1 Filed 4/17/14 In re P.C. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Colusa)

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In re P.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. C075201

COLUSA COUNTY DEPA RTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
I.V., Defendant and Appellant. (Super. Ct. No. JU3655)

I.V., mother of the minor P.C., appe als from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights. (W elf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) 1 Mother contends

1 Undesignated statutory references ar e to the Welfare and Institutions Code.2 there was insufficient ev idence that her continued custody of P.C. was likely to result in serious emotional or physic al damage to him. Disagreeing, we will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
BACKGROUND On May 9, 2012, the Colusa County Depa rtment of Health and Human Services (Department) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of minor P.C. (the n 11 years old). The petition was also filed on beha lf of P.C.’s half siblings Ad. (then almost three years old), A. (then two years old), and An. (then two months old). 2 The petition alleged use of methamphetamine by the parents and th at Ad. and A. tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother had also failed to follow up with pren atal care for An.,
missed her scheduled caesarean secti on delivery, and tested positive for methamphetamine at his birth. Prior to An.’s birth, the minors had been the subject of a previous dependency case, resulting in P.C.’s detention from parent al custody in August 2010. Mother had a history of alcohol abuse and father was incarc erated for domestic violence. The previous dependency had been terminated in August 2011.
The minors were found to be Indian children but the tribe decided not to intervene. Instead, the tribe asked to receive notices of hearings and to be kept informed of the parents’ progress and any decisi on to pursue adoption or termin ation of parental rights. The juvenile court sustained the petitions on June 4, 2012; Ad ., A., and An. were placed together in foster care. P.C. was plac ed in a separate home, the same home he had been placed during the previous dependenc y case. The parents engaged in services and

2 This appeal was taken from the orders ente red at the section 366. 26 hearing as to minor P.C. Mother filed an earlier appeal from the termination orders as to minors Ad., A., and An. This court affirmed the juvenile court’s orders in that case. ( In re A.J . (Feb. 5, 2014, C074566 [nonpub. opn .].) The facts, up to the time of the permanency planning hearing for the half siblings, are taken almost verbatim from our previous opinion.3 were having supervised visita tion three times a week. The juvenile court declared the minors dependents of the court at the Ju ly 16, 2012 disposition hearing. On August 4, 2012 , mother was arrested for public intoxication and father, who had also been drinking heavily , was arrested for spousal a buse. The parents had just begun unsupervised visitation pr ior to the arrests but supervis ed visits were reinstated. Unsupervised visits were resumed in Sept ember 2012 and the Department planned to begin unsupervised weekend visits on Octobe r 5, 2012. Mother, however, was arrested again for public intoxication on October 13, 2 012. She had been so intoxicated that she did not remember her arrest. At that point, mother recognized she needed to enter an inpatient treatment program and entered th e Salvation Army program on November 26, 2012. Supervised visits were reinstated.
Reunification services were terminated on February 15, 2013. The section 366.26 selection and implementation hear ing for the half siblings was held on July 15, 2013. At that time, the juvenile court received into eviden ce two reports from the social worker and reports from the adoptions specialist and Dr. Art Martinez, the Indian Child Welfare Act specialist. Dr. Martinez and the social worker testified at the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile c ourt found beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody by the parent s was likely to result in seri ous emotional or physical damage to the half siblings. The juvenile co urt also found that the half siblings were adoptable and that no exception to adoption applied. The juvenile court terminated parental rights as to Ad., A., and An. P.C.’s selection and implementation hearin g was held on September 16, 2013. In
addition to the evidence presented at the hearing for the ha lf siblings, there was also an updated report from the adoptions specialist and additional testimony from Dr. Martinez. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody by the parent s was likely to result in seri ous emotional or physical4 damage to P.C. The juvenile court found th at P.C. was adoptable and that no exception to adoption applied. The juvenile court terminated parental rights as to P.C.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends there wa s insufficient eviden ce that her continued custody of P.C. was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to him. We disagree. In order to terminate parental rights when an Indian child is involved, there must be “a determination, support ed by evidence beyond a reas onable doubt . . . that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” (25 U.S.C. § 1912(f); see also § 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(B)(ii).) When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a fi nding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial cour t is beyond a reasonable doubt, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial eviden ce -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid va lue -- to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) In making this determination, all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party and issues of fact and credibility are questio ns for the trier of fact. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 578; In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 924; In re Jason L., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1214; In re Steve W . (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.) The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence when a ssessing the sufficiency of the evidence. ( In re Stephanie M., (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
Mother identifies no evidence establishing that she was able to safely take physical custody of P.C. To the contrary, th e June 2013 written re port by Dr. Martinez specifically stated that mother was not at a place where return of the minors was indicated. Dr. Martinez noted that, while mo ther was doing well in her recovery, she was living at the Salvation Army Treatment Center where there were “a few observed issues5 of harm or risk” and, furthermore, “withou t the safety and secu rity of the current [sheltered] environment, it is at least possible that the moth er’s enduring post-traumatic responses would reengage, therefore causing her to become emotionally volatile leading to mismanagement of the ch ildren.” He believed she wa s unable to live on her own
outside a sheltered environment and he did not believe she was currently able to care for
the minors. In a June 2013 letter to the juvenile c ourt, mother’s therapist opined that mother was doing well in her approach to recovery, but the therapist sa id nothing to establish that
it was safe to return the minor s to mother’s custody. The social worker believed that, due to mother’s progress in recovery, six months of additional reunification services might be warranted. However, the social worker did not suggest returning the minor s with maintenance services. Mother argues that although those reports were made in June or July of 2013, P.C.’s hearing was held two months later, giving mother “two additional months to progress in her ability to care fo r the child.” But the passage of time, without more, does
not evidence remediation of risk to P.C. There was no evidence of any new progress or change to suggest mother was currently ready to safe ly take custody of P.C. Mother also points out th at Dr. Martinez did not be lieve serious emotional or physical damage would result if mother had legal custody. But even if the juvenile court had accepted that opinion, it was still required to find detriment if mother’s physical custody of P.C. was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to him. The use of the word “custody” in 25 U.S. C. section 1912(f) and section 366.26, subdivision (c)(2)(B)(ii) includes both legal and physical custod y, and the Indian Child Welfare Act recognizes different types of custody. ( In re Crystal K. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 655, 667-668.) The use of the phrase “continued custody,” without delineating the type, means the phrase encompasses both physical and legal custody. ( Ibid .)6 Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that mother’s continued custody of P.C. was likely to result in seri ous emotional or physical damage to him.
DISPOSITION The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

M AURO , J.

We concur:

RAYE , P. J.

HULL , J.