NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT

AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

EDNA MAE REWERS, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

DUSAN PAUL POPE, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0007

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2008-053605

The Honorable John R. Doody, Commissioner

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Hammerman & Hultgren, P.C., Phoenix

By Jon R. Hultgren, Allan R. Draper

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

C. Robert Collins, Phoenix

By C. Robert Collins

Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
REWERS v. POPE

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Chief Judge Diane M. Johnsen 

joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Pope appeals from the denial of his motion to dismiss a 

foreign judgment against him for child support arrearages. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Pope and Rewers were married and lived with their 

daughter in Illinois until 1980, when they moved to California. They 

divorced in September 1984, and the Orange County, California, Superior 

Court entered a dissolution decree. Primary physical custody of the child 

was awarded to the child’s mother, Rewers, and the child’s father, Pope, 

was ordered to pay child support.

¶3 Rewers and her daughter moved back to Illinois, and in 

September 1993, Rewers petitioned to domesticate the California decree in 

the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, and petitioned for an order to 

show cause why Pope had not paid child support. An Illinois attorney 

filed an appearance on behalf of Pope and moved to quash service of 

Rewers’ petitions claiming that Pope was not subject to personal 

jurisdiction in Cook County. The court found it had jurisdiction over 

Pope, however. Litigation continued between the parties until May 1995, 

when the parties entered a settlement agreement stating that Pope must

pay Rewers for child support arrearages from January 1, 1987, to June 1, 

1995. It also provided that Pope must pay Rewers monthly support for a 

year and a portion of the child’s future expenses, including college, 

medical, and dental expenses. The court entered this order.

¶4 Pope retired to Arizona in 2007, and in November 2008, 

Rewers filed the Illinois judgment in Arizona pursuant to the Uniform 

Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act. A.R.S. §§ 12-1701 to -1708. For 

several years that followed, the record reveals no action taken regarding 

the matter.
REWERS v. POPE

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 In May 2012, Rewers filed a Petition in Support of 

Supplemental Proceedings, requesting that the court require Pope to 

appear and answer questions concerning his assets pursuant to A.R.S. 

§§ 12–1631 and -1632. Pope responded with a “Motion and Memorandum 

in Support of Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice,” stating that he had no 

knowledge of the Illinois judgment and that it was fraudulent. Pope 

further stated that he had paid all child support owed under the 

California decree but could not now produce proof of his previous 

payments. He argued that the Illinois court lacked personal jurisdiction,

the doctrines of equitable estoppel and laches applied to prevent Rewers 

from pursuing the judgment, and the statute of limitations barred the 

action. He attached to the motion a signed affidavit supporting his factual 

allegations. Rewers opposed the motion.

¶6 The court denied Pope’s motion to dismiss, and rejected 

Pope’s challenge to the validity of the Illinois judgment, noting that the 

Illinois court records demonstrated that Pope had hired an attorney to 

represent him in the case and contest jurisdiction, and stated that “it 

appears that Mr. Pope swore a false affidavit.” The court found that the 

Illinois judgment was validly entered and the statute of limitation had not 

run. It also noted that Pope’s false affidavit “adds an element of ‘unclean 

hands’ which further bars him from invoking the doctrine of laches.”

¶7 On October 2, 2012, Pope moved to “Continue Supplemental 

Hearing & To Determine Amount Due,” asking the court to continue the 

hearing so that “the Court [can] set a hearing and determine how much 

the Court believes he owes and to allow him an opportunity to explain 

what the Court has found to be false in his affidavit.” The court heard 

brief oral argument on Pope’s motion and denied it.1 The judgment debtor 

exam of Pope began with further examination to be held later in the 

month.

¶8 The trial court consequently issued a judgment denying 

Pope’s motion to dismiss. In the minute entry accompanying the 

judgment, the court noted that Pope had argued that the court erred in

denying the motion to dismiss without holding a hearing on whether his 

affidavit was willfully false or whether he had a lapse of memory. The 

court stated that it denied the motion to dismiss because it was wrong, 

regardless of its falsity. Pope timely appeals the judgment.

 

1 Pope did not provide this Court with a record of the proceedings.
REWERS v. POPE

Decision of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

¶9 Pope argues that (1) the California and Arizona statute of 

limitations barred the enforcement of the judgment, (2) the court should 

have held a hearing allowing Pope to explain why his affidavit was false 

and to determine how much child support was owed, and (3) the doctrine 

of laches barred the enforcement of the judgment.2

I. Statute of Limitations

¶10 Pope asserts that the judgment cannot be enforced because 

California law provides that child support payments must be collected 

within ten years, and— “assuming without admitting” that child support 

payment was due when his daughter turned 18, on March 14, 1996—

Rewers had only until March 13, 2006, to collect arrears.3 We review de 

novo whether the trial court erred in applying the law relating to the 

statute of limitations defense. Logerquist v. Danforth, 188 Ariz. 16, 18, 932 

P.2d 281, 283 (App. 1996). We reject Pope’s argument because the 

California statute of limitation is inapplicable. 

¶11 Arizona has adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support 

Act. See A.R.S. § 25-1201. It provides that “[i]n a proceeding for arrears 

under a registered support order, the statute of limitation of this state or of 

the issuing state, whichever is longer, applies.” A.R.S. § 25-1304(B). The 

“issuing state” is defined as “the state in which a tribunal issues a support 

order or renders a judgment determining parentage.” A.R.S. § 25-1202(9). 

“Support order” means “a judgment, decree, order or directive . . . for the 

benefit of a child . . . or former spouse, that provides for monetary 

support, heath care, arrearages or reimbursement . . . .” A.R.S. § 25-

1202(24). The Illinois judgment is therefore a “support order.” Because 

 2 For the first time on appeal, Pope argues that the Illinois judgment 

is not actually a judgment. He cites decisions identifying elements of a 

judgment, but does not state why the Illinois judgment fails to meet those 

elements. Regardless, the argument was not raised before the trial court 

and is therefore waived on appeal. See In re MH 2008-002659, 224 Ariz. 25, 

27 ¶ 9, 226 P.3d 394, 396 (App. 2010).

3 Alternatively, Pope also argues that A.R.S. § 25-403(H) (2004), the 

statute in effect in Arizona in 2006, bars this action. This argument was 

raised for the first time on appeal, and is therefore waived. See In re MH 

2008-002659, 224 Ariz. at 27 ¶ 9, 226 P.3d at 396. 
REWERS v. POPE

Decision of the Court

5

Rewers domesticated the Illinois judgment, and not the California divorce 

decree, Illinois is the issuing state, not California, and the statute of 

limitation of Arizona or Illinois could apply. 

¶12 Arizona’s relevant statute provides that “[n]otwithstanding 

any other law, any judgment for support and for associated costs and 

attorney fees is exempt from renewal and is enforceable until paid in full.” 

A.R.S. § 25-503(K). The statute also provides that “if the oblige . . . make[s] 

efforts to collect a child support debt more than ten years after the 

emancipation of the youngest child subject to the order, the obligor may 

assert as a defense, and has the burden to prove, that the obligee . . . 

unreasonably delayed in attempting to collect the child support debt.” 

A.R.S. § 25-503(J).

¶13 In this case, Rewers submitted a settlement agreement from 

Illinois regarding child support arrearages. Arrearages are included in the 

definition of support, and therefore the settlement is enforceable until 

paid in full. Pope’s daughter became emancipated upon her eighteenth 

birthday on March 14, 1996. Rewers did not attempt to domesticate the 

judgment in Arizona until November 21, 2008; therefore, pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 25-503(J), Pope may assert as a defense to any attempt by Rewers 

to execute on the judgment that Rewers had unreasonably delayed in 

attempting to collect the debt. But this defense does not prevent 

domestication of the judgment. Therefore, the court did not err rejecting 

the motion to dismiss.

II. Evidentiary Hearing 

¶14 Pope also argues that the trial court was required to hold an 

evidentiary hearing to allow him to explain the inconsistencies in his 

affidavit and to determine how much child support he owed. We review 

the trial court’s decision not to hold a hearing for an abuse of discretion. 

Pioneer Fed. Sav. Bank v. Driver, 166 Ariz. 585, 589, 804 P.2d 118, 122 (App. 

1990). “[A] trial court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing if ‘the 

facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative 

value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people 

could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the 

claim or defense.’” Brake Masters Sys., Inc. v. Gabbay, 206 Ariz. 360, 365

¶ 14, 78 P.3d 1081, 1086 (App. 2003) (quoting Ruelas v. Staff Builders Pers. 

Serv., Inc., 199 Ariz. 344, 347 ¶ 7, 18 P.3d 138, 141 (App. 2001)).

¶15 We agree with the trial court that a hearing was not 

necessary for Pope to explain any inconsistencies in his affidavit. To 
REWERS v. POPE

Decision of the Court

6

enforce a judgment from another state, a party may file a properly 

authenticated copy of that judgment in the superior court pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 12–1702. Rewers filed a properly authenticated copy of the Illinois 

judgment and the trial court accepted it. Whether Pope forgot about the 

Illinois proceedings or lied to the court concerning those proceedings had 

no relevance to whether the judgment should have been filed and 

accepted. Moreover, whatever relevance an explanation may have had, 

Pope had the opportunity through counsel to explain the inconsistencies 

to the trial court at the hearing on the motion. Because Pope did not 

include a transcript of the hearing, we presume that the record supports 

the trial court’s ruling. Kohler v. Kohler, 211 Ariz. 106, 108 ¶ 8 n.1, 118 P.3d 

621, 623 n.1 (App. 2005).

¶16 We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in rejecting Pope’s request for an evidentiary hearing on the amount of 

child support Pope owed. A judgment debtor is certainly entitled to argue 

that he has already satisfied a domesticated judgment. A.R.S. § 12–1702 

(“A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same 

procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying 

as a judgment of a superior court of this state . . . .”); Jones v. Roach, 118 

Ariz. 146, 150, 575 P.2d 345, 349 (App. 1977) (prior payment is proper 

defense). Although Pope may defend an action to collect on the judgment 

by claiming that he has already satisfied part or all of the arrearages, at the 

time of the hearing, Rewers had not yet instituted any collection 

proceedings. Thus, any question about the amount Pope still owed was 

premature, and the trial court was well within its discretion to decline to 

hold an evidentiary hearing.

III. Laches

¶17 Pope argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his defense 

of laches because Rewers’ delay in enforcing the Illinois judgment was 

unreasonable and the delay caused him to lose his records of child 

support payment. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on laches for 

an abuse of discretion. McLaughlin v. Bennett, 225 Ariz. 351, 353 ¶ 5, 238 

P.3d 619, 621 (2010). The equitable doctrine of laches applies when delay is 

unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party. League of 

Ariz. Cities and Towns v. Martin, 219 Ariz. 556, 558 ¶ 6, 201 P.3d 517, 519 

(2009). Equity does not encourage the use of laches, and the doctrine “may 

not be invoked to defeat justice but only to prevent injustice.” Beltran v. 

Razo, 163 Ariz. 505, 507, 788 P.2d 1256, 1258 (App. 1990). In child support 

cases, the doctrine requires the obligor to establish laches by clear and 
REWERS v. POPE

Decision of the Court

7

compelling evidence. Schnepp v. State ex rel. Dept. of Econ. Sec., 183 Ariz. 24, 

30, 899 P.2d 185, 191 (App. 1995).

¶18 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Pope’s 

arguments. To the extent that Pope argued that laches precluded the mere 

domestication of the Illinois judgment, he is wrong. Domestication of a 

foreign judgment requires only the filing of a properly authenticated 

foreign judgment in the superior court. A.R.S. § 12–1702. Laches is 

inapplicable. To the extent that Pope argued that laches should prevent 

the collection of the arrearages owed under the Illinois judgment, the issue 

was premature because although Rewers had called for a debtor’s 

examination to determine Pope’s assets, Rewers had yet to institute 

collection proceedings against Pope. 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

¶19 Rewers requests a fee award under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, which 

provides for a fee award in any contested action arising out of contract. 

Because this action arose out of Pope’s alleged failure to abide by the 

settlement agreement, the action arose out of contract. As the successful 

party on appeal, Rewers is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’

fees and costs upon her compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate 

Procedure 21 and pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-342.

CONCLUSION

¶20 We affirm the trial court’s domestication of the Illinois 

judgment.