1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

GERARD R. SMAGALA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN COLVIN,1

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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No. 12 C 4547

Magistrate Judge

Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff Gerard Smagala’s claim for 

Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. The parties have 

consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons that follow, Smagala’s motion for summary 

judgment is denied, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment 

[Doc. No. 28] is granted. 

 1

 Carolyn Colvin is substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 25(d).
2

BACKGROUND

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Smagala applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental 

Security Income on October 22, 2008, alleging a disability due to borderline 

intellectual functioning and low IQ since July 1, 2004. (R. 10, 181-90.) The 

applications were denied on March 13, 2009 and upon reconsideration on June 22, 

2009. (Id.) Smagala filed a timely request for a hearing by an Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on September 15, 2010.2 (Id.) Smagala, who was not 

represented by counsel, personally appeared and testified at the hearing. (R. 10, 35-

107.) A medical expert and a vocational expert also testified at the hearing. (R. 10.)

On March 16, 2011, the ALJ denied Smagala’s claim for benefits and found 

him not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 7-20.) The Social Security 

Administration Appeals Council denied Smagala’s request for review on April 26, 

2012, (R. 4-6), leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner 

and therefore reviewable by the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes 

v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).

 2

 An initial hearing was held on May 12, 2010, but no substantive testimony was 

taken. Smagala instead asked for a continuance in order to seek representation. The ALJ 

allowed the continuance but advised Smagala that the next hearing would proceed whether 

or not he had secured a representative. (R. 10, 25-34.)
3

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Background

Smagala was born on July 12, 1957, and was fifty-three years old at the time 

of the ALJ hearing. (R. 49.) Smagala lives alone in a studio apartment. (R. 15, 55.) 

He graduated from high school but was a C student. (R. 65, 92.) Smagala was 

previously employed in a number of different jobs, including roofer, laborer, 

packager, order picker, forklift driver, and material handler. (R. 49- 86-95, 202-04, 

210-12.) He also received Social Security benefits from 1995 to 2008. (R. 10 n.1, 24, 

44.) 

B. Testimony and Medical Evidence

1. Smagala’s Testimony

Smagala testified that he had a nervous breakdown in approximately 1999, 

after he was divorced, his mother passed away, and he had to care for his blind 

father, who was on dialysis. (R. 42-43.) He was hospitalized at the time for two to 

three weeks, and then he was recommended to Foxfire day treatment center, where 

he went for counseling and treatment over a period of two or three years until 2000. 

(R. 58-60.) He was on medication, including Lithium and briefly Zoloft, but he 

experienced side effects from Zoloft. (R. 60.) He states that he was diagnosed with 

manic depression at Foxfire before his alleged onset date of July 1, 2004. (R. 61.) 

From July 2004 until the time of the hearing, he had not received treatment or 

medication for any mental health issues, and he only saw a psychiatrist for 

evaluations. (R. 61-63, 69.) Smagala testified that although he had access to doctors 
4

through Medicare from 2004 to 2008, he did not feel the need to see anyone. (R. 63-

64.) He said that he was gradually taken off of Lithium while at Foxfire because he 

was doing well and was “balanced out.” (R. 63.)

Smagala stated that he left most of the jobs he had over the years for various 

reasons, but he never had difficulty working with supervisors and co-workers and 

generally has an easygoing personality and did as he was told. (R. 43-44.) He did 

not return to work as a roofer because he found out he would first need to pay back 

dues to the union, and he had only applied for a couple of other jobs, at Jewel and 

the YMCA. (R. 64-65.) Smagala also did not pursue job placement through any state 

agency. (R. 66.) He explained that he did not look for work very much because he 

did not think anyone would hire him due to his age and work experience. (R. 65-66, 

101.) He is not entirely sure what prevents him from working, and he does not know 

why he quit various jobs. (R. 68.)

He testified that he applied for Social Security when his prior receipt of 

benefits was stopped after determination that he had been overpaid funds because 

he engaged in substantial gainful employment.3 (R. 10 n.1, 45-47.) Smagala stated 

that he did not actually receive many of those funds, because they were misused by 

his sister or brother, who were his payees at the time. (R. 45-47, 70-72.)

 3

 The record reflects that Smagala earned $1,082.05 in 1995; $9,317.84 in 1996; 

$13,749.26 in 1997; $11,482.65 in 1998; $15,709.71 in 1999; $2,134.96 in 2000; $5,378.66 in 

2001; $1,368.50 in 2002; $6,228.62 in 2003; $2,063.79 in 2004; and he had no reported 

income from 2005-2010. (R. 210-13.)
5

Smagala does his own grocery shopping and also gets food from a church 

pantry in exchange for helping set up and distribute the food. (R. 56-57.) He is able 

to drive but does not currently own a car, although he occasionally borrows a car 

from a friend. (R. 55-57.) He also walks, rides his bike, and takes public 

transportation. (R. 57.) He is able to read the newspaper, he filled out all of the 

Social Security paperwork by himself, and he can read and understand an 

application. (R. 67-68.) 

2. Medical Evidence

a. Susan Frederiksen, M.D.

Dr. Frederiksen completed a psychiatric consultative examination (“CE”) 

report after a thirty-five minute interview on July 18, 2002, eight days after the 

death of Smagala’s father. (R. 310-12.) She noted that Smagala was a limited 

historian, had a “perplexed air about him,” was anxious, and did not have 

spontaneous speech. He found it difficult to express his thoughts and would give

uncertain tentative responses.

She concluded that it was difficult to make a diagnosis due to the limited 

amount of information available, but opined that chronic schizophrenia with 

predominant negative symptoms was possible. Dr. Frederiksen also found that 

Smagala seemed to have avoidant, schizoid, dependent features in his personality. 

His ability to maintain attention and concentration was moderately impaired, and 

his ability to comprehend instructions was intact but limited to concrete tasks. 

Smagala’s ability to initiate, sustain, and complete tasks in a competitive work 
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environment appeared to be moderately to markedly impaired, and his ability to get 

along with co-workers and supervisors and to withstand normal work pressure 

appeared to be markedly impaired.

b. Dianne Stevenson, Psy. D.

Dr. Stevenson tested and interviewed Smagala over a period of four hours on 

January 14, 2006. (R. 297-300.) She noted that Smagala did not offer spontaneous 

conversational speech, his memory appeared to falter at times, and his conversation 

was often tangential and circumstantial. She administered the Wechsler Adult 

Intelligence Scale-III (“WAIS-III”) test, and Smagala’s full-scale IQ was measured 

at 79, which is borderline to low average. His verbal comprehension score was 89 

(average) and was much higher than his perceptual organization ability score, 

which was 74 (borderline impaired). On the Wide Range Achievement Test-2, 

Smagala tested at the post-high school grade equivalent in reading, the high school 

equivalent in spelling, and the fifth grade equivalent in arithmetic. 

Based on the results of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2

(“MMPI-2”) test, Dr. Stevenson noted no significant elevations, although certain 

items indicated fearfulness, problems with family members, low self-esteem, and 

depression. She opined that he is deficient in interpersonal and social skills and 

finds it difficult to trust anyone deeply.

Dr. Stevenson concluded that Smagala’s intellectual functioning is in the 

borderline to low average range. He is a loner, finds it difficult to vary his life 

experience, tends to be frustrated by his lack of accomplishment, has feelings of 
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helplessness and hopelessness, and is worried about his future. He depends on 

others for direction and help with decision making. Dr. Stevenson diagnosed 

Smagala with Bipolar Disorder, Recurrent, Unspecified (per report); Personality 

Disorder NOS, with avoidant and dependent traits; and Borderline Intellectual 

Functioning. She concluded that Smagala would be unable to function in a normal 

work-like setting.4

c. Jeffrey Karr, Ph.D,

Dr. Karr, a licensed clinical psychologist, examined Smagala for fifty minutes 

and completed a psychological report on February 19, 2009. (R. 337-40.) Dr. Karr 

observed that Smagala was polite and pleasant but appeared ill at ease and 

anxious, and he had pressured speech. He also described to Dr. Karr that he was 

compelled to engage in certain activities, such as cleaning, attending mass, and 

taking walks. Dr. Karr’s diagnosis was Bipolar Disorder (per history) and OCD. 

d. Tyrone Hollerauer, Psy.D.

DDS physician Dr. Hollerauer completed a Psychiatric Review Technique 

(“PRT”) and a Mental Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) assessment in March 

 4

 Three copies of Dr. Stevenson’s report are in the record. Two appear to be identical 

copies and were included as part of the same exhibit before the ALJ. (R. 297-304.) A third,

(R. 293-96), was also before the ALJ but was offered as a separate exhibit. The third report 

is nearly the same as the other two except with respect to certain redactions. In the two 

identical reports, certain information is “whited out”; in the third, it is redacted with a 

black pen. Most of the redactions are the same. However, in the two identical reports, Dr. 

Stevenson’s conclusion states that “Gerald Smagala would be unable to function in a 

normal work-like setting”; in the third report, the letters “un” are redacted, and thus the 

conclusion is that Smagala would be able to function in a work-like setting. The discrepancy 

is not explained in the record.
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2009. (R. 341-69.) During the interview, Smagala was cooperative and had no 

problem with memory, concentration, or in answering questions. 

He concluded that Smagala had impairments in the categories of Affective 

Disorders (Listing 12.04), based on Bipolar Disorder by history, and AnxietyRelated Disorders (Listing 12.06), based on OCD features. Under the B criteria of 

the listings, Dr. Hollerauer found that Smagala had mild limitations in his 

activities of daily living and moderate limitations in the areas of maintaining social 

functioning and concentration, persistence, or pace, with one or two episodes of 

decompensation. Dr. Hollerauer stated that his functional limitations did not meet 

or equal a listing.

Dr. Hollerauer’s Mental RFC found that Smagala was moderately limited in 

his ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions; to work in 

coordination or proximity to others; to complete a normal workday without 

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; and to accept instructions and 

respond appropriately to criticism. He was not found to be significantly limited in 

any other area. Dr. Hollerauer opined that Smagala was in the low average range 

intellectually and could understand and carry out simple instructions, but he would 

be limited to unskilled tasks.
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e. Roy Gilliland, Ph.D.

Dr. Gilliland prepared a psychological evaluation on September 13, 2010, two 

days before the ALJ hearing.5 (R. 387-88.) Smagala reported to Dr. Gilliland that he 

had “leveled out” and thus had not taken any medications for his psychological 

problems since 2000. He also stated that he was not currently experiencing 

significant symptoms of bipolar disorder. His speech was fluent, logical, and 

coherent, although he appeared anxious with constricted affect. Smagala’s thought 

process was disorganized and often required redirection. Dr. Gilliland found that 

Smagala’s insight and judgment appeared good.

Testing suggested minimal depression and mild anxiety. The MMPI-2 test 

revealed the highest elevated scale associated with individuals who are socially 

introverted and have difficulty in social situations. Dr. Gilliland concluded that his 

social phobia symptoms appeared to be limiting in terms of psychosocial 

functioning. He did not demonstrate any clinical symptoms other than some 

distractibility. Dr. Gilliland recommended a referral to a psychiatrist or counselor in 

the event that Smagala’s symptoms worsened. Smagala was ultimately diagnosed 

with Bipolar Disorder NOS, and R/O Social Phobia.

3. Medical Expert’s Testimony

Dr. Michael Cremerius testified at the hearing as a medical expert. Dr. 

Cremerius stated that Smagala’s medically determinable impairments supported by 

 5

 The ALJ left the record open for two weeks in order to allow the record to include 

evaluations that were not available on the date of the hearing. (R. 83-84, 105.)
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the record include borderline intellectual functioning (Listing 12.02) based on a fullscale IQ of 79, which is in the borderline low-average range; Bipolar Disorder 

(Listing 12.04); OCD features (Listing 12.06); and personality disorder (Listing 

12.08). (R. 73-74.)

Dr. Cremerius pointed out that Dr. Stevenson’s January 2006 CE provided 

the diagnosis of bipolar disorder and borderline intellectual functioning, and the 

February 2009 psychological CE performed by Dr. Karr diagnosed bipolar disorder 

by history. (R. 75.) He opined that there was little additional evidence of 

psychological limitations in the file. (R. 75.)

When asked to evaluate the B criteria, Dr. Cremerius concluded that based 

on the record, Smagala’s presentation at the hearing, and the fact that the claimant 

had not been in any psychiatric treatment or on medications for a number of years, 

Smagala has at best only mild limitations in his activities of daily living; mild 

impairments in social functioning; only mild limitations in concentration, 

persistence, and pace; and no periods of decompensation during the relevant time 

frame. (R. 77-78, 80-81.) Dr. Cremerius concluded that Smagala’s Mental RFC 

would include minimal limitations, and he would not be limited to simple, routine 

work but instead could perform a variety of semi-skilled tasks. (R. 80-81.) 

4. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

Edward Steffan testified at the hearing as a Vocational Expert (“VE”). The 

VE questioned Smagala in detail in order to properly classify his past work 

experience. (R. 85-94.) ALJ asked the VE whether there would be any work 
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available for a hypothetical individual with Smagala’s age, education, full scale IQ 

of 79, and work experience, with no exertional limitations, but limited to semiskilled work. (R. 95-96.) The VE responded that the individual would be able to 

perform all of Smagala’s past work. (R. 96.) The ALJ also asked whether work exists 

for such a person if he were limited to simple, routine, unskilled tasks. (R. 96-97.) 

The VE testified that such a person could perform a number of jobs, including 

Smagala’s past job as an order filler, as well as mail clerk (5,000 jobs in the region); 

office helper (more than 15,000 jobs); small products assembler (more than 15,000 

jobs); and outside delivery. (R. 97-100.) Next, the ALJ added to the hypothetical a 

limitation that the person would sometimes be slow in responding, and the VE 

concluded that the assembler job would be eliminated, but he could perform the 

other unskilled jobs, which are independently performed tasks. (R. 99-100.)

C. ALJ Decision

The ALJ found that Smagala met the insure status requirements of the 

Social Security Act through March 31, 2009, and he had not engaged in substantial 

gainful employment since the alleged onset date of July 1, 2004. (R. 12.) At step 2, 

the ALJ concluded that Smagala had severe impairments of borderline intellectual 

functioning/low IQ and non-severe impairments of bipolar disorder by history, 

obsessive compulsive features, and personality disorder. (R. 13.) At step 3, the ALJ 

found that none of Smagala’s impairments, alone or in combination, met or equaled 

a listing. (R. 13-14.)
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The ALJ next determined that Smagala had the RFC to perform a full range 

of work at all exertional levels, limited to semi-skilled work. (R. 14-18.) The ALJ 

concluded that Smagala was capable of performing his past relevant work as a 

material handler, general laborer, forklift operator, and order filler and thus was 

not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 18-20.)

DISCUSSION

I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months.” 42. U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a claimant is 

disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the claimant 

presently unemployed? (2) Does the claimant have a severe impairment? (3) Does 

the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments 

enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform his former 

occupation? and (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(a)(4) (2008). 

An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the 

claimant is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389 

(7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a 

finding of disability. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps 1-4. Id.
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Once the claimant shows an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts 

to the Commissioner to show the ability to engage in other work existing in 

significant numbers in the national economy. Id.

II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is 

limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are support by substantial 

evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d. 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. 

Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). This Court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, 

resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d 

at 841.

The ALJ is not required to address “every piece of evidence or testimony in 

the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning 

behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th 

Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to a claimant, “he must build an 

accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d 

at 872. The ALJ “must at least minimally articulate the analysis for the evidence 
14

with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.” Boiles v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 630, 634 

(7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record before drawing any 

conclusions, and must adequately articulate his analysis so that we can follow his 

reasoning.”).

Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the 

responsibility for determining whether a claimant is disabled falls upon the 

Commissioner, not the court. Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1990). 

However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors his 

ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. 

Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994).

III. ANALYSIS

Smagala argues that the decision was in error because the ALJ: (1) did not 

properly evaluate the medical opinions, particularly that of Dr. Stevenson; (2) did 

not properly evaluate Smagala’s credibility; and (3) did not sufficiently develop the 

record.

A. Medical Evidence

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Stevenson’s opinion 

that Smagala would be unable to work in a competitive environment in favor of that 

of testifying expert Dr. Cremerius. The ALJ assigned little weight to Dr. 

Stevenson’s opinion because it was inconsistent with Smagala’s activities of daily 

living and the record as a whole. She assigned significant weight to Dr. Cremerius’s 
15

opinion because it was more consistent with the record, he had the benefit of 

additional evidence, and he was able to observe Smagala at the hearing. (R. 17.) She 

further noted that the opinion of Dr. Gilliland, who was a consultant chosen by 

Plaintiff and whose report was submitted after the hearing, also did not recommend 

further treatment unless Smagala’s condition worsened.

As a general rule, opinions of examining physicians are given more weight 

than those of non-examining physicians. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). However, 

Dr. Stevenson was a consultant, not a treating physician, and therefore the ALJ 

was not required to give her opinion controlling weight.6 See White v. Barnhart, 415 

F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, her opinion, which predated those of 

Drs. Karr, Hollerauer, Cremerius, and Gilliland by several years, was not consistent 

with the record as a whole in a way that would support a finding of total disability.7

Plaintiff’s emphasis on consistencies in the record with regard to his limitations is 

unpersuasive. It is not disputed that Smagala has impairments and limitations, and 

the ALJ’s decision took those into consideration. The issue is whether his

limitations are disabling, and Dr. Stevenson’s opinion is the only evidence in the 

record supporting that finding. The ALJ’s decision to assign little weight to Dr. 

 6

 Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the fact that Dr. Stevenson spent four hours with 

Smagala, longer than any other consultant, is not so relevant that the ALJ’s failure to 

mention it in the decision warrants reversal. Dr. Stevenson administered four separate 

tests during her consulting examination, including the WAIS-III, which was more testing

than any other consultant performed.
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Stevenson’s opinion was therefore supported by substantial evidence. See Young v. 

Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004).

Similarly, the Court does not find error with the ALJ’s development of the 

record at the hearing. Her failure to question Dr. Cremerius about specific aspects 

of the record that Plaintiff believes are inconsistent with his opinion was at best 

harmless error. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that even if Dr. Cremerius had 

credited some of the more restrictive limitations given in some of the medical 

evidence, he would not be capable of performing the independent, unskilled jobs 

which the VE testified exist in significant numbers in the regional economy.

B. Credibility

In her ruling, the ALJ found Smagala’s allegations of disabling limitations 

less than fully credible based upon his wide range of daily activities; the fact that he 

has not sought medical treatment or taken medication since his alleged disability 

onset date; and that his main contention at the hearing was that he believed no one 

would hire him, which is not a basis for a disability determination. (R. 15.) 

The Court concludes that the ALJ’s credibility finding was adequately 

supported. An ALJ’s credibility determination is granted substantial deference by a 

reviewing court unless it is “patently wrong” and not supported by the record. 

Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2007); Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 

 7 As discussed supra note 4, it is not entirely clear that Dr. Stevenson did conclude 

that Smagala was unable to perform work activity, but for purposes of this decision, the 

Court assumes that she did.
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435 (7th Cir. 2000). However, an ALJ must give specific reasons for discrediting a 

claimant’s testimony, and “[t]hose reasons must be supported by record evidence 

and must be ‘sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any 

subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements

and the reasons for that weight.’” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 

539-40 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887-88).

When assessing the credibility of an individual’s statements about symptoms 

and their functional effects, an ALJ must consider all of the evidence in the case 

record. See SSR 96-7p.8 “This includes . . . the individual’s own statements about 

the symptoms, any statements and other information provided by treating or 

examining physicians or psychologists . . . and any other relevant evidence in the 

case record.” Id. at *1. In instances where the individual attends an administrative 

proceeding conducted by the adjudicator, the adjudicator may also consider his or 

her own observations of the individual as part of the overall evaluation of the 

credibility of the individual’s statements. Id. at *5. 

 8 Interpretive rules, such as Social Security Regulations (“SSR”), do not have force of 

law but are binding on all components of the Agency. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1); accord Lauer 

v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1999).
18

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s credibility analysis was erroneous because it 

included a meaningless boilerplate statement,9 and additionally that the ALJ’s 

stated reasons were insufficient. First, the mere presence of the boilerplate 

language is insufficient grounds for remand where, as in this case, the use of the 

boilerplate is incidental. See, e.g., Carter v. Astrue, 413 Fed. Appx. 899, 905-06 (7th 

Cir. 2011). 

Second, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s credibility finding. 

Although Plaintiff correctly argues that an ALJ may not equate daily activities with 

the requirements of competitive work, the ALJ has not done so here. She listed 

certain of his daily activities but did not suggest that the list was exhaustive or 

equated to a work environment. The problem for Plaintiff is that he has offered no 

activities he is not able to do as a result of a disabling condition. To the extent the 

record reflects anxiety in social situations, the jobs of office helper, mail clerk, and 

order filler are independently performed tasks. The record does not require the ALJ 

to have found that Smagala’s social limitations are wholly disabling.

 9 The following is the language in question: “After careful consideration of the 

evidence, I find that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably 

be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning 

the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the 

extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” (R. 

15.) This “credibility template” has been subject to criticism because of its meaninglessness 

and the circular logic that it embraces. See Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 

2012) (finding the template “gets things backwards,” and is “meaningless boilerplate” that 

“implies that ability to work is determined first and is then used to determine the 

claimant’s credibility”).
19

There is also substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that 

Smagala’s failure to receive any mental health treatment eroded his credibility. An 

ALJ must consider a claimant’s reasons for not seeking treatment, see SSR 96-7p, at 

*7, and in this case, the reason was that Smagala himself felt he had “balanced out” 

or “leveled out.” Plaintiff argues at length that his reason for not seeking treatment 

was that he had limited insight, but the record does not support this claim. Smagala 

stopped taking medication under a physician’s care, not because he alone decided he 

did not need it. Moreover, none of the psychological opinions in the record 

recommended further treatment at any relevant time frame; the recommendations 

only stated that he should pursue treatment if his symptoms worsened. The Court 

therefore concludes that the ALJ’s credibility determination was not patently wrong 

and was adequately supported by the record.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Gerard Smagala’s motion for summary 

judgment is denied, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment 

[Doc. No. 28] is granted. 

SO ORDERED. ENTERED:

 

DATE: March 31, 2014 ___________________________

HON. MARIA VALDEZ

United States Magistrate Judge