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S. HRG. 111–406 

EXAMINING U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM PRIORITIES 

AND STRATEGY ACROSS AFRICA’S SAHEL REGION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 17, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Benjamin, Hon. Daniel, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of 

State, Washington, DC ........................................................................................ 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Russell D. 

Feingold ......................................................................................................... 47 

Carson, Hon. Johnnie, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department 

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Russell D. 

Feingold ......................................................................................................... 45 

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, opening statement ... 1 

Gast, Earl, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S. Agency 

for International Development, Washington, DC .............................................. 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Russell D. 

Feingold ......................................................................................................... 50 

Gutelius, Dr. David, founder and partner, Ishtirak, consulting senior fellow, 

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, San Francisco, CA .. 32 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33 

Huddleston, Hon. Vicki, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa, Department 

of Defense, Washington, DC ................................................................................ 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 17 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Russell D. 

Feingold ......................................................................................................... 48 

Kennedy-Boudali, Lianne, senior project associate, RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA .................................................................................................................. 25 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 27 

(III)

(1) 

EXAMINING U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM PRIORITIES AND STRATEGY ACROSS AFRICA’S 

SAHEL REGION 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D. Feingold 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Feingold and Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. This hearing will come to order. 

Good morning everybody. I apologize in advance; it looks like 

we’re going to have three votes or so, starting at about 11:15, 

maybe a little earlier. We’ll see if we can get through the first 

panel by then, but I do appreciate everybody’s patience if we have 

to take a break in the hearing. 

On behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, I welcome all of you to this hearing entitled ‘‘Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy Across Africa’s 

Sahel Region.’’ I’m honored to be joined later by the ranking member of the subcommittee, Senator Isakson. When he arrives, I’ll ask 

him to deliver some opening remarks, as well. 

Let me first clarify what constitutes the Sahel region. This region 

covers those territories on the southern border and directly to the 

south of the Sahara Desert. For our discussion today, it includes 

parts or all of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. The Sahel is a region on the front lines of climate 

change, facing the challenges of soil erosion, deforestation, and 

desertification. It also is a vast land-area home to nomadic communities, many of them minority ethnic groups, which have long been 

in conflict with some of the centralized state authorities in those 

regions. 

Over the years, this region’s long porous borders and ungoverned 

spaces have been exploited by criminal groups, particularly for the 

trafficking of drugs, weapons, illicit goods, and people. And over the 

last decade, there’s been increasing concern about the potential for 

violent extremist groups to do so, as well. 

2 

Counterterrorism officials have particularly focused on an 

al-Qaeda affiliate, a group known as ‘‘al-Qaeda in the Lands of the 

Islamic Maghreb.’’ AQIM, as it’s known, emerged in Algeria and 

has primarily operated in North Africa, but it has extended its 

region to parts of the Sahel, and could expand farther. Some U.S. 

intelligence officials have expressed concern at AQIM’s increasing 

capabilities and more sophisticated attacks. 

Today’s hearing is an opportunity to assess the threat posed by 

AQIM amidst other transnational threats in the Sahel region. This 

is yet another reminder that al-Qaeda is operating in countries 

around the globe, and our fight against them, therefore, must be 

global, too. 

The administration is right to focus attention on the Pakistan/ 

Afghanistan region, but we cannot lose sight of other places where 

al-Qaeda is seeking to gain ground. As we have seen in Somalia 

and Yemen, weak states, chronic instability, ungoverned spaces, 

and unresolved local tensions can create almost ideal safe havens 

in which terrorists can recruit and operate. Several parts of the 

Sahel region include that same mix of ingredients, and the danger 

they pose, not just to regional security, but to our own national 

security, is real. 

At the same time, crafting an effective counterterrorism strategy 

toward the Sahel requires an appreciation of the unique local conditions that al-Qaeda seeks to exploit and the factors that could 

motivate individuals to join their struggle. We need to understand 

ongoing changes in conflicts—political, economic, and social—that 

are shaping this region. Without an appreciation of these local 

dynamics, injecting new U.S. resources into the region could actually end up complicating or even exacerbating the threat, rather 

than mitigating it. We need to seriously consider how short-term 

activities relate to our long-term goals of promoting good governance and the rule of law. 

In 2005, the Bush administration launched the Tran-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership to enhance the capabilities of governments across the Sahel, as well as in Algeria, Morocco, and 

Tunisia, for counterterrorism and to help confront the spread of 

extremist ideology. Nearly $500 million has been allocated for this 

program since fiscal year 2005, yet nearly 5 years later it remains 

unclear to what extent these efforts have been successful. 

Today’s hearing is an opportunity to review our approach to 

counterterrorism in the Sahel, the continuing challenges, and what 

progress has been made. Because this is not in a classified setting, 

I realize we are limited in how much we can get into specific activities. But, we can discuss the overall strategy and priorities of our 

counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel and the roles played by different implementing agencies. I believe it’s important that we can 

explain to the American people, at least generally, what we’re 

doing and why they should be confident that our efforts are making 

progress. 

Let me just briefly introduce our witnesses this morning. I’m 

very pleased that we have such great interagency lineup for our 

first panel: the Department of Defense, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Africa, Vicki Huddleston; from USAID, Senior Deputy Assistant 

3 

Administrator for Africa, Earl Gast; and from the State Department, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson. 

In addition, State is also represented by its coordinator for 

counterterrorism, Daniel Benjamin. Ambassador Benjamin’s presence here is particularly important because, while this subcommittee approaches issues from the lens of sub-Saharan Africa, the 

threat from AQIM cuts across regions and the traditional boundaries of State Department’s regional bureaus. 

So, I thank all of you for being here, and I ask that each of you 

keep your remarks to 5 minutes or less so that we have enough 

time for questions and discussion. And, of course, we will submit 

your longer written statements for the record. 

Our second panel, we’ll hear from Dr. David Gutelius, who brings 

together a unique mix of expertise on this region and technological 

innovation and media strategies. Dr. Gutelius was a visiting professor at Stanford University. He founded and is currently a partner of Ishtirak, a Middle East and Islamic Africa-focused consultancy. He’s also a consulting senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins 

University Applied Physics Laboratory’s National Security Analysis 

Department. 

We also hear from Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, who has done research and written about the history and evolution of armed groups 

in Maghreb up in Sahel regions. Ms. Kennedy-Boudali was a senior 

associate and assistant professor at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and now works as a senior project associate at 

the RAND Corporation. 

So, again, I thank all of our witnesses for being here. And now 

I will—unless the ranking member shows up in the next couple of 

seconds. So, I’ll turn to Ms. Huddleston—nope, he came just as I 

was about to turn to the witnesses. 

I’m pleased to recognize, for his opening statement, Senator 

Johnny Isakson, the ranking member. 

Senator ISAKSON. I will waive my opening statement, except to 

say welcome to Secretary Carson—it’s good to see you again—and 

all of our witnesses. Counterterrorism is of particular interest. In 

my travels to Africa, I’ve been very interested in seeing our engagement on that continent, because the potential for some very dangerous things to happen very well could take place. 

So, I welcome you all here. I apologize, Mr. Chairman, for being 

late, and it’s good to be with you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you, Senator Isakson, and we’ll begin 

with Honorable Johnnie Carson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador CARSON. Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member 

Isakson, other members of the committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our support to the 

countries of Africa’s Sahel region to approve their long-term security and to constrict the ability of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 

I have a longer statement that I would like to submit for the 

record, if I may. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection. 

4 

Ambassador CARSON. Terrorism in the Sahel has become an 

issue of increasing concern. Over the past 5 years, AQIM and its 

predecessor organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and 

Combat, GSPC, have stepped up their activities across the Sahel. 

In the past 6 months alone, AQIM has been implicated in the killing of an American nongovernmental organization—NGO—worker 

in Nouakchott, Mauritania; the execution of a British hostage in 

Mali; the assassination of a senior Malian military officer; and an 

attempted suicide bombing against the French Embassy in 

Nouakchott. 

The countries in the region have recognized the problem and 

have intensified their efforts against AQIM. Algeria recently hosted 

regional chiefs of defense to promote improved cooperation, and we 

understand that Mali will organize a heads-of-state meeting in 

Bamako to address the situation soon. 

However, all the countries in the Sahel face daunting challenges. 

They are among the poorest countries in the world and lack the resources to develop effective antiterrorism programs on their own. 

They are also vast countries, stretching over thousands of miles, 

where government services and authority are weak or nonexistent. 

They are preoccupied with critical humanitarian and development 

issues, and, in some cases, terrorism is not their most pressing 

challenge. 

The United States is committed to helping these countries 

address the counterterrorism problems that these states face in the 

Sahel. However, we believe that this is best done in a supporting 

role rather than a leading role. We want to avoid undertaking 

actions that could make the situation worse. We must consult with 

the governments of the region to assess their needs. We must 

encourage regional collaboration and cooperation across borders. 

We must consult with our European partners and urge them to be 

helpful. We have emphasized to those partners that, while the 

United States will do its part, the burden must be shared by us all. 

We have also stressed that we must make sure that the assistance 

we in the United States provide does not aggravate longstanding 

historical and cultural problems that exist in some of the states in 

the region. 

Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and others in the region can manage 

and contain this issue if they work together and receive appropriate encouragement and support from countries like the United 

States. We should not seek to take this issue over. It is not ours 

and doing so might have negative consequences for U.S. interests 

over the long term. 

We must also recognize that the governments in the region have 

explicitly stated that the Sahel’s security is the responsibility of the 

countries in the region. They have not asked the United States to 

take on a leadership role in the counterterrorism efforts. In fact, 

they have clearly signaled that a more visible or militarily 

proactive posture by the United States might, in some instances, 

be counterproductive. 

The focal point of our effort has been the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Created in 2005, TSCTP allocates between 

$120 and $150 million per year for programs in 10 countries. 

TSCTP originally included Algeria, Chad, Mali, Morocco, MauriVerDate Nov 24 2008 19:29 May 11, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\SAHEL.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
5 

tania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. Burkina Faso was 

added in 2009. 

The TSCTP program reflects our recognition that sporadic 

engagements without adequate followup or sustainment would fail 

to achieve the meaningful, long-lasting results that we seek in the 

region. The emphasis, therefore, has been placed on addressing key 

capacity shortfalls that could be addressed over a period of years 

in these countries. The program draws resources and expertise 

from multiple agencies in the U.S. Government, including the State 

Department, the Department of Defense, and USAID. 

TSCTP does not provide a one-size-fits-all assistance package. As 

the current threat levels prevail in the region, we look at the states 

on a case-by-case basis and adjust the program to meet the needs 

of the countries. 

We will continue to work with the countries in the region to identify capacity, weaknesses, and to ensure that TSCTP programs are 

adequately funded. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to make this brief 

statement, and I will be happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Carson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN

AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the committee, I 

welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our counterterrorism 

approach in Africa’s Sahel region. I look forward to working with the Congress, and 

especially with this committee, to identify appropriate tools to support the efforts 

of the countries in the region to improve their long-term security and constrict the 

ability of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and a variety of criminal networks to exploit the area’s vast territory. 

This hearing is very timely. While the security challenges in the Sahel are not 

new, several attacks in recent months against African and Western targets have 

drawn additional focus to the situation. Key countries in the area, including Algeria, 

Mali, and Mauritania, have intensified efforts to coordinate their activities against 

AQIM and address the region’s short, medium, and long-term vulnerabilities. At the 

same time, we have consulted with African and European partners to identify areas 

where we can more effectively support regional efforts to improve the security environment in the Sahel over the long term. 

The United States can play a helpful supporting role in the regional effort, but 

we must avoid taking actions that could unintentionally increase local tensions or 

lend credibility to AQIM’s claims of legitimacy. First and foremost, we must be sensitive to local political dynamics and avoid precipitous actions which exacerbate 

longstanding and often bloody conflicts. 

AQIM’s ideology and violent tactics are antithetical to the vast majority of people 

in the region and the group’s ability to mobilize significant popular support for its 

objectives has been largely frustrated. It has failed to build and sustain meaningful 

alliances with insurgencies and criminal networks operating in the region. In fact, 

AQIM’s murder of a Malian military officer this summer, the unprecedented execution of a British hostage, and the murder of an American citizen in Mauritania may 

have caused some groups in Northern Mali to sever opportunistic economic arrangements occasionally established to supplement local groups’ efforts to survive in the 

region’s austere environment. By contrast, the perceptions of the United States have 

been generally favorable throughout the Sahel, even during periods when our popularity around the world declined. It is instructive that a 2008 poll involving 18 Muslim countries revealed that Mauritanians had the highest opinion of the United 

States. 

The countries in the region continue to demonstrate the political will to combat 

terrorism and transnational crime. They have explicitly stated that the Sahel’s security is the responsibility of the countries in the region. They have not asked the 

United States to take on a leadership role in counterterrorism efforts and have, in 

fact, clearly signaled that a more visible or militarily proactive posture by the 

United States would be counterproductive. We fully concur that the appropriate 

6 

roles for the United States and other third countries with even more significant 

interests in the region must be to support regional security efforts while continuing 

to provide meaningful development assistance to the more remote areas. Moreover, 

we have emphasized that while the United States will do its part, the burden must 

be shared. 

We recognize, however, that the security environment in the Sahel requires sustained attention to address a wide range of vulnerabilities and capacity deficits. 

There is insufficient capacity to monitor and protect immense swaths of largely 

ungoverned or poorly governed territory. The arid northern half of Mali alone covers 

an area larger than Texas. Niger is the poorest country in the world according to 

the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Mauritania and Mali rank 

near the bottom of the Human Development Index scale. 

The vulnerability of the northern Sahel has not only led AQIM to seek out safe 

havens in the region, but has also enabled the operations of a range of transnational 

criminal networks. Criminal traffickers in human beings, weapons, and narcotics 

also exploit parts of the region. West Africa has emerged as a major transshipment 

area for cocaine flowing from South America to Europe. Narcotrafficking poses a 

direct threat to U.S. interests since the proceeds of cocaine trafficked through the 

region generally flow back to Latin American organizations moving drugs to the 

United States. 

The committee has asked how our counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel relate to 

our long-term goals of good governance, civilian control over security forces, and 

respect for human rights. The first priority President Obama has identified for our 

Africa policy is helping to build strong and stable democracies on the continent. This 

is essential in West Africa. In recent years, the region has witnessed two military 

coups in Mauritania, deeply flawed elections in Nigeria, and an undemocratic seizure of power in Niger. Our experience in the region has underscored the urgency 

of improving governance, strongly promoting the rule of law, developing durable 

political and economic institutions at all levels of society, and maintaining professional security forces under civilian control. 

Meaningful progress in these areas is crucial to the success of ongoing efforts 

against AQIM and other criminal networks. The groups are drawn to areas where 

they can take advantage of political and economic vulnerabilities to safeguard their 

operating spaces and lifelines, cross borders with impunity, and attract recruits. 

They benefit when security forces and border guards lack the necessary training, 

equipment, intelligence, and mobility to disrupt their activities. Their cause is 

advanced when human rights abuses undermine the credibility of security forces. 

Terrorists and criminal organizations also take advantage of weak or corrupt criminal justice systems unable to effectively investigate, prosecute and incarcerate all 

forms of criminals. 

Underdevelopment in key areas represents a critical security challenge in the 

Sahel. The region is extremely diverse and the sources of insecurity in the region 

vary. In Northern Mali, for example, insecurity in isolated border areas and along 

traditional smuggling routes is perpetuated by unmet economic expectations and the 

lack of legitimate alternatives to smuggling or opportunistic commerce with criminal 

networks. Mali is one of Africa’s most stable democracies, but its efforts to address 

insecurity in the northern part of the country are severely hampered by poor infrastructure and the inability to provide adequate service delivery and educational and 

vocational opportunities to isolated areas. This dynamic can become particularly 

problematic in cases where AQIM has provided small amounts of food and other 

consumables to generate good will or at least tolerance from groups living in their 

vicinity. 

Although AQIM’s attempts to recruit in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel have 

been largely unsuccessful, its limited successes in countries such as Mauritania can 

largely be traced to its ability to capitalize on the frustration among the young over 

insufficient educational or vocational opportunities. AQIM has also attracted 

recruits and material support from isolated communities or neighborhoods in Mauritania and elsewhere that lack alternatives to schools, media, or networking centers 

that promote violent extremism. 

The United States primary instrument to advance counterterrorism objectives in 

the Sahel and the Maghreb is the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership 

(TSCTP). TSCTP is a multiyear commitment designed to support partner country 

efforts in the Sahel and the Maghreb to constrict and ultimately eliminate the ability of terrorist organization to exploit the region. The rationale and overarching 

strategy for TSCTP was approved by a National Security Council (NSC) Deputies 

Committee in 2005. TSCTP originally included Algeria, Chad, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia; Burkina Faso was added in 2009. 

7 

TSCTP serves two primary purposes. The program identifies and mobilizes 

resources from throughout the interagency to support sustained efforts to address 

violent extremism in the region. It was understood when TSCTP was created that 

sporadic engagements without adequate followup or sustainment would fail to 

achieve meaningful long-term results in a region with a multitude of basic needs. 

The emphasis was therefore placed on key capacity deficits that could be addressed 

over a period of years. The program draws resources and expertise from multiple 

agencies in the U.S. Government including the State Department, the Department 

of Defense, and USAID. As the threat levels, political environments, and material 

needs differ substantially among the partner countries, most engagements and 

assistance packages under TSCTP are tailored to fit the priorities of the individual 

countries. 

TSCTP was also designed to coordinate the activities of the various implementing 

agencies. The coordination takes place at several levels. Action Officers representing 

the various agencies meet periodically in Washington to coordinate activities and 

share information. Representatives from Washington and AFRICOM also meet regularly with our Embassies in TSCTP countries. The first line of coordination and 

oversight takes place at our Embassies. While various assessments and inputs from 

throughout the interagency inform decisions regarding TSCTP programming, Chiefs 

of Mission must concur with all proposed activities. They are best placed to understand the immediate and long-term implications of various activities and are ultimately the primary interlocutors with the host countries. 

Forming a definitive conclusion at this relatively early stage regarding whether 

our counterterrorism approach in the Sahel is working is difficult, but we believe 

that we are making important progress. For example, TSCTP resources contributed 

to training and equipping more capable and professional security forces in Mauritania. We believe that our work with Mali to support more professional units capable of improving the security environment in the country will have future benefits 

if they are sustained. Our public affairs teams and USAID are implementing a 

range of beneficial exchanges and projects in Mali and promoting outreach to communities potentially vulnerable to extremism in Mauritania, Chad, Senegal, and 

elsewhere. 

The decision in 2005 to focus on long-term capacity-building rather than search 

for quick fixes was clearly correct, even more so given the limited absorptive capacity of these countries. Clear victories against the underlying security and developmental challenges in the region are unlikely to clearly announce themselves in the 

near term, but I am confident that a steady and patient approach provides the best 

opportunity for success. 

The recognition that we must take a holistic approach involving multiple agencies 

was also correct. Efforts to improve interagency coordination and the vital coordination between our missions and program managers in Washington and Stuttgart 

have been crucial. We continue to seek a balance between the financial resources 

for the development and diplomatic pieces of TSCTP and funding devoted to military-to-military activities. We will continue to work toward a balanced approach 

envisioned when the program was created. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Carson. 

Mr. Benjamin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL BENJAMIN, COORDINATOR FOR 

COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Senator Feingold, Ranking Member Senator Isakson, thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to 

you today about the Department’s role in countering terrorism in 

the Sahel region. 

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb continues to menace parts of 

the Maghreb and the Sahel. In the north, it is frustrated by Algeria’s effective counterterrorism operations, but in parts of the 

Sahel, it continues to operate with considerable impunity. 

We are working bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally to 

develop the capacity of countries in the region to control their sovVerDate Nov 24 2008 19:29 May 11, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\SAHEL.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
8 

ereign territory, disrupt terrorist conspiracies, and counter those 

who advocate violence. A well-thought-out, long-term approach provides the best opportunity to ensure our security and that of our 

friends and allies against the terrorist threats from this region. 

AQIM has failed to meet its key objectives and, under pressure 

from Algerian security forces, is on the defensive in Algeria. AQIM 

is financially strapped; indeed, it appears that the Algerians have 

AQIM in the northeastern part of the country increasingly contained and marginalized. The group has largely worn out its welcome in the Kabylie region, where residents have become increasingly resentful of its presence. 

One of the central questions about AQIM has long been whether 

it would be able to establish itself in Europe and carry out attacks 

there. Some of our closest counterterrorism partners in Europe 

have identified this possibility of infiltration as one of their foremost concerns. That said, we currently view the near-term possibility of such an expansion of operations as less likely than it was 

just a few years ago. 

In the Sahel, however, the picture is different. AQIM maintains 

two separate groups of fighters in northern Mali and has recently 

increased attacks and kidnappings, including against Western 

targets. 

The group relies, to a considerable extent, on hostage-taking for 

ransom while carrying out murders and low-level attacks to garner 

media attention. In the last 2 years, AQIM in the Sahel has 

stepped up the pace. It has kidnapped two Austrian tourists along 

the Tunisian/Algerian border in early 2008; two Canadian diplomats in Niger in December 2008; four European tourists near the 

Mali/Niger border in January of this year. 

One of the Europeans, a British hostage, was subsequently murdered by AQIM, as you all know. 

AQIM has also increased other kinds of attacks in the Sahel. 

This year the group killed a Malian official in northern Mali; an 

American NGO worker in nearby Mauritania; and attempted a suicide bombing outside the French Embassy in Mauritania. 

Despite the uptick in violence, hostage-taking, and the murder of 

individual Western citizens, we believe that these operations reveal 

some AQIM weaknesses. AQIM has failed to conduct attacks or 

operations in Morocco, Tunisia, or Libya. The Muslim population in 

the Sahel and the Maghreb, as a whole, still reject AQIM’s extremism. There are exceptions, however, and the increase in AQIM 

recruitment in Mauritania is troubling. 

That said, if we play our cards right, we can further contain and 

marginalize AQIM’s threat to U.S. interests, and we can make 

investments that will be productive and reasonable. 

We’re striving to build countries’ capacity through long-term programs such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. 

We’re also working closely with other key international partners to 

ensure that our collective efforts in the region are well targeted, 

well coordinated, and effective. 

Our quiet, but solid support for their counterterrorism—that is, 

those in the region—has emboldened our partners to stand up to 

extremism. We have been, if you will, leading from the side. These 

9 

partners have shown the will to take on terrorists in the past, and 

we expect that that will continue. 

Our support to military and law enforcement capacity-building 

has led to stronger controlled borders and remote spaces, and that 

continues to improve. Our programs for countering violent extremism—such as radio programming, messaging from moderate leaders, and prison reform—have bolstered the region’s traditionally 

moderate inclinations. 

We believe that our relatively modest efforts in the region are 

paying off and are worthy of continuation. A steady, long-term commitment to building effective security in the region will benefit the 

United States by enabling others to take the lead in stopping 

terrorists in their own countries before those threats reach our 

borders. 

These countries have made it clear that they do not want the 

United States to take a more direct or visible operational role, but 

welcome assistance from the United States and other third countries. 

We are particularly pleased that our regional partners are working together to weaken AQIM, motivated in part by the group’s 

recent atrocities. In August, Algeria hosted a conference for highlevel defense ministry representatives from Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Algeria to coordinate AQIM efforts, and we expect Mali 

to follow that up with a regional heads-of-state summit before the 

end of the year. 

We’re also working with our European partners, with whom we 

met in Paris last month, on this issue, specifically to coordinate 

assistance to our partners in the Sahel and the Maghreb. Additionally, we have met with Canadian officials to discuss cooperation in 

the wake of the hostage-taking of one of their diplomats. 

I should add that capacity-building is not the only contribution 

the Western partners can make to defeating terrorism in the 

region. It is also imperative that we do what we can to remove 

incentives for kidnapping. This administration plans to make a 

broader acceptance of the no-concessions approach an important 

initiative. 

In closing, let me reiterate. We welcome the readiness of our 

partners in the region to take the lead in confronting AQIM, and 

we are pleased about the cooperation among our Western allies as 

we take effective steps to help build security in the Sahel. This cooperation, I strongly believe, will help fulfill the vision of working 

in partnership with other nations in troubled areas that has been 

a hallmark of President Obama’s foreign policy. I believe, also, that 

as we continue to provide support using the TSCTP as our primary 

tool, we will achieve our goal of reducing the danger AQIM possess 

to the region and to American interests. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Benjamin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL BENJAMIN, COORDINATOR FOR

COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Senator Feingold, Ranking Member Senator Isakson, members of the committee, 

thank you for the invitation to speak to you today about the Department’s role in 

countering terrorism in the Sahel region. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 

continues to menace parts of the Maghreb and the Sahel. In the north, it is frustrated by Algeria’s effective counterterrorism operations, but in parts of the Sahel, 

10 

it continues to operate with significant impunity. We are working bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally, to develop their capacity to control their sovereign territory, 

effectively disrupt terrorist attacks, and counter those who advocate violence. A 

well-thought-out, long-term approach provides the best opportunity to ensure our 

security and that of our friends and allies against the terrorist threats from this 

region. 

AQIM has failed to meet its key objectives and, under pressure from Algerian 

security forces, is on the defensive in Algeria. AQIM is financially strapped, particularly in Algeria, and unable to reach its recruiting goals. In the Sahel, they are also 

having difficulties recruiting although the influx of Mauritanian recruits has meant 

that their manpower situation is not as critical as in the north. 

AQIM has historically focused on Algerian targets in the northeastern portion of 

Algeria. After AQIM’s 2006 merger with al-Qaeda, the group has continued to 

attack the Algerian Government and military, while expanding its targeting of 

Western interests in the region. In December 2007, the group conducted sophisticated dual suicide bombings of both the Algerian Constitutional Council and U.N. 

office buildings in Algiers. 

Since then, however, the group’s fortunes have been ebbing. AQIM has been unable to conduct large-scale attacks since summer of 2008, in part due to pressure 

from Algerian forces, which have achieved important successes in breaking up 

extremist cells and disrupting operations. Increasingly, it appears that the Algerians have AQIM in northeastern part of the country increasingly contained and 

marginalized. Nonetheless, AQIM has continued to conduct low-level attacks in 

northeastern Algeria by carrying out ambushes, laying mines, and using small 

explosives, primarily against military checkpoints, gendarmes, police, and army 

vehicles. AQIM has also largely worn out its welcome in the Kabylie region, where 

residents have become increasingly resentful of the group’s presence. Although 

AQIM has never conducted attacks on U.S. diplomatic targets in Algeria, U.S. and 

Western business interests, particularly those linked to oil companies have been targeted in the past, and remain at risk. 

One of the central questions about AQIM has long been whether it would be able 

to establish itself in Europe and carry out attacks there. There is no question but 

that we need to take this possibility very seriously, especially in light of past attacks 

carried out by predecessors to AQIM such as Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in France. 

Some of our closest counterterrorism partners in Europe have identified this possibility of infiltration as one of their foremost concerns. That said, we view the nearterm likelihood of such an expansion of operations as less likely than it was just 

a few years ago. This, in large measure, is because of the pressure on the group 

in Algeria. 

In the Sahel, the picture is different. AQIM maintains two separate groups of 

fighters in Northern Mali, and has recently increased attacks and kidnappings, 

including against Western targets. They rely to a considerable extent on hostagetaking for ransom while carrying out murders, and low-level attacks to garner 

media attention. In the last 2 years, AQIM in the Sahel has stepped up the pace: 

Kidnapped two Austrian tourists along the Tunis-Algerian border in early 2008; two 

Canadian diplomats in Niger in December 2008; and four European tourists near 

the Mali/Niger border in January 2009. One of the Europeans, a British hostage, 

was subsequently murdered by AQIM. 

AQIM has also increased other kinds of attacks in the Sahel, although their capabilities still compare poorly with earlier AQIM operations in Algeria. This year, 

AQIM killed a Malian official in northern Mali, killed an American NGO worker in 

neighboring Mauritania, and attempted a suicide bombing outside the French 

Embassy in Mauritania. In 2007, AQIM fighters killed four French tourists in Mauritania. AQIM in the recent past has attacked Mauritania and Malian security units 

with some success as well, killing 12 Mauritanian soldiers and beheading them in 

one instance and annihilating a Malian unit searching for AQIM elements after the 

murder of the British citizen. 

Despite the uptick in violence, hostage-taking, and murder of individual Western 

citizens, we believe that these operations reveal some AQIM weaknesses. AQIM has 

failed to conduct attacks or operations in Morocco, Tunisia, or Libya. The Muslim 

population in the Sahel and Maghreb, as a whole, still rejects AQIM’s extremism. 

There are exceptions, however, such as the increase in AQIM recruitment of Mauritanians, which is troubling. 

In the future, we view AQIM as posing a persistent threat to Western individuals 

in the Sahel, including our Embassies and diplomats, as well as tourists, businesspeople, and humanitarian workers. I would like to emphasize, however, that AQIM 

represents less of a threat to stability in its region than do al-Qaeda in the Federally Administered Territories in Pakistan or al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in 

11 

Yemen. The group cannot seriously threaten governments or regional stability, nor 

is it poised to gain significant support among the region’s population. AQIM cannot 

drive a wedge between the United States and its partners; it also cannot ignite an 

ethnic-based civil war as al-Qaeda in Iraq nearly did. 

If we play our cards right, we can further contain and marginalize AQIM’s threat 

to U.S. interests, and the investments required are reasonable. 

We are striving to build countries’ capacity through long-term programs such as 

the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). We are also working 

closely with other key international partners to ensure that our collective efforts in 

the region are well targeted, well coordinated, and effective. 

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a multiyear, multiagency commitment designed to support partner efforts in the Sahel and the 

Maghreb to constrain and ultimately eliminate the ability of terrorist organizations 

to exploit the region. The program supports partner efforts to: Build long-term 

capacity to defeat terrorist organizations and facilitation networks; disrupt efforts 

to recruit, train, and provision terrorists and extremists; counter efforts to establish 

safe havens for terrorist organizations; disrupt foreign fighter networks that may 

attempt to operate outside the region; address underlying causes of radicalization; 

and increase the capacity of moderate leaders to positively influence vulnerable populations. It also supports efforts to increase regional and subregional cooperation 

and interoperability, in such areas as communication and intelligence-sharing. 

Our quiet but solid support for their counterterrorism efforts has emboldened our 

partners in the region to stand up to extremism. We have been ‘‘leading from the 

side,’’ if you will. These partners have shown the will to take on terrorists in the 

past. In 2003, for example, Mali, Niger, and Chad worked together to track down 

and arrest the extremist leader al-Para, who was infamous for taking 32 European 

hostages for ransom. In 2005, Algeria, Mauritania, and Mali conducted relatively 

successful joint combat operations against the Salafist Group for Call and Combat 

(GSPC), the precursor group to AQIM, in northwestern Mali. The United States 

supported these operations from the background by providing information and logistics support. Our capacity-building assistance has enabled Niger and Chad to take 

on antiregime rebels successfully. Our support to military and law enforcement 

capacity-building has led to stronger control of borders and remote spaces, and that 

continues to improve. Our programs for countering violent extremism—such as 

radio programming, messaging from moderate leaders, prison reform, and university 

linkages, such as connecting U.S. universities to the Algerian university in Constantine—have bolstered the region’s traditionally moderate inclinations. 

We believe that our relatively modest efforts in the region are paying off and are 

therefore worthy of continuation. A steady, long-term commitment to building effective security in the region will benefit the United States by enabling others to take 

the lead in stopping terrorists in their own countries—before they reach our borders. 

These countries have made it clear that they do not want the United States to take 

a more direct or visible operational role, but welcome assistance from the United 

States and other third-party countries. 

The good news is that Algeria has been relatively successful against AQIM in 

northeastern Algeria. Despite its political turmoil, Mauritania has retained a strong 

interest in working with the United States on counterterrorism issues. Malian Government efforts, including a brief period of stepped-up military operations in mid2009, have also helped to disrupt AQIM operations in the Sahel. We hope that our 

recent deliveries of trucks, communications gear, and nonlethal logistical supplies 

will reinforce an effort that suffered from physical/logistic incapacity issues. We are 

particularly pleased that our regional partners are working together to weaken 

AQIM, motivated in part by AQIM’s most recent atrocities. In August, Algeria 

hosted a conference for high-level Defense Ministry representatives from Mali, 

Niger, Mauritania, and Algeria to coordinate anti-AQIM efforts. Mali plans to host 

a followup regional heads of state summit before the end of the year. That the 

region will to take on AQIM is clear; we should make clear our commitment to enable them to succeed. We remain troubled by the extra-constitutional actions taken 

by President Tandja in Niger to stay in power and we have halted our assistance 

to that country for the time being. 

We are also working with our European partners, whom we met with in Paris last 

month on this issue specifically, to coordinate assistance offered to our partners in 

the Sahel and Maghreb. At the Paris meeting, which included Stephane Gompertz 

and Olivier Chambard from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Charlotte 

Montel from the Foreign Minister’s Cabinet, as well as officials from the European 

Union, Great Britain, and Germany; discussions centered on cooperation in the 

future. Additionally, we have met with Canadian officials to discuss cooperation in 

the wake of the hostage taking of their diplomats. We share the opinion that the 

12 

best way to bolster the regional will to defeat terrorism in the trans-Sahara will 

involve building the law enforcement and military capacity of our regional partners. 

I should add that building capacity is not the only contribution that Western partners can make to defeating terrorism in the region. It is also imperative that we 

do what we can to remove the incentives for kidnapping for ransom. The key will 

be for other countries to embrace a policy of no concessions to hostage takers. This 

administration plans to make broader acceptance of the no-concessions approach an 

important initiative. We have seen that, over time, kidnappers lose interest in 

nationals of countries that adhere to such a policy. 

In closing, let me reiterate: We welcome the readiness of our partners in the 

region to take the lead in confronting AQIM, and we are pleased about the cooperation among our Western allies as we take effective steps to help build security in 

the Sahel. This cooperation, I strongly believe, will help fulfill the vision of working 

in partnership with other nations in troubled areas that has been a hallmark of 

President Obama’s foreign policy. I also believe that as we continue to provide support, using the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership as our primary tool, we 

will achieve our goal of reducing the danger AQIM poses to the region and U.S. 

interests. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Benjamin. 

Mr. Gast. 

STATEMENT OF EARL GAST, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. GAST. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Isakson. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the role 

USAID is playing in the fight against terrorism in Africa’s Sahel 

region. 

Terrorism is a challenge that has plagued U.S. Government work 

around the world. In Africa, our efforts to improve governance and 

create opportunity are increasingly threatened by the emerging 

forces of violent extremism. 

To counter the forces that would derail our progress toward 

development in this fragile region, USAID is working in concert 

with the Departments of Defense and State in the Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership to define how development assistance can most effectively be used to contribute to long-term peace 

and stability. 

Because of the dearth of information about the drivers of extremism in Africa that existed in 2005 when the program started, 

USAID commissioned two studies: one to aggregate and supplement what was known, and one to apply those findings to programs that would address those drivers. 

The studies highlighted the complex nature of extremism and 

showed that an overarching root cause, such as poverty, is often 

just one of many factors that contribute to radicalization; rather, 

a number of factors often work together. For instance, corruption 

undermines state capacity and facilitates the emergence of ungoverned or poorly governed spaces, which, in turn, may provide opportunities for extremist groups and local conflicts to flourish. 

These findings are critical to our decisionmaking and inform 

what interventions will be the most effective toward preventing 

drivers of extremism from spiraling out of control. 

Youth empowerment, education, media, and good governance are 

the four areas where we see the greatest opportunity for local partnerships and progress. Unlike traditional development programs, 

our counterextremism efforts often target narrow populations, and 

13 

we specifically reach out to young men, the group most likely to be 

recruited by extremist groups. 

While it can be different to measure success in countering extremism, we have seen some progress in our efforts. As a result of our 

outreach in Chad, the Association of Nomads and Herders has created a youth branch of its organization. Youth participation in 

organizations like this one helps to build stronger ties with the 

community and provides youth with a voice in society. This type of 

empowerment can greatly reduce the feelings of marginalization 

that feeds into—recruitment into extremist groups. 

In the uranium mining areas of northern Niger, communities 

have formed listening clubs to discuss USAID-funded radio programs on good governance. One club even reports that they are 

pooling funds together to purchase a phone card so that they can 

call the radio station with feedback. 

But, despite the promise of these community-based efforts, 

national governance has seen a setback in Niger. The recent referendum and sham elections have done more to empower the current antidemocratic regime than to provide a voice for the people, 

and we are concerned about the path that regime is taking. 

For our programs to be successful, we must invest in strong local 

partnerships, and our methods of engagement must be nimble and 

creative. Because trends in extremism are fluid, we must constantly reassess our priorities, our progress, and our policies to 

ensure that our work is based on the realities of today. 

Toward this end, we are pleased with our strong and productive 

partnership in the interagency. Sustained engagement within U.S. 

Government, with other donor governments, and with our partners 

in the Trans-Sahara region will be the key to combating extremism 

today and securing peace and stability for years to come. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Isakson. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EARL GAST, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR

FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the role USAID is playing 

in the fight against terrorism in Africa’s Sahel region. 

Terrorism is a challenge that has plagued U.S. Government work around the 

world. In Africa, especially in the trans-Saharan region, our efforts to improve governance and create economic opportunity are increasingly threatened by the emerging forces of violent extremism. To counter the forces that would derail our progress 

toward development in this fragile region, USAID is working in concert with the 

Departments of Defense and State in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). USAID has been committed to TSCTP since its inception in 2005, 

working to define how development assistance can most effectively be used to contribute to long-term peace and stability. 

Because of the dearth of information about extremism in Africa that existed when 

the partnership began, USAID commissioned two studies: one to aggregate and supplement what is known about the drivers of extremism in Africa, and one to take 

those findings and apply them to programs that could address those drivers. These 

exhaustive, peer-reviewed studies have helped create the foundation on which we 

design our development programs. 

The studies highlighted the complex nature of drivers that lead to extremism and 

showed that an overarching ‘‘root cause,’’ such as poverty, is often just one of many 

factors that contribute indirectly to radicalization in Africa. Socioeconomic drivers 

such as social exclusion and unmet economic needs often contribute to the threat 

of violent extremism. Politically, extremism can be driven by the denial of political 

rights and civil liberties, or endemic corruption and impunity for well-connected 

14 

elites. And broader cultural threats—to traditions, values or cultural space—also 

are drivers that may need to be addressed. Our research shows that these drivers 

are neither static nor globally consistent, and they evolve over time. 

A number of factors often work together to contribute to radicalization, and the 

full impact of one factor often depends on whether other factors are present at the 

same time. For instance, as noted in the study, someone who has been marginalized 

socially may only be radicalized if he also has the opportunity to form personal relationships and networks with violent extremists. A person who feels thoroughly 

estranged from mainstream society may drift into violent extremism groups, not primarily because of his anger at being excluded, but because social alienation fuels 

the types of personal relationships and group dynamics that, in turn, facilitate the 

turn to violent extremism. Along similar lines, pervasive corruption undermines 

state capacity, and facilitates the emergence of ‘‘ungoverned,’’ ‘‘undergoverned,’’ 

‘‘misgoverned,’’ or ‘‘poorly governed’’ spaces, which, in turn, may provide opportunities for violent extremist groups. In addition, failed or failing states are creating 

more space for local conflicts to flourish, which may then be co-opted or hijacked 

by transnational terrorist networks. These findings are critical to our policy and programming decisions and will inform what interventions will be the most effective 

toward preventing drivers from spiraling, how to monitor our progress, and how to 

integrate counterterrorism concerns into our future efforts. 

Combined with country assessments, these findings have led us to focus our work 

on maintaining low levels of violent extremist threat in Chad, Niger, Mali, and 

Mauritania by reducing the drivers we identified through activities that strengthen 

resiliencies and communicate messages among at-risk groups. USAID’s TSCTP 

approach has concentrated on youth empowerment, education, media, and good 

governance—the four areas where we see the greatest opportunity for local partnerships and progress. Each activity is tailored to meet the specific threat levels, 

political environments, and material needs of each country. Unlike traditional development programs, our counterextremism efforts, when necessary, target narrow 

populations that generally aren’t reached by other programs. We also specifically 

reach out to young men—the group most likely to be recruited by extremist groups. 

In Niger, we have been building the capacity of local leaders to launch and sustain community development projects. In Mali, the 11 community radio stations 

we’re building will reach 385,000 people with messages of peace-building, governance, and education. And in Chad, we are developing conflict mitigation and community stabilization projects that reach into the country’s remote north. 

While it can be difficult to measure success in countering extremism, we have 

seen some progress in our efforts. As a result of our outreach in Chad, the Association of Nomads and Herders has created a youth branch of its organization, which 

has given those young men who participate greater stature in their community. The 

promotion of youth participation in organizations such as this one helps to build 

stronger ties between youth and their communities, and provides them with a voice 

in society. Empowering youth in this way can greatly reduce the feeling of marginalization that feeds recruitment into extremist groups. 

In northern Mali, where one of the underlying drivers of extremism is the lack 

of educational opportunity, a USAID radio-based program has trained more than 

1,400 teachers in 217 schools. 

And in Niger, our early partnership with a local imam has directly resulted in 

more than a dozen madrassas adding a course on peace and tolerance to their 

curricula. 

In the uranium-mining areas of northern Niger communities have formed listening clubs to discuss USAID-funded radio programs on good governance. One listening club even reports that they are pooling funds to purchase a phone card so that 

they can call the radio station with their feedback. 

But despite the promise of these community-based efforts, national governance 

has seen a major setback in Niger. The recent referendum and sham elections have 

done more to empower the current antidemocratic regime than to provide a voice 

for the people, and we are concerned about the path the regime is taking. As a 

result, most development assistance has been frozen, and programs that work with 

local officials and provide skills training to young people are now on hold, though 

our work in media is ongoing. 

Similarly, in Mauritania, our work was curtailed by the August 2008 coup d’etat. 

However, with Mauritania’s return to constitutional order following the signing of 

the Dakar Accord and July 2009 elections, we are again focusing on strengthening 

democracy and human rights. 

The FY 2010 request for $32 million in development assistance and economic support funds for TSCTP seeks to build on these programs through more robust programming reaching a greater number of people, particularly youth, and a possible 

15 

scaling-up of activities to additional countries such as Burkina Faso, where we plan 

to conduct an assessment in the near future. This continued funding in the base 

budget will allow USAID to develop long-term staffing and procurement plans to 

ensure we continue to make progress countering extremism through strategic development programming. 

For our programs to be successful, we must invest in strong local partnerships 

and our methods of engagement must be nimble and creative. Because trends in 

extremism are fluid, we must constantly reassess our priorities, our progress, and 

our policies to ensure that our work is based on the realities of today. 

Toward this end, we are pleased with our strong and productive partnership with 

the Departments of Defense and State on the planning and implementation of 

TSCTP, as well as our work with other donors on coordinating efforts to counter 

extremism. Sustained engagement—within the U.S. Government, with other donor 

governments, and with our partners in the trans-Sahara region—will be the key to 

combating extremism today and securing peace and stability for years to come. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Senator Isakson, and members of the subcommittee for your continued support for USAID and our programs. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Gast. 

Ms. Huddleston. 

STATEMENT OF HON. VICKI HUDDLESTON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICA, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Chairman Feingold and Ranking 

Member Isakson, thank you for the invitation to testify today about 

the Department of Defense’s role in the Sahel region. 

DOD is the third pillar of the 3–D approach—diplomacy, development, and defense—in the Sahel and Maghreb region to address 

the challenges posed by al-Qaeda in the land of the Islamic 

Maghreb known, as you said, Mr. Chairman, as AQIM. 

Under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, we have 

a comprehensive approach that addresses political, developmental, 

and defense issues. Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, Coordinator for Counterterrorism Dan Benjamin, and USAID Senior 

Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa Earl Gast have all addressed the underlying political, ethnic, and geographic challenges. 

So, I will focus my remarks principally on the military dimension. 

The Department of Defense, through primarily the U.S. Africa 

Command, is supporting an overarching U.S. Government strategy 

to counter AQIM in the Sahel and north Africa. The principal DOD 

activity supporting the TSCTP effort is Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans-Sahara, OEF–TS, which focuses on building the capacity of regional militaries, so that they can counter the presence of 

AQIM and prevent terrorist operations in those areas. 

In addition, through our DOD military training, equipping, and 

advising activities, we seek to foster greater coordination and cooperation among the security institutions in the region. 

We believe that the long-term solution must be that each nation 

is capable of governing and controlling its territory with professional militaries accountable to civilian governments that have the 

support of local populations. If this is not the case, then those who 

espouse violent extremism and acts of terrorism, even if temporarily deterred, will return to the ungoverned spaces. 

DOD military cooperation programs and activities span a broad 

spectrum, from relatively simple outreach and humanitarianrelated efforts through academic courses and education programs, 

to tactical and operational-level training and exercises, sharing 

16 

military advise, information, and equipment, to enable our partner 

nations to carry out military operations. 

The U.S. Africa Command train and liaison missions use our special forces in support of the OEF–TS mission objectives throughout 

the Sahel. 

Algeria and Mali are critical to leading and resolving the challenge posed by AQIM. The AQIM leadership is headquartered in 

Algeria, the majority of its members are Algerian, and most of its 

attacks, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, have been against Algerian targets. AQIM’s rear base, or safe haven, has been in Mali 

since 2002. Near neighbors, namely Mauritania, Niger, and Chad, 

have all been negatively impacted by AQIM attacks over the past 

several years. 

Our military relationship with Algeria is designed to support our 

mutual security interests. Algeria is working with Mali to bring the 

region together around a common solution acceptable to the countries that are directly involved. Algeria—indeed, the region and our 

allies, as Mr. Benjamin pointed out—believe that a solution is only 

possible when the response is coordinated and implemented 

through a regional approach. 

Mali is a major recipient of DOD military cooperation efforts in 

the Sahel, receiving equipment in FY 2009, through security assistance resources, as well as section 1206 authority. In addition, 

DOD has carried out over 10 training events with the Malian military throughout the year, an extremely high tempo for operations 

and tactical training. 

President Amadou Toure and the chief of the Malian military, 

General Poudiougou, have consistently expressed their appreciation 

for our assistance in helping them address the challenges posed by 

AQIM, and President Toure has said that he is committed to a 

regional summit to coordinate efforts across the board to counter 

AQIM. 

DOD military cooperation activities with Mauritania were suspended in August 2008, following the military coup there. Military 

cooperation is now restarting, following this country’s return to a 

constitutional system in July 2009. AFRICOM planning has 

already begun, with exercises and training to start after January 

2010, and possibly equipment enhancement starting at the end of 

FY10. Unfortunately, our cooperation with Niger is limited because 

of President Tandja’s suspension of the constitution. U.S. military 

cooperation with Niger prior to January 2008 was good and similar 

in scope and effort to the current activities in Mali. We hope that 

President Tandja will return to a democratic and constitutional 

framework so that AFRICOM can again work with Niger. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me ask you to conclude, if I could. 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON [continuing]. Oops—your invitation 

letter asked me to address our interagency coordination related to 

our Sahel programs. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership is a good example of bringing together State, USAID, and 

DOD to address an issue that impacts the stability and growth up 

the north and west Africa. 

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss DOD’s efforts and 

AFRICOM’s role as part of the larger USG government effort in 

17 

addressing the challenges posed by AQIM in the Sahel and 

Maghreb regions of Africa. My colleagues and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Huddleston follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. VICKI HUDDLESTON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY

FOR AFRICA, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Senator Feingold, Senator Isakson, members of the committee, thank you for the 

invitation to speak to you today about DOD’s role in the Sahel region. DOD is the 

third pillar of the ‘‘3–D approach—Diplomacy, Development, and Defense—in the 

Sahel and Maghreb region to address the challenges posed by al-Qaeda in the Lands 

of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 

The DOD through primarily U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is supporting 

an overarching U.S. Government (USG) strategy to counter terrorism—specifically 

al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—in the Sahel and North 

Africa. The principal tools for doing so are the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans-Sahara (OEF–TS), 

which seek to build the capacity of regional militaries so that they can counter the 

presence of AQIM and prevent their operations within their countries. In addition, 

through our military training, equipping, and advising efforts, we seek to foster 

greater coordination and cooperation among the security institutions in the region. 

We believe that the long-term solution must be that each nation is capable of controlling its territory because it has the support of it citizens while maintaining the 

military capacity to ensure stability. If this is not the case, then those who espouse 

violent extremism and acts of terrorism, even if temporarily defeated, will return 

to the ungoverned spaces. 

Under TSCTP we have a comprehensive approach that addresses political, developmental, and defense issues. Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism Dan Benjamin, and USAID Acting Administrator for Africa Earl 

Gast, have addressed the underlining political, ethnic, and geographic challenges, so 

I will focus my remarks principally on the military dimension. However, the military aspect of our combined strategy cannot effectively move forward without the 

political will and buy-in by the regional partners themselves. 

Algeria and Mali are critical to leading and resolving the AQIM challenge. The 

AQIM leadership is headquartered in Algeria and most of its attacks have been 

against Algerian targets. The majority of its members are Algerian; however, 

Mauritanians now make up a substantial number of AQIM’s foot soldiers. AQIM’s 

rear base or safe haven has been in Mali since 2002, when its predecessor organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), moved 15 European 

hostages into the Malian Sahara Desert from Algeria. Near neighbors, namely Mauritania, Niger, and Chad, have all been negatively impacted over the past several 

years by the GSPC and its successor AQIM. Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Libya, and 

Morocco, could also be future targets of opportunity where AQIM could attempt to 

recruit, link up with like-minded organizations, or carry out terrorists attacks. 

I recently met with the Algerian leadership, including the Minister of State for 

African and Maghreb Affairs, the Presidential Advisor on Terrorism, and the Minister-Delegate for the Ministry of National Defense, who all expressed their desire 

not only to cooperate with the USG and our allies, but also to lead the region in 

facing this challenge. To this end. Algeria has already moved forward by organizing 

in August of this year a meeting of the military Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) of Mali, 

Mauritania, and Niger in Tamanrraset, Algeria. The CHODs agreed to establish a 

united command which will rotate among these militaries. We believe that this initiative is critical to dealing with the AQIM challenge. 

The other side of regional military coordination is the political commitment among 

the regional partners to a comprehensive strategy that addresses the developmental 

and political issues as well as the security and stability issues. During my visit to 

Mali in June, President Toure informed U.S. Ambassador Milovanovic and me that 

he is committed to hosting a Bamako summit that would address achieving a 

regional agreement on the way forward against AQIM. We consider this summit 

critical to the region’s success. It would also provide a framework in which the USG 

and our European partners could provide assistance that would support regional 

development and security. 

General Ward, Commander of AFRICOM, is also scheduled to travel to both Mali 

and Algeria in the next few weeks to consult on the progress in planning for the 

Bamako summit and other collaborative initiatives for the region. 

18 

DOD military cooperation in the Sahel is conducted primarily through the authorities and resources of OEF–TS. OEF–TS is the DOD contribution to the larger 

counterterrorism effort of TSCTP, which I mentioned earlier and of which you’ve 

heard from my colleagues here today. Executed under the operational control of 

USAFRICOM, led by General Ward, the objectives of OEF–TS flow from the TSCTP 

strategy, using military cooperation programs and activities to build military capacity in our African partners to reduce the availability of the Sahel region as a safe 

haven and operational support, resupply, and sustainment area for AQIM. 

DOD military cooperation programs and activities span a broad spectrum from 

relatively simple outreach and humanitarian-related efforts, through academic 

courses and education programs, tactical and operation-level training and exercises, 

up to sharing of military information and providing equipment to enable partner 

nation military operations. 

DOD, through USAFRICOM training and liaison missions, has deployed to several countries in the region to support achievement of OEF–TS mission objectives. 

In this region, DOD has deployed teams including: the Joint Planning Advisory 

Teams (or ‘‘JPAT’’) that work closely with embassies to schedule, support, and synchronize the multiple training events occurring across this region; Civil-Military 

Support Elements (or ‘‘CMSE’’) that coordinate DOD humanitarian and other civic 

action projects; and Military Information Support Teams (or ‘‘MIST’’ teams), that 

work closely with Embassy Public Affairs officers to positively counter the messages 

of violent extremism and proactively project U.S. efforts, particularly those by the 

U.S. military. 

When we look, at AQIM, Algeria is the focus and primary target of their attacks. 

Our military relationship with Algeria is designed to support our mutual security 

interests. Algeria is working to bring the region together around a common solution 

acceptable to the countries that are directly involved. Algeria believes—as we do— 

that a solution is only possible when the response is coordinated and implemented 

together. As I mentioned earlier, Algeria organized a meeting of CHODs in August 

in Tamarraset to coordinate a military approach. This effort, however, is dependent 

upon an endorsement by the political leadership in the region. This endorsement 

could be possible through the long-awaited Bamako summit that I mentioned earlier. Algerian officials told me that they remain committed to a regional approach. 

Mali is a critical player. It is a recipient of DOD military cooperation efforts in the Sahel, receiving over $10M in equipment in FY09 through security assistance 

resources as well as the section 1206 authority. In addition, DOD spent over $5M 

in FY09 through OEF–TS in Mali conducting over 10 training events with the 

Malian military throughout the year—an extremely high tempo for operations and 

tactical training. I visited Mali in June of this year, meeting with President Toure 

and General Pougiougou, the chief of the Malian military. They expressed their appreciation for our assistance in helping them address the challenges posed by AQIM. 

President Toure stated his commitment to a regional summit, however, we would 

like to see Mali take a more proactive stand in combating AQIM. 

With respect to Mauritania, while all DOD military cooperation activities with 

Mauritania were suspended in August 2008 following the military coup, DOD is 

restarting military cooperation following Mauritania’s return to a constitutional system following democratic elections in July 2009. DOD outreach activities with Mauritania have already begun, with exercises and training to start after January 2010, 

and possible equipment enhancements starting near the end of FY10. 

Unfortunately our cooperation with Niger is limited because of President Tandja’s 

decision to suspend the constitution. Past U.S. military cooperation with the 

Nigerien military was good and was similar in scope and effort to current activities 

with Mali. However, DOD military cooperation with Niger was terminated in compliance with growing U.S. policy restrictions against Niger due to President Tandja’s 

actions. We hope that the Nigerien Government will return to a democratic and constitutional framework, so that DOD can again work with the Nigerien military to 

address the challenges posed by AQIM in the Sahel. 

Your invitation letter asked me to talk about our interagency coordination related 

to our Sahel programs. In my opinion, TSCTP is an excellent example of how interagency coordination should work. While our Departments’ and Agencies’ programs 

are typically separately funded and implemented, in the case of TSCTP, there is 

close collaboration between the State Department, USAID, and DOD, including in 

annual planning, leveraging appropriate resources from multiple and disparate programs, monthly interagency teleconferences between Washington organizations and 

the field (including our Embassies and USAFRICOM, and synchronizing scheduling 

and implementation of activities on the ground in our partner nations. 

I assess that the greatest challenge to our regional partner’s security forces is due 

to the vast distances and harsh environment of the Sahara. This vast, sparsely popVerDate Nov 24 2008 19:29 May 11, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\SAHEL.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
19 

ulated region, has a long tradition of trade and routes that carry whatever goods 

are traded. In addition, there are preexisting tensions and wide porous borders that 

also contribute to the region’s challenges. It is the geographic and environmental 

realities of this region that is used by AQIM to find refuge in the vast, undergoverned spaces. Our partner nations have a daunting challenge from a security perspective in maintaining awareness, monitoring their borders and providing the necessary security functions traditional of a government to its population. 

I’d like to again say thank you for this opportunity to discuss DOD’s role as part 

of the larger U.S. Government team addressing the challenges posed by AQIM in 

the Sahel and Maghreb region in Africa. My colleagues and I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ms. Huddleston. And thank all of 

you. 

Let’s start with the rounds—7-minute rounds—in the hope that 

each of us could get a round in before the votes start. 

Ambassador Benjamin, as you cite in your testimony, there’s 

been a long concern about AQIM’s ability to establish itself in 

Europe and carry out attacks there. You’ve said that, ‘‘We view the 

near-time likelihood of such an expansion of those operations as 

less likely than before.’’ But, as you know, the AP recently reported 

the arrest, in Italy and elsewhere in Europe, of 17 Algerians suspected of raising money to finance terrorism. Do we believe that 

AQIM is still trying to gain a foothold and carry out attacks in 

Europe? And to what extent does this continue to be a pressing 

concern for our European partners? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Senator Feingold, it certainly remains a 

high concern for our European partners. I think that, at the 

moment, it would be safe to characterize AQIM activity outside of 

Africa, and particularly in Europe, as being aspirational and focused, at the moment, more on fundraising and logistics; and they 

have not yet acquired an operational capability on the continent. 

That said, it remains a high priority. But judging by what we 

know about the goings-on within the group and also the very 

strong capacities of Algerian law enforcement and also French 

intelligence, we believe that the group’s ability to project itself has 

been somewhat degraded and that, as I said in my testimony, it’s 

probably less likely than before. 

That said, we are always confronted with the same problem in 

terrorism, and that is, it’s an arena in which small numbers can 

make a big difference and you can’t ensure that you can detect 

every small number, every operative, every small cell. I think we 

are fairly confident in our assessment, but, nonetheless, we can’t 

be absolutely certain that nothing would happen. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Your testimony states that, ‘‘Our 

capacity-building assistance has enabled Niger and Chad to take 

on antiregime rebels successfully.’’ Is this a reference to AQIM or 

to other opponents of the regimes? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. It’s primarily a reference to other rebel 

groups, Senator. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And isn’t that outside the scope of the TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership? Isn’t there some risk that, 

if we’re providing general support to these abusive governments, 

that we could fuel anti-American attitudes and undermine our 

overarching counterterrorism goals? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. It is certainly true that the fundamental 

target of this assistance is al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, but, as a 

20 

general rule, this is about capacity-building, and capacity-building 

often allows governments to strengthen themselves and extend 

their controls over larger areas of territory. 

Perhaps Secretary Carson would like to add to that. 

Ambassador CARSON. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that we are 

constantly monitoring how our assistance is used by different governments, not only in the Sahel, but across Africa. The last thing 

that we want to do is to provide bad governments with the capacity 

to inflict harm on their people, to carry out human rights violations. So, we do monitor these assistance programs very, very carefully. 

And in the case of a country like Chad—Chad has been subject 

to invasions from rebels coming across the border from Sudan, and, 

in some of those instances, it is believed that those rebels have 

received assistance from foreign governments. In those instances, 

we think that it is important to help governments strengthen their 

capacity to defend against rebel groups and rebel incursions. 

Now, our assistances may not, in fact, exclusively be from or out 

of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program, but 

may come from other assistance that we provide. One of the other 

points we’re also making when we extend assistance to the government of a country like Chad is that it is important that their militaries operate under civilian control, that they follow human rights 

norms that are universal, and that they not act against their 

citizens. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, obviously it’s terribly important that we 

get this right. The nature of these regimes is not something to be 

very comfortable with vis-a-vis this kind of activity. So, whether it’s 

part of the Trans-Sahel or some other source of funding, this is 

something that I’m going to want to monitor closely and be as fully 

informed as possible with regard to non-AQIM uses of this capacity 

that we’re help building. 

Ambassador Benjamin, AQIM’s activity cuts across several countries and involves both the Bureau of African Affairs and the 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the State Department. What 

mechanisms exist to encourage information-sharing and collaboration among the relevant embassies and these two bureaus, and 

what role does your office play in ensuring that State has a coordinated approach to dealing with AQIM? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Senator, thank you for that question. 

One of the virtues of the TSCTP is that it has led us to create, 

I think, a more robust coordinating mechanism than we have for 

many other areas of the world. There is a standing interagency 

working group for the Trans-Sahara, which meets regularly on a 

monthly basis in Washington, with action officers from State, OSD, 

and USAID, to discuss issues. There are an enormous number of 

daily contacts. We also have a regular monthly videoconference 

with AFRICOM. TSCTP has annual conferences that include DCMs 

or ambassadors from all the embassies in the region, as well as 

representatives from across the interagency. We also host two 

regional strategic initiative meetings per year that include the 

ambassadors and senior interagency representatives. It was the 

first RSI that I had the pleasure of addressing. 

21 

So, I think that this is one very well-coordinated process. There’s 

always room for improvement, but I think that we’re pleased with 

the way it has worked and that it’s a model for cooperation in other 

geographical areas. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Benjamin. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Carson—and this may apply to someone else as well; 

feel free to chime in—we had a hearing a few weeks ago on narcotrafficking in West Africa, and with AQIM in that area, are they 

being financed, in part or in whole by narcotrafficking? 

Ambassador CARSON. The AQIM groups that are operating in the 

Sahel are engaged in a lot of illicit activities, including smuggling 

across the border, and probably to include some narcotrafficking, as 

well. 

We don’t have specifics on precisely how they get all of their 

money, but we do know that they engage in smuggling goods, 

smuggling and trafficking people, probably moving illegal drugs, 

and, most recently, engaging in high-profile kidnappings for ransom of Europeans. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Daniel, we had a death of a British citizen, I believe, in Mali 

or Mauritania, an American citizen there, as well. What is the level 

of cooperation with those governments in bringing those who perpetrated those crimes to justice? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. As a general rule, Senator, the level of 

cooperation is very high. In fact, one of my colleagues from the 

British Embassy is right behind me. We have met multiple times 

on a range of counterterrorism issues, including this one. I was in 

Ottawa last month to discuss this and other relevant issues with 

Canadian officials. In general, we are in touch on a very close and 

regular basis to do what we can both to prevent such kidnappings 

and hostage-takings and murders, and to deal with them when 

they happen, but also to track down the offenders and bring them 

to justice. And there’s close cooperation with regional partners, as 

well. 

Senator ISAKSON. Was either of those crimes tied to AQIM? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I believe they both were. 

Senator ISAKSON. They both were. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Yes. The American NGO worker and the 

British hostage, Dyer, were both, I believe, victims of AQIM. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I know we, unfortunately, had a Georgian, who was a Peace Corps volunteer that was murdered in 

Benin earlier this year, and I want to say again, how much I 

appreciate the Government of Benin, which is in the region, it’s not 

a part of the partnership, I don’t think, but it’s just south of 

there—they’ve done a wonderful job in helping to bring justice to 

the perpetrator of that crime. 

Mr. Gast, you made an interesting comment in your remarks, 

and I wrote it down. You talked about ‘‘strategies, given the realities of the day.’’ And then you made a reference to the four areas 

you were focusing on, which were youth empowerment, education, 

government, and then young men. 

22 

I have found in my travels to Africa that some of the efforts 

we’re working on relate to reducing the vulnerability of young African men to be exploited or misdirected, for lack of a better term, 

because it is a serious problem in many African countries. Are you 

developing any programs that deal directly with young African 

men? 

Mr. GAST. Very good question, and it’s something that we’ve been 

struggling with for more than a year, is looking at the youth bulge 

and looking at many of the states that are in conflict now throughout the continent, or just emerging from conflict. There is a very 

large youth population and a very large young male population, 

and we’re seeing violence perpetrated by young men in southern 

Sudan, and we’re coming up with country-specific or region-specific 

approaches in trying to deal with those issues. 

We in AID also have recognized that this is a big issue, and not 

just in Africa, but also in Asia, and we’re coming up with an 

agency strategy and approach to addressing the issues related to 

young men—unemployed young men; idle young men. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I—my observation is—and I have not 

been to any of the countries—well, I have been to Algeria and 

Tunisia, but I haven’t been to any of the ones directly involved 

here—but, in my travels in South and Central Africa and in Sudan 

and Ethiopia, it seems like the single largest vulnerability we have 

is to get the energies and direction of these young men out of nefarious activity and into some type of productive economic activity. 

For many women, this has been done in terms of the Village Savings and Loan programs and things of that nature. 

I appreciate your answer on that, because I think it is a critically 

important thing to do. 

Ms. Huddleston, you mentioned AFRICOM and some visibility or 

support in the counterterrorism partnership. Is some of that coming out of our deployments in Djibouti? 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

The most of the support that we do under the Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans-Sahara is from, what we call, SOCAF, our 

Special Forces of the Africa Command. And so, although Djibouti 

supports, it’s mainly out of Stuttgart and component commands 

from the Special Forces. 

And I wondered if I could just go back one moment to the chairman’s question regarding our accountability of our training of 

forces in the region. 

Senator ISAKSON. Please. 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Senator Feingold, I’d just like to point 

out that I think we’ve been particularly good on this one. In Mali, 

of course, they have remained democratic and the forces that we’ve 

provided—JSETs to, as well as train and equip, have been the 

forces that are focused on the AQIM; in other words, the region to 

Timbuktu and the Gao region where those—where the AQIM is 

active. 

In the case of Chad, we actually redirected a train-and-equip because we were dissatisfied with the chain of command. That has 

now been resolved. 

In the case of Niger, of course, we have suspended our assistance. And in the case of Mauritania, we suspended our assistance; 

23 

and now we’ll resume. But, again, that training and those—that 

assistance will be directed at military capacity that is directed at 

counterterrorism activities. 

So, just—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON [continuing]. To clarify a bit. 

Senator ISAKSON. That’s all, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I’m going to continue until the vote starts, 

and we’ll leave the record open for this panel so we can ask additional questions if we like. 

But, let me go to Assistant Secretary Carson. As you know, the 

GAO study released in July 2008 found that the Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership suffered from a lack of comprehensive integrated strategy. Given that the Africa Bureau is the program lead, I’d like to ask you now: Is there now a comprehensive 

integrated strategy that has been agreed to be the interagency? 

Ambassador CARSON. We are still working off of the previous 

documents with respect to strategy, but the strategy that we’re 

using, Mr. Chairman, focuses on several elements. One is to deter 

violent extremism and to put programs in place that will help prevent violent extremism from taking root in various countries. The 

second part of the strategy is to build security capacity within the 

various African militaries in the region. And the third is to 

strengthen the coalition and the regional cooperation among states. 

These remain a core part of our activity: deterring extremism, 

building security capacity, and strengthening regional focus. 

We, here in Washington, work extraordinarily closely together, 

as Ambassador Dan Benjamin has pointed out in his testimony. We 

are in frequent contact, coordinating our efforts in the field and our 

strategic efforts back here in Washington. 

We—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. A little more specifically, what mechanisms 

exist for the interagency to review and assess the appropriateness 

and progress of specific activities in light of this strategy? 

Ambassador CARSON. Well, we do, in fact, get together, under the 

guidance of the NSC, and we also meet regularly within the State 

Department, under various mechanisms that have been outlined 

for myself and for Ambassador Huddleston and for Special Coordinator Dan Benjamin, to review where we are, review the progress 

that we’re making in the field, and review what we need to do to 

modify and adjust our core elements in the strategy. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, sir. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Huddleston, you have a unique vantage point, given your experience as previous U.S. Ambassador to 

Mali, and we were there together, as you, I’m sure, remember. As 

you know, the Malian military has engaged this year in several 

military confrontations with AQIM. Have these been successful 

engagements? And, more broadly, what are the greatest needs of 

the Malian military and other militaries in the Sahel as they seek 

to combat AQIM and carry out effective counterterrorism? 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I 

remember your visit very well; in fact, you said it was one of the 

better USAID projects, if not the best—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. It was excellent. 

24 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON [continuing]. That you had ever seen. 

[Laughter.] 

Thank you. 

Mali has been a good partner, but Mali lacks capacity. And so, 

it is sometimes also hesitant in the way in which it carries out its 

operations. 

Right now, in order to address that issue, we are providing $3.5 

million through the Department of State to help them improve 

their logistics capacity, as well as their training. And this is continuing to be an enormous problem for Mali, because the area up 

there, as you know so well, Senator, above the Niger River is so 

vast. I think that area itself is about the size of Texas. And there 

have been two Tuareg rebellions in that area. And as a result, in 

many ways Mali has lost the capacity to govern successfully in that 

area. 

And so, long-term success depends upon its ability both to reestablish its security presence, something that we are trying to help 

them do, along with the State Department, as well as to have the 

support of the people, both the Tuaregs and the Berabiche, in the 

area. 

I think you saw this one operation in which a number of Malian 

military were killed. I think that showed, in itself, that they were— 

there was a resolve on the Malian part to try to face this threat. 

But, it also showed that sometimes they’re not—they don’t have 

the capacity to do it as well as they should. 

And that’s why this Algerian/Malian initiative, at which they 

held in Tamanrasset with the chiefs of staff of the various defense 

organizations of Niger, Mauritania, Mali, and Algeria, is so important. Because the only really effective way to address this challenge 

is for the region to address it together. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

Mr. Gast, when USAID carries out assessments to identify communities most at risk to violent extremist organizations or ideology, what are the characteristics that you’re really looking for? 

And how specifically has USAID adapted its development programs 

to try to target these kinds of risk factors? 

Mr. GAST. Yes, thank you, Senator Feingold. 

Recently, within the last year, we had a final version of our Drivers of Extremism paper, as well as our programming options, which 

we peer tested. And, from that, we have used—we have come up 

with an analytical framework that we’re using in the countries. 

And we’ve used this analytical framework in all four of the primary 

participating countries. And we’re looking at areas that are most 

vulnerable to violent extremism. And so, that would be, for instance, areas where there’s marginalization; it could be ethnic conflict, it could be high unemployment. And so, it depends on the 

region. 

And, for example, in Mauritania, we have determined—and by 

the way, these assessments are done on an interagency basis, so 

it’s not just AID; State Department officers, DOD officers participate in the assessments, as well—in Mauritania, we’ve determined 

that the youth who’ve come into the city are most vulnerable to 

messages of violent extremism. So, the program is urban-targeted. 

25 

In Mali, for instances, it is in the north, and—as well as Niger, also 

in the north. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Just one question, and Secretary Carson, I’ll 

ask you, but somebody else might answer it. 

The eastern border of Chad borders western Sudan, which is 

where Darfur is, and in the displacement and the tremendous refugee problem that we have there, a lot of those people were—in 

Darfur—were displaced by Chadian rebels. Is there any evidence, 

that you know of that AQIM-supported, in whole or in part? 

Ambassador CARSON. Senator, no, we have no indication that 

AQIM has been operating in that part of Africa along the Chad 

border with Sudan. No indication whatsoever. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. One more quick question for Deputy Assistant Secretary Huddleston. 

Assistant Secretary Carson’s testimony states that, ‘‘Chiefs of 

mission must concur with all proposed activities,’’ related to 

TSCTP. Can you assure the committee of the Department of 

Defense’s unqualified support for this principle? 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Yes, Senator, I can, and I would cite 

the fact that General Ward has been very conscientious in always 

going to the ambassadors and making sure that the ambassadors 

in each of the countries are comfortable with and support whatever 

activity we are engaged in. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you, and I thank all the panelists. We 

will recess at this point, because the votes are about to start. I’m 

hoping we’ll be able to come back and begin with the second panel 

in roughly 45 minutes. 

I thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. Call the hearing back to order. 

Thank you for your patience. And it was almost exactly 45 minutes, so I thank the second panel for waiting. 

And, at this point, I would like to ask Ms. Lianne KennedyBoudali to give her testimony. And, of course, we’d be more than 

happy to put your full statement in the record. 

STATEMENT OF LIANNE KENNEDY-BOUDALI, SENIOR 

PROJECT ASSOCIATE, RAND CORPORATION, ARLINGTON, VA 

Ms. KENNEDY-BOUDALI. Thank you, Chairman Feingold. 

It’s my honor to be here. I have been asked to provide an assessment of threats to the Sahel from al-Qaeda in the Lands of the 

Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, and other extremists groups. 

Insecurity in the Sahel is not a new condition, and although recent terrorist incidents have drawn greater attention to the region, 

terrorism is not the primary problem. Weak states, ineffective governance, civil conflict, smuggling of goods and people, drug and 

weapons trafficking, and criminality all contribute to insecurity in 

the region. 

The problems of poor education, a lack of economic opportunity, 

and poor social mobility create an environment in which AQIM’s 

recruitment messages find an audience. AQIM has the capacity to 

26 

threaten U.S. citizens and U.S. interests in the region; however, 

the group is not in a position to destabilize any of the states in the 

Sahel, and it is not likely to form the nucleus of a Taliban-like 

insurgency. 

I would like to briefly discuss AQIM’s current activities in the 

Sahel. 

In September 2006, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, the 

GSPC, declared its allegiance to Osama bin Laden, and became an 

al-Qaeda affiliate in January 2007 by changing its name to ‘‘the alQaeda Organization in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb.’’ 

AQIM’s goal—the overthrow of the Algerian state—has not 

changed since the merger, although the group has increased its 

rhetorical attacks on the West, and it has greatly expanded its outreach to jihadists in the region. AQIM has incorporated increasingly sophisticated IED technology into its attacks against Algerian 

security services, and it began conducting suicide attacks in 2007. 

Suicide attacks make up a small percentage of AQIM’s attacks, 

however, and the deadliness of these attacks has been decreasing 

over time. 

AQIM’s association with al-Qaeda may have provided new 

sources of external donations, but the group still appears to get 

most of its funds from its own criminal activities, including kidnapping and smuggling in Algeria and the Sahel, and from petty crime 

in Europe. 

AQIM has capitalized on insecurity in the Sahel to maintain safe 

havens in Mali and Mauritania, but its ability to operate beyond 

Algeria depends on maintaining cooperative relationships with the 

Tuareg and Berabiche tribes in the region. 

AQIM’s alliance with al-Qaeda allowed it to attract fighters from 

the Sahel, but, despite this, the group does not appear to be gaining strength. The recent expansion of activity into Mauritania and 

Mali is taking place in part because AQIM has been increasingly 

constrained in Algeria, and because it has been unable to organize 

operational cells in Morocco, Libya, or Tunisia. 

AQIM’s strict interpretation of Islam holds little appeal in the 

Sahel, and its recent actions in Mali—the execution of a British 

hostage in May and the assassination of a Malian military officer 

in June—may have put its safe haven in jeopardy. 

The group also suffers from internal personality conflicts and has 

lost many of its experienced fighters to the Algerian Government’s 

amnesty programs and its aggressive counterterrorist actions. 

Despite fears to the contrary, AQIM does not appear to have 

received a large influx of foreign fighters from Iraq, which is one 

of the few variables that could have significantly increased the 

group’s capability for violence. 

AQIM is likely to continue kidnapping foreigners, and it may 

increasingly seek to target Western interests in the region. As 

such, the group poses an ongoing threat to U.S. citizens and interests in the region. This threat is best countered by a multipronged 

U.S. policy response that includes programs designed to support 

development, governance, and security. 

States in the region need assistance in creating the conditions for 

social development, including better education, more economic 

27 

opportunity, more transparency in governance, stronger rule of law, 

and support for countering both criminal and terrorist violence. 

Additionally, longstanding civil conflicts, notably the ongoing 

problems between the states in the region and the Tuareg minorities, require resolution before progress can be made in improving 

security and development. 

The best option for reducing terrorism and improving security in 

the Sahel is to focus our efforts on improving human security in 

all forms—physical, economic, environmental, and so on—by supporting the Sahel states’ ability to deal with these problems themselves. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kennedy-Boudali follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LIANNE KENNEDY-BOUDALI, SENIOR PROJECT ASSOCIATE, 

RAND CORPORATION, ARLINGTON, VA 

Chairman and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ Subcommittee on African Affairs 

session on ‘‘Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy across Africa’s 

Sahel Region.’’ This testimony will focus on the nature of the terrorist threat posed 

by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 

REGIONAL INSTABILITY IN CONTEXT

As this committee is well aware, the Sahel is a sparsely populated area that is 

extremely difficult to govern. National borders are remote and poorly monitored, 

and significant distances separate the developed areas in the south from the northern areas where terrorist activity largely takes place, making it difficult for security 

services to respond rapidly to terrorist activity. The states themselves are weak or 

poorly institutionalized, and effective governance is hindered by lack of transparency and accountability. Corruption and a lack of professionalization negatively 

affect the performance of local security services, while ongoing civil conflict with 

minority ethnic groups creates distrust between the governments and their citizens. 

Insecurity in the Sahel is not a new condition, and although recent terrorist incidents have drawn greater attention to the region, terrorism is not the primary problem. Corruption, civil conflict, smuggling of goods and people, drug and weapons 

trafficking, and terrorism all contribute to insecurity in the region. Although the 

indigenous practice of Islam in the Sahel is tolerant and syncretic, less tolerant external religious influences are increasingly making inroads in the region as foreignsponsored religious organizations introduce Salafi, Wahabi, and Tablighi teachings. 

Given that many people cannot read at all, let alone read the Qur’an in Arabic, 

Muslims in the Sahel are vulnerable to the influence of extremist clerics, particularly those who have external support and are thus able to attract followers through 

charitable spending and provision of Qur’anic education, Poverty, environmental 

degradation, poor access to primary education, and a lack of economic, social, and 

political progress create conditions for radicalization and extremism, and AQIM’s 

calls for Islamic governance and anti-Western violence have found traction with certain audiences in North Africa and the Sahel. That said, the majority of Muslims 

in the region appear to reject the extremist messages put forth by violent groups 

such as AQIM, and despite the apparent increase in violence in the region, terrorist 

groups do not pose a strategic threat to governments in the region. In sum, AQIM 

has the capacity to threaten U.S. citizens and U.S. interests in the region, however, 

the group is not in a position to destabilize any of the states in the Sahel, and it 

lacks the resources and popular support that would be needed to form a broad, 

Taliban-like insurgency. 

AQIM

AQIM emerged in January 2007 when the Salafist Group for Call and Combat 

(GPSC), having declared its allegiance to Osama bin Laden in September 2006, 

changed its name to the ‘‘Organization of al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic 

Maghreb.’’ Prior to the merger, the GSPC was considered a nationalist jihadist organization focused on challenging the Algerian state, although it had longstanding ties 

28 

1 Interview with Emir Abu Ibrahim Mustafa, Media Committee of the Salafi Group for Call 

and Combat, December 18, 2003; Muhammad Muqaddam, ‘‘Nabil Sahraoui Confirms Relationship with al-Qaeda and Stresses Continuation of Struggle Against Algerian Authorities,’’ alHayah, January 9, 2004. 2 Abu Obeida Yusuf al-‘Annabi, ‘‘Congratulations to the People of Tawhid in the Occasion of 

Eid,’’ Al-Fajr Media, October 6, 2008, and Abu Musab ‘Abd al-Wadud, ‘‘A Message to Our 

Ummah in the Islamic Maghreb,’’ Al-Fajr Media, September 21, 2008. 3 ‘‘The War of Bombs and Mines,’’ video released November 3, 2008. Summary available from 

SITE Intelligence Group, November 4, 2008; Information Committee of al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb, ‘‘Press or Nonsense?! In Response to Some of the Lies Published in the Algerian 

Press,’’ al-Fajr Media Center, December 25, 2008; Abu Mus’ab ‘Abd al-Wadud, ‘‘A Message to 

the Algerian Muslim People,’’ January 2006. 4 Abu Musab ‘Abd al-Wadud, ‘‘A Message to Our Ummah in the Islamic Maghreb,’’ al-Fajr 

Media Center, September 21, 2008; Abu Musab ‘Abd-al-Wadud, ‘‘Gaza: Between the Hammer 

of Jews and Crusaders and the Anvil of Apostates,’’ al-Fajr Media Center, January 15, 2009. 5 ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shanqiti, ‘‘My People, Follow Me, for I Will Lead You to the Path of 

Right,’’ May 30, 2009; Abu Musab ‘Abd al-Wadud, ‘‘Statement in Relation to Moroccan Sister 

and Baby Who Were Beaten Near the Prison,’’ June 4, 2008. 6 AQIM is organized into four operational zones: Center, East, West, and South (alternately 

Sahara), each with its own military commander. The Southern zone contains the kata’ib that 

operate in the Sahel. 7Mokhtar bel Mokhtar, who was also active in the Sahara under the GPSC, has longstanding 

ties to Touareg and Berabiche tribes in Mali and Mauritania. It is bel Mokhtar who is believed 

to run AQIM’s Saharan training camps. 8 ‘‘The Sinews of the ‘Holy War ’: Racketeering, Holdups, and Kidnappings,’’ Le Monde, December 11, 2008; ‘‘Bejaia Court: The Terrorists’ Treasurer Given Life Sentence,’’ Liberte, May 2, 

2007; ‘‘Sahara Zone Kidnappings,’’ Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, March 3, 2009; International Crisis Group, ‘‘Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page,’’ ICG Middle East Report No. 29, July 30, 2004. 

to al-Qaeda and the wider international jihadist movement.1 Since the merger, 

AQIM has increasingly mirrored al-Qaeda in its rhetoric and its actions, and this 

has led to speculation that AQIM might become a much more dangerous group, 

capable of threatening U.S. interests and conducting attacks in Europe. Although 

its alliance with al-Qaeda has given AQIM greater legitimacy among jihadists, provided increased access to media outlets, and possibly introduced the group to new 

sources of private funding and other resources, the group itself is under enormous 

stress, and its ability to operate in Algeria appears increasingly constrained. This 

has forced AQIM to shift its focus toward the Sahel, particularly Mauritania, in 

search of new recruits and easier targets. The expansion of operations in the Sahel 

should not be taken as an indication of greater strength, however; the group may 

have become more violent, but it is not necessarily more dangerous, as the following 

discussion will show. 

The Effects of the al-Qaeda Affiliation 

AQIM’s overarching goal—the overthrow of the Algerian state—has not changed 

since the merger with al-Qaeda, despite an increase in rhetorical attacks on the 

West and the governments of neighboring countries.2 AQIM has sought to legitimize 

its violence by associating itself with al-Qaeda’s vision of global jihad, and its 

recruitment has increasingly drawn on themes linked to al-Qaeda, particularly the 

conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.3 AQIM has attempted to radicalize potential 

recruits in neighboring countries by pointing out events that appear to have negative consequences for Muslims or by inserting itself into local affairs.4 For example, 

AQIM commented on apparent police brutality in Morocco in June 2008 and later 

warned Mauritanians about the futility of participating in national elections in May 

2009.5 Although AQIM appears to have succeeded in recruiting some fighters from 

the Sahel countries, its overall success in attracting new recruits appears marginal, 

as the group has shown few signs of increased strength or capability as a result of 

its various radicalization efforts. Furthermore, AQIM does not appear to have 

received a large influx of ‘‘foreign fighters’’ from Iraq, which is one of the few variables that could have significantly increased the group’s capacity for violence. 

AQIM’s headquarters remains in northeast Algeria, but AQIM maintains several 

operational units (called katibah—plural kata’ib—in Arabic) in the Sahel.6 These 

units are nominally under the command of AQIM’s national leadership, led by Emir 

Abdelmalek Droukdal (aka Abu Mus’ab Abd-al-Wadud), but some units in the Sahel 

control independent resources and are selfsustaining.7 AQIM appears to get most 

of its funds from its own criminal activities, including kidnapping and smuggling 

in Algeria and the Sahel, and from petty crime in Europe.8

The vast majority of AQIM’s attacks are in the form of ambushes, roadblocks, kidnapping, extortion, and bombings. AQIM has occasionally attacked Algeria’s energy 

sector, targeting natural gas pipelines with explosive devices or attacking foreign 

29 

9 Andrew Black, ‘‘AQIM’s Expanding Internationalist Agenda,’’ CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1 Issue 5, 

April 2008; Hanna Rogan, ‘‘Violent Trends in Algeria Since 9/11,’’ CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1 Issue 

12, November 2008. 10 Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center, ‘‘JTIC Briefing: Algerian Jihadists Continue 

Attacks Despite Internal Rifts,’’ September 27, 2007. 11 In 2008, al-Qaeda announced that the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) had merged 

with al-Qaeda. LIFG has little (if any) ground presence in Libya, as most of its members were 

either arrested or fled the country in the late 1990’s. As a result, LIFG is unlikely to provide 

much in the way of support to AQIM. 12 Hamid Yas, ‘‘Police Investigation Reveals that Mauritanians, Nigerians, and Libyans are 

Members of Al-Qaidah in Algeria,’’ EI-Khabar, May 22, 2007. 13Media Committee of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, ‘‘Statement on New Victories of the 

Mujahidin in Algeria and Mauritania,’’ AI-Fajr Media, December 29, 2007. 14Media Committee of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, ‘‘Claim of Responsibility for Killing 

the American Infidel: ‘Christopher Langis (sic),’ in Nouakchott,’’ Al-Fajr Media, June 24, 2009 

and ‘‘Statement Claiming the Operation on the French Embassy in Nouakchott,’’ Al-Fajr Media, 

August 18, 2009, respectively. 

personnel involved with gas production. Following its merger with al-Qaeda, AQIM 

incorporated increasingly sophisticated IED technology into its attacks against Algerian security services, and it adopted suicide attacks in 2007.9 Suicide attacks make 

up a small percentage of AQIM’s attacks, however, and the deadliness of these 

attacks has decreased over time, as has their frequency. The group suffers from internal personal conflicts and has lost many of its experienced fighters to the Algerian Government’s amnesty programs and aggressive counterterrorist actions, which 

may have resulted in the loss of experienced trainers, planners, and bomb-makers.10

AQIM’S NEW EMPHASIS ON THE SAHEL

The recent expansion of terrorist activity into Mauritania and Mali is taking place 

in part because Algerian security services have put AQIM on the defensive, but also 

because AQIM has been unable to organize operational cells in Morocco, Libya, or 

Tunisia. In Morocco, there is no logical counterpart with whom AQIM might form 

an effective relationship. Moroccan security services arrested thousands of suspects 

after the 2003 suicide attacks in Casablanca, effectively splintering the emerging 

jihadist movement. Jihadist presence is weak in both Tunisia and Libya, and as a 

result, AQIM’s outreach in North Africa has been limited to attracting a handful 

of recruits to join its Algerian units.11 AQIM has had little choice but to turn its 

focus to the Sahel. 

AQIM, like the GSPC before it, has been able to capitalize on insecurity in the 

Sahel to maintain safe haven, capitalize on smuggling routes, and draw recruits 

from criminal groups and disenfranchised populations. AQIM’s continued ability to 

operate outside of Algeria depends on maintaining cooperative relations with the 

Touareg and Berabiche tribes in the region. Cooperation between these tribes in the 

Sahel and the Algerian jihadists is based on mutual interest in generating revenue 

and avoiding interference from state security services. However, AQIM’s actions 

generated a great deal of attention from the international community—particularly 

following the execution of British hostage Edwin Dyer in May 2009—and this 

increased tensions between the Algerian terrorists and the Touareg. Most Touareg 

do not share AQIM’s goal of establishing an Islamic state, and even militant 

Touareg groups are not seeking to overthrow the governments of Mali and Niger. 

If AQIM’s presence becomes too disruptive, the Touareg are probably capable of 

eliminating AQIM’s safe havens in Mali and Niger—either alone or with the help 

of their governments’ security services. 

Despite these tensions, the number of fighters recruited in Mali, Niger, and Mauritania—although not large—is believed to be growing.12 Some of these fighters are 

operating in the Sahel, while others have been incorporated into AQIM’s Algerianbased units. In 2008, AQIM claimed responsibility for two attacks in Mauritania, 

including an attack on a military patrol that resulted in the beheading of 12 

Mauritanian soldiers near Zouerate and an attack on the Israeli Embassy in 

Nouakchott.13 In 2009, AQIM claimed responsibility for the murder of an American 

working in Mauritania and for a suicide attack targeting the French Embassy in 

Nouakchott (during which only the bomber was killed).14 AQIM claimed the suicide 

attack after a delay of 10 days, suggesting that AQIM’s central leadership may not 

have anticipated the attack, and it appears that AQIM’s Mauritanian cells remain 

weak. 

Until recently, AQIM appears to have had a tacit noninterference agreement with 

the Malian Government: AQIM refrained from attacking Malian interests and the 

30 

15 In a statement released on July 7, 2009, AQIM articulated its understanding of the tacit 

agreement: ‘‘You know very well that we do not have to fight you. . . . We only came your way 

in the past after you captured our brothers and you committed acts of aggression against us.’’ 

Media Committee of al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Fajr Media, July 9, 2009. 16 Jeune Afrique, ‘‘Murders in the Sahel,’’ June 9, 2009. 17 BBC News, ‘‘Mali Army ‘Takes al-Qaeda Base’ ’’—June 17, 2009, online report, last accessed 

August 23, 2009, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8104491.stm. 18 Anneli Botha, ‘‘Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism,’’ 

ISS Monograph Series, No. 144, June 2008. 19 Abu Mus’ab al-Sun suggests that some cooperation took place between the early Algerian 

jihad movement—specifically the GIA—and the Polisario, but he later states that the relationship deteriorated over time. See al-Suri, ‘‘A Call to Global Islamic Resistance,’’ p. 781. 20 Recent related RAND reports include: ‘‘How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering 

al Qa’ida,’’ by Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, MG–741–RC, 2008; ‘‘Social Science for 

Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together,’’ edited by Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin, MG– 

8949–08D, 2009; and ‘‘More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the 

Arab World’’ by Dalia Dassa Kaye et al., MG–772, 2008. 

government ignored its presence.15 However, AQIM’s execution of Edwin Dyer in 

May 2009 followed by the June assassination of a senior Malian army officer in his 

home in Timbuktu appear to have tipped the balance.16 Malian forces engaged 

AQIM in May and again in July of this year, killing dozens of AQIM fighters while 

losing at least five of their own.17 AQIM may be at risk of losing its safe haven in 

Mali as a result of its strategic miscalculation. In order to permanently deny AQIM 

sanctuary, however, the Malian Government would need the cooperation of the local 

Touareg population. In the near term, AQIM may be able to ride out the Malian 

armed forces’ campaign by relocating to Mauritania or Niger. 

There has been some speculation that AQIM could join forces with other militant 

Muslims living in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically extremist groups in Northern 

Nigeria and the Polisario in Western Sahara. Although AQIM may share some ideological common ground with a small number of militant Nigerians, there are cultural, linguistic, and geographic barriers that inhibit cooperation between them. 

Conservative Islamist elements in Nigeria have been primarily concerned with implementing shari’a law in the northern areas of Nigeria. AQIM has little to offer 

them, and they are unlikely to see any benefit in aligning with a foreign terrorist 

group. While a handful of Nigerians may join AQIM’s combat units or provide 

logistical support, it is unlikely that AQIM will recruit large numbers of Nigerian 

jihadists. As for the Polisario—an armed group seeking an independent state for the 

Sahrawi people in the Western Sahara—while Salafi and Salafi-jihadist ideologies 

may be making inroads within the Polisario camps, the Polisario does not share 

AQIM’s goal of establishing an Islamic state, and the Polisario itself has denied any 

association with al-Qaeda.18 As such, the likelihood of AQIM absorbing or affiliating 

with the Polisario is remote, although it is possible that the groups may cooperate 

on the movement of people or materiel.19

THE NEEDS OF STATES IN THE REGION AND U.S. POLICY RESPONSES

AQIM is likely to seek to expand its activities in the Sahel, including the kidnapping of foreigners, and it may increasingly seek to target Western interests in the 

region as a means to maintain its bona fides within the larger jihadist movement. 

As such, the group poses an ongoing threat to U.S. citizens and interests in the 

region. This threat is best countered by a multipronged U.S. policy response that 

includes programs designed to support development, governance, and security. 

The causes of insecurity in the Sahel need to be understood and addressed in a 

regional context. Although each country in the Sahel poses unique opportunities and 

challenges for engagement, U.S. policy toward the region needs to take an integrated approach that incorporates both the Sahel and the states in North Africa. 

Although certain kinds of engagements—such as police training and support for 

greater rule of law—that target particular ministries or departments are best conducted via bilateral agreements, many of the problems in the region are transnational in nature, and are best treated as such. It will be of little use to improve 

education in Mali without a comparable effort in Niger, and little help to improve 

police capability in Mauritania but not in Mali. 

Recent studies indicate that emphasizing police and intelligence capabilities is 

particularly useful in countering terrorism, and research also suggests that political 

violence may be reduced through measures that improve the quality of life for people in the affected areas.20 The Sahel states need support in improving governance, 

transparency, accountability, political participation, and rule of law. Traditional 

development assistance should be targeted toward building local capacity to improve 

health, the environment, sustainable agriculture, and education, with particular 

31 

21http://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp, accessed November 8, 2009. 22 Abu Musab ‘Abd-al-Wadud, ‘‘A Message to Our Ummah in the Islamic Maghreb,’’ September 

21, 2008. 

emphasis on improving educational access for girls. Security sector training and 

assistance is needed to professionalize local security services—including the police 

and judiciary, the gendarmerie, and the military—and to institute legal and judicial 

frameworks to facilitate criminal prosecution of terrorist suspects. Regional military 

and security services also need support in developing efficient intelligence structures 

and appropriate mechanisms for rapid response to terrorist incidents. 

The United States has wide array of policy mechanisms to combat terrorism in 

the Sahel. AQIM (as well as its predecessor organizations, the GPSC and GIA) is 

designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the State Department, and several AQIM members, including Emir Abu Mus’ab ‘Abd al-Wadud, are on the Department of Treasury’s list of Specially Designated Nationals. Additionally, the FBI’s 

legal attache ́s support initiatives that promote regional counterterrorism cooperation, and traditional bilateral military relationships facilitate counterterrorism 

training and operations. One of the main avenues for regional engagement on counterterrorism has been the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). 

The goal of the TSCTP is to build partner capacity for counterterrorism and facilitate efforts to counter extremist thought. Begun in 2005 as the Pan-Sahel Initiative 

(PSI), this interagency program has grown to include nine countries—Morocco, Algeria, Mali, Niger, Tunisia, and Mauritania, Senegal, Nigeria, and Chad. 21

Some critics of the TSCTP have suggested that the program has encouraged African governments to exaggerate the nature of terrorist threats in their territory in 

order to receive military assistance that might then be used to suppress internal 

dissent. This may have been the case when the PSI was created in 2005, but given 

that AQIM has moved aggressively into the Sahel over the last several years, Mali, 

Mauritania, and Niger have even greater reason to participate. In the early years 

of the program, there was an essential difference of opinion between the United 

States and the African governments over the nature of the terrorist threat in Africa. 

The United States has necessarily been primarily concerned with incidents of international terrorism, whereas most African officials are preoccupied with terrorism 

that poses a threat to domestic security. In the last year, AQIM has demonstrated 

that it, at least, is both a domestic and international threat. 

High-profile programs like TSCTP are an effective way to focus human and financial resources on the problem of terrorism in the Sahel, but difficulties in implementation and interagency cooperation appear to hinder the effectiveness of the program. Furthermore, a visible U.S. footprint may not be appropriate in all countries, 

as particular aspects of the TSCTP are politically sensitive. For example, when the 

United States assisted the Algerian Government in expanding its physical military 

infrastructure in the south of the country, local press reports immediately suggested 

that the United States was constructing a secret intelligence base in the desert. Suspicion, misinformation, or confusion about the nature of U.S. counterterrorist programs in the Sahel will undermine our ability to reduce terrorism, extremism, and 

anti-American sentiment. Many people in the Sahel are already suspicious of U.S. 

motives for involvement in local security affairs, and on several occasions, AQIM 

has pointed to TSCTP activities and AFRICOM’s presence as evidence of American 

‘‘occupation’’ of Muslim lands.22 In planning anti- or counter-terrorist policies, the 

United States needs to take into account local sensitivities and ensure that the 

scope and the reasons for our activities are communicated to both the host government and the local population. 

CONCLUSION

Reducing terrorism and insecurity in the Sahel requires steady, consistent, longterm engagement by the United States in order to address the immediate threat of 

terrorism and criminality while improving human security in a broader sense. There 

is no silver bullet for solving the problems in the Sahel, and the region faces complex, interconnected problems that require integrated solutions. Going forward, the 

United States should continue to focus its efforts on developing partner capacity. 

Specifically, the United States should seek to build counterterrorist, antiterrorist, 

and judicial capacity in the affected states and, rather than emphasizing military 

capabilities, the United States should focus on programs that support the professionalization and modernization of police, investigative, and intelligence services. 

The United States should also push for serious, tangible mechanisms for regional 

cooperation, specifically intelligence-sharing, both within the region and with European partners. 

32 

AQIM and other terrorist groups will always be able to find recruits among the 

small pool of fellow extremists who share their distorted vision of jihad, but their 

ability to draw active or tacit support from populations in the Sahel can be curtailed 

with a combination of targeted security assistance and development aid. Activities 

that allow local governments to reduce AQIM’s ability to operate while also undermining its appeal to potential recruits stand the best chance of reducing insecurity 

in the Sahel. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Ms. Kennedy-Boudali. 

Dr. Gutelius. 

STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID GUTELIUS, FOUNDER AND PARTNER, ISHTIRAK, CONSULTING SENIOR FELLOW, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY, SAN 

FRANCISCO, CA 

Dr. GUTELIUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to 

testify on a set of issues that I believe is key to the stability of both 

the Sahel and greater Saharan region. 

Today we face an uncertain, complex, ever-shifting situation 

across the nations that straddle the Sahara and Sahel. While certain issues seem new—natural resource exploitation, the emergence of AQIM, and recent revolts in both Niger and Mali—these 

are, in many ways, simply newer threads of a much older weave. 

From a local perspective, neither GSPC nor AQIM are considered 

major threats, nor is Salafism, per se. To those living on the southern edge of the Sahara, the most critical issues are perhaps not 

surprising: (1) Environmental degradation; (2) differential access to 

resources and extreme poverty; (3) the sharp growth of smuggling; 

and (4) continued political disenfranchisement of key northern 

populations. 

Many of these issues, with one exception, is new. The Sahel has 

seen serious desiccation punctuated by periodic droughts over the 

last 40 years, which has had a devastating local impact. 

Northerners, Berabiche and Tamashek in particular, are largely 

marginalized by southern majorities that control national politics, 

armed forces, foreign direct investment, and the foreign aide that 

flows into Mali and Niger. 

Informal trade remains a staple of economic activity through the 

desert because there are few other ways for people to sustain themselves. 

One major exception to these longer term dynamics is the changing nature and scale of smuggling. Over the last 4 to 5 years especially, the volume of the cross-desert trade has grown sharply, and 

cocaine has overtaken other commodities: people, cigarettes, fuel. 

This new trade may be creating the conditions for serious political disintegration. This, to me, is the largest current threat to 

regional stability, rather than either AQIM specifically or reformist 

Islam more generally. 

My written testimony discusses AQIM’s shifting fortunes, the 

tenuous links between ideology and violence in the Sahel, the rise 

of the Trans-Saharan drug trade, and local perceptions of the 

TSCTP response. 

Let me just summarize in saying that the threat of instability in 

the Sahel is very real, but the source of that threat is more directly 

linked to economic desperation, criminality, differential access to 

33 

political and economic control, rather than al-Qaeda or Salafist 

ideology. 

Terrorists do indeed pose a real threat, but we tend to give these 

groups more credit than they deserve. U.S. counterterrorism efforts 

should provide a well-integrated programmatic focus on those 

larger regional challenges and hold U.S. agencies and their partners accountable for outcomes. The stakes are high and growing, 

not just for African Governments, but for the United States and 

Europe, as well. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gutelius follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID GUTELIUS, PARTNER, ISHTIRAK, CONSULTING

SENIOR FELLOW, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY, SAN

FRANCISCO, CA 

Thank you, Mr Chairman, for the opportunity to testify on a set of issues that 

I believe is key to the stability of both the Sahel and greater Saharan region. 

Today we face an uncertain, complex, ever-shifting situation across the nations 

that straddle the Sahel and Sahara. It is worth pointing out, however, that this is 

hardly new. While certain factors seem new, such as the discovery of and interest 

in natural resource exploitation, the emergence of a new al-Qaeda franchise in 

AQIM, and recent revolts in Niger and Mali, in many ways are simply newer 

threads of an older weave and belong to a much longer history. 

Today the committee is focused on two related subthemes, roughly the performance to date of U.S. counterterrorism efforts and especially the Trans-Saharan 

Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and emergence and prospects for violent extremism and criminality in Mali and Niger, with a particular focus on al-Qaeda in 

the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM). From a local perspective, neither GSPC nor AQIM 

have ever been considered major threats, nor has Salafism’s more violent strain, per 

se. U.S. policy, on the contrary, has made these a priority and in doing so, has sometimes made worse local political and social dynamics in Sahel and worked to bolster, 

rather than suffocate, AQIM and the GSPC before it. To be sure, AQIM poses a certain kind of threat and the United States and its Malian and Nigerien allies have 

had important tactical successes over the last 6 years. But these successes have 

come at some cost, and it is unclear if U.S. officials appreciate that those continuing 

costs affect the overall success of such programs as the TSCTP. 

The most critical regional issues are (1) environmental change (2) differential 

access to resources and extreme poverty (3) the growth of the value and volume in 

real terms of smuggling (4) and continued political disenfranchisement of northern 

populations, particularly the Tamashek (Tuareg). Yet U.S. policy has more narrowly 

focused on terrorism and extremism, and indirectly addressing these much more 

pressing concerns. 

None of these larger issues—with one exception—is new. The southern Sahara 

has seen serious desiccation punctuated by severe periodic droughts over the last 

40 years, which has had a devastating impact on local livelihoods. Northerners 

(Arabs and Tamshek in particular) are, as ever, largely seen and treated as bandits 

by the southern majorities who control national politics, armed forces, foreign direct 

investment, and the foreign aid that flows into Mali and Niger. Informal trade remains a staple of economic activity through the desert—there are few other ways 

for people to sustain themselves in the Sahara’s edge. 

The one major exception to these longer term dynamics is the changing nature 

and scale of smuggling. Over the past decade, and particularly in the last 4 to 5 

years, the volume of trade has increased and cocaine has rapidly overtaken other 

commodities (people, cigarettes, fuel) in the long distance cross-desert trade. Demand from Europe and the relative efficiency of South American cartels in moving 

drugs to and through West African ports has led an exponential growth in the value 

and volume of the trade. Less appreciated, however, is that this has affected social 

and political patterns that may be creating more opportunities for political disintegration as the sheer number of those involved in this new trade grows. In my view, 

this is the largest current threat to regional stability—rather than either AQIM specifically or reformist Islam more generally. I will return to this point, below. 

34 

1Souad Mekhennet and Michael Moss, ‘‘Ragtag Insurgency Gain a New Lifeline From alQaeda,’’ New York Times, July 1, 2008. Nicolas Schmidle, ‘‘A Saharan Conundrum’’ New York 

Times Magazine, February 13, 2009. 2 A fascinating example of this can actually be heard in a New York Times audio interview 

with Droukdal, where Droukdal uses carefully chosen classical Arabic when explaining AQIM’s 

Islamist credentials and goals, but inadvertently switches to his native Algerian dialect when 

asked about his opinions of Bouteflika and the Algerian Government. He literally could not 

reframe the older, familiar anti-Algerian state GSPC rhetoric in the language of the global 

Jihad. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01algeria.html?lr=2&hp& 

oref=slogin. 

GSPC AND AQIM

The fortunes of AQIM and of Abdel-Wadoud (Abdel Malik Droukdal) have waxed 

and waned over the past 5 years since he rose to the head of GSPC (Groupe 

Salafiste pour la predication et le combat). His reputation in the community and 

related ability to command have relied on several discrete factors: (1) closeness (real 

and perceived) to the al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan; (2) success in attacking Algerian military targets, the older focus of GSPC’s ire; (3) attacks against Western civilian targets; and (4) personal relationships between key lieutenants (called Emirs) 

located across the major Algerian provinces, and particularly the Emirs of Zone IX, 

the southernmost Algerian province, and other Saharan-based cells. 

By 2005, serious rifts appear to have threatened Droukdal’s authority and AQIM’s 

ability to keep or attract members. His move to ally himself and the remnants of 

the GSPC with al-Qaeda in 2006 was likely a last-ditch effort at shoring up support 

among a core of harder-line, more ideologically driven members of his organization 

and a perceived path to gaining newer, younger adherents. In some ways, the move 

has succeeded. From all accounts, the GSPC in 2005–06 was a broken, dysfunctional 

organization of loosely affiliated gangs, with those hiding in the Sahel seemingly 

more interested in smuggling and extortion rather than any particular Salafi 

Jihadiyya ideals. While Droukdal also likely expected a windfall of financial 

resources and perhaps equipment and advisors, AQIM has not done much better 

than GSPC did. It has attracted new members (who appear to be a mixture of everything from committed Salafis to common criminals), but also seen many of the older 

guard GSPC leave, retire, or take advantage of the periodic amnesty programs Algeria offers. It appears to have received a small sum of money from abroad in 2006– 

07. But it also appears that a combination of multinational, multiagency counterterrorism efforts effectively put pressure on key transnational networks that could link 

AQIM with other groups.1 It seems clear that today AQIM finds it difficult to effectively resource its operations from foreign donations. 

The Algerian military establishment remained the main stated focus of GSPC violence throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Droukdal’s somewhat abrupt switch 

from Algerian military targets to mainly Western civilian in 2006 was carefully calculated to manage his new brand. At the same time, Droukdal purged much of the 

senior GSPC leadership, in a conscious effort to reject the semi-independence (particularly in an economic sense) of what he saw as less ‘‘pure’’ Salafists—mainly 

those south of the Atlas Mountains. The calculation also took into account the fact 

GSPC as a brand had a weak reach outside of Algeria proper, the fact that America 

and allies had begun the Pan-Sahel Initiative which had already stirred local anger 

in conservative Islamist circles across North and West Africa, and the hope that 

al-Qaeda would reward the newly reminted organization for its renewed commitment to proper Salafi credentials.2

But below the surface, Droukdal balanced a new commitment with older GSPC 

tendencies and principles. Fearful of alienating a large contingent of older GSPC 

members, Droukdal renewed tactically familiar hit and run attacks on Algerian 

military targets even while younger members of the AQIM blew themselves up in 

the hopes of gaining martyrdom (for example, the 11 April 2007 suicide bombings 

in Algiers that killed 30 and wounded 220). 

In late 2008 and early 2009, however, AQIM scored important victories that have 

put them in a stronger position, and more importantly offered a path to financial 

independence. The committee is no doubt familiar with the spate of recent kidnappings in Mali and Niger. More than any other single factor, the willingness of governments and companies to pay ransoms for prisoners has been the decisive factor 

in bolstering AQIM and its growing network of semiadherents and smuggler allies. 

It has created in the two several years a small-scale industry of targeting foreigners, 

mostly Westerners, and served to help realize some of Droukdal’s larger ambitions 

in the region. While formal recruitment into the organization is still likely challenging, the organization has been able to strengthen its ties with a number of local 

leaders, throughout the Sahara and Sahel—not on the basis of ideology, but mostly 

35 

3Literally, ‘‘blessing’’ or divine presence. 

on the basis of shared economic interests. This does not mean an increase in the 

absolute numbers of fighters under AQIM command, but does mean that AQIM is 

developing an enabling support network for its larger interests. 

IDEOLOGY AND VIOLENCE

AQIM’s stated brand of Islam is generally and quite often roundly rejected in the 

Sahel. There is something of a stereotype of ‘‘African Islam’’ being more ‘‘tolerant’’ 

and moderate than Islam as it is practiced elsewhere, and like most sterotypes it 

has a shade of truth to it. The vast majority of Muslims in the Sahel follow the generally more tolerant Maliki and Shafi’i jurisprudence rather than the Hanbali school 

associated with Wahhabism and Salafism. But the Sahel is generally a fairly conservative place; memory is strong (if fluid), customary practice matters, and there 

is a long history of Islamic intellectual production—the traces of which are on full 

display today in traveling exhibitions of unique manuscripts from places like Timbuktu, Gao, and Agadez. 

It is vital that we not lump reformist-oriented Muslims together. Following a 

more or less conservative interpretation of Islamic law (in comparison to what?) 

does by no stretch necessarily mean sympathy with AQIM or even with nonlocal 

interpretations of Islam such as Wahhabism. Do Wahhabi and Salafi ideas find 

some purchase in the Sahel? To a certain limited extent and in some communities, 

yes. But so do the ideas of the Pakistani Jama’a al-Tabligh as well as the Libyan 

Dawa (both of which opened missions in northern Mali in the past several years). 

More importantly, there exists a long, rich and local history of quite conservative 

interpretation of Islamic law; whether within the Songhai, Arab or Tamashek populations, sources of reformist thought and education are readily at hand. 

The question about the ‘‘spread’’ of Salafism/Wahhabism/Qutbism as it has so 

often been posed within U.S. analyst circles (each of which is distinct) is both distracting and unhelpful. It presumes both a kind of ideological epidemic and weakness of mind on the part of local actors. It also presumes a causal connection 

between ideology and violence in the Sahel that does not exist. In any case, countering ideology is fraught with difficulty, and carries the burden of neocolonialism 

that makes it nearly impossible to succeed. More importantly, however, the presumed spread of Salafi al-Jihadiyya is not nearly as important to the stability of 

the region as more prosaic problems of smuggling, differential resource access, and 

the changing natural environment. 

The U.S. has the opportunity to avoid making similar mistakes and becoming perceived as a neocolonial power in the region. But this will take not just reframing 

questions and avoiding easy stereotypes of entire populations as ‘‘tribal’’ and susceptible, but also taking a substantively different tack in addressing deeper regional 

challenges. And it will take a level of coordination and commitment that we have 

so far been unwilling or unable to muster. 

SMUGGLING

One key variable in the political stability of the Sahel remains control of informal 

capital flows and markets, which, next to aid dollars, bolster the wider Saharan 

region (Keenan 2006: 286–287). The question over who gets access to capital of differing types—to a more expansive sense of capital that includes social prestige, 

baraka3, authenticity, rightful claims to privilege as well as property, goods, and 

currency—and the extent to which local leaders establish their own social positions 

as providers of this capital directly reflect the social power they can wield. 

Particularly since 2001, smuggling has become a major site of struggle between 

various interest groups, including U.S. military, national governments, and local 

authorities, as the main way (outside foreign donations or investments) for many 

northern leaders and their communities to remain self-sufficient and autonomous. 

American pressure to completely shut down illicit market networks completely in 

order to starve potential terrorist networks has largely backfired so far. Here again, 

Kel Ifoghas and Kunta leaders have told me that the United States is increasingly 

characterized as working with corrupt government lackeys against the interests of 

everyday people in the Saharan fringe, the vast majority of whom rely on informal 

economies to get by every day. 

These informal marketing activities include important social practices by which 

communities in desert-side societies not only cope with environmental degradation 

and social change, but also shifting formal sector markets that continue to put 

northern populations at a disadvantage. Smuggling remains a long-cherished symbol of autonomy and control and an important part of both social practices (ideas 

36 

4The recent bitter feud between prominent Kunta and Moor families, particularly since 2003, 

are apparently linked to these market shifts—again with echoes of competition that are, in this 

case, well beyond a century old. 5 Certainly the recent history of the unintended consequences of trying to quash black markets 

can provide lessons, most particularly in Afghanistan and Columbia. 6Douglas Farah, ‘‘Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa’’ Testimony before the Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, June 23, 2009. 7Thomas Harrigan of DEA estimates between three and five times higher than the U.N. estimate in 2007. See his ‘‘Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa’’ Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, June 23, 2009. 8Farah, ‘‘Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa.’’ 

9 Christopher Thompson, ‘‘Fears for Stability in West Africa as Cartels Move In.’’ Guardian 

U.K. March 10, 2009. 10 Cf. the blog Moor next Door, ‘‘AQIM-Mauritania—Quite Saharan, In Fact.’’ Sept 21, 2008. 

Accessed 11/10/09 at http://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com/2008/09/21/aqimmauritania-quitesaharan-in-fact/. 

of protection, blessing, or right of passage) and shifting political alliances. Here, religious authority and memory may be mixing in ways akin to the 19th century 

Sahara when the Kunta, for instance, used their religious authority to legitimate 

the tobacco and slave trades, partially as a way of competing with reformist 

Massina leaders in the south. Today’s struggle over illicit trafficking bears resemblance to the ways in which leaders established and deployed Islam both before and 

during the colonial era. The rhetoric of this social process may differ, but the outlines of that past remain powerful. This is not to make excuses for illicit trafficking, 

but it does point up that there’s more to smuggling than outright banditry. 

While analysts rightly point out how ransom revenues has allowed AQIM to purchase an ever-more sophisticated array of weaponry, there is a far more productive 

way of putting that capital to work for longer term growth: smuggling drugs. The 

older smuggling operations in people, fuel, cigarettes, and other commodities still 

exist but the potential profits simply cannot compare to cocaine. This is relatively 

new. When I first lived in Timbuktu over a decade ago, smugglers favored cigarettes 

as the preferred commodity and had constructed sophisticated and relatively efficient mechanisms that included import, remanufacture and repackaging, forgery, a 

secure system of exchange and a network that spanned from the ports of West 

Africa through the Sahara to Eastern Europe. The new cocaine operations, 

bankrolled now by a number of stakeholders from major South American cartels to 

AQIM to Eastern European mafia, make the cigarette trade seem quaint. 

As pressures have grown on smugglers since 2002, increased risk seems to have 

recently helped push some key commodity prices higher in major Saharan markets, 

and touched off violent competition between major merchant groups operating in 

and around the desert (Cisse ́ 2003; Sylla 2004).4 But with the newer cocaine trade 

there is a qualitatively and quantitatively different phenomenon. The stakes and 

scale of both the extended trade networks supporting it and the levels of violence 

are growing at an alarming rate. And trying to kill off the entire regional informal 

economy without viable short- and long-term livelihood alternatives would likely 

have the opposite effect to what most American strategists and Bamako or Niamey 

politicians intend: that is, it would increase political instability in the north and ire 

against the governments of both Mali and Niger.5

The rise of the cocaine trade, fueled by South American cartels’ credit and transport from West African ports, has grown exponentially over just the past 5 years. 

The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime estimated that West Africa handled 

40 to 50 tons of cocaine, worth an estimated $1.8B at European wholesale prices, 

in 2007.6 The real volume is likely much higher.7

This growth has worked to both destabilize authority (both central government 

authority and that of local leaders) and catalyze or concretize networks that support 

the trade. If the trans-Saharan cocaine trade develops as other cocaine smuggling 

routes have, we can expect to see an explosion of violence as different gangs, groups, 

and factions vie for control and a share of the profits. Distribution networks will 

be paid in drugs, which will likely fragment competition and gradually draw more 

people into the traffic. Again, if history is any guide, this will likely infect police 

and military forces and could eventually lead to the Sahel to become a fragmented 

narcoregion.8 And in fact, the phenomenon is currently on full view in places such 

as Senegal, where drug money is reportedly fueling a building boom in Dakar.9

So far it remains unclear how deeply involved the AQIM organization is in these 

networks, but anecdotal evidence suggests that individual AQIM members—particularly operating in Mauritania, Mali and Niger are already directly involved.10 It 

seems clear that at least sections of AQIM are not just willing to engage in drug 

smuggling, but are also looking for additional ways to support their future operVerDate Nov 24 2008 19:29 May 11, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\SAHEL.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
37 

11See the State Department’s official announcement at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/ 

14987.htm. 12Gutelius, ‘‘U.S. Creates Enemies Where There Were None,’’ Christian Science Monitor, June 

11, 2003. 

ational activities. Their expansion in the Sahel will depend less on finding those 

who share their ideology and more on where economic opportunities coincide with 

other groups. Again, this highlights the importance of the larger shifts in informal 

markets, protection rackets, and money laundering rather than the particular attitudes and ideologies in the future of AQIM in the region. 

PAN-SAHEL INITIATIVE AND TSCTP

In 2002, the U.S. Government’s goal was simply to watch and monitor activity in 

and around the Sahara, since at that point there was little consensus within the 

American administration as to what next steps should be. What began as an extension of intelligence gathering, however, became an important campaign to quash 

what at that time was loosely referred to as ‘‘Al Qaida in Africa.’’ In late 2002, this 

culminated in the formation of the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), the U.S. State Department-funded, Defense Department-run program meant to provide training and 

equipment to regional militaries as well as to develop military-to-military relationships with key regional military commanders.11 American military advisors spent 

time in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad between 2003 and 2005, training security forces in weapons and communications technologies, small unit maneuvers, and 

mobile warfare. 

From the beginning in 2003, key Tamashek and Arab populations were largely 

left out of PSI-sponsored activities, exacerbating the longstanding ill-will between 

these groups and the national governments of Niger and Mali. This fact, combined 

with the rhetoric U.S. officials and their local allies used at the time very quickly 

brought out older tensions and suspicions, and linked them to the U.S. military.12

Fearful, highly speculative language remains a common element in reports and 

public statements from the American Government—statements which are widely 

published and easily accessible across Mali and Niger, including the north (FisherThompson 2004; USAID 2005: 3–4; Keenan 2006: 274–275). Part of this selffulfilling prophecy stems from the outlook of U.S. analysts and other personnel, who 

have tended to lump reformist leaders and organizations in the Sahel as undifferentiated Salafist-oriented threats to regional peace and stability. On a trip into the 

north of the Mali, for example, former U.S. Ambassador to Mali Huddleston warned 

with alarm: ‘‘With the Dawa [alTabligh], were dealing with something even more 

worrisome because they’re in the north. The Salafists are in the north and they are 

terrorists. And there are connections between them.’’ (Anderson 2004) This attitude, 

along with the Malian Government’s responses, had the effect of driving Islamic 

missionaries and at least some Muslim community leaders closer together (Kimbery 

2005). 

Rumors of inappropriate conduct of U.S. personnel also began to spread across the 

southern Sahara over 2004, and public statements by American military leaders and 

interpreted and rebroadcast by northern political leaders added to resentment 

among northern leaders (ICG 2005: 31; U.S. House of Representatives 2005: 22–27). 

The rhetoric on the American side often continues to repeat allusions to the Sahara 

as a lawless, traditionally violent place; a breeding ground for terrorists, and a 

swamp that needs draining (For example, Powell 2004; CBSNews 2004; Motlagh 

2005; McKaughan 2005). Political pundits and armchair analysts in the West have 

used the repeatedly same imagery and even phrases repeatedly—imagery that some 

political clients in Mali and Niger in the Sahara have since adopted in their own 

statements as way of attracting and maintaining American aid (Diarra 2006; Takiou 

2006). On the desert side, stories about these stories and about U.S. forces began 

to spread both informally among trade networks and in radio broadcasts—at a time 

(in 2003) when the American military in Iraq had become the daily focus of every 

Middle East media outlet in the world. 

For its missteps, PSI also had clear and important successes, most notably in 

helping to capture El Para and a number of accomplices when they kidnapped several dozen European tourists in 2003. But these strategic successes have come at 

some cost. In Mali and Niger, PSI money and programs acted to widen the perceived 

gulfs between north and south, as well as between northern nomadic and sedentary 

populations. The U.S. has funneled millions of aid dollars to the Malian and Nigerien Governments since 2003 under PSI and subsequently under TSCTP. Northerners complain that these new moneys have remained solidly within the hands of 

the Bambara-dominated government, taking both local political and economic opporVerDate Nov 24 2008 19:29 May 11, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\SAHEL.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
38 

tunities away from local people. It seems that whatever the case, the PSI program 

aid—and to a lesser extent, TSCTP aid—quickly became a politicized symbol of a 

contest for power in the North. It is unclear to what extent this affected the dynamics of the most recent (but separate) Tuareg rebellions in Mali and Niger in 2007– 

09, but infighting and claims of economic and political oppression became core rallying cries of both movements. 

WAYS FORWARD

In assessing the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism activities and particularly 

the TSCTP, I can only speak from the perspective of (a) what I see firsthand and 

through local French and Arabic press and (b) what locals and NGO practitioners 

in Northern Mali, and less directly, in Niger tell me—and less from any privileged 

government view. 

Partnering with the Malian and Nigerien Governments, while without a doubt 

necessary, has had a mixed record, in my view. The emphasis on working with national-level institutions, while necessary, creates a preset friction in the northern 

Sahel that is difficult to overcome without balancing those efforts with more local 

society outreach, sustained local presence and specifically nonmilitary programming. 

PSI’s initial execution increased local resentment of both national armies and their 

U.S. backers. Over time and with TSCTP, the United States began to alter the 

approach and although TSCTP programs are showing the first signs of progress, 

more needs doing. Related, TSCTP programs appear as overly executed by proxies, 

whether those are NGO subcontractors or Malian and Nigerien Government institutions. 

Agencies involved in TSCTP should consider increasing their presence where 

establishing long-term local relationships are key to the success of its programs. 

There continues to be a severe lack of information about ongoing programs and their 

effects at the local level, in large measure because we have few people on the ground 

and few specialists with relevant languages and training interfacing with local communities. Funding for local data gathering and analysis, including survey instruments, should be a part of the TSCTP toolkit (and in fact exactly such a capability 

has inexplicably been removed from AFRICOM’s FY 2010 budget). This may also 

mean opening staffed offices in Timbuktu, Agadez, and perhaps even Kidal. At the 

same time, more concerted nonmilitary efforts to visit effected communities on the 

desert edge, support of local cultural programs and institutions, and above all 

addressing local economies’ viability are all requisite to addressing the larger issues 

of stability in the Sahel. In this connection, appropriate diplomatic pressure should 

be brought to bear on both Bamako and Niamey to ensure that aid and other 

resources are reliably reaching populations in the north of Mali and Niger and that 

U.S.-funded programs are having some expected local impact. 

Can innovative technology help in addressing these questions? Yes, particularly 

in better information gathering, coordination, and decisionmaking. At Ishtirak, for 

example, we are working with NGOs and corporate social responsibility programs 

on a series of tools that can track development projects, lessons learned, and 

metrics, and assist with program planning and resource allocation. This can be coupled with lightweight data collection applications that work on any modest mobile 

or satellite phone, providing a near-real time picture of what’s happening, who’s 

involved, and how to improve outcomes. Technology, appropriately designed and 

deployed, can provide transparency, accountability, and coordination at a much 

higher level than we see today. As most of this technology is based on free open 

source software, there is no excuse not to make the most of it. 

USAID, at its best, is one of the most effective ways to change minds on the 

ground about the United States and its motives. It needs a larger presence in the 

region, and should make program and infrastructure investments in concert with 

other U.S. agencies, development NGOs, and local partners. We should increase 

commitments to local livelihood programs and environmental monitoring and training programs and target more specifically fragile communities scattered across the 

Sahara’s southern edge. GeekCorps and other creative USAID communications programs should be focused to improve communications networks in these areas, and 

should create a cadre of Malians and Nigeriens who can help sustain these networks 

on an ongoing basis. Most importantly, sustainable, small-scale businesses are 

needed to counteract the growing influence of illicit trafficking. 

AFRICOM must work in concert with USAID and other agencies in both meeting 

the demands of the TSCTP and its own mission. While the command is still in its 

early days, General Ward has a chance to shape an innovative, nimble organization 

that works cohesively with both local African partners and other U.S. Government 

agencies. AFRICOM is making headway and this should be commended and fully 

39 

13GAO, GAO–08–860 ‘‘Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed To Enhance Implementation of 

the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,’’ Report to the ranking member of the House 

of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 2008. 

supported. But there is also a great deal of suspicion on the part of those who have 

not seen direct benefit from its military-to-military exchanges. AFRICOM should 

consider extending its outreach activities directly to those in northern Mali and 

Niger, in ways that also align with bettering lives in the region. And of course, 

working closely with USAID and the Department of State here can help in a number of ways. 

Many of these ideas are recognized within U.S. policy circles already. The GAO 

completed an assessment of the TSCTP in July 2008 and found a number of aspects 

of the program that needed improvement.13 There is no comprehensive, integrated 

TSCTP plan. TSCTP lacks both coherent high-level goals and metrics for assessing 

progress against those goals over time. This holds true for U.S. Government activities and with Malian and Nigerien partners. While interagency coordination seems 

to have improved over time, it is clear that cooperation needs improvement. Continued tensions over State Department’s authority over Defense Department personnel 

under TSCTP reflect this need. 

Beyond this, however, TSCTP needs to shift its frame of reference from terrorism 

per se to the context that makes a sustained AQIM possible. It must more directly 

address the deeper, more immediate threats to Mali and Niger: environmental degradation, systematic disenfranchisement of Northerners, and the new smuggling 

economy. TSCTP in its current form will likely never have more than tactical successes against what is in reality small, loosely organized, opportunistic terrorist 

franchise—because addressing the larger threats are largely secondary to its focus 

on terrorism. 

We must be clearer about what the stakes are in the Sahel and what our national 

interest is. I can tell you that the local perception, based on PSI and the initial 

activities under AFRICOM and the TSCTP is still strongly that the United States 

is first concerned with protecting and expanding American economic interests followed by controlling an al-Qaeda threat that exists mostly in the minds of American 

Government analysts and some European allies. The more we ignore the region’s 

larger issues, the more this misperception gets reinforced. 

In summary, the threat of instability in the Sahel is real, but the source of that 

threat is more directly linked to economic desperation, criminality, and differential 

access to political and economic control rather than al-Qaeda or Salafist ideology. 

AQIM and its allies still pose a real threat. But we tend to give the group more 

credit than it deserves. U.S. counterterrorism efforts should provide a well-planned, 

integrated programmatic focus on those larger regional challenges and hold itself 

and its partners accountable for outcomes. The stakes related to the growing criminality in the region that feeds violence and erodes societal institutions are high and 

growing—not just for African Governments, but for the United States and Europe 

as well. We ignore these at our collective peril. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much. And I certainly agree 

with you that the problem here has to do with the types of things 

you’re talking about. It’s an environment in which al-Qaeda-type 

organizations can thrive, but that is not necessarily the leading 

issue. It’s something we have to address as a country with regard 

to our national security interests. But, having been to most of these 

countries, I certainly would share that assessment. 

Let me start with Ms. Kennedy-Boudali. You wrote in your testimony that one of the reasons AQIM has turned its focus to the 

Sahel is that it has not been able to organize operational cells in 

Morocco or Libya or Tunisia. In your view, why is that? What challenges does AQIM face in these three countries? 

Ms. KENNEDY-BOUDALI. Thank you, Senator. I think that’s a 

really important question, because those three countries are the 

most logical partners for AQIM to seek support—support or recruits. But they have been unable to do so, in part because those 

states are that much more capable than the Sahel states, in terms 

of their ability to monitor extremist recruitment in their region, in 

40 

their ability to keep track of who’s entering and exiting the country, and in their ability to control their populations, frankly. Those 

three states have very strong security services, as I mentioned. In 

Morocco, in particular, after the bombings in Casablanca in 2003, 

there was a wave of arrests, as I’m sure you’re aware, of extremists; not only those with jihadist tendencies, but anyone who 

opposed the government, frankly. And as a result, whatever public 

support there might have been for terrorist activity was fragmented and splintered. 

In the case of Libya, there was a jihadist movement that was 

quite active there in the 1990s, but it is severely weakened. And, 

additionally, a number of the jihadists that might have supported 

AQIM in Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia have probably switched their 

attention to conflicts elsewhere, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

So, the pool of recruits that might have supported jihad in the 

region may now be more interested in looking toward Iraq or 

Afghanistan as a theater for their activities. 

Senator FEINGOLD. You write that, while AQIM has succeeded in 

recruiting some fighters from the Sahel, its overall success in 

attracting new recruits is actually marginal. Now, to what do you 

attribute that lack of success, and what are the constraints to 

AQIM expanding its region’s support in the Sahel? And you’ve 

alluded to some of these already, but—— 

Ms. KENNEDY-BOUDALI. Within Algeria, Senator, I think it’s important to remember the context of that country’s experience, with 

an extremely bloody civil war in the 1990s that killed—estimates 

range up to hundreds of thousands of people. 

So, I think there’s a sense, in Algeria itself, that the people are, 

quite simply, tired of hearing about these jihadist groups, and 

they’re not supporting them because they’ve seen no benefit from 

them. They’re—they make the lives of the people more difficult 

through extortion, through roadblocks, through violence and criminality. They’re not proposing any positive political solution. They’re 

seeking to overthrow the state, but I don’t think people in the 

region see that their success would be any kind of improvement in 

their lives. 

In the Sahel region—this has been mentioned by the previous 

panel, as well—I think AQIM’s idea of what Islam means and what 

a good Muslim should do is, quite simply, an anathema to the people in the region. They don’t support the idea of a Shariah-based 

governance; they’re not interested in overthrowing the states in the 

region. It’s just not a very competitive message. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And you’ve mentioned the Tuareg, most of 

whom do not share al-Qaeda’s ideological goals, either. What do 

you see as the key to gaining the support of Tuareg communities 

in the fight against AQIM? 

Ms. KENNEDY-BOUDALI. I think this is probably the most important question regarding ways to disaggregate the threat in the 

Sahel. Different populations of Tuareg have different interests, so 

we don’t want to bunch them together. Certainly, there is an element of some of the Tuareg populations that is involved in criminality, and they are probably best disaggregated from AQIM by 

highlighting the danger to themselves that AQIM has posed, 

because the increase in their—AQIM’s—activity in the Sahel has 

41 

drawn the attention of, not only American, but also European and 

local security services. AQIM is making peoples’ lives harder there. 

For the majority of the Tuareg, who are law-abiding citizens with 

political concerns about representative government or the level of 

state interference in their affairs, I think governments in the region need support in finding solutions to reduce those grievances, 

whether that’s a matter of increased educational opportunities, 

education in local languages, or increased access to economic opportunities, by presenting a better alternative. I think whatever level 

of Tuareg support or tolerance or tacit support may be going on, 

it could be reduced through engagement. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Gutelius, I’m very interested in your observation of the trade 

in cocaine across the Sahel as rapidly increasing. And this subcommittee held a hearing earlier this year to explore the growing 

problem of drug trafficking in West Africa. In your assessment, 

what is driving the increasing trade in cocaine, and who are the 

key players in the trade? 

Dr. GUTELIUS. Yes, that’s an excellent question, Senator, thank 

you. 

This is really a change over the last 5 years of, you know, being 

based in the north, living in Timbuktu for some time in the late 

1990s, I’ve watched the nature of smuggling really change in pretty 

substantial ways. 

It seems clear that South American cartels are directly involved 

from the supply end, but it goes beyond that. These cartels, as 

you’ve heard testimony on before, have a quite sophisticated array 

of both ways of getting the goods to the eventual markets, but also 

things like financing mechanisms. They’ve done this before, they’re 

very experienced at it, and now it seems that they’re following a 

similar pattern in West Africa, which I think is, you know, akin to 

the cancer we see throughout Central and South America. 

The November 5 crash outside of GAO—I don’t know if you’re 

aware, but it was a—I think it was a DC–10, about 10-ton capacity 

flying from Venezuela, crashed on takeoff; it was able to deliver its 

goods, unfortunately, and forces are still trying to recover those. 

But, it highlights this problem of these desert-side entrepots—these 

desert-side centers—for the trade across the Sahara. 

The other part of the problem, obviously, is demand, and largely 

demand in Europe now, which is driving that trade and sucking it 

across the desert. The profits involved, I’m afraid, are driving different kinds of social and political relationships in the desert that 

I haven’t seen before, alliances that I wouldn’t have expected, 

necessarily. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Give an example of an alliance—— 

Dr. GUTELIUS. Well, so, in the older—say 6 to 8 to 10 years ago, 

with the cigarette trade, which was the kind of king trade across 

the Sahara, in terms of profitability—about a billion-dollar industry 5 years ago—was really run by a set of Berabiche and Tuareg 

families, Tamashek families, that were fairly well known, they’d 

been in the trade for awhile, and, you know, had established networks that not only got the goods from West African ports, but also 

safely across the desert to their partners in North Africa. 

42 

Those same families are now competing with new kinds of networks that are much more directly related to the cocaine trade; 

much more specialized, in some ways. And that poses a problem for 

those older families and the power structures that they represent. 

So, young guns—Lianne and I were actually talking about it 

before the session—young guns are actually able to challenge, in 

some ways, these more established networks. And a big problem 

there is that the middlemen are being paid now—just like we see 

in other areas where drug smuggling’s a problem, being paid in 

drugs. 

So, you have—as the sheer number of people involved in the 

trade grows, you have this possibility that the cancer that has 

affected other parts of the world will infect these societies, as well. 

That’s not the case yet, but I fear, given the current trajectory, and 

just the, it seems, focus of the South American cartels and the ease 

with which they can still move those goods across the desert, that’s 

where we’re headed. 

Senator FEINGOLD. OK. 

Doctor, you were critical in your testimony of the tendency by 

U.S. analysts to sometimes conflate the spread of conservative 

Islam, particularly Wahhabism, and violent extremism. What are 

the implications of this tendency for counterterrorism efforts? And 

how could you recommend that the United States could shift its 

programming to avoid this kind of conflation? 

Dr. GUTELIUS. I think there are several areas that we can focus 

on, and first and foremost is continuing to improve the execution 

of TSCTP. I think it’s an innovative program in many ways, it can 

be an example for similar types of programs in the future. At this 

point, I still have to agree with the 2008 GAO assessment. And, 

from what I see on the ground, there’s still a lot of fragmentation, 

in terms of, again, carrying out the program elements. 

I think, from a Washington, DC, perspective, I think they are 

making a lot of progress, in terms of coordination. From a field perspective, from an on-the-ground perspective, it doesn’t look that 

way. 

So, I think a lot can be done there to harmonize what’s happening on the ground. I think a big need is simply to listen a lot more 

for what some of these local populations, especially the targeted 

populations—Berabiche and Tamashek—want and need in their 

communities. 

And I think the speaker from the previous panel—Ambassador 

Gast, I believe—mentioned listening clubs in Niger. And that’s a 

great example. That’s a great example of creating support on the 

ground and using that information to drive priorities, in terms of— 

whether it’s USAID or AFRICOM types of activities. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Doctor. 

Finally, before I turn to Senator Isakson, I agree with you that 

we need to increase our diplomatic presence in order to better 

gather information and build long-term local relationships. And I’ve 

been saying this about many neglected regions of Africa for many, 

many years. 

If you were to advise the United States on expanding our presence in the Sahel, where would you begin? In your view, where 

43 

could opening a new U.S. office tomorrow make the biggest 

difference? 

Dr. GUTELIUS. Yes. I think, Timbuktu, for a few different reasons. It’s geographically central and allows us a kind of reach, not 

only in terms of just purely geography, but also culturally, that 

would afford us much more reach into the communities that we’re 

interested in working with. And that’s not simply the Tuaregs who, 

you know, many of which are based up in the Kidal region. But, 

also, it is, traditionally, a kind of, sort of, cross section of the desert 

population down there. So, that’s one area, I think, where having 

a permanent mission or some small presence, especially with the 

State Department or USAID kind of leading that outward-facing 

representation of the United States would make a huge difference, 

in terms of credibility, for local populations. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I strongly agree with that. I had—one 

of the most memorable moments of my career was in Timbuktu, 

meeting, having lunch ceremony with the local Tuareg and other 

people, and we were discussing these kinds of issues, but also the 

broader range of issues. And this sense of it being not only a critical place now, but a traditional crossroads, as well as the classic 

center of Islamic learning, centuries ago. It really does make sense 

as a location. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize I was 

late, to both of you. I really have two questions. The first, just to 

both of you. I think you both were here for the previous panel, is 

that not correct? If I state this wrong, please correct me, but our 

policy with regard to the partnership in the Sahel is basically to 

be a partner but sort of a step back from the forefront. Do you 

agree? I’d like for both of you to answer this. Do you agree with 

the posture the United States is taking with regard to the Counterterrorism Partnership? 

Dr. GUTELIUS. I’ll begin. Thank you, Senator. 

In a sense, yes, especially when we’re considering—specifically 

counterterrorist activities, and specifically with our AFRICOM initiatives. I think that’s the right thing to do. I think that can be balanced; if you look at the program as a whole, I think that can be 

balanced. And, in fact, I think we need to actually put a United 

States or American face on especially some of the development 

activities that are happening, even ones that AFRICOM carries 

out. I think that’s an important message that we’re interested in 

more than simply bolstering militaries. We’re interested in actually 

improving societies, in a very general sense. 

And so, in a sense I understand the approach to kind of being 

a silent partner; at the same time that generates some cost, I 

think, for us. And one of the best ways this country has of showing 

its support for development worldwide is USAID. And I would love 

to see them more, kind of, publicly on the ground, creating these 

programs, and, again, putting an American face on the effort. 

Senator ISAKSON. So, not a bunch of a public face in counterterrorism, but a big public face in terms of economic development, 

health care, things of that nature. Is that what I hear you saying? 

Dr. GUTELIUS. That’s correct. 

Senator ISAKSON. Yes, ma’am. 

44 

Ms. KENNEDY-BOUDALI. I would agree with what Dr. Gutelius 

has said. And I would add that I think that approach is appropriate; to keep the counterterrorism and antiterrorism mission 

somewhat in the background, because it is very prone to misinterpretation in the region, particularly with the—I don’t want to say 

the tendency—particularly with the fact that there are few trusted 

media outlets in the region, and so there’s a great deal of rumor 

and misinformation and misinterpretation about the U.S. military 

presence in the region. 

I think one of the things that could be done better is explaining 

to local governments and local media outlets what exactly the 

United States is doing in the region, to reduce this tendency for 

misinterpretation. 

As far as putting a U.S. face on development activities, I think 

that’s a great idea, and it does build—it does support—it could 

contribute to a reduction of anti-American sentiment, particularly 

programs, not only like USAID, but also the Peace Corps, which 

I—Senator, I believe you’re also a member of the committee that 

governs Peace Corps funding. And that’s dollar for dollar, a great 

program that puts an American face on very positive work that’s 

done in the region. 

Senator ISAKSON. Yes, it’s something we lovingly refer to as ‘‘soft 

power’’ around here, but it is very important. I have not traveled 

to any of these countries, but many all around it where we have 

significant USAID, CARE, Save the Children, the Basic Education 

Coalition, and others that are winning a lot of friends and really 

changing the lives of the African people. 

I have one other question. And I was reading the conclusion, Ms. 

Boudali, of your report, where you talked about there not being a 

silver bullet for solving the problem. I certainly agree with that, 

but I have a great concern because when you look at the map and 

you end at Chad, if you go further to the east is Sudan, next is 

Ethiopia, and next is Somalia. And if the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement—which comes to a head, I think, February 2011—falls 

apart, and we get into civil war in Sudan again, it is close to tying 

a heavily terrorist-based Somalia closer and closer to some of these 

other organizations. Is that something that you worry about, or is 

the expanse of territory between the Sudan and Ethiopia so great 

you wouldn’t worry about it? 

Ms. KENNEDY-BOUDALI. That’s a good question, Senator. I would 

worry about it, but I think we want to be careful to keep the caveats in mind. As you mentioned, there is a distance that separates 

those two conflicts, currently—not only a geographic distance, but 

there’s also a cultural distance—that we should keep in mind. 

One of the things that we know now from declassified documents 

is that al-Qaeda has experienced difficulty operating in Africa, and 

they are considered foreigners when they go there. So, despite the 

fact that they do seem to be increasingly involved in the conflict 

in Somalia, there are reasons to think that there are local interests 

that are not particularly supportive of al-Qaeda. And, although 

there has—it looks like there’s some evidence of trafficking of 

weapons and people and things back and forth from the Horn of 

Africa to the Sahel and to North Africa, those relationships have 

existed throughout time. And I think when we look at those two 

45 

conflicts, we need to keep in mind that there are some differences 

between them. 

I think it is important to watch what’s going on and keep in 

mind what assistance we might give to states in the region that 

would particularly help them monitor borders and to keep track of 

flows of goods and people, because that could be one of the earliest 

indicators that there is a greater connection between the two 

theaters. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Isakson, for your very 

active participation in this helpful hearing. 

I want to thank the witnesses very much for your expertise and 

for your sharing it with us. 

And that concludes the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNNIE CARSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. As was mentioned, there have long been tensions between nomadic Tuareg communities and the governments in Niger and Mali, leading to a series of 

rebellions in the past. The most recent rebellions have ended, thanks to successful 

peace talks in both countries, but AQIM may seek to exploit lingering resentment 

among the Tuareg and to link up with existing rebel groups. How much of a concern 

is this and what can be done to prevent such partnerships from forming? Is there 

any risk that we could become a target of Tuareg grievances and play into AQIM’s 

hands if we are seen by them as too closely associated with the government and 

specifically the military in Mali and/or Niger? 

Answer. Tuareg communities in Niger and Mali have not proven receptive to 

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) ideology or tactics. There have been isolated instances where Tuaregs have tolerated AQIM’s presence in their areas or 

entered into temporary arrangements to facilitate smuggling or other opportunistic 

trade. This dynamic has been problematic in cases where AQIM has purchased 

goods locally and provided small amounts of food and other consumables to generate 

good will or at least tolerance among those living in the vicinity. However, we have 

not seen a trend toward durable alliances or successful recruitment of individual 

Tuaregs. In fact, there have been indications that AQIM’s murder of a Malian military officer this summer, the unprecedented execution of a British hostage, and 

murder of an American in Mauritania may have alienated certain groups in northern Mali that occasionally did business with the group. 

We recognize, however, that AQIM may wish to exploit low levels of development 

and frustration produced by unmet economic expectations in northern Mali. Furthermore, in Mali a political settlement of Tuareg unrest is closely linked to promises of government attention and resources to the underdeveloped north. Whether 

in service of countering prospective extremism, or preventing renewal of tensions 

between the Tuareg and the Government of Mali that could undermine the recently 

solidified united front against AQIM, government development efforts in northern 

Mali are important. We are also concerned that breakdowns in the rule of law and 

poor economic conditions in certain areas have made individual Tuaregs and nonTuaregs receptive to AQIM offers of bounties for hostages. 

The United States has traditionally enjoyed good relations with Tuareg communities and our strong ties with the Malian Government have not negatively impacted those relations. Our Embassy in Bamako implements a range of outreach initiatives, including radio programming, with communities in the north that include 

Tuareg populations. USAID and State Department resources support a range of conflict resolution and development initiatives. In Niger, this has included the ESFfunded U.S. Institute of Peace conflict mitigation workshop held in Niamey in October 2008, which the High Commissioner for Restoration of Peace personally credits 

for advancing peace talks with rebel Tuareg groups. We have also been unequivocal 

46 

during our contacts with Tuaregs and government officials that we support peaceful 

resolution of outstanding political and economic disputes. 

Question. As you know, Niger is in the midst of a political crisis. I am pleased 

that the administration has spoken out against the disputed legislative elections 

there in October and President Tandja’s blatant disregard for democratic institutions. What is the administration currently doing to press for the resolution of this 

political crisis? And if it is not resolved soon, how will it affect our ability to cooperate with Niger on counterterrorism matters? 

Answer. Our Ambassador to Niger on several occasions has made it very clear 

both to President Tandja and to other levels of the Government of Niger (GON) that 

there will be consequences to President Tandja’s recent undemocratic actions. We 

are cutting off all bilateral nonhumanitarian assistance to the government and have 

placed visa restrictions on government officials who block Niger’s return to democracy. We also support the efforts of international and regional organizations, such 

as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, 

and the European Union, to pressure the Nigerien Government to return to democracy. ECOWAS, for example, has recently suspended Niger and sent a high-level 

mediator to start a dialogue between the GON and the opposition. The United 

Nations Secretary General offered for U.N. offices to work with regional partners, 

in particular the African Union and ECOWAS, to find a solution to this political 

crisis. 

The current political situation limits the scope of our counterterrorism engagement with Niger. Prior to the events of the last several months, our military-to-military engagement had already been severely curtailed following credible reports of 

human rights violations by a Nigerien military unit. We anticipate using a similar 

approach to that used in Mauritania after the August 2008 coup, where security sector engagements were limited to low-profile activities that addressed potentially 

imminent threats. Security-sector engagements with longer term capacity-building 

objectives were halted. 

Question. In the case of Chad, we are engaging with government that has a troubling record with regards to the rule of law and respect for human rights. As you 

know, the State Department’s most recent human rights report for Chad cites ‘‘torture and rape by security forces’’ and ‘‘the use of excessive force and other abuses 

in internal conflict, including killings and use of child soldiers.’’ Given that record 

and the lack of internal controls for accountability, does it make any sense to provide new capabilities to Chad’s military without significant reforms? Outside of 

training and equipping the military, what are the other ways we can engage with 

the government there to strengthen the rule of law and law enforcement? 

Answer. We continue to engage with the Government of Chad (GOC) on its 

human rights record, in particular, because of its abuses by its security forces and 

we do hold them accountable when abuse is confirmed. The GOC has taken steps 

to address certain human rights abuses, most notably the issue of child soldiers. The 

government, along with UNICEF, has visited Chadian military barracks in recent 

months to raise awareness on the issue of child soldiers and hand over child soldiers 

to UNICEF. We continue to urge the GOC to launch initiatives to eradicate child 

soldier recruitment and enforce the Chadian National Army Law prohibiting such 

recruitment. The GOC has also made its own attempts to reform the Chad Armed 

Forces (ANT) since February 2008, including efforts to support ethnically mixed 

units, eliminate military salaries to nonauthorized persons and enforce mandatory 

retirement for long-serving generals to rationalize its command structure. The GOC 

has further plans to retire some 300–500 colonels in the coming months. 

The State Department seeks to ensure all Leahy vetting requirements are met. 

The State Department conducts thorough Leahy vetting procedures on any USG 

training of security officials or units, and has denied trainings due to reported 

human rights abuses. In an advocacy effort, we regularly discuss with the GOC our 

concerns with reports of human rights abuses attributed to individuals in the Chadian Army (ANT), including specifically with the PSI chain of command. Chad’s 

PSI unit and its new chain of command recently have been vetted and cleared for 

training. 

U.S. counterterrorism (CT) training will not provide Chad with new capabilities, 

but will provide its CT unit with expertise and training on combating terrorism. 

This training will have a multiplier effect on our ability to achieve other U.S. strategic goals in Chad. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) security 

assistance can professionalize Chad’s Armed Forces, including training on respect 

for human rights, while making the exercise of state power more legitimate in the 

eyes of the Chadian people and making Chad a more reliable partner in efforts to 

47 

reinforce regional security. Our programs allow U.S. security experts to reach out 

to Chadian police, customs officers, and other law enforcements officials as well as 

to the Chadian military. 

Governing justly and democratically is a USG strategic goal that includes 

strengthening the rule of law in Chad. With limited Economic Support Fund 

resources, we have provided support for the Justice Ministry, and coordinate with 

our international partners, including the EU, which has a 35 million euro project 

to strengthen Chad’s judicial system, including 4.8 million euros for training criminal investigators, magistrates, court clerks and other justice personnel, including 

those working in the penal system. For the rule of law to take hold in Chad, a 

change in mentality needs to occur and this must begin at an early age. Accordingly, 

we have supported the Education Ministry’s efforts to develop a standardized civics 

education curriculum for Chad’s schools, which led to the development of locally produced textbooks for grades 1–12 currently being used throughout the country. 

RESPONSES OF COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM DANIEL BENJAMIN TO

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. You acknowledged that sometimes our counterterrorism training and 

assistance is used by governments in the Sahel ‘‘to take on antiregime rebels successfully.’’ When we provide training or assistance under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), what mechanisms do we have to monitor and 

account for how governments use these new capabilities? And can you provide a 

thorough description of ways in which we have witnessed the use of our assistance 

by governments against groups not connected to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 

(AQIM)? This may be classified if necessary. 

Answer. The fundamental goal under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) remains that our assistance be used specifically for counterterrorism (CT) purposes but we recognize that such assistance, like training and equipping, is fungible. We constantly monitor how our assistance is used and we remain 

vigilant to any reports of abuse. We do make it clear that our assistance comes with 

the price tag of the military operating under civilian control and that the military 

operate under respect for human rights norms in a bona fide and concrete manner. 

We establish 505 End Use Agreements on how equipment can be used and we 

vet the personnel to be trained under the auspices of the Leahy law. We may also 

enter into a Memorandum of Understanding that will spell out the intended use of 

this equipment or training. Use of this equipment and the activities of the units is 

monitored on a continual basis by our embassies, Global Combatant Command personnel, and by visits from Washington-based officials. If a country acts in contravention to these agreements we can place future engagement on hold until the situation 

is clarified. We can also cancel or redirect engagement as we have done in Mauritania and Chad in the past and are doing currently with Niger. 

The U.S. trained and equipped one Niger mobile light infantry company in 2005, 

funded during the pilot program to the TSCTP, the Pan Sahel Initiative. This company was active in providing security along Niger’s northern border, but was, at 

times, deployed against the Nigerien Movement for Justice (MNJ) rebels which was 

conducting a low-intensity fight predominately consisting of skirmishes, ambushes, 

and mining of roads. At the time, the MNJ was a Tuareg-based rebel group challenging central government authority over the issue of perceived economic marginalization. The democratically elected Government of Niger, with U.S. encouragement 

that included a conflict negotiation workshop facilitated by the U.S. Institute for 

Peace, pursued several rounds of peace talks with the MNJ and other rebel groups, 

resulting in a de facto cease-fire, weapons handovers, and an executive order providing amnesty to rebels and those who supported them, including members of the 

Nigerien Armed Forces. In the end, the U.S. strategy was successful in encouraging 

a peaceful end to the conflict. 

In Chad, units trained and equipped the Pan Sahel Initiative, known as PSI 

units, were utilized by the Chadian Government to thwart a Sudan-backed rebel 

takeover of the capital and government; i.e., during a national emergency. Upon 

learning that the government placed PSI units under a different chain of command 

with a primary mission that did not have CT as a core mission, we objected and 

halted assistance. Eventually, Chad reorganized again and placed its PSI units 

under an appropriate chain of command after the United States made it clear that 

further assistance would be impossible without this change. 

48 

Question. In your assessment, what motivated AQIM’s predecessor, the Salafist 

Group for Preaching and Combat, to formally merge with al-Qaeda in 2006? And 

without getting into classified information, how would you characterize the current 

relationship between AQIM and al-Qaeda? 

Answer. The decision to affiliate followed after the Salafist Group for Preaching 

and Combat (GSPC) was increasingly marginalized by Algeria’s successful amnesty 

program and security operations. We believe that first and foremost the GSPC saw 

linkage with al-Qaeda as an attempt to enhance its recruiting ability by co-opting 

the name of a larger, more notorious, and more famous terrorist organization, a 

move, likely to secure steadier streams of financial and other types of support. 

Shortly before and after the announced merger, AQIM conducted an attack on a 

western oil worker bus (10 December 2006) and a car bomb attack on the Algerian 

Prime Ministers office (April 2007) and the attack on the United Nations compound 

in December 2007, which garnered significant media attention, which seemed to 

underscored the new link with al-Qaeda. However, AQIM has not been able to sustain these types of large jihadist operations. AQIM has published many public statements that heavily borrow from al-Qaeda’s style and rhetoric, especially as it pertains to a call for jihad in North Africa and the Sahel. However, AQIM is different 

in that it still retains GSPC’s focus on traditional targets of the Algerian State as 

a practical matter while taking haven in the northern regions of neighboring Mali. 

Question. You mentioned a meeting with European partners in Paris last month. 

Given France’s historic relationship with many of the countries in the region, its 

partnership in our overall counterterrorism strategy is particularly important. Do 

we have the same strategic priorities as France in the Maghreb and the Sahel? And 

what is the day-to-day working relationship like between our embassies? 

Answer. Strong French ties in this region remain pivotal and France has expressed a sincere desire to cooperate with the United States in this area of the 

world. The Paris meeting in September was the first senior-level meeting that 

mapped out a way forward for such cooperation. 

Our strategic counterterrorism (CT) priorities in this region are very similar, 

focusing as they do on building law enforcement, military capacity and development. 

We expect that further meetings in the new year will spell out more specific areas 

of cooperation in followup to the information that we exchanged about our respective 

activities in the reason. 

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VICKI HUDDLESTON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. As you’ve said, DOD is engaged, at different levels, in training and 

equipping militaries across the Sahel for purposes of counterterrorism. However, is 

there a risk that these militaries could misuse their new capabilities, particularly 

to suppress groups with arguably legitimate political grievances or opponents of governments? To what extent is that risk considered before DOD decides to provide 

training or equipment, and what steps can be taken to minimize that risk? 

Answer. DOD conducts a wide range of military cooperation activities with partner nation militaries in Africa. These activities span the spectrum from relatively 

simple outreach efforts (e.g., seminars and conferences), to training events and on 

to joint/combined exercises. The principal objective of DOD military cooperation 

activities is to work with our partner militaries in Africa to foster stability, build 

capacity, and reduce threats. DOD achieves these goals by promoting civil control 

and defense institutional reform, developing professional militaries, and building or 

strengthening African security capacities. 

While military capacities can be a foundation for stability and security in a society, there is always a risk that the capabilities, if misused or misdirected, could be 

used to suppress legitimate political processes or oppress rightful civil activities. 

DOD takes this risk seriously, and works closely with the State Department to mitigate the possibility of abuse. Both DOD and State Department monitors what Chad 

does with the assistance the United States provides and does not hesitate to inform 

the Chadian Government of the consequences should any abuse be detected. In 

every case, DOD military cooperation events, including section 1206 train and assist 

programs are closely coordinated with the respective U.S. Embassy as well as 

the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to ensure 

that partner nation military participants; i.e., individuals and units, are appropriately nominated, reviewed, and vetted by the State Department in accordance 

with the requirements of the Leahy amendment prior to their participation in a 

DOD activity. 

49 

Question. Chad is perhaps the most extreme example in this regard. Since 2005, 

we have provided some training and equipment to Chad through 1206 funds. However, DOD recently briefed committee staff that it had to redirect some equipment 

originally intended for Chad because we learned that a unit we had trained for 

counterterrorism was being used for unrelated domestic purposes. As you know, 

Chad’s security forces have a poor human rights record with reports citing torture, 

rape and the use of excessive force as well as the use of child soldiers. Looking to 

the future, under what conditions, would we seek to provide new training or equipment to the Chadian military? 

Answer. This question refers to DOD plans to implement two section 1206 

projects for Chad in FY07. The first was a tactical airlift equipment package of 

$1.7M, which was processed and delivered. The second was a combined $6.0M 

equipment and training package for a counterterrorism (CT) unit in Chad. Delivery 

of the equipment to the Chadian unit, a former recipient of U.S. assistance under 

the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), was initially delayed due to instability surrounding 

Chadian rebel attacks into Chad in February 2008. Following the attacks and the 

government’s successful effort to reestablish control over the capital city of 

N’Djamena and other key areas, the government placed their CT unit under a new 

chain of command with the primary mission of regime protection. 

In response to this unit’s command and mission reorganization, the USG interagency suspended CT cooperation with the unit due to concerns that Chad had 

shifted the unit’s primary focus away from CT activities. By spring 2009 it was not 

clear when or if the CT unit would return to its previous organization and CT 

mission, and DOD was incurring monthly storage fees for the purchased equipment. DOD and the State Department jointly decided in May 2009 to redirect the 

original equipment and training package to Nigeria, thereby reducing the FY09 section 1206 program cost by the amount of the Chad package. The Secretary of 

Defense approved, the Secretary of State concurred, and Congress was notified of 

the redirection. 

In July 2009, Chad realigned the CT unit back into the main Chadian Army chain 

of command and restored its primary mission to CT, which allowed DOD to consider 

a measured resumption of the suspended security cooperation program. DOD monitors what nations do with U.S.-provided military training or equipment. DOD will 

continue to work closely with the U.S. Embassy in N’Djamena and the Bureau of 

African Affairs at the State Department to mitigate the risk of possible abuse by 

the Chadian military. DOD also will work closely with the State Department to 

ensure that Chadian military participants, both individuals and units, are appropriately nominated, reviewed, and vetted in accordance with the requirements of the 

Leahy amendment prior to their participation in a DOD activity. 

Question. As you know, there has been some suspicion throughout the continent 

about AFRICOM’s activities and intentions. As DOD carries out its work in the 

Sahel, how are you seeking to address these suspicions? What public diplomacy 

activities is DOD carrying out, and how are those efforts coordinated with the 

efforts of State and USAID? 

Answer. DOD provides information to the public regarding military cooperation 

activities in Africa principally through its public affairs system and the local U.S. 

Embassies. This public affairs effort is conducted mainly through U.S. Africa Command, which coordinates all DOD military cooperation activities in Africa. U.S. 

Africa Command maintains a robust public affairs Web site (www.africom.mil) 

which outlines the purpose, mission, leadership, and organization of the command, 

as well as providing updates on U.S. Africa Command activities, such as senior 

leader travel on the continent, conferences and seminars, training events, and exercises. This Web site also provides a discussion-thread forum by which the public can 

post comments as well as questions that can be addressed by U.S. Africa Command 

personnel—in many cases by the commander himself. In addition to this Web site, 

U.S. Africa Command’s Public Affairs office works closely with U.S. Embassies to 

prepare, coordinate, and support press coverage, both international and local, of 

DOD activities and events in Africa. 

DOD works closely with U.S. Embassies in the region in support of the State 

Department’s public diplomacy efforts. U.S. Africa Command has deployed military 

personnel to several regional embassies to ensure the official message being disseminated is consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. These 

Military Information Support Teams coordinate closely with the Chief of Mission 

and Public Diplomacy officer. 

50 

RESPONSES OF SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR EARL GAST TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. As I understand it, most of USAID’s work with the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership is carried out by contractors or grantees. Are there any 

challenges to the fact that this work is not being carried out directly by U.S. Government employees? How does USAID oversee this work and monitor the impacts? 

Answer. Countering violent extremism is a relatively new area of work for 

USAID, and we are providing training to our officers. This work does not naturally 

fall under one technical specialty; rather it touches on several technical areas in 

which USAID has vast experience. TSCTP programs are cross-cutting and bring in 

elements of education, conflict mitigation, governance, and media. TSCTP targets its 

activities at youth, a population group with which USAID works extensively across 

development sectors. 

As with other USAID programming, our implementing partners—contractors and 

grantees—use familiar development practices such as training, community development grants, microcredit, and community radio. Wherever possible, they work 

through local nongovernmental partners and associations as a way to promote sustainability and partnerships. These local organizations are becoming the primary 

partners in TSCTP implementation, sometimes involved from the initial design 

phase of activities. In some cases, it is these organizations—not USAID or a U.S.- 

based NGO—that are executing the community-level grants. 

In the countries where USAID does not have a bilateral mission—Niger, Chad, 

and Mauritania—TSCTP activities are overseen by USAID’s West Africa Regional 

Mission based in Accra, Ghana, in conjunction with USAID’s resident representatives in Niger and Chad. The program in Mali is managed by the bilateral USAID 

mission in Bamako. 

Along with reporting on the standard foreign assistance indicators related to 

counterterrorism, USAID has developed custom indicators at the country level to 

help monitor more incremental progress in TSCTP programs. For these indicators, 

our implementing partners have gathered solid baseline data against which 

progress is being monitored quarterly. Additionally, USAID and the Departments of 

State and Defense are utilizing more broad-based, independent polling data to gauge 

general attitudes and support for violent extremist organizations. We expect that 

this polling data will allow for a broader assessment of the impact of TSCTP activities. Meanwhile, the impact of the program is becoming evident in certain trends; 

for example, youth beneficiaries are more involved in their communities and are 

working to involve their peers in positive and constructive activities. 

Question. About how many staff in USAID work on programs of the Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership in, respectively, Washington and in each of the participant countries? 

Answer. There are seven USAID staff working on TSCTP programs: An advisor 

based in Washington to provide technical support; a program manager and program 

assistant in Niger; one program manager and program assistant in Chad; a program 

manager and program assistant in Mali; and a regional program manager based in 

the West Africa Regional mission based in Accra, Ghana. While all of these staff 

manage TSCTP programs as their primary duties, they all have additional program 

responsibilities. 

Question. Do you think USAID’s limited presence in the region affects its ability 

to be an equal partner in shaping and implementing the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership? 

Answer. The USAID West Africa Regional mission based in Accra, Ghana, manages numerous programs in West African countries where USAID does not have a 

permanent mission; the TSCTP program is not unique in this respect. In the countries where there are TSCTP programs, other development projects are being implemented with strong results. For example, in Chad, USAID efforts focus on governance, elections, and conflict mitigation and reconciliation. 

In these countries, USAID’s resident representatives work closely with the embassies, other agencies, and implementing partners to ensure the appropriateness and 

quality of TSCTP program activities. In fact, the way USAID operates in close partnership with local organizations at the grassroots level makes it uniquely qualified 

to undertake these activities. However, we would prefer a greater level of coverage 

on TSCTP and are looking to increase the number of officers working on the 

program. 

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