UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

R. DANIEL CONLON, BISHOP OF

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE

OF JOLIET, ILLINOIS, as Successor

Trustee Under the Provisions of the Trust

Agreement Dated December 31, 1949;

CATHOLIC CHARITIES DIOCESE OF

JOLIET, INC; THE MOST REVEREND

THOMAS JOHN PAPROCKI, ROMAN

CATHOLIC BISHOP OF

SPRINGFIELD-IN-ILLINOIS;

CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE

DIOCESE OF SPRINGFIELD-INILLINOIS; CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF

THE ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO;

and SAINT PATRICK HIGH SCHOOL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official

capacity as Secretary of the U.S.

Department of Health and Human

Services; HILDA SOLIS, in her official

capacity as Secretary of the Department

of Labor; TIMOTHY GEITHNER; in his

official capacity as Secretary of the 

U.S. Department of the Treasury; 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES; 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,

Defendants.

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Case No. 12-cv-3932

Judge John W. Darrah

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
 On August 8, 2012, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, alleging nine separate

counts against Defendants with regards to the enactment and enforcement of the Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”). Plaintiffs assert that because they

are Catholic, religious entities and employers, the requirements of the ACA to provide

contraceptive, sterilization, and abortion services to employees violate Plaintiffs’

sincerely held religious beliefs. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-5.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege

Defendants, in the enactment and enforcement of the ACA, violate the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act, the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and the

Administrative Procedure Act. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 200-304.) Defendants move to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing Plaintiffs

lack standing, and that the matter is not ripe for adjudication. For the reasons presented

below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted, and the Amended Complaint is

dismissed without prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

The instant action is one of many filed across the country, challenging the legality

of the ACA’s regulations regarding contraception and preventative care. In granting a

similar motion to dismiss on the basis of standing and ripeness, Judge Boasberg of the

District of D.C. provided a detailed explanation of the statutory history. See Belmont

Abbey College v. Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2012) (Belmont Abbey). The

United States Department of Health and Human Services enlisted the guidance of the

Institute of Medicine, a private health policy organization, to establish guidelines

regarding preventative health care for the Health Resources and Services Administration

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(“HRSA”). The Institute of Medicine suggested, among other proposals, that insurance

plans be required to cover contraceptives and sterilization procedures, including

emergency contraceptives, such as the “morning-after” pill. Id. at 29. HRSA adopted

these proposed guidelines; and, on August 1, 2011, the Department of Health and Human

Services, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Treasury (“the Departments”)

issued an interim final rule, requiring group insurance plans to cover the preventative

services for women suggested by the Institute of Medicine. Id. at 29-30 (quoting 76 Fed.

Reg. 46621; 45 C.F.R. § 147.130). According to the federal regulation, all insurance

plans and policies, unless specifically exempt, must provide women coverage for

contraceptive services, beginning on August 1, 2012, without any cost-sharing

requirements. Id. 

The Departments acknowledged the impact on the religious beliefs of some

religious employers if they were required to cover contraceptive services. Wheaton

College v. Sebelius, No. 12-1169, 2012 WL 3637162, at *2 (Aug. 24, 2012 D.D.C.)

(Wheaton College). The interim final rule gave exemption to certain employers,

including churches or religious orders, and other employers that meet the following

criteria: 

(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization. 

(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious

tenets of the organization. (3) The organization serves primarily persons

who share the religious tenets of the organization. (4) The organization is

a nonprofit organization as described in section 6033(a)(1) and section

6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as

amended.

45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B). The Departments invited comments to the interim

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final rule, specifically with regards to the definition of religious employer, described

above. In response to the comments received, the Departments stated the following:

[T]he Departments are adopting the definition in the amended interim

final regulations for purposes of these final regulations while also creating

a temporary enforcement safe harbor, discussed below. During the

temporary enforcement safe harbor, the Departments plan to develop and

propose changes to these final regulations that would meet two

goals—providing contraceptive coverage without cost-sharing to

individuals who want it and accommodating non-exempted, non-profit

organizations' religious objections to covering contraceptive services . . . .

77 Fed. Reg. 8725. The rule provides a one year “safe harbor” by which “certain nonexempted, non-profit organizations with religious objections to covering contraceptive

services” will not be held to be in violation of the regulations for failing to cover

contraceptive services.1

 77 Fed. Reg. 8728. The safe harbor remains in effect “until the

1

 To qualify for the safe harbor, an organization must meet the following criteria: 

1. The organization is organized and operates as a non-profit entity.

2. From February 10, 2012 onward, the group health plan established or

maintained by the organization has consistently not provided all or the same

subset of the contraceptive coverage otherwise required at any point,

consistent with any applicable State law, because of the religious beliefs of

the organization.

3. As detailed below, the group health plan established or maintained by the

organization (or another entity on behalf of the plan, such as a health

insurance issuer or third-party administrator) must provide to participants the

attached notice, as described below, which states that some or all

contraceptive coverage will not be provided under the plan for the first plan

year beginning on or after August 1, 2012.

4. The organization self-certifies that it satisfies criteria 1-3 above, and

documents its self-certification in accordance with the procedures detailed

herein.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Guidance on the Temporary

Enforcement Safe Harbor for Certain Employers, Group Health Plans and

Group Health Insurance Issuers, at 3 (Aug. 15, 2012), available at

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first plan year that begins on or after August 1, 2013.” Belmont Abbey, 878 F. Supp. 2d

at 31 (citation omitted). During the safe harbor period, the Departments intend to

“develop alternative ways of providing contraceptive coverage without cost sharing with

respect to non-exempted, non-profit religious organizations with religious objections to

such coverage.” 77 Fed. Reg. 8728. On March 21, 2012, the Departments issued an

“Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” or “ANPRM,” whereby the Departments

formally declared their intention to amend the final regulations, and invited additional

comments from the public and interested parties. See 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501; Belmont

Abbey, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 31. The Departments intend to finalize such amendments to

the final regulations prior to the end of the safe harbor period, August 1, 2013. 77 Fed.

Reg. 16,503. 

“Plaintiffs are Catholic religious entities that provide a wide range of spiritual,

educational, and social services” to Illinois residents, without regard to an individual’s

religious beliefs. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs Diocese of Joliet and Diocese of

Springfield state they do not know if they will qualify as a “religious employer” under

the federal regulations. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs further state that Diocese of

Springfield’s and Catholic Charities Springfield’s health plan is grandfathered and that

those Plaintiffs are injured by their inability to change their plan as they see fit. (Resp. at

5.) All Plaintiffs allege that the enactment of the federal regulations regarding coverage

of preventative care would force Plaintiffs “to provide, pay for, and/or facilitate access to

abortion-inducing drugs, sterilization, and contraception, or [require] Plaintiffs to submit

http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/prev-services-guidance-08152012.pdf. 

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to an intrusive governmental examination of their religious missions.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, asserting that

Plaintiffs’ suit should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because

Plaintiffs fail to allege an imminent injury, required to establish standing. Defendants

further contend that the case is not yet ripe for judicial review. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to raise as a defense, by

motion, a federal court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. “When reviewing a

dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . the district court must accept as true

all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff.” St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999)). 

However, when a defendant challenges subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561

(1992) (Lujan). 

A challenge of standing is a challenge to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction;

standing is an essential jurisdictional requirement. To establish standing, a plaintiff must

show: a violation of a concrete, particularized legally protected interest; a causal

relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the injury to the plaintiff, and an injury

which can be redressed if a court finds in the plaintiff's favor. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.

The nonmoving party must support the basis of the jurisdiction with competent proof of

jurisdictional facts. Kontos v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 826 F.2d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 1987). 

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“When considering a motion that launches a factual attack against jurisdiction, ‘[t]he

district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint

and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact

subject matter jurisdiction exists.’” Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d

440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). In establishing standing, a plaintiff must

demonstrate the threat of an “‘injury in fact’ that is concrete and particularized; the threat

must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” American Civil Liberties

Union of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 590 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Summers v. Earth

Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)) (citations omitted). Without a certainly

impending injury, standing does not exist. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 611 (7th

Cir. 1995) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. 564; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)

(Whitmore)). 

Challenges to standing may be made prior to the enforcement of a law. The

“existence of a statute implies a threat to prosecute, so pre-enforcement challenges are

proper, because a probability of future injury counts as ‘injury’ for the purpose of

standing.” Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted)

(Bauer). 

A case may be challenged on the issue of ripeness, which, like the issue of

standing, stems from the U.S. Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement. Concerns

of whether or not a case is ripe for adjudication can “arise when a case involves uncertain

or contingent events that may not occur as anticipated, or not occur at all.” Wisconsin

Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 148 (7th Cir. 2011)

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(Barland). In determining if an issue is ripe for adjudication, a court considers: (1) “the

fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and (2) “the hardship to the parties of

withholding court consideration.” Id. (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.

Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983)). 

ANALYSIS

Standing

Defendants contend Plaintiffs lack the requisite standing to pursue their claims

because they do not allege an imminent injury resulting from the ACA and related

federal regulations. Specifically, Defendants argue that because of the safe harbor

provision, “Defendants will not take any enforcement action against an organization that

qualifies for safe harbor until the first plan year that begins on or after August 1, 2013.” 

(Mem. in Support of Defs.’ Mot. at 10.) However, standing is not vitiated simply

because the harm is not immediate, but rather likely to occur in the near future. 

“Standing depends on the probability of harm, not its temporal proximity.” 520 S.

Michigan Ave. Associates, Ltd. v. Devine, 433 F.3d 961, 962 (7th Cir. 2006) (520 S.

Michigan Ave.) (further noting “Courts frequently engage in pre-enforcement review

based on the potential cost that compliance (or bearing a penalty) creates.”). The mere

fact Plaintiffs are perhaps not harmed today does not destroy the parties’ standing; it is

enough for Plaintiffs to demonstrate the probability of harm in the future. See Bauer, 620

F.3d at 708. The safe harbor provision, on its face, simply delays the enforcement of the

contraceptive provisions as to Plaintiffs; the provision does not “reduce the certainty of

the impending injury.” Belmont Abbey, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 35. 

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Though the safe harbor does not eliminate the possibility of an imminent injury

for purposes of standing, the ANPRM issued on March 21, 2012, does impact the likely

imminence of Plaintiffs’ injuries. The Government, in the ANPRM, made clear its intent

to amend the regulations to address concerns, like that of Plaintiffs’, regarding employers

with religious objections to contraception. 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501. The ANPRM further

provided that such amendments would be implemented prior to the end of the safe harbor

provision. Id. Moreover, government agencies are entitled to the presumption that they

act in good faith, and no evidence has been presented to indicate the Departments will

renege on the statements made regarding amendment in the ANPRM. See Starr v.

Federal Aviation Administration, 589 F.2d 307, 315 (7th Cir. 1978). With an amendment

to the final regulations forthcoming, Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries regarding the enforcement

of the current regulations are not “certainly impending.” Belmont Abbey, 878 F. Supp. 2d

at 37 (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158.). 

However, Plaintiffs also allege that, beyond the future impact at the expiration of

the safe harbor, the regulations also create present injuries. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue

that the current regulations impact their ability to plan their future budgets, contending

that “if Plaintiffs are to comply with the law at the end of the safe harbor, they must

begin taking compliance measures now or bear the risk of being unprepared.” (Resp. at

10) (emphasis in original). In support of this position, Plaintiffs rely in part upon the

Seventh Circuit’s ruling in 520 S. Michigan Ave. However, 520 S. Michigan Ave. is

readily distinguishable from the facts at issue here. In 520 S. Michigan Ave., an

employer believed a credible threat of criminal prosecution existed if it failed to comply

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with a law, and no promises were made regarding the non-enforcement of the law. 520

S. Michigan Ave., 433 F.3d at 963-64. Here, the Government has clearly indicated that

the present regulations will be amended. Therefore, any present injuries incurred by

Plaintiffs as a result of their planning for the future, in response to regulations they know

will be amended, are of their own making. Plaintiffs assert that the possibility of a

change (or lack thereof) in a regulation causes Plaintiffs immediate harm, because that

possibility affects their ability to plan for the future. Those claims of present injury are

remote and based in conjecture; the claims do not establish an actual, concrete harm

required to confer standing to Plaintiffs. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

Thus, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of standing is granted.

Ripeness

Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe for adjudication. The ripeness

doctrine prevents a court from engaging in a premature adjudication of an issue,

particularly when an administrative decision is not yet final. See National Park

Hospitality Association v. Department of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-808 (2003)

(National Park). The doctrine prevents courts “from entangling themselves in abstract

disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial

interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a

concrete way by the challenging parties.” Id. (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,

387 U.S. 136, 148–149 (1967) overruled on other grounds (Abbott Labs); Califano v.

Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977)). 

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In determining if an issue is ripe for adjudication, a court considers: (1) “the

fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and (2) “the hardship to the parties of

withholding court consideration.” National Park, 538 U.S. at 808. Defendants argue

Plaintiffs’ claims are not yet ripe because the promised accommodations regarding

religious objections mean the current regulations are not truly final, rendering any

judicial decision as to the legality of the current regulations premature. Plaintiffs counter

that the regulations are “final rules” and, therefore, fit for pre-enforcement review. 

However, Plaintiffs’ position ignores the reality that the Government stated its intention

in the ANPRM to amend the regulations and that the Government further represented the

amendment was impending at oral argument. Hence, it is possible that the forthcoming

amendments will eliminate the need for judicial review or, at the very least, impact the

scope of Plaintiffs’ claims. The ANPRM demonstrates that the challenged regulations

are not “sufficiently final” and, therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe for judicial

review. See Belmont Abbey, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 39. 

Likewise, the hardship to Plaintiffs if the Court does not adjudicate their claims is

insufficient to overcome the requirement that the claims be fit for final review. As

discussed above, Plaintiffs argue they cannot properly plan for the future, particularly

with regards to their budgets, due to the current state of the regulations. However, their

claims of uncertainty do not meet the hardship requirement necessary to make their

claims ripe for adjudication. The current regulations, considering the forthcoming

amendments, do not have a direct impact on Plaintiffs’ day-to-day operations, despite

Plaintiffs’ allegation that the current regulations somehow already inhibit their ability to

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hire employees, attract students, and solicit charitable contributions. (Am. Compl. ¶

164.) See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 536 F.2d 156, 162-163 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding

plaintiffs’ “claims of uncertainty in their business and capital planning are not sufficient

to warrant our review of an ongoing administrative process. . . . the claims are vague and

speculative.”). The necessity to postpone judicial review of Plaintiffs’ claims until the

Departments have finalized the amended regulations outweighs the purported hardship to

Plaintiffs in their ability to plan for contingencies. See Belmont Abbey, 878 F. Supp. 2d

at 41. 

Therefore, in addition to failing to assert standing necessary to establish subjectmatter jurisdiction, the claims alleged by Plaintiffs are unripe for adjudication. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction [31] is granted, and Plaintiff’s

Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. The merits of the current preventative care

regulations or proposed amended regulations cannot be reached. 

Date: February 8, 2013 ______________________________

JOHN W. DARRAH

United States District Court Judge

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