AUDIT REPORT IG-03-028

Report Recipients: 

B/Melvin DenWiddie 

JM/John Werner 

JM/June Flickinger 

JM/Margy Myles 

JM/Margie Team

MSFC/RS40/Danny

 Walker 

SUMMARY REPORT ON AUDIT OF 

INTEGRATED FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 

PROGRAM CORE FINANCIAL MODULE 

September 29, 2003 

cc: 

A/Integrated Financial 

 Management Program

 Executive 

B/Deputy Chief Financial 

 Officer for Financial 

 Management

B/Director, Integrated 

 Financial Management 

 Program

B/Deputy Director, 

 Integrated Financial 

 Management Program

MSFC/RS02/Core 

 Financial 

 Project Manager

 National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Released by: __[original signed by]__________________

David M. Cushing, Assistant Inspector General for Auditing 
IG-03-028 September 29, 2003 

 A-01-061-00 

Summary Report on Audit of 

Integrated Financial Management Program (IFMP) 

Core Financial Module (CFM) 

Our audit of the IFMP Core Financial Module, during the period August 2002 through 

June 2003, identified four issues that, due to the fast moving nature of the CFM 

implementation, were immediately communicated to NASA IFMP Program Executive. 

NASA’s responses to those issues were also received at various points during the audit. 

As of the issuance of this summary report, NASA management has adequately addressed 

all issues, and we consider each issue closed. 

At the time of our audit, we found that the NASA CFM Team had not: 

• Planned to test all transactions prior to full, NASA-wide implementation of the 

CFM (Audit Issue 1), 

• Tested all CFM-generated reports for accuracy (Audit Issue 2), 

• Resolved critical data conversion testing discrepancies in the tracking system 

before Wave 2 (Headquarters, Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center) 

CFM implementation (Audit Issue 3), and 

• Used the IFMP Knowledge Sharing System (KSS) to document and disseminate 

lessons learned (Audit Issue 4). 
Audit Issues and Recommendations 

Audit Issue 1. Testing Transactions Deferred from the First Wave of 

CFM Implementation. 

When we reported this issue to NASA management on February 13, 2003, CFM 

management had no plans to test all possible transactions prior to implementation of the 

CFM at the NASA Centers. CFM Team officials stated that untested transactions would 

be tested by October 1, 2003, about 3 months after the CFM was implemented at all 

NASA Centers. Ideally, all transactions should be thoroughly tested prior to system

implementation. However, CFM Team officials felt that all transactions could not be 

tested if the October 2002 target implementation at the Marshall Space Flight Center and 

the Glenn Research Center were to be met. Therefore, CFM Team officials identified 

119 transactions that were not critical to the Pilot and Wave 1 implementation, and 

deferred them for testing after Pilot and Wave 1 implementation was complete. 

CFM Team officials informed us that the majority of the deferred transactions were 

closing transactions that are only required at the end of the fiscal year. However, 

according to documentation we were provided by the CFM Deputy Project Manager, 

only 29 (24 percent) of the 119 deferred transactions were closing transactions. An 

IFMP support contractor – International Business Machines (IBM) Business Consulting 

Services, stated in its October 25, 2002, draft report on NASA’s CFM transaction testing 

that some of the transactions that CFM officials identified as closing transactions would 

be encountered before fiscal year end and recommended that NASA test all deferred 

transactions “as soon as practical.” Adequate transaction testing assures the integrity and 

effectiveness of the transactions and their data content, thereby reducing the likelihood of 

rejected transactions, labor-intensive workarounds, and inaccurate data. 

Recommendation for Corrective Action Made on February 13, 2003. 

1. Identify and test all deferred “non-closing” transactions prior to Wave 2 

and 3 implementation. Test all remaining deferred transactions prior to 

October 1, 2003. 

Management’s Response Received on April 7, 2003, and Our Evaluation of the 

Response 

NASA partially concurred with the recommendation. Management’s intent was to test all 

deferred transactions prior to the start of Fiscal Year (FY) 2004. During the IBM review, 

NASA deferred selected financial transactions for future implementation. The deferred 

transactions as identified in the IBM report are categorized as: Prior Year, Agency 

Level, Closing Transactions, Not Applicable to Wave 1, Advance Payments, and Other. 

Testing for those transactions was targeted for either Wave 3 (the last of the NASA 

Centers to implement CFM – Dryden Flight Research Center, Goddard Space Flight 

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Center, and Langley Research Center) implementation or FY 2003 closing. Regarding 

the Prior Year (Upward/Downward Adjustments), the CFM software obtained from the 

SAP Corporation (SAP), upgrades incorporated after Pilot/Wave 1 implementation did 

not resolve all of the open items related to Upward/Downward Adjustment accounting. 

The Core Financial Project continues to work with SAP representatives to configure and 

test the changes necessary to accommodate upward/downward adjustment processing in 

the NASA SAP environment for Wave 3 implementation. The complete text of 

management’s response is in Appendix C. 

Management’s actions were responsive and we consider the recommendation closed. 

Management plans for testing remaining transactions prior to October 1, 2003, were 

adequate. 

Audit Issue 2. Testing SAP-Produced Reports. 

When we reported this issue to NASA management on February 13, 2003, management 

had not tested CFM-generated reports for accuracy. NASA contracted with IBM 

Business Consulting Services to determine if the CFM complied with the U.S. Standard 

General Ledger (SGL), and tasked them to determine if reports produced by SAP were 

supported by amounts recorded in the SGL. However, the reports were unavailable for 

IBM to review. Inaccurate reports could result in program and project managers making 

decisions based on inaccurate or incomplete data. 

After receiving this issue, management determined that its first priority of report testing 

would be “custom-developed” reports that are of importance to Program/Project 

managers. Management stated that the Agency Process Team validated for accuracy the 

“custom-developed” reports. The remainder of the reports would be tested as time 

allowed. 

Recommendation for Corrective Action 

2. Perform appropriate tests to ensure that all CFM-generated reports can be 

traced to and verified by the standard general ledger accounts. 

Management’s Response and Our Evaluation of the Response. 

NASA partially concurred with the recommendation. All CFM “custom-developed” 

reports were designed, tested, and validated for accuracy by the Agency Process Team. 

With respect to the IBM task, it was not NASA’s intent to have IBM review and test all 

CFM-generated reports. On the other hand, NASA did expect IBM to review applicable 

SGL-related reports to confirm the accuracy and logic of the SGL postings. Given the 

timing of the IBM review, this effort was never fully completed (see Appendix C). 

We consider management’s actions responsive to the recommendation and the 

recommendation is closed. Our primary concern at the time we presented this issue to 

3 
management was that CFM-generated reports be designed, tested, and validated for 

accuracy before implementation of CFM. When we received management’s response on 

April 7, 2003, five Centers had already implemented CFM and the remaining 

implementation schedule was aggressive. Therefore, management’s response that they 

validated for accuracy the “custom-developed” reports and planned to test the remaining 

reports as time allowed was reasonable. Further, the software’s reporting functionality 

and performance is currently being evaluated and tested during the FY 2003 financial 

statement audit. 

Audit Issue 3. Core Financial Module Data Conversion Testing 

Concerns. 

As of February 6, 2003, 18 days before the planned Wave 2 implementation, there were 

373 open data conversion testing discrepancies (System Investigation Requests, or SIRs) 

of which 139 were classified as critical as follows. 

Open Data Conversion General Request SIR Priorities for Wave 2 Centers 

Center Total Priority

Critical High Medium 

Johnson Space Center 96 35 25 36

Kennedy Space Center 90 34 22 34

Headquarters 187 70 32 85

Total 373* 139 79 155

*86 of the open SIRs (34 critical) were not yet coded in the tracking system as “retesting complete” 

meaning that those SIRs were still subject to further testing and analysis. 

A critical SIR is defined by NASA as one that (1) impacts the immediate ability to move 

forward or complete an entire business function or task, and impacts multiple business 

functions, multiple users and/or locations; (2) represents a failure that has no workaround 

or alternative; or (3) no further action can be taken without full resolution. One critical 

SIR example was established on January 22, 2003, when testing resulted in amounts paid 

exceeding amounts budgeted. 

NASA’s procedures require that for a SIR to be closed it must be reviewed and approved 

by the CFM Team for closure. IFMP Team officials told us that although they had 

properly resolved or managed the risks associated with each open SIR, they had not had 

sufficient time and resources to close each SIR and may not do so before implementation. 

We were concerned that until the IFMP Team formally closes a SIR it continues to pose a 

risk. For example, we identified a SIR that the IFMP Team categorized on November 20, 

4 
2002, as “retesting complete.” However, on November 25, 2002, the same SIR was 

updated with new issues that were not resolved as of February 6, 2003. In October 2002, 

when the Marshall Space Flight Center (Marshall) and the Glenn Research Center 

(Glenn) went live with the CFM, both Centers experienced problems processing 

contractor payments that resulted in a backlog of invoices. Rejection errors in converted 

data contributed to those problems. NASA had to pay to contractors (as of January 23, 

2003) more than $128,000 in interest due to late payments. As of February 6, 2003, 

Marshall and Glenn still had 579 open data conversion SIRs. This type of problem

indicates the criticality of thorough analysis of testing discrepancies, including data 

conversion discrepancies, before the CFM goes live. 

Recommendation for Corrective Action 

3. Apply additional resources to prioritize all open SIRs and to close them in a 

timely manner. 

Management’s Response and Our Evaluation of the Response. 

As of February 27, 2003, NASA open SIRs have been substantially reduced. NASA will 

follow the recommendation of the OIG and continue to formally change the indicator to 

‘Closed’ for the remaining SIRs within the tracking system as soon as possible. NASA 

will also improve the SIR tracking and maintenance process for the Wave 3 Centers by 

expeditiously updating the status of the SIRs as they progress through the process (see 

Appendix C). Management’s actions are responsive to the recommendation and the 

recommendation is closed. 

Audit Issue 4. Core Financial Module Lessons Learned. 

After performing our audit of the CFM data conversion and testing procedures at the 

Johnson Space Center (Johnson), we reported to NASA management on April 3, 2003, 

that IFMP CFM personnel did not use the IFMP KSS to document and disseminate 

lessons learned, and overall, the KSS was being used sparingly. Because sharing 

information is a key to successfully implementing the IFMP, NASA hired a contractor to 

conduct a full-scale needs assessment considering all aspects of knowledge management. 

Based on the assessment, NASA hired a contractor to create the KSS to provide a webbased, user-friendly capability to disseminate lessons learned and best practices related 

specifically to the IFMP. The KSS Plan directs that lessons learned be implemented at 

all levels of the IFMP to ensure knowledge, experiences and best practices are shared 

among projects and NASA Centers. The KSS Plan is also designed to increase efficiency 

and ensure successful implementation of all the IFMP Modules. NASA implemented the 

KSS to achieve that purpose. 

5 
On March 25, 2003, we examined the KSS by performing a search under the phrase 

“Core Financial,” and by browsing through the drop down project menu titled “Core 

Financial” and found that it contained only four entries related to the CFM. Two of those 

entries were briefings held at the Glenn Research Center and the Marshall Space Flight 

Center on broad, high-level lessons learned after the Pilot/Wave 1 CFM implementation. 

The remaining two KSS entries resulted from activities at the Pilot/Wave 1 Centers prior 

to data conversion and go-live. While it is not feasible to determine how many lessons 

learned should be documented in the KSS at this point, we would expect that after 

implementation of the CFM at five NASA Centers, there would be many more detailed 

lessons learned. 

Johnson IFMP personnel informed us that they shared lessons learned, but did not record 

them in the KSS under the Core Financial area. Personnel stated that they entered 

lessons learned not into KSS, but into the data design documents that will be used by the 

Wave 3 Center personnel in implementing the CFM. Similarly Wave 2 Center personnel 

shared other lessons learned with other Centers during daily meetings but did not record 

them in KSS. 

We believed that CFM personnel were focused on implementing the module and using 

the KSS was not one of their top priorities. However, by reporting lessons learned 

informally, we believed that NASA lacked assurance that personnel implementing future 

IFMP modules would have easy access to documented lessons learned and best practices 

of the CFM teams. In addition, personnel implementing future IFMP modules may not 

be able to readily use the data design documents used in CFM implementation since the 

remaining IFMP modules probably will not use the same data design documents. The 

KSS is a valuable part of the implementation of IFMP and should be used as a control 

and feedback tool for the overall implementation of IFMP. 

Recommendation for Corrective Action 

4. Emphasize to all IFMP personnel, the value of timely and fully documenting 

lessons learned in the relevant areas of the KSS and ensuring that the KSS is 

used to the fullest extent possible. 

Management’s Response and Our Evaluation of the Response 

Management concurred with the recommendation. The IFM Program will undertake the 

following actions: 

• Review and update our KSS plan to ensure that the structures and processes 

described within are still appropriate; 

• Provide the updated KSS plan to the IFMP lessons-learned points of contact at 

Program, Project, and Center levels; 

• Review and update if needed the best practices and lessons-learned already 

captured within the KSS to ensure they are appropriately categorized; and 

6 
• Continue to emphasize to the various IFMP teams and NASA Centers the 

importance of using a KSS and emphasize the timely submittal of lessons-learned 

and best practices applications (see Appendix C). 

Management’s actions are responsive to the recommendation and the recommendation is 

closed. 

Appendixes 

Details related to the disposition and closure of all of our audit objectives related to the 

CFM are in Appendix A. Among the other appendixes, note that Appendix B shows our 

audit scope and methodology related to the issues contained in this summary report. 

Appendix C contains management’s responses in their entirety. 

7 
List of Appendixes 

Appendix A – Disposition of OIG CFM Audit Objectives 

Appendix B – Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Appendix C – Management’s Response 

Appendix D – Report Distribution 

Acronyms Used in the Report 

CFM Core Financial Module 

FY Fiscal Year 

IBM International Business Machines 

IFM Integrated Financial Management 

IFMP Integrated Financial Management Program

KSS Knowledge Sharing System

OIG Office of Inspector General 

SIR System Investigation Request 

SGL Standard General Ledger

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Appendix A. Core Financial Module Audit Objectives Disposition 

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has been auditing the Agency’s latest Core 

Financial Module (CFM) implementation effort since October 2001. Below are the audit 

objectives that we addressed in conducting our work and the disposition of each of those 

objectives. 

Assignmen

t Number 

Title Objective Disposition

A0106100 Audit of 

Integrated 

Financial

Management

Program

(IFMP) CFM.

Assess the adequacy of the 

procurement actions taken to

acquire and implement the CFM. 

We reported to management on 

March 29, 2002, that we noted no 

discrepancies in procurement

actions taken as of November 2001 

and planned no further work. 

 

Determine whether module 

implementation is on target with

budget and schedule 

expectations. 

We reported to management on 

March 29, 2002, that as of January

2002 nothing came to our attention 

to indicate that the module would 

not fall within budget and would not

meet the schedule and we planned 

no further work. 

Determine whether the module 

meets Federal financial

management system

requirements. 

On March 29, 2002, we notified 

management that we revised the 

objective to determine whether 

(1) the CFM would implement

NASA’s full cost initiative, and (2) 

the CFM would adequately support

NASA’s preparation and audit of its

financial statements. 

Determine whether the CFM 

would implement NASA’s full

cost initiative. 

Objective addressed in audit report

number IG-03-015 dated May 23, 

2003. 

Determine whether the CFM 

would adequately support

NASA’s preparation and audit of 

its financial statements 

On January 5, 2003, we notified 

management that we would address 

this objective under assignment

number A-01-061-03. 

A0106102 IFMP Core 

Financial

Management

Data 

Conversion 

Testing 

Procedures 

To determine whether the NASA 

Centers will properly transfer 

accurate and essential financial 

data to the IFMP system

Due to the fast moving nature of 

system development, all exceptions 

noted were reported to management

via quick response reports and 

summarized under this report.

9 
Appendix A 

Assignmen

t Number 

Title Objective Disposition

A0106102 

(continued) 

IFMP Core 

Financial

Management

Data 

Conversion 

Testing 

Procedures 

To determine whether the NASA 

Centers will properly exchange

financial and cost information 

between legacy financial systems 

and the Core Financial System. 

We performed limited work on this 

objective. This objective is being

further assessed under the FY 2003 

NASA Financial Statement audit. 

To determine whether the NASA 

Centers will properly develop

feasible plans for managing 

legacy financial systems when the 

Core Financial System becomes 

operational.

We did not address this objective 

under this assignment. This

objective will be addressed in a 

planned OIG audit.

A0106103 IFMP Core 

Financial

Testing 

Procedures. 

Determine whether the CFM 

would adequately support

NASA’s preparation and audit of 

its financial statements. 

All exceptions noted were reported 

to management via quick response 

reports and rolled up and reported 

under this summary report.

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Appendix B. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Objectives 

Our audit objectives related specifically to this report were to determine whether: 

• NASA Centers will properly transfer accurate and essential financial data to the 

IFMP system; and 

• CFM would adequately support NASA’s preparation and audit of its financial 

statements. 

Scope and Methodology 

We reviewed CFM testing plans and data subsequent to Wave 1 implementation 

(Marshall Space Flight Center and Glenn Research Center October 2002 implementation) 

and prior to Wave 2 implementation. To meet our objectives we: 

• Held discussions with CFM staff from the Huntsville, Alabama project office and 

from the Glenn Research Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, Johnson Space 

Center, and Headquarters offices. 

• Held discussions with CFM support contractor personnel from Accenture and 

International Business Machines Business Consulting Services. 

• Reviewed Integrated Financial Management Program (IFMP) requirements for 

testing, data conversion, and lessons learned. 

• Analyzed the Methods Delivery Manager for Systems Investigation Request 

status and other testing results. 

• Analyzed the IFMP Knowledge Sharing System database. 

During our audit work we found it increasingly difficult to follow a formal reporting 

process to provide observations and recommendations to management, discuss the 

observations, and assess management’s response to those recommendations in a timely 

manner. This was due to the tight schedule that the CFM Team was following to meet 

the targeted implementation date. Therefore, to minimize our impact on the CFM Team

in meeting its schedule, we employed a quick response reporting process to address the 

objectives. Management has taken responsive corrective actions in response to each of 

11 
Appendix B 

those observations and all are considered closed. The purpose of this report is to roll up 

those observations, recommendations, and management actions into this summary audit 

report to meet our reporting obligations.1

Management Controls Reviewed 

We identified and assessed the controls for ensuring that all CFM data conversion testing 

results were acted on and dispositioned in a timely manner, and that all CFM lessons 

learned were disseminated in accordance with NASA IFMP planning. All weaknesses in 

these controls were reported to management. 

Audit Field Work 

We performed audit fieldwork related to the objectives of this report at the CFM facility 

in Huntsville, Alabama; Johnson Space Center; Glenn Research Center; and 

Headquarters from August 2002 through June 2003 in accordance with generally 

accepted Government auditing standards. 

 1

 Section 8.54 of the Government Auditing Standards, dated June 2003 states: “Government auditors 

should submit audit reports to the appropriate officials of the audited entity and to the appropriate officials 

of the organizations requiring or arranging for the audits, including external funding organizations, such as 

legislative bodies, unless legal restrictions prevent it. Auditors should also send copies of the reports to

other officials who have legal oversight authority or who may be responsible for acting on audit findings 

and recommendations and to others authorized to receive such reports. Unless the report is restricted by 

law or regulation, or contains privileged or confidential information, auditors should clarify that copies are 

made available for public inspection.” 

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Appendix C. Management’s Response 

Following is management’s full response to Audit Issues 1 through 4. 

IFMP Response to Audit Issue 1 (April 7, 2003) 

IFMP partially concurs with this recommendation. It is our intent to test all deferred 

transaction prior to the start of FY04. Our detailed response to the OIG’s issues and 

concerns in this area are provided below. 

During the IBM Review, NASA deferred selected financial events for future 

implementation. The deferred events as identified in the IBM report can be categorized 

as follows: 

• Prior Year--These events were deferred because at the time of Pilot/Wave 1 

implementation, SAP was unable to process upward and downward adjustments 

to prior year transactions in accordance with US SGL requirements. 

(40 proformas) 

• Agency Level--These events will be processed at the Agency level and were 

deferred until SAP implementation for the Agency users or all Centers have 

implemented SAP based on the associated business process and timing for 

implementation in the Agency rollout. (19 proformas) 

• Closing Transactions--These events will be needed at the end of FY 2003 and 

were deferred until SAP implementation at all NASA Centers. (29 Closing/Year 

End proformas) 

• Not Applicable to Wave 1--Core Financial Project Management and the Agency 

Business Process Owner determined that these events were not applicable to the 

financial processing requirements of MSFC and GRC and were deferred until 

Wave 2 implementation. (8 proformas) 

• Advance Payments--The events associated with advance payment for goods and 

services were deferred due to the low volume of transactions processed at all 

Centers. (8 proformas) 

• Other--These events relate to sale of property, reclassification of assets, and other 

miscellaneous events and were deferred due to the low volume of transactions 

processed at all Centers. (15 proformas) 

(NOTE: The above totals to 119 proformas – versus 120. This is because one of 

the proformas --- #929 --- was duplicated.) 

Current status of the configuration, testing and implementation for these deferred 

financial events is as follows: 

13 
Appendix C 

• Prior Year (Upward/Downward Adjustments)--SAP upgrades incorporated 

after Pilot/Wave 1 implementation did not resolve all of the open items related to 

Upward/Downward Adjustment accounting. The Core Financial Project 

continues to work with SAP representatives to configure and test the changes 

necessary to accommodate upward/downward adjustment processing in the 

NASA SAP environment. While considerable progress has been made, more 

work needs to be done. The Project is monitoring the progress and believes it is

still on target for the FY04 implementation. As of February 24th, approximately 

50 to 75% of the overall scenarios had been successfully unit tested, but still 

require extensive integration testing to fully verify the results. Regardless, there 

are still challenges with some of NASA’s more complex scenarios (e.g., 

adjustments for an invoice receipt that covers multiple goods receipts that were 

created in different fiscal periods) and the Project will continue to work with SAP 

as challenges/issues are encountered. In the end, if specific scenarios are 

identified that cannot be fully automated due to their complexity, we will address 

alternatives with the process owners to ensure we are in compliance with NASA 

policy and external regulations. Until SAP provides acceptable resolutions, Code 

B has requested that the Centers continue the manual analysis and tracking 

process that was utilized prior to implementation of the Core Financial system. 

Agency Level--In process, and targeted for Wave 3 implementation. The Core 

Financial Project is in the process of configuring and testing the deferred 

proformas. Obviously, the Agency Level events are not being processed in SAP 

at this time. The existing legacy GLAS system at Headquarters is continuing to 

be utilized during the Agency transition to SAP. To provide clarification for the 

transition year, below is an excerpt from the Core Financial Business Transition 

Processes Plan (section 6.6) that depicts the process used during FY03. 

“For several years, NASA has been under a legal mandate to implement the SGL 

at the transaction level. This has not yet been implemented because of the issues 

with modifying each Center’s existing general ledger system to accommodate the 

SGL. NASA HQ Code BF currently crosswalks the GLAS structure to the SGL 

each quarter for external reporting. When SAP is implemented at each Center, 

the SGL will be implemented at the same time with GLAS and FACS (F)

continuing to be reconciled monthly by Code BF. The data from SAP will be 

combined by NASA HQ Code BF with the data crosswalked to the SGL from 

GLAS (for Centers not on SAP). This combined data will be used for external 

reporting, including financial statements.” 

14 
Appendix C 

• Closing Transactions--In process, and targeted for implementation prior to FY03 

closing. 

• Not Applicable to Wave 1--PCS transactions originally deferred until JSC 

implementation were incorporated into production during Wave 2 implementation 

as planned. 

• Advance Payments--In process, and targeted for Wave 3 implementation. The 

Agency design supports the recording of Advances for Travel and Government 

Orders. As agreed by the process owners (Code B), advances for Letter of Credit, 

SBIRs and Training orders will be treated as disbursements. The Core Financial 

Project is currently finalizing the configuration and testing for ‘prepayments to 

other government agencies.’ This impacts one of the Wave 2 Centers only and is 

being tracked as a reconciling item for the conversion reconciliation. 

• Other--Six have been successfully configured and tested; remaining in process, 

and targeted for Wave 3 implementation. 

IFMP Response to Audit Issue 2 (April 7, 2003) 

IFMP partially concurs with this recommendation. We don’t disagree that all reports 

should be tested – and they are – however, there is some implication here by the OIG that 

that all CFM-generated reports are related to the SGL accounts – which they’re not. Our 

detailed response to the OIG’s issues and concerns in this area are provided below. 

Core Financial reports produced from SAP contain information obtained from numerous 

sources, not just the Standard General Ledger. It is these “non-SGL” type reports that 

will be of importance by Program / Project managers, not the SGL reports. Some

examples of the SAP modules containing Core Financial reporting information include: 

• Materials Management (e.g., Purchase Requests, Contracts/Grants, Receiving 

Reports, Invoices) 

• Sales and Distribution (e.g., Reimbursables) 

• Project Systems (e.g., Phasing Plans) 

• Controlling (e.g., Cost Assessments) 

• FI (e.g., Standard General Ledger) 

• FM (e.g., Budget Controls) 

• Business Warehouse (predominately used to meet the needs of end users (e.g., 

Program/Project Managers) 

All Core Financial custom developed reports (from both SAP R/3 and SAP Business 

Warehouse, or BW) are designed, tested and validated for accuracy by the Agency 

Process Team. It is inaccurate to state that CFM officials said there were no plans for 

testing report accuracy. With respect to the IBM task, it was not NASA’s intent to have 

15 
Appendix C 

IBM review and test all CFM-generated reports. On the other hand, we did expect IBM 

to review applicable SGL-related reports to confirm the accuracy and logic of the SGL 

postings. Given the timing of the IBM review, this effort was never fully completed. To 

the extent that IBM or the OIG will perform this task, the scope of this review should be 

limited to SGL reports. This will entail on-site visit(s) to MSFC, and will require support 

from the SGL team. This will need to be planned accordingly. 

IFMP Response to Audit Issue 3 (April 7, 2003) 

IFMP concurs with this recommendation. Our detailed response to the OIG’s issues and 

concerns in this area are provided below. 

The steps leading up to go-live rely heavily on the success of the conversion activities at 

a given Center. There is a very rigorous process in place to ensure that the conversion 

work is managed efficiently and effectively. This process requires that all issues, 

whether they relate to the legacy data, legacy data extraction routines, the conversion 

load programs, or the environment be documented immediately via a System

Investigation Report (SIR). The process requires immediate attention be placed on 

conversion related SIRs so that the conversion activities will not be halted. 

The conversion teams aggressively worked all conversion SIRs in conjunction with the 

Central Support staff located at MSFC. Working together, these teams concentrated on 

the materiality and criticality of the SIRs and correcting the issue. 

It is apparent from the success of the go-live conversions by JSC, KSC, HQ, and NMO 

that the SIR process worked to help document issues and focus adequate attention on 

identifying the required corrections so that the go-live would be successful. 

16 
Appendix C 

Although the SIR status is fluid throughout the lifecycle, below reflects the conversion 

SIR status as of February 27, 2003: 

Center 

Open 

(In Process/ 

Assigned) 

Ready to Retest / 

Authorized to Retest 

Retest Complete 

(Ready to Close) 

Marshall Space Flight 

Center 

0 0 0 

Glenn Research Center 0 0 0

Johnson Space Center 0 0 23

Headquarters 4 1 56

Kennedy Space Center 2 1 15 

In conclusion, the administrative activity to officially ‘Close’ the SIRs does not reflect on 

a Center’s ability to go-live successfully. Nevertheless, NASA will follow the 

recommendation of the OIG and continue to formally change the indicator to ‘Closed’ for 

the remaining SIRs within the tracking system as soon as possible. We will also improve 

the SIR tracking and maintenance process for the Wave 3 Centers by expeditiously 

updating the status of the SIRs as they progress through the process. 

IFMP Response to Audit Issue 4 (June 24, 2003) 

The Program concurs with the OIG recommendation that, "The Integrated Financial 

Management Program Executive should emphasize to all IFMP personnel, the value of 

timely and fully documenting lessons learned in the proper areas of the Knowledge 

Sharing System (KSS) and ensuring that the KSS is used to the fullest extent possible."

We agree with the OIG that the Knowledge Sharing System (KSS) is a unique and 

valuable application for “lessons-learned” collection, analysis and distribution within the 

IFMP community. Though other methods (e.g., formal reviews, scheduled workshops) 

have been effectively used in disseminating lessons-learned among the IFM project teams 

and Center-based users and implementers, particularly during the rollout phase, a KSS is 

still an important tool, facilitating the continuous identification, capture, submittal, 

utilization, and updates of lessons learned and best practices with minimal impact on our 

program resources. The KSS will be especially valuable to future IFMP efforts (e.g., 

Integrated Asset Management) in their reviews of lessons learned from the Core 

Financial and other module implementations. 

17 
Appendix C 

Therefore, the IFM Program will undertake the following actions: 

• Review and update our KSS plan to ensure that the structures and processes 

described within are still appropriate; 

• Provide the updated KSS plan to the IFMP lessons-learned points of contact at the 

Program, Project, and Center levels; 

• Review and update if needed the best practices and lessons-learned already 

captured within the KSS to ensure they are appropriately categorized; and 

• Continue to emphasize to the various IFM project teams and Centers the 

importance of using a KSS and emphasize the timely submittal of lessons-learned 

and best practices applications. 

In summary, the IFM Program has, in its KSS, an effective tool in place for capturing and 

sharing lessons-learned and best practices observations and analysis. For example, many 

of the comments received from the Core Financial Waves 2 and 3 Centers showed that 

the lessons-learned from the previous Waves rollouts were quite valuable. However, as 

noted by the OIG, improvements can and will be made with respect to the use and 

efficacy of the KSS tool. IFMP is committed to improving the use of this capability. 

18 
Appendix D. Report Distribution 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters 

A/Administrator 

ADI/Associate Deputy Administrator for Institutions and Asset Management 

ADT/Associate Deputy Administrator for Technical Programs 

AA/Chief of Staff 

AB/Associate Deputy Administrator 

B/Deputy Chief Financial Officer for Financial Management 

B/Deputy Chief Financial Officer for Resources (Comptroller) 

BF/Director, Financial Management Division 

G/General Counsel 

H/Assistant Administrator for Procurement 

HK/Director, Contract Management Division 

HS/Director, Program Operations Division 

J/Assistant Administrator for Management Systems 

JM/Director, Management Assessment Division 

L/Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs 

M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight 

Q/Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance 

NASA Advisory Officials 

Chair, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 

NASA Centers 

ARC/D/Director, Ames Research Center 

DFRC/X/Director, Dryden Flight Research Center 

GRC/0100/Director, John. H. Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field 

GSFC/100/Director, Goddard Space Flight Center 

JPL/Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, NASA Management Office 

JSC/AA/Director, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 

KSC/AA/Director, John F. Kennedy Space Center 

LaRC/106/Acting Director, Langley Research Center 

MSFC/DA01/Director, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 

SSC/AA00/Acting Director, John C. Stennis Space Center 

19 
Appendix D 

Non-NASA Federal Organizations and Individuals 

Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Policy 

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division, Office of Management and 

 Budget 

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch, Energy and Science Division, Office 

 of Management and Budget 

Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team, General Accounting 

 Office 

Senior Professional Assistant, Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space 

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member – Congressional Committees and 

Subcommittees 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Senate Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space 

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 

House Committee on Appropriations 

House Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies 

House Committee on Government Reform

House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management 

House Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, 

 and the Census 

House Committee on Science 

House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science 

Congressional Member 

Honorable Pete Sessions, U.S. House of Representatives 

20 
NASA Assistant Inspector General for Auditing 

Reader Survey 

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20546-0001. 

Report Title: Summary Report on the Audit of the Integrated Financial 

 Management Program Core Financial Module 

IG-03-028, dated September 29, 2003 

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Suggestions for Future Audits

To suggest ideas for or to request future audits, contact the Assistant Inspector General 

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 Assistant Inspector General for Auditing 

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NASA Hotline

To report fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement contact the NASA Hotline at (800) 

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Reader Survey 

Please complete the reader survey at the end of this report or at 

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Major Contributors to This Report

Neil Ryder, Office of Audits (OA) Director, Financial Management Audits 

Karl Allen, Project Manager 

Linda Wagner-Anderson, Auditor 

Daniel Birnbaum, Auditor 

Gene Griffith, Auditor 

Bret Skalsky, Auditor