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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

111TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

S. PRT. 

2010

111–47 

COMMON ENEMY, COMMON STRUGGLE: 

PROGRESS IN U.S.-MEXICAN EFFORTS 

TO DEFEAT ORGANIZED CRIME 

AND DRUG TRAFFICKING 

A REPORT 

TO THE MEMBERS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 18, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


seneagle
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v 

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 

Background .............................................................................................................. 3 

Observations ............................................................................................................. 6 

Recommendations .................................................................................................... 12 

Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 14 

APPENDIXES

Appendix I ................................................................................................................ 17 

Appendix II ............................................................................................................... 18 

Appendix III ............................................................................................................. 19 

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC, May 18, 2010. 

DEAR COLLEAGUE: From April 28 to May 1, 2010, I directed my 

senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff member 

for Latin America, Carl Meacham, to visit Mexico City to assess 

the Obama Administration’s recent 2011 budget request of $310 

million for the Me ́rida Initiative. 

The Me ́rida Initiative, proposed to the U.S. Congress by former 

President George W. Bush in the fall of 2007, is a multi-year and 

multi-country effort (involving Mexico, the Dominican Republic, 

Haiti, and the nations of Central America) to provide equipment, 

training, and technical assistance for long-term reform and oversight of security agencies. The Initiative has allocated more than 

$1.3 billion for Mexico from 2008 to 2010, nearly a 10-fold increase 

above 2007 levels of assistance to that country. As a result, Mexico 

is now the top recipient of U.S. assistance in the Western Hemisphere. 

The Me ́rida Initiative was put forward to support the Mexican 

Government’s stepped-up efforts against organized crime and drug 

trafficking, which pose a serious threat to public security and economic well-being. Because of the Me ́rida Initiative, relevant security agencies on opposite sides have strengthened cooperation, establishing regular, secure communications and routinely exchanging information at an operational level. This leap forward in collaboration along the border has resulted in dramatic progress in 

drug seizures and extraditions. But most importantly, our assistance and collaboration has helped Mexico develop stronger institutions to fight organized crime and drug trafficking. 

The Mexican Government is continuing to seek ways to improve 

its capacity to combat these threats. Chief among its efforts is the 

reform and consolidation of police forces nation-wide. With U.S. collaboration, the reform of the federal police force, numbering more 

than 30,000 officers, is moving forward. But little progress has 

been made on a framework for organizing the 2,022 state and local 

police forces spread among 31 states and the Federal District. Reform of these state and local units is essential to the success of 

Mexico’s anti-crime initiatives, because they constitute more than 

90 percent of Mexico’s police strength. 

(V)

vi 

This report highlights the need to deepen the partnership between the United States and Mexico in a way that respects our 

mutual sovereignty and yet addresses the shared problems caused 

by criminal organizations operating on both sides of the border. By 

history, by geography, and by family ties, the United States and 

Mexico are natural partners. Our policies toward Mexico should reflect our common interests and objectives. 

In the run-up to Mexican President Felipe Caldero ́n’s state visit 

on May 19–20, I hope this report will help stimulate broader debate on the importance of building a closer partnership that will 

improve our capacity to address shared challenges. 

Though we still have a long way to go, it is clear that efforts to 

fight the common threat posed to our societies by drug traffickers 

and organized crime are showing positive results and should be 

bolstered. I look forward to continuing to work with you on these 

issues, and welcome any comments you may have. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

Ranking Member. 

(1) 

1Statement by Senator Lugar for field hearing on ‘‘U.S.-Mexico Border Violence,’’ March 30, 

2009. 2Trans-Border Institute, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001–2009, January 2010. 3William Booth, ‘‘A deadly new front in Mexico’s drug war: Nation’s northeast is seized by 

terror as cartels’ feud escalates,’’ Washington Post, April 21, 2010. 

COMMON ENEMY, COMMON STRUGGLE: 

PROGRESS IN U.S.-MEXICAN EFFORTS 

TO DEFEAT ORGANIZED CRIME 

AND DRUG TRAFFICKING 

INTRODUCTION

The basis of U.S.-Mexico ties is a strategic relationship that goes far beyond the problems of drugs and violence. Our nation is inextricably intertwined with Mexico historically, culturally, and commercially. The flow of 

goods and people across our borders helps drive our economy and strengthen 

our culture. But our land borders also serve as a conduit for illicit activity. 

This is a problem that bears shared responsibility and requires cooperative 

action.—SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR1

Since 2007, the Me ́rida Initiative has deepened U.S.-Mexican cooperation to jointly tackle the transnational threat posed by drug 

traffickers and organized crime. In 2010, the urgency of this task 

is heightened by the dramatic growth in drug-related violence. By 

conservative estimates, more than 6,500 people died last year in 

drug-related homicides, while January 2010 marked ‘‘the bloodiest 

month on record,’’ with nearly 800 homicides country-wide.2 According to press reports using Mexican Government data, more 

than 3,000 drug-related homicides occurred in the first four months 

of 2010 alone.3

This escalation of violence is fueled in large part by competition 

for the profits generated by illegal drug consumption in the United 

States and by the illicit flow of weapons and money to cartel operations. According to the Government of Mexico (GOM), which has 

defined organized crime as the country’s greatest threat, the current surge of violence reflects the success of the government’s offensive against drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), a perception 

shared by relevant U.S. agencies. As rival organizations battle each 

other for control of lucrative trafficking routes into the United 

States, most of the violence occurs between and among DTO members. Nevertheless, police officers, journalists, and politicians have 

become more frequent targets, while the January 2010 massacre of 

15 teenagers in Ciudad Jua ́ rez highlighted the victimization of innocent civilians. Criminality has also extended itself to extortion, 

robbery, and kidnapping, affecting innocent people throughout 

Mexico and making security the number one concern of Mexican 

citizens. 

2 

4Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, ‘‘United States-Mexico Security Partnership: 

Progress and Impact,’’ March 23, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/03/138929.htm. 5 Based on the Trans-Border Institute (TBI), ‘‘Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis 

from 2001–2009,’’ January 2010, citing data gathered by Reforma newspaper. 6 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, February 2010, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/index.htm . 7Testimony by Secretary Napolitano before Senate Committee on the Judiciary. April 27, 

2010. 8 El Milenio, ‘‘Gana el narco guerra contra el gobierno federal, piensa 59 % de los mexicanos.’’ 

March 22, 2010., http://www.milenio.com/node/407205. 

Some significant government victories against the DTOs include 

the December 2009 killing of Arturo Beltra ́n Leyva and January 

2010 capture of Teodoro Garcia Simental, the extradition of 107 fugitives to the United States in 2009, and the GOM’s seizure of 92 

tons of cocaine between December 2006 and March 2010.4 Yet 

drug-related violence continues to threaten public security throughout Mexico, particularly near the U.S.-Mexico border. The most afflicted Mexican states include Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Guerrero, and 

Durango [see map in Appendix II], while the most violent cities are 

considered to be Ciudad Jua ́ rez (on the border between Chihuahua 

and Texas), Culiaca ́n (the capital of Sinoloa), and Tijuana (on the 

border between Baja California and California).5

Currently, U.S. Government (USG) officials deny that the increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has resulted in 

a significant spillover of violence into the United States, but they 

recognize that the prospect is a serious concern. Even without evidence of spillover violence, however, the United States has an important stake in Mexico’s challenges. According to a 2010 assessment by the National Drug Intelligence Center, Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) represent the single greatest drug 

trafficking threat to the United States.6 Mexico is a major transit 

country for cocaine and a source country for heroin, marijuana, and 

methamphetamine. 

Both the GOM and the USG acknowledge the gravity of the crisis and their shared interest in improving coordination of law enforcement, institution-building, and efforts to reduce demand for 

drugs. Mexico City has received a series of high-level visits by 

Obama administration officials, testifying to Homeland Security 

Secretary Janet Napolitano’s characterization of the current level 

of cooperation as ‘‘unprecedented.’’ 7 Yet, as the record levels of violence demonstrate, many of the challenges undermining bilateral 

efforts are deep-rooted and difficult to change, from the lack of 

legal economic opportunities for Mexico’s youth to corruption cases 

in both countries. 

Moreover, as the violence increases, public criticisms of President 

Caldero ́n’s strategy and of the Me ́rida Initiative grow in number 

and intensity. A poll conducted in March 2010 by Milenio newspaper found that 59 percent of Mexicans believe organized crime is 

winning the drug war, while only 21 percent believe the government is.8

At the direction of Senator Lugar, this study examines the current state of U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. Its focus is on efforts to improve border security and modernize Mexico’s police 

forces, as these key areas will contribute to the success of the 

Me ́rida Initiative. The chief conclusion is that the Me ́rida Initiative 

is delivering results but must be bolstered in order to achieve its 

3 

9This section is adapted from a memo prepared by Clare Seelke of the Congressional Research 

Service, April 23, 2010. 

aims. While the dramatic surge in violence is an expected upshot 

of the aggressive campaign against DTOs, the risk is that political 

support for expanded cooperation may not survive daily news reports of brutal homicides and kidnappings. The Me ́rida Initiative 

is thus entering a critical period, with important implications for 

the national security of both the United States and Mexico. 

BACKGROUND9

In response to the GOM’s request for increased cooperation and 

assistance, in October 2007 the United States and Mexico proposed 

the Me ́rida Initiative, a package of U.S. counterdrug and anticrime 

cooperation to Mexico and Central America. The Me ́rida Initiative 

was to provide some $1.4 billion in assistance, largely in the form 

of equipment and training, from FY 2008 through FY 2010. The 

four primary goals of the Me ́rida Initiative, as originally conceived, 

were to (1) break the power and impunity of criminal organizations; (2) assist the Mexican and Central American Governments in 

strengthening border, air, and maritime controls; (3) improve the 

capacity of justice systems in the region; and (4) curtail gang activity in Mexico and Central America and diminish drug demand in 

the region. 

Congress has so far appropriated $1.3 billion of the original package, resulting in a significant increase in foreign assistance for 

Mexico. In FY 2007, total assistance to Mexico was $65.4 million, 

while in FY 2008, after the Me ́rida Initiative was enacted, total assistance to Mexico (including Me ́rida funds) was $405.9 million. 

There has been increasing concern, however, about the slow delivery of Me ́rida assistance [see Appendix III for chart of delivered 

items]. U.S. officials reportedly attributed early delays in disbursal 

of FY 2008 funds to USG contracting regulations, negotiations with 

Mexico and other countries about what equipment is actually needed, the time required to conduct competitive procurements, and the 

difficulty of delivering an aid package that involves so many agencies and offices. 

