### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J une 22 , 2 004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK

Honora ble B . Avant Ede nfield, United States District Judge f or the Southern District of * Geor g ia, sitting by

desig nation. [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 03- 1283 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNo. 0 1- 00 33 3- CR-T-3 0- MAP UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us STEPHEN BRACCIALE, D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J un e 22, 200 4) Befo re EDMONDSON, Ch ie f Ju dg e, HULL, Circu itJu dg e, an d EDENFIELD , * District Judge. HU LL , C ircuit Judg e:Al l c itatio ns to t he se nte nc ingguid e lin e s h e re in a re to t he 19 95 ve rs ion , unle ss o the rw ise 1 noted. 2 A ft er ple ad ing gui lty , S te phe n B ra cc ia le appe al s hi s 15 -m onth pr iso n se nte nc e fo r w ir e fr au d, in vio la tio n of 18 U . S. C. §§ 1 343, 134 6, and 2 . B ra cc ia le ar gue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed : ( 1) in its los s c al cu la tio ns unde r se nte nc ing gui de lin e § 2F 1. 1; and ( 2) in im posi ng the abuse -o f- tr

ust e nhanc em en t purs uant t o guid eline § 3B1.3. U. S. S. G. §§ 2F1.1 & 3B1.3 (1995). A fter r eview and oral 1 ar gum en t, w e re ve rs e the los s c al cu la tio n and a ff irm the abuse -o f- tr

ust enhanc em en t. I. BACKG ROUND A. Fact s Fr om 197 4 to 199 7, D ef

en dant B ra cc ia le w as e m

plo y ed by K ra ft F oods (“ K ra ft ”) . B ra cc ia le he ld s al es pos iti ons, ult im at el y a dvanc ing to the pos iti on o f Reg io na l Sa le s M an ag er atKraft . Inthe c our se of

it s no rm al bus ine ss, K

ra ft of fe rs dis co unt ed

pr ic es to ce rt ai n custom ers in exchange for var ious p rom otion al and advertising activiti es (“pr om oti ona l a ct ivi tie s” ). F ro m 199 4 to 199 7, K

ra ft of fe re d th re e kin ds o f de al s to c ust om er s: ( 1) “ Me rc handi se ” dis co unt s, w he re by the c ust om er

r ec ei ve d a dis co unt ed

pr ic e in e xc hange f

or ne got ia te d pr om oti ona l a ct ivi ty ; ( 2) “ Purc ha se3

O nly ” dis co unt s, w he re by the c ust om er

r ec ei ve d adis co unt ed

pr ic e in e xc hange for m erely

purchasing th e food product; and (3) “ Purchase and Merchandise” dis co unt s, w he re by

the c ust om er

r ec ei ve d adis co unt ed

pr ic e in e xc hange f

or purchasing th e food product and agreeing to certain prom otion al activity . Kr aft pe rm itt ed onl y c er ta in a uth or iz ed c ust om er s to part ic ipate in its dis co unt pr ogr am s. Under these discount program s, authorized custom ers w ouldpurchase K raft food produ cts at full price. T he custom er, however, would rece ive m oney back fro m Kraftby sub m it ti ng Deal Paym en t Au th or iz at io n (“ DPA”) fo rm s t o Kra ft. The D PAform s required K raft to r eim

burse the custom er f

or the differ ence be tw ee n th e fu ll pur ch as e pr ic e an d th e pr ev iou sly ne got ia te d di sc ount

pr ic e. T his pr oc es s was kn own as “ bi ll -b ack s.” AK ra ft se nio r ex ec uti ve , suc h a s B ra cc ia le , w oul d th enappr ove the bil lba ck and p ay the c ust om er

the r equir ed

am ount . Whe re the sa le inc lud ed a

“ Merchandise” or “ Purchase and Merchandise” discoun t, the c ustom er w as obl igate d to use som e of

the bil l- ba ck

m one y to m ar ke t K ra ft ’ s pr oduc ts. F or exam ple, bill-back m oney

could be used to ere ct K raft display s or to provid e new pr oduc t sam

pli ng i n gr oc er

y sto re s.4

D ur ing his e m

plo ym en t w ithK

ra ft , D ef en dant B ra cc ia le m et

D av id W ei nbaum , w ho o pe rate d D &K , ac om pany w hic h su ppl ie d f ood pr oduc ts t o sm al le r fo od s tor es and o the r re ta il es ta bli shm en ts. D &K

w as not auth or iz ed

to rece iv e d is co un te d fo odpri ces un de r an y of Kra ft’s t hr ee d is co un t p ro gr am s. H ow ev er , due to his a cqua int an ce w ithW ei nbaum , Br ac ci al e ar range d f or D &K to obtain Kraft goods at the discoun ted prices offe red to an authorized custom er, Mc L an e Co m

pany , I nc . ( “ Mc L an e” ). B ra cc ia le e nc our ag ed Mc L an e to d ive rt

to D&K som e of the food products that it h ad boug ht from Kr aft at a

discoun ted price. T his allowed D&K to purchase those products at McL ane’ s discou nted pr ic e, apr ic e m

uc h lo w er than th at w hic h D &K

w oul d have pa id f

or the pr oduc ts on th e o pe n m ark et . Br ac ci al e an d W ei nba

um share d th e pr of

its that D &K

e nj oy ed a s ar es ult

of thi s di ve rs ionsc he m e. K ra ft ' s in te rn al pol ic y , how ev er , barr ed Br ac ci al e fr om

( 1) se lf -d ea lin g or

m ak ing arr an ge m en ts w ithit s c ust om er s to pr of it pe rs ona lly

f ro m Kraftsal es , and(2) pa rti ci pa ti ng in th e d iv ers io n o f Kraftpro du ct s. B. Inform ation and P lea Agree m ent18 U. S.C. § 2 state s: 2 Se c tio n 2 . Pr inc ipa ls (a ) Wh oe ve r c omm its an o ff e ns e a g a in st the Un ite d St ate s o r a ids , a be ts, couns e ls, c omm and s, ind uc e s o r p ro c ur e s it s c omm iss ion , is punis ha ble a s a pr inc ipa l. (b) Whoever wi l l fully

cause s an ac t to be done which if direc tly perf ormed by him or ano the r wo uld be an of fe ns e a g a ins t the Un ite d St ate s, is p un ish a ble a s a pr inc ipa l. 18 U.S.C. § 2. 5 O n S ep te m

be r 10, 200 1, D ef

en dant B ra cc ia le w as c harg ed by inf orm at ion w ithone c ount

of w ir e fr au d, in vio la tio n of 18 U . S. C. §§ 1 343, 134 6, and 2 . 2 Se ct ion134 3 m ak es it

af ed er al c ri m e to d ev ise

any sc he m e or

art if ic e to d ef ra ud, or f or obt ai nin g m one y

or pr ope rty by m eans o f fa lse o r fr au dul en t pr et en se s, r ep re se ntatio ns, or pr om ise s, tr an sm its or

c au se s to be tr an sm itt ed by m eans o f w ir e, r ad io, or te le vis ionc om

m uni catio n ininte rs ta te or f or ei gn c om

m er ce , any w ri tin gs, sig ns, sig na ls, pic tur es , or soun ds f or the pur pose of e xe cu tin g su ch sch em e o r art ifi ce. 18 U . S. C. § 13 43. F urthe r, § 13 46 s ta te s th at “ the te rm ‘ sc he m e or

art if ic e to de fr au d’ inc lud es asc he m e or art if ic e to d ep ri ve anothe r of

the int an gib le r igh t of honest s ervices. ” 18 U. S. C. § 134 6. I n its inform ation, the governm ent alleged that f ro m 199 4 to 199 7 B ra cc ia le “ did kno w ing ly

and w ill fu lly

e xe cu te and atte m pt t o e xe cu te asc he m e an d art if ic e to d ef ra ud K ra ft F oods of m one y and pr ope rty and the int an gib le r igh t of his hon es t se rv ic es by

m eans o f fa lse and fraudulent pretenses, r epresentations, and prom ises.”Th is p le a a g re e me nt f

oll ow e d a n e arl ie r p le a

a g re e me nt whic h w a s su bs e qu e ntl y 3 withdrawn. 6 O n S ep te m

be r 18, 200 2, pur suant t o aw ri tte n pl ea a gr ee m en t, Br ac ci al e ple d gu ilty

to w ir e fr au d, in vio la tio n of 18 U . S. C. §§ 1 343, 134 6, and 2 . T he 3 plea agree m ent specifically listed the elem ents of Brac ciale’ s fraud offe nse as fo llo w s: Fi rs t: T ha t the D ef en dant k now ing ly de vis ed or part ic ipate d ina sc he m e to d ef

ra ud, or f or obt ai nin g m one y

or pr ope rty by m eans o f fa lse pr et en se s, r ep re se ntatio ns o r pr om ise s; Se co nd: T ha t the de fend an t di d so w ill fu lly w ithan in te nt t o de fr au d; Third: That the D efendant transm itted or caused to be transm itted

by m eans of w ire com

m unication in interstate com m erce a w r i t i n g an ds i g n a l , f

o r th e p u r p o s e o f e x e c u t i n g th e s c h e me to d ef ra ud; and F o u rth : T h a tth e D e f e n d an tr e a s o n ab l y

f o r e s awo r

s h o u l dh a ve foresee n that his breach of a fiduciary duty to his em ploy er which [sic] m i g h t cause an ec onom ic harm to that em ploy er. C. Lo ss Cal cul at io ns Under § 2F1 .1 A ft er a cc ep tin g B ra cc ia le ’ s pl ea , it w as ne ce ssary

f or the dis tr ic t c ourt t o de te rm ine K

ra ft ’ s m one tary

los s inor de r to s en te nc e Br ac ci al e. U nde r the 199 5 Se nte nc ing G uid el ine s, the ba se of fe nse le ve l f

or of fe nse s in vol vin g f

ra ud i s si x an d i s i nc reas edup to eig ht een lev el s b as edon th e fraudvi ct im ’s lo ss . U.S.S.G. §§ 2F1.1(a), (b)(1). T he Pre sentence Investigation Report (“ PSI ”) c onclud ed that7

K ra ft ’ s lo ss w as $1, 031, 123. 35 b as ed on a m em or an dum

by K ra ft ’ s R ic k G y lli ng (“Gy l l i n g Me m o ”) . Th e G yll i n g Me m o ’s ca l cu l at i o n s we re b as edo nMc La n e’s i mp r o p e r b i l l - b a c k s t o K

r a f tf o r p r o du c t s d i v e rt e dt o D & K . T h e G yl l i n g M e mo separates the im

proper bill-backs into the three discount prog ram s, and lists them as f oll ow s: ( 1) f

or K ra ft ’ s “ Purc ha se and M er ch an dis e” pr ogr am , $72 3, 006. 61; ( 2) fo r K ra ft ’ s “ Me rc handi se ” pr ogr am , $30 8, 116. 74; and ( 3) f or K ra ft ’ s “ Purc ha se Only ” program , $494,207.05. A ccording to th e G y lling Mem o, the docum entary ev ide nc e “ show s th at

$72 3, 006. 61 ( Purc ha se and M er ch an dis e) plu s $3 08, 116. 74 (Mer chandise) we re unear ned by Bra cciale since the funding wa s used to finance the diverting o f the product.” Thus, a ccording to th e G y lling Mem o, the “ total am ount of $1,031,123.35 represents the injury to Kra ft since the funds wer e providedto secure specific m erchandising from McL ane[-] supp lied retailers that wa s never re ceived.” The di st ric t co ur t re

jecte d t he PSI’s l os s ca lc ul at io ns of $ 1,0 31 ,12 3.3 5. In ste ad , the dis tr ic t c ourt us ed the $73 3, 211. 86 m one tary ga in r ea liz ed

by Br ac ci al e an d W ei nba

um a s asub sti tut e fo r K

ra ft ’ s m one tary

los s. I n op tin g f

or the ga in am ount , the dis tr ic t c ourt de te rm ine d th at K ra ft ’ s a ct ua l m one tary

los s w as too dif

fi cu lt to d ef

ine and tha t the pr of

it to B ra cc ia le and W ei nbaum w as a m ore specific and reliable figure.The district cour t also order ed that B rac ciale pa y a $5,000 fine and pay

Kra ft restitution 4 of $4 20 ,1 37 .9 0. In a dd iti on to t he a bu se -o f- tr us t e nh anc e me nt, the dis tr ic t c ourt a dd e d tw o le ve ls for more than minimal planning unde r § 2F 1.1(b)( 2)(A) , but then decr ease d three levels for acc eptanc e of r esponsibility under § 3E1.1. T he district cour t also depar

ted two levels downw ard for diminished ca

pacity due to B rac ciale’ s bipolar disorder under § 5K2.13, and two leve ls for overstate ment of the ser iousness of the off ense, pur suant to application note ten unde r § 2F 1.1. Th e pa rt ie s d id n ot a

pp e a l th e se de te rm inatio ns . 8 D. Abus e-o f-Tr us t Enha ncement Unde r § 3B 1.3 Over Bra cciale’ s objection, the district court also applied a tw o-level abuseof-trust enhancem ent. D efendant Bra cciale argued that the enhancem ent resulted i n i mp e rmi s s i b l e d o ub l e c o u n t i n g b e c au s e h i s w i r e f r au dc o n du c tw a s th e s a me conduct us ed for the abuse-of- trust enhancem ent. B racc iale also stressed that breach of f

iduciary duty wa s an elem ent of his wire fraud offe nse and again that br ea chof f idu ci ar y duty and “ ab use of

tr ust ” w er e the sam e co nduc t. Rej ecting Bracc iale’ s contentio ns, the district court determ ined that an ab use -o f- tr

ust e nhanc em en t w as w ar

rante d “be ca

use Mr . Br ac ci al e’ s po sit ion ai d edh i m i n co m m i t t i n g th i s o ff

en s e a n di ns et t i n g up th i s s ch eme. H e w as n ’t supe rv ise d c los el y , and i t w as a ll be ca use of the tr ust a ff or de d hi m

in his pos iti on that a llo w ed

thi s sc he m e to f

louri sh. ” B ra cc ia le appe al s hi s 15 -m onth pr iso n

4 se nt en ce. II . LOSS CALCULAT IO NS“We re view the a pplication and interpr etation of the Sente ncingGuidelines de novo, a nd 5 we re vie w f

ind ing s o f f

a c t f or c le ar e rr or .” Un ite d St ate s v . Snyde r, 29 1 F .3 d 1 29 1, 12 95 (1 1th Cir. 2002). 9 T he f ir st i ssu e on a

ppe al is w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in usi ng Br ac ci al e an d W ei nba

um ’ s ga in a s asub sti tut e fo r K ra ft ’ s lo ss f

or the pur pose of se nte nc ing Br ac ci al e unde r § 2F 1. 1. 5 A. U.S.S.G. § 2 F1.1 Se ct ion2F 1. 1 a ssi gns a ba se of fe nse le ve l of

six to a w ide vari ety

of f ra ud cr im es . S ee U . S. S. G . § 2F 1. 1( a) & cm t. ba ck gr ound . U nde r the 199 5 S en te nc ing G uid el ine s, the ba se of

fe nse le ve l of

six is inc re as ed

ba se d onthe a m ount

of the loss o ccasioned by

the fra ud. U .S .S .G . §§ 2F1.1(a ), (b)(1). T hus, “ ‘ loss’ under § 2F 1. 1( b) is a spe ci fi c of fe nse c hara ct er ist ic int en de d to m ea sur e the a ct ua l, atte m pte d, or int en de d harm

of the of fe nse . ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. O rt on, 73 F . 3d 3 31, 3 3 3 (1 1 th Ci r. 1 9 9 6 ). Th e mea s u re o f h arm g en er al l y fo cu s es o nth e “vi ct i m ’s direct loss,” see United State s v. W ilson , 993 F. 2d 21 4, 217 (11th Cir. 1993), such as “ th e v al ue of t he m on ey , pro pe rty, or se rv ic es un la wfu ll y tak en .” U.S.S.G. § 2F 1.1 , cmt. n .7.

“ Fo r pur pose s of sub se ct ion( b) (1 ), the los s ne ed not be de te rm ine d w ith pr ec isi on. T he c ourt ne ed onl y m ak e a re as ona

ble e sti m at e of

the los s, giv enthe av ai la ble inf orm at ion . ” U . S. S. G . § 2F 1. 1, c m t. n. 8; s ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. Re nic k,See United States v. Ye ag er, 331 F .3d 1216, 1226 (11th Cir. 2003) (notingthat district 6 court wa s unable to re asonably estimate the loss due to the c onflictingand conf using a ccounts at trial by experts and af

firmingdistrict court’s findingthat the amount of prof it obtained by

the defe ndant was a

rea sonable e stimate of the loss inflicted by his fraudule nt conduct). Unlike Yea g er, in this case a re asonable estimate of loss is available from the Gy lling Memo without resor ting to the g ain amount and is thus appropr iate to use. F urther, in Ye ag er, the defe ndant’s fr a ud a llo we d h is c omp a

ny , Re sp ir ator

y Di str ibutor s, Inc ., to m ake a pr of it o n s a le s o f p ro du c ts he purc hased f

rom the victim BI PI , and under the par ticular fa cts of that ca se the prof it the defe ndant’s compa

ny made c orre lated to the prof it the victim BI PIcould have made but for the de fe nd ant’ s f

ra ud . Se e id. at 12 25 -2 6. In c ontr a st, in t his c a se the de fe nd ant’ s g a in d oe s n ot s o c or re late wi th K

ra ft ’s los s. Ins te a d, the de fe nd ant’ s f ra ud c a us e d th e vic timKr a ft

to p ay c e rt a in bill-backs and K

raf t’s loss can be r easona

bly estimated by

the amount of bill-bac ks Kraf t paid, as outlined in the Gylling Memo. 10 273 F. 3d 1 009, 102 5 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ; O rt on, 73 F . 3d at 33 5 ( quot ing § 2F 1. 1, cm t. n. 8) . A t the sam e tim e, the dis tr ic t c ourt c annot m er el y “ spe cu la te ” as to the pr ope r am ount

of los s. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. S upe lve da , 115 F . 3d 8 82, 890 ( 11th Ci r. 199 7) . “ Upon ch al le nge , how ev er , the gov er nm en t be ar s th e bur de n of supp ortin g it s lo ss c al cu la tio n w ith‘ re lia ble and s pe ci fi c ev ide nc e. ’ ” Re nic k, 273 F. 3d at 102 5 (quotin g Supelveda, 115 F.3d at 890). Further, under § 2F1.1(b)(1),

“ subs tit uti on o f de fe ndants ’ ga in i s no t the pr ef er re d m ethod be ca

use it or din ar ily underestim ates the loss.” United States v. S ny der, 291 F.3d 1291 , 1295 (11th Cir. 2002 ); se e al so O rt on, 73 F . 3d at 33 4. Whi le “ th e ‘los s t o l os in g v ic ti m ’ ap pr oa ch is no t re qu ire d i n e ve ry cas e,” the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d no t a bandonalos s c al cu la tio n inf av or of aga in am ount w he re “ a re as ona

ble e sti m at e of

the vic tim s’ los s ba se d one xis tin g in fo rm at ionis feasible. ” Sny der, 291 F.3d at 1296 (citing Or ton, 73 F.3d at 334). 611

B. Kr af

t’ s L oss St at ing that the e xa ct

a m ount of K ra ft ’ s lo ss w as “ dif

fi cu lt to d ef

ine , ” the dis tr ic t c ourt us ed

Br ac ci al e an d W ei nbaum ’ s m one tary ga in a s asub sti tut e fo r Kr aft’ s loss u nder § 2F1.1(b)(1) . How ever, we conclude that the dis trict court er re d be ca use ar ea sona

ble e sti m at e of

K ra ft ’ s lo ss b as ed

on e xis tin g in fo rm at ion was feas ib le in th is cas e. InS ny de r, thi s C ourt r ev er se d adis tr ic t c ourt’ s lo ss c al cu la tio n ba se d onthe defendants’ gain. 291 F. 3d at 129 6. P rior to sentencing, the governm ent obtained an estim ated victim

loss calculation from

an acc ount ing report prepared by a CP A at the direction of the U. S. Attorney ’ s Of fice. Id. at 1295. D espite this, the district court found th at “ a re asonable estim ate of the victim s’ loss was not feasible” be ca use “ [i ] t w oul d r equir e sig nif ic an t e xpe ndi tur es of

ti m e an d r es our ce s to de te rm ine the larg e am ount of de ta ile d in fo rm at ionand n o su chinf orm at ion[ w as ] before [ the] Court.” Id. T he district court thus “ found, sua spon te, the better ca lc ulatio n of

the vic tim s’ los s w oul d be to use the int en de d or pot en tia l ga in attr ibu ta ble to the de fe ndants . ” I d. T his Co urt r ev er se d, and c onc lud ed that the CP A ’ s r es earc h su gge ste d th at “ a re as ona

ble e sti m at e of

the vic tim s’ los s ba se d on ex ist ing inf

orm at ion[ w as ] f

ea sib le . ” I d. a t 12 96.12

Although the figures in the Gy lling m em o m ay not provi de the “precise” loss su ffer ed by

Kr aft, such precision is u nnecessary under § 2F1.1. See id. at 1295 -9 6. T he los s am ount in the G y lli ng M em o w as ba se d onthe bil l- ba ck s rece ived and paid b y

Kr aft re garding foodproduct that was im properly diverted fr om Mc L an e to D &K . T he G y lli ng M em o c ont ai ne d su ppor tin g do cum en ta tio n an dw a s b y n o me an s “s p e c u l a t i v e . ” R a th e r , th e G yl l i n g M e mo r e p r e s e n t e d“a re as ona ble e sti m at e of

the vic tim s’ los s ba se d one xis tin g in fo rm at ion , ” id. , and the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d have use d th e G y lli ng M em o a s th e ba sis f or de te rm ini ng K ra ft ’ s m one tary

los s. Ther efore, we rever se and rem and this case so that th e district court m ay consider anew its loss calculations. Upon rem and, w e instruct that the district co urt us e the G y lli ng M em o’ s “pr oj ec te d” los s f igure of $1, 031, 123. 35 a s it s starting po int, but note th at Bra cciale r em ains entitled to challenge the indivi dual bil l- ba ck num be rs use d inthe G y lli ng M em o. T he gov er nm en t i s e nti tle d to re spon d, and the dis tr ic t c ourt sh al l the n m ak e fa ct f ind ing s a s to the los s am ount . II I. ABUSE -OF-T RUST ENHANCEME NT D ef en dant B ra cc ia le a lso appe al s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s tw o- le ve l e nhanc em en t fo r ab us e o f a p os it io n o f pr iv at e trus t u nd er U.S.S.G. § 3 B1 .3. Sec ti on 3B 1.3 pr ovi de s f

or atw o- le ve l e nhanc em en t whe re “ a de fe ndant a buse d apos iti on o f“While the district court’s fa ctual dete rmination that a def endant a bused a position of 7 [private] t rust is reviewe d for c lear err or, its conclusion that the def endant’ s conduct justifies the abuse- of-trust enha

nceme nt is a question of law that we revie w de novo.” United States v. Gar rison, 133 F.3d 831, 837 ( 11th Cir. 1998). 13 publ ic or pr ivate tr ust . . . in a m anne r that si gni fi cantl y f ac ili ta te d th e co m

m iss ion or concealm ent of the offense. ” U .S .S .G . § 3B1. 3. T here is no dispu te that Br ac ci al e oc cu

pie d apos iti on o f pr ivate tr ust a t K ra ft and tha t hi s po sit ionof private trust sign ificantly fac ilitated the comm issio n of the offense. T herefor e, Br ac ci al e’ s c ondu ct

is co ve re d by

§ 3B 1. 1. T his doe s no t e nd the inquir y be ca use § 3B 1. 3 a lso state s th at “ [t ] his ad j ustm en t m ay

not be e m plo y ed if an a buse of tr ust . . . is inc lud ed

in the ba se of fe nse le ve l or

spe ci fi c of

fe nse c hara ct er ist ic . ” U . S. S. G . § 3B 1. 3 ( em pha sis ad de d) . T he re fo re , if

e ith er Br ac ci al e’ s ba se of

fe nse le ve l or

spe ci fi c of

fe nse ch ar ac te ri sti cs a lr ea dy

too k in to a cc ount

Br ac ci al e’ s a

buse of tr ust , the n th e dis tr ic t c ourt i m

pr ope rl y appl ie d § 3 B1 . 3. I f, how ev er , Br ac ci al e’ s ba se of fe nse le ve l or spe ci fi c ch ar ac te ri sti cs did not take int o a cc ount

Br ac ci al e’ s a

buse of tr ust , th en th e d i s tri ct co u rtco rr ec t l y ap p l i ed§ 3 B1 .3 . We t h u s ad dre s s Br ac ci al e’s spe ci fi c of

fe nse c hara ct er ist ic s and the n hi s ba se of fe nse le ve l. 7 A. Spec ific Of

fense Ch aracteristics14

As f or Bra cciale’ s specific offe nse charac teristics, ten levels w ere added be ca use K ra ft ’ s “ los s” w as ove r $500 , 000, and tw o le ve ls w er e ad de d be ca use Br ac ci al e’s o ff

en s e i n v o l v edm o re th an m i n i m al p l an n i n g . Th e f ac tth at Kr af

t ’s lo ss was m or e th an $5 00 ,00 0 i n n o way acco un ts forBrac ci al e’s ab us e o f trus t. Rathe r, the te n- le ve l e nhanc em en t i s de te rm ine d so le ly by the a m ount

of los s and would apply

equally to a senior executive or tem porary m ail room

em ploy ee w hose f ra ud r es ult ed

in a los s of

m or e than $5 00, 000. Likew ise, B racc iale’ s two-level enhancem ent for m ore than m inim al p l an n i n g d o e s n o tt a k e i n t o a c c o u n th i s ab u s e o f tr u s t . T h e f

a c tth a th i s s c h e me w as c om ple x and w ar

rante d atw o- le ve l e nhanc em en t i s ir re le vant t o th e an al y sis under § 3B1.3 because the m inim al-planning enhancem ent would be applied regardless of Br acciale ’ s posi tion at Kraf t. T hus, Brac ciale’ s abuse of trust was not inc lud ed in his spe ci fi c of

fe nse c hara ct er ist ic s. B. Base Off

ense L evel W e tur n to w he the r Br ac ci al e’ s a buse of tr ust is inc lud ed

in his ba se of

fe nse le ve l of six und er § 2F 1. 1( a) . A s no te d e ar lie r, § 2F 1. 1( a) a ssi gns a ba se of fe nse l e v e l o f s i x t o aw i d e v ar i e ty o f

c r i me s , i n c l u d i n g f

r au d , d e c e i t , f

o r g e ry, an ds o me co unt er fe iti ng o ff

en se s. U . S. S. G . § 2F 1. 1( a) . B ra cc ia le ’ s ba se of fe nse le ve l of

six is not d ependent on anyabuse of trust or breac h of fiduciary duty ; rather, he w asSection 2F1.1( a) is entitled “F raud a nd Dec eit; Forg ery ; Offe nses Involving Alter ed or 8 Counterfe it I nstruments Other than Counter feit B ear er O bligations of the United States.” The commentar

