### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A SS IG N E D O N BR IE FS S E PT E MB E R 1 9, 200 3
BOB BY R. ESSARY v. J OHN R. ESS ARY
Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for G ibson County at Trenton No. 14912-P

& 15117-P

Consolid ated G eorgeR. Ellis, Ch ancellor

No. W2003-00299-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Dece m ber 31, 2003

This case involves a Ch an cery Court’s denial of the Appellant’s Motion to Set Aside J udg ment pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil Procedur e. F or the following rea sons, we a ff ir m th e low e r c ou rt ’s de nia l of thi s mo tio n a ndre ma ndfo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed
A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
Marc us M. Reaves, De nmark, TN, f or Appe llant Stephen L . Hug hes, Milan, TN, for Appellee
OP IN ION
F acts and P roce dural Hi story The pa rties to th i s appea l are the two adult childre n of Ruth N. Essary (“Ruth” or “D ece ased” ). The dispute be tween the parties a rose prior to Ruth’s death when John R. Essary (“A ppellant”) , Ruth’s son , t ransferr ed Ruth’s rea l property to himself pursuant to a powe r of attorney

. Ruth’s othe r son, Bobby R. Essary (“A ppellee” ), subseque ntly filed a pe tition t o set aside this transfer

and appoint a c onservator for Ruth. During these proc eeding s, Appellee soug ht visit ation rig hts wi t h R u t h and obtained suc h rig hts by court orde r on September 22, 2000. Howeve r, Ruth passed awayonly day s later on September 27, 2000. The court be low dismiss ed Appe llee’ s p et i t i on for a conservatorship for Dec ease d and re serve d all other matter s pending an orde r of the c ourt.-2-

On Octobe r 6, 2000, Appellee filed a petition to establish a lost wil l dated May 24, 1996, and c od ic il d a te d A pril 1 6, 19 97 , o f D e c e a se d. I n D e c e mbe r 2 00 0, Ap pe lla nt f ile d a n a ns wer to thi s petition and asserted that a will dated F ebrua ry 10, 1999, naming Appellant t h e ex ec u t o r of Dec ease d’s estate, s h o u l d co ntrol. The trial c ourt consolidated all matters betwee n the parties pu rs ua nt t o Ru le 42 .0 1 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e du re a ndc e rt if ie d th e wi ll c on te st t o the Circuit Court of Gibson County

. Upon a motion for summary judgme nt by Appellee , the Circuit Court found the instrument offe red by

Appellant invalid and rema nded all other pending issues back to the Chance ry Court of Gibson County . A hea

ring for the rema ining issues betwee n the parties was set for November

21, 2002. Thoug h Appellant had sig nificant c ontact with his attorney , was notified by his attorney the hearing w as on Nove mber 21, 2002, a nd spoke wit h his attorney on two occa sions on the day befor e the hea ring , Appellant fa iled to appea r in court for the hea

ring on this date and wa s repr esente d by counsel only . The trial c ourt enter ed a judg ment ag ainst Appellant on the pe nding issues.
I n r e sp on se , A pp e lla nt m ov e d to se t a sid e the Cha nc e ry Cou rt ’s jud g me nt pu rs ua nt to R ule 60.02. I n that motion, Appellant stated that his error was due to his mi stake in writing down Dec ember

21, 2002, as the date for the hearing and “the stress and strain that this matter [had] place d on [Appellant] .” Af

ter holding a hearing on this motion, the t rial court denied Appe llant’s motion and Appe llant timelyappea led to this Court. The following issues a re pr esente d for our

revie w:
I

. Whether the trial c ourt corr ectly denied Appe llant’s motion to s et aside the judgme nt pursuant to Rule 60.02; and I I

. Whether this appea l is frivolous and devoid of merit such that Appe llee should be awa

rded da mag es in the form of attorney ’s fees and costs pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27- 1-122. For the following rea sons, this C ourt aff irms the decision of t he trial c ourt and re mands for f urther pr oc e e din g s. Stand ard of Review
I t is wi thi n th e so un d d isc re tio n of the tr ia l judg e wh e the r t o g rant a mot ion ba se d o n Ru le 60.02 g rounds. For

this reason, our r eview of such a de cision is an abuse o f d i s cretion standard. Underwood v. Zurich Ins. Co. , 8 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d 9 4 , 9 7 (T en n
. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Banks v. D eme nt Constr . Co. Inc. , 8 17 S.W. 2d16 , 1 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) ; Toney v. M ueller Co. , 810 S.W .2d 145, 146 (Tenn. 1991) ). We a re a lso min df

ul that “ [t]he we ig ht, faith a nd c re dit to b e g ive n to a ny wi tne ss’ te sti mon y

lie s in the first i nstance with the t rier of fac t, and the cre dibilit y acc orded will be given gr eat weig ht by the appellate court.” First Nat ’l Bank of Shelby ville v. M ut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. , 732 S.W .2d 278, 280 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 8 7 ) ( ci t i n g Town of Alamo v. Forc um-J ames Co. , 327 S.W .2d 47 (Tenn. 1959) ; Sisk v. Valley Forge Ins. Co. , 640 S.W .2d 844 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982))

.

