Filed 1/29/15 P. v. Bragg CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ERIC MONTE BRAGG,

Defendant and Appellant. B257380

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. MA062642)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Su perior Court of Los Angeles County, Charles A. Chung, Judge. Affirmed.

Linn Davis, 

### under appointment by the Court of Appeal , for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Defendant and appellant, Er ic Monte Bragg, appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of guilty to second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) 1 and his admission that, as a juvenile, a petition alle ging he had committed ro bbery (§ 211) had

been sustained on or about June 15, 2011 and was now being considered a prior “strike” within the meaning of the Th ree Strikes law (§§ 667, subds . (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)- (d)). The trial court senten ced Bragg to six years in state prison. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROC EDURAL HISTORY

1. Facts

. On or about March 29, 2014, Bragg and two codefendants took two bottles of Vodka from a Von’s supermarket. When the manager approached the three young men, Bragg sprayed her in the face w ith pepper spray, causing her to suffer burns on her face and lip.

2. Procedural history In a felony complaint filed April 7, 20 14, Bragg was charged with one count of mayhem (§ 203) and two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211), during one of which he inflicted great bodily injury upon the vic tim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). It was further alleged he previously had been found to have committed the serious and viol ent felony of robbery within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds, (a)-(d)) and, finally, it was alleged th at, should Bragg be fo und to have committed the offenses charged, any time imposed woul d be served in stat e prison pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h)(3). After waiving his constitutional rights and acknowledging the consequences of his plea and admission, Bragg pl ed guilty to one co unt of second degree robbery and admitted he previously had su ffered a sustained juvenile petition which had alleged he committed a robbery. However, on his plea form, Bragg wrote: “I am admitting a juvenile prior 211[, robbery,] conditionally. After my admissi on, my attorney will review my prior strike and will bring an y appropriate motions re[:] the validity of that prior. If

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.3 the prior is stricken by the cour t due to [its] invalidity, I w ill be allowed to withdraw my plea.” At proceedings held on May 15, 2014, Br agg waived “arraignment for judgment and state[d] there [was] no legal cause why sentence should not be pronounced.” The trial court then imposed the midterm of thr ee years in state prison for Bragg’s conviction of one count of second degree robbery and three years in prison for his admission he previously had been found guilty of robbery pursuant to the Th ree Strikes law, for a total sentence of six years in state prison. The trial court noted Bragg was ineligible for housing in the county jail due to the nature of the charges and his prior criminal history (§ 1170, subd. (h)). The court awarded Brag g presentence custody credit for 43 days actually served and six days of good time/ work time, or a total of 49 days, then recommended that he be placed in fire camp. With regard to fines and fees, the tria l court ordered Bragg to pay a $40 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a )(1)), a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), an $1,800 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), and a stayed $1,800 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45). In addition, Bragg was ordered to pay restitution to the victims. He was to pay $50 to the Von’s store and $199 to the store manager (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)). All restitutio n payable to the vic tims was ordered joint and several with Bragg’s two codefendants. After imposing the fines, the trial court dismissed all the remaining counts and allegations. Bragg filed a timely notice of appeal on July 7, 2014. He indicated his appeal was

“based on the sentence or other matters occu rring after the plea that [did] not affect the validity of the plea. (Cal. Rule s of Court, rule 8.304(b).)”

CONTENTIONS

After examination of the reco rd, appointed appellate coun sel filed an opening brief which raised no issues and requested this c ourt to conduct an independent review of the record. By notice filed Octobe r 29, 2014, the clerk of this court advised Bragg to submit within 30 days any contentions, grounds of appeal or arguments he wished this court to consider. No response has been received to date.4 REVIEW ON APPEAL

We have examined the entire record and are satisfied counsel has complied fully with counsel’s responsibilities. ( Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278-284; People

v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 443.)

DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KITCHING, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ALDRICH, J.