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EXAMINING PREPAREDNESS AND COORDINATION 

EFFORTS OF FIRST RESPONDERS ALONG THE 

SOUTHWEST BORDER 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY 

COMMUNICATIONS, 

PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 31, 2009 

Serial No. 111–13 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


Congress.#13
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

ERIE J.J. MASSA, New York 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

VACANCY 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Mississippi 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

LANIER AVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNER, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, PREPAREDNESS, 

AND RESPONSE 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas, Chairman 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

VACANCY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, (ex 

officio) 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York (ex officio) 

VE ́ RONIQUE PLUVIOSE-FENTON, Staff Director 

STEPHEN VINA ́, Staff Director 

DANIEL WILKINS, Clerk 

AMANDA HALPERN, Minority Subcommittee Lead 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, 

Preparedness, and Response: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Alabama, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency 

Communications, Preparedness, and Response ................................................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Mississippi, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security ......... 38 

The Honorable Anh ‘‘Joseph’’ Cao, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Louisiana ................................................................................................ 43 

The Honorable Emmanuel Cleaver, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Missouri .................................................................................................. 43 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 45 

The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California ................................................................................................ 48 

The Honorable Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Nevada .............................................................................................................. 53 

WITNESSES

Ms. Janice Ayala, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Investigations, 

Immigration and Department of Homeland security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

MG Peter Aylward, Director of the Joint Staff, National Guard Bureau: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 21 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22 

Dr. Richard C. Barth, Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

Sheriff Larry A. Dever, Cochise County, Arizona: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 30 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 31 

Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzalez, Jr., Zapata County, Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 23 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 26 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security—Press Release ...................................................................................... 6 

Letter to Hon. Janet Napolitano ............................................................................ 52 

APPENDIX

Letter: 

To Hon. Henry Cuellar ........................................................................................ 57 

Page

IV 

Questions and Responses: 

Responses from Dr. Richard C. Barth ................................................................ 58 

(1) 

EXAMINING PREPAREDNESS AND COORDINATION EFFORTS OF FIRST RESPONDERS 

ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER 

Tuesday, March 31, 2009 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, 

PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:59 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Henry Cuellar [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Cuellar, Thompson, Richardson, 

Cleaver, Titus, Rogers, Cao, and McCaul. 

Mr. CUELLAR. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee of Emergency Communications and Preparedness and Response will come to order. 

The subcommittee meeting today is to receive testimony regarding 

examining preparedness and coordination efforts of first responders 

along the Southwest border. 

Mr. Rogers? As you know, there is another meeting right now. 

There is a caucus meeting on Afghanistan and Pakistan. So we will 

get some of the other members to come and join us after a while, 

but we will go ahead and get started for the witnesses so they can 

go ahead and go on with their day. 

But on behalf of the members of the ubcommittee and the chairman also, I mean, the ranking member, let me welcome the witnesses from the Office on Policy of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE; the Department of Homeland Security; the National Guard Bureau, and the sheriffs from my home state of Texas 

and Arizona. 

Today’s hearing entitled, ‘‘Examining Preparedness and Coordination Efforts of First Responders Along the Southwest Border’’ is 

designed to assess the unique challenges that the federal, state, 

local, and tribal first responders face in border communities in 

light of the escalation of the drug cartel-related violence along the 

U.S.-Mexico border. 

Specifically, this hearing is an opportunity to discuss the emergency preparedness and response needs specific to the Southwest 

border states including cross-border communications and information sharing capabilities and multi-jurisdiction partnerships. 

Additionally, this hearing is an opportunity to examine the coordination and planning among international, federal, state, local, 

2 

and tribal governments to prevent drug cartels-related crimes from 

spreading into the U.S. 

By now, we have all heard the media reports that describe the 

heinous and brutal violence of the drug cartels in Mexico, who have 

been competing for the control of trafficking routes into the United 

States. 

In the past few years, we have learned of the assassinations of 

high-level government and law enforcement officials, horrific murders including beheadings, violent kidnappings, use of a growing 

and varied arsenal of high-power weapons, and the indiscriminate 

killing of civilians. 

What is more disturbing is that in 2008, more than 5,600 people 

in Mexico were killed in drug trafficking violence, a 110 percent increase over 2007. Of that number, 550 of the killed were law enforcement officials. 

Although we have been baffled by the battles of the Mexican 

drug cartel, there is a ever-growing concern of a spillover into the 

United States. As a member whose district includes the border city 

of Laredo, Texas, I can tell you that just last year, the city of 

Nuevo Laredo, which lies just across my district was gripped in terror at the hands of the cartels. 

Again, you know, working with the local sheriffs, worked with 

the state law enforcement, the Texas National Guard, the federal 

agencies, and of course, we have Janice Ayala and some of the folks 

that worked very hard to establish the BEST organization. 

DHS, as you know, got first started on Laredo BEST then from 

there it spread over to the concept across the nation. The Laredo 

does focus on the disruption of cross-border criminal activity related to narcotics smuggling, money laundering, human and weapons smuggling, transnational gangs and cross-border violence. 

As a result of this collaboration and coordination, the Laredo 

BEST helped stem the encroaching violence and protect our community. Unfortunately, the Mexican drug cartels moved their aggressiveness to our other border communities that could provide 

them with access routes to the United States. 

First responders from border communities tell me that the demand for drugs from this country, coupled with the illegal weapons 

going into Mexico, fuels the strength of the drug cartels in Mexico. 

But I remain convinced that a collective commitment to combat the 

efforts of those cartels will prevail. 

This is why we must support our first responders, who are the 

nation’s first line of defense. Thus coordinating policies and procedures at all levels of government to address border security and 

emergency preparedness as complementary—may expedite emergency response while improving homeland security on both sides of 

the border. 

That is why I have issued my support for the Merida Initiative 

and the president’s major Southwest Security Initiative that was 

announced last week. Our first responders need and deserve additional personnel, increased intelligence capacity, better coordination and the strategic redeployment of the 360 additional officers 

and agents at the border and in Mexico City. 

But I must also state that the only way we can address against 

the greed and the violence of drug cartels is by working together 

3 

as a team. I am disturbed by the reports of turf battle among federal agencies that now seek to threaten the success of the first responders at the state, local, and tribal communities. 

As the great Henry Ford stated, ‘‘Coming together is the beginning. Keeping together is progress. Working together is success.’’ 

As the chairman of this subcommittee, I will use my authority to 

conduct aggressive oversight that we can stamp out this unnecessary turf battles. Simply put, we cannot fight the turf battles of 

Mexican drug cartels if we are distracted by the turf battles of our 

own agencies. 

First responders must put their lives on the line everyday. So to 

them I say, one team, one fight. 

With that, I will look forward to hearing from Dr. Richard Barth, 

the acting assistant secretary from the Office of Policy of DHS. Dr. 

Barth will tell us how DHS is coordinating with other federal agencies, state, local, tribal communities, to increase the security of our 

homeland. 

Ms. Janice Ayala, the deputy assistant director of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE, will discuss the success of the 

BEST program and the other efforts of ICE toward a collective effort with its multi-jurisdictional partners. 

Major General Peter Aylward, who serves as the director of the 

Joint Staff at the National Guard Bureau will discuss the support 

of the Guard at the Southwest border to carry out border security 

initiatives. 

First witnesses, or the first responders, should I say, our final 

witnesses are our first responders, Sheriff Sigi Gonzalez of Zapata 

County and Sheriff Larry Dever of Cochise County in Arizona who 

will give the committee their perspectives of the first responders 

community along the Southwest border. 

And I certainly want to thank all the witnesses, the sheriffs, the 

National Guard, ICE and, of course, DHS for being here with us. 

I look forward to a robust discussion and the exchange of specific 

recommendations on these most-pressing issues, and that is one 

thing that as you all do your 5-minute presentations and answer 

some of the questions, one of the things that we will be asking is 

for suggestions on how we can go ahead and coordinate. 

We just finished a classified briefing just, I guess, about an hour 

ago with all the federal agencies, and, you know, they are doing a 

great job, but one of the big questions we had is, how do we coordinate first among ourselves the federal agencies? 

And then how do we coordinate with the state, and how do the 

four states that we have in the Southwest area, and then how do 

we coordinate with all the sheriffs’ departments that we have on 

the border, all the police departments that we have on the border? 

And it is a very simple concept, but it is an extremely difficult 

concept to implement. 

But at this time, the chair now recognizes the ranking member 

of the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for an opening statement. 

4 

Opening Remarks of Chairman Henry Cuellar 

Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response 

Examining Preparedness and Coordination Efforts of First Responders Along the 

Southwest Border 

March 31, 2009, 10:00 a.m.—311 Cannon House Office Building 

•Good morning. On behalf of the Members of the Subcommittee, let me welcome 

the witnesses from the Office and Policy and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Guard 

Bureau, and the sheriffs of my home state of Texas, and Arizona. 

•Today’s hearing, entitled ‘‘Examining Preparedness and Coordination Efforts of 

First Responders along the Southwest Border,’’ is designed to assess the unique 

challenges that Federal, State, local, and Tribal first responders face in border communities in light of the escalation of drug-cartel related violence along the U.S.- 

Mexico border. 

•Specifically, this hearing is an opportunity to discuss the emergency preparedness and response needs specific to southwest border States, including cross-border 

communications and information sharing capabilities, and multi-jurisdictional partnerships. 

•Additionally, this hearing is an opportunity to examine the coordination and 

planning among international, Federal, State, local, and tribal governments to prevent drug-cartel related crimes from spreading to the United States. By now, we 

have all heard the media reports that describe the heinous and brutal violence of 

the drug cartels in Mexico who have been competing for the control of trafficking 

routes in the United States. 

• So in the past couple of years, we have learned of the assassinations of highlevel government and law enforcement officials, horrific murders including beheadings, violent kidnappings, use of a growing and varied arsenal of high-powered 

weapons and the indiscriminate killing of civilians. 

• What is most disturbing is that in 2008, more than 5,600 people in Mexico were 

killed in drug trafficking violence, a 110% increase over 2007. Of that number, 550 

of the killed were law enforcement officers. 

• Although we have been buffered by the battles of the Mexican drug cartel, there 

is ever-growing concern of a spillover into the United States. 

• As a member whose district includes the border city of Laredo, Texas, I can tell 

you just last year the city of Nuevo Laredo, Mexico—which lies just across my district – was gripped in terror at the hands of the cartels. 

• But my local sheriff worked with the State law enforcement, the Texas National 

Guard, and Federal agencies as part first Border Enforcement Security Taskforce 

(BEST) established by DHS in Laredo, TX. 

• The Laredo BEST focused on the disruption of cross-border criminal activity related to narcotics smuggling; money laundering; human and weapons smuggling; 

transnational gangs; and cross-border violence. 

• As a result of this collaboration and coordination, the Laredo BEST helped to 

stem the encroaching violence and protect our community. 

• Unfortunately, the Mexican drug-cartel moved their aggression toward other 

border communities that could provide them with access routes to the United 

States. 

• First responders from border communities tell me that the demand for drugs 

from this country, coupled with the illegal weapons going into Mexico, fuels the 

strength of the drug-cartels in Mexico. 

• But I remain convinced that our collective commitment to combat the efforts of 

the cartels can prevail. 

• That is why we must support our first responders who are the Nation’s first 

line of defense. 

• Thus, coordinating policies and procedures at all levels of government to address border security and emergency preparedness as complementary concepts may 

expedite emergency response while improving homeland security on both sides of 

the border. 

• That is why I have issued my support for the Merida Initiative and the President’s ‘‘Major Southwest Border Security Initiative’’ announced last week. 

• Our first reporters need and deserve the additional personnel, increased intelligence capacity, better coordination and the strategic redeployment of 360 additional officers and agents at the border and in Mexico City. 

5 

• But I must state emphatically that the only way we can address against the 

greed and violence of the drug cartels is by working together as a team. • I am disturbed by reports of turf battles among Federal agencies that now seek 

to threaten the successes of first responders at the State, local, and tribal communities. • As the great Henry Ford stated, ‘‘Coming together is a beginning. Keeping together is progress. Working together is success.’’ • As Chairman of this Subcommittee, I will use my authority to conduct aggressive oversight to that we can stamp out these unnecessary turf battles. • Simply put, we cannot fight the turf battles of the Mexican drug cartels if we 

are distracted by the turf battles of the Federal agencies. • Our first responders put their lives on the line everyday. So to them I say, ‘‘One 

team, one fight!’’ • With that, I look forward to hearing from Dr. Richard C. Barth, the Acting Assistant Secretary for the Office of Policy at DHS. Dr. Barth will tell us how DHS 

is coordinating with other Federal agencies, State, local, and Tribal communities to 

increase the security of the homeland. • Ms. Janice Ayala, Deputy Assistant Director at the Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), will discuss the success of the BEST program and other efforts 

at ICE to work collective with its multi-jurisdictional partners. • Major General Peter Aylward, who serves as the Director of the Joint Staff at 

the National Guard Bureau will discuss the support of the Guard at the southwestern border to carry out the border security initiatives. • Our final witnesses are our first responders Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzalez, Jr. of 

Zapata County, Texas and Sheriff Larry A. Dever, Cochise County, AZ who will give 

the Committee the perspective of the first responder community along the southwestern border. • With that, I thank the witnesses for coming today and I look forward to a robust discussion and the exchange of specific recommendations to address this most 

pressing issue. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I too want to join 

the chairman thanking each and every one of you for taking the 

time out of your busy schedules to be here. It really does help us 

as policymakers to make better policy to have the information and 

the expertise that you are able to share with us. 

As the chairman said, today’s hearing is to look at emergency 

preparedness from among first responders along the Southwest 

borders with their unique challenges. 

As we all know, drug-related violence along the Southwest border 

is certainly not a new phenomenon, but the intense drug war now 

taking place among the cartels in Mexico demands a higher level 

of awareness and preparedness among federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies along the border and throughout the United 

States. 

If drug violence continues to spill over into the U.S. as we have 

seen with murders, home invasions and kidnappings in cities like 

Tucson, Phoenix, Atlanta, and Birmingham, the consequences could 

be devastating to our communities. 

We need to make sure that our first responders have the tools 

they need to deal with these issues. We also need to make sure 

they receive adequate support from the federal government, not 

just in words, but in action. 

During the last Congress, the Committee on Homeland Security 

did not pass a single piece of border security legislation, although 

over 40 bills dealing with border security were referred out of this 

committee, or referred to this committee. 

It is important to look at what more Congress can do to ensure 

that agencies charged with this important mission have enough resources and authority to gain control of the border and combat rising threats. 

6 

Last week Secretary Napolitano announced the Department of 

Homeland Security’s new strategy to combat drug violence and 

crack down on Mexican cartels. While it is an important first step, 

there are many unanswered questions. For example, when the secretary testified before our committee in February, I talked with her 

about the need to increase the number of ICE agents. 

[Information follows:] 


11113-48.eps
7 

Unfortunately, under the new Southwest Border Strategy, the 

Department is not planning to hire new ICE personnel in order to 

deal with the rising drug violence. Instead, the Department wants 

to realign funds from ‘‘less urgent activities.’’ 

It has not been made clear which offices or programs will be affected, and I am concerned that the Administration’s approach will 

pull agents and officers away from other important assignments. 

I look forward to hearing today from Rich Barth and Janice 

Ayala. I hope I pronounced that right on the Department’s efforts 

to partner with State and Local enforcement along the border to 

achieve common goals and how these relationships can be improved. 

I also look forward to testimony by Major General Aylward on 

the National Guard’s counterdrug operations throughout the 

States, and finally, I want to hear from Sheriff Gonzalez and Sheriff Dever on the threats and challenges you face and how the Federal government can be a stronger partner in combating the escalating drug violence along our border. 

And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. And again, to all members 

of the subcommittee is a reminder that under the committee rules, 

opening statements may be submitted for the record. 


11113-49.eps
8 

At this time, I would welcome the panel of witnesses, and our 

first witness will be Dr. Richard Barth, who is the acting assistant 

secretary for the Office of Policy at the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

So, Mr. Barth? 

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD C. BARTH, ACTING ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, OFFICE OF POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Dr. BARTH. Thank you, Chairman Cuellar and Ranking Member 

Rogers and members of the committee. 

On behalf of the Obama administration and Department of 

Homeland Security, Secretary Napolitano, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you about the preparedness and coordination efforts with first responders along the Southwest border. 

As you all know, the Department of Homeland Security and the 

Obama administration are greatly concerned about the increased 

level of cartel-related violence in Mexico and its impact on communities on both sides of the border. That is why the U.S.-Mexico relationship is getting sustained, high-level, and comprehensive attention. 

Our department has undertaken a proactive response on both 

sides of the border to fully support the Mexican government’s campaign against the violent cartels and reduce the flow of contraband 

across the border in both directions. 

State, local, and tribal first responders along the Southwest border have significant roles to play both in dealing with the current 

violence and preparing for scenarios where violence in Mexico could 

directly impact the United States in the future. 

First responders have dealt with border crime and related issues 

for their entire careers. The successful mitigation of a complex and 

multi-faceted threat like border violence means that DHS and 

other federal agencies must constantly collaborate and coordinate 

with our state, local and tribal allies in an effort to share resources 

and information. 

The Department’s Office for State and Local Law Enforcement 

led by Assistant Secretary Ted Sexton coordinates DHS policies 

with more than 730,000 first responders across the nation. 

Assistant Secretary Sexton has been directed by Secretary 

Napolitano to ensure that the state, local and tribal enforcement officials have a seat at the table when it comes to the development 

and implementation of programs and policies like those currently 

impacting the Southwest border. 

The capabilities of state, local and tribal first responders to deal 

with cartel-related violence are substantial, and DHS works collaboratively with both state and local governments in a number of 

ways. The Department created the Border Enforcement Security 

Task Forces. We call them ‘‘BEST teams,’’ which are led by ICE. 

The 12 BESTs that currently exist, of which eight are located on 

the Southwest border, include the participation of DHS and other 

federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies. These law 

enforcement participants play a critical role in the BEST model by 

providing boots-on-the-ground intelligence and operational knowledge on a daily basis. 

9 

In terms of grant funding, last week Secretary Napolitano announced that DHS would change the grant guidance for our remaining balances in the Operation Stonegarden Grant Pool. We 

modified the program to focus up to 59 million still available in Operation Stonegarden funding to enhance the operational readiness 

and asset capabilities of law enforcement along the Southwest border. 

We will also expand the use of Stonegarden funds to pay for additional law enforcement personnel overtime. Travel and other related expenses for deployment of state, local, and tribal officials to 

the border. 

DHS is participating in numerous initiatives that will increase 

the capability of first responders to communicate effectively both 

along the Southwest border and with their counterparts across the 

border in Mexico. 

The DHS Office of Emergency Communications is in the process 

of developing the congressionally mandated Border Interoperability 

Demonstration Projects, which seek to improve interoperable communications in no fewer than six border communities. 

DHS is working tirelessly to create open lines of communication 

and information sharing along the Southwest border. DHS assistant secretary for state, local and law enforcement, Ted Sexton, recently traveled from Brownsville, Texas to San Diego, California 

over 11 days to meet with Southwest border first responders and 

discuss their concerns about border violence and related DHS programs and policies. 

During the course of this trip, Assistant Secretary Sexton met 

with over two dozen border police chiefs and sheriffs, all of which 

indicated they are willing to fully cooperate and collaborate to respond to ongoing border violence and crime. 

The secretary’s office is also coordinating regular conference calls 

with Southwest border law enforcement officials including members of the Southwest Border Sheriff’s Coalition and representatives of DHS components including ICE. 

These conference calls create a two-way flow of border-related intelligence by providing state, local and tribal officials with the opportunity to discuss critical Southwest border issues and receive 

briefings from department components on relevant programs and 

policies. 

