DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, LINDA PAGELSEN, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, 

ADAM HARRIS, ANN REESE, BROOKE BOYER, TIM PRINCE, MATT WASHINGTON, B G WRIGHT, 

CHRIS WHITE, CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, Administrative Aide 

PART 1 

Page 

Air Force Nuclear Enterprise ............................................... 1 

Contract Services and Acquisition Management ............ 55 

Army Contracting .................................................................... 283 

Outsourcing ............................................................................... 353 

Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury 

Problems ................................................................................. 431 

Global Mobility ......................................................................... 515 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

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PART 1—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, LINDA PAGELSEN, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, 

ADAM HARRIS, ANN REESE, BROOKE BOYER, TIM PRINCE, MATT WASHINGTON, B G WRIGHT, 

CHRIS WHITE, CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, Administrative Aide 

PART 1 

Page 

Air Force Nuclear Enterprise ............................................... 1 

Contract Services and Acquisition Management ............ 55 

Army Contracting .................................................................... 283 

Outsourcing ............................................................................... 353 

Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury 

Problems ................................................................................. 431 

Global Mobility ......................................................................... 515 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

56–232 WASHINGTON : 2010 

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2 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

MICHAEL HONDA, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

JERRY LEWIS, California 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New 

Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

BEVERLY PHETO, Clerk and Staff Director 

(II)

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(1) 

DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2009. 

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE 

WITNESSES 

HON. MICHAEL B. DONLEY, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 

GENERAL NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES 

AIR FORCE 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the 

hearing today which involve classified material be held in executive 

session because of the classification of the material to be discussed. 

Mr. MURTHA. Without objection. 

You know, this is a closed hearing this morning. We have had 

the room swept. And we are pleased to welcome two distinguished 

veterans here of the hearings. We appreciate your coming. I see 

you got a lot of backup there. I always get concerned when you 

have got so many people back there ready to answer questions. 

But this is a serious concern of ours. I said to Secretary Gates 

whenever I found out that we had nuclear weapons that were flying around; I said, Mr. Secretary, they take our nail clips away, 

they take our little scissors away at the airport, and yet you have 

got nuclear weapons flying around, activated. He did not laugh at 

that. He did not think that was funny. 

And I know the Air Force took some strong action, good friends 

of ours who were dismissed because of what happened over there, 

as they should have been even though they were good friends. I 

mean, there couldn’t be anything more serious than flying around 

with activated nuclear weapons. 

So I appreciate it. We look forward to hearing what you have to 

say about it, and in an addition to what you talk about as far as 

what you have done to secure the nuclear weapons, also what you 

think needs to be done as far as down the road making sure they 

are taken care of. And I do not know that we need any more, but 

we ought to make sure that they are ready to go in case we would 

ever need them. 

Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And Chairman Murtha has, I think, pretty much explained the 

position of the members of the subcommittee. I just want to say 

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2 

that I appreciate the seriousness with how you, the Air Force, are 

addressing this extremely important issue. 

And we welcome your comments and your suggestions and your 

advice on how we deal with this problem. 

And thank you for being here. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Secretary. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY DONLEY

Mr. DONLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for scheduling this hearing today to discuss a critically important mission area for the United States Air Force, stewardship 

of our nuclear deterrent forces. This is a responsibility we take seriously, and one that is, as General Schwartz has put it, among our 

most solemn obligations. 

Mr. MURTHA. Would you check to see that your microphone is 

on? 

Mr. DONLEY. Can do. Is that better? 

Mr. MURTHA. Yes. 

Mr. DONLEY. Great. The nuclear deterrence mission assigned to 

the United States Air Force is one of our most solemn obligations 

to our Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, our national leadership, and to the American people. 

Nuclear deterrence operations and the sustainment activities 

that ensure the integrity of the nuclear arsenal entrusted to our 

care are core functions that the Air Force has proudly accepted 

since our inceptions 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for over 60 

years America’s Airmen have committed their talent and their skill 

to delivering the Nation’s strategic backstop in a safe, secure, and 

reliable manner. Improving our institutional performance in the 

nuclear area has held my attention since my first day in office. It 

remains a top priority in both policy and actionable terms. And 

whatever the size or composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, I am 

absolutely committed to ensuring that the Air Force meets its solemn obligation, with the hallmark of professionalism and discipline 

for which we are known the world over. 

When I testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee 

last July, I indicated that I had directed the Air Force to establish 

a nuclear task force to synchronize corrective actions underway 

across the major commands of the United States Air Force. More 

importantly, however, I tasked the Air Force nuclear task force to 

identify root causes and necessary steps to mitigate these problems 

from an institutional and enterprise perspective over the long term. 

Creation of that task force raised the level of discussion to the top 

leadership team of the Air Force about how our service can be the 

best steward of our nuclear enterprise. 

General Schwartz and I have invested significant personal attention in enhancing our institutional performance. We have demonstrated the same—we have demanded the same of our Air Force 

assistant secretaries and the commanders of our major commands, 

and all for whom we are responsible and who are responsible for 

stewardship of our nuclear weapons. The output of our analysis 

and discourse is the Air Force’s Nuclear Roadmap, a comprehensive 

assessment of root causes and required actions. We published the 

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3 

ing good progress in its implementation. Since nuclear matters are 

also interagency matters, I want to assure you that the roadmap 

reflects thoughtful collaboration and feedback from many outside 

the Air Force, including our OSD and interagency partners. 

The roadmap and its implementation have benefited greatly from 

Dr. Jim Schlesinger’s panel and their comprehensive and detailed 

examination of Air Force nuclear operations and sustainment. And 

I would like to thank Dr. Schlesinger for all the good work his 

panel has done. 

Among the most important changes we have instituted is the enactment of several corporate governance changes that will ensure 

the integrity of all aspects of the Air Force nuclear enterprise, from 

the missile fields in America’s northern tier to our fleet of nuclearcapable bombers to the sustainment activities that ensure the reliability of these forces on a day-to-day basis. 

We have established a provisional Global Strike Command to 

prepare for the consolidation of nuclear operations, including our 

missile forces and nuclear-capable bombers under a single operational command. Additionally, we have worked to strengthen our 

nuclear sustainment functions by assigning all nuclear 

sustainment responsibilities to the Air Force Nuclear Weapons 

Center, using a measured and phased approach over time that will 

bring all the sustainment and support under one organization. 

Within our headquarters, we have established the Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Directorate, an A10 office, which 

reports directly to the Chief of Staff. So we now have an office inside the Air Staff focused on the nuclear mission. We have also established a Nuclear Oversight Board chaired by the Chief and me 

that gets together quarterly to gather the senior leadership of the 

Air Force with responsibilities for nuclear matters and provide a focused forum for debating and deciding policy matters, as well as resolving enterprise-level issues confronting our nuclear forces. 

Despite this progress, I want to caution the Committee that reinvigorating the Nuclear Enterprise in the Air Force will take not 

just months but years. But I am confident that we have established 

a comprehensive and appropriate framework that restores our institutional performance to a level consistent with the high standards of precision and excellence synonymous with the rest of the 

United States Air Force. 

Thank you again for the continued support that this Committee 

provides to our Airmen. I look forward to our dialogue this morning. 

Mr. MURTHA. General Schwartz. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL SCHWARTZ

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Members of the 

Committee, for allowing us to testify on behalf of America’s Air 

Force. Thank you as well for your support for our reinvigoration of 

the nuclear enterprise. 

I would like to echo and reinforce Secretary Donley’s remarks by 

providing briefly my perspective on our nuclear posture. The 

United States Air Force is fully committed as stewards of the Nation’s resources, those resources that the Nation entrusts to us. 

And America’s airmen will work diligently each and every day, 

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4 

with precision and reliability, to earn and preserve that trust that 

the Nation places in us. We are grateful for the opportunity to 

serve the Nation by providing critical capabilities in air, space and 

cyberspace, capabilities that work in concert with our joint and 

interagency partners to support America’s strategic deterrence policy. 

We also recognize the magnitude of the role that we play and the 

highest standards of accountability and performance this role demands. America’s nuclear capabilities remain an indispensable part 

of our deterrence policy, and they are important contributors to our 

efforts to limit and to dissuade proliferation, as well as the threat 

of weapons of mass destruction. 

The Air Force is responsible for operating, maintaining, sustaining, and securing a substantial portion of the Nation’s nuclear 

arsenal. We have devoted ourselves to performing this mission with 

great pride and skill and precision since our inception as a service, 

providing over 60 years of credible nuclear deterrence for the Nation. We expect every Airman to perform with precision and reliability each and every time. Certainly excellence, even perfection, 

is the standard. 

For all these reasons and more, Secretary Donley and I have established Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear enterprise as our 

number one priority. Today thousands of Airmen dedicate their 

lives and talents to sustaining and safeguarding America’s nuclear 

capabilities. They operate America’s on-alert missile fields to provide vital, stable, and a ready force for the Nation. This force 

stands ready to deter and dissuade any potential aggressor from 

launching an attack on the United States each and every day. 

These Airmen maintain bomber capabilities that provide visible 

and flexible deterrent effects around the globe and serve the vital 

role of reassuring our allies. Your Airmen sustain our nuclear 

weapon and delivery systems, providing life cycle cradle-to-grave 

support to ensure the integrity of the Nation’s most powerful weaponry. 

Recent well-documented failures highlight the need to improve 

institutional performance in several areas of this crucial mission. 

Today I join Secretary Donley to give you my word, we will not accept anything but the highest standards of performance and accountability. We will not cease our concentrated effort to reinvigorate the Air Force nuclear enterprise, ensuring that our Airmen are 

fully committed to demonstrating the highest standards of excellence, standards that the American people, our national leadership, 

and our allies expect of those who are entrusted with the solemn 

obligation of America’s nuclear capabilities. Your Air Force and 

America’s Airmen are all in. We will keep our promise to the Nation to provide effective and uncompromising stewardship and mission readiness. 

Thank you for the committee’s continued support of America’s 

Air Force and particularly its Airmen and their contribution to nuclear deterrence. 

Sir, if I may request that our prepared statement be entered into 

the record. 

[The joint statement of Secretary Donley and General Schwartz 

follows:] 

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Mr. MURTHA. Without objection. 

General SCHWARTZ. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me diverge a little bit from the subject and just 

say how important it is, since the budget is going to be late, that 

you folks get your act together and get the information we need 

early. This is a bipartisan committee. Whenever something comes 

out of this subcommittee, it does not change until it goes to conference, and then there is very minor changes. So the product we 

produce is a key to the Defense Department’s funding. 

But we need to know numbers. We need to be able to plan short 

term and long term about what needs to be done. And we need to 

have it as soon as we can. Supplementals are going to stop, and 

we are going to be in a bind as far as the regular budget goes. The budget this year is $387 billion plus whatever the President adds to that. But the supplemental, we think, will be about $20 billion more than the Defense Department sent 19 over. Whatever we 

can do in the supplemental is so important. We tried to do a little 

in the stimulus. And the committee met; it was almost too late by 

the time we found out the way it was going. But we are going to 

get $4 billion or $5 billion there for infrastructure and things like 

that. 

But the sooner we know what the bottom line is, the sooner we 

can stabilize and look not just short term but long term about what 

needs to happen, and we can buy in quantities that get the price 

down. 

So the information we request is very important, and the sooner 

you can get it to us, the better. 

Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And as I said, Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for being here. 

We are discussing a pretty important issue here. And I am curious 

if there have been any similar incidents in nuclear weapons under 

the control of U.S. Air Force Europe. 

General SCHWARTZ. There have not, sir. There have been no 

similar incidents or even major mistakes that I am aware of that 

have occurred under the control of the United States Air Forces in 

Europe. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, are they under any different rules or regulations? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, they operate under the same exact criteria, now under unified supervision of, for example, the Air Force 

Nuclear Weapons Center. Their policies and their procedures apply 

in Europe as they do in the Continental United States. Likewise, 

when Global Strike Command stands up, the two major commands 

will interact and support one another in terms of providing for nuclear deterrence. 

But the key thing is that the standard is universal, and the policies and procedures that we employ apply equally in Europe as it 

does here. There is the nuance of the ally in Europe. But in terms 

of the way the Americans execute the mission, it is the same. 

Mr. YOUNG. Operational control of nuclear weapons has been 

transferred from the Air Combat Command to the Air Force Global 

Strike Command. Has that been accomplished? Is that already in 

place? 

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21 

Mr. DONLEY. It is not yet in place. We have stood up Air Force 

Global Strike Command provisionally in early January to begin the 

work to stand up that command at the end of this year. But we 

have not transferred operational responsibility for the ICBMs or for 

the bombers to that new command yet. That will be something that 

happens further along in its evolution. But we have established the 

new command in a provisional form. It will grow this year. At the 

appropriate time in the future, then we will transfer the responsibility into that command section. 

Mr. YOUNG. Will the European-based nuclear weapons also be 

transferred to that command or will they stay under U.S. Air Force 

Europe? 

General SCHWARTZ. They will stay under U.S. Air Forces in Europe in a supporting, supportive relationship. I might reemphasize, 

Congressman Young, what the Secretary just related is that this 

really is a wing-walking exercise. We will not let go of one hand 

until we are ready to make the transition. It will be seamless and 

continuous between the existing organizations which are operating 

the machines and the weapons and managing the people now to 

the new organization. 

Mr. YOUNG. A little different direction. We are hearing that OMB 

is doing a study to transfer control of nuclear weapons from the 

Department of Energy to the military. Back in World War II, the 

Oppenheimer decision was to keep the control or the development 

of nuclear weapons in the civilian control as opposed to the military. Can you tell us anything about this? Is this a real study? I 

know President Reagan tried to do this during his administration. 

Is there a major effort under way, or are we just hearing rumors? 

Mr. DONLEY. I am not able to give you an update on the Department’s position on that subject. I am aware that it had been discussed at the OMB level. Whether or not there are Defense officials 

involved in that dialogue, I am not aware. It has not worked itself 

down to the Navy or the Air Force at this point. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chair, if I have time for one more question, the 

Schlesinger report indicates that the Navy’s control of their nuclear 

responsibilities are somewhat frayed at the edges but that they 

think that they are being managed properly. Do you have any comment on that at all? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, we certainly understand that the Navy 

has processes in place which we should model. In fact, we are doing 

that. A case in point is our decision to consolidate nuclear weapons 

related material that was in the inventory of other DOD activities 

within a dedicated Air Force facility with dedicated Air Force inventory control and management. That is something which is exactly the way the Navy manages their process, and one that is well 

proven. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I want to thank you very much. And despite 

the fact that you had a couple of raps in the press on this issue, 

I would not trade our Air Force for anybody else’s, believe me. So 

thank you very much for the good job you do. 

Mr. MURTHA. I assume this transition makes no difference in the 

ability of us to respond to any attack. 

General SCHWARTZ. It does not. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

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Mr. DICKS. Secretary Gates appointed the Nuclear Weapons 

Management Task Force to recommend necessary improvements 

and measures to enhance deterrence and confidence in it. The task 

force found an unambiguous and unacceptable decline in U.S. Air 

Force commitment to the nuclear mission. In comparison, the task 

force found the Navy maintained the commitment, though there 

was evidence, as the chairman had just said, or Mr. Young has 

said, fraying around the edges in the Navy’s manpower experience 

base as well as in maintaining the TLAM–N system. The report 

concluded that the U.S. Air Force failed to properly focus on the 

nuclear mission and identified six recurring U.S. Air Force problem 

areas. 

First is the U.S. Air Force has underinvested in the nuclear deterrent mission. What are you going to do about that? We are glad 

to have you here, by the way. 

General SCHWARTZ. Thank you. 

Sir, I will take the lead on this for just a second. Congressman 

Dicks, fundamentally, there are three major pieces to what we 

have done. One is organizational. We talked about it already with 

the stand up of the provisional Global Strike Command. The other 

one is this unified sustainment channel so we have a single center 

on the operations side and on the sustainment side to work these 

matters. There were underfunded elements in both areas, operations and in sustainment. We put $300 million in 2009 into the 

program in order to remedy that. 

Mr. DICKS. $300 million in what? 

General SCHWARTZ. Additional dollars in a range of activities 

from sustainment to standing up a fourth B–52 squadron and so 

on, in order to—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Was this a reprogramming, or was this new 

money? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it was new money. This was in the process when producing the 2009 program. 

Mr. MURTHA. But there is also reprogramming money? 

General SCHWARTZ. There is some reprogramming dollars involved. 

Mr. DONLEY. I can give you just a quick lay down. But to get 

back to the bigger point just so you understand, we had been taking recommendations from 11 or 12 different reports set in motion 

by the Secretary of Defense or the Air Force or others. We rolled 

all those into our roadmap, and we used end-of-year money in 2008 

within our own—top line within our own capability to get started 

on additional resources to put back toward the enterprise. We 

bumped up our intentions for 2009 by $320 million. 

I will give you the breakout of that. Almost half of that we realigned as priorities within our 2009 budget within existing limitations so we are not coming to you for that. 

Mr. MURTHA. Limitations, is that a money limitation or what? 

Mr. DONLEY. O&M kind of funding, personnel realignments to 

get dollars—— 

Mr. MURTHA. What I am asking, do you have enough money to 

realign this? 

Mr. DONLEY. Well, of the $320 million, $145 million we have 

done internally to the Air Force. We have come to you for $104 milmstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

23 

lion in a reprogramming on top of that $144 million. So you have 

in front of you—— 

Mr. MURTHA. I do not mean to interrupt—— 

Mr. DICKS. As long as you do it on your time, Mr. Chairman, that 

is fine with me. Go ahead. 

Mr. MURTHA. What I am worried, you are not limiting the transition by not having enough money. 

Mr. DONLEY. No. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. So you are working on that. Now it says nuclear-related authority responsibility is fragmented. What are you 

doing about that? You got your new command. But is there one 

person in charge who can say, I know where every single one of 

these nuclear weapons, cruise missiles is, and I know for sure we 

are not going to go out there in the hangar and get the wrong 

cruise missiles and send them to some place and make a fool of 

ourselves. Is there somebody in charge of that underneath you two? 

General SCHWARTZ. Absolutely. 

Mr. DICKS. Who is it? 

General SCHWARTZ. It is a brigadier general who is the commander of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland Air 

Force Base, New Mexico. He is the accountable party. 

Mr. DICKS. He is the accountable party for all nuclear weapons? 

General SCHWARTZ. Correct. 

Mr. DICKS. Now this isn’t the land-based missiles, too? Has he 

got that, too? 

General SCHWARTZ. That includes the warheads associated with 

the land-based missiles and those which are associated with air-delivered munitions. 

Mr. DICKS. So he knows where every one, and he is going to— 

somebody is going to talk to him before any of these are moved? 

General SCHWARTZ. There is coordination that occurs, yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. What happened here it seems to me is that somebody 

went in and got the wrong missiles. That means that somehow 

there was not an identification on those missiles that would make 

it very clear, or a separate area where they were that would make 

it very clear that these are nuclear weapons and that—you know, 

it is almost incomprehensible. 

General SCHWARTZ. It is. Congressman, you are right. What we 

did was we mixed both training devices, shapes, if you will, with 

the real deal. Foolishly. Not consistent with procedure. We did the 

wrong thing. When you allow that to occur, it increased the risk. 

In fact, we made a terrible mistake. We have structured this corrective action from the street level to the very top in a way that 

will foreclose that chance of happening again. People will make 

mistakes. But that is why we have a two-man or two-person concept. The bottom line is we—— 

Mr. DICKS. It takes two people now to move these things? 

General SCHWARTZ. More than two. But at least two. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

General SCHWARTZ. So that if one person has, you know, a bad 

day, not both of them will. This is the whole nature of check, double check, precision, and reliability. You have the right to expect 

that. We demand that of our own people. And that is what our Airmen will deliver. 

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24 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I serve with Mr. Visclosky; he is Chairman of the Energy and 

Water Committee. And we have the responsibility for the nuclear 

stockpile. I spent Thursday and Friday down at Savannah River 

DOE site. And I must say, pretty tightly controlled. What struck 

me, and maybe this is not politically correct, is how old everybody 

is down there. And the gist of my question here is, and let me give 

you a few quotations from the Schlesinger report, you know, I see 

many of the people, there are a few young people behind you, but 

there is quite a lot of gray hair. Secretary Schlesinger said in his 

report, quote, the decision that junior officers assigned initially to 

ICBMs will spend the remainder of their careers in the space mission area, and thus outside the broader Air Force, both devalue the 

mission area, and have the effect of reducing the dept of the Air 

Force nuclear experience, especially among mid-career and senior 

officers, and that is all within quotation marks. 

And then, on page 55 of the Schlesinger report, and coincidentally I had hard about the report, but quite honestly this hearing 

had not been scheduled, so I read it, and it was an interesting comment here: And I quote, the task of providing unambiguous employment guidance regarding an increasingly complex plan has become more difficult with fewer nuclear-qualified and experienced 

personnel. Moreover, U.S. STRATCOM has difficulty filling positions designated for rated air crew personnel with nuclear experience. As a result, these billets are often filled by rated personnel 

without nuclear experience, requiring the incumbent to invest a 

great deal of time and energy to on-the-job training, hardly a satisfactory posture in a mission with potentially little margin for error. 

I know you are intimately familiar with this aspect. Can you 

comment as to what we are doing relative to training, should we 

say, the next generation of young people to work with this, you 

know, vitally important area? 

Mr. DONLEY. Well, sir, we have undertaken a number of actions 

on the personnel side to rebuild the nuclear career fields. So as we 

establish a new command, as we go out and find the nuclear expertise in the Air Force and rebaseline what our requirements are 

going forward, we are bringing all those pieces together. We have 

already changed school house training, sort of short-term changes 

in curriculum, to make sure commanders get a full background on 

nuclear operations and understand the importance of that mission. 

We are also working on the career development issues that—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How are you making it interesting besides 

obviously exposing young people to perhaps your greatest responsibility and making it interesting enough for them to make it a serious career path? 

Mr. DONLEY. The main thing we have done I think is to highlight 

the importance of this mission to the United States Air Force and 

to organize ourselves in the way that focuses on that mission. So, 

as people go into that command, they will know that their primary 

responsibility is to focus on the safety, security, reliability, and 

operational support for nuclear weapons. 

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25 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And I assume to be, you know, knowledgeable about why nuclear weapons are nuclear weapons. They are 

primarily a deterrent. Is this inculcated in what we are—what you 

are setting up here as a curricula? 

General SCHWARTZ. It certainly is in an academic sense, but I 

think from a policy point of view—it was not a small thing, Congressman, that the Secretary of Defense, the first Secretary ever to 

visit Minot Air Force Base back in November, he went in part to 

remind the Airmen that what they are doing is valued. 

Yes, we have two wars going on. And yes, the people that are deployed down range are doing important things. But we have young 

Airmen who are deployed in place providing the back drop of deterrence for all the other activity that the Department executes. The 

bottom line is what they are doing is important; it has the support 

of the Nation’s leadership; and we will work the career paths so 

that youngsters know they can grow up to be the commander of a 

Global Strike Command or 20th Air Force with missiles or Eighth 

Air Force with bombers. That is part of the institutional piece of 

this that is so vital. There is a path that people can see their future 

and that they can have passion in what they are doing. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Do we have any nuclear-trained people here with 

you? Nuclear experts? 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, probably the quintessential 

nuclear trained person is over my left shoulder, Major General Don 

Alston. 

Mr. MURTHA. Okay. How about the person you said would be in 

charge of the overall program? 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, the person we intend to 

nominate is exquisitely qualified. 

Mr. MURTHA. So he is not in charge yet? 

Mr. DICKS. You are talking about the brigadier general, Mr. 

Chairman? He is not in place yet? 

General SCHWARTZ, No, he has been there certainly since I arrived in the job, Congressman Dicks. So he has been there at least 

six months, and probably longer. 

Mr. DICKS. Why does he have to be confirmed? 

General SCHWARTZ. No, this is the command. Global Strike Command will be a three-star commander. The brigadier is at the Nuclear Weapons Center, two different positions. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, welcome. 

Secretary, welcome. 

And I just want to make sure in the interest of full disclosure, 

Mr. Secretary, I understand that you have two degrees from the 

University of Southern California. I am a Notre Dame grad. So I 

would make a couple of observations. 

One, I would congratulate you on beating our football team about 

12 years in a row. It might be 13 or 14. 

Mr. DICKS. And the University of Washington. We can throw 

them in. 

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26 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. We can throw in a whole bunch of them. 

Mr. DICKS. Except we got two of their coaches now coming to 

Washington. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. But also make the observation that my first born 

male child just graduated from U.S.C. in December. 

Mr. DONLEY. So you just got a pay raise then. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Right. 

Mr. Secretary and General, as Mr. Frelinghuysen mentioned, we 

both serve on the Energy and Water Subcommittee, and we have 

an interest, obviously, with NNSA and the weapons program. Will 

not have time, obviously, to get into great detail on all of the issues 

of concern, but for the record, in particular on pages 11, 12, 15, 18, 

22 and 23, I certainly have a particular interest. 

And on this round, I do want to talk about the proposed life extension program, the Mod 12. The first question I would have is, 

my understanding is we have just spent $400 million on a life extension and modification program. Could you explain the necessity 

of Mod 12? And briefly, because I know I do not have a lot of time 

and I have a couple of follow-up questions. 

Mr. MURTHA. I think this is very important. You take the time 

you need. 

Mr. DONLEY. Well, the Air Force operates 10 different models of 

nuclear weapons. Without getting into the detail of each weapon, 

but if you have questions, we will take them for the record. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. But this would be for the B–61. 

Mr. DONLEY. The B–61 life extension. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Specifically B–61. 

Mr. DONLEY. Okay. B–61, in all these weapons, but especially B– 

61, we need to be looking at life extension issues that focus on safety, security, and reliability of these weapons going forward. There 

are real issues with the life cycle of their components and where 

they are. Many of these weapons need attention. We need investment to keep up on the surety issues, safety, security, reliability, 

and we need to be considering and having good debates as a country about the future of these weapons and how we are going to sustain them going forward. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. If I could ask for the record, because I want to 

proceed here, why, after the expenditure of $400 million on modification of some of the B–61s, there is now a request for the Modification 12? But you had mentioned the debate as far as the various components of these weapons as far as surety and safety and 

use control. And I am with you on that. But I would simply point 

out for the record that the Committee, the full Committee, in the 

last 2 years in report language has talked about the necessity of 

knowing where we want to be in the end before we start down the 

road. And that is to make sure——and I know that we have a 

stockpile posture. But what we have talked about in our report language is a strategy. Because you have, as I would understand it, 

in excess of 900 warheads here. The question would be as you proceed, are they all going to be modified? 

[The information follows:] 

The current B–61 Life Extension Program (LEP) will consolidate 4 of the 5 B– 

61 variants B–61–3, 4, 7, 10) and refurbish components that were not part of the 

recently completed LEP (Alt 357). In particular, Alt 357 reworked the canned submstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

27 

assembly on the B–61–7 and B–61–11 and did not include the B–61–3, B–61–4, and 

B–61–10 which are deployed outside the continental United States to support 

NATO. A two-year B–61 LEP feasibility and cost study (Phase 6.2/6.2A) began in 

September 2008. The cost of the LEP will be determined as part of that study. 

General SCHWARTZ. And Congressman, if I may, sir—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Yes. 

General SCHWARTZ. I think what you addressed there is really an 

issue for the nuclear posture review, which will commence shortly 

and work through the middle part of this year in terms of the 

strategy and so on. But I would like to reiterate Secretary Donley’s 

comments. It is important for us to recognize that there are components that need to be sustained or remanufactured in the existing 

stockpile: Fuses, neutron generators, things that really influence 

the reliability of the weapons we already possess. And so that is 

where the focus of the Air Force is at, on those we currently possess that allow us to maintain our deterrence posture and where 

we will focus going forward. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Would you describe it, General, as a modification 

or an alteration of the weapon? 

General SCHWARTZ. I would characterize it as sustainment of the 

existing weapon. This is not dramatically changing the characteristics and so on and so forth. It is making them safer. It is maintaining their reliability and, in some cases, improving their security. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And if I could look out to 2010, my understanding is the first increment for the cost that you would ask for 

is about $120 million, give or take? Or if you could for the record, 

and that would be moneys that are available under NNSA now, 

and then what the request would be from the Air Force. 

Mr. DONLEY. We will provide that for the record at the appropriate time. Just to be clear, at least as I understand our respective 

responsibilities here, DOE is responsible for the weapon and the internal operations of the weapon. We are responsible for the interface of the weapon to the platform. We share responsibilities and 

we share funding costs as we go forward to get this work done. 

[The information follows:] 

The cost of the B–61 LEP to the Air Force depends on the design option selected 

and will be determined as part of the Phase 6.2/6.2A study. The Air Force continues 

to evaluate funding options for LEP engineering studies related to the weapon/platform interface. The Air Force will address further LEP resource requirements in developing the Fiscal Year 2010 Program Objective Memorandum. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Right, and I do just want to emphasize, because 

after 2 years of language and hearings, particularly with NNSA 

and others, there is a perception, and I speak only for myself now, 

that I am opposed to doing or having any changes made to any 

warhead. That is wrong. But I also would not want to be misunderstood. I understand we have issues on surety, safety, just use control. I am with you there but would want to make sure, because, 

as you point out, General, we are doing another posture review. 

What we are harping on, and I would say harping, whining, whatever you want to call it, the strategy, because in the end, you are 

looking at what changes need to be made now for some sums of 

money after just spending $400 million. Then the question is, to 

how many of those weapons will you apply that change at what 

cost only to find out later, well, we, because of a strategy that 

works, we do not need to apply it to all of these weapons maybe 

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28 

we have now applied it to. And obviously, we are talking about one 

system here. But as you allude to, Mr. Secretary, there is a number 

of them. So I would want to emphasize I would want to stay in 

touch and appreciate the additional time from the Chairman. I just 

want to be very cautious here and use every opportunity, because 

my point then is, if you have a strategy, and not just as far as the 

uses of the nuclear arsenal but nonnuclear, nonkinetic, the role of 

proliferation, my upset in the past has been that the weapons figure goes up, and I am not necessarily again opposed to that, but 

the nonproliferation number in the last several has gone down. 

And my sense is the greatest threat this morning when we woke 

up is that person who cannot be deterred; they can only be stopped. 

And after you, then, know what the constitute weapons are, particularly it is important to Mr. Frelinghuysen and myself and others, what does the weapons complex look like? Because my fear is 

if we start down a road without realizing or making a final determination of what the rationalization size should be, we will never 

get there. So I certainly do intend to, if you would, work with you. 

And I just want to make sure we are very careful here. Thank you 

very much. 

Mr. DONLEY. Understood. Thank you. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen, you have anything to add to 

this conversation? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. No, I support the Chairman’s questions in 

this hearing. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Kingston. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General, I have a question about the inventory in 

general. You have an inventory of every nuclear weapon that is in 

the country or in the world owned by the United States. 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes, 4,961 are under Air Force custody (A total of 

8,938 are owned by the U.S.). 

Mr. KINGSTON. How about lost nuclear weapons? Do we have an 

idea of any that are unaccounted for going back to the 1940s? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, there are some, you know, that have 

gone down in airplane crashes in those days gone by when we actually flew missions and training missions with live nuclear weapons. 

Decades ago, sir. 

Mr. KINGSTON. And in those cases where we know one was lost 

because it went down, what do we do about those? How are those 

being monitored today? Because they would still be nuclear capable, correct? 

General SCHWARTZ. In each case, there were concerted efforts, 

and in one with which you might be personally familiar, very concerted efforts, even in recent years, when the possibility or new 

technology came along that would allow us to reconfirm areas 

where the weapons may have been lost due to accidents, we continued to do that work. And in fact that occurred I guess two years— 

no, more like 4 years ago in the effort down towards Savannah 

River where we used side-scanning sonar and other new technologies to try to reassure ourselves that if it was there, we were 

going to retrieve it even after all these years. This never goes completely off the radar screen to be sure. 

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Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. So, theoretically, it could be 10 years, 30 

or 40 years from now we would eventually be able to find these 

with the right technology? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think we never dismiss that as a possibility, Congressman. 

Mr. KINGSTON. All right. Thank you. 

I have a question about the aging B–52s, just switching subjects 

on dual capabilities and the bombers. We have nuclear capable B 

–52, B–2s and then dual capability in the F–16 and the F–15E. 

Has the Air Force thought about using Joint Strike Fighters and 

making them nuclear capable? What is going on with that? 

General SCHWARTZ. The short answer is yes. That decision, given 

that the F–35 is an international program, we have a steering 

group that talks about what is on the airplane. It involves the 

international partners and when that goes on the airplane. We believe in the Air Force that the F–35 should be dual capable and 

that we will present that for consideration by the steering group 

this summer. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. And also on the question of aging fleet, the 

WC–135s do the atmospheric sampling on vital intelligence after 

nuclear detonation. And is it correct that there are only two of 

them and they are 50-years old or approaching 50-years old? Have 

we thought about using the 737s or moving in the direction of the 

C–40A frame I guess? 

Mr. DONLEY. We have looked at that. We will continue to look 

at it going down the road. Those airframes, while they are very old, 

they still have a lot of life on them because they do not take a lot 

of stress in the airframe like a fighter would. They still have 20 

years plus on the airframes left. We have recently been asked by 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense to go back and look at an 

analysis of alternatives. Going forward, we would want to think 

about how we do this mission out into the future. There may be 

other ways to do this, different combinations of sensors and capabilities, but we have time to work this. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, all right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions, but I 6 think 

it is only fair- to defer to those who have been waiting longer than 

I to ask them. So I am willing to defer. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Moran. 

Welcome. I am interested in knowing how both of these incidents 

first came to public attention. The Taiwan, I remember reading it 

in the paper myself, and then also the Minot situation. How did it 

first—both—come to public attention, General? 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, it preceded my arrival in town. I was 

in a different position at the time that these situations occurred. 

In general, they were reported through channels once they were 

discovered all the way up to the Secretary of Defense and ultimately the President, in both cases. Then institutions within the 

Department swung into action. 

Ms. KAPTUR. So you are saying, there was a public announcement by the Department? 

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30 

General SCHWARTZ. No. What I am saying is, once the incidents 

were discovered, they were reported in command channels within 

the Department of Defense. I was not in town at the time, when 

an announcement occurred. 

Ms. KAPTUR. They announced it publicly? 

General SCHWARTZ. They did. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Could you please explain to me, on the first incident 

where nuclear-related ICBM parts labeled as helicopter batteries, 

so, first of all, there was a mislabeling, were sent to Taiwan in 

2006. All right. Do you separate in your parts supply chain the nuclear-related parts versus others? Is there a separate supply chain? 

General SCHWARTZ. The supply chain was goofed up previously. 

We are improving but there is not a separate supply chain. This 

is part of the solution I described to you where we had multiple 

agencies responsible for different pieces of material, the so-called 

nuclear weapons related material. We are in the process of consolidating control of all nuclear weapons material under Air Force 

dedicated supervision. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. 

General SCHWARTZ. Inventory management system is associated 

with that as well. So that was one of the lessons learned from this 

incident. We followed the Navy’s lead on this of doing it ourselves 

at one location. 

Ms. KAPTUR. So you have a separated supply chain. Are all those 

components domestically sourced? 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, I would have to take that for the 

record. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I would be very interested in knowing that. 

General SCHWARTZ. Okay. 

[The information follows:] 

All assets defined as nuclear weapons-related materiel, which is the class of materiel involved in the Taiwan incident, are domestically sourced. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you very much, General. Now on the 2007 

incident, where the B–52 crew mistakenly flew six nuclear weapons 

from one base to another, which nuclear weapons, I did not find it 

in your testimony, exactly which nuclear weapons were flown? 

Mr. DONLEY. The weapons were attached to the bomb wing at 

Minot Air Force Base, and they were mistakenly flown from Minot 

Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Correct. But what type of weapon? 

General SCHWARTZ. Air-launched cruise missile. 

Ms. KAPTUR. They are cruise missiles? 

General SCHWARTZ. Right. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. How did that happen? 

General SCHWARTZ. This was an incident which involved commingling of the real deal and training assets. The truth of the matter is that—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. Loaded missiles versus unloaded missiles? They 

were not—— 

General SCHWARTZ. We had pylons with training devices loaded 

and pylons with real weapons in the same igloo, in the same weapons storage space. There were multiple failures which allowed the 

incorrect pylon to get put on the airplane and flown from North 

Dakota to Louisiana. 

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Ms. KAPTUR. That just seems so—— 

General SCHWARTZ. I agree with you completely. 

Ms. KAPTUR [continuing]. Incredible. 

General SCHWARTZ. It is incredible. It is embarrassing. It is profoundly unsettling, and it is why we are laser-focused on correcting 

the underlying reasons that this occurred, not just the superficial 

reasons that one or two people did not do their jobs, but rather the 

underlying rationale, some of which is culture-based, as Dr. Schlesinger outlined, some of which is procedure and process. 

Ms. KAPTUR. General, can I be assured that every single person 

who goofed was under the command structure and not in a civilian 

contractor position? So it was a mess up internal to the Air 

Force—— 

General SCHWARTZ. With respect—— 

Ms. KAPTUR [continuing]. With no civilian contractors were involved in any aspect of this? 

General SCHWARTZ. With respect to the Minot incident, that is 

true. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. But not necessarily—— 

Mr. DONLEY. But not the Taiwan incident. 

General SCHWARTZ. The Taiwan incident—— 

Mr. DONLEY. The Taiwan incident involved depot operations at 

Hill Air Force Base, where there are both uniformed and civilian 

depot employees working on nuclear-related matters. So there is a 

mixture of uniformed and civilian personnel. 

Mr. MURTHA. Will that be changed under the new system? 

Mr. DONLEY. Well, I do not believe so. All of that—what has 

changed is the responsibility there, which was a mixture of Air 

Force and DLA, has been moved to Air Force. The Air Force and 

DLA have agreed to move that responsibility into the United States 

Air Force. We still have a civilian-heavy workforce at our depots. 

The civilian leadership has been changed in that particular organization. But I believe we still have civilians involved in our depotrelated operations. 

General SCHWARTZ. But they are DOD employees. 

Mr. DONLEY. They are DOD employees. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I would like to have some type of information provided to the record to really look at who these—how they are classified. And of those working in the nuclear programs, how many 

are enlisted, how many are civilian contractors, if there is a way 

one can easily do that. And I am interested, for every single person 

under this new—is it three-star general? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department of the Air Force has many military, civilian, and civilian contractors working nuclear programs. 

The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, located at Kirtland AFB, MN, is the overall responsible agency for the operation of safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapon 

systems to support the National Command Structure and the Air Force war-fighter 

and is led by an Air Force major general. The following two units are subordinate 

to the Nuclear Weapons Center. 

The 526th ICBM Systems Group, located at the Ogden Air Logistics Center, UT, 

is responsible for inception-to-retirement integrated weapons system management of 

Minuteman and Peacekeeper weapon systems. The group develops, acquires and 

supports silo based ICBMs and provides program direction and logistics support as 

the single face to the customer. The group is also responsible for acquisition, sysmstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

32 

tems engineering and depot repair; manages equipment spares; provides storage 

and transportation; and accomplishes modifications and equipment replacement to 

maintain silo-based ICBM systems. 

The 498 Armament Sustainment Wing is a reporting unit of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. It is responsible for sustainment of nuclear munitions and 

cruise missiles, including operation of two munitions maintenance and storage complexes (at Kirtland AFB and Nellis AFB, Nevada). 

Unit Officer Enlisted Civilian CME * Total 

Ogden Air Logistics Center, UT 

526 ICBM Group ........................................... 55 9 381 371 816 

Nuclear Weapons Center, Kirtland AFB, NM 

Headquarters, Nuclear Weapons Center ...... 33 23 108 0 164 

498 Armament Sustainment Wing ...... 66 259 241 37 603 

* CME=contract man-year equivalents. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. Do you have a ribbon if you are working 

in a nuclear program? Are you separate from other people in the 

Air Force? I do not have any such basis in my area, but I would 

like to know if there is a culture of teamwork that is built because 

of special designation for persons working in this program regardless of what title you might have in the chain of command. 

General SCHWARTZ. In the lingo that is known as what patch you 

wear. That patch will be a Global Strike Command patch. There 

will be a sense of community, a sense of mission, a sense of belonging, which we lost over the last 15 or 20 years and that we are 

bringing back. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

In the report produced by Major General Alston, the recurring 

thread or theme is the underinvestment in nuclear enterprise. And 

my question is with the new corporate restructuring about the A10 

head or position, the advocate for nuclear deterrent mission in the 

Air Force, with that sort of emphasis, what sort of effect will it 

have on other major programs within the Air Force like the F–22, 

the Joint Strike Fighter and the personnel? 

Mr. DONLEY. Ms. Granger, we have already taken steps to realign resources inside the Air Force to get back additional focus 

and additional manpower and additional dollars on the nuclear 

mission. We started in 2008. We are it in 2009. We have a string 

of dollars tied to 2010 and the out years where we are beefing up 

the nuclear enterprise, both people and dollars. We have added a 

B–52 squadron, a fourth B–52 squadron that will be dedicated to 

One year’s worth of alert time. So we have gotten all this going as 

a result of our roadmap. We have a pretty robust view of all the 

things that need to be undertaken from an equipment point of view 

and from a people point of view, to include operations, organization, and training. We are identifying the resources that go with 

that. We are making adjustments inside Air Force as we can to address this issue. 

Ms. GRANGER. Right. And my question is, though, how does that 

affect existing programs or programs that are being built, like the 

F–22 and the F–35? 

Mr. DONLEY. Right. I do not believe it has had any direct impact 

on those investment programs. Probably the biggest impact that it 

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33 

has had is on our total active duty manpower. The Secretary of Defense made a decision in the summer to allow the Air Force to grow 

manpower back up to about 332,000 active duty end strength from 

a previously planned reduction down to 316,000. So one of the 

major resource decisions was to allocate some of that manpower 

back into the nuclear enterprise. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

General SCHWARTZ. 2,500 spaces. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. I am going to pass. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Boyd. 

Mr. BOYD. I am going to pass. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rothman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary and General, thank you for being here, thank you 

for your distinguished careers, and all of your years of service and 

sacrifice for our country. And I am hoping that your present positions will be the crowning jewel of your lifetime’s work. 

Mr. DICKS. If you get the tanker thing right. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. General Schwartz, I wanted to just touch base 

with you on something that I may have misunderstood in your testimony, or in your response to a question, namely that there would 

be two people responsible for—and remind me what those two people would be responsible for. 

General SCHWARTZ. We have a policy, it is called the two person 

policy, and in a number of situations that relate to handling or 

processing of nuclear weapons that it takes two people to do it. In 

other words, one person cannot move it from place A to place B. 

It has to be done by two people. And accountability purposes has 

to be done again by two folks, one person and then verified by a 

second person. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So if I understand it, the storage of the materials 

in an igloo is done by two people? 

General SCHWARTZ. At least two people. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. At least two. Its location in the igloo is done by 

two people? 

General SCHWARTZ. At least two people. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So every step of the way, the loading onto the aircraft by two people, the inspection of the aircraft before it takes off 

from a base with nuclear weapons. 

General SCHWARTZ. In general, that is true, sir. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. You used the words, General, ‘‘profoundly 

unsettling.’’ And I do not think that that was an understatement. 

Each of those 6 warheads, each of them had the destructive power 

of up to 10 Hiroshima bombs; each of them, flying over U.S. soil 

and unaccounted for, for 36 hours. Each of the 6 have a destructive 

power of 10 Hiroshima bombs. 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, we should not—I am not minimizing what happened. It is bad, but we shouldn’t suggest that 

these weapons, had they left the airplane, would have detonated. 

Just allow me to make that caveat, that was not an issue in this 

instance. 

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Mr. ROTHMAN. Well, yes, I get that distinction, if you will. But 

they were without a steward—— 

General SCHWARTZ. Modest though it may be. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Good. There was no special guard for these weapons for 15 hours. So whether they could have been stolen by some 

bad guys, and then armed, and then blown up would have been extraordinarily catastrophic. 

Mr. MURTHA. If the gentleman would yield, would he explain the 

arming process so we would know why they wouldn’t have detonated? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, there is a—and I am not the 

expert on this—but fundamentally there is a complex mechanism, 

including codes, which have to be matched and done electronically 

in order for the weapons to arm. 

Mr. MURTHA. From the ground or from the airplane? 

General SCHWARTZ. It is from the aircraft. 

Mr. DICKS. But how do they know—if they think it is a test missile and not a nuclear missile, how do they know that they have 

to do that? 

General SCHWARTZ. There is a way to determine by looking 

through a small window in the body of the weapon to determine 

whether it is an actual weapon or not, or a training shape. Regrettably in this instance, either that was not done properly, or the 

person who executed that, the persons, didn’t know what the hell 

they were looking for. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, what Mr. Rothman is asking is you say it 

couldn’t be detonated. No chance of it being detonated. In other 

words, they would not have had the key, the electronic key, to arm 

the weapon? 

General SCHWARTZ. Correct. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. If I may, Mr. Chairman, but we are very concerned these days about loose nukes, and our loose nukes would 

have been a disaster. And the fact that they were—they were without a special guard for hours just sitting 18 there at the base is 

obviously what has disturbed all of us. 

But to move on, if I might, to—and the fact that those four ballistic missile fuses that were unaccounted for for 17 months, you 

know, my understanding as a lay person is those nuclear fuses are 

highly sought after and very important in the building of a nuclear 

program, and yet we didn’t know about them for 17 months. 

My last question, which is a little bit of a—may require a little 

bit of an elaboration by each of you gentlemen, is how did this happen? General, you used 15 to 20 years. Does it go back longer than 

that? How did this culture develop? And I don’t ask it to assign 

blame of any individual or administration, I ask it so that we can 

judge whether what you are doing now is the right fix for what the 

problem was. So if you can tell us the right fix and what the problem was at the time. 

General SCHWARTZ. In the 1990s and the post-Cold War setting, 

sir, we decided, for example, weapons systems bombers that had 

been almost exclusively assigned to the nuclear role would have a 

much broader conventional responsibility to deliver conventional 

munitions. 

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In addition, there was a sense that perhaps the nuclear—the relevance of deterrence had waned in a post-Cold War situation. 

Our service took on the mantra, properly, perhaps excessively, 

but properly, to be expeditionary and to be able to move out and 

take care of business wherever that might be required, again, a 

conventional mission. 

In the process of these things occurring over time, the emphasis 

on the nuclear mission diminished. We go to war, and naturally 

there is a compulsion to do that well, to devote the resources to 

support the fight, to put good people and so on. 

In fact, in our Air Force, the truth of the matter is that being 

deployed forward was more valued than sitting in a missile hole in 

Montana, Wyoming or North Dakota. This is symptomatic of what 

Dr. Schlesinger identified, of a shift of which we, as leadership, 

over time, didn’t grasp the significance. We do now. 

In establishing the Global Strike Command—and, I mean, one of 

the fundamental rationale for that is to have an institution in our 

Air Force as a major command whose singular focus is on nuclear 

stewardship and operations. 

Mr. DONLEY. Right. If I could just add, just briefly, the Chief has 

outlined this, I think, very well. To give you a little bit more flavor 

and sort of color background to this, as the wall came down at the 

end of the Cold War, we made national decisions to reduce the 

number of nuclear weapons and forces in our inventory. We made 

national DOD-level decisions to take what used to be Strategic Air 

Command, focused on the nuclear mission, rename it, reshape it, 

and give it more than just nuclear missions. Within the United 

States Air Force, the impact of those changes were to put the 

bombers under a command that had other than nuclear responsibilities, Air Combat Command, which has all our bomber aircraft responsibilities. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. But they are still dual use. 

Mr. DONLEY. They are, but the command’s focus was broader 

than nuclear, and, in fact, started to be oriented toward supporting 

joint warfighting and getting ready for other conflicts. 

The missiles went to Air Force Space Command, which has responsibilities for oversight of space-related activities, launch support, all of these other matters, some affinity with nuclear missiles—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Could I just follow up on that—all right, never 

mind. 

Mr. DONLEY. Different than a nuclear mission. I apologize, sir. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. No, no, I just wondered—oh. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Bomber fleet, you got, what, 76 B–52s, and the age of that fleet? 

What is the age of the B–52 fleet? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, it is in the neighborhood of 50 

years. It was first built in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. 

Mr. ROGERS. I am sorry. 

General SCHWARTZ. The aircraft were built in the late 1950s and 

early 1960s. 

Mr. ROGERS. But are some of them newer than that, though? 

General SCHWARTZ. No. 

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Mr. ROGERS. So all of them are approaching 50 years. 

General SCHWARTZ. Right. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me interrupt, Mr. Rogers. Mr. Boyd has to 

leave. I just wanted to give the subcommittee an idea what the 

schedule would be towards April. Where is Paul? Is Paul here? No. 

Well, that takes care of that. We are trying to get as many hearings as we can get in by April 6. 

Now, the problem we are looking at is people aren’t confirmed, 

won’t be available to us, and the budget won’t be done until later. 

We will have a series of 22, 23 hearings up until April 6, and then 

after we come back from our recess, we will try to get the rest in. 

The intelligence hearing, which we normally have first, we are 

going to get as soon as we can. 

The Secretary of Defense we won’t get until probably after the 

recess because we just won’t have a budget by that time. But as 

soon as we get a budget, we will get a lot of these people back up 

at the end, but we will try to finish up. We don’t think we will have 

a product until June or July, and the supplemental will have to be 

done, we think, by May. 

I was telling leadership this. Let us get the supplemental done as quickly as we can. It is about $20 billion short in figures. We 

only have couple of pages, six pages, of justification, but we will 

add to that because the cost of the war is not included in the supplemental. 

But we will do everything we can to get that done, and, with 

some cooperation from the Defense Department, we will try to do 

as much as we can on the supplemental, get it passed. Now, if it 

goes past June, and you get into July, then you really got a problem with the Army. The other services can get by, but the Army 

really has a problem, too. We will try to work it out as quickly as 

we can as long as leadership goes along. 

So basically that is the schedule, and we will try our best to adhere to it. I know that a lot of you, because of other responsibilities, 

won’t be able to come, but this is as good a turnout as we will probably have the rest of the year because all of you are such high-powered Members, so many different areas. But I appreciate the turnout, and we will get a concrete schedule to you as quickly as we 

can. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. At one point in time, at least, you had plans for a 

replacement aircraft for the B–52s, correct? 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you still have such a plan? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. And what is the plan? 

General SCHWARTZ. It is an R&D effort at the moment. You know 

the term, sir, that we use is next-generation bomber. 

Mr. ROGERS. When do you expect to have the next-generation 

bomber in operation? 

General SCHWARTZ. The target for a developmental platform 

would be in the late teens, 2018, 2019 timeframe. Fielding would 

be later than that. 

Mr. ROGERS. So at least 9 years? 

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General SCHWARTZ. Sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Now, what do you plan to do in the meantime with 

50-year-old bombers that are getting older every day on the chance 

that you will have a replacement bomber, next-generation bomber, 

in 9 years? 

Mr. DONLEY. We have continued to make modifications in all our 

bomber equipment, so B–52s have had modifications. B–52s have 

had many modifications over the years. We continue to upgrade 

them as we can and modernize them. 

General SCHWARTZ. For example, Congressman, the B–52 used to 

be an analog airplane. In other words, it did not have a digital 

backbone. It does now, so we can deliver the new digital weapons 

like the joint direct attack munition and so on. These are the kinds 

of things, new sensors and global positioning capabilities and what 

have you. 

The airplanes are not static. They might be 50 years old, but 

they are not static. 

Mr. ROGERS. I presume they have been reengined perhaps several times. 

General SCHWARTZ. The B–52s have not been reengined. 

Mr. ROGERS. They have the original engines? 

General SCHWARTZ. If I am not mistaken. I will take that for the 

record to reconfirm for you, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

The H model B–52, the only model still in the active inventory, is equipped with 

its original Pratt & Whitney TF–33 engines. However, over the years, the Air Force 

has completed several engine depot maintenance modifications needed to replace the 

high wear components, extending the service life of the engines and enhancing aircraft safety. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are there any plans to reengine those aircraft? I 

mean, just from a lay point of view, just looking at that plane, I 

can tell you that engine is not working very good. 

Mr. DONLEY. Well, the engines get a lot of attention in the depot 

process, so they get rebuilt on a regular basis. To my knowledge, 

we have not had any catastrophic or engine maintenance 

sustainment problems that has threatened the health of the B–52. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, here is my concern, and I share it with you: 

making that plane last until the next generation is operable, one; 

and, two, I am not even sure you are going to get the next generation in the time frame, at least, you are talking about. Secretary, 

Secretary Gates said before the Senate Armed Services Committee 

in January that that plane may not be on the schedule that he had 

first thought, right? And he said—when he had talked about the 

importance of that plane being available in 9 years, he said, ‘‘I 

made that speech at a time when the economic outlook was rather 

different than it is now, and the prospects for the defense budget, 

perhaps, differed accordingly.’’ 

Tell us what he meant. 

General SCHWARTZ. I think it is pretty clear, sir, if there are not 

sufficient funds to do all the things the Department needs to do, 

we will make choices. 

Your Air Force, however, would make the argument, in the appropriate forum within the Department, that this is an important 

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initiative for the country. We will make the argument as powerfully as we can, and we will see where it leads us. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, just any commonsense reading of what he 

said before the committee tells me that the plans for the next-generation plane are off. 

Mr. DONLEY. I don’t believe that those plans are off. I do think 

we are going to have a good discussion on the NGB this year, probably not going to be finally decided in the next few weeks as we 

put together the fiscal year 2010 budget, but probably will get a 

lot closer and, I would say, broader attention during the QDR and 

during the Nuclear Posture Review that the Department and the 

administration have planned for later this year. This will be in the 

mix, I think, for the NPR discussion. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, under your plans, what would be the first fiscal year that you would need money toward the next-generation 

bomber? 

Mr. DONLEY. You have been supporting the R&D efforts for several years now, and there is both a white world and a black world 

classified dollars that go with that program. There have been dollars supporting the effort. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Beyond the immediate concern about inventory control, that is 

the fundamental issue, where do we go from here? 

President Obama made several public declarations that he was 

committed to substantially reducing our nuclear stockpile, but 

there is resistance on the part of the Pentagon, as I understand it. 

I don’t want to put words in your mouth, I want you to clarify and 

find the posture, if you would, that you don’t want to do that until 

we are well on our way to a modernization of our weapons and particularly of the production capability. 

Now, I know part of our problem is that it is really DOE that 

controls the production capability, and you distribute it and implement it. But that really seems to be the critical issue we are going 

to have to face. 

This public commitment, which I think there is a fair consensus 

that over time it has to be done, but there seems to be a commitment to substantially and quickly reduce our stockpile versus the 

Pentagon’s position that we are not ready in terms of the modernization that would make you feel comfortable, particularly with 

regard to production capability. 

So would you address that a bit, both of you, but particularly 

General Schwartz? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, we respond to policy. I think 

this is why the Nuclear Posture Review is so important. It has, 

both within DOD and outside DOD, implications, and in the end 

we will accommodate to the national policy. If it is the current 

number or lesser number or lesser than that, we will do what policy dictates. 

Mr. MORAN. I understand that, but you will also make recommendations, and that is what we are trying to get out of you, 

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what you would recommend, because the implementation of that 

public policy has not been defined. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, my basic recommendation is whatever 

the number is, they have got to be viable, they have got to be safe, 

they have got to be secure, and there are some issues in that regard, and I think that needs attention. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, let me pursue it a little more so that I can get 

a more specific answer, if I could. By what percentage are we really 

talking about? They are going to turn to you for a recommendation, 

General, you know that. They are not going to make it in a vacuum. I mean, he is going to want to say, well, I am following the 

advice of the military on this, for instance, you, with the Secretary. 

So what would your recommendation likely be? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, the way this works is that the Joint 

Chiefs will make a recommendation to the civilian leadership, and 

I can’t presuppose what that recommendation will be. 

I can tell you, contrary to the implication that the Department 

has already made a decision on this, that issue has not come to the 

Joint Chiefs’ tank for consideration. It has not been teed up yet, 

and I don’t think it is likely to be teed up until the Nuclear Posture 

Review reports out its conclusions. 

The bottom line is I am not in a position, sir, to offer you other 

than personal insights, which I have. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, personal insight. 

General SCHWARTZ. Personal insight is whatever the number is— 

and I cannot give you a number now. I am not educated enough 

at the moment to do that. But whatever the number is, we have 

got to make sure that these things are viable, safe and secure. As 

your colleague mentioned earlier, there needs to be a strategy, it 

needs to be connected, and that is the purpose of the Nuclear Posture Review. It will come to the tank, the Chiefs will make their 

recommendations to the civilian leadership, and then that clearly 

will be, you know, ready for your consideration. 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield just briefly for a comment? 

Mr. MORAN. Sure. 

Mr. DICKS. The comment I would make is, you know, we have 

all been talking about nuclear weapons today, and one of the reasons for this whole discussion is with the advent of smart, conventional weapons that were highly accurate, you know, these things 

can be extremely effective and can be usable. I mean, nuclear 

weapons are a weapon of last resort. It is a deterrence weapon. 

So I think that we ought to—when we look at our whole capability, we ought to be first looking at the conventional capability 

and what that gives us in order to make a decision about how 

many nuclear weapons do you wind up with. 

We have been coming down, and I think it has been done in a 

safe and responsible way, but the thing that is different is the advent of these smart, conventional weapons. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, reclaiming my time, even though there is none 

of it left, I wholly agree with you, Norm, and there is a certain 

irrelevancy to current and likely future threats in terms of the nuclear option, if you will. 

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But I didn’t want to prejudice the response. I wanted to see if 

we could get any kind of specificity in terms of what the recommendation might be. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. I have to say that was a masterful response by 

General Schwartz, because he didn’t really tell us anything at all. 

Mr. DICKS. It is premature. 

Mr. MURTHA. It is premature, too, but I think we have to be careful interceding between what the recommendations of the Armed 

Forces and what the President might do. 

Mr. Hinchey. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman and Mr. 

Secretary. Thank you for your very interesting answers, although 

I couldn’t hear every single word, interesting enough. 

I think the attention recently in the context of this hearing has 

been focused on the issue of global security, the fact that we have 

seen a decline of global security over the course of the last recent 

years, and that is something that is going to have to be an increased focus of our attention, generally, to improve that situation. 

And hopefully that is going to happen, and we very much anticipate that, and, of course, it is absolutely needed. 

But just focusing on the situation that we are addressing here, 

those two incidents that occurred, the transfer of the nuclear fuses 

from Taiwan and then the airplane flying over the country with 

nuclear weapons it, the transfer of the nuclear fuses didn’t show 

up, at least publicly, for about 18 months. 

Was there an investigation going on in the course of those 18 

months, or was that the situation generally, that no one knew it 

for about that length of time? 

General SCHWARTZ. The latter, Congressman. 

Mr. HINCHEY. The latter, yes. 

In the context of the investigations that had ensued on both of 

these incidents, has anything else shown up, any other problems 

that have popped up, maybe not as big as these two, but any other 

circumstances that you are now focusing your attention on? 

General SCHWARTZ. We have had nothing, certainly, of that consequence, but we have identified—for example, in this effort to sort 

of make sure that the inventory is right, we have discovered ourselves that some items that should have been on the inventory that 

are in stock are not, and that that primarily is what has occurred. 

This is the reconciliation of items with the inventory, and those 

are the discoveries that have ensued since that time. Going forward, we see that as positive. We are getting to ground truth on 

inventory, location, numbers and so on, which we did not have in 

sufficient measure before. 

Mr. HINCHEY. So in the context of the investigation, you didn’t 

see anything that was done here intentionally, or did you; or was 

it mostly something that resulted from an increased casuality in 

the way that these things were happening? 

Mr. DONLEY. Inadvertence, lack of discipline, a lack of adherence 

to the published technical orders, people 2 developing their own 

ways of doing business locally to accommodate their work routine. 

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But, you know, this discussion about the two incidents is helpful, 

but it also points to the broader underlying issues that we need to 

address. 

The main result of these investigations, and there were many, is 

that we do not just have individual problems at Minot Air Force 

Base and at Hill Air Force Base, we have an institutional challenge 

here to reinvigorate our culture of precision and discipline and reliability in the whole nuclear enterprise, so that is where we have 

been focusing. 

All the immediate corrective action, the discipline actions on 

Minot, on the Taiwan fuses, those have been done. The local corrective actions have all been taking place. That is behind us. Now 

what we are after is getting back to the level of performance across 

the Air Force that we need to rebuild to get back to where we have 

been in the past. 

Mr. HINCHEY. And in the context of that, you are focusing on the 

people who are involved, obviously, and the people who do it. Most 

of them are in the military, but we know that some are civilians. 

I think you said they were all Department of Defense personnel? 

General SCHWARTZ. In the Air Force, that is true. 

Mr. HINCHEY. In the Air Force, and so they are overseeing the 

proper security operations, very tight in a secure way? 

General SCHWARTZ. Of course. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Just one last thing I would like to mention. This 

new triad, can you talk a little bit about that? What are the circumstances surrounding? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think this, sir, this kind of relates a little 

bit to what Congressman Dicks was referring to, is that in—the 

sort of traditional triad was missiles, bombers, and submarines. 

That was the sort of traditional, nuclear triad. 

A subsequent version of that included missile defense, properly, 

and included also the use of high-precision conventional-type capabilities, which didn’t exist, you know, in the original sort of formulation. 

The notion of the so-called new triad is just a recognition that 

over the years, the decades, in fact, that technologies and such 

have changed would suggest to us that we should be more sophisticated about how we deter adversaries. It is not just the traditional 

delivering a nuclear munition, but there are other ways to effectively deter, too, and that we should take advantage of those. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, and 

General. This has been very instructive here this last hour. I feel 

a lot better than I did when I came in here in terms of what you 

are now doing as well as how we got to this place. 

Mr. Secretary, I understand you have been the Secretary since 

October? 

Mr. DONLEY. I have. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. You anticipate that you will keep that job, or is 

there any way to anticipate that? 

Mr. DONLEY. I am awaiting the President’s determination of 

what he plans to do in terms of Secretaries. Secretary Gates has 

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asked that all senior officials remain in place until their replacements are identified and in place. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you. I commend you for your service. 

General Schwartz, how long have you been Chief of Staff? 

General SCHWARTZ. Since the 12th of August, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And that would apply, Mr. Secretary, to your 

positions as well? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, ma’am, the Chiefs of Staff service positions are statutory four-year tours. They obviously can be curtailed, 

as was the case, but that is typically a four-year tour, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And I appreciate your service and your command of your responsibilities. 

You were talking earlier about the three things that the Air 

Force has done to get ready and to move forward. You mentioned 

organizationally, unified sustainment, and I don’t know if you got 

interrupted or I missed it, but what is the third leg of that? 

General SCHWARTZ. This is the headquarters representation of 

having a champion who works for me and the Secretaries, not embedded; he has direct access, or she has direct access, in order to 

be the champion for the nuclear enterprise in our Air Force. It is 

not filtered, it is not submerged, it has direct access to us. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I served on the Air Force Academy Board some 

years since I have been here, and the most outstanding part of my 

tenure there was the young men and women you are training, visiting Colorado and the school, and spending some time there and 

watching them. 

I mean, I feel better for our country because of the academies, 

first of all, and then the dedication that you all give the young men 

and women is something second to none. 

General SCHWARTZ. I would just say that this problem that we 

had as an Air Force is not about the young Airmen. This, as the 

Secretary suggested, was—this was an institutional failure, and 

that is how we are approaching it. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you. 

And then lastly, for me, how do we fare in the world? I hate looking at the news anyway most of the time, but sometimes you have 

got to look at it. How do we fare, our nuclear capabilities, in terms 

of the world, our partners as well as our enemies, with what is 

going on? How do we fit? 

General SCHWARTZ. Clearly we provide a deterrence capability 

for more than just America. It supports allies and other institutions, NATO, for example, and so on. We clearly are a leader in 

this area, and it is why, when we make mistakes like we have, that 

it harms the perception that others have of our professionalism and 

the viability of our deterrent. That is why this is so profoundly important. We will not goof it up again. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Can’t, can’t afford to, unless—and I think the 

Chairman and Mr. Rogers were talking about our—you know, you 

have got to ask for what you want. We are the Appropriations 

Committee. Sometimes you can’t ask for it, and some of our colleagues think we spend too much in defense. But all of us, to a person, all 535 of us, wants to be equipped and trained and educated 

and all of that. 

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So I appreciate what you do, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. I want to say I am impressed. You have all those 

people with you, and you didn’t have to turn to them. I always 

measure the witnesses by how many times they have to have the 

backup people answer questions, so I am impressed by what you 

have said. 

But Mr. Dicks has one additional question. 

Mr. DICKS. Just so we don’t get overly confident, data from the 

report shows that the Air Force failed on 5 of its 22 surety tests, 

inspections, in 2008. It was the fourth time since 1992 that at least 

five failing grades were issued, the report said. And the most recent surety inspection failure took place at the 90th Missile Wing 

at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming from December 2 to December 17. 

The base is in charge of 150 Minuteman III missiles that are on 

alert 24 hours a day. The Air Force official said the 90th was given 

failing grades by inspectors from Space Command and Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency for not properly documenting tests on 

missiles which require strict monitoring. 

The two other nuclear surety inspections took place at the 341st 

Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, from October 26 to November 10, 2008; and at the 91st Missile Wing at 

Minor Air Force Base. This was earlier in the year, before you all 

took over, from January 22 to January 2008. So here we have five 

failures this year. 

So where was our brigadier general when all of this was happening? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman Dicks, these are not Santa 

Claus inspections. 

Here is the fundamental thing, we have deliberately, by design, 

increased the intensity, the depth, the invasiveness of our inspection process. The reason is, because what happened earlier occurred in part because our evaluation and inspection process did 

not alert commanders to problems, to symptoms that they might 

well have dealt with had they been aware. 

So part of the challenge, part of the reason that we failed to perform was because our inspection processes were too superficial. 

So do I apologize for having five failures when we are turning 

over every rock, when instead—— 

Mr. DICKS. But what about the people out there on the bases? 

I mean, this is December. Haven’t they gotten the message they 

have got to do these things properly at this point; there is no room 

for an inadequate report or not reporting all the testing that has 

gone on? I mean, they should have the word by now. 

General SCHWARTZ. No doubt about that. But we are not going 

to paper it over it they haven’t performed. 

The reality is that, for example, in the prior inspection regime, 

we used to sample paperwork. We don’t do that anymore. We do 

a 100 percent look at the paperwork. And in the case of F.E. Warren we discovered that there were some discrepancies in the paperwork. That is a major finding, because in this business there is 

only one way to do it, Congressman, and that is the Air Force way. 

Mr. MURTHA. Define ‘‘failure.’’ 

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General SCHWARTZ. There was a major finding, and this is the 

situation on a nuclear surety situation. 

Mr. MURTHA. But from a technical standpoint are we talking 

about a technical administrative mistake? What are we talking 

about? 

General SCHWARTZ. These were, I would characterize, as administrative errors. It still results in a failure of the inspection. You 

know, this is a pass-fail scenario. If you have a major finding, you 

fail. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, let me just give you what they say 

here. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, you know, gave 

them—marked them down for not properly documenting tests on 

missiles which require strict monitoring. 

General SCHWARTZ. Right. But what they—— 

Mr. DICKS. That goes to your whole point about the viability of 

these missiles. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, and in the case of those particular missiles, it was not an issue of whether the maintenance had been performed; it had, and that was confirmed. This was a question of 

whether it was properly documented. 

I am not saying that we should feel better about that because 

this is a system issue, but what I am trying to describe to you is 

that I personally am convinced that being invasive, that turning 

over every single rock, is the way to get us back up on step where 

you expect us to be. 

Mr. DICKS. What about training? I am just going to ask him this 

question. Are we going out and are we training these people? I 

mean, when we are obviously seeing people fail time and time 

again, it looks to me as if there is inadequate training. 

Can you tell us what you are doing? Do we have a day when 

training stops, and we have focused on training these Air Force 

people to do these jobs right? 

General SCHWARTZ. We certainly have done that. We have had 

stand-downs. You know, the commands have been engaged on the 

missile and the bomber side and in the sustainment channel as 

well. 

As the Secretary suggested earlier, this is not an instantaneous 

fix. This will take some time, and we need your patience. I am not 

suggesting—— 

Mr. DICKS. With nuclear weapons, I don’t think we have a lot of 

time. I mean, in other words, you know, I think there ought to be 

a sense of urgency. 

General SCHWARTZ. There is. If we haven’t communicated that to 

you here today, Congressman, we flunked. 

Mr. ROGERS. Will the gentleman yield on that point? 

Mr. DICKS. I yield. 

Mr. ROGERS. It was not just a simple administrative pencil error, 

apparently, because the Defense Department Task Force report 

issued in October warned that the Air Force was not doing its job 

of securing and maintaining nuclear missile forces. The report 

identified ‘‘a serious erosion of senior-level attention, focus, expertise, mission readiness, resources and discipline in the nuclear 

weapons mission.’’ 

General SCHWARTZ. Guilty as charged. 

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Mr. ROGERS. That is not a simple pencil error then. It is not an 

administrative overlook. 

Mr. DONLEY. We are all about rebuilding that discipline of precision and reliability in the nuclear business. I hope we have conveyed that 110 percent this morning. It is not about Taiwan and 

Minot. Those are symptoms, symptoms of deeper institutional problems that will take time to address. 

We are working the local issues, each one as they come up. The 

results of these inspections are reported to the Secretary of Defense. We evaluate on these inspections whether or not the officers 

or NCOs in charge need to be relieved, and there continues to be 

disciplinary action in these as they go along, depending on the situation. So we are deadly serious about how we are approaching this 

and tightening down. 

Mr. DICKS. You know, Admiral Rickover used to come out to the 

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington, where we 

do overhauls on nuclear-powered ships and submarines. He would 

come out and meet with the people who were burning the nuclear 

part of the shipyard and to make certain and insist that they were 

doing things safely. 

Now, they are not perfect. They have had their problems, too, 

over a long period of time, but the record of the nuclear Navy is 

pretty amazing considering everything. That is the level of attention that was given to the issue by the Navy, and I think that is 

a good example. 

General SCHWARTZ. And still is, and it is the gold standard, and 

we are doing our best to replicate it. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen, do you have any other questions? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. No, I don’t, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. The committee is adjourned until this afternoon— 

Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Just a couple of quick comments and one question on the B–61 again. One, I would agree with my colleagues’ 

interchange earlier, which probably we are all wrong, but I would 

add nonkinetic, and I would add nonproliferation as far as the 

strategy. 

The second thing is—and I know there was already a question 

asked about the possible transfer in jurisdiction of the NNSA, and 

I know that question has been asked—but I am opposed to losing 

that civilian control for the very reason the Secretary is sitting 

here. 

Third, and I appreciate your seriousness about these issues and 

your urgency, and I do share that. What I am trying to imbue the 

Department of Energy with is that same sense of urgency, because 

2 years ago, when we were talking about another system—and I 

don’t want to beat a dead horse, we were talking about 2014—but 

the reorganization of the Department was going to be in 2030, 

which means it would never happen, and that is a DOE issue, not 

your issue. 

The question I would just ask, very briefly, what is the role of 

the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the facilities involved in 

that as you do look at the modification for the B–61? 

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General SCHWARTZ. Sir, that is a major function within the Department. The Nuclear Weapons Council, which is cochaired both 

by the civilian leadership in OSD and the Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs, deals with that specific matter, the stockpile, its composition and its status. 

I think, at least by my observation, that gets, you know, considerable attention. You are aware that the Vice Chairman is the 

former STRATCOM Commander, so he is clearly well-schooled in 

these areas. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I appreciate what you do, too, and thank the 

Chair for its indulgence. 

Mr. MURTHA. We are adjourned until 1:30. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

NUCLEAR SECURITY INCIDENTS

Question. As a result of nuclear security incidents and the subsequent lack of responsiveness from the Air Force, the Secretary of Defense asked for the resignations 

from the Secretary of the Air Force, Mike Wynne, and the Air Force Chief of Staff, 

Michael Mosley. After taking their new positions, Secretary Donley and General 

Schwartz disciplined six general officers and nine colonels for their roles in various 

incidents. 

Secretary Donley, given the nature and severity of the nuclear incidents over the 

past couple of years, are you satisfied with the accountability actions (concerning 

the disciplinary actions) taken within the Air Force? 

Answer. Yes, we are satisfied with the actions taken and we will continue to hold 

leaders at all levels accountable. To successfully reinvigorate the nuclear enterprise, 

leaders at every level must accept responsibility and demand that subordinates, 

peers, and superiors strive for excellence and precision. 

Question. Secretary Donley, what changes has the Air Force made to inventory 

control of nuclear components following the Taiwan incident? 

Answer. The nuclear components involved in the Taiwan incident belong to a class 

of materiel called nuclear weapons-related materiel or NWRM. Following the Taiwan incident, the Air Force took immediate action to gain positive inventory control 

of its NWRM, including emphasizing and clarifying existing policy and procedures; 

conducting a worldwide inventory of all nuclear weapons, nuclear components, and 

nuclear weapons related materiel and increasing the awareness and training of 

NWRM special handling procedures. The Air Force is now transferring all NWRM 

from the Defense Logistics Agency to Air Force controlled facilities. As part of that 

process, we are capturing the serial numbers of all NWRM assets, marking the assets with a corresponding tag or bar code and updating our legacy information technology inventory systems to automatically track the assets by serial number 

throughout the supply chain. Twice a year, the Air Force will conduct a world-wide 

inventory of NWRM to confirm the condition and location of the assets. We are also 

updating and consolidating our nuclear logistics policy, developing an assessment 

program to verify compliance with logistics policy and procedures and increasing the 

expertise of our personnel in the nuclear logistics enterprise. 

Question. General Schwartz, what changes has the Air Force made to the handling and transporting of nuclear weapons following the Minot incident? 

Answer. Within 60 days of the incident, the Air Force and Air Combat Command 

developed a formal process for coordinating, publishing and changing maintenance 

schedules. Additionally, Air Combat Command updated weapons loading technical 

orders and checklists mandating payload verification, and we published a revision 

to Air Force nuclear weapons maintenance procedures. This revision mandated specific procedures to record, coordinate, track and brief deviations to approved maintenance schedules. It further mandated maintenance teams validate contents of each 

storage structure with munitions control. This guidance prohibits co-mingling of nuclear and non-nuclear munitions within same storage structure, cell or weapons 

storage vault and we have mandated procedures to stanchion/cone, rope and placard 

all non-operational weapons and non-nuclear munitions. Formal custody transfer 

(signature) process for intra-area, logistics and operational weapons movements has 

been implemented as well. 

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Question. General Schwartz, how is the Air Force re-instilling the confidence of 

the American people that their nuclear arsenal is in safe hands? 

Answer. The Air Force has taken several significant steps to reinvigorate the Air 

Force nuclear enterprise as we move forward towards fully regaining the confidence 

of the American people in our ability to safeguard our nuclear arsenal. We are creating a new major command, Air Force Global Strike Command, which will place 

all nuclear capable bombers and ICBMs under a single command. We are also consolidating all weapons sustainment functions under the Air Force Nuclear Weapons 

Center. Finally, we established the Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence 

and Nuclear Integration Directorate (AF/A10). This change provides a single directorate that is focused day-to-day on the nuclear mission and is responsible for the 

integration of all nuclear related policy and issues across the Air Staff and major 

commands. All three efforts increase the level of advocacy and repair the fragmented lines of authority within the Air Force nuclear enterprise. In addition, a 

comprehensive Air Force nuclear enterprise roadmap has been developed that contains detailed action plans which will restore the Air Force’s world-class nuclear culture. This roadmap provides the framework to maintain an effective, credible nuclear force by strengthening our nuclear-related policies, inspections and training. 

The roadmap also lays out the framework for increased rigor and standardization 

within our nuclear inspection process and will lead to increased precision and reliability throughout the nuclear enterprise. Further, the roadmap provides a direct 

reporting link of nuclear enterprise-level performance metrics that are reported to 

the Secretary of the Air Force and me as co-chair of the Nuclear Oversight Board: 

this board is comprised of the top general officers in the Air Force nuclear enterprise and will ensure sustained institutional focus for this critical mission area. 

TRAINING OUR NUCLEAR FORCES

Question. Secretary Donley, the Department of the Air Force is responsible by 

statute to train our nuclear forces to ensure effective nuclear deterrence and flawless nuclear security. The Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures Report, issued in February 2008, observed the base of USAF 

personnel with nuclear experience is diminishing, nuclear units are finding it difficult to attract and train personnel with nuclear experience, and there is no standardized system to track personnel with nuclear experience, with the exception of the 

space and missile operations field. Further, the team observed that the Air Force 

needs a surety program that develops and supports a less experienced nuclear force 

and makes the nuclear business the core business of those engaged in it. 

In your view, what caused the reduction in the number of Air Force personnel 

with nuclear experience? 

Answer. The end of the Cold War necessitated changes in our National Security 

Strategy which drove a restructuring of Air Force priorities. Precision weapons became the weapons of choice both militarily and politically. Efforts to minimize collateral damage began to shift the focus of air power. With the changes in priorities, 

resources diminished, the nuclear weapon inventory downsized, and engagements in 

conventional conflicts increased. The Air Force reorganization of 1992 and subsequent BRAC closures resulted in a fragmented nuclear sustainment system, atrophy 

in the pool of nuclear experienced Airmen, and an erosion in nuclear expertise as 

less time and personnel were allocated to maintain nuclear systems proficiency. The 

Global War on Terror and Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM further shifted focus and institutional priorities away from the nuclear mission. 

In his report on Department of Defense Nuclear Management, Dr. Schlesinger 

noted the post-Cold War environment, the implementation of arms control treaties, 

attenuation of the nuclear alert posture, and the priority assigned to the conventional and space missions led the Air Force to give markedly less attention and 

fewer resources to the nuclear enterprise. The result was five broad, accelerating 

trends: 1. Nuclear missions became embedded in organizations whose primary focus 

is not nuclear; 2. Overwhelming emphasis was given to conventional operations; 3. 

The grade levels of personnel in line and staff appointments whose daily business 

involved nuclear weapons were lowered; 4. The nuclear mission and those who performed it were generally devalued; and 5. There was no single command to advocate 

for the resources required to support nuclear capabilities. Collectively this meant 

that no one command in the Air Force had ‘‘ownership’’ of the nuclear mission. 

These trends led to the state of the Air Force that you described in your question. 

Question. What action will you take to (1) identify the number of personnel needed in the nuclear career field and (2) attract and retain personnel with nuclear experience? 

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Answer. The Air Force has reviewed its nuclear personnel requirements and 

added nuclear enterprise positions to its overall endstrength. The Air Force has established a key nuclear billet list which articulates the key positions in the nuclear 

enterprise and the experience requirements needed to fill these positions. 

The Air Force has strategic force management practices to ensure the health of 

all Air Force career fields. The force management practices rely on a sustainment 

methodology which ensures we annually assess enough personnel into each career 

field to meet their requirements and to account for the retention of each career field. 

Additionally, the Air Force recently chartered the Nuclear Enterprise Advisory 

Panel. This panel is focused on providing oversight of the management and development of our officer, enlisted, and civilian nuclear work force and will regularly review the health of the career fields that support the nuclear enterprise. 

At this time, we do not envision a bonus program to target the accession or retention of strictly nuclear specialties but continually evaluate bonus needs. The Air 

Force currently pays special and incentive pays to some career fields in the nuclear 

enterprise as a part of a larger force management practice not related to nuclear 

issues. Aviator continuation incentive pay is paid to bomber pilots and combat systems operators as part of an aviation incentive program. Selected reenlistment bonuses are provided to enlisted career fields to encourage retention. Enlisted career 

fields supporting the nuclear enterprise are eligible for these bonuses as part of a 

larger force management strategy. We continue to advocate for the special and incentive pay programs currently in place and will make on-going modifications to 

meet the Air Force’s strategic force management objectives. 

Question. How long will it take to attract and retain a sufficient number of personnel in the nuclear field? 

Answer. The Air Force has reviewed its nuclear personnel requirements and 

added nuclear enterprise positions to its overall endstrength. The Air Force has just 

started evaluating the time needed to retain a sufficient number of personnel and 

the force management impacts of these additions. For now, the only career field supporting the nuclear enterprise which is projected to have shortages are bomber pilots and combat systems operators. 

Question. What will it cost to implement programs to attract and retain needed 

personnel? Where will the resources come from to cover those costs? 

Answer. At this time, we do not envision a bonus program to target the accession 

or retention of strictly nuclear specialties but continually evaluate bonus needs. The 

Air Force currently pays special and incentive pays to some career fields in the nuclear enterprise as a part of a larger force management practice not related to nuclear issues. Aviator continuation incentive pay is paid to bomber pilots and combat 

systems operators as part of an aviation incentive program. Selected reenlistment 

bonuses are provided to enlisted career fields to encourage retention. Enlisted career 

fields supporting the nuclear enterprise are eligible for these bonuses as part of a 

larger force management strategy. We continue to advocate for the special and incentive pay programs currently in place and will make on-going modifications to 

meet the Air Force’s strategic force management objectives. 

RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD

Question. The Reliable Replacement Warhead was originally envisioned to ensure 

the aging nuclear stockpile could meet its long term mission by improving the long 

term reliability, longevity, and certification of the existing weapons and associated 

components. However, the design effort led by Department of Energy has seemingly 

led to the development of a whole new program. Last year the Committee markup 

removed all funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program which was consistent with the Energy and Water Subcommittee markup which removed all Reliable Replacement Warhead funding from the Department of Energy for weapons development. 

General Schwartz, in light of the fact that there was no funding appropriated to 

the Department for the Reliable Replacement Warhead, is it the Department’s intent to support further development of a new nuclear weapon? 

