NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.R.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0023 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD533852

The Honorable Ashley V. Halvorson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa

By Suzanne W. Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Jennifer L. Thorson

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Sacks Tierney PA, Scottsdale

By Katya M. Lancero

Counsel for Appellee Pueblo of Laguna

FILED 8-31-2023
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.R.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in 

which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Juan A. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order

terminating his parental rights to his daughter, M.R., born in December

2020, on the grounds of abandonment and out-of-home placement for 15 

months. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

juvenile court’s order. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 2 (2016).

M.R. is an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”). See

25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (defining “Indian child”). She is considered a descendant 

of a member of the Pueblo of Laguna of New Mexico Tribe (“Tribe”).

¶3 Father and M.R.’s mother have a history of substance abuse.1

In December 2020, the Department of Child Safety received a report that

M.R. was born substance-exposed and suffered withdrawal symptoms. As 

a result, the Department took custody of M.R. and placed her with her 

maternal grandparents, who are enrolled members of the Tribe. The 

Department also petitioned the juvenile court for M.R.’s dependency

because of Father’s neglect. In May 2021, the juvenile court found M.R. 

dependent as to Father and approved family reunification as the case plan.

¶4 The Department offered Father family preservation services, 

parent-aide sessions, substance-abuse testing, substance-abuse assessment 

and treatment, counseling, and visitation with M.R. The Department also 

tried to contact Father monthly by calling, texting, and emailing to establish 

services. Father did not respond. At times, the Department was unaware of 

Father’s whereabouts. Maternal grandmother later reported to the 

Department that Father was homeless. 

1 M.R.’s mother is not a party to this appeal; her parental rights were 

terminated. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.R.

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¶5 Father failed to participate in visitations with M.R. He last 

saw M.R. on her first birthday in December 2021. He also failed to 

participate in any other services that the Department offered. But he selfreferred for substance-abuse treatment and received inpatient detox. He

claimed at a status conference that he had not received communications

about services from the Department. The Department then confirmed that 

it had sent Father communications to the email address he was using 

during these proceedings—the same email address that his counsel used to 

successfully communicate with him.

¶6 The Department petitioned to terminate Father’s parental 

rights, alleging abandonment and out-of-home placement for 15 months.

The Tribe moved to intervene, and the juvenile court granted the motion. 

At the termination hearing, the Department’s program supervisor testified 

that her numerous attempts to reach Father through calls and emails had 

failed. She also testified that the Department had met Father only once 

throughout this case. Finally, she testified that Father had not participated 

in the services that the Department had provided and that termination was 

in M.R.’s best interests because she would have a stable living environment.

¶7 The Department also elicited testimony from an employee in 

its Tribal Relations Policy Section. She testified that she had worked for the 

Department as an ICWA specialist for nine years and that she had been 

providing qualified expert testimony about ICWA for about 10 years. She

testified that Father’s custody of M.R. was likely to result in serious 

emotional or physical damage to her because of his lack of engagement in 

the preservation services that would help eliminate the risk.

¶8 The Tribe’s ICWA expert testified that the Department had 

made little to no efforts to work with the Tribe. According to her, the 

Department tried to contact her fewer than 10 times. The Department also 

did not ask the Tribe to locate and contact Father or to participate in M.R.’s 

case planning. She also testified that the Department had not made “active 

efforts” to provide Father with remedial services and rehabilitative 

programs. Finally, she testified that the Tribe did not “honor [termination 

and] adoption;” instead, it preferred guardianship.

¶9 The juvenile court found that the Department had proved 

both grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights—abandonment 

and out-of-home placement for 15 months. It also found that Father’s 

continued custody of M.R. was likely to result in serious emotional or 

physical damage to M.R. and that termination was in M.R.’s best interests. 

It therefore terminated Father’s parental rights. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.R.

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¶10 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See Ariz. Const. 

art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 8–235(A), 12–120.21(A)(1), –2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Father argues that the State did not prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the Department made “active efforts” to prevent 

the breakup of the family under ICWA. A juvenile court’s termination 

determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. E.R. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 58 ¶ 9 (App. 2015). The juvenile court is in the best 

position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of 

witnesses, and resolve disputed facts. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 

209 Ariz. 332, 334 ¶ 4 (App. 2004). Due process requires that we assess 

whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude, based on the record, that 

the Department met its clear and convincing evidentiary burden to sustain 

the termination of parental rights. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,

747–48 (1982). We will uphold the court’s findings of fact “if supported by 

adequate evidence in the record.” Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 

Ariz. 445, 451–52 ¶ 19 (App. 2007) (quoting State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 247 

(1979)).