Finally, I would close with a few brief words on the highly successful El Paso Intelligence Center referred to as EPIC. EPIC is a 

fully coordinated tactical intelligence center supported by databases and resources from member agencies, which include Homeland Security, the El Paso Sheriff’s Office, the Texas Department 

of Homeland Security, the ICE and other components of DHS. 

The state and local first responders embedded within EPIC make 

tremendous contributions to the many intelligence-led operational 

initiatives that EPIC facilitates along the Southwest border. In 

closing, DHS is fully engaged and focused on ensuring that the 

local, state, and tribal first responders have the necessary resources to respond to crime and violence. 

Clearly, no single entity can defeat this threat alone. As spillover 

violence from Mexico ultimately occurs, state, local and tribal first 

responders will be our first line of defense. 

10 

I thank you for your continued support of DHS programs and 

policies, and I would be happy to answer your questions after the 

opening presentations. 

[The statement of Dr. Barth follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD C. BARTH

Introduction 

Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers and distinguished members of the 

Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today about the preparedness and coordination efforts of first responders along the Southwest Border 

(SWB). 

As you all know, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Obama 

Administration as a whole are greatly concerned about the increased level of cartelrelated violence in Mexico and its impact on communities on both sides of the border. That’s why the U.S.-Mexico relationship is receiving sustained, high-level and 

comprehensive attention. Prior to his inauguration, President Obama met with 

President Calderon. Admiral Mullen visited Mexico on March 5th and 6th. Secretary 

of State Clinton visited Mexico last week, and Secretary Napolitano will visit at the 

end of this week with Attorney General Holder, all ahead of the President’s trip to 

Mexico on April 16th and 17th. 

The daily reporting on drug-related violence in Mexico may make us feel familiar 

with the situation, but we will not let familiarity breed complacency. The magnitude 

and severity of the violence in places like Ciudad Jua ́ rez has overwhelmed local police forces and spurred President Calderon to deploy over 7,000 Mexican troops to 

this city that sits just a stone’s throw away from El Paso, Texas. Our Department 

has undertaken a proactive and comprehensive response on both sides of the border 

to fully support the Mexican government’s campaign against the violent cartels and 

reduce the flow of contraband across the border in both directions. 

State and Local First Responders: The Need for Partnership 

In order for this comprehensive response to be successful in the long run, the 

United States government must support the efforts of State, local, and tribal first 

responders along the Southwest Border. They have significant roles to play both in 

dealing with the current violence and preparing for scenarios where violence in 

Mexico could directly impact the United States homeland in the future. 

While violence in the Southwest United States has not increased markedly since 

the brutal drug wars began in Mexico, other border-related criminal activity continues to confront State, local, and tribal first responders in the region, who remain 

concerned about the potential for spillover violence in the future. First responders 

at the State, local and tribal level have dealt with border crime and related issues 

for their entire careers. They are the ‘‘boots on the ground’’ that possess deep operational knowledge of the border region and its unique social, cultural and geographical intricacies. The successful mitigation of such a complex and multifaceted 

threat like border violence means that DHS and other Federal agencies must constantly collaborate and coordinate with our State, local, and tribal allies in an effort 

to share resources and information whenever necessary. 

DHS Office for State and Local Law Enforcement 

The Department’s Office for State and Local Law Enforcement, led by Assistant 

Secretary Ted Sexton, coordinates DHS policies with the more than 730,000 State 

and local first responders across the nation. Assistant Secretary Sexton has been directed by Secretary Napolitano to ensure that State and local law enforcement officials have a seat at the table when it comes to the development and implementation 

of programs and policies like those currently impacting the Southwest Border. 

State and Local First Responders: Capabilities 

The capabilities of State, local and tribal first responders to deal with cartel-related violence along the Southwest Border are substantial and DHS will continue 

to support these vital assets. I will discuss several of these capabilities and associated DHS support in greater detail. 

Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST) 

Although I understand that my colleague, Deputy Assistant Director Ayala, will 

be focusing on BESTs in her testimony, I would still like to take a moment to touch 

on the critical role that State, local, and tribal first responders play in these task 

forces. As you know, BEST is not just a program, it is also an innovative model for 

collaborative law enforcement that has delivered substantial results. The BEST program coordinates with the Department of Justice and its initiatives such as Project 

11 

Gunrunner and the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Drug Task Force to ensure 

a unified approach to the problems along the border. Since July 2005, the BESTs 

have been responsible for a number of criminal and administrative arrests, indictments and convictions. BESTs utilize a comprehensive approach towards dismantling the cross-border criminal organizations that exploit our border and utilize that 

information to eliminate the top leadership and the supporting infrastructure that 

sustains these often violent organizations. The 12 BESTs that currently exist (of 

which eight are located on the Southwest Border) include the participation of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the 

U.S. Coast Guard, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. 

These State, local, and tribal law enforcement participants play a critical role in the 

BEST model by providing essential ‘‘boots on the ground’’ intelligence and operational knowledge on a daily basis. Additionally, my colleague, Deputy Assistant Director Ayala will discuss Operation Armas Cruzadas, which is an important complement to the BEST initiative. 

We at DHS firmly believe that reinforcing the highly successful BEST model will 

greatly enhance our ability to deal with the root causes of cartel-related violence 

along the Southwest Border. Just last week, Secretary Napolitano announced that 

DHS would be doubling the number of BEST teams that incorporate Federal, State, 

local and tribal law enforcement and intelligence officers. This will greatly expand 

our capacity to collaborate with State, local, and tribal law enforcement to combat 

cartel-related crime that occurs on the U.S. side of the border. 

Operation Stonegarden 

In terms of grant funding, last week, Secretary Napolitano also announced that 

DHS will change the grant guidance for our remaining balances in the Operation 

Stonegarden grant pool. We modified the program last week to focus $59 million 

available in Operation Stonegarden funding to enhance the operational readiness 

and asset capabilities of State, local and tribal law enforcement along the Southwest 

Border. 

And we will expand the scope of Operation Stonegarden funds to pay for additional law enforcement personnel overtime, travel and other related expenses for deployment of State, local, and tribal officials to the border. 

Started in 2004, Operation Stonegarden supports U.S. border States and territories in increasing their capability to prevent, protect against, and respond to border security issues. The program has made funds available to more than 200 agencies in areas adjacent to either the Canadian and Mexican borders to enhance their 

border security operations. In the past, funds have been used to support overtime 

and per diem costs, and to purchase equipment such as night vision technology and 

observation equipment to enhance security operations on the border in areas close 

to Border Patrol operations. Participation in the program allows agencies to enhance 

their traditional law enforcement missions. The recently-announced funding flexibilities will ensure that State, local, and tribal first responders are equipped with 

the resources they need to confront the complex and dynamic challenges that exist 

along the Southwest Border. 

In addition, we are engaging State, local, and tribal law enforcement in ways that 

haven’t been done previously. DHS is coordinating regular conference calls with 

Southwest Border law enforcement officials and representatives from DHS components. These conference calls create a two-way flow of border-related intelligence by 

providing State, local, and tribal officials with the opportunity to discuss critical 

Southwest Border issues and receive briefings from Departmental components on 

relevant programs and policies. This increased engagement will help arm State and 

local first responders with the best information available. 

Emergency Communications with Mexico 

DHS is currently participating in numerous initiatives that will increase the capability of State, local, and tribal first responders to communicate effectively both 

along the Southwest Border and with their counterparts across the border in Mexico. Specifically, the DHS Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) is in the process of developing the Congressionally-mandated Border Interoperability Demonstration Project (BIDP). The BIDP seeks to improve interoperable communications in no 

fewer than six U.S. border communities, at least three of which will be located on 

the southern border. Although still in the planning phases, the Demonstration 

Project will ultimately function as a competitive selection grant program for State, 

local, and tribal communities in border areas to improve their communications capabilities. 

12 

Additionally, OEC co-chairs the Security Communications Task Group (SCTG) for 

the U.S.-Mexico High-Level Consultative Commission (HLCC) on Telecommunications. The SCTG is a joint U.S.-Mexico effort to address cross border communications among emergency responders. In May 2008, HLCC principals agreed to an Action Plan which directs OEC to lead the U.S. development and implementation of 

a Cross Border Security Communications network. This network will enable emergency responders to share video surveillance streams, conduct joint operations teleconferencing and securely exchange fingerprints and photographs. OEC is also leading a domestic working group of first responders that is examining different communications equipment that may be effective along the Southwest Border. The successful implementation of these initiatives will help ensure that State and local first responders have the ability to communicate with one another during critical incidents 

along the Southwest Border. 

Increased Engagement with Southwest Border State, Local, Tribal Law Enforcement 

DHS is also working tirelessly to create open lines of communication and information sharing with our State, local, and tribal partners along the Southwest Border. 

In fact, DHS Assistant Secretary for State and Local Law Enforcement Ted Sexton 

recently traveled from Brownsville, Texas to San Diego, California to meet with 

Southwest Border first responders and discuss their concerns about border violence 

and related DHS programs and policies. During the course of his two-week trip, Assistant Secretary Sexton met with over two dozen border police chiefs and sheriffs, 

all of whom indicated that they are willing to fully cooperate and collaborate to respond to ongoing border-related crime and violence. 

El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) 

Located in El Paso, Texas, EPIC was established in 1974 in an effort to improve 

drug-and border-enforcement operations along the Southwest Border. Initially comprised of representatives from the U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (now United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement) and the 

Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), EPIC is now staffed with over 300 personnel and 

liaison staff from 15 Federal, State and local agencies. The State and local agencies 

embedded at EPIC include the El Paso Sheriff’s Office and Texas Department of 

Homeland Security. Through the years, EPIC has evolved into a fully coordinated, 

tactical intelligence center supported by databases and resources from its member 

agencies. The State and local first responders embedded within EPIC make tremendous contributions to the numerous intelligence-led operational initiatives that 

EPIC helps to facilitate along the Southwest Border. Additionally, EPIC disseminates tactical bulletins (including officer safety alerts) to first responders along the 

Southwest Border and across the country. The intelligence center is also home to 

a State and local liaison group that organizes criminal interdiction training. To further assist State, local, and tribal law enforcement along the Southwest Border, 

DHS created the Homeland Intelligence Support Team (HIST) at EPIC in 2007. The 

goal of the HIST is to improve information sharing among Federal agencies and 

with State, local, and tribal partners. 

Conclusion 

In closing, DHS is fully engaged and focused on ensuring that our State, local, 

and tribal first responders have the necessary resources to successfully respond to 

border-related crime and violence along the Southwest Border. These officials have 

unequivocally indicated their willingness to partner with each other and DHS. 

Clearly, no single entity can defeat this threat alone. If spillover violence from Mexico ultimately occurs, State, local, and tribal first responders will be, as the name 

suggests, our first line of defense. As indicated in my testimony, our State and local 

partners have existing capacity to respond effectively along the Southwest Border. 

The recent increases in funding, personnel and programmatic support to the Southwest Border will reinforce this capacity in vital way. I remain confident that DHS 

and the Federal family can successfully confront the cartel-related violence through 

a successful partnership with these brave men and women who risk their lives on 

a daily basis to secure our homeland. 

Thank you for your continued support of DHS programs and policies. I would be 

happy to answer any questions you might have at this time. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Without objection, the witness’s full statement will 

be inserted into the record. And, of course, each of you all are summarizing your statements. I want to thank Dr. Barth. 

At this time, our second witness is Ms. Janice Ayala, deputy assistant director of the Office of Investigations at United States ImVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:21 May 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\111-CONG\111-13\55055.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
13 

migration and Customs Enforcement at the Department of Homeland Security. 

Welcome, Ms. Ayala. 

STATEMENT OF JANICE AYALA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND 

CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE), DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. AYALA. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Acting Assistant Secretary Torres, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss ICE’s longstanding relationship with their law enforcement 

partners and our collective response to cross-border crimes. 

Recognizing that partnerships are essential, ICE works closely 

across agency and international boundaries to provide effective 

cross-border communications, information sharing and emergency 

preparedness. 

ICE augments first responder assets on the Southwest border by 

deploying the largest force the Department of Homeland Security 

investigators. To ensure we are prepared to support first responders, ICE established a national incident response unit, which ensures ICE law enforcement programs coordinate their response 

during civil emergencies. 

Last week, Secretary Napolitano announced several Southwest 

border initiatives aimed at cracking down on Mexican drug cartels. 

The administration’s plan starts with additional personnel, increased intelligence capability and increased coordination with 

state, local, and Mexican law enforcement authorities. 

Specifically, ICE will double assignments to the Border Enforcement Security Task forces known as BEST, and increase its Mexico 

attache personnel by 50 percent. Moreover, ICE will quadruple the 

number of designated border liaison officers and continue Operation Armas Cruzadas aimed at thwarting the export of arms from 

the Mexico into United States. 

BEST task forces are the DHS platforms that provide the most 

direct support to state and local first responders. In July of 2005, 

in response to increased violence in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico and Laredo, Texas area, ICE, CBP, Mexican, federal and other law enforcement entities created an international multi-agency initiative 

dubbed Operation Blackjack. This successful concept was later formalized to create the BEST. 

I would like to share with you an example of a recent support 

to law enforcement by BEST. On February 6, 2009, two Department of Public Safety officers stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation near Laredo, Texas. While one of the troopers approached the 

vehicle, the driver accelerated in reverse and attempted to run him 

over. 

A high-speed chase ensued and ended in the Rio Grande River 

where the driver waded across the border to Mexico. Texas DPS requested the assistance of Laredo BEST in locating the driver, 

whose vehicle contained nearly 900 pounds of marijuana. The 

BEST coordinated with Mexican officials to locate the driver, and 

14 

within hours, the driver, a U.S. citizen, was detained by Mexican 

officials and turned over to Laredo BEST and to Texas DPS officers. 

Through BEST, we have dismantled arms trafficking, human 

trafficking, bulk cash smuggling, arms and narcotics smuggling organizations and their hostage taking and murder and kidnapping 

cells in the United States and Mexico. 

Since July of 2005, BESTs have been responsible for over 2,034 

criminal arrests, and in addition, they seized over 169,000 pounds 

of narcotics, 515 weapons, 341,000 rounds of ammunition and nearly $23 million in U.S. currency and monetary instruments. 

The magnitude of violence surrounding these transnational 

smuggling organizations necessitated the merging of legal authorities and expertise in multiple law enforcement and intelligence entities through task forces such as the BEST and outbound operations such as our weapons Outbound Operations Initiative, Operation Amas Cruzadas, and our bulk cash smuggling initiative Operation Firewall. 

In June of 2008, ICE officially launched Operation Amas 

Cruzadas to combat criminal networks smuggling weapons from 

the United States into Mexico. To that end, the U.S. and Mexico 

synchronize interdiction, investigation, and intelligence sharing activities aimed at dismantling weapons smuggling networks on both 

sides of the border. 

Since 2008 Operation Amas Cruzadas has resulted in over 112 

arrests and the seizure of over 1,400 weapons and 116,000 rounds 

of ammunition. One of the most effective methods to deal with violent transnational criminal organizations is attacking the criminal 

proceeds of—operations. 

ICE targets individuals and organizations that exploit 

vulnerabilities and financial systems to launder a list of proceeds. 

The combination of successful investigations, banking regulations, 

and stringent laws has forced criminal organizations to seek other 

means to transport their list of funds across our borders. 

One of the means is a smuggling of bulk cash currency out of the 

United States, specifically, along Southwest border. ICE’s Operation Firewall, in which we partner with CBP, Office of International Affairs, and state and local officers combats this threat, 

and since inception has resulted in over 423 arrests, seized over 

$183 million, 62 million of that has been seized overseas and, specifically 38 million in Mexico. 

ICE is committed to effective cross-border communications and 

information sharing to standby national criminal activity and its 

associated violence through the deployment of BEST, Operation 

Amas Cruzadas and Operation Firewall. 

By partnering with other law enforcement agencies, we are able 

to use a broad range of authorities including the more sophisticated 

and investigative tools to respond to and conduct our investigation. 

I would like to thank the subcommittee for its confirmed support 

of ICE, its continued support of ICE and our law enforcement missions and would be happy to answer any questions that you may 

have at this time. 

[The statement of Ms. Ayala follows:] 

15 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANICE AYALA

Introduction 

Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers, and distinguished Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Acting Assistant Secretary Torres, I would 

like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) long-standing partnerships with our state and local law enforcement partners who, along with other federal agencies, respond to cross-border 

crimes. Recognizing that partnerships are essential, ICE works closely across agency 

and international boundaries with our law enforcement partners to create a multilayered law enforcement network, which provides effective cross-border communication, information sharing, and emergency preparedness. While ICE does not traditionally perform the functions of a state or local police officer, who responds to a 

myriad of crimes on a daily basis, ICE materially augments first responder resources on the Southwest Border by deploying the largest force of investigators in 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). These investigators utilize expansive 

investigative authority to target criminal organizations engaged in the bi-lateral 

smuggling of people, narcotics, bulk cash, and weapons that threaten the well-being 

of the United States. 

To ensure ICE is prepared to support first responders, ICE established the National Incident Response Unit (NIRU). This unit, working in conjunction with the 

National Response Framework, Emergency Support Function (ESF)—13, responds 

in an efficient and coordinated way that addresses preparedness, prevention, and 

recovery during civil emergencies. NIRU develops, enhances, and oversees programs, policies and initiatives to focus ICE’s emergency preparedness, management 

and response efforts and continuity of operations planning.This includes ICE’s support to ESF–13 and our law enforcement partners who respond to unexpected disasters such as avian and pandemic influenza and hurricanes. In 2008, ICE supported 

response and recovery efforts during the hurricanes that struck New Orleans and 

Houston. ICE also provided law enforcement support for National Special Security 

Events, such as the 2009 Presidential Inauguration. In addition, ICE partners with 

the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

personnel who are often first responders themselves. ICE’s investigative mission is 

directly linked to CBP’s border protection and interdiction mission, and ICE augments CBP’s effort through investigative, transportation, and public safety support. 

Another example of ICE’s support of first responders is ICE’s Law Enforcement 

Agency Response (LEAR) program. Established in September 2006 to provide a 

more comprehensive response to Arizona law enforcement agencies seeking assistance from ICE during encounters with suspected illegal aliens, the LEAR unit received 1,283 calls for assistance and arrested 6,235 illegal aliens last year. 

As you may know, on March 24, 2009, the Administration announced several 

Southwest Border initiatives aimed at cracking down on Mexican drug cartels 

through enhanced border security. The Administration’s comprehensive plan calls 

for additional personnel, increased intelligence capability, and increased coordination with state, local and Mexican law enforcement authorities. Specifically, Secretary Napolitano announced that ICE will double assignments to ICE’s Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST) from 95 agents to 190. ICE is also increasing ICE AttachE ́ personnel in support of Mexican law enforcement efforts and ICE’s 

BEST efforts from 24 to 36 agents. Moreover, ICE will quadruple the number of 

agents designated as Border Liaison Officers, from 10 to 40 personnel who work to 

create cooperative relationships between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement authorities. In addition, DHS will continue Operation Armas Cruzadas, an ICE-led bi-lateral law enforcement and intelligence-sharing operation to thwart export of arms 

from the U.S. into Mexico. These DHS task forces include important partners such 

as Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF) and other foreign, federal, state and local task force offices. When it comes 

to countering the illicit weapons trade in particular, we closely coordinate our efforts 

with ATF, as they possess long-standing expertise in gun trafficking investigations 

and in engagement with Federal Firearms Licensees. 

Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) 

While ICE is generally not a first responder, the BEST task forces are the DHS 

operational platform that provides the most direct support to state and local first 

responders. In July 2005, in response to increased violence in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico 

and Laredo, Texas, ICE, CBP, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and 

other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, including Mexican agencies, 

expanded the ongoing Border Crimes Initiative by creating an international, multiagency initiative called Operation Black Jack. This initiative used the respective auVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:21 May 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\111-CONG\111-13\55055.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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thorities and resources of its members to dismantle cross-border criminal organizations. In its first six months, its target-driven focus led to the dismantling of a murder/kidnapping cell operating on both sides of the border, including the seizure of 

high-powered fully automatic weapons and live grenades; the components to make 

over 100 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), such as pipe bombs and grenades; and 

over $1 million in U.S. currency. 

