### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A pr il 13, 200 4 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. PA TRIC IA WHITE and C RA IG WHITE

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Gibson Coun ty Nos. 16216 and 16216-1 L. T . Laf ferty, Judge

No. W2003-00751-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled October 15, 2004

A G ibs on Cou nty jury c on vic te d Pa tr ic ia Whit e of the ft of pr op e rt y va lue d o ve r $ 10 ,0 00 , a

Cla ss C felony ; the trial court se ntence d her to a term of four y ear s, suspended, a nd fiftee n y ear s’ probation. The same jury

also convicte d Patricia White’s husband, Craig Whit e, o f fac ilitation of theft of property valued ove r $10,000; the t rial court sentence d him to a term of two y ear s suspended, a nd two y ear s’ probation. As a condition of probation, the trial court he ld the couple jointly liable for $1 24 ,0 00 in re sti tut ion

. On app e a l the de fe nd a nts c on te ndthat th e tr ia l e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o
s u p p o r tt h e i r

c o n v i c t i o n s

. T h e y a l s o c o n t e s t t h e a m o u n t o f r e s t i t u t i o n t h e y h a v e b e e n o r d e r e d t o p a y. After an exhaustive revie w of the r ecor d, the brief s of the parties, and applica ble law, we conclude that the evidence is suffic ient to support Patricia White’s conviction, but we a re una ble to rea ch the

same c onclusion for Cra ig White’s fac ilitation conviction. Acc ording ly
, we aff irm Patricia White’s conviction; the conviction of Cra ig White i s reve rsed, and the charg e is dismiss ed. Finding that the trial court made inadequate finding s in assessing restitution, we furthe r re mand t h at i s sue for determination based on the re quired statutory finding s. Finally , we take notice that base d on three statutory enhanc ement fac tors (none of which involved prior criminal history ), the trial c ourt set the leng th of Patricia White’s sentenc e at one y ear above the presumptive minimum sentence of three y ear s; pursuant to Blakely v. W ashington , ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. C t. 2531 (2004), we mod i fy her sentenc e to three y ear s but leave undisturbe d the leng th and terms of he r probation.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nts of the Circ uit Court are Aff irm ed in Par t, Re verse d in P art, and Modi fi ed and Rem anded i n Par t.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., concur red in re sults. D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., filed a dissenting opinion.
Timothy Crocker , Milan, Tennesse e (at trial); and Da niel J . Tay lor, J ackson, Te nnessee (on appe al), for the A ppellees, Patric ia White and Craig Whit e.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; J . Ross Dy er, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; and John C. Zimmerman, District Attorney Gene ral, Pro Tem , for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee.-2- OP IN ION

I n 1 9 9 0
, a gr o u p o f W es t T en n es s ee h o g p ro d u ce rs co n ce i v ed t h e i d eao f f o rm i n g a
c oo pe rativ e to p oo l r e so ur c e s, se ll h og s d ir e c tly to v ari ou s st oc ky ard s, a ndsa ve on fe e d a ndg rain cost s. To that e nd , Co op e rativ e Por k Se rv ic e s ( “ CPS” ) w a s in c or po rate d in June 19 90 , a ndits

m e m b e r s h i p g r e w t o i n c l u d e h o g p r o d u c e r s i n T e n n e s s e e , M i s s i s s i p p i
, A l ab a m a , a n d K e n t u c k y.

CPS coordinated the pickup a nd delivery of hog s. Producer s would t el ep h o n e the CPS office to “book” a

certain number of hog s. As soon as a truc k load -- approximately 175 to 180 hog s -- we re booke d in a particular a rea , CPS rese rved slaug hter a nd packing dates for that particula

r load of hog s. CPS handled the t ra n s p o rt at ion and was r esponsible for c ollecting the money and distributing the proc eeds to the pr oducer s.

The money collecte d from the sale of the hog s was de posited into a “custodial” bank

acc ount maintained by

CPS . The produc ers we re pa id by chec ks issue d throug h the custodial

a c c o u n t , a n d tr a n s p o r t a t i o n , s l a u g h t e r , a n d p a c k i n g e x p e n s e s w e r e a l s o p a i d f r o m t h a t a c c o u n t

. In the ory , the c us tod ia l ac c ou nt s ho uldha ve ba la nc e d o ut t o ze ro a ft e r e a c h s hip me nt. To c ov e r p a yro ll for of fice employ ees a nd other business expenses, CPS char g ed it s members a small commissi on of $0.70 for e ach hog that was handled and a 3.5 perc ent commission for purc hases of supplies, such

as fee d. These c ommissi on-ty pe cha rg es we re de posited into a “g ener al” ope rational ba nk acc ount maintained by

CPS

.
F ro m vi rtua lly

its inc e pti on , CPS wa s pla g ue d by fi na nc ia l a ndma na g e ri a l pr ob le ms. The dire ctors on CPS’s board wer e occ upied with the de m an d s o f t heir own livestock and other fa rm ing a c tiv iti e s, wh ic h le ft lit tle tim e to m on ito r C PS’ s a c tiv iti e s. Th e orig ina l CPS m a na g e r, Phi l Hooker , had prior e x perie nce w orking for a hog packing company in Union City
, and his backg round ostensibly

was a n asset for

the fledg ling c ooperative. I n 1993, howeve r, CPS board me m b ers dis c ov e re d th a t H oo ke r h a d b e e n mi sa pp ro pria tin g CPS’ s f

un ds

.
The de fenda nt, Patricia White, and another woman, Va lerie B aker , wer e CPS office

e mpl oy e e s d uring Ho ok e r’ s te nu re . E vid e ntl y , n e ith e r w oman w a s sus pec te d o f c omp lic ity in Hooker ’s larc eny . Be g inning in 1994, in the af termath of Hooker ’s m isappropriations, the def endant Patricia W hite assumed more responsibilities for the day -to-day operations of CP S. CP S recor ds and office equipment wer e re moved from Hooke r’s re sidence , an d a n ew ba se of ope rations was ultimately

established in the Milan re sidence of the de fenda nts Patricia and Cra ig White.

In 1998, financ ial irreg ulari t i es at C P S we re s u s p ec t ed an d i n v es t i gat ed

. I n v es t i gat o rs revie wed CPS documents, subpoenae d bank re cords, a nd applied for and executed a

sear ch wa

rra nt on October

2, 2001, for the de fenda nts’ Milan residenc e. The sear ch uncove red, int e r a lia
, additio n al C P S rec ords and the de fenda nts’ 1996-1998 tax returns. B ased on the investigation’sA f t er t he jur y ret urned i t s verdict i n t hi s case, the reco rd reveal s a b ri ef e xchange b et ween t he t ri al c o urt and 1

t h e s t at e wi t h t h e cou r t i n qu i r i n g w h et h er t h e s t at e des i r ed t o n o lle p r os equi th e c ri m i nal fo rf ei t ure count i n t he i ndi ct ment

. T he s t at e r epl i ed t hat i t di d s o i nt end. T he re co rd b efo re us , howev er , cont ai ns no j udgment or order di s po s i ng of

t hat count

. O n r emand, t he t r i al cour t s houl d e nt er an appropri at e di s po s i t i on s o t hat t he r ecor d i s comp l et e.
-3- re su lts , th e Gi bs on Cou nty Gr a ndJury

c ha rg e d Pa tr ic ia Whit e a nd he r hu sb a nd
, Cr a ig Whit e , w ith theft over $60,000 and criminal forfe iture. 1

The de fendants pleaded not g uilty . At the conc lusion of a l eng thy trial, the jury found the def endant Patric ia W hite g uilty of t he lesser-included offense of t heft ove r $10,000 and f ound the def endant Cra ig White g uilty of facilitation of t heft over $10,000. The trial c ourt sentenc ed the defe ndant P at ri ci a W hite to a term of f our y ear s, suspended, a nd fiftee n y ear s’ probation. The defe ndant Craig Whit e re ceive d a sente nce of two y ear s, suspended, a nd two y ear s’ probation. The defe ndants wer e held jointly liable for $124,000 in restitution and ordere d to pay $400 per month.
Ag g rieve d by

their convic tions and sentence s, the defe ndants have appea led. I na smu c h a s th e de fe nd a nts vig or ou sly a ssail the su ff

ic ie nc y of the c on vic tin g e vid e nc e , w e be g in wi th a de ta ile d s umm ary

of thete sti mon y

a ndpr oo f at tria l.

Ge or g e Irv in Coo pe r, Jr. an d Mar k Smith , b othho g pr od uc e rs , w e re ins trume nta l in forming CPS in 1990, and they serve d on the boar d of direc tors. Mr. Cooper testified a s the state’s lead witness. He explained the impetus for setting up CPS and its g ener al operat i n g features and service s. Cooper described hims elf as having the m ost active role i n the day -to-day operations of the bu sin e ss b e c a us e of

his pr oximi ty

to the of fi c e . H e ha d th e bo ard ’s a uth oriza tio n to sig n CPS chec ks, as did Mr

. Smit h and the office employ ees. Eac h chec k require d two signatures, but Cooper reg arde d the precaution as “totally useless,” because neither he nor Smit h had ti me t o g o to the offic e
ev er y t i m e ach ec k

h ad t o b e i s s u ed

. As a r es u l t , wh en ei t h erm an wa s at t h e o ff i ce , h e w o u l d s i gn and lea ve multiple blank chec ks that the offic e staff would later f

ill out and use.
Cooper testified that he “basic ally ran the bus i n es s with the help of the of fice over the phone” afte r Hooker was discharg ed in 1993 for misappr opriating funds. All available rec ords and equipment we re r emoved f rom Hooker ’s hous e, and for a pproxi mately

one or two months the office operated out of a f

arm house ow ned by

one of the office employ ees, Valerie Ba ker. D uring that time, CP S transfer

red its ac counts to Union Planters B ank in Milan. Ther eaf ter, the of fice for CPS was re located to a

g ara g e room at the defe ndants’ re sidence on Chapel Hill Road.
Cooper testified that a fter H ooker de parte d, the boar d au t h o ri z ed the de fenda nt Patricia White to be paid seve n dollars an hour . By late 1998, her hourly rate of pay had bee n raised to ten dollars. I n addition, CP S paid $400 per month as re nt for use of the def endants’ r esidenc e and to defray part of the cost of the de fenda nt s’ homeowne rs’ insura nce. Coope r believe d that the defe ndant Patricia White also re ceive d ten day s of paid vac ation eac h y ear

.-4- Cooper said that he was phy sically in the office only

once or twice a month and that his primary

contac t was by

telephone. T he off

ice did not have a time clock, and emp l oy ees w ere trusted t o keep track of their t ime. Cooper would g o by the offic e to g et nee ded information for the monthlyboard me eting s. Most of the information, ac cording to Co o per, w as maintained on computer, a nd the def

endant Patric ia White would retrieve fo r h i m fig ures r elative to sale s and

e xpe ns e s. Coo pe r did no t atte mpt to ind e pe nd e ntl y ve ri fy the inf orma tio n o wi ng to h is u nf a mil iari ty with computers. I n terms of CP S’s bank statements, Cooper te stified that they wer e mailed to the defe ndants ’ re s i d ence and that he ne ver r eviewe d them. The de fenda nt Patricia White was

re sp on sib le fo r r e c on c ili ng the a c c ou nts

.

Cooper identified Aug ust 17, 1998, as the fir st occa sion when he le arne d of anything

wr on g wi th C PS’ s f

inanc e s. He te sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt Pat ri c ia Whit e c a lle d a nda dv ise d h im that the custodial ac count was ove rdra wn by about $26,000, that the g ener al ac count was ove rdra wn by about $20,000, and that the bank was pre par i n g t o return a ll the chec ks that had bee n issued. Co o p er said that he deposited $50,000 of his own mone y into the acc ounts as an interim solution

un til the pr ob le m c ou ld b e ide nti fi e d a nd re so lve d. Ov e r the ne xt se ve ra l day s, Coo pe r w a s in da ily contac t with the office to find out if any bank er rors ha d been disc overe d. When nothing

ma te ri a lize d, Coo pe r s e nt h is f a ther, who h a d e xpe ri e nc e wi th t a x-r e la te d matte rs , to the of fi c e to

c he c k f or a ny ba nk e rr or s. Whe n Co op e r’ s f a the r w a s u na

ble to d isc e rn the so ur c e of the pr ob le m, Coo pe r a sk e d th e de fe nd a nt P a tr ic ia Whit e fo r the ba nk state me nts a ndc a nc e lle d c he c ks re la te d to the custodial ac count. Cooper testified that he planned to r eview t h e re co rd s over the L abor D ay
wee kend. He said that Smit h was the only board member consulted about t he problem at that time.

The rec ords reve aled that money had been transfe rre d into a nd out of the custodial

acc ount. The state asked Cooper about transfe rs out of the custodial acc ount that he m ay h ave authorized. He te stified about an occa sion w hen the defe ndant Patricia Whit e was out of town and

a no the r o ff

ic e e mpl oy e e , A my

Sto ots , c a lle d h im t o r e po rt that th e g e ne ra l a c c ou nt h a d b e c ome overdr awn. Cooper

instructed Stoots to t ransf er mone y from the cust odial acc ount to cover the shortfall. I nitially , Cooper denied authorizing any other transfer s out of the custodial ac count. On

cross-e x amination, howeve r, he acknow ledg ed directing that a che ck be issued f rom the custodial

acc ount in 1996 for $5,000 pay able to the First Assembly of God. Cooper explained that the money
was owe d to him for hog s that had bee n sold; he wanted to make a donation to t he chur ch, so he ha d t h e m o n e y tr a n s f

e rr e d d i r e c t l y.
Ultimately , the missing-f

unds problem was disclosed to CPS’s board, a nd the boar d decide d that the only

way to “ g et to the bottom” of what was g oing on was to close down CPS and

cover the outstanding chec ks in the custodial acc ount. Cooper testified that when that ha ppened, a shortfall of a

pproxi mately

$120,000 to $125,000 emer g ed. Cooper said that he and Smith funded the shortfa ll and then turned to impounding the CPS rec ords kept at the de fenda nts’ residenc e. The defe ndants turned ove r some, but not all, of the re cords. Cooper took the ret ri ev ed re cords to a

c e rt if ie d p ub lic a c c ou ntant i n Jac ks on . Co op e r a dmi tte d th a t th e bo ardme m b e r s w e r e“ p o or

bu sin e ss manag ers” and we re “ neg lige nt” in failing to have CPS audited annually . He explained that money-5-

was also a consideration, i nasmuch as a prof essional audit per formed in the a ftermath of Hooker ’s misappropriations had c ost CP S $26,000.

Ba sed on the a ccounta nt’s finding s, Cooper attempted to set up a mee ting with the defe ndants. Cooper said that the defe ndants declined to meet, even after Cooper r etained an attorney to communicate with the de fenda nts’ counsel. W h en n o t h i ng could be done , the local district attorney g ener al’s office and the F eder al B ureau of I nvestig ation wer e conta cted. The FB I ref err ed the matter to the s tate authorities, and afte r a le ng thy investigation, the Gibson CountyGra nd J ury pr e se nte d c ri min a l th e ft

c ha rg e s a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nts

.
I n terms of what CP S had authorized the def endant Patric i a W h i t e t o do, Cooper testified that the “ b o ar d had told her that if she nee ded to work ove rtime that she could.” Cooper de nie d h a vin g a ny

private arr a ng e me nt w ith the de fe nd a nt t o p a y he r “ un de r the ta

ble ” fo r C PSrelated work in a d d ition to her reg ular wa g es. Cooper w as spec ific that neither he nor the board authorized her to r ece ive anything other than her hourly wag es and t h e m o n t h ly

office renta l and insurance . Cooper wa s equally specific that he neve r authorized her to pay her pe rsonal cr edit car d bil ls o ut o f C PS f

un ds

.
The defense cross-e x amination of C ooper aimed to discredit his motives for g iving testimony a g ain s t t h ed efe ndant Patricia White. The de fense inquired whe ther Cooper had eve r made

ro ma nti c a dv a nces to wardhe r andif he ha d ma de inq uirie s a bo ut h e r s e xua l in vo lve me nt w ith someone other

than her husband. Cooper de nied any inappropriate behavior on his part but admitted asking a male a cquaintanc e about “ making a pass” at t h e d ef en d an t

. He a lso denied that his wife urg ed him to fire the de fenda nt. The def ense e licited from C o o p er that he did not contest the defe ndant’s re ceipt of une mploy ment compensation after he r job termination.

The de fense also cross- examined Cooper about the ove rall ca rele ss manag ement of CPS . Cooper acknowledg ed that CPS never filed a tax return during its eig ht-y ear exis tence from 1990 to 1998. Cooper tried to assig n bl am e t o t h e def endant Patric ia White for not providing the i n fo rm ati on nece ssary

to prepa

re a return; the pr oblem, howeve r, pre dated the de fenda nt’s manag ement of the office . Additionally , Cooper tried to c laim that the board was not a war e of any pr ob le m w ith the c us tod ia l a c c ou nt i n 1 99 5. Min ute s in Coo pe r’ s o wn ha nd writi ng , f ro m a n A pril 3
, 1 9 9 5 b o ar d m ee t i n g, co n tra d i ct ed t h at cl ai m

. T h e mi n u t es re p o rt ed a $ 1
, 8 0 0 t o $ 2
, 0 0 0 s h o rt age of funds in the c ustodial acc ount.

The de fense secur ed Cooper’ s conce ssion that he had aske d the def endant to per form a lot of bac k work for

CPS to straig hten out the problems that Hooker had cr eate d. Moreove r, Cooper testified that he did not place a ny restric tions o n o r l i m i t t h e amount of time that the defe ndant worke d. Even so, Cooper e x plained that the boa rd should have be en n o t i fi ed o f the mag nitude of the e x tra wor k that the def

endant c l ai m ed to have pe rformed. Most of the compensation for the “e x tra wor k” wa s not refle cted in the de fen d an t ’s W -2 s , and althoug h the defe ndant did not prepa

re the W-2s, she did provide the inform ati on upon which the W-2s wer e based.-6- Cooper wa s shown numerous CPS checks bea ring his signatur e and p ay able to the de fe nd a nt P a tr ic ia Whit e

. He did no t de ny sig nin g the c he c ks bu t st a te d th a t he a lw a y s si g ne d CPS

c he c ks in b la nk . Co op e r t e sti fi e d th a t on c e he be g a n r e vie wi ng the re c or ds a ndba nk state me nts in 19 98 , it be c a me app are nt that th e de fe nd a nt ha d wr itt e n ap pr oximate ly 40 0 c he c ks pa y able to h e rs e lf from 1995 throug h 1997. Cooper admitting know ing that the defe ndant was a dvancing CPS money to one hog produce r who was in a cash-flow crunch. He also knew that the de fenda nt was adva ncing money for ove rnig ht ma il so that produce rs could g et their che cks more quic kly . The de fense asked Cooper to identify

a spec ific che ck fro m the c us tod ial accou nt that constituted a theft by the defe ndant. Cooper r esponded, “ There are none.”

State witness Mark Sm ith offe red a dditional insi g hts into t he oper ations of CPS . He te sti fi e d th a t w he n th e pr ob le m aro se wi th H oo ke r i n 19 93
, the de fe nd a nt wa s o ne of the pe op le in the offic e who wa s being trained. The defe ndant was in c harg e of handling the acc ounts pay able a nd

re c e iva ble . Sm ith sa id that, b e fo re the of fi c e wa s tr a ns fe rr e d to the de fe nd a nts ’ r e sid e nc e , h e wo uld stop by the office once or twice a wee k to sign c hecks or

see if he could help with anything. Af ter the move, Smith seldom checke d on the office because the money and the a ccounts ha d been a udited and chang ed to cor

rec t the problems that Hooker had cr eate d.

Smit h explained that al t h o u gh CPS ’s boar d tried to meet onc e a month, ofte n the meeting s were sever al months apart be cause of the fa rmers’ hectic work sche dules. Smit h described the meeting s as ca sual. Usually the boar d wou l d rec eive a n oral re port about the c ooperative’s fi na nc ia l si tuatio n. Smith r e c a lle d s e ldo m se e ing a ny writt e n r e po rt ; e it her th e de fe nd a nt P a tr ic ia Whit e would write down fig ures a nd bri n g t h em to the meeting , or she would pr ovide fig ures f or Coo pe r t o p res e nt a

t th e me e tin g . T he inf

orma tio n p ro vid e d to the bo ardinc lud e d th e pa yro ll expenses of the office employ ees. Smit h testified that the defe ndant Patricia Whit e was prese nt for some of the boa

rd mee tings whe n pay

roll expenses were disclosed.

Acc ording to Smit h, some board me mbers believe d the offic e sala ries we re too hig h. Smit h kept a f

older with notes of the m eeting s to monit or what was being reported for w ag es paid. I n terms of ove rtime compensation, Sm ith believed the board ma y have disc ussed it to some lim ited deg ree . He sa id that the board a lway s understood t h at t h e office personne l may need to wor

k overtime to take car e of a hog produce r. Smit h g ave as an example that paper work for a particular shipment of hog s might be delivere d late in the afte rnoon, requiring the office staff to w ork past 5:00 p.m. Even so, Smith was under the impre ssion that relatively littl e overtime was re quired.

Smit h did not recall a ny occa sion w hen the defe ndant aske d his permission to spend extra money . Smit h did remembe r that the defenda nt advised him that she could secur e shipment of c e r tain p r o d u c ts f

o r th e h o g p r o d u c e r s b y u s in g a c r e d it c ar d

. B e c a u s e CP S d id not have a business cre dit card, Sm ith authorized the defendant to use her persona l cre dit car d as long as she documented what was pur chase d and the r eimbursement. Smith said that he was ne ver shown any
su c h d oc ume ntatio n. Smith a lso a uth orize d th e de fe nd a nt t o us e CPS’ s b us ine ss l ic e ns e to p ur c ha se g if t ite ms f ro m a c omp a ny kn ow n a s A B C, p ro vid e d th at th e de fe nd a nt d oc ume nt the tr a ns a c tio ns

.-7- As did Cooper, Smith t estified t h at t h e first inkling of trouble c ame L abor D ay
wee kend in 1998 when Coope r ca lled him upset that money was missing a nd that t h e b an k was poised to decline pay ment on chec ks from the c ustodial acc o u n t

. S m i t h rec alled g oing to the defe ndants’ re sidence on two or three occa sions to investigate the problem. When he and Cooper first made ba sic inquiries about expenses, the de fenda nt looked up information on the computer

. The ne x t time, the men returned looki ng for specific checks. Smit h said that the def endant c ould not produce t h e checks. “ Thing s just weren’ t balancing out,” Smith t estified. As fa r as Smith and Cooper could disce rn, money had bee n transfe rre d on an ong oing basis from the c ustodial acc ount into the g ener al account. Smit h denied authorizi ng the t ransf ers even though hi s signature a ppear ed on some of the c hecks. Smith ex plained that he c ould “ never reme mber e ver w riting a

signature on a che ck that wa s alrea dy

filled out. I

was usually

the first name on the che ck.”

Finall y , C o o p er and Smit h asked f or all the re cords. Smith drove his truck to the defe ndant s’ re sidence and loade d up box es, desks, c hairs, and c omputer equipment, whic h the d ef en d an t s h ad s et o u ti n t h ei r c a r p o rt

. S m i t h s ai d t h at h e t h o u gh th e h ad go t t en ev er y t h i n g; ho we ve r, a dd iti on a l CPS r e c or ds we re fo un d a t the ho us e wh e n the se arc h w arr a nt w a s e xec ute d in October 2001.

Smit h and Cooper sor ted throug h the re cords and took many of them to the

acc ountant who had pr evious l y au d i t ed CPS afte r Hooke r’s de parture . Cance lled chec ks were mis sin g fr om so me of the ba nk state me nts , a nd c op ie s ha d to be or de re d fr om the ba nk . Sm ith sa id th a t in g o in g th r o u g h th e b a n k s tate me n ts , it “ im me d iate ly h it h im ” th a t a s man y a s te n to twelve chec ks per month had be en written pay able to the order of the defendant and draw n on CPS ’s g ener al

a c c ou nt. Th e sa me inf

orma tio n sh ow e d up on the of fi c e c omp ute r, wh e n Smith a c c e sse d the fi le s. Smit h estimated that at most six chec ks per month should have written to the defe ndant: four or five chec ks for we ekly

pay roll and one chec k for the office rent/insuranc e. Smit h had believed that the defe ndant was e arning betwee n $18,000 to $20,000 per y ear

. I nstead, what he discove red w as that the def endant wa s being paid “a lmost t wice that much.” Equa lly t ro u b l i ng , pay

roll tax es had not been ta ken out of most of the c hecks.

Smit h testified, “So, to ma ke a long story short, I put up $62,000 of my money , and I think Mr. Cooper put about the same a mount of his.” That money cover ed the shorta g es cr eate d by the transf

er of funds from the c ustodial acc ou n t to the g ener al ac count and the subse quent withdrawa l of monies from the g ener al ac count. Smith had not been re imbursed for his c ontribution.

Smit h was a damant that the boa rd neve r authorized compe nsation for the de fenda nt in the amounts they

discovere d. I ndeed, the board minutes f rom a meeting in J anuary

1996 ref lected

a c u rr e n t h o u r l y r a t e o f

c o m p e n s a t i o n o f $ 8

. 5 0 f

o r t h e d e f e n d a n t a n d $ 7

. 5 0 a n d $ 5

. 0 0
, r e s p e c t i v e l y, for the two othe r off

ice e mploy ees. A t the J anuary meeting , as shown in the mi n u t es, t he boar d approve d incre asing the def endant’ s compensation t o $ 1 0.00 per hour and anothe r employ ee’ s compensation to $8.00 per hour.-8- Smit h was a sked on cr oss-examination if he knew that the defe ndant had on occa sion paid other employ ees out of her persona l f unds. Smit h was unawa

re but a g ree d that if it happene d, t h e d ef en d an twa s en t i t l ed t o re i m b u rs em en t

. R ega rd i n g o v er t i m e, S m i t h re af fi rm ed h i s k n o wl ed ge that overtime wa s require d on occa sion. He ce rtainl y , h o we ver, did not know a bout any sort of “unre stricted” a

bilityon the def

endant’ s part to w ork overtime. Smit h insisted that the board wa s
no t no tif ie d th a t th e de fe nd a nt w a s w or kin g un re stric te d o ve rt ime , a ndhe blu ntl y re to rt ed, “ [I ]f i t
was re ported to us that she wa s m aking twice he r salary , we would ha ve stopped it.” More over,
re g ard le ss o f the ov e rt ime Coo pe r m a y ha ve a uth orize d, Smith s a id that th e bo ard ex pect e d it s employ ees to be honest. The de fenda nt, however , misrepre sented how muc h CPS was pay ing out in w a g e s, a ndsh e hidthe inf orma tio n f

ro m th e bo ardkn ow ing that the bo ard wa s re ly ing on he r t o pr ov ide a n a c c ur a te a c c ou nti ng of inc ome a nde xpe ns e s.

Smit h did not disput e that in some re spects CPS was “run sloppily .” F or instance
, Smit h knew that CPS had never filed a tax return. He te stified that the boar d err oneously believed that Hooker

had bee n filing the returns. Af ter Hooke r left, the boa

rd enlisted the he lp of Cooper’s fathe r for prepa ring tax returns. Cooper’s father wa s unsure how to pr ocee d, beca use he could not determine if CPS had bee n reg istered a s a non-pr ofit corpor ation and bec ause he had neve r filed a return be fore for a cooper ative. As a result, no prog ress wa s ever made in straig htening out CP S’s tax s tatus and potential tax li ability

. Cooper’s father did, howeve r, pre pare the W-2s for the of fice

e mpl oy e e s. Th e de fe nd a nt p ro vid e d th e inf orma tio n tha t Coop e r’ s f

a the r u se d to pr e pa

re the W-2 s.

Th e c ri min a l in ve sti g a tio n of the de fe nd a nts ’ ac tiv iti e s spa nn e d sev e ra l y e ars . Smith related that initiallythe local district attorne y g ener al advised the m to enlis t t h e FBI’s assistance

. Approx i m at el y t wo y ear s later, in the wa ke of the Columbi ne shooting s, the FB I assig ned the investigation to the “back burner,” at which time the investig ation was turne d over to the loc al authorities. The de fenda nt Patricia White then was indicted f or theft in Jul y

2000; her husband w as not char g ed until J anuary 2002.
The state pr esente d brief te stimonyfrom the f ormer Pre sident o f

U n ion Planters Ba nk in Milan, W ay ne Minton, and fr om Eliz abeth Ow nby , a re cords c ustodian with the bank. Mr. Minton met with Cooper and Smit h in Septe mber 1998 to disc uss the CPS chec ks that were being pr e se nte d w ith ins uf

fi c ie nt f un ds to c ov er th em. M r. Min ton re c a lle d th a t th e CPS a c c ou nts

oc c a sio na lly ha d be e n on the ba nk ’s ins uf fi c ie nt fu nd s re po rt , a nd he kn e w that Coo pe r andSmith adv an ce d their per sonal funds to cove r the c hecks be ing pr esente d in September. Ms. Owe nby int ro du c e d
, w i th o u t

d e f e n s eo b j e c t i o n , th eUn ion Pla nte rs c he c kin g a c c ou nt r e c or ds of the de fe nd a nts from Nove mber 1995 throug h 1998.

Th e state pr e se nte d the me a t of its c a se , in te rm s of sp e c if ic fi na nc ial t rans a c tio ns , throug h the testimony

of I nvestig ator Virg inia Dra per, w ho over a

period of m an y m o n ths, had subpoenae d, revie wed, a nd analy zed the defe ndants’ per sonal bank a ccount r ecor ds. I nvestig ator Dra per a lso reviewe d rec ords t hat S mith and C ooper had obtained and rec ords t hat l ater wer e seized by sear ch wa

rra nt from the def

endants’ r esidenc e. With the available r ecor ds, I nvestig ator Dr aper-9-

cre ated a computerized spre adshee t showing the various CPS checks pay able to the de fenda nt Patricia White or pay able to third parties for he r bene fit.

The spre adshee t cover ed the time period of Novemb e r 1 9 9 5 thr o u g hSep te mb er 1998. The be g inning month and y ear wer e chose n based on the earliest rec ords that Union Planters B ank could supply . I nvestig ator Dr aper explained that in reviewing the rec ords, she first dete rmined the total amount of CPS checks deposited monthly into the defe ndants’ joint bank ac count, then subtracte d the def

endant Patric ia White’s monthlywages and off ice r ent/insurance pay ment, and finally added an y C PS pay ments made dire ctly to the defe ndants’ cr edit car d companies a nd telephone c arrier. Investig ator Dr ap er summarized her finding s for the jury and re ported the following amounts of money over a nd above the allowed wa g es and of fice rent/insuranc e:

1995 1996 1997 1998
Nov.: $2,214.36 J an.: $4,628.26 J an.: $3,154.84 J an.: $4,239.05 Dec .: $5,603.00 Fe b.: $3,592.79 Fe b.: $1,849.33 Fe b.: $685.97

Mar.: $4,293.89 Mar.: $4,504.20 Mar.: $1,128.50 Apr.: $5,247.09 Apr.: $3,486.15 Apr.: $3,173.73 May : $4,958.08 May : $1,992.15 May : $3,292.91 J un.: $2,908.27 J un.: $5,112.28 J un.: $6,012.87 J ul.: $3,832.71 J ul.: $4,218.04 J ul.: $2,527.41 Aug .: $3,551.15 Aug .: $2,308.49 Aug .: $3,252.54 Sep.: $4,558.96 Sep.: $4,729.68 Sep.: $3,736.65 Oct.: $5,731.33 Oct.: $3,785.42 Nov.: $2,083.37 Nov.: $3,356.04 Dec .: $4,011.38 Dec .: $4,777.63

The total for

the months covere d was $128,939.29.

I nv e sti g a tor

Dr ape r a l s o t e s t i f i e d a bo ut e xec uti ng a

se arc h w arr a nt f

or the de fe nd a nts ’ residenc e on Oc tober 2, 2001, to sea rch f or CPS records and evidenc e of how t h e money misappropriate d from CPS h ad b ee n spent. I nvestig ator Dr aper introduced multiple photog raphs taken inside a nd outside the residence. I nvestig ator Draper testified t hat a Honda ATV, a riding lawn
mower, a nd two trac tors wer e par ked outside and that a g reat deal of pow er tools wer e in the g ara g e. I nside the residence she found, int e r a lia
, ra ck s an d p i l es o f cl o t h i n g, s o m e of wh i ch h ad p ri ce t ags aff ix ed; “boxes and boxes” of shoes, many of which a

ppear ed u n wo rn ; a sig nificant a mount of jewelry with the price tag s still aff ix ed; bags a nd stacks of unope ned VCR tapes; and w ell-appointed kitchen cabine ts. Most notably
, I nvestig ator Dra per also discovere d more CPS reco rd s an d t he defe ndants’ ta x re t urns for the y ear s 1996 throug h 1998. For 1996, the def

endants re ported a combined net income of $41,548.07; for 1997, $47,465; a nd for 1998, $49,378.

On cr oss-examinati o n , t h e d ef en s e e x tra ct ed n u m er o u s co n ce s s i o n s from I nvestig ator Dra per, suc h as that the jew elry found in the re sidence was inexpensive, that she did not check the-10-

siz es on the shoe boxes, that the def endant r eporte d that the clothing in the g ara g e wa s left over f rom
a re c e nt g ara g e sa le
, that a no the r of fi c e e mpl oy e e ’s sa lary

ha d b e e n a dv a nc e d o nc e by the de fe nd a nt, and that the defenda nt had advance d her personal funds to cover items for CPS. Als o, I nvestig ator Dra per a g ree d that she wa s unable to dete rmine how all of t he mi ssing CP S money had been spent by defe ndants; she had be en told, moreove r, that the de fenda nt Craig Whit e had inhe rited a substantial amount of money in 1994.
Reg arding expenses for f

ood sundries, I nvestig ator Draper did not cre dit the snacks and soft drinks that the de fenda n t h ad purc hased. Investig ator Dr aper said that both Cooper and Smit h told he r that those purcha ses wer e not le g itimate busine ss pur chase s. As for the def endant’ s teleph o n e bills, I nvestig ator Dr aper said that Cooper e x plained that he ha d g iven the def endant

a uth ority to re pa y he rs e lf fo r lon g -d ist a nc e bu sin e ss ca lls ma de on he r hom e te le ph on e , b ut h e did not authorize pay ment for c ellular tele phone ca lls.

Th e state ’s tw o f

ina l c a se -i n- c hie f w itn e sse s w e re Gi bs onC o u n ty S he ri ff ’s De pu tie s, who wer e pre sent when the sear ch war rant for the def

endants’ r esidenc e wa s executed. De puty J eff Ma itl a ndte sti fi e d th a t th e bu lk o f the c lothin g t hat h e sa w a pp e are d to be ne w w ith ta g s st ill attache d. Be fore his la w enf orce ment car eer , Deputy

Maitland had sold vac uum cleane rs. Fr om that experience , he k n ew t h at the vac uum cleane r in the def endants’ r esidenc e wa s very expensive,

se lli ng ne w f

or ov e r $ 1, 00 0. De pu ty

Ste ve Gr oo ms te sti fi e d that the de fe nd a nts didno t c omp la in in his presenc e about how the sear ch wa s conducte d.

Th e d e f e n s e o p e n e d i t s c a s e b y c a l l i n g Ir v i n C o o p e r ’ s w i f e , C ar o l C o op e r. Ms. C o o p e r , a s c h o o l t e a c h e r , w a s n o ti n v o l v e d i n t h e o p e r a t i o n o r m a n a g e m e n to f

C P S

. O c c a s i o n a l l y, she would pick up blank CPS chec ks from the defe ndant, which her husband then s igne d and which she re turned to the de fenda nt. Otherwise, he r involvement consist ed p ri m arilyin assisting her hu sb a ndin r e vie wi ng CPS’ s f inanc ia l r e c or ds a ft e r the ov e rdra ft pr ob le ms s ur fa c e d in 19 98 . M s. Cooper testified that the ove rdra ft bank c harg es totaled a pproxi mately

$12,000.

On cr oss-examination by the state, Ms. Cooper discusse d in gr eate r deta il her inv olv e me nt w ith re vie wi ng CPS r e c o rd s. Th ro ug h M s. Coo pe r, the state the n in tr od uc e d a s e xhibi ts the pay roll re co rd s for the defe ndant and the othe r off ice e mploy ees a nd a Te nnessee Depa rtment of Employ ment Security

report conce rning wag es sub m i t t ed for the de fenda nt and another office emplo y ee

. Fo r t h e last quarter of 1997, the defe ndant re ported that she ha d earned $4,144. The

re po rt bo re the sig natur e of

the de fe nd a nt.

The de fenda nt Patricia White testified in her own defe nse. She beg an byrelating he r persona l ande mp lo y me n t h is to r y

. A t th e ti me o f tria l, th e d e f

e n d a n t w a s 4 3 y e ar s o ld
, h a d been marrie d for six teen y ear s, and had two children. Since being laid off at CPS , she ea rned mone y

by perf orming commerc ial and re sidential clea ning.

The de fenda nt said that befor e being hired by Hooker
, she knew nothing a bout hog p ro d u ct i o n o r m an agi n g a l i v es t o ckco o p er at i v e. S h e w as a h i gh s ch o o l gra d u at e w i t h a c o s m et o l o gy-11-

lic e ns e . She tr a c e d h e r kno wl e dg e of bu sin e ss f

inanc e to an e arl ie r j ob sh e ha d w or kin g fo r R on nie Boswe ll at Boswe ll Oil Company . During that time, the defe ndant learned to handle busine ss chec ks and acc ounts pay able and rec eivable. The defe ndant explained that she had authority to write che cks fo r M r. B os we ll, a ndsh e pa id h is b ill s.

Th e de fe nd a nt te sti fi e d that sh e wo rk e d f or B os we ll O il Co mpany

fo r f ou rt e e n y e ars

. During that time, no acc usation of theft ha d ever arisen r eg arding her w ork. W hen the oil company closed down, the defe ndant continued to wor k for Mr. Boswe ll. Mr. B oswell and his brother owned Milan Racew ay , and the defe ndant took over the f inancial e nd of the business and r outinely handled larg e amounts of c ash. Ag ain, the def endant wa s never

acc used of stea ling in conne ction with that job . T he de fe nd a nt w or

ke d at th e ra c e tr a c k f

or app ro xima te ly

tw o a nd on e -h a lf y e ars , a t wh ic h ti me Mr. B oswell sold t h e busi ness. Mr. B oswell laid her of f so that she c ould draw une mploy ment be ne fi ts. He r n e xt em

plo y me nt w a s w ith CPS.

The de fenda nt relate d that she had know n Hooker throug h church activit ies. He offe red he r a job, a nd she starte d working at C PS in J une or J uly of 1993. At first, the def endant wa s handling CPS ’s books and Hooke r’s pe rsonal books. Hooke r paid he r sepa rate ly for t h e personal

wo rk sh e didfo r h im. Th e de fe nd a nt was hi red at CP S at $8 .0 0 o r $ 8. 50 pe r h ou r. She ini tia lly

wo rk e d p art

tim e , b ut a ft e r H oo ke r’ s mi sa pp ro pria tio ns we re un c ov e re d, sh e be g a n w or kin g f u l l t ime for CPS.

The de fenda nt testified that she beg an to g et suspicious of Hooker ’s ac tiviti es whe n she could not locate re cords showing t h at p ay ro l l t ax es for CPS had bee n paid. Then, w hen she

c omp are d CPS’ s c omp ute ri zed re c or ds a nd de po sit bo ok s wi th Ho ok e r’ s de po sit bo ok s, sh e c ou ld detec t how Hooker

had bee n diverting CPS ’s funds to his persona l acc ounts. The def endant a lerted Cooper, who then inf

ormed the boa

rd of Hooker’s misappropriations. The def endant c hara cterized the financ ial c o n d it io n o f CP S a t th a t ti me a s “ ab s o lu te ly h o rr ib le ” w ith th e b u s in e s s b o o k s in a “mess.”
Concerning the various locations for CPS ’s offic e, the de fenda nt expl ained that whe n she first came to work, the of fice was in a space attached to Hooke r’s house. From Hooker ’s home, the offic e moved first to a farmhouse provided by Cooper. After a couple of months, the office was reloc ated to re ntal space on College Street in Tre nton. Finally
, i n September of 1994, the defe ndants’ re sidence became the base of oper ations for CPS.

The de fenda nt said that she performed a l ot of back work a nd rec ord re trieval that wa s pro v id e d to th e a c c o u n tan t w h o a u d it e d CP S a f te r H o o k e r ’ s te r mi n a ti o n

. T h e d e f e n d a n t b e li eved that H o o k e r

r e tain e d a n a tt o r n e y

a n d th a t th e ma

tt e r w a s u lt im a te ly

s e tt le d w ith H o o k e r

r e p a y ing

some of the money

. Acc ording to the defe ndant, Cooper told her that they would have to r eview a lot of oldCPS r e c or ds , th a t th e wo rk ha d to be don e , an d tha t he wo uld pa y he r w hate ve r i t to ok

to sort out the rec ords. The de fenda nt maintained that Cooper plac ed no re strictions on the amount of back w ork she wa s to perform. As far as pay ment for the back wor k, the def endant sa id that she kept up with her time, as Cooper had ins tructed her to do, but that pay ment for the back work was delay ed-12-

beca use CPS di d not have the money to pay her at the t ime and because the t rue f inancial c ondition of CPS was not known.

Th e de fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t CPS’ s o pe ratio n ac c ou nt ha d fr e qu e nt o ve rdra ft c ha rg e s. To the def

endant’ s knowledg e, the boa rd wa s advised about t h e o verdr afts, and she rec alled

oc c a sio na lly

a tte nd ing bo ardme e tin g s w he n s he re po rt e d th e ov e rdra ft s. Ov e rdraft ch arg e s a lso

oc c ur re d in the c us tod ia l a c c ou nt, bu t tho se ov e rdra ft s we re mor e sp or a dic . Re g ard ing wi thdra wa ls from the c ustodial acc ount, the defendant said that Cooper and, to a lesse r extent, Sm ith authorized transfe rs on a r eg ular ba sis to cover e x penses in the o p er at i o n account. At some point, Cooper authorized her to pur chase drinks and snac ks for the of fice ; the defe ndant paid for the items out of her pe rs o n al ac count and late r re imbursed her self. As for rec eipts for pe rsonal money that she expended on CPS ’s behalf, the defendant admitt ed not doing a good job of re cord ke eping . Also, she neve r re imbursed her self for work-r elated milea g e and ne ver charg ed C PS for any portion of her uti lit y bil ls.

T h e d ef

en d an tex p l ai n ed h o w C P S ca m e t o p ayh ert el ep h o n e b i l l

. I n t h e b egi n n i n g, CPS h a d tw o ph on e lin e s a nda fa x line . T he pr od uc e rs be g a n c omp la ini ng that th e y we re un able to ge t throug h on the exist ing lines to plac e their hog and fe ed orde rs. As a r esult, Cooper told the de fe nd a nt that if

sh e wo ulda lso us e he r hom e te le ph on e , he wo uld e ns ur e re imb ur se me nt b y CPS. Somet ime s, ho we ve r, CPS d id n ot h a ve su ff ic ie nt f un ds to r e imb ur se he r f

or te le ph on e c ha

rg e s. L ater , Cooper au t h o ri z ed the def endant to use he r ce llular telephone for business a nd to be reimburse d by

CPS

. Also, the defe ndant testified Cooper w as aw ar e of the routine for handling office expenses. The defenda nt said that many times when CP S neede d basic office supplies, CPS did not ha ve su ff ic ie nt f un ds to p a y

the ven do r’s previou s b ill . Rathe r tha n p la c e a n o rd e r w he n th e la st order rema ined unpaid, the defenda nt would pay for the new purchase s from her persona l funds and later r eimburse he rself.

I n terms of he r working schedule , the def end an t s t ated that her re g ular hours w ere 8:0 0 a .m. to 5:0 0 p. m. Du ri ng that tim e sh e pe rf orme d c ur re nt w or k, a lth ou g h p ro du c e rs mig ht c a ll her late at nig ht needing assistance . The ba ck work involved the problems that Hooker had cr eate d,

a n d s h e trie d to r e s o lv e s a le s ta x is s u e s

. E v id e n tl y , CP S h a d n e v e r c h ar g e d o r

c o ll e c te d s a le s ta x. Th e de fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t Co op e r i ns truc te d h e r t o g o b ack th rou gh the re c or ds sin c e 19 90 in prepa ration for re- billing ea ch hog producer for it ems that wer e tax able. The defe ndant believe d that Smit h knew a

bout this work.

Th e de fe nd a nt P a tr ic ia

Whit e a dmi tte d tha t she c re a te d two se pa rate se ts o f p a yro ll

re c or ds . Sh e e xpla ine d th a t Co op e r i ns truc te d h e r t o k eep her ba c k w or k h ou rs se pa

rate ly ; he did not want to disclose those hours to the boa rd beca use they would not acc urate ly

ref lect what CP S’s operational costs would be once the back work was completed. The defe ndant added that Cooper

never told her to hide her back work from the board, but Cooper did express conce rn that if the boa rd knew what the back w ork wa s costing, the board w ould close down CPS.-13- The d efe ndant was una

ble to explain why

the hours for

the bac k work we re not

re po rt e d o n h e r W-2 , but she a dmi tte d th a t sh e ha d n ot r e po rt e d a ll o f h e r i nc ome on he r t a x re turns

. She claimed that she and the other office employ ees kept up with the ir time, and the def endant g ave the time sh ee t s t o C o o p er to take to his father , who pre pare d the W-2 forms. The de fenda nt mentioned a c onversation with C ooper’ s father , at some unspec ific time, wherein he a ssured the de fe nd a nt that he wo uldtake c are of a ll the pa pe rw or k a nda me nd ing he r t a x re turns

.
The de fenda nt testified that she had trie d to r econstruc t the rec eipts she had kept f or items personally

purcha sed for C P S for which she wa s entitled to reimbursement. Ma ny of the

re c e ipt s, sh e sa id, ha d b e e n s e ize d at the tim e the se arc h w arr a nt w a s e xec ute d, bu t th e re we re a lso additional rec ords in her automobile that wer e not confiscated. Many of the re ceipts we re old a nd illegible. T he def

endant c laimed that from th e re co rd s she had to wor k with, the rec eipts totaled $2 3, 78 4. 17 . T he de fe nda nt a dmi tte d th a t sh e dida “ c ru dd y job ” of ke e pin g up wi th the re c e ipt s. Additional matters for w hich the def endant r ece ived re imbursement involved per sonal che cks she had written to cover

the salar y of other e mploy ees. F or example, the def endant pa id one employ ee, Trac y Rinks, $4,335. The defe ndant wrote six persona l che ck s to another e mploy ee that totaled $191.

Patricia White nex t t es t i fi ed about he r home a nd what the of fice rs found whe n the

sear ch wa rra nt was e x ecute d. She said that a boat on the property was titled to and belong ed to Mr. B os we ll’ s b ro the r. Th e c lothin g ins ide the garage an d o the r b a g g e d it e ms w e re le ft ov e r f ro m a g ara g e sale the wee k befor e the se arc h. The c lothing inside the re s i d en ce b elonged to her , her hus b a n d
, h e r s o n s , h e r d e c e a s e d mo th e r

- in

- la w , a n d h e r s is te r

- in

- la w , w h o w a s in th e p r o c e ss of divorcing and livin g wi t h the def endant. The jewelr

y , the def endant e x plained, wa s costume and relatively inexpensive. Many of t he box es i nside her bedroom closet contained donate d items that she planne d to take on mission trips. For the last twelve to fifteen y ear s, the defe nd an t h ad bee n g oing on mission trips to Mex ico.

Many of the shoes f

ound wer e tennis shoes purc hased f rom a s t o re g oing out of business, which the de fenda nt intended to send to an orphanag e home. The law n mower c ame f rom a neig hbor whose y ard the def endant Cra ig White was te nding. T he def endant testified that one of the trac tors in he r y ard belong ed to a friend who owned a construction compa ny

and who at one point put the trac tor in her y ard a nd advertised it for sale. The other tractor, she said, was jointly owned by her husband and another friend. As for personal transportation, the defendant testified that she drove a 1995 Oldsmobile with 185,000 mi les on it and that her hu s b an d h ad a 1994 Ford Rang er with approxim ately

100,000 miles on it. Her re sidence was mortg ag ed at $147,000.

Re g ard ing pa y me nt f

or ba c k wor

k, the de fe nd a nt sa id that sh e re c on str uc te d h e r t ime fr om w hat r e c or ds we re a va ila ble to h e r. Coo pe r o ff

e re d to pa y

he r t ime a nda

ha lf fo r h e r s e rv ic e s. CPS did not have a time c lock for the employ ees to punc h, and the de fenda nt never rec alled either Cooper or Smith requesting to see her ti me records for back work. The de fenda nt claimed that she noted her back w ork time on ca lendar s kept in front of he r desk. The defe ndant produc ed some of tho se c a le nd ars , w hich sh e sai d ha d b e e n in he r a uto mob ile a ndno t se ize d b y la w e nf or c e me nt.-14-

Acc ording to the defendant, from 1994 to 1998, she rec eived $113,408.06 in compe nsation for ba ck work. I n addition, the defe ndant testified that her son had been compensated $573 fo r e n t ering inf orma tio n in to the CPS c omp ute r; Coo pe r n e ve r o bje c te d to that arr a ng e me nt, a ndhe ha d b e e n in the offic e whe n her son wa s working on the computer

.

The de fenda nt conclude d her dire ct examination by deny ing g uilt of the char g ed

o f f e n s e a n d e m p h a s i z i n g h e r c r i m e

- f r e e p r i o r h i s t o r y.

The state a g g ressively

cross-e x amined the de fendant. The state c halleng ed the defe ndant’s explanation of the c alenda rs being in he r automobile, the notations on the cale ndars of hours worke d, and the spa rse doc umentation of whe n she was out of the offic e on vac ation or on a mission t rip. The state also pointed out that the ca lendar s appea red to ha ve hours written down for prac tically

every day

. The state showed the de fenda nt her c alenda r for October of 1997. The w ord

“ va c a tio n” is wr itt e n o n th e date of Oc tob e r 3 , a ndthe de fe nd a nt c la ime d th a t sh e too k a mis sio n trip to Afric a at t hat time. Another e ntry for Oc tober 3, howe ver, pur ports to show that the defe ndant

wo rk e d f ou rt e e n a ndon e -h a lf

ho ur s tha t day

. Th os e ho ur s d id n ot a pp e ar o n CPS ’s re g ula

r p a yro ll sheets.

Forty -five a dditional hours appea red to be recorde d on the calendar for the wee k of October 5, when the de fenda nt was supposed to be in Af rica . The de fenda nt asserte d that she ca rried business paper s to w ork on during the trip. The CPS pay roll sheets for

the wee k ending October 10, ho we ve r, sh ow e d n o p a yro ll c he c k is su e d to the de fe nd a nt.

The state que stioned other ca lendar entries. The cale ndar f

or January

1995 purported to show that she worke d ten re g ular hours and thre e hours of back time. The rate of $10 is written above the numbers. The state pointed out that the boar d had not incre ased her hourly wag e to $10 until 1996, to which the defe ndant claimed that Cooper had given her and another e mploy ee “ raises that the boar d knew nothing about.” She a dded that Cooper had also g iven the employ ees day s off and extra vac ation day s. When the state noted that ac cording to her c alenda rs, she wor

ked a l l the tim e , th e de fe nd a nt the n r e sp on de d th a t sh e pe rf orme d CPS ba c k w or

k o n h e r o ff

da y s.

Th e de fe nd a nt d id a g re e wi th the state that the inf orma tio n that Coo pe r re po rt e d to the boar d about the employ ees was false. The defe ndant blamed Cooper, stating that he did not want t h e b o ar d t o k n o w t h at h e h ad au t h o ri z ed ra i s es an d d ay s o ff fo r t h e e m p l o y ee s

. Fo r t h e m ee t i n gs that the def

endant pe rsonall y at tended, she char acte rized Cooper’s re ports as “not a ccur ate” and maintained that he intentionally misled the board.

The state c ontinued to highlig ht t h e i n co n s i s t en ci es b et we en t h e d ef en dant’s ca

lendar s and CPS’s recor ds. For example, the pay roll rec ords for O ctober

1997 showed ve ry

few paid hours that the def

endant wor

ked, althoug h her cale ndar note d signific antly g reater hours. When the de fe nd a nt o ff

e re d th e e xpla natio n th a t CPS d id n ot h a ve su ff ic ien t funds t o p a y

fo r a ll h e r t ime actua lly worke d, the state c onfronted the defe ndant with chec ks she had written i n October to herself
, draw n on CPS ’s g ener al ac count in the amounts of $425, $625, $400, $200, $337, $425, $425, $400,-15-

$87.90, and $450. The $200 chec k was written to the defendant’s credit card carrier, MB NA, and the $87.90 che ck wa s to pay the defe ndant’s cellular telephone bill. The defe ndant then claimed that the chec ks repr esente d pay ment for hours worke d in previous months for which CPS did not have

a va ila ble fu nd s.

As for the defe ndant adva ncing her pe rsonal funds to cove r pay ro l l fo r ot her

em p l o y ee s , t h e s t at e s h o we d h er C P S p ayro l l re co rd s fo r T ra cyR i n k s fo r t h e p er i o d Oc t o b ert h ro u gh De c e mbe r 199 6. F or Oc tob e r, Rin ks re c e ive d a CPS p a yro ll c he c k e ve ry

pa y pe ri odwi th a

pp ro pria te deductions. Rinks also rec eived, howe ver, a chec k on October

29 from the de fe n d an t ’s persona l

acc ount. When asked what the persona l c heck repr esente d, the defe ndant responde d it was for “ back work” that Rinks had performed. Other simi lar checks were shown to the defe ndant for w hich she, likewise, cla imed to be compensating Rinks for ba ck work

. None of the exist ing r ecor ds showed that Rinks had worked back hours. The state elicited f rom the def

endant that she and Rinks were related by marria g e.

As for the defe ndant adva ncing persona l funds to pay for items such a s postag e, Fe dera l Ex press s h i p m ents , and off ice supplies, she sa id that she reimburse d herse lf “whe n funds

wer e available .” The state c ountere d by producing and showing the def endant a multit ude of c hecks written fr om CP S’s acc ount to pay vendors directly
, indicating that expenses wer e routinelybeing

c ov e re d b y

the bu sin e ss.

The de fenda nt’s testimonywas interr upted at trial to acc ommodate t he schedules of three other de fense witnesses. United States B ankruptc y J udg e Ha rvey Boswe ll testified that he had known t he W hites for a considera ble num ber of y ear s and that their r eputation in the community for truthfulness and de pendability was g ood. He corr oborate d that the def endant Patric ia White had worke d for him at the rac etra ck and had handled tens of thousands of dollars of c ash eve ry Friday nig ht. No su sp ic ion of a ny wr on g do ing by de fe nd a nt Pat ri c ia Whit e e ve r a

ro se . Jud g e B os we ll a lso explained that at one time he a nd the defendant Craig White jointlyowned a boat. Ultimately , the d ef en d an tb o u gh to u tJ u d ge B o s we l l ’s i n t er es ti n t h e b o at

. T h e s t at e d i d n o tcr o s s -e x am i n e J u d ge B os we ll.

Mil a n G e ne ra l Se ssi on s Co urt Judg e Col lin s B on d te sti fied tha t, w he n in private prac tice, he ha d previously repr esente d the Whites. J udg e Bonds related t hat he attempted to s et up

a mee ting with the attorney repr esenting CPS to d i s cu s s the theft a lleg ations. The mee ting ne ver
occur red, be cause afte r the de fenda nts and CPS board me mbers collec ted the information needed to sit down and meet, the other attorney called and advised Judge B onds that he no long er w as inv olv e d in the ma tte r. Th e state didno t c ro ss- e xami ne Judg e B on ds

.

The third def

ense w itness taken out of order was Melissa McMinn, the co-ow ner of a pharmace utical re sear ch business and a lifelong Milan resident. Ms. McM i n n h ad known the de fe nd a nt P a tr ic ia

Whit e fo r 2 7 y e ars . M s. Mc Min n te sti fi e d a bo ut co nd uc tin g joi nt y ard sa le s w ith the de fe nd a nt andabo ut M s. Mc Min n’ s hu sb a ndha bit of sto ri ng sh op too ls at th e de fe nd a nts ’ residenc e.-16- Ms. McMinn had taken va cations with t h e d ef endants a nd had ac companied the defe ndant Patricia W hite on sever al mission trips. M s. McMinn testified that for the mission excursions, they

would solicit clothes from an y o ne willing to donate and would distribute the

c lothin g to a du lts a nd c hil dr e n. Ms. Mc Min n kne w that the de fe nd a nt ha d he rs e lf pu rc ha se d it e ms at the Dollar

Store to take on the miss i o n t ri p s

. Ms. McMinn cre dited the def endant with a g ood

re pu ta tio n f

or truth fu lne ss.

On cr oss-examination of Ms . McMinn, the state foc used on the mission trips. The state elicited that a mission trip was “def initely not a vac at i o n

. ” M s

. McMinn testified that they

wo rk e d th e e nti re tim e the y we re g on e

. Whe n she a ndthe de fe nd a nt w e nt t og e the r o n mi ssi on tr ips
, they roomed tog ether . The state a sked Ms. McMinn if the def endant did wor

k for CPS wh i le on these mission trips. The witness replied in the ne g ative, “not at all.”

When the defe ndant’s testimony resumed, the state aske d her a bout Ms. McMinn’s statement that the de fenda nt did n ot perform company work on the mission trips. The def endant blamed the state for not asking the witness for specific information about which mission trips they had jointly

taken a nd not asking about the length o f t h e airplane trip to Africa, whic h would have allowed f or work to be done.

J oe McMinn, the de fenda nts’ next door nei gh b o r, t estified that he ha d stored numerous thing s at the def end an t s ’ re s i dence , such as c lothing, tools, and a motorc y cle. Mr. Mc Min n a ndthe de fe nd a nt C raig Whit e joi ntl y ow ne d a tr a c tor , a ndbo th m e n h a d f ou r w he e le rs

. Mr. McMinn re g arde d the def endants a s honest people. The defe n s e el i ci t ed from him two

c on ve rs a tio ns that he ha d with Coo pe r. On on e oc c a sio n, Coo pe r ca me to his ho me a ndwa nte d h im to unlock the def

endants’ house to l ea ve a book and pick up re cords. Althoug h Mr. McMinn had a key to the residenc e, he declined Cooper’s r equest. Mr. Mc Minn said that ultim ately Cooper lef

t the bo ok a t Mc Min n’ s ho us e bu t tol d him no t to loo k at it . M r. Mc Min n th e n le ft the de fe nd a nts a
me ssa g e that he ha d s ome thi ng fo r the m. T he se c on d co nv e rs a tio n o c c ur re d a ft e r the dis c ov e ry

in 19 98 that mo ne y

wa s mi ssi ng . M r. Mc Min n te sti fi e d that Coo pe r a dmi tte d, “ Th e re ’s no thi ng a g a ins t Craig [, and] . . . he’s ha sn’t done anything wr ong . I t’s strictly betwee n Patricia a nd us.”

Th e de fe nd a nt C raig Whit e wa s the fi na l def e ns e wi tne ss. He re la te d b e ing bo rn in P ar i s , T en n es s ee , m o v i n g t o M i l an , gra d u at i n g fr o mh i gh s ch o o l i n 1 9 6 8
, at t en d i n g b u s i n es s co l l ege
a t Jac ks on Sta te , wo rking a t I TT in Mil a n, a nd ha vin g va ri ou s o the r j ob s. At

thetim e of

tr ia l, C raig Whit e wor

ked at Gr aves Me tal Service in J ackson. H e had ne ver be en ar rested.

The de fenda nt describe d his wife’ s work schedule and habits afte r C PS’s office wa s
re loc a te d in his ho us e . T he de fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t hi s w if e wo rk e d v e ry

lon g ho ur s. He pe rs on a lly knew that she had worke d fourtee n to six teen hours a day at t imes to take care of t he hog loads for the fa rm e rs

. I n ad dit ion , he sa id that his wif e fr e qu e ntl y wo rk e d on Satu rd a y s andSun da y s f or CPS. To the def

endant’ s knowledg e, his wife had never inflated her working hours. Moreove r, he knew nothing about his w ife stealing from CPS

. Rather, he stated, “I know she’s g iven a l o t t o CPS .”-17-

Al tho ug h h e ha d n e ve r a c c omp a nie d his wi fe on mis sio n tr ips
, the de fe nd a nt kn e w that sh e wo uld

car ry business paper work with her

.

The state’ s cro s s

- e xami n ati o no f th ed e f e n d an t f ocused primarily

on the couple’ s joint chec king a ccount. The defenda nt admitted that the bank statements came t o the re sidence and that he sig ned the tax returns that we re f iled. He ex plained, howe ver, that his wife took car e of the chec king a ccount a nd that he seldom wrote c hecks on the acc ount. His responsibilitywas to kee p trac k of how much w as spent on the c onstruction of their r esidenc e.

Th e de fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t he trus te d his wif e ’s jud g me nt. At tim e s, sh e tol d h im that she wa s putting money into CP S to get f

eed de livered to the pr oducer s. He kne w that a lot of the money

spent seeme d to be on cr edit car d bills, but he also stated that neither he nor his wife we re
c la imi ng that e ve rythi ng c ha rg e d to the c re dit

c ard s w e re fo r C PS.

I n rebuttal to the de fense case , the state re called Mark Smit h and I nvestig ator Dr aper
a ndof fe re d the te sti mon y of

a fo rm e r c ou rtho us e c le rk , Jose ph ine Jac ks on . With Sm ith , th e state simplyclarified that he ma de two trips to the def endants’ r esidenc e to pick up re co rd s an d other office items. Ms. J ackson’ s contribution was having known Cooper’s father for appr ox imately 50 y e ars , kno wi ng that he ha d p re pa re d ta x re turns fo r farms , a ndkn ow ing that he wa s a hig hly

re sp e c te d in div idu a l.

I nvestig ator Dr aper

testified that she kne w nothing a bout th e d efe ndants befor e becoming involved in the case

. Reg arding Patricia Whit e’s cale ndars, I nvestig ator Dr aper informed the jury that w hil e the se arc h wa s on g oin g , the de fe nd a nts ne ve r m e nti on e d a ny oth e r c a le nd ars in

a n auto mob ile . Sh e a lso c on c e de d, ho we ve r, that th e a uto mob ile s c ou ld h a ve be e n, bu t w e re no t,

sear ched.
The jury

deliberated on th i s ev i d ence and r eturne d verdic ts finding the de fenda nt P a tr i c i a W h i t e g u i l t y o f C l a s s C t h e f t a n d t h e d e f

e n d a n tC r a i g W h i t e g u i l t y o f f a c i l i t a t i o n o f

a f e l o n y. This appea l ensued.