Rul e 60 .0 2 M ot ion to Se t A sideT h i s Cour t a l s o n ot es t h at D ec embe r 21, 2002, f el l on a Sa t u r day wh en t h e cou r t h ou s e wou l d be c l os ed. 1
-3- Appellant ar g ues the trial c ourt abused its discr etion when it refuse d to set aside the judg ment based on A ppellant’s mistake of f ailing to appea

r i n court on the he aring date. Rule 60.02(1) of the Tenn e s s e e Ru le s o f Ci v il Pr o c e d u r e s tate s th a t “ [o ]n mo ti o n a n d u p o n s u c h te r ms a s ar e ju s t, the court may

relieve a party

or the pa

rty ’s leg al re prese ntative from a final judg ment, order or proce eding for the f

ollowing r easons: (1) mistake, inadvertence , surprise or excusable neg lect . . . .” Te nn. R. Civ. P . 60.02(1). The Tenne ssee Supre me Court has also dec lare d: [T] he mer e neglig ence or i nattention of a party is no gr ound for va cating a judg ment ag ainst him. Carelessne s s i s n o t sy nony mous with ex cusable neg lect. Mer e forg etfulness of a party to an action is not a sufficie nt g round for vacating or

setting a sid e a jud g me nt b y

de fa ult . Pa rt ie s a re no t ju sti fi e d in ne g le c tin g the ir c a se s me re ly be c a us e of

the str e ss o r i mpo rt a nc e of the ir ow n private bu sin e ss a ndsu c h n e g le c t is ordinarily not excusable.
Fo od Lio n, In c . v . W

as h. Cou ntyBe e r B oa rd , 70 0 S.W. 2d89 3, 89 6 ( Te nn . 1 98 5) (q uo tin g 46 Am

. J ur. 2d J ud gm e nts § 7 1 8 (1 9 6 9 ); ci t i n g Dudley v . Stiles , 386 P.2d 342 (Mont. 1963)). Appellant arg ues that his mistake of writing down the wrong day for the hearing in a ddition to the “ str e ss andst rai n” of the tr ia l is su ff ic ie nt c a us e to s e t a sid e the fi na l ju dg me nt a g a ins t hi m pursuant to Rule 60.02. We disag ree . I n this case, Appe llant and his counsel both stated that they wer e in almost daily

contac t in the weeks be fore the trial and that Appellant spoke with this attorney twice on the day

befor e trial. Additionally , in the supporting affida vit to Appellant’s motion to set aside the final judg ment, Appellant admits that his attorney advised him of the c orre ct day for the hearing on N ovember

21, 2002. The fa ct that Appellant wr o t e De ce mber 21, 2002, rathe r than 1 November

21, 2002, and that the proce eding s wer e a strain on him falls fa r short of wa

rra nting the extraordinary

relief of setti ng aside a final j udg ment in this case
. There fore , the trial court did not abu se its dis c re tio n w he n it re fu se d to se t a sid e the fi na l ju dg me nt a g a ins t A pp e lla nt.
Dam ages from Appeal Appellee arg ues that Appe llant’s appea l is frivolous and, therefor e, requests this Court gra nt him the costs of this appeal, including attorne y ’s fe es incurr ed on this appea l. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27 -1 -1 22 (2 00 0) state s: When it appear s to any

revie wing court that the a ppeal f rom any court of r ecor d was frivolous or take n solely

for de lay , the court may , either upon motion of a pa rty or of its o wn m o t ion, awar d just damag es ag ainst the appe llant, which may include, but need not be li mited to, costs, interest on the j udg ment, and expenses incur red by the app e lle e a s a

re su lt o f the app e a l. “An a ppeal is dee med frivolous if it is devoid of merit or if it has no r easona ble cha nce of

succe ss.” W ake fie ld v . Lo ng mi re , 5 4 S

. W

. 3 d 3 0 0 , 3 0 4 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Bursack v . W ilson , 982-4-

S.W. 2d 34 1, 34 5 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 19 98 ); Indus. Dev . Bd. v. Hanc ock , 901 S.W .2d 382, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)).
After our re view of the rec ord , we ag ree with Appellee that this appeal is frivolous. The rec ord is simplydevoid of a ny evidenc e that the t rial court abused its discretion by ref using to g rant Appellant his motion to set aside the judg ment. Considering the admissions made by Appellant and his attorney

conce rning the amount of contact the t wo had and that his attorney had advise d him of the c or re c t tria l date , th is a

pp e a l ha d n o re a so na

ble c ha nc e of

su c c e ss. Th e re fo re , w e re ma ndthi s case to the Chance ry

Court for an a ssessment of costs and attorney ’s fe es in favor of Appe llee under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27- 1-122.
Conclusion
For the f o regoing rea sons, we af

firm the dec ision of the trial court a nd rema nd for f urther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. Costs are judge d ag ainst Appellant, John R . Essary , and h i s s u r e t y, f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE