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40–967 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–12]

CURRENT MANNING, EQUIPPING AND

READINESS CHALLENGES FACING SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND

CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

JANUARY 31, 2007

(II)

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

SUBCOMMITTEE

ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

MARK UDALL, Colorado

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

KEN CALVERT, California

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

BILL NATTER, Professional Staff Member

ALEX KUGAJEVSKY, Professional Staff Member

ANDREW TABLER, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, January 31, 2007, Current Manning, Equipping and Readiness

Challenges Facing Special Operations Forces ................................................... 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, January 31, 2007 ................................................................................ 45

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2007

CURRENT MANNING, EQUIPPING AND READINESS CHALLENGES

FACING SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Terrorism,

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ................................. 1

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee .................... 2

WITNESSES

Brown, Gen. Bryan D., Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S.

Army ...................................................................................................................... 2

Hejlik, Maj. Gen. Dennis J., Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special

Operations Command, U.S. Marine Corps ......................................................... 20

Maguire, Rear Adm. Joseph, Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command,

U.S. Navy .............................................................................................................. 19

Wagner, Lt. Gen. Robert W., Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations

Command, U.S. Army .......................................................................................... 18

Wooley, Lt. Gen. Michael W., Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command, U.S. Air Force ........................................................................................... 20

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Brown, Gen. Bryan D. ...................................................................................... 49

Hejlik, Maj. Gen. Dennis J. ............................................................................. 93

Maguire, Rear Adm. Joseph ............................................................................ 82

Wagner, Lt. Gen. Robert W. ............................................................................ 59

Wooley, Lt. Gen. Michael W. ........................................................................... 98

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 109

Mr. Thornberry ................................................................................................. 134

(1)

CURRENT MANNING, EQUIPPING AND READINESS

CHALLENGES FACING SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

SUBCOMMITTEE,

Washington, DC, Wednesday, January 31, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:01 p.m. in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman

of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SMITH. We will go ahead and call the meeting to order. One

of my goals is to start all our meetings on time. In Congress, I am

not sure how long I will achieve that objective, but I am going to

do my best to do that.

I want to thank Representative Thornberry for being here and

for working with me on the subcommittee. I think we will have a

very, very good hearing. I think the subcommittee has a very important series of issues to deal with within our jurisdiction and

look forward to doing that. Our primary goal is to be as helpful as

possible to our forces in the field to help them do the job we all

are asking them to do, and we are very, very fortunate with our

first hearing today to have the Commander of Special Operations,

General Brown, here, as well as all of the component commanders

here as well. That will give us a great opportunity to get a terrific

perspective.

The other thing I am going to try to do as chairman is dispense

with opening statements from Members of Congress. I have been

in hearings before where the witnesses didn’t get to talk until we

were about an hour into it, and it always struck me as kind of odd.

So, for ten years, I watched that and figured, if I get the opportunity, I would do it differently, and this is my opportunity.

So I will just say that we are very interested, obviously, in the

mission of Special Operations. We know we are trying to increase

the size of the force and that challenges come with that. I want to

hear a little bit about that. I am also very interested, not just the

direct action piece, but in the hearts and minds piece, which General Brown and I have talked about before, and how we can use

that more comprehensively in many places in the world.

With that, I will turn it over to my ranking member, Mac Thornberry from Texas, for any comments he has.

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STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would just say that we are looking forward to working with you

as well. On your left, or my left, we bring a lot of expertise and

a lot of intense interest in the matters which are before this subcommittee, and we look forward to working with you, looking at

what is happening today but with a focus to what we need for the

future, which I think is Congress’s proper role. So we look forward

to working with you and appreciate, as you do, General Brown and

our other witnesses being with you today.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I will do one other thing. I will recognize

Representative Castor, who I know has MacDill Air Force Base in

her district where General Brown is joining us from. So if you want

to say a quick greeting to your constituent, we will do that and

then move on.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just to point out that the Tampa Bay community appreciates everyone that works at MacDill and all of the brave men and women

that serve our country, whether it is at MacDill Air Force Base,

Central Command (CENTCOM), but especially Special Operations

Command (SOCOM). Everyone in our community is so pleased to

have the brave men and women of SOCOM working hard in the

Tampa Bay area. So thank you. I look forward to working with you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Representative Castor.

With that, General Brown, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF GEN. BRYAN D. BROWN, COMMANDER, U.S.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, U.S. ARMY

General BROWN. Mr. Chairman, Representative Thornberry and

distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before this committee today to report on the current manning

and readiness challenges facing Special Operations Forces (SOF).

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few

remarks to compliment my written statement for the record.

Two decades ago, Congress created the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to be an exceptionally trained, exceptionally skilled and highly successful joint command with a

mandate to accomplish our Nation’s most challenging military missions. As we mark the 20th anniversary of USSOCOM, the innovation of Congress——

Mr. SMITH. I am having a little trouble hearing. Is the microphone on? Thank you.

General BROWN. As we mark the 20th anniversary of

USSOCOM, the innovation of Congress has proven to be visionary

in today’s conflict. We find ourselves engaged in a fight we were

built for, a dynamic conflict against a multifaceted enemy who is

global, unconventional and formidable. A significant portion of our

recent successes is due to the tremendous support we have received

from the office of the Secretary of Defense and the Congress as a

whole to ensure our SOF warriors have been appropriately

resourced to successfully accomplish the types of unconventional,

irregular and adaptive missions demanded of them. Enabled by

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SOCOM’s responsive and agile acquisition authorities, today’s SOF

warriors are better trained and equipped than ever before.

Recruiting across the command has been good but not without its

challenges. One of those challenges has been the enlisted Navy

Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) ranks. To meet this recruiting challenge, the

Chief of Naval Operations has made SEAL recruitment the top recruiting priority in the Navy.

Our components have been proactive in maximizing our training

pipelines. We have grown the school houses, increased the number

of instructors and reviewed and revised our training methods. This

ensures we can accept the increased student load while upholding

the rigorous standard required to become a SOF operator.

Additionally, some of this group growth has been building new

SOF capabilities never before in our inventory. I have mentioned

MARSOC, the Marine Corps Special Operations Command, but

there is also the addition of a predator unmanned vehicle squadron, manned intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) capability, strategic psychological operations capability, and the delivery of

our first ever CV–22 tilt rotor aviation, just to name a few of the

new capabilities.

We are proud of our growth and I commend our component commanders for meeting the challenges of growth while transforming

the force and deploying at the highest rate in our history, all while

keeping or improving the standard. However, we must continue to

grow carefully. The hallmark of Special Operations Forces is their

skill, experience and maturity. Building the force with new graduates must be balanced by retaining our seasoned operators to

maintain effectiveness on the battlefield. We simply cannot overpopulate the force with junior personnel to meet the aggregate

numbers.

Our Special Operations component commanders will appear following my testimony, and I trust you will hear the details of incredible programs that they have built and manage every day.

Our retention initiatives have been successful. In fiscal year

2005, the Under Secretary of Defense for personnel and readiness

approved the SOF retention initiative. This initiative enables us to

provide focused incentives for SOF throughout their career and

provide us a known inventory for management. But it isn’t enough.

Currently, we have commissioned a study of SOF recruiting and retention incentives and compensation that will help us determine

what works and what doesn’t so we can better manage the force

of the future.

Our overall readiness is excellent, and our deliberate growth is

supported by associated gains in training and equipping of SOF.

The readiness of our equipment is challenged by sustained combat

operations and increased maintenance requirements impacting an

aging fleet of aircraft, land and sea mobility assets.

Our high operations tempo tests the strength of both our personnel and the enablers that support them. Our equipment receives

first class maintenance, but, more importantly, the SOF warriors

receive first class family support. In recruiting SOF, we gain the

individual, but we retain the family.

I want to thank you and the members of the House Armed Services Committee for your continued support to our soldiers, sailors,

4

airmen and Marines, our first class Department of Defense civilians and our dedicated USSOCOM families. The support of this

committee, especially your visits to our troops in the field and the

support of the Secretary of Defense help ensure SOCOM remains

the most capable special operations force in the world. I will be

happy to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Brown can be found in the

Appendix on page 49.]

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, General.

On the questions, we will try to stick to the five-minute rule, but

also I want to say, for members, this is a relatively small committee. We are not going to adhere strictly to the five-minute rule or

to the order. If you have something we are talking about and something you really want to ask about, then we will be liberal about

yielding that time; I will be very liberal about yielding that time

and allowing the conversation to flow forward.

So don’t feel like you have to sit there and wait forever if there

is something you think is important, and I will trust your judgment

on that, at least for a little while.

With that, I just have a couple of quick questions. I had the opportunity, Representative Thornberry and I did, to be down at

SOCOM on Monday. So we got a lot of our questions answered

then, and I appreciate that.

One specific question, particularly with regard to the Army. They

have the bulk of the Special Operations Forces and the bump-up

in terms of getting to the higher numbers on the training piece.

Has there been any alterations in the training to sort of make,

easier is the wrong word, there is nothing easy about this, have

they had to alter, have the requirements been more liberal on how

they have accepted people in order to meet these numbers, or are

they still at the same requirements they had before the bump-up?

General BROWN. Mr. Chairman, actually, they are higher than

they were before. When I used to command Army Special Operations Command, the requirement for an Special Forces (SF) soldier to graduate was what we call zero-plus-zero in the language

capability. Today they have raised this standard to one, one, one;

read, write and understand the language. So the standards have

actually been raised.

Now what they have done through a very, very detailed analysis

of every training day, they have reduced the course and the length

of time, and they begin training language the day the soldier starts

the course, thereby giving him a full year or more to study the language.

Those kind of innovations in the training pipeline for Special

Forces has been very, very positive. We get a better product out of

the end of the pipeline, but quite frankly, if anything, the standards are much, much higher than they were throughout history.

Mr. SMITH. What percentage of Special Forces are in Iraq right

now, of your forces?

General BROWN. To give you the specific percentage, I would

have to—I would have to figure it out. We have got about 7,500

folks deployed, about 5,000 in Iraq across all of the SOCOM—of all

SOCOM, we have got about 5,000. For Special Forces, I would have

to figure that out specifically.

5

Mr. SMITH. One last question. When we were down there, you

talked about the need to upgrade your aircraft, C–130, and you are,

as we all know, dependent upon the forces themselves for the larger pieces of equipment like aircraft basically, and then you specialize it from there, so you are dependent on them moving forward

and you are waiting for the Air Force to make their decision on

what to do about the air frame around the 130.

What is your preferred outcome, accepting for the moment you

have to live with ultimately what the Air Force decides, but in

terms of our input in the process, what would you need? Do you

think you can take the existing air frame out there and upgrade

them? Do you need a new air frame? If you needed a new one, what

would it look like? I ask that because where the V–22 is concerned,

you didn’t exactly get what you wanted. You are going to live with

it, and I understand that, but I would like to try to avoid that

when we are trying to replace the 130. I am curious what your

preference would be.

General BROWN. I think what we need is a 130 size aircraft. I

think that we are about done modernizing our current fleet. Now

we have already started a small modernization program with what

we call the C–130 Whiskey fleet.

Mr. SMITH. What does that mean? You mentioned that when I

was down there.

General BROWN. Our most capable C–130 is called the Combat

Talon II, and that is an all-weather penetrating aircraft that can

penetrate enemy defenses and weather to deliver troops to the target. We have a lesser version of that; it is called the Whiskey

model. It is not a full-up Talon but it is part of our modernization

and it will be the stop gap so that we have some new rebuilt airplanes on the flight line until we do get a decision and figure out

what our modernization program is for the future of our C–130

fleet.

It is my opinion that we need a new aircraft. Most of our aircraft

are I would guess 29 to 40 years old, and they are flying every day,

and we are putting a lot more hours on them. I would say my number one modernization issue is the C–130 fleet. Today we have several different models of C–130’s. Pilots can’t fly each other’s model.

So you have—you fall into the law of small numbers immediately

because you have got a few aircraft that can do this, a few aircraft

that can do a different mission.

What we are looking for is a modernization program with a new

aircraft about a C–130 size that ultimately will give us a pure fleet

so that we can get some mass in our capability and better manage

the force.

Mr. SMITH. So that basically one pilot could fly—same pilot could

fly any one of the four or five different versions you need.

General BROWN. That would be a good solution to a lot of our

problems.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, General.

Mr. Thornberry.

General BROWN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, one of the tasks that has been assigned to SOCOM is

overall planning for the global war against the terrorists, and I

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think it would be helpful to hear from you, at a very high level,

how do we win this war in the long term because there is concern

of course that we will have a difficult time hunting down every person who chooses to become a terrorist and so there must be a larger and longer approach? How—how would you describe that?

General BROWN. We have written the global war on terror

(GWOT) plan. Without getting too detailed into the plan, there are

two basic vectors, and one is the direct action piece, and one is the

indirect action piece. The direct action piece has a direct impact on

our enemy. The indirect action has a direct impact on the environment, thereby influencing the enemy.

The most important piece of that is the indirect piece, and that

is the very, very difficult piece, eliminating underlying conditions,

eliminating Islamic extremist ideologies. It is the indirect piece

that is very, very—building partner nation capability. That is the

more difficult, and long term is a piece, but it is critical to the success in the long war for the global war on terror.

The direct action piece is critical because quite frankly that has

a direct impact on the enemy and in fact protects the homeland

and buys time for the indirect piece of the global war on terror

strategy to work.

So I would say the secret is we have got to do both, both of them

to protect the homeland, but the indirect piece of working with our

partner nations, enabling them to be able to hunt down terrorists

inside their own borders, building their capacity, eliminating underlying conditions, eliminating Islamic radical ideologies, those

are the things that will eventually win it, and that influences the

environment, which in turn influences the enemy.

Mr. THORNBERRY. As you know, there has been some criticism

that we as a government are too heavily weighted toward direct action. How do you think—do you think we have the balance about

right or not?

General BROWN. Well, I think there is a need for both of them

right now, but I would say, it would be better if we could be doing

more indirect action around the world. Our Forces, SOF Forces are

specifically capable of doing the indirect piece as well as the direct

action piece. Most of our deployments as you know are into Afghanistan and Iraq, and so we are not doing as many engagement and

training host nation countries and partner nation countries as we

would traditionally do around the world. SOF forces are very good

at that. There is one other point I would make, and that is on the

Iraqi battlefield, our SOF Forces, our Special Forces and our

SEALS are doing direct action, but they are doing it in concert

with the Iraqi battalions. They are doing it in the combat advisor

role, which is in fact the indirect piece. It is enabling partner nations.

Now the outcome may be a direct action mission, and I think

that is widely misunderstood and reported because people think

that because you are going to hit a direct target, that is a direct

mission, and it is in fact a direct action mission. But when you are

doing it by training the Iraqi forces and then combat advising

them, helping them plan and execute the mission, you are building

their capacity and capability to do it by themselves, thereby making it an indirect approach.

7

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. I appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. I believe what we will do is, I will call on Ms. Castor,

and we will break, and if the General could, I think the other members of the committee would have questions for you. We will endeavor to be back as quickly as possible. Probably about a half

hour.

Ms. Castor.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When talking about the indirect action, that piece of it that we

have got to further develop in the global war, talk to me about how

your recruitment efforts have changed and the challenges you face

in recruitment, especially of the high-quality type that you place

special emphasis on in Special Operations and the challenges you

face with cultural and racial diversity and recruits that have the

linguistic skills that are necessary for your type missions.

General BROWN. That is a great question. First of all, recruiting

since 9/11 has not been a problem for Special Operations Forces.

Every seat in every school is full to start the course. We have had

some problems getting people through the course but, quite frankly, overall speaking, and there may be some spot shortages, our recruiting has been excellent.

We require every Special Forces graduate to be able to speak a

language, and so they obtain those language skills while they are

in our course. We have subsequently started language programs

also in our SEALS, and the main requirement for language in our

Air Force Special Operations Command is a unit we call the 6th

SOS, which is a foreign internal defense, and they specialize in

going into countries and helping them learn to maintain and fly

their aircraft. So they have a language requirement.

Language is incredible. It is incredibly difficult to train and

maintain, and so we then target the people that we train in one

area of the world so that they can maintain that cultural awareness and language skills. So while we don’t try and recruit people

with language ability, it is helpful.

Our premise is that we are going to bring you in, we give you

the Defense Language Aptitude Test, and then we put you in the

language that we want to target you against where you will stay

in that area of the world.

Our recruiting, quite frankly, has been very, very good.

Ms. CASTOR. And the training has been successful. The recruits

are making it through that training and learning the languages in

a timely manner enough to be deployed, and you are not having

any difficulties with sending qualified, highly qualified troops out

on their mission.

General BROWN. The troops going out on the mission today from

Special Operations Command are the best that have ever gone out

of Special Operations Command. About 23 percent graduate from

the course, and they fail the course for all kinds of reasons, one of

them being their inability to pass the language portion. And so if

you can hit a target at 600 meters, that is great, but unless you

can speak a language that we ask you to learn, you are still not

going to graduate and wear a Special Forces tab.

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Ms. CASTOR. I am still learning a great deal about all of the services under the jurisdiction of this committee, but I imagine that,

under Special Operations indirect action missions, those are much

longer deployments, much longer-term than I am typically learning

about in the Army Brigades that are in the more traditional combat missions. Is that right?

General BROWN. I think you are right. On the indirect approach,

we have to provide some sort of persistent presence to build that

relationship, to build that capability, and occasional deployment to

an area to work with a foreign military to train them for four to

six weeks is helpful but it is not nearly as helpful if we can keep

a persistent presence in that country working with those forces for

a much longer period of time and bring them up to a higher state

of resonance to include training their non-commissioned officer

(NCO) corps.

The people I failed to mention real quick on the indirect piece

that are critical to the indirect piece are the Civil Affairs and the

Psychological Operations Forces, which are two core tasks of Special Operations Command, and we enjoy the good fortune of having

the active Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Forces under

our command and proponency for them. They are critical in the indirect piece, which I think is pretty clear.

Ms. CASTOR. Can those deployments go on for many years then?

General BROWN. They could. What our concept for future operations is that we will build a rotational force with the growth, with

the SOF growth that is being provided by the Quadrennial Defense

Review (QDR) that will allow us to maintain whatever the deployment is required but have sufficient forces trained in a joint nature

so that we can still continue to do rotational Special Operations deployments.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, General.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. With that, I believe we will recess. I

would imagine it would be about 25 minutes to a half hour.

General BROWN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for your patience.

[Recess.]

Mr. SMITH. Call us back to order. Ms. Drake.

Mrs. DRAKE. Mr. Chairman.

General Brown, first of all, thank you for being here. I am very

concerned and I know all of us are about the increasing use of

IEDs. As we all know, they are the leading cause of U.S. combat

deaths and injuries in Iraq and additionally the use of improvised

explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan has doubled last year

alone. IEDs are the low-cost weapon of choice of our enemies, and

it seems to me that, as long as we are fighting the war on terror,

we will be confronting IEDs.

It is my understanding that SOCOM’s role in this battle against

the use of IEDs is to attack the networks that place them, thus

neutralizing the threat before it even materializes. Can you comment on this mission and address for us whether your command

has the resources necessary to execute this mission?

General BROWN. Thank you for the question. I think it is

everybody’s mission on the battlefield at all times to see if we can

take this network apart that is developing the IED, delivering the

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parts for it, employing it, and so it is everybody’s mission, but certainly, we are very, very aggressive about trying to track down that

network that is providing the supplies that build the IED, all the

way to the guys that hire people to put them in, people that put

them in, and so we are very aggressive about it. We have got the

resources we need to take this mission on.

I should say that, right from the beginning, when the first IEDs

started to hit us, we were very, very aggressive about doing what

I think was just about everything we could do immediately to go

after this problem set. We actually deployed forces to other countries that had some experience in it. We learned from them. We

wrote the handbook. We worked with the United States Army and

the Marine Corps to help develop the handbook for tactics, techniques and procedures. We immediately tried to start armoring up

our vehicles.

So we have taken the IED threat very, very seriously. But I

think you hit the nail on the head. It is the entire spectrum from

the IED maker all the way to protecting our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines with the best equipment we can. That is critical.

IEDs are going to be with us a long time. They are a very, very

inexpensive weapon of choice of terrorists around the world and it

is proliferating around the world, but I think we do have the resources and the drive and the initiative to go after everything that

we can to try and protect our forces on the battlefield.

Mrs. DRAKE. General Brown, thank you for that. But just one

other thing that I wanted to mention. We had a breakfast here a

couple of weeks ago for Special Operation Forces, and we had two

SEALS who came to tell us about their experience in Iraq, and

they said three things that all of us have heard the exact opposite

of and Americans have heard the exact opposite of. The first thing

they said is they hire Iraqis when they are able to contract out

work. Then they said this, the sheik had given them 350 of his people to be Iraqi police. And the third thing was that the Iraqi Security Forces were doing a very good job, and they were very impressed by the progress they have made.

My question to them is, can we put them on TV, or how do we

get the message out? Is there a better way to get the message out

of what you are able to accomplish?

General BROWN. I am sure there is a better way to get the message out. I would just reiterate and re-emphasize what they said.

I have been over there many times, will be back over there next

week. I have been out with the Iraqi Security Forces, especially the

Iraqi special operations forces that we have had the responsibility

for training, and they are very, very good, and they are very dedicated to the task and so the folks that we have had the opportunity

to train, quite frankly, are doing very, very well.

I am sure there are better methods of getting the information

out, and we are probably not doing well enough.

Mrs. DRAKE. It was just the exact opposite of what we all think.

Thank you for your answers. I yield back.

Mr. SMITH. If I can follow up on that, and I did hear that, but

isn’t it fair to say, it is a little bit more of a mixed bag in terms

of the quality of the Iraqi forces and the support from the locals?

I think there are some areas, particularly in the Sunni-held provVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:46 Aug 07, 2008 Jkt 040967 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-12\031260.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
10

inces, where a number of Sunnis have decided recently that al

Qaeda is not in their best interest, and they are working with us.

That has made an enormous difference. There you are working

with basically what amounts to the militias for the local sheiks.

Once the local sheiks have given the big thumbs up that they are

supposed to work with them, then it is really good. But at other

places, particularly in more mixed neighborhoods, the Iraqi forces,

there have been instances when they haven’t shown up, they

haven’t been prepared to do the job. Our forces have had to take

on responsibilities.

It is not all just one side or the other, and I will agree with Mrs.

Drake that certainly we hear more of the negative than the positive, but I think it would be misleading to give the impression that

all the negative stuff just isn’t accurate.

General BROWN. I think you are exactly right. Sir, it is a mixed

bag. It depends on where you are and what forces you are training

with and their commanders. So it is different for whoever you draw

as your team.

The point I would make is for the Iraqi special forces, which we

have trained from day one, they are very, very good, and so I am

very, very confident and comfortable with their capabilities, and, as

you know, that force is expanding.

Once you get out away from the Iraqi special operations forces,

our Special Forces teams and some of our SEAL teams, specifically

in Ramadi, are out as combat advisors, and it is a mixed bag. But

a little bit of training—when I was there, on the last trip I was

there, the SEALS that I visited in Ramadi were in a large warehouse where they had taken the leadership of the Iraqi battalion

that they were training with, and they had pulled off the NCO

corps and had taken them to this warehouse and were training

them at night so that the next day when they showed up to take

over their platoons as platoon sergeants and first sergeants, they

would act like NCOs, and they would have expertise that the

troops did not have. So they were giving them this little additional

training off to the side where nobody would see it to try and build

the credibility of the NCO corps.

So I would agree with you that it is dependent upon the unit you

are working with, how good that commander is, but, quite frankly,

the ones I have seen over the years, it is much improved. One of

my first trips over up in the Mosul area, quite frankly, we had

problems with just getting them to come to train. I didn’t see that

the last trip over. They were out there training, and we were getting pretty good numbers to show up.

So it is a process you just have to stay after. It is not going to

be instantaneous.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to take this opportunity before

I ask the question to congratulate you, inasmuch as I wasn’t here

for the re-organization of the subcommittee, upon your becoming

chairman of the subcommittee. I look forward to working with you

and with Mr. Thornberry as ranking member, and I, as you know,

enjoy serving on this subcommittee very much and getting to know

11

the men and women of the Special Operations Command. So I look

forward very much to working under your leadership in this regard

so congratulations.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Of course, chairing, you have chaired the

committee as well and did so quite ably. So I appreciate that.

Thank you for those kind words.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

General Brown, just by happenstance, Congressman Thornberry

and I about a month ago realized that in between, sometime in between the election and when we came back here to reorganize the

Congress, he and I both read a book entitled, The Sling and the

Stone. The book is a book that explains the nature of what the author refers to as fourth-generation warfare. And without going

through an explanation of first generation, second generation and

third generation, fourth-generation warfare is a strategy which attempts to weaken the political will of your opponent.

As I watch the progress of the war, the global war on terror, I

see the author’s description played out over and over again. Basically, the folks in the Middle East have realized after watching the

United States military or the coalition military in 1990 and 1991,

that it is probably not a good idea to take us on in that kind of

a war.

And so in order to accomplish their goals, they had to find another way, and they watched what has happened through history

where weaker—the weaker force has been successful in taking on

a stronger force and using those techniques and methods and strategies to carry out this war.

I don’t know if you have seen that book, but could you—I think

you probably get the gist of what I am saying. Could you just comment on what you see going on in regard to this as being a different kind of war, perhaps even a fourth generation warfare?

General BROWN. I am not familiar with the book. I will go get

it and read it. But it sounds exactly like what we are talking about.

This is that kind of war.

It is a different kind of war. People have to understand that it

is not big formations on big formations. A lot of people find that

a very comfortable way to go to war because you can do all kinds

of simulations and modeling and, as you know, in this kind of a

war very, very difficult to do any of that.

