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43–965 PDF 2008

PARTNERSHIPS IN SECURING CRITICAL 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY 

AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 12, 2008 

Serial No. 110–100 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas, Chairwoman 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

ERIN DASTE, Director & Counsel 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

COLEY O’BRIEN, Minority Senior Counsel 

(II) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security 

and Infrastructure Protection ............................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security and Infrastructure Protection .............................................................. 8 

WITNESSES

Mr. Douglas B. Arnot, Senior Vice President, Games Operations, Chicago 

2016: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

Mr. Jeffrey A. Slotnick, President, Setracon, Inc.: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security 

and Infrastructure Protection: 

Letter to Honorable Michael Chertoff ................................................................ 5 

Letter to Honorable Rick Larsen ........................................................................ 7 

(1) 

PARTNERSHIPS IN SECURING CRITICAL 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

Wednesday, March 12, 2008 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee 

[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, Clarke, and Lungren. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [presiding.] The subcommittee will come to 

order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on partnerships in securing critical infrastructure. Importantly, this testimony will include insight into the planning that goes into securing 

critical infrastructure for a global event like the 2010 Vancouver 

Winter Olympics. 

Let me acknowledge the presence of my friend and colleague 

from New York, Congresswoman Clarke, and indicate that the 

Ranking Member has been detained. However, he will be arriving 

shortly. At that time, we will allow him to give his opening statement. 

Importantly, this is a vital hearing, and I welcome the witnesses. 

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of you for joining 

us again this afternoon. We are here to learn about the preparations that are going into securing critical infrastructure in advance 

of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver. Some might ask why 

this should be a topic to be addressed by this subcommittee. The 

importance to us is that the Vancouver games will be a mere 30 

kilometers from the U.S. border, and planning, preparation and response measures must be in place on our side of the border. 

We are certainly reminded of the attempt by an alleged terrorist 

that walked across the border at the turn of this century. So this 

is an important challenge that we have before us. 

Between February 12, 2010 and February 28, 2010, it is estimated that 1.8 million tickets will be sold for the events and that 

250,000 visitors will attend. Three billion people are expected to 

watch or to view this world event on television. Because the games 

are being held so close to the United States, there will be a heavy 

reliance on U.S. infrastructure. Washington State will provide key 

transportation access and overflow accommodations for the event. 
2 

Seattle-Tacoma International Airport will be used frequently as 

an alternate airport to direct flights into Canada. The games will 

also mean more travel on Washington State highways, passenger 

rail lines, airlines and ferries. Certainly, we welcome this opportunity, but it would be foolish if we did not focus on how do we secure the homeland. That is the responsibility of this committee, 

and I thank Chairman Thompson for his leadership. I thank my 

colleague, Ranking Member Lungren, for working with us for this 

important hearing. 

U.S. resources will be stressed during the games and the need 

for these resources will be exacerbated in the event of some sort 

of attack. For this reason, essential planning is necessary to ensure 

that proper prevention and response procedures are in place on the 

U.S. side of the border. The purpose of this hearing is to begin a 

discussion about the efforts underway to secure the 2010 Vancouver Olympics. 

This hearing is intended to be fact-finding hearing, where we 

learn from people deeply involved in planning for Olympic events 

about what needs to be done and what role DHS should have in 

securing critical infrastructure. This hearing will allow members to 

acquire knowledge from experts about the steps to be taken and 

the questions to be asked. 

In short, this hearing will not complete the subcommittee’s activities on this important topic. It lays the groundwork for activity 

ahead that will attempt to move DHS in the right direction of better coordinating planning and response activities prior to this global event. As we all know, the Olympic Games have been the site 

of terrorist activity dating back over 3 decades, most notably the 

Munich massacre, which occurred in 1972 at the Summer Olympics 

in Germany—an absolutely atrocious and violent event that woke 

the world up in a tragic way. Eleven Israeli athletes and one German police officer lost their lives. 

So we know that this is not impossible. This is not a question 

of the possibility of the possible. This is a question of being prepared for what has already happened and what could happen in 

the future. During the Atlanta Games in 1996, at a late-night concert in the town square of the Olympics, Eric Robert Rudolph 

placed a green military knapsack containing nails and three pipe 

bombs at the crowded event. 

Two people were killed and 111 were injured from the pipe bomb 

explosion. As Rudolph later said, he acted for political reasons. 

This means that this is an open and viable possibility. We do not 

encourage terrorist acts, but we certainly need to be prepared. 

This past weekend, Chinese police allegedly thwarted a planned 

attack on the Beijing Olympics scheduled for this summer by a 

group based in Western China. State-run Xinhua News Agency 

quoted government officials as saying—— 

Although it has not been independently corroborated that these 

individuals were in fact terrorists, this event reinforces that individuals may attempt to make political statements through violence 

at the Olympics in Vancouver. In its role to prevent, protect and 

coordinate responses to disasters such as acts of terrorism, DHS 

has designated a DHS Federal coordinator whose tasks is coordi-
3 

nating the security plans of the DHS components in preparation for 

the games. 

However, some have suggested that this coordinator has not 

played a prominent role in any planning effort. An over-arching 

complaint among stakeholders in the State of Washington is the 

lack of involvement of DHS personnel in assisting with the planning efforts that may be necessary to employ if an event at Vancouver cascades and negatively affects U.S. infrastructure. 

There are several potential problems that have been identified as 

causes for concern as we move forward to 2010: lack of planning 

efforts ahead of any potential terrorist activity; lack of procedures 

in place if Canada shuts down its border; lack of status review regarding mutual aid agreements between the United States and 

Canada—and might I add, if the borders shut down, what is the 

viability of ingress and egress even for escape or some need to provide security to our homeland?; lack of knowledge about the consequences of a port being shut down; and lack of understanding of 

how the interoperability of radios is functioning between stakeholders. That is an important challenge that we have to be concerned about. 

The Governor of the State of Washington created the 2010 Winter Olympic Task Force and it includes a Security Subcommittee 

Task Force. Most of the planning efforts carried out within the 

United States are done by this entity. DHS published a report required by Congress entitled Report to Congress on the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games on June 22, 2007. I would like 

to introduce that report into the record. 

This report required DHS to report on expected increases in border flow, necessary enhancements to border security, estimated 

border crossing wait times, and any need for increased border personnel. The report recognizes that significant progress is necessary 

for the United States to know how the United States prepares for 

a large-scale special event occurring in the immediate vicinity of its 

international borders. 

Key issues discussed in the first section of the report include 

Washington State’s role providing critical transportation access to 

the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games. Key issues discussed in the second section of the report include technical interoperability challenges such as the significant impact that multi-jurisdictional agencies have on frequency and band width used and 

the need for coordination and interoperability both technical and 

operational, and the need to involve Canadian and U.S. frequency 

licensing agencies early in the planning process. 

So this hearing is about planning and preparedness. In a letter 

from members of the Washington State delegation to Secretary 

Chertoff dated December 21, 2007, members inquired about steps 

taken to implement recommendations in the report, as well as 

what sources of funding exist to ensure that implementation is successful. In a response dated February 4, 2008 and surprisingly 

signed by the assistant secretary for legislative affairs, the concerns of members were not addressed. 

The concerns were: the creation of an integrated Federal support 

plan; the creation of a multi-year training and exercise plan and 

schedule; a plan by CBP to meet anticipated impact of increased 
4 

* The information has been retained in committee files. 

border flow at domestic airports, seaports, rail stations and bus terminals, including the expected displacement effect; a plan by CBP 

to ensure border wait times at ports of entry do not exceed the current average peak wait times, including opening of additional lanes 

and augmentation of temporary duty officers; an operational and 

funding plan to establish a brick-and-mortar multi-agency coordination center close to the border; an integrated interoperability 

plan to support the 2010 Olympic mission using the SAFECOM 

interoperability continuum to develop a robust interoperability solution. 

