care providers may not act with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2011). Deliberate
indifference has both an objective and a subjective element: the inmate must have an objectively
serious medical condition, and the defendant must be subjectively aware of and consciously
disregard the inmate’s medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Estelle, 429
US. at 103-04; see also Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 862 (7th Cir. 2011). For purposes of summary
judgment, the Court will assume that Plaintiffs asthma is a objectively serious medical condition.
See Lee v. Young, 533 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2008) (depending on the severity of the attack, asthma
can be an objectively serious medical condition). However, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Dr. Hart was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's
medical needs.

To establish a deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that the defendant
in question was aware of and consciously disregarded the inmate’s medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 837; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04; Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2008). The fact
that a prisoner has received some medical treatment does not necessarily defeat his claim; deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need can be manifested by “blatantly inappropriate” treatment,
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original), or by “woefully
inadequate action,” as well as by no action at all. Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir.
1999); Allen v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 11 C 3834, 2011 WL 2463544, *1 (N.D. Ill. Jun.
17, 2011) (Kocoras, J.). Neither medical malpractice nor a mere disagreement with a doctor’s
medical judgment amounts to deliberate indifference. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 441 (7th

Cir. 2010), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.


ANALYSIS
1. Individual Capacity Claim

Individual liability under the Civil Rights Act requires a defendant’s personal involvement
in the alleged constitutional violation. See Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir.
2003). Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault;
thus, “to be liable under § 1983, an individual defendant must have caused or participated in a
constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005)
(citations omitted). Although direct participation is not required, there must be at least a showing
that the individual acquiesced in some demonstrable manner in the alleged constitutional violation.
See Palmer, 327 F.3d at 594, For a supervisor, the personnel responsibility requirement of Section
1983 for an official is satisfied if the conduct causing the constitutional violation occurs at the
supervisors direction or with his knowledge and consent. See Hildebrandt v. Illinois Dep’t of
Natural Resources, 347 F.3d 1014, 1039 (7th Cir. 2003). The supervisor “must know about the
conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye. In short, some casual connection
or affirmative link between the action complained about and the official sued is necessary for §1983
recovery.” Hildebrandt, 347 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.
1995).

Pretrial detainees have a right to adequate medical treatment under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 401 (7th Cir. 2007). Claims of deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need of a pretrial detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment use
the same standard for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need applied to Eighth Amendment

claims for convicted prisoners. See Williams, 509 F.3d at 401. Correctional officials and health


Here, Dr. Hart had no personal involvement in Plaintiff's medical care or medications and
Plaintiff never informed him in any manner of an issue with his asthma and/or a lack of an inhaler.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Dr. Hart was not aware of, nor that he consciously
disregarded, Plaintiff's medical condition.

II. Official Capacity Claim

Plaintiff's official capacity claim against Dr. Hart is actually against the municipality, Cook
County. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985). To prevail on a Section 1983 claim
against a government entity, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an alleged constitutional right
deprivation was caused by a policy, custom, or practice. See Monell v. Department of Social Serv.,
436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). Unconstitutional policies or customs can take three forms: an express
policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; a widespread practice that, although
not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a usage or custom with the force of law; or a constitutional injury that was caused by a
person with final policy-making authority. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1013 (7th Cir.
2000).

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his lack of an inhaler in one instance was the result
of a policy, custom, or practice. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff was provided an
inhaler on the day that he entered the Jail. Approximately a month later, when Plaintiff had an
asthma attack, he did not have an inhaler for unknown reasons. However, he was able to use another
detainee’s inhaler at that time. The next month, Plaintiff immediately received an inhaler when he
requested one during his second asthma attack. Plaintiff has not had any more asthma attacks or

issues with receiving his inhaler. The one incident is insufficient to demonstrate a widespread


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
KEVIN DEON EDWARDS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 12 C 4491
)
) Hon. Charles R. Norgle, Sr.
Cook County Municipality, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at Cook County Jail, has brought this pro se civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that Defendant, Dr. Hart, violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights by failing to provide him with an asthma inhaler. Dr. Hart is sued in both his
individual and official capacities and Cook County is a party for indemnification purposes only.
This matter is before the court for ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the
reasons stated below, the motion is granted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In determining the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact, a court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Weber v. Universities Research Assoc., Inc., 621 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir.
2010). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be

drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The court does not “judge the credibility of the

Mr


unconstitutional policy. See Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2008) (four
incidents affecting the plaintiff insufficient to demonstrate a “widespread unconstitutional policy”);
Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 760 (7th Cir. 2005) (three incidents of improper pepper-
spraying insufficient to show a widespread practice). In fact, Plaintiff describes his lack of an inhaler
as a “mistake,” not as a result of a policy or custom within the Jail. (See Plaint.’s 56.1(b)(3)
Statement § 12.)

Based on the above, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law as to all claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [28] is granted.

Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. Judgment is rendered in favor of Defendants. This case is

terminated.

Dated: Ga KL2 Mack ieg—

Charles R. Norgle, 7
United States District Court swt



witnesses, evaluate the weight of the evidence, or determine the truth of the matter. The only
question is whether there is a genuine issue of fact.” Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 529
(7th Cir. 2009) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)).

However, Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Sarver v.
Experian Information Solutions, 390 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). “A genuine
issue of material fact arises only if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists to permit
a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Egonmwan v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 602 F.3d 845,
849 (7th Cir. 2010), quoting Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 640-41 (7th Cir. 2008).

“{T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party
for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc. v. A & E Oil, Inc., 503
F.3d 588, 594-595 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50
(1986) (internal citations omitted). The inquiry is essentially “whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury, or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.

FACTS
The relevant undisputed facts are as follow. Plaintiff has been a pretrial detainee at the Cook

County Jail since January 2012. (Defs.’ 56.1(a)(3) Statement § 1.) Plaintiff has been housed in the


Jail’s Division 1 virtually his entire time at the Jail. (id., 2.) Division 1 is a maximum security
division. (d., 43.)

Plaintiff was not being treated for asthma prior to entering the Jail. (Defs.’ 56.1(a)(3)
Statement J 4.) The last time Plaintiffhad an asthma attack before entering the Jail was in 2010, and
the last attack before 2010, was in 2005. (/d., 45.) Plaintiff was given an asthma inhaler the first
day he entered the Jail. (d., 6.) The prescription for the inhaler was for twelve weeks, January 8
2010 through April 1, 2010. (Plaint.’s 56.1(b)(3) Statement { 3.) Plaintiff was allowed to keep his
inhaler with him at all times, including in his cell. (Defs.’ 56.1(a)(3) Statement §[ 7.)

Plaintiff had an asthma attack on February 7 or 8, 2012. (Defs.’ 56.1(a)(3) Statement § 8.)
Another detainee let Plaintiff use the other detainee’s inhaler, which helped his asthma attack. (/d.,
4,9.) Plaintiff categorized this asthma attack as “mild.” (/d.,4 11.) Plaintiff had another asthma
attack on March 8 or 9, 2012. (/d., 9 12.) Plaintiff asked a correctional officer for an inhaler and he
was provided one “right away,” after he showed the correctional officer his prescription for the
inhaler (/d., { 13; Plaint.’s Resp. § 13.)

Plaintiff had no asthma attack s after the second attack and has had no problem getting an
inhaler while detained at the Jail. (Defs.’ 56.1(a)(3) Statement § 15.) Plaintiff never spoke to Dr.
Hart about his asthma or any other medical condition. (/d., 17.) Plaintiff was never examined by
Dr. Hart and he never wrote any letters to Dr. Hart about his asthma or any other medical condition.
Dr. Hart had no personal involvement in the prescription, authorization or distribution of medication

to detainees in 2012. (/d., ¥ 20.)