UNITED STATES NAVY-MARINE CORPS 

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Before

J.R. MCFARLANE, M.C. HOLIFIELD, K.J. BRUBAKER

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

RYAN C. POLITZ

SERGEANT (E-5), U.S. MARINE CORPS

NMCCA 201400305

SPECIAL COURT-MARTIAL

Sentence Adjudged: 3 April 2014.

Military Judge: Maj Nicholas A. Martz, USMC.

Convening Authority: Commanding Officer, MALS 14, MAG 14, 

2D MAW, Cherry Point, NC. 

Staff Judge Advocate's Recommendation: LtCol J.J. Murphy, 

USMC.

For Appellant: CDR Ricardo A. Berry, JAGC, USN.

For Appellee: CDR James E. Carsten, JAGC, USN; Capt Cory A. 

Carver, USMC.

23 December 2014

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OPINION OF THE COURT 

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THIS OPINION DOES NOT SERVE AS BINDING PRECEDENT, BUT MAY BE CITED AS 

PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY UNDER NMCCA RULE OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 18.2.

 

PER CURIAM:

A military judge sitting as special court martial convicted 

the appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of 

destroying military property of a value greater than $500.00, 

and one specification of larceny of military property of a value 

greater than $500.00, in violation of Articles 108 and 121, 

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 908 and 921. The 

military judge sentenced the appellant to four months’
2

confinement, reduction to pay grade E-1, and a bad-conduct 

discharge. As an act of clemency the convening authority (CA) 

disapproved all confinement in excess of seventy-eight days, but 

otherwise approved the sentence as adjudged. The pretrial 

agreement had no effect on the adjudged sentence. 

On appeal, the appellant alleges that the military judge 

erred when he denied the appellant’s implied bias challenge 

against the military judge.1 After considering the pleadings of 

the parties, and the record of trial, we conclude that the 

findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and that no 

error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the 

appellant was committed. Arts. 59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ. 

Background

On 16 November 2013, the appellant stole a large number of 

power cables belonging to his command, valued at over 

$17,000.00. He then took the cables to an off-base location and 

tried to burn off the rubber insulation in order to recover the 

cooper. The burning was stopped by local law enforcement, but 

not before power cables worth nearly $7000.00 had been damage 

beyond repair. The charges against the appellant stemming from 

those actions were sent a special court-martial that first 

convened on 3 April 2014. 

Prior to forum selection and the entry of pleas, the 

military judge informed both parties that he had presided over a 

different, contested, court-martial involving the appellant more 

than a year earlier, wherein a panel of members with enlisted 

representation served as the fact finder. During the voir dire

that followed, the military judge stated that he remembered 

nothing about the case other than it was a single specification 

drug charge that ended in acquittal. He stated that he did not 

remember what drug was alleged to have been used, or whether the 

appellant had testified. The military judge also stated that he 

had not formed an opinion about the appellant’s military 

character, that he would not consider the prior case during this 

case, and that the appellant’s prior acquittal was not relevant. 

Following voir dire, trial defense counsel moved to 

disqualify the military judge on the basis of implied bias, 

relying “solely on the fact that [he was the] military judge in 

the previous case.” Record at 7. After carefully considering 

the legal authority cited by the appellant, the military judge 

denied the motion. Thereafter the appellant, pursuant to the 

 

1 This assignment of error was raised pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 

12 M.J. 31 (C.M.A. 1982).
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terms of his pretrial agreement, elected trial by military judge 

alone and entered unconditional guilty pleas to both charges. 

Recusal of the Military Judge

This court reviews a military judge's decision on the issue 

of recusal for an abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Butcher, 56 M.J. 87, 90 (C.A.A.F. 2001). In general, a military 

judge must disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which that 

military judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

RULE FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 902(a), MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES

(2012 ed.). A military judge also must recuse himself if he has 

a “personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal 

knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 

proceeding.” R.C.M. 902(b)(1). 

Whether the military judge should recuse himself under 

R.C.M. 902(a) is an objective test, so it is "assessed not in 

the mind of the military judge himself, but rather in the mind 

of a reasonable man . . . who has knowledge of all the facts." 

United States v. Wright, 52 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 1999)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, a 

military judge need not recuse himself “solely on the basis of 

prior judicial exposure to an accused and his alleged criminal 

conduct.” United States v. Soriano, 20 M.J. 337, 340 (C.M.A. 

1985) (citations omitted). 

In this case, the military judge did not abuse his 

discretion by denying the appellant’s motion to disqualify. His 

knowledge of the appellant came solely from prior judicial 

exposure unrelated to the present case. Moreover, the military 

judge noted for the record that the two courts-martial were not 

related, that he remembered nothing about the previous case, and 

that he had no opinion on the appellant's credibility. Based on 

these facts, we find that a reasonable person with knowledge of 

all the facts presented above would not question the military 

judge’s impartiality. 
4

Conclusion

The findings and the sentence as approved by the CA are 

affirmed. 

For the Court

 

 

 

R.H. TROIDL

Clerk of Court