Answer. Capabilities of the existing weapons stockpile meet the nuclear deterrence requirements of the nuclear combatant commanders. The Air Force requires 

refurbished or replacement weapons to maintain existing stockpile capabilities and 

to enhance weapon safety and security. 

Question. General Schwartz, has the Department of Defense defined its nuclear 

stockpile needs? 

Answer. The Department of Defense defines nuclear weapons stockpile requirements annually in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum to the President. 

The plan for Fiscal Year 2009 was delivered to the President on October 16, 2008 

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and approved on January 16, 2009. These requirements will be reviewed in detail 

this year during the Nuclear Posture Review that will begin shortly. 

Question. General Schwartz, will the fiscal year 2010 budget submission include 

any legislative proposals that would authorize development of a new nuclear weapon? 

Answer. The Fiscal Year 2010 budget submission is still in formulation at this 

time, but we do not anticipate the submission will include any legislative proposals 

that would authorize development of a new nuclear weapon. 

Question. General Schwartz, has the Department of Defense begun working with 

the Department of Energy to develop a nuclear weapons strategy for the 21st century as directed by the Appropriations Committee in the prior year’s legislation? 

Answer. The Department of Defense and the Department of Energy issued a joint 

white paper on nuclear strategy in 2008. The two departments are conducting joint 

studies and analyses under the auspices of the Nuclear Weapons Council that will 

support the Nuclear Posture Review to begin shortly. 

NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT

Question. The current Air Force inventory for nuclear aircraft includes bombers 

and dual-capable fighters. Each of these platforms that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons is aging and recapitalization plans are unclear. As an example, the 

average age of the B–52 is over 46 years old. 

What are the Air Force’s future plans with regard to these aircraft? 

• Nuclear capable bombers (B–52, B–2)? • Dual-capable aircraft (F–16, F–15E)? • Dr. Schlesinger’s report emphasized the NATO alliance dependency on extended 

deterrence as provided by European and U.S. dual-capable aircraft. Does the Air 

Force intend to make the Joint Strike Fighter nuclear capable? 

Answer. The Air Force is following the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review plan to 

update the nuclear capable bomber fleet in three phases. Phase one will modernize 

the current bomber fleet of B–2s and B–52s to improve sustainability and maintain 

combat relevance. The second phase will field the Next Generation Bomber which 

will complement a modernized legacy bomber force. The third phase will evaluate 

cutting edge technologies for follow-on systems in the 2030 plus timeframe. 

The dual-capable F–16 and F–15E aircraft will remain mission capable beyond 

2020 and will be gradually replaced by the nuclear capable Joint Strike Fighter. We 

plan to fund the Joint Strike Fighter Dual-Capable Aircraft modification in the Fiscal Year 2012 Program Objective Memorandum. 

NEXT GENERATION BOMBER

Question. Mr. Secretary, you are investing a significant amount of time, attention 

and money in a next generation bomber program to recapitalize the Air Force’s 

aging fleet of bombers, yet the Secretary of Defense has noted the defense budget 

may not be able to sustain all efforts. 

In light of Secretary Gates’ recent comments to the Senate Armed Services Committee in January, what is your recapitalization strategy for the next generation of 

bombers? 

Answer. The Air Force is continuing to pursue its three phased strategy for maintaining the Long Range Strike (LRS) capabilities needed to support the national defense strategy and combatant commanders’ operational plans. Phase one will modernize the current bomber fleet to improve sustainability and maintain combat relevance. The second phase will field the Next Generation Bomber which will complement a modernized legacy bomber force. The third phase will evaluate cutting 

edge technologies for LRS inclusion in the 2035 plus timeframe. However, as Secretary Gates has stated, the Department of Defense will complete the Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR) over the next few months with the purpose of identifying Department of Defense and Service actions necessary to field the capabilities and force 

required to realize our national security goals and objectives. The Air Force’s LRS 

recapitalization strategy, which will sustain and modernize the bomber force, will 

be one of the many areas reviewed during the QDR process. 

Question. If not the Next Generation Bomber, how with the Air Force sustain our 

bomber fleet in the future? 

Answer. There are three phases to the Air Force’s Long Range Strike (LRS) strategy. Phase one will modernize the current bomber fleet to improve sustainability 

and maintain combat relevance. The second phase will field the Next Generation 

Bomber which will complement a modernized legacy bomber force. The third phase 

will evaluate cutting edge technologies for LRS inclusion in the 2035 timeframe. 

Under Phase 1 of LRS, the Air Force is investing over five billion dollars in current 

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bomber modifications over the Future Years Defense Program, focusing on requirements needed to sustain and maintain an operationally relevant force structure. 

Sustainment programs focus on systems like avionics and radars to mitigate safetyof-flight issues. Current modernization programs include advanced weapon and targeting pod integration to improve lethality; satellite communications and data links 

to increase responsiveness; and, defensive systems and stealth materials to enhance 

survivability. 

RESOURCES TO REINVIGORATE THE AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

Question. Under the leadership and culture recommendations of his report, specifically recommendation number seven, Dr. Schlesinger proposed that the Secretary 

of the Air Force should provide the resources necessary for the initiatives required 

to upgrade and revitalize the nuclear mission. 

Mr. Secretary, Dr. Schlesinger’s panel asserted the Air Force underinvested in the 

nuclear mission. Do you agree? If so, what steps have you taken to change these 

conditions? 

Answer. Yes. Over the past two decades, an increased focus on conventional operations due to continual air combat operations put the nuclear mission at a competitive disadvantage with other Air Force priorities, resulting in underinvestment in 

the nuclear deterrence mission. We are continuing to review nuclear enterprise requirements and match them against combatant commander requirements and recommendations made in the various reports, including Dr. Schlesinger’s. 

Question. Mr. Secretary, how do you define the Air Force’s budget for the nuclear 

enterprise? How has it changed since these incidents? Do you feel training is adequately resourced to provide a force capable of following through on the action items 

of your nuclear enterprise roadmap? 

Answer. For our Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget preparation, the Air Force 

looked at all aspects of the nuclear enterprise. Funding for the Air Force’s nuclear 

enterprise is defined as the Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation 

(RDT&E); Procurement; Personnel; and Operations & Maintenance (O&M) funding 

that covers all aspects regarding the development, operations, supporting infrastructure, and sustainment of nuclear forces. This includes activities from Science and 

Technology (S&T)—through development, fielding, and operations—to retirement; 

for the equipment and personnel supporting Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

(ICBMs), nuclear capable bombers (B–52s and B–2s), and the Dual Capable Aircraft 

(DCA) fighters that are in U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). The Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Roadmap recommendations and action plans were used as a guide 

to focus resources on those areas needing the most attention. 

To define the nuclear enterprise budget, the Air Force evaluated requirements for 

our nuclear capable bomber force (B–52 and B–2); Minuteman III ICBM (including 

sustainment activities); nuclear security for continental U.S. bases and European locations; and electromagnetic pulse hardening requirements at certain Ballistic Missile Early Warning System sites. The Air Force also reviewed numerous smaller requirements to address recommendations and issues. All have been thoroughly reviewed for inclusion in the Fiscal Year 2010 Air Force Budget request. The Air 

Force believes this represents a critical step toward reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. 

In addition, the Air Force requested nearly $170 million in Fiscal Year 2009 research, development, test and evaluation, and procurement funds be reprogrammed 

through Congressional action and we reallocated resources to execute over $144 million in Fiscal Year 2009 operations and maintenance funds to address immediate 

needs. 

Training has been adequately resourced to address the Nuclear Roadmap action 

items and recommendations. During requirements validation, we included funding 

for any recommended additional and/or complementary training. For example, in 

Fiscal Year 2009, included within the $144 million of reprogrammed operations and 

maintenance funds, $12 million will provide realistic weapons trainers for our munitions Airmen, cruise missile trainers for increased technical training, and tools for 

providing realistic training on tracking and inventory systems. Of the $12 million, 

nearly $5 million will be dedicated to help further nuclear career path development, 

develop refresher courses and curriculum for nuclear specific and related career 

fields. 

Question. General Schwartz, in your internal Blue Ribbon Review completed in 

February 2008, your team identified $100 million in unfunded requirements. Do you 

feel this list of unfunded requirements in all-inclusive? If not, what requirements 

are the most urgently needed? 

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Answer. Reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise is the Air Force’s number one priority and we will ensure the proper resources are provided to upgrade and revitalize 

the nuclear mission. We have carefully examined all Blue Ribbon Review recommendations as well as those of the Schlesinger Panel Review for funding requirements. These are all being considered for funding in the Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget submission. 

We are confident the most pressing nuclear enterprise needs are addressed. These include: Requested reprogramming authority for $39.7 million in Research & Development funds to establish positive inventory control of our Nuclear Weapons Related Material and committed an additional $500 million in Fiscal Year 2008–2009 

for security, training, sustainment and logistics requirements. In addition, the Air 

Force is recommending even greater increases in the out-years which will be identified in the Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget submission. 

SUSTAINING THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

Question. According to the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 

Nuclear Matters’ website, the U.S. produced its last nuclear weapon in 1991 and 

performed its last Underground Nuclear Test in 1992. The Presidential decision to 

stop testing and to terminate weapons production resulted in a paradigm shift that 

required significant adjustments in the U.S. approach to nuclear weapons stockpile 

management. 

Secretary Donley, with the U.S. producing its last nuclear weapon in 1991, what 

is your assessment of the nuclear industrial base? 

Answer. In regards to the weapon industrial base, the Air Force looks to Department of Energy (DOE) as the lead agency. The National Nuclear Security Administration under DOE is focused on research, development efforts and long-term viability, while seeking to identify, develop, and deliver new or enhanced processes, and 

technologies. 

Air Force industrial base concerns are focused on delivery platforms. Specifically, 

the Air Force supports the industrial base activities to sustain Minuteman III while 

developing next-generation strategic missile technologies to address future requirements. 

STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

Question. The latest National Security Strategy (2006) indicated, ‘‘Safe, credible, 

and reliable nuclear forces continue to play a critical role. We are strengthening deterrence by developing a New Triad composed of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and improved conventional capabilities); active and passive defenses, including 

missile defenses; and a responsive infrastructure, all bound together by enhanced 

command and control, planning and intelligence systems. These capabilities will better deter some of the new threats we face, while also bolstering our security commitments to allies. Such security commitments have played a crucial role in convincing 

some countries to forgo their own nuclear weapons programs, thereby aiding our 

nonproliferation objectives.’’ 

Secretary Donley, Please describe the strategic deterrence provided by ICBMs, 

Nuclear-capable bombers, and dual-capable aircraft? 

Answer. Our nuclear-capable ICBMs and aircraft (B–2s, B–52s, F–15Es and F– 

16s), provide unique, yet complimentary, capabilities to our nuclear deterrence mission. 

Operationally deployed Continental United States (CONUS) based ICBMs provide 

the President with a highly accurate, reliable, and ready response capability with 

near-global range. The offensive and defensive deterrence value of the ICBM force 

located in hardened facilities spread over thousands of miles is a stabilizing force. 

Our fielded ICBM forces are survivable in almost any attack scenario we can postulate. It would take a large scale attack of unmistakable intent and origin to defeat 

them. Operationally deployed ICBMs, while responsive, are under positive control 

and can only be employed with approval of the President. 

Nuclear-capable CONUS-based bombers and Overseas CONUS-based fighters provide visible deterrence and escalation control. This flexible capability is deployable 

and recallable, and maintains a human in the loop until the last possible moment. 

Furthermore, our nuclear-capable fighters serve a vital role in our extended deterrence commitment to our NATO partners. 

Question. General Schwartz, do you believe the U.S. nuclear arsenal enhances our 

nonproliferation efforts? 

Answer. A safe, secure and reliable nuclear arsenal is critical to providing a credible nuclear deterrence. This credible nuclear deterrence is not only critical to our 

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proliferation efforts. If our extended deterrence capability begins to falter, some nonnuclear allies may perceive a need to develop their own nuclear capability. 

Question. General Schwartz, is ‘‘hair trigger alert’’ an accurate way to depict our 

ICBM nuclear forces? 

Answer. No. ‘‘Hair trigger alert’’ is not an accurate way to depict our ICBM nuclear forces. A better way to depict the force is utilizing a term that General Chilton 

stated during a February 27, 2009 media engagement and that is that our ICBM 

force is analogous to a ‘‘weapon in a holster with two combination locks on it, requiring two people to open the locks. They can’t do it without authenticated orders from 

the President of the United States.’’ All U.S. nuclear forces maintain rigorous discipline and operate under very strict and demanding nuclear surety and command 

and control principles to insure that all weapons remain safe, secure and reliable. 

In addition, ICBMs provide stability in crisis by presenting any adversary a complex 

targeting solution while providing the President survivable and flexible response options. It is through this confidence that we plan and posture ICBM forces that provide the President with the maximum decision time and flexibility. 

WC–135 AIRCRAFT

Question. The number of unstable countries with nuclear weapons capabilities is 

likely to grow in the coming years, specifically when considering what is happening 

in Iran, Pakistan, India, and North Korea. The U.S. Air Force has two WC–135 aircraft that are used to perform atmospheric sampling to collect vital intelligence following a nuclear detonation. Approaching fifty years of age, these two WC–135s are 

the oldest –135 airframes currently operated by the Air Force. The age of these aircraft has a tremendous impact on their ability to deploy quickly to hot-spots around 

the world. I understand that the Air Force is considering spending tens of millions 

of dollars to re-engine these nearly 50-year-old airplanes. 

Have you looked at the possibility of utilizing a new aircraft like the C–40A for 

the mission? 

Answer. Yes. In 2006 the Air Force initiated a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

(Intelligence) funded study to analyze alternatives to the WC–135. The study completed a functional area analysis, functional needs analysis and functional solutions 

analysis. The C–40 was one of the options. However, from January 2008 to January 

2009 the WC–135 enjoyed a mission capable rate of 76.2 percent which includes all 

maintenance and operations reporting, and we applied resources to more pressing 

Air Force needs. Importantly, the aircraft has flown every collection mission tasked. 

In 2009, Congress approved a funding request for WC–135 cockpit upgrades. These 

upgrades will allow the aircraft to continue to accomplish its mission viably beyond 

the 2025 timeframe. 

Question. The Air Force currently operated a fleet of 737s under the C–40 designation, and could realize two major benefits of going to the 737—greatly increased 

reliability (and therefore greater ability to deploy where necessary) and greatly reduced maintenance and operation costs. Would it not make more sense to take the 

current sensing equipment and install it on new C–40 airframes as opposed to continuing to maintain and operate 50-year-old airframes that are not adequately accomplishing their mission? 

Answer. Although the WC–135 is one of our older aircraft, the Air Force is mitigating risk with cockpit upgrades, keeping the platform viable beyond 2025. In addition, the WC–135 has accomplished all collection missions tasked and has an overall 

mission capable rate of 76.2 percent over the last year. 

Question. Given our current expanding nuclear threat (Iran, North Korea, unstable Pakistan), our nuclear sampling capability appears to be more critical than ever, 

yet it remains on nearly 50-year-old airframes. I understand that the current planes 

used for this mission have extremely poor mission readiness and propulsion issues. 

What is the Air Force’s plan to ensure we have the capability to gather this critical 

intelligence in the future? 

Answer. The Air Force has looked at options to replace or upgrade the WC–135, 

however, from January 2008 to January 2009, the WC–135 enjoyed a mission capable rate of 76.2 percent which includes maintenance and operations reporting. Additionally, the aircraft has flown every collection mission tasked. 

In 2006, we conducted a functional area analysis, functional needs analysis and 

functional solutions analysis which also explored the option of WC–135 cockpit avionics upgrades. Given its mission capable rate (76.2 percent) and the fact that it 

has met every collection mission tasking, the cockpit upgrades were chosen as the 

best solution. In 2009, Congress approved an Air Force/Deputy Undersecretary for 

Defense (Intelligence) funding request for WC–135 cockpit avionics upgrade. These 

upgrades permit the aircraft to use faster and more economical flight paths appromstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

53 

priate for rapid deployment worldwide, satisfying the air sampling mission. When 

coupled with continued support for the jet engines and other maintenance, these upgrades should allow for WC–135 operation beyond 2025. 

At this time the Air Force does not seek to replace the WC–135 as regards its 

current missions but does anticipate potential requirements increase associated with 

national technical nuclear forensics. When the national technical nuclear forensics 

requirements now in development become available, Air Force will examine the 

need for possible adjustments of the air sampling platforms. 

Question. We understand that the State Department has stated that this is a high 

priority mission for treaty verification and compliance. Does the Air Force share this 

view? 

Answer. The Air Force views this mission as a high priority and will continue executing this mission as tasked by our national authorities. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 

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(55) 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2009. 

CONTRACT SERVICES AND ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT 

WITNESSES 

GENE L. DODARO, ACTING COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED 

STATES 

KATHERINE V. SCHINASI, MANAGING DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND 

SOURCING MANAGEMENT 

MICHAEL SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT 

CAROLE COFFEY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES 

AND MANAGEMENT TEAM 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. Welcome, Mr. Dodaro. 

When Mr. Walker came before the Committee, I said to him, 

when I was in Iraq, these contractors were falling all over themselves. How many contractors do we have? He could not answer 

that question. He did not know, he says, and I cannot get the answer. I need you to help me get the answer. 

Well, it turns out, Ann reminds me that we put fencing language 

in and said, until you tell us how many contractors you have, you 

are not going to get any money. So we got the information. But 

when I look at the numbers, that we have 267,000 DOD contractors 

in CENTCOM; we have we think 190,000 in Iraq; and the figures 

we have, the determination we have is if we save—or if we hire 

them in-house, we save $44,000 per person. 

Now, last year, the Committee cut 5 percent out of the con- tracting, $4.5 billion. We added a billion dollars so that they could 

hire people. Because they would veto the bill, we had to drop those 

provisions. And we were not able to implement that cut. We did 

put a $650 million cut in the budget. But when I look at the number of contractors and the cost overruns that we have had over and 

over and over again, I think we have to do something about contracting out. And I would ask you to look at a couple things. One 

is to describe what a contractor is, describe what their mission is, 

and so forth. Give us as much information as you can. And then 

make recommendations to us how we can get this under control. 

I think fencing the money may be the only way. But certainly we 

have got to do something about it. If it costs $44,000 per contractor 

more than it costs for a person in-house, then it seems to me the 

direction to go is to get rid of as many contractors as we can and 

hire as many people as we can in-house. But I know the trend has 

been going the other way. But this is just atrocious in my estimation, and we need help trying to get it under control. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

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REMARKS OF MR. FRELINGHUYSEN

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am substituting for Congressman Bill Young, who sends his best and may 

be with us a little later in the afternoon. 

I certainly would like to welcome you and the team behind you 

here this afternoon for what is the first in a series of three contracting hearings this year. I only point this out to illustrate how 

important this issue is, as the Chairman said, this issue is to all 

of us. 

For years the contracting acquisition workforce was taken for 

granted. They were on the receiving end of numerous downsizing 

and outsourcing actions that left them barely capable of handling 

today’s global challenges. The acquisition workforce now is a fraction of what it once was, yet their responsibilities have grown exponentially. 

It appears now, however, that we have arrived full circle and 

must deal with the ramifications of this neglected workforce. The 

Department has started to address this, but much work remains to 

be done. In those regards, your testimony today is very important. 

I welcome you and look forward to your comments. 

You know that Mr. Walker has gone onto greener pastures, I 

might say much greener pastures, and you are left to, shall we say, 

provide the Committee with the information that we tried to secure 

during his period directing the GAO. So we look forward to your 

testimony. 

Mr. MURTHA. Look forward to your recommendations. 

Mr. Dodaro. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MR. DODARO

Mr. DODARO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Frelinghuysen. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss GAO’s 

work as it relates to contracting at the Department of Defense as 

it relates to weapons systems acquisition and service contracting as 

well. We have had a number of concerns and pointed out a number 

of challenges in both of these areas. 

First, in the acquisition of weapons systems, as you pointed out, 

Mr. Chairman, there has been considerable cost growth in this 

area. When we last did a comprehensive assessment of 95 weapons 

systems that were in the DOD portfolio in 2007, we noted that 

there had been cost growth from the initial estimates of close to 

$300 billion. In 44 percent of those 95 programs, the cost growth 

had been over 25 percent from the initial estimates. In addition to 

that, the average schedule delay for bringing new weapons systems 

on line had been up to 21 months, which was up 5 months over 

16 months previously in 2000 before that. So the cost growth is 

going up, the schedule delays are there as well. And this has been 

a problem. 

We pointed out it is a problem at two levels. First is a strategic 

level, which is where the Department is not making clear priority 

choices across the Department on which weapons systems to deploy. Still largely a process driven by the services, and that needs 

to change going forward if you are going to get that part of it under 

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57 

control. Then, at the individual program level, we have noted that 

there is not always a good business case for moving forward with 

the weapons systems, from research and development into deployment. That technologies are not always matured before they move 

forward with decisions. And best practices are not employed. And 

we think there needs to be more discipline at that process as well. 

And we made recommendations on both of these fronts to the Department. 

Now, we were pleased in December 2008; DOD adopted some 

changes in their guidance in these areas and put in place some 

best practices, which we encouraged. I have also been encouraged 

by the Secretary’s recognition recently that this is a big institutional challenge for them in terms of their acquisition of weapons 

systems. But, ultimately, the policies are not enough if they are not 

implemented very effectively. And that is one area where we have 

consistently seen DOD have some difficulties. So implementation of 

these new policies is really paramount to bringing about change to 

bring costs down and bring systems in on time. 

Now, on the service contracting area, you have additional concerns there. The amount of money for contracting, as you point out, 

has doubled in real terms over the last 6 years to $200 billion a 

year just in service contracting alone. We have pointed out that the 

Department has used some risky contracting vehicles, time and 

materials contracts, undefinitized contracts, and they have not 

managed those very effectively. 

Also there has not been enough training provided to contracting 

personnel throughout the acquisition workforce. And they really do 

not have enough people to be able to adequately oversee the contractors. While the size of the contracting budget has doubled during the last 6 years, the acquisition workforce, contracting workforce rather, has only increased by 1 percent. So there really has 

to be better management and control—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Say that again. 

Mr. DODARO. It is in our statement, Mr. Chairman. 

The contracting budget has doubled over the last 6 years, I believe. But the acquisition or do the contracting workforce, the acquisition workforce has only grown by 1 percent during that period 

of time. 

Mr. MURTHA. Do you define that contracting workforce as contractors or you define it as people working for the Defense Department as government employees? Which one? 

Mr. DODARO. The latter. These are people that are working for 

the Department and are responsible for overseeing the contractors. 

You know, basically what I am saying is they are using more contractors, money is going up, but the amount of DOD people managing the contractors has stayed roughly about the same. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, would you yield just on this point for 

a second? What about—I mean, there was a period where we cut 

back the acquisition force. Is not that correct? 

Mr. DODARO. That is correct. That was during the 1990s, following the Cold War, end of the Cold War. 

Mr. DICKS. I remember hearing a former chairman of the Armed 

Services Committee saying these are shoppers; they are not impormstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

58 

tant. He demeaned and cut the budget for them. Now how much 

was it cut? 

Mr. DODARO. Let me just—— 

Mr. DICKS. From say the middle of the 1990s forward. 

Mr. DODARO. I can provide that. 

Mr. DICKS. Any idea? 

Mr. DODARO. How much was the acquisition workforce cut during the 1990s? My staff tells me it was about in half during that 

period of time. 

Mr. DICKS. So it has been cut by 50 percent. Now we wonder why 

we have a problem. 

Mr. DODARO. Right. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DODARO. This is a key point that you are bringing out. We 

bring it out in our report as well. And it is really very important 

because regardless of how much you reduce the numbers of contractors, you are still going to be relying on them to some level. But 

the real key is to make sure you effectively manage the contractors 

so we bring things in on time, within cost, and we have the right 

outcome as it is received. 

Now with regard to our recommendations on the service contracting, DOD put some additional controls in place to provide 

some additional training and established a focal point. So they 

have reacted to some of our recommendations and put in place 

some recent changes. But, again here, implementation of the new 

policies is going to be very important. 

Now, one of our main recommendations here, and just sort of in 

closing, and I am happy to answer any questions you have, there 

are really three things that we are recommending at this point, 

particularly in light of DOD’s recent adoption of our recommendations: Number one, DOD has to translate these new policies into 

practice. Implementation is paramount. Number two is that there 

has to be follow-through to make sure that the new policies are implemented and people are held accountable in the Department for 

implementing these new policies and really making sure that they 

happen. Then three, and this goes to the heart of your opening 

statement, Mr. Chairman, we have recommended that the Department do a comprehensive assessment as to what should be done by 

contractors and what should be done by employees. This is really 

a strategic decision that needs to be made by the Department. 

What we have pointed out, and they have recognized, is that we 

are where we are right now at the Department of Defense because 

of the collection of thousands of individual decisions that have been 

made to contract out, but it has not occurred within a framework 

of a strategic vision on where to take the Department over time 

and then how to build in the necessary controls and the skills to 

oversee that contractor workforce. And we think that is a very important recommendation. I think it goes to the heart of your concerns that whatever is done in terms of the balance between the 

Federal employees and the contractors produces good results. And 

right now, the current process does not do that. 

[The statement of Mr. Dodaro follows:] 

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REPORT ON CONTRACTORS

Mr. MURTHA. Well, one of the worst examples I heard last year 

was the budget for the Comptroller of the Defense Department 

wanted to hire contractors to send a budget over to us. You know, 

we stopped that. But the point was everybody was looking for contractors. And part of this happened because the Armed Services 

Committee cut the acquisition force so substantially, and so they 

had to hire contractors who were not as responsive. 

But say again, it comes down to accountability and how do we, 

for instance, how do we get the information? Okay, we can fence 

the money and say, look, unless you come up with this comprehensive report the GAO asked for, we are not going to give you any 

money. How much time should they have in order to come up with 

this comprehensive report? 

Mr. DODARO. I would think within the next year they should be 

able to produce something. 

Mr. MURTHA. Can we not force the issue by, say our bill is ready 

to go by June or July, cannot we get the information from them 

that quick? 

Mr. DODARO. You would have to ask DOD that question. We 

have had this recommendation on the books for a while now. I am 

not sure how far along they are in that area. But I think it would 

be a very important question to ask them. I mean, our goal here 

would be to make sure that they do it correctly. They could perhaps 

give you some short-term answers and then a longer-term strategy 

that would cover more years down the road. 

I would also point out here that there are two other factors in 

addition to the cutback in the acquisition workforce in the 1990s. 

One is the complexity of the weapons systems that are being procured. You may want to ask for a strategy on weapons systems acquisition apart from service contracting because there are different 

levels of sophistication here. The complexity of those weapons systems is a critical issue where DOD is going to need to have the capability to manage. And it could be more difficult to build all that 

in-house. 

And the other area is the extent to which these demands have 

been driven by the immediacy of the needs for the global war on 

terrorism in the past few years. And particularly it is going to be 

an issue if we are going to deploy additional forces over to Afghanistan. It is important that the lessons learned about training people 

before they are deployed to manage contractors in Afghanistan is 

heeded as well. 

Mr. MURTHA. I just talked to the National Security Adviser, and 

I told him how important it was to get us information to this Committee as quickly as he could about what his plans are so we would 

have some idea of what is going to happen. 

Now, for instance, we do not know whether they are going to 

take troops in by land or have to fly them in, which is going to be 

a substantial additional expense. But what you say about the acquisition system, we found LCS just all kinds of problems. One of 

the worst examples is that helicopter one, the Marine One. That 

thing increased so much. I had people in here, and I said to them, 

we are not going to pay $500 million for one helicopter, period. And 

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88 

there are 14 people sitting there. And finally, they said, well, we 

will put off the decision until the new administration comes in. I 

mean, it is just frightening how they throw money around like it 

is out of style. 

Well, we will listen for any advice you have and try to come up 

with some recommendations. But when I look through the increased cost of the weapons systems, the increased cost of doing 

business, and the personnel costs and so forth, it is not sustainable 

in what it amounts to, particularly as we are going to build down 

the budget. But I appreciate the work you folks do. The staff tells 

me you are leaning forward on this issue. And it is so important 

to us. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

RETIREMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am sure there will be a lot of time to talk 

about how long it took to develop the F–22, the Future Combat 

System, the littoral combat ships. I just have a few sort of basic 

questions. There has been a reduction in the acquisition workforce. 

That is recognizable. You also have the issue of retirements. Would 

you briefly comment on that? 

And the complexity of the systems, it is great to say that we 

want, you know, DOD personnel as opposed to private contractors, 

but sometimes the complexity of the system calls upon the very 

people who are familiar with how it was developed to provide that 

information. Would you comment a little bit on the potential retirement of what I would call institutional memory, and also the issue 

of competition in the workplace for people who would be qualified 

to make up the group that would replace the diminished acquisition force? 

Mr. DODARO. All right. Yes. Those are both very important 

issues. 

First, on the retirement issue, that is a problem. And it is not 

only a problem in DOD; it is a problem across the Federal Government in terms of the age of the workforce and the impending retirements. Now a lot of that is driven by demographics and the 

Baby Boom generation, et cetera, but it is a concern. I know in 

leading the GAO, I spend a lot of time on this myself making sure 

we have good succession planning in place to go forward. And it 

will be an issue that the Department’s going to have to confront, 

and it will be a problem, particularly in having the numbers of people who have the experience and the background to oversee contractors or carry out some of the activities. The team and I were 

just talking about this before we came to the hearing. We can provide some additional information on that area. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I assume you have some information. I 

mean, normally people have some information about how many 

people are, you know, eligible to retire. Somebody must have that 

figure. 

Mr. DODARO. I know we have it, and we can provide it. I do not 

have it with me. But I can provide it. 

[The information follows:] 

According to DOD demographic data dated December 2008, about 11 percent of 

the department’s 670,492 permanent employees covered by the Civil Service Retiremstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

89 

ment System (CSRS) and the Federal Employee’s Retirement System (FERS) are 

currently eligible for optional retirement. As of December 31, 2013, about 30 percent, or 193,880 civilian employees will be eligible for optional retirement. Optional 

retirement is available to federal employees who have reached the required age and 

years of service necessary to receive an immediate retirement benefit. For example, 

under CSRS, an employee who is 55 years of age with 30 years of service is eligible 

for optional retirement An employee under FERS who is 60 years of age and has 

20 years of service is eligible for optional retirement 

DOD’s demographic data also shows that, in addition to those permanent employees eligible for optional retirement, about 15 percent, or 100,605 civilian employees 

are currently eligible for early retirement. Further, as of December 31, 2013, 32 percent, of DOD’s civilian workforce will be eligible for early retirement. Early retirement is available to federal employees that meet special requirements. For example, 

for an employee to take an early retirement, his or her agency must be undergoing 

a major reorganization, reduction-in-force, or transfer of function determined eligible 

by OPM. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. All right. 

Mr. DODARO. And on the complexity of the weapons systems, that 

is a very important point. Things are becoming more complex. I 

think the issue here is DOD, like a lot of agencies, is going to have 

to rely on contractors to some extent. I mean, there is just not 

going to be any substitute for a certain portion of people will need 

to be contractors with the appropriate technical skills. What DOD 

needs to make sure is it has people that can oversee and manage 

the contractors. The competition in the workplace is an important 

issue here. But you need a certain cadre of people that have some 

technical skills to oversee the contractors so you are not totally relying on the contractors. So you need that core expertise there. You 

are not going to ever be able to replace the full complement of technical people that the contractors can bring to the table. And an important issue here—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Some of these systems have been studied 

for so long that some of the very people that are most knowledgeable might have been there at the beginning, but I would think 

would be heading out the door in a retirement queue. 

Mr. DODARO. That could be an issue. But you also have a lot of 

changes that take place. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What about competition for good people? 

Mr. DODARO. I think the competition, particularly for the highly 

skilled people, is an issue in the government. I mean, it is hard to 

compete under some of our salary structures for the really highly 

technical people. I know I face that at the GAO as well. And so 

that is an issue. And I think we are going to have to, if the government wants to build some of that capacity, and we do it at some 

of our national labs and other places, I mean, we have got a lot of 

technical people. We are going to have to consider the proper salary 

incentive and retention structures to be able to do something like 

that. But I think the more practical and immediate need is to make 

sure we have the capacity at the government with government people to oversee the contractors. And that I think is where we need 

to start. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

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SUBCONTRACTORS

Mr. DICKS. You know, another part of this problem, you know, 

you talk about the 95 weapons systems that I have noticed in the 

things that I follow is that the prime contractors, the big companies now, I am talking about Boeing, Lockheed, Northrop-Grumman, Raytheon, all of them seem to have a major problem monitoring the subcontractors. In other words, they get the work, and 

then they subcontract it out to all these other companies. And then, 

you know, on several major weapons systems, we have had major 

problems with the subcontractors not performing. And then that 

delays the whole program. And that forces up the cost. Have you 

guys looked at that at all as one of your things to take into account? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. That is where, again, you are so right, if you do not 

have the acquisition personnel who is not only monitoring the 

prime contractor on these major weapons systems but actually getting down to see what these subs are doing and ensuring that the 

prime contractor is overseeing the subcontractors. It is shocking to 

me to find out how sometimes, until they get into major trouble, 

these prime contractors are not monitoring their own subcontractors. And again, I think it is the failure of having adequate government personnel there to do their job to insist that that be done. 

And because of that, we have these delays and escalations in cost. 

Mr. DODARO. I am going to ask Mr. Sullivan to elaborate on this. 

But one point I would bring to your attention in that area is it is 

not only, you know, adequately monitoring, but there need to be 

intermediary metrics that people are held accountable to, particularly for these long development projects, where there can be discrete decision points made and you either meet the decision point 

or you do not. A lot of times things are let to continue on into the 

next phase when they have not completed the prior phase. And so 

I think, you know, holding people to metrics and monitoring is very 

important in this regard. But Mike leads a lot of our weapons systems work. And I would like him to elaborate on your specific questions. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think, just specifically to what you are talking 

about, about managing—— 

Mr. DICKS. Pull that just a little closer. 

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. Managing major subcontractors as 

well as the overall, I think, supplier base—— 

Mr. DICKS. Right. 

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. On a major weapons systems program, we recently did a study that was focused on looking at why 

the quality assurance problems that we always found at the end of 

programs. And the study led to actually three key findings, I think, 

that get at what you are talking about. And in fact, it drives right 

up into the Department’s workforce. There is a lack of systems engineering knowledge, both in the Department as overseers of these 

major weapons systems. I do not have exact numbers, but I know 

that the systems—— 

Mr. DICKS. Systems engineering, what was the last word? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Knowledge. 

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Mr. DICKS. Knowledge. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Systems engineers as part of the acquisition workforce that would be able to oversee requirements setting, for example, understanding the requirements and if they are doable given 

the resources that are available to the government at both the government level as overseers and in the major prime contractors and 

all the way down to probably through the contracted workforce. 

That is an area that probably the private sector is able to attract 

people a lot better than the government can for the reasons that 

Mr. Dodaro was pointing out earlier. And there are other things. 

You know, I would say the requirements-setting process and oversight is the key thing to that. But in addition to that, they do not 

have good supplier management processes in place. The kind of 

contracting methods they use, cost-reimbursable contracts, things 

like that make it harder to incentivize people to do that and oftentimes the designs. When designs on major weapons systems are not 

stable because of their complexity, it makes it difficult to manage 

that process. 

ACQUISITION STRATEGY FOR MAJOR PROGRAMS

Mr. DICKS. The other point I want to make, and I think this is 

something that we have to insist on, and I found this out as we 

were going through, Mr. Chairman, the acquisition on the tankers, 

that there are DOD acquisition regulations that require it to examine the industrial base impacts in developing the acquisition strategy for major programs. Now, I confronted Secretary Young on this 

point. I do not think they are doing this. They are supposed to be 

doing this. It is in the law that they are supposed to be doing it. 

Do you have any idea that they do an industrial base impact analysis on every major weapons system before they start the acquisition? We have got the—you got the information on this. We will get 

you the information on where in the law it says you are supposed 

to do this. 

Mr. DODARO. Okay. 

[The information follows:] 

10 U.S.C. 2440 requires the Secretary of Defense to prescribe regulations requiring DOD to consider the national technology and industrial base when developing 

and implementing acquisition plans for each major defense acquisition program. 

DOD’s existing guidance requires that the contents of a written acquisition plan for 

a major defense acquisition program include an analysis of the capabilities of the 

national technology and industrial base to develop, produce, maintain, and support 

the program including the consideration of factors related to foreign dependency, requirements for efficient manufacture of the systems to be procured under the program, and methods to encourage investment by U.S. domestic sources in advanced 

manufacturing technology production equipment and processes. This guidance also 

requires the program to have an industrial capability strategy that assesses the capability of the U.S. industrial base to achieve identified surge and mobilization 

goals, or explain the rationale for why no strategy has been developed. According 

to a DOD official, the Department is revising its current guidance, in part to require 

industrial capability assessments earlier in the acquisition process and to require 

program managers to evaluate the impact of their program’s acquisition strategy on 

the competitive market place. 

Mr. DICKS. But this would be something interesting to see if 

GAO could find out whether in fact they are doing this or not. I 

do not think they are. They say, well, we do not have to. I do not 

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think the law gives them any discretion. Do you know anything 

about this? 

Mr. DODARO. We have not done any work on it, my team tells 

me. But we would be happy to look at your citation and look into 

the issue. 

Mr. DICKS. Has your study of DOD acquisition found any trends 

or results about how well, you know, I mean, I think the industrial 

base issue is part of the problem here, where you do not have as 

much competition. I mean, what have we got? Three major companies, Lockheed, Boeing and Northrop-Grumman. I mean, you know, 

they are all intertwined in these things. Somebody wins the prime, 

and then, I mean the major contract, and the other ones come in 

as subcontractors. I mean, is the lack of having enough competitors 

part of the problem here in terms of the raising costs and not getting these things built right? 

Mr. DODARO. The one thing I would say we know is that the adequate management of whatever the original decisions are is really 

probably the most difficult or most contributing factor to the increase in cost growth. I am not sure, and I cannot comment on the 

competition issue, you know, from a general perspective. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Kingston. 

ABILITY OF LOCAL CONTRACTORS TO WIN DOD CONTRACTS

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was wondering something that might be a little more routine, 

and I am not sure if it comes into your purview or not, but the ability of a local contractor to get military construction-type jobs on 

military installations or to sell a product to the military; it seems 

to me that it is really the domain of large contractors and large 

vendors, and not the small entrepreneurial local guy. Can you comment to that? 

Mr. DODARO. Let me ask Katherine to comment on that. 

Ms. SCHINASI. The ability of local contractors to win DOD contracts? 

Mr. KINGSTON. Yes. 

Ms. SCHINASI. Yes, there are. DOD has certain requirements that 

it must provide, you know, award a portion of its contracts to certain categories of business. Local is not one of those, but small is 

one of those. Small and disadvantaged is another one. So as an 

overall measure, DOD has a requirement at the macro level to do 

that. But they do it in different ways that might or might not capture someone in every locality. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I have had the honor of representing Fort Stewart, for example, for 16 years now. At the present level it has about 

$500 million worth of military construction going on, largely because of a lot of the good things this committee and the other committee has done, and the Chairman has been down there personally. But it is very frustrating to the local vendors, painters, sheetrock guys, masonry, concrete workers, heat and air, people who 

have been in business 10, 15 years, who do a solid day’s work and 

deliver a good product, but because they are not really geared up 

for it, they cannot get on the post. And it seems like the front end 

is an inside track. What can we tell—and I have been working for 

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years to try to open it up more but have not had much success in 

that. 

Ms. SCHINASI. I do not have an answer for an individual company. But I do know that the Department is required, at that 

macro level. But it is up to the individual companies at each location to compete for those contract awards. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, who would be a point of contact within your 

office that I could talk to, maybe bring down to Fort Stewart and 

have a vendors and a contractors job fair, if you will? 

[The information follows:] 

Congressman Kingston asked us to identify a person at Ft. Stewart, Georgia who 

could be contacted regarding the process for small and disadvantaged businesses to 

obtain contracts at Ft. Stewart. Accordingly, we are providing the name and contact 

information for Deborah Swindell, the senior person within the Office of Small and 

Disadvantaged Business Utilization at Ft. Stewart. She may be contacted at 912– 

767–8425. 

Ms. SCHINASI. We can get you that information. But I would offer 

up the Department’s own Office of Small and Disadvantaged Businesses. They are the ones, OSDBU. That name might be more appropriate for what you are looking for. Those are the individuals 

who are on—their responsibility is to keep the Department honest, 

if you will, in terms of meeting the requirements that they have 

to give a certain amount of the contract awards to small businesses. So that might be a more helpful person for you. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. Mr. Chairman, if we have a second round 

I wanted to follow up on this, but I will yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky. 

OVERSEEING THE CONTRACTORS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You had talked earlier about the mix of Federal employee and contractor. And I certainly would assume there is no set formula. And even within a department, you have so many different missions and functions taking place. But you do talk about the disparity as far as the number 

of contractors and government employees—— 

Mr. DODARO. Overseeing the contractors. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY [continuing]. Overseeing the contractors. And not 

wanting to keep bringing up the Department of Energy, and I 

know that is not part of the hearing, but the ratio is nine to one. 

And I think just human nature, you got nine people and one supervising, human nature takes hold. How are we supposed to know 

what the right mix is? It seems like there is an imbalance. But 

when do we know we are back in balance? 

Mr. DODARO. I think there are two parts to that equation. One 

is the recommendation that we did make to figure out how many 

contractors should you have to begin with versus employees? And 

then I think one of the ways that you know is whether or not what 

you are contracting out for is being delivered on time, within budget, and you get the deliverables you have. And then, secondly, the 

type of problems that we and the Inspector General and others 

have found, you know, lack of documentation in some of the contracts, the fact that the people are not trained properly to be able 

to do it. So you have the level of activity, but number one is you 

get what you pay for without as much cost overruns as we have 

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seen in the period of time and you get it on time. And so those type 

of metrics are the type of things that should be in place. And you 

do not have as many problems that are identified by people in your 

contracting activities. You know, those I think would be the two 

things I would say off the top of my head that are really important 

ways to gauge. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And I assume numbers are not everything. Part 

of it is also the skill and talent of the people who are doing the supervision. 

Mr. DODARO. Right. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I assume just from the questions and statements 

I have been reading here that that also is a problem that needs to 

be addressed as well. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. Yes. Right now, the Department is going 

through and identifying what competencies that they need for some 

of their acquisition workforce and where they have skill gaps. And 

there definitely is a qualitative component of this, having not only 

the numbers properly but the right skills necessary to be able to 

do it. You know, the main reason we are bringing this up is to just 

show, why there continues to be problems with many of the contractors. We are trying to get, at some of the root causes here. And 

one of the root causes is the fact that you have not had a comprehensive strategic decision made on what to do. And then following from that, having the right kind of workforce plan with the 

right skills and the right numbers of people and then the right 

metrics to track it. And so that all has to be, I think, recalibrated 

in a comprehensive way. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And you are still asking DOD to provide a clearer statement as to what an inherent governmental position is 

versus a private sector position? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, that is part of the issue. Let me ask Katherine to elaborate on that. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. If I could, just, and again and from some of the 

notes I have in front of me, it appears that the Army has started 

down this road and identified at least a thousand contract positions 

that are inherently governmental and moving them back over, if 

you could. 

Ms. SCHINASI. The Office of Management and Budget was directed last year to come up with a definition of inherently governmental that would be more useful—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. For everybody. 

Ms. SCHINASI [continuing]. For people making decisions about 

whether or not to hire a contractor. They are in the process, they 

are just starting that right now, they are in the process of trying 

to determine by regulation what that means. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Are there standards today in place? 

Ms. SCHINASI. Yes, there are. The Federal Acquisition Regulations lay out certain activities that are prohibited, that are reserved for a government official. For example, signing a contract 

must be done by a government official. But in addition to the inherently governmental definition, there are also a number of things 

that are associated with that or closely associated with that that 

we would still want to have more discussion about even after a regulation is put in place. Because, for example, if you have the prohimstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

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bition against a contractor signing a contract, but how about the 

basis, how about the analysis that he was given to make the decision whether to sign it or not? Who performed that analysis for 

him? So we are calling that closely associated with inherently governmental function. 

So you have not just the definition that OMB is working on in 

a regulatory manner, but you also have a management imperative 

to look at how those decisions are actually made. What are the 

costs and risks associated with having a private individual perform 

a function than having a government employee perform that function? 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is there a timeline as to when OMB is supposed 

to finish their—— 

Ms. SCHINASI. They are just now starting. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And are the principles, are they more principles 

as opposed to job classification definitions that are in place today? 

Ms. SCHINASI. That is my understanding. And actions. Not just 

principles, but actions. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. So that would not necessarily be as helpful. 

Ms. SCHINASI. Not sufficient. Necessary, but not sufficient. 

Mr. DODARO. Yeah. What I would say on this issue, Congressman, is that, you know, for decades this issue about inherently governmental, you know, the A–76 process and other processes have 

been in place probably for over 50 years in the government with 

this inherently governmental kind of definition. But there is a narrow legal definition to it. But as we have seen greater reliance on 

contractors at DOD and other agencies, you know, the sphere of 

things that are involved in being contracted out and management 

has grown considerably. So I think, one suggestion I have is, while 

this is an important issue, there is a broader issue as to what management risk the government is willing to bear, whether it falls in 

that narrow legal definition or not. And are we getting the right 

type of service at the right type of cost? So there are a lot of risks 

in making sure that the government is properly using contractors 

that fall outside of that narrow legal definition that are really important, too. And I think they are ones that are a little easier to 

get to because they are tied to mission and what kind of outcomes 

that you want to achieve. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you for your work. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

REMARKS OF MR. MORAN

Mr. MORAN. All right. 

Mr. Chairman, this issue is not going to be a pleasant one for 

the administration, even though some of the folks that will be responsible were not initially responsible for creating this situation. 

We know that we have always had mercenaries in the Army. We 

did in the Revolutionary War. We always had contracted with some 

support personnel. But it is way out of control right now. And we 

look for the reasons. 

I think part of it was ideological. But we have also seen that 

while military pay went up by 26 percent in the last decade, civilian pay went up by 10 percent. From what we can gather, contracmstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

96 

tors went up by a hundred percent, even though we do not have 

specific numbers. This subcommittee in almost every single hearing 

has asked about contract personnel. And now, 8 years later, we are 

talking about figuring out what the definition of inherently governmental is. We have looked at some of the situations that have arisen which boggle the mind, really, and it goes to this definition. 

Now, we know that military and civilian and even contract personnel have always worked side by side. But the Pentagon has had 

contractors manage other contractors and even manage other government and military personnel. In March of this past year, the 

GAO found that 42 percent of the Army’s Contracting Center of Excellence was staffed by contractors. 

We also learned that the Comptroller had contracted for the development of the budget justification for the fiscal year 2008 supplemental funding request. I used to work in the budget office. I 

cannot imagine having contractors come in and developing the 

budget justification. Well, I mean, seriously, talk about how far we 

have gone, I do not think it has been in the right direction. We 

found that we have had contractors making decisions on the expenditure of government resources, determinations of agency policy, directing and controlling other Federal employees, the intelligence analysis, weapons systems maintenance. I could go on and 

on. 

The GAO found that poor planning, changing requirements, and 

inadequate number of contract oversight personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan led to an average 385 percent cost increase in the service 

contracts that the GAO investigated. I mean, this is unbelievable. 

And it is not for lack of concern expressed by this subcommittee 

that has funded all this. They found that the total acquisition cost 

for DOD’s 2007 portfolio of major programs under development or 

in production has grown by nearly $300 billion over initial estimates. So, obviously, something is wrong. 

And here is an issue that the Chairman has been particularly on 

top of, but apparently to no avail. We now find out, CBO told us 

just in the last few months that there are 190,000 private personnel operating under U.S.-funded contracts in Iraq alone; 

150,000 of them are Defense contract personnel. So who is fighting 

this war? The contractors. Now, the first question, and you are 

probably wondering, is he ever going to get to a question, the first 

question is what are your plans to draw down contractors? If we 

have got—— 

Mr. DICKS. This is the GAO. This is not the Defense Department. 

Mr. MORAN. Oh, this is Dodaro, I know it. 

Mr. DICKS. They are just reporting to us what the issue is. They 

do not run—— 

Mr. MORAN. I know. I am just getting warmed up for the Army 

that is coming. Thank you. It is true. But the question, let me rephrase, the question I want you to ask of the military, what plans 

exist for drawing down contract personnel when we draw down the 

military? It just seems if you have got as many contract personnel 

as uniform personnel, how are we ever going to get them out? Now, 

have we asked that, Mr. Dodaro? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. We issued a report for the planning for the 

draw down in Iraq, where the status was with the DOD planning. 

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We listed a number of factors. We would be happy to provide that 

to you. But we are now, at the request of the Congress, looking at 

how that will ripple through the contract draw down as well, because as you point out, there are as many contractors in these 

areas as there are military personnel right now. 

[The information follows.] 

During a discussion of DOD’s planning for a draw down from Iraq with Congressman Moran, I indicated that GAO had issued a report on DOD’s draw down planning efforts and promised to provide a copy of the report. The report, GAO–08–930, 

is attached. 

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Mr. DICKS. Was the surge military or contract? 

Mr. MORAN. That is the thing. The surge was—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me interrupt. 

Mr. DODARO. But we are looking at that issue. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, thank you. The information we get is coming 

from GAO. You are giving us this information. It is unbelievable. 

But our frustration has just reached the level of, you know, we are 

ready to pull our hair out on this. And I am sure if you were to 

continue doing more investigations, the information is going to be 

all the more compelling that something needs to be done dramatically. I do not take fault at your recommendations. But things continue to deteriorate. And I think that we are going to have to continue to ask you to get this information on even a more timely 

basis than you have been able to, because we have got to change 

things very quickly. And it sounds accusatory. I do not mean to be 

accusatory of you. I do of the Army. The idea that the Pentagon 

is finally getting around to coming up with a definition of what is 

inherently governmental is just unbelievable, really. 

And you know, you have got to be dispassionate about this, but 

we do not have to be. And that is why this is as important an issue 

as we are going to face. And we are going to have to get to the bottom of it. We appreciate the effort you have made to help us in that 

pursuit. 

Mr. DODARO. Thank you. 

I would say, Congressman, also that while there are some shortterm issues that need to be dealt with, one of the fundamental 

frustrations I have is looking at the quality of strategic planning 

in the government over a period of time. And we cannot move from 

one end of the spectrum to the other end of the spectrum without 

having unintended consequences. And there needs to be a plan to 

get there. And so a lot of our recommendations go to having wellthought-out, well-crafted plans and strategies at the Department. 

And I would hope that the Congress provides adequate oversight 

to ensure that that happens. That, I think, at the end of the day 

is really the, or one of the, fundamental issues. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me say, before Mr. Moran came in, we talked 

about what we had done. When Mr. Walker came before the subcommittee 2 years ago, he said he could not get the information. 

So we fenced. I had forgotten this; the staff reminded me. We 

fenced the money and said, you do not get any money until you report to us how many contractors you have. Well, they got the information pretty quick after that. So I think we, as a subcommittee, 

we are going to have to fence the money in order to get some movement out of them. We save $44,000, according to the study we 

have, for every person we hire in-house compared to a contractor. 

Now, last year, we cut $4.5 billion out of contractors in this subcommittee. We added a billion dollars to hire direct hires and of 

course lost it because they were going to, the administration was 

going to veto the bill. So we have got to get some guidance and 

some recommendations, but they will not do it unless we tell them 

to do it, unless we put some teeth into it. And I think that is 

what—— 

Mr. MORAN. They would not even spend the money you put in 

for contract acquisition procurement personnel. You put money in 

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184 

for that and Shay what’s-his-name would not even spend it this 

past year. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I think the new administration will 

be a little more forward leaning on your request. 

Mr. MURTHA. I hope so. 

Mr. DICKS. I know it is sometimes hard to remember that—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. If not, we are in trouble, right? 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Tiahrt. 

Mr. TIAHRT. I do not have any questions at this time, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the work of the GAO. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Granger. 

PROJECT PURCHASING OFFICERS IN AFGHANISTAN

Ms. GRANGER. Let me follow up a little built on Mr. Moran’s 

questions and let me turn to Afghanistan. 

According to the information I have got, according to GAO, there 

are six Department of Defense warranted contracting officers in Afghanistan, and they approve every contract valued at $250,000 or 

above or the commander emergency response. If there are six—so 

they are approving contracts. How does the number come up? How 

does that make sense? 

Mr. DODARO. Yeah, Congresswoman Granger, we need to correct 

the record. I mean, our staff says it is 60. 

Ms. GRANGER. It is how many? 

Mr. DODARO. Sixty to seventy, not six. And that was our communication issue. And so I would like to correct that. 

Ms. GRANGER. Okay. Do you think that is the right amount? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, it depends on how things are going forward. 

Our recommendation here is that we learn the lessons on how we 

accelerated a contractor workforce in Iraq and that contracting acquisition workforce people be trained, plus the commanders in Afghanistan, so that whatever contractors go there, there is adequate 

oversight structure in place to make sure we do not have a repeat 

of the problems that we had in Iraq. 

Ms. GRANGER. If it is adequate oversight, then, according to, 

again, to GAO, 97 percent of the commander’s emergency response 

projects are valued at less than $500,000. They are awarded by the 

project purchasing officer, who has 1 hour’s training. Is that a mistake, too? 

Ms. COFFEY. No, that is correct. 

Mr. DODARO. That is correct. 

Ms. GRANGER. Would you say that was adequate, 1 hour’s training to oversee 97 percent of those contracts? 

Mr. DODARO. We are supportive and have recommended additional training. 

Ms. GRANGER. How much additional training? 

Mr. DODARO. It depends on the position. I can give you some information on it. Let me think that through. 

[The information follows:] 

GAO is currently reviewing the Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

(CERP) in Afghanistan. Our preliminary work raises some concerns over the 

amount and type of training Project Purchasing Officers (PPO) are currently receiving. PPOs are either officers or senior enlisted personnel designated by the commstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

185 

manders to award contracts for CERP projects or services up to $500,000. According 

to military officials, generally PPO personnel have had little or no contracting experience and do not undergo the same type of extensive training that is provided to 

warranted contracting officers. Current training for PPOs consists of a 1 hour briefing which is focused on the CERP guidance and not the technical aspects of contract 

management or administration such as writing statements of work, drafting contract documents, ensuring that the project is completed to contract specifications, 

and completing contract close out. For the past several years GAO has reported on 

the need for better and more complete training for those responsible for contract 

management in contingency operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, to reduce 

the risk of waste or mismanagement. While we are finalizing our work at this time, 

our preliminary view is that PPOs do require more training than the one hour that 

is currently provided. 

Mr. MURTHA. Would these folks identify themselves for the reporter? 

Mr. DODARO. Okay. Yeah, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. COFFEY. I am sorry, I am Carole Coffey. 

Mr. MURTHA. Did you hear that, reporter? 

And this young lady here. 

Ms. SCHINASI. Katherine Schinasi. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. How much time do you have? We have plenty of 

time, because there is 224 that have not voted. 

Mr. Rothman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to lay out 

some general concerns and then let you have it so I do not take 

up all the time. You have talked about lack of strategic planning, 

lack of management. And I am glad you are there to discover these 

things and to make recommendations to address them. Again, my 

concern is, why did this develop? Has this always been the case in 

the history of our Defense establishment since the founding of the 

Republic? And again, not to identify an administration for that purpose, but to identify what did we stop doing that was right and 

what did we start doing that was wrong so we can know how to 

fix it? Will you be addressing that in general terms? Was there a 

culture change? Or, as has been alluded to, was the interest in contracting out that expanded in the last 8 years, is it a necessary consequence of contracting out that there will be less accountability? 

Is that a consequence of contracting out? And if so, then you should 

let us know. If not, let us know that if not. Because I see in your 

statement you say that reliance on contractors can create mission 

risk when contractors are supporting deployed forces. And you say, 

without understanding the depth and breadth of contractor support, they will be unable to determine the right mix. And you are 

concerned about, the urgency is because of our upcoming increase 

in forces in Afghanistan. So goodness, we do not want to increase 

mission risk upon our forces that we are bringing or existing in Afghanistan because we do not know the impact of contractors. So it 

is the philosophical or general principle, what happened to the culture there? Does contracting per se equal some less accountability? 

And number three, as quickly as possible, how do we address what 

you call mission risk for deployed forces caused by our contractor 

forces? 

Mr. DODARO. Okay. First, let me say that some of these fundamental weaknesses have been present at the Department for a long 

time. We have had weapons systems acquisition on the high risk 

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186 

list that we keep for Congress of areas of potential risk of fraud, 

waste, abuse, and mismanagement since 1990 when we first created the list. We added contract management in 1992 to the list. 

So there have been some fundamental needs for improvement at 

the Department for a long time. What has happened recently, however, though, is the decline in the acquisition workforce at the 

same time you had a concomitant huge increase in the use and reliance of contractors over a period of time. Underlying all that has 

been the demographic changes that are occurring throughout our 

society and the aging of the Federal Government’s workforce, and 

you had a natural turnover of experience. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And they were not being replaced on the numbers. 

Mr. DODARO. Right. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. The numbers were not even being replaced. 

Mr. DODARO. Right. Right. But I would also say that we have for 

the past several years, though, stepped up some of our criticism of 

the Department’s strategic planning that has been taking place. 

But the situation in global war on terrorism and other things have 

accelerated the need to have strategic planning, not only within the 

Department but across the agencies. But I would say the Department of Defense has more areas on our high-risk list than any 

other Department in the Federal Government. They are also one of 

the few departments that have not yet been able to pass a test of 

a financial audit. So that is why I think you have a lot of data 

problems as well. 

Now, to get to your point on recommendations, we have made 

recommendations on the need to do a comprehensive study in these 

areas to deal with and put in place best practices. And so we have 

got plenty of recommendations. But the point that we made, and 

the Department has been very willing to make some policy 

changes, but implementation is really a key here. And I cannot 

stress that enough. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. If I could get those for the record, that would be 

great, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Congressman Rothman asked for copies of reports or testimonies in which GAO 

has recommended or called for a comprehensive study of DOD’s use of contractors 

(see page 41 of the transcript). Please find copies of three testimonies in which GAO 

called for a fundamental re-examination of the use of contractors by DOD. Specifically, see GAO–08–621T, page 13; GAO–08–572T page 30; and GAO–08–436T, pages 

19 and 21. 

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Mr. MURTHA. I think we have exhausted the information that 

you have and recommendations you have. You have seen our frustration and concern about contracting out. With your help, and 

with our help, if you need help from us, ask, and we will try to get 

you more information that they are hesitant to give. You said to 

me before the hearing started that you did not think they were 

hesitant to give us information; they just did not have the information. Well, we are going to force them to find the information, because we cannot make a legitimate decision and recommendation 

on money until we get some idea of what a government contractor 

is, what the government responsibility is. And I think the idea of 

oversight is the key. You said at least as you make the transitions 

you should have somebody working for the government that is in 

charge of the contractors. Well, we will see here. But as two examples that Mr. Moran gave, they have got contractors in charge of 

contractors. And one of my staff said, when he was in the Army, 

they were cutting the grass at Fort Benning, they hired a contractor to tell the contractors how to cut the grass. I mean, we got 

a hell of a problem here. And we are going to have to work together 

trying to get to the bottom of it. 

We appreciate your coming before the committee. 

Unless somebody else has any questions, we adjourn the committee until 10 a.m. tomorrow. 

Mr. Moran will be the Chair. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow.] 

Question. Mr. Dodaro, do you think DOD has thought about its workforce holistically in order to determine the right balance of federal and contractor employees 

in performing DOD missions? 

Answer. DOD has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of its workforce 

needs particularly with regard to the roles and functions contractors perform in supporting DOD’s missions and activities. Our work on strategic human capital planning and acquisition workforce issues has encouraged DOD to conduct such an assessment. 

Question. Mr. Dodaro, if DOD is not defining the proper balance between federal 

and contractor workforce, what steps should DOD take to better assure a balance? 

Answer. DOD must engage in a fundamental reassessment of when and under 

what circumstances the department should use contractors. As part of this assessment, DOD needs to take several steps, including developing a data collection system that will allow DOD to identify all services currently being provided to DOD 

by contractors; detennine which of those services being performed by contractors 

should be performed by government personnel, taking into account the need to ensure proper government oversight of contractors’ efforts and the need to develop or 

retain in-house sufficient institutional capacity to perform core capabilities; develop 

a total workforce strategic plan to identify and effect the appropriate mix, roles, and 

responsibilities of contractor, civilian, and military personnel, to include plans for 

how DOD will grow the in-house capabilities it has identified as lacking or otherwise convert contractor performance to in-house performance; developing budgets, 

both short and long term, that will support implementation of DOD’s total workforce 

strategic plan, to include funding additional government personnel full time equivalents when necessary to perform the services in-house. These steps are consistent 

with the requirements contained in sections 324 and 807 of the Fiscal Year 2008 

National Defense Authorization Act. 

Question. Does the Department have the ability to report on the number of contractors that they employ and their compensation costs? 

Answer. Section 807 of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act 

directed the department to develop a department-wide inventory of services being 

provided by contractors and the numbers of contractor full time equivalents used 

to provide the service. The inventory report is an annual requirement and is to be 

provided to Congress by the end of the third quarter of each fiscal year. However, 

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279 

DOD does not currently have the ability to report on the total number of contractor 

personnel it employs or their compensation costs at a department-wide level. 

Question. Mr. Dodaro, DOD continues to deploy huge numbers of contractors. Currently 267,000 contractors are deployed to the CENTCOM area of responsibility. 

Would you comment on the consequences of having more contractors than military 

personnel in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility? 

Answer. Our work has noted that DOD’s increased reliance on contractors at deployed locations exacerbates long-standing challenges regarding DOD management 

and oversight of contractors to support deployed forces. These include an insufficient 

number of acquisition workforce personnel, DOD’s failure to systematically collect 

and distribute lessons learned, and a lack of pre-deployment training for military 

commanders and contract oversight personnel. Moreover, the large number of contractors at deployed locations, particularly the widespread use of third-country and 

host-country national contractor employees, can increase the risk to military personnel due to the limited background screenings of contractor personnel. 

The fact that there are more contractors than military personnel in Iraq further 

highlights the strains on DOD’s ability to provide appropriate contract management 

and oversight. As we have noted in the past, DOD lacks adequate numbers of properly trained contract oversight personnel in Iraq to oversee the large numbers of 

contractors there. This is why we testified in January 2008 (see GAO–08–436T) that 

as part of the DOD’s efforts to increase the size of the Army and the Marine Corps, 

the department should consider using a portion of its increased force structure to 

expand its professional acquisition corps. DOD’s heavy reliance on contractors also 

underscores the need we identified last year for DOD to carry out a fundamental 

reexamination of when and under what circumstances the department should use 

contractors versus civil servants or military personnel. 

Question. DOD officials have stated that contractors will be redeployed from Iraq 

in proportionate numbers to the redeploying troops. How can DOD effectuate proportionate redeployment given that the number for contractors in Iraq is a function 

of hundreds of decentralized contract actions in contrast to military personnel 

strength levels which are a function of a handful of centrally managed deployment 

orders? 

Answer. In September 2008, GAO reported that from late 2007 through July 

2008, planning for the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq did not include a theaterwide plan for the withdrawal of contractors. It is still unclear how DOD plans to 

manage and coordinate the drawdown of contractors and military forces from Iraq. 

We have recently begun a new review of DOD’s plans for managing the drawdown 

and will review DOD’s plans for contractors as part of this effort. In addition, in 

October 2008, DOD released Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support, 

which states that for each operation, the geographic combatant commander should 

publish a contractor management plan and outline in an appendix contractor management planning considerations. 

Question. Does DOD have a good plan to account for assets, both government and 

contract, when drawing down contractors out of Iraq? 

Answer. As of August 2008, DOD had not established effective plans and procedures to account for its assets—both government and contractor-managed—during 

the drawdown process. As we noted above, we have recently begun a new review 

of DOD’s plans for managing the drawdown and will review DOD’s plans for plan 

to account for government and contractor assets as part of that review. 

DOD’s management of the equipment retrograde process is hindered by use of incompatible data systems that necessitate frequent manual manipulation of data. 

This system incompatibility has resulted in diminished visibility over equipment 

and materiel while it is in transit. Furthermore, in addition to the incompatibility 

of the data systems, the disposition process can be slow and cumbersome due to the 

manual workarounds used to pass and manipulate the data. Although a fix for this 

system incompatibility had been identified, the implementation of the fix had not 

been enforced by DOD. 

GAO also identified problems related to the accountability and disposition of contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq. While there are ongoing efforts to plan for the disposition of contractor-managed government-owned property 

in Iraq, several challenges remain. The first challenge is determining the original 

or fair-market value of contractor-managed government-owned property and determining any security restrictions on its disposition. Second is the time-consuming 

and labor-intensive task of accounting for and determining the disposition of contractor-managed government-owned property. Finally, the Defense Logistics Agency 

may not have sufficient data to adequately plan capacity needs at the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices—facilities in theater responsible for disposing of 

surplus DOD property through reutilization, transfer, donation, and sale. 

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280 

Question. The Department reports that a great number of contractors perform 

base support functions in Iraq. What exactly does ‘‘base support’’ mean? 

Answer. Base operations support is a term used to describe a collection of dayto-day programs, activities, and services needed to keep the bases and installations 

running. As we have previously reported, base operations support is not a single, 

well-defined program area but a collection of many diverse programs, activities, and 

services. According to DOD budget documents, base operations support provides the 

resources to operate DOD bases, installations, camps, posts, and stations. According 

to the department, these resources sustain mission capability, ensure quality-of-life, 

and enhance work force productivity and fund personnel and infrastructure support. 

Personnel support includes food and housing services for unaccompanied and deployed forces; religious services and programs; payroll support; personnel management; and morale, welfare, and recreation services to military members and their 

families. Infrastructure support includes utility systems operations; installation 

equipment maintenance; engineering services including fire protection, crash rescue, 

custodial, refuse collection, snow removal, and lease of real property; security protection and law enforcement; and transportation motor pool operations. 

Base operations support at deployed locations, such as Iraq, consists of providing 

food and housekeeping services on bases. This includes many of these services described above such as food, laundry, recreational, construction and maintenance, 

road maintenance, waste management, fire-fighting, power generation, and water 

production and distribution. While DOD estimates that over half of its contractors 

in Iraq are engaged in providing base support GAO has not verified DOD’s estimates nor has GAO analyzed the data to determine what specific services are categorized as base support in Iraq. 

Question. How can the DOD become less reliant on contractors in future military 

operations? 

Answer. As noted in a February 2009 testimony, DOD officials have stated that 

without a significant increase in military end-strength, the department is likely to 

continue to rely on contractors to support future operations. The testimony also 

noted that the department has yet to conduct a fundamental reexamination of its 

extensive reliance on contractors in order to identify what types of function and activities should be contracted out. We called for such a reexamination in March 2008 

(see GAO–08–572T). Until such an examination is completed, DOD may not be totally aware of the risks it faces in using contractors and will therefore be unable 

to mitigate those risks in the most cost-effective and efficient manner. 

Question. Mr. Dodaro, the DOD is required by law 10 U.S.C. 2464 to have an inhouse depot maintenance workforce able to respond to national defense emergencies. 

Do you believe that DOD has sufficient numbers of in-house personnel to meet all 

core maintenance functions to respond to national emergencies? 

Answer. On the basis of ongoing work, we believe the depots currently have sufficient numbers of in-house personnel to handle their workload. As a result of the 

Global War on Terror (GWOT), the depots have experienced a surge in workload 

over the past few years. Some of this work relates to special projects, such as adding 

armor to vehicles, and some is attributable to repairing battle damage and other 

depot repair work associated with the military’s high operations tempo. To accommodate the surge of workload, the depots have added to their total workforce over 

the last several years. Workforce data for the Army and Marine Corps indicate that 

the number of permanent government employees has remained steady, but the number of contract labor and temporary workers has risen. Depot officials told us they 

hired contractors and temporary workers in lieu of hiring permanent government 

workers due to uncertainties about the duration of GWOT. In the future however, 

there is a possibility that the depots could lack sufficient in-house technical expertise if core capabilities for new systems are not established at the depots. 

Question. Mr. Dodaro, do you agree that current DOD policy encourages the use 

of contractor logistics support? 

Answer. While DOD policies call for the use of both the public and private sectors 

to maintain weapon systems, DOD has moved toward greater use of the private sector to perform maintenance and other logistics support for new weapon systems. 

Our ongoing work on core logistics capabilities and depot operations indicates that 

some program managers prefer the original equipment manufacturers to provide 

long-term logistics and maintenance support for new and modified systems. Among 

the reasons cited for not considering the military depots is the cost associated with 

purchasing technical data and providing equipment to establish depot capability. In 

addition, DOD stated in 2001 that performance based logistics (a form of contractor 

logistics support) is its ‘‘preferred weapon system support strategy.’’ DOD’s policy is 

that performance based logistics arrangements shall make the best use of public 

and private sector capabilities, and with support provided by the government, the 

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private sector, or a combination of both. Nearly all of the performance based logistics arrangements we reviewed recently were implemented directly with private sector contractors, although some of the contractors subcontracted with government depots to provide support either for economic reasons or to help the government meet 

requirements for having a core logistics capability. 

Question. If so, are we in danger of not having sufficient in-house technical expertise? 

Answer. There is a possibility that the depots could lack sufficient in-house technical expertise in the future if core capabilities for new systems are not established 

at the depots. Our ongoing work on core logistics capability and depot operations 

raises concerns about the ability of the depots to maintain core capability in the future. Depot planners are concerned about the type and amount of workload that will 

replace their existing workload if GWOT-related and legacy system workloads decrease. Moreover, with the shift toward greater use of contractors to provide logistics support for new systems, depot planners are concerned that their permanent 

workforce may not be equipped with the necessary technical expertise to support 

core maintenance for new weapon systems. The depots have developed recruitment 

and training programs to attract and retain skilled workers, and they believe sufficient numbers of skilled workers are currently available. However, uncertainties 

about the type and amount of future workload hinder their ability to plan for future 

workforce requirements. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 

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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2009.

ARMY CONTRACTING 

WITNESS 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL N. ROSS THOMPSON, III, PRINCIPAL MILITARY 

DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY AND DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION CAREER MANAGEMENT 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MORAN. Good morning to everyone. 

This morning, the Committee will hold a hearing on the Army’s 

contracting services, often referred to as outsourcing. More specifically, our private-sector contractors support government functions 

and the policies and procedures to ensure appropriate oversight. 

We will also talk about the DOD acquisition workforce and about 

acquisition management and oversight of contracts. 

We are very pleased to welcome Lieutenant General Ross 

Thompson, the Military Deputy to the Acting Assistant Secretary 

of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. General 

Thompson is co-Chair of the task force to address the Army’s structural weaknesses and shortcomings in contracting, of which there 

are many. He also shaped improvements to expeditionary contracting activities. 

We are very pleased that you are with us this morning, General. 

America has relied on contractors for national security support 

and materiel since the founding of the Republic, but that reliance 

has never been more pervasive than it is today. The Army now 

spends twice as much on contract services than on the pay of 

American military and civilian personnel combined. 

For decades, it has been the policy to contract for all functions 

and activities that are not inherently governmental. But now it is 

impossible to define what that phrase ‘‘inherently governmental’’ 

means. 

Further, after careful examination of some service contracts, the 

Army discovered that it had contracted out some of what we would 

consider—and most rational people would—inherently governmental functions, with contractors evaluating other contractors, 

building budget justifications and the like. The Army is now bringing those jobs back in house. 

This Committee has oversight of DOD funding, and under Chairman Murtha’s direction we focused considerable attention on contracted services over the past 2 years. The Army spends a lot of 

money on contracted services, and today we will hear more about 

how the contracts are made, how requirements are determined 

about the contracting workforce and how oversight is accomplished. 

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General Thompson, thank you for the time and attention that 

you have given to this problem and thank you for being here to discuss this very important issue. 

We welcome Vice Chairman Dicks, Mr. Frelinghuysen, Ms. 

Granger and Ms. Kilpatrick to the hearing; and we are going to 

hear now from the ranking member, Bill Young. 

We appreciate your presence and leadership. Mr. Young, if you 

would proceed. 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I just want to 

add my welcome to General Thompson, representing the Army in 

this great, real challenge. We have had an opportunity to visit and 

talk, and I feel very confident with him in charge of this particular 

responsibility. So, General, thank you for being here today. Welcome to the members of your team who are here. 

Mr. Chairman, I just want to make a personal note that sitting 

in back with the team is one of my constituents and a former member of my staff like maybe 15, 18 years ago, Ky Dughi, whose mother still lives in my district. And, Ky, she keeps telling me to come 

home more often to see her. 

General, welcome. 

Mr. MORAN. Let that be on the record. 

General Thompson, you may proceed with your summarized 

statement; and your entire statement will be placed in the record. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMPSON

General THOMPSON. Thank you for inviting me here today, 

Chairman Moran and Congressman Young and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I really do thank you for the opportunity 

to update you on the Army’s progress, and I do mean progress, in 

enabling the contracting mission to be agile, expeditionary and responsive to our warfighters, while ensuring proper stewardship of 

taxpayer dollars. 

I have a written statement that I will respectfully request be 

made part of the record of today’s hearing. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Secretary of the Army created 

a special commission on contracting, led by Dr. Jacques Gansler 

and a number of distinguished members, to look at the long-term 

strategic view of the Army’s acquisition and contracting mission in 

support of expeditionary operations. The Army Contracting Task 

Force, which you alluded to, I co-chaired with Kathryn Condon, 

who is the Executive Deputy at the Army Materiel Command; and 

we looked at current contracting operations and took immediate action steps where they were necessary. 

When our work was complete, we handed this off and created a 

Army Contracting Campaign Plan Task Force. It was led by my Assistant Military Deputy, Major General George Harris, who I work 

with on a daily basis. We continued the review of the Commission’s 

recommendations and the other contracting recommendations that 

came from audits and other sources to determine the requirements 

and resources necessary to address the systemic issues. The mandate of both these task forces has been met, and their workload is 

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being transferred to the enduring organizations in the Army that 

are responsible for the long-term contracting success, and we think 

our progress has been steady and significant. 

In all of our work, we were guided by Dr. Gansler’s Commission’s 

overarching recommendation, which was to implement the Commission’s recommendations rapidly and then measure success. Because if you don’t measure success, you don’t know if you are going 

to get there. 

The Commission outlined four supporting recommendations for 

our success, and they included 40 actions to correct discrepancies 

identified. Twenty-two of those were Army specific actions; and the 

remaining 18 are within the purview of the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense or are legislative actions being addressed jointly among 

the services, with OSD in the lead. 

We have completed actions on 21 of the 22 specific recommendations that came out of the Gansler report. The remaining one, to 

increase the contracting workforce by 400 military and 1,000 civilians, is going to require more time to ensure we have both the 

quality and the quantity necessary to properly execute the contracting mission. 

The initial recommendation from the Gansler Commission was 

the 400 military and the 1,000 civilian. Our actual numbers that 

we are pursuing in growing the contracting workforce are 446 military and 1,191 civilians. I will talk more about that later depending on the question. 

Mr. MORAN. Are those on board? 

General THOMPSON. No, sir, they are not. They are planned in 

our structure. We are starting to grow those military and civilian 

members this year. As I indicated yesterday when we talked, it is 

going to be a multiple-year process; and I can talk about the specific numbers. But about a third of those numbers is the planned 

growth in each of the next 3 years. 

Mr. MORAN. But they are fully budgeted for. They are included 

within the personnel ceiling? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir, they are included both in the military personnel accounts and they have been budgeted for in our 

budget. And even though we may adjust the budget here, as we resubmit it in the current schedule of April, they won’t fall out of 

that budget, I assure you. 

We also want to thank the Congress for the five additional general officer billets designated for acquisition. As of September, 

2008, even in advance of the authorization from the Congress, we 

selected an additional general officer, a newly promoted Brigadier 

General, as commander of our recently established expeditionary 

contract command; and we will select more acquisition general officers this year. That board has already met, and the results are 

being reviewed appropriately in the Defense Department, and 

those results will be announced here over the next couple of 

months. 

We have already established a two-star U.S. Army contracting 

command as part of the Army Materiel Command and a one-starlevel mission and installation contracting command, which does all 

of the contracting primarily for our bases. These two billets are 

presently being filled by experienced members—and I emphasize 

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that—experienced members of the Senior Executive Service; and it 

is our plan over time to replace those two individuals with a properly qualified and skilled general officer once those selections are 

done. 

Let me also mention here that Brigadier General Bill Phillips, 

who is really one of our best acquisition officers with an extensive, 

extensive background in contracting, just took command in the last 

couple of weeks of the Joint Contracting Command in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is an excellent choice to lead this Command. His indepth contracting experience and expertise will be instrumental in 

continuing our efforts to improve Army contracting, and under his 

leadership the Army intends to improve the management of large 

dollar contracts in theater through reach-back to the Army 

Sustainment Command in Rock Island, Illinois. This reach-back 

methodology was largely successful in some of the issues that we 

had a year and a half ago in Kuwait, and we want to expand on 

that success by doing it for more of the large dollar contracts in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. 

As we have testified before, Mr. Chairman, the Army acquisition 

workforce declined significantly in the last decade, while the workload and the dollars associated with that workload have increased 

significantly. To further improve contracting, the Army is now participating in a defense acquisition workforce 60-day joint assessment team to assess and make recommendations regarding the 

component workforce mix, the total force mix and future funding 

levels. I think personally we are well ahead of that, so our participation is going to just reinforce the path that we are already on. 

A brief topic of interest to this committee and the U.S. Army is 

insourcing. Insourcing implements congressional direction to give 

special consideration to Federal Government employee performance 

of contracted functions based on the review and inventory process 

required by Congress for identifying inherently governmental functions, those closely associated with inherently governmental functions, and unauthorized personnel services. 

We have a comprehensive approach to comply with the congressional direction. Insourcing is not simply a contracting matter. It 

also involves civilian manpower authorizations, our hiring processes and our budgets. 

We have found that a practical insourcing schedule must be established in order to ensure continuity of service. This schedule 

may be affected by the timing of base realignment and closure 

moves, the effect of headquarters head counts or ceiling limits, and 

the ability and capacity of our civilian infrastructure to hire people. 

Most importantly, successful insourcing requires strategic planning that looks at activities or functioning holistically for the total 

work force, looking at the workforce balance between military, Department of Army civilians and contractors within the framework 

of a manpower requirements determination process. Simplistically, 

what is the work that needs to get done and what is the proper 

mix of the workforce in order to get it done? 

It also requires a contractor inventory and a process for reviewing the contracted activities in that inventory. And, again, we are 

well on the way; and I can talk more about that subject to your 

questions. This was recently directed by the Congress in the fiscal 

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year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, but we started to 

put our arms around the contractor inventory back in 2005. So we 

have got a very comprehensive database, we know what that contractor inventory is, and we are starting to make decisions around 

what is the proper mix of the contractors in the workforce. 

I have submitted for the record a detailed written statement 

which describes how we are changing our culture in this vital area 

specifically to ensure prompt compliance with both the congressional intent and the Federal acquisition regulation. To date, the 

Army is planning to in-source nearly 1,400 positions, of which 

1,127 are programmed in fiscal year 2009 to 2011. 

In light of the congressional interest, Dr. John Anderson, who is 

sitting behind me, who is our expert in this area from the Office 

of Manpower and Reserve Affairs, is leading our efforts and has accompanied me today and is available to provide additional details 

should you desire. 

The other individual I would like to introduce behind me is Mr. 

Ed Harrington, who is now the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Procurement. This gets to one of my larger issues on the 

acquisition workforce about having the right people. 

Mr. Harrington left the Army as General Harrington in 2003 as 

Commander of the Defense Contract Management Agency. He has 

a long history in the Federal Government and is really an expert 

in the contracting area, and we convinced Mr. Harrington to come 

back to work for us starting in December. We are delighted to have 

him back on our team. I think he is delighted to be with us to date. 

But it is just an indication of hiring the right people in order to 

help us get through these very challenging areas that are of interest to the committee. 

I am honored to be here today, and I will forthrightly—and I 

mean that—answer your questions that fall into my area of responsibility. 

This concludes my opening remarks, Mr. Chairman; and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The statement of General Thompson follows:] 

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CONTRACT PERSONNEL

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, General Thompson. 

As difficult an issue as this is to deal with, we know that you 

are not the problem, that you are part of the solution. I would like 

to figure out how you got a guy like Harrington back, because that 

is part of our problem. We get these experienced people and they 

leave and we desperately need to bring them back into the government, but a private contractor is willing to pay him three times as 

much without harassment from the Congress. So it is difficult to 

get them back. So if you have any ideas on how that can be done, 

we need to know. I don’t know how you get the incentives to bring 

the people of that caliber back into the government. 

General THOMPSON. It is a good recruiting pitch, I think. 

Mr. MORAN. I suspect there has to be some substantive incentives there, too. Whatever they are, I am glad you used them. 

We are here because contracted services has gone up by 183 percent in the last 8 years, while salaries for military personnel have 

grown 5 percent. So we feel there is something wrong. We want 

balance. We are not trying to eliminate contract services, but it is 

out of balance now. I would like to hear your views about that and 

what you are beginning to think might be the proper balance. 

One of the indications of the imbalance is what Chairman Murtha continually references, the fact it appears we have more contract personnel in Iraq than we do Federal employees, whether it 

be military or civilian. I will never forget being on one of those 

Congressional Delegations (CODELs) waiting in a line that there 

were four or five of us, and we were doing what we were told, we 

were waiting in line to get into the Green Zone. By the time we 

got up to the end of the line, it didn’t take long because many people deferred to us, but I had been looking over to our left and there 

was a group of people that just walked right through, just waved 

and in they went. 

So I asked the military police (MP), we don’t mind waiting in 

line, but what is with all of those folks who just walk in? Who are 

they? This MP says they are from Halliburton. He said ‘‘They run 

the place.’’ This was the Green Zone, and somehow I thought the 

U.S. military ran the place. So that is the imbalance that has 

struck us. 

Lord knows when we did the surge how many of those surge personnel were actually contractors. 

REDEPLOYMENT OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL

And that brings up another related issue that I think the Committee would be interested in hearing. As we redeploy troops out 

of Iraq, how are you going to redeploy those contract personnel, 

who are at least as many? Are you going to do it proportionally or 

whatever? That might be of interest to the subcommittee. 

If you might respond to some of those general questions, then we 

are going to hear from the members of the panel and their questions. 

General THOMPSON. Well, let me answer the second one first on 

the rebalancing as we reduce the force presence in Iraq. I have 

seen and been briefed on the comprehensive plans as we bring 

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down the military structure that also appropriately brings down 

the contract support structure that is in Iraq. That is one of the 

things that is General Phillips’, who just went over there, prime responsibilities is to appropriately bring that down. 

So I don’t know what the exact numbers will be, but they will 

be proportional. So we should have fewer troops and a smaller 

presence with the forward-operating bases. You will need fewer 

support contractors to be able to support the troops that are out 

there doing the mission. 

The way I would look at this, Congressman, if you go back strategically, there was a conscious decision at the end of the Cold War 

to reduce the size of the military, the military force structure. 

When we reduced the size of the military, it was to keep as many 

of the warfighters in the force and look at the reliance on some of 

the support functions that we had military members performing 

such as cooks and truck drivers and supply personnel. 

In the Army, I know when we reduced from 780,000 in the active 

component and a proportionate reduction in the reserve components, we kept as much of the war fighting structure as we could; 

and we eliminated not all but some of the structure that was doing 

the support mission, with the thought that, if we needed it, we 

could contract for it if necessary. And I think that is what happened strategically from 2001 until today. When we needed the 

base support structure and contracted support primarily, we ended 

up contracting for it. 

Is it too much? I don’t know. I think it is a balance. There is a 

defined amount of work that needs to get done in order to support 

the troops. Some of it we do ourselves with the military and the 

Department of Army civilians, but we have elected to contract for 

it with a large proportion of it over the last 6 years. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, General Thompson. 

Again, we understand you are not the problem and didn’t make 

those decisions in terms of the proper balance of contract versus inhouse military personnel, but at this point let me turn to ranking 

member and former chairman, Chairman Young. 

DOD CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

General, for a number of years, the Armed Services Committee 

and especially its Chairman made the case that he referred to 

them as shoppers. I am sure you know what I am talking about. 

He was determined to reduce the number of people in the contracting business at the Pentagon. Obviously, that was not the decision on the part of the Congress, at least not in a major way. But, 

today, apparently we have turned and gone a different direction. 

For example, GAO identified DOD contract management as a 

high-risk area. Most recently, a senior DOD acquisition official 

stated that the Department must increase the size and capability 

of its civilian acquisitions workforce dramatically. What does that 

mean, ‘‘dramatically’’? Does that mean an additional 100 or 1,000 

or 10,000? What does that mean? This was GAO’s recommendation, 

so what do you think it means? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, what I think it means are the numbers 

that I articulated in my oral statement at the beginning and in the 

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written statement. For us, we have gone through our very deliberative process, and it is the 400-some military and the nearly 1,200 

civilians in the contracting workforce, and we think that will get 

us to where we need to be properly in balance with the right number of people doing this critically important mission. 

I do think the pendulum swung too far the other way. There was 

a conscious decision to reduce the size of the acquisition workforce, 

because we had statute at the time. We complied with that statute, 

but we swung the pendulum too far, and we need to swing it back 

in the other direction to an appropriate level. 

I don’t want one more person on my staff in any of my organizations than I need to get the job down done. But, right now, with 

the amount of contracted services we have and with the complexity 

of a lot of the contract instruments, you need to have a larger 

workforce. And you need to value that workforce. You can’t label 

them in a pejorative way. Because if you do that, you won’t get 

good people that want to do that mission and function. You have 

got to value that contracting workforce, make them feel like every 

day that they are a valuable part of the team. Because they are. 

They are at the forefront of guarding the taxpayer dollars and 

making sure we get an appropriate service or product for those taxpayer dollars. 

So our numbers are there, very well thought out. We will adjust 

those as we need to over time here. But, right now, I am in a major 

recruiting effort, using some of the authorities that have been 

given to us by Congress that we have now implemented in policy 

in order to recruit the right people, like Mr. Harrington, to come 

to work for the Army or the Department of Defense in this critically important area. 

ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND

Mr. YOUNG. General, the Committee understands you are talking 

about raising the Army Contracting Command to 5,800 civilians 

and military personnel. Is that the right number? 

General THOMPSON. That is about right. 

Mr. YOUNG. Where are you today? 

General THOMPSON. We are a little over 5,000. We are about 800 

short. 

Mr. YOUNG. Will that 800 be civilian or military or a combination? 

General THOMPSON. Primarily civilian, in the Army’s acquisition 

workforce as we define it. And it is not just contracting. There are 

12 different skill sets. Program management, engineering, cost estimating are another couple of examples as well as information technology. There are about 40,000 members roughly in the Army’s acquisition workforce. We are at about 1,500 military members today, 

and we will grow that to around 2,000 over the next couple of 

years. The rest of that 40,000 are all Department of the Army civilians. 

WARRANT OFFICER CONTRACTING BRANCH

Mr. YOUNG. Sir, where are you on the creation of the warrant officer contracting branch? 

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General THOMPSON. Sir, that was a proposal to create a career 

field in contracting for warrant officers. This is one of the things 

that had just gotten started when Ms. Condon and I led the early 

task force in 2007. We have noncommissioned officers—NCOs— 

now that we are starting to recruit, and we now have about 240 

noncommissioned officers that have got operational experience and 

other specialties that are now in the contracting career field. We 

are looking through our deliberate process. We call it a forced design process. Should we have warrant officers involved in that mix 

between NCOs, officers and warrant officers, which are a skill set? 

We haven’t come to a conclusion yet that we think warrant officers 

are the right fit. They may be. But we are in the process of evaluating that right now. 

We do need the number of people, whether they are civilians or 

NCOs, to do the mission; and we are evaluating whether warrant 

officers would be more appropriately suited to do a particular portion of the contraction mission, which is a broad mission. 

Mr. YOUNG. Have you planned safeguards to make sure that we 

just don’t create a bloated bureaucracy that might not do any better than what is being done today? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. And those safeguards are good 

metrics and good performance plans for organizations and individual performance plans for every individual in the organization. 

I will give you one metric that we use with the Program Executive Officers who are direct reports to me, and there are 12 of 

them. We look at their overhead. So we evaluate the percent of the 

dollars that they have responsibility for and how much of that is 

in overhead; and we hold them to less than 5 percent, which is the 

high side, and in most cases it is far less than that. So we do evaluate that very significantly in the acquisition business. That is a key 

metric for me. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I wish you a lot of success, because this is a 

real challenge, and it is a problem that is becoming more and more 

obvious to the Congress and I think the general public. 

General, thanks for being here today. I appreciate your testimony. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Young. 

Vice Chairman Dicks. 

NUMBER OF CONTRACTORS

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Thompson, we are glad to have you here today. 

In October of 2008, Nelson Ford, the Under Secretary of the 

Army, stated, ‘‘We really don’t know the number of contractors that 

we have, and we really haven’t thought about the appropriate role 

of contractors on the battlefield. We still don’t understand that.’’ 

This is October of 2008. Where is all this action that was outlined in your statement, General? 

I was over in Iraq. I am sorry that Congresswoman Kaptur is not 

here; she has been very interested in this. We have asked witness 

after witness after witness how many contractors do we have, and 

we never got an answer until we had to take out some money and 

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say you are not going to get your money until you answer these 

questions forthrightly. 

I think in my mind this was a deliberate attempt to keep the information from Congress so that Congress wouldn’t realize the 

number of people that we have over there. 

Now, as I understand it, when you look at the whole picture in 

CENTCOM, we have currently 216,000 military personnel versus 

267,000 contractors. The Under Secretary of the Army doesn’t have 

any idea about this? What is going on? Why was this information 

withheld from the Congress? Were you ordered or did somebody tell 

you not to present us the information when we asked for it year 

after year after year? 

We went over there to Iraq, and I met with the officials there in 

Iraq, and I asked them these questions. They said, we don’t know. 

That was the official answer from the military until this hearing 

today. Why didn’t we know? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I don’t know why that information 

wasn’t presented to you, but that information is available. I remember Congresswoman Kaptur asking me those questions last 

year, and I answered the questions very closely to what the numbers actually were, and then we followed up on that in response to 

the Committee. And I have got those numbers. 

Mr. DICKS. Why does the Under Secretary still think we don’t 

know anything about this? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I don’t know. Mr. Ford is no longer the 

Under Secretary. I have a great deal of respect for Mr. Ford. 

Mr. DICKS. Is this one of the reasons? 

General THOMPSON. For Mr. Ford? No, sir. I think it was just the 

appropriate time because of the change of the administrations. 

Mr. DICKS. For a long time there was a difficulty within the administration to come up with any numbers. 

General THOMPSON. And we have those numbers today. I will 

ask one of the guys here in the back to pull out the sheet, and I 

will give you the latest numbers. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense now has a Senior Executive Service member, Mr. Gary Motsek, who has put his arms 

around this issue. We have monthly reports. I get a report every 

day that accounts for the contractor workforce in the theater. It 

comes on my BlackBerry every morning at 6 o’clock, and we gather 

up those numbers on a monthly basis and report them. I can give 

you the January figures in just a minute here. 

SURGE IN CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES

Mr. DICKS. Was the surge really the surge in contractor employees, or was it these additional five brigades? What are these 

267,000 people doing besides supporting the troops? Is that basically what it is all about? 

General THOMPSON. Well, it is supporting the troops. I will give 

you the exact numbers in a minute here. But a lot of the individuals that are over there are local nationals. 

So here are the numbers as of the middle of January. 

In the CENTCOM area of responsibility—that is Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Qatar, that whole area—there are 266,678 contractors; 41,000 of those are U.S. citizens, 100,640 are third-country 

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nationals, and 125,000 are local and host-country nationals. A lot 

of the local and host-country nationals are being hired in order to 

create jobs, in order to rebuild their own infrastructure in Iraq. 

Those numbers are available. There is no reason why they can’t 

be shared with the Members of Congress. 

Mr. DICKS. That is good. That was not part of your testimony, 

I don’t believe, was it? 

General THOMPSON. It was not in the prepared statement that I 

made. 

Mr. DICKS. Are there any other reports like this that you would 

like to present us? We would like to have that for the record. 

General THOMPSON. We can add that for the record. There is no 

information here that should not be part of the public record. 

[The information follows:] 

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Mr. MORAN. If the gentleman will yield, this is the number of deployed contractors, but we also wanted to know how many contractors are working for the defense establishment. Do we have that 

number? Can we even guess at what it might be? 

General THOMPSON. I can tell you that number for the Army. I 

don’t know the number off the top of my head for the entire Department of Defense. If you just give me one second, Congressman. 

Dr. Anderson, who as I said earlier is our expert in this area. 

Mr. DICKS. Do you want him to come up to testify? 

General THOMPSON. I don’t think it is necessary unless I don’t 

get this right. John will keep me straight. 

But in the deployed infrastructure, which is not what is overseas, 

the number is about 125,000 for the Army right now. We started 

in 2005, before I had the job that I am in now, when our former 

Secretary asked us to get our arms around this issue because he 

wanted to understand the total workforce mix. So we have gone out 

and gathered that information on how many contractors we have 

working for us. 

Mr. DICKS. 125,000 separate contractors. 

General THOMPSON. Separate than the number I just gave you. 

Mr. DICKS. This isn’t people. This is contractors. He is telling me 

you are wrong now. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, full-time equivalent employees. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay, but not 125,000 contractors who would have 

500,000 employees. 

General THOMPSON. It is 125,000 people that are part of the multiple contracts we have got. I don’t know what that number is, but 

125,000 full-time equivalents people. 

Mr. MORAN. So the answer to Vice Chairman Dicks’ question is 

there are about 400,000 contracted people working for the Army 

alone in addition to the normal military and civilian hired personnel? 

General THOMPSON. If I can make a clarification, the 266,000 

number in the CENTCOM area of responsibility are all DOD, are 

all contractors, not just Army. The 125,000 number that Dr. Anderson just gave us are the ones that work for the Army here in the 

continental United States. 

ACQUISITION

Mr. DICKS. The other point I would like to make, I think we have 

to make a distinction—correct me if I am wrong—but this contracting that is going on and sending those people over there instead of government workers or whatever, there is a whole separate thing here which is acquisition, right? The acquisition thing is 

the Army’s ability to go out and buy equipment, which has not 

been one of your strong suits over the years, just thinking of the 

six or seven billion dollars that we lost on the Comanche helicopter. 

Acquisition hasn’t been one of the—since the ’80s, when we did the 

tank, the Bradley and the Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the helicopter. So we are trying to get the acquisition thing straightened 

out. 

I go back to what Mr. Young said. The former chairman of the 

Armed Services Committee kept demeaning these acquisition people as ‘‘shoppers’’. This is the people that go out and get the weapmstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

316 

ons system, buying the equipment, doing this stuff. We cut way 

back on the number of people we had there, unfortunately. 

Can you tell us just quickly what are we trying to do to improve 

Army acquisition, to try to get beyond the period of time when we 

have been not very successful in bringing in new equipment? 

General THOMPSON. The strategic thing, Congressman Dicks, is 

the people and having the right number of people and having the 

people with the right skill set. We have an excellent acquisition 

workforce today. They have certification levels that they have to 

achieve. They have required training. 

Mr. DICKS. Are any of those people contractors? 

General THOMPSON. The acquisition workforce that I referred to, 

the 40,000 earlier, are all government. 

Mr. DICKS. This is inherently government. 

General THOMPSON. This is inherently government. They do the 

inherently governmental things. They write and approve contracts, 

they build budgets, they approve payments, they do the final 

checks on everything that is required in the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation and the Defense and the Army supplements that go 

with that. 

There are contractors that work in support of the acquisition 

process, for example, in engineering. When we don’t have the engineer with the right skill set because of a particular technical area, 

we will go out and hire that engineer to work for us, and then they 

have the appropriate checks on what they can and cannot do because they are a contractor. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Dicks. 

The problem we are having up here is that for these contracted 

services that you said are 125,000 working for the Pentagon, basically—— 

Mr. DICKS. No, this is for the Army. 

Mr. MORAN. The Army. 

Mr. DICKS. Not for the whole military. 

Mr. MORAN. That is right. We understand that. Just for the 

Army. The number in the budget is $35 billion for contracted services. It averages out to, what, 20 or 30 million per person. So we 

are wondering if it isn’t much larger than 125,000. That is something the staff is working on now, but you may want to respond 

to that. Because the figure we have for contracted services for the 

Army for 2007, that is the time period that you gave us those numbers, is $35 billion. It was an increase of $23 billion over 2000. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, is that just for personnel, or is that 

buying stuff as well? 

Mr. MORAN. Well, it says contracted services. So it is just contracted services, which is not products, it is not equipment, it is not 

weapons. Maybe your people there, Mr. Anderson, might give some 

thought to that, and you can respond to us in a few moments. 

Let’s hear from Mr. Frelinghuysen for the time being. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, will you yield for a moment before 

we leave this subject? 

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QUALIFICATIONS FOR CONTRACTING OFFICIAL

General, what qualifications do you require when you hire someone as a contracting official? We are talking about large numbers 

of people, adding large numbers of people. What kind of experience 

do you expect, do you demand or do you get? 

General THOMPSON. The minimum qualification is 24 college 

credits in a business or a management or an economic area for contracting, and then there are the certification levels as they work 

through, they have a number of courses they have to go to and a 

number of individual self-development things they have to do. To 

be certified at level 1, it is 2 years of experience on the job. To be 

certified at level 2, it is an additional 2 years of experience at an 

appropriate job. And level 3 just adds on top of that. 

So, depending on the discipline, for engineering, you would expect us to hire people with an engineering degree; and we do. For 

cost estimating, somebody that has got an economics degree or accounting degree. Those are the kind of people that we hire for the 

different acquisition career fields. 

Mr. YOUNG. Do you hire them with personal interviews, or do 

you just use this computer system that seems to be engulfing the 

government where a person applies on line and they get a response 

yes, no or maybe on-line, never having talked to or had contact 

with a human being? 

General THOMPSON. Well, I can’t say categorically that it is 100 

percent done with interviews, but it is pretty close to 100 percent. 

My stump speech to people is the most important thing you do is 

to hire the right people to work for you. And if you can do that with 

a computer resume, more power to you. I don’t see how you do that. 

So the ones that I am involved in the selection process with and 

all of the people that I interact with at a more senior level typically 

go through an interview process. 

They will get, as an example, 10 resumes for a particular job application. I forget the exact number for Mr. Harrington, but it was 

over 20 people applied for his position. We evaluated those, we 

picked what we thought were the top 7 or 8, and I personally interviewed every one of those individuals, in some cases more than 

once, in order to make sure we got the right person for the job. 

That is the typical way it is done. It is time-consuming, yes, but 

it is also a critically important thing to do. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Frelinghuysen, thank you very much for yielding 

to me. 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Young. 

The Committee has focused on the issue of contractors in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, and I assume we have quite a few contractors in 

Kuwait, where we have a rather large footprint, and much has 

been made of the fact that we have so many contractors. But the 

figures you have given us here about foreign nationals—and what 

was the other category? 

General THOMPSON. Third country nationals. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Third country nationals. That puts the picture in far greater focus. 

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In Vietnam, we had similar foreign national support. We had 

large companies with a variety of different initials which ran military bases large and small. So there is contracting, and there is 

contracting. 

I would like to just know sort of what you are doing in terms of 

ratcheting up the acquisition workforce. It is a little indefinite as 

to where you stand relative to your hiring goals. But how are those 

goals impeded by issues of retirements/loss of institutional memory 

and what are you doing to sort of retain people, taking a look at 

a variety of different incentives? Much has been made of the whole 

issue of competition for people with core competency. Can you sort 

of briefly touch on those issues dealing with issues of retirement 

and retention? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. There has been lots of studies done, 

Congressman Frelinghuysen, on the percent of the government 

workforce—we are talking civilians primarily now—who are retirement eligible or will be early retirement eligible in the next 5 

years; and those numbers are at the 50 to 60 percent level, typically, depending on the study that is done. So when we take into 

account our necessary strategic hiring plan, we take into account 

those retirement numbers. 

We typically don’t see nearly the number of people retire in a 

year that could retire in a year. People typically stick around 

longer than they could in order to draw retirement benefits, which 

is a good thing for us because you do want to keep that experience 

and skill set. 

So when we look at the strategic hiring, how many we are going 

to hire in 2009 and 2010 and out, we take into account those numbers. We predict how many we need in order to keep the numbers 

up against the authorization documents that are out there. So in 

the acquisition workforce, again, if I can go back to the 40,000, to 

try to stay at least at that steady state for 40,000, and as we grow 

by a couple of thousand over the next few years how do we make 

sure that we don’t fall further behind. 

The one thing that we have gotten from the Congress in the 2008 

authorizations are the Section 852 permissions which were designed to give us the right statute and mechanism to recruit, retain, and train the acquisition workforce; and we are doing that. 

We are using those tools starting in 2008. We got started late in 

the year, but we are going to spend in the DOD nearly $900 million 

out to 2013 in order to take care of the government acquisition 

workforce. 

As I mentioned yesterday to several of you, the mechanism to do 

that is to tax the contracted services dollars. So to meet the intent 

of Congress is to tax the dollars that we are spending on contracted 

services and spend less there and to take that nearly $900 million 

and apply it for the right incentives for the government acquisition 

workforce. I am not the best business person in the world, but that 

is a pretty good way, I think, of meeting the intent of Congress and 

accomplishing a number of objectives. 

REACH-BACK TECHNIQUE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Lastly, I think you somewhere made a good 

choice with General Phillips being responsible for contracting in 

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Iraq and Afghanistan. Could you comment on the whole issue, 

what you call the reach-back? Is this the issue that was identified 

in the Gansler report of the Pentagon actually talking to the commanders in the field as to what the hell is going on and getting 

their take on things, rather than on some other, shall we say, more 

traditional model? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

When I use the term reach-back, the contracting process is a 

broad process that starts with identifying what do you want to do, 

what is the requirement. That process, the requirements definition 

has got to be done with what the commander needs, whether it is 

base support services or transportation services or pick something 

that is a requirement. That part has got to be done with the requiring activity of the commander in the field. 

But a lot of the contracting process, the detailed source selection, 

the pricing, things like that, doesn’t have to be done in theater, and 

I would argue strategically, don’t do forward what you can do back 

here. With the tools that we have got available today, if I can do 

the source selection process, the evaluation, the pricing, the negotiation with the contractors, if I can do all that at Rock Island, Illinois, which we have done very successfully with the contracts we 

had in Kuwait. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you have problem-solving teams back 

here. 

General THOMPSON. Back here. And what we did in Kuwait, 

when Ms. Condon and I got that started, is we put the people at 

Rock Island, Illinois, who were in support of the contracting office 

in Kuwait, we put them on the same work schedule. So they would 

start work at 7 o’clock Kuwait time, which was 3 or 4 o’clock in 

the afternoon here. They would run the same work schedule. So 

they were in direct support. That has proved to be very, very successful. 

I can give you an example on one contract that we negotiated because of the right expertise back at Rock Island where we had an 

$18 million savings from what we would have already spent, and 

a lot of other examples that way. General Phillips is well aware of 

that. He is over there to do his command mission for the joint contracting, but one of his specific strategic objectives is to appropriately expand the use of that reach-back technique for what we 

are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And that is into Afghanistan as we move 

a greater obligation there, expand that? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you. 

General THOMPSON. Bill Phillips has got responsibility, Congressman, for both the contracting in Iraq and in Afghanistan. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I will defer. 

Mr. MORAN. Ms. Kaptur. 

COST OF CONTRACTORS

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, General. I am sorry I wasn’t here a little bit earlier. 

I had two other briefings and meetings I had to attend. 

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I am very interested in the subject of contracting, and you have 

a very difficult job. 

I wanted to ask you for the record, do you have the most recent 

numbers of the number of contractors employed in Iraq versus— 

hired by our military—versus the number of individuals who are, 

as you have, dedicated their lives to the military in the regular 

force? Could you provide those numbers for the record? And could 

you tell me off the top of your head are those numbers of contractors increasing or decreasing at this point as a percent of total 

budget? 

General THOMPSON. We talked about those numbers before you 

had the opportunity to join us, because that question came up already. I can restate that, but I plan on leaving those numbers behind with the latest DOD report. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. Are those numbers increasing? 

General THOMPSON. I don’t know. I will check before we leave 

here and somebody go back and look at the notes. I don’t know 

what the trend has been in the last year, for example. I want to 

give you the most relevant information. 

My recollection is that they have been fairly steady for the last 

couple of years, not increasing dramatically but fairly steady over 

the last couple of years. 

Ms. KAPTUR. According to the numbers I have, from the period 

of 2000 to 2007, the Army’s spending on contracted services grew 

by 183 percent in constant dollars while spending on military and 

civilian personnel salaries grew by 5 percent. The personnel salaries of the Army’s budget were 31 percent, had fallen to 15 percent 

of the total, and contracted services from the year 2000 to date rose 

from 15 percent to now 20 percent of the total. And in October of 

2008, Nelson Ford, then Under Secretary of the Army, made this 

statement—I don’t know if others have put this in. 

Mr. MORAN. We have discussed it. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Okay. So my question is, what steps is the Army 

taking to understand its reliance on contractors? 

General THOMPSON. To the specific numbers, ma’am, having a 

little bit of an operations research background, I always ask what 

was the source of the information. And I think we probably need 

to get with that and reconcile that with the committee staffers to 

make sure of the numbers. But not arguing about the percentages. 

I can say, no matter what database they came from, that the 

spending on contracted services has grown faster than the percent 

that we have spent on military pay. 

As I indicated earlier, we started in 2005 to get our arms around 

the number of contractors, full-time equivalents, that work for the 

Army. Dr. Anderson, who I introduced earlier, has built that database over time. 

Our process right now is, as we look at our authorization documents for the organizations in the Army, we don’t just look at how 

many military are there or Department of the Army civilians. We 

also look at how many contract employees they have and should 

they be contract employees. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Do you look at salary levels and compensation? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, ma’am. 

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Ms. KAPTUR. That will be in this document or material given to 

the committee? 

General THOMPSON. It can be. We can come back to your staffers 

or the professional staffers on the committee with Dr. Anderson 

and show you our process to evaluate that. 

But it is what is the work to be done, simplistically. What is the 

right mix, military, government or civilian, to do that? A lot of that 

is driven by the dollars available. So if I got somebody that is picking up trash on an installation, we will pay them an appropriate 

salary to pick up the trash that goes through a justification process 

to make sure that is a fair salary to pay, a fair contracted price 

to pay. All that is done in conjunction with the proper auditors and 

the Defense Contract Management Agency. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, I don’t want to repeat what others may have 

said earlier, but I am very, very interested in the costs to the taxpayers of the United States of increasing reliance on contractors, 

and I am very interested in contracted work force. I have asked for 

that information in the past. I am still interested in that. And I 

am interested in compensation levels. 

So I would be very interested in the meals. I am interested in 

the whole deal. But I am particularly interested in the contracted 

forces and what has happened since the year of 2000 to date, and 

I am interested in those compensation and benefit levels. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Ms. Kaptur. 

The $35 billion, which represents the 183 percent increase in 

contract personnel, is comprised of almost 400,000 people. But if 

that includes all the foreign nationals who are paid virtually nothing in terms of U.S. dollars, $10,000, $15,000, $20,000 at the most, 

which of course has much more purchasing power in their country 

of origin, but it is an average figure of $100,000 that probably 

masks some great disparities in terms of compensation levels. So 

I think what Ms. Kaptur and the Committee would like is to break 

some of those numbers down. 

For example, what do the average American contract service person get per person compensation? What does the foreign national 

get? And maybe break them down by security or professional category so that we can get our hands around this to see what is a 

typical kind of compensation for these personnel. Because just to 

say 400,000 and 35 billion, doesn’t really give us much insight into 

whether it is appropriate or not. 

General THOMPSON. I think that is definitely a fair question. 

That is analysis we can do. 

Again, it comes back to what is the source of the information, 

and you’ve got to come to agreement on where the data came from 

and how we pulled it. Otherwise, we could be talking past one another. 

But, back to the point, roughly half of the contractors in theater 

are the local and host country nationals who do make a salary at 

the lower end of the wage scale. And it is done not just because 

we need the work done, but it is also done so that they have jobs 

and they don’t become insurgents themselves and they begin to rebuild their own economy as well. 

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Mr. MORAN. We are not arguing about that policy. I don’t think 

that is at issue. 

Did you want to continue to pass, Mr. Visclosky? 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I will keep passing. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Bishop. 

INSOURCING/OUTSOURCING

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

Let me also extend my welcome to you, General Thompson. 

I want to talk about, at least inquire about, outsourcing, about 

insourcing and also about some contingency contract problems. The 

2008 Defense Authorization Bill required that the services take an 

inventory of the contracts; and, of course, the Army did that and 

was fairly aggressive I think with some push from our subcommittee; and I think you had some initial findings. 

As I understand it, you reviewed your contractor positions; and 

you discovered there were a number of inherently governmental 

functions that were in fact performed by contractors. I want to ask 

you what do you as a military person identify as the dangers of relying on contractors for inherently governmental functions, and in 

your review were you able to convert some of those positions thus 

far from contract positions to government positions? And what are 

the financial implications that you have been able to determine 

were the result of either utilizing the contractors for governmental 

functions or switching back and if that was a cost saving. And 

what are the factors that you are using to determine what the mission needs are with regard to governmental functions or for contractors or government personnel? 

General THOMPSON. Let me start, Congressman, and I think I 

will get answers to all of those questions, and if I don’t, just remind 

me, and I will come back to it. 

We have a very deliberate process, and I gave some of the committee staffers the checklist ahead of time. This is a checklist that 

we go through that has to be signed by a senior official for service 

contract approvals. It starts with the statute and works its way 

down; it is a yes/no checklist. 

I will just give you an example looking at the checklist for inherently governmental. 

Here is an example: Does the function involve contractors providing legal advice and interpretations of regulations and statutes? 

Does the contract involve the direct conduct of criminal investigations? Does it involve the conduct of foreign relations? Determination of Federal program priorities for budget requests. 

Those are just examples of a very comprehensive checklist. You 

must answer no to all of those, or you cannot contract it out, because by the definition we determine that to be inherently governmental. 

That process is in place. 

Mr. BISHOP. How is that monitored? Is that left to the discretion 

of the local commander? Who decides whether that yes or no answer is sufficient or is accurate? 

General THOMPSON. It is the appropriate level of approval authority depending on the contract value, in most cases. For example, I, for the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisimstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

323 

tion who I work for, have the approval authority for services contracts over a certain dollar threshold. 

Mr. BISHOP. What is that dollar threshold? 

General THOMPSON. That dollar threshold is $250 million. That 

is not just one year. That is multiple years in some cases. So any 

request for a services contract that exceeds that threshold has to 

come to me, and with that packet comes this checklist. 

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. So if they do it incrementally and it does not 

exceed that amount, it means who under you without having to get 

your approval has the discretion to make that decision, if they decide to do it, say, in $500,000 increments or $250,000 increments 

or $1 million increments or $10 million increments? What kind of 

checks and balances do we have there so we know they are not 

done incrementally to get around the approval of a sharp eye like 

yours? 

General THOMPSON. It is against our policy to do things incrementally because that is really not meeting the intent. The approval authorities for those service contract thresholds below me 

are depending on the dollar value. 

INCREMENTAL CONTRACTS

Mr. BISHOP. The Gansler commission found that there were a 

number of incremental contracts, in fact, an excessive number, in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, and they found that was a problem because 

it caused unnecessary workload, inefficient operations, and limited 

the contracting officer’s ability to achieve a better bargain. Now, 

apparently it may have been against your policies to do it but the 

Gansler commission found that it was very common practice that 

was being done. Some of them were funded monthly, and some of 

them even on more shorter intervals than monthly. 

General THOMPSON. A couple of points. There is no threshold on 

the checklist. Every services contract has got to have that checklist 

gone through, and it is part of the contract file, and so you make 

it part of the record on who approved that, it could be a $2 contract 

or a $250 million contract. I don’t have any specific examples. If 

we had specific examples of somebody that was trying to break 

apart a contract in multiple increments to get underneath the 

threshold, we would deal with that appropriately. We would deal 

with that appropriately administratively or legally or criminally if 

it came to that. 

Mr. BISHOP. But the discretion is that the command level, the 

unit level, brigade level? 

General THOMPSON. It is typically at the general officer or the 

SES equivalent level. 

Mr. BISHOP. That doesn’t depend on an amount? 

General THOMPSON. No, it doesn’t. The principal assistants responsible for contracting in the government are the senior procurement officials who have the most expertise in compliance with the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation and all of the policies that exist. 

Mr. BISHOP. But all of that has been thrown out for the most 

part with Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly at the beginning of 

the effort with the no-bid, sole-source contracts. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I don’t think it has been thrown out, 

and to make sure we are complying with that, our Army audit 

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324 

agency is doing an audit on that very issue just to make sure we 

are in compliance. We have a team that works for Mr. Harrington, 

a contract operations review team, that goes out and reviews every 

one of our contracting organizations to make sure that they are in 

compliance. That is in addition to the Army Audit Agency, the 

DOD, the Inspector General. 

Mr. BISHOP. That is a relatively recent occurrence, though, only 

after this Committee, through the language that we put in our report, as well as the authorization committee required that you be 

more accountable for that. You weren’t doing it before that, were 

you? 

General THOMPSON. I would say that we have probably paid 

more attention to it since the interest has been there, but it is not 

something that we just started recently. It is part of the process. 

The detailed checklist is relatively new because of the emphasis 

there, and that has been put in place within in the last year. 

Mr. ANDERSON. Since June. 

General THOMPSON. Within the last year. 

Mr. BISHOP. Since June, did I hear him say? 

General THOMPSON. Yes. 

Mr. MORAN. That was 7 years on, but thank you very much, Mr. 

Bishop, for your line of inquiry. 

I would wonder, General, if you might pass that checklist 

around. It appears to be the kind of checklist this Committee was 

pursuing. And it is strange that it is the only Army that has it, but 

it is the kind of checklist that we need so as to define what should 

be inherently governmental work in terms of classification. So if 

you would just pass that around to the Members and give it to the 

staff at some point. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Mr. Chairman, could the staff get it and copy 

it and see that we all get it? 

Mr. MORAN. Yes. 

General THOMPSON. We did give a copy to Ms. Reese but we will 

provide additional copies. 

[The information follows:] 

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333 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Young, you had a request you wanted to make 

at this point. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, what I discussed with you off the 

record was whether or not it would be any advantage to the Committee or if it would be a task so large that I shouldn’t ask for it 

to have a list of all of the contractors employed by the Department 

of Defense and how many people they employ and what they do. 

I just—I am seeing amazing numbers, and I am just thinking of 

bloated bureaucracies all over the place. 

General, if we were to ask you to provide that for the record, 

would that be an insurmountable assignment? 

General THOMPSON. From an Army perspective, again, going 

back, Congressman, we started to gather that information starting 

in 2005. So we have got a pretty good handle on that information 

in the Army. I don’t know if the other organizations are as far 

along. 

You have got the Web site? 

Mr. ANDERSON. It is on our Web site in a PDF file. 

General THOMPSON. That information for the Army is on a Web 

site that is accessible? 

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, it is an M and RA Web site. 

General THOMPSON. M and RA is the Manpower and Reserve Affairs Assistant Secretary of the Army. So we have got that information for the Army, it is not an onerous burden. 

But, starting in 2005, I will tell you there was a lot of pushback 

when Dr. Anderson and I sat with the Secretary of the Army and 

said, we really need to do this, and he agreed because he knew the 

importance of it to get our arms around this. But it has been a couple of years of work to get this to where we are right now. So if 

the committee would ask the Defense Department to do it, I am not 

sure that other parts of the Defense Department would be happy 

to have that analysis passed. 

Mr. YOUNG. Are you saying this would be available to the Committee online? 

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir. We provided it to Congress last fall, and 

it is also on our Web site so it is available. 

Mr. MORAN. You provided to the authorizing or Appropriations 

Committee? 

Mr. ANDERSON. To both. It was in a hard file, and then we had 

electronic versions. It is a work in progress. We think it is about 

70 percent accurate. That is a guess. 

Mr. MORAN. Seventy percent accurate? 

Mr. ANDERSON. Right. Because we compare it to the your accounting system numbers. We have about 82 billion reported associated with 125,000 and it is important to understand the accounting system counts the total invoice amount of the contract which 

includes other direct costs. We also have direct labor amount, 

which is a portion of that. 

General THOMPSON. You can’t just divide the $82 billion by 

125,000 and get a number. That is why it is important, Congressman, to define the analysis task so we don’t end up with an average number that over or under represents the point we are trying 

to make. 

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Mr. MORAN. The 125,000 you are referring to, if it is not 82 I 

think—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Mr. Chairman—— 

Mr. MORAN. I think that would result in 20 million per contract 

person; so we know that is not accurate. 

General THOMPSON. That is right. 

Mr. MORAN. The information our staff—she does not recall our 

being in receipt of that, but if we could get that, I think that would 

be helpful. 

[The information follows:] 

The contractors and the number of contracted full-time equivalents providing 

services to the Army worldwide are listed in the Army FY2007 Report of Contracts 

for Services, which is available on the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs website at http://www.asamra.army.mil/ref.htm. Included in the report is a list of contracted functions with the number of contractor 

full-time equivalents performing the functions and the total contract costs and direct 

salary costs of the functions. 

SEE ATTACHMENT: FY2007 ARMY INVENTORY OF CONTRACTING CONTRACT

SERVICES

Some important caveats are in order: Because total contract cost and direct labor 

cost are treated as proprietary information when associated with either contract 

number or contractor name, these costs are not listed with contractors providing 

services in the inventory. We are still reviewing and validating the Fiscal Year 2008 

data. 

Ms. Kaptur. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman for yielding. 

I just wanted to ask in the way that information is organized, if 

one goes to that, which categories, how is it arranged? Are we 

going to just look at an accounting list, or are there headings for 

different functions within that? If I am interested in contracted 

force, how easy is that to pick out versus garage collection? What 

are we going to look at when we look at this site? 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MORAN. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Being the newest member on here and having 

done some of the research, the Web site is very convoluted. It is 

not an easy access; it is incomplete. And as he mentioned, they are 

in the process of getting better in formulating. We have been looking at it, and it is coming, but it is not what you want yet. And 

as a teacher— it takes a while. So we have begun the process. 

There are several things you have to compare in chart and form. 

It is not something you are quite looking for, but it is a start, I 

think. 

Mr. MORAN. We will see if we can’t perfect it. But as we understand it, it is only the Army that is even trying to do it. 

Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. That is the point. What has made it so frustrating 

for us is, with different accounting methods, with different methods 

of organizing the data, it has been virtually impossible for us as 

a Committee and for the auditors as well as the Inspectors General 

to sort all of this information out and sometimes we wondered if 

it was intentionally obfuscated so we couldn’t track it and of course 

up until the last couple of years we were not allowed very much 

oversight, and we just begun our serious oversight 2 years ago, and 

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I think that somehow we have got to make sure that we compare 

apples to apples and originals to originals. 

Mr. MORAN. It is an appropriate line of questioning. So if you 

could get it to us in a way we could get our arms around it intellectually to understand what it is we are seeing, it would be very 

helpful to this Committee. 

General THOMPSON. And to all of the members of the Committee, 

Mr. Chairman, if you would just define for us the questions you 

think you want answered, we will go out of our way to give you 

access to all of that information and to make sure we are talking 

apples to apples, not passed from one to another, because it is not 

helpful to you or to us if we are throwing out numbers that we 

don’t come from the same frame of reference from the database 

perspective and accounting, et cetera. We want to get this right because it is our responsibility to get it right, and we owe that to you. 

Mr. MORAN. I think the staff may have done that. But the staff 

will give you a clear list of questions that we would like to have 

answered. 

REMARKS OF MS. KAPTUR

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to place this experience on the record. As someone who tried to understand how our 

government had contracted with Blackwater security in Iraq, and 

Mr. Dicks led us on a CODEL. We were in Iraq. We were in Baghdad. And what I found was that the Blackwater contract wasn’t 

under DOD. It was over at the State Department. So even when 

you produce your data set for us, one of my questions is, who is 

contracting for force across this government, and can this Committee access that information from other Committees? Because we 

have people being paid in theater that one would normally think 

would be under the purview of this Committee, and all of a sudden, 

you find it is squished over somewhere else inside the Government 

of the United States, and it was extraordinarily frustrating to try 

to track contracting when it was in other places in this government. So I don’t know how you deal with referral contracts that 

were over at State, for example, and they were doing more than 

just guarding embassy personnel. But I wanted to place that experience on the record so we can get at the full extent of contracted 

force. 

Mr. BISHOP. Will the gentlewoman yield on that point? 

Mr. MORAN. This is getting a little out of order here, but very 

quickly go ahead. 

Mr. BISHOP. If the gentlewoman will recall, I think it was 2 years 

ago that she was only able to get any information about that contracting from Vanity Fair Magazine. 

Mr. FRELINGHYSEN. So the object here is to substitute our military for whatever these people are doing in terms of protective 

services? I sort of want to know where we are going here. I am for 

full disclosure, but with all due respect, when we go over there, 

would you rather have our soldiers doing that? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Yes. 

Mr. FRELINGHYSEN. All right, I just sort of wanted to know that 

so—— 

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Ms. KAPTUR. I want to understand who it is providing force, certainly inside theater, but in any place relating to our Department 

of Defense, I want to know who they are. And I found with 

Blackwater, all of a sudden it vaporized, and it was over at the Department of State. At least that is what we were told, and it was 

very hard to find it inside of DOD and how all of that happened. 

Mr. MORAN. The decision as to the allocation of security personnel wasn’t made by General Thompson, but what we are trying 

to get here is a handle on the scope of contracting out, the imbalance, et cetera. And we are really primarily talking about the Army 

here. So if we could develop kind of a best practices approach to 

at least providing the Committee with relevant information, I think 

that would be helpful. And then we can ask other military services 

to do the same so that we can get our handle—our arms around 

the scope of this, and that will yield to some policy conclusions. But 

at this point if we can get information as to at least the Army’s 

contracting, as Mr. Young has suggested, in a way that we can understand, we would very much appreciate that, General. 

And at this time, let us turn to Mr. Kingston. 

Mr. Kingston. 

BECOMING PRIVATE CONTRACTORS

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I just want to say I represent the Third Infantry in 

Hinesville, Georgia, Savannah, at Fort Stewart. I know a lot of the 

retired soldiers actually are able to be effective by becoming private 

contractors, and the ones I know are really great, top notch people. 

Most of them didn’t even want to get out of the Army, but as you 

know, there is a kind of retirement timeline. So it might be helpful 

for you for the record to outline the advantages because I know of 

so many really young people who are now out of the Army but 

want to stay involved in Iraq, believe in the mission, are dedicated 

to the mission, doing a great job, working side by side with soldiers 

right now, and it could be good just for you to outline some of the 

advantages of using contractors because I don’t think we talk about 

it that much. And there are mistakes that are made by contractors, 

just as there are by men and women active duty in uniform, but 

the ones that get the headlines are the mistakes, not the good 

work. However, I actually wanted—so if you could submit that for 

the record, that will be very helpful, I think. 

General THOMPSON. A point would be that part of our recruiting 

efforts for the Army are to look at those men and women who have 

served in uniform that because of retirement eligibility or just for 

personal reasons decided to not wear the uniform anymore. We 

have active programs to recruit them if they are good people, most 

of them are or they wouldn’t get through all of the wickets, to continue to work for us. I do that personally. I have a lot of senior officers, for example, in the acquisition workforce that, when they do 

decide it is time to retire, I try to encourage them to look for the 

federal civilian opportunities to continue to work for us because it 

takes 20, 25 years to develop that kind of a skill set, and you don’t 

want to let that skill set go. So that is part of the routine for us, 

not just in the acquisition workforce. 

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Mr. KINGSTON. And also when they return to service wearing a 

contractor’s hat, so to speak, they actually have some flexibility 

which they did not have when they were in the Army. And it also 

gives you flexibility that, if you don’t need them, you don’t hire 

them. But there are a lot of people who actually don’t make colonel 

or general, and they are forced to retire, and yet they have lots to 

offer, lots of good productivity. 

General THOMPSON. I agree 100 percent. 

PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

Mr. KINGSTON. Actually, my question, though, is in a different direction. In terms of procurement, when we earmark things—and I 

have been with lots of military procurement people, and I will 

say—I will ask a rhetorical question, how many of you think the 

Army or Navy or whatever procurement system is in great shape? 

Zero hands go up. 

And I understand everybody thinks there is room for improvement. But when we earmark stuff in the budget, often it is because 

of a frustration with procurement. And this committee was known, 

I guess, as the one who really pushed for the Predator, for example, 

and there are other weapons systems, and I can tell you some other 

stories, as I am sure everybody here can, but I think all of us really 

try to vet the earmarks. 

There is this public perception that, oh, you know, you like somebody, they are a supporter, you want to earmark. I don’t think anybody, Democrat or Republican, does that, particularly on this committee. We vet it. We shop it around at Pentagon. Is this really the 

gizmo that you want? Because there is really only one private company that could supply it or manufacture it or whatever, and we 

have to earmark it. Does this help the system or does this undermine the system? And you are kind of darned if you do and darned 

if you don’t, but is there a growing problem or a growing solution 

with DOD earmarks? 

General THOMPSON. Well, earmarks do indicate the intent of the 

Congress, and we execute on those earmarks for the most part. The 

strategic objective though is full and open competition wherever we 

can do it. So roughly two-thirds of all of our contract actions are 

full and open competition. They are very strict. There are seven 

provisions that allow you to not do full and open competition. 

Those things again have to be approved all the way up to the Assistant Secretary level or the DOD level in some cases so the arching principle is full and open competition so that everybody out 

there has an opportunity to compete for that product or services. 

And that is the overarching objective in every acquisition decision 

we make, and we only do not do full and open competition by exception. 

Mr. KINGSTON. So are earmarks good or bad? I would never ask 

you to answer that in a yes or no, General. But I can tell you 

that—— 

General THOMPSON. It depends. 

Mr. KINGSTON. We all have seen earmarks that have done something very helpful. 

General THOMPSON. That is true. 

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Mr. KINGSTON. Yet I think all of us would like to think, hey, if 

this is a good system, it doesn’t need an earmark because the Army 

is going to go after it anyhow but the problem is the Army doesn’t, 

and many times these are your small entrepreneurial inventors 

that come up with the idea and, it is something that the soldiers 

on the ground actually do want. But, again, I think most of us vet 

the heck out of this stuff before we thrust it. 

General THOMPSON. We do look for those small innovative solutions. But it has to start with a need for that. And sometimes you 

create a need when you have got an inventive solution, but it has 

got to start with the need. And I get a lot of people that talk to 

me at trade shows and things like that, if I could just get you to 

buy this particular product, my answer always is, go back and look 

at our solicitation opportunities, which are open to everybody, and 

compete that product. And I will say that the ones that are good 

are successful, and the ones that are not good are not so successful. 

But I will say for the record, and this is a broad statement and 

I hope it doesn’t get me into too much trouble here, a lot of people 

oversell the value of their product or service. And when you bore 

into it and you look at it objectively with set criteria that we do 

for all of our contracts, the ones that are good come to the top, and 

the ones that are not so good come to the bottom. And if somebody 

feels like they haven’t gotten a fair shot, they have appropriate 

remedies to include a protest of our action that goes to GAO, and 

we fairly adjudicate that. So I think the proper checks and balances are in the system. The outcomes of those checks and balances are not always in the government’s favor or the contractor’s 

favor but they are fair. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, we want to work with you if there is a better way for us to do earmarks, something we should know, we want 

to work closely with you because we don’t want to be embarrassed, 

and we don’t want you to be embarrassed, and we certainly don’t 

want to waste taxpayers’ money, but we also philosophically believe 

in the legislative branch’s prerogative to put in an earmark because almost everyone understands in Washington and almost no 

one understands outside of Washington that the Pentagon budget 

is the President’s budget, and whether you are of his party or the 

other party, you may have some disagreements as to that budget. 

So the equal branch of government, the legislative branch, should 

be able to do earmarks. But if there is anything we need to know 

that we can do better, I think all of us would like to work with you 

on that. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Kingston. 

Mr. Hinchey. 

REMARKS OF MR. HINCHEY

Mr. HINCHEY. General, thanks very much. 

I really appreciated the response that you have given to these 

questions. And I think we are dealing with a very difficult set of 

circumstances that has evolved over the course of the, well, last 

several years, and there are a number of examples of that. Yesterday I had a meeting with the Secretary of the Army, Secretary 

Geren, at the West Point Board of Visitors meeting. And one of the 

things that he was talking about was the number of suicides that 

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have occurred and how that number of suicides has been at record 

proportions, last year particularly, and how it even jumped up in 

January of this year. So I assume that that is something that you 

and other leaders in the Army are deeply concerned about, and I 

think that we would appreciate any insight that you might be able 

to give us with regard to that problem and how it can be dealt 

with. 

For example, and this is not the critical example, but I understand that the investment in personnel in the military as a matter 

of the function of the budget has dropped from 31 percent of the 

Army’s budget to 15 percent of the budget over the course of the 

years 2000 to 2007. Now, that is something that I think ought to 

get some attention. So anything that you and the other people in 

the Army who are focusing on that issue can provide us with information so that we could be helpful, I think would be something 

very significant, and I would appreciate that very much, if you 

have any comment on that. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, to your question on the suicides, it is 

something that the entire Army takes very seriously, and there are 

comprehensive plans in place. We are even increasing the level of 

effort to make sure that the numbers don’t go in the wrong direction; they go down as they should be. From the medical help that 

is there and the personnel community is doing all the things they 

need to do to reach out to the right psychologists and psychiatrists 

and social service providers, a significant investment. This is not 

an area that is directly under my purview, but it is something we 

take very seriously. I know there are a number of plans in place, 

I am just not the right person to talk about those plans. 

To the question on the percent of the pay, again, it is, how do 

those numbers get derived? I used to be the Army’s programmer 

in my former job, and that is the individual that has got responsibility for the 5- or the 6-year plan and where the Army puts all 

of its money; it balances its portfolio. So, again I don’t recognize 

that 15 percent number. My recollection, and it is still pretty true 

today, is that about 42 or 43 percent of the Army’s total dollars in 

its base program are spent on military pay, but that military pay 

is not just salaries. That is also retirement accrual and health benefits and reenlistment bonuses, et cetera. I don’t recognize that 15 

percent number. I have to determine how we got that, and so that 

is the issue of defining the question we are asking here. 

Mr. MORAN. General, that is just pay. It is not benefits; it is pure 

pay. 

General THOMPSON. Okay. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Anything further? 

General THOMPSON. No, sir. Unless I have got something I didn’t 

answer that you asked me. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Well, I appreciate the answer and I appreciate the 

focus of attention on it because it is something that has to be—— 

General THOMPSON. It has to be addressed. 

Mr. HINCHEY. The Army’s obligation on contracts has essentially 

tripled over the course of the last several years. It rose from 18 billion to 54 billion, just gone up three times. What do you see happening in the future? Do you continue to see that kind of thing to 

continue to develop or is it going to change? Now, I know that 

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there is a whole set of circumstances relating to the situation in 

Iraq and Afghanistan which promoted this kind of a set of circumstances. And while those conditions there continue, while we 

continue to have to deal with them, probably some of that is going 

to have to change but not very much. But the situation here with 

contractors, I think, is causing a great deal of concern, and I am 

just wondering what you think about that and what you think that 

this issue might—how it might change, how it might not change, 

what will be the set of the circumstances over the course of the 

next couple of years. 

General THOMPSON. The number of contractors that we need in 

order to get the work done, whether it is in the Middle East or 

someplace else, it depends on the work that needs to get done. As 

we draw down our presence in Iraq, we will have fewer military 

and fewer contractors in Iraq. As we grow our presence in Afghanistan, the number of military is going to go up; the number of contractors is going to go up. It takes years to grow the military. The 

Army is on a path to grow the size of the active Army and the Reserve components. From the active component, it is to increase to 

about 547,000. We are going to get there quicker than we thought, 

but it was going to take us a couple of years in order to grow that. 

So when you don’t have enough military to do the work that needs 

to get done, then you need to appropriately contract for that in 

order to get the work done. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Well, this is the first time that we have had an 

alleged war and we didn’t have the kind of active recruitment that 

you normally have. You are just relying on volunteers, and that is 

the basic problem. And in addition to that broad analysis, you have 

also had to deal with the situation of the decline in the quality and 

the value of the people who were being recruited or absorbed into 

the Army, taken into the Army, and I know that that has been a 

problem, something that you have had to deal with; you and others 

have had to deal with. So the situation with regard to the contractors is the main focus of attention right now. 

What is the kind of oversight that you have on the activity of 

these contractors, the kind of oversight that they deliver in places 

like Iraq, for example? 

General THOMPSON. Every contract that we have got has got a 

statement of work, duties that that contractor is supposed to perform. And there is oversight. The contracting officer doesn’t always 

do that him or herself because that is too much of a responsibility. 

The Defense Contract Management Agency has a responsibility primarily for the weapons systems contracts, but they are now doing 

quite a bit of the service contract in theater. And then we have individuals that are not part of the professional workforce that are 

contracting officer representatives. And it is those people, as an example, if you are on a forward-operating base in Iraq and a contractor is there to pick up trash three times a day, somebody has 

got the responsibility to make sure that contractor is picking up 

the trash three times a day and not just once a day because that 

is what the terms of the contract specify. And if they perform satisfactorily to the terms of the contracts, they get paid appropriately, 

and if they don’t, there are remedies that are taken. So there is a 

check and balance taking place. 

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Mr. HINCHEY. Based on experience, what is the real outcome 

there? What you are talking about is the general way that it is 

supposed to behave, but we have seen a number of examples of bad 

behavior on the part of the contractors, and this bad behavior causing a host of serious problems. 

General THOMPSON. The seriousness of the issue from 2003 to 

2006 was because there was not contracting officer representatives 

assigned to every contract. That was one of the reasons that we 

had so many cases of fraud and abuse during that timeframe. I can 

say today that, starting in Kuwait, there is a contracting officer 

representative assigned to every contract. So we do that. That is 

the way it should be done. Nothing is ever 100 percent but damn 

near 100 percent that is being done today in the theater. 

Mr. HINCHEY. But you know you have got more oversight on the 

regular military personnel than you do on the contractors, don’t 

you? 

General THOMPSON. Sure you do. You have got a uniform code 

of military justice. But the change in policy in the last couple of 

years is the contractors over there are subject to the discipline as 

well. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Let me ask you one more small specific question. 

Do you think it is appropriate to have contractors in charge of security operations at places like West Point and other military academies? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, I do. 

Mr. HINCHEY. You do? 

General THOMPSON. I do. As long as the government has got the 

ultimate responsibility for that. But to pay a security guard to 

check passes coming in and out of an installation like West Point, 

you can’t just compare the cost of that security guard to the cost 

of a soldier doing that, because the soldier has got nonsalary benefits. It has got retirement accrual benefits and health care benefits. 

The cost of the security guard as a contractor is a fully burdened 

cost. If you want to compare that to the cost of a soldier doing that, 

you have got to compare apples to apples with fully burdened cost. 

We make those kind of business case analyses all the time. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Are you saying that the contractors do a better job 

than a military personnel would do in security operations? 

General THOMPSON. I did not say that. I did not imply that. You 

asked me if it is appropriate for them to do that, and I do think 

it is appropriate with the right oversight. We set the standards for 

the force protection aspects around West Point and all of our installations. Some Department of the Army civilian police, some contracted security force, some military police on some installations— 

we expect them to do that. 

Years ago, we had a lot of military police on our installations 

doing traffic control and security. We don’t have as many today 

doing that because the demands of the operational environment in 

the Middle East primarily have caused us to use the military police 

in their military-only roles and not in a role that could be done by 

a private security contractor. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Hinchey. 

Mr. Young. 

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Mr. YOUNG. Yes. Mr. Chairman, the conversation that we had a 

little bit earlier on the list of contractors, Ms. Kilpatrick makes a 

good point. What is on the Web, unless you have some way to 

break the code, it is pretty hard to understand. So what I would 

like to do is make a formal request for what we discussed a few 

minutes ago, that you provide us for the record a list of contractors 

that provide services to the Army worldwide; identify the function 

for each contractor; in other words, what they are doing for you, 

identify the total contract cost; and break it down so that we know 

the number of employees employed by the contractor and what the 

personnel cost is. 

General THOMPSON. That is doable. I am just looking behind here 

to the guy that is going to have to lead that work. He is nodding, 

we can do that, so we will sign up for that as a team. 

Okay, John? 

[The information follows:] 

The contractors and the number of contracted full-time equivalents providing 

services to the Army worldwide are listed in the Army FY2007 Report of Contracts 

for Services, which is available on the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs website at http://www.asamra.army.mil/ref.htm. Included in the report is a list of contracted functions with the number of contractor 

full-time equivalents performing the functions and the total contract costs and direct 

salary costs of the functions. 

SEE ATTACHMENT: FY2007 ARMY INVENTORY OF CONTRACTING CONTRACT

SERVICES

Some important caveats are in order: Because total contract cost and direct labor 

cost are treated as proprietary information when associated with either contract 

number or contractor name, these costs are not listed with contractors providing 

services in the inventory. We are still reviewing and validating the Fiscal Year 2008 

data. 

Mr. MORAN. Very well and within a timely timeframe. 

General THOMPSON. No doubt, if we could have a little leeway to 

negotiate that timeline with you, so that it is reasonable for you 

and reasonable for us. 

Mr. MORAN. But it would be helpful to have those numbers available for the 2010 budget consideration. 

General THOMPSON. Right. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Visclosky. 

PAY SCALE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL VS. CONTRACTORS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much. 

In a sense, the question has been covered, and I know you and 

Ms. Kaptur talked about it, too, but I have just a general question 

about wage rates and understanding your interchange with Mr. 

Hinchey that you have to factor in all of the cost of that military 

personnel. Is there a broad differential as far as what contractors 

in places like Iraq and Afghanistan are being paid compared to 

military personnel? 

I assume there is a variance position to position. But, of course, 

we hear the exaggerated exception to the rule where you have a 

military personnel doing a function and is getting paid in the high 

20s and a contractor in the same room with this military getting 

$120,000. Is there a wide discrepancy? Because at some point, you 

are still paying more for a contractor. And will some of these tables 

that are being requested reflect those salary levels? 

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General THOMPSON. We spend a lot of time with differences of 

opinion. It would be easy to say, and I am making this up and I 

am giving you an example, to say that Sergeant Thompson gets 

$50,000 a year as salary and yet there is a guy—a maintenance 

guy, I fix Bradleys or I fix helicopters, and there is a contracted 

field service rep there that is making $150,000 a year. That is a 

fully burdened cost for that contractor. That includes retirement 

benefits and the war differential they are getting for being in 

harm’s way. The soldier also gets danger pay, and he also has 

health care benefits and a housing allowance that is tax free. So 

you have got to make a fair comparison. And it is easy to say this 

guy is making $150,000 a year, and I am making $50,000, and that 

is not fair. You have got to put it in context. For the same kind 

of work, you can make a fair comparison, I think. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Can I ask it a different way? For the person making $120,000 and, again we are talking hypothetically here, 

that is cash in the pocket compared to the sergeant making 

$50,000 plus benefits that may equal $120,000 but the contractor 

employee, I assume, will have some health care benefits and some 

type of thrift plan that the company will provide for. He is probably 

getting some housing that is allotted to him added onto that 

$120,000. 

General THOMPSON. The operative question I always ask if I 

have got a contracted employee working is what is the burden cost 

for that employee. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And we are paying the contractor every penny on 

that and the contractor is making a profit on that employee. 

General THOMPSON. I will give you an example. On my immediate staff, when I first got to the position that I am in now, we 

had 11 different management support contract instruments in 

place supporting the acquisition function at the headquarters of the 

Department of the Army. I said, what are we doing? We have now 

reduced that to two and on a glide-path to go to one because I want 

to pay one set of overhead if I need that kind of function and not 

11. And I asked the operative question, what is the burden cost of 

that? 

So I may be paying somebody $150,000, but the profit and the 

GNA and all of that that goes with that it may be $250,000. And 

so the question to ask for everybody, not just the Congress, but for 

everybody, is, am I getting a fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay? 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And I would ask two other questions related to 

the salary because I want to make sure that person is working for 

me and not loyal to somebody else. I am not saying anybody who 

is working for a contractor isn’t loyal to the United States of America, but you have got somebody in a uniform who, essentially, when 

they take that oath and put on that uniform, they are risking their 

life, and they are making less money. On the issue of the Gansler 

Commission, it is suggested it is going to take 3 to 5 years to hire 

additional personnel and training. If there is that pay differential, 

the question is what about the retention of quality trained people? 

I understand people make a career of the military. They retire, and 

then they go over to contractor, but I assume we are losing a lot 

of people on the front end of this, too, if I am sitting in that room, 

and I am seeing somebody make 120,000 plus a thrift plan plus 

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344 

health care plus housing plus a profit. It is not just to get up to 

where we want to be in 3 and 5 years but retaining people. And 

if I am paying $50,000 in cash, and somebody else $120,000 in 

cash, and forgetting the benefits for a second, who is going to attract somebody who may have that additional skill set that I want 

as a Federal employee, as a military employee, keeping an eye on 

the contractor? I want somebody who has the same set of skills and 

more as the government employee working for me keeping an eye 

on them. 

General THOMPSON. I do, too. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. How do we—is there a pay differential here or 

something we have to look at as far as retention and the issue of 

finding those quality people who will work for the government? 

General THOMPSON. We talked earlier, Congressman, about the 

authorities that we have, and I refer back to the section 852. We 

need to, one, value the acquisition workforce more than we have, 

not put them under the spotlight and criticize them constantly because they all are trying to do the best job that they can, but we 

have got the right authorities, I think, to recruit, retain, and train 

those people. We have a lot of programs, for example, where we 

send people off to education opportunities to get master’s degrees, 

to pay back college tuition loans because I want a smarter shopper 

than the other person on the other side of the negotiating table for 

the contract. 

And there are a lot of people in this room, I will use Mr. Harrington as an example, who could and do make more money on the 

outside, but the level of responsibility and authority and the service that you get, you can put a dollar value against it, but that is 

the kind of person that I want both militarily and the Department 

of Army civilian. And I say this to you honestly, and I use this a 

lot when I talk to the workforce: I like my contractors that are 

doing a fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay. I love my government 

workforce, because they are on my team. They have the same set 

of values. Their motivations are more pure. 

And contractors are not evil people, but they have a different set 

of motivations. The ones, as Congressman Kingston alluded to, that 

are former military. They have a different set of allegiances, and 

I like those kind of people that are working for us in a contracted 

capacity because they know what it is like to be shot at and cold 

and hungry and dirty and in harm’s way. So I am giving you more 

a philosophical answer than a specific one. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And I have nothing against contractors. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MORAN. Good line of questioning. Thank you. 

Ms. Kilpatrick. 

BUSINESS REPRESENTATION

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, General, for your service and your time. This has 

been very instructive. I am a new member on the Committee. It 

took an hour and 45 minutes for you to say you love your troops. 

I sincerely needed to hear that. And I never doubted it, but I need 

to hear you say that. 

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345 

General THOMPSON. I mean that sincerely. But sometimes it is 

tough love, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Congress is tough. It is tough here. That is the 

nature of who we are. 

A couple of questions. Of the 266,600 plus troops who are in theater overseas, in Kuwait and other places, how many businesses 

are represented in the 267,000? 

General THOMPSON. I would have to take that one for the record. 

To the specific question that Mr. Young read out earlier, the answer to that question will be in answer to your question. 

[The information follows:] 

SEE ATTACHMENT: FY2007 ARMY INVENTORY OF CONTRACTING CONTRACT

SERVICES (CONTRACTOR TAB) 

This list was compiled by Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. So, in that number and as you prepare that document, we are to understand that, as you talk about the contractors, as you have been doing this morning, those are individuals 

you speak of rather than businesses; is that right, for the most 

part? 

General THOMPSON. That is correct. The number 266,000 is individuals. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I know that is individuals. The discussion this 

morning has been mostly about the individuals and not the businesses themselves. 

I think Mr. Visclosky, our chairperson, our cardinal from Energy 

and Water was going where I went with the Gansler report, which 

talked about what they found that contributed to abuse and neglect 

perhaps, and you are on about fixing that in the Army. We heard 

earlier from one of the other branches of services this week who 

said their contractors did all of that as well including the administrative things as well as researching weapons, as well as monitoring those weapons, and doing the reporting back. I heard you 

say a little while ago that your report back of the monitoring of the 

monitor will be an Army personnel; is that right? Or is it a contractor monitoring their contracting obligation? 

General THOMPSON. The way I would answer that, ma’am, is to 

those things that are inherently governmental, there is a government employee, military or Department of Defense civilian that is 

at the head of that approval process. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. But the report found some abuse there and that 

contractors, they do government functions like programs, financial 

management, intelligent analysis, policy making, weaponry, researching. Those are contractor obligations you have been using. 

Are you saying you are not going to use contractors for some of 

those now in the Army? 

General THOMPSON. We want to in-source those things that 

should be done by the government. And if there are cases where 

that is being done by a contractor today, we want to switch that 

and make it done by a government employee. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. So, over the last 7 or 8 years, where contracting 

has increased tremendously and it seems like military and civilian 

personnel has decreased, is it the view of the Army that we do 

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346 

more contracting and less of those dedicated Army civilian DOD 

employees? Is that the move—— 

General THOMPSON. The move is to bring more of that capacity 

in-house but not let the government overhead get too great because, again, it is swinging the pendulum back to what is the right 

balance. I want enough government people to do the job that needs 

to get done and not one person more than that. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I think that is what all of us want. And from 

where I sit, I want more government employees. I want more people who are dedicated and take that oath and wear that uniform, 

civilians and military, to run and be operative in the military. Of 

course, I am not opposed to contracting. I just don’t believe that 

they ought to have more of the $500 billion that we spend. I have 

heard in my own district from soldiers, who are next to and done 

their third deployment, an armed uniform person side by side by 

the contractor who does get two or three times the pay. You mentioned the fringe benefits that they get. They don’t think it is right. 

And you have not mentioned it this morning, but you have got to 

feel some of that as well. 

I didn’t like your opening remarks. I can read that, and I am a 

reader; I can read those on the airplane. But what we have been 

talking about for the last 2 hours is what I want you to sit there 

and talk to us about because that is really the meat of who we are 

as a Nation and what our military service—we have got to understand what you do and who you are because many of our colleagues 

think $500 billion for Defense, is too much, and the Congress 

should cut it. I don’t care what they are doing. So I, as a new appropriator to this Committee and 10 years on the Appropriations 

Committee, I want the real information. 

We don’t have a lot of time, and you have been pretty straight 

with us, and I appreciate your staff. But as I sit here and I try to 

learn, and I am like a CRS 101 just trying to keep up; I need you 

to give it to me straight. And when I read and have a question, I 

really want to know. And about those 267,000 contractors I do 

want to know if it is the top 10 companies—I have a list here of 

the top 20, and since 2003, one particular company got $5 billion 

plus dollars, many of them contractors. Why? There are men and 

women all over the country, and we want to help you with a strong 

military uniformed American force that will raise their hand and 

commit their lives. We want you to help you with that, and I want 

you to count on me. 

General THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Kilpatrick. 

We need to vacate this room within a few minutes. They are 

going to need it for logistics of putting together the stimulus bill. 

So we will conclude this hearing at this point. 

We do want to thank the Army for being as responsive to the 

subcommittee’s questions and concerns as you have been. So we 

thank you, General Thompson, and I think the best that we could 

hope for is to get kind of a best practices approach to getting a handle on how much is being spent and the manner which it is being 

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347 

spent so that we can a apply that to the Air Force and the Navy. 

They are not as far along as the Army is. 

And it is not that there is any vendetta against contracting. I 

would hope we have made that clear that there needs to be a balance between in-force personnel and contracted-out personnel. But 

at this point, we really haven’t had much control upon the way in 

which the money was being spent, and when we realized that there 

were more contract personnel in Iraq than there were uniformed 

and regular civilian personnel, it naturally raised a great deal of 

concern on the part of all the Members. 

So, once we get that information, we can address it in the 2010 

appropriations bill. And we appreciate you certainly having this 

forum. That is the best step yet in terms of helping us to define 

what is and should be inherently governmental. And we appreciate 

your being willing to disclose the information on what contractors 

this subcommittee is funding, and we will move forward from here. 

So this has been a very informative hearing. We appreciate your 

testimony, General Thompson, and those of the fine professionals 

that backed you up on it. 

General THOMPSON. Congressman, I just want to say thank you 

to the members of the committee. Every time I have been before 

this committee, and it has been more than once, or dialogue with 

the Members or the staffers related to issues, it has been an honest 

exchange, and the committee has always been supportive of the 

military and the Army, in particular. My promise to you is to be 

forthright and share the information so we can come to the best decisions for the country. 

Mr. MORAN. Very good. Thank you, General. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the 

questions thereto follow.] 

CONTRACTOR SERVICE PROVIDERS

Question. Please list the contractors providing services to the Army worldwide. 

For each: 

• List the number of contracted personnel in terms of full-time equivalents. 

• Identify the contract function by describing the type of work performed. 

• Provide total contract cost and identify direct salary costs. 

Answer. The contractors and the number of contracted full-time equivalents providing services to the Army worldwide are listed in the Army FY2007 Report of Contracts for Services, which is available on the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Manpower and Reserve Affairs website at http://www.asamra.army.mil/ref.htm. 

Included in the report is a list of contracted functions with the number of contractor 

full-time equivalents performing the functions and the total contract costs and direct 

salary costs of the functions. 

SEE ATTACHMENT: FY2007 ARMY INVENTORY OF CONTRACTING CONTRACT

SERVICES

Some important caveats are in order: Because total contract cost and direct labor 

cost are treated as proprietary information when associated with either contract 

number or contractor name, these costs are not listed with contractors providing 

services in the inventory. We are still reviewing and validating the Fiscal Year 2008 

data. 

Question. Has Army done mission analysis and/or a study of roles and missions 

that includes consideration of the role that contractors should play? 

Answer. The Army, the Joint Staff and DoD have engaged in a number of working 

group efforts and studies to analyze the proper roles and missions of contractors. 

Some of these efforts resulted in guidance, such as the DoD Instruction 1100.22, 

Guidance for Determining Workforce Mix; a 2005 RAND Study, How Should the 

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Army Use Contractors on the Battlefield; and a 2005 Secretary Harvey directive to 

establish a contractor manpower inventory to be used for this kind of analysis. The 

Army has used this inventory to comply with the National Defense Authorization 

Act for FY 2008 mandate for such an inventory and is at the very beginning stages 

of doing the kinds of reviews and analyses required by that statute. 

CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT

Question. How does the Army headquarters achieve oversight of contracting that 

is accomplished at Army field locations around the world? 

Answer. The Army has an overarching strategy that provides for the oversight of 

contracting from formation to administration. The Army recently mandated Solicitation Review Boards and Contract Review Boards to implement the Office of Defense 

Procurement policy for Peer Reviews. Standards for the boards are communicated 

through ‘‘toolkits’’ and validated through Procurement Management Reviews. 

Metrics from the approved acquisitions are reported annually back to the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement) (DASA(P)). Army policy stipulates 

that all service contracts contain quality surveillance plans and all service contracts 

valued greater than $2,500 must have an appointed Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) prior to contract award. Moreover, the COR must complete the minimum training standard of the Defense Acquisition University Continuous Learning 

Course ‘‘COR With A Mission Focus’’ (CLC 106); over 19,000 Army civilian and military employees have completed this training through Fiscal Year 2008. In addition 

to training, Army policy mandates that CORs are held accountable for their responsibilities via their performance objectives. Policy instituted in November 2008 also 

mandates oversight performance objectives for contracting personnel. Compliance 

with the Army’s oversight policies is being monitored through routine reporting to 

the DASA(P). All acquisition strategies for services greater than $500 million are 

reviewed and approved by the Army Services Strategy Panel, which is a multi-functional leadership team chaired by DASA(P). 

BASE SUPPORT

Question. The Army reports that a great number of contractors do base support 

in Iraq. What exactly does ‘‘ base support’’ mean? 

Answer. Base Support refers to the resources involved with operating and maintaining Army installations. Base Support accounts fund installation functions such 

as administration; automation support; family programs; morale, welfare and recreation services; real estate leases; environmental conservation and compliance; pollution prevention; facility support services; minor construction; maintenance and repair; audiovisual and visual information production, acquisition and support; demolition and disposal of excess facilities; base communications; and other base operations support services. 

OUTSOURCING

Question. While it may be appropriate to outsource activities when they are to be 

performed at home station, this outsourcing may result in the need to deploy contractors to contingency operations. What steps does the Army take to factor the potential need to deploy contractors into its outsourcing calculation? 

Answer. The Department has preplanned certain capabilities such as the Logistics 

Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) which provides a wide variety of logistics 

and base operations services for the combatant commanders. This program has been 

effective in providing preplanned and negotiated services. There is room for improvement in this area. Two areas of note include contract logistics support (CLS) 

for major weapons systems and certain shortage combat support and facility engineering functions that are highly interrelated to tactical operations. The Army is developing an enhanced manpower estimate reporting (MER) process for acquisition 

systems to examine Contract Logistics Support. Expanding the Army Total Army 

Analysis (TAA) process to include both civilian and contractor requirements on the 

battlefield will improve the latter. 

COMBATANT COMMANDERS ROLE

Question. What role should the combatant commanders play in deciding what 

tasks should be contracted out, particularly for mission essential skills that will be 

needed for a contingency? 

Answer. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 164(b), the combatant commander is responsible 

to the President and Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions assigned 

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to that command by the President and pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 164(c)(1)(C) for organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to 

carry out missions assigned to the command. Additionally, according to 10 U.S.C. 

3013(c), the Secretary of the Army is responsible for ‘‘carrying out the functions of 

the Department of the Army so as to fulfill the current and future operational requirements for the unified and specified combatant commands.’’ The combatant commander requests a particular capability, and the source of labor to perform that mission is determined by the size of the Army and the available force structure. Therefore, the ultimate decision regarding what functions are contracted is made by the 

Department of the Army, not by the Combatant Commander. 

LEAD SYSTEMS INTEGRATORS

Question. The Army Future Combat Systems (FCS) Program has contracted for 

a lead Systems Integrator (LSI) to assist in defining, developing and integrating the 

programs. Employing an LSI was viewed as the best option for program management due to the scope and complexity of the FCS program. Why can’t the Army 

manage all of its own programs rather than use Lead Systems Integrators? 

Answer. The Army has not contracted out the Program Management functions for 

the FCS program. The Army has invested extensive resources in managing the FCS 

Program. The FCS LSI is the prime contractor for the FCS development effort. Just 

as with every other prime contractor relationship within DoD, the prime contractor 

for the FCS Program routinely subcontracts and manages efforts of its subcontractors and suppliers for major components of the acquisition. The FCS Program manager is responsible for and provides program management and oversight to ensure 

government equities are protected. This is evidenced by the assignment of a Major 

General as the Program Manager, the assignment of three flag level (General Officer/Senior Executive Service) Deputies, four 06 (Colonel) level Project Managers, 

twelve 05 (Lieutenant Colonel) level Product Managers, a total of over 80 Army Acquisition Corps officers, and over 1,000 Army civilian Acquisition Corps professionals. Every LSI senior position has an Army leader as a counterpart. Program 

level decisions involving subcontracts are coordinated and agreed to by both Army 

and LSI leaders. 

CONTRACTING OUT

Question. Why does the Army need to contract out for program management, in 

effect hiring a contractor to manage other contractors? 

Answer. With respect to the FCS program, The Army has not contracted out the 

Program Management functions for the FCS Program. The Army has invested extensive resources in managing the FCS Program. The FCS LSI is the prime contractor for the FCS development. Just as with every other prime contractor relationship within DoD, the prime contractor routinely subcontracts and manages efforts 

of suppliers for major components of the acquisition. This does not take away from 

government oversight and management of the program to ensure government equities are protected. This is evidenced by the assignment of a Major General as the 

Program Manager, the assignment of three flag level (General Officer/Senior Executive Service) Deputies, four 06 (Colonel) level Project Managers, twelve 05 (Lieutenant Colonel) level Product Managers, a total of over 80 Army Acquisition Corps officers, and over 1,000 Army civilian Acquisition Corps professionals. Every LSI senior 

position has an Army leader as a counterpart. Program level decisions involving 

subcontracts are coordinated and agreed to by both Army and LSI leaders. 

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Question. Isn’t program management an inherently governmental function? 

Answer. Yes, program management is an inherently governmental function. Army 

has not contracted out program management. 

WEAPON SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

Question. Does the Army have any concerns about its institutional capacity to 

manage its own weapon system programs given this degree of contractor support? 

Answer. Yes and we have taken steps to mitigate these concerns through reducing 

our reliance on contractor support. The Army’s in-sourcing policy has allowed us to 

convert 150 contractor support positions to government employees. We will continue 

to use in-sourcing to reduce our reliance on contractor support. 

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IN-HOUSE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Question. Specifically what has the Army done to expand in-house program management capacity? What more should be done? 

Answer. The Army has acquired and will continue to acquire and train personnel 

in key areas such as systems engineering, network engineering, and software development as well as sustaining program management, contracting, and business management expertise. 

EQUIPPING THE FORCE

Question. The committee understands that the traditional requirements determination process is not responsive enough to provide essential capabilities required 

by deploying units. The committee further understands that the Army has expanded 

the number of ways a unit can request a materiel capability and these are called 

the ‘‘Operational Needs Statement’’ and the ‘‘10 liner’’. 

Isn’t equipping the force the responsibility of the Chief of Staff, Army and the Department of the Army and not the deploying unit? 

Answer. The Secretary of Army has statutory responsibility for equipping Army 

forces. As senior military advisor, the Chief of Staff, Army supervises the execution 

of policies, plans, and programs to include the ‘‘traditional’’ materiel requirements 

determination process known as Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 

System (JCIDS). This process is centered on the deliberate analysis of operational 

concepts set 10–15 years in the future, representing the entire range of military operations our Army may be asked to execute. If capability gaps against potential enemies are identified, analysis of the alternative solutions is conducted to determine 

operational suitability, technical feasibility, and life-cycle affordability. The selected 

solution is then described in sufficient detail to support execution of an acquisition 

program and associated force integration activities such as documenting required 

changes to unit equipment authorizations, ensuring life-cycle sustainment capabilities are emplaced, and establishing Army training plans for operators and commanders that will employ the new capability. Deploying commanders are not responsible for developing, introducing and sustaining new capabilities to their own 

unit or to the Army force at large. Commanders are responsible for conducting mission analysis and requesting any additional resources such as manpower, equipment, direct support affiliations, etc. that they determine are essential to mission 

accomplishment or the safety of their soldiers. 

MATERIEL CAPABILITIES

Question. Why does the Army need three processes to provide materiel capabilities 

for deploying forces? 

Answer. The three processes cited are mutually supporting and not redundant. 

The deliberate requirements determination process is used to design Army units 

and develop the integrated capabilities that those units will need to perform their 

missions over the full range of potential military operations. There is risk inherent 

in this designed force due to the difficulty in analyzing every possible scenario 

against every potential type of enemy. Additional risk is introduced by fiscal realities that preclude development of solutions for every capability gap that can be identified. The Operational Needs Statement (ONS) process provides a mechanism for 

the Army to adjust to a known enemy and a narrower set of capability gaps. In that 

sense, the ONS is part of the Army’s risk mitigation strategy. Operational Commanders conduct mission analysis using actual rather than theoretic intelligence, 

environmental considerations, and assessments of the strengths/weaknesses of their 

own units as well as coalition partners. With this information, the Deploying Commander develops ONS requests to fine-tune his unit to accomplish his assigned mission. The additional equipment or ‘‘new capabilities’’ are provided for that specific 

mission and they do not become a permanent addition to that unit’s authorization 

or design. The Army is constantly assessing and analyzing current operations, to include the requests for additional capabilities, to glean lessons learned that should 

be applied to the designs of the future force. These potential future force improvements are integrated and resourced through the deliberate processes. The Army’s 

Rapid Equipping Force (REF) provides a forward-deployed research and development capability that is focused on finding quick solutions to warfighter problems. 

Deployed soldiers describe these tactical challenges in a simple ‘‘10 Liner’’ format. 

The REF methodology capitalizes on market surveys to identify potential useful 

technologies and rapid prototyping—unit evaluation of the initiatives. The REF does 

not develop integrated solutions for large-scale application. REF Initiatives are assessed for broader applicability to current operations via the ONS process and the 

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potential integration of successful REF solutions with the future force is evaluated 

through introduction to the deliberate requirements determination process. 

OPERATIONAL NEEDS STATEMENT/10 LINER

Question. What is the difference between the Operational Needs Statement and 

the ‘‘10 liner’’? 

Answer. The Operational Needs Statement process is used by deployed or deploying units to request: (1) additional quantities of Army Standard equipment above 

the level they are already authorized, (2) Army Standard equipment that is not normally authorized to that type of unit, or (3) a ‘‘New’’ capability that doesn’t currently 

exist in the Army inventory. This last category can include commercially available 

equipment or software, Other Service equipment, or a capability that must be developed or prototyped because it does not exist in an operational configuration. The 

Army’s ability to provide training and sustainment for the requested equipment is 

an element of the ONS validation/approval process. An ONS request can be satisfied 

or disapproved by any Commander in the chain of command. Validation of the ONS 

at HQDA is essential to access Army resources but does not automatically constitute 

approval to execute as resourcing priorities may force a given request to be documented as an Unfunded Requirement (UFR). Additionally, an ONS request for additional/improved capability may be satisfied with a different solution than requested 

by the Commander. Any proposed ‘‘in lieu of’’ capability is coordinated with the requesting commander to ensure operational suitability. The ‘‘10 Liner’’ submitted by 

a deployed unit is used by the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) to initiate rapid prototyping and/or expedient evaluation of commercial products that have potential to 

solve that particular unit’s problem or ‘‘capability gap’’. REF is limited in the 

amount of resources and the number of interested units that they can provide the 

solution to for use and evaluation. If the initiative is deemed successful by the deployed commanders, an ONS will be submitted to the Army G–3/5/7 to expand the 

initiative to additional units and to initiate Army integration and sustainment planning. 

Question. Who approves each of these processes? 

Answer. The Army’s approval authority for the deliberate requirements determination process (JCIDS) is delegated by the Army Chief of Staff to the Vice Chief 

of Staff (VCSA) and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7. The Army Requirements 

Oversight Council (AROC) process facilitates integration of Army Staff input to the 

VCSA and DCS G–3/5/7 for each materiel capability proposal before it is submitted 

for joint review in the (Joint Requirements Oversight Council) JROC process. The 

approval authority to direct re-distribution of equipment to satisfy Operational 

Needs Statement (ONS) requests exists at each level of command for equipment organic to that organization. Approval authority to apply Army resources for additional procurement as well as to divert or re-distribute equipment at the Army-level, 

in support of ONS requests is the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7. This approval authority is delegated by the Army G–3/5/7 to his subordinate Flag Officers 

and Colonels within resource thresholds. The Army Requirements and Resources 

Board (AR2B) process facilitates integration of Army Staff input for each ONS submitted by an Army Commander and also Joint Urgent Operational Needs submitted 

by Joint Commanders that require Army resources to resolve. The approval authority for a ‘‘10 Liner’’ submitted to the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) for limited prototyping and procurement is the REF Commander (Colonel). REF initiatives are 

briefed to the Army G–3/5/7 within the AR2B process to ensure Army Staff visibility 

for potential expansion or integration opportunities. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 

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(353) 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2009. 