Crucial to our success is the cooperation of our international partners. The BESTs 

on the Southwest Border have secured the participation of the Mexican law enforcement agency, Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP). Through the interaction and 

coordination of all the member agencies, BESTs provide for immediate and international enhanced information sharing on border violence due to geographic proximity to the U.S. borders. 

Through BESTs, we have dismantled arms trafficking, human trafficking, bulkcash, alien and narcotics smuggling organizations and their hostage-taking and 

murder/kidnapping cells in the United States and Mexico. Since July 2005, BESTs’ 

efforts have resulted in 2,034 criminal arrests and 2,796 civil immigration arrests. 

The U.S. Attorneys Offices have worked with ICE to secure more than 800 indictments, and more than 700 convictions. In addition, BESTs have seized approximately 7,704 pounds of cocaine, 159,832 pounds of marijuana, 558 pounds of methamphetamine, 39 pounds of crystal methamphetamine, 1,023 pounds of ecstasy, 213 

pounds of heroin, 97 pounds of hashish, 22 pounds of opium, 515 weapons, 341,345 

rounds ammunition, 745 vehicles, six properties, and $22.7 million in U.S. currency 

and monetary instruments. 

I would like to share a few of our successes with you: the discovery and repatriation by the El Paso BEST of one of Mexico’s top ten most wanted fugitives; the 

arrest by the Laredo BEST of a weapons trafficker who supplied cartels with assault 

rifles used to murder Mexican Police Officer Navarro Rincon and others; and the 

arrest by the Los Angeles Seaport BEST of an arms trafficker and seizure of 38 

military style weapons. These cases clearly illustrate the violence that results from 

narcotics trafficking, weapons smuggling, alien smuggling, human trafficking, and 

money laundering at our borders. BESTs provide a unified and international response to securing our borders, stemming the violence, and assisting first responders. 

I would also like to share with you an example of how our foreign partnerships 

and information sharing benefits ICE, as well as front line officers from the Texas 

Department of Public Safety (DPS). On February 6, 2009, a Texas DPS trooper conducted what he thought was a routine vehicle stop of a Ford F-250 truck near Laredo, Texas. When the trooper stepped out of his patrol car and began walking towards the truck, the driver, Lino ZAMORA, placed the truck in reverse and attempted to run the trooper over. Fortunately, the trooper was not injured, and a 

high speed chase ensued ending by the Rio Grande river banks near the World 

Trade Bridge where ZAMORA waded into the river and into Nuevo Laredo, 

Tamaulipas, Mexico. Texas DPS officers requested immediate assistance from the 

Laredo BEST indicating they had discovered 897 pounds of marijuana hidden inside 

the truck and that the driver, ZAMORA, absconded to Mexico. 

The Laredo BEST, which has a Mexican law enforcement officer embedded in the 

task force, coordinated with the Mexican Military and Immigration Officials to locate ZAMORA, who was hiding in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. Mexican military officers 

located ZAMORA, a United States Citizen, and turned him over to Mexican Immigration officials. These officials then turned ZAMORA over to Laredo BEST agents 

without incident. Texas DPS officers arrested ZAMORA for possession of marijuana 

and assault on a peace officer. Just after 10:00 a.m., ZAMORA fled from the Texas 

DPS officer, and at 3:30 p.m. he returned and was arrested in the United States. 

Although we have had significant success in dismantling transnational smuggling 

organizations, they have proven to be flexible, wealthy, well-organized, and intelligent. While the contraband the organizations smuggle may vary, these organizations use the same smuggling corridors to further their enterprise. Cartels invest 

significant resources in gaining and maintaining control of these lucrative smuggling corridors, expecting a considerable financial return from smuggling ventures 

and from user fees paid by other transnational smuggling organizations. To protect 

these lucrative corridors, cartels hire assassins to kidnap, torture and murder competitors that they perceive to infringe upon their territory. 

The magnitude of violence surrounding these transnational smuggling organizations in recent years necessitated expertise of multiple law enforcement and intelligence entities through task forces such as the ICE-led BEST, and law enforcement 

outbound operations such as our weapons smuggling initiative, Operation Armas 

Cruzadas, and our bulk cash smuggling initiative, Operation Firewall. 

17 

As I have noted, ICE plays several roles varying from assisting federal, state, and 

local front line officers in emergency situations to coordinate bi-national efforts beyond our borders. ICE has agents in attaché offices in embassies and consulates worldwide, as well as foreign law enforcement officers such as Mexico’s 

Secretaria de Seguridad Publica, co-located within our Border Enforcement Security 

Task Forces in the United States. 

Armas Cruzadas 

As I mentioned previously, ICE is focused on the illicit flows of weapons and bulk 

cash to reduce border violence through our ‘‘Armas Cruzadas’’ initiative. 

In June 2008, ICE, in partnership with CBP, formally launched Operation Armas 

Cruzadas to combat transnational criminal networks smuggling weapons into Mexico from the United States. As part of this initiative, the United States and the Government of Mexico (GoM) agreed to bi-lateral interdiction, investigation, and intelligence-sharing activities to identify, disrupt, and dismantle these networks engaged 

in weapons smuggling. This initiative has resulted in actionable intelligence leading 

to arrests, as well as the seizure of firearms and ammunition on both sides of the 

border. ICE has provided training in appropriate export and other weapons’ laws 

and methods used to combat transnational smuggling; used its Project Shield America outreach program and made presentations to groups involved in the manufacture, sale or shipment of firearms and ammunition along the Southwest Border; reinvigorated the ICE Border Liaison Program to sustain an open and cooperative 

working relationship with foreign and domestic government entities; initiated a 

Weapons Virtual Task Force to create virtual communities where law enforcement 

can rapidly share intelligence and communicate in a secure environment; created a 

U.S.-vetted GoM Arms Trafficking Group; and used the ICE Border Violence Intelligence Cell. In addition, ICE recognizes the need to coordinate with ATF, the agency with principal firearms enforcement responsibility, in its efforts to slow the flow 

of firearms into Mexico. On this front, ICE will coordinate its Armas Cruzadas Initiative with ATF’s Project Gunrunner. 

Since June 2008, Operation Armas Cruzadas has resulted in 112 criminal arrests, 

40 administrative arrests, 80 criminal indictments, 43 convictions and in the seizure 

of 1,417 weapons and 116,478 rounds of ammunition. 

Operation Firewall 

One of the most effective methods to deal with violent, transnational criminal organizations is attacking the criminal proceeds that fund their operations. Well financed criminal organizations present a threat to all law enforcement as their use 

of high-powered firearms presents a real danger to first responders. ICE targets 

those individuals and organizations that exploit vulnerabilities in financial systems 

to launder illicit proceeds, and ICE pursues the financial component of every crossborder criminal investigation. The combination of successful financial investigations, 

Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements, and Anti-Money Laundering compliance 

efforts by traditional and non-traditional financial institutions has forced criminal 

organizations to seek other means to transport illicit funds across our borders. Currently, the smuggling of bulk currency out of the United States, especially along the 

Southwest Border, is the prevailing method. ICE is the primary investigative agency 

with jurisdiction over bulk cash smuggling crimes. Since its inception, Operation 

Firewall has resulted in the seizure of over $183 million, including $62 million 

seized overseas, and 423 arrests. 

Conclusion 

ICE is committed to effective cross-border communication and information sharing 

to stem bi-national criminal activity and associated violence through the deployment 

of the BESTs, Operation Armas Cruzadas and Operation Firewall. By partnering 

with other law enforcement agencies, we are able to use a broad range of authorities, including the most sophisticated investigative tools available, such as certified 

undercover operations and electronic surveillance operations to respond to and conduct our investigations. 

Once again, I would like to thank the Subcommittee for its continued support of 

ICE and our law enforcement mission. I would be happy to answer any questions 

that you may have at this time. 

ATTACHMENT 

Operation Armas Cruzadas Fact Sheet 

The mission of Armas Cruzadas is for U.S. and Mexican government agencies to 

synchronize bi-lateral law enforcement and intelligence-sharing operations in order 

18 

to comprehensively identify, disrupt and dismantle trans-border weapons smuggling 

networks. The goals include: 

• Establishing a bilateral program to stop weapons smuggling 

• Coordinating operations 

• Developing intelligence about arms trafficking networks 

• Strengthening interagency cooperation 

•Promoting intelligence information exchange 

• Implementing points of contact for information exchange 

•Partnership Roles and Responsibilities 

In order for Operation Armas Cruzadas to succeed, ICE has incorporated the following key components: 

• Training Stakeholders 

ICE will train stakeholders in appropriate laws, resources and methods used to 

combat trans-border smuggling as well as how to input and retrieve database 

information on active cases. 

• Creating a Border Violence Intelligence Cell 

Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST) generates arrests, seizures and 

significant events raw data. ICE Field Intelligence Groups compile the raw data for 

reports, and the Border Violence Intelligence Cell (BVIC) analyzes the information. 

• Developing a Vetted Arms Trafficking Group 

Receives and analyzes investigative information for exploitation in Mexico and 

provides investigative information from Mexican weapons seizures and arrests for 

exploitation by BEST. 

• Implementing a Weapons Virtual Task Force (WVTF) 

The WVTF facilitates real-time online access to actionable information on daily 

firearms seizures, arrests and other intelligence generated by ICE, CBP, the Mexican government and other agencies as appropriate. 

• Reinvigorating the ICE Border Liaison Program 

The Border Liaison Program establishes an official ICE point of contact for CBP, 

ICE representatives in Mexico, state and local law enforcement agencies, as well as 

Mexican law enforcement agencies along the U.S. and Mexican border. 

Border Enforcement Security Team (BEST) FACT SHEET 

In January 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary adopted 

the Border Enforcement Security Taskforce (BEST) initiative as a DHS task force 

in order to leverage federal, state, local, tribal and foreign law enforcement and intelligence resources in an effort to identify, disrupt, and dismantle organizations 

that seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the border and threaten the overall safety and 

security of the American public. The task forces are designed to increase information sharing and collaboration among the participating agencies focusing toward the 

identification, prioritization, and investigation of emerging or existing threats. 

BESTs incorporate personnel from ICE; Customs and Border Protection (CBP); 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives (ATF); Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); 

and the U.S. Attorney’s Office along with other key federal, state, local and foreign 

law enforcement agencies. 

A key element of the BEST program is the coordination between U.S. and foreign 

law enforcement agencies. This collaboration better enables our governments’ ability 

to attack organizations in a more unified way. BESTs on the Southwest border have 

the participation of the Mexican law enforcement agency, Secretaria de Seguridad 

Publica (SSP). On the Northern border, Canadian law enforcement agencies participating in the BESTs include the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Ontario Provincial Police, Niagara Regional Police 

Service, and Toronto Police Service. Argentina Customs participates in the Miami 

seaport BEST. 

There are currently 12 BESTs; 8 on the Southwest border, 2 on the Northern border, and 2 in seaports. 

The BEST concept was first implemented in Laredo, Texas in January 2006. 

BESTs were subsequently established in Tucson, Arizona (March 2006); El Paso, 

Texas (October 2006); San Diego, California (November 2006); and Rio Grande Valley (Harlingen, Brownsville, McAllen), Texas (March 2007). 

In fiscal year 2008, BESTs were established in Phoenix, Arizona (March 2008); 

Yuma, Arizona (March 2008); and Imperial Valley, California (June 2008). 

The first Northern border BEST initiated operations in Blaine, Washington (February 2008) and was followed in Buffalo, New York (March 2008). 

19 

In fiscal year 2009, BESTs were also established in the seaports of Los Angeles/ 

Long Beach, California (October 2008), and Miami, Florida (November 2008). The 

seaport BESTs will address threats that encompass the entire maritime operating 

environment, including ports of entry and areas between the ports. 

LAREDO BEST • In January 2006, the BEST concept was first implemented in Laredo. 

•The Laredo BEST focuses on the disruption of cross-border criminal activity 

related to the following: narcotics smuggling; money laundering; human smuggling; weapons smuggling; transnational gangs; and cross-border violence. 

•The Laredo BEST members are co-located at the ICE DSAC office in Laredo, 

Texas. 

•The Laredo BEST is comprised of members from the following agencies: ICE 

OI; ICE DRO; ICE Intel; CBP; ATF; DEA; Texas Department of Public Safety; 

Texas National Guard; the Laredo Police Department, and the Government of 

Mexico—SSP. 

TUCSON BEST •Tucson BEST initiated operations in March of 2006. 

•Tucson BEST targets major criminal organizations involved in the following: 

narcotics smuggling; human smuggling; weapons smuggling; money laundering/ 

bulk cash smuggling; and transnational criminal gangs. 

•Full-time members of the Arizona BEST are co-located at the ICE DSAC office 

in Tucson, Arizona. 

•The Tucson BEST is comprised of members from the following agencies: ICE 

OI; ICE Intel; CBP; Arizona Department of Public Safety; Pima County Sheriff’s 

Department; Arizona National Guard—Joint Counter Narco-Terrorism Task 

Force; Government of Mexico—SSP; with assistance from the DHS Office of the 

Inspector General; DHS Field Intelligence Group; and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. 

EL PASO BEST • In October 2006, the El Paso BEST initiated operations. 

• El Paso BEST concentrates on the following major threats: human smuggling; 

narcotics smuggling; money laundering/bulk cash smuggling; and weapons 

smuggling. 

•Full-time members of the El Paso BEST are co-located in the ICE SAC office 

in El Paso, Texas and the ICE RAC office Alpine, Texas. 

•The El Paso BEST is comprised of members from the following agencies: ICE 

OI; ICE Intel; ICE DRO; CBP; U.S. State Department—Diplomatic Security 

Service, El Paso Police Department; and the El Paso Sheriff’s Office. DEA is a 

part time participant. 

SAN DIEGO BEST • In November 2006, the San Diego BEST initiated operations. 

•The major threats that the San Diego BEST concentrate on are the following: 

cross-border tunnels; narcotics smuggling-specifically methamphetamine and 

methamphetamine precursors; human smuggling; and weapons smuggling. 

•Full-time members of the San Diego BEST are co-located at the DSAC San 

Ysidro office in San Diego, California and the DSAC San Diego Operation Alliance office in San Diego, California. 

•The San Diego BEST is comprised of members from the following agencies: 

ICE OI; ICE Intel; CBP; FBI; Naval Criminal Investigative Service; ATF; Chula 

Vista Police Department; and Government of Mexico - SSP. 

RIO GRANDE VALLEY BEST 

• In March 2007, the Rio Grande Valley BEST initiated operations. 

•The Rio Grande Valley BEST focuses on cross-border criminal activity related 

to: weapons smuggling; human smuggling; and money laundering 

•Full-time members of the Rio Grande Valley BEST are co-located at the RAC 

Harlingen office, in Harlingen, Texas. 

•The Rio Grande Valley BEST is comprised of members from the following 

agencies: ICE OI; ICE Intel; ICE DRO; CBP; with assistance from ATF; Social 

Security Administration; and the United States Marshals Service. 

BLAINE BEST 

•The Blaine BEST initiated operations in February of 2008. 

• Blaine BEST focuses on the following: Port of Entry (POE) smuggling events 

(both inbound and outbound); contraband smuggling via commercial truck; 

human smuggling and trafficking; money laundering and bulk cash smuggling; 

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20 

rity. Blaine BEST also acts as the investigative arm of the Integrated Border 

Enforcement Team, when requested. 

•Full-time members of the Blaine BEST are co-located at the Assistant Special 

Agent in Charge (ASAC) Office in Blaine, Washington. 

•The Blaine BEST is comprised of members from the following agencies: ICE 

OI; ICE Intel; CBP; DEA; RCMP; and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 

BUFFALO BEST 

• In March 2008, the Buffalo BEST initiated operations. 

•The Buffalo BEST is focused on the development of investigations of international criminal organizations exploiting the Buffalo Ports of Entry. Initial investigative focus includes: narcotics smuggling; money laundering/bulk cash 

smuggling; weapons smuggling; and alien smuggling/human trafficking. 

•The Buffalo BEST is comprised of members from the following agencies: ICE 

OI; CBP; ATF; DEA; New York State Police; Niagara Falls Police Department; 

Buffalo Police Department; CBSA; RCMP; Ontario Provincial Police; Niagara 

Regional Police Service (NRPS); and Toronto Police Service (TPS). 

•The Buffalo BEST also receives additional support from the following: USCG; 

FBI; United States Postal Investigative Service; and the Internal Revenue Service. 

•The Buffalo BEST also receives support from the following: USCG; FBI; 

United States Postal Investigative Service; and the Internal Revenue Service. 

YUMA BEST 

•The Yuma BEST officially initiated operations in March of 2008. 

• Yuma BEST focuses on the following areas: cross-border violence; human 

smuggling and trafficking; cross-border subterranean tunnels; money laundering and bulk cash smuggling; contraband smuggling; transnational criminal 

gangs; weapons smuggling; and travel document-related identity theft and benefit fraud. 

• Yuma BEST personnel are co-located in the ASAC Yuma office, in Yuma, Arizona. 

•The Yuma BEST is comprised of members from the following agencies: ICE 

OI; CBP; and the Government of Mexico - SSP. Part time support also comes 

from FBI, DEA and the Arizona Department of Public Safety, State Gang Task 

Force. 

PHOENIX BEST 

•The Phoenix BEST initiated operations in March of 2008. 

•Phoenix BEST focuses on three main investigative areas: narcotics smuggling; 

violent alien smuggling organizations; and weapon smuggling. 

•Full time participants in the Phoenix BEST are co-located in office space 

leased by the DEA Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix Office, in Phoenix, Arizona. 

•The Phoenix BEST is comprised of representatives from the following agencies: ICE OI; CBP; Mesa Police Department; and the Government of Mexico— 

SSP; with additional assistance provided by ICE DRO; ICE Intel; Maricopa 

County Sheriff’s Department; and the Phoenix Police Department. 

IMPERIAL VALLEY BEST 

•The Imperial Valley BEST initiated operations on June 2, 2008. 

•The Imperial Valley BEST focuses operations on cross-border criminal activity 

related to: weapons smuggling; contraband smuggling; human smuggling; and 

violent ‘Bandit’ activity. 

•Participants work primarily out of their own offices. ICE is located at the 

Calexico, CA East Port of Entry. Border Patrol is in El Centro. DEA, BLM and 

FBI have their separate offices in Imperial. 

•The Imperial Valley BEST is comprised of members from the following agencies: ICE OI; CBP; FBI; DEA; Imperial Police Department; and Bureau of Land 

Management (BLM). 

Los Angeles/Long Beach BEST 

•The Los Angeles/Long Beach BEST initiated the first seaport operations on 

October 30, 2008. 

•The Los Angeles/Long Beach BEST focuses operations on threats that encompass the entire seaport environment. Specifically, the Los Angeles/Long Beach 

BEST concentrate on the following investigative areas: the importation of illicit 

contraband; trade fraud; cargo theft; unlawful exportation of controlled commodVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:21 May 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\111-CONG\111-13\55055.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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ities and munitions; stolen property; alien smuggling; and exportation of illicit 

proceeds. 

•Full time participants in the Los Angeles/Long Beach BEST are co-located in 

office space within the Los Angeles seaport that has been acquired and outfitted 

to house the BEST. 

•The Los Angeles/Long Beach BEST is comprised of members from the following agencies: ICE OI; CBP; U.S. Coast Guard Investigative Service; U.S. Secret Service; Federal Air Marshal Service; ATF; Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department; California Highway Patrol; and Los Angeles Port Police. 

Miami BEST 

•The Miami BEST initiated seaport BEST operations on November 24, 2008. 

