12C03057 Olsson vs. Madigan, et al. Page 1 of 4

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge or 

Magistrate Judge John J. Tharp Jr. Sitting Judge if Other 

than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 12 C 03057 DATE 04/23/2013

CASE

TITLE

Olsson vs. Madigan, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration [40] is denied, and motion for determination of status 

[41] is denied as moot.

Ŷ[ For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT

I. Background

Plaintiff Paul Olsson filed this action against defendants Illinois Attorney General Lisa 

Madigan, Assistant Attorney General Michael D. Arnold, McHenry County Circuit Judge 

Michael Chmiel, and Chief Deputy Lake County State’s Attorney Daniel Jasica alleging 

violations of his constitutional rights in connection with a Lake County Chancery Court default 

order, which invalidated a “Lis Pendens and Notice of Federal Lien” that Olsson recorded with 

the Lake County Recorder of Deeds on August 17, 2011. On January 2, 2013, this Court 

dismissed Olsson’s complaint without prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and his 

case was terminated. See Mem. Op. and Order, Dkt. 39 (“January 2 Order”). As the Court 

explained, because Olsson’s complaint challenges the state-court proceedings and default order 

which invalidated his “lien,” it is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

On January 29, 2013, Olsson filed a motion for reconsideration of the January 2 Order, 

which is now pending before the Court. See Mot. for Recons., Dkt. 40. In his motion, Olsson 

contends that the Court erred in its finding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars his claim and 

by its refusal to transfer his case to the Chief Judge. Further, he requests clarification that this 

Court “is sitting as an Article III Court.” For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff’s motion 

for reconsideration is denied in its entirety.

II. Analysis

Motions for reconsideration serve a limited purpose. “Rule 59 is not a vehicle for 

rearguing previously rejected motions.” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 

2000); see also Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A motion that merely 

republishes the reasons that had failed to convince the tribunal in the first place gives the 

tribunal no reason to change its mind.”). To prevail on a motion for reconsideration, a movant 

must show manifest errors of law or fact or present newly discovered evidence. See id. (citing 
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LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995)). But a 

“‘manifest error’ is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party.” Id. Rather, it is 

the “wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Id. at 

606 (quoting Sedrak v. Callahan, 987 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1997)). As such, motions 

for reconsideration are rarely granted. “Once judgment has been entered, there is a presumption 

that the case is finished, and the burden is on the party who wants to upset that judgment to show 

the court that there is good reason to set it aside.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 

(7th Cir. 2009). Olsson’s motion falls well short of this high bar.

As the Court explained in its January 2 Order, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine this 

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims seeking review of and challenging state-court 

judgments. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic 

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (holding that Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine, “confined 

to cases...brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and 

rejection of those judgments.”). “The doctrine applies not only to claims that were actually 

raised before the state court, but also to claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state 

court determinations.” Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16). That said, plaintiffs may proceed in federal court on 

independent claims that are distinct from the implicated state-court determination, id. (citing 

Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293), or on claims that the plaintiffs did not have a “reasonable 

opportunity” to present in state court. Id. at 605. But “[i]f the plaintiff could have raised an issue 

in state court, the claim is barred under Rooker-Feldman.” Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442 

(7th Cir. 2012).

The thrust of Olsson’s argument is that the Court misapplied the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine to his complaint, because he did not have a reasonable opportunity to present his claims 

in state court and that his claim is independent from the implicated state-court default order.

First, Olsson contends that his complaint falls within the “reasonable opportunity” exception to 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which provides federal district courts with subject matter 

jurisdiction over federal claims that a plaintiff could not have presented in state court due to 

either Illinois law or some other state-court act or procedure. See Kelley, 548 F.3d at 605; see 

also Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 558 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Typically, either some 

action taken by the state court or state court procedures in place have formed the barriers that the 

litigants are incapable of overcoming in order to present certain claims to the state court.”).

Olsson claims that, because he was found unfit to stand trial by the Lake County Circuit Court, 

he is an “incompetent person,” and was thereby precluded from participating in the state-court 

civil proceedings that invalidated his “lien.” According to Olsson, the Circuit Court found him 

“unfit and incompetent to proceed in litigation without representation.” Mot. for Recons., Dkt. 

40 at 2. 

Olsson overstates the effect of this fitness determination. Under Illinois law, “[f]itness 

speaks only to a person’s ability to function within the context of trial; it does not refer to sanity 

or competence in other areas.” People v. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d 509, 524, 660 N.E.2d 919, 928 (Ill. 

1995) (quoting People v. Fowler, 222 Ill. App. 3d 157, 164, 583 N.E.2d 686, 692 (2d Dist. 

1991)). The Circuit Court’s determination that Olsson was unfit to stand trial did not prevent 

him from appearing in the state-court civil proceedings as he contends. Even “[a]n insane person 
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has a legal capacity to sue or be sued, the same as a sane person, provided he has not been 

divested of the power of the appointment and qualification of a conservator or guardian.”

Kirkland v. Kirkland, 38 Ill. App. 2d 280, 287, 186 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1st Dist. 1962) (explaining 

that the appointment of a guardian ad litem is procedural, not jurisdictional, and, therefore, that 

the failure to appoint a guardian does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to enter a decree on a 

proper showing); see also O’Toole v. Vill. of Downers Grove Police Dep’t, No. 85 C 07380, 

1986 WL 8732 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1986). And whether a guardian ad litem or attorney should 

have been appointed by the state court is a claim that seeks review of the state-court 

proceedings—effectively an appeal—that belongs in the state court system. See id. 38 Ill. App. 

2d at 287, 186 N.E.2d at 797 (explaining that the state court’s failure to appoint a guardian ad 

litem to an insane person, who was served but failed to appear or answer petition for annulment,

might have been grounds for reversal in the appellate court, had the plaintiff’s application been 

timely filed); see also Kelley, 548 F.3d at 603 (“A state court litigant seeking review of a state 

court judgment must follow the appellate process through the state court system and then 

directly to the United States Supreme Court,” citing GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, Ill., 995 

F.2d 726, 727 (7th Cir. 1993)).

Further, the decision to involuntarily commit Olsson to the Elgin Mental Health Center 

(“EMHC”), based on a diagnosis of pedophilia and determination that he is a “serious threat to 

public safety,” see People v. Olsson, Nos. 2-11-0173, 2-11-0174, 2012 WL 6967262, at *1 (2d 

Dist. June 27, 2012) (citing 725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2)), did not strip him of his ability to answer 

the defendants’ complaint in state court, respond to their motion for default, or appeal the 

Chancery Court’s default order. The decision to involuntarily commit an individual says nothing 

about their competence or ability to appear in a civil proceeding. In fact, the Illinois Supreme 

Court has noted that the presumption of competency to direct one’s legal affairs extends to those 

adjudicated mentally ill. See In re Phyllis P., 182 Ill.2d 400, 402, 695 N.E.2d 851, 852 (Ill. 

1998). Specifically, there is a “distinction between mental illness and the specific decisional 

capacity to exercise or waive legal rights.” Id. Accordingly, Olsson has failed to demonstrate

that the state-court determination that he was unfit to stand trial or his commitment to the EMHC 

created an insurmountable barrier to presenting his claims in state court. See Long, 182 F.3d at 

560 (the plaintiff must point to “some action taken by the state court or state court 

procedures...[which have] formed the barriers that [the plaintiff was] incapable of overcoming 

in order to present [his] claims to the state court”); see also id. at 558 (“It is not enough for [the 

plaintiff] to say that because she was kept away from the Circuit Court...proceeding[s] by the 

defendants’ chicanery, she was denied a reasonable opportunity to raise her claims before the 

Circuit Court.”).

Olsson’s claim that he did not have a reasonable opportunity to present his claim in state 

court is also belied by his own conduct. According to the exhibits attached to his motion, on 

December 19, 2012—the day he was served with notice of the defendants’ complaint in 

Chancery Court—Olsson proclaimed, “I will not be attending any court hearings allegedly 

pertinent to me.” Mot. for Recons., Dkt. 40, Ex. 1. He further stated, “Please instruct EMHC 

personnel and staff. . . not to bother me with inquiries concerning my going to court. I will let 

you know if and when I change my mind.” Id. And most tellingly, instead of answering the 

complaint, responding to the defendants’ motion for default, or appealing the state court’s 

default order, Olsson filed this (now terminated) action in federal court (in addition to numerous 

motions and briefs), while the window to appeal the state court’s order was still open.

Specifically, Olsson had until May 19, 2012 to file a motion to have the default order set aside, 
12C03057 Olsson vs. Madigan, et al. Page 4 of 4

but instead chose to file his complaint in this Court on April 25, 2012. “[O]ne who turns his back 

on the original tribunal does not help himself to the opportunity to litigate elsewhere.” Homola v. 

McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 1995). Olsson was not prevented from presenting his 

claim in state court—he simply refused to do so, instead opting to file an action in this Court.

Having made that decision, Olsson cannot now claim that he lacked a reasonable opportunity to 

raise his claim in state court. As this Court previously explained in its January 2 Order, RookerFeldman bars the plaintiff’s attempted course of action.

Olsson further contends that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because his claim is 

independent from the state-court judgment. Olsson argues that the defendants “perpetrated a 

fraud” by conducting the state-court proceedings with full knowledge that Olsson was “legally 

incompetent,” unrepresented, and barred from participating. Mot. to Recons., Dkt. 40 at 6. But 

no matter how carefully Olsson crafts his argument to avoid Rooker-Feldman, his claim, at 

bottom, still challenges the propriety and outcome of the state-court proceedings—precisely the 

type of action barred by Rooker-Feldman. Inferior federal courts are “barred from evaluating 

claims. . .where all of the allegedly improper relief was granted by state courts.” Kelley, 548 

F.3d at 605. While Olsson contends that the defendants’ actions during the course of the statecourt proceedings constituted “due process violations...independent of and complete prior to the 

entry of the state court judgment,” they are actions that allegedly caused the result that he 

complains of, namely the entry of the default order invalidating his “lien.” Olsson therefore 

would not have suffered his alleged injury in the absence of the court order and Rooker-Feldman

therefore applies. See, e.g., Kelley, 548 F.3d at 605 (plaintiff’s claim that defendants fraudulently 

obtained attorney fees barred under Rooker-Feldman because in order to “capitalize on the 

alleged fraud,” the defendants “needed to prevail in state court,” which would “ultimately 

require [the federal court] to evaluate the state court judgments”).

As a final matter, Olsson moves for reconsideration of his requests for equitable relief 

and to transfer his case to the Chief Judge. Olsson also requests “Clarification that the Court is 

Sitting as an Article III Court.” Mot for Recons., Dkt. 40 at 10. As explained above, the Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims, and therefore, his requests must be

denied. See, e.g., State of Ill. v. City of Chi., 137 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Subject-matter 

jurisdiction is the first question in every case, and if the court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction 

it must proceed no further.”). Furthermore, to the extent that the Court has already addressed the 

plaintiff’s arguments throughout the course of this case, he has neither demonstrated a manifest 

error of law or fact regarding those determinations, nor has he presented newly discovered 

evidence for this Court to consider. And lastly, to the extent that the plaintiff seeks clarification 

and asserts that this court does not “sit as an Article III court,” that claim is outside the scope of 

a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, which does not permit the movant to present new 

arguments. See Evans v. Ashburn, 67 Fed. Appx. 938, 939 (7th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the 

plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and request for clarification is denied in its entirety.

Courtroom Deputy

Initials:

AIR