Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge

CHARLES P. KOCORAS Sitting Judge if Other

than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 12 C 2104 DATE April 2, 2012

CASE

TITLE

Larry Winkfield (#2011-0903119) vs. Superintendent Reyes, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

The plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc [3]) is granted. The court authorizes and

orders Cook County Jail officials to deduct $6.44 from the plaintiff’s account, and to continue making monthly

deductions in accordance with this order. The clerk shall send a copy of this order to the Supervisor of Inmate

Trust Fund Accounts, Cook County Dept. of Corrections Administrative Office, Division V, 2700 S. California,

Chicago, Illinois 60608. The clerk is directed to issue summonses for service on defendants by the U.S. Marshal. 

The clerk is also directed to send the plaintiff a magistrate judge consent form and filing instructions along with

a copy of this order. 

O [For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT

The plaintiff, a prisoner in the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections, has brought this

pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff claims that two correctional officers at the

jail violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by using unjustified force against him. More specifically, the

plaintiff alleges that the officers viciously attacked him when he simply asked why he was being sent to his room. 

The plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(1), the plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $6.44. The supervisor of inmate trust accounts

at the Cook County Jail is authorized and ordered to collect, when funds exist, the partial filing fee from the

plaintiff’s trust fund account and pay it directly to the Clerk of Court. After payment of the initial partial filing

fee, the trust fund officer at the plaintiff’s place of confinement is directed to collect monthly payments from the

plaintiff’s trust fund account in an amount equal to 20% of the precedingmonth’s income credited to the account. 

Monthly payments collected from the plaintiff’s trust fund account shall be forwarded to the Clerk of Court each

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the full $350 filing fee is paid. All payments shall be sent to

the Clerk, United States District Court, 219 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, Illinois 60604, attn: Cashier’s Desk, 20th

(CONTINUED)

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STATEMENT (continued)

Floor, and shall clearly identify the plaintiff’s name and the case number assigned to this action. The Cook County

inmate trust account office shall notify transferee authorities of any outstanding balance in the event the plaintiff

is transferred from the jail to another correctional facility. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt initial review of prisoner complaints

against governmental entities or employees. Here, accepting the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, the court

finds that the complaint states a colorable cause of action under the Civil Rights Act. Unjustified force against a

pretrial detainee violates the inmate’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Dorsey v. St. Joseph

County Jail Officials, 98 F.3d 1527, 1528 (7th Cir. 1998), citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10

(1989).

It should be noted that the complaint fails to state a tenable cause of action against Sheriff Thomas Dart. 

The plaintiff has alleged no facts suggesting Dart’s direct, personal involvement, as required by J.H. ex rel. Higgin

v. Johnson, 346 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2003), inter alia. Nor has the plaintiff indicated that the alleged violation

of his constitutional rights occurred at Dart’s direction or with his knowledge and consent. Id. Section 1983 creates

a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, “to be liable under § 1983, an

individual defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak

Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The doctrine of respondeat superior (blanket

supervisoryliability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d

687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Nevertheless, because one defendant is identified only as “Officer Smith” and the other as “John Doe,”

Sheriff Dart will remain as a defendant for purposes of discovery. In this circuit, the courts recognize a useful

fiction to permit pro se litigants an opportunity to discover the identities of those who were personally involved

in the alleged actions underlying their complaint. When a plaintiff does not know the names of the persons who

actually injured him, the law permits the court, at the pleading stage, to make an inference of responsibility on the

part of the defendants’ immediate supervisor. See Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 655-56 (7th Cir. 1981);

see also Billman v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 56 F.3d 785, 789-90 (7th Cir. 1995); Donald v. Cook County

Sheriff’s Dept., 95 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 1996). Consequently, defendant Dart will remain as a defendant for the

sole purpose of identifying the two officers in question.

Once the plaintiff has obtained service Dart, and an attorney has entered an appearance on his behalf, the

plaintiff may send defense counsel interrogatories (that is, a list of questions) eliciting information regarding the

identity of the defendants who allegedly violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33. After

the plaintiff learns the defendants’ identities (i.e., full names and badge numbers), he may again ask leave to amend

the complaint to substitute their names for those of the John Does. Summonses will then issue for service on the

defendants in interest and Dart will be dismissed. The plaintiff is advised that there is a two-year statute of

(CONTINUED)

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STATEMENT (continued)

limitations for civil rights actions; he should therefore attempt to identify the officers as soon as possible. See

Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Wood v. Worachek, 618 F.2d 1225, 1230

(7th Cr. 1980). 

The clerk shall issue summonses for service of the complaint on defendants Smith and Dart. The United

States Marshals Service is appointed to serve the defendants. Any service forms necessary for the plaintiff to

complete will be sent by the Marshal as appropriate to serve the defendants with process. The U.S. Marshal is

directed to make all reasonable efforts to serve the defendants. If either officer can no longer be found at the work

address provided by the plaintiff, the Cook County Department of Corrections shall furnish the Marshal with the

defendant’s last-known address. The information shall be used only for purposes of effectuating service [or for

proof of service, should a dispute arise] and any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the 

Marshal. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Marshal. The Marshal

is authorized to mail a request for waiver of service to the defendants in the manner prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(d)(2) before attempting personal service. 

The plaintiff is instructed to file all future papers concerning this action with the Clerk of Court in care of

the Prisoner Correspondent. The plaintiff must provide the court with the original plus a complete judge’s copy,

including any exhibits, of every document filed. In addition, the plaintiff must send an exact copy of any court

filing to the defendants [or to defense counsel, once an attorney has entered an appearance on behalf of the

defendants]. Every document filed with the court must include a certificate of service stating to whom exact copies

were mailed and the date of mailing. Any paper that is sent directly to the judge or that otherwise fails to comply

with these instructions may be disregarded by the court or returned to the plaintiff.

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