Russell Ainsworth Aaron Mandel

Steve Art Elizabeth Mazur

Roshna Bala Keen Pier Petersen

Vincenzo Field Scott Rauscher

Gayle Horn Rachel Steinback

Michael Kanovitz Anand Swaminathan

Heather Lewis Donnell Julie Thompson

Samantha Liskow Tara Thompson

Arthur Loevy Cindy Tsai

Danielle Loevy Daniel Twetten

Jon Loevy Elizabeth Wang

Debra Loevy-Reyes

Telephone 312.243.5900 Website www.loevy.com

Facsimile 312.243.5902 Email loevylaw@loevy.com

December 1, 2014

Via Electronic Mail

Eileen Rosen

321 N. Clark Street

Suite 2200

Chicago, IL 60654

Re: Rivera v. Guevara, Case No. 12 C 4428

Dear Eileen:

We received your November 14, 2014 letter raising objections to nearly all of the 

topics in our 30(b)(6) deposition. I write in response.

First, Plaintiff issued the Notice of 30(b)(6) deposition on April 2, 2014, and followed 

up repeatedly seeking the City’s designations, including by email on August 17, September 

26 and October 20. The City’s objections come more than seven months after Plaintiff 

issued the notice. As such, the City’s untimely objections are waived. See, e.g., Martinez v. 

Cook County, 2012 WL 6186601, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2012); Hobley v. Burge, 2003 WL 

22682362, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2003); see also, e.g., Davis v. City of Springfield, 2009 

WL 268893, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Jan.30, 2009) (two month delay in asserting objections, with no 

proffered explanation, amounted to waiver); Lock Realty Corp v. U.S. Health L.P., 2008 

WL 4372411, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2008) (objections raised nearly a month-and-a-half 

after they were due were waived); Alloc, Inc. v. Unilin Decor N.V., 2006 WL 2583431 (E.D.

Wis. Sept. 5, 2006) (objections raised to discovery requests six months after requests were 

made were untimely and waived). 

Although we believe that the City's remarkably lengthy delay in raising objections 

LOEVY & LOEVY

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

312 N. May Street

Suite 100

Chicago, Illinois 60607

Case: 1:12-cv-04428 Document #: 143-4 Filed: 12/13/14 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:2354
Eileen Rosen

December 1, 2014 

Page 2 of 3 

LOEVY & LOEVY

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

makes the waiver argument particularly compelling here, we are nevertheless willing to 

withdraw some of our requests in an effort to resolve this matter without the need to 

involve the court. Plaintiff will withdraw his request for the City's deposition on topics 

1(b), as well as 4(a), 4(b), 4(c), and 4(d), without conceding that the City’s objections to 

those topics are well founded. 

As for the remaining topics, Plaintiff cannot agree to withdraw his request for Rule 

30(b)(6) testimony by the City because the topics are absolutely central to Plaintiff’s 

theories of individual and municipal liability in the case. Regarding request 2, Plaintiff is 

seeking information regarding what efforts the City has made to locate and produce

documents relating to the Valentin homicide investigation. This is a common 30(b)(6) 

request, yet the City objects to it.1 The request is simple: Who looked for responsive 

documents? Where did they look (and not look)? For the records that were produced, 

where were they found (and where have they been)? These are basic questions, and 

particularly relevant to both Plaintiff’s individual and Monell claims, and given the 

parties’ ongoing disputes over street files in this case and the inconsistent responses given 

to Plaintiff regarding the contents and locations of particular documents in the Valentin 

investigation. We further note that the City continues to refuse to respond on this issue 

when presented by interrogatory. See City’s Response to Plaintiff’s Seventh Set of 

Interrogatories, No. 1. 

With regard to request 4(e), (f), (g), (h) and (i), these requests seek the City’s binding 

testimony as to the City’s training of officers on topics relevant to this case, including 

live/in-person and photographic lineups, preservation of information during homicide 

investigations, the use of gangbooks during homicide investigations, Brady obligations, 

and use of street files and other investigative files by Gang Crimes Specialists. The City 

cannot reasonably claim that these topics are not relevant; they are at the heart of 

Plaintiff’s individual and Monell claims. To the extent your letter appears to articulate an 

argument that the failure to train cannot be a “moving force” as to any Monell claim, that 

is an argument for summary judgment and trial. The failure to train is a tried and true 

Monell theory, and these are subjects well within the bounds of Plaintiff’s allegations as 

set forth in his complaint and discovery responses. Merely by way of example, Plaintiff has 

amassed substantial evidence that information was withheld from him in violation of 

Brady; Plaintiff is entitled to present evidence in support of both his individual claims and 

his Monell claims that this Brady violation occurred because the City failed to properly 

train officers about their Brady obligations.

 1 Contrary to the City’s statement in its letter, Plaintiff has not agreed to limit this request to “how 

records were stored and located in 1988-1990.” Plaintiff merely pointed out that where the 

Valentin homicide records from 1988 to 1990 have been stored from that time to the present is 

highly relevant in this case, and indeed a topic in which the Court has expressed particular 

interest. 

Case: 1:12-cv-04428 Document #: 143-4 Filed: 12/13/14 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:2355
Eileen Rosen

December 1, 2014 

Page 3 of 3 

LOEVY & LOEVY

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

With regard to request 5, the City is refusing to produce anyone to provide binding 

testimony about discipline against Reynaldo Guevara, and regarding highly-relevant

topics such as improper eyewitness identification procedures; Brady violations; noncompliance with the 1982, 1983 and 1986 police orders regarding street files; and the 

preservation of information learned during homicide investigations. Again, failure to

discipline is a tried and true theory of Monell liability, and Plaintiff is entitled to prove 

that misconduct that occurred during the Valentin investigation on any of these topics 

resulted from the City’s failure to discipline officers in these areas. The City’s claim that 

Plaintiff has not presented evidence on these points is simply wrong, and in any event is 

an argument for summary judgment.

Finally, the City objects to producing the final policymaker(s), or the persons 

designated to speak on their behalf, in response to request 6. The City’s basis – that 

Plaintiff “has not presented any evidence that these issues were . . . actual problems” – is 

plainly erroneous. These are arguments for summary judgment. The City does not get to 

decide by fiat that Plaintiff’s evidence of misconduct on these topics is inadequate to prove 

his claims, and therefore conclude unilaterally that Plaintiff is not entitled to know 

policymaker information necessary to prove his Monell claims. Moreover, Plaintiff notes 

that the City has refused to respond to Plaintiff’s interrogatory requests asking that it 

identify final policymakers on many of the same topics. See City’s Response to Plaintiff’s 

First Set of Interrogatories, Nos. 9-11. In an effort to reach a compromise, Plaintiff is 

willing to withdraw this 30(b)(6) request if the City will provide the requested information 

through a fulsome interrogatory response. 

Please let us know by December 5, 2014 whether the City will agree to the 

compromise Plaintiff has set forth above. In addition, please note that we intend to flag 

this issue for the Court during tomorrow’s status conference. 

As always, I thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Anand Swaminathan

Cc: All counsel of record

Case: 1:12-cv-04428 Document #: 143-4 Filed: 12/13/14 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:2356