United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

January 29, 2010 

The Honorable James L. Oberstar 

Chairman 

The Honorable John L. Mica 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings 

Chairman 

The Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Coast Guard: Service Has Taken Steps to Address Historic Personnel 

Problems, but It Is too Soon to Assess the Impact of These Efforts

During this decade, the Coast Guard has been challenged with expanded mission 

responsibilities, and concerns have been raised about whether sufficient personnel exist 

within the Coast Guard to fulfill these mission responsibilities. The terrorist attacks of 

September 11th resulted in additional and expanded security-related mission areas, while 

major natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, provided lessons learned in allocating 

personnel and other resources across Coast Guard units. However, the impact of 

expanding Coast Guard missions and the increasing nationwide need for mission-ready 

Coast Guard units underscored shortcomings in the Coast Guard’s ability to effectively 

allocate resources, such as personnel, ensure readiness levels, and maintain mission 

competency. GAO, the Offices of Inspector General at first the Department of 

Transportation and then the Department of Homeland Security, the National 

Transportation Safety Board, Congress, and the Coast Guard itself have reported on 

these types of personnel concerns both before and after the 2001 attacks. 

Commenting on the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2009 appropriations, congressional 

appropriators noted in a Senate Appropriations Committee Report that while the Coast 

Guard workforce is approximately the same size today as it was at the end of fiscal year 

GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
1975, its present mission responsibilities are greater.1

 For example, the congressional 

appropriators reported that the number of foreign vessel arrivals in the United States 

increased by 61 percent over the last 10 years while the number of marine inspectors 

responsible for inspecting these vessels decreased by 1 percent. According to the Senate 

Appropriations Committee Report, however, the Coast Guard has not completed the 

necessary human resource requirements analysis to address the increases in its 

personnel needs. Further, a number of our reports and others have noted problems the 

Coast Guard has had allocating its personnel and other resources to accomplish its 

missions. For example, in 2008, we commented on the Coast Guard’s inability to clearly 

monitor resource allocations, particularly in mission areas like marine safety where 

work is heavily personnel-based and not as dependent on physical assets such as ships 

or airplanes. There are also concerns about the competency levels of some Coast Guard 

personnel. Specifically, maritime stakeholders have raised issues about the competency 

of some Coast Guard personnel to fulfill its marine safety mission, which Coast Guard 

leadership agreed needed to be addressed. 

Interested in these issues and others, you requested that we provide information on 

personnel efforts undertaken by the Coast Guard. This report discusses (1) documented 

personnel problems experienced by the Coast Guard in the last decade, (2) Coast Guard 

efforts to address these personnel problems, and the extent to which these efforts 

conform to congressional direction or identified best practices, as appropriate, and (3) 

possible challenges to their implementation.

To provide the historical perspective of personnel problems experienced by the Coast 

Guard, we reviewed our prior work on the Coast Guard’s difficulties allocating its 

personnel and other resources to accomplish all of its diverse missions while ensuring 

that it addresses personnel readiness, qualifications, and training requirements. We also 

reviewed the results of relevant Coast Guard personnel qualifications and training 

investigations conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board and the Coast 

Guard, as well as reports of the Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security 

Offices of Inspector General related to the Coast Guard’s management and readiness 

posture. 

To assess the Coast Guard’s efforts to address personnel problems, we reviewed relevant 

laws and congressional guidance, instructions, staffing manuals, training guidance, 

policies, and procedures related to the Coast Guard’s workforce planning and personnel 

development. We analyzed the Coast Guard’s Workforce Action Plan against guidance 

provided by congressional appropriators, the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Workforce Planning Guide, and key principles for effective strategic workforce planning 

 

1

 The Senate report (S. Rep. No. 110-396 at 80 (2008)) accompanying the Fiscal Year 2009 Department of 

Homeland Security Appropriations Act (Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3652 (2008)) required the 

Commandant of the United States Coast Guard to develop a workforce action plan. The Explanatory 

Statement accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009, directed the 

Coast Guard to comply with the Senate report direction regarding a workforce action plan. H. Comm. on 

Appropriations, 110th Cong., Committee Print on H.R. 2638/Public Law 110-329 at 646 (2008). 

2 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
we identified in previous work.2

 In addition, we analyzed the Force Readiness Command 

Business Plan as it reflects the Coast Guard’s effort to align and standardize training to 

ensure force interoperability and readiness across all units. We also compared the 

Business Plan to planning elements set out in the Government Performance and Results 

Act (GPRA) of 1993.3

 We analyzed the Marine Safety Performance Plan to assess how 

the Coast Guard planned to address certain complaints raised by the maritime 

community regarding a lack of competency in personnel conducting this mission, among 

other things. We also compared the Marine Safety Performance Plan to planning 

elements set out in the GPRA. Further, we reviewed the Coast Guard’s Acquisition 

Human Capital Strategic Plan as well as a body of our work related to Coast Guard 

acquisitions as the Coast Guard continues implementing the largest acquisition program 

in the Coast Guard’s history.4 We also analyzed information that reflects how the Coast 

Guard assessed personnel resources and allocated personnel to its various missions. In 

addition, we spoke with relevant Coast Guard officials from various offices, including the 

Office of the Vice Commandant; Human Resources; Assistant Commandant for Marine 

Safety, Security, and Stewardship; Assistant Commandant for Capability; Deputy 

Commandant for Operations; and Force Readiness Command, to discuss new personnel 

initiatives, including plans and data-driven tools, which are designed to better inform 

Coast Guard management of the personnel resources available, the status of training and 

other necessary qualifications, and options to allocate personnel for Coast Guard 

missions. 

To identify and assess the challenges the Coast Guard may experience implementing 

new personnel initiatives, we discussed with relevant Coast Guard officials the purpose, 

status, and time frames for these initiatives, as well as the challenges and obstacles to 

implementing them. We also reviewed the National Academy of Public Administration’s 

(NAPA) 2009 study addressing the Coast Guard’s modernization program, and 

interviewed members of the project team.5 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2008 through January 2010 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

 

2

 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Workforce Planning Guide, (July 31, 2007); and GAO, Human 

Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 

14, 2003). 

3

 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993). 4

 We have a robust body of work related to the acquisition challenges of the Coast Guard spanning several 

years. For example, GAO, Coast Guard: As Deepwater Systems Integrator, Coast Guard Is Reassessing 

Costs and Capabilities but Lags in Applying Its Disciplined Acquisition Approach, GAO-09-682

(Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2009) and Coast Guard: Change in Course Improves Deepwater Management 

and Oversight, but Outcome Still Uncertain, GAO-08-745 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2008). 5

 NAPA, U.S. Coast Guard Modernization Study (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2009). NAPA is an independent, 

nonprofit organization chartered by Congress to assist federal, state, and local governments in improving 

their effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability. 

3 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Results in Brief 

The Coast Guard has made efforts to address its personnel problems, but it is too soon to 

assess these efforts’ impact. The Coast Guard has a well-documented history of 

personnel problems, identified by Congress, GAO, and marine safety industry 

stakeholders, among others. For example, the Coast Guard faces continuing problems in 

balancing homeland security and more traditional missions, such as law enforcement 

and marine safety. The Coast Guard has made efforts to address these problems, such as 

the development of servicewide mission-support and mission-specific plans, as well as 

the creation or expansion of data-driven management tools. However, most of these 

efforts are in early stages of implementation or expansion, the data are not yet available 

to assess them, and of the four plans we reviewed, one plan did not fully conform to 

congressional direction. For example, one servicewide effort provides a description of 

the processes used by the Coast Guard to manage its personnel resources. Yet this effort 

did not include a gap analysis of the mission areas that continue to need resources and 

the type of personnel necessary to address those needs, in response to congressional 

direction. The remaining three plans generally conformed to best practices. Other efforts 

involve the development of electronic tools to allow for more data-driven management 

decisions on personnel requirements and preparedness. For example, the Officer 

Specialty Management System is designed to help workforce planners monitor the 

officer corps and identify potential shortfalls in specific knowledge, skills, education, 

and experience. The tool may help determine the rotation assignments of individual 

officers and assist program managers with calculating the time and cost of obtaining 

specific specialties, but officials do not expect the system to be fully online until 2011. 

Furthermore, as the Coast Guard continues to develop and implement these personnelrelated efforts, it faces challenges due to resource constraints, data reliability problems, 

coordination, and leadership concerns. 

Background 

The Coast Guard is a multimission military service comprising approximately 49,100 fulltime personnel—including about 42,000 military personnel and 7,100 civilians. Active 

duty military personnel, in turn, are comprised of almost 7,000 officers and 35,000 chief 

warrant officers and enlisted personnel. The Coast Guard’s statutory mission 

responsibilities include homeland-security-mission programs such as the protection of 

ports, waterways, and coastal security; defense readiness; undocumented migrant 

interdiction; and nonhomeland-security-mission programs, such as drug interdiction; aids 

to navigation and waterways management; search and rescue; living marine resources; 

marine safety; marine environmental protection; other law enforcement; and ice 

operations.6

 For fiscal year 2010, the Coast Guard’s budget request totals about $9.7 

billion to meet its personnel and mission responsibilities, which is about $360 million 

more than its total enacted appropriation in fiscal year 2009. 

 

6

 The Coast Guard’s homeland security and nonhomeland security-missions are delineated in section 888 of 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2249 (2002)). Starting with the 

fiscal year 2007 budget, however, the Office of Management and Budget designated the Coast Guard’s drug 

interdiction and other law enforcement mission programs—which were originally homeland-securitymissions—as nonhomeland-security-missions for budgetary purposes. 

4 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
 

As the Coast Guard continues to tackle historical documented problems related to 

personnel resource allocation, personnel readiness, qualifications, and training, the 

service is undergoing a significant organizational change, part of which involves 

modernizing its command structure, support systems, and business processes. The Coast 

Guard intends for this modernization program to better position the service to fulfill not 

only traditional missions but also homeland security responsibilities that expanded after 

September 11th. The modernization program is focused on the Coast Guard’s command 

and control structure and human resources systems, among other mission-support 

systems.7 These new commands are as follows: 

• The Deputy Commandant for Operations is responsible for aligning policy and 

planning across the Coast Guard’s 11 statutory mission programs. The Deputy 

Commandant for Operations coordinates the development of resource proposals, 

including personnel resources, articulates gaps in workforce planning, and 

prioritizes the workforce gaps to be filled. 

• The Deputy Commandant for Mission Support is responsible for processes and 

systems related to logistics, mission support, and human resources, including the 

development of human resource strategies to support mission execution (e.g., the 

Coast Guard’s Workforce Action Plan). 

• Force Readiness Command (FORCECOM) has the overall role of providing 

prepared forces throughout the Coast Guard by using enterprisewide analysis and 

standardized doctrine, training and tactics, and techniques and procedures to best 

allocate forces for sustainable mission execution. 

• Operations Command is comprised of and consolidating the Coast Guard’s field 

command and control structure, with ultimate responsibility for Coast Guard 

mission execution. Operations Command, as the end-user of operational 

personnel, is expected to collaborate with other commands to help ensure that its 

personnel-related needs are met. 

The Coast Guard has requested certain additional statutory authorities to fully 

implement the new command structure and associated senior leadership positions. As of 

January 8, 2010 there were three pending bills (H.R. 3619, H.R. 2650, and S. 1194) 

containing the Coast Guard’s requested provisions. For example, H.R. 3619, one of the 

pending Coast Guard authorization bills, would amend federal statutes that govern the 

operations of the Coast Guard and authorize four instead of the current two vice admiral 

positions to take leadership positions for each of the commands listed above. 

