IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SUSAN DOBRZENIECKI )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

) No. 11 C 7956

REBECCA VELA-SAILSBERY, )

ROBERT GROSSMAN, TIMOTHY HOLEVIS )

CHRISTOPHER MUELLER, )

ST. JAMES HOSPITAL, and HEIDI BROWN, )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES F. HOLDERMAN, District Judge:

On November 9, 2009, Peter Dobrzeniecki (“Peter”), the adult son of plaintiff Susan 

Dobrzeniecki (“Susan”), was shot in the face, setting in motion a series of events that included 

the involuntary commitment of Susan and a warrantless search of the Dobrzenieckis’ Sauk 

Village, Illinois home by the police. On November 8, 2011, Susan and her now-deceased 

husband, Thomas Dobrzeniecki, Sr. (“Thomas”), filed this lawsuit against several Sauk Village 

police officers, as well as St. James Hospital and two of its emergency room doctors.

1

During the course of this litigation, Susan has amended her complaint four times. (Dkt. 

Nos. 5, 30, 99, 178.) Susan’s fourth amended complaint (“Fourth Amended Complaint”) (Dkt. 

No. 178 (“Am. Compl.”)) contains six counts: two claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

1 Thomas passed away on October 1, 2013, (Dkt. No. 137 ¶ 4), leaving Susan as the sole 

plaintiff proceeding on behalf of herself and as the court-appointed administrator of her 

deceased husband’s estate. (Dkt. No. 248 ¶ 1.)

 
against Sauk Village Acting Chief of Police Rebecca Vela-Sailsbery (“Vela-Sailsbery”)2 for 

illegal seizure of Susan’s person (Count I) and her purse and keys (Count II); a § 1983 claim 

against Vela-Sailsbery and three other Sauk Village police officers—Timothy Holevis 

(“Holevis”), Robert Grossman (“Grossman”), and Christopher Mueller (“Mueller”) (collectively, 

the “Sauk Village Defendants”)—for illegal entry into and search of the Dobrzenieckis’ home 

(Count III); and claims for medical malpractice (Count VI), intentional infliction of emotional 

distress (Count VII), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VIII) against Dr. Heidi 

Brown (“Dr. Brown”) and St. James Hospital (“St. James”) (collectively, the “Hospital 

Defendants”). 3 The Sauk Village Defendants and the Hospital Defendants have moved 

separately for summary judgment on all of Susan’s claims. (Dkt. Nos. 168, 171, 207.) For the 

following reasons, the Sauk Village Defendants’ motion is denied, and the Hospital Defendants’ 

motions are granted in part and denied in part.

RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In November 2009, Susan, Thomas, and their son Peter lived together in Sauk Village, 

Illinois. (Dkt. No. 209 ¶ 3.) Susan remains a Sauk Village resident as well as a Sauk Village 

employee, where she has worked as a building inspector or an administrative clerk since 2003, 

with the exception of a six-month period in 2009. (Dkt. No. 178 ¶ 11.) Until his death in 2013, 

Thomas suffered from multiple sclerosis. (Dkt. No. 244 ¶ 24.) Susan contends that in November 

2009, Thomas was not physically capable of walking without assistance of a family member or a 

2 Both Susan and Vela-Sailsbery herself have previously spelled Vela-Sailsbery’s name as 

“Salisbery.” (See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 43, 46.) The parties have since corrected the spelling to 

“Sailsbery.”

3 After this court dismissed Counts IV and V, (Dkt. No. 60), Susan did not renumber the 

counts contained in her Fourth Amended Complaint.

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rollater, nor was he capable of walking downstairs. (Id.) The Sauk Village Defendants dispute 

Thomas’s physical limitations, (Dkt. No. 244 ¶ 24), notwithstanding the fact that Vela-Sailsbery

has previously stated on a sworn document that Thomas was “bed ridden” in November 2009

(Dkt. No. 213 at 3).

I. Peter’s Shooting

Early on the morning of November 9, 2009, Susan’s son Peter was shot in the face in 

Chicago Heights, Illinois. (Dkt. No. 248 ¶ 2.) At about 10:30 a.m., in the parking lot outside 

Susan’s place of work, Vela-Sailsbery told Susan that her son had been shot, (id. ¶ 3), after 

which Susan became upset and started crying because she thought that her son might be dead or 

dying (id. ¶ 4). Susan said something to the effect of “I’m a good person. Why does this keep 

happening to me? If he dies, I want to die.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Sherry Jasinski (“Jasinski”), Susan’s 

supervisor and best friend, drove Susan to St. James to see her son. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.)

After telling Susan that Peter had been shot, Vela-Sailsbery spoke with Sauk Village 

Chief of Staff Burnetta Hill-Corley (“Hill-Corley”) in the Sauk Village administrative building. 