• Miami BEST will address a number of criminal activities with a nexus to U.S. 

seaports, and focus on threats that encompass the entire maritime operating environment. Specifically, the Miami BEST will concentrate on the following primary investigative areas: the importation of illicit contraband; trade fraud; 

cargo theft; unlawful exportation of controlled commodities and munitions; stolen property; alien smuggling; and exportation of illicit proceeds. 

•Full time participants in the Miami BEST are co-located at the SAC Miami 

office in Miami, Florida. 

•The Miami BEST is comprised of members from the following agencies: ICE 

OI; CBP; Broward County Sheriff’s Department; Miami–Dade Police Department; and the Argentine Customs Service. 

STATISTICS 

Since inception, the BESTs have been responsible for 2,034 criminal arrests, 2,796 

administrative arrests, 885 indictments, and 734 convictions, and have seized approximately 7,703 pounds of cocaine, 159,831 pounds of marijuana, 557 pounds of 

methamphetamine, 39 pounds of crystal methamphetamine, 1,022 pounds of ecstasy, 212 pounds of heroin, 97 pounds of hashish, 22 pounds of opium, 515 weapons, 745 vehicles, 6 properties and $22,678,550 million in U.S. currency and monetary instruments. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Ms. Ayala, for your testimony. 

I now recognize Major Peter Aylward to summarize his statement for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL PETER AYLWARD, 

DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT STAFF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU 

Gen. AYLWARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Rogers, 

and committee members for allowing me to come and testify before 

you today. I think it is really appropriate the seating you gave me, 

first of all, here. 

Historical constitutional role and Article 1, section 8, clause 15 

and 16 is available to the governor and available to the president. 

So putting us in between the local and state folks and the federal 

government is the appropriate role of the National Guard has always played. 

Historically, the National Guard has provided support along the 

borders under two programs: Narcotic Drug Program under Title 

32, Section 112, which is our congressionally mandated program, 

which has authorizations up to 4,000 by law and is currently funded at approximately 2,500. 

The other program is under our Innovative Readiness Training 

Program. That program uses existing training funds as a training 

benefit to the units that are getting ready to do global deployments. 

And then finally, what I would ask is that the integration of the 

efforts between the two is kind of where we are in the whole process of the defining requirements based upon capability gaps at the 

local and state level and at the corporate federal government level. 

22 

In fact, later on today, I will be a member of the integrated planning committee over at the Eisenhower Executive Office building to 

work with the community as a team to discover what those capability gaps are so we can provide the appropriate technical advice 

and assistance and military capabilities to complement those. 

So, gentlemen, subject to your questions, I am looking forward to 

the question and answer period later on. Thank you. 

[The statement of General Aylward follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MG PETER M. AYLWARD

Opening Remarks 

Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished members of the subcommittee; I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 

activities of the National Guard (NG) in helping to secure our Nation’s borders. National Guard support to border security today is provided through the National 

Guard Counterdrug program and through our use of Innovative Readiness Training. 

The National Guard Counterdrug Program 

The National Guard Counterdrug Program is governed by Section 112 of Title 32 

of the United States Code. This authority is the foundation for the National Guard 

Counterdrug Program that has operated in the 54 States and Territories for nearly 

twenty years. The law limits the program to 4,000 personnel on full-time counterdrug program duties. At present it is funded and staffed for just over 2,500 Army 

and Air National Guard personnel. These federally funded programs are developed 

by the respective governors and approved by the Secretary of Defense. They are developed within the context of the National Counterdrug Strategy of the White 

House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy with supporting direction from the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, Counter-proliferation, 

and Global Threats. 

I am pleased to inform you that these federally funded state centric programs are 

built in response to Federal, State and local law enforcement agency counterdrug 

operational requirements. They fully consider State and local threats and 

vulnerabilities. At all times National Guard counterdrug resources are employed in 

support of law enforcement counterdrug operational requirements or community 

based organizations focused on drug demand reduction programs. 

Our efforts in market disruption support law enforcement agency operations in 

marijuana suppression and eradication, enhance information sharing networks, provide linguistic support, and conduct ground and aerial reconnaissance, among others. Community based organizations benefit from our drug demand reduction programs such as ‘‘Stay on Track’’. Our criminal analysts work closely with the Directors of the 28 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) and other information fusion centers to develop drug case-related information that continues to facilitate law enforcement operations. An example of such continuing support can be 

found in the HIDTA supported Denver Colorado Metro Gang Task Force where NG 

Counterdrug Program assets provide full time criminal analysts and regularly conduct aerial reconnaissance missions for this Federal, State and local LEA endeavor 

In Fiscal Year 2008, our contributions can be measured through data provided by 

law enforcement agencies and community based organizations. Law enforcement 

agencies attribute the seizure of 21,603 weapons and $382.4 million in United 

States currency to our support efforts. The seizure of over 5.3 million cultivated 

marijuana plants and 903,000 pounds of processed marijuana are directly attributed 

to National Guard support of marijuana eradication operations. In Fiscal Year 2008, 

nearly 530,000 pounds of cocaine were seized in state operations with National 

Guard support of law enforcement agencies. Community based organizations report 

that we have provided demand reduction programs for 6.2 million students, and 

nearly 60,000 participated in the Stay on Track Program in Fiscal Years 2007 and 

2008. We project 120,000 students by the end of Fiscal 2009. Our Counterdrug Program also provided nearly 40,000 flying hours supporting various law enforcement 

counterdrug operations over public lands, border missions, and extensive marijuana 

eradication operations. 

The National Guard Counterdrug Program has made similar impacts over the last 

twenty years. The credit for these accomplishments goes to the Governors and the 

Adjutants General for an efficient and focused application of authorized and appropriated funds. But we must remain vigilant in the application of those resources as 

threats and vulnerabilities change. Our program accomplishments do not go unnoticed by drug trafficking organizations. They shift and adjust their tactics and trafVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:21 May 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\111-CONG\111-13\55055.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
23 

ficking networks to counter our strengths and those of law enforcement. The Mexican drug cartels are in conflict over control of production and distribution within 

their own country as well as the market place in the United States. Their conflicts 

as we know have developed into intense violence in northern Mexico near the U.S. 

border. Each of the four Southwest Border states are experiencing increased drugrelated violence and are concerned with the potential ‘‘spill-over’’ of that violence 

from Mexico into our sovereign States and Nation. 

For the last twenty years we have supported law enforcement operations along 

the Southwest Border with National Guard Counterdrug personnel and equipment. 

We have long-standing operational and interagency models employed every day in 

ground and aerial observation, information sharing, and linguistics. Today, we have 

over 300 National Guard Counterdrug personnel on duty in Arizona, California, 

New Mexico and Texas working in direct support of Federal, State, and local law 

enforcement agencies conducting counterdrug operations along the border. The majority of our support efforts are focused on ground and aerial observation, case analysis, engineer work and communications support. 

Innovative Readiness Training 

Recently, we have successfully employed the use of ‘‘Innovative Readiness Training’’ (IRT) with specialty units such as engineers and aviation, among others. IRT 

is a Department of Defense (DOD) program governed by Section 2012 of USC Title 

10 and DOD Directive 1100.20. The program’s objective is to train soldiers and simultaneously provide a benefit to the community. Missions supported by IRT are 

based on requests from thirteen pre-approved organizations, or a Federal, State, and 

local government agency. We are currently supporting the Department of Homeland 

Security’s United States Customs and Border Protection with engineering work on 

border roads and vehicle maintenance. The National Guard has conducted IRT 

events along the Southwest Border in support of CBP’s Border Patrol, which includes activities such as engineering, medical/dental, and transportation support. 

Annual IRT events along the Southwest Border have involved an average of 3,250 

Guardsmen. Recent IRT events from July 2006 to July 2008 provided support 

through Entry Identification Teams, aviation and ground observation, medical, and 

engineering in support of the ‘‘Operation Jump Start’’ (OJS) initiative. We are capable of assisting through other support to civil authorities based on situational needs. 

Recent Activity of National Guard Bureau 

In regards to possible National Guard support along the Southwest Border, we, 

through the Department of Defense, are working with the Southwest Border states 

and with the Department of Homeland Security to determine if any new requirements exist and whether enhanced National Guard support is appropriate. 

The Strategic Context 

Mr. Chairman and members of committee, I would close by saying that, in addition to accomplishing its federal mission to be a reliable reserve component to the 

Army and the Air Force in combating America’s enemies overseas, the National 

Guard has also been the first military responder to nearly every public disaster, 

manmade or otherwise here inside the homeland, providing vital capabilities in support of and alongside civilian first responders. We have exemplary citizen-soldiers 

and airmen who are in touch with the communities in which they live and work. 

The resultant networks only enhance our ability to provide immediate and thoughtful responses to a myriad of challenges. The Southwest Border challenge is no different. We have and will continue to serve those in need; our communities, our 

States and our Nation. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Major General, for your testimony. 

At this time, I will recognize Sheriff Gonzalez to summarize his 

statement for 5 minutes. 

Sheriff? 

STATEMENT OF SHERIFF SIGIFREDO GONZALEZ, JR., ZAPATA 

COUNTY, TEXAS; SHERIFF LARRY A. DEVER, COCHISE 

COUNTY, ARIZONA 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning 

committee members, Ranking Member Rogers, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor and a privilege to be here with you today 

24 

to discuss and examine preparedness coordination and response efforts of first responders along the Southwest border and how 

unique some of those challenges are to us as local law enforcement. 

I would like to briefly explain to you how we formed our coalition. In May of 2005, 16 sheriffs in Texas, whose counties border 

the Republic of Mexico, formed the Texas Border Sheriff’s Coalition. In 2007, also because of their frustrations, sheriffs from New 

Mexico, Arizona and California joined the Texas Coalition, and we 

formed the Southwestern Borders Sheriff’s Coalition. 

These coalitions were formed because of our frustration with this. 

Us 31 sheriffs along the Southwest border dealt with inadequacy 

and a lot of times the inability of our federal government to be able 

to protect our borders. We felt then, and still do, that the 2,000 

miles of Southwest border of this great country of ours needs protection and some type of immediate attention. 

We are ready to work as a team, and we have been ready to work 

as a team for a long, long time. One of the many matters that concern us along the border is the cross-border violence that at times 

terrorizes the more than 5 million people that live along the Southwest border of our country. 

After all this border shares, we are responsible for over 2,000 

miles of border with Mexico and 98,480 square miles, which encompasses the 31 counties along the Southwestern border. This violence that we see spilling over from Mexico, we refer to it as Narco 

Terrorism. 

People are always living in fear. People that live along the border 

live in fear a lot of times because of this spillover violence. 

Now what is Narco Terrorism? As far as we are concerned, it is 

the threats that our officers have to deal with along the border on 

a daily basis. 

And they include but are not limited to kidnappings, carjackings, 

home invasions, extortions, shooting of law enforcement officers on 

the U.S. side from Mexico, armed individuals escorting humans 

and narcotics into this great country of ours, members of drug trafficking organizations that visit law enforcement officers’ homes on 

the U.S. side and threaten them and their families at times. 

We all see many deportable or people that have been deported, 

previously deported from our country coming back into the United 

States, individuals that have been deported because of convictions 

for murders, for child sex assaults, and we are seeing them come 

back into the country. We are seeing an increase in auto thefts, not 

only in the area of the border but in Dallas and Houston and San 

Antonio, Texas. 

Those vehicles come back to the border to Mexico used for smuggling of narcotics and humans. Now these criminal violations or 

spillover violence from Mexico and violence along the Southwest 

border, as far as we are concerned, has intensified in most areas 

since at least 2004. 

Now working as a team and working into an interoperable communications along the Southwest border, more and more, we are 

seeing individuals, armed individuals, coming into out country or 

to our counties. We feel that it is a matter of time before a shootout 

will occur, and in the event that that were to happen, we are very 

definitely outgunned and outmanned along the border. 

25 

The federal government must provide some type of funding for 

local law enforcement in order to assist us in securing the borders 

of this country. In Texas, because of our efforts, our governor has 

opened the Texas Border Security Operations Center. The Center 

along with six others along the Texas-Mexico border houses peace 

officers and enlists intelligence officers, and most of them are 

officed at Border Pro-sector offices. 

We then formed the Joint Operations Intelligence Center, the 

JOICs, where we have local officers, state officers, and federal officers working together in obtaining intelligence information and 

then giving it back to the officers in the field. This is done on a 

daily basis. 

Now it is my understanding that this subcommittee wants to 

evaluate the level of coordination of emergency communications between federal, state and local officers and how we can effectively 

exchange information in real time in the event of an overwhelming 

emergency. 

Interoperability, I am sad to say, is not always working along the 

Southwest border. We are trying to meet those challenges and be 

able to effectively communicate among first responders first in 

other agencies. Information sharing, however, is still a very long 

ways off. I really want to talk about is of course the—— 

What we are doing in Texas with some of the programs we have, 

Operation Linebacker, Operation Stonegarden, Operation Border 

Stories Deterrence, if we had as many officers on the border as we 

are doing in Texas now, we are preventing an incident from happening in this country. We are preventing spillover violence from 

Mexico. 

And, again, we are very, very concerned of what is happening on 

the Southwest border. We, as sheriffs, are ready to proceed. We, as 

sheriffs, at this time. 

Some of the solutions we talked about, again, is funding to be 

able to properly address the situations for local law enforcement. 

Now, Dr. Barth briefly touched a little while ago regarding Sheriff 

Ted Sexton from Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, who has been to the 

border. This is the first time that we have seen the cooperation 

from the federal government with local law enforcement. 

We have attended hearings before here in D.C. and elsewhere. 

With Sheriff Sexton’s visit though, we are finally able to see something from the federal government where the federal government 

is finally listening to local law enforcement. 

We hope that Secretary Napolitano continues with his program 

with the state and local law enforcement, and we hope, of course, 

that Sheriff Sexton continues to visit us in the future—the border. 

With this, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for what you do 

for our district, the 20th district, and I want to thank the committee members for what you do for this great country of ours. 

Chairman Cuellar, this concludes my statement, and I would be 

happy to answer any questions the committee members may have. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Sheriff Gonzalez follows:] 

26 

1 28C.F.R. Section 0.85 and http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror2000l2001.htm 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SIGIFREDO GONZALEZ, JR. 

Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers, Members of the Subcommittee, it is 

an honor and a privilege to be invited to appear before this subcommittee to discuss 

and examine preparedness and coordination efforts of first responders along the 

southwest border. 

In May of 2005 sixteen Texas sheriffs whose counties border the Republic of Mexico formed the Texas Border Sheriff’s Coalition. This coalition was formed out of 

frustration in what we felt was the inadequacy of our federal government to protect 

our border in preventing a potential terrorist and their weapons of mass destruction 

from entering our country. We felt then, and still do, that the 1,276-mile Texas border with the Republic of Mexico is very much unprotected, wide-open, and extremely 

porous. In late March 2007, also because of their frustration, sheriffs from New 

Mexico, Arizona, and California joined the Texas coalition in our efforts and we 

formed the Southwestern Border Sheriff’s Coalition. The 2,000 miles of southwestern border of this great country of ours needs protection and immediate attention. Some of the goals of these coalitions are interoperability in the event of an 

emergency, a border area records management system, and information sharing. We 

continue to believe that terrorists have expressed an interest and a desire to exploit 

the existing vulnerabilities in our border security to enter or attack the United 

States. 

Although some of the matters of which I offer testimony today may seem as if 

I criticize federal agencies, I want to make sure that we understand that neither 

I nor our coalitions blame the agents of the United States Border Patrol, ICE, or 

any other federal agency, but, rather, we sometimes criticize the policies that they 

have to adhere to. In most areas of the southwest border we do not know what we 

would do without CBP/USBP presence. 

One other matter that concerns us along the border is the cross-border violence 

that at times terrorizes the more than 5 million people that live along the southwest 

border of our country. After all, as border sheriffs we are responsible for 98,480 

square miles of land along the border. 

The one thing that border sheriffs deal with on an almost daily basis is ‘‘narcoterrorism’’, or better yet: Domestic Terrorism—Defined—Code of Federal Regulations-‘‘. . .the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 

furtherance of political or social objectives.’’ 1 For the exception of the last seven 

words of this definition, people living along the border, and other areas in the 

United States, have, at one time or another, and are presently experiencing ‘‘domestic terrorism’’. Whether or not they are involved in drug trafficking, innocent bystanders, including family members, stand to suffer for the actions of individuals 

that may have crossed, knowingly or not, a member of a drug cartel. 

Emergency Preparedness and Readiness 

Violence along the southwest border has intensified along some areas since the 

latter part of 2004. More and more, we learn of abductions, kidnappings, 

carjackings, home invasions, murders, and large-scale incidents. These violations of 

law are attributed to spillover violence from Mexico. 

Through intelligence information and investigations it has been learned that several murders along the Texas—Mexico border have been orchestrated by members 

of drug cartels operating on both sides of the border. These drug cartel enforcers 

cross our international border, some illegally in areas other than a designated port 

of entry, commit their murders in the United States, then go back to Mexico. They 

are very well armed and are very accurate in what their assignment is. 

The cartels operating in Mexico and the United States have demonstrated that 

the weapons they posses can and will be used in protecting their caches. One informant familiar with the operations of these cartels mentioned to us that the weapons we use are water guns compared to what we will have to come up against if 

we ever have to. These cartels, known to frequently cross into the United States, 

possess and use automatic weapons, grenades, and grenade launchers. 

27 

2 National Drug Intelligence Center, U. S. Department Of Justice, Drug Market Analysis, 

South Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, 2008. 3Testimony of Ms. Marcy M. Forman, Director of Office of Investigations, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, March 1st , 2006, before 

the U. S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security 

and Citizenship and Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security. 

In confirming the above, the National Drug Intelligence Center has stated that 

‘‘drug traffickers in the South Texas HIDTA region use sophisticated surveillance, 

counter-surveillance, and communication techniques to aid their trafficking operations. Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations maintain cells that monitor law enforcement activities and the smuggling operations of rival traffickers.’’ 2

In late January 2006, Immigration and Customs Enforcements’ Border Enforcement and Security (BEST) Task Force confiscated components of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Laredo, Texas. It is believed that these components were to 

be sent to Mexico for use by the cartels or possibly to be used against us at the 

appropriate time.3

On December 28, 2005, and for the next three days, a sniper in Mexico shot at 

Border Patrol agents that were working along the banks of the river in the area 

of the cities of Rio Bravo/El Cenizo, which are located a few miles south of Laredo, 

Texas. This continued, sporadically, for three days. Agents reported seeing several 

individuals wearing military style uniforms on a hill on the Mexican side. One of 

them was using what was believed to be a high-powered rifle with scope. 

On July 12th, 2006, deputy sheriffs of the Hidalgo County, Texas, Sheriff’s Office 

and Border Patrol agents were fired upon from Mexico after they tried to rescue two 

individuals. This incident happened south of Donna, Texas. Hidalgo County Sheriff 

Guadalupe ‘‘Lupe’’ Trevino was quoted as saying that 300 to 400 continuous rounds 

were fired from automatic weapons from the Mexican side of the Rio Grande. It was 

also reported that shots were also fired at the officers from the east, the United 

States side. The FBI has indicated that this was the third incident of shootings from 

Mexico at local or federal officers in the first seven months of 2006 between Laredo 

and Brownsville, Texas. 

Cameron, Hidalgo, and Starr Counties in Texas have continuous problems with 

pseudo-cops coming from Mexico to extort and kidnap citizens in these counties. 

This area is the fastest growing area in the nation. They have seen their share of 

terrorist activity as it relates to the migration of many members of ruthless gangs 

that come into this country for reasons other than legitimate employment. 

In my county, Zapata County, as well as in other counties along the border, we 

get reports from informants of kidnappings in our counties. Individuals are kidnapped and taken to Mexico for ransom. Family members seldom file official reports 

due to fear of further retaliation. 

