alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Memorandum

To: U.S. Department of Education and Negotiated Rulemaking Committee

From: Carolyn Fast 

Date: March 16, 2022

Re: Definition of a nonprofit institution 

To address concerns raised by negotiators during today’s discussion, I recommend that 

the Department restore the definition of a nonprofit institution proposed in the Department’s 

Issue Paper 5: Changes of Ownership and Change in Control, Session 2. The Department’s 

Session 2 language, found in § 600.2, is as follows: 

Nonprofit Institution: An institution that -

***

(iv) When the Secretary makes the determination regarding net earnings, the Secretary 

considers the entirety of the relationship between the institution, nonprofit entities in its 

ownership structure, and other parties. By way of example, for purposes of participating 

in the Federal student aid programs, a nonprofit institution is generally not an institution 

that:

(A) Is an obligor (either directly or through any entity in its ownership chain) on a 

debt owed to a former owner of the institution or a natural person or entity related to 

or affiliated with the former owner of the institution; or

(B) Either directly or through any entity in its ownership chain, enters into or 

maintains a revenue-based agreement with a former owner of the institution or a 

natural person or entity related to or affiliated with the former owner of the 

institution; or 

(2) For a foreign institution -

***
§ 767.23 Payment of final assessment. ( a ) Respondent must make full payment of the civil penalty, enforcement costs and/or liability for damages assessed within 30 days of the date upon which the assessment becomes effective as the final administrative decision and order of the Agency. Payment must be made by mailing or delivering to the Agency at the address specified in the NOVA a check or money order made payable in U.S. currency in the amount of the assessment to the “Treasurer of the United States”, or as otherwise directed.
( b ) Upon any failure to pay the civil penalty, enforcement costs and/or liability for damages assessed, the Agency may request the Department of Justice to recover the amount assessed in any appropriate district court of the United States, or may act under any law or statute that permits any type of recovery, including but not limited to arrest, attachment, seizure, or garnishment, of property and/or funds to satisfy a debt owed to the United States.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 6064** 

OVARIAS VERDAD CRIEGO , Petitioner

- Appellant ,
v. UNKNOWN RESPONDENT , Respondent

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern D istrict of North Carolina , at Raleigh
. Louise W. Flanagan , District Judge. ( 5:11

- hc

- 02140

- FL )

Submitted : March 29, 2012 Decided: April 3, 2012

Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
.

O varias Verdad Criego, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Ovarias Verdad Criego seeks to appeal the district
court ’ s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is n ot appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (A) (2006) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “ a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. ” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slac k v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Criego has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appeal ability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials3 before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

DISMISSE D
----

**FORM 10-QSB**

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSIONWashington D.C.  20549

**Quarterly Report Under Section 13 or 15 (d)Of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934**

For Quarter Ended        March 31, 2001

Commission File Number          0-5662       

              CARDIFF COMMUNICATIONS, INC.(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)

                         NEVADA                                                                                   87-0267292(State or other jurisdiction of                                                                               (IRS Employer   incorporation or organization)                                                                             Identification No.)
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-6448

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

RONALD G. BUMPUS, a/k/a Ronald Bompus,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Charles H. Haden II,

Chief District Judge. (CR-98-185, CA-01-156)

Submitted: July 18, 2002 Decided: July 24, 2002

Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronald G. Bumpus, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Lee Keller, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Ronald G. Bumpus seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.

2001). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s

opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the

district court. See United States v. Bumpus, Nos. CR-98-185; CA01-156 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 18, 2002). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
**EXHIBIT 32.1****CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT**I, John P. D. Cato, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of The Cato Corporation,certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that onthe date of this Certification:1. the Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended August 4, 2007 (the “Report”) fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934; and2. the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.   Dated: September 12, 2007       /s/ John P. D. Cato     John P. D. Cato
#### 222.001 Definitions.

*Labor advisor,* as used in this part, means the departmental or agency headquarters labor advisor.

[56 FR 36358, July 31, 1991, as amended at 72 FR 20763, Apr. 26, 2007]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                             180
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 61470
<PP&E>                                        17448883
<DEPRECIATION>                                   23355
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                17545983
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         11873373
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    2350000
<COMMON>                                      54331687
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  17545983
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  1260117
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (14678)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              131784
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (1245439)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (1245439)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (1245439)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.06)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.06)


</TABLE>
# Issue Paper 7

# Session 1: January 12-14, 2016

**Issue:**Revise the Direct Consolidation Loan regulations to include Nurse Faculty Loans in the listing of loans that are eligible for consolidation. 

**Statutory cite:**§§428C(a)(4)(E) and 455(g) of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended 

**Regulatory cite:**34 CFR 685.220(b)(21)

**Summary of issue:**

Current §685.220(b)(21) indicates that nursing loans made under subpart II of part B of title VIII of the Public Health Service Act may be consolidated into a Direct Consolidation Loan. This reflects language that was previously in §428C(a)(4)(E) of the HEA. Based on this language, the Direct Consolidation Loan Application and Promissory Note indicates that Nursing Student Loans are the only type of nursing loan that may be consolidated. 

After receiving inquiries about the eligibility for consolidation of another type of nursing loan made under a program administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (Nurse Faculty Loans), the Department determined that a 2009 technical change amended §428C(a)(4)(E) of the HEA to provide that loans made under “part E of title VIII of the Public Health Service Act [42 USC 297a et seq.]” may be consolidated. However, the Direct Consolidation Loan regulations have never been amended to reflect this change. Part E of title VIII of the Public Health Service Act includes both Nursing Student Loans and loans made under the Nurse Faculty Loan Program.  

To codify this technical change:

34 CFR 685.221(b)(21) should be updated to reflect the current statutory language in §§428(C)(a)(4)(E) of the HEA which allows for the consolidation of Nurse Faculty Loans.
Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    This Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A of the Company for the quarter ended June 30, 2007
(the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and(2)
    
    That the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Dated: November 10, 2008
    /s/ Mark A. LibratoreMark A. LibratorePresident and Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 23
                 CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

The Board of Directors
Mid-America Bancorp:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements No. 2-92270, No. 2-99495, and No. 33-42989 on Forms S-8
of Mid-America Bancorp of our report dated January 22, 1996,
relating to the consolidated balance sheets of Mid-America Bancorp
and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1995 and 1994, and the related
consolidated statements of income, changes in shareholders' equity,
and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended
December 31, 1995, which report appears in the 1995 annual report
to shareholders, which is incorporated by reference in the December
31, 1995 Form 10-K of Mid-America Bancorp.             

Our report refers to a change in the method of accounting for 
certain debt and equity securities in 1994.


Louisville, Kentucky               /s/ KPMG Peat Marwick LLP
March 27, 1996
<PAGE>
#### 1814.201-6 Solicitation provisions.
Motion Dismissed; Petition for Writ of Mandamus Dismissed and 

Memorandum Opinion filed September 12, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-24-00642-CV

IN RE TRAVIS A. BRYAN I AND AMBER N. BRYAN, Relators

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

County Civil Court at Law No. 3

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1208789

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On September 3, 2024, relators Travis A. Bryan I and Amber N. Bryan filed 

a petition for writ of mandamus in this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221; 

see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, relator recites that the respondent is 

the Honorable LaShawn A. Williams, presiding judge of the County Civil Court at 
2

Law No. 3 of Harris County, but the substance of the petition is directed at the 

county clerk of Harris County, the Honorable Teneshia Hudspeth, to “dissolve the 

writ of possession that was issued on September 3, 2024, or immediately recall the 

same.” 

On September 10, 2024, the court notified relators that unless relators 

demonstrate this court’s jurisdiction on or before September 17, 2024, relators’ 

petition for writ of mandamus may be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

On September 11, 2024, relators filed an amended petition asserting that the 

trial court abused its discretion by issuing the writ of possession. However, 

relators acknowledge that “[t]he Clerk of the Trial Court issued a second writ of 

possession for the Property . . . .” The mandamus record reflects that the writ of 

possession was signed by the county clerk on September 3, 2024.

This court’s power to issue writs is defined in Government Code section 

22.221. Section 22.221 grants the court of appeals the authority to issue: (1) writs 

of mandamus and other writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction; (2) writs of 

mandamus against a judge of a district or county court in the court of appeals 

district; and (3) writs of habeas corpus under specifically defined circumstances 

involving contempt orders in civil cases. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221. We 

are not authorized to issue writs of mandamus against clerks of court, and relators 

have not claimed or shown that the relief requested is necessary to enforce the 

jurisdiction of our court. See In re Bunton, No. 14-07-00651-CV, 2007 WL 
3

2301413, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 14, 2007, orig. proceeding) 

(mem. op.) (per curiam).

Accordingly, we dismiss relators’ amended petition for writ of mandamus

for lack of jurisdiction. We further dismiss relators’ second emergency motion for 

temporary relief.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Spain, Poissant, and Wilson.
Case: 1:12-cr-00367 Document #: 22 Filed: 08/01/12 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:33
Case: 1:12-cr-00367 Document #: 22 Filed: 08/01/12 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:34
Case: 1:12-cr-00367 Document #: 22 Filed: 08/01/12 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:35
Appeal No. 74-149.

#### Charles J. Fox, Jr. *v.*Dorothy F. Fox.

*Harold H. Winsten,*for appellee. *Matthew F. Callaghan, Jr.,*for appellant.

Motion of appellee, Charles J. Fox, Jr., to dismiss appeal pursuant to Rule 16 (g) is denied.
#### In the Matter of William. J. Cronin, Appellant, v. Temporary New York State Commission of Investigation, Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term which denied petitioner’s applica lion to quash a subpoena issued and served upon him by respondent commission in connection with its investigation into purchases made by and for institutions, *690agencies and departments of the County of Albany. The contention, advanced by appellant, that the commission was not created for “special purposes” within the requirement of the Constitution (art. V, § 3) has been overruled and may not be considered anew. *(Matter of Commission of Investigation of State of N. Y.*v. *Lombardoggi,*7 A D 2d 48, affd. 5 N Y 2d 1026, cert, denied 360 TJ. S. 930, appeal dismissed 361 TJ. S. 7, cert, denied and appeal dismissed 361 TJ. S. 10.) We find no basis for appellant’s argument that the extension for two years (L. 1962, ch. 478) of a temporary commission originally established for five years in some way transformed the commission into a permanent department of the State government, in violation of the Constitutional limitation upon the number of civil departments (N. Y. Const., art. V, §§ 2, 3). The life of the commission will terminate at the end of the extended term and may, indeed, be terminated prior thereto by action of the Legislature. Neither do we find merit in the contention that the commission is a permanent department because it succeeded to the functions of the Commissioner of Investigation. (See L. 1953, eh. 887; L. 1958, eh. 989, § 9; cf. *Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y.*v. *Moore,*277 App. Div. 245, 249-250.) As apposite now as when the commission was originally constituted is the statement in the *Lombardoggi*ease *(supra,*p. 53) that “Judged by any standards the commission is a temporary one”. Order affirmed, without costs. Settle order on notice. Bergan, P. J., Gibson, Herlihy and Taylor, JJ., concur.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6,1

Eastern Division

Grant Birchmeier, et al.

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:12−cv−04069

Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly

Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., et al.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Friday, March 20, 2015:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Status hearing and

motion hearing held on 3/20/2015. Motion to compel [278] is denied for reasons stated in

open court. Motion for leave to file [284] is granted. Defendant has until 4/17/2015 to

respond to the amended complaint. Discovery on the amended consolidated complaint is

to be completed by 7/1/2015. Status hearing set for 4/27/2015 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed

notice.(pjg, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:12-cv-04069 Document #: 288 Filed: 03/20/15 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:5603
**Exhibit 31.2**
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
I, Tracy A. Kern, as Chief Financial Officer of CHAD Therapeutics, Inc. (the “Company”), herebycertify that:
(6) I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of CHAD Therapeutics, Inc.; (7) Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; (8) Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; (9) The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13(a)-15(e)and 15(d)-15(e) for the registrant and have:
 (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;  (b) Paragraph omitted;  (c) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by the report based on suchevaluation; and  (d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and
(10) The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
 (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.   Date: June 27, 2005 /s/ Tracy A. Kern     Tracy A. Kern  Chief Financial Officer of CHAD Therapeutics, Inc.