JULY 30, 2009 

AUDIT REPORT

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 (ASSIGNMENT NO. A-08-004-00) 

OFFICE OF AUDITS

NASA COULD IMPROVE ANALYSES AND 

COORDINATION IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINT PLANNING 

AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE TO DEVELOP THE NEXT 

GENERATION AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

 
Final report released by: 

 signed 

Debra D. Pettitt 

Acting Assistant Inspector General for Auditing 

Acronyms 

AA Associate Administrator 

ARMD Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FFC Future Flight Central 

FY Fiscal Year 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

IWP Integrated Work Plan 

JPDO Joint Planning and Development Office 

LaRC Langley Research Center 

NPR NASA Procedural Requirements 

NRC National Research Council 

OI Operational Improvement 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PA&E Program Analysis and Evaluation 

PDM Program Decision Memorandum 

R&D Research and Development 

SCAP Strategic Capabilities Assets Program 

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 
JULY 30, 2009 

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

OVERVIEW

NASA COULD IMPROVE ANALYSES AND COORDINATION 

IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 

OFFICE TO DEVELOP THE NEXT GENERATION AIR 

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

The Issue 

In December 2003, Congress authorized development of the Next Generation Air 

Transportation System (NextGen) in Public Law 108-176, “Vision 100—Century of 

Aviation Reauthorization Act,” December 12, 2003. NextGen will replace the Nation’s 

existing air transportation system by 2025 to accommodate an expected tripling of air 

travel. 

NASA has a significant role in NextGen development. Vision 100 named the Agency to 

the NextGen Senior Policy Committee. The Committee provides policy guidance for 

NextGen’s plans, identifies resource needs, and makes legislative recommendations for 

the new system. Subsequently, in 2006 and 2007, NASA reformulated its aeronautics 

research programs to align with NextGen as directed by the “NASA Authorization Act of 

2005,” December 30, 2005. 

Vision 100 also established the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) and 

directed it to develop and carry out an integrated development plan and to oversee 

research and development (R&D) on the new system. JPDO’s September 30, 2008,

comprehensive NextGen development plan defined 203 R&D activities needed to 

develop the new system. Of the 203 R&D activities, NASA leads 44 (22 percent) and 

supports 37 (18 percent). Of the 81 total R&D activities that NASA leads or supports, 

one weather-related support activity is delegated to the Science Mission Directorate1

 and 

the remaining R&D activities to the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD). 

Our overall audit objective was to determine whether NASA was working effectively 

with JPDO to accomplish NextGen development. Specifically, we determined whether 

• ARMD’s program and project management provided adequate control over and 

accountability for the NASA-led NextGen R&D activities; and 

 

1

 We did not review the one weather-related R&D activity delegated to the Science Mission Directorate. 

We limited our review to the 44 NASA-led R&D activities delegated to the Aeronautics Research 

Mission Directorate. 
OVERVIEW

ii REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

• NASA had sustained aeronautics research capabilities identified as necessary for 

NextGen development. 

Details of the audit’s scope and methodology are in Appendix A. 

Results 

Overall, we determined that NASA had taken some actions to work effectively with 

JPDO to accomplish NextGen development. NASA implemented an organizational 

structure to support JPDO R&D activities, assigning responsibility to accomplish 

NextGen R&D activities to ARMD. ARMD reformulated programs and projects to 

execute its NextGen responsibilities, developed program and project plans that support 

JPDO’s plans, assigned responsibility and defined supervisory positions to support the 

accomplishment of those plans, and established project plan milestones and schedules to 

ensure progress toward NextGen objectives. 

However, concurrent with those actions in support of NextGen, when faced with 

impending budget reductions, ARMD eliminated or reduced three aeronautics research 

capabilities that JPDO and NRC had identified as critical for achieving NextGen goals. 

This resulted in delayed or canceled milestones in two NASA-led projects and affected 

FAA’s development of critical NextGen technologies. ARMD may have been able to 

minimize the impact on NextGen development, had it conducted benefit-cost analyses 

and coordinated more effectively with JPDO and FAA on the consequences of its 

decisions. Processes implemented by JPDO in 2008—research transition teams and a 

Web-based Joint Planning Environment—should improve coordination and management 

of NextGen technical and schedule risks. 

NASA’s Participation in JPDO Processes. In 2008, JPDO implemented two 

processes—an analysis of R&D activities and research transition teams—that allow 

JPDO to manage the work scope and risk of R&D activities. In March and April 2008, 

NASA researchers participated in the analysis of R&D activities with JPDO. The 

analysis identified the scope of work for each R&D activity and allowed the partners to 

address areas that were not included in NASA or FAA project plans. NASA personnel 

also serve on the research transition teams with JPDO and FAA personnel. The teams 

include researchers, planners, and implementers that work to effectively transfer research 

products from NASA to FAA. Effective transfer of research products lowers the risk that 

NASA research products will not meet FAA’s technical or schedule needs. In May 2008, 

JPDO implemented a Web-based application, the Joint Planning Environment, that 

allows JPDO to communicate planning information to NextGen partners, to integrate 

research products from the partners, and to manage NextGen technical and schedule 

risks. 

NASA’s participation with JPDO on the NextGen Senior Policy Committee, the analysis 

of R&D activities, the research transition teams, and the Joint Planning Environment 

application provided adequate control over and accountability for the NASA-led 
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 iii 

NextGen R&D activities. Therefore, additional control and accountability for NASA-led 

R&D activities were not needed within ARMD. 

ARMD Reduced Aeronautics Research Capabilities without Adequate Analyses or 

Coordination. We found that NASA’s decision to eliminate or reduce certain 

aeronautics research capabilities resulted in delayed or canceled milestones in two NASA 

projects and affected FAA’s development of critical NextGen technologies. 

In 2006, ARMD senior management began reevaluating the Directorate’s priorities and 

restructured ARMD’s programs and projects to focus on long-term, cutting-edge research 

(i.e., fundamental research) in anticipation of severe budget reductions. The ARMD 

budget decreased from $673 million in FY 2006 to $447 million in FY 2009, a 34 percent 

decrease. 

At the same time that ARMD was reevaluating its priorities, JPDO and the National 

Research Council (NRC) identified three specific research capabilities as critical for 

achieving NextGen goals: (1) a Boeing 757 (B-757) aircraft and flight test components of 

the Simulation-to-Flight Program, (2) wake turbulence research, and (3) the Future Flight 

Central (FFC). ARMD management recommended, and NASA approved, eliminating 

the B-757 flight test capability by October 2006, reducing wake turbulence research, and 

placing the FFC in standby status. However, we found that ARMD did not conduct 

adequate analyses prior to recommending the changes, despite JPDO and NRC 

identifying the capabilities as critical for achieving NextGen goals. In light of the 

competing priorities—NASA’s and NextGen’s—ARMD officials should have conducted 

a benefit-cost analysis to support their recommendation and should have coordinated 

more effectively with JPDO and FAA in order to minimize the impact on NextGen 

development. The research transition teams implemented by JPDO in 2008 are intended 

to facilitate more effective coordination and management of technical and schedule risks. 

Management Action 

In our June 26, 2009, draft of this report, we recommended that the Associate 

Administrator for ARMD establish policy that ARMD conduct and document a benefitcost analysis regarding NASA’s investment decisions concerning major capabilities that 

are needed for NextGen. Analyses should be in accordance with Office of Management 

and Budget Circular No. A-94, “Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis 

of Federal Programs,” October 29, 1992, which recommends that a benefit-cost analysis 

be used as a management tool when considering changes in Government programs or 

projects. NASA policy should also require ARMD to use JPDO’s research transition 

teams to coordinate investment decisions regarding major capabilities that are needed for 

NextGen. 

In response to the draft report, the Associate Administrator for ARMD concurred in 

principle with the recommendation to establish policy or procedures, or both, to ensure 

that ARMD conducts and documents benefit-cost analyses in accordance with OMB 
OVERVIEW

iv REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

Circular A-94. The Associate Administrator stated that the scope of a benefit-cost 

analysis may be limited because “changes may be required in such a short time,” but that 

“ARMD will document the justification for the change.” We consider management’s 

proposed action to be responsive. The recommendation is resolved and will be closed 

upon completion and verification of management’s corrective action. 

The Associate Administrator for ARMD concurred with our recommendation to establish 

policy for using JPDO’s research transition teams to coordinate investment decisions and 

stated that the process and structure of the research transition teams, which include 

oversight from both NASA and FAA officials, satisfies the recommendation. ARMD and 

JPDO have instituted quarterly meetings to discuss strategic issues, and ARMD will use 

the quarterly meetings as a venue to coordinate ARMD investment decisions. We 

consider management’s actions to be responsive, and the recommendation is closed. (See 

Appendix C for the full text of management’s comments.) 
JULY 30, 2009 

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Background __________________________________________ 1 

Objectives ___________________________________________ 5 

RESULTS

ARMD Reduced Aeronautics Research Capabilities without 

Benefit-Cost Analyses or Adequate Coordination ___________ 6 

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology _______________________________ 19 

Review of Internal Controls _____________________________ 21 

Prior Coverage _______________________________________ 22 

APPENDIX B 

JPDO Memorandum ___________________________________ 23 

APPENDIX C 

Management Comments _______________________________ 25 

APPENDIX D 

Report Distribution ___________________________________ 28 

JULY 30, 2009 

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 1 

INTRODUCTION

Background 

Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) Legislation. Public Law 

106-398, “The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2001,” established the Presidential Commission on the Future of the United States 

Aerospace Industry. The Commission was formed to study the importance of the 

domestic aerospace industry to our future economic and national security and to identify 

actions needed to ensure the future health of the industry. The Commission, in its final 

report dated November 18, 2002, recommended transformation of the existing air 

transportation system as a national priority. 

Public Law 108-176, “Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act,” 

December 12, 2003, also known as Vision 100, authorized transformation of the Nation’s 

air transportation system to NextGen by 2025. Vision 100 established the Joint Planning 

and Development Office (JPDO) to execute NextGen planning and development. JPDO 

is a joint initiative of the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and 

Homeland Security; NASA; and the White House Office of Science and Technology 

Policy. The NextGen Senior Policy Committee, also established by Vision 100, provides 

policy guidance for NextGen development plans, identifies resource needs, and makes 

legislative recommendations for the new system.

JPDO Plans. On June 13, 2007, JPDO issued the “Concept of Operations for the Next 

Generation Air Transportation System,” Version 2.0, to provide a common vision of how 

NextGen will operate in 2025 and beyond. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

reported that the existing system would not be sufficient to meet the anticipated demand 

for air travel or changes in the industry. In 2007, over 700 million passengers used the 

system, and FAA forecasts over 1 billion passengers by 2015. As JPDO pointed out in 

various planning documents, NextGen is expected to do more than just increase 

capacity—enhancements are also envisioned in the areas of security, safety, and aircraft 

noise and emission reduction. 

JPDO issued two development plans. The “Research and Development Plan for the Next 

Generation Air Transportation System FY 2009 - FY 2013,” August 31, 2007, details 

requirements for needed NextGen technologies and identifies responsibilities of each 

agency. The “Next Generation Air Transportation System Integrated Work Plan: A 

Functional Outline” (IWP), Version 1.0, September 30, 2008, documents the 

comprehensive NextGen development plan. The Plans include the following elements: 

• Operational improvements (OIs). OIs describe a specific operational 

transformation needed or an improved level of performance. An OI is realized 
INTRODUCTION

2 REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

using the results from one or more research and development (R&D) activities. 

The IWP states a target completion date for each OI. 

• R&D activities for research or technology development. For each R&D activity, 

the IWP describes the desired outcome and expected completion date, the OI the 

activity supports, the lead agency, and any supporting agencies. The IWP defines 

203 R&D activities, of which NASA leads 44 (22 percent) and FAA and other 

participating agencies lead 159 (78 percent). NASA is a supporting agency for 

37 R&D activities.

Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Execution of NextGen. The 

“NASA Authorization Act of 2005,” December 30, 2005, required NASA to align 

aviation research projects to provide direct support for NextGen goals. Of the 44 NASAled R&D activities, NASA delegated one weather-related activity to the Science Mission 

Directorate2

 and the remaining activities, as well as overall NextGen responsibility, to 

ARMD. ARMD implemented an organizational structure for executing NextGen that 

reflects the intent of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-123, 

“Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control,” December 21, 2004. Specifically, 

ARMD took the following actions: 

• Reformulated its programs in 2006 and 2007 to align with NextGen.3

• Developed program and project plans that support the Agency’s NextGen 

objective. 

• Defined program and project management positions and assigned responsibilities 

to those positions: 

o A Program Director oversees program portfolio formulation, 

implementation, evaluation, and integration of results with other 

ARMD/NASA programs. 

o A Principal Investigator is responsible and accountable to the Program 

Director for the technical objectives and content of the project and for the 

planning and execution of the project. 

o A Project Scientist is responsible and accountable to the Principal 

Investigator for the technical content, integrity, innovativeness, and longterm vision of the project and ensures that the highest technical standards 

are exhibited by the project. 

 

2

 The audit did not review the weather-related R&D activity delegated to the Science Mission Directorate. 

3

 According to “A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge, Third Edition,” 2004, published 

by the Project Management Institute, Inc., which describes project management principles and best 

practices, a program is a group of related projects managed in a coordinated way to obtain benefits and 

control not available from managing them individually. The Guide also defines a project as a temporary 

endeavor undertaken to create a unique product, service, or result. 
INTRODUCTION

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 3 

o A Project Manager is responsible and accountable to the Principal 

Investigator for developing the project plan and for overseeing the 

execution of the project with primary responsibility for project fiscal 

performance. 

o An Associate Principal Investigator is responsible and accountable to the 

Principal Investigator for technical content and task plan contract 

execution of a specific research topic area. 

• Established project plan milestones and schedules. Each research activity is a 

project plan milestone. The project plan includes a planned completion date, or 

schedule, for each milestone. Milestones and schedules are regularly reviewed by 

program and project management. 

ARMD Budgets. As shown in Figure 1, ARMD’s budget decreased from FY 2004 

through FY 2009. From FY 2009 through FY 2013, ARMD budgets are projected to 

increase slightly. 

Figure 1. Enacted and Planned ARMD Budgets, FYs 2004 through 2013 

Source: Office of Inspector General (OIG) analysis of data provided by ARMD 

and the President’s Budget for FY 2009 

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

$800

$900

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Fiscal Year

Dollars in Millions
INTRODUCTION

4 REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

Three ARMD programs provide direct support of NextGen: Airspace Systems, Aviation 

Safety, and Fundamental Aeronautics. The Aeronautics Test Program provides indirect 

support to NextGen. Figure 2 shows the four programs’ FY 2008 budget, totaling 

$511.7 million. 

Figure 2. Programs Funded by the FY 2008 ARMD Budget 

Source: OIG analysis of the President’s Budget for FY 2009 

In FY 2007, ARMD reported to FAA that approximately 68 percent of its total budget 

from FY 2007 through FY 2013 will be expended in direct support of NextGen R&D. 

Figure 3 displays the dollar amounts reported by NASA to FAA. 

Fundamental 

Aeronautics 

Program 

$269.9 million 

(52 percent) 

Airspace Systems 

Program 

$100.1 million 

(20 percent) 

Aeronautics Test 

Program 

$75.1 million 

(15 percent) 

Aviation Safety 

Program 

$66.6 million 

(13 percent) 
INTRODUCTION

Figure 3. ARMD’s Direct Support of NextGen as Reported to FAA 

FY 2007 through FY 2013 

Source: OIG analysis of data provided by ARMD and the President’s Budget for FY 2009 

$50

$100 

$150 

$200 

$250 

$300 

$350 

$400 

$450 

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Fiscal Year

Dollars in Millions

Objectives 

Our overall audit objective was to determine whether NASA was working effectively 

with JPDO to accomplish NextGen development. Specifically, we determined whether 

• ARMD’s program management provided adequate control over and 

accountability for NASA-led NextGen R&D activities and 

• NASA sustained aeronautics research capabilities identified as necessary for 

NextGen development. 

See Appendix A for details of the audit’s scope and methodology, our review of internal 

controls, and a list of prior coverage. 

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 5 
RESULTS

6 REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

ARMD REDUCED AERONAUTICS 

RESEARCH CAPABILITIES 

WITHOUT BENEFIT-COST 

ANALYSES OR ADEQUATE 

COORDINATION

From 2006 through 2008, ARMD eliminated or reduced three aeronautics research 

capabilities: (1) a Boeing 757 (B-757) aircraft and flight test components of the 

Simulation-to-Flight Program, (2) wake turbulence research, and (3) the Future 

Flight Central (FFC). We found that NASA’s decision to eliminate or reduce these 

capabilities resulted in delayed or canceled milestones in two NASA projects and 

affected FAA’s development of critical NextGen technologies. 

ARMD officials recommended the elimination of the B-757 and reductions in the 

other two capabilities after reevaluating the Directorate’s priorities and restructuring 

ARMD’s programs and projects to focus on long-term, cutting-edge research. OMB 

recommends that agencies considering program or project changes conduct benefitcost analyses to ensure well-informed decision-making. However, we found that 

ARMD did not conduct adequate analyses prior to recommending the changes, 

despite JPDO and the National Research Council (NRC) identifying the capabilities 

as critical for achieving NextGen goals. In light of the competing priorities—

NASA’s and NextGen’s—ARMD officials should have conducted benefit-cost 

analyses to support their recommendations and should have better coordinated with 

JPDO and FAA in order to minimize the impact on NextGen development. The 

research transition teams implemented by JPDO in 2008 are intended to facilitate 

more effective coordination. 

ARMD Reevaluation of Directorate Priorities 

ARMD senior officials stated that, in 2006 and 2007, they reevaluated the Directorate’s 

priorities and restructured ARMD’s programs and projects to focus on long-term, cuttingedge research (i.e., fundamental research) in anticipation of severe budget reductions. 

The ARMD budget decreased from $673 million in FY 2006 to $447 million4

 in 

FY 2009, a 34 percent decrease. The reevaluation of priorities resulted in ARMD’s 

recommendations to eliminate or reduce some of its aeronautics research capabilities. 

Specifically, the elimination of the B-757 flight test capability by October 2006 reduced 

ARMD’s annual operating costs by $11 million. The reduction in the wake turbulence 

 

4

 Budget amounts are expressed in “direct equivalent” dollars. NASA changed its accounting methodology 

during the fiscal years under examination. To make valid budget year comparisons, budgets must be 

adjusted to equivalent dollars to eliminate the effect of inconsistent accounting methodology. Therefore, 

we obtained NASA’s estimate of “direct equivalent” dollars as the basis for our analyses. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 7 

research capability was realized by reducing the number of researchers by 64 percent. 

ARMD eliminated operating costs of approximately $10 million annually by converting 

the FFC from an active to a standby status. 

OMB Benefit-Cost Analysis 

OMB Circular No. A-94, “Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of 

Federal Programs,” October 29, 1992, recommends, but does not require, that a benefitcost analysis be used as a management tool when considering changes in Government 

programs or projects. A benefit-cost analysis is recommended to help meet the goal of 

promoting efficient resource allocation through well-informed decision-making. The 

Circular describes four elements of a benefit-cost analysis: policy rationale, explicit 

assumptions, evaluation of alternatives, and benefit-cost verification. As a best business 

practice, management should have analyzed the aeronautics research capabilities using 

the four elements in OMB Circular A-94 and documented the results. 

National Needs for NASA Capabilities in Support of NextGen 

In 2006, at the same time that ARMD was reevaluating its priorities and aligning its 

projects to directly support JPDO and NextGen, JPDO and the NRC identified the B-757 

flight test capability, wake turbulence research, and the FFC as critical for achieving 

NextGen goals. They communicated their concerns to ARMD and provided 

documentation to support NextGen’s need for the capabilities. However, ARMD 

officials were unable to provide official documentation showing that they had given due 

consideration to the national needs identified by JPDO. In light of JPDO’s concerns, 

ARMD needed to ensure that it was making the best decision possible and should have 

conducted and documented a benefit-cost analysis following OMB Circular A-94 

guidelines before deciding to eliminate or reduce NASA’s aeronautics research 

capabilities. 

In addition, ARMD could have improved its communication and coordination with JPDO 

and the FAA concerning these capabilities in order to minimize the impact on NextGen 

development. As discussed in the following sections, we found that NASA’s decision to 

eliminate the B-757, reduce the wake turbulence research capability, and place the FFC 

in standby status resulted in delayed or canceled milestones in two NASA projects and 

affected FAA’s development of critical NextGen technologies. 

Processes Implemented by JPDO Should Improve Coordination 

and Management of Risks 

In 2008, JPDO implemented two processes—an analysis of R&D activities and research 

transition teams—that allow JPDO to manage the work scope and risk of R&D activities. 
RESULTS

8 REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

In March and April 2008, NASA researchers participated in the analysis of R&D 

activities with JPDO. The analysis identified the scope of work for each R&D activity 

and allowed the partners to address areas that were not included in NASA or FAA project 

plans. NASA personnel also serve on the research transition teams with JPDO and FAA 

personnel. The teams include researchers, planners, and implementers who work 

together to ensure effective transfer of research products from NASA to FAA, which 

lowers the risk that NASA research products will not meet FAA’s technical or schedule 

needs. In May 2008, JPDO implemented a Web-based application, the Joint Planning 

Environment, that allows JPDO to communicate planning information to NextGen 

partners, to integrate research products from the partners, and to manage NextGen 

technical and schedule risks. 

B-757 Flight Test Capability 

In July 2006, ARMD senior management officials recommended that the Agency dispose 

of a uniquely modified B-757 aircraft because ARMD had not identified it as a critical 

need for any ARMD projects. The Agency agreed with ARMD’s recommendation and 

decided to dispose of the aircraft. However, the decision eliminated a key capability to 

perform NextGen flight test research, which the Agency did not address in the 

memorandum that directed disposal of the aircraft. 

The B-757 was the centerpiece of the Simulation-to-Flight Program at Langley Research 

Center (LaRC). The Simulation-to-Flight Program was developed to streamline the 

transition of advanced new technologies from the simulation environment to the flight 

environment. The success of the Program relied on the existence of two nearly identical 

integration laboratories, one for simulation research and one for flight integration. 

Simulation-to-Flight increased the efficiency and reduced the cost of technology 

development and validation by using common hardware and software, procedures, and 

processes for both piloted simulation and flight testing. 

NASA purchased the B-757 for $24 million in 1994 and invested heavily in 

modifications, the cost of which cannot be fully determined,5

 to develop the B-757 into a 

unique platform for testing flight hardware and software in a real-world environment. In 

addition to the B-757, a team of 58 civil service and 43 contract personnel with 

specialized skills to plan and conduct flight test research supported the flight test 

component. 

 

5

 NASA’s cost records did not provide a full accounting of the Agency’s investment in the B-757. We 

found documentation of additional investment in two areas of modification totaling between $37 million 

and $68 million. Specifically, our review of program documents to estimate the cost of the aircraft 

modifications found documentation of modifications costing between $24 million and $55 million for the 

Aft Flight Deck and $13 million for data systems and flight control modifications. We were unable to 

estimate civil service labor costs for designing the modifications. In September 2006, when the B-757 

aircraft was transferred to Dryden Flight Research Center, the NASA Equipment Management System 

reported a capitalized value of $28.4 million. However, the cost of aircraft modifications made since 

1994 were generally expensed as part of each year’s annual cost of operations. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 9 

On July 19, 2006, the former Associate Administrator (AA) for ARMD issued a 

memorandum to the LaRC Director explaining the Agency’s decision to dispose of the 

B-757. The memorandum stated: 

None of the Aeronautics research proposals identified a need for the B-757 because 

sufficient capabilities, facilities, and flight research assets already exist elsewhere 

within NASA, other Government agencies, and industry. Thus, the NASA Aeronautics 

Program has no identified need for the B-757 in the foreseeable future. 

The memorandum further directed that LaRC deobligate any aeronautics funding 

associated with contractor support of the B-757 beyond September 30, 2006. 

In a separate memorandum, also dated July 19, 2006, the NASA Associate Administrator 

stated that the Agency had considered funding the B-757 and LaRC’s overall Simulationto-Flight capability as part of the NASA Strategic Capabilities Assets Program (SCAP, 

formerly the Shared Capability Assets Program). However, the Agency concluded that 

the capability did not meet “SCAP investment criteria because there are no known NASA 

or national requirements for the capability.” The NASA Associate Administrator 

directed that the B-757 receive no Agency funding in FY 2007 and beyond. The 

memorandum instructed that LaRC “transition the aircraft into flyable storage at Dryden 

Flight Research Center as quickly and cost effectively as possible.” 

ARMD Analyses. ARMD senior management did not adequately document its analysis 

of the need for the B-757. ARMD’s July 2006 memorandum to the LaRC Director 

explained that the flight test capability was being eliminated because there were no 

known NASA or national requirements. 

However, prior to the final Agency decision regarding disposal, ARMD received the 

JPDO white paper, “Justification of National Assets,” July 12, 2006, identifying the 

B-757 as a critical asset needed for NextGen. The AA for ARMD stated that the issues 

raised in the JPDO white paper did not justify maintaining the B-757, but ARMD 

officials were unable to provide official documentation showing that they had given due 

consideration to the national needs identified in the JPDO white paper. Instead, ARMD 

officials provided an undated issue paper prepared by a former Program Analysis and 

Evaluation (PA&E) analyst near the time of the disposal recommendation. The undated 

issue paper did not meet OMB Circular A-94 criteria that recommend an evaluation of 

possible interactions between benefits and costs and other Government activities. The 

analysis evaluated costs to NASA but did not evaluate the interactions between those 

costs and the benefits to NextGen development that were stated in the JPDO white paper. 

PA&E Analysis. PA&E is responsible for conducting independent studies and analyses 

in support of NASA policy, program, and budget decisions. On July 21, 2006—2 days 

after the former AA issued the memorandum explaining the decision to eliminate the 

B-757 at LaRC—PA&E issued Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) #24, “Eliminate 

B-757 from the LaRC Simulation-to-Flight Capability.” PDM #24 states that “the 

simulation-to-flight capability at LaRC does not meet Agency/SCAP investment criteria 
RESULTS

10 REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

because there are no known NASA or national requirements for the capability.” 

However, PA&E did not conduct an independent analysis to support the PDM’s 

conclusions. The PA&E analyst who prepared the PDM stated that PA&E did nothing to 

independently verify or validate those conclusions, which were provided by the former 

AA for ARMD. The analyst described his role as “limited to putting [the former AA’s] 

conclusions into English.” 

An independent analysis would have disclosed the national need for the B-757 and also 

that NASA project management planned to use the B-757’s capabilities in meeting the 

Agency’s commitments to NextGen. Draft project plans, which had been reformulated 

for the Airspace Systems Program, the Aviation Safety Program, and the Fundamental 

Aeronautics Program in March 2006, included requirements for Simulation-to-Flight and 

flight test capability. Those requirements were subsequently removed from the draft 

plans to be consistent with ARMD’s move to fundamental research. 

An undated PA&E issue paper, provided to us by ARMD in March 2009, concluded that 

there were no known NASA or national requirements for the B-757 flight test capability. 

To determine the validity and reliability of the issue paper, we interviewed the former 

analyst who prepared the document and a PA&E Deputy Director. The former analyst 

acknowledged that key conclusions in the issue paper had been provided to PA&E by 

ARMD officials and the former director of SCAP. 

National Need for the B-757 Flight Test Capability. On July 12, 2006, prior to the 

ARMD memorandum explaining the Agency’s decision to dispose of the B-757, JPDO 

issued its white paper with recommendations to NASA. JPDO’s cover memorandum 

(see Appendix B) states that the recommendations are “to ensure no irreversible decisions 

are made with regard to the National assets concerned or with regard to the talented 

workforce assembled by NASA to support these facilities.” JPDO’s white paper 

recommended that NASA retain the B-757 or another appropriate jet transport as part of 

the larger Simulation-to-Flight capability. 

JPDO’s white paper states that “all federal organizations researching new air traffic 

management concepts, including NASA, will need to evaluate/validate these concepts via 

experiments on aircraft,” and specified seven areas where flight test validation will be 

needed.6

 The JPDO white paper also states that there is no other Federal facility close to 

replicating ARMD’s Simulation-to-Flight capability. According to the white paper, other 

Federal agencies have flight research aircraft and research simulators, but those assets are 

not linked together as seamlessly as ARMD’s Simulation-to-Flight capability. The white 

paper notes that the B-757’s value is in the capabilities of the research avionics and 

systems that are installed in the aircraft and their alignment with piloted (i.e., real-time) 

 

6

 The JPDO white paper specified that validation would be needed for (1) separation assurance between 

aircraft and the air navigation service provider, (2) validation of aircraft trajectory prediction methods, 

(3) concepts for reducing separation standards, (4) wake vortex prediction methods, (5) integrated flight 

deck system concepts, (6) precision flight path management concepts, and (7) integrated vehicle health 

management. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 11 

and “batch” simulators.7 The white paper further states that the Federal Government 

does not have any other single-engine general aviation aircraft used for research to 

improve general aviation operations in the National Airspace System. The white paper 

notes that “once such multi-disciplinary teams of highly specialized personnel are 

dispersed, it will likely take many years to reestablish the competency.” 

 

Impact on NextGen Research. NASA’s July 2, 2008, quarterly review of the Airspace 

Project (under the Airspace Systems Program) reported one delayed milestone and one 

canceled milestone because flight test capability was unavailable. The review report 

stated that one milestone, “Flight test evaluation of an airborne situation awareness-based 

application,” was delayed for 2 years because NASA aircraft had been removed from 

service.8 The review report also stated that the milestone requiring flight validation of 

low noise guidance was canceled in 2007 when ARMD removed the aircraft from LaRC. 

An official within FAA’s Advanced Technology and Prototyping Group confirmed that 

ARMD’s actions to eliminate the Simulation-to-Flight capability affected FAA’s 

development of critical NextGen technologies because FAA had planned to use the 

capability for testing. FAA officials described the following critical technologies 

affected by ARMD’s decision: 

• required area navigation and required navigation performance technologies, 

which are critical for quieter descent procedures that burn less fuel; 

• satellite-based air traffic control, paired with automatic dependent surveillancebroadcast technology on an aircraft, which are critical for safer, closer separations 

between aircraft and more direct routing; and 

• an electronic cockpit tool that gives pilots a moving map display of their position 

and is critical for using global positioning systems, which will replace the existing 

Air Navigation Services.

The official stated that the FAA will develop the technologies since they are critical for 

NextGen. 

Inadequate Coordination with JPDO and the FAA. Although the JPDO white paper 

specified research areas and articulated why NASA should retain the Simulation-to-Flight 

capability, ARMD did not adequately coordinate the July 2006 decision to eliminate the 

B-757 with JPDO or the FAA. Specifically, we found that ARMD did not provide 

7

 A “batch” simulator is an off-line version of the simulation, commonly provided to researchers for their 

desktop workstation to generate and verify the real-time simulation and to test candidate control laws 

prior to implementation. The off-line, or batch, version uses identical code as the real-time simulation for 

the simulation models. 

8

 The Airspace Project subsequently reported that the milestone had been successfully completed, without 

conducting the flight test, in September 2007. The Milestone Completion Memorandum, dated 

September 4, 2008, stated that “scheduling and execution of this flight test rests solely with the FAA and 

Airservices Australia.” 
RESULTS

12 REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

alternative solutions for accomplishing NextGen activities that JPDO reasoned were best 

suited for the B-757, NASA had not provided an official response to JPDO’s concerns, 

and ARMD had not conducted a credible benefit-cost analysis. The AA for ARMD 

stated that the Directorate contacted FAA during 2006 to inquire whether FAA would 

provide direct funding for the aircraft, but documentation provided by ARMD personnel 

did not specify the date of inquiry or the FAA official contacted. ARMD officials also 

stated that the Agency identified five alternative aircraft that could be used for flight 

testing in place of the B-757. This too was not documented. 

A documented benefit-cost analysis could have supported the Agency’s decision to 

eliminate the B-757. In addition, better coordination by ARMD with JPDO and the FAA 

on the Agency’s decisions concerning major capabilities needed for NextGen research 

could have minimized the impact on NextGen development. The processes implemented 

by JPDO in 2008—the research transition teams and the Web-based Joint Planning 

Environment—should improve coordination and management of NextGen technical and 

schedule risks. 

Wake Turbulence Research Capability 

An aircraft generates wake in its trail as an inevitable product of lift. As the weight of an 

aircraft increases, the stronger its wake; the greater an aircraft’s wingspan, the longer the 

wake persists. Wake can be a safety hazard when smaller aircraft follow relatively larger 

aircraft too closely. That hazard, known as wake turbulence, requires aircraft to maintain 

safe separation distances from other aircraft. The FAA mandates separation distances to 

minimize risk from wake turbulence. 

Researchers conduct wake turbulence research to determine whether FAA separation 

distances can be safely reduced. Safe reduction of separation distance will increase air 

traffic capacity—a fundamental requirement for NextGen. To explore minimum safe 

separation distances between aircraft under different conditions, researchers measure 

wake vortices and conduct wake vortex modeling. Researchers investigate and develop 

high-resolution sensors to measure aircraft wake vortices as well as evaluating how 

changing meteorological conditions affect wake vortices. Wake vortex modeling predicts 

the basic characteristics of the wake vortices trailing the aircraft as a function of the 

generating aircraft and ambient atmospheric conditions. 

From FY 2005 through FY 2008, ARMD reduced its wake turbulence research capability 

64 percent by decreasing the number of wake turbulence researchers in the Airportal 

Project—from 22 researchers (10 civil service personnel and 12 contract personnel) in 

2005 to eight researchers by the end of FY 2008.9

 The wake turbulence researchers 

 

9

 On September 30, 2008, ARMD awarded an NRA that included five additional researchers in the 

proposal, increasing NASA’s level of support for wake turbulence research from three to eight 

researchers. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 13 

support six distinct research areas,10 which support Airportal Project plan milestones 

related to six NextGen OIs. 

ARMD Analysis. Wake turbulence research was reduced to align NASA’s research with 

ARMD’s policy for conducting long-term, cutting-edge research. The AA for ARMD 

explained that wake vortex research was conducted because the Directorate had expertise 

in that area. However, the AA stated that while ARMD’s wake vortex research collected 

empirical data, it was not advancing cutting-edge research. 

In 2006, program and project managers, at the direction of ARMD senior management, 

revised draft project plans to cut the number of project plan milestones related to wake 

turbulence research. Those revisions resulted in the elimination of contractors and a 

reduction in the number of civil service researchers. ARMD officials stated that the 

former AA for ARMD’s decision to shift resources to other research areas was based on 

an independent assessment of ARMD programs, which noted that ARMD devoted too 

many resources to wake turbulence research. The officials explained that, if the 

Directorate had continued the same level of support for wake research, other gaps in 

NextGen development might have appeared. However, officials had no analysis to show 

that other gaps in NextGen might appear. 

ARMD could not provide a documented benefit-cost analysis in support of its decision to 

reduce the wake turbulence research capability. Since the analysis was not documented, 

we cannot substantiate that ARMD followed the Circular A-94 recommendation for an 

evaluation of the interaction between benefits and costs and other Government activities. 

National Need for Wake Turbulence Research. NASA and FAA program officials 

stated that before the wake turbulence research capability was reduced, ARMD had a 

robust, system-level wake turbulence research capability. The officials explained that the 

capability provided a unique interface between the users of wake turbulence research 

(airlines, pilot unions, FAA regulators) and wake turbulence researchers. The interface 

provided the researchers an understanding of National Airspace System limitations, 

which allowed the researchers to address data quality assurance in fundamental research 

and early designs. The officials said that most of the system-level wake turbulence 

research capability has been significantly reduced because of reductions to the ARMD 

capability. A NASA program official familiar with NASA and FAA wake turbulence 

research stated that NASA’s researchers are no longer able to support FAA research 

efforts that NASA and the FAA agreed to conduct jointly, such as wake turbulence 

encounter and mitigation at airport arrival. 

An FAA wake turbulence program official stated that the wake turbulence research 

capability being established by FAA would not fully replace the capability formerly 

provided by NASA in the medium-term research area. The official described medium-

 

10(1) Wake turbulence mitigation for departure; (2) wake turbulence mitigation for arrivals; 

(3) crosswind/reduced separations for departure operations; (4) recategorization; (5) work to establish 

acceptable levels of wake encounter; and (6) collision risk modeling and analysis capability. 
RESULTS

14 REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

term as research that takes 3 to 6 years to transition “to the FAA systems engineering 

organization.” The official explained that the interface NASA provided between wake 

turbulence researchers and the users of that research facilitated technology transfer to 

FAA in the medium-term research area. The official characterized NASA’s mediumterm wake turbulence research as a cohesive force that kept researchers from multiple 

organizations focused on technology transfer to FAA for introduction into FAA’s 

systems engineering process. 

In “Wake Turbulence: An Obstacle to Increased Air Traffic Capacity,” January 2008, the 

NRC states that unless the separation distance can be reduced through wake turbulence 

research, other NextGen technologies will have less of an impact on departure and arrival 

capacity. The NRC also reported: 

The Committee to Conduct an Independent Assessment of the Nation’s Wake 

Turbulence Research and Development Program found that the wake vortex problem 

does present a real impediment to increased air traffic capacity, something reflected in 

most of the documentation that has been drafted to date by the JPDO. 

The NRC report, referring to capabilities prior to the staff reductions, noted that NASA 

expertise was well aligned for conducting medium- to long-term fundamental research, 

including wake vortex modeling and wake vortex mitigation work. The report also states 

that FAA did not have the necessary expertise and that no other Government agency 

appeared to possess the capability or capacity for wake turbulence research. The report 

recommended that NASA continue to conduct medium- to long-term wake vortex 

modeling and mitigation work at a level of effort sufficient to achieve NextGen goals. 

Impact on NextGen Research. Reducing the wake turbulence research capability has 

resulted in two effects. First, a research gap will occur because FAA will not fully 

replace the capability formerly provided by NASA. NRC’s January 2008 report states 

that Federal investment does not place sufficient priority on wake turbulence research to 

achieve the results called for by NextGen goals. The report also states that air 

transportation system capacity could be significantly enhanced by applying the results of 

robust and focused wake vortex research and development. The report recommended 

that NASA continue to conduct medium- to long-term research because of its wake 

turbulence expertise and that operators and controllers be included in evaluating wake 

turbulence-related changes to the air transportation system. Second, the portion of wake 

turbulence research assumed by FAA has been delayed by approximately 2 years. This 

delay occurred in FYs 2006 through 2008 as FAA established its wake turbulence 

research capability. 

Inadequate Coordination with JPDO and the FAA. When NASA reduced its wake 

turbulence capability from 2006 to 2008, there was not an effective mechanism in place 

to coordinate wake turbulence research with JPDO and the FAA, which resulted in a 

2-year delay to the NextGen research just discussed. Better coordination by ARMD with 

JPDO and the FAA on the Agency’s decisions concerning major capabilities needed for 

NextGen research could have minimized the impact on NextGen development. The 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 15 

research transition teams implemented by JPDO in 2008 should improve coordination 

among NASA, JPDO, and the FAA. 

FFC Capability 

The FFC, located at Ames Research Center, is an air traffic control and air traffic 

management simulation facility designed to help solve the capacity problems of the 

Nation’s airports. The facility can project a 360-degree, full-scale, real-time simulation 

of an airport for air traffic control and air traffic management tests. The simulation 

shows how air traffic controllers, pilots, and airport personnel participate to optimize 

expansion plans, operating procedures, and new technologies. From FY 2001 through 

FY 2006, NASA used the FFC to test and evaluate aircraft surface movement decision 

support tools; aviation safety issues, such as runway incursions; and commercial airport 

design and operations issues. FFC operating costs are approximately $10 million 

annually. In FY 2006, the FAA made a one-time contribution of $2.5 million to share 

that cost.11 

ARMD senior management discontinued NASA’s use of the FFC at the end of FY 2006 

and eliminated the $10 million annual operating cost of the facility. In FY 2007, the FFC 

was converted from an active to a standby status. The conversion reassigned facility 

personnel with specialized skills to other programs at Ames Research Center. During 

FY 2007, the FFC operated as a part-time, reimbursable facility with a 40 percent 

utilization rate. In early FY 2007, a NASA paper, “Programmatic and Other Impacts 

Associated with Disposition Options,” commented on the FFC’s low utilization rate: 

“With the unexpected stoppage of ARMD use of the facility as a research tool, it is 

understandable why FFC suddenly appears to be underutilized. It is recommended that 

FFC be given reasonable time to recover its business base.” However, FFC utilization 

fell to zero during FY 2008. 

ARMD Analysis. In November 2006, ARMD analyzed FFC operating costs and 

utilization rates to support its decision to place the FFC in standby status. The analysis 

stated that neither Ames Research Center or ARMD was aware of FAA requirements for 

the FFC. However, ARMD’s analysis did not follow the OMB Circular A-94 

recommendation to evaluate possible interactions between benefits and costs and other 

Government activities and did not adequately evaluate requirements identified in the 

JPDO white paper. 

National Need for the FFC. In its July 2006 white paper, JPDO states that it is crucial 

for the Federal Government to retain the FFC’s capabilities in airport surface operations 

models and associated real-time simulation software, as well as the experienced 

personnel who understand those models and software. The white paper notes that the 

 

11 According to the NASA official responsible for the FFC, FAA contributed $2.5 million as a one-time 

contribution in FY 2006. FAA did not provide funding to NASA to operate the FFC after FY 2006. 
RESULTS

16 REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

FFC provides a means to test surface density operations throughout development under 

conditions similar to an actual airport, adding that achieving critical NextGen goals 

depends on “significant improvements in the performance of surface operations at the 

busiest airports in addition to complete integration of surface operations with 

arrival/departure operations at the airport.” JPDO also notes that NASA is expected to 

perform key research on surface operations concepts, but does not address funding for 

this research. 

Impact on NextGen Research. Placing the FFC in standby status potentially affects the 

testing of surface density operations throughout development. In 2006, ARMD senior 

officials removed research milestones from Airportal Project draft project plans that 

would have supported basic research of surface density operations identified in the IWP 

as OI-339, “Integrated Arrival/Departure and Surface Traffic Management for 

Metroplex.” The OI addresses increasing regional capacity by effectively managing 

aircraft arrivals and departures, runway use, and aircraft sequencing. Project-level 

personnel had intended to validate those milestones using the FFC. ARMD senior 

officials eliminated support for the capability and removed those milestones from 

Airportal Project draft project plans in 2006. The FFC was placed in standby status after 

ARMD eliminated its support. 

FAA’s research on the air traffic management system may be delayed by the FFC’s 

status, as the FAA will need to allocate funding to activate the facility. An official within 

FAA’s Air Traffic Systems Concept Development Group stated that, if the FFC is 

unavailable for FY 2009, FAA would not be able to test technology during development 

under airport-like conditions. The official explained that because of the lack of that 

testing capability, research on the NextGen air traffic management system would be 

delayed. 

Inadequate Coordination with the FAA and JPDO. Although the ARMD analysis 

included $175,000 in funding for 2007 from an FAA rudder study, it did not address 

funding from FAA research initiatives that need the FFC. ARMD’s coordination with the 

FAA and JPDO did not determine the specific FAA research initiatives described in the 

JPDO white paper. ARMD should have identified FAA’s research initiatives and 

planned schedule for using the FFC for NextGen research. That information would have 

been useful to FFC management in planning future facility usage and revenues. Future 

coordination and communication will be facilitated by the research transition teams that 

JPDO implemented in 2008. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 17 

Recommendations, Management’s Response, and Evaluation of 

Management’s Response 

Recommendation 1. The Associate Administrator for ARMD should establish policy or 

procedures, or both, to ensure that ARMD conducts and documents benefit-cost analyses in 

accordance with OMB Circular A-94 before recommending the elimination or significant 

reduction of major capabilities that are needed for NextGen. 

Management’s Response. The AA for ARMD concurred in principle and stated that 

ARMD will establish policies or procedures, or both, to ensure that appropriate benefitcost analyses are conducted. However, the AA also stated that “it is possible for 

circumstances to exist where there is not adequate time to conduct such analyses.” In 

those cases, the AA stated that “ARMD will document the justification for the change.” 

The AA estimated that policies or procedures would be developed by October 1, 2009. 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Management’s proposed action is responsive. 

The recommendation is resolved and will be closed upon completion and verification of 

management’s corrective action. 

Recommendation 2. The Associate Administrator for ARMD should establish policy or 

procedures, or both, to ensure that ARMD coordinates investment decisions regarding major 

capabilities that are needed for NextGen through the JPDO’s research transition teams. 

Management’s Response. The AA for ARMD concurred and stated that the process and 

structure of the research transition teams, which include oversight from both NASA and 

FAA officials, satisfies this recommendation. In addition, ARMD and JPDO have 

instituted quarterly meetings to discuss strategic issues. ARMD will use the quarterly 

meetings as a venue to coordinate ARMD investment decisions. 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Management’s proposed action is responsive. 

Based on the actions taken and procedures in place, we have closed the recommendation. 

APPENDIXES

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 19 

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology 

We performed this audit from January 2008 through June 2009 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives. 

Objective Methodology 

Our overall objective was to determine whether NASA was working effectively with 

JPDO to accomplish NextGen development. In April 2008, we revised the subobjectives 

to reflect initial fieldwork and discussed the revisions with ARMD management. The 

revised subobjectives were to determine whether (1) ARMD’s program management 

provided adequate control over and accountability for NASA’s NextGen R&D activities 

and (2) NASA was sustaining aeronautics research capabilities identified as necessary for 

NextGen development. 

Overall Methodology. To gain an overall understanding of NextGen and NASA’s role 

in NextGen development, we reviewed Public Law 108-176 (Vision 100) and the 

following JPDO planning documents: 

• “Concept of Operations for the Next Generation Air Transportation System,” 

Version 2.0, June 13, 2007; 

• “Research and Development Plan for the Next Generation Air Transportation 

System FY 2009 to FY 2013,” August 31, 2007; and 

• “Next Generation Air Transportation System Integrated Work Plan: A Functional 

Outline,” Version 1.0, September 30, 2008. 

We interviewed the JPDO Director; the JPDO Deputy Director; JPDO Division 

Directors; the AA for ARMD; ARMD Program Directors for the Airspace Systems, 

Aviation Safety, and Fundamental Aeronautics Programs; and ARMD Resource 

Managers. 

Objective 1 Methodology. We obtained requirements from NASA Procedural 

Requirements (NPR) 7120.5C, “NASA Program and Project Management Processes and 

Requirements,” March 22, 2005; NPR 7120.8, “NASA Research and Technology 
APPENDIX A 

20 REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

Program and Project Management Requirements,” February 5, 2008; NPR 8000.4, “Risk 

Management Procedural Requirements,” February 1, 2007; NASA Policy Directive 

1000.0A, “Governance and Strategic Management Handbook,” August 1, 2008; OMB 

Circular No. A-123, “Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control,” December 21, 

2004; Executive Order 13419, “National Aeronautics Research and Development,” 

December 20, 2006; and JPDO's “NextGen Budget Formulation Guidance—FY 2010,” 

February 15, 2008. We used “A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge, 

Third Edition,” 2004, published by the Project Management Institute, Inc., to identify 

project management best practices. 

We evaluated risk assessments and risk management plans for four projects in programs 

that support NextGen. The evaluation compared project documentation as of July 2008 

against requirements. The four selected projects were 

• the Airspace Project (Airspace Systems Program), 

• the Airportal Project (Airspace Systems Program), 

• the Integrated Vehicle Health Management Project (Aviation Safety Program), 

and 

• the Subsonic Rotary Wing Project (Fundamental Aeronautics Program). 

We reviewed JPDO IWP 1.0 and determined that NASA leads 44 R&D activities 

(22 percent) and supports 37 (18 percent) of the 203 total R&D activities. Of the 81 total 

R&D activities that NASA leads or supports, one weather-related support activity is 

delegated to the Science Mission Directorate and the remaining R&D activities to 

ARMD. We did not review the R&D activity delegated to the Science Mission 

Directorate. We limited our review to the 44 NASA-led R&D activities delegated to the 

Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate. 

We selected four projects to evaluate ARMD's procedures to manage project risk. We 

interviewed Principal Investigators, Project Managers, Project Scientists, Associate 

Principal Investigators, and Resource Managers. We also reviewed program and project 

plans. We identified delayed or canceled milestones for the four R&D projects from the 

July 2008 quarterly review reports. We also analyzed crosswalks provided to us by 

ARMD for the Airspace Systems Program and the Subsonic Rotary Wing Project, 

January/February 2008. We interviewed FAA program officials at LaRC and FAA 

Headquarters. 

We reviewed three reports by the NRC: “NASA Aeronautics Research: An Assessment” 

(2008), “Aeronautics Innovation: NASA’s Challenges and Opportunities” (2006), and 

“Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics: Foundation for the Future” (2006). We also 

reviewed external reviews of the Airspace Systems Program, the Aviation Safety 

Program, and the Fundamental Aeronautics Program, which were issued in February and 

March 2008. 
APPENDIX A 

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 21 

Objective 2 Methodology. We identified requirements for NASA aeronautics research 

capabilities from the JPDO white paper, “Justification of National Assets,” July 12, 2006; 

“NASA’s Challenges and Opportunities,” NRC, 2006; “Decadal Survey of Civil 

Aeronautics: Foundation for the Future,” 2006; and “Wake Turbulence: An Obstacle to 

Increased Air Traffic Capacity,” NRC, January 2008. 

We reviewed program and project draft and final plans and quarterly review reports. For 

the B-757, we also reviewed the President’s Budget for FY 2009 and documentation of 

NASA’s decision to dispose of the aircraft. Documentation included memorandums from 

the former NASA Associate Administrator, July 19, 2006, and the former AA for 

ARMD, July 19, 2006, and PDM #24, “Eliminate B-757 from the LaRC Simulation-toFlight Capability,” PA&E, July 21, 2006. We interviewed ARMD senior management, 

ARMD program and project officials, program analysts in PA&E, and the former 

Director, SCAP. We obtained cost data of the B-757 from the Office of the Chief 

Financial Officer at LaRC and the B-757 purchase agreement. We inspected remaining 

assets at LaRC in September 2008. We interviewed the former Director, Flight Research 

Services Directorate, at LaRC. For wake vortex research, we also reviewed an FAA 

analysis of wake vortex research gaps and delays, March 2008, and analyzed R&D 

activities related to wake vortex research. For the FFC, we reviewed NASA’s “ARC 

Future Flight Central – Disposition Assessment,” November 2006, and analyzed FFC 

usage rates and resource requirements. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data 

We did not rely on computer-processed data to perform this audit.

Review of Internal Controls 

We evaluated the organization, policies, and procedures that ARMD put in place to 

support JPDO’s efforts to develop NextGen using OMB Circular A-123 and the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) publication, “Internal Control Management 

and Evaluation Tool” (GAO-01-1008G, August 2001). Circular A-123 defines five 

control standards and requires management comply with those standards. The GAO tool 

provides managers guidance to implement the control standards and to determine whether 

improvements are needed. 

Our evaluation found that NASA has taken actions to work effectively with the JPDO to 

accomplish NextGen development. NASA assigned NextGen responsibility to ARMD, 

reformulated ARMD program and projects to align with or relate to NextGen, developed 

program and project plans, defined supervisory positions and assigned responsibilities to 

those positions, established project plan milestones and schedules, and reviewed project 

plan milestones and schedules regularly. However, we found that ARMD senior officials 

failed to follow OMB Circular A-123 control standards or Circular A-94 best practices 

for benefit-cost analyses. ARMD senior officials eliminated an aeronautics research 
APPENDIX A 

22 REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

capability without documenting their analysis. NASA officials did not follow OMB 

Circular A-94 and did not ensure that benefit-cost analyses supporting ARMD’s decision 

were documented. ARMD senior officials reduced two other aeronautics research 

capabilities based on cost analyses but did not evaluate other relevant criteria in 

accordance with Circular A-94. Documentation and compliance with established 

procedures are required by Circular A-123 control standard, “Control Activities.” 

Implementation of this report’s recommendations should correct the identified 

weaknesses. 

Prior Coverage 

During the last 5 years, the GAO, the Department of Transportation OIG, and the NRC 

have issued seven reports of particular relevance to the subject of this report. 

Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.gao.gov; 

unrestricted Department of Transportation OIG reports can be accessed at 

http://www.oig.dot.gov/; unrestricted NRC reports can be accessed at 

http://www.nap.edu/. 

Government Accountability Office

“Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of Systems Acquisition and the 

Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System” (GAO-08-1078, 

September 2008) 

“Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges Associated with 

the Transformation of the National Airspace System” (GAO-07-25, November 2006) 

Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General

“Joint Planning and Development Office: Actions Needed to Reduce Risks with the Next 

Generation Air Transportation System” (AV-2007-031, February 12, 2007) 

National Research Council

“Wake Turbulence: An Obstacle to Increased Air Traffic Capacity” (2008) 

“NASA Aeronautics Research: An Assessment” (2008) 

“Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics: Foundation for the Future” (2006) 

“Aeronautics Innovation: NASA’s Challenges and Opportunities” (2006) 
APPENDIX B 

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 23 

JPDO MEMORANDUM

In July 2006, JPDO issued a white paper, “Justification of National Assets,” with 

recommendations to NASA. The following JPDO cover memorandum accompanied the 

white paper. 
APPENDIX B 

24 REPORT NO. IG-09-019 
APPENDIX C 

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 25 

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS
APPENDIX C 

26 REPORT NO. IG-09-019 
APPENDIX C 

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 27 
APPENDIX D 

28 REPORT NO. IG-09-019 

REPORT DISTRIBUTION

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Administrator 

Deputy Administrator 

Associate Administrator for Aeronautics Research 

Director, Ames Research Center 

Director, Langley Research Center 

Non-NASA Organizations and Individuals 

Office of Management and Budget 

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division 

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch 

Government Accountability Office 

Director, Defense, State, and NASA Financial Management, Office of Financial 

Management and Assurance 

Director, NASA Issues, Office of Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Member 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

Subcommittee on Science and Space 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement 

House Committee on Science and Technology 

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics 
Major Contributors to the Report: 

Raymond Tolomeo, Director, Science and Aeronautics Research Directorate 

Nora Thompson, Project Manager 

Jobenia Odum, Management Analyst 

James Pearce, Senior Auditor 

Robert T. Rose, Senior Auditor 

Elizabeth Shifflett, Report Process Manager 

REPORT NO. IG-09-019 29 
JULY 30, 2009 

REPORT No. IG-09-019 

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