As previously submitted to this legislative body, on February 10th, 2005, a highranking member of the Mara Salvatrucha, or MS–13, was apprehended in Brooks 

County, Texas. He had been previously deported at least four times. This MS–13 

gang member is believed to have been responsible for the killing of 28 persons, including six children, and the wounding of 14 others, in a bus explosion in his native 

country. These people, as many others, find it very easy to come into our country 

through a very porous, wide-open, and unprotected border. 

According to the 2008 report of the National Drug Intelligence Center, drug traffickers and gang members involved in drug smuggling frequently commit assault, 

automobile theft, burglary, extortion, and murder throughout the South Texas borVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:21 May 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\111-CONG\111-13\55055.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE

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28 

der area to facilitate smuggling activities and to protect their operations from rival 

trafficking organizations and gangs. 

On July 1st, 2006, twenty-six year old Starr County, Texas, Detention Officer 

Gilberto Hernandez, Jr. went across the river from his hometown of Roma to visit 

his girlfriend. The detention officer failed to return and his parents reported him 

missing the following day. On July 3rd his badly beaten body was found in Mexico 

several miles from the border. His hands had been tied behind his back and his eyes 

had been bandaged. It is believed that he was tortured before being shot through 

the head, from behind, the bullet exiting through his forehead. During his funeral 

services a kidnapping was taking place across the street from the funeral home. One 

of the kidnappers was a Mexican National who had an outstanding warrant for a 

murder that he had committed a year before in the same county. 

Other threats that our offices have to deal with along the border on a daily basis 

include, but are not limited to, the following: 

• Kidnappings 

• Carjackings 

• Home Invasions 

• Extortions 

• Shooting from Mexico at law enforcement officers. 

• Armed individuals escorting drug and human loads into the United States. 

• Members of Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO’s) visiting the 

homes of U. S. officers to threaten them and their families. 

• Drug/Prison/Gang members working for Mexican DTO’s. 

• Documented/Deported criminals re-entering the United States, including murderers and child sex molesters. 

• Auto theft (vehicles are used for smuggling of humans and drugs). 

These criminal violations are spill-over violence from Mexico. 

Cross-Border Communications and Information-Sharing Capabilities / 

Emergency Response Resources and Personnel 

We have always maintained that if you don’t live on the border you don’t know 

how vulnerable this country is for a terrorist attack. Persons living 50 miles or more 

away from the border have the impression that this border is very well protected. 

This is a farce. The border is not protected. It is known that many of the operatives 

of cartels in Mexico live in the United States. Information received by our respective 

agencies indicates these criminals are living in our communities. They come to our 

cities and towns when things get too hot in Mexico. They come here to escape the 

possibility of apprehension in Mexico. Information received is that they are living 

along the border on the United States side. 

Employees of our offices have also seen incursions into this country of persons 

seeming to be members of the military of Mexico. On March 3rd, 2005, several officers assigned to do surveillance by the Rio Grande River by the Zapata/Webb County line in Texas observed approximately 20-25 persons walking on a gravel road, 

coming from the area of the riverbanks, marching in a cadence. These individuals 

were dressed in battle dress uniforms (BDUs), carrying what officers believe to be 

automatic weapons, very clean cut, and in very good physical condition. They were 

carrying backpacks and large duffle bags and walking two abreast. 

More and more we are seeing armed individuals entering our country through our 

counties. We feel that it is a matter of time before a shootout will occur. In the unfortunate event of a shootout, federal, state, and local officers along the southwest 

border are not adequately armed. Compared to the ruthless and brazen and open 

behavior of the cartels we face, we are most certainly outmanned. In the event of 

a shootout, many casualties will likely occur. Federal, state, and local officers all 

along the southwest border of the United States are outgunned and outmanned. 

The federal government must provide funding to local law enforcement agencies in 

order to assist in securing the borders of this country. 

In Texas, because of the efforts of the Texas Border Sheriff’s Coalition, Texas Governor Rick Perry has opened up the Border Security Operation Center. This center, 

along with six other ones along the Texas/Mexico border, houses analysts and intelligence officers. Most are officed at Border Patrol sector headquarters. Every day all 

law enforcement agencies that participate in Operation Border Star, the border security initiative presently being used, send in their intelligence information. At least 

once a day these centers, called Joint Operations Intelligence Centers (JOIC’s) disseminate the collected information back to the field officers. 

SUMMARY 

The 31 member sheriffs (20 from Texas, 5 from New Mexico, 4 from Arizona, and 

2 from California) of the Southwestern Border Sheriff’s Coalition are very concerned 

29 

with the very unique problems along our border. Border Patrol is doing the best 

they can with the resources that are available to them. Immediate help is needed 

for them and for southwestern border sheriffs for the protection of our country. 

We are seeing more and more persons coming across our southwestern border 

than ever before. From what we are seeing, we feel that most of these persons are 

not coming into the country to look for legitimate employment. We feel that terrorists are already here and continue to enter our country on a daily basis. Our border 

is wide open; it is very porous and definitely unprotected and vulnerable. 

Putting pressure on the Mexican government to enforce drug laws and provide the 

assistance mandated by the Merida Initiative is like filling up a balloon with air 

and then starting to squeeze it a little bit at a time. After squeezing it much, the 

balloon will burst. It is better that this balloon burst towards the southern border 

of Mexico and not toward the United States. 

It has been almost eight years since the worst terrorist attack in this country and 

we are still as vulnerable, if not worst, that before September 11, 2001. We have 

seen no funding for any projects along the southwest border. On the contrary, as 

time goes by we see less funding opportunities. 

In five years we have seen broken promises of protecting our great nation. September 11, 2001, was a dark day in American history and the protection of a great 

nation. What has changed since that day along the border and in my backyard? 

Nothing. As I speak before you today, funding aimed at border security along the 

southwest border didn’t come from Washington, DC, it came from Austin, Texas. 

The governor of Texas is in the same position we in law enforcement have been 

in for years. We are fed up and tired of failed policies and promises. Texas is the 

can do state and Governor Perry has decided to fund a border security initiative 

that has literally shut down criminal enterprises in several Texas counties. 

We did this with state funds and working with federal partners on an initiative 

that puts law enforcement in the driver’s seat instead of the carters, smugglers, and 

border crossing criminal entrepreneurs. This should have been done on September 

12, 2001, by our federal government. Washington, DC didn’t just fail me and my 

law enforcement comrades. . . .it has failed Americans. Just shy of eight years 

from that day and the border remains open to smuggling operatives, criminal organizations and people aimed at destroying this nation. 

On the southwest border you left us no choice; we have had to pick up the fight 

to save our counties. We didn’t ask for this battle on the border..... .but we 

refuse to lose to criminals! 

POSSIBLE SOLUTION 

In Texas, we have implemented Operation Linebacker, a second line of defense 

in the protection of our country. The United States Border Patrol being the first line 

of defense. The problems along the border are federal problems. Our governor, the 

Honorable Rick Perry, could not wait for a peace officer to get killed along the border. He, just as we, is very much concerned. The Texas Legislature appropriated 

$110 million as seed money for us to start Operation Border Star. Operation Border 

Star is an operation that partially funds Operation Linebacker and makes available 

all state resources for the protection of the border. Operation Linebacker and Operation Border Star have proven to be successful. Deterrence has been very successful. 

These are proven operations that should be funded by the federal government. 

CONCLUSION 

Committee Members, there cannot be homeland security without border security. 

Border Security, the prevention of spillover violence from Mexico, and information 

sharing is not a blue issue or a red issue. It is a red, white, and blue issue. Our 

southwest border needs immediate attention. Local officers, sheriffs, not federal officers, answer emergency calls for assistance made by our constituents. We are the 

first responders! Must we wait for another terrorist act or until an officer gets killed 

before we act? 

I want to express my most sincere appreciation for allowing me the opportunity 

to appear before you and thank you for the work you do for our country, the United 

States of America. 

Chairman Cuellar, this concludes my statement. I will be pleased to answer any 

questions that you or Members of the Sub-Committee may have. 

Mr. CUELLAR. On the cameras, just make sure there is no flash 

photography, just on that. 

Sheriff Gonzalez, I always appreciate, actually he is from my district. Janice also is in Laredo, also. I want to thank them because 

they do have a lot of experience on the border. 

30 

As the next sheriff, Sheriff Dever, who will now summarize his 

statement for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF SHERIFF LARRY A. DEVER, COCHISE COUNTY, 

ARIZONA 

Sheriff DEVER. Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers, 

members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today. 

I sit here not only representing my constituents in Cochise County and fellow law enforcement officers in Arizona but also the National Sheriff’s Association, where I sit on the board of directors 

and chair the Immigration Subcommittee, and it is with their support that I am here today. 

Just to give you a brief history, kind of put in perspective where 

we have been and where we are: I have in my hand a magazine 

published by Arizona Sheriffs and County Attorney’s Association 

that quotes then Border Patrol Sector Chief John Gall as saying 

this, ‘‘Within the last year, we have been mandated by Congress to 

gain control of the border, and we are going to do that on our 

southern border, whether it is narcotics, illegal aliens, terrorists, 

criminals or whatever.’’ 

Now, what I find remarkable about this publication is that it was 

published in 1987, and the word ‘‘terrorist’’ is mentioned here. So 

this is nothing new. Criminal aliens on the border is nothing new, 

and this was also 1987, 1 year post Reagan Amnesty. And obviously, that program did not work at that time and is likely not to 

work again in terms of securing our border. 

Also, in 1997, I was invited before a body of Congress to testify 

about border violence on the Southwest border. That was 12 years 

ago, and here we sit today holding a hearing regarding the same 

thing. I only say that to help us to not continue the same path that 

has led us here today and that 12 years hence, we are holding 

these hearings over the same matter. 

Violence comes in many forms on the border, and it starts, frankly, south of the border with the smuggling organizations competing 

for the corridors that they work in and competing for illegal aliens 

to smuggle, and it continues as they cross the border. 

It is estimated that over 80 percent of the women who cross the 

border illegally have been subjected to sexual assault somewhere 

on their journey prior to ever crossing the border. We deal with 

homicides, sexual assault, physical assault, robbery, and all of 

those crimes have to be investigated by state and local law enforcement on this side of the border. 

When people are arrested and charged with those crimes, they 

are housed in our jails at tremendous expense. Their stay is long 

because they can’t post bond. Most of them are indigent, so they 

are assigned an attorney to represent them by the county, by the 

state, at the state’s expense, and many of them have serious medical problems that also require, since they are now wards of the 

state, require the state and counties to foot that bill. That is some 

of the bad news. 

Also, another portion of the bad news is that people who die 

crossing the border as a consequence of natural causes, those cases 

have to be investigated fully as homicides until cause of death is 

determined. And so those are very expensive as well. 

31 

Moving quickly along, the physical impact over the years has 

suggested that as much as 37 percent of local budgets are being expended on matters illegal-alien related. If you had to spend 37 percent of your business profit, all of a sudden, overnight were diverted to something you hadn’t planned or prepared for, you would 

probably be out of business. 

SCAAP was an important program, State Criminal Alien Assistance Program, that in 1995 resulted in a reimbursement to localities for incarcerating illegal aliens of approximately 33 percent. 

Today, that fund accounts for 9 cents on the dollar in reimbursement to localities. It needs to be restored. 

How better to coordinate my friend and colleague, Sheriff Gonzalez, has suggested some things. We have seen an improved outreach by DHS in the last few months. It is greatly appreciated. Important thing to remember that I can’t emphasize enough, is that 

every federal initiative, every federal strategy and tactical planning 

opportunity needs state and local input because they have local 

consequences. And if those aren’t considered up front, we will continue to suffer tremendously under this great burden. 

Thanks for having us here today. I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

[The statement of Sheriff Dever follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LARRY A. DEVER

INTRODUCTION: 

Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers, members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for inviting me to this hearing. The matters being heard here today regarding 

security of our Country’s southern border are of great concern for me and should 

be at the top of the list of concerns for the welfare and protection of our great nation. I was born and raised in the border environment. That along with over 33 

years of law enforcement work in this arena offers, I believe, a perspective unknown 

or experienced by most officials who sit in decision making positions that so profoundly affect our nation’s security. 

BACKGROUND: 

The region of the U.S./Mexico border identified in the Federal border enforcement 

scheme of things is the Tucson Sector of the Border Patrol. It encompasses three 

counties and covers over 200 miles of the border. This portion of the 2200 mile border accounts for almost half of the people captured illegally crossing our border and 

almost half of the marijuana seized being smuggled into this country. 

The Arizona Sheriffs and County Attorney’s Association once published a quarterly magazine. The United States Border Patrol was featured in one of its editions. 

Then Border Patrol Tucson Sector Chief Jondal is quoted as saying this: ‘‘Congress 

has mandated that we get control of our border. And that is exactly what we are 

going to do. Whether it is illegal aliens, drugs, terrorists, or whatever, we are going 

to get control of our border.’’ That publication was issued in the fall of 1987. There 

are four remarkable points to note in this statement: That ‘‘Congress mandated’’ 

control; that this was post Reagan amnesty (and I emphasize the word ‘‘amnesty’’ 

which is widely discussed today): that the idea that a terrorist threat existed even 

then; and that we sit here 20 years later still discussing the same stuff. 

Then, June 1997 I was invited to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The focus of the hearing--Border Violence. And now, 12 years later, we see 

this sudden flurry of activity and concern over the need to reign in this wave of terror on the border. 

WHAT WE KNOW: 

Violence associated with drug and people smuggling is increasing. It comes in 

many ways. People attempting to enter this country illegally are regularly subjected 

to robbery, assault, rape, kidnapping and all other kinds of atrocities. Much of this 

occurs before they ever cross the border. Competing organizations rob, steal and 

murder, also on both sides of the border. In Arizona, the transportation hub cities, 

Tucson and Phoenix experience these events daily. Kidnappings and murders south 

32 

of the border are occurring at an alarming rate and some of it is migrating north 

as vulnerable groups move their families out of Mexico. 

Smugglers working on the U.S. side of the border are more inclined to fight than 

to flee, have better telecommunications than many border law enforcement agencies, 

and have extremely sophisticated networks that challenge the best we have to offer 

in response. 

RESPONSE AND INTEROPERABILITY: 

In today’s border environment there is a multitude of federal, state and local law 

enforcement personnel, firefighters and medical providers who play a role in the response scheme of things. And then there are others—Red Cross, F.M.A., Search and 

Rescue, Medics, Hospitals, etc., etc., etc. While we hold meetings, hold simulation 

exercises and do lots of other things to bring all these assets together, the greatest 

obstacle to success is the inability to communicate on a common network. While 

there are jurisdictional and financial obstacles to achieving complete operability, the 

biggest challenge is the building of infrastructure and having manpower to staff 

communication centers. This will require the construction of physical communication facilities and funding to hire support personnel. 

The good news is that cooperation, communication and planning activities are 

more common today than ever before. A recognition and emphasis of these activities 

should remain a priority. 

The bad news is that last year Congress swept $480M from BYRNE/JAG funding 

for joint narcotics task force funding, severely crippling coordinated drug enforcement efforts across the nation, most particularly along the border. These funds need 

to be restored. 

A meaningful federally funded effort to enhance border enforcement is what is 

known as ‘‘Operation Stonegarden.’’ This pays overtime and operational costs for 

local law enforcement officers to support and enhance Homeland Security efforts to 

interdict illegal border crossings. An expansion of this project, to include the permanent hiring of additional officers would help to significantly mitigate the impact of 

crime committed by illegal aliens. 

FISCAL IMPACTS: 

Over the past ten years, as much as 37% of local jurisdiction criminal justice system resources have been diverted to matters illegal alien related. We have always 

had to deal with the dynamics of drug smuggling in this area, but alien smuggling 

has presented a whole new dimension of challenges. Property damage, theft, burglary and the trail of garbage and human waste left behind by countless numbers 

of illegal border crossers are the order of the day. People who commit these crimes 

and who are housed in county jails and state prisons add to the cost. Since they 

cannot pay bond, declare indigency and often have serious medical problems, all of 

this expense is shifted to the local jurisdiction. 

In 1995, Congress authorized reimbursement to state and local jurisdictions 

(S.C.A.A.P. State Criminal Alien Assistance Program) to assist with these costs. 

Then, we recovered approximately 33% of actual expenses, minus medical costs. 

Today, that fund only reimburses about 9 cents on every dollar. 

BOTTOM LINE: 

There are some good things that are working. Operation Stonegarden, which provides funding to local jurisdictions to support Federal border enforcement efforts, 

has proved to be effective. Sheriffs on the border have no interest in becoming border enforcement agents. We do, however, have a significant role to play in preventing and investigating crime related to drug and people smuggling in our respective counties. Until our Federal Government achieves its mandate to secure our borders, we will be plagued with the consequences. We do not have the resources to 

successfully meet our obligations, and therefore require some relief. Expansion of existing federal programs that adequately reimburse and enable local criminal justice 

agencies to employ necessary resources are imperative. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Sheriff Dever, I thank you very much for your testimony, and I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony. 

I would like to recognize, of course, the chairman of the full committee, Chairman Thompson, who is here present and thank him 

for the leadership that he has provided on this issue. 

I would like to remind each member that he or she will have 5 

minutes to question the panel. I will now recognize myself for 5 

minutes on the questions. 

33 

As a proponent of team work that produces measurable results, 

I introduced the Southwest Border Security Task Force Act of 

2009, that is H.R. 1439. That will coordinate the efforts at the federal and the state and the local folks are doing and to work together, not only on this side, but also with our counterparts across 

the river. 

I know that those specific instances where we have BEST and 

other programs where they are working together, but I am talking 

about a coordinated effort across the Southwest border. 

Taking that in consideration, I was also disturbed, you know, to 

read that the March 25th edition of The Wall Street Journal said 

that those federal agencies are refusing to work together on task 

forces that the administration has established to fight drug cartels. 

The article cites an example, for example, one of the federal 

agencies that refuses to allow its agents to participate in the special task force groups established by DHS in Arizona, which is a 

major corridor for gun trafficking. 

They are participating in Texas but they are not participating in 

Arizona, and this is one of the reasons why I am a big proponent 

of coordinated—it is a very simple concept, but it is hard to implement, but I think we need to have that coordination. 

I guess, Dr. Barth, my question to you is, does DHS have the authority to compel participation of DHS components and other federal agencies to work collectively to deter the encroaching drug cartel related violence? 

Dr. BARTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that I am not 

aware of the exact incident that you are referring to that The Wall 

Street Journal reported on. 

Mr. CUELLAR. ATF. 

Dr. BARTH. ATF? Okay. I am not aware of that precise case, for 

example. DHS does not have, indeed, the authority to compel other 

agencies to participate in various operations; however, DHS does 

have a leadership role in the Southwest border that I think you 

will see being very effectively managed collaboratively among the 

agencies. 

For example, Secretary Napolitano, has met both with Secretary 

Clinton and the Attorney General Holder to ensure at the very 

highest levels of the administration that there is a commitment to 

work collaboratively on all of the issues across the board that affect 

the Southwest border. 

That goes to north of the border, collaboration on guns moving 

south and money moving south to interdict drugs that are moving 

north and to work with the Mexican government on the violence 

that is south of the border, particularly through the Merida Initiative and other collaborative work that is done by ICE and other 

components of all the agencies of government. 

As we speak here today, there is intensive work going on that 

involves, indeed, all of the components of DHS as well as representatives of other agencies to ensure that the level of collaboration going forward is unlike that we have ever seen before. 

And from what I can tell from where I sit working both with the 

White House and other agencies, through the White House coordination process, I would add that the White House and the Obama 

34 

administration is fully committed to making sure that the collaboration exists going forward. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Right. What about working with the local offices? 

I know you had the gentleman Sexton go out to specific areas, but 

that is a time-specific, time-certain time that you have an individual, but is there more of a coordinated effort that you are reaching out to the local folks? 

Dr. BARTH. Yes, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that Secretary Napolitano as a former border governor, will focus on those relationships 

like no one ever has before. She realizes the critical nature of that 

kind of collaboration. I think that you will see frequent visits by 

her and her senior staff to the northern border and to Mexico until 

we get ahead of the curve here. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Secretary Napolitano will be in Laredo this Friday. 

I don’t know exactly what her schedule is. I have a general idea 

what it is, but can you make sure that she meets with the local 

state and local law enforcement? 

Because my understanding is that, you know, without going to 

her agenda, but I just want to make sure that two things are said: 

one, that we include the state and local folks, and we will be happy 

to coordinate with you, number one. 

And number two, that we bring some of the business community 

leaders, because one of the things—for example, Laredo’s the largest inland port in the U.S., and we want to make sure that we have 

strong border security, and I think Janice and—you know that in 

that area. 

We want to have strong border security, but at the same time, 

you know, when we have 13,500 trucks a day coming across the 

border, doesn’t include rail, doesn’t include air also. We don’t want 

to impede the trade. 

We don’t want to impede the truism, the retail, which is so important to our border economy, and I would ask you to just make 

sure you send that message that it is not just coming in and meeting with federal ICE officials. You know, with all do respect, but 

also to include our local and state officials also. 

Dr. BARTH. I will transmit that message. I know she is trying to 

meet with both private sector representatives as well as state and 

local officials on all parts of her trips as she travels around the 

country, and that message will be transmitted for sure. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Dr. Barth. 

Dr. BARTH. You are welcome. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Major General Aylward, last month, Governor 

Perry for the state of Texas requested the president provide 1,000 

more guardsmen to support border security missions along the 

Texas-Mexico border. 

From your perspective, does Texas need more Title 32 resources, 

or do we have enough adequate resources to meet its mission? 

Gen. AYLWARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my opening remarks, I mentioned we are really at the preliminary stages, the 

formative stages of developing requirements based upon capability 

gaps that exist. 

The appropriate role, and from a Guard Bureau view, is to provide the technical advice and assistance on the capabilities within 

the military portfolio that augment either state and local requireVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:21 May 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\111-CONG\111-13\55055.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
35 

ments or requirements that we would get from the Department of 

Homeland Security. And so, we are still in the formative stages of 

that. We really don’t have a complete list of what the requirements 

would be. 

But any requirement that we did get, we wouldneed that increased funding in order to be able to accomplish those missions 

and the range of activity that they are looking for us to perform, 

without which that increased funding, then there would be an impact on our readiness. 

Mr. CUELLAR. So you are answer is? 

Gen. AYLWARD. I mean the view of the state and local folks in 

terms of what the requirements are is, as you kind of highlighted, 

is a combination of the local officials and the state officials. 

Do they have enough capacity and capability within those different organizations and agencies to cover down on what the governor asked for, I think, is still something that they are working 

through. And so, until they complete that analysis, the identification of any gaps that would exist that the Guard may augment is 

still a work underway. 

Until that work is done, I don’t have a definitive answer for you. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Thank you, sir. 

One last question, and then I will pass this on to the ranking 

member. 

Ms. Ayala? That same article, the March 25th edition of The 

Wall Street Journal, the former ICE director, Julie Myers said, 

that the MOUs regarding who works on drug-related cases are outdated and, ‘‘the agents have their hands tied behind their backs.’’ 

Any comments on any MOUs that you all have among agencies, 

federal agencies, and any opinions as to whether they are outdated 

or whether they should be adjusted so you can go ahead and meet 

the emerging threats that we have? 

Ms. AYALA. Thank you. Yes, we are working on an MOU that 

predates the establishment of ICE or DHS. It is a MOU from 1994 

between Customs and DEA, and it does put a cap on the number 

of cross-designated Customs agents, or ICE in this case. At that 

time, we were working with about 3,000 agents, and now we are 

up to T.O. of over 6,000 agents. 

We are a border agency that deals with all cross-border smuggling, and we would appreciate to have Title 21 concurrent authorities that would help us to do our job better and avoid delays. 

Mr. CUELLAR. So are you all working on updating that MOU? 

Ms. AYALA. We have been working, yes, sir, with DEA on updating that MOU. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Do you know when roughly you will have that 

done? 

Ms. AYALA. I am not sure, but I can get back to you on that, or 

we can set up a briefing to give you more particulars of all the details at this point. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. If you would just keep the committee updated on that, and if we can assist you in any way, and try to get 

you and DEA to get together and work this out, let us know. 

Ms. AYALA. Thank you. 

36 

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. At this time, I would like to recognize 

the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Rogers, the gentleman from Alabama for questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I had planned to go 

in a different direction with questions, but Sheriff Dever really, I 

think, honed in on what this hearing’s all about, and that is referring to the 1987 article that talked about these same things. And 

here we are dealing with them in a more of a reactive fashion than 

a proactive fashion. 

I would like to know, particularly from you and then Sheriff Gonzalez, what are we at the federal level not doing that we should 

be doing to make sure that you have what you need at the first 

responder level to deal with these threats that you described so 

well? 

Sheriff Dever first. 

Sheriff DEVER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rogers, thank 

you. A couple of things come to mind. The federal government has 

increased resources on the border significantly over the past 10 

years, but sadly still coming up very, very short. I mentioned the 

SCAP funding program, which is really significant. 

I mean, most counties along the border are small and poor and 

yet have a tremendous burden in terms of bearing the financial 

hardship of the cost associated with crime committed by people 

who cross the border illegally. And those—— 

Mr. ROGERS. How much do you receive in Cochise County? 

Sheriff DEVER. Right now, we are getting about 9 percent on 

every dollar that we spend. 

Mr. ROGERS. What do you need? 

Sheriff DEVER. One-hundred percent. 

Mr. ROGERS. Which is how much? 

Sheriff DEVER. Right now, we are incurring somewhere between $400,000 and half million dollars a year in housing, and keep in 

mind, we do not house people charged for federal immigration violation or federal drug crimes. These are crimes committed against 

the state where charges have been filed in the county. 

Mr. ROGERS. So you need $1 million a year for SCAP funding? 

Sheriff DEVER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. What else? 

Sheriff DEVER. Well, we were just talking about one county. 

Mr. ROGERS. I know. I am asking you what else do you need? 

Sheriff DEVER. Secondly, Operation Stonegarden has had some 

success. Enhancement of that would be helpful. One of the things 

that is lost in most funding mechanisms in programs, Congressman, is costs for infrastructure to support. 

We put a lot of boots—we talk about boots on the ground. We 

talk about officers and patrol cars and costs associated with all of 

that, but as that component grows and increases, so does the need 

for supporting infrastructure. 

Mr. ROGERS. Such as? 

Sheriff DEVER. Communications, communications infrastructure, 

giving us the ability to talk to each other across—— 

Mr. ROGERS. What else? 

Sheriff DEVER. —jurisdictional boundaries and lines. There has 

been some improvement there and there is still a long way to go. 

37 

Personnel to man communications centers, money for brick and 

mortar to build enhanced communications centers. 

We are operating out of little cubby holes and corners, and a 

place where we can co-locate and have a commonality for communications, as well as the support staff in terms of recordkeeping, 

you know, report and data retrieval, intelligence gathering and dissemination. 

All of those components are necessary. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. What about you, Sheriff Gonzalez? 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. Basically, about the same thing, Mr. Rogers— 

we are looking at, for example, Ms. Ayala talks about the BEST 

task forces, regular task forces. When you have small counties, you 

cannot always contribute to those task forces with personnel, because you don’t have any personnel to contribute with. 

There is some counties in Texas that have a sheriff and two deputy sheriffs cover 6,000 square miles. It is very, very difficult to be 

able to have somebody or to participate. Operation Stonegarden is 

good—also, how long can you work this officers on overtime? 

The COPS Programs, for example, that have been recently reinitiated again, very good programs. Things we would like to see 

is that perhaps at year 4 that the local agencies don’t have to continue to fund those positions as a requirement to keep those officers. 

What do we need on the border officer to assist in what is happening on the borders is personnel for local agencies. This Congress 

of the 107th, 108th Congress, I don’t recall exactly which one it is, 

but there was legislation filed that was also sponsored or supported 

Congressman Cuellar, Congressman McCaul and some other congressmen along the border. 

Legislation was filed together with Congressman Culverson. That 

was directed at specifically local law enforcement, and that is 

where we need the funding. You can have all the ICE agents or 

border patrol agents in the nation go to the border. How long will 

they be there? 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. For one, and how many of those 95 percent, 

probably, are going to be lost. They don’t know where they are 

going to go. They don’t know the local people. They don’t know who 

the local dealers are. They don’t know those things. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. So, mostly, you go to the borders for federal 

agents mostly what I call a hardship station. You get there, you 

want to get out of there as quick as you can. We are there. We live 

there. We know the people. We need—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. —the funding for local agencies. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Ms. Ayala? Has there been any communication between your office or your department and these local law enforcement agencies 

about specifically what they need from you or from the Department, and that may be for Dr. Barth, I don’t know. 

And a way to kind of put this in a form of a request to Congress 

to make sure that they are receiving what they need to work in collaboration with you in an effective manner. 

38 

Ms. AYALA. Well, we work with them every day. Most of them 

are on our task forces to look at what type of equipment needs and 

what type of facility needs they have. We participate with them on 

a daily basis as far as trying to get them cross designated and providing some other means for them to have asset-sharing opportunities. 

Because they are on our task forces, any time we seize an asset, 

they are entitled to put in for asset sharing—— 

Mr. ROGERS. But my question is, have you put together an inventory of what is needed along the Southwest border, specifically, 

with regard to local first responders, local assets so that you can 

come to us as the authorizing entity and say what we need to do 

our job in collaboration with local law enforcement is A, B, C, D, 

E. Do you have that assembled? 

And that may be for Dr. Barth. It may not be a fair question for 

you. 

Dr. BARTH. Thank you, yes. Let me at least give us two data 

points for point of departure here. For the Operation Stonegarden 

funding, in 2008, we have about $58 million to award. We have 143 

applications totaling $290 million. So that, for example, gives you 

a highlight of the gap between what might be required to help all 

of the 24 counties in the four states along the Southwest border. 

We will award that $58 million in the near future. We have $60 

million in the 2010 budget plan for Operation Stonegarden. So 

clearly, more resources could be used along the Southwest border. 

Our effort is to try to make sure that the resources we do have are 

prioritized according to risk and, therefore, allocated accordingly. 

Mr. ROGERS. I understand, and in fairness, I am not beating up 

on you, because it is not your fault—$60 million along the entire 

four states of the Southwest border is a miniscule amount of money 

to deal with the problem we have got, particularly, given the 

amount of money we are talking about giving to the Mexican government to deal with this. 

We need you all to come to us with some meaningful numbers 

that you need from us to deal with this problem. You know, the 

numbers that Secretary Napolitano’s talking about redirecting 

within her current budget, is not really a meaningful number, in 

my view. 

So that is the direction I would ask for from you. 

I am sorry I went over my time, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CUELLAR. At this time, I will recognize other members for 

questions that they may wish to ask the witnesses, and accordance 

with our committee rules and practice, I will recognize members 

who were present at the start of the hearing based on their seniority of the subcommittee, alternating between the majority and the 

minority. Those members coming in later will be recognized in the 

order of their arrival. 

At this time, I will recognize the chairman of the committee, Mr. 

Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate you holding this hearing. 

I would like to ask both Sheriff Gonzalez and Sheriff Dever prior 

to the announcement of this border initiative, did you receive any 

39 

communication from the Department. Yes or no? I guess that 

is—— 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. Very short answer, Mr. Chairman, you talking 

about the Department of Homeland Security? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes. 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. No, sir. 

Sheriff DEVER. It would be the same answer here, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Are there some things in this initiative that you 

think we could do better in line with what the ranking member 

asked earlier, or are you satisfied in the present form? 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. Again, Mr. Chairman, there is really not 

enough funding there. And let me just clear something up, and I 

know I have said this many, many times in the several times that 

I have testified before Congress. We don’t want to be border patrol 

agents. We are just concerned with what is coming into the country 

on the criminal type of basis. 

We need, again, funding for local law enforcement to be able to 

do what we are supposed t be doing along the border, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So in other words, you are looking for help to 

help catch the bad guys. Am I correct? 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. We are looking for help in catching the bad 

guys who are coming in, sir, and also protecting the citizens and 

residents who are already living in our counties so that they not 

get kidnapped and not get extorted, not have their homes invaded, 

that they not get tortured and things like this. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Absolutely. 

Sheriff Dever? 

Sheriff DEVER. Give you a ballpark number and actually it is 

kind of a hard number. We beat this around National Sheriff’s Association for sometime about a year ago trying to come up, for the 

Southwest border, a hard number that we thought would be adequate—*$500 million a year for 5 years was the figure that we 

looked at as being actually something meaningful that would provide the resources Sheriff Gonzalez and I mentioned here today. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Major General Aylward? You referenced in Chairman Cuellar’s 

question that you are not quite ready to address Governor Perry’s 

request for 1,000 people or you are still analyzing it, and could you 

just kind of expand on your previous answer? 

Gen. AYLWARD. Yes, sir. In fact, this afternoon I will be attending a meeting over at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. 

We just got to take the requirements across the four-state region 

marry it up against what the rest of the 22 agencies that make up 

the Department of Homeland Security and make sure that we appropriately cover down on the gaps that exist. 

Military isn’t the only solution to the gaps that exist out there. 

So the appropriate role for us would be a result of that more rigorous analysis in terms of what can be done across the team here 

from local, state, through the federal government. We have always 

bridged that gap within the National Guard program on a counterdrug and an innovative and earnest training. 

Any requirements that come out of that gap analysis will require 

the additional funding for us to effectively perform those missions. 

40 

Mr. THOMPSON. So I guess the answer I am looking for is whether or not you presently possess the money and/or resources to address this request for 1,000 personnel to go to the border? 

Gen. AYLWARD. For additional 1,000 people to go to the border, 

as I mentioned a number of times, would be the increased funding 

to pick up the incremental cost associated with that deployment of 

the additional 1,000 folks. 

Within our program at large, we believe that we have at least 

up to 1,500 folks that could be available under the counter drug 

program, which is the congressionally mandated program that has 

a statutory cap of 4,000 and currently is at approximately 2,500 

folks at this point. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Okay. Maybe I will get you to tell me what the 

answer. Thank you, General. 

Dr. Barth? 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Mr. Chairman, can I just follow up? The 

study that we have been talking about Governor Perry from the 

state of Texas, but I guess, you all analyzing the four border states, 

right, not just the state of Texas needs? 

Gen. AYLWARD. Yes, sir. That is the way I understand is that 

meeting this afternoon at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Right. 

Gen. AYLWARD. I understand Governor Perry has a requirement 

on the table for 1,000, but that has to be vetted again, you know, 

with the local, state folks and with our corporate partners and the 

22 agencies that make up the Department of Homeland Security to 

make sure that we appropriately cover down on what that request 

is all about. 

Mr. CUELLAR. And you said there are about 1,500 personnel that 

could be available right now? 

Gen. AYLWARD. Within our program, sir, we believe there is a 

statutory cap on the counter drug program, Title 32, Section 112, 

of 4,000. I have approximately 2,500 people right now that are 

funded. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you have 1,500 that are not funded. 

Gen. AYLWARD. Correct. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Okay. That is what I was trying to get to. 

Gen. AYLWARD. Okay, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Barth? Who at DHS is responsible for the Southwest Border 

Initiative? 

Dr. BARTH. Sir, by her active engagement on the issue, I would 

have to say it is Secretary Napolitano. She is engaged on this issue 

with respect to every aspect of it. 

The use of the Merida funds south of the border to support the 

Mexican government, the deployment of the specific agents and inspectors from all of our component agencies, and takes a lot of the 

responsibility for ensuring interagency coordination with our sister 

department and agencies. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well I appreciate your putting the ultimate burden on the secretary. Okay? But after secretary, I need you to give 

me, and maybe you can just forward it to the committee, the components that make up Southwest Border Initiative and the staff 

41 

persons who are responsible for either management or oversight of 

each component. I mean, that is what I am trying to get to. 

Dr. BARTH. We can provide you that, sir, very quickly after today’s hearing. 

Mr. THOMPSON. One of the concerns is you heard two sheriffs 

talk about some concerns that they have, but I want to make sure 

that there is enough continuity of information and individuals so 

that their job can be made easier in this whole initiative process. 

It really doesn’t matter which one, but as long as they are clear as 

to who the individuals they relate to. 

One other question. 

Ms. Ayala? Okay, good enough, I hope. What incentives do we, 

from the department level, offer state, locals, and tribal entities to 

participate in these programs, especially the BEST program? 

Ms. AYALA. Well, I think, first we provide a force multiplier effect, as Sheriff Dever was saying that often times we have a sheriff’s office that have one or two people, and they are trying to be 

involved in a complex investigation. They may need more resources, more equipment. 

We, in turn, need their expertise. So by being on a BEST, we 

have multi-agency international, multi-disciplinary team that provides that. 

Number two, they are able to be cross designated in Title 19 and 

Title 8, which is Customs and Immigration Authorities, at least be 

able to do their job and further those cases that they are working 

in furtherance of the BEST. 

We also have the asset sharing program so they can be paid for 

overtime and share assets for other things that they may need for 

their department, and because they are participating in task forces 

such as a BEST, they also can apply for DHS grants as specific to 

that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Both sheriffs, other than overtime, you heard some other opportunities that are available to you. Before the hearing and what you 

heard, were you familiar with that? 

Sheriff DEVER. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Thompson, yes, to some 

degree. We have a great, at least at the working field level, great 

cooperative spirit with our federal partners on the border. 

Where communication generally breaks down and doesn’t occur 

is what I mentioned earlier, there is a lot of planning, strategic 

planning, tactical planning and policy making that goes on in this 

town that then gets pushed down to the SACs and sector chiefs 

that have a local impact and are already in place before we ever 

hear about them, and the consequences are already developing. 

And so, again, we have seen a recent improvement. We welcome 

that with open arms. We hope that it continues. And continuity, as 

you mentioned, earlier, sir, has been the problem. 

We have, you know, little spaces and points of time where we sit 

down and we talk, and then it all goes off everybody’s radar screen 

for some reason. We don’t get back together until there is another 

crisis, and by then it is too late. 

I would in response to your question, if you don’t mind, mention 

one other component here that is critical that isn’t represented 

here today. In the federal scheme of things, the U.S. Attorney, and 

42 

I don’t know if this is at the Washington level or state level, they 

established thresholds for prosecution. 

For instance, drug smuggling cases in our state, the threshold for 

prosecution of marijuana smuggling cases, it is 500 pounds. Anything under 500 pounds, is dismissed or referred to local and state 

prosecutors for dealing with, and we simply don’t have those resources. 

And I know the U.S. Attorney is strapped for resources, but that 

is another component needs some serious addressing, not only for 

drug smuggling but people smuggling and the movement to illegal 

weapons in both directions across the border. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So when that happens, what burden does that 

put on you? Do you have to house those individuals until they are 

transported or what? 

Sheriff DEVER. The local prosecutor has to make a decision on 

whether or not he has resources to prosecute. If he does, then we 

house those individuals. 

From a law enforcement perspective, what you will always here 

is we think everybody ought to go to jail who is committed a crime 

and that none of these people should walk and get off free. 

But they know they can come through a port of entry for something less than 500 pounds of marijuana or a couple of hundred 

kilos of cocaine, and within impunity. 

They will lose the contraband. They may lose the mode of transportation, but there is no criminal prosecution, and that just makes 

an open announcement that, you know, come on in. Nothing is 

gonna happen—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. And you think that is predicated because there 

is no or there is limited resources available at the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office to prosecute? 

Sheriff DEVER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Sheriff Gonzalez? 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman, in response to your question, also, yes. We are very much familiar with Ms. Ayala’s talking 

about prior to today. 

Thing is, again, we cannot dedicate resources on a full-time basis 

unless they are paid for. And I have two deputy sheriffs assigned 

to a HIDA task force. The deputy sheriffs are paid through HIDA 

funds. I could not afford to pay them through county funds. So we 

are familiar with the programs that are there. 

We are familiar with asset sharing. We are familiar with these 

things here; however, we cannot commit to some type of very longterm investigation. What I am talking about here today, Mr. Chairman, is something that is needed immediately. 

In other words, when you have that 911 call that is made to us, 

we have to respond now. It is not a long-term thing where we can 

leave it for next week. We have to respond now. 

So we are familiar with these programs. The things is, we just 

cannot dedicate the personnel for this long amount of time. For another one again is that this is something I love to hear. We just 

heard it last week again, information for Mexico. When you guys 

were working, which is us, we don’t move our loads. 

To me, Mr. Chairman, I would much rather prevent a burglary 

or prevent a murder than try to solve it later on. To me, sir, deterVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:21 May 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\111-CONG\111-13\55055.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
43 

rence is paramount. To me, deterrence is the best there is, and that 

is what we do. 

What Sheriff Dever was talking about also like the SCAP funding. District attorney in our jurisdiction does not accept any federal 

referrals at all. If you got 200 pounds of marijuana, federal government, you take it. If you got an ounce of marijuana, federal government, you take it. We do not accept federal referrals. 

We have to put these people in our jails again. We are not getting funded through SCAP. President Bush cut SCAP funding to 

zero, JAG funding to zero, Burn grants to zero. We cannot continue 

to—I guess you cannot continue to subsidize the federal government with local taxpayers when on April 15th, here comes IRS 

wanting more money. 

Our local taxpayers can just not afford these things. So what 

Sheriff Dever’s talking about, we don’t accept federal referrals, period. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Gentleman from state of Louisiana, Mr. Cao. 

Mr. CAO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to ask you a 

very quick question concerning communication between local enforcement officers with federal agencies. 

Is there a system for you all to communicate, because based on 

the testimony of Sheriff Gonzalez, you were saying how the local 

people understand the situation; they know who the people are. Is 

there a communication system between the different level that exists out there? 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. I am assuming you are talking information 

sharing, Mr. Cao, I think, not radio communication, right? Information sharing? 

What we do for information sharing is that we do submit our reports or intelligence information on a daily basis to our JOICs, to 

our Joint Operations Intelligence Centers. Ours is located in Laredo, Texas, and we have the main one in Austin, Texas, our state 

capital. 

There is communication, yes, sir. Just about a month-and-a-half 

ago, as a matter of fact, I did call a meeting in my office with federal agencies and state agencies asking them to please participate 

a little bit more in information sharing and in providing us improper not improper rather information sharing. Is that what you 

are referring to, sir? 

Mr. CAO. Correct. Thank you very much. That is all I have. 

Mr. CUELLAR. At this time, I would like to recognize Mr. Cleaver 

from the state of Missouri. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To the sheriffs, do either or both of you know who T.J. Bonner 

is? 

Sheriff DEVER. Yes. I am acquainted with Mr. Bonner. 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. And I am also, sir. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Mr. Bonner, in an interview last week, said that 

he was underwhelmed with the new emphasis that Secretary 

Napolitano has put in place, that it does not in any real way halt 

the flow of weapons going into Mexico. 

44 

Apparently, the drugs travel northward and the weapons travel 

southward. Do you agree with Mr. Bonner, I mean, that our efforts 

are weak and that little change is going to take place? 

Sheriff DEVER. If I may, I probably have a little bit different perspective on this, and I don’t mean to be flippant. So I will try to 

be careful in my remarks, but, you know, there is a lot of talk 

about more southbound inspections, but I don’t know if you have 

ever traveled out of Mexico into the United States. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Yes. 

Sheriff DEVER. Sometimes 2—, 2-1/2—,3-hour wait to cross the 

border because of our inspection process, and even then, only one 

out of, you know, a handful of vehicles is inspected. You start doing 

that going south, now you can begin to imagine what kind of infrastructure and personnel you are going to have to put in place to 

make a meaningful effort there to inspect a significant number of 

vehicles to make a difference in the flow of any kind of contraband 

entering Mexico. 

The other thing I would like to say I am a little puzzled that it 

is our fault that drugs are coming into this country at the same 

time it is our fault that weapons are flowing south, and I think 

that the Mexican government has a greater responsibility to step 

up to the plate and do their part on their side of the border in 

order to secure the sovereignty of their nation. 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. With that also, sir, and I am more concerned, 

and I don’t—this is not taken the wrong way, but I am more concerned with what is coming into our country, sir, than what is 

going out. Obviously, yes, I am concerned with weapons going to 

Mexico, because some of those weapons are going to be used 

against us in the near future, probably. 

But I am more concerned with what is coming in. Now, also, we 

are assuming here we are talking about ports of entry. The illegal 

stuff that we are seeing is coming into the country or going into 

Mexico in areas that are not ports of entry. In other words, between the ports of entry, and that is what concerns us. 

Now, regarding, again, more funding to Mexico, I am not saying 

that I am against the Merida Initiative by any way, shape or form, 

but what I am saying, sir, is that I think a lot of this money going 

into Mexico where you saw it pumping this money, you start 

squeezing this balloon, that balloon’s going to burst somewhere. 

And I think through the Merida Initiative also, we could get 

some funding for local law enforcement on the U.S. side, and we 

can try to hopefully prevent that balloon from exploding into our 

country but rather maybe explodes at the southern border of Mexico. 

And I don’t mean to say that in a bad way, but we also need 

something for the weapons, for the drugs on our side of the border 

also. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Well maybe Ms. Ayala? Is the program that has 

been put in place, Operation Firewall, I mean, are we seeing any 

successes? 

Ms. AYALA. Yes, thank you. And as I answer that question to 

also say that as far as the strategy that is going on today as far 

as deploying agents to the border to help with the situation, is 

something we saw in 2005 with the Mexican government deployed 

45 

federal and military and additional agents to the Nuevo Laredo, 

and we in turn sent agents down to the Laredo area to deal with 

increased border violence. 

And we saw a drop of from 68 murder rate in 2004 up to 168 

and then back down to 40 by 2007. So we did, by formulating this 

initiative, Operation Blackjack, that was a border enforcement security task force through international commitment, and the multiagency concept, we were able to really make a difference in the 

area of border violence. 

So this is something similar that we are dealing with now when 

we think that we will be successful, and as far as Operation Firewall, we have really been seeing lately as far as prevailing smuggling methods along the border is the bulk cash smuggling initiative, and it has been very successful. 

It is a multi-prong initiative that looks at the domestic international and international movement of bulk cash, and we have 

been working with our partners in Domestic Highway Interdiction 

and we have seized over $183 million since its inception and 38 

million of that has been seized in Mexico. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Is it common knowledge where the ant trails are 

so-called ant trails? Is it common knowledge? Anyone, sheriff? General Aylward? I mean—— 

Ms. AYALA. Are you referring to the weapons smuggling south, 

the one-by-one? 

Mr. CLEAVER. Yes. The does this, I mean, they are called the ant 

trails that the drugs follow these ant trails from Mexico across the 

borders. There is apparently a number of them, is that a term that 

you are familiar with? 

Ms. AYALA. I am familiar with the term as far as weapons smuggling—— 

Mr. CLEAVER. Yes. 

Ms. AYALA. —used outbound, and I think it has been referred to 

in the context as to whether we are looking at complex smuggling 

organizations or just following out one weapon at a time, and we 

are doing both where we have seized many weapons. 

We are doing complex investigations and seized arsenals of weapons that, sometimes dozens at a time, but we do regard the one 

gun just as important as a, you know, magazine full of bullets that 

could kill an innocent bystander. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back all the rest of my time. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. McCaul? 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the chairman. 

Clearly, the state of violence has increased exponentially since 

the time we have come into office, the 6,000 killings, more than 

Iraq and Afghanistan combined, the beheadings, the torture, the 

killing. And I want to welcome the witnesses, and particularly the 

sheriffs for being here and the role that you play in the front lines. 

Sheriff Gonzalez? I agree with you. I think one of the criticisms 

of Merida was the fact that we didn’t have a joint strategy on this 

side and didn’t provide adequate funding for this side of the border. 

So my first question is to our DHS witnesses, Dr. Barth and Ms. 

Ayala. 

46 

And that is, what is the new enhanced role for the sheriffs, and 

will there be increased assets and resources for them? I know the 

Secretary talked about a reallocation of the resources that she has. 

Dr. BARTH. Thank you, sir. The primary resource change in the 

new announcement that the secretary made a week ago is with respect to the Stonegarden grants. There are some $58–59 million in unexpended, unobligated 

grants from 2006 and 2008 that we have expanded the use of that 

money for various additional applications by the state and local 

governments along the border states. 

The amount of money is unchanged from what has already been 

authorized and appropriated by Congress, but with the expanded 

capability to deploy that money, for example, you could see the 

state of Washington, which is facing significant bump up in crossborder traffic with the Olympics coming up. 

We could fund a 20-person state trooper team to go down and 

work along the southern border as a training exercise for them for 

what is coming in their future as well as helping out in the southern California border to deal with the criminal export of weapons 

and money, bulk cash, going south and drugs coming north. 

Beyond the Stonegarden money, at this time, we are not prepared to announce any new funding for the state and local partners, but I think you will see, as I already said, a substantial reach 

out from this former southern governor, Secretary Napolitano, to 

the state and locals to make sure that that partnership is as strong 

as it has ever been. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And let me say, I commend her for focusing on the 

Southwest border, which we have been focused on for quite some 

time—$60 million that sounds like a lot, but with the threat that 

we face, I don’t believe is nearly adequate enough. 

If this is a major funding mechanism for the state and locals, I 

would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we take a look in the Congress 

at increasing this funding for Stonegarden, which is a very successful and a very good program. 

And I think, Sheriff Dever, you mentioned $500 million was the 

amount that was talked about at the National Association level? 

Sheriff DEVER. Yes, sir. We spent a lot of time just analyzing, 

talking to all the Southwest border sheriffs trying to get a grasp 

on a good hard number of what would be something meaningful, 

and that was the number that we came up with, $500 million, actually, a year appropriated for 5 consecutive years. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I think in addition, the SCAP funding that you 

mentioned is very important. Another issue out of this committee’s 

jurisdiction though as a former federal prosecutor, we could never 

take all these cases at the border, and I think more resources at 

Justice to handle the lower amounts, because what they are really 

good con artists. 

They are scamming us right now by bringing in shipments that 

are below the federal guidelines. And they are doing that at smaller quantities and getting around the system, and there is not 

enough resources there to prosecute and lock them up. And I think 

you all understand that as you live it day-to-day. 

I want to focus next to the National Guard, as the chairman 

mentioned, our governor has requested 1,000 National Guard. The 

47 

Counter Drug Program has been successful. We had the JTF Sexton in El Paso out at EPIC, and it seems to me that we need to 

bear all resources possible on this issue. 

And it seems to me the Guard can play a very useful role with 

respect to patrols and inspections at the border to choke not only 

drugs and human trafficking coming in but to choke the weapons 

and the cash going from this country back into Mexico, which arm 

and fund these drug cartels, and I just wanted to get the general’s 

comments on that. 

Gen. AYLWARD. As I have mentioned and as they go through that 

requirements analysis, we take a look at each range of activity, the 

troops, the task that they actually want us to perform, we kind of 

vet it against six criteria: What is the cost? Is it legal? Is lethal 

force going to be used? Is it appropriate for DOD to actually perform that role? What is the risk associated with it? And is their 

readiness impact? 

So based upon that criteria, we try to really kind of—down in 

terms of, you know, what is the image that we portray as U.S. military augmenting local and federal agents along for precisely the 

task that you described, sir. 

You know, you have to look through it through the lens of, you 

know, what is it going to look like in the media as well. And so, 

we are very thoughtful about that, and we are very deliberate 

working with our partners in terms of discovering what is the most 

appropriate role and how can we actually make sure that is sustainable, supportable, and affordable program. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And I understand the thoughtful deliberation you 

have to go through. How long of a time line are we talking about 

before a decision may be made? You know, if you will answer that, 

but— 

Gen. AYLWARD. Well, sir, I wish I had the answer myself, and 

frankly, you know, time sensitive planning or crisis action planning, the reality is that there has to be the more comprehensive, 

thoughtful—is this going to be something that we are just going to 

do for the next 6 months, or is this part of a corporate strategy that 

is going to span a number of years, perhaps maybe 5 or 10 years. 

And so, with that and then you really get, you know, what is the 

most appropriate answer or option for the leadership to consider? 

Is it, should it be a military thing or should it be one of the 22 

partners in the—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. No, I would submit that you look at the urgency 

of the situation. We talk about a tipping point. I think we have 

reached the tipping point. The spillover’s pretty clear. I just had a 

drug cartel-related style killing just outside of Houston, in my district, just last week. 

This is the United States. I mean, these cartels are operating in 

the United States, moving their drugs through 230 cities in the 

United States. So this is not just south of the border. And I think 

that we need to again bear every resource we have to address this 

urgent situation. 

Yes, sir? 

Gen. AYLWARD. Sir, we hope to be part of that process with our 

partners on the left and right of me. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. Can I indulge the chair in one final? 

48 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I appreciate that. Sheriff Gonzalez, I am ranking 

member on the Intelligence and Information Sharing Subcommittee. You mentioned that information sharing has a long way 

to go, and I just wanted to follow up with you on that. 

And can you tell me and the committee what needs to be done 

to make sure you do have the information you need? 

Sheriff GONZALEZ. Well, sir, the first thing, and I hope I don’t get 

in any trouble for saying this, the first thing we need to do, sir, 

is learn to trust each other. 

And there are many times where, at least that is the impression 

that a lot of local agencies have that local agencies are looked down 

at. In other words, you are not state, you are not federal, you are 

local. The thing to remember, sir, is that we know our areas. We 

know who we are dealing with in our areas. 

It is like the same as having somebody come down TDY for 6 

months or so. They don’t know the area. Texas is sending a lot of 

DPS troopers, state police troopers to the border area to do enforcement along the border. Many times they run into situations where 

they need some help, and they get on the radio and they can’t talk 

to us, because we don’t have any communication with them, one. 

In other words, sir, is that they don’t know where they are at. 

So I have to send a deputy sheriff from Zapata 32 miles north and 

see if he is somewhere along the road going towards Laredo, 28 

miles south to see if he is along the road somewhere south of us, 

or 32 miles east to see if he is somewhere out there. He don’t know 

where he is at; we don’t know where he is at. 

The thing is, information sharing, sir, is very important. We can 

talk about this all the time, every day. If local agencies are not involved, then it is going to be very hard to have that full cooperation 

from everybody. We need to work, as Chairman Cuellar, mentioned 

during his opening statement here, as a team. 

And we are part of the team, whether anybody likes it or not, 

we are part of the team. We are dealing with our turf. We are dealing with our territory. We are dealing with our counties. 

Our counties go to the river bank, and we have to work as a 

team. If we don’t have that team effort, it is not going to work, sir. 

Information sharing should be done immediately. It is done in 

Texas. I am proud to say we, you know, we have the Joint Operation Intelligence Centers, six of them in Texas. 

Information is shared. Needs to go back out the same way. We 

are working on it. I think we were successful in Texas. I would 

hope that the nation would take this approach with what we are 

doing in Texas. It is working. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I agree with you, and you do need to be a part of 

the team to be able to do that. You need to talk to each other, and 

I commend the chairman for his great work. I know we had the 

hearing in Laredo last year on interoperability at the border, and 

I think the ability for you to talk to state and federal law enforcement is very important. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. 

At this time, I recognize the gentlewoman from California, Ms. 

Richardson, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

49 

I just have two questions. The first one is, currently, it is my understanding there are 12 BEST teams, Border Enforcement Security Teams, eight on the Southwest border, two on the northern 

border, and two in the seaports. 

At the request of the New Mexico’s congressional delegation, on 

March 18th, the president decided to establish two BEST offices in 

that state. The question is: Should the California delegation be considering the same? 

Ms. AYALA. Ma’am, we have two of the eight Southwest border 

BEST located in California, one in San Diego and one in the Imperial Valley. And one of the maritime BESTs is in Long Beach. 

One of the ways that you or anyone can request to have a BEST 

in their area is to speak to a DHS entity in the field or at headquarters, and then what we do is we do a local threat assessment, 

and that is then reviewed at the headquarters level by ICE and 

CBP so that we can then prioritize where BEST should be or in 

what order we are going to deploy them. 

So that doesn’t preclude any other citizen or someone in the government or congressional member for requesting that we send over 

BEST in their area. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. So you said San Diego, Long Beach, and what 

was the second one? 

Ms. AYALA. Imperial Valley. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. Is it determined that the one in San 

Diego is sufficient in your opinion? 

Ms. AYALA. Well based on the assessment by the SAC office there 

in CBP, right now, those are sufficient because of distances between them, because the coverage that we have in the border, the 

neighboring state of Arizona. So for right now, based on the assessments, San Diego, Imperial Valley, and Los Angeles or Long Beach 

are covering that area now. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you. My last question, we have heard 

numbers such as only one in every four guns that is confiscated by 

Mexican authorities is actually provided to the AFT for tracing of 

its origin. 

I realize that AFT is not on the panel today; however, I would 

like to know if this is a symptomatic problem that we feel we need 

better coordination, which has been talked about today, or if, in 

fact, this is just individual law enforcement agencies who are refusing to give up control over their investigations. 

Ms. AYALA. I am not sure of the figures on that. I do know that 

we work very closely with the Mexican government and ATF 

through their Project Gunrunner and our Project Amas Cruzada to 

coordinate information and seizures of guns. So I can’t speak to the 

number that ATF is actually receiving from the Mexican government to trace. 

But we are working very closely with them on that particular 

program. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. The key though would be, numbers aside, 

would you agree that there is a turf battle going on in terms of 

agencies withholding or keeping information? 

Ms. AYALA. No, ma’am. The field agents work everyday collaborating whether it be on individual cases or operations or an ad hoc 

task forces or informal task forces. That is why when we created 

50 

the task force, Border Enforcement Security Task Force, we made 

sure that anybody that came to the table had an equal say in the 

targets that we were going to identify and go after. 

And that if they bought a case to the table that they would lead 

it. That way they are equally invested and all of their equities are 

protected. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Would you followup with the AFT to verify if, 

in fact, they are only receiving 25 percent and report back to this 

committee? 

Ms. AYALA. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Ms. Richardson. Before I move on to 

Ms. Titus, let me just ask a couple questions. 

I guess this would be more for ICE, Ms. Ayala. Can you all have, 

do you all have the authority to when a foreign national is deported 

from the United States to give a state that information so they can 

then turn around and have their driver license deported? These are 

a couple questions that Governor Perry sent in a letter to Secretary 

Napolitano yesterday. 

First question he is requesting when a foreign national with a 

Texas driver license has been deported from the U.S., can the state 

of Texas be notified so then it can revoke his or her Texas driver 

license? Because apparently, according to this information, they get 

deported, then they will come back and they will use their driver 

license again. 

And, I guess, that would apply also to Arizona and any of the 

other states also. Do you have the authority to do that right now? 

Ms. AYALA. I am not sure of that. That is not my particular area. 

That belongs to another division. So I will get back to you on 

that—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. Would you get back to the committee on that question? The second question, and I guess to Dr. Barth or Ms. Ayala 

on this. The secured communities will use that electronic fingerprint booking. 

I think, for example, in the state of Texas, there is 19 state agencies that are currently participating, but they are requesting to use 

those at the state prisons in Texas. 

Again this thing, it can apply to Arizona and New Mexico, you 

know, but have the other 233 agencies in Texas that maintain jails 

also use—be part of this electronic fingerprinting. Because according to the information that we have to date, 37,733 individuals 

have been checked through this system at just those 19 locations 

are participating. 

Out of that, 8,844 or 23 percent have fingerprints on file with 

ICE. So if we are getting such high numbers, it will only make 

sense that we spread that out not only to the other agencies in 

Texas or to Arizona and New Mexico, California. You know, I think 

you would get a lot of hits there to identify people that have those 

criminal records. 