¶12 To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find at 

least one statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8–533 by clear and convincing 

evidence and must find that termination is in the child’s best interests by a 

preponderance of the evidence. A.R.S. § 8–537(B); Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 286 ¶ 15 (App. 2016). ICWA applies when an Indian 

child is the subject of a termination. See Yvonne L. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

227 Ariz. 415, 419 ¶ 20 (App. 2011). Before terminating parental rights under 

ICWA, the Department must prove (1) beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

“continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely 

to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child,” Ariz. R.P.

Juv. Ct. 353(d)(1); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f), and (2) prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that “active efforts have been made to provide remedial services 

and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian 

family and that those efforts have proven unsuccessful,” 25 U.S.C. 

§ 1912(d); Yvonne L., 227 Ariz. at 420 ¶ 20.

¶13 “Active efforts” mean “affirmative, active, thorough, and 

timely efforts intended primarily to maintain or reunite an Indian child 

with his or her family.” 25 C.F.R. § 23.2. The parents must be assisted 

“through the steps of a case plan and with accessing or developing the

resources necessary to satisfy the case plan.” Id. Active efforts “should be 

conducted in partnership with the Indian child and the Indian child’s 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.R.

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parents . . . and Tribe.” Id. They should be “tailored to the facts and 

circumstances of the case.” Id. “[A]ctive efforts demand more than merely 

drawing up a reunification plan and leaving the parent to use his or her 

own resources to bring it to fruition.” Yvonne L., 227 Ariz. at 423 ¶ 34 n.17 

(cleaned up). But “neither ICWA nor Arizona law mandates that [the 

Department] provide every imaginable service or program designed to 

prevent the breakup of the Indian family before the court may find that 

‘active efforts’ took place.” Id. at 423 ¶ 34. Further, the Department cannot 

force parents to engage in services but must provide them with the 

“necessary ‘time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to 

help [them] become’ effective parents.” Id. (quoting Maricopa Cnty. Juv. 

Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994)).

¶14 Relevant examples of active efforts include (1) identifying 

appropriate services and actively assisting parents to obtain those services; 

(2) inviting representatives of the child’s Tribe to provide the family with 

support and services; (3) implementing “all available and culturally 

appropriate family preservation strategies and facilitating the use of 

remedial and rehabilitative services provided by the child’s Tribe”; (4) 

supporting visitation with parents “in the most natural setting possible”; 

(5) identifying community resources and assisting the parents in accessing

them; (6) “[m]onitoring progress and participation in services”; and (7) 

considering alternative methods of addressing the parents’ needs where 

services are unavailable. 25 C.F.R. § 23.2.

¶15 Here, reasonable evidence shows that the Department made 

active, thorough, and timely efforts to provide remedial services and 

rehabilitative programs to prevent the family breakup. The record supports 

the juvenile court’s finding that the Department offered family preservation 

services, parent-aide sessions, substance-abuse testing, substance-abuse 

assessment and treatment, counseling, and visitation services. The 

Department thus provided Father with the necessary time and opportunity 

to participate in these programs designed to help him become an effective 

parent. See Yvonne L., 227 Ariz. at 423 ¶ 34. The Department actively tried 

to communicate with Father through phone calls, text messages, email,

in-person meetings, and service letters. And these attempts failed, despite 

the Department’s using correct channels to communicate with Father. The 

Department was not required to force Father to engage in the offered 

services. Id. Lastly, termination would not separate M.R. from her cultural 

heritage since she was placed with her grandparents, who are members of 

the Tribe. Therefore, Father has shown no error.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.R.

Decision of the Court

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¶16 Father also argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that 

his custody of M.R. was likely to result in serious emotional or physical 

damage to M.R. He contends that the finding was not based on a qualified 

expert witness testimony because the Department’s ICWA witness lacked 

expertise about “the parenting norms” of the Tribe and “substance abuse 

and its impact on parents of Indian Children.” But as the Department points 

out, Father failed to challenge the Department’s ICWA witness’s 

qualifications in the juvenile court, despite his counsel’s extensive 

examination of her during the termination hearing. See Estate of Reinen v. N. 

Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., 198 Ariz. 283, 286–87 ¶ 9 (2000) (explaining that 

failure to object to the witness’s qualifications before or during the witness’s 

testimony waived any objection to the witness’s qualifications). Father has 

therefore waived this argument. 

CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm.