IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DIANE PARKER,

Plaintiff,

 No. 12 C 3207

FOUR SEASONS HOTELS, LIMITED, Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Diane Parker (“Parker”) was injured after 

a sliding glass bathroom door shattered on her while she was 

staying at a hotel owned and operated by Defendant Four Seasons 

Hotels, Limited (“Four Seasons”). Several motions are pending 

before the Court: Four Seasons’ motion for summary judgment,

(ECF No. 88); four separate motions to strike certain evidence 

Parker submitted in opposition to the motion for summary 

judgment, (ECF Nos. 119, 121, 123, and 125); and Four Seasons’ 

motion for sanctions against Parker for allegedly making false 

statements and misrepresentations in her filings with this 

Court, (ECF No. 88). For the reasons explained below, Four 

Seasons’ motion for summary judgment is granted in part and 

denied in part. The motions to strike and the motion for 

sanctions are denied.
I. MOTIONS TO STRIKE

As an initial matter, Four Seasons has moved to strike 

Parker’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts, her Statement of 

Additional Facts, her affidavit in opposition to the motion for 

summary judgment, and the supporting affidavits of her father 

and sister. Motions to strike are disfavored and generally 

unnecessary since the parties are free to present arguments as 

to the adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence in their briefing

on the underlying motion. Moreover, Local Rule 56.1 “includes 

its own enforcement provisions, making motions to strike [Local 

Rule] 56.1 statements or responses superfluous at best.” 

Loeffel Steel Prods., Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 

2d 968, 971 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2005). The Court has taken into 

account the various arguments raised in the motions to strike

and is capable of determining which facts are relevant to the 

present motion and which facts are extraneous or improper. See,

e.g., Jenkins v. Spaargaren, No. 09 C 3453, 2011 WL 1356757, at 

*2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2011). Accordingly, each of the motions 

to strike is denied as moot. 

II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Background

On April 27, 2007, Parker checked in as a guest of the Four 

Seasons Hotel Chicago (“Hotel”). Parker was assigned to Room 

3627. The following day, while exiting the bathroom after 

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taking a shower, Parker attempted to open a frosted sliding 

glass door separating the bathroom from the vanity area. As 

Parker slid open the door, it exploded suddenly and rained 

shards of glass onto her naked body causing her to suffer 

injuries. 

Parker’s sister, Cindy Schiavon (“Schiavon”), who also was 

staying at the Hotel at the time, called down to the front desk 

to request help. Although Schiavon asked specifically for

assistance from a female employee, two male employees arrived at 

the room instead. Shortly thereafter, Joesph Gartin (“Gartin”), 

an engineer employed by the Hotel, arrived to investigate the 

incident. According to Schiavon’s affidavit, Gartin immediately 

looked upwards towards the door’s overhead track and stated that 

it “look[ed] like the stopper [had] moved again.” Gartin went 

on to explain that the Hotel had been renovated recently and 

that “several” of the newly-installed sliding glass doors had 

exploded because the overhead track stoppers were not working 

properly. Gartin further stated that Parker’s room was on the 

Hotel’s “do not sell” list and suggested that Schiavon check the 

glass door in her own room. 

On April 21, 2009, Parker brought suit for her injuries in 

the Circuit Court of Cook County, Law Division. After years of 

discovery, Parker dismissed the case voluntarily and, on April 

30, 2012, refiled the action in this Court. Although Parker’s 

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Amended Complaint does not specify particular Counts, a liberal 

reading of her pleadings permits the Court to infer the 

following causes of action: (1) premises liability, (2) common 

law fraud, (3) violation of the Illinois Safety Glazing 

Materials Act and the Chicago Municipal Code, (4) negligence in 

connection with the installation of the Hotel’s sliding glass 

doors; (5) spoliation of evidence, and (6) intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. Parker’s brief in opposition 

to Four Seasons’ motion for summary judgment does not indicate 

that she pursues other theories of liability, so the Court 

addresses only these six claims. 

B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party 

“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence would 

permit a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the suit. 

Id. If the moving party satisfies its burden, the non-movant 

must present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that a genuine 

factual dispute exists. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 323-24 (1986). In doing so, the non-moving party “must do 

more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 

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material facts.” Sarver v. Experian Info. Sys., 390 F.3d 969, 

970 (7th Cir. 2004). Rather, it must demonstrate “through 

specific evidence that a triable issue of fact remains on issues 

for which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial.” 

Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463-64 (7th Cir. 2009).

C. Analysis

1. Premises Liability

In a premises liability action, the plaintiff has the 

burden of proving “(1) the existence of a condition that 

presents an unreasonable risk of harm to persons on the 

premises; (2) that the defendants knew, or should have known, 

that the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) that 

the defendants should have anticipated that individuals on the 

premises would fail to discover or recognize the danger or 

otherwise fail to protect themselves against it; (4) a negligent 

act or omission on the part of the defendant; (5) an injury 

suffered by the plaintiff; and (6) that the condition of the 

property was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff.” 

Mueller v. Phar-Mor, Inc., 784 N.E.2d 226, 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 

2000). Under Illinois law, owners of property owe their 

invitees a duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe 

condition. Reid v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 545 F.3d 479, 481 

(7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). This duty includes an 

obligation to inspect and repair dangerous conditions on the 

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property or give adequate warnings to prevent injury. Culli v. 

Marathon Petroleum Co., 862 F.2d 119, 123 (7th Cir. 1988). To 

be liable, the defendant must have had actual or constructive 

notice of the dangerous condition. Id. 

The parties dispute whether Four Seasons knew or should 

have known that the sliding glass door in Parker’s room was a

dangerous condition. Four Seasons contends that the incident 

was “the first of its kind” and that no similar glass doors ever 

had broken at the Hotel prior to the occurrence in this case. 

That assertion, of course, ignores Schiavon’s affidavit, which 

indicates that Gartin acknowledged that the Hotel had 

experienced problems with other sliding glass doors and that 

several had exploded on prior occasions because of defective 

track stoppers. Four Seasons’ only response is that Schiavon’s 

affidavit should be disregarded because Parker allegedly failed 

to disclose her as a witness. That claim, however, finds no 

support in the record. Indeed, in answers to Four Seasons’ 

state court interrogatories, Parker listed Schiavon as a witness 

who was present at the time of the incident. (See, Pl.’s Ans. 

to Def.’s Interrogatories (“Pl.’s Int.”) ¶¶ 3, ECF No. 122-2). 

Parker further noted that she was aware that various Hotel 

employees (although, at the time, she did not know their names) 

made oral statements relating to the occurrence shortly 

afterwards. (Id. ¶ 22). In addition, Schiavon’s name again 

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appeared in Parker’s written Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures, which 

she submitted after she refiled her case in this Court. (Pl.’s 

26(a)(1) Disclosures at 1, ECF No. 38).

Four Seasons complains that Parker withheld the existence 

and contents of Schiavon’s discussion with Gartin despite having 

asked specifically whether Parker or “anyone acting on [her] 

behalf” had ever had any conversations with any person regarding

“the manner in which the occurrence complained of occurred.” 

(Pl.’s Int. ¶ 21). While it is true that Parker did not include

Gartin’s statements to Schiavon in her answer to that 

interrogatory, there is nothing to suggest that Schiavon was 

acting “on Parker’s behalf” when Gartin mentioned to her that 

other sliding glass doors in the Hotel had exploded before. 

Therefore, it is difficult to see how Parker’s answer was in any

way improper. Under the circumstances, Four Seasons’ cries of 

foul play simply are not credible. 

While Schiavon’s affidavit alone is enough to preclude 

summary judgment on the issue, the Court notes that there is 

other evidence that Four Seasons knew that its sliding glass 

doors were a potential hazard to guests. In an email dated 

October 2, 2007, John Sheridan (“Sheridan”), the Senior Vice 

President of James McHugh Construction Co., the general 

contractor that had performed renovations at the Hotel shortly

before Parker’s stay, noted that at least five sliding glass 

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doors had broken since the renovation and that the door in Room 

3627 (Parker’s room) actually had broken on two separate 

occasions. (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to Sum. J. (“Pl.’s Opp. Mem.”), 

Exs. PL-B-1, PL-B-2 (“Sheridan Email”), ECF Nos. 101-2, 101-3). 

Since Four Seasons stated in answers to interrogatories that it 

did not replace the glass door in Parker’s room after she was 

injured, (see, Def.’s Answers to Pl.’s Second Set of 

Interrogatories ¶ 4, ECF No. 101-9), it is clear that the other 

occasion on which the door in Parker’s room broke happened at 

some point prior to her stay. Thus, it can be inferred that 

Four Seasons was aware that the sliding glass door in Parker’s 

very room was defective.

But there is a wrinkle: the email is hearsay and, since it

was sent several months after Parker sustained her injuries, the 

assumption that Four Seasons was on notice is only valid if the 

contents of the message are admitted for the truth of the 

matters asserted. The email, however, does not appear to be 

admissible under any of the traditional exceptions to the 

Hearsay Rule. Nonetheless, courts have long recognized that the 

prohibition on hearsay is not intended to be a mechanical bar on 

otherwise reliable evidence. Thus, Rule 807 of the Federal 

Rules of Evidence permits the admission of hearsay statements to 

prove the truth of their contents if (1) the statements have 

circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the 

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type of evidence allowed under other hearsay exceptions, (2) the 

statements are offered as evidence of a material fact, (3) the 

statements are more probative on the point for which they are

offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain 

through reasonable efforts, and (4) admission of the statement 

would best serve the purposes of the Federal Rules and the 

administration of justice. Put more simply, hearsay evidence 

“should be admissible when it is reliable, when the jury can 

understand its strengths and limitations, and when it will 

materially enhance the likelihood of a correct outcome.” United 

States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., 

concurring). 

Where, as here, the so-called “hearsay dangers” – lack of 

reliability and the inability to cross-examine the declarant –

are minimal, there is no reason to bar evidence simply because 

it is hearsay in a technical sense. There can be no question 

that the contents of the Sheridan Email are highly probative to 

the case and, indeed, more probative than any other evidence on 

the issue of premises liability. Moreover, there is nothing to 

indicate that the Sheridan Email is somehow unreliable or 

otherwise inaccurate. Gartin’s comment to Schiavon that 

“several” sliding glass doors had broken in the past provides

additional circumstantial guarantees that the statements in 

Sheridan’s email are neither untrustworthy nor false. Under 

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these circumstances, the Court concludes that the admission of 

this evidence would significantly enhance the likelihood of a 

correct outcome in this case. Accordingly, the statement is 

admitted under the Residual Exception to the hearsay rule.

Considering both Schiavon’s affidavit and the Sheridan 

Email, it is clear that there is a significant factual dispute 

regarding Four Seasons’ knowledge of prior incidents involving 

guestroom sliding glass doors. Summary judgment therefore is 

improper on Parker’s premises liability claim.

2. Fraud

Parker next alleges that Four Seasons fraudulently 

concealed its plans to install sliding glass doors in guestroom 

bathrooms by failing to list this proposed work in its permit 

application with the Department of Buildings. To recover on an 

action for common law fraud, a plaintiff must prove, among other 

things, that her reliance on the defendant’s fraudulent 

statement led to her injury. Rubloff Dev. Grp., Inc. v. 

SuperValu, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 732, 748 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 

Here, the allegedly fraudulent statements of which Parker 

complains were made to the Department of Buildings, not to her. 

Since Parker cannot show that she relied on statements for which 

she was unaware, her fraud claim must be rejected. 

Moreover, there simply is no evidence that Four Seasons 

perpetrated any fraud in connection with the Hotel’s renovation

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plans. Although Parker finds it significant that Four Seasons 

did not mention the installation of sliding glass doors in its

permit application, it is obvious that the application’s threeline entry box for “Description of Proposed Work” was not 

intended to require an exhaustive list. At any rate, at the 

same time Four Seasons filed its application, it also provided 

the Department of Buildings with a complete set of architectural 

drawings detailing the precise nature of the work that was to be 

performed. (Affidavit of John E. Sheridan, sworn to on May 6, 

2013 (“Sheridan Aff.”) ¶¶ 9-14, ECF No. 98-7). Those plans, 

which Four Seasons incorporated by reference in the permit 

application itself, provide specifically for the installation of 

sliding glass doors in guestroom bathrooms, including Parker’s 

room. (Id.). Clearly, there was no attempt by Four Seasons to 

mislead the Department of Buildings as to its intention to 

install sliding glass doors in its renovation of the Hotel.

Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of Four 

Seasons on Parker’s common law fraud claim. 

3. Violation of Safety Glazing Regulations

Parker next asserts that Four Seasons used inferior quality 

glass when it installed the guestroom sliding glass doors, 

thereby violating the Illinois Safety Glazing Materials Act 

(“Safety Glazing Act” or “Act”), 430 Ill. Comp. Stat. 60/1 et 

seq., and Section 13-124-350 of the Chicago Municipal Code

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(“Municipal Code”). Both the Safety Glazing Act and the 

Municipal Code mandate that any materials used in the 

construction of sliding glass doors meet certain specifications 

and safety requirements. Neither law, however, provides 

plaintiffs a private right of action for damages caused by 

alleged safety violations. Indeed, under the Safety Glazing 

Act, the only form of relief available is a criminal penalty. 

See, 430 Ill. Comp. Stat. 60/7; Rhodes v. Mill Race Inn, Inc., 

467 N.E.2d 915, 917-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (finding no implied 

private right of action for violations of the Act). Similarly, 

the Municipal Code affords no express civil remedy for 

violations of Section 13-124-350 and the Court is aware of no 

case (and Parker cites none) that has extended an implied right 

of action to plaintiffs seeking redress for injuries arising 

under that Section. Since traditional tort remedies are 

available to Parker for any harm caused by Four Seasons’ alleged

use of substandard glass, the Court declines to imply a private 

right of action under the Municipal Code. See, e.g., Abbasi ex 

rel. Abbasi v. Paraskevoulakos, 718 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Ill. 1999) 

(an implied cause of action is not conferred under the Chicago 

Municipal Code where a common law negligence claim provides an 

adequate remedy). 

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For these reasons, Four Seasons is entitled to summary 

judgment on Parker’s Safety Glazing Act and Municipal Code

claims.

4. Negligent Installation of Sliding Glass Doors

To the extent that Parker argues that Four Seasons was 

negligent in its installation of the sliding glass doors, any 

claim in that regard is unsupported by the record. “In an 

action for negligence under Illinois law, a plaintiff must show 

‘that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that defendant 

breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause 

of the plaintiff’s injuries.’” Chess v. United States, 836 F. 

Supp. 2d 742, 751 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (quoting First Springfield 

Bank & Trust v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Ill. 1999)). 

Here, Parker’s only evidence of negligence is her allegation 

that the glass found on the Hotel’s sliding doors did not bear 

the proper safety etchings required by law. Parker also 

proffers the “expert opinion” of her father, Alan Frank

(“Frank”), a suspended attorney who also claims to have an 

engineering background and an extensive knowledge of the glazing 

requirements for tempered and laminated glass. (See Aff. of 

Alan Frank, sworn to on July 17, 2013 (“Frank Aff.”), ECF No. 

104). Since Parker never sought to qualify Frank as an expert 

witness, however, the Court disregards his undisclosed opinion 

testimony, which in any event is speculative and, for the most 

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part, irrelevant. See, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 

Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 

As to Parker’s claim that the Hotel failed to use glass 

with the appropriate safety etchings, the uncontroverted 

evidence demonstrates that Four Seasons used certified tempered 

glass that complied with all applicable federal, state, and 

municipal codes. (Aff. of Arnold Harris, sworn to on Apr. 30, 

2013 (“Harris Aff.”) ¶ 14, ECF No. 98-8). Contrary to Parker’s 

assertion, all necessary safety etchings did appear originally

on the glass, but the contractor in charge of installing the 

sliding doors received a waiver permitting the removal of all 

markings in order to provide Four Seasons with a clean product. 

(Id. ¶ 17). In light of the foregoing explanation, it is 

difficult to see how Four Seasons’ conduct could be construed as

negligent in any way.

Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on Parker’s 

negligent installation claim. 

5. Spoliation of Evidence

Parker next alleges that Four Seasons intentionally 

“covered-up” critical evidence to her case by “destroying, 

concealing or disposing of” the individual pieces of glass that 

broke off of the sliding door. Because Illinois law “does not 

recognize a tort of intentional spoliation,” the Court construes 

Parker’s claim as one of ordinary negligence. Borsellino v. 

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Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 509-10 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Contrary to Parker’s assertion, there is no evidence that Four 

Seasons breached any duty it owed her in its handling of the 

broken glass. Indeed, Four Seasons represents that the pieces 

of glass were preserved and have been available to Parker for 

inspection at counsel’s office since the inception of this 

litigation. To the extent that Parker complains that she has 

been unable to have the glass “test[ed] by experts who are 

capable of corroborating the extreme extent to which . . . [the] 

glass violated the law,” (Am. Compl. ¶ 54, ECF No. 11), any test 

results in that regard would be irrelevant because the Court has 

rejected Parker’s claims relating to Four Seasons’ alleged 

failure to use the appropriate type of safety glass. 

Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of Four 

Seasons on Parker’s spoliation claim.

6. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Parker’s final claim is for damages arising out of the

emotional distress she alleges she suffered as a result of Four 

Seasons sending two male employees into her room while she 

remained naked after the incident. To succeed on a claim for 

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”), a 

plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant engaged in extreme 

and outrageous conduct, (2) the defendant intentionally or 

recklessly caused the plaintiff emotional distress, (3) the 

15
plaintiff, in fact, suffered severe or extreme emotional 

distress, and (4) the plaintiff’s emotional distress was 

actually and proximately caused by the defendant’s outrageous 

conduct. Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1030 

(7th Cir. 2006) (citing Pub. Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 360 N.E.2d 

765, 767–68 (Ill. 1976)).

Here, Parker has presented no evidence that Four Seasons 

engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct or that it 

intentionally or recklessly caused her emotional distress. 

Although Schiavon may have asked the front desk for “female 

assistance,” there is no indication that she communicated to the 

Hotel that her reason for this request was because Parker was 

unclothed. Thus, there is no indication that the Hotel was 

aware that Parker would be naked when staff arrived at her room. 

Understandably reacting to Parker’s urgent need for medical 

attention, the Hotel sent two employees who happened to be male. 

Under the circumstances, Four Seasons had no way of knowing that 

sending a male employee to Parker’s room would cause her severe 

emotional distress. Thus, whatever brief indignity Parker may 

have suffered as a result is not recoverable here. Accordingly, 

summary judgment is granted on Parker’s IIED claim. 

IV. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

On December 14, 2012, Four Seasons filed a motion seeking 

to deem certain factual matters admitted on grounds that Parker 

16
had defaulted on her discovery obligations by failing to respond 

to its state court requests to admit. (ECF No. 57). Parker 

objected to that request, contending that she, in fact, had 

responded to Four Seasons’ requests “on or about February 4, 

2011, by U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid.” (ECF No. 63). Counsel 

for Four Seasons denied having received anything from Parker, 

however; thus, in an apparent attempt to corroborate her claim, 

Parker submitted an unsigned and undated copy of her purported 

responses.

In a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated May 6, 2013, the 

Court ordered Parker to file signed and dated responses, since 

it was unclear whether her undated submissions simply were

drafted after the fact in an effort to manufacture evidence in 

opposition to Four Seasons’ motion. (ECF No. 84). On May 20, 

2013, Parker resubmitted a copy of her responses, which was

signed and dated May 9, 2013 – more than two years after the 

date she claimed to have mailed them.

On May 24, 2013, Four Seasons filed a motion for sanctions,

arguing that Parker failed to comply with the Court’s May 6 

Order and that her undated responses did not substantiate her 

claim as to the timeliness of her original submissions. (ECF 

No. 88). In opposition to the motion, Parker submitted an 

affidavit reaffirming that she had mailed her responses to Four 

Seasons’ counsel in February 2011. (Aff. of Parker (“Parker 

17
Aff.”), at 1, ECF No. 92-1). Parker further explained that she 

was unable to provide a copy bearing the correct date because 

she had retained only an electronic version of the document, 

which contained neither her signature nor any date. (Id.). In 

an apparent effort to comply with the Court’s order, however, 

Parker simply resubmitted this version, which she altered to 

include the current date. (Id.). 

Although it was perhaps somewhat irresponsible of Parker to 

fail to maintain verified copies of her original responses, 

there does not appear to be any evidence that she intended to 

mislead the Court by submitting the “dated” copy which she 

produced in reply to the May 6 Order. Rather, she affixed the 

current date because she had no other version of the document

and the Court directed her to produce a dated copy. In the 

absence of any clear indication that Parker intended any deceit 

by her conduct, the Court is unable to conclude that Parker 

acted in bad faith.

This is not to say, however, that the Court discredits Four 

Seasons’ claim that it never received Parker’s original

responses. Nor is the Court unsympathetic to any frustration 

that such a delay may have caused. But without evidence that 

Parker willfully made false statements or submitted misleading 

documents, Four Seasons’ complaints alone are not sufficient to 

18
warrant the imposition of sanctions. Consequently, the 

application for sanctions is denied.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Four Seasons’ motion for 

summary judgment, (ECF No. 97), is granted in part and denied in 

part. Four Seasons’ motions to strike, (ECF Nos. 119, 121, 123, 

and 125), are denied as moot. Four Seasons’ motion for 

sanctions, (ECF No. 88), is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/31/2014 ____________________________

Judge Harry D. Leinenweber

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