IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DONNA J. SCHWEIZER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 12 C 3239

v. )

) Judge John Z. Lee

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL )

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, )

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In this appeal, Donna J. Schweizer seeks a review of the final decision of the 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her claims for Disability 

Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Schweizer moves for summary judgment asking the Court to reverse the Commissioner’s 

decision to deny benefits, while the Commissioner opposes her motion and asks the Court to 

affirm the decision. For the reasons provided herein, the Court denies Schweizer’s summary 

judgment motion, affirms the Commissioner’s decision, and dismisses this lawsuit in its entirety. 

Background

I. Procedural History

On December 1, 2010, Schweizer applied for both Disability Insurance Benefits and 

Supplemental Security Income. Schweizer alleged that she became disabled on April 17, 2009,

due to a condition resulting from a torn esophagus sustained during an endoscopy procedure. R. 

174, 183. Schweizer’s applications were denied. R. 91-95. She then requested reconsideration 

of the denial, but on August 16, 2011, that request was also denied. R. 96, 102. 
At her request, SSA Administrative Law Judge Lee Lewin (“ALJ Lewin”) held a hearing 

on December 6, 2011, to determine the merits of her claims. R. 31, 112, 116. Schweizer, who 

was represented by counsel, medical expert John Pollard, and vocational expert Stephen Davis

testified at the hearing. R. 31. 

On December 28, 2011, ALJ Lewin denied Schweizer’s claims for Disability Insurance 

Benefits and Supplemental Security Income, finding that Schweizer was not disabled as required 

by the Social Security Act. R. 7-20. 

On March 22, 2012, the SSA Appeals Council denied Schweizer’s request for review. R. 

5. Thus, ALJ Lewin’s ruling became the SSA’s final decision on the matter and is reviewable by 

the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 361 (7th Cir. 

2013). 

II. Factual Background

A. Vocational Evidence

Schweizer was born on January 29, 1967, and was 44 years old at the time of the SSA 

hearing. R. 176. She is five feet eight inches tall, weighs around 194 pounds, and has a high

school education. R. 34. She alleges a disability onset date of April 17, 2009, at which time she 

was 42 years old. R. 174, 183. Schweizer’s alleged disability results from scar tissue and nerve 

damage to her throat that purportedly was caused by a small tear in her esophagus from an 

endoscopic procedure. R. 37. From February to November 2010, she made $26,000.00 while 

employed as a full-time automotive sales person at a car dealer making straight commission. R. 

35-36. 

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B. Medical Evidence

The medical evidence in the administrative record describes the onset of Schweizer’s 

condition and the treatment she received. On April 16, 2009, Schweizer underwent an upper 

endoscopy of her upper gastrointestinal tract. R. 459. On the day she underwent the endoscopy, 

Schweizer began experiencing a cough and a sore throat. R. 461. Her symptoms prompted her to 

go to the emergency room, where Schweizer received a CT scan that showed that she had a small 

upper esophageal tear.

1 R. 461. She subsequently developed an infection, and she was 

hospitalized at Provena-St. Mary’s Hospital in Kankakee, Illinois, for at least six days. While 

she was at the hospital, Schweizer was intubated for respiratory support and suffered from high 

fevers and a chest infection. R. 594. 

Shortly thereafter, on May 6, 2009, Schweizer was examined by her primary doctor, Dr. 

Hashim Zaidi. R. 540. Dr. Zaidi noted that Schweizer complained of moderate epigastric pain, a 

cough, and a constant sore throat. R. 539. He diagnosed her as having gastroesophogeal reflux, 

a persistent cough, and reflux esophagitis. R. 540. Dr. Zaidi authorized Schweizer to return to 

work as of May 11, 2009. R. 575. 

Schweizer sought further treatment from her ENT physician, Dr. Christopher Lombardo. 

On May 13, 2009, Dr. Lombardo examined Schweizer, who complained of chronic hoarseness, 

difficulty swallowing, and pain when swallowing. R. 594. According to Dr. Lombardo, 

Schweizer indicated she had intermittent fevers, a chronic cough, and fullness in the throat,

especially in the left upper anterior throat at the level of the hyoid and sternal notch region. R. 

594-95. Seven months later, on December 23, 2009, Schweizer returned to Dr. Lombardo, who 

observed that she was experiencing intermittent hoarseness that was stress-related, a sensation of 

1 Subsequent gastrografin esophagrams failed to show evidence of a tear. See Letter from Brian C. 

Sasso, D.O. R. 593.

3

 
fullness in the throat, and some difficulty swallowing. R. 588. After examining Schweizer, Dr. 

Lombardo also noted that she had minimal to mild tenderness in her right neck muscles when 

touched. R. 589-90. He advised Schweizer to continue seeing her speech therapist. R. 590. 

In June 2010, because Schweizer had complained of right neck pain, she underwent a 

magnetic resonance imaging report (“MRI”) of her neck and cervical spine as well as bone scans. 

R. 582, 584. The bone scans were normal with minimal arthritic cervical change. R. 586. The 

MRI of her cervical spine showed no acute compression, some disc space narrowing and disc 

degeneration from C4-C5 through C6-7, and normal spinal cord size and signal. R. 584. 

In September 2010, Schweizer saw another ENT physician, Dr. Rajeev Mehta, for her 

throat problems. R. 580. She stated that she was suffering from a constant sore throat, a raspy

voice that became worse later in the day, right neck pain that felt like needles, and some neck 

stiffness when turning her head to the left. R. 580. She told Dr. Mehta that she was not taking 

any medication to alleviate those symptoms. R. 580. A month later, in October 2010, Dr. Mehta 

met with Schweizer to report the results of an ultrasound and an esophagram of her esophagus. 

R. 578. Dr. Mehta told her that her esophagus was normal, with the exception of a small bleb, or 

mucous change, which had questionable significance. Id. 

On October 28, 2010, Schweizer began seeing a neurologist, Dr. Daniel Orozco, to treat 

her throat symptoms. R. 522, 520. She complained of sharp pains on the right side of her throat 

throughout the day, difficulty in swallowing, and intermittent problems with her vocal cords that 

caused hoarseness. R. 522. Schweizer told Dr. Orozco that she had been treated with different 

medications that had not worked well, including Dilantin, which did little to alleviate the pain. 

R. 523. Dr. Orozco prescribed the liquid form of Neurontin. R. 524. During a follow-up visit 

on November 18, 2010, Dr. Orozco diagnosed Schweizer with glossopharyngeal neuralgia. R. 

4
521. He noted that her voice was hoarse and that the liquid form of Neurontin provided her with 

temporary relief of her symptoms. R. 520. Dr. Orozco instructed her to return in four months. 

R. 521.

After Schweizer applied for disability benefits, the Illinois Bureau of Disability 

Determination Services selected Dr. Sarat Yalamanchili to perform a physical examination. The 

agency also asked Dr. James Madison to perform a consultative physical Residual Functional 

Capacity (“RFC”) Assessment based on the medical evidence in the record. R. 636, 642-49. 

Additionally, the agency selected Erwin Baukus, Ph.D., to conduct a mental examination of 

Schweizer, and Joseph Mehr, Ph.D., to perform a consultative mental RFC. R. 652, 679-82.2

Dr. Yalamanchili conducted a physical examination of Schweizer on February 22, 2011. 

Based upon the forty minute examination, he found her speech to be normal. R. 636-37. Dr. 

Yalamanchili also concluded that her cervical spine was normal and that the motion of any spinal 

segment or any joint in the upper extremities was not limited. R. 638. Dr. Yalamanchili noted, 

however, that Schweizer appeared to be in discomfort during the range of motion test on her 

cervical spine and upper extremities. R. 638. He diagnosed Schweizer as having 

glossopharyngeal neuralgia, difficulty swallowing, esophageal tear in 2009, and intermittent loss 

of voice. R. 640. 

Dr. Madison reviewed the medical evidence and provided a consultative physical RFC 

assessment on March 2, 2011. R. 642-49. He concluded that Schweizer did not have any 

communicative, manipulative, visual, or environmental limitations. R. 645-46. He also 

determined that Schweizer could lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; sit, 

stand and/or walk (with normal breaks) for about six hours in an eight-hour workday; perform

2 A physical or mental RFC assessment determines the most work a claimant can perform taking 

into consideration her or his physical or mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945. 

5

 
unlimited pushing and/or pulling; occasionally climb stairs; occasionally balance; and was 

unable to climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds. R. 642-49. 

Dr. Madison also determined that Schweizer’s self-reported, symptom-related limitations 

were only partially credible given her medical history. R. 647. He found her claims credible to 

the extent that she had had a treatment history for glossopharyngeal neuralgia. R. 647. But he

pointed to inconsistencies in the medical evidence that undermined her credibility in certain 

respects. For example, although Schweizer reported difficulty in swallowing, she had gained 

weight over the last few months. R. 647. Further, while she complained that she was unable to

bend her head down, Dr. Yalamanchili had noted that she only had a minor decrease in the range 

of motion in her cervical spine. R. 647. Schweizer claimed to experience throat pain and loss of 

voice after speaking for five to ten minutes, but Dr. Yalamanchili had observed that her speech 

was normal during the forty-minute examination. R. 646-47. Finally, although Schweizer

stated that she could not lift anything, could only walk ten feet, and had difficulty reaching, 

climbing, and kneeling, Dr. Yalamanchili had reported she had normal strength, reflexes,

sensations, and gait. R. 647. 

Dr. Baukus conducted a mental examination of Schweizer on March 9, 2011. He noted 

that the volume of her speech was a bit low, but otherwise her speech was normal with respect to 

articulation, grammar, syntax, and vocabulary. R. 652-53. He diagnosed her as having chronic 

pain disorder with both psychological factors (depression and anxiety) and a general medical 

condition. R. 655. 

On March 25, 2011, Dr. Mehr reviewed the medical evidence and provided a consultative 

mental RFC. R. 679-82. He determined that Schweizer had the cognitive, psychological, social, 

and functional capacity to perform simple work of a routine and repetitive basis. R. 681. 

6
C. The December 6, 2011, Hearing Testimony

1. Donna Schweizer’s Testimony

At the hearing, Schweizer testified that her neurologist had diagnosed her with 

glossopharyngeal neuralgia, i.e., pain caused by the cranial nerve that goes to the throat. R. 39, 

66. Glossopharyngeal neuralgia makes it difficult for Schweizer to talk. R. 38. She testified 

that she can normally talk for five to ten minutes before she starts to cough and has severe pain 

that feels like strep throat for about half an hour to an hour. R. 39. On a scale of one to ten, 

Schweizer rated the pain at about an eight. R. 41. She testified that her throat pain increases 

when she talks and that her throat is less painful when she does not talk loudly. R. 41, 60. 

Schweizer stated that she speaks anyways and works through the pain because she “hate[s] just 

sitting there.” R. 60. However, she explained, when she speaks for a long time, she starts 

coughing and loses her voice for a while. R. 60. When asked whether she experienced throat 

pain during the hearing, Schweizer stated that even during the hearing she experienced 

throbbing, shooting pain that felt like knives stabbing her in the throat. R. 44. 

Schweizer also explained how her throat condition affected her other activities. For 

example, she testified that engaging in more-than-normal activity made her throat swollen. R. 

38-39. She added that turning her head to her right side was difficult and turning to her left side 

was feasible to some extent. R. 44. Schweizer also stated that reaching her arm out in any 

direction caused throat pain. R. 44-45. Walking and swallowing also trigger her throat pain. R. 

59. Schweizer testified that, other than the physical symptoms of her throat condition, she is not 

experiencing any other physical problems with any other part of her body. R. 37. 

Schweizer also described her daily activities. She stated that she slept about four to five 

hours per night, but at times would have trouble sleeping because it was hard to breathe when 

7
lying on her side. R. 45. She dressed herself, showered by herself, wrote, typed, opened doors, 

used telephones, picked up pencils, bent over slightly, climbed stairs a bit, read books, used a 

computer, and went to the store once or twice a week with her husband, who drove her. R. 46. 

However, she herself did not drive because she could not turn her head. R. 35, 50. 

Additionally, Schweizer stated that she could only stand for about ten minutes before her 

throat started to hurt, and as a result, she could not cook or prepare meals. R. 46-47. She also 

explained that she could only walk about ten or fifteen yards before her throat began to hurt. R. 

47. Although she had back surgery in 2000, Schweizer stated that her SSA claim was not based

on the injury to her lumbar spine. R. 174, 183. Schweizer agreed that she was able to follow 

instructions, remember things, concentrate on tasks at hand and finish them, and work with 

people. R. 50. She was not feeling anxious or depressed, she was not being treated for any 

mental or emotional problems, and she had never taken any medications for anxiety or 

depression. R. 51. Schweizer stated that she did not smoke cigarettes, drink alcohol, or use 

drugs. R. 52. 

According to Schweizer, she began seeing her neurologist, Dr. Orozco, in 2010, and 

continued to see him once every three months. R. 39-40. Between August 2010 and November 

2010, Dr. Orozco prescribed Neurontin that, when taken consecutively with doses of Ibuprofen, 

was more helpful than over-the-counter pain medication to alleviate her pain. R. 43, 55-56, 58. 

However, Schweizer testified that she discontinued taking Neurontin in November 2010 because 

she could no longer afford it due to lack of income. R. 43, 55-56, 58. Schweizer explained that, 

although she had attended forty two sessions of voice therapy so that she could improve her 

voice and speak without pain, her doctors said that the only thing that can help her now is 

8
medication. R. 53-54. Schweizer added that she currently was taking Tylenol and Ibuprofen, 

but they did not really help to alleviate her pain. R. 14-15. 

Schweizer also testified that Dr. Zaidi, who has been her primary doctor since she was 29 

years old, has treated her throat condition, and she sees him twice a year. R. 40. In 2010, Dr. 

Zaidi wanted her to attempt to return to work. R. 57. She returned to work from February to 

November 2010 and earned $26,000.00 in straight commissions during that time period. R. 8, 

35, 57. But in November 2010, her throat pain worsened, and she did not want to take additional 

doses of Neurontin because it made her dizzy and light-headed.3 R. 58. She stopped working in 

November 2010. R. 36. 

2. Medical Expert Dr. John Pollard’s Testimony 

Dr. John Pollard testified at the hearing as a neutral medical expert. To arrive at his 

opinions, he reviewed the complete medical evidence, including the records of Schweizer’s 

treating physicians and their conclusions. R. 63-70. Dr. Pollard stated that Schweizer’s 

symptoms were consistent with glossopharyngeal neuralgia. R. 65. He noted one contradictory 

indication in the medical evidence: an otolaryngologist had stated that Schweizer showed 

dysphonia, or tension in the vocal chords, which could be caused by anxiety rather than 

glossopharyngeal neuralgia. R. 65. 