OUTSOURCING 

WITNESS 

HON. GORDON S. HEDDELL, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MORAN [presiding]. All right. The Committee will come to 

order. Mr. Young, we didn’t want to start without you. Ms. Granger, thank you for joining us. Let the record show that we have Vice 

Chairman Dicks on hand here. This morning the Committee will 

hear about the Pentagon’s use of private sector contracts to support 

government functions, often referred to as outsources. We will also 

discuss the acquisition workforce which has been a focus for many 

members of this Committee. 

We are very pleased to welcome Mr. Gordon Heddell who is 

DOD’s acting inspector general, doing a fine job, as well as two expert members of his staff, Mary Ugone and Charles Beardall. We 

know both of them. They are long time pros and we are very happy 

to have you with us. Mr. Heddell and his staff have taken this 

topic very seriously. Their research is thorough. And we are grateful that these folks are with us this morning to answer some of our 

questions and concerns. 

REMARKS OF MR. MORAN

As we all know, DOD has increasingly relied on contracted services activities and functions provided by contract personnel. In the 

year 2000, 26 percent of DOD’s budget was spent on contracted 

service, but today contracted services account for 34 percent of the 

budget. Another indication of DOD’s increasingly large contracts is 

that contractor costs are now greater than compensation costs. 

Prior to 2008, more was spent on personnel compensation than on 

service contract, but this year DOD will spend $43 billion more on 

service contracts than on military and civilian compensation combined. 

Despite this growth, the Secretary of Defense’s Office has yet to 

establish a chain of accountability and oversight. They still cannot 

answer a fundamental question: How many contractors has DOD 

hired with the funds that this committee has appropriated? I know 

that the DOD IG has reviewed the actions underway in the Pentagon to inventory the contracts for services, identify functions that 

are inherently governmental, and insource the inherently governmental positions. 

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This hearing will continue to help the committee better understand the extent of the problems in contracting, but more importantly, how we can solve those problems constructively. 

The Congress has pressed for this and will be interested in what 

you believe that DOD has accomplished, Mr. Inspector General. We 

will also want to know what needs to occur to ensure that there 

is an effective and cost-efficient mix of a Federal and contracted 

workforce and DOD. 

Mr. Heddell, thank you for the time and attention that you have 

given to these issues. Before we hear your testimony, we would like 

to call on the Ranking Member, Mr. Young, for his comments. Bill. 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I want to 

add my welcome to our distinguished guests as we conclude the 

third hearing in a series of hearings on contracting. The truth is 

we could probably spend a lot more time on the issue because it 

is a very major issue and it has a lot to do with the cost-effectiveness of our programs. 

We heard from GAO earlier this month and from the Army on 

the subject of contracting. The challenges facing the Department 

and contingency contracting are highlighted and may be created by 

long-term neglect of the Department’s contracting and acquisition 

workforce. 

Maybe it is because of this that we see reports of 87,000 weapons 

unaccounted for in Afghanistan. I don’t know if that is true or not, 

but we are probably going to ask you about that. We are concerned, 

because rumored last year at a similar hearing, we discussed 

190,000 unaccounted-for weapons in Iraq. So these are important 

issues and especially for those of us responsible for providing the 

funding. So we look forward to your testimony today. 

And as an afterthought, I wanted to make a suggestion that I 

made last year at the hearings. We have some very successful business firms that keep track of everything they handle almost minute 

by minute. And at a meeting with some UPS workers, I made the 

comment that might be good if the Defense Department would hire 

somebody like UPS or FedEx who know how to do this, who don’t 

lose packages, and they surprised me by introducing me to a young 

man who was an Army reservist, who actually worked in management control at UPS. And he had just been called up to be deployed 

to go to Afghanistan to help with that purpose. 

So we need to get a handle on it. And I know that you all feel 

that this is as important as we do. So we are looking forward to 

your testimony and anxious to see what we can all do together to 

work together to fix this problem. 

Thank you for being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Young. 

Mr. Heddell, you may proceed with your summarized statement. 

Your entire statement will be placed in the record. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MR. HEDDELL

Mr. HEDDELL. Thank you very much, sir. 

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Congressman Moran and distinguished members of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, thank you for this opportunity 

to appear before you today to discuss challenges regarding the 

management of acquisition and contract outsourcing. 

Effective and efficient contracting is an ongoing challenge. Concerns related to overpricing, contractor fraud, inadequate goods, 

and the lack of government oversight began with the Revolutionary 

War. Today, that challenge has been compounded by the global nature of Department of Defense operations and the size of our military. 

A great urgency has been placed to increase the speed of procurement needed to meet urgent warfighter needs in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and to support other efforts such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. 

Since the early 1990s, my office and the Government Accountability Office have identified contracting as a high-risk area within 

the Department. In 1998, then-Inspector General Eleanor Hill, in 

testimony before Congress, expressed her concern regarding the 

downsizing of the acquisition workforce and the plan to increase 

the outsourcing of numerous functions. 

One thing is very clear: that adjustments to the acquisition workforce should not be driven merely by personnel reduction goals, but 

by management decisions based on sound, reliable, and quantifiable analysis. 

We also continue to be concerned about the lack of oversight in 

services contracting. As we testified recently before the Commission on Wartime Contracting, contract administrators focus primarily on timely mission accomplishment, sometimes, unfortunately, at the expense of following traditional contract administration procedures, many of which are designed to reduce the risk of 

fraud, waste, corruption, and abuse. 

When engaging in contingency contracting, administrators may 

not always consider the increased risk of failing to apply stringent 

controls and oversight of contracting practices. Their priority is to 

provide goods and services to the warfighters as quickly as possible. Very legitimate. 

However, every acquisition dollar that is not prudently spent is 

a dollar that is not available to fund other top priorities of the Department of Defense. Because of the magnitude of the Department’s purchasing power and the global presence of personnel and 

resources, we face significant challenges relative to the absolute requirement for fair and reasonable pricing, the importance of contract oversight and administration, and the dangers of outsourcing 

inherently governmental functions. 

One example of pricing problems involves an investigation by our 

Defense Criminal Investigative Service regarding C&D Distributors, a company. C&D, beginning in 1997 and continuing all the 

way into 2006, submitted electronic bills to the Department to supply small hardware components, things like plumbing fixtures, 

electronic equipment, and other items, as well as claims for shipping costs. 

These fictitious shipping costs ranged in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, despite the fact that the value of the items that 

were shipped rarely exceeded $100. In fact, in the final transaction 

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before this particular scheme was discovered, C&D billed the Department almost $1 million to ship two flat washers, two flat washers that cost 19 cents apiece. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Heddell, I want to make sure that everyone 

heard that precisely. Two flat 19-cent washers and they charged 

$998,000 for them? 

Mr. HEDDELL. That is correct, sir. That is correct. 

Mr. DICKS. Was that the only thing they shipped? Was that the 

only thing? 

Mr. HEDDELL. No, sir. In fact, over the period of—— 

Mr. MORAN. For the $998,000, but—— 

Mr. HEDDELL. For that particular shipment, yes. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Was there any engineering that went with it? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Nothing except for two washers at the cost of 

$998,000. And I will tell you that over the course of this particular 

conspiracy, the defendants obtained approximately $21 million in 

fraudulent shipping costs. Now, the surviving sister in this particular company pled guilty and is today pending sentencing. 

In this instance, it is clear that the attempt to expedite supplies 

into a war zone allowed pricing to be manipulated through a vulnerability in an automated purchasing system that lacked oversight and effective internal controls. 

With regard to contract oversight and administration, we reported in a recent audit that Regional Contracting CommandBagram contracting officials, accepted construction projects that required extensive rework by another contractor. This particular 

audit looked at 42 contracting actions totaling $1.9 million for construction, and of these 42 contracts, 2 contract files were missing 

and 40 contract files lacked quality assurance surveillance plans as 

well as contracting officers’ representative designation letters. Contracting personnel further stated that there was often a lack of 

qualified personnel available to serve as contracting officer representatives. 

Examples of rework that was performed included reinstalling 

sewer lines for latrines and repairing flooring that was improperly 

installed. 

We have also identified many examples of outsourcing inherently 

governmental functions, which are functions that are so intimately 

related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government employees in one example regarding controls over what 

should have been government-issued contractor Common Access 

Cards, also known as CACs. All DoD employees carry one of these 

for access and identification. We found that contractors were sponsoring other contractors to obtain these cards. These Common Access Cards are the DoD credential for obtaining physical and logical access worldwide, to include facilities in Southwest Asia. 

My office is also engaged in proactive initiatives to improve acquisition and contracting practices. And these include aggressive 

audit planning for contracts, depot overhaul, maintenance of equipment, and spare parts in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

We also maintain an active membership on the Panel on Contracting Integrity and we have launched our own fraud indicator 

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Web site to assist oversight personnel in detecting indicators of potential fraud. 

This concludes my opening statement. I thank the committee for 

this opportunity to testify on contracting and outsourcing within 

the Department and I would be more than happy to try to answer 

your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Heddell follows:] 

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MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP)

Mr. MORAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Inspector General. 

I appreciate your testimony. I appreciate the work that you have 

done. 

I was concerned in your more extensive testimony about the 

MRAPs. I saw that it appeared that we have paid for the same vehicle very substantially different amounts; for example, it has 

ranged from about $300,000 to over $1 million. Is this truly for the 

same vehicle, the difference in prices that we have been charged? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, Mr. Chairman, there are a variety of vehicles that we have contracted for, and it is a little more complex 

than simply saying it was one particular kind of vehicle. In fact, 

that actually in a way is the problem, in that when the contracting 

process itself frequently ignored in this particular case the type of 

vehicle that we were contracting for. So you may have had, let us 

say hypothetically, five or six different kinds of vehicles, and we 

were just looking at whatever price the company was offering that 

vehicle for without regard to it being one specific kind of vehicle. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, at one point it looks like the Marine Corps 

purchased 1,500 MRAPs and yet never asked for a quantity discount; paid exactly the same price as if they had ordered one individual vehicle. That is the kind of thing I was getting at. Is that 

what you have determined? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Absolutely. In fact, with regard to the audit, one 

of two audits that we did regarding the MRAP, there was one instance involving nine different contracts. There were two problems 

with these contracts. One is that we never obtained the underlying 

pricing data in order to determine what a fair and reasonable price 

would be. The second problem is what you alluded to, and that is 

that we never asked for volume discounts from one contractor. And 

clearly in hindsight, we realize that those would have been available had they been asked for, and we know that in one case we 

very likely would have saved had we asked for the volume discount. We would have saved at least $45 million on that one particular contract. 

Now, the two contracts that you are actually alluding to involved 

contracts that exceeded the maximum of 1,500 vehicles to be purchased in each of those. And the Marine Corps exceeded that in 

one case by 300 to 400 vehicles and in another case by as many 

as 2,800, and should have in fact, absolutely should have asked for 

a volume discount, but did not. So we do not believe that the Marine Corps has any assurance that the prices that they paid for 

those vehicles were fair and reasonable. 

Mr. MORAN. There is just no particular relation between price 

and cost? 

Mr. HEDDELL. That is correct. 

Mr. MORAN. They are pricing whatever they can get away with. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, on that point, was there a competition 

here? No competition? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Competition in the sense that the vehicles that 

were offered for sale were different kinds of vehicles in that—for 

instance, let me put it in U.S. terms. Ford, Chevrolet, a Honda, a 

Saturn, and they were all different makes and models, and we 

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viewed those as one specific kind of vehicle without regard to model 

and the bells and whistles and whatever happened to be the best 

price; we looked at it as if it was all for the same vehicle. We didn’t 

go to the trouble to obtain what we would call the underlying pricing data. For instance, we didn’t know what it cost these companies 

to build those vehicles so that we knew where our foundation starting point was. 

Mr. DICKS. If I could just follow up. What I was trying to get to, 

was there a competition by the services, the Marines or the Army, 

amongst various companies to build the MRAPs? Was this sole 

source? 

Mr. HEDDELL. This was not sole source. There were five contractors that were bidding for these contracts. There ended up being 

nine contracts altogether. Am I correct on that, Mary? 

Ms. UGONE. Yes. 

[The information follows:] 

The contracts were not sole-source. Nine contractors submitted proposals (bids), 

and nine contracts were awarded. Subsequent to contract awards, 2 contracts were 

terminated because their vehicles did not pass testing. In addition, the Government 

decided not to order additional vehicles from another contractor due to unfavorable 

automotive and human factors; and one other contractor could not meet contractual 

obligations and therefore was terminated. As a result, five contractors remained in 

the competition and are producing MRAP vehicles. 

COMMON ACCESS CARDS

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Dicks, I think I will reclaim my time, because 

I would like for you to pursue that further. I think this is an important issue. 

I wanted to raise one other issue and then turn it over to Mr. 

Young, and that is the matter of common access cards. People get 

cards that give them access to military bases and to Federal agencies. So this is a very important matter of security. But from what 

I understood from your report, these cards are issued by contractors, not by Federal Government personnel. And they determine 

who they issue them to and generally they issue them to employees 

of the same contracting firm first. So if we are looking at security 

on military bases and the like, it seems to me we could be compromising our security if the determination of who gets access is made 

by a contractor and not by the Federal Government. 

Now, am I misreading this, or would you explain it further, Mr. 

Heddell? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Let me clarify that, Congressman Moran, because 

we are very concerned about this and we have spoken with the Department about it. But let me clarify it a little bit and give a little 

bit of background here. 

The Common Access Card and what we are talking now about 

is the contractor Common Access Card. This goes back to HSPD– 

12, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive, that established 

a mandatory government-wide standard for secure and reliable 

Federal identification. And out of that requirement, the Department came up with this card. And it began issuing these back in 

October of 2006. The Common Access Card is the Department’s credential for obtaining physical and logistical access worldwide, not 

to mention—and also that includes southwest Asia, not to mention 

the fact that you can get Internet information access with it also. 

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It gives a person access to installations and to services such as dining facilities, welfare and recreation facilities, and various military 

exchanges around the world. It also, as I said, can give access on 

the Internet. 

[The information follows:] 

Common Access Cards were not created in response to HSPD–12, but were in use 

prior to the issuance of HSPD–12. However, a new generation of HSPD–12-compliant Common Access Card was issued by the Department beginning in October 2006, 

after the new requirement was established. 

Now, what is significant about all of this is that as services are 

outsourced in these contracts, contractors who have a validated 

need to have access to our facilities, they apply for these. A government official, a government-employed official is responsible for 

overseeing the application and approving the application, and then 

the card is issued to the particular contractor. 

Now, if these cards are not properly processed, if they are not 

controlled throughout their life cycle, they pose a potential national 

security risk, and that is why we are concerned about it. And what 

we have found in the work that we are doing—and we have done 

one audit which I can tell you about this morning and we are in 

the process of doing an additional audit, because we are so concerned about this—there are several things we found. But one 

thing we found is that in one instance, 303 out of about 10,000 

Common Access Card sponsors, in other words, the government 

employees—they are supposed to be government employees that 

issue these—303 of the sponsors were in fact contractors who had 

the authority to issue these cards. So we found that when we 

looked at a sample of about 10,000. That means that these 303 contractors had the authority to issue these cards to other contractors, 

violating what is essentially an inherently governmental function 

and creating a national security vulnerability. We did inform the 

Department and they did deactivate these 303 accounts. 

We also found in another random sample of 30 KBR employee 

Common Access Card applications that one of the KBR contractors 

was authorized to approve access card applications for KBR employees. In addition, we found that verification of background 

checks was not always being performed on KBR contractors. And 

this is very important because in order to get one of these cards, 

you have to have a background investigation conducted and it has 

to be certified as properly done by a government employee. It is my 

opinion that, as of July 2007, the Department of Defense did not 

have assurance that as many as 25,428 KBR contractors who were 

deployed in Southwest Asia had authorized access. That is my 

opinion based on—— 

Mr. MORAN. They got cards, but they didn’t have authorization—— 

Mr. HEDDELL. No one at the Department can say with assurance 

that those cards were properly issued. Now, the reason for that, for 

the most part, is that the verification of the background checks for 

criminal history, et cetera, were not certified, not verified to have 

been done properly. 

Now, we also have concerns about the possible misidentification 

of United States and foreign national contractors who have been 

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cent of 421,000 contractor cards had a General Schedule designation on the card. And what that means is that that 10 percent were 

identified as U.S. Government employees when, in fact, they were 

not. So that is another concern of ours. And that 72 percent of 

290,000 U.S. contractors and 93 percent of 3,500 foreign national 

contractors were misidentified as U.S. Government personnel in email addresses, which is included on this card. 

So these are significant concerns and we are concerned because 

of the lack of what we think are potentially extremely weak internal controls. We estimate that about 90 percent of 40,000 contractors with these cards have inaccurate or unsupportable expiration 

dates also. So in other words, we are concerned that even the expiration dates on these are not accurate, and we are also concerned 

that about 38 percent of 28,000 cards that have been revoked or 

terminated were never recovered. So there are a lot of cards out 

there that possibly have current—that are active and current that 

should have been turned in and canceled that were not. 

Mr. MORAN. So 38 percent would be about how many? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Thirty-eight percent would be about 7,000. 

Mr. MORAN. Seven thousand that are still out there and should 

have been turned in, but in somebody else’s hands. Thank you very 

much, Mr. Young. 

[The information follows:] 

Thirty-eight percent of 28,000 would be about 10,600. Therefore, approximately 

10,600 cards are still out there and should have been turned in, but could be in 

somebody else’s hands. 

COMMON ACCESS CARDS

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, this last point was very interesting, 

and let me follow up on that. Who has the authority to call in those 

cards and have them canceled or terminated or gotten out of the 

hands of the people that aren’t supposed to have them any longer? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Under HSPD–12, Congressman Young, the Secretary of Defense and his executive have the authority to—or the 

responsibility to establish a system of cards that are legitimate, 

and we have spoken with the deputy secretary about this. And I 

could tell that he was very moved and—— 

Mr. YOUNG. I get the feeling that nothing was done when you notified them. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, at this point, that is one of the reasons we 

are doing a second audit because we—in fact, we are going to do 

an audit in southwest Asia and also in Korea because we want to 

look at what is happening more specifically on the ground, whether 

anything is in fact being done with these. So we also have suggested that one of the requirements of having these cards is that 

when you no longer are justified and validated to use it, it is a requirement that you should have to turn it in. It can be a pretty 

simple procedure, to be honest with you. 

QUANTITY DISCOUNTS

Mr. YOUNG. Sir, you were asked earlier about quantity discounts, 

and your response was sort of disappointing because we don’t get 

a benefit for quantity buys. What about a lot of the equipment we 

buy from our contractors, also sold to allies overseas interests, do 

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we get any credit for that? Or do they pay the same thing that we 

pay, or do they get a discount of some kind? Where do we stand 

on the foreign sales versus our own purchases? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, I actually don’t know the answer to that, 

Congressman Young. But, again, it seems to me just reasonable 

that if we buy a product and if we buy it in significant volume for 

our own people, that we should get some kind of a discount for 

that. Did I answer that as best as I could? 

ACCOUNTABILITY OF WEAPONS

Mr. YOUNG. Let me go back to one issue that I mentioned in my 

opening comments. The 190,000 weapons that were unaccounted 

for in Iraq, I expect that someone has looked into that and investigated it. And I am just wondering—I see some heads shaking yes. 

And I am just wondering what we found out. Did we learn anything? Did we recover any of these lost weapons? 

Mr. HEDDELL. I actually am very fortunate to have my Principal 

Deputy who is sitting behind me today, who actually led the team 

that went over and took a look at that. And the short answer is, 

yes, we think we have had some impact here. And you may want 

to take the opportunity to let my deputy speak. 

We recently spoke with General Petraeus and that was one of 

the subjects we talked about, and General Petraeus knows the results of our first effort in terms of weapon accountability and has 

asked us to go back in, particularly now with regard to Afghanistan, but to go back in and confirm that accountability has improved. 

But as I say, I have Mr. Gimble here, and he knows this subject 

in tremendous detail since he actually was on the ground. And I 

will be fine to allow him to answer your questions, with your permission. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, is that—— 

Mr. MORAN. Please. Again, you can identify yourself for the 

record, sir. 

Mr. GIMBLE. I am Thomas Gimble, Principal Deputy Inspector 

General, of the Department of Defense. 

The answer to the 190,000—there has been a lot of work done 

on that. That was originally reported to SIGIR and also GAO. And 

we took a team in led by General Kicklighter initially, to look at 

the processes in place on the ground in Iraq and to determine what 

kind of control and accountability of weapons. And what we found 

is there were not adequate policies and procedures in place to account for them. So we made the recommendations and Central 

Command issued the policies and procedures. 

About a year ago, I led a team back in and we looked at control 

and accountability of weapons, going down to the warehouses, the 

depots, inventory, also sending teams out. Another part of this is 

how do you control or account for the weapons that we turn over 

to the Iraqi security forces, to look at those controls. We thought 

there was a great deal of progress being made in the—when arms 

in Iraq, to the country, that they are being accounted for. The processes are pretty much in place and working. There was a weapons 

cell put together. 

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There are actually criminal investigators to try to ascertain what 

happened to many of the 190,000 weapons. They have, in fact, determined that they were recovered. We have determined where 

some of the leaks were; for example, where the Glocks were leaving 

out of Baghdad Police College. The Iraqis had put together a number of very stringent controls for basic—like if a weapon is issued 

to a police officer and it turns up in the wrong hands and is recovered, or when it is not accounted for, there is a substantial cost, 

like $5,000 U.S., which is about a year’s salary that they levy on 

that police officer. 

So I personally went through two of the police colleges and did 

the inventories on the weapons that they had on hand. And in 

those 2 days that we were in Simone and Irbil, we had 100 percent 

accountability of the weapons that they had on hand, which I 

thought was good progress. 

I would just offer up that we have done the same type of stuff 

in Afghanistan. We have a team scheduled to depart on a followup visit next week, going back in. One of the topics they will be 

looking at is control and accountability of weapons and munitions 

in Afghanistan. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, the situation is embarrassing, I would say, to 

probably all of us. And I know that many of us are called on to explain why we are paying for these things, and these situations develop. Anyway, Mr. Chairman, I know the attendance is good today 

and I know a lot of members have a lot of good questions so I will 

yield back. 

Mr. MORAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Young. That is an ongoing 

concern. We are glad that some progress is being made, but we still 

have cause for concern. Mr. Dicks. 

CONTRACTOR ACCESS CARDS

Mr. DICKS. On these cards, we have been working—my staff and 

I have been working on trying to understand how we get access to 

our defense bases in the United States. The problem at Fort Dix 

is one of—where people got in, and we find that there is just no 

understandable strategy between the services. And we can’t find 

out literally who is in charge of this program inside the Department of Defense. They have different groups that are doing different things, DBIDS and different systems. 

And I think it sounds as if what you are facing on the international scene, and with these cards, is just part of a total disaster. 

I have had at least seven or eight meetings in my office, bringing 

over all the people that were involved, trying to understand this. 

And we are still baffled by who, in fact, is in charge, how do we 

get them to do it—have proper security at these bases, some of 

which have nuclear weapons? And I mean, we are finding where 

we do get proper checking of the identification cards, that a lot of 

people are going on these bases who are not supposed to be, people 

with criminal offenses and other things. And we brought this to the 

attention of each of the services, and yet—it is very hard to ask 

questions when we have—thank you. 

Anyway, can you give us any understanding of that? 

Mr. HEDDELL. I think you make a very good point, Congressman. 

Mr. DICKS. This is a problem right here in the United States. 

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Mr. HEDDELL. Keep in mind, I have been at the Department of 

Defense for 6 months, but I think based on my travels and having 

some of the same problems you just mentioned, I think one of the 

concerns might be a very decentralized system that has a lot of 

people at a very decentralized level that are controlling different 

systems and processes for gaining access. That is not an audit opinion; that is an observation of my own at this point. 

And I think that is part of the problem that we deal with these 

contractor access cards. It is decentralized. There are a lot of people who have responsibility at different levels around the country, 

around the world; in some ways they develop their own policies, 

they determine—they hire the security forces, they train them on 

how they should review the identification of people that want access. They issue the access passes and cards in this case. And I 

think the system just simply needs to be tightened up and it needs 

to start at the top and work down. I think right now we are at the 

bottom working up. 

Mr. DICKS. It would seem to me that we need to get the deputy 

to appoint somebody in charge of this. I mean, we still couldn’t find 

out who, in fact, has the responsibility. We had brought in people 

from various—from the services, from DOD, and they really 

couldn’t tell us who is in charge. 

Mr. HEDDELL. That actually was our recommendation to the deputy secretary, that one person needed to take charge of this problem. And that was—in fact, that was probably our central recommendation. 

CONTRACTING

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you another thing. Is this just—are 

these—I mean, these contracts going out to companies to do work 

in the Department of Defense, outsourcing, is there any plan here 

or is this just done service by service and by Defense Department 

agencies without any strategy or understanding of the cost or anything? How is it—it looks very chaotic based on your testimony. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Secretary Gates in fact testified on that very question in January of this year, and he stated that the Department, 

particularly with regard to the combatant areas, had no holistic or 

strategic plan for how it handles contracting. That was his statement and not—maybe not an exact quote, but I think it is fairly 

close. 

And there are literally thousands of people making contracting 

decisions around the world. And our audits would indicate that we 

are not always considering important issues of pricing. We are not 

thinking about oversight and administration of the contracts. We 

are not thinking about the dangers of the issue of inherent government authority and accountability here. And in some cases, it is because there are not enough contracting officials. In some cases it 

is because, as you know, the volume and the dollar value of contracting has gone up so significantly over the years, over the last 

decade in particular, and the level of contracting officials has actually gone down or stayed the same. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, the previous Chairman of the Armed Services 

Committee would go on the floor and say, ‘‘These are shoppers, we 

don’t need these people.’’ And now we find that we are understaffed 

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in terms of acquisition on the weapons systems, isn’t that correct, 

and having enough program managers to properly manage these 

weapons systems? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, I can’t address a specific weapons system, 

but I think I can say generally that there are not enough skilled, 

able contracting officials to handle all of the high-dollar important 

contracting that is being done out there. 

Mr. DICKS. Just one last quick—is there a difference—you talk 

about all these contracts where they are actually doing work that 

normally was done. That is different, isn’t it, from acquisition of 

weapons systems? Those are two separate—— 

Mr. HEDDELL. There is contracting to purchase materials and 

services and contracting to purchase weapons systems. I mean, I 

am not sure I am following what you are getting at. 

Mr. DICKS. What I am trying to get at is, we understand there 

is an acquisition group that works on each of the major weapons, 

the F–22, the C–17. These are huge contracts, okay? I am talking 

about all these service contracts where they are doing work that 

used to be done by government employees. Is that a different acquisition force that handles that? 

Mr. HEDDELL. No. There are program managers for each major 

weapons acquisition, and those program managers are supposed to 

be knowledgeable and to be engaged and to follow those acquisitions all the way through from beginning to end. Depending on 

which particular acquisition you might be referring to, it would be 

hard to know—to say, well, one is good and one isn’t. I think we 

are speaking in a general sense here that we have concerns because of the kinds of problems that we are identifying. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Dicks. 

The reality is that the amount of contracting is almost three 

times what it was 8 years ago, and yet the number of acquisition 

officers is one half of what it had been. And that seems to be an 

underlying problem in terms of oversight and accuracy. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

RECRUITING QUALIFIED PROCUREMENT OFFICERS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Satisfy my curiosity. Does the IG for the DOD do any outsourcing? 

Mr. HEDDELL. We do contract for auditors to help us with some 

of the work. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Your IT work? 

Mr. HEDDELL. We do. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I just want to make sure if we are talking 

about organizations that are assignment pure, I would like to 

know. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Absolutely. I think you will find that most—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. My questions are going to focus on how we 

get qualified procurement officers. But I would just like to know 

that in your own portfolio we are not contracting out jobs that are 

inherently governmental. So can you—— 

Mr. HEDDELL. Excellent question. We at the Department of Defense do contract out for work that we do on the financial statement, for example. 

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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. For your specific office, I am talking about. 

Mr. HEDDELL. That is correct, sir. And even though I am Acting 

Inspector General at DoD, I am also the Senate-confirmed IG of 

Labor right now. And I only mention that because at Labor, most 

of the work that we do on the financial statement is contracted out. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. My time is limited. I just raise that issue. 

I happened to see Joe Davidson’s Federal Diary in the Washington Post yesterday. It was ‘‘Stimulus Contracts: Let’s Avoid Another Katrina.’’ I commend it to your attention. It points out, 

among other things, that answering the questions—this is how 

we—all the many contractors will have to deal with the stimulus 

package, he says, and I quote: ‘‘Answering any questions will fall 

to Federal staffers who work with the contractors. Government 

data shows that the procurement workforce, while increasing in recent years, remains short of the 67,885 that the Federal Acquisition Institute said that Uncle Sam employed in 1992.’’ Somewhat 

apropos of the Chairman’s comments. 

And he goes on to say, ‘‘As of fiscal year 2007, the number was 

61,434, with more than half of those in the Department of Defense.’’ All of that within quotation marks. 

I would like to focus—we had General Ross Thompson in here 

the other day and a lot of my questions had to do with education 

and training of Federal contracting personnel. How should the Department of Defense be going out and locating, recruiting and hiring, developing the needed professionals to do the job? And then 

you add in perhaps the disincentive to go to the war zone. What 

would you recommend that we should be doing? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, you know—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Or if we are doing something now, how 

should we do it differently? 

Mr. HEDDELL. This was also part of the work of the Gansler 

Commission. Clearly there is a lot that needs to be done here. But 

first I think you have to know what we are trying to get at here 

with our contracting. It is very simple. We are trying to purchase 

materiel and services that are safe, that have a high level of quality and performance, and that are provided in sufficient numbers 

and that are provided at a reasonable cost. Once we do—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am all for that. But I want to know how 

we get the people on board that can do that. From your perspective, I know you have been on the job for 6 months, but—— 

Mr. HEDDELL. What I am saying sir, is that—I can tell you just 

in terms of recruiting, all right, but I think it is a bigger problem 

than that, and that is what I am getting at. From a standpoint of 

just getting the right people, you know, there are incentives. We 

need to go out and recruit people that have the skills that can do 

this kind of work. There are internship programs to get people into 

the government who are interested in this. This is not an area that 

is of great interest to an awful lot of people. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is of interest to this Committee because 

we are focusing—— 

Mr. HEDDELL. But it isn’t to young people coming out of college. 

And that is what I am saying. 

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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So we are being thwarted from doing the 

very things we need to do to provide oversight because we don’t obviously want—— 

Mr. HEDDELL. It is extremely important. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN [continuing]. Valuable equipment walking 

away. 

Mr. HEDDELL. It is extremely important, sir. And we have to find 

programs and incentives: internships, journeyman programs, 

things that are going to cause young people coming out of college 

to have an interest in this kind of work, get them recruited. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Underlying your comments is the fact that 

you don’t seem to be too optimistic about that happening, which is 

a nice way of saying it is a competitive environment out there and 

it is pretty difficult to get people to join up. 

Mr. HEDDELL. That takes me back to where I started. The problem, in my opinion, if you sense a lack of optimism, it isn’t that 

we can’t find people or encourage people to do this kind of work, 

it is that we have to understand the need at the very top. We have 

to understand at the very top of our executive level of government 

why this is so important and what the dangerous ramifications are 

if we do not do a good job of contracting. We have been in—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. General Thompson, I think—and maybe 

you are saying basically the same thing. You say we need to make 

sure that the people we are trying to put in these positions know 

that their job is considered to be valuable. It is a major contribution to our national security. 

Mr. HEDDELL. That is correct. But the people doing the hiring, 

the people responsible for making the decisions have to—that is 

where it really starts. They are the ones who have to decide that 

it is important enough to have the right number of people and to 

have people that are qualified and to find ways to recruit them and 

then, once recruited, to keep them on board and to raise the status 

of this kind of work because I think—I think it is difficult—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, my time is limited. As you put your 

oar in the water, which is an opportunity you have been given 

today, you are in there pitching as IG, because obviously you came 

up with a whole slew of recommendations, and obviously in the war 

zone it is a particularly difficult task to get people that are willing, 

to quote, ‘‘volunteer,’’ other than the military. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, I think it can be done. We have allowed this 

to happen, unfortunately, over a period—I mean, this is a 230-yearold problem in our country. We have had—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It has recently gotten a lot worse. 

Mr. HEDDELL. It has gotten a lot more expensive. And that is a 

factor of complexity. The more expensive it gets, the more complex 

it gets, and it goes to these very sophisticated warfighting systems 

that we purchase. And planning. Planning contingency planning 

years in advance, being prepared for the Southwest Asia event, 

knowing—unfortunately, we often focus as a government on personnel reductions, when in reality our management decisions 

should be based on sound, reliable, qualifiable analysis. And it is 

not. It is simply based on how do we reduce the workforce here or 

there. 

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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, we have a new regime, so let us see 

what happens under new leadership. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

As the inspector general says, this has been around a long time, 

although it is a particularly acute problem now. Larger testimony 

cites how in the Revolutionary War, contractors were supplying 

General Washington’s troops with meat that was full of stones and 

roots in order to make them look—make it look heavier and fuller. 

And the troops found the stones and roots in the meat. Isn’t that 

true? 

Mr. HEDDELL. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. So apparently this is not a problem that just 

cropped up but it is one that we need to do a better job of addressing. 

Mr. Young says he forgot about that. 

Ms. Kaptur. 

CONTRACTED SERVICES

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very interested in 

the culture of the Department of Defense over a period of actually 

centuries. But if one goes back to World War II and we compare 

the amount of contracted services in World War II to, let us say, 

the first Persian Gulf War and today, what can you say about the 

culture of contracting in those eras? According to some numbers we 

have here in material that has been provided us, it states that 

today DOD’s obligations on contracts rose from 47 percent of total 

budget in fiscal year 2000 to over half, 51 percent, in 2007. And 

then from that, it says, contract costs, service contracts, grew from 

26 percent of that total to 27 percent. 

I assume the difference between the service contract and obligation on overall contracts must be hardware contracts or something, 

as distinguished from service contracts? 

Mr. HEDDELL. I don’t know the answer to that specific part of 

your question, although I think I can address the broader—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. But if one looks back at the amount of 

contracting, my sense is that only until recently have we had this 

level of contracted-out functions of the Department of Defense. 

What about World War II? Can you compare it to that era? 

Mr. HEDDELL. I think that there—we must have faced very similar issues. If you remember, after World War—or maybe it was 

during—that the Truman Commission on Wartime Contracting, 

clearly they were looking at the very same issues, I think, that we 

are looking at today. Just different numbers and a different war. 

Ms. KAPTUR. How difficult, Mr. Heddell, would it be for you to 

get me those numbers? I am just looking for a percent. 

Mr. HEDDELL. I will certainly do my best to get you those. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What about the first Persian Gulf War in 1991, 

about how many contracted services would we have had back then 

compared to—— 

Mr. HEDDELL. I will do my best to find those for you. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I just need a number. And I am particularly interested in the contracted security forces. That is a number that I am 

extraordinarily interested in. 

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Mr. HEDDELL. There has been—in fact, I think that the National 

Defense Authorization Act asked the Department to tell it how 

many contractors it had in theater, and it has not been able to do 

that. But it has made efforts to begin to try and obtain that kind 

of data. 

[The information follows:] 

The Congressional Budget Office issued a report, ‘‘Contractors’ Support of U.S. 

Operations in Iraq,’’ in August 2008, which addressed these issues. The CBO report 

contains estimates of the number of contractor personnel presence during U.S. military operations. This report can be accessed at: http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/ 

doc9688/08-12-IraqContractors.pdf. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Contracted security officers, sir, did you say. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, any kind of contractors, whether they are 

contracting security officers, any contractors that we are hiring to 

go into theater. Or am I misunderstanding your question? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, I am just interested in—— 

Mr. HEDDELL. You are talking about service contracting? 

Ms. KAPTUR. As I understand the numbers—I am just trying to 

get simple numbers, okay? If we look at DOD and we look at all 

contracts, they now total over half your budget. Is that a correct 

statement? 

Mr. HEDDELL. That, I believe, is correct. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Right. If one were to go back to World War II and 

look at what percent of the total overall DOD expenditures were 

contracts, I would be interested in that number. I would be interested in that number for the first Persian Gulf War. 

Mr. HEDDELL. We are going to try to get the answer. But I will 

tell you that because—I will be surprised because I don’t think 

there is a current inventory that would give you that answer for 

today, much less in 1990 or in 1943. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And I guess what has got me concerned is normally 

the recommendations that come to us are, well, because we have 

so many more contractors, now just give us more contract personnel and accountants to count those. 

Well, my answer is, wait a minute, let’s have fewer contracts, 

and maybe I will give you more contract auditing personnel. But 

if we cut back on the contracts, we don’t need as many—I don’t 

want to grow it. I don’t want to grow it. I want to manage it. 

Mr. HEDDELL. I mean, we know what has happened. We know 

that in the last 7 years, the value of contracts—well, in 2008 it was 

$390 billion, and that is compared to $155 billion in 2001. And, at 

the same time, the number of contracting officials to handle those 

has not kept pace. We know that. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I understand. Those are very helpful numbers. 

Mr. HEDDELL. What we don’t know is how many contractors are 

out there. 

Now, you know from the Army’s testimony, I guess, General 

Thompson addressed this as what they—you know, they have gone 

from 10,000 contracting officials back—when was that, Mary? 1996 

or 1997, I forget. Or, I am sorry, in the early 1990s from around 

10,000 contracting officials to 1996 when they were down to 5,500. 

And it has stayed pretty level since that time. But the amount and 

volume of the contracts that they have overseen has gone up 331 

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397 

percent. In fact, today the Army alone handles over $100 billion in 

contracts every year. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I don’t want to abuse my time here, but I am interested in the culture change at a department that contracts out over 

half of what it does. And I am especially interested in the culture 

of the security forces. We have not been able to pursue a line of 

questioning here as I want to regarding deployed contractors involved in security. 

According to the numbers I have for overall military personnel 

as of January, there were 219,000 military personnel versus 

259,000 contractors deployed to CENTCOM. All right, of those 

numbers, of those numbers, which are defined as security personnel? And how much of that is a culture change from what might 

have existed in the first Persian Gulf War and certainly from 

World War II? 

I don’t remember contractors in World War II carrying guns. I 

don’t remember that. 

Mr. MORAN. It is a good line of inquiry, Ms. Kaptur. I am not 

sure the Inspector General is going to be able to answer that completely. 

But perhaps you could solicit an answer from someone in the 

Pentagon and provide it for the record. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Yes, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support point 

paper, ‘‘Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan’’ released February 2009, reported 12,907 private security contractor 

(PSC) personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan (9,218 Iraq and 3,689 Afghanistan) as of 

the end of the 1st quarter FY 2009. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And we will provide specific questions to the record. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MORAN. Excellent. Thank you, Ms. Kaptur. 

Mr. Kingston. 

EDUCATION TRAINING OF CONTRACTING OFFICERS

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Heddell, on page 6 of your testimony, going back to the 

MRAP for a minute, you talked about, and I quote, ‘‘The current 

leading contracting officer could not explain how the price evaluation team concluded that prices were fair and reasonable.’’ And 

then it went on to say, ‘‘The Marine Corps did not obtain volume 

pricing discounts from two contractors.’’ 

Now, it would appear to me that that is his job. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KINGSTON. And so the question would be, what was his punishment for not doing his job? 

Mr. HEDDELL. I don’t have an answer to that, sir. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Was he punished? 

Mr. HEDDELL. I don’t know. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Is part of your recommendation to say, hey, you 

guys aren’t punishing bad behavior and incompetence or neglect or 

however you want to classify it, call it? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Mary, do you know? Do you want to shed light on 

that? 

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Ms. UGONE. I can shed a little bit of light on that. 

There is a fundamental—and it goes back to what Mr. Heddell 

has stated. Our contracting officers, the skills of our contracting officers, when they are faced against negotiating these huge multibillion-dollar contracts, they are not as skilled as they should be. 

That is part of the problem. Part of the problem is education and 

training, having a skilled contracting officer facing very, very competent negotiators on the other side of the table. That is one thing. 

The second thing—— 

Mr. KINGSTON. I don’t get that. Just a minute, if I could reclaim 

my time for a second, and then I will get back to you. 

That doesn’t make any sense at all. You know, we all laugh 

about how incompetent the government is. This—I mean, everybody here is beating up on private contractors, and rightfully so, 

but you are telling me that somebody for the Marine Corps that is 

sitting in the seat of being a purchasing officer, they don’t do the 

obvious of a $306,000 to $1,089,000 difference and they don’t question it? And then we say, ‘‘Oh, well, he is not trained’’? 

For example, Abu Ghraib, the general was fired who probably, 

you could argue, had very little to do with it except for the fact that 

it happened during his or her watch. I don’t remember who the 

general was. But the reality is, you know, that is the message that 

you send, that it is your responsibility. 

And it would appear to me that this contracting officer should 

have been potentially fired, certainly reprimanded, and so should 

his superior and his superior. And that is the way it is done in the 

field of active-duty combat, for example, or something. 

So I am hear hearing from you, ‘‘Well, it is not his fault because 

he is not trained.’’ 

Ms. UGONE. I am not saying that, actually. I wanted to put it in 

a little context before I actually answered the specific question. 

The Marine Corps didn’t agree with us on our findings, and that 

is part of it, is that they believe that there was price competition 

and there was a disagreement about that as well. But the contracting officer—there are corrective actions that were undertaken 

with regard to this. 

But I wanted to provide the context. And each individual program or contract has—or each contract has a contracting officer. 

We can find out whether or not this particular contracting officer 

had any kind of administrative action taken. But the response to 

our report was generally a good response. But the dilemma there 

also is the Marine Corps does not believe that there was, you know, 

necessarily a problem in the price competition area. 

Now, we had to go to Mr. Shay Assad, the director of defense 

procurement, to weigh in on this. And he pretty much indicated 

that we—he concurred with our position. 

So we can follow up for you and get additional information, but 

I wanted to provide the context, because this whole area of pricing 

is not a very easy area. It requires a lot of skill and training and 

attention at both the contracting officer level and also senior levels. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I would like to know, you know, if there was punishment or what was the after action. 

[The information follows:] 

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399 

According to a responsible Marine Corps official, as of April 2009, they were unaware of any administrative actions taken against the contracting officer. The Marine Corps does not believe there was necessarily a problem in the price competition 

area. 

And I want to—you know, going to page 8 a minute, you are saying here, ‘‘We recommended that the Marine Corps contracting officers be provided training on their authority and responsibility and 

that the assistant Secretary of the Navy’’—blah, blah—‘‘agreed 

with this recommendation.’’ 

And then on page 25, you say, ‘‘The statute requires the Army 

Audit Agency, Naval Audit Service, and the Air Force Audit Agency, in coordination with the OIG, to develop the plan to audit 

equipment, maintenance, and spare parts. We are actively developing this plan.’’ 

Both those statements seemed to be stating the obvious. And, 

you know, if this problem has been going on since George Washington and here we are saying, ‘‘We recommend that the Marine 

Corps contracting officers be trained on their authority and responsibility,’’ oh, well, I feel better about government now. And I am 

not being sarcastic towards you, but, I mean, let’s think about it 

in terms of stewards of taxpayer dollars. Why in the heck wasn’t 

that the case last year, the year before, the year before, going back 

to General Washington? And, you know, here it is, the same thing 

on page 25, that ‘‘we are actively developing a plan.’’ 

And I am not pointing my finger at you. We are all responsible 

here. But, you know, if you went out prime-time and told this to 

the public, ‘‘I want you to feel a lot better about this because we 

are actively developing an audit plan,’’ what the heck? I mean, I 

am sure in our individual offices, as would be the case with somebody who runs a shoe store, a bike store, or a barber shop, they 

are doing this kind of stuff every single day. Why in the world 

would the military culture start thinking that there was an option 

on doing audits? 

Ms. UGONE. What you refer to on page 25 of the testimony is section 852, which was legislated by Congress for the service audit 

agencies to work with us, coordinate with us on a plan to look at 

depot maintenance. Because when we draw down, there is going to 

be an enormous amount of reset issues. Our depot maintenance capability, which is a whole other arena that we could probably talk 

about, they are a very complex issue. 

So this audit plan is actually to be able to focus more accountability and oversight of what we know will be heavy contractor involvement, as well as in-house involvement, in depot maintenance. 

I mean, this is a huge area as we reset our equipment that return 

back from Iraq and also from the standpoint of the proper mix of 

what is going to be in depot maintenance. And that is an issue of 

proper mix of contractors and government employees. 

So this audit plan, as Congress recognized, is an important piece 

of providing accountability over that side of the house. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I appreciate it. 

Mr. MORAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. But I might mention, in this report, they do make the point that it has not just a 

matter of lack of quantity; it is also of quality. Many of the best 

government negotiators are scooped up by the private sector to 

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work on their behalf. And that is why we have a constant need for 

training, promotion, and enhancement of the quality. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Absolutely. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Boyd. 

PROCUREMENT AND ACQUISITION

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Panel, thank you for your service. 

I think everyone here understands we have a serious problem in 

procurement and acquisition in our Federal Government. And probably everybody here understands that the Department of Defense 

is the worst abuser of that procurement system. And I think it is 

good that we try to understand what has happened in the past. It 

leads us to where we go in the future. 

But I want to shift gears, if I might, Mr. Chairman, and talk 

about where we go in the future. And I know, relative to Mr. 

Frelinghuysen’s line of questions and Ms. Kaptur’s, we focused a 

lot on what has happen in the past. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I know everybody here understands that, as 

Mr. Frelinghuysen said, we do have a new sheriff in town—I don’t 

think you used exactly those terms, but something like that—and 

the new administration understands this issue and is focusing on 

it. 

Now, there was a fiscal summit this week. And for those of you 

who weren’t there, you only read the press clips, and you really 

didn’t get into the guts of it. But there were five particular issues, 

five issues, that that fiscal summit focused on. The sexy ones are 

health care and taxes and budget reform and stuff like that. But 

the fifth one was procurement. You may not know that, but procurement and acquisition, Federal procurement and acquisition. 

And the President put together a team across the political spectrum to deal with those issues. And Senator John McCain, sort of, 

headed that team. And so I want to make sure everybody understood that we are going to have an opportunity, as a legislature, 

to delve into this, because the administration clearly understands 

the gravity of this problem and will want to help solve it. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to make sure all the Committee 

members knew that, and the Committee staff, that there will be 

ample opportunity to work on these kind of problems to improve 

the situation, not just look at what has been wrong in the past. 

Now, my question for you, Mr. Heddell, is—I have two quick 

questions, and it won’t take long. In the 2009 Defense Authorization Act, the director of the OMB was required to develop a single 

consistent definition of an inherently governmental function. Now, 

the director was supposed to address deficiencies with existing definitions and develop criteria that each government agency, each department, could identify positions that should not be contracted 

out. 

In that act, in that law, he was given 1 year to report back to 

Congress on the new definition. Now, obviously, we have had a 

change in the OMB office, a change in the administration. Can you, 

do you have any information as to the status of that effort, the 

OMB’s effort to help the heads of the agencies better understand 

which positions are inherently governmental? And what plans does 

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the OMB have in place to ensure a smooth transition of what has 

already been done? 

Mr. HEDDELL. I can’t answer that, sir. 

Mr. BOYD. You can’t answer that. 

Mr. HEDDELL. No, sir. 

Mr. BOYD. Okay. That is all I have, and maybe we could ask that 

of another expert, Mr. Chairman. 

AUDITS AND INVESTIGATIONS

Mr. MORAN. Is it not true, though, Mr. Inspector General that 

you do have some survey work going on, there are some classifications that some agencies have used to determine what is an inherently governmental role? We are working on that, are we not? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, it is something, Mr. Chairman, that, by virtue of our audit and investigative work for one thing, we are constantly addressing that issue when it comes up in our audits and 

investigations with the Department. So we know that they are constantly sensitized to our concern about that. 

We know that the law—in fact, I think the laws are pretty clear 

on that. I don’t know that there is even any need for any additional 

language in the law. If the law is followed, I don’t think there is 

going to be a problem with regard to that matter of definition. I 

mean, I think it is fairly clear. 

Mr. BOYD. Mr. Chairman, one quick follow-up question. 

Do you know of any interaction or communication between the 

OMB office and the Department of Defense relative to this directive 

in public law in the Defense Authorization Act? 

Mr. HEDDELL. No, sir, I am not personally aware of any. But 

there may have been. I don’t know of any. 

Mr. BOYD. Okay, thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Boyd. 

Ms. Granger. 

INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL

Ms. GRANGER. I am going to follow up on what Congressman 

Boyd asked about, and it is not the definition—and this is pretty 

simple, I am sure, for you. But, in making those decisions, this is 

going to be inherently a governmental position or contractor, then, 

in that comparison, we have looked at national security, we have 

looked at cost, we have looked at effectiveness, are we comparing, 

like, just paycheck to paycheck and say it is cheaper to have a contractor? Are we looking at all the benefits, all the entitlements? 

How do we make a comparison of the actual cost, at that point? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Your question absolutely gets to the core of the entire problem, because we have thousands of contractor officials and 

executives out there that are purchasing materials and services, 

and there is no—we can’t tell you what they are doing, how they 

are doing it, or when they are doing it. And we don’t know what 

their motives are in terms of—for instance, we don’t know if they 

really understand the definition of what is inherently governmental. We don’t know what their motives are when they purchase. 

I mean, for instance, Congressman Kingston asked the question, 

what has been done about this? But if a military official were sitmstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

402 

ting here as a devil’s advocate, they would say, ‘‘Look, we did our 

job. We got that material and those services out there on the front 

line as quickly as we could. It cost us, perhaps, but we got it out 

there. And we are saving lives by doing it.’’ 

This is not a simple issue, unfortunately. But what we have 

learned is that, no matter how expediently you think it should be 

done, it is not worth it to overlook the fiscal issues. Because every 

dollar that we lose is a dollar that doesn’t go out there and support 

our troops. 

There is a lot that we need to do to improve this whole process. 

And, as I said earlier, it is not a simple matter of making personnel 

decisions. It is a matter of balancing. It is a matter of making 

sound, reliable, quantifiable analysis of the entire issue regarding 

a particular product or service. 

Ms. GRANGER. But as we are making a decision on that personnel, part of that has to be, what is the real cost of that person, 

whether that person is a contractor, whether that person is a government employee. And is that his disability or her disability, her 

retirement, her health care, are we looking at that? And is that 

consistent? I think the answer is no. 

Mr. HEDDELL. I don’t know. In fact, I will defer to Mary. She 

may be able to answer that a little better than I can. I don’t know 

the answer to that question. 

Ms. UGONE. Let me see if I can try and answer. 

When we look at this inherently governmental function, if you 

look at the FAR, the Federal Acquisition Regulation specifies what 

is inherently governmental, and then they give examples of what 

is not inherently governmental. And I think there is an education 

and interpretation issue of what we don’t think is inherently governmental. 

Let me just give you an example. Assisting in preparing the 

statement of work. Well, how much is ‘‘assisting’’? Assisting could 

be doing, doing all of it, doing the first draft; that is assisting. 

So I think part of it is clearly an educational issue. I am not sure 

people understand what they mean with ‘‘inherently governmental.’’ It could be easy just to say it is a decision-making process. 

But there are a lot of decisions we make. 

So, if you look at the FAR, you could take what is not inherently 

governmental and put your own interpretation to it. And, you 

know, people in this room could probably interpret it many different ways. So I think that is a fundamental issue there, too. 

And also I think the Department has recognized, by going back 

to insourcing, trying to find ways where it makes sense to bring 

those functions that really are inherently governmental, bring 

them back in. And that is through section 324. 

And that is also, in answering Congresswoman Kaptur, is that 

there is no—when you really look at it and you look at the total 

picture, there is no inventory of services contractors. There is no 

inventory of how we are managing our contracts at this level. How 

are we managing our contractors? How do we manage the mix? 

What is the strategy? There is no strategy. 

So, I think there are a lot of interrelated issues, inherently governmental, services contracting, pricing. If you look at these conmstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

403 

tracting issues, they all interrelate—skilled workforce—they all 

interrelate. 

I hope I answered your question. 

Mr. HEDDELL. You know, if I can just add, the Department, on 

this whole issue of inherently governmental, I mean, does have a 

policy. And they, in fact, they list numerous examples of what inherently governmental is. I mean, they go way beyond the definition. They go down to the—— 

Mr. MORAN. So this goes to Mr. Boyd’s question, as well, and Ms. 

Granger’s. There is work done. It is not that they are mindless of 

the issue of the distinction. Excuse me for interrupting. 

Mr. HEDDELL. No, I think that they fully understand it is an important issue. But I don’t think that—I think every case is separate, sir. And whether they even consider the issue is maybe the 

first question. And then, if they do consider it, do they really understand what ‘‘inherently governmental’’ means? 

And then I guess you might even ask, do they care? I am not 

sure I would go that far. I believe the Department of Defense does 

care. I just think it is a matter, many times, of just not knowing. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, what the Army did in having the list that they 

made available was helpful because people could consult that, as 

to what would normally be considered inherently governmental. 

And then there is the issue of cost. If it is a short-term responsibility where you can hire somebody without having to pay them 

benefits and be responsible for them for the rest of their career, 

there is that economic consideration. 

This is a very good line of questioning. Thank you, Ms. Granger. 

Mr. Hinchey. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MORAN. We have three votes, but I think we can finish this 

up before we have to leave for the votes. But anybody that wants 

to should feel free to. 

CONTRACT OVERSIGHT

Mr. HINCHEY. Thanks very much for your testimony and your response to these questions. It is a fascinating set of circumstances, 

and obviously a set of circumstances that has to be dealt with effectively. 

Based upon the questions, you remind us that the corruption and 

incompetence involving military operations is not unique in the 

context of the last several years. It has happened before. But what 

we are dealing with now is also very serious and needs to be dealt 

with effectively. 

One of the numbers, for example, that I understand is that the 

defense obligations and contract acquisitions increased from somewhere around $190 billion in 1997 to up to about $430 billion in 

2007. But at the same time it went up, the people overseeing those 

contracts went down. More and more money is being spent, more 

and more money is being spent wastefully, incompetently, corruptly. And the number of people who are obligated and responsible to watch that stuff have been reduced significantly. It doesn’t 

seem to be an accident; seems to have been done intentionally. 

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What are your observations about that and about the way it has 

been operated? And how many oversight employees do we have 

right now focusing on the seriousness of this issue? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, I can’t say that it has been intentional, Congressman. 

Mr. HINCHEY. No, I am going to say that. You don’t have to. 

Mr. HEDDELL. But I can tell you that it is a serious, serious problem. I can tell you that, if this matter is not addressed, probably 

not just within the Department of Defense, I would bet government-wide, we are going to be in even more serious trouble. It has 

to be addressed. 

We have to make very clear, very intellectual decisions regarding 

what we buy, what we are going to pay for it, and what it is going 

to do for us. And then we have to decide what is most important, 

because we don’t have money to buy everything. But we clearly 

don’t have enough contracting officials to do the work that is out 

there. 

So it is either, don’t buy as much, don’t do as much contracting, 

or find more people that can handle it. 

Mr. HINCHEY. So the problem, obviously, is in the context of 

funding, all the money that we have lost, all the money that has 

been misused, all the money that has been poured into people for 

whatever the reason, whether it was intentional or just sloppy. 

But there is also a downgrade in security because of the way in 

which military operations have been manipulated and the way in 

which military materials have been lost. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, we haven’t even begun to talk about the 

fraud issue, which Mr. Beardall could address at great length, here 

today. That is a big concern of ours, also, because when you don’t 

have controls, the opportunity for fraud is there. And we have 

many examples of that having occurred in recent years as a result 

of poor contract oversight. 

Mr. BEARDALL. It is the sad truth, but that is what it is. And it 

gets worse and worse and more difficult. 

And I think some of it goes back to the fundamental struggle 

with, how big of an army do you want to have? And that has been 

the issue, with the size of the military. And as you cut down the 

size of the military, where people used to do contract oversight— 

you used to have lawyers who were contract law specialists and 

those folks who are now getting paid better by contractors. It is 

that struggle where, once you are not doing it yourself, where you 

have controls, you have a very good structure in the military to 

oversee those things, and then you have to then farm that business 

out because your military is small, you will always then have: Now 

we are farming it out, and then you get to the question of what is 

inherently governmental. We wouldn’t even have to ask that question if we had our own folks to do the work internally. 

Mr. HINCHEY. If you make the military small because you don’t 

want to engage in actually requiring civilians to come in and be involved in the military because you don’t want to get that as a political issue, well, then you have created another part of the problem. 

I just have one last question, if I may, Mr. Chairman. 

In your written statement, you identify an important potential 

security risk. And you noticed that there are 212,000 Department 

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of Defense contractors with e-mail addresses. And that classifies 

them as government personnel. So they have access to huge 

amounts of information—not just information, a whole host of other 

things as well. 

How serious is this? What has happened? What are some of the 

effects that have taken place? Have you had an opportunity to look 

into that, or is this something that we are going to have to do? 

Mr. HEDDELL. We have only looked at the aspect of whether or 

not people who have this access have gotten security background 

checks done. Keep in mind that even if a person has access to information, there are levels of classification, and they would have to 

have additional access codes, et cetera, to gain that access. 

Are we concerned? Absolutely. We still are concerned. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Well, whatever recommendations you might have 

on that I think would be very important because of the insight that 

you have on it and the experience that you have had investigating 

it. And what needs to be done additionally, that kind of information 

would be very, very important to this committee and to the Congress generally. 

Mr. HEDDELL. We are doing additional work in both southwest 

Asia and Korea. We will be. And we will make that one of the 

things that we will—— 

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Hinchey. 

The Committee will want to be kept apprised of your progress on 

that. It is a very serious concern. 

Ms. Kilpatrick. 

COMMON ACCESS CARD

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am scared to death, sitting here. I have heard what you said. 

I read your testimony last night. It is even more flagrant when I 

hear you give it. And thanks to you and your staff for being here 

and for your knowledge. 

The Common Access Cards, first of all, did they start in 2006 or 

2007? 

Mr. HEDDELL. October of 2006. The current what is called the 

Common Access Card was implemented as a result of HSPD–12. 

[The information follows:] 

Common Access Cards were not created in response to HSPD–12, but were in use 

prior to HSPD–12. A new generation of the Common Access Card was implemented 

as a result of HSPD–12, and the Department began issuing the new HSPD–12-compliant Common Access Cards in October of 2006. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Right. I wanted to make sure I had the year 

right. It sounds like it is totally inoperable, a security breach, and 

anybody can get one. 

Mr. HEDDELL. I would say this: As I said, we are concerned. We 

do not believe that the Department can provide full assurance that 

the people that are intended to have that card are in fact the ones 

who have it. So we do have concerns. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Major. I mean, that right there is a start. Because if we have contractors who are monitoring the contractors 

and giving fraudulent cards, and it sounds like, from what I read 

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last night and hearing you today, it is out of control and unable 

to monitor in its current state. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, it is potentially much greater than just a 

matter of the issue of inherently governmental. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Right. It is much broader. It is much broader 

than that. 

Mr. HEDDELL. It is a potential national security issue, and we 

are concerned. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. So, should we be handling it? If you tell me it 

is being handled and we know it is out of order and you have 

turned that over and Pentagon are now addressing that—can you 

tell me that today? 

Mr. HEDDELL. No, ma’am. That is why we are beginning two new 

audits, one in southwest Asia and one in Korea, because we are following up to determine what the new status of this is. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Okay. I know what you do, and you do it well. 

I don’t know if it is Congress’s responsibility or our Chairman—and 

I love how our two Chairmen work together—that we have to do 

something with this. And it is not acceptable to this Rep, and I am 

sure it is not to any of the congressional people sitting here. 

You alluded to the KBR employee. And this is another fraudulent 

thing. I guess they are contractors; most KBRs are. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, the KBR staff around the world have these 

contractor Common Access Cards issued to them, yes. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And they also issue cards, some of them. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, we found in use—we did a sample of 30, and 

we found that one KBR employee had the authority to issue other 

KBR employees—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. It has to be centralized somewhere, and I would 

rather that be a governmentally inherent responsibility rather than 

a contractor doing it. 

Mr. HEDDELL. It is not just a preference, it is a requirement. It 

has to be a government employee to authorize or sponsor the 

issuance of that card. It cannot be a contractor. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. In this particular case, the employee worked in 

Afghanistan. He was sentenced to 26 months in prison and a 

$216,000 restitution. After receiving the gas, according to your 

comments this morning, receiving it, selling it back, making the 

bribe, taking—I mean, it is like six layers. And all he got—I want 

him in jail longer, first of all, and I want him to pay back all the 

money. So it seems like the military court was too lenient, because 

it is an example to continue the fraud and abuse. 

Mr. BEARDALL. It was the Federal district court. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. He must have known the judge. 

Mr. HEDDELL. If it were a court-martial, it would be a lot more 

than that. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Okay, then somebody has to say that. Somebody 

has to say that. That is a very light fine, from what I read last 

night and you reinforced today in your opening comments. 

I still want to believe we have the best military in the world. 

Mr. HEDDELL. I think we do. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. That things happen, and from time to time we 

will have to correct them. But all the IGs that do your work, it is 

up to the Congress and the Executive Office to take action. This 

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that I have been reading in the last 24 hours is very troubling to 

me. I commend you for the work you do. 

Mr. Chairman, I am not sure where it goes from here. And I 

heard all the comments from my colleagues this morning. This is 

very serious. I don’t know how you can fight two wars, and we are 

about to expand in Afghanistan and do all this stuff, and have all 

this going on. 

If a contractor—and we already know, I would rather have government employees. I want a larger military if that is what it 

takes. I don’t know where it came from; shrink the military, cut off 

the monitors and hire all the contractors. It is very dangerous. And 

I think we have to fix it sooner rather than later. 

Thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Ms. Kilpatrick. 

I think the committee staff is planning on having an extensive 

section of the report on the bill dealing with this subject area. So 

any member of the committee who would like to contribute to that, 

I would hope they would. 

Mr. Dicks had a quick question, and then Mr. Kingston if we still 

have time. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I will pass. 

Mr. MORAN. Okay. Fine, Jack. Thanks. 

ACQUISITION PERSONNEL

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you a question. When we were talking 

about the personnel for the acquisition, in some departments I understand that they have a private contractor with a Web site—and 

I think DOD does this—to bring in the personnel. Is that correct? 

So it would seem to me to be an inherently government function, 

you know, the hiring of personnel to do acquisition, is being done 

through a contractor and a Web site. Is that correct? 

Mr. HEDDELL. I am not aware of that, sir. It may be correct. I 

am not aware of that. 

[The information follows:] 

The Director of Defense Procurement responded that he was not aware of any use 

of a private contractor with a website for hiring acquisition personnel. 

Mr. DICKS. Yeah, I think that is something you might want to 

take a look at. 

Also, the whole question on personal service contracts, I don’t 

know if you got into that. 

Mr. HEDDELL. We have. Well, I mean, we have done work in that 

area. 

Mr. DICKS. Are we reversing that? Apparently, they went beyond 

the legal authority to do this to services, and now we are talking 

about insourcing some of this. 

The other thing I would just point out, you know, under A–76, 

they should be using the A–76 process, which I think they are not 

doing, under pressure. And can you talk about that? 

Mr. HEDDELL. I can tell you that we have completed audits 

where we felt that there was a strong appearance of violating the 

personal services contracting rules. And, in fact, one was an audit 

that we recently did, and although I am pretty familiar with it, I 

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think it might be worth it to have Mary explain that, if you have 

a moment. It is an interesting audit, and it goes to your question. 

Ms. UGONE. Personal services contracts, as I am sure you are 

aware, Congressman Dicks, is not the preferred method. And, in 

fact, I think it is not legal, except in certain circumstances there 

are waivers for that. And that is a situation in which we are having a government employee directly supervising contractors to the 

point where it is a daily ongoing supervision. 

We had ‘‘America Supports You,’’ an audit report that we issued 

that had to do with it. And we did not go as far to say it was personal services, but it had some of the characteristics of a personal 

services contract, which is verbal direct communication to the contractor of how to proceed, what to do. And that does trouble us, 

from that standpoint. 

We have not done a significant amount of work in personal services contracting, but the area that we are focused—and it is part 

of the overall services contracting area. I think the whole area of 

services contracting is an area that needs additional focus, because 

it is for services. It is not like your traditional, you know, you buy 

an end item and you have a deliverable that you can actually touch 

and feel. Services contracting is a lot more problematic, where you 

are actually having some sort of service done that you may not necessarily touch and see and feel. 

And so I think that, absolutely, personal services contracts we 

should not be using. And, in fact, if we are, they are illegal except 

under certain waivers circumstances. 

Mr. DICKS. Do we have any idea on numbers of these personal 

services contracts? 

Ms. UGONE. We don’t even have any idea of the number of services contracts that we have. In fact, that is what the—I think it 

was section 807, which Congress had asked that the Department 

implement. And so there is a phased approach. I think the Army 

is supposed to be identifying an inventory in two phases, and the 

other services kick-in in, I believe, 2010, yes, fiscal year 2010, and 

then other defense agencies will kick-in in 2011 to report to Congress an inventory of services contracts. We don’t even currently 

have an inventory right now. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Dicks, we are out of time in the vote. We are 

all going to have to run up there, unfortunately. 

This has been a very good hearing. We thank you very much. I 

have some questions that I will submit for the record. Any other 

member who does, as well, will get them answered for the record. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Inspector General, and your very 

competent staff. Thank you. Your colleagues were very good, as 

well. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Moran and the answers thereto follow:] 

ADVANCE COMPETITION NOTICE

Question. Numerous defense industry representatives have discussed with me the 

importance of the Government providing industry with greater advance notice of 

when an existing contract (i.e. re-compete with an existing incumbent contractor) or 

a new contract (i.e. new start with no incumbent contractor) acquisition is to take 

place so that it can align and allocate business development capture and proposal 

resources to targeted procurements. 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

409 

What is your perspective of the job the Department of Defense does today at providing industry with such advance procurement notices, which maximizes the potential for competition, thereby resulting in reduced Government cost and are there opportunities for improvement? 

Answer. During the past five years, we have issued 31 reports that have addressed sole source or directed source awards. We have found that sole source 

awards have occurred because of poor acquisition planning rather than the urgency 

or uniqueness that have been cited as the need for a particular source. We have also 

found problems with advance notice to contractors on multiple award contracts. 

Contracting officers have limited the amount of time for contractors to respond to 

solicitations for proposals or have cited inappropriate exceptions to competition to 

select a particular contractor. 

SOLE SOURCE CONTRACTING

Question. One area of contracting concern is sole source contracts. 

Does the Department of Defense know how many active sole source contracts 

there are by name, contract #, the period of performance, the contract amount, the 

company awarded the sole source contract, the last time the contract was competed, 

and the sponsoring organization and their FAR rationale for the sole source contract 

award? 

Answer. The Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) captures a variety of information about DoD as well as other Federal contracts. Similar information is also 

reported on the USAspending.gov website. For instance, in FY 2008, a query of DoD 

contract dollars by competition type shows that of $383 billion reported, only $131 

billion was fully and openly competed. The remaining contract awards were based 

on more limited or no competition. 

APPROPRIATE OVERSIGHT

Question. It appears that in many federal agencies, both within and outside of 

DoD, greater and greater emphasis is being placed on the seamless and rapid obligation of appropriated funds. This transactional focus manifests itself when acquisition management systems have been subsumed into the agency’s overall financial 

management solution. I am concerned that the strategic importance of acquisition 

management (e.g. contract writing) systems and the required checks and balances 

that these systems historically have provided have been diluted tremendously since 

they are now considered by many to be simply a ‘‘back office’’ non-core feeder system 

to the financial management system. 

Please comment on what is being done to reinvigorate the necessary checks and 

balances and the strategic importance of acquisition management systems to combat 

waste, fraud and abuse, and maximize the benefit that each taxpayer dollar is being 

spent wisely and in compliance with federal law and regulation? 

Answer. We have issued a number of reports that have cited problems with attempts to rapidly award procurements. Our audits have found that urgent awards 

are often improperly justified. Additionally, the Panel on Contracting Integrity has 

taken on a number of contracting initiatives designed to improve the contracting 

process and reduce the risk of fraud, waste and abuse. The Panel established 10 

subcommittees, to include (1) the current structure of contracting integrity, (2) sustained senior leadership, (3) capable contracting workforce, (4) adequate pricing, (5) 

appropriate contracting approaches and techniques, (6) sufficient contract surveillance, (7) contracting integrity in a combat/contingent environment, (8) procurement 

fraud indicators, (9) contractor employee conflicts of interest, and (10) recommendations for change. The Panel identified 21 actions for implementation in FY 2008 to 

improve contracting, and has identified 28 new actions for FY 2009. 

ROLE OF THE DOD IG IN CONTRACTING

Question. There is some concern in the contracting industry that DoD IG staff are 

now performing more roles during contract negotiations between contractors and the 

GSA. Specifically, that these DoD IG advisors are not participating in negotiations 

with rather than GSA contracting officers. 

What is the proper role of the DoD IG in instances where contractors are negotiating GSA schedules contracts with the GSA? 

Answer. My office has no role in negotiating GSA schedules between GSA contracting officers and contractors. The GSA IG has primary oversight of GSA contracting actions. Over the past several years, the DoD IG was mandated to perform 

joint reviews with the GSA IG of interagency direct and assisted contracting actions 

using DoD funds. These audits have looked at contract actions that have already 

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been awarded and while we may have looked at issues related to the award of these 

actions, none of our work was done during the actual pre award phase for these actions. 

CLEARED PERSONNEL

Question. One of the impediments to processing contracts and execution of those 

contracts in a timely manner is the availability of cleared personnel, both within 

the acquisition and contracting force for the government and with the contracting 

industry. 

Can you comment on the challenges that the current clearance process presents 

to our contract management and execution? 

Answer. The clearance process has become mired due to the failure of federal 

agencies to rely upon clearances processed by other federal agencies. This inability 

and several other inefficiencies are being addressed through the development of a 

federal strategy to improve the accessibility of federal investigative records. The Repository Reform Implementation Team is working with the Office of Personnel Management and the Joint Reform Team to remove obstacles to developing a fully automated, end-to-end capability, which processes record requests and record responses 

in optimal time. This would apply to reports of background investigations and federal records of Executive Branch agencies requested in support of those investigations. While the team’s long term goals will be accomplished by automation, short 

term goals will be accomplished by agency accountability and incrementally increasing performance standards. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Moran. 

Questions submitted by Ms. Kaptur and the answers thereto follow:] 

Question. I am interested in the evolution of the culture of contracting within the 

Department of Defense and its changing nature over time and its impact on the 

‘‘Espirit de corps’’ within the U.S. military. 

Answer. The DoD IG does not have a body of work to use as support for responses 

to these questions. As such, in response to Representative Kaptur, we utilized three 

publications that are in part responsive to her questions. • Congressional Budget Office report, ‘‘Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in 

Iraq,’’ released August 2008 (http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/08-12- 

IraqContractors.pdf) • Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support point paper, 

‘‘Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan,’’ released February 2009 (http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/docs/ 

5AlFeb2009.doc) • Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction report, ‘‘Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,’’ released October 

30, 2008 (http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/09-005-fpdf) 

What was the total number of contractors during World War II? 

Answer. The Congressional Budget Office report, ‘‘Contractors’ Support of U.S. 

Operations in Iraq,’’ released August 2008, estimated that during World War II 

there were 734,000 contractors and 5,400,000 military. 

Question. What was the number of contractors during the Persian Gulf War? 

Answer. The Congressional Budget Office report, ‘‘Contractors’ Support of U.S. 

Operations in Iraq,’’ released August 2008, estimated that during the Gulf War 

there were 9,000 contractors and 500,000 military. 

Question. What is the current number of contractors in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support 

recently reported that as of the end of the 1st quarter FY 2009 there were approximately 259,400 contractor personnel working for the DoD in the USCENTCOM 

AOR, broken down as shown in the following chart: 

Iraq ................................................................................................................................................................... 148,050 

Afghanistan ..................................................................................................................................................... 71,755 

Other USCENTCOM ...................................................................................................................................... 39,616 

Total ...................................................................................................................................................... 259,421 

Question. What were the responsibilities and assignments of contractors during 

those two conflicts? 

Answer. The aforementioned reports do not address the responsibilities and assignments of contractors during those two conflicts, and the DoD IG does not have 

a body of work to address this question. 

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Question. What are the current contractor responsibilities in the current wars in 

Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support 

[ADUSD (PS)] recently reported the contractor breakdown by type of service provided in Iraq as of the end of the 1st quarter FY 2009. The contractor breakdown 

for Iraq is detailed below; the ADUSD(PS) report did not provide a similar breakdown for Afghanistan. 

Construction .................................................................................................................................................... 20,729 

Base Support ................................................................................................................................................... 80,931 

Translator/Interpreter .................................................................................................................................... 9,268 

Transportation ................................................................................................................................................. 6,685 

Security ............................................................................................................................................................ 8,380 

Communication Support ................................................................................................................................. 700 

Other ................................................................................................................................................................ 21,357 

Total .......................................................................................................................................................... 148,050 

Question. Has there been an expansion of the missions contractors are providing? 

Answer. We cannot state for certain whether there has been an expansion of the 

missions of contractors. However, all contractor requirements are to be stated in the 

contract and any subsequent contract modifications. Accordingly, any expansion of 

contract requirements would be specified and approved by DoD. 

Question. Provide a breakout by category of responsibility. 

Answer. The Congressional Budget Office report, ‘‘Contractors’ Support of U.S. 

Operations in Iraq,’’ released August 2008, and the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support point paper, ‘‘Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan,’’ released February 2009, 

list the following types of services as being provided by contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

• Professional, Administrative, and Management Support 

• Construction of Structures and Facilities 

• Fuels, Lubricants, Oils, and Waxes 

• Subsistence (Food) 

• Lease or Rental Facilities 

• Maintenance, Repair, or Alteration of Real Property 

• Utilities and Housekeeping Services 

• Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding Equipment 

• Research and Development 

• Architect and Engineering—Construction 

• Translator / Interpreter 

• Transportation 

• Security 

• Communication Support 

• Other 

Question. Provide a breakout of contracts for contracted security forces. 

Answer. The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support 

point paper, ‘‘Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, 

and Afghanistan,’’ released February 2009, reported the following distribution of private security contractors (PSC) in Iraq and Afghanistan as of the end of the 1st 

quarter FY 2009: 

Total U.S. coalition Third country 

national 

Local/host country 

national 

Total DoD PSC in Iraq ......................................................... 9,218 782 7,226 1,210 

Armed DoD PSC in Iraq ....................................................... 8,701 727 6,909 1,065 

Total DoD PSC in Afghanistan ............................................ 3,689 15 23 3,651 

Armed DoD PSC in Afghanistan .......................................... 3,184 12 18 3,154 

Question. Provide an analysis of Department of Defense and Department of State 

contracted security forces. 

What are the total dollars spent by both Departments? 

Answer. The DoD IG does not have a body of work to support a response to this 

question and we were only able to identify responsive information related to Iraq. 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) in its report, ‘‘Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,’’ released October 30, 2008, stated that as of September 2008, the obligations of reconstruction funds for private security contracts by agency in Iraq were as follows: 

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Fund source 

(in millions) DoD DoS USAID 

Multiple Funds Used for Contract .......................................................................... $712.0 $1,443.3 $493.8 

Operations and Maintenance Account .................................................................... 1,150.1 0.0 0.0 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund ..................................................................... 310.7 422.4 127.1 

Iraqi Security Forces Fund ...................................................................................... 244.1 254.5 0.0

Diplomatic and Consular Programs Fund .............................................................. 0.0 97.7 0.0 

Economic Support Fund .......................................................................................... 67.6 0.0 14.7 

Development Fund for Iraq (Iraqi funds) ............................................................... 71.9 0.0 0.0 

Fiscal Year 2007 Supplemental ............................................................................. 0.0 71.6 0.0 

Seized Assets .......................................................................................................... 16.8 0.0 0.0 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program ........................................................ 11.0 0.0 0.0 

Iraq Freedom Fund .................................................................................................. 7.9 0.0 0.0 

Fund Source Not Identified ..................................................................................... 331.2 0.0 105.1 

Total ............................................................................................................... $2,923.3 $2,289.5 $740.7 

SIGIR further reported that as of September 2008, obligations for private security 

services by agency in Iraq were as follows. 

Security service 

(in millions) DoD DoS USAID 

Multiple Services Provided ...................................................................................... $962.9 $1,875.4 $314.7 

Static ....................................................................................................................... 893.4 414.1 108.5 

Convoy ..................................................................................................................... 185.9 0.0 0.0 

Personal Security Detail .......................................................................................... 163.3 0.0 7.4

A & P Advice and Planning .................................................................................... 17.7 0.0 0.0 

Escort ...................................................................................................................... 1.8 0.0 0.3 

Security Service Not Identified ............................................................................... 698.2 N/A 309.8 

Total ............................................................................................................... $2,923.3 $2,289.5 $740.7 

Question. Who were the contracted security forces? 

Answer. The DoD IG does not have a body of work to support a response to this 

question and we were only able to identify responsive information related to Iraq. 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction in its report, ‘‘Agencies Need 

Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,’’ released October 30, 2008, provided the following chart for Total Obligations for Contractors with 

Direct Contracts or Subcontracts for Private Security Contractors (PSCs) by U.S. 

Agency since 2003 (in $ Millions): 

Contractor name Direct Sub DoD DoS USAID 

Blackwater Worldwide ......................................................... 7 2 $27.740 $1,147.020 $31.290 

Aegis Defence Services LTD. ............................................... 19 2 798.621 0 0 

DynCorp International LLC .................................................. 10 3 31.428 659.220 0 

Triple Canopy, Inc. .............................................................. 35 0 106.932 422.233 0.291 

EOD Technology, Inc. (EODT) .............................................. 295 0 328.665 0 0 

Sabre International Security ............................................... 25 3 225.816 0 58.666 

Special Operations Consulting-Security Management 

Group (SOC–SMG) ........................................................... 35 2 271.856 0 0 

Agility Logistics ................................................................... 23 0 183.030 0 0 

Unity Resources Group ........................................................ 0 2 0 50.000 92.951 

ArmorGroup .......................................................................... 22 7 91.558 0 46.088 

Erinys International ............................................................. 3 8 108.159 0 0 

Sallyport Global Holdings .................................................... 0 3 0 0 101.526 

Global Strategies Group ...................................................... 7 1 83.797 0 0 

Garda World ........................................................................ 0 4 0 0 74.701 

Kroll Associates, Inc. ........................................................... 2 2 8.969 0 38.386 

MVM ..................................................................................... 21 0 38.382 0 0 

US Investigations Services (USIS) ...................................... 10 0 35.511 0 0 

Vance Global ....................................................................... 0 1 0 0 31.255 

Falcon Group ....................................................................... 8 0 29.289 0 0 

Hart Group ........................................................................... 4 1 26.264 0 0 

Olive Group FZ LLC ............................................................. 13 8 17.603 0 0 

Control Risks Group ............................................................ 8 3 17.213 0 0 

Custer Battles ..................................................................... 1 0 16.840 0 0 

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Contractor name Direct Sub DoD DoS USAID 

CSS Global, Inc. .................................................................. 112 0 15.016 0 0 

Total Defense Logistics ....................................................... 13 0 12.710 0 0 

Iraqi Contractor #4 ............................................................. 0 1 0 10.800 0 

Reed Incorporated ............................................................... 8 0 9.235 0 0 

Universal Security ............................................................... 86 0 8.523 0 0 

Edinburgh International ...................................................... 2 2 4.989 0 0 

Raymond Associates ........................................................... 5 0 4.944 0 0 

BLP ...................................................................................... 1 0 4.185 0 0 

Rover Global Services, Ltd (RGS Logistics) ........................ 46 0 3.883 0 0 

ISI Group ............................................................................. 1 3 3.838 0 0 

Securiforce International ..................................................... 73 0 3.408 0 0 

SAL Risk Group Ltd. ............................................................ 63 0 1.861 0 0 

American-Iraqi Life Support Solutions ................................ 1 0 1.614 0 0 

Sandi Security Company ..................................................... 1 0 1.575 0 0 

Panalpina ............................................................................ 0 1 0 0 1.137 

Blue Hackle Middle East ..................................................... 3 25 0.904 0 0 

Overseas Security & Strategic Information ........................ 2 0 0.781 0 0 

Threat Management Group ................................................. 2 0 0.500 0 0 

BH Defence .......................................................................... 1 0 0.179 0 0 

Iraqi Contractor #1 ............................................................. 0 1 0 0.119 0 

Iraqi Contractor #3 ............................................................. 0 1 0 0.054 0 

Tetra International LLC ....................................................... 3 1 0.053 0 0 

Iraqi Contractor #6 ............................................................. 0 1 0 0.047 0 

Iraqi Contractor #2 ............................................................. 0 1 0 0.034 0 

Danubia Global ................................................................... 1 0 0.010 0 0 

Iraqi Contractor #5 ............................................................. 0 1 0 0.008 0 

Peak Group Inc. ................................................................... 1 0 0.005 0 0 

Cochise Consultancy Inc. .................................................... 1 0 0 0 0 

ECC International (ECCI) .................................................... 1 1 N/A 0 0 

Operations Support Technologies ........................................ 1 0 N/A 0 0 

OSSI-Safenet Security Services ........................................... 2 9 N/A 0 0 

Janusian Security Risk Management Ltd. .......................... 1 0 N/A 0 0 

Paratus World Wide Protection ........................................... 1 0 N/A 0 0 

Pesh—Kurdistan Army ........................................................ 1 0 N/A 0 0 

Pilgrims Group Ltd .............................................................. 1 0 N/A 0 0 

Iraqi Contractor #28 ........................................................... 0 0 N/A 0 0 

Askar Security Svcs ............................................................. 2 14 N/A 0 0 

Ronco Consulting Corporation ............................................ 1 0 N/A 0 0 

Innovative Technical Solutions, Inc. (ITSI) ......................... 2 0 N/A 0 0 

Rubicon International Services ........................................... 1 0 N/A 0 0 

Safe Security Limited (SSL) ................................................ 1 0 N/A 0 0 

Babylon Gates ..................................................................... 1 0 N/A 0 0 

TOIFOR ................................................................................. 12 1 N/A 0 0 

Ellis World Alliance Corp. (EWAC) ...................................... 1 0 N/A 0 0 

Britam Defence, Ltd. ........................................................... 1 0 N/A 0 0 

Burhan Security Services .................................................... 2 0 N/A 0 0 

Wamar International, Inc .................................................... 0 0 N/A 0 0 

Whitestone Group, Inc. ........................................................ 1 0 N/A 0 0 

Greystone Ltd ...................................................................... 0 1 N/A 0 0 

Centurion Risk Assessment Ltd .......................................... 1 0 N/A 0 0 

Lakeshore Engineering Svc, Inc. ......................................... 1 0 N/A 0 0 

Iraqi Contractor #7 ............................................................. 0 1 N/A 0 0 

Unity Logistics and Security ............................................... 1 0 N/A 0 0 

DS Vance Iraq ..................................................................... 1 0 N/A 0 0 

Total ........................................................................... ............ ........ $2,525.890 $2,289.530 $476.290 

Question. What is the breakdown by nationality of individuals employed by contracted security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support 

point paper, ‘‘Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, 

and Afghanistan,’’ released February 2009, reported the following distribution of private security contractors (PSC) in Iraq and Afghanistan as of the end of the 1st 

quarter FY 2009: 

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Total U.S. coalition Third country 

national 

Local/host country 

national 

Total DoD PSC in Iraq ......................................................... 9,218 782 7,226 1,210 

Armed DoD PSC in Iraq ....................................................... 8,701 727 6,909 1,065 

Total DoD PSC in Afghanistan ............................................ 3,689 15 23 3,651 

Armed DoD PSC in Afghanistan .......................................... 3,184 12 18 3,154 

Question. Between 1997 and 2007 there has been a 331 percent increase in the 

amount of dollars awarded to contractors. 

What has been the increase in the number of contractors during that time? 

Answer. The DoD IG does not have a body of work to support a response to this 

question. However, information on contractors is available at the USAspending.gov 

website. A query from this website shows that in FY 2008 there were 85,891 parent 

companies, and in FY 2000 there were 29,361 parent companies. 

Question. Please provide a list of all current Department of Defense contractors. 

Answer. The USAspending.gov website has a search function to obtain a list of 

contractor parent companies by agency, specifically the DoD. The list of current DoD 

contractor parent companies can be printed from the site. 

Question. On page 5 of your written testimony you write, ‘‘We saw no comprehensive efforts by the Department to oversee or manage the growth, costs, profits, or 

fees for services contracts. In just the last decade, the value of services contracting 

more than tripled.’’ 

Who in the Department of Defense is responsible for such oversight and management? Who should? 

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

is responsible for oversight and management and we believe this is the appropriate 

office. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Ms. Kaptur. 

Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIONS TO IMPROVE CONTRACT OVERSIGHT

Question. On March 31, 2008, the Inspector General issued a Growth Plan for Increasing Audit and Investigative Activities, as required by the fiscal year 2008 Defense Authorization Act. Under that plan, the IG will add 481 full-time positions to 

its Audit, Investigation, Policy & Oversight, Intelligence, Administration & Management, and other staff by the year 2015. The Defense Appropriations Subcommittee 

has supported this planned growth by providing the DoD IG with an additional $63 

million over the past two years: 

Fiscal Year 2008: +$24 million 

Fiscal Year 2009: +$24 million 

Stimulus 2009: +$15 million 

Mr. Heddell, how many staff have you hired with the additional $63 million provided to the IG by the Committee in the last two fiscal years? 

Answer. We increased our staff by 132 personnel over the last two fiscal years, 

from 1,398 at the end of FY 2007 to 1,530 as of April 13, 2009, to include: 

• 51 auditors; 

• 23 investigators; 

• 8 intelligence-related positions; 

• 7 dedicated GWOT-related positions; 

• 10 personnel in a new office of Special Plans and Operations; 

• 4 personnel in a new Office of Professional Responsibility; 

• 10 conversions of contracted IT positions; 

• 1 ombudsman position; and 

• 18 positions in administrative and support functions. 

In addition to our current strength of 1,530, we have authorized a total of 1,704 

positions for FY 2009, to allow us to expand by up to another 174 positions by the 

end of this fiscal year. 

Question. Can you provide specifics about how additional staff has enabled the IG 

to improve contract oversight? 

Answer. The additional staff has been used to bolster our mission effectiveness 

in priority oversight areas. Some of the additional Audit positions have been used 

to augment our overseas presence in Southwest Asia to ‘‘get more boots on the 

ground.’’ We have also augmented our staff at headquarters and established new 

field offices to provide coverage in areas where our coverage was limited in the past, 

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and to focus our resources where they are most needed. For example, within Audit, 

our additional staff is performing oversight of the controls over contractor common 

access cards within the Department, including controls over common access cards 

provided to contractors in Southwest Asia and Korea. 

The additional funding was also used to establish the Special Plans and Operations component. Its work to date includes assessments of the accountability of 

weapons, ammunition, and night vision devices; foreign military sales; building the 

logistics and medical sustainability base for the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan; and the train and equip mission for the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, the additional personnel allowed Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) to deploy six additional agents for 6-month rotations to Kuwait, Iraq, and 

Afghanistan. This increase places more investigators on the ground to conduct investigations of fraud, waste, and abuse of DoD funds in the Southwest Asia area 

of operations. Similarly, we increased agent strength in the U.S. as stateside agents 

also support OIF and OEF efforts by investigating criminal activities in the U.S. as 

well as supporting investigations that occurred in Southwest Asia to ensure conclusion and prosecution. 

Question. Do you have a plan in place to increase the number of auditors and investigators working in Afghanistan to support the growth in contracting there that 

will follow the expected increase in U.S. force levels? 

Answer. We do have a plan in place for increasing our oversight presence in Afghanistan. In December 2008, I met with and received the endorsement of the Commander, U.S. Central Command, to expand our footprint in Southwest Asia, including Afghanistan. Overall, we plan to increase our permanent presence to 36 (an additional 15 persons) in Southwest Asia. In Afghanistan, our goal is to have 12 permanent personnel for a total of 8 auditors (growth of 5) and 4 agents (growth of 

2). DCIS has already increased its presence in Afghanistan by one agent for a total 

of three on the ground, and anticipates the fourth agent by the end of FY 2009. 

Our current personnel work out of our field office on Bagram Air Base, which we 

established in June 2007. In February 2009, we sent senior personnel to Afghanistan to brief the command on our growth plan and negotiate office space for future 

field offices in Kandahar and Camp Eggers. We plan to adjust our deployed strength 

as the DoD mission in Afghanistan grows and we can better ascertain the requirement for oversight personnel. 

Question. Are the majority of the new staff relatively junior, or are you finding 

experienced auditors and investigators who can hit the ground running? 

Answer. To ensure that we obtain a cadre of experienced staff for our priority efforts, such as oversight of Southwest Asia operations, we generally emphasize recruiting experienced, Government personnel (current or retired)—both Federal and 

DoD—as well as retired military members. For example, when establishing our Special Plans and Operations component, we acquired several experienced, retired Government oversight personnel as well as an Ambassador with experience in Iraq/Afghanistan transition programs. Our DCIS teams consist of a mix of junior and experienced agents, with every team consisting of at least one senior experienced agent. 

We have found that the experienced recruits augment our existing, experienced staff 

and our junior staff, to create an effective balance in support of our Southwest Asia 

oversight efforts. 

Question. Are you competing for talent with DoD agencies, such as the Defense 

Contract Audit Agency and the Defense Contract Management Agency, who are also 

trying to beef up their contract oversight staff? 

Answer. Yes. In addition to competing for auditors with DoD agencies, such as 

the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Defense Contract Management Agency, 

we also compete with the DoD Service Audit Agencies, other Federal Inspectors 

General, as well as the private sector, CPA firms, and businesses to attract and retain talented staff to support our oversight mission. And while having to compete 

with other federal law enforcement agencies for talent is a normal occurrence, our 

DCIS has no trouble recruiting and retaining special agents. 

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE VS. CONTRACTOR MIX

Question. Over the period 2000—2007 (the most recent year actual financial data 

is available) spending on services contracted from the private sector grew by 98 percent in constant dollars while spending on total civilian personnel compensation 

grew by 13 percent. 

However, there has been no study to establish the appropriate mix of federal and 

contracted personnel. 

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Mr. Heddell, Do you think DoD has thought about its workforce holistically in 

order to determine the right balance of federal and contractor employees in performing DoD missions? 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense testified in January 2009 that DoD has not 

thought holistically or coherently about the use of contractors, particularly when it 

comes to a combat environment. Additionally, GAO recently conducted an assessment to determine the sufficiency of the Department’s acquisition workforce and its 

efforts to improve its workforce management and oversight. GAO Report 09–342, 

‘‘Additional Actions and Data Are Needed to Effectively Manage and Oversee DoD’s 

Acquisition Workforce,’’ March 25, 2009, found that DoD lacks critical departmentwide information to ensure its acquisition workforce is sufficient (including the right 

number and appropriate mix of civilian, military, and contractor personnel) to meet 

its national security mission. 

Question. How does DoD define a proper balance between federal and contractor 

employees? How should they? 

Answer. As previously mentioned, GAO issued a report in March 2009 that states, 

‘‘DoD lacks critical department-wide information to ensure its acquisition workforce 

is sufficient to meet its national security mission. First, in its acquisition workforce 

assessments, DoD does not collect or track information on contractor personnel, despite their being a key segment of the total acquisition workforce. DoD also lacks 

information on why contractor personnel are used, which limits its ability to determine whether decisions to use contractors to augment the in-house acquisition workforce are appropriate. Second, DoD’s lack of key pieces of information limits its ability to determine gaps in the acquisition workforce it needs to meet current and future missions. For example, DoD lacks information on the use and skill sets of contractor personnel, and lacks complete information on the skill sets of its in-house 

personnel.’’ GAO made recommendations aimed at improving DoD’s management 

and oversight of its acquisition workforce, including the collection of data on contractor personnel. DoD concurred with three of the recommendations and noted that 

implementing the other requires careful consideration. 

Question. Mr. Heddell, if DoD in your view is not defining the proper balance, 

what steps should DoD take to better assure a balance between federal and contractor employees in meeting DoD mission needs? 

Answer. The first and most important step is to determine (1) what workforce mix 

(civilian, military, and contractor personnel) currently exists, and (2) what the appropriate workforce mix should be. Once the appropriate balance has been established, the budget needs to be aligned in support of the appropriate workforce mix. 

Question. Has DoD done mission analysis and/or a study of roles and missions 

that includes consideration of the role that contractors should play? 

Answer. GAO found that in its acquisition workforce assessments, DoD does not 

collect or track information on contractor personnel; lacks information on the use 

and skill sets of contractor personnel; and lacks complete information on the skill 

sets of its in-house personnel. However, Secretary Gates stated during an April 6, 

2009, press briefing, ‘‘there is broad agreement on the need for acquisition and contracting reform in the Department of Defense. There have been enough studies. 

Enough hand-wringing. Enough rhetoric. Now is the time for action.’’ The Secretary 

concluded this statement with a final recommendation to overhaul how defense organizations are staffed and operated with regards to contractors versus full-time 

government employees. 

Question. Do you share the concern that there has been an erosion of federal personnel control within the DoD? 

Answer. Yes, we share the concern of the Secretary of Defense that the correct 

mix of military, DoD civilian, and contractor personnel was not thought out holistically. However, on April 6, 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced key decisions 

that he will recommend to the President with respect to the fiscal year 2010 defense 

budget, to include a recommendation that will have a significant impact on how defense organizations are staffed and operated. Under this budget request, the Department will reduce the number of support service contractors from the current 39 percent of the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent and replace them with fulltime government employees. The Secretary stated that the goal is to hire as many 

as 13,000 new civil servants in fiscal year 2010 to replace contractors and up to 

30,000 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years. 

Question. Do you share the concern that there may be an over reliance on contractors? 

Answer. Contractor support has become an integral part of today’s execution of 

DoD’s mission. However, with this comes a greater risk that contractor’s roles infringe on areas that are inherently governmental. I highlighted an example of this 

during my testimony on February 26, 2009; specifically, I described an incident in 

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which a contractor, rather than the military or other DoD entity, was responsible 

for issuing Common Access Cards, which allowed the holder to gain access to DoD 

facilities world-wide creating a national security issue. As such, we agree with the 

Secretary of Defense’s recommendation as part of his FY 2010 budget to reduce the 

number of support service contractors and replace them with full-time government 

employees; specifically, up to 30,000 new civil servants in place of contractors over 

the next five years. 

GROWTH IN CONTRACTOR PROVIDED SERVICES

Question. DoD’s obligations on contracts rose from 47 percent of the total budget 

in fiscal year 2000 to 51 percent in fiscal year 2007 (according to the 2009 President’s Budget). Of the contract costs, service contracts grew from 26 percent of the 

total budget billion in 2000 to 27 percent in 2007. 

The GAO recently testified to this Committee that the transition to contractor 

provided services was in no way the result of a strategic decision but was a piecemeal response to downsizing that occurred despite increasing workload. Have you 

seen any strategic thinking on this issue from DoD? 

Answer. We agree that the reliance on contractors to support DoD’s current mission was not the result of a strategic or deliberate process but resulted from thousands of individual decisions to use contractors to provide specific capabilities. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense testified in January 2009 that DoD has not 

thought holistically or coherently about the use of contractors particularly when it 

comes to a combat environment. 

Question. Does DoD have clear policy guidance on contracted services? 

Answer. In addition to the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, DoD continues to clarify and issue new 

guidance on aspects of service contracts in response to findings in our audit reports 

and other information. 

Question. Where in the Pentagon do you believe service contract policy should emanate from? 

Answer. Because spending for services accounts for such a large portion of the Defense budget, policy should emanate from the highest levels of the Department. Specifically, the Under Secretary of Defense of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is 

responsible for establishing and publishing polices and procedures governing the operations of the DoD Acquisition System and the administrative oversight of defense 

contractors. In addition, since policy should be based on informed decisions about 

the balance of in-house versus contracted resources, policies should include senior 

officials responsible for personnel and human capital decisions. 

Question. Should contract service policy be a function of a human capital plan? 

Answer. It appears it would not be possible to appropriately evaluate the Department’s needs to contract for services without having coordinated such an assessment 

against a human capital plan of overall DoD resource considerations. 

Question. Does DoD have a human capital plan? 

Answer. Yes, the Department does have a Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan. 

OMB CIRCULAR A–76 

Question. The Executive Office of the President’s policy on the performance of 

commercial type activities, OMB Circular A–76, states: 

‘‘The longstanding policy of the federal government has been to rely on the private 

sector for needed commercial services.’’ Further DoD has not defined or measured 

the value it seeks from contract service dollars, in part because the roles of contractors are not fully known or defined. 

Mr. Heddell, it seems that federal policy encourages contracting out of services, 

rather than determining the correct balance between federal and contractor personnel. Do you agree? 

Answer. We do believe that contracting out of services has been encouraged. Commercial Services Management (formerly Competitive Sourcing) has been a President 

Management Agenda item for the past 8 years. It was also encouraged through 

OMB Circular A–76 for years without a study by DoD on the proper balance. 

Question. Is there any evidence that once a government activity has been 

outsourced to the private sector that there continues to be savings to the taxpayer? 

Answer. In our opinion, the savings are questionable. Examples of questionable 

A–76 Competitions include: 

• In an audit of the DFAS military retired and annuitant pay A–76 competition, we identified a $30 million error in the in-house cost proposal, which 

caused the Government to lose the competition to the contractor. We are currently conducting an audit looking at the contractor’s costs. 

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• In an audit of the Navy San Diego Public Works Center environmental 

services A–76 competition, the contractor won by proposing rates that were 

lower than the rates the contractor actually charged once he began work on the 

contract. 

We have a competitive sourcing strategic audit plan, and plan to look at A–76 cost 

savings in the future. However, the recent Congressional direction to freeze further 

competitions may alter or delay our planned oversight. We will continue to monitor 

the guidance and efforts to determine what oversight can be performed and be of 

value given the potential changes to the overall efforts in the Department. 

Question. The previous administration held the assumption that using contractors 

in place of federal employees will yield cost savings. Does DoD, in making decisions 

to contract for services, have sound decision-making processes to ensure that savings will result from using contractors to meet a mission requirement? If not what 

should be done by Congress to get DoD to put such safeguards into place? 

Answer. DoD Instruction 1100.22, ‘‘Guidance for Determining Workforce Mix,’’ implements policy for determining the appropriate mix of manpower (military and civilian) and private sector support necessary to accomplish Defense missions consistent with applicable laws, policies, and regulations. However, GAO found in past 

oversight efforts instances where converting functions from the Government to the 

private sector was actually more costly. GAO Report No. 09–041, ‘‘Improved Analysis and Cost Data Needed to Evaluate the Cost Effectiveness of Performance Based 

Logistics,’’ December 19, 2008, gives several examples where contractor support 

costs are greater than in-house maintenance costs. For example, the report states 

that FA–18 E/F contractor support would be $400 million more expensive than Government support over the next 28 years. 

Question. Is there evidence that services provided by the private sector are in any 

way inherently less costly than the public sector? 

Answer. It would not be appropriate to generalize regarding cost effectiveness; 

each comparison should be done on a case-by-case basis to ensure best value for the 

government. 

COMPETITIVE SOURCING

Question. The DoD IG issued a report on January 13, 2009 that the Defense Department is studying the outsourcing of nearly 9,000 civilian jobs. The IG report 

was ordered by Congress to evaluate whether the Pentagon is holding jobs competitions under orders from the Office of Management and Budget. The fiscal year 2008 

National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110–181) prohibited OMB from ordering 

DoD to hold the competitions. The IG concluded the Defense Department’s jobs competitions were not being done under orders from OMB but the report said some jobs 

competitions were being done under pressure from senior Pentagon officials and 

that the competitions were hurting morale and fueling turnover of staffs in some 

cases. 

Mr. Heddell, please summarize the finding in the January 13, 2009, DoD IG report that senior Pentagon officials pressured the Military Services to compete 9,000 

jobs with the private sector. 

Answer. As of the April 22, 2008, date of our interim report, only the Army was 

feeling extreme pressure from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to conduct public-private competitions. However, as of December 15, 2008, the date of our 

final report, the Army was no longer receiving pressure from OSD to conduct publicprivate competitions. 

Question. Did you find inappropriate influence to compete government jobs with 

the private sector? 

Answer. No, we found no evidence of inappropriate influence to compete government jobs. As of the December 15, 2008, date of our final report, DoD competitive 

sourcing officials and headquarters-level competitive sourcing officials for the three 

Military Departments all stated that they were not directed by and did not feel any 

pressure from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to conduct public-private competitions. Major Command and Budget Submitting Office competitive 

sourcing officials agreed with the statements made by headquarters-level officials, 

and stated that the pressure to conduct public-private competitions was not directly 

from OMB or OSD, but from the chain of command. 

Question. If so, who was it that exerted inappropriate influence? 

Answer. We found no evidence of inappropriate influence to compete government 

jobs. 

Question. What is the impact on morale? 

Answer. During our audit, installation-level officials within the three Military Departments raised many concerns about the competitive sourcing process, including 

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staffing. Most of the officials we spoke with expressed concerns about the strain 

public-private competitions place on their workforce and the ability to meet their 

mission. They stated that because a public-private competition puts a person’s livelihood at risk, it causes angst among the workforce and in turn, management of that 

workforce becomes very difficult. Also, many employees look for and accept other 

employment opportunities before the completion of the competition, which creates 

vacant positions. Officials stated that it is difficult to hire new employees during an 

ongoing competition because most qualified personnel do not want to take a temporary position. At a time when much of the workforce is eligible for retirement, 

positions under public-private competitions add to the difficulty of hiring, training, 

and transferring knowledge to a younger workforce, which creates a struggle to 

maintain an adequate workforce to meet the required level of performance. 

DEFINITION OF INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL

Question. The Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Federal Procurement 

Policy advocated ‘‘competitive sourcing’’ during the last Administration. Competitive 

sourcing requires that federal government work that is not ‘‘inherently governmental’’ go through a public-private competition. 

There have been numerous media reports that illustrate how private contractors 

have been hired to perform contract oversight functions that were traditionally reserved for federal employees. The GAO found that of 52 major weapons programs, 

over 45 percent of the program office staff were private contractors. 

In the 2009 Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 110–417), the OMB Director 

was required to develop a single consistent definition of an ‘‘inherently governmental function.’’ The Director was supposed to address deficiencies with the existing definitions and develop criteria so that the head of each department could identify positions that could not be contracted out because they exercise an inherently 

governmental function. The Director was given one year to report to Congress on 

the new definition and put forward any legislative recommendations as may be necessary. 

What is the status of the OMB Director’s effort to help the heads of the Agencies 

better determine which positions are inherently governmental and cannot be contracted out? 

Answer. We are not aware of the current status of OMB’s efforts. The OMB could 

provide the best answer to this question. 

Question. What plans does OMB have in place to ensure an orderly transition of 

the existing work to the new administration? 

Answer. We are not aware of OMB’s plans. This question would be best answered 

by OMB. 

INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

Question. An inherently governmental activity is an activity that is so intimately 

related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government personnel. 

These activities require the exercise of substantial discretion in applying government authority and/or in making decisions for the government. • For example, in March of last year, the GAO found that 42 percent of the 

Army’s contracting center of excellence was staffed by contractors. In other words, 

contractors were making decisions on government contracting. • In another example, the OSD Comptroller had contracted for the development 

of budget justification of the fiscal year 2008 supplemental funding request. 

Inherently governmental functions are not to be performed by contractors. Within 

the Department of Defense, are there any private contractors performing inherently 

governmental functions? 

Answer. We have identified instances of outsourcing inherently governmental 

functions. For example, we identified that contractors were used as contracting officer representatives for the Air Force Second Generation Wireless Local Area Network contract. We believe that the interests of taxpayers are not protected when we 

have one contractor monitoring another contractor. 

Question. Do you believe that the DoD should provide a clearer statement of what 

constitutes inherently governmental functions? 

Answer. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines inherently governmental functions, not DoD. However, the definition is interpreted differently and inconsistently by different people at different agencies. As such, GAO has recommended that the DoD provide a clearer statement regarding which positions are 

inherently governmental. 

Question. Do you believe that there needs to be greater attention on the types of 

functions and activities that should be contracted out and which should not? 

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Answer. Yes, the Department needs to pay greater attention to the types of functions that should be contracted out and provide training to acquisition, contracting, 

and human capital officials for appropriately contracting out personnel services. 

Question. What are the dangers in relying on contractors for inherently government functions such as program and financial management, intelligence analysis, 

and policy making? 

Answer. As GAO reported, the closer contractor services come to supporting inherently governmental functions, the greater the risk of contractors influencing the government’s control over and the accountability for decisions that may be based, in 

part, on the contractor’s work. We believe this may also increase the risk that contractors can inappropriately influence government decisions to provide the contractor a financial windfall, all of which may result in decisions that are not in the 

best interests of the government and the American taxpayer. Over-relying on contractors could also lead to increased vulnerability of fraud, waste, and abuse (i.e. 

organizational conflicts of interest might arise if an employee of a contractor recommends an action that would benefit the contractor in a future procurement). 

Question. The line separating contractor from government employee can be blurry 

and not well-defined on work that closely supports inherently governmental functions. The Army has undertaken a review of contracted positions and has discovered 

that inherently governmental functions are often performed by contractors. Do you 

believe that this may be the case in the Navy and Air Force as well? 

Answer. This is certainly a possibility. The inventories that the Navy and Air 

Force will be compiling in response to Section 807 of the FY 2008 National Defense 

Authorization Act, ‘‘Inventories and Reviews of Contracts for Services,’’ should assist 

them in determining whether they have inappropriately contracted out inherently 

governmental functions. 

Question. What factors should DoD consider when making a decision to use contractors to meet mission needs and what tradeoffs are involved in considering such 

factors? 

Answer. The factors and tradeoffs vary depending on the mission and the needs 

of the requiring activity. However, whether a function is inherently governmental, 

cost/benefit and human capital considerations should be part of the process. 

PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACTS

Question. A personal service contract is when the government obtains the services 

of specific person by contract, rather than by direct hire. It is legal in only a few 

specific instances, for example when the need for services is short term or intermittent. However, GAO has testified that the DoD may be using these contracts more 

expansively than intended. 

Mr. Heddell, personal service contracts are legal for very limited circumstances. 

Do you believe that DoD confines its use of personal services to only those that are 

legally allowable? 

Answer. Not in all cases. DoD is required to comply with the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation in relation to the use of personal service contracts. However, we have 

identified concerns regarding the appearance of a personal service contract in the 

America Supports You Program, and GAO has reported concerns with the use of 

personal services contracts by the Army Contracting Command. 

Question. Mr. Heddell, could you comment on DoD’s use of personal service contracts? 

Answer. DoD is required to comply with the Federal Acquisition Regulation in relation to the use of personal service contracts. However, we have identified concerns 

with the use of a personal service contract in the America Supports You Program, 

and GAO has reported concerns with the use of personal services contracts by the 

Army Contracting Command. 

Question. Mr. Heddell, how does the work that contractors perform differ from the 

work that civilian employees perform? 

Answer. Contractors can not perform tasks that require either the exercise or discretion in applying government authority, which should be performed by government employees. 

Question. How do government ethics rules apply to personal service contractors? 

Do the personal conflict of interest safeguards apply to personal service contractors? 

Answer. Contractor employees, including those performing personal service contracts, are not subject to the same laws and regulations that are in place to prevent 

conflicts of interest among federal employees. As examples, 5 C.F.R. Part 2635, 

‘‘Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch,’’ and the 

Joint Ethics Directive, DoD 5500.07 (November 29, 2007) do not apply to contractor 

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1 Unless the contract is for the acquisition of a commercial item or will be performed entirely 

outside the United States. 

employees. Similarly sections of Title 18, United States Code are only applicable to 

Government employees (207 and 208). 

There are certain laws and regulations applicable to both federal and contractor 

employees (i.e., 18 U.S.C. 201—Bribery or 41 U.S.C. 423(a) and FAR 3.104–4—protection of procurement-related information). Specifically, contractors are bound to 

follow ‘‘ethical rules’’ set forth in the FAR and DFARS (i.e., Part 3, ‘‘Improper Business Practices and Personal Conflicts of Interest,’’ Part 9.2, ‘‘Qualification Requirements,’’ Part 9.1, ‘‘Responsible Prospective Contractors,’’ Part 9.4, ‘‘Suspension and 

Debarment and Ineligibility,’’ Part 9.5, ‘‘Organization and Consultant Conflicts of 

Interest,’’ and Part 9.6, ‘‘Contractor Team Arrangements’’). Perhaps most importantly, the FAR was recently amended to require that if the value of the contract 

is expected to exceed $5,000,000 and the performance period is 120 days or more, 

the solicitation and the contract shall contain FAR clause 52.203–13 1, ‘‘Contractor 

Code of Business Ethics and Conduct.’’ That section requires the contractor to have 

a code of conduct and business ethics, and to provide a copy of that code to each 

employee engaged in performance of the contract. It does not set forth specific requirements for what the code shall address. 

Question. How can the Congress compel DoD to limit the use of personal service 

contracts to only those few unique circumstances where they are legal? 

Answer. The Congress should not have to compel DoD because DoD is obligated 

to follow the law and the rules delineated in the Federal Acquisition Regulation on 

the use of personal services contracts. As such, DoD is drafting guidance with regard to this matter in response to Section 831, ‘‘Development of Guidance on Personal Services Contracts,’’ of the FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act. 

GUIDELINES ON CONSIDERING CIVILIANS FOR NEW AND CONTRACTED FUNCTIONS

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, required 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD[P&R]) to develop 

guidelines and procedures to ensure that consideration is given to using DoD civilian employees to perform new functions or functions that are performed by contractors—and required the DoD IG to review implementation. 

Mr. Heddell, In July of last year, the DoD IG reported on the actions underway 

within DoD to in-source new and previously contracted functions. Would you give 

a general description of on DoD’s in-sourcing efforts? 

Answer. DoD issued guidelines and procedures on in-sourcing new and contracted 

functions on April 4, 2008. As of March 13, 2009, an official from the DoD Office 

of Program Analysis and Evaluation stated that the directive-type memorandum for 

the Full Cost of Manpower Business Rules was submitted for formal coordination 

and the review was expected to begin the week of March 23, 2009. Also, the costing 

software contract was awarded and the contractor was developing a timeline. We 

have not conducted any follow-up work to determine if there has been any progress 

on DoD components beginning in-sourcing actions under Section 324. 

In addition, on April 6, 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced key decisions 

that he will recommend to the President with respect to the fiscal year 2010 defense 

budget, to include a recommendation that will have a significant impact on how defense organizations are staffed and operated. Under this budget request, the Department will reduce the number of support service contractors from the current 39 percent of the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent and replace them with fulltime government employees. The Secretary stated that the goal is to hire as many 

as 13,000 new civil servants in fiscal year 2010 to replace contractors and up to 

30,000 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years. Finally, 

the Secretary stated that he would also recommend overhauling the acquisition 

workforce by converting 11,000 contractors and hiring an additional 9,000 government acquisition professionals by 2015—beginning with 4,100 in fiscal year 2010. 

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD 

[P&R]) was to develop in sourcing guidelines. Did, the USD (P&R), Dr. Chu, comply? 

Answer. Yes, DoD complied. On April 4, 2008, Deputy Secretary of Defense England issued the in-sourcing guidelines and procedures prepared by the USD (P&R). 

Question. Mr. Heddell, this Committee heard testimony from the Army earlier 

this month on their in sourcing efforts. What, if anything, have the Navy and Air 

Force done? 

Answer. As of the July 23, 2008, date of our report, the Air Force and Navy had 

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tion Act. We have not conducted any follow-up work on the in-sourcing efforts of 

the Air Force and Navy since our final report was issued. 

Question. What do you recommend to the Navy and Air Force? 

Answer. As of the July 23, 2008, date of our report, the Air Force and Navy had 

not in-sourced functions under Section 324 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. We have not conducted any follow-up work on the in-sourcing efforts of 

the Air Force and Navy since our final report was issued. Therefore, we cannot 

make recommendations to the Navy and Air Force until we have determined 

through our follow-up efforts what actions the Navy and Air Force have taken under 

Section 324 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. 

ANNUAL INVENTORIES AND REVIEW OF CONTRACTS FOR SERVICES

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, required 

The Secretary of Defense to submit annual inventories of contracted services beginning in 2008. The Army has largely completed an inventory. However, due to ‘‘the 

magnitude of the task . . .’’ the Air Force and Navy cannot complete inventories 

until 2010. 

Mr. Heddell, Why can’t the Navy and Air Force submit the required annual inventories of contracts for services? 

Answer. DoD is not currently capable of tracking all service contracts. We are not 

aware of one DoD system that exists to fully capture the required information of 

Section 807 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. Additionally, some contract information is tracked manually, making reporting even more difficult. 

Question. Is it fair to assume that if the DoD cannot provide an inventory of contracted services that it also cannot do meaningful oversight and management of contracted services? 

Answer. While DoD cannot provide an inventory of contracted services and some 

contract information is tracked manually, we cannot assume that meaningful oversight is not occurring. 

Question. How can the Congress force greater visibility of the contracted services 

workforce? 

Answer. I believe the Congress has provided the Department with the tools necessary for greater visibility. As GAO testified earlier this month, ‘‘DoD needs to ensure that existing and future guidance is fully complied with and implemented. 

Doing so will require continued sustained commitment by senior DoD leadership to 

translate policy into practice and hold decision-makers accountable.’’ 

Question. How can Congress compel better management and oversight of contracted services? 

Answer. I believe the Congress has provided the Department with the tools necessary for better management and oversight. As GAO testified earlier this month, 

‘‘DoD needs to ensure that existing and future guidance is fully complied with and 

implemented. Doing so will require continued sustained commitment by senior DoD 

leadership to translate policy into practice and hold decision-makers accountable.’’ 

CONTRACTOR OVERSIGHT

Question. In 2007 more than half of DoD’s budget was obligated on contracts. Of 

the contract costs, 27% of the total DoD budget was spent on service contracts. Despite this very significant percent of DoD resources, DoD does not know how many 

contractors and subcontractors are employed, or what their average salary is. The 

responsibility for acquiring services within DoD is spread among individual military 

commands, weapon system program offices, or functional units on military bases 

with no central oversight. 

Does the Department have the ability to report on the number of contractors and 

subcontractors that they employ and their compensation costs? 

Answer. While certain databases such as the Federal Procurement Data System 

can provide information on awards to contractors, we are not aware of any system 

that can report the number of contractors, subcontractors, or their compensation 

costs. 

Question. Has DoD considered or planned what part of the workforce increase 

should be dedicated to contract oversight? 

Answer. My understanding is that each Military Department and Defense agency 

should provide its own oversight or include the Defense Contract Management 

Agency in the oversight process. We are not aware of a DoD-wide plan for oversight 

resources. 

Question. Mr. Heddell, the DoD can report for both military and civilian employees the number of employees, the pay costs, and the total compensation costs. Why 

doesn’t DoD track the number of contractors and their compensation costs? 

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Answer. In response to Section 807 of the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, DoD is required to submit annual inventories and reviews of contracts for 

services. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology has 

issued implementing guidelines and stated that, because of the magnitude of the 

task of conducting inventories and reviews for all service contracts, DoD will implement this in phases. The Army will submit an inventory in FY 2009, the Navy and 

Air Force in FY 2010, and all Military Departments and Defense Agencies in 2011. 

We believe this effort will provide DoD greater visibility over contractors and their 

compensation costs. 

Question. Mr. Heddell, given that DoD does not know or track contractors’ average salaries, how can DoD make an informed decision on obtaining ‘‘contractor’’ VS. 

‘‘in-house’’ services—if the ‘‘unit costs’’ can’t be compared? 

Answer. DoD cannot make fully informed decisions if unit costs cannot be compared. 

GANSLER COMMISSION REPORT

Question. In the November of 2007, a commission headed by the former Undersecretary for Acquisition during the Clinton Administration, Dr Jacques Gansler, found 

a number of key failures of the Army’s contract system which contributed waste, 

fraud and abuse. The Commission examined business processes, the acquisition 

workforce, and contract management and made 22 specific recommendations for the 

Army and 18 for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On December 14, 2008 the 

Secretary of the Army reported on the status of implementation of the Commission 

recommendations. 

Mr. Heddell, Do you believe that the Army has implemented all of the actions 

called for by the Gansler Commission on Expeditionary contracting? 

Answer. Based on our interaction with the Army and work in this area, we believe 

the Army is actively implementing or addressing the recommendations made in the 

Gansler report. In addition, the Army testified in February 2009 that they completed actions on 21 of the 22 specific recommendations from the Gansler report. 

The remaining recommendation—to increase the contracting workforce by 400 military and 1,000 civilians—will require additional time by the Army to ensure the 

quality and quantity of workforce is obtained. 

Question. How would you grade the Army expeditionary contracting now? 

Answer. As stated above, the Army is actively implementing or addressing recommendations to improve expeditionary contracting, but it is a work in progress 

and will take time. 

Question. Mr. Heddell, the Gansler Commission recommended that Army increase 

the status and size of the Army acquisition workforce. What’s been done and what 

is still needed? 

Answer. The Army testified in February 2009 that they are pursuing growth of 

their contracting workforce by 446 military and 1,191 civilians. The Army further 

testified that about one-third of those numbers is the planned growth in each of the 

next three years. 

Question. Mr. Heddell, the Gansler Commission recommended that the Army elevate the authority for acquisition issues within the Army. How has the Army done 

this? What obstacles did the Army face? 

Answer. The Army established a 2-star billet to head the U.S. Army Contracting 

Command and obtained five additional general Army officer billets for acquisition; 

one of which will head the recently established Expeditionary Contracting Command. The Army needed the authority provided in the FY 2009 National Defense 

Authorization Act to create the billets. 

DEPLOYED CONTRACTORS

Question. DoD has extensively used contract support in the conduct of Operations 

Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Deployed contractors continue to outnumber 

deployed U.S. military personnel. As of January, 219,000 Military personnel versus 

259,000 contractors were deployed to CENTCOM. 

Mr. Heddell, DoD continues to deploy huge numbers of contractors. Currently 

259,000 contractors are deployed to the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Would 

you comment on the consequences of having more contractors than military personnel in CENTCOM area of responsibility? 

Answer. While we cannot express a suitable ratio for the number of contractors 

compared to military members in an area of operations, we can state that contractors deployed to the CENTCOM area of responsibility should be performing necessary work. In addition, for the contracted efforts in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, it is imperative that the number of contractors, type of contract vehicle, 

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scope of the contracted efforts, and complexity of the effort be considered to ensure 

that the appropriate level of contract oversight is also maintained in the area of operations. 

Question. How does the CENTCOM commander control the number of contractors 

in his area of responsibility? 

Answer. Joint Publication 4–10, ‘‘Operational Contract Support in Joint Operations,’’ October 2008, provides overall guidance to support the CENTCOM Commander on contracting and contractor management in his area of responsibility. The 

joint publication defines key personnel involved in the contracting process and includes checklists to support the Commander with proper contractor planning. The 

Contracting Support Plan Checklist covers the key requirements associated with orchestrating and managing contracting efforts in a joint operations area, including 

a requirement to ensure that there are adequately trained Contracting Officer Representatives and Contracting Officer Technical Representatives to assist in managing contract performance. The Contractor Integration Plan Checklist covers the 

key requirements associated with managing contractor personnel in a joint operations area and providing Government-furnished support, when such support is required. 

In addition to the Joint Publication, the CENTCOM Commander should consider 

what magnitude of contractor efforts are sustainable, will most likely achieve the 

desired outcomes, and are feasible given the operational environment in his area of 

responsibility. 

Question. Are there any particular lessons from the extensive use of contract support in Iraq that DoD must consider as Military forces are increased in Afghanistan? 

Answer. DoD must consider that increased utilization of contractors requires additional oversight on the part of the military and civilian DoD components to ensure 

that contractors comply with relevant contractual requirements and refrain from engaging in fraudulent activity. Contractor oversight personnel must be properly 

trained and deployed timely and in adequate strength to ensure proper oversight. 

Our summary report of challenges impacting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom reported by major oversight organizations from FY 2003 through FY 

2007 identified specific problems in contract management, logistics, financial management and other areas, which should all be considered before contracting functions in Afghanistan. 

DOD’S PANEL ON CONTRACTING INTEGRITY

Question. Panel on Contracting Integrity identified areas for improvement all of 

which focus on acquisition workforce issues. Areas that the Panel identified are reinforcing the functional independence of contracting personnel, filling contracting 

leadership positions with qualified leaders, determining the appropriate size of the 

contracting workforce and ensuring that it has the appropriate skills; and improving 

the planning and training for contracting in combat and contingency environments. 

Mr. Heddell, this Committee is interested in DoD’s progress in addressing the 

problems of the acquisition workforce based on the work of DoD’s Panel on Contracting Integrity. 

What should this Committee be looking for from DoD to ensure that DoD keeps 

focused on taking actions to resolve the long-standing problems of DoD’s acquisition 

workforce? 

Answer. During 2008, DoD made significant progress in establishing the framework to assure functional independence of contracting personnel, Separation of Duties of senior acquisition and contracting leaders, and leveraging of contracting officer training. In addition, DoD has begun a workforce-wide competency assessment 

of 22,000 civilian and military contracting professionals, and the Secretary of Defense stated in a press conference on April 6, 2009, that his recommended fiscal year 

2010 defense budget is aligned to support the Department’s acquisition reform goals 

by increasing the size of defense acquisition workforce, converting 11,000 contractors, and hiring an additional 9,000 government acquisition professionals by 2015 

beginning with 4,100 in FY 2010. The Committee should expect periodic updates 

from the Department on the implementation of its initiatives. 

Question. What factors should DoD consider when making a decision to use contractors to meet mission needs and what tradeoffs are involved in considering such 

factors? 

Answer. The most important consideration when determining whether contractors 

should be used is whether it is essential that the function be performed by government personnel (i.e. inherently governmental functions). Once it is decided that a 

contractor could do the work, there are a number of tradeoffs. One consideration is 

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how well can the work be defined? If it can be well-defined, fixed price contracting 

would be appropriate to put the risk on the contractor and reduce the need for surveillance. If the work cannot be well-defined, some form of cost-type contract will 

likely be used, which puts more risk on the government and requires more use of 

government personnel to oversee the work. Other considerations include whether 

multiple contractors are available to do the work or only one contractor. Multiple 

contractors would allow for competition and require fewer resources for pricing the 

contract. Whereas, detailed pricing evaluation would be needed in a sole source situation. 

Also, DoD needs to consider from recent wartime contracting experience that it 

continues to have insufficient resources to monitor contractor performance in an expeditionary environment. The inability to enforce contract requirements and monitor contractor performance remains a critical DoD problem because DoD lacks the 

trained resources to award, monitor, and ensure that contractors provide services 

needed by the warfighter. 

DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Question. Nearly a year ago GAO testified that the DoD lacks the assurance that 

corps logistical capabilities were being maintenance as needed to ensure timely and 

effective response to national defense emergencies and contingencies (as required by 

10 U.S.C. 2464). However, the DoD continues to outsource much of these core depot 

maintenance functions. 

Mr. Heddell, the DoD is required by law to have an in-house depot maintenance 

workforce able to respond to national defense emergencies. 

Do you believe that DoD has sufficient numbers of in-house personnel to meet all 

core maintenance functions to respond to national emergencies? 

Answer. This is a continuing challenge for the Department. We agree with the 

GAO testimony that DoD lacks the assurance that core logistics capabilities were 

being maintained as needed to ensure timely and effective response to national defense emergencies and contingencies. We will continue to assess DoD’s progress in 

this area through our reviews of the Department’s efforts related to depot overhaul 

and maintenance of equipment, spare parts, and in-house overhaul and maintenance of military equipment for the forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Question. Mr. Heddell, do you agree that current DoD policy encourages the use 

of contractor logistics support? 

Answer. Yes. Current law encourages that at least 50 percent of all depot work may go to contractors. Data shows that for FY 2009, about $16 billion of $32 billion 

of depot work is planned for contracted depot work. 

Question. If so, are we in danger of not having sufficient in-house technical expertise? 

Answer. Yes, that is why we believe the Department must assess its needs and 

skills requirements to determine the proper mix of military, civilian, and contractors 

in its workforce. 

SIZE OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN CONTRACTING WORKFORCE

Question. DoD downsized the defense contracting workforce without ensuring that 

it retained an adequate in-house workforce with the specific skills and competencies 

needed to accomplish the DoD contracting mission. 

The Committee understands that from 1997 to 2007 obligations for contracts and acquisition increased from $190 billion to $429 billion per year, while the DoD acquisition workforce which oversees contracts and acquisition was downsized significantly. 

In your opinion, is the current DoD acquisition or contracting workforce adequate 

to the task in terms of number of employees and the skill level of those employees? 

Answer. No. Several internal DoD panels, such as the Panel on Contracting Integrity and the Gansler Commission, have found or acknowledged the fact that the 

present DoD Acquisition workforce is insufficient to fully meet wartime contract 

award, monitoring, and performance oversight functions needed by the warfighter. 

Question. How does the DoD contracting workforce compare with the contracting 

workforce at large private sector companies, in terms of the number of workers and 

the skill level of those workers? 

Answer. I cannot comment on the quantity or skill level of the private sector contracting workforce; however, a Defense Acquisition University study published in 

early 2008 on Acquisition Structures and Capabilities found: 

• The Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) workforce is the most 

experienced in DoD (Fifty percent of the AT&L civilian workforce has more than 

20 years of experience); 

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• The AT&L workforce is highly educated, with 74 percent of civilians having 

bachelor’s or advanced degrees; and 

• Sixty-six percent of the AT&L workforce is certified, and 50 percent meet 

or exceed their position level requirements. 

Question. In your opinion, is the current DoD acquisition or contracting workforce 

adequate to the task in terms of number of employees and the skill level of those 

employees? 

Answer. No. Several internal DoD panels, such as the Panel on Contracting Integrity and the Gansler Commission, have found or acknowledged the fact that the 

present DoD Acquisition workforce is insufficient to fully meet wartime contract 

award, monitoring, and performance oversight functions needed by the warfighter. 

In addition, Secretary Gates acknowledged during an April 6, 2009, press briefing 

that ‘‘there is broad agreement on the need for acquisition and contracting reform 

in the Department of Defense.’’ The Secretary stated that he would recommend 

overhauling the acquisition workforce by converting 11,000 contractors and hiring 

an additional 9,000 government acquisition professionals by 2015—beginning with 

4,100 in fiscal year 2010. 

CONTRACTING MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL

Question. DoD has acknowledged that it faces significant workforce challenges 

that if not effectively addressed could impair the responsiveness and quality of acquisition outcomes. 

The Department of Defense workforce of contracting officials is losing many of its 

most talented and experienced personnel to retirement. In some cases the talent 

that remains does not match up well with the types of services to be contracted. 

How does the DoD go about finding, recruiting, hiring, and developing the needed 

contracting professionals? What should be done differently? 

Answer. My office has long been concerned about the need to maintain a trained 

and experienced acquisition workforce in DoD. We have not performed any analysis 

of the Department’s hiring practices and have not offered any specific recommendations to the Department on how it could improve its recruiting policies and procedures. 

Question. What are the career education and training progressions for DoD contracting personnel? What should be done differently? 

Answer. The Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) Workforce Desk 

Guide provides the DoD AT&L Education Training and Career Development Program requirements. The intended audience is the acquisition and contracting workforce and provides information about certification, qualification, and tenure requirements. 

Question. As private contractors increasingly are intertwined into the work that 

civilian personnel perform in managing contracts, how can the DoD ensure that private contractors have adequate skills to meet the demands of the work? 

Answer. As a contract management requirement, DoD must have metrics in all 

contracts and hold contractors accountable for their performance. 

Question. How do you rate the DoD contracting workforce in achieving the appropriate levels of skill certification? 

Answer. GAO issued a report in March 2009 that states that the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) ‘‘not 

only lacks information on contractor personnel, but also lacks complete information 

on the skill sets of the current acquisition workforce and whether these skill sets 

are sufficient to accomplish its missions.’’ The report further states that AT&L is 

conducting a competency assessment to identify the skill sets of its current acquisition workforce, and that while this assessment will provide useful information regarding the skill sets of the current in-house acquisition workforce, it is not designed to determine the size, composition, and skill sets of an acquisition workforce 

needed to meet the department’s missions. 

Question. How is the new training program for military non-contracting officers 

intended to affect contract management and oversight in forward areas? 

Answer. It is intended to improve management of contracts because non-contracting personnel will be aware of contract oversight requirements. 

NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS TO THE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Question. For years numerous high level panels of experts found that the acquisition workforce must be improved by filling contracting leadership positions with 

qualified leaders, determining the appropriate size of the contracting workforce and 

ensuring that it has the appropriate skills; and improving the planning and training 

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for contracting in combat and contingency environments. Most recently the DoD’s 

Panel on Contracting Integrity made recommendations. 

Mr. Heddell, this Committee is interested in DoD’s progress in addressing the 

problems of the acquisition workforce based on the work of DOD’s Panel on Contracting Integrity. 

What should this Committee be looking for from DoD to ensure that DoD keeps 

focused on taking actions to resolve the long-standing problems of DoD’s acquisition 

workforce? 

Answer. During 2008, DoD made significant progress in establishing the framework to assure functional independence of contracting personnel, Separation of Duties of senior acquisition and contracting leaders, and leveraging of contracting officer training. In addition, DoD has begun a workforce-wide competency assessment 

of 22,000 civilian and military contracting professionals, and the Secretary of Defense stated in a press conference on April 6, 2009, that his recommended fiscal year 

2010 defense budget is aligned to support the Department’s acquisition reform goals 

by increasing the size of defense acquisition workforce, converting 11,000 contractors, and hiring an additional 9,000 government acquisition professionals by 2015— 

beginning with 4,100 in FY 2010. The Committee should expect periodic updates 

from the Department on the implementation of its initiatives. 

Question. What factors should DoD consider when making a decision to use contractors to meet mission needs and what tradeoffs are involved in considering such 

factors? 

Answer. The most important consideration when determining whether contractors 

should be used is whether it is essential that the function be performed by government personnel (i.e. inherently governmental functions). Once it is decided that a 

contractor could do the work, there are a number of tradeoffs. One consideration is 

how well can the work be defined? If it can be well defined, fixed price contracting 

would be appropriate to put the risk on the contractor and reduce the need for surveillance. If the work cannot be well defined, some form of cost-type contract will 

likely be used, which puts more risk on the government and requires more use of 

government personnel to oversee the work. Other considerations include whether 

multiple contractors are available to do the work or only one contractor. Multiple 

contractors would allow for competition and require fewer resources for pricing the 

contract, whereas detailed pricing evaluation would be needed in a sole source situation. 

Also, DoD needs to consider from recent wartime contracting experience that it 

continues to have insufficient resources to monitor contractor performance in an expeditionary environment. The inability to enforce contract requirements and monitor contractor performance remains a critical DoD problem because DoD lacks the 

trained resources to award, monitor, and ensure that contractors provide services 

needed by the warfighter. 

Question. It seems that ‘‘blue ribbon commissions’’ come to nearly the same conclusions on what must be done to improve the acquisition workforce. What inhibits 

these recommendations from being implemented? 

Answer. Primary factors include funding and a trained, available, professional 

workforce (i.e. available personnel). Also, the ‘‘tone at the top’’ needs to show a continued commitment. 

TYPES OF SERVICE CONTRACTS

Question. Some types of contracts are: 

• Cost Reimbursement—Utilized for acquisitions when uncertainties in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy: 

• Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) 

• Fixed Price—Optimal for acquiring commercial items or other supplies/services with reasonably definite functions or detailed specifications: 

• Firm Fixed Price Fixed Price Incentive 

We often hear of apparent waste and abuse associated with sole source contracts. 

What other types of contracts are available for providing services? 

Answer. Other than sole source contracts, there are competitive contracts. However, you may be referring to the types of contracts included under Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 16, where there are many different variations of fixed-price 

and cost-type contracts. 

Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each type and how frequently are they used? 

Answer. Cost-reimbursement contracts are suitable for use only when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract. Cost type contracts place more 

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risk on the Government and require close supervision to oversee performance and 

costs. 

Firm-fixed-price contracts provide for a price that is not subject to any adjustment 

on the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in performing the contract. This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk and full responsibility for all 

costs and resulting profit or loss. It provides maximum incentive for the contractor 

to control costs and perform effectively and imposes a minimum administrative burden upon the contracting parties. 

Fixed price and cost type incentive contracts have many varieties, which include 

fixed fees, incentive fees and award fees. For FY 2007, cost type contract actions 

accounted for about $100 billion, which represents about a third of the contract expenditures for FY 2007. 

Question. Is ‘‘Best Value’’ contracting more difficult to accomplish than ‘‘Lowest 

Cost’’ contracting? 

Answer. Best value contracting involves more considerations than lowest cost contracting so it would be more complicated and probably more difficult. The contracting officer is required to evaluate technical as well as cost considerations in 

making the selection. Despite the difficulties, we support the best value contracting 

process because cheaper is not always better. 

COMMON ACCESS CARDS

Question. Your testimony points out that the DoD had contracted out the inherently governmental function of issuing Common Access Cards which permits the 

card holder to enter military bases and access certain official information. 

Did someone in the U.S. Military give KBR authority to decide who would receive 

Common Access Cards. 

Answer. The Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Deputy Under Secretary 

of the Army for Business Transformation (DUSA–BT) are responsible for monitoring 

the CAC life cycle at the KBR Deployment Processing Center. Because the KBR contractors were receiving CACs for work under contract to AMC, AMC was responsible 

for CAC approval, revocation, and recovery. 

An Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness [USD (P&R)] Memorandum required the use of the Contractor Verification System (CVS), manned by 

a Trusted Agent (i.e. a Government sponsor), for approving all contractors for CACs 

and did not authorize the continued use of the DD Form 1172–2. However, AMC 

officials believed they had a waiver to this policy because they received an e-mail 

from the Defense Enrollment Eligibility and Reporting System/Real-time Automated 

Personnel Identification System (DEERS/RAPIDS) Project Office within the U.S. 

Army Human Resources Command. This e-mail stated that AMC could continue 

using the DD Form 1172–2 to authorize CAC issuance and that an official waiver 

from USD (P&R) was not necessary. According to my Office of General Counsel, the 

U.S. Army Human Resources Command had no authority to waive a policy issued 

by the USD (P&R). 

DoD IG Report No. D–2009–05, ‘‘Controls Over the Contractor Common Access 

Card Life Cycle,’’ October 10, 2008, recommended that the Commander, AMC mandate the use of CVS at the KBR Deployment Processing Center and appoint Government employees to sponsor KBR contractors; AMC concurred with this recommendation. Further, we recommended that the Adjutant General, U.S. Army Human Resources Command inform the DEERS/RAPIDS Project Office that it is not permitted 

to waive DoD policy unless explicitly delegated that authority. The Adjutant General agreed, stating that corrective action has been taken to ensure that the Project 

Office complies with DoD identity card issuance policies and procedures. 

Question. If so, who was that person? 

Answer. The U.S. Army Human Resources Command DEERS/RAPIDS Project Office (for additional information, see response to Question #72). 

Question. When was the decision made? 

Answer. The e-mail referred to in the response to Question #72 was sent on Tuesday, March 27, 2007. 

Question. Has anyone been reprimanded for this decision to hand over the CAC 

vetting process to KBR? 

Answer. The Adjutant General, U.S. Army Human Resources Command stated 

that corrective action has been taken to ensure that the Army DEERS/RAPIDS 

Project Office complies with DoD identity card issuance policies and procedures. The 

Adjutant General also stated that the Army DEERS/RAPIDS Project Office has been 

notified that any deviation from DoD policy will not occur without prior coordination 

and approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

Question. Are KBR employees still approving CACs independent of DoD review? 

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Answer. DoD IG Report No. D–2009–05, ‘‘Controls Over the Contractor Common 

Access Card Life Cycle,’’ October 10, 2008, recommended that the Commander, AMC 

mandate the use of CVS at the KBR Deployment Processing Center and appoint 

Government employees to sponsor KBR contractors. In a response to a draft of this 

report, AMC agreed, and stated that they would ensure compliance and use CVS 

by September 1, 2008. AMC also stated that as of October 29, 2008, the Army had 

assigned a Government employee as the Trusted Agent Security Manager within the 

acquisition center and was in the process of hiring an additional person to assume 

the responsibility of the alternate Trusted Agent Security Manager by November 10, 

2008. Those Trusted Agent Security Managers would be responsible for assigning 

Trusted Agents to oversee the KBR contract via CVS. We have not verified whether 

AMC’s corrective actions have been implemented. 

Question. If no formal DoD decision was made to give KBR authority to issue 

CACs, has anyone from KBR been held accountable for overstepping their approved 

role in granting the cards? 

Answer. As previously mentioned, AMC officials believed they had a waiver to the 

USD (P&R) policy requiring the use of CVS because they received an e-mail from 

the DEERS/RAPIDS Project Office authorizing the continued use of the DD Form 

1172–2 to authorize CAC issuance. AMC has since stated that they would ensure 

compliance and use CVS by September 1, 2008, and assign Government employees 

to oversee this process by November 10, 2008. We have not verified whether AMC’s 

corrective actions have been implemented. 

Question. If KBR did not have DoD approval to decide who would receive CACs, 

were DoD personnel in the field aware that KBR employees were issuing the cards 

in violation of their contract and DoD security guidelines? 

Answer. As I mentioned during my testimony on CACs earlier this year, one of 

the reasons we are doing audits in Southwest Asia and also in Korea, is because 

we want to look at the impacts of weak controls over CACs ‘‘on the ground.’’ As a 

result, one objective of our follow-on audit of the Controls Over the Contractor Common Access Card Life Cycle in Southwest Asia is to ensure the proper use of the 

Common Access Card by contractors. 

Question. If DoD personnel were aware of KBRs routinely circumventing security 

protocol, have any of them been reprimanded or punished for allowing it to take 

place? 

Answer. See the response to Question #75. In addition, DoD IG Report No. D– 

2009–05, ‘‘Controls Over the Contractor Common Access Card Life Cycle,’’ October 

10, 2008, recommended that the Commander, AMC, verify that KBR contractors undergo background checks that meet Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 

and Federal Information Processing Standard 201–1 requirements prior to issuing 

these contractors CACs, and maintain evidence of these background checks. AMC 

agreed and explained procedures that they will implement to verify that KBR contractors undergo background checks. 

Question. Is there any discussion of rebooting the program and issuing new Common Access Cards to appropriate military and non-military personnel and making 

the old CACs obsolete? 

Answer. DoD IG Report No. D–2009–05, ‘‘Controls Over the Contractor Common 

Access Card Life Cycle,’’ October 10, 2008, recommended that the Commander, 

AMC, implement procedures to recover CACs from KBR contractors when the cards 

are expired or no longer needed. AMC agreed and explained procedures that they 

will implement to recover contractor-issued CACs. Additionally, we recommended 

that the USD (P&R), the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration)/DoD Chief Information Officer: a. Designate within 90 days the lead organization responsible for 

immediately developing and implementing a recovery plan for contractor CACs 

showing improper pay grades and e-mail addresses; and b. Implement the recovery 

plan for contractor CACs showing improper pay grades and e-mail addresses. The 

USD (P&R) agreed and stated that their office is the lead proponent for CACs, and 

the plan for CAC recovery is to let current CACs be revoked and expire according 

to the normal card life cycle, which will be completed in conjunction with improvements to policy and issuance processes. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration)/DoD Chief Information Officer also agreed and stated that they would work 

with the USD (P&R) to implement a recovery plan. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 

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TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 2009. 

PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN 

INJURY PROBLEMS 

WITNESSES 

ELLEN P. EMBREY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 

FORCE HEALTH READINESS AND PROTECTION 

BRIGADIER GENERAL LOREE K. SUTTON, M.D., DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH AND 

TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. The meeting will come to order. 

Let me welcome Ms. Embrey and General Sutton to the committee. 

And let me acknowledge Nick Buoniconti. He used to play for one 

of those teams other than the Steelers. You know, I got my Steelers 

tie on. 

You notice that, Nick? 

But he has been very involved in research with spinal cord injury. He has done a marvelous job there, and we appreciate the 

work that he has done. 

But we appreciate the work that you two have done. 

A couple years ago, this Committee realized, because we visited 

the hospitals so often, that we had real problems with PTSD and 

brain injuries. And we put $900 million in. And we want you to 

talk about how you spent that money, talk about how important it 

was. And then we put $1 billion, I think, for PTSD, I think, last 

year. 

I was just out to Fort Carson, and every place I go, suicide rates 

are up. Homicide is up. Divorce rates are up. So we have got a lot 

of problems, and much of it comes from PTSD. In a book that a 

doctor friend of mine gave me, ‘‘War and Medicine,’’ they talk 

about, it is going to cost, they quote, ‘‘the trillion dollar war,’’ and 

say it is going to cost $660 billion to treat PTSD after the Iraq war. 

I don’t know if that is accurate, but certainly we are certainly going 

in that direction with the amount of money that we are spending. 

And the sooner we get to it, the better off we are; everybody that 

I have talked to. But to give you an example, I was at one of the 

bases not long ago, and the commander certainly recognized the 

problem. But in talking to some of the enlisted men in a private 

conversation, one was telling me that he was in Iraq, and this fellow said he was going to commit suicide. And he said, well, here 

is a rifle, go out and shoot yourself. You know, that is not the way 

we want to handle it. And yet it will take a long time for that to 

get down to the NCO level. 

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The other thing that I noticed is the quality, according to them, 

is much less than it was. We have a tendency, those of us that 

have been there, to say the ones coming in now aren’t as good as 

the old corps. But still we find that this is a real problem, according to them. They call them sugar babies and so forth. But what 

I worry about, if the quality has decreased, if we are facing people 

with a lot more psychological problems that come into the military 

just for the money or to get away to get a job, we are going to have 

more PTSD. And so it is something we have to really focus on. 

And I know you folks are in the forefront, and we appreciate it. 

This Committee has been in the forefront of taking care of military 

medicine for a long time, and we have increased the money substantially year after year. 

Ms. Embrey mentioned to me that she was pleased to see that 

her request for increase in research, for research, has gone up substantially, advanced research. I am glad to hear that, and we will 

look at it and maybe even put more money in if we can see that, 

if you can persuade us that it is necessary. 

And you two are very persuasive, so we appreciate your appearing before the Committee. 

And I ask Mr. Frelinghuysen if he has any comments. 

COMMENTS OF MR. FRELINGHUYSEN

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is an important hearing. And I am substituting for Congressman Bill Young, who I may say would very much associate, 

as would I, his remarks to those of the Chairman. I think your 

work here is important. 

Let me, first of all, and I think we all pay tribute to those, obviously, who fight on our behalf in Iraq and Afghanistan, but to the 

remarkable work that physicians and medics do before you in fact, 

deal with the more substantial parts of working to make their lives 

sufficient and better. Really, what happens on the battlefield, compared to Vietnam, a remarkable transformation of health care and 

support. 

But to you, General, I have read of your distinguished career; 

present at the creation of this new entity and have seen it through. 

And we are particularly proud of your work, your distinguished history of work in the military, and Ms. Embrey, as well for your work 

in this important area. I am very pleased that both of you are here, 

and we look forward to a productive hearing. 

Mr. MURTHA. As Mr. Frelinghuysen said, Bill Young has been in 

the forefront of military medicine when he was Chairman. 

And this is a bipartisan Committee. When we send a bill to the 

Full Committee, it is not changed. And when it goes to the floor, 

it is not changed. And it goes to conference, and we have some concessions and adjustments that we make, but as a whole, the bill 

that comes out of here pretty well is the bill that you will see at 

the end of the day. 

But we appreciate your coming before the Committee and your 

dedicated work in the field of medicine. 

And Dr. Embrey, if you will lead off. 

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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MS. EMBREY

Ms. EMBREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Frelinghuysen. I 

thank you for the opportunity to bring you up to date on what the 

Department of Defense is doing to improve the quality of care for 

our warriors with psychological health needs or traumatic brain injuries. 

We are very pleased to be here, and we thank the Committee, 

you especially, for the support that you have given us since the war 

began, and we very much appreciate it. 

We are committed to ensuring that every warrior, especially 

those with psychological health or traumatic brain injuries, receives consistently excellent care across the entire continuum of 

care, from prevention, protection, diagnosis, treatment, recovery 

and transition; from the Department of Defense to the Department 

of Veterans Affairs or to the private sector. 

In 2007, the Department of Defense embarked on a comprehensive plan to transform our system of care for psychological stress 

and traumatic brain injuries. The plan was based on seven strategic goals: first, to build a very strong culture of health leadership 

and advocacy for these two topics; the second was to improve the 

quality and consistency of care around the country, as well as in 

locations where we have personnel across the globe; third, to increase the timeliness and frequency and quality of care regardless 

of where the patient is located; fourth, to strengthen individual and 

family health, wellness and resilience; fifth, to ensure early identification and intervention for individuals who have conditions, as 

well as concerns, which are not the same thing; sixth, to eliminate 

gaps, particularly in the handoffs between physicians as they move 

from location to location; and lastly, to establish a very strong foundation of research, to address gaps and to build new technologies 

and therapies for these two topics. 

Throughout 2008, as you will see in our statement for the record, 

we made significant progress towards achieving those strategic objectives. We established the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury, of which General 

Sutton is the director. She is leading the effort to develop excellence in practice standards, training, outreach, research and direct 

care for those with mental health and TBI concerns. 

We established clinical standards that incorporated lessons 

learned and best practices to improve the quality of care and introduced evidence-based care as the enterprise standard for acute 

stress disorder and PTSD and depression as well as substance 

abuse disorders. 

To assess the likelihood of mild traumatic brain injury, we introduced a military acute concussion evaluation tool and published 

clinical guidelines for its management in field settings. We implemented a standardized training curriculum for medical providers, 

and we initiated a certification process for TBI programs at military treatment facilities. 

To improve access to care, regardless of location, we funded additional mental health providers in contracts, as well as civilians. We 

are also seeking ways to embed military uniformed providers in our 

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quires first appointment access within 7 days for psychological 

health issues. 

To strengthen resilience to psychological stress and traumatic 

events, we are implementing solid prevention and health protection 

policies, mitigating organizational risk factors and strengthening 

family wellness programs. To ensure earlier identification and 

intervention, we enhanced post-deployment health assessments and 

reassessments, modifying them to include information that helps 

us understand and early intervene problems as they occur. We are 

working to eliminate gaps in care as patients transition throughout 

the various systems or to different locations. 

Lastly, we are establishing a strong foundation of research that 

will improve prevention, detection, and diagnosis, particularly for 

traumatic brain injury, and treatment. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you again for your contribution. My comments are joint. A statement is provided for the 

record. We stand by to answer questions. 

[The joint statement of Ms. Embrey and General Sutton follows:] 

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Mr. MURTHA. We talked earlier. Your statement is a joint statement. 

Are you going to say anything, General Sutton? 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL SUTTON

General SUTTON. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Frelinghuysen, good morning, and thank you so much for your support and comments. 

I would just say that, sir, I join Ms. Embrey in thanking you for 

the privilege of being here this morning and to review what we 

have done this last year. We have come a long way since a little 

over a year ago and we started out with a title on a paper and passion in our hearts for this effort. 

Since then, today, Mr. Chairman, I am proud to report, we have 

got five component centers. We have got a sixth center, the National Intrepid Center of Excellence. We have Dr. James Kelly, who 

just joined us from the University of Colorado. He will serve as a 

director. We have a network of 20 and growing sites. These are a 

mixture of the VA polytrauma centers, as well as military treatment facilities, as well as civilian facilities. Last month we opened 

up the pilot assisted living program in Johnstown, where we have 

three families and soldiers who are there recovering. 

We have a number of training programs going on. We have 

trained over 2,700 providers. We have launched, together with the 

Department and the services, over 90 research studies, and we are 

continuing that process with the fiscal year 2008 supplemental and 

the CSI. 

We also, sir, in the process of working with the vice chiefs to 

launch a public national educational campaign. Because we can do 

all of these other things, Mr. Chairman; we can become that open 

front door for the Department of Defense working with the VA for 

all issues related to these concerns, and we have done that. We can 

continue our unceasing efforts to grab next-generation solutions 

and bringing them here and now today. But fundamentally our 

challenge becomes that of transforming the culture, transforming 

the culture to one of transparency, resilience, accountability, candor, strength; one which supports individuals and their family 

members and recognizes that seeking support, seeking treatment, 

is an act of courage and strength. 

And so, Mr. Chairman, we will continue our efforts. We look forward to addressing your questions. And of course, we are committed to bringing excellence in all things on behalf of those who 

are so deserving. 

I would just close my opening comments, sir, with some wisdom 

from a great, great preacher who started out his life as a slave, and 

when looking back over the state of America at the end of his life, 

he said this, he said: We ain’t where we want to be. We ain’t where 

we ought to be. We ain’t where we gonna be. But thank God we 

ain’t where we was. 

I look forward to your questions Mr. Chairman. 

REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. Well, you gave me a couple of articles which we 

want to put in the record. And let me just read the titles of the 

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articles. A very poignant one was by Gabrielle Luera, L-U-E-R-A, 

and the other is by a survivor of the war. And to me, having been 

there, and one a Doonesbury cartoon, which I don’t know if we can 

put the cartoons in there, but it is very poignant, products of people who know what it is all about in being at the war. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Articles are located at the end of this hearing.] 

But you mentioned the Intrepid. And Bill Young and I have 

talked about this, and we are committed to putting the additional 

money in, because we know the private sector, they have done so 

much so many places all over the world, and particularly in Fisher 

houses and so forth, that we are going to, we will put the $20 million in the supplemental. We will recommend it to the subcommittee, and we feel confident the subcommittee will agree to 

fund the equipment and so forth. 

The Guard and Reserve, I know with the unit you have in Johnstown, you are addressing problems that the Guard and Reserve 

have. And it is one of the things that has worried us for a long 

time. I have had a number of people, and I have talked about it 

before, one had a foot amputated, and he was blinded, and he is 

struggling. In the early part of the war, we didn’t do near as good 

a job as we are doing now. One young fellow lost both his hands 

and was blinded. So we have a lot of them that get lost once they 

leave. And the sooner we get to PTSD in particular, the better off 

we are. 

And the work that has been done with prosthesis has just been 

absolutely amazing. In this war, in medicine, when you look back 

at the Crimean War and World War I, you see examples of how difficult it was for them to be rehabilitated versus the way we do it 

today. So it is like that former slave said, we aren’t where we want 

to be, but we are going to get there, and we have got a ways to 

go, so I am impressed. 

Now, one of the things I mentioned, General Mattis came to see 

me. He says that, at Pendleton, they have a new process of teaching the young people when they go to war about what it is all 

about before they get there with all the sights, sounds, and smells, 

and so forth. And I don’t know if any medical people have looked 

at it, but I would be very interested if you would have somebody 

go out there and evaluate it from a medical standpoint to see if 

there is anything in addition we should do. I was supposed to go 

out there, and I just couldn’t get out there to look at it. But he 

claims, and having been in Iraq himself for a long period of time, 

he claims that could be the best type of thing to harden the mental 

aspect of this thing before they go to war. 

Two other points. One, transplants. I had some people in that 

said they could transplant hands. And I know that Dr. Embrey 

looked into it, and she feels that the cost is really expensive, and 

the rejection process is so onerous. But we are going to put some 

money in for that because we think we ought to do more research 

on rejection. I know sometimes the rejection medicine is so onerous 

that they feel like, well, I wish I hadn’t gone through it. I know 

a lot of members finally say, well, take that leg off because it is 

causing such a problem or take that arm off because it is just not 

getting any better. 

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But we still think we ought to do research. So we will put extra 

money in. And if somebody wants to have a hand transplant or an 

arm transplant, you will certainly have that available. I know it is 

expensive, but I think that is the kind of stuff we need to do, especially if they lost both hands. And I have seen a number of them 

that lost both hands. And they are in good morale when they are 

in the hospital, but I know it has to affect them when they go 

home. But I appreciate the work you two do, because there are no 

better people to be in charge of this field than you two are, so we 

appreciate it. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Either one of you, when you talk, give us 

a few of the, or give the Committee a few of the statistics that relate to traumatic brain injury. 

General SUTTON. Yes, sir. 

What we are finding is we are finding that, of the continuum of 

traumatic brain injuries, which of course encompasses mild traumatic brain injury, or concussion, moderate and severe, of the over 

8,000 troops that we currently have in our registry, between 80 and 

85 percent of them fortunately are mild concussion. But that 

doesn’t mean that we are not concerned about them. Clearly, much 

of our research is aimed at better understanding what the impact 

of blast injury is, for example, and the differences between the concussion that may be experienced on a football field versus that 

which occurs on a battlefield where you have such a mix of factors, 

the life-threatening stressors, the very real physical risks, the psychological risks, the morale, and the spiritual risks. When we bring 

troops back home and do the screening, we find that the incidence 

of traumatic brain injury, and again, most of these are concussion, 

because if they were moderate or severe, they would have come 

through our medical evacuation system where we keep our arms 

around them and then have a care coordination process for ensuring that we keep our arms around their needs as well as their families, but for those who come back with their units, it ranges between 10 to 20 percent of those who screen positive for concussion 

or mild traumatic brain injury. 

This is very similar to what the RAND study, which used different methodology, earlier last year reported; when those individuals then get clinical evaluation, whether it be in the VA system 

or within our own military treatment system—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Can you make the distinction here? You 

know, I know that, according to the figures I have, of the 61,000 

veterans that the VA has screened for TBI to date, 11,000, approximately 11,000 to 12,000, or as you said between 19 or 20 percent, 

screen positive for TBI. What is the hand-off between the active 

DOD and the VA? You know, we like the notion on this committee 

that the DOD and the VA are joined at the hip, but in reality, how 

are they co-joined? 

General SUTTON. Well, sir, let me give you an example. During 

this conflict, DOD has already transferred over 1 million records, 

those post deployment health assessment records and 

postdeployment reassessment health records, so that the VA promstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

449 

viders will have those records when they see troops. This a work 

in progress. But I will tell you that the hand-off, the linkage between DOD and VA, it is at the level that I have not seen in my 

28 years in service. As an example of that would be the fact that 

when Secretary Peake first got into office last year, one of the first 

things he did was he sent one of his best and brightest psychologists, Dr. Sonja Batten, to become our deputy at the Defense Centers of Excellence. So this is an ongoing partnership that continues 

to grow and develop, broaden and deepen. 

Ma’am, I don’t know if you would like to add to that. 

Ms. EMBREY. I would like to talk a little bit about how we engage 

with the Department of Veteran Affairs. 

Back in 2007, the Deputy Secretaries of both Departments determined that we needed to get together and to develop common approaches for how we saw some of the challenges associated with 

psychological health and traumatic brain injury specifically. Together with the oversight of, and leadership of, the top leaders in 

both Departments, we embarked on a series of initiatives to include 

coming up with common protocols for how we screen and assess for 

traumatic, mild traumatic brain injuries. We have had a decade’s 

worth of partnership on traumatic brain injury with the DVBIC, 

the Defense Brain Injury Center, Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center, sorry. We have had a whole series of updated clinical 

practice guidelines and postdeployment health guidelines that we 

have developed in partnership with the VA, and we apply those to 

both of our health communities. So I would say that we have unprecedented levels of collaboration and sharing across the continuum of care. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Obviously, those that are severely, have severe traumatic brain injury are wholly embraced by both the DOD 

and the VA system. 

But, obviously, there are obviously other soldiers besides the regular military, Guard and Reserve, who are under, have suffered 

concussions from IEDs. Well, what happens to, should we say, the 

citizen soldier who is not hospitalized, but let us say months down 

the road, and we have had plenty of discussion in here, what happens to that man or woman who might suffer psychological and 

certainly some symptoms of traumatic brain injury? 

General SUTTON. Sir, I would note that the VA has completed a 

Herculean effort in contacting over 500,000 troops. These were 

troops who had gotten out of uniform or perhaps gone back to their 

communities as guardsmen and reservists before the screening had 

been implemented for TBI; contacted every one of those troops directly, gave them the information on how to enroll, checked in with 

them to see how they were doing, and made that personal contact 

that is so important. Every individual who gets treated at the VA 

gets screened, just as our individuals in the DOD get screened. 

POST-DEPLOYMENT REASSESSMENT

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. There is a desire, obviously, of many men 

and women in the service to get far away from the trauma they experienced. And I am not talking about necessarily TBI but obviously the war environment. And I assume that what you are saying, you are giving them fairly high marks for the follow-up. 

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Ms. EMBREY. Sir, we use the same assessment tool. And in addition to that, the Department implemented a postdeployment reassessment 6 to 9 months following deployment. We engage the VA 

in that screening process for all service members, whether they are 

Guard, Reserve or Active Duty. And that is the time in which we 

evaluate how they are doing. It is the point in time where research 

tells us it is the optimum time to early intervene, especially for 

mental health issues. So we have partnered with the VA, and we 

conduct those assessment processes with the VA for the Guard and 

Reserve specifically. 

General SUTTON. Sir, I know you will also be glad to know that, 

during this transition period, there has been no momentum lost 

with the actions of the Senior Oversight Committee that Ms. 

Embrey addressed. Just last week we had our first Senior Oversight Council meeting. It was chaired by Secretary Gates and Secretary Shinseki. I was asked to give a briefing on what the collaborative efforts are that are going on with the VA and DOD joined 

by Dr. Ira Katz specifically aimed at suicide prevention. I will say 

that the national lifeline, that 1–800–273–TALK, the VA has gotten over 100,000 calls on that, many of them from our service 

members who are either still active duty, Guard or Reserve. And 

we are working closely with our outreach center in all of the call 

centers to make sure that when an individual calls in, we have the 

right processes in place to make sure that we take care of their 

needs, get them back plugged into the system. And there have been 

over 2,000 clear saves already over the last 2 months. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. That is great progress. Thank you both. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

SUICIDE RATES

Mr. MURTHA. Yet suicide rates are up. 

General SUTTON. Yes, sir. This is an area that clearly is demanding our greatest efforts and focused urgency. We are focused, working on the far end of that continuum, to make sure that our service 

members are aware of the danger signs who know and know how 

to intervene. Each service has a program that is geared towards 

that end. 

But we also know how important it is to get what we say to the 

left, to get to this side of writing the note or buying the weapon 

or giving ones prized possessions away, and to address all of those 

psychological health principles, both at the individual, family and 

community level, that will build resilience, that will foster posttraumatic growth, and yes will, good Lord willing, reduce our suicide numbers, which as you know, sir, in recent years, have gone 

up, within the Army at any rate. 

EVACUATION OF THE INJURED

Mr. MURTHA. Well, you folks have done a magnificent job in this 

book that I quoted. In the American Revolution, 41 percent of the 

people died from injuries, and it goes, stays about the same; the 

Civil War, it went up to 56 percent; 37 percent World War II; 26 

percent the Korean War. But it is now 11 percent in Iraqi Freedom. 

Now, Afghanistan, and this is something that we need some advice on, we keep playing around with these helicopters which we 

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need to get these folks out. It is taking longer to get out in Afghanistan. So I would assume that is one of the reasons that the percentage of people who die from injuries or wounds is higher. So you 

folks need to—you know, the military keeps playing around with 

coming up with a helicopter that will work. We put $100 million 

in to fix the one up because it couldn’t make a decision. We need 

a recommendation that you folks ought to get on them a little bit 

because you can see the difference there between the people in Afghanistan and Iraq; where they can get them out in a hurry in 

Iraq, and Afghanistan, for one reason or another, and I would assume it is because they don’t have the ability to evacuate them as 

quickly as they would like. 

Ms. EMBREY. Sir, if I can address that a little bit. I know the 

Secretary of Defense, Secretary Gates, and General Petraeus both 

have identified this concern and have specifically asked for a plan 

that distributes medical assets in such a way that we can respond 

more effectively as we expand operations in Afghanistan. 

Mr. MURTHA. Doctor, we don’t get a decision. We keep getting 

studies. That is the problem with the Defense Department. They 

study it to death. In the meantime, people are not making it because they don’t have the equipment they need out in the field. 

That is the frustrating thing to me. It is like any decision over 

there; it takes them forever to make a decision. In this particular 

case, we have been in front of them in TBI. We have been in front 

of them in post-traumatic stress, all these areas. So you need to 

urge them a little bit to get better medical evacuation. 

Mr. Visclosky. 

PERIODIC HEALTH ASSESSMENT

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Two lines of questioning. One is for individuals who do have a 

problem who have been injured. Do you have a concern? Is there 

a problem about identifying them before they leave service? And we 

have had this discussion in previous hearings about, hey, I just 

want to sign my papers, I am fine, I want to get out. And are we 

losing people? And do you have programs in place to do a better 

job to say, listen, there is no shame here; we want to help; we are 

not trying to force you out to deny you have got a problem. How 

are you dealing with that? 

Ms. EMBREY. The Department of Defense recognizes that we 

need, it is part of our force health protection policy, and we are focusing on maintaining and sustaining a healthy and fit force. And 

we have set up several metrics to evaluate how healthy the force 

is and how deployable, medically ready they are to deploy. We instituted a series of assessments; some are required by law, some 

of which are appropriate to ensure that we are constantly evaluating the health and the fitness of a person to serve. 

We do that throughout their career. We do it on accession. We 

do it every year at a periodic health assessment, and then prior to 

deployment, and following deployment twice, we evaluate the status of the health of the individual so that we can appropriately intervene and sustain a healthy force. 

When individuals do not come forward, we figure these forced assessment processes allow us to maintain visibility. As an individual 

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separates, there is also a very elaborate separation physical process 

involving the VA to evaluate injuries that have occurred over a lifetime. 

We have been evaluating a pilot to evaluate not only what an individual has suffered as a result of military service, but how compensable it might be from the VA perspective. We are doing that 

with the VA, with VA providers, so we believe we have improved 

the process significantly. 

PROGRAMS FOR CHILDREN

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And what about children? Could you describe 

programs? And how do you identify which children may be having 

a problem? Is it through school programs. 

General SUTTON. Yes, sir. Children certainly bear a good share 

of the toll on the wear and tear of deployment stress. We have a 

number of programs in place. The military family and life consultants working within the school systems; we partner with Military 

Child Education Coalition for example with their Living in the New 

Normal program. We have also invested in the National Child 

Traumatic Stress Network. The Uniform Services University is the 

military site for this national network that is working together to 

coordinate efforts to develop the research strategy, to collaborate 

and to identify, particularly building on the work of Dr. Steve 

Cozza, who, during his time as the chief of psychiatry of Walter 

Reed, really pioneered a lot of the research that has helped us better understand how to support children who are part of wounded 

warrior families, as well as now in a broader community-based effort, how can we reach out and give the support that is developmentally appropriate for children of military families, because we 

know now, eight years into this conflict, that for the children who 

were 6, 7, 8 years old when 9/11 happened, they are now in their 

teenage years. And there are different issues that affect them that 

we absolutely must continue to support them and their parents in 

addressing. 