(Id. ¶ 8.) According to her testimony, Vela-Sailsbery then left the administrative building to go to 

lunch with her assistant, Lisa Gibbons (“Gibbons”). (Dkt. No. 212 at 12:5-14-6.) Sometime 

before Vela-Sailsbery and Gibbons ate lunch, however, Vela-Sailsbery received a call on her cell 

phone from Hill-Corley directing her to come to St. James. (Id. at 14:23-24.) Susan disputes 

Vela-Sailsbery’s reason for coming to St. James, contending that Vela-Sailsbery did so because 

she suspected Susan might be involved in the shooting of her son. (Dkt. No. 248 ¶ 9.)

Upon arriving at St. James, Vela-Sailsbery told a nurse that Susan had said that she “just 

wanted to die.” (Dkt. No. 209 ¶ 19.) The parties dispute whether Vela-Sailsbery also informed 

the nurse of the context—specifically, that Susan made her comments immediately after 

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Vela-Sailsbery informed her that Peter had been shot. (Dkt. No. 249 ¶ 19.) After speaking with 

the nurse, Vela-Sailsbery filled out a petition (“Petition”) (Dkt. No. 213 (“Pet.”)) to commit 

Susan involuntarily. (Dkt. No. 209 ¶ 20.) Vela-Sailsbery states that she decided to initiate the 

commitment process because of the “dire gravity of the scene [at St. James],” and 

Vela-Sailsbery’s desire “to seek attention for [her] colleague.”4 (Dkt. No. 208 at 8.) Susan 

disputes that Vela-Sailsbery’s actions arose out of her personal concern for Susan’s well-being. 

Instead, Susan asserts that Vela-Sailsbery’s actions were in retaliation for Susan’s and the 

Dobrzenieckis’ long-simmering disputes with the Sauk Village police department and 

Vela-Sailsbery’s personal suspicion that Susan was involved in the shooting of her own son.

5

II. The Petition

Susan asserts that in completing the Petition, Vela-Sailsbery made a number of false 

statements that led to Susan being committed against her will. First, Vela-Sailsbery checked 

boxes on the Petition stating (1) Susan was mentally retarded, (2) Vela-Sailsbery had a legal 

interest in the matter, and (3) Vela-Sailsbery had a financial interest in the matter. (Dkt. No. 248 

¶ 13.) The nurse later scratched out Vela-Sailsbery’s answers and wrote “Error” on the 

erroneously completed sections of the Petition. (Id.) Second, the Petition contains a section to list 

the names and addresses of Susan’s spouse, parent, guardian, substitute decision-maker, close 

relative, or friend. (Pet. at 4.) In the absence of listing any names, the petitioner must certify that 

he or she conducted a diligent inquiry to identify and locate a spouse, parent, guardian, substitute 

4 In the Petition, Vela-Sailsbery describes her relationship to Susan as “Police Officer. No 

relationship.” (Pet. at 4.)

5 Susan’s Fourth Amended Complaint chronicles at length the purported animosity between 

the Dobrzenieckis and the Sauk Village police department. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.) Her Rule 

56 Statement does not rehash the specific conflicts.

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decision-maker, close relative, or friend. (Id.) Vela-Sailsbery failed to conduct any inquiry and 

instead listed herself, despite the fact that (1) on the same page, she described herself as having 

“no relationship” with Susan, (id.), and (2) Susan’s “best friend” Jasinski was also at St. James at 

the time. Third, Vela-Sailsbery certified that she made a good faith attempt to determine whether 

Susan had executed a power of attorney for health care. (Id. at 4.) Susan contends that 

Vela-Sailsbery made no such inquiry. (Dkt. No. 248 at 16.) Fourth, Vela-Sailsbery stated on the 

Petition that Susan said “I just want to die, I do, I just want to die.” (Pet. at 3.) Susan asserts that 

Vela-Sailsbery intentionally omitted the context—Susan had just learned that her son had been 

shot—and misrepresented Susan’s statement, which was actually “If he dies, I want to die.” (Dkt. 

No. 248 ¶ 17.)

III. Susan’s Seclusion

After Vela-Sailsbery completed the Petition, Susan agreed to speak with a St. James 

nurse, who took Susan to a St. James “seclusion” room. (Dkt. No. 209 ¶ 23.) Another St. James 

nurse “triaged” Susan and noted, according to the Petition, that Susan had “made comments 

[that] she wants to die,” and was “non-compliant with psych meds.” (Id. ¶ 24.)

The parties agree that Vela-Sailsbery entered the seclusion room with a St. James nurse,

who asked Susan to take off her clothes and put on a robe. (Dkt. No. 248 ¶ 18; Dkt. No. 209 ¶ 

26.) The parties appear to dispute that Susan complied, but stated that she first wanted to give her 

purse to Jasinski, her best friend, who was waiting in the hall outside the seclusion room. (Dkt. 

No. 248 ¶ 18.) Susan asserts that Vela-Sailsbery agreed to give Susan’s purse to Jasinski and that 

Susan then gave her purse to Vela-Sailsbery based on that assurance. (Id.) Vela-Sailsbery 

contends that “Sailsbery was given the purse by [Susan]. [Susan]’s purse was taken by hospital 

staff.” (Dkt. No. 244 ¶ 18.)

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Vela-Sailsbery upon leaving the seclusion room did not, however, give Susan’s purse to 

Jasinski. (Dkt. No. 248 ¶ 19.) Vela-Sailsbery contends that she determined that because Susan 

was being admitted to St. James, her purse was “property turned over to me,” which 

Vela-Sailsbery decided to keep based on “officer discretion.” (Dkt. No. 212 at 8:13-23.) Instead 

of giving Susan’s purse to Jasinski, Vela-Sailsbery took Susan’s purse back to Sauk Village Hall 

and placed it in a filing cabinet. (Dkt. No. 209 ¶ 28.)

IV. Warrantless Search of Dobrzeniecki Family Home by Sauk Village Police

At approximately 3:00 p.m. on November 9, 2009, Detective Grossman and two of his 

fellow Sauk Village police officers—Mueller and Holevis—went to the Dobrzenieckis’ home in 

Sauk Village, purportedly to conduct a “wellness check” on Thomas (Dkt. No. 209 ¶¶ 43-45; 

Dkt. No. 248 ¶ 22.) The officers claim that Thomas walked down the stairs to greet them at the 

door and invited them in, (id. ¶ 46-47), while Susan asserts that the officers’ version of events is 

impossible because Thomas was not physically capable of walking down stairs. (Dkt. No. 248 ¶ 

24.) Instead, Susan claims that the officers entered her home using keys from her seized purse.

(Dkt. No. 248 ¶ 22.) Susan’s and Thomas’s other son, Tom Dobrzeniecki, Jr. (“Tom Jr.”), 

arrived as the officers were leaving and observed Grossman standing over Susan’s car with her 

keys in his hand. (Id. ¶ 26.)

Although the officers’ stated basis for entering the Dobrzenieckis’ home was to perform a 

“wellness check” on Thomas, they acknowledge searching for a firearm once they were inside

the home. (Dkt. No. 209 ¶ 50.) The extent of the officers’ search is disputed. The officers claim 

they looked only for a firearm lying out in the open, (id.), while Tom Jr. testified that every 

drawer in Susan’s bedroom was tossed and open and that “stuff [was] [lying] all over the place.” 

(Dkt. No. 248 ¶ 25.)

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V. Susan’s Medical Treatment at St. James

From about 2:15 to approximately 2:42 p.m. on November 9, 2009, Dr. Brown examined 

Susan in the seclusion room, (Dkt. No. 201 ¶ 4), and ultimately ordered that Susan be held in 

seclusion for her safety because she presented an “elopement” risk and a risk of harm to herself. 

(Dkt. No. 209 ¶ 25.)

Susan and Dr. Brown dispute the rigor of Dr. Brown’s examination. Dr. Brown asserts

that she conducted a physical examination of Susan, ordered lab tests, and spoke with Susan 

about the stressors in her life. (Dkt. No. 186 ¶¶ 18, 19.) Based on Susan’s statement to 

Vela-Sailsbery and the “other stressful events” in Susan’s life, Dr. Brown became convinced that 

Susan may be suicidal. (Id. ¶ 23.) 

Susan does not dispute that Dr. Brown ultimately came to such a conclusion, but 

contends that Dr. Brown did so based on an inadequate examination. Susan asserts that Dr. 

Brown failed to ask any questions about suicidality, (Dkt. No. 201 ¶ 7), erroneously noted that 

Susan had a family history of suicide, (id. ¶ 8), and specifically ignored the four categories that 

Dr. Brown was directed to evaluate on the St. James’s “Psych/Medical Clearance 

Template”—Orientation, Judgment and Insight, Memory, and Mood and Affect (id. ¶ 9a-f). In 

place of the examination protocol set forth by St. James, Susan states that Dr. Brown blindly

relied on the false statements in the Petition. For example, Susan contends that Dr. Brown 

accepted Vela-Sailsbery’s allegedly false statements on the Petition without ever speaking to 

Vela-Sailsbery or Jasinski, both of whom were at St. James. Similarly, Susan asserts that Dr. 

Brown failed to confirm Susan’s current “medication profile,” which would have revealed that 

Susan was not, in fact, “non-compliant with [her] psych meds,” as indicated on the Petition. (Id.

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¶ 11.) The physician certificate (“Certificate”) supporting Susan’s commitment supports Susan’s 

version of Dr. Brown’s examination. (Dkt. No. 172 Ex. H at 33.) 

Under 405 ILCS 5/3-602, a physician must complete a certificate stating the clinical 

observations and factual information relied upon in reaching a diagnosis. In the Certificate 

supporting Susan’s involuntary commitment, Dr. Brown listed the following three observations: 

(1) “[p]atient stated to co-worker that she wanted to die”; (2) “[p]atient not taking medication 

(Lexapro) prescribed previously”; and (3) “[s]tated to co-work[er] ‘I just want to die, I do, I just 

want to die.” (Id.) Dr. Brown’s observations reflect only the purportedly false statements 

contained in the Petition. By contrast, Dr. Brown did not list any of the observations from her 

examination, which she testified were the bases for her diagnosis that Susan might be suicidal.

Dr. Edward Ward, Susan’s medical expert, testified that Dr. Brown’s examination and 

failure to verify the statements set forth in Vela-Sailsbery’s Petition fell short of the standard of 

care for an emergency room doctor performing an examination that might result in the patient’s 

involuntary commitment. (Dkt. No. 201 ¶ 21.)

VI. Susan’s Transfer to Riveredge Hospital

Around 2:45 p.m. on November 9, 2009, after Dr. Brown completed the Certificate in

support of Susan’s involuntary commitment, Dr. Brown advised Susan that she would need to be 

examined by a psychiatrist. (Dkt. No. 186 ¶ 30.) Dr. Brown also advised Susan that St. James did 

not have any psychiatrists on call and that St. James might have to transfer her to another 

hospital. (Id.) At 6:30 p.m., St. James contacted Riveredge Hospital (“Riveredge”) to inquire 

about accepting Susan as a patient. (Id. ¶ 38.) Sometime between 12:25 a.m. and 3:30 a.m. on 

November 9, 2009—the parties dispute the precise time—St. James transferred Susan to 

Riveredge. (Id. ¶ 39.)

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During the 10-14 hours St. James held Susan in the seclusion room, Susan contends that 

St. James rarely checked on her, failed to provide her a meal at an appropriate interval, and 

refused to permit her to contact her family—all in violation of St. James’s own policies and the 

required standard of care for patients held against their will. (Dkt. No. 199 ¶¶ 15, 25.) Susan also 

asserts that none of St. James’s personnel provided Susan with a description of her rights; instead 

she states that a nurse falsely told her that she was being held pursuant to a court order, which 

she was not permitted to see. (Id. ¶ 12.)

Finally, Susan contends that St. James transferred her to Riveredge without verifying that 

Susan was medically stable for a transfer and without advising Susan of the “risks and benefits” 

of the transfer. (Id. ¶¶ 22.) Dr. Brown, however, signed an “Authorization for Transfer Form” 

stating that St. James staff had, in fact, performed each task. (Id.) Furthermore, when Susan 

refused to sign the form consenting to her transfer, she contends that a St. James nurse falsely 

recorded that Susan was “unable to sign due to [her] physical condition. (Id. ¶ 23.) Susan 

contends that the nurse did this pursuant to a St. James policy which instructs nurses to always 

document “Patient unable to sign due to physical condition,” whenever a patient refuses to 

consent to a transfer. (Id.)

After being transferred to Riveredge, Susan was subjected to a battery of tests and 

released into her own care the next day, November 11, 2009, at 1:50 p.m. (Dkt. No. 186 ¶ 59; 

Compl. ¶ 43.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A grant of summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for 

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its motion and identifying the evidence it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “There is no genuine issue of 

material fact when no reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party.” Brewer v. Bd. 

of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2007). When ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment, the court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. Woodruff v. 

Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2008). The court does not make credibility determinations or 

weigh conflicting evidence. McCann v. Iroquois Mem’l Hosp., 622 F.3d 745, 752 (7th Cir. 

2010).

ANALYSIS

I. Illegal Seizure of Susan (Count I)

In Count I, Susan brings a § 1983 claim against Vela-Sailsbery, alleging that she seized 

Susan when she initiated involuntary commitment proceedings against her in retaliation for the 

Dobrzenieckis’ past run-ins with the Sauk Village Police Department. (Am. Compl. ¶ 55-60.) 

Like an arrest, a civil commitment is a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment, and may only 

be made upon probable cause. Rusinowski v. Village of Hillside, No. 11 C 4772, 2011 WL 

6842509, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2011) (Leinenweber, J.) (citing Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 

792, 795 (7th Cir. 1992)). For an involuntary commitment, probable cause exists “only if there 

are reasonable grounds for believing that the person seized is subject to seizure under the 

governing legal standard.” Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 732 (7th Cir. 2013). In Illinois, 

that standard is met when an officer has “reasonable grounds to believe that the person is subject 

to involuntary admission on an inpatient basis and in need of immediate hospitalization to protect 

such person or others from physical harm.” Rusinowski, 2011 WL 6842509, at *3 (citing 405 

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ILCS 5/3-606). Because probable cause “turns on the assessment of probabilities in particular 

factual contexts . . . it is usually a jury question.” Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271, 1276 (7th Cir. 

1988) (citations omitted). If the material facts are not disputed, however, a court may find 

probably cause as a matter of law. See Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis, 998 F.2d 431, 434 (7th 

Cir. 1993).

Vela-Sailsbery argues that Susan’s crying and statement that “she wanted to die,” 

established reasonable grounds to believe that Susan would harm herself if she was not 

immediately hospitalized. (Dkt. No. 208 at 8.) The court does not agree. 

As a threshold matter, there is an unresolved factual dispute regarding what Susan 

actually said. Vela-Sailsbery stated that Susan said “I just want to die, I do, I just want to die.” 

Susan, by contrast, claims that she said “If [Peter] dies, I want to die.” As this court noted in 

denying Vela-Sailsbery’s motion to dismiss, “such a statement, made by Susan in the immediate 

aftermath of learning [of her son’s shooting], is very different from repeatedly saying that she 

wanted to die.” Dobrzeniecki v. Salisbery, No. 11 C 7956, 2012 WL 1531278, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 

Apr. 27, 2012) (emphasis original).

The gap between the time Susan made the disputed statement about desiring to die and 

the time Vela-Sailsbery reported it similarly does not support a finding of probable cause. 

Probable cause required that Susan be in need of immediate hospitalization to prevent her from 

harming herself. Rusinowski, 2011 WL 6842509, at *3. But Vela-Sailsbery did not act on 

Susan’s purportedly suicidal statement immediately. Instead, after informing Susan of her son’s 

shooting, Vela-Sailsbery first went inside the Sauk Village administrative building and then went 

to lunch with her assistant. She only drove to St. James after receiving a call on her cell phone 

from Hill-Corley. At the summary judgment phase, the court must view the evidence in the light 

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most favorable to the opposing party. See, e.g., Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) 

(citations omitted). Vela-Sailsbery’s actions after hearing Susan’s statement, viewed in the light 

most favorable to Susan, support a finding that Vela-Sailsbery did not truly believe Susan was an 

immediate threat to herself.

Vela-Sailsbery alternatively argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity on Susan’s 

unlawful seizure claim. Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 

(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Officers are not, however, 

protected by qualified immunity when they are “plainly incompetent or . . . knowingly violate the 

law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Vela-Sailsbery argues that the “dire gravity of 

the scene would lead anyone of reasonable prudence to seek attention for their colleague.” (Dkt. 

No. 208 at 8.) She further argues that she reasonably believed that she had probable cause to 

prepare the Petition and, to the extent she did not, her erroneous belief was a good-faith mistake.

(Id. at 12.)

Although qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial, the general rule of 

summary judgment still applies: “courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the 

party seeking summary judgment.” Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866. Here, Vela-Sailsbery’s statements

on the Petition undermine any claims of good-faith mistake. Vela-Sailsbery erroneously described 

Susan as mentally retarded, erroneously described herself—rather than Susan’s best friend who 

was also at St. James—as the “spouse, parent, guardian, substitute decision-maker, close relative, 

or friend,” erroneously described Susan’s statement in the parking lot of the administrative 

building, and omitted the fact that Susan had made the statement earlier in the day and 

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immediately after hearing that Peter had been shot in the face. The veracity of the foregoing 

misstatements is, of course, disputed. But viewed in the light most favorable to Susan, 

Vela-Sailsbery’s statements support a deliberate violation of the law, not a good-faith mistake 

that would entitle Vela-Sailsbery to qualified immunity.

Accordingly, because the existence of probable cause to support Susan’s involuntary 

commitment depends on several disputed material facts, the court cannot grant summary 

judgment in Vela-Sailsbery’s favor on Count I of the Fourth Amended Complaint.

II. Seizure of Susan’s Purse and Keys

In Count II, Susan seeks to recover against Vela-Sailsbery for the separate seizure of her 

purse and keys. Vela-Sailsbery puts forth a number of contradictory arguments which, on their 

own, illustrate why summary judgment is not appropriate. Vela-Sailsbery argues: (i) Susan’s 

purse was seized by the St. James staff, not Vela-Sailsbery (Dkt. No. 208 at 10); (ii) Susan 

voluntarily gave her purse to Vela-Sailsbery (id.); (iii) Vela-Sailsbery lawfully seized Susan’s 

purse pursuant to an inventory search incident to arrest (id. at 11); and (iv) there was no separate 

seizure of Susan’s purse because her person had already been seized through her involuntary 

commitment (id.). Whether Vela-Sailsbery or St. James’s staff seized Susan’s purse is 

unquestionably a material fact, and is a fact that Vela-Sailsbery’s summary judgment filings 

cannot themselves agree on. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 244 ¶ 18 (“Undisputed that Sailsbery was given 

the purse by Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s purse was taken by hospital staff.”)) Consequently, because the

parties seem to dispute who seized Susan’s purse, the question will have to be resolved by the 

trial jury. Vela-Sailsbery’s motion for summary judgment on Count II is denied.

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III. Illegal Search of Dobrzeniecki Family Home

In Count III, Susan alleges that the Sauk Village Defendants violated the Dobrzenieckis’ 

Fourth Amendment rights when the officers entered the Dobrzenieckis’ home using the keys 

from Susan’s purse and searched the home without a warrant. The Sauk Village Defendants 

claim they went to the Dobrzenieckis’ home to conduct a “wellness check” on Thomas. They do 

not offer a reason for wanting to search the Dobrzenieckis’ home, but nevertheless concede they 

were looking for a firearm.

6

The Sauk Village Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the 

warrantless entry and search claim because Thomas let them into the house and consented to the 

search. (Dkt. No. 208 at 13-14.) “A warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment if 

a person possessing, or reasonably believed to possess, authority over the premises voluntarily 

consents to the search.” United States v. King, 627 F.3d 641, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

United States v. Groves, 530 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 2008)). The existence of voluntary consent, 

however, “is a question of fact to be determined based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id.

(citing United States v. Figueroa-España, 511 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Here, whether Thomas actually consented to the search is hotly disputed. The Sauk 

Village Defendants rely on Detective Grossman’s statements that Thomas walked downstairs 

and let the officers in, as well as Thomas’s deposition testimony acknowledging that he 

consented to the entry and search. Susan, by contrast, argues that Grossman’s story is impossible 

and further argues that Thomas’s deposition testimony is inadmissible because he suffered from 

dementia at the time of his deposition. The Sauk Village Defendants concede that the 

6 The Sauk Village Defendants deny that Vela-Sailsbery suspected Susan of shooting her own 

son.

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admissibility of Thomas’s testimony is “an evidentiary issue better suited for motions in limine,”

(Dkt. No. 242 at 8), and the court agrees. Notwithstanding Thomas’s testimony, there are a 

number of other facts that weigh against the existence of consent. The most obvious is that 

Thomas was physically unable to walk down stairs in the manner described by Grossman. 

Although the Sauk Village Defendants dispute Thomas’s mobility, Vela-Sailsbery herself stated 

that Thomas was “bed ridden” when she filled out the commitment Petition roughly an hour 

before the search. (Pet. at 3.) Tom Jr.’s testimony that Grossman had his mother’s keys further 

undercuts Grossman’s story that Thomas let the officers into the house. Finally, the Sauk Village 

Defendants’ stated reason for being at the house—to conduct a “wellness check”—begs the 

question of why the officers would have discussed a search with Thomas in the first place.7

In sum, Susan has presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer 

that Thomas did not consent to the officers’ entry and search of the Dobrzenieckis’ home. 

Because the Sauk Village Defendants have offered no other justification for their warrantless 

entry and search, their motion for summary judgment on Count III must be denied.

IV. Medical Malpractice Claim against the Hospital Defendants (Count VI)

In Count VI, Susan alleges that Dr. Brown and St. James failed to use the requisite 

standard of care and committed medical malpractice by holding Susan at St. James and 

transferring her to Riveredge against her will. Dr. Brown and St. James both argue they are 

entitled to summary judgment on Count VI because Susan has failed to present expert testimony 

establishing the elements of a medical malpractice claim. (Dkt. No. 228 11-12; Dkt. No. 229 at 

7 The Sauk Village Defendants insinuate, but do not expressly argue, that there may have been 

no search because they only looked at items that were in plain view. (Dkt. No. 249 ¶ 50.) 

This fact is also disputed by Tom Jr.’s testimony that when he arrived home, the house was 

tossed and multiple drawers were left open, presumably as a result of the search.

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4-7.) Under Illinois law, a plaintiff bringing a claim of medical negligence must show: “(1) the 

standard of care in the medical community by which the physician’s treatment was measured; (2) 

that the physician deviated from the standard of care; and (3) that a resulting injury was 

proximately cause by the deviation from the standard of care.” Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 

502 (Ill. 2000). And, in most cases, each element must be proven by expert testimony. Purtill v. 

Hess, 489 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ill. 1986).

Dr. Brown and St. James argue that neither of Susan’s disclosed experts, Nurse Przislicki 

and Dr. Ward, testified that Dr. Brown’s and St. James’s conduct was a proximate cause of 

Susan’s “injury.” Susan concedes that she has not presented expert testimony concerning 

proximate cause, but contends that such testimony is unnecessary because the element is within 

the common knowledge of the jury. In Heastie v. Roberts, 877 N.E.2d 1064 (Ill. 2007), the 

Illinois Supreme Court explained the limited circumstances where expert testimony is not 

necessary:

Whether expert medical testimony is necessary in a given case depends on 

whether ascertaining the applicable standard of care, determining whether there 

was a deviation from that standard, and evaluating whether there was an injury 

proximately caused by that deviation require consideration of knowledge, skill, or 

training in a technical area outside the comprehension of a layperson . . . Expert 

testimony is not required if the health-care provider’s conduct is so grossly 

negligent or the treatment so common that a layman could readily appraise it . . . 

or where the act alleged to be negligent is not an implicit part of the medical 

procedure.

Heastie, 877 N.E.2d at 1088.

Here, Susan’s allegations concern Dr. Brown’s exclusive reliance on the statements 

contained in Vela-Sailsbery’s Petition. Specifically, Susan contends that Dr. Brown did nothing 

to verify that Susan had actually made purportedly suicidal statements and that Dr. Brown did 

nothing to verify that Susan was actually “non-compliant” with her medication. Despite Dr. 

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Brown’s failure to verify these facts, Dr. Brown—at least according to the Certificate—based her 

decision to commit Susan exclusively on those facts. Factual verification is not an “implicit part 

of the medical procedure,” and no special medical knowledge is necessary to realize that 

grounding an commitment order solely on the unconfirmed statements of a layperson might lead 

to a wrongful commitment. Accordingly, Susan’s failure to provide expert testimony establishing 

proximate cause is not a basis to grant summary judgment in favor of the Hospital Defendants.

Dr. Brown further argues that the examination supporting her decision to commit Susan 

did not deviate from the requisite standard of care.8 This position is contradicted by the expert 

testimony of Dr. Ward, who testified that Dr. Brown’s exclusive reliance on Vela-Sailsbery’s 

written statements and Dr. Brown’s failure to gather information concerning Susan’s prescribed 

medications deviated from the accepted standard of care required for such an examination. Based 

on Dr. Ward’s testimony, a reasonable jury could find that Dr. Brown’s examination deviated 

from the requisite standard of care. The disputed facts regarding Dr. Brown’s examination will 

have to be presented and resolved by the trial jury.

Finally, St. James argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on any claims premised 

on Dr. Brown’s conduct because Dr. Brown was not an agent of St. James. According to St. 

James, Dr. Brown was employed by Emergency Medicine Physicians of Cook County, LLC 

(“EMP”) and worked at St. James pursuant to a contract between St. James and EMP. St. James 

further argues that it is not liable under an apparent agency theory. In Illinois, to succeed on an 

apparent agency claim, a plaintiff must prove that: 

8 St. James’s argued only that Susan failed to present expert testimony supporting proximate 

cause, not that Dr. Brown’s conduct was consistent with the standard of care.

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(1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable 

person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an 

employee or agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the 

appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had 

knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon 

the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and 

prudence.

Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 795 (Ill. 1993) (citations omitted).

St. James does not dispute that Susan has established the first two elements of apparent 

agency, but contends that Susan could not have relied on the apparent agency between St. James 

and Dr. Brown because she was placed in seclusion involuntarily. St. James’s argument is 

unpersuasive. As a threshold matter, St. James’s interpretation of the law would preclude liability 

any time St. James held someone against her will, merely because the detainment was 

“involuntary.” Furthermore, after St. James’s staff placed Susan in the seclusion room, she relied

on the apparent agency between St. James and Dr. Brown when she agreed to Dr. Brown’s 

battery of “invasive” tests. Susan had never met Dr. Brown before the day in question. The 

natural assumption at the time was that St. James, after placing Susan in seclusion, had sent one 

of its doctors to examine her. See O’Banner v. McDonald’s Corp., 670 N.E.2d 632, 634 (Ill. 

1996) (“[I]f a principal creates the appearance that someone is his agent, he should not then be 

permitted to deny the agency if an innocent third party reasonably relies on the apparent agency 

and is harmed as a result.”)

In Gilbert, the Illinois Supreme Court stressed that “[i]f a patient knows, or should have 

known, that the treating physician is an independent contractor, then the hospital will not be 

liable.” Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 794; see also Rusinowski v. Vill. of Hillside, No. 11 C 4772, 2014 

WL 477439, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2014) (rejecting apparent agency theory where patient signed 

waiver acknowledging doctor’s independent contractor status). That is not the case here. St. 

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James presented Susan with no reason to believe that Dr. Brown was an independent contractor 

and therefore cannot deny liability on that basis.

V. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VIII)

In Count VIII, Susan claims common law negligent infliction of emotional distress 

(“NIED”) against Dr. Brown and St. James, alleging that Dr. Brown and St. James had a duty to 

provide medical services consistent with the requisite standard of care, breached that duty, and

the breach proximately caused Susan to be injured.

9 Dr. Brown and St. James argue that Count 

VIII is duplicative because it is identical to Susan’s medical malpractice claim, which also 

alleges that Dr. Brown’s and St. James’s deviation from the requisite standard of care resulted in 

her involuntary commitment. Susan largely agrees, but contends that her NIED claim is distinct 

from her medical malpractice claim because “damages between such claims are measured 

differently.” (Dkt. No. 184 at 15.)

The court agrees that Susan alleges a different type of injury in Count VIII than in Count 

VI, but the distinction forecloses her claim in Count VIII. In Count VI, Susan’s alleged injury 

was limited to the loss of her freedom. As discussed above, the court concluded that Susan need 

not present expert testimony proving proximate cause because no specialized medical knowledge 

was necessary to realize that Dr. Brown’s blind reliance on third-party statements would lead to a 

wrongful commitment. In Count VIII, by contrast, Susan claims that her wrongful commitment 

resulted in “long-lasting traumatic neurosis which was severe and extreme.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 86.) 

The description alone implies that determining the cause of “long-lasting traumatic neurosis” 

9 Count VIII also contains allegations against Vela-Sailsbery. The court assumes 

Vela-Sailsbery’s inclusion was inadvertent since the court in an earlier ruling dismissed 

Susan’s NIED claim against Vela-Sailsbery as untimely. (See Dkt. No. 60 at 14-16.)

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requires technical knowledge beyond the comprehension of a layperson. Susan acknowledges 

that her life at the time was replete with other sources of stress. Consequently, under Illinois law, 

Susan must present expert testimony proving that Dr. Brown’s flawed examination—not those 

other stressors—caused her “long lasting traumatic neurosis.” Purtill, 489 N.E.2d at 872. Susan’s 

failure to do so entitles Dr. Brown and St. James to summary judgment on Count VIII.

VI. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VII)

In Count VII, Susan claims that Dr. Brown and St. James intentionally inflicted 

emotional distress (“IIED”) on her through their conduct. In her response to Dr. Brown’s motion 

for summary judgment, Susan voluntarily conceded her IIED claim against Dr. Brown should be 

dismissed. (Dkt. No. 187 at 14.) Susan has not sought to dismiss her IIED claim against St. 

James, which rests primarily on the treatment Susan received while in seclusion at St. James, 

which she contends was “truly extreme and outrageous.” (Dkt. No. 184.) Specifically, Susan 

objects to the lack of monitoring she received in seclusion, claims her rights were not posted 

inside the seclusion room, asserts that St. James personnel did not take her vital signs with 

sufficient frequency, and complains that no doctor re-examined Susan before St. James 

transferred her to Riveredge. (Dkt. No. 184 at 8.)

Under Illinois law, a plaintiff seeking to recover damages for an IIED claim must 

establish that: “(1) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, (2) the defendant 

intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that there was at least a high probability that 

his conduct would inflict severe emotional distress, and (3) the defendant’s conduct did cause 

severe emotional distress.” Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 605 (7th Cir. 2006) 

(citations omitted). The standard for an IIED claim is high, and “under no circumstances [do] 

mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities qualify as 

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outrageous conduct.” Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 80 (Ill. 2003) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). “Rather, the nature of the defendant's conduct must be so extreme as to go 

beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as intolerable in a civilized 

community.” Id. at 80-81.

Faced with this high standard, Susan does not cite any cases holding that actions similar 

to St. James’s qualify as “extreme and outrageous.” Susan dedicates a large portion of her Rule 

56 Statement of Facts to establishing that St. James’s treatment of her in seclusion fell short of 

the standards of the “Joint Commission” accrediting body. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 182 ¶¶ 5-11.) 

Although St. James’s failure to adhere to all of the Joint Commission standards is disappointing, 

it is not sufficient to support an IIED claim. The court finds no reason to doubt that St. James’s 

acts caused Susan further aggravation during an already stressful ordeal. But the acts at 

issue—posting patient rights, taking vital signs more frequently, and failing to examine Susan 

right before her transfer to Riveredge—are closer to “petty oppressions” than the “truly 

outrageous and extreme” conduct required to sustain an IIED claim. Consequently, St. James’s 

motion for summary judgment on Count VII must be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained in this memorandum opinion, the court rules as follows: The 

Sauk Village Defendants motion for summary judgment [207] on Counts I, II, and III is denied 

in its entirety. Dr. Brown’s motion for summary judgment [171] is denied with respect to Count 

VI, and granted as to Counts VII and VIII. St. James’s motion for summary judgment [168] is 

denied with respect to Count VI, and granted as to Counts VII and VIII. The parties are strongly 

encouraged to discuss settlement regarding the remaining claims which, if not settled by 

agreement, will proceed to trial. This case is set for a report on status at 9:00 a.m. on 10/30/14.

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ENTER:

_______________________________

JAMES F. HOLDERMAN

District Judge, United States District Court

Date: October 6, 2014

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