 

7

 GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the Genesis and Progress of the Service’s Modernization Program, 

GAO-09-530R (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2009). This report provides additional information about the 

status of the Coast Guard’s modernization effort. 

5 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
The Coast Guard Has a History of Personnel Resource Allocation and 

Preparedness Problems 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard has encountered 

difficulties allocating its personnel and other resources to accomplish all of its diverse 

missions while ensuring that it addresses personnel readiness, qualifications, and 

training requirements. More specifically, the Coast Guard’s security responsibilities 

increased following the September 11th attacks, while it maintained responsibility for 

conducting its nonhomeland security responsibilities, such as law enforcement and 

marine safety. Moreover, although the Coast Guard received increases in funding 

following the attacks, resources allocated to some nonhomeland-security activities 

declined, and remained below historic levels for years.8

 In 2002 and 2003, we reported 

that the Coast Guard did not have a long-term strategy that outlined how it sees its 

resources—including personnel—distributed across its various missions in this new 

operating environment.9

 Furthermore, we reported that although the Coast Guard used a 

variety of mission performance measures, it lacked a useful reporting mechanism to 

synthesize and convey data to Congress about its nonsecurity-mission resource levels. 

Thus, we recommended in 2004 that the Coast Guard implement a system to accurately 

account for resources expended in each of its mission areas.10 The Coast Guard acted 

upon this recommendation and has reported improvements in the transparency and 

accuracy of its financial systems and data. Similarly, in 2008, we noted that a lack of 

reliable data hindered the Coast Guard’s efforts to estimate the number of facility 

inspectors needed to fulfill statutory responsibilities for conducting regular security 

inspections of the nation’s ports and other maritime facilities to help prevent terrorist 

attacks.11 Facility inspectors may be assigned other duties apart from inspections, and 

the Coast Guard did not have data on how inspectors’ time was allocated. Further, in 

2008, we reported that the Coast Guard’s execution of a security-related program was at 

risk because it lacked a strategic workforce plan that defined appropriate staffing levels, 

identified the critical skills needed to achieve the mission, and eliminated workforce 

gaps to prepare for future needs.12 

Formulating appropriate personnel levels for specific programs or across mission areas 

also involves a consideration of military-to-civilian staff ratios. A previous Coast Guard 

report to Congress on workforce issues, submitted to Congress in 1997, noted that 

civilian employees were better qualified to fill support positions that require technical 

 

8

 GAO, Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions, GAO03-155 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2002) and Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance 

and Monitor Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions, GAO-03-544T (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 12, 2003). 

9

 GAO-03-155 and GAO-03-544T. 

10 GAO, Coast Guard: Relationship between Resources Used and Results Achieved Needs to be Clearer, 

GAO-04-432 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2004). 

11 GAO, Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility Deficiencies, but 

More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing, Practices, and Data, GAO-08-12 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 

2008).

12 GAO, Maritime Security: Coast Guard International Port Security Program Has Made Progress, but 

Additional Workforce Planning Is Needed, GAO-08-335SU (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2008).

6 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
skills, extensive specialty training, and continuity of service.13 In 2000, we reviewed close 

to 1,000 nonoperational commissioned officer positions and determined that about 800 

of the positions did not meet the Coast Guard’s criteria for military staffing and could be 

filled by civilians.14 Although the Coast Guard identified several disadvantages to filling 

the military positions with civilians, such as loss of flexibility and impact on promotions 

and retention in the officer corps, we maintained that the long-term cost savings of the 

conversion outweighed the Coast Guard’s concerns. Specifically, for the jobs examined 

in the study, the cost of employing an officer was on average 21 percent more than filling 

the same position with a comparable civilian. Despite the fact that the Coast Guard did 

not agree with several aspects of the analysis, it concurred that additional civilian 

conversions were appropriate and acknowledged additional qualitative benefits of a 

civilian workforce. More recently, the Coast Guard has sought to strengthen continuity 

of expertise in mission-related areas, such as marine safety, by adding civilian positions. 

These types of considerations will continue to make the balance of military and civilian 

personnel an important component of Coast Guard workforce planning, especially given 

the service’s uncertain long-term budget outlook.

The Coast Guard has also faced other personnel problems related to readiness, 

qualifications, and training in specific mission areas, some of which predate the terrorist 

attacks. For example, some personnel qualifications and training elements associated 

with the Coast Guard’s search and rescue mission were questioned in a National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation of the 1997 fatal sinking of a 

recreational sailing vessel.15 The NTSB concluded that substandard performance by the 

Coast Guard in initiating a search and rescue response to the incident contributed to loss 

of life, and recommended training improvements and changes in the certification process 

for Coast Guard communications staff that receive and act upon distress calls. In 2001, 

2002, and 2003, the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General also 

reported personnel concerns with the Coast Guard search and rescue mission along with 

the network of boat stations typically responsible for carrying out these operations.16

Among other things, the Inspector General noted boat station staff shortages, a declining 

trainer-to-trainee ratio that diminished the quality of on-the-job training, and a lack of 

entry-level training for boatswain’s mates, who are key search and rescue mission staff 

that comprise a large segment of Coast Guard enlisted personnel. We reported in 2005 

that stations were still unable to meet Coast Guard standards in the area of staffing.17 As 

 

13 U.S. Coast Guard, Report to Congress on Civilians in Personnel Management Structure (Washington, 

D.C., June 26, 1997). 

14 GAO, Coast Guard Workforce Mix: Phased-In Conversion of Some Support Officer Positions Would 

Produce Savings, GAO/RCED-00-60 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2000). 15 National Transportation Safety Board, Marine Accident Report: Sinking of the Recreational Sailing 

Vessel Morning Dew at the Entrance to the Harbor of Charlestown, South Carolina, December 29, 1997 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1999). 

16 U.S. Department of Transportation, Audit of the Small Boat Station Search and Rescue Program, 

United States Coast Guard (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2001); U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast 

Guard Budget and Management Issues: Statement of the Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector 

General, U.S. Department of Transportation (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2002); and U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Audit of the Use of Fiscal Year 2002 Funds to Improve the Operational Readiness of 

Small Boat Stations and Command Centers, United States Coast Guard (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2003). 17 GAO, Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and Management Concerns 

Remain, GAO-05-161 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2005). 

7 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
recently as 2009, the experience levels of Coast Guard personnel were again called into 

question following a search and rescue response to a fatal fishing vessel sinking. A Coast 

Guard memorandum about the incident stated that the delayed response “revealed 

several procedural, training, and judgment shortfalls” and recommended further study.18

The Coast Guard has also acknowledged significant personnel problems in conducting 

its marine safety mission. The primary goal of this long-standing core mission is to 

promote the safe operation and navigation of U.S. and foreign flagged commercial 

vessels, passenger vessels, and recreational boats. Towards this goal, the marine safety 

mission encompasses several different activities, including vessel inspections, mariner 

credentialing, developing and enforcing federal marine safety regulations, industry and 

public outreach, and maritime casualty investigations. According to Coast Guard 

documents, the demand for marine safety mission services has increased significantly 

over the past decade in conjunction with industry growth and increased complexity. For 

example, citing Department of Transportation figures, a Coast Guard budget publication 

affirms that from 2002 to 2005, the number of U.S. port calls made by oceangoing vessels 

increased more than 10 percent to 61,047 calls.19 At the same time, however, many of the 

Coast Guard’s industry stakeholders (e.g., ports; shipyards; cargo, tank, and small 

passenger vessels; cruise ships) perceived a widening performance gap in the marine 

safety mission as the Coast Guard assumed additional homeland security responsibilities 

after the September 11th attacks. In August 2007, the Coast Guard Commandant 

acknowledged industry concerns in his written testimony for a congressional hearing on 

marine safety challenges. The most prominent concerns included reduced access to 

senior Coast Guard leadership, delays in mariner license issuance, perceived reduction in 

marine inspector experience, and confusion over the Coast Guard rulemaking process. A 

more detailed Coast Guard report documenting maritime stakeholder complaints was 

released later in 2007.20 It described specific stakeholder concerns related to marine 

safety personnel issues: the number of personnel/resources, capability, career 

path/professionalism, training and qualifications, civilian/military mix, and tour length 

and rotations. In addition to maritime stakeholders, the Department of Homeland 

Security Office of Inspector General has raised personnel-related concerns about aspects 

of the Coast Guard’s marine safety mission. For example, a 2008 report found that the 

marine casualty investigations program had been hindered by less than fully qualified 

personnel conducting investigations, among other things.21 The Office of Inspector 

General made several recommendations with which the Coast Guard concurred, 

including developing and implementing a plan to increase the number of marine casualty 

investigators (including hiring additional civilians), and improving the investigator career 

path. 

 

18 U.S. Coast Guard, Final Action on Administrative Investigation of the Coast Guard Response to the 

Sinking of the F/V Patriot that Occurred on 3 January 2009 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2009). 19 U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Coast Guard Posture Statement with 2009 Budget in Brief (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 2008). 

20 U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Marine Safety Analysis: An Independent Assessment and Suggestions 

for Improvement, (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2007). 21 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, United States Coast Guard’s 

Management of the Marine Casualty Investigations Program (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2008). 

8 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
In addition to issues in specific mission areas, such as search and rescue and marine 

safety, the Coast Guard has faced significant problems developing and managing its 

acquisition workforce, which we have reported on previously.22 Although we noted in 

2009 that the Coast Guard had made progress in identifying and mitigating acquisition 

workforce challenges, the service had difficulty hiring and retaining qualified 

acquisitions personnel and key positions remained unfilled as of July 2009. However, the 

Coast Guard’s Office of Acquisition Workforce Management reported that the vacancy 

rate across the civilian acquisition workforce had declined from 27.2 percent to 12.7 

percent during the second half of the 2009 calendar year. 

The Coast Guard Has Developed Plans and Tools to Address Personnel 

Problems, but It Is too Soon to Assess Their Impact 

The Coast Guard has responded to its historic problems related to personnel by 

developing both plans and tools to better allocate personnel resources, and prepare 

personnel for the positions they have been assigned. Figure 1 provides an overall 

diagram of how selected plans and data-driven tools collectively work to inform 

management decisions about personnel, including allocation and training needed. 

Following the figure is a more detailed description of each plan and tool we reviewed. 

For additional information on the time frames and status of each of these efforts, see 

enclosure. 

 

22 GAO has a robust body of work related to the acquisition challenges of the Coast Guard spanning several 

years. For example, GAO-09-682 and GAO-08-745. 

9 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Figure 1: Select Coast Guard Personnel-Related Plans and Tools

Sources: GAO (analysis), Coast Guard (data).

Coast Guard strategic intent and mission requirements

Personnel preparedness/training Personnel resource allocation

Competency Management System

Officer Specialty Management System

Sector Staffing Model

Manpower Requirements Determination

Select servicewide plans

Select mission-support and mission-specific plans

Select data-driven tools

Workforce Action Plan

Force Readiness Command Business Plan 

Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan

Marine Safety Performance Plan

Coast Guard 

Business Intelligence

Information exchange among overall Coast Guard strategic intent and mission requirements, 

personnel-related plans, and data-driven tools

Servicewide, Mission-Support and Mission-Specific Plans 

To address problems related to personnel, the Coast Guard has developed plans 

including, among others, two servicewide plans for implementing broad workforce 

changes—the Workforce Action Plan and the FORCECOM Business Plan—plus a 

mission-support plan focused on increasing the number of acquisition personnel within 

its Acquisition Directorate, and a mission-specific plan focused more narrowly on its 

10 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
marine safety mission.23 According to the Coast Guard, these plans represent its efforts 

to better identify its personnel resource needs and manage its workforce. 

 

• Workforce Action Plan: This plan considers Coast Guard mission areas and was 

developed in response to appropriations committee report direction, whose 

members had expressed concern that the size of the Coast Guard’s workforce had 

not kept pace with its increased mission requirements.24 The creation of a 

workforce action plan can help to ensure that the Coast Guard better align its 

human capital program with current and emerging mission requirements, and 

facilitate the development of long-term strategies for acquiring, training, and 

retaining needed staff. In this case, the Coast Guard was directed to provide a 

workforce plan that would include (1) a gap analysis of the mission areas that 

continue to need resources and the type of personnel necessary to address those 

needs; (2) a strategy, including funding, milestones, and a timeline for addressing 

personnel gaps for each category of employee; (3) specific strategies for 

recruiting individuals for hard-to-fill positions; and (4) any additional authorities 

and resources necessary to address staffing requirements. The Workforce Action 

Plan did not provide a gap analysis of the mission areas and personnel needed, 

and thus also did not provide a strategy with proposed funding, milestones, and a 

timeline for addressing these personnel gaps for each employee category 

consistent with congressional direction. The Workforce Action Plan did provide a 

general view of recruiting strategies for meeting the service’s three priority 

workforce needs related to the quantity, quality, and diversity of its applicant 

pool, and referred generally to two mission areas that the Coast Guard identified 

as needing personnel adjustments—acquisitions and marine safety. Lastly, while 

the plan discussed some of the agency’s existing authorities, it did not expound 

upon any additional authorities needed to address staffing requirements. Instead, 

the Coast Guard’s Workforce Action Plan explained the Coast Guard’s workforce 

planning process. For example, the Workforce Action Plan provided an overview 

of how the Coast Guard would use the resources requested in the fiscal year 2010 

President’s Budget and provided a list of manpower determinations for some units 

and platforms, an accession plan, civilian hiring targets, and a workforce status 

report (as of the first quarter of 2009). Although the workforce plan did not 

comport with the direction provided by the congressional appropriators, it 

followed the Department of Homeland Security’s workforce planning guidance in 

that the Coast Guard identified its human resource planning processes, 

highlighted recent efforts undertaken to improve the Coast Guard’s human 

resources management program, and discussed areas for improvement in its 

human resource planning and budgeting processes.25 The Workforce Action Plan

was completed in August 2009, but elements, such as the accession and recruiting 

23 In this review, we focused on the marine safety mission and the Coast Guard’s November 2008 Marine 

Safety Performance Plan because of the number of complaints lodged by maritime stakeholders 

nationwide, and the Coast Guard’s recognition of the extent and serious nature of the problems within this 

mission area. In addition, enhancing aspects of the marine safety mission was identified as a “strategic 

priority” in both the 2008 and 2009 Coast Guard Posture Statements. 

24 In response to the congressional direction provided in Senate Report 110-396, the Coast Guard produced 

a document, entitled U.S. Coast Guard Workforce Action Plan: Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Congress. 25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Workforce Planning Guide (July 31, 2007). 

11 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
plans, are to be implemented once final fiscal year funding is identified. The Coast 

Guard reported that it intends to revise the plan periodically as needed. 

• FORCECOM Business Plan: The Coast Guard has developed a business plan for 

improving the readiness of its operational personnel and has tasked one of its new 

commands, FORCECOM, with carrying out the plan. The plan reflects 

FORCECOM’s goals of ensuring servicewide force interoperability and readiness 

and supports the command’s overall mission to provide ready forces to 

operational commanders. Standardizing personnel requirements and training may 

help to ensure that the Coast Guard can surge people and assets across the nation 

to fulfill mission needs. GPRA provided agencies a framework for effectively 

implementing and managing programs including setting strategic goals, measuring 

performance, and reporting on the degree to which goals are met. Although GPRA 

is generally applied to agencywide strategic plans, its framework is useful to guide 

any type of planning. The FORCECOM Business Plan contains characteristics of 

GPRA planning including defining a mission and desired outcomes and identifying 

performance measures to gauge progress.26 For example, the plan defines a clear 

mission, specifically, to ensure the allocated forces are trained to standards, 

armed with current tactics and procedures, interoperable, and inspected in order 

to meet current and future operational requirements. The plan also calls for 

performance to be measured with specific actions. For example, the FORCECOM 

Business Plan contains a goal to catalogue and review all general mandated 

training requirements to ensure that each requirement is carefully approved and 

targeted for efficiency by 2010. To fulfill this plan, FORCECOM is assuming 

responsibilities in several personnel-related areas, including training and 

standardization. For example, under FORCECOM, Coast Guard officials we spoke 

with said they are planning to work with Coast Guard units to develop more 

standardized on-the-job training requirements across local units. We reported in 

2006 that for the Hurricane Katrina response, standardization enabled Coast 

Guard search and rescue personnel from anywhere in the country to form unified 

crews to perform operations. For example, a helicopter pilot from Florida, a 

copilot from Alabama, and a rescue swimmer from Alaska formed a crew to 

perform numerous search and rescue operations. FORCECOM intends to take the 

standardization lessons-learned from this historic response and apply them across 

Coast Guard units and mission areas. FORCECOM officials noted that the Coast 

Guard’s consolidation of force readiness responsibilities under FORCECOM 

represents an effort to increase this standardization and integration of personnel 

management. The FORCECOM Business Plan was completed in October 2008, 

and is planned to be implemented through fiscal year 2010. The Coast Guard 

reported that it intends to update the plan periodically to reflect FORCECOM 

priorities. 

 

26 GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act,

GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996). It is important to note that while GPRA focuses on the 

agency level, performance goals and measures are important management tools for all levels of an agency, 

such as the bureau, program, project, or activity level, and these criteria are applicable at those levels as 

well. 

12 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
• Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan: This document addresses the 

challenges the Coast Guard is facing in filling the government acquisition 

positions it has identified both now and in the future. By developing its own 

acquisition workforce, the Coast Guard may improve accountability for its 

acquisitions by increasing government control and visibility over its assets and 

capabilities. The plan sets forth three overall challenges to developing its own 

acquisition workforce, including (1) recruitment, development, and retention of 

qualified acquisition personnel; (2) human capital information management; and 

(3) human capital management policy guidance, procedures, and practices. 

Further, it outlines 10 strategies for building and maintaining an acquisition 

workforce. The strategies include creating a “reward environment” that 

recognizes factors beyond employee compensation and benefits that attract, 

retain, and motivate employees. They also include establishing and maintaining 

human capital information systems that support the recruitment, development, 

and retention of the acquisition workforce, and performance planning, 

assessment, and measurement. According to the Acquisition Human Capital 

Strategic Plan, it established the strategic foundation for specific actions to be 

taken to achieve its human capital objectives, and identified performance metrics 

to track progress towards these goals. In addition, the plan adopted and applied 

the Office of Personnel Management’s Human Capital Assessment and 

Accountability Framework, which includes guidance in the areas of Strategic 

Alignment, Leadership and Knowledge Management, Results-Oriented 

Performance Culture, Talent Management, and Accountability. The Acquisition 

Human Capital Strategic Plan was first released in 2008, with an updated version 

published in 2009, and officials indicated that the outcomes and effectiveness of 

this plan are under constant assessment and review to ensure that the Coast 

Guard acquisition workforce is continually improving. 

• Marine Safety Performance Plan: This mission-specific plan seeks to address 

competency concerns by setting goals, objectives, and performance targets for the 

marine safety mission for fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Having the appropriate 

numbers and fully trained marine safety personnel may help to ensure that the 

Coast Guard successfully meets the increasing needs of maritime stakeholders. 

Similar to the FORCECOM Business Plan, the Marine Safety Performance Plan

also contained characteristics of planning set out by GPRA, including involving 

stakeholders in defining the mission and desired outcomes of the plan, and 

identifying specific goals, objectives, and performance measures that link to the 

stated mission.27 For example, according to the Marine Safety Performance Plan, 

it incorporates input from maritime stakeholders, and defines the mission of the 

plan as a means to ensure the safety of maritime stakeholders by preventing 

marine casualties, protecting marine environment, and strengthening maritime 

commerce. In addition, the Marine Safety Performance Plan outlines specific 

goals and objectives that can be measured. For example, as of December 3, 2009, 

the Coast Guard had filled 88 of 108 civilian marine safety positions, including 

more civilian inspectors for continuity, adjusted tour lengths, strengthened career 

paths, and expanded marine safety training and education. The Marine Safety 

 

27 GAO/GGD-96-118. 

13 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Performance Plan was designed to reduce maritime casualties, facilitate 

commerce, improve program processes and management, and improve human 

resource capabilities. The Marine Safety Performance Plan was completed in 

November 2008, and is planned to be implemented through fiscal year 2014. 

Tools to Facilitate Data-Driven Management Decisions 

Coast Guard officials have expressed a need for reliable, verifiable, and repeatable data 

to facilitate data-driven management decisions on personnel requirements and 

preparedness. The five tools identified below are all in development and intended to 

collectively provide Coast Guard management with access to more reliable and 

comprehensive data. The last of the five tools is expected to provide the Coast Guard 

with data access capability to allow it to use the data captured by the first four tools, 

among other things. 

• Officer Specialty Management System (OSMS): OSMS is a new framework for 

Coast Guard officer “specialties,” specific areas of expertise within the service 

associated with different occupations or positions. In addition to replacing over 

70 legacy specialties with 13 new specialties and 38 subspecialties, for the first 

time the Coast Guard plans to identify specific competency requirements for each 

specialty. For example, the legacy specialties of Boating Safety, including General, 

Boating Affairs, Boating Standards, and Boating Investigations, have been 

consolidated into one subspecialty under OSMS entitled Maritime Law 

Enforcement/Ports, Waterways & Coastal Security Operations. According to 

officials and an agency overview document, the overarching goal of these changes 

to legacy specialties is to gain a clearer picture of (1) what is required by Coast 

Guard officer positions, and (2) the capabilities of the officer corps.28 OSMS is the 

product of internal studies initiated in 2001. The Coast Guard expects to assign 

specialties to officers beginning in summer 2010 with full implementation of the 

system by spring 2011. 

• Competency Management System (CMS):29 CMS is the mechanism by which Coast 

Guard officials establish and modify a standard set of competencies, assign 

competencies to positions, record competencies earned by members, collect and 

organize competency data and information, and allow for the use of competency 

information in personnel management decisions. For example, CMS contains the 

engineering competency “Engineering Inspections" and describes the individual 

with this competency as “able to inspect facilities or construction projects from 

an engineering perspective to identify required repairs, remaining life, and 

potential problems or improvements.” In another example, CMS lists the marine 

safety competency “Boarding Officer (Marine Safety)” and describes an individual 

with this competency as able to “perform detailed examinations of foreign and 

U.S. vessels of all types to verify compliance with U.S., class society, and 

 

28 Unlike officer specialties, the Coast Guard’s enlisted ratings already provide specific requirements for 

each rating. 

29 “Competency” in the Coast Guard generally refers to attributes such as knowledge, skills, abilities, and 

personal attributes that a person exercises while performing the business of any given position. 

14 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
international safety, security, and pollution prevention regulations.” According to 

the CMS Manual, at a basic level CMS is designed to help decision makers 

understand the demands of the service and specific positions along with the 

supply of people available to meet those demands. As of November 2009, CMS 

covered approximately 80 percent of active duty and reserve positions, and the 

Coast Guard was in the early stages of developing processes to identify and assign 

competencies to civilian and auxiliary positions. It is unclear at this time when 

CMS will fully reflect military, reserve, and auxiliary competencies. 

• Manpower Requirements Determination (MRD): According to Coast Guard 

documents and officials, the MRD system is designed to help calculate the human 

capital needed to perform Coast Guard tasks or missions using verifiable, 

repeatable, and defendable analyses. According to the MRD Business Model, 

Coast Guard officials currently measure human capital in ways that can vary 

based on factors such as programmatic or local needs. The goal of the MRD 

system is to create a common set of standards and analytical approaches so that 

officials responsible for personnel allocation decisions can make more 

standardized human capital comparisons across units or programs. For example, 

in December 2008 the MRD system was used to conduct a baseline analysis of the 

optimal mix of manpower required to maintain safety and sustain the mission of 

the Juniper Class cutter, which resulted in recommended increases of certain 

enlisted positions, and decreases in other enlisted positions.30 MRD was chartered 

in 2006, and the Coast Guard expects the guiding doctrine, policy, and procedure 

documents for the MRD program to be complete by September 2010; the service 

expects the supporting automated information system that would be accessed 

through the Coast Guard Business Intelligence system to be completed by 

September 2012. 

• Sector Staffing Model (SSM): Using SSM, the Coast Guard expects to be able to 

create baseline staffing data that are comparable across the Coast Guard’s 35 

diverse sectors.31 Specifically, according to Coast Guard officials, SSM seeks to 

quantify staffing shortfalls, which in turn could justify resource proposals for 

additional staff; provide a transparent basis for mission requirement resource 

allocation; enable senior leadership and program managers to understand 

resource implications of proposed policy changes and requirements; and help 

forecast future staffing needs based on projected activity and mission growth. 

SSM uses two types of worksheets to analyze baseline staffing at sectors: (1) an 

activity-based worksheet and (2) a command cadre worksheet. For example, 

using the activity-based worksheet for “container inspections,” each sector 

estimates annual mission hours and activity levels needed to complete inspectionrelated activities. The results of this worksheet are converted into time available 

for work. The second worksheet—the command cadre tool—accounts for the 

 

30 A Coast Guard cutter is a vessel 65 feet in length or greater, having adequate accommodations for crew 

to live onboard. The Juniper Class cutter is 225 feet in length and the first vessel of this class was 

commissioned in 1996 as the lead ship in the Coast Guard's Buoy Tender Replacement Project. 

31 Sectors are operational units that carry out the full range of Coast Guard missions. There are currently 35 

geographically-based Coast Guard sectors in the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, 

and Guam. 

15 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
number of subordinate officers, and enlisted and civilian personnel, and considers 

unit-specific data for roughly 12-15 criteria related to each unit’s size, assets, and 

missions. For example, the Prevention Department Head worksheet would 

include criteria, such as number of vessels inspected in that particular sector and 

the number of serious marine casualties occurring in that sector. These SSM 

worksheets are converted into Coast Guard positions, taking into account the mix 

of civilian and military staff, as well as their rates, ranks, or pay grades, providing 

Coast Guard management with a baseline of the personnel needed at each sector. 

SSM was chartered in 2007, and the Coast Guard expects that it will be accessible 

through the Coast Guard Business Intelligence data system in December 2010. 

• Coast Guard Business Intelligence (CGBI): According to Coast Guard documents 

and officials, the CGBI data system is designed to support decision making across 

all levels of the Coast Guard by leveraging existing Coast Guard data, measures, 

and processes. This data system can generate a variety of reports or displays by 

drawing and combining data from multiple electronic sources. CGBI can access or 

is expected to be able to access the Officer Specialty Management System, 

Competency Management System, Manpower Requirements Determination, and 

Sector Staffing Model and is to provide a foundation for more data-driven 

decisions. For example, the Coast Guard expects to be able to access Sector 

Staffing Model results through CGBI in June 2010. In April 2009, the Coast Guard 

launched an updated version of CGBI, which added features to the initial 2006 

version. Although the CGBI system is operational and utilized across the Coast 

Guard, its development continues. Program staff will continue to focus on 

measuring data quality in the future, according to one official. The next major 

system upgrade, which involves increasing the Coast Guard’s capability to use 

existing data for predictive modeling or simulations, is expected to be completed 

in 2011, according to the Coast Guard. 

Efforts Still in Development 

It is too soon to tell whether the plans and data-driven tools that the Coast Guard has 

begun to put in place will provide an analytical foundation to support management 

decisions related to resource allocation and personnel preparedness because the plans 

and tools are still in development or support ongoing efforts. The Workforce Action Plan 

and FORCECOM Business Plan both describe discrete goals related to personnel 

improvements that extend beyond 2010. The Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan 

also contains challenges and outlines strategies for addressing these challenges, which 

have deadlines provided by the Blueprint for Acquisition Reform, a companion 

document to the human capital strategic plan. As we reported in July 2009, the Coast 

Guard has completed a number of the initiatives, including the adoption of a model to 

assess future acquisition workforce needs. The Marine Safety Performance Plan

contains initiatives that extend through fiscal year 2014. In terms of the tools, OSMS and 

SSM have undergone beta testing and have been deployed for limited use, but are not 

expected to be fully implemented until 2011 and 2010, respectively, according to 

estimates from the responsible program offices. The Coast Guard reported in December 

2009 that the Manpower Requirements Determination analysis tool has been utilized in 

23 completed or ongoing projects; however, the Coast Guard estimated that the currently 

16 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
expanding Manpower Requirements Determination system will not be completed until 

2012. The Competency Management System tool currently provides information relevant 

to most military positions, but officials have only recently begun to populate civilian and 

auxiliary competencies, and it is not clear when this update will be completed. Lastly, 

although the CGBI system is operational and in use across the Coast Guard, it too 

undergoes updates and revisions to meet the needs of those who use the system, 

according to officials who manage the system. 

Figure 2 illustrates the timeline for implementation or development of Coast Guard plans 

and data-driven tools that may address personnel challenges. 

Figure 2: Timeline of Select Coast Guard Personnel-Related Plans and Tools 

Sources: GAO (analysis), Coast Guard (data).

Select servicewide plans

Workforce Action Plan

Force Readiness Command Business Plan

Select mission-support and mission-specific plans

Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan

Marine Safety Performance Plan

Key milestone

In implementation

Development towards key milestone

Expected continuous development

Mar. 2010

Oct. 2008

Sept. 2014

 Apr. 2008

Nov. 2008

Aug. 2009 Sept. 2010

Sept. 2010

2001 2011

2004

2006 2012

2007 2010

2006 2011

Effort initiation to present

Select data-driven tools

Officer Specialty Management System

Competency Management System

Manpower Requirements Determination

Sector Staffing Model

Coast Guard Business Intelligence

*

*Milestone not identified, but the Coast Guard indicated that system development is ongoing. 

The Coast Guard May Face Challenges in Implementing Personnel Efforts 

The Coast Guard may encounter four specific challenges as it implements the personnel 

management actions discussed above. Specifically, there may be challenges related to 

resources being sufficient to implement personnel efforts, as well as sufficient to support 

mission requirements, data reliability, coordination among the Coast Guard offices 

responsible for developing and implementing each of these actions, and leadership. It is 

too soon to tell how successful the Coast Guard will be in overcoming these challenges. 

17 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Resource Challenges Are Twofold: Are Resources Sufficient to Implement Personnel 

fforts and Fill Mission Requirements 

he resources to meet its personnel and mission 

quirements once they are established. 

w 

the 

ages 

d’s 

t 

r 

es 

n that are focused on standardizing personnel training and 

reparedness requirements. 

ed by all 

d 

 

E

The Coast Guard acknowledged that it faces two types of resource challenges—first, 

dedicating the necessary resources to implement and monitor its planning and data-tool 

personnel initiatives, and second, having t

re

First, it remains unclear whether the Coast Guard’s existing resources are sufficient or 

appropriately utilized to put these new plans and tools into operation. For example, the 

Manpower Requirements Determination office consists of five staff and one supervisor 

and has three unfilled positions (two officers and one civilian)32 and they plan to revie

human resource requirements for over 100 unit types (including small-boat stations, 

sectors, National Security Cutter, and headquarters), provide an analysis for each new

unit, or mission requirements, which is estimated to take about 6-12 months (e.g., 

new enlisted maritime enforcement specialist rating), and provide support for all 

resource proposals that are considered for funding by the Coast Guard.33 As a result of 

the size of the workload relative to the size of the staff, the program office that man

MRD is conducting an MRD analysis on its own manpower requirements, which it 

expects to complete by July 2010. The results will inform the MRD office’s staffing 

decisions and may result in a request for additional personnel. Further, the Coast Guar

reliance upon congressional authorization for the new overall Coast Guard command 

structure may also complicate steps to standardize training and personnel requirements 

across all Coast Guard units. Under the Coast Guard’s current approach, until the Coas

Guard’s new command structure, which includes FORCECOM, is fully authorized and 

funded under the new structure, personnel assigned to FORCECOM are to continue to 

conduct their legacy responsibilities under the old command structure. Although senio

Coast Guard officials from FORCECOM responsible for training and other personnelrelated initiatives reported that they have continued to fulfill their legacy responsibiliti

and complete their new responsibilities under FORCECOM, it is unclear what impact 

these dual responsibilities will have on the timely implementation of the goals set out in 

the FORCECOM Business Pla

p

Second, given the current resource-constrained federal budget environment fac

agencies, the use of more standardized and analytical tools like the Manpower 

Requirements Determination or Sector Staffing Model will not guarantee that identified

personnel needs are met in units and platforms across the Coast Guard. Admiral Tha

Allen, the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, recognized the economic 

challenges the nation faces when he testified in May 2009 on the Coast Guard’s fiscal 

32 The MRD office anticipates filling these three positions by the summer of 2010. There are an additional 

three analysts that conduct manpower requirement determinations for acquisition-related reviews. 

33 In January of 2010, the new maritime enforcement specialist rating will take effect; in the future the 

personnel in this position will execute the duties of port security specialists. The maritime enforcement 

“A” school will be located in the Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement Academy at the Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center in Charleston, South Carolina, and the first class will graduate in spring 2010. 

18 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
year 2010 budget request. He acknowledged that the Coast Guard could no longer do 

more with less, and would need to prioritize resource allocations, while accepting risk

areas where resources would be lacking. In July 2009, we noted that while the Coast 

Guard’s budget has increased significantly since 2003, the long-term budget outlook for 

the service is uncertain.

 in 

 the 

nnel 

 increase resources, it will still be a challenge for the Coast 

uard to obtain them. 

ata Reliability Challenges Are Ongoing Concern 

ases, 

ore 

ta 

er 

igh 

rer 

 plans 

important to strengthening the reliability of the CGBI system and its subordinate tools, 

 

34 Specifically, administration budget projections indicate that

Department of Homeland Security’s annual budget is expected to remain constant or 

decrease over the next 10 years. As a result of this uncertainty, if the results of perso

analyses show a need to

G

D

Coast Guard officials we spoke with acknowledge challenges with obtaining reliable, 

verifiable, and repeatable data that may affect the data-driven tools created by the Coast

Guard. For example, CGBI combines data from multiple databases to create its various 

informational reports. Coast Guard officials acknowledge that some of these datab

including Direct Access and Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement 

(MISLE), have data quality problems.35 Although Coast Guard officials said that the m

widespread use and greater transparency of CGBI has promoted more accurate da

entry, these officials added that the increased use of the system has also exposed 

unreliable data. As a result, the Coast Guard has begun taking steps to proactively 

validate data, for example, within the Direct Access system, which is the service’s 

authoritative human resources database. Specifically, all active duty personnel were 

required to update or validate certain information, such as marital status, birth date, and

number of dependents. According to Coast Guard officials, they intend to continue this 

validation process for other data fields. In another effort to improve data accuracy, aft

discovering that one data element—military service entry date—had a relatively h

error rate, the Coast Guard reported addressing this issue by providing a clea

definition of this data field to personnel. According to an official with direct 

responsibility for CGBI, these types of incremental improvements at the transactional 

database level will improve the overall efficacy of CGBI products. However, in 2008 we

reported our concerns about the reliability of some MISLE data, and the Coast Guard 

concurred with our recommendation to assess the data, including their completeness, 

along with data entry, consistency, and data field problems.36 As the Coast Guard

to rely on MISLE data to help inform personnel decisions, ensuring its reliability is 

34 GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2010 Budget and Related Performance and 

Management Challenges, GAO-09-810T (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2009). 35 Direct Access is a computer-based human resource system. It provides Coast Guard assignment 

processing; posts official positions; schedules training; and processes retirements, promotions, and 

disciplinary actions. Direct Access also maintains all personnel attributes and military payroll. MISLE 

began operating in December 2001 as the Coast Guard’s primary data system for documenting marine 

safety and environmental protection activities. Storage of data on facility oversight and other Coast Guard 

activities, such as vessel boardings and incident response, have since been added. The purpose of MISLE is 

to provide the capability to collect, maintain, and retrieve information necessary for the administration, 

management, and documentation of Coast Guard activities. 

36 GAO-08-12. 

19 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
but achieving this data reliability will likely be a challenge for the Coast Guard given its 

past problems with ensuring data reliability.37 

Challenges Coordinating Various Personnel-Related Plans and Tools 

Along with resource and data reliability challenges, the Coast Guard faces potential 

challenges in coordinating its various personnel-related plans and tools. Specifically, in 

the midst of the large organizational transformation that is under way involving 

numerous changes to the Coast Guard’s command structure, enterprisewide support 

systems, and business practices, it may prove difficult for the Coast Guard to coordinate 

more narrowly defined personnel-related efforts, such as the nine plans and tools 

highlighted in this report. These plans and tools, although interrelated, span a range of 

specific functions and encompass a variety of Coast Guard activities. Efforts such as the 

Manpower Requirements Determination system and Sector Staffing Model, for example, 

are designed to help the Coast Guard better allocate overall personnel resources across 

the service, while efforts such as the Officer Specialty Management System and 

Competency Management System are more focused on the knowledge, skills, and 

abilities of individuals. In addition to varying in purpose and scope, the efforts are 

subject to different time frames and are overseen by several different entities. 

Specifically, the nine plans and tools have been managed by at least eight different 

program or mission support offices and three separate commands, and some initiatives, 

such as the Officer Specialty Management System and Sector Staffing Model, have 

shifted or may shift to different program offices as they move from development to 

implementation.

Although the Coast Guard has established an office to coordinate the modernization 

effort and other broad organizational change initiatives, it is not clear whether its span of 

control or influence will extend to the specific personnel-related plans and tools 

described above. In May 2009, the Coast Guard established the Office of Enterprise 

Strategy, Management, and Doctrine Oversight Directorate within the Office of the Vice 

Commandant, to enhance servicewide change management and strategic analysis, among 

other things. According to a draft charter document provided to us in September 2009, 

this newly established office will lead a team of senior officials from across the Coast 

Guard charged with the overarching design, planning, implementation, and sustainment 

of organizational change initiatives such as modernization. However, as of December 

2009, the draft charter had not been finalized and senior officials from the Office of 

Enterprise Strategy had previously stated that their office was not tasked with direct 

coordination of specific personnel efforts. Furthermore, these officials emphasized that 

the more narrowly defined personnel plans and tools are owned and managed by their 

respective program offices. For instance, at the programmatic level, the Office of Future 

Force provided examples of outreach and coordination with offices responsible for 

implementing aspects of the plans and tools we have discussed above. The Office of 

Future Force coordinates with FORCECOM’s Office of Assessment, Integration and Risk 

Management on building competency-based curriculum, works with the Acquisition 

Workforce Planning, Development & Certification office to identify acquisition 

 

37 GAO, Coast Guard: Update on Marine Safety Information for Safety and Law Enforcement System, 

GAO-02-11 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2001) and GAO-08-12. 

20 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
competencies, and with the Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety and Stewardship 

has developed two new competencies. 

However, management by different program offices may complicate coordination. For 

example, in August 2009, the Personnel Service Center assumed responsibility for the 

Officer Specialty Management System; the Office of Future Forces maintains the 

Competency Management System. The expertise of staff in the Office of Enterprise 

Strategy, one official continued, does not typically extend to program subject matter 

itself and the program offices are ultimately accountable for developing and monitoring 

their own initiatives. Officials did note, however, that the Office of Enterprise Strategy’s 

role in managing the Coast Guard Business Intelligence system involves checking the 

performance metrics of the various initiatives for duplication. In addition, they 

concurred that the visibility of the Coast Guard Business Intelligence system data 

throughout the Coast Guard would facilitate coordination among the relevant program 

offices themselves. Still, because of the numerous Coast Guard entities involved with the 

development of the various personnel-related plans and tools, the Coast Guard faces the 

potential for duplication of efforts and challenges in establishing accountability for its 

overall workforce goals. 

Upcoming Change in Leadership May Make Sustaining Personnel Efforts Challenging 

A change in the Coast Guard's leadership in May 2010 may make it challenging to sustain 

various personnel efforts associated with the Coast's Guard's ongoing modernization. In 

our view, fostering continued progress in addressing workforce issues is important to 

achieving the agency’s workforce goals embedded within the agency’s overall 

modernization plan. As we have previously reported, at the center of any serious change 

management initiative—such as the modernization plan—are the people.38 Thus, the key 

to a successful merger and transformation is to recognize the “people” element and 

implement strategies to help individuals maximize their full potential in the new 

organization, while simultaneously managing the risk of reduced productivity and 

effectiveness that often occurs as a result of the changes. One key practice in this effort 

is ensuring that the organization’s top leadership drives the change initiative and defines 

and articulates a succinct and compelling reason for the change. For example, in 2003 we 

reported that because a merger or transformation entails fundamental and often radical 

change, strong and inspirational leadership is indispensable, and that top leadership that 

is clearly and personally involved in the merger or transformation represents stability 

and provides an identifiable source for employees to rally around during tumultuous 

times. The agency’s leadership must set the direction, pace, and tone for the 

transformation. According to a 2009 National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) 

study, the current Coast Guard Commandant has taken several positive steps in this 

regard by reaching out to an unprecedented number of agency staff through a variety of 

innovative mechanisms and by involving his senior leadership in the design, 

communication, and implementation of the modernization vision since announcing his 

 

38 GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational 

Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

21 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
intention to transform the organization.39 However, with the transition to a new 

Commandant’s leadership in the summer of 2010, there is no guarantee that the events 

put into motion to achieve this transformation will be supported by the new 

Commandant’s agenda. As NAPA reported, it is possible that the current leadership’s 

vision will not be sustained past the summer of 2010. Moreover, our previous work also 

reported that experience shows that successful major change management initiatives in 

large private and public sector organizations can often take at least 5 to 7 years. Thus, 

the combined factors of the Coast Guard’s dependence on receiving congressional 

authorization to fully implement the modernization plan, and the current Commandant’s 

limited time remaining as the leader of this effort, may make it challenging to retain the 

sustained and inspired attention needed to accomplish these changes, unless the 

incoming Commandant shares a similar vision for the organization. Certainly the 

progress made to date in implementing the modernization plan helps to mitigate this 

challenge, but the final results remain to be seen. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 

On December 21, 2009, we provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Coast Guard. On January 5, 2010, the 

department’s audit liaison office responded by e-mail that DHS concurred with the 

report. The department and the Coast Guard provided no formal comments but offered 

one technical clarification. We incorporated the technical clarification into this report 

where appropriate. 

_ _ _ _ _ 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report 

earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, 

we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and interested 

congressional committees and subcommittees. In addition, this report will be available at 

no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff has any questions about this report or wish to discuss the matter 

further, please contact me at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of 

this report. Other key contributors to this report are listed in enclosure II. 

 

39 NAPA, U.S. Coast Guard Modernization Study (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2009). NAPA is an independent, 

nonprofit organization chartered by Congress to assist federal, state, and local governments in improving 

their effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability. 

22 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Stephen L. Caldwell 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Enclosure – 2 

23 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Enclosure I 

Key Personnel Plans and Data-Driven Tools 

 

This enclosure provides more detailed information about how the Coast Guard seeks to 

address its personnel problems. The Coast Guard has developed plans and tools 

including, among others, two servicewide plans for implementing broad workforce 

changes—the Workforce Action Plan and the FORCECOM Business Plan— plus a 

mission-support plan focused on improving the number of acquisition personnel within 

its Acquisition Directorate, and a mission-specific plan focused more narrowly on its 

marine safety mission. Table 1 provides a detailed description of the purpose of each 

personnel plan or tool, the specific Coast Guard office responsible for its 

implementation, the time frames for implementation, and the status of each initiative. 

Table 1: Summary of Key Personnel Plans and Data-Driven Tools 

Servicewide Plans

Workforce Action Plan 

Issue 

This plan considers Coast Guard mission areas and was developed at the direction of the 

Senate Appropriations Committee, whose members had expressed concern that the size 

of the service’s workforce had not kept pace with its increased mission requirements. 

The plan was to include (1) a gap analysis of the mission areas that continue to need 

resources and the type of personnel necessary to address those needs; (2) a strategy, 

including funding, milestones, and a timeline, for addressing personnel gaps for each 

category of employee; (3) specific strategies for recruiting individuals for hard-to-fill 

positions; and (4) any additional authorities and resources necessary to address staffing 

requirements. The creation of a workforce action plan may help the Coast Guard better 

align its human capital program with current and emerging mission requirements, and 

also facilitate the development of long-term strategies for acquiring, training, and 

retaining needed staff. 

Purpose 

The Coast Guard’s Workforce Action Plan, which emphasizes the Coast Guard’s mission 

staffing for fiscal years 2009-2010, was created in response to congressional direction 

and examines current human resource planning processes, highlights recent 

improvements to these processes, and discusses areas for improvement.

Responsible Command 

The Assistant Commandant for Human Resources under the future Deputy Commandant 

for Mission Support is responsible for development of the Workforce Action Plan. 

24 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Time frames 

Start 

• September 2008—Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009 

(Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574 (2008)) enacted. Senate appropriations 

committee report 110-396 accompanying this appropriations act directed the 

Coast Guard to create a workforce action plan. The Explanatory Statement 

accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009 

directed the Coast Guard to comply with the Senate report direction regarding a 

workforce action plan. H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong., Committee Print 

on H.R. 2638/Public Law 110-329 at 646 (2008). 

End 

• August 24, 2009—Plan signed by Commandant. 

• Fiscal year 2010—Plan listed selected requests for personnel increases contained 

in the fiscal year 2010 President’s Budget; the Coast Guard reported that it intends 

to revise the plan periodically as needed. 

Status 

The Workforce Action Plan did not provide a gap analysis of the mission areas and 

personnel needed, and thus also did not provide a strategy with proposed funding, 

milestones, and a timeline for addressing these personnel gaps for each employee 

category consistent with congressional direction. The Workforce Action Plan did provide 

a general view of recruiting strategies for meeting the service’s three priority workforce 

needs related to the quantity, quality, and diversity of its applicant pool, and referred 

generally to two mission areas that the Coast Guard identified as needing personnel 

adjustments—acquisitions and marine safety. Lastly, while the plan discussed some of 

the agency’s existing authorities, it did not expound upon any additional authorities 

needed to address staffing requirements. Instead, the Coast Guard’s Workforce Action 

Plan set out an explanation of the Coast Guard’s workforce planning process. For 

example, the Workforce Action Plan provided an overview of how the Coast Guard 

would use the resources requested in the fiscal year 2010 President’s Budget and 

provided a list of manpower determinations for some units and platforms, an accession 

plan and civilian hiring targets, as well as a workforce status report (as of the first 

quarter of 2009). Although the submitted workforce plan did not comport with direction 

provided by the Senate appropriators, it did follow the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) workforce planning guidance in that the Coast Guard identified its 

human resource planning processes, highlighted recent efforts undertaken to improve 

the Coast Guard’s human resources management program, and discussed areas for 

improvement in its human resource planning and budgeting processes. Following the 

DHS Workforce Planning Model, the Coast Guard plan frames its human resource 

planning and budget processes across five stages: 

• Strategic Planning: As described in the Workforce Action Plan, Coast Guard 

strategic planning takes place under the “Evergreen process,” a 4-year planning 

cycle aligned with the appointment of a new Commandant. The incoming 

Commandant’s Intent is developed into the Coast Guard Strategy and 

communicated to the organization. The central linkage between overall strategy 

and human capital allocations is the budget process. Program managers submit 

25 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Resource Proposals (RP) to request staffing for current shortfalls or anticipated 

needs using guidance from the Commandant, which is reflected in the Coast 

Guard Strategy. The RPs are reviewed and prioritized by different groups of senior 

resource managers before inclusion in the DHS budget. 

• Supply, Demand, Discrepancies: In its Workforce Action Plan, the Coast Guard 

describes how program managers determine the nature of their human resource 

needs by identifying the job tasks to be performed, the skills needed to do them, 

and an assessment of the training needed to deliver the job skills to an individual. 

The Coast Guard has developed the Manpower Requirements Determination tool, 

which according to Coast Guard documents and officials is designed to use a 

scientific approach to measure workload, in order to help determine the 

appropriate number and mix of personnel needed to conduct Coast Guard work. 

The Manpower Requirements Determination system, is under development and is 

planned to be linked to RP requests—with the goal of providing senior Coast 

Guard managers the information they need to make better informed resource 

management decisions. 

• Develop Action Plan: According to the Workforce Action Plan, the Coast Guard 

develops an annual Integrated Accession Plan (IAP) to provide guidance on 

personnel requirements and goals for the following fiscal year. The IAPs provide 

target numbers of needed military and civilian personnel, and are based on 

expected on-budget personnel increases or decreases and forecasted losses. In 

addition, the Coast Guard Recruiting Command annually develops a recruiting 

plan that focuses on hiring individuals in sufficient quantity to meet mission 

requirements. 

• Implement Action Plan: To help attain hiring goals contained in annual IAPs, the 

Workforce Action Plan describes various Coast Guard recruiting strategies for its 

military and civilian workforce, including incentive programs for difficult to fill 

positions. Strategies used include bonuses and guaranteed skills training; directhire authority for limited occupations such as contracting specialist; a pilot 

referral bonus program; recruitment, relocation, and retention incentives; rehire 

of annuitants without a salary offset; moving/relocation assistance; student loan 

repayments; enhanced annual leave accrual; and student internship/ 

developmental programs. Also, the Acquisition Directorate’s Human Capital 

Strategic Plan outlines the tools used to meet the human capital goals of the 

acquisition workforce. 

• Monitor, Evaluate, Revise: According to the Workforce Action Plan, the Coast 

Guard creates and distributes to senior leadership a monthly workforce status 

report to help monitor several aspects of the Coast Guard’s human capital. The 

status reports track indicators such as the number of personnel in Coast Guard 

positions (by officer, chief warrant officer, and enlisted), rates of attrition, and 

position vacancy rates. The Workforce Action Plan states that anomalies revealed 

through these reports and through other means are investigated further, and can 

result in corrective actions, such as offering incentives to attract personnel to a 

26 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
specific job. In addition, mission performance data are used by program managers 

to help identify potential links between declining performance and workforce 

gaps. 

In the section Coast Guard Staffing Level Requirements, the Workforce Action Plan

contains fiscal year 2010 requested personnel increases and fiscal year 2009 enacted 

increases. 

The concluding comments of the Workforce Action Plan indicate that the Coast Guard 

will continue its development of tools, such as the Manpower Requirements 

Determination system, and the Competency Management System, in order to provide a 

clearer picture of the service’s general human resource requirements, and will also 

continue to implement programs in specific mission areas where resource needs have 

already been identified, such as marine safety, acquisitions, and financial management. 

27 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Force Readiness Command (FORCECOM) Business Plan

Issue 

Prior to FORCECOM, which was established on June 1, 2009, many personnel readiness 

roles were independently managed by the Atlantic Area and Pacific Area commands.40

This bifurcation resulted in geographic variation in how Coast Guard personnel were 

trained; how their operational readiness was inspected, assessed, and reported; and 

which doctrine or Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)41 they followed when 

performing their missions. For example, at the unit level, on-the-job training 

requirements for the same positions could vary by location at the discretion of the 

commanding officers. Standardizing personnel requirements and training will help to 

ensure that the Coast Guard can surge people and assets across the nation to fulfill 

mission needs. 

Purpose 

FORCECOM’s overarching mission is to provide ready forces to meet the supported 

commander’s current and future operational requirements. FORCECOM is leading 

efforts to make aspects of personnel readiness more standardized across the Coast 

Guard. As described in the Business Plan and FORCECOM Commander’s Intent for 

fiscal years 2009 through 2010, the intended roles of the new command are to 

• allocate mobile and deployable specialized forces, 

• formulate operational doctrine that will align training and standardization to 

ensure force interoperability and readiness, 

• provide timely and high-quality operational training, 

• consolidate and standardize operational inspections and establish a standard 

measurement system to evaluate force readiness, and 

• validate field innovation best practices and incorporate them into TTP. 

While recognizing that Coast Guard personnel serve in diverse operating environments 

that require a degree of local control and flexibility, the consolidation of force readiness 

responsibilities under a single service-wide command represents an effort to increase 

standardization and integration of personnel management, according to the Coast Guard. 

Responsible Command 

FORCECOM, along with the Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, the Deputy 

Commandant for Operations, and the Operations Command, is one of the four new 

commands created under the Coast Guard’s modernization effort. 

 

40 The Coast Guard is in the process of transitioning from a bicoastal operational command structure, 

consisting of the Atlantic Area Command and Pacific Area Command, to one where all operations are 

centralized under one command (Operations Command). According to the Coast Guard, when 

modernization is complete, both Atlantic and Pacific Commands will cease to exist. 41 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures are codified, specific, and measurable actions and methods that 

implement doctrine or policy. TTP captures the content of the information, including the “what,” “when,” 

“how,” “where,” “who,” and “why.” 

28 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Time frames 

Start 

• October 2008—FORCECOM Fiscal Year 2009-2010 Business Plan issued.

• June 1, 2009—FORCECOM stood-up at initial operating capability, but awaiting 

full congressional approval.

End 

• Fiscal year 2010—FORCECOM Business Plan end date; the Coast Guard reported 

that it intends to update the plan periodically to reflect FORCECOM priorities. 

• 2012—FORCECOM expected to reach final operating capability. 

 

Status 

Between its 2009 commission date and 2012, FORCECOM will incrementally expand its 

operations to final operating capability. Although not fully implemented, FORCECOM 

documents and officials provided examples of specific initiatives under way that intend 

to further the overall goal of more centralized and standardized force readiness 

management: 

• Assume management of all major training commands—For the first time in the 

Coast Guard’s history, according to FORCECOM documents, all training for 

individuals, boat, cutter, shore, and aviation units will be managed under a single 

command. 

• Review and revise operational policy, doctrine, and Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures—One FORCECOM division is currently leading an effort to identify, 

catalog, and prioritize legacy operational doctrine. 

• Standardize unit inspection requirements and coordinate inspections—

According to the FORCECOM Commander’s Intent, an average Coast Guard unit 

spends 60 days completing inspection visits each year. In addition, we spoke with 

the senior officer from the FORCECOM offices responsible for standardizing unit 

inspection requirements and coordinating inspections and he explained that in 

many cases they request the same information. In 2009, FORCECOM began beta 

testing new processes to consolidate and standardize assessment visits at three 

types of field units: cutter, air station, and sector. The command is also seeking 

ways to more efficiently integrate best practices from the field into standard Coast 

Guard operating doctrine. 

• Develop a Coast Guard-wide system of readiness measures—This “FORCECOM 

Readiness Dashboard” is expected to measure individual, unit, and mission 

readiness across six broad indicators: People, Equipment, Supply, Training, 

Infrastructure, and Information, and will be accessed through the Coast Guard 

Business Intelligence system. 

• Collaborate with operational command and program offices to build a catalog of 

Coast Guard Mission Essential Tasks—Mission Essential Task Lists for specific 

unit types or assets are intended to help the Coast Guard better assess readiness 

29 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
gaps and will be used as part of a system that reports readiness to the Department 

of Defense and others. 

We used the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), which provides 

agencies a framework for effectively implementing and managing programs including 

setting strategic goals, measuring performance, and reporting on the degree to which 

goals were met, in our analysis of the FORCECOM Business Plan. Although GPRA is 

generally applied to agencywide strategic plans, its framework is useful to guide any type 

of planning. The FORCECOM Business Plan contains characteristics of GPRA planning 

including defining a mission and desired outcomes and identifying performance 

measures to gauge progress.42 For example, the plan defines a clear mission, specifically 

to ensure the forces allocated are trained to standards, armed with current tactics and 

procedures, interoperable, and inspected, in order to meet current and future operational 

requirements. The plan also calls for performance to be measured with specific actions 

needed to create this new command. For example, the FORCECOM Business Plan sets a 

goal to catalogue and review all general mandated training requirements to ensure that 

each requirement is carefully approved and targeted for efficiency by 2010. Some 

personnel-related milestones contained in the FORCECOM Business Plan, such as 

establishing processes for developing new operational doctrine and assuming 

management of certain training teams, for example, are not expected to be reached until 

2010. 

 

42 GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act,

GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996). It is important to note that while GPRA focuses on the 

agency level, performance goals and measures are important management tools for all levels of an agency, 

such as the bureau, program, project, or activity levels, and these criteria are applicable at those levels as 

well. 

30 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Mission-Support Plan

Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan 

Issue 

In the late 1990s the Coast Guard began the largest acquisition program in its history to 

build or modernize ships and aircraft and to procure other capabilities, and in 2007, after 

a series of programmatic failures, the Coast Guard sought to change how its acquisitions 

were managed. Recognizing that it did not have in place a workforce with the experience 

and depth to manage all Coast Guard acquisitions, and that it was relying too heavily on 

contractors, the Coast Guard took steps to build its own acquisition workforce to 

manage its multibillion dollar acquisition program. By developing its own acquisition 

workforce, the Coast Guard may improve accountability for its acquisitions by increasing 

government control and visibility over its assets and capabilities. 