Until these vital issues are addressed by DHS, we cannot rest assured that the 2010 games will be secure. In fact, we cannot rest 

assured that we have a plan that ensures that this homeland of the 

United States is secure, working in cooperation with the Canadian 

government. As this subcommittee continues to investigate the efforts in Washington State, we will eagerly be looking for DHS, including Secretary Chertoff, to show us that it has the security situation well in hand. 

At this time, I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter into 

the record the DHS report to Congress on the 2010 Olympic and 

Paralympic Winter Games, and we will do that again when the 

Ranking Member is present. We will add that as an admitted document, but we will repeat that.* 

I would also ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the 

two letters, the first by members of the Washington State delegation to Secretary Chertoff, inquiring about implementation of the 

previously mentioned report; and the second is the response to the 

Washington delegation by DHS. Again, I am offering to enter this 

into the record by unanimous consent, and we will submit that 

again when Mr. Lungren is present. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
5 
6 
7 
8 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Once again, I would like to thank everyone for 

their participation today. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. As I indicated, Ranking Member Lungren will be in, but at 

this time this committee will stand in recess for the vote, and we 

will return in a moment. I thank the witnesses for their indulgence. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The subcommittee will now come to order. 

It will be my pleasure to now recognize the Ranking Member of 

the subcommittee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, for 

an opening statement for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

I am glad we were able to finally get here. It takes me a little 

bit longer these days. I share your interest and concern over the 

challenges the Nation faces securing our critical infrastructure. Unfortunately, it will be a never-ending struggle due to our country’s 

many critical infrastructure assets scattered from coast to coast. As 

we know the 2010 Winter Olympics will be held in Vancouver, Canada, which creates terrorist opportunities similar to those which 

have been exploited in the past. A world stage, enormous crowds, 

multiple venues and close proximity to the U.S. border presents an 

attractive target to the twisted terrorist mind. 

This is a very serious issue which should be examined in a bipartisan manner. I am sorry the hearing was only noticed less than 

a week ago, and that I did not have warning about it. Hopefully, 

we can have future hearings with Republican input. The Vancouver 

Olympics certainly deserves more attention than we are able to 

provide this afternoon. 

I would hope that we could have the Department of Homeland 

Security, which has the Federal responsibility of protecting our 

critical infrastructure; the Coast Guard, which would play a key 

role securing U.S. ferries, waterways and ports for citizens traveling to and from Vancouver; and I wish we would have reached 
9 

* The information has been retained in committee files. 

** Previously submitted and included in the hearing record. 

out to the 2010 Olympic Committee core group, which is currently 

planning for the Vancouver games. 

As I understand it, in fact yesterday, a tabletop exercise was conducted at Camp Murray, Washington for the 2010 Olympic Security Committee Core Group and liaison agencies from Federal, 

State and local security partners. This first tabletop exercise is attempting to identify gaps in the initial standard operating procedures, future training goals, communications and coordination center needs. 

As I understand it, DHS Federal Coordinator Mark Beatty also 

participated. I hope that the chairwoman would agree we need to 

examine the issue in a more comprehensive fashion. The Vancouver 

Olympic threat deserves no less than our best congressional bipartisan oversight efforts. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses 

we have here today. 

Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We wanted to resubmit documents that we 

ask unanimous consent to submit into the record. That would be 

the report to Congress on the 2010 Olympic Winter Games by the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. I ask unanimous consent. 

With no objection, it will be submitted into the record.* Then two 

letters,** one dated December 21, 2007 to Michael Chertoff by the 

Washington State delegation, and one dated February 4, 2008, the 

response of the Department of Homeland Security to the Washington delegation from the Homeland Security Department. We ask 

unanimous consent. Without objection, they will be submitted. 

Let me indicate to Mr. Lungren that we look forward to building 

on your comments. I think they are important comments on expanding this research. Of course, we noticed the hearing in the appropriate time, and we will look forward to the minority staff in future hearings. Mr. Lungren is correct that there is a top-off going 

which I applaud, frankly, because that will give us an opportunity 

in our future hearings to ensure that we have representatives engaged in that top-off, and again being able to ask them the hard 

questions about coordination. 

So we are grateful to the witnesses that are here today. That will 

simply lay the groundwork for our future hearings, because with 

the Olympics in 2010, we certainly have our work cut out for us, 

and certainly a period of time in which we must move forward on 

these issues. 

With that in mind, let me remind any other Members of the subcommittee that under the committee rules, opening statements 

may be submitted for the record. 

I now welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first witness, Mr. 

Doug Arnot, is senior vice president, games operations, Chicago 

2016. Mr. Arnot served as security lead for the Salt Lake Olympic 

Games, overseeing all games operations. He is presently developing 

the security plan for Chicago’s bid for the 2016 games. 

Our second witness, Mr. Jeff Slotnick, is a security industry consultant with more than 26 years of experience in providing professional development and training to security, law enforcement, mili-
10 

tary personnel, and conducting comprehensive security risk assessments. Mr. Slotnick is a member of the Washington State 

governnor’s Homeland Security Council on the Infrastructure Protection Subcomittee, and the Security Subcommittee Task Force of 

the 2010 Winter Olympic Task Force. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his statement 

for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Arnot. Gentlemen, I would offer 

to say that your testimony is in fact timely, as we indicated in the 

backdrop of operational planning and top-off activities going on in 

the region. So we thank you for your presence here today. 

Mr. Arnot. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS B. ARNOT, SENIOR VICE 

PRESIDENT, GAMES OPERATIONS, CHICAGO 2016 

Mr. ARNOT. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman and the 

honorable Member from California. I appreciate the opportunity to 

address this subcommittee. I genuinely appreciate the study that 

each of you has apparently given to this matter. It is clear that you 

have a significant understanding of the challenges that face the securing of an Olympic games, the infrastructure around it, and the 

areas around it. 

Very briefly, the Department of Homeland Security report began 

to capture the magnitude and complexity of the games. Not to go 

too deep into all of the statistics, but about 7,000 athletes and officials, 80 countries, 1.8 million tickets, and there will be about 

500,000 general spectators. The media will be about 10,000. The 

media sub-center and the main international broadcast center for 

the games will be about the size of CNN and 30 Rock combined. 

There are about 25,000 volunteers that will work at the games. 

The athletes’ village, just for your little statistic of the day, will 

probably serve somewhere in the neighborhood of about 250,000 

meals, all for the various varieties of diets for the athletes during 

the games. 

The games, in short, whether summer or winter, are really the 

largest peacetime events in the world. The size and complexity are 

matched only by the worldwide attention and scrutiny. As each of 

you has noted, the games are an attractive target and need to be 

protected as such. 

The target is actually growing larger. With each consecutive 

games, you not only now have the games venues, but what is built 

around the games—the live sites, the entertainment centers, the 

sponsor hospitality. So the number of ticketed spectators ends up 

being about 25 percent of the people who will actually participate 

in games activities. 

The security period itself for the games extends well beyond the 

period of the 16 days of the games. The security period is generally 

around 60 days, and I would urge us all to recognize that the security period includes not only the Olympic Winter Games, but the 

Paralympic Winter Games. 

No post-community can handle the security of the games alone. 

It needs to be supplemented significantly, and the public safety 

forces in the region will need the help obviously in Canada of significant Federal support, as has been the case in the United States. 
11 

A clear understanding of the event itself is crucial to being able 

to protect the event. It needs to be provided by knowledgeable and 

experienced games experts and is essential to the security planning 

and understanding of what resources each agency can bring to the 

games. Yet I would urge also that we need to understand there 

needs to be a balance struck between the spirit and excitement of 

the games, and the protective needs of the games, between the 

image, that is, and the security needs. Only with a comprehensive 

understanding of the games and exhaustive preparation is this possible. 

I might point out quickly a couple of things which can assist in 

preparation for the games. We can reduce the burden in Washington and in Oregon with appropriate interaction from more distant ports of entry and the communication back and forth between 

those ports of entry and the organizing committee, as well as the 

forces in the United States. We should also understand that travel 

profiles can be established and border demand anticipated. That 

will help a great deal. That information can again be developed 

with the VANOC group. 

Public information programs detailing what Olympic travelers 

can expect and how they can facilitate their own cross-border travel 

must be balanced with the threat assessments and properly adjusted security policies and procedures. There are also other concepts—express lanes, off-hours logistics and freight operations— 

that will help in the efficacy of the operation. 

Finally, I would like to note that throughout the world, Olympic 

athletes and officials and the media that follow them, and the 

many national team officials that support them, enjoy a status at 

international borders in other countries that is the near-equivalent 

of international diplomats. As the United States of America has responded to terrorist threats, our reputation as a host for travel for 

international sport has deteriorated. 

Re-engaging operations like the 24-hour rapid response effort of 

the United States State Department and INS that was developed 

for the Salt Lake Olympics will help us to monitor the travel of the 

athletes and key officials, and ensure them an appropriate travel 

and ease of transit from the United States ports of entry all the 

way to the Vancouver Games. 

Thank you very much. I stand ready for whatever questions you 

might have. 

[The statement of Mr. Arnot follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS B. ARNOT

MARCH 12, 2008 

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Report to Congress on the 2010 

Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games fairly represents some of the baseline statistics that begin to outline the challenge of securing the events for 2010. As one of 

the world’s ‘‘super events’’ the Olympic Winter Games are an extraordinary organization and execution challenge. 

The number of athletes, officials, media, broadcasters, spectators listed in the 

DHS report are part of the picture. The Games will be spread over a distance of 

120 kilometers stretching from Vancouver and Richmond to Whistler Mountain. 

There will be four venue clusters and two Athlete Villages. Some of these areas, particularly the more remote, are served by limited public safety resources. So, the capability of calling on existing ‘‘reserves’’ or off-duty personnel is not an option, and 

the force must be supplemented. As at all Winter Games the rugged terrain around 
12 

the mountain venues calls for special attention and the winter weather can be particularly harsh on personnel, equipment and infrastructure. 

The Olympic Games attract the attention of the world as no other event. Any incident at an Olympics is felt around the world. The Games have been attacked twice, 

and should be protected as an attractive target. That target grows larger with each 

consecutive Games as they evolve beyond the sports venues into many major public 

celebrations, attracting an event population that is several multiples of the number 

of ticketed spectators and event support personnel. 

The security period of the Games, with some waves of increasing and decreasing 

activity is about 60 days. The number of places that must be secured is well beyond 

the obvious competition and key non-competition venues. Live sites, medal ceremonies, concerts, sponsor events, and much more, expand the event and the job of 

securing the event. 

Of course, all of the Games-related activity is added to the normal activity of the 

host city/region and so, as noted, the resources needed to secure the host city/region 

grows well beyond the local resources regularly available for public safety. Thus, I 

am sure that Canada is planning significant Federal support such as that which 

was provided and absolutely necessary for the 2002 Olympic and Paralympic Winter 

Games. 

Arguably the most critical aspect of securing the Games is adopting a command 

and control structure that will serve the Games in planning and preparation as well 

as in execution of the plan. In Games prior to Salt Lake, planning by public safety 

agencies for Games Security tended to exclude a major player, the event itself. Yet, 

a clear understanding of the event, provided by knowledgeable and experienced 

Games experts, is essential to Security planning and an understanding of what resources each agency and organization can provide to the plan. 

Early planning for Salt Lake City was similarly isolated from the event. Inexperienced local planners worked in an information vacuum. But, over time, an extraordinary new model was developed. It was a complex private, public partnership of 

local, State and Federal agencies, the United States Military and the Organizing 

Committee that structured a plan that was strong enough that it required little 

modification after 9/11. It was the seemingly endless integration work sessions, with 

key agencies and the Organizing Committee at the table, that developed the appreciation and understanding of roles, responsibilities, resources and procedures for the 

routine, as well as the exceptional, that made the security operation at the 2002 

Olympic Winter Games a success. A similar approach is suggested for planning the 

U.S. operations for 2010. 

One apparent challenge for 2010 is to secure the Northwest border States without 

unduly disrupting the experience of Olympic visitors or the lives and commerce of 

the region. To achieve this, the security force must develop a comprehensive understanding of the event itself with which, even at a distance, it will be interacting 

daily. As fundamental as it may seem, an understanding and trust must be developed in order for each agency and organization to develop an appreciation for the 

task and challenge of the others so that a balanced, team plan can be developed. 

The DHS report logically focuses on the Washington, Idaho and Montana borders. 

But, the burden at those points can be reduced with appropriate interaction with 

more distant ports of entry in other parts of the United States of America. An Olympic Travel plan such as that developed for Salt Lake should be considered. Working 

with the Organizing Committee, information about athletes, media, broadcasters, 

and officials was developed and shared with multiple ports of entry into the United 

States of America. The same was done for sports and broadcast equipment that is 

critical to the Games. There was also the appointment of intermediate airports for 

private aircraft inspection, again reducing the burden on the ‘‘Olympic Zone’’. This 

might be considered for air traffic in traveling north as well as south. 

Working with the Vancouver Olympic Organizing Committee, a detailed understanding of event schedules and crowds should be developed. Travel (USA Re-entry) 

profiles need to be studied and border-demand anticipated. Public information programs detailing what Olympic Travelers can expect and how they can facilitate 

their own cross-border travel must be balanced with threat assessments and properly adjusted search policies and procedures. The operation will need well-trained 

personnel supported by information and communication. It is suggested that concepts such as express lanes, and off-hours logistics and freight operations may reduce the peak hour burdens and add to search efficacy. The Winter Games present 

unique challenges posed by terrain, and weather. This should be accounted for in 

all planning, especially for a State-side response to an exceptional incident in Canada that could prompt an unanticipated early, mass departure from the event. 

Throughout the world, Olympic athletes and officials, the media that follow them 

and the many national and team officials that support them enjoy a status at inter-
13 

national borders that is the near equivalent of international diplomats. As the 

United States of America has responded to terrorist threats, our reputation as a 

host or travel hub for international sport has deteriorated. By re-enaging operations 

like the 24-hour Rapid Response effort of the U.S. State Department and INS (developed for the Salt Lake Olympics) we can monitor the travel of athletes and key 

officials and ensure them an appropriate welcome and ease of transit from a U.S. 

port of entry all the way to the Vancouver Games. 

These practices helped the United States of America to avoid what could have 

been very damaging international press reports of athletes or officials in holding 

cells waiting resolution of entry status. To the contrary, the hard work on entry procedures set the tone for a Salt Lake Games that many hailed as the best Winter 

Olympics ever. With information, communication and cooperation we can facilitate 

travel to the 2010 Olympic Winter Games without jeopardizing our national security. As the United States of America seeks the honor of hosting the world in 2016 

in Chicago, we can enhance our place among sport-loving nations of the world. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the witness for his testimony. 

The next witness, thank you very much. You are recognized for 

5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY A. SLOTNICK, PRESIDENT, 

SETRACON, INC. 

Mr. SLOTNICK. Madam Chairwoman, and the gentleman from 

California, I stand here today to inform you of my impression of security, critical infrastructure, preparedness and response capabilities in preparation for the 2009 World Fire and Police Games, 2010 

Olympics and 2010 Paralympics. Based on my experience, I can seriously tell you we are not prepared. 

The safety and security of the United States is at risk if we do 

not take direct action. There are tasks identified by DHS in their 

congressional report, some of which have not been completed, and 

11 additional tasks that must be accomplished to ensure a safe and 

successful event. 

The DHS report to Congress on the games identifies gaps which 

must be addressed prior to the Olympics. It is my impression that 

precious little has been accomplished in the way of Federal preparation and support, although tremendous strides have been made 

on a State level with minimal funding. The World Fire and Police 

Games commence in 14 short months. The DHS Special Events 

Working Group promised a comprehensive risk, threat and vulnerability assessment. This essential planning document has not yet 

been prepared. 

The Pacific Northwest has a higher threat of disaster. We are 

susceptible to a variety of potential catastrophic incidents, including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, flooding, terrorism, epidemics 

and fires. These are exacerbated by the geographic constraints of 

the population centers, bordered by the Pacific Ocean on the west 

and the Cascade Mountain range on the east. 

In its current status, the 2010 Olympics has been federally designated as a special event. In past year, the Academy Awards, 

Superbowls, and 2002 Winter Games were given the higher designation of national special security events. Many of these were 

only 2 to 4 hours in duration. The 2010 Olympics will be conducted 

over 14 days and seen by 3 billion viewers, seconded only by the 

Summer Olympics. 

The Pacific Northwest has significant private sector assets—Boeing, Microsoft, Starbucks and Washington Mutual are national or 

global in nature and possess significant intelligence assets. In 
14 

many cases, individuals in these organizations have higher security 

clearances than law enforcement officials. It would be unfortunate 

not to capitalize on these assets through the framework established 

by the Northwest Warning and Response Network. 

These companies and others have significant physical assets that 

will be impacted by Olympic traffic. They must move supplies, materials and personnel in support of business operations. The impacts will be significant in the case of a manmade or natural disaster. 

A robust information intelligence-sharing process can prevent an 

attack by discovery in the early planning stages. This is best accomplished through a process which includes vetted public and private professionals in all critical infrastructure sectors. Additionally, 

our intelligence-sharing abilities with our Canadian partners needs 

to be enhanced and tested. 

Recent flooding in Lewis County closed down all lanes of Interstate 5 for 4 days. This closure had an estimated economic impact 

of $5.8 million per day. From this, we can only extrapolate what 

the financial impact might be of a major event. The best way to 

limit significant expense is to rapidly respond, mitigate and recover 

from an emergency. Costs become exponential each day an emergency continues. To prevent this, we must enhance the State’s capabilities developed through General Lowenberg’s excellent efforts. 

The DHS report does not address border issues for emergency operations. It is imperative that medical, fire and police resources 

have prearranged agreements for expedited border crossings in 

both directions. In regards to nurses, doctors, and medical personnel, there are union issues which must be considered. Although 

identified in the congressional report, it is not apparent what 

progress has been made at the Federal level to enhance the interface between the United States and Canadian Customs authorities. 

I have noted 11 areas for improvement. We should upgrade the 

2010 Olympics and associated games to a national security event; 

provide Federal support for funding, training and exercise of 

NWWARN; permit participation in intelligence and information 

process of professionals; fund exercises to support greater interoperability of intelligence assets between Washington Fusion Center and Canadian authorities; provide funding for training of private security officers and police officers in surveillance detection; 

fund exercising of the Pacific Northwest Emergency Mutual Aid 

agreements; complete the SEWG threat and vulnerability assessment; fund tabletop exercises which include participation from all 

sectors from both sides of the border; plan for border crossings during emergency situations; develop prearranged border-crossing 

agreements for medical and fire personnel; and develop protocols 

for expediting mass transit through the border. 

The return on investment for this funding and support is the development of best practices which will directly impact the safety 

and security of the Pacific Northwest and 2010 Olympics. The lessons learned will have national relevance as other States and event 

planners can benefit from our experiences and best practices. 

Dealing with future catastrophes is not easy. It requires time 

and commitment. Commitment in the Federal Government means 

establishing priorities for action through funding. Only when this 
15 

is seen, will collaborative plans have a reasonable chance of successful implementation. PNWER is a unique organization, statutorily viable in several northwest States and the Canadian provinces. It has a proven track record through its Center for Regional 

Disaster Resilience to expedite these processes and significantly 

impact preparedness through its ability to develop collaborative solutions between the public and private sectors. 

Pending your questions, this concludes my testimony. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Slotnick follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEFFREY A. SLOTNICK

MARCH 12, 2008 

Ms. Chairwoman and Members of the subcommittee, first and foremost I want to 

thank you for this opportunity you have provided me as a citizen of the United 

States of America to impact the safety and security of our great Nation and specifically the Pacific Northwest. 

You have seen the biography I provided so I will not take time with my professional bona fides. I do have a brief story to recount: In 1985 while I was still serving 

in active military service I was returning from a 5-year overseas tour in Europe 

where I experienced terrorism first-hand through the activities of the Bader Mein 

Hoff Gang, the Italian Red Brigade, the 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in 

Beirut, and the day I will never forget as I watched in June 1985 the hijacking of 

TWA Flight 847 in which a 23-year-old U.S. Navy diver, Robert Dean Stethem, of 

Waldorf, MD, was shot and dumped on the tarmac of Beirut International Airport. 

These events fundamentally changed my outlook on the world and put me on a 

course that has led to me speaking with you today. 

You may ask why do I invoke these memories—well in 1985 as I returned to the 

United States through Kennedy International Airport I looked around and said to 

myself, We are not ready, doesn’t anybody watch the news? I retired from military 

service late in 1992 and watched in horror as the World Trade Center was destroyed 

in 2001. 

I stand here today to inform you of my impression of security, critical infrastructure preparedness, and the response capabilities of the Pacific Northwest in preparation for the 2009 World Fire and Police Games, 2010 Olympics, and 2010 ParaOlympics and based on my experience I can seriously tell you that we are not prepared. 

The safety and security of the 2010 Olympics and the United States is at risk if 

we do not take direct action. There are tasks that were identified by DHS in their 

congressional report, some of which have not been completed, and eleven additional 

tasks I will identify that must be accomplished to insure a safe and successful 

event. 

I have lived in the Pacific Northwest for almost 22 years and during that time 

I have served on numerous Homeland Security-related committees, personally conducted Risk, Threat, and Vulnerability Assessments for two counties, Transit Facilities, water and sewer utilities, private corporate facilities, and educational facilities. 

Additionally, I have participated as a planner and evaluator for several Blue Cascades Critical Infrastructure Interdependency Exercises held by the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER). Additionally, I have been involved in writing initiatives and breaking down barriers in support of public/private partnerships in information sharing and intelligence. Most recently I was an active participant in the 

recent floods in Lewis County which closed down Interstate 5 for a period of several 

days. 

I am an industry professional who has a ground-up view and I wish to share that 

with you today. I am going to provide information on several critical areas, they are: 

• Public/Private Interoperability Issues; 

• Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Regional Disaster Resilience; 

• Expedited Border Crossing Issues. 

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Report to Congress on the 2010 

Olympic and Para-Olympic Winter Games identifies many gaps and shortfalls which 

must be addressed prior to the 2010 Olympics. As I have experienced in local meetings and read in various Federal documents precious little has been accomplished 

in the way of Federal preparation and support although tremendous strides have 

been made on a State level with minimal funding. 
16 

The 2009 World Fire and Police Games will be held also in Vancouver, and provide an opportunity for us to plan and test our preparedness for the Olympics. 

The World Fire and Police Games which commence in 14 short months and will 

bring athletes, spectators, and support staff from all over the world to the Pacific 

Northwest. 

As we speak winter Olympic teams are already arriving in the Northwest for 

practice and preparation. 

To this end the DHS Special Events Work Group (SEWG) promised to provide a 

comprehensive risk, threat and vulnerability assessment. This is a critical document 

as security planning and decisions are based in risk and risk is calculated from 

threat. This essential planning document has not yet been prepared. 

Different from other Olympic Events the Pacific Northwest has a considerably 

higher threat of disaster. We are susceptible to a variety of potential catastrophic 

incidents (indeed, these are more than potential—most have occurred in the recent 

past): Including earthquakes; volcanic eruptions with a lahar flow possibility; flooding; hurricane-force windstorms; domestic and foreign terrorism; epidemics; 

tsunamis; fires; hazardous materials disaster; landslides; and tornadoes. These 

events—and the problems associated with any response to them—are exacerbated 

by the geologic and geographic constraints of the main population centers (Seattle, 

Tacoma, Portland, Vancouver) which are bordered by the Pacific Ocean on the west 

and the Cascade Mountain Range on the east. These geographic features create 

what has become known as the I–5 corridor. 

In its current status the 2010 Olympics has been federally designated a ‘‘Special 

Event’’. In past years the Academy Awards, Super Bowls 2002 to 2008, and 2002 

Winter Olympics were given the higher designation of ‘‘National Special Security 

Events’’. Many of these events were only 2 to 4 hours in duration. The 2010 Olympics will last for 14 days and be seen by over 3 billion viewers seconded only by 

the Summer Olympics. 

Given the above information I ask that you consider upgrading the designation 

of this event to ‘‘National Special Security Event’’. 

PUBLIC/PRIVATE INFORMATION SHARING

The Pacific Northwest has significant private sector assets. Companies like Boeing, Microsoft, Starbucks, and Washington Mutual are national or global in nature 

and possess significant intelligence assets for support of their operations. In many 

cases individuals in these organizations have higher security clearances than many 

law enforcement officials. 

It would be unfortunate not to capitalize on these assets in support of the 2010 

Olympics through the framework established by the Northwest Warning and Response Network NWWARN. 

The best way to prevent an attack is by discovering it in the early planning 

stages. This can best be accomplished through a robust Information and Intelligence 

Sharing process for vetted professionals in all critical infrastructure sectors, both 

public and private. 

Sharing intelligence and warning information with Canada will be key in preventing any attack during the 2010 Olympics. In consideration of our cross-border 

Canadian partners this ability needs to be enhanced and tested. 

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PREPAREDNESS AND REGIONAL DISASTER RESILIENCE

I was recently involved in flooding of Lewis County Washington which closed all 

four lanes of Interstate 5 for 4 days, 3 to 7 December 2007 it is estimated this 4- 

day closure had a regional economic impact of $5.8 million per day. 

In the grand scheme of things this was a relatively minor event. From this, we 

can only imagine what impact a major event would have on the Pacific Northwest 

Economy. 

The best way to prevent significant expense is the ability to rapidly respond, mitigate, and recover from an emergency event. Costs rapidly become exponential each 

day that an emergency event continues. 

To prevent this we must enhance the States’ capacities developed through General 

Lowenbergs’ excellent efforts and conduct federally-supported and -funded cross-border, multi-jurisdictional, disaster resilience preparedness exercises that consider 

critical infrastructure interdependencies which could negatively impact the Games, 

and the border. 

EXPEDITED BORDER CROSSING

At present there are considerable issues pertaining to cross-border movement of 

people and goods related to the various games. The DHS report prepared for the 
17 

2010 Olympics identified numerous significant issues with border crossing, the report only considers the anticipated increases in traffic due to the games. The report 

does not address Emergency Operations in case of a manmade or natural disaster. 

It is imperative that Medical, Fire, and Police resources have pre-arranged agreements for expedited border crossings in both directions should their support be required during the response phase of a critical incident. In regard to nurses, doctors, 

and medical personnel there are union issues which must be considered and resolved. 

I have several concerns for non-emergency operations during the Olympics including developing protocols for the movement of people and goods at the border. To the 

best of my knowledge not enough effort is being made at the Federal level to develop this interface between the Customs and Border Patrol, and the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA). 

Ideally, it is important to develop protocols for mass transit carriers such as buses 

and high-speed ferries. 

To further cut down on Border delays it would be reasonable to consider a Parkand-Ride type of arrangement with shuttle busses where the benefit is pre-clearance 

of passengers to expedite border crossing during the games. 

Reduced passenger car traffic is very important to the Vancouver Olympic Committee (VANOC) as no private cars will be allowed on the road to Whistler, not to 

mention emergency response and potential congestion issues. Identified gaps need 

to be federally addressed, especially on our side of the border, with Critical Infrastructure owners and operators, Mass Transit carriers, and border officials. 

ELEVEN AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

General 

• Upgrade the 2010 Olympics and associated games to a National Special Security Event. 

Information Sharing 

• Provide Federal Support for funding, training, and exercises for NWWARN. 

• Permit participation of vetted professionals through NWWARN in all critical infrastructure sectors both public and private. 

• Include participation by our Canadian partners in information and intelligence 

sharing. 

• Fund exercises to support greater interoperability of intelligence assets between 

the Washington Fusion Center WAJAC and Canadian Authorities. 

• Provide training for private security officers and street level police officers in 

Surveillance Detection and Indicators of Deception. 

Critical Infrastructure 

• Fund exercising the mutual aid agreements with (PNEMA) which have not been 

tested. 

• Complete the SEWG Risk, Threat, and Vulnerability Assessment. 

• Fund the development of Table Top Exercises which include participation from 

impacted sectors specifically owners and operators of critical infrastructure, 

emergency managers, PNEMA, fire, and police from both sides of the border. 

Expedited Border Crossing 

• Consider and plan for Border Crossings during emergency situations. 

• Develop pre-arranged border crossing agreements (both ways) for Medical, Fire, 

and Police personnel. 

• Develop protocols for expediting Mass Transit through the border by expedited 

manifests of passenger information. 

The return on investment for this funding and support is the development of best 

practices which will directly impact the safety and security of the Pacific Northwest 

and 2010 Olympics. The lessons learned will have national capacity as other States 

and event planners can benefit from our experiences and best practices. 

CLOSING

Given the current world situation and based on my experience I feel the 2010 

Olympics has strong potential to be a global target and at a minimum has a higherthan-normal possibility for natural disaster. 

In this light I remind you of the 1972 Olympics where the terrorist target was 

not only twelve Israelis, but the millions of innocent viewers worldwide who had terrorism brought right into their living rooms as they watched a terrorist event unfold 

on national television. 
18 

The way forward: Dealing with future catastrophes is not easy. It requires time 

and commitment. Commitment in Federal Government means establishing priorities 

for action through funding. Only when this is seen will collaborative plans have a 

reasonable chance of successful implementation. 

The Pacific Northwest Economic Region, of which I am a part, is a unique organization that is statutorily viable in several Northwest States and the Canadian Provinces. 

PNWER has a proven track record through its Center for Regional Disaster Resilience to expedite these processes and significantly impact preparedness through it 

ability to develop collaborative solutions between the Public and Private Sectors. 

Through the dedicated efforts of General Lowenberg and his staff, the Pacific 

Northwest economic region, and an involved community the framework for successful completion of these actions exists in the Pacific Northwest. 

This concludes my testimony. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank both of the witnesses for their 

insightful testimony. I will begin the questioning by yielding myself 

5 minutes. 

May I ask both Mr. Arnot and Mr. Slotnick, based upon your expertise in security, and specifically security for the Olympics, I 

want you both to consider these thoughts. In past Olympics, what 

has the role of security been in advance of and during the games’ 

preparation? As part of those Olympics, what has been the role of 

the Federal Government? That is, how has it been involved in the 

process? What should be the role of the Department of Homeland 

Security and the rest of the Federal Government be doing in preparation for the Vancouver Olympics? Is DHS and the rest of the Federal Government providing the necessary support? 

I will start with Mr. Arnot. Mr. Slotnick, I do want you to answer the question in the context of your remarks which say we are 

not prepared. 

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Mr. Arnot. 

Mr. ARNOT. Well, Madam Chairwoman, I think the key role of 

the Federal Government is important to address. I think overall, 

what we are looking at and what was very successful finally in Salt 

Lake City was clearly outlining roles and responsibilities for the 

specific Federal agencies. 

The key lead agency should be the local agency. In the case of 

Utah, it was the Utah State Police. In Chicago, should we be fortunate enough to host the games, it would be the Chicago Police Department. They need to take the lead in the unified command 

structure, but the Federal agencies can all play a very specific role. 

Secret Service played a very important role in terms of developing 

the infrastructure protection plan, particularly as it related to the 

venues themselves. The Federal Bureau of Investigation played key 

roles in terms of intelligence, hostage rescue, and response to terrorist activities. 

I could go on with each one of the elements of the command, each 

one of the agencies that was involved. You know well what the responsibilities are, but clearly what was successful for us in Salt 

Lake City was to understand the expertise of each one of the agencies and apply it appropriately to the command structure. 

In the early stages, in advance of the games, the key role of the 

Federal Government actually was to assist in the development of 

the training for all of the agencies that were involved and to sup-
19 

port financially the training of the local agencies. No local agency, 

as I said in my testimony, is prepared to handle the games alone. 

They need to be supplemented by the Federal agencies, and they 

need obviously of course to be able to handle the normal public 

safety responsibilities of their jurisdiction during the games time. 

To handle both that and the games is simply too much for them. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The Department of Homeland Security did not 

exist. 

Mr. ARNOT. That is correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So, was there a coordinating lead agency from 

the U.S. Government. 

Mr. ARNOT. From the U.S. Government, the lead agency was the 

United States Secret Service. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. They coordinated with the lead law enforcement on the ground? 

Mr. ARNOT. They did. They coordinated directly with the Utah 

Public Safety Command, but the Public Safety Command, importantly, included all of the Federal agencies, as well as all of the 

State and local agencies. It compelled everybody, quite frankly, to 

sit down in the same room and work through together what the details of planning would be, what the communication protocols 

would be, and all of the myriad of details for each one of the 

venues, all of the surrounding area, and everything, quite frankly, 

that dealt with it, from the air above to the ground beneath us. It 

obviously involved the U.S. military significantly, too. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What do you think now with the Department 

of Homeland Security in place, with all of its resources, and I imagine tentacles in a lot of emergency preparedness and the whole 

question of providing equipment so there is interoperability, what 

role would you see for the Department of Homeland Security? 

Mr. ARNOT. I would see the Department of Homeland Security 

taking a role of coordination of the Federal agencies, and understanding again what the expertise of each one of those agencies is, 

and being able to oversee each of those agencies in handing their 

roles and their areas of expertise. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I guess not speaking directly as to what is 

going on in Vancouver and Washington State, did you have enough 

resources during your time, your tenure for the Olympics, from the 

Federal Government? Was there sufficient support? 

Mr. ARNOT. We did in Salt Lake City. It was late, perhaps, in 

coming, but when it did come, it was adequate. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank you for your polite demeanor in 

that it was adequate. We thank you for giving us that assessment. 

Thank you, Mr. Arnot. 

Mr. Slotnick. 

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. 

As far as what should DHS be doing, I think I can summarize 

it by saying providing expertise, funding and being a good community partner. I think those are things that are very important. 

As I stated, we are talking about the 2010 Olympics, but in reality what we are speaking about is the 2009 World Fire and Police 

Games that give us an excellent opportunity to prepare and exercise in preparation for the games. In many cases, as far as partici-
20 

pants, there is a larger attendance from the 2009 World Fire and 

Police Games than there are for the Olympics. 

So it would be appropriate to have that funding and have that 

funding up front so that what we are able to do is involve the community, get everybody working together so that we have this adequate response. The other thing that I see is that since the 2010 

Olympics is not on U.S. soil, it has been given a lesser designation. 

As Mr. Arnot said, the Utah Olympics was designated a lead agency of the U.S. Secret Service. The U.S. Secret Service only takes 

the lead if it is designated as a United States special event. 

That is why I would encourage that we change that designation 

to a special event, because we do have significant impact within 

the continental United States as an alternate hub, an arrival 

points, teams coming into practice in the Pacific Northwest before 

the games, and the impact of the Americans that will be attending 

the Olympics. Our understanding is that 40 percent of the 

attendees at the 2010 games will be Americans, and most of those 

are expected to come through the port of Seatac into Vancouver. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. I will have some follow-up questions, but my time has expired. 

I am now pleased to yield to the distinguished gentleman for 5 

minutes for questioning, Mr. Lungren, the Ranking Member. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Arnot, you talked about the organizational model developed 

for the Salt Lake City Olympics involving the private-public partnerships, local, State, Federal, U.S. military, Olympic Organizing 

Committee. Are you knowledgeable about whether or not that is 

the model that is being used by the Washington State Olympics Security Committee? 

Mr. ARNOT. I don’t have specific knowledge of that, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Do you, Mr. Slotnick? 

Mr. SLOTNICK. I do know that in Washington State, we are using 

an ICS-based model. That is the model for all responses within 

Washington State, simply because of our hazard profile, being on 

the cusp of a 9.0 earthquake, we adhere to ICS very carefully. I 

can’t imagine that we would use anything but unified command for 

that. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Slotnick, you talked about some union issues 

involving doctors, nurses and other medical personnel that might 

somehow interfere with them rendering assistance. Can you tell me 

what you mean by that? 

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes. There are some union agreements within 

Canada that prevent our people from actually going across the border and responding. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I see. So it is the cross-border, not any—— 

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes, it is not a U.S. union issue, but it is an issue 

that needs to be addressed and resolved. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. You mention in your testimony about your 

background and how we were all shocked at what happened at the 

Olympics in Munich—— 

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN [continuing]. And that sort of thing. Obviously, we 

have a heightened concern for terrorism today, coming in our own 

borders. 
21 

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. That has heightened the interest of not only this 

committee, but the entire Congress and the government itself. 

What I am trying to find out is the gravamen of your complaint 

about what is occurring now. Is it that it is not happening fast 

enough? You are afraid it is not going to happen? Or is it because 

there has not been a designation of the 2010 Olympics as a national special security event that is at the core of your concern? 

Mr. SLOTNICK. I think it is a bit of all of the above, sir. My personal perception is that things are not moving fast enough. We are 

14 months away from the 2009 World Fire and Police Games. We 

have adequate time with the proper Federal support to be able to 

respond adequately and properly for the 2010 Olympics. But it just 

doesn’t seem to have the impetus behind it that it should. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Let me ask this about, when we talk about risk, 

we talk about threat, we talk about vulnerability, we talk about 

consequence. Threat is primarily, in my judgment, a function of us 

gathering, analyzing and disseminating intelligence, and understanding what the bad guys are looking at. 

Are you satisfied at this point in time with the level of intelligence sharing from the Federal Government to State and local authorities with respect to either or both of the 2010 Olympics or the 

earlier games, the Police and Fire that you have been referring to? 

Mr. SLOTNICK. At this point, to the best of my knowledge, sir, the 

Security Working Group has not produced their risk, threat and 

vulnerability assessment that would give that threat and identify 

that threat specifically for the Olympics. The other thing, as I identified, it is very important that we incorporate private sector in 

this. Private sector has significant assets and is going to be directly 

impacted by any event that occurs as a result of the Olympics, 

whether it is something that is caused by a criminal act, or whether it is something that happens as a result of natural disaster. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Let me ask you this, it has been my impression 

that the Northwest, particularly the State of Washington, from a 

standpoint of coordination of local, regional and State law enforcement and other first responders, are on what I would call the forefront of coordination and collaboration. Is that your feeling, that 

throughout that region there is a real effort at a regional approach? 

And that whether we are talking about the 2009 games or the 

2010, that it is one of the better areas of our country in that regard? 

Mr. SLOTNICK. Definitely, sir. The Northwest Warning and Alert, 

NWWARN, is leaning way forward in the trenches in that regard 

for coordinating information coming from private sector and elevating it to the Washington Joint Analytical Center, WAJAC. 

WAJAC is a tremendous program and does have coordination at 

the upper levels with the Federal intelligence group and the JTTF, 

Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

But it could be better. Again, funding is an issue. General 

Lowenberg has done some significant things with State funding. It 

would be exceptional if we could advance that model and get that 

model up to speed for the 2010 Olympics. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Lungren. 
22 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, Ranking 

Member Lungren. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your patience and perseverance. 

Let me just start by asking Mr. Arnot, in your experience with 

Chicago and your previous experience with New York, to what extent is security and having a plan in place taken into account when 

the Olympic Committee decides upon a location? Is this a significant factor? 

Mr. ARNOT. The easy answer is yes, it is a significant factor. 

When the International Olympic Committee makes the decision, 

the security and general public safety of the entire Olympic environment is definitely a major consideration on their part. 

Ms. CLARKE. I wasn’t here, unfortunately, for the beginning of 

both of your testimonies, but I wanted to ask either of you, since 

you both have had the experience with security at large-scale 

events going back many years, generally speaking has security 

greatly evolved significantly since the 2001 Olympics and other 

such events held in North America? If so, in what ways? 

Mr. ARNOT. If I could start. The 2002 games established a new 

threshold for us. I think that the bar was raised significantly by 

9/11, obviously. I think that the model that has been established, 

the work that was done on the 2000 games was significant. It 

would be my own personal opinion that we have not seen significant advancement since 2002. 

Ms. CLARKE. Mr. Slotnick, did you want to chime in? Is there 

anything that you would vary with Mr. Arnot on? 

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes, ma’am, I would concur with that. I think 

since 2001, we have seen considerable growth in security in general, and security concerns against criminal acts and terrorism. It 

has been exponential. Of course, since that time, the National Incident Management System, the National Response Plan, the National Intelligence Plan have all evolved since that time and impact 

how we conduct ourselves and how we plan for emergencies and 

prepare for terrorist acts. 

Ms. CLARKE. Then, this question is for either of you as well: In 

preparing for any Olympics, who takes ultimate responsibility for 

security? Is there one organization that has the final say and ensures that all security organizations work together in a sensible 

way? Is it the Olympic Committee, the government of the host 

country, the local government? What would you say is the command structure around security for events of this magnitude? 

Mr. ARNOT. I think we would probably both agree that it needs 

to be a unified command structure. At the top of that unified command should be the host city, assuming that the host city in itself 

has significant resources. A city like New York for the 2012 bid, a 

city like Chicago for the 2016 bid, would take the lead. The other 

agencies, including the Federal agencies, would come in in a designated support role. 

In Utah, it was a bit different because the city of Salt Lake itself 

did not have a very substantial police department. So the Utah 

State Patrol was the lead agency. In each case, it was the lead government officer. In the case of Salt Lake, it was the Governor. In 

the case of New York’s bid, it was the mayor. In the case of Chi-
23 

cago, it would be the mayor who in fact is the person in charge of 

that public safety command. 

Mr. SLOTNICK. Ma’am, I think of considerable note is that this 

is not an event that is a specific U.S. event. We have the cross-border issue, so all the more need for unified command and the ability 

to exercise those commands prior to any event. With the actual 

Olympics being conducted on Canadian soil, but significant impact 

to the United States and U.S. businesses and the I–5 corridor, it 

is just absolutely huge in what we should be preparing to do. 

Ms. CLARKE. So are you saying that in terms of unified command, is it your assertion that the Federal Government probably 

through CPB would also have to be a partner in this? Then just 

in closing, because I know my time is running out, I know that the 

Chairwoman raised the issue of interoperability in terms of communication. Have there been any advances to your knowledge 

which would facilitate the emergency preparedness for the environment that you are working with right now? 

Mr. SLOTNICK. We have been working on interoperable communications within the State. The ability to communicate with the 

Federal Government has improved, but again we are dealing with 

a cross-border issue. So it is not only our ability to communicate 

within ourselves, but it is our ability to communicate with Canadian law enforcement and Canadian Federal Government even for 

normal operations, let alone during an emergency. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the gentlelady for her thoughtful 

questions. I would like to pursue those questions, so I yield myself 

an additional 5 minutes for an abbreviated second round. 

Again, let me suggest that this is both instructive and I think it 

opens the door for future hearings for those who are presently in 

the top-off and presently engaged. But let me raise this question. 

As you well know, I gave a list of concerns when I gave my opening 

remarks, having to do with the 2010 Vancouver Olympics. I would 

like to again raise them with you for your thought and analysis by 

both witnesses, and Mr. Arnot first. 

I am concerned about expedited border closings during the 

games, and what would happen if we would have to close the borders; intelligence fusion across borders and within governments, 

the way of communicating intelligence quickly; radio interoperability, which my colleague mentioned just a moment ago; and the 

need for a multi-agency coordination center; and what roles should 

DHS play in support of these efforts. 

Now, I would appreciate as I have looked over the landscape of 

large events, Mr. Arnot, the Olympics are not the only large events 

that we confront every day here in the United States. I know that 

the NASCAR is continuously happy, the throngs of individuals that 

they put in a stadium almost on a weekly basis. Likewise, so is the 

Superbowl thrilled with their numbers, whether it is the NBA All 

Stars or playoffs—these are large-number venues. 

So please incorporate in your answer your thoughts about a 

breakdown or a break-out or a segregated—‘‘segregated’’ is not 

right—but an actual designated assistant secretary or component 

of DHS to deal with large events, so that there is a point person 
24 

that is collaborative, that is coalescing, that is working, even thinking, if you will, way ahead of the time when we have to address 

these sometimes very thorny questions. 

Mr. Arnot, I mentioned the expedited border crossings, intelligence fusion, radio interoperability. I think you heard all my 

points. 

Mr. ARNOT. Madam Chairwoman, thank you. 

I think the notion of expedited border crossings—the notion that 

we have the appropriate personnel at the border crossings now to 

be handled an expedited border crossing I would assume from Canada into the United States, especially in the event that there would 

be some kind of a significant incident surrounding the games and 

what that would do to the general psyche of the people who were 

at the games, obviously being able to have the appropriate number 

of people at the border closings I think is, as the distinguished representative from Washington noted earlier, the idea that that is 

supported by appropriate medical personnel and other support personnel is something absolutely to take a look at. 

Intelligence fusion—intelligence is absolutely the first key to the 

security of the games or any large event. The sharing of intelligence back and forth between the United States and Canada is 

something that absolutely needs to be looked at with regard to the 

event. The development of fusion centers for this particular event, 

if it has not already happened, it something that I would suggest 

should be researched. 

Radio interoperability—your operation is only as good as your information. Your information is only as good as your communication. Your communication is based on your communications equipment. You can’t operate if you don’t have interoperability of your 

communications equipment. 

I was very impressed, Madam Chairwoman, with your understanding of the spectrum demands on an event like this, especially 

when they are crossing borders and we are dealing with different 

Federal agencies, and the control of those spectrums. 

The multi-agency coordination center—regardless of the fact that 

this event is in Canada, if the United States is going to be able to 

address the threats that might be posed by this event to the United 

States, it would be suggested that a multi-agency task force be assembled and that they are in one place able to communicate and 

work with each other on a regular basis. 

Your question about the threat assessment to other events I 

think is also quite wise. On any given Saturday in the fall, we have 

dozens of stadiums across the United States with 50,000, 60,000, 

70,000, 100,000 people. Each of the State and local agencies have 

done a good job between 2002 and today in terms of stepping up 

what they can do individually to protect those areas. The job is 

enormous. The risk is significant. The threat, because of the numbers of people alone, is something that bears some consideration. 

I think that the notion of having someone or an office within the 

Department of Homeland Security that is able to review those 

events on a regular basis, preview the events on a regular basis 

and be able to address Federal support that might be deemed necessary, I think would be prudent. 
25 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me, before I go to Mr. Slotnick, Mr. Arnot 

first of all thank you for bringing your vast range of knowledge and 

disparate knowledge, different venues that you have either consulted on or actually been operationally involved in and in charge. 

In the games in Atlanta and Salt Lake, did you have direct contact 

with security so that as you are managing whether or not an athlete has gotten on the bus and has gotten to the venue for his or 

her particular skill, did you feel that you had either the walkietalkies, whether e-mail was sufficient at that time, but the direct 

contact with the principals dealing with security? 

Mr. ARNOT. Madam Chairwoman, in Atlanta, the answer is no, 

we did not. Atlanta was a challenge from a number of different perspectives. The advancement of the planning from Atlanta to Salt 

Lake was very significant. I will tell you that I felt that during the 

Salt Lake Games, I could get to the information in a relatively 

short period of time. In the case of an emergency, that short period 

of time may not have been short enough. The communications 

equipment and the varieties of communications equipment that we 

were working with at that time would have allowed us—the protocols were there, the cooperation was there, the will was there, but 

the way was not necessarily there. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me let Mr. Slotnick finish, and I will then 

yield very quickly to Ms. Clarke for a question that she has as well. 

Did you remember my questions? 

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes, ma’am, I did. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Arnot, very much. That was 

a very important response. Thank you. 

Mr. SLOTNICK. As to expedited border crossings, I think this is 

very important to include private sector. The Pacific Northwest economic region through their Blue Cascades exercises has done quite 

a bit to conduct gap analysis and identify alternatives for emergencies and for natural disaster. 

I think the same model would be applied to looking at issues 

with border crossing in a collaborative effort, how we might expedite certain crossings. For example, having mass transit set up so 

that there wasn’t a lot of individual vehicular traffic, but with the 

carrot being for people to get pre-cleared if they take mass transit, 

allowing them to cross the border rather expeditiously in both directions, would eliminate a lot of tie-up at the border; would reduce 

the amount of personnel needed; and have folks with ability to 

travel very rapidly. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Are you suggesting opening up or expanding 

mass transit that crosses the border? And are you suggesting that 

that would be a manner of evacuation? 

Mr. SLOTNICK. It could be both. It could be both, ma’am. But yes, 

I am suggesting that we consider pre-clearing folks, similar to some 

other programs like the CLEAR Program that we use here in the 

United States for folks that are traveling between TSA venues from 

airport to airport. They get pre-cleared in a biometric fashion, so 

that they are able to transit the TSA rapidly—to have something 

set up like this at the 2010 Olympics to allow citizens from both 

sides to be able to cross rapidly during normal operations, as well 

as have expedited crossing in case of an emergency. 
26 

As to intelligence fusion, it is absolutely key. It is a critical component. Again, I would like to reemphasize the need for private sector involvement in that. We see a lot of information that comes 

across that is geared toward Federal consumption, toward law enforcement consumption. 

But not only does private sector need to be aware of what is 

going on, but private sector has a tremendous awareness of what 

is going on, because they have to deal with it to protect their enterprises on a daily basis. When you are protecting a Boeing enterprise or you are protecting a Microsoft enterprise, you are aware 

of a lot of the same things that Federal Government is and law enforcement. The opportunity to share that in both directions to me 

is key and critical. 

As to an office within DHS, I think instead of having to reinvent 

things at each event, the ability to have an office that would be in 

charge and have standardized protocols, lessons learned, the ability 

to learn from each event and improve those standard operating 

procedures and personalize them for each event would be greatly 

enhanced by having a central repository for those type of events. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

I will now yield to the gentlelady from New York for her question. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

My question is really a follow-up to the expedited border crossing. I just wanted to note that the Olympics tend to be international by nature, so that the processing, the Customs processing 

of individuals who may not be either citizens of Canada or the 

United States, has that been taken into consideration? For U.S. 

citizens, the CLEAR Program is great, but if you are not a citizen 

of the United States, it doesn’t really facilitate the transporting of 

ease through TSA. 

Have you looked at the fact that we will have people from around 

the world attending this event, and the intricacies of having to deal 

with moving them about should something occur at the venue? 

Mr. SLOTNICK. Ma’am, I would say that it has been considered. 

Probably not many solutions have been developed. Funding is certainly lacking in that area, but the ability to have funding for collaborative exercises that allow those things to rise to the top where 

a gap analysis can be done and solutions developed, needs to happen. That has not happened yet. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

Let me add my appreciation on behalf of the committee and offer 

to say to you that we selected a day that couldn’t have been more 

busier, if that is completely correct English, with members in a variety of hearings. You might hear a lot of buzzing of emails. These 

are other staff members asking us why we are not in the committee meeting that is going on across the campus, which is why 

Congresswoman Clarke and Congressman Lungren is now on the 

floor dealing with a matter, and a number of our Members are 

doing so. 

Having said that, we believe this is a very important first step 

and hearing. We are grateful to each of you for providing now the 

series of questions, and I think a roadmap going forward, one, not 
27 

only for Vancouver, but really the question that we really have 

been studying over a period of time, large venues. We have had 

some staff assessments on a number of large venues. I don’t think 

that we have reached the final conclusions that you have now contributed to in terms of what we need to be addressing. 

Mr. Arnot, your very frank and blunt statement, without I know 

any attempt to denigrate, but your frank comment on Atlanta is 

taken for what it is, as a help to us to realize that the incidences 

that we have had, whether or not one would say it would be totally 

preventable because terrorists are by their nature based upon surprise. But we do know that we have now the wake-up call, and now 

with more sensitivity after 9/11, to really be prepared. 

We have been very fortunate in all of the large events that we 

have engaged in as Americans, from whether it is a faith meeting 

with how many hundreds of thousands come to a faith event for 

good purposes, versus boxing opportunities and NASCAR and just 

plain old Rose Bowl activities where all the parents and everyone 

is gathered for a celebratory time. 

We need to be more conscious, and I do think we are going to 

look very closely at the idea of this designation in DHS because we 

need to be consulting with experts like yourself. We need to build 

a very tight team within the agency that has immediate response 

and activity and operational activity on all of these events, which 

frankly I believe certainly have probably been attended to by a 

number of law enforcement agencies. 

I can’t imagine that some of our important law enforcement 

agencies are not engaged in some of these large venues. But again, 

how are they engaged? Are they on the day-of and that is the extent of their work? Then I think that is not enough. This hearing 

contributed to moving us forward along those lines. 

So let me again on behalf of the full committee, Mr. Thompson 

the Chairman, Mr. King the Ranking Member, and myself as the 

subcommittee Chair that has a great interest in this concept called 

critical infrastructure, thank you very much for your testimony and 

your patience today. We appreciate it. 

Any additional statements to be offered by our members can be 

submitted into the record. Let me do my follow-up so that we will 

make sure that everything is in order. The Members of the subcommittee may have additional questions for the witnesses, and we 

will ask you to respond expeditiously in writing to those questions. 

You will be assisted by the committee staff in case you want to 

know where those submissions can be made. 

This subcommittee looks forward to subsequent hearings and 

briefings on the security issues surrounding the 2010 Vancouver 

Olympics. As I previously indicated, now that you have brought us 

quite a bit of information and challenge, we will be looking at other 

large-venue events, and we will do so in the coming weeks and 

months. This continues to be an ongoing issue and a very important issue. 

Hearing no further business, the subcommittee now stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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