333 West Wacker Drive, Suite 810 

Chicago, Illinois 60606 

Tel: (312) 929-1970 1 Fax: (312) 929-1975 

www.truckandenginemanufacturers.org 

Truck & Engine emo Manufacturers 

Association° 

Bringing Cleaner Power to the U'voriui Srnce 1968 ° 

Jed R. Mandel 

(312) 929-1960 

jmandel@emamail.org 

July 9, 2014 

Ms. Melanie King 

Energy Strategies Group 

Sector Policies and Programs Division 

Off'ice of Air Quality Planning and Standards 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

109 T. W. Alexander Drive 

Mail Code: D243-01 

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711 

Dear Melanie: 

As you requested, I am providing information in support of the Truck and Engine 

Manufacturers Association's (EMA) request that the Office of Air Quality Planning and 

Standards (OAQPS) take action to allow engine manufacturers of stationary source diesel 

engines to give operators the means to obtain short-term relief from the inducements associated 

with the use of selective catalytic reduction (SCR) emission control technology while operating 

in emergency situations, such as those where operation of the stationary source diesel engine is 

needed to protect human life. Extensive background explaining the need for such relief is 

available in the docket associated with EPA's direct final rule and notice of proposed rule 

published on June 8, 2012. See 77 Fed. Reg. 34130-34148 and 77 Fed. Reg. 34149-34178 and 

Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-1032. 

In addition, I am attaching for your convenience EMA's initial and supplemental 

comments in response to that NPRM (see Attachments A and B). It is our understanding that the 

Administrator is about to sign a Final Rule providing short term relief from SCR inducements for 

nonroad mobile source engines used in emergency situations. EMA and its stationary source 

engine manufacturers are seeking to have EPA provide for stationary engines the same relief it is 

about to finalize for nonroad engines. 

The need for such relief is straightforward and obvious. As such, I will only briefly 

summarize the need here. 

Stationary source diesel engines are used in a wide variety of applications that are 

essential to be maintained, uninterruptedly, during an emergency. Those applications include 

generators, pumps, emergency back-up power supplies, etc. Under EPA's existing rules, 

customers can buy engines compliant with Tier 2 or Tier 3 emission standards where such 

engines are used in emergency applications. The Tier 2 and Tier 3 option is not available for 

non-emergency applications that might, nevertheless, be called upon to operate during an 

emergency. Manufacturers wish to sell, and many customers wish to purchase, the cleanest 

engines possible, meeting the most stringent emission control standards, irrespective of its 

application. Those engines, available for both nonroad and stationary applications, meet EPA's 

A Non Governmental Organization in Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
Ms. Melanie King 

July 9, 2014 

Page 2 

Tier 4 standards. Compliance with Tier 4 standards generally has been accomplished by the use 

of catalyzed diesel particulate filters (DPFs) for particulate emission control and SCR systems 

using diesel exhaust fluid (DEF) for NOx control. 

Inasmuch as the size of the DEF tank, as a practical matter, is not large enough to hold 

enough DEF to properly operate the SCR systems for the regulatory useful life of the engine, the 

DEF supply must be replenished by the operator. Further, EPA has determined that DEF is an 

adjustable parameter within the control of the operator. As such, EPA has determined that 

engines using SCR technology must include inducements that will remind, motivate and, 

ultimately, require the operator to replenish the DEF, use proper quality DEF, and otherwise 

assure that the SCR system is operating properly. Those inducements ramp up in severity and 

include as the "final inducement" shut down of the engine. 

It is essential that stationary source engines used in emergency situations, where human 

life is at risk, never face the possibility of regulatory induced shutdown, or even a forced loss of 

power. The Agency already has recognized that principal, and adopted appropriate policies, in 

the nonroad emergency rulemaking it is about to finalize. Nothing about the use of stationary 

source engines in an emergency should lead to a different result. 

We do note that, unlike mobile sources, stationary sources must operate under 

"continuous control." As such, EPA has informed us that, unlike the nonroad emergency engine 

rule, any such provisions applicable to stationary engines will require a"back-up" standard that 

the engine would be required to meet whenever the SCR inducement is actuated, and if the SCR 

system should actually fail to operate properly. 

Please note that while the nonroad emergency rule allows the inducement to be 

overridden, overriding the inducement does not automatically override the SCR system; and, 

thus, does not automatically put the engine into non-compliance. If no DEF were available, or if 

a hose was damaged and no DEF were flowing, the engine would not meet the Final Tier 4 

standards. However, there are a multitude of other situations that could trigger an inducement 

and for which the engine would still be operating in a fully compliant mode. For example, a 

NOx sensor might be damaged or defective. It then would trigger an inducement, but the SCR 

system likely would still be fully operational. 

It also is worth noting that the nonroad emergency rule allows the SCR inducement 

system to be overridden "anticipatorily" when an emergency occurs. However, if DEF is 

available, hoses are intact, sensors are operating, etc., the engine nevertheless will continue to 

operate in a fully compliant manner and will meet the Tier 4 standards. Overriding the 

inducement (to avoid the potential for reduced power or shutdown during an emergency) does 

not mean the engine automatically is noncompliant with the applicable emission standards. 

EMA and its members recommend that OAQPS move promptly to implement procedures 

that will allow stationary source diesel engine manufacturers to give operators the means to 

override the SCR inducements. If OAQPS determines a fallback standard is required for those 
Ms. Melanie King 

July 9, 2014 

Page 3 

very limited and infrequent situations where an inducement related to an actual malfunction were 

to be overridden (an event which would be electronically logged, reported, and available for 

inspection), the appropriate and feasible fallback is Tier 1. 

Tier 2 and Tier 3 compliance generally was achieved by the use of exhaust gas 

recirculation (EGR) technology. Thereafter, interim Tier 4 standards were met with the addition 

of a DPF to reduce PM emissions. However, while some manufacturers, for limited applications, 

chose to add "mild" SCR to their EGR and DPF engine designs, many manufacturers, for a 

significant number of applications, chose to take advantage of the robust capabilities of SCR 

technology. As such, they eliminated EGR and maximized the in-cylinder emission control 

trade-off between NOx and PM (increasing NOx, to be controlled by the SCR system, and 

decreasing engine-out PM). Likewise, they maximized the trade-off between NOx and fuel 

efficiency (increasing NOx, but improving fuel efficiency and lowering GHG emissions). As 

such, for reasons of reduced emission control complexity (the elimination of the EGR system), 

reduced engine-out PM emissions, improved fuel efficiency, reduced GHG emission and, 

overall, optimized in-cylinder emission control, manufacturers have substantially relied on the 

use of robust SCR controls to comply with Tier 4. 

Consequently, if the SCR system were to fail (for any reason, but in this particular case 

because the regulatory inducements were overridden and, thus, failed to shut the engine down for 

a limited time period), the engine likely would not be able to comply with either Tier 2 or Tier 3 

(for NOx compliance purposes). The engine would continue to meet the Tier 4 PM emission 

limits. However, engine manufacturers have a wealth of data that clearly demonstrate that 

engines meeting the Tier 4 standards, even those that use "heavy" SCR, will always meet or 

exceed compliance with Tier 1 standards if the SCR system should fail. 

EMA and its members also recommend that any demonstrated compliance with the Tier 1 

fallback standard deemed necessary by EPA be accomplished through the submission of existing 

data that manufacturers have generated on their engine's emission compliance capabilities, and 

the use of good engineering judgment. If EPA deems that any additional compliance checks are 

necessary, EPA can use its confirmatory testing authority as additional assurance of full 

compliance to Tier 1. 

EPA should note, and its actions should be guided by, several important facts. The likely 

frequency of operators needing to override the SCR inducement is low. And, the likely override 

of the inducement also allowing the engine to operate in actual noncompliance is even lower. It 

simply is not that often that customers will encounter emergency situations where they would 

need to override SCR related inducements and where the SCR system was not functioning 

properly. However, it is often that the customer's mere perception of not being able to depend 

on continuous operation during an emergency will deter them from purchasing the cleanest Tier 

4 engines. And, most important of all, while the likely frequency of emergency overrides is 

small, the potential harm to human life and safety that would result from the inability to override 

an inducement is enormous. 
Ms. Melanie King 

July 9, 2014 

Page 4 

The use of Tier 1 as the fallback and the compliance demonstration approach outlined 

above will avoid imposing significant and unnecessary costs on manufacturers. Further, it will 

significantly reduce the certification burden on OTAQ. 

Because nonroad engines and diesel engines used in stationary sources are often 

identical, EPA has allowed manufacturers to "dual certify" those engines. In other words, a 

single engine family is tested and certified in conformance with EPA's 40 CFR Part 1039 

requirements and that engine is labeled and legal for sale in both mobile and stationary 

applications. That practice reduces the number of engine families that a manufacturer must 

certify, reduces the number of engine models that dealers, distributors and customers must 

inventory and manage, and reduces the number of engine families that EPA must certify. 

If EPA were to take any steps that might foreclose the ability of manufacturers to 

continue to dual certify, it will result in significant costs and burden. Inasmuch as EPA is about 

to finalize rules that allow mobile source engines to override the SCR inducement in emergency 

situations, EPA must move quickly to provide similar relief for stationary sources. Otherwise, 

manufacturers may be forced to split engine families, dealers and customers will have to double 

their inventory, and EPA will face significant demands on its already overburdened certification 

staff. 

Complicating all of this is the fact that some dual certified Tier 4 engines already have 

been sold and are operating in stationary source applications today. Those installations include, 

for example, major medical centers. It is imperative that EPA take action to allow a"reflash" of 

those engines to provide customers with the inducement override (with, as necessary, a Tier 1 

fallback). Failing to do so could result in the failure of those engines -- due solely to the 

imposition of a regulatory inducement requirement -- during an emergency and the potential 

significant risk to human life. 

EMA and its members are available to work with you to (i) address the serious risk to 

human life that exists today because stationary engines with clean SCR technologies cannot 

override, in an emergency, regulatorilly imposed inducement and (ii) avoid the costs and 

burdens, and adverse impacts on air quality, that will result if EPA fails to allow the use of an 

override for new engine sales. 

We urge EPA to take prompt action. Please let me know if you need additional 

information. 

Very truly yours, 

. 

1 I 

Jed R. andel 

President 
Attachment A 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

Heavy-Duty Highway Program: 

Revisions for Emergency Vehicles and Docket ID No.: EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-1032 

SCR Maintenance 

COMMENTS OF THE 

TRUCK & ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION 

July 26, 2012 Jed R. Mandel 

Kimberly A. Pendo 

Truck & Engine Manufacturers Association 

333 North Wacker Drive, Suite 810 

Chicago, Illinois 60606 

(312) 929-1970 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 

U. Summary of Comments ................................................................................................... 1 

III. Emergency Vehicle Provisions ........................................................................................ 2 

A. Background ............................................................................................................2 

1 . DPFs ........................................................................................................... 3 

2 . SCR ............................................................................................................ 4 

B. DFR ........................................................................................................................ 4 

1. EVFM Approval Process ........................................................................... 4 

2. Labeling Requirements .............................................................................. 6 

IV. Diesel Exhaust Fluid Provisions ..................................................................................... 7 

A. Background ............................................................................................................7 

B. NPRM .................................................................................................................. 10 

1. DEF Replenishment Intervals .................................................................. 10 

V. Nonroad Equipment Used Temporarily in Emergency Service ................................ 13 

A. Background ..........................................................................................................13 

B. NPRM .................................................................................................................. 13 

l. Definition of "emergency situation .. ........................................................ 13 

2. Activation of AECD ................................................................................ 14 

3 . Duration of AECD ................................................................................... 15 

4 . Extended Waivers .................................................................................... 16 

VI. Summary ..........................................................................................................................16 

Page 1 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

Heavy-Duty Highway Program: ) 

Revisions for Emergency Vehicles and ) Docket ID No.: EPA-HQ-OAR 2011-1032 

SCR Maintenance ) 

COMMENTS OF THE 

TRUCK & ENGINE MA.NUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION 

I. Introduction 

The Truck & Engine Manufacturers Association ("EMA") hereby submits its 

comments on both the direct fmal rule ("DFR") entitled "Heavy-Duty Highway Program: 

Revisions for Emergency Vehicles" and the notice of proposed rulemaking ("NPRM") 

entitled "Heavy-Duty Highway Program: Revisions for Emergency Vehicles and SCR 

Maintenance," published by the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") 

in the Federal Reg-ister on 7une 8, 2012. (See 77 FR 34130-34148 and 77 FR 34149- 

34178, respectively.) 

EMA is the trade association that represents the world's leading manufacturers of 

internal combustion engines and on-highway heavy-duty trucks including the engines that 

(i) power emergency vehicles and nonroad equipment used during emergency responses 

and (ii) utilize Selective Catalytic Reduction ("SCR") technology in emission control 

systems that are the subject of the pending DFR and NPRM. 

II. Summary of Comments 

EMA supports EPA's efforts to take immediate action to avoid potential power 

loss on emergency vehicles related to normal engine regeneration operation during 

emergency situations as reflected in the DFR. While EMA has suggestions for improving 

the emergency vehicle field modification ("EVFM") procedures and comments on the 

labeling requirements, as set forth below, EMA supports the DFR. 

Further, EMA supports the NPRM and EPA's efforts to provide (i) specific 

regulatory requirements addressing emission-related scheduled maintenance and 

maintenance intervals for the replacement of diesel exhaust fluid ("DEF") and (ii) 

flexibility to the nonroad engine compliance regulations in connection with the use of 

nonroad engines in temporary emergency service. However, there are a number of 

specific issues that EPA must address in the final rule. 
EMA's comments to the DFR and NPRM, which will be further detailed, include 

the following: 

1. Emergency Vehicle Provisions: 

a. EPA must establish a clear timeline for responding to requests for 

approval of EVFMs not comparable to a previously approved 

EVFM or AECD 

b. EPA should not require manufacturers to place an emission control 

label on emergency vehicles or equipment already in service when 

an EVFM is later installed 

2. Diesel Exhaust Fluid Provisions: 

a. EPA should establish a minimum 1:1 DEF inaintenance interval 

for all heavy-duty on-highway engines 

3. Nonroad Equipment Used Temporarily in Emergency Service: 

a. EPA must clarify that its definition of "emergency situation" 

includes both direct and indirect, as well as immediate and 

delayed, risks to human life 

b. EPA should modify the allowable AECD activation approval 

sequence in order to reflect emergency conditions, specifically 

eliminating the need for a verbal request for prior permission to 

activate an AECD 

c. EPA must allow an AECD to remain active for a period of time 

that is appropriate for the intended purpose 

In sum, and subject to the following detailed comments that elaborate on these 

and other specific concerns, EMA supports EPA's overall framework for the DFR and 

NPRM. EMA and its members remain committed to working collaboratively with EPA 

to finalize the DFR and the NPRM. 

III. Emergency Vehicle Provisions 

A. Background 

Pursuant to its authority under the Clean Air Act, on January 18, 2001 EPA 

adopted stringent standards regulating the emission of oxides of nitrogen ("NOx") and 

particulate matter ("PM") by heavy-duty highway engines (the "Heavy-Duty Highway 

Rule"). In order to meet those stringent standards, engine manufacturers developed and 

deployed sophisticated emission technologies to achieve the near-zero heavy-duty onhighway emissions standards that have been phased in between 2007 and 2010. Those 

emission control technologies function through the use of exhaust aftertreatment — 

-2- 
namely diesel particulate filters ("DPFs") and SCR exhaust aftertreatment systems ("SCR 

systems"). Both devices require routine maintenance, and the frequency of that 

maintenance can vary depending on the duty cycle under which each engine operates. 

The emission control technologies are designed in order to induce the operator to comply 

with the required maintenance schedules through various measures. 

According to data cited in the DFR's preamble (See 77 FR 34157 — 34158), 

emergency vehicles can experience extreme duty cycles offering limited opportunities to 

regenerate DPFs and may, therefore, require different, or more frequent, maintenance 

than other types of vehicles. Additionally, since emergency vehicles must be able to 

respond to emergencies at any time with full power, it is critical that their engines are 

able to function at peak performance, and avoid routine maintenance events when the 

emergency vehicle is performing its emergency function. As EPA acknowledges, its 

regulations should prevent an engine's emission control system from unnecessarily 

interfering or preventing emergency vehicles from performing life-saving work. The 

DFR and NPRM provide additional flexibility necessary to avoid such unacceptable 

situations. 

DPFs 

DPFs are exhaust after-treatment systems that reduce emissions from dieselfueled vehicles and equipment by physically trapping PM and removing it from the 

exhaust. Once the PM has been trapped in the filter, it must be cleaned after a certain 

amount of use so that the DPF can continue to work effectively and efficiently. There are 

two forms of PM trapped by the DPF that must be cleaned — combustible and noncombustible PM. In order to oxidize the combustible PM trapped in the DPF, such PM 

must be regularly burned off in a cleaning process that is referred to as "regeneration." 

Regeneration of the DPF is routine and occurs frequently in order to burn off 

accumulated combustible PM. The regeneration process involves extra heat and oxygen, 

and must be done under controlled conditions to ensure that it is performed safely. There 

are three types of routine DPF regeneration — passive regeneration, automatic active 

regeneration, and manual (parked) active regeneration. Noncombustible PM cannot be 

burned off through regeneration and remains inside the DPF until the DI"F is physically 

removed and cleaned with a special machine. As very little noncombustible PM is 

generated, this cleaning process occurs infrequently and is not, therefore, a subject 

addressed in the DFR. 

In order to ensure that engines utilizing DPFs meet the stringent emission 

requirements of the Heavy-Duty Highway Rule, the DPF must continuously work to 

effectively remove PM from the exhaust, and regeneration is essential to maintain the 

mandated emissions levels. If the DPF fails, or regeneration does not occur, PM 

emission control becomes less effective and may cease altogether — each of which can 

cause a build-up of heat and pressure which can affect the performance of the engine and 

can create a dangerous situation. For these reasons, engine manufacturers program their 

engine's electronic control modules ("ECM") to limit maximum engine power, speed, or 

torque in the event the DPF fails or does not regenerate. 

-3- 
2. SCR 

SCR after-treatment systems generally require an aqueous urea solution, referred 

to as DEF, in order to control NOx emissions from heavy-duty engines by converting 

NOx into nitrogen and water. In order to function properly, the DEF tank of engines 

containing an SCR system must be refilled when needed. As part of EPA's regulatory 

program, manufacturers must induce operators to refill the DEF tank when needed. 

Failure to refill the DEF tank leads to eventual loss of engine power, speed, or torque. 

EVFM Approval Process 

EMA supports the emergency vehicle revisions proposed in the DFR and believes 

that they will enable emergency vehicles to perform their critical life-saving work 

without risk of incurring certain non-routine emission control system conditions that can 

result in decreased engine power, speed, or torque. By excluding certain AECDs 

designed to avert this situation from the definition of "defeat device," EPA is taking 

important steps to prevent the unacceptable scenario where an emergency vehicle is not 

able to properly respond to an emergency solely because of the timing of a regeneration 

event or the need for a DEF refill. Such regulatory flexibility will allow engine 

manufacturers to deploy specific emission controls and settings to significantly reduce 

that risk -- and with insignificant effect on the environment. While EMA supports the 

DFR, EMA nevertheless recommends that EPA improve the EVFM approval procedures 

through the course of developing the final rule. EMA's suggestions are intended to 

create a more efficient process that aligns with EPA's intentions. Additionally, in 

response to EPA's request, EMA also has comments on the proposed labeling 

requirements. 

In order to ensure that emergency vehicles already in service perform properly in 

emergency situations, it may be necessary to implement an EVFM. As set forth in the 

DFR, prior to distributing or installing an EVFM the manufacturer must (i) notify EPA in 

writing of its intent to install or distribute the EVFM and (ii) include with such 

notification a full description of the EVFM and documentation supporting the 

determination that the EVFM is necessary to prevent the emergency vehicle from losing 

speed, torque, or power due to abnormal conditions of its emission control system (or to 

prevent such abnormal conditions from occurring during operation related to an 

emergency response). In those cases where an EVFM may not be installed or distributed 

without EPA's prior approval, it is crucial that EPA review and approve such an EVFM 

in a timely manner. 

As provided in the DFR, no advance approval is needed when a manufacturer 

proposes an EVFM that is identical to an AECD that already has been approved for an 

engine family in production. See §85.1716(c)(1). Further, the DFR provides that such 

EVFM will be deemed to be automatically approved 30 days after the manufacturer 

provides EPA with a notice where the proposed EVFM is based on an approved AECD 

for an engine family no longer in production. See §85.1716(c)(2). In the event a 

-4- 
manufacturer proposes an EVFM that is not comparable to a previously approved EVFM, 

the DFR requires the manufacturer to obtain EPA's prior approval before such EVFM is 

installed or distributed. See §85.1716(c)(3). However, the DFR fails to ensure EPA's 

timely response to such requests. It must in order to meet EPA's stated public safety 

objectives. 

Pursuant to §85.1716(c)(3)(i), EPA may request additional information from the 

manufacturer supporting its determination that the EVFM is necessary to prevent the 

emergency vehicle from losing speed, torque, or power due to abnormal conditions of its 

emission control system, or to prevent such abnormal conditions from occurring during 

operation related to emergency response. The proposed regulatory language fails to (i) 

include any requirement that EPA request such additional information in a timely manner 

or (ii) require EPA to provide a timely, or even any, response acknowledging the receipt 

of such requested additional information. While §85.1716(c)(3)(iii) provides that such a 

proposed new EVFM is deemed approved 30 days after EPA acknowledges that the 

manufacturer has provided EPA with all requested additional information, the failure to 

establish a timeframe within which EPA must request such information or acknowledge 

the receipt of such information is a glaring omission that must be addressed. 

Accordingly, the regulatory text must be revised to require EPA to request 

additional information with respect to an EVFM not used previously in an approved 

application in a timely manner. If EPA fails to request additional information with 

respect to such new EVFM within 30 days after the manufacturer submits its application, 

the EVFM should be deemed approved. Similarly, in the event EPA requests additional 

information within the 30 day timeframe, the EVFM should be deemed approved 30 days 

after EPA receives the requested additional information unless EPA notifies the 

manufacturer otherwise. Such relatively minor modification to the final rule will ensure 

prompt review and approval of field modifications in every situation, while preserving 

EPA's ability and authority to request additional information, or deny a request. 

Accordingly, EMA recommends the following revisions to the regulatory text 

(suggested new language is in bold and underlined and language to be deleted is 

stricken): 

§ 85.1716(c)(3) If we have not approved an EVFM 

comparable to the one you are proposing, you must get our 

approval before installing or distributing it. Unless we 

request additional information or say otherwise. vour 

proposed EVFM is deemed approved 30 davs after you 

notifv us. In this case, we may request additional 

information to support your determination under paragraph 

(b) of this section, as follows: 

§ 85.1716(c)(3)(iii) Unless we say otherwise, your 

proposed EVFM is deemed approved 30 days after you 

notify us. If during that period, we ask you for more 

information, your proposed EVFM is deemed approved 

-5- 
30 days after you provide w° °^kn^w'°a^° *h^+ yea 

^via°d us wi*" a" ^ the additional information we have 

specified, unless we sav such information is insufficient. 

§ 1039.670(c)(3) If we have not approved an EVFM 

comparable to the one you are proposing, you must get our 

approval before installing or distributing it. Unless we 

request additional information or sav otherwise, your 

pronosed EVFM is deemed agproved 30 days after you 

notify us. In this case, we may request additional 

information to support your determination under paragraph 

(b) of this section, as follows: 

§ 1039.670(c)(3)(iii) Unless we say otherwise, your 

proposed EVFM is deemed approved 30 days after vou 

notifv us. or 30 days after we acknowledge receiptthat 

of the additional information 

we have specified, whichever is later . 

2. Labeling Requirements 

Finally, EMA supports the proposed labeling requirements for engines with one 

or more approved AECDs for emergency vehicle applications, emergency vehicles, and 

emergency equipment as set forth in the DFR and agrees that such labels are necessary to 

permanently distinguish new engines with approved emergency vehicle AECDs from 

similar engines not intended for emergency vehicles. The proposed statements (as set 

forth in the DFR) for inclusion on the emission control label will provide added assurance 

that engines certified with emergency AECDs will be installed only in emergency 

vehicles. 

EPA also seeks comment on the necessity of requiring the installation of a similar 

label on in-use emergency vehicles or equipment where an EVFM has been deployed for 

non-new engines (i.e., those already installed in an emergency vehicle). Such an 

additional label is not necessary and should not be required. Unlike new engines (those 

yet to be installed), there is no risk that non-new, already installed engines will be used in 

non-emergency vehicles or equipment. Accordingly, there is no need to distinguish them 

from other engines. In addition, emission control labels are permanently applied to 

engines and, by design, are very difficult to remove. Replacing an existing emission 

control label would impose a significant cost and burden without any corresponding 

benefit. Furthermore, when engine control labels are originally installed at the factory, it 

is done under very tight quality controls that ensure each engine receives the correct 

label. In the case of a field installation, the wrong labef could potentially be installed on 

an engine, particularly if multiple engines in a fleet are being modified at the same time. 

For all of these reasons, EPA should not require a separate labeling requirement for nonnew engines. 

MIT 
IV. Diesel Exhaust Fluid Provisions 

A. Background 

Under the current regulatory scheme, EPA's regulations applicable to heavy-duty 

on-highway diesel fueled engines and nonroad compression-ignition ("NRCI") engines 

define the required emission-related maintenance and service intervals for such engines 

and vehicles and include procedures that allow manufacturers to request a different 

maintenance schedule, or to request a new maintenance schedule related to the 

implementation of new technology. 

EPA adopted new emission standards applicable to NOx emissions from (i) 

heavy-duty highway engines on January 18, 2001 and (ii) NRCI engines on June 29, 

2004. As a result of such standards, most diesel engine manufacturers have implemented 

(or soon will implement) SCR as a NOx reduction technology. SCR systems use DEF 

that is stored in a DEF tank until it is injected into the exhaust gas in order to limit NOx 

emissions to levels that are compliant with the applicable emission standards. In order to 

ensure continued operation of the SCR system, the DEF tank must be periodically 

refilled. 

In a Guidance Document issued by EPA on March 27, 2007, EPA stated that the 

requirements for critical emission-related maintenance would apply to replenishment of 

the DEF tank and that manufacturers wanting to use SCR technology would likely have 

to request a change to scheduled maintenance. EMA submitted a petition under 40 CFR 

§86.094-25(b)(7)(ii) (a "(b)(7) petition") requesting that EPA approve reduced 

recommended scheduled maintenance intervals for heavy-duty on-highway engines. 

EPA granted EMA's request for reduced DEF refill intervals for model year 2009 — 2011 

engines and vehicles, and stated that "SCR systems are a new type of technology 

designed to meet the newest emission standards and the DEF refill intervals represent a 

new type of scheduled maintenance; therefore, EPA believes that manufacturers may 

request from EPA the ability to perform the new scheduled maintenance of DEF refills." 

See 74 FR 5761. Specifically, EPA approved the following reduced DEF refill 

maintenance intervals: 

(i) for vocational vehicles such as dump trucks, 

concrete mixers, refuse trucks and similar vehicle applications 

that typically are centrally-fueled, the DEF tank refill interval 

should be no less than equal to the range (in miles or hours) of 

vehicle operation that is provided from the vehicle's fuel 

capacity (i.e., the range of vehicle operation from its DEF tank 

and from its fuel tank should be equivalent — a 1:1 ratio); 

(ii) for all other vehicles equipped with a readily 

viewable DEF level indicator (e.g., a DEF gauge or dashboard 

DEF fill-level indicator), the DEF tank refill interval should 

provide a range (in miles or hours) of vehicle operation that is 

m 
at least twice the range of vehicle operation provided from the 

vehicles fuel capacity (i.e., a 2:1 ratio); and 

(iii) for all other vehicles that are not equipped with a 

readily viewable DEF gauge or dashboard indicator, the DEF 

tank refill interval should provide a range (in miles or hours) of 

operation that is at least three times the range of vehicle 

operation provided from the vehicle's fuel capacity (i.e., a 3:1 

ratio). 

In reaching its decision to approve the foregoing reduced maintenance intervals, 

EPA made a number of determinations relating to the maximum feasible maintenance 

intervals for the refilling of DEF tanks, including the following specific findings and 

conclusions: 

• it is reasonable to base DEF refilling events on diesel 

refueling intervals given the likelihood that DEF refill 

maintenance will be undertaken at the time of fuel 

refill, and given the DEF infrastructure available at 

diesel refueling stations; 

• the DEF consumption rate (approximately 3% of the 

diesel fuel consumption rate) requires reduced DEF 

refill maintenance intervals, since they are 

technologically necessary (e.g., requiring a DEF refill 

interval of 150,000 miles would necessitate a 750- 

gallon DEF tank, weighing more than 6,750 pounds 

when full, which would reduce the cargo-carrying 

capacity of a line-haul truck by more than 15%); 

• longer DEF refill intervals than those approved by the 

Agency in 2009 would require DEF tanks that are too 

large or too heavy to be feasibly incorporated into 

HDOH vehicles; and 

• larger DEF refill intervals than those approved by the 

Agency in 2009 would require great compromises in 

the cost, weight and utility of HDOH vehicles. 

(See 74 FR at 57673-74.) 

-8- 
EPA then summarized its findings and conclusions in 2009 regarding the 

reasonableness of the reduced DEF refill intervals at issue, as follows: 

EPA believes that in light of the existing tight space constraints 

and the overall desire to maximize cargo-carrying capacity, 

minimize emissions and meet consumer operational demands, 

and the built-in DEF tank size buffer to insure DEF refills, that 

the tank DEF tank sizes associated with the 2:1 refill and 3:1 

intervals are technologically necessary. EPA believes that 

requiring tank sizes above these ratios will cause increases in 

space constraints and weight that would not be appropriate for 

these vehicles. Similarly, manufacturers note that only a small 

number of applications will employ the 1:1 refilling ratio and 

that such vehicle applications have very limited vehicle space 

available to house surplus DEF. Such applications (e.g., a 

garbage truck, concrete mixer, beverage truck, or airport 

refueler) will also be refueled daily at central locations. At 

approximately 0.134 ft3per gallon, any extra DEF would 

displace significant space available to vehicle components and 

subsystems on both the vocational trucks at the 1:1 refill 

interval, as well as the 2:1 and 3:1 vehicles. 

After reviewing this data and information, EPA believes that 

longer refill intervals than those noted above would require 

larger and heavier DEF tanks, and the design and engineering 

work performed by manufacturers thus far indicate that the 

recommended DEF refill intervals noted above approximate 

the maximum feasible maintenance intervals associated with 

reasonable DEF tank sizes. The maintenance intervals 

recommended ensure that the functions and operational 

efficiency of such vehicles are not overly compromised. Based 

on this information we believe the intervals noted above are 

warranted. 

(See 74 FR at 57674.) (Emphasis added.) 

On June 13, 2011, EMA submitted an additional request to EPA to extend its 

approval of the previously requested DEF refill maintenance intervals to model year 2012 

and later engines and vehicles. On January 5, 2012, EPA extended its previous approval 

of the special DEF refill intervals. 

On July 26, 2011, EPA held a workshop for NRCI engine manufacturers to 

provide guidance on the certification of NRCI engines using SCR systems, and addressed 

the issue of appropriate maintenance intervals for DEF refill. EPA instructed 

manufacturers to petition EPA under 40 C.F.R. § 1039.125(a)(5) if they needed new 

maintenance intervals for NRCI engines equipped with SCR systems. On December 30, 

2010, EMA submitted such a request on behalf of certain of its members and specifically 

-9- 
asked for a 1:1 refill interval. We explained the need for such a refill interval based on 

weight and space limitations. Further, we explained that there was a reasonable basis to 

conclude that customers would be expected to refill the DEF tank. Finally, EMA also 

explained that nonroad equipment typically was centrally fueled and, as such, EPA 

should apply the same refill interval logic that it had adopted for centrally fueled heavyduty on-highway vehicles. On January 5, 2012, EPA approved a 1:1 maintenance 

interval for refill of DEF tanks in NRCI engines for 2011 and later model years. In 

approving such 1:1 maintenance interval, EPA specifically noted that, there are 

"significant space and weight constraints associated with increasing DEF tank size in 

order to accommodate a 2:1 refill ratio" and that it believed "it appropriate to take into 

consideration ... the increased likelihood that the DEF tank will be refilled if it becomes 

standard operating practice to refill the DEF tank at the same time as the fuel tank." 

Further, EPA noted that "such nonroad equipment is similar to centrally-fueled heavyduty on-highway vehicles and that there is a sufficient basis and a reasonable expectation 

that DEF tank refills will occur on a timely basis." 

DEF Replenishment Intervals 

Virtually all engine manufacturers have adopted (or have indicated an intent to 

adopt) SCR technology in order to meet EPA's stringent NOx emissions standards. Due 

to the prevalence, and acceptability of SCR technology in the market, and the necessity of 

DEF refilling to the operation of such emission control systems, it makes sense to add a 

DEF refill interval to the list of scheduled emission-related maintenance intervals 

published in the Code of Federal Regulations, rather than continue the process of granting 

petitions under 40 CFR §86.094-25(b)(7)(ii) and 40 CFR § 1039.125(a)(5). EPA should 

include provisions in the regulations explicitly (i) adding DEF replenishment to the list of 

scheduled emission-related maintenance for diesel-fueled engines; and (ii) adopting 

scheduled maintenance intervals for DEF replacement. 

As EMA originally requested in its b(7) and a(5) petitions, a 1:1 refill interval is 

appropriate for centrally-fueled heavy-duty on-highway diesel engines and for nonroad 

diesel fueled engines. However, EMA no longer believes that a 2:1 refill interval is 

appropriate for non-centrally fueled heavy-duty on-highway diesel engines equipped with 

a readily viewable DEF level indicator or gauge. At the time of EMA's original petition, 

SCR technology was brand new and its acceptability in the marketplace was not yet 

known. In addition, the certification requirements for inducing customers to refill their 

DEF tank were in the process of being finalized and, in any event, it was not clear how 

customers would adopt to having to replenish the DEF supply. Further, the infrastructure 

for assuring the availability of DEF was not fully mature. All of those issues have been 

resolved favorably. 

SCR technology has been embraced by manufacturers and the marketplace, and 

has become standard on heavy-duty on-highway diesel engines. The technology no 

longer is new, and both industry and EPA have been actively engaged in overseeing and 

monitoring the successful development of this effective means of reducing emissions. 

-10- 
SCR technology is now a proven, successful emission control technology with a welldeveloped record of successful adoption, use and compliance. 

The prevalence of SCR technology is reflected by the marketplace's robust 

development of a DEF delivery infrastructure which has resulted in a readily and widely 

available supply of DEF. There no longer is any valid question surrounding the ready 

availability of DEF to operators of non-centrally fueled on-highway diesel engines. 

Further, experience has shown that operators of SCR-equipped heavy-duty onhighway diesel engines routinely refill the DEF tank without inducement, indicating that 

trucking fleets and their engine and vehicle supplies have successfully trained operators 

on the proper operation of SCR equipped trucks, and incorporated successful 

inducements into SCR system design. 

All of these indicators support the adoption of a 1:1 DEF tank refill interval for all 

heavy-duty diesel engines. Those conclusions are supported by EPA's own findings. 

Over a year ago, EPA concluded: 

• On-highway heavy-duty SCR systems introduced into commerce to date 

have been highly successful in inducing operators to refill DEF tanks on a 

timely basis and to avoid interfering with SCR operation. 

• Current information concerning in use operation of SCR-equipped trucks 

indicates that warning signals work correctly and that drivers do not wait 

for SCR-related inducements to be triggered to ensure appropriate and 

continuing operation of the systems. 

• The strong indication is that DEF warning systems are working correctly, 

and that when warned, drivers have not continued to drive distances long 

enough to lead to inducements. 

• Inducements appear to be triggered in very few cases. 

• Inducements have the intended effect of motivating appropriate driver 

behavior. 

• Manufacturers' past SCR designs and EPA's guidance have resulted in 

highly effective controls to protect the operation of SCR systems. 

• Drivers are properly operating their SCR-equipped trucks. 

• Manufacturers of heavy-duty engines and operators of trucks have gained 

significant experience in the design and use of SCR systems, and this 

experience should be reflected in the certification process. 

- 11 - 
• When manufacturers implement new emission controls, the engine 

technology generally evolves and the manufacturers make improvements 

over the course of initial model years as they develop and certify engines 

and vehicles for each new model year. 

• SCR technology will continue to mature, and appropriate designs for 

heavy-duty diesel vehicles and heavy-duty diesel engines may continue to 

evolve as additional experience with the technology is gained. 

(See 76 FR 32886.) 

Adoption of a minimum 1:1 ratio for all heavy-duty engines is consistent with 

EPA's conclusions and determinations. As recognized by EPA, the significant 

experience in the design and use of SCR systems gained by manufacturers of heavy-duty 

engines and operators of trucks should be reflected in the certification process. Engine 

technology has continued to evolve and SCR technology has matured. Manufacturers 

must have the opportunity and incentive to design the most fuel efficient engines and 

vehicles feasible — and the regulations intended to further those goals should not serve as 

an impediment. In that regard, it is important to keep in mind that the 1:1 ratio is a 

regulatory minimum - the actual size of the DEF tank will ultimately be driven by 

customer demand, practicality, and marketplace needs. 

Beyond the fact that the programmatic and marketplace reasons for distinguishing 

the appropriate minimum DEF refill intervals for centrally-fueled (and nonroad) engines 

and for line-haul engines no longer exist, we note that the legal basis for granting a 

reduced allowable maintenance interval under b(7) also no longer is operative. Under the 

Clean Air Act, EPA can adopt allowable maintenance intervals by regulation after giving 

appropriate consideration to cost, energy and safety factors. Those considerations are 

much broader, and provide EPA with greater flexibility, than the "technologically 

feasible" standard required for granting a petition for an alternative maintenance interval 

that is shorter than the established regulatory default under b(7). 

Moreover, failure to establish a 1:1 ratio for all heavy-duty engines in the final 

rule would be inconsistent with our Nation's greenhouse gas reduction goals and would 

be contrary to the precedent setting GHG/fuel efficiency regulations just adopted by EPA 

(and NHTSA). (See 76 FR 57105.) Those regulations specifically push reducing vehicle 

weight as a necessary and important GHG reduction/fuel efficiency improvement 

strategy. Taking this opportunity to establish the 1:1 ratio is a crucial opportunity to 

advance the fuel economy standards set forth in the GHG Rule as well as the Nation's 

efforts to further reduce CO2 emissions. As EPA states in that Rule, weight impacts fuel 

efficiency and GHG emissions and plays a key factor in meeting the requirements of the 

GHG Rule: Imposing a 2:1 ratio requires a larger than necessary DEF tank, which will 

increase the weight of the vehicle and, thus, burn more fuel and have an unnecessary and 

avoidable negative impact on GHG emissions and the environment. By establishing a 2:1 

ratio, EPA actually will be imposing an impediment to complying with the new 

regulations -- and for no good reason. EPA should take this opportunity to adopt a 1:1 

minimum ratio. The reasons for the current 2:1 ratio no longer exist. The legal standards 

-12- 
that drove EPA to adopt the longest maintenance interval technologically feasible no 

longer apply. And, public policy and EPA's own rules support the shortest practical ratio 

in order to limit weight and improve fuel efficiency. 

Accordingly, EMA maintains that a minimum 1:1 DEF inaintenance interval 

across the heavy-duty engine class is the appropriate standard and should be reflected in 

the final rule. 

V. Nonroad Equipment Used Temporarily in Emergency Service 

A. Background 

A wide range and variety of nonroad equipment applications are used to address 

emergency situations. Backhoes, tractors, bulldozers, excavators, wheel loaders, 

generators, and a host of other nonroad equipment types are used to fight fires, rescue 

people in collapsed buildings, and, in general, work to address emergencies. Unlike 

certain on-highway emergency vehicles (like fire trucks or ambulances), there are very 

few nonroad equipment types or designs that are uniquely dedicated solely to emergency 

services. Diesel powered nonroad equipment is employed to save lives, property, and 

infrastructure crucial to the preservation of human life, public safety and national 

security. Such equipment is used all over the nation to respond to car crashes, mine 

collapses, hurricanes, entrapments, terrorist attacks and a plethora of other catastrophes. 

Accordingly, it is imperative that nonroad diesel engines are available to respond to such 

emergency situations at full capacity - without loss of power caused by the functioning 

(or malfunctioning) of emission controls. 

I 011~21' : MO 

It is critical that EPA provide flexibility in its regulations to ensure that nonroad 

equipment used temporarily in emergency operations may continue to operate to 

ameliorate the emergency and save lives without having to be concerned that the 

functioning (or nonfunctioning) of emission controls could lead to a mission disabling 

inducement. The NPRM's proposed revisions would permit manufacturers to seek EPA 

approval of AECDs to ensure the functionality of nonroad engines certified by EPA 

under Part 1039 in emergency situations. In sum, the NPRM provides a process by 

which SCR equipped engines operating in emergency situations can continue to operate 

without a loss of power (or other inducement strategy) resulting from the functioning (or 

nonfunctioning) of emission controls which could prevent the equipment from 

performing its lifesaving mission. EMA strongly supports the adoption of such flexibility 

and urges EPA to finalize the rule promptly with the following modifications: 

Definition of "emergency situation" 

Without clarification, the proposed definition of "emergency situation" in 

§1039.665 could prevent the activation of an AECD in critical situations. EPA has 

proposed that an emergency situation be defined as one in which there is "a significant 

risk to human life." EPA should confirm that its definition of "emergency situation" 

encompasses situations that pose not only an immediate or direct "significant risk to 

-13- 
human life", but also those that pose an indirect or delayed risk to human life such as 

emergencies that threaten national security or public safety. It is crucial that nonroad 

equipment used to respond to such threats are able to operate at full capacity without 

interference from emission-control systems. Limiting the interpretation of "risk to human 

life" too narrowly could fail to recognize potential catastrophic events that, while not 

presenting an immediate or direct life or death situation, nevertheless pose a threat to 

human life. Accordingly, EPA should clarify that the definition of "emergency situation" 

and/or the interpretation of "significant risk to human life" includes delayed and/or 

indirect risks to human life such as those posed by threats to national security and public 

safety. While examples of life threatening situations involving rescue equipment are 

plentiful (i.e., car crashes, mine collapses, building collapses, etc.), it also is necessary to 

consider other types of situations that pose real threats to the safety and welfare of the 

country and its citizens such as disruptions to the nation's air traffic control system, 

banking systems, communication networks, or other key components to the Nation's 

infrastructure. 

2. Activation of AECD 

Under the proposed regulations, operators of nonroad equipment used in 

emergency situations would have to take critical time to establish verbal contact with the 

certificate holder in order to obtain "specific permission" to activate an AECD. (See 

§1039.665(b)(1).) Not only would such a requirement squander precious time and 

endanger lives, it may be impossible, due to the nature of the emergency, to comply with 

such a requirement. As we have learned from past disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, 

the 2011 tsunami in Japan, and the September 11 terrorist attacks, it is foreseeable that it 

an operator may not (i) have an effective means of contacting the certificate holder due to 

interruptions to communication systems caused by the emergency situation or (ii) have 

the time to establish such communication. Moreover, it is not prudent to jeopardize 

human life or national or public security based on the availability of the certificate holder 

to field such calls 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and 365 days a year. In addition, 

requiring the certificate holder to establish a means of fielding such requests for 

permission (literally around the clock and year round) would create an undue burden on 

the certificate holder and provide no benefit to the environment. 

Instead, EPA should adopt a regulation that provides the certificate holder with 

the flexibility to adopt activation methods that assure the availability of such equipment 

to assist in the wide range of emergency situations that may arise and which minimize the 

likelihood of abuse. Such flexibility should include the ability for the operator to activate 

the AECD either by entering a preprogrammed emergency sequence of commands found 

in the owner's manual or by some other means of "one time only" use of an inducement 

override option. Following such initial activation, the operator should be required to send 

the certificate holder notice that it engaged the AECD within 30 days of such activation, 

including a description of the emergency situation, the reason for the use of the AECD, 

and a signature from an official acknowledging the conditions of the emergency situation 

(as generally described in § 1039.665(4)(c)(1)). Upon receipt of such notice, the 

certificate holder would provide the operator with a means of resetting the AECD so that 

it may be reactivated, if necessary, to address a future emergency situation. Absent such 

-14- 
notice to the manufacturer, it would not be possible to reactivate the AECD. Further, the 

regulations should provide the operator a means to reactivate the AECD immediately 

(without the notice described above) in the event a prolonged emergency situation 

requires continued use of the engine without interruption from the functioning (or 

nonfunctioning) of its emission controls. As set forth in the NPRM, EPA would receive 

reports of all such AECD usage. Finally, in order to insure that users have the ability to 

reactivate the AECD in the future if needed, EPA should include a provision in the final 

rule that encourages manufacturers to provide incentives for users to seek approval to 

reset the AECD. 

3. Duration of AECD 

The NPRM requires that, once activated, "the AECD must become inactive 

within 24 engine hours of becoming active." (See §1039.665(b)(2).) However, EPA 

provides no basis or rationale to support the 24 engine hour time limit. If the objective is 

to ensure that the functioning (or malfunctioning) of emission controls does not pose a 

significant risk to human life, the AECD must remain active for the period of time 

necessary to avoid the significant risk to human life. Arbitrarily establishing a 24 engine 

hour time limit does not further EPA's stated objectives and would be difficult to defend 

or explain in the event of an engine shut-down in the middle of a life saving operation. 

At a minimum, the AECD should remain active for the length of time that a human being 

can survive without food and water. As engines typically do not have a means to 

measure calendar time, such time frame should be described in terms of engine hours of 

operation. Otherwise, operators must have the ability to reactivate the AECD an 

unlimited number of times without the need for reprogramming by the manufacturer in 

order to avoid significant risk to human life created by the functioning (or 

malfunctioning) of emission controls. 

Even if EPA fails to see the logical connection between tying the purpose of their 

rule (to avoid significant risk to human life) to the length of time the AECD can operate 

(the time period for which a human can live without food and water), EPA's proposed 24 

hour time period is simply too short. As we have noted to EPA previously, if nonroad 

diesel equipment fails to operate because diesel fuel cannot be obtained, the equipment 

fails to operate as a matter of physics. However, if the equipment fails to operate because 

DEF cannot be obtained, the only reason for such failure is the EPA regulations which 

drive manufacturer design. 

Because of the inherent need and high demand for diesel fuel, and the enormous 

number of diesel fueled vehicles in the marketplace, there is an existing, well established 

and robust diesel fuel supply infrastructure in the United States. As such, large supplies 

of diesel fuel are readily available in various storage facilities even, and especially, in 

remote areas. Moreover, in the case of emergencies, diesel fuel also can be siphoned 

from non-emergency use vehicles into those needed for the emergency if there are critical 

needs. The same cannot be said for DEF. 

-15- 
While DEF is now readily available throughout the United States, the number of 

on-highway and nonroad vehicles that currently require DEF pales in comparison to the 

number of all other diesel fueled vehicles. As such, the DEF storage infrastructure is not 

nearly as well developed and mature as that for diesel fuel. As such, in the event of an 

emergency that might preclude the availability of DEF, there likely would be some 

significant continued availability of diesel fuel, at least for the short term. As such, 

nonroad equipment being used for emergencies would be able to refill their diesel fuel 

tanks multiple times with locally available supplies of diesel fuel even if the emergency 

prevented the delivery of additional diesel fuel. However, they wouldn't necessarily have 

a readily available inventoried supply of DEF. 

For those reasons, EPA should recognize that nonroad equipment used in an 

emergency would be able to refill with diesel fuel multiple times with available diesel 

fuel supplies. Based on customer needs, a typical diesel fuel tank is sized to allow the 

operator to run the equipment a full shift — generally 12 hours — without having to refill. 

EMA recommends that, at a minimum, EPA allow the AECD to be activated, and 

operate, for 10 diesel fuel refilling cycles (i.e., 120 hours) without concern that the 

emission control system will trigger an inducement. 

4. Extended Waivers 

Finally, EMA recommends that EPA include in the final rule (or establish a 

process for granting) extended AECD approvals in the event of a wide-scale or prolonged 

emergency situation that would result in EPA granting a DEF waiver. Faced with a 

catastrophe on the scale of the 2011 tsunami in Japan or Hurricane Katrina, it is 

foreseeable that DEF inay be unavailable for a prolonged period of time. Accordingly, if 

EPA were to grant a DEF waiver, EPA should provide a means to allow extended 

deactivation of scheduled inducements resulting from an operator's inability to replenish 

DEF in such situations. Such long term DEF waiver scenarios are equally applicable to 

both nonroad and on-highway engines. 

VI. Summary 

Overall, EMA supports EPA's framework for the DFR and NPRM. However, as 

highlighted above, there are a number of issues that EPA must address in the final rule. 

Specifically, EMA urges EPA to take action to (i) establish a clear timeline in the 

emergency vehicle provisions for responding to requests for approval of EVFMs not 

comparable to a previously approved EVFM or AECD; (ii) establish a minimum 1:1 DEF 

maintenance interval for all heavy-duty on-highway engines; (iii) clarify that its 

definition of "emergency situation" for purposes of §1039.665 include both direct and 

indirect, as well as immediate and delayed, risks to human life; (iv) eliminate the need to 

make a verbal request for prior permission to activate an AECD in an emergency 

situation under § 1039.665; (v) allow an AECD activated in connection with an 

emergency, situation under §1039.665 to remain active for a period of time that is 

appropriate for the intended purpose; and (vi) establish a process for granting extended 

AECD approvals in the event of a prolonged emergency situation requiring EPA to grant 

a long term DEF waiver. 

-16- 
EMA and its members are committed to working with EPA to ensure the 

fmalization and implementation of successful rules. If you need additional information, 

please do not hesitate to contact us. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Truck & Engine Manufacturers Association 

-17- 
Attachment B 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

ENVIRONIVIENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

Heavy-Duty Highway Program: ) 

Revisions for Emergency Vehicles and ) Docket ID No.: EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-1032 

SCR Maintenance ) 

) 

SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS OF THE 

TRUCK & ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION 

September 4, 2013 Jed R. Mandel 

Kimberly A. Pendo 

Truck and Engine Manufacturers Association 

333 West Wacker Drive, Suite 810 

Chicago, IL 60606 

(312) 929-1970 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

Heavy-Duty Highway Program: ) 

Revisions for Emergency Vehicles and ) Docket ID No.: EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-1032 

SCR Maintenance ) 

) 

SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS OF THE 

TRUCK & ENGINE MA.Ni7FACTURERS ASSOCIATION 

On July 26, 2012, the Truck & Engine Manufacturers Association ("EMA") submitted 

comments to the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") on both the direct 

final rule ("DFR") entitled "Heavy-Duty Highway Program: Revisions for Emergency Vehicles" 

and the notice of proposed rulemaking ("NPRM") entitled "Heavy-Duty Highway Program: 

Revisions for Emergency Vehicles and SCR Maintenance," published by the EPA in the Federal 

Register on June 8, 2012. (See 77 FR 34130-34148 and 77 FR 34149-34178, respectively). 

EMA submits these supplemental comments to memorialize the information we have shared 

informally with EPA, and to provide additional information in support of EPA establishing an 

AECD period appropriate to the purpose of the proposed rule. 

Since the submission of EMA's initial comments, EMA and its members have additional 

information regarding the optimal duration of AECDs based on the use of nonroad emergency 

equipment in connection with Hurricane Sandy and other similar emergency situations. The 

preparation, rescue and relief operations preceding and following the aftermath of Hurricane 

Sandy highlight the need for implementation of flexible regulations ensuring that the nonroad 

equipment used in emergency operations is able to continue to operate to ameliorate the 

emergency, and save lives, without concern that the inducements related to the use of SCR 

technology could disable life saving operations. We note that those SCR related inducements 

could be triggered because of a lack of available diesel exhaust fluid (DEF), a crimped DEF line, 

a faulty sensor, or any number of conditions that could lead to engine shutdown and the 

subsequent need to diagnose and fix whatever triggered the inducement. The availability of 

AECDs, as described in EPA's NPRM, are essential to ensure the functionality of nonroad 

engines in emergency situations. SCR equipped engines operating in emergency situations must 

have the ability to continue to operate without a loss of power (or other inducement) resulting 

from the functioning (or nonfunctioning) of emission controls which could prevent the 

equipment from performing its lifesaving mission. 

As discussed below, the Hurricane Sandy experience highlights the necessity of a final 

rule that provides for an AECD that can be activated and operated continuously for a minimum 

of (i) 120 engine operating hours; or (ii) 30 calendar days in the case of engines used to power 

electrical power generation or flood control pumps where the generator or pump is the sole 
source of electrical or shaft power when the normal source of power is interrupted (referred to 

herein as non-dedicated emergency "gen sets" and "pumps" respectively) without the emission 

control system triggering an inducement. Furthermore, it is imperative that an operator can 

activate the 120 hour AECD period either by entering a preprogrammed emergency sequerice of 

commands found in the owner's manual or by some other means of "pre-armed" inducement 

override option. In the case of gen sets and pumps, EMA recommends a 30 day AECD period 

that would be actuated manually in anticipation of an impending emergency situation in order to 

shut-off potential inducements that might impair the equipment's ability to function during the 

emergency. We note that shutting off the inducement in anticipation of an emergency does not 

disable the engine's emission control system. The engine would still be expected to operate in 

accordance with its design. However, if a situation would occur that otherwise would trigger an 

inducement, and cause the gen set or pump to be disabled, that disabling inducement would be 

overridden. Furthermore, we note that operators have no incentive to activate AECD overrides 

unless an emergency truly is expected, as such action would trigger reporting, a potential service 

call to reactivate the AECD, and would immediately start the counter on the AECD override. 

Following Hurricane Sandy, EMA's members worked to gather information and learn 

from the experiences of their dealers, distributors and customers. As a result of such efforts, 

EMA collected pertinent information regarding emergency response activities and the use of 

nonroad engines (including those used in gen sets and pumps) during and following the 

aftermath of the Hurricane and other recent emergency situations as well as anecdotal 

information regarding the real-life experiences of those directly affected by such disasters. 

The First Response Team of America, a not-for-profit charitable organization that 

deploys a mobile fleet of equipment to respond to large societal disasters ("First Response 

Team"), was among those that shared information with EMA regarding its rescue efforts and use 

of equipment during its recent response to Hurricane Sandy. According to First Response Team, 

activity following a disaster takes place in two phases — emergency response and recovery. 

Immediately following the disaster and continuing during the first few critical weeks emergency 

responders are deployed and all resources and responses are focused on "life safety" - including 

available power and communications systems. Bridges, roads, power lines, utility companies, 

grocery stores, gas stations, airport runways, and hospitals in the direct path of the disaster 

typically sustain heavy damage and power outages can last for weeks, if not months, impeding 

food, fuel and water delivery. Such heavily impacted areas are secured first (access to which is 

restricted to emergency response personnel) and engine dealers and distributors shared that 

following Hurricane Sandy their resources were solely focused on ensuring that the critical 

generators providing power to hospitals, shelters, aid centers, and other essential resources were 

operational. 

Member company dealers and distributors on the East Coast also shared that during and 

immediately following the hurricane they did not have power, their servers were down, they 

could not recharge their cell phones, and they were left without both internet and telephone 

service. Basically, they were unable to communicate. Under the proposed regulations, operators 

of nonroad equipment used in emergency situations would have to take critical time to establish 

contact with the certificate holder in order to obtain "specific permission" to activate an AECD. 

(See §1039.665(b)(1).) Not only would such a requirement squander precious time and endanger 

lives, it may be in fact impossible, due to the nature of the emergency, to comply with such a 

-2- 
requirement (as was the case with Hurricane Sandy). Moreover, as stated in EMA's initial 

comments, it is not prudent to jeopardize human life or national or public security based on 

questionable ability of the certificate holder to field such calls 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and 

365 days a year. Instead, EPA should adopt a regulation that provides the certificate holder with 

the flexibility to adopt activation methods that assure the availability of such equipment to assist 

in the wide range of emergency situations that may arise and which minimize the likelihood of 

abuse. 

Such flexibility should include the ability for the operator to activate the AECD either by 

entering a preprogrammed emergency sequence of commands found in the owner's manual or by 

some other means of "one time only" use of an inducement override option. Gen sets and pumps 

that generally are intended to operate unattended (without the actual presence of a person) and 

without interruption must have the ability to be manually activated in advance of an impending 

emergency situation in order to prepare and prevent unnecessary loss of life. Following either 

form of initial activation, the operator should be required to provide the certificate holder their 

contact information in order to obtain approval to reset the AECD for use in future emergency 

situations. Further, the regulations should provide the operator a means to either reset the AECD 

without the approval of the certificate holder or allow the certificate holder to activate a longer 

duration AECD in the event a prolonged emergency situation required continued use of the 

engine without interruption from the functioning (or nonfunctioning) of its emission controls. If 

the regulations do not permit "pre-armed" AECDs, the AECD could be rendered useless when 

faced with a situation in which they are most needed. 

Further, EMA member company's dealers and distributors shared that immediately 

following Hurricane Sandy those able to communicate were overwhelmed with calls (up to 

fifteen (15) times more than usual) to repair or service vital emergency equipment as well as with 

requests to rent such life-saving equipment. Basically, if a generator was not at a hospital, it took 

over two (2) weeks, at least in some cases, to get a technician to repair the unit (normal response 

time is typically same day service). The need and demand for continuous emergency power 

generation following Hurricane Sandy and other major disasters cannot be overstated. The 

majority of customers sustaining the direct impact of the disaster were in dire need of emergency 

generators that could be operated twenty-four hours a day seven days a week for thirry (30) or 

more days. Following Hurricane Sandy, such customers included utility companies, hospitals, 

data centers, nursing homes, grocery stores, and gasoline service stations. In fact, a majority of 

the gasoline service stations and outlets in the most heavily affected areas remained closed for 

over a month following Hurricane Sandy. First Response Team shared that their teams were 

forced to secure fuel on their own which they did by traveling long distances to fill fifty (50) 

gallon barrels with fuel and transport it back into the disaster zone in order to permit them to 

continue their critical rescue and recovery operations. 

While DEF is widely available, the number of DEF suppliers and outlets carrying DEF is 

much smalier than both the fuel and food supply base and has a less developed infrastructure. 

Because of the inherent need and high demand for diesel fuel, and the enormous number of 

diesel fueled vehicles in the marketplace, there is an existing, well established and robust diesel 

fuel supply infrastructure in the United States. As such, large supplies of diesel fuel are readily 

available in various storage facilities even, and especially, in remote areas. The same cannot be 

said for DEF. The fact that the First Response Team was forced to secure their own fuel 

-3- 
demonstrates the scarcity of available fluids. In addition, First Response Team indicated that in 

some of the disaster zones, food was not even available for weeks. If food and fuel are not 

available in disaster areas, it is not reasonable to expect that DEF would be available for weeks if 

not months following a major disaster. EMA learned from dealers directly impacted by 

Hurricane Sandy that access to diesel fuel was greatly disrupted following the storm and diesel 

remained largely unavailable for at least two (2) weeks while other fluids (such as DEF) were 

even harder to secure. Moreover, the hurricane destroyed numerous bridges making access, 

transportation, and shipping to affected areas impossible for well over thirty (30) days. 

Customers on the East Coast reported that gen sets ran from October 28 (the day the storm hit) 

through March — a 5 month period, and generators continued to provide power to buildings in 

Manhattan through the end of November. 

As demonstrated above, service personnel are overwhelmed and simply not available in 

the aftermath of a disaster to repair emission related failures on nonroad equipment. 

Accordingly, it is imperative that the AECD override all emission related inducements — not just 

those triggered by a lack of DEF. The engines and equipment used in emergency situations must 

have the ability to operate continuously without shut-down due to any type of impairment to the 

emissions systems including, without limitation, inducements triggered by sensor errors, hose or 

fuel line impairments or other emission systems related failures. It is important to note that 

customers currently have the ability to purchase Tier 2 and Tier 3 engines for certain emergency 

applications. Those engines do not use SCR technology, do not meet stringent Tier 4 standards 

and do not include emission related inducements. Without the adoption of regulations providing 

for the types of AECDs described herein, customers will be less likely to purchase equipment 

incorporating the cleaner Tier 4 engines. EMA's members want to be able to sell the cleaner, 

more environmentally friendly Tier 4 engines. We urge EPA to ensure that Tier 4 engines are a 

viable option by removing a barrier -- the ability of their customers to use those engines in gen 

sets and pumps during an emergency -- which prevents those clean engines from being 

purchased. 

Based on the information gathered following Hurricane Sandy, it is apparent that once 

activated, the AECD for nonroad engine applications other than gen sets and pumps must have 

the ability to remain active for a minimum of 120 hours after activation. As engines typically do 

not have a means to measure calendar time, such time frame should be described in terms of 

actual engine hours of operation. In order to prevent the AECD from remaining active when the 

emergency has concluded, EMA proposes that activation of the AECD trigger a counter that 

would automatically deactivate the AECD after 240 cumulative hours (whether the override was 

active or inactive). Requiring a time/calendar clock as the default shut-off is not feasible as the 

design and implementation expense would be cost-prohibitive. 

Further, AECDs incorporated into gen sets and pumps must have the ability to remain 

active for a period of 30 calendar days after initial activation. Such non-dedicated emergency 

gen sets and pumps will include (i) a time clock for the purpose of recording the time elapsed 

after the AECD is first activated and automatically triggering deactivation of the AECD after 30 

days and (ii) labels specifying that such engines may only be installed in electrical power 

generation or flood control applications. 

~ 
EMA and its members are committed to working with EPA to ensure the finalization and 

successful implementation of the nonroad emergency vehicle rules. If you need additional 

information, please do not hesitate to contact us. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Truck & Engine Manufacturers Association 

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