Purpose 

The Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan is the second human capital plan used 

by the Coast Guard since the Acquisition Directorate was created in 2007. The first 

human capital plan described the challenges related to building a new acquisition 

directorate, and the updated Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan set out longerterm planning and management of the acquisition workforce. 

Responsible Command 

The Office of Acquisition Workforce Management within the future Deputy Commandant 

for Mission Support authored the plan.

Time frames 

Start 

• Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan first released in April 2008, with a 

recently updated version published in 2009 and a third iteration expected in the 

second quarter of fiscal year 2010, according to the Coast Guard. 

End 

• According to the July 2009 Blueprint for Continuous Improvement—a 

companion document to the Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan—the 

plan will be updated. 

Status 

The 2009 version of the Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan identifies three 

overarching human capital challenges facing the Coast Guard’s Acquisition Directorate 

along with 10 specific strategic objectives to address these challenges. In addition, the 

plan adopted and applied the Office of Personnel Management’s Human Capital 

Assessment and Accountability Framework, which includes guidance in the areas of: 

Strategic Alignment, Leadership and Knowledge Management, Results-Oriented 

31 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Performance Culture, Talent Management, and Accountability. While the Acquisition 

Human Capital Strategic Plan itself does not identify time frames for completion, the 

Blueprint for Acquisition Reform, renamed the Blueprint for Continuous 

Improvement, supports many of the initiatives and provides deadlines for their 

completion. 

32 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Mission-Specific Plan

Marine Safety Performance Plan 

Issue 

Some Coast Guard officials, congressional members, and industry stakeholders 

perceived a widening performance gap in the service’s marine safety mission as the 

Coast Guard took on increased homeland security mission responsibilities. Specific 

concerns were summarized in a November 2007 report by retired Vice Admiral James C. 

Card, Coast Guard Marine Safety Analysis: An Independent Assessment and 

Suggestions for Improvement. Personnel-related issues described in the report were: the 

number of marine safety personnel/resources; capability; professionalism; training and 

qualifications; civilian/military mix; and tour length and rotations. Having the appropriate 

numbers and fully trained marine safety personnel will help to ensure that the Coast 

Guard successfully meets the increasing needs of maritime stakeholders. 

Purpose 

The Marine Safety Performance Plan was developed in part as a response to concerns 

expressed by stakeholders and others noted above. The plan sets goals, objectives, and 

performance targets for the marine safety mission for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 

2014. 

Responsible Command 

Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship under the Deputy 

Commandant for Operations authored the Marine Safety Performance Plan and is 

responsible for managing its implementation. 

Time frames 

Start 

• November 2008—Performance Plan issued. 

End 

• Fiscal year 2014—Performance Plan end date. 

Status 

The Coast Guard set out a course of action to meet its human resource capability goals 

and objectives identified in the Marine Safety Performance Plan. 

• Additional positions for fiscal year 2009—The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009 

appropriation included 310 marine safety positions. About two-thirds (202) of 

these positions are for military personnel and about one-third (108) are for civilian 

personnel. The military positions include 47 officers, 42 warrant officers, and 113 

enlisted personnel, and as of December 16, 2009, the Coast Guard reported that it 

had placed a total of 178 military personnel in marine safety positions, including 

33 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
39 officers, 26 warrant officers, and 113 enlisted personnel. The Coast Guard also 

reported that it expects to assign the remaining marine safety military positions 

during the regular assignment cycle (which will conclude in June 2010). With 

regard to the civilian positions, as of December 3, 2009, 88 of the 108 positions 

were filled, 17 positions were advertised, and three position descriptions were 

under development, according to the Coast Guard. Civilian positions have been 

funded within the National Centers of Expertise for Marine Safety, and among 

apprentice marine inspectors, and additional civilian training, planning, oversight, 

policy, and investigating officer positions have also been funded. 

• Additional positions for fiscal year 2010—The Coast Guard has requested 

funding for an additional 74 positions for marine inspectors and investigating 

officers at field units; marine inspector training officers at feeder ports; staffing for 

the Steam and Vintage Vessels Center of Expertise; engineers for standards 

development and review; and expanded training curricula at the Marine Safety 

School in Yorktown, Virginia. 

• Strengthen marine safety career paths—The Coast Guard is developing an 

apprentice, journeyman, and senior marine inspector career progression as well 

additional career paths for junior civilian marine safety positions. 

• Feeder Ports and National Centers of Expertise—Feeder ports are ports that have 

sufficient volume and workload to train apprentice-level personnel on marine 

safety competencies during a 2-year rotation. Eighteen feeder ports have been 

established to enhance training consistency and opportunities for new marine 

safety personnel. In addition to the feeder ports, the Coast Guard has created 

various National Centers of Expertise (NCOE) designed to enhance professional 

development and interaction with industry. Seven centers were developed in fiscal 

years 2008 and 2009, including the Vintage Vessels National Center of Expertise, 

Duluth, Minnesota; Towing Vessel NCOE, Paducah, Kentucky; Liquefied Gas 

Vessel NCOE, Port Arthur, Texas; Outer Continental Shelf NCOE, Morgan City, 

Louisiana; and Investigating Officer NCOE, New Orleans, Louisiana. 

• Industry training/ Merchant Marine Industry Training Program—The Coast 

Guard is developing Mutual Training Memorandums of Understanding for industry 

and the Coast Guard, and has a goal of doubling annual industry training billets to 

24. In fiscal year 2009, six commissioned Coast Guard Academy graduates were 

assigned to a newly developed merchant marine ship-rider program. The purpose 

of the program is to provide staff with exposure to the U.S. merchant marine and 

maritime industry prior to beginning marine inspector assignments. The Coast 

Guard and industry are developing long-term (12 months), mid-term (3-6 months), 

and short-term (less than 1 month) professional development opportunities. 

We found that that this performance plan also contained characteristics of planning set 

out in the Government Performance and Results Act, including involving stakeholders in 

defining the mission and desired outcomes of the plan, and identifying specific goals, 

34 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
objectives, and performance measures that link to the stated mission.43 For example, this 

5-year plan was the result of actively solicited input from maritime stakeholders, and 

defines the mission of the plan as a means to ensure the safety of maritime stakeholders 

by preventing marine casualties, protecting the marine environment, and strengthening 

maritime commerce. In addition, the Marine Safety Performance Plan outlines specific 

goals and objectives that can be measured. For example, the plan envisions adding over 

300 inspector and investigator positions in fiscal year 2009, including more civilian 

inspectors for continuity, adjusting tour lengths, strengthening career paths, and 

expanding marine safety training and education. The Marine Safety Performance Plan

describes various initiatives and set targets for marine safety outcomes through fiscal 

year 2014. In addition, a senior marine safety official said and the Marine Safety 

Performance Plan states that the plan is a living document and will undergo continual 

review. 

 

43 GAO/GGD-96-118. 

35 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Data-Driven Tools 

Officer Specialty Management System (OSMS) 

Issue 

The legacy Officer Corps Management System and Officer Billet Code framework, 

according to agency documents and officials, was too complex and no longer accurately 

reflected Coast Guard mission requirements. The OSMS, by providing a framework with 

more clearly defined specialties and position requirements, may help officers manage 

their careers and development, and assist Coast Guard management to better understand 

the skills set within the officer corps and those skills that need to be enhanced or 

expanded. 

Purpose 

The OSMS consists of a new framework of officer specialties and subspecialties—the set 

of over 70 legacy specialties under the Officer Billet Code framework was reorganized 

into 13 specialties and 38 subspecialties. Also, unlike the previous system, the OSMS is to 

detail specific competencies and qualifications required for the specialties and 

subspecialties. 

The OSMS is an evolving system for managing Coast Guard officer “specialties”—specific 

areas of expertise within the service associated with different occupations or positions. 

As described both by officials who designed the new system and by key end-users 

responsible for assigning officers to new positions, OSMS is intended to more clearly 

articulate information than the legacy system it is to replace, providing the technological 

link between competencies, individual officers, and specialties. As a result, the system 

should facilitate the Coast Guard’s efforts to specifically identify, for the first time, the 

specific competency requirements for each officer specialty. As such, according to 

officials and an agency overview document, the new streamlined system of specialties 

will provide a clearer picture of what is required by Coast Guard officer positions and the 

capabilities of the officer corps. In addition, the OSMS allows for the addition or deletion 

of specialties and subspecialties as service needs dictate. Officials responsible for OSMS 

development outlined different ways that stakeholders may capitalize on these 

clarifications and use the OSMS as a type of management tool: 

• Individual officers may be able to better manage their professional development 

and career choices given more clearly articulated specialty requirements and 

standards. 

• Supervisors and workforce planners may be able to better monitor the 

competency profile of the officer corps, including potential shortfalls of specific 

knowledge, skills, education, and experience. In addition, standard specialty 

requirements may assist managers with calculating the time and cost of obtaining 

specific specialties. 

36 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
• Assignment Officers who determine the rotation assignments of individual 

officers can use the tool to inform their placement decisions, although officials 

involved with the assignment process emphasized that the system data by itself 

would not determine placements. 

Responsible Command 

OSMS was developed by the Future Force Office within the Office of the Assistant 

Commandant for Human Resources and the future Deputy Commandant for Mission 

Support. In August 2009 the management of the system was transferred to the Personnel 

Service Center, the Coast Guard entity responsible for officer assignments. 

Time frames 

Start 

• 2001—the Coast Guard sponsored studies focused on officer specialties that led to 

a 2-year Future Force Office evaluation of the legacy system. 

• May 2004—Coast Guard Commandant approved new officer specialty framework. 

• Summer 2010—the Coast Guard expects to start assigning specialties to all 

officers. 

End 

• Summer 2010—the Coast Guard expects System to be mapped to CMS. 

• Spring 2011—Expected full implementation, followed by continued development. 

Status 

The Future Force Office assigned the new specialties and subspecialties to officer billets 

in 2008 and conducted beta testing from December 2008 through June 2009. The 

Personnel Service Center, having assumed management of OSMS in August 2009, 

planned to carry out additional beta testing in four specific specialty areas (aviation, 

medical, legal, and C4IT) from September 2009 through May 2010.44 

As of summer 2009, program offices were still in the process of identifying requirements 

for the new specialties, and full system implementation is not expected until 2011. 

 

44 C4IT refers to Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information Technology. 

37 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Competency Management System (CMS) 

Issue 

There are ongoing general concerns in the Coast Guard about personnel being subjected 

to different sets of human resource requirements. For example, a 2006 Commandant 

Intent Action Order stated that the Coast Guard’s “staffing standards are obsolete and no 

process exists to remedy this state.Leaders and resource managers do not have 

confidence that any particular set of human capital requirements are based on industrial 

engineering principles, or any objective science, and cannot compare sets of 

requirements to optimize human resource allocation.” 45 Having clearly defined, 

standardized human resource requirements should help the Coast Guard ensure that the 

appropriate personnel with appropriate skill sets are assigned to the appropriate 

positions. 

Purpose 

Through a standard set of defined competencies, according to Coast Guard documents, 

CMS is designed to help decision makers understand the demands of the service and 

specific positions along with the supply of people available to meet those demands. 

Specifically, for all Coast Guard personnel, including officers, enlisted, and civilian, the 

system allows the Coast Guard to 

• establish and modify competencies, 

• assign competencies to positions, 

• record competencies earned by members, 

• collect and organize competency data and information, and 

• allow for the use of competency information in personnel management decisions. 

Responsible Command 

The Future Force Office, which falls under the Assistant Commandant for Human 

Resources and the future Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, maintains CMS. 

Time frames 

Start 

• 2004—CMS initial implementation. 

End 

• Ongoing. Competencies are routinely reviewed and modified if needed based on 

changing Coast Guard mission requirements, according to officials. 

Status 

As of November 2009, CMS covered approximately 80 percent of active duty and reserve 

positions, and the Coast Guard was in the early stages of developing processes to 

identify and assign competencies to civilian and auxiliary positions. The system’s 

Competency Dictionary currently contains close to 900 competencies. It is unclear at this 

time when CMS will fully reflect all military, reserve, and auxiliary competencies. 

 

45 Commandant Intent Action Order #8, Human Resource Strategies to Support Coast Guard Maritime 

Strategy.

38 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Manpower Requirements Determination (MRD) 

Issue 

In general, the MRD system was developed to help make the Coast Guard staffing 

processes more objective. More specifically, according to the MRD business model, 

Coast Guard officials currently measure human capital in ways that can vary based on 

factors such as programmatic or local needs. Having a common set of standards and 

analytical approaches may enable officials responsible for personnel allocation decisions 

to make more standardized human capital comparisons across units or programs. 

Purpose 

According to the MRD business model, the MRD system is designed to help calculate the 

human capital needed to perform Coast Guard tasks or missions using verifiable, 

repeatable, and defendable analyses. 

The MRD analyses consider a range of variables including Coast Guard strategy, mission 

requirements, standards shaped by program mangers, and inputs from operational 

commanders. Analyses can be conducted on current, new, or changing mission 

requirements, such as the recent addition of the new Maritime Enforcement Specialist 

rating, or on more specific unit- or asset-based activities, such as operating a particular 

class of cutter. 

In addition to the number of personnel needed, analysis outputs can include data on 

personnel competencies, experience, training, and rank required to conduct the mission, 

as well as broader Coast Guard considerations like the appropriate mix of ranks needed 

for continuous growth. When summed across all units, the MRD business model notes, 

the total human capital requirements associated with a particular mission can be 

advocated by the program manager or unit in the Coast Guard’s resource prioritization 

and allocation process. 

The MRD system is highlighted in the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2009 Workforce Action 

Plan as an example of a tool being developed by the service to help identify workforce 

supply and demand gaps.

Responsible Command 

The Future Force Office within the Office of the Assistant Commandant for Human 

Resources and future Deputy Commandant for Mission Support is developing the MRD 

system. 

Time frames 

Start 

• August 2006—Commandant Intent Action Order #8 (Human Resource Strategies 

to Support Coast Guard Maritime Strategy) noted the need for a more 

standardized, objective set of human capital requirements. 

• October 2006—MRD Enterprise Project Chartered. 

End 

• September 2010—Expected completion of policy and program development. 

39 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
• September 2012—Expected completion of automated information system to 

support the MRD (including access through CGBI), followed by continued 

development. 

Status 

According to an agency document, 16 MRD analyses were completed throughout the 

Coast Guard as of December 2009, an additional 7 were ongoing, and 2 were planned. 

These types of analyses can be conducted at the request of a sponsoring program, 

operational commander, or Coast Guard planning element to support specific resource 

requests in the Coast Guard’s annual budget process. The analyses are currently not 

required and represent almost none of the total number of human capital resource 

proposals evaluated, according to one official involved with the development of the MRD 

system. This official stated, however, the Future Force Office hopes to eventually 

conduct an MRD analysis of every unit type, every 5 years. 

40 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Sector Staffing Model (SSM) 

Issue 

As noted in the 2007 charter that established SSM’s guidance team and working group, 

when sectors were created between 2004 and 2006, there was no standard model to help 

determine staffing levels—personnel allocations were developed using methodologies 

that differed by program or unit. Having a transparent and repeatable methodology to 

determine the minimum number of personnel needed to staff a sector should assist Coast 

Guard management in allocating personnel resources across all sectors and help project 

future personnel needs. 

Purpose 

According to Coast Guard documents, SSM is designed to assist officials with resource 

allocation decisions by creating baseline staffing data that are comparable across the 

Coast Guard’s 35 diverse sectors. 

Officials hope that SSM will address these inconsistencies by applying a transparent, 

repeatable, and scalable methodology to the staffing process. Specifically, officials 

intend to use the model to 

• quantify staffing shortfalls to justify human capital requests in the Coast Guard’s 

regular resource prioritization and allocation process, 

• provide a transparent basis to reallocate resources, 

• enable senior leadership and program managers to understand resource 

implications of proposed policy changes and requirements, and 

• help forecast future staffing needs based on projected activity and mission growth. 

SSM, according to an official involved with its development, will quantify staffing needs 

for specific sector activities, such as “container inspections,” based upon a number of 

variables, including 

• Coast Guard mission requirements, 

• individual sector activity levels, 

• “average” time to complete activities, and 

• other sector-specific data (e.g., local travel factors). 

In addition to defining the quantity of human capital needed to complete an activity in a 

particular location, the model is planned to break out a recommended mix of officer, 

enlisted, and civilian personnel along with their rates, ranks, and grades. Another 

component of the model, a “command cadre tool,” is expected to recommend 

appropriate ranks for sector leadership based on responsibility and span of control 

measures. 

A key official noted that base-level staffing data generated by the model assume 

positions will be staffed with fully qualified personnel and that data on the length of time 

41 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
needed to complete training requirements have not been collected; specific training 

factors were, however, under development as of spring 2009.

Responsible Command 

The Office of Shore Forces within the Assistant Commandant for Capabilities and the 

Deputy Commandant for Operations is leading the development of SSM. According to 

one official, Shore Forces intends to maintain the model until at least 3-years of activity 

data are incorporated and other refinements to the model are complete. The same 

official further commented that the Manpower Requirements Determination workgroup 

in the Future Force Office will recommend which Coast Guard directorate should take 

ownership of all service staffing issues, including SSM. Currently, the official said, the 

Office of Budgets & Programs is responsible for the Coast Guard staffing requirements 

and the official service staffing manual. 

Time frames 

Start 

• 2007—Sector Staffing Senior Guidance Team and Working Group chartered. 

End 

• December 2010—Expected SSM access through CGBI. 

Status 

SSM was accredited by senior Coast Guard leadership in July 2009 and is now available 

for use by select units to support resource requests and unit-level reprogramming. 

According to one Shore Forces official, further refinement is required before the SSM is 

implemented on a large scale in 2010. This refinement includes additional testing to 

reduce data anomalies and faulty assumptions, as well as the development and 

integration of a Sector competency framework. A charter to begin development of the 

refined model, Phase III, was issued July 2009. 

42 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Coast Guard Business Intelligence (CGBI) 

Issue 

The Coast Guard employs numerous data systems that exhibit varying degrees of data 

quality, reliability, and integration. The Coast Guard recognizes the need for accurate 

data from a variety of sources to use in its analysis of personnel management decisions.

Purpose 

According to Coast Guard documents and officials, the CGBI system is designed to 

support decision making across all levels of the Coast Guard by leveraging existing Coast 

Guard data, measures, and processes. Specifically, the tool accesses raw data from the 

Coast Guard’s numerous “transactional” systems, (i.e., individual databases like Direct 

Access or Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement that serve a range of 

functions). The general premise of the tool, according to one official, is to collect data 

once through the appropriate transactional systems in order to have the ability to use the 

information multiple times in a variety of configurations. Along with providing decision 

makers a means to view Coast Guard data, officials told us that CGBI also promotes 

information transparency, which has resulted in more self-correcting of inaccurate data, 

and greater information sharing, which among other things, helps prevent duplication of 

efforts. 

Responsible Command 

The Office of Performance Management and Decision Support under the Office of the 

Vice Commandant, maintains CGBI. This office is currently transitioning to the new 

Office of Performance Management within the Coast Guard Enterprise Strategy, 

Management and Doctrine Oversight Directorate, also under the Office of the Vice 

Commandant. 

Time frames 

Start 

• 2006—CGBI Phase I launched. 

End 

• Officials indicated that the system will continue to evolve to meet organizational 

needs. The next major system upgrade, which involves predictive analytics 

capabilities, is expected to be implemented by 2011. 

Status 

CGBI Phase II was launched in April 2009. This version, according to agency 

documentation, is capable of more powerful searches and has more features than the 

initial system launched in 2006. 

Several other tools related to personnel issues, including the Competency Management 

System, the Manpower Requirements Determination system, the Officer Specialty 

Management System, and the Sector Staffing Model, are currently or are planned to be 

accessed through CGBI. 

The CGBI system has been implemented, but its refinement continues. For example, an 

43 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
official noted that the next major system enhancement is focused on capabilities that will 

help the Coast Guard use existing data in models or simulations to help predict future 

outcomes. In addition, the Office of Performance Management staff that support the 

CGBI system will continue to focus on measuring data quality for the foreseeable future, 

according to one official. 

44 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
Enclosure II

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements 

GAO Contact 

Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov

Acknowledgements 

In addition to the contact name above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director, and Lori Kmetz, 

Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. David Lutter contributed to all aspects of 

the work. Neetha Rao and Brian Schwartz provided analytical support to several aspects 

of this review. Greg Wilmoth assisted with design and methodology. Geoffrey Hamilton 

provided legal support. Katherine Davis assisted in report development.

45 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
GAO Related Products 

Coast Guard: As Deepwater Systems Integrator, Coast Guard Is Reassessing Costs and 

Capabilities but Lags in Applying Its Disciplined Acquisition Approach. GAO-09-682. 

Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2009. 

Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2010 Budget and Related Performance 

and Management Challenges. GAO-09-810T. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2009. 

Coast Guard: Observations on the Genesis and Progress of the Service’s Modernization 

Program. GAO-09-530R. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2009. 

Coast Guard: Update on Deepwater Program Management, Cost and Acquisition 

Workforce. GAO-09-620T. Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2009. 

Military Personnel: DOD’s and the Coast Guard’s Sexual Assault Prevention and 

Response Programs Face Implementation and Oversight Challenges. GAO-08-924. 

Washington, D.C.: August 29, 2008. 

Coast Guard: Change in Course Improves Deepwater Management and Oversight, but 

Outcome Still Uncertain. GAO-08-745. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2008. 

Coast Guard: Strategies for Mitigating the Loss of Patrol Boats Are Achieving Results 

in the Near Term, but They Come at a Cost and Longer Term Sustainability is 

Unknown. GAO-08-660. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2008. 

Coast Guard: Status of Selected Aspects of the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program.

GAO-08-270R. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008. 

Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Recent Performance, and 

Related Challenges. GAO-08-494T. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2008. 

Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility 

Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing, Practices, and Data.

GAO-08-12. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2008. 

Military Personnel: The DOD and Coast Guard Academies Have Taken Steps to 

Address Incidents of Sexual Harassment and Assault, but Greater Federal Oversight Is 

Needed. GAO-08-296. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2008. 

Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later. 

GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007. 

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and 

Management Functions. GAO-07-454. Washington, D.C.: August 17, 2007. 

Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and Management 

Efforts to Address Them. GAO-07-874. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2007. 

46 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues
47 GAO-10-268R Coast Guard Workforce Issues

Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, Performance, 

Reorganization, and Related Challenges. GAO-07-489T. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2007. 

Coast Guard: Status of Efforts to Improve Deepwater Program Management and 

Address Operational Challenges. GAO-07-575T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2007. 

Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery Missions 

Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006. 

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and Future 

Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006. 

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