y to § 2F1.1(a ) lists offenses unde r 18 U.S.C. § 1341-44 as subjec t to § 2F1.1(a ). U. S.S. G. § 2 F 1. 1, c mt. 18 U. S.C. § 1 34 3 ma ke s it a c ri me to d e vis e a

sc he me or

art if ic e to defr aud and § 1346, e ntitled “Def inition of ‘scheme or

artifice to defra

ud,’” state s that “the ter

m ‘s c he me or

art if ic e to d e fr a

ud ’ i nc lud e s a

sc he me or

art if ic e to d e pr ive ano the r o f t he int ang ibl e rig ht of honest servic es.” 18 U .S.C. §§ 1343, 1346. On appe al, the g overnme nt asserts that B rac ciale’ s brea ch of hone st service s under 9 § 1346 does not nec essar ily involve a bre ach of

fiduciar y duty in private sec tor § 1346 ca ses. See United States v. Deve g ter, 198 F .3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that “ a private sec tor vio latio n o f § 13 46 ho ne st s e rv ic e s f ra ud inv olv e s a

br e a c h o f f

idu c iary duty and re a so na bly fore seea ble ec onomic harm,” but ultim ately concludingthat the Court “nee d not decide . . . whether a fiduc iary

duty is nece ssary

in private sec tor § 1346 ca ses”) . Nonethele ss, give n how the g overnme nt prosecute d this particular § 1346 c ase a g ainst Br acc iale in the district cour t, we treat brea ch of f

iduciary duty as an e lement of B rac ciale’ s offe nse in this particular c ase. No thi nghe re in s ho uld

be c on sid e re d a s r

uli ngon the iss ue le ft

un ans we re d in

De ve g te r. We a lso a ssume , s ole ly

fo r t he purp os e s o f t

his a pp e a l, t hat c on du c t th at br e a c he s a fi du c iary duty a lso constitutes an abuse of a position of private trust – Bra ccia le contends this is so, and the g ov e rnme nt d oe s n ot d isp ute thi s c onte nti on on a pp e a l. 15 sentenced under § 2F1.1(a) because his underly ing offense is a form of fr aud. I n fact, any defendant com

m itting one of the num erous ty pes of fra ud list ed under § 2F 1. 1( a) r ec ei ve s aba se of fe nse le ve l of

six ir re spe ct ive of

w he the r any

abuse of tr ust or br ea chof

f idu ci ar y duty w as inv olv ed

in the c om

m iss ionof

his f ra ud of fe nse . T he re fo re , w e co nc lud e that B ra cc ia le ’ s ba se of fe nse of sixdoe s no t 8 in cl ud e o r ta ke in to acco un t h is ab us e o f hi s p os it io n o f pr iv at e trus t. W e re co gni ze that B ra cc ia le ’ s pl ea a gr ee m en t l ist ed

br ea chof

f idu ci ar y duty as an e le m en t of

his und er ly ing f

ra ud o ff en se . A s ob se rv ed

above , how ev er , the 9 ba se of fe nse le ve l of

six in § 2F 1. 1 is f

or vari ous fo rm s of

f ra ud and i s no t de pe nde nt o n ho wthe de fe ndant c om m itt ed the f ra ud o r the e le m en ts o f theWe note that there is a separ ate guideline for § 1343- 46 fra ud that is committ ed by 10 public officia ls, as opposed to private pa rties such a s Br acc iale. See § 2C1.7. Sec tion 2C1.7(a) a ssi g ns a ba se of fe ns e le ve l of

te n a nd its c omm e nta

ry sp e c if ic a lly state s th at th e a

bu se -o f- tr us t enhanc ement should not be applied. U .S.S.G. § 2C 1.7(a) & c mt. n.4. This is further indication that the base offe nse leve l of six for f raud unde r § 2F 1.1 does not ca pture the a

buse of trust or oth e rw ise § 2 F 1. 1 li ke wi se wo uld state sp e c if

ic a lly tha t th e a bu se -o f- tr us t e nh anc e me nt s ho uld not be applied. 16 p ar t i cu l arfr au dcr i m e i n v o l v ed . F o r s en t en ci n g g u i d el i n e p u rp o s es , B ra cc i al e’s ab use of his pos iti on o f tr

ust or br ea chof

his f idu ci ar y duty is ca pture d on ly

by the ab use -o f- tr

ust e nhanc em en t. T hus, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in ap ply ing the 10 ab use -o f- tr

ust e nhanc em en t. C. Comm enta ry to § 3B 1.3 O ur c onc lus ionis co nsi ste nt w iththe c om m en tary to § 3B 1. 3. T he co m m en tary to § 3B 1. 3 st at es that the “ ad j ustm en t, f

or e xam ple , w oul d a

ppl y in the c as e of

. . . abank e xe cu tiv e’ s f

ra udul en t l oan sc he m e. ” U . S. S. G . § 3B 1. 3, cm t. n. 1 ( em pha sis a dde d) . T he c om

m en tary a lso state s th at

the a dj ustm en t sh oul d

“ not appl y in the c as e of

an e m be zz le m en t or

the ft by an or din ar

y bank t el le r. ” I d. Fo r ex am ple , abank e xe cu tiv e an d bank t el le r en ga ge in tw o se parate , but i d e n t i c a l f

r au du l e n tw i r e tr an s f

e r s . A l th o u g h th e g o v e rn me n tmu s tp r o v e th e s a me underly ing elem ents of the offense for both , the c omm entary to § 3B1.3 m andates that on ly the bank e xe cu tiv e is e lig ibl e fo r the e nhanc em en t. T his ha s no thi ng t o do with the elem ents of their respective off enses, but rather it is based on the roles17

each individu al has in the bank – o ne a position of trust and one not . Ther efore, the c om m en tary to § 3B 1. 3 a lr ea dy

dr aw s adis tin ct ionbe tw ee n th ose w ho s houl d re ce ive the e nhanc em ent and those w ho s houl d no t w ith out r eg ar d to the e le m en ts of the und er ly ing f

ra ud o ff en se . S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. Mi lli gan, 958 F . 2d 3 45, 347 (1 1thCi r. 199 2) ( ap ply ing the abuse -o f- tr ust e nhanc em en t i n an e m

be zz le m en t ca se be ca use the appl ic ab le gui de lin e, § 2B 1. 1, c ove rs a ll kin ds o f the ft and the re fo re , “ the onl y

w ay that an e m

be zz le r re ce ive s any

kin d of e nhanc em en t f

or ab use of pos iti on o f tr

ust is thr ough[ § 3B 1. 3] ”) ; se e al so Unit ed S ta te s v. S m ith , 231 F.3d 800 , 819 (11th Cir. 2000) (providing that “ [t] he fac t that another d ef en d an tco m

m i t t edth e s ame o ff

en s e w i th o u tu s e o r ab u s e o f t h e d ef en d an t ’s posit ion [of trust] does not p reclude application of the § 3B1.3 enhancem ent”). D . U ni te d St at es v. Ga rr iso n W e re co gni ze that di ct a in the Me dic ar e fr au d c as e of U nit ed S ta te s v. Garri so n, 1 33 F.3d83 1, 8 42 -4 3 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 8) , m ay su gg es t a c on tra ry

res ul t. H ow ev er , a s e xpl ai ne d be low , that di ct a in G ar ri son w as ba se d onthe S ec ond Ci rc uit ’ s de ci sio n inU nit ed S ta te s v. Br ode rs on, 67 F . 3d 4 52 ( 2d C ir . 199 5) , f ro m w hic h th e Se co nd C ir cu it ha s no wr etre at ed . F urthe r, thi s C ourt’ s su bse que nt de ci sio n inanothe r Me dic ar e fr au d c as e, U nit ed S ta te s v. L iss , 265 F . 3d 1 220 (1 1thCi r. 200 1) , a ff

irm ed the abuse -o f- tr

ust e nhanc em en t and d id n ot m en tio n18

that G ar ri son dic ta . I d. a t 12 29- 30. T o e xpl ai n and s tr ai ght enout the c onf usi ng de ve lop m en ts a ft er

G ar ri son, w e fi rs t di sc uss G ar ri son an d th enpos t- G ar

ri son de ci si on s. The G arrison Court addressed the question of “ whether the owner and chief executive officer

of a hom e healthcare provider properly wa s accorded a two-level enhanc em en t un de r U . S. S. G . § 3B 1. 3 f or abusi ng a

pos iti on o f publ ic tr

ust by subm itting falsified Medicare c laim s to a fiscal interm ediary .” 133 F.3d at 833. In an sw er ing thi s qu es tio n, the G ar ri son Co urt c onc lud ed

that the de fe ndant G ar

ri son wa s “ not di rectly

in a positio n of trust in relation to Medicare. While Medicare m ay have be enthe vic tim

in thi s c as e, the se ct ion3B 1. 3 e nhanc em en t i s unava ila ble be ca use G ar ri son did not oc cu py asuf fi ci en tly pr oxi m at e posi tio n of trust relative to Medicare .” Id. at 841. T he Garrison Court expressly determ ined that the de fe ndant G ar

ri son w as ine lig ibl e fo r anabuse -o f- tr ust e nhanc em en t be ca use she did

not oc cu py apos iti on o f tr

ust vis -a -v is the vic tim

of the f ra ud. I d. at 842 . Afte r m ak in g t ha t h ol di ng , th e Garri so n C ou rt i nd ic at edth ata § 3 B1 .3 enhanc em en t w as ina

ppl ic ab le f

or anothe r re as on. T he Co urt a gr ee d w ith G ar ri son’ s arg um en t tha t he r of fe nse c ondu ct

of pe rp etratin g af

ra ud a ga ins t Me dic ar e via

f al se c ost r ep orts w as the sam e co nduc t be ing use d a s th e ba sis f orSe e Ko kk on e n v . Gua rd ian L if e Ins . Co . o f Ame ri c a , 5 11 U. S. 3 75 , 3 79 , 1 14 S. Ct . 11 16 73 , 1 67 6 ( 19 94 ) ( “ I t is to t he ho ldi ng s o f o ur

c a se s, ra the r t ha n th e ir dic ta , th at w e mus t atte nd .” ); B ro wn ingv. AT & T Pa ra dy ne , 1 20 F .3 d 2 22 , 2 25 n. 7 ( 11 th C ir . 1 99 7) (“ ‘S inc e thi s statement wa s not part of a ny holding in the c ase, it is dicta and w e ar e not bound by it.’” (citation omitted)); Gre at L akes D redg e & Dock Co. v. Tanke r Robert Watt Miller, 957 F.2d 1575, 1578 (11th Cir. 1992) (e x plaining that dicta is “neither law of the case nor binding prec edent” ); McDona ld's Corp. v. Rober tson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 1998) (Ca rnes, J., concur ring ) (“ [D] icta in our opinions is not bindi ngon anyone for any purpose.” ). 19 the abuse-of-trust enhancem ent. I d. S pecifically , the G arrison Court stated that

“ [s ] inc e G ar

ri son’ s ba se f

ra ud c ri m e w as the sub m iss ionof f al se state m en ts o n co st r ep orts s ubm itt ed

to A etnaf

or Me dic ar e re im

bur se m en t, she c annot

r ec ei ve an enhancem ent for abuse of a posit ion of pub lic trust based on th e sam e conduct unde r the spe ci fi c te rm s of se ct ion3B 1. 3. ” I d. a t 84 3. B ec au se the Co urt f ir st he ld tha t G ar

ri son w as not

in a posi tio n of

tr ust and i ne lig ibl e fo r the enhanc em en t, thi s “ sam e- co nduc t” ana ly sis is dic taand, the re fo re , is not bin din g on this Co urt. W e al so n ote that this Co urt, w hil e ci tin g G ar ri son on m any 11 occasions, has never cited the opinion for its "sam e-conduct" analy sis, but inst ead h a s c i t e dth e c a s e p r i mar i l y fo r i t s c o n c l u s i o nth a tGa rr i s o nd i dn o to c c up y a posi tio n of

tr ust vis -a -v is the vic tim

of the f ra ud. S ee , e . g. , U nit ed

S ta te s v. H al l, 349 F. 3d 1 320, 132 4- 26 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) ; L iss , 265 F . 3d at 12 29; S m ith , 231 F . 3d at 819-20; United States v. Mills, 138 F. 3d 92 8, 941 (11th Cir. 1998). Furthe r, G ar

ri son re lie d onaS ec ond Ci rc uit de ci sio n inBr ode rs on, f

or the pr opos iti on tha t “ ‘ [t ] he c ondu ct that i s th e ba sis of

the c onvi ct ionm

ust beWe note that the Second Circuit, in United States v. Jol ly , 102 F.3d 46, 48 ( 2d Cir. 12 19 96 ), dis c us se d B ro de rs on and ob se rv e d th at “ if

B ro de rs on

ha d a c c e pte d a

br ibe fr om a

pa rt y with whom he was ne g otiating to swe eten the te rms of a de al with his employ er, B roder son wo uld have a bu se d h is p os iti on

of tr us t vi s- a -v is h is e mpl oye r. ” Suc h a sc e na ri o, wh ic h th e Jolly Court de e me d to be an a

bu se of tr us t, i s c los e ly

ana log ou s to B ra c c ia le ’s pr of iti ngpe rs on a lly fr om t he div e rs ion

of Kr a ft pr od uc ts. 20 ind ep en de ntl y

c ri m ina l . . . and n ot i tse lf the abuse of

tr ust . ’ ” G ar

ri son, 133 F . 3d at 843 (quo ting Broderson, 67 F.3d at 456). H owever , the S econd Circuit has re tr eate d f

ro m it s c ondu ct -b as ed

appr oa chin Br ode rs on. S ee U nit ed S ta te s v. N tsh ona , 156 F . 3d 3 18 ( 2d C ir . 199 8) ( re fu sin g to r ea d B ro de rs on b ro ad ly , statin g that “ the abuse of

tr ust ne ed not be e nti re ly

unr el at ed

to the c om

m iss ionof

the ba se of fe nse ” an d r ej ec tin g de fe ndant’ s c ont en tio n th at , f or he r Me dic ar e fr au d of fe nse , “ anabuse of

tr ust is the e sse nc e of

the c ri m e an d th er ef

or e is a lr ea dy ac co unt ed

f or in the ba se le ve l of

fe nse ”) ; se e al so Unit ed

S ta te s v. H ir sc h, 239 F. 3d 22 1, 228 (2d Cir. 2001 ) (a ffirm ing th e abuse-of-tr ust enhancem ent for a br oke r / i nve stm en t a dvi sor gui lty of m ai l f ra ud) ; U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ca

rr oz ze lla , 105 F. 3 d7 9 6 , 8 0 0 -0 1 (2 dCi r. 1 9 9 7 ) ( p ro v i d i n g th at , d es p i t e t h e f ac tth at a l aw yer’s ac co unt s to apr obate c ourt w er e inc lud ed in his ba se of

fe nse le ve l f

or m ai l f ra ud, his f ra ud “ se em s to f

it square ly

w ith in [ § 3B 1. 3] ” be ca

use “ [h ] is p osi tio n a s a tr ust ee in the pr obate c ourt w as c hara ct er iz ed by pr ec ise ly the ty pe of dis cr et ion and consequ ent lack of supervision that com m entary to the guid eline sets out as the key feature of a position o f trust”). 12Spe c if ic a lly , th e F if

th C ir c uit in B uc k s tate d: 13 The other case reli ed o n by

[defendant] Buc k, United States v. Gar rison, 133 F.3d 83 1, 84 3 ( 11 th C ir . 1 99 8) , a lso fa ils to sup po rt he r ar gume nt t hat th e a bu se of tr us t enhanc ement is unavailable for fraud c onvictions. In fac t, the Eleventh Circuit has cited Ga rrison in aff

irming a n abuse of

trust enhanc ement to a fraud se ntence . See United States v. L iss, 265 F.3d 1220, 1229-30 (11th Cir. 2001). 324 F.3d at 793 n.13. 21 Likew ise, the F ifth Circuit, in United States v. Buck, 324 F.3d 786 (5th Cir. 2003 ), c onc lud ed

that B ro de rs on h as be en“ lim ite d to it s f ac ts” by the S ec ond Ci rc uit . I d. a t 79 3. T he F if th C ir cu it uphe ld “ the abuse of tr ust e nhanc em en t t o a fraud sentence where the def endant em

ploy ed discretionary

authority given byher posi tio n inam anne r that f ac ili ta te d or

c onc ea le d th e fr au d. ” I d. I n B uc k, the Fifth Circuit also rej ected the defe ndant’s contention that Garr ison m ade abuse-oftr ust e nhanc em en ts unava ila

ble in fr au d c onvi ct ion s and n ote d th at the E le ve nth Circuit in United States v. Liss, 265 F.3d 1220 , 1229 (11th Cir. 2001), had cited G ar ri son (M ed ic ar e fr au d) w he n a ff irm ing an a

buse -o f- tr ust e nhanc em en t f

or doc tor s who c om

m itt ed Me dic ar e fr au d. B uc k, 324 F . 3d at 79 3 n. 13. 13 In L iss, a j ury

found two doctors gu ilty of conspiracy

to defraud the U nited States and of re ceiving rem uneration in return for Medicar e re ferr als. 265 F. 3d at 1225 . T he c ondu ct

a t the he ar

t of the se c ri m es w as the doc tor s’ a cc ep tin g kickbacks in return for refe rring patients to a Florida laboratory . Id. at 1224 . It wa s this sam e conduct, ac cepting illegal com pensation for Me dicare r efer rals, that22

se rv ed a s th e ba sis f

or the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a ddi ng tw o le ve ls f or abuse of tr ust to the defendants’ sentences. Id. at 1225 . How ever, the Liss Court upheld the abuseof -tru st e nhanc em en t, c iti ng G ar ri son fo r its “posi tio n of

tr ust ” an al y sis , w hil e not m en tio nin g a t a ll the “ sam e- co nduc t” dic tain G ar ri son. I d. a t 12 29; se e al so U nit ed S ta te s v. L inv ill e, 228 F . 3d 1 330, 133 1- 32 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) ( af fi rm ing abuse-of-trust enhancem ent in a bank fraud case in a post-Garr ison d ecision). For the fore goin g reasons, w e determ ine that Gar rison’s c ondu ct-based ap pr oa chis dic ta , w as not m en tio ne d ( an d thus n ot f oll ow ed ) in L iss , and i s no t bi nd in g i n t hi s ca se . D. Doub le C ounting O ur c onc lus ionthat the e le m en ts o f Br ac ci al e’ s un de rl y ing of fe nse do n ot control whether he is eligible to rece ive an abuse-of-trust enhancem ent is further supp orte d by

thi s C ir cu it’ s c as e lawc onc er nin g im pe rm iss ibl e doub le c ount ing .

“ Im pe rm iss ibl e doub le c ount ing oc curs onl y w he n on e part

of the G uid el ine s is appl ie d to inc re as e a de fe ndant' s punis hm en t ona cc ount of akin d of harm that ha s a lr ea dy

be enf ull y a cc ount ed

f or by appl ic at ionof

anothe r part

of the Guidelines.” United States v. Matos-Rodriguez, 188 F. 3d 13 00, 1309 (11t h Cir. 1999 ) (internal quotations andcitation om itted). D oubl e counting is perm issib le, however, when ( 1) “ the Sentencing Com m issio n intend ed the result,” and (2) eac hWe note that the def endant in Naves wa s sentence d under the 1998 guidelines, as 14 opposed to the 1995 ver sion applicable he re. 23 gui de lin e se ct ionin que sti on “ co nc er ns c onc ep tua lly

se parate not ion s r el at ed

to sentencing.” Id. at 1310 (internal quo tations andcitation om itted). T his Court pr es um es that, unl es s sp ec if ic al ly dir ec te d othe rw ise , the S en te nc ing Co m m iss ion int en de d th at

se parate gui de lin es se ct ion s be appl ie d c um ulativ el y . I d. In United State s v. N aves, 252 F. 3d 11 66, 1168 (11t h Cir. 2001 ), this Court ad dr es se d asit

ua tio n inw hic h ade fe ndant w as c onvi ct ed of c ar j ac kin g in vio la tio n of

18 U . S. C. § 21 19( 1) . A s no te d inN av es , c ar j ac kin g c ri m es are to be se nte nc ed und er § 2B 3. 1. S ee id. ; U . S. S. G . § 2B 3. 1, c m t. statut or y pr ovi sio ns. 14 Se ct ion2B 3. 1 pr ovi de s aba se of fe nse le ve l of

tw en ty that a ppl ie s no t on ly

to carj ac kin g bu t a lso to ro bbe ri es in ge ne ra l. S ee U . S. S. G . § 2B 3. 1( a) . T o th at ba se of fe nse le ve l of

tw en ty , the dis tr ic t c ourt a dde d atw o- le ve l e nhanc em en t be ca use the of fe nse inv olv ed

c ar j ac kin g a s pr ovi de d inU . S. S. G . § 2B 3. 1( b) (5 ). N av es , 252 F.3d at 1168 . The def endant Naves contended “ that the base offense level fu lly a cc ount ed

f or the le ve l of

c ulp ab ili ty

a ttr ibu te d to the of

fe nse of c ar j ac kin g an d th at the re fo re a ddi ng tw o le ve ls b ec au se ‘ the of fe nse inv olv ed

c ar j ac kin g’ co nst itu te s im

pe rm iss ibl e ‘ doub le c ount ing . ’ ” I d.24

InN av es , thi s C ourt c onc lud ed that the tw o- le ve l e nhanc em en t f or carj ac kin g di d no t c onst itu te im pe rm iss ibl e doub le c ount ing . I d. a t 11 69. I n so doi ng, the N av es Co urt st at ed that “ [w ] e m

ust a ssum e that the S en te nc ing Co m m iss ionkne wthat the tw o po int e nhanc em en t at i ssu e he re in w oul d be im pose d ine ve ry

c as e inv olv ing ac onvi ct ionund er § 21 19 [ carj ac kin g] , that i t intended th is result, and that in effe ct it wa s creating a base level of 22 for a co nvi ct ionund er

§ 21 19. ” I d. a t 11 68- 69. I n f ac t, “ [t ] he S en te nc ing Co m m iss ion is authorized to prov ide such an enhancem ent as long as there is a rational relationship betwee n the enhancem ent and a legitim ate governm ental objec tive.” Id . a t 11 69. I n N av es , an e le m en t of the und er ly ing of

fe nse – c ar

j ac kin g – w as not ca pture d inthe ge ne ra l r obbe ry gui de lin e that e sta

bli she d th e ba se of

fe nse le ve l of twenty for carj acking crim es. See id. at 1168-69. L ikewise in this case, the breac h of f idu ci ar y duty e le m en t of

Br ac ci al e’ s w ir e fr au d w as not c ap tur ed in the f ra ud guid eline that established a base offense level of six for a variety of fr aud crim es but w as c ap tur ed

onl y in the abuse -o f- tr

ust e nhanc em en t. Si m ilarl y , in U nit ed

S ta te s v. P hil lip s, 363 F . 3d 1 167 (1 1thCi r. 200 4) , thi s Court addressed a situation where the ele m ent of the crim e w as also the proper subj ec t of ase parate e nhanc em en t. I n P hil lip s, ade fe ndant, w ho w as c onvi ct ed of fa ili ng t o pay

c ourt- or de re d c hil d su

ppor t, r ec ei ve d atw o- le ve l e nhanc em en t25

be ca use his of fe nse of c onvi ct ioninv olv ed

“ ‘ a vio la tio n of

any pr ior , spe ci fi c j udicial or adm inistrative order, inj unction , dec ree, or process not addressed elsewher e in the guidelin es.’ ” 363 F.3d at 1168 (quoti ng U. S. S. G. §§ 2B1.1(a) & (b )( 7) (C )) . O bvi ousl y , the gov er nm en t w as r equir ed

to pr ove that P hil lip s ha d a le ga l ob lig at ionto pay

c hil d su ppor t, or he c oul d no t have be enf ound in vio la tio n of 18 U . S. C. § 22 8( a) (3 ). T he re fo re , an e le m en t of the of fe nse w as a lso use d to enhance his base offense level. In so concludin g, this Court stated that [T ] he S en te nc ing Co m

m iss ionc oul d have cr eate d a se parate gui de lin e fo r w ill fu l fa ilure to pay ch ild supp ort wi th a bas e of fe nse of e igh t. T he fa ct that the S en te nc ing Co m m iss ione le ct ed

not to dr af t a se parate gui de lin e doe s no t r en de r the appl ic at ion of the tw o- le ve l e nhanc em en t unde r § 2B 1. 1( b) (7 )( C) ir ratio na l. Rathe r, it is ratio na l f or the Sentencing Com

m issio n to use § 2B1 .1 to establish a base offense level o f s i x f o r th e c u l p ab i l i ty i n c i d e n tt o o f f e n s e s i n v o l v i n g l a r c e n y, em be zz le m en t, and o the r fo rm s of the ft . Id . a t 11 69. A s no te d inN av es and P hil lip s, the S en te nc ing Co m m iss ionc oul d have c re at ed

adif fe re nt g uid el ine takin g in to a cc ount Br ac ci al e’ s a

buse of tr ust an d c oul d have a ssi gne d th at gui de lin e a ba se of

fe nse le ve l of

e igh t. R athe r, it

is ratio na l f or the S en te nc ing Co m

m iss ionto use § 2F 1. 1 to e sta bli sh a ba se of fe nse le ve l of six f or avari ety of f ra ud c ri m es , and t o a llo wthe abuse -o f- tr ust enhanc em en t t o a

ppl y in ca se s li ke Br ac ci al e’ s. T he f ac t tha t the S en te nc ing Co m m iss ione le ct ed

not to es ta bli sh a se parate gui de lin e fo r Br ac ci al e’ s sp ec if icBe cause we va cate Br acc iale’s se ntence , the district court on re mand also may 15 rec onsider its various other se ntencingdecisions. See, e .g ., United States v. L e, 256 F .3d 1229, 1241 n.12 (11th Cir. 2001) (providingthat, beca use L e’s se ntence was va cate d, the district court o nr e ma n d w a s a ll o w e d

to r e c o n s id e r

any a s p e c ts o f

L e ’ s s e n te n c e ) ; Un it e d

St ate s v . A lv ar e z, 11 5 F .3 d 8 39 , 8 43 (1 1th

Cir . 1 99 7) (“ B e c a

us e we va c ate Al va

re z’s se nte nc e , th e dis tr ic t c ourt is fre e on re mand to rec onsider Alvar ez’s sentenc e in its entirety .”). 26 cr im e doe s no t r en de r the appl ic at ionof § 3B 1. 3 to Br ac ci al e ir

ratio na l or

r es ult in im pe rm iss ibl e doub le c ount ing . IV. C ONC LUS ION Fo r al l the above r ea sons , w e af fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a

ppl ic at ionof

the abuse-of-trust enhancem ent in § 3B1.3. H owever , w e vacate Bra cciale’ s sentence and rem and this case for re -sentencing so th at the district court m ay consider anew the los s am ount

und er se ct ion§2F 1. 1. 15 AF FIRMED in part ; REVE RS ED AN D REMA ND ED in part.