United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued January 26, 2016

Decided February 16, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

No. 15Ȭ1161

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

ȱȱȱȱȱȱ PlaintiffȬAppellee,

v.ȱ ȱ

MANTRELL L. JOHNSON,

ȱȱȱȱȱȱ DefendantȬAppellant.

Appeal from the United States Districtȱ ȱ

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 12 CR 283Ȭ1

Virginia M. Kendall,

Judge.

O R D E R

Mantrell Johnson pleaded guilty to possessing crack cocaine with intent to

distribute and using a cell phone to commit that offense. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 843(b).

He initially told authorities that he had purchased crack cocaine for resale weekly

between 2004 and 2009, but by the time of sentencing he had recanted that testimony and

argued that he should be held accountable only for two specific transactions in 2008. The

district court found Johnson’s recanted testimony sufficient to establish—for purposes of

its analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)—that he had engaged in “significant and serious”

drug dealing. On appeal, Johnson challenges the procedural and substantive

reasonableness of his aboveȬGuidelines 180Ȭmonth sentence. We affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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In August 2010, Chicago police arrested Johnson for violating Illinois law by being

a felon in possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number. Johnson then provided

sworn testimony supporting two state searchȬwarrant applications, including one

targeting a drug dealer named Ed White, who Johnson claimed to have seen with a

firearm on multiple occasions. Police did, in fact, uncover a handgun during a search of

White’s home, so White was arrested on a state firearm charge. Almost a year later,

Johnson signed an affidavit recanting his earlier statement, and this recantation led to the

charges against White being dismissed. Following a bench trial in 2013, Johnson was

sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment in his state case.

While his state case was pending, Johnson was charged in federal court with

possessing with intent to distribute 63 grams of crack cocaine that he had obtained from

Isaiah Hicks in May 2008, as well as two counts of using a cell phone to commit that

offense. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 843(b). In a postȬarrest statement, Johnson explained

that Hicks had been introduced to him by Ed White, whom he identified as his regular

supplier, and that he had bought crack cocaine from Hicks on two occasions when he was

unable to reach White. Johnson estimated that he purchased approximately 13 kilograms

of crack cocaine from White between 2004 and 2009, based on average weekly purchases

during that time of 63 grams.ȱ ȱ

Johnson repeated his claims about purchasing drugs from White in a subsequent

proffer interview and in testimony before a grand jury. During his grand jury testimony,

Johnson also recanted his earlier recantation of his statement about seeing White with a

gun; he now stated that he had seen White with a gun after all. White had a reputation for

violence, Johnson explained, and had intimidated him into falsely recanting his

statements in support of the state searchȬwarrant applications.ȱ ȱ

The government prepared a draft plea agreement recommending that the 13

kilograms of crack cocaine Johnson had admitted to purchasing from White count as

relevant conduct to his conviction for purchasing 63 grams of the drug from Hicks in May

2008. Remarkably, six months later Johnson again changed his story. At a status hearing,

he testified this time that he had lied to the grand jury about purchasing crack cocaine

from White in order to make himself more important in the government’s eyes and, in the

process, secure a more favorable plea deal. A year after that, Johnson pleaded guilty to

reselling the 63 grams of crack cocaine he had purchased from Hicks in May 2008, and

also to calling Hicks twice to facilitate that transaction.

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A probation officer calculated a Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months, based on a

total offense level of 35 and a criminalȬhistory category of IV. The offense level was

boosted considerably by the inclusion of the 13 kilograms of crack cocaine as relevant

conduct. Johnson objected, arguing that his inconsistent testimony was insufficient to

establish by a preponderance of the evidence how much cocaine he had purchased from

White.ȱ ȱ

The district court rejected the probation officer’s relevant conduct finding,

concluding that the evidence was sufficient to show that Johnson had purchased crack

cocaine from White but insufficiently precise to establish the quantity of those purchases

for purposes of relevant conduct. Thus, the court recalculated a Guidelines range of 92 to

115 months’ imprisonment. And the court sentenced Johnson well above the range to 180

months for the possession count and 48Ȭmonth concurrent sentences for each of the cell

phone counts. The court justified its aboveȬGuidelines sentence as necessary to punish

Johnson for the additional purchases he had made from White and for his repeated efforts

to manipulate the judicial system.