So I guess my question, Dr. Barth or Ms. Ayala, do you all have 

the resources to extend that, and why has not been done earlier? 

Dr. BARTH. Yes, sir. The Secure Communities Program is relatively new and is expanding as we speak. I am not sure what the 

51 

president’s budget will have for 2010 to continue that expansion, 

but it has been the Department of Homeland Security’s view that, 

for some years, the fingerprint biometric database expansion is an 

extremely useful tool for identifying criminals early and dealing 

with them effectively. 

The U.S. Visit Program is the repository of the fingerprints collection, if you will, of DHS, and the administration’s very close to 

being able to collaboratively share fingerprints across other agencies that also have fingerprint databases to improve the effectiveness of that program. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, and in other words, we have a databases out 

there. And we have state, local officials that would like to get that 

information, and I would like for you to get back to me and see 

what we can do to expand that, because if it is something that is 

working or even on the revoking of the licenses, if you could let the 

states know. 

And it all goes back to, I think, what Sheriff Gonzalez and Sheriff Dever were talking about, it is sharing the information, and this 

is another example that, I think, you know, we can do a better job 

at sharing that information with our local folks on that. 

Dr. BARTH. Yes, we will get back to you, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. At this time, I will ask the subcommittee’s 

unanimous consent to insert Governor Perry’s letter into the 

record. And there is another question that he asked, but we will 

go ahead and submit it into the record also. 

[The information follows:] 

52 


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53 

Mr. CUELLAR. All right, at this time, I will recognize the gentlewoman from the state of Nevada, Ms. Titus, for 5 minutes of questioning. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

My district in southern Nevada’s not directly on the border, but 

I imagine that Las Vegas is a key stop along the supply line of anything moving both north and south. And I think it is very important that we address those supply lines that we now learn are 

miles away from the border. 

So what you are doing on the border is very important, but I 

would ask you, what are you doing to work perhaps with state and 

local officials further up that line to try to break the line and in 


11113-34.eps
54 

that way have some impact on the things that are happening right 

on the border? 

Maybe Dr. Barth or Ms. Ayala? 

Ms. AYALA. We have 26 SAC offices throughout the nation that 

are investigating crimes related to human smuggling, human trafficking, drug smuggling, narcotics smuggling and other cyber 

crimes, child pornography and money laundering crimes, and they 

have offices that are located, sub offices, throughout the nation. 

And everyday, they work with state and locals just on those specific issues including Las Vegas and other areas to make the connection between the border and the supply lines and the destination cities. 

Ms. TITUS. Is one of those 26 located in Las Vegas? 

Ms. AYALA. We do have an office in Nevada. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. TITUS. Okay. Well maybe I can get some more information 

about what they are doing in that office? 

Ms. AYALA. Yes. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Ms. Titus. 

As we get ready to close up, I certainly appreciate your testimony 

and your answers to the questions, and I know our ranking member, Mr. Rogers, had some questions so if there is any other questions that are submitted in writing, I would ask you to submit the 

answers to us as soon as possible. 

But one of the things that I would ask, and I have done this, I 

guess, for the last panels and I am going to followup on what Mr. 

Rogers, Chairman Thompson mentioned, and something that we 

have been doing with other panels, is that I would ask you all 

within 30 days to submit some specific recommendations, working 

together, working through your appropriate command centers.??? 

But I would ask you, Dr. Barth, if you could include somebody 

from city police association for some input here since we have a 

sheriff’s association. 

But what I would ask is first, you know, the sheriffs, you know, 

if you can provide a specific recommendations that would assist you 

on your day-to-day to activities to provide security in your respective border communities. 

And all of you all together, I would ask you to come up with 

some specific recommendations as to how we can have some sort 

of coordination between the state, federal, local officials. 

Because one of the things that we are seeing is that, there are 

instances in time that an individual will go out there and do the 

efforts. For example, you all sent out, and I appreciate Secretary 

Napolitano sending Mr. Sexton out there to specific times. Well, 

you know, that is a specific time, what is the follow up? 

I mean, is there some sort of communication protocol or process 

that we can continue this communicating with the local folks. So 

what I would ask all of you all is to get together by phone, by person, work through your appropriate command structure and provide a report to the committee in 30 days. 

And I mean 30 days from today, and tell us how we can—go 

ahead and include the tribal community also in your recommendations also—to give us some very specific recommendations as to 

55 

how we can coordinate and work together on a day-to-day basis 

where we can have a structure that works instead of saying well 

here is a new administration and they are doing an effort and then 

another administration comes in and then, you know, Dr. Barth, 

you are gone and, Ms. Ayala, you are gone, or any of you all are 

gone, some new people come in, I am gone, other people are gone. 

So we need to have some sort of structure on how we can coordinate on that and cover all the aspects of it. If there is specific needs 

that you all need for—sheriffs, you know, tell us exactly what specific needs that you have. I would ask you just temper the request. 

No, you know, no huge wish lists but just, you know, very specific 

things that you all need. 

And then, of course, on the federal level, I will ask you to do the 

same thing and reach out to our states also, the four states that 

we have. But I would ask you to do that. I will ask our committee 

to monitor this on a week-to-week basis, we would like to have a 

report, because I don’t want to come back in 30 days and say, you 

know, we need additional time. 

So our committee will be working with both our counterpart, Mr. 

Rogers, committee members also to make sure that you all come 

up with very specific requests. And following on what Mr. Rogers— 

the inventory, what we need, basically, that type of concept on 

that. 

Do you all have any questions as to what we are requesting of? 

Okay—30 days from today, without exception, I would ask you 

to please provide that information. 

Again, to all the members, I want to thank you for being here. 

To the witnesses, thank you for your valuable testimony. We appreciate it. The members of the subcommittee, as I mentioned, 

might have an additional questions. Please provide that to us as 

soon as possible. 

Having no further business, the hearing is adjourned. Thank you 

very much and good day. 

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(57) 

A P P E N D I X 


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QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE BENNIE G. THOMPSON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON

HOMELAND SECURITY

RESPONSES FROM DR. RICHARD C. BARTH

Question: Secretary Napolitano has promised to increase personnel and improve 

screening technology at the border to target the flow of illegal guns, narcotics, and 

cash associated with the increased border violence. We know from experience that 

one of the best ways to detect such items is with detector dogs, and DHS announced 

that it would put 12 dogs toward the outbound inspection effort. But these dogs are 

being pulled off of inbound inspection assignments: about half from the Southwest 

border, and about half from other regions. 

The border is already short-staffed when it comes to having enough canines to 

screen incoming cargo, no less outgoing vehicles. We can ill afford to move these resources away from their current mission areas. 

What jobs will these 12 canines be taken from?

When will they be returned to their original posts? 

Why was the number 12 chosen? 

Response: In the mid 1990’s the then U.S. Customs Service initiated a program 

to train dogs in the detection of currency and firearms. These teams were assigned 

with the intent to direct their enforcement efforts primarily toward outbound inspection operations. The use of specialized currency/firearm detector dog teams supplemented the narcotic detector dog teams, which focus on inbound inspection operations. 

Currently, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Office of Field Operations 

(OFO) has 623 detector dog teams trained in several detection disciplines. Of that 

number, 340 detector dog teams are assigned to Ports of Entry (POE’s along the 

Southwest Border (SWB). Five of these teams, assigned to the SWB, are trained to 

detect currency and firearms. 

In order to enhance the outbound enforcement effort, directed at interdicting 

smuggled firearms and currency, CBP increased the number of currency/firearms 

detector dog teams to be trained and deployed in fiscal year 2009. Training for the 

21 new currency/firearms detector dog teams began in April 2009 with a projected 

graduation and deployment date of July 2009. Of these 21 teams, 14 are being assigned to the SWB. 

While the new teams are being trained, CBP deployed seven (7) additional currency/firearms detector dog teams to the SWB in order to augment the five (5) currency/firearms detector dog teams already assigned to the SWB. These seven teams 

were deployed from airports and seaports throughout the United States. It is anticipated that the seven teams will be returned to their home ports once the teams undergoing training have graduated and been deployed. 


11113-36.eps
59 

CBP currency/firearms detector dog teams are primarily focused on outbound enforcement operations, so there is minimal impact on the screening and inspection 

of incoming cargo, which is screened and inspected by other detector dog disciplines 

(narcotics, concealed humans, agriculture, and explosives). 

Question: To counter the rising drug cartel violence, the United States and Mexico announced the Me ́rida Initiative—a multi-year proposal for U.S. assistance to 

Mexico and Central America. As part of this initiative, DHS components, particularly CBP and ICE, will be required to commit personnel to help train Mexican law 

enforcement and customs officials. 

Are resources going to be pulled from ongoing U.S. border security operations to conduct these training missions? 

With significant money going to Mexico under Me ́rida, does DHS have additional resources going to U.S. law enforcement - Federal, State, and 

local—along the border? 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to meet recent increases of cartel violence in Mexico with strong action and solidified coordination with U.S. federal, state, local, tribal and Mexican authorities. 

The Me ́rida Initiative 

Me ́rida is funded through Department of State appropriations for use in Mexico, 

Central America and the Caribbean. Me ́rida Funding will support equipment purchases, training and information technology infrastructure. Although DHS does not 

receive direct funding under Me ́rida, assisting and training our Mexican counterparts helps to increase the effectiveness of U.S. security operations on both sides 

of the border. Moreover, we carefully plan our engagement so as to ensure that our 

Me ́rida efforts will enhance, not detract from, U.S. border security operations. 

Southwest Border Initiative 

On April 24, 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced a major set of 

SWB initiatives designed to support Mexico’s campaign against violent drug cartels 

by limiting the flow of firearms and cash from the United States to Mexico. These 

initiatives bring more personnel to the SWB and place additional technology at strategic locations. 

The initiatives will be budget-neutral to the Department, funded by realigning 

from less urgent activities, tapping available fund balances, and, in some cases, reprogramming to deploy resources where they are currently needed the most. 

The exact placement of these increased resources will be determined by shared 

intelligence and coordinated with all relevant stakeholders: federal, state, local, tribal and international. Specific deployment location information is law enforcement 

sensitive and is not detailed below to protect operational planning. Furthermore, resources will be supplemented or moved based on continual changes in intelligence 

information and operational needs. Finally, these deployments parallel the Government of Mexico’s (GOM’s) Government’s efforts to combat drug trafficking and associated criminal activity. 

Doubling Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) Staffing 

• DHS will double the number of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) agents assigned to BESTs—teams that bring together federal, state, local 

and Mexican authorities in an effort to increase cross-border crime investigations, arrests and prosecutions at strategic locations along the SWB. 

• Doubling assignments of ICE special agents to BESTs from 95 to 190 will 

help to facilitate seamless cross-border enforcement actions. The 95 additional 

ICE investigators will augment BEST task forces at the following locations: San 

Diego and Imperial Valley, California; Phoenix and Tucson, Arizona; Deming 

and Las Cruces, New Mexico; and El Paso, Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley, 

Texas. In addition, to further BEST efforts in Mexico, the Department will assign an additional four agents to the Mexico City Attache ́ to help coordinate 

BEST investigations. 

• BEST details have already begun and the additional personnel are currently 

in place. 

Tripling DHS Intel Analysts on the SWB 

• DHS will triple the number of intelligence analysts working at the SWB, providing a greater capability to develop pre-operational intelligence reports, strategic intelligence products and post-operational impact assessments to ensure 

DHS resources have the maximum impact possible to protect public safety. 

• Thirteen ICE analysts are currently assigned to SWB operations. Eight are 

assigned to BESTs and five are assigned to the Border Violence Intelligence 

Center (BVIC) in El Paso, Texas. 

60 

• ICE will detail 26 additional analysts to the SWB—16 will be assigned to 

BESTs in Imperial Valley, Calif.; Phoenix, Tucson and Yuma, Ariz.; and El 

Paso, Laredo and Rio Grande Valley, Texas; five will go to the BVIC and five 

more to ICE Attache ́ offices in Hermosillo, Juarez, Mexico City, Monterrey, and 

Tijuana, Mexico. 

• Intelligence analyst details have already begun and the additional personnel 

are currently in place. 

Increasing ICE Attache ́ Personnel in Mexico by 50 percent • DHS will increase ICE Attache ́ personnel in Mexico by 50 percent. This program supports the Mexican Government, as well as domestic ICE offices, by 

pursuing investigations inside Mexico involving money laundering, narcotics or 

human trafficking, and weapons smuggling. With regard to narcotics and its related activities, and in accordance with the current Memorandum of Understanding, ICE will coordinate and deconflict all narcotics trafficking related investigations and activities related (as ICE does not have independent jurisdiction to investigate narcotics trafficking inside Mexico) with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) which is designated as the lead agency and single 

point of contact for foreign drug law enforcement operations. 

• Twenty-four ICE Attache ́ personnel are currently assigned in Mexico. ICE 

will detail an additional twelve Office of International Affairs personnel to 

Attache ́ offices in Hermosillo, Juarez, Mexico City, Monterrey, and Tijuana, 

Mexico. 

Doubling Violent Criminal Alien Sections Assignments • DHS will double the number of ICE Detention and Removal Operations 

(DRO) personnel assigned to Violent Criminal Alien Sections along the SWB.μ 

These sections work to expedite identification, processing for removal, and prosecution of recidivist criminal aliens. 

• Due to the large volume of cases of repeat offenders, namely criminal aliens, 

doubling Violent Criminal Alien Sections manpower will allow DHS to expand 

its ability to identify perpetrators, develop casework and prosecute these violators. 

• Fifty DRO officers are currently assigned along the SWB; ICE will detail an 

additional 50 officers to support ICE and CBP operations in San Diego, Calif.; 

Phoenix, Ariz.; and El Paso, San Antonio, and Houston, Texas. 

Quadrupling the Number of Border Liaison Officers (BLOs) • DHS will quadruple the number of ICE Border Liaison Officers (BLOs) assigned along the SWB. These officers work to identify and combat cross-border 

criminal organizations with a focus on coordination between U.S. and Mexican 

law enforcement authorities. 

• Ten BLOs are currently deployed along the SWB: five are assigned in San 

Diego, Calif., and five in San Antonio, Texas. ICE will increase the number of 

BLOs by designating 30 additional special agents already deployed to the SWB 

to serve in this capacity—resulting in a total of 40 BLOs operating at the border. The additional assignments will be in San Diego, Calif.; Phoenix, Ariz.; and 

El Paso and Laredo, Texas. 

• Existing positions are already in place. 

Bolstering Secure Communities Biometric Identification Deployment 

• The Secure Communities program uses biometric identification technology to 

share information between law enforcement agencies in order to focus resources 

on assisting communities in removal of high-risk criminal aliens. 

• Currently, 23 counties in the SWB States of Arizona and Texas use the Secure Communities biometric identification technology. Secure Communities 

plans to make this capability available to an additional 26 SWB counties in Arizona, California, New Mexico and Texas within 90 days. 

• ICE will also activate Secure Communities biometric identification technology 

in Los Angeles County, Calif., Ventura County, Calif., and San Diego County, 

Calif. 

Implementing 100% Southbound Rail Screening 

• Using non-intrusive inspections systems, CBP can screen 100 percent of 

southbound rail traffic to identify the presence of any contraband, such as 

weapons or currency. In early March 2009, CBP launched 100 percent southbound rail screening at all SWB rail crossings. 

Increased Maritime Interdiction Operations 

• In response to numerous U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) reports of go-fast boats loitering or moving north along CaliVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:21 May 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\111-CONG\111-13\55055.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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fornia Baja, DHS began focused interdiction operations.μAdditional operations 

over the past year have successfully stopped drugs and undocumented migrants 

from entering the U.S. 

• Operation Baja Oleada: This maritime operation, which began in December 

2005, cracks down on illegal migrant and drug smuggling along California Baja 

to the arrival zone in northern Baja and San Diego area. The Coast Guard 

maintains a twenty–four hours a day, seven-days per week patrol boat presence 

and frequently surges additional patrol boats, with air support as available. In 

FY 2009, the operation has resulted in seizures of four vessels and more than 

50,000 pounds of marijuana. 

• Operation Red Zone: This highly successful interagency operation to detect, 

deter and disrupt transnational smuggling threats in the maritime approaches 

to southern California and off Baja California ran from February 1 through 

March 31, 2009. It involved USCG, CBP, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Navy, local 

police and Mexican Navy (SEMAR). 

Immediate Port of Entry (POE) Resources Enhancements • Mobile X-Rays. This technology enhances the ability of law enforcement authorities to identify contraband in passenger vehicles that may contain weapons 

and/or currency. Previously, seven mobile x-ray units were deployed along the 

SWB—four in San Diego, two in El Paso, Texas, and one in Laredo, Texas. Two 

additional units have recently been moved to Tucson, Ariz., and Laredo, Texas. 

• Border Patrol Agents. One hundred Border Patrol Agents currently stationed in the area will be reassigned from non-critical tasks to augment southbound vehicle and pedestrian inspection operations. More than 16,400 CBP 

agents currently work between POE’s along the SWB. No personnel will be 

transferred to implement this initiative as the initiative is already in place. 

• Canine Detection Teams. CBP cross-trained canine teams, which can recognize both currency and weapons, provide enhanced detection capabilities in 

cargo and vehicles and on passengers. CBP currently uses dual-detection teams 

along the SWB; 7 additional dual-detection canine teams have been deployed, 

for a total of 12 teams in California, Arizona, and Texas. Up to 15 additional 

teams will be deployed to locations yet to be determined. 

• Mobile Response Teams (MRT). Mobile Response Teams are deployed for 

short operations along the SWB, providing increased enforcement presence and 

personnel to conduct additional inspections of southbound individuals and vehicles. Three MRTs, consisting of 25 officers each, are currently available for special deployments along the SWB. Twelve additional MRT officers have already 

been deployed to Texas and Arizona field offices; 24 more are scheduled to be 

deployed to the California, Texas and Arizona field offices in early May. Combined with the four existing teams, these 36 officers will comprise eight additional teams for a total of 12. Additional deployments will be determined operationally. 

• Operation Stonegarden Grants. DHS designed these grants to enhance cooperation and coordination among federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies in a joint mission to secure the border. On March 24, DHS distributed an informational bulletin to all eligible state and local entities outlining modified grant guidance for the remaining FY 2006-2008 balances (totaling up to $59 million). The new guidance does not take funding away from any 

states. Rather, it expands the scope of how the remaining balances can be spent 

to enhance current state, local and tribal law enforcement operations and assets 

on the SWB. Eligible expenses include activating reserve and part-time law enforcement personnel, deploying existing law enforcement personnel, and covering overtime expenses, travel or lodging for deployment to the SWB. Secretary 

Napolitano waived the 50 percent cap on personnel and operational activity 

costs for local eligible jurisdictions along the border to provide additional resources where they are needed most. 

• License Plate Readers (LPR). License plate readers are intended to automatically read vehicle license plates and automate law enforcement queries. 

Southbound LPR information provides valuable intelligence, enhances domestic 

and international partnerships and supports (or enhances) current weapon and 

currency southbound operations. CBP currently operates 52 outbound LPR 

lanes at 16 SWB crossings. CBP has initiated and expanded outbound operations and is moving quickly to replace the 52 LPRs currently equipped in 

southbound lanes to improve accuracy rates and enhance capability. 

Periodic Evaluation and Review of the SWB Initiative 

• DHS will employ an iterative and risk-based decision making process that 

will guide the nature and makeup of DHS operations on the border. Key considVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:21 May 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\111-CONG\111-13\55055.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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erations will be threats and priorities across all of the Department’s missions. 

Actions and deployments within this initiative will remain flexible in order to 

respond quickly and effectively to the most current information and intelligence. 

• Secretary Napolitano will be regularly briefed regarding DHS operations on 

the SWB and will conduct quarterly reviews of DHS enhancements. 

Æ