I. EVIDENCE SUFF ICIENCY

B othde fe nd a nts c on te st the le g a l su ff ic ien cyof

the e vid e nc e un de rl y ing the ir

c on vic tio ns

. This court considers such a challeng e in a jury

trial strictly , viewing all of the e vidence in the light most favor able to the verd i ct an d overturning a convic tion onlyif no rea sonable jury could have c o n c lu d e d th a t th e d e f e n d a n t w a s g u il ty

b e y o n d a r e a s o n ab le d o u b t o n e a c h e s s e n ti al element of

the cha rg e. Se e Sta te v . Tr

ac y Lore nz o G oo dwi n ,

__ S.W. 3d

__ , N o. E2 00 1- 01 97 8- SCR11 -C D, sli p op

. a t 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 4) ; Sta te v . R e id , 9 1 S. W.3 d 2 47 , 2 76 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T he state is aff orded the strong est leg itimate view of the evidence and all rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces that flow from the evidence. Se e Sta te v . S mi th
, 24 S.W. 3d 27 4, 27 9 (T e nn

. 20 00 ). Mo re ov e r, thi s court doe s not re-w eig h or re -eva luate the e vidence , nor does it substitute its infere nces drawn f rom circ umstantial evidence for those dr awn by the trier of

fac t. Re id
, 91 S.W .3d at 277. A jury verdic t-18-

approve d by

the trial judg e acc redits the state’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in f avor of the verdic t. See State v . Bigbee , 885 S.W .2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994) . Simpl y stated, the de fenda nt, once

c on vic te d, is p re su me d g uil ty a ndbe ars the bu rd e n o f p ro vin g that th e e vid ence w a s in su ff ic ie nt. See State v . Evans , 838 S.W .2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992)

.

With the se g ro un d r

ule s in min d, we turn to bo th d e fe nd a nts ’ c on vic tio n o ff e ns e s.

A. Defendant Pat ricia White
The jury found the defenda nt Patricia White guilty of Class C theft of prope rty valued

ov e r $ 10 ,0 00 bu t le ss tha n $ 60 ,0 00 . She arg ue s tha t her c on vic tio n sho uld be ov e rturne d e sse nti a lly be c a us e Coo pe r andSmith, wh o w e re he r s up e rvis or s a ndCPS b oa rdme mbe rs , auth orize d h e r t o advanc e expenses for

CPS and to work unlimited overtime, ther eby eff ectively con s en t i n g t o the

re imb ur se me nt that sh e re c e ive d f or he r o ve rt ime wo rk

a ndbu sin e ss e xpe ns e s.

When the Tenne ssee Ge nera l Assem b l y en acted the Criminal Code in 1989, the

va ri ou s la rc e ny -r e la te d c ri min a l of

fe ns e s w e re c on so lid a te d in to a sin g le of fe ns e of the ft of pr op e rt y to eliminate “the a ntiquated and c onf u s in g d is ti n c ti o n s among various lar ceny -re lated crimes.” Sta te

v . B y rd , 9 68 S.W. 2d29 0, 29 1- 92 (T e nn . 1 99 8) ; see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-101 (2003) (theft statute emb ra ce s “e m b ez z l em en t , fa l s e pre tense, fr audulent conversion, larc eny , rec eiving/conce aling stolen property , and other simil ar of

fense s”).

Pur su a nt to the statut e e na c te d in 1989 , “[a ] pe rs on c omm its the ft of pr op e rt y if, w ith intent to deprive the owner of property , the person knowing ly obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner’ s eff

ective c onsent.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103 (2003). The ref ore, to obtain a theft c onviction, the state must establish “(1) the d ef endant knowingly

obtained or exercised c ontrol over property ; ( 2) the defe ndant did not ha ve the owne r’s e ffe ctive conse nt; and (3) the de fenda nt intended to deprive the owner of the property .” State v. Amanns , 2 S.W .3d 241, 244-45 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1999). Consent is not effe ctive if it is induced by dece ption. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106( a)( 9)(A) (2003). F urthermor e, a pe rson “de prives” an o wn er of property when he or she disposes of the prope rty , uses it, or t ransf ers an interest in t he prope rty in such a manne r as to make r estoration unlikely

. Id . § 39-11-106( a)( 8)(C) ( 2003).

As we un de rs ta ndthe de fe nd a nt’ s a rg ume nts , s h ed o e s n o t

d isp ute that sh e kn ow ing ly obtained CPS’s property in the form of m oney

. L ikewise, she does not controvert that she intended to deprive CPS of its property . Th e p i v o t al i s s ue, ac cording to the defe ndant, is whether she had

e ff e c tiv e c on se nt t o ta

ke CPS’ s p ro pe rt y . “[ T] he ju ror s [ in this c a se ] we re in the be st p os iti on to make determinations a s to w hether the def endant ha d eff

ective c onsent.” State v. Mila Shaw , No. W2001-02430-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 10 (Tenn. Crim. App., J ackson, Jan. 16, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2003)

.
Viewe d in a light most favor able to the state , the evidenc e at tria l clearly was sufficie nt for a r ational jury to conclude that the defe ndant Patricia Whit e did not ha ve the e ffe ctive-19-

c on se nt o f C PS to c on ve rt its pr op e rt y

in the fo rm

of mon e y wi thdra wn fr om CPS’ s b a nk a c c ou nts

. At the ou tse t, w e ob se rv e that a lth ou g h s uc c e ss m a y ha ve c ro wn e d th e de fe nd a nt’ s e ff orts t o e xpos e the ov e ra ll c are le ss ma na g e me nt of CPS a nd to po rt ray the CPS b oa

rdme mbe rs a s “ po or

bu sin e ss manag ers,” those eff

orts wer e lar g ely

irrele vant to the question of ef fec tive consent. That CPS board

me mbe rs ma y

ha ve be e n la x in f

e rr e tin g ou t th e true fi na nc ia l c on dit ion of the bu sin e ss d id n ot, there by , confe r tac it authority or ef fec tive consent for

the defe ndant to ma nag e the business financ es howeve r she de sired.

As fa r a s w hat Co op e r m a y

or ma y no t ha ve le d th e de fe nd ant to belie ve a ndhis inv olv e me nt a s th e de fe nd a nt’s su perv isor , th e pa rt ie s w e re a t od ds thr ou g ho ut the tr ia l. It is
, howeve r, undisputed from the pro of that virtually all of CPS’s board members w ere misled about the “wa g es” that the defe ndant was r ece iving. The defe ndant, moreove r, wa s prese nt at some of the board me eti n gs wh en pay roll expenses were disclosed and discusse d; she knew that the board members we re r ece iving e rrone ous inform at ion and that Cooper wa s intentionallymisleading the board. Smith testified unequivoca lly that the boar d neve r

authorized compensation for the def endant in the a mou nts la te r d isc ov e re d. I n a dd iti on , a c c or din g e ve n to the de fe nd a nt’ s a c c ou nt o f e ve nts , Cooper expressed his c o n ce rn t h at if the boar d knew what the back w ork wa s costing, the board would close down CPS.

That “e ffe ctive conse nt” re quires “la wful conse nt” oug ht to be self-e vident. Cooper

wa s n ot a uth orize d b y the bo ard of CPS to set the de fe nd a nt’ s compe ns a tio n at wh a te ve r rate he so desired or without consideration of the other operating expenses of the business. Smith testi fied that of fi c e sa lari e s w e re a

sp e c if ic bo ardc on c e rn , a ndhe ke pt a fo lde r o f not e s fr om b oa

rdme e tin g s to monitor what was being reported for wag es paid. I nasmuch as a rational jury was e ntitled to find that the def endant kne w t hat C ooper was not authorized by the board to unilaterally determine employ ee
c omp e ns a tio n, the jur

y wa s ju sti fi e d in c on c lud ing that Coop e r’ s “c on se nt” wa s not “ e ff e c tiv e ” to exonerate the defe ndant from c riminal culpability

. See Ten n. Co de A nn . § 39 -11 -10 6(a) (9) (B) (2003) ( “Consent is not effe ctive whe n . . . [g]iven by a per son the defe ndant knows is not authorized to act as a n ag ent.”)

.

Reg arding the def

endant “ reimbursing ” her self for business expenses, the jury was entitl ed to cr edit Cooper’s testimony that he did not authorize the def endant to pay

her pe rsonal

cre dit card bills out of CPS funds. The jury was, likewise, entitled to acc ept I nvestig ator Dr aper ’s testimonythat when she interviewe d C o oper a nd Smit h, the men informe d her that purcha ses of snacks a nd drinks wer e not leg itimate business ex penses a nd that althoug h the def endant wa s authorized to repay

herse lf for business-relate d long distanc e ca lls made on her home telephone, she

wa s n ot a

uth orize d to pa y her cellu lar t e le ph on e c ha rg e s. F urthe rm or e , e ve n th ou g h Sm ith

a c kn ow le dg e d g ivi ng his pe rm iss ion fo r the de fe nd a nt t o u se he r p e rs on a l c redi t cardto f a c ili ta te shipment of certain products for the hog produce rs and to use CPS ’s business license to pur chase g ift items from a company

known as AB C, Sm ith testified that he conditioned his permission on the defe ndant documenting the transa ctions. Smi th said that he neve r saw any such docume ntation, and the def endant attempted to excuse her a ctions on the basis that she di d a “c ruddy job” of ke eping up wi th r e c e ipt s.-20- Other te lling bits of inculpatory evidenc e included the sheer number of CPS chec ks -- approximately

400

-- t h at t he def

endant wr ote to herse lf from 1995 to 1997. I n addition, the defe ndant’s income tax re turns for 1996, 1997, and 1998, seized from her residenc e, fa iled to report tho us a nd s of do lla

rs wi thdra wn fr om CPS, a nd sh e ha d no re a dy e xpla natio n w hy

he r W- 2 f orms d id

no t a c c ur a te ly

re fl e c t th e “ wa g e s” pa id b y CPS.

A re asonable jury , moreove r, ea silycould have conclud ed t h at the def endant exagg erated the amount of ba ck w o rk t hat she pe rformed in an ad hoc a tte mpt to j us tif y the su ms of money diverted eac h month f

rom CPS

. The state discredited the defe ndant’s neve r-be fore -see n cale ndars, on whic h s h e claimed to have ke pt track of her hour s devoted to bac k work. The cale ndars ha d entries f

or n ea rly every day , including holiday s and day s that the defe ndant was of f work or on va cation, and an h o u rl y ra t e of $10 was noted on the c alenda r for J anuary 1995, even though CPS’s board ha d not approve d that rate until 1996. The de fenda nt’s explanations that she did back wor

k on her day s off, that she carrie d and worked on busi ness pape rs during out-of-town mis si on tr ips, a ndthat Co op e r h a d g ive n “ raise s th a t th e bo ardkn e w n oth ing abo ut” we re ha rd ly compelling or per suasive. In particula r, the testimony

o f d ef en s e witness Melissa McMinn, who

ro ome d w ith the de fend ant on m iss ion tr ips , w a s d e va statin g to the de fe nd a nt’ s c la im o f mult ipl e hours spent on CPS paperwork while on mission trips. Finally
, toward the end of the defe ndant’s te sti mon y , th e inc on sis te nc ie s b e tw e e n h e r c a le nd ars a ndCPS’ s r e c or ds be c a me e ve n mo re e vid e nt, and the de fenda nt’s eff

orts to rec oncile the inconsistenc ies bec ame incr easing ly implausible.

Fr om its verdict, the jury

acc epted much, but not all, of the state’s theory of the c ase. Finding the def

endant g uiltyof a le s s er gra d e of theft, the jury obviouslyconclude d that the defe ndant had pe rformed many leg itimate se rvice s for CPS and wa s entitled to reimbursement f or
certain leg itimate business ex penses. The verdic t was eminently rea sonable and rational fr om the proof pr esente d, and the c onviction, acc ording ly is affirme d.

