IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Blairsville-Saltsburg School :

District :

:

v. :

:

Blairsville-Saltsburg Education :

Association, : No. 1340 C.D. 2013

Appellant : Argued: April 23, 2014

BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge

HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge

HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE McGINLEY FILED: August 20, 2014

Blairsville-Saltsburg Education Association (Association)

1

appeals 

from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County (trial court) which 

granted Blairsville-Saltsburg School District’s (School District) Petition to Vacate 

Arbitration Award that reinstated Kevin L. Stoner’s (Grievant) discharge.

The School District employed Grievant as a teacher since 1988. On 

June 20, 2012, the School District’s Board of Directors (School Board) voted to 

terminate Grievant’s employment. At the time of his employment termination 

Grievant taught social studies to 7th and 8th grade students. 

 

1

The Association is the exclusive and sole representative for collective bargaining for all 

employees of the School District.
2

Grievant’s criminal record history is uncontested. In 1987, Grievant 

was arrested in New York and charged with driving while intoxicated and 

operating a motor vehicle with .10% blood alcohol content (BAC). Both offenses 

were graded as misdemeanors. Grievant pled guilty to the traffic offense Driving 

While Ability Impaired under Section 1192.1 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic 

Law.

Thirteen years later, in 2000, Grievant was arrested in Pennsylvania 

and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and related charges. 

This offense was graded as a misdemeanor of the second degree. Grievant was 

accepted into the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program. Grievant

successfully completed the program and as a result, the charges were dismissed 

and the charges were expunged. 

Ten years later, in 2010, Grievant was arrested and charged again with 

DUI in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. Given Grievant’s BAC and the 

existence of the earlier DUI charge, this DUI was graded as a misdemeanor of the 

first degree. 

On July 31, 2011, Grievant entered a guilty plea to DUI under 75

Pa.C.S. §3802(c), which involved the highest rate of alcohol and a second offense 

for sentencing purposes. Grievant was sentenced to five years’ probation with the 

first five months on house arrest with electronic monitoring (ankle bracelet). 

Grievant was also ordered to surrender his driver’s license for 18 months, complete 

an alcohol highway safety program and complete a court reporting network (CRN) 

evaluation.
3

Grievant’s sister contacted the School District’s Superintendent, 

Tammy Whitefield, Ph.D., (Dr. Whitefield), and told her of Grievant’s 2010 DUI 

arrest. When confronted, Grievant admitted he was arrested for driving while 

impaired in 2010. Grievant informed Dr. Whitefield that he had attended Gateway 

Genesis, a rehabilitation center and that he was sober. Grievant later told Dr. 

Whitefield about the two prior offenses.

On January 20, 2012, the School District sent Grievant a Statement of 

Charges informing him that he was suspended without pay and that the 

administration recommended his dismissal based on these offenses. The School 

District asserted that the three incidents of driving while impaired constituted 

“immorality” which constituted “just cause” for terminating Grievant’s 

employment under Section 1122 of the Public School Code,224 P.S. §11-1122.

The Association filed a grievance on Grievant’s behalf and alleged 

that his termination was without just cause.

On November 6, 2012, an arbitration hearing was held. On March 13, 

2013, the Arbitrator issued an Opinion and Award. The Arbitrator made the 

factual determination that the three incidents, each separated by a “great expanse of 

time,” did not constitute a course or pattern of conduct sufficient to support a 

charge of immorality. Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award, March 13, 2013, Finding 

of Fact (F.O.F.) Nos. 1-3, at 25. The Arbitrator also found that Grievant “is a 

recovered alcoholic who is now living the life of sobriety and who has clearly 

learned from his mistakes of being involved in drinking and driving.” Arbitrator’s 

 

2 Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended.
4

Opinion and Award, March 13, 2013, F.O.F. Nos. 7-8, at 25. The Arbitrator 

directed the School District to reinstate Grievant to his former position, but without 

payment of any wages or benefits he lost while he was suspended. 

The School District petitioned to Vacate the Award. On July 12, 

2013, the trial court granted the School District’s Petition and reinstated Grievant’s 

discharge. The trial court concluded that the Arbitrator’s Award did nothing “to 

promote the public policy of protecting children from the dangers of alcohol.” 

Trial Court Opinion, July 12, 2013, at 16. The trial court based its ruling on the 

fact that Grievant “has repeatedly consumed alcohol and made the decision to 

operate a vehicle” and that “instead of learning from his errors in judgment, the 

gravity of his offenses has increased.” Id.

The “essence test” is the proper standard to be employed when this 

Court reviews a grievance arbitration award. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit No. 

7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit No. 7 Classroom Assistances Education 

Support Personnel Association, 939 A.2d 855 (Pa. 2007). The essence test 

requires a two-prong review. First, the court shall determine if the issue as 

properly defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 

Second, if the issue is embraced by the agreement and appropriately before the 

arbitrator, the arbitrator’s award will be upheld if the arbitrator’s interpretation can 

rationally be derived from the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 863.

In Westmoreland Intermediate Unit No. 7, the Supreme Court adopted 

a narrow exception, the “public policy” exception, to this highly deferential 

standard of review. 
5

The “public policy” exception requires the court to consider whether 

the arbitrator’s award “contravenes a well-defined, dominant public policy that is 

ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from mere 

general considerations of supposed public interests.” Westmoreland Intermediate 

Unit No. 7, 939 A.2d at 866. 

The focus must be on whether the arbitration award, if enforced,

would contravene public policy, not whether the grievant’s misconduct violated 

public policy. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit No. 7. The arbitrator’s findings of 

fact are binding on this Court. Bethel Park School District v. Bethel Park 

Federation of Teachers, Local 1607, 55 A.3d 154 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). 

Here, the parties stipulated that the two-prong “essence test” was 

satisfied. That is, they agree that the matter was within the terms of the collective 

bargaining agreement (CBA) and the Award was rationally derived from the CBA. 

Accordingly, the sole issue on appeal is whether the arbitrator’s award 

which ordered reinstatement of Grievant violated an established public policy.3 

 

3

The Association listed four issues in its Statement of Questions Involved: (1) did the 

trial court err in its decision to vacate the award of the arbitrator by its finding that the award 

itself was in direct contravention of public policy; (2) did the trial court err in its finding that the 

public policy exception calls for a vacating of the award especially since the trial court found at 

pages 9 and 10 of its opinion that the two prongs of the essence test had been satisfied; (3) did 

the trial court err in ignoring the public policy that places great importance as to the 

rehabilitation of people who have had problems with alcohol and this error is especially 

egregious in light of the trial court’s statement at page 16 that it appears that Mr. Stoner 

[Grievant] has been sober since August 5, 2010, and (4) did the trial court err in its failing to 

follow well-established case laws as to the highly deferential standard of review of public 

employee arbitration awards?

(Footnote continued on next page...)
6

In Westmoreland Intermediate Unit No. 7, there was a well-defined 

public policy of protecting children from exposure to drugs and drug use. The 

arbitrator’s award, which placed the teacher back into the classroom while she was 

attempting recovery, violated that policy.

Here, there is a well-defined policy against drinking and driving under 

the influence. However, the Arbitrator found that Grievant was a recovered 

alcoholic. He no longer drank and drove. The Arbitrator found that in the months 

preceding the Award, Grievant had successfully attended a rehabilitation center

and clearly learned from his mistakes. This Court is bound by those findings. So 

was the trial court. However, the trial court incorrectly revisited Grievant’s 

conduct and concluded, contrary to the Arbitrator, that Grievant remained a threat 

to school-aged children based on his prior convictions. That was error.

The Arbitration Award which placed Grievant back into the classroom 

after he was rehabilitated did not violate this well-defined public policy. 

The Order of the trial court is REVERSED.

____________________________

BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

 

 

(continued...)

 All of these issues are subsumed in the issue as stated and this Court’s disposition of that 

issue. The Court need not address them separately. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Blairsville-Saltsburg School :

District :

:

v. :

:

Blairsville-Saltsburg Education :

Association, : No. 1340 C.D. 2013

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20th day of August, 2014, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Indiana County in the above-captioned matter is hereby 

REVERSED.

____________________________

BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Blairsville-Saltsburg School :

District :

 :

v. : No. 1340 C.D. 2013

 : Argued: April 23, 2014

Blairsville-Saltsburg Education :

Association, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge

HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge

HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

DISSENTING OPINION BY

JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: August 20, 2014

With regret, I must respectfully dissent. This is an extremely 

sympathetic case, but I must conclude that Section 111(f.1)(3) of the Public School 

Code,

1

24 P.S. § 1-111(f.1)(3), establishes a sufficient well defined public policy 

 

1

This section provides:

If the report of criminal history record information or a form 

submitted by an employe under subsection (j) indicates the person 

has been convicted more than once for an offense under 75 Pa. 

C.S. § 3802(a), (b), (c) or (d) (relating to driving under influence of 

alcohol or controlled substance) and the offense is graded as a 

misdemeanor of the first degree under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3803 (relating 

to grading), the person shall be eligible for current or prospective 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
BBL-2

against Grievant’s reinstatement. Accordingly, I believe we are constrained to 

affirm the decision of the Court of Common Pleas.

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

Judge

_____________________________

(continued...)

employment only if a period of three years has elapsed from the 

date of expiration of the sentence for the most recent offense. 

Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, added by Section 1 of the Act of June 30, 2011, 

P.L. 112.