IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SAF-T-GARD INTERNATIONAL, INC, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 12-cv-3671

v. )

) Honorable Joan B. Gottschall

VANGUARD ENERGY SERVICES LLC, )

VANGUARD ENERGY LLC AND )

SEMINOLE ENERGY SERVICES, LLC. ) JURY DEMAND

)

Defendants. )

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 

OF FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

Plaintiff, Saf-T-Gard International, Inc. individually and as representative of a Class of

similarly situated persons, by Class counsel respectfully submits the following Memorandum in

Support of Final Approval of the Class Action Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) which this

Court preliminarily approved on August 7, 2013. Doc. 58.

The Court is advised that subsequent to the entry of the preliminary approval order, 82

notices of settlement were sent via U.S. first class mail. The affidavit of the claims administrator

was filed on August 30, 2013. Doc. 59. There were no requests for exclusion and no objections

submitted by Class members. Doc.61.

I. OVERVIEW OF THE LITIGATION PRECEDING SETTLEMENT

Saf-T-Gard filed a Class Action Complaint against Defendants on May 14, 2012

and a First Amended Class Action Complaint against Defendants on July 18, 2012, both alleging

that Defendants violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227, (“TCPA”),

the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/2, and Illinois common law (conversion) by

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sending Plaintiff and the class members unsolicited facsimile advertisements of their services.

The TCPA and implementing Federal Communications Commission regulations (Count I)

make it unlawful for any person within the United States . . . to make any call (other than a call made

for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any

automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . .” 47 U.S.C. §

227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

On December 6, 2012, the Court granted Saf-T-Gard’s motion for class certification and

certified the following class:

(a) all persons or entities (b) who, on or after May 14, 2008 and on or before June

4, 2012 (c) were sent unsolicited faxes by or on behalf of defendants promoting

their goods or services for sale (d) and who were not provided an “opt out” notice

as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227. Doc. 38.

On February 15, 2012, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery regarding

faxes sent by defendant Seminole Energy Services, L.L.C. (“Seminole”) and ruled that “the class

definition is properly understood to encompass persons who received unsolicited faxes sent by VES,

on behalf of VES, Vanguard and/or Seminole.”

With that understanding, Plaintiff diligently pursued the discovery necessary to identify the

class members and prosecute the class claims. Discovery has shown that defendant Vanguard Energy

Services (“VES”) sent a total of 119 potentially unsolicited facsimile advertisements to a total of 82

persons/entities during the relevant time period. Discovery has not shown that any such faxes were

sent by Seminole or Vanguard Energy, L.L.C. (“Vanguard”) on behalf of VES during the relevant

time period.

The parties reached a settlement after arms length negotiations where Defendants have

agreed to establish a common fund in the amount of $59,500.00 to make a payment of $500.00 for

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each facsimile sent to the class members. Assuming the Court awards the total requested attorney’s

fees and costs of $19,635.00, each class member would receive $335.00 per facsimile without any

requirement to submit a claim form. Appendix 1

Separate and apart from the above relief, Defendants will pay Settlement Administration

Costs and a class representative incentive award to Plaintiff in an amount to be determined by the

Court, but not to exceed $5,000.

Counsel for plaintiff has reviewed and analyzed the legal and factual issues presented in this

action, the information provided by defendants and third parties in discovery, the risks and expense

involved in pursuing the litigation to conclusion, the likelihood of recovering damages in excess of

those obtained through this settlement, the protracted nature of the litigation and the likelihood, costs

and possible outcome of one or more procedural and substantive appeals. Based on the review and

analysis, and after arms-length negotiations with counsel for defendant, plaintiff entered into the

Settlement Agreement.

 As demonstrated below, the Agreement is ripe for consideration and final approval.

II. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THIS CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

A. The Preliminary Approval Order.

On August 7, 2013, this Court entered an order granting preliminary approval of the

Agreement reached between the parties. Doc. 58. In the Preliminary Approval Order (“Order”), the

Court specifically found that the proposed terms of the settlement satisfied all of the elements of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The Order further established a procedural

framework for the final approval of the settlement. The Order required the parties to cause notice

certified by the Court to be mailed and faxed to the members of the Class, set deadlines and

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procedures for submission of claims, requests for exclusion, and objections to the settlement, and

set November 12, 2013 for the final approval hearing. 

B. The Sending of Class Notice.

Subsequent to the entry of the preliminary approval order, notice of settlement was sent via

U.S. first class mail to each of the 82 class members. The affidavit of the claims administrator was

filed on August 30, 2013. Doc. 59. There were no requests for exclusion and no objections

submitted by Class members. Doc. 61 Once again, there was no claim form requirement, so every

class member will be mailed a check upon final approval. 

 C. The Value of the Settlement. 

This Court has previously considered the terms of the settlement in granting preliminary

approval of the Agreement. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, and subject to court approval,

defendant will create a common fund of $59,500.00, to make a payment of $500.00 for each

facsimile sent to the class members. Assuming the Court awards the total requested attorney’s fees

and costs of $19,635.00, each class member would receive $335.00 per facsimile without any

requirement to submit a claim form. Appendix 1.

Separate and apart from the above relief, Defendants will pay Settlement Administration

Costs and a class representative incentive award to Plaintiff in an amount to be determined by the

Court, but not to exceed $5,000. Id. 

D. No Objections Or Exclusions Were Received.

No class members have elected to be excluded from the Class, and no Class member has

objected to the settlement. This should be viewed as an endorsement of the settlement by the Class. 

III. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT FINAL APPROVAL TO THE SETTLEMENT.

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On December 6, 2012, the Court found the class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23

when it granted plaintiff’s motion for class certification, which certified the following class:

(a) all persons or entities (b) who, on or after May 14, 2008 and on or before June

4, 2012 (c) were sent unsolicited faxes by or on behalf of defendants promoting

their goods or services for sale (d) and who were not provided an “opt out” notice

as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227. Doc. 38.

A. The Standard For Granting Final Approval To The Class Action Settlement. 

In Amchem Productions, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), the United States Supreme

Court explained that, before approving a class action settlement, the District Court must first be

satisfied that the elements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b) have been met. Id. at 621. This determination

was satisfied during the contested class certification briefing and order. 

Once the Court has determined that the requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b) have been met,

the Court must then determine whether Rule 23(e) has been satisfied by determining whether the

settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. General Electric Capital Corporation v. Lease

Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1082 (7th Cir. 1997). 

There is usually an initial presumption of fairness when a proposed class settlement “is the

product of arm’s length negotiations, sufficient discovery has been taken to allow the parties and the

court to act intelligently, and counsel involved are competent and experienced.” H. Newberg, A.

Conte, Newberg on Class Actions §11.41 (4th ed. 2002); Goldsmith v. Technology Solutions Co.,

No. 92 C 4374, 1995 WL 17009594, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 1995); Boggess v. Hogan, 410 F. Supp.

433, 438 (N.D. Ill. 1975). 

As the Seventh Circuit recognizes, courts generally favor settlements of class actions: 

It is axiomatic that the federal courts look with great favor upon the

voluntary resolution of litigation through settlement. In the class action

context in particular, “‘there is an overriding public interest in favor of

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settlement.’” Settlement of the complex disputes often involved in class

actions minimizes the litigation expense of both parties and also reduces

the strain such litigation imposes upon already scarce judicial resources.

Armstrong v. Bd. of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee, 616 F. 2d 305, 312-13 (7th

Cir.1980)(citations and quotations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Felzen v. Andreas, 134

F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998).

The Court considers the following six factors in making this determination:

1. The strength of the plaintiff’s case on the merits measured against the terms 

of the settlement;

2. The complexity, length, and expense of continued litigation;

3. The amount of opposition to the settlement among class members;

4. The presence of collusion in gaining a settlement;

5. The stage of the proceedings; and

6. The amount of discovery completed.

GE Capital at 1082. (citing Donovan v. Estate of Fitzsimmons, 778 F. 2d 298, 308 (7th Cir. 1985)); 

Synfuel Techs., Inc., 463 F. 3d at 653; In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594

F. 2d 1106, 1132 (7th Cir.1979) (citations omitted); Isby v. Bayh, 75 F. 3d 1191, 1199 (7th

Cir.1996). Of these considerations, the first is most important. Synfuel Techs., Inc., 463 F. 3d at 653. 

The class action settlement in the present case satisfies each of the factors outlined in GE Capital.

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All Of The Factors Weigh In Favor Of Final Approval

A. The $500 Cash Provides Significant Benefits To The 

Settlement Class And The Release Is Narrow.

In a TCPA case, each class member would be entitled to $500 per call and up to $1,500 if

they can prove a willful violation of the Act and the Court determines that treble damages are

warranted. While plaintiff submits that it has a strong claim, plaintiff recognizes that defendant has

defenses to the claim. The value of the program is $500.00 per facsimile and if the class member

received multiple faxes, it would receive $500 for each, which is 100% of the statutory damages

putting aside the issue of treble damages. Goldsmith, at *5 (approving settlement with a monetary

fund representing a portion of the damages that could reasonably have been proven for the class).

In addition, the settlement is warranted by the complexity, length and expense of continued

litigation, satisfying the second GE Capital factor. 

The settlement satisfies the third GE Capital factor because no Class member has excluded

themselves from the settlement and no Class member has objected to the settlement. 

b. The Settlement Resulted From Extensive Arms-Length Negotiations

As a leading treatise on class action jurisprudence explains, “...decisions indicate that the

courts respect the integrity of counsel and presume the absence of fraud or collusion in negotiating

the settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is offered.” Newberg, §11.51. The requirement that

a settlement be fair is designed to protect against collusion among the parties. Mars Steel Corp. v.

Cont’l Ill. Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 834 F. 2d 677, 684 (7th Cir. 1987) (approved

settlement upon finding of no “hanky-panky” in negotiations). There usually is an initial

presumption that a proposed settlement is fair and reasonable when it was the result of arms-length

negotiations. Newberg, §11.42.

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Settlement was reached after the discovery identifying the number of class members, which

involved the contested discovery motion referenced above. Settlement was not reached until after

plaintiff prevailed on class certification and after the Court denied plaintiff’s motion to compel. 

The significant economic benefit to the Settlement Class, coupled with the narrow release, 

demonstrate that the settlement is more than fair, reasonable and adequate. 

Given the stage of proceedings, the investigation and discovery completed, the proposed

settlement satisfies the fifth and sixth GE Capital factors.

B. The Notice To Class Members Is Adequate

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2), class members are entitled to notice of any

proposed settlement and an opportunity to object or opt out before it is finally approved by the

Court. Manual for Complex Litig. (Fourth) § 21.31 (2004). Notice is adequate if it is “reasonably

calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action

and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.

156, 174 (1974), quoting, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

The Notice sent to class members was clear and straightforward, providing putative class

members with enough information to evaluate whether to participate in the Settlement, as well as

directions on how to seek further information. Appendix 1 at Exhibit C. The Notice contained all

of the information required by Rule 23, such as the nature of the action; the class definition;

summary of the class claims and defenses; the amount paid for a claim; the potential class

representative fee and attorneys’ fees and costs; ability to enter an appearance; exclusion rights;

objection rights and binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23. 

 The Claims Administrator mailed, by first class mail, the Class Notice to all 82 class

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members. Doc 59

The notice scheme is consistent with the due process requirements incorporated in Rule

23(c)(2)(B). Rule 23’s advisory committee note states that the “mandatory notice pursuant to

subdivision (c)(2) . . . is designed to fulfill requirements of due process to which the class action

procedure is of course subject.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) advisory committee’s note. (citing, Mullane,

339 U.S. 306 (additional citations omitted). 

IV. FINAL APPROVAL ORDER

The parties have agreed to the Final Approval Order attached as Exhibit B to the Settlement

Agreement that is attached as Appendix 1. A copy of the proposed final approval order is also

attached hereto as Appendix 2 for the convenience of the Court. The release that is incorporated into

the Final Approval Order is narrowly tailored to claims that “arise out of, are based upon, or are

related to the conduct alleged in the Lawsuit.” 

V. THE ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS ARE REASONABLE.

Pursuant to the Agreement, Class Counsel requests approval of payment of attorney’s fees

and costs in the amount of $19,635.00, which equals less than 33% of the value of the settlement

because it includes costs. 

Plaintiff’s counsel includes experienced class action attorneys, all of whom contributed their

skills and expended their resources in a coordinated effort that resulted in the settlement of this

matter. The Seventh Circuit has specifically authorized the district courts to award attorney’s fees

using the percentage of fund method. In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F. 3d 712 (7th Cir. 2001).

Attorneys who achieve a benefit for class members in the form of a “common fund” are

entitled to be compensated for their services from that settlement fund. See Boeing Co. v. Van

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Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (“a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the

benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the

fund as a whole”); see also Gaskill v. Gordon, 160 F. 3d 361, 362 (7th Cir. 1998); Florin v.

Nationsbank, N.A., 34 F. 3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F. 2d 566, 572

(7th Cir. 1992) (“Cont’l I”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 985 F. 2d 867, 868 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Cont’l

II”); Kendrick v. Atcor, Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8389 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 

In Taubenfeld v. Aon Corp.,415 F. 3d 597 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh Circuit provided

guidance for the award of attorneys’ fees in a securities class action:

[W]hen deciding on appropriate fee levels in common-fund cases, courts must do their best

to award counsel the market price for legal services, in light of the risk of nonpayment and

the normal rate of compensation in the market at the time.” Although it is impossible to

know ex post exactly what terms would have resulted from arm’s-length bargaining ex ante,

courts must do their best to recreate the market by considering factors such as actual fee

contracts that were privately negotiated for similar litigation, information from other cases,

and data from class-counsel auctions. Id. at 599 (citation omitted). In affirming an award of

fees equaling 30% of the $7.25 million settlement fund plus expenses, the Aon court

considered, among other things, the following factors: (1) “awards made by courts in other

class actions” which “amount[ed] to 30-39% of the settlement fund”; (2) “the quality of legal

services rendered”; and (3) “the contingent nature of the case. 

Id. at 600. In considering a fee request, the court must do its “best to award counsel the market price

for legal services, in light of the risk of nonpayment and the normal rate of compensation in the

market at the time.” In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d at 718. As discussed below, the

requested fee, which includes expenses in this case and excludes the value of the non monetary

benefits of the settlement, is the most appropriate method to “recreate the market” given the nature

and scope of the Litigation, the time spent and expenses incurred in its prosecution and the

substantial result achieved for the Class. 

“‘[T]he approach favored in the Seventh Circuit is to compute attorney’s fees as a percentage

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of the benefit conferred on the class,’ particularly where that percentage of the benefit approach

replicates the market.” Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, No. 99-829, 2005 WL 1981501, at *3

(S.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2005). The percentage method is consistent with, and is intended to mirror, the

private marketplace for negotiated contingent fee arrangements. See Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F. 2d

320, 324 (7th Cir. 1986) (“When the ‘prevailing’ method of compensating lawyers for ‘similar

services’ is the contingent fee, then the contingent fee is the ‘market rate.’”) (emphasis in original). 

In the marketplace, the “contingent fee uses private incentives rather than careful monitoring

to align the interests of lawyer and client. The lawyer gains only to the extent his client gains.”

Kirchoff, 786 F. 2d at 325; see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions,

148 F. 3d 283, 333 (3d Cir. 1998). If this case were an individual case, the customary fee

arrangement would be contingent, on the percentage basis, and in the range of 331/3% to 40% of

the recovery. See Kirchoff at 323 (observing that “40% is the customary fee in tort litigation” and

noting, with approval, contract providing for one-third contingent fee if litigation settled prior to

trial); Retsky Family Limited Partnership v. Price Waterhouse, LLP, 2001 WL 1568856 at *4 (N.D.

Ill 2001) (recognizing that a customary contingent fee is “between 33 1/3% and 40%” and awarding

class counsel the requested one-third of the common fund); Phemister v. Harcourt Brace

Jovanovich, Inc., No. 77 C 39, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23595, at *40–41 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1984)

(“Contingent fee arrangements in non-class action damage lawsuits use the simple method of paying

the attorney a percentage of what is recovered for the client. The more the recovery, the more the

fee. The percentages agreed upon vary, with one-third being particularly common.”).

This District has noted that “the Seventh Circuit strongly endorsed the percentage method 

of computing appropriate fee awards in class action common fund cases.” See Goldsmith v. Tech.

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Solutions Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15093, *24 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (other citations omitted)

(approving 33.33% fee award), citing Cont ’l Ill. II, 985 F. 2d 867. This District has also recognized

that a fee award of “33 1/3% is in fact in line with that which has, in previous cases, been approved,”

and “[t]hirty three percent appears to be in line with what attorneys are able to command on the open

market in arm’s length negotiations with their clients.” Id. at 26–27. Notably, the Northern District

has recognized the appropriateness of a fee of nearly 1/3 of the common fund in complex litigation

and the historic approval of such fees in the Seventh Circuit. See also Family L.P. v. Price

Waterhouse LLP, 2001 WL 1568856 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (33 1/3 % awarded); In re Lithotripsy Antitrust

Litig., 2000 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 8143, **6-7 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2000) (“33.3% of the fund plus

expenses is well within the generally accepted range of the attorneys’ fee awards in class-action antitrust lawsuits.”); In re Spyglass, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 99-c-5 12 (N.D. Ill. March 24, 2000) and In re

Spyglass, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 99-cv-0512 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2000) (33% fee award approved); Rehm

v. Eagel Fin. Corp. ̧1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20015 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 1998) (approving 33.3% fee

request), aff’d Rehm v. EagelFin. Corp., No. 96-2455 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 1998) (“the 7thCircuit Court

of Appeals, as well as the majority of other circuit courts have approved the use of the percentage

of the fund method to award attorneys’ fees in class action/common fund cases”); Taubenfeld, 415

F.3d at 598 (7thCir. 2005) (affirming fee award of 33.3%). Gaskill, 942 F. Supp. 382, aff’d 160 F.

3d 361 (7th Cir. 1998) (38% awarded); In Re Ameriquest Mortgage Co. Mortgage Lending Practices

Litigation, Case No. 05 CV 07097 (N.D. Ill. 2010) ( Awarded $7.33 million for attorney fees, which

is 33% of the common fund); See also Appendix 3, Chart of Securities Class Actions awarding fees

of 33.3% of the Settlement Fund.

The requested fee is similar to fees awarded by district courts in TCPA class actions. Saf-T12

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Gard v Seiko, 09 C 776 (N.D. Saf-T-Gard v Seiko, 09 C 776 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (Judge Bucklo)

(Awarding 33% of the common fund); Hinman v. M and M Rental Center Inc., 06-cv-01156, Doc.

225(N.D. Ill. 2008) (Awarded 33% of the common fund plus costs); CE Design, Ltd. v. Cy’s

Crabhouse, 07 C 5456 (N.D. Ill.) (Kennelly, J.) (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2010) (Awarded 33% of the

common fund plus costs. Doc. 373); Holtzman v. CCH, 07 C 7033 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2009)

(Nordberg, J.) (Awarded 33% of the common fund plus costs. Doc. 33);CE Design, Ltd. v. Exterior

Systems, Inc., 07 C 66 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2007) (Darrah, J.) (Awarded 33% of the common fund plus

costs. Doc. 32-2); Locklear Electric, Inc. v. Norma L. Lay, 09 C 0531 (S.D. Ill.) (Reagan, J.)

(Awarded 33% of the common fund plus costs. Doc. 67) Accounting Outsourcing, LLC. v Verizon

Wireless, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97153 (M.D. La. 2007) (Awarded $2,314, 328, which is in excess

of 35% of the common fund, plus costs); Nicholson v Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 95-RCCV-616

(Richmond County, Ga. April 25, 2001) (Awarded $3,931,035.62, which was 33% of the common

fund plus costs).

The market based percentage approach supports the reasonableness of this request. 

No Class Member Objected to the Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses Requested

As noted above, no objections to counsel fees and costs were filed. Doc 61. Based on the 

foregoing, the Court should grant Class Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees (inclusive of expenses)

in the amount $19,635.00.

VII. THE COURT SHOULD ALSO APPROVE THE REQUESTED SERVICE AWARD

Class Counsel requests that the Court approve service awards in the amount of $5,000

for plaintiff, which is paid separate from the amount made available to the class.

The Notice informed the Class of this request and no objections to proposed service awards

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were received. Courts have approved service awards on the basis that Named Plaintiffs in class

actions take risks and perform services for the benefit of the Class. See Albert Conte and Herbert

B. Newberg, 4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, §11.38 (4th ed.). Indeed, “since without the

named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may be necessary to induce him

to participate in the suit could be thought the equivalent of the lawyers’ non-legal but essential case

specific expenses.” In re Cont’l I, 962 F. 2d 571. Since In re Cont’l I, service awards for named

plaintiffs in class actions have been regularly granted and upheld in this Circuit. See Cook, 142 F.

3d 1016 (7thCir. 1998); Saf-T-Gard v Seiko, 09 C 776 (N.D. Saf-T-Gard v Seiko, 09 C 776 (N.D.

Ill. 2011) (Judge Bucklo) ($12,500 to named plaintiff in TCPA class); In Re Ameriquest Mortgage

Co. at ¶12. (Awarded service payments of $7,500 to each of the 87 named plaintiffs.); Gibson &

Company Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. QFA Royalties LLC., 06-cv-05849-PSG-PLA Document 212

(C.D. Ca. 2009) ($15,000 to the named plaintiff for service payment in TCPA class settlement);

Nicholson v Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 95-RCCV-616 (Richmond County, Ga. April 25, 2001)

($15,000 to the named plaintiff in a TCPA class action for service payment).

In fact the Seventh Circuit was recently critical of a $7,500.00 incentive award in a TCPA

case as being too small. In Ira Holtzman , C.P.A, & Associates Ltd. v Turza, 11-3188 (7th Cir.

August 26, 2013) the court described the award as a disincentive award. p.14.

Plaintiff invested time and energy working with counsel. For its willingness to continue to

represent the Class in such circumstances and for its ultimately fruitful efforts on behalf of the Class,

plaintiff has earned the requested service award. 

Finally, any reduction in the service award would not benefit the class as defendant is paying

the incentive fee in addition to any payment to the class members and if it is reduced defendant

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would retain the difference.

VIII. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff individually, and as representative of the Class,

by Class Counsel, request that this Honorable Court grant final approval of the Agreement and enter

the proposed final approval order attached hereto as Appendix 2.

Respectfully submitted, 

 

/s/ Keith J. Keogh

Keith J. Keogh

Timothy Sostrin

Katherine Bowen

KEOGH LAW, LTD.

55 W. Monroe, Suite 3390

Chicago, IL 60603

(312) 726-1092/(312) 726-1093 (fax)

Keith@Keoghlaw.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Keith J. Keogh, hereby certify that on October 11, 2013, I filed the foregoing

documents with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF System, which sent notification of

such filing via electronic mail to all parties of record.

/s/ Keith J. Keogh

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