B. Defendan t Cr aig White
The jury found the de fenda nt Craig Whit e g uiltyof Class D fa cilitati o n o f t h ef t of pr op e rt y va lue d o ve r $1 0, 00 0 bu t le ss tha n $ 60 ,0 00 . H e arg ue s th a t hi s c on vic tio n is inf ir m be c a us e the state introduce d no evidenc e that he furnished substantial assistance that fac ilitated any theft that his wife may have committed. The sole proof, he contends, that he was marrie d to his wife, had a joi nt b a nk

a c c ou nt w ith he r, a ndsig ne d th e ir joi nt t a x re turns is l e g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt to su pp ort his

c on vic tio n. As we sh all e xpla in, we a g re e , r e ve rs e his c on vic tio n, a nddis mis s th e c ha rg e a g a ins t him

.
B e fo re

ana c c u s e d

c anb ec o n vic te d o f f

a c ili ta tin g a

fe lon y , th e state mus t de mon str a te the commission of a spec ified fe lony and the a ssistance that the a ccuse d provid ed to t he per son committing the fe lony

. See State v . Parker , 932 S.W .2d 945, 950-51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). To b e pre cise, Code se ction 39-11-403, de noted “Criminal re sponsibili ty for f acilitation of fe lony ,” provides: “A pe rson is criminally responsible for the fac ilitation of a felony if, knowing that another intends to commit a specific f elony , but w ithout the intent r equire d for c riminal responsibilityunder-21-

§ 39-11-402( 2), the pe rson knowing ly furnishes substantial assistanc e in t h e commission of the f e lo n y

. ” T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 3 9

- 1 1

- 4 0 3 ( a ) ( 2 0 0 3 )

. F a c il it a ti o n is p u n is h ab le in a n o f f e n s e c la s s n e xt below the f

acilitated f

elony

. Id

. § 39-11-403( b) (2003). “As such, f acilitation is a lesser- included offe nse whe n the ac cused is not the ac tive malefa ctor involved in the c rime.” State v. Clifford L eon Fa rra , No. E2001-02235- CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 11 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxvi lle, Dec

. 10, 2003), perm. app. de nied

(Tenn. 2004)

.
H e r e , t h e e v i d e n c e v i e w e d i n t h e l i g h tm o s tf a v o r ab l e t o t h e s t a t e e s t ab l i s h e d o n l y, as the de fenda nt claims, that he shar ed a bank acc ount wi th his wife and sig ned their joint tax returns. The defe ndant Craig Whit e, furthermore, testified without contradiction that his wife took responsibilityfor their

chec king a ccount a nd that he seldom wrote chec ks fr o m the ac count. The evidenc e is undisputed that he had no e mploy m ent connection to CP S. The photog raphs of the de fe nd a nts ’ r e sid e nc e a ndpe rs on a l pr op e rt y a dd e d li ttle t o th e state ’s c a se , b e c a us e the state established no concre te connection betwee n any particula r i tem and money

taken f rom CPS ; indeed, in some instances, the p ro o f s h o wed that photog raphe d items were not even owne d by the de fe nd a nts

.
Our re sear ch discloses no c ase w here in criminal responsibility fo r fa cilitation was predic ated on this kind of innocuous evidenc e. For its pa rt, the state simplyarg ues that the de fenda nt provided subst antial assis tance to his wife by signing tax returns to conce al her crimes a nd by not stopping or reporting his w ife to the authorities. At the conc lusion of the state’s c ase, the trial court expressed g rave rese rvations about the sufficie ncy of the state’s e vidence conce rning the def endant Craig Whit e. “N ow, poor Mr. White, I haven’ t hear d a wor d about him in this trial. Now, wh ere does he f it in? ” From its later comments, the tri al co u rt evidently decide d ag ainst dismis sing the char g es bec ause it mig ht signa l to the jury that his wife wa s g uilty

. T h e court said, “And I don’t know how a jury

would interpre t that, at this stage of the procee dings, if they don’t see him sitting there tomorrow morning.” Then at the conclusion of t he proof, the trial judg e re iterate d, “I don’t like to separate def

endants be cause of the infe renc e juries mig ht find.”

When the evidenc e suff

iciency was raised a fina l time in connection with th en e w trial motion, the trial court dec lined to d i s t u rb t h e j ury ’s ver dict. At that time, it commented that the evidenc e wa s sufficient f

or the jury to find “there was substantial aid[ ,] and he rec eived be nefits from the theft by

his wife.” We mention these re marks bec ause the rec eipt of bene fits does not thereby establish g uilt byfac ilitation of a fe l o n y

. The ke y feature of f

acilitation is knowingly

furnishing substantial assistance to the pe rpetrator of a felony
, not benef itting i n the proc eeds. Com pa re Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403( a) ( 2003) (f acilitation of fe lony ), with id . § 39-11-402( 2) (2003) (criminal responsibilityfor c onduct of a no t h er by acting with intent to benefit in proce eds of of fense ). Reg ardle ss of bene fit, the key component of f

acili t at i o n -- knowingly

furnishing substantial

a ssi sta nc e -- wa s n e ve r sh ow n in thi s c a se , fo r wh ic h the de fe nd a nt Cr a ig Whit e ’s c on vic tio n mu st be vac ated.E v e n tho u g h the d e fe n d a n t C ra ig W h ite’s c o n v ic tio n is re v e rs e d a n d d ism isse d , w e w ill stil l ad d re ss h is 2

re m a inin g issu e to fac ili ta te p o ssib le S u p re m e C o u rt re v ie w

. See St at e v. Pat t er s on , 96 6 S

. W

. 2d 43 5, 44 2 ( T e n n

. Cr i m. A p p . 1 9 9 7 ); St at e v

. W oo dcock , 9 2 2 S .W .2 d 9 0 4 , 9 1 2 (T e n n . C rim . A p p . 1 9 9 5 ).

-22- II. SE NTENCING

A. Rest itution

The de fenda nts contest the tr i al court’s or der of restitution in the amount of 2 $124,000. Their a

rg ument is two-fold. I ndicted for the offe nse of thef

t of property

in an amount

over $60,000, the jury acquitted both de fenda nts of that char g e and, instead, convicted the defe ndant Patricia W h i t e o f t h e lesser -included of fense and amount of the ft over $10,000 but not excee ding $ 6 0
, 0 0 0 a n d c o n v i c t e d t h e d e f e n d a n t C r a i g W h i t e o f f a c i l i t a t i o n o f t h e f

t i n a lik e a mou nt. Ac c or din g ly , th e de fe nd a nts ins ist that th e tr ia l c ou rt

wa s n ot a uth orize d to or de r r e sti tut ion in e xce ss of the jury ’s ver dict. Alternatively , the def endants c ontend that the amount of r e stitut ion ordere d was

e x c e s s i v e a s n o tt ak i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e i r f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s a n d t h e i r f u t u r e ab i l i t y t o p a y.

As a uth ority

that r e sti tut ion in exc e ss of the jury ’s ve rd ic t is imp ro pe r, the de fe nd a nts

re ly on Cod e se c tio n 4 0- 20 -1 16 . T he state c ou nte rs that Co desecti on 40 -35- 30 4 is app lic able beca use t he trial court ordere d restitution as a condition of probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 304(a) (2003) ( “A se ntencing court may direc t a def

endant to make restitution to the victim of the of fe ns e a s a c on dit ion of

pr ob a tio n. ” ). Ou r ana ly sis re ve a ls that bo th p art ie s a re pa rt ly c or re c t.

Cod e se c tio n 4 0- 20 -1 16 pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art a s f oll ow s:

40-20-116. Order

of restitution. -- (a ) Whenev er a fe lon is convicted of stealing or fe loniouslytaking or re ceiving property , or defr auding another there of, the jury shall asce rtain the va lue of such pr op e rt y , if

no t pr e vio us ly

re sto re d to the ow ne r, a ndthe c ou rt sh a ll, the re up on , o rd e r the re sti tut ion of the pr op e rt y , a nd , in c a se thi s cannot b e done, that the party ag g rieve d rec over the value a ssessed

a g a ins t the priso ne r, fo r wh ic h e xec uti on ma y iss ue a s in oth e r c a se s.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 20-116( a) (2003). B y its clear te rms, this statute impos es a ma ndatory obligation that restitution be ordered wheneve r a de fenda nt is convicted of a theft-r elated of

fense

. S ee State v . Charles Chesteen
, E 1 9 9 9

- 0 0 9 1 0

- CC A

- R3

- CD
, s li p o p

. a t 1 3 ( T e n n

. Crim

. App., Kn oxvil le , Jun . 8 , 2 00 0) (“ [R]es tituti on in the ft c a se s is ma nd a te d a ndc on tr oll e d b y a sp e c if ic provision found in Code section 40-20- 116(a) .”).

T h e s tate sug g ests that the re quirements of Code se ction 40-20-116 a re irr eleva nt be c a us e the tr ia l c ou rt

or de re d r e sti tut ion as a co nd iti on of the de fe nd a nts ’ p ro batio n, pu rs ua nt t o Code section 40-35- 304. As we vie w the matter , there are sever al interre lated issues to be considere d. The fir st issue is whe ther restitution in thef t case s is ex clusively

controlled by

section-23-

40-20-116

. T h e second issue involves the ef fec t of the jury ’s ver dict reg arding the ra ng e of the ft committed on the amount of restitution that the sentenc ing court may order

. The last issue, noticed by this court, is whether the United States Supreme Court’s r ece nt opinion in Blakely v. W ashington
, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. C t. 2531 (2004), ac ts as a constitutional limi tation on the amount of re stitut ion that may be imposed.

“The mandatory

lang uag e of [40-20-116] distinguishes the particular fun ctions of the judge and the jury ; it im plicitlyauthorizes the t rial court to ‘orde r t he re stitut ion of the prope rty ’ or allow to the victim a re covery of i ts value only when the jury has first asce rtained its value.” Sta te v. Bryant , 775 S.W .2d 1, 4-5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988)
, perm. app. de nied (Tenn. 1989) . Our re view of the re c or d in thi s ca se re ve a ls that the jury wa s in str uc te d th a t if

it f ou nde ith e r d e fe nd a nt g uil ty of the ft it mus t “ fi x th e va lue of the pr op e rt y or se rv ic e s ob ta ine d a lon g wi th i ts v e rd ic t by indicating whi c h o f th e fol low ing ra ng e s th e v alu e fal ls w ith in .” (Empha sis added.) Consistent with that instruction, the j ury reported i ts g uilty verdic t in terms of more than $10,000 but less than $60,000. T h e j u r y w a s n e v e r

a s k e d t o r e f

i n e f u r t h e r t h e v a l u e o f

t h e p r o p e r t y.

I n State v. Kai Nielsen , No. 03C01-9807-CR-00233 (Te nn. Crim. App., Knox ville, Dec . 28, 1999), aff’d on o t h er g r o u n d s in State v. Nielsen , 44 S.W .3d 496 (Tenn. 2001) , the defe ndants wer e found g uilty of Class C felony theft involving the sale of stock. As in the instant

case , the jury

was instructe d that it could fix the value of t he property within one of four ra ng es. Id
., slip op. at 4. At sentencing , the court set restitution in t he amount of $25,000, id

. , s l i p o p. at 5, which fe ll within t he Class C theft g rading of more tha n $10,000 but less than $60,000.

Rely ing on Code section 40-20- 116, the def endants in Kai Ni elsen arg ued that they sh ou ld n ot b e re qu ir e d to pa y re sti tut ion be c a us e the jury did no t se t th e va lue or a mou nt o f p ro pe rt y stolen. The court responded,

The jury returne d a verdict of g uilt as to count one, which wa s the C felony

o f t heft. The court he ard a mple proof to make a de te rm inatio n th a t th e a mou nt i nitia lly pa id f or the sto c k w a s tw e nty five thousand dollar s. The c ourt order ed that amount of r estitution, and did not include additional interest or damag es. A trial judge may direc t the pay men t of re stitut ion to the victim as a condition of probation, pursua nt to T.C.A. 40-35-304. This co u rt has held that wh e n r e sti tut ion is o rd e re d a s a c on dit ion of pr ob a tio n, the a uth ority to de termine the appropriateness and the amount of restitution lies solely w ith th e tria l c o u r t.

. . . T h e d e f e n d a n ts w e r e p la c e d on probation in this c ause, a nd restitution was order ed as a condition of probation. The jury

was not re quired to f

ix the amount of re stitut ion.

Id ., slip op. at 5-6.-24- I n Charles Chesteen , the def enda n t p l ea d ed guilty

to Class C t heft a nd officia l misconduct. The c ourt imposed an effec tive six -y ear incar cer ative sente nce, a long w ith restitution in the amount of $101,821.73. On appea l, the court modified the manner of service of the sentenc es and re verse d and re manded the r estitution determination. Charles Chesteen
, slip op. at 1, 15. The sentenc ing c ourt had orde red no r estitution for the theft conviction, but it assessed the f ull amount of $101,821.73 for

the official misconduct conviction. “At the outset,” the Charles Chesteen court noted in its opini on, “wediscern e rror s of law in the tria l court’s judg ment as they relate to the matter of re stitut ion.” Id ., slip op. at 12. The court continued,

I n th e of fi c ia l misc on du c t con vic tio n, re sti tut ion wa s n ot a va ila ble to the trial court in conjunction with a sentenc e of total c onfinement. . . . [B]ased on the sentenc ing la w as it exist ed for crimes c ommit t ed prior to J u l y 1
, 1 996, restitution could not be order ed whe n total confine ment was imposed. . . .

I n the theft c ase, the trial court’s error is the fa ilure to order restitution. The court was not hampere d

. . . in or dering b o t h t o tal

c on fi nemen t andre sti tut ion

. . . . [R]es tituti on in the ft c a se s is

man d a te d a n d c o n tr o ll e d b y a s p e c if ic p r o v is io n f

o u n d in Code section 40-20- 116(a)

.
Id ., slip op. at 12-13.

Be cause the Charles Chesteen court modified the de fenda nt’s s en t ence to include pr ob a tio n, re sti tut ion the n w a s a ppropri a te fo r b othc on vic tio ns , a ndthe c ou rt re ma nd e d w ith instructions for the sente ncing c o urt to establish appropriate amounts of r estitution. C oncerning

re sti tut ion in the the ft

c a se , th e c ou rt

a dd e d th e fo llo wi ng re mark s:

I n determining re stitut ion in the theft ca se, the trial c ourt should be awa

re of a distinction betw ee n the sanc tion of levy upon
e xec uti on pr ov ide d in Cod e se c tio n 4 0- 20 -1 16 (a ) and re sti tut iona s a
c o n d it io n o f

p r o b a ti o n p u r s u a n t t o s e c ti o n 4 0

- 3 5 -304. .

. . [W] e be lie ve that to the e xten t th a t th e tr ial c ou rt wi sh e s to imp os e
re sti tut ion a s a

c on dit ion of

pr ob a tion, wheth e r the re sti tut ion its e lf is authorized by the sentenc ing act or mandated by section 40-20- 116(a) , the court must comply with the provisions of the sentenc ing act . . . r elative to th e am ount being rea sonable a nd based upon the defe ndant’s fina ncial ability

. . . . Neve rtheless, if this determination leads the c ourt to establish an amount of r estitution t hat i s l es s than the theft victim’s pec uniary loss, section 40-20-116(a ) conte mplates the court establishing the de ficienc y amount -- that is, the diff ere nce b et we en the amount that is order ed as a condition to probation and-25- the tot a l a mou nt o f the los s. Th is d e fi c ie nc y a mou nt i s su bje c t to

c oll e c tio n b y

e xec uti on a s in the c a se of a jud g me nt.

Id ., slip op. at 13.

A re stitut ion fac t pattern, striking ly simil ar to the one in this case, ar ose in State v. S ta cy Jones Reed
, N o

. 0 2 C01-9602-CC-00060 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, J an. 2, 1997), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1997) . The de fenda nt Reed wa s indicted for theft over $1,000 but less than $10,000. Reed, howe ver, w as convic ted on a jury verdic t of theft of pr operty over $500 but le ss tha n $1,000, with the jury

reporting to the tria l court that it set val u e at $550. As part of Reed’s a lternative sentenc e, she w as re quired to pay $5,354 in restitution to t he victim. Id ., slip op. at 2.

On app e a l, R e e d a

rg ue d e rr or

in the a mo un t of th e re sti tut ion or de re d. Th e state

conce ded er

ror. Id ., slip op. at 11. The court ruled,
The jury found the de fenda nt g uilty of theft of $550.00. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-116( a) pr ovides that when a felon is convicte d of steal in g p r o p e r ty , a

ju r y mu s t a s c e r tain th e v a lu e o f th e s tole n property

. See State v . Brenda Bryant , 775 S.W .2d 1 , 4-5 (Te nn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 88 ). We the re fo re mod if y the sent ence imp os e d to provide that de fenda nt must pay $550.00 in restitution.

Stacy J ones Ree d , slip op. at 11-12. Restituti on, imposed as a condition of probation, we note, wa s
never discussed in Stacy Jones Ree d

. See also State v . Joe King , No. M2003-01869-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, J un. 17, 2004) (def endant questioned trial court’s authority to require $1,000 for restitution whe n jury convicted on lesser- included theft off ense in a n amount of $500 or less; issue waived as not supported byarg ument, authorities, or re fer ence s to the

rec ord).

Fr om the se case s, we distil l that ( 1) the jury ’s failure to de termine a s p ec i fi c v alue or amount of pr operty

stolen does not fore close the imposition of restitution as a conditi on of probati o n , p u rsuant to C ode sec tion 40-35-304; (2) in thef t convictions, the sentenc ing c ourt may order restitution pur suant to Code section 40-20- 116(a) and a s a c on dit ion of

pr ob a tio n; and(3 ) i n theft ca ses not involving restitution a s a condition of probation, section 40-20-116( a) restitution may

no t e xce e d e ith e r the va lue a sse sse d by the jury or the the ft -v a lue rang e re fl e c te d in the jury ’s ve rd ic t. Be cause , in this case , restitution was im posed sol ely as a condition of probation, the sec tion 40-35- 304(d) c onsiderations about fina ncial re source s and future ability to pay determine the amount and

me tho d o f p a y me nt o f a

pp ro pria te re sti tut ion

. Th e re c or d in this c a se , h ow e ve r, c on ta ins ina de qu a te finding s in this reg ard f

or which a

re m an d is require d for the trial court to consider and make the

re qu ir e d s ta tut ory

fi nd ing s.

Ou r fi n al inquiry

is whether any

order of re stitut ion in this case is subject to the dictates of t h e re cent United States Supreme Court’s dec ision in Blakely v. W ashington
, _

__ U. S.-26-

___, 124 S. Ct . 2531 (2004). Pursuant to B l a k e ly
, an y fa ct t h at incre ases a sentenc e bey ond the

“ relevant statut ory ma ximum ” -- de fi ne d b y the Cou rt ’s ma

jority a s th e ma ximum

se nte nc e that a judge may

impose without making a ny additional finding s of fa ct -- must be submitted and pr oved to the j ury bey ond a reasonable doubt or admit ted by the def endant. Id

. at ___, 124 S. Ct . at 2536- 37. The Bl ake ly Court did not spe ak in na rrow terms that targ eted mere ly the leng th of an a ccuse d’s sentenc e; rather, the Court spoke in br oader terms of the pow er to pu nis h : “ Whe n a jud g e inf lic ts punishment

that the jury ’s ver dict alone doe s not allow, the jury has not found all the f

acts ‘w hich the law make s essential to the punishment ,’ . . . and the judge exceeds his prope r authority .” Id . at ___, 124 S. Ct . at 2537 (e mphasis added)

.

Ex isting Tenne ssee c ase la w expressly rec og nizes, “The purpose of restitut ion is not

on ly to c omp e ns ate the vic tim bu t al so to p un ish and re habilitate the g uilty .” State v. Johnson , 968 S.W .2d 883, 884 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (empha sis added). Restituti on has also been de scribed as “a n important tool in t he punishment of criminals.” Sta te v . W ill iam T. Co war t , No. 01C01-9508- C C

- 0 0 2 5 1
, s l i p o p

. a t9 n

. 5 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. , N a s h v i l l e , N o v

. 2 2
, 1 9 9 6 )

. M o r e p ar t i c u l ar l y, restitution has been r eg arde d as “a part of the sentenc ing scheme and in the natur e of a penalty for crime,” which is not affe cted by the victim relea sing the offe nder f rom civil liabilit y

. State v. Jason C. D ey ton , J

r. , No. 234, slip op. at 4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxvill e, F eb. 2, 1989).

Tenne ssee’ s view of restitution ostensibly conflicts with the pre vailing vie w in two fede ral c ircuits, United States v. Be hrman , 235 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir. 2000) (re stitut ion for harm done is a c la ssi c civi l r e me dy , n ot a pe na lty fo r a c ri me ; Apprendi , there fore , does not aff ect the

c a lc ulatio n o f res tituti on ); Un ite d S tat e s v . Ni c ho ls , 169 F.3d 1255 ( 10th Cir. 1999) (purpose of

re sti tut ion no t to pu nis h b ut t o e ns ur e vic tim s a re ma de wh ole fo r los se s)
, bu t it is c on sis te nt w ith the appr oach ta

ken in two other f

eder al circ uits, United States v. Sy me , 276 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2002) (re stitut ion orders ma de pursua nt to criminal convictions are criminal penalties within the meaning of Apprendi ); United States v. Be arden , 2 74 F .3 d 1 03 1 ( 6thCir

. 20 01 ). Th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court, in Kelly v. Robinson , 479 U.S. 36, 107 S. Ct . 353 (1986), he ld that a re stitut ion obligation, imposed as a c ondition of probation in a s t at e criminal procee ding, w as not dischar g eable under Chapter 7 of t h e Ba n k ruptcy Code bec ause, int e r a lia
, re s t i tu t i o n o rd er s i n cr i m i n al p ro ce ed i n gs focus on the state’s intere st in re h ab i litation and punishment rather tha n the victim’s desire f or compensation.

Re g ard le ss w he the r r e sti tut ion qu a lif ie s a s p un ish me nt, ho we ve r, we be lie ve that a jud ic ia l f ind ing of a n a mou nt of re sti tut ion do e s n ot r un a fo ul o f the Du e Pr oc e ss o r S ixth Amendment g uara ntees a s interpre t ed in Bl ake ly

. Bl ake ly and its prog enitor, Apprendi v. New Jerse y , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. C t. 2348 (2000), spec ifical l y t ar g eted incr ease d penalties for crimes beyond the prescribed statutory max imum wi tho ut su bmi ssi on to a jury or a dmi ssi on by

a de fe nd a nt. Ne ith e r C od e se c tio n 4 0- 20 -1 16 no r s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -3 04 e mbr a c e s a “ statut ory ma ximum ” that c ou ld be incr ease d by

a g iven finding ; that is to say , neither statute spe ci fi es a max imum amount of restitution that may

be orde red. A cco rd i n gl y , nothing in Bl ake ly appea rs to rea ch our r estitution scheme or the pa

rticular r estitution order ente red in this case

.T h e tr ia l c o u r t d id im p o se a p re su m p tive m inim u m two -yea r se n te n c e fo r th e d e fen d a n t C ra ig W h ite’s 3
fac ili ta tio n c o n v ic tio n

. See T enn

. Co de Ann. §§ 3 9- 11

- 40 3(b) ( 20 03 ) ( f aci l i t at i on of comm i s s i on of

a f el ony i s an

o ff e n se o f the c la ss ne x t b e lo w the felo n y fac ili ta te d ), 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 2 (a )( 4 ) (2 0 0 3 ) (R a n g e I se n te n c e fo r C la ss D felo n y is

no t l ess t han t wo nor m o re t han fo ur y ears)

. -27-

For the re asons discussed a

bove, we vacate the orde r of r estituti on and re mand the matter of r estitution t o the trial court for the a ppropriate determinations required unde r Code section 40-35-304.
B. Length of Sentence and Manner of Service

The trial court sentenc ed the de fenda nt Patricia White to a term of four y ear s, which it then suspended in fa vor of pr obation. As a R ang e Ioffe nder c onvicted of a Class C offense, the defe ndant’s sentencing rang e was three to six y ear s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-112(a )(3) (2003). The trial court enhanc ed her sentenc e base d on her le ader ship role in the commission of the offe nse,
se e id ., § 40-35-114( 3) (2003) , the involvement of more than one victim, s e e id

. , § 40-35-114( 4) (2003), a nd her a

buse of a position of private trust, se e id ., § 40-35-114( 16) (2003)

.
I n our estimation, the dec ision in Bl ake ly require s a pre sumptive mini mum sentence of three y ear s absent any enhanc ement fac tors. Eac h of the e nhance ment fac tors found by the trial court fa ll within t he ambit of Bl ake ly ’s prohibition of sentenc e enhanc ement g reater than t he statutory maxi mum without jury intervention and de termination. See State v. Stev en M. Stinson , No. E2003-01720-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 8 (Te nn. Crim. App., Knox v i l l e, J u l. 29, 2004) (misapplication of enhanc ement fac tors pursuant to Bl ake ly ). Although the trial court suspended the de fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e a ndpla c e d h e r o n p ro batio n, the le ng th of he r o ri g ina l se nte nc e is, no ne the le ss, moment ous because in the eve nt probation is revoke d, the orig inal sentenc e imposed ca n be eff ectuated. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-310 (2003). Acc ording ly , a sente nce- leng th modification to a pre sumptive mini mum three-y ear sentenc e is appropriate. 3

A s f o r th e d u r a ti o n o f p r o b a ti o n imp o s e d in th is c a s e , f if te e n y e ar s , th e r e is no require ment that the duration of the probationary period be identical to the leng th of t h e s entenc e imposed. Se e id . § 40 -3 5- 30 3( c ) (2 00 3) . T he du ratio n o f t he pr ob a tio n mu st b e a t le a st the le ng th of the statut ory min imu m se nte nc e , bu t it c a n ru n “ up to a nd inc lud ing the statut ory ma ximum

tim e for the c lass of the c onviction offense ,” id . § 40 -3 5- 30 3( c ) ( 20 03 ), wh ic h is wh a t w a s o rd e re d in thi s
case . No finding s outside of or in a ddition to the jury ’s ver dict are require d befor e the tria l court ca n set the duration of the probationary period g reater than the leng th of the statutory minimum sentenc e. We a re , th e re fo re , p e rs ua de d th a t Bl ake ly does not aff ect the pr obationary

sentenc ing in this ca se.

III . C ON CL USI ON

For the fore g oing rea sons, the conviction of de fenda nt Craig Whit e is reve rsed, a nd the c ha rg e is d ism iss e d. Th e de fend ant Pa tr ic ia Whit e ’s c on vic tio n f

or Cla ss C fe lon y

the ft is-28-

a f f i r m e d
, b u t t h e l e n g t h o f h e r s e n t e n c e i s m o d i f i e d t o a p r e s u m p t i v e m i n i m u m o f t h r e e y e a rs

. F ina lly , th e iss ue of

re sti tut ion is r e ma nd e d to thetr ia l c ou rt fo r a pp ro pria te fi nd ing s.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE