IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

GERALD HOWARD, 

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

VALUE CITY FURNITURE, et al. 

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 12 C 02923 

Judge John J. Tharp, Jr. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff Gerald Howard alleges that his employer, Value City Furniture, and his 

supervisor, Klint Duvall, discriminated against him on the basis of his race (African American) 

and subjected him to racial harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964. Value City Furniture moves for summary judgment on all counts of Howard’s 

complaint. The Court grants Value City Furniture’s motion in its entirety. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Howard’s Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) Response and Statement of Additional 

Facts

 The Court must first address Howard’s failure to comply with Northern District of 

Illinois Local Rule 56.1, which provides litigants with instructions and procedures for properly 

filing and responding to motions for summary judgment. Under Rule 56.1(a), a party seeking 

summary judgment must file with its motion “a statement of material facts as to which the 

moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment 

as a matter of law.” N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(a)(3). The defendants properly filed a Rule 56.1(a)(3) 

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Dkt. 31). 
2

 A party opposing summary judgment must comply with Local Rule 56.1(b), which 

requires:

a concise response to the movant's statement that shall contain ... a 

response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's 

statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific 

references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other 

supporting materials relied upon, and ... a statement, consisting of 

short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require the 

denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, 

parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon. 

N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(A)-(C). 

 As the defendants point out, Howard has failed to comply with these requirements. First, 

Howard has not responded—with a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party’s 

statement—to the defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts. Instead, Howard submitted a 

document which he titled “Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement of Undisputed Facts” (Dkt. 54); it sets forth 

additional facts which Howard adds are “in contrast to the Defendants’ Statement of [F]acts.” 

The reference to Rule 56.1(a)(3) is improper; Howard is not the moving party. Putting aside the 

title for the moment, Howard’s submission appears to combine additional facts and responses to 

(“in contrast to”) the defendants’ facts. This is improper, as well. See Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, 

Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s refusal to consider 

plaintiff’s submission because it simultaneously denied defendant’s facts and presented 

additional facts). Local Rule 56(b)(3) requires a party opposing a summary judgment motion to 

file “a concise response to the movant’s statement” that includes a response to each numbered 

paragraph in the moving party’s statement and a statement of separately numbered paragraphs 

setting forth any additional facts, and supporting citations to record evidence, on which the party 

relies. The plaintiff’s submission is also improper because it is replete with legal conclusions, 

unsubstantiated “facts,” and argument, as well as citations to affidavits that are themselves 
3

unsubstantiated. See Ciomber, 527 F.3d at 644 (affirming district court’s disregard of long, 

argumentative paragraphs). 

 District courts are “entitled to expect strict compliance with Rule 56.1.” Ammons v. 

Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Bordelon v. Chi. Sch. 

Reform Bd. of Trust., 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000)). Even “[s]ubstantial compliance is not 

strict compliance.” Id. Further, district courts are not required to “wade through improper denials 

and legal argument in search of a genuinely disputed fact.” Smith v. Lamz et al., 321 F.3d 680, 

683 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bordelon, 233 F.3d at 529). It is not too much to expect counsel to 

comply with straightforward procedures, clearly outlined in the rules; the alternative is to require 

courts to devote more time and resources to ferreting out factual information with which the 

parties are far more familiar, thereby delaying the resolution of not only the pending motion in 

this case, but also the pending motions in all of the other cases before the Court. These rules are 

not arbitrary; they are here for a reason: to improve the quality of justice for all litigants. If 

attorneys are permitted to ignore them, everyone will pay the price. The Court, therefore, 

declines to consider Howard’s submission at Dkt. 54. 

 Because Howard has not responded properly to the defendants’ Statement of Undisputed 

Facts, the defendants’ facts are deemed admitted to the extent they are supported by admissible 

record evidence. The facts asserted by Howard are disregarded. See Cichon v. Exelon Generation 

Co., LLC, 401 F.3d 803, 809-10 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A district court does not abuse its discretion 

when, in imposing a penalty for a litigant’s non-compliance with Local Rule 56.1, the court 

chooses to ignore and not consider the additional facts that a litigant has proposed.” (citation 

omitted)). 
4

 The Court nonetheless views the defendants’ admitted facts in the light most favorable to 

Howard, the non-moving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in Howard’s favor. See

Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).

B. Relevant Facts1

 American Signature, Inc., d/b/a Value City Furniture, has 126 retail furniture stores in the 

United States, and 12 stores in Illinois. Def.’s Facts (Dkt. 31) ¶ 1. Howard worked at the 

Calumet City store from October 2006 until September 2011 as a Home Furnishing Consultant 

(HFC). Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. He reported to the general manager of the store, Klint Duvall. Id. ¶ 3. 

Howard’s job was to sell furniture to customers; he was paid with commissions, which were a 

percentage of the proceeds from his successful sales. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13. In general, commissions at 

Value City Furniture are unpredictable because they are tied to individual customer desires and 

luck of the draw; one customer may simply browse, another may purchase a lamp, another may 

purchase an entire bedroom set. Id. ¶ 16. Once a sale is made, an HFC works with a cashier to 

finalize the purchase. Id. ¶ 17. 

1. Howard’s transfer to the Burbank store. 

 If an employee wishes to transfer between Value City Furniture stores, the employee 

must tell the general manager of his current store that he is interested in the transfer. The general 

manager can then choose to recommend the employee to the general manager of the store the 

employee requests. The receiving general manager has the discretion to accept or reject the 

transfer. Id. ¶ 33. 

1

 The following facts are drawn from the defendants’ Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement of 

Undisputed Material Facts. Dkt. 31. 
5

 In July 2010, Howard expressed an interest in transferring from the Calumet City store to 

the store in Burbank, Illinois. Id. ¶ 45. Howard wished to transfer because the Burbank store had 

a higher volume of sales than the Calumet City store at the time; Howard believed that a higher 

sales volume would translate into higher commissions. Id. ¶ 32. Duvall informed Joe Gagne—

the Burbank general manager—that he recommended Howard for a transfer. Id. ¶¶ 34, 46. 

 In July 2010, however, Mr. Gagne had already interviewed and offered an HFC position 

to Anthony Alvarez, an experienced furniture salesman who was scheduled to begin work at the 

Burbank store on July 16, 2010. Consequently, Mr. Gagne did not have an opening for an HFC 

position. Gagne Aff. ¶ 5; Def.’s Facts ¶ 46. 

 In April 2011, Duvall again voiced his support to Gagne for Howard’s transfer. Gagne 

agreed to the transfer. Id. ¶ 47. But a second delay intervened: a company-wide reduction-inforce and cost-savings plan, which included the elimination of HFC positions in over 75 stores 

between April and May of 2011. Id. ¶¶ 48, 49. In particular, the Burbank store was required to 

institute a freeze of all hiring and pending transfers, and to reduce the store’s staff by one 

employee. Id. ¶¶ 49, 50, 52. Gagne told Howard that he could not be transferred to the Burbank 

store because of the reduction-in-force. Id. ¶ 53.2

 Howard, however, believes the transfer was 

delayed because he refused to apologize to a coworker for an incident that occurred a month or 

so earlier.

2. The winter 2011 incident. 

2

 Duvall was not part of the decision to freeze hiring and transfers at the Burbank store. 

Id. ¶ 51. Gagne made all hiring decisions at the Burbank store. Id. ¶ 68. 
6

 In February or March of 2011,3

 while Howard still worked at the Calumet City store, 

Howard was in line to process a purchase for a customer. Id. ¶ 18. The cashier at that moment 

was Carrie Lockhart, a Caucasian woman. Id. Also in the line was Larry Hamm, another HFC at 

the Calumet City store. Id. A conversation ensued between Hamm and Howard, in which Hamm 

stated, “look at the line, poor Carrie.” Id. Howard then stated, “You didn’t say that when Syvella 

was up there, a black woman.” Id. ¶ 19. According to Howard, the conversation continued:

And so he said, don’t go there. I said, what do you mean don’t go 

there. I said that’s the truth, you didn’t say it when a black woman 

was up there, but all of the sudden Carrie is so important. And so 

he said – he threatened me, he said, if you say that again I’m going 

to go to the office. I told him he can go to hell. 