So a number of programs. For example, the Mr. Poe program. If 

you go to battlemind.org, they have developed a number of videos 

using real military families and children to illustrate some of the 

challenges as well as the strengths. We have partnered with Sesame Workshop, who has now issued the second of what will be a 

three DVD series. The first one is ‘‘Talk, Listen and Connect,’’ focusing on the general deployment stress issues for families, giving 

them a way to talk about it and to make it approachable. The second one, which was launched last spring, focused in on the changes 

caused by deployments, both psychological, physical changes, and 

how families adapt to those changes. This spring, we will be 

launching the third in the series, which will address the issues of 

grief, trauma, and loss due to losing a parent. 

So we are continuing to focus our efforts on communities, families. And we know that children, not only are they our armed forces 

of the future; they are our precious, precious treasure here and 

now. So we will continue our efforts in that regard, as well as continue to invest in the research which will help us to better understand their evolving needs. 

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Mr. VISCLOSKY. Any particular unmet needs you have that we 

can be helpful with, whether it is monetary or directive, to do a 

better job? 

Ms. EMBREY. This Committee particularly has been extraor- dinarily helpful to us with the $900 million provided and then subsequent supplemental funds, as well as honoring and increasing 

our budget requests over the last year. We are challenged to make 

sure that we responsibly expend those dollars, and we are learning 

from the infusion of those dollars right now. I would say that you 

have helped us significantly, and we would like to report back to 

you in future hearings or briefings to let you know how we are 

doing with the money you have provided, which is significant. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much for your work. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

MENTAL HEALTH CARE

Mr. MORAN. Thanks Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank Mr. Visclosky for raising the issue of the 

children. It is almost 3,000 children who have lost their parents in 

the war. I taught football, and I have coached football and taught 

a class at Fort Devens after college for awhile, and boy, you could 

immediately recognize kids’ behavior based upon the status of their 

parents, either overseas or those who have lost parents and so on. 

We do need to extend that. But the first priority is what the Chairman put in the 2007 supplemental for mental health care, and that 

is the purpose of this hearing. It was $900 million. More than $1 

billion has been provided now. We were concerned last year that of that $1 billion, only about $53 million was actually obligated. I know that that has now been 

corrected, that there is a substantial amount of money that is going 

into the purposes for which it was intended and particularly looking at alternative means of providing mental health care, breaking 

from the tradition. 

One of the problems I think that we have encountered is the 

military culture. As the Chairman and Mr. Frelinghuysen mentioned, it is contrary to the culture to acknowledge that you might 

have some kind of mental health concern, particularly PTSD, yet 

you tough it out. But that is counterproductive in terms of what 

we are seeing, and one of the contributing factors to the fact that 

suicide rates are twice what they are among the general population. One of the things we found is that almost half of military 

families are using what is called complementary medicine, integrative medicine, I guess that is the term that you now use, again, 

contrary to the culture. But they find that even meditation, yoga, 

all kinds of things that you never would have imagined in the last 

generation, is actually helpful in coping with the stress, the psychological problems that PTSD generates. Are you encouraging that, 

or are you running into any resistance? 

General SUTTON. Thank you so much for that question, sir. 

We are absolutely encouraging that. We, in fact, last spring, we 

published a request for proposals and were able to fund ten 

projects specifically focused on complementary and alternative 

forms of therapy, such as yoga, acupuncture, Tai Chi, facilitated 

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pet therapy. We are continuing that work. We know that in places 

like Fort Bliss, places like Fort Campbell, places like Camp 

Lejeune, as well as Camp Pendleton; and, sir, I did have a chance 

two weeks ago to meet with General Lehnert there at Camp Pendleton, and to review that program, which was actually initiated 

through a partnership through our top psychological health advisor 

Russ Schilling. And so we are looking broadly. We recognize that 

this is a moment in history that may not pass our way again, certainly not in this lifetime. And so we see ourselves in a position 

where through our efforts to transform military culture, we can 

perhaps even serve as a model for the Nation at large. To that end, 

we are working very closely with the Samueli Institute. Dr. Wayne 

Jonas, as you know, has been a real pioneer in this area. As well 

as with the RAND Corporation, this year now that we are in, within the next month, we are launching the initial phases of what we 

are calling the win-win network, the Warrior Wellness Innovation 

Network. This will be a series of pilot studies so that we can put 

program outcome metrics against some of these promising practices. Whether it be the ones that we have already mentioned or 

noninvasive neuromodulation, there are a number of different biofeedback products and social networking tools and Web 2.0 and 3.0 

tools that really we are so excited about. For example, last fall, we 

launched our afterdeployment.org Web site, which now is getting 

4,000 hits a month, providing tools, providing interactivity. We 

have invested in an Island on Second Life, and now we are working 

with the VA so that we can make this truly a seamless transition. 

So, yes, sir, we will continue our efforts to both better understand the potential efficacy and use of these kinds of therapies, as 

well as to promote them as part of our culture of resilience, performance and wellness. 

MILITARY ONESOURCE PROGRAM

Mr. MORAN. Well said. 

I want to get in a couple of questions, so maybe you can address 

that as well. I want your colleague to be able to speak as well, General. 

But I am also, there are two other things that I am concerned 

about. You can choose which ones to emphasize in your response. 

When soldiers call the hotline that VA has set up, some people 

have suggested that they are much more likely to talk, to listen, 

if the person on the other end has gone through their experience, 

is a veteran themselves. And while the hotline, that Military 

OneSource is a terrific program, I wonder if we shouldn’t complement it with volunteers, veterans, who would be more than 

happy to do that, many of them, but it might encourage other veterans to be more likely to call, even though you have already gotten a lot of calls, I know that, and I understand you have saved 

maybe a couple thousand lives. But I would like for you to respond 

to that. 

And then in terms of personnel, you had said that, actually we 

put into the language of the bill that you needed to hire more mental health providers; that for all the good intentions, unless you 

have got the mental health providers out there, you are very limited. I mean, you can do stuff on the Web and so on, but you really 

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need professionals dealing with PTSD victims. And clients, I guess 

I should say. Have you found them? Are you hiring them? And I 

don’t know how you are doing it, because Public Health Service has 

a great need as well, and yet Public Health Service was supposed 

to provide the personnel that you needed to implement this program. So those are three things. 

ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE/THERAPIES

And if you would like to, Ms. Embrey, maybe respond to the alternative medicine as well, because it is very important for us, if 

we are going to fund it, we have got to be able to show objectively 

that it does work. 

Thank you. 

Ms. EMBREY. Alternative medicine or alternative therapies are 

often not considered by the medical community nor medically reimbursable by insurance companies. Therefore, it is very important 

that we, and the Center of Excellence, do not ‘‘medicalize’’ some of 

these approaches and address these issues in ways that nonphysicians and that social workers and other folks that aren’t certified 

per se can engage. Studying them and studying the metrics of their 

effectiveness is very important. We believe very strongly that our 

leaders and our commanders own this issue. We should not 

medicalize this. We should make it a part of their normal day-today living. An individual should view themselves as a person who 

is striving to stay fit and healthy to perform their mission, and fitness includes mind and body and spirit. Just as we send people to 

the gym to be physically fit, we need to create an environment 

where people can go to the psychological gym, and that we develop, 

through research, the tools that will work to strengthen our mental 

health. So that is in answer to your first question. 

Mr. MORAN. Well put. Thank you. 

Ms. EMBREY. And secondly, I think the idea that the Veterans 

Administration—the Department of Veterans Affairs—I am sorry, 

I am an old-timer, I keep thinking of VA as Veterans Administration, but it is the Department of VA. 

Mr. MORAN. We do, too, so it is okay. 

Ms. EMBREY. But I think the idea of having a veteran who understands is the whole concept behind the veterans centers that 

they stood up. I think that we are trying to embed and engage our 

line leaders and outreach and education for the very same reason, 

for our active duty service members. They are creating mechanisms 

within their units, within their commands and within their line 

structures that don’t medicalize it, but help people understand the 

signs and symptoms and to recognize when medical intervention is 

appropriate and to refer them at that time without penalty, without penalty. 

And then to answer your question, are we hiring folks? Yes, we 

are. Are we hiring enough? I don’t think we could hire enough at 

this point. But I think we should give a lot of credit to the 

TRICARE community, our purchase care network. They have expanded their outreach to hire mental health providers to deal with 

our family members and beneficiaries, including retirees, who are 

affected and stressed by this environment as well. And they have 

hired more than 3,000 health providers in our network since last 

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year. The services have a target of hiring 1,000 providers by this 

point in time. They have actually been able to hire approximately 

800 so far, so they are not as successful as they would like. We 

have several initiatives that are actually combining the energy of 

all of the services to have a single way so that they are not competing with each other and elevating the salaries. That is one initiative that we are taking to try to improve that national recruiting 

initiative. 

And lastly, the Public Health Service is assisting us. They are required by law to recruit a cadre, a fairly large cadre of mental 

health professionals to deal with Katrina-like events, to be prepared to deal with that. We realize that if we had them on a string 

and they weren’t being used, that that would be a problem. And 

so what we asked in a Memorandum of Agreement with them was 

to share those assets when they hired them to help us in our time 

of need. We had a landmark agreement to support that. And they 

are recruiting as best they can to meet our specific needs as they 

recruit to meet their objectives under the law. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Embrey and General 

Sutton. You are both very articulate, and I am glad you are doing 

what you are doing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

PERSONNEL SHORTAGES

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Could you put a little meat on the bone? 

When Senator Dole and Secretary Donna Shalala did their work 

with the Wounded Warrior Program at Walter Reed, the Army was 

down 20 percent from its full complement of psychologists at that 

point in time. The Air Force was missing 17 percent of its 235 authorized psychologists. It only filled, I think, 11 of the 23 internship slots last year. And the Navy, which also provides, correct me 

if I am wrong, psychological services for the Marine Corps, was 

down 29 percent with only 87 of its 122 psychologists and nontraining positions on board. I know the figures are a little bit outdated. Where do we stand now? 

General SUTTON. Sir, when the services came together as part of 

the Red Cell that Ms. Embrey led last summer, they identified 

what they approached their provider needs were going to be. And 

that was the roughly 1,000 additional providers that were identified, of whom approximately 80 percent have been hired at this 

point, thankfully a year, year and a half later. 

I think the other question though that your question raises is the 

need for us to look at our uniformed provider population, the authorized slots. Because we know that with the needs on the home 

front as well as the needs on the battle front, that there has been 

a tremendous load, an operational and deployment load on our uniformed providers. And that is why, as we get the results back from 

the Center for Naval Analysis, the staffing study which we are currently working to complete at this point, we will be able to take a 

look from a risk-adjusted population health standpoint to look at 

the total complement of our team, both our uniformed providers as 

well as our government service civilian providers as well as our 

contract providers. So it is a team effort, but your question raises 

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a number of different important dimensions that we are continuing 

to pay attention to. 

Ma’am. 

Ms. EMBREY. I would like to also add that one of the other initiatives that Loree specifically has undertaken, excuse me, General 

Sutton has undertaken is to recognize that our military treatment 

facilities are not where all warriors need care. General Sutton has 

in her Center of Excellence established a specific center that is focused on telemedicine that will provide a fairly extensive network 

to use expertise that is resident in our system to provide consultative care in remote areas. This is particularly to address the 

issues of guardsmen and reservists who live in small towns who do 

not have access to the kind of expertise that is needed. She has a 

staff that is working those issues extensively and leveraging the already excellent networks that were established with the VA. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Bishop. 

HYPERBARIC OXYGEN THERAPY

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you so much for what you ladies do for our Defense 

health. PTSD and TBI are real challenges that we are facing with 

this Committee and our force. And you have indicated in your testimony that, well, let me just say that, because of the challenges we 

face, recruitment and retention of trained military personnel who 

are affected by TBI and PTSD is difficult. And the replacement 

costs, which this Committee has to be very concerned about, are 

very, very high. If you have got a pilot or a Special Ops person who 

suffers from PTSD or TBI, you are talking about hundreds of thousands of dollars per soldier to replace that particular personnel. 

In your testimony, you talk about the fact that, in fiscal years 

2007 and 2008, you executed research, development and testing in 

the areas of psychological health and TBI, including complementary and alternative medicine approaches to treating PTSD and 

TBI, and yoga, even acupuncture. My question to you, based on 

some information that I have recently seen, is, what has the Department of Defense done in relation to hyperbaric oxygen therapy 

treatment that has been used and which has been found to be extremely effective and economical in treating TBI as well as PTSD? 

There have been particular concerns where it has been tried and 

utilized and results were given, but TRICARE would reimburse the 

cost of the treatment. It is my understanding you can get any of 

those treatments for about $16,000 compared to hundreds of thousands of dollars to retain or to train and recruit new military personnel. So tell me about the hyperbaric oxygen therapy support 

that the Department has given and whether or not you are going 

to pursue that, whether or not you think it is something that we 

ought to pursue, and if it would give results, would you please. 

General SUTTON. Thank you, sir, for that question. 

Mr. BISHOP. And explain for those who may not know what that 

is, what that treatment consists of. 

General SUTTON. Yes, sir. 

Hyperbaric oxygen is a treatment that has been around for 

years. It has been used, for example, very effectively with wound 

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458 

healing as well as divers, in terms of folks who have the benz. 

There are a number of different uses for which there is clearly 

sound evidence upon which to base that practice. 

When it comes to traumatic brain injury, at this point, although 

there are some very promising case studies, we have not yet got 

the science in front of us that will allow us to move forward and 

establish this as a standard of care. 

Now, having said that, we are as hopeful as anyone that this 

may be actually, may become a proven standard of care that we 

can use on behalf of our troops who are experiencing post-traumatic stress and TBI. We were looking forward to funding research, quality research. In fiscal year 2007/fiscal year 2008 Broad 

Agency Announcement, there was one study proposal that met scientific muster with our peer-reviewed process. We funded it; a preclinical animal study. We have also worked with Dr. Bill Duncan, 

who is here today; and his group, Dr. Harch at Louisiana State 

University; as well as Dr. Cifu, who is at Richmond; and Dr. Lynn 

Weaver at Utah, to name a few of the experts in this area. And 

we brought together, understanding that the research hadn’t been 

done, and we didn’t get the proposals that would have allowed us 

to move forward, we said, well, let us bring together the leading 

experts across the services, across the government and across the 

Nation. So early last December, we brought together approximately 

60 individuals and spent 2 days immersed in this. The individuals 

who had done off-label work with hyperbaric oxygen brought their 

pilot study data. We were able to lay that out on the table. And 

the consensus was among that group that in fact there was enough 

information, there was enough data, enough evidence that would 

allow us to go forward to conduct a multi-site randomized clinical 

controlled trial. And so that is the course that we are on right now. 

We are working across those various studies that I mentioned in 

terms of the individuals who are using it for off-label uses at this 

point. And we are very eager to bring that data into the randomized control trial data. We are, at this point, compressing what is 

ordinarily a 12- to 18- or even 24-month cycle of study preparation 

and development so that we can launch with subject enrollment as 

early as this April and launch a multi-site randomized controlled 

clinical trial, so that within a year, we will have some definitive 

evidence that will point us towards what the safe and efficacious 

use for this modality may be. 

Mr. BISHOP. Do you think it is very promising? 

General SUTTON. It is very promising, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Do you have the resources now that you need to 

move forward with it? 

General SUTTON. We do. 

Mr. BISHOP. There is nothing else that this committee needs to 

do too? 

General SUTTON. Sir, we are, at this point, we have a meeting 

schedule with the FDA at the end of this month. They have been 

very helpful with us in helping us understand what the requirements will be. In this case, it will be for an investigational new 

drug registration. And we are moving full speed ahead on this 

without squandering any of the scientific rigor and safety and 

standards that, of course, are so important and part of the integrity 

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459 

of any scientific research process. But nothing more needed from 

this committee. We have everything we need to move forward, and 

we are very much looking forward to the outcome of this study. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

I understand that one of the people who participated in the pilot 

was a general who had brain injuries and had miraculous recovery 

as a result of this HBOT therapy and that it holds great promise 

for treating this. And it will save our government a lot of money 

in having to retrain people who are discharged, who are well 

trained, as a result of TBI and PTSD. 

General SUTTON. Yes, sir. We are all united in that hope that we 

can do whatever it takes to bring relief, health and well-being to 

our troops who are suffering. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

General SUTTON. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

DEFENSE CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And outstanding, as a new member of the Committee, outstanding, first, that there are women in charge. I am most impressed by that. 

General, General Sutton, your passion, your understanding and 

really the rigor that you use in presenting yourself and the material is outstanding, to the both of you. 

How long and how old is this Defense Center of Excellence? 

General SUTTON. Ma’am, thank you for your kind comments and 

your words of support. The Defense Centers of Excellence opened 

its doors on the 30th of November in 2007. At that time, we had 

a receptionist, a phone number, a bank of empty offices, a parttime chief of staff and two contractors, thanks to Ms. Embrey’s generosity. From that point forward, ma’am, we have evolved the concept. We have grown the five component centers that I mentioned. 

We have developed the design and concept of operation for the National Intrepid Center of Excellence, which will be the hub of our 

national and global network. We have also recognized the importance of broadening our focus. You will recall perhaps in the spring 

and summer of 2007, following the Walter Reed tragedy, there was 

a lot of focus on PTSD and TBI. 

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER

Ms. KILPATRICK. And how long has that been defined as such? I 

mean, how old does it go back? 

General SUTTON. Post-traumatic stress disorder was actually 

codified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for the American 

Psychiatric Association in 1980. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. It has been evolving ever since. 

General SUTTON. But I will tell you, ma’am, and this is why it 

is so important for us to learn from history, is that we know from 

the beginning of time that these issues related to the adversity of 

war and post-traumatic stress, everyone is affected by combat. In 

fact, I would worry about an individual who, going down range and 

experiencing what our warriors are experiencing today, who would 

come back and say, you know, it didn’t affect me a bit. Of course, 

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it does. In our own civil war, we talked about it then as ‘‘soldier’s 

heart,’’ which remains to this day my favorite phrase for those 

struggles. But of course, World War I, ‘‘shell-shock.’’ World War II, 

‘‘battle fatigue.’’ More recently, combat stress and post-traumatic 

stress. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. That is where I was kind of going. I have an 

uncle, a World War II veteran, mental illness, then came home 

looking fine but, for the next 60 years, was in and out of mental 

health hospitals and lived there for a couple of years; just died last 

year at 80-some years old, did not find it at first. He came back 

looking normal, but he obviously had battled something and lost 

his mind literally. I am happy to see the innovations and how we 

have moved forward on that. 

I have one of my staffers here, who is Riley Grimes, who won the 

Purple Heart, won an award from the Purple Heart Association 

just recently for his work in this area, so he has been kind of updating me. He is a Marine himself, so he has a certain passion for 

that. So I want to appreciate you for that. 

MULTIPLE DEPLOYMENTS

Ms. KILPATRICK. Tour of duty. And we keep hearing they keep 

going back again and again, some two, three, four-time deployment. 

I just last weekend was with Chairman Dicks in Washington State 

on a naval submarine, two of them, and one aircraft carrier, talking to young sailors, I am told, sailors not soldiers, sailors. And 

many of them have been out two or three times. With the number 

of suicides and what you discussed earlier with both TBI and 

PTSD, how does it all relate? How can we help with that? What 

needs to happen? 

It comes back to me that we are short military. Contractors we 

talked about a little bit in this Committee, and we are going to talk 

about it more, and we have more now than ever before. Do we 

need—and this may not be your part, because I know you are 

healthy. With the shortages that we are seeing in the enlisted and 

the repeated tours of duties and TBI and PTSD, how does it all 

intertwine and relate? 

General SUTTON. Thank you for that question, ma’am. It is a serious concern. 

I think once again, looking back to our history, never in the history of our Republic has so much been placed on the shoulders of 

so few on behalf of so many for so long. And so there is an enormous challenge for us to both do some of the things that are already under way in terms of expanding and increasing the force 

strength as well as tailing back on the tour lengths. Those are certainly factors, risk factors that we are well aware of. 

I think also there are the struggles—and you mentioned the 

Navy. The Navy and the Air Force, those troops who have been included as individual augmentees for units to go downrange and to 

do things perhaps for which they had not been trained initially, 

then they received training and go down as part of a unit but not 

their home unit. That also carries significant stressors related to 

it. 

We know that in the history of warfare, actually, suicides themselves, the suicide rate typically during high-intensity warfare is 

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not adversely affected; and that makes some sense because when 

you are in high-intensity warfare, you are focused on a goal. Operations are very fast, very intense, very deadly at times certainly. 

But suicide doesn’t seem to be affected adversely in those conditions. 

We know that when it becomes a lower intensity and more protracted situation—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Like multiple tours of duty. 

General SUTTON. Like multiple tours, like the kinds of stressors 

on families, like the physical, spiritual, psychological, and moral 

wear and tear over a protracted period of time, certainly that has 

its impact. 

But I would like to also point out that while everyone is affected 

by combat, the majority of individuals do not go on to develop a disorder. The majority of folks who experience concussion or mild TBI 

completely recover from that injury and do well. 

Now it is important for us to document it as we would any other 

injury, and it is important for us to monitor and evaluate to see, 

does this troop need to take a leave? Do they need to take a few 

days before they get back into the battle? And, of course, we have 

some of the same challenges that the civilian world does with highschool-football-age and college-age players who want to stay in the 

battle. 

But those are all things that are important for us to continue to 

monitor, to act, to develop those programs while, at the same time, 

we ensure that we put the truth out in terms of the fact that most 

folks will actually do very well; and in fact many, despite the adversity of war, will go on to claim what has been termed now posttraumatic growth. That is to say that even, for example, the double-lower-extremity amputee that I spoke with last week at the Canadian Embassy who told me, ma’am, if someone offered to give me 

back my legs today, I wouldn’t take them. I have grown so much 

in this experience. I know so much more about myself, my family, 

life, what my purpose is. 

Individuals, despite the most adverse and ugly of situations, can 

develop a greater sense of purpose, of faith, of meaning, of connection to others. And so it is important as we go forward that we 

communicate accurately and balance not only the tough reality of 

war but also ensure that individuals understand that this is an experience like other traumatic experiences from which individuals 

cannot only bounce back but also grow stronger as a result. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, one more, based on what you just said. 

So will we find in 5, 10 years RAND studies that show it is not 

the combat itself but maybe the tour of duties or duty that would 

cause the rates to increase? 

General SUTTON. You know, those are all questions that, as we 

focus our longitudinal prospective studies now over the next 10 to 

15 years, we will absolutely be able to understand more about 

those factors. Right now, what we know is that each of those factors has an additive effect, but we don’t understand completely the 

relationship between them as well as the various factors that combine to make this such a tough experience for both troops as well 

as family members. And I must also recognize and I appreciate so 

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much the Committee commenting on the service and sacrifice of 

our health care professionals. It is just phenomenal. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General SUTTON. And they deserve our care and concern as well. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Right. Thank you very much. 

General SUTTON. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

HYPERBARIC OXYGEN THERAPY TREATMENTS

Mr. DICKS. I apologize for not being here for your testimony. I 

have another Committee that I Chair, and we are reviewing the 

conduct of the Department of the Interior this morning. 

There are two questions I wanted to ask. One, I had some people 

come into my office. And I know you have discussed this, but I 

want to discuss it a little bit further, on hyperbaric oxygen therapy 

treatments. What they basically told me is that they are having 

great difficulty—that because the Surgeon General I think of the 

Navy somehow doesn’t like this treatment or thinks this treatment, 

you know, has to be studied further, FDA, whatever—but there 

have been 16 instances where they use I guess an off-label prescription; and in all 16 of these, the people have been dramatically 

improved, in cases that were very severe. And this is with traumatic brain injury. 

So if you have had 16 successes—and I think this is 16 for 16— 

why would we then go have a study? I mean, what I am concerned 

about—now General Corelli keeps telling me that we are moving 

out, that we are going to get something in the field. But I don’t see 

that yet. Except I understand we are doing yoga and massage and 

things like this. To me, that seems as if a higher priority might be 

the hyperbaric oxygen treatment if it is really helping these people 

beyond these other things. I mean, I can’t understand why it is, 

you know, that it is taking us so long to come to grips with this 

and to take action. 

General SUTTON. Sir, thank you for your comments and your 

question. 

First of all, let me just clarify, the Navy Surgeon General has 

been enormously supportive of this endeavor. 

Mr. DICKS. I am glad to hear that. 

General SUTTON. In fact, hosted a conference at his office last 

August. All of the Surgeon Generals. And in fact, the vice chief, the 

service vice chiefs—and you mentioned General Corelli, but all of 

the service vice chiefs have come forward and, in fact, are now 

serving as—— 

Mr. DICKS. So why are we going to study it? Why can’t we just 

implement it and let people get this treatment? 

General SUTTON. Sir, we brought together the 60 leading experts 

in the country to advise us on this issue. Because—yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Sixteen people were treated, and sixteen people 

were successful? Is that accurate? 

Dr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Who said, yes, sir, in the back? Are you a witness or 

are you public? 

Dr. DUNCAN. I am a doctor. 

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Mr. DICKS. Okay. Well that is good. So you know about this, too. 

Mr. MURTHA. Is that accurate or not accurate? 

General SUTTON. I have seen some case reports—— 

Mr. MURTHA [continuing]. People know whether it is accurate or 

not? 

General SUTTON. I have not seen 16 case study reports, but I 

have seen the five that Dr. Duncan has recently distributed. 

Mr. MURTHA. Does Dr. Duncan work with you? 

General SUTTON. He does not, sir. We certainly are colleagues. 

Mr. DICKS. Who does he work with? 

General SUTTON. I will let Dr. Duncan speak for himself. 

Dr. DUNCAN. I am a pro bono lobbyist for the hyperbaric community to get these men and women treated as quickly as possible. 

Mr. MURTHA. Factually, we know that 16 have been treated; and 

that is accurate? 

General SUTTON. We do not know, sir. I have not seen that data. 

I will tell you that Dr. Jim Kelly, who was a member of the consensus group study, the group of experts that met in December, as 

was Dr. Duncan, when they looked at these promising case studies—and that is what they are. They are very promising. 

Mr. DICKS. When was this? 

General SUTTON. Early December of 2008, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. That is 3 months ago. 

General SUTTON. Yes, sir. When we came out of that conference, 

the consensus of those national experts was that, given these promising case study results, given the promising off-label uses for this 

modality, that the time is now ripe for us to proceed to what becomes the gold standard for scientific evidence. And this is an opinion that is supported by the leading experts across the Nation. We 

are being responsible scientists and leaders in this area. 

Mr. DICKS. How did these doctors, these 16 doctors decide that 

they didn’t need any further studies or analysis, that they could go 

forward and prescribe this and then have it work and yet we are 

still not—we are still not moving out on this? This is what is very 

frustrating to me. 

Ms. EMBREY. Sir, off-label use, if the Department of Defense 

were to establish a policy to direct doctors to a standard of care 

that was off-label, not FDA-demonstrated in science and evidence—— 

Mr. DICKS. The FDA has approved this, by the way. 

Ms. EMBREY. Not for this. The issue is we in the Department of 

Defense have a long-standing policy that we do not direct off-label 

practices without the evidence behind it. So any doctor can talk to 

their colleagues and make a judgment based on the particulars of 

that individual to use a therapy in an off-label way. For instance, 

aspirin for heart, you know, for heart, cardiac issues, that is an offlabel use of aspirin. Although aspirin isn’t a prescribed drug, but 

it is a simple way to understand it. The Department of Defense 

can’t just make a policy to go do this since it is an off-label application. 

Mr. DICKS. Even though it has worked. 

Ms. EMBREY. Doctors can choose to do it on a case-by-case basis. 

But as a department policy, we cannot direct it as a standard of 

care without the evidence. 

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Mr. DICKS. All right. My time is running out. 

I have another question. The other issue is—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Excuse me. Tell us what this is. Tell us what this 

encompasses, this process. 

Ms. EMBREY. Well, FDA—— 

Mr. MURTHA. No. I mean, what is he talking about? 

Mr. BISHOP. Hyperbaric oxygen therapy. 

General SUTTON. Yes. Hyperbaric oxygen therapy involves a series of usually 40 to 60 treatments where an individual is exposed 

to increased atmospheric pressure of oxygen, and it is certainly 

closely supervised medically. It has been proven to be effective for 

conditions such as wound healing as well—infection as well as certainly when divers, for example, get the bends. The research, 

though, just simply has not yet been done to establish its use for 

TBI. 

Mr. MURTHA. I want to know. You get in some sort of a—— 

General SUTTON. A chamber, yes. 

Mr. MURTHA. Turn the atmospheric pressure up and adjust that 

and so forth, and it is closely monitored? 

General SUTTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. They have increased oxygen, also. 

Mr. DICKS. These off-label prescriptions were people with traumatic brain injury who, because of the treatment, were vastly improved and able to go back to their jobs. I mean, so I think it is 

worth—I am glad you are at least looking at it. It just takes so 

long. That is what is frustrating. 

Mr. BISHOP. They also generated new nerves. Nerves that had 

been killed were regenerated in the brain. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, I have to take the side with the Defense Department. I argue with folks all the time about these things. But 

we want to make sure it is safe, because there are always effects 

that we don’t recognize. 

We were talking earlier, Norm, about transplants. And when you 

transplant a hand, it is something that they haven’t done a lot of. 

But the rejection figure really causes a lot of problems. So we have 

got to be careful here. 

But, from what I am hearing is, we certainly ought to move as 

quickly as we can studying this thing so that we know what we are 

doing. 

General SUTTON. Absolutely. 

WEB-BASED CLINICAL MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES

Mr. DICKS. If I could just finish up here. The other one I wanted 

to ask you about, our Committee last year in the report said to 

DOD, to establish and use a Web-Based clinical mental health 

service program is a way to deliver critical clinical mental health 

services to service members and their families, particularly in rural 

areas. Now, I know that—and I talked to General Corelli. I have 

talked to everybody about this. I know you sent out a request for 

information, and now you are going to have an RFP on this, and 

I have been told that a decision is going to be made on this by 

April. Is that correct? 

General SUTTON. Actually, sir—— 

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Mr. DICKS. I happen to think that for a lot of people who are 

fearful that there is going to be recriminations, to have a WebBased system—I think you could even do this in country where 

they would be able to go back, talk to a psychiatrist and have it 

done privately and get the help that they need. 

I think this—and especially for our Guard and Reserve people 

who aren’t at like Fort Lewis or a base, this is another way of trying to reach out and help these people. And we see these suicide 

numbers going up, up, up, and yet again there—we put this in 

months ago, and we are supposed to get a report back on March 

16. It is frustrating that we can’t move this forward a little more 

expeditiously, because I think it is an idea that is at least worth 

studying, and we should do it as soon as possible. 

General SUTTON. Sir, I completely agree with you, and I would 

like to inform you of some of the efforts that are already under 

way. 

For example, Military OneSource, an individual can get counseling online, by phone or in person. The military mental health 

tool, which was launched last year, develops the ability for an individual in the safety and the privacy of their own home to be able 

to assess their mental health and to get linked up with those that 

can help them. 

Last fall, we launched the afterdeployment.org. It is a Web 2.0, 

3.0 socially interactive tool which likewise, again, is a Web-Based, 

stigma-free opportunity for troops to get help. 

Destress, which is a program that was developed in partnership 

with Duke University and Dartmouth—— 

Mr. DICKS. Is this where the yoga comes in? 

General SUTTON. No, sir. Destress is a Web-Based treatment program involving coaching and treatment for post-traumatic stress as 

well as depression. 

We also have a training module that is available for providers, 

primary care providers; and we are embedding behavioral health 

providers in our clinics across the services and in concert with the 

VA. 

All of this, sir, in addition to the request for proposal that is 

feeding off of the 23 submissions for information—there is a lot of 

interest in this area, and we share it. We are excited about it. 

All of these efforts, sir, will serve as a down payment, if you will, 

for what I would say is possibly the most revolutionary project that 

we are endeavored in right now; and that has to do with the Sim 

coach. We are working with the Institute for Creative Technology 

in southern California as well as with Carnegie Mellon and 

DARPA. We are bringing the best of artificial intelligence, the best 

of neuroscience knowledge, the best of simulated conversation and 

expert technology and voice recognition to provide a coach, an avatar coach. 

With this generation, virtual is as real as real is to us. That will 

provide that opportunity to have a coach that they can talk with 

who can bring in the most promising tools and practices and, yes, 

providers no matter where one is stationed. 

And we have launched the SBIR on that. We have got four submissions. We are moving forward towards a Sim coach. 

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We will have as a down payment—yes, in the very near future 

we will have providers who troops and their family members can 

access online as well. Every avenue that we can possibly use to 

connect with our troops and their family members to provide them 

that help, that support, that compassion that they need, we are 

committed to providing. 

Ms. EMBREY. Sir, I would also like to just clarify, too, out of the over $1 billion that this Committee has provided to us to study 

these topics, only $5 million was provided for the study of alternative medicine, such as yoga. 

Mr. DICKS. Have you asked for a reprogram? 

Ms. EMBREY. Well, it was also congressional direction to engage 

in study of alternative medicine for these topics. It was congressionally directed. 

Mr. DICKS. This is where the yoga and the—what do you do with 

the pinpricks? 

Ms. EMBREY. Acupuncture. 

Mr. DICKS. Acupuncture, all that. What are the results? How is 

that working? 

General SUTTON. Actually, sir, there is some very promising results. A couple of months ago Dr. Kelly and I had a chance to visit 

the Rehab Institute of Chicago where we funded some research, in 

this case looking at the efficacy of using acupuncture for sleep conditions. We know that sleep problems, it is the number one factor 

that affects our troops coming back. And of course when your sleep 

is not going well, nothing goes well over the long term. And pain 

management as well. 

So in talking with that particular research group, one of the 

things that they are very hopeful about at this point, the preliminary findings are looking good. But the possibility is that we 

could—just as we have provided our frontline corpsmen and medics 

a tourniquet to be able to perform life-saving practices that will 

save lives for severely injured extremities, we are looking at the 

possibility of having a very basic acupuncture kit which could be 

used for sleep, for pain, if the research continues to support it. 

Our own deployment health clinical center has done some of the 

pioneering work, looking at virtual cognitive behavioral therapy 

and its use for post-traumatic stress. Also, the use of yoga and acupuncture. We have got a program just up the road at the Deployment Health Clinical Center that has a 3-week regimen. They 

bring in referrals from all over the Department of Defense, folks 

who just aren’t getting better where they are locally. And it is not 

clear why. We bring together the best of eastern medicine, the best 

of western medicine. 

As one officer last spring testified here on the Hill, he said, I owe 

my life to this program, my family. We have had continued 

testimonials as well as rigorous science that have demonstrated the 

efficacy of some of these promising practices. So it is on that basis, 

whether it be hyperbaric oxygen or yoga or acupuncture or tai chi, 

we will continue to follow these promising practices and learn everything we can on behalf of our troops and their loved ones. 

Mr. MURTHA. The $5 million we put in was to study whether alternative medicines were working, not for alternative medicine but 

whether it works or not, $5 million. You can spend any amount you 

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want to on alternative medicine. We said, study it and come up 

with a result. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

THERAPEUTIC PROPOSALS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Just so I understand it, you serve as a 

clearinghouse. You should know that Members of Congress are visited by a variety of different constituents, university-based R&D, 

hospital-based R&D, which may not be university connected, the 

private sector with a variety of therapeutic proposals to deal with 

TBI. Just assure the committee that you are the general clearinghouse for such proposals here. I mean, the ingenuity that is out 

there is incredible, what people are coming up with. But you are 

the gatekeeper. 

General SUTTON. It is absolutely phenomenal, sir. And as we 

have gone across the country and visited with the leading programs 

across the country, whether it be places like Mayo Clinic, Cleveland Clinic, UCLA, Stanford, Cornell, Kessler Institute, just these 

programs across the country who are doing just incredible work, 

much of the time in partnership with our own scientists, our own 

clinicians. 

We are working right now, for example, with the NIH, their Center for Information Technology. We are signing a memorandum of 

agreement that will establish the same data analytic and storage 

infrastructure as was developed for autism. This will allow researchers around the country and around the world to have visibility of the knowledge as we reap it, as we harvest it from this 

research that will then advance and catalyze the development of effective treatments and approaches for our troops. 

So we are absolutely joined at the hip with, for example, our consortium, our research as well as our clinical consortium, the leading minds not only in this country but around the world. So we are 

absolutely committed to continuing to develop those relationships, 

that network of networks, not just in this country but in places like 

Canada, like Great Britain, like Australia, Spain, any number of 

countries that we have already been partnering with. 

I would also mention, sir, is that as important as the medical—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You are going to give your stamp of approval here? 

General SUTTON. Oh, yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. This is obviously based on sound science 

medicine. There are a lot of interesting people that come into our 

lives, but we want to make sure that it is substantiated in a way 

that it has veracity, that it is truly effective. 

General SUTTON. We adhere to excellence, yes, sir, in all things. 

And that means that we cannot squander, we cannot violate scientific rigor and integrity. So we will not do that. But we certainly 

will relentlessly pursue leading and advanced ways of treating, of 

diagnosing, of screening, of building resilience, of supporting our 

troops and their loved ones with a sense of focused urgency because 

we know time is not our friend. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. One of the things we are still concerned about is 

there is a number of Wounded Warrior programs. We don’t think 

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that you have proved to this committee, who funds these programs, 

that they are working. 

We need you to give us some proof if there are gaps in the program, overlapping programs, are we spending money in areas 

where we shouldn’t be spending it to—I am not convinced that— 

you know, it sounds good. You know, you can get up here and tell 

me apocryphal stories, but we want to see the proof. We want to 

see that these are working. Because if there is someplace else that 

we could spend the money, we would want to spend the money 

there. 

The Congress is anxious to spend money in the places where it 

works. But, you know, many times when you get a name like 

Wounded Warrior, that sounds good. But, you know, there is a lot 

of programs in that category that we are not sure of that merit 

funding. So you need to show us about that. 

The other thing, simulation out there, you said you looked at the 

simulation out there at Camp Pendleton. Do you think that it hardens the mind, it helps with their mental attitude when they go into 

combat? 

General SUTTON. Sir, the evidence points to the fact that anytime 

that we can build resilience through the use of tough, realistic and, 

yes, dangerous training that as closely as possible approximates 

what a troop will encounter in battle, that will much better prepare 

them for that experience. 

Mr. MURTHA. I want to you answer specifically. Does this help? 

Because General Mattis wants me to fund that. He wants me to 

recommend to the Committee we fund that and one at LeJeune. 

Does that help? That is what I am asking you. Does this particular 

program help toughen mentally the people going into combat? 

General SUTTON. Sir, we have research that is undergoing right 

now looking at those specific programs. The preliminary results are 

promising. I will let you know in 6 months what my opinion is on 

proliferating. 

Mr. MURTHA. We want you to let us know by May or June, because that is when we will be funding the programs. 

General SUTTON. Okay, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Any other questions? 

Mr. Bishop. 

PTSD SCREENING

Mr. BISHOP. Yes, sir. 

Ms. Embrey, one of DOD’s psychological strategic goals is to ensure early identification and prevention for individual conditions, 

but apparently this does not always occur. I have got two soldiers 

from my district who were not properly diagnosed on redeployment 

for PTSD, and they suffered relationally, that is, ended up in divorce. And they suffered professionally, ended up with some problems and ended up getting busted. 

The issue seems to be improper screening at the local unit level. 

DOD has designed the National Intrepid Center of Excellence to 

deal with PTSD nationally. What is being done to rectify the issue 

of poor PTSD screening at the local unit level? And how can our 

troops who are suffering from PTSD and related mental health 

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problems be properly screened so that they don’t suffer disciplinary 

actions, which are really a function of their PTSD? 

Ms. EMBREY. I think that we have struggled to develop sensitive 

and specific assessment tools that allow us to understand through 

a dialogue of questions whether or not an individual is at risk and 

needs referral and intervention for PTSD and other traumatic 

stress. The challenge is is that some individuals are in denial or 

they choose not to answer the questions honestly; and, as a result, 

they make it through the accessment without referral. 

So what we are trying to do is a double-pronged process, which 

is to address the issue through outreach with the line leadership. 

We learned that individuals respond well to traumatic stress with 

very strong leaders. 

Mr. BISHOP. Can I interrupt you for a second? I have got an example right here where an individual says that on the 20th of January he approached his first line supervisor with an issue that he 

needed to see the chaplain, he was having mental issues, and he 

needed to be dealt with. All the way through—he was set up for 

an appointment. It was cancelled. He tried to make it through. He 

was rescheduled. It was set up. It was cancelled. All the way—and 

his next appointment is now set for March 9. He has not gotten the 

support that he needed on the unit level. 

And that is to make my question short. But I have got a narrative here on what this particular soldier had to go through and 

still has not gotten his therapy. He has not gotten to talk to a therapist. 

Ms. EMBREY. I misunderstood your question. I thought you were 

talking about our assessment process. 

Actually, when an individual seeks care—there is emphasis from 

the very top of the department when a person approaches a commander for a referral. It may well be that the culture has not 

changed, and we need to further emphasize it further down the line 

and make sure that people understand that when people have identified a need that they are taken care of as quickly as possible. 

MEDICAL HELICOPTERS

Mr. MURTHA. Let me just stress the last question here, the CSAR 

thing. I just saw a classified report. The staff went down and got 

me a classified report. You folks have to weigh in on this. We can’t 

let the budget drive the number of medical helicopters we have. 

They don’t want to announce the number they have because it is 

inadequate, in my estimation. But the amount of time it takes to 

get these people out of the field is absolutely unacceptable. So I 

wish you folks would look at it and then make a recommendation, 

to us in particular. 

I went out to Nellis, and I was unhappy about—so we put $100 

million into refurbishing the ones. The RFP fell by the wayside. 

Now Secretary Gates is himself involved. But sometimes they get 

sidetracked by numbers. 

You folks are the ones that use it, and you folks are the ones who 

should make the recommendation. So I need to hear from you 

about the numbers you need and see if there is anything we can 

do. 

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It is a complicated problem. And with the altitudes they have, 

with the outposts that are so isolated, it is a much different situation; and the Afghans are a much more difficult enemy than the 

Iraqis. So we have got some real problems here. 

But we appreciate your coming before the Committee, your dedication to the health of our soldiers. 

The Committee will now adjourn until 10:00 Thursday, March 5. 

Ms. EMBREY. Thank you. 

General SUTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Ms. Granger and the 

answers thereto follow.] 

Question. Has the Defense Department estimated or studied the impact of OEF 

and OIF on local community health systems, and in particular the mental and behavioral health systems in regions where the military is growing the force? More 

specifically, the north Texas region? 

Answer. Absolutely. The TRICARE Regional Office-South, with its managed care 

support contractor, Humana Military HealthCare Services (HMHS), has established 

the Warrior Navigation and Assistance Program (WNAP) to support Active Duty, 

Guard, and Reserve warriors in transition and their families with information and 

assistance with TRICARE programs. WNAP offers these beneficiaries person-to-person guidance and access to a new advocacy unit specially trained for the unique 

challenges that many warriors face as it relates to access to care or the need for 

information on all available resources. This includes the Military Health System, 

Veterans Affairs, and local community assets. Additionally, WNAP will also oversee 

education and assistance initiatives for civilian providers caring for warriors and 

their families. 

In addition to WNAP, HMHS has partnered with ValueOptions to provide behavioral assistance and services to beneficiaries in the South region, which includes 

north Texas. They provide a behavioral health provider locator and appointment assistance line. 

Question. One of the biggest challenges faced by the behavioral health care organizations in my region when trying to provide outreach and treatment is the lack 

of knowledge as to the number of soldiers in the region, specifically the reserve component, that need immediate access to behavioral health specialists. Is there a reason that non-military entities are not able to access information in the Millennium 

Cohort Study to assist in planning and delivering of behavioral health services? If 

not, why? Please explain. 

Answer. We appreciate the outreach efforts of behavioral health care organizations in your region. The best and fastest way to help our beneficiaries is to have 

those organizations work with local military treatment facilities, the TRICARE Regional Office-South and the managed care support contractors for your region. 

Humana Military HealthCare Services has partnered with ValueOptions to provide 

behavioral health care. We expect all to work together to either provide or arrange 

for health care for our beneficiaries. 

In response to concerns about the health effects of deployments following the 1991 

Gulf War, Congress and the U.S. Institute of Medicine recommended that the DoD 

conduct prospective epidemiological research to evaluate the impact of military exposures, including deployment, on long-term health outcomes. The Millennium Cohort Study, the largest prospective health study in the military with more than 

140,000 participants at present, meets this critical need. The Millennium Cohort 

Study is poised to provide critical information toward understanding the long-term 

health of future generations of military members, thus contributing to force health 

protection, a DoD priority. The DoD Center for Deployment Health Research currently shares non-patient specific information collected with non-DoD entities. 

Question. How is the Department addressing behavioral health care needs in 

large rural areas that consist of diverse populations? 

Answer. Our military treatment facilities, TRICARE regional offices, and our 

managed care support contractors work together to provide or arrange for care. For 

TRICARE Prime enrollees, they work together to provide the care within our written access standards, regardless of location. Because we understand that access to 

behavioral health services is a key component of TRICARE, we require our managed 

care support contractors to offer beneficiary assistance to Active Duty service members and Active Duty family members in locating behavioral health care providers 

and making behavioral health care appointments. We have asked our contractors 

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to provide a dedicated toll-free telephone number and have given them one of two 

ways to assist the beneficiaries. 

The first way the contractor will provide telephone numbers of behavioral health 

care providers and call the beneficiary back within three days to see if the beneficiary was successful, and to offer any additional assistance needed. The second 

way, the contractor will establish a three-way conversation between the beneficiary, 

provider’s office and the contractor. The contractor will only participate in this 

three-way conversation long enough to confirm the provider is willing to provide an 

appointment. 

Question. How is the Department addressing behavioral health care needs in 

large rural areas based on reserve components? 

Answer. The Department has implemented many programs for our Service members who reside in medically underserved areas and in particular to meet the mental health care needs of our Reserve members. We have been incrementally enhancing our capabilities from general medical support to niche programs designed to 

support the specific mental health challenges faced by the Reserve Component. Our 

vision is for a robust system of mental health support across the entire continuum 

of care. The following are highlights of different types of programs currently offered 

along this continuum. 

Prevention/Pre-clinical: 

(1) An example of an internet-based mental health tool is afterdeployment.org, online since August 5, 2008, which offers anonymous access. Afterdeployment.org addresses the concerns of Service members who do not seek in-person consultation for 

adjustment problems because of barriers to care and concerns about stigma. Its behavior-change strategies and educational materials span several content areas, including combat stress; conflict at work; re-connecting with family and friends; depression; anger; sleep problems; substance abuse; stress management; kids and deployment; spiritual guidance; living with physical injuries; and health and wellness. 

(2) Another example of preclinical counseling support is Military OneSource. This 

is an internet-based Service member and family assistance program that offers personalized advice and support on many kinds of issues, such as relationship problems, spouse employment, and other mental health issues. Military OneSource offers the opportunity for Active Duty, Reserve, or National Guard Service members 

or their family members to speak to master’s-level, credentialed healthcare providers or social workers on many topics. 

Diagnosis and Care: One of the most mature programs available to the Reserve 

Component addresses both physical and mental health needs. TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS) is offered to qualified National Guard and Reserve members who are not 

otherwise qualified for TRICARE. It is a premium-based plan and offers coverage 

similar to TRICARE Standard and Extra. TRICARE Reserve Select allows the first 

eight behavioral health visits per fiscal year without prior authorization. TRS members may obtain this care from any TRICARE authorized mental health provider, 

but we encourage these members to use existing TRICARE network providers. 

Members choosing TRS are authorized to use military treatment facilities on a 

space-available basis. 

Screening/Assessments: The Post-Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA) program is designed to identify and address health concerns, with specific emphasis on 

mental health, that have emerged over time following deployment. The reassessment is scheduled for completion before the end of 180 days after return from deployment so that Reserve Component members have the option of treatment using 

their TRICARE health benefit. The PDHRA is required for all Service members who 

have returned from operational deployment, including all National Guard and Reserve members, as well as those who have separated or retired following their return from deployment. The assessment includes questions on behavioral health and 

traumatic brain injury. 

Transition: The Transitional Support Program (TSP) has been designed to bridge 

potential gaps in psychological health services that can occur during periods of 

transfer that are typical to Service members. The TSP uses an established behavioral health network with national networking capabilities and scope. Through the 

program, Transitional Support Facilitators provide a readily accessible (24/7), 

knowledgeable specialists for Service members who are seeking expert advice about 

mental health specialties, techniques, and modalities that are typically used in therapy, as well as direction in obtaining assistance and resources in their immediate 

area. 

Question. It is my understanding that the Texas region is underserved and if that 

is accurate, can the coalition of behavioral health care providers led by University 

of North Texas Health Science Center work effectively with the Defense Center of 

Excellence? 

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Answer. We are always interested in learning more about new and innovative 

ways to assist Service members, Veterans, and their families. As to this specific program, it sounds promising and something the DoD would be interested in exploring. 

As a result, we will be in contact with them, and hope to set up a meeting where 

we can learn more about the program, and better determine whether it would be 

of benefit. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Ms. Granger. 

Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow.] 

MENTAL HEALTH AND MILITARY FAMILIES

Question. Visits to military bases have confirmed the widespread nature of this 

problem. Declines in school performance and increases in disciplinary problems have 

surfaced at major bases throughout the country. For example, last year alone the 

Children’s hospital here in D.C. had over 1,000 visits from children of military Service members, many of which were suffering from mental health problems. Getting 

information about the trends in children’s illnesses related to the war would serve 

as an important basis for potential additional action by the Committee. 

Of the amounts this Committee approved for PTSD and other mental health programs, how much have you dedicated for children’s programs? What are there any 

notable trends in children’s illnesses related to the war? 

Answer: In addition to robust family support systems at installations and online, a step-up of $5,010,800 has been dedicated for children’s programming, with 

$4,710,800 for Sesame Street programs and distribution of Sesame Street DVD’s 

and online resources: (http://www.sesameworkshop.org/initiatives/emotion/tlc/). Videos were developed for children and adults covering: deployments, homecomings, 

and changes. In addition, specialized outreach materials and guides for using the 

videos were developed and distributed. In addition, $300,000 went to the DoD Uniformed Services University of Health 

Sciences’ Child Trauma Network organization and affiliations, supporting research 

into the effects of war on children. We have also allocated $320,000 for the ‘‘Signs 

of Suicide’’ school-based suicide prevention program in DoD middle and senior high 

schools and others with high proportions of military dependents. 

Significant trends from 2003 to 2008 have been noted for child and adolescent use 

of DoD direct and purchased mental health care resources. There have been increases in inpatient bed days for both 0–14 and 15–17 age groups, as well as for 

ambulatory mental health visits in both age groups. 

Historically most information about the effect of war on the children of Service 

members has been anecdotal and limited. DoD-funded research is underway to more 

precisely define the relationship. 

Question. If so, what initiatives have been funded by the Department and what 

are potential future programs that should be considered? 

Answer. In 2006, the offices of Health Affairs and Military Community and Family Policy jointly funded a specialized initiative to establish the United States military site of the National Child Traumatic Stress Network, based at the Uniformed 

Services University of the Health Science’s Center for the Study of Traumatic 

Stress. This program develops knowledge related to military childhood experiences, 

develops effective public education materials, and expands and studies effective 

intervention strategies, all using a strength-based approach. The Center for the 

Study of Traumatic Stress conducts research, education, consultation, and training 

on preparing for and responding to psychological effects and consequences of traumatic events. Program scientists are recognized nationally for their expertise related 

to the health and well-being of military children and have published and presented 

extensively on the topic. 

Signs of Suicide (SOS) is a school-based suicide prevention program that teaches 

adolescents how to identify symptoms of depression and suicidality, and how to respond effectively by seeking help from a trusted adult. The SOS program is the only 

school-based program proven to reduce suicide attempts in a randomized, controlled 

study. A future program in development will supply SOS Booster Kits to high school 

seniors to prepare them for mental health issues that may arise after graduation. 

In order to address the mental health of adolescent and teen children of Service 

members, an online screening was added to the existing online Mental Health SelfAssessment Program to help parents assess their children for depression or 

suicidality. 

Current research focuses on a comparison of the effects upon family members of 

a Service member who returns from deployment wounded versus those who were 

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not injured. Congressionally mandated research funding has been provided for research on the effects of deployments upon children. Research consortium centers 

(hubs) for psychological health, and traumatic brain injury are being established in 

three locations in the United States: San Diego, San Antonio, and Houston. Each 

will be affiliated with local study sites at major medical centers (spokes) across the 

country engaging the finest scientific minds to fill gaps in research, including research on families and children of Service members who deploy. 

Sustained research will more completely characterize the near- and long-term effects of sustained war efforts upon our families, the effectiveness of enhanced preventive family support, and clinical interventions for those who experience severe 

distress and psychiatric disorders. 

Question. What does research tell us about the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on children of military members suffering from this disease? 

Answer. Returning Service members may suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, substance use disorders, or other mental health conditions 

that may have a significant impact upon their spouses and children. The extent to 

which this occurs has not been fully characterized for this war. Research regarding 

Vietnam veterans described negative impacts, including reduced family cohesion, 

interpersonal expressiveness, ability to problem-solve, and increased interpersonal 

conflict. Vietnam veterans have reported that the PTSD symptom of avoidance, in 

affiliation with co-morbid anger and depression, negatively affected their family 

functioning, while their spouses identified anger as the most damaging symptom. 

Thus, identifying and treating PTSD early may reduce the potential negative impact 

to families of struggling Service members and veterans. 

Trans-generational effects of PTSD have been the focus of some recent research. 

These effects merit more study but cannot be directly inferred as relevant to the 

children of Service members with PTSD. 

Due to more robust data systems now in place, the connections between Service 

member PTSD and adverse effects, such as child neglect and maltreatment, may potentially be better characterized during this conflict. 

Question. Is there a correlation between child and spouse abuse and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)? 

Answer. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is not directly related to child or 

spouse abuse, i.e., one is not always present with the other. However, they can occur 

together. The same can be said of substance abuse or depression, which are often 

seen with PTSD. All children of parents with mental health conditions have some 

effects—especially when the parent’s condition is alcohol dependence, but others as 

well. Researchers have recently examined the impact of PTSD symptoms on family 

relationships, and on children in particular. Family members of individuals with 

PTSD may experience numerous difficulties. Children may experience cognitive or 

emotional symptoms related to witnessing their parent’s symptoms (e.g., having difficulty concentrating at school because they are thinking about the parents’ difficulties). However, DoD family and child-oriented initiatives focus on minimizing the 

negative effects on families and children of parental mental health issues in general, 

not only of PTSD. 

Child and spouse abuse are indicators of a stressed family that needs help in coping with challenges. Child abuse, particularly neglect, also can be seen in times of 

high deployment, not necessarily with PTSD, but accompanying the demands of deployment and single parent families that are a part of deployment. Many DoD programs are in place to address these issues and there is ongoing attention to these 

family needs. 

A study describing the characteristics of neglect for substantiated Army child neglect cases (2001–2006) is nearing completion to better understand the key factors 

that lead to these conditions by identifying: 

• child, parent, and family-based risk and protective factors for child neglect 

cases; 

• possible military community risk and protective factors for child neglect 

cases; 

• civilian community risk and protective factors for child neglect cases; and 

• family-based factors (marital/relationship problems, financial problems, 

substance use problems) and Service member injuries (including PTSD). 

We anticipate the findings of this study will serve to help us develop programs 

to reduce risk and increase protective factors in our military families. 

Question. Of the amounts appropriated for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 

could any of these funds be used to help children? 

Answer. The Services and the TRICARE Management Activity are using part of 

the funding appropriated to PTSD to implement programs appropriate for children 

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derstand the changes they see in their parents. These programs will encourage their 

support and caring for their affected parent, and to identify ways to help them cope 

with the changes in the family dynamics that result. Additionally, by expanding the 

number of clinical providers for mental health conditions, including PTSD, there is 

more capacity to provide behavioral health services to beneficiary children. 

DEFENSE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH AND TRAUMATIC

BRAIN INJURY

Question. It seems that the Department’s ‘‘Center for Best Practices’’ is a topdown solution to a bottom-up problem. Meaning, that the center was created not by 

‘‘lessons learned’’ from soldiers or their families seeking care but by multiple outside 

panels comprised of retired military officers and former secretaries. While there is 

a need for a ‘‘Center for Best Practices’’ it may not address the immediate concern 

about increasing access to services for individuals. 

What action, not PROCESS, have you taken over 3 1/2 years? 

Answer. The Defense Centers of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health (PH) 

and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) was established in response to the recommendations of seven panels and commissions, as well as to the FY 2008 National Defense 

Authorization Act (NDAA). In November 2008, the Department reported in detail 

on the responsibilities and actions of the DCoE in its report to Congress in response 

to FY2008 NDAA, Section 1624. DCoE addresses the spectrum of PH and TBI concerns of Service members with seven strategic goals: 

Leadership and Advocacy. Reinforces the notion that taking care of Service members is a leadership responsibility by developing training and education programs, 

both career and just-intime, to raise leader awareness of PH and TBI issues and 

intervention opportunities. 

Access to Care. Enhances the ability of Service members and their families to receive the resources they need—when and where they need them—by evaluating PH 

and TBI resilience requirements and making recommendations regarding future 

personnel, resources, and capabilities. 

Quality of Care. Ensures the highest quality of care through research and evidence-based clinical practice guidelines and state-of-the-art therapies. 

Resiliency Promotion. Focuses on preventing or mitigating PH conditions through 

research into risk factors and specific preventive techniques. 

Surveillance and Screening Systems. Promotes consistent, effective PH and TBI 

assessment practices and new classification systems to enhance diagnostic capabilities. 

Transition of Care. Ensures the successful, standardized transition between DoD, 

VA, and civilian health care systems. 

Research. Fosters scientifically rigorous programs to address gaps in current 

knowledge regarding PH and TBI conditions. 

The design and concept of operations for the National Intrepid Center of Excellence (NICoE), a component center of DCoE, is under construction in Bethesda, MD. 

NICoE began with Mr. Arnold Fisher’s offer in September 2007 to build and equip 

the facility at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda using private funds. 

The facility is expected to open in the spring of 2010. DoD’s plans to staff and operate the NICoE are complete to ensure the best care for Service members living with 

the effects of TBI or psychological health problems such as depression, anxiety and 

post-traumatic stress disorder. The NICoE concept is a ‘‘hub-and-spoke’’ model with 

the hub as the NICoE state-of-the-art facility in Bethesda offering diagnostic planning and treatment, along with research and education that would inform and elevate the levels of care in military and civilian healthcare sectors. The spokes in the 

model will be military medical treatment facilities and civilian centers around the 

country that partner with NICoE in caring for these injured Service members in locations near where they live. The NICoE Director has already begun the process of 

visiting treatment sites around the nation in an effort to identify those of high quality and willingness to partner in this important mission. Planning groups for the 

NICoE have involved both those with PH problems and TBI, and their family members, to get the most complete stakeholder input. The NICOE will add one more 

component of the DoD continuum of care that increases access to healthcare services 

for individuals. 

Question. How many mental health professionals will see patients in the new Center? 

Answer. The Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health and 

Traumatic Brain Injury will not see patients. However, the National Intrepid Center 

of Excellence (NICoE), one of the centers associated with the DCoE will see patients 

once it becomes operational. All of the 90+ staff members of the NICoE will be semstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

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lected for their experience in the diagnosis and treatment of human brain disorders 

from both the neurological and psychological perspectives. The needs of each individual patient referred will be assessed in a holistic fashion, taking into account 

their physical, cognitive, psychological, and spiritual well-being. There will be psychiatric, psychological, substance abuse, and chaplaincy services as well as neurological and neuropsychological assessment and rehabilitation with the full complement of occupational, speech/language, physical and recreation/art/music therapy. 

Question. Will there be in-patient beds? 

Answer. The National Intrepid Center of Excellence (NICoE) will be an outpatient 

facility, although housing for the Service members and their family members will 

be provided during the duration of their assessment and treatment at NICoE. Inpatients will continue to receive care at military medical treatment facilities and Department of Veterans Affairs’ hospitals and clinics around the country. 

Question. What type of utilization capacity will the Center have? 

Answer. On any given day, the National Intrepid Center of Excellence (NICoE) 

will see approximately 20 patients in various stages of the individualized diagnostic 

and treatment planning process. All patients will be offered the opportunity to participate in clinical research being performed in collaboration with the National Institutes of Health, the Uniformed Services University for Health Sciences, and other 

affiliated academic research programs. The NICoE will also host education and 

training programs locally at the Bethesda facility as well as broadcasting lectures 

and interactive training sessions from its media room. 

Question. How much of the funding provided will be designated for the Center? 

Answer. In FY 2008, the Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) was allotted 

$79.2M in Operations and Maintenance funding. In FY 2009, that amount was 

$123M in support of the DCoE and its associated Centers to include the National 

Intrepid Center of Excellence (NICoE). However, since the NICoE is not scheduled 

to become operational until FY 2010, very little funding has been allotted for it to 

date. A notable exception is that a Director was hired in FY 2009. 

Question. How much of the funding provided will be designated for the Defense 

and Veterans Head Injury Center? 

Answer. In FY 2009, $34.2 million (including $5 million transferred from the 

Army) has been designated for the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center. 

Question. How will returning servicemembers and their families in rural parts of 

the country access the new center? 

Answer. Individual patients can be referred from anywhere in the United States 

and abroad to the National Intrepid Center of Excellence (NICoE) for its specialized 

assessment and interventions, or they can be referred to partnering centers nearer 

home. Specialty centers in each region of the country will be ‘‘spokes’’ of NICoE and 

will use treatment plans established by NICoE to gather outcome data to measure 

the effectiveness of the interventions. To target the needs of our military and their 

families in rural regions, the Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological 

Health (PH) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) has established a link to the nation’s 

Area Health Education Centers, which were created by federal statute to address 

the educational and training needs of healthcare professionals in rural America’s 

underserved regions. This liaison will help elevate the requisite knowledge of PH 

and TBI of the healthcare in underserved areas. 

The DCoE National Center for Telehealth and Technology also is delivering multiple projects that address this need. The www.afterdeployment.org program offers 

online self-help interactive resources targeting those affected by deployment. A coordinated effort with the Services is underway to develop robust telehealth capabilities to better serve those for whom accessing services is difficult due to distance or 

other factors. Finally, DCoE National Center for Telehealth and Technology has embarked on a program to develop and deliver web-based telehealth care that will further extend the reach of services to our rural beneficiaries. 

Question. What are the anticipated operating costs of the center and how will they 

be funded? 

Answer. Of the $600M Operations and Maintenance supplemental funds received 

in FY 2008, $79.2M went to the Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health (PH) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) to initiate operations of its 

headquarters and to fund specific ongoing initiatives in the area of PH and TBI. Of 

the $575M supplemental funds identified in FY 2009, $123M was allotted to the 

DCoE to fund its headquarters and transition support to the subordinate centers. 

The DCoE will receive additional funding in FY 2010. This will fully support the 

headquarters and its subordinate centers. 

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RAND REPORT

Question. What, if any parts of the RAND study has the Department incorporated 

in the Defense Center of Excellence for psychological health (PH) and traumatic 

brain injury (TBI)? 

Answer. The RAND study provided four recommendations, which the Defense 

Centers of Excellence (DCoE) for PH and TBI has been addressing: 

1. Increase the cadre of providers who are trained and certified to deliver proven 

(evidence-based) care, so that capacity is adequate for current and future needs. 

• In FY 2008, trained 1178 providers in deployment care, including Prolonged Exposure and/or Cognitive Processing Therapy for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. 

• Trained providers at 13 sites in Virtual Reality Therapy. 

• Trained more than 1600 providers in evidence-based treatment for traumatic 

brain injury (TBI) through joint DoD and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) 

training courses. 

• Provided funding for development of training materials (e.g., training Family 

Practice physicians to treat those with mild to moderate mental health and TBI concerns). 

• Developed Courage to Care materials. 

• Offered clinician education and training through the Deployment Health Clinical Center’s site (www.pdhealth.mil). 

2. Address the stigma that poses a barrier to seeking mental health care. 

• In May, will launch the ‘‘Real Warriors Real Battles Real Strength’’ campaign, 

a national outreach initiative that seeks to combat the stigma around mental health 

conditions and treatment and encourage psychological resilience. This public information campaign will solicit the involvement of DoD, VA, and the general population to foster a culture of support for psychological health. 

• Changed question 21 on Security Questionnaire related to seeking mental 

health treatment for combat-related issues; limits required disclosures for military 

members in counseling. 

3. Deliver proven, evidence-based care to Service members and veterans whenever 

and wherever services are provided. 

• Established clinical standards as well as researching, refining, and distributing 

lessons learned and best practices throughout the Military Health Services. 

• Developed education and outreach resources for leaders, families, and communities. 

• Introduced evidence-based care as the enterprise standard through VA/DoD 

clinical practice guidelines for mild traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress 

disorder, depression, and substance use disorders. 

• Issued the Military Acute Concussion Evaluation tool, which is based on the 

validated Standardized Assessment of Concussion used in sports medicine, for accessing the likelihood of mild traumatic brain injury after events in which the head 

may have been hurt. 

• In conjunction with the VA, published symptom management guidelines for 

mild traumatic brain injury and established clinical guidance for acute management 

of mild TBI in military operational settings. 

• Implemented standardized training curriculum and content for our medical providers, as we have initiated a certification process for TBI programs in our medical 

treatment facilities. 

• Funded research to improve knowledge of evidence-based treatment. 

• Assisted military members, veterans, and families with deployment health concerns or military related exposures after deployment 

—Post-Deployment Clinical Practice Guidelines; 

—Specialized Care Programs; and 

—Web-based PTSD self-management tool (DESTRESS–PC). 

• Advanced quality care through education, research, consultation and training. 

• Provided evidence-based training on deployment-related behavioral health topics to military and civilian mental healthcare providers. 

• Advanced TBI-specific evaluation, treatment and follow-up care and conducted 

clinical research that defines optimal care and treatment for individuals with TBI. 

4. Invest in research to close information gaps and plan effectively. 

• Expanded the research opportunities for PH and TBI to establish a strong foundation of medical and cross-functional research, including new and innovative treatments such as complementary and alternative medicine techniques. 

• Initiated integrated individual and multi-agency research efforts that will lead 

to improved prevention, detection, diagnosis, and treatment of combat-related psychological health issues and traumatic brain injury. 

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• Will execute program funds to address targeted research gaps in the area of 

psychological health and TBI. The goal of the research program is to fund scientifically meritorious research to prevent, mitigate, and treat the effects of traumatic 

stress and traumatic brain injury on function, wellness, and overall quality of life 

for service members and their caregivers and families. The program strives to establish, fund, and integrate both individual and multi-agency research efforts that will 

lead to improved prevention, detection, diagnosis, and treatment of combat related 

psychological health and traumatic brain injury. 

Question. How do the percentages in the RAND report correlate to the Departments? Are there any differences? If so what are the differences? 

Answer. The DoD-funded the Millennium Cohort Study has shown that combatexposed Service members are at significantly higher risk of post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD). The RAND report measured PTSD using a screening instrument, 

not an actual clinical diagnosis, so we do not know how many of those who screened 

positive in the RAND report actually had PTSD. Thus, it is difficult to correlate the 

RAND data with Service-level data derived from clinician-diagnosed PTSD. 

DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS AND OUTSIDE ENTITIES

Question. Psychological health is an overarching concept that covers the entire 

multi-dimensional continuum of psychological and social well being, prevention, 

treatment and health maintenance. An approach of this type would be more complete by using new and innovative companies and approaches. 

How many outside entities, companies and individuals have you met with outside 

the military that specialize in behavioral health programs? Please discuss a few of 

the promising ones. 

Answer. Over the past two years, staff from the office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense (Health Affairs) and in particular the Director and staff of the Defense 

Centers of Excellence (DCoE), have met with many companies and groups to solicit 

the best ideas for consideration and possible implementation within the DoD. Several of our collaboration efforts are addressed below. 

1. The RESPECT-Mil is a project that in 2003 we did not have the capability of 

doing but through contacts with subject matter experts, we created a collaborative 

primary care program for detection and management of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression. This program was based on a MacArthur Foundationfunded program for depression (‘‘RESPECT-Depression’’) and the outside collaborators were all internationally respected experts funded under that program. 

Within RESPECT-Mil, we needed the capability for a web-based care management support system. We consulted with an internationally respected primary care 

mental health expert at University of Washington (Seattle) who modeled a prototype 

system used there. In consultation with the expert, the Defense Health Clinical Center joined with a contractor called Previdence from Salt Lake City, Utah, to build 

this system and it is going on line at 43 primary care clinics later this month. 

2. DESTRESS is an online PTSD psychotherapy tool that with investigators in the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (Boston VA and Boston University, Charleston 

VA and Medical University of South Carolina) and in Australia (University of New 

South Wales), we developed, tested, and published the results of the initial test in 

the American Journal of Psychiatry in November 2007. Now, we are rolling out and 

continuing to test it for use in primary care. 

3. We funded one Small Business Innovation Research (topic ‘‘Interactive GameBased System for Psychological Health Education’’) to four businesses: Novonics, 

SOAR, Simmerson, and Total Immersion. 

4. We co-sponsor a Common Data Elements Workshop for Research in PH/TBI 

with the VA, the National Institute for Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS, 

which is a part of the National Institutes of Health (NIH)), and the National Institute for Disability Rehabilitation Research (NIDRR). Approximately 175 subject 

matter experts, 48 agencies, 21 universities, 8 NIH components, 4 rehabilitation 

centers, 6 international experts, 19 DoD entities and the 4 Services. The purpose 

of this undertaking is to reach consensus on recommendations for common data elements, standard definitions, metrics, outcomes and instruments to facilitate for use 

in PH and TBI research for more robust comparisons of research studies not only 

within the fields of PH and TBI, but also between those fields. Involves both national and international partners. 

5. We have established a strategic scientific advisory group for PH and TBI research, which includes both federal and civilian agencies. 

6. We established regular Community Collaboration Days to allow the community 

an opportunity to discuss their products. 

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7. The Center for Deployment Psychology partnered with Magellan to provide content for web-based distance learning modules for mental health care providers. 

8. We partnered with the Institute for Creative Technology at the University of 

Southern California to develop and research Virtual Reality as a technology for use 

in the treatment of PTSD. Other partners are from Emory University and Cornell. 

9. In the area of virtual worlds, we have been working with the Seattle Science 

Foundation and a development company along with key partners at the University 

of Washington to advance potential applications in this area. 

Question. How many of these programs demonstrate capabilities to which that the 

Department currently does not have access? 

Answer. Quite a few of our collaborations are resulting in growing and enhancing 

our capabilities. While we could develop some of these capabilities within DoD, we 

often find it is faster or easier to rely on the expertise or a capability already existing elsewhere and importing it directly or shaping it to meet our particular need. 

We rely on leveraged resources and collaboration with partners (both federal and 

nongovernmental) to maximize our impact in addressing clinical, research, and 

training needs associated with traumatic brain injury and psychological health. 

For instance, the Common Data Elements workshop hosted by the Defense Center 

of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury tap into expertise 

DoD does not have. The products of the workshop will help inform and develop evidence needed to support future projects, and will be of potential use to existing 

projects. 

Additionally, our research program often partners federal resources with outside 

resources—innovative technologies, infrastructure, facilities, staff, and eligible study 

populations. 

Question. Please list the mental health and behavioral health demonstration and 

pilot project Requests for Proposal (RFPs) that the Services or Force Health Protection have issued since the FY 2007 supplemental was enacted? 

Answer. The following represents a list of Psychological Health pilot projects identified by the Services and TRICARE Management Activity. These projects are in 

various stages of planning and execution. 

Psychological Health Pilot Projects Service 

TeleHealth ................................................................................................................... Navy. 

Caregiver Occupational Stress Control ...................................................................... Navy. 

Combat and Operational Stress Control for Caregivers ............................................ Navy. 

Families Coping with Deployment ............................................................................. Navy. 

Naval Special Warfare Resilience Enterprise ............................................................ Navy. 

Outreach Coordination for USN Reserve .................................................................... Navy. 

Promoting Resilience in the Face of Loss ................................................................. Navy. 

Psychological Health Training for Family Practice Physicians .................................. Navy. 

Adaptive Disclosure Training Program for Marines ................................................... Navy. 

Web Based Training for Combat Stress First Aid Grief and Loss (USMC) ............... Navy. 

Assessment and Treatment of Wounded Warriors Families ...................................... Navy. 

Family Program Assessment ...................................................................................... Navy. 

Outreach Call Center ................................................................................................. DCoE. 

DoD-wide Gap Analysis .............................................................................................. DCoE. 

Sesame Workshop ...................................................................................................... DCoE. 

Child Trauma Network Support .................................................................................. DCoE. 

RESPECT.MIL .............................................................................................................. DCoE. 

Virtual Reality ............................................................................................................ DCoE. 

Pro Resilience Campaign (Real Warriors) ................................................................. DCoE. 

South East Regional Medical Center Psychological Health Program ........................ Army. 

Intensive Outpatient Program .................................................................................... Army. 

Residential Treatment Facility ................................................................................... Army. 

Warrior Resiliency ....................................................................................................... Army. 

Warrior Transition Intensive Outpatient Program ...................................................... Army. 

Family Resilience Building ......................................................................................... Army. 

Compassion Fatigue Program .................................................................................... Army. 

Medication Management ............................................................................................ Army. 

Soldier Wellness Assessment ..................................................................................... Army. 

Virtual Reality ............................................................................................................ Army. 

Transition Support ...................................................................................................... FHP&R. 

Our headquarters data systems are not configured to identify if a pilot is contracted out or if it is run internally to DoD. Therefore, we have submitted a data 

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call to the Services to collect this data and will forward a more complete answer 

to the Committee staff as soon as we compile the information from the Services. 

Question. Are you engaging the States to assist in closing gaps that exist? 

Answer. We are working to develop relationships with the National Guard Bureau’s Directors of Psychological Health (PH) in order to conduct training workshops 

across the United States. 

In August 2008, DoD partnered with Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to sponsor the ‘‘Paving 

the Way Home’’ conference, in which 10 states identified policies and practices that 

would advance the continuum of care and services for returning Service members 

in their states. 

We are developing Military Family Toolkits, which identify federal, state, and 

local resources that can help create a supportive network for the mental health 

needs of returning service members. 

In a separate effort, DoD will discuss military culture and deployment issues and 

provide DoD resource training to the Arkansas chapter of the National Association 

of Social Workers, many of whom provide direct clinical care to Reserve Component 

beneficiaries in local and rural communities. This effort may prove to be a viable 

model or template for equipping local and rural providers with an important cultural context and PH and traumatic brain injury (TBI) familiarization to empower 

local and rural clinicians and encourage their engagement as part of a community 

response and linkage with a national collaborative effort to address the clinical and 

support needs of our returning Service members. 

Research partnerships exist at all levels of government and non-governmental 

service. The post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)/TBI Clinical Consortium consists 

of 10 study sites across the United States, each focusing on unique aspects of research in PH and TBI. 

Question. What is the Department doing to increase evidence based and translation research instead of doing research that will not be applicable to solving or 

assisting current mental health issues? 

Answer. Evidence-based approaches to the treatment and prevention of psychological health (PH) problems and traumatic brain injury (TBI) rely on both basic 

science as well as translational research. As such, the DoD—and its federal research 

partners—funds a portfolio of research programs aimed at addressing expert-identified gaps in the science relevant to current mental health issues. 

We have initiated a program in Complementary and Alternative Medicine ($45M 

from FY 2007 Supplemental Funds) to evaluate therapies in non-traditional areas 

such as acupuncture, yoga, and meditation. Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) 

also has been supporting the continued development of Virtual Realty Therapy for 

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) treatment and encouraging additional 

translational research. In FY 2009, we will develop mechanisms to quickly evaluate 

therapies and promising practices to speed the ability of transitioning new approaches to Service members and their families. 

Through a collaborative research database of federated information-technology 

systems, we find ways for researchers in the fields of PH and TBI to gain access 

to data from previous or ongoing projects that may contribute to new studies. 

Current efforts investigate the feasibility of a social networking tool for scientists 

in PH/TBI that will identify leaders in particular areas of research. 

A State of the Knowledge Summit will bring together researchers in the field with 

policymakers and military leaders through a face-to-face forum in which researchers 

and consumers dialogue and address procedural challenges. 

We are conducting a national gap analysis to determine where additional efforts 

are needed. 

The PH/TBI Clinical Consortium and the PTSD Multidisciplinary Research Consortium (STRONGSTAR) are examples of DoD’s efforts to increase evidence-based 

and translational research. The research underway and planned for the 

STRONGSTAR consortium involves the application of evidence-based treatments to 

military and new veteran populations. 

HOTLINE FOR MENTAL AND BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES AND COUNSELING

Question. The suicide rate among Iraq and Afghanistan veterans is almost twice 

that of the national average. That does not include alcohol and drug abuse, spousal 

abuse and/or murder, not to mention the effects on children. Can you provide the 

following information? 

What action has been taken to ensure easy access to behavioral health care to 

our service members and their families? 

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Answer. We consider access to care a top behavioral health priority and have invested in it more heavily than other strategic goals. Within the direct care system, 

we implemented strategies increasing behavioral health staffing, primarily by increasing contract and government service providers. 

In 2007, a Health Affairs policy memorandum clarified the routine access standard of 7 days for initial mental health specialty care for PRIME beneficiaries. (For 

emergent conditions, care is to be provided immediately; for urgent conditions, care 

is to be provided within 24 hours.) 

Subsequent analyses of initial mental health specialty care for PRIME beneficiaries seen in the direct care system demonstrated 96 percent of these visits occur 

without an appointment, when beneficiaries present to a mental health clinic for 

care unannounced. Four percent of initial care visits were scheduled by appointment. This is due to the practice of most military mental health clinics that designate rotating behavioral health specialty care providers as ‘‘on call’’ for emergent, 

urgent, and walk-in patients every workday. 

Additionally, the Services are increasing the degree to which behavioral health 

providers function as consultants serving in primary care clinics (integrated care), 

markedly reducing the stigma of receiving specialty assistance. In addition, models 

of enhanced screening and behavioral health consultation are being utilized in populations where there is a higher risk of combat-related Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and depression. 

We have also improved mental health access under our managed care support 

contracts. In addition to the substantive TRICARE PRIME benefit of eight 

unmanaged behavioral health specialty visits a year without referral (plus more visits as required), TRICARE contractors now provide Behavioral Health Locators to 

assist beneficiaries in engaging specialty care within 7 days from network providers. 

Locators will assist by providing telephone numbers of behavioral health care providers near beneficiaries’ homes, or by establishing a three-way conversation with 

the beneficiary and a provider’s office staff. The Locator will only participate in this 

three-way conversation long enough to confirm that the provider is willing to provide an appointment within access standards. 

We have also implemented innovative programs in concert with the line Commanders to improve resiliency and reduce stigma for seeking mental health care. 

These programs range from training Chaplains to assist with pre-clinical responses 

to mass disasters and trauma to Military One Source, which is an anonymous call 

center where Service members and their families can obtain support for a myriad 

of issues as well as up to 12 free counseling sessions with licensed counselors per 

year. We have also implemented web sites for Service members and family members 

to access when they want to learn more about mental health conditions, what symptoms they may have that are normal reactions to stress or when symptoms might 

be such that they should seek professional care. 

Additionally, we have worked diligently to educate our Service members and family members about the many resources currently available to them. The TRICARE 

website describes all benefits and provides a convenient list of specific Mental 

Health Resources. The Defense Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and 

Traumatic Brain Injury maintains a call center to provide information. A particularly robust asset developed by the Department of Defense (DoD) is the national Resource Directory where anyone can seek available help by clicking on a map showing where various services (including mental health) are available to Service members and family members at the Federal, state and local level. 

Below is a Department information paper that reviews pre-clinical psychological 

support resources provided by DoD and the Services. 

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Question. What is the number of Service members, to include Guard and Reserve 

members, and their family members that have used the Military OneSource hotline 

for mental and behavioral health services and counseling? 

Answer. In FY 2008, service members and their families made over 2.8 million 

contacts with Military OneSource by telephone, e-mail or through the web page for 

information, resources or referrals. 

If the contact deals with a mental health issue, the master’s level Military 

OneSource consultant makes an assessment and a referral. If the mental health 

issue is determined to be serious enough for medical mental health services, the 

Military OneSource consultant stays on the line and connects the caller to a Tricare 

consultant. For less serious mental health issues, callers have several options for 

counseling; a counselor in their community provided by Military OneSource, Chaplains and Military Family Life Consultants are all options for Service members and 

their families. In FY 2008, Military OneSource provided approximately 105,475 

counseling sessions to Service members and their families. 

Question. How many suicide calls have the Military OneSource and the other 

services hotlines received? Please break down by component. 

Answer. In FY 2008, Military OneSource received 93 Duty-to-Warn: Harm-to-Self 

calls. Sixty-seven (67) of these calls came from Active Duty, 14 from the National 

Guard and 11 from the Reserves. In the case of a Harm-to-Self call, the Military 

OneSource consultant keeps the caller on the phone and talking while another Military OneSource consultant contacts local service providers. Only after help arrives 

on the scene will the Military OneSource consultant end the call. The next day, the 

Military OneSource consultant follows-up with the service provider who responded 

to the call and asks what further resources or services can be provided by Military 

OneSource. 

Question. What is the mechanism for follow up with Service members or their 

family members following a call to Military OneSource? 

Answer. If the call is a Duty-to-Warn situation, local service providers are contacted while the consultant keeps the caller on the line. The call will only be released when help arrives at the location of the caller. Within 24 hours, a follow-up 

call is placed by the Military OneSource consultant to the local service provider to 

ensure that any services that Military OneSource can provide are made available 

to the Service member and their family. 