As you know, we have just written in concert with the Marine

Corps our, Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, and basically the definition of irregular warfare fits right into that type of

warfare it sounds like this book is talking about with protracted—

the protracted efforts to exhaust your enemy and his political system as opposed to direct action force on force. So I think that exactly describes what we are up against. So I will take that book

on and read it before my next testimony.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, General Brown. Good to see you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. McIntyre.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Brown, for your outstanding leadership. I

wanted to ask you, I know we have been interrupted by votes, and

wasn’t sure if this had been examined, I had the opportunity to be

12

at the new Marine Special Operations Center in late August that

is being stood up at Camp Lejeune and I know the good General

is going to be with us in the next panel to talk with us about that.

But with the proximity of Fort Bragg and Camp Lejeune, has

there been any effort in the option of utilizing Army Special Operations Command infrastructure with the Marine Special Operations Forces training?

General BROWN. While we haven’t physically overlaid the Marine

Corps Special Operations training on top of the Special Warfare

Center and school at Fort Bragg, the very first thing that the commanding general did, and I am sure he will be glad to talk to you

about that, is go to visit the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg

and look for areas where they can work together to help get the

Marine Corps Special Operations Command assessment, selection,

training, get it on board and get going with it.

They have in fact—we do share, all of our SOF forces share each

other’s schools so we are already maximizing that. The Marine

Corps Special Operations Command has a high number of medics

in our medic course there at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which the

Special Forces medic is world renowned. So we are already sharing

a lot of those kind of schools. We will do better a year from now

as we work through more slots and building the capability to put

more Marine Special Operation Forces into our schools. But there

is a lot of work going into making sure we are not redundant, that

we are parallel, because those forces have different requirements,

different mission sets. So where we can do the same training and

assessment, selection together, then we are encouraging them to do

that. But where they need to be separate, they are.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Brown, thanks for coming today. A couple of questions,

hopefully quick answers, on the Civil Affairs and the other nonoperational types, for lack of a better phrase, are they fully SOFqualified or other folks that don’t necessarily need to be able to do

all the things that——

General BROWN. The Civil Affairs Forces and the Psychological

Operations Forces come through our school at Fort Bragg, North

Carolina, and have to graduate from our Civil Affairs or our Psychological Operations Course. And so when they come to us, and

they also have language skills and language requirements dependent upon what unit that they are habitually aligned with. They will

be airborne qualified. They will deploy with SOF forces.

So they are fully integrated into Special Operations with special

training.

Mr. CONAWAY. I know they are fully integrated, but in terms of

their overall level of training, they go through all of the schools

that someone——

General BROWN. Not all of the schools. They go through the

schools that are applicable to the skills that we require them to

have on the battlefield. I might mention that the Civil Affairs force

has done a phenomenal job in Iraq and Afghanistan, and these are

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small four-man teams or, in many cases, men and women teams

that are far out all by themselves, in villages, on the roads, in a

Humvee, just doing an incredibly important job, and they have

done it very, very well.

Mr. CONAWAY. You talked to us a little bit more about modernization. You mentioned aircraft issues and needs. Are there

other areas where there is training facility or equipment capability

that you need that you don’t already have?

General BROWN. Modernization, it never stops because you are

always looking at what you have and what is available to make

sure that we are putting the best equipment that we can for SOF

operators. One of the key areas that we also focus on is what we

call soldier systems, but it is really soldier, sailor, airmen and Marine systems for the ground forces and those that are on the

ground to make sure that we are getting the best body armor,

lighter body armor, the best radios, the best weapons, and so we

are modernizing the force in all those areas.

We are looking at a new weapons system called the combat assault rifle, Special Operations Combat Assault Rifle called the

SCAR. We are about to start fielding that at low rate initial production to make sure it meets our requirements.

We are modernizing our helicopter fleet. We are building MH 60

model Black Hawks. We are building G model, through great efforts by the United States Army, G model Chinooks. We are not

only modernizing that fleet. We are growing that fleet, and we are

stationing some helicopters out at Fort Lewis, Washington, so, for

the first time, in our history, we will have aviation on the west

coast. Forty percent of all SOF is stationed west of the Mississippi,

but no aviation, so we are fixing that piece on the helicopter piece

and of course CV–22 is probably our biggest modernization project.

All of our—we need to move faster on our boat programs, and we

are. We have got some initiatives going on to look at the next generation of our rivarine craft, our Mark 5 SEAL assault crafts. So

we are looking at our boat programs, and we are starting to move

on. So we are modernizing in just about every area. We have got

some pretty good plans.

Mr. CONAWAY. But there are no glaring deficiencies that you are

really concerned at this stage?

General BROWN. Glaring deficiencies is probably too hard. We

need to work a little harder and get some decisions on the modernization of our C–130 fleet. That is the biggest one that kind of

sticks out right now.

Mr. CONAWAY. One last quick one. Can you talk to us about casualty rates among SOF forces in Iraq and Afghanistan versus nonSOF forces?

General BROWN. I have not taken a look at the numbers of casualties compared to the conventional force casualties. Our forces

are doing high-risk missions, all the way down to Civil Affairs and

Psychological Operations, like I talked about. They are out on very

dangerous roads, out by themselves, they are in small teams. So

they are doing very high-risk missions.

They are provided the best equipment and the best training.

They are trained at a higher level. So all that plays into the

amount of casualties we take but the other thing is we are very,

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very proud of our medical capability for all the special operations

medics so when they are wounded we have got very, very highly

trained medics right next to them.

I have not looked at the numbers. I can go back and look at that.

Quite frankly, I try and stay away from briefing the numbers of

casualties. These guys aren’t numbers. These are absolutely wonderful special operators that are on the battlefield defending this

Nation.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. Hayes.

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Brown, thank you for being here. A special thank you

and our prayers for the men and women that you represent.

General BROWN. Thank you.

Mr. HAYES. I have been kind of tagging along behind your wonderful folks ever since I have been in Congress, and it has been an

incredible privilege. If I could yield my time to you, and I can, is

there anything that you can bring to this hearing in terms of the

folks back home—the committee is pretty well aware we are at war

and what the stakes are. This is not a negotiating kind of thing.

Is there a comment that you can add there that might help focus

on the one word to describe Iraq, which is win, which is what you

are doing.

General BROWN. I think I need to focus, if I were making a comment about Iraq, I need to focus on what the special operations

tasks are and how well our forces are trained, organized, equipped

and employed. And we will be going back over tomorrow morning

to visit them.

And when you go over, you kind of look at are we doing things

right, and are we doing the right things with our Special Operations Forces? Are we doing missions that conventional forces are

not organized, trained and equipped to do, because that is the purpose that this Nation built this wonderful Special Operations

Forces? We are trained, organized and equipped to perform the

functions that conventional forces are not.

So the measurement of success for the SOF forces, when I go

over, I see them doing everything, and they are doing it very, very

well. I am not just up here cheerleading for them because they are

a wonderful people, and we certainly don’t get everything correct.

But I will tell you that where I see them training and combat advising Iraqi and Afghani forces, they are phenomenal. Where I see

our Civil Affairs Forces out meeting with Pashtun leadership, they

are phenomenal.

So I am very, very happy. And then our high-value targeting capability is very, very good. So I think that the thing I would say

about Iraq is that the SOF forces over there are doing a tremendous job.

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, sir. I am smiling because I am thinking

about the breakfast that Chairman Smith and Mike McIntyre and

others of us had. You generals are fine. We appreciate you, but

when the operators come and tell from their own perspective in a

very humble way who they are and how they do it, the press can’t

refute that. Again, thanks to all those guys.

15

A cousin just graduated from college in December magna cum

laude, and guess what he did with his degree, he is headed down

to Fort Benning to join Special Forces to be a combat medic.

Yield back. Look forward to the next panel.

General BROWN. Thanks very much.

We will look forward to seeing him in the force.

Mr. SMITH. I should say for all members’ information, we are

going to try to do more of those hearings with Special Operations

Forces, individual members coming back from battlefield and giving us some firsthand accounts, informal briefings. Try to do the

same thing, something early in the morning. I have discussed that

with General Brown, something they definitely want to do, interested certainly in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also one of the pieces,

and I will be asking Admiral Maguire, when he comes up, about

this, about the experience in the Philippines and the more indirect

action piece of it, which as Mr. Thornberry has said, has enormous

potential. So we are going to try to set them up and urge all of you

to attend because I agree with Representative Hayes, that was incredibly useful for all of us.

Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Brown, for being here. I have missed some

of the testimony and the questions and answers, and I don’t want

to be redundant, but I do want to say how very grateful I am for

your service and the service of the extraordinary men and women

in the Special Operations Command, to thank you and to thank

them.

I, too, am looking forward to the testimony of the next panel, but

with my deep thanks and congratulations. I will yield back, Mr.

Chairman.

General BROWN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Actually, I think that concludes. I have

just one more question. On the Capstone Concept for Special Operations, which put differently, is sort of your I guess 30,000-foot vision of, here is what we want the Special Forces to be doing in the

immediate future in the environment we are in on the war on terror. If you could say a few words about that vision, because I think

it is going to be enormously important in the war on terror.

General BROWN. Thanks for the opportunity.

In Special Operations Command, our staff is built by functions.

It is not built with the normal line and block charts that you would

normally see in a joint staff. One of those that we stood up is called

the Center for Knowledge and Futures, and their job is doing our

Title 10-required doctrine writing, and also I have given them the

task of taking on the future.

We based our concept, Capstone Concept for Special Operations

employment on three factors, and that is global war on terror, expeditionary trained join SOFs, and the ability to have a persistent

presence forward.

So what we did is we took this look at what we thought would

be required around the world, how we could best meet those three

strategic requirements, and I think we have come up with a good

concept that will allow us to build and train a joint SOF force to

match the requirement in a specific environment, build that and

16

train it in the United States, put a command and control over it,

enable it with all the schools, all the command and control communications intelligence, with all the logistics pieces, and then deploy

that as an integrated unit to take care of a problem set in a specific

environment.

Mr. SMITH. By specific environment, you mean as specific as this

particular part of the world.

General BROWN. Exactly.

Mr. SMITH. Train about the culture, the language.

General BROWN. If in fact you were the European Command

(EUCOM) commander and you had a requirement today for a campaign in Africa, we can build that force. We can train it to a standard and it will have all the pieces and enablers, and they will work

as a joint force. Today, we traditionally do it based on the requirement of the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs). They will

ask for like a Special Forces team. We will then train, organize and

equip and deploy that Special Forces team.

Our concept goes beyond that. Our concept is building a Joint

Force with a joint command and control with all the enablers in it

to match the problem set that you are giving us. And so we wrote

this Capstone Concept.

The two enablers for it are the SOF growth that we got in the

QDR, which helps us have the capacity to do this in the future, and

global positioning of where our forces are around the world so that

we match up with the task that we are trying to take on.

So we put all those kind of pieces into a document. We wrote the

concept. It is called the Capstone Concept for Special Operations,

and it kind of guides us in the future of how we intend to employ

special operations.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. One last question, as I was thinking

about it. It could sort of touch off a broader discussion, but I will

ask it anyway. In terms of the use of our forces and what you just

talked about there sort of triggered it in my mind, there are a lot

of places particularly in Africa, Southeast Asia, different parts of

the Middle East where there is a definite threat. There is an unstable environment, an extremist element if not al Qaeda directly. We

have seen these extremist elements may not start out as al Qaeda

but link up with them, as is happening in Algeria. It strikes me

those are areas where you guys could really be enormously important in stopping that before it starts. The main problem with that

right now is there is such a high percentage of the force in Iraq,

would be my guess. I am not suggesting, and don’t mean to, that

somehow we can just go ahead and abandon that because we have

other things to do.

But I just make the point because conceptually the GWOT is

about more than Iraq. It is not like if we win there, whatever at

this point win might look like, if we succeed there, get a reasonably

stable environment I think is a better way to put it than in terms

of a win or a loss at this point, but even if we succeed there, we

have got all these other places where you guys can be making an

enormous difference, is my perception. Is that sort of, as you look

at the world, can you see 5, 10, 15 places like gosh, if we have two

dozen of our SOF guys, that would make an enormous difference

there?

17

General BROWN. Sir, I think there are plenty of places and opportunities where small Special Forces teams working with indigenous

forces to train them, to help equip them, to help give them the capability to defend their own borders, fight terrorism inside their

own countries, that Special Operations Forces could be working

today.

Our center of gravity as you said is Iraq. We are going to build

five more Special Forces battalions, for example. Those battalions,

while people think that is to reduce our ops tempo, it will do some

of that. But the main thing it will do is give us the capacity and

the capability to spread out and do the other types of missions that

you are discussing.

I should say also that, when we do the indirect piece, and part

of that is enabling our partner nations around the world, I failed

to mention earlier that there is a big interagency piece of that. And

working with the interagency in our plan for the global war on terror is a key piece of our entire strategy.

Mr. SMITH. That is all I have. Does any other member have anything else for General Brown?

If not, again we thank you very much. We know you are headed

out into the field, so give all of our troops over there our best and

our support, and thank you very much for being here and for all

your great work on behalf of our country.

General BROWN. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. SMITH. We will bring in the other panel. My preference is if

we could just have us sit here. It shouldn’t take more than a couple

of minutes. I don’t want to lose any time. So we will bring in the

four component commanders and get going as soon as they are situated.

Is Admiral Maquire just outside the room? We will give him just

a minute. We did that kind of quick. You didn’t necessarily see that

coming, then all of a sudden we asked for you.

I apologize, Admiral. My fault. We should have given you a little

bit more of a warning time there.

Welcome. We are now joined by our four Special Operations component commanders. We have Lieutenant General Robert Wagner

from the U.S. Army Special Ops; Rear Admiral Joseph Maquire,

Commander, U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command; Lieutenant

General Michael Wooley from the U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command; and Major General Dennis Hejlik from the U.S.

Marine Corps Special Operations Command.

I want to welcome all four of you and say we are very honored

and pleased to have all of you here. It is incredibly helpful to our

committee to have your perspective. We know it is not easy. You

are busy. You are in the middle of a war and doing very important

things. So for you to take time and come back here and testify before us and give us a chance to ask you some questions means a

great deal to this committee and gives us a great opportunity to get

insights on what you could and, more importantly, how we can help

you do it.

With that, we will go left to right and start with Lieutenant General Wagner from the U.S. Army Special Ops Command and go

down from there. General.

18

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. ROBERT W. WAGNER, COMMANDER,

U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, U.S. ARMY

General WAGNER. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Thornberry, distinguished Members of Congress, it is my honor to appear before

the committee and to report on the manning and readiness of the

U.S. Army Special Operations Forces, which are the best manned,

trained and equipped in our history. They continue to perform

magnificently. They are incredibly capable soldiers, and I think you

can be very proud of them.

My top two priorities are support the global war on terror and

the readiness of our forces. First I would like to talk about the command support to the global war on terror.

Every day we have over 4,500 carefully selected, highly trained,

and well equipped Army Special Operations soldiers, the Green Berets, our Rangers, our Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and

Special Operations aviators and support forces deployed around the

world.

The pace and intensity of their deployments is incredible. The

soldiers are engaged in full-dimension warfare, from indirect to direct action, requiring maturity, judgment and seasoned experience.

In regard to the kinetic aspects of our mission, Army SOF soldiers are in a continuous cycle of find, fix, finish, exploit and analyze. Our SOF soldiers and the joint team are routinely hitting

multiple targets per night. Their agility at exploiting intelligence

from one target to go to the next is unmatched in the annals of

warfare. This cycle is played out nightly in multiple locations in

Iraq and Afghanistan and is a hallmark of the direct action success

on the battlefield.

Just this weekend, our Special Forces teams, embedded with

Iraqi counterpart units and Air Force Special Operations Forces

and conventional forces, were engaged in a major operation on

short notice that prevented a major attack on a holy celebration.

The force is very heavily committed. Most of our operators have

completed eight or more combat rotations, with very little rest at

home while they are in fact training for the next deployment and

are on alert for contingencies.

Conversely, in the non-kinetic aspect of our mission, Army SOF

teams are embedded with indigenous people in the armies of Iraq

and Afghanistan and in the Philippines and around the world,

working side by side, building capacity and capability in the host

nation forces, enabling them to operate independently with increased effectiveness.

In my opinion, this is the most important work we do and is

aptly key to winning the war, working by, with, and through partner forces and enabling their success. It is a hard, tough, patient

work that President Kennedy had in mind when he insisted on expanding the size of the Special Forces, forces that are uniquely

blended of skills to help those who have the will to help themselves. That we find ourselves today expanding the size of Special

Operations Forces once again is instructive and, again, to your

credit.

To my second priority of force readiness, it is linked to the current fight. As General Brown stated, people are our most precious

asset, followed closely by equipment and training. We must recruit,

19

train, assess, equip, retain and professionally develop our SOF soldiers and continue to monitor every aspect of that process.

As you know, we are in the process of adding over 6,800 Active

Duty soldiers to the Army Special Operations Forces from the QDR

growth. Continued increased production of our SF Civil Affairs and

PsyOps soldiers has been the total transformation of the instruction program at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and

School, Fort Bragg.

This continues to be very much a good news story as Special

Force student production has increased from an average of 238 per

year in the nineties to a current steady state of over 750 Active

Duty soldiers per year. We did this basically using best business

practices, all while maintaining increasing standards.

Army SOF’s population is more senior than most units, which

highlights the importance of senior-grade retention initiatives. Retention programs are critical to keeping these extraordinary skilled

professionals, who routinely separate themselves from their families and place their lives at risk. Over 1,000 retirement-eligible soldiers have accepted retention incentives to remain in Army SOF.

With your help, we must sustain these initiatives and be prepared

to initiate others to keep the force at peak readiness.

In conclusion, I thank the members of your committee for your

continued support to our soldiers. You help make our success possible as we prosecute the global war on terror, grow the force and

maintain our high standards. I look forward to answering your

questions.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, General.

[The prepared statement of General Wagner can be found in the

Appendix on page 59.]

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Maquire.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JOSEPH MAGUIRE, COMMANDER,

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND, U.S. NAVY

Admiral MAQUIRE. Chairman Smith, Congressman Thornberry,

distinguished members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. It is

an honor and privilege to appear before the subcommittee and talk

to you about the state of Naval Special Warfare and the maritime

component of the United States Special Operations Command.

As I said in my written statement to you, and Mr. Hays said earlier in General Brown’s session, nobody in this room has to be told

that the Nation is at war and we have been engaged in combat operations for 5–1/2 years.

Those of us who got Title 10 responsibilities to organize, train

and equip have done our part, but I am glad to be here this afternoon to have an opportunity to thank the Congress for the equipment part. You have resourced us well. You have given us all the

tools that we need to achieve victory on the battlefield. But we also

realize that of those that are given much, much is expected.

That said, Special Operations is not about the equipment, it is

about our people, and I know that the focus of this afternoon is

about our manpower and our retention.

I was pleased to have the opportunity two weeks ago to be here

with a couple of my young operators to talk to you about what they

20

are doing on the battlefield, and I look forward to continuously engaging the subcommittee on such matters.

Thank you for the opportunity this afternoon, and I look forward

to a continued relationship as we support the marvelous men and

women of Special Operations and do what we can to help them

achieve victory on the battlefield.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Maguire can be found in the

Appendix on page 82.]

Mr. SMITH. General Hejlik.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. DENNIS J. HEJLIK, COMMANDER,

U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General HEJLIK. Chairman Smith, Congressman Thornberry, and

distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much on

behalf of all the marines, sailors and Department of Defense (DOD)

civilians of the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command,

MARSOC, for the opportunity to testify this afternoon on our manning, our equipping and our readiness of MARSOC.

In less than one year, because of your untiring support, we have

gone from an operational concept to global deployed forces in the

long war on terror. We have four military training unit teams at

Tajikistan, in Yemen and in Columbia, and soon to have them in

Saudi Arabia and in Chad. We have a Marines Special Operations

company that is offloading on the 3rd of February from Djibouti

and will join our fellow Special Operational Forces in Afghanistan

in the fight in Afghanistan.

Last, I would tell you that I look forward to your questions, and

please come down and see your marines, sailors and civilians in

Camp Lejeune. We would really appreciate that.

Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. We appreciate the invitation and will take you up on

it. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Hejlik can be found in the

Appendix on page 93.]

Mr. SMITH. Last we have General Wooley.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MICHAEL W. WOOLEY, COMMANDER,

AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE

General WOOLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman

Thornberry, and other distinguished members of the committee. It

is an honor for me as well to appear before this committee today

representing my airmen and Air Force Special Operations Command.

As you know, as the Air Force Special Operations Command

(AFSOC) Commander, my primary responsibility is to provide General Brown and SOCOM with this specialized airpower required to

execute SOCOM’s mission. As airmen, we bring our Air Force core

values, our heritage and service capabilities to join my fellow soldiers, sailors and Marines in forming a truly awesome Joint Special

Operations capability for this great Nation.

21

I believe AFSOC is a force unlike any other. We are very small

in numbers. We have always been transformational. We always

seek the edge in personnel training and readiness, tactics and equipage of our force in order to prevail in any conflict. We believe the

maturity of our Air Commandos and their high levels of training

have been directly responsible for our success on the battlefield.

Recently we have been engaged in providing fire support, mobility and air control for Joint Special Operations teams engaged in

this global war. The addition of our Predator unmanned aerial systems and the companion intelligence processing and dissemination

capability has provided the field commanders with time-critical information to make effective battlefield decisions. I am proud to say

that our AFSOC airmen are operating the Predator and those intelligence pieces that are enabling special operators to view data from

a Special Operations perspective.

Not only are we fully engaged in hunting down the Nation’s

vilest enemies, but we are also engaged in assisting friendly foreign

air forces in developing their own internal capability to fight terrorism. We know that AFSOC is in high demand, yet our forces cannot be mass produced. We incorporate that philosophy when devising the best ways to apply that force in the future.

I too would like to thank this committee for the things that you

have done for us in the past, the things that you will continue to

do for us, and I look forward to answering your questions. I am

honored to be here today before this committee. Thank you very

much.

[The prepared statement of General Wooley can be found in the

Appendix on page 98.]

Mr. SMITH. Thank you all. I have quite a few questions. I will

ask some of them, and then move on to my colleagues and catch

them at the end.

Beginning with the training component, we all agree that basically you all are going to be asked to do a lot more in the years

ahead, try to bring more Special Operations Forces on line, ready

to go, do a divergent number of missions, and there are all kinds

of layers of challenge there in terms of can you recruit the people,

do you have the trainers, do you have the facilities to train, are you

able to do, as General Brown was talking about, some of the special, okay, we are sending this particular group to this part of the

world so we are going to take three months and train them in this

language and culture. So there is a wide range of different pieces

of that.

I would like all of you to sort of let me know, tell the committee

what are the greatest challenges. What do you think are going to

be the biggest difficult hurdles to overcome to get to those numbers

in general?

Then specifically I have specific questions for the Army, Navy

and Marines. Sorry, I didn’t come up with one for the Air Force.

I am new at this. I will work on that.

But in the Army piece, there have been allegations, concerns,

that in order to get those numbers up, you made the training

slightly easier or given more opportunities for people to meet the

levels. Just anecdotally, I have heard this. General Brown anVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:46 Aug 07, 2008 Jkt 040967 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-12\031260.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
22

swered the question, but General Wagner, I would like to have you

answer on that as well.

On the Navy piece, concerns about language skills, the language

skill requirements are not as high in the Navy.

On the Marines piece, since you are relatively new at this, and

we had the opportunity to talk a little bit before the hearing, but

I am curious; seeing as how Camp Lejeune is so close to Fort

Bragg, are there plans to coordinate and cooperate with the Army

to take advantage of the training facilities that they have at Fort

Bragg as you train your marines?

That is a complicated, multipart question, but I figured I would

throw it out there to get it started. So both the specific questions

I asked, but also the general piece for each of you, what is going

to be the toughest part of getting this done?

General WAGNER. Sir, thank you very much. From our standpoint, the transformation within our school is a major success and

we have made a lot of changes. We did a number of things that

I would say were business practice changes. They introduced efficiency without in any other way impacting cost or performance.

We introduced the language training at the very beginning of the

course. So if I am going to train to be an engineer sergeant and

I am going to be assigned to the 7th troop and my area is Southern

Command (SOUTHCOM) and my language is Spanish, part of my

engineering training is in Spanish.

What we have been able to do is get people to go through the

course, and, with a 98 percent pass rate first time through, introduce language without having to add a separate phase following

training, which used to exist.

So what we did simply is we told people at the beginning of their

training what group they were going to, what their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) was, as opposed to waiting to the end of

the training. That gave us the language piece.

Another thing we did is we used to teach the course four times

a year. We teach it eight times a year. In so doing, we were able

to use basically the same faculty, but increase the throughput by

eliminating the space between blocks of training.

Mr. SMITH. The mere fact you are speeding up getting these people through doesn’t mean that you are dumbing down the training?

General WAGNER. Asbolutely not. We did make some changes. I

will give you an example. We deemphasized map reading. We increased intelligence. Does that make sense? We are teaching the

course to be directly applicable to the soldiers who are going to the

warfight.

We have increased the amount of interagency participation, particularly with the intelligence functions. We teach the course now

at a secret level, so we can have true integration of the intelligence

function into the program.

I will tell you that we have exceeded all of our recruiting categories for our officers and our enlisted strength to come to the program, so there are more than enough people that want to do this

work.

The other thing that is unique about my recruiting is I do very

little recruiting from initial entry training. I am recruiting career

professionals. I go to the active Army and find people who are sucVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:46 Aug 07, 2008 Jkt 040967 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-12\031260.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
23

cessful sergeants or captains and we recruit them to come to the

command. So I draw on the experience of the active Army force,

which is increasing phenomenally, as you know, and we recruit

those people.

