IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DIANE PARKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

FOUR SEASONS HOTELS, LTD.,

Defendant.

Case No. 12 C 3207

Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are a number of discovery-related motions,

including: (1) Defendant Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd. (Hereinafter,

“Defendant” or “Four Seasons”) Motion to Quash, for Entry of a

Protective Order and for Sanctions (ECF No. 39); (2) Third Parties

900 Hotel Venture, LLC and 900 HDP, LLC’s (hereinafter,

collectively, “900 Venture”) Motion to Quash (ECF No. 46); (3)

Third Party Pat Meara’s Motion to Quash and for a Protective Order

(ECF No. 67); (4) Third Party William H. Gates III’s (“Gates”)

Motion to Quash and for a Protective Order (ECF No. 42); (5)

Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 76); and (6) Plaintiff’s

Motion for Reconsideration of Two Court Orders (ECF No. 77). For

the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion to Quash and for

Protective Order is granted in part and denied in part. 900

Venture’s Motion is granted in part and denied in part. Gates’ and

Meara’s Motions are granted. Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider is

Case: 1:12-cv-03207 Document #: 84 Filed: 05/06/13 Page 1 of 26 PageID #:675
granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff’s Motion for

Sanctions is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

This action began as a negligence suit in Cook County Court

Law Division on April 21, 2009. Plaintiff was a guest in

Defendant’s hotel when a sliding glass shower door shattered and

injured her. Significant discovery took place in the state court

action prior to Plaintiff taking a voluntary non-suit and refiling

here on April 30, 2012. Despite the discovery that had taken place

in the state court matter, on August 21, 2012, Plaintiff filed a

motion requesting an extensive discovery plan in this action. Her

plan included six phases of discovery and the inspection of thirty

hotel rooms with sliding glass doors. 

On September 28, 2012, this Court entered an Order (the

“September Order”) that sought to balance the burden that

Plaintiff’s excessive plan would cause while giving Plaintiff the

opportunity to seek information related to new allegations in her

Amended Complaint. These new allegations raised for the first time

the issue of punitive damages. Defendant was ordered to produce

two bankers boxes of documents referenced within their response. 

The Court rejected Plaintiff’s plan to inspect thirty rooms at

Defendant’s hotel because Plaintiff gave no justification for why

such an inspection was necessary. Plaintiff was ordered to “limit

her discovery requests to new issues raised in the Amended

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Complaint, those topics that could not be discovered earlier, or

those request[s] that were unreasonably denied or ignored by

Defendant.” See 9/28/12 Order at 3, ECF No. 35. The Court also

warned Plaintiff that she would need to be able to demonstrate “how

each and every request she now makes was either made and unfairly

denied in state court or how it relates to new issues.” Id. The

Court encouraged Plaintiff to retain counsel or consult the Court’s

Pro Se Help Desk, as she “must still obey the Rules of Civil

Procedure . . . [as] missteps in this regard could lead to a loss

by Plaintiff or sanctions.” Id.

What followed appears to be a gross abuse by Plaintiff of the

Court’s September Order allowing her to pursue limited additional

discovery, as well as a failure on her part to heed the Court’s

warnings about adhering to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff

issued additional document requests to Defendant and subpoenaed

numerous third parties, including some with improper service and

outside of this Court’s subpoena power. Apparently, Plaintiff has

pursued this course while failing to review the two boxes of

documents Defendant made available to her pursuant to the September

Order. Even more troubling, despite having her request to inspect

thirty hotel rooms explicitly denied, Plaintiff attempted

repeatedly to compel such inspections. Defendant has stonewalled

all of Plaintiff’s additional discovery requests by generically

stating that they are all outside the scope of the September Order. 

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Defendant and some of the third parties move to quash Plaintiff’s

outstanding discovery. Fact discovery closed on March 31, 2013.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Discovery is not without its limits. Rule 26 states that a

court, “on motion or on its own, must limit the frequency or extent

of discovery otherwise allowed” if it determines that (1) the

discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or can be obtained from

a source that is more convenient; (2) that the party seeking

discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information; or

(3) the burden of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely

benefit. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Rule 26 also allows a court

to enter a protective order, for good cause shown, forbidding

inquiry or limiting the scope of discovery into certain matters. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).

Discovery pursuant to a Rule 45 subpoena is not unlimited. 

Widmar v. Sun Chem., No. 11 C 1818, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89253 at

*4 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2012). Under Rule 45, a court is required

to quash a subpoena under various circumstances, including when it

requires a non-party to travel more than 100 miles from where he

resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business, as well as

when the subpoena subjects the recipient to undue burden. FED. R.

CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(a).

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Defendant’s Motion to Quash, For Entry

of Protective Order, and for Sanctions

Against Plaintiff (ECF No. 39)

1. Local Rules 7.1 and 37.2

The Court first notes that Plaintiff filed two briefs

responding to Defendant’s motion (ECF Nos. 48, 50), and thus failed

to comply with Local Rule 7.1’s requirement that no brief exceed 15

pages without approval from the Court. The Court will accommodate

Plaintiff and consider both responses. However, failure by either

party to abide by Rule 7.1’s page limit in the future without

permission may result in the Court refusing to consider the brief.

Plaintiff is not the only one having difficulty following the

Court’s rules. Defendant, in moving to quash, failed to abide by

Local Rule 37.2, which states in part:

[the] court shall hereafter refuse to hear any and all

motions for discovery and production of documents under

Rule 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, unless a motion includes a statement (1) that

after consultation in person or by telephone and good

faith attempts to resolve differences they are unable to

reach an accord, or (2) counsel’s attempts to engage in

such consultation were unsuccessful due to no fault of

counsel’s.

N.D. Ill. L.R. 37.2. This rule encourages resolution of discovery

disputes without judicial involvement. Biedrzycki v. Town of

Cicero, No. 04 C 3277, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16423 at *6 (N.D. Ill.

Aug. 8, 2005). Defendant failed to provide a statement that any

attempt was made to resolve these discovery issues. Given the

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mandatory language of Local Rule 37.2, the Court could deny

Defendant’s motion. Id. at *7. However, the Court will excuse

Defendant’s failure, as well.

2. Plaintiff’s Additional Rule 34 Document Requests

The Court’s September Order was clear that any additional

discovery Plaintiff sought had to involve: (1) new issues raised

in the Amended Complaint; (2) those topics that could not be

discovered earlier; or (3) information that Defendant had

unreasonably failed to provide. See 3/28/12 Order at 3, ECF

No. 35. To justify her extensive discovery, Plaintiff now asserts

that the “major issue is the amount of punitive damages to be

awarded.” Pl.’s 11/6 Resp. at 1, ECF No. 48. Indeed, she states

that her document requests “must necessarily be broad and detailed”

because she is unaware of Defendant’s position with respect to “the

major issue,” punitive damages. Id. Plaintiff thus served on

Defendant two very similar document requests within a week of one

another. As Plaintiff states she intended the latter set of

requests to amend the former, the 44 document requests (excluding

subsections) attached as Exhibit K to Defendant’s Motion to Quash

are the requests at issue. See Defs.’ Mot. to Quash Ex. K, ECF

No. 39 PageID # 279. 

Defendant makes no attempt to provide the Court with any

specific objections to the document requests. Ironically, it makes

the general objection that Plaintiff uses punitive damages as her

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general justification for the requests. This was not helpful. 

Plaintiff, to her credit, did what Defendant would not by

attempting to justify each document request. Unfortunately, most

of her requests seek information that is beyond the scope of the

September Order, irrelevant, or otherwise burdensome. 

a. Valid Document Requests

Plaintiff claims all of her requests are aimed toward punitive

damages. There are a few ways in which the new allegations in her

Amended Complaint could involve punitive damages. First, she

claims that Defendant and others fraudulently concealed plans to

install the type of sliding glass door that injured her when it

applied for its building permit. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-27. Second,

Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s use of the sliding glass doors

violate the Illinois Safety Glazing Materials Act, 430 ILCS 60, and

the Chicago Municipal Code. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-38. Evidence

concerning the regulatory or criminal penalties to which a

defendant exposed itself can be helpful in considering punitive

damages. See, Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672,

678 (7th Cir. 2003). Third, Defendant’s net worth is relevant to

punitive damages. Baldonado v. Wyeth, No. 04 C 4312, 2012 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 59512 at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2012).

In light of the above allegations, Requests 12, 13, 26, 27,

28, 42, and 43 are reasonable requests. The Court makes special

note of Request 28, which seeks “[a]ll Incident Reports that refer

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to breakage of said [sliding glass doors].” Defs’ Mot. to Quash

Ex. K, ECF No. 39 PageID # 285. The Court stated in its September

Order that such a report struck the Court as “highly relevant.” 

See 9/28/12 Order at 2, ECF No. 35. The Court reiterates this

belief and again orders any such reports be produced.

A few of Plaintiff’s requests are valid if restricted.

Requests 36 and 39 seek information relevant to Defendant’s net

worth, though both should be limited only to Defendant and only for

2012. 

All of the above requests appear to be valid attempts to

discover information relevant to Plaintiff’s new allegations. That

Defendant made no attempt to respond to these, or provide a

specific reason as to why it should not, is troubling. Defendant

has thirty (30) days from the entry of this Order to produce any

documents that are responsive to these requests.

b. All Remaining Document Requests

All of Plaintiff’s remaining requests are either beyond the

scope of the September Order, are not narrowly tailored for the

discovery of relevant information, and/or are overly burdensome. 

As such, they are all denied. 

The Court limited Plaintiff’s discovery to issues that could

not have been discovered previously and to new issues raised in

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Several of Plaintiff’s document

requests seek documents that frankly could or should have been

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requested during Plaintiff’s state court action. For example,

Request #31 asks for “[a]ll documents containing information of all

safety measures that were taken to minimize the likelihood of

personal injuries to guests as a result of breakage of said

[sliding glass doors].” Def.’s Mot. to Quash Ex. K, ECF No. 39

PageID #286. That request does not involve Plaintiff’s new

allegations and could have been made earlier. Many other requests

suffer the same fatal flaw. 

Several of the requests involve Defendant’s interactions with

its parent companies or the value of its parent companies or

owners. Plaintiff seeks such information because it will

“facilitate piercing corporate veils.” See, e.g., Pl.’s 11/21

Resp. at 26, ECF No. 50. Neither type of information is

appropriate in this case. In an action to pierce the corporate

veil, a plaintiff must allege “(1) there is such unity of interest

and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation

and the individual no longer exist; and (2) circumstances must be

such that an adherence to the fiction of a separate corporate

existence would promote injustice or inequitable consequences.” 

Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Lake City Janitorial, Inc., 758 F.Supp.2d

607, 618-619 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2010). Even construed liberally,

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not contain such allegations. 

The Amended Complaint also does not name any of Defendant’s

parents or investors as defendants. Plaintiff, however, seeks

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documents indicating the net worth of individuals who own or

control Defendant. Plaintiff seeks such information because she

claims “[t]he net worth of the defendant is relevant to the amount

of punitive damages that should be awarded.” See, e.g., Pl.’s

11/21 Resp. at 5, ECF No. 50. Plaintiff is correct that under

Illinois law, the net worth of a defendant is relevant to the

amount of punitive damages that should be awarded. See Baldonado,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59512 at *11-12. But Defendant’s parents or

owners are not defendants in this case. It is a general principle

of corporate law that a parent corporation is not liable for the

acts of its subsidiaries. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51,

61 (1998). Absent a claim of piercing the corporate veil, the

wealth of a parent corporation is not relevant to determining the

appropriateness of punitive damages. See, e.g., Schutter v. Wyeth,

Inc., No. 05 C 988, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127082 at *20 (N.D. Ill.

Feb. 24, 2012). Thus, Plaintiff’s requests aimed at Defendant’s

owners and investors are beyond the scope of the September Order.

Plaintiff’s other requests suffer from a variety of other

shortcomings. For example, Plaintiff admits Requests 19 and 22 are

irrelevant, and that 32 is a “catch-all” that this Court deems

overly broad. She admits that Requests 37 and 38 are publicly

filed documents. As such, she is capable of getting those

documents without Defendant’s assistance. And while evidence of

criminal or regulatory penalties can be relevant for punitive

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damages, it should be limited to the penalties to which Defendant

may be exposed because of the sliding glass door that injured

Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks extensive information regarding all of

the hotel rooms that had sliding glass doors (see, e.g.,

Request 15(a)-(j)), which are far broader requests than fit her

claim. 

3. Plaintiff’s Resumed Attempts to Inspect Guest Rooms

As clear as the Court was in instructing Plaintiff what

discovery she could seek, it was equally clear as to what she could

not. The Court stated explicitly that “Plaintiff’s failure to

enunciate why inspection of other rooms is necessary or relevant

means the Court must deny the request [to examine 30 hotel rooms]

in light of the burden it would put on Defendant’s business and

customers.” 9/28/12 Order at 2, ECF No. 35. This was not a

suggestion, recommendation or request on the Court’s part; it was

an Order instructing Plaintiff that she could not pursue such

discovery, the violation of which makes her subject to sanctions. 

Yet, in direct contradiction of the September Order, Plaintiff

sought to compel Defendant and others to allow her to inspect rooms

with sliding glass doors. Regardless of her status as a pro se

plaintiff, such blatant disregard for the Court’s authority is

unacceptable. In light of Plaintiff’s failure to follow the

September Order, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for a

Protective Order preventing Plaintiff from any further attempts to

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conduct room inspections. So there is no confusion, if Plaintiff

makes any such attempt, either through Defendants or through a

third party, she will be found in contempt and subject to

sanctions.

4. Defendant’s Request to Quash Third Party Subpoenas

Defendant also seeks to quash numerous subpoenas issued by

Plaintiff to third parties. Specifically, Defendant asks this

Court to quash subpoenas Plaintiff issued to non-parties Arnie

Harris, Neil Bower, Sophie Martinez, Suzanne Jacobs, 900 Hotel

Venture, LLC and 900 HDP, LLC, Isadore Sharp, James DeFily and

William Gates. 

“Ordinarily, a party has no standing to seek to quash a

subpoena issued to someone who is not a party to the action unless

the party claims some personal right or privilege with regard to

the documents sought.” Kessel v. Cook County, No. 00 C 3980, 2002

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4185 at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2002). Defendant

claims it has standing to object to the non-party subpoenas because

(1) service of the subpoenas on witnesses outside of this state (or

country) are improper under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

and (2) the requests made in the subpoenas violate the September

Order.

Defendant cites no cases in support of its argument that it

has standing because the subpoenas directed to witnesses outside of

this state violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court

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finds Square D Co. v. Breakers Unlimited, Inc. instructive on this

issue. Square D Co. v. Breakers Unlimited, Inc., No. 07-cv-806-

WTL-JML, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49317 (S.D. Ind. June 11, 2009). In

that case, plaintiff sought to quash trial subpoenas issued to two

individuals outside of the scope of the court’s subpoena power

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. Id. at *2. The court

stated that, as a “technical matter, the motion is easily

resolved.” Id. The subpoenas were not directed at plaintiff, and

though a party may have standing to quash a subpoena addressed to

another if it infringes on the movant’s legitimate interests,

plaintiff did not assert that its own rights would be violated if

the subpoenas were enforced. Id. Instead, the sole basis of the

motion to quash was that the two witnesses would have to travel

more than 100 miles to attend trial. Id. The court found that

plaintiff did not have standing to raise that issue on behalf of

the non-parties, and the motion to quash was denied. Id. at *2-3. 

The Court noted that had the non-party witnesses moved to quash the

subpoenas themselves, it would have granted the motions. Id. at

*3.

Similarly, it is clear that some of the subpoenas were served

on individuals who are outside this Court’s subpoena power. For

example, Plaintiff served Isadore Sharp in Toronto, Canada. Not

only is Canada outside of the Court’s subpoena power, but Plaintiff

admits she is aware of that fact. Pl.’s 11/21 Resp. at 3, ECF

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No. 50 (“The key documents that Plaintiff needs might be stored in

Canada, completely beyond reach of the subpoena power of this

Honorable Court.”) Defendant does not argue that it has some

privilege or legitimate reason to contest the subpoena to Sharp,

only that the subpoena violated the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. That is not enough to confer standing to object to the

subpoena. Had Sharp brought his own Motion to Quash, the Court

would have granted it. However, since Plaintiff admits to being

aware of the Court’s subpoena power limitations, it warns her that

if she tries to compel compliance with any improper subpoena she

issued, the Court will sanction her.

With regard to Defendant’s second argument, Defendant cites no

case involving a party seeking to quash a non-party subpoena on the

grounds it sought materials beyond the subject matter limitations

of a previous order. Instead, Defendant bases its standing

argument on Phipps v. Adams, No. 11-cv-147-GPM-DGW, 2012 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 105376 (S.D. Ill. July 30, 2012). In that case, the court

allowed a plaintiff to quash a third party subpoena issued two

months beyond an order ending discovery. Id. at *6-7. The court

found that the plaintiff “has standing to seek enforcement of the

order because he has an interest in the administration of the legal

proceeding.” Id. at *7. 

While the reasoning in Phipps is sound for the facts of that

case, the facts here are different enough that extending that

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reasoning is problematic. The law is clear that generally, a party

does not have standing to quash a subpoena to a non-party. 

Instead, it is usually up to the non-party to bring its own motion

to quash. Instances that fall under the “personal right or

privilege” exception and confer standing on a party include the

assertion of work product or attorney-client privilege,

interference with business relationships, or production of private

information about the party that may be in the possession of a

third party. See, e.g., Countryman v. Cmty. Link Fed. Credit

Union, No. 11-cv-136, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47681 (N.D. Ind.

Apr. 3, 2012) (assertion of privacy interest can confer standing);

Farmer v. Senior Home Companions of Indiana, Inc., No. 8-cv-0379,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18557 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 5, 2009) (assertion of

interference with a client relationship confers standing);

Minnesota Sch. Bds. Assoc. Ins. Trust v. Employers Ins. Co. of

Wausau, No. 98 C 6285, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81 at *4 (N.D. Ill.

Jan. 6, 1999) (assertion of privilege confers standing). While not

exhaustive, these exceptions demonstrate that there are limited

circumstances that allow a party to have standing to contest a

third party subpoena. Relevance, burden or service objections fall

to the subpoena’s recipient to make. See, e.g., Kessel v. Cook

County, No. 00 C 3980, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4185 at *5-6 (N.D.

Ill. Mar. 13, 2002); Biedrzizchi v. Town of Cicero, 04 C 3277, 2005

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16423 at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2005). To grant

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standing to a party because it says it has an interest in the

“administration of the legal proceeding” would effectively wipe out

the rule entirely. Every time a third party received a subpoena,

regardless of whether there had been a pre-existing discovery order

or not, a party could seek to quash it simply by asserting its

objections and stating it had “an interest in the administration of

the legal proceeding.” See Phipps, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105376 at

*7.

Defendant gives no justification that falls into any exception

to the standing rule other than its claim that the subpoenas

violate the September Order. The Court finds this insufficient to

confer standing to Defendant under these circumstances. In the

end, the Defendant is claiming that because the Plaintiff’s third

party subpoenas exceed the scope of the Court’s Order, they are

either overly broad or irrelevant. Such objections are for the

subpoena recipients to make.

There is one non-party subpoena that Plaintiff issued in which

the Court finds Defendant has standing to move to quash. Plaintiff

served a subpoena for documents on James DeFily (“DeFily”),

Director of Engineering of the Four Seasons Hotel, Chicago and

current employee of Defendant. DeFily is a witness under

Defendant’s control and was presented for a deposition in this case

last year. The subpoena contains many similar document requests

for Defendant’s business records described above. Because

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Plaintiff seeks to get Defendant’s business records from one of its

own employees, the Court finds that Defendant has standing to

object to the DeFily subpoena. These document requests are best

responded to by Defendant instead of DeFily. 

In light of the above, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to

Quash Plaintiff’s subpoena to James DeFily, but denies its Motion

to Quash the other non-party subpoenas. Because the Court finds

that Defendant does not have standing to contest the non-party

subpoenas Plaintiff issued to everyone other than DeFily, the Court

must turn to the non-party motions to quash. 

B. Third Party Motions to Quash

Three of the third parties who received subpoenas from

Plaintiff filed their own motions to quash. “In keeping with the

text and purpose of Rule 45(c)(3)(A), it has been consistently held

that ‘non-party’ status is a significant factor to be considered in

determining whether the burden imposed by a subpoena is undue.” 

Robinson v. Morgan Stanley, No. 6 C 5158, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

25073 at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2010). Indeed, while parties

must accept the burdens of litigation, non-parties have different

expectations. Id. As such, courts give special weight to the

unwanted burdens thrust upon non-parties when balancing competing

needs. Id. Thus, in determining whether the recipient of a

subpoena is being subjected to undue burden, courts consider a

number of factors, including “the person’s status as a non-party,

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the relevance of the discovery sought, the subpoenaing party’s need

for the documents, the breadth of the request and the burden

imposed on the subpoenaed party.” Last Atlantis Capital, LLC v.

AGS Specialist Partners, No. 04 C 0397, 05 C 5600, 05 C 5671, 2013

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7044 at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2013). 

1. Pat Meara, 900 Hotel Venture, LLC and

900 HDP, LLC Motions to Quash (ECF Nos. 46, 67)

On November 1, 2012, Plaintiff served a subpoena on 900

Venture addressed to Patrick J. Meara, Vice President. 900 Venture

moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that it sought documents that

were already available to Plaintiff, that previously could have

been the subject of discovery, and that were irrelevant. On

December 21, 2012, while 900 Venture’s Motion to Quash was still

pending, Plaintiff served a nearly identical subpoena on Meara

himself that also sought his deposition. Meara moved to quash the

second subpoena.

With respect to the November 1, 2012 subpoena, many of the

requests are duplicative of those directed to Defendant. As such,

many of the requests are inappropriate for the same reasons. The

Court finds Requests 14, 15, 29, 30, and 31 are reasonable. To the

extent documents responsive to these requests have not already been

produced, 900 Venture will do so within thirty (30) days from the

entry of this Order. Plaintiff will pay reasonable copying costs

for such documents. The Court finds the remaining requests either

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overly broad, burdensome, irrelevant or previously could have been

the subject of discovery and thus invalid.

As for the second subpoena that was served on Meara on

December 21, 2012, it is redundant for the most part except it

seeks to depose Meara. However, Plaintiff failed to tender any

witness fees or travel costs when she served Meara with the

subpoena. Failure to provide these required fees is a violation of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(b)(1) and sufficient basis to

quash a subpoena. See, Rotter v. Cambex Corp., No. 93 C 4137, 1995

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8561 at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 1995). Plaintiff

offers this Court no explanation for this failure, nor does she

address it in any way. The Court warned Plaintiff that she was

expected to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court is also

wary of the fact that Plaintiff failed to pay the reasonable copy

fees for the two boxes of documents discussed in the September

Order, as well of the fact that Meara is a witness Plaintiff has

known about for quite some time. Meara’s Motion to Quash is

granted.

2. William Gates’ Motion to Quash (ECF No. 42)

Non-party William H. Gates III moves to quash the subpoena

issued by Plaintiff on October 26, 2012 as being both defective and

overly burdensome. Under Rule 45, the subpoena for the production

or inspection of documents must be issued “from the court for the

district where the production or inspection is to be made.” FED.

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R. CIV. P. 45(a)(2)(C). Service via certified mail is not

sufficient under Rule 45. Special Markets Ins. Consultants Inc. v.

Lynch, Case No. 11-C-9161, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61088 at *2 n.1

(N.D. Ill. May 2, 2012). Rule 45 also requires that the subpoena

may be served within the district of the issuing court, outside the

district but within 100 miles of the place specified for

production, or within the state of the issuing court if a statute

or court rule permits. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(2). 

The subpoena is clearly defective under the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Contrary to Rule 45, Plaintiff sent, via

certified mail, the subpoena to Gates to an address in Washington

seeking the production of documents to Plaintiff in Pennsylvania. 

Washington is clearly outside this District and further than 100

miles away from Pennsylvania. Plaintiff’s subpoena was also issued

from the Northern District of Illinois instead of a district court

in Washington. The subpoena is thus invalid, as it was issued from

the wrong court and served improperly. Moreover, even if the

subpoena was not defective on its face, it seeks irrelevant

information and would clearly subject Gates to an undue burden,

contrary to Rule 45(c)(3)(A). For these reasons, the Court grants

Gates’ Motion to Quash.

E. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions

and Motion to Reconsider

On February 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed another Motion for

Sanctions (ECF No. 76), and a Motion for Reconsideration of two of

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the Court’s Orders (ECF No. 77). She filed both Motions without

proper notice, in violation of Local Rule 5.3. Rule 5.3 requires

that “[e]very motion or objection shall be accompanied by a notice

of presentment specifying the date and time on which, and judge

before whom, the motion or objection is to be presented.” 

L.R. 5.3. The Court could strike these motions without further

consideration for being in violation of the rule. However, the

Court, cognizant of Plaintiff’s pro se status, will consider them

this time. The Court puts both parties on notice that any future

motions filed in violation of Rule 5.3 will be struck.

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 76)

Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is not the first in this

case. Indeed, both parties have requested sanctions for alleged

discovery misconduct on the part of their opponent. The parties

have not hesitated to sling all manner of unseemly accusations in

their filings, from filing false pleadings to improperly

interfering with discovery. That ends now. In litigation,

credibility is the coin of the realm, and frankly both parties have

little change left in their pockets. Both parties are reminded of

their obligations not only to adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and the Local Rules, but to also maintain a respectable

level of professionalism in this Court. The Court denies all

pending motions for sanctions, but warns both parties that future

misconduct will not be tolerated.

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2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 77)

Most of the issues raised in Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider

have been addressed by the present Order. First, Plaintiff seeks

to extend fact discovery for three months. She claims the

extension is necessary because of Defendant’s failure to produce

any discovery, as well as third parties refusing to respond to

subpoenas due to confusion about the discovery deadline. In light

of the Court’s significant narrowing of Plaintiff’s overbroad

discovery in this Order, three months is unnecessary. Plaintiff’s

request is denied. The parties have thirty (30) days to complete

all outstanding discovery in accordance with this Order. 

Plaintiff also asks the Court to vacate its January 15, 2013

Order (ECF No. 72) allowing Defendants to depose her treating

physicians and experts because it “portrays the appearance of

overreaching and impropriety, as though it was the product of

oversight or misunderstanding.” Pl.’s Mot. to Reconsider. at 6,

ECF No. 77. The Court’s Order was not oversight or

misunderstanding. It authorized Defendant to depose Plaintiff’s

treating physicians and experts if it chose to do so. To the

extent these depositions have not taken place, Defendant again has

thirty (30) days from the entry of this Order to take them. 

Plaintiff’s request is denied.

Plaintiff asks the Court to amend another portion of its

Order of January 15, 2013. The Order currently reads, in part,

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that “Defendant is granted 30 days from the date on which those

documents are received in which to answer Plaintiff’s Requests to

Admit.” See ECF No. 72. Plaintiff would like to add “the

genuineness of said documents” to the end of that sentence. Id. at

7. Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is unnecessary, as it is clear

from the language in rest of the Order that it is referring to

Plaintiff’s Request to Admit the Genuineness of Documents. 

Plaintiff’s request is denied.

The only request in Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider that has

any merit involves the Court’s prior ruling granting Defendant’s

Motion to Deem Facts Admitted. On December 14, 2012, Defendant

moved pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216 to have facts

deemed admitted. See ECF No. 57. Defendant claimed that in the

state court action, Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant’s

Rule 216 Requests to Admit, and as such, those facts must be deemed

admitted. The Court heard Defendant’s Motion on January 15, 2013. 

Plaintiff did not appear during that hearing, and based on

Defendant’s representations, the Court granted the Motion. 

Plaintiff filed subsequent responses seeking to establish that she

had, in fact, responded to the requests. Plaintiff offered an

unsigned, unverified, undated response in support of her

contention.

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Rule 216 was amended to add several “special requirements”

with respect to requests to admit. Specifically, it states that a

party must:

put the following warning in a prominent place on the

first page in 12-point or larger boldface type: 

“Warning: If you fail to serve the response required by

Rule 216 within 28 days after you are served with this

document, all the facts set forth in the requests will be

deemed true and all the documents described in the

requests will be deemed genuine.”

Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 216(g). This amendment took effect on January 1,

2011. Defendant served its requests to admit on January 28, 2011,

yet failed to include the necessary warning of the harsh

consequences of failing to respond to the requests. Defendant

offered no explanation to the Court for why it failed to include

the required language. The Court does not find this omission to be

a mere technicality. Clearly, the drafters of the amendment

thought the warning significant in requiring that it be printed in

large bold font “in a prominent place” on the first page of the

requests. See Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 216(g). Such a warning seems

particularly necessary for a pro se plaintiff who may not recognize

the severity of failing to respond. In light of this violation of

Rule 216, the Court vacates its earlier ruling granting Defendant’s

Motion to Deem Facts Admitted.

That does not end the discussion, however. The Court is

troubled by the fact that in responding to Defendant’s Motion,

Plaintiff offered an unsigned, undated, unverified copy of her

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responses to the Court. Both Defendant’s counsel and counsel for

a prior third-party defendant offer affidavits that they never

received such a response. These facts could lead to the unpleasant

possibility that Plaintiff may have drafted her responses for the

first time in response to Defendant’s Motion, years after they were

due. Plaintiff needs to be aware that filing false or frivolous

pleadings with the Court will lead to severe sanctions pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Plaintiff should file signed

and dated responses to Defendant’s Requests to Admit.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court rules as follows:

1. Grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s Motion to

Quash, for Entry of a Protective Order and for Sanctions (ECF

No. 39).

2. Grants William Gates’ Motion to Quash and for a

Protective Order (ECF No. 42).

3. Grants in part and denies in part 900 Venture’s Motion to

Quash and for a Protective Order (ECF No. 46).

4. Grants Patrick Meara’s Motion to Quash (ECF No. 67).

5. Denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 76).

6. Grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration (ECF No. 77). Pursuant to this ruling, the Court

vacates its earlier decision granting Defendant’s Motion to Deem

Facts Admitted (ECF No. 72), and denies that Motion (ECF No. 57).

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7. The parties have thirty (30) days from the entry of this

Order to complete any outstanding discovery so that the case may

proceed. No party is to serve any new discovery. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge

United States District Court

Date: 5/6/2013

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