Question. How many mental health TRICARE claims have been submitted in the 

past 6 months? 

Answer. While we do not have data readily available about the number of mental 

health TRICARE claims submitted in the past six months, we recently analyzed 

mental health care utilization by TRICARE beneficiaries during FY 2008. The analysis revealed claims in the private sector for: 372,432 days of inpatient mental 

health services, 5,556,594 outpatient mental health visits, and 4,629,865 pharmacy 

prescriptions for mental health medicines. 

Question. You are forming partnerships with the Public Health Service to provide 

200 uniformed public health service mental health providers of all disciplines. 

Has this happened? 

Answer. Yes. The partnership was finalized through a memorandum of agreement 

(MOA) that was signed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) on 

15 April 2008. The MOA is in place for 10 years and identifies that recruitment of 

mental health providers estimated at, but not limited to, 200 officers. The Public 

Health Service works directly with the Surgeons General of the military Departments to identify and fill critical mental health gaps. 

Question. If not, what is the time frame for contracting with these 200 health officials? 

Answer. N/A 

Question. How can Public Health Service commit to this number when a shortfall 

exists across the United States? 

Answer. The Commissioned Corps of the United States Public Health Service 

(PHS) has advised the DoD that it remains confident of meeting the goal of placing 

approximately 200 mental health PHS officers at DoD military treatment facilities 

(MTFs) and other appropriate locations within the next several years, in keeping 

with the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DoD and the Department of 

Health and Human Services signed April 15, 2008. PHS advised that, in summer, 

2008, it began quite an aggressive implementation response to the signed agreement. Despite the constraints of its limited recruitment resources at the time, PHS 

has already been able to provide DoD with more than 40 active duty PHS officers, 

including psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, nurses, and physician assistants, for deployment to CONUS-wide MTFs. Since that successful early beginning, 

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sistance of additional funding from DoD for this purpose, including funding support 

for salaries and benefits of the PHS officers assigned to this DoD project. At present, 

nine additional mental health professionals are being cleared and prepared for 

placement as PHS commissioned officers in support of DoD MTFs, and some 25 additional candidates are being processed through various stages of inquiry, clearance, 

and preparation for commissioning. 

WARRIOR TRANSITION UNITS

Question. As part of its efforts to improve Wounded Warrior care, the Army established 32 Warrior Transition Units to provide a unit in every medical treatment facility that has 35 or more eligible service members. Funding for Warrior Transition 

Units (WTUs) is both supplemental and base bill funding. 

Can you define what Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) are and how they compare 

or augment other resources for counseling or services to be provided by the Center 

of Excellence? 

Answer. The delivery of care and treatment is provided by medical and behavioral 

health professionals practicing primarily at the military medical treatment facilities. 

WTUs provide the command, control, and care management necessary to ensure soldiers receive this care and information about other support services in an effective 

and efficient manner. Currently, there are 36 WTUs with about 3,600 assigned personnel, located across the United States and in Germany. WTUs are primarily 

staffed with combat-experienced officers and noncommissioned officers. 

The key to WTU success since they became fully operational in January of 2008 

is the ‘‘Triad of Care’’ concept where each soldier’s care and progress is closely managed by three individuals: a Primary Care Manager (a physician), a Nurse Case 

Manager, and a Squad Leader. These individuals develop and implement a multidisciplinary Comprehensive Transition Plan that identifies the courses of treatment 

and goals to accomplish in the care, education, and training of soldiers and their 

family, and then assure the soldiers receive the care and assistance required during 

rehabilitation and transition. Additionally, WTUs are staffed with behavioral health 

professionals to provide care management; Medical Evaluation Board physicians to 

ensure timely and comprehensive medical care, recovery, and medical determinations; and legal professionals to counsel and advocate for soldiers and families as 

they progress through the Disability Evaluation System. 

The Department of Defense Centers of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health 

(PH) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) assesses, validates, oversees, and facilitates 

prevention, resilience, identification, treatment, outreach, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs for PH and TBI. It provides a clearinghouse of the latest information pertaining to PH and TBI, making that information available to WTUs. It 

also collects best practices to help standardize consistently excellent PH and TBI 

care across all WTUs. 

Question. Are Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) are as effective as they can be 

given resourcing and other constraints? 

Answer. The Army is committed to supporting the Warrior Care and Transition 

Program, which includes the Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) concept of care. The 

WTUs have significantly improved the rehabilitation experience of Army wounded 

warriors and their families, and they attribute that success to the ‘‘Triad of Care’’ 

concept where each soldier’s care and progress is closely managed by three individuals: a Primary Care Manager (a physician), a Nurse Case Manager, and a Squad 

Leader. 

The Army established extensive metrics to assess the effectiveness of WTUs. Senior Army leadership receives briefings regularly to enable adjustments in resourcing 

when the situation changes to assure a consistently effective level of operation. 

Question. What are the Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) not doing that they 

should be to assist soldiers and their families? 

Answer. The Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) are doing what they were designed 

to do. These units work in consonance with other non-medical wounded, ill and injured support service organizations to provide comprehensive support for their rehabilitation, recovery and transition back to active duty or to civilian life. Mindful of 

the changing needs of wounded warriors and their families, the Army revises its 

operational procedures for WTUs whenever it identifies something else that WTUs 

need to do. For example, the Army is currently focusing on changing the mindset 

from a focus on disability to a focus on achievement and aspiration. This approach, 

which we strongly endorse, would promote resilience, self-reliance, and provide for 

re-education and employment, while ensuring that soldiers and their families receive the enduring benefits they so richly deserve. 

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INTERFACING WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY

Question. Some military installations are located in communities that provide additional support beyond the walls of the base. There are also installations in communities that resources are not available to support the needs of an individual base. 

With the growth of mental health issues in and around military installations: 

Can the military health care system provide local communities with the appropriate level of interaction and support for treatment of psychological health issues? 

Answer. We believe that through the expansion of our web-based programs, online 

services, telehealth direct care and care partnered with our managed care support 

contractors, we will be able to reach out beyond the physical boundaries of our military bases and work closely with our civilian counterparts to address the mental 

health needs of our Service members and their families. 

The findings of the DoD Task Force on Mental Health clearly suggest that the 

military health system is challenged to provide resources in the form of clinical providers sufficient to meet the mental health care needs. It has been particularly challenging to address the mental health needs of Reserve and Guard members who reside in remote or smaller communities that are geographically distant from military 

medical treatment facilities or TRICARE providers. We have been actively involved 

in addressing these challenges by focusing on the reintegration issues faced by returning Service members. The Defense Centers of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health (PH) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) co-chairs (along with the VA) 

the Federal Partners Priority Workgroup on the Reintegration of Returning Service 

Members and their Families, which is a collaborative effort among DoD, VA, and 

multiple federal agencies, to tighten the fabric of resources to the benefit of our 

Service members and families. Through this same venue, we are exploring ways to 

maximize outreach to service members and their families in order to facilitate the 

connection, or bridge the gap, between warrior needs and resources. DCoE has also 

formed a collaborative partnership with the Department of Labor’s ‘‘America’s Heroes at Work’’ campaign to help our returning Service members with PH or TBI conditions succeed in the workplace. This initiative also underscores the importance of 

employment in the reintegration process, while also highlighting the vital role of collaboration across agencies and government/private/public sectors in addressing such 

issues of complexity. 

Question. Does the military health care system provide for coordinating efforts 

with the local level with education and training programs to local and rural providers? 

Answer. The Center for Deployment Psychology (CDP) provides training on evidenced-based treatment of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) to local providers 

through the TRICARE network. This training has been very well received and is 

continuing. 

CDP provided training to civilian mental health care providers. The training is 

also being offered to the National Guard Bureau’s Directors of Psychological Health 

in each State. 

CDP is also developing online versions of training materials to make them available to health care providers in all areas of the country. 

We are engaged in discussions with representatives of Area Health Education 

Centers to establish bridge training to health care providers the private sector, particularly in rural areas. 

The Defense Centers of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health (PH) and 

Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) is leading a collaborative, multi-agency effort to develop a toolkit that will support community partnership building at the local level. 

This toolkit will be geared primarily towards supporting the Guard and Reserve 

members who are often geographically isolated from military support facilities. 

In a separate effort, DoD is discussing military culture and deployment issues and 

providing DoD resource training to the Arkansas chapter of the National Association 

of Social Workers, many of whom provide direct clinical care to Reserve Component 

beneficiaries in local and rural communities. This effort may prove to be a viable 

model or template for equipping local and rural providers with an important cultural context and PH and TBI familiarization to empower local and rural clinicians 

and encourage their engagement as part of a community response and linkage with 

a national collaborative effort to address the clinical and support needs of our returning Service members. 

Question. What current non-governmental programs are currently being used by 

the Department? 

Answer. The American Red Cross developed a new course, ‘‘Coping with Deployments: Psychological First Aid for Military Families’’ that is now available. The 

course, offered free of charge, is open to military family members of Active Duty 

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Service members, Reserve and National Guard forces, as well as veterans and their 

families. Presently, the course is offered in sixteen states (AL, AR, CA, CO, FL, HI, 

IN, MN, NE, NH, OH, OR, PA, TN, TX and WV) and Washington, D.C. However, 

the Red Cross plans to make the course available across the country in the summer 

of 2009. The Red Cross developed the course to address the stress and strain of deployments on military family members to include spouses, children, parents, siblings 

and significant others of Service members and veterans. 

The DoD announced October 1, 2008, that families of deployed members of the 

National Guard and Reserve, Active Duty Service members on independent duty 

and their families, and Active Duty Service members and their families assigned to 

selected bases would be eligible for free family memberships at participating 

YMCAs in their local community. The new program was effective immediately. The 

free YMCA memberships for Guard and Reserve families are available if the Service 

member’s deployment exceeds six months. The deploying Service member also will 

be eligible for three months pre- and post-deployment membership to help promote 

family participation. Active Duty families assigned to independent duty stations, 

such as recruiting and Reserve Officer Training Corps assignments and not currently receiving support from the Service component also are eligible for free memberships at participating YMCAs. Additionally, 32 hours a month of free respite 

child care is available for families of deployed National Guard and Reserve and geographically dispersed Active Duty Service members in 10 states with YMCA child 

care programs that have been preapproved by DoD. Participating YMCAs have 

agreed to cap their monthly fees and waive all joining fees so there is no cost for 

Service members and their families for membership. 

Inova Health Systems of Northern Virginia and the DoD have launched a new 

partnership to train and support military spouses interested in careers in 

healthcare. The new program provides military spouses with streamlined access to 

training, career, and job opportunities in a wide range of healthcare related fields 

at Inova facilities. Inova worked closely with DoD to develop a formal plan to recruit, hire, and retain military spouses. Inova hopes to set an example for corporations and institutions all over the country to support military spouses in the work 

force. 

The National Military Family Association (NMFA), a non-profit informational and 

educational organization, has been responsible for producing two documents which 

have been important sources of data for DoD program planning on issues relevant 

to families. The report, ‘‘Serving the Home Front: An Analysis of Military Family 

Support from September 11, 2001 through March 31, 2004’’ (NMFA 2004), was 

based on data derived from an online survey of 2,500 respondents (military spouses), 

focus groups representing 14 Active and Reserve groups from all military Services, 

personal interviews, anecdotal information gleaned from periodicals, and information from congressional testimony and military briefings. The second report, ‘‘Cycles 

of Deployment: An analysis of survey responses from April through September 

2005’’ (NMFA, 2005), presents data from another online survey. This survey had 

1,592 respondents (military spouses) from both Active and Reserve components of 

the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, Coast Guard and Public Health Service, with 

half of the respondents having a Service member currently deployed. The goal of the 

NMFA is to promote the interests of military families by influencing the development and implementation of legislation and policies affecting them. 

Military OneSource introduced the video-sharing site ‘‘TroopTube,’’ designed to 

help military families connect and keep in touch while miles apart. It is the only 

video-sharing site for military families sponsored by the DoD. ‘‘TroopTube’’ extends 

the virtual military community by enabling Service members and their families to 

connect with each other and share videos wherever they may be. 

Because members of the military and their families are stationed worldwide and 

must often travel great distances for specialized medical care, Fisher HouseTM Foundation donates ‘‘comfort homes,’’ built on the grounds of major military and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers. These homes enable family members 

to be close to a loved one at the most stressful times—during the hospitalization 

for an unexpected illness, disease, or injury. There is at least one Fisher HouseTM

at every major military medical center to assist families in need and to ensure that 

they are provided with the comforts of home in a supportive environment. By law, 

there is no charge for any family to stay at a Fisher HouseTM operated by the VA. 

The Foundation uses donations to reimburse the individual Fisher Houses operated 

by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. No family pays to stay at any Fisher House. 

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LEGISLATIVE DIRECTION

Question. The Committee’s language that directed DoD to increase its reach and 

work with commercial entities to increase capacity of the mental health system as 

well as the breadth of programs available to individuals. It is unclear whether 

progress has been made, and whether Service members have access to increased 

services. 

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, how many certified mental health 

providers will the Department require in the next 24 months to handle the increasing prevalence of psychological health (PH) and traumatic brain injury (TBI)? 

Answer. A 20+ population- and risk- factor based mental health staffing model 

was developed by DoD in the summer of 2007. In the fall of 2007, a contract was 

awarded to the Center for Naval Analyses for an independent validation study of 

the model, which is now complete. The validated model was rolled out to the Services on April 1, 2009, to inform them regarding the optimal number and mix of mental health staff providers to the installation level in the United States and to the 

command level overseas. It includes several assumptions that can be adjusted by 

the Services to accommodate their unique needs and access to networks for additional purchased care, as required. Based upon the current distribution of care provided directly, and TRICARE purchased network services, a projection of requirements for each mental health specialty has been made for the Services from 2009 

through 2014, including mental health specialty providers embedded into operational units and integrated into primary care clinics. 

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Question. Where do you intend to find certified mental health care professionals? 

Answer. Increased accession and retention incentives are being made available to 

uniformed mental health care providers. Legislative authority to incentivize civilian 

mental health provider trainees to repay their obligation at Military Treatment Facilities as civilians could potentially increase the availability of providers, as long 

as incentives were not more than those for uniformed providers, which could create 

higher attrition rates. 

Services and local facilities engage local hires and contractors to identify available 

resources, as well as establish government service positions. 

Public Health Service mental health providers are already assisting DoD and up 

to 200 positions are approved and funded in a cooperative agreement. 

Question. How many has the Department and or the Services hired? 

Answer. From January 2007 through October 2008, 845 civilian mental health 

professionals were hired across the Services. For the same period TRICARE Regional Office–West added 8,095, TRICARE Regional Office–South added 213, and 

TRICARE Regional Office–North added 2148 mental health providers. 

Question. How else has the Department increased services to soldiers and their 

families? 

Answer. Increased civilian mental health providers: 

• Funded more civilian mental health providers at military medical treatment facilities (MTFs) 

• Created and deployed Military and Family Life Consultants 

• Developed an interim staffing model and hired 233 mental health providers 

against it 

• Signed agreement with Department of Health and Human Services to provide 

200 Public Health Officers for MTFs 

• Implemented retention incentives such as incentive pays, special pays, and bonuses 

• Established the Telehealth and Technology Center to increase access of services 

in remote areas 

• Initiated multiple telemedicine pilot programs to provide mental health services 

to Service members and their families, regardless of geographic location 

• Integrated behavioral health with primary care: 

—Army RESPECT-Mil 

—Air Force Behavioral Health Optimization Program 

—Navy Deployment Health Clinics 

—Increased on-line capabilities to access care or recognize when care is needed: 

—Military OneSource 

—Wounded Warrior Outreach Center 

—AfterDeployment.org 

—Established a 24/7 Outreach Center 

—Established a National Resource Directory 

• Improved access through TRICARE 

• Implemented TRICARE Mental Health Care Finder System 

• Established monitoring of TRICARE Regional Offices contractors’ performance 

• Released policy requiring 7-day mental health access standard; compliance with 

this new standard is over 95% 

• Developed the Family Caregiver Curriculum 

• Trained civilian mental health care providers in appropriate care of military 

personnel and their families 

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Question. The Committee put a lot of responsibility on the Department to properly 

execute the funding provided with tangible results. The Department has reported 

to the Committee on the spending plan and current obligation of funds. 

What reporting mechanisms have been put in place to ensure the Services are 

executing funding properly? 

Answer. The Services report to Chief Financial Officer monthly. Their reports include execution of psychological health and traumatic brain injury funds by strategic 

goal (access, transition, resilience, quality, and screening/surveillance). The Services 

also have reported quarterly on their execution of funding at the program and 

project level, and have recently been asked to input status of implementation and 

program execution through a web-based tool. 

Question. How often are the Services required to report to the Department? 

Answer. The Services are required to provide both financial and programmatic reports on a monthly basis. 

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Question. What difficulties have the Services or the Department generally experienced implementing the new programs and pilot projects as demonstrated by the 

reports? 

Answer. While implementation of programs can be accelerated, steps in the process can not be bypassed. In addition, certain processes just take time. We need to 

implement pilots, evaluate them for best practices, convert best practices to policies 

for implementation, ensure we have enough providers and tools to implement the 

policy, and train all the users in the new policy, after which we can evaluate the 

program to continue the cycle. Managing expectations becomes critical because a 

program may be successful under one set of conditions but not another. 

We also are experiencing a shortage of experienced trainers for the large number 

of new and expanded training and education programs. 

Communicating information about best practices, lessons learned, and promising 

programs across the Services and (sometimes) across facilities within a Service still 

needs improvement. 

OBLIGATION OF FUNDING TO THE SERVICES

Question. Of the funding provided for psychological health and TBI, about 45% 

went to the Army, 15% went to the Navy, 10% went to the Air Force, and 30% went 

to the TRICARE Management Agency for Joint Support. 

Does the Department believe the distribution of funds was done equitably or have 

other shortfalls been identified by the Services? 

Answer. We distributed the funds to augment already on-going initiatives to support psychological health and traumatic brain injury needs of our Service members 

and families. The augmented initiatives were to address gaps in capability and improve our ability to improve access to care and quality of care. Each Service proposed programs to address those gaps, so the distribution was based not on total 

capability but on the areas of focused enhancement. 

Question. What other programs or initiatives are the Services looking at to improve access to care for soldiers and their families. 

Answer. There are more than 325,000 providers in the TRICARE network with 

over 1 million non-network providers accepting TRICARE patients. The TRICARE 

Management Activity (TMA) conducts surveys to determine the numbers of health 

care providers accepting new patients under TRICARE. TMA’s FY 2005–2007 surveys covered network/non-network providers in various geographic areas nationally, 

including remote areas. Together, the three-year findings across all states and 

health care service areas reveal that approximately 87 percent of all physicians surveyed are aware of the TRICARE program and about 81 percent of physicians accepting new patients would also accept new TRICARE patients. We are in the process of re-surveying our beneficiaries and civilian providers. 

In areas where access to care is severely impaired because of low reimbursement 

rates, TMA can use its authority to increase TRICARE reimbursement rates by 

issuing locality waivers. Also, TMA can issue network-based waivers that increase 

network civilian provider reimbursements up to 15 percent above the maximum 

TRICARE reimbursement rate to ensure an adequate number and mix of civilian 

network providers. 

TRICARE Regional Offices (TROs) also monitor the number and mix of providers 

in their region. For example, TRO-West identified all geographical locations with a 

TRICARE Standard beneficiary population of 500 or more. There were 56 locations 

identified, and to ensure access to care was on par with TRICARE Prime, a beneficiary population sizing model was designed for each location. Using a Graduate 

Medical Education National Accrediting Committee-based model, it established provider requirements for 26 specialty categories and primary care. They then identified network and non-network providers to see TRICARE beneficiaries. Their experience was that providers are willing and ready to see TRICARE patients even in remote and rural areas. 

Question. Of the Army’s 45%, the bulk of it is for access to care for psychological 

health and traumatic brain injury. 

How is the Army obligating the funding provided? 

Answer. The Army has obligated the amounts for Access to Care in the commodities mentioned below: 

Commodity Obligations 

($000) 

Civilian Personnel ................................................................................................................................................. 5,790 

Contracts .............................................................................................................................................................. 15,156 

Equipment ............................................................................................................................................................ 38 

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Commodity Obligations 

($000) 

Other ..................................................................................................................................................................... 12 

Supplies ................................................................................................................................................................ 89 

Travel .................................................................................................................................................................... 233 

Total ............................................................................................................................................................. 21,318 

Question. How much has been obligated to date? 

Answer. During FY 2009 the Service Medical Departments have obligated the following amounts through February 2009: 

Service Obligations 

($000) 

Army Medical Department .................................................................................................................................... 34,210 

Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery ................................................................................................................ 12,101 

Air Force Medical Service ..................................................................................................................................... 95 

Question. Are mental health professionals being hired in a timely fashion? 

Answer. The direct-hire authorities for the mental health specialties have been assigned to the medical facility-level and local hiring officials are using these to hire 

government mental health professionals. The Services are establishing innovative 

hiring programs, such as centralized recruitment and referral centers for mental 

health professionals to maximize the use of the direct-hire authorities. 

Question. Are there any contracting issues with current hiring policies? 

Answer. Our primary issue continues to be a shortage of qualified Mental Health 

providers in the locations where they are most needed. We are attempting to accomplish this with a combination of government civilian hires, expanded purchased-care 

network providers, and local contracting for behavioral health providers to fill critical needs. Our contracting offices have worked hard to satisfy our requirements but 

they received no additional staff for the expanded workload, so they are often understaffed and oversubscribed. 

Question. Of the Navy’s 15%, most of it is for access to care. 

How is the Navy obligating the funding provided? 

Answer. During FY 2009 for the Access to Care Initiative, the Navy Bureau of 

Medicine and Surgery has obligated a total of $8.192 million through the month of 

February 2009 for the commodities listed below: 

Commodity Obligations 

($000) 

Contracts .............................................................................................................................................................. 8,050 

Equipment ............................................................................................................................................................ 7 

Travel .................................................................................................................................................................... 135 

Total ............................................................................................................................................................. 8,192 

Question. Are mental health professionals being hired in a timely fashion? 

Answer. The direct-hire authorities for the mental health specialties have been assigned to the medical facility-level and local hiring officials are using these to hire 

government mental health professionals. The Services are establishing innovative 

hiring programs, such as centralized recruitment and referral centers for mental 

health professionals to maximize the use of the direct-hire authorities. 

Question. Of the Air Force’s 10%, has the funding been used for existing programs 

or new initiatives? 

Answer. The Air Force Medical Service’s FY 2009 funding has been used to expand existing psychological health and traumatic brain injury programs to support 

new requirements. 

Question. Of the TRICARE Management Agency’s (TMA) 30%, most of the amount 

is for the Center of Excellence and for surveillance. 

Has there been obligation of these funds for the intended programs? 

Answer. Through the Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) and its associated centers, funding is programmed for multiple research and surveillance initiatives. Examples of such initiatives include clinical trials, longitudinal and epidemiological 

studies, the Suicide Risk Management and Surveillance Office, neuro-imaging programs, and child and family studies. 

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Question. What new initiatives has TMA been looking at for enhancing care and 

treatment? 

Answer. Examples of new initiatives include evaluating the efficacy of a virtual 

reality exposure treatment for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, assessing a variety 

of alternatives for web-based interventions, determining the standard of care to assure the effective use of telepsychiatry services, investigating mind-body techniques 

for provider resilience, developing and implementing an automated behavioral 

healthcare record, and designing and executing Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy clinical 

trials. 

OBLIGATION OF FUNDING

Question. The funds provided have been distributed to the services and TRICARE 

Management Agency. 

Please briefly explain what the Department has provided the Service members 

and their families with the funds provided. 

Answer. DoD funded a broad spectrum of mental health and traumatic brain injury projects designed to support Service members and their families across the continuum of care in both non-clinical and clinical settings. These programs range in 

focus from preventive resilience building to post deployment transitioning programs. 

Examples of accomplishments include: 

Area Major accomplishments 

Quality of Care ................................ Army—First Summit on Military Child and Adolescent Behavioral Health and WellBeing During Wartime and Beyond was held June 2008 at McChord Air Force Base. 

Attended by over 150 military and community youth serving professionals. 

Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE)—Assisted in the development of educational 

tools designed to help families, especially children, cope with having parents or 

loved ones on deployment, including the Sesame Workshop ‘‘Talk, Listen, Connect: 

Deployments, Homecomings, Changes’’ program. DCoE worked with the nonprofit 

educational organization behind ‘‘Sesame Street’’ to produce over 700,000 DVD kits 

and to date, DoD has distributed over 350,000 kits. 

Resilience ........................................ Navy—Held Returning Warrior Workshop training for over 1,000 Reservists and family 

members—100% of attendees recommended that others attend. 

Navy—Over 25,000 families, providers, and community members have received 

proactive outreach, education, and training. 

Army—Funded three psychological health (PH) school based programs that take a 

preventative approach by providing PH support to and for school-aged children in 

the school setting. 

Army—Established the Child and Adolescent Center of Excellence to focus on the impacts of being a child with a parent deploying, wounded or killed, supporting interventions, programs, and policy assisting families dealing with these unique 

stressors. 

Transition of Care ........................... Navy—Continuing to support and expand Wounded Warriors Program, a program for 

Soldiers who are disabled, as found by the Army disability system, to ensure their 

families receive all the benefits and support they are entitled—741 Service members have received outreach with 178 having been referred to appropriate levels of 

care. 

Air Force—Continuing to support and expand the Air Force Wounded Warrior (AFW2) 

Program which takes a comprehensive approach to helping wounded Airmen. Family liaison officers are assigned to hospitalized wounded members and provide a 

wide range of assistance to family members. 

Screening and Surveillance ............ Air Force—Screening and Surveillance Conducted Community Assessment and Survey 

which provided anonymous data on post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), alcohol/ 

drug use and family maltreatment. 

Question. What funds if any have yet to be obligated? 

Answer. Obligation status as of the end of January 2009 is shown in the following 

tables. 

$ millions 

FY 2007/2008 

Appropriated 

O&M 

Appropriated 

RDT&E 

Reprogrammed 

RDT&E 

Reprogrammed 

Procurement 1 Total 

Appropriated Amounts ....................... $600.0 $300.0 ........................ ........................ $900.0 

Less: O&M Extended to FY08/09 ...... $(75.0) ........................ ........................ ........................ $(75.0) 

Less: O&M Reprogrammed to RDT&E 

and Procurement .......................... $(70.5) ........................ $58.8 $11.7 $— 

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$ millions 

FY 2007/2008 

Appropriated 

O&M 

Appropriated 

RDT&E 

Reprogrammed 

RDT&E 

Reprogrammed 

Procurement 1 Total 

Less: Statutory withhold for Small 

Business Innovation Research 

(Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 

638) .............................................. ........................ $(7.5) ........................ ........................ $(7.5) 

Net Funding .............................. $454.5 $292.5 $58.8 $11.7 $817.5 

Amount Obligated Through 

January 31, 2009 ................. $416.0 $292.5 $51.8 $6.0 $766.3 

Percentage of Net Funding Obligated .................................. 92% 100% 88% 51% 94% 

1 Procurement funds are FY 2007/2009 and will continue to obligate through FY 2009. 

FY 2009 O&M 

funding 

Appropriated 

RDT&E funding 2 Total 

FY 2008 Supplemental Appropriation— 

RDT&E (portion of $273.8 appropriated for Battle Casualty/Psych 

Health Research)3.

$107.3 $107.3 

FY 2009 Supplemental Bridge Funding—O&M.$300.0 $300.0 

FY 2009 Appropriation ............................ $210.0 $90.0 $300.0 

FY 2007/2008 Funding Extended to FY 

2008/2009 (from above).

$75.0 $75.0 

Less: Army Suicide Study with National 

Institutes of Health.

$(10.0) $(10.0) 

Total Funding ................................. 585.0 $197.3 $772.3 

Amount Obligated Through December 31, 2008.$67.8 $— $67.8 

Percentage of Net Funding Obligated.12% 0% 9% 

2 RDT&E projects are peer-reviewed before award of funds. RDT&E does not reflect withhold 2.5% for Small Business Innovation Research (Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 638) pending final calculations. 3 FY 2008 Supplemental Appropriation—RDT&E is FY 2008/2009 funding. 

Question. A large part of the funding provided was to hire additional staff. Where 

are you in executing a hiring plan? 

Answer. The Services have established internal staffing requirements and received funding to support these Service-specific conditions. Psychological health 

(PH) and traumatic brain injury (TBI) FY 2009 staffing update as of March 3, 2009: 

Service PH funded PH hired TBI funded TBI hired 

Air Force ......................................................................................................... 97 91 NA NA 

Army ............................................................................................................... 890 444.3 * 250 149 

Navy ................................................................................................................ 297 162 115 25 

TMA ................................................................................................................. 200 ** 41 ................ ................

Total ...................................................................................................... 1484 732.3 365 174 

* Some of Army’s TBI dollars have been used to pay for existing staff retasked to provide TBI care. 

** Awaiting breakdown of how many are serving in TBI position versus PH positions. 

*** Navy numbers reflect: ‘‘Funded’’ = those positions being supported and contracted in FY 2009 (including the FY 2009 continuation of 

FY 2008 positions), ‘‘Hired’’ = those positions previously contracted and filled in FY 2008. 

Question. What shortfalls or gaps exist in your staffing? 

Answer. The Services have noted the following gaps: 

1. Short supply of child and adolescent mental health providers 

2. Small number of available, qualified providers 

3. Disparity of provider specialties depending on regional locations 

Question. What still needs to be accomplished? 

Answer. We need validation of a population-based, risk-adjusted 

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tion and acceptance of the model, funding requirements will be reviewed to implement efforts to meet the population-based, risk-adjusted needs. 

SPEND PLAN

Question. Can you update this Committee on your spend plan? 

Answer. A Spend Plan summary is attached. Most of the funding is pushed to the 

4th quarter when contracts will come due. 

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Question. Does the Department and the Service have the internal capacity to obligate the funding provided? Please explain. 

Answer. DoD has the internal capacity to obligate the funding. The funds have 

been distributed to the Services and TRICARE Management Activity for execution. 

Question. What issues exist that are hindering the Department in executing these 

funds? 

Answer. The health care support requirements for the psychological health and 

traumatic brain injury programs are labor intensive and highly reliant upon the 

availability of civilian and contract providers to accomplish the required functions. 

Given the limited number of specialists available psychological health or traumatic 

brain injury training and the competition by the private sector organizations who 

concurrently seek to hire from the limited labor pool, the Department’s ability to 

execute all the appropriated funds for psychological health and traumatic brain injury requirements may be hindered. 

Question. What is still needed, whether funding or personnel to continue this endeavor? 

Answer. We are still looking at opportunities for technological infrastructure, 

equipment for virtual therapy, research studies and outcomes evaluations, personnel 

to provide empirically supported treatments, and more mental health providers to 

be embedded in line units. 

Question. What shortfalls exist? 

Answer. We are still working to improve connectivity and collaboration between 

clinical and pre-clinical care (Military OneSource, chaplains, etc.); enhance access to 

care in deployed situations, especially for those in small units or at outposts; promote evidence-based programs and treatment; and expand access to substance 

abuse/dependence treatment, particularly for adolescents. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha. Articles referred to by Mr. Murtha follow:] 

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THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 2009. 

GLOBAL MOBILITY 

WITNESSES 

GENERAL DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES 

TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

GENERAL ARTHUR J. LICHTE, COMMANDER, AIR MOBILITY COMMAND 

MAJOR GENERAL RANDAL D. FULLHART, DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL 

REACH PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION 

MR. MURTHA’S OPENING STATEMENT

Mr. MURTHA. I will ask Mr. Young for a motion. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the 

hearing today which involve classified material be held in executive 

session because of the classification of the material to be discussed. 

Mr. MURTHA. Without objection. 

We are having, in my estimation, one of the most important 

hearings that we will have this year. I have said over and over 

again, we want to try to fit in some of these other programs so that 

we can take care of mobility—tankers, mainly—down the road. And 

so you two, with your experience, we appreciate your being here. 

We appreciate what you are going to say, but when we see the 

CSAR program, the KC–X, all these programs being protested, I 

worry. The President says you are going to reform the system. 

Well, it takes forever to reform the system. So we have to get something done. If we are going to get tankers out there, ready to go, 

replaced, we have got get to get it done early; and of course, these 

other programs which you have control over also. 

As you know, we put the C–130s and C–17s in, which helped alleviate some of the problems. We are going to try to do the same 

thing. 

We get all kinds of guidance from the White House. We are the 

ones that finally make the decision. It is not that we are fighting 

with the White House. We just don’t agree with them on some 

issues. We know more than they do about what needs to be done. 

So you folks have the recommendations. We know you have to 

agree with the Secretary of Defense. I don’t always agree with the 

Secretary of Defense. And we sometimes, this committee—this subcommittee changes, and we put in what we thinks need to be done. 

I will give you an example. We put in limiting language for the 

Marine One long before Senator McCain or anybody else recognized 

it. We said, we are not going to build this thing. As a matter of 

fact, I had 14 people in here, and I told the White House, You have 

got to quit increasing these requirements because it is your fault 

that these costs have gone up. And we want to protect the Presimstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

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dent, but we are not going to spend that kind of money on one helicopter. 

So they said, Well, we will put this off until the Obama administration comes in. They did. And now we are trying to convince the 

Obama—they need a helicopter, no question about that, but they 

don’t need the requirements for the one that is so expensive. And 

we are willing to fund the other one—at least I am going to recommend to the subcommittee that they fund the other one. 

We look forward to your testimony, and we know that we will get 

some good questions from the members about what needs to be 

done. 

Mr. Young. 

MR. YOUNG’S OPENING STATEMENT

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I want to 

add my welcome to our very distinguished guests today. And as we 

have discussed—and General McNabb and I had a very long session, one-on-one, not too long ago and we discussed the fact that 

you can’t engage the enemy if you can’t take your troops and your 

equipment where the enemy is. 

So the importance of our airlift, the importance of being able to 

move personnel and material is just—you just can’t do it without 

it. And that is why this is so important and this hearing is so important, because we do have some issues that need to be resolved. 

And I think most everybody on the committee would agree, we are 

here to help you resolve the issues. 

Thank you for being here today. 

Mr. MURTHA. We have 8,000 miles we have to travel to resupply 

the people in Afghanistan, the most difficult terrain in the world. 

You folks are as important as anybody. I used to think, when I was 

in the infantry on the ground, these other guys were just nothing. 

Well, I found out when you didn’t have the food, you didn’t have 

the resources you needed, you damn well needed everybody else. 

So I appreciate your coming. And who is first here on this, General McNabb? 

General McNabb, we will hear from you first. Summarize the 

statement. We will put the rest in the record. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL MCNABB

General MCNABB. Chairman Murtha, Congressman Young, distinguished members of the committee, it is indeed my privilege to 

be with you today, representing USTRANSCOM and the 136,000 of 

some of the world’s finest logisticians. This total force team of active duty, Guard, Reserve, civilian contractors and commercial 

partners enables the combatant commanders to succeed anywhere 

in the world by providing them unmatched strategic lift and endto-end global distribution. 

And this committee is well aware that it is our great people that 

get it done. It is our total force air crews, flying combat approaches 

on night vision goggles or air-dropping supplies to our troops in Afghanistan. It is our air-refueling crews who deliver 5 million 

pounds of fuel every day at night in the weather, extending the 

reach of our joint and coalition partners. 

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With the maintenance teams and aerial porters behind them, 

these crews execute over 900 sorties a day, sometimes in the most 

austere conditions, like Antarctica, and sometimes into the most 

dangerous, like in a forward operating base under fire in Afghanistan. 

It is our merchant mariners and military and civilian port operators, loading, offloading and sailing over 35 ships every day to support the warfighter. It is our terminal operators pushing thousands 

of containers, domestic freight and railcar shipments, pushing 

warfighters—their vital supplies, and making sure that they have 

what they need to fight. 

It is our contingency response groups, port opening experts arriving first, to open up the flow in a disaster relief operation. And it 

is our commercial airlift and sealift partners, standing beside us, 

opening up new routes through, the north going into Afghanistan, 

or supporting the Nation in times of surge. 

And it is our medical crews and critical care teams, tending to 

our wounded warriors, rapidly delivering them from the battlefield 

to the finest world-class care on the planet, saving lives and families at the same time. And it is our crews bringing back fallen comrades, transporting heroes dressed in our Nation’s colors, Americans returning with dignity to our country which owes them so 

much. 

It is this logistics team, working from home and abroad, that 

gives our Nation unrivaled global reach, committed to serving our 

Nation’s warfighters by delivering the right stuff to the right place 

at the right time. Whether sustaining the fight, providing disaster 

relief to friends in need or moving six brigades simultaneously, we 

are there. 

Chairman Murtha, your support and the support of this committee has been instrumental in providing the resources our team 

needs to win and support the combatant commanders, and I thank 

you. You have given us the Large, Medium-Speed Roll On-Roll Off 

ships and supported upgrades to the Ready Reserve Fleet, all of 

which have been key to our success over the last seven years; and 

the new joint High-Speed Vessels will give us even greater flexibility. 

The C–130J and C–17 have come of age since 9/11 and have allowed us to change how we support the combatant commanders 

from the air. The current C–5, C–130 and KC–10 modernization 

programs will also make an enormous difference in our capability 

to support the warfighter. 

My top priority remains the recapitalization of our aging tanker 

fleet. The KC–X will be a game changer. Its value as a tanker will 

be tremendous. Its value as a multirole platform to the mobility enterprise will be incomparable. It will do for the whole mobility 

world what the C–17 did for theater and strategic airlift. It will be 

an ultimate mobility force multiplier. 

Chairman Murtha and Congressman Young, I am grateful to you 

and the committee for inviting me to appear before you today. I respectfully request my written testimony be submitted for the 

record, and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. MURTHA. Without objection. 

[The statement of General McNabb follows:] 

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Mr. MURTHA. General Lichte. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL LICHTE

General LICHTE. Mr. Chairman and committee members, thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

As the commander of Air Mobility Command, I am extremely 

proud of the total force team of over 132,000 active duty, civilian, 

and Air National Guard and Air Reserve mobility Airmen. We 

stand ready as proud members of the United States Transportation 

Command joint team, and we are privileged to provide global reach 

to our Nation’s warfighters through airlift, air refueling and global 

patient movement. 

I am extremely pleased by what the command has accomplished 

as we continue our focus on winning today’s fight as part of the 

joint and coalition force, developing and caring for our Airmen and 

families, enhancing the nuclear mission, optimizing mobility partnerships and preparing the mobility forces for the future. 

And, although the process of recapitalizing our tanker fleet could 

take more than three decades and will require a long-term commitment, it is time that we take that first step towards retiring our 

geriatric, Eisenhower-era KC–135s, a first step that will posture future generations of mobility Airmen to continue their great support 

of the joint warfighter and United States Transportation Command’s global mission. 

Considering the critical role that the tanker plays in today’s joint 

and coalition environment, it is no surprise that modernizing and 

recapitalizing today’s tanker fleet is the Air Force’s number one acquisition priority. Without a modern tanker capable of flexible and 

versatile operations and response in this new century, our Nation’s 

ability to respond to the traditional spectrum of conflict is in jeopardy, as is our Nation’s ability to respond to future challenges. 

Procurement of a new tanker is a matter of national security, 

and that is why it is the Air Force’s number one acquisition priority. Tankers underpin the entire joint mobility team’s ability to 

project combat power or humanitarian relief operations around the 

world. And while a decision on source selection and acquisition 

strategy remains with OSD, my goal remains to ensure that we 

procure a system that best meets the warfighter’s requirement now 

and well into the future. To meet that end, Air Mobility Command 

is working closely with OSD in their management of this program. 

Air Mobility Command brings a unique tool to our Nation. 

Through mobility forces our Nation can extend a clenched fist to 

our adversaries or an open hand to those in need. Air Mobility 

Command stands ready to assist at home or abroad to save lives 

and alleviate human suffering in the aftermath of any natural disaster or other crisis. 

Although we still await the outcome of the mobility capabilities 

and requirements study, we are making progress with regards to 

recapitalization efforts. We are modernizing our C–5s with the avionics upgrades that will allow us to continue to operate in international airspace and foreign airfields. Additionally, the C–5 reliability enhancement and reengining program is making great 

strides. We recently delivered the first C–5M to Dover Air Force 

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Base and we look forward to modernizing a total of 52 C–5s to enhance the capabilities of our Nation’s largest airlifter. 

However, we are focused more on just modernization and recapitalization. We continue to take care of airmen, not just airmen, but 

soldiers, sailors, marines, as well. Through airlift and precision airdrop, we continue to pull the supply chain vertically up out of the 

threat, reducing the need to place soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines in harm’s way on the roads of Iraq and Afghanistan. 

For those who must be on the front lines to perform their duties, 

Air Mobility Command has airlifted almost 4,000 Mine Resistant 

and Ambush Protected vehicles, MRAPs, to Iraq on C–5s and C– 

17s and contract carriers as part of the United States Transportation Command’s joint effort to rapidly deliver these high-priority 

systems by both sea and air. 

Air Mobility Command clearly offers an edge in irregular warfare 

operations. When properly integrated with other military and civil 

efforts, the mobility advantage enables the infiltration, resupply 

and exfiltration of relatively small ground units. By providing humanitarian assistance, medical support and transportation for government officials to remote areas, Air Mobility can promote the 

government’s credibility and improve the quality of life for its population. These types of operations which directly affect and are immediately visible to the population in question can have significant 

effects in the overall campaign against insurgents. 

The continued wear and tear on our airframes remains a major 

concern. As our mobility Air Force’s C–130 fleet shrinks, the remaining fleet ages quicker, resulting in aircraft being operationally 

restricted sooner. This, in turn, increases the number of inspections 

required, which affects our aircraft availability. And while our C– 

130 center wing box replacement program is making great 

progress, we are beginning to see wear-and-tear issues on other 

airframes as well. 

The C–5 fleet has cracks appearing on the top of the aircraft and 

in the structures near the forward cargo door hinges. We are pressing ahead with fixes for these issues, but others undoubtedly will 

appear in the future as the fleet remains heavily tasked to meet 

mission requirements. 

We also face looming deadlines to complete avionics upgrades to 

meet global air traffic requirements and continue to access congested airspace worldwide. Thus far, we have been able to modify 

a considerable portion of our fleets, but we have a lot to do before 

restrictions begin to impact operations in the year 2015. 

In conclusion, I am proud to be both a mobility airman and a 

member of the United States Transportation Command’s joint 

team. From direct support of the warfighter on the battlefield to 

humanitarian relief in response to natural disasters, our air mobility fleet is and will continue to be a critical component of America’s 

strategy—strategic capability. 

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I am proud to wear the Air Mobility Command patch, and I am 

humbled to represent the 132,000 Mobility Command Airmen as 

we support the United States Transportation Command in demonstrating our national resolve, delivering combat power and saving lives. 

Thank you very much for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement of General Lichte follows:] 

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Mr. MURTHA. General Fullhart. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL FULLHART

General FULLHART. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young and 

members of the committee, I am honored to be here this morning 

to update you on the status of Air Force Mobility programs. I will 

keep my remarks brief in order to provide additional time to focus 

on issues of interest to the committee. 

It is a privilege for me to be here with General Lichte from Air 

Mobility Command and General McNabb from United States 

Transportation Command. They are Air Force acquisition’s primary 

customers for mobility aircraft. They determine the requirements 

and capabilities that are needed by the warfighter; and it is my responsibility to work with those who acquire aircraft platforms that 

meet those needs. 

As the Director of Global Reach Programs, I oversee the acquisition of nearly 30 airlift, refueling, training and Special Operations 

Forces programs. I am proud of the approximately 50 acquisition 

professionals who serve in the Directorate of Global Reach. On a 

daily basis these individuals work with industry, the Department 

of Defense, other services and Congress to provide the warfighter 

with the capabilities they need to accomplish their missions. Our 

job is to properly execute the acquisition process so we can effectively equip the warfighter. 

We are successfully moving forward with the acquisition and 

modification of our mobility aircraft. We are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to release a draft request for proposal for the KC–X air refueling tanker. We are competing the 

combat search and rescue aircraft source selection and anticipate 

awarding a contract this year. 

We appreciate greatly the support that this committee has provided to the C–17 and C–130J programs. Procurement of these aircraft is on cost and on schedule. 

Finally, the modernization programs for C–5 and legacy C–130 

fleets are under way and performing well. 

The timely acquisition of critically needed platforms will be an 

ongoing priority for our Air Force. The warfighter depends on the 

Air Force’s acquisition workforce to procure these aircraft platforms 

so they can execute the mission that they have been given. We will 

also continue to focus our efforts on modernizing and recapitalizing 

our aging weapons systems. 

We appreciate Congress’s ongoing support for Air Force mobility 

programs. 

Sir, I respectfully request my written statement be included in 

the record. Thank you again for the opportunity to be here. And I 

look forward to answering your questions. 

[The statement of General Fullhart follows:] 

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Mr. MURTHA. Without objection, all three statements will be put 

in the record. 

Because of the interest of our vice chairman in this particular 

subject, we are going to allow him to go first with his 5 minutes. 

TANKER

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to welcome all 

witnesses, particularly General McNabb, whom I have worked with 

for many years. 

You know, last year we went through this tanker issue, and the 

Air Force made a decision, which I strongly disagreed with. General Handy, who doesn’t work for Northrop Grumman or for Boeing, writes a very good op-ed about, you know, somebody who was 

both head of Air Mobility Command and TRANSCOM—like the 

last person to have both hats—why a smaller tanker is better and 

especially a tanker that would replace the KC–135. 

And what the Air Force had testified to up until the very—like 

weeks before we had this decision, is, they wanted a medium-sized 

airplane. 

And, you know, the question I have here is—one thing that was 

not taken into account that I found out was not taken into account 

was life cycle costs. And the evaluation they did was very cursory, 

and was only 25 years. The JROC had said that the life cycle of 

these planes is 40 years. 

So the big issue to me is, if that had been properly evaluated and 

you look at the difference in the fuel consumption rate of an A– 

330—these are commercial airplanes; we know how much fuel they 

burn. And the numbers that I come up with—and let’s say, at $100 

a barrel, comparing the 767 and the A–330, 750 planes for 40 years 

at 750 hours per year, the difference in fuel cost between the two 

planes is $25 billion. 

If it was 150—and we were almost at 150 last year; now it has come back rather dramatically—the difference would be $35 billion. 

And that is enough to buy the 179 airplanes. 

So if I can get one point across to my colleagues, bigger isn’t better. And that is why, General Lichte, I was so disappointed in what 

you said. Now you have clarified it to me today. You seem like a 

gentleman and a professional, so I am going to give you the benefit 

of the doubt that maybe you had a bad day. 

But the reason I bring this up—— 

Mr. MORAN. It is like this for all of us. 

Mr. DICKS. I know you weren’t part of the selection process. I 

called Sue Payton immediately after I heard what you said, because in the selection process there were certain requirements, and 

if you met the requirements, you didn’t get any extra points for 

doing extra, because they were concerned about getting too big an 

airplane. In fact, the testimony all the way up to the last days was 

that we wanted a medium-sized plane, which the 767 is. 

The A–330 is a much bigger plane. It is even larger than the 

KC–10s, much larger, and yet has less fuel capability than the KC– 

10. 

Now, on fuel offload, one other point I want to make, the average 

fuel offload of these planes, these tankers, is 62,000 pounds per 

sortie. Now the Boeing plane—the KC–135E offloads—has the camstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

561 

pability of carrying 200,000 pounds of fuel; the 767, 205; the A– 

330, 245,000. So they are well in excess of the average requirement, which is 62,000 pounds. It may be 62,000 to 69,000, somewhere in that range. 

So, again, you see that having a bigger airplane is going to wind 

up costing you more money not only in fuel, but you have hangars, 

that more hangars have to be replaced with the A–330 than the 

767. They can’t land at as many runways around the world. 

This is like the difference between a C–5 and a C–17. One of the 

reasons why the C–17, a smaller airplane, but a very capable airplane, was the Air Force choice over C–5 was because you had 

more flexibility. In Europe, for example, I think you can have two 

C–5s on one of these fields and it stops everything. And you can 

have seven to nine C–17s. 

This is the same issue here. You have more airfields that you can 

use with the 767 versus the A–330. 

So, again, you are the leaders of the Air Force. All I am saying 

to you—and I am also very concerned on the acquisition side of this 

thing, again, that the companies are not even allowed to talk to the 

Air Force. 

When is that gag rule going to be lifted? I think that is wrong. 

I think the companies need to be engaging the Air Force on the 

next RFP. When are we going to lift this we-can’t-talk-to-anybody 

rule? 

General LICHTE. Sir, that ruling, if you will, came out of OSD, 

anticipating that as we await the arrival of the new Under Secretary for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, that we will be 

starting that engagement process soon thereafter. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

I want you to address fuel consumption. I want you to address 

some of the things that would have to be—you would have to have 

more hangars, you would have to strengthen the runways with a 

bigger airplane. Those costs weren’t even taken into account. Those 

costs were not even taken—I mean, it was some general number, 

but not a real hard evaluation for the National Guard. 

The other thing, one other thing that is just as important to our 

committee, we are going to have the Osprey, 439 Ospreys. The A– 

330 cannot refuel the Osprey; the 767 can. That is a big, additional 

benefit of having this smaller airplane, because the other plane 

can’t slow down to a speed where it can offload the fuel to the Osprey. 

I would like to hear you explain why you thought on the day of 

this announcement that more was better when the requirements 

said, if you meet the requirements, you shouldn’t get extra credit 

for more, and it isn’t necessary; and it has got this fuel—and it has 

got this weight problem that causes all this extra fuel consumption. 

Would you like to address that, General? 

General LICHTE. I would be happy to, Mr. Dicks. Thank you for 

raising some of those issues, and perhaps I can clarify. 

First of all, on February 29 last year, when I was at the announcement, I, as the operator of Air Mobility Command, the commander of Air Mobility Command, established the requirements 

that were necessary to meet the new tanker requirements. And 

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then the acquisition world takes over and comes up with the solution. 

The day that I was standing there on February 29 was really the 

first time that I found out which tanker won the source selection; 

and so, when I made the comment about more, I was talking in 

comparison to the KC–135. Either tanker really provided more 

than the KC–135—more fuel offload, more passengers carried, 

more cargo carried—and that was my reference to when I made the 

comment that afternoon. Because, quite frankly, I was very excited 

with the fact that we had finally gotten a new tanker. We have 

been asking for a new tanker for a long time. 

These tankers were built in the Eisenhower era. As a matter of 

fact, these tankers were designed and built before our current 

President was even born. We need to get on with the replacement 

for the tankers. And as the person who established the requirements, either tanker met that requirement. 

And so what I was trying to say is, I was very pleased that we 

were taking the next step to start this process, because even if everything had gone well—and as you know, we had the protest—it 

is going to take some 30 years and a long-term commitment to replace the tankers. And so when I made those comments, it was 

really in regard to that. 

When you talk about offload requirement, yes, the average could 

be 62,000. I won’t debate that. But there are B–52s, there are C– 

5s and everything that will take 125,000-, 150,000-pound offload 

which we are required to give them. And so, on the average, it may 

be. All those other parameters that were decided and reviewed by 

the acquisition world, that is how they came out with which tanker 

was the winner. And so I was expressing my gratitude and happiness with the fact that we were finally taking a bite out of the elephant, finally trying to get forward progress on an issue that we 

need to tackle. 

And I am glad to see that at this committee you continue to tackle that. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. We are 

going to work this thing out, that is for sure. We know you need 

tankers. We know it is the number one priority of the Air Force, 

as far as I am sure it should be in the Department. When we are 

going 8,000 miles to a battle area, we need to work that problem 

out. 

Mr. Young. 

C–17 GLOBEMASTER

Mr. YOUNG. Yeah, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. 

And we have covered the tanker issue quite well, but I want to 

tell you that having MacDill Air Force Base right on the edge of 

my district—and, of course, I claim MacDill anyway and we have 

invested a lot of time and a lot of taxpayers’ money in making 

MacDill the base that it should be. 

But we have tankers there, and these tankers are KC–135s. 

They are not even the oldest version of the KC–135s, but they are 

old. And I want to tell you, your crews are amazing. As I talk to 

these young men and women that are flying these aircraft on missions, they tell me, Hey, this is old; I can’t believe that we are flymstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

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ing airplanes this old, but we will fly them until there are no wings 

left on them. I mean, these guys are determined. 

But the wings are only going to last so long and the aircraft is 

only going to last so long, and they are getting very expensive to 

maintain. So we need to get a decision, and we needed to get a contract, and we need to get the tankers in the air. 

And having said that, let me go to the issue of the C–17. C–17 

is pretty much a program that this committee basically kept going 

when there was serious question about whether we should even 

build a C–17. But once we had the C–17, there has never been a 

question about its capability or its reliability or what it can do for 

us that a C–5 can’t do. And a C–5, of course, has been just a tremendous airplane. 

But now we are in a dilemma; we don’t have a budget request, 

and I don’t think we are going to get one—I don’t know—for any 

new C–17s. We also don’t have any indication that there is going 

to be a budget request to close down the line. 

Where do we go on C–17? The committee is going to need a little 

bit of direction on what the Air Force really thinks we should do 

on the C–17. Give us a good answer, we will find a way to make 

it happen. But I think we should think really long and hard before 

we do away with C–17. 

General MCNABB. Well, Congressman Young, thanks. Again, 

your support has been superb. And the C–17, if you look at where 

we sit, both as we were asked to get convoys off the road in Iraq 

and going into Afghanistan, the C–17 has proven its worth. Everything that we had hoped it would do, it has done. 

I am checked out on the C–17, and I go down and fly with those 

young folks at Altus. And those young captains put their arm 

around me and say, ‘‘Come on over here, son; let me show you how 

we fly this airplane.’’ And it is really tremendous what we have 

done, and it has taken it to a whole different level, and it has been 

great. So the support of the committee has been superb, and we 

really do appreciate it. 

I would say that I know, as you all know, as the new administration has taken over, they are reviewing all of these programs—the 

Secretary of Defense is personally in the middle of that—to take a 

look at all of these things to see how it will fit with all the requirements to include when the President outlines his strategy for Iraq 

and Afghanistan. So those are under review right now, and I know 

that there are a lot of decisions and discussions that are going on 

right now. 

I was in the middle of the Nunn-McCurdy discussion last year 

when we said, how much does the C–5 reengining cost, and coming 

back saying, here is what we think as a department. And I would 

say that the current program of record of 205 C–17s, 52 modernized, reengined C–5s and 59 C–5As, which will have an avionics 

modernization program, ends up giving you a fleet of about 316. 

That meets the requirement, as TRANSCOM Commander; and the 

205 C–17s gives me the flexibility that I need to make sure that 

I can deal with places like Afghanistan and others. Again, that was 

brought together by everybody taking a very good look at all of the 

options to include additional C–17s and reengining more C–5s. 

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564 

And we have a new study that is going to be due out in December that is going to take into account the increased ground strength 

of the Marines and the Army—look at how we are employing the 

assets, look at the Future Combat System, the fact that it has got 

to be carried by the C–17 vice the 130. If there are any changes, 

we have flexibility. 

Mr. MURTHA. That doesn’t help us because the budget—the 

money that we are going to—in the supplemental and in the full 

bill, this study is not going to help us a bit. We need to know. 

What are we going to do, shut down the line and then reopen it? 

You know the expense of that. 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. We need to know if you need additional C–17s. 

General MCNABB. Yes, Chairman. And what I would say is that, 

right now, the budget is going to come to you in a couple of 

weeks—3 weeks, I think—that is, the final decisions along with the 

administration; and I think probably in discussions with you all, 

will try to get their final hands around that. 

So those are the things that are playing with it right now. I am 

comfortable that the Nunn-McCurdy, as we came in with, this is 

the overall solution on the airlift side, on that portion of it. I would 

say, the tanker is, no question, my number one priority; and as I 

look at that, that also helps us deal with the overall mobility situation. 

So that is kind of where I sit right now. 

C–5 RE-ENGINING

Mr. YOUNG. General, you mentioned that you reengined C–5s, 

the C–5M. And I understand you have—some of those are deployed 

to Dover Air Force Base. 

General MCNABB. Yes. The first two, Congressman Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. What kind of a success story do we have with the 

C–5M? Is it a good story? 

General MCNABB. Yes. I think right now it is meeting the test. 

I will let General Lichte, who actually flew the airplane into 

Dover—the first airplane went into Dover. But—they will test and 

evaluate, but right now the test and evaluation has gone very well, 

or I would say, the parameters of meeting the requirements that 

they have outlined. 

We will do further tests now that it goes out in the system, and 

we will see how that does. But right now not only is it meeting all 

the parameters that we had asked it to do, in fact, it is exceeding 

some of those. 

I will also say that the cost seems to be good as long as they keep 

that cost down. And right now that all looks good from where I sit. 

General LICHTE. Right. 

I would just add that the C–5M performs wonderfully. It will be 

able to carry more cargo. It will be able to go longer because of the 

new engines. 

The engines were probably the biggest problem with the old C– 

5s. So with the new engines—the time on the wing with the old engines was about 1,000 hours. Now with the new engines, it may 

last longer than the airplane does. 

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I think it has tremendous capability. It has got a mission-capable 

rate now in the 50s. We expect that to be up around 75 percent 

as an absolute minimum; but what we have seen so far—indications are that it is going to probably be about 81 percent. That allows us to get it out in the field and doing well. It is doing well. 

Two of them have arrived. The third one is on the way. 

Mr. MURTHA. General, what does it cost to refurbish those airplanes, well over $100 million? 

General LICHTE. Right. You get about two C–5Ms for the price 

of one C–17, roughly. 

Mr. MURTHA. And the infrastructure or the body of the airplane 

is how old? 

General LICHTE. Well, we expect it to fly until 2040. What we are 

going to have to deal with on the older A models, which are the 

older ones—— 

C–5 RETIREMENTS

Mr. MURTHA. But you see our problem, if you don’t come up 

with—to shut down the C–17 line is inconceivable. So we are going 

to have to make the decision, what—you know, what we do here. 

And we are sure as hell—I don’t see us shutting down the line because that would be so expensive to reorganize it. 

General LICHTE. All the studies indicate that about 205 C–17s 

and 111 C–5s will meet the requirements that we have for wartime. And so if more C–17s come, then we would need permission 

to start retiring some of the C–5s, the older, poorest-performing C– 

5s. 

C–17 PROCUREMENT

Mr. YOUNG. Just one last question on the C–17. Isn’t it a fact 

that the C–17 has been used far more extensively than we ever intended in a short period of time, which means that the maintenance requirements, means that the life span is being used more 

rapidly than we had anticipated; isn’t that a fact? 

General LICHTE. That is a fact. 

General MCNABB. Absolutely, Congressman. But you know, when 

we talked about buying the C–17, we said, here are the kinds of 

things that we may need it to do, and in fact, that is what we have 

been doing with it both in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

It is not the flying hours per se. It is the wear and tear on the 

airplane, because we actually are tankering a lot more fuel and 

doing a lot more of those assault landings than we had programmed for its life cycle. 

This committee helped us a bunch two supplementals ago by giving us the 10 airplanes to make up for the wear and tear that we 

had on the fleet. I can’t tell you how much that meant to us. 

The 15 aircraft helps us do the same kind of thing. It allows us 

to now spread that wear and tear over the overall fleet because 

where that wear and tear is happening is in the airplanes that are 

flying into Afghanistan and Iraq. 

General LICHTE. I will say, big picture-wise, we had programmed 

to fly them about 1,000 hours a year. They are up around 1,100. 

So, what we are doing is using fleet management, taking some of 

those that have been at home, maybe at the Guard and Reserve 

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that haven’t had the high rate of flight, using those more. So we 

are trying to balance this out, coupled with, as General McNabb 

pointed out, the result of getting some extra aircraft to bring us up 

to higher numbers. 

It is fleet management and we are controlling it very closely. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

KC–X PROCUREMENT

Mr. MORAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I may not get into quite the 

prelude that my colleague got into in asking my question, but I do 

want to get just a little bit into the tanker issue. 

I understand that there was a review of the KC–X procurement 

program just last week, and we are told that some of the requirements in the RFP were reduced. I don’t think you mentioned that 

in your testimony, did you? 

Is that true or false? 

General LICHTE. The initial stage is, we have not changed our requirements. What we are looking at and where that comes from is, 

how do you translate requirements into language? And I am going 

to let the acquisition expert just give you the rest of the story. 

Mr. MORAN. Okay. I don’t want to get a long explanation. Let me 

give you another question you can answer at the same time. 

I understand that they may be looking at low-cost versus best 

value. I gather that is far more than just semantics. What does it 

mean? 

General FULLHART. Sir, I will try to give you the short answer 

that you desire. 

Mr. DICKS. Can you speak up? We are having a hard time hearing you. Get a little closer. 

General FULLHART. The green light is on. Is that all right, sir? 

There are two key documents in terms of requirements. The capabilities development document is the core document. And what 

General Lichte is referring to is, those are the requirements levied 

by the warfighter and that are approved by the AFROC and JROC, 

if I could use those acronyms with you; those are the formal bodies. 

Those requirements are translated into things that you then put 

into a request for proposal. Those are the systems requirements, 

document requirements. Those were the famous 800-plus requirements that I think people have heard about. With great credit to 

the warfighter to the acquisition community, they have gone 

through a very extensive review of those requirements to look at, 

how do you clarify them, how do you make sure there are not 

redundancies. Because that was one of the findings from the 

last—— 

Mr. MORAN. So there is no substantive change in the requirements, you are just making them clearer, more concise? 

General FULLHART. Exactly. 

Mr. MORAN. It does seem to me to be a substantive change, 

though, if the policy is to seek low cost versus best value. 

General FULLHART. Yes, sir. And all those things are on the 

table, because clearly, until we have, as the Secretary of Defense 

has indicated, a new Under Secretary for Acquisition Technology 

and Logistics, we haven’t had a dialogue between OSD and the Air 

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567 

Force on both the acquisitions strategy as well as the source selection strategy. 

Mr. MORAN. You haven’t had the dialogue? 

General FULLHART. We have not, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. Let me ask you, there seems to be pushback against 

the idea of having a mixed buy of tankers. 

Do you have a policy or a clear issue with regard to the idea of 

having two different types of tankers? 

General FULLHART. Well, sir, as I think you know, the Secretary 

of Defense is on the record both in testimony and in public comments that, at this time, the fiscal realities are that we think that 

one tanker program is the way to go. 

Mr. MORAN. And you agree with that? That is what I am asking. 

Was that your recommendation? 

General FULLHART. Well, sir, we haven’t made a formal recommendation. But all the indications that I have seen, or the data 

that I have seen, do point out the fact that clearly if you are acquiring two aircraft at the same time, the costs are going to be 

higher. How you rationalize that in the fiscal environment is a dialogue that certainly we want to have with this committee and others. 

MRAP TRANSPORTATION

Mr. MORAN. Well, I know what Secretary Gates said. I just wanted to hear what you might say. 

Let me ask you about the transportation of MRAPs. You have already sent 12,000 MRAPs to Iraq and Afghanistan in the last year 

and a half or so. I want to know what you are going to do with 

those MRAPs in Iraq. It is enormously expensive to move them, but 

the DOD made the policy to transport them by air, particularly 

into Iraq because you can’t trust getting them across land through 

Pakistan. 

Can you tell us what your plan is and give us some sense of the 

cost of moving these MRAPs out of Iraq, recapitalizing them 

maybe, getting them back into Afghanistan? 

General MCNABB. Congressman, I will take that one. 

What we initially did was—because lives were at stake, we basically said, hey, if you needed to go by air so that we can get those 

to the warfighter the fastest possible way, obviously we took the 

initial ones in there. 

It is about a tenth of the cost to take it by surface. You are right 

about Afghanistan. We will take it, if we can, by surface as far forward as possible, and then take it for the last leg by air. 

Obviously, we don’t take that through a ground line of communication (LOC) through Pakistan; we take that by air. We will take 

MRAPs in that final leg into Afghanistan by air. 

Whatever we can do by surface, we will as long as—— 

Mr. MORAN. What surface is there? There is no surface between 

Iraq—I mean, maybe some surface Iraq out to Saudi Arabia. But 

you are using the port there, I guess, in the Basra area anyway. 

So you are floating them, and then you are flying them. 

You are going to land them in Pakistan, so there is really no surface that you can use, is there? 

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General MCNABB. Right, in Afghanistan. If I am moving them 

from Iraq to Afghanistan, pretty much you are exactly right. 

But in many cases these are different types of MRAPs. They are 

lighter. There are different types that they need in Afghanistan. So 

primarily what we will do is, we will take those in. Like I said, 

those last legs will come in by air to make sure that we don’t put 

them at risk as we take them through the ground Loc. 

So you are exactly right. It is about—again, about a tenth of the 

cost to take it by surface. And again, whatever we can do as far 

forward as we can by surface and do the last part by air, that 

makes us money. 

Currently, about 72 percent of the MRAPs have moved by surface and, you know, roughly 28 percent by air, but that was going 

into Iraq. Now we are going to Afghanistan. 

Mr. MORAN. The proportion is going change dramatically, 

though, as you get into Afghanistan. 

I am out of time so I am not going to ask a question, but I just 

want to make a point. 

FUEL LOGISTICS

Fuel logistics—we can ask a question on this for the record—but 

they represent 70 percent of the materiel that the Army ships into 

battle. It is something we need to look at. That is an enormous 

cost, just fuel logistics, and it is going to continue to be as we ramp 

up in Afghanistan. 

So we will present a question for the record. 

General MCNABB. Congressman, I will be glad—as TRANSCOM 

and especially as the J–4, obviously getting fuel into Afghanistan 

has always been just really a key issue. 

We try to make sure we have lots of options coming in from different directions. A lot of our fuel, in fact, 65 to 70 percent comes 

in from the north; only 30 percent comes in from the Pakistan side, 

to give you an idea. And the idea is you want to have multiple 

ways of getting it in. 

That is one of the big things—as we bring in additional forces, 

is to make sure that we have got the fuel in place in Afghanistan, 

something General Petraeus, something we watch very closely with 

CENTCOM and also with DOA and DESC, who is responsible for 

that. But we watch it every day to make sure that we are keeping 

that fuel flowing. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being with us this morning. I have not 

forgotten my trip out to the Air Mobility Command several years 

ago. The logistical footprint of what your young people do across 

the world is amazing; and no matter what anyone thinks about 

what happens in Iraq and Afghanistan, the support and the operations under that command are truly remarkable, night and day. 

And it is amazing, of all the flights and tanker issues, that you 

don’t really hear of some of the problems that could come from such 

aged tankers. It is truly remarkable. 

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569 

Your second highest priority behind the tanker replacement— 

and I know the chairman has been to Nellis Air Base. And, you 

know, sometimes in life when you make a promise—when I met 

with some of those crews, talking about the combat search and rescue helicopters, those guys and gals that are involved—and they 

are going to be, you know, really involved in Afghanistan. 

I learned yesterday—I guess this isn’t confidential—there is not 

1 mile of rail in Afghanistan. You would think there might have 

been. 

General MCNABB. Right. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But the air support of getting our injured— 

well, obviously getting our troops there, setting up a whole new series of air bases, where does the CSAR contract stand? I mean, 

what in the devil is going on here? Is there any optimistic news on 

the horizon? 

General FULLHART. Yes, sir, there is. 

In fact, on the day of the Inauguration we received the best and 

final proposals from the three vendors who are vying for that contract. We are in source selection as we speak, and we are on track 

for an April review by OSD in getting that contract signed and getting started with production. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So we are making some progress? 

General FULLHART. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The combat search and rescue, obviously 

there have been situations where remarkable things have happened—— 

General FULLHART. Absolutely. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN [continuing]. In terms of rescuing. 

What is the medevac component? Hasn’t the Secretary of Defense 

directed the use of CSARs for medevac? 

General FULLHART. Sir, I can take that; that is an operational 

question which I can take for the record. 

[The information follows:] 

The medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) component exists under the U.S. Army for 

the specific mission of evacuating injured personnel. The mission is performed by 

U.S. Army rotary-wing assets. Due to enduring requirements for MEDEVAC capability, the Air Force has assisted the U.S. Army in performing this mission in U.S. 

Central Command with HH–60G Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) helicopter assets, which are inherently capable of performing the MEDEVAC mission with their 

advanced mission abilities. 

The Secretary of Defense has recently directed additional Air Force CSAR assets 

to enhance the MEDEVAC capability in Afghanistan. However, this has not been 

the first time that Air Force CSAR assets have been used for MEDEVAC operations 

in this theater. Since the initiation of U.S. Central Command combat operations, deployed Air Force CSAR helicopters have always performed MEDEVAC missions, 

when requested, due to their inherent capability to execute missions in demanding 

environmental and threat conditions, such as night low illumination conditions. 

Starting in January 2006, Air Force CSAR helicopters were also deployed solely to 

perform the MEDEVAC role in Afghanistan due to shortages of available U.S. Army 

aircraft. In February 2009, to further support the Secretary of Defense’s MEDEVAC 

initiatives, all Air Force helicopters located in Afghanistan were tasked to perform 

the MEDEVAC mission, including those assigned for CSAR alert. In addition, to further improve MEDEVAC response with more aircraft, the Air Force will temporarily 

cease advanced tactics training at the HH–60G Weapons School at Nellis Air Force 

Base, Nevada in March 2009 to provide these aircraft and instructors for combat 

operations in Afghanistan. 

General FULLHART. But certainly they play in all those roles. I 

have a colleague who is in that business, and his story to me was 

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570 

that since 2001 in Iraq and Afghanistan alone that they have been 

responsible for about 2,600-plus savings out there. So there are a 

lot of mothers and fathers and husbands and wives out there who 

are grateful. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. They don’t have any roads. With all due respect, the few roads that are out there, we have built. 

General FULLHART. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And these helicopters, one thing we know 

about Afghanistan, high altitudes. 

General FULLHART. Absolutely. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How does that fit into the overall equation? 

And how does it meet, should we say, other operations that are important, Special Ops and—— 

General FULLHART. Certainly. The contract that we are going to 

be letting for the replacement CSAR–X helicopter specifically addressed the need for that platform to be able to operate in higher 

altitudes and higher heat conditions because that is a limitation 

that we are facing in places like Afghanistan today. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And satisfy my curiosity. 

Afghanistan is not Iraq—obviously, a far more or less hospitable 

terrain, horrendous situation. What sort of evacuation procedures 

are you looking at, planning for? You are obviously—we have a 

higher rate of injury and deaths in Afghanistan now. 

What are we doing relative to evacuations that are different from 

Iraq? 

General MCNABB. Actually, we will end up—as you said, it is 

that front end portion of how do you get the forces to the hospital. 

And once we stabilize them, to get them aboard an aircraft. 

Once we get them aboard a C–17, KC–135, the new KC–X, then 

that is going to be pretty much the same. We will bring them pretty much the same into Landstuhl unless we need to bring them all 

the way home, just like we do now using air refueling. That, as you 

said, has been one of the greatest things we have done in our 

promise to these great Americans that have raised their hands. 

Mr. MURTHA. I think what Mr. Frelinghuysen is saying, we had 

a hearing yesterday, or the day before yesterday, and they talked 

about 72 minutes and the death rate is almost twice as much in 

Afghanistan as it is in Iraq. 

General MCNABB. Right. 

Mr. MURTHA. That is because it takes so long to get them in. We 

are in the business of trying to get the resources to you, and we 

can’t get an answer in many of these things. 

CSAR is absolutely essential. And what Mr. Frelinghuysen is 

talking about is, let’s get these things out there, whether it is tankers or CSARs or whatever it is, and—so we can reduce the time 

it takes to get these troops to the hospital. 

General MCNABB. Absolutely. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And do we have, quite honestly, enough 

aircraft to do what we need to do—— 

General MCNABB. On the aircraft side—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN [continuing]. To shorten that period of time? 

General MCNABB. It is really going to be that helicopter movement that you are talking about. 

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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Do we have shortfalls in these types of helicopters? Do we, because of this mess-up or the delay with the 

CSAR contract? 

General FULLHART. Sir, what I will do is take that for the record 

as an operational question. 

But what I will tell you is that this contract is intended to replace 101 of the current fleet with 141 of the new fleet, which is 

meant to address the—— 

[The information follows:] 

Yes, but not because of the delay with Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) contract. In 2003, the Air Force developed the Personnel Recovery Vehicle Operational 

Requirements Document. In 2005, it was converted the CSAR–X capability development document. This document identified a base-line fleet of 141 aircraft. The current HH–60G fleet stands at 101 from an original fleet of 112, a capability gap of 

40 airframes. 

The delay of CSAR–X is not causal in the shortfall of rescue helicopters we currently face. Desired Initial Operational Capability of CSAR–X was Fiscal Year 2013. 

Without an acceleration of this original initial operational capability, CSAR–X 

would not have been able to alleviate the shortfall in today’s rescue assets. 

Mr. MURTHA. But you are only going to buy 10 a year, one a 

month. I mean, we can’t save any money when we buy that small 

a fleet. 

You guys have got to give us figures where we can save money 

and get the stuff out in the field. That is the problem we have, and 

there is no question, CSARs is something that fits into a supplemental because it is so directly related to the warfighting. You 

need to get that information to us so we could put the money in 

to reduce the hazards to the troops out in the field. 

General FULLHART. Yes, sir. I will take that back. 

And as we have indicated, there are meetings going on as we 

speak to try to determine the future. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We have wounded soldiers, I assume, still 

being flown into Balad. And then they go out from there. I assume 

we have the same sort of logistical responsibilities in Afghanistan. 

And are there shortfalls in aircraft assets for the theater? 

So we are going to get that information; we don’t have it now? 

That is unfortunate. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Hinchey. 

STEWART AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Generals, thank you very much. In the context of this hearing 

and your response to the questions, I even understand a little more 

clearly the complexity and the difficulty of the circumstances that 

you are dealing with in light of the new political circumstances 

that we have with the new President. So I can appreciate what is 

going on here. 

But at the same time, as our chairman has been saying, we need 

to know more information, as much as we can get from you and 

as quickly as possible. 

I just want to mention a situation that is a little local in my context. The 105th Airlift Wing is located at the Stewart Air National 

Base in New York; and it is a fairly large and fairly active operation there. 

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They are pretty much dominated by the C–5As. And the C–5As, 

as we know and has been discussed here, are running low. They 

have been around a long time and there is increased concern about 

the safety and security of the people who are operating them and 

using them. But there is also a certain amount of growing concern 

about some of the people who live in the area around the airport, 

that there may be some problem that might result. 

In any case, the C–5As were supposed to be replaced by C–17s 

in 2010, but that is now in the process of changing, or at least potentially so. Well, we know that there are some changes. 

I would like for you, if you would, to just give us a little clarity 

with regard to that. And in the short time that I have, I just want 

to mention just a couple of things in the context of this situation 

which you might be able to answer. 

C–5A MODERNIZATION

Could you describe for us the challenges of modernizing the C– 

5As, which are older than the C–5Bs, and I know that that has 

been part of the problem because there is such a challenge to modernize them. Can you give us some information about that? 

If all of these C–5As need to be replaced, is there a reason—what 

is the reason why we wait to do so? Why are we putting it off if 

they need to be replaced? And it is pretty clear that they do. 

And just my own situation, when do you expect that the changes 

at the Stewart Air Base are likely to be made? And when will the 

mobility and capabilities requirements study, which has focused on 

these issues, when is that going to be completed and what do you 

think we are going to get as a result of that? 

General LICHTE. If I could take that, sir, I just visited Stewart— 

twice in the last 6 months. I agree with you. They are a fantastic 

group of folks. General Johnston has a great team up there. Some 

of the things you talk about with modernizing the C–5A, your folks 

are up there coming up with innovative and creative ideas. One 

thing they showed me is, two of the NCOs have figured out a new 

way of doing the landing gear panel on the C–5. It is very complicated. The gears all have to spiral and turn and everything all 

at the same time. They were able to figure out a better way to do 

that, to test it without having to launch an aircraft. They are trying to help with modernization efforts. 

But you point out that the C–5A is old. And when you put new 

equipment on it, it is the digital interface with the old round dials. 

And when you say, What is the challenge for modernizing C–5s, it 

comes down to dollars. And as we have looked at this over the 

years, it was cheaper to modernize C–5s with new equipment, new 

engines to keep them going than to afford new C–17s. 

And so it has been a balance, and that is why we struck the difference of 205 C–17s, 111 C–5s, fully modernized, all of them get 

avionics upgrades and 52 of them get the new engines. 

When will MCRS, the Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 

come out? We hope about a year—well, at the end of the year we 

should have something for the results of that. 

We have been doing a lot of studies over all the years. We come 

out with about the same each time because it is based on deliberate 

war plans; and we are waiting to see the results of the MCRS bemstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

573 

cause we did factor in some new items on this Mobility Capabilities 

Requirements Study. So we are hoping to get that. 

The reason we held up on distributing the C–17s, as you discussed about Stewart perhaps being in line for C–17s, was if this 

study comes out with new requirements, higher requirements, and 

we don’t get permission to retire any C–5A models, we are kind of 

stuck with, where do we put these aircraft? And that is why we 

said, we are better off distributing them among the C–17 bases we 

have right now until we get the final decision and then we will go 

back and address it. 

We are certainly aware, very much aware of Stewart’s contribution, the fact that it could do the mission with C–17s as well. We 

just want to make sure we get it right for the taxpayers so we don’t 

have to do this two or three times. 

Mr. HINCHEY. So are you looking at the possibility of the danger, 

the increasing danger of the C–5As and the rate that they have 

been used so steadily and effectively? 

General LICHTE. Right. 

Mr. HINCHEY. But the age and the aging, in spite of the fact that 

the modernization process is—— 

General LICHTE. The age is a factor that comes out, and quite 

frankly, we put it back on our NCOs and airmen who are fixing 

and repairing those aircraft. They do a marvelous job. Just like Mr. 

Young said, those folks go out there and even though they are 

working on aircraft sometimes twice as old as them, they take 

great pride in launching those aircraft and making them successful. 

But that—for me and General McNabb and General Fullhart, we 

want to make sure that that doesn’t continue forever. We want to 

get new requirements out there, we want to try to do it. And again, 

we appreciate the great work that the committee does to help us 

on it. 

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. HINCHEY. Just one last thing, if I could. 

Mr. DICKS. What is the mission reliability rate of the C–5 and 

the C–17? 

General LICHTE. I will give it to you exactly. The C–5As are— 

47.9 is the mission capable rate; C–5B is 57.8; and the C–5M, we 

hope to go greater than 75 percent or higher; and for the C–17, the 

C–17 is 86.4, to be exact. 

Mr. HINCHEY. I would just—if I may, one last thing. 

I just hope, and I would expect that this is going to happen, that 

the people who are putting this budget recommendation together 

which is going to come to us, which our Chairman has been so focused on, will understand your understanding of the circumstances 

that we are dealing with, with issues like the C–5A and how that 

issue has to be addressed; and also to put it into context of the economic development program in which we are engaged and the jobs 

that are associated with the development of the new aircraft. 

All of that, I think, is very important. 

General LICHTE. Yes, sir. 

General MCNABB. Congressman, I couldn’t agree with you more 

on that, to bring that all together. 

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There is no question that if you can’t trust an airplane, you have 

to treat it differently. In other words, you will have to put in four 

to make two, three to make two. And you have to build in—you 

can’t carry cargo into places because—if you are afraid that it will 

break. 

So we have to manage the fleet differently because of that. And 

I think that all plays—and again, I echo what General Lichte says, 

it is amazing what our folks who are out there do. 

Stewart has been instrumental across the C–5 fleet making sure 

that when we—we put the C–5 into battle, they have been ready 

to take care of anything we need done, to include bringing in other 

airplanes to do heavy maintenance there at Stewart. 

So again I tell you a great unit that has been, and we really do 

appreciate that. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Well, thank you very, very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. You have no choice is what it amounts to. The 

same way with the line. We may have put enough money into this, 

the C–17 line, but the subcontractor is going to run out. This is the 

problem we are going to have down the road if you guys don’t make 

a decision there down the line before long. 

Mr. Tiahrt. 

TANKER REPLACEMENT

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Have we decided whether the tanker competition is going to come out of OSD or out of the 

Air Force? Has that decision been made? 

General FULLHART. Sir, that is a decision that has not yet been 

made. 

Mr. TIAHRT. We don’t yet know. I keep seeing ads for a KC–45. 

Did we actually terminate the contract with Airbus and Northrop 

Grumman? 

General FULLHART. Yes, sir, we did. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Was there a term liability clause in there that was 

employed? And I would like to know how much was spent there. 

General FULLHART. I can provide that to you for the record. 

Mr. TIAHRT. All right. Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 

The contract contained both the cost reimbursement termination clause as well 

as the limitation of funds clause. The contractor had billed for approximately $60 

million prior to the termination. The Air Force and the Defense Contract Management Agency are currently in the process of negotiating a settlement price to the 

terminated contract. 

Mr. TIAHRT. We heard about low cost, best value. Mr. Moran 

brought that up. 

SUBSIDIES

How are you going to deal with these ongoing problems, though, 

that were apparent in the previous proposals, like the startup subsidies that the United States Trade Representative says are illegal? 

Are we going to turn a blind eye to those again, or will they be 

taken into consideration in the next go-around? 

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General FULLHART. Sir, it is my understanding that those are 

being adjudicated in the WTO, and so we await the outcome of 

those. 

Certainly, we are following whatever laws have been passed by 

Congress in terms of our Federal acquisition regulations, and we 

will certainly abide by those. 

Mr. TIAHRT. So as far as the contract itself, it will have no contractual consideration for these startup subsidies? 

General FULLHART. Sir, it would be premature for me to know 

at this point what the future contract—— 

Mr. TIAHRT. This is an ongoing problem. There needs to be either 

some kind of reconciliation if it occurs after the contract award, if 

there is an impact—a little late when it is downstream. I think it 

should be taken into consideration as we move forward, that this 

is an unfair advantage that some corporations have in this process. 

