U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

89–010 

" ! SENATE 

111TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

2010

111–199 

ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACK ON 

NORTHWEST AIRLINES FLIGHT 253 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

together with 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

MAY 24, 2010.—Ordered to be printed 


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DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

ORRIN HATCH, Utah 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

DAVID GRANNIS, Staff Director 

LOUIS B. TUCKER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 


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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC, May 20, 2010. 

Hon. ROBERT C. BYRD, 

President pro tempore, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We are pleased to file today, as a Senate 

report, the Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the 

Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253. 

Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976) charges the 

Committee with the duty to oversee and make continuing studies 

of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States 

Government, and to report to the Senate concerning those activities 

and programs. Pursuant to its responsibilities under Senate Resolution 400, the Committee has undertaken an in-depth examination 

of the matters described in the report. 

The portion of the report that we are submitting for printing is 

the unclassified Executive Summary and unclassified Additional 

Views. The remainder of the report contains highly classified information. For that reason it is being held in the secure facilities of 

the Select Committee on Intelligence where it will be available to 

Members of the Senate for reading. Both the unclassified and classified portions of the report are also being provided to appropriately cleared officials of the Executive Branch. Officials of the 

Executive Branch have already had an opportunity to review the 

report for classification purposes. 

Sincerely, 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 

Chairman. 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, 

Vice Chairman. 


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C O N T E N T S 

Committee Letter of Transmittal to Senate .......................................................... III 

Unclassified Executive Summary ........................................................................... 1 

Background ....................................................................................................... 1 

Committee Investigation .................................................................................. 1 

Background on Report ...................................................................................... 1 

Findings and Conclusions ................................................................................ 1 

Committee Action ............................................................................................. 3 

Note on Historical Hindsight ........................................................................... 3 

Unclassified Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations ......................... 3 

Unclassified Additional Views of Senators Chambliss and Burr ......................... 10 


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1SSCI Press Release, ‘‘Intelligence Committee Announces Hearings into Failed Christmas Day 

Terrorism Attack,’’ available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=321274 2 50 U.S.C. 404o(d). 

Unclassified Executive Summary of the Committee Report on the 

Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 

Background: On December 25, 2009, a 23-year-old Nigerian 

man, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (hereafter Abdulmutallab) attempted to detonate a concealed nonmetallic device containing the 

explosive pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan, as the plane 

was descending into Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport. 

Committee Investigation: Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) 

announced on December 31, 2009, that the Committee would conduct hearings on the attempted Christmas Day terrorist attack and 

‘‘collect all intelligence related to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab held 

by various intelligence agencies in order to determine who had 

what, and how the information was handled. In addition, the Committee [would] review national security policies on sharing information and terrorist watchlisting.’’ 1

Background on Report: This report contains information gathered by the Committee through hearings, briefings, and document 

requests from the following agencies: 

• Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 

• National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 

• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

• National Security Agency (NSA) 

• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

• Department of State 

• Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—including agencies 

under its purview, such as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). 

Findings and Conclusions: The Committee found there were 

systemic failures across the Intelligence Community (IC), which 

contributed to the failure to identify the threat posed by 

Abdulmutallab. Specifically, the NCTC was not organized adequately to fulfill its missions. Following 9/11, Congress created the 

NCTC and charged it with serving as ‘‘the primary organization in 

the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government 

pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism. . . .’’ 2 In practice, 

however, the Committee found that no one agency saw itself as 

being responsible for tracking and identifying all terrorism threats. 

In addition, technology across the IC is not adequate to provide 


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search enhancing tools for analysts, which contributed to the failure of the IC to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat. 

The SSCI report identifies fourteen specific points of failure—a 

series of human errors, technical problems, systemic obstacles, analytical misjudgments, and competing priorities—which resulted in 

Abdulmutallab being able to travel to the United States on December 25, 2009. Those points of failure are: 

1. The State Department Did Not Revoke Abdulmutallab’s U.S. 

Visa. 

2. Abdulmutallab Was Not Placed in the ‘‘Terrorist Screening 

Database’’ (TSDB), on the Selectee List, or on the No Fly List. 

3. Reporting Was Not Distributed to All Appropriate CIA Elements. 

4. A CIA Regional Division, at CIA Headquarters, Did Not 

Search Databases Containing Reports Related to Abdulmutallab. 

5. CIA Did Not Disseminate Key Reporting Until after the 12/25 

Attempted Attack. 

6. A CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC) Office’s Limited Name 

Search Failed to Uncover the Key Reports on Abdulmutallab. 

7. CIA CTC Analysts Failed to Connect the Reporting on 

Abdulmutallab. 

8. FBI Counterterrorism Analysts Could Not Access All Relevant 

Reports. 

9. NCTC’s Directorate of Intelligence Failed to Connect the Reporting on Abdulmutallab. 

10. NCTC’s Watchlisting Office Did Not Conduct Additional Research to Find Additional Derogatory Information to Place 

Abdulmutallab on a Watchlist. 

11. NSA Did Not Pursue Potential Collection Opportunities That 

Could Have Provided Information on Abdulmutallab. 

12. Analysts Did Not Connect Key Reports Partly Identifying 

Abdulmutallab and Failed to Ensure Dissemination of All Relevant 

Reporting. 

13. NSA Did Not Nominate Abdulmutallab for Watchlisting or 

the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) Based on 

Information Partly Identifying Him. 

14. Intelligence Analysts Were Primarily Focused on Al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Threats to U.S. Interests in Yemen, 

Rather than on Potential AQAP Threats to the U.S. Homeland. 

Based on the information provided, the Committee concludes 

that the Intelligence Community failed to connect and appropriately analyze the information in its possession prior to December 25, 2009 that would have identified Abdulmutallab as a possible terrorist threat to the United States. The Committee believes 

the IC, and other parts of the U.S. Government, should have taken 

steps to prevent Abdulmutallab from boarding Northwest Flight 

253 to Detroit, Michigan, on Christmas Day. 

Points of failure #1 and #2 relate to failures of the systems and 

procedures in place to prevent suspected terrorists from entering 

the United States. Points of failure #3 through #14 discuss why the 

relevant intelligence was not connected. Doing so may have led analysts to link sufficient threat and biographical information on 

Abdulmutallab to place him on the watchlists. 


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Committee Action: On March 16, 2010, the Committee unanimously approved a 55-page report and provided it to the Intelligence Community for a classification review. This unclassified Executive Summary was prepared based on that Intelligence Community review. 

On May 18, 2010, the Committee unanimously approved a motion to report to the Senate its ‘‘Report on the Attempted Terrorist 

Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253’’ which consists of (1) the 

publicly released unclassified Executive Summary together with 

Additional Views of Senators Chambliss and Burr, and (2) the previously adopted classified portion of the report which shall be retained by the Committee and available in its secure offices for 

reading by other Senators. 

In the classified portion of the Committee’s report, each point of 

failure includes a description, a Committee conclusion, Committee 

recommendations, and a discussion of the corrective actions being 

taken by the Intelligence Community. Because the other parts of 

the report remain classified, this Executive Summary only contains 

unclassified portions of the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations about each failure. 

The SSCI report also includes classified appendices which describe: (1) the intelligence collected on Abdulmutallab prior to the 

terrorist plot and what was or was not done with that intelligence; 

(2) the terrorist watchlisting process and standards as they existed 

at the time; and (3) additional biographical information on 

Abdulmutallab. 

In addition to the review conducted by the Committee, the Director of National Intelligence created an Intelligence Community Review Panel that was chaired by John McLaughlin, former Deputy 

Director of the CIA. That panel’s report endorsed three of the specific classified recommendations made by the SSCI report. The 

panel also disagreed with one of the Committee’s recommendations 

to expand access to certain counterterrorism information. The Committee stands by its recommendation. 

