Congressional Committees 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

JOINT STRIKE 

FIGHTER 

March 2010 

Additional Costs and 

Delays Risk Not 

Meeting Warfighter 

Requirements on Time

GAO-10-382 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2009

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting

Warfighter Requirements on Time 

Highlights of GAO-10-382, a report to 

congressional committees 

The F-35 Lightning II, also known 

as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is 

the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) most costly and ambitious 

aircraft acquisition, seeking to 

simultaneously develop and field 

three aircraft variants for the Air 

Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and 

eight international partners. The 

JSF is critical for recapitalizing 

tactical air forces and will require a 

long-term commitment to very 

large annual funding outlays. The 

current estimated investment is 

$323 billion to develop and procure 

2,457 aircraft. As required by law, 

this report discusses (1) program 

cost, schedule, and performance; 

(2) manufacturing results; and 

(3) test plans and progress. GAO’s 

work includes interviews, cost 

data, test plans, production 

measures, and analyses by defense 

and contractor officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD 

 (1) make a new, comprehensive, 

and independent assessment of the 

costs and schedule to complete the 

program, including military 

construction, JSF-related expenses 

in other budgets, and life-cycle 

costs; and (2) reassess warfighter 

requirements and, if necessary, 

defer some capabilities to future 

increments. GAO also suggests 

that Congress consider requiring 

DOD to establish a management 

tool to help Congress better 

measure the program’s progress in 

maturing the weapon system in a 

variety of areas to include cost 

estimating, testing, and 

manufacturing. 

The JSF program continues to struggle with increased costs and slowed 

progress—negative outcomes that were foreseeable as events have unfolded 

over several years. Total estimated acquisition costs have increased $46 

billion and development extended 2 more years, compared to the program 

baseline approved in 2007. DOD leadership is now taking some positive steps 

which, if effectively implemented, should improve outcomes and provide 

more realistic cost and schedule estimates. Officials increased time and 

funding for system development, added 4 aircraft to the flight test program, 

and reduced near-term procurement quantities. Restructuring is not finished 

and further cost growth and schedule extensions are likely. The program is at 

risk for not delivering aircraft quantities and capabilities on time. Dates for 

achieving initial operational capabilities may have to be extended or some 

requirements deferred to future upgrades. Aircraft unit costs will likely 

exceed the thresholds established by the statutory provision commonly 

referred to as Nunn-McCurdy and may require DOD to certify the need for the 

JSF to Congress. Program setbacks in costs, deliveries, and performance 

directly affect modernization plans and retirement schedules of the legacy 

aircraft the JSF is slated to replace. 

Manufacturing JSF test aircraft continues to take more time, money, and 

effort than budgeted. By December 2009, only 4 of 13 test aircraft had been 

delivered and labor hours to build the aircraft had increased more than 50 

percent above earlier estimates. Late deliveries hamper the development 

flight test program and affect work on production aircraft, even as plans 

proceed to significantly ramp-up annual procurement rates. Some 

improvement is noted, but continuing manufacturing inefficiencies, parts 

problems, and engineering technical changes indicate that design and 

production processes may lack the maturity needed to efficiently produce 

aircraft at planned rates. The independent manufacturing review team 

determined that the planned production ramp rate was unachievable absent 

significant improvements. 

Although restructuring actions should help, there is still substantial overlap of 

development, test, and production activities while DOD continues to invest in 

large quantities of production aircraft before variant designs are proven and 

performance verified. Slowed by late aircraft deliveries, technical problems, 

and low productivity, the flight test program only completed 10 percent of the 

sorties planned during 2009. Other technical challenges include (1) relying on 

an extensive but largely unproven and unaccredited network of ground test 

laboratories and simulation models to evaluate system performance; (2) 

developing and integrating very large and complex software requirements; and 

(3) maturing several critical technologies essential to meet operational 

performance and logistical support requirements. Collectively, testing and 

technical challenges will likely add more costs and time to development, 

affecting delivery of warfighter requirements and hampering start up of pilot 

and maintainer training and initial operational testing. 

View GAO-10-382 or key components.

For more information, contact Michael J. 

Sullivan at (202) 512-4841or 

sullivanm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-10-382 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 3 

Cost Increases and Schedule Delays Increase Risk of Not 

Delivering Capabilities to the Warfighter on Time 5 

Manufacturing and Engineering Challenges Continue to Slow 

Aircraft Deliveries and Hold the Production Schedule at Risk 14 

Little Progress in Development Testing While Program Continues 

to Face Technical Challenges 22 

Conclusions 31 

Recommendations for Executive Action 33 

Matter for Congressional Consideration 34 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 37 

Appendix II Changes in Reported JSF Program Costs, 

Quantities, and Deliveries 40 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 41 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 46 

Related GAO Products 47 

Tables 

Table 1: Estimated Cost and Schedule for System Development 6 

Table 2: Total Projected Procurement Funding Requirements 9 

Table 3: Changes in Major Milestones 11 

Table 4: Initial Operational Capability Requirements 12 

Table 5: Procurement and Manufacturing Plans as of February 2010 21 

Table 6: Progress in Meeting Planned Development and Test 

Activities 23 

Joint Strike Fighter 
Table 7: Changes in Reported JSF Program Costs, Quantities, and 

Deliveries 40 

Figures 

Figure 1: JSF Labor Hours for Manufacturing Test Aircraft 15 

Figure 2: Wing Station Labor Hours 16 

Figure 3: Mate and Delivery Labor Hours 17 

Figure 4: Growth in the Number of Engineering Design Drawings 20 

Figure 5: Breakdown of Verification Venues 25 

Figure 6: Software Increments 28 

Figure 7: JSF Procurement Investments and Progress of Flight 

Testing 30 

Abbreviations 

CAPE Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

CTOL conventional takeoff and landing 

DOD Department of Defense 

JSF Joint Strike Fighter 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

STOVL short takeoff and vertical landing 

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Page ii GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
Page 1 GAO-10-382 

 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

March 19, 2010 

Congressional Committees 

The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft 

acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft 

variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international 

partners. The JSF is critical to our nation’s plans for recapitalizing the 

tactical air forces and will require a long-term commitment to very large 

annual funding outlays. The total U.S. investment is now estimated at 

$323 billion to develop and acquire 2,457 aircraft. 

We have reported on JSF issues for a number of years. We have expressed 

our concerns about the substantial overlap of development, test, and 

production activities and resulting cost increases and schedule delays. We 

have also identified opportunities for the program to reduce risks and 

improve chances for more successful outcomes. Our recommendations 

have included adopting a more evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition 

strategy and limiting investment in production aircraft until each variant 

demonstrates required capabilities in flight tests. Our March 2009 report 

was the fifth and final annual report under a congressional mandate.1

 In 

that report, we noted the government’s increased financial risk from 

development cost increases, additional delays in manufacturing and 

testing schedules, and plans to increase procurement in advance of testing. 

We recommended that DOD report to Congress its plans for mitigating 

risks and transitioning from cost-reimbursement procurement contracts to 

fixed-price contracts, and that DOD ensure the prime contractor performs 

1

Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 

108-375, § 213 (2004). 

Joint Strike Fighter 
 

detailed schedule risk analyses to provide important insight into use of 

reserve funds and manufacturing progress.2

Our work for this report began under a request from the Chairman and 

Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Air and Land 

Subcommittee. Subsequently, we received a new mandate in the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 to annually review the JSF 

program through 2015.3

 This report thus satisfies the original request as 

well as the first year of the new mandate. In this report, we (1) determine 

the JSF program’s progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance 

goals; (2) assess plans and results in manufacturing; and (3) evaluate 

plans, progress, and risks with testing plans and related technical 

challenges. 

To conduct this work, we tracked and compared current cost and 

schedule estimates with those of prior years, identified changes, and 

determined causes. We obtained program status reports, manufacturing 

data, and test planning documents. We conducted our own analyses of the 

information. We discussed results to date and future plans to complete JSF 

development and move further into procurement with DOD, JSF, and 

contractor officials. We conducted this performance audit from May 2009 

to February 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

 

2

Previous reports under the 2005 mandate are GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Accelerating 

Procurement before Completing Development Increases the Government’s Financial Risk, 

GAO-09-303 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12, 2009); Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by 

DOD Add to Program Risks, GAO-08-388 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008); Joint Strike 

Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain, GAO-07-360 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 

2007); Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing Demonstrates 

Acceptable Performance, GAO-06-356 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006); and Tactical 

Aircraft: Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike Fighter Program with Different 

Acquisition Strategy, GAO-05-271 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2005). 

3

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84 § 244 (2009). 

Page 2 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

The F-35 JSF program is a joint, multinational acquisition to develop and 

field an affordable, highly common family of stealthy, next-generation 

strike fighter aircraft for the United States Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, 

and eight international partners. The JSF is a single-seat, single-engine 

aircraft incorporating low-observable (stealth) technologies, defensive 

avionics, advanced sensor fusion,4

 internal and external weapons, and 

advanced prognostic maintenance capability. There are three variants. The 

conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variant will primarily be an airto-ground replacement for the Air Force’s F-16 Falcon and the A-10 

Warthog aircraft, and will complement the F-22A Raptor. The short takeoff 

and vertical landing (STOVL) variant will be a multi-role strike fighter to 

replace the Marine Corps’ F/A-18C/D Hornet and AV-8B Harrier aircraft. 

The carrier-suitable variant (CV) will provide the Navy a multi-role, 

stealthy strike aircraft to complement the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. 

Background 

The program began in November 1996 with a 5-year competition between 

Lockheed Martin and Boeing to determine the most capable and 

affordable preliminary aircraft design. Lockheed Martin won the 

competition, and the program entered system development and 

demonstration in October 2001. Pratt & Whitney is the primary engine 

manufacturer, while General Electric has been funded to develop a 

potential second source for the engine. DOD officials adopted a “single 

step” acquisition strategy to develop and acquire full combat capabilities 

on an aggressive schedule with significant risk associated with 

concurrently developing, testing, and producing aircraft. In 2004, DOD 

extended the program schedule to address airframe weight problems 

discovered during systems integration and design review. DOD 

rebaselined the program extending development, adding resources, and 

delaying deliveries. This caused a breach of the significant cost growth 

threshold, commonly referred to as a Nunn-McCurdy breach.5

 Cost and 

 

4

 Sensor fusion is the ability to take information from both multiple onboard and offboard 

aircraft sensors and display the information in an easy-to-ue format for the single pilot. 

5

 10 U.S.C. § 2433 establishes the requirement for DOD to perform unit cost reports on 

major defense acquisition programs or designated major defense subprograms. Two 

measures are tacked: procurement unit cost (total funds programmed for procurement 

divided by the total number of fully configured items to be procured) and program 

acquisition unit cost (total cost of development, procurement, and system-specific military 

construction divided by the number of fully configured end items to be procured). To 

eliminate the effects of inflation, costs are expressed in constant base year dollars. If a 

program exceeds specified cost growth thresholds specified in the law, a Nunn-McCurdy 

breach, DOD is required to report to Congress. In certain circumstance, DOD is required to 

reassess the program and submit a certification to Congress in order to continue the 

program, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 2433a. 

Page 3 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

schedule changes since then resulted in another rebaselining in 2007, the 

current acquisition program baseline. 

DOD plans to buy a total of 2,457 JSFs and allies are expected to procure a 

minimum of 730 CTOL and STOVL aircraft. Because of the program’s sheer 

size and the numbers of aircraft it will replace, the JSF is the linchpin of 

DOD’s long-term plan to modernize tactical air forces. It is DOD’s most 

costly acquisition program and its longest in duration—total acquisition 

cost is currently estimated at $323 billion with procurement lasting 

through 2035. The JSF is also DOD’s largest cooperative program. Our 

international partners are providing about $4.8 billion toward 

development, and foreign firms are part of the industrial base producing 

aircraft. DOD’s funding requirements for the JSF assume economic 

benefits from these foreign purchases in reducing unit costs for U.S. 

aircraft. 

In our March 2009 report,6

 we noted that more money and time would be 

needed to complete development. At that time, development costs were 

projected to increase between $2.4 billion and $7.4 billion and the 

schedule extended from 1 to 3 years according to two estimates, one by 

the JSF program office and one by a joint team of Office of Secretary of 

Defense (OSD), Air Force, and Navy officials. We reported that 

manufacturing inefficiencies and parts shortages continued to delay the 

delivery of development test aircraft and would make it difficult for the 

program to meet its production schedule. In addition, we reported that 

DOD plans to further accelerate procurement and invest heavily in 

production aircraft despite a nascent flight test program that was very 

risky.7

 The risk is reflected by the continued use of cost reimbursement 

contracts for low- rate production quantities, a contract type that places 

most of the cost risk on the buyer, which in this case is DOD. DOD 

concurred with, but has not yet implemented, our two recommendations 

to report on its plans for mitigating the risks of using cost-reimbursement 

procurement contracts for low-rate production and transitioning to fixedprice contracting, and to ensure that the prime contractor performs 

detailed schedule risk analyses to provide important insight into use of 

reserve funds and manufacturing progress. 

 

6

GAO-09-303. 

7

Subsequent to the report, DOD cut back on its plans to accelerate procurement, but still 

expects to significantly invest in procurement prior to completing system development and 

flight testing. 

Page 4 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

Because of continuing cost and schedule problems, the Secretary of 

Defense directed a comprehensive restructuring of the JSF program in 

February 2010 acquisition decision memorandum. The restructuring was 

the culmination of an extensive department-wide review of the JSF 

program directed by OSD in 2009. In addition to input from contractors, 

the joint program office, and various defense offices, the review 

considered the findings and recommendations from three independent 

work groups chartered to assess the program: the Joint Estimating Team 

(JET) evaluated program execution and resource requirements, the 

Independent Manufacturing Review Team (IMRT) assessed contractor 

capabilities and plans for ramping-up and sustaining production at 

maximum rates, and the Joint Assessment Team (JAT) reviewed F135 

engine costs and affordability projections. Among other actions, the 

restructuring (1) increased funding for the JSF development and 

procurement programs to the revised JET estimates over the next 5 years; 

(2) extended development flight testing by 13 months and moved the full 

rate production decision to April 2016; (3) added 4 aircraft to support the 

development test program (one new test jet and use of three production 

jets); (4) expanded software integration capabilities; 

(5) reduced near- term procurement quantities; (6) directed the program 

office and military services to determine the potential impacts of the 

restructuring on initial operational capabilities; and (7) directed the Air 

Force and Navy to revise the development and low rate production 

contracts and fee structures to reward improved cost and schedule 

performance and to move to fixed-price incentive fee structures as soon as 

possible. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics stated that the department-wide review would continue and cited 

2010 will be a critical year for assessing progress on the new plans and 

expected delivery of test aircraft, completing of hundreds of test flights, 

and meeting other key milestones. 

In ordering the restructure, DOD leadership is recognizing the relatively 

poor cost and schedule outcomes that we and others have previously 

reported. The restructuring added time and money to the development 

effort and decreased near-term procurement quantities to help pay the bill. 

Recent independent assessments projected much higher costs for 

development and procurement and more testing time needed to ensure 

that the design and performance of each variant meets requirements and is 

operationally suitable. Cost increases and further delays pose a substantial 

risk that the program will not be able to deliver the quantities and 

capabilities in the time required by the warfighters. It is likely that either 

the dates for achieving initial operational capabilities must be delayed or 

Cost Increases and 

Schedule Delays 

Increase Risk of Not 

Delivering 

Capabilities to the 

Warfighter on Time 

Page 5 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

the military services will have to accept less initial capability and defer 

some requirements to a future upgrade program. Furthermore, higher 

costs and lesser quantities will likely result in unit cost increases 

exceeding the thresholds established by the statutory provision commonly 

referred to as Nunn-McCurdy and may require DOD to certify the need for 

the program to Congress. 

Recent Estimates Project 

Significant Cost Increases 

and Delays to Complete 

Development 

Several recent defense assessments and our work identified significant 

cost growth and further schedule delays for completing JSF system 

development. As a result, DOD restructured the program and added 

additional time and funding to complete development. The re-estimated 

effort funded in the fiscal year 2011 budget submission has increased 

development funding by $4.5 billion and extended the time needed to 

complete development by 2 1⁄2 years, compared to the current approved 

baseline. Table 1 compares the new budget data with the original baseline 

in 2001, the approved baseline in 2007, and the program’s interim estimate 

dated December 2008. The interim estimate had earlier added $1.4 billion 

to the fiscal year 2010 request to pay for cost overruns on the airframe and 

engine contracts, technical scope increases, and additional funding to 

mitigate risk. 

Table 1: Estimated Cost and Schedule for System Development 

October 2001 

original baseline 

March 2007 

approved baseline 

December 2008 

program estimate 

Fiscal year 2011 

budget request 

Total development costs $34.4 billion $44.8 billion $46.2 billion $49.3 billion 

Date to complete development April 2012 October 2013 October 2014 April 2016 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

According to defense officials, the new budget reflects the findings of the 

JET.8

 Consistent with its previous 2008 study, the JET projected higher 

development costs and greater schedule delays compared to the internal 

program estimates reported to Congress. Among other factors, the JET 

projected (1) more engineering staff needed for longer periods of time to 

complete development, evaluate test results, and correct deficiencies; (2) 

 

8

In July 2009, OSD tasked its Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office to 

lead an update of its 2008 cost estimate and analysis to reflect actual F-35 performance to 

date. This included assessing the overall executability of the JSF development program and 

resource requirements. The F-35 joint estimating team was composed of CAPE, Air Force, 

and Navy cost and subject-matter experts. 

Page 6 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

greater growth in software requirements and complexity; (3) longer 

manufacturing times; and (4) considerably more time and effort needed in 

development testing. 

Additional cost increases and more time to complete development are 

possible. The preliminary estimate by the JET projected as much as a 

30-month extension in the schedule for completing development flight 

tests, more than the 13-month extension ordered in the restructuring. 

Defense officials acknowledge that the revised schedule for completing 

development, testing, and supporting the full-rate production milestone is 

still aggressive. Also, the 2011 budget estimate does not include costs 

beyond 2010 for the alternate (or second) engine program. Should that 

program go forward, an estimated $1.6 billion may be needed to complete 

development in 2016. 

We further note that the prime aircraft contractor is spending management 

reserves9

 faster than budgeted, likely creating a need for additional 

funding. The prime contractor has continually struggled to maintain 

management reserves at a prudent level. As we previously reported,10 DOD 

in late 2007 decided to replenish the contractor’s depleted reserve with 

funding provided in part by the elimination of two test aircraft. Since that 

time, continuing engineering changes, inefficient manufacturing flow, 

software development challenges, and other factors have again depleted 

reserves. The prime contractor’s management reserve balance declined by 

over $900 million from August 2008 to November 2009. As of August 2008, 

the contractor had over $1 billion in its management reserve fund and as 

of November 2009 had only about $100 million. The prime contractor now 

estimates it will need an additional $600 million, at a minimum, to 

adequately resource its reserves needed to complete development. 

 

9

Management reserve funds are a pool of money set aside to handle unanticipated changes 

and other risks encountered as a development program proceeds. Prudent defense 

programs typically strive to maintain a management reserve of from 5 to 10 percent of the 

estimated funding requirements to complete contracted work. At development start, the 

JSF program budgeted reserves at 10 percent of contract value and expected to draw on 

them at about the same rate as contract work was executed. 

10GAO-08-388. 

Page 7 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

Engine cost growth and development delays are also contributing 

substantially to overall program costs. The F135 primary engine 

development effort—a separate contract from the airframe development 

effort—is now estimated to cost about $7.3 billion, a 50 percent increase 

over the original contract award. This includes an $800 million contract 

cost overrun in 2008. Engine development cost increases primarily 

resulted from higher costs for labor and materials, supplier problems, and 

the rework needed to correct deficiencies with an engine blade during 

redesign. Engine test problems have also slowed development. 

Engine Manufacturers 

Encountering Cost and 

Schedule Growth 

The alternate engine program to develop a second engine source—the 

F136—is also encountering cost and schedule challenges. The government 

has invested about $2.9 billion in development through fiscal year 2010. 

The JET estimates about $1.6 billion would be needed to complete F136 

development in 2016. Contractor officials told us that funding stability, 

engine affordability, and testing issues are key concerns. 

The alternate engine program has been an area of contention between 

DOD and Congress. Congress has directed DOD to develop a second 

source for the JSF engine to induce competition and to reduce future 

operational risks by ensuring that the failure of one type of engine would 

not ground all F-35 fleets. DOD does not think the risks are worth the 

extra costs to maintain a second source and has removed funding from the 

JSF program line the last four years through fiscal year 2010. Each year, 

Congress has subsequently provided funding for engine development 

efforts to continue. We have previously testified11 on our assessment that, 

based on past defense competitions (including a fighter engine 

competition started in the 1980s between these same manufacturers) and 

making certain assumptions about relative quantities purchased from 

each, competition could be expected to yield enough savings to offset the 

additional investments required to sustain a second source. Prior studies 

also indicate a number of nonfinancial benefits from competition, 

including better performance, increased reliability, and improved 

contractor responsiveness. 

 

11GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Strong Risk Management Essential as Program Enters Most 

Challenging Phase, GAO-09-711T (Washington, D.C.: May, 20 2009) is our most recent 

testimony on engine issues. 

Page 8 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

As part of the ongoing restructuring, DOD revised procurement plans, 

reducing purchases by 122 aircraft over the next 5 years, and moving these 

purchases to future years. On the basis of the revised plans, the fiscal year 

2011 budget data projects total procurement funding requirements of 

$273.3 billion. This new estimate is $41.6 billion (18 percent) more than the 

current approved baseline. This increase raises the expected average price 

for each aircraft to $112 million compared to $95 million in the current 

baseline approved in March 2007. Table 2 compares the 2011 budget 

submission with the original and approved program baselines and the 

December 2008 program interim estimate. 

Table 2: Total Projected Procurement Funding Requirements 

Projected Procurement 

Cost Increases May Trigger 

a Nunn-McCurdy Cost 

Breach 

October 2001 

original baseline

March 2007 

approved baseline

December 2008 

program estimate 

Fiscal year 2011 

budget request

Procurement funding requirements $196.6 billion $231.7 billion $255.0 billion $273.3 billion 

Procurement quantity 2,852 2,443 2,441 2,443

Average procurement unit cost $69 million $95 million $104 million $112 million 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The December 2008 estimate recognizes the two aircraft deleted by Congress in the 2009 

budget. However, officials plan to reinsert these two aircraft in later years to restore the full 

complement of 2,443 aircraft. 

While aircraft affordability has been an issue for several years and the 

largest driver behind procurement costs, engine affordability has become 

a growing concern of late. Program officials earlier added $1.2 billion more 

to DOD’s 2010 procurement budget request from the previous year’s 

estimate to pay for higher than expected engine costs, tooling, and other 

items. For the fiscal year 2009 buy, the negotiated unit price for the STOVL 

engine and lift fan increased by $5.8 million, 21 percent higher than the 

budget estimate ($33.4 million from $27.6 million). The negotiated unit 

price for the CTOL engine increased by $5.2 million, 42 percent higher 

than budgeted ($17.7 million from $12.5 million). The F135 engine 

contractor has acknowledged the affordability risks and is taking steps 

designed to reduce engine unit costs. The JAT review identified cost 

drivers and opportunities to reduce cost. Officials concluded that engine 

contractor improvement plans were credible but challenging, and would 

require additional investment by the contractor for cost reduction 

initiatives. 

The JET review and an adjunct analysis by the Naval Air Systems 

Command indicate that procurement costs could increase still further 

from the total projected in the 2011 budget. For the budget projection, cost 

Page 9 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

estimators used the JET data through fiscal year 2015 and then applied 

current program office assumptions on manufacturing span times and 

expected learning curves12 to estimate total procurement funding 

requirements through completion of acquisition in 2035. A JET official said 

these program office assumptions were overly optimistic and that the JET 

analysis suggests a more moderate gain in learning over time as well as 

longer manufacturing span times and other assumptions. This official said 

the DOD analysts are continuing to study out-year costs. NAVAIR’s 

October 2009 cost assessment estimated total procurement costs of 

$314 billion—$41 billion more than the 2011 budget submission, an 

increase of about 15 percent with a corresponding increase in unit costs. 

Because NAVAIR’s assessment was based on the production profile before 

the changes made by the restructuring, it is not directly comparable to the 

budget estimate, but we agree with its underlying basis. NAVAIR officials 

projected higher future procurement costs due to continuing 

manufacturing challenges and significant future retrofit requirements 

among other factors. They expected parts shortages and engineering 

changes to continue to affect production, especially as procurement 

quantities increase. Officials also factored in assumed costs for retrofitting 

fielded aircraft as design and performance problems are discovered during 

testing. 

 

As shown in table 2 above, the new budget estimate would increase 

aircraft average unit costs to $112 million, an increase of $17 million 

(18 percent) over the 2007 baseline estimate and $43 million (62 percent) 

more than the original baseline. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 

data projects greater increases. Increased costs are expected to result in 

the JSF program exceeding unit cost growth thresholds established by the 

statutory provision commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy.13 Until 

12Learning curves are mathematical projections that account for the effects of learning—

the expectation that time and cost for building a new system decreases over time as 

production processes mature over time and workers become more productive through 

experience. 

1310 U.S.C. § 2433 establishes the requirement for DOD to prepare unit cost reports on 

major defense acquisition programs or designated major defense subprograms. Two 

measures are tracked: procurement unit cost (total funds programmed for procurement 

divided by the total number of fully configured items to be procured) and program 

acquisition unit cost (total cost of development, procurement, and system-specific military 

construction divided by the number of fully configured end items to be procured). To 

eliminate the effects of inflation, costs are expressed in constant base year dollars. If a 

program exceeds cost growth thresholds specified in the law, this is known as a NunnMcCurdy breach and DOD is required to report the breach to Congress. 

Page 10 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

restructuring is complete and a new comprehensive procurement cost 

estimate is finalized (and expressed in constant-year dollars), we do not 

know whether unit cost increases will breach the “critical” or “significant” 

cost growth threshold.14 Breaches of either cost growth threshold require 

reporting to the Congress, and a critical breach would also require DOD to 

justify the continued need for the JSF program to Congress. 

JSF cost increases and schedule delays increase the risk that the program 

will not be able to meet warfighter requirements regarding capability and 

quantities on time. Overall program performance in 2009 did not meet 

expectations and the schedule for completing key milestones and 

development activities continued to slip from prior years. Table 3 shows 

the extension in time from successive estimates for meeting key program 

milestones to ensure that the design and performance of the three JSF 

variants meet warfighter capability requirements and are suitable for 

military operations. 

Table 3: Changes in Major Milestones 

Achieving Warfighter 

Requirements on Time Is 

at Risk 

Major Milestones 

Program of record 

December 2007 

Program of record 

December 2008 

Restructure 

February 2010 

Development Testing Complete October 2012 October 2013 March 2015 

Initial Operational Test and Evaluation Complete October 2013 October 2014 January 2016 

System Development and Demonstration Phase Complete October 2013 October 2014 April 2016 

Full Rate Production Decision October 2013 October 2014 April 2016 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Despite the steady deterioration in meeting major schedule events, the 

military services have not revised their milestones for achieving initial 

operational capability. Historically, initial operational capability dates are 

critical milestones when the warfighter requires a new system to be 

operational and available in quantity for wartime use based on future 

threats and force structure projections. Table 4 summarizes the current 

initial operational capability requirements for the services. The Marine 

Corps requires operational STOVL aircraft with initial warfighting 

capabilities, basic weapons, and moderate mission system capabilities by 

March 2012. The Air Force and Navy require operational squadrons with 

full warfighting capabilities and mission functionality by March 2013 and 

 

1410 U.S.C. § 2433. 

Page 11 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

March 2015, respectively. However, these goals were set several years ago 

when system development and testing was expected to be substantially 

completed by now. Key milestone dates for developing and testing aircraft 

have slipped about 3 years from the times expected when the current 

program baseline was established. 

Table 4: Initial Operational Capability Requirements 

Service Variant Quantities Date required Capability 

Marine Corps STOVL 30 March 2012 Interim warfighting capabilities. Some functionality for close air support, 

moving targets, electronic attack, and air interdiction. Ability to fuse 

information from other JSFs and increased logistics support with 

advanced prognostics capabilities. Qualification of some bombs and 

missiles. 

Air Force CTOL 51 March 2013 

Carrier Variant 28 March 2015 

Full warfighting capability. Warfighters’ desired capability. Concludes 

avionics development, including ability to fuse information from other 

platforms or sensors for increased situational awareness. Suppression 

and destruction of enemy air defenses and deep strike capabilities and 

qualification of additional weapons. 

Navy 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics’ 

February 2010 restructuring acquisition decision memorandum directs the 

JSF program office to determine potential impacts of the restructured 

program on the schedule for achieving initial operational capabilities. At 

the time this report was published, we understood that the Air Force and 

Navy are expected to extend initial operational capability dates, while the 

Marine Corps still plans initial operational capability in 2012. 

Continuing delays in development testing, finding and fixing deficiencies, 

maturing software, and full mission integration efforts will likely impede 

proving out required capabilities. In its October 2009 risk assessment, 

NAVAIR reported that the program’s ability to deliver Marine Corps and 

Navy requirements at the initial operational capability dates within the 

current cost and schedule parameters is not achievable given the technical 

risks, system immaturity, lack of demonstrated system integration, and 

lack of progress in the test plan. NAVAIR also noted that pilot training 

cannot be expanded without the full complement of development test 

aircraft still to be delivered. In addition, the Director of Operational Test 

and Evaluation (DOT&E) is now predicting initial operational testing of 

the full warfighting capability by mid-2016, but only if additional flight test 

aircraft are added, software is delivered on time, and a strenuous pace of 

testing is maintained. DOT&E reported that the mission capability of the 

initial production aircraft is unclear, creating planning problems for the 

Page 12 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

services that depend on those aircraft to meet initial operational 

capabilities. These actions, coupled with plans to reduce procurement in 

the near term and to utilize some production aircraft in testing, could 

impinge on concurrent efforts to begin training pilots and maintainers and 

could significantly overlap operational testing. These efforts are important 

to stand up the first operating units and ensure warfighter capabilities are 

met. If delays continue, the services may have to reduce, defer, or revise 

operational requirements and pursue fall-back plans to span capability 

gaps until JSF full warfighting capabilities are available. 

A key tenet of the JSF program from inception— to deliver an affordable, 

highly common fifth generation aircraft that could be acquired by the 

warfighters in large numbers—is also at increased risk. The program office 

currently estimates total life-cycle costs for operating, sustaining, and 

maintaining JSF fleets at $764 billion, substantially higher than earlier 

estimates. The cost per flying hour of the CTOL variant is projected to be 

higher than the F-16, one of the Air Force aircraft it is slated to replace. 

NAVAIR officials recently projected total life-cycle costs even higher, at 

more than $1 trillion. Service officials are concerned whether future 

budgets will be able to afford the higher costs expected. Compared to the 

up-front costs of developing and procuring aircraft, the long-term costs for 

operating, maintaining, and sustaining JSF fleets over an aircraft’s useful 

life represent the much larger portion of total ownership costs. Escalating 

life-cycle costs represent major future funding requirements that could 

significantly affect how many aircraft we and our allies can afford to buy. 

Because the JSF is the linchpin of our plans to recapitalize tactical aircraft, 

delays and affordability concerns about the JSF directly affect funding 

needs and retirement plans for the legacy aircraft it is slated to replace. 

Legacy systems must be sustained and kept operationally relevant until 

JSFs replace them. If JSF quantities are reduced or deliveries slip into 

future years, billions of dollars more in as yet unbudgeted funding may be 

required to sustain, modernize, and extend the life of legacy aircraft. Both 

the Departments of the Air Force and Navy have cited looming shortfalls 

in the tactical aircraft inventory based on last year’s JSF plans and legacy 

retirements; further delays would exacerbate calculated shortfalls. JSF 

concerns are especially troublesome for the Marine Corps, which has 

based its entire future strike force structure on acquiring a capable STOVL 

in large quantities. Uncertainty about JSF costs and deliveries makes it 

challenging for all the services to effectively plan and efficiently 

implement modernization efforts and retirement schedules. During our 

ongoing work on tactical aircraft recapitalization for the House Armed 

Services Committee, service officials and legacy aircraft managers 

Page 13 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

indicated that they are largely in a reactive mode to unfolding JSF events 

and may have to put forward unfunded contingency plans to modernize 

and extend the life of some legacy aircraft. 

Manufacturing JSF test aircraft continues to take more time, money, and 

effort than budgeted, delaying development tests and affecting the 

prospects for the significant ramp-up in annual production rates planned. 

While some improvement is noted, continuing manufacturing 

inefficiencies, parts problems, and engineering technical changes indicate 

that design and production processes may lack the maturity needed to 

efficiently produce aircraft at planned rates. This is confirmed by the 

recent results of intensive studies conducted by the IMRT and the JET that 

resulted in the reduction of near-term procurement quantities. 

Manufacturing and 

Engineering 

Challenges Continue 

to Slow Aircraft 

Deliveries and Hold 

the Production 

Schedule at Risk 

Manufacturing Test 

Aircraft Continues to Take 

Longer and Cost More 

Than Planned 

The JSF program is still recovering from earlier problems—extensive 

design changes, late parts deliveries, and inefficient manufacturing 

practices—that continue to delay aircraft deliveries. The prime contractor 

has restructured the manufacturing schedule three times since 2007 and a 

fourth revision is under way. Each revision has lengthened the time to 

deliver aircraft to the test program. As of December 2009, the contractor 

had delivered only 4 of 13 development test aircraft, 2 CTOL aircraft 

(including the original non-production representative model) and 2 STOVL 

aircraft. Delivery of the first CV test aircraft is now expected in March 

2010. Contractor and program officials now expect to complete delivery of 

all test aircraft at the end of 2010. Prior plans had expected delivery of 

almost all aircraft by 2009. 

The total labor hours budgeted to produce the test aircraft have steadily 

increased over time, suggesting the need to mature production processes 

and improve supply chain performance. In the aggregate, the 2009 revised 

schedule estimates total labor hours at 3.2 million, exceeding the 2007 

schedule estimate by more than 1 million hours, a 54 percent increase. 

Expected improvements in labor productivity did not occur to the degree 

expected. Figure 1 shows that the 2007 schedule assumed a steep drop in 

labor hours as more units were produced, manufacturing processes 

matured, and worker knowledge increased. The expected increase in 

efficiency due to learning is typical of manufacturing programs and is 

important to JSF achieving its future procurement rate as planned while 

keeping costs in line. The current 2009 schedule, informed by actual 

Page 14 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

performance, demonstrates that some learning is occurring, but to a lesser 

degree than projected by the 2007 schedule. Higher than expected labor 

costs for the manufacturing of test aircraft increases the risk that future 

procurement costs for building operational aircraft may also be higher 

than budgeted. This, in addition to other program problems, may result in 

reduced buying power where the services may not be able to purchase the 

number of aircraft currently planned. 

Figure 1: JSF Labor Hours for Manufacturing Test Aircraft 

BF= Short take-off and vertical landing aircraft for the Marine Corps 

AF= Conventional take-off and landing aircraft for the Air Force 

CF= Carrier variant for the Navy 

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

400,000

BF-1 BF-2 BF-3 BF-4 AF-1 AF-2 AF-3 CF-1 CF-2 CF-3 BF-5 AF-4

Labor hours

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Aircraft

2007 budget

2009 estimated actual hours

As we reported last year,15 labor hour performance in two major cost 

areas—wing assembly and the mate and delivery stations—have been 

particularly troublesome. According to officials, the prime contractor is 

taking steps to improve both areas, but only modest improvement has 

been demonstrated to date. Figure 2 shows the actual number of labor 

 

15 GAO-09-303. 

Page 15 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

hours required to complete wing assembly on the first five productionrepresentative test aircraft. The total actual hours are more than twice that 

predicted in the 2007 manufacturing schedule for the same aircraft. 

Figure 2: Wing Station Labor Hours 

Similarly, figure 3 shows that the actual time required for completing the 

mate and delivery phase for the first five test aircraft was 49 percent 

higher than predicted in 2007. 

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

BF-1 BF-2 BF-3 BF-4 AF-1 AF-2 AF-3 CF-1 CF-2 CF-3 BF-5 AF-4

Labor hours

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Wing

2007 budget labor hours

2009 actual labor hours for vehicles that have completed assembly

Page 16 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

Figure 3: Mate and Delivery Labor Hours 

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

BF-1 BF-2 BF-3 BF-4 AF-1 AF-2 AF-3 CF-1 CF-2 CF-3 BF-5 AF-4

Labor hours

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Aircraft

2007 budget labor hours

2009 actual labor hours for vehicles that have completed assembly

One of the prime reasons for increased labor hours is the continued 

prevalence of out-of-station work. This is work not finished at its 

designated station that needs to be carried forward and completed at a 

different station down the production line.16 Out-of-station work is highly 

inefficient, increasing labor hours, causing delays, and possibly resulting 

in quality problems, according to program officials. The amount of out-ofstation work has been decreasing and officials hope it will be fully 

corrected by the end of 2010. 

Program officials noted that major contributors to out-of-station workload 

have been parts shortages caused by design changes and an immature 

supplier base. In some cases, design changes from the prime contractor 

necessitated subcontractors to adjust their manufacturing processes to 

 

16An efficient production line establishes an orderly flow of work as a product moves from 

workstation to workstation and on to final assembly. Out-of-station work, sometimes 

referred to as traveled work, refers to completing unfinished work on major components, 

for example, the wings, after they have left the wing workstation and moved down the 

production line to another station, such as mate and final assembly. 

Page 17 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

new designs resulting in late parts deliveries. In other cases, some 

subcontractors have been slower than expected in developing their 

capacity to manufacture and deliver both routine and complex parts on 

time. According to prime contract officials, efforts are under way to 

address parts problems and supplier performance. In particular, the 

contractor has (1) increased its oversight of key subcontractors that are 

having problems, (2) secured long-term raw material purchase price 

agreements for the prime and key subcontractors, and (3) improved 

internal production capabilities. 

Recent evidence suggests mixed results. Officials from the Defense 

Contract Management Agency (DCMA) noted that while late parts 

deliveries continue, the response time to deliver the parts has improved. 

The scrap, rework, and repair rate—a good indicator of parts quality—has 

improved. Program office and prime contractor officials state that the 

effects from previous design changes and parts shortages are lessening, 

but will persist over the near term. Officials also noted that JSF quality 

performance compares favorably with prior acquisitions at similar stages 

of development, including the F-16 and F-22A. Nonetheless, supplier costs 

are expected to make up a substantial share of total expenses as the 

program moves further into production. 

The F135 engine contractor has experienced manufacturing challenges 

similar to those of the aircraft contractor, including part shortages, late 

deliveries, subcontractor management issues, and test failures. Engine 

redesigns and manufacturing problems caused slips in engine deliveries, 

according to program officials. Officials note that these late engine 

deliveries have not yet critically affected the delivery of test aircraft 

because airframe production lagged even further behind. However, the 

prime contractor has been forced to perform out-of-station engine 

installations and other workarounds as a result of engine issues. As of 

January 2010, 17 of 18 F135 development flight test engines have been 

delivered, 7 of which have flown. 

Future Design Changes 

May Drive Additional 

Costs 

Continuing changes and additions to engineering drawings may cause 

further manufacturing delays and increased cost. Although the program 

did not achieve this at the time of the critical design reviews, officials are 

reporting that 100 percent of expected engineering drawings have now 

been released for each of the three variants, a level typically associated 

Page 18 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

with a stable design.17 However, despite being well beyond the design 

reviews for each variant, the total number of engineering drawings 

continues to grow due to design changes and other revisions to drawings 

(see fig. 4). Contractor officials estimated in 2007 that change traffic—

additions and revisions to drawings—would decline to less than 200 per 

month by the end of fiscal year 2009; however, current change traffic is 

considerably higher, averaging about 500 changes per month. While many 

recent drawing additions and revisions are classified as minor in nature, 

acquisition programs typically encounter higher and more substantive 

design changes as a result of discovery and rework during development 

testing. With most of development testing for JSF still ahead, the risk and 

impact from required design changes are significant. Future changes may 

require alterations to the production process; changes to the supply base; 

increases in the amount of on- and out-of-station work required on aircraft 

in production; and require costly retrofitting of aircraft already produced 

and fielded. 

 

17A best practice is to achieve design stability at the system-level critical design review, 

usually held midway through system development. Completion of at least 90 percent of 

engineering drawings at this point provides tangible evidence that the product’s design is 

stable, and a prototype demonstration shows that the design is capable of meeting 

performance requirements. 

Page 19 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

Figure 4: Growth in the Number of Engineering Design Drawings 

Expected design drawings

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Years

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

2007 2008 2009

41,171

48,899

53,297

Critical Work Ahead to Fix 

Problems as Annual 

Production Rates Increase 

Given the ongoing engineering and manufacturing challenges, the program 

will have difficulty meeting its current procurement plans. To the point, 

the IMRT reported that the prime contractor would need to address a large 

number of conditions in order to achieve its planned full-rate production 

ramp-up. These conditions focused on, among other things, improving 

management of the supply chain, engineering changes, part shortages, 

tooling, unit costs, schedule, and risk mitigation. In addition, the JET 

recommended that the program reduce its near-term production quantities 

given the design complexities of the three variants and the concurrent 

production of both development and production aircraft. As result, DOD 

slowed down production by delaying the procurement of 122 aircraft 

between 2011 and 2015. Table 5 illustrates the current procurement plans 

for the United States and the international partners. 

Page 20 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

Table 5: Procurement and Manufacturing Plans as of February 2010 

Buy year 20 20 20 20 20 11 12 13 14 15

Delivery year 201 201 20 20 20 3 4 15 16 17

Air Force-CTOL 23 24 33 53 70

Navy-CV 7 7 13 15 19

Marine Corps-STOVL 13 14 25 22 24

International partners 0 8 33 67 94

Total (564) 43 53 104 157 207

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Even after decreasing near-term quantities, the annual procurement rate is 

still expected to ramp up rapidly, increasing from 43 to 207 during the 5-

year period 2011 through 2015. Total procurement during this period is 564

aircraft: 362 for the United States and 202 for the international partners. If 

the improvements recommended by the IMRT are not implemented, the

is greater risk that the p

re 

rime contractor will not be able to produce planes 

according to plan, and a backlog of aircraft on order but waiting to be 

ial 

h 

 in contract 

curacy 

 not yet 

sufficiently mature and that pricing information is not exact enough for 

nd 

 

produced will develop. 

As we reported last year, the JSF program is procuring a substant

number of production aircraft using cost-reimbursement contracts whic

place most of the risk on the buyer (DOD), with the government 

potentially paying more than budgeted should labor, material, or other

incurred costs be more than expected when the contract was signed. 

According to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, cost reimbursement 

contracts are suitable for use only when uncertainties involved

performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient ac

to use any type of fixed-price contract. 18 While the use of cost 

reimbursement contracts is permissible for buying initial low-rate 

procurement quantities, continued use further into production indicates 

acknowledgement by DOD and the contractor that knowledge on JSF 

design, production processes, and costs for labor and material is

the contractor to assume the risk under a fixed-price contract. 

We are encouraged by the Secretary’s statement in the February 2010 

restructuring acquisition decision memorandum that future aircraft a

18 Federal Acquisition Regulation § 16.301-2. 

Page 21 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

engine production contracts should move to fixed-price incentive f

structures as soon as possible. According to DOD, the restructuring 

further established critical business measures to monitor in 2010, 

including the possible negotiatio

ee 

n of a fixed-price low-rate production 

contract for the 2010 lot buy and completion of a cost study to inform a 

xed price for the 2011 lot buy. 

ment 

antly 

g, but 

are 

eral 

 pilot 

 are to 

rogram, DOD continues to push 

ahead and invest in large quantities of aircraft before variant designs are 

roven and system performance verified. 

the warfighters. Table 6 summarizes recent delays to key JSF test activities 

fi

Steadily lengthening schedules to complete key system develop

efforts further exacerbates the already extreme overlap among 

development, test, and production activities. Late deliveries of 

development test aircraft and less productivity than planned have slowed 

development flight testing and resulted in the program missing important 

milestones. The restructuring directive to add four aircraft to supplement 

the development flight test program, if implemented, should signific

increase test capacity and lessen concurrency with operational testin

officials agree that flight plans are still aggressive. Other technical 

challenges abound, including (1) relying on an extensive but largely

unproven and unaccredited network of ground test laboratories and 

simulation models to evaluate system performance, (2) continuing 

challenges in developing and integrating very large and complex softw

requirements essential to JSF capabilities, and (3) maturing sev

technologies that are essential to meet operational performance and 

logistical support requirements. Collectively, these testing and 

developmental challenges can be expected to lead to additional delays and 

increased program costs, while hampering delivery of warfighter 

requirements, the planned start-up of initial operational testing, and

and maintainer training. While technical problems and some delays

be expected in any major defense acquisition, the JSF is especially 

challenged because of its size, scope, and complexity and exerts a 

correspondingly larger impact on future defense budgets and force 

structure. While all this is still before the p

p

For several years, DOD and the contractors have made annual adjustments

to the schedules for key system development activities, each time 

lengthening the time needed to complete work. Flowing more work to the 

future further compresses the time available for verifying design and 

performance and for finding and fixing problems in advance of investing in 

new aircraft in time to meet capability requirement dates established by 

Little Progress in 

Development Te

While Program 

Continues to Face 

sting 

Technical Challenges 

d Schedule 

and Entering Its Most 

Stressing Years 

Development Flight 

Testing Is Behin

Page 22 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

and related development events. In particular, it shows the rippling effec

from manufacturing delays and diminishe

ts 

d test assets on the program’s 

ability to meet development flight plans. 

Table 6: Progress in Meeting Planned Development and Test Activities 

Development activity 007 Plan 008 Plan 009 Plana2 2 2

Manufacturing 

Flight test aircraft delivered by 2010 14 aircraft 13 aircraft 4 aircraft 

Testing activities 

Complete Development Testing October 2012 October 2013 March 2015 

Flight tests expected by September 2009 700 310 120 

Flight test hours expected (by September 2009) 1431 532 160 

Testing events 

STOVL vertical landing First Quarter 2009 er 2009 a Third Quart Second Quarter 2010 

First CTOL (optimized) flight test January 2009 May 2009 October 2009 

First CV flight test May 2009 October 2009 January 2010 a 

First mission system aircraft flight test January 2009 March 2009 January 2010 a 

Start of Block 1 flight tests (basic warfighting capability) hird quarter 2 T 009 ourth quarter 2009 hird quarter 2010 F T

Engine deliveries 

Engine initial service release (CTOL/CV) Second quarter 2008 Fourth quarter 2008 Fourth quarter 2009

Engine initial service release (STOVL) Fourth quarter 2008 irst quarter 2009 hird quarter 2010 F T

Software Integration 

Development and integration of software providing full 

warfighting capability 

2012 2013 2015 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

a

Not achieved as of January 2010. 

t 

ring 

ilities, 

a 

The JSF development flight test program currently has few assets 

available, has not been as productive as expected, and has missed key tes

events. By the end of December 2009, only 4 of the planned 13 flight test 

aircraft had been delivered. Overall, only about 3 percent of total planned 

flight tests had been completed by the end of 2009. According to the 2007 

test plan, 13 percent were to be completed at this time. Productivity du

2009 remained low as only 10 percent of the planned test flights were 

accomplished, according to DOT&E. Important test events, including the 

first flight demonstrating full-STOVL characteristics, the first flight of the 

carrier variant, and initial demonstration of basic warfighting capab

have not yet occurred and each has been delayed more than 1 year 

compared to the schedule in 2007. Our analysis of DOD schedule dat

determined that the test fleet averaged 13 month delays from initial 

Page 23 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

projections in actual or planned first flights. Program officials noted th

some of the recent flight test delays are the result of decisions to hold 

aircraft at the manufacturing location until manufacturing is completed

that aircraft delivered to the developmental test 

at 

 so 

locations better meet 

requirements and are fully prepared for testing. 

add 

, 

in for 

d, a 

gistical 

support to sustain the increased number of test sorties per day. 

pon 

 in its 

y 

ght 

rol costs, and 

meet key milestones of the program’s aggressive test plan. 

e 

Program Risks Is Unclear 

Program officials expect to aggressively step up the program’s flight 

testing over the next couple of years. The restructuring directive to 

four aircraft to supplement the development flight test program, if 

implemented, should significantly increase test capacity. Accordingly

DOD officials reduced the JET’s projection of a 30-month extension 

needed for flight testing to a 13-month extension. DOD officials agreed 

that the new plan reduces risk and is more achievable given the additional 

aircraft but is still challenging. The new plan has little schedule marg

error and will still be under pressure to accommodate the inevitable 

discovery of issues and retests that occur over the course of every flight 

test program. We further note that the new test aircraft to be ordere

carrier variant, will not be available until mid-2013. In addition, an 

operational test official said the program may have insufficient lo

The JSF test program relies much more heavily than previous wea

systems on its modeling and simulation labs to verify aircraft and 

subsystem performance. As figure 5 depicts, the program plans to verify 

83 percent of JSF capabilities (as measured by individual test points)

ground labs, the flying test bed, and through desk studies, and onl

17 percent through flight testing. Contractor officials believe this 

breakdown by venues is misleading. If instead quantified by the venue 

where the final sign-off of requirements is expected to occur, the program 

plans to complete 55 percent in off-aircraft venues and 45 percent in fli

tests. By either method, the reliance on ground labs and simulations is 

substantial. Program and contractor officials believe that the up-front 

investment of $5 billion in the simulation labs will allow for early risk 

reduction, reduce the need for additional flight testing, cont

Most Simulation Labs Ar

Not Yet Accredited and

Progress in Reducing 

Page 24 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

Figure 5: Breakdown of Verification Venues 

5%

17%

59%

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

19%

Flight testing

Flying test bed

Simulation labs

Subject matter analysis

The JSF program’s simulation labs appear more prolific, integrated, and 

capable than the labs used in past aircraft programs; the program utilizes 

18 labs for development testing compared to 9 for the F-22A, 7 for the F-18, 

and 5 for the F-16. According to program officials, the greater number of 

labs allows engineers to work simultaneously on different development 

blocks, reducing bottlenecks that may occur in testing. In contrast, 

engineers for the F-18 and F-22A programs had to interrupt or shut down 

work on one development block while they made corrections to another 

block. Also, key JSF simulation labs are co-located at the Lockheed Martin 

plant in Fort Worth, Texas, whereas the F-22A program utilized three 

locations and two different companies. The co-location of labs should 

facilitate more seamless integration for more realistic subsystem tests. 

Further, the JSF utilizes the first fully integrated airborne test bed for 

mission system testing. According to program officials, the test bed’s 

design is geospatially proportionate to an actual F-35 aircraft, enhancing 

its ability to accurately verify aircraft performance. 

Despite the extensive network of simulation labs, their ability to substitute 

for flight testing is unproven and their progress in reducing program risk is 

difficult to assess. Lab use did increase substantially in 2009; mission 

systems lab use, for example, increased 81 percent from 2008. According 

to program officials, early flight test results have tended to corroborate lab 

results. However, most labs and models have yet to be accredited, a 

lengthy and involved technical evaluation to ensure fidelity of results. Labs 

Page 25 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

and models must be fully accredited prior to using them to verify JSF 

requirements. The prime contractor identified 11 physical labs and 23 

models and simulations needing accreditation. At the time of our review, 

no physical labs and only two models were accredited. Although officials 

told us that current requirements verification plans are on track, it is 

difficult to assess performance until more labs and models are accredited 

and more flight testing is done to corroborate fidelity of results. 

Accordingly, although the contractor seems to be utilizing its labs well, the 

true measure of progress will be when all these venues are accredited and 

officials are completing the test plan by successfully verifying required 

capabilities. To date, only 62 of 2,879 capabilities have been verified 

through labs, flight tests, or both. 

Delays in accreditation add substantial risk to future software block 

completion and defect discovery later in the program and could lead to 

more flight testing, which is generally more expensive. Moreover, it is 

unclear how the ongoing delays in flight testing will affect the 

accreditation process. Validating that the models accurately reflect aircraft 

performance is crucial to the accreditation process. In this way, model 

validation relies to a certain extent on the progress of flight testing. As 

such, continued delays to flight testing increase the risk that simulation 

labs may not be accredited when expected. 

Software Development and 

Other Technical Risks 

Increase the Likelihood of 

Further Testing Delays and 

Cost Increases 

While technical challenges are part of any major defense acquisition, the 

JSF program has particularly daunting tasks ahead. The JSF software 

development effort is one of the largest and most complex in DOD history, 

essential to providing capabilities for sensor fusion, weapons and fire 

control, diagnostics, and propulsion. The program estimates that the 

systems will require 11.6 million effective software lines of code.19 By 

comparison, the F/A-18/E/F has only 1.1 million and the F-22A has 2.2 

million lines of code on board. Progress on software is noted by several 

measures. Currently, JSF engineers have written about three-fourths of the 

total lines of aircraft code expected and about 40 percent of the written 

code has been integrated and tested. This is typically the most challenging 

phase of software development. The program, however, also continues 

 

19 The program estimates it will have 11.6 million effective software lines of code (ESLOC). 

ESLOC measures the effective size of reused and adapted code, and is adjusted to its 

equivalent size in new lines of code. This is not a deliverable product. The program will 

have over 18 million software lines of code (SLOC), which is a measure of the total raw size 

of software. 

Page 26 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

moving some capabilities to future blocks in order to keep on schedule. 

This adds pressure and costs to future efforts and increases the probability 

of defects being realized later in the program. 

Software is developed, integrated, and released in five increments (see 

fig. 6). The first increment, needed to enable basic aircraft flying 

characteristics, is the only one completed. All other software increments 

are behind schedule. Mission system software, in particular, is behind 

schedule, poses significant integration challenges, and its progress is 

difficult to assess.20 Further delays may affect the already delayed first 

mission system flight test. Naval Air Systems Command officials predict 

further delays in providing software capability to flight tests due to 

competing scarce resources from upcoming blocks to complete or rework 

current blocks. The joint estimating team projects more time and effort 

will be needed to complete the fifth software increment, the development 

and integration of software for achieving full warfighting capability. Team 

officials project 2015 for completing this work, 2 years later than currently 

reported by the program office. They also believe that the most complex 

and troublesome work is still ahead, that dedicated resources to complete 

software development and integration are inadequate, and that the 

contractor will not be able to write code as fast and productively as earlier 

releases. The joint team also predicts that software requirements will 

continue to grow. Recent prior acquisitions have experienced 30 to 

100 percent growth in software requirements over time, whereas the JSF 

program office current estimate assumed no growth. We note that JSF 

software has grown 40 percent since the preliminary design review and 

13 percent since the critical design review over initial program estimates. 

Given the resource shortages and the complexity of the work ahead, DOD 

directed the program to expand software integration capabilities by adding 

an additional software integration line as part of the recent restructuring. 

If properly resourced, the extra line should significantly increase 

throughput. 

 

20Mission systems are critical to realizing increased warfighter capability in combat 

effectiveness through next- generation sensors with fused information from on-board and 

off-board systems (i.e., Electronic Warfare, Communication Navigation Identification, 

Electro-Optical Target System, Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System, Radar, and 

Data Links). 

Page 27 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

Figure 6: Software Increments 

In addition to ongoing software challenges, the program continues to 

address several technical issues. We spoke with several defense 

organizations, as well as the JSF program office and contractors, who 

identified technical hardware and software challenges that could have 

significant operational impacts if not resolved. Several challenges cited by 

more than one office and considered critical to meeting requirements 

include the following: 

Block 0.1 Block 0.5 Block 1.0 Block 2.0 Block 3.0

Flight essential

• Supports basic

 flight performance

• Navigation

• SDD aircraft only

Mission systems

infrastructure

• Initial sensors &

 weapons

• Preliminary logistics

• Mission systems

 displays

Initial warfighter 

capability

• Initial data fusion

• Initial logistics support 

• Enhanced sensors

• Data security

USMC IOC

• Final data fusion

• Enhanced logistics

support

• Data links

• Weapons addition

• Advanced warfighting

 capability 

Full warfighting

capability

• Final data links

• Weapons addition

• Final logistics

• Enhanced training

• Maintenance aids

Incremental development process

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

• Design changes to carrier variant. The carrier variant requires 

significant design modifications to the keel web, a key structural joint 

to enable catapult takeoffs. Proposed design changes are still being 

reviewed and cost and schedule impacts are unknown at this time. 

Design modifications will be needed for any test aircraft planned for 

carrier suitability testing. It is not clear at this point which aircraft are 

expected to receive design modifications on the manufacturing line and 

which will be modified after their first flight. Nonetheless, completing 

the design modifications will likely result in carrier suitability test 

delays of at least 4 months, according to an official from DOT&E. 

• JSF engine. The program continues to address significant technical 

and design challenges with the F135 engine. The STOVL engine’s lift fan 

has required design changes in response to damages incurred during 

testing which will limit flight test efficiency and will likely require 

additional modifications, time, and resources. In addition, other key 

engine components, such as the turbine blades, electric de-icing 

system, and dual vane fuel pump, have required reengineering after 

failing initial tests. 

Page 28 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

• Logistics support. The advanced integrated support system aims to 

improve and streamline aircraft logistics and maintenance functions in 

order to reduce life-cycle costs. NAVAIR reported that the software to 

support the system’s communication with legacy information systems 

is currently not planned and may affect interoperability. In addition, the 

Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) reported 

that the current integrated support system for the JSF prohibits 

operating two detachments from one squadron simultaneously. This 

limitation will severely affect current operating practices. The JSF 

program has proposed interim solutions, but full support system 

deployability will not be available by the Marine Corp’s and Air Force’s 

initial operational capability dates. 

• Helmet Mounted Display. Critical to information integration and 

situational awareness, issues with the helmet mounted display 

continue to impact system effectiveness and air system integration. 

These include night operations, system latency for information 

displayed, weapon systems aiming and accuracy, and laser eye 

protection. These shortfalls may lead to workarounds or omissions 

during flight tests, according to NAVAIR. Further, the lack of a 

production helmet mounted display configuration at this time could 

result in a major system redesign or change in concept of operations. 

• Damage to flight deck and runways. The F-35 engine and integrated 

power package exhaust may cause excessive damage to the flight deck 

environment and runway surfaces that may result in operating limits or 

drive costly upgrades and repairs of JSF basing options. The program 

office and DOD are still evaluating the problem and plan to conduct 

further studies when full-scale models or actual aircraft are available. 

In addition, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is 

soliciting research proposals in the area of thermal management 

systems for aircraft landing decks. 

• Thermal management. Heat build-up and exhaust impedes the 

aircraft’s ability to conduct missions in hot environments. The program 

has made design changes to address this issue, but those changes are 

not expected to go into effect until the third low-rate procurement lot 

and are likely to affect operational testing. The development of a fuel 

pump to mitigate excessive heat is not expected to fully achieve 

requirements. As a result, the program has instituted restrictions on 

how the aircraft can be used. These restrictions will limit flight test 

efficiency and may not be feasible for operational deployment. 

Page 29 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

While DOD officials acknowledge that the program continues to address 

technical risks, they note that discovering and working through technical 

problems are to be expected in any development program especially a 

program as complex as JSF. They further note that the Department has 

not uncovered any technology or manufacturing issues as a result of the 

restructuring that would prevent the aircraft from meeting requirements. 

Significant Investments in 

Aircraft Are Planned 

Before Flight Testing Is 

Completed 

Although officials recently reduced near-term procurement plans and 

added test aircraft, DOD is still planning significant investments in 

procuring large quantities of JSF aircraft before flight testing proves they 

will perform as required. The intent of development flight testing is to 

discover and fix design and performance deficiencies during development 

when it is cheaper to do so than discovering problems and shortfalls 

during follow-on operational testing and after initial fielding. Purchasing 

aircraft before testing successfully demonstrates that the designs are 

mature and that the weapon system will work as intended increases the 

likelihood and impact of design, manufacturing, and requirements changes 

resulting in subsequent cost growth, schedule delays, and performance 

shortfalls. Systems already built and fielded may require substantial 

modifications, driving further costs. Figure 7 shows DOD’s planned 

investment in dollars and aircraft prior to the completion of development 

flight testing. DOD has already bought 28 production aircraft through 

fiscal year 2009. Under the current plan, DOD may procure as many as 307 

aircraft at a total estimated cost of $58.2 billion before development flight 

testing is completed. 

Figure 7: JSF Procurement Investments and Progress of Flight Testing 

 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Cumulative procurement (billions of dollars) $0.9 $3.6 $7.1 $14.4 $23.6 $33.2 $45.2 $58.2 $72.4

Cumulative aircraft procured 2 14 28 58 101 146 217 307 420

Development flight testing schedule 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

We have reported on several occasions about the risks of procuring 

aircraft before testing demonstrates the design is mature, costs are well 

understood, and manufacturing activities can support the ramp up in 

production.21 The JSF program has entered production and has laid out an 

 

21GAO-09-303, GAO-08-388, GAO-07-360, and GAO-06-356. 

Page 30 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

investment schedule that significantly increases procurement rates by 

163 percent from fiscal year 2011 to 2015. However, at the same time, it 

has not been successful in meeting demonstration goals and testing 

schedules to support increases in production investments, placing billions 

of dollars at risk as it develops and produces aircraft concurrently. As the 

JSF program development and test program slips, it further increases the 

chances that costly design changes will surface in the later years of flight 

testing. 

The risk of further concurrency could be managed if the program outlines 

a plan that illustrates what minimum conditions should be met before 

increases in investments are made. Such a plan would allow decision 

makers to gauge a program’s progress and to determine whether a 

program has demonstrated a sufficient amount of knowledge that would 

justify such an increase in investment levels. To date, the JSF program has 

not outlined such a plan. Also, given the several changes to schedules, test 

program, and procurement profiles, and continued program uncertainty, it 

has been difficult to baseline the program and measure its progress. 

Congress had similar concerns about the concurrency planned for the 

advanced technology bomber B-2 program, and the planned investment in 

procurement aircraft prior to fully testing the aircraft. Congress enacted 

legislation requiring DOD to establish an initiative for maintaining 

discipline in cost, contractor performance, and management within the 

program. The initiative was required to include creation of a management 

plan under which decisions to commit to specified levels of production are 

linked to progress in meeting specified program milestones, including 

testing milestones. The initiative was also required to include creation of a 

“full performance matrix,” a tool used by DOD to identify minimum 

conditions that would be met before making annual procurements. The 

full performance matrix laid out over time how different capabilities for 

the B-2 would be demonstrated in relationship to procurement decisions. 

Such a tool helps provide visibility for decision makers into a program’s 

progress in ensuring the maturity of the weapon system based on 

expected, demonstrated knowledge compared to a baseline plan thus 

allowing for more informed investment decisions, and better managed 

risks inherit in a highly concurrent development and production program. 

The JSF is DOD’s largest and most complex acquisition program and the 

linchpin of the United States and its allies’ long-term plans to modernize 

tactical air forces. It will require exceptional levels of funding for a 

sustained period through 2034, competing against other defense and 

Conclusions 

Page 31 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

nondefense priorities for the federal discretionary dollar. As such, it is 

critical to maintain affordability while moving forward, prudently 

balancing program, technical, and funding risks with the achievement of 

warfighter performance requirements. Risks are manifold—mounting cost 

and schedule pressures; complex, extensive, and unproven software 

requirements; and a nascent, very aggressive test program that continues 

to experience significant delays. Since our last report, development costs 

have again increased and the schedule for completing development and 

operational testing has been extended. Further acquisition cost increases 

and delays are expected. Impacts on production are uncertain, but 

increased manufacturing labor hours and late deliveries of development 

aircraft indicate that learning curve efficiencies are not meeting 

expectations and will likely result in higher future procurement unit prices 

than those currently reported to Congress. Given all these challenges, 

moving forward with the current plan for ramping up production does not 

seem prudent. 

JSF cost increases, schedule delays, and continuing technical problems 

also increase the risk that the program will not be able to deliver the 

aircraft quantities and capabilities in the time required by the warfighter. 

Because of the significance that JSF is expected to have on the overall 

composition of the future tactical aircraft fleet, the services’ ability to meet 

their initial operational capability requirements and to acquire JSFs in 

quantity should have a high degree of confidence so that DOD can 

effectively plan its overall tactical aircraft force structure strategy. DOD 

leadership is now taking some positive steps that, if effectively 

implemented, should improve outcomes and provide more realistic cost 

and schedule estimates. Nonetheless, there is still substantial overlap of 

development, test, and production activities while DOD continues to push 

ahead and invest in large quantities of production aircraft before variant 

designs are proven and system performance verified. As we have 

recommended in the past, adopting a more evolutionary, incremental 

strategy that delivers proven and operationally suitable capabilities when 

available, but acknowledges that more time is needed to deliver the full 

capabilities, would increase the likelihood of success in providing timely 

and affordable capability to the warfighter. Credible cost and schedule 

estimates are critical because they allow DOD management to make sound 

trade-off decisions against competing demands and allow Congress to 

perform oversight and to hold DOD accountable. While the independent 

cost estimate completed by the Joint Estimating Team is a very good start, 

it by design focused only on the near term. Until a complete and 

comprehensive cost estimate that provides cost through completion of 

procurement and includes a more complete estimate of military 

Page 32 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

construction funding requirements is formally adopted as the new 

program of record, JSF program costs will remain unclear. Tying annual 

investments more directly to demonstrated progress in developing, testing, 

and manufacturing aircraft would be a prudent fiscal measure. 

Given the continuing changes in JSF program plans and future risks going 

forward and to provide DOD leaders and Congress with accurate and 

timely data for making decisions and appropriating funds, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense direct appropriate offices within DOD to 

expeditiously complete a full, independent, comprehensive cost and 

schedule estimate for the JSF acquisition program through completion and 

that this new estimate be established as the official program of record for 

planning, budgeting, and congressional reporting purposes. This effort 

should build upon the work already accomplished by the Joint Estimating 

Team, the Independent Manufacturing Review Team, the Joint Assessment 

Team, and NAVAIR. In addition to development and procurement costs, 

this effort should also include (1) a robust estimate of military 

construction costs, (2) identification of JSF-related costs not funded in the 

JSF program but which are needed to properly base and operate service 

fleets on the ground and at sea, and (3) a comprehensive evaluation of 

projected operating and support costs and the implications of higher JSF 

operating costs compared to legacy aircraft on future defense budgets and 

force structure. 

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the military 

services, with Joint Staff and combatant command participation, conduct 

a detailed review of each service’s initial operational capabilities 

requirement to determine the minimum warfighter needs (both capabilities 

and capacity) and reasonable, realistic time frames for achieving the 

requirement. In conducting this review, the military services should 

consider trading off desired capabilities in order to more rapidly field JSF 

aircraft with an initial set of usable capabilities to reduce risks of a future 

tactical aircraft “gap” created by delays in fielding the JSF. Capabilities 

that are not needed to meet more immediate warfighter needs should be 

deferred to a future development increment. If options are not available 

for deferring capabilities to future increments, DOD needs to extend its 

IOC dates to better align operating plans with more realistic, higher 

confidence development and production schedules. In addition, because 

of remaining JSF development risks and uncertainties—including potential 

for future delays and possible reductions in JSF quantities—contingency 

plans for legacy aircraft need to be developed so that a properly resourced 

strategy is in place to fill the capability and capacity gaps until the JSF can 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 33 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

replace the legacy aircraft. Completing this review before finalizing its 

ongoing program restructure would ensure that the program’s acquisition 

strategy is in sync with and supports revisions to services’ IOC 

requirements. The Secretary of Defense should report the results of this 

review to the congressional defense committees. 

In addition to the recommendations for the Secretary above, Congress 

may wish to consider requiring DOD to provide a JSF “system maturity 

matrix” as a tool that could help Congress better measure the program’s 

progress in maturing the weapon system. The matrix should provide 

criteria and conditions for comparing documented results to expected 

progressive levels of demonstrated weapon system maturity in 

relationship to planned increases in future procurement quantities. This 

matrix should explain how increasing levels of demonstrated, quantifiable 

knowledge about the weapon system maturity at annual procurement 

decision points justify a ramp up of procurement quantities, and 

corresponding increasing funding needs, leading up to full-rate 

procurement. Key areas of the matrix and potential criteria could include: 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

• manufacturing maturity (including on-time deliveries, manufacturing 

process control, quality rates, and labor efficiency rates); 

• engineering maturity (design traffic and design changes); 

• performance and testing progress (test points, hours and flights 

accomplished, capabilities demonstrated, key performance parameters, 

and attributes demonstrated); 

• mission effectiveness and system reliability (operational effectiveness 

and reliability growth); 

• cost estimate fidelity; and 

• training, fielding, and deployment status. 

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. The Department 

concurred with our two new recommendations. Its comments are 

included in appendix 3. DOD also provided some technical comments that 

we incorporated in the final report. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Our draft report included a third recommendation, reiterated from our 

2009 report, concerning plans to transition to fixed-price procurement 

contracts. In the interim since we submitted the draft for comment, the 

Department announced its significant restructuring plans, including 

directions to transition to fixed-price procurement contracts, perhaps as 

soon as this year, and prescribed other changes to contracting strategy and 

provisions. In written comments, the Department partially concurred with 

Page 34 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

our recommendation, stating that they were addressing this topic with the 

prime contractors, had discussed specific plans with all four defense 

committees, and will continue to update them on the progress. 

Accordingly, the Department believes its actions meet the intent of this 

recommendation, both in this report and in our prior report. We agree and 

deleted it in the final report. Furthermore, we added more details on 

elements of the restructuring as it impacted several sections of the report. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; and the Director of the 

Office of Management and Budget. The report also is available at no 

charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Staff members making key contributions to this 

Michael J. Sullivan 

report are listed in appendix IV. 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 35 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
 

List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Norm Dicks 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 36 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program’s progress in meeting 

cost, schedule, and performance goals, we received briefings by program 

and contractor officials and reviewed financial management reports, 

budget documents, annual Selected Acquisition Reports, monthly status 

reports, performance indicators, and other data. We compared reported 

progress with the program of record and previous years’ data, identified 

changes in cost and schedule, and obtained officials’ reasons for these 

changes. We interviewed officials from the JSF program, contractors, and 

the Department of Defense (DOD) to obtain their views on progress, 

ongoing concerns and actions taken to address them, and future plans to 

complete JSF development and accelerate procurement. 

At the time of our review, the most recent Selected Acquisition Report 

available was a limited report from December 31, 2008. The most recent 

full Selected Acquisition Report was from December 31, 2007. The Office 

of the Secretary of Defense was still preparing its new cost estimate to be 

included in the program’s Selected Acquisition Report dated December 31, 

2009, which will be delivered to Congress in April 2010. Additionally, at the 

time of our review the JSF program was in the process of developing a 

new test schedule. We received a draft of the new schedule; however, 

since it had not yet been approved we continued to use the program of 

record in our assessment. 

In assessing program cost estimates, we compared the official program 

cost estimate in the 2008 Selected Acquisition Report to estimates 

developed by the JSF program, Defense Contract Management Agency 

(DCMA) reports, and independent reviews from the Joint Estimating Team 

(JET), Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and the Independent 

Manufacturing Review Team (IMRT) for fiscal years 2010 through 2017. 

Because the fiscal year 2011 budget had not been submitted to Congress at 

the time of the draft report, some of the report’s findings are based on 

preliminary cost projections that existed at the time of our review rather 

than the official program of record. We interviewed members of NAVAIR, 

DOD Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation Office (CAPE),1

and DCMA to 

understand their methodology, data, and approach in developing their 

independent cost estimates. To assess the validity and the reliability of 

 

1

The CAPE serves as the principal advisory body to the milestone decision authority on all 

matters concerning an acquisition program’s life-cycle cost, and is given general 

responsibilities for establishing DOD policy guidance on a number of matters relating to 

cost estimating. The independent CAPE cost estimate is designed to assess the program 

office estimate and ensure realistic cost estimates are considered. 

Page 37 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

contractors’ cost estimates, we reviewed audit reports prepared by DCMA 

and conducted independent analysis of contractor cost performance 

reports. 

To assess the program’s plans and risk in manufacturing and its capacity 

to accelerate production between fiscal years 2010 and 2015, we analyzed 

manufacturing cost and work performance data to assess progress against 

plans. We compared budgeted program labor hours to actual labor hours, 

identified growth trends, and noted differences between future labor 

requirements and current plans to release engineering staff. We reviewed 

data and briefings provided by the program, DCMA, and the JET to assess 

supplier performance and ability to support accelerated production 

between fiscal years 2010 and 2015. We also determined reasons for 

manufacturing delays, discussed program and contractor plans to 

improve, and projected the impact on development and operational tests. 

We also reviewed the program’s schedule estimates and compared them 

with relevant best practices2

 to determine the extent to which they reflect 

key estimating practices that are fundamental to having a reliable 

schedule. In doing so, we interviewed program officials to discuss their 

creation of the program’s current schedule and interviewed officials from 

NAVAIR to understand their approach and to obtain results of their 

independent schedule risk analysis. 

To assess plans, progress, and risks in test activities, we examined 

program documents and interviewed DOD, program office, and contractor 

officials about current test plans and progress. To assess progress towards 

test plans, we compared the number of flight tests conducted as of 

December 2009 to the original test plan established in 2006. We also 

reviewed documents and interviewed prime contractors about flight 

testing, the integrated airborne test bed, and ground testing. To assess the 

ground labs and test bed, we interviewed officials from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, and toured the testing labs at the Lockheed Martin 

facilities in Fort Worth, Texas. We also reviewed independent assessments 

conducted by the JET and NAVAIR to obtain their perspective on the 

program’s progress in test activities. 

In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed officials 

from the JSF Joint Program Office, Arlington, Virginia; Naval Air Systems 

Command, Patuxent River, Maryland; Defense Contract Management 

 

2

GAO-09-3SP. 

Page 38 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Agency, Fort Worth, Texas; Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, 

Texas; Defense Contract Management Agency, East Hartford, Connecticut; 

Pratt & Whitney, East Hartford, Connecticut; Defense Contract 

Management Agency, Cincinnati, Ohio; and General Electric Rolls-Royce, 

Cincinnati, Ohio. We also met with and obtained data from the following 

offices of the Secretary of Defense in Washington, D.C.: Director, 

Operational Test and Evaluation; Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation 

Office; and Systems and Software Engineering. We assessed the reliability 

of DOD and JSF contractor data by (1) performing electronic testing of 

required data elements, (2) reviewing existing information about the data, 

and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report. We conducted this performance audit from June 2009 to February 

2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 39 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix II: Changes in Reported JSF Appendix II: Changes in Reported JSF Program Costs, Quantities, and Deliveries 

Program Costs, Quantities, and Deliveries 

Table 7 shows the evolution of DOD’s official estimated cost, quantity, and 

deliveries from the initiation of system development in October 2001 to the 

fiscal year 2011 budget request submitted to Congress in February 2010. It 

depicts quantities reduced in the last major program restructure in 2004, 

the impacts of increased costs on unit prices, and the slip in delivering 

initial operational capability to the warfighter. 

Table 7: Changes in Reported JSF Program Costs, Quantities, and Deliveries 

October 2001

(system development start)

December 2003 

(2004 Replan)

March 2007

(approved baseline)

Fiscal year 2011 

budget request

Expected quantities 

Development quantities 14 14 15 14

Procurement quantities (U.S. only) 2,852 2,443 2,443 2,443

Total quantities 2,866 2,457 2,458 2,457

Cost estimates 

(then-year dollars in billions) 

Development $34.4 $44.8 $44.8 $49.3

Procurement 196.6 199.8 231.7 273.3

Total program acquisition (see note) $231.0 $244.6 $276.5 $322.6

Unit cost estimates 

(then-year dollars in millions) 

Program acquisition $81 $100 $113 $131

Average procurement 69 82 95 112

Estimated delivery dates 

First operational aircraft delivery 2008 2009 2010 2010

Initial operational capability 2010-2012 2012-2013 2012-2015 2012-2015

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Military construction cost s, typically part of total program acquisition costs, are not included in 

this table. Construction costs associated with the JSF program are incomplete and have been 

inconsistently portrayed at various stages. 

Page 40 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 41 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 42 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 43 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 44 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 45 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 46 GAO-10-382 

Michael Sullivan (202) 512 4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact name above, the following staff members made 

key contributions to this report: Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant Director; Ridge 

Bowman; Charlie Shivers; David Adams; Lindsay Taylor; W. Kendal 

Roberts; Matt Lea, Karen Richey; Jason Lee; and Greg Campbell. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

Joint Strike Fighter 
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Joint Strike Fighter: Significant Challenges Remain as DOD 

Restructures Program. GAO-10-520T. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2010 T

Joint Strike Fighter: Strong Risk Management Essential as Program 

Enters Most Challenging Phase. GAO-09-711T. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 

2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-09-326SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2009. 

Joint Strike Fighter: Accelerating Procurement before Completing 

Development Increases the Government’s Financial Risk. GAO-09-303. 

Washington D.C.: March 12, 2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Better Weapon Program Outcomes Require 

Discipline, Accountability, and Fundamental Changes in the 

Acquisition Environment. GAO-08-782T. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-08-467SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2008. 

Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on Program Risks. 

GAO-08-569TT. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008. 

Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by DOD Add to Program Risks.

GAO-08-388. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008. 

Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment 

Strategy. GAO-07-415. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-07-406SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Analysis of Costs for the Joint Strike Fighter 

Engine Program. GAO-07-656T. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2007. 

Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain. GAO-07-360. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007. 

Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter 

Alternate Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis. 

GAO-06-717R. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2006. 

Page 47 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
Related GAO Products 

Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience 

Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy. GAO-06-368. 

Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2006. 

Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2006. Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed 

to Get Better Results on Weapons Systems Investments. GAO-06-585T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2006. 

Tactical Aircraft: Recapitalization Goals Are Not Supported by 

Knowledge-Based F-22A and JSF Business Cases. GAO-06-487T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2006. 

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing 

Demonstrates Acceptable Performance. GAO-06-356. Washington, D.C.: 

March 15, 2006. 

Joint Strike Fighter: Management of the Technology Transfer Process.

GAO-06-364. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006. 

Tactical Aircraft: F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Plans and Implications 

for Tactical Aircraft Modernization. GAO-05-519T. Washington, D.C: 

April 6, 2005. 

T

Tactical Aircraft: Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint StrikeFighter 

Program with Different Acquisition Strategy. GAO-05-271.Washington, 

D.C.: March 15, 2005. 

(120822) Page 48 GAO-10-382 Joint Strike Fighter
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