SEPTEMBER 2, 2009

AUDIT REPORT

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 (ASSIGNMENT NO. A-08-019-00)

OFFICE OF AUDITS

THE LANDSAT PROGRAM IS NOT MEETING THE GOALS 

AND INTENT OF THE LAND REMOTE SENSING POLICY 

ACT OF 1992

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration
REPORT NO. IG-09-021

Final report released by:

signed

Debra D. Pettitt

Acting Assistant Inspector General for Auditing

Acronyms

DoD Department of Defense

DOI Department of the Interior

FY Fiscal Year

GOES Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite

LDCM Landsat Data Continuity Mission

LRD Launch Readiness Date

LRSP Landsat Remote Sensing Policy

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

NLIP National Land Imaging Program 

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NPOESS National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System

NSTC National Science and Technology Council

NPR NASA Procedural Requirements

OLI Operational Land Imager

OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy 

RSDO Rapid Spacecraft Development Office

SLC Scan Line Corrector

SMD Science Mission Directorate

SRB Standing Review Board

TIRS Thermal Infrared Sensor

TM Thematic Mapper 

USGS U.S. Geological Survey
SEPTEMBER 2, 2009

REPORT NO. IG-09-021

OVERVIEW

THE LANDSAT PROGRAM IS NOT MEETING THE GOALS AND 

INTENT OF THE LAND REMOTE SENSING POLICY ACT OF 1992

The Issue

The Landsat Program comprises a series of Earth-observing satellite missions of, thus far, 

six satellites. The Program is jointly managed by NASA’s Science Mission Directorate 

(SMD) and the Department of the Interior’s U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) on the basis 

of a memorandum of understanding. The Program has used remote sensing instruments 

since 1972 to gather wide-swath images of Earth’s surface. Landsat images have 

provided over 3 decades of continuous data on changes in land cover, land use, water 

resources, and climate, worldwide, that researchers rely on to establish trends and 

prediction models. The Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM) is the next satellite 

mission NASA is developing for USGS’s Land Remote Sensing Program.1

The overall objective of our audit was to determine whether NASA’s project 

management of LDCM has adequately addressed risks associated with the acquisition 

strategy and a potential data gap between Landsats 5 and 7 and LDCM. In addition, we 

addressed the LDCM Project and the Landsat Program management’s efforts to meet the 

goals and intent of the Land Remote Sensing Policy (LRSP) Act of 1992 and also 

addressed the impact late changes to LDCM requirements have had on mission costs and 

launch schedule. (Details of the audit’s scope and methodology are in Appendix A.)

 The primary 

purpose of LDCM is to extend the land surface record by collecting data that can be 

compared to data collected by the previous Landsat satellites, including data collected via 

infrared imaging capability. 

Results

We found that LDCM Project management had ensured that the acquisition plan and 

subsidiary documents prepared for LDCM followed applicable interagency agreements, 

policies, regulations, and best practices. In addition, we found that LCDM Project 

management effectively identified, reported, and mitigated LDCM acquisition risks and

had implemented an effective Earned Value Management System to improve 

management of cost and schedule risks. However, NASA’s efforts to comply with the 

goals outlined in the LRSP Act of 1992 needed improvement. Specifically, NASA and 

the Nation’s efforts to develop, launch, and operate a land remote sensing system to 

maintain long-term data continuity is in jeopardy because no Federal agency has been 

 1 USGS’s Land Remote Sensing Program includes the satellites developed under the Landsat Program and 

alternative data sources.
OVERVIEW

ii REPORT NO. IG-09-021

given overall responsibility for the Landsat Program and LDCM baseline requirements

changed after the contract award for the spacecraft, resulting in increased Project costs 

and possible launch schedule delays. 

Because no single Federal agency has overall responsibility for the Landsat Program, 

decisions about acquisition strategies were delayed, causing significant schedule delays, 

and thus challenging the goals and intent of the Act, which were to serve the user 

community’s interests and maintain data continuity with the Landsat system. Over the 

course of more than 6 years, several alternatives for satisfying the LDCM mission 

objectives were considered, pursued, and rejected, resulting in LDCM and the Landsat 

Program not fully meeting the goals or intent of the LRSP Act of 1992. Specifically, 

Landsats 5 and 7 have surpassed their life spans, are operating in a degraded state, and

therefore not producing a full set of data, yet LDCM is not scheduled to launch until 

December 2012. Establishing operational program responsibility and accountability for 

the Landsat Program within a single Federal agency could help ensure Landsat data 

continuity. 

NASA removed, and now must reinstate, Landsat’s legacy thermal imaging capability. 

Congress directed NASA to reinstate the thermal imaging capability to satisfy the user 

community’s needs, congressional concerns, and the goals and intent of the LRSP Act of 

1992. The reinstatement of the capability late in LDCM Project development has 

resulted in increased Project costs estimated between $11 million and $20 million and the 

risk of a full data gap if LDCM’s launch is further delayed. Historically, NASA has 

made changes to Project requirements, resulting in cost and schedule impacts. 

Management Action

In our July 7, 2009, draft we made five recommendations to the Associate Administrator

for SMD. He concurred with the five recommendations. 

Recommendation 1was that the Associate Administrator coordinate with USGS to assist 

in developing a plan for continuous provision of Landsat-type data, should Landsat 7 and 

Landsat 5 become inoperable before LDCM is operational. In response, the Associate 

Administrator noted that a USGS analysis of fuel usage suggests that Landsat 7 has 

sufficient fuel to operate through 2012 or longer, that assessments of the viability of 

alternative data sources continue, and that NASA will coordinate with USGS to 

document a plan to mitigate the potential data gap by August 31, 2010. 

Our Recommendation 2 suggested that the Associate Administrator coordinate with 

USGS to assist in establishing the National Land Imaging Program, to include developing 

detailed plans for future Landsat acquisitions and agency funding responsibility for the 

program. In response, the Associate Administrator noted that NASA meets monthly with 

USGS to discuss implementation of the National Land Imaging Program and that NASA 

intends to work with OSTP and USGS to plan for a follow-on mission. 
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 iii

We suggested in Recommendation 3 that the Associate Administrator request an 

independent analysis of the impact on the spacecraft’s development cost and schedule 

due to the late change of LDCM requirements. In response, the Associate Administrator 

stated that an independent analysis of LDCM’s development cost and schedule will be 

conducted in preparation for Key Decision Point-C, scheduled for October 2009. 

Recommendation 4 was that the Associate Administrator issue guidance affirming the 

need for Space Flight Programs and Projects to quantify technical and programmatic risks 

associated with undefined system-level requirements, which can impact cost and 

schedule, prior to contract award for any major mission element. The Associate 

Administrator concurred and noted, in response, that the requirement to quantify 

technical and programmatic risks is codified in NASA Procedural Requirements 

(NPR) 7120.5D, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements,” 

March 6, 2007, and stated that SMD’s Management Handbook, released in February 

2008, affirms the need for all programs and projects to follow that NPR through all 

mission phases. In addition, the Associate Administrator stated that the thermal infrared 

sensor (TIRS) requirements issue was mitigated by structuring the LDCM spacecraft 

request for proposal so as not to preclude its late introduction. 

Recommendation 5 was that the Associate Administrator re-emphasize the provisions of 

NPR 7123.1A, “NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements,” March 26, 

2007, which require that NASA programs and projects adequately consider stakeholder 

expectations and user community interests prior to contract award for development of any 

major mission element, revisiting these expectations and interests whenever fundamental 

changes are made to the mission implementation approach. In concurring with 

Recommendation 5, the Associate Administrator noted that SMD is committed to 

working with the stakeholder community, as detailed in the SMD Management 

Handbook, published in 2008, and consistent with NPR 7123.1A. 

We consider management’s proposed actions to be responsive. On the basis of actions 

already taken and procedures in place, the recommendations are resolved. 

Recommendations with corrective actions forthcoming will be closed upon completion 

and verification of management’s corrective action. (See Appendix B for the full text of 

management’s comments.) 

SEPTEMBER 2, 2009

REPORT NO. IG-09-021

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Background _________________________________________ 1

Objectives __________________________________________ 3

RESULTS

Finding A: Landsat’s Ability to Meet Congressional Goals 

Is Hampered by a Lack of Accountability ________ 4

Finding B: Reinstatement of Thermal Imaging Increased Costs 

and May Further Delay Launch________________ 11

APPENDIX A

Scope and Methodology_______________________________ 21

Review of Internal Controls ____________________________ 23

Prior Coverage ______________________________________ 23

APPENDIX B

Management Comments ______________________________ 25

APPENDIX C

Report Distribution___________________________________ 28

SEPTEMBER 2, 2009

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

The Landsat Program, at Goddard Space Flight Center (Goddard), constitutes missions to 

launch Earth orbiting satellites that record land surface changes on a global scale and is 

the only program, worldwide, committed to preserving a consistent, long-term record of 

Earth’s land surface at moderate resolution. The Landsat satellites constitute the only 

satellite system designed and operated to observe the global land surface continuously at 

a moderate resolution;

2

Landsat’s land images serve hundreds of users annually who observe and study the Earth, 

manage and utilize its natural resources, and monitor the changes brought on by natural 

processes and human activities. The instruments on the Landsat satellites have recorded 

millions of images used to monitor timber loss, estimate soil moisture and snow water 

equivalence, monitor population changes, and estimate community growth. The images 

provide information that meets the needs of a broad and diverse user community that 

includes business, science, education, government, and national security. For example, 

Federal agencies and programs that use Landsat data include the Department of Defense 

(DoD) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the Department of the Interior’s 

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Land 

Management; USDA’s Forest Service, and the U.S. Climate Change Science Program as 

well as NASA’s Biodiversity and Applied Science Applications and Land-Cover and 

Land-Use Change Program. 

and the data provided by the Landsat spacecraft constitute the 

longest record of Earth’s continental surfaces as seen from space. 

History of Landsat. The first Landsat satellite was launched in 1972 by NASA. NASA 

launched Landsats 2 and 3 in 1975 and 1978, respectively. NASA managed these three 

satellites as experimental missions. A second generation of Landsat satellites was 

developed and launched as Landsats 4 and 5 in 1982 and 1984, respectively. From 1979

until 1984, the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA) managed all Landsat satellite operations (Landsats 2 through 5). 

Public Law 98-365, the “Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984,” 

directed Commerce/NOAA to delegate management of Landsats 4 and 5 and their data 

distribution to the private sector. As a result, the Earth Observation Satellite Company, a 

consortium of private companies, was chosen to operate those satellites as well as build 

and launch Landsats 6 and 7. Landsat 6, the only satellite not built and launched under 

NASA management, failed at launch. 

 2 Remotely sensed images are numeric representations of the sampled land surface made up of individual 

picture elements, or pixels. Each pixel represents a square area on an image that is a measure of the 

sensor’s resolution. The finer the spatial resolution, the smaller the objects that are detectable. Moderate 

resolution sensors are useful in seasonal and time series applications at regional or global scales, whereas 

fine resolution studies are more useful in local environmental applications.
INTRODUCTION

2 REPORT NO. IG-09-021

Figure 1. Illustrative Timeline of Landsat Satellites 1 through 7.

Source: NASA Landsat Program Web site.

Landsat 7 was mandated in 1992 by Public Law 102-555, “The Land Remote Sensing 

Policy Act” (LRSP Act of 1992). The Act identified three goals for the Landsat Program:

(1) encourage the development, launch, and operation of a land remote sensing system that 

adequately serves the civilian, national security, commercial, and foreign policy interests 

of the United States;

(2) encourage the development, launch, and operation of a land remote sensing system that 

maintains data continuity with the Landsat system; and

(3) incorporate system enhancements, including any such enhancements developed under the 

technology demonstration program under section 303, which may potentially yield a 

system that is less expensive to build and operate, and more responsive to data users, than 

is the Landsat system projected to be in operation through the year 2000

In 1999, the initial acquisition planning began for Landsat 7’s successor, the Landsat 

Data Continuity Mission (LDCM). 

Program Responsibilities and Accountabilities for LDCM. LDCM is being jointly 

developed by NASA’s Science Mission Directorate (SMD) and USGS for USGS’s Land 

Remote Sensing Program. NASA and USGS established a memorandum of 

understanding (MOU) for collaborative programs in January 2000. The MOU sets forth 

the general terms and conditions under which NASA and USGS will coordinate and 

cooperate in implementing research and technology development activities. The MOU 

states that there shall be a separate Implementing Agreement for each project to define 

the specific interagency relationships and responsibilities with regard to the activity. For 

the LDCM Project, NASA is responsible for developing and launching the satellite, and 

USGS is responsible for mission operations, data collection and processing, and 

distributing land surface data to users. 
INTRODUCTION

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 3

However, neither NASA nor USGS has program-level responsibility for the Landsat 

Program. The agencies receive LDCM acquisition strategy directions through the Office 

of Science and Technology Policy3

The Project’s pre-formulation phase of the acquisition life cycle began in 1999. By 2009, 

the LDCM Project had progressed to the formulation phase. LDCM’s original 

acquisition schedule was driven by an aggressive launch readiness date (LRD) of July 

2011 because time constraints were imposed to have the Project develop and launch a 

successor before Landsats 5 and 7 failed. However, after independent reviews identified 

high levels of risk as a result of the aggressiveness of LDCM’s acquisition schedule, 

NASA rescheduled the LRD to December 2012 to reduce development risks. In fiscal 

years (FYs) 2007 and 2008, NASA awarded contracts for the Operational Land Imager 

(OLI), spacecraft, and Mission Operations Element (in coordination with USGS), and 

conducted the Mission Confirmation Review.

(OSTP) and congressional mandates. 

The total NASA New Obligation Authority for development and operations of LDCM 

was $624 million. For FY 2008, Congress appropriated $160.2 million for NASA’s 

portion of work on LDCM. In NASA’s FY 2009 budget request, NASA projected future 

budget needs of $139.4 million and $127.1 million for LDCM for FYs 2009 and 2010, 

respectively. 

Objectives

Our overall objective was to determine whether NASA’s project management of LDCM 

had adequately addressed the risks associated with the acquisition strategy and the 

potential data gap between Landsats 5 and 7 and LDCM. Specifically, we determined 

whether

• the acquisition plan and subsidiary documents follow applicable interagency 

agreements, policies, regulations, and best practices;

• management has effectively identified, reported, and mitigated LDCM acquisition 

risks, to include implementation of an effective Earned Value Management 

System to improve management of cost and schedule risks; and

• LDCM will meet Congress’s goals, as set forth in the Land Remote Sensing 

Policy Act of 1992, and the NASA Authorization Act of 2008.

See Appendix A for details of the review’s scope and methodology, our review of 

internal controls, and a list of prior coverage. 

 3 Congress established OSTP in 1976 with a broad mandate to advise the President and the Executive 

Office of the President on the effects of science and technology on domestic and international affairs and

to lead interagency efforts to develop and implement sound science and technology policies and budgets. 
RESULTS

4 REPORT NO. IG-09-021

FINDING A: LANDSAT’S ABILITY TO 

MEET CONGRESSIONAL GOALS IS 

HAMPERED BY A LACK OF 

ACCOUNTABILITY

The Land Remote Sensing Policy (LRSP) Act of 1992 mandates expedited 

procurement procedures to ensure Landsat data continuity. However, NASA spent 

more than 6 years in LDCM’s pre-formulation phase (concept studies and acquisition 

planning). The delays in acquiring and launching the next Landsat satellite resulted 

primarily because no single Federal agency had operational program responsibility 

or accountability for the Landsat Program or for Landsat data continuity. As a result, 

the Landsat Program is not meeting the goals or intent of the LRSP Act of 1992. 

Specifically, Landsat 7—the only operational on-orbit source of complete global 

Landsat imagery—is operating in a degraded state and is likely to fail prior to 

LDCM reaching orbit, ending over 3 decades of Landsat data continuity.

Landsat Management Responsibility and Acquisition Process 

Changed Periodically 

Since the Program’s inception, responsibility for acquisition, launch, and operations of 

Landsat satellites has been divided and moved among several Federal agencies and 

private industry (see Figure 2). The LRSP Act of 1992, section 401, directed NASA and 

DoD to develop and USGS and NOAA to operate Landsat 7. In addition to Landsat 7, 

the Act directed the agencies to assess various system development and management 

options for a satellite system to succeed Landsat 7. The 1992 Act also expressed a 

preference for “private-sector funding and management.” In 1993, the National Science 

and Technology Council (NSTC) reassessed the joint NASA/DoD Landsat 7 

development strategy in an attempt to minimize the potential for a data gap if Landsats 4 

and 5 ceased to operate and to reduce costs and development risks. In May 1994, NSTC 

mandated the transfer of all Landsat 7 development responsibilities to NASA via 

Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-3, “Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy.” The 

Directive also mandated that USGS and NOAA were responsible for satellite operations 

and data management. Landsat 7 launched in April 1999. In that same year, the initial 

acquisition planning began for Landsat 7’s successor, LDCM.
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 5

Figure 2: Generalized Timeline Schematic of Landsat Responsibility

Source: USGS Report to the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites’ Working Group on Collaboration 

& Validation (February 26, 2008). 

On October 16, 2000, an amendment to the May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive 

transferred responsibility for Landsat operations and data management from NOAA 

solely to USGS. Thus, jointly, NASA, with development responsibilities, and USGS,

with operations and data management responsibilities, began exploring various data 

acquisition strategies for Landsat 7’s successor. However, neither NASA nor USGS was 

assigned Landsat Program-level responsibility. The agencies received LDCM acquisition

strategy directions through OSTP and congressional mandates. The original LDCM 

acquisition plans called for NASA to purchase, from a commercially owned and operated 

satellite system, data that met LDCM specifications. 

LDCM Formulation Phase Delayed by Acquisition Strategy 

Indecision

LDCM Project management spent more than 6 years (FYs 2000-2006) and $54.2 million 

in the pre-formulation phase (concept studies and acquisition planning) of development. 

Given the 5-year projected life span of Landsat 7 and equivalent development time for 

LDCM, in order to prevent a potential gap in data continuity, the acquisition process 

should have commenced immediately after the launch of Landsat 7 in 1999. However, 

delays resulted as several alternatives for satisfying the LDCM mission objectives were 

considered, pursued, and rejected. 

In FY 2000, NASA, in cooperation with USGS, began formulating LDCM as a 

commercial data buy from a vendor who would build, launch, and operate the satellites 

and charge users for the data. Within that context, the Government acquisition strategy 

of partnering with private industry was characterized by having both partners provide 

consideration for and receive benefit from the system once data was acquired. During 

formulation of the data buy procurement, NASA awarded two study contracts to develop 

preliminary designs for a system that would provide continuity of Landsat data. 

Following the delivery of the two preliminary designs, NASA requested proposals for 

implementation of the system and completion of the data buy procurement. Ultimately, 

however, NASA received only one proposal. After the proposal evaluation process was 

completed, the selection official, NASA’s Associate Administrator for Earth Science, 
RESULTS

6 REPORT NO. IG-09-021

determined that acceptance of the proposal was not in the best interests of the 

Government, due to a lack of competition, and decided not to complete the data buy 

procurement.

Following the non-completion of the data buy procurement, in 2003, OSTP chartered an 

Interagency Working Group, chaired by the National Security Council and NASA, to 

study an implementation strategy for the Landsat Program. After a 9-month study, the 

Interagency Working Group recommended that land surface data be obtained by 

developing instruments for use aboard the National Polar-Orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). However, further technical evaluation 

determined that Landsat’s instrumentation was not compatible with the NPOESS satellite 

configuration, and in December 2005, consideration of incorporating Landsat capabilities 

on NPOESS was discontinued. OSTP then directed NASA to pursue an independent 

satellite mission approach for Landsat. In early 2006, NASA began re-formulation of 

LDCM and notified industry that mission development would be openly competed. 

Following an extensive re-formulation of the mission during 2006 and early 2007, NASA 

initiated open competitions for the separate elements (spacecraft, instrumentation, launch 

vehicle, ground system) of LDCM.

In 2007, after more than 6 years of exploring and evaluating various strategies to meet 

Landsat data continuity requirements, OSTP directed NASA and USGS to use the same 

acquisition strategy for LDCM that was successfully used to develop and launch 

Landsat 7, wherein NASA builds and launches the satellite and USGS operates it, and 

mandated that the Final Implementation Agreement be commensurate with that strategy. 

Thus, the NASA/USGS Final Implementation Agreement for LDCM was not established 

until April 2007, more than 8 years after the launch of Landsat 7. In July 2007, in 

compliance with the OSTP mandate, NASA commenced the acquisition process with the 

procurement of LDCM’s primary instrument, the Operational Land Imager (OLI). 

Initial Acquisition Schedule Driven by Aggressive Launch Readiness Date. LDCM’s 

original acquisition schedule was driven by an aggressive LRD of July 2011 with the goal 

of developing and launching a successor before Landsats 5 and 7 failed. During the Key 

Decision Point reviews to transition into Phase B of the Project Life Cycle,4 LDCM’s 

Standing Review Board (SRB)5

 4 During Phase B, the project team completes its preliminary design and technology development, to 

include baselining the system-level requirements and developing the subsystem and lower-level technical 

requirements. 

determined that the LRD requirement of July 2011 drove 

the Project to baseline an extremely aggressive, high-risk schedule with no schedule 

reserve at the mission level. At the outcome of the Key Decision Point review, NASA 

estimated a more likely development schedule to launch, and delayed the LRD to 

December 2012. In September 2008, the results of the SRB’s Independent Cost Review 

indicated that delaying the LRD from July 2011 to December 2012 increases the 

5 The SRB’s role is advisory to the program/project and the convening authorities and does not have 

authority over any program/project content. Its review provides expert assessment of the technical and 

programmatic approach, risk posture, and progress against the program/project baseline. When 

appropriate, it may offer recommendations to improve performance and/or reduce risk.
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 7

Project’s life cycle cost estimate by $90.5 million (from $614.7 million to 

$705.2 million), but this LRD correlates with a 70 percent confidence level for achieving 

the launch date as the Project enters Phase B of the life cycle. 

However, the Landsat Science Team,6 in January 2008 had concluded that LDCM must 

be operational by March 2012 to observe the Northern Hemisphere growing season. The 

LRD of December 2012 conflicts with this user requirement and is far beyond the 

expected life span of Landsat 7. The latest technical assessment of Landsat 7’s projected 

life expectancy approximates a 50 percent to 70 percent chance of the satellite 

experiencing a full system failure by December 2012. In the “NASA Report to Congress 

Regarding Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM) Data Continuity,” April 2008, 

NASA management states, “[b]oth Landsat 7 and Landsat 5 are presently experiencing 

technical problems and are expected to run out of fuel in late 2010.7

No Mandated Responsibility or Accountability for Landsat Data 

Continuity

 Combine this with 

the most expedient development for LDCM and the outcome is that a Landsat data gap is 

inevitable.” 

The LRSP Act of 1992 mandates continuity in Landsat data collection—maintaining 

consistency with earlier Landsat systems in terms of spectral and spatial coverage. The 

Act states that continuous collection and utilization of land remote sensing data from 

space are of major benefit in studying and understanding human impacts on the global 

environment, in managing Earth’s natural resources, in carrying out national security 

functions, and in planning and conducting many other activities of scientific, economic, 

and social importance. The Act further states that given the importance of the Landsat 

program to the United States, urgent actions, including expedited procurement 

procedures, are required to ensure data continuity. 

The Act specifically directs NASA and USGS to assess various system development and 

management options for a satellite system to succeed Landsat 7. In addition to 

maintaining data continuity, the LRSP Act of 1992 mandates that the Landsat system 

should serve the civilian, national security, commercial, and foreign policy interests of 

the United States and incorporate system enhancements that may potentially yield a 

system that is less expensive to build and operates more responsively to user requests. 

One of the key objectives of LDCM is to make all Landsat-type data available at an 

affordable cost to ensure that the different sectors of the user community can utilize the 

data for high-quality research applications. However, in the 35-year history of the 

 6 The Landsat Science Team comprises scientists and engineers selected to investigate and advise USGS 

and NASA on issues critical to the success of LDCM. The team combines USGS-based leadership, 

USGS and NASA agency scientists, and a group of external scientists and application specialists. The 

external members consist of principle investigators representing the larger Landsat science and 

applications community. The most common application appears to be estimating annual agricultural

production and national and international forest area.

7 In a subsequent report to Congress, “Report on Landsat Thermal Infrared Data Continuity,” June 2009, 

NASA management states that because of fuel limitations, Landsat 7 may cease operating in 2013.
RESULTS

8 REPORT NO. IG-09-021

Landsat Program, no Federal agency has been directed or has chosen to adopt the 

operational program responsibility for Landsat data continuity and, thus, serve the 

Nation’s land imaging needs. 

The delays in acquiring and launching LDCM were primarily the result of no single 

Federal agency taking responsibility for Landsat data continuity. The indecision about 

LDCM’s acquisition strategy was ultimately caused by a lack of ownership of, and 

dedication to, the continuation of Landsat missions. Although NSTC provided guidance 

for the continuance of Landsat 7 operations in its 1994 Presidential Decision Directive, 

NSTC divides responsibilities between NASA and USGS and does not clearly assign the 

program and associated funding to either agency. While the LRSP Act of 1992 states in 

its introduction that the purpose of the Act is “[t]o enable the United States to maintain its 

leadership in land remote sensing by providing data continuity for the Landsat program, 

to establish a new national land remote sensing policy, and for other purposes,” no single 

Agency has been mandated responsibility or accountability for ensuring that the United 

States maintains that leadership role or that the Nation’s future land imaging needs are 

met. 

Landsat Spacecraft Degradation and Ensuing Data Gap Ends 

Three Decades of Data Continuity

The Landsat Program is not meeting the goals or intent of the LRSP Act of 1992, as 

Landsat 7, the only present on-orbit source of complete global Landsat imagery, is 

operating in a degraded state. Specifically, on May 31, 2003, Landsat 7’s scan line 

corrector (SLC), a subsystem of Landsat 7’s primary instrument, the enhanced thematic 

mapper plus (ETM+), underwent a permanent failure, which caused a 22 percent loss of 

data on all future images from this system. May 2003 marked the end of more than 

30 years of complete Landsat global coverage. Now, to create a full image, older data 

has to be overlapped onto newer imagery. Many users find this data unacceptable and 

have pursued other data sources, to include India’s ResourceSat and China-Brazil Earth 

Resources Satellite; however, these sources are not capable of meeting all user needs. 

Landsat 5, which is more than 20 years beyond its design life and limited by subsystem 

degradation, has not been capable of providing complete global coverage since 1985 and 

cannot fill the data gap caused by the SLC failure. Further, Landsat 7 is likely to fail 

prior to LDCM reaching orbit. 

NASA and USGS recognized the likelihood that both Landsat 5 and Landsat 7 will 

become inoperable before LDCM reaches orbit, resulting in a 100 percent data gap. 

Consequently, they formed the Landsat Data Gap Study Team to evaluate potential 

sources of data to fill the ensuing full data gap. The results of their evaluation indicate 

there is no replacement for all of the data that Landsat satellites provide. Other sources 

do not provide the inventory of global land surface over time at a resolution allowing 

human versus natural causes of change to be differentiated or global land observations on 

a seasonal basis. The Landsat Program is the only national or international program 

committed to preserving a consistent, long-term record of Earth’s land surface at this 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 9

resolution. Specifically, no other satellite or combination of satellites can provide the 

same baseline specifications (spectral bands, radiometry, spatial resolution, geographic 

registration, band-band registration, and geographic coverage) that Landsat provides. 

Our interviews with NASA users of Landsat data confirmed that, while several systems 

could meet special regional acquisition needs during some or all of the potential data gap 

period, no other satellite system is capable of providing annual global coverage. Thus, 

the use of other systems will only minimize the impact of the data gap, not close it. 

Although the Landsat Data Gap Study Team has determined that at present “there is no 

substitute for Landsat,” the team continues to conduct assessments of the viability of 

alternative data sources should Landsat 7 or Landsat 5 fail before LDCM is operational. 

Establishing a Long-Term Program to Meet Land Imaging Needs

The FY 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act directed NASA “to develop, in cooperation 

with OSTP and USGS, a plan for a follow-on mission to LDCM consistent with the 

recommendations of the [NSTC] report, A Plan for a U.S. National Land Imaging 

Program.”8

In the judgment of NSTC and the stakeholder agencies it represents, Landsat operational 

program responsibility most appropriately fits within the mandate and objectives of 

USGS/DOI; and NASA, which has historically maintained a research, development, and 

applied science role in land remote sensing, should maintain that role. For example, a

similar cross-agency cooperative agreement exists between NASA and the Department of 

Commerce for the execution of the Geostationary Operational Environmental 

Satellite (GOES) Program.

 This report calls for a continued U.S. commitment to moderate-resolution 

land imagery, recommends that the United States maintain a core operational capability 

for land imagery while supplementing its data with similar data from partners, and 

designates the Department of the Interior (DOI) as the host of the program. NSTC 

concluded that establishing the National Land Imaging Program (NLIP) would ensure a 

consistent planning and budgeting process for future land imaging missions and would 

“transition the Landsat program from a series of independently planned missions to a 

sustained operational program.” The report also stated that NLIP would provide a 

mechanism to assess the land imagery needs of Federal agencies, state and local land 

management officials, scientists, and geographic researchers, and to translate those needs 

into the technical capabilities of future satellites.

9

 8 Future of Land Imaging Interagency Working Group, Executive Office of the President, NSTC, A Plan 

for a U.S. National Land Imaging Program (Washington, D.C.: August 2007).

 GOES operational program responsibility and funding 

authority falls under the Department of Commerce’s NOAA. On June 15, 2007, NOAA 

and NASA signed a memorandum of understanding such that NOAA’s GOES-R 

Program Office is fully responsible for all aspects of program management: acquisition 

strategy, funding, program-level systems engineering and integration, and scientific, 

9 The GOES Program develops and provides satellites that operate at a fixed position above the Earth’s 

surface to collect and transmit environmental data used to forecast the weather. GOES-R is the next 

satellite in the series and scheduled for launch in FY 2015.
RESULTS

10 REPORT NO. IG-09-021

technical, and administrative support, while NASA’s primary responsibility is to manage 

the development of the Flight Project, which includes spacecraft, launch services, 

instruments, and satellite integration. NOAA fully reimburses NASA for all resources 

used to support the GOES program. In its report, “Geostationary Operational 

Environmental Satellites: Acquisition Is Under Way, but Improvements Needed in 

Management and Oversight,” April 2, 2009, the Government Accountability Office

(GAO) noted that NASA and NOAA have made progress on the Program. DOI and 

NASA could benefit from the lessons learned in developing and executing the GOES 

Program and apply those lessons to NLIP implementation. 

Recommendations, Management’s Response, and Evaluation of 

Management’s Response

Recommendation 1. The Associate Administrator for SMD should develop a plan for 

continuous provision of Landsat-type data, should Landsat 7 and Landsat 5 become 

inoperable before LDCM is operational. 

Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator for SMD concurred with the 

recommendation, noting that, on the basis of USGS’s further analysis of fuel usage for 

both Landsats 5 and 7, NASA officials believe that Landsat 7 has sufficient fuel to 

operate through 2012 and perhaps longer. He also noted that the Landsat Data Gap Study 

Team continues to conduct assessments of the viability of alternative data sources should 

Landsat 5 or 7 fail before LDCM data is available, and that NASA will coordinate with 

USGS to document a formal plan for the partial mitigation of the potential data gap by 

August 31, 2010. 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. We consider management’s proposed action

to be responsive. The recommendation is resolved and will be closed upon completion 

and verification of management’s corrective action. 

Recommendation 2. The Associate Administrator for SMD should assist in establishing the 

National Land Imaging Program, to include developing detailed plans for future Landsat 

acquisitions and agency funding responsibility for the program. 

Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator for SMD concurred with this 

recommendation. He added that NASA meets monthly with USGS to discuss 

implementation of the National Land Imaging Program, although full implementation by 

USGS is on hold pending legislation authorizing the program and appropriation of funds. 

Also, NASA intends to work with OSTP and USGS to plan for a follow-on mission to 

LDCM in time to inform the President’s FY 2012 Budget Request, which is due to the 

Office of Management and Budget by September 1, 2010. 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Management’s proposed action is responsive. 

Based on actions taken and procedures in place, we have closed the recommendation. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 11

FINDING B: REINSTATEMENT OF 

THERMAL IMAGING INCREASED 

COSTS AND MAY FURTHER 

DELAY LAUNCH

On March 11, 2009, Congress directed NASA to reinstate Landsat’s legacy thermal 

infrared imaging capability. In 2002, NASA management removed the thermal 

infrared imaging capability from the LDCM requirements baseline, disregarding the 

Landsat data continuity goals of the LRSP Act of 1992 and not adequately 

considering the user community’s growing reliance on thermal imaging. LDCM 

Project management estimates that reinstating the capability this late in the Project’s 

life cycle will result in spacecraft modification costs of $11 million to $20 million, 

and could cause further delays to an already significantly delayed mission.

Importance of Thermal Imaging Increased for the Landsat Data 

User Community 

The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 directs Landsat Program management to 

“maintain data continuity.” The Act defines “data continuity” as “the continued 

acquisition and availability of unenhanced data which are, from the point of view of the 

user, sufficiently consistent (in terms of acquisition geometry, coverage characteristics, 

and spectral characteristics) with previous Landsat data to allow comparisons for global 

and regional change detection and characterization.” Spectral characteristics that are 

sufficiently consistent with previous Landsat data would include thermal spectral band

imaging. 

Since 1972, Landsat satellites have carried sensors that collect wide field-of-view images 

of the Earth’s surface. Landsats 1 through 3 each carried both a Remote Beam Vidicon 

camera and a multispectral scanner subsystem instrument. Landsat 3, launched in 1978, 

marked the beginning of thermal image acquisitions on Landsat missions, and thermal 

imaging has been a function of Landsat satellites since then. One of the technical 

advancements made in 1982, for Landsat 4 and follow-on Landsat satellites, was the 

addition of the Thematic Mapper (TM) sensor. Analysts found that TM data significantly 

improved capabilities for recognizing and mapping land cover types and for detecting 

land cover change relative to multispectral scanner subsystem data. The TM sensor 

collected data for seven spectral bands, compared to the four multispectral scanner 

subsystem bands of Landsats 1 through 3. In addition, the TM sensor provided an 

improved spatial resolution relative to the multispectral scanner subsystem instruments, 

to include image data for a thermal spectral band sensitive to emitted radiation. The user 

community used images from the TM sensor thermal band to map and monitor the 

variation of surface temperatures across landscapes. 
RESULTS

12 REPORT NO. IG-09-021

The user community’s growing preference for TM data resulted in the next two Landsat 

satellites—Landsat 6 and Landsat 7—being built to carry single sensors that were close 

derivatives of the TM design. The Landsat 6 sensor, the Enhanced Thematic Mapper 

(ETM), was enhanced by the addition of a panchromatic band sensitive to all or most 

light in the visible spectrum and improved spatial resolution. Landsat 7 carries the 

Enhanced Thematic Mapper – Plus (ETM+) sensor; the “plus” refers to an improvement 

in the ground resolution of the thermal spectral band.

During FYs 2000 through 2007, while the implementation strategy for Landsat data 

continuity was being formulated, the Landsat 5 TM and Landsat 7 ETM+ sensors 

continued to provide users thermal spectral images, along with the data from the other 

spectral bands, and user community interest in thermal data increased. The increased use 

of thermal imagery was driven by multiple factors; specifically, the lowering of costs for 

Landsat images, removal of copyright restrictions on Landsat data, successful research in 

developing dependable processes for computing “evapotranspiration”10

Western state and local governments found the high-resolution thermal imagery provided 

by Landsat 7 to be particularly useful in the early detection of water stress in crops and in 

tracking sediment and chemical transport in lakes and coastal waters. As coverage and 

estimates of water consumption became more reliable, local governments in many arid 

regions came to rely heavily on the thermal images and began to use thermal image data

to improve their management of over-subscribed water resources. 

from satellite 

images, and the need for evapotranspiration data by state water resources entities such as 

the Idaho Department of Water Resources. 

The importance of thermal imaging to the user community was established and had been 

addressed in earlier Landsat satellites. NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7123.1A, 

“NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements,” March 26, 2007, requires 

that NASA programs and projects analyze stakeholders (which includes relevant user 

communities) expectations using a process to establish a set of measures by which overall 

system or product effectiveness will be judged and customer satisfaction will be 

determined. Once established, the project is required to obtain commitments from 

stakeholders that the resultant set measures is acceptable. The process is then used to 

transform the baselined stakeholder expectations into unique, quantitative, and 

measurable technical requirements. 

NASA Removed Thermal Imaging Capability from LDCM 

Requirements

In 2002, NASA management removed the thermal imaging capability from the LDCM 

requirements baseline on the basis of contractors’ recommendations even though Project 

management recommended retaining the capability. However, in removing the thermal 

 10 USGS defines evapotranspiration as the water lost to the atmosphere from the ground surface, 

evaporation from the capillary fringe of the groundwater table, and the transpiration of groundwater by 

plants whose roots tap the capillary fringe of the groundwater table. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 13

imaging capability, NASA management disregarded the Landsat data continuity goals of 

the LRSP Act of 1992 and the increasing reliance on the data by the user community. 

The thermal infrared spectral band is a legacy capability present on the last four 

successfully launched Landsat missions (Landsats 3, 4, 5, and 7), providing data dating 

back to 1978. Sufficient consistency with the data archive provided by previous Landsats 

allows effective monitoring of land and water usage and consumption trends, tracking of 

sediment and chemical transport, and research in “global and regional change detection.” 

Contractors Recommend Exclusion of Thermal Capability. In FY 2000, a year after 

the launch of Landsat 7, NASA, in cooperation with USGS/DOI, began formulation of 

LDCM as a commercial data buy. Early in the formulation process, NASA, in an attempt 

to commercialize Landsat development, awarded two study contracts to develop 

preliminary designs for a system that would provide data continuity. The contractors, as 

potential commercial partners with NASA, considered and analyzed various designs and 

took different approaches to a thermal instrument. 

The first contractor proposed a cryo-cooler system, citing excellent performance but 

significant impact to the spacecraft’s mass, power, propulsion, and possibly reflective 

instrument performance. The second contractor proposed a microbolometer-based 

system, citing anticipated adequate performance but with newer technology that was not 

flight proven in Earth remote sensing in a system whose 5-year reliability was unproven,

and recommended that the capability only be included as a technology demonstration. 

Both contractors recommended that NASA not include the thermal capability unless 

classified as experimental (technology demonstration) with the admonition of “best 

performance within cost constraints.” 

The contractors were concerned with levying firm requirements on a microbolometerbased instrument because of its technological immaturity. However, reverting to mature 

technologies (active cryo-cooling) would have required significant re-baselining of the 

spacecraft architecture. Both study contractors indicated that the thermal imaging 

capability was not “commercially viable” and that the return on investment for thermal 

image data, based on their assessment of the limited number of users, was far too low for 

consideration. Because neither contractor had determined a customer base supporting 

commercial applications, both recommended NASA not include the thermal capability 

with current LDCM requirements. 

LDCM Project Management Recommends Inclusion of Thermal Capability. In 

August 2002, LDCM Project management reported the results of these studies to the 

Associate Administrator for Earth Science11

 11 The Science Mission Directorate was established in 2004 from the merger of the former Office of Space 

Science and Office of Earth Science. 

and recommended inclusion of the thermal 

capability on LDCM “as a technology demonstration with relaxed lifetime requirements.” 

Project management stated that the “microbolometer-based instrument is the only viable 

LDCM approach” and “should be flight proven for Earth remote sensing missions.” 

Project management also determined that the microbolometer approach had some flight 
RESULTS

14 REPORT NO. IG-09-021

heritage within NASA’s Thermal Emission System aboard the Mars Odyssey mission 

spacecraft and reasoned that it was technically feasible with the current technology. 

LDCM Project management reported that the mass, power, schedule, and cost of the 

cryo-cooled instrument would result in significant impacts to mission and architectures. 

These findings were validated in a study by Goddard’s Instrument Synthesis and Analysis 

Laboratory. 

Despite LDCM Project management’s analyses and recommendations, the Associate 

Administrator for Earth Science removed the thermal imaging capability from the LDCM 

requirements baseline on the basis of the assessments provided by the potential 

commercial partners. As Project formulation continued, further implementation 

approaches were explored for LDCM, including incorporating Landsat capabilities on 

NPOESS. The thermal imaging capability remained unsupported and unfunded. Since 

the development of NASA’s FY 2002 budget, neither budget requests nor its 

appropriated budgets included funding for a thermal capability for LDCM. It was not

again addressed until the FY 2007 budget, but “due to the expected high cost and low 

priority of the thermal capability relative to the other Landsat instrument spectral 

requirements,”12 it was not included. Development of the FY 2008 budget also did not 

include funding for the thermal capability “due to the magnitude of the likely schedule 

impact that was indicated by the 2007 thermal development studies.”13

System-Level Requirements Change to Reinstate Thermal 

Capability Late in Acquisition Life Cycle 

 

In 2007, congressional concerns “that the LDCM mission does not include a thermal 

infrared sensor to provide important data for surface and ground water information”14

In July 2007, NASA awarded the contract for LDCM’s primary instrument, the 

Operational Land Imager (OLI), to Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corporation. 

During the preliminary phase of the OLI design, the LDCM Project office began 

procurement of the LDCM launch vehicle through the NASA Kennedy Space Center’s 

Launch Services Program. 

prompted NASA to initiate technical and programmatic studies on developing a thermal 

imaging capability. NASA’s analyses indicated that the schedule for development of a 

thermal instrument would drive the overall LDCM mission schedule, delay the launch 

date significantly, and increase the potential Landsat data gap. Development of a thermal 

capability was estimated to take 48 months, plus an additional 9 months for satellite 

integration and testing. 

 12 “NASA Report to Congress Regarding LDCM Continuity,” April 2008.

13 “NASA Report to Congress Regarding LDCM Continuity,” April 2008.

14 FY 2008 Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill; 

Calendar No. 259, 110th Congress Report to Senate (June 29, 2007).
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 15

In May 2008, during the LDCM Project’s life cycle reviews to transition into Phase B, 

the LDCM SRB expressed concerns with the possibility that, because the Project did not 

have system-level Spacecraft and Mission Operations requirements fully defined or 

signed by NASA and USGS, system-level requirements could change, resulting in 

technical, cost, and schedule impacts to mission execution. In addition, the SRB 

expressed concerns that the Project had a lingering requirement for the spacecraft to 

accommodate TIRS and continued to conduct feasibility studies to include the instrument 

on LDCM. The SRB stated, “continued requests for technical, cost, and schedule plans 

and estimates for adding the TIRS instrument distracts the Project leadership and 

engineering personnel from focusing on implementing the current baseline mission, 

which adds risk.” 

LDCM Project management had recognized the requirement for spectral data continuity 

and included it in the LDCM Technical, Schedule, and Cost Control Plan (May 5, 2008), 

mission requirements for LDCM. Specifically, both the Plan and the LRSP Act of 1992 

state that the data acquired by LDCM shall be sufficiently consistent with that provided 

by Landsat 7 to allow comparisons for global and regional change detection and 

characterization. The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 (dated May 15, 2008) directed 

NASA to incorporate the thermal imaging capability on LDCM and provide the plan to 

Congress not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of the Act. Specifically, 

Section 205, “Landsat Thermal Infrared Data Continuity,” states: 

In view of the importance of Landsat thermal infrared data for both scientific research 

and water management applications, the Administrator shall prepare a plan for 

ensuring the continuity of Landsat thermal infrared data or its equivalent, including 

allocation of costs and responsibility for the collection and distribution of the data, 

and a budget plan. As part of the plan, the Administrator shall provide an option for 

developing a thermal infrared sensor at minimum cost to be flown on the Landsat 

Data Continuity Mission with minimum delay to the schedule of the Landsat Data 

Continuity Mission.

Though TIRS development was under way, as of June 1, 2009, NASA had not provided a 

formal plan to Congress in response to the Act. However, the FY 2009 Omnibus 

Appropriations (PL 111-8) provided NASA $10 million to initiate development of TIRS 

and directed NASA to identify the earliest and least expensive development approach and 

flight opportunity for TIRS. In addition, NASA’s American Recovery and Reinvestment 

Act program final plans (dated May 15, 2009) include funding for a Critical Design 

Review15

 15 The Critical Design Review demonstrates that the maturity of the TIRS design is appropriate to support 

proceeding with full-scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and test.

of TIRS. As of June 10, 2009, a specific dollar amount had not been identified 

because the Agency is awaiting Congress’ approval of its Operating Plan. 
RESULTS

16 REPORT NO. IG-09-021

Spacecraft Costs Increased as a Result of Late Changes to 

Requirements

In testimony before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics on April 3, 2008, GAO 

highlighted cost and schedule risks resulting from requirement changes in NASA’s Ares I 

Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle Projects.16

Project management estimated that the addition of cryo-cooled thermal imaging 

capability to LDCM would cause spacecraft modification costs, which do not include any 

costs associated with the development of the TIRS instrument, of $11 million to 

$20 million and possible delays to an already delayed mission. However, historically, 

NASA has made changes to Project requirements, resulting in cost and schedule impacts. 

The following table illustrates NASA’s RSDO spacecraft cost growth and launch 

readiness date (LRD) delays for similar projects with the respective reason or cause for 

each. Each projects’ initial projection of cost and schedule was significantly less than the 

actual. 

 Likewise, the 

LDCM Project has incurred cost increases and may experience schedule delays 

associated with spacecraft modifications needed to accommodate a change in baseline,

system-level requirements after NASA awarded the spacecraft contract. NASA awarded 

the firm-fixed price contract for the spacecraft in April 2008 through the Agency’s Rapid 

Spacecraft Development Office (RSDO). At the time of award, LDCM Project 

management designed or “scarred” the spacecraft to account for the possible late addition 

of a microbolometer-based—not a cryo-cooled—thermal instrument. Yet, in August 

2008, 4 months after award, NASA management made the decision to use the cryocooled TIRS instrument, which required a substantial redesign of the spacecraft in 

development. Consequently, spacecraft costs increased as a result of NASA-directed 

design changes. 

 16 Government Accountability Office. “NASA: Ares I and Orion Project Risks and Key Indicators to 

Measure Progress” (GAO-08-186T, April 3, 2008). Ares I and Orion Projects are being developed by 

NASA’s Exploration Systems Mission Directorate under the Constellation Program.
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 17

Table. Rapid Spacecraft Development Office Spacecraft Development History 

Spacecraft Development Cost

 ($ Millions) 

Launch Readiness Date Delay

(Months from Project Inception)

Spacecraft Estimate Actual Difference 

Planned 

ATP

Actual 

ATP Delay

Reason/Cause 

of Cost and Delay

ICESat (Ice, 

Cloud, and Land 

Elevation 

Satellite)

$39.40 $68.20 $28.80 41.0 60.0 19 Technical changes/ 

adding mission 

operations scope, and 

GFE instrument delays

GLAST

(Gamma-Ray 

Large Area 

Space 

Telescope)

$55.60 $102.60 $47.00 48.5 70.0 21.5 Immature spacecraft 

requirements definition 

when delivery order 

awarded

Swift (GammaRay Burst 

Detecting 

Satellite)

$36.30 $46.40 $10.10 46.7 58.3 11.6 GFE instrument delays

NPOESS 

Preparatory 

Project

$75.35 $153.87 $78.52 50.0 96.0 46 Changes in capabilities 

and lateness of 

instruments

LDCM $116.30 TBD TBD 38.0 TBD TBD Change/adding

instrument 

requirements after

delivery order 

awarded

ATP - Authority to Proceed; GFE - Government furnished equipment. 

Throughout the formulation phase of the acquisition, LDCM Project management briefed 

NASA management on the implementation risks of changing baselined system-level 

requirements and integrating a cryo-cooled thermal instrument after contract award. 

Specifically, Project management reported the following to Goddard and Agency 

Program Management Councils:

• Given that the cryo-cooled TIRS instrument design is too immature to enable 

detailed definition of the spacecraft interface in time to support the spacecraft 

development schedule, there is a possibility that there may be substantial 

spacecraft or TIRS redesign if the LDCM is directed to fly TIRS. The scarring of 

the spacecraft as defined in the contract is based on micro-bolometer technology, 

which did not involve cryo-cooler or larger than expected radiators. 

• Latest TIRS design exceeds project-required volume and intrudes into the OLI 

field of view. Given that a TIRS instrument may be located within thermal lineof-sight of the OLI, there is a possibility of a significant redesign to the OLI 

thermal control system. 

The Project’s preliminary integrated master schedule indicates that the late manifestation 

of this requirement has resulted in TIRS having the latest delivery time of all mission 
RESULTS

18 REPORT NO. IG-09-021

elements and could therefore cause the entire LDCM Project schedule and launch to be 

delayed. Accordingly, on February 12, 2009, an independent review team was convened 

by the Earth Systematic Missions Program Manager. Their Assessment Summary, 

March 6, 2009, states that the TIRS development schedule is “very aggressive.” 

However, the review team also reported that “[t]he plan presented showed that risk, cost 

and schedule are already being actively managed.” The independent review team made 

several recommendations, to include the implementation of Earned Value Management 

for TIRS development and a plan to address funding for the instrument, to “increase the 

probability of a successful development effort meeting schedule and cost constraints.” 

Recommendations, Management’s Response, and Evaluation of 

Management’s Response

Recommendation 3. The Associate Administrator for SMD should request an independent 

analysis of the impact on the spacecraft’s development cost and schedule due to the late 

change of LDCM requirements. 

Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator for SMD concurred, stating that

an independent analysis of LDCM’s development cost and schedule will be conducted in 

preparation for Key Decision Point-C, scheduled for October 2009. 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. We consider management’s proposed action 

to be responsive. The recommendation is resolved and will be closed upon completion 

and verification of management’s corrective action. 

Recommendation 4. The Associate Administrator for SMD should issue guidance affirming 

the need for Space Flight Programs and Projects to finalize system-level requirements prior 

to contract award. 

Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator for SMD concurred with our 

recommendation. He noted that the requirement to quantify technical and programmatic 

risks is codified in NPR 7120.5D, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project 

Management Requirements,” March 6, 2007, and stated that SMD’s Management 

Handbook, released in February 2008, affirms the need for all programs and projects to 

follow that NPR through all mission phases and further noted that risk management 

approach, risk identification, and risk mitigations will be critically evaluated at all major 

program/project reviews and key decision points. In addition, he stated that the thermal 

infrared sensor (TIRS) requirements issue was identified and purposely mitigated by 

structuring the LDCM spacecraft request for proposal so as not to preclude its late 

introduction.

Evaluation of Management’s Response. We consider management’s actions, 

specifically, issuance of the Management Handbook affirming the provisions of 

NPR 7120.5D, to be responsive, and the recommendation is closed. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 19

Recommendation 5. The Associate Administrator for SMD should re-emphasize the 

provisions of NPR 7123.1A, “NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements,” 

which require that NASA programs and projects adequately consider stakeholder 

expectations and user community interests prior to contract award for development of any 

major mission element. 

Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator for SMD concurred with the 

recommendation, noting that SMD is committed to working with the stakeholder 

community to develop missions that are responsive to scientific and other needs, as 

detailed in the SMD Management Handbook, published in 2008, and consistent with 

NPR 7123.1A. He further noted that the decision to make fundamental changes to a 

mission (e.g., descopes, launch slips, or cancellations) resides with SMD management,

not the program or project, taking into consideration all stakeholder expectations, 

including congressional direction, and community interest. For LDCM, the Landsat 

Science Team was specifically tasked to prioritize a thermal imaging capability vis-à-vis 

a launch readiness date and the higher priority was placed on an earlier launch readiness 

date.

Evaluation of Management’s Response. The 2008 issuance of SMD’s Management 

Handbook includes numerous mechanisms for working with stakeholders. In 2002, 

despite LDCM Project management’s analyses and recommendations and stakeholder 

interest, the then-Associate Administrator for Earth Science removed the thermal imaging 

capability from the LDCM requirements baseline on the basis of assessments provided by 

potential commercial partners. Issuance of the SMD Management Handbook is

consistent with NPR 7123.1A and adequately emphasizes SMD’s commitment to 

working with the stakeholder community. We consider management’s actions to be 

responsive, and the recommendation is closed.

APPENDIXES

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 21

APPENDIX A

Scope and Methodology

We performed this audit from August 2008 through August 2009 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives. 

We gathered data and information from NASA Project personnel, NASA users of 

Landsat data, and external users to determine whether the Project was meeting, and 

would continue to meet, the intent, goals, and other provisions of the LRSP Act of 1992. 

We reviewed the NASA acquisition strategy used to acquire prior Landsats and compared 

it to the acquisition strategy for LDCM to determine whether there were any risks 

associated with the established acquisition and management processes. The acquisition 

strategy detailed in the acquisition plan was consistent with the memorandum of 

understanding between NASA and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for LDCM. The 

acquisition strategy also addressed the possibility that a thermal infrared sensor (TIRS) 

instrument might be incorporated onto the LDCM mission during the development phase, 

even though NASA initially decided to forego including the legacy thermal capability, 

contrary to the data continuity goals of the LRSP Act of 1992. 

We obtained, reviewed, and summarized the applicable provisions of the Land Remote 

Sensing Policy (LRSP) Act of 1992, NASA Authorization Acts of 2008 and 2009, 

LDCM Project plan, and pertinent policy documents. We evaluated and compared the 

mission, objectives, and goals of the LDCM Project, as stated in the Project plan with the 

goals set forth in the LRSP Act of 1992 and the NASA Authorization Act of 2008. We 

interviewed Project personnel to determine whether the Project was meeting, and would 

continue to meet, the intent, goals, and other provisions of the Acts. We reviewed 

documentation of Landsat 7 Life Projections, the impact of the scan line corrector failure, 

and Landsat Data Gap Study Team analyses. We obtained Landsat data use information 

from external users’ Web sites to determine how they are using Landsat data, the 

uniqueness of Landsat, and the importance of thermal imaging to their operations. We 

interviewed NASA users of Landsat data to determine if they could use sources other 

than Landsat for their needs and what sources they would use if Landsat 5 and Landsat 7 

failed before LDCM’s launch readiness date. We evaluated current projected milestones 

for LDCM and most likely time of failure for Landsat 5 and Landsat 7 to determine 

potential gap in image coverage. We interviewed Landsat Data Gap Study Team 

personnel and obtained supporting documentation to determine whether the team is 

adequately evaluating the feasibility of acquiring data from alternate data sources in the 

likely event of a gap in Landsat satellite coverage. 
APPENDIX A

22 REPORT NO. IG-09-021

We obtained and reviewed the LDCM Project acquisition plan and related acquisition 

documentation. We compared the roles and responsibilities of management documented 

in the acquisition plan to those of the Interagency Agreement and NASA policies. We 

reviewed the NASA-USGS Interagency Agreement for LDCM to determine what 

changes have occurred in NASA’s roles and responsibilities. We attempted to identify 

NASA and other agency projects that used the selected acquisition strategy and contract 

type. We reviewed the acquisition cost and development schedule for all elements of the 

LDCM Project. We reviewed the Earned Value Management System and data as it 

pertains to the OLI contract. We reviewed the results and recommendations of the 

LDCM Standing Review Board for the System Requirements Review, Mission Definition 

Review, and Preliminary Non-Advocate Review.

We obtained and reviewed the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), an 

Executive Office of the President, “A Plan for a U.S. National Land Imaging Program,” 

August 2007 report; “NASA Report to Congress Regarding Landsat Data Continuity 

Mission (LDCM) data Continuity,” April 2008; and Presidential Decision 

Directive/NSTC-3 “Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy,” May 1994; and other 

documentation to determine NASA’s role regarding the various Landsat satellites. We 

interviewed NASA users of Landsat data to determine if NASA would be adversely 

impacted if Landsat became an operational program with DOI as the lead agency. We 

interviewed the USGS/DOI representative to determine the status of National Land 

Imaging Program (NLIP). 

Earned Value Management. We found that management had implemented an effective 

Earned Value Management System to improve management of cost and schedule risks. 

LDCM Project management’s Earned Value Management System, managed through the 

Defense Contract Management Agency, formally complied with the standards of the 

American National Standards Institute/Electronic Industries Alliance - 748 (ANSI/EIA748), “Standard for Earned Value Management Systems,” June 1998,17 as required by 

NPR 7120.5D, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements,” 

March 6, 2007. Project management also implemented Earned Value Management in 

accordance with the, “LDCM Project Plan,” May 2008,18

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We used computer-processed data for historical 

Rapid Spacecraft Development Office Spacecraft cost growth and LRD delays, which we 

verified to records maintained by the LDCM Deputy Resource Manager. We also used 

computer-processed data from Review Item Discrepancies (RIDs) tracked by Center 

management. We tracked each of the 28 RIDs and issues through the risk identification, 

reporting, and mitigation process. We believe the data to be reliable based upon our 

confirmation of spacecraft costs and tracked RIDs and issues. 

as required by NPR 7120.5D.

 17 ANSI/EIA-748-B was published in June 2007.

18 The Project also implemented the Earned Value Management System in accordance with the “Technical, 

Schedule and Cost Control Plan,” May 5, 2008, a document referenced in the “LDCM Project Plan.” 
APPENDIX A

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 23

Review of Internal Controls 

We identified and tested LDCM acquisition processes for compliance with NASA’s 

policies and procedures. We reviewed Goddard Space Flight Center (Goddard) 

procedures for controlling LDCM risks and for conducting critical milestone reviews of 

contractor performance. We found that LCDM Project management effectively 

identified, reported, and mitigated LDCM acquisition risks. Our review of the Project’s 

internal controls found that Project management established a risk assessment process 

that complied with NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8000.4, “Risk Management 

Procedural Requirements,” April 25, 2002. As of February 5, 2008, Project management 

managed 19 unique review item discrepancies and 9 issues (a total of 28 unique risks), 

which they reported to Goddard management. We tracked the 28 risks through the risk 

identification, reporting, and mitigation process. The Project’s Risk Management Board 

unanimously closed 8 of the 28 items, leaving 20 open or ongoing items to be addressed 

in Phase B of the Project’s life cycle reviews. We did not identify any NASA internal 

control weaknesses

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the NASA 

Office of Inspector General (OIG) have issued four reports of particular relevance to the 

subject of this report. Unrestricted reports can be accessed over the Internet at 

http://www.gao.gov (GAO) and http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY09 (NASA). 

“Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on Satellite and 

Related Acquisitions” (GAO-03-825R, June 2, 2003)

Government Accountability Office

“NASA: Ares I and Orion Project Risks and Key Indicators to Measure Progress” 

(GAO-08-186T, April 3, 2008)

“Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Acquisition Is Under Way, but 

Improvements Needed in Management and Oversight” (GAO-09-323, April 2, 2009)

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Our office issued “More Stringent Entrance Criteria Needed for Project Life-Cycle 

Reviews” (Report No. IG-09-004, October 31, 2008). We determined that the Orion 

Project Office (Project Office) conducted a Phase A life-cycle review with a vehicle 

configuration (606 vehicle) that was not at the proper maturity level to proceed to Phase 

B. Specifically, a required engineering design analysis conducted prior to the life-cycle 

review disclosed that the vehicle configuration required a reduction in weight, power, and 

instrumentation. However, instead of delaying the Phase A life-cycle review until the 

correct vehicle configuration (607 vehicle) could be reviewed, the Project Office 

proceeded with a nonconforming vehicle. As a result, a significant portion of the vehicle 
APPENDIX A

24 REPORT NO. IG-09-021

configuration that eventually did proceed to Phase B did not receive the benefit of a 

Phase A life-cycle review, nor was it completely evaluated for compliance with 

requirements. 

Our office also issued “Final Memorandum of NASA’s Management of the Flight Project 

for the Geostationary Operational Environment Satellite Series-R Program” (Report No. 

IG-08-006, December 19, 2007). We determined that the responsible NASA Program 

Management Councils for the GOES-R Program was effectively reviewing project issues 

and progress and that NASA’s GOES-R Flight Project Office had procedures and 

processes in place to adequately identify, mitigate, and report technical risks in 

accordance with NASA policy. However, we found that NASA’s ability to effectively 

procure, manage, and execute the GOES-R Flight Project was impeded by the level of 

oversight provided by NOAA and Commerce. Specifically, increased management 

oversight by NOAA and Commerce delayed the release of requests for proposals for the 

GOES-R spacecraft. The delays were caused by Commerce implementing processes that 

were in conflict with the current memorandum of understanding (MOU) between 

Commerce and NASA, dated June 15, 2007. The MOU states that guidance for GOES-R 

Program processes will be derived from NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 

7120.5D, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements,” 

March 6, 2007. The process followed for the spacecraft request for proposal conflicted 

with NPR guidance and the resultant delays increased the risks to GOES-R Program 

development and the GOES-R launch schedule.
APPENDIX B

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 25

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS
APPENDIX B

26 REPORT NO. IG-09-021
APPENDIX B

REPORT NO. IG-09-021 27
APPENDIX C

28 REPORT NO. IG-09-021

REPORT DISTRIBUTION

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Administrator

Deputy Administrator

Chief of Staff

Assistant Administrator for Science Mission Directorate

Non-NASA Organizations and Individuals

Office of Management and Budget

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch

Government Accountability Office

Director, Defense, State, and NASA Financial Management, Office of Financial 

Management and Assurance

Director, NASA Issues, Office of Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics, and Related Sciences

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

House Committee on Appropriations

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement

House Committee on Science and Technology

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
REPORT NO. IG-09-021 29

Major Contributors to the Report:

Raymond Tolomeo, Director, Science and Aeronautics Research Directorate

Tony Lawson, Project Manager

Gregory Lokey, Auditor

Candice Dunn, Auditor

Cindy Stein, Aerospace Technologist

Janet Overton, Editor
SEPTEMBER 2, 2009

REPORT No. IG-09-021

OFFICE OF AUDITS

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

ADDITIONAL COPIES

Visit http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY09 to obtain additional copies of this report, or contact the 

Assistant Inspector General for Auditing at 202-358-1232.

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at Joel.Rodriguez@nasa.gov or call 202-358-4440.

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Washington, DC 20546-0001

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