NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2008-7099 GLENDA BROOME, Claimant-Appellant,

v. JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D., Secret ary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

Glenda Broome , of Easley, South Carolina, pro se. Michael D. Austin , Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, fo r respondent-appellee. With him on the brief were Gregory G. Katsas , Acting Assistant Attorney General; Jeanne E. Davidson , Director; and Harold D. Lester, Jr. , Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief were David J. Barrans , Deputy Assistant General Counsel; and Amy M. McAtee , Staff Attorney, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Of fice of the General Counsel, of Washington, DC. Appealed from: United States Cour t of Appeals for Veterans Claims Judge Robert N. DavisNOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2008-7099

GLENDA BROOME, Claimant-Appellant,

v. JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D., Secret ary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Court of A ppeals for Veterans Claims in 06-1261, Judge

Robert N. Davis.

__________ ________________ DECIDED: September 4, 2008

__________________________ Before MICHEL, Chief Judge , MAYER, Circuit Judge and STEARNS, District Judge *. PER CURIAM. Glenda M. Broome appeals a porti on of the judgment of t he Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board of Veterans’ Appeals decision denying her claim for service-connection for the cause of her husband’s deat h, and therefore her claim for dependency and indemnity compensation. Broome v. Peake , No. 06-1261

_____________________ * The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, District Ju dge, United States District Court of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.2008-7099 2 (Vet. App. Mar. 3, 2008). We affirm-in-part and dismiss-in-part

. The veteran died on June 1, 2001, of intracerebral hemorrhage due to spontaneous rupture of a cerebral vessel. Prior to his death, service connection was established for degenerative arthritis and mult iple sebaceous cysts. He was granted total disability based on individual unem ployability due to his service-connected disabilities effective January 1, 2000. Broome’s assertion of clear and unmistakable error (“CUE”) on the board’s failure to grant claims by the veteran for 100 percent disability prior to January 1, 2000, is not ripe for review because she has yet to file such a claim with the VA regional office (“RO”). Each claim of CUE underlying a req uest for revision of a previous RO decision must be presented to and adjudicat ed by the RO in the first instance. Similarly, her new claim of service-connection for Agent Or ange exposure first must be presented to the RO for adjudication. Because those issues we re raised for the fi rst time on appeal, we affirm the Veterans Court’s decis ion not to address them. Broome also claims that the board and the Veterans Court erred in concluding that the veteran’s intracerebr al hemorrhage was not a result of his service-connected degenerative arthritis. We see no legal error in the Veterans Court’s conclusion that the veteran’s service-connected disabilities were not causally connected to his death. See 38 U.S.C. § 1310; 38 C.F. R. § 3.312. Credibility of expe rt testimony is a question of fact, and it was not inappropriate for the board to weigh the expert medical opinions on record for their probative values in determi ning whether the veteran’s cause of death was service-connected. Contrary to Broome’ s contention, the board was not required to consult with medical experts outside of the D epartment of Veterans Affairs (“DVA”).2008-7099 3 Indeed, it is up to the board’s judgment to decide whether a case is of such medical complexity or controversy as to warrant an advisory medical opinion from one or more medical experts who are not av ailable within the DVA. 38 U. S.C. § 7109; 38 C.F.R. § 20.901(d). Even if the board concludes t hat such an advisory medical opinion is warranted, it has some discretion to decide whether to seek one. 38 U.S.C. § 7109(a) (stating that, in such a case, “the Board may secure an advisory medical opinion from one or more independent medica l experts who are not empl oyees of the Department”) (emphasis added). We have considered Broome’s remainin g arguments, and conclude that they each (1) challenge a factual conclusion reac hed by the board or the Veterans Court, and (2) fail to raise a constitutional issue. Be cause we lack authority to review either “a challenge to a factual determination” or “a c hallenge to a law or re gulation as applied to the facts of a particular case” absent a cons titutional issue, 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2), we dismiss the remainder of her appeal.