RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2861-19

T.F.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

D.F.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Argued on May 11, 2021 – Decided June 3, 2021

Before Judges Gilson, Moynihan, and Gummer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, 

Docket No. FM-14-0165-11.

D. F., appellant, argued the cause pro se.

T. F., respondent, argued the cause pro se.

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-2861-19

In this appeal of a post-judgment matrimonial order, defendant D.F. 

(Debra)1argues the trial judge erred in granting plaintiff T.F. (Ted) interim 

supervised parenting time with their child and in suppressing her defenses 

pursuant to Rule 1:2-4 for failure to appear at a December 4, 2019 conference. 

We disagree and affirm. 

The parties were married in October 2003 and have a daughter, C.F. 

(Carly), born in 2008. In June 2011, Debra obtained a final restraining order 

(FRO) against Ted based on a predicate act of harassment. The parties were 

divorced by way of a dual judgment of divorce entered on December 21, 2011. 

The judgment of divorce incorporated a settlement agreement providing Debra 

was the parent of primary residential custody and Ted would have parenting 

time. Since the divorce, the parties have had a contentious relationship and have 

filed numerous motions and appeals concerning Ted's parenting time with 

Carly.2 

1

 We use fictitious names for ease of reading and to protect the identities of the 

parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(13).

2

 Debra also filed an appeal from an order denying her motion to recuse the 

family judge. We have affirmed that order in a separate opinion under docket 

number A-1083-19.
3

A-2861-19

I.

Debra's stated reason for failing to appear at the December 4, 2019 

conference was a pending appeal of a purported order denying a recusal motion 

she had filed. In fact, the recusal motion had not been decided, no order denying 

it had been issued, and her appeal had been deemed deficient. 

According to Debra, on or about September 28, 2019, she filed a motion 

seeking the recusal of the trial judge, with an initial return date of November 8, 

2019. The judge scheduled a conference for November 13, 2019. Pending 

before the court were Ted's request for parenting time and Debra's motions 

opposing Ted's request, for recusal, and to sequester Ted from all future court 

proceedings. Debra contacted the court multiple times, seeking an adjournment; 

the judge denied her request. On November 12, Debra again requested an 

adjournment, stating there had been a death in her family. The judge granted 

the adjournment request and left her a telephone message asking her to provide 

proof of the reason she had sought the adjournment. 

Even though the judge had not yet decided or issued an order on the 

recusal motion, Debra submitted a notice of appeal, which we received on 

November 13, 2019, stating she was appealing a "[j]udgment" entered on 
4

A-2861-19

November 8, 2019.3 In her appellate case information statement, Debra 

described the "judgment" as "11-8-19 Denied Recusal." When asked to list the 

proposed issues to be raised on appeal, she stated "Recusal." She also checked 

"Yes" when asked if the judge had issued written findings or an opinion and 

"No" when asked if the judge had issued oral findings or opinion. 

In a November 18, 2019 letter, the clerk of the Appellate Division advised 

Debra her appeal was deficient because, among other reasons, she had not 

attached a copy of any judgment or order, as required by Rule 2:5-1, and the 

appeal would be dismissed if she did not correct the deficiencies within fifteen 

days. 

In a letter dated November 19, 2019, the trial judge rescheduled the 

conference and again asked Debra to provide proof of the reason she had sought 

the adjournment. In response to a letter she had sent regarding decisions on 

outstanding motions, the judge in a November 25, 2019 letter advised Debra he 

3

 In her main brief, which was filed on April 30, 2020, Debra asserts she "was 

notified verbally the recusal motion was denied and [she] would receive the 

order, but [she] did not." She claims the judge "purposefully withheld the orders 

to intentionally block my [a]ppeal rights." That assertion contrasts with 

information provided to the Appellate Division by the trial judge in a November 

27, 2019 letter, copies of which were sent to the parties. The trial judge stated 

he had not yet issued any orders on her pending motions and that Debra had been 

advised over the telephone the motions were still pending. 
5

A-2861-19

would "be addressing the outstanding motions" at the December 4 conference. 

In a letter dated November 25, 2019, which she faxed to the court on November 

26 at 7:40 p.m., Debra requested an adjournment of the conference based on her 

"current [a]ppeal pending on Your Honor's [r]ecusal." The judge responded in 

a letter dated November 27, 2019, telling her he understood her appeal was 

deficient because she had not provided an order; all of her pending motions 

would be heard and decided at the December 4 conference, which would not be 

adjourned; he disagreed with her assertion the court could not schedule a case 

management conference; and he had not yet received proof of the reason she had 

sought the adjournment of the November 13, 2019 conference and directed her 

again to provide the requested information. 

On the morning of December 4, Debra sent a letter to the court, stating 

she had "spoken with [an Appellate Division clerk] on December 2[], 2019, and 

the Appellate Division still has jurisdiction on my docketed appeal." She 

asserted she had been advised she could not "argue in Superior Court, and the 

Appellate Division simultaneously" and asked the judge "to hold the pending 

conference until after the Appellate [Division] . . . gives me a decision, so the 

orders do not become interlocutory, and block my appeal rights." She also stated 

"[i]f the order in response to my recusal can only be obtained by appearing in 
6

A-2861-19

court, even though my motion is uncontested, past the return date, and I did not 

request oral argument, I am requesting additional time to appear with a domestic 

violence advocate, since I have been victimized in Your Honor's courtroom." 

The judge's secretary called the Appellate Division and spoke with the Appellate 

Division clerk, who said he had not spoken with Debra but had left a message 

in response to a message she had left. 

On December 4, the judge stated on the record Debra had failed to appear 

and found her failure to appear to be "inexcused." He explained the purpose of 

the day's proceeding was to "afford everyone a . . . hearing" and to "decide these 

outstanding motions," meaning Ted's request for parenting time, which had been 

pending for over two years, and Debra's motions. As for her asserted reason for 

seeking an adjournment of the hearing – her appeal of a purported order denying

her recusal motion – the judge accurately stated the appeal was deficient and 

confirmed he had not yet ruled on the pending motions and had not issued an 

order on her recusal motion. He reviewed the relevant procedural history, 

including Debra's multiple efforts to adjourn the hearing, her failure to provide 

proof of the basis for her November 12 adjournment request, and her failure to 

seek a stay. He stated a domestic-violence advocate would have been provided 

to Debra that day if she had appeared and requested one. Citing Rule 1:2-4, the 
7

A-2861-19

judge suppressed Debra's defenses as a sanction for her failure to appear. He 

explained she could move to restore her defenses and, even if she did not move 

to restore, would be permitted to cross-examine witnesses at a future proceeding 

but could not testify. 

The judge decided the pending motions, granted Ted parenting time

supervised by the previously appointed guardian ad litem pending a future 

hearing regarding his request for unsupervised parenting time, and issued orders 

memorializing those decisions. In granting Ted interim supervised parenting 

time, the judge confirmed Ted and Carly had not seen each other in three years 

and found:

[Debra] has gone on a campaign . . . of . . . using 

various judicial resources, State resources, with the 

result being that [Ted] is continuing to be deprived of 

the affections of, and the relationship with [Carly]. 

The [c]ourt continues to find that [Debra's] 

efforts are concerted, they are purposeful, and they 

continue to alienate the child from the affections of 

[Ted].

The [c]ourt has gone to great lengths to try to 

reunify the parties. . . . 

[Ted] has been shown to not have done anything

. . . . There's been no proof that he has done anything 

that was alleged years ago that led to his supervised 

parenting time, and then a complete shut-down of the 

parenting time, nothing.
8

A-2861-19

Approximately six years ago there was an 

allegation that [Ted] inappropriately touched his 

daughter. That was brought to law enforcement's 

attention, it was brought to [the Division of Child 

Protection and Permanency's] attention. Both entities 

closed their files.

The child was asked. The child said during a 

tender[-]years interview, that Daddy did nothing of the 

sort. That that's Mommy's story. Ask Mommy about 

that. That's what the child said twice. 

. . . .

We have gone through every safety check, 

opportunity to ease this relationship back into a 

relationship. 

And in the [c]ourt's opinion, it . . . has been 

frustrated only by one party, and it wasn't [Ted]. . . . 

[Ted] was willing to pay for the therapy. He 

picked up the majority of the guardian's expense at this 

point, and – and were just met with obstinance . . . for 

no reason.

He has been shown to have committed no crime 

or wrongdoing, yet he suffers the punishment as if he 

did so.

And that's wrong. 

On appeal, Debra argues the judge erred in suppressing her defenses and 

granting Ted interim supervised parenting time, asserting: Rule 1:2-4 does not 

include as a sanction the "exclusionary rule," which applies in criminal not civil 
9

A-2861-19

cases; the judge improperly granted Ted parenting time supervised by the 

guardian ad litem, who has not appeared for conferences or hearings and has not 

interviewed Debra or Carly; the judge violated her first-amendment right to free 

speech by "precluding [her] from a hearing"; the judge violated her due-process 

rights when on April 19, 2018, he found Carly was being alienated from Ted's 

affections; the judge improperly scheduled case-management conferences in a 

way that violated her due-process rights by impeding her ability to obtain a stay 

or leave to appeal; and the judge was "rogue" and was "trying to block [her] 

appeal rights." 

In response, Ted argues Debra has refused to follow any court orders or 

therapist or doctor recommendations concerning Carly's relationship with Ted

and contends Debra appealed "to block any and all reunification efforts" 

between Ted and Carly. He asserts, without dispute, he has not had any 

parenting time with Carly in several years. 

II.

Our review of a family judge's factual findings is limited. N.J. Div. of 

Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.B., 459 N.J. Super. 442, 450 (App. Div. 2019). 

We defer to a family judge's factual findings when supported by substantial, 

credible evidence in the record because the judge has "special expertise in 
10 A-2861-19

matters related to the family." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 

N.J. 420, 448 (2012); see also Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). We 

intervene only when a trial judge's factual conclusions are "so wide of the mark" 

that they are "clearly mistaken." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 

N.J. 596, 605 (2007). We review de novo a judge's legal conclusions. J.B., 459 

N.J. Super. at 451. 

"The trial court has an array of available remedies to enforce compliance 

with a court rule or one of its orders." Gonzalez v. Safe & Sound Sec. Corp., 

185 N.J. 100, 115 (2005); see also Williams v. Am. Auto Logistics, 226 N.J. 

117, 124 (2016) (noting the "expansive discretion" a trial court "wields in 

managing its docket"); Kohn's Bakery, Inc. v. Terracciano, 147 N.J. Super. 582, 

584-85 (App. Div. 1977) ("There is no doubt at all of the right of a trial judge, 

as an exercise of discretion, to impose sanctions for violation of the rules or 

failure to obey the orders of the court, and these sanctions may include dismissal 

of the action."). 

Rule 1:2-4(a) authorizes a trial court to dismiss a complaint or strike an 

answer if "without just excuse" a party fails to appear at a court proceeding. 

Dismissals of pleadings for failure to appear are usually without prejudice and 

"should generally not be employed where a lesser sanction will suffice."
11 A-2861-19

Connors v. Sexton Studios, Inc., 270 N.J. Super. 390, 393 (App. Div. 1994). 

"The extent to which [one party] has impaired [the other's] case may guide the 

court in determining whether less severe sanctions will suffice." Gonzalez, 185 

N.J. at 116. 

We see no error in the judge's finding that Debra's failure to appear at the 

December 4 conference was "inexcused" or in his decision to strike her defenses 

without prejudice as a sanction. Her stated reason for not appearing was her 

pending appeal of a purported November 8, 2019 order denying the recusal 

motion. In fact, the recusal motion had not been decided – that was one of the 

purposes of the December 4 conference – and, contrary to her assertion in her 

appellate case information statement, the judge had not issued written findings

or an opinion. Unsupported by any order – because no decision had been

rendered and no order had been issued – her appeal was deemed deficient, a fact 

Debra knew from the Appellate Division clerk's November 18, 2019 letter. The 

judge fairly considered Debra's earlier failure to appear when the conference 

was scheduled to take place on November 13, 2019, given she had not responded

to the judge's repeated reasonable requests she provide proof of the purported 

family death that was the stated basis for her adjournment request.
12 A-2861-19

The judge suppressed her defenses without prejudice, expressly 

permitting her to move to restore her defenses and to cross-examine witnesses 

at future proceedings. Given the parties' self-represented status and Debra's

limited financial means, lesser sanctions were not available; given the history of 

the case, the suppression of Debra's defenses without prejudice was appropriate. 

We also see no error in the judge's decision to grant Ted interim 

supervised parenting time, which was supported by findings on the record. The 

allegation that resulted in the suspension of Ted's parenting time had been 

rejected by law enforcement authorities and the Division. At the time of the 

December 4 proceeding, Ted had not seen Carly in three years despite the court's 

use of "every safety check [and] opportunity to ease this relationship back into 

a relationship." See Wilke v. Culp, 196 N.J. Super. 487, 496 (App. Div. 1984) 

(holding the law "favors visitation and protects against the thwarting of effective 

visitation rights"); In re Adoption of J.J.P., 175 N.J. Super. 420, 430 (App. Div. 

1980) (finding "[a]bsent serious wrong-doing or unfitness, the right of visitation 

is strong and compelling"). As the judge found, Carly has "an absolute right to 

have a relationship with both parents unless there's some reason not to. [] I'm 

still waiting to hear the reason why there's no relationship here. I[] have not 

heard it." 
13 A-2861-19

We find insufficient merit in Debra's remaining arguments to warrant 

further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.