According to Dr. Pollard, the only functional limitation from Schweizer’s condition was

related to talking. R. 66. He concluded that the condition would be a severe impairment with 

regard to certain voice-dependent occupations, but would not be a severe impairment as to nonvoice-dependent occupations. R. 63-64. Dr. Pollard also concluded that any back condition 

related to Schweizer’s lumbar spine fusion surgery in 2000 was not a severe impairment. R. 64. 

3 Dr. Orozco, however, noted that Schweizer reported no difficulties or side effects from the liquid 

Neurontin. See R.17 (citing R. 664, 693). 

9

 
Furthermore, Dr. Pollard determined that Schweizer’s continued pain would not cause any 

functional limitations. R. 66. He pointed to Dr. Orozco’s notation that Schweizer’s pain was 

partially alleviated by liquid Neurontin. R. 67. Dr. Pollard also noted that Schweizer had

discontinued taking the medication due to the expense. R. 67. 

Based on his review of the medical evidence and his observation of Schweizer’s 

testimony at the hearing itself, Dr. Pollard opined that Schweizer was able to produce speech that 

could be heard, understood, and sustained. R. 69-70. Given the medical records, Dr. Pollard

disagreed with the conclusions of Drs. Orozco and Zaidi that Schweizer could not produce 

speech that could be heard, understood, and sustained. R. 70. 

3. Vocational Expert Stephen Davis’s Testimony

Stephen Davis testified at the hearing as a Vocational Expert (“VE”). The ALJ asked 

Davis several questions involving a hypothetical person, who was Schweizer’s age with the same 

education and work history, intermittent voice loss, and restrictions for occasional reaching. (R. 

73, 642-49.) 

First, the ALJ asked the VE whether a hypothetical person limited to light work, who was 

(1) able to stand or walk a total of about six hours of an eight-hour work day, (2) able to 

frequently lift ten pounds, (3) able to occasionally lift twenty pounds, (4) able to occasionally 

climb ramps and stairs and balance, (5) incapable of climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and (6) 

limited to simple, routine and repetitive work with simple instructions, would be able to perform 

the tasks that Schweizer had performed in her prior jobs. R. 73. Davis answered “no.” R. 73. 

The ALJ then asked Davis whether there was other work in the economy that such a hypothetical 

person, who was restricted to light-duty work with the above restrictions, could perform. Davis 

replied that such a person could be employed as a bench worker and that 47,250 bench worker 

10
positions were available in Illinois. R. 74-75. He also testified that such a person could work as 

an assembler of electrical equipment and that 2,325 positions were available in Illinois. R. 74-

75. Further, the ALJ asked Davis whether there was other work in the economy that such a 

hypothetical person, who was restricted to sedentary work with the above restrictions, could 

perform. Davis replied that such a person could obtain work as an assembler, for which 67,150

positions were available in Illinois, or as a surveillance system monitor, for which 6,300 

positions were available in Illinois. R. 74-75. 

Second, the ALJ asked Davis whether a hypothetical person limited to light work, who 

could: (1) stand or walk a total of about six hours of an eight-hour work day, (2) frequently lift 

ten pounds, (3) occasionally lift twenty pounds, (4) occasionally climb ramps and stairs and 

balance, (5) never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, (6) do work limited to simple, routine and 

repetitive tasks with simple instructions, and (7) occasionally speak, would be able to perform 

Schweizer’s past work. R. 74 (emphasis added). Davis replied that such a person would not be 

able to perform Schweizer’s past work. R. 75. Davis explained, however, that the same jobs for 

light work and sedentary work he described with regard to the ALJ’s first hypothetical would be 

available to the person in the ALJ’s second hypothetical. R. 75. 

Third, the ALJ inquired as to whether a hypothetical person limited to sedentary work, 

who could (1) sit a total of about six hours of an eight-hour work day with a sit/stand option, (2) 

lift a maximum of ten pounds, (3) occasionally lift twenty pounds, (4) do work limited to simple, 

routine and repetitive tasks with simple instructions, (5) occasionally bend, (6) occasionally 

reach in all directions, (7) occasionally speak, and (8) occasionally rotate the head left and 

right, would be able to perform Schweizer’s past work. R. 75 (emphasis added). Davis replied 

that such a person would not be able to perform Schweizer’s past work. Davis added, however,

11
that such a person would be able to perform the following jobs in Illinois: 6,300 jobs as a 

surveillance system monitor; 34,000 jobs as a sedentary table worker; 34,000 jobs as a laminator;

and 4,080 jobs as a coater working with brake linings. R. 75-77.

Fourth, the ALJ asked the VE whether a hypothetical person, who could (1) sit for less 

than a total of two hours in an eight-hour day, (2) stand or walk up to a total of two hours of an 

eight-hour day, and (3) never bend, reach, kneel, crouch, or climb, but would need breaks at will 

throughout the eight-hour day, would be employable. R. 77. The VE replied that there are no 

full-time jobs for a person who could only sit for two hours and stand and walk for up to two 

hours. R. 77. 

III. The ALJ’s Decision

Although Schweizer claimed that her onset of disability started on April 17, 2009, the 

ALJ found that Schweizer had engaged in substantial gainful activity from February 2010

through November 3, 2010. R 12. The ALJ noted, however, that Schweizer had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity from approximately November 4, 2010, to the time of the hearing and 

focused his findings on that time period. R. 13. 

Next, the ALJ found that Schweizer had the severe impairments of “glossopharyngeal 

neuralgia and neck impairment/pain.” R. 13. However, the ALJ found that neither of these

impairments, alone or in combination, qualified as one of the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. § 

404, Subpart P, App. 1. R. 14. The ALJ explained that he carefully considered the opinions of 

Drs. Zaidi and Orozco, but gave them little weight because they were conclusory in nature and 

contradicted by evidence in Schweizer’s own medical records. R. 14. See infra Analysis, 

Section II. 

12
In addition, the ALJ assessed Schweizer’s RFC. The ALJ concluded that, although the 

objective medical evidence showed that Schweizer’s impairments could reasonably be expected 

to cause at least some of her symptoms, her description of the intensity, persistence, and limiting 

effects of her symptoms were not credible and inconsistent with the physical RFC assessment

and her treating physicians’ notes. R. 16. He thus concluded that, overall, the record did not 

support the degree of limitation alleged by Schweizer. There was no indication in her medical 

records that Schweizer was unable to speak effectively, that she had brought someone to

communicate for her, or that she needed to write her responses to her doctors due to her 

intermittent loss of voice. R. 17. The ALJ observed that, at the hearing, Schweizer stated that 

her voice was almost gone, and yet her voice remained understandable at that point and 

throughout the entire hearing. R. 17. Although her voice may have been hoarse, its volume and 

clarity persisted, despite the vocal demands of testifying at a hearing. R. 17. The ALJ also 

emphasized that, although Schweizer testified that she could speak for only five to ten minutes 

before losing her voice, she answered questions for thirty-five minutes during the hearing and for 

one hour during her prior psychological examination with Dr. Baukus without losing her voice. 

R. 17. 

Based on the medical evidence and hearing testimony, as well as Schweizer’s age, 

education, and work experience, the ALJ determined that Schweizer had the RFC to perform 

sedentary work and was able to (1) sit a total of about six hours of an eight-hour work day with a 

sit/stand option, (2) lift a maximum of ten pounds, (3) occasionally lift twenty pounds, (4) do 

work limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks with simple instructions, (5) occasionally 

bend, (6) occasionally reach in all directions, (7) occasionally speak, and (8) occasionally rotate 

her head left and right. Given this assessment, and relying on Davis’s testimony, the ALJ found

13
that Schweizer was unable to perform the work she had done in the past. R. 18-19. However, 

based upon Davis’s testimony regarding the number of jobs available for a person with 

limitations similar to those experienced by Schweizer, the ALJ concluded that Schweizer would

be able to perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, and thus 

held that she was not disabled as defined under the Social Security Act. R. 19-20.

Legal Standards

I. Standard of Review

A court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to examining whether the 

ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether there is substantial evidence to support the 

ALJ’s findings. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Terry v. 

Astrue, 580 F.33d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009). A court reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo

and factual determinations deferentially. Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). 

“Substantial evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence and “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 

402 U.S. at 401. “[T]he ALJ’s decision, if supported by substantial evidence, will be upheld 

even if an alternative position is also supported by substantial evidence.” Scheck v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 2004). A court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in evidence, or 

deciding questions of credibility. Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Although the ALJ is not required to address “every piece of evidence or testimony in the 

record, the ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning behind h[is] decision to 

deny benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). The ALJ “must build an 

accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion,” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863,

14
872 (7th Cir. 2000), and must minimally articulate the “analysis of the evidence with enough 

detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review,” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 

F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005).

II. Disability Standard

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she or he has an “inability to engage 

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 

last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). To determine 

whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order. First, is 

the claimant presently unemployed? Second, does the claimant have a severe impairment? 

Third, does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments 

enumerated in the regulations? Fourth, is the claimant unable to perform her former occupation? 

Fifth, is the claimant unable to perform any other work? See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). 

If the answer is “yes” at either step three or step five, then the claimant is considered 

disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1992). If the 

answer is “no” at any step, other than at step three, the claimant is not disabled. Id. The 

claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. Id. If the claimant establishes that 

she cannot perform past work at step four, then the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to 

show that the claimant is able to engage in other work existing in significant numbers in the 

national economy. Id. 

15
Analysis

Focusing on the loss of her voice, Schweizer argues that the Commissioner’s decision 

should be reversed because the ALJ applied Listing 2.09 incorrectly, improperly assessed 

Schweizer’s credibility, and did not give deference to the opinions of Schweizer’s treating 

physicians. The Commissioner opposes each of these assertions.

I. The ALJ’s Application of Listing 2.09

As an initial matter, Schweizer contends that the ALJ applied Listing 2.09 incorrectly. 