ȱ ȱ

On appeal Johnson presents two procedural arguments, asserting first that the

district court based its aboveȬGuidelines sentence on unreliable evidence. His recanted

statements, he maintains, were insufficiently reliable to support the probation officer’s

proposed relevantȬconduct finding. As long as he is not regarded as a reliable witness, he

says, then “his statements should not be credited either for the purpose of § 3553(a) or

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 and § 1B1.3.”ȱ ȱ

Because a factfinder may accept some parts of a witness’s testimony while rejecting

other parts, see Whitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 926 (7th Cir. 2012), the court was entitled to

accept Johnson’s prior testimony that he purchased crack cocaine from White while

finding his testimony about the precise quantities unreliable. Moreover, the court’s

conclusion that Johnson purchased some crack cocaine from White was partially

supported by corroborating evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing, which

showed that (1) White had supplied Hicks with powder cocaine, (2) Hicks sold drugs to

Johnson, (3) Johnson purchased crack cocaine in 63Ȭgram quantities, and (4) White had

convinced Johnson to recant his testimony in White’s state case. This corroborating

evidence did not establish that Johnson purchased kilograms of crack cocaine from White,

but it did provide a reasonable basis for the court to credit part of Johnson’s recanted

testimony.

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Johnson also argues that the district court failed to justify the need for a sentence 65

months above the high end of the Guidelines range. He points to the court’s

acknowledgment that it could not estimate the amount of crack cocaine Johnson had

resold over the years:

[T]here is sufficient evidence in his statement to say that he was doing other

drug sales, and I just don’t know what those amounts are. I don’t know

what they are. It may be it was 63 grams per week. But with the evidence

that I’ve been presented, I don’t think there’s enough to corroborate it.

I do think there’s enough to vary from the guideline sentence to increase the

sentence for that drug dealing and not to give him a benefit for lying to the

grand jury or to the Court and to the agents.ȱ ȱ

As Johnson sees it, the court’s finding that he had bought some unquantifiable amount of

drugs from White is so speculative and imprecise that it could not have justified a

sentence nearly 50% above the top of the Guidelines range.ȱ ȱ

The district court did not err in citing these additional drug sales as one reason to

impose an aboveȬGuidelines sentence. Johnson cites no case—and we have found

none—suggesting that a district court must support its § 3553(a) analysis byȱ ȱ

precisely calculating the drug quantity involved in a defendant’s uncharged distribution

offenses. See United States v. Fraser, 647 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming

aboveȬguidelines sentence based in part on finding defendant had dealt between 150 and

500 grams of cocaine over a period of years). Moreover, the additional drug sales were not

the only factor the court cited to justify the sentence; the court also expressed deep

concern about Johnson’s “egregious” efforts to manipulate the judicial system.

Johnson also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, faulting the

district court for not using its discretion under Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85

(2007), to sentence him as if his offense involved powder cocaine. He highlights comments

from the court at sentencing that, he maintains, reflects the court’s understanding that

crack and powder cocaine were equally harmful to the community:ȱ ȱ

I am adopting the crack cocaine amount that the Sentencing Commission

has revised, because I do think that the impact of the crime, regardless of whether it

is powder or crack, is significant on a community, and that anyone who is

addicted to the crack cocaine has faltered in being a productive member of

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the community. And I think that the Sentencing Commission has been

grappling with it, as Mr. Brindley has said, and they’ve come up with this

calculation based upon substantial information, and I’m going to adopt

their—their findings in that regard. And I know this will continue on maybe

for years and years to come.

If crack and powder cause equal damage to the community, Johnson insists, then the court

should not have sentenced him so harshly.

Johnson mischaracterizes the court’s comments; the court at no point suggested it

thought crack and powder cocaine were equally harmful. The court concluded merely that

it was going adopt the findings underlying the Sentencing Commission’s 4:1

crackȬtoȬpowder ratio.

Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an

aboveȬGuidelines sentence in this case. Although the court accepted Johnson’s argument

that it would be inequitable to triple his Guidelines range based solely on his inconsistent

testimony, the court believed that an aboveȬGuidelines sentence was necessary to punish

him for his “significant and serious” drug dealing, and especially for his repeated

obstruction of justice. The court noted Johnson’s long history of serious—and sometimes

violent—crimes, his substance abuse, and the need to adequately deter Johnson and

others from dealing drugs in the future. It is true that Johnson’s criminal history and

obstruction were reflected in the court’s Guidelines calculation, but the court reasonably

believed that an aboveȬGuidelines sentence was appropriate, particularly in light of

Johnson’s “egregious” manipulation of the judicial system. See United States v. Grigsby, 692

F.3d 778, 792 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that false testimony during court proceedings

can justify a higher sentence under § 3553(a)); United States v. Willis, 523 F.3d 762, 770

(7th Cir. 2008) (same).ȱ ȱ

AFFIRMED.

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