1 

2020 IL App (5th) 200032-U 

NO. 5-20-0032

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

________________________________________________________________________

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

JENNIFER R. GRIFFITH, ) Shelby County.

 ) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

 ) No. 16-D-1 

and ) 

 ) 

JASON M. GRIFFITH, ) Honorable

 ) Amanda S. Ade-Harlow, 

Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.

________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Cates and Wharton concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s order modifying the appellee’s maintenance and child 

support obligations is affirmed where the court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining that the appellee’s decreased income after he was involuntarily 

terminated from his employment constituted a substantial change in 

circumstances warranting modification. 

¶ 2 This is an appeal arising from an order of the circuit court of Shelby County granting 

the appellee, Jason M. Griffith’s, motion to modify maintenance and child support that he

was required to pay to the appellant, Jennifer R. Griffith, under the parties’ judgment for 

NOTICE

Decision filed 11/12/20. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and 

may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).
2 

dissolution of marriage and marital separation agreement (MSA). For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The parties were married in April 1994. There were two children born of the 

marriage, one of whom was still a minor at all times relevant to this appeal. On November 

15, 2016, the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution of marriage incorporating the 

MSA which, inter alia, ordered the appellee to pay the appellant $1970 in monthly 

maintenance and $695 in monthly child support. The MSA provided in relevant part that 

“maintenance is subject to modification and termination pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/510.” 

¶ 5 At the time of the dissolution judgment, when the original maintenance and child 

support orders were entered, the appellee worked for Stuart C. Irby Company (Irby). The 

appellee’s financial affidavit filed on January 25, 2016, indicated that his estimated salary 

was $91,754.01 per year. His amended financial affidavit filed on September 22, 2016, 

showed that his gross income for 2015 was $97,177 and his gross monthly income was 

$7929. According to the appellant’s financial affidavit filed on February 1, 2016, she was 

employed part-time at CVS earning $9.20 per hour; she worked around 20 hours per week. 

The paystubs attached to her financial affidavit revealed that she was paid bi-weekly, with 

the gross pay being approximately $423 on one check and $450 on the other. 

¶ 6 On January 28, 2019, the appellee filed a motion to modify maintenance and child 

support. A hearing on the appellee’s motion to modify was held on October 3, 2019, during 

which the following evidence was presented. 
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¶ 7 The appellee testified that he started working for Irby in April 2014 when he 

accepted the position of director of services for Irby’s tool repair business. When he was 

hired to work for Irby, the appellee was provided a handbook outlining company policies. 

He signed the handbook receipt and acknowledgement form on June 18, 2014. He also 

signed a personal commitment and acknowledgement of receipt of the code of ethics and 

business conduct that same day. 

¶ 8 Irby had also established a travel and expense policy, which was introduced as the 

appellant’s Exhibit F. The policy established a detailed protocol for claiming and obtaining 

reimbursement for expenses. It provided that, “The Corporate Card is to be used for all 

credit card purchases of reimbursable business travel and entertainment expenses where 

the Corporate Card is accepted. The Corporate Card is a company asset. As such, it is to 

be used for business purposes only. See Separate Irby Corporate Card Policy for more 

detail.” The policy also included rules relating to automobile expenses. 

¶ 9 In his employment with Irby, the appellee received a base salary with some growth 

incentives. He was subject to annual reviews. The appellee, who was a high school 

graduate, reported a total income from salary of $83,174 in 2017 and $102,532 in 2018. 

The appellee explained that his base salary did not change, but his bonus incentives 

increased annually. In 2017, Irby had growth across the business, and the appellee hit a 

portion of his bonus that substantially increased his salary for the following year. In 2018, 

the appellee had four different metrics set for his bonus plan: sales revenue increase, gross 

margin increase, inventory discrepancies, and overall earnings before income and taxes 

(EBIT). The appellee met all four goals and expected a bonus of $40,000 to be paid in 
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March 2019. However, the appellee did not receive this bonus as he was terminated in 

January 2019. 

¶ 10 The appellee testified that his job at Irby was important to him. He loved his job; it 

was what he had done for the past 24 years. He had worked all his life and had financial 

responsibilities to meet. During his employment at Irby, he never missed a maintenance 

or child support payment. He made consistent payments on a vehicle loan that his parents 

had extended to him after he had to file bankruptcy due to the parties’ divorce. In 

anticipation of his continued employment with Irby and the bonus he was going to receive, 

the appellant gifted his parents $1200 so they could go on an extended vacation to Gulf 

Shores, Alabama. He also purchased a pontoon boat and planned to purchase a new home. 