Note on Historical Hindsight: As is the case with many reports analyzing the past performance of the IC, the SSCI report 

presents information that was relevant to the Flight 253 plot in 

hindsight. Briefers and intelligence officials stated frequently that 

the intelligence described in the classified SSCI report was among 

thousands of other intelligence reports and that other terrorist 

threats were assessed to be more pressing at the time. Thus, while 

the SSCI report presents the information as it was known, and as 

it could have been known, the Committee recognizes the benefit of 

‘‘20–20 hindsight’’ in our evaluation of the IC’s performance. 

1. The State Department did not revoke Abdulmutallab’s U.S. visa 

Conclusion: 

The State Department could have revoked Abdulmutallab’s U.S. 

visa based on the information available to the Department. The 

State Department consular officer in Abuja, Nigeria should have 

used all of the tools available, including using ‘‘fuzzy logic’’ or a 

passport number, to search for a visa for Abdulmutallab. Had this 


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occurred, it is likely that Abdulmutallab’s active U.S. visa would 

have been located in the Department’s database. 

The State Department has an independent obligation to evaluate 

a non-U.S. person’s suitability for entry into the U.S., but instead 

relies on the IC’s assessment of whether an individual meets the 

standard for placement on the terrorist watchlists. The Committee 

believes Abdulmutallab’s visa should have been identified and revoked independently by the State Department based on the information provided to the consulate by other embassy officers, which 

included an assessment that Abdulmutallab should be watchlisted 

because of suspected ‘‘involvement with Yemeni-based extremists.’’ 

Recommendations: 

• The State Department must use its independent judgment and 

authority to revoke visas for anyone suspected of being involved 

with terrorism or a terrorist group, and must be able to do so in 

real-time in coordination with the Intelligence Community. 

• The Director of NCTC should make recommendations to deny 

or revoke a U.S. visa based on terrorism-related intelligence. In addition to exercising its own independent authority to revoke visas, 

the State Department should accept the Director of NCTC’s recommendations. 

• The State Department should develop a system for electronically notifying all airlines of individuals whose visas have been revoked. 

2. Abdulmutallab was not placed in the ‘‘Terrorist Screening Database’’ (TSDB), on the Selectee List, or on the No Fly List 

Conclusion: 

The standards to place an individual on the Terrorist Watchlists 

were interpreted too rigidly and may be too complicated to address 

terrorist threats. Although U.S. Embassy officials in Abuja recommended that Abdulmutallab be placed on the No Fly List, the 

determination was made at CIA Headquarters and at the NCTC 

Watchlisting Office that there was only sufficient derogatory information to enter Abdulmutallab’s information in the general ‘‘Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment’’ (TIDE) database, but not 

sufficient derogatory information to place him on any of the 

watchlists. Because of the language of the watchlisting standard, 

the manner in which it was being interpreted at the time, or both, 

analysts responsible for making the watchlisting determination did 

not believe they had the ability to give additional weight to significant pieces of information from the field, such as the report that 

resulted from the meeting with Abdulmutallab’s father. 

Recommendations: 

• The Administration, in consultation with Congress, should simplify, strengthen, and add flexibility to watchlisting practices to 

better protect the U.S. homeland. 

• Intelligence officers responsible for watchlisting terrorist suspects should have the flexibility to give added weight to significant 

information, such as recommendations from Chiefs of Station or 


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other experienced intelligence professionals, in determining whether to place an individual on a watchlist. 

3. Reporting was not distributed to all appropriate CIA elements 

Conclusion: 

The inconsistencies in distributing key intelligence reports may 

have contributed to the failure of the Intelligence Community to 

identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat. While there was no 

intent to limit access to the reports, processes failed to disseminate 

relevant intelligence to all offices and individuals with a need to 

know. 

Recommendations: 

• Classified recommendation excluded. 

4. A CIA Regional Division (at CIA Headquarters) did not search 

databases containing reports related to Abdulmutallab 

Conclusion: 

CIA had reports related to Abdulmutallab, but a regional division failed to search other databases that would have identified relevant information. CIA tasked this division with the responsibility, 

but not the tools to adequately identify terrorism-related reporting. 

