IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SHARON ALICIA BURKE ANZALDI, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 2987

)

RACHEL MARIE CANNON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM

Sharon Alicia Burke Anzaldi (“Anzaldi”) has just filed this

action against a host of defendants, charging them with

violations of her constitutional rights. Because Anzaldi has

paid the $350 filing fee, this Court cannot address her Complaint

in the same manner that would be applicable if she were seeking

in forma pauperis status. Instead this memorandum speaks to some

of the problems that are apparent from a threshold examination of

Anzaldi’s allegations.

To begin with, she seeks to invoke 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985

and 1986 as the bases for her action. But in doing so she 1

misunderstands the scope of each of those statutes:

1. Section 1983, which creates potential liability on

the part of persons “who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or

Territory or the District of Columbia,” does not apply to

 Further references to those statutes will simply take the 1

form “Section --,” omitting the prefatory “42 U.S.C.”
federal defendants.

2. Although by contrast the scope of Section 1985’s

conspiracy provisions could extend to federal officials sued

in their official capacities, such suits must be based on

such persons’ actions that stem from (a) the intent to deny

the plaintiff equal protection of the laws (Section 1985(2))

or (b) racial or other class-based animus (Section 1985(3),

as taught in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03

(1971)). Nothing of either sort is even hinted at here.

3. By its terms, Section 1986 imposes liability only

for persons who fail to prevent violations covered by

Section 1985.

Moreover, three of Anzaldi’s targeted defendants--Magistrate

Judges Jeffrey Cole, Martin Ashman and Jeffrey Gilbert--are

insulated against any liability for damages by the doctrine of

absolute judicial immunity (see, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.

547 (1967)), because each was acting within the scope of his

judicial duties (Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871)). And the

comparable doctrine of prosecutorial immunity (see, e.g., Imbler

v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)) protects the first named

defendant, Assistant United States Attorney Rachel Cannon, from

Anzaldi’s damages action.

That then leaves FBI Agent David White and Internal Revenue

Service Agent Nick Zagotta and some unnamed individuals as

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Anzaldi’s asserted villains whom she seeks to mulct in damages to

the tune of $727,700,000. As stated earlier, this Court

expresses no ultimate substantive view as to Anzaldi’s

allegations against them. Instead it will simply await any

further developments initiated by Anzaldi.

With all of that said, however, this Court feels it would be

remiss if it failed to caution Anzaldi that the filing and

pursuit of lawsuits such as this one are not always risk-free. 

Because it seems from her filing that she has access to legal

materials, her attention is called (1) to the opinions in Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) and Denton v. Hernandez,

504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992), as well as (2) to the “plausibility”

requirement for complaints as introduced by Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009), and (3) to the requirement of objective good faith

imposed on unrepresented litigants as well as lawyers by Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11(b).

________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: April 26, 2012

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