

abandoned cause.”) (citing cases); Letter to Anton Metlitsky,

Esq., Lucia v. SEC, No. 17-130 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2018) (inviting

a private attorney “to brief and argue this case, as amicus

curiae, in support of the judgment below”); Brief for the

Respondent at 9–10, Lucia v. SEC, No. 17-130 (U.S. Nov. 29,

2017) (notifying the Court that the government would no

longer defend the decision below and urging the Court to

“appoint an amicus curiae” to do so).

The Supreme Court has relied on its inherent judicial

power to appoint appellate counsel specifically in the context

of contempt. In United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485

U.S. 693 (1988), the Court held that a special prosecutor

appointed under Rule 42 needs the permission of the Solicitor

General to litigate a contempt case in the Supreme Court. Id.

at 699 n.5. The Court noted that the independence of the

judiciary “might appear to be threatened” by this holding,

especially in cases in which the contemnor was convicted by

the district court, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the

Solicitor General refused to either defend the judgment below

or authorize the special prosecutor to do so. Id. at 703–04. 

However, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]his threat . . .

is inconsequential” because of the Court’s inherent authority

to appoint an amicus to appear before the Court to defend the

judgment below: “[I]t is well within this Court’s authority to

appoint an amicus curiae to file briefs and present oral

argument in support of that judgment.” Id. at 704.
8 UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO

Conclusion

We will appoint special counsel and address all other

pending motions by separate order.

SO ORDERED.

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Amici ask us to appoint a private attorney under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 42(a)(2) to defend the

district court’s Order denying Defendant/Appellant Joseph

Arpaio’s request for vacatur of his criminal contempt

conviction. Rule 42(a)(2) is not applicable here. Arpaio

effectively conceded his guilt by accepting the pardon, and

there is no need for more investigation, presentation of

evidence, or further proceedings to determine if the equitable

relief of vacatur is appropriate. The United States has told us

it is not abdicating its responsibility to represent the

Government’s interest in this appeal. Nor do amici attempt

to hide the true purpose of their request—to challenge the

underlying pardon. But the constitutionality of the

President’s pardon is not at issue in Arpaio’s current appeal;

the denial of Arpaio’s motion for vacatur of his conviction is. 

The request is inappropriate. My colleagues’ decision to

appoint separate counsel now is therefore ill-advised and

unnecessary. I respectfully dissent.

I

Following his pardon on August 25, 2017, Arpaio moved

to dismiss his criminal contempt conviction with prejudice
UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO 9

and for vacatur of the record. On October 4, 2017, an able

United States district judge found that the pardon was valid,

dismissed the action for criminal contempt, entered that order

on the public docket, and closed the case. The order also

denied amici’s motion to appoint a Rule 42 attorney, but

reserved ruling on Arpaio’s additional request for vacatur. 

After considering further briefing on whether to vacate, the

district court denied the request for vacatur on October 19,

2017, and Arpaio timely appealed.

Amici initially wanted us to appoint a special prosecutor

to both defend the October 19 vacatur order and file a notice

of appeal from the district court’s earlier October 4 dismissal

order. We denied amici’s motion in part, however, because

under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(B)(ii), the

time for filing an appeal to challenge the constitutionality of

the pardon had run. Nov. 22 Order, Dkt. 9; see United States

v. Wheeler, 952 F.2d 326, 327 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] district

court’s order refusing to vacate an underlying contempt order

is nonappealable when the ground on which vacatur is sought

existed at the time the contempt order was entered and the

contemnor failed to appeal timely from that order.”). In

short, the basis for our November 22 Order was that amici

were too late because they missed the deadline to raise a

constitutional challenge to the earlier order.

We also asked the United States to state its intentions

regarding Arpaio’s separate vacatur appeal. The Government

responded that it had entered an appearance and “intends to

represent the government’s interests in this appeal.” The

Government explained that, instead of defending the district

court’s October 19 order, it “intends to argue . . . that the

motion to vacate should have been granted.” That ought to

have been the end of the matter.
10 UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO

But because the United States has chosen not to defend

the vacatur order, amici now assert that the Government is

declining to prosecute Arpaio’s criminal contempt conviction

and that we are required to appoint special counsel. 

Regrettably, my colleagues in the majority agree. Sound

judicial discretion instead counsels that we should deny the

request and not appoint a special prosecutor at this late date

in the case.

II

The request to appoint a private lawyer under Rule

42(a)(2), in place of the United States, is inappropriate now

because it effectively gives interested parties an avenue to

belatedly appeal the pardon’s effect on successful conviction,

despite the Government’s continued participation.

A

The criminal contempt case was successfully prosecuted

by the United States, which did not hesitate or decline to

prosecute. No useful purpose would be served by appointing

a new prosecutor now.

Rule 42(a)(2) was developed for a very different purpose

than employed here. “Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

42(a)(2) allows a court to appoint a private attorney to

investigate and prosecute potential instances of criminal

contempt.”1 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2673

1 Rule 42(a)(2) states in whole, “Appointing a Prosecutor. The

court must request that the contempt be prosecuted by an attorney for the

government, unless the interest of justice requires the appointment of
UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO 11

(2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). In

recognizing the power of the judiciary to appoint special

prosecutors, the Court stated in Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton

et Fils S.A. that “[t]he prosecutor is appointed solely to pursue

the public interest in vindication of the court’s authority.” 

481 U.S. 787, 804 (1987) (emphasis added). Accordingly,

“[a] private attorney appointed to prosecute a criminal

contempt therefore certainly should be as disinterested as a

public prosecutor who undertakes such a prosecution.”2

 Id.

The need for special counsel is over. The United States

secured a contempt conviction at trial and any affront to the

court’s authority was vindicated. We have observed that a

prosecutor, as part of the prosecutorial power to punish a

putative contemnor, “can gather evidence and investigate

matters more thoroughly than a court can at an evidentiary

hearing alone. He or she can also serve to shorten the length

of trial by culling through evidence and witnesses beforehand

to determine which are relevant and credible.” F.J. Hanshaw

Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1140

(9th Cir. 2001).

But these powers of prosecution do not ̄and should

not ̄extend to tangential matters of end-of-case recordanother attorney. If the government declines the request, the court must

appoint another attorney to prosecute the contempt.”

2 Amici do not appear disinterested. Given that the law firm serving

as the primary signor for amici represented President Trump’s former

political rival, Hillary Clinton, their possible opposing interests should at

least preclude them from appointment as special counsel, as they

requested. Young, 481 U.S. at 811 (“[A]ppointment of an interested

prosecutor creates an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in

the fairness of the criminal justice system in general.”).
12 UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO

keeping or vacatur of the record of a successful conviction

following a pardon. This is not why Rule 42(a)(2) exists. It

exists to ensure the judiciary “has a means to vindicate its

own authority without complete dependence on other

Branches.” Young, 481 U.S. at 796. It also applies when the

government is ineligible or otherwise declines to prosecute. 

See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Am. Nat. Cellular, 868 F.2d 315, 318–20

(9th Cir. 1989) (analyzing factors that contribute to a party’s

ineligibility to prosecute criminal contempt charges); In re

Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding

that the appointment of a special prosecutor was appropriate

where the government attorneys were the possible source of

the leak of information underlying the criminal contempt

prosecution).

Here, the district court’s authority was vindicated when

Arpaio was convicted of criminal contempt. Its authoritywill

not be usurped if that conviction is vacated in light of the

pardon, or if the court of appeals ultimately affirms the

district court’s refusal to annul it from the defendant’s record.

B

The Government has also never declined to prosecute this

case. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a)(2) (“If the government

declines the request [to prosecute a contempt charge], the

court must appoint another attorney to prosecute the

contempt.”). It maintains that it continues to represent the

public (and the Executive) interest in the vacatur proceedings. 

Amici, however, would have us believe that because the

United States supports the vacatur, such action is tantamount

to the Government declining to prosecute a criminal contempt

conviction. But they cite no cases for the proposition that

Rule 42 requires appointing a special prosecutor where, as
UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO 13

here, the Government has already successfully obtained a

conviction, but the President has pardoned the contemnor.

Nor does “the interest of justice” mandate that the

Government be precluded from continuing to act as a

prosecutor so the record of Arpaio’s conviction may be

maintained. Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a)(2). And because the

pardon does not erase Arpaio’s guilt or expunge the fact of

the judgment, there is no underlying affront to the court’s

authority stemming from criminal contempt left to vindicate. 

See In re North, 62 F.3d 1434, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(“Because a pardon does not blot out guilt or expunge a

judgment of conviction, one can conclude that a pardon does

not blot out probable cause of guilt or expunge an

indictment.”).

Even if some future merits panel subsequently reversed

the district court’s vacatur order denying Arpaio’s request,

the special prosecutor would still need the Solicitor General’s

approval to file a petition for writ of certiorari to the United

States Supreme Court. United States v. Providence Journal

Co., 485 U.S. 693, 706–07 (1988). This seems highly

unlikely given the Government’s current litigating position. 

Arpaio was convicted, pardoned, and all that remains is a

matter of record-keeping as to the fact of his conviction.

Given the Government’s continued participation in this

case, our appointment now of a special prosecutor to advance

a litigating position different from that pursued by the United

States Department of Justice makes it appear as though we

are appointing another prosecutor because we have prejudged

the case and disagree with the Government’s position. In

light of this appearance of judicial bias, we should respect the

Government’s position and remain impartial on the matter. 
14 UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO

See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393

U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (“[A]ny tribunal permitted by law to try

cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also

must avoid even the appearance of bias.”); Code of Conduct

for United States Judges, 175 F.R.D. 363, 364–66 (1998).

C

More worrisome still is that amici seemingly want a

special prosecutor appointed just to take another stab at

attacking the pardon on constitutional grounds after they

failed to timely appeal. See Amici Curiae’s Reply to

Statement of the United States, Dkt. 13, at 1 (“[T]he need for

a Rule 42 attorney is particularly acute in this case given the

unprecedented nature of the Pardon and the novel and

important constitutional issues it raises.”); Brief for Amici

Curiae, Dkt. 5, at 1 (“[P]roposed amici have a profound

interest in ensuring that the constitutionality of President

Trump’s extraordinary pardon of Arpaio is reviewed by this

Court.”); Motion for Leave for Erwin Chemerinsky, Michael

E. Tigar, and Jane B. Tigar to Participate as Amici Curiae,

Dkt. 18, at 3–23 (proposed amici spend three pages

addressing vacatur, and nineteen subsequent pages addressing

the validity of the pardon).

The Supreme Court has already ruled that the President

has the power to pardon criminal contempt convictions. Ex

parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 122 (1925). And we have

already ruled that amici missed the deadline for arguing the

merits of such an appeal. It’s time amici let go of that issue.
UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO 15

III

It is an unwise use of our authority to appoint a private

attorney at this late stage to (1) “prosecute” the appeal of a

case the Government already won, (2) in the face of the

Government’s continued willingness to participate, and (3) to

countenance a surreptitious use of the vacatur appeal to

pursue an untimely attack on the President’s constitutional

authority to pardon. I fear the majority’s decision will be

viewed as judicial imprimatur of the special prosecutor to

make inappropriate, unrelated, and undoubtedly political

attacks on Presidential authority. We should not be wading

into that thicket.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.