And I don’t know how you get a true low cost if you don’t take into 

consideration illegal subsidies. 

What about these regulations that are waived in the DFARS for 

foreign suppliers, the things like Buy American Act, cost accounting standards, international trafficking in arms regulations, the 

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Berry amendment? The DFARS 

waives these; Congress doesn’t waive these considerations. 

In waiving those regulations, are you going to take into consideration the difference in cost of employing these, or are you going to 

waive them for American manufacturers as well as the foreign 

manufacturers? 

General FULLHART. Sir, I can take that one for the record. 

My understanding of the Buy American Act is that there are 

memorandums of agreement that have been signed that, in effect, 

many of the countries in Europe and others are treated as an 

equal. 

[The information follows:] 

No waivers have been processed with regard to the KC-X competition. On any future KC-X source selections, offerors will need to comply with current Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement guidance for the Buy American Act, cost accounting standards, international trafficking in arms regulations, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and the Berry amendment. 

Specifically, the Buy American Act allows for acquisition of commercial derivative 

supplies from qualifying countries to include France. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2533, 

the Secretary of Defense may enter into agreements with partners in national security for the purposes of the Buy American Act. These agreements are established 

through Defense Cooperation Agreement letters signed by the Secretary of Defense. 

The Department of Defense does not determine the applicability of Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). That is the prerogative of the CAS Board, a five member 

board, chaired by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and is comprised of 

members of industry, academia, and government. The CAS Board regulations allow 

for modified coverage for foreign concerns and U.S. firms in certain circumstances. 

Most of our major trading partners have financial systems requirements similar to 

our cost accounting standards. However, modified coverage does require the application of CAS 401 and 402, which provide for consistency in estimating, accumulating, 

and reporting costs as well as consistency in allocating costs incurred for the same 

purpose. Also, CAS does not apply to commercial products utilized in the manufacture of an end item being delivered to the government and CAS does not apply to 

contracts and subcontracts with foreign governments as set forth in Federal Acquisition Regulation appendix 1 subpart 9903.2011. In this case, the KC-X tanker contract is compliant with CAS requirements. 

The Air Force did not waive the requirements of the international trafficking in 

arms regulations (ITAR). While there are elements of the KC-X tanker acquisition 

which are subject to ITAR restrictions, the KC-X program team verified that the 

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576 

competing contractors complied with the ITAR restrictions for the applicable elements. 

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is designed to impact the way U.S. 

firms do business in foreign markets. The Department of Defense did not waive the 

FCPA, which applies only to practices by foreign corporations. All offerors are required by section K of the Request for Proposal/contract to certify that they are in 

compliance with all laws and regulations. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 removed the specialty metals requirement from 10 U.S.C. 2533a (the ‘‘Berry Amendment’’) and established a new specialty metals requirement at 10 U.S.C. 2533b. The specialty metals requirement flows down to subcontractors and it now applies to procurement of 

‘‘end items, or components thereof’, not just specialty metals. As a result of extensive pressure from industry, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008 granted additional flexibilities in sections 804 and 844 to include and exception 

for commercial derivative military aircraft. 

This new exception for commercial derivative military articles allows contractors 

to certify that the contractor or its subcontractors have entered into agreements to 

purchase an amount of domestically melted or produced metal, in the required form, 

for use during the period of contract performance in the production of the commercial derivative military article. 

Mr. TIAHRT. So you are going to waive them for the American 

manufacturers as well as the foreign manufacturers? 

General FULLHART. Sir, I have no idea. 

Mr. TIAHRT. In order to treat them as equal, that would be a fair 

thing to do. But that is an ongoing problem that I think needs to 

be taken into consideration. Do you waive regulations for foreign 

suppliers that have a significant portion of this—I mean, the first 

five airplanes, according to the EADS proposal will be built in 

France. So we are going to completely waive those regulations for 

those five and maybe the subsequent ones? 

I think that is an ongoing problem that needs to be addressed 

in this bid, because I don’t know how you achieve a low cost versus 

best value if you don’t take that into consideration. 

Also, what about proposals that have false pretenses employed in 

them? And I will tell you a little story because it is Army that did 

this instead of the Air Force, but it is a lesson learned that needs 

to be a OSD lesson learned. 

The light utility helicopter contract was awarded to EADS with 

a proposal that included work done in America to—it managed to, 

with the proposals, to meet Buy American standards; but then, 

once it was signed into contract, that work was pulled back to Europe. The airframe was pulled back, the avionics were pulled back, 

some of the fire walls were pulled back around the engine. 

And I know this because they were Kansas companies that were 

part of a successful bid, part of a successful manufacturing plan 

that, once it came into a contract, they just kept that work over 

in Europe. So there was a false pretense in obtaining the contract. 

What mechanism will you put in place to make sure that there 

are no false pretenses in their proposed manufacturing plan? Because that has a great deal of—if you make a decision based on the 

data in front of you, and then they change the rules of the game 

afterwards—and in the clause of every contract that I have looked 

at that comes out of EADS, there is a paragraph that says, We are 

going to make manufacturing decisions based on best economic 

principles for the company—and I can understand that—but that 

is code that says, We are going to keep this work in Europe. 

And we know for a fact that what we saw in the last proposal, 

the work was going to stay in Europe for at least the first five. 

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577 

And the same thing happened in the light utility helicopter contract. The first five helicopters were built in Europe. And then a 

letter came to Spirit Aerospace in Wichita, Kansas, that said, you 

know, We have got this ongoing line in Europe; and we are doing 

okay and we think it would cost a little extra money to move this 

work to America, so we are just going to cancel our contract with 

you. And there was no penalty. 

And I asked the Army, what mechanism did you have in place? 

Zero. Nothing. Nada. No way to go back and say, By the way, you 

gave us a false premise, and there is a pretty good reason to believe that you misled us. 

So what mechanism do we have? 

And this is an ongoing problem. There needs to be a mechanism 

in place that promises made are promises kept. Because promises 

build hope, but keeping promises builds trust. And right now I 

don’t trust the people that you awarded the contract to last time. 

So this is an ongoing problem. And I don’t think you can have 

a low cost, best value evaluation without these mechanisms in 

place. 

General FULLHART. Well, sir, I appreciate those views, and I am 

certain that will be part of the discussion. It will be ongoing as the 

OSD and the Air Force—when we finally get together to talk about 

things, it will be part of the consideration. 

Mr. TIAHRT. You do hold them accountable for requirements. 

This ought to be a requirement. 

General FULLHART. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentleman yield just briefly? 

Mr. TIAHRT. Glad to. 

INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. DICKS. We had a hearing with Secretary Young. One of the 

things we brought out to him was, on every one of these procurements, you are supposed to do an evaluation of the impact on the 

U.S. industrial base. 

As far as I am concerned, I don’t think that study was ever done. 

And since we are starting this acquisition again, I just want to reiterate to General Fullhart that we have to do that. That is a statute. 

We will be glad to get that to you so that you know; I don’t think 

it was done last time; I think it was kind of waived by the Air 

Force. But we need you to—it is a 10 U.S.C. 2440, implemented by 

FAR Part 34 and DOD instruction 5002, which require development of a program acquisition strategy which looks into the impact 

on the industrial base in the United States. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TIAHRT. This illustrates my point, because if you had done 

an industrial impact—what was the title of it again, Norm? 

Mr. DICKS. 10 U.S.C. 2440. 

Mr. TIAHRT. If that had been conducted on the light utility helicopter based on the proposal, based on what is happening today, 

you would have two different scenarios. 

So a decision was made based on the first one, which was a false 

premise; and the impact is now felt with people who are looking 

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578 

for a job here in America. I mean, this is hometown stuff. This is 

stuff that we are all worried about. 

There are intellectual property repercussions. There are a whole 

lot of things that impact our industrial base that are based on a 

document that may or may not be fulfilled. And somehow we have 

to have the mechanism to say, Tell me anything you want, but 

whatever you tell me, I am going to hold you accountable for. 

General FULLHART. Yes, sir. I understand. Thank you. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

TANKER REPLACEMENT TIMELINE

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, Generals. The awarding of the acquisition was let, 

pulled back. I am assuming now it is somewhere in house being relooked at. I understand the Secretary is very much involved in it. 

The first question from me is, will it harm our fleet, our defense 

capabilities, or any of that as we wait for the administration, the 

Congress, to act? I know that 40 years they can operate. Are we 

close to that or do we have another 2, 3, 4 years to debate this? 

General LICHTE. Well, we hope that it will happen soon. I can assure you that everyone has been involved with working with the 

old administration, and now the new administration, in laying everything out. As General Fullhart pointed out, the Secretary of Defense is just waiting for his Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to be in place; and then we hope it is going 

to go. 

We have laid out the requirements from Air Mobility Command 

side. We have been talking about the need for a new tanker for a 

number of years. We have always known that because of the length 

of time that it will take, it will take us out until about 2040 before 

all the KC–135s are recapitalized; and we are doing the best we 

can with what we have. 

And so we just hope it accelerates. And we appreciate all the 

support we have been getting. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. So it must not be absolutely settled during this 

111th Congress. You would like it, but we can still—— 

General LICHTE. No. It needs to be started because if it doesn’t— 

first of all, if everything goes right, we don’t see the first airplanes 

showing up until about 2015. 

On the tanker side, we have a number of KC–135s, but we also 

have KC–10s, 59 of them. They were supposed to be the bridge to 

the new tanker, but we haven’t modernized those as well. So we 

have to get on or we will find ourselves at a tremendous shortage 

of tanker aircraft. 

General MCNABB. Congresswoman, if I could add to that. I say 

it is my number one priority. There is no question about it. We 

need them sooner. We need them now. We needed them yesterday, 

because as soon as we get on with that, we will have a capability 

that I think will be essential to what we are trying to do around 

the world. 

Mr. MURTHA. Would the gentleman yield? Go back to that 2015. 

Start when you said 2015. 

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General LICHTE. 2015 is the time that, for air traffic control management, we need new avionics in the KC–10; otherwise, we are 

not allowed to fly in some of the sweet airspace—first of all, primarily in Europe, and then it expands around the rest of the world. 

That was the KC–10 that I was talking about. 

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman has a good point here. 

Let’s ask a question: When he has got it, when would be the IOC 

if we got a decision in this year, when would be the initial operating capability? 

Mr. MURTHA. We can work out a compromise in the supplemental. When would you get your first airplane out there? 

We tell you to buy the airplane. 

General LICHTE. Well, as you know, both companies had different 

dates that they could get the aircraft out. 

Mr. MURTHA. What is the first one that we could get out in the 

United States, built in the United States? 

Mr. DICKS. Two or 3 years? 

General FULLHART. Yes, sir, about 3 to 4 years; in that range because you have the development period, the testing period. Once 

you get through that, then you start delivering to the warfighter. 

Mr. MURTHA. Is that because of the requirements you put on that 

are absolutely essential to the thing? These airplanes were already 

built, flying. 

General LICHTE. These first ones would go out to Edwards Air 

Force Base and do the test to make sure that all our aircraft can 

refuel behind them, to make sure it has everything, and anything 

that was added or included—we have the performance data to 

make sure that our air crews are ready to fly them. 

And so I would expect to see it—as quickly as it comes, it is 

going to start flying. As soon as the aircraft arrives, we will start 

flying it at the test program. And then usually it is about close to 

2 years of tests. And then it shows up—just like with the C–5M 

with the reengining, it is going to take a while. 

It has been in tests for a while. It is going to go through some 

operational tests, and then we put it on the line. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, it is much better if we did this from 

scratch. It would be 20 years 15 years—much shorter by having a 

commercial derivative. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

MIXED FLEET

Ms. KILPATRICK. Never miss a plug. I like that, Chairman, over 

there. 

That was one thing. Then it talks about the mixed, which means 

to reinforce or something, or new fleet. I didn’t hear a clear answer 

up here. 

Which is better? The cost, yes, you considered it, but I am not 

sure it is the only thing that you consider. Does it matter to the 

Air Force? 

And we are appropriators. And you all can’t say much to the 

President and OMB and SDD and all that—that was the wrong acronym. 

But you know, if you can’t say it, just say the other people make 

that decision. 

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General MCNABB. Obviously, the Secretary of Defense has been 

very clear on how he sees that. And obviously, Congressman Murtha, the chairman, has come on and said, Here are some different 

ways of looking at it. 

I think they are looking at all ways. I know that is kind of how 

I understand it. They are looking at every avenue and mix and how 

you might do that. 

I would also just say that from the standpoint of TRANSCOM, 

both of the bidders when they came in with the tankers, they came 

in with magnificent bids that would have met all the requirements 

that we needed. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I don’t want to go back to that. 

General MCNABB. I would say that as long as it meets the requirements we have laid out, TRANSCOM is going to be happy. 

And right now everybody is coming in with bids that have more 

than met our requirements. So we are happy. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Let me ask one other thing. 

I am going to leave that because we can go, in here, all day on 

that one. 

PIRACY

Piracy, I keep hearing it is in one part of the world. And I know, 

General McNabb, it is also one of your priorities. What is the status of it? Are we there? I know you work with a coordinated effort 

here. Is it larger or smaller? Where are we going with that? 

General MCNABB. Well, I do think that, as you say, it is a global 

problem. It is a global transportation problem that has to be dealt 

with. What we have done with our sealift fleet is, we have worked 

tactics, techniques and procedures along with the Navy to make 

sure that they have got a good concept of how we escort our ships 

through. 

We have gone out to industry and helped them with assessments 

to make sure that they are able—you know, they have got all the 

latest, here is how you deal with that. And I think that is all working very well; there have not been any attacks on our ships. 

It is a constant problem. It is one that I think we will have to 

live with and make sure that we are always thinking ahead about 

how do we do this. Again, it is not necessarily our Military Sealift 

Command ships. It is more our container ships that our commercial 

partners are carrying our stuff with it. 

We track that very carefully. We watch them. We have special 

ways of working with the Navy to make sure that they get escorted 

when required. All of those things are taking place. 

But it is one of those concerns I have every day. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The gentleman from Georgia. 

INVENTORY, AIRCRAFT RETIREMENTS, CHINOOKS, C–130JS, AND C–5S

VS C–17S

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen I have 

four unrelated questions. And what I was going to do is just go 

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ahead and ask them; and whatever you can’t get to, if you could 

answer it for the record. 

The first question has to do with the inventory, that we often 

interfere with your ability to control in terms of airplanes that you 

want to mothball. I think, actually, Congress did make some 

progress and gave you more flexibility. So I wanted to hear how 

that was going. 

The second question actually has to do with Chinooks in Afghanistan. I was talking to an Army Guard unit from Georgia yesterday, 

who will be using them. But I was wondering what the split was 

between Air Force and Army on Chinooks. Do we have enough in 

theater there? Getting back to what Rodney was asking in terms 

of transportation over there, and Guard versus regular Air Force, 

I just wanted a comment on that. I just would be interested in 

what you had to say. 

And then on the C–130Js, there were 34 in the fiscal year 2008 

supplemental. There were none requested in the 2009 President’s 

budget, and I was wondering if there would be any in the 2010 

budget. 

And the last question was following up on Mr. Dicks’s question 

about the reliability of the C–5 versus the C–17. And if I heard you 

correctly, you said that C–17 was at 86 percent, and the best C– 

5 was, I think, 46 percent. That is a huge disparity, so I was wondering if you could maybe tell us more about that difference. Because that being the case, it would appear to be, you know, let’s 

just use C–17s. 

So those are my questions. 

General MCNABB. Congressman, how about I hit the first two? 

On inventory, there is no question that as we get new aircraft, 

we like to have permission to retire the old. What really makes our 

system is the crews, the maintenance, the facilities, all of those. 

And so our ability to say, Hey, if we get new things, we need to 

retire the old because those crews, we need to transfer them over 

to the new assets. 

Many of the new assets can handle a higher utilization rate. 

They are much better, much more valuable, and we can make them 

much more useful by doing that. We need the maintainers to do 

the same thing. If we don’t retire the old ones, we can’t transfer 

them. 

So I would say, that ability to retire the old is absolutely essential. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Isn’t it something like $3 million a week to maintain those soon to be, or hopefully to be, mothballed airplanes? I 

know it is a big cost. Do you know what it is? 

General MCNABB. I can get that for the record. But, of course, 

it depends on which fleet we are talking about, what kind of storage we need to bring them in. But many times we are required to 

keep them on the ramp and keep them crewed and with maintenance and all of the others. 

[The information follows:] 

The initial in-processing cost for a C–5 aircraft entering Type 1000 Storage is 

$49,000. Twice a year the aircraft is inspected at a cost of $262/inspection (annually 

$524). Every four years there is a re-preservation; estimated at $33,000 for C–5 aircraft. 

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But we need to get those young airmen moved across to the new 

assets so we take full advantage of the investment that is made. 

There is no question about that. 

The Chinooks, the Air Force, as far as I know, doesn’t own any 

Chinooks, so—— 

Mr. KINGSTON. It is all Army? 

General MCNABB. All Army. 

And then I will let you all answer the 130J and the reliability 

issue. 

General LICHTE. Let me circle back. Because the biggest issue for 

us was KC–135 retirement, KC–135E models in particular. This 

year we were granted permission to retire them, so by the end of 

this year, all the E models will be retired. 

It did cost money to go out and rotate the tires once a week, run 

the engines once a month. So that is where you were coming up 

with that figure. I don’t think it was quite as high as $3 million, but when you 

factor in how much money it also costs to put it into what we call 

Type 1000 storage out in the desert—my term is a ‘‘bubble wrap’’ 

around the airplane—that was expensive. We didn’t think we needed to do that, but we were forced to do that. 

We have been given permission now to retire the rest of the E 

models. Some of them will remain in Type 1000 storage. Some of 

them have just been retired, so they will just sit in the desert. 

Then we can use them for parts on other airplanes. 

The same, by the way, for the 130 fleet, we are trying to do that. 

We still have restrictions on the C–5 fleet, which we can’t retire 

any. 

With regard to the reliability, I will do that. 

I will let you talk about C–130Js. 

57.8 is the reliability for the C–5B, which is our youngest C–5 

and the most modern C–5; we are trying to push that up to a reliability rate of 75 percent. And you are right, when you compare 

that even to the 86 percent of the C–17, we are hoping to get all 

the way up to 81 percent on the C–5. But still, the C–17 is more 

reliable. 

General FULLHART. Sir, with regards to fiscal year 2010, that is 

part and parcel of the ongoing dialogue that OSD is running. And 

I simply just don’t have insights into that at this time. 

Mr. KINGSTON. We will know in 3 weeks. 

General FULLHART. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rogers. 

AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, MANAS AIR BASE

Mr. ROGERS. You are going to be given a lot more work to do in 

the next few months with the anticipated buildup in Afghanistan 

and the build-down in Iraq. Are you ready for that? 

And number two, what does the closing of the Manas Air Base 

in Kyrgyzstan do if that takes place to these needs? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

What we have been doing to make sure that we have whatever 

General Petraeus needs on the ground in Afghanistan: We have 

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been really working that hard with AMC and our own components 

to make sure that we are set. The portions we are doing are to 

make sure that we have more than one option on the ground and 

make sure that we have the air robust enough so that if, in fact, 

we have to take it in by air, we will be able to do that. 

General Lichte has heard me say on a number of times, if we had 

to do a Berlin airlift kind of deal tonight, you need to be ready to 

do that; and his folks have been working very hard on that. The 

way you do that is make sure that airfields—we make sure that 

we can do very quick turns on aircraft, make sure that if we can 

get parking ramp and you get the throughput going on the different airfields there in Afghanistan. 

We have been working that very closely with CENTCOM. And 

those are the kinds of things we have been working on. I think that 

the—we can provide this for the record. 

But what we have done is increase the throughput at Bastion, 

at Kandahar and Bagram specifically, in some cases quadrupled 

the throughput there by working together, sending in teams to be 

able to do that. And that is on the air side. 

On the ground side, you all know that we have been working on 

being able to come in also from the north, using what we call the 

‘‘Northern Distribution Network,’’ to make sure that we can take 

commercial kinds of cargo through the north if we can. We do that 

with fuel now. And I think that that is—we have 800-plus containers in the Northern Distribution route now. And we want to 

make sure that we take advantage of those supply chains to get in 

there. 

We are working very closely with CENTCOM to make sure that 

we measure the flow that is going in there as they put the 17,000 

troops in. And I think that from the standpoint of making sure that 

we meter that and are thinking ahead of that, that is all being 

worked very closely again with CENTCOM and with the folks in 

the Pentagon. 

My take is, we want to make sure that everybody understands 

that they will not be slowed down because of our ability to resupply. 

I think when you brought up Manas, I say that Manas is useful 

but not essential because we always have other options. In some 

cases that may be a little more expensive but we have them. And 

we don’t want anybody to feel like they can slow us down by holding an airfield hostage or saying, Hey, if you don’t have this, we 

can really take you out. We don’t want anybody to believe that because they can’t. We have other options to be able to do that. 

Mr. ROGERS. So you have no problem with the equipment and 

the capability and the strategic capability of flying into Afghanistan? 

General MCNABB. No, sir. In fact, I mentioned earlier my thanks 

to this committee; because of what you have done in the past, decisions that were made in the last 15, 20 years in this committee, 

specifically supporting things like the 130J, like the C–17, like 

Tunner loaders, that have allowed us to be able to get the velocity 

and reliability on our aircraft up and to be able to go into these 

smaller airfields. That has paid huge dividends for us. 

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DEFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES

Mr. ROGERS. One last question. In Afghanistan especially I would 

suspect that you would be susceptible to a lot of ground-to-air attack. Are you equipped to handle that? 

General MCNABB. Again, this committee has been superb in supporting us, our defensive systems and our tactics. We have been 

flying in Afghanistan, as you know. Many of you, if not all of you, 

have flown on our airplanes when they come in on night vision goggles and random approaches to make sure that every one is going 

to be a little bit different. So those kinds of tactics are what have 

allowed us to be able to maintain that flow that goes in there. My 

take is, that has really paid some big dividends for us. 

When I think about Afghanistan and I think about the throughput, the C–17 is a perfect asset for that, something Congressman 

Dicks—way back when we talked about that throughput model. Afghanistan is that place. If you end up saying, I have got only a 

small parking spot, but I am going to have airplanes go through 

here, and they are going to leave the engines running, dump the 

load in 15 minutes and be off again, so I can bring the next airplane in. That is the CONOPS that we have been working on. 

I will let General Lichte jump in here. But I have asked AMC. 

They have responded. They are all over this. But they know that 

they may be asked; our ultimate guarantor that we can get into Afghanistan and support General Petraeus is there. Again, the defensive systems is a big part of that. And again, the support of this 

committee has been huge. 

Mr. MURTHA. Do you have the airplanes to do it? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. As you said, the C–17, 130J, the 

kinds of assets you have given us, the C–27. 

You asked me, Chairman, earlier about how that would fit. Given 

the more dispersed ops, the ability to have tails becomes important 

as well. And, in fact, being able to bed down small tails in that 

area also is important. There are places that different assets really 

come of age. That is where the C–27 fits. 

MEDEVAC HELICOPTERS

Mr. MURTHA. CSAR takes 22 minutes to get somebody out of Afghanistan because you don’t have enough helicopters. I told people, 

start lobbying for more helicopters and get them out in the field. 

Now, I know that the Air Force has stepped up some of their resources there. You don’t have the resources, so twice as many people are dying in Afghanistan before they get to the hospital. That 

is what we are talking about. 

General MCNABB. Right. 

Mr. MURTHA. You could do it, but do you have the resources to 

do it? That is what this committee wants. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me talk about a couple things we have done. 

We put the money in for the C–17. We put the money in for the 

C–130 years ago. We put money in for SL–7. The 1991 war, if you 

didn’t have SL–7, you wouldn’t get the equipment past where it 

was. We put money in for ships, all those things. 

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So this Committee—and health care, we put money where we see 

there is a need. But if we don’t get the information, then they give 

us hell on the floor. These guys get up here and they say, you 

shouldn’t do this, you shouldn’t do that. 

Well, our job is to appropriate money, but we have to have figures in order to do that. 

We can justify everything we put in this bill. Only 18 people 

voted against this bill. When it leaves here, it stays the same until 

it goes to conference, and it doesn’t change. And they get all kind 

of railing against it. And the Senate feels the same way. When we 

come to a compromise, the bills pass very handily. 

But information is the key, and we have got to have information 

from you or we can’t do the things that we need to do to make sure 

the troops have what they need. 

Mr. Young. 

TANKER REPLACEMENT

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I want to go 

back to the tanker issue for just a minute. 

A year ago when the tanker issue was really up in the air, I had 

the audacity to suggest, why doesn’t the Air Force consider splitting the buy and having the two competitors both build tankers? 

I was ridiculed everywhere. I took raps from almost everybody who 

knew anything about the tanker issue. But today we are talking 

about doing just that. So I have got another weird suggestion that 

might not have any benefit today, might not ever have any benefit. 

Why not consider—when the Air Force decides what they want 

in this tanker, why not have both companies build the same aircraft, build the same tanker, the same suppliers for spare parts, 

the same types of maintenance, same types of equipment on the 

ground at airports? It is probably as weird as my first suggestion 

last year. But this is something that has been going through my 

own mind. 

General MCNABB. Let me let General Fullhart talk about that 

from an acquisitions standpoint. 

General FULLHART. Sir, it is definitely an innovative idea, and I 

am not going to try to throw water on it. 

I think some of the things that we would need to consider in that 

kind of construct is, do we lose the savings that we currently envision in terms of taking something that is already established and 

having to create something out of whole cloth, in other words, 

something that is new? 

Certainly there is a business case to be made out there by companies that might be reluctant to share some of their own proprietary information. That is something they would have to work 

through, obviously. 

It is a fascinating idea. Perhaps as the time comes; we will have 

to wait and see. 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. YOUNG. Sure. 

Mr. DICKS. I guess what I would say to the gentleman’s question—and I always have great respect for the gentleman. He is always serious in trying to do the right thing. 

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The advantage of this program is that you have these commercial 

planes already developed. So, I mean—you know, for them to build 

a 767, which would mean they would have to go through a whole 

development phase; or for Boeing to build an A–330, they would 

have to go through a whole development. It would raise the cost 

dramatically. It would be like building a brand-new airplane. 

As we were talking about earlier, if you are going to do a brandnew airplane, it would take maybe 15 years to bring it in. So the 

whole idea here is to take these commercial planes off the shelf and 

then modify them for the military mission. And that saves us a ton 

of money; you can do that for $6 or $7 billion. 

Now the reason Gates is against this is because—I mean the 

dual buy—is because, one, it would cost $6 or $7 billion to do both 

of them, so that is another pot of money. Then you would have to 

divide the buy. 

I know the Chairman thinks we could double the buy. But it 

would be better to double the buy on the low-cost, small, correct 

airplane—you know who I am thinking of—and that would drive 

the costs down. 

But to buy two different planes—and I would just also say to the 

gentleman, Pete Aldridge, when he made the first decision, buy 80, 

lease 20, which was overturned because of the scandal, he didn’t 

even let Airbus compete because he said that they didn’t have a 

plane that met their requirements. 

If you look at the GAO report on two important issues, an Airbus 

can’t meet the requirements. They had to be modified under pressure from the other body in order to be able to even compete. 

So, again, I think the right thing to do is to stay with the commercial buy, pick one airplane and if we can enhance the spending 

for that, drive the cost down and buy more of them soon, that 

would be, I think, the best solution. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I appreciate the gentleman’s comments. And as 

usual, he is probably always right. 

Mr. DICKS. I am not necessarily right. I have been wrong many 

times. 

Mr. YOUNG. I admitted that this was a strange suggestion today, 

as the one I made last year that you are all talking about now. 

Mr. DICKS. Not all of us. 

Mr. YOUNG. If you are going to take an airplane off the shelf, 

why couldn’t two contractors take the same airplane off the same 

shelf? 

Mr. MURTHA. Okay, folks, we are going to solve this problem, 

and it is going to take a while, but we are going to work it out. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, can I ask another question? 

You are not going to end the hearing, are you? 

Mr. MURTHA. I was going to end the hearing. 

Mr. DICKS. Can I just finish one thing? 

Mr. MURTHA. The gentleman from Washington. 

TANKER FUEL USAGE

Mr. DICKS. You guys have your fuel charts up there. We sent you 

up fuel charts. 

Can you give them to them? We have got some more. 

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Now here is what bothers me. This is what I was trying to say. 

But this is a Conklin & de Decker are a company that evaluates 

fuel consumption for commercial airplanes. So these are commercial numbers. These are not numbers that would relate to the military plane. But if you look at these numbers—let’s just take the $100 per barrel and let’s cut it in half to $50. If you have the 767–200ER 

versus the A–330, the difference in consumption—now this is 179 

airplanes. They fly 750 hours per airplane per year and over a 40- 

year period. 

Now, General Fullhart remembers that the acquisition people 

made a mistake. They only had a 25-year life cycle. That is what 

the JROC had, 40. Mr. Young had to admit that they had to in the 

next go-round have a 40-year life cycle. So we are using a 40-year 

life cycle. The difference in fuel consumption at $100 a barrel is $25 billion. Let’s cut that to $50; It would be $12.5 billion. I mean, if that had 

been taken into account and evaluated, there is no way the A–330 

could have won the competition to have the lowest cost. In fact, 

when the GAO redid the numbers, Boeing had the lowest cost and 

should have been awarded the contract. 

Do you have any comments? I mean, does this not make an impression on any of you up there about this fuel consumption thing, 

which was not taken into account? 

They accepted the numbers of the two contractors and didn’t 

evaluate life cycle. And I have been given assurances that the next 

go-round we will have a valid life cycle. In fact, Mr. Murtha put 

language in the bill that says, you must do this and you must have 

an outside authority verify that these are the numbers. 

I would like you to take these numbers. Mr. Murtha wants to 

know what the numbers are on the KC–135E. I think you guys 

could look at these numbers and then look at the KC–135E and 

give us back what your assessment is. I mean, I think we have to 

get this straightened out because last time they didn’t even evaluate it. 

And I would like to hear from you on this. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me say though, they don’t make the decision 

this time. OSD is making the decision. So we could talk—— 

TANKER REQUIREMENTS

Mr. DICKS. But they are developing their requirements and they 

are giving all that information to OSD. That is what you guys just 

said, that they are preparing information for the Secretary about 

how to do this. 

And the other thing, on those 800 requirements, Boeing vastly 

beat Airbus on those 800 requirements. That was not even looked 

at. And one of the criticisms of GAO was, you put out 800 requirements, one of the guys met most of them or a huge—it was like 

two-to-one at least, and that wasn’t even evaluated. So that is another thing that bothers me. 

And then, of course, I took the chairman out to Everett, Washington, to see where they build 767s. Now that is a lot different 

than an open piece of ground down in Alabama, you know, where 

you haven’t got any workers and you haven’t got a factory. And yet 

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the Air Force evaluation said that was a stronger proposal than 

Boeing with the 767 factory under way and proven machinists. 

And the other thing that bothers me—but I will stop here for the 

fuel numbers. I would like your comments on the fuel numbers. 

General FULLHART. Well, sir, I appreciate that information. And 

you are correct, we are looking at life-cycle costs. I am sure that 

will be part of this next round. So I will certainly take this back 

and appreciate your comments. 

Mr. DICKS. I appreciate that. 

[The information follows:] 

Although the Government Accountability Office did not find a basis to object to 

the Air Force’s evaluation of fuel consumption costs during the first tanker competition, the Air Force is working with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Office to ascertain what level of detail and specific methodology to evaluate fuel consumption in the future competition. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Tiahrt. 

Mr. TIAHRT. We have heard a lot about a split buy, and last year 

there was a lot of criticism because one—the Boeing plane was supposedly not delivered yet. But today Boeing has delivered their airplanes to Japan and Italy, and they have flying booms that actually work. The KC–30 is delayed on their flying boom to Australia. 

And a boom is a complex piece of equipment. It is pretty hard 

to handle that surge of fuel and absorb it. So when we talk about 

a split buy, there are significant barriers for having a split buy just 

based on the technology that has not been proven yet today versus 

what has been proven today. 

We have an airplane that has been flying, that has been proven, 

that I think would be better to start more quickly like we had proposed back in 2003. We could have saved this country $15 billion 

had we moved forward back then. 

I want to go on record saying that there is a better one available. 

VIP/SAM AIRCRAFT

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to move the topic, but 

I do have a question that is provincial. Gulfstream Aerospace announced today a layoff of 1,200 people, and in talking to their management, one of their concerns right now is this kind of anti-corporate jet discussion that is going on in the media. And I was wondering if—and I know that is happening to other aircraft manufacturers. That is not the only reason. 

I mean, the big reason, of course, is the recession. But does this 

concern the Air Force in terms of losing some of the manufacturing 

ability? And would that be of any consequence? Or does this just 

sort of happen? 

General LICHTE. Certainly, over the years we have relied on 

Gulfstream. In fact, we have a number of C–20 type aircraft that 

are getting old, and we were planning on replacing them with the 

C–37Bs, from Gulfstream. 

You are right, there are a lot of comments out there on the system right now that will affect. However, quite frankly, I still think 

that the safe, comfortable and reliable transportation—— 

Mr. MURTHA. General, last year we tried to put three in. We 

didn’t hear a word from the Air Force. It was like dead silence. I 

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589 

mean, you know, they are hurting, Gulfstream is. And you know, 

anything you guys can speak up and put in the budget helps. 

General LICHTE. Obviously, those types of aircraft are very helpful, because I think it is very important for our leaders to include—— 

Mr. MURTHA. But it is not in the budget, General. 

General LICHTE. The problem becomes dollars available, sir. 

What is more important? If you ask me what is more important, 

I am going to tell you I need the tanker more than I need another 

Gulfstream. 

Mr. MURTHA. I understand that. 

But you see our problem. If we go through a budget, we want to 

buy as many as we can, to get the price down. We have to have 

information from you folks who are the experts in order to make 

that buy. 

So just keep in mind the problems we have because we are going 

to be marking up long before these damn studies that you guys are 

working on all the time come up. 

But I appreciate your time and your frankness and the committee will adjourn until sometime next week—10:00 a.m. Tuesday. 

Thank you very much. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

KC–135 TANKER FLEET

Question. The Air Force has previously expressed concern that the KC–135 tanker 

fleet was suffering serious corrosion issues before the Global War on Terror even 

began. 

Has the Air Force evaluated what affect the high operations tempo of the KC– 

135 tanker fleet and the adverse conditions of the environment in theater had on 

the service life of these aircraft? 

Answer. The KC–135R/T fleet has experienced an average annual utilization 

(UTE) rate of 488 flying hours per aircraft between Fiscal Year 2004–Fiscal Year 

2008. This UTE has negligible service life impact and negligible cost impact. However, certain specially configured KC–135s (notably those with Multi Point Refueling 

System, Roll-On Beyond Line-of-Sight Enhancement and Special Operations Air Refueling) have recently experienced significantly higher utilization rates. These aircraft make up a small percentage of the overall fleet and are actively managed and 

monitored to minimize impact. Currently the data does not reflect any adverse conditions that we can attribute to environmental conditions in theater. 

KC–135 R/T 5-YEAR UTE 

(Avg Hrs/Yr) 

FY04 .................................................................................................................................................... 479 

FY05 .................................................................................................................................................... 481 

FY06 .................................................................................................................................................... 475 

FY07 .................................................................................................................................................... 491 

FY08 .................................................................................................................................................... 513 

Question. Given the operations tempo of the tanker fleet, does the Air Force still 

believe that the fleet is structurally viable to 2040, as stated in the ‘‘KC–135 Economic Service Life Study,’’ of February 2001? 

Answer. The 2040 projection was based on use of the average tanker flying the 

fleet average flight hours until it reached the economic life of 39,000 hours. Certain 

configurations of KC–135, notably the Multi-Point Refueling System jets, have recently experienced significantly higher utilization rates based on their operational 

requirements. The Multi-Point Refueling System aircraft make up a small percentage (20 aircraft) of the overall fleet and are being monitored for any impact. If susmstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARINGS

590 

tained at the current utilization rate without any upgrades, these aircraft will reach 

their economic service life as early as 2020. 

Question. What is the mission capability rate of the KC–135? 

Answer. The mission capability rate for the KC–135 fleet is trending along at an 

even rate. In Fiscal Year 2006 the rate ended at 79.71 percent, in Fiscal Year 2007 

at 79.35 percent and in Fiscal Year 2008 the rate was 80.04 percent. For the first 

two quarters in Fiscal Year 2009 the rate is holding at 79.95 percent, which is the 

established KC–135 mission capable standard. 

NOTE. Mission capability rates only address unit possessed aircraft. To get a better picture of the overall fleet we also track aircraft availability (includes aircraft 

in depot status, etc). In Fiscal Year 2008 the KC–135 availability was 61.5 percent. 

Question. How many of the KC–135s cannot be deployed because of flight restrictions or the lack of a capability to repair them if they have problems in theater? 

Answer. As of February 28, 2009, 22 KC–135E models are grounded. All 37 KC– 

135E aircraft, including the 22 which are grounded, are scheduled for retirement 

in Fiscal Year 2009. There are no other KC–135s restricted due to condition. In theater repair capability is not a limiting factor for any KC–135 deployment but because of operational limitations we do not deploy KC–135Es to the theater. 

KC–135 TANKER MAINTENANCE

Question. The current fleet of KC–135 aircraft is almost 50 years old. Based on 

the Air Force recapitalization plan of 12 to 15 aircraft per year, some aircraft will 

be 80 years old by the time they are replaced. In order to maintain the fleet, many 

upgrades will have to be conducted leading to significant costs. 

Just last week, you were quoted about the cost of re-skinning aging KC–135s. 

When will this be started and at what costs? 

Answer. 

DISCUSSION OF APPROACH

KC–135 Skins Replacement has been manageable to date. Replacements in Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) have been limited and there is a reasonable 

amount of rework that can be accomplished before most of the skins require replacement. However, the lack of a methodology that accounts for the interaction of corrosion with fatigue generates uncertainty in the ability to accurately predict the degradation to the structure. 

A future skin replacement program may be necessary. The following assumptions 

were made to estimate the cost and schedule for replacing the skins. The dates we 

have forecast for replacement were selected to gain the most benefit from the work 

that may be accomplished, therefore the initiation date was schedule and not technically driven. Furthermore, to minimize the impact to aircraft availability, it was 

assumed that no more than 12 aircraft would be down at any one time, and the 

tasks were grouped to be accomplished concurrently. Each estimate uses current 

year (FY09) dollars and is per aircraft. 

AFT BODY SKINS

Replacement of these skins is already programmed to be done as part of PDM 

FY12–FY17. 

Estimated cost per airplane: $0.3 million. 

Schedule: FY12–FY17, 416 aircraft. 

Max Aircraft Down: N/A–concurrent with PDM. 

UPPER WING AND HORIZONTAL STABILIZER SKINS

These would be done concurrently, separate from PDM, in a speed line, and include replacement of substructure components that are important to continued use 

of the aircraft and accessible when the skins are removed. 

Estimated cost per airplane: $6.7 million. 

Schedule: FY16–FY34, 416 aircraft. 

Max Aircraft Down: 12 (at any one time) 

CROWN AND CENTER WING (WING BOX) UPPER SKINS

This replacement is planned further in the future since recent experience has not 

indicated significant problems with corrosion or cracking. They are planned to be 

done concurrently in a speed line and separate from PDM. We have accounted for 

planned retirements in this increment. 

Estimated cost per airplane: $4.6 million. 

Schedule: FY26–FY34, 230 aircraft. 

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Max Aircraft Down: 12 (at any one time) 

Question. What is the impact of fatigue cracking on the fleet and how will the 

Air Force address these issues? Is the cracking driven by usage or age? What are 

the costs of addressing the issue? 

Answer. To date fatigue cracking has not been a serious issue on the fleet. We 

continuously monitor the flying hours and use the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP) to identify and monitor highly stressed areas of the aircraft and then 

repair or replace as necessary. 

Fatigue cracking is driven by usage. 

ASIP inspections are performed during programmed depot maintenance (PDM). 

As part of the ASIP program, individual aircraft receive a tailored set of inspections 

that monitor the aircraft for fatigue damage. The cost for the ASIP inspections during PDM runs from $75,300 to $125,500 (300 to 500 man-hours) per aircraft. Replacement of the aft body skins is a fatigue issue and will begin in Fiscal Year 2012 

at estimated costs of 1,200 maintenance man hours ($301,200) per aircraft. 

NOTE. Not asked in your question, but of significant concern, is the issue of corrosion which is driven by age, environment and design. In the coming years we will 

have to address major corrosion issues in the wing and horizontal stabilizers upper 

skins, the fuselage crown skins, landing gear trunnions, etc. 

Question. The KC–135 was manufactured in the 1950s as basically a handmade 

aircraft with minimal corrosion protection unlike the C–17 that today uses laser 

precision tools with extensive corrosion protection. 

How have manufacturing techniques impacted the corrosion on the KC–135? How 

is manufacturing different today? 

Answer. The KC–135 was manufactured with very little sealant between mating 

surfaces, light but strong corrosion prone materials, and fasteners were installed dry 

creating a corrosion cell. Spot welds also eliminated fasteners and provided a way 

to attach the multiple layers of skins. This combination of spot-welds and corrosion 

prone materials creates an ideal corrosion environment. 

Lessons learned have been incorporated as today’s accepted industry practices. 

This includes installing fasteners wet with sealant, providing sealant on mating surfaces, chemical milled skins that eliminate mating surfaces, and availability of corrosion and stress corrosion resistant materials. Whenever possible, repairs performed in PDM use the most corrosion resistant material along with the industry 

standards for installation to prevent corrosion. 

Question. Please discuss material degradation from exposure. Is KC–135 maintenance increasing in time and cost? 

Answer. Maritime environments, such as Kadena Air Force Base, Japan, MacDill 

Air Force Base, FL, and Hickam Air Force Base, HI, promote metal degradation due 

to the corrosive elements found in those atmospheres. Because the locations increase 

the rate of corrosion occurring to our aircraft, we typically rotate the aircraft out 

of severe corrosion environments every two to four years. This ensures impacts to 

any single aircraft are reduced. Additionally, to overcome environmental impacts 

and to reduce the overall maintenance required on the fleet, an aggressive corrosion 

control program was implemented. This includes shorter wash cycles for severe environments and treating the aircraft with corrosion preventative compounds. All 

new replacement materials are less corrosion prone. 

Programmed depot maintenance (PDM) hours have remained relatively constant 

since 2003. While the hourly rate changes yearly, the man-hour requirement for 

PDM has remained at approximately 28,000 maintenance man hours. 

Air Force cost models show that overall logistics costs for operating the KC–135 

have continued to climb in constant year dollars and the models project continued 

growth in the future. Base level maintenance costs, engine overhaul and PDM costs 

account for nearly all the increases in logistics costs above inflation. PDM cost increases are largely due to increases in direct material. 

Question. Has the fleet experienced growth in depot possessed aircraft? What are 

the main drivers? 

Answer. Yes. The fleet has experienced growth in depot possessed aircraft. Depot 

possessed aircraft consists of aircraft in programmed depot maintenance (PDM), 

unprogrammed depot level maintenance (UDLM) and aircraft modifications (Mods). 

The table below shows the recent growth. 

Number of A/C Depot Possessed 

FY06 FY07 FY08 

PDM ......................................................................................................................... 39 44 47 

UDLM ....................................................................................................................... 1 2 0 

Mods ........................................................................................................................ 15 24 29 

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Number of A/C Depot Possessed 

FY06 FY07 FY08 

Totals ............................................................................................................. 55 70 76 

As indicated in the table above, there are a number of main drivers for this recent 

growth. 

PDM growth is driven by a couple of factors at the organic and contract sources 

of repair. One factor in the PDM growth is due to a change in the mix of major 

structural repairs (MSRs). While the overall number of MSRs has decreased, the 

MSR mix has changed to repairs which limit concurrent maintenance. Another factor in PDM growth is PDM flow days have increased resulting in increased PDM 

depot possessions. Flow days increased due to process changes, materiel support 

issues, and contract PDM issues which impacted production. Lean process and material supportability improvement efforts have been implemented to improve flow 

days. Contract PDM issues are directly related to two Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) protests and Court of Federal Claims (CoFC) lawsuit on the September 

2007 PDM contract award. GAO ultimately ruled in favor of the Air Force, but the 

CoFC did not and directed a re-solicitation of the contract. 

Modifications growth is driven by two major modifications: Global Air Traffic 

Management (GATM) and Control Column Actuated Brake (CCAB). GATM was accelerated to more quickly provide this required capability to the warfighter. CCAB 

was implemented with an aggressive schedule to modify the KC–135 fleet as quickly 

as possible with this safety-oriented modification. Though resulting in a short-term 

increase in depot possessed aircraft, the modifications will be accomplished sooner 

and in the long-term provide much needed capability. 

Question. What are the costs and available forecasts for the KC–135? What about 

the costs for the airframe, engines, and avionics modifications? What about the 

availability due to programmed depot maintenance? 

Answer. Costs: The total funding associated with all KC–135 aircraft modifications currently in-progress is $1.636 billion. The preponderance of this funding is 

associated with two major aircraft modifications: Global Air Traffic Management 

(GATM) and KC–135 Communications Navigation Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) which is also known as Block 45. GATM began in 1999 and will 

complete in 2011, with a total program cost of $967.1 million (including spares) and 

modification of 419 C/KC–135 aircraft. Block 45 began in 2008 and will continue 

through 2021, with a total program cost of $587.0 million (including spares) and 

modification of 417 C/KC–135 aircraft. The remaining funding ($82.2 million) is associated with 21 avionics and airframe related modifications. Plans for two future 

avionics modifications scheduled to begin in Fiscal Year 2010 are estimated to cost 

$37.8 million. 

Availability: The fleet has experienced growth in depot possessed aircraft. Depot 

possessed aircraft consists of aircraft in programmed depot maintenance (PDM), 

unprogrammed depot level maintenance (UDLM) and aircraft modifications. The 

total number of aircraft in the depot possessed category has grown from 55 in Fiscal 

Year 2006, to 70 in Fiscal Year 2007, to 76 in Fiscal Year 2008. There are a number 

of main drivers for this recent growth. 

Growth in depot possessed aircraft is driven by two factors at the organic and contract sources of repair. One factor in the PDM growth is due to a change in the mix 

of major structural repairs (MSRs). While the overall number of MSRs has decreased, the frequency of MSRs limiting concurrent repairs has increased. The second factor in PDM growth is increased PDM flow days. Flow days increased due to 

process changes, materiel support issues and contract PDM issues which impacted 

production. Lean process and material supportability improvement efforts have been 

implemented to improve flow days. Contract PDM issues are directly related to two 

GAO protests and Court of Federal Claims (CoFC) lawsuit on the September 20 07 

PDM contract award. GAO ultimately ruled in favor of the Air Force, but the CoFC 

did not and directed a re-solicitation of the contract. The CoFC decision is currently 

under appeal. 

Growth in depot possessed aircraft due to modifications is driven by two major 

modifications, Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) and Control Column Actuated Brake (CCAB). 

GATM, an upgrade to the aircraft’s communication and navigation systems to enable free operation in civil airspace, was accelerated to more quickly provide this 

required capability to the warfighter. CCAB was implemented with an aggressive 

schedule to modify the KC–135 fleet as quickly as possible with this safety-oriented 

modification. Though resulting in a short-term increase in depot possessed aircraft, 

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593 

the modifications will be accomplished sooner and in the long term will provide 

much needed capability. 

FEE-FOR-SERVICE REFUELING

Question. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Air Force to 

pursue a fee-for-service refueling capability over a five year period. 

What is the requirement for a contractor supplied capability? 

Answer. In our KC–X Analysis of Alternatives, commercial refueling services were 

evaluated. The analysis indicated that commercial services were not a viable permanent solution to replace the organic air refueling capability, but suggested the potential to augment the organic tanker fleet. It could be used to fill any potential shortfall that might occur while acquiring a new tanker. 

Question. Is the Air Force today not able to meet its needs for refueling? 

Answer. The Air Force meets current requirements for air refueling. 

Question. How would the Air Force structure the program? 

Answer. The program would be executed in two parts. The first part would be the 

preparatory period where the selected company or companies would be responsible 

for the boom modification, integration and certification of their chosen aircraft. We 

anticipate this would take two to three years. Once the aircraft and boom are certified, we would begin the service period of the program which is statutorily mandated at five years. 

Question. What is the cost of the pilot program? 

Answer. We are currently evaluating the data we received from the last request 

for information from industry. That data will help determine our acquisition strategy and the overall cost of the eight-year program. 

Question. What type of aircraft do you foresee vendors attempting to use? 

Answer. Potential vendors who have responded to our requests for information 

have indicated potentially using a wide range of aircraft including the B–767, A– 

330, DC–10 and B–707. 

Question. Do you anticipate vendors using new aircraft or used? 

Answer. Potential vendors have indicated potentially using both new and used 

aircraft. 

Question. If the Fee-For-Service air refueling pilot program proves beneficial to 

the warfighter and the taxpayers will you re-evaluate the total number of KC–Xs 

required? 

Answer. It is essential that we meet national security requirements with an organic capability. The Fee-For-Service pilot program will help determine if augmenting that organic capability with commercial air refueling services is a good 

value to the taxpayer. 

Question. Would the companies flying the contract aircraft performing the refueling have the refueling boom and aircraft markings consistent with current KC–135 

and KC–10 configurations? 

Answer. We will require markings to comply with currently accepted standards 

necessary to safely refuel receivers. 

OTHER C–5 MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS

Question. Due to the cost increases in the C–5 avionics modernization program, 

the Air Force reduced requirements and deferred some development activities to 

other programs. The Air Force waived 14 operations requirements and deferred the 

correction of nearly 250 deficiencies, to be addressed and funded in the re-engining 

and other future efforts. 

What is the status of waivers and deficiencies? 

Answer. A portion of prioritized outstanding deficiencies will be incorporated in 

the fielding of the next sustainment software build expected in June 2009. In addition, the C–5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program Block Software 

Upgrade program and future sustainment software builds will address the remaining deficiencies dependent on the available funding and Air Mobility Command priority. Air Mobility Command is not experiencing operational limitations and is currently supporting the strategic airlift mission with over 49,000 operational avionics 

modernization program flight hours. 

Question. How and when does the Air Force intend to fix these issues and at what 

cost? 

Answer. The Air Force will go through an iterative process and address the deficiency reports based on the available funding and Air Mobility Command priority. 

The effort will be scoped and the cost will be determined as we go through this 

iterative process. 

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Question. Besides the avionics and re-engining modifications, what other major 

modifications does the Air Force believe are needed for the C–5? Why are they needed? When should these efforts start and what are the expected costs? 

Answer. There are several major modification efforts currently needed for the C– 

5 besides avionics and re-engining modifications: Structural repair initiatives and 

Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM). The structural repair initiatives being addressed today are the repair/replacement of the C–5A/C Aft Crown 

Skin and the C–5A/C Contour Box Beam Fitting. These modifications are needed 

due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC) susceptibility of these components, leading 

to unsafe operating conditions. The C–5A Aft Crown Skin is projected to cost approximately $534 million if the Air Force decides to pursue as a modification. There 

are currently two aircraft participating in the validation/verification process. The C– 

5A Box Beam Fitting is projected to cost approximately $150 million if the Air Force 

decides to pursue as a modification. There is currently no funding in the budget for 

either of these projects and are proceeding on a ‘‘repair as necessary’’ basis. 

LAIRCM is needed due to the requirement for the large aircraft like the C–5 to operate in infrared-threatened airspace, as stated in the LAIRCM operational requirements document 314–92, dated August 1998. The program was initiated in Fiscal 

Year 2007 for 52 C–5B/M aircraft and operates under an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract for system acquisition/installation. There are 15 funded aircraft in the Fiscal Year 2009 budget. 

Question. How much does it cost today to maintain a C–5 that has not been modernized, one that has only received the avionics modernization, and one that has received both the avionics and reengining modifications? 

Answer. Operations and Support (O&S) costs are not available by specific tail 

number, we can only make predictions on the fleet-wide costs. The estimated O&S 

cost of the 111 C–5’s if not modernized is $73.1 billion from 2005 through 2040. C– 

5 fleet instrumentation must be converted from analog to digital via modernization 

to provide capabilities needed to allow continued operations in European and Pacific 

airspace and address significant vanishing vendor issues. 

The O&S cost of the 111 C–5’s if they only receive the avionics modernization is 

$84.4 billion from 2005 through 2040. The avionics modernization program is a capability improvement not a reliability improvement and allows access to ever-restrictive airspace. There are significant costs associated with hardware/software updates and new maintenance requirements for these capabilities. 

The O&S cost of the 111 C–5 Fleet that received both the avionics modernization 

and reengining modification is $66.6 billions from 2005 through 2040. The reengining modification is a reliability improvement and also increases fuel efficiency 

with new engines. It includes a mix of legacy systems, avionics modernizations and 

re-engining modifications aircraft following the production schedules that vary up 

to steady state of 59 C–5As under the avionics modernization program and 52 C– 

5Ms for the re-engining modifications. 

Question. What are the expected gains in reliability, maintainability, and availability of a modernized C–5? 

Answer. Even though the C–5 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) will realize 

some ‘‘reliability, maintainability, and availability’’ improvements, such improvements were not the program focus. The initial intent of the program was to address 

issues with obsolete parts, diminishing manufacturing source issues, the All-Weather Flight Control System and Global Air Traffic Management compliance requirements. This resulted in replacing the existing flight and engine instrument system 

and the flight control system with integrated, state-of-the-art, and cost effective systems. The C–5 AMP implemented the applicable emerging Civil Aviation Authority 

requirements for communication, navigation, and surveillance for operation in the 

global air traffic management environment. 

C–5 OVERSIZED CARGO

The C–5 is the only U.S. aircraft capable of carrying some oversized equipment 

such as generators and space launch systems. 

Question. How many C–5s are required for this unique capability? 

Answer. None. The C–5 program of record is not based on outsized cargo requirements. The Defense Department organic airlift requirements were studied and established in the 2000 Outsize/Oversize analysis of alternatives, the Mobility Capabilities Study 2005, the C–5 Nunn-McCurdy breach, and subsequent Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The current combined C–5 and C–17 programs of record 

meet these airlift requirements. There are 12 C–5 unique outsized cargo items 

which are transported on an infrequent basis to support Department of Defense and 

NASA requirements. 

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Question. Are there plans to retire equipment that must be carried by C–5s? If 

so, when? 

Answer. At this time, there are currently no plans to retire equipment that must 

be carried by a C–5. 

Question. Are there commercial carriers that could address this requirement? 

Answer. If the cargo delivery is not time sensitive, some outsized C–5 unique 

cargo, (i.e., truck with 100 kilowatt generator and truck with 475 BTU HVAC) could 

be moved via a commercial surface carrier. If delivery is time-sensitive, the AN–124 

(a foreign flag carrier) is of similar size and would be able to carry some of the C– 

5 unique outsize cargo. However, the AN–124 cannot carry NASA cargo which is 

transported on our space cargo modified C–5Cs and it will not carry the outsized 

cargo of special operations nor that of classified users. 

C–17 OPERATIONS TEMPO

Question. C–17s have been involved in a number of landing incidents in the Central Command Area of Operations of late, most notably just a couple of weeks ago 

when a C–17 landed at Bagram without its landing gear down. The Committee understands investigations are ongoing and is not looking for comment on the cause 

for each; however, the Committee is concerned these incidents may indicate a more 

serious problem. 

What can you tell us about the latest incident and what other incidents have occurred in theater with C–17s? 

Answer. Summarized below are a total of 12 C–17 landing incidents that have occurred in theater since January 2005. The accident investigation board for the latest 

incident is still in progress and its findings have not yet been released. 

Date Mishap 

Class Synopsis 

5 Jan 05 A Main landing gear lug assembly failed on landing. 

6 Jun 05 A Hard landing following low visibility instrument approach. 

7 Jul 05 B Landing gear damaged when aircraft encountered 4 to 5 inches of standing water during landing rollout. 

5 Aug 05 A Aircraft landed with right main landing gear off the runway. 

29 Aug 06 C Underside of fuselage damaged during semi-prepared runway operations (i.e., dirt field). 

5 Sep 06 C Underside of fuselage damaged during semi-prepared runway operations (i.e., dirt field). 

18 Dec 06 C Tire failed during landing and damaged right main gear. 

5 Jan 07 C Tire failed during landing and damaged left main gear. 

9 May 07 C Underside of fuselage damaged during semi-prepared runway operations (i.e., dirt field). 

24 Jul 08 C Hot brakes caused fuse plugs to deflate 6 tires. 

23 Dec 08 C Aircraft veered off the runway during landing, un-commanded. 

30 Jan 09 A Aircraft landed with the landing gear retracted. 

Question. What is your estimate on how fatigued your crew is and your aircraft 

fleet? 

Answer. We have no indicators that lead us to believe the C–17 crew force is 

chronically stressed or fatigued at this time. C–17 crewmembers have spent an average of 94.8 days TDY for the last 12 months through February 2009. This compares to 74 days for C–5, 91.3 for C–130, 122.8 for KC–10, and 118.9 for KC–135 

crewmembers. The average number of days TDY for C–17 crew members has actually decreased by over 30 days annually in the past 3 years. Waivers are rarely ever 

granted to time-tested crew duty day limits or cumulative monthly flying hour limits. Air Mobility Command (AMC) leadership and aircraft commanders proactively 

manage crew fatigue work/rest cycles to mitigate the potential for fatigue. Furthermore, AMC uses an operational risk management program to predict and 

proactively adjust missions to reduce risk factors such as fatigue. 

AMC, Air Force Materiel Command, and Boeing have a joint process in place to 

analyze C–17 fleet equivalent flying hours (stress). Through close tracking of aircraft hours and specific aircraft stress points, plus appropriate fleet rotation, AMC 

maintains an active program to predict and manage the wear and tear on the C– 

17 fleet. Based on that analysis, we do not believe the C–17 aircraft fleet is currently fatigued. 

Question. Are some of the issues a result of young pilots that just do not have 

experience in a war environment? 

Answer. Pilot experience in a war environment is at the highest levels in the last 

two decades due to the support to operations in South West Asia. Air Mobility Command (AMC) uses an operational risk management program to predict and 

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stance, operational risk management analysis dictated that Bagram airfield be designated as a ‘‘special aircrew’’ airfield. This required aircrews with a higher level 

of experience in order to fly missions to Bagram. The two primary indicators of experience are the qualification levels of aircraft commander and instructor aircraft 

commander. Aircrew must have accumulated requisite amounts of flight experience, 

received a recommendation from unit leadership, and successfully passed a rigorous 

flight and academic training program to obtain these qualifications. AMC’s aggregate C–17 pilot force is healthy (over 100% manned) in both these key instructor 

pilot and aircraft commander qualifications. Long-term, the two prime factors that 

can erode pilot experience are poor pilot retention and/or insufficient pilot flying 

rates. Currently, the Air Force, AMC, and C–17s have near record pilot retention 

rates and are regularly flying at rates that exceed programmed requirements due 

to ongoing operations. 

Question. Is the constant operations tempo weighing too hard on the force? 

Answer. No. We do not believe the C–17 crew force is overly stressed at this time. 

C–17 crewmembers have spent an average of 94.8 days TDY for the last 12 months 

through February 2009. This compares to 74 day for C–5, 91.3 for C–130, 122.8 for 

KC–10, and 118.9 for KC–135 crewmembers. 

We have also changed the way we utilize the C–17 to help reduce the operations 

tempo of the C–17 crew force. We now provide two squadrons of C–17s to the theater on a full time basis, negating the need to continually move assets back and 

forth to support intra-theater operations. This reduced the average TDY days for the 

C–17 crew force by almost 30 days annually. 

Question. What are your risk mitigation factors to combat a fatigued force? 

Answer. From an operational perspective, we use a multi-tiered risk analysis 

process. The mission planners, the squadron leadership, and the aircraft commander 

all analyze the risks of a given mission prior to execution using Operational Risk 

Management. If an increased risk is identified, it is mitigated either by changing 

the crew composition (for example adding more experienced crewmembers) or by 

changing the mission conditions (for example flying during daylight hours). 

As highlighted above, there is leadership involvement throughout the entire mission planning and execution chain to ensure we are providing the best resource, 

whether it is aircraft or aircrew to execute the mission. 

Part of the leadership involvement includes monitoring aircrew flying hours during the previous 30, 60 and 90 days. Regulations allow a maximum number of hours 

during each of those periods to ensure we are not overstressing the crew members. 

We also let our aircraft commanders make a safety call. During execution, if the 

aircraft commander deems that risk or fatigue may possibly endanger the mission, 

he or she is empowered to either lower the risk if possible or delay the mission until 

conditions improve. 

Above all, Air Mobility Command instills a culture of safety at all levels. 

Question. Has the Air Force considered increasing the crew ratio for strategic assets to address crew fatigue? 

Answer. Currently, the operations tempo of the C–17 is such that there has been 

no requirement to increase the crew ratio. We continue to monitor the crew force 

and don’t see any issue with crew fatigue across the force. With additional C–17s 

coming on-line, the additive effect of those aircraft should also continue to push 

down the operations tempo on the entire C–17 fleet. 

Also, the C–17 has the highest crew ratio in the Mobility Air Forces (MAF) at 

3.0 for the active component. Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) C–17 associate 

units are manned at a 2.0 crew ratio. AFRC and Air National Guard unit equipped 

C–17 units vary between a 3.0 and 5.0 crew ratio. The next highest crew ratio in 

the MAF is 2.25 for active component C–130s. The C–5 crew ratio is 1.8 for the active units, with an equivalent 1.8 for their Associate Reserve Units. 

FUTURE C–17 PROCUREMENT

Question. The C–17 program of record has increased over the last several years. 

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2005 Mobility Capabilities Study 

both determined a need for 180 C–17s to meet strategic airlift requirements; this 

number assumed that the entire C–5 fleet received avionics upgrades and new engines. In 2008, following a cutback in the C–5 modernization plans; officials stated 

a need for 190 aircraft. The two mobility studies are expected to identify airlift requirements and support decisions on future force size and mix. 

How do the ongoing mobility studies address the C–17s dual role in providing 

both a strategic and tactical airlift capabilities? 

Answer. The ongoing mobility studies utilize C–17s as either strategic or tactical 

aircraft while ensuring that no assets are utilized in both roles simultaneously. The 

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studies are structured to model aircraft throughout their entire mission capability 

spectrum. The models themselves determine which role provides the maximum impact to closure and will utilize them in that capacity. 

Question. Will the studies quantify numbers expected to be used in a tactical 

intra-theater role and are these numbers then not considered available for meeting 

the strategic inter-theater requirements? 

Answer. Yes. The studies will quantify the number of C–17s utilized in a tactical 

intra-theater role. The studies are structured to model cargo and personnel flow 

from end-to-end and thus capture any platform’s utility across the array of missions 

it can perform. The end-to-end modeling structure ensures assets are not in use in 

more than one mission simultaneously. 

C–17 AS STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL AIRLIFT

Question. The C–17 is the only airlifter capable of providing both strategic (intertheater) and tactical (intra-theater) airlift. 

How and to what extent is the C–17 currently employed in a tactical role supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. Currently, approximately 50 percent of Air Mobility Command’s daily C– 

17 operations are directly supporting Iraq and Afghanistan with 28 percent of the 

C–17 sorties supporting intra-theater (tactical) missions. Of those, the tactical missions include using the C–17 for airdrop to remote forward operating bases; airland 

sorties to fully-improved runways, short-field (assault) runways and semi-improved 

surface runways. The C–17 will also use night vision goggles during both inter-theater and intra-theater missions. Based on the threat, many of the C–17 missions 

also accomplish tactical arrival and departures in combination with the use of defensive systems, such as LAIRCM, to mitigate the potential threat. 

Question. Are its tactical airlift responsibilities expected to increase in the future? 

Answer. The C–17 is an extremely versatile and capable aircraft. As operations 

in Afghanistan increase, so will the requirement for air-drop, semi-improved surface 

and air refueling operations. Airlift operations in Iraq will still be required to support the remaining forces in place, utilizing both intra-theater and inter-theater assets. Ultimately, the future requirement of the warfighter will dictate whether C– 

17s- will be needed to a greater extent in the tactical role. On a daily basis, command and control decisions are made to optimize the balance of C–17s and C–130s 

used in the tactical role. 

Question. Is it the only aircraft capable of delivering Army Stryker units today 

within the theater of operations and to more austere fields? 

Answer. The C–17 is not the only aircraft capable of delivering Army Stryker 

units. The C–5 is also capable of delivering Army Stryker units to theater airfields 

that can support it. The C–17, however, does have access to more austere airfields 

than the C–5. 

Question. What other equipment cannot be delivered intra-theater by the C–130 

fleet? 

Answer. The C–130 can carry oversize equipment, bulk cargo, and passengers, but 

it cannot carry outsize equipment. Examples of outsize equipment include the 

Abrams M1 main battle tank, the AV8B Harrier aircraft, and the CH–47 helicopter. 

The C–17 can carry outsize equipment in addition to the equipment, cargo and passengers the C–130 can carry. 

Bulk cargo can be loaded onto a 463L pallet and does not exceed 104 inches in 

width, 84 inches in length or 96 inches in height. Oversize cargo cannot be loaded 

onto a 463L pallet but does not exceed 810 inches in length, 117 inches in width 

or 96 inches in height. Outsize cargo exceeds 810 inches in length, 117 inches in 

width or 96 inches in height, but can be loaded onto C–17 or C–5 aircraft. 

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT (JCA) MISSIONS

Question. The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA), now designated the C–27J, is a joint 

program between the Army and Air Force to procure, field, and sustain a multifunctional fixed wing cargo aircraft. 

Does the Air Force currently have a stated and validated need for the C–27J? Is 

it expected to replace any aircraft currently in inventory? What capability gap does 

it address? What is the analysis behind the 24 aircraft in the Air Force program 

of record? 

Answer. Yes. The Air Force has a Department of Defense validated need for the 

C–27J to support the Time Sensitive/Mission Critical (TS/MC) resupply of Army 

forces. The C–27J is not expected to replace any aircraft currently in the Air Force 

inventory. However, the C–27J is expected to replace the Army’s fleet of C–23s. The 

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ments Oversight Council. The foundation of the analysis behind the Air Force program of record is the May 2007 Department of Defense validated the JCA Analysis 

of Alternatives for 75 aircraft to meet Army TS/MC resupply demand. The Department of Defense directed this requirement would be met jointly by the Army with 

54 aircraft and the Air Force with 24 aircraft. 

Question. Will the Air Force use the C–27J to perform intra-theater airlift operations as part of their common user pool or will it be dedicated to the Army’s time 

sensitive cargo? Will Army aircraft be available for common user pool requirements? 

In a theater of operations, who will control scheduling and ownership of these assets? 

Answer. The Department of Defense Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, dated January 2009, determined Air Force C–27Js will conduct Army direct 

support missions when requested and the Army will integrate its C–27Js into the 

common-user pool when available/allocated. Scheduling control and ownership is 

done by the Deployment Distribution Operations Centers within geographic combatant command structures. It can better integrate and optimize distribution operations. 

Question. Will distributing the Air Force C–27J fleet among five or six Air National Guard bases hamper or enable satisfying the Army’s time sensitive/mission 

critical missions? 

Answer. The Army’s time sensitive/mission critical requirement is an in-theater 

need. Continental U.S. basing decisions should not affect in-theater utilization. 

MOBILITY CAPABILITY STUDIES

Question. The Department has two studies ongoing to help determine the proper 

size and mix of future airlift forces, a congressionally-directed airlift requirements 

study by the Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA) and a mobility capabilities requirements study to project force requirement in 2016. Results from these studies, the 

timing, and use of information is crucial for making near-term decisions on C–17 

procurement or shutting down the production line, C–5 and C–130 modernizations, 

potential C–5 retirements, and future airlift options. Some officials believe the studies indicate a need for more airlift due to increased troop strengths, heavier Army 

equipment, establishment of the African Command, and decreased forward presence 

of U.S. forces. 

What are the preliminary results of the studies that can be shared at this time? 

Answer. The Congressionally-directed airlift requirements study by the Institute 

of Defense Analyses was submitted to the Congress in March 2009. It found the current program of record for airlift is adequate to meet the requirements identified 

in MCS for moderate acceptable risk. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (PA&E) 

and U.S. Transportation Command led Mobility Capabilities and Requirements 

Study 2016 is in progress and there are no preliminary results available at this 

time. The report from that study is expected in December 2009. 

Question. Are there indications that more airlift or a different mix is needed? 

Answer. To date, there are no indications that more airlift or a different mix is 

needed. The Congressionally-directed airlift requirements study by the Institute of 

Defense Analyses (IDA) was submitted to Congress in March 2009. It found the current program of record for airlift is adequate to meet the requirements identified 

in MCS for moderate acceptable risk. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (PA&E) 

and U.S. Transportation Command led Mobility Capabilities and Requirements 

Study 2016 is in progress. The report from that study is expected in December 2009. 

Question. What kind and detail of information will be briefed, and when? 

Answer. The Congressionally-directed airlift requirements study by the Institute 

of Defense Analyses (IDA) was briefed to U.S. Transportation Command in December 2008 and submitted to Congress in March 2009. It found the current program 

of record for airlift is adequate to meet the requirements identified in MCS for moderate acceptable risk. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (PA&E) and U.S. 

Transportation Command led Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 

is in progress. This study will assess the end-to-end Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise to determine the mobility capabilities and requirements needed to 

support the National Security Strategy in 2016. The report from that study is expected in December 2009. 

Question. When does the department expect to release its completed findings? 

Answer. The Department expects to release its findings in December 2009. 

MOBILITY CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS STUDY METRICS

Question. It was reported last year that Department of Defense officials had not 

yet decided on the metrics and plans for using metrics to inform the 2016 mobility 

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requirements study. The prior study in 2005 lacked some important metrics and 

data to define and quantify capacity requirements as a basis for computing the size 

and optimal mix of airlift forces and for assessing the impacts of alternate force levels on achieving warfighting objectives 

(Has the Department of Defense decided which metrics to use in its study? What 

are they? Do these metrics include a specific strategic airlift requirement expressed 

in million ton-miles per day? What are the primary metrics for evaluating tactical 

airlift requirements? 

Answer. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study has a set of 75 

metrics arranged in three tiers. Tier I measures time definite delivery of units and 

sustainment and has direct impact on the warfighter. Tier II measures Availability 

of Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise Assets and Infrastructure. Tier II 

assets are watercraft, aircraft, ground transportation and infrastructure. Tier II 

metrics inform Tier I metrics. Finally, Tier III metrics are the basic measures that 

inform Tier II metrics and are used for analysis. Tails used and Million Ton Miles 

per Day are Tier III metrics. 

Question. Does TRANSCOM plan to use metrics, including a ton-miles per day 

metric, for the study in describing any gaps, shortfalls, or redundancies in capabilities for the C–17 and the C–5? 

Answer. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study has a set of 75 

metrics arranged in three tiers. Tier I measures time definite delivery of units and 

sustainment and has direct impact on the warfighter. Tier II measures Availability 

of Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise Assets and Infrastructure. Tier II 

assets are watercraft, aircraft, ground transportation and infrastructure. Tier II 

metrics inform Tier I metrics. Finally, Tier III metrics are the basic measures that 

inform Tier II metrics and are used for analysis. 

Tails used and Million Ton Miles per Day are Tier III metrics. These metrics will 

be used to describe any gaps, shortfall, or redundancies in capabilities for the C– 

17 and the C–5. 

Question. How will the study address the C–17’s dual role in providing both strategic and tactical airlift capabilities? Do the studies quantify numbers to be used 

in a tactical intra-theater role and are these numbers then not considered available 

for the strategic inter-theater role? 

Answer. The study is structured to model cargo and personnel flow from end-toend and thus capture any platform’s utility across the array of missions it can perform. The end-to-end modeling structure ensures assets are not in use in more than 

one mission simultaneously. 

Question. To what extent will requirements include civil reserve air fleet requirements expressed in terms of passenger-miles per day metric and resulting overages 

and/or shortfalls expressed in the same metric? 

Answer. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study plans to measure aircraft use in tails and Million Ton Miles per Day. There is no specific plan to express 

the requirement in terms of Million Passenger Miles per Day for civil reserve air 

fleet passenger aircraft, but the tails measurement of this metric can be transformed into Million Passenger Miles per Day. 

INDUSTRIAL BASE

Question. In the past few years, defense policy makers have expressed concern 

that further consolidation in the industry that designs and manufacturers U.S. military aircraft, which now consist of three prime contractors (in contrast to 11 in 

1960), will cause the Department of Defense to acquire aircraft that are designed 

and produced in a far less competitive and innovative environment than they were 

in the past. 

Describe the military combat aircraft industry? 

Answer. Today’s military combat aircraft industry consists of several tiers. The 

first tier consists of those few companies with the resources to provide the overall 

design and integration of systems into an airframe. The next tier consists of companies that produce major components, such as engines and avionics. Supporting these 

tiers are the firms that produce the various parts that make up the engines or 

major structural elements of the airframe and subsystems, such as integrated circuits, printed circuit boards, and metal or composite parts. At the foundation of the 

industry are the suppliers of the raw materials needed to fabricate all the parts. 

Question. With the limited number of vendors, is the U.S. military able to maintain a high level of innovation in the military aircraft industry? 

Answer. Yes. The U.S. military is able to maintain a relatively high level of innovation in the military aircraft industry. Although fewer in number today, vendors 

still have to compete for business in the military aircraft arena and it is in their 

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own self-interest to attract and retain talented individuals capable of the creative 

thinking that leads to innovative, new ideas. This talent is not limited only to the 

design and development of new weapon systems; rather, today’s military aircraft industry has shown itself to be adaptable at generating innovative ideas for incorporating new technologies into existing aircraft as well. Innovation can also come 

from sources outside the traditional aerospace industrial base as evidenced by new 

developments in unmanned aerial systems and in composite materials, both of 

which have military aircraft applications. In this regard, the Air Force Science and 

Technology Program is fundamental in funding and focusing innovative research 

with industry and universities in areas directly feeding into the military aircraft industrial base, such as turbine engines. In addition, programs such as the University 

Research Initiative, Defense Acquisition Challenge, and Small Business Innovation 

Research are another avenue by which innovation is stimulated and rewarded. The 

Air Force does not depend on a limited pool of vendors, but uses a variety of avenues to seek out and encourage innovation. 

Question. What are the prospects for innovation and competition in the military 

aircraft industry? 

Answer. Prospects for both innovation and competition in the military aircraft industry are still viable despite today’s smaller number of prime contractors; however, 

when looking at the industry’s second and third tier suppliers, prospects are a bit 

less favorable. The U.S. aerospace industry has been at the forefront of innovation 

since the development of manned flight. The early stages of the industry were 

marked by the rise of many competing firms with innovations occurring at a rapid 

pace. As the technology and industry matured, market forces resulted in some firms 

choosing to exit with others consolidating to improve their ability to compete. Today’s operating environment for the U.S. aerospace industry is still marked by innovation, while competition is now on a more global level—the military aircraft industry, as part of this larger U.S. aerospace industry, is subject to the same forces that 

act upon the entire industry. It should also be noted that innovative technologies 

stemming from the Air Force Science and Technology Program and its partnership 

with industry feed into the military aircraft industrial base enhancing its competitive edge. This is especially true in the area of turbine engines. 

Question. What policy options does the U.S. military have concerning the consolidation of the U.S. aircraft industry? 

Answer. There really are no specific U.S. military policy options as regards the 

consolidation of the U.S. aircraft industry; however, when there are concerns over 

the potential impact consolidation might have on competition, the military can take 

actions such as funding the development of competing prototypes to ameliorate 

those concerns. In addition, early systems engineering and development of reliable 

cost estimates position the U.S. military to better negotiate the best value for its 

procurement dollars. Along these lines, a recent report by the Defense Science Board 

titled, ‘‘Creating an Effective National Security Industrial Base for the 21st Century,’’ recommended policy options to maintain competitive sources to include funding competitive suppliers, periodic competitions for system upgrades on major programs, and selecting two suppliers who would continue to compete for a share of 

the buy, among others. As long as the U.S. aircraft industry remains capable of effectively and efficiently providing for the needs of the warfighter, the focus of the 

U.S. military will be primarily on the products provided rather than the organization of that industry. Future Air Force warfighting capability needs and available 

funding will define the U.S. military aircraft industry. 

Question. What do you see as the future for mobility aircraft production capability? 

Answer. As in the past, the future capability to produce mobility aircraft will remain closely tied to the health of the U.S. aerospace industrial base as the military 

does not have the financial means to meet its current requirements while paying 

companies to maintain a ‘‘warm’’ industrial capacity in terms of either engineering 

talent or facilities. There are many areas where the commercial aerospace industry 

and the military aircraft industry overlap. In the case of fighter aircraft, the area 

of intersection is limited. In the case of mobility aircraft, the area of intersection 

can be significant. Even a cursory review of the various mobility aircraft used in 

the past would reveal those uniquely designed and produced for the military, such 

as the Lockheed C–141 Starlifter or the Boeing C–17 Skymaster III, and those 

adapted by the military from a commercial aircraft design, such as the Douglas DC– 

3 (C–47 Skytrain) or the McDonnell Douglas DC–10 (KC–10 Extender). In each 

case, the military benefits from having a viable commercial aerospace industry that 

can provide the engineering and design talent, as well as the facilities and supporting infrastructure of suppliers, to meet the infrequent demands of producing 

mobility aircraft. 

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601 

This is not to say that there are no areas of concern. Some aspects of any military 

aircraft require different engineering design considerations than those used for commercial aircraft and the military operating environment tends to be more demanding. Until near the end of the Cold War, the demands of the military enabled the 

aerospace industry to develop and maintain a cadre of engineers conversant with 

these military unique design considerations and to maintain the facilities for production of those aircraft. The industry also included a large manufacturing base 

upon which to draw. That operating environment has changed. The current cadre 

of designers and engineers is aging and there are few new military aircraft, either 

mobility or combat, under consideration. The C–17 production line will soon close 

with no replacement and, while the C–130 continues in production, it has become 

its own replacement using the same production facilities. As such, it is expected that 

the military will be more dependent on the health of the U.S. aerospace industry 

than previously. 

LARGE AIRCRAFT INFRARED COUNTER MEASURES (LAIRCM) 

Question. LAIRCM is designed to counter the increasing threat that large, slowmoving cargo aircraft face from shoulder-fired missiles and missiles launched from 

vehicles. The system automatically detects the heat-seeking missiles and puts out 

a signal to confuse its path and direct it away from the aircraft. 

What is the requirement for LAIRCM for the mobility fleet? 

Answer. The current requirement for Large Aircraft Infrared Counter Measures 

(LAIRCM) capability was defined in the 1998 Operational Requirements Document 

and the 2001 Operational Requirements Document Annex. Air Mobility Command 

previously established a requirement of 444 LAIRCM-equipped aircraft. LAIRCM 

quantities are currently being readdressed in a Department of Defense-directed 

study. This study takes into account revised major contingency operations plans and 

threat progression since 2004, and results are due April 30, 2009. 

Question. How is the Air Force addressing the requirement? 

Answer. The Air Force is addressing the requirement through two ways: Adequate 

funding and ensuring growing requirements are documented within the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense. The Air Mobility Command funds, and seeks additional funds, 

to provide the increased protection of LAIRCM to as many aircraft as possible, ensuring enough aircraft remain available on a daily basis to support the warfighter’s 

needs. LAIRCM quantities are currently being readdressed in an Office of the Secretary of Defense-directed study. This study takes into account revised Major Contingency Operations Plans and threat progression since 2004. The results of this 

study are due April 2009. 

Question. How do you decide which aircraft will have this system installed and 

how do you develop the installation schedule? 

Answer. Air Mobility Command decides which aircraft will have LAIRCM installed based on operational capability requirements. Mission taskings into higher 

threat environments have driven the current installation priority order of the C– 

17, followed by the C–130, C–5, C–40, C–37, C–20, KC–135, and KC–10 aircraft. Installation schedule is determined by the aircraft modification facility capacity and 

equipment procurement lead times. 

Question. What is the cost of the LAIRCM per aircraft? 

Answer. There are 17 different LAIRCM configurations with final costs depending 

on airframe type and configuration. The figures in the table below represent the 

final configuration costs per airframe. There have been lower costs based on ‘‘lite’’ 

configurations and/or use of baseline equipment. Equipment costs depicted in the 

table include costs for LAIRCM Line Replaceable Units, support, spares, and other 

costs. The C–130J cost depends on work scheduled to begin this year. 

Cost of LAIRCM per aircraft ranges between $4–$10 million 

[Dollars in millions] 

Platform Install 

Costs 

Equipment 

Costs 

Total 

Costs 

C–17 ..................................................................................................... $2 .0 $5 .8 $7 .8 

C–5 ....................................................................................................... 4 .5 5 .4 9 .9 

C–130 (various) .................................................................................... 0 .8 4 .5 5 .3 

C–130J .................................................................................................. 1–4 4–6 5–10 

VIP Special Air Mission ......................................................................... 2–5 2–3 .3 4–8 .3 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 

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W I T N E S S E S 

Page 

Coffey, Carole ........................................................................................................... 55 

Dodaro, G. L ............................................................................................................. 55 

Donley, M. B ............................................................................................................ 1 

Embrey, E. P ............................................................................................................ 431 

Fullhart, Major General R. D ................................................................................. 515 

Heddell, G. S ............................................................................................................ 353 

Lichte, General A. J ................................................................................................. 515 

McNabb, General D. J ............................................................................................. 515 

Schinasi, K. V ........................................................................................................... 55 

Schwartz, General N. A ........................................................................................... 1 

Sullivan, Michael ..................................................................................................... 55 

Sutton, Brigadier General, L. K ............................................................................. 431 

Thompson, Lieutenant General N. R., III ............................................................. 283 

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