SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2770-14T1

KEVIN M. WRIGHT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TOWNSHIP OF CHERRY HILL,

Defendant-Respondent.

_______________________________

Argued October 13, 2016 – Remanded 

Resubmitted February 2, 2017 – Remanded 

Resubmitted April 19, 2017 – Decided 

Before Judges Lihotz and Whipple.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L4769-12.

Matthew S. Wolf, attorney for appellant.

Brown & Connery, L.L.P., attorneys for 

respondent (Christine P. O'Hearn, of counsel; 

Ms. O'Hearn and Michael J. Miles, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

November 28, 2016

March 6, 2017

June 13, 2017
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Plaintiff appeals from a January 23, 2015 order denying his 

motion for reconsideration of a November 21, 2014 order, granting 

defendant's motion for summary judgment. We twice remanded this 

case for findings of fact or conclusions of law as required by 

Rule 1:7-4. Having reviewed submissions of the parties and the 

judge's findings on the record March 9, 2017, we affirm.

The underlying facts are outlined in our previous opinion of 

November 28, 2016. In that opinion, we affirmed the motion judge's 

denial of a plaintiff's adjournment request but reversed and 

remanded the entry of an order granting summary judgment for 

defendants because the judge had not provided a statement of 

reasons supporting the entry of judgment on an unopposed motion. 

Wright v. Twp of Cherry Hill, No. A-2770-14 (App. Div. Nov. 28, 

2016). We summarize the facts relevant to the summary judgment 

motion.

Plaintiff was a Cherry Hill police officer for nineteen years. 

After an automobile accident while on duty in 1995, plaintiff 

suffered a brain injury and later suffered from major depression, 

headaches, and numerous personal and psychological problems. 

Notwithstanding his injury, plaintiff returned to work without 

restriction and was deemed fit for duty after several psychological 

examinations. In June 2010, plaintiff was suspended for ten days 

after an internal affairs investigation resulted in a finding of 
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improper conduct because he did not appear in court when required. 

On August 30, 2010, Cherry Hill Police Department suspended 

plaintiff after an internal affairs investigation uncovered 

plaintiff had abandoned hundreds of law enforcement items and 

documents. These items were found after Cherry Hill Police 

searched plaintiff's home without a warrant or consent.

Plaintiff was advised he was subject to termination. In 

September 2010, while on paid leave, plaintiff submitted to a 

fitness for duty examination and was found to be suffering from 

severe depression. Counseling was recommended, but plaintiff did 

not fully comply. Notwithstanding his non-compliance, defendant 

did not terminate plaintiff but continued to pay him for seven 

months. 

On August 30, 2011, a disciplinary hearing was scheduled 

before an independent arbitrator. Plaintiff did not appear. On 

September 1, 2011, the arbitrator issued a decision concluding 

plaintiff had "ceased to conduct his affairs in a manner required 

by a police officer," and plaintiff was unresponsive to defendant's 

efforts to assist him. The arbitrator agreed termination from the 

police force was the only option because plaintiff could not 

function as a police officer.

Plaintiff filed suit on November 7, 2012, under the New Jersey 

Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, and 
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the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA), N.J.S.A. 10:6-2. The 

first count of the complaint alleged plaintiff suffered a 

disability under the NJLAD and had suffered adverse employment 

consequences as a result thereof. The second count asserted 

plaintiff's constitutional rights had been violated as a result 

of the illegal search of his home and the use of the illegally 

seized items.1

On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge erred because he did 

not construe all facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving 

party as required by Rule 4:46(2)(c), and the judge failed to 

correlate factual findings with legal conclusions. We disagree.

In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Fisher, we said, "[s]ummary 

judgment is appropriate where the evidence fails to show a genuine 

issue as to any material fact challenged and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 408 N.J. Super. 289, 

299 (App. Div. 2009) (citing R. 4:46-2(c)). In support of an 

 

1 On October 4, 2013, prior to the completion of discovery, 

defendant moved for partial summary judgment dismissing the claim 

under the NJCRA because the claims alleged were barred by the twoyear statute of limitations. Through counsel, plaintiff submitted 

a certification stating he had been unaware Cherry Hill police 

searched his home without a warrant until September 17, 2012, 

because the police had previously lied to him, telling him they 

had been responding to a burglary report. The court rejected 

plaintiff's assertion and granted defendant's motion on November 

22, 2013. That order was not appealed.
5 A-2770-14T1

order granting summary judgment, a judge is required to detail the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in a written or oral 

opinion. R. 1:7-4(a); R. 4:46-2(c). A trial judge is obligated 

"to set forth factual findings and correlate them to legal 

conclusions. Those findings and conclusions must then be measured 

against the standards set forth in Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance 

Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)." Great Atl. & Pac. Tea 

Co. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 495, 498 (App. Div. 2000). 

Neither the parties nor the appellate court is "well-served by an 

opinion devoid of analysis or citation to even a single case." 

Ibid. 

Rule 4:46-2(b) provides that all sufficiently supported 

material facts will be deemed admitted for purposes of the motion 

unless "specifically disputed" by the party opposing the motion. 

Pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(a), however, the judge must still correlate 

those facts to legal conclusions. 

Here, the judge explicitly adopted defendant's reasoning and 

arguments and read into the record facts he deemed material and 

admitted. The judge determined plaintiff had not set forth a 

prima facie case of disability discrimination under the NJLAD 

because he had not produced evidence defendant was aware of his 

disability, and defendant was justified in terminating plaintiff's 

employment because he did not perform the essential functions of 
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his job. Based on the undisputed record, the court determined 

even if plaintiff had pled a prima facie claim, defendant had 

established a non-pretextual, non-discriminatory basis for 

removing plaintiff from his job. Plaintiff's failure to 

accommodate claim was rejected by the court because plaintiff 

could no longer perform the essential functions of the job. The 

record supports the judge's findings.

Affirmed.