The other point that is important to me is while most units have

a large number of junior soldiers and a small number of senior people, our command goes the other way around. The junior people

don’t exist. There are senior people. So I have to not only recruit

them, but I have to retain them. So to me recruiting and retention

are hand in hand, because I have to retain those senior people.

That is the heart of our strength, is in that senior team. In that

12-man team, for example, that has a captain, a warrant officer

and senior non-commissioned officers, we have as much leadership

there as in a conventional infantry company. So retention is key

and recruiting is very strong and we are meeting all those goals.

So I think you should be very, very confident and feel very good

about what is happening within that transformation. I could take

it to the other courses as well, but that is an example. Perhaps

that is enough at this point, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Admiral MAQUIRE. Chairman Smith, there are many facets to the

training. I have got a great deal of time I spend with my forces on

the advance, and we really have no significant issues to report to

you on that.

My greatest challenge in Naval Special Warfare is with my basic

training, my Basic Underwater Demolition SEAL (BUD/S) training

in order to achieve the correct number of students in the door with

the proper throughput out the door to fill the requirements from

the Quadrennial Defense Review and the program as far as the

number of SEALs.

So, with that, in the last two years, working with General

Brown’s leadership and the Chief of Naval Operations, we have

been able to apply the focus to prioritizing SEAL recruiting within

the United States Navy and changing the way we are doing business within the United States Navy in order to bring young people

into Naval Special Warfare.

Last year, in 2006, I had a demand signal for over 1,000 students, recruits, to come to our basic training, and we achieved

roughly somewhere over 600 enlisted men in the door with a

throughput of about 120-plus, which was significantly short. Giving

that feedback to the Chief of Navy Personnel and to the Chief of

Naval Operations, we have, as I said, changed the way we did business in recruiting, which I won’t go into too much.

But the results are this year, the fourth month of the fiscal year,

I have a requirement for 1,400 men in the door. As of this week,

the Recruiting Command has signed contracts for 1,200 of the

1,400, which is a significant improvement. So I feel confident we

will be able to get the proper number of students in the door.

In addition to that, I had changed my basic program and done

away with my winter class, because that was my highest attrition

class. But as a result of the work that recruiting command has

done and the throughput, I had a backlog of young men to start

training.

24

So based on my experience, I didn’t want them to lose their motivation; I reinstituted my winter class and this week I have class

263 going through hell week. And as of today, just coming in to testify for the subcommittee, I still have 67 young candidates left on

Wednesday of hell week.

Now, they have got until Friday to complete the 120-hour program, but based on my experience as a SEAL and also as the

former commanding officer of the Center, nobody is going to quit

after going this far on Wednesday.

Mr. SMITH. After this long, you are going to stick out the last two

days.

Admiral MAQUIRE. So we will finish up with about 65 of these

guys, because of some illness. The other two will be rolled back.

But if you complete hell week, then you have a 95 percent chance

of receiving it all the way through to receiving your Trident.

Based on these numbers, and this is just a snapshot, but even

in southern California it gets pretty cold, we will have 60 of these

men finish. Roughly, being conservative, let’s just say only 50 of

them make it to their Trident, and I have five classes a year this

year, so right now, it is looking pretty good to growing the force.

So that is my greatest challenge right now, and changing the

way we are doing business, because we have a different battlefield.

My Basic Underwater Demolition SEAL training is pretty much

the same program as started in World War II. The battlefield in

the 21st century and the irregular war we are in right now requires a different type of warrior.

But yet we are the maritime component of the United States

Special Operations Command, so I also need to make sure that I

am doing that part for the Nation. Because if I am not preparing

the young force to conduct maritime operations, Special Operations

in a maritime environment, then nobody else is doing that as well.

So my greatest challenge is to get the throughput in. I think that

the United States Navy and General Brown have done a great deal

to do that. I am confident that my community can increase this,

and I have also hired industry to work within the United States

Navy to do some stuff.

So as far as the language training is concerned, it is somewhat

of a challenge for us, because we are primarily a strategic reconnaissance and direct action force. Today, I am involved in combat

operations, well, my men are, in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are also

throughout—we are in Kenya, we are in Chad, we are in Nigeria

and throughout the globe, in the southern Philippines as well.

So with a small force of 1,771 enlisted men and roughly 450 officers, it is difficult to key on the language and then have that individual be focused on that country with the language requirements

and the cultural awareness with worldwide commitments.

So we do have language requirements and I do have a number

of my force who have achieved a level on that, but I do not have

the level of language capability that is resonant in the United

States Special Operations Command.

Mr. SMITH. You have a different mission, so that is understandable.

Admiral MAQUIRE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. General.

25

General HEJLIK. Sir, thank you very much for your question. It

is a two-part question. The first one is on the training.

First of all, we recruit within the Marine Corps, so we don’t have

the real young marine, the 18, the 19-year-old for the most part.

There are two mission sets in MARSOC. One is the indirect phase,

which the foreign military training unit does, and the other one is

the direct action, which the Marine Special Operations companies

do.

If you are a four military training unit indirect recruit, you are

a combat veteran and you have anywhere from four to six years in

the Marine Corps. A little younger force.

Their requirement is for zero-plus, zero-plus for language capability. They go through a 25-week training package. We have patterned some of that from General Wagner’s Special Warfare School,

taking some of their program in destruction and adapted it to what

we need in the indirect approach on the battlefield.

For the Marines Special Operations companies, we have gotten

tremendous support from General Wooley down at Hulbert Field.

We have had our people working down there with AC–130

gunships, with the CV–22 and with our own V–22 in the Marines,

with Admiral Maquire’s folks down at Norfolk and at Coronado—

because I am split, my forces are at Camp Pendleton and at Camp

Lejeune—and with General Wagner through the Schoolhouse. A

great example of through the Schoolhouse, we have doubled the

number of corpsmen or medics that we put through this Schoolhouse from 16 to 32. So the training coordination and interrogation

is there throughout the components.

If you look at my biggest challenge, sir, when it comes to training, it is what we call our high-demand, low-density MOS’s or skill

sets, that is our Intel capability and that is some of our communicators. You have to be in the Marine Corps, for most of our Intel

capability, you have to be a sergeant with anywhere from four to

six years. Our school throughput is very small.

So that is our challenge. It will take us until about fiscal year

2010 to make sure we are up to that skill set. The interrogation

is there, the cooperation is there, and we are using all of the facilities throughout the components.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

General WOOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to kind of come at

this from two different perspectives.

As you know, we have a ground force with similar recruiting

needs and a pipeline to train them with. The Air Force has been

very cognizant of the issue with finding those new recruits, and we

have specialized recruiters that go out, for example, to extreme

sporting events to use as a recruiting base for us. It is a known

fact——

Mr. SMITH. You are watching the X games on television and go,

that is the guy we want.

General WOOLEY. In a sense we are, because we need that physical ability, the stamina, the mental facilities, if will you, to do

that. We, too, have reengineered our training pipeline. We have

come down from about 2 years, down to just over 12 months to get

them through our advanced skills training, which is a very concentrated course of events.

26

Our battlefield airmen, as we call them in our component, are

very highly skilled air traffic controllers. They are parachutists,

they are underwater divers. So they are multidisciplined, and it is

hard to recruit folks that can do all of those things. We are on an

up-tick right now. The pipeline is helping us out. The concentrated

recruiting is helping us out.

On our air crews side, we are entering into a new phase where

we are flying UAVs with a SOF operator. That is a magnificent

thing for us to add to our capability. We are taking pilots and sensor operators from our gunships, for example. We are taking gunners from helicopters and training them to be sensor operators. But

the SOF mind and the mind-set of those SOF operators operating

those unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is bringing a force multiplier to the battlefield. We are doing that mainly within our own

crew force.

One place that we go outside of our own crew force when we field

new weapons systems, like non-standard aviation that we are fielding as a result of the QDR, we are asking for help from the Air

Force, as well as internal crew members as well.

So we have got to come at it from a couple of different perspectives in our ground force as well as our crew force.

Mr. SMITH. The specific question about who you allow to fly on

the unmanned vehicles, if enlisted folks are allowed to do that? I

heard in the Air Force there is a restriction.

General WOOLEY. Yes, sir. It is a two-person crew. The aviator

is actually a pilot, and in some cases it can be a navigator, but they

must be Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pilot qualified. And

then the other position is that enlisted sensor operator. As I mentioned, the core that we drew from are the sensor operators that

we already have on our gunships, gunners and intelligence specialists that we train to operate the sensors on the Predators.

So it is a two-person crew, an aviator that actually flies the machine, and the sensor operator that actually flies the sensor.

Mr. SMITH. Picks up the data. Thank you. I thank the panel for

their patience. Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I yield to our colleagues and

will save my questions to the end.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentleman, thank you for coming today. I am a certified public

accountant (CPA), and periodically the profession has to go through

an analysis of what CPAs do, particularly entry-level CPAs, in

order to set the bar for folks who can get in and not get in, not

dissimilar to what your ‘‘hell week’’ and other things do. But one

of the things you have to decide, and that——

Mr. SMITH. I’m sorry, could you pull the mike up closer? I can’t

pick you up there.

Mr. CONAWAY. Sure. That mission changes over time. It was a

whole lot easier when I did it 40 years ago. As a part of that 10-

or 12-year review, that then changes the tasks, changes the skill

sets that young folks need.

Collectively across your systems, do you do a similar type of review to make sure that—particularly, Admiral, you mentioned hell

week looks like it did following World War II, but yet we have a

27

different fight today—to make sure that wherever you set the bar,

and I am not saying to lower the bar or raise the bar, but wherever

you decide you set the bar, that that is in fact an appropriate current bar for whatever it is we are going to pass these wonderful

young men, and perhaps some women, to do?

Can you speak to me about how you come to the conclusion you

still have the right test as across the system?

General WAGNER. Would you like me to answer that first?

Mr. CONAWAY. All four of you, sir.

General WAGNER. I truly do appreciate your question, because a

standard can both help you and hurt you. If you are not careful,

you can eliminate somebody who had great talent but didn’t quite

look like the profile you thought was appropriate. So we do continuously review our criteria.

The good news, I think because we have been running our programs as long as we have, we have a good feel for what ‘‘average’’

looks like and a place to see how to go above or below that, where

we need to make our changes. I think as I mentioned in the Special

Forces qualifications course, that causes us to eliminate from the

program emphasis on one area and place more of it on another

area.

I will tell you that we place a lot of the emphasis too on psychological analysis, on people being interviewed to make sure we are

bringing in people that have the characters, the values and the

moral strength to be part of the team, because in essence we rely

on mature people with good judgment, because we oftentimes put

them into very undefined situations, which is the heart of how we

use the Special Operations Force. As opposed to giving them details, do this, this, and do this, you give them intent and mission

guidance. So the character of the person and their moral courage

is a key part of that. Many of the other skills we can train them

over time if they are a little weak in one area.

I think we can tell you that we feel very confident that we do

continuously review them.

As we look to the number of people we need to bring in and the

categories, every year we take a 2-year backward look to see what

is happening and we review our analysis in terms of where we

want to place our emphasis. We have a program where we would

bring in a number of initial entry personnel. We start with 400. We

went to 1,000. We went to 1,500. We are down to 900. We looked

at where we think that balance will be, because we were new into

the program so we had to establish a water level to see how those

people will perform.

Then a key part of all of it for us is how will those people be retained, because we cannot invest in people who will stay with us

two or three or four years. We need the people to advance through

our senior ranks to run the organization.

So your point is very important to us and I do think we give it

a tremendous amount of emphasis. We have trained professionals,

civilians as well as military, who help us look at our standards and

our criteria.

Thank you, sir.

Admiral MAQUIRE. Although we may conduct hell week pretty

similar to the way we did it back in World War II, certainly the

28

quality of the standard of the individual is far greater than it was

in the past. I feel quite confident, sitting here as the Commander

of Naval Special Warfare, that had I applied today with my previous record, that I would not be accepted into Naval Special Warfare.

That said, our basic program is a course. It is a curriculum. It

is Basic Underwater Demolition SEAL training, which is a ‘‘26 curriculum’’ under the Chief of Naval Education and Training.

Mr. CONAWAY. Twenty-six weeks?

Admiral MAQUIRE. It is what the basic course is. It is a 26-week

curriculum, and each hour is just broken down into different blocks

of instruction, different blocks of training, just like any other curriculum would be. So it is a schoolhouse. As such, any curriculum

undergoes continuous review.

As the commander, I have had delegated from the Chief of Naval

Education and Training the curriculum control authority for the

basic course. So we are continuously improving it, and no matter

what you put on paper, it is one thing.

I would think though, sir, it is the quality of the instructors that

makes the program what it is today. I was most fortunate when

I went through to have all Vietnam combat veterans. Today the

young men who go through our basic program have the privilege

of being put through training from some SEALs that have got

three—and some actually have seven combat tours.

So as far as the academic environment and the curriculum, it is

something we do take very seriously and we continuously review.

General HEJLIK. Sir, thank you. That is a great question for us,

because one of the things we really wrestled with up front is what

do we want the MARSOC Marine and sailor to look like? What attributes does he or she have to have?

One of the things we really tried to get away from, the core of

the MARSOC, the Marine Special Operation Company, is the Force

Reconnaissance Marine. He has about 11 to 15 years in the Marine

Corps. He is an E–5, E–6, E–7. The standing joke in the Marine

Corps had always been, to get into Force Reconnaissance you have

to put an 80-pound rucksack on your back, swim the Mississippi

twice, longways. That was a standing joke.

We did not want that in a MARSOC Marine, standing joke or

not. So what we look for is a Marine who is mentally tough, physically tough and morally tough, because that Marine has to stand

alone and he is a strategic asset when he is out there in Chad,

Yemen or wherever he happens to be. So, again, does he have the

attitude, does he have the aptitude, can we take him to a higher

level?

If you are an Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU) marine, it

is a 25-week training package. If you are an MARSOC Marine, it

is an 18-month training package. And it is tough. We haven’t lowered our standards. But, again, we start with that basic mental,

physical and moral toughness.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. General.

General WOOLEY. Sir, we too have the same high standards as

the other components. It had been a while when I arrived since we

had gone through and reviewed those standards and our pipeline.

We reengineered our training pipeline for our combat controller

29

battlefield airmen last year. We are currently going through our

pararescuemen training pipeline as we speak. So we are doing just

what you talked about. It had been a while. We needed to do it,

and we are about halfway done.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mrs. Drake.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, first of all, welcome to all of you. Admiral Maquire, I think

I met you probably close to two years ago. I remember at that time

we talked about the time you spend in the air between the West

Coast and the East Coast, and I certainly think that is difficult. I

know a lot of my fellow Members of Congress do the same thing.

But I wondered, since that time——

Mr. SMITH. For the record, I for one don’t mind the plane trip.

The West Coast is worth it. I just wanted to make that known.

Mrs. DRAKE. I won’t talk about my drive. But, anyway, the Marines Special Operations Command has left Navy Special Warfare,

so you are the only component command on the West Coast. You

know I have been very supportive of your command moving to the

East Coast, because I truly believe that would benefit the Special

Operations Forces community.

Can you comment on the status of that project or where we are

with that now, or is it still up in the air?

Admiral MAQUIRE. Well, Congresswoman Drake, I would be

happy to him comment on that. There have been some other factors

that have mitigated that as well that I would like to share, inasmuch as now they are charging for a bottle of water onboard

planes, and I think it is just a matter of time until you have to

start trading frequent flier miles to use the lavatory. I think that

the move to the East Coast is looking like something that needs to

be done.

I spend over half my time on travel, and most of it to the East

Coast corridor. Obviously, the Navy Command is here, my boss,

General Brown in Tampa, as well as the other component commanders. So programmatically, the United States Special Operations Command has placed about $60 million into the 2008 program that is still working its way through the Department of Defense, and we are conducting site surveys in the Virginia Beach

area for the possible headquarters location, if that is approved. I

believe that we have also even started on the environmental impact

on that.

So I think that it looks like it is probably very likely to take

place, and I would envision that if it is approved in the 2008, we

will start the money flowing there in fiscal year 2008 and probably

a move to the East Coast in the 10/11 time frame, ma’am.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you for that. The question I have for all of

you, because I know our troops that are serving overseas in Iraq

or Afghanistan are typically four months to a year, based on the

branch of service, how long they rotate in and out of there.

For Special Operation Forces, can you comment on what is the

amount of time they typically are deployed into theater?

General WAGNER. Yes, Congresswoman. Good to see you again.

30

I think there is a couple of things that I would look at. Oftentimes you talk about tempo, which is how long people are gone. But

I have come to believe that what is even more important than that

is the pace and tempo of what they are doing while they are gone,

because different forces are doing different things. So while I used

to think there should be a standard, I think that was shortsighted,

and the reality is we have to make sure we understand what we

are asking the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines to do so they

can stay at the operational peak that is required.

For example, with our Rangers, who are hitting multiple targets

at night, direct action missions, high intensity night operations, we

are rotating them at a shorter duration than we are with the Special Forces, who we want to go in and build rapport and relationships and help create an environment.

So our rotations go between 90 days to 7 months, and we think

that is fair. The reason I think it is fair is because we are training

the soldiers. They go back again, again and again. And I will tell

you, when they come back, what they are doing is preparing to go

back again. For the most part, a lot of our forces are there 50/50

time, or one-third of the time. That is how the bulk of our forces

are rotating.

Of course, in addition to that, they are doing the other deployments, the other Joint Security Assistant Training (JSATs), the 70

joint exercises for training that we do. So it is a very busy pace,

but we do feel it is proper to balance it toward the intensity of their

level of effort, don’t burn them out in a short period of time, and

let them do that. We are fighting a long war, so we each have a

schedule that we think we can sustain for time.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you. Admiral Maquire.

Admiral MAQUIRE. Echoing General Wagner’s statement, though,

it is really kind of diverse. I have SEALs and I have Special Warfare Combat-craft Crewman (SWCC) and then I have SEALs Special Mission Unit. But as far as the boat teams, the Special Warfare Combatant Craft Crewmen, I have the river boats deployed in

the Euphrates, so right now they are only a small unit under Mr.

Taylor’s district there in Stennis, Mississippi, that had been deployed there for about the last eight months on a rotational basis.

My other boat teams are rotating throughout the world, to Europe, down in the Philippines and into Central Command, on a onein-four rotation. My SEAL, teams, right now I have them back into

a one-in-four rotation, which means that they have six months forward deployed in the combat zone and 18 months out of the combat

zone.

That does not necessarily mean that they are home every night.

So when they return, the way we have the situation set up, is that

the individual level training for the first six months back, that is

when the young SEAL will go off and do their language training,

their advanced medical training and the individual skills that advance them personally. Then we have six months’ unit level training where they form up in a SEAL platoon and work together as

a group. And then the final six months prior to deployment is

squadron integration training, where the SEAL team commanding

officer steps up and becomes a squadron commander, brings in the

SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) teams, the boats, the cryptologic

31

technicians and all of the enablers and work within the next six

months as a team prior to deploying.

So roughly in the 18 months back, or 18 months out of combat

zone, they are roughly away from home I would say probably about

11 to 12 months of that time.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you. General.

General HEJLIK. Thank you, ma’am, very much. I may have misunderstood in the last question you had with Special Forces on the

West Coast, we have a battalion at Camp Pendleton that is neighbors down with Maquire’s folks. So there is a Marine Special Operations battalion at Camp Pendleton.

Mrs. DRAKE. Right, but your command is at Camp Lejeune.

General HEJLIK. My headquarters is at Camp Lejeune, that is

correct. So I fly back and forth all the time. And I don’t enjoy it.

For our dwell time, ma’am, a great question for us, we do oneto-one dwell time. We are trying to do one-to-one. If you are a Marine Special Operations company, you will be deployed for 7

months. When you return, you will have basically 18 months back

at the home station.

Like Admiral Maquire and the rest of the components, that is not

time necessarily at home. Bring them back up to standards and

make sure they get their proper professional military education,

that they are still qualified in their military free-fall, their dive, all

those other functions.

With the foreign military training teams, the dwell time again is

one-to-one. They will be deployed anywhere from 60 to 120 days.

After that 120 days, they are eligible to deploy again. The team

that we have right now in Yemen was in Chad in November, and

they just redeployed into Yemen. The team that we had in Colombia back in October is back in Colombia. But, again, we are trying

very hard to stay to that one-to-one dwell time. For every day you

are deployed, that equal amount of time back in CONUS. Not necessarily at home. Thank you.

Mrs. DRAKE. General.

General WOOLEY. Yes, ma’am. Again, two parts to my answer.

Our ground force mirrors the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) that

General Wagner talked about, because we attach our combat controllers and pararescuemen to those teams out in the field to integrate the air and the ground piece.

Let me say that any airplane flying with weapons is able to support a ground team in a troops-in-contact or particular mission because of their air traffic control skills and their air attack skills,

if you will. They can call in F–16s, they can call in B–52, they can

call in our own AC–130 airplanes for air support. So our attachment to those teams out in the field, our battlefield airmen, mirror

what General Wagner just explained to you.

On the air crew side, it is different for each airplane. What we

don’t want to get ourselves into a situation of doing is concentrating in just one particular area of our warfighting skills on the aviation side. Iraq and Afghanistan bring a different set of requirements than you would find, say, out in the Pacific.

What I don’t want to do is atrophy, so I rotate my crews through

the airplanes that are stationed there. And depending on the type

of airplane it is, whether it is an MC–130, MH–53 helicopter or the

32

AC–130, between 90 days and 120 days are the typical deployments for our air crews. Then we bring them back for their leave,

their retraining, getting specialized training in those skills that

they haven’t been able to practice in Iraq and Afghanistan, so that

they remain worldwide deployable.

So our problem is just a little bit different, but the OPTEMPO

is about the same. We don’t have anybody that is exceeding the

one-to-one dwell time. So we are doing okay.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ellsworth.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentleman. This is a little challenging. I would like

to thank you all for coming. As I told you in the lobby, the reason

I asked to be on this committee was because I want to help you

complete your missions and keep Americans safe. This may be to

the Rear Admiral, all you have to do is watch one episode on Discovery of the BUD/S training and you realize how bad of shape

guys my age are in.

This may be the quickest question, and you may not be able to

answer this, but I was intrigued. We talked a lot about training.

General Hejlik, a comment you made in there, does it fall under

any of your bailiwicks, on the training we are doing, and I am referring to page four, the Foreign Military Training Unit, where you

are responsible and/or oversee the training of the trainers in theater, especially the Iraqi military. And, if so, then I guess I would

like some kind of response on what you are getting back and how

tough that is on our trainers, to train them in theater when things

are going. It is one thing when you are over here and things are

safe on our ground, and when bombs are exploding and bullets are

flying by.

Then I think it was General Wagner that said the will to help

those who have the will to help themselves. I guess that is my

question, is what are we hearing back on that training, the Iraqis’

will, their fortitude, their aptitude to pick up. I have 100 percent

confidence in our troops and what you are doing with our troops.

I would like to get a feel for how they are adapting to our training

methods.

I know I have kind of covered a gambit there, but if anybody or

one or all can comment on that, what kind of vibes you are getting

back?

General WAGNER. I will give you some comments first, sir. To

me, that is an ideal Special Forces SOF mission, and all of our

forces in the different capacities can do it and with different elements. For example, we have an aviation outfit, who would do that

with aviation. And General Hejlik’s forces and my forces could do

it in a similar area with the ground force, and Admiral Maquire’s

could do it in a different environment.

So the real question gets down to when you are teaching the

forces of another nation, where do you apply what force?

In my case, with the Special Operations Forces, they started

training the Iraqi Special Forces. So you start with a unit that

doesn’t exist. You recognize the need and you go through a recruiting effort to find people. You then vet those people and then you

33

put them through a training program. In some cases we did that

in Iraq, and others we took out of country to train them.

Then you build the unit. Then you start to take them through.

After you do the individual training, you do small unit training.

Then you let them go with you on a mission. Then they participate

in a mission. Then you step back and let them do the mission. And,

before long, they are doing the mission and you are watching them

from a distance.

That is what is happening. I think General Brown made a comment to you about the effectiveness of how that is happening. In

fact, we have the most effective units in the theater that have been

trained under that program and are doing an absolutely wonderful

job.

So that is kind of the ideal, and that is the goal of a SOF operator, is to have that opportunity to create that, because what we are

trying to do is build capacity, build the capacity of the Nation to

do the job themselves.

Now, while we can do that with Special Operations Forces and

it becomes a priority—you should prioritize our forces against special mission units in the country—conventional forces have to do

the same thing. They are training infantry battalions and the infantry brigades, because it is more of a capacity than we can do

ourselves. So it becomes a priority, where you prioritize your Special Mission Units against that special capability you are trying to

develop in the nation.

So I can tell you that it is happening. It is happening around the

world. It is happening in the Philippines. It is happening all

around the world. It is a little bit more visible perhaps right now

in Iraq.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. And the will, the fortitude and the will is there?

General WAGNER. Absolutely. We are very proud of the people.

Then you see the missions they are conducting. What you do when

you build a special unit like that, it brings the local leadership, the

civilian leadership to the field to see these people, and then they

start to get resources because they realize how capable a unit like

that can be.

So it goes far beyond just you trained a unit. It makes a mark

on how they try to bring that professionalism to the rest of their

force. It is a nation-builder,

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you.

General WOOLEY. Sir, if I could jump in there and add the aviation piece. One of the things we got in the QDR was capacity doubling, if you will, in our aviation, foreign internal defense capability, which we are very excited about.

We are training those folks right now. We have got a pipeline set

up. As we drawdown our Image 53 Fleet, we are taking those already trained SOF aviators and maintainers and bringing them

into this new unit that we are building to go out and work with

other countries’ aviation assets. Not teaching them how to fly the

basic airplane, because they already know that, but taking them to

the next level, if you will, giving them the skills that we want them

to excel in, night vision goggle flying, for example.

34

So we are pretty excited about that capability, and one that you

all have been very supportive of and the Department at large has

been very supportive of. So we thank you for that.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you. I yield back.

General HEJLIK. Sir, I don’t have teams in Iraq. I have teams in

Chad, basically Africa. And your question is, what do we get out

of it? That is a great question.

First of all, the teams that we trained in Chad were the same

two battalions that pushed the forces back in East Chad on the

border. That in itself, to bring that force up to that level, was absolutely amazing.

What we get out of it is language skills. You watch those young

marines go in there with basic French, basic Arabic. They come out

of there at 1–1 out of a 2–2. So we get that out of it. We get retention out of it, because those young marines go in there and they

go, wow, this is exactly what I signed up to do.

So it is tough to deploy a lot, but that country, we build the capacity in that country so they don’t have to go back when we are

in phase four or active combat operations, and we get retention out

of it and get language skill sets out of it.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I didn’t want you to misunderstand. It is just

what feelings you are getting about those people we are going over

and training. Are you getting feelings they are receptive and/or

have the same—or at least a percentage of the will—that our

troops do, because I know that is a high level.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman, good to see

you all again.

General Wagner, a trip or two ago when I was in Iraq, I was

looking at the training of the Iraqi counterterrorism forces. I know

we have changed the names and the organization a little bit. But

fundamentally, your forces, in particular the Green Berets, were

doing the training of those Iraqi forces. I understand from our subsequent conversations that the Iraqis are now doing most of their

own training, or a significant part of it. Is that correct?

General WAGNER. Yes. That is, of course, again one of the objectives, is to train them to that level where they can do it; yes, sir.

Mr. KLINE. But we still have some Green Berets involved in supervising and so forth?

General WAGNER. Participating with them, yes, sir.

Mr. KLINE. Great. Thank you. I just was very, very impressed

with their capabilities when I was over there, and I gather again

from subsequent discussions that you are pretty pleased with their

progress as well and their ability to do the job and to do most of

their own training.

General WAGNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLINE. General Hejlik, I got to talk to the Marines. Just a

couple of quick things. When MARSOC was stood up, there was no

end strength/force structure to accommodate that. It was taken out

of hide. With the new addition of new Marines and the end

strength of the Marines Corps, is MARSOC now whole in that regard? Or perhaps looking at it another way, is the Marine Corps

now whole? Are the Marines part of MARSOC now accommodated?

35

General HEJLIK. They are, sir. As you well know, 2,600 came

right out of the end strength of the Marine Corps. There is also 191

sailors in there, which are basically corpsmen and doctors, and

there are two Army veterinarians in there, because we have dogs

or will have dogs for that capability. But with the plus-up of the

Marine Corps for that 20,000, 22,000, it will take about 5 years to

recruit that.

But, Representative Kline, I think the important thing to understand is when we took those 2,600 marines, 1,300 of which we have

on deck right now, we took basically all of the Marine Corps’ force

reconnaissance capability.

Mr. KLINE. That was my next question. Do we still have a force

reconnaissance capability in the regular Marine Corps, or are they

now your Marine Special Operations companies?

General HEJLIK. What we did, sir, each force reconnaissance

company had seven platoons. Two platoons stayed with the Marine

Expeditionary Force, one east and one west. So they still have that

capability.

The other thing that the war has done for both force reconnaissance battalion that belongs to the division and force reconnaissance that belongs to the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF),

their capabilities gap has really shrunk. So they still have that capability in the Marines. What we took from the Marine Corps is

really that more experienced Marine.

Mr. KLINE. I assumed that is what happened when we set up

MARSOC, is that Force Recon would take the hit. I would hope

that with the plus-up in end strength of the Marine Corps, that the

Marine Corps, not MARSOC, but the Marine Corps can go back

and do some of that repair work, or, as you are suggesting or perhaps I am hearing, that the recon Marines who are not Force

Recon but in the regiments will improve.

Let me ask that question then. How would you compare the Marines in your Marines Special Operations Company to the Force

Recon Marines of three years ago before there was a MARSOC?

Are they the same, a little below, twice as good? Just ballpark for

me. Come on, you can do it.

General HEJLIK. The Marines in the Marine Special Operations

Company get in the Corps as the Force Reconnaissance Marine. So

if you look at the capability of the MARSOC today and looked at

the capability of the Force Reconnaissance platoon three years ago,

the standard is quite a bit higher. The difference is this: They

shoot probably five times as much. But the other part is, you can

teach any Marine to shoot, any good soldier, any good sailor, any

good airman. Give them enough ammunition and give them enough

time, they can shoot.

Mr. KLINE. Apparently even you and I.

General HEJLIK. Well, at least you can, sir. I don’t know about

myself. But the other side of that is where we really get to that

SOF standard is working with General Wagner’s folks at Fort

Bragg and at Fort Campbell and Fort Lewis, Washington, working

with Admiral Maquire’s folks at Coronado and down at Norfolk,

and working with General Wooley’s folks at Holbrook Field.

That is the difference, because they are very well qualified in the

AC–130, working with the different type aircraft. All our air conVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:46 Aug 07, 2008 Jkt 040967 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-12\031260.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
36

trollers are JTAC, Joint Tactical Air Controls, they are all qualified

that way. And they have the enabler, that high demand, low density. That is also a bit different. They carry their own Intel assets

with them. That is about 14 Marines.

Mr. KLINE. Okay. I am looking forward to the opportunity to

come down and visit.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Wagner, you mentioned a couple of phrases which I

wrote down a while ago. When talking about people you talked

about the unique blend of skills that was required and mature people with good judgment, particularly in thinking about those Special Forces involved in indirect action. I guess I want to ask how

do we keep such people. We talked a lot today about how we get

them and how we train them, but if you could do one thing that

you can’t do currently to retain folks who have worked their way

through and have developed these skills and this judgment, what

would that be?

I will just throw out one example. This committee last year

heard testimony that we need to expand the number of E–8 or E–

9 slots to make it easier to keep people who have worked their way

through the ranks. But without limiting to that, what one thing

that we are not doing now could we, should we do or look at in

order to retain the folks that develop that judgment and skills that

you talked about?

General WAGNER. Congressman, I say we can’t afford to break

our system because I can’t fix it. Because I have senior people, you

have to build them over time, and if I lose them, I can’t replace

them. I can only bring in junior people and wait over time to grow

them. So I cannot afford to break the senior structure that I have

because I can’t fix it on my watch. So we watch that very carefully

and ask why do these people stay. It is a very good question because most of them could easily earn more money somewhere else.

They are highly motivated, they have got great initiative, and they

are problem solvers. So they are people that could be easily attracted for employment somewhere else.

The heart of it is they have to believe in what they are doing,

they have to believe the team they are part of, and they have to

think that we care about what they are doing and it has to be an

honest caring. I think some of the initiatives, incentives and bonus

payments that we give them, it is not the money that keeps them

there, it is believing that we care and knowing that we are going

a little bit of an extra step to thank them because we know that

nobody else in the world can do what they are doing and that their

job is absolutely critical.

So I think how we take care of our soldiers and their families.

When we say we recruit the soldier but we retain a family, we

must continue to care for these people as we would want to be

cared for while they are doing this serious work for us.

So we continue to look at our incentive programs, we look at the

amount of time we have them deployed. They see that we are trying to grow the force. They realize if we grow the force it will help

37

them with the tempo. I think they stay with us because they trust

in what we are doing and believe in what they are doing. If we

break faith with them we will have made a serious mistake. For

example, if we are giving an incentive, a bonus, and we take the

money away and ask them to do the same work, than what have

we told them? We have now told them, hey, it’s not that important

anymore. And that would be unfair.

And so the sergeant majors do a wonderful job of looking at the

rank structure and been giving a fair amount of latitude with the

Army to increase range structure where we need to do it, but personnel system is a total throughput and the retention part is absolutely the most key to us because if we can’t retain those people

we are in trouble.

So I do think honestly it is about truly caring about the people

and recognizing how important they are to us, the soldiers and

their families. And I think that is true for the other services, but

that is my view. Thank you.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Anybody else have a suggestion on something

we could do that is currently not being done to help retain these

people?

General HEJLIK. I think, sir, it is being done but it is something

we are going have to pay attention to as we continue to go through

this, and that is the care of our wounded because as those young

Marines, sailors, soldiers, airmen come back, some with traumatic

brain injury, TBI, that is a long-term effort, and if the service

member knows he is going to be taken care of and his family is

taken care of, no matter how seriously wounded, then they will do

anything we ask them to do regardless of the money because they

are just that patriotic.

Taking care of our wounded I think is going to be a long-term

effort.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. I do want to ask General Wooley

about one other matter. The chairman referred earlier to the fact

that if special operations were designing the CV–22 it would be designed with probably greater carrying capacity in some way. I

would like to get your view on the program, where it stands now.

Do you think it is on track, moving ahead and so forth.

General WOOLEY. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. The CV–

22 is a wonderful airplane. I have had the opportunity to deliver

two of the CVs, one out to Kirtland, our training unit, and the first

operational one to Hurlburt on the 16th of November. The airplane,

as you know since it is put together in your district, flies at turbo

prop speed, so it is comparable to our C–130 fleet that we have,

and then it can pull into a hover and land exactly where it needs

to land to drop off those troops.

The aircraft, as you know, was filling a niche that we found that

we had a shortfall in after the failed Iranian hostage attempt at

Desert 1 during Operation Eagle Claw. The airplane was specifically designed to do combat radius of 500 nautical miles unrefueled

and in one period of darkness, so that is why the speed is such an

important factor.

The airplane is performing very, very well. I often get questions

well, what about the bad rap? There has been several deaths.

When you take a transformational leap, particularly in the aviation

38

field, I think this airplane has performed and is continuing to perform at or above standards.

We don’t anticipate any real difficulties bringing this airplane on

board. We are still in the testing phase, so there are some things

that we will continue to find out about the airplane. But I would

invite any of the members of this subcommittee to come down and

fly on the airplane because it will answer a lot of questions in your

mind, and it is a magnificent piece of equipment, one that is truly

transformational for us.

If there is one thing that I could make a pitch for to this subcommittee and other committees is the time frame that it is scheduled to be delivered is almost unacceptable for us. Acceleration of

the delivery would be most helpful to get it out on the battlefield

in useful numbers because the first time we will have enough airplanes that we will be able to deploy is in fiscal year 2009. So anything we could do to speed up that initial capability for the airplane and then get all 50 of them sooner rather than later would

be very helpful.

But I would invite any of the members to come out and visit with

us and explore the airplane for yourself. It is magnificent. One of

the things that I think we did exactly right in building and designing this airplane, we designed it as a system. One of the strengths

of the airplane is not the airplane itself, but it is in the training

system that we bought to go with it. The FAA level D simulator

capability we benchmarked from the airlines, and most of you may

know that when an airline captain changes from one airplane to

another, most often the first time he lands with people in the back

of the airplane is on his first mission, it is not on a training mission in the airplane. He or she learns that in the simulator.

So we have benchmarked off of them and bought the training

systems with the fidelity and the other things that will allow most

of the training and currency and some of the proficiency flying to

be done in the simulators so we don’t waste that precious airframe

time. So that is one of the things that we did do right when we

designed that airplane.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, that I appreciate each of the witnesses being here and each

of your service to the country and through you the people you lead.

General Wagner, I hope each of them knows how much this committee appreciates them and their families and the sacrifice they

make because it is certainly inspirational for us. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. McIntyre.

Mr. Conaway, something quickly on that subject?

Mr. CONAWAY. You mentioned care of our wounded. Are there

gaps there, do you have concerns there, or are you just making that

as a statement that that is something we need to do? Are we not

doing that?

General HEJLIK. It is a concern because I think it is a long term.

Mr. CONAWAY. But you will keep us apprised—this committee,

among all of them, including Veterans’ Affairs, would come unwrapped if we—let me tell you a quick story. John Kelly tells a

great story about a young Marine he was visiting at Bethesda, and

the family was there from Montana, and the dad pulled Kelly

39

aside, said I need to visit with you about something. So John

walked out with him and said my son is really hurt pretty bad but

he’s getting great care. He said but I’m just a working man from

Montana, I don’t know how I’m going to pay for that care.

Of course Kelly looked at him and said what do you mean, he

said well, we don’t have health insurance. Kelly was just stunned

that this father thought he needed to take care of that son.

So if any of you see something that Armed Services Or Veterans’

Affairs or something is not doing in regards to making sure that

there is a 50-year commitment to that young soldier who is unable

to do for himself what he ought to able to do, you will bring that

to our attention, I hope.

General WOOLEY. Yes, sir, thank you.

Mr. SMITH. To follow up, I think there are some gaps. One of the

biggest gaps right now is in mental health. And I know there are

different pieces that are working to change that. Out at Ft. Lewis

and Madigan they have got a program to make it mandatory and

a whole bunch of different pieces to deal with. There are things beyond the basic health care. Actually, when we were down with

General Brown in Tampa he mentioned SOF has a special charity

that is set up, and a variety of different examples. One soldier was

going home in a wheelchair and the house where he was at wasn’t

outfitted for that so they had some money set up to build what was

necessary. There are some pieces and my initial look at it is there

are things that we can be doing better to make sure that the

wounded are taken care of. I think when you are talking about

when they are in the hospital when they are getting that direct

care, it is pretty good, but there is so many complications to the

life of an injured soldier and his or her family that looking at that

total piece is something we can do and it is great that these charities are set up. They shouldn’t have to rely on that. It might be

a good thing to look at.

Mr. McIntyre.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thanks to each of you for the magnificent mission that each of you do in leading our forces who are at the tip

of the sphere. As you know, I share Ft. Bragg with a couple of my

colleagues here and go up near the edge of Camp Lejeune, so I

want to ask you, General Wooley, the airlift capacity, do you feel

like you have the necessary airlift capacity to help with the projected increase in the Army, in the Marines Special Operations

Forces particularly?

General WOOLEY. Sir, we are looking very closely at that. One of

the things that is going on right now is we are looking at recapitalizing our mobility fixed wing fleet, the MC–130’s, and I believe

General Brown talked a little bit about that during his testimony.

But that is something that we have to keep our eye on, we need

that recapitalization effort to move out very quickly the decision to

be made and then purchase those aircraft, get them on the ramps

where we can use them.

There has been a lot of growth in Special Operations Forces

across the board. This will not be a one-for-one replacement of the

airplanes but an increase in the number of the airplanes that we

will buy. So it will be very, very important for us to get through

this source selection process.

40

Mr. SMITH. General, do you have a time frame on that? Because

I know that is already running months behind schedule and I know

that is the Air Force that needs to make that decision. But as the

Air Force guy here, I know that is not your decision. But do you

know the time frame?

General WOOLEY. Yes, sir. Source selection is scheduled for the

springtime. I would tell you that I don’t think it is running behind.

We ran very fast to catch up with an existing program. We linked

up with Air Combat Command (ACC) on the rescue side. They are

recapitalizing their eight C–130 fleet. Our airplane is almost a mirror image of that one.

So we got our documentation very quickly after the increases in

the QDR manpower, the growth of the SOF forces was made known

to us, and then we joined up on ACC’s wing.

Mr. SMITH. If I may, I wasn’t talking about the SOF forces piece.

The Air Force overall was supposed to come up with a new airframe decision for the 130 for their needs as well as yours. Maybe

I got the information wrong but actually General Brown was the

one that told me eight, nine months ago that was supposed to have

been done.

General WOOLEY. We don’t know what the airplane will be. We

have written the requirement document. It is going to be a C–130

size airplane. There are two or three airplanes out there that

would fill that bill, ranging from a new airplane; the A–400 comes

to mind, the C–130J comes to mind. There are attributes of all of

them. And we are urging moving quickly through that process that

is very rigid, as you know, and, as I said, that decision should be

made in the springtime on which airplane that will be.

And one of the things that we have pushed very hard for is that

we don’t want just the basic airplane when we get it. We have written the requirements such that we will get the SOF modifications

done as the airplane is being built because we can ill afford to stagger step, if you will, get an airplane and then have to turn a brand

new airplane right around and go through the modification process.

So we have very meticulously and specifically written into our requirement that those—the airplane be delivered full up as a SOF

airplane, which is a different approach. And that may be what you

may have been thinking that has slowed down the process. But I

would tell you that from where we were when we were notified

that the plus-ups were coming to where we are today, the Air Force

has done very well by us and we are working very closely with

them to—and anxiously awaiting these new airplanes to get to us.

It is a wonderful question and one that we have to keep our eye

on to keep it moving.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Very quickly in my remaining time, what additional capacity would you require? Do you have an idea about how

many additional planes for Special Operations Forces?

General WOOLEY. Two numbers are coming to mind. The initial

37, which will recapitalize the fleet that we have, and then the

growth of the forces takes that number up to 61.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. If I may ask you about one other

plane, the AC–130 gunship. How many gunships now are operational? How many do you have in the fleet and how many are actually operational?

41

General WOOLEY. We have 25 today. There are eight H models,

which are the oldest Vietnam-era airplanes, and 17 U models,

which are the newest ones. In that 17 are four brand new ones that

was just recently completed and are going through the testing

phase. We are putting some new weapons on the airplane, we are

getting rid of the 25-millimeter up front on the U models and the

old 40-millimeter cannon in the back of the airplane.

So the new four that are coming off the line will have 30-millimeter, an area suppression weapon, if you will, with common ammunition with the other services, and of course the Stalwart 105 cannon in the back as well. We had to replace the 40. It is getting very

expensive. Each round fired is about $200 and the cannon is literally an old naval antiaircraft gun that has been in use ever since

we designed the C–130 model of the gunship.

The thing that I would tell, though, even though the U models

are the newest airplanes they are the ones that I am concerned the

most about. We are flying, literally flying the wings off of those airplanes. The center wing box where the attachment point of the

wing to the fuselage joins together, we are putting so much stress

on that airplane because it is flying three times the amount that

we had programmed for it to fly.

So the equivalent hours that we are eating up on that airplane,

we have got about four airplanes that are entering into a caution

zone. So we are having to meticulously monitor the flying time on

those airplanes, use them for trainers at Hurlburt, keep the ones

that have airframe hours left on that center wing box because we

can ill afford to sit those airplanes down waiting for the center

wing box to be replaced.

We have a similar problem with our Talon II fleet, and I know

that wasn’t part of your question but I will take this opportunity

to say we have the same issue with our Talon IIs. We have a plan

that we have worked on, the money is there, the wings boxes are

being built. We have got our first one in modification now.

But the rate at which we are flying the U model gunships has

brought that as a new issue and one that I am very, very concerned

about.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I have a couple more questions. The hour

is late here so I will probably just ask you them and then you can

just get back to us on the piece. One is going back to something

that Mrs. Drake was talking about on the time away from families,

on the dwell time and how even within that they are away, soldiers

are away training a great deal.

If there was any way to consolidate that training someplace closer to home, we would be very interested in ideas. I know that costs

money undoubtedly, but we would be happy to provide that to try

to help with some of that retention of the family piece.

I am also interested in, within each of your forces, the difference

between direct and indirect action and the emphasis. One of the

concerns is that direct action gets more emphasis in terms of promotions, in terms of how it is used. If you would just let me know

sort of what the practice is in your field because I think it is the

opinion of this committee on both sides that the indirect piece is

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enormously important and more long term. So the emphasis that

is placed on that.

I guess the only thing that I would like to get an answer from

before we go is if Admiral Maguire could tell us a little bit about

the experience in the Philippines and what your teams did down

there. Obviously you can answer that question in an hour length

version, so I am looking for a little more condensed. If you could

give us a little bit of an idea of what you did, why it was successful,

and how it worked down there.

Admiral MAGUIRE. Mr. Chairman, we are just part of the team

down there. I don’t mean to minimize and give an ‘‘aw, shucks’’ on

that, but we are down there in the Philippines working through the

Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) down there, the Special Operations Task Force led by a Special Operations colonel. I

provide SEALs and special boats to that effort.

Mr. SMITH. That is my ignorance. I apologize. It wasn’t just

Navy, it was other?

Admiral MAGUIRE. We have got Green Berets, also Air Commandos. So it is a team effort. But what the Pacific Commander is

doing and what we are supporting is a long-term foreign internal

defense down in the southern Philippines. We are working in

Mindanao, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan Island and Jolo Island in order to

work with the Filipino military to help them raise their standard

of professionalism in order for them to be able to conduct military

operations to a certain level down there in the southern Philippines.

We as a group have been supporting the Pacific Command in

those operations now for about over two years, and I think that you

can see from some of the stories in the press that the Filipinos that

we are working with and the Filipino military is actually having

some success with their combating terrorism operations down

there, with the recent stories that have been in the press as far as

those that have been killed.

Our forces were not directly involved in those military operations, but we have been advising and training those Filipinos that

have conducted those military operations. In addition to that, it is

a maritime environment. So I do have my Mark Vs that have been

there, as well as my rigid hull inflatable boats that have been significantly working not only to transport folks back and forth, but

we are putting ISR equipment on board that and working around

there in order to, just like overhead with ISR in order to be able

to increase the intelligence picture there as well and then with Pacific Command we share what intelligence we can with the Filipinos in order to enable them to be successful in the battlefield.

Mr. SMITH. And the final question, actually, your comment made

me think of it, that I did want you to get back to us on, is the ISR

piece and what acquisition you might need in order to get that up

to a higher level. I know it is at a very high level right now. I appreciate your honesty there, Admiral. And what other equipment

you need. Just in the brief period I have been looking at this I

know that is enormously important to have that complete situational awareness real time, and we have the technology these days,

a lot of great stuff out there, we just want to make sure we get

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it to you. So let us know what your wish list top priorities are on

that.

I will also say for the record that if any members want to submit

questions for the record, they can do that as well. And with that,

if there are no objections, nothing further, we are adjourned. Thank

you very much.

[Whereupon, at 5:52 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JANUARY 31, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JANUARY 31, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

Mr. SMITH. Mrs. Drake was talking about on the time away from families, on the

dwell time and how even within that they are away, soldiers are away training a

great deal.

Admiral MAGUIRE. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

Deployment Red Line Policy, dated January 23, 2007, sets the command’s dwell

time at a 1:1 ratio. This policy was originally established on August 2, 2005, and

is retroactive to May 1, 2004. USSOCOM personnel do spend time training away

from home when they are not deployed. The greatest impact is on our Naval Special

Warfare personnel who conduct most of their training away from their home station.

The command recognizes that training cuts into dwell time and has considered

that in our policy. The policy states: ‘‘The dwell time ratio is the time away from

home versus home station time. Calculating time away from home includes deployments, Theater Security Cooperation Plan events and unit training temporary duties (TDY), i.e., Joint Combined Exchange Training, Certification Exercises, etc.

However, individual training/school TDYs, i.e., military freefall, professional military education, etc., are not included in time away from home calculation.’’

Mr. SMITH. If there was any way to consolidate that training someplace closer to

home, we would be very interested in ideas. I know that costs money undoubtedly,

but we would be happy to provide that to try to help with some of that retention

of the family piece.

Admiral MAGUIRE. Some training may be consolidated at venues closer to home.

Where possible, U.S. Special Operations Command Component commands are moving training closer to home facilities. For example, the Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) established a Naval Parachute Course at Otay Lake, on the eastern

edge of San Diego, just a few miles from Naval Air Base Coronado, California. This

school provides what is now considered a pipeline skill to all NSWC personnel locally. The upside to this is less travel cost and temporary duty time. The downside,

specifically to new schools, is they must be assessed initially to ensure they meet

Special Operations Forces (SOF) standards, with some type of monitoring function

to ensure operators from various components are receiving a minimum standard of

training. An additional strategy that can be used is the use of mobile training teams

(MTTs) for certain skills that can be taught in 1–2 week blocks. Unfortunately, not

all training can be accomplished close to home. Some training events require specific

ranges cleared for military operations such as live fire, exercises, realistic urban terrain training, military operations in urban terrain, etc. Is it possible to move more

training ‘‘closer to home?’’ Yes. However, such a move would require feasibility studies to determine which training could be moved, expansion of facilities, coordination

with local and state authorities, and the completion of several Environmental Impact Statements for training to be moved closer to home.

Mr. SMITH. I am also interested in, within each of your forces, the difference between direct and indirect action and the emphasis. One of the concerns is that direct

action gets more emphasis in terms of promotions, in terms of how it is used. If you

would just let me know sort of what the practice is in your field because I think

it is the opinion of this committee on both sides that the indirect piece is enormously important and more long term. So the emphasis that is placed on that.

Admiral MACGUIRE. I share your opinion that the indirect approach is enormously

important and more long-term in nature. In fact, in the Department of Defense’s

plan for the Global War on Terror (GWOT), three of the five lines of operation use

the indirect approach to combat our terrorist enemies. They are: Enable Partners

to Combat Violent Extremist Organizations; Deter Active and Passive Support for

Violent Extremist Organizations; Erode Support for Extremist Ideologies.

DOD’s GWOT plan further stipulates that enabling our partners is expected to

be the decisive military effort in the campaign over time. It is understood that these

efforts will require a long term effort by not only DOD, but the entire US Government, as well as our partners around the world. The direct approach by itself, while

important in keeping us safe, will not win this war. It will, however, allow us and

our Partners the time needed for the indirect approach to have effect and ultimately

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defeat our terrorist enemies. One of the keys to the indirect approach is to address

the roots of terrorism.