As part of the FY 2011 budget preparation process, U.S. and 

Mexican officials began to revise the strategic framework underpinning U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. After several months of 

consultations, the Obama and Caldero ́n governments agreed to a 

new strategy, called ‘‘Beyond Me ́rida’’ or ‘‘Me ́rida 2.0,’’ that broadens the scope of bilateral security efforts and focuses more on institution-building than on technology and equipment transfers. The 

Obama Administration outlined the strategy in its FY 2011 budget 

request, which includes $310 million for Me ́rida-related programs 

in Mexico: $292 million in International Narcotics Control and Law 

Enforcement (INCLE) funds, $10 million in Economic Support 

Funds (ESF), and $8 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF). 

4 

10 An asset forfeiture law is currently under discussion in the Mexican Congress. ‘‘Ley 

Debilitarμ las Finanzas del Narcotrμfico y Crimen Organizado en Me ́xico,’’ EFE, April 13, 2010. 11 For a description of U.S. programs planned for Ciudad Juμrez, see: U.S. Embassy in Mexico 

City, ‘‘Confronting Border Violence in Ciudad Jua ́ rez,’’ March 2010, available at: http:// 

www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eng/merida/pdf/emerida_factsheet_ViolenceCJ.pdf. 

The Obama administration formally announced the new strategy 

at the Me ́rida High-Level Consultative Group meeting in Mexico 

City on March 23, 2010. Its four pillars include: 

1. Disrupting the operational capacity of organized crime; 

2. Strengthening Mexican institutions to sustain the rule of law 

(police and judicial reform); 

3. Creating a 21st century border; and 

4. Building strong and resilient communities. 

The Caldero ́n government has focused its efforts on a comprehensive strategy, including dismantling the power of drug trafficking 

organizations. To that end, the government has conducted joint police-military operations to arrest DTO leaders, investigated and indicted public officials suspected of collusion, and begun to go after 

the DTOs’ illicit assets.10 A significant percentage of U.S. assistance appropriated during the first phase of the Me ́rida Initiative, 

including at least $421 million in FMF funding, was obligated to 

purchase equipment for those efforts. The Obama administration 

has asked for only $8 million in FMF for FY 2011. 

As the GOM has increasingly begun to conceptualize the DTOs 

as corporations, its strategy, and U.S. efforts to support it, has 

begun to focus more attention on disrupting the illicit weapons and 

funding flowing to the traffickers from the United States. These efforts, as well as increased intelligence-sharing and coordinated law 

enforcement operations, have been suggested as possible areas for 

increased cooperation under pillar one. As the DTOs increasingly 

evolve into poly-criminal organizations, perhaps as a partial result 

of drug interdiction efforts cutting into their profits, some analysts 

have also urged both governments to focus more on combating 

other types of organized crime, such as human trafficking and alien 

smuggling. 

Notwithstanding a comprehensive judicial reform underway in 

Me ́xico, many security experts also maintain that the GOM, with 

U.S. support, needs to focus more on addressing the country’s weak 

law enforcement and judicial institutions than it has in the last 

three years (pillar two). Federal police reform is well underway. In 

Jua ́ rez, the federal police has assumed control over all police forces, 

with the military in a supporting role. But there are not sufficient 

federal police to replace dysfunctional local police with federal police across the country, which underscores the need for a Mexican 

strategy to reform its state and municipal police forces. Some 

FY 2009 Me ́rida funding is likely to be reprogrammed in order to 

extend U.S.-funded police training and corrections reform efforts to 

Tijuana and Jua ́ rez as part of a pilot project. Designed by a binational team for the areas of Tijuana-San Diego and Ciudad Jua ́ rezEl Paso, the project is intended to support the GOM’s plan for 

Jua ́ rez through training, equipment, professional exchanges, and 

targeted information-sharing.11 Security experts have also identified improving police-community relations, respect for human 

5 

12 In other words, about 98% of perpetrators have not been brought to justice. This is figure 

is widely cited. See, for example, a recent report by the Center of Research for Development 

(CIDAC), ‘‘I ́ndice de Incidencia Delictiva y Violencia 2009,’’ August 2009, p. 9. 13 Eric L. Olson and Christopher E. Wilson, ‘‘Beyond Me ́rida,’’ Woodrow Wilson Center, April 

6, 2010. 14 U.S. Department of State, United States-Mexico Partnership: A New Border Vision, Washington, DC, March 23, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/03/138926.htm. 15Testimony of Vanda Felbab-Brown, Fellow, the Brookings Institution, before the Domestic 

Policy Subcommittee of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, April 14, 

2010. 

rights, and the prevention and punishment of street crime as important issues that need to be addressed in Jua ́ rez and elsewhere 

in Mexico. 

With impunity rates hovering around 98%, experts maintain that 

it is crucial for Mexico to implement the judicial reforms passed in 

the summer of 2008 and focus on fighting corruption at all levels 

of government.12 In order for Mexico to transition its criminal justice system to an accusatorial system with oral trials by 2016, some 

argue that U.S.-funded judicial training programs, some of which 

are just getting started, may have to be significantly expanded. 

They are encouraged that $207 million of the Obama administration’s FY 2011 request for Me ́rida programs in Mexico are under 

the ‘‘Governing Justly and Democratically’’ category.13 Others 

argue that, even with expanded U.S. assistance, it may be unrealistic to expect Mexico to implement such a major transformation in 

its judicial system in the midst of the current struggle against escalating drug trafficking-related crime and violence. 

The third pillar included in the State Department’s proposal for 

the second phase of the Me ́rida Initiative involves the creation of 

a ‘‘21st Century border.’’ The proposed 21st century border is based 

on: 

• Enhancing public safety via increased information sharing, 

screenings, and prosecutions; 

• Securing the cross-border flow of goods and people; 

• Expediting legitimate commerce and travel through investments in personnel, technology, and infrastructure; 

• Engaging border communities in cross-border trade; and 

• Setting bilateral policies for collaborative border management.14

Pillar four will be a new focus for U.S.-Mexican cooperation and 

may include targeted efforts to assist at-risk youth and curb unemployment and other social problems in communities plagued by 

drug trafficking and violence. Experts have lauded the inclusion of 

social development and crime prevention programs in the new 

Me ́rida framework but have expressed concern about the limited 

funds the programs are likely to receive from the United States. 15

While U.S. assistance in this area includes promising new projects 

in support of local funding by municipalities through bond 

issuance, additional support for advice and consultative partnering 

between our two governments could help expand in a dramatic way 

our cooperation in this area. 

Bilateral efforts under pillar four are focusing for now on pilot 

projects in Ciudad Jua ́ rez and Chihuahua but may also be expanded to Tijuana and the state of Baja California. These efforts 

6 

involve the continuation and expansion of some existing Me ́ridafunded initiatives, such as school-based ‘‘culture of lawfulness’’ programs and demand reduction and treatment services. They may 

also involve USAID or other agencies providing technical expertise 

in how to re-zone neighborhoods to prevent crime, issue municipal 

bonds to fund infrastructure projects, and/or launch public-private 

partnerships. It is also still possible that the GOM may request additional U.S. support to carry out President Caldero ́n’s ‘‘We Are All 

Jua ́ rez’’ plan, which includes 160 different initiatives that the federal government has begun to implement in the city, in some cases 

with the help of state and local officials. 

At this point, it appears that the funding and implementation of 

pillar four will primarily be the responsibility of the GOM, possibly 

with support from multilateral institutions like the Inter-American 

Development Bank. Still, staff believes that U.S, assistance can 

helpfully create models to be replicated and can leverage hundreds 

of millions of dollars in investments from other sources. For example, a USAID technical assistance program helped introduce a legal 

framework to issue state and municipal bonds, which have now 

raised over $1 billion in about five years. Such bond issues can be 

linked with socioeconomic investment programs, public-private 

partnerships, and development bank financing. Hence, USAID contributions even in the range of $30 million can still have a major 

impact through the resources such investments can leverage. 

OBSERVATIONS

The central goal of border security is to prevent dangerous goods 

and people from causing harm to our country and our people. In 

the context of economic globalization and widespread international 

travel, as our Ambassador in Mexico City stated to staff, ‘‘We cannot simply attempt to ‘hold the line’ at the border itself rather, we 

must work with the appropriate Mexican officials to deter, identify 

and intercept threats as early as possible, developing effective 

channels to share with each other the information necessary to do 

so.’’ 

Cross-border criminal organizations—including Mexican based 

DTOs and gangs—are responsible for most of the traffic in people, 

drugs, arms, money, and other contraband across the land border. 

They are also responsible for the dramatic surge of violence occurring in parts of Mexico. 

According to senior government officials on both sides of the border, we should respond to cross-border crime with binationally coordinated law enforcement operations, both at the border and in 

the interior of both countries. The administration is taking some 

key steps to enhance public safety and security: 

• Increased sharing of mutually useful information to permit integrated, intelligence-driven operations along the border. 

• Common approaches and standards for vetting officials and 

purging those found to be compromised, including sharing of 

information on corrupt officials in both countries. 

• Development and implementation of joint strategies for key 

smuggling and trafficking corridors, including the Ciudad 

7 

16Operation Coronado was a joint law enforcement operation conducted in October 2009 

across the United States. It resulted in the arrests of 303 individuals, many of them associated 

with the Mexican drug trafficking organization ‘‘La Familia Michoacana.’’ This investigation relied heavily on coordination between the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and state and local law enforcement authorities, and was supported by information and 

cooperation from Mexican authorities. 17The Nogales Controlled Substances Program is aimed at reducing narcotics smuggling along 

Arizona’s border with Mexico. Since its inception in October 2009, 24 suspects have been referred to Mexican authorities for prosecution (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/1003/100315nogales.htm). 

Jua ́ rez-El Paso, Tijuana-San Diego, Sonora-Arizona, and 

Tamaulipas-Rio Grande Valley corridors, among others. 

• Strengthening of a Mexican enforcement presence between the 

ports of entry, extending efforts in the Sonora-Arizona corridor 

to Ciudad Jua ́ rez-El Paso and other locations along the border. 

• Regular, secure communications and exchange of information 

at an operational level between enforcement agencies on opposite sides of the border. 

• Flexibility, discretion, and initiative at the operational level to 

reach out to counterparts on the other side of the border. 

• Design and implementation of an integrated strategy to prevent arms trafficking, significantly extending and deepening 

Operation Armas Cruzadas and other efforts. 

• Acceleration of current efforts to seize cash proceeds from 

criminal activities by (among other ways) continuing investigations and southbound inspections in the United States. 

• Progressive increasing of alignment and coordination among 

law enforcement and military assets, building on successes to 

date. 

• Regular sharing of information from investigations and prosecutions, building on the success of recent efforts related to Operation Coronado.16

• Application of the Controlled Substance Project, extending the 

current pilot program in Nogales to the areas around Ciudad 

Jua ́ rez and elsewhere along the border.17

• Expansion of Operation No Refuge, denying visas, adjustment 

of status, admission into the United States and other benefits 

to known drug traffickers and close family members or associates who knowingly assist, aid, abet, conspire, or collude in 

drug trafficking, and closer coordination between Mexican and 

U.S. law enforcement authorities when suspected criminals are 

denied entry into one country. 

• Enhanced coordination on the repatriation process of criminal 

aliens. 

Many of the steps mentioned take place through the Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST) Initiative and the Operation Against Smugglers (and Traffickers) Initiative on Safety and 

Security (OASISS). 

BEST is a multi-agency initiative, led by the U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS, wherein task forces 

seek to identify, disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations posVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:21 May 26, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\56491.TXT MIKEB
8 

18Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Border Enforcement Security Task Forces, November 3, 2009, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/ 

080226best_fact_sheet.htm. Besides BEST, there is a variety of interagency collaborative efforts, 

such as the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Forces and the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), both led by the Drug Enforcement Agency but with Department of Homeland Security and other agency participation. 19 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Armas Cruzadas, November 2, 2009, http:// 

www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/armas_cruzadas.htm. 20 See testimony by Audrey Adams, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of International 

Affairs, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security before the 

U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western 

Hemisphere, U.S.-Mexico Relations, 109th Cong., April 26, 2006. 21Data provided to CRS by DHS Congressional Affairs. 

ing significant threats to border security.18 Through the BEST Initiative, ICE partners with Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 

the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, as well as local, state, and international law enforcement 

agencies. In particular, the Mexican Secretariat for Public Security 

(SSP) is a partner along the Southwest border. There are currently 

17 BEST teams around the country, 10 of which are along the 

Southwest border and one in Mexico City. 

BEST teams provide the platform for Operation Armas 

Cruzadas, an ICE-led operation to disrupt and dismantle weapons 

smuggling networks.19 Operation Armas Cruzadas involves several 

components such as training stakeholders in database management, laws, resources, and methods to combat organized crime. It 

also is the umbrella for the Vetted Arms Trafficking Group, the 

Weapons Virtual Task Force, and the ICE Border Liaison Program. 

CBP and the Mexican Government have also partnered through 

OASISS, a bi-lateral program aimed at enhancing both countries’ 

abilities to prosecute alien smugglers and human traffickers along 

the Southwest border.20 Through OASISS, the GOM is able to prosecute alien smugglers apprehended in the United States. From the 

time of its inception in 2005 through the end of FY 2009, OASISS 

generated 1,579 cases.21 This program is supported by the Border 

Patrol International Liaison Unit, which is responsible for establishing and maintaining working relationships with foreign counterparts in order to enhance border security. 

Staff strongly believes that additional funding for U.S. law enforcement agencies along the border, coupled with increased technology and the building of additional barriers, where necessary, 

would help with these efforts. Additional trained personnel for CBP 

would be far more effective than only pursuing an increased National Guard presence on the border, which could complicate Mexico’s willingness to cooperate. As one senior Mexican official commented, ‘‘Finding the political will for closer collaboration may be 

compromised if the Mexican public perceives that the border is 

being militarized.’’ 

The cross-border investigation between Ciudad Jua ́ rez and El 

Paso of the murders of three individuals associated with the U.S. 

consulate in Jua ́ rez has provided a model that is demonstrating 

wider results and should be replicated. Over 200 law enforcement 

personnel have worked on the case on the El Paso side of the border, and about 40 on the Jua ́ rez side. This intensive effort has generated massive information on previous crimes and on the gangs 

9 

and cartels working in the area, possibly facilitating legal actions 

targeting these entities as organizations. Cooperation with Mexican 

law enforcement has been excellent on this case. Staff believes that 

this kind of intensive law enforcement increases prospects to damage drug trafficking organizations as corporate entities. 

At the ports of entry, dangerous goods and other contraband are 

concealed within the vast amount of legal cargo that crosses the 

border each day; dangerous people (including those who constitute 

a threat to national security, public safety, or simply use false documents) likewise attempt to blend into the much larger number of 

legal travelers. As Mexican and U.S. officials stated to staff, ‘‘The 

central challenge in managing flows of people and goods is to separate travelers and cargo by level of risk and threat.’’ Such risk segmentation allows governments to enhance security by focusing 

more attention on stopping illegitimate trade, while at the same 

time facilitating legal travel and commerce. 

Equally essential to securing flows is closer collaboration in managing land ports of entry, building on the Port Security Committees 

framework. Staff believes that we should continue and expand efforts to facilitate trade and enhance security at the ports of entry 

begun under the Binational Strategic Plan 

Ultimately, customs and immigration on both sides should have 

access to the information they need to do their jobs effectively and 

be able to communicate with each other in real time. The administration is taking some key steps to enhance the smooth movement 

of legal goods and people, including : 

• Complementary risk management strategies on both sides of 

the border, and the replacement of comprehensive customs inspections in Mexico with a risk-based approach. 

• Greater reciprocal sharing of information on potentially dangerous or illegal goods to permit more accurate targeting. 

• The establishment of a binational ‘‘model port’’ with comparable infrastructure, state-of-the-art inspection technologies, 

harmonized operation standards, and real-time information 

sharing. 

• Integrated, interoperable systems for collecting, analyzing, and 

sharing information on passengers entering our countries from 

outside North America, building on the work to date on advanced passenger information system (APIS). 

• Shared watch lists and common screening protocols for dealing 

with aliens from special interest countries (ASICs), building on 

the Joint Security Program in Mexico City. 

• Coordinated efforts to secure key shipping centers in our countries. 

• An environment of greater compliance and legality in flows 

across Mexico’s southern border. 

• Purging of corrupt officials from agencies in both countries 

with responsibility for border management and inclusion of information from other agencies on prospective employees in the 

vetting process. 

10 

22Tracy Wilkinson, ‘‘Mexico Under Siege: Elite Police Tainted by Drug Gang,’’ Los Angeles 

Times, October 28, 2008. 23 Robert E. Donnelly and David A. Shirk, eds., Police and Public Security in Mexico, San 

Diego, CA: University Readers, 2010, p. 228. 

• Substantial investments in capacity building (training and vetting personnel, enhancing professionalism, constructing or refurbishing facilities, deploying new technology, etc.). 

• A legal, orderly, and secure system for managing the movement of people across the border (including, in the case of illegal migration, close coordination on deportations). 

Public Security and Law Enforcement Reform 

The corruption of law enforcement and government officials in 

both countries has made the campaign against drug trafficking organizations more difficult. In October 2008, an elite unit within the 

federal Attorney General’s office for Special Investigations of Organized Crime (SIEDO) was implicated in a scandal involving payoffs 

for sensitive information about antidrug activities, with at least 35 

officials fired or arrested.22 In November 2008, the former head of 

SIEDO was arrested and accused of accepting bribes from a drug 

cartel. The former investigative agency within the PGR, the Federal Agency of Investigations (AFI), which was created in 2001, 

was also widely criticized for corruption by 2005 and partially disbanded in June 2009.23

Corruption has also plagued federal, state, and municipal police 

forces. The Caldero ́n administration had launched a concerted effort to improve training, root out corruption via a comprehensive 

vetting program and a network of control centers, and establish a 

workable model for professionalizing the 4,000+ new members of 

the national police, these officials stated. 

Mexican officials stated that police corruption has been a major 

problem at all levels of the Mexican policing system and that reform was necessary. Officials told staff that ‘‘reforms of Mexico’s 

federal, state and municipal police force could strengthen border 

security, and that, in particular, reforms under consideration to 

have state-level forces absorb the municipal police could bring increased effectiveness, efficiency, standardization, and better trained 

and equipped police to municipalities, particularly those in rural 

areas that have lacked human and financial capital.’’ As one senior 

official mentioned, ‘‘In Mexico the police are looked down upon, 

hated, and feared.’’ Mexican officials believe that police reform will 

help strengthen confidence in the police, as well. 

An important legal step was the passage of an implementing law 

on reform of the constitution in January 2009 that set the parameters for a three-tiered model of police: a reaction element, a prevention element, and an investigatory element. This effort was ongoing and channeled through various Secretariat of Public Security 

(SSP or Federal Police) offices responsible for implementing standardized training and other requirements necessary to build a professional force. SSP state offices were providing some minimal support to state and local authorities, but this cooperation was contingent on the interest of local authorities. As of March 2010, 4,300 

university-educated SSP officers had graduated from a newly-esVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:21 May 26, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\56491.TXT MIKEB
11 

24 ‘‘Mexico Mulls Plan to Eliminate Municipal Police,’’ EFE, March 24, 2010. Office of Senator 

Ramo ́n Galindo Noriega, ‘‘Con Liquidacio ́n de Policı ́as Municipales, Gobernadores Buscan 

Ratificar Virreinatos,’’ March 29, 2010. 

tablished basic investigative training course at the refurbished federal police institute. 

Mexican law enforcement officials acknowledged that the larger 

challenge was to address local and state police forces, which comprised over 90 percent of the police forces nationwide and which 

suffered from corruption, mismanagement, and low levels of professionalism. There are 2,022 separate police forces, and a reform law 

that would consolidate them under state control has been stalled 

in the Congress because of disagreements at the state and local levels, where reform was seen as a competition for resources. 

The reform law that was proposed on September 24, 2009, intends to reform article 115 of the Mexican Constitution in order to 

dissolve the country’s municipal police forces and put them under 

the authority of state police entities. In order to take effect, the 

measure has to be approved by the Mexican Congress and then a 

majority of the state legislatures, a process which could take several months to a year or more. In April 2010, the National Governor’s Conference (CONAGO), with the unanimous support of all 

governors from all parties, presented to the Senate a proposal for 

a ‘‘unified force’’ within each state, perhaps because it would likely 

increase the power of the governor’s office. 

But there are serious political challenges that revolve around entrenched interests. Most senators from the opposition PRI and 

Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) parties are in support of the 

reform measure, while some National Action Party (PAN) senators 

have dismissed it as a ploy by the governors to concentrate power 

in their offices and undermine municipal governments.24

Staff met with PAN Senator Felipe Gonza ́lez, head of the Public 

Security Committee, and his PRI counterpart, Eloy Cantu ́, a strong 

supporter of the U.S.-Mexican bilateral relationship who hails from 

Nuevo Leo ́n. Gonza ́lez observed that not all the parties were on 

board with the reform law. While some governors were pushing 

CONAGO, there were still concerns at the municipal level that the 

shift in resources to the state would undermine local efforts and 

have an unfair political impact by rewarding some state governments that had done very little in the past to support a professional police force. Cantu ́ noted his frustration with the slow pace 

of reform and the ‘‘same old politics’’ that are complicating Mexico’s 

ability to confront organized crime. ‘‘The recent violence in Nuevo 

Leo ́n did not start yesterday. The inability of local authorities to 

confront rising violence in recent months reflected deeper and longstanding problems with an ever-pervasive corruption that was undermining state and local officials,’’ Cantu ́ observed. 

Staff believes that some PAN leaders may be concerned about 

giving more power to the governors at a time when 19 of the country’s 32 governorships are controlled by the PRI. Beyond the political implications of the proposed reform, a debate in Mexico has ensued concerning whether the proposed reform would help or hinder 

broader police reform efforts. Proponents of the reform maintain 

that it would improve coordination with the SSP. They assert that 

the reform would bring efficiency, standardization, and better 

12 

25Phone Interview with Daniel Sabet, Visiting Professor at Georgetown University, April 15, 

2010. 26 ‘‘Casting Too Wide a Net For Cartels,’’ Newsweek International, March 8, 2010. 27 Associated Press, ‘‘Mexican Policy Question, Release Drug Lord’s Wife,’’ May 14, 2010. 

trained and equipped police to municipalities, particularly those in 

rural areas that have lacked human and financial capital. They say 

that corruption has been particularly rife among local police in 

Mexico, and that previous reform efforts have been insufficient to 

address the deep problems that exist at that level of the policing 

structure. SSP Secretary Garcia Luna has publicly advocated this 

reform as a critical step to create an effective state and local capacity to complement SSP’s federal role. 

Skeptics argue that police corruption has been a major problem 

at all levels of the Mexican policing system, including the state and 

federal police.25 They challenge the assertion that the Caldero ́n 

government’s restructuring of the police will be more effective than 

past restructuring efforts. Critics also argue that there is a role for 

municipal police who are acclimated to local conditions and concerns and are trained to deal with household and community 

issues, as opposed to federal concerns like the fight against organized crime. They urge the GOM to concentrate its resources and 

attention on implementing the vetting and certification procedures 

for state and local police that were codified in the public security 

law passed in 2009, and on strengthening the National System of 

Public Security, which is responsible for overseeing those efforts. 

The Caldero ́n government has also cracked down on existing corruption within the police and other government institutions. Critics 

maintain, however, that a large percentage of those who have been 

arrested on charges of colluding with organized crime have been 

subsequently released for lack of evidence. In May 2009, for example, federal agents arrested ten mayors and seventeen other officials from Michoaca ́n for allegedly colluding with DTOs, but a majority of those individuals have since been released.26 Most recently, the wife of a fugitive trafficker, Joaquı ́n ‘‘El Chapo’’ 

Guzma ́n, was captured but then released on May 13, 2010.27

This is a difficult issue that will not be resolved quickly or easily. 

It should not come as a surprise that there was no agreement on 

the police reform law in the last session of Congress that ended on 

April 30. The law will likely be taken up in September when Congress resumes. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

As demonstrated in the current stalemate on police reform in 

Mexico, new approaches to strengthening law enforcement and 

modernizing border security will face obstacles and require policy 

change, but also a change in attitude. Staff believes that assistance 

must be reconceived in a way that reflects the collaborative efforts 

between our countries. Cooperation must be based on jointly-funded programs in which both countries determine priorities, with 

clear objectives and transparent funding mechanisms. 

On the police front, it is clear we will not achieve the security 

we are both looking for unless there is an organized, well-trained, 

and professional police force throughout the country. The details of 

such a reform are for the Mexicans to decide, but the USG could 

13 

expand on the collaborative funding mechanism that was used to 

establish and sustain the federal police academy at San Luis 

Potosı ́. Staff would suggest building on the following ideas: 

• As a foundational point, the GOM would establish clear legal 

parameters for the creation of modern state/local police. 

• Develop a framework for perhaps 6–8 regional police academies that could have national coverage and achieve economies 

of scale, drawing on lessons and courses from the San Luis 

Potosı ́ SSP academy. 

• Begin with 1–2 states that could provide a base for developing 

an effective regional model and provide Me ́rida funding, 

through established channels, to build a modern police training 

program. 

• As with San Luis Potosı ́, the GOM would provide the bulk of 

funding for facilities and salaries. The United States would 

focus on course development and training. Both should work 

together to leverage other donor contributions. Both U.S. and 

Mexican monies would have agreed benchmarks with reporting 

and auditing requirements. 

• The GOM would develop a federal-state cost-sharing plan to 

sustain these regional academies respect professional standards, and uphold promotion and retention policies in the future. The USG should also support judicial sector reform. 

On the border, though much progress has been made, more is 

necessary. 

Both governments are yet to establish agile processes to permit 

rapid policy-making and binational policy coordination. Key ingredients include: 

• The establishment of inter-agency policy-making processes that 

meet these specifications. 

• Regular binational meetings of these committees. 

• Coordination of this new policy-making structure with existing 

inter-agency and binational mechanisms. 

• Integration of Canada into the process, on issues or topics that 

affect all three countries. 

Developing a new vision for border security will not be an easy 

task; both governments will have to address a number of obstacles 

and challenges along the way—cultural, political, bureaucratic, regulatory, statutory, and possibly even constitutional. Staff strongly 

encourages relevant United States government officials to advance 

the following: 

• Improve infrastructure and increased staffing of ports of entry. 

• Demonstrate that the benefits of preclearance and related activities more than offset their costs. 

• Re-prioritize border infrastructure projects, adjudicating competing funding requests and financing necessary infrastructure 

in the interior of each country. 

• Develop the concept of ‘‘corridor security,’’ aimed at integrating 

intelligence, interdiction, and investigation across the border. 

14 

• Create a regulatory framework for sharing intelligence and information with counterpart Mexican officials, including addressing the challenges involved in sharing third-party information, access to databases, and real-time data feeds. 

• Create strict vetting procedures for border enforcement personnel. 

• Ensure safety of law enforcement personnel, including those 

stationed abroad. 

• Establish the appropriate diplomatic arrangements and staffing models necessary for expanded exchange of personnel and 

their assignment abroad. 

• Ensure that law enforcement personnel operating outside their 

home country have the necessary authorities to do their jobs 

effectively. 

• Address the issue of access to airspace, roads, and waterways 

where that access is necessary for certain law enforcement operations. 

• Devise the optimal mechanisms for coordinating policy-making 

binationally and within each country. 

• Coordinate investment in technology to ensure system compatibility. 

• Engage Canadian partners in efforts to create a secure North 

American economic space. 

• Secure permission from foreign partners to conduct joint 

preclearance operations abroad. 

The challenge for both governments will be to not let these alltoo-familiar barriers deter them from pursuing the larger goal of 

collaborative border management. 

CONCLUSION

Collaboration across the border has grown at an impressive rate. 

First, under President Bush and now under President Obama, unsurpassed cooperation has yielded dramatic progress. This close relationship is evidence that both sides of the border understand that 

we are bound in a common struggle to rid Mexico and the United 

States of DTOs and organized crime, and that when we work together positive results follow. 

Though much remains to be done, it is clear that we are witnessing the clear strengthening of institutional capacity building in 

Mexico—police, intelligence, courts, an inter-agency process—that 

could allow in the future for drug trafficking and organized crime 

to move from a national security concern to a local law enforcement 

concern. Though it may not be possible to eliminate drug trafficking entirely, it is vital that we support the strengthening of 

Mexican institutions so that the transnational DTOs cannot threaten the security of both U.S. and Mexican states. Because of our 

shared border, any national security threat to Mexico represents a 

security threat to the United States. 

Staff believes that the establishment of the current institutional 

frameworks is progress in itself. Still, efforts by the Mexican Government will not succeed if state and local authorities are not inVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:21 May 26, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\56491.TXT MIKEB
15 

volved and held accountable for implementing and providing effective oversight of law enforcement and legal institutions at the state 

and local level. If the Mexican authorities succeed in building this 

nation-wide capacity across key areas, especially in the reform of 

local and state police, we will see more progress in the coming 

years. 

In this regard, the most dramatic change is the contention by 

many Mexican officials that police reform would allow the country 

to shift from the overuse of the military against drugs to the targeted use of the military in support of law enforcement operations. 

This would be an important development. Most Mexicans currently 

favor the military over the police because of their distrust of the 

police, despite the common view that the military’s involvement involves questionable methods. As one senior Mexican official stated, 

‘‘The military’s objective is to do away with an enemy. The military 

is the sword.’’ 

In the United States, many fear developments in Mexico because 

of spillover violence in border cities, though it has been sporadic. 

For many Americans, the problem is ‘‘elsewhere.’’ But as one U.S. 

Embassy official remarked, ‘‘There is no doubt that Mexican organized crime would not be as successful in moving drugs into the 

United States without distribution networks, safe houses, and ways 

to launder money in the United States.’’ In other words, the problem is already in the interior of the United States—it is not simply 

a border issue. 

In the short term, strengthening and institutionalizing cooperation on border security issues, intelligence sharing, and the support 

of Mexican efforts to reform law enforcement are the best ways to 

protect U.S. security from the threats posed by organized criminals 

in Mexico and by those who work with them in the United States. 

Strong U.S.-Mexico cooperation is vital to our common aim of defeating the drug trafficking organizations. President Caldero ́n’s 

May 19 visit is an ideal opportunity both to raise the public’s understanding of the common challenge facing both countries and of 

the vital need for continued cooperation. Today, transnational cooperation has become more vital, both to confronting the drug cartels and to handling broader challenges in the bilateral relationship. President Caldero ́n’s visit will provide an opportunity for both 

governments to reaffirm and express our shared commitment to 

meeting those challenges head-on, in a spirit of mutual friendship, 

trust, and cooperation. 

(17) 

A P P E N D I X E S 

Appendix I 

Contributor 

Kezia McKeague, Legislative Assistant, Committee on Foreign 

Relations, United States Senate 

MEETINGS WITH INDIVIDUALS IN MEXICO

U.S. Diplomats 

Carlos Pascual, Ambassador to Mexico 

Representatives from NAS, DEA, FBI, DOJ, CBP, OPAD 

Mexican Government Officials 

Margarita Go ́mez, Secretarı ́a de Seguridad Pu ́ blica 

Yessica de la Madrid, Procuradurı ́a General de la Repu ́ blica 

Jorge Medina, Penitentiary System 

Jose ́ Juan Bravo Moises, Customs Administrator 

Alejandro Poire ́, Secretarı ́a de Gobernacio ́n 

Marco Tulio, Secretarı ́a de Seguridad Pu ́ blica 

Julian Ventura, Secretarı ́a de Relaciones Exteriores 

Gonzalo Villareal, Penitentiary System 

Antonio Vivanco, Presidencia 

Rafael Ferna ́ndez de Castro, Presidencia 

Mexican Legislative Branch 

Senator Felipe Gonza ́lez, Public Security Committee 

Senator Eloy Cantu ́, Foreign Affairs Committee 

Mexican Civil Society 

Representatives from Me ́xico Unido contra la Delicuencia 

18 

Appendix II. Rates of Drug Trafficking-Related 

Killings in Mexico by State 

(per 100,000 people) 

Source: Congressional Research Service, April 2010. 


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Appendix III—Me ́rida Deliverables as of May 2010 

SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MAY 11, 2010

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