¶ 11 The appellant testified that in 2018, Irby had a change in management. He explained 

that the company frequently restructured according to growth and various factors. The 

company made personnel changes when its employees were not making their numbers. 

¶ 12 On the morning of January 18, 2019, the appellee was informed via phone call that 

an audit had been done on the company fuel cards, it was determined that he used the card 

for his personal truck, and that day would be the last day of his employment. Prior to that 

phone call, the appellee did not believe that using the fuel card was a terminable offense. 

He explained that it was common practice to utilize the fuel card, as most employees 

traveled for business. The appellee’s home was in Shelbyville, Illinois, and he would drive 

anywhere he could within six to eight hours. The fuel card was located in the branch office

in Shelbyville, and employees who were in sales would utilize it. The appellee was 
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devastated and immediately offered to repay the funds he used, which amounted to about 

$1100. 

¶ 13 The appellee testified that he received a notice of termination letter on January 18, 

2019. Although the appellant entered into evidence the purported “Notice of Termination,” 

the appellee denied that it was correct, as it was dated January 16, 2019, and his termination 

date was January 18, 2019. The appellee further adamantly denied that Irby’s travel and 

entertainment policy submitted as the appellant’s Exhibit F was the policy that he violated. 

The appellee explained that the travel and entertainment policy only pertained to companyissued credit cards utilized for meals, hotels, and customer entertainment. He testified that 

the actual company-issued card that he utilized for business-related travel fuel expenses 

was a “Fuelman” card, which was issued to the branches and commonly utilized by all 

employees who performed business travel. 

¶ 14 The appellee stated that on the evening of his termination, he updated his resume 

and immediately began seeking alternative employment. He estimated that he applied for 

40 to 50 jobs; he started keeping track shortly after his termination. Looking for new 

employment was difficult because the appellee lacks education beyond high school. 

¶ 15 The appellee accepted a sales position from Snap-On Industrial, a $3.5 billion per 

year company that had an opening in southern Illinois. The appellee believes that as he 

works his way up in the company, his income will be similar to what he earned in prior 

years. He immediately commenced making child support payments after he found new 

employment. 
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¶ 16 The appellee filed an updated financial affidavit to support his motion to modify, 

which indicated that his estimated salary was $3309.84 per month (or approximately 

$39,708 per year). At the time of the dissolution judgment, the appellee had an estimated

salary of $91,754.01 per year or $7670 per month. As such, his 2019 annual income was 

significantly less than what he made in 2016 when the original maintenance and child 

support orders were entered. 

¶ 17 At the time of the motion to modify, the appellant had obtained full-time 

employment at Hydro-Gear earning $12.75 per hour, she worked 40 hours per week, and 

her salary was $2503.60 per month (or approximately $30,036 per year). She was eligible 

for overtime pay at Hydro-Gear but did not receive overtime at CVS. At the time the 

appellant filed her financial affidavit in response to the motion to modify, she was not 

receiving maintenance because the appellee’s employment had already been terminated. 

Thus, the adjusted gross income shown on her 2018 tax return ($44,295) was higher than 

her earnings from employment ($30,036) because she was receiving maintenance during 

2018, and that counted towards her adjusted gross income. 

¶ 18 During her testimony, appellee’s counsel asked in detail about the appellant’s bank 

statements. The appellant was unable to locate proof that she paid the water bill, Ameren 

bill, her car payment, and garbage bill, all of which were set forth in her sworn financial 

affidavit. With respect to the above bills, the appellant testified that she always had lights, 

water, and garbage removal. She was “pretty sure” that she paid her water bill and car 

payment in cash.
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¶ 19 The appellant testified that she moved into a residence at 507 N. Douglas St., 

Shelbyville, Illinois, in December 2017. The appellant testified that although her 

boyfriend, Adam Powers, was an over-the-road truck driver, he occasionally stayed with 

her at that address when he was not working. During a review of her bank statements, the 

appellant admitted that there were months where Powers deposited $350 into her checking 

account, and on the same days that those deposits were made, she withdrew money to pay 

her rent. The appellant also testified that Powers gave her money for her children, and that 

she would transfer funds from her account to Powers’s when he needed money while 

traveling. The appellant confirmed that she had been in a dating relationship with Powers 

since August 2016. The appellant further testified that Powers took care of her children, 

attended the minor child’s extracurricular activities, went out to eat and on vacations with 

her family, and they spent holidays together. 

¶ 20 The appellant testified that she moved into her mother’s residence in February 2019

because she could no longer afford the rent at her own residence since she had not been 

receiving maintenance payments. She testified that if her maintenance were restored, she 

could resume living independently. 

¶ 21 The trial court ordered the parties to provide calculations regarding the figures to be 

adopted by the court. The appellee turned in calculations that showed that the appellant 

owed him thousands of dollars. The appellant asked the court that any modification of 

maintenance be limited to changes attributable to her increase in earnings, and that the 

court should impute the same income to the appellee as he had been earning at the time of 

the dissolution of marriage. 
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¶ 22 On December 31, 2019, the trial court entered its order on child support and 

maintenance. The court found that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred so 

as to require a modification of the maintenance order. The court declined to impute income 

to the appellee, finding that:

“[T]his Court agrees with [the appellee] that while his actions (misusing the 

company credit card) was the cause of his termination, the [appellee] immediately 

repaid it in an attempt to keep that job, explained, with credibility, how that specific 

card was used and not included in the employer’s policy that was admitted into 

evidence, that the card was subject to [the] other policy, that the card had been used 

by others in the field office for the same purpose, was not limited to termination as 

discipline, immediately began looking for work, and took a job in a similar field that 

could, in the long run, yield income similar to his income at Irby. There was no 

evidence or testimony that [the appellee] was underemployed nor was there any 

evidence or testimony that another job similar to the Irby job was available to [the 

appellee].” 

The court also found that the appellee’s “actions for termination were not done to avoid his 

support obligations based upon his credible testimony and his history of paying those 

support obligations was impeccable and not suggestive of someone who was trying to avoid 

his financial support obligations.” 

¶ 23 The trial court further found that the appellant’s income had significantly increased 

since the initial maintenance and child support orders were entered, and that she had regular 

monetary contributions from her boyfriend that should be considered for purposes of 

calculating her income. Based on the appellee’s change in employment and the appellant’s 

increased income, the court decreased the monthly maintenance amount to $0. However, 

the court specifically disclaimed, “this is not a termination of maintenance.” The court 

further stated that the maintenance amount was “subject to modification in the future 

pursuant to Illinois law.” 
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¶ 24 Similarly, the trial court found that the same substantial change in circumstances 

justified modification of the appellee’s child support obligation. Accordingly, the court 

modified the monthly child support amount to $427.39. The appellant appeals the court’s 

orders as to maintenance and child support. 

¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 26 The appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that a 

substantial change in circumstances occurred that warranted modification of the appellee’s 

maintenance and child support obligations. She asserts that the court erred in decreasing 

the maintenance and child support amounts based on the appellee’s decreased income after 

he was terminated from his job. Relying on In re Marriage of Imlay, 251 Ill. App. 3d 138 

(1993), the appellant contends that the court should have determined that because the 

appellee’s termination was due to his misconduct, his employment change was voluntary 

and in bad faith. As such, the appellant maintains that the court should have imputed 

income to the appellee consistent with the income he earned at the time of the dissolution 

judgment. 

¶ 27 Motions to modify child support and maintenance are governed by section 510 of 

the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. See 750 ILCS 5/510 (West 

2018). Section 510 provides that “upon a showing of a substantial change in 

circumstances,” an order for child support or maintenance may be modified. Id.

§ 510(a)(1), (a-5). A substantial change in circumstances warranting modification may 

occur upon: (1) an involuntary change or loss of employment, (2) a voluntary change of 

employment made in good faith, or (3) a change in the needs of the recipient spouse or the 
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ability of the payor spouse to make the payments. In re Marriage of Brent, 263 Ill. App.

3d 916, 922 (1994). When determining whether maintenance should be modified upon a 

finding of a substantial change in circumstances, the court must also consider factors such 

as the needs of each party, the duration of the marriage relative to 

the maintenance payments previously paid, the property awarded to each party under the 

judgment of dissolution, each party’s present and future earning capacity, and the change 

in each party’s income since the prior judgment or order from which a modification is being 

sought. 750 ILCS 5/504(a), 510(a-5) (West 2018). 

¶ 28 The party seeking modification has the burden of proving a substantial change in 

circumstances, and the trial court has “wide latitude in determining whether a ‘substantial 

change’ has occurred.” In re Marriage of Saracco, 2014 IL App (3d) 130741, ¶ 13. The 

decision to grant or deny a motion to modify a party’s child support or maintenance 

obligation will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of 

Carpenter, 286 Ill. App. 3d 969, 973 (1997); In re Marriage of Fink, 275 Ill. App. 3d 960, 

964 (1995). “[I]f the court’s exercise of discretion has an evidentiary basis, then the 

reviewing court will consider the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re Marriage of

Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489, 524 (2004). A judgment is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the court’s findings are 

arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based on the evidence. In re Marriage of Matchen, 372 Ill. 

App. 3d 937, 946 (2007).

¶ 29 Here, the trial court found a substantial change in circumstances occurred based on

the appellee’s termination from his employment at Irby. It further found that the appellee’s
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employment change was not voluntary, and that while it did result from his conduct, he

immediately attempted to rectify the situation and keep his job by repaying the funds he

used. The court found credible the appellee’s testimony as to how the Fuelman card was

used, that it was not included in the Irby travel and entertainment policy relied on by the

appellant, that the card was subject to another policy, that it had been used by other

employees in the field office for the same purpose, and that the discipline for misuse of the

card was not limited to termination. See In re Marriage of Mitteer, 241 Ill. App. 3d 217,

226-27 (1993) (“It isthe function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of witnesses

and the weight to be given their testimony.”). 

¶ 30 The evidence presented on the appellee’s motion to modify supported the trial

court’s findings. The appellee testified that it was common practice to utilize the fuel card

as most employees traveled for business. The appellee would drive anywhere he could

within six to eight hours of his home. The fuel card was located in the branch office in

Shelbyville, and employees who were in sales would utilize it. The appellee testified that

he charged about $1100 to the card. Prior to the phone call notifying him of histermination,

the appellee did not believe that using the fuel card was a terminable offense. He was

devastated and immediately offered to repay the funds he used. Further, he adamantly

denied that Irby’s travel and entertainment policy relied on by the appellant was the policy

that he violated. Similarly, the uncontradicted evidence indicated that the appellee loved

his job, it was important to him, and it was what he had done for the past 24 years. He had

been successful at his job, with his income increasing each year because he received

substantial bonuses. He made six figures in 2018. 
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¶ 31 In this vein, we think the appellant’s reliance on Imlay, where a request to modify 

maintenance was considered in the context of a voluntary change in employment, is 

misplaced. There, the trial court denied a petition to modify maintenance after it 

determined that the payor spouse’s deliberate actions caused his termination and, therefore, 

that he could not meet the burden of establishing that the employment change was made in 

good faith. Imlay, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 142 (noting that “[a] party who voluntarily changes 

employment resulting in a reduced income and seeks to modify a support obligation must 

show the employment change was made in good faith” (emphasis added)). Here, the 

appellee’s employment change was not voluntary. As such, we think that this record more 

closely resembles the following three cases where employment changes warranted support 

modifications.

¶ 32 First, in In re Marriage of Barnard, 283 Ill. App. 3d 366 (1996), the payor spouse, 

an attorney, petitioned to reduce his child support obligation. The payor spouse had been 

employed with his law firm for 20 years, was the firm’s chief trial lawyer, and had earned 

a salary of $191,000. For various reasons, the payor spouse felt forced to leave the firm. 

He established his own law practice but, to supplement his income, he accepted part-time 

work with the Adams County State’s Attorney’s office for $30,000 per year. He petitioned 

the trial court to reduce his support in light of his greatly reduced earnings. The court found 

that the payor spouse left his law firm in good faith (he was essentially forced to resign), 

that the change resulted in a substantial change in circumstances, and that child support 

would be temporarily reduced for a period of six months with the accrued balance to be 

paid at a later date. The appellate court affirmed, finding that, although the payor spouse 
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made the job change expecting to earn less than he had at the firm, the choice to leave his 

former employer was motivated by concerns of job security, there was no evidence that the 

change was motivated by bad faith, and he had made considerable efforts to obtain other 

employment. Id. at 372. Given the circumstances surrounding his leaving the firm, the 

court agreed that he “was not required to wait until his change of employment became an 

involuntary one to justify a reduction” in support. Id. 

¶ 33 Next, in In re Marriage of Gosney, 394 Ill. App. 3d 1073 (2009), the trial court 

denied a petition to modify child support, but the appellate court reversed because the payor 

spouse was involuntarily unemployed and, within months of his termination, found another 

position in the financial management industry (moving from a salary of $755,497 in 2006 

to $110,000 in 2008). The appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s finding that the 

payor spouse should earn $350,000, noting that “he did not willingly decide to leave his 

job and then remain unemployed” and that “nothing in the record suggests an attempt to 

evade a support obligation.” Id. at 1078. The appellate court noted that, immediately after 

he lost his job, the payor spouse began searching for new employment and continued to 

make support payments. Id. Further, the court found there was no evidence of “an 

unreasonable failure to take advantage of an employment opportunity,” or that he had been 

offered a position that would have paid him $350,000. Id. “At the time of trial, [the payor 

spouse] had no employment opportunity that would have produced an income in the range 

imputed by the trial court. Indeed, there is no evidence that a job of that income was 

available to someone of [his] experience in 2008.” Id. 
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¶ 34 Finally, in In re Marriage of Lavelle, 206 Ill. App. 3d 607 (1990), the appellate court 

reversed the trial court’s denial of a petition to modify child support. There, the payor 

spouse, at the time of the original judgment, was self-employed as the owner of an 

electronics store. The store went bankrupt. After filing for bankruptcy, the payor spouse 

enlisted a headhunting agency to find him employment in the electronics field, but those 

efforts proved fruitless. While unemployed, the payor spouse became licensed as a 

stockbroker and became employed at an investment firm with his entire salary based on 

commission. He testified that he expected his income at the firm would increase. The 

appellate court disagreed with the recipient spouse’s argument that, while the bankruptcy 

was unfortunate, the payor spouse voluntarily changed careers and should instead have 

obtained a job in the electronics field for which he was qualified. The court concluded 

that, where the loss of employment was involuntary and where the payor spouse’s efforts 

to obtain a position in the electronics field failed, even with an agency’s assistance, he had 

demonstrated that a substantial change in circumstances warranted a reduction or 

modification of his support obligations. Id. at 611-12. Therefore, the appellate court found 

that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the petition to modify. Id. at 612.

¶ 35 The aforementioned cases persuade us that, here, the trial court’s findings that the 

appellee did not voluntary change his employment, is not underemployed, and the actions 

underlying his termination were not done for the purpose of avoiding his maintenance or 

child support obligations are not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and, 

therefore, that it did not abuse its discretion in concluding that modification should be 

granted. As in Barnard, Gosney, and Lavelle, the record here reflects that the appellee’s
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job change was forced, not voluntary, he actively sought reemployment on his own, he 

found appropriate new employment for his education level, he expects to make a salary 

comparable to what he was previously earning, he made support payments up until his 

termination and resumed child support payments as soon as he found new employment, 

and there was no evidence that he was offered, but turned down, any higher paying 

positions.

¶ 36 Specifically, and in accordance with the foregoing cases, we agree with the trial

court’s assessment that the appellee immediately began looking for work and took a job in 

a similar field that he believed would eventually yield an income comparable to what he 

made at Irby. Moreover, the court found that there was no evidence indicating that the 

appellee was underemployed or that he had turned down employment with a salary that 

was closer to what he previously made. The uncontradicted evidence showed that the

appellee updated his resume and began seeking alternative employment immediately after

his termination. He estimated that he applied for 40 to 50 jobs but looking for new

employment was difficult because he lacks education beyond high school. However, he

was offered and accepted a sales position from Snap-On Industrial. The appellee believes 

that as he works his way up in the company, his income will be similar to what he earned

in prior years.1 He also immediately commenced making child support payments after he

found new employment. 

1

We note that if the appellee’s belief is true, and his income level rises to that of what he made 

prior to his termination, there is nothing stopping the appellant from filing a motion to modify the appellee’s 

maintenance and child support obligations to reflect such increased income. 
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¶ 37 Although the appellant spent a considerable amount of argument on the issue of 

whether the appellee’s job change was done in good faith, we note that consideration of 

good faith appears relevant to voluntary employment changes, not involuntary employment 

changes. See, e.g., Brent, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 922 (listing as separate circumstances 

warranting modification an involuntary job change versus a voluntary job change made in 

good faith). Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court’s finding that the appellee’s 

“actions for termination were not done to avoid his support obligations based upon his 

credible testimony and his history of paying those support obligations was impeccable and 

not suggestive of someone who was trying to avoid his financial support obligations.” See

Mitteer, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 226-27 (“It is the function of the trier of fact to determine the

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.”). The uncontradicted

evidence revealed that prior to his termination, the appellee had worked all his life,

consistently paid maintenance and child support, and kept up with other financial

responsibilities. 

¶ 38 In light of the foregoing, we find that the appellee’s loss of employment was

involuntary and constituted a substantial change in circumstances. The trial court did not

abuse its discretion in granting modification of his maintenance and child support

obligations because the reasons supporting its decision were not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Therefore, we affirm the court’s modification of the maintenance

and child support amounts. 

¶ 39 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 40 The order of the circuit court of Shelby County is hereby affirmed.
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¶ 41 Affirmed.