Listing 2.09, entitled “Loss of Speech,” defines the qualifying disability condition as: “Organic 

loss of speech due to any cause with inability to produce by any means speech which can be 

heard, understood, and sustained.” 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 1, Listing 2.09. Social 

Security Ruling 82-57 (“Ruling 82-57”) elaborates upon this definition:

Three attributes of speech pertinent to the evaluation of speech 

proficiency [under Listing 2.09] are: (1) audibility – the ability to 

speak at a level sufficient to be heard; (2) intelligibility – the 

ability to articulate and to link the phonetic units of speech with 

sufficient accuracy to be understood; and (3) functional efficiency 

– the ability to produce and sustain a serviceably fast rate of speech 

output over a useful period of time. When at least one of these 

attributes is missing, overall speech function is not considered 

effective.

In addition, Ruling 82-57 further explains: “To speak effectively, an individual must be able to 

produce speech that can be heard, understood, and sustained well enough to permit useful 

communication in social and vocational settings.” 

Schweizer opines that the ALJ, by denying her claim based, in part, on the fact that she 

only lost her speech intermittently, incorrectly assumed that Listing 2.09 requires an absolute 

inability to produce speech. This is not the case. Rather than premising his ruling on the 

assumption that Listing 2.09 requires the absolute inability to speak, the ALJ affirmatively found 

16
that Schweizer did not fall within the scope of Listing 2.09 because she was capable of 

producing speech that “can be heard, understood, and sustained” to a degree sufficient to permit 

communication in social and work environments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 1, 

Listing 2.09. This conclusion is sufficiently supported by the record.

First, the ALJ was in an advantageous position to observe firsthand at the hearing 

whether Schweizer was capable of producing speech that can be heard, understood, and 

sustained. He specifically found that “the claimant sustained her voice throughout the hearing,” 

and that she “testified at one point during the hearing that her voice was almost gone, yet she 

remained understandable at that point and throughout the entire hearing.” R. 15. The ALJ added 

that, “[w]hile hoarse, the volume and clarity of her voice persisted despite the vocal demands of 

an oral hearing.” R. 15, 17. Although the medical expert did ask Schweizer to speak up at one 

point during the hearing, this alone is insufficient to refute the fact that the ALJ was able to hear 

and understand Schweizer when she spoke for thirty-five minutes at the hearing, R. 17, 35. See 

Beauvoir v. Chater, 104 F.3d 1432, 1434 (2nd Cir. 1997) (affirming ALJ’s denial of benefits 

under Listing 2.09 because claimant provided audible, intelligible stage-whisper responses 

during an hour-long hearing, which showed that his speech was sustained).

Second, the ALJ also properly relied on Schweizer’s past treatment history. For example, 

Schweizer’s ENT physician, Dr. Lombardo, repeatedly noted that, although her voice was 

hoarse, she verbalized and communicated normally and appropriately. R. 15. Another one of 

Schweizer’s ENT physicians, Dr. Mehta, observed that Schweizer was able to communicate. R. 

15. In addition, although Drs. Zaidi and Orozco’s treatment records indicated that Schweizer 

complained of hoarseness and moderate, intermittent, and dull throat discomfort, there was no 

indication that her speech could not be heard, understood, or sustained. R. 14-15. It was for this 

17
reason that the ALJ gave little weight to their conclusory statements that Schweizer’s 

glossopharyngeal neuralgia satisfied the listing requirement. R. 14-15. See infra Analysis, 

Section II. Additionally, the ALJ considered persuasive Dr. Pollard’s neutral medical opinion 

that Schweizer’s impairments did not satisfy the requirements of Listing 2.09. R. 15, 63, 69-70.

With respect to Schweizer’s claim of intermittent speech loss, the ALJ noted that the 

condition had not impaired her ability to speak to her physicians: “None of the claimant’s 

medical records suggests she was unable to communicate, that she had brought someone to 

communicate for her, or that she needed to write responses.” R. 17. Furthermore, the ALJ also 

noted that Schweizer previously had “communicated throughout an hour-long psychological 

evaluation [performed by Dr. Baukus] with volume that was ‘a bit low,’ but with good 

articulation and no indication from the examiner that he was unable to hear or understand her or 

that she was unable to sustain her speech.” R. 15 (citing R. 652-53). 

After reviewing the record in its totality, the Court concludes that the ALJ correctly 

applied Listing 2.09 when he determined that the administrative record failed to support 

Schweizer’s contention that she is unable to produce speech that can be heard, understood, and

sustained.

II. The ALJ’s Credibility Finding as to Schweizer

Next, Schweizer argues that the ALJ failed to justify his determination that parts of her

testimony were incredible. In addition, she contends that the ALJ failed to point to parts of the 

administrative record that undermined her complaints with regard to steps three through five of 

the analysis.

The credibility of a claimant is considered in light of “the entire case record, including 

the objective medical evidence, the individual’s own statements about symptoms, statements and 

18
other information provided by treating or examining physicians or psychologists and other 

persons about the symptoms and how they affect the individual, and any other relevant evidence 

in the case record.” Social Security Ruling 96–7p. Because ALJs are in a unique position to 

observe a claimant’s testimony, their credibility determinations are entitled to special deference.

Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2013). Thus, the Court will not overturn an 

ALJ’s credibility determination unless it is patently wrong.4 Id. In other words, the ALJ’s 

assessment stands as long as it has some support in the record. Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 

1098 (7th Cir. 2013). That said, an ALJ must give specific reasons for discrediting a claimant, 

and “[t]hose reasons must be supported by record evidence and must be ‘sufficiently specific to 

make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to 

the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight.’” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 

336 F.3d 535, 539-40 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887–88 (7th 

Cir. 2001)). 

In this case, the ALJ provided an extensive analysis of the credibility of Schweizer’s selfassessed limitations. R. 16-18. In so doing, he described the absence of objective medical 

evidence to support Schweizer’s statements about the intensity and persistence of pain and other 

symptoms caused by her glossopharyngeal neuralgia. R. 16-17. The ALJ also pointed out that 

none of her medical records suggested she was unable to communicate with her physicians due 

to pain or intermittent loss of speech. R. 17. For instance, although Schweizer claimed that she 

had suffered from the severe disability since April 17, 2009, she had advised Dr. Zaidi in January 

2010 that she was 100% better and desired to return to work as an automotive salesperson, which 

4 Although Schweizer cites Ninth Circuit law in support of her argument that an ALJ is required to 

provide clear and convincing reasons for finding a claimant’s testimony not credible, “[t]he Seventh 

Circuit has not adopted the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that the ALJ must state clear and convincing 

reasons.” Adaire v. Colvin, No. 11-3149, 2013 WL 6342993, at *23 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 26, 2013) (citing Sims 

v. Barnhart, 442 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 2006)).

19

 
required speaking to customers with great frequency. R. 18. In fact, Schweizer returned to work 

in February 2010 and earned more in commissions that year than any other year since 2002. R. 

18. 

Furthermore, the ALJ explained that his own observation of Schweizer’s speaking 

capabilities at the hearing, as well as the observations of other physicians, contradicted her own 

assessment of her limitations. R. 17. For example, although Schweizer testified that she could 

only talk for five to ten minutes before she started to cough and lost her voice altogether, she 

testified audibly and understandably at the hearing for thirty-five minutes straight, and also had 

spoken for sixty minutes during her psychological examination. R. 17. The ALJ also

highlighted the fact that, although Schweizer testified at one point during the hearing that her 

voice was almost gone, she remained understandable at that point and remained so throughout 

the entire hearing. R. 17. 

Given the deferential standard of review that applies to credibility assessments made by 

ALJs, the Court holds that ALJ Lewin’s decision to afford minimal weight to Schweizer’s 

testimony finds support in the record, and his decision sufficiently identifies the grounds for this 

determination. The ALJ observed Schweizer first-hand and is in the best position to gauge the 

credibility of her statements. Because there is no basis to believe that the ALJ’s credibility 

determination is patently wrong, the Court will not overturn it. 

III. The ALJ’s Consideration of the Treating Physicians

Lastly, Schweizer argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the assessments of limitations 

provided by her treating physicians, Drs. Zaidi and Orozco, as well as the examining physician, 

Dr. Yalamanchili. Normally, “[a] treating physician’s opinion regarding the nature and severity 

of a medical condition is entitled to controlling weight if supported by the medical findings and 

20
consistent with substantial evidence in the record.” Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 503 (7th 

Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). “However, ‘while the treating physician’s 

opinion is important, it is not the final word on a claimant’s disability.’” Books v. Chater, 91 

F.3d 842, 979 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Reynolds v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 1988)). 

For example, “‘[t]he patient’s regular physician may want to do a favor for a friend and client, 

and so the treating physician may too quickly find disability.’” Id. (quoting Stephens v. Heckler, 

766 F.2d 284, 289 (7th Cir. 1985)). Alternatively, “the claimant's regular physician may not 

appreciate how her patient's case compares to other similar cases,” while a consulting physician's 

opinion “might have the advantages of both impartiality and expertise.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 

F.3d 1171, 1177 (7th Cir. 2001). And in those cases when a treating physician expresses his or 

her opinion by answering “yes,” without further elaboration, in response to a question posed by a 

claimant’s attorney, an ALJ may question the validity of that opinion. See Dixon, 270 F.3d at 

1177. In any case, in weighing the evidence of a disability in the record, “[a]n ALJ must only 

‘minimally articulate his or her justification for rejecting or accepting’” it. Berger v. Astrue, 516 

F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 371 (7th Cir. 2004)). 

To support her argument, Schweizer points to the responses given by her treating 

physicians, Drs. Zaidi and Orozco, to several questions posed in letters from Schweizer’s 

attorney. The letters asked whether, in the opinion of the treating physician, Schweizer has: (1) 

“intermittent loss of voice”; (2) “any impairment that impacts her ability to produce speech that 

can be heard understood, or sustained”; (3) “any impairment that impacts her ability to sustain 

speech for a significant enough time to permit useful communication in a vocational setting”; or 

(4) “a voice that tends to become inaudible after she speaks for several minutes.” Additionally, 

the letters also asked whether Schweizer’s “intermittent loss of speech or impairment persisted 

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since at least” January 26, 2011 (as to Dr. Zaidi) or March 18, 2011 (as to Dr. Orozco). Finally, 

the letters requested that the doctor “provide any additional information that you believe would 

be relevant to the determination of whether Donna Schweizer meets Listing of Impairment 2.09 

Loss of Speech. R. 702-03, 705-06. 

In response to the questionnaire, Dr. Zaidi answered “yes -- sustained” as to the second 

question, “yes” to the remaining questions, and did not response to the sixth question. R. 702. 

Dr. Orozco answered “yes” to all the questions, and noted that “Donna has a severe case of 

glossopharyngeal neuralgia.” R. 708. 

After considering these responses, the ALJ explained that he gave little weight to them 

because they were conclusory in nature and neither Dr. Orozco nor Dr. Zaidi provided any 

explanations for their answers. Furthermore, the ALJ stated that, based upon his review of the 

record, these conclusions were not supported by the medical evidence or Drs. Zaidi’s and 

Orozco’s own treatment notes. R. 14. 

As for Dr. Orozco, the ALJ found that Dr. Orozco’s records were inconsistent with his 

affirmative answers because, other than mentioning that Schweizer was having difficulty 

speaking and was hoarse, there was no clinical indication anywhere in his notes that Schweizer’s 

speech could not be heard or understood or that her voice would fade over time. R. 14. The ALJ 

also emphasized that the records made by other physicians who had treated Schweizer also failed 

to support Dr. Orozco’s conclusions. The ALJ concluded, “Neither [Orozco’s] office notes nor 

records of other physicians support the inability to produce speech that could be heard, 

understood, and sustained well enough to permit useful communication in social or vocational 

settings.” R. 14. The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to Dr. Orozco’s 

responses to the letter sent by Schweizer’s counsel is sufficiently supported in the record. See 

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Johanson v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 287-88 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that treating physician’s 

opinion was not entitled to controlling weight because it was contradicted by other treating 

physicians).

Turning to Dr. Zaidi, the ALJ also found that Dr. Zaidi’s “yes” answers did not warrant 

significant weight because “[h]is records, too, fail to support the conclusory/affirmative 

responses that the claimant satisfies the listing requirements.” R. 14. As the ALJ points out, Dr. 

Zaidi released Schweizer to work in May 2009, after the onset of disability. R. 14. On January 

18, 2010, he recommended that Schweizer discontinue non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs 

and aspirin. R. 14 (citing R. 622). In September 2010, Dr. Zaidi noted that Schweizer described 

her throat pain as moderate in intensity, intermittent, and dull. R. 14-15 (citing R. 616). In 

January 2011, Dr. Zaidi stated that her condition had remained unchanged. R. 15. And Dr. 

Zaidi’s treatment notes from November 2011 made no mention of issues related to speaking or 

pain. R. 15. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to Dr. Zaidi’s opinions also is 

sufficiently supported by the record. 

Finally, according to Schweizer, the ALJ also ignored Dr. Yalamanchili’s diagnosis of 

intermittent loss of voice. R. 640. But this mischaracterizes the record. In fact, rather than 

ignoring Dr. Yalamanchili’s diagnoses of intermittent vocal loss, the ALJ took it into account 

when finding that Schweizer could only perform work that required occasional verbal 

communication. R. 17. Moreover, the ALJ’s finding that Schweizer suffered from intermittent 

voice loss does not ineluctably require the ALJ to conclude that Schweizer suffered from an 

impairment that meets the requirements of Listing 2.09. As discussed above, the ALJ made 

factual determinations based on the administrative record that, despite Schweizer’s intermittent 

23
loss of voice, she was able to produce speech that could be heard, understood, and sustained to a 

sufficient degree to permit useful communication in social and work environments.

5

 

What Schweizer is really arguing in this appeal is that the ALJ should have weighed the 

evidence differently. But when reviewing the Commissioner’s denial of benefits, “[w]e do not 

reweigh the evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the ALJ; if reasonable minds can 

differ over whether the applicant is disabled, we must uphold the decision under review.” 

Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012). “Because the Commissioner is responsible 

for weighing the evidence, resolving conflicts, and making independent findings of fact, this

Court may not decide the facts anew.” Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999) 

(citation omitted). 

In sum, the Court holds that Schweizer has failed to establish that the ALJ’s legal 

conclusions were erroneous or that his factual findings are not based on substantial evidence in 

the record. Accordingly, the Court denies Schweizer’s motion for summary judgment and 

affirms the Commissioner’s decision. 

5 Because ALJ Lewin did not find that Listing 2.09 required a complete loss of speech, the cases 

cited by Plaintiff are distinguishable. See Woods v. Astrue, No. CV 09-1547-OP, 2010 WL 147959, at *3 

(C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2010); Hajjar v. Astrue, No. CV 08–7468–PLA, 2009 WL 3170097, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 

Sept. 30, 2009). 

24

 
Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Donna J. Schweizer’s motion for summary judgment 

[12] is denied. The Commissioner’s decision denying Schweizer’s claims is affirmed. This case 

is hereby terminated.

IT IS SO ORDERED. ENTERED: 10/3/14

 

___________________________

The Honorable John Z. Lee

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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