Inadequate technological search tools and the fragmented nature of 

the Intelligence Community’s databases made it difficult to find additional intelligence related to Abdulmutallab. 

Recommendations: 

• The Director of the CIA should report to the congressional intelligence committees within 30 days on the increased access to its 

all-source counterterrorism database. The report should include the 

total number of personnel with increased access and the positions 

these individuals occupy. 

• Classified recommendation excluded. 

5. CIA did not disseminate key reporting until after the 12/25 attempted attack 

Conclusion: 

Had the CIA intelligence report been disseminated, other intelligence officers outside of the CIA and NCTC who tracked intelligence on Yemen and AQAP may have made the connection between the information provided. 

Recommendations: 

• The CIA should set standards to ensure that all intelligence reports are disseminated promptly—within two days for counterterrorism and all other high priority issues. 

• The CIA and other intelligence agencies must ensure that critical intelligence functions are not delayed when personnel are temporarily deployed to other assignments. 

• The CIA should provide broader access to operational traffic 

for all analysts with a need to know, whether those analysts are 


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employed by the CIA or by another agency in the Intelligence Community. 

6. A CIA CTC office’s limited name search failed to uncover the key 

reports on Abdulmutallab 

Conclusion: 

CTC conducted a limited name search of CIA’s all-source database, which included key reports on Abdulmutallab, to determine 

if there was other available information. Because of the limited nature of the search, it failed to uncover key reports on 

Abdulmutallab. Thus, CTC failed to draw the link between 

Abdulmutallab’s father’s information and the key reports. 

7. CIA CTC analysts failed to connect reporting on Abdulmutallab 

Conclusion: 

The failure of CIA CTC analysts to connect the reporting contributed to the failure of the Intelligence Community to identify 

Abdulmutallab as a potential threat. Like other Intelligence Community analysts, according to CIA, CTC analysts were focused on 

Yemen-based AQAP-related threats and supporting operations to 

counter these threats. 

Recommendations for 6 and 7: 

• The Director of the CIA should ensure that CIA personnel understand their responsibility to connect related all-source information and disseminate all possible threat reporting, particularly reports that might help identify homeland threats. 

• The DNI should develop a comprehensive plan to implement 

advanced information technology systems that can draw connections among related intelligence reports and assist in the 

prioritization of terrorism threat streams. The DNI should notify 

congressional intelligence committees of the progress made in implementing the plan on a biannual basis. 

8. FBI counterterrorism analysts could not access all relevant reports 

Conclusion: 

The misconfiguration of an analyst’s computer profile prevented 

her from accessing relevant intelligence reports, despite their existence in FBI systems. Had the FBI counterterrorism analyst’s computer profile been configured appropriately, the analyst may have 

been able to identify the threat stream on Abdulmutallab. 

Recommendations: 

• The Director of the FBI should conduct a review of FBI’s information technology systems to ensure all FBI analysts have access 

to the necessary intelligence databases and that the FBI information systems are appropriately configured to support intelligence 

analysis. The Director should provide a report to the congressional 

intelligence committees within 90 days on the changes made as a 

result of this review. 


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3 50 U.S.C. 404o(d). 

4 50 U.S.C. 404o(d). 

9. NCTC’s Directorate of Intelligence failed to connect the reporting 

on Abdulmutallab 

Conclusion: 

NCTC personnel had the responsibility and the capability to connect the key reporting with the other relevant reporting. The 

NCTC was not adequately organized and did not have resources 

appropriately allocated to fulfill its missions. 

NCTC has the primary role within the IC to bring together and 

assess all-source terrorism-related intelligence. One of the NCTC’s 

missions, as outlined in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), is: 

‘‘to serve as the primary organization in the United 

States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism . . .’’ 3

NCTC has the primary role within the IC to bring together and 

assess all-source terrorism-related intelligence. Prior to 12/25, 

NCTC’s Directorate of Intelligence was not staffed adequately and 

analysts were not tasked to track or identify all threat streams related to the AQAP threat to the U.S. homeland. Like other analysts 

in the Intelligence Community, NCTC’s analysts were primarily focused on Yemen-based AQAP-related threats. 

Recommendations: 

• The Director of the NCTC should ensure that all NCTC analysts understand their responsibility to connect related all-source 

information and disseminate all possible threat reporting, particularly reports that might help identify homeland threats. 

• The Director of the NCTC should ensure that NCTC is organized and resourced to fulfill its responsibility to track, analyze, 

and report on all terrorist threats to the United States emanating 

from terrorist groups overseas. 

• Classified recommendation excluded. 

10. NCTC’s Watchlisting Office did not conduct additional research 

to find additional derogatory information to place 

Abdulmutallab on a watchlist 

Conclusion: 

NCTC had the responsibility and the capability to connect the 

key intelligence reporting with the other relevant reporting. Doing 

so could have produced sufficient information to recommend that 

Abdulmutallab be placed on the terrorist watchlists. The NCTC 

was not adequately organized and did not have resources appropriately allocated to fulfill its missions. 

Under IRTPA a primary role of the NCTC is: 

‘‘to serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on 

known and suspected terrorists and international terror 

groups.’’ 4


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Prior to 12/25, NCTC’s standard practice was to process 

watchlisting information it received, but not to conduct additional 

analysis or enhance existing records with more derogatory information. Thus, even though NCTC created a basic terrorist record for 

Abdulmutallab in TIDE, NCTC did not conduct additional research 

to identify other intelligence related to Abdulmutallab—intelligence 

that may have placed Abdulmutallab in the TSDB, and potentially 

on the Selectee List, or the No Fly List. 

Recommendations: 

• NCTC should keep the congressional intelligence committees 

fully informed of resources needed to perform the watchlisting 

function without compromising its other missions. 

11. NSA did not pursue potential collection opportunities that could 

have provided information on Abdulmutallab 

Conclusion: 

NSA did not take all available actions which contributed to the 

failure of the Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as 

a potential threat. 

Recommendations: 

• Classified recommendation excluded. 

• Classified recommendation excluded. 

• Classified recommendation excluded. 

12. Analysts did not connect key reports partly identifying 

Abdulmutallab and failed to ensure dissemination of all relevant reporting 

Conclusion: 

The failure of analysts to connect and disseminate all relevant 

reports may have contributed to the failure of the Intelligence 

Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat. 

Recommendations: 

• Classified recommendation excluded. 

• Classified recommendation excluded. 

• Classified recommendation excluded. 

13. NSA did not nominate Abdulmutallab for watchlisting or the 

Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) based on information partly identifying him 

Conclusion: 

The policy of not making nominations to TIDE based on information partly identifying Abdulmutallab may have contributed to the 

failure of the Intelligence Community to identify him as a potential 

threat. 

Recommendations: 

• NSA should immediately clear the backlog of reports that require review for watchlisting. 


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• NCTC should change its practices to allow for nominations to 

TIDE of partially identifying or other incomplete information to assist in enhancing terrorist identities records and other agencies 

should change their policies accordingly. 

14. Intelligence analysts were primarily focused on AQAP threats to 

U.S. interests in Yemen, rather than on potential AQAP threats 

to U.S. homeland 

Conclusion: 

Analysts’ competing priorities contributed to the failure of the Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential 

threat. Prior to the 12/25 plot, counterterrorism analysts at NCTC, 

CIA, and NSA were focused on the threat of terrorist attacks in 

Yemen, but were not focused on the possibility of AQAP attacks 

against the U.S. homeland. These other priorities contributed to 

the failure of analysts to recognize and collate the several pieces 

of intelligence reporting that mentioned Abdulmutallab. 

Recommendations: 

• The DNI should review the roles and responsibilities of 

counterterrorism analysts throughout the Intelligence Community 

to ensure that all agencies understand their counterterrorism role, 

their role in identifying and analyzing threats to the U.S. homeland, and that counterterrorism analysts actively collaborate across 

the Intelligence Community to identify such threats. This review 

should also investigate how to expand access to counterterrorism 

intelligence throughout the Intelligence Community, including 

whether counterterrorism analysts within each IC component 

should be provided access to all counterterrorism intelligence. In 

conducting this review, the DNI should be mindful of the intent of 

Congress to give NCTC the primary role and responsibility within 

the IC to bring together and assess all-source terrorism-related intelligence in IRTPA. The DNI should report the results of this review to congressional intelligence committees within 60 days. 

• The DNI should examine whether adequate intelligence resources are directed against the homeland threat. 

[The classified portion of the report is available for reading by Members of the Senate in the offices of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence] 


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1 50 U.S.C. 404o(d). 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS CHAMBLISS AND BURR 

I. BACKGROUND

As is illustrated throughout this report, there were a number of 

technical or human errors by the CIA, NSA, the State Department, 

and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) which led to the 

Intelligence Community’s collective failure to identify 

Abdulmutallab as a terrorist threat to the U.S. In testimony before 

Congress, DNI Blair stated that ‘‘this was not—like in 2001—a failure to collect or share intelligence; rather it was a failure to connect, integrate, and understand the intelligence we had.’’ However, 

as Members who participated in the Joint Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence into Intelligence Community Activities 

Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (the 

Congressional ‘‘Joint Inquiry’’), we respectfully disagree. Some of 

the systemic errors this review identified also were cited as failures 

prior to 9/11. 

Following 9/11, several investigations, including the Congressional Joint Inquiry, examined the intelligence failures that led to 

that atrocious attack, and, overwhelmingly, found that the Intelligence Community was severely inhibited by information stovepipes, lacked effective technological tools, and in many cases was 

not aggressive enough to identify terrorist plots. These failures resulted in an Intelligence Community that was not well positioned 

to identify and disrupt terrorist threats. 

As a result of these findings, Congress passed the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). One of the primary 

goals of this legislation was to create one place in the Intelligence 

Community—the NCTC—where all terrorism related information 

could be integrated and analyzed. The IRTPA defines NCTC’s primary missions, including: 

‘‘to serve as the primary organization in the United 

States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism . . .’’ 

and 

‘‘to serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on 

known and suspected terrorists and international terror 

groups.’’ 1

In addition, the IRTPA directs that the Director of NCTC shall 

have the role and responsibility to ‘‘disseminate terrorism information, including current threat information’’ and ‘‘have primary reVerDate Mar 15 2010 08:47 May 26, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 E:\HR\OC\SR199.XXX SR199

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2 50 U.S.C. 404o(f)(1)(G). 

3 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 

Report (W.W. Norton & Co., 2004). p. 93. 4 NCTC Response to SSCI, March 11, 2010. 

5 NCTC Response to SSCI, March 11, 2010. 

sponsibility within the United States Government for conducting 

net assessments of terrorist threats.’’ 2

II. NCTC FAILED TO FULFILL ITS MISSION

IRTPA was to have corrected the problems identified after 9/11 

by making NCTC responsible and accountable for all terrorism related intelligence analysis. Instead, the Committee found in this review that no one agency believes its analysts are responsible for 

tracking and identifying all terrorist threats, essentially the same 

problem identified six years ago by the 9/11 Commission, which 

found ‘‘the intelligence community’s confederated structure left 

open the question of who really was in charge of the entire U.S. 

intelligence effort’’ 3 to combat terrorism. 

Despite its statutory mission, NCTC did not believe it was the 

sole agency in the IC for piecing together all terrorism threats. In 

fact, in a response to the Committee, NCTC stated, ‘‘no one entity 

within the IC has sole responsibility nor bears the entire burden 

of either connecting dots or accountability for failing to do so.’’ 4

Further, NCTC stated to staff that it focused primarily on providing strategic, or high level, terrorism assessments, and providing support to senior policymakers. No one at NCTC was given 

responsibility for tracking all terrorist threats thoroughly or 

searching for additional intelligence related to a threat. NCTC’s 

daily threat reports, ‘‘Threats and Threads,’’ tracked only the most 

serious threats. All lower priority threats are not examined by any 

one office at NCTC. Yet, a lower priority threat that succeeds, as 

the 12/25 plot almost did, would most definitely be seen as a serious attack by al-Qa’ida. 

NCTC was created to be the central knowledge bank for all terrorism related information. As such, it is the only Intelligence Community agency with access to all intelligence databases as well as 

law enforcement information. Its unique role and access to information make it best suited to be responsible for integrating all intelligence—and connecting the dots—on any one particular threat, as 

well as, to provide comprehensive strategic terrorism assessments. 

However, NCTC failed to organize itself in a manner consistent 

with Congress’ intent or in a manner that would clearly identify its 

roles and responsibilities necessary to complete its mission. 

III. TEAM EFFORTS DO NOT NEGATE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY

NCTC believes that tracking terrorist threats should be a team 

effort, and ‘‘without a clearly identified ‘lane of responsibility’.’’ 5

We disagree. Terrorism analysts throughout the Intelligence Community often perform overlapping analysis, repetition designed to 

identify oversights by any one agency. This duplication serves as 

a valuable check and balance—and enhances security. In this case, 

both CIA and NCTC had access to all the relevant reporting on 

Abdulmutallab and either agency could have connected them, however, neither identified the intelligence as a threat stream. OverVerDate Mar 15 2010 08:47 May 26, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 E:\HR\OC\SR199.XXX SR199

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6 Joint Inquiry, p. 54. 

lapping efforts can help reduce the risk of one agency overlooking 

a threat, but these additional efforts cannot replace the need for 

one primary agency to have ultimate responsibility for this mission. 

As such, NCTC’s failure to understand its fundamental and primary missions is a significant failure and remains so today. 

IV. TECHNOLOGY IS STILL A PROBLEM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

The Congressional Joint Inquiry, that we participated in, found 

in 2002 that, ‘‘While technology remains one of this nation’s greatest advantages, it has not been fully and most effectively applied 

in support of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Persistent problems in 

this area included a lack of collaboration between Intelligence Community agencies, a reluctance to develop and implement new technical capabilities aggressively, the FBI’s reliance on outdated and 

insufficient technical systems, and the absence of a central counterterrorism database.’’ 6 This remains a problem today. 

As this Committee review noted, technology across the Intelligence Community still is not adequate to provide search enhancing tools for analysts. Several of the intelligence analysts involved 

in the Abdulmutallab case said that they were unable to link together the various reports on Abdulmutallab due to the struggle to 

balance searching the large volume of terrorism-related intelligence 

available with their daily workloads. The large number of intelligence databases compounded this problem by forcing some analysts and collectors to search multiple databases. NCTC officials 

told Committee staff that NCTC does not have the technical ability 

to follow or process all leads. Rather, NCTC is dependent on its 

personnel to conduct complex searches in multiple intelligence 

databases and to rely on the memory and knowledge of those analysts to link intelligence. CIA has similar problems with its main 

all-source counterterrorism database. This remains a problem 

today. 

V. CONCLUSION

Almost nine years after 9/11, we are concerned about whether or 

not the Intelligence Community is organized effectively to identify 

and disrupt terrorist attacks. While we commend the Intelligence 

Community’s hard-working personnel for their dedicated and tireless service, we are concerned that the policies, procedures and 

technology that they must work within today are hampering their 

ability to detect in advance the next attack against the Homeland. 

We have seen terrorist organizations adapt and be agile in concealing their operations. They are unwavering, however, in their 

intent to strike the Homeland. In fact, since 12/25, Anwar al-Aulaqi 

called upon individuals to act independently and conduct attacks 

against the U.S. and other Western countries. 

We must ensure that NCTC understands its role and its responsibilities as the Mission Manager for counterterrorism, and that 

our analysts have the technological tools they require to search 

through large quantities of intelligence. Today, identifying terrorist 


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13 

operatives is the biggest challenge our Intelligence Community 

faces, and they should have all the support necessary to be successful in their mission. 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS. RICHARD BURR. 

Æ 


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