alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Louis M. Kagan, Respondent, v. United States Life Insurance Company, Appellant.

Judgment awarding summary judgment unanimously reversed, without costs of this appeal to either party and motion denied, without costs; order of October 29, 1963, modified to provide that the denial of defendant’s motion for a physical examination is without prejudice to reapply for an examination. Memorandum: Summary judgment should not have been granted to plaintiff. An issue of fact was presented as to the onset of the sickness, including the question of whether the condition for which the insured was operated upon was a new sickness or the result of a natural progression of a former illness. At the time of reargument and the decision thereafter, the new CPLR was in effect and applicable. 3212 is particularly pertinent to the present motion. Subdivision (f) thereof provides that it should appear from affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated, the court may deny the motion or order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had. This section alone should have prompted the denial of the motion, particularly in view of the fact that the requested physical examination was not permitted. It was apparent that the defendant was in no position to determine whether this was a new sickness. The defendant may never be in a position to dispute this without a physical examination. The original application for a physical examination was made under section *306*of the Civil Practice Act, which applied to examinations where claims for physical injuries were involved. The new 3121 of the CPLR permits an examination in any action “in which the mental or physical conditions * * * of a party * * * is in controversy”. A physical examination was denied in part because section 306 of the Civil Practice Act did not authorize it; but again we say that, upon reapplication, 3121 of CPLR was before the court. Furthermore, *Beckley*v. *Otsego County Farmers Co-op. Fire Ins. Co.*(3 A D 2d 190) and other similar cases relied upon by [Special Term in denying a physical examination have no application. There the applications for examinations were made under the terms of contracts that had already been repudiated by the insurance companies. Here the examination is not sought under the contract. It is sought under the general right to obtain disclosure and in the furtherance of exchange of information. The defendant should have the right to reapply for a physical and oral examination. (Appeal from judgment of Onondaga Special Term granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for a physical examination; also appeal from order of Onondaga Special Term which confirmed the court’s previous order.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Henry and Noonan, JJ.
#### 2401.602 Contracting Officers.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                  1000

<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                       DEC-02-2000
<PERIOD-END>                            MAY-27-2000
<CASH>                                        8,189
<SECURITIES>                                 59,302
<RECEIVABLES>                                18,529
<ALLOWANCES>                                    300
<INVENTORY>                                  24,340
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            112,135
<PP&E>                                      131,884
<DEPRECIATION>                               97,667
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              150,416
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        12,106
<BONDS>                                         385
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                             0
<PREFERRED>                                       0
<COMMON>                                      1,319
<OTHER-SE>                                  128,012
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                150,416
<SALES>                                      57,880
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             57,880
<CGS>                                        52,154
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                52,154
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              6,957
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                725
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               36
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               1,518
<INCOME-TAX>                                    382
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           1,136
<DISCONTINUED>                                    0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                   0
<CHANGES>                                         0
<NET-INCOME>                                  1,136
<EPS-BASIC>                                     .21
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   .21


</TABLE>
237.102-72 Contracts for management services. In accordance with Section 802 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Pub. L. 110-181), DoD may award a contract for the acquisition of services the primary purpose of which is to perform acquisition support functions with respect to the development or production of a major system, only if— ( a ) The contract prohibits the contractor from performing inherently governmental functions;
( b ) The DoD organization responsible for the development or production of the major system ensures that Federal employees are responsible for determining— ( 1 ) Courses of action to be taken in the best interest of the Government; and
( 2 ) Best technical performance for the warfighter; and
( c ) The contract requires that the prime contractor for the contract may not advise or recommend the award of a contract or subcontract for the development or production of the major system to an entity owned in whole or in part by the prime contractor.
[74 FR 34269, July 15, 2009]
Exhibit 32.2

BRIGGS & STRATTON CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES

Form 10-Q for Quarterly Period Ended March 28, 2010

EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Briggs & Stratton Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter
ended March 28, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, James E. Brenn, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to
§906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                                  
|--------------------------------------------------
|/s/ James E. Brenn                                
|James E. Brenn Chief
Financial Officer May 5, 2010

This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed
by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A signed original of this
written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                          43,000
<SECURITIES>                                   200,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                  264,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     43,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               627,000
<PP&E>                                       3,765,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,105,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,771,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          580,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        13,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,817,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,771,000
<SALES>                                        358,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               359,000
<CGS>                                          439,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  522,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              14,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (240,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (240,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (240,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.18)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.18)


</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 23



                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
S-8 No. 333-39408) pertaining to the Information Resources, Inc. 2000 Employee
Stock Purchase Plan, the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-31182)
pertaining to the Information Resources, Inc. 1999 Restricted Stock Plan and
1999 Nonqualified Defined Contribution Plan, the Registration Statement (Form
S-8 No. 333-31416) pertaining to the Information Resources, Inc. Restricted
Stock Plan - Joseph P. Durrett, the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No.
33-48289) pertaining to the Information Resources, Inc. Employee Nonqualified
Stock Option Plan, the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 33-48290) pertaining
to the Information Resources, Inc. Amended and Restated 1992 Stock Option Plan,
the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 33-48291) pertaining to the Information
Resources, Inc. 1992 Executive Stock Option Plan, the Registration Statement
(Form S-8 No. 33-52719) pertaining to the Information Resources, Inc. Employee
Nonqualified Stock Option Plan, the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No.
33-52721) pertaining to the Information Resources, Inc. Employee Nonqualified
Stock Option Plan, the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 33-54649) pertaining
to the Information Resources, Inc. 1992 Executive Stock Option Plan and the
Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-24041) pertaining to the Information
Resources, Inc. 401(k) Retirement Savings Plan and Trust of our report dated
February 5, 2002, except for Note 11 as to which the date is March 1, 2002 with
respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of Information
Resources, Inc. included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended
December 31, 2001.


ERNST & YOUNG LLP
Chicago, Illinois
March 21, 2002
DISMISS and Opinion Filed August 4, 2021 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-21-00393-CV 

IN RE SHERRY BEARD, Relator 

Original Proceeding from the 193rd Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-04466 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Myers, Partida-Kipness, and Carlyle 

Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness 

Before the Court is relator’s May 28, 2021 petition for writ of mandamus in 

which she challenges the trial court’s order compelling discovery. In her petition, 

relator argues that the trial court abused its discretion because all discovery must be 

automatically stayed while the parties’ motions to dismiss pursuant to the Texas 

Citizens Participation Act are pending. 

In its June 21, 2021 letter, which we construe as a motion to dismiss, real party 

in interest advises us that this original proceeding has been rendered moot by the 

trial court’s denial of the TCPA motions. We grant the motion and dismiss the 
 –2– 

original proceeding as moot. We also lift the May 28, 2021 stay order issued by this 

Court. 

210393F.P05 

/Robbie Partida-Kipness/

ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS 

JUSTICE
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Esther R. Post, Respondent, v. Wallauer Paint Co., Inc., et al., Appellants. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Reynolds, J.

Appeal by the employer and its carrier from a decision and award of death benefits by the Workmen’s Compensation Board on the grounds that there is no substantial evidence to support the board’s finding of accident and causal relationship. On August 2, 1961 decedent, a paint salesman, experienced chest pains while assisting in unloading and placing, on appropriate shelves a shipment of about 100 to 120 cartons of paint. These cartons weighed from 11 to GO pounds, depending on the *982size containers involved, and were wheeled via a handcart, 4 at a time, a distance of approximately 30 feet along a level surface. This attack subsided, and decedent continued working, until August 10, 1961 when the chest pains reoccurred. Then for the first time he consulted a physician who diagnosed “ myocardial disease, left ventricular strained and anterior wall myocardial infarction.” A second electrocardiogram taken on August 28, 1961 confirmed this diagnosis and showed further cardiac changes. Decedent was immediately hospitalized and remained so until September 16, 1961. About one month later on October 18, 1961 decedent died from what was diagnosed as “ Acute coronary thrombosis. Previous myocardial infarction.” The board could properly find that decedent’s activities on August 2, 1961 constituted arduous work within the meaning of *Matter of Masse*v. *Robinson*(301 N. Y. 34) and *Matter of Burris*v. *Lewis*(2 N Y 2d 323). We cannot say that ,the average man could not so find. The fact that decedent was performing his usual activities is, of course, not controlling *(Matter of Pickhardt*v. *Heist Ohio Corp.,*20 A D 2d 737). Similarly the question of causal relationship is factual, and although the medical evidence was conflicting, the board’s determination is supported by substantial evidence and must therefore be sustained *(Matter of Palermo*v. *Gallucci & Sons,*5 N Y 2d 529). Decision affirmed, with costs to the Workmen’s Compensation Board. Gibson, P. J., Taylor, Aulisi and Hamm, JJ., concur.
#### William Hicks, Respondent-Appellant, v. State of New York, Appellant-Respondent.

(Claim No. 39891.)

Herlihy, J.

J. This is an appeal by the State of New York from a judgment of the Court of Claims awarding damages to the claimant for false arrest and imprisonment. In 1940 the claimant was convicted of criminally buying and receiving stolen property. At the arraignment for sentence the District Attorney filed an information, charging the claimant with being a third felony offender, having been previously convicted of two felonies. He was represented by counsel and after pleading to the information was given a mandatory sentence. He was released on parole in 1948 and was arrested in 1960 for violation of parole and returned to prison. In 1961 a writ of habeas corpus was sustained, it being determined that in 1940 he was actually a first offender and he was accordingly resentenced. In the Court of Claims it was found that he “had been improperly actually confined in prison for some 19 months ”. In 1940 when the then District Attorney *838filed an information pursuant to sections 1941-1943 of the Penal Law, he was a public officer acting in the performance of his official duties. If error were committed as to the nature and degree of the crimes charged in the information, the defendant had the right at the time of his arraignment to question the accuracy of the charges. He also had the right to appeal from all or any part of the judgment of conviction. The fact that the alleged felonies in the information were in reality misdemeanors does not give rise to a cause of action against the State for false imprisonment. *(Natasi*v. *State of New York, 275*App. Div. 524, affd. 300 N. Y. 473.) To sustain the judgment awarding damages would constitute a basis for liability for which presently there is no statute or decisional law. Controlling authority is to the contrary. *(Natasi*v. *State of New York, supra; Ford*v. *State of New York,*21 A D 2d 437.) *Troutman*v. *State of New York*(273 App. Div. 619) relied upon by the claimant, is not determinative. In the instant circumstances the court, at the time of the imposition of judgment, had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person. It is highly questionable whether Certain of claimant’s additional contentions are properly before us, but we have nevertheless considered all of the arguments advanced and we find them without merit. Judgment reversed, on the law and the facts, and claim dismissed, without costs. Gibson, P. J., Taylor, Aulisi and Hamm, JJ., concur.
- IG-07-003 Part One [With Letter].pdf
- IG-07-003 Part Two [With Letter].pdf
#### Heather WEATHERS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SCHOOL BOARD OF LAFAYETTE PARISH; James H. Easton, Superintendent of Schools, Lafayette Parish; Joseph Craig, Principal, Comeaux High School, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 07-31082

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 18, 2008.

David Benoit, Breaux Bridge, LA, Katharine Murphy Schwartzmann, ACLU of Louisiana, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Dawn L. Morris, Preis & Roy, Lafayette, LA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiff, Heather Weathers, appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the School Board of Lafayette *429Parish and two of its officials, sued in their official capacities, on her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ms. Weathers was a substitute teacher at Comeaux High School where Defendant Joseph Craig was a principal. She alleges that Principal Craig fired her in violation of her First Amendment rights as a result of a student complaint about Ms. Weathers’ website which contained adult art.

A municipal level governmental entity, such as the School Board here, can be held liable for Section 1983 violations only as a result of an official policy or the decision of a person or entity with final policymaking authority. *Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,*7 F.3d 1241 (5th Cir.1994); *see also Barrow v. Greenville Indep. Sch. Dist.,*480 F.3d 377, 381-82 (5th Cir.2007)(where state law makes the school board the policymaker and the superintendent the administrator, the school board is not liable under Section 1983 for the superintendent’s refusal to recommend a teacher for promotion), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 255, 169 L.Ed.2d 148 (2007). The District Court determined as a matter of law that Principal Craig was not vested with “final policymaking authority” in the matter of hiring and firing of teachers because only the School Board was authorized by state law to make such decisions. As a result, the District Court concluded that summary judgment should be granted.

Having carefully reviewed the record on appeal, including the briefs of the parties and the district court’s thorough opinion, we are satisfied that the district court’s rulings are fully supported. Finding no error, we adopt the reasoning of the district court. The grant of summary judgment by the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### 232.006-5 Reporting.

Departments and agencies, in accordance with department/agency procedures, shall prepare and submit to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Sustainment) through the Principal Director, Defense Pricing, Contracting, and Acquisition Policy, annual reports (Report Control Symbol DD-AT&L(A) 1891) containing the information required by FAR 32.006-5.

[63 FR 11535, Mar. 9, 1998, as amended at 65 FR 39705, June 27, 2000; 68 FR 7440, Feb. 14, 2003; 88 FR 73237, Oct. 25, 2023; 89 FR 60832, July 29, 2024]
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|   | PHOTOMEDEX, INC.                             |   |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | 2005 EQUITY COMPENSATION PLAN                |   |
|   | (amended and restated as of August 3, 2010)  |   |

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|               |                                  |                                                                    |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|               | PHOTOMEDEX, INC.                      |
|     |                        |                                                          |
|               | By:                         | /s/Dennis McGrath          |
|               | Dennis McGrath                        |
|               | President and Chief Executive Officer |

----

----
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### January 26, 2010 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. CHRIS HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant. No. 09-2118 (D.C. No. 1:05-CR-02365-MV-1) (D.N.M)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , BALDOCK, and HOLMES , Circuit Judges.
Defendant Chris Harris entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(a)(iii). On appeal, Defendant argues the district court er red in denying his motion to suppress because probation and police officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment when they entered his apartment and searched him and the apartment without a warrant or reasonable suspicion. Because the parties are familiar with the historical facts of this case, we do not2 recite them here. Having reviewed the record and considered the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we are convinced the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant’s order of probation provided for warrantless searches of his person, residence, and property by a probation officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a probation violation. The district court properly found the probation and police officers had reasonable suspicion to enter and search Defendant’s apartment and his person in accordance with Defendant’s order of probation based on (1) information from two independent confidential informants that Defendant was dealing drugs, in addition to information from a third independent confidential informant who participated in a controlled buy from Defendant; (2) one officer’s knowledge of Defendant’s history of possessing and illegally discharging a firearm; and (3) highly suspicious and evasive behavior of Defendant and the two men with him in his apartment, visible to the officers from outside. These facts provided the officers with a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity, justifying their entry and search in accordance with Defendant’s order of probation. See United States v. Trujillo , 404 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Reasonable suspicion requires only a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity . . . .”).3 Accordingly, the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress is
AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court,

Bobby R. Baldock United States Circuit Judge