IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SHIREETHA WILBERTON,

on behalf of M.M.W., a minor.

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,1

Defendant.

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No. 12 C 4216

Magistrate Judge

Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying the claims of M.M.W.,2 a minor, for 

Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. The parties have 

consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion for summary 

judgment or remand [Doc. No. 14] is DENIED and the Commissioner’s cross-motion 

for summary judgment [Doc. No. 23] is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 19, 2008, Shireetha Wilberton filed a claim for Supplemental 

Security Income on behalf of her daughter M.M.W., a minor, alleging M.M.W.’s 

1 Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for her predecessor, Michael J. Astrue, pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

2 M.M.W. is represented by Shireetha Wilberton, her mother.

 
disability since November 14, 2008. The claim was denied initially and upon 

reconsideration, after which Wilberton timely requested a hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on September 17, 2010. M.M.W.

personally appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel.

Wilberton also testified at the hearing, as did medical expert Dr. Keenan Farrell. 

On October 26, 2010, the ALJ denied M.M.W.’s claim for Supplemental 

Security Income, finding her not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social 

Security Administration Appeals Council then denied Wilberton’s request for 

review, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, 

therefore, reviewable by the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. 

Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005). 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3

A. Background

M.M.W. was born on October 9, 1999 and was ten years old at the time of the 

ALJ hearing. 

B. Medical Evidence

M.M.W. was referred to occupational therapy in 2003 because she was having 

difficulty playing with her peers and understanding directions and questions, and 

because she was not meeting developmental milestones. (R. 256-57.) She worked 

with a therapist through July of 2005. A 2004 therapy evaluation revealed that she 

did not play well with others and still needed assistance tying shoes and using a 

zipper. (R. 292.) A speech and language evaluation, also from 2004, concluded that 

3 The following facts from the parties’ briefs are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

2

 
she had moderate to severe delays in language receptiveness and a moderate delay 

in expressiveness. (R. 269-70.) In 2005, an occupational therapy evaluation 

summary specified that M.M.W. became easily frustrated when performing tasks 

and required constant praise in order to complete those tasks. (R.294.)

In 2008, M.M.W. was referred to a psychiatrist for assessment due to 

problems at school. The assessment concluded that she was “explosive, aggressive,

and ready to fight with her peers and siblings.” (R. 222.) The report also noted that 

M.M.W.’s teachers had reported that she was “socially unwell,” that M.M.W. had 

behavioral problems, and that she reported bad dreams once a week. Id. M.M.W. 

also experienced nosebleeds and would pick her nose to attempt to make it bleed in 

order to be excused from school. Id. M.M.W. was diagnosed with attention deficit 

hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and prescribed Focalin in 10 milligram doses. (223.)

In a follow-up appointment, M.M.W. reported experiencing stomach aches a sideeffect of the medication and, as a result, her dosage was reduced to 5 milligrams. (R. 

224.) However, experience proved that 5 milligrams was not a strong enough dose, 

and M.M.W.’s dosage was later changed to 5 milligrams in the morning and 2.5 

milligrams in the afternoon. (R. 226.) In a late January 2009 session, it was noted 

that M.M.W. improved with Focalin and was better focused, although M.M.W. 

remained behind in school (R. 244.) Continued progress was reported in April 2009, 

(R. 245.), and November 2009, (R. 253), although M.M.W.’s dosage of Focalin was 

increased to 10 milligrams. (R. 253.) At the last appointment in the record,

3
M.M.W.’s mother reported worsening symptoms, and M.M.W.’s Focalin dosage was 

increased to 15 milligrams. (R. 255.)

As part of the application process, M.M.W.’s records were reviewed by two 

agency medical consultants, Dr. Ronald Havens in late January 2009 and Dr. 

Patricia Beers in June 2009. Both concluded that M.M.W. had a severe impairment, 

but that the impairment did not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal any 

Listed impairment. (R. 238, 246.) Both Drs. Havens and Beers found that M.M.W. 

had less than marked limitations in all domains of functioning, including the 

domains of acquiring and using information, attending and completing tasks, and 

interacting and relating with others. (R. 240, 248.) Accordingly, both Drs. Havens 

and Beers concluded that M.M.W. was not disabled. (R. 243, 251.)

C. Evidence from School

M.M.W.’s teacher also submitted an evaluation as part of the application, 

which was completed in early January 2009. With respect to acquiring and using 

information, the teacher noted that M.M.W. had difficulty working independently 

and frequently requested assistance and attention; she found that M.M.W. had “an 

obvious problem” on a majority of relevant measures. (R. 229.) With respect to 

attending and completing tasks, the teacher noted that M.M.W. had “a difficult time 

not disrupting others during work periods throughout the day. This happens on a 

frequent basis.” (R. 230.) However, the teacher found that M.M.W. had a slight 

problem on most key activities, with a serious problem “working without distracting 

self or others.” Id. With respect to interacting and relating with others, the teacher 

4
noted that M.M.W. “consistently seeks both positive and negative attention.” (R. 

231.) She also noted that M.M.W. had a slight or no problem in all of the related key 

areas except expressing anger appropriately and seeking attention appropriately, 

which were an obvious problem and a serious problem respectively. Id.

In 2010, an Individualized Education Program (IEP) was formed for M.M.W. 

at her school. According to the IEP, M.M.W. was performing below grade level in all 

academic areas. (R. 312.) She scored in the eighth percentile in one standardized 

test relating to language arts, and her evaluator noted that she had difficulty 

reading and independently answering questions. (R. 314.) In terms of 

developmental and functional needs, it was noted in the IEP that M.M.W. had 

ability but was not “applying herself,” was “inconsistent in her efforts,” and would 

benefit from additional time and attention on schoolwork. (R. 305.) 

D. Plaintiff’s Testimony

M.M.W. testified at the hearing that she was able to bathe, dress, and feed 

herself. She also performed limited chores, cleaning her room and taking out the 

garbage. At school, she received help from “special teachers” during the school day, 

but could add, subtract, and multiply. M.M.W. stated that she does her homework.

M.M.W. also testified that she would get into fights and verbal altercations weekly 

at her school, and that she would get in trouble at school for talking with other 

students instead of doing her work. She also stated that, sometimes when angered, 

she would make her nose bleed. Although M.M.W. takes Focalin every day, she still 

has trouble concentrating on schoolwork. M.M.W. testified that taking Focalin 

5
caused her “to see things moving around,” and that she hears birds chirping and 

people talking when she takes her medication. (R. 61.)

E. Mother’s Testimony

Wilberton, M.M.W.’s mother, also testified at the hearing. She stated that 

M.M.W. had a speech impediment, although her problem had improved through 

therapy. Although M.M.W. had been barely passing her classes, she had been 

continued to fourth grade based on the formation of an IEP. Her mother stated that 

M.M.W. does not complete her homework independently, but instead needs someone 

to sit with her in order to help her complete her work. She also testified that 

M.M.W. had been “hearing voices” since she began taking Focalin. Wilberton also 

stated that M.M.W. has problems sleeping and also has nightmares. However, she 

also acknowledged that M.M.W.’s ability to focus had improved after she had begun 

taking Focalin. (R. 71-72, 77-78.)

F. Medical Expert Testimony

Dr. Keenan Farrell, a licensed clinical psychologist, also testified. He 

recognized a diagnosis of ADHD and found that M.M.W.’s condition was severe, but 

that her condition did not medically or functionally equal a listing. Dr. Farrell 

testified that M.M.W. had a marked limitation in interacting and relating to others. 

However, Dr. Farrell also stated that M.M.W. had less-than-marked limitations in 

acquiring and using information, attending and completing tasks, caring for herself, 

and health and physical well-being, and had no limitation in moving about and 

manipulating objects.

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G. ALJ Decision

The ALJ found at step one that M.M.W. had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since her application date of November 19, 2008. At step two, the 

ALJ concluded that M.M.W. had the severe impairment of attention deficit 

hyperactivity disorder. At step 3, however, the ALJ concluded M.M.W.’s impairment 

did not meet or medically equal a Listing, after noting that no physician had 

indicated findings sufficient to satisfy a listing. After discussing the evidence 

presented in the case, the ALJ concluded that M.M.W. had less-than-marked 

limitations in acquiring and using information, attending and completing tasks, 

interacting with and relating to others, and caring for herself, and that she had no 

limitation in moving about and manipulating objects or health and physical wellbeing. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that M.M.W.’s impairment did not 

functionally equal a listing, and that she therefore was not disabled.

DISCUSSION

I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD

For a child to qualify as disabled and thus eligible for SSI, she must have a 

“medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked 

and severe functional limitations . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for 

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). The 

regulations provide for a three-step framework for analyzing the disability claims of 

children. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). First, the ALJ must determine if the child is 

engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, there will be a finding of no disability. 

7
Second, if the child does not have a severe medical impairment or combination of 

impairments, then there will also be a finding of no disability. Third, the ALJ must 

determine if the severe impairment(s) meet, medically equal, or functionally equal 

the Listings of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1 and also 

meet the duration requirement. If so, that will lead to a finding of disability.

To determine whether an impairment is functionally equivalent to a Listing, 

the ALJ must analyze the severity of the impairment in six domains: “(1) acquiring 

and using information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting and 

relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for 

oneself; and (6) health and physical well-being.” Hopgood v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 696, 

(7th Cir. 2009); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). An impairment (or combination 

thereof) “must be of listing-level severity; i.e., it must result in ‘marked’ limitations 

in two domains of functioning or an ‘extreme’ limitation in one domain.” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.926a(a). A “marked” limitation is found when the impairment(s) “interferes 

seriously with [the child’s] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete 

activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). A “marked” limitation also includes “a 

limitation that is ‘more than moderate’ but ‘less than extreme.’” Id. An “extreme” 

limitation exists when the impairment(s) “interferes very seriously with [the child’s] 

ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.926a(e)(3)(i). An “extreme limitation,” however, “does not necessarily mean a 

total lack or loss of ability to function.” Id.

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II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is 

limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. 

Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). This Court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, 

resolving conflicts in the evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 

F.3d at 841. Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds could differ 

as to whether a claimant is disabled, a reviewing court “must nevertheless affirm 

the ALJ’s decision denying her claims if the decision is adequately supported.” Elder 

v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).

A reviewing court “examine[s] the ALJ’s decision to determine whether it 

reflects a logical bridge from the evidence to the conclusions sufficient to allow . . . a 

reviewing court . . . to assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and 

afford [a claimant] meaningful judicial review.” Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 

1121 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) 

(“An ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . 

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and must adequately articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . 

.”). The ALJ is not required to address “every piece of evidence or testimony in the 

record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning 

behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th 

Cir. 2001). And an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors 

his ultimate conclusion.” Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994); see 

Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2014) (“This ‘sound-bite’ approach 

to record evaluation is an impermissible methodology for evaluating the evidence.”).

III. ANALYSIS

Wilberton argues that the ALJ’s erred by failing to adequately evaluate 

whether M.M.W.’s impairment both medically met and functionally equaled Listing 

112.11. She contends that the ALJ improperly failed to consider evidence which 

would have proven disability and, therefore, that the ALJ’s analysis was improper. 

But because the ALJ considered that evidence presented and because his decision is 

otherwise supported, the ALJ did not err and his decision is affirmed.

A. Medical Equivalence

M.M.W. argues first that the ALJ erred in deciding that her impairment did 

not meet listing 112.11. She claims that, in reaching his conclusion, the ALJ failed 

to adequately consider the notes of her treating psychiatrist and classroom teacher, 

her IEP, and her low scores on standardized tests.

“[A]lthough an ALJ does not need to discuss every piece of evidence in the 

record, the ALJ may not analyze only the evidence supporting her ultimate 

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conclusion while ignoring the evidence that undermines it,” and an “ALJ must 

confront the evidence that does not support her conclusion and explain why that 

evidence was rejected.” Moore, 743 F.3d at 1123. In this case it is true that the ALJ 

did not mention the specific pieces of evidence identified by M.M.W. in the 

paragraph of the opinion in which he reached his step 3 conclusion. However, in his 

survey of the evidence elsewhere in the opinion, the ALJ conducted an extensive 

analysis of the evidence of record in the case and specifically discussed the evidence 

that M.M.W. claims was ignored, including her 2008 psychiatric evaluation, the 

later reports of her psychiatrist, the report of agency psychiatrist Dr. Havens, and 

M.M.W.’s teachers’ evaluations. (R. 13-16.)

Wilberton therefore appears to argue that the ALJ erred because his detailed 

discussion of the evidence she cites was not included in the paragraph containing 

his conclusion on meeting Listing 112.11. But “[t]here is no requirement of such tidy 

packaging.” Buckhanon ex rel. J.H. v. Astrue, 368 F. App’x 674, 678-79 (7th Cir. 

2010). Instead, a reviewing Court “read[s] the ALJ’s decision as a whole and with 

common sense.” Id. (citing Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 2004)) 

(finding no error where, “[a]lthough the ALJ cited the listings she considered and 

discussed the evidence of [the child’s] impairments in separate parts of the decision, 

[the claimant] treat[ed] the finding as unreasoned because the ALJ did not 

incorporate that information within a single paragraph”). As the Seventh Circuit 

has specified, “[b]ecause it is proper to read the ALJ’s decision as a whole, and 

because it would be a needless formality to have the ALJ repeat substantially 

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similar factual analyses at both steps three and five,” a reviewing court “consider[s] 

the ALJ’s treatment of the record evidence in support of both his conclusions at 

steps three and five.” Rice, 384 F.3d at 370 n.5. In this case, where the ALJ 

addressed the evidence M.M.W. argues was overlooked in a separate part of the 

opinion, it cannot be said that the ALJ ignored an entire line of evidence in reaching 

his conclusion. The ALJ did not err on this account.

To the extent that Wilberton argues that the ALJ’s determination was in 

error because substantial evidence would have supported a finding that M.M.W. 

met the Listing, this immaterial to the Court’s review. Instead, “so long as, in light 

of all the evidence, reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the claimant] 

is disabled,” this court “must affirm the ALJ’s decision denying benefits.” Schmidt v. 

Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 842 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 978 

(7th Cir.1996)); see also Elder, 529 F.3d at 413. In this case, the ALJ correctly noted 

that all of the medical opinions in the record had concluded that M.M.W. was not 

disabled at step 3, which provides substantial evidence for his conclusion. See

Buckhanon, 368 F. App’x at 679 (“The ALJ expressly relied upon the medical 

judgment of the state-agency consultants [in determining medical equivalence], and 

their uncontradicted opinions constitute substantial evidence.”). The ALJ did not 

err in determining that M.M.W.’s impairment did not meet Listing 112.11.

B. Functional Equivalence

M.M.W. also argues that the ALJ erred when he determined that her 

impairment did not functionally equal Listing 112.11. Wilberton contends the ALJ 

12
erred when he found M.M.W.’s impairment to be less-than-marked in three 

domains. Similar to her claims regarding medical equivalence, Wilberton argues 

that the ALJ failed to consider evidence contradicting his conclusion when he 

determined that M.M.W.’s limitations in acquiring and using information, attending 

and completing tasks, and interacting and relating to others. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 

416.226a(g)-(i). However, while the ALJ’s discussion of the evidence was not 

optimally organized, he nonetheless adequately considered the evidence presented 

in making his decision, which is in turn supported his decision with substantial 

evidence. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err.

1. Acquiring and using information

Wilberton argues that that ALJ erred in determining that M.M.W. was not 

markedly limited in acquiring and using information. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g); 

SSR 09-3p, 2009 WL 396025.4 She first contends that the ALJ failed to adequately 

discuss the evidence contradicting his finding by failing to consider portions of 

M.M.W.’s IEP which found her eligible for an extended school-year program, as well 

as teacher evaluations noting low test scores and difficulty concentrating and 

completing tasks. This characterization of the decision, however, is incorrect.

As with the ALJ’s finding on medical equivalence, it is true that the ALJ did 

not present a detailed discussion of the evidence cited by Wilberton in the 

paragraph where stated his decision on this domain. (R. 17.) However, earlier in the 

4 Interpretive rules, such as Social Security Rulings (ASSR@), do not have force of law but 

are binding on all components of the Agency. 20 C.F.R. ' 402.35(b)(1); accord Lauer v. Apfel, 

169 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1999).

13

 
opinion the ALJ gave an extensive narrative discussion of M.M.J.’s diagnosis of 

ADHD, the symptoms of the impairment, and her course of treatment prior to 

reaching her conclusions as to functional limitations, and noted his reason for 

discounting this evidence. There, the ALJ specifically referenced the teacher’s 

evaluation, noted the problems that the teacher had identified, and determined to 

give the opinion “moderate weight.” (R. 15.) However, the ALJ noted that the record 

indicated that M.M.W.’s condition had improved since the evaluation, which took 

place prior to the reports indicating her improvement with her medication. Id. The 

ALJ also discussed the IEP specifically, referencing the low test scores and 

M.M.W.’s difficulty concentrating, but found this contradicted by the IEP’s 

conclusion that M.M.W. had the ability to improve but had put forth inconsistent 

efforts. Id. And in the section of the decision where the ALJ addressed this domain 

explicitly, he noted the IEP and specifically identified the low test scores and 

reports that M.M.W. had difficulty focusing and following instructions. 

As stated above, while an ALJ may not ignore evidence contradicting his 

ultimate opinion, he need only “minimally articulate his or her justification for

rejecting or accepting specific evidence of a disability.” Rice, 384 F.3d at 371

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, where the ALJ 

addressed the contrary evidence and linked that evidence to his ultimate finding, he 

appropriately built a “logical bridge” from the evidence to his conclusion. See

Washington ex rel. Stewart v. Barnhart, 481 F. Supp. 2d 905, 915 (N.D. Ill. 2007) 

(“Because this Court can track the ALJ’s reasoning regarding the evidence and is 

14
certain that the ALJ considered all evidence that is important, this Court finds the 

ALJ’s decision meets the minimum articulation standard.”).

Wilberton also argues that the ALJ failed to give appropriate weight to her 

testimony and to M.M.W.’s teacher’s evaluation, and that the ALJ should have 

found M.M.W.’s responses at the hearing indicative of disability. This Court, 

however, may not “reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide 

questions of credibility, or, in general, substitute [its] own judgment for that of the 

Commissioner. [Its] task is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s factual 

findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 

1001 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted). In addition to his survey of the 

evidence which noted that three agency physicians had concluded that M.M.W.’s 

limitations were less-than marked in this domain, the ALJ also pointed to evidence 

from M.M.W.’s teacher’s report and her IEP in support of her finding, as well as 

testimony from M.M.W.’s mother regarding her capabilities in reaching his decision. 

The ALJ’s decision on this point was supported by substantial evidence, and he did 

not err in finding that M.M.W. had less than marked limitations in this domain.

2. Attending and completing tasks

Wilberton also argues that the ALJ erred in finding that M.M.W. did not 

have a marked limitation in attending and completing tasks. See 20 C.F.R. § 

416.926a(h)(3); SSR 09-4p, 2009 WL 396033. Wilberton’s arguments on this point 

also consist largely of a disagreement with the ALJ about the weight due to 

competing pieces of evidence: she disputes the weight given to the ALJ’s findings

15
that M.M.W. helped with chores at home and that M.M.W. takes her medication 

without prompting, as well as his evaluation of M.M.W.’s performance at the 

hearing. Wilberton argues that the ALJ’s evaluation of the evidence was flawed 

because, although M.M.W. stated she completed chores at home, she did so only 

when bored. And Wilberton argues that, had the ALJ questioned her more robustly 

at the hearing, he would have “seen more of her comprehension and communication 

difficulties,” which would have altered his analysis. (Clmt.’s Mot. at 15.)

As stated above, it is not for this Court to reweigh the evidence in a Social 

Security case; instead, a reviewing court examines the decision to determine 

whether it was supported by evidence which “a reasonable person would accept . . . 

as adequate to support the conclusion.” See Young, 362 F.3d at 1001. While the 

evidence in the case could have been viewed in a different manner, the ALJ 

undertook an extensive discussion of the medical evidence as described above prior 

to making his findings. Relevant to this domain, the ALJ not only discussed the 

evidence raised by Wilberton, but also noted that evidence from both state agency 

medical consultants had concluded the limitation in this domain were less-than 

marked. (R. 18.) Furthermore, he noted that Wilberton had testified that M.M.W.’s 

Focalin prescription had improved her functioning, and that M.M.W.’s teacher had 

noted that—with the exception of working without distracting other students—

M.M.W.’s problems in this area were “generally slight.” (R. 18.) This evidence is 

“sufficient for a reasonable person to accept as adequate to support the [ALJ’s] 

16
decision.” Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003). The ALJ did not err 

in finding that M.M.W.’s impairment was less-than marked in this domain.

3. Interacting and relating to others

Wilberton also argues that the ALJ erred in finding that M.M.W. did not 

have a marked limitation in interacting and relating with others. See 20 C.F.R. 

§416.926a(i); SSR 09-5p, 2009 WL 396026. Wilberton claims that the ALJ 

improperly rejected the testimony of the testifying medical expert—who determined 

that M.M.W. had a marked limitation in this domain—without providing sufficient 

grounds for doing so.

In support of her argument, Wilberton relies on Patino v. Astrue, 574 F. 

Supp. 2d 862, 871 (N.D. Ill. 2008). In that case, a psychologist had initially testified 

at the hearing that, within the domain of “acquiring and using information,” the 

child had a “marked” limitation; later in her testimony, however, the psychologist 

stated that aspects of the child’s limitation were “extreme.” Id. at 868. The ALJ’s 

decision, however, did not address the psychologist’s testimony at all; instead, it 

simply stated that the decision was made after “ ‘consider[ing] all of the evidence of 

the record, including the medical records and other evidence’ as well as ‘testimony 

show[ing] that claimant has a severe learning disability in reading.’ ” Id. at 870 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing the decision, the district court

found that the ALJ had failed to sufficiently consider the psychologist’s testimony 

on this domain because the opinion “never refer[ed] to [the expert] by name or, more 

importantly, discusse[d] her substantial testimony at any length.” Id. at 870. The 

17
Court found this particularly problematic given the expert’s “conflicting statements 

as to whether Patino showed an ‘extreme’ versus ‘marked’ limitation.” Id.

M.M.W.’s case, however, is distinguishable from Patino. Here, the ALJ 

explicitly discussed the medical expert’s opinion and noted his reasons for 

discounting that opinion, including contrary testimony from state agency 

psychologists and evidence from M.M.W., her mother, her teacher, and her IEP. (R. 

19.) Furthermore, although occurring earlier in the opinion as described above, the 

ALJ gave a detailed account of the expert’s testimony, (R. 16), and a detailed 

account of the evidence referenced later in discounting that testimony. (R. 13-16.)

Patino is simply not applicable to the facts of this case, where the ALJ explicitly 

addressed the medical expert’s conclusion and the evidence contradicting it before 

determining not to credit the opinion. The ALJ did not err on this point.

Wilberton also argues that the ALJ selectively discussed the evidence by 

failing to consider testimony from M.M.W., Wilberton herself, and M.M.W.’s teacher 

as to the extent of M.M.W.’s limitations. However, again that is simply not the case, 

as the ALJ gave a detailed examination of these points in his summary of the 

evidence. (R. 13-16) And even in the paragraph stating his conclusion on this 

domain, the ALJ noted the evidence that Wilberton argues was overlooked—that

M.M.W. had been involved in altercations with other students in the past and that 

M.M.W.’s teacher has stated that M.M.W. often seeks attention inappropriately—

before concluding that evidence from M.M.W.’s IEP, her teacher’s evaluation, and 

the agency medical consultants contradicted this finding. (R. 19.) As “an ALJ need 

18
only ‘minimally articulate his or her justification for rejecting or accepting specific 

evidence of a disability,’ ” Rice, 384 F.3d at 371, the ALJ did not err. It is clear that 

the ALJ considered the evidence raised by M.M.W. in reaching his decision on this 

domain, and “the ALJ satisfied his minimal duty to articulate his reasons and make 

a bridge between the evidence and the outcome.” Id.

Additionally, even if the ALJ erred in rejecting the medical expert’s 

testimony, such an error was harmless. Harmless error in a Social Security case 

occurs where a reviewing Court “can say with great confidence” that “no reasonable 

ALJ would reach a contrary decision on remand.” See McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 

884, 892 (7th Cir. 2011). In order to prove disability based on functional equivalence

to a listing, as Wilberton argues she had done, a claimant must show an 

impairment “resulting in ‘marked’ limitations in two domains of functioning or an 

‘extreme’ limitation in one domain.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a). In this case, M.M.W. 

does not contend that her limitations in any domain were “extreme,” only that the 

ALJ erred in failing to find them “marked” in the three domains described above.

But, as discussed above, the ALJ did not err in finding that M.M.W. was not 

markedly limited in the first two domains. Therefore, even if the ALJ should have 

credited the testifying expert’s opinion and found M.M.W. markedly limited in 

interacting and relating to others, this would not result in a finding of disability. 

Even if the ALJ erred in this respect, no ALJ would reach a different decision on 

remand, and such an error would be harmless.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or 

remand [Doc. No. 14] is DENIED and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment [Doc. No. 23] is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED. ENTERED:

 

DATE: November 17, 2015 ___________________________

HON. MARIA VALDEZ

United States Magistrate Judge

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