We believe addressing the roots of terrorism requires a whole government approach where DOD predominantly supports interagency actions and requirements

such as those required by the Department of State or the U.S. Agency for International Development. Their actions to engage partner nations focus on the nation

state or the regional development necessary to diminish extremist influence by implementing socio-economic initiatives that improve governance as well as health,

welfare, and education programs. Also, the Department of State Strategic Communication activities promote our messages and counters radical ideology. Development

and enhancing local or regional leadership capable to represent and establish legitimate local governance extends control and support to ungoverned areas and de-legitimizes the terrorist ideological focus against their governments.

Mr. SMITH. The final question, actually, your comment made me think of it, that

I did want you to get back to us on, is the ISR piece and what acquisition you might

need in order to get that up to a higher level. I know it is at a very high level right

now. Admiral MAGUIRE. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) continues

to rely on a combination of Service-provided and Special Operations Forces (SOF)-

unique airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) to help meet

our needs. Currently we are working with the U.S. Central Command and the Joint

Staff to meet the immediate surge requirement of SOF in that theater. At the same

time, we are formalizing our Fiscal Years 2010 through 2015 enduring ISR requirements, which will likely continue to increase. USSOCOM appreciates the Committee’s support of our past and current requests for ISR needs, and as emergent needs

are identified, we will work with the Committee to address those requirements.

Mr. SMITH. Could you please describe for us the vision of the Capstone Concept

for Special Operations 2006, or CCSO? What are the goals of this vision and what

are the plans for implementing it throughout the community?

Admiral OLSON. The Capstone Concept for Special Operations (CCSO) is the intellectual foundation of the U.S. Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) long

range planning and a blueprint for how Special Operations Forces (SOF) will adapt

to the requirements of the complex security environment. It is our overarching depiction of how the Special Operations community will support national strategic and

military objectives beyond the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). We recognize

that traditional concepts of military response will no longer succeed in defeating the

current adversaries, and will not succeed in defeating adaptive future adversaries.

The vision of the Capstone Concept is simply this: to develop the premier team of

special operators who are highly skilled, thoroughly prepared, and properly

equipped for the significant challenges our Nation will continue to face.

The goal of the Capstone Concept is to provide a direction for how USSOCOM will

implement its Title 10 and Unified Command Plan functions, focus the Joint SOF

capabilities growth identified in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and operate

around the world to disrupt and defeat transnational terrorists and other adversaries.

The implementation pathway for the Capstone Concept is centered on three strategic objectives: first, to plan, prioritize, and synchronize Department of Defense

global operations against terrorist networks; second, to establish a worldwide persistent Joint SOF presence to shape operational environments; third, to provide expeditionary, quick reaction, task-organized Joint SOF teams.

These three objectives are enabled by five Keystone Capability Areas that we are

developing in concert with our component forces. These Keystone Capability Areas

represent concepts, innovations, and adaptations we must pursue to place SOF in

the best posture to support U.S. objectives.

The first keystone capability is developing truly integrated SOF, with interagency

and international partners that can address the spectrum of challenges in the operational environment. The second keystone is developing our SOF individuals to

achieve higher order special skills for both direct and indirect approaches to defeating our adversaries. The third keystone is developing command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence capabilities that enable SOF to understand and

comprehend the complex environment so that we can devise tailored, nuanced plans.

The fourth keystone is developing logistics, acquisition, and resourcing capabilities

to equip our team with best tools for them to operate. The last keystone is the development of intelligence and information capabilities across the full spectrum of multidisciplinary intelligence functions to enable our comprehension of the complex international environment.

Mr. SMITH. What type of Special Operator is needed to meet the national security

challenges of the future and help our nation succeed in the Global War on Terror

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(GWOT)? What attributes are required? How do we maintain a force consisting of

these individuals?

Admiral OLSON. Our highly skilled and proficient people are the reason Special

Operations Forces (SOF) are so unique, but they do not develop these attributes

overnight. It takes years of development and experience. Through all our adaptations and innovations, we will maintain the focus on continuing to provide people

who can do what no one else can do, in conditions no one else could operate.

To operate effectively in this war on terror, special operators need to be mature,

able to comprehend the complex operational environment, adept at working alongside interagency and international partners, and able to operate in small teams or

even alone. They must have highly developed intuition built from an understanding

of other cultures and the variety of motivations and interests that drive peoples’ actions. They must know how to knit together security, political, social, ideological,

economic, and informational aspects of a particular operation to achieve the operational and strategic objectives given to them. Most of all, special operators need

the ability to reason and determine what is the best thing to do in the most complex

of circumstances. These attributes are highly nuanced, but they form the core of

what makes our people special. The SOF warrior works at the tactical level, often

with strategic outcomes.

Maintaining a force of these highly qualified individuals will be challenging but

it is essential. The Joint Special Operations Warrior of the future who will be prepared and equipped for global expeditionary employment. USSOCOM is developing

a prototype of the Joint SOF warrior system, blending individual skills with the

proper equipment, weapons, mobility, support, and communications systems. We are

also developing a Joint SOF career management system emphasizing selected educational, overseas and exchange or liaison assignments. We will continue to examine

potential improvements to current selection and assessment processes to broaden

the range of people joining Joint SOF. We will also look at our Joint Special Operations University so that it can direct and integrate educational initiatives and student management throughout USSOCOM and coordinate educational initiatives

with other Department of Defense, interagency, civilian and foreign educational institutions.

USSOCOM takes the business of preparing its people very seriously. Our people

are the essence of what we do, and we will continue to ensure we have the best.

Mr. SMITH. The MARSOC manning assessment and selection process is expected

to be fully functional in May 2007. For cost-saving purposes and to incorporate already-existing training standards, have your examined the option of utilizing

USASOC infrastructure for MARSOC schooling? If not, then why not? Does the current plan for the command include the creation of parallel and perhaps redundant

accession pipeline? If so, then please explain how this is in the best interest of our

nation?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, we are currently assessing all skill sets but not all assessments have been completed. Completed assessments include the combat medic career field. For combat medics, the increased training requirement will be accomplished through an increase in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command

(USASOC) training capacity. Other skill sets such as, Military Free-Fall and Combat Dive, are currently under review. We are working to incorporate those into the

USASOC training pipeline where available. There are some limitations to training

capacity increases that will require longer-term solutions and we are only beginning

to look at those.

Mr. SMITH. What is your view of the Command’s casualty rates in the GWOT?

How does it compare with those of General Purpose Forces? How do these break

down between the ‘‘white’’ and ‘‘black’’ SOF communities? Could you provide these

figures to the subcommittee?

Admiral OLSON. Special Operations Forces (SOF) casualty rates are proportionately higher than conventional forces. Total SOF killed in action (KIA) in Operation

ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)/Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) is 177 (3.7 percent of deployed SOF in the Area of Responsibility (AOR)). Comparatively, the conventional forces’ KIA number is 3,176, which equates to 1.4 percent of conventional

forces deployed in the AOR. Of the 177 SOF KIA, 11 were ‘‘black’’ SOF.

Mr. SMITH. Please share with us your views on the ‘‘1208 authority’’ provided by

Congress. How has this improved SOF’s ability to execute the GWOT? Would you

please provide a detailed classified briefing on the use of this authority to date?

Admiral OLSON. In some cases, it has been used to better enable partner nation

forces to support us in fixing and finishing terrorists. In others, it has been used

to employ indigenous elements to gain access to hostile areas where U.S. forces cannot operate overtly and obtain information about potential terrorist targets which

could not be obtained through conventional intelligence collection methods. In all

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cases, 1208 has provided invaluable access and information which have saved American lives and contributed to the successful apprehension of high-value terrorist targets.

Mr. SMITH. Please tell us what modernization issues are your greatest concerns.

Admiral OLSON. Since entering Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, U.S. service members have been exposed to evolving tactics by the opposition. One of the key methodologies for engaging Special Operations Forces (SOF) has been the use of the improvised explosive device (IED). Thus, we need to obtain ground vehicles capable of

surviving these new and constantly evolving threats.

SOF has not modernized the standard combat rifle since the fielding of the original M4 carbine in 1994. The M4 was based on a conventional Army specification

that did not take into account all the requirements of the SOF warfighter. Consequently, performance and sustainment issues with the weapon have emerged during its service life. To remedy this situation, the United States Special Operations

Command (USSOCOM) developed a requirement for a new assault rifle. This requirement, the SOF Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR), calls for a modular weapon system capable of firing current North Atlantic Treaty Organization standard 5.56mm

and 7.62mm ammunition in two weapon variants labeled SCAR-Light (L) and

SCAR-Heavy (H).

There are three major concerns associated with modernizing the SOF aviation

fixed wing fleet: aging airframes and associated structural fatigue, obsolete avionics,

and filling capability gaps. USSOCOM is addressing these concerns by recapitalizing the oldest SOF aircraft, fielding MC–130W aircraft, and accelerating the procurement of AC–130U center wing kits. Due to delays in Service-common avionics

modernization programs, USSOCOM will need to execute service-life extension and

replacement programs for our C–130 avionics.

To satisfy current mobility capability gaps, USSOCOM is fielding CV–22s to increase vertical lift capacity with significantly improved speed and range. The Fiscal

Year (FY) 2008 Global War on Terror (GWOT) Supplemental request includes accelerating procurement of five CV–22s. The capability gap for operational movement

of small special operations teams in support of GWOT in austere and remote locations not serviced by reliable and safe commercial aviation service is being addressed by the Non-Standard Aviation program starting in FY 2008.

The major concern associated with modernizing the SOF Naval platforms is replacing the aging combatant craft. The need for a new combatant craft brings with

it several areas of technological improvement such as signature reduction, utilization of advanced composites and new hull forms, better human systems integration

to reduce shock and vibration, integrated bridge systems, and the need for enhanced

communications.

Mr. SMITH. Please share with the subcommittee your view of the command’s recruitment and retention efforts? What are the challenges and solutions?

Admiral OLSON. Recruiting and retention are Service responsibilities and we work

closely with the Services to monitor and influence the process. The biggest challenge

for non-prior Service recruiting is the available population of qualified applicants for

military service. Figures that are widely accepted by recruiting experts show that

approximately 28 percent of Americans in the target enlistment cohorts of 19–24

years of age qualify for military service. The three main qualification criteria are:

medical, character, and mental. The Services, as well as universities and industry,

are all competing for the same population. Successful recruiting has and will continue to be a cornerstone for Special Operations Forces (SOF).

More specifically, Navy recruiting continues to give us great support. The Chief

of Naval Operations made Sea, Air, and Land (SEALs) the number one recruiting

priority. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), in partnership

with the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, continues to meet with success through

the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB). Unlike SEALs, Army SOF are

recruited almost exclusively from within the Service. The SORB is highly successful

and allows us to better field candidates for Special Forces (SF) Assessment and Selection of the best qualified who volunteer whether they are prior Service and nonprior Service. In turn, there is a lower attrition rate at the SF Qualification

Courses. The Air Force is meeting recruitment goals for Air Force special operators.

The U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command is on target to be fully operational capable by December 2008. The Marine Corps is filling their authorizations

that meet or exceed targets.

The challenges to recruiting and retention continue to be the operational tempo

for our forces. Because many of our Army and Marine ground forces are committed

overseas, the full complement of available in-Service SOF candidates are not optimally available for recruitment. To offset this challenge, the SORB intends to explore an in-theatre initiative by the end of the year to widen the recruitment pool.

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Recruiting and retention continue to be areas that require vigilance and your support.

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee has received anecdotal evidence of frustration with

the nature of leadership at the mid- and lower-level ranks of SOF. a. What is your

view of the leadership demands at these levels? b. What efforts do you have underway to strengthen leadership skills at these levels? c. Do these efforts include both

compensatory and non-compensatory solutions?

Admiral OLSON. It is my view that leadership at all levels within the Special Operations Community is at an all time high due to the incredibly experienced and

mature force we are currently fielding across the globe in combat and in peace.

Without more specificity to anecdotal evidence referenced, I cannot address the frustrations addressed.

The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) relies upon the Services and

Service Component training and education institutions, as well as SOF organizational leadership, to instill leadership values and serve as mentors for their junior

officer and enlisted forces. USSOCOM also relies upon the Service and Joint Professional Military Education (PME) venues as opportunities for leadership development

and discussion on leadership values and characteristics to take place. The command

has SOF representation at many of the intermediate and senior Service colleges for

military officers to assist in specific learning outcomes, however they are primarily

directed at special operations-specific knowledge and meeting the Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff-defined learning areas and objectives (CJCSI 1800.01C, Officer PME

Policy). USSOCOM has developed a Joint SOF Leadership Competency Model as

part of an education requirements analysis study in 2005. As SOF-specific courses

are developed or revised in institutions like the U.S. Air Force Special Operations

School (USAFSOS) or the USSOCOM Joint Special Operations University QSOU),

course developers and managers look to incorporate those as additional standards.

The majority of the USAFSOS and JSOU courses are attended by junior and midlevel officer and enlisted special operations and SOF-enabling personnel. Of note,

the Joint Staff is currently working on Joint Leadership competencies which, when

approved and published, will be utilized and assessed by the special operations community.

Without specifics, it is difficult to speculate on anecdotal evidence as it relates to

leadership. The welfare of our SOF personnel and their families are of primary importance to me.

Mr. SMITH. How do you compare U.S. Special Operations Forces with SOF in

other countries, such fielded by the United Kingdom, Israel, Jordan and Poland? Do

each of these SOF communities have a distinct characteristics? How would you rate

them and describe their respective attributes?

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. Please describe for the subcommittee frustrations you have about the

current requirements and acquisition system for SOCOM, especially the challenge

of coordinating and co-producing weapons with the larger Services.

Admiral OLSON. We must deal with two separate timelines in the requirements

generation and approval process. We have our internal U.S. Special Operations

Command process which is quite efficient. But the Joint Staff’s Joint Capabilities

Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process is much more time consuming, and not as conducive to rapid decisions on a routine basis.

From the acquisition perspective, we need to work with the Secretaries of the

Military Departments to put in place overarching Memoranda of Understanding

(MOU) addressing how we will do business together. These MOU would cover not

only the respective acquisition processes, but also a variety of other business and

administrative processes such as manpower management and participation in their

requirements generation and budget processes. This particular deficiency was noted

in the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) analysis of our management

of weapons system programs.

Mr. SMITH. What is your overall view about the current and projected growth of

SOF? From a practical standpoint, can SOF grow beyond projected levels? If not,

why not?

Admiral OLSON. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is regularly

reviews how we can increase our responsiveness and effectiveness to fight the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provided Special Operations Forces

(SOF) with the resources to right size and equip its force to prosecute the GWOT,

but recruiting, selection and training creates challenges that have to be continually

monitored to ensure force growth can be achieved. SOF can grow beyond projected

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levels, but it will require a multi-faceted approach, starting with a coordinated effort

in conjunction with the Services.

Prior to the 2006 QDR-approved growth, USSOCOM grew its school houses and

instructor cadre in preparation for programmed growth. However, any growth beyond currently projected levels will require a re-evaluation of training capacity at

SOF school houses.

Since the original QDR analysis, and in conjunction with our continuous review

of our operational tempo, the GWOT has expanded SOF roles and missions, which

in turn, has increased the strain on SOF forces. USSOCOM will continue to monitor

this area, but a requirement for additional force structure could soon exist in the

following areas: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

(C4I); Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); Combat Service Support

(CSS); and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). Additional air, maritime, and ground mobility will be required to support forward deployed operations

and rotational deployments.

Mr. SMITH. What is your ‘‘tooth-to-tail ratio’’ in the community? Can it be adjusted?

Admiral OLSON. The U.S. Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) ‘‘tooth-totail ratio’’ is about 80 percent tooth, 20 percent tail. The tooth-to-tail ratio is appropriately balanced to support USSOCOM operational requirements. Adding or subtracting force structure could result in impacts on the ratio.

Mr. SMITH. Are current SOF incentive programs effective? Is there anything that

should be down to enhance or modify them?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, the current Special Operations Forces (SOF) incentive programs are effective and require continual assessment to identify how they can be

enhanced or modified. Our assessment of the incentive programs show initial popularity and success upon introduction. The programs are still in their early stages,

but are making a positive difference in retention. Removal of these pays would have

a disproportionately negative response than not having introduced them at all.

Mr. SMITH. What is your overall assessment of the interagency capability and

level of effort? Do you have thoughts or recommendations about how it might be improved?

Admiral OLSON. Overall assessment of the U.S. Special Operations Command

(USSOCOM) interagency capability is good. We have established our engagement efforts on two levels: a ‘‘home’’ team, Interagency Task Force (IATF), with liaison personnel from 11 different Department of Defense (DOD)— and non-DOD agencies;

and an ‘‘away’’ team, Interagency Partnership Program (IAPP), with USSOCOM (to

include the Joint Special Operations Command) personnel assigned to 19 different

agencies.

There are several ways to improve interagency engagement. For example, exchanging liaison personnel is one key way to facilitate collaboration. USSOCOM personnel assigned to interagency locations are hand-picked for their Special Operations Forces (SOF), interagency, and Joint experience. We are currently re-evaluating our interagency program to determine if we’ve placed the right number of personnel at the right organizations. Sharing education and training opportunities is

another way to improve interagency relationships. USSOCOM personnel attend

agency orientation and training courses, and facilitate partner agency personnel attendance in USSOCOM courses. Another critical factor in ensuring interagency engagement is establishing interoperable communications channels. USSOCOM has

developed an interagency website to provide key contact information and assist in

collaboration. USSOCOM has also installed communications equipment at many of

our partner agencies to provide video teleconference and secure communications

connectivity. Finally, institutionalizing interactions will contribute greatly to improving the interagency process. These activities could include establishing common

battle-rhythms, capitalizing on agency specific authorities, developing staff and senior leader visit programs, and attending partner conferences and key events.

Mr. SMITH. Do you foresee necessary SOF organizational growth beyond that identified in the QDR?

Admiral OLSON. Transforming Special Operations Forces (SOF) to be more responsive and adaptive to the current world situation will require the U.S. Special

Operations Command (USSOCOM) to continuously make adjustments to its force

structure. USSOCOM will continue to conduct detailed analysis of additional requirements as we realize the full capabilities, capacity, or potential shortfalls or

gaps of the programmed Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) growth. We will evaluate our Active and Reserve Component force structure levels, striving to achieve the

optimum force mix based on the additional increases in both the active and reserve

components provided through the QDR. In addition, we will continue to coordinate

with the Services to determine any future force structure requirements.

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Mr. SMITH. What are the details of the SOF Retention Initiative and how will it

affect your command? What specific problem or problems were identified to be addressed by this number?

Admiral OLSON. The Special Operations Forces (SOF) retention incentive initiatives are primarily the Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) and the Assignment

Incentive Pay (AIP) which target retention of our senior enlisted and Chief Warrant

Officer (CWO) SOF operators. The CSRB is offered to operators between 19 and 25

years of service. This target population is critical at the tactical and operational

level because they provide senior enlisted leadership, guidance, and training to junior operators. This program provides an incentive for these highly skilled and

trained leaders to remain on active duty beyond retirement eligibility. If an operator

accepts a 6-year contract to the 25 years of service point, he will receive $150,000

upfront. The amounts decrease significantly on a sliding scale with declining years

of obligation: 5 years would amount to $75,000; 4 years would amount to $50,000;

3 years would amount to $30,000; 2 years would amount to $18,000; and 1 year

would amount to $8,000. The AIP targets the E–8 and E–9 senior enlisted population. They receive $750 per month.

Our current inventory of SOF operators is critical as we achieve Quadrennial Defense Review growth. The introduction of these programs provided both measurable

gains and stability in Special Forces (SF), Sea, Air, Land (SEAL), Combat Controllers (CCTs), and Pararescue Jumpers (PJs) inventory. In communities with possible

shortfalls, the introduction of the CSRB increased continuation by 10% in targeted

enlisted Special Forces and SEALS. For Air Force CCTs and PJs, the effects are not

as clear cut. Unlike SF and SEALs, Air Force SOF are not separate communities

within the Air Force, but the incentive initiatives are having a positive overall effect. As with senior enlisted operators, SF Chief Warrant Officers retention is extremely critical in the Operation Detachment Alpha teams. In Fiscal Year 2007,

83% of eligibles signed up for the CSRB. The AIP is also a critical program and designed for the highly skilled, extensively trained, and experienced senior enlisted

and CWOs. We have invested heavily in their training and need to retain them. As

a population, their skill sets are very sought after in the lucrative private sector.

Mr. SMITH. Please tell us more about the ‘‘assessment and selection’’ process and

the identification of the proper ‘‘aptitude and attitude’’ for potential SOF-personnel.

Admiral OLSON. Assessment and selection is done at the component level.

USSOCOM assures the standardization of training for SOF selected personnel. Assessment and selection for each MOS varies.

Mr. SMITH. Does SOCOM have a training modernization plan? If so, what is it?

Admiral OLSON. Modernization of training for USSOCOM is based on the Joint

training system model and hinges on the recapitalization and modernization of the

operational forces.

Mr. SMITH. How has your component command supported or taken steps to execute the vision contained in the Capstone Concept for Special Operations 2006?

General WAGNER. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) remains globally engaged having conducted missions to over 60 countries in the past

year. Each of these engagement missions have been crafted by Geographic Combatant Commanders, Ambassadors, Theater Special Operations Commands and United

States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to advance priority Theater and

USSOCOM missions; 50 of these countries were for Theater Security Cooperation

Programs, and 32 countries were for operational missions. USASOC’s Special

Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces are experts in both advancing U.S. interests and objectives; and, developing the capabilities of partner nations

through regional engagement. The Capstone Concept for Special Operations (CSSO)

2006 brings excellent focus and direction to the global engagement strategy which

will enhance an already robust and successful engagement program.

The CCSO outlines the Future Operating Environment for Special Operations

Forces (SOF) and lists USSOCOM’s three strategic objectives: Department of Defense Global War on Terror (GWOT) Lead, Global Presence, and Global Expeditionary Force. During Fiscal Year 2006–2007, USASOC worked closely with the

USSOCOM Center for Knowledge and Futures conducting wargaming and experimentation on these strategic objectives to assist in developing implementing actions.

USASOC is currently involved in seven initiatives that support the CCSO:

Joint Futures Wargaming. Unified Quest 07 (UQ 07, completed May 2007) and

Unified Quest 08 (UQ 08), Title X wargames co-sponsored by U.S. Army, U.S. Joint

Forces Command (JFCOM) and USSOCOM. USASOC Futures Center was

USSOCOM’s Executive Agent for UQ 07 and is again for UQ 08. Wargame objectives for UQ 08 include examining the effects of evolving operational command and

campaign design initiatives on Global SOF Posture and the Joint Expeditionary

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SOF concept. UQ 08 also contains the February 4–8, 2008 USSOCOM-led Irregular

Warfare Seminar Wargame, with robust USASOC participation.

Joint Futures Experimentation. Futures Expeditionary SOF Experiment 08

(FESOF 08) is a USSOCOM Futures Experiment that focuses on the CCSO’s Joint

Expeditionary SOF strategic objective. USASOC Futures Center is USSOCOM’s executive agent for FESOF 08. The experiment is projected for execution in May 2008,

and will provide quantitative analysis of joint SOF collaborative planning capability

using the Command Post of the Future.

Future Operating Environment (FOE). The USASOC FOE is the Futures Center’s

effort to simplify the JFCOM Joint Operating Environment document into a condensed readable version that is applicable to Army SOF. Guidance contained in this

document was derived from the CCSO, and provides the Army SOF component of

the overarching USSOCOM FOE.

Army SOF Enabling Concept Development. USASOC Futures Center’s Concept

Division is developing the Army SOF portion of the CCSO’s five Joint Special Operations Keystone Capability Areas.

Operational and Experimentation Support to activation of Joint Special Operations Group 08–PACOM 1.

Staff participation in USSOCOM’s Global SOF Posture workgroups to identify and

solve challenges related to developing and maintaining an expeditionary SOF capability. The capabilities include logistical support, personnel management, movement

of personnel and equipment and command and control.

Irregular Warfare. USASOC staff directorates are participating in the Irregular

Warfare Joint Operating Concept initiative, which has now become a Capabilities

Based Assessment. In support of this USSOCOM initiative, USASOC is currently

conducting an Unconventional Warfare Functional Area Assessment.

Mr. SMITH. What is your view of recruiting and retention? a. What is the general

quality of recruits and is there a need to improve recruiting methods? What steps

are in place to make such improvements? b. What is the general state of retention?

What steps have been taken or need to be taken to maintain an effective retention

situation?

General WAGNER. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. Please tell me about the linguistic skills of the Army Special Operations Force (ARSOF) community. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the

command in this area? How are you trying to address the weaknesses?

General WAGNER. It is important to understand our requirement for, and our approach to language. Our expectation is that our Special Forces (SF) Soldiers will

leave our training institution with a ‘‘working knowledge’’ of a language. We do not

provide the training necessary to be a ‘‘linguist’’. . . we want our Soldiers to be Special Operators; not linguists. Our SF Soldiers, for example, are trained on numerous

Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) such as; SF Combat Medic, SF Combat Engineer, SF Communications, SF Weapons Sergeant and others. In addition to the

extensive training involved in these specialties, they will be regionally aligned

throughout their career. They must understand the culture they will work in and

they have functional language skills in their MOS specialty: a working knowledge

of the language. To achieve that ‘‘working knowledge’’ we train to a minimum standard of 1/1/1 on the Defense Language Institute (DLI) Scale; this is up from the previous goal of 0+/0+. Since 2004, when we raised the standard and transformed our

program, 95 percent of our SF Soldiers have achieved the new higher standard with

no increase in training time. As a means of comparison, our personnel whose MOS

is to be a ‘‘linguist,’’ are trained to a minimum level of 2/2/2 at the DLI. For example, the ‘‘signals intercept’’ personnel in our formations are trained at DLI. Additionally, we provide for sustainment and enhancement training at the unit locations.

Many of our Soldiers, with the benefit of numerous deployments, the incentive of

additional pay, and additional study, improve their qualifications. Current

OPTEMPO and out of sector deployments have had an effect on our language skills.

Mr. SMITH. Please provide greater detail on your statement that ARSOF’s recruiting effort is ‘‘uniquely tied to the overall health of the Army.’’ What exactly do you

mean?

General WAGNER. Most of our Soldiers are recruited from other units within the

Army. If the ‘‘pool’’ from which we select our Soldiers is healthy, in terms of numbers and quality, then our recruiting will reflect that. This is also true for our lowdensity Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) which are often critical throughout

the entire Army.

Mr. SMITH. Please explain and describe the ‘‘change in training venue’’ for Special

Forces Warrant Officers and why this is expected to increase end strength figures

for that community?

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General WAGNER. All Special Forces Warrant Officer (MOS 180A) training requirements are now conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, by the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFKSWCS). Previously, the training was

split between Army’s Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS) at Fort Rucker,

Alabama, and Special Forces specific training at Fort Bragg. Unlike the larger

Army; all SF Warrant Officer Candidates must have first served as a Special Forces

Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) in one of the Special Forces Groups. Thus, on average, they start Warrant Officer training with an average of over 10 years service.

Much of what was taught at Fort Rucker has already been taught to our NCOs

through the Non-Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), and through

their years of experience as a Special Forces NCO. This new format (all training

at Fort Bragg) eliminates redundant training and acknowledges the NCOs’ professional and life experiences. Additionally, although the course remains 15 weeks in

length, the training is now tailored to our specific requirements. Further, since our

Warrant Officer candidates no longer have to wait in a queue for a class date at

Fort Rucker, we can enroll the candidates soon after their request is approved, and

we can get them fully trained: frequently up to 30 weeks sooner. All of these factors

result in a more efficient, effective and attractive course. Since inception of this new

design, the 180A program has exceeded its Fiscal Year 2006 and Fiscal Year 2007

recruiting missions—after having failed to meet mission requirements the previous

three years.

Mr. SMITH. Please provide your views on the low manning figures for National

Guard Captains and Warrant Officers (34% and 26% respectively). Why do you believe these are so low? Please explain how the command is addressing this situation.

General WAGNER. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. Please share with us the plan to improve the training through-put

problem associated with shortfalls in MH–47 personnel.

General WAGNER. A number of major factors impact the MH–47 personnel

throughput: increased pilot authorizations due to growth, ongoing transition from

MH–47D/E to MH–47G aircraft, and operational tempo. In December 2006, the

160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR (A)) received Department of Defense authorization to grow from 2,437 Soldiers to 2,993 Soldiers. This

allowed the 160th SOAR (A) to organize into four battalions, provide them with

equipment for another Company of 10 MH–60s, and authorized an increase of 556

Soldiers to round out the staff, maintenance, and aircrew growth to increase the

ratio of crews to aircraft. This 556 Soldier growth will occur as depicted with 84

Soldiers in Fiscal Year 2008, and the remaining 472 Soldiers through the Fiscal

Year 2012 Future Years Defense Program.

The planned growth over the next five years will cause the 160th SOAR (A) to

annually chase personnel fill rates to meet the pace of new authorizations. However,

the gradual increase of personnel authorizations over the five year period was specifically designed to give the Regiment the ability to manage that growth. Bottom

line: this is ‘‘good news’’ as we have been authorized to grow which is essential to

supporting mission requirements.

As of September 2007, the 160th SOAR (A) has fielded 38 of 61 authorized MH–

47G aircraft, 8 of which are assigned to the training of new MH–47G crews.

The Special Operations Aviation Training Company (SOATC), 160th SOAR (A)

can currently train 32 MH–47G pilots and 32 Flight Engineers per year. Beginning

in January 2008, they will increase throughput up to 48 MH–47G pilots and 48

Non-rated crewmembers per year to keep pace with the programmed growth of the

Regiment. However, the Regiment expects difficulty filling some pilot training seats.

Army Aviation GWOT unit rotations complicate assessment and assignment of

qualified pilots. To help reduce these new pilot assignment issues, the command

must continuously dialog with other Combat Aviation Brigade Commanders.

The 160th SOAR (A) is addressing three areas that challenge the training

through-put issue: availability of aircraft, training time, and instructor availability.

The availability of training aircraft will be a constant challenge until all MH–47G

aircraft are fully fielded in July 2011. This requires the 160th SOAR (A) to meticulously manage its aircraft. SOATC is conducting the last MH–47E training class and

will soon focus on training a pure fleet of MH–47G pilots and crewmembers. Reducing the MH–47 series aircraft to one type will increase overall aircraft availability

through the reduction in maintenance and trainer overhead. While it has taken

time, the 160th SOAR (A) is beginning to reap the benefits of transformation from

3 types of MH–6s, 4 types of MH–60s, and 3 types of MH–47s to a single airframe

of each type.

Training time continues to be an issue while the 160th SOAR (A) remains heavily

engaged in the GWOT. Every increase in the deployed number of combat aircraft

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ultimately affects the ability to train our Special Operations Aviators and Crewmembers to exacting standards. The initial training base remains relatively unaffected, but we experience training setbacks as low density/high demand operational

assets, such as MC–130 tankers, are committed in support of the GWOT. Our mission crews have great difficulty apportioning continuation training time as they balance a GWOT cycle of rotation at a nearly 1:1 rate. Without a reduction in

OPTEMPO, mission crews will continue to get less than optimal environmental

training during their dwell periods. The result is a force that is highly proficient

in the environments presented in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Instructor limitations are addressed through increases to SOATC’s contractor support base. The primary training base within SOATC is the complement of Civil/Military Instructors (CMIs), retired Special Operations Aviators who continue to pass

on a wealth of knowledge to newly assigned aviators—holding them to the demanding standards expected of the 160th SOAR (A).

Mr. SMITH. The fill-rate within the field of psychological operations is unsatisfactory, especially at the rank of Captain. Is this a recruiting problem, a schoolhouse

through-put problem, or retention problem? As the proponent of this branch, what

is your command doing to assist with efforts to address this situation?

General WAGNER. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. Please describe in detail the metamorphosis of the Special Operations

Sustainment Brigade, especially as some elements will be utilized to form the five

new Special Forces Battalions and three Ranger Support Companies.

General WAGNER. Based on Lessons learned from the Global War on Terrorism,

the U.S. Army and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Transformation Campaign Plan, and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

Special Operations Forces (SOF) Logistics Study, USASOC redesigned and reorganized its organic Combat Support Service (CSS) force structure. The new CSS force

structure supports expeditionary Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), provides

early, rapidly deployable CSS force structure, provides logistical staying power to

deployed ARSOF by tying into the operational theater support structure, and structures ARSOF CSS units so they are co-located and habitually train with their supported units.

Prior to transformation, the USASOC CSS force structure consisted of centralized

organizational level support from detachments and platoons organic to tactical

units, direct support from the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (SOSB),

and operational level support from Theater Units coordinated by the Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM). This CSS structure was inadequate to provide

sustained CSS to deployed ARSOF.

To alleviate the shortfall in organizational support to Special Forces Groups

(SFG), the Group Service Detachments were merged with the Special Forces Forward Support Companies of the 528th SOSB to create five Special Forces Group

(SFG) Support Battalions transitioning to a decentralized structure. The Group Support Battalions are now assigned to and located with the SFG, and are commanded

by CSS Lieutenant Colonels. In the Ranger Regiment, Ranger Support Platoons

were transformed to Ranger Support Companies, organic to and co-located with each

Ranger Battalion, to provide the required tactical logistical support. These companies are commanded by CSS Captains. Additionally, a Ranger Support Operations

Detachment was added to the 75th Ranger Regiment Special Troops Battalion to

provide field grade oversight to the logistics planning and operations in the Regiment.

SOSCOM was reorganized to create the Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations)

(Airborne) (SB(SO)(A)) which provides synchronization of logistical operations and

planning, and battlefield command and control for logistical and Combat Health

Support operations in support of USASOC or a SOF Joint Task Force. The most

critical component of this command is the ARSOF Liaison Element (ALE). ALEs are

organic to the SB(SO)(A), in direct support of the five Theater Special Operations

Commands (TSOC), with duty at the Theater Army Service Component Command

(ASCC). The ALE coordinates ARSOF CSS requirements with the ASCC in accordance with ASCC Title 10 or Executive Agent responsibilities.

Increasing CSS structure in concert with the growth of Special Forces and Ranger

units remains a challenge. The transformation of CSS units in USASOC has improved support in war and garrison.

Mr. SMITH. Special Forces Warrant Officer training and commissioning is now

conducted entirely at Ft. Bragg. Would you help us understand the significance of

this approach by contrasting it with how it was done previously? How is this more

effective and cost-efficient?

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General WAGNER. It is more effective because we can now include more training

relevant to being a Special Forces Warrant Officer. It is more cost efficient because

there is less time required to complete all the necessary training (transition from

Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) to Chief Warrant Officer) and there is less travel

involved. Previously, once NCO were selected for the Warrant Officer program, they

typically waited weeks or months for a class date at Fort Rucker, Alabama’s, Army

Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS). After completing the 4 weeks of WOCS,

they returned to their unit to await a class date for the 11 week Special Forces Warrant Officer training course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Now, they make one trip

to Fort Bragg where we design, control, and schedule the training to optimum effect.

Mr. SMITH. Please explain the vision of the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion for increasing the number of recruits for USASOC. It is more than a matter of

increasing the number of recruiters, correct?

General WAGNER. We recruit the majority of our Soldiers from existing Army

units—such as Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). The Special Operations Recruiting

Battalion (SORB) is the only recruiting battalion in the Army focused solely on recruiting in-service Soldiers. Our vision is to have recruiting teams, augmented with

trained Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations personnel, co-located with the major concentrations of the Army’s combat units. We also need the

ability to quickly move recruiters from one installation to another as the availability

of potential recruits ebbs and flows with BCT deployments. This management is

provided by a Battalion command and control structure that understands this mission and SOF unique requirements. So yes, it is not about increasing the number

of recruits—we have not increased the overall target number of recruits in three

years. It is more about giving as many Soldiers as possible access to accurate information about careers in Army Special Operations, and then getting the right recruits to the training.

Mr. SMITH. Special Forces soldiers must achieve a passing language rating of ‘‘1,

1, 1’’ in reading, speaking and understanding to graduate. What was the standard

before? Was there previously no language requirement for an SF soldier?

General WAGNER. Previously there was a goal of 0+/0+. If a Soldier failed to

achieve this goal they were still awarded the Green Beret and sent to their unit

with instructions to continue their language study. The new 1/1/1 standard provides

both a better initial capability as well as a stronger base from which to improve.

Our approach is that we teach 10 core languages based on current and projected

requirements. We now make language assignments immediately after a Soldier’s selection for Special Forces Training, doing so based on Defense Language Aptitude

Battery exam scores and personal interviews. Then, we reinforced the learning process through the use of technologies such as Rosetta Stone and grouping students

for training based on languages and regions of the world. We now incorporate language and cultural training throughout the Special Forces Qualification Course

training pipeline, and we incorporate language-capable role players in our Culmination Exercise, Robin Sage.

Definition of 1/1/1:

Reading: Sufficient comprehension to read very simple connected written material

in a form equivalent to usual printing or typescript.

Listening: Sufficient comprehension to understand utterances about basic survival

needs, and minimum courtesy and travel requirements.

Speaking: Able to satisfy minimum courtesy requirements and maintain very simple face-to-face conversions on familiar topics.

Mr. SMITH. What modernization concerns keep you awake at night?

General WAGNER. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. How has your component command supported or taken steps to execute the vision contained in the Capstone Concept for Special Operations 2006?

Admiral KERNAN. To achieve our national strategic goal of defeating terrorist extremism and creating a global environment inhospitable to terrorist extremists,

NAVSOF is increasing its capability to wage Irregular Warfare (IW) against Fourth

Generation Warfare adversaries. Naval Special Operation Forces (NAVSOF) will

continue to provide the nation with the premier maritime special operations (SO)

capability; uniquely trained to access maritime environments to conduct SO.

NAVSOF’s highest priority is to conduct IW against the global network of terrorist

and insurgent groups. Much of this capability is being sourced from our two newest

commands, Support Activity Teams ONE and TWO (Questions #8 refers). Naval

Special Warfare Command (NSWC) recruits, organizes, trains, equips, deploys, and

sustains NAVSOF to conduct UW, FID, Counterterrorism (CT), Counterproliferation

(CP), Direct Action (DA), and Special Reconnaissance (SR) in support of GWOT and

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other operations as directed. To adapt NAVSOF to more effectively prosecute the

Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), NSWC has taken steps in the areas of specialized training, technology development, and equipment procurement to improve our

Find-Fix-Finish-Exploit-Analyze (F3EA), Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Unconventional Warfare (UW) capabilities.

Mr. SMITH. What is your view of recruiting and retention? a. What is the general

quality of recruits and is there a need to improve recruiting methods? What steps

are in place to make such improvements?

Admiral KERNAN.

Recruit Quality:

Overall the quality of recruits is satisfactory with some recent improvements

noted. Within the last year we have some interesting trends. On the one hand, we

see increased physical preparation. Much stricter quality control has been established in the pipeline; we are seeing a much lower number of candidates who fail

the basic Physical Screening Test upon arrival at BUD/S. In addition, an increased

number of recruits are achieving higher scores on their PST. There are several possible explanations for this. First of all, there is more information available to potential SEAL candidates about the training pipeline then ever before, which obviously

helps candidates prepare more effectively. Recent initiatives such as the CNRC contracted Mentor Program, which gives Delayed Entry Program (DEP) personnel access to contracted retired SEALS, also appears to be paying significant dividends

in helping candidates prepare physically and mentoring.

On the other hand, we are still seeing students that show up for SEAL training

that are not serious candidates.

Recruiting Methods:

There is a need to continue to improve recruiting methods to ensure those candidates with physical and mental attributes conducive to success in the Naval Special Warfare community are exposed to NSW career opportunities. Based on analysis of years of training data, we know that successful SEAL training graduates generally do well on the Physical Screening Test and have participated in competitive

sports where teamwork, commitment and mental toughness are keys to success. In

light of that, we are working with CNRC to expand the NSW-developed ‘‘Navy

SEAL Fitness Challenge’’ that has already been piloted in several venues throughout the country, using the NSW PST is used as an athletic event. The SEAL Fitness

Challenge is envisioned as a campaign with a local high school component and regional and national events that enliven interest in young athletes. When combined

with both a targeted media effort and a contracted relationship with a national high

school coaches organization, we have high hopes for this initiative.

Other important recruiting/accessions efforts that are underway and require continued effort:

- Media outreach to support targeted marketing within the US population and

the Fleet. While there are some good supporting media initiatives, more work is required in this arena.

- Establishment of a BUD/S preparation course to better prepare SEAL candidates. Pilot course expected to start in November 2007.

- Psychological testing of SEAL candidates to complement current physical

screening. A very promising test battery has already been developed and tested on

four classes of BUD/S students. Further testing is planned at RTC and at Recruiting

Stations. Analysis of implementation options has started recently.

Mr. SMITH. b. What is the general state of retention? What steps have been taken

or need to be taken to maintain an effective retention situation?

Admiral KERNAN. b. The overall health of SEAL retention is very good. Overall

SEAL retention for FY07 is 86.4% compared with 83.2% during FY02 (stop-loss)

year. Below is a comparison between FY04 and FY07 as we have seen a steady increase each year since FY04.

FY04 FY07 Percent +/¥

Zone A 67.8 96.3 +28.5

Zone B 78.6 86.2 +7.6

Zone C 68.3 81.3 +13.0

Zone D 97.3 99.1 +1.8

Zone E 45.5 39.1 ¥6.4

TOTAL 70.6 86.4 +15.8

Incentives: Increased SDAP and SRB while adding AIP and CSRB.

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CSRB should remain in effect. Reducing funding for CSRB during this time would

have a negative effect not only on Zone E but those members in Zones C and D.

Recommend keeping SDAP at current level and increasing SRB level.

Mr. SMITH. ‘‘WARCOM’’ is at 87% manning levels for enlisted SEALs and you expect this to drop to 77%. What are all the causes of this drop?

Admiral KERNAN. Current manning level for enlisted SEALs is 94%. On 1 October

2007, 150+ additional SEAL billets will come online. Due to the rapid manpower

growth and rate of graduation, we expect manning levels to drop to approximately

77%. This will be mitigated by SEAL production process efforts which will increase

SEAL qualification training graduates and execute the planned growth.

Mr. SMITH. The Command has increased annual accession efforts to address the

need for more enlisted and officer personnel. How is this being accomplished? Why

was this not initiated earlier?

Admiral KERNAN. The Navy has gone to great lengths to establish policies, offer

retention incentives and improve the manning of what is one of the most critical

communities in the Global War on Terrorism. This occurred recently due to 2006

QDR directed growth. Naval Special Warfare focused Navy actions for recruiting

and retention:

— The significant increases in bonuses for enlisted personnel such as the $40K

enlistment bonuses for SEAL recruits and the $60K, $75K, $75K Zone A, B & C

Selective Reenlistment Bonuses which has improved overall reenlistment rates by

6%.

— Adding Assignment Incentive Payments for Naval Special Warfare personnel

over 25 Years of Service in non USSOCOM billets.

— The creation of the Naval Special Warfare Center recruiting directorate led

by a SEAL O–6 to assist Commander, Naval Recruiting Command (CNRC) with the

great challenge of recruiting young men with the determination and ability to succeed as SEALS.

To combat recruiting discrepancies and Recruit Training Command attrition

NAVPERS, Commander, Naval Recruiting Command and Commander, Naval Special Warfare Center have been working together to implement several actions including the following:

* In January 2006, Chief of Naval Personnel issued a Special Warfare/Special Operations accessions planning order to provide strategic direction.

* In March 2006, CNRC recruiting districts administered swim tests with the

PST prior to offering the recruit a SEAL, SWCC, Diver or EOD Challenge contract.

* In March 2006, CNRC began hiring former SEAL/EOD personnel as contractors

to work at CNRC recruiting districts as the Naval Special Warfare and Special Operations program coordinators. As of May 2006, 14 of 31 contractors have been

hired.

* Naval Special Warfare detailed a SEAL Master Chief to CNRC Headquarters.In

addition, a Navy Master diver and a Master EOD technician will be joining the

CNRC team in order to better align recruiting policy and goals.

* The Navy established the SEAL (Special Operator-SO) and Special Warfare

Combatant Crewman (Special Warfare Boat Operator-SB) rating in October 2006.

Aligned with Sea Warrior, the rating enables Special Warfare/Special Operations to

work solely in their own rating and compete for promotion against their respective

peer groups.

* Established a Special Warfare/Special Operations recruiting goal for Naval Recruiting District.

* Organized a cross-functional working group to attempt to develop psychological

screening tests for identifying recruits with a higher chance of success in Special

Warfare/Special Operations.

* In February 2006, CNRC raised the enlistment bonus for SEALS from $18K to

$40K; EOD from $15K to $30K; Navy Diver from $12K to $25K; SWCC from $12K

to $18K.

Additional Navy initiatives implemented to improve retention:

* Implemented SOF Critical Skills Retention Bonus on 08 February 2005.

* Increased Special Duty Assignment Pay $450 per month May 2007.

* Began paying Assignment Incentive Pay to Sailors with 25 years or more of

service as of 1 January 2005.

* Implemented targeted Selective Reenlistment Bonus payments in order to improve retention rates.

RADM Kernan is chairing an NSW/NRC/NSTC process that is working to identify

and implement policies and business practices that optimize a candidates chances

for success in SEAL training while improving efficiency of the entire process. BUD/

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S did have some success decreasing attrition; and due to the large amount of recruits that CNRC has accessed we have added another BUD/S class during FY07.

The Navy’s FY06 goal for enlisted recruiting was 1400 and we did not meet it,

producing only 829 SEAL candidates. However, the Navy has revamped its business

practices on SEAL and SWCC recruiting and pipeline training. Changes such as the

implementation of the SEAL and SWCC ratings (as of October 2006) are streamlining the time it takes for a recruit to get to BUD/S. The average timeline for a recruited BUD/S candidate to complete all SEAL training to earn his warfare designation is 18–24 months, so the effects of our changes in FY06 have had direct positive

results in FY07 (1222 recruited for a goal of 1397—87%). Additionally, the hiring

of the ex-Special Warfare and Special Operations Sailors by CNRC will continue to

improve both quality and quantity of the recruits.

For Officer growth, Naval Special Warfare has increased annual accessions from

63 to 83. Accessions have been increased across all commissioning programs—U.S.

Naval Academy, ROTC, and Officer Candidate School—and also in the number of

Lateral Transfers from other communities within the U.S. Navy.

Mr. SMITH. The total number of SEALs—enlisted and officer—seems low when

compared with the total manning figure of 47,000 in the SOF community. What is

the tail-to-tooth ratio of Naval Special Warfare Command?

Admiral KERNAN. Tail-to-tooth ratio is 86%.

TOOTH (Total SEALs/SWCC Officers and Enlisted): 2729

TAIL (Total Technicians—Support Personnel): 3181

Total TOOTH and TAIL: 5910

TOOTH to TAIL Ratio: 2729/3181 86%

Mr. SMITH. Why is the greatest manning shortfall found at the mid-grade, or O–

4 level? What is the cause of this?

Admiral KERNAN. Our shortage of O–4’s has been created by a marked increase

of SEAL Lieutenant Commander billets in a short five year timeframe, from FY03

to FY08 SEAL Officer Programmed Authorizations (OPA) have increased from 101

to 200 (99%). The current 97 SEAL Lieutenant Commanders would have filled those

101 FY03 OPA requirements very well but the 99% increase in O–4 requirements

cannot be filled without time to grow Naval Special Warfare Lieutenant Commanders from the Ensign and Lieutenant Junior Grade pay grades. In an effort to meet

the SEAL mid grade officer requirements Navy has increased SEAL accessions

every year since 2002 and is diligently working to retain the current inventory with

retention incentives such as Officer Critical Skills Retention Bonus.

Mr. SMITH. Please describe in greater detail the current and planned ‘‘Special

Warfare Combatant Crew,’’ or ‘‘SWICK,’’ curricula reforms mentioned in your testimony. What do these entail and how do they affect standards and future skillsets

within the community?

Admiral KERNAN. In early 2006, Commander Naval Special Warfare Center initiated a bottom-up review of the SWCC basic training pipeline (Basic Crewman

Training and Crewman Qualification Training COIs). Upon completion of this review, the recommended changes were implemented in order to improve course efficiency and effectiveness. The changes include:

Basic Crewman Training (BCT): COI duration reduced from eight weeks to seven

weeks (two weeks indoctrination and five weeks of BCT training). Weapons Training, Land Navigation, and Water Rescue phases were moved to the Crewman Qualification Training (CQT) COI. This shift allowed trainees greater opportunity to enhance individual skills required to complete training without changing the passing

standards of performance.

Crewman Qualification Training (CQT): COI duration increased from 12 weeks to

14 weeks; as noted above, Weapons Training, Land Navigation, and Water Rescue

phases were moved to the Crewman Qualification Training (CQT) COI.

Further changes were implemented IOT maximize training cadre capability and

SWCC basic training pipeline efficiency. CQT classes are now composed of the graduates from two BCT classes. As a result, there are now a total of six BCT classes,

vice four, conducted each year; and a total of three CQT classes conducted each year

vice four previously.

Taken together, the above noted changes to the SWCC training pipeline decreased

attrition rates without lowering training standards.

Mr. SMITH. Please explain the concept of and plan for the Support Activity Teams.

Admiral KERNAN. In February 2005, Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (COMNAVSPECWARCOM), directed establishment of two Support Activities

to provide more robust, tactical-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

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(ISR) capability and capacity in support of Naval Special Warfare Command operations.

On December 7, 2006, Naval Special Warfare Group One commissioned Support

Activity (SUPPACT) One in San Diego, CA. Support Activity Two was commissioned

19 July, 2007, in Virginia Beach, VA. The Support Activities are commanded by

SEAL Commanders (pay-grade 0–5).

SUPPACTS accomplish their missions by operating like other conventional Army

and Marine Corps ground support units—by integrating and organizing multi-discipline, combat support personnel with administrative, logistical, and analytical

skills to support SEAL combat elements. Naval Special Warfare units have been receiving this type of combat support and combat service support on an extended basis

from the Navy’s Individual Augmentee Program. Establishment of SUPPACTs enables Naval Special Warfare Command to permanently assign personnel to provide

necessary, dedicated support at the earliest opportunity in the NSW Inter-Deployment Training Cycle—thus providing better, more integrated support to combat operators. Similar to other Services’ combat and combat service support, these personnel also coordinate and deconflict tactical-level operations with other DoD units.

Increasing and focusing subject matter expertise at the tactical level of Naval Special Warfare operations fulfills the intent of the 2004 Quadrennial Defense Review

(QDR) by engaging non-SOF forces in support of SOF’s prosecution of the GWOT

and enabling more SEALs to focus on combat operations.

Mr. SMITH. What is your understanding of how the Navy’s Chief of Naval Personnel will execute the stated goal of pursuing a ‘‘focused and targeted enlisted SEAL

recruiting’’ as his number one priority?

Admiral KERNAN. My understanding and hope is that the current emphasis placed

on SEAL recruiting will be supported well into the future. Some important aspects

of that current emphasis:

- SEAL recruiting clearly established and promulgated as CNP’s #1 priority.

- Mandatory PST in DEP. (prior to 2006, no swim was included)

- Contracted NSW/NSO mentors in each of the 26 NRDs (majority are retired

SEALs)

- NRD recruiters given hard goals for SEAL candidates

- Establishment of the BUD/S preparation course at Great Lakes (Nov. 2007)

- Development of a psychological test battery intended for SEAL screening (ongoing)

- Support to the SEAL fitness challenge program and a partnership with the national high school coaches association to help best identify candidates with the mental and physical attributes valued in the SEAL community.

In addition, within the constraints of a stretched NSW force, I have endeavored

to help with SEAL recruiting efforts wherever possible. I established a NSW Recruiting Directorate (NSW RD), headed by a SEAL O–6, that serves as a leveraging

force to help focus recruiting efforts, utilizing the lessons learned from many years

of tracking successful and unsuccessful SEAL candidates. In addition to developing

the Navy SEAL Fitness Challenge concept, the NSW RD has facilitated SEAL presence at a multitude of important recruiting efforts and has expanded NSW’s media

reach considerably.

Mr. SMITH. What exactly is the attrition rate at BUD/S? Might this be improved?

Admiral KERNAN. The historic attrition rate for BUD/S is 74% for all students and

78% for enlisted students. Over the period of the last two years the attrition rate

was 70% for all students and 74% for enlisted (This is over a 15% improvement in

success rate). We expect this attrition rate to continue to improve as we improve

our targeted recruiting programs and as we implement a Pre-BUD/S preparatory

course.

Mr. SMITH. The graduation rate in 2006 increased by 6%. Is this a sign of future

rates? If so, why?

Admiral KERNAN. We believe the graduation rate increase experienced in 2006 is

an indication of future rates, and our expectation is that future graduation rates

will continue to improve for several reasons. First of all, we have recently implemented a professional mentorship program at BUD/S that we believe will not only

help reduce DOR attrition, but will also help us develop a more mature and mentally prepared SEAL. Additionally, recent Navy efforts at targeted recruiting

through events such as the SEAL Fitness Challenge will help us attract better

qualified candidates that have demonstrated the attributes necessary for success

during BUD/S training and a Naval Special Warfare career. Attributes such as goalsetting, self-discipline, and the desire to succeed. Last, the Pre-BUD/S preparatory

course at Great Lakes will give young men the opportunity to properly prepare

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ance of mentors and physical training experts. We expect this will have an almost

immediate impact on the number of medical losses due to improper physical preparation (injuries such as stress fractures) as well as reduce the number of physical

performance failures during basic SEAL training.

Mr. SMITH. What is the attrition rate of recruits prior to their actual start of

BUD/S? Why is this so great?

Admiral KERNAN. Historic attrition during our Indoctrination Course is approximately 10%. The FY 2007 rate went up to 25%). Many students quit before they

start the First Phase of training. We believe there are two factors contributing to

this trend.

First, as of October 2006 when the enlisted SO rate was established, Basic Underwater Demotion/SEAL (BUD/S) training is now a Navy ‘‘A’’ school. Prior to that

point, all of our recruited BUD/S students (those not lateral transferring from the

fleet) went to a ‘‘source rate’’ A school prior to SEAL training. Pre-BUD/S attrition

in that part of the pipeline was spread out among a variety of A schools and was

not well tracked. Now, that attrition has moved to BUD/S and is much more visible.

Second, we believe that we are seeing an unintended consequence of the continued

high priority that CNRC is placing on filling the SEAL schoolhouse. Aggressive recruiting campaigns coupled with significant financial incentives to candidates that

complete the SEAL training pipeline have attracted some percentage of students

that would not have otherwise considered being a SEAL. We know that a true passion for a NSW career is critical to success in the pipeline; when a young man’s motivation is based primarily on other factors, his lack of commitment often becomes

evident in early attrition.

Mr. SMITH. Your command seems correctly focused on the recruitment and

throughput phases of SEAL development and also targeted solutions for retention.

But what about ‘‘non-compensation’’ types of solutions, such as leadership development and improved business practices and better approaches to operationalizing the

force? A recent reform effort called ‘‘Naval Special Warfare-21’’ successfully

‘‘operationalized the operators.’’ What about ‘‘operationalizing the direct and administrative support’’ to SEALS? Are there opportunities to improve WARCOM’s operational support to SEALS?

Admiral KERNAN. Prior to Naval Special Warfare 21 (NSW 21), three SEAL

Teams on each coast would deploy SEAL Platoons to Geographic Combatant Commanders based upon validated theater requirements and availability of forces. The

SEAL Teams were organized geographically so that a number of platoons from each

Team would be required to fulfill existing commitments.

NSW 21 created a fourth SEAL Team on each coast and reduced the number of

platoons at each Team from eight to six. Support personnel that were previously inherent to the individual commands were synergized under a newly formed Logistical

Support Unit in order to more effectively manage support requirements for deploying units. Under this new construct, the entire SEAL Team would deploy with augmentation from a variety of units as a Naval Special Warfare Squadron.

NSW 21 operationalized direct and administrative support by establishing a Logistics Support Unit (LOGSU) on each coast through the consolidation of Combat

Service Support (CSS) and Combat Service (CS) assets under a single hat. The

LOGSUs are responsible for CSS support in CONUS and for sustainment of deployed forces. Each LOGSU is approximately sixty percent Sea-duty and forty percent Shore-duty. LOGSU personnel regularly deploy to support NSW operations as

augmentation for each deploying Squadron to provide support for deployed operations. Recently, Supply Officers have been assigned to the Teams as the CSS Troop

Leaders in the Professional Development Phase of the Inter-deployment Training

Cycle (ITDC) to ensure the SEAL Team’s Expeditionary Operational Logistics requirements of are managed in garrison and deployed.

In the ongoing OIF and OEF operations, the direct and administrative support

personnel that are within the Naval Special Warfare claimancy are not sufficient

to fulfill all the existing support requirements. U.S. Navy individual augmentees

have been critical to the success of Naval Special Warfare across the battlefield by

filling essential support positions. The Navy is currently providing 240 Navy

augmentees annually to support Naval Special Warfare. Another ongoing effort is

WARCOM’s POM 10 submission to USSOCOM for 177 personnel in order to

operationalize the Naval Special Warfare Groups so that they may deploy as the

core element of a Joint Special Operations Task Force. Additionally, 800 personnel

were submitted into the POM 10 cycle to support expeditionary Echelon IV combat

support/combat service support requirements to alleviate reliance on Navy Individual Augmentees.

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Mr. SMITH. Please qualify for us the ‘‘continual improvements’’ in instructor and

staff development, and leadership training. What about this gives you confidence

that attrition rates will be reduced without a sacrifice in standards?

Admiral KERNAN. The instructor staff is just one element of the NSWC instructional system, so instructor training is not the sole factor in attrition. However, continual improvement in instructor performance ensures other counter-attrition initiatives are fully effective. There are four major areas in which high-performance instruction can prevent the loss of SEAL and SWCC students who pass a rigorous selection process:

1. Applied principles of learning and motivation. Instructors are expected to develop instructional techniques based on recognized research from the cognitive

sciences. These fundamentals enable instructors to make sound decisions in any

given learning environment. They are given the skills to continually analyze student

performance and immediately respond to variable student needs, whether in the

classroom or the field.

2. Presentation and briefing skills. Practical exercises in the instructor qualification process focus on teaching lessons and presenting briefs that are drawn from

NSW curricula. Unlike the generic presentation-skills training stressed in standard

Navy instructor courses, the NSW Instructor School centers on NSW specific training.

3. Critical review of curriculum, methods, and standards. Instructor responsibility

extends beyond training delivery to an active role in continuously improving the

training system. Each instructor is taught to identify deficiencies or inefficiencies

in any part of the curriculum. They are expected to maintain active relationships

with instructional systems specialists to fine-tune the delivery, assessment, and

maintenance of their courses.

4. Mentorship and Instructional Leadership. The special responsibilities and critical role of the NSW Instructor are stressed in formalized instructor training and ongoing professional relationships. Mentorship has two dimensions. The first is instructor-to-student mentorship. Second, and equally important, is mentorship within

the instructor staff—senior instructors and supervisors guiding the professional development of junior instructors.

Finally, initial instructor training is seen as the first step in a professional development continuum, not as a singular instructional event. The continuum includes

regular in-service training and evaluation, but will also provide consultation from

technical training experts. This includes customized workshops designed to meet the

needs of any training phase or specialized course.

The initiatives cited above are specifically designed to improve student success

while preserving the high standards placed on SEAL and SWCC qualification.

Mr. SMITH. How has your component command supported or taken steps to execute the vision contained in the Capstone Concept for Special Operations 2006?

General WOOLEY. AFSOC has focused on the fact that our adversaries are ideologically driven and globally networked. Traditional kinetic weapons are less important than exploiting influence, information and intelligence. Improvements in EC–

130J COMMANDO SOLO aircraft contain upgrades for cell phone and PDA capabilities in the target audience, as well as satellite and wireless internet broadcasts.

Our unmanned ISR capabilities have greatly expanded, providing SOF-trained specialists to process, exploit, and disseminate intelligence information. As part of this

process, we stood up two squadrons specifically to operate UAVs and to process intelligence information. QDR 05 doubled our specialized aviation manpower. This

growth will continue to enable our aviation advisors to help coalition partners develop an internal defense capability. This low visibility approach will facilitate indirect use of US military power without a large US presence, and help friendly nations counter terrorist threats.

Mr. SMITH. What is your view of recruiting and retention? a. What is the general

quality of recruits and is there a need to improve recruiting methods? What steps

are in place to make such improvements? b. What is the general state of retention?

What steps have been taken or need to be taken to maintain an effective retention

situation?

General WOOLEY. The general quality of AF recruits has remained high since we

have the luxury of being selective while continuing to meet or exceed recruiting

goals. Consistent with the overall AF quality of recruits, AF SOF recruiting quality

has remained high as well. The introduction of recruiter incentives for bringing recruits into some critical SOF specialties has been beneficial. Keep in mind that getting new recruits in the door has not historically been a problem, but rather getting

them through their initial qualification training in several demanding SOF specialties. Significant washout rates and training pipeline backlogs in a few specialties

have hindered our ability to fully man some operational units. Within the AF

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(AFSOC and AETC), we are addressing these issues. In fact, we have steadily increased production/throughput over the past 3 years. Our current manning picture

in some specialties may give the appearance of remaining low due to programmed

QDR growth in the out years.

Mr. SMITH. Your testimony states that your number one issue is recapitalizing

your fleet. What action have you taken so far and what can this subcommittee do

to assist this effort?

General WOOLEY. We have worked closely with Air Combat Command and

USSOCOM to complete the formalized validation process required by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. In October 2006 the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) received Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validation. Since then we have completed an Analysis of Alternatives and produced a

Capability Development Document or CDD. We are currently waiting the final stage

of validation from the JROC via memorandum regarding the HC/MC–130 Recapitalization CDD. We believe we have provided the required documentation and the

memorandum providing validation of the CDD should be forthcoming shortly.

With Congressional approval of fiscal year 2008 advance procurement funds and

the JROC’s endorsement of our urgent need to begin procuring new aircraft, I am

hopeful that the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OSD/ATL) and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/

AQ will move forward quickly to begin the acquisition. It is my understanding the

determination of an acquisition strategy regarding full and open competition or a

sole-source action has yet to be decided. This appears to be the biggest issue at this

point. Once that acquisition decision is made we will have better visibility on meeting the warfighter required IOC, and enact the recapitalization effort for this critical

capability.

Mr. SMITH. Do you currently have enough airlift capacity to meet the projected

increase in Army and Marine Special Operations Forces? If not, what additional capacity would you require?

General WOOLEY. The 2006 QDR yielded unprecedented SOF growth and AFSOC

must continue critical programming actions in order to support SOF mobility.

AFSOC did not gain additional airlift force structure commensurate with SOF

ground growth. It is therefore imperative that we improve our current force as we

recapitalize and pursue acquisition efforts in order to support increased airlift requirements into the future. AFSOC currently has a programmed fleet of 65 MC–

130s (23 MC–130Ps, 20 MC–130Hs, 10 MC–130Es, and 12 MC–130Ws).

Based on QDR guidance, the AFSOC C–130 force will necessarily increase, incorporating requirements due to increased SOF strength and a new AFRICOM combatant command. This force will include MC–130H/W and recapitalized MC–130E/P

SOF tankers. In addition, AFSOC is pursuing a three-year acceleration of CV–22

deliveries, critical to getting this capability to the field. This planning is targeted

toward obtaining the optimal force required to implement the SOF Pre-deployment

and Training Cycle, allowing continual long term rotation of SOF forces throughout

the globe.

AFSOC is also pursuing additional commercial off-the-shelf light and medium aircraft to fulfill immediate theater combatant commander intratheater lift requirements. We are also planning long range requirements to include a transformational

capability that goes beyond the speed and range of the MC–130, adds greater cargo

capacity than the CV–22, and increases clandestine SOF air mobility. These aircraft

will provide SOF rapid, self-deployable, global, high threat, anti-access capability

with agility in the objective area independent of prepared runways. This conceptual

aircraft is required to support and improve SOF rapid global mobility beyond 2018.

Mr. SMITH. How mature is the AFSOC Predator Squadron concept? Has this been

deployed overseas? Is this in the training/ramp-up mode? When should we expect

Initial Operational Capability and/or Full Unit Equipped status?

General WOOLEY. AFSOC Predator concept is mature as evidenced by two years

of 3 SOS operational experience since the squadron’s activation on 28 Oct. 05. The

squadron is organized to fly Combat Air Patrols from CONUS and operate overseas

Launch & Recovery Elements which take-off and land the MQ–1s. AFSOC’s concept

for the 3 SOS is well documented in its Concept of Operations/Concept of Employment, USSOCOM Hunter-Killer Requirement, and the Unit Manning Document.

Today, 3 SOS flies six Combat Air Patrols (i.e. Orbits) and operates two Launch &

Recovery sites in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

AFSOC personnel are deployed overseas operating the Launch & Recovery Elements. MQ–1 aircraft that are assigned to AFSOC are also deployed.

Even with this success, we’re not yet meeting the full requirement to special operations forces. That requirement calls for having the capability to operate four simulVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:46 Aug 07, 2008 Jkt 040967 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-12\031260.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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taneous Launch & Recovery Elements; today we do two. Requirement also calls for

a rapidly deployable, expeditionary capability; we’re working towards having this capability.

AFSOC should have its full unit-equipped status in FY10. This is when the USAF

can provide the remaining pieces of equipment required to claim full operational capability. AFSOC can declare Initial Operational Capability when operational control

of the fielded MQ–1s transfers from CENTCOM to USSOCOM control.

Mr. SMITH. What are the manning requirements of the Predator squadron and

what assumptions were used to establish these requirements? Your testimony includes the term ‘‘Airmen’’ when describing Predator utilization. Should we interpret

this to mean that AFSOC enlisted personnel will pilot these aircraft? If not, why

not? If so, how will their training requirements be met? Will their training be overseen by the Air Force? What will be the role and involvement of contractor support?

General WOOLEY. For the Predator Squadron, AFSOC’s current manning requirements to fly 6 Combat Air Patrol are: 100 officers, 171 enlisted, and 2 civilians for

a total of 273. AFSOC would be flying 6 CAPS 24/7 with the capability to launch

from up to 4 locations. Crew would consist of 1 pilot and 1 sensor with a crew ratio

of 11.4 crews per CAP for a total of 92 pilots (includes Commander, Director of Operations, Stan Eval, Safety, Plans, and Tactics/Current Ops) and 86 sensors (includes Stan Eval)

Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) crews would consist of 4 pilots and 4 sensors

per LRE and will also have limited mission coordinators and communications support in austere locations. Mission Coordinators would be earned as a post for a total

of 6 officers and 40 enlisted (to include 10 enlisted for LRE operations). Maintenance would be Contract Logistics (CLS) for all aircraft and would require government oversight of the contract (QAEs) that would total 12 enlisted. Unit would operate and earn squadron overhead as applicable to an operations squadron by applying approved Air Force Manpower Standards.

The term ‘‘Airmen’’ means both officers and non-commissioned officers. In the twoperson MQ–1 crew, enlisted members serve as sensor operators while officers perform pilot duties. Enlisted crews are critical to ensuring control of the laser designator and keeping ‘‘eyes’’ on target. Enlisted sensor operators train at Creech AFB as

part of the Formal Training Unit where training is overseen in accordance with

USAF regulations and operating instructions. Air Force only utilizes rated-officers

to fly the MQ–1 because the MQ–1 operates in heavily congested Air Space and

needs to be able to communicate with other manned aircraft.

The role of contractor support includes: contractor logistics support for maintenance; operational-level maintenance support to deployed aircraft and other MQ–1

equipment. AFSOC is also examining the use of contractors for launch & recovery

element duties.

Mr. SMITH. Your testimony mentions the skills of Battlefield Airmen (i.e., Combat

Controllers, Pararescuemen or ‘‘PJs,’’ and Combat Weathermen) and note that they

are embedded with ground forces. Please describe this in greater detail. Are these

airmen deployed as units, deployed as individuals and assigned to Army and Navy

SEAL units, or both? Are they also assigned to General Purpose Forces? How are

these individuals or units trained and prepared for this joint tactical environment?

General WOOLEY. AFSOC’s Special Tactics (ST) forces are flexible in their employment. PJs teamed with CCT comprise specially trained teams uniquely suited for

personnel recovery missions from an air platform. Often, that Special Tactics expertise will be teamed with ‘‘shooters’’ who defend/secure crash sites as the PJs recover

personnel and sensitive equipment, and the CCT provides fire support and longrange communications. Special Operations Weather Team (SOWT) operators are attached to each service’s Special Operations Forces with a special focus on Army Special Ops (Special Forces, Rangers and Aviation).

ST members can also be attached directly to other SOF elements (e.g., SEAL

teams, Army Special Forces detachments) to provide ST expertise, as required by

the mission. As already mentioned, SOWT attach to Army SOF, often as individuals. The same is true of CCT and PJs, depending on the skill set needed. A single

Joint Terminal Attack Control (JTAC)-qualified CCT can attach to Army Special

Forces detachments and provide fire support (gunships, fast-mover CAS, naval surface fires, and indirect fires) and limited assault zone support for the entire team.

A PJ can provide limited rescue/recovery capability, and extensive combat medical

support to a SEAL team.

In conjunction with General Purpose Forces (e.g., Air Force Contingency Response

Groups, Army XVIII Airborne Corps), and depending on the scope of the mission,

a team of combat controllers can provide critical landing zone establishment and air

traffic control for follow-on airlift forces. In an airfield seizure scenario, there may

be anywhere from 10–30 combat controllers assigned duties in/around the airfield

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and attached to ground elements. There may also be PJs on the airfield to conduct

the casualty collection, initial treatment, and management. In this fashion, ST

forces are both embedded with the assault force as well as operate in ST-only elements, ensuring the airfield operations and casualty care are proceeding safely and

smoothly.

ST forces are trained to perform in the joint environment through joint exercises

and training, as well as studying after-action reports from those who have gone before them. The various training pipelines and professional education expose PJ,

CCT, and SOWT operators to other Services’ elements, which are reinforced during

training and deployments.

Mr. SMITH. Please explain in further detail the ‘‘re-engineering’’ of the Combat

Controller training pipeline. Exactly how has it been possible to shorten this training schedule and improve the quality of instruction? And how can we be sure that

the quality of instruction has improved and so soon?

General WOOLEY. In 2000, the CCT pipeline was intertwined with the PJ pipeline.

Attrition was high for both PJ and CCT trainees, though CCT throughput was the

more stifled of the two. Because the attrition was choking off the CCT production

from the pipeline, AFSOC initiated a change in training methodology, the so-called

CCT pipeline reengineering.

Working with AETC and Air Staff, AFSOC re-sequenced the CCT pipeline schools,

placing ‘‘Pre-Scuba’’ towards the end of the pipeline, so we could realize improvements in throughput by helping trainees ramp up for Pre-Scuba over a longer period

of time (approx. one year) rather than the ten weeks up front during Indoctrination.

Packaged as Advanced Skills Training (AST), the streamlined 11 month program

produces a graduate CCT with the same quality, having completed Dive School,

Freefall School, and initial 5-level upgrade training. Previous to AST, this training

with associated wait time was 6 to 12 months longer. With AST, all combat controllers graduate with standardized lesson plans, standardized individual equipment,

standardized operating procedures, etc., all planned and conducted within a cookiecutter template, year-round.

When the AST-era began, the CCT career field worried about a drop in quality

CCT operators. In fact, AST operators have proven themselves year after year in

the GWOT. Some have even returned to instruct at AST as 7-levels, after several

deployments under fire. The fifth AST class to graduate did so about two weeks

early: the 720th Special Tactics Group commander sent them to Baghdad during initial OIF hostilities to help his deployed forces secure and run Baghdad International

Airport. A fair number of AST graduates are currently assigned to Special Tactics’

Special Mission Unit. The Special Tactics Officers who have graduated AST are now

candidates to be a squadron Director of Operations. We have seen that AST graduates are every bit as fit for duty as the Indoc graduates, which is a testament to

the quality of the re-engineered CCT pipeline training.

Mr. SMITH. You state in your testimony ‘‘that the best way to reduce the length

of our training programs and (simultaneously) increase operational readiness is to

invest in new training facilities (with) high-fidelity simulators at our schoolhouses

and operational bases.’’ Would you please provide this analysis to the committee?

General WOOLEY. Aircrew experience can only be developed by flying aircraft or

high-fidelity simulators. The SOF aviation mission requires complex aircraft and

drives a need for aircrews to fly 30–40 hours per month. However as our fleet ages

and maintenance requirements increase, aircraft are only available 30–35 hours a

month, resulting in average monthly flying of only 15–20 hours for most pilots.

Eliminating this flying experience deficit requires either additional aircraft or highfidelity simulators.

Aircraft procurement is costly and so are life-cycle sustainment costs. Most

AFSOC aircraft exceed $8000/hour to operate and when aircraft procurement and

modification costs are factored over a 40 year life span, it adds an additional

$4,000–$10,000 per hour depending on aircraft variant. A simulator with its combination of procurement and sustainment costs can provide the same amount of

training as 6–8 aircraft, and provide that training at 1/10 the cost.

An analysis of all AFSOC aircraft actual flying hours covering a five-year period

shows 66% of all flying time was documented as some form of training time. In the

post-9/11 period, sustained deployments have significantly reduced aircraft flying

time for training. In FY06 our most heavily deployed aircraft, the AC–130U, documented 80% of flying time in combat leaving only 20% for all other flying requirements which include training, testing, and currency.

Setting aircraft maintenance issues aside, and without providing more aircraft,

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craft types were never provided adequate numbers of simulators. Those built were

for initial aircrew training only.

Flight simulator technology is proven in the commercial world. The FAA allows

commercial pilots to fully qualify in a Level-D simulator, so that his first flight in

the aircraft is a revenue flight. High-fidelity flight simulation is the only possible

way to meet the commands aircrew readiness challenges and can be done at a fraction of the cost of flying actual aircraft.

Mr. SMITH. What is the total size of the AC–130 gunship fleet? How many

gunships are operationally available and mission ready at any given time? What is

the current maintenance cycle of these aircraft and how does it compare with the

historical average? What are the greatest challenges for keeping this capability forward and operational?

General WOOLEY. The AC–130 fleet consists of 8 H-model aircraft and 17 U-model

aircraft. These numbers include combat, training and backup aircraft. Two AC–

130Hs and four AC–130Us are simultaneously unavailable for modification, test and

major maintenance.

The AC–130H fleet averaged 5.7 aircraft possessed with a 75% mission capable

rate for FY05–07, resulting in an average of 4.3 aircraft being available and mission

ready. The AC–130U fleet averaged 10.8 aircraft possessed with a 75% mission capable rate, resulting in an average of 8.1 aircraft being available and mission ready.

The Planned Depot Maintenance (PDM) cycle is 54 months for the AC–130H and

60 months for the AC–130U. Historically they required over 200 days in PDM, but

through an application of AF Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21) procedures, we have reduced PDM to 150 days for the last 6 aircraft. Higher combat

utilization rates for the AC–130U has compressed the isochronal inspection cycle

from 360 days to 330 days and may be an indicator of ever increasing maintenance

frequencies.

One of the greatest challenges we face is reducing down time for PDM, recurring

inspections and modifications. We are having success in achieving some of those

goals, reducing the down time in maintenance inspections, but we have serious challenges ahead with C–130 Center Wing Box (CWB) replacement requirements. We

are carefully monitoring individual aircraft flying time against the scheduled point

for that aircraft to enter the CWB replacement modification line. Aircraft that over

fly their maximum flight hours prior to entering the CWB replacement line would

be ‘‘grounded’’ until entering that line.

Last, we are installing 30mm cannons to replace the 25mm and 40mm legacy gun

systems. This program has had some accuracy problems develop during testing, but

the resultant commonality and ability to strike from a higher altitude will greatly

enhance our lethality.

Mr. SMITH. What is the plan for modernizing the gunship fleet? What is the current state of affairs regarding the follow-on capability for the AC–130 fleet? What

kind of aircraft might be required after the phase-out of the AC–130 fleet? What

might be the desired flight envelope associated with the requirements of a followon aircraft design?

General WOOLEY. AFSOC recognizes the critical need for AC–130 Gunship capability and has planned numerous upgrades for the fleet. The AC–130U will have its

center wing box replaced for enhanced service life. Both versions of the Gunship

have modernization programs, including various aspects of radar, target designator,

mission computer, and sensor systems. A 30mm gun system is being tested that will

provide commonality between both Gunship versions and address a vanishing vendor for the 40mm gun.

The follow-on capability planned for the AC–130 fleet is based on the Next-Generation Gunship (NGG). The specific type of platform has yet to be determined. The

NGG must be capable of conducting long-endurance operations in low- to selected

high-threat environments, day or night; a requirement much more challenging than

any currently operational aircraft was designed to meet. The NGG will be capable

of prosecuting multiple targets simultaneously and engaging them in adverse

weather and all terrain environments as well as having the ability to coordinate

closely with supported friendly ground parties both in terms of applying offensive

fires and sharing information. Last, the NGG must have the persistence to remain

in the area of responsibility for eight hours, up to 500 nautical miles from its base

or tanker, deliver fires and record sensor data.

The NGG requires a cruise speed permitting operations with other CAF strike

and suppression assets. The ability to operate at high subsonic airspeeds will minimize reaction time to get to real-time emerging targets and ‘‘on-call’’ calls for fire

in support of dynamic ground situations. To accomplish this, the NGG requires an

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er capability, and enhanced weapons and sensors to allow greatly increased standoff distances.

AFSOC would like to aggressively pursue a small gunship capability to augment

the AC–130 fleet until the Next Generation Gunship delivers. Intent for the small

gunship is not to phase out the current AC–130 fleet, but add to it. Battlefield commanders need more gunship capacity today to support ground forces, and we expect

this demand to increase through the FYDP. The ideal kind of aircraft would be twin

engine class aircraft capable of carrying at least 16,500 lbs. for the gunship unique

characteristics (e.g. one or two side-firing guns, gun mounts, ammo, crew and sensors) with an un-refueled range of 2,000 nautical miles. Desired flight envelope is:

operating altitude of 6,000–15,000 feet above ground level, 18,000 feet attack slant

range, minimum service ceiling of 25,000 feet mean sea level, and day/night and all

weather capable.

Mr. SMITH. What is the total number of fixed-wing aircraft in the entire C–130

family? Are modernization efforts being coordinated across each parts of this family?

General WOOLEY. AFSOC has 65 C–130 based aircraft in its active force inventory, broken down by individual aircraft type, there are eight AC–130H Spectre

Gunship, seventeen AC–130U Spooky Gunship, seventeen MC–130H Combat Talon

II, nineteen MC–130P Combat Shadow, and four MC–130W Combat Spear aircraft.

Over the next two and a half years the MC–130W inventory will grow to a total

of twelve aircraft as the donor aircraft from the Air National Guard are converted.

In addition to the AFSOC inventory, Air Education and Training Command (AETC)

owns three MC–130Hs and four MC–130Ps used to train our new aircrew. Finally,

as part of our total force, the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) own and operate

ten MC–130E and have four more in flyable storage, while the Pennsylvania Air National Guard (PAANG) at Harrisburg own and operate a total of seven EC–130Js.

Modernization efforts are being coordinated across the entire AFC–130 inventory.

As a result of the USAF C–130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) Nunn

McCurdy actions, OSD/AT&L mandated a revised acquisition strategy for modernizing the C–130 fleet be developed and briefed. The Avionics Modernization Program

has already been approved as the way-ahead for 222 Air Mobility Command aircraft

and pending a decision by OSD/AT&L may be the modernization strategy for

AFSOC aircraft. Another AF wide sustainment-modernization program with dramatic impact to AFSOC is the C–130 Center Wing Box replacement schedule. Both

the MC–130H and AC–130U are scheduled to have their center wing boxes replaced

by the enhanced service life box.

Mr. SMITH. In terms of recapitalization efforts, what action have you taken to date

and what can the subcommittee do to assist in this effort?

General WOOLEY. We have worked closely with Air Combat Command and

USSOCOM to complete the formalized validation process required by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. In October 2006 the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) received Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validation. Since then we have completed an Analysis of Alternatives and produced a

Capability Development Document or CDD. We are currently waiting the final stage

of validation from the JROC via memorandum regarding the HC/MC–130 Recapitalization CDD. We believe we have provided the required documentation and the

memorandum providing validation of the CDD should be forthcoming shortly.

With Congressional approval of fiscal year 2008 advance procurement funds and

the JROC’s endorsement of our urgent need to begin procuring new aircraft, I am

hopeful that the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OSD/ATL) and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/

AQ) will move forward quickly to begin the acquisition. It is my understanding the

determination of an acquisition strategy regarding full and open competition or a

sole-source action has yet to be decided. This appears to be the biggest issue at this

point. Once that acquisition decision is made we will have better visibility on meeting the warfighter required IOC, and enact the recapitalization effort for this critical

capability.

Congressional support for the recapitalization of our HC/MC–130 fleet will be

vital in maintaining the acquisition rate once a strategy is in place. With the aging

of our C–130 fleet, it is critical to ensure funding and timelines for recapitalization

are maintained.

Mr. SMITH. How has your component command supported or taken steps to execute the vision contained in the Capstone Concept for Special Operations 2006?

General HEJLIK. The vision statement from the U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command’s (MARSOC) Campaign Plan, published in April 2006, clearly

aligns MARSOC’s way ahead with the vision of the Capstone Concept for Special

Operations from 2006.

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MARSOC is charged with organizing, training, equipping and deploying highly capable, flexible, and mature special operations forces with the ability to seamlessly

integrate with joint special operations forces, interagency representatives, conventional forces, or partner nation militaries. Our primary goal is to build a special operations force with long term relevancy that the U.S. Special Operations Command

(USSOCOM) can successfully employ across the spectrum of Special Operations

Forces (SOF) mission requirements.

People are our center of gravity. MARSOC has the capability to assess and select

from a qualified population of recruited and screened candidates to find the right

people to perform special operations missions involving a high degree of political

and physical risk while independent of friendly support. Marine Special Operations

Forces (MARSOF) will be expert conventional warriors first, a platform from which

to build SOF-unique skills to meet or exceed USSOCOM standards. During our initial build, we will capitalize on our investment in training with the execution of our

extended five year tour policy.

MARSOC will provide the indirect forces of choice for supported commanders. To

that end, MARSOC will prioritize language and cultural training for the majority

of its operating forces, with further emphasis on combat advising and expert instruction of partner nation forces. We will continue our contribution to USSOCOM’s

world wide standard for regionally-focused, persistent engagement designed to develop lasting relationships with partner nations. Similarly, MARSOC will maintain

and refine our direct action and special reconnaissance capability in order to swiftly

and conclusively deal with emerging counter-terror opportunities.

This is a critical juncture in our common history and future as MARSOC. We are

in the initial stages of a campaign to create a new warrior archetype. Combining

the tenacity, espirit de corps, and indomitable spirit of our Marine heritage with the

independence, maturity, and cultural awareness of the SOF operator will ensure the

MARSOC of 2015 is actively engaged in influencing partner nations, providing critical training to support nascent democracies and taking action to find and stop the

spread of terrorism in critical regions of the world.

Mr. SMITH. What is your view of recruiting and retention? a. What is the general

quality of recruits and is there a need to improve recruiting methods? What steps

are in place to make such improvements? b. What is the general state of retention?

What steps have been taken or need to be taken to maintain an effective retention

situation?

General HEJLIK. U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) recruiting is in its infancy. We currently have five recruiters and a recruiting senior

non-commissioned officer but need to grow the recruiter pool if we are to fill sic to

eight 80-man assessment and selection classes per year in order to achieve our staffing goals. Initial assumptions were that many Marines would be very interested in

coming to MARSOC and we would have more interest than we have billets. We are

currently working with the manpower section of the Marine Corps on MARSOC’s

unique manpower requirements to include non-standard tour lengths, assignment

process, and retention process required for this unit to function. Additionally, we are

establishing and codifying the processes required to make finding the correct Marines for MARSOC a Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps priority.

Currently MARSOC has conducted three assessment and selection courses. To

date, our attrition rate is approximately 70 percent. This includes Marines dropped

for medical reasons, failure to meet course standards, or because they chose to quit

the course. Through Fiscal Year 2008, Marine Recruiting and Assessment is responsible for filling all operational billets within MARSOC.

Internally, MARSOC is also taking steps to improve the recruiting process and

generate appeal among Marines about opportunities in Special Operations. A

MARSOC Recruiting Website was recently created and a MARSOC Recruiting Film

is in development. The film, scripted to highlight MARSOC’s legacy in World War

II Marine Raider Units and Vietnam Combat Advisors, will highlight MARSOC’s

critical role in our Nation’s War on Terrorism and educate Marines about Special

Operations.

Recruiting methods will be improved by bringing professional military recruiters

in to educate them on the standards required in successful recruits. We are developing a plan that requires an increase in recruiting structure and manning those billets from recruiting school graduates along with a senior non-commissioned officer

or Warrant Officer career recruiter.

The following SOF recruiting incentives and retention entitlements have been approved for various MARSOC Marines and Sailors based on the governing order: Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP) was approved for Operational and combat support billets. Levels 2 through 5 are authorized based on billet assignment within

MARSOC. Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) for enlisted members serving in critical

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primary skills within MARSOC who have more than 25 years of active service is

authorized. The Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) is authorized for enlisted

members serving in critical primary skills within MARSOC who have more than 19

but less than 25 years of active service.

Every first term Marine in MARSOC gets interviewed, and informed what their

options are in relation to retention, by his or her Career Retention Specialist (CRS)

and either his or her Battalion Commanding Officer or Company Commander. First

term Marines are interviewed at least twice before they become eligible for reenlistment. We are in the process of creating a First Term Alignment Plan brief that will

be given to Marines to inform them on available options to stay within MARSOC.

Career Marines that have not put in for reenlistment within six to nine months of

their end of service will be interviewed and informed of their options. MARSOC as

a whole has very little problems with retention at this time. For Fiscal Year 2007

we are at 155 percent of our mission for first term Marines and 126 percent for career Marines.

Mr. SMITH. What exactly is MARSOCs ‘‘build plan’’ for personnel and equipment

agreed to by U.S. SOCOM and the U.S. Marine Corps?

General HEJLIK. The approved personnel plan for the U.S. Marine Corps Special

Operations Command (MARSOC) was a three year build plan with the understanding that an additional 45 Marine High Demand Low Density billets would not be

completely filled until Fiscal Year 2010 for a total of 2,290 Marine billets, 191 Navy

billets, 2 Army billets and 33 civilian billets. MARSOC is currently at 88.73 percent

for overall staffing of the 1,892 personnel authorized during Fiscal Year 2007.

The MARSOC equipment build plan is designed to support the personnel build

plan. The goal of the equipment build plan is to meet Full Operational Capability

no later than First Quarter of Fiscal Year 2009. MARSOC will continue to build capability under this construct until it is Fully Mission Capable in Fiscal Year 2010.

The equipment required has been identified to both the U.S. Marine Corps and

the U.S. Special Operations Command. The fielding of this equipment is aligned

with the personnel build plan in order to match the two and provide an operational

capability.

As emerging requirements for equipment are identified through operational deployments, these requirements or capability gaps will be addressed to the appropriate headquarters in accordance with the Joint Capabilities Integrated Documentation System.

Mr. SMITH. According to your testimony, the completion of some MARSOC manning requirements will not occur in some ‘‘high demand, low-intensity specialties’’

until after the FY 2008 deadline due to throughput capacity at formal schools. Are

these Marine Corps schools? Where are they located?

General HEJLIK. The U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC)

will be short 42 intelligence Marines (primarily HUMINT and SIGINT) after the

Fiscal Year 2008 deadline. The below data lays out by primary military occupational

specialty (MOS) the intelligence Marines MARSOC will be short during this timeframe and the schools they will attend:

Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Intelligence Officers will be short 1 officer (MOS 0202). The 0202’s are trained at a 10-week U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)

course at Navy-Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC), Dam Neck,

Virginia. This is a career-level, MOS-producing school where officers at the rank of

Captain from the four officer specialties (ground, air, HUMINT and SIGINT) are

trained to be well-rounded intelligence officers.

Counterintelligence/HUMINT specialist (MOS 0211) will be short 19 Marines. The

0211’s (typically enlisted ranks E–5 through E–8) are trained at a 16-week USMC

course at NMITC.

Counterintelligence/HUMINT Officer (MOS 0210—Warrant Officer (WO)) will be

short 3 Marines and are generally accessed from the 0211 population and don’t necessarily need to attend the MOS producing course at NMITC. The 0210 population

in the Marine Corps is small, meaning the 11 Warrant Officers for MARSOC would

be a healthy percentage of these professionals.

MAGTF Intelligence Specialist (MOS 0231) will be short 2 Marines and attend a

12-week USMC course at NMITC.

Communications Signal Collection/Manual Morse Operator/Analyst (MOS 2621)

will be short 9 Marines and attend a 15-week combined Navy and Marine course

at Corry Station.

Tactical Data Network Operator (MOS 2651) will be short 2 Marine and attend

an 18-week USMC course at Corry Station.

Arabic Cryptologic Linguist (MOS 2671) will be short 4 Marines and attend 63

week joint language course at Defense Language Institute, Monterey, California,

with a 10-week follow-on USMC course at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas.

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Mr. SMITH. In terms of professional development, what will occur when select Marines complete their initial schooling and finally report to MARSOC? Does a plan

exist to build upon their basic skills? Will additional ‘‘joint-like’’ schooling occur to

ensure seamless, interoperability with the rest of SOF? If not, then why not?

General HEJLIK. As noted above, U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command

(MARSOC) Marines completing Recruiting Screening Assessment and Selection

(RSAS) and Individual Training Course (ITC) will go on to unit level training in Marine Special Operations Teams (MSOTs) as part of the Marine Special Operations

Advisory Group (MSOAG) or in MSOTs as part of Marine Special Operations Companies (MSOCs) in the Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOBs). Designated

personnel will go on to advanced schooling as necessary depending on where their

parent unit is in the deployment cycle. Advanced schooling can include additional

language and cultural training for those Marines who demonstrate language proclivity during the Initial Acquisition Program for language and culture in ITC and have

the appropriate Defense Language Aptitude Battery score, and advanced training in

Special Operations Forces (SOF) specific skills at the unit level, at the Marine Special Operations School (i.e. breaching, language, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape), at other Service or SOF component schools (i.e. Airborne, Joint Special Operations Medical Course, and Military Free Fall) or USMC schools (i.e. USMC sniper).

Joint training occurs through informal coordination between MSOCs/MSOTs and

their counterparts in Operational Detachments from Army Special Forces and U.S.

Navy Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) teams. If an MSOT is engaging with a partner nation in alternation with another SOF unit, they will coordinate with that unit to

maximize efficiencies and exchange of pertinent information about the host nation,

tactics, techniques, procedures, and development of that host nation’s partnered

forces. MSOCs are already training with the Naval Special Warfare Command’s

Special Boat Team (SBT) assets during their pre-deployment training to develop the

habitual relationship for conduct of Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure while underway aboard a Marine Expeditionary Unit. MSOCs are also coordinating with the

Special Forces Groups who form the core of the Joint Special Operations Task

Forces forward in order to synchronize their pre-deployment training schedules to

allow for interoperability and exposure. MSOCs also coordinate with Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) assets to conduct air assault operations and

Close Air Support training when these assets are available.

There is no substitute for conducting side by side operations with other SOF

forces, and MARSOC has done this successfully in Fiscal Year 2006 and Fiscal Year

2007 around the world. Only with years of experience will there be truly ‘‘seamless

interoperability’’ between SOF forces, but the current deployment tempo has ensured that generations of SOF Marines, Airmen, Soldiers, and Sailors have been

able to work together, learn from one another, and get past many of the cultural

differences and conflicts that existed as recently as a decade ago when attempting

to conduct joint operations.

Mr. SMITH. Please explain the ‘‘closed loop’’ concept for personnel management at

MARSOC. What does this mean? What are the strengths and weaknesses to both

SOF and the Marine Corps writ large?

General HEJLIK. There are three key elements a component has to consider when

creating Special Operations Forces (SOF). The first is selection based on a set of

criteria that need to be pre-existing within the Marine and Sailor (in the Army Special Forces, this comes in the form of Special Forces Assessment and Selection and

in the Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEALs) this comes in the form of Basic Underwater

Demolitions School). MARSOC screens, assesses and selects for effective intelligence, leadership, maturity, people skills, judgment, physical fitness, and determination with its Recruiting Screening Assessment and Selection (RSAS) program.

These are attributes that must exist in the individual that cannot be trained to and

can be measured quantitatively or qualitatively through the screening and selection

process.

The second key element in creating quality SOF forces is investment in SOF specific skills to a unique set of conditions and standards. This can include everything

from specialized insertion and extraction skills such as military free fall (MFF)

parachuting and combat diving to practical application of SOF specific equipment

related to special reconnaissance, to investment in language and culture or survival,

evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) training. This investment works from the

same basic skill areas that conventional forces use to form the core of their training—shoot, move, communicate, survival, medical—but take a step beyond. This investment initially occurs across the SOF component in the form of an initial training course (for the Army Special Forces this is the Special Forces Qualification

Course and for the Navy SEALS this comes in the form of SEAL Qualification

Training) such as the Individual Training Course (ITC) that MARSOC will start in

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October 2008. Follow-on investment will occur in the form of advanced training in

SOF specific skills at the unit level, at the Marine Special Operations School (i.e.

breaching, language, SERE), at other Service or SOF component schools (i.e. Airborne, Joint Special Operations Medical Course, and MFF) or USMC schools (i.e.

USMC sniper).

The third key element is return on investment or retention of ‘‘mature SOF.’’ Taking a Marine non-commissioned officer, sailor, or junior officer and investing in

RSAS, ITC, and advanced skills creates a SOF Warrior, but he needs to be seasoned

with experience that can only be gained by operational deployments before he can

be considered ‘‘mature SOF’’—the bread and butter of the U.S. Special Operations

Command (USSOCOM) engagement strategy. What we are looking to build at

MARSOC is the SOF senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) who has joint operational experience, a myriad of advanced skills, is multilingual, and has developed

relationships with partner nations that can be leveraged at the strategic level in the

long term. This investment of both training and experience necessitates extended

tours, and in some cases, a ‘‘closed loop’’ personnel system to ensure appropriate return on SOF specific investment for MARSOC and USSOCOM. This impacts Marine

Corps manpower management because MARSOC attracts and targets high quality

NCOs, senior NCOs, and junior officers removing this group from the conventional

operating forces. The five year extended tour in MARSOC serves our initial integration of MARSOC into USSOCOM with the eventual goal of achieving USSOCOM’s

‘closed loop’ personnel system.

Mr. SMITH. Have you considered utilizing the existing USASOC schoolhouse infrastructure for developing MARSOC Special Operators?

General HEJLIK. The U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC)

uses existing U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) infrastructure to

the greatest extent possible by sending MARSOC Marines to skill courses such as

Military Free Fall, Ranger, and the Joint Special Operations Medical Course. The

Special Forces Assessment and Special Forces Qualification Course could be leveraged by MARSOC and has been evaluated in detail at the Marine Special Operations School (MSOS) when developing the Recruiting Screening Assessment and

Selection (RSAS) and Individual Training Course (ITC), but USASOC has different

requirements to fill. MARSOC has a different input than USASOC and different

guidance from the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in its mission

guidance letter, therefore MARSOC requires a MARSOC-unique baseline Special

Operations Forces (SOF) specific school and selection process. The costs of sending

MARSOC Marines to schools include filling instructor billets in proportion to allocated school seats with MARSOC operators and a lesser priority level at some SOF

specific skill schools.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY

Mr. THORNBERRY. How indicative is the current readiness reporting system of actual unit readiness? What recommendations do you have to improve the monitoring

and reporting of unit readiness?

General BROWN. Current readiness reporting systems provide a basis for determining actual unit readiness. However, there are many other factors that must be

considered in order for we can develop a more complete picture of Special Operations Forces (SOF) readiness.

One of the biggest challenges is that SOF units submit readiness reports to their

respective Services and not directly to the U.S. Special Operations Command

(USSOCOM). This command does not have its own specific readiness reporting system. In order to derive data on our SOF components, we must utilize each of the

Services’ current systems and these systems are tailored Service needs and rather

than USSOCOM needs.

Each Service system measures personnel, equipment-on-hand, equipment condition, training, and an overall assessment of command readiness. Each Service has

differing standards for measuring these readiness areas and each have a unique

philosophy on the way readiness is maintained in its units. The end result is that

USSOCOM must extract readiness data on SOF units from Service databases, break

down the data, interpolate information, and then cross-level the various inputs in

an effort to make a readiness assessment that covers our forces across the board.

This is very time consuming and is often open to much debate within the command

and the services.

A second issue is that Service readiness reports only measure equipment-on-hand

and equipment condition status against Service provided equipment. However, SOF

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units have significant quantities of SOF-peculiar equipment which is not measured

in Service readiness reports.

USSOCOM has taken steps to make readiness reporting of SOF units more relevant for our purposes. The ultimate goal will be a tailored readiness report with

SOF units reporting directly to USSOCOM.

Mr. THORNBERRY. What impact has the current restriction of one involuntarily

mobilization of Reserve and National Guard troops for a named conflict had on

SOCOM’s ability to effectively meet its world-wide mission requirements?

General BROWN. The current restriction of one involuntarily mobilization of Reserve and National Guard troops for a named conflict has had no negative impact

on the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). USSOCOM is able to meet

mission requirements while complying with current policy.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Some graduates of the Special Forces Qualification Course arrive at their units without having met the graduation requirement of a 1/1/1 rating

on the Defense Language Proficiency Test. What steps are taken to retrain them

and how effective has that been? Additionally, some SF graduates are reassigned

before the completion of the Qualification Course to a SF Group that requires a different target language than that in which the graduate has been trained. How often

does this happen and why? What is done to ensure they are culturally and language

proficient for the target region of their new Group?

General WAGNER. To put our response in perspective, in 2004 the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) raised the initial language standard from

0+0+ to 1/1/1. Since July 2004, we have graduated over 2,500 Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Soldiers and 98 percent achieved 1/1/1 before reporting to

their unit. Thus a very small percentage of graduates of the Special Forces (SF)

Qualification Course arrive at their units without having met our self imposed graduation standard of a 1/1/1 rating on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT).

Soldiers failing to meet the 1/1/1 DLPT standard on the first attempt are immediately placed into a six week intensive retraining program. This retraining program

meets the requirements specified in the Department of Defense Instruction for Soldiers in order to retake the DLPT. If a Soldier fails to meet the 1/1/1 DLPT standard after retaking a second DLPT, a formal board of officers will determine if the

Soldier should be allowed to continue training and be assigned to an operational

unit. The board reviews each Soldier’s entire training and academic record when determining suitability for continued training and assignment to an operational unit.

If the board determines that a Soldier should be allowed to continue training, the

1st Special Warfare Training Group Commander signs a memorandum that is forwarded to the Soldier’s gaining unit commander notifying that the Soldier requires

further language training. Each Operational Group has a robust unit language

sustainment training program designed and resourced to provide Soldiers with the

tools to maintain and improve required language skills. Unit Language Program

Managers are able to tailor continued language training to meet the specific requirements of these Soldiers. Bottom line: The Special Forces language training program

is a major success operating above a 98 percent 1/1/1 graduation rate.

Reassignment before the completion of the Qualification Course to a SF Group

that requires a different target language than that in which the graduate has been

trained is a very rare occurrence. It should also be noted that the five Active Duty

SF Groups have multiple language, and overlapping, language requirements. Thus,

there are no wrong languages to know in any group as most adversaries and target

countries operate in a global environment such that within their own boundaries

they, and we, encounter languages ‘‘foreign’’ to the nation with which we are engaged. Every effort is made to assign Soldiers to the group requiring the target language in which they have been trained. The ten core languages that are taught during the SF Qualification Course span multiple operational units and regions of the

world. Assignment of Soldiers to an operational group that requires a different language than that in which the soldier was trained in initial acquisition training is

triggered by extremely rare circumstances; i.e. exceptional family member program,

compassionate reassignment, medical or unforecasted critical personnel shortfalls in

one of the operational groups.

SF units conduct routine and detailed analysis and study of their respective operational areas. Soldiers assigned under these afore mentioned exceptional circumstances will participate in these events with their fellow Soldiers who have extensive regional expertise. These Soldiers can also become invaluable when unexpected language requirements emerge in the global environment.

Mr. THORNBERRY. What is the MSOC’s command relationship with the MEU on

which it is deployed and how will the MSOC be operationally employed from the

MEU once in the theater of operations?

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Gerneral HEJLIK. The U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command’s

(MARSOC) forces are commanded and controlled in accordance with U.S. Code Title

10, Joint Doctrine, and the associated Joint Staff and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) deployment orders. USSOCOM executes command and control

(COCOM) of MARSOC forces. Inherent in COCOM is the execution of operational

control (OPCON) of MARSOC forces in the United States. When MARSOC forces

deploy overseas, they are under the OPCON of the associated Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and OPCON is normally delegated to the Theater Special Operation Command (TSOC).

MSOCs deploy with the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or as directed by

USSOCOM in support of GCC operational requirements. When embarked with a

MEU the MSOC is OPCON to the associated TSOC. The TSOC has the authority

and flexibility to delegate tactical control (TACON) of the MSOC to the MEU in support of specific operational requirements. The TSOC retains OPCON throughout the

exercise or operation.

Our recent deployments from January 2007 to February 2008 have resulted in the

MSOC remaining OPCON to the TSOC or delegation of OPCON to one of their subordinate Joint Special Operations Task Forces. The MEU maintains an OPCON relationship with the associated Naval Force (NAVFOR) while afloat and transfers

OPCON once ashore to the associated Marine Force Commander (MARFOR) or

Land Component Commander.

The MSOC re-embarks the MEU for the redeployment transit to the continental

U.S. Once embarked; the MSOC continues its OPCON relationship with the associated TSOC until arrival in the continental U.S.

Mr. THORNBERRY. What needs to be done to ensure AFSOC has enough airlift capacity to meet the operational needs associated with a larger SOF organization?

General WOOLEY. The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) needs to

increase the capacity and capability of its mobility fleet to support the growth of

the ground and naval forces in Special Operations Forces (SOF). This capacity and

capability increase should be provided as rapidly as possible to insure we are able

to meet our operational commitments.

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