Archived NIST Technical Series Publication 

The attached publication has been archived (withdrawn), and is provided solely for historical purposes. 

It may have been superseded by another publication (indicated below). 

Archived Publication 

Series/Number: 

Title: 

Publication Date(s): 

Withdrawal Date: 

Withdrawal Note: 

Superseding Publication(s) 

The attached publication has been superseded by the following publication(s): 

Series/Number: 

Title: 

Author(s): 

Publication Date(s): 

URL/DOI: 

Additional Information (if applicable) 

Contact:

Latest revision of the 

attached publication: 

Related information: 

Withdrawal 

announcement (link): 

Date updated: June ϭ9, 2015 

NIST Special Publication 800-28

Guidelines on Active Content and Mobile Code

October 2001

March 2008

SP 800-28 is superseded in its entirety by the publication of

SP 800-28 Version 2 (March 2008).

NIST Special Publication 800-28 Version 2

Guidelines on Active Content and Mobile Code

Wayne A. Jansen, Theodore Winograd, Karen Scarfone

March 2008

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-28ver2

Computer Security Division (Information Technology Lab)

SP 800-28 Version 2 (as of June 19, 2015)

http://csrc.nist.gov/

N/A
*XLGHOLQHVRQ$FWLYH&RQWHQW

DQG0RELOH&RGH

Recommendations of the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology 

Wayne A. Jansen

Special Publication 800-28 
Computer Security Division 

Information Technology Laboratory 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Gaithersburg, MD 20988-8930 

October 2001 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Donald L. Evans, Secretary 

Technology Administration 

Karen H. Brown, Acting Under Secretary of Commerce 

for Technology 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Karen H. Brown, Acting Director 

NIST Special Publication 800-28 Guidelines on Active Content 

and Mobile Code 

Recommendations of the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology 

Wayne A. Jansen 

C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y
Reports on Computer Systems Technology 

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology 

(NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation’s 

measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of 

concept implementations, and technical analysis to advance the development and productive use of 

information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the development of technical, physical, 

administrative, and management standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of 

sensitive unclassified information in Federal computer systems. This Special Publication 800-series 

reports on ITL’s research, guidance, and outreach efforts in computer security, and its collaborative 

activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON: 2001 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov — Phone: (202) 512-1800 — Fax: (202) 512-2250 

Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in 

order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is 

not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or 

equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-28 

Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-23, 53 pages (Oct. 2001) 

CODEN: NSPUE2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

,,,

7DEOHRI&RQWHQWV

Foreword....................................................................................................................................v

Executive Summary..................................................................................................................v

Introduction............................................................................................................................... 1

Background .............................................................................................................................. 1

Browser Anatomy.............................................................................................................. 3

Server Anatomy ................................................................................................................ 8

Threats.................................................................................................................................... 11

Underlying Issues............................................................................................................ 14

Categories of Threats ..................................................................................................... 16

Technology Related Risks .................................................................................................... 17

PostScript ........................................................................................................................ 19

Portable Document Format ............................................................................................ 20

Java.................................................................................................................................. 20

JavaScript and VBScript................................................................................................. 22

ActiveX............................................................................................................................. 22

Desktop Application Macros........................................................................................... 24

Plug-ins............................................................................................................................ 25

CGI and Related Interfaces............................................................................................ 26

Safeguards ............................................................................................................................. 27

Security Policy................................................................................................................. 27

Risk Analysis and Management..................................................................................... 28

Evaluated Information Technology ................................................................................ 29

Security Audit .................................................................................................................. 30

Application Settings......................................................................................................... 30

Version Control................................................................................................................ 31
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

,9

Incident Response Handling .......................................................................................... 31

Automated Filters ............................................................................................................ 31

Behavioral Controls......................................................................................................... 32

Readers ........................................................................................................................... 32

Digital Signature..............................................................................................................33

Isolation............................................................................................................................ 33

Minimal Functionality....................................................................................................... 34

Least Privilege................................................................................................................. 34

Layered and Diverse Defenses...................................................................................... 34

Summary ................................................................................................................................ 35

Terminology............................................................................................................................ 37

On-line Resources ................................................................................................................. 40

References ............................................................................................................................. 41

Annex A – HTTP Request Methods ..................................................................................... 46

Annex B – HTTP Response Status...................................................................................... 46
FORWARD 

9

)RUHZRUG

This document provides guidelines for Federal organizations’ acquisition and use of 

security-related Information Technology (IT) products. These guidelines provide advice 

to agencies for sensitive (i.e., non-national security) unclassified systems. NIST’s advice 

is given in the context of larger recommendations regarding computer systems security. 

NIST developed this document in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities under the 

Computer Security Act of 1987 and the Information Technology Management Reform 

Active of 1996 (specifically section 15 of the United States Code (U.S.C.) 278 g-3(a)(5)). 

This is not a guideline within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. 278 g-3 (a)(3). 

These guidelines are for use by Federal organizations that process sensitive information.1

 

They are consistent with the requirements of OMB Circular A-130, Appendix III. 

The guidelines herein are not mandatory and binding standards. This document may be 

used voluntarily by non-governmental organizations. It is not subject to copyright. 

Nothing in this document should be taken to contradict standards and guidelines made 

mandatory and binding upon Federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under his 

statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding 

the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget, or any other Federal official. 

 1

 The Computer Security Act provides a broad definition of the term “sensitive information,” namely “any 

information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of which could adversely affect the 

national interest or the conduct of federal programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under 

section 552a of title 5, United States Code (the Privacy Act), but which has not been specifically authorized 

under criteria established by an Executive Order or an Act of Congress to be kept secret in the interest of 

national defense or foreign policy.” 

([HFXWLYH6XPPDU\

The private and public sectors depend heavily upon IT systems to perform essential, 

mission-critical functions. As existing technology evolves and new technologies are 

introduced to provide improved capabilities and advanced features in systems, new 

technology-related vulnerabilities often arise. Organizations implementing and using 

advanced technologies, therefore, must be increasingly on guard. One such category of 

technologies is active content. Broadly speaking, active content refers to electronic 

documents that, unlike past character documents based on the American Standard Code 

for Information Interchange (ASCII), can carry out or trigger actions automatically 

without an individual directly or knowingly invoking the actions. Therefore, exploits 

based on vulnerabilities in active content technologies by their very nature can be 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

9,

insidious. The following key guidelines are recommended to Federal departments and 

agencies for dealing with active content. 

Federal departments and agencies should understand the concept of active 

content and how it affects the security of their systems. 

The use of products, with capabilities for producing and handling active content, 

contributes to the functionality of a system as a whole and, thus, is an important factor in 

IT procurement and implementation decisions. Active content technologies allow code, in 

the form of a script, macro, or other kind of portable instruction representation, to execute 

when the document is rendered. Like any technology, active content can provide a useful 

capability for delivering essential government services, but it can also become a source of 

vulnerability for exploitation by an attacker. 

Examples of active content include PostScript documents, Web pages containing Java 

applets and JavaScript instructions, proprietary desktop-application formatted files 

containing macros, spreadsheet formulas, or other interpretable content, and interpreted 

electronic mail formats having embedded code or bearing executable attachments. 

Electronic mail and Web pages accessed through the Internet provide efficient means for 

conveying active content, but they are not the only ones. Active content technologies span 

a broad range of products and services, and involve various computational environments 

including those of the desktop, workstation, server and gateway devices. Therefore, the 

knowledge required to understand their security ramifications is extensive. Federal 

agencies are encouraged to draw needed technical information from the many information 

resources that exist and gain sufficient understanding of the security implications of active 

content. Pointers to some useful on-line resources can be found in a separate section at the 

end of the document. 

Federal departments and agencies should develop policy regarding active 

content. 

Information security in any organization is largely dependent on the quality of the security 

policy and the processes that an organization imposes on itself. As appropriate to their 

situation, agencies should develop policy for the procurement and use of products 

involving active content technologies. A good criterion for decision-making is to apply 

active content where it specifically benefits the quality of the services delivered to the 

citizen and not simply for show or because of its availability within products. Both the 

consumption and production of active content should be addressed by the policy. A badly 

implemented, poorly planned, or nonexistent security policy on this subject can have a 

serious negative security impact, since over time these deficiencies have the potential to 

create a situation ripe for exploitation. The policy should be stated clearly and 

consistently, and made known and enforced throughout the organization. Putting an 

organizational security policy on active content in place is an important first step in 

applying effective safeguards and mitigating the risks involved. 

Federal agencies should specifically be aware of the benefits they gain 

using active content and balance that against associated risks. 

One of the most significant security practices often missing in an organization is the ongoing process of risk analysis and management. Security involves continually analyzing 

and managing risks. A risk analysis identifies vulnerabilities and threats, anticipates 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

9,,

potential attacks, assesses their likelihood of success, and estimates the potential damage 

from successful attacks. Risk management is the process of assessing risk, taking steps to 

reduce risk to an acceptable level, and maintaining that level of risk. Experience has 

shown that use of active content technologies involves risk, since they are frequently 

accompanied by new vulnerabilities. 

Security is relative to each organization and must take into account an organization’s 

specific needs, budget, and culture. As new products are selected and procured, agencies 

need to consider the risk environment, cost-effectiveness, assurance level, and security 

functional specifications, in making their decisions. Agencies should also be aware of the 

interconnectivity and associated interdependence of organizations, and that a risk accepted 

by one organization may inadvertently expose other organizations, with whom they 

interoperate, to the same risk. Moreover, since active content is heavily oriented toward 

rendering information for an individual, their decisions may affect the citizens being 

served. Once an assessment is made, safeguards can be put in place against those risks 

deemed significantly high, by either reducing the likelihood of occurrence or minimizing 

the consequences of the attack. 

Federal departments and agencies need to maintain consistent systemwide security when configuring and integrating products involving active 

content into their system environments. 

Federal departments and agencies should be knowledgeable of the features in the products 

they procure, which can be used to control active content. Products and software 

applications that handle active content typically have built-in controls that can be used to 

control or prevent activation of related features. For example, The National Security 

Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NSTISSC) has 

recently issued an advisory memorandum on Web browser security2

 [NAM00] that 

outlines steps to lower associated risks through tightly controlled browser configurations. 

Electronic mail, spreadsheet, word processor, database, presentation graphics, and other 

desktop software applications have similar configuration settings that can be used to 

control the security capabilities of active content documents. Such configuration settings 

demand scrutiny in light of past exploits. Even today, many products are delivered with 

insecure default settings. 

Network devices or other special purpose software should be used to supplement existing 

application-oriented controls. For example, firewalls can be augmented by gateway 

devices to filter certain types of electronic mail attachments and Web content that have 

known malicious code characteristics, and reject them at a point of entry. Desktop antivirus software has also become increasingly capable of detecting malicious code 

signatures within active content. In addition, a new class of security product is emerging 

that dynamically restrains the behavior of mobile code by quarantining it within a logical 

sandbox. It behooves organizations to become familiar with all of the available security 

options and use them according to their organizational policy. 

 2 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/secpubs/index.html#other
INTRODUCTION 



,QWURGXFWLRQ

The private and public sectors depend heavily upon Information Technology (IT) systems 

to carry out essential, mission-critical functions. As existing technology evolves and new 

technologies are introduced to provide new capabilities and features, new vulnerabilities 

are often introduced as well. Organizations implementing and using advanced 

technologies, therefore, must be increasingly on guard. 

One such category of emerging technologies is active content. Although the term has 

different connotations among individuals, it is used here in its broadest sense to refer to 

electronic documents that, unlike ASCII character documents of the past, can carry out or 

trigger actions automatically without the intervention of a user. Examples of active 

content documents include PostScript3 documents; Web pages encoded in HTML or 

another markup language conveying or linking to mobile code such as JavaScript, 

VBScript, Java applets, or ActiveX controls; desktop application files containing macros; 

and HTML encoded electronic mail bearing executable attachments. Taken to its extreme, 

active content becomes, in effect, a delivery mechanism for mobile code. The purpose of 

this report is to provide an overview of active content, its technological underpinnings, and 

suitable security measures, so that the reader understands the associated security risks and 

can make an informed IT security decision on its application. 

This report begins by providing background information on markup languages and other 

World Wide Web technologies involving active content. Readers already familiar with 

that material may wish to skip over the section. The discussion proceeds onto generic 

threats, followed by a perspective on risks drawn from past exploits involving technologyrelated vulnerabilities. Real-world examples appear throughout the report to increase 

understanding and awareness of the risks involved with various forms of active content. 

The report concludes by identifying available safeguards and summarizing some detailed 

recommendations. Key high-level recommendations appear at the front of the report in 

the executive summary. A glossary of relevant terms and links to useful on-line references 

appear at the end of this document. 

 

3 This document discusses certain computer manufacturers’ products and standards. The discussion is not 

intended, however, to imply recommendation or endorsement, by the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the products and standards identified are necessarily the best 

available. 

%DFNJURXQG

Being able to download files and electronic documents off the Internet is a useful function 

and a common practice for many people today. Web pages serve as an electronic 

counterpart to paper documents such as forms, brochures, magazines, and newspapers. 

Although paper documents come in different shapes and sizes, they are composed entirely 

of text and graphics. Similarly, most Web pages consist mainly of text and graphics. 

However, unlike paper documents, Web pages can entail active content, capable of 
BACKGROUND 



delivering digitally encoded multimedia information enlivened through embedded 

computer instructions. 

Active content involves a host of new technologies such as built-in macro processing, 

scripting languages, and virtual machines, which blur the distinctions between program 

and data. Electronic documents have evolved to the point that they are themselves 

programs, or contain programs that can be self-triggered. Loading a document into a word 

processor can produce the same effect as executing a program and requires appropriate 

caution to be taken. The popularity of the World Wide Web (WWW) has spurred the 

trend toward active content. A dynamic weather map, a stock ticker, and live camera 

views or programmed broadcasts appearing on a Web page are common examples of use 

of this technology. Capabilities for Web access have also spread from workstations and 

desktop computers onto portable handheld devices, such as cell phones and Personal 

Digital Assistants (PDAs), and Internet appliances, affecting more people daily. Like any 

technology, active content can provide a useful capability, but can also become a source of 

vulnerability for an attacker to exploit. 

Despite these capabilities, people tend to use electronic documents in much the same way 

that they use paper documents – accessing and viewing content, following references to 

other documents, and collecting information filled into forms. That is, Web pages 

delivered from Web servers to individuals via Web browsers impart an inherent document 

metaphor [Ven99]. The value of the document metaphor is that people are familiar with 

handling paper documents and can quickly adapt to using electronic facsimiles appearing 

within Web pages, since they understand the basic operations. 

One drawback, however, is that the document metaphor is generally considered nonthreatening and can lull one into a false sense of security. Moreover, strictly observing the 

document metaphor somewhat limits the way in which Web-based applications function. 

In particular, non-textual content does not lend itself to paper document style handling. 

For example, streaming or continuous delivery media, such as a live radio transmission or 

voice communication can transpire only as they occur in real time. In situations where the 

document metaphor has become awkward, alternatives that are more natural have arisen, 

evolving the document metaphor toward serving as a general-purpose vehicle to provision 

electronic services. 

Code versus Data: In the recent past, the security risks associated with the use of 

computers were relatively straightforward. Instructions were distinct from the data 

on which they operated and some hardware could even distinguish internally 

between instructions and data (e.g., using a special memory bit), to avoid 

confounding them. Over the years the situation changed: tools emerged to facilitate 

application development in higher-level languages in lieu of machine languages, 

generic applications appeared, and hardware processing speeds increased 

dramatically. Eventually, it became advantageous to trade off the execution speed 

of compiled code against the flexibility of interpreted code. 

An interpreter is a type of translator that accepts source code and executes it 

directly, without first producing object code (i.e., native machine instructions) as with 

a compiler. Reserved characters and/or words (e.g., "<” and “if” in JavaScript) are 

used by an interpreter to distinguish instructions within a text stream. An interpreter 

fetches each instruction sequentially, according to the flow of control, and carries out 

the intended behavior. Because of this, interpreters are inherently slower than 
BACKGROUND 



compilers, which directly generate machine instructions for execution. Interpretative 

languages range from lists of simple macro-type commands to complex 

programming structures. Special purpose interpreters, called emulators, have been 

used successfully to simulate the behavior of hardware no longer in existence or to 

provide a virtual machine environment for conceptual devices. The latter has been 

used effectively to support platform heterogeneity through interpretative compilers, 

which translate source code into virtual machine code that can execute on various 

independently implemented virtual machines. 

With the arrival of the Web came the desire to make static pages more dynamic and 

lively by using interpreters throughout the system architecture. Today, most data 

files contain instructions that aid in the presentation or use of the data. Interpreters 

are ubiquitous: spreadsheet formulas, database query languages, word processing 

macros, and script interpreters not only embedded in Web browsers and servers, 

but also as stand alone development tools to forge applications from existing 

program components. While these technology improvements facilitate computer 

use, they also can involve serious risks, which are often not readily apparent to 

users. Many of these risks are associated with vulnerabilities created through the 

disguised (e.g., using special characters) or unexpected input of commands to an 

interpreter. For example, a program that uses an interpreter to process received 

information may be fed a string containing special characters that confuses the 

interpreter, causing it to treat correctly the initial part of the string as a legitimate 

parameter for some intended command, but treat incorrectly the remainder as a 

new unintended command sequence. Some applications use multiple interpreters 

in tandem, passing the output of one directly into another, which further compounds 

the problem, since a harmful operation may be brought about and executed 

unobtrusively along the way. 

%URZVHU $QDWRP\

A browser is the generic term used to refer to software that lets individuals view pages 

from various sources, including Web servers on the Internet, which make up the WWW. 

Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer are two popular Web browsers that 

aid in navigating text, graphics, hyperlinks, audio, video, and other multimedia 

information and services on the Web. Although Web browsers support a number of 

legacy protocols, such as the File Transfer Protocol [FTP], they rely mainly on a simple, 

request-response communications protocol, the HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 

[HTTP], to access Web servers. The browser requests information from a specific Web 

site, by sending a method request to the Web server conveying the Universal Resource 

Locator (URL) of the desired resource (e.g., a Web page), client information, and content 

handling capabilities. The URL is used to locate the server and serves as a unique address 

of the resource. Annex A contains a brief explanation of the available request methods a 

browser can issue. Typical usage involves mainly the issuing of GET and POST methods 

to retrieve information or provide form content, respectively. 

Once the request is issued, the browser expects a response from the server, containing a 

status code, meta-information about the resource, the content corresponding to the 

resource requested (e.g., the Web page specified by the URL), and an indication of content 

encoding. Five general classes of response exist, as indicated by the first digit of the status 

code. For example, most users have received a 400 series code, the 404 code, at one time 

or another when unsuccessfully attempting to reach a resource at some site. Annex B 

contains a brief description of the classes of status code returned by a server. 
BACKGROUND 



In order to choose the best available representation of a resource at a browser, HTTP 

version 1.1 provides two forms of content negotiation: 

 Server-driven, where the browser sends hints about its preferences to the server, using 

headers such as Accept-Language, Accept-Charset, etc., allowing the server to choose 

the representation that best matches the expressed preferences. 

 Browser-driven, where in response to a browser request, the server replies with a list 

of the available representations and a description of their properties (e.g., language 

and character set), allowing the browser to choose one representation and reissue the 

request for the chosen variant. 

The first alternative is the more mature. In fact, since the HTTP 1.1 specification does not 

completely define the headers needed for browser-driven negotiation, server-driven 

negotiation is the more viable alternative at this time. 

The representation of a resource such as a Web page involves control codes, normally 

referred to as tags, and data. Browsers interpret control codes within Web pages, which 

denote the structure of the data (e.g., beginning of item, end of item) and the way to render 

it (e.g., heading, subheading, paragraph, list, embedded image). The codes may also 

embed URLs of additional information such as images, which entail further requests to the 

server to retrieve the information and complete the Web page. The control codes are the 

subject of intense standardization and include specifications for the HyperText Markup 

Language (HTML) [HTML4], Cascaded Style Sheets (CSS) [CSS1, CSS2], the eXtended 

Markup Language (XML) [XML1], and the Wireless Markup Language (WML) [WML]. 

Browsers are designed to read such codes, interpret their meaning, and render the Web 

page accordingly. 

The original HTML specification, which signaled the birth of the WWW, also implicitly 

stipulates the basic requirements of a browser. Like most standards, commercial 

implementations have tended to extend the basic requirements into proprietary areas, and 

occasionally ignore a basic requirement or interpret it differently than originally intended. 

This has led to standardization bodies such as the WWW Consortium (W3C) to evolve 

standards along the lines of existing implementations, and developers of Web pages to 

undertake measures to ensure compatibility with versions of commonly used browsers. 

Browsers inherently involve many different program components, both internal and 

external. Figure 1 illustrates the common components found in most browsers. The 

component layering illustrated is only for discussion purposes and not meant to imply any 

structural relationship. A basic protocol machine for HTTP, a parser for HTML, and a 

mechanism to render simple textual and graphical content are essential core components 

present in all browsers. The remaining components represent mechanisms to render other 

forms of content. To some extent, the specific choices depend on the browser 

manufacturer. However, competition and market demand influence manufacturers to offer 

components having comparable functionality with a high degree of compatibility and 

uniformity. Scripting languages (e.g., JavaScript, Visual Basic (VB) Script, and JScript), 

conveyed within the HTML from the server, are a useful means of having instructions 

executed by the browser, and require an interpreter for each language supported. 

Similarly, environmental components for Java, ActiveX, and Plug-in technology allow 

code external to the browser to be executed by the browser. 
BACKGROUND 



Plug-ins

HTTP

Rendition

Scripting (e.g., JavaScript, VBScript)

Java ActiveX

HTML Parsing (or other ML, e.g., XML)

• Figure 1: Basic Components of a Generic Browser 

To simplify the browser development, product designers allow extensibility through a 

variety of techniques for communicating with other functional components. The 

motivation is twofold: no one can reasonably build-in the means to render all forms of 

content themselves, and to attempt to do so would limit innovation as well as the 

usefulness of the browser. As long as the browser developer employs or provides a welldefined interface, other software manufacturers can readily extend functionality with their 

components. Overall, the program components of a browser, both built-in and otherwise, 

can be divided into the following classes [Mor98]. 

3URJUDP &RPSRQHQWV ,QFRUSRUDWHG 'LUHFWO\ ZLWKLQ WKH %URZVHU

Browsers contain a significant amount of built-in functionality and typically can render a 

variety of content types inherently, including text, HTML delimited text, scripting 

languages, Java applets and common types of image files. The associated program 

components are functionally internal to the browser and able to interpret such content 

directly. To keep the browser safe from arbitrary content at sites that have diverse levels 

of trust, the program components must take adequate precautions against the information 

received. Because these programs are contained within the browser, the browser 

manufacturer is able to impose security constraints on them. Built-in functionality is also 

a means for the manufacturer to distinguish its product from others in various ways, such 

as offering proprietary extensions to standard script languages, close integration and 

interworking with other product offerings, and entirely new content handling capabilities. 

In general, script-based languages do not incorporate an explicit security model in their 

design, and rely mainly on decisions taken during implementation. One noteworthy 

example of the rigor necessary is the implementation of secure JavaScript in Mozilla 

[Anu98]. The implementation controls access to resources and external interfaces, 

prevents residual information from being retained and accessible among different contexts 

operating simultaneously or sequentially, and allows policy, which partitions the name 

space for access control purposes, to be specified independently of mechanism. Java 

applets are also an interesting case, because the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), the internal 

browser component that provides the execution environment for Java applets, involves an 

elaborate level of security beyond that of the browser. The default security-policy settings 

for a JVM environment are normally determined by the browser manufacturer, but can be 
BACKGROUND 



tailored by each user. For example, with the Internet Explorer, a user can set Java 

permissions, such as file and network I/O, of both signed and unsigned applets received 

from various zones (i.e., trusted, intranet, internet, and restricted) to which specific Web 

sites can be allocated. 

3URJUDP &RPSRQHQWV ,QVWDOOHG WR ([WHQG WKH %URZVHU YLD D 'HILQHG

,QWHUIDFH

A significant innovation in the design of Web browsers is the ability to extend them 

beyond their built-in functionality. For a browser to hand off content rendering to such 

program components, the component must register its handling capabilities (i.e., the file 

extensions and MIME types it supports – see the sidebar below) with the browser when it 

installs. Often, these extensions require full access to the browser internals and the 

underlying operating system in order to accomplish their goals. Therefore, programs that 

extend browsers typically enjoy full-function interfaces to the internals of the browsers 

and to the operating system. The two most common means of extending browsers, 

Netscape plug-ins and ActiveX controls, have somewhat different security models. 

Microsoft ActiveX controls can require authenticated digital signatures as a prerequisite 

for installation, while Netscape plug-ins have no mechanism for enforcing authenticated 

signatures. However, once an ActiveX control is installed, it has free range over the entire 

machine, whereas the plug-in is typically confined to the capabilities of the browser. 

MIME Types: Both browsers and Web servers are aware of Multipurpose Internet 

Mail Extensions (MIME) content types [MIME] and use them during content 

negotiation. MIME was designed originally as an extensible mechanism for 

electronic mail, using the convention of content-type/subtype pairs to specify the 

native representation or encoding of associated data fully. Content types include 

the following: 

• Audio – used for transmitting audio or voice data. 

• Application - used to transmit application data or binary data, and hence, 

among other uses, to implement an electronic mail file transfer service. 

• Image – used for transmitting still image (picture) data. 

• Message – used for encapsulating another mail message. 

• Multipart - used to combine several body parts, possibly of differing types of 

data, into a single message. 

• Text - used to represent textual information in a number of character sets and 

formatted text description languages in a standardized manner. 

• Video – used for transmitting video or moving image data, possibly with audio 

as part of the composite video data format. 

When a browser requests a Web page, it attaches information about what kind of 

content it can handle (e.g., "image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, 

image/png") using MIME conventions. This allows the server to provide content 

selectively, based on the capability of the browser (e.g., serve graphics in GIF or 

JPEG instead of TIFF format). 
BACKGROUND 



In response to a browser’s request, Web servers always indicate the type of content 

being sent via preliminary header information that conveys the MIME content 

type/subtype. Web servers use a mapping to associate the filename extensions of 

requested resources with MIME content types/subtypes. In a typical MIME map, 

each entry contains a filename extension to be associated with one or more MIME 

data types/subtypes. For example, an entry for image/gif uses the filename 

extension “.gif” and the entries for application/postscript use the filename extensions 

“.ps “and “.eps”. 

Based on the MIME types provided by the server, the browser must then ascertain 

what to do. It can render the associated content, either directly through a built-in or 

incorporated program component, or indirectly through the execution of a helper 

application. If the browser cannot locate a registered program entry for a MIME 

type, it can attempt to associate a program component using the filename extension 

of the resource and process accordingly. If that fails, as a final option, the browser 

can save the information to disk for later use. Note that for security reasons, 

browsers typically do not automatically launch executable programs downloaded 

from the Web, which have a MIME content type of "file/executable" indicated by the 

server. The default action is to ask whether the program should be launched or 

saved to disk, although the configuration can be set so that the browser starts such 

programs automatically without any prompts. 

3URJUDPV /DXQFKHG DV DQ ,QGHSHQGHQWO\ ([HFXWLQJ 3URFHVV E\ WKH

%URZVHU

As an alternative to using a programming interface, a browser’s capabilities can be 

extended using a so-called helper application or content viewer. Like a plug-in, the 

browser starts a helper application and hands off content rendering when it encounters a 

content type (MIME type or file extension) for which the helper application is registered to 

handle. Unlike a plug-in, a helper application runs separately from the browser in its own 

process space, and does not interact with or rely on the browser once initiated. Because a 

helper application runs independently, executed with the content file as input, it is 

completely outside the control of the browser, including the browser’s security controls. 

3URJUDP &RPSRQHQWV 'LUHFWO\ (QFDSVXODWLQJ WKH %URZVHU

An interesting and somewhat unconventional approach is to embody the browser itself 

within another application to extend the functionality of the application. The best example 

is that Internet Explorer, or any other browser that complies with ActiveX container or 

OLE container technology, can be run as an ActiveX control inside an application. Visual 

Basic applications inherently have this capability, which allows one to not only control the 

URL requested, but also interact with the content received to the point of allowing HTML 

pages to pass information to and from the container application [Hug99]. Microsoft MSN, 

America Online, and a number of free Internet service access providers configure their 

browsers this way. A number of browsers, developed using different technology schemes, 

are available today specifically for being embedded within an application, as a way to add 

new functionality. An electronic mail application, for example, could use such a 

component to enhance its capabilities and render HTML formatted messages directly, 

including any embedded scripts. 
BACKGROUND 



6HUYHU $QDWRP\

A Web server is a program that resides on a computer on the Internet and supplies 

information and services formatted in HTML or another markup language, which contains 

text, image, audio, and video content. The primary function of a Web server is to respond 

to requests sent to it from a Web browser via HTTP. 

The transaction begins when a browser requests a resource from the Web server. In the 

simplest case, the Web server retrieves the requested content from a file system and 

transmits it to the browser. While this approach works well for static non-volatile 

information, it can be unsuitable in situations where the information is volatile, already 

resides in a database or other repository under a different format, or varies according to the 

input provided. In such cases, the Web server responds to the request by creating the 

content dynamically, typically by spawning a process or lightweight thread to generate the 

information. The Common Gateway Interface (CGI) is an industry standard for 

communicating between a Web server and another program, often employed in such 

instances. 

As with browsers, Web servers involve many different kinds of program components and 

are designed to be extensible and to interact with databases, legacy systems, and other 

servers running on an organization's network. Figure 2 illustrates the common 

components found in most Web servers, depicted using the same convention as was done 

earlier for browsers. The key components present in all Web servers are a basic protocol 

machine for HTTP, a means to fetch Web pages or resource templates, and a mechanism 

to compose and validate the contents of the response. The remaining components 

represent mechanisms to extend functionality, mainly for the purpose of generating 

information dynamically. Besides the widely supported CGI standard, the specific choices 

depend on the Web server manufacturer. 

CGI Code Java Servlets

HTTP

Composition

Server Side Scripting

Web Page/Template Retrieval

• Figure 2: Basic Components of a Generic Web Server 

A CGI application executes as a separate process, which can be written in a variety of 

programming languages. As an independent process, the application is capable of 

accessing other hosts (e.g., a database server) and resources in performing its function, 

subject to its system security permissions. Once the application creates the information, 

the Web server conveys it in a response back to the browser. One drawback with this 
BACKGROUND 



approach is that it consumes a significant amount of computational resources to spawn a 

new process for each request. The kernel receives an interrupt each time the application is 

called; the application must then be allocated memory, loaded into memory, passed the 

input parameters from the browser, and executed. If the application is called multiple 

times in unison from different sources, multiple copies of the application are resident in 

memory simultaneously. 

Because of the overhead involved with CGI, developers have sought after more efficient 

means to communicate between the software on the Web server and another program or 

library. A number of other programming interfaces offering performance improvements 

have arisen, such as the Netscape Server Application Programming Interface (NSAPI) and 

the Microsoft Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI). An application 

built using one of these interfaces, however, operates quite a bit differently from a CGI 

application. For example, rather than executing as an external application in a separate 

process, an ISAPI application executes as an integral part of the Web server within the 

same address space as the server code. This is possible because, unlike an external 

program, the ISAPI application is a dynamic link library component, which can be loaded 

or unloaded at will. Thus, the ISAPI application can remain in memory indefinitely or, 

when it finishes, be unloaded from memory and reloaded again, if needed, to conserve 

system resources. An ISAPI application is also a shared multithreaded code image, 

requiring only a single copy to support multiple simultaneous browser requests. These 

characteristics conserve system resources and improve response. 

The techniques for dynamically generating content and improving Web server capabilities 

tend to be proprietary and used by software manufacturers to differentiate their product 

from others in the marketplace. Often the approach is to adapt or extend a technology 

developed for the browser environment, such as a particular scripting language or a 

framework for distributed program components, for the server environment. The 

following items provide examples of a few of the more notable technologies. 

6HUYHU 6LGH ,QFOXGHV 66,

SSI is a limited server-side scripting language supported by most Web servers. SSI 

provides a set of dynamic features, such as including the current time or the last 

modification date of the HTML file, as an alternative to using a CGI program to perform 

the function. When the browser requests a document with a special file type, such as 

“.shtml”, it triggers the server to treat the document as a template, reading and parsing the 

entire document before sending the results back to the client. SSI commands are 

embedded within HTML comments (e.g., <!--#include file="standard.html" -->). As the 

server reads the template file, it searches for HTML comments containing embedded SSI 

commands. When it finds one, the server replaces that part of the original HTML text 

with the output of the command. For example, the SSI command given above (i.e., 

#include file) replaces the entire SSI comment with the contents of another HTML file. 

This allows the display of a corporate logo or other static information prepared in another 

file to occur in a uniform way across all corporate Web pages. A subset of the directives 

available allows the server to execute arbitrary system commands and CGI scripts, which 

may produce unwanted side effects. 
BACKGROUND 



0LFURVRIW $FWLYH 6HUYHU 3DJHV $63

ASP is a server-side scripting technology from Microsoft similar to SSI, which can be 

used to create dynamic and interactive Web applications. An ASP page is essentially an 

HTML template that contains server-side scripts that run when a browser requests an 

“.asp” resource from the Web server. The Web server processes the requested page and 

executes any script commands encountered, before sending the composed result to the 

user’s browser. Both JScript and VBScript are supported scripting languages, but other 

scripting languages can be accommodated as well, provided an ASP compliant interpreter 

for that language is installed. For example, scripting engines are available for PERL, 

REXX, and Python languages from various sources. Scripting capabilities can be 

extended through the use of ActiveX objects, which can be developed in a variety of 

languages, including Visual Basic, C++, Cobol, and Java. A script that invokes an 

ActiveX object causes the object to be created and supplied any needed input parameters. 

Note that ActiveX is an optional technology not required by Active Server Pages. 

-DYD 6HUYOHWV

Servlets are based on Java technology and are essentially a kind of server-side applet. The 

Web server first determines whether the browser's request requires dynamically generated 

information from a servlet. If so, the Web server can then locate or instantiate a servlet 

object corresponding to the request (e.g., by uploading the code from another server) and 

invoke it to obtain the needed results. The Web server typically populates itself with the 

servlet objects, which remain active until invoked. Thus, no startup overhead is associated 

with execution of the servlet objects. A Web server may also offload the handling of 

servlets to another server. By relying on Java portability and observing a common 

applications program interface, servlet objects can run in nearly any server environment. 

Servlets support an object-oriented environment on the Web server, which is flexible and 

extendible. Moreover, untrusted servlet objects can be executed in a secure area, with the 

dynamically generated information being passed from the secure area into the remaining 

server environment. 

Web Scripting – Client vs. Server: To understand Web scripting, one must 

distinguish scripts run by the browser (i.e., client-side scripting) from those run by 

the Web server (i.e., server-side scripting). Client-side scripting and server-side 

scripting are distinct concepts that serve different purposes. For example, since a 

server does not interact directly with a user, server-side scripting requires no 

human-to-computer interface capability. Furthermore, the Web browser and server 

each supply their own unique environment for executing scripts. 

Client-side scripting is used to make Web pages more interactive and functional 

after they have been sent to the browser. For example, client-side scripts might 

involve validation of data entry fields on an HTML form so the user gets immediate 

feedback when a mistake occurs, or integration of an ActiveX control or Java applet 

with another component on the page so that they interact. 

A Web browser environment for client-side scripting includes the objects that 

represent the user interface (e.g., windows, menus, dialog boxes, text areas, 

anchors, frames, cookies, and input/output) and a means to associate scripting 

code with events at that interface (e.g., change of focus, selection, loading and 

unloading of text and images, form submission, error and abort, and mouse 
BACKGROUND 



actions). Scripting code appears within the HTML and the displayed page is a 

combination of fixed and computed text, images, and user interface elements. 

Since the scripts react to user interaction, a main program is not needed. 

A Web server provides a different environment for scripting, which includes objects 

representing requests, clients, and files, and mechanisms to lock and share data. 

All server-side scripting takes place before the resource (e.g., a Web page) is sent 

to the browser. The server-side scripts, for example, may involve creating a Web 

page dynamically by querying a database and formatting the results into HTML for 

delivery to the browser. 

By employing both client-side and server-side scripting for a Web-based application, 

needed computations can be split appropriately between the browser and Web 

server environments, while providing a customized user interface. 

Client-side scripting depends on the capabilities of the browser that processes a 

script, which requires awareness of what type of browsers might be encountered. 

While server-side scripting, such as with ASP pages, can create pure HTML pages 

acceptable by any browser, they are not necessarily portable to or compatible with 

the Web server software running elsewhere in an organization. 

7KUHDWV

The openness of the Internet makes it easily accessible to intruders. Over recent years, 

intruder activity has revealed a number of shortcomings in the original design of the 

Internet. While some security features were foreseen and built into the relevant protocols, 

including the keystone Internet Protocol (IP), others were not addressed. They include the 

following omissions: 

 Data confidentiality: Data passed across the Internet travel in packets that can easily 

be captured and viewed to reveal their contents. 

 Data integrity: Data traversing the Internet may be intercepted and modified before 

reaching the recipient or replayed later. 

 User identification and authentication: The responsibility for user authentication falls 

to the connected hosts. Unfortunately, many systems still rely on cleartext passwords 

and are, therefore, open to having them captured by an eavesdropper. 

 System identification and authentication: Internet addresses identify host systems 

connected to the Internet, but because they are not authenticated or strongly bound to 

a host, the addresses can easily be spoofed. 

 Reliable domain name translation: The Domain Name System (DNS) used to 

translate names to host addresses on the Internet, relies on truthful and accurate 

reporting of mappings by all components, which is difficult to ensure. 

Intruders have used these omissions to attack hosts on the Internet. Furthermore, the 

Internet amplifies risks associated with vulnerabilities in connected hosts, by exposing 

those vulnerabilities to a broader range of threats. 
THREATS 



An attack is a realization of some specific threat that affects the confidentiality, integrity, 

accountability, or availability of computational resources. Many initiatives to mitigate 

these threats are underway or reaching maturity. Standards for Internet Protocol Security 

(IPSec), Secure DNS, and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) have been completed and 

realized in products. Commercial, government-certified, security evaluation laboratories 

have been established under regional and worldwide mutual recognition schemes. 

Competition for an algorithm to replace the aging Data Encryption Algorithm is complete, 

with NIST’s selection of the Rijndael algorithm for the Advanced Encryption Standard. 

Organizations have established emergency response teams, which have improved their 

effectiveness in combating intrusions. Commercial software for detecting and eliminating 

computer viruses, filtering network protocols (i.e., firewalls), and detecting intrusions is 

widely available. 

While the outlook should be positive, a number of factors contribute to perpetuating 

security problems. 

6FDOH RI WKH ,QWHUQHW

Millions of computers and tens of thousands of individual computer networks make up the 

Internet, precluding wholesale upgrades to new security protocols and solutions. 

Therefore, a large pool of systems lags behind in various degrees from having the most 

update protection mechanisms in place. While one’s enterprise may have up-to-date and 

secure systems, one or more systems from the pool of stragglers may be used as a launch 

pad for new attacks, such as hard-to-prevent, distributed denial-of-service attacks. 

5DWH RI ([SRVXUH

Invariably errors of commission or omission occur that allow protection mechanisms to be 

bypassed or disabled, and create a vulnerability. A vulnerability in and of itself may or 

may not pose a serious problem, depending on what tools are available to exploit it. As 

vulnerabilities are discovered and made known to the manufacturer, a window of exposure 

exists until a patch, containing corrective code to close the vulnerability, can be made 

available. A patch usually involves the installation of native, platform-specific code 

modules, which are developed as a replacement for or an insertion into compiled code 

already installed. Any delay in applying the patch opens the window not only to a wider 

time period for exploitation, but also to a greater audience of potential intruders, as attack 

tools that exploit the vulnerability emerge. Today, vulnerabilities are discovered at an 

increasingly high frequency, further compounding the problem. 

4XDOLW\ RI 6RIWZDUH

Tolerating the prevalence of large numbers of unintentional implementation errors in 

software products has become an accepted business practice. Modern market-driven 

development processes, such as synchronize and stabilize [Cus99] and extreme 

programming [Bec99], evolved to meet the demand for constructing large, complex 

feature-rich software products in a flexible manner. While such approaches emphasize 

efficient adaptability to incorporating new technologies, shifting priorities, and 

competition-driven features, these benefits come at the expense of discipline (e.g., formal 

design, code review, and complete testing) and schedule. The goal of producing a 

shippable product takes precedence over the elimination of known errors. While most 

errors are benign with respect to security, an unresolved implementation error may create a 
THREATS 



serious security vulnerability. The lack of quality control manufacturers have over the 

implementation process is also indicated by the significant and growing occurrance of 

hidden functionality, so-called Easter Eggs, that exist in well known and widely used 

commercial products [Wer99]. Easter Eggs often embody significant code ranging from 

simple games to three-dimensional flight simulators. While intended to be nonthreatening and surreptitiously honor the software development team whose names are 

eventually revealed, they provide another possible avenue for attack. 

&RQIRXQGLQJ RI 3URJUDPV DQG 'DWD

In striving to offer greater functionality and flexibility, software developers continue to 

blur the distinctions between program and data. While the intentions of the developer are 

presumably good, they can often have a negative impact when the need for security is not 

considered fully. Moreover, the prevalence of unintentional implementation errors in 

software applications that process electronic documents plagues active content technology. 

Even if a design is correct and secure, the implementation may unintentionally contain a 

serious vulnerability that can be exploited by malicious code conveyed in an active content 

document. An attacker needs only to learn what software their target is using, find an 

appropriate exploit, and send the document to the target. 

&RPSOH[LW\ RI 6RIWZDUH

The trend in application software development is to add more features and greater 

complexity to products. Greater complexity requires more code and more interaction 

among components, resulting in more implementation errors occurring. This trend 

combined with the competitive pressures facing manufacturers to be first to the market, 

the technical and cost barriers to extensive testing, and a marketplace that chooses 

functionality over security, ensures attackers continual opportunities in the future. 

&RQILJXUDWLRQ RI 6RIWZDUH

For a general population often baffled by the programming interface of a videocassette 

recorder, understanding a system’s security posture and correctly setting its configuration 

is an unrealistic expectation. Yet, we are increasingly relied upon to exercise such skills, 

particularly with our own Web browsers and desktop software configuration. Even 

knowledgeable, enterprise system administrators are faced with a similar challenge – 

confronted with an array of security solutions, including those involving company 

proprietary and incompatible mechanisms, they must oversee a fragile patchwork of 

software products and devices that demand constant oversight. 

3ULYDF\ 3UDFWLFHV RI ,QGXVWU\

Commercial companies are increasingly using their Internet offerings to collect 

information on individuals, both directly (e.g., during credit card purchases and free 

service subscriptions) or indirectly (e.g., via persistent cookies, Web bugs, and spyware). 

These actions compound the aforementioned security problems, since successful attacks 

launched against commercial servers can also seriously affect the privacy of individuals 

whose information resides there. 
THREATS 



/LPLWV RI 6DIHJXDUGV

Defending against all attacks completely in an open network such as the Internet is not 

possible. At the very least, the possibility exists for the occurrence of remotely launched 

denial-of-service attacks, which consume resources and deny the processing of legitimate 

requests by flooding the target with bogus requests. Recent distributed denial-of-service 

attacks, launched simultaneously from multiple proxy sites under the control of a single 

attacker, demonstrate both the ease in which the capacity of any Web site can be 

overwhelmed, and the value of having complete site redundancy for critical services. 

8QGHUO\LQJ ,VVXHV

Active content allows code, in the guise of a script, macro, or other kind of portable 

instruction representation, to execute when the document is rendered. HTML and other 

related markup language documents, whether delivered via the WWW or another means, 

provide the richest mechanisms for conveying executable content; they are ideal active 

content containers. However, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that many other 

document formats, while not as rich in mechanisms, have similar potential. A more 

general view of the production and handling of active content is the producer-consumer 

model illustrated in Figure 3. Here, a producer composes an electronic document 

containing some form of executable code in addition to text, graphic images, audio, and 

video content. A producer could range from a user creating macros for a word processing 

document to a Web server dynamically generating Web pages. By some means, the 

document becomes available to a consumer who renders it with an electronic device 

within an execution environment, such as that provided by a word processor or Web 

browser. The execution environment of nearly all active content technologies impose 

policy restrictions that limit the code’s access to computational resources during a 

rendition of the document. 

Producer

Consumer

Compose Code

Code

Resources

Code

Render

• Figure 3: Producer-Consumer Model 

While any means used to compose, deliver, and render active content automatically is a 

concern, our focus is on the WWW, because the associated technologies are designed and 

implemented to work together seamlessly under this framework, with a user often 

unaware of the security implications. Figure 4 illustrates a simplified Web-based 

transaction supported by HTTP’s client-server architecture. HTTP enables active content 

to be conveyed from one platform (i.e., a Web server) to another (i.e., a client browser) 
THREATS 



where it is rendered automatically. As depicted in the figure, not only can the server 

impact the browser by supplying it code to execute, but also the reverse, input from the 

browser can influence the execution at the server. In the previous sections, we have seen 

that the process of rendering the active content is more involved than what is illustrated. 

Nevertheless, conceptually the depiction is accurate, insofar as the supplier of the code and 

the operator of the execution environment can be from different domains, posing a 

security risk for each side. 

Browser

Web

Server Request

Response

Server Side Code

Running against User

Provided Data

Client Side Code

Running with Server

Provided Code & Data

...

...

• Figure 4: Simplified HTTP Transaction 

Web-based transactions often involve other computer platforms besides those of the 

browser and Web server. As mentioned earlier, the Web server may rely on a database 

server or other on-line repository or computational engine to fulfill requests it receives. 

HTTP also accommodates the use of a proxy, which normally resides on a firewall device 

to screen browser interactions, and automatic redirection by the referenced Web server to 

another server, which supposedly has the requested resource. Therefore, though we 

conceptually visualize a transaction as a simple HTTP interchange between a browser and 

a Web server, the reality is typically more complex, involving other entities. Figure 5 

gives a more thorough picture of some of the entities that could be involved in an HTTP 

transaction. 

Browser

Proxy

Web

Server

Redirected Web

Server

Database

Server Request

Response

• Figure 5: Entities Involved in HTTP Transaction Processing 

Fred Cohen [Coh95] summarized some of the fundamental security issues of the design of 

the WWW, which bear repeating here: 
THREATS 



 Distributed untrusted computation: “As a basic premise, the Web provides a means 

for information provided by arbitrary servers at unknown locations operated by 

unknown organizations to be interpreted by any of a large number of different 

browsers at unknown locations operated by unknown organizations. The idea of 

interpreting unknown information from unknown sources seems inherently risky.” 

 Remote execution of untrusted software: “Many Web extensions are designed to 

provide added function making the Web more than just a massive uncontrolled 

distributed database. These extensions, such as PostScript, Java, and MIME 

essentially allow for remote execution of untrusted software. For the browser, the risk 

is that the computer running the browser will be taken over, while for a server, the 

same risk extends to the server and any subsequent browsers that get information from 

that server once it is attacked.” 

 Remote interpretation of unstructured and unverified content: “In essence, most 

browsers and servers assume that the incoming information follows the HTTP 

protocol, but there is inadequate enforcement of this by servers and browsers. The 

result is that any incoming information might not conform, might be interpreted using 

an undefined method (corresponding to a don't care condition in the interpreter), and 

might result in arbitrary undesirable side effects.” 

&DWHJRULHV RI 7KUHDWV

A number of generic security threats apply to systems on the Internet, for example, 

unauthorized release of information, modification of information, and denial of service. 

The WWW, as a superstratum over the basic Internet technology, is subject to these same 

threats. In addition, the capabilities for supporting active content and mobile code provide 

new threat opportunities that fall within these general categories. Like any technology, 

active content can provide a useful capability, but can also become a source of 

vulnerability for an attacker to exploit. Overall, three different classes of attacks against 

this framework exist. While our emphasis is on the first of these, browser-oriented attacks, 

the others are important since a successful attack there may provide an avenue for 

launching a browser-oriented attack. Keep in mind too that other desktop applications, 

particularly electronic mail clients, often possess browser-like capabilities that are 

susceptible to browser-oriented attacks. 

%URZVHU 2ULHQWHG

Attacks can be launched against Web browser components and technologies by the Web 

server. The mobile code paradigm requires a browser to accept and execute code 

developed elsewhere. Incoming code has two main lines of attack. The first is to gain 

unauthorized access to computational resources residing at the browser (e.g., security 

options) or its underlying platform (e.g., system registry); the second is to use its 

authorized access based on the user’s identity in an unexpected and disruptive fashion 

(e.g., invade privacy or deny service). Because browsers can support multiple associations 

with different Web servers as separate windowed contexts, the mobile code of one context 

can also target another context. Unauthorized access may occur simply through a lack of 

adequate access control mechanisms or weak identification and authentication controls, 

which allow untrusted code to act or masquerade as a trusted component. Once access is 

gained, information residing at the platform can be disclosed or altered. Besides sensitive 

data, this information could include the instruction codes or configuration of the platform. 
THREATS 



Depending on the level of access, complete control of the platform may be subsumed by 

the mobile code. Even without gaining unauthorized access to resources, malicious code 

can deny platform services to other processes by exhausting computational resources, if 

resource constraints are not established or not set tightly. Otherwise, the code can interfere 

with the platform by issuing meaningless service requests wherever possible. 

6HUYHU 2ULHQWHG

Attacks can be launched against Web server components and technologies by the browser. 

A browser can easily isolate and capture a response from a server, and may launch an 

attack by manipulating information and feeding back unexpected input to the server in a 

subsequent request. The idea is to induce the server into performing unauthorized 

commands provided by the browser, which in turn gains access to sensitive information or 

control of the server. For example, because HTTP is stateless, having no efficient means 

of maintaining persistent information between transactions, Web-based applications often 

use tricks, such as hidden fields within a form, to provide continuity between transactions, 

which may provide an avenue of attack. Similarly, other user provided input might 

eventually be passed to an application interface that interprets the input as part of a 

command upon which other commands can piggyback or whose interface buffer can be 

overrun in a buffer overflow attack. Such exploits may involve the complete analysis and 

reversing engineering of transactions by an attacker. Subtle changes introduced into the 

Web server can radically change the server’s behavior (e.g., turning a trusted entity into 

malicious one), the accuracy of the computation (e.g., changing computational algorithms 

to yield incorrect results), or the confidentiality of the information (e.g., disclosing 

collected information). 

1HWZRUN 2ULHQWHG

Attacks can be launched against the network infrastructure used to communicate between 

the browser and server. Even assuming the browser and Web server are well behaved, 

other entities may attempt actions to disrupt, harm, or subvert the framework. An attacker 

can gain information by masquerading as a Web server using a man-in-the-middle attack, 

whereby requests and responses are conveyed via the imposter as a watchful intermediary. 

Such a so-called Web spoofing attack [Fel97] allows the impostor to shadow not only a 

single targeted server, but also every subsequent server accessed. Other obvious attack 

methods lie outside the browser-server framework and involve targeting either the 

communications or the supporting platforms. For example, at a level of protocol below 

HTTP, an entity may eavesdrop on messages in transit between a browser and server to 

glean information. An attacking entity may also intercept messages in transit and modify 

their contents, substitute other contents, or simply replay the transmission dialogue later in 

an attempt to disrupt the synchronization or integrity of the information. Denial-of-service 

attacks through available network interfaces are another possibility, as are exploits 

involving any existing platform vulnerability. 

7HFKQRORJ\5HODWHG5LVNV

Risk is a measure of the likelihood and the consequence of events or acts that could cause 

a system compromise, including the unauthorized disclosure, destruction, removal, 

modification, or interruption of system assets. Most computer technologies involve some 
TECHNOLOGY RELATED RISKS 



degree of vulnerability due mainly to flaws or weaknesses in their design or 

implementation, or to the way in which they are deployed. More generally, a security 

vulnerability is the absence of or weakness in the security controls for a system that could 

result in a violation of the system’s security policy. While technology-related 

vulnerabilities are often subtle and do not affect either the overall functionality or 

performance of a product, they can be discovered and exploited by an attacker. The 

impact of a vulnerability to an individual or organization is the subject of a risk analysis, 

and can vary widely, depending on such factors as the value of the resource affected or the 

perceived harm to one’s reputation. 

Two main factors should be considered when attempting to gauge the risk involved with 

active content technologies: the capabilities or facilities of the programming language, and 

the breadth and strength of controls in place within the execution environment to enforce 

policy [DoD00]. Different technologies offer a wide range of functionality regarding the 

types and granularity of actions on local resources such as windows, files, and network 

ports. Similarly, security controls can be imposed at different places within the execution 

environment and at different times (i.e., before or during execution), resulting in varying 

degrees of effectiveness. For instance, JavaScript, implemented within a browser 

environment, normally denies the ability of a downloaded script to read or write files by 

making file objects unavailable. In contrast, an ActiveX control, once accepted, can have 

complete reign over the entire file system. Besides the two main factors, determining the 

acceptable level of risk may involve other factors, such as the maturity of the technology, 

the scope of its intended use, the experience of the organization with the technology, and 

other controls in place. 

To understand the range of risks associated with active content better, some popular active 

content technologies and their associated vulnerabilities are described below. They are 

provided merely as examples and do not imply an official opinion by NIST of the product 

or underlying technology. Most of the technologies discussed provide a useful capability 

when used in a Web environment. However, they also can be exploited by an attacker. 

The motivation for these technologies is to improve functionality and gain flexibility for 

the user. In a Web application, this often involves moving code processing away from the 

Web server onto the client’s Web browser. Allowing remote systems to run arbitrary code 

on some local system, however, poses serious security risks. Traditional client-server 

systems do not involve such risks since they rely on static code on both the server and 

client sides. 

Privacy Risks: Privacy is not synonymous with security; privacy is related to 

security, but is quite a different property. One may securely transmit personal or 

credit card information to a company, but who has access to the information after 

receipt is generally unknown to the individual. Although privacy breeches directly 

affect individuals, they can also affect the companies for which affected individuals 

work. For example, the inkling, unsubstantiated or not, that a company’s CEO is 

suffering from a serious illness can cause its stock value to plummet. 

Some organizations link records from different sources to target marketing efforts 

and to assess risks. When taken collectively, such information constitutes an 

electronic dossier on an individual, which in the wrong hands can cause harm, even 

if it is not completely accurate. No one can learn the full extent of the information 

kept on them by various organizations, much less verify accuracy, or control access. 

Sadly, much of the information collected over the Internet occurs in the background, 
TECHNOLOGY RELATED RISKS 



without the individual's knowledge or consent. One compelling example is the 

recent discovery that many legitimate companies have distributed free plug-ins or 

other software products containing so-called spyware – functionality that, once 

installed, periodically sends reports back to the company about its use and its 

environment. 

Besides spyware, Web site developers have a myriad of tools at their disposal to 

collect personal information. They including tracking use by storing persistent 

information known as cookies on a system via a user’s browser; embedding 

invisible single-pixel images within HTML, so-called Web bugs, whose downloading 

signals viewing to a third party; and invoking the communication capabilities of 

embedded scripts and program components downloaded. 

Servers routinely log information that identifies users indirectly by recording client 

host names and even, when available, user names, and gives information about the 

request. Users may not be aware that such logs are being collected and most likely 

have no idea how that information is used or how long it is retained. There are few 

legal rules or ethical guidelines in most countries governing the disposition of log 

information, such as the sale to other organizations where they may be combined 

with other databases (e.g., on-line address listings) to infer further information. 

3RVW6FULSW

One of the earliest examples of active content is PostScript document representation 

[Ado99], still in wide use today. PostScript is a page description language from Adobe 

that is a de facto standard in commercial typesetting and printing houses. PostScript 

commands are language statements in ASCII text that are translated into the printer's 

machine language by a PostScript interpreter built into the printer. PostScript can also be 

interpreted by software on most computer platforms and drawing to computer screens or 

an attached drawing device. The interpreter uses scalable fonts, eliminating the need to 

store a variety of font sizes. 

A PostScript file contains a document description, which is specified in the PostScript 

page description language. The language is a powerful interpreted language, comparable 

to many programming languages. Thus, PostScript documents inherently entail active 

content. For example, the language defines primitives for file manipulation, which can be 

used in a PostScript document to modify arbitrary files when the document is displayed or 

printed. Unfortunately, the operations can be abused by intentionally embedding 

malicious file commands within an otherwise harmless image, so that in displaying the 

image the interpreter also causes damage. 

An early exploit of PostScript technology involved the language's ability to set a password 

held by the interpreter. In some hardware implementations of the language interpreter, if 

the password were set, it remained in non-volatile memory and prevented subsequent 

documents from being printed unless they contained the same password. An attacker 

sending a password-setting document could disable the printer in this way, requiring 

hardware replacement to rectify the situation [Cle90, Spe90]. Some PostScript interpreters 

can be set to disable potentially harmful primitives. For example, ghostscript, a wellknown PostScript interpreter, recognizes the command-line option “-dSAFER” that 

disables file operations as well as the PostScript %pipe operator, which could be abused to 
TECHNOLOGY RELATED RISKS 



cause damage. One drawback is that applying such safeguards can also inhibit useful 

functions. This dilemma is a recurring theme with active content. 

3RUWDEOH 'RFXPHQW )RUPDW

Portable Document Format (PDF) [Ado00a] is a page description language from Adobe 

for specifying the appearance of pages containing text, graphics, and images, using the 

same high-level, device-independent imaging model employed by PostScript. Unlike 

PostScript, however, PDF is not a full-scale programming language and does not include 

language features such as procedures, variables, and control constructs. PDF readers, used 

to view or print PDF files, can be installed as either a plug-in or a helper application for a 

browser. Other, full-featured tools exist to generate and manipulate, as well as view and 

print, PDF files. 

A PDF document can be regarded as a hierarchy of objects. For example, a page object, 

which includes references to the page’s contents (i.e., a content stream), other attributes, 

such as its thumbnail image, and any associated annotations, represents each page of the 

document. A content stream, in turn, is an object whose data consists of a sequence of 

instructions that describe the graphical elements to be rendered on a page, which are also 

represented as PDF objects using the same object syntax as the rest of the PDF document. 

However, whereas the document as a whole is a static, random-access data structure, the 

objects in the content stream are intended to be interpreted and acted upon sequentially. 

Because of the object orientation and limited image-rendering operators, PDF is generally 

considered a benign format for use with a capability-limited content reader or viewer, such 

as the widely used Adobe Acrobat Reader. However, full-featured PDF tools, such as 

Adobe Acrobat, may be more susceptible to attack by virtue of their extended 

functionality. Recently an individual dramatically demonstrated that while the format 

itself may be benign, a PDF file could bear malicious code as an embedded file attachment 

[Fis01]. When the contaminated PDF file is opened, a game is launched that prompts the 

user to click on a moving image of a peach. The occurrence of that event, in turn, causes 

the execution of an embedded VBScript file, which attempts to mail out the PDF file to 

others using Microsoft Outlook. 

Note that even content readers are not completely immune from problems. From time-totime, vulnerabilities have occurred in the implementation of Acrobat Reader that could be 

exploited with carefully constructed content [Hir99]. For example, a recently released 

patch to Acrobat Reader 4.05 eliminates a buffer overflow vulnerability [Ado00b]. An 

attacker could exploit the vulnerability by creating a PDF file that would cause a Windows 

version of the reader to crash or to execute arbitrary code when the file was rendered. This 

example illustrates how even relatively benign content can affect document rendering 

software having implementation errors. 

-DYD

Java is a full-featured, object-oriented programming language compiled into platformindependent byte code executed by an interpreter called the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). 

The resulting byte code can be executed where compiled or transferred to another Javaenabled platform (e.g., conveyed via an HTML Web page as an applet). Java is useful for 

adding functionality to Web sites. Many services offered by various popular Web sites 
TECHNOLOGY RELATED RISKS 



require the user to have a Java-enabled browser. When the Web browser sees references 

to Java code, it loads the code and then processes it using the built-in JVM. 

The developers of Java tried to address the problem of security and were largely 

successful. The Java programming language and runtime environment [Gon98, Gos96] 

enforces security primarily through strong type safety, by which a program can perform 

certain operations only on certain kinds of objects. Java follows a so-called sandbox 

security model, used to isolate memory and method access, and maintain mutually 

exclusive execution domains. Java code such as a Web applet is confined to a sandbox, 

designed to prevent it from performing unauthorized operations, such as inspecting or 

changing files on a client file system and using network connections to circumvent file 

protections or people's expectations of privacy. 

Security is enforced through a variety of mechanisms. Static type checking in the form of 

byte code verification is used to check the safety of downloaded code. Some dynamic 

checking is also performed during runtime. A distinct name space is maintained for 

untrusted downloaded code and linking of references between modules in different name 

spaces is restricted to public methods. A security manager mediates all accesses to system 

resources, serving in effect as a reference monitor. Permissions are assigned primarily 

based on the source of the code (where it came from) and the author of the code (who 

developed it), which restricts the access of the code to computational resources. In 

addition, Java inherently supports code mobility, dynamic code downloading, digitally 

signed code, remote method invocation, object serialization, and platform heterogeneity. 

Limitations of Java to account for memory, CPU, and network resources consumed by 

individual threads [Cza95] and to support thread mobility [Fug98] have been noted. 

Hostile applets still pose security threats even while executing within the sandbox. A 

hostile applet can consume or exploit system resources inappropriately, or cause a user to 

perform an undesired or unwanted action. Examples of hostile applets exploits include 

denial of service, mail forging, invasion of privacy (e.g., exporting of identity, electronic 

mail address, and platform information) and installing backdoors to the system. The Java 

security model is rather complex and can be difficult for a user to understand and manage, 

which can increase risk. Moreover, many implementation bugs have also been found, 

which allow one to bypass security mechanisms [SUN01]. 

C# - An Emerging Technology: C# (pronounced C sharp) is a strongly typed, 

object-oriented programming language that enables programmers to build 

applications for the new Microsoft .NET platform. Under the .NET framework, 

languages compile into a common intermediate language, Microsoft Intermediate 

Language Code (MSIL), and use a common type and object system. MSIL enables 

the runtime environment, called the Common Language Runtime (CLR), to provide 

common services such as cross-language integration, cross-language exception 

handling, and security. C# borrows most of its operators, keywords, and statements 

from C++ and is intended to be used in programming both hosted and embedded 

systems. C# is normally compiled into MSIL byte codes and then just-in-time 

compiled into native code during execution, but can also can be compiled directly 

into native code. The language and security features appear to be similar to Java’s 

and, thus, should pose similar risks. While Java runs on any platform having a 

JVM, C# currently runs only on Windows platforms. 
TECHNOLOGY RELATED RISKS 



-DYD6FULSW DQG 9%6FULSW

JavaScript is a general purpose, cross-platform scripting language, whose code can be 

embedded within standard Web pages to create interactive documents. While JavaScript 

is implemented widely today in Web browsers, it is also implemented within other 

execution environments on the client side, such as Acrobat Forms and Windows Script 

Host, as well as on the server side. Each context supplies the needed objects to control the 

execution environment and, therefore, the functionality can differ significantly from one 

context to another. Within the context of the browser, the language is extremely powerful, 

allowing prepared scripts to perform essentially the same actions as those that a user could 

take. Within that context, however, JavaScript does not have methods for directly 

accessing a client file system or for directly opening connections to other computers 

besides the host that provided the content source. Moreover, the browser normally 

confines a script’s execution to the page with which it was downloaded. 

The name JavaScript is a misnomer since the language has little relationship to Java 

technology and rose independently from it. For example, while JavaScript is an objectoriented language, it is based on prototypes, not on classes as with Java. Netscape 

developed JavaScript for its Navigator browser, and eventually JScript, a variation of 

JavaScript, appeared in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer. Standardization, regulating the core 

language and facilities of JavaScript and JScript, resulted in the ECMAScript Language 

Specification [ECMA99], which both companies support in their products. Design and 

implementation bugs have been discovered in the commercial scripting products of both 

manufacturers. 

Visual Basic Script (VBScript) is a programming language developed by Microsoft for 

creating scripts that can be embedded in Web pages for viewing with the Internet Explorer 

browser. Netscape Navigator, however, does not support VBScript. Like JavaScript, 

VBScript is an interpreted language able to process client-side or server-side scripts. 

VBScript is a subset of the widely used Microsoft Visual Basic programming language 

and works with Microsoft ActiveX controls. The language is similar to JavaScript and 

poses similar risks. 

In theory, confining a scripting language to boundaries of a Web browser should provide a 

relatively secure environment. In practice, this has not been the case. Many browserbased attacks stem from the use of a scripting language in combination with a security 

vulnerability. The main sources of problems have been twofold: the prevalence of 

implementation flaws in the execution environment and the close binding of the browser 

to related functionality such as an electronic mail client. Past exploits include sending a 

user's URL history list to a remote site, and using the mail address of the user to forge 

electronic mail. The increasing use of HTML and other markup languages as content for 

electronic mail and in push technology services has opened new avenues for exploits 

through embedded scripts. 

$FWLYH;

ActiveX is a set of technologies from Microsoft that provide tools for linking desktop 

applications to the World Wide Web. ActiveX controls are reusable component program 

objects that can be attached to electronic mail or downloaded from a Web site. ActiveX 

controls also come preinstalled on Windows platforms. Web pages invoke ActiveX 

controls using a scripting language or with an HTML OBJECT tag. It is possible to 
TECHNOLOGY RELATED RISKS 



specify a URL where the control can be obtained, if not installed locally. Unlike Java, 

which is a platform-independent programming language, ActiveX controls are distributed 

as executable binaries, and must be separately compiled for each target machine and 

operating system. 

ActiveX Technologies: ActiveX is an ambiguous term, since it refers to a set of 

technologies under a common banner. Web users normally encounter ActiveX 

technology in the form of ActiveX controls, ActiveX documents, or ActiveX scripting. 

• ActiveX controls, formerly known as Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) 

controls, are components (or objects) of prepackaged functionality that can be 

inserted into a Web page or other application for reuse. ActiveX controls are 

included with Microsoft Internet Explorer to allow Web pages to be enlivened 

with sophisticated formatting features, special effects, and animation. 

• ActiveX documents allow an ActiveX-enabled Web browser to open an 

application, with the application’s own toolbars and menus available, and serve 

as its container. This allows non-HTML native-formatted files, such as 

Microsoft Excel or Microsoft Word files, to be opened and manipulated 

seamlessly when encountered by the browser. 

• ActiveX scripting refers to enhancements to VBScript and JavaScript to interact 

with ActiveX controls. ActiveX scripting can be used to integrate the behavior of 

several ActiveX controls and/or Java applications from the Web browser or 

server, extending their functionality. 

The ActiveX security model is considerably different from the Java sandbox model 

[Ste00]. The Java model restricts the permissions of applets to a set of safe actions. 

ActiveX, on the other hand, places no restrictions on what a control can do. Instead, 

ActiveX controls are digitally signed by their author under a technology scheme called 

Authenticode. The digital signatures are verified using identity certificates issued by a 

trusted certificate authority to an ActiveX software publisher. For an ActiveX publisher's 

certificate to be granted, the software publisher must pledge that no harmful code will be 

knowingly distributed under this scheme. The Authenticode process ensures that ActiveX 

controls cannot be distributed anonymously and that tampering with the controls can be 

detected. This certification process, however, does not ensure that a control will be well 

behaved. Thus, the ActiveX security model assigns the responsibility for the computer 

system's security to the user. 

Before the browser downloads an unsigned ActiveX control, or a control whose 

corresponding publisher's certificate was issued by an unknown certifying authority, the 

browser presents a dialog box warning the user that this action may not be safe. The user 

can choose to abort the transfer, or may continue the transfer if they assume the source is 

trustworthy or they are willing to assume the risk. Users may not be aware of the security 

implications of their decision, which may have serious repercussions. Even when the user 

is well informed, attackers may trick the user into approving the transfer. In the past 

attackers have exploited implementation flaws to cover the user dialogue window with 

another that displays an unobtrusive message such as “Do you want to continue?” while 

exposing the positive indication button needed to launch active content. More recently, an 

individual revealed another avenue for attack – the Authenticode certificates themselves – 
TECHNOLOGY RELATED RISKS 



by successfully posing as an employee of a well-known software manufacturer and 

receiving a class 3, software publisher certificate from a respected certification authority 

for public key certificates [Ver01]. This exploit opened the door for possible production 

and distribution of malicious ActiveX controls, appearing to come from the manufacturer. 

An ActiveX-enabled browser provides an ideal vehicle for malicious code delivery. Once 

downloaded, the control is automatically executed without the victim having to take any 

conscious action. Members of the Chaos Computer Club, an infamous German hacking 

group, developed and demonstrated an ActiveX control that, under the pretense of 

displaying a graphic image to the user, accessed a popular accounting software package 

installed on the user’s computer and transferred money from the user’s bank account to 

their own [CNET97, Gil97]. Recent versions of Internet Explorer allow the user to 

customize the behavior of ActiveX controls depending on whether they are downloaded 

from a site on the Internet, a site on the local area network, or a site belonging to sets of 

identified trusted and untrusted sites. 

'HVNWRS $SSOLFDWLRQ 0DFURV

Developers of popular spreadsheet, word processing, and other desktop applications 

created macros to allow users to automate and customize repetitive tasks. A macro, in its 

simplest form, is a series of menu selections, keystrokes, and commands recorded and 

assigned a name or key combination. When the macro name is called or the macro key 

combination is pressed, the steps in the macro are executed from beginning to end. 

Macros are used to shorten long menu sequences as well as to create miniature programs 

within an application. More complex macro languages often include programming 

controls (IF, THEN GOTO, WHILE, etc.) and language features that make them 

comparable to a scripting language. A virus can be written into a macro stored in a 

spreadsheet or a word processing document. When the document is opened for viewing or 

use, the macro is executed and the virus is activated. It can also attach itself to subsequent 

documents that are saved with the same macro. For these reasons, under normal 

circumstances desktop applications should not be configured to open automatically for 

another desktop application, such as a browser or electronic mail client, which receives 

untrusted content. 

The recent Melissa virus is an example of the risk involved [Sha99]. A Microsoft Word 

document containing a malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macro propagated 

itself through the Internet by sending the host document as an electronic mail attachment 

addressed to contacts found in the previous victim’s address book. A contact opening the 

attachment permits the macro to execute and the virus to take hold. VBA is an integral 

part of MS Office applications, included as a means for developers to build custom 

solutions within that environment. VBA is a superset of VBScript and offers the same 

automation and customization capabilities, but within the context of a desktop application. 

At least one other vendor, Corel, licenses and supports Microsoft’s VBA in its products. 

The newer generation of electronic mail applications, including the ones built into Web 

browsers, support HTML content and MIME attachments. Since active content provides 

many avenues for exploits, such enclosures should be opened only after due consideration 

of the inherent risks. The problem lies in the dual roles for which HTML is being used. 

On the one hand, HTML is surpassing plain, non-tagged ASCII as a common means for 

composing and exchanging documents. On the other hand, HTML is also being used as 

an environment to house such things as scripting languages, Java applets, and ActiveX 
TECHNOLOGY RELATED RISKS 



components. By combining the flexibility to send and receive HTML content with its 

ability to embody scripts and other forms of programs that have full access to memory and 

files, the potential for abuse becomes self-evident. 

3OXJLQV

Plug-ins are native code modules that work in conjunction with software applications to 

enhance their capabilities. Plug-ins are often added to Web browsers to enable them to 

support new types of content (audio, video, etc.). Increasingly, plug-ins are also being 

devised for electronic mail and other desktop software to extend their functionality. Such 

plug-ins can be downloaded from either the browser vendor’s site or a third party site. 

Browsers typically prompt the user to download a new plug-in when a document that 

requires functionality beyond the browser’s current capabilities. Although plug-ins allow 

browsers to support new types of content, they are not active content in and of themselves, 

but simply executables that enable active content technologies. Windows Media player, 

RealPlayer, ThingViewer, QuickTime, ShockWave and Flash are all examples of plug-ins 

that allow browsers to support new content types ranging from audio, video, interactive 

animation, three-dimensional animation effects, and other forms of “new media.” Thus, 

there are two security concerns with plug-ins: the behavior of active content processed by 

an installed plug-in, and the behavior of the plug-in executables themselves once they are 

downloaded and installed. 

For instance, the ShockWave plug-in from Macromedia provides the ability to render 

multimedia presentations created in a compatible format, as they are downloaded. By 

design, ShockWave content supports the Lingo interpretative language as an aid to 

presentation development. When creating a ShockWave presentation, the author can 

include custom code using Lingo. Early versions of Lingo allowed the author to make 

local system calls based on the platform executing the content, potentially allowing 

malicious code to be downloaded as part of the presentation. 

From a security standpoint, plug-ins are executable code and, therefore, precautions 

should be exercised in obtaining and installing them, as with any other software 

application. Downloading free software code and authorizing its installation by simply 

clicking an “Install now” or an equivalent button is risky. Downloading plug-ins directly 

from a reputable manufacturer is normally less risky, but even in this case, it is difficult for 

the user to be always aware of the security implications. In the past, unwanted side effects 

such as changes to browser security settings and tracking of a user’s content preferences, 

however well intentioned, have occurred. Plug-ins designed to animate cursors or 

hyperlinks have also been designed to track user preferences and viewing habits across a 

particular Web site more accurately. Although these additional capabilities may improve 

the user's experience with a particular Web site, the privacy and security implications are 

often not readily disclosed [Mar00]. Even if the site has a valid identity certificate 

associated with the signed downloaded code, that only tells the user that the manufacturer 

of the code has been verified by a certificate authority, but not whether the code obtained 

from them will behave non-maliciously or correctly. Users of plug-ins should be 

cautioned to read the fine print before agreeing to download executables, and take 

adequate measures to backup the system in the event of problems. 

Assessing Risk: Using general categories such as high, medium, and low, a 

practical assessment of technology risks can be made on a qualitative, rather than 
TECHNOLOGY RELATED RISKS 



quantitative, basis. For example, the following ranking of relative risk, ordered from 

low to high, can be determined from the previously discussed active content 

technologies with respect to the execution environment of a browser: 

• Portable Document Format 

• ShockWave Low 

• JavaScript and VBScript 

• Java Applets 

• PostScript Medium 

• Visual Basic for Applications 

• ActiveX Controls High 

Because these technologies are associated with products that are regularly updated 

with enhanced features, the relative ranking of a technology may change over time. 

Moreover, one could legitimately argue moving a technology at the fringe of one 

category to an adjacent category, based on changing circumstances. For example, 

because of the ubiquity of JavaScript and VBScript, their high degree of coupling to 

email clients or other services, and a heightened frequency of detected 

vulnerabilities, the risk associated with these technologies could be raised from Low 

to Medium. Similarly, because of Java’s extensive security mechanisms and 

lowered frequency of detected vulnerabilities, the associated risk could be dropped 

from Medium to Low. Choosing whether a particular active content technology is 

right for an organization requires a continual balancing of the associated risks 

against the perceived benefits. 

While the focus of this discussion has been mainly on the consumer side of the 

equation, consideration of the producer side is warranted as well. Often, one 

technology may be traded off for a lower risk technology without much difficulty. For 

instance, some ActiveX functionality may be programmed in Java and some Java 

functionality may be carried out with a scripting language. Similarly, a less 

troublesome document format may be substituted for another, such as using PDF 

or Rich Text Format (RTF) in lieu of PostScript or a proprietary word processing file 

format. 

&*, DQG 5HODWHG ,QWHUIDFHV

Unlike the above technologies, CGI and other similar server interfaces fall on the producer 

side of the producer-consumer model. CGI applications can be written in most 

programming languages to run on a Web server. More often than not, a server-side 

scripting language such as Perl (Practical extraction and report language) is used for this 

purpose, because of its flexibility, compactness, and facility. If scripts are not prepared 

carefully, however, attackers can find and exercise flaws in the code to penetrate a Web 

server. Therefore, scripts must be written with security in mind and, for example, should 

not run arbitrary commands on a system or launch insecure programs. An attacker can 

find flaws through trial and error and does not necessarily need the source code for the 

script to uncover vulnerabilities. 
TECHNOLOGY RELATED RISKS 



Two general areas exist where CGI applications can create security vulnerabilities at the 

server: 

• They may intentionally or unintentionally leak information about the host system 

that can aid an attacker, for example, by allowing access to information outside 

the areas designated for Web use. 

• When processing user-provided input, such as the contents of a form, URL 

parameters, or a search query, they may be vulnerable to attacks whereby the user 

tricks the application into executing arbitrary commands supplied in the input 

stream. 

Ideally, server-side scripts should constrain users to a small set of well-defined 

functionality and validate the size and values of input parameters so that an attacker cannot 

overrun memory boundaries or piggy back arbitrary commands for execution. In the 

event that a script does contain flaws, it should be run only with minimal privileges (i.e., 

non-administrator) to avoid compromising the entire Web site. However, potential 

security holes can be exploited even when CGI applications run with low privilege 

settings. For example, a subverted script could have enough privileges to mail out the 

system password file, examine the network information maps, or launch a login to a high 

numbered port. 

The two areas of vulnerability mentioned potentially affect all Web servers. While these 

vulnerabilities have frequently occurred with CGI applications, other related interfaces and 

techniques for developing server applications have not been immune. CGI being an early 

and well-supported standard has simply gained more notoriety over the years, and the 

same areas of vulnerability exist when applying similar Web development technologies at 

the server. 

6DIHJXDUGV

Safeguards are approved security measures taken to prevent or reduce the risk of system 

compromise. To protect computational resources from attack, appropriate safeguards, 

such as hardware and software mechanisms, policies, procedures, and physical controls, 

must be in place. A number of steps can be taken to mitigate the risks in using active 

content. Overall, there are two main approaches to follow: avoidance – staying 

completely clear of known and potential vulnerabilities, and harm reduction – applying 

measures to limit the potential loss due to exposure. The following sections highlight 

some of the more useful safeguards one can apply. 

6HFXULW\ 3ROLF\

A security policy is the set of rules, principles, and practices that determine how an 

organization implements its security. A policy reflects an organization's view on required 

safeguards, based on a consideration of its assets, the impact of loss or compromise, and 

the threat environment. Information security in any organization is largely dependent on 

the quality of the security policy and the processes that an organization imposes on itself. 

No amount of technology can overcome a badly implemented, poorly planned, or 

nonexistent security policy. If the policy is not stated clearly and consistently, and not 
SAFEGUARDS 



made known and enforced throughout an organization, it creates a situation ripe for 

exploitation. 

Therefore, having or establishing an organizational security policy is an important first 

step in applying safeguards for active content. For example, an Internet security policy 

can address enabling Java, JavaScript, or ActiveX on an individual user's Web browser in 

various ways: 

 Functionality must be disallowed completely. 

 Functionality is allowed, but only from internal organizational servers. 

 Functionality is allowed, but only from trusted external servers. 

 Functionality is allowed from any server. 

One practical difficulty is that functionality invariably takes precedence over security in 

product marketing and consumer demand. Often new technology products are in use 

within an organization years before the security policy is written to guide employees. For 

example, the Department of Defense (DoD) has recently completed formulating its policy 

and guidance on mobile code technology [DoD00]. The policy delineates three categories 

of technology based on increasing associated risk. Category 1, the most dangerous, 

includes ActiveX and script languages interpreted at the operating system command level. 

Category 2 includes Java mobile code, PostScript, and various scripting languages running 

within the confines of a desktop application. Category 3 includes Shockwave Flash 

content, PDF, and VBScript and ECMAscript-variant scripting languages interpreted 

within the confines of a browser. Any mobile code technology not yet assigned to a 

category by DoD falls into category 1 by default. Where possible, the policy distinguishes 

between signed and unsigned code, favoring the former over the latter. 

While the policy comes many years after the respective technology’s debut in products, 

the DoD started to address the problem early, relative to most other organizations. Yet, on 

the horizon are technologies, allowing entire processes (i.e., code, accumulated data, and 

execution state) to move among host computers, which go beyond mobile code and the 

limits of classical computer security. 

5LVN $QDO\VLV DQG 0DQDJHPHQW

Security involves continually analyzing and managing risks. Any such analysis must 

identify vulnerabilities and threats, anticipate potential attacks, assess their likelihood of 

success, and estimate the potential damage from successful attacks. Experience has shown 

that use of active content technologies involves risk, since they are frequently 

accompanied by new vulnerabilities. Risk management is the process of assessing risk, 

taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level, and maintaining that level of risk. One 

of the most significant security pieces missing from most organizations is an on-going 

practice of risk analysis and management. 

Because security is relative to each organization, it must be tailored to an organization’s 

specific needs, budget, and culture. For example, an attack launched against one 

organization might succeed easily and compromise extremely important information, but 

against another organization would only result in minimal damage, perhaps because of an 
SAFEGUARDS 



absence of sensitive data. Companies, much like people, have personalities with differing 

comfort levels on the amount of risk that is reasonable, which also influence this process. 

Once an assessment is made, safeguards can be put in place against those attacks deemed 

significantly high by either reducing the likelihood of occurrence or minimizing the 

consequences of the attack. Different safeguards are employed to meet an organization’s 

specific needs. 

Recently, the General Accounting Office (GAO) analyzed and summarized information 

security weaknesses identified in audit reports of federal agencies [GAO00], issued from 

July 1999 through August 2000. They noted that most of the organizations reviewed had 

not adopted systematic, thorough practices for evaluating system vulnerabilities and for 

reducing risk. 

“Despite the importance of this aspect of an information security program, poor 

security planning and management continues to be a widespread problem. As noted 

earlier, of the 21 agencies for which this aspect of security was reviewed, all had 

deficiencies. Many of these agencies had not developed security plans for major 

systems based on risk, had not documented security policies, and had not 

implemented a program for testing and evaluating the effectiveness of the controls 

they relied on. As a result, agencies (1) were not fully aware of the information 

security risks to their operations, (2) had accepted an unknown level of risk by default 

rather than consciously deciding what level of risk was tolerable, (3) had a false sense 

of security because they were relying on controls that were not effective, and (4) could 

not make informed judgments as to whether they were spending too little or too much 

of their resources on security.” 

To help remedy the problem, GAO has developed a guide on implementing an 

information security risk assessment process [GAO99]. It contains examples, or case 

studies, of practical risk assessment procedures, which have been adopted by several 

organizations that have successfully established good risk assessment practices. The guide 

also identifies factors that are important to the success of any risk assessment program, 

regardless of the specific methodology employed. 

(YDOXDWHG ,QIRUPDWLRQ 7HFKQRORJ\

Where appropriate, consideration should be given to using information technology 

products that have undergone a formal security evaluation. Products that quarantine or 

block the behavior of active content are coming onto the market and at least one has 

undergone formal evaluation. The Evaluation Criteria for Information Technology (IT) 

Security, more commonly known as the Common Criteria (CC), is the prevailing 

international standard for specifying and evaluating the security features of computer 

products and systems [IS15408]. The National Information Assurance Partnership 

(NIAP), jointly sponsored by NIST and NSA, has responsibility for CC related activities 

within the US. The focus of a CC security evaluation is primarily on the correctness and 

effectiveness of the design, under the well-founded principle that a sound design enables a 

secure implementation, but an unsound design is hopelessly doomed. Products that have 

undergone other, less formal forms of third-party testing and evaluation also merit 

consideration over those lacking such scrutiny. However, an evaluated product absent a 

needed security capability might be less preferable to a product having a lower level of 

assurance that offers such a capability. A more detailed recommendation for Federal 
SAFEGUARDS 



Organizations on the acquisition and use of evaluated and tested products is available 

elsewhere [Rob00]. 

Note that using tested and evaluated software does not necessarily ensure a secure 

operational environment. The way in which a product is applied and composed with other 

system components affects security. Even when a product does successfully complete a 

formal security evaluation, it may contain vulnerabilities. For example, one of the most 

common attacks, if not the most common, is through a buffer overflow, whereby the input 

to a defined programming interface is carefully crafted to overwrite memory beyond the 

input buffer limit with instructions designed to gain control of the process. Most people 

would probably expect a security evaluation to include a systematic search and elimination 

of buffer overflows. Unfortunately, it does not. While evaluators test the implementation 

for known security vulnerabilities, and at more stringent levels even attempt penetrations, 

a systematic search of buffer overflow vulnerabilities is out of scope due mainly to cost. 

Automatic discovery of buffer overflow vulnerabilities within code is a research challenge. 

6HFXULW\ $XGLW

An increasing popular approach for measuring the security posture of an organization is 

through a formal security audit. Audits ensure that policies and controls already 

implemented are operating correctly and effectively. Audits can include static analysis of 

policies, procedures, and safeguards as well as active probing of the systems external and 

internal security mechanisms. The results of an audit identify the strengths and 

weaknesses of the security of the system and provide a list of noted deficits for resolution, 

typically ranked by degree of severity. Because the security posture of a system evolves 

over time, audits are most effective when done on a reoccurring basis. 

While periodic formal audits are useful, they are not a replacement for day-to-day 

management of the security status of a system. Enabling system logs and reviewing their 

contents manually or through automated reports summaries can sometimes be the best 

means of uncovering unauthorized behavior and detecting security problems. A wellpublicized example of this is documented in Cliff Stoll’s book, The Cuckoo's Egg, where a 

75-cent accounting error appearing in a computer log eventually leads to the discovery of 

an industrial espionage ring. Some security product manufacturers’ sites, such as finjan 

software’s site (http://www.finjan.com/mcrc/test.cfm), offer the ability to launch nonmalicious examples of common attacks involving active content, to test the security 

posture of a personal computer. 

$SSOLFDWLRQ 6HWWLQJV

The desktop applications that handle active content documents typically have built-in 

controls that can be used to control or prevent access. For example, both Netscape and 

Microsoft Web browsers have options or preferences menus that can be used to select 

appropriate security settings regarding downloadable active content. The National 

Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NSTISSC) 

has recently issued an advisory memorandum on Web browser security [NAM00] that 

outlines steps to lower associated risks through tightly controlled configurations. 

Electronic mail, spreadsheet, word processor, database, and presentation graphic desktop 

software applications have control settings similar to those of a browser and demand 

scrutiny in light of past exploits. For example, the ability of many electronic mail 

applications to render HTML formatted content can be controlled to disallow or disable 
SAFEGUARDS 



any executable content. Tight functional binding among desktop applications is a concern, 

particularly where automatic rendering of multi-part or composite documents is enabled. 

Even today, products are delivered with insecure default settings. It behooves the user of 

such applications to become familiar with the security options available and use them in 

accordance with organizational policy. 

9HUVLRQ &RQWURO

Administrators of systems can gain better security by routinely applying security patches 

when they become available. This is a well-known and effective remedy, but for a variety 

of reasons also a well-ignored one. Users and administrators can also take advantage of 

security enhancements to applications that they manage by upgrading to newer versions, 

when appropriate. Updating software products automatically over the Web is becoming 

increasingly popular, as the benefits are considerable. For example, users of Microsoft 

Windows 98 and above can use a built-in Windows update feature to find bug fixes and 

product updates and download them automatically from the Web. Using this feature, 

however, requires the downloading of an ActiveX control that scans the computer for any 

needed updates particular to software already installed. Microsoft’s Web site states that 

none of this information is sent over the Internet or back to Microsoft. As this practice 

becomes more commonplace, users must be aware of their implicit decision to allow a 

vendor to run software on their machine and act accordingly, following prescribed policy. 

,QFLGHQW 5HVSRQVH +DQGOLQJ

No matter how well an organization’s security program is executed, inevitably, a security 

breach will occur in a system. Besides adopting reasonable precautions for securing 

computer systems and networks, one must also establish the ability to respond quickly and 

efficiently when a security incident occurs. A security incident is an adverse event or 

situation involving a networked information system that poses a threat to the integrity, 

confidentiality, or availability of computational resources. Examples of incidents include 

unauthorized use of an account, unauthorized elevation of system privileges, and 

execution of malicious code that corrupts data or other code. Incidents may result in a 

partial or complete loss of security controls, an attempted or actual compromise of data, or 

the waste, fraud, abuse, loss or damage of computational resources. Active content has 

played an increasingly significant role in security incidents. Responding to computer 

security incidents effectively requires a significant amount of preparation. Incident 

response activities require technical knowledge as well as effective communication and 

coordination among personnel who respond to the incident, in order to return the system as 

quickly as possible to normal operations. Proper periodic backup of critical files is a key 

ingredient in recovering from the adverse effects of an incident. 

$XWRPDWHG )LOWHUV

Once forms of malicious content have been identified and understood, they can be 

selectively detected and eliminated or completely blocked from entry. For example, 

firewalls can be augmented to filter certain types of electronic mail attachments and Web 

content that have known malicious code characteristics, and reject them at a point of entry. 

Anti-virus software has also become increasingly capable of detecting malicious code 

signatures within active content. 
SAFEGUARDS 



Besides ingress filtering, egress filtering is also useful in denying unacceptable actions 

originating from internal hosts. Strange or unexpected, but not necessarily unacceptable, 

transmissions from internal hosts may signal that they have been compromised in some 

way. Intrusion detection systems provide an additional safeguard for screening network 

and host behavior and provide notification when either inappropriate or unusual event 

sequences occur, or signatures of known exploits are matched. 

While firewalls, anti-virus software, and intrusion detection tools provide useful 

safeguards, they are not foolproof. Constructing a program to detect with certainty the 

presence or absence of harmful code within arbitrary programs or protocol is impossible. 

Moreover, a variety of techniques exist for deception such as mutation, segmentation, and 

disguise via extended character set encoding. Thus, screening tools are faced with the 

prospect of diminishing returns – greater investments are needed for small increases in 

effectiveness. Despite services to refresh protection software with signatures of known 

exploits, and cascaded defense-in-depth measures, apart from total isolation, there is no 

guarantee that something harmful cannot get through. 

%HKDYLRUDO &RQWUROV

While nearly all interpretive execution environments, such as those supported by Web 

browsers and desktop applications, impose restrictions on the languages they process and 

execute, those restrictions may not be sufficient for all organizations. For such situations, 

imposing additional or redundant restraints on the code’s behavior as it executes (e.g., 

privilege or function) might be appropriate. Conceptually, behavior controls can be 

viewed as a software cage or quarantine mechanism that dynamically intercepts and 

thwarts attempts by the subject code to take unacceptable actions that violate policy. As 

with firewall and anti-virus products, technologies that dynamically restrain mobile code 

were born out of necessity to supplement existing mechanisms, and represent an emerging 

class of security product. Such products are intended to complement firewall and antivirus products that respectively block network transactions or mobile code based on 

predefined signatures (i.e., content inspection), and may refer to technologies such as 

dynamic sandbox, dynamic monitors, and behavior monitors, used for controlling the 

behavior of mobile code [Vib01]. In addition to mobile code, this class of product may 

also be applicable to stationary code or downloaded code whose trustworthiness is in 

doubt. 

5HDGHUV

Occasionally, manufacturers of desktop applications provide free software readers, which 

can interpret their proprietary file formats for document recipients who do not own the 

application. The Adobe Acrobat Reader, for example, allows users to view and print PDF 

files, but does not allow users to create or edit them. Since software readers are only 

intended to produce a viewable rendition of the document and have limited inherent 

capabilities, they bypass many potentially harmful features and exploits based on 

implementation vulnerabilities contained in the full-fledged application. Besides 

manufacturer-provided readers, general-purpose software readers are commercially 

available, which can render dozens of different file formats. 

A related measure is the selection of less capable types of active content documents, when 

multiple choices are offered. Some Web sites offer an electronic document in a variety of 

formats such as proprietary word processor format, PostScript, or PDF. While PDF 
SAFEGUARDS 



represents text and graphics using the PostScript language-imaging model, PDF is not a 

programming language and does not support macros, making it the safest alternative. 

Whenever possible, content providers and site operators should strive to provide material 

encoded in less harmful document formats. For example, when document distillers are not 

available to convert textual documents into PDF, a good alternative is to make available a 

version in “.rtf”, rich text format, rather than a proprietary word processing format. 

'LJLWDO 6LJQDWXUH

A digital signature is an unforgeable code computed over a document or other information 

that uniquely identifies the signer who computed it. When applied properly, a digital 

signature serves as a means of confirming the authenticity of an object, its origin, and its 

integrity. Because of these characteristics, digital signatures are involved in most 

authentication schemes. For example, the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, built into 

most browsers and Web servers, relies on digital signatures for authenticating the parties 

involved in a transaction. When applied to mobile code, the code signer is typically the 

individual or organization that created the code. 

Digital signatures involve public key cryptography, which relies on a pair of keys 

associated with an entity. One key is kept private by the signing entity and the other is 

made publicly available. Passing mobile code through a non-reversible hash function 

provides a fingerprint or message digest of the code. Applying a digital signature function 

to the message digest using the private key of the signer forms a digital signature. A 

recipient uses the signer’s public key to verify the signature conveyed with the code. The 

digital signature is in effect an integrity mechanism, since changes to the code would 

invalidate the signature and, thus, be detectable by the recipient. Digital signatures benefit 

greatly from the availability of a Public Key Infrastructure, since certificates containing the 

identity of an entity and its public key (i.e., a public key certificate) can be readily located 

and verified. This allows the code, signature, and public key certificate to be forwarded to 

a recipient, who can easily verify the source and authenticity of the code. 

When appropriate, digital signatures should be considered for use in applications 

involving active content, to not only verify the identities of the various parties involved, 

but also confirm the integrity of any mobile code and the acceptability of the code’s 

author. Note that the meaning of a signature may be different depending on the policy 

associated with the signature scheme and the party who signs. For example, the author of 

some code, either an individual or organization, may use a digital signature to indicate 

who produced the code, but not to guarantee that the agent performs without fault or error. 

In fact, author-oriented signature schemes, such as Microsoft's Authenticode, were 

originally intended to serve as digital shrink wrap, whereby the original product warranty 

limitations stated in the license remain in effect (e.g., the manufacturer makes no 

warranties as to the fitness of the product for any particular purpose). Many users, 

however, misinterpret the significance of such a signature scheme beyond its original 

intent of establishing the authenticity of distributed software. Instead, for them it has 

become a form of trust in the software’s behavior, which could ultimately have disastrous 

consequences. 

,VRODWLRQ

Isolation can be applied at various levels. The simplest is complete isolation at the system 

level. A production computer system that is unable to receive active content documents 
SAFEGUARDS 



cannot be affected by malicious hidden code. Although isolating a system physically is 

not always possible, logical isolation (e.g., via router settings or firewall controls) may be 

applied, at least partially. For example, risky functions, such as Web browsing, may be 

restricted to trusted sites only or confined to a second system designated and configured 

exclusively for that purpose. Often older or spare systems are available, which could be 

put to good use this way. 

Isolating tightly bounded, proprietary program components is another alternative. 

Seamless interoperation of products such as electronic mail, Web browsers, and office 

applications is a goal of product manufacturers. To provide better functionality or 

performance, manufacturers often allow products within their product line to take 

advantage of little known or undocumented programming interfaces, which from time-totime has lead to unwanted or insecure side effects. By integrating products from different 

manufacturers, one can effectively isolate program components from using all but the 

standard documented interfaces. 

0LQLPDO )XQFWLRQDOLW\

Security is inversely related to complexity – the more complex a system, the more difficult 

it is to secure. Prudent users and administrators should remove unnecessary applications 

and program components to reduce complexity and shut off possible avenues of attack. 

Though a system configuration may have a function logically disabled, a clever attacker 

may be able to alter the settings to enable the functionality and then use it in an exploit. 

On the browser side, unnecessary plug-ins or ActiveX controls should be removed. On 

the server side, any unnecessary software not needed in providing Web services must go 

as well, particularly any development tools that could be used to further an attack, should 

an intruder gain an initial foothold. 

/HDVW 3ULYLOHJH

The principle of least privilege states that programs should operate only with the privileges 

needed to accomplish their functions. During application development, it is easier to run 

code at the highest level, with the intention of paring back privileges in the production 

deployment. Unfortunately, the privilege reduction step is easy to overlook and often is. 

For example, Unix developers may enhance the server using Set-User-ID (SUID) 

programs, which refer to code that run with privileges of the owner (e.g., root) regardless 

of who is executing them. SUID programs, particularly those owned by root, can be 

dangerous because if subverted, they allow an intruder to gain control with the owner’s 

privilege. Running the code instead with the minimum privileges needed, restricts the 

range of access to the intruder, if an attack is successful. Similarly, on the browser side, 

any mobile code received should be constrained to the minimal privileges needed. The 

recent versions of the Java Virtual Machine environment, for example, offer the user the 

ability to set fine-grained permission controls for incoming applets. 

/D\HUHG DQG 'LYHUVH 'HIHQVHV

Defending an information system requires safeguards to be applied not only at points of 

entry, but also throughout it. Ideally, the selection and placement of security controls are 

done in such a way that all attacks are progressively weakened and eventually defeated. 

Having an identical control in succession tends to only lengthen the duration of the attack. 
SAFEGUARDS 



Applying different types of controls that complement each other and are mutually 

supportive is a much more effective approach. While the capabilities of available 

safeguards may overlap to some extent, their combined effect should be far greater than 

the sum of each individual effect. For example, if control A misses 30% of attacks and 

control B also misses 30%, in combination they should only miss about 9% (.3 x .3) of 

attacks. The previous sections mention a number of complementary safeguards that are 

available, including classes of products that employ firewall, anti-virus, intrusion 

detection, and behavior blocking technologies. 

6XPPDU\

Active content documents offer benefits to both the consumers and producers of such 

documents. The associated technologies are varied, yet sometimes similar and 

overlapping in function. Java applets, JavaScript, VBScript and ActiveX provide 

additional functionality to Web pages, while plug-ins, helper applications, and ActiveX 

controls enable browsers to support new types of content. PostScript offloads the 

processing and interpretation of the presentation of documents to the printer or display 

interpreter, and macros automate repetitive word processing and spreadsheet tasks. 

HTML, JavaScript, and Java are relatively platform independent and can run on current 

versions of both Internet Explorer (IE) and Netscape Navigator. VBScript and JavaScript 

can also be used to pass information between HTML, Java, and ActiveX components. 

The benefits of each of these active content technologies must be carefully weighed 

against the risks they pose. Security is not black or white, but shades of gray. When 

employing active content technology, security measures should be put in place to reduce 

risk to an acceptable level and to recover if an incident occurs. 

Informed security officers, administrators, and other IT professionals are responsible for 

developing security policies based on their organization’s specific security needs and level 

of acceptable risk. Unfortunately, rarely is there a “one size fits all” guideline that fits the 

unique needs of every organization. Thus, each organization must decide for itself what 

constitutes an acceptable level of risk and act accordingly. Establishing an organizational 

security policy is an important step in developing and applying appropriate security 

measures. The IT and security staff have a responsibility for keeping abreast of the risks 

associated with emerging technologies, by subscribing to security mailing lists and visiting 

vendor Web sites for information and updates to products used within their organization. 

As active content moves beyond desktop personal computers to mobile handheld or 

wearable devices, television sets, and other consumer electronic goods, users will be faced 

with competing and difficult tradeoffs of decreased privacy and security against increased 

functionality and ease-of-use. 

Before handling active content documents, consider seriously the following checklist, 

which summarizes some recommendations drawn from the material presented in the 

previous sections: 

 Develop (or follow) the enterprise security policy regarding active content. 

 Identify and assess the risk to critical information resources from active content. 
SUMMARY 



 Audit systems on a regular basis to ensure the security policy is implemented correctly 

and remains effective. 

 Identify critical information resources and maintain regular backups. 

 Become knowledgeable of the security settings of desktop applications and turn off 

unneeded functionality. 

 Keep systems current with the latest software upgrades and patches that address 

security vulnerabilities in desktop applications, such as Web browsers, readers, and 

electronic mail, and other critical software. 

 Obtain all software through approved distribution channels. 

 Evaluate and install virus scanners, firewalls, active content filters, and dynamic 

behavior monitors according to enterprise security requirements. Keep these products 

upgraded to the latest version. 

 Read the fine print before agreeing to download application software and plug-ins. 

 Institutionalize how needed plug-ins and freeware are obtained from software 

manufactures, evaluated, and distributed throughout the organization. 

 Do not peruse active content or run downloaded software from untrusted sources. 

Enable ActiveX code only from trusted Web sites that require its use. 

 Create and distribute active content documents only after carefully considering the 

risk and benefits. Where possible, use forms of active content that poses the least risk 

 Consider using an isolated system and safe browser settings when visiting untrusted 

Web sites. 

 Limit the applications installed on a system, deleting any that are not used or no 

longer needed. 

 Disable JavaScript and any other active content processing capabilities within 

electronic mail desktop applications that are capable of handling HTML or other mark 

up language encoded messages. 

 Do not open active content documents or execute any electronic mail attachments, 

without first verifying them with the sender. Be especially wary of attachments to 

electronic chain mails forwarded from or through friends. 

 Keep informed of latest security advisories from either the Federal Computer Incident 

Response Center (FedCIRC) or the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) 

Coordination Center, and subscribe to security mailing lists. 

 Periodically crosscheck products against published lists of known vulnerabilities, such 

as the NIST ICAT vulnerability database, which provides pointers to solution 

resources and patch information. 

 Regularly audit systems and networks, quickly remedying any deficits noted. 
SUMMARY 



 Know who to contact and what steps to take when discovering evidence of an 

intrusion. 

One typical and common sense approach is to improve the security infrastructure 

incrementally over time. At each step, apply safeguards against the most critical risk 

items. For example, start inexpensively with firewalls and gateway servers capable of 

screening active content and executable electronic mail attachments, and successfully 

defending against a high percentage of Internet launched attacks. Later, for additional 

protection, complement anti-virus software with behavioral controls, intrusion detection 

capabilities, or other technologies. Regular site security audits also help to identify 

vulnerabilities and appropriate safeguards, and to decide whether the remaining risks 

warrant further expenditures of time and money. 

7HUPLQRORJ\

The following definitions highlight important concepts used throughout this document: 

$FWLYH &RQWHQW

Active content refers to electronic documents that can carry out or trigger actions 

automatically on a computer platform without the intervention of a user. Active content 

technologies allow mobile code associated with a document to execute as the document is 

rendered. 

%XIIHU 2YHUIORZ

As the name implies, a buffer overflow is a condition at an interface under which more 

input can be placed into a buffer or data holding area than the capacity allocated, 

overwriting other information. Attackers exploit such a condition to crash a system or to 

insert specially crafted code that allows them to gain control of the system. 

&RPSXWHU 9LUXV

A computer virus is similar to a Trojan horse insofar as it is a program that hides within a 

program or data file and performs some unwanted function when activated. The main 

difference is that a virus can replicate by attaching a copy of itself to other programs or 

files, and may trigger an additional “payload” when specific conditions are met. 

&RRNLH

Cookies entail a piece of state information supplied by a Web server to a browser, in a 

response for a requested resource, for the browser to store temporarily and return to the 

server on any subsequent visits or requests. 

(DVWHU (JJ

An Easter egg is hidden functionality within an application program, which becomes 

activated when an undocumented, and often convoluted, set of commands and keystrokes 
TERMINOLOGY 



is entered. Easter eggs are typically used to display the credits for the development team 

and intended to be non-threatening. 

,QWHUSUHWHU

An interpreter is a program that processes a script or other program expression and carries 

out the requested action, in accordance with the language definition. 

0DFUR 9LUXV

A macro virus is a specific type of computer virus that is encoded as a macro embedded in 

some document and activated when the document is handled. Many desktop applications, 

such as word processors and spreadsheets, support powerful macro languages that can be 

exploited this way. 

0DOLFLRXV &RGH

Malicious code refers to programs that are written intentionally to carry out annoying or 

harmful actions. They often masquerade as useful programs or are embedded into useful 

programs, so that users are induced into activating them. Types of malicious code include 

Trojan horses, computer viruses, and worms. 

0RELOH &RGH

Mobile code refers to programs (e.g., script, macro, or other portable instruction) that can 

be shipped unchanged to a heterogeneous collection of platforms and execute with 

identical semantics. The term also applies to situations involving a large homogeneous 

collection of platforms (e.g., Microsoft Windows). 

5LVN

Risk is measure of the likelihood and the consequence of events or acts that could cause a 

system compromise, including the unauthorized disclosure, destruction, removal, 

modification, or interruption of system assets. 

6DIHJXDUGV

Safeguards are approved security measures taken to protect computational resources by 

eliminating or reducing the risk to a system. Available safeguards include hardware and 

software mechanisms, policies, procedures, and physical controls. Safeguards, put in 

place to counter a specific threat or attack, are also known as countermeasures. 

6FULSW

A script is a sequence of instructions, ranging from a simple list of operating system 

commands to full-blown programming language statements, which can be executed 

automatically by an interpreter. Unlike compiled programs, whose instructions are native 

to a class of computer processor, a script involves portable instructions that must be 

processed by an “interpreter” program to carry out the indicated action. 
TERMINOLOGY 



6FULSWLQJ /DQJXDJH

A scripting language defines the syntax and semantics for writing scripts. Typically, 

scripting languages follow the conventions of a simple programming language, but they 

can also take on a more basic form such as a macro or a batch file. JavaScript, VBScript, 

Tcl, Perl, and PHP are examples of scripting languages. 

6S\ZDUH

Spyware is a program embedded within an application that collects information and 

periodically communicates back to its home site, unbeknownst to the user. Spyware 

programs have been discovered within shareware or freeware programs, without 

notification of this hidden functionality given in the license agreement or elsewhere. 

7KUHDW

Threats are possible dangers to a computer system, which may result in the interception, 

alteration, obstruction, or destruction of computational resources, or in some other way 

disrupt the system. 

7URMDQ +RUVH

A Trojan horse is a useful or seemingly useful program that contains hidden code of a 

malicious nature. When the program is invoked, so is the undesired function whose 

effects may not become immediately obvious. The name stems from an ancient exploit of 

invaders' gaining entry to the city of Troy by concealing themselves in the body of a 

hollow wooden horse, presumed to be left behind by the invaders as a gift to the city. 

9XOQHUDELOLW\

Vulnerabilities are flaws or weaknesses in a computer system, its security procedures, 

internal controls, or design and implementation, which could be exploited to violate the 

system security policy. 

:HE %URZVHU

A browser refers to any collection of software that lets individuals view Web content, and 

includes the user interface, helper applications, language and byte code interpreters, and 

other similar program components. 

:HE %XJ

Web bugs are tiny images, invisible to a user, placed on Web pages in such a way to 

enable third parties to track use of Web servers and collect information about the user, 

including IP address, host name, browser type and version, operating system name and 

version, and cookies. 

:RUP

A worm is a self-replicating program that propagates itself through a network onto other 

computer systems. Unlike a virus, it is self-contained and does not require a host program 
TERMINOLOGY 



or any user intervention to replicate. Although worms are associated with malicious code 

nowadays, the concept was introduced originally as a means of building useful 

applications [Sho82]. 

2QOLQH5HVRXUFHV

A wealth of security information, which supplements this publication, is available on-line. 

Note that, in addition to this section, many of the publications in the reference section 

contain URLs for perusal by the reader. The following list of Web sites contains a number 

of notable government, industry, and university sites where one can begin to explore 

additional information on computer security. 

1,67 ,&$7 9XOQHUDELOLW\ 'DWDEDVH

ICAT is a searchable index of information on computer vulnerabilities. It provides a 

manufacturer and product oriented search capability at a fine granularity, and links users to 

vulnerability and patch information. http://icat.nist.gov

1,67 &RPSXWHU 6HFXULW\ 5HVRXUFH &OHDULQJKRXVH &65&

The CRSC contains current US security policy documents, calendar of events, security 

publications, training resources, and information on various computer security subjects. 

http://csrc.nist.gov

)%, 1DWLRQDO ,QIUDVWUXFWXUH 3URWHFWLRQ &HQWHU 1,3&

NIPC serves as the U.S. government's focal point for threat assessment, warning, 

investigation, and response for threats or attacks against the nation’s critical 

infrastructures, which include telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, water 

systems, government operations, and emergency services. http://www.nipc.gov

1DWLRQDO ,QIRUPDWLRQ $VVXUDQFH 3DUWQHUVKLS 1,$3

NIAP is a U.S. Government initiative to promote the development of technically sound 

security requirements for IT products and systems and appropriate metrics for evaluating 

those products and systems to meet the needs of both information technology (IT) 

producers and consumers. http://www.niap.nist.gov/

)HGHUDO &RPSXWHU ,QFLGHQW 5HVSRQVH &HQWHU )HG&,5&

FedCIRC provides a government focal point for incident reporting, handling, prevention, 

and recognition. http://www.fedcirc.gov/

&RPSXWHU (PHUJHQF\ 5HVSRQVH 7HDP &(57 &RRUGLQDWLRQ &HQWHU

CERT issues security advisories, helps start other incident response teams, coordinates the 

efforts of teams when responding to large-scale incidents, provides training to incident 

response professionals, and researches the causes of security vulnerabilities. 

http://www.cert.org/
ON-LINE RESOURCES 



::: &RQVRUWLXP 6HFXULW\ )$4

The World Wide Web Consortium site contains a repository of information about the Web 

for developers and users. http://www.w3.org/Security/Faq/

&HQWHU IRU (GXFDWLRQ DQG 5HVHDUFK LQ ,QIRUPDWLRQ $VVXUDQFH DQG 6HFXULW\

&(5,$6

CERIAS is a university center for multidisciplinary research and education in areas of 

information security (computer security, network security, and communications security), 

and information assurance. http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/

5,6.6 IRUXP

ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy forum advises on risks to the public in 

computers and related systems. http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/

0LFURVRIW ,QWHUQHW ([SORUHU 6HFXULW\ 3DJH

Microsoft posts information and code fixes for security problems in their products as soon 

as the information is available. http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ie/security/default.asp

1HWVFDSH 6HFXULW\ 3DJH

Netscape posts the latest news concerning the security of their browser, Web server, and 

development software. http://home.netscape.com/security/notes/

6XQ 0LFURV\VWHPV -DYD 6HFXULW\ 3DJH

Sum maintains the latest information Java Security, including answers to frequently asked 

questions, white papers, and articles. http://java.sun.com/security/

6\VWHP $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ 1HWZRUNLQJ DQG 6HFXULW\ 6$16 ,QVWLWXWH

The SANS community offers various types of products and services, including: system 

and security alerts, news updates, special research projects and publications, in-depth 

education, and certification. http://www.sans.org

5HIHUHQFHV

[Ado00a] Adobe Portable Document Format, Version 1.3, second edition, Adobe 

Systems Incorporated, July 2000, 

http://partners.adobe.com/asn/developer/acrosdk/DOCS/PDFRef.pdf

[Ado00b] “Security Update,” Adobe Systems Incorporated, 2000, 

http://www.adobe.com/misc/pdfsecurity.html
REFERENCES 



[Ado99] PostScript Language Reference, third edition, Adobe Systems Incorporated, 

February 1999, 

http://partners.adobe.com/asn/developer/PDFS/TN/PLRM.pdf

[Anu98] V. Anupam, A. Mayer, “Secure Web Scripting,” IEEE Internet Computing, 

vol. 2, no. 6, November/December 1998, pp. 46-55 

[Bec99] K. Beck, “Embracing Change with Extreme Programming,” IEEE Computer, 

vol. 32, issue 10, Oct. 1999, pp. 70 -77 

[Cle90] Robert E. Van Cleef, “New Roque Imperils Printers,” The Risks Digest, 

Volume 10, Issue 32, September 1990, 

http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/10.32.html

[Coh95] Fred Cohen, “Internet Holes: 50 Ways to Attack Your Web Systems,” 

Management Analytics, 1995, http://all.net/journal/netsec/9512.html

[CNET97] “ActiveX Used as Hacking Tool,” CNET News.com, February 7, 1997, 

http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-316425.html?tag=st.ne.ni.rnbot.rn.ni

[CSS1] Cascading Style Sheets – level 1 (CSS1), W3C Recommendation, January 

1999, http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-CSS1-19990111

[CSS2] Cascading Style Sheets – level 2, (CSS2), W3C Recommendation, May1998, 

http://www.w3.org/TR/1998/REC-CSS2-19980512

[Cus99] Michael A. Cusumano, David B. Yoffie, “Software Development on Internet 

Time,” IEEE Computer, October 1999, pp.60-69 

[Cza95] G. Czajkowski, T. von Eicken, “JRes: A Resource Accounting Interface for 

Java,” ACM Conference on Object Oriented Languages and Systems 

(OOPSLA), Vancouver, Canada, October 1998 

[DoD00] “Policy Guidance for Use of Mobile Code Technologies in Department of 

Defense (DoD) Information Systems,” Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Memorandum, November 7, 2000, 

http://www.c3i.osd.mil/org/cio/doc/mobile-code11-7-00.html

[ECMA99] ECMAScript Language Specification, 3rd edition, Standard ECMA-262, 

December 1999, ftp://ftp.ecma.ch/ecma-st/Ecma-262.pdf

[Fel97] Edward W. Felten et ali, “Web Spoofing: An Internet Con Game,” National 

Information Systems Security Conference, October 1997, 

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/sip/pub/spoofing.html

[Fis01] Dennis Fisher, “'Peachy' Virus Targets PDF Files,” Interactive Week, August 

8, 2001, 

http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/news/0,4164,2802558,00.html
REFERENCES 



[FTP] Postel, J., Reynolds, J., File Transfer Protocol (FTP), IETF Network Working 

Group, STD 9, RFC 959, October 1985, 

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0959.txt?number=959

[Fug98] A. Fuggetta, G. P. Picco, and G. Vigna, “Understanding Code Mobility,” 

IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 24(5), May 1998, pp. 342-361, 

http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~vigna/listpub.html

[GAO00] “Information Security: Serious and Widespread Weaknesses Persist at 

Federal Agencies,” United States General Accounting Office (GAO), 

GAO/AIMD-00-295, September 2000, 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ai00295.pdf

[GAO99] “Information Security Risk Assessment: Practices of Leading Organizations,” 

United States General Accounting Office (GAO), GAO/AIMD-00-33, 

November 1999, http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/ai00033.pdf

[Gil97] John Gilles, “Crackers Shuffle Cash with Quicken, ActiveX,” Wired News, 

February 7, 1997, 

http://www.wirednews.com/news/technology/0,1282,1943,00.html

[Gon98] L. Gong, “Java Security Architecture (JDK 1.2),” version 1.0, Sun 

Microsystems, October 1998, 

http://java.sun.com/products/jdk/1.2/docs/guide/security/spec/securityspec.doc.html

[Gos96] J. Gosling, H. McGilton, “The Java Language Environment: A White Paper,” 

Sun Microsystems, May 1996, http://SunSITE.sut.ac.jp/java/whitepaper/

[Hir99] Shane Hird, “Adobe Acrobat Viewer ActiveX Buffer Overflow 

Vulnerability,” September 27, 1999, http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/666

[HTML4] HTML 4.01 Specification, W3C Recommendation, December 1999, 

http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/

[HTTP] R. Fielding, J. Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Frystyk, L. Masinter, and T. Berners-Lee, 

Hypertext Transfer Protocol – HTTP/1.1, IETF Network Working Group, 

RFC 2616, June 1999, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt?number=2616

[Hug99] Paul Hughes, “Building a Web Browser,” THT Productions Inc., December 

1999 

[IS15408] Evaluation Criteria for Information Technology Security, ISO/IEC 

International Standard (IS) 15408, Parts 1 thru 3, JTC 1/SC 27, June 1999 

[Mar00] David Martin Jr., Richard Smith, Michael Brittain, Ivan Fetch, Hailin Wu, 

“The Privacy Practices of Web Browser Extensions,” Privacy Foundation, 

December 6, 2000, http://www.privacyfoundation.org/pdf/bea.pdf
REFERENCES 



[MIME] N.Borenstein and N. Freed, MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) 

Part One: Mechanisms for Specifying and Describing the Format of Internet 

Message Bodies, IETF Network Working Group, RFC 1521, September 

1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1521.txt?number=1521

[Mor98] John F. Morar, David M. Chess, “Web Browsers – Threat or Menace?” 

Virus Bulletin Conference, October 1998, 

http://www.research.ibm.com/antivirus/SciPapers/Chess/Threat/Threat.html

[NAM00] “Advisory Memorandum on Web Browser Security Vulnerabilities,” 

NSTISSAM INFOSEC 3-00, August 2000, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/secpubs/index.html#other

[Rob00] Ed Roback, “Guidelines to Federal Organizations on Security Assurance and 

Acquisition/Use of Tested/Evaluated Products,” NIST SP 800-23, August 

2000, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-23/sp800-23.pdf

[Sha99] Stephen Shankland, “Melissa's Mischief Hits All Sides,” CNET News.com, 

March 31, 1999, http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-

340611.html?tag=st.ne.ni.rnbot.rn.ni

[Sho82] Shoch, John F., and Jon A. Hupp, “The Worm Programs – Early Experience 

with a Distributed Computation,” Communications of the ACM Volume 25, 

Number 3, March 1982, pp. 172-180 

[Spe90] Henry Spencer, “Re: New Roque Imperils Printers,” The Risks Digest, 

Volume 10, Issue 35, September 1990, 

http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/10.35.html

[Ste00] Lincoln D. Stein, “The World Wide Web Security FAQ,” Version 2.0.1, 

March 2000, http://www.w3.org/Security/Faq/www-security-faq.html

[SUN01] Chronology of Security-related Bugs and Issues, Java Security, Sun 

Microsystems, February 2001, http://java.sun.com/sfaq/chronology.html

[Ven99] Venners, Bill, “A Walk through Cyberspace,” JavaWorld, December 1999, 

http://www.javaworld.com/javaworld/jw-12-1999/jw-12-jiniology.html

[Ver01] VeriSign Security Alert – Fraud Detected in Authenticode Code Signing 

Certificates, March 22, 20001, 

http://www.verisign.com/developer/notice/authenticode/

[Vib01] Robert Vibert, “AV Alternatives: Extending Scanner Range,” Information 

Security Magazine, February 2001, 

http://www.infosecuritymag.com/articles/february01/features_av_alternatives

.shtml

[Wer99] Werring, Laurentius, “ The Hidden Threat Within,” 11th Annual Canadian 

Information Technology Security Symposium, May 1999, pp. 201-214 
REFERENCES 



[WML] Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) Wireless Markup Language 

Specification, WAP-191, Version 1.3, WAP Forum, February 19, 2000, 

http://www1.wapforum.org/tech/documents/WAP-191-WML-20000219-

a.pdf

[XML1] Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0, Second Edition, W3C 

Recommendation, October 2000, http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/REC-xml20001006
ANNEXES 



$QQH[$2+7735HTXHVW0HWKRGV

• Table 1: Summary of Available Browser Request Methods 

Method Class Meaning 

OPTIONS Probe Get information about the 

communication options available 

GET Retrieval Retrieve the resource identified by 

URL 

HEAD Probe Retrieve meta-information (not 

content) about the identified resource 

POST Storage Send data to the server 

PUT Create/Replacement Send data to the server 

DELETE Removal Delete the identified resource 

TRACE Diagnostic Loop back this message 

CONNECT Server Error Reserved for SSL tunneling via a proxy 

$QQH[%2+7735HVSRQVH6WDWXV

• Table 2: Categories of Server Response Code 

Status Code Class Meaning 

1xx Informational Request was received; continuing 

process 

2xx Success The action was successfully received, 

understood, and accepted 

3xx Redirection Further action must be taken in order 

to complete the request 

4xx Client Error The request contains bad syntax or 

cannot be fulfilled 

5xx Server Error The server failed to fulfill an 

apparently valid request