Id. ¶ 20. Hamm reported the incident to Duvall. Id. ¶ 21; Dkt. 56-3 at 2. Duvall asked Howard 

about it, and Howard admitted that he made the comments and that they may have been 

inappropriate. Def.’s Facts ¶ 22 (citing Howard Dep. Ex. 2 (Dkt. 29-1) at 68). Duvall then asked 

Howard to apologize to Hamm, but Howard refused. Id. Instead, Howard wrote a statement 

describing the incident and raising a complaint about Hamm—namely, that Hamm had called 

Howard a “black son of a bitch” at a workplace barbeque in September 2010. Id. ¶¶ 23, 27. 

Howard admitted, however—in both his statement and at his deposition—that he considered 

Hamm to be a friend, that he considered the alleged name-calling to be a joke, and that he had 

not been offended by the comment. Id. ¶¶ 23, 28. In his statement, Howard wrote, “We both 

laughed about it ... I never considered that a racist slur ....” Id. ¶ 24. Duvall later met with 

Howard and Hamm and emphasized the company’s policies against discrimination, reminding 

both men that discrimination was a violation of company policy and that any comments that 

3

 The defendants’ statement of facts recites the date of this incident as March 10, 2011. 

Def.’s Facts ¶ 18. Hamm’s handwritten complaint addressed to Klint Duvall refers to the date of 

the incident as February 18, 2011. Dkt. 56-3 at 2. Howard’s handwritten statement (dated March 

10, 2011) also refers to the date of the incident as February 18, 2011. Dkt. 56-3 at 4. 
7

could be considered discriminatory could result in discipline up to and including termination. Id. 

¶ 25. Duvall also provided Howard and Hamm with a copy of the company’s harassment policy. 

Id.

 Howard did not complain about Hamm to anyone else or at any other time. Id. ¶ 26. This 

is the only incident that Howard considered to be “harassment” and the only incident about 

which Howard complained to anyone in management. Id.4

3. Howard’s discrimination charges.

 On August 2, 2011, Howard filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, stating that 

he was “subjected to different terms and conditions of employment, including, but not limited to, 

being [] denied [a] transfer.” Dkt. 5 at 6. He added that he was “subjected to racial harassment 

and [he] complained to Respondent” and that he “believe[d] he [was] discriminated against 

because of [his] race, Black, and in retaliation for engaging in protected activity ....” Id. The 

EEOC, finding that it was unable to conclude that the information Howard offered established a 

violation of Title VII, issued a right-to-sue letter on January 24, 2012. Id. at 7. 

 On August 26, 2011, an HFC at the Burbank store was terminated. Def.’s Facts ¶ 55. On 

September 16, 2011, Howard was transferred to the Burbank store. Id. ¶ 56. He had the same title 

(HFC), duties, pay structure, and benefits as he received at the Calumet City store. Id. ¶ 58. In 

2010, Howard earned on average $40.33 per hour at the Calumet City store. Id. ¶ 60. In 2011, 

Howard earned on average $37.96 per hour at the Calumet City store and once transferred, he 

4

 Howard testified in his deposition about an incident in which Howard’s coworker, 

Adam Defarno, allegedly told Howard “They don’t want your black ass over there, they ain’t 

fitting to hire your black ass” in reference to his delayed transfer to the Burbank store. Def.’s 

Facts ¶¶ 29-30. He lodged no complaint concerning this incident, however, and does not argue in 

his response brief that this incident supports his harassment claim. 
8

earned on average $28.24 per hour at the Burbank store. Id. ¶ 61. In 2012, Howard earned on 

average $40.84 per hour at the Burbank store. Id. ¶ 62.

 Howard was the first hire at, or transfer to, the Burbank store since Anthony Alvarez in 

July 2010. Id. ¶ 46.5

 As of February 28, 2013, the date on which the defendants filed their motion 

for summary judgment, Howard continued to work at the Burbank store. Id. ¶ 12.

II. ANALYSIS 

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is also appropriate when “the nonmoving party fails to 

establish the existence of an element essential to his case, one on which he would bear the 

burden of proof at trial.” Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 

1996) (citation omitted). 

A. Race Discrimination 

 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 

sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

 Howard may proceed under either the direct method of proof or the indirect burdenshifting method articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See 

5

 Howard claims in his brief that “the Burbank store hired four white employees during 

the time Plaintiff had requested his promotion.” Pl. Resp. at 4. During his deposition, however, 

he testified only that several individuals had been transferred to Burbank before Alvarez; he did 

not testify (or provide any other evidence) that anyone began working at the Burbank store 

between July 2010 and September 2011, when he was transferred. See Howard Dep. at 81:22-23.
9

Fischer v. Avanade, Inc., 519 F.3d 393, 401 (7th Cir. 2008). Howard has not indicated which 

method he is using. 

 Under the direct method of proof, Howard must present “direct or circumstantial 

evidence that creates a convincing mosaic of discrimination on the basis of race,” Good v. Univ. 

of Chi. Med. Ctr., 673 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted), that “motivated an 

adverse employment action.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the 

indirect method of proof, Howard must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) his 

job performance met Value City Furniture and Duvall’s legitimate expectations; (3) he suffered 

an adverse employment action; and (4) Value City Furniture and Duvall treated similarly situated 

individuals outside of Howard’s protected class more favorably. See Egonmwan v. Cook Cnty. 

Sheriff’s Dep’t., 602 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 2010). If Howard establishes all four elements, the 

burden shifts to Value City Furniture and Duvall to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 

for the adverse employment action. See id. If the defendants meet this burden, Howard must then 

demonstrate that the proffered reasons are pretext for discrimination. See id. at 849-50. 

 Here, Howard cannot get out of the gate under either the direct or indirect method, both 

of which require evidence that Howard suffered an adverse employment action. The delay of 

Howard’s transfer from the Calumet City store to the Burbank store was not an adverse 

employment action. In Haywood v. Lucent Tech., Inc. the Seventh Circuit held that an employee 

“must be able to show a quantitative or qualitative change in the terms or conditions of 

employment” to establish an adverse employment action. 323 F.3d 524, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (also 

noting that “mere unhappiness and inconvenience are not actionable under Title VII.”). Where 

the employee’s duties, responsibilities, compensation, and benefits remain the same, and the 

plaintiff does not otherwise allege that a delay in obtaining a transfer affected his opportunities 
10

or delayed his career, a claim of race discrimination cannot stand. Id. (“the uncertainty [the 

employee] experienced while waiting for her transfer may have been unpleasant, but it was not 

severe enough to constitute an adverse employment action.”). 

 Howard’s transfer was delayed for approximately 14 months, from July 2010 until 

September 2011. Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 45, 56. Howard was ultimately transferred to the Burbank store, 

where he worked as a Home Furnishing Consultant, the same position he held at the Calumet 

City store before his transfer. Id. ¶ 58. He had the same duties, the same pay structure, and the 

same benefits as he received at the Calumet City store. Id. Howard argues in his response brief 

(Dkt. 56) that the Burbank transfer was a promotion, and the loss of that purported promotion 

(his “promotion opportunity (transfer)” was “taken away” in his words) was an adverse 

employment action. Pl. Resp. at 3, 6.6

 As to the latter point, Howard did not lose the transfer at 

all; he was transferred to the Burbank store on September 16, 2011. Def.’s Facts ¶ 56. Moreover, 

the transfer was not a promotion, as the defendants’ facts (which are deemed admitted) explain. 

Id. ¶¶ 58-59 (describing same title, duties, pay structure and benefits, as well as possibility of 

making fewer commissions and Howard’s lower earnings at Burbank store compared to Calumet 

City store).

 Howard has not shown a “quantitative or qualitative change in the terms or conditions of 

employment.” Haywood, 323 F.3d at 532. In other words, he has not shown that he suffered an 

adverse employment action—the third prima facie element—and accordingly his discrimination 

6

 Howard also argues that a “Corrective Action Report” regarding the winter 2011 

incident, which was submitted with Howard’s response brief, shows an adverse employment 

action. Pl.’s Resp. at 3. A disciplinary report is not akin to an adverse employment action if it 

does not result in a tangible job consequence. See Longstreet v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 276 F.3d 379, 

384 (7th Cir. 2002) (negative performance evaluations are not adverse employment actions 

actionable under Title VII). In Howard’s case, he has not shown that the report had any 

consequences.
11

claim cannot succeed. Summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on Howard’s race 

discrimination claim is therefore warranted. 

B. Racial Harassment 

To prove a claim for racial harassment, Howard must show that: (1) he was subject to 

unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on his race; (3) the harassment 

unreasonably interfered with his work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or 

offensive working environment that seriously affected his psychological well-being; and (4) 

there is a basis for employer liability. See Herron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 388 F.3d 293, 302 

(7th Cir. 2004) (citing Hrobowski v. Worthington Steel Co., 358 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 2004)). 

Further, Howard must establish that the harassing words or conduct were “severe or pervasive.” 

See id. (citing Hrobowski, 358 F.3d at 476).

 It is clear that Howard has established none of the required elements to avoid summary 

judgment on this claim. To begin, it is not even clear what his claim of racial harassment 

comprises. In his complaint, Howard checked a box accusing the defendants of “fail[ing] to stop 

harassment” and in his list of “facts supporting [his] claim of discrimination,” he included 

“harassment.” Dkt. 5 at 4-5. In his EEOC charge, Howard wrote, “I was subjected to racial 

harassment and I complained to Respondent.” Id. at 6. Howard explains in his brief in opposition 

to the defendants’ summary judgment motion that he was “subjected to a hostile work 

environment when he had to endure racial slurs, which were supposed to be a joke, on a 

continuous basis.” Pl.’s Resp. at 7.

 Assuming Howard’s claim of racial harassment refers to Howard’s claim that Larry 

Hamm called Howard a “black son-of-a-bitch,” this comment is far from sufficient to establish 

racial harassment. Howard admitted at his deposition that he considered Hamm’s comment to be 
12

a joke; that they both laughed about it at the time; that he “didn’t take offense to it”; and that he 

never considered the reference to be a racist slur. Howard Dep. (Dkt. 29-1) at 24:19-25:7. In 

other words, Howard has not shown that the purported harassment was “unwelcome,” as 

required by Seventh Circuit case law. See Herron, 388 F.3d at 302.

 Nor would a single comment by a co-worker suffice to establish a claim of racial 

harassment. See Luckie v. Ameritech Corp., 389 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir. 2004) (considering 

frequency of conduct and holding that isolated comments were insufficient to show a severe or 

pervasive work environment). Howard claimed during his deposition and in his response brief 

that there were other incidents of harassment, but he has failed to adduce any evidence in support 

of that claim (even in his purported response to the defendants’ statement of facts). For example, 

in his response brief, Howard asserts that Hamm and Duvall “would continue to remind the 

Plaintiff that he was nothing more than a black[] son-of-a-bitch who better not talk back to white 

folks or you will be punished,” Pl. Br. at 7, but this is hyperbole unsupported by evidence. 

Howard never testified that Hamm or Duvall said any such thing; rather, he testified in his 

deposition that “Larry been calling me [black son-of-a-bitch], he says it at the lunchroom table 

... there were a number of times that he said it.” Howard Dep. at 24:3-9. But Howard also 

admitted that he had never complained about any other conduct by Hamm, and offered no 

specifics regarding any other incident. Id. at 23:20-24; 25:17-26:3. Similarly, Howard testified in 

his deposition that “Klint engages in discrimination every day,” Howard Dep. at 25:22-23, but he 

provided no information whatsoever about what Duvall supposedly did, to whom, or when he did 

it. These unsupported, conclusory statements, fall far short of establishing that Howard endured 

harassment severe enough to constitute a hostile work environment. See, e.g., Ezell v. Potter, 400 

F.3d 1041, 1048 (7th Cir. 2005) (claim that defendant made hostile comments on a “regular” 
13

basis rejected where plaintiff “provides no detail on the regularity and so we cannot consider the 

few comments detailed in the briefs to be pervasive”). 

 Not surprisingly, in view of his failure to adduce evidence sufficient to support a claim 

that he was harassed, Howard has also failed to present evidence that his working environment 

was so hostile that it unreasonably interfered with his work performance by creating an 

intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment that seriously affected his psychological 

well-being. See Herron, 388 F.3d at 302. All of these shortcomings require granting the 

defendants’ summary judgment motion as to the harassment claim as well. 

C. Retaliation 

 Finally, Howard raises a claim for retaliation “for engaging in protected activity.” Dkt. 5 

at 4, 6. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because 

the employee “oppose[s] any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].” 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The direct method “requires proof that (1) the employee engaged in a 

statutorily protected activity; (2) [the employee] suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) 

a causal link exists between the two.” See Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 537 (7th Cir. 

2013) (citing Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ. Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 784-85 (7th Cir. 2007)). To 

establish a causal link, Howard must show that his purported protected activity was a 

“substantial or motivating factor” in the adverse employment action. See Milligan v. Bd. or Trs. 

of S. Ill. Univ., 686 F.3d 378, 388 (7th Cir. 2012). The indirect method requires proof that (1) the 

employee engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he was meeting his employer’s 

legitimate expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) he was treated 

less favorably than similarly situated employees who did not engage in statutorily protected 

activity. Majors, 714 F.3d at 537. Howard again does not indicate which method he is using. 
14

 Whether or not Howard engaged in a statutorily protected activity by complaining about 

Hamm’s comment (this is highly doubtful because Hamm’s comment did not refer, even 

implicitly, to race), Howard’s claim again falls flat under either the direct or indirect method 

because he has not shown that he suffered an adverse employment action. An adverse 

employment action under Title VII’s retaliation provision must be “materially” adverse. See

Brown v. Advocates South Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 2012) (“it is important 

to separate significant from trivial harms”). In essence, “an action is only adverse if it might 

dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 

1106-07.

 In July 2010, Howard first requested the transfer (and Duvall supported the request); in 

winter of 2011, Howard complained about Hamm’s comment in the cashier line; in April 2011, 

Duvall supported Howard’s transfer again; and in September 2011, Howard was transferred. 

Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 23, 45, 46, 47, 56. As discussed above in Section A, the delay by itself was not 

materially adverse; Howard has not shown a “quantitative or qualitative change in the terms or 

conditions of employment.” Haywood, 323 F.3d at 532. Given that his duties, responsibilities, 

compensation, and benefits remained the same, and he did not otherwise allege that the delay 

affected his opportunities or delayed his career, the delay was not severe enough to rise to the 

level of an adverse employment action. Id.

 Further, even if the delayed transfer were an adverse employment action, Howard has not 

demonstrated that there was a causal link between the delay and his filing of a discrimination 

charge, as required by the direct method of proof.7

 For starters, most of the “delay” Howard 

7

 Under the indirect method, Howard makes no attempt to show that he was treated less 

favorably than similarly situated employees who did not engage in statutorily protected, so his 

claim would fail under the indirect method, as well. 
15

complains of occurred between July 2010 and March 2011—before Howard ever complained 

about Hamm’s allegedly racist comment. Howard, moreover, believes (as shown by the 

defendants’ admitted facts) that his transfer was delayed because Howard “refused to apologize” 

to Hamm, not because of Howard’s purported protected activity—complaining about Hamm’s 

comment in the cashier line. Def.’s Facts ¶ 54; see Howard Dep. at 30:11-15 (“Q: And you 

believe—you’ve mentioned you believe that that transfer was taken away because of your 

complaint? A: Correct—I mean because I did not apologize.”). There is simply no evidence 

connecting the timing of the transfer—which occurred as soon as there was an open position at 

the Burbank store—to Howard’s complaint about Hamm’s comment in the cashier line. 

 For these reasons, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be granted as to 

Howard’s retaliation claim under Title VII.

D. Klint Duvall 

As the defendants’ point out, Klint Duvall, the general manager of the Calumet City store 

where Howard worked, cannot be held individually liable for purposes of Title VII. See Williams 

v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995) (agents are not individually liable under Title VII); 

see also Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 896 n.2 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that under Williams, Title 

VII “authorizes suit only against the employer as an entity rather than against individual people 

who are agents of the employer”). Accordingly, Howard’s claims against Duvall do not survive 

summary judgment. 

* * * * * 

 For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Howard has failed to offer 

sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on his claims for race discrimination, racial 
16

harassment, and retaliation. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment is therefore granted 

in its entirety. 

Entered: March 25, 2014 ____________________________________ 

John J. Tharp, Jr. 

United States District Judge