Cybersecurity Framework

Access Control

olicy Machine

Cloud Computing

yp

g

p

y

Evaluation

Guidelines

Standards

Systems

Security Practices Critical Infrastructure

Verification

Security Controls

Assets

Risk Management Framework

Biometrics

Supply chain risk management

FIPS 140-2

Validated Products List

FISMA

Mobile Devices Continuous Monitoring

Authorization

Assets

EO 13636

Roadmap

NIST Special Publication 800-170

Computer

Security

Division

2013 Annual Report

Patrick O’Reilly, Editor

Computer Security Division

Information Technology Laboratory

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Co-Editors:

Chris Johnson

Doug Rike

Greg Witte

G2, Inc.

Lorie Richards

Facilities Services Division

Creative and Printing Service

This publication is available free of charge from

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-170

June 2014

U.S. Department of Commerce

Penny S. Pritzker, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Dr. Willie E. May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Acting Director
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 ii

Disclaimer: Any mention of commercial products is for information only; it does not imply NIST recommendation 

or endorsement, nor does it imply that the products mentioned are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-170 Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. 

Pub., 93 pages (June 2014) CODEN: NSPUE2
Welcome Letter.................................................................. 1

Computer Security Division (CSD) Management Team....... 2

Computer Security Division Organization .......................... 3

The Computer Security Division Implements the 

Federal Information Security Management Act ................. 7

Program & Project Achievements for Fiscal Year 2013 ..... 9

NIST Responsibilities Under Executive Order 13636, 

“Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” .................... 10

Contributions to National and International Standards 

Development........................................................................... 11

Identity Management Standards within INCITS B10 

and ISO JTC1/SC 17 ................................................................ 14

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 

Implementation Project ........................................................... 14

Biometric Standards and Associated Conformity Assessment 

Testing Tools ........................................................................... 16

Cybersecurity of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)....................... 19

Federal Cybersecurity Research & Development (R&D) ........... 19

Security Aspects of Electronic Voting ...................................... 20

Health Information Technology Security................................... 20

Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) for Information 

and Communications Technology (ICT) .................................... 21

Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN) 

Security .................................................................................. 23

Smart Grid Cybersecurity ........................................................ 23

Cybersecurity Awareness, Training, Education, 

and Outreach .......................................................................... 25

National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) .................. 25

Computer Security Division Publications.................................... 26

Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC)............................... 27

Federal Computer Security Program Managers’ Forum................ 28

Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ 

Association (FISSEA) ............................................................... 29

Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) ............. 30

Small and Medium Size Business (SMB) Outreach ...................... 33

 Cryptographic Technology ...................................................... 33

Cryptographic Standards Program ............................................ 33

Cryptographic Research .......................................................... 36

New Research Areas in Cryptographic Techniques for 

Emerging Applications............................................................. 38

Applied Cryptography.............................................................. 40

Identity Management .............................................................. 42

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) and FIPS 201 

Revision Efforts ...................................................................... 42

PIV Program Test Cards........................................................... 43

NIST Personal Identity Verification Program (NPIVP) .................... 43

Research in Emerging Technologies ........................................ 44

Cloud Computing and Virtualization........................................... 44

Mobile Device Security ............................................................ 46

Strengthening Internet Security .............................................. 47

USGv6: A Technical Infrastructure to Assist IPv6 Adoption............ 47

Access Control and Privilege Management.............................. 48

Access Control and Privilege Management Research .................. 48

Conformance Verification for Access Control Policies.................. 48

Metrics for Evaluation of Access Control Systems 

(Real-Time Access Rule Fault Detection).................................... 49

Attribute Based Access Control ................................................ 50

Advanced Security Testing and Measurements ........................ 51

Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring......................... 51

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)............................. 52

Continuous Monitoring ............................................................ 54 

National Vulnerability Database (NVD)........................................ 55

Computer Security Incident Coordination ................................... 56

Incident Handling Automation ................................................... 56

National Checklist Program (NCP) ............................................. 57

United States Government Configuration 

Baseline (USGCB) / FDCC Baselines.......................................... 58

iii

Table of Contents
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 iv

Apple OS X Security Configuration ............................................ 59

Validation Programs ................................................................ 59

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) 

Validation Program.................................................................. 59

Cryptographic Programs and Laboratory Accreditation ................ 60

Automated Security Testing and Test Suite Development ............. 62

ISO Standardization of Security Requirements for 

Cryptographic Modules............................................................ 64

Cryptographic System Validation .............................................. 65

Technical Security Metrics ...................................................... 65

Security Risk Analysis of Enterprise 

Networks Using Attack Graphs ................................................. 65

Algorithms for Intrusion Measurement....................................... 66

Automated Combinatorial Testing.............................................. 67

Hardware Roots of Trust .......................................................... 67

Honors & Awards ............................................................ 69

FY 2013 Computer Security Division Publications ........... 73

NIST Technical Series Publications − FIPS, Special 

Publications, NISTIRs, and ITL Bulletins................................... 74

Abstracts of NIST Technical Series Publications Released 

in FY 2013............................................................................... 76

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)........................ 76

NIST Special Publications (SPs) ................................................ 77

NIST Interagency Reports (NISTIRs)........................................... 81

Additional Publications by CSD Authors ................................... 84

Journal Articles....................................................................... 84

Conference Papers.................................................................. 87

Books and Book Sections......................................................... 89

White Papers.......................................................................... 90

Opportunities to Engage with CSD and NIST.................... 91

Acknowledgements ......................................................... 93
Welcome Letter

1

The Computer Security Division (CSD), a component of the Information Technology Laboratory at the National Institute of Standards and Technology 

(NIST) is responsible for developing standards, guidelines, tests, and metrics for protection of non-national security federal information systems. 

NIST standards and guidelines are developed in an open and transparent manner that enlists broad industry and academia expertise from around 

the world. While developed for federal agency use, these resources are voluntarily adopted by other organizations because they are effective and 

accepted throughout the world. 

The need for cybersecurity standards and best practices that address interoperability, usability and privacy continues to be critical for the Nation. 

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, CSD continued to align its resources to enable greater development and application of practical, innovative security 

technologies and methodologies that enhance our ability to address current and future computer and information security challenges. Our foundational 

research and applied cybersecurity programs continue to advance in many areas including cryptography; identity and access management; cloud, 

virtualization, and mobile technologies; and advanced security testing and measurement.

Strong partnerships with diverse stakeholders are vital to the success of our technical programs. In February 2013, the President issued Executive 

Order 13636 that directed NIST to work collaboratively with industry to develop a voluntary framework - based on existing standards, guidelines, and 

practices - to improve critical infrastructure cybersecurity practices. NIST held several workshops, meetings, webinars, and informal sessions to 

gather feedback with the goals of generating content for the framework and discuss several topics that help inform and guide NIST in this effort. In 

August 2013, we produced a discussion draft of the preliminary framework. 

Working closely with standards developing organizations, industry and interagency partners, we are evolving and expanding security automation 

capabilities to help organizations manage and measure the security of systems and technologies. Our cybersecurity awareness, training, and 

education programs also exemplify the importance of these partnerships by engaging with academic institutions, federal agencies, small and medium 

businesses and others to increase awareness and enhance the overall cybersecurity posture of the Nation.

Active engagement with the diverse federal community continues to be critical to our success. This interaction is most prominent in our strengthened 

collaborations with the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Committee on National Security Systems to establish a common 

foundation for information security across the federal government. Through this partnership, NIST released Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Revision 

4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, in April 2013. This guideline provides organizations with state-ofthe-practice security controls to fundamentally strengthen their systems and the environments in which those systems operate. SP 800-53 Revision 

4 and other NIST standards and guidelines contribute to systems that are more resilient in the face of cyber attacks and other threats.

Late in FY 2013, news reports about leaked classified documents caused concern from the cryptographic community about the security of NIST 

cryptographic standards and guidelines. Recognizing community concern regarding some specific standards, we reopened the public comment period 

for three Special Publications to give the public a second opportunity to view and comment on the documents. This initial step will be followed by a 

review of our cryptographic development process and NIST cryptographic standards and guidelines in FY 2014.

For many years, CSD, in collaboration with our global partners across industry, academia, and government, 

has made great contributions to help secure the nation’s critical information and infrastructure. We look forward 

to furthering these relationships in FY 2014 as we lead the development and practical implementation of 

scalable and sustainable information security standards and practices in areas such as cyber-physical and 

industrial control systems, privacy engineering, security automation, and mobile technologies.

To participate in any CSD research areas – whether current or future – or to learn more about our programs 

and activities, please visit http://csrc.nist.gov.

Donna Dodson

Chief, Computer Security Division

& Deputy Chief Cybersecurity Advisor
Computer Security Division (CSD) 

Management Team

Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 2

Donna Dodson

Chief, Computer Security Division, Acting Associate Director & Acting 

Chief Cybersecurity Advisor, Cybersecurity Advisor Office, and Acting 

Executive Director, National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence

Lily Chen

(Acting Group Manager)

Cryptographic Technology Group

Kevin Stine

Security Outreach 

and Integration Group 

David Ferraiolo

Secure Systems and 

Applications Group

Michael Cooper

Security Testing, Validation 

and Measurement Group

Mark (Lee) Badger

Security Components and

Mechanisms Group

Matthew Scholl

Deputy Chief, Computer Security Division and 

Acting Associate Director of Operations, National 

Cybersecurity Center of Excellence

GROUP MANAGERS
Cybersecurity Framework Policy Machine

Cloud Computing Cryptography

Standards

Security Practices

Verification

Security Controls

Assets

Risk Management Framework

Biometrics

Supply chain risk management

FIPS 140-2

Validated Products List

FISMA

Continuous Monitoring

Mobile Devices

Authorization EO 13636

Roadmap

3

Computer Security 

Division Organization

The Computer Security Division’s computer scientists, mathematicians, IT specialists, administrative staff and others 

support CSD’s mission and responsibilities through five groups that are described in the following sections:

•	 Cryptographic Technology Group

•	 Security Components and Mechanisms Group

•	 Secure Systems and Applications Group

•	 Security Outreach and Integration Group

•	 Security Testing, Validation, and Measurement Group
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 4

Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG) 

Mission Statement:

Research, develop, engineer, and standardize cryptographic 

algorithms, methods, and protocols.

Overview:

CTG’s work in the field of cryptography includes researching, 

analyzing, and standardizing cryptographic technology, such 

as hash algorithms, symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic 

techniques, key management, authentication, and random 

number generation. CTG’s goal is to identify and promote 

methods to enhance trust in communications, data, and storage 

through cryptographic technology, encouraging innovative 

development and helping technology users to manage risk.

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, CTG continued to make an impact in 

the field of cryptography, both within and outside the Federal 

Government, by collaborating with national and international 

agencies, academic and research organizations, and standards 

bodies to develop interoperable security standards and 

guidelines. In addition, CTG worked with industry partners to 

promote the use of NIST-approved cryptographic methods.

Federal agency collaborators include the National Security 

Agency (NSA), the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects 

Activity (IARPA), the National Telecommunications and 

Information Administration (NTIA), the National Strategy for 

Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC), General Services 

Administration (GSA), the United States Postal Service (USPS), 

and the Election Assistance Commission (EAC).

CTG also works closely with foreign government agencies, 

such as the Communications Security Establishment of 

Canada and Australia’s Defense Signals Agency and Centrelink. 

Additionally, CTG is active in national and international standards 

bodies, including the Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X9 

(financial industry standards), the International Organization for 

Standardization (ISO), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 

Engineers (IEEE), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the 

American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and the Trusted 

Computing Group (TCG). Industry collaborators include Intel, 

Microsoft, and Cisco.

Academic collaborators include Carnegie Mellon University, 

Yale University, University of Southern Denmark, the University 

of Milan, Malaga University, and the University of Lisbon. 

Research organizations include the Information-technology 

Promotion Agency (IPA)/Cryptography Research and Evaluation 

Committees (CRYPTREC) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade 

and Industry (METI) of Japan.

Group Manager (Acting):

Dr. Lily Chen

(301) 975-6974

lily.chen@nist.gov

Security Components and Mechanisms Group 

(SCMG) 

Mission Statement:

Research, develop, and standardize foundational security 

mechanisms, protocols, and services.

Overview:

The SCMG’s security research focuses on the development 

and management of foundational building-block security 

mechanisms and techniques that can be integrated into a 

wide variety of mission-critical U.S. information systems. The 

group’s work spans the spectrum from near-term hardening 

and improvement to the design and analysis of nextgeneration, leap-ahead security capabilities. Computer security 

depends fundamentally on the level of trust for computer 

software and systems. This work, therefore, focuses strongly 

on assurance building activities ranging from the analysis of 

software configuration settings to advanced trust architectures 

to testing tools that surface flaws in software modules. This 

work also focuses significantly on increasing the applicability 

and effectiveness of automated techniques, wherever feasible. 

The SCMG conducts collaborative research with government, 

industry, and academia. Outputs of this research consist of 

prototype systems, software tools, demonstrations, NIST 

Special Publications (SP), NIST Interagency or Internal Reports 

(NISTIR), and conference and journal papers.

SCMG works on a variety of topics, such as specifications 

for the automated exchange of security information between 

systems, computer security incident handling guidelines, 

formulation of high-assurance software configuration settings, 

hardware roots of trust for mobile devices, secure Basic 

Input Output System (BIOS) layers, combinatorial testing 

techniques, conformity assessment of software implementing 

biometric standards, and adoption of Internet Protocol Version 

6 and Internet Protocol security extensions. SCMG collaborates 

extensively with government, academia, and the private sector.

In FY 2013, collaborations have included Carnegie Mellon 

University (test development environment), Johns Hopkins 

Applied Physics Lab (practical application of combinatorial 

coverage measurement tool), North Carolina State University 

(access control policy testing), University of North Texas and 

University of Maryland-Baltimore County (test prioritization 

algorithms), University of Texas at Arlington (covering array 

generation algorithm), Mexico’s Centro Nacional de Metrología 

(constraints for testing coverage tool), National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration (NASA) (practical application for 

combinatorial coverage measurement), U.S. Air Force Test and 

Evaluation (a new event sequence testing method), the National 

Security Agency (secure software tool chain competition 

development), and the Department of Homeland Security 

(incident coordination).
5

SCMG accomplishments include the Advanced Combinatorial 

Testing System (ACTS) software and documentation, the NIST 

BioCTS 2013 biometric conformance testing tool and test 

assertions, and a security log analysis tool.

Group Manager:

Mr. Mark (Lee) Badger

(301) 975-3176

mark.badger@nist.gov

Secure Systems and Applications 

Group (SSAG) 

Mission Statement:

Integrate and apply security technologies, standards, and 

guidelines for computing platforms and information systems.

Overview:

SSAG’s security research focuses on the identification of 

emerging and high-priority technologies and on the development 

of security solutions that will enhance the security of U.S. 

critical information infrastructure. The group conducts research 

and development on behalf of government and industry from 

the earliest stages of technology development through proofof-concept, reference and prototype implementations, and 

demonstrations. SSAG works to transfer new technologies to 

industry; to produce new standards and guidance for federal 

agencies and industry; and to develop tests, test methodologies, 

and assurance methods.

SSAG investigates topics such as mobile device security, 

cloud computing and virtualization, identity management, 

access control and authorization management, and software 

assurance. SSAG research helps federal agencies meet 

information security requirements that might not be fully 

addressed by existing technology. The group collaborates 

extensively with government, academia, and private sector 

entities. 

Example successes from this work include tools for access 

control policy testing, new concepts in access control and 

policy enforcement, methods for achieving comprehensive 

policy enforcement and data interoperability across enterprise 

data services, and test methods for mobile device (smart phone) 

application security. For example, the SSAG Mobile Application 

Testing Portal (ATP) went operational for military use (known in 

the U.S. Army as PANTHR) and is in the process of transitioning 

to other federal agencies as open source. In support of the 

Federal Government’s cloud computing initiatives, SSAG led 

the NIST Security Working Group that published the NIST Cloud 

Computing - Security Reference Architecture. The SSAG also 

completed revision of Federal Information Processing Standard 

(FIPS) 201-2, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal 

Employees and Contractors, which was approved by the 

Secretary of Commerce and published in September of 2013.

To improve access to new technologies, SSAG chaired, 

edited, and participated in the development of a wide variety of 

national and international security standards.

Group Manager:

Mr. David Ferraiolo

(301) 975-3046

david.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Security Outreach and Integration Group (SOIG)

Mission Statement:

Develop, integrate, and promote the mission-specific 

application of information security standards, guidelines, best 

practices, and technologies.

Overview:

The U.S. economy, citizens, and government rely on 

information technology (IT); so the protection of IT and 

information infrastructure is critical. SOIG leverages broad 

cybersecurity and risk management expertise to develop, 

integrate, and promote security standards, guidelines, tools, 

technologies, methodologies, tests, and measurements to 

address cybersecurity needs in many areas of national and 

international importance.

The SOIG collaborates with stakeholders to address 

cybersecurity considerations in many diverse program areas, 

including the Information and Communications Technologies 

(ICT) supply chain, Smart Grid, Electronic Voting, Health 

Information Technology, and Cyber Physical and Industrial 

Control Systems. The group continues to increase its efforts to 

research, develop, and align cybersecurity standards, practices, 

and testing methods necessary to foster interoperable and 

secure public safety communications. In our Federal Information 

Security Management Act (FISMA) implementation program, 

the group produces standards and guidelines to help federal 

agencies build strong cybersecurity risk management programs. 

In each of these program areas, the group extends outreach 

to stakeholders across federal, state, and local governments; 

industry; academia; small businesses; and the public. The SOIG 

also leads several broad cybersecurity awareness, training, 

education, and outreach efforts, including the National Initiative 

for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), the Small- and Mediumsized Business (SMB) outreach program, the Federal Computer 

Security Managers’ Forum, and the Federal Information Systems 

Security Educators’ Association (FISSEA).

Key to the group’s success is the ability to interact with a 

broad constituency to ensure that SOIG’s program is consistent 

with national objectives related to or impacted by information 

Introduction to CSD’s Five Groups
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 6

security. Through open and transparent public engagement, 

collaboration, and cooperation, the group works to address 

critical cybersecurity challenges, enable greater U.S. industrial 

competitiveness, and facilitate practical implementation of 

scalable and sustainable information security standards and 

practices.

Group Manager:

Mr. Kevin Stine

(301) 975-4483

kevin.stine@nist.gov

Security Testing, Validation, and Measurement 

Group (STVMG) 

Mission Statement:

Advance information security testing, measurement science, 

and conformance.

Overview:

Federal agencies, industry, and the public rely on cryptography 

for the protection of information and communications used 

in electronic commerce, critical infrastructure, and other 

application areas. The STVMG supports testing and validation 

of underlying cryptographic modules and cryptographic 

algorithms in consideration of established standards. These 

cryptographic modules and algorithms enable products and 

systems to provide security services, such as confidentiality, 

integrity, and authentication. Although cryptography provides 

security, poor designs or weak algorithms can render a product 

insecure and place highly sensitive information at risk. When 

protecting sensitive data, Federal Government agencies require 

a minimum level of assurance that cryptographic products meet 

established security requirements and use only tested and 

validated cryptographic modules.

STVMG’s testing-focused activities include validating 

cryptographic algorithm implementations, cryptographic 

modules, and Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)-

compliant products; developing test suites and test methods; 

providing implementation guidance and technical support 

to industry forums; and conducting education, training, and 

outreach programs.

STVMG’s validation programs work together with 

independent Cryptographic and Security Testing laboratories 

that are accredited by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory 

Accreditation Program (NVLAP). Based on the independent 

laboratory test report and test evidence, the Validation Program 

then validates the implementation under test. NIST publishes, 

through public websites, lists of validations awarded.

Group Manager:

Mr. Michael Cooper

(301) 975-8077

michael.cooper@nist.gov
Cybersecurity Framework Policy Machine

Cloud Computing Cryptography

Standards

Security Practices

Verification

Security Controls

Assets

Risk Management Framework

Biometrics

Supply chain risk management

FIPS 140-2

Validated Products List

FISMA

Continuous Monitoring

Mobile Devices

Authorization EO 13636

Roadmap

7

The Computer Security 

Division Implements the 

Federal Information 

Security Management Act 
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 8

The CSD Implements the Federal Information 

Security Management Act

The E-Government Act, Public Law 107-347, passed by 

the 107th Congress and signed into law by the President in 

December 2002, recognized the importance of information 

security to the economic and national security interests of the 

United States. Title III of the E-Government Act, entitled the 

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, 

included duties and responsibilities for the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory, 

Computer Security Division (CSD). In 2013, CSD addressed its 

assignments through the following activities:

 Issued two final Federal Information Processing 

Standards (FIPS): FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard 

(DSS), which specifies a suite of algorithms that can 

be used to generate digital signatures, and FIPS 201-2, 

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees 

and Contractors, which specifies the architecture and 

technical requirements for a common identification 

standard for Federal employees and contractors.

 Issued 25 draft and final NIST Special Publications (SP) 

that provide management, operational, and technical 

security guidelines in areas such as personal identity 

verification, cryptographic key generation, cryptographic 

key management systems, random bit generators, 

transport layer security, mobile devices and mobile 

device forensics, hardware-rooted security in mobile 

devices, malware incident prevention and handling 

for desktops and laptops, industrial control systems 

security, e-authentication, security and privacy controls 

for federal information systems and organizations, 

patch management technologies, attribute based access 

control, and supply chain risk management practices.

 Issued 13 draft and final NIST Interagency or Internal 

Reports (NISTIR) on a variety of topics, including 

cryptographic key management issues and challenges in 

cloud services, cybersecurity in cyber-physical systems, 

the SHA-3 cryptographic hash algorithm competition, 

combinatorial coverage measurement, credential 

reliability and revocation model for federated identities, 

security automation, reference certificate policy, 

trusted geolocation in the cloud, and a glossary of key 

information security terms.

 Performed research and conducted outreach on 

standards, practices, and technologies to enable prompt 

and effective computer security incident handling and 

coordination.

 Continued the successful collaboration with the Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the 

Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), 

and the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish a 

common foundation for information security across 

the Federal Government, including a structured, yet 

flexible approach for managing information security 

risk across an organization. In 2013, this collaboration 

produced updated guidelines for selecting and specifying 

security controls, and an updated catalog of security 

and privacy controls for federal information systems and 

organizations.

 Provided assistance to agencies and the private 

sector through many outreach efforts associated 

with the Federal Information Systems Security 

Educators’ Association (FISSEA), the Federal Computer 

Security Managers’ Forum, the National Initiative for 

Cybersecurity Education (NICE), and the Small Business 

Information Security Corner.

 Conducted workshops, awareness briefings, and 

outreach to CSD customers to ensure comprehension 

of standards and guidelines, to share ongoing and 

planned activities, and to aid in scoping guidelines 

in a collaborative, open, and transparent manner. 

CSD public workshops addressed a diverse range of 

information security and technology topics, including 

cloud and mobile technologies, voting systems security, 

cyber physical systems, improving trust in the online 

marketplace, safeguarding health information, attribute 

based access control, supply chain risk management, 

improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity, and broad 

computer security awareness, training, and education 

forums and events.

 Engaged with international standards bodies in a variety 

of areas, including promoting broader international 

adoption of security automation specifications. 

Additionally, NIST continued to lead, in conjunction with 

the Government of Canada’s Communications Security 

Establishment, the Cryptographic Module Validation 

Program (CMVP). The Common Criteria Evaluation and 

Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and CMVP facilitate security 

testing of IT products usable by the Federal Government.

 Solicited recommendations of the Information Security 

and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) on draft standards 

and guidelines, and on information security and privacy 

issues.

 Produced the CSD 2013 annual report and released 

it as a NIST SP. CSD annual reports from fiscal years 

2003 through 2013 are available on the Computer 

Security Resource Center (CSRC) at http://csrc.nist.gov/

publications/PubsTC.html#Annual Reports.
Cybersecurity Framework Policy Machine

Cloud Computing Cryptography

Standards

Security Practices

Verification

Security Controls

Assets

Risk Management Framework

Biometrics

Supply chain risk management

FIPS 140-2

Validated Products List

FISMA

Continuous Monitoring

Mobile Devices

Authorization EO 13636

Roadmap

9

Program and Project 

Achievements for 

Fiscal Year 2013 
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 10

In FY 2013, CSD continued to research and develop guidance 

for a broad array of technical areas, including supply chain 

risk management; security analytics; cloud, mobile, and 

privacy-enhancing technologies; hardware-enabled security; 

and cyber-physical and embedded systems. The staff and 

guest researchers within CSD have collaborated with global 

partners from government, industry, and academia, making 

significant contributions to help secure critical information and 

infrastructure. The following sections describe CSD’s programs 

and project achievements that include extensive research 

and development for high-quality, cost-effective security and 

privacy mechanisms, standards, guidelines, tests, and metrics 

that address current and future computer and information 

security challenges. 

NIST Responsibilities Under Executive Order 

13636, “Improving Critical Infrastructure 

Cybersecurity”

Recognizing that the national and economic security of the 

United States depends on the reliable functioning of critical 

infrastructure, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 

13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, in 

February 2013. This Executive Order directed NIST to work 

with stakeholders to develop a voluntary framework – based 

on existing standards, guidelines, and practices − for reducing 

cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructure.

The Cybersecurity Framework will provide a prioritized, 

flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective 

approach, including information security measures and controls 

to help owners and operators of critical infrastructure and other 

interested entities to identify, assess, and manage cybersecurityrelated risk while protecting business confidentiality, individual 

privacy, and civil liberties. To enable technical innovation 

and account for organizational differences, the Cybersecurity 

Framework will not prescribe particular technological solutions 

or specifications.

In FY 2013, NIST worked with a diverse stakeholder 

community to develop the Framework through an open public 

process. This process included:

 Issuing a Request for Information (RFI) in the Federal 

Register in February 2013

 Conducting five open workshops to provide the public 

with additional opportunities to provide input. These 

workshops were hosted at the Department of Commerce 

in Washington, D.C. (April 2013), Carnegie Mellon 

University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (May 2013), the 

University of California, San Diego (July 2013), the 

University of Texas at Dallas (September 2013), and the 

North Carolina State University in Raleigh, North Carolina 

(November 2013)

 Preparing a Preliminary Cybersecurity Framework for 

official public review and comment

In FY 2014, NIST will continue to conduct stakeholder outreach 

and will work collaboratively to further develop and issue the 

Cybersecurity Framework. NIST will initiate a 45-day public 

comment period on the Preliminary Cybersecurity Framework, 

review and adjudicate all public comments received, and issue 

a final Cybersecurity Framework (version 1.0) in February 2014 

as specified in the Executive Order.

http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework

Contacts:

Mr. Kevin Stine Mr. Adam Sedgewick

(301) 975-4483 (301) 367-4678

kevin.stine@nist.gov adam.sedgewick@nist.gov
11

Contributions to National and International 

Standards Development

Figure 1 (below) shows many of the national and international 

Standards Developing Organizations (SDOs) involved in 

cybersecurity standardization. CSD participates in cybersecurity 

standards activities in many of these organizations, either in 

leadership positions or as editors and contributors. Many of 

CSD’s publications have been the basis for both national and 

international standards projects. This section discusses CSD 

standards activities in conjunction with InterNational Committee 

for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) Technical 

Committee Cyber Security 1 (CS1), where Dan Benigni serves 

as Chair and U.S. Head of Delegation to subcommittee SC 27, 

and Sal Francomacaro serves as CS1 Vice Chair.

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO)

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a 

network of the national standards institutes of 148 countries, 

with the representation of one member per country. The scope 

of ISO covers standardization in all fields except electrical and 

electronic engineering standards, which are the responsibility 

of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).

The IEC prepares and publishes international standards for 

all electrical, electronic, and related technologies, including 

electronics, magnetics and electromagnetics, electroacoustics, 

multimedia, telecommunication, and energy production and 

distribution, as well as associated general disciplines such 

as terminology and symbols, electromagnetic compatibility, 

measurement and performance, dependability, design and 

development, safety, and the environment.

Figure 1: Cybersecurity Standards Development Organizations (SDOs)

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 12

Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC 1) was formed by ISO and 

IEC to be responsible for international standardization in the 

field of information technology. It develops, maintains, promotes, 

and facilitates IT standards required by global markets, meeting 

business and user requirements concerning:

 Design and development of IT systems and tools

 Performance and quality of IT products and systems

 Security of IT systems and information

 Portability of application programs

 Interoperability of IT products and systems

 Unified tools and environments

 Harmonized IT vocabulary

 User-friendly and ergonomically designed user interfaces

JTC 1 consists of a number of subcommittees (SCs) and 

working groups that address specific technologies. SCs that 

produce standards relating to IT security include:

 SC 06 − Telecommunications and Information Exchange 

Between Systems

 SC 17 − Cards and Personal Identification

 SC 27 − IT Security Techniques

 SC 37 – Biometrics (Fernando Podio, NIST, Chair)

JTC 1 also has:

 Technical Committee 68 – Financial Services

 SC 2 − Operations and Procedures including Security

 SC 4 – Securities

 SC 6 − Financial Transaction Cards, Related Media, and 

Operations

 SC 7 – Software and Systems Engineering

The American National Standards Institute (ANSI)

ANSI is a private, nonprofit organization (501(c)(3)) that 

administers and coordinates the U.S. voluntary standardization 

and conformity assessment system and facilitates the 

development of American National Standards (ANS) by 

accrediting the procedures of SDOs.

ANSI promotes the use of U.S. standards internationally, 

advocates U.S. policy and technical positions in international 

and regional standards organizations, and encourages the 

adoption of international standards as national standards where 

they meet the needs of the user community. ANSI is the sole 

U.S. representative and dues-paying member of the two major 

non-treaty international standards organizations, ISO and, via 

the United States National Committee (USNC), the IEC.

INCITS is accredited by ANSI and serves as the ANSI Technical 

Advisory Group (TAG) for ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1. 

INCITS is sponsored by the Information Technology Industry 

(ITI) Council, a trade association representing the leading U.S. 

providers of information technology products and services.

INCITS is organized into Technical Committees that focus 

on the creation of standards for different technology areas. 

Technical committees that focus on IT security and IT securityrelated technologies or that may require separate security 

standards include:

 B10 – Identification Cards and Related Devices

 CS1 – Cyber Security (Dan Benigni, NIST, Chair; Sal 

Francomacaro, NIST, Vice Chair; and Richard Kissel, NIST, 

Principal voting member)

 E22 – Item Authentication

 M1 – Biometrics (Fernando Podio, NIST, Chair)

 T3 – Open Distributed Processing (ODP)

 T6 – Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology

 GIT1 – Governance of IT

 DAPS38 – Distributed Application Platforms and Services

As a technical committee of INCITS, CS1 develops United 

States, national, ANSI-accredited standards in the area of 

cybersecurity. Its scope encompasses:

 Management of information security and systems

 Management of third-party information security service 

providers

 Intrusion detection

 Network security

 Cloud computing security

 Supply chain risk management

 Incident handling

 IT security evaluation and assurance

 Security assessment of operational systems
13

 Security requirements for cryptographic modules

 Protection profiles

 Role-based access control

 Security checklists

 Security metrics

 Cryptographic and non-cryptographic techniques 

and mechanisms, including confidentiality, entity 

authentication, non-repudiation, key management, data 

integrity, message authentication, hash functions, and 

digital signatures

 Future service and applications standards supporting 

the implementation of control objectives and controls as 

defined in ISO 27001, in the areas of business continuity 

and outsourcing

 Identity management, including identity management 

framework, role-based access control, and single signon

 Privacy technologies, including privacy framework, 

privacy reference architecture, privacy infrastructure, 

anonymity and credentials, and specific privacyenhancing technologies

The scope of CS1 explicitly excludes the areas of work on 

cybersecurity standardization presently under way in INCITS 

B10, M1, T3, T10, and T11, as well as other standard groups, 

such as the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions 

(ATIS), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 

(IEEE), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Travel 

Industry Association of America (TIAA), and the Accredited 

Standards Committee (ASC) X9. The CS1 scope of work includes 

standardization in most of the same cybersecurity areas as are 

covered in the NIST CSD.

As the U.S. TAG to ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, CS1 contributes to 

the SC 27 program of work on IT Security Techniques in terms of 

U.S. comments and contributions on SC 27 standards projects; 

votes on SC 27 standards documents at various stages of 

development; and nominates U.S. experts to work on various SC 

27 projects as editors, coeditors, or in other SC 27 leadership 

positions. Currently, over a dozen CS1 members are serving 

as SC 27 document editors or coeditors on various standards 

projects, including CSD staff Randy Easter and Richard Kissel.

All input from CS1 is processed through INCITS to ANSI, 

then to SC 27. CS1 also serves as a conduit for getting U.S.-

based new work item proposals and U.S.-developed national 

standards into the international SC 27 standards development 

process. In its international efforts, CS1 responded to all calls 

for U.S. contributions and/or voting positions on all international 

security standards projects in ISO/IEC JTC1 SC 27 in a 

consistent, efficient, and timely manner.

NIST contributes to many of CS1’s national and international 

IT security standards efforts through its membership on CS1, 

where Dan Benigni serves as the non-voting chair and Richard 

Kissel as the NIST Principal voting member. Internationally, 

there are over 100 published standards, and almost all have 

been adopted as U.S. national standards. There are more than 

80 current international standards projects. During FY 2013, 

29 new standards were published in SC 27, and most of them 

have been recommended by CS1 for adoption as U.S. national 

standards. 

CSD Contributions to Cybersecurity 

Standardization in INCITS CS1

CSD’s cybersecurity research also plays a direct role in the 

Cybersecurity Standardization efforts of CS1 at the national 

level. Nationally during FY 2013:

 The NIST Policy Machine research and development has 

resulted in three ongoing national standards projects 

in CS1, each in the early stages of development. They 

include:

• INCITS 499-2013, “Next Generation Access Control 

–Functional Architecture (NGAC-FA)”, David Ferraiolo, 

NIST, Editor, Published May 2013

• “Next Generation Access Control – Generic 

Operations & Abstract Data Structures (NGACGOADS)”, Project Number: 2195-D, Serban Gavrila, 

NIST, Editor (Planned Publication FY 2014)

• “Next Generation Access Control-Implementation 

Requirements, Protocols and API Definitions (NGACIRPADS)”, Project Number: 2193-D

Within CS1, liaisons are maintained with nearly 20 

organizations, including:

 ABA Federated Identity Management Legal (IdM Legal) 

Task Force

 American Bar Association (ABA), section on Science and 

Technology

 Cloud Security Alliance

 Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST)

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 14

 IEEE P1700 and P1619

 INCITS T11, M1, GIT1, DAPS38, and PL22

 Internet Security Alliance

 Kantara Initiative Identity Assurance Working Group 

(IAWG)

 Open Group

 SC 7 TAG

 Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE)

 The Storage Networking Industry Association (SNIA)

 Trusted Computing Group

Dan Benigni also serves as cybersecurity standards 

coordinator in CSD.

Contact:

Mr. Daniel Benigni

(301) 975-3279

benigni@nist.gov

Identity Management Standards within INCITS 

B10 and ISO JTC1/SC 17

CSD supports identity management standardization activities 

through participation in national and international standards 

bodies and organizations. CSD actively participates in the 

INCITS B10 committee, which is focused on interoperability of 

Identification Cards and Related Devices. CSD staff serves as 

Chair and Vice Chair of the B10.12 committee, which develops 

interoperable standards for Integrated Circuit Cards with 

Contacts. CSD staff also serves as the U.S. Head of delegation 

to ISO/IEC JTC1 SC 17 Working Groups 4 and 11.

In addition to chairing the B10.12 committee, CSD provides 

technical and editorial support in the development of national 

and international standards. Specifically, CSD staff serves as 

the technical editor of ANSI 504-1, Generic Identity Command 

Set (GICS). GICS enables PIV, PIV-Interoperable (PIV-I) and 

Common Access Card (CAC) card applications, and others, to 

be built from a single platform. GICS defines an open platform 

where identity applications can be instantiated, deployed, and 

used in an interoperable way between the credential issuers 

and credential users. CSD staff also provides significant input 

to standards of major interest to U.S. government agencies and 

U.S. markets. CSD influences the development and revision of 

ISO/IEC 7816 (Identification Cards, Integrated Circuit Cards), 

ISO/IEC 24727 (Identification Cards, Integrated Circuit Card 

Programming Interfaces), and ISO/IEC 24787 (Biometrics 

“Match On Card” Comparison).

During FY 2013, INCITS 504 Parts 1, 2, and 4 were published 

and ISO/IEC 7816 Part 4 was published with significant changes 

added per NIST’s request. CSD provides contributions and 

feedback on many other INCITS B10 identity management 

standards projects. 

During the FY 2014, the INCITS B10 committee, along with 

the active collaboration of CSD staff, plans to publish Part 

3 of INCITS 504 and contribute to the publication of several 

standards of the ISO/IEC 7816 family (all relevant to FIPS 201 

specifications). CSD staff will continue actively supporting 

relevant ID management standard initiatives.

CSD’s investment in these activities is motivated by new 

technical ideas that emerge from these standards. For example, 

INCITS 504 is an ID platform that leverages the FIPS 201 

infrastructure to support a larger number of government and 

enterprise initiatives. In particular, INCITS 504 aims to support 

initiatives such as the NSTIC. ISO/IEC 24727 aims to create 

an interoperability framework that increases the resilience 

and scalability of identity management solutions and fosters 

domestic and international interoperability.

Contact: 

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro

(301) 975-6414

salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov

Federal Information Security Management Act 

(FISMA) Implementation Project

The FISMA Implementation Project focuses on:

 Developing a comprehensive series of standards 

and guidelines to help federal agencies build strong 

cybersecurity programs, defend against increasingly 

sophisticated cyber attacks, and demonstrate 

compliance to security requirements set forth in 

legislation, Executive Orders, Homeland Security 

Directives, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

policies

 Building common understanding and reference guides 

for organizations applying the NIST suite of standards 

and guidelines that support the NIST Risk Management 

Framework (RMF)

 Developing minimum criteria and guidelines for 

recognizing security assessment organization providers 

as capable of assessing information systems consistent 

with NIST standards and guidelines supporting the RMF
15

 Conducting FISMA outreach to public and private sector 

organizations

During 2013, CSD strengthened its collaboration with the 

Department of Defense (DoD), the Intelligence Community, 

and the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), in 

partnership with the Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, 

which continues to develop key cybersecurity guidelines for 

protecting federal information and information systems for 

the Unified Information Security Framework. Previously, the 

Joint Task Force developed common security guidance in the 

critical areas of security controls for information systems and 

organizations, security assessment procedures to demonstrate 

security control effectiveness, security authorizations for risk 

acceptance decisions, and continuous monitoring activities 

to ensure that decision makers receive the most up-to-date 

information on the security state of their information systems. In 

addition, CSD worked with the General Services Administration 

(GSA) Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program 

(FedRAMP) to identify security assessment requirements, and 

prototype a process for approving Third-Party Assessment 

Organizations (3PAOs) that demonstrate capability in assessing 

Cloud Service Providers (CSP) information systems for 

conformance to NIST standards and guidelines.

In FY 2013, CSD worked on the following three initiatives:

1. Risk Management and Risk Assessment Guidelines: 

Developed a comprehensive risk assessment guideline 

examining the relationships among key risk factors, 

including threats, vulnerabilities, impact, and likelihood. 

Special Publication (SP) 800-53, Revision 4, Security 

and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems 

and Organizations, provides a holistic approach 

to information security and risk management. The 

publication provides organizations with security controls 

necessary to appropriately strengthen their information 

systems and the environments in which those systems 

operate − contributing to systems that are resilient in 

the face of attacks and other threats. This “Build It Right” 

strategy combines with a variety of security controls 

for “Continuous Monitoring” to give organizations near 

real-time information that is essential for senior leaders 

making ongoing risk-based decisions affecting their 

critical missions and business functions.

To take advantage of the expanded set of security and 

privacy controls, and to give organizations greater 

flexibility and agility in defending their information 

systems, the revision introduces the concept of 

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013

GENERIC RISK MODEL WITH KEY RISK FACTORS

producing

initiates exploits causing

Threat

Source 

Threat 

Predisposing

Conditions

Event Vulnerability

with Risk

as a combination of

Impact and Likelihood

with Severity

In the context of

Inputs from Risk Framing Step

(Risk Management Strategy or Approach)

Influencing and Potentially Modifying 

Key Risk Factors 

with

Characteristics

(e.g., Capability, Intent, and

Targeting for Adversarial Threats)

with

Sequence 

of actions, activities, 

or scenarios

with

Likelihood

of Initiation

with

Likelihood

of Success

with

Degree

with

Pervasiveness

with

Effectiveness

Security Controls

Planned / Implemented

ORGANIZATIONAL RISK

To organizational operations (mission, functions, 

image, reputation), organizational assets,

individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

Adverse

Impact

Figure 2: Generic Risk Model with Key Risk Factors
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 16

overlays. Overlays provide a structured approach to 

help organizations tailor security control baselines 

and develop specialized security plans for specific 

missions/business functions, environments of operation, 

and/or technologies. This specialization approach is 

important as the number of threat-driven controls and 

control enhancements in the catalog increases and 

organizations develop risk management strategies to 

address their specific protection needs within defined 

risk tolerances.

2. Criteria and Guidelines for Recognizing Security 

Assessment Provider Organizations: CSD updated 

proficiency tests and technical requirements for 

evaluating FedRAMP 3PAO providers’ capability to 

conduct security assessment of cloud-based information 

systems for compliance with FISMA in accordance 

with FedRAMP and ISO/IEC 17020 Inspection Bodies 

requirements. Additionally, CSD provided input to GSA 

requirements (including orientation and training) for 

private sector accreditation body of FedRAMP 3PAOs that 

resulted in GSA FedRAMP Program Management Office 

(PMO) selecting one 3PAO private sector accreditation 

body.

3. FISMA Outreach Activity to Public and Private Sector 

Organizations: CSD conducted cybersecurity outreach 

briefings and provided support to state and local 

governments as well as private sector organizations on 

topics of interest, such as effective implementation of 

the NIST Risk Management Framework. In addition, CSD 

conducted outreach activities with academic institutions, 

providing information on NIST’s security standards and 

guidelines, and exploring new areas of cybersecurity 

research and development.

In FY 2013, CSD completed the following outreach activities:

 Finalized SP 800-53, Revision 4

 Collaborated with the ITL Software and Systems Division 

and the NIST Standards Coordination Office using the 

International Standard ISO/IEC 17020:2008, Conformity 

Assessment – Requirements for the operation of various 

types of bodies performing inspection, in support of GSA 

in establishing a process for qualifying 3PAOs to conduct 

security assessments of CSPs information systems 

consistent with GSA requirements based on NIST 

standards and guidelines

 Developed a preliminary draft of SP 800-53A, Revision 4, 

Guide for Assessing the Security and Privacy Controls in 

Federal Information Systems and Organizations

 Developed a preliminary draft of SP 800-18, Revision 

2, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal 

Information Systems and Organizations

In FY 2014, CSD intends to:

 Finalize SP 800-53A, Revision 4, Guide for Assessing 

the Security and Privacy Controls in Federal Information 

Systems and Organizations

 Finalize SP 800-60 Revision 2, Guide for Mapping Types 

of Information and Information Systems to Security 

Categories

 Finalize SP 800-18 Revision 2, Guide for Developing 

Security Plans for Federal Information Systems and 

Organizations

 Expand cybersecurity outreach to include additional 

state, local, and tribal governments, as well as private 

sector organizations and academic institutions

 Continue to support federal agencies in effective 

implementation of the NIST Risk Management 

Framework.

http://csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert

Contacts:

Dr. Ron Ross Ms. Pat Toth

(301) 975-5390 (301) 975-5140

ron.ross@nist.gov patricia.toth@nist.gov

Mr. Arnold Johnson Ms. Kelley Dempsey

(301) 975-3247 (301) 975-2827

arnold.johnson@nist.gov kelley.dempsey@nist.gov

Ms. Peggy Himes

(301) 975-2489

peggy.himes@nist.gov

Biometric Standards and Associated Conformity 

Assessment Testing Tools

The CSD staff responds to government, industry, and market 

requirements for open systems standards by:

 Accelerating development of formal biometric standards

 Providing effective leadership and technical participation 

in the development of these standards

 Developing Conformance Test Architectures (CTA) 

and Conformance Test Suites (CTS) designed to test 

implementations of biometric standards

 Supporting harmonization of biometric, tokens, and 

security standards
17

 Promoting biometric standards adoption

 Promoting conformity assessment efforts

To achieve these project goals, CSD continues to work in close 

partnership with government agencies, industry partners, and 

academic institutions. CSD actively participates in a number of 

biometric standards development projects, contributes to the 

development of biometric standards, and leads national and 

international biometric standards bodies. Nationally, CSD’s staff 

leads the INCITS Technical Committee 1 (M1) – Biometrics; 

international efforts include ISO JTC 1 and IEC Subcommittee 

SC 37 - Biometrics - JTC 1/SC 37. CSD plans to continue this 

work in FY 2014.

During FY 2013, the development of object-oriented CTAs and 

CTSs to test implementations of biometric standards progressed 

at an accelerated pace. CSD developed and publicly released 

two fully functional object-oriented CTAs. One CTA supports 

CTSs designed to test implementations of Extensible Markup 

Language (XML) encoded biometric data interchange formats 

and the other supports CTSs designed to test implementations 

of ISO/IEC data formats developed by JTC 1/SC 37 as well as 

PIV profiles of biometric standards. CSD released these test 

tools as “BioCTS 2013 for ANSI/NIST 1-2011” and “BioCTS 

2013 for ISO/IEC” respectively. As depicted in the figure, CTA/

CTSs’ key features include search capabilities of the Text Log 

Outputs (very useful to debug errors in large implementations), 

formatted test results, and test result basic statistics (on batch 

of files or individual files).

In addition to previously designed CTSs (e.g., CTS for 

ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 [AN-2011] traditional encoding 

transactions and ISO/IEC biometric data interchange format 

implementations), BioCTS 2013 conformance test software 

includes a CTS designed to test National Information Exchange 

Model (NIEM) XML encoded AN-2011 implementations. The 

functionality of this tool goes beyond the existing basic 

XML testing techniques, such as schema validation. CSD’s 

project team concluded that the XML schema validation was 

insufficient to address full conformance testing of the AN2011 requirements. The team implemented over 1,200 test 

assertions beyond the schema validation (validating an XML 

file against an XSD file) for this standard, including those for 

AN-2011 Record Types 1, 4, 10, 13, 14, 15, and 17. NISTIR 7957, 

Conformance Test Architecture and Test Suite for ANSI/NIST-ITL 

1-2011 NIEM XML Encoded Transactions (September 2013) 

and a presentation delivered at the last Biometric Consortium 

conference3

 discussed these test tools and provided technical 

implementation details.

BioCTS 2013 conformance test software also includes CTSs 

to test PIV profiles (e.g., finger minutia and image data formats) 

and to test implementations of the second-generation face 

recognition data format developed by JTC 1/SC 37 (published 

in 2011). The PIV profile of the SC 37 iris data format was 

aligned with SP 800-76-2, Biometric Specifications for Personal 

Identity Verification. The face recognition CTS was aligned with 

the associated conformance testing methodology developed by 

JTC 1/SC 37.

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013

Figure 3: Biometric Conformance Test Software by NIST/ITL CSD
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 18

These conformance-testing tools provide significant 

functionality, usability, and performance. In addition to supplying 

an installer version of the CTAs, which supports new and 

existing CTSs with new graphical user interface enhancements, 

the CSD project team extended the work to a command line 

interface version for AN-2011 traditional encoding that runs 

under Windows and Linux (with Mono). The test tools developed 

support a Web-based environment. A prototype was developed, 

tested, and demonstrated at the last Biometric Consortium 

Conference.

Based on the detailed analysis of the biometric standards 

(ISO/IEC and AN-2011) required to develop the associated 

conformance test tools, the CSD team provided technical 

contributions to the relevant standards bodies. In FY 2013, 

these included:

 Over 200 test assertions for AN-2011 Record Type 18 – 

DNA Data Record

 Technical contributions on the AN-2011 standard and the 

published XML schema

 Technical contributions to JTC 1/SC 37 (via INCITS M1) 

on SC 37 XML namespaces, data elements, schemas, 

and related items; an XML-based data interchange 

format framework and DNA data interchange format

In addition to ongoing participation and management 

of biometric standards activities in INCITS M1 and JTC 1/

SC 37, in FY 2014, CSD plans to develop additional CTSs to 

test implementations of selected international biometric 

data interchange formats specified in XML encoding (under 

development in JTC 1/SC 37). The CSD team also plans to 

develop conformance test assertions for selected record types 

of the 2013 version of the ANSI/NIST standard and plans 

to develop the associated CTA/CTS for traditional and XML 

encoded transactions. The latest version of the ANSI/NIST 

standard now incorporates extended forensics-related data, 

such as a dental supplement and additional record types, such 

as voice data record. The team will continue researching and 

developing additional test environments support, such as web 

services and tools in the cloud. The research plan expands to 

technical interfaces, such as Biometric Application Programming 

Interface standards specified in Object Oriented Programming 

and Biometric Information Assurance Services standards.

Outreach efforts in FY 2013 in support of biometric standards 

development and conformity assessment efforts included: 

 Contribution of the area editor for articles on biometric 

standards for Springer’s second edition of the Biometrics 

Encyclopedia (under development), where 25 papers 

were reviewed and edited

 Keynote talks and presentations on biometric standards 

and conformity assessment at national and international 

conferences

 Related technical publications and participation in 

conference program committees and paper reviews

NIST helped develop the program of the 2013 Biometric 

Consortium Conference, which CSD’s Mr. Fernando Podio cochaired. Held September 17-19, 2013, in Tampa, Florida, this 

year’s conference included nearly 1,600 attendees from 30 

countries representing government, industry, and academia. 

CSD supported a booth at the conference’s technical 

exposition and presented material regarding the conformance 

test tool development project. The conference program included 

sessions on Federal Government programs, advances in 

biometric technologies and standards, and Biometrics Identity 

and Security (BIdS) research. NIST’s session highlighted 

achievements and ongoing biometric research, testing, and 

standards projects. Over 140 speakers participated in the 

program. 

ITL’s Biometric Resource Center:

http://www.nist.gov/biometrics

BioCTS 2013 - Biometric Conformance Test Tool Downloads:

http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/biometrics/biocta_download.

cfm#CTAdownloads

Biometric Consortium website:

http://www.biometrics.org

Biometric Consortium 2013 conference program (released 

presentations are linked):

http://www.biometrics.org/bc2013/program.pdf

Contact:

Mr. Fernando Podio

(301) 975-2947

fernando.podio@nist.gov
19

Cybersecurity of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)

Leveraging CSD’s expertise in cybersecurity for industrial 

control systems, smart grid, hardware-enabled security, 

and embedded systems, the division is now researching 

cybersecurity needs of the broader landscape of cyberphysical systems (CPS). CPS are hybrid networked cyber and 

engineered physical elements co-designed to create adaptive 

and predictive systems that respond in real-time to enhance 

performance with varying degrees of human interaction, and 

are commonly used in the nation’s critical infrastructure. 

Such systems control the electrical grid, provide clean water, 

produce chemicals, and underlie transportation systems. CPS 

capabilities continue to grow as a result of technological 

advances, enabling future engines of growth, such as advanced 

manufacturing, and advancements in safety initiatives, such as 

autonomous vehicles.

Cybersecurity is an important crosscutting discipline that is 

critical to safeguarding CPS and supporting communications 

and information infrastructure. CPS presents unique challenges, 

including the need for real-time response in support of 

extremely high availability, predictability, and reliability. Despite 

the ubiquity and criticality of CPS, additional thought is required 

regarding the design of secure CPS. As a result, there have been 

numerous successful attacks targeting CPS for the control of 

critical infrastructure (e.g., Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame, Gauss).

In April 2013, CSD and the Cyber Security Research Alliance 

(CSRA) co-hosted a 2-day workshop to explore emerging 

research needs for cybersecurity in CPS with the diverse 

cyber-physical community at large. The workshop brought 

together engineering and IT experts who have dealt with 

security issues related to CPS. Representatives from industry, 

academia, and government engaged in interactive discussions 

during the workshop in the areas of supply chain, assurance, 

threat information, identifying existing tools and practices to 

secure CPS, security in acquisition and implementation, and 

trustworthy operations. Attendees were invited to participate 

in break-out sessions where the discussion topics were briefly 

framed, allowing the attendees to explore the discussion topics 

and to share their experiences with integrating security into 

existing organizations (e.g., lessons learned and examples).

CSD, in conjunction with ITL’s Advanced Network 

Technologies division, Information Access division, and NIST’s 

Engineering Laboratory, collaborated to develop an initial NIST 

notional reference architecture for CPS. This notional reference 

architecture was designed at such a level of abstraction that 

it can be applied across the breadth of the CPS, yet provides 

modularization and context for integration. The notional 

CPS reference architecture was driven from a community 

need to provide a common lexicon and taxonomy, a common 

architectural vision to help facilitate interoperability between 

elements and systems, and promotes communication across 

the breadth of CPS stakeholders. 

CSD, in conjunction with NIST’s Engineering Laboratory, will 

finalize the revision of SP 800-82 in FY 2014. CSD will continue 

to participate in the International Society of Automation (ISA) 

99 Committee, which develops and establishes standards, 

recommended practices, technical reports, and related 

information that define procedures for implementing 

electronically secure industrial automation and control systems 

and security practices, and for assessing electronic security 

performance. Leveraging the initial NIST notional reference 

architecture as a starting point to address the lack of an 

industry-wide consensus definition, reference architecture, 

and taxonomy for CPS, CSD will work in collaboration with 

NIST’s Engineering Laboratory and ITL’s Software and Systems 

division, and Advanced Networking Technologies division to 

lead a public-private working group of government, academia, 

and industry stakeholders. The working group will consist of 5 

technical subgroups: 1) Definitions and Taxonomy, 2) Reference 

Architecture, 3) Use Cases, 4) Cybersecurity and Privacy, and 5) 

Timing. CSD will lead the Cybersecurity and Privacy subgroup 

focused on identifying strategies for cybersecurity and privacy 

in CPS, and work collaboratively with the other subgroups to 

ensure that cybersecurity is included as a design principle in 

development. 

Contacts:

Ms. Tanya Brewer Ms. Suzanne Lightman 

(301) 975-4534 (301) 975-6442 

tbrewer@nist.gov suzanne.lightman@nist.gov

Ms. Vicky Yan Pillitteri

(301) 975-8542

victoria.yan@nist.gov

Federal Cybersecurity Research & Development 

(R&D) 

The Networking and Information Technology Research and 

Development (NITRD) Program provides a framework in which 

many federal agencies come together to coordinate their 

networking and IT research and development (R&D) efforts. 

CSD remained committed to the value of communicating its 

R&D efforts to other federal colleagues and identifying the 

opportunities to support R&D efforts throughout the Federal 

Government.

In FY 2013, the CSIA Interagency Working Group (IWG) monthly 

meetings provided an opportunity to learn and share about 

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 20

ongoing research related to the themes and thrusts expressed 

in the Strategic Plan for the Federal Cybersecurity Research and 

Development. CSD briefed the working group regarding efforts 

on Executive Order 13636, “Improving Critical Infrastructure 

Cybersecurity,” under which NIST has been directed to work 

with stakeholders to develop a voluntary framework for reducing 

cyber risks to critical infrastructure. CSD also described 

work on the Advanced Network Technologies division’s High 

Assurance Domain project, which exists to foster development 

and deployment of new network security technologies to 

increase trust in online communications.

CSD is also a regular participant in the coordination 

activities of the federal Special Cyber Operations Research and 

Engineering (SCORE) Committee. SCORE enables technology 

transfer through the sharing of NIST cybersecurity expertise 

and output. The SCORE committee interacts with federal 

leaders as part of the White House’s Comprehensive National 

Cybersecurity Initiatives (CNCI).

Contacts:

Mr. Bill Newhouse Dr. Ernest McDuffie

CSIA IWG, CSIA SSG SEW Education Team and SCORE rep

(301) 975-2869 (301) 975-8897

william.newhouse@nist.gov ernest.mcduffie@nist.gov

Security Aspects of Electronic Voting

In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to 

encourage the upgrade of voting equipment across the United 

States. HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission 

(EAC) and the Technical Guidelines Development Committee 

(TGDC), chaired by the Director of NIST. HAVA directs NIST to 

provide technical support to the EAC and TGDC in efforts related 

to human factors, security, and laboratory accreditation. As part 

of NIST’s efforts, CSD supports the activities of the EAC related 

to voting equipment security.

In the past year, NIST supported the EAC by developing 

responses to public comments on the Voluntary Voting System 

Guidelines (VVSG) 1.1. The security guidelines were updated 

in FY 2012 to improve the auditability of voting systems, to 

provide greater software integrity protections, to expand and 

improve access control requirements, and to help ensure 

cryptographic security mechanisms are implemented properly. 

In addition, CSD supported the efforts of the EAC and Federal 

Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) of DoD to improve the voting 

process for citizens under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 

Voting Act (UOCAVA) by leveraging electronic technologies. The 

team worked with the TDCG’s UOCAVA Working Group to develop 

a risk analysis on technologies used in current UOCAVA voting 

processes, including vote-by-mail, online voter registration, 

electronic ballot delivery, and online ballot marking. 

In FY 2014, NIST will continue to assist the EAC in developing 

responses to public comments and providing updates to VVSG 

1.1. Additionally, CSD will continue to support efforts for the 

EAC and FVAP to improve the voting process for UOCAVA voters. 

CSD will continue security research efforts to support future 

standards development efforts, particularly in the areas of risks 

to voting systems and innovative voting system architectures.

http://vote.nist.gov

Contacts:

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid Mr. Joshua Franklin 

(301) 975-5155 (301) 975-8463

andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov joshua.franklin@nist.gov

Health Information Technology Security

Health information technology (HIT) enables better patient 

care through secure use and sharing of health information. It 

leads to improvements in healthcare quality, reduced medical 

errors, increased efficiencies in care delivery and administration, 

and improved population 

health. Central to reaching 

these goals is the assurance 

of the confidentiality, integrity, 

and availability of health 

information. CSD works 

with government, industry, 

academia, and others to 

provide security tools, technologies, and methodologies that 

provide for the security and privacy of health information. 

NIST continued its HIT security outreach efforts in FY 2013. 

NIST and the Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS) 

Office for Civil Rights (OCR) cohosted the sixth annual HIPAA 

Security Rule conference, “Safeguarding Health Information: 

Building Assurance through HIPAA Security,” in May 2013 at 
21

the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in 

Washington, D.C. The conference offered important sessions 

that focused on broad topics of interest to the healthcare 

and health IT security community. Over 600 in-person and 

virtual attendees from federal, state, and local governments, 

academia, HIPAA-covered entities and business associates, 

industry groups, and vendors heard from, and interacted with, 

healthcare, security, and privacy experts on technologies and 

methodologies for safeguarding health information and for 

implementing the requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule. 

Presentations covered a variety of current topics including: 

 Updates on the OCR privacy, security, and breach 

notification audit program

 Patient and provider identity management, HIPAA 

requirements in cloud and mobile environments

 HIPAA rule changes affecting breach notification and 

HIPAA security

 Cybersecurity Framework for improving critical 

infrastructure cybersecurity

 Health IT activities at the National Cybersecurity Center 

of Excellence

 Methods for managing insider threat

 Tools available to manage security settings on end-user 

devices

The keynote address was delivered by Eric Dishman, Fellow 

and General Manager of the Health Strategy & Solutions Group 

at Intel.

In FY 2014, NIST plans to issue a 

draft revision to Special Publication 

(SP) 800-66, An Introductory 

Resource Guide for Implementing 

the HIPAA Security Rule. As part of 

its continued outreach efforts, NIST 

also plans to co-host the seventh 

annual Safeguarding Health 

Information conference with OCR.

http://www.nist.gov/healthcare/security/

Contact:

Mr. Kevin Stine

(301) 975-4483

kevin.stine@nist.gov

Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) for 

Information and Communications Technology 

(ICT) 

Federal agency information systems are increasingly at risk 

of both intentional and unintentional supply chain compromise. 

The management of ICT supply chain risk includes ensuring the 

integrity, security, and resilience of the supply chain and the 

products and services it delivers (Figure 4). Today’s ICT supply 

chains have increased complexity, diversity, and scale. Federal 

Government information systems have rapidly expanded in 

terms of capability and number, with an increased reliance on 

outsourcing and commercially available products. These trends 

have caused federal departments and agencies to have a lack 

of visibility and understanding of how acquired technology is 

developed, integrated, and deployed. Supply chain risks also 

affect the processes, procedures, and practices used to assure 

the integrity, security, resilience, and quality of products and 

services. This lack of visibility and understanding, in turn, 

has decreased federal departments’ and agencies’ control 

regarding decisions affecting the inherited supply chain risks 

and the ability to manage those risks.

Figure 4: The Four Elements of ICT SCRM

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 22

Figure 5: ICT Supply Chain Risk

The ICT SCRM project seeks to provide federal agencies with 

a toolkit of standardized, repeatable, and practical resources 

to strategically manage supply chain risk throughout the entire 

lifecycle of systems, products, and services.

In October 2012, NIST held a workshop with industry, 

academic, and government stakeholders to discuss:

 The fundamental underpinnings of ICT SCRM (terms, 

definitions, characterizations)

 Current and needed commercially reasonable ICT 

SCRM-related standards and practices (need, scope, and 

development approach)

 Current and needed ICT SCRM tools, technology, and 

techniques useful in securing the ICT supply chain

 Current and needed research and resources

NIST used input from the workshop and additional stakeholder 

forums to begin developing an initial public draft of NIST SP 

800-161, Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal 

Information Systems and Organizations, which is scheduled to 

be finalized in FY 2014. This document provides guidance to 

federal departments and agencies on identifying, assessing, 

and mitigating ICT supply chain risks at all levels in their 

organizations and utilizes and builds on existing guidance in 

the unified information security framework.

Additionally in FY 2013, a grant was awarded to the University 

of Maryland’s Supply Chain Management Center to support the 

development and hosting of a web application with the following 

capabilities:

 Enterprise Risk Assessments: A three-tier risk analysis 

system based on the ICT SCRM Community Framework 

Reference Architecture – A Strategic Assessment/

Organizational Readiness, Best Practices and Standards, 

and a composite network vulnerability map of physical 

and cyber hubs and nodes, with risk ratings

 Collaboration/Crowdsourcing Portal: User-documented 

ICT SCRM use/abuse cases and real-time polling about 

vulnerabilities and responses

 ICT SCRM Initiatives: A dynamic matrix of current 

industry and public sector ICT SCRM best practices, 

standards, and policy reform initiatives that can be 

updated by appropriate individuals from across industry, 

academia, and government

 ICT SCRM Digital Library: An online repository of policy 

and academic documents related to ICT SCRM

In FY 2014, CSD will continue its work to develop and 

publish draft NIST SP 800-161. It will research and develop 

tools and guidance to help agencies more effectively manage 

their ICT supply chain risk. Additionally, NIST will continue to 

co-chair Working Group 2 of the White House’s Comprehensive 

National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) 11, Develop a MultiPronged Approach for Global Supply Chain Risk Management,

and participate in national and international standards 

activities related to supply chain risk management. Feedback 

from organizations implementing ICT SCRM programs will 

be evaluated, and best practices will be accumulated. NIST 

will continue to engage stakeholders to identify needs and 

opportunities for providing additional guidance regarding 

identifying and implementing supply chain protections.

http://csrc.nist.gov/scrm/

ICT SCRM Team email: scrm-nist@nist.gov

Contacts:

Mr. Jon Boyens Ms. Celia Paulsen

Project Lead (301) 975-5549

(301) 975-5981 celia.paulsen@nist.gov

jon.boyens@nist.gov
23

Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network 

(NPSBN) Security

In February 2012, Congress passed the Middle Class Tax 

Relief and Job Creation Act. One portion of this legislation calls 

for the establishment of a nationwide, interoperable public 

safety broadband network based on Long-Term Evolution (LTE) 

technology. The network will be deployed and operated by 

the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet). The planned 

National Public Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN) will “create 

a much needed nationwide interoperable broadband network 

that will help police, firefighters, emergency medical service 

professionals and other public safety 

officials stay safe and do their jobs.” 

(http://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/

public-safety). NIST is directed to 

establish a list of certified devices and 

required components for interacting with 

the nationwide network by public safety 

officials, vendors, and other interested 

parties. NIST is directed to conduct 

research and development that supports 

the acceleration and advancement of the 

nationwide network.

In FY 2013, CSD supported the joint National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and NIST 

Public Safety Communications Research (PSCR) program 

(http://www.pscr.gov) efforts by developing and establishing 

security-related activities to support the proposed NPSBN. CSD 

presented details of the PSCR security-related activities at 

PSRC’s Annual Public Safety Broadband Stakeholder Conference 

in June 2013.

CSD provided comments and contributed text for the securityrelated aspects of the National Public Safety Telecommunications 

Council (NPSTC) Public Safety Broadband High-Level Launch 

Requirements, published in December 2012, that describe, in 

increasing levels of detail, the technical requirements of the 

NPSBN infrastructure, equipment, and communications.

CSD began participating in the standards development 

process for LTE technology within the 3rd Generation Partnership 

Project (3GPP) supporting public safety’s security requirements 

related to Proximity Services (ProSe) and Group Communication 

System Enablers (GCSE). In addition, CSD broadened its scope 

within the IETF to include efforts related to public safety.

In FY 2014, CSD will continue supporting NPSTC’s efforts 

related to NPSBN and to representing public safety in 

international standardization efforts, such as IETF and 3GPP. 

CSD will work to incorporate security capabilities into the 

PSCR’s Public Safety Broadband Demonstration Network 

located in Boulder, conduct research into identity management 

technologies for mobile devices that can support the NPSBN, 

and investigate ways to enhance the security of mobile 

applications used by the public safety community. CSD 

will continue to engage the public safety communications 

community by participating in events such as PSRC’s Annual 

Public Safety Broadband Stakeholder Conference.

Contacts:

Ms. Sheila Frankel Dr. Nelson Hastings

(301) 975-3297 (301) 975-5237

sheila.frankel@nist.gov nelson.hastings@nist.gov

Smart Grid Cybersecurity

Figure 6: Smart Meter

The major elements of the smart grid are the information 

technology, the industrial control systems, and the 

communications infrastructure used to send command 

information across the electric grid from generation to 

distribution systems, and to exchange usage and billing 

information between utilities and their customers. Key to the 

successful deployment of the smart grid infrastructure is 

the development of the cybersecurity strategy that includes 

cybersecurity as a design consideration for new and emerging 

systems, and an approach to adding cybersecurity into 

existing systems. The electric grid is critical to the economic 

and physical well-being of the nation, and emerging cyber 

threats targeting power systems highlight the need to integrate 

advanced security to protect critical assets.

In January 2013, the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) 

became a membership-supported organization. The SGIP 

Cybersecurity Working Group (CSWG) was renamed the Smart 

Grid Cybersecurity Committee (SGCC). All three of these groups 

have been led by a NIST representative since their respective 

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013 Image Source: http://www.pscr.gov/index.php
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 24

creations, originating with the Cybersecurity Coordination 

Task Group (CSCTG), created by NIST in support of the Energy 

Independence and Security Act of 2007. The SGIP SGCC includes 

additional leadership by a management team, comprised of 

three volunteer vice-chairs representing the Department of 

Energy (DOE), an electric utility, and a smart grid vendor, and a 

volunteer secretariat. 

During the past year, members of the CSWG/SGCC worked to 

revise NISTIR 7628, Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity, to 

address changes in technologies and implementations since the 

publication’s original release. The revision updates and expands the 

development strategy, cryptography and key management, privacy, 

vulnerability classes, research and development topics, standards 

review, and key power system use cases to reflect changes in the 

smart grid environment since 2010. The final version is expected to 

be posted in FY 2014.

In addition to the revision of NISTIR 7628, the CSWG/

SGCC has focused on specific topics such as cybersecurity 

risk management, security architecture, security testing and 

certification, Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) security, 

the development of a User’s Guide for NISTIR 7628, and cloud 

computing and privacy for the smart grid. Work in these areas 

is completed through SGCC subgroups, which are created and 

disbanded in order to meet present needs. The SGCC currently 

consist of the following subgroups:

 The Architecture subgroup continues to refine the 

smart grid cybersecurity architecture in coordination 

with the SGIP Smart Grid Architecture Committee on the 

European Union architecture harmonization effort.

 The Cloud Computing subgroup is addressing 

the unique cybersecurity issues of using and managing 

smart grid applications that utilize the cloud.

 The High-Level Requirements subgroup

maintains the high-level security requirements in NISTIR 

7628 and develops analyses between NISTIR 7628 and 

other documents, standards, and guidelines.

 The NISTIR 7628 User’s Guide subgroup is 

developing a User’s Guide for utilities and other entities 

involved in implementing smart grid systems can use 

to apply the NISTIR 7628; including the identification, 

risk assessment and selection of the applicable security 

requirements needed to secure their smart grid systems.

 The Privacy subgroup identifies and describes 

privacy risks and concerns within developed or emerging 

interoperability standards for the smart grid, and then 

determines the most appropriate and feasible practices 

for mitigating the risks. 

 The Standards subgroup assesses cybersecurity 

requirements associated with SGIP-identified smart grid 

standards and other documents for the SGIP Catalog of 

Standards (CoS). The subgroup has reviewed over 75 

documents to date.

An example of a SGCC deliverable in 2013 is the analysis 

of cybersecurity regulations relevant to electricity subsector 

stakeholders and of NIST security guidance. The analysis 

identifies the relationship, similarities, and differences among 

NISTIR 7628, SP 800-53, and the draft North American Electric 

Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection 

Standards (CIP) v5, recognizing that each document has a 

different scope and audience. 

The SGCC also supports the SGIP Catalog of Standards (CoS), 

a compendium of standards, practices, guidelines and other 

technical documents considered relevant for the development 

of a robust, secure, and interoperable smart grid. Through the 

ongoing efforts of the SGCC, these documents are reviewed for 

cybersecurity, and recommendations are made for how to include 

cybersecurity in future revisions and in the implementation 

of the standards. CSD supports the SGCC in assessing the 

security of cryptographic methods used in these standards, 

practices, guidelines, and other technical documents. In many 

cases, the standards bodies have taken the results of the 

reviews and modified the standards or documents to address 

our recommendations. The SGCC has worked closely with some 

of the standards bodies to ensure that the recommendations 

are interpreted correctly and that the mitigation strategies 

selected meet the intent of the NISTIR 7628 high-level 

security requirements. The result is cybersecurity “baked-in” 

to the standards rather than “bolted-on” after the standard is 

implemented. 

In FY 2014, CSD will continue to support the SGCC in the 

evaluation of the cryptographic methods used standards, 

practices, guidelines, and other technical documents for 

inclusion in the SGIP CoS.

Future activities include working with the SGIP Committees, 

Domain Expert Working Groups, and Priority Action Plans to 

integrate cybersecurity into their work efforts. The SGCC will 

establish a new subgroup to produce a cybersecurity risk 
25

management process case study to accompany the Department 

of Energy Risk Management Process guideline. Members of 

the committee will produce white papers on security defense 

in depth and breadth, unique cloud computing considerations 

for the smart grid, as well as a User’s Guide for NISTIR 7628. 

Additionally, the SGIP SCCC will continue to collaborate with 

industry, academia, other working groups, and government 

agencies to address the cybersecurity needs for the smart grid.

In addition to the SGIP SGCC activities, CSD will also 

coordinate with NIST’s Engineering Laboratory (EL) and Smart 

Grid Program Office on the development of a Cybersecurity 

Smart Grid Test Lab, part of the NIST Smart Grid Testbed Facility 

now under construction. CSD will also collaborate with ITL’s 

Software and Systems Division on cybersecurity research in 

relation to the IEEE 1588, Precision Time Protocol, a standard 

on time synchronization that is used for the electric grid and 

other special-purpose industrial automation and measurement 

networks.

http://www.sgip.org

Contacts:

Ms. Vicky Yan Pillitteri Ms. Tanya Brewer 

(301) 975-8542 (301) 975-4534

victoria.yan@nist.gov tbrewer@nist.gov

Mr. Quynh Dang

(301) 975-3610

qdang@nist.gov

Cybersecurity Awareness, Training, Education, 

and Outreach

aNational Initiative for Cybersecurity 

Education (NICE)

NIST has served as the lead for the National Initiative for 

Cybersecurity Education (NICE) since 2010. NICE is responsive 

to President Obama’s declaration that the “cyber threat is one 

of the most serious economic and national security challenges 

we face as a nation” and “America’s economic prosperity in the 

21st century will depend on cybersecurity.”

The goal of NICE is to enhance the overall cybersecurity 

posture of the United States by accelerating the availability of 

educational and training resources designed to improve the 

cyber behavior, skills, and knowledge of every segment of the 

population, enabling a safer cyberspace for all. NICE addresses 

this challenging goal by:

 Raising national awareness about risks in cyberspace

 Broadening the pool of individuals prepared to enter the 

cybersecurity workforce

 Cultivating a globally competitive cybersecurity 

workforce

This initiative comprises four component areas:

 National Cybersecurity Awareness

 Formal Cybersecurity Education

 Cybersecurity Workforce Structure

 Cybersecurity Workforce Training and Professional 

Development

CSD is home to the NIST NICE Leadership Team (NNLT) that 

focuses on the following activities:

 Developing planning documents and building consensus 

on the strategy and implementation activities of NICE

 Facilitating cross-functional cooperation among NICE 

component lead agencies

 Fostering communication between the component 

lead agencies by coordinating meetings, facilitating 

discussions, and disseminating information

 Promoting the initiative and its efforts by representing 

NICE and speaking at cybersecurity events nationwide

 Planning and hosting an annual workshop to promote 

and support the evolving issues in cybersecurity 

education

 Coordinating with other federal initiatives and efforts 

related to NICE

 Maintaining and updating the NICE website

In FY 2013, NIST stewarded the National Cybersecurity 

Workforce Framework (NCWF), developed within NICE’s 

Cybersecurity Workforce Training and Professional 

Development Component, through government-wide review. 

NIST also planned, organized and hosted the fourth annual NICE 

Workshop, “Navigating the National Cybersecurity Education 

Interstate Highway,” from September 17-19, 2013. The 

workshop highlighted cybersecurity awareness, education, 

and training programs that can be adopted, copied, used, or 

built-on by small businesses, educational institutions, industry, 

and government at the state, local, tribal and federal levels to 

advance the strategic goals of NICE.

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 26

The NNLT attended more than 100 events, symposia, forums, 

competitions, educational outreach meetings, and workshops 

to promote the activities within NICE. The NNLT worked with 

the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on the OPM CrossAgency Priority Goal: “Closing Skills Gap” for IT/Cybersecurity 

and on the OPM Special Cybersecurity Workforce Project focused 

on reducing cybersecurity workforce skills gaps. The project 

will allow agencies to identify and address their needs for 

cybersecurity skill sets to meet their missions. In accomplishing 

this project, agencies will also be updating their cybersecurity 

positions with codes that revise the definitions of and taxonomy 

used for cybersecurity work. In FY 2013, the NNLT supported 

DHS in the launch of the National Initiative for Cybersecurity 

Careers and Studies (NICCS), (http://niccs.us-cert.gov), an 

online resource for cybersecurity career, education, and training 

information. NICCS leverages efforts of government, industry, 

and academia to provide a comprehensive, single resource to 

address the nation’s cybersecurity knowledge needs. 

In FY 2014, NIST will continue to promote the coordination 

of existing and future cybersecurity education, training, and 

awareness activities while planning the transition of NICE 

leadership. NIST will also identify opportunities to extend and 

integrate NICE activities to raise cybersecurity awareness in the 

context of other sectors, and promote the NCWF as a resource 

to be used to identify workforce gaps, lead bi-weekly NICE 

component meetings, and continue to conduct broad outreach 

on the NICE program.

http://www.nist.gov/nice/

Contacts:

Dr. Ernest McDuffie Mr. Bill Newhouse

NICE Project Lead NICE Program Lead

(301) 975-8897 (301) 975-2869

ernest.mcduffie@nist.gov william.newhouse@nist.gov

aComputer Security Division Publications

During FY 2013, CSD continued its efforts to improve 

the quality of information about its publications on various 

NIST websites. CSD also explored new ways to make those 

publications available to CSD’s customers, who access CSD’s 

technical security publications in various ways: (1) directly from 

the CSRC website, (2) through the NIST Publications Portal, via 

Internet search or (3) direct links from digital content, or (4) 

from external information providers. By the end of FY 2013, CSD 

had more than 270 current publications in the NIST technical 

series (FIPS, Special Publications (SPs) and NISTIRs). 

Providing accurate metadata about publications improves 

users’ abilities to locate the information they are seeking. In FY 

2013, CSD cleaned up the NIST Publications Portal records and 

PDF metadata for all of its NIST technical series publications 

and for more than 100 journal articles and conference papers 

co-authored by CSD staff in recent years. By improving 

the metadata—such as title, authors, report numbers and 

keywords—within the PDFs themselves, Internet searches 

provide more informative results and make NIST’s security 

publications easier to find. CSD continues to apply those 

consistent metadata practices to all new publications. 

Additionally, CSD expanded the dissemination of its 

publications to the Association for Computing Machinery 

(ACM) Digital Library (DL). ACM DL now has a “collection” 

of NIST Computer Security Publications, which includes SP 

800-series publications. CSD initiated an internal project to 

test the feasibility of creating electronic book (e-book) editions 

of its FIPS, SPs and NISTIRs, to supplement the PDF editions 

currently available on CSRC. The aim is to provide a wider range 

of options for CSD customers to view and use CSD’s technical 

publications. The pilot project uses the EPUB file format, an open 

standard for e-books from the International Digital Publication 

Forum (IDPF). CSD intends to begin posting EPUB versions of 

selected publications in FY 2014, which will especially benefit 

users of mobile devices. 
27

In FY 2014, CSD intends to explore more ways to improve 

the consistency of its publications and associated metadata, 

enhance users’ ability to browse and search publications on 

CSRC, make more e-book editions available, and expand 

publication availability on external sites.

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/

Contact:

Mr. Jim Foti

(301) 975-8018

jfoti@nist.gov

aComputer Security Resource Center 

(CSRC)

The Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC), CSD’s 

website, is one of the most visited websites at NIST. CSRC 

encourages broad sharing of information security tools 

and practices, provides a resource for information security 

standards and guidelines, and identifies and links key security 

web resources to support industry and government users. CSRC 

is an integral component of all of the work that CSD conducts 

and produces. It is CSD’s repository for anyone wanting to 

access these documents and other valuable security-related 

information. During FY 2013, CSRC had more than 53 million 

page views and downloads.

Figure 7: Total Number of CSRC Website Requests for 2013 

(Oct. 1, 2012 to Sept. 30, 2013)

CSRC is the primary gateway for gaining access to NIST 

computer security publications, standards, and guidelines, 

and serves as a vital link to CSD’s customers. Publications are 

organized to help users locate relevant information quickly and 

are arranged by topic, relevant security control family, and legal 

requirements.

During FY 2013, the top ten most downloaded publications 

were:

1. SP 800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for 

Federal Information Systems and Organizations

2. SP 800-12, An Introduction to Computer Security: The 

NIST Handbook

3. FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic 

Modules

4. FIPS 201-2, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal 

Employees and Contractors

5. SP 800-100, Information Security Handbook: A Guide for 

Managers

6. SP 800-30, Revision 1, Guide for Conducting Risk 

Assessments

7. SP 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management: Part 

1: General

8. SP 800-53, Revision 3, Recommended Security Controls 

for Federal Information Systems and Organizations

9. NISTIR 7916, Proceedings of the Cybersecurity in CyberPhysical Systems Workshop, April 23-24, 2012

10.SP 800-123, Guide to General Server Security

In the FIPS publication series, the top three most downloaded 

FIPS were:

1. FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic 

Modules

2. FIPS 201-2, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal 

Employees and Contractors

3. FIPS 197, Advanced Encryption Standard

In the SP publication series, the top three most downloaded 

SPs were:

1. SP 800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for 

Federal Information Systems and Organizations

2. SP 800-12, An Introduction to Computer Security: The 

NIST Handbook

3. SP 800-100, Information Security Handbook: A Guide for 

Managers

CSRC

CSRC CSRC CSRC

Millions

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 28

In the NISTIR publication series, the top three most 

downloaded NISTIRs were:

1. NISTIR 7916, Proceedings of the Cybersecurity in CyberPhysical Systems Workshop, April 23-24, 2012

2. NISTIR 7250, Cell Phone Forensic Tools: An Overview and 

Analysis

3. NISTIR 7896, Third-Round Report of the SHA-3 

Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition

In addition to CSRC, CSD maintains a publication 

announcement mailing list. This free email list notifies 

subscribers about publications that have been posted to the 

CSRC website. The email list is a valuable tool for more than 

28,000 subscribers from the Federal Government, industry, 

academia, and individuals with a personal interest in IT security. 

Individuals who are interested in subscribing to this list should 

visit http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/subscribe.html for more 

information.

Questions on the website should be sent to the CSRC Webmaster at: 

webmaster-csrc@nist.gov.

Contacts:

Mr. Patrick O’Reilly Ms. Judy Barnard

(301) 975-4751 (301) 975-5502

patrick.oreilly@nist.gov jbarnard@nist.gov

aFederal Computer Security Program 

Managers’ Forum

The Federal Computer Security Program Managers’ Forum is 

sponsored by NIST to promote the sharing of security-related 

information among federal agencies. The Forum, which serves 

more than 1,100 members, strives to provide an ongoing 

opportunity for managers of federal information security 

programs to exchange information security materials in a timely 

manner, build upon the experiences of other programs, and 

reduce possible duplication of effort. It provides a mechanism 

for NIST to share information directly with federal agency 

information security program managers in fulfillment of NIST’s 

leadership mandate under FISMA. It assists NIST in establishing 

and maintaining relationships with other individuals or 

organizations that are actively addressing information security 

issues within the Federal Government. NIST serves as the 

Secretariat of the Forum, providing necessary administrative 

and logistical support. Kevin Stine serves as the Chairperson.

The Forum maintains an extensive email subscription 

service. Participation in the service is only open to Federal 

Government employees who participate in the management of 

their organization’s information system security program. There 

are no membership dues. The Forum also holds bimonthly 

meetings and an annual 2-day conference to discuss current 

issues and developments of interest to those responsible for 

protecting sensitive (unclassified) federal systems. Participation 

in Forum meetings is open to Federal Government employees, 

and their designated support contractors, who participate in 

the management of their organization’s information security 

program. 

Topics of discussion at Forum meetings in FY 2013 included 

briefings from various federal agencies on Preparing for 

and Responding to Certification Authority Compromise and 

Fraudulent Certificate Issuance; Software Assurance: Enabling 

Security throughout the Software Development Lifecycle; Use 

of Cybersecurity Function Code; Census Risk Management 

Program Implementation; National Cybersecurity Center of 

Excellence (NCCoE); demonstration of Trusted Geolocation in 

the Cloud; and Policy Machine: Enabling an Enterprise-wide, 

Data Centric Computing Environment.

This year’s annual 2-day offsite meeting featured updates on 

the computer security activities of the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO), General Services Administration (GSA), Bureau of 

the Fiscal Service, and NIST. Recent administration guidance 

directing federal agencies to reduce travel and conference 

budgets significantly reduced attendance. Technical sessions 

included briefings on evolving cybersecurity strategies, IT 

security concerns during a consolidation (merger), supply chain 

risk management activities, the National Vulnerability Database 

(NVD), SP 800-53 Revision 4, continuous monitoring, industrial 

control systems security, and EO 13636.

On August 8, 2013, a Cybersecurity and Risk Management 

Training Workshop was held at the Department of Commerce 

with over 500 registrants. Attendees gained a greater 

understanding of the Risk Management Framework (RMF) and 

its practical application. Dr. Ron Ross discussed SP 800-53 

Revision 4 and the fundamentals of continuous monitoring. Two 

afternoon panels discussed case studies regarding RMF and 

“ongoing authorization.”

The Forum plays a valuable role in helping NIST and other 

federal agencies to develop and maintain a strong, proactive 

stance in the identification and resolution of new strategic 

and tactical IT security issues as they emerge. The number 

of members on the email list has grown steadily and provides 

a valuable resource for federal security program managers. 

To join, email your name, affiliation, address, phone number, 

title, and confirmation that you are a federal employee to 

sec-forum@nist.gov.
29

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/

Contacts:

Mr. Kevin Stine Ms. Peggy Himes

Chair Administration

(301) 975-4483 (301) 975-2489

kevin.stine@nist.gov peggy.himes@nist.gov

aFederal Information Systems Security 

Educators’ Association (FISSEA)

The Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ 

Association (FISSEA), founded in 1987, is an organization run 

by and for information systems security professionals to assist 

federal agencies in meeting their information systems security 

awareness, training, and education responsibilities. FISSEA 

strives to elevate the general level of information systems 

security knowledge for the Federal Government and the federal 

workforce. It also seeks to assist the professional development 

of its members.

FISSEA membership is open to information systems security 

professionals, professional trainers and educators, and 

managers responsible for information systems security training 

programs in federal agencies, as well as contractors of these 

agencies and faculty members of accredited educational 

institutions who are involved in information security training 

and education. There are no membership fees to join FISSEA; all 

that is required is a willingness to share products, information, 

and experiences. A working group meets monthly to administer 

business activities

FISSEA maintains a website, a mailing list, and participates 

in a social networking site as a means of communication for its 

members. NIST assists FISSEA with its operations by providing 

staff support for several of its activities and by being FISSEA’s 

host agency.

FISSEA membership in 2013 spanned federal agencies, 

industry, military, contractors, state governments, academia, the 

press, and foreign organizations to reach over 1,395 members 

in a total of ten countries. The 700 federal agency members 

represent 89 agencies from the executive and legislative 

branches of government.

The 26th Annual FISSEA Conference occurred March 19-21, 

2013, at NIST. Approximately 140 information systems security 

professionals and trainers attended from federal agencies, 

academia, as well as industry representatives from firms that 

support federal information systems and security programs. 

Recent government sequestration efforts prevented some from 

receiving permission to attend, which had a noticeable effect 

on attendance. NIST’s Pat Toth and Peggy Himes, as well as 

Gretchen Morris, Susan Hansche, and other members of the 

FISSEA Technical Working Group, were integral to the effort to 

support the conference.

This year’s theme was, “Making Connections in Cybersecurity 

and Information Security Education,” to solicit presentations 

that reflect current projects, trends, and initiatives that provide 

for future solutions in federal security programs. Attendees 

gained new techniques for developing/conducting training, 

cost-effective practices, workforce development, free resources 

and contacts, as well as an update on NICE activities.

NIST ITL Computer Security Division Deputy Chief, Matthew 

Scholl, welcomed attendees. Keynote presentations were 

given by John J. Suess, VP of IT & CIO, University of Maryland, 

Baltimore County; Bryant Tow, Vice President, InfraGard National 

Members Alliance; and Lamont Hames, Chief Development 

Officer, UNCF Special Programs Corporation. Mr. Hames 

presented on Expanding the Role of Minorities in Cyber Security.

Presenters represented NIST, DHS, DOS, DOE, NSA and the 

Library of Congress as well as private industry and academia. 

Conference attendees had the opportunity to visit vendors, 

receive a government best practice poster, and attend a 

demonstration session, which provided an opportunity for 

agencies to share about their specific awareness and training 

programs.

Traditional FISSEA conference events included announcing 

the winners of FISSEA contests and awarding prize drawings. 

Susan Hansche, Avaya Gov/U.S. Department of State, presented 

the FISSEA Educator of the Year plaque to Mr. J. Paul Wahnish, 

Career Technical Education Foundation, Inc., for his work in 

preparing the future workforce. The FISSEA Security Awareness, 

Training & Education Contest includes five categories from 

one of FISSEA’s three key areas of Awareness, Training, and 

Education. The winner is selected from each category and 

awarded a certificate. The categories include: (1) awareness 

poster, (2) motivational item (e.g., pens, stress relief items, 

t-shirts), (3) awareness website, (4) awareness newsletter, and 

(5) role-based training & education.

The winners of the 2013 FISSEA Awareness, Training, and 

Education Contest are:

 Poster Winner: Alexis Benjamin – Department of State, 

Office of Computer Security

 Website Winner: Sara Fitzgerald and Kimberly Conway – 

Food & Drug Administration (FDA)

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 30

 Motivational Item Winner: Jennie Blizzard, Shannon 

Jones, and Shirley Clement – Federal Reserve Bank

 Newsletter Winner: Deborah Coleman – Department of 

Education, Office of the Chief Information Officer

 Role-Based Training Winner: DISA, SAIC, and Carney, Inc. 

(submitted by Carmina Carper)

Conference attendees selected their Peer’s Choice Awards, 

and they are...

 Poster Winner: Deborah Coleman – Department of 

Education, Office of the Chief Information Officer

 Website Winner: Deborah Coleman – Department of 

Education, Office of the Chief Information Officer

 Motivational Item Winner: Chrisan Herrod – University of 

Maryland University College

 Newsletter Winner: Sara Fitzgerald and Kimberly Conway 

– Food & Drug Administration (FDA)

 Role-Based Training Winner: Sara Fitzgerald and 

Kimberly Conway – Food & Drug Administration (FDA)

New this year was the Pecha Kucha session on the third day. 

During Pecha Kucha (Lightning Round) speakers had 6 minutes 

40 seconds to present a limited number of slides (20 slides at 

most), and only 20 seconds per slide. The presentation method 

is challenging for the speaker and enjoyable for audience 

members. There were four participants and their fast-paced 

talks proved to be lively and entertaining.

Attendee networking is a valuable benefit of attending 

the FISSEA conference. The conference continues to be a 

valuable forum in which individuals from government, industry, 

and academia who are involved with information systems/

cybersecurity workforce development (awareness, training, 

education, certification, and professionalization) learn of 

ongoing and planned training and education programs and 

initiatives. It provides NIST the opportunity to provide assistance 

to departments and agencies as they work to meet their FISMA 

responsibilities. 

The 2014 FISSEA conference is planned for March 18-20, 

2014, at NIST.

http://csrc.nist.gov/fissea

fisseamembership@nist.gov

Contacts:

Ms. Patricia Toth Ms. Peggy Himes

(301) 975-5140 (301) 975-2489

patricia.toth@nist.gov peggy.himes@nist.gov

aInformation Security and Privacy 

Advisory Board (ISPAB)

The ISPAB was originally created by the Computer Security 

Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-235) as the Computer System Security 

and Privacy Advisory Board, and amended by Public Law 

107-347, The E-Government Act of 2002, Title III, The Federal 

Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002. The 

statutory objectives of the Board include identifying emerging 

managerial, technical, administrative, and physical safeguard 

issues relative to information security and privacy.

In drafting the Computer Security Act of 1987, which 

created this Advisory Board, the Congress saw a need for an 

independent, non-federally dominated group of computer 

security experts to offer its advice to senior government officials 

on emerging computer security areas. The Board members, 

with their individual and collective skills, responsibilities, and 

experiences fulfill this requirement. No other similar group of 

experts meets regularly to review information security issues 

involved in unclassified Federal Government computer systems 

and networks. Also, Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002 

reaffirmed the need for this Board by giving it additional 

responsibilities.

The ISPAB’s statutory purpose is to advise the Secretary of 

Commerce, the Director of the NIST, and the Director of the 

OMB on information security and privacy related issues. Title III 

of the E-Government Act of 2002 also mandated the Board to 

thoroughly review all of the proposed information technology 

standards and guidelines developed under Section 20 of the 

National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 

278g-3) as amended. 

The charter (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/

documents/ispab_charter-2012-2014.pdf) defines that the 

Board’s membership should consist of 12 members and 

a Chairperson. The Secretary of Commerce appoints the 

Chairperson, and the Board members are selected for their 

preeminence in the information technology industry or related 

disciplines. The term of office for each board member is four 

years.

The Board is comprised of members from a broad range of 

interested parties. There are three main categories and each 

category has four members. Category 1 includes members 

from outside the Federal Government eminent in the information 

technology industry, at least one of whom is representative of 

small or medium-sized companies in such industries. Category 2 

also includes members from outside the Federal Government and 

not employed by or representative of a producer of information 

but are eminent in the field of information technology, or related 

disciplines. Category 3 includes experienced information 

system managers from the Federal Government, including 
31

those with experience in information security and privacy, 

at least one of whom should be from the National Security 

Agency. Federal members bring a detailed understanding of 

the federal processing environment; industry brings concerns 

and experiences regarding product development and market 

formation, while private computer security experts are able to 

bring their experiences of commercial cost-effective security 

measures into Board discussion.

In October 2012, Matt Thomlinson agreed to assume the 

responsibilities of Chairperson from Dan Chenok. The Board 

expressed its gratitude to Dan Chenok for his leadership and 

contributions to ISPAB both as a member and Chair since 2005. 

Presently, ISPAB has nine members and a Chairperson. The 

ISPAB Board members are:

 Matthew Thomlinson, (Chair), Microsoft

 Daniel Chenok (Chair – Retired from the Board in October 

2012), IBM Center for The Business of Government

 Julie Boughn, Center for Medicare and Medicaid 

Innovation, Department of Human Health and Services, 

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (DHHS/CMS)

 Christopher Boyer, AT&T

 John Centafont, National Security Agency (NSA)

 Kevin Fu, The University of Michigan

 Gregory Garcia, Garcia Cyber Partners

 Brian Gouker, NSA - U.S. Army War College 

 Toby Levin, Retired

 Edward Roback, U.S. Department of Treasury

 Phyllis Schneck, (Retired from the Board in September 

2013), McAfee, Inc.

 Gale Stone, Social Security Administration

 Peter Weinberger, Google, Inc.

From Left to Right: Tatiana Laszczak, Chris Boyer, Annie Sokol, Ed Roback, Greg Garcia, Matt Thomlinson (Chair), Peter Weinberger, John Centafont, 

Toby Levin, Matt Scholl, Gale Stone.Not Present for photo: Julie Boughn

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 32

During FY 2013, ISPAB held three meetings, all held in 

Washington D.C:

 October 10-12, 2012

 February 13-15, 2013

 June 12-14, 2013

It is of particular interest to mention ISPAB’s involvement 

with the EO Cybersecurity Framework and that prior to opening 

the ISPAB meeting on February 15, 2013, the Board attended 

the presentation of cybersecurity policy discussion and launch 

of the Executive Order (EO) to improve the Cybersecurity 

of the U.S.’s critical infrastructure at the U.S. Department of 

Commerce. The President signed the EO and also approved the 

presidential directive to improve the security and resilience of 

critical infrastructure in both the cyber and physical realms. 

Dr. Patrick Gallagher, Under Secretary of Commerce for 

Standards and Technology and NIST Director, provided the 

opening remarks on the EO. A group of distinguished panelists 

presented more information:

 Andy Ozment, Senior Director of Cybersecurity, Executive 

Office of the President

 Samara Moore, Cyber Director for Critical Infrastructure, 

Executive Office of the President

 Adam Sedgewick, Senior Information Technology Policy 

Advisor, National Institute of Standards and Technology

 Bruce McConnell, Senior Counselor for Cybersecurity, 

Department of Homeland Security

 Ari Schwartz, Internet Policy Advisor, National Institute of 

Standards and Technology

 Jenny Menna, Director, Stakeholder Engagement and 

Cyber Infrastructure Resilience Division, Department of 

Homeland Security

ISPAB meeting agendas are established based on the Board’s 

list of emerging issues developed from previous meetings. The 

meeting agenda topics also include non-work list items that 

are of immediate security and privacy concerns to the Board. 

During FY 2013, the Board provided guidance on many issues 

relating to security and privacy such as:

 Security and Privacy Controls

 Digital and Mobile Security

 FISMA as privacy appendix on SP 800-53, metrics, 

FISMA review, reduction of reporting

 A130 Appendix A

 GAO Reports: Security and Privacy

 Medical Device Security

 Cybersecurity – Education, Training, Awareness

 Cross-Agency Priority (CAP) Goals

 Cloud Computing and Security Challenges

 Exploring the Future of Privacy for Federal IT

 IT System Performance

 Supply Chain and Risk Management

 SEC Security Breach Notification

The presenters at every Board meeting were leaders and 

experts from private industries, academia, federal agency CIOs, 

IGs and CISOs. 

Copies of the current list of members and their bios, the 

Board’s charter and past Board activities can be located at 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab. Information on ISPAB 

Meetings is published in Federal Register Notice at least 16 

days prior to the meeting. Those interested in receiving meeting 

notices may email name, affiliation, and address to:

Contact:

Ms. Annie Sokol

DFO, ISPAB

(301) 975-2006

annie.sokol@nist.gov
33

aSmall and Medium Size Business (SMB) 

Outreach

Small business owners 

face a broad range of 

information security 

issues. A computer 

failure or system breach 

could jeopardize the 

company’s reputation and may result in significant damage 

and recovery cost or going out of business. The small business 

owner who recognizes the threat of computer crime and takes 

steps to deter inappropriate activities is less likely to become 

a victim.

The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) reports that 

over 27 million U.S. companies - more than 99 percent of all 

U.S. businesses - are SMBs of 500 employees or fewer (http://

www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/allprofiles12.pdf). While the 

threats to individual SMBs may not be significantly different 

from those facing larger organizations, a SMB frequently has 

fewer resources available to protect systems, detect attacks, 

or respond to security issues. A vulnerability common to a 

large percentage of SMBs could pose a threat to the nation’s 

information infrastructure and economic base.

To help address information security risk, these businesses 

require assistance with identification of security mechanisms 

and with practical, cost-effective training. Training helps SMB’s 

use their limited resources most effectively to address relevant 

and serious threats. In response to this need, NIST, the SBA, and 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) co-sponsor a series 

of cyber security training workshops for small businesses. 

These workshops provide an overview of cyber security 

threats, vulnerabilities, and corresponding protective tools and 

techniques, with a special emphasis on information that small 

business personnel can apply directly.

In FY 2013, the SMB outreach team provided 15 workshops 

in 15 cities: Toledo, Ohio; Burlington, Vermont; Portland, Maine; 

Providence, Rhode Island; Lexington, Kentucky; Louisville, 

Kentucky; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Cleveland, Ohio; Detroit, 

Michigan; Portland, Oregon; Little Rock, Arkansas; Shreveport, 

Louisiana; Alexandria, Louisiana; Ruston, Louisiana; and 

Monroe, Louisiana.

In collaboration with the SBA and the FBI, CSD is planning 

locations for small business cyber security workshops in FY 

2014.

http://sbc.nist.gov

Contact:

Mr. Richard Kissel

(301) 975-5017

richard.kissel@nist.gov

 Cryptographic Technology

aCryptographic Standards Program

Hash Algorithms and the Secure Hash Algorithm 

(SHA-3) Standard (Draft FIPS 202)

In response to vulnerabilities discovered in 2005 in the 

NIST-approved, government hash algorithm standard, SHA-1, 

NIST opened a public competition in 2007 to develop a new 

cryptographic hash algorithm, SHA-3, to augment the hash 

algorithms specified in FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard. 

After 64 entries, 3 rounds of the competition, and 5 years of 

intensive analysis, provided mostly by the world cryptographic 

community, NIST announced the selection of Keccak as the

winning algorithm on October 2, 2012, and summarized its 

decision in NISTIRs after each round.

After the competition had ended, NIST invited the winning 

team to NIST in February 2013, and hosted a 2-day workshop to 

discuss the Keccak features and options for standardization as

the new SHA-3 hash standard. CSD developed a standardization 

plan and shared with the Keccak designers and subsequently

with the cryptographic community at the 2013 RSA Conference, 

the 2013 Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded 

Systems (CHES), and at the IETF 86 and 87 Workshops. In 

addition, this standardization plan was posted at the NIST hash 

website for public comment.

A draft of the SHA-3 Permutation-based Hash Standard (Draft 

FIPS 202) is being finalized, and NIST is preparing a Federal 

Register Notice to announce this draft standard. NIST expects 

to release the draft standard during FY 2014 and plans a 60-day 

public comment period. After the comment period closes, NIST 

will analyze the comments, make changes to the document, as 

appropriate, and propose the draft standard to the Secretary 

of Commerce for approval as a FIPS. In addition to publishing 

FIPS 202 in FY 2014, NIST is also considering standardizing a 

generic “tree hashing” mode and other Keccak features. NIST

plans to host a workshop in FY 2014 to discuss these options.

Information about the SHA-3 competition and 

the SHA-3 standardization effort is available at 

http://www.nist.gov/hash-competition.

Contact:

Ms. Shu-jen Chang

(301) 975-2940

shu-jen.chang@nist.gov

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 34

Hash Algorithm Standards and Security Guidelines

CSD’s Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG) is responsible 

for the maintenance and development of the FIPS 180-4, 

Secure Hash Standard (SHS). A hash algorithm processes a 

message, which can be very large, and produces a condensed 

representation, called a message digest. A cryptographic hash 

algorithm is a fundamental component of many cryptographic 

functions, such as digital signature algorithms, key derivation 

functions, keyed-hash message authentication codes, and 

random number generators. Cryptographic hash algorithms 

are frequently used in Internet protocols and other security 

applications.

FIPS 180-4 specifies seven hash algorithms: SHA-1, SHA-224, 

SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256. 

Their security properties in different cryptographic applications 

are discussed in SP 800-107, Revision 1, Recommendation for 

Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms.

CSD authored an article, “Changes in Federal Information 

Processing Standard (FIPS) 180-4, Secure Hash Standard,” 

which was published in the January 2013 issue of the journal 

Cryptologia. The article describes the rationale behind the 

standardization of the SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256 hash 

algorithms in FIPS 180-4 and the performance advantage of 

these two hash algorithms over the SHA-224 and SHA-256 hash 

algorithms. This article was written to help the adoption of the 

two new hash algorithms in security protocols and applications 

to improve performance.

Contacts:

Mr. Quynh Dang Ms. Elaine Barker

(301) 975-3610 (301) 975-2911

quynh.dang@nist.gov elaine.barker@nist.gov

Transport Layer Security (TLS)

SP 800-52, Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, 

and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations, 

provides recommendations regarding TLS server and client 

implementations. TLS is a widely used cryptographic protocol 

that provides communication security for a variety of network 

applications, such as email, e-commerce, and healthcare.

The first version of SP 800-52, published in 2005, was 

withdrawn in March 2013. A draft of SP 800-52 Revision 1 

was issued for public review and comment in September 

2013. The revision is a substantially different document than 

the original and includes recommendations providing higher 

levels of security, both for TLS and aspects of the Public Key 

Infrastructure (PKI) that TLS relies on. New recommendations 

include the support of TLS versions 1.1 and 1.2, guidance on 

certificate profiles and validation methods, TLS extensions, and 

support for a greater variety of cryptographic algorithms.

The final version of SP 800-52 Revision 1 will be published 

in FY 2014.

Contacts:

Dr. Kerry McKay Dr. Lily Chen

(301) 975-4969 (301) 975-6974

kerry.mckay@nist.gov lily.chen@nist.gov

Random Number Generation (RNG)

Random numbers provide the required security for many 

cryptographic algorithms. For example, random numbers are 

used to generate the keys needed for encryption and digital 

signature applications.

In the late 1990s, a project to develop more rigorous 

requirements and specifications for random number generation 

(RNG) was initiated in coordination with the American National 

Standards Institute’s (ANSI) Accredited Standards Committee 

(ASC) X9. The resulting standard (X9.82) contains four parts: 

Part 1 provides general information; Part 2, which is nearing 

completion, will provide requirements for entropy sources; 

Part 3 provides specifications for deterministic random bit 

generator (DRBG) mechanisms; and Part 4 provides guidance 

on constructing random bit generators (RBGs) from entropy 

sources and DRBG mechanisms.

In March 2007, NIST published SP 800-90, Recommendation 

for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random 

Bit Generators, which contained the DRBG mechanisms in 

Part 3 of ANS X9.82, plus an additional DRBG mechanism. This 

recommendation was revised as SP 800-90A, Recommendation 

for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit 

Generators, in January 2012 to include additional capabilities 

identified during the development of Part 4 of ANS X9.82. 

Two additional documents (SP 800-90B, Recommendation for 

the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation and SP 

800-90C, Recommendation for Random Bit Generator (RBG) 

Constructions) are under development and are available for 

public comment. SP 800-90B addresses the development 

and testing of entropy sources, including descriptions of the 

validation tests for NIST’s Cryptographic Algorithm Validation 

Program to validate candidate entropy sources. SP 800-90C 

provides basic guidance on the construction of RBGs from 

entropy sources and DRBG mechanisms.

CSD held a workshop in December 2012 to discuss the drafts 

of SP 800-90B and C, after which NIST began the adjudication 

of the comments received during the public comment period 

and the workshop.
35

In September 2013, articles from major news organizations 

based on leaked classified documents raised public concern 

that one of the DRBGs specified in SP 800-90A, the Dual_EC_

DRBG, could contain a backdoor. This could allow attackers to 

successfully predict the secret cryptographic keys that form the 

foundation for the assurances provided by security products. 

Taking these concerns seriously, NIST assured the community 

of its commitment to producing strong cryptographic standards, 

and took immediate steps to examine and remediate the issue.

Shortly after these concerns were raised, CSD published 

an ITL Bulletin that provided a high-level discussion of the 

issues, reopened the SP 800-90 series of publications for 

public comment, and recommended that the Dual_EC_DRBG no 

longer be used, pending the resolution of the comments. Since 

that time, NIST has released a revised draft of SP 800-90A that 

removes the questioned algorithm and addresses other issues 

that were identified in the public comment process. NIST 

intends to finalize the revised SP800-90A publication in FY14.

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Mr. John Kelsey

(301) 975-2911 (301) 975-5101

elaine.barker@nist.gov john.kelsey@nist.gov

Key Management

NIST continues to provide guidelines on cryptographic key 

management for the Federal Government, and to coordinate 

with other national and international organizations, industry, 

and academia. The guidelines are available at http://csrc.nist.

gov/publications.

SP 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment 

Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, specifies 

approved methods for key establishment using Diffie-Hellman 

and Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (MQV) schemes. This document was 

first published in 2006 and was revised in May 2013 to provide 

further clarification and additional methods for key derivation. 

SP 800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment 

Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, was first 

published in August 2009. It is under revision to provide further 

clarification and additional methods for key derivation; these 

changes are consistent with those made in SP 800-56A. The 

revision of SP 800-56B will be available for public comment in 

FY 2014.

SP 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management, Part 3: 

Application-Specific Key Management Guidance, was first 

published in 2009. A revision of this document has been under 

development. The revision will include an additional section on 

the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol and the removal of the Transport 

Layer Security (TLS) section, which is now being addressed in SP 

800-52, Revision 1, Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, 

and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations. The 

revised SP 800-57, Part 3 will be available for public comment 

in FY 2014.

SP 800-130, A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key 

Management Systems, was completed in August 2013 and 

provides guidance on a Cryptographic Key Management System 

(CKMS) framework.

SP 800-152, A Profile for U.S. Federal Cryptographic Key 

Management Systems (CKMS), is under development. This 

document is intended to provide refinements of the framework 

requirements in SP 800-130 that are appropriate for use in a 

CKMS employed by the Federal Government, plus guidance on 

its implementation, procurement, installation, configuration, 

and operation. This document will be available for public 

comment in early FY 2014.

A new publication will provide guidance on the security 

strength of a cryptographic key that is used to protect data 

(i.e., a data-protection key), given the manner in which the key 

was generated and handled prior to its use to protect the target 

data. This document, SP 800-158, Key Management: Obtaining 

a Targeted Security Strength, involves a considerable amount 

of new research, since it is an area that has not been fully 

addressed to date. This publication will be available for public 

comment in FY 2014.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/key_mgmt/

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Dr. Dustin Moody

(301) 975-2911 (301) 975-8136

elaine.barker@nist.gov dustin.moody@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen Mr. Ray Perlner

(301) 975-6974 (301) 975-3357

lily.chen@nist.gov ray.perlner@nist.gov

Mr. Quynh Dang

(301) 975-3610

quynh.dang@nist.gov

Digital Signatures

FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), specifies 

three techniques for the generation and verification of digital 

signatures that can be used for the protection of data: the Digital 

Signature Algorithm (DSA), the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 

Algorithm (ECDSA), and the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) 

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 36

algorithm. A digital signature is represented in a computer as 

a string of bits and is computed using a set of rules and a set 

of parameters that allow the identity of the signatory and the 

integrity of the data to be verified.

FIPS 186, first published in 1994, has been revised several 

times since then. In FY 2013, the Secretary of Commerce 

approved the latest version of the standard, FIPS 186-4.

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Dr. Allen Roginsky

(301) 975-2911 (301) 975-3603

elaine.barker@nist.gov allen.roginsky@nist.gov

Block Cipher Modes of Operation

The engine for many of the techniques in NIST’s cryptographic 

toolkit is a block cipher algorithm, such as the Advanced 

Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm or the Triple Data 

Encryption Algorithm (TDEA). A block cipher transforms some 

fixed-length binary data (i.e., a “block”) into seemingly random 

data of the same length. The transformation is determined by 

the choice of some secret data called the “key.” The key can 

also be used to recover the original block of data. 

A method of using the block cipher to protect one or more 

blocks of data is called a block cipher mode of operation. 

The approved modes are specified in the SP 800-38 series. 

Each approved mode provides data confidentiality and/or 

authenticity/integrity.

In December 2012, NIST approved block cipher modes for 

key wrapping (i.e., the protection of the confidentiality and 

integrity of cryptographic keys). In particular, SP 800-38F, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods 

for Key Wrapping, identifies existing methods that are approved 

for key wrapping, and also specifies three deterministic 

authenticated-encryption modes: the AES Key Wrap (KW) mode, 

the AES Key Wrap with Padding (KWP) mode, and one TDEA 

mode, called TKW.

Block cipher modes can also provide format-preserving 

encryption (FPE). A format can be a sequence of decimal digits, 

such as a credit card number or a social security number; 

formats can also be defined for other sets of characters besides 

decimal digits. FPE is expected to be very useful because this 

property facilitates the retrofitting of encryption to existing 

applications.

NIST proposed the approval of three block cipher modes for 

FPE in Draft SP 800-38G, Recommendation for Block Cipher 

Modes of Operation: Methods for Format-Preserving Encryption, 

which was released for a 60-day period of public comment 

in July 2013. This publication specifies three schemes for 

FPE: FF1, FF2, and FF3. These schemes were submitted for 

NIST’s consideration in recent years under the names FFXbase, VAES3, and BPS; the original submission documents 

are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/

modes_development.html, in the FFX and BPS entries under 

the heading “Encryption Modes.”

Contact:

Dr. Morris Dworkin

(301) 975-2354

morris.dworkin@nist.gov

aCryptographic Research

Post-Quantum Cryptography

In FY 2013, NIST researchers Stephen Jordan, Yi-Kai Liu, 

Dustin Moody, Ray Perlner, and Daniel Smith-Tone internally 

presented status reports in the areas of quantum computation, 

coding-based cryptography, lattice-based cryptography, and 

multivariate cryptography, which included detailed surveys of 

the respective fields, as well as security overviews and specific 

results. The project members also created evaluation criteria to 

compare proposed post quantum cryptosystems with the end 

goal of standardization. 

NIST also engaged the international cryptographic community 

with presentations and publications. Daniel Smith-Tone and 

Ray Perlner presented a paper at PQCrypto 2013, in addition to 

Dr. Smith-Tone speaking at the Joint Romanian Mathematical 

Society, and the Quantum Cryptanalysis Seminar in Schloss 

Dagstuhl, Germany. Yi-Kai Liu presented his research at QCrypt 

2013, as well as giving a talk at the European Telecommunication 

Standard Institute (ETSI) Quantum-safe Crypto Workshop. Lily 

Chen also spoke at the ETSI Quantum-safe Crypto Workshop. 

Stephen Jordan delivered a keynote address at the 16th 

Workshop on Quantum Information Processing on a paper that 

was published in Science magazine. In FY 2013, Dr. Jordan also 

spoke about research at the Institute for Quantum Information 

and Matter, the Hughes Research Laboratory, and the Lorentz 

Center, as well as submitting some research papers for 

publication.

In FY 2014, NIST will continue to explore the security capacity 

of purported quantum-resistant technologies with the ultimate 

goal of uncovering the fundamental mechanisms necessary for 

efficient, trustworthy, and cost-effective information assurance 

in the post-quantum market. Upon the successful completion 

of this phase of the project, NIST will be prepared for possible 

standardization efforts in this area. NIST will consider hosting 
37

a workshop on post-quantum cryptography to discuss practical 

steps towards this goal.

Contacts:

Email project Team: pqc@nist.gov

Dr. Dustin Moody Dr. Lily Chen

(301) 975-8136 (301) 975-6974

dustin.moody@nist.gov lily.chen@nist.gov

Mr. Ray Perlner Dr. Daniel Smith-Tone

(301) 975-3357 (502) 852-6010

ray.perlner@nist.gov daniel.smith@nist.gov

Dr. Yi-Kai Liu

(301) 975-6499

yi-kai.liu@nist.gov

NIST Beacon - A Prototype Implementation of a 

Randomness Beacon

NIST has implemented a public source of randomness. 

The prototype uses two independent, commercially available 

sources of randomness, each with an independent hardware 

entropy source. 

The Beacon is designed to provide unpredictability, autonomy, 

and consistency. Unpredictability means that users cannot 

algorithmically predict bits before they are made available 

by the source. Autonomy means that the source is resistant 

to attempts by outside parties to alter the distribution of the 

random bits. Consistency means that a set of users can access 

the source in such a way that they are confident that they all 

receive the same random string.

The Beacon posts bit-strings in blocks of 512 bits every 

60 seconds. Each such value is time-stamped and signed by 

NIST and includes the hash of the previous value to chain the 

sequence of values together. This prevents anyone, even the 

Beacon itself, from retroactively changing an output packet 

without being detected. The Beacon keeps all output packets 

and makes them available online at https://beacon.nist.gov/

home. 

Tables of random numbers have probably been used for 

multiple purposes at least since the Industrial Revolution. In the 

digital age, algorithmic random number generators have largely 

replaced those tables. The NIST Randomness Beacon expands 

the use of public randomness to multiple scenarios in which 

the latter methods cannot be used. The extra functionalities 

stem mainly from three features. First, the Beacon-generated 

numbers cannot be predicted before they are published. 

Second, the public, time-bound, and authenticated nature of 

the Beacon allows a user application to prove to anybody that 

it used truly random numbers not known before a certain point 

in time. Third, this proof can be presented offline and at any 

point in the future. For example, the proof could be mailed to a 

trusted third party, encrypted, and signed by an application, to 

be opened if needed and authorized.

Although commercially available physical sources of 

randomness are adequate as entropy sources for currently 

envisioned applications of the Beacon, NIST is working on 

developing a source of verifiably random sequences. Given that 

it is impossible to construct such sequences in any classical 

physical context, CSD is collaborating with the NIST Physical 

Measurement Laboratory (PML) to build a quantum source. 

The aim is to use quantum effects to generate sequences 

that are guaranteed to be unpredictable, even if an attacker 

has access to the random source. For more information on this 

collaboration, see http://www.nist.gov/pml/div684/random_

numbers_bell_test.cfm.

As the bits posted by the Beacon are public, these are not 

to be used as secret values, such as cryptographic keys or 

seeds for random number generators used in the construction 

of cryptographic keys. NIST encourages the community-atlarge to research and publish novel ways in which this tool 

can be used. Some examples of applications are unpredictable 

sampling, new authentication mechanisms, and secure multiparty computation. More details are available at http://beacon.

nist.gov.

Contacts:

Dr. Michaela Iorga Dr. René Peralta

(301) 975-8431 (301) 975-8702

michaela.iorga@nist.gov rene.peralta@nist.gov

Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography Project

The privacy-enhancing cryptography project seeks to promote 

the use of communication protocols that do not unnecessarily 

reveal private information of communicating parties. There are 

many technical challenges in doing this, as it is typically hard 

to separate private data from general data (e.g., to convert a 

third-party-signed date-of-birth certificate into a certificate 

that a person is of voting age). Zero-knowledge (ZK) proof 

techniques and their variants can be used to accomplish this 

for a large class of assertions. These techniques allow one party 

to prove to another party that a given statement is true, without 

conveying any additional information apart from the fact that 

the statement is indeed true. Although many such ZK protocols 

are practical, adoption by industry is slow. CSD is following the 

progress of emerging technologies, such as fully homomorphic 

encryption (FHE). FHE could potentially solve a large class of 

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 38

problems, by allowing computation on encrypted data without 

decryption. CSD has also shown that the NIST Randomness 

Beacon (discussed in the previous section) can be used as a 

primitive in secure multi-party computation, such as sealed-bid 

online auctions in which losing bids are never opened.

Team members continue to be in close collaboration with 

the NSTIC program and the Federal Cloud Credential Exchange 

(FCCX) project. In this context, CTG has served as evaluators 

and in technical support roles. Information about NSTIC and 

FCCX is available at http://www.nist.gov/nstic/.

Current communication security standards are primarily 

designed for two-party communication. Future protocols, 

such as those for identification, commercial transactions, 

and social media, will necessitate standards for three-party 

communications (e.g., two parties involved in a commercial 

transaction and a third party that serves as an enabler of some 

aspects of the transaction). This is particularly important if 

standards are to provide privacy protection. NIST has developed 

some basic protocols for this purpose. One such protocol allows 

for privacy-preserving identification with the aid of a mediator. 

In this protocol, the issuer of an assertion, such as “John Smith 

is an employee of the Department of Commerce,” does not need 

to know who the consumer of the assertion is, yet it can encrypt 

the assertion with a key only known to that consumer (i.e., the 

mediator does not get to see the unencrypted assertion).

Contact:

Dr. René Peralta

(301) 975-8702

rene.peralta@nist.gov

Cryptography for Constrained Environments

Pervasive computing is an emerging technical area in which 

many highly constrained devices (e.g., limited resources, such 

as program space and RAM) are interconnected, typically 

communicating wirelessly with one another, and working in 

concert to accomplish some task. These systems apply to a 

wide variety of fields. Sample application areas include sensor 

networks, medical devices, distributed control systems, and the 

Smart Grid. Security can be very important in each of these 

areas. For example, an unauthorized party should not be able 

to take control of an insulin pump or the brakes on a car. There 

are also privacy concerns, particularly in the area of Health IT.

Because the majority of the current cryptographic algorithms 

were designed for desktop/server environments, many of these 

algorithms cannot operate under these constraints, or if they 

can be made to operate in these constrained environments, 

their performance is typically not acceptable. A particular 

problem is the use of asymmetric (public key) algorithms. These 

algorithms tend to be much more computational and resourceintensive and are not easily accommodated in such constrained 

environments.

As a result, CSD is currently focusing on studying the use 

of the NIST-approved symmetric-key algorithms in constrained 

environments. Symmetric-key algorithms can perform 

encryption for confidentiality, and can generate message 

authentication codes (MAC) for authenticity and integrity. 

NIST has implemented the Advanced Encryption Standard 

(AES) to provide both confidentiality and the AES-based 

message authentication code, CMAC mode, for authentication. 

Additionally, CTG has implemented the 256-bit version of the 

Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-256) to provide a Hash-based 

Message Authentication Code (HMAC) for authentication. 

The emerging Keccak algorithm has also been implemented

– both the original 1600-bit permutation that won the hash 

competition (see the SHA-3 report above) and the reduced 

800-bit permutation. It has been demonstrated that the Kecca

algorithm allows a more efficient construction for computing 

MACs than SHA-256, which requires the HMAC construction. 

CTG has also investigated other, non-NIST-approved algorithms 

for constrained environments.

CTG will continue to analyze the resource requirements and 

performance characteristics of these algorithms, and study 

their use as building blocks to perform other cryptographic 

functions beyond encryption.

Contact:

Mr. Lawrence Bassham

(301) 975-3292

lawrence.bassham@nist.gov

aNew Research Areas in Cryptographic 

Techniques for Emerging Applications

Stream Ciphers

Stream ciphers are symmetric-key cryptographic primitives 

that encrypt plaintext bits individually using a time-varying 

transformation. The performance advantages of dedicated 

stream ciphers make them more attractive than block ciphers 

in stream-cipher-type modes (e.g., AES counter mode) for 

some niche software and hardware applications. In 2004, 

the European Network of Excellence for Cryptology (ECRYPT) 

announced the ECRYPT Stream Cipher (eSTREAM) project with 

the goal of identifying new stream ciphers that offer some 

performance advantages over AES. The eSTREAM portfolio, 

published in 2012, includes: 1) four algorithms for software 

applications: HC-128, Rabbit, Salsa20/12 and Sosemanuk, and 
39

2) three algorithms for hardware applications: Grain, Trivium 

and Mickey. 

The primary focus of the project is to study the eSTREAM 

candidates and other commonly used stream ciphers for 

possible standardization. During FY 2013, three internal talks 

were given: “Stream Ciphers for Constrained Environments,” 

“Authenticated Encryption In Stream Ciphers,” and “Stream 

Ciphers For Software Applications.” NIST researchers Meltem 

Sönmez Turan and Santanu Sarkar were two of the co-authors 

of “A Chosen IV Related Key Attack on Grain-128,” published 

at the 18th Australasian Conference on Information Security 

and Privacy, ACISP 2013. Dr. Turan also published “Related-Key 

Slide Attacks On Block Ciphers With Secret Components” at the 

Second International Lightweight Cryptography for Security and 

Privacy workshop, LightSec 2013.

After comparing the security and performance of stream 

ciphers to block ciphers designed for constrained environments, 

CTG observed that the gate array requirements for block and 

stream ciphers are comparable, but stream ciphers have 

a better throughput/area performance characteristic. CTG 

currently believes that well-designed lightweight block ciphers 

may be more suitable than stream ciphers for constrained 

environments. This determination is based upon the following 

factors: 1) the maturity of literature on block ciphers; 2) the 

availability of better tools to analyze the security of block 

ciphers; 3) reduced round attacks on the stream cipher finalists; 

and 4) lack of flexible key sizes for stream ciphers.

In FY 2014, NIST will continue to study the security and 

performance of software-oriented stream ciphers and block 

ciphers designed for constrained environments.

Contacts:

Dr. Lily Chen Dr. Meltem Sönmez Turan

(301) 975-6974 (301) 975-4391

lily.chen@nist.gov meltem.turan@nist.gov

Circuit Research

Cryptographic primitives, such as encryption, digital 

signatures, and hashing, are implemented as electronic circuits 

for a wide class of applications. A variety of metrics is relevant 

to designing “good” circuits. In particular, minimizing the size 

and maximizing the throughput of a circuit closely translate into 

the combinatorial problem of designing circuits with few gates 

and short depth. The project team has shown that solving this 

design problem, even approximately, is “MAX-SNP Complete.” 

In practice, this means that it is necessary to settle for heuristics 

that design “good” circuits, as opposed to provably optimal 

circuits. It also means that many basic questions are likely to 

remain unanswered for the foreseeable future, even if quantum 

computers are ever built. For example, it is unlikely that the 

minimum number of gates necessary to implement the AES can 

be found. In the 12 years since the approval of AES, successive 

improvements have roughly cut the gate count in half. The 

standard reference for the smallest published circuit for AES 

is from a study funded by the National Security Agency. CTG 

improved on this work significantly by designing combinatorial 

circuits that are smaller (meaning that they are likely to use 

less energy) and others that are of lower depth (meaning that 

they are likely to be faster). The general technique was issued a 

patent held jointly between NIST and the University of Southern 

Denmark.

CTG is also researching circuit-based security metrics for 

cryptographic functions. For a function to be secure (oneway), it must be the case that any circuit that implements it 

is sufficiently complex. In particular, a function is insecure if 

it can be implemented by a circuit containing too few Boolean 

AND gates. This security metric, namely the number of AND 

gates necessary and sufficient to implement a function, is 

referred to as its multiplicative complexity. When comparing 

two cryptographic functions, all other things being equal, 

the one with higher multiplicative complexity is preferable. 

Unfortunately, determining multiplicative complexity is 

extremely hard. Mathematicians attempted this in the 1970s, 

but the effort had been largely abandoned by the 1980s. CTG 

has been able to compute tight bounds for the multiplicative 

complexity of an important class of functions (the symmetric 

functions). This theory seems to have wide applicability and 

it points to exciting directions for both theoretical and applied 

research in security and cryptography.

A partial list of results includes:

 The construction of the smallest known circuits for 

multiplication in several small finite fields.

 The construction of the smallest known circuits for 

binary multiplication (i.e., multiplication of polynomials 

of degree n over the Galois Field with two elements).

 The construction of optimal circuits – with respect to 

multiplicative complexity – for all predicates on four 

bits. There are 65,536 such predicates. Surprisingly, the 

multiplicative complexity of all these functions turned 

out to be at most three.

 Circuits with small multiplicative complexity can be 

used to design more efficient multiparty computation 

protocols. Such circuits are useful for protocols that 

use either partially homomorphic schemes or fully 

homomorphic schemes. Some of the published circuits 

are being used as benchmarking tools in those areas.

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 40

 Significant advances have been made in heuristics for 

linear circuit complexity, and this is expected to yield 

improvements to the best-known circuits in this area for 

years to come.

Contact:

Dr. René Peralta

(301) 975-8702

rene.peralta@nist.gov

aApplied Cryptography

Development of Federal Information 

Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-3, Security 

Requirements for Cryptographic Modules

FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic 

Modules, defines the security requirements for the cryptographic 

modules that perform cryptographic operations. This standard is 

applicable to all federal agencies that use cryptography-based 

security systems to protect sensitive information in computer 

and telecommunication systems (including voice systems), 

as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology 

Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106, and the 

Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Public 

Law 107-347. The standard must be used in designing and 

implementing cryptographic modules that federal departments 

and agencies operate, or that are operated for them under 

contract.

The current version of the standard is FIPS 140-2. Draft 

FIPS 140-3, a revision proposed to supersede FIPS 140-2, has 

been developed. The draft revision of the standard adds new 

security requirements for cryptographic modules to reflect the 

latest advances in technology and security and to mirror other 

new or updated standards published by NIST in the areas of 

cryptography and key management. Additionally, software and 

firmware requirements are addressed in a new topic area while 

another new area specifying requirements to protect against 

noninvasive attacks is also provided.

The standard provides four increasing, qualitative levels of 

security, intended to cover a wide range of potential applications 

and environments. The security requirements cover areas 

related to the secure design, implementation and operation of 

a cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic 

module specification; cryptographic module physical ports and 

logical interfaces; roles, authentication, and services; software 

security; operating environment; physical security; physical 

security – non-invasive attacks; sensitive security parameter 

management; self-tests; life-cycle assurance; and mitigation of 

other attacks. 

The draft of FIPS 140-3 has had two rounds of public review. 

The resolutions to the public comments received on the second 

draft of FIPS 140-3 include: 1) a description of the assumed threat 

models (e.g., attacker’s level of experience, expectations from 

the cryptographic module) for each of the four security levels; 

2) an insertion of missing definitions for terms and acronyms; 

3) changes to the Trusted Channel requirements; 4) the removal 

of the Trusted Role; 5) the inclusion of an identity-based 

authentication mechanism that would be allowed at Security 

Level (SL) 2; 6) the addition of a self-initiated cryptographic 

output capability and remote control capability; 7) the inclusion 

of additional integrity-technique requirements for the software 

components of a cryptographic module; 8) a restructure of the 

annexes and enhancement of the requirements for the allowed 

operator-authentication mechanisms; 9) an update of the list 

of the noninvasive attacks covered by the standard; and 10) an 

update of the requirements for the allowed modifiable operating 

environments.

During the process of addressing the public comments 

received on the second draft, CSD determined that additional 

feedback was required from the public to resolve gaps and 

inconsistencies among the comments received for particular 

sections of the second draft of FIPS 140-3. As a result, CSD 

requested additional public comments in August 2012 on 

several clearly identified sections.

During FY 2013, CSD discussed and addressed all comments 

received on the identified issues and prepared the updated draft 

FIPS 140-3 for a final internal review. The completion of the 

internal review and submission for approval by the Secretary of 

Commerce are expected in FY 2014.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/FIPS140_3/

Contact:

Dr. Michaela Iorga

(301) 975-8431

michaela.iorga@nist.gov

Authentication

To support the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal 

Agencies, NIST developed SP 800-63, Electronic Authentication 

Guideline. Its subsequent revision, SP 800-63-1 (published 

at the end of FY 2012) significantly expanded the range of 

included technologies, such as Security Assertion Markup 

Language (SAML) assertions. The OMB memorandum defines 

four levels of authentication in terms of assurance about the 

validity of an asserted identity. This recommendation covers 

remote authentication of users (such as employees, contractors, 
41

or private individuals) interacting with government IT systems 

over open networks. It defines technical requirements for each 

of four levels of assurance in the areas of identity proofing, 

registration, tokens, management processes, authentication 

protocols and related assertions. 

As more electronic service delivery systems that require 

authentication and identity management became available, 

large-scale enrollment and registration issues became a 

significant problem for agencies, particularly for health care. 

Enrollment and identity proofing result in much of the up-front 

cost to agencies of implementing online service delivery and 

can be a barrier to user adoption. SP 800-63-2, a revision 

with changes largely limited to identity proofing and credential 

issuance, was published at the end of FY 2013 and is available 

at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html.

SP 800-63-2 is intended to facilitate more efficient and 

convenient user enrollment and identity proofing, mainly by 

exploiting the identity proofing already done for professional 

licensing, registration, or certification (e.g., for doctors, nurses, 

lawyers, professional engineers). SP 800-63-2 also reduces the 

number of cases where postal mailings are required to confirm 

addresses, saving expense and making registration easier and 

more immediate for users.

In FY 2014, NIST expects its authentication work to be 

driven by the needs of the ongoing rapid expansion of online 

service delivery, as experience accumulates and technology 

progresses. Efforts to develop accreditation programs for 

e-authentication have revealed problem areas in the text of 

the specifications, while the rapidly growing and evolving use 

of mobile devices with Internet access and new capabilities 

present both challenges and opportunities. Practical business 

models for large-scale registration and credential issuance 

seem to indicate that separate organizations should do both, 

and NIST has been urged to make a clearer delineation of 

these activities in a future revision of SP 800-63. Unattended 

biometric authentication is considered problematic for remote 

authentication in SP 800-63-2, but the relatively high quality 

and online video/audio capabilities of the current mobile 

devices, as well as the fingerprint readers in some mobile 

phones, all deserve fresh consideration. Level 4 identity 

proofing currently requires an in-person appearance, which is 

often both expensive for agencies and inconvenient and time 

consuming for registrants, particularly in rural or remote areas. 

A comment received during the public review of SP 800-63-2 

urged allowing the use of secure kiosks with high-quality video, 

document scanners and biometric readers that would be linked 

to a human registration operator in a registration center, as 

a viable solution. While this was judged to be too complex to 

evaluate in the schedule for SP 800-63-2, the idea is intriguing 

and deserves a detailed consideration.

NIST, therefore, plans to actively consider another incremental 

revision to SP 800-63-2 in response to the issues noted above 

and other issues that can be dealt with in time to assist in the 

intense ongoing efforts to expand online services.

Contact:

Dr. Lily Chen

(301) 975-6974

lily.chen@nist.gov

Wireless Networks and Mobile Device Security

Today, wireless networks often provide connections for 

mobile devices using multiple and different radio technologies. 

In such a heterogeneous network, a mobile device may switch 

its between different wireless technologies. The procedure 

of conducting such a switch is called a “handover.” Intertechnology handover has brought many challenges to existing 

security solutions, such as the delays caused by access 

authentication for each handover. CSD has conducted intensive 

research in the security for media-independent handover (MIH) 

and has worked closely with the working group of IEEE 802.21 

on security solutions for MIH services. The services specified 

in IEEE 802.21 include information service, event service, and 

command service. The security mechanisms were developed 

by Task Group A of IEEE 802.21 and specified in Amendment 

2 of IEEE 802.21, which provide MIH message protection and 

accommodate proactive authentications. 

However, the protection mechanisms specified in Amendment 

2 of IEEE 802.21 are only applied to unicast messages; that 

is, the mechanisms protect messages between a point of 

service (PoS) and a mobile node. When the services provided 

by the pervasive heterogeneous networks are extended to 

other applications, such as Smart Grid applications, the MIH 

needs to be processed for a group of wireless nodes, such as 

smart meters, for the reliability of the services. For example, 

the information may need to be delivered to a group of smart 

meters. In this case, the multicast message is used to deliver 

the information. That is, the message is sent from one PoS to 

multiple wireless nodes. In some of the application environments, 

such as sensor networks, the groups are formed dynamically. 

That is, new nodes can be added to the group, and some nodes 

may need to be removed. Such groups are managed through 

multicast signals. The protection for multicast messages and 

group management signals becomes critical. In FY 2013, CSD 

has worked with IEEE 802.21 to develop security solutions 

for group management in Task Group D of IEEE 802.21. The 

solutions include the mechanisms to distribute group keys and 

for the protection of multicast messages. In FY 2014, CSD will 

continue to contribute to the development of the IEEE 802.21 

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 42

Amendment on group management.

Contact:

Dr. Lily Chen

(301) 975-6974

lily.chen@nist.gov

Identity Management

aPersonal Identity Verification (PIV) 

and FIPS 201 Revision Efforts

Figure 8: Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 

and FIPS 201 Revision Efforts

In response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 

(HSPD-12), Policy for a Common Identification Standard for 

Federal Employees and Contractors, Federal Information 

Processing Standard (FIPS) 201, Personal Identity Verification 

(PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, was developed and 

was approved by the Secretary of Commerce in February 2005. 

HSPD-12 called for the creation of a new identity credential for 

federal employees and contractors. FIPS 201 is the technical 

specification for both the PIV identity credential and the PIV 

system that produces, manages, and uses the credential. Within 

NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), this work is a 

collaborative effort of the Information Access Division (IAD) and 

CSD. CSD activities in FY 2013 directly supported the revision 

and maintenance of the FIPS 201 standard. CSD performed the 

following activities during FY 2013 to revise the standard:

 Drafted and published the final release version of FIPS 

201-2. FIPS 201-2 reflects the disposition of more than 

1,000 comments received from over 40 organizations on 

the first public comment draft, and over 500 comments 

received from 36 organizations on the second public 

comment draft. NIST coordinated with the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB), the United States 

Access Board, Office of Personnel Management (OPM), 

and other U.S. Government (USG) stakeholders before 

incorporating changes in the final release version of 

FIPS 201-2.

 Prepared and published a draft revision 4 of Special 

Publication (SP) 800-73 (SP 800-73-4), Interfaces for 

Personal Identity Verification. The update to the threepart SP details the new PIV Card capabilities introduced 

in FIPS 201-2 including Virtual Contact Interface 

(VCI), a secure channel protocol, an on-card biometric 

comparison mechanism and enforcement a minimum 

PIN length of six digits. 

 Prepared and published a draft revision 4 of SP 800-78 

(SP 800-78-4), Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes 

for Personal Identity Verification. The document has 

been modified to align with SP 800-73-4 (Draft), and 

includes the addition of new algorithms and key sizes for 

the secure messaging protocol and the addition of test 

requirements with the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation 

Program (CAVP) validation.

 Started drafting an update to SP 800-79, Guidelines for 

the Accreditation of Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 

Card Issuers (PCIs), in order to incorporate changes 

required by FIPS 201-2.

 Started drafting updates to SP 800-85A, PIV Card 

Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines,

and SP 800-85B, PIV Data Model Test Guidelines, in 

order to align these documents with FIPS 201-2, 

SP 800-73-4, and SP 800-78-4.

 To accommodate mobile devices, NIST started drafting 

SP 800-157, Derived PIV Credentials. As intended by 

FIPS 201-2, derived PIV credentials are part of the set of 

PIV credentials that can be provisioned directly to mobile 

devices to enable remote enterprise access from the 

device.

In FY 2014, CSD will be focusing on updating the relevant 

publications associated with FIPS 201-2, including developing 

a new publication, SP 800-156, Representation of PIV Chain-ofTrust for Import and Export. CSD will also continue to provide 

technical and strategic inputs to the PIV related initiatives.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/

Contacts:

Ms. Hildegard Ferraiolo Dr. David Cooper 

(301) 975-6972 (301) 975-3194

hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov david.cooper@nist.gov

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro Mr. Ketan Mehta

(301) 975 6414 (301) 975-8405

salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov ketan.mehta@nist.gov
43

aPIV Program Test Cards

To facilitate the development of applications and middleware 

that support the PIV card, CSD developed a set of smart cards 

for testing. The initial work of developing the test cards was 

performed during FY 2011 and was completed during FY 

2012. In late FY 2012, NIST began selling the test cards as 

NIST Special Database 33 (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/

testcards.html).

Over the course of FY 2013, additional sets of test cards 

were created as the existing inventory of cards were sold. 

In addition, CSD has maintained a mailing list that has been 

used by individuals who have purchased the test cards to ask 

questions about the cards and to exchange advice on their use.

For further details on the PIV project, see the Personal Identity 

Verification (PIV) and FIPS 201 Revision Efforts section.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/testcards.html

Figure 9: PIV Test Card

Contact:

Dr. David Cooper

(301) 975-3194

david.cooper@nist.gov

aNIST Personal Identity Verification 

Program (NPIVP)

The objective of the NIST Personal Identity Verification 

Program (NPIVP) is to validate PIV components for conformance 

to specifications in FIPS 201 and its companion documents. 

The two PIV components that come under the scope of NPIVP 

are PIV Smart Card Application and PIV Middleware. All of the 

tests under NPIVP are handled by third-party laboratories that 

are accredited as Cryptographic and Security Testing (CST) 

Laboratories by the NIST NVLAP and are called accredited 

NPIVP test facilities. As of September 2013, there were nine 

such facilities.

In prior years, CSD published SP 800-85A, PIV Card 

Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines, to 

facilitate development of PIV Smart Card Application and PIV 

Middleware that conform to interface specifications in SP 

800-73, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification. CSD also 

developed an integrated toolkit called “PIV Interface Test 

Runner” for conducting tests on both PIV Card Application and 

PIV Middleware products, and provided the toolkit to accredited 

NPIVP test facilities.

NPIVP validation utilized the following versions and documents 

throughout FY 2013: 

 SP 800-73-3, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification

 SP 800-85A-2, PIV Card Application and Middleware 

Interface Test Guidelines

In FY 2013, two new PIV card application products were 

validated for conformance to SP 800-73-3 and received 

certificates, bringing the total number of NPIVP validated PIV 

Card application products to 36. Three PIV Middleware products 

were validated for conformance to SP 800-73-3 and received 

certificates, for a total number of 20 NPIVP-validated PIV 

Middleware products.

In addition, NPIVP is closely involved in ensuring that all 

changes in PIV companion documents, such as SP 800-

73-3, SP 800-76-2, and SP 800-78-3, are fully reflected in 

the conformance test document SP 800-85A-2 as well as 

subsequently in the PIV Test Runner toolkit consequent on the 

expected publication of FIPS 201-2.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/npivp

Contacts:

Dr. Ramaswamy Chandramouli Ms. Hildegard Ferraiolo

(301) 975-5013 (301) 975-6972

mouli@nist.gov hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov 

Lorie, this image was used in last year’s annual report. Guess you can use the same im

year.

Thanks.

Pat

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 44

Research in Emerging Technologies

aCloud Computing and Virtualization

Cloud computing is a model defined in the NIST SP 800-

145, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing. The foundational 

technologies that facilitate the use of a computing infrastructure 

for cloud computing services is virtualization. At the core of a 

virtualized infrastructure is the virtualized host that provides 

abstraction of the hardware (e.g., CPU, memory) enabling 

multiple computing stacks (comprised of the operating 

system, middleware, and applications) to be run on a single 

physical machine. The efficiency of such a dynamic and 

distributed processing environment is counter-balanced by the 

interoperability, portability, and security challenges inherent 

to this computing environment. NIST is working in parallel on 

several projects introduced below that aim to accelerate the 

Federal Government’s secure adoption of cloud computing by 

collaborating with standards bodies, public and private sector 

in developing security, interoperability and portability standards 

and guidance.

CSD Role in the NIST Cloud 

Computing Program

During FY 2013, the NIST Cloud 

Computing Team continued to promote the 

development of publications, national and 

international standards, and specifications 

in support of the USG’s effective and secure 

use of cloud computing as well as providing 

technical guidance to USG agencies for 

secure and effective cloud computing 

adoption.. CSD supports many of the 

technical standards activities supported 

by the NIST Cloud Computing Program, 

with a particular focus on cloud computing 

security.

 Participated in the development of 

a revised SP 500-291, NIST Cloud 

Computing Standards Roadmap. 

The document, initially published in 

2011, was updated in July 2013, and 

was incorporated into draft SP 500-293, 

US Government (USG) Cloud Computing Technology 

Roadmap. 

 Participated in the update to the multi-part draft 

document SP 500-293, US Government (USG) Cloud 

Computing Technology Roadmap (Vol. I, II, and III)

that defines and prioritizes USG requirements for 

interoperability, portability, and security for effective 

cloud computing adoption. It is anticipated that final 

versions of Volumes I and II of the SP 500-293 will be 

released by the end of the first quarter, FY 2014.

 Led the development of the draft SP 500-299, NIST 

Cloud Computing Security Reference Architecture (SRA). 

It is anticipated that the final version of the document 

will be released by the end of the second quarter, FY 

2014. SP 500-299 defines a modular framework that 

provides a formal model and a methodology for the 

secure adoption of cloud computing by applying a Cloudadapted Risk Management Framework. The SRA is a 

security overlay to SP 500-292: NIST Cloud Computing 

Reference Architecture.

 Provided technical support to several Federal Chief 

Information Officer (CIO) Council committees, including 

the Cloud Computing Executive Steering Committee, 

Cloud Computing Advisory Council, the Information 

Security and Identity Management Workgroup, and the 

Web 2.0 working group.

CSD staff members contributed significantly to several NISThosted events:

 Sixth Cloud Computing Forum and Workshop: Cloud 

Computing and Big Data Forum, held in January 2013

 Seventh Cloud Computing Forum and Workshop: The 

Intersection of Cloud and Mobility Forum, initially 

scheduled for October 1-3, 2013, currently rescheduled 

Figure 10: NIST Security Reference Architecture Diagram
45

due to USG shutdown

 First Cloud Forensic Science Workshop, initially 

scheduled for October 3, 2013, also rescheduled due to 

USG shutdown.

In support of and advancement of USG cloud computing 

mandates, CSD staff members provided leadership for several 

public work groups operating under the NIST Cloud Computing 

Program. Through these working groups, CSD staff led the 

development of technical guidelines and recommendations that 

considered a close collaboration with public, private, academia 

and other stakeholders.

CSD staff chaired or co-chaired several significant cloud 

computing efforts in 2013:

 Chair of the NIST Cloud Computing Security Working 

Group focused the group on development of SP 500-299 

(described above), and on key management research. 

 Co-Chair, NIST Cloud Computing Forensic Science 

Working Group, led development of Digital Forensics 

Challenges in a cloud environment.

 Co-Chair, NIST Cloud Computing Standards Roadmap 

Working Group, led development of SP 500291, USG 

Cloud Computing Standards Roadmap (described above).

 Chair and Vice-Chair, INCITS CS1 (Cybersecurity) 

− U.S. Technical Advisory Group (TAG) to the ISO/

IEC international committee JTC1/SC27 (IT Security 

Techniques) − that covers cloud computing taxonomyrelated standards and cloud computing security 

standards.

CSD staff members participate in various standards 

development organizations, two of which are ISO/IEC JTC 1 Sub 

Committee 38 – Distributed Application Platforms and Services 

(SC 38) and ISO/IEC JTC 1 Sub Committee 27 – IT Security 

Techniques (SC 27). In SC 38, CSD acts as the co-convener 

for a collaborative ISO/ITU-T initiative on cloud computing 

taxonomy that includes work on ISO/IEC 17788 – Information 

Technology – Cloud computing – Overview and Vocabulary. 

Notably, the genesis for this international body of work is the 

widely accepted and used cloud computing definition found in 

SP 800-145, NIST Definition of Cloud Computing.

ISO/IEC 17788 is closely coordinated with another standards 

activity, ISO/IEC 17789 – Information technology – Cloud 

Computing – Reference Architecture, which is based on the 

widely used and accepted NIST publication, SP 500-292. Both 

ISO/IEC 17788 and 17789 are in the final stages of international 

balloting before final publication, which is anticipated in the 

first quarter of calendar year 2014.

CSD staff members are also actively participating in cloud 

computing security standards, primarily through SC 27, which 

is responsible for cloud computing security standards. CSD 

has provided technical contributions based on SP 500-299 and 

continues to advocate for secure, non-proprietary solutions.

In FY 2013, the CSD members of the NIST cloud computing 

team also presented the results of cloud computing research 

and development, introduced the standards and specifications 

under development, and provided status of the NIST Cloud 

Computing Program in a variety of conferences and workshops.

Policy Machine – Leveraging Access Control for 

Cloud Computing

Figure 11: Policy Machine operating environment

In FY 2013, CSD continued the research and development 

of a virtualization-based, enterprise-wide controlled delivery 

of data services for advanced cloud computing through Access 

Control. NIST and other members of an Ad Hoc INCITS working 

group are developing a three-part PM standard, under the title 

of “Next Generation Access Control” (NGAC), under three subprojects:

 Project 2193–D: Next Generation Access Control – 

Implementation Requirements, Protocols and API 

Definitions

 Project 2194–D: Next Generation Access Control – 

Functional Architecture

 Project 2195–D: Next Generation Access Control – 

Generic Operations & Abstract Data Structures

The Policy Machine’s architecture has been adopted by 

the ANSI/INCITS and is now available as ANSI INCITS 499 – 

Information technology – Next Generation Access Control – 

Functional Architecture (NGAC–FA).

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 46

Cryptographic Key Management Issues 

in Cloud Infrastructures

Many of the security capabilities associated with exercise 

of cloud service rely on cryptographic operations. The key 

management system (KMS) required to support cryptographic 

operations for the above tasks can be complex, due to differences 

in ownership and control of underlying infrastructures on 

which the KMS and the protected resources are located. CSD 

developed NISTIR 7956, Cryptographic Key Management Issues 

& Challenges in Cloud Services to discuss these critical issues.

Virtualization Security & Leveraging 

Virtualization for Security

CSD has been researching key areas in cloud and virtualization 

security producing the following papers: 

“Security Assurance Requirements for Hypervisor 

Deployment Feature” published as part of the proceedings of 

the 7th International Conference on Digital Society. In FY 2014, 

CSD will consider feedback from public comments received and 

publish a (yet unnumbered) Special Publication titled Secure 

Management Practices for Protection of Hypervisors. In addition, 

security assurance requirements and security recommendations 

will be developed for components of virtualized infrastructure 

other than the hypervisor, such as the guest O/S, VM-based 

applications, and the virtual network..

Additional information about the NIST Cloud Computing 

Program is available at:

http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud

http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-cloud-computing/bin/view/

CloudComputing/StandardsRoadmap

http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-cloud-computing/bin/view/

CloudComputing/CloudSecurity

http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-cloud-computing/bin/view/

CloudComputing/CloudForensics

Contacts for each project:

Computer Security Division Role in the NIST Cloud Computing 

Program

Dr. Michaela Iorga

Chair, Cloud Computing Security Workgroup

(301) 975-8431

michaela.iorga@nist.gov

Ms. Annie Sokol

Co-Chair, Cloud Computing Standards Roadmap

(301) 975-2006

annie.sokol@nist.gov

Mr. Daniel Benigni

Chair, INCITS CS1 (Cybersecurity) - US Technical Advisory Group 

(TAG) to the ISO/IEC international committee JTC1/SC27 (IT Security 

Techniques)

(301) 975-3279

dbenigni@nist.gov

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro

Vice-Chair, INCITS CS1 (Cybersecurity) - US Technical Advisory Group 

(TAG) to the ISO/IEC international committee JTC1/SC27 (IT Security 

Techniques)

(301) 975-6414

salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov

Policy Machine - Leveraging Access Control for Cloud Computing

Mr. David Ferraiolo Mr. Serban Gavrila

(301) 975-3046 (301) 975-4242

david.ferraiolo@nist.gov serban.gavrila@nist.gov

Cryptographic Key Management Issues in Cloud Infrastructures

Dr. Ramaswamy Chandramouli Dr. Michaela Iorga

(301) 975-5013 (301) 975-8431

mouli@nist.gov michaela.iorga@nist.gov

Virtualization Security & Leveraging Virtualization for Security

Dr. Ramaswamy Chandramouli

(301) 975-5013

mouli@nist.gov

aMobile Device Security

Smart phones have become both ubiquitous and indispensable 

for consumers and business people alike. Although these 

devices are relatively small and inexpensive, they can be used 

for voice calls, simple text messages, sending and receiving 

emails, browsing the web, online banking and ecommerce, 

social networking, and many functions once limited to laptop 

and desktop computers. Smart phones and tablet devices have 

specialized built-in hardware, such as photographic cameras, 

video cameras, accelerometers, Global Positioning System 

(GPS) receivers, and removable media readers. They also 

employ a wide range of wireless interfaces, including infrared, 

Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi), Bluetooth, Near Field Communications 

(NFC), and one or more types of cellular interfaces that provide 

network connectivity across the globe. Naturally, just as 

consumers and business people can realize productivity gains 

from these technologies, so can government agencies.
47

Like any new technology, smart phones present new 

capabilities, but also a number of new security and privacy 

challenges. As the pace of the technology life cycles continues 

to increase, current Information Assurance (IA) standards and 

processes must be updated and new technologies to allow 

government users to employ the latest technologies that 

consumers can use without sacrificing privacy and security.

NIST is conducting research in new software assurance 

methodologies for smart phone software (i.e., apps) and is 

working with industry to bridge the security gaps present 

with today’s smart phones. NIST has developed an online beta 

Application Testing Portal (ATP) for Android that examines 

app functionality with respect to agency security and privacy 

guidelines. NIST is working closely with the Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to transition this software 

assurance technology to other agencies and making the ATP 

software available to industry as open source.

Building on this expertise in mobile app software assurance, 

NIST researchers are developing platform-independent 

techniques for identifying mobile malware by analyzing mobile 

app network behavior. NIST researchers are also developing 

metrics for evaluating the effectiveness of mobile app security 

test tools. 

Contacts:

Dr. Steve Quirolgico Dr. Jeffrey Voas

(301) 975-8426 (301) 975-6622

stephen.quirolgico@nist.gov jeff.voas@nist.gov

Dr. Tom Karygiannis

(301) 975-4728

karygiannis@nist.gov

Strengthening Internet Security

aUSGv6: A Technical Infrastructure to 

Assist IPv6 Adoption

Internet Protocol (IP) Version 

6 (IPv6) is an updated version of 

the current Internet Protocol, IPv4. 

The primary motivations for the 

development of IPv6 were to increase 

the number of unique IP addresses 

available for use and to handle the needs of new Internet 

applications and devices. In addition, IPv6 was designed with 

the following goals: increased ease of network management 

and configuration; expandable IP headers; improved mobility 

and security; and quality of service controls. IPv6 has been, 

and continues to be, developed and defined by the Internet 

Engineering Task Force (IETF).

FY 2012 was a significant year for the deployment of IPv6 

in the United States Government. OMB’s Memo of September 

10, 2010, Transition to IPv6, required all government agencies 

to “upgrade public/external facing servers and services (e.g., 

web, email, Domain Name System (DNS), Internet Service 

Provider (ISP) services) to operationally use native IPv6 by 

the end of FY 2012.” NIST worked with the USGv6 Task Force 

and with individual government agencies to achieve this goal. 

NIST developed an online monitor to demonstrate which highlevel government domains have met this goal with respect to 

DNS services, email, web servers, and Domain Name System 

Security Extensions (DNSSEC). In FY 2013, NIST and OMB 

continued to use this monitor to measure USGv6 compliance 

with OMB’s requirement.

FY 2014 will bring additional OMB IPv6 requirements. 

Agencies will “upgrade internal client applications that 

communicate with public Internet servers and supporting 

enterprise networks to operationally use native IPv6 by the end 

of FY 2014.” NIST is developing online diagnostic tools to help 

agencies verify compliance to this requirement.

The NIST IPv6 Test Program, whose goal is to provide 

assurance on IPv6 product conformance and interoperability, 

continues to operate. In FY 2014, NIST will continue to manage 

and evolve the USGv6 Test Program. The NIST program is a 

collaboration between CSD and the Advanced Networking 

Technology Division. 

http://www.antd.nist.gov/usgv6

Contacts:

Ms. Sheila Frankel Mr. Douglas Montgomery

(301) 975-3297 (301) 975-3630

sheila.frankel@nist.gov dougm@nist.gov

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 48

Access Control and Privilege Management

aAccess Control and Privilege 

Management Research

With the advance of current computing technologies and 

the diverse environments in which these technologies are 

used, security issues, such as situational awareness, trust 

management, preservation of privacy in access control, and 

privilege management systems, are becoming increasingly 

complex. Practical and conceptual guidance for these topics is 

needed.

In FY 2013, the following research was accomplished for this 

project: 1) unified enforcement mechanism of data services 

for use by a Policy Machine (PM) for enterprise computing 

environment, 2) enhanced the capabilities of the Access Control 

Policy Tool (ACPT), 3) researched a new fault-detection method 

for access control rule using Simulated Logic Circuit algorithms, 

4) researched formal ABAC models, and completed the 

development of Special Publication 800-162, Guide to Attribute 

Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition and Considerations, 

which provides information of function components as well as 

enterprise consideration of ABAC.

CSD expects that this project will:

 Promote (or accelerate) the adoption of community 

computing that utilizes the power of shared resources 

and common trust management schemes

 Provide guidance in implementing access control models 

and mechanisms for standalone or enterprise systems

 Increase the security and safety of static (connected) 

distributed systems by applying the testing and 

verification tool for the access control policies

 Assist system architects, security administrators, and 

security managers whose expertise is related to access 

control or privilege policy in managing their systems, and 

in learning the limitations and practical approaches for 

their applications

 Provide accurate and efficient fault detection and 

correction technology for implementing access control 

rules and policies

Figure 12: Access Control and Privilege Management

Contacts:

Dr. Vincent Hu Mr. David Ferraiolo

(301) 975-4975 (301) 975-3046

vhu@nist.gov david.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Mr. Rick Kuhn

(301) 975-3337

kuhn@nist.gov

aConformance Verification for Access 

Control Policies

Access control systems are among the most critical network 

security components. Faulty policies, misconfigurations, or flaws 

in software implementation can result in serious vulnerabilities. 

The specification of access control policies is often a challenging 

problem. Often a system’s privacy and security are compromised 

due to the misconfiguration of access control policies instead 

of the failure of cryptographic primitives or protocols. This 

problem becomes increasingly severe as software systems 

become more and more complex and are deployed to manage a 

large amount of sensitive information and resources organized 

into sophisticated structures. Identifying discrepancies between 

policy specifications and their properties (intended function) is 

crucial because correct implementation and enforcement of 

policies by applications is based on the premise that the policy 

specifications are correct. As a result, policy specifications must 

undergo rigorous verification and validation through systematic 

testing to ensure that the policy specifications truly encapsulate 

the desires of the policy authors.

To formally and precisely capture the security properties 

that access control should adhere to, access control models 

are usually written to bridge the rather wide gap in abstraction 

between policy and mechanism. Thus, an access control 

model provides unambiguous and precise expression as 
49

well as reference for design and implementation of security 

requirements. Techniques are required for verifying whether 

an access control model is correctly expressed in the access 

controls policies and whether the properties are satisfied in 

the model. In practice, the same access control policies may 

express multiple access control models or express a single 

model in addition to extra access control constraints outside of 

the model. Ensuring the conformance of access control models 

and policies is a nontrivial and critical task.

Started in 2009, CSD developed a prototype system, Access 

Control Policy Tool (ACPT), which allows a user to compose, 

verify, test, and generate access control policies.

In FY 2013, ACPT was downloaded by 190 users and 

organizations. CSD performed prototype testing, enhanced the 

capability of ACPT by adding privilege inheritance algorithms, 

applied user cases of Attribute Based, Multi-Level, and 

Workflow access control models to test ACPT’s performance, 

and compared to other formal method for performance and 

usability. CSD also produced a new user manual that explains 

new capabilities of ACPT. In addition, CSD published a research 

paper related to ACPT.

In FY 2014, CSD will continue testing, enhance the capability 

of ACPT by applying the tool for more complex access control 

policy combinations, provide model profiles, and improve user 

interfaces. CSD will also update ACPT based on user feedback 

and suggestions.

Figure 13: Conformance Verification

This project is expected to:

 Provide generic paradigm and framework of access 

control model/property conformance testing

 Provide templates for specifying access control rules in 

popular access control models such as Attribute Based, 

Multilevel, and Workflow models

 Provide tools or services for checking the security 

and safety of access control implementation, policy 

combination, and eXtensible Access Control Markup 

Language (XACML) policy generation

 Promote (or accelerate) the adoption of combinatorial 

testing for large-system (such as access control system) 

testing

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/acpt/

Contacts:

Dr. Vincent Hu Mr. Rick Kuhn

(301) 975-4975 (301) 975-3337

vhu@nist.gov kuhn@nist.gov

aMetrics for Evaluation of Access Control 

Systems (Real-Time Access Rule Fault 

Detection)

Specifying correct behaviors of Access Control (AC) policies 

is a challenging task, especially when an AC policy includes 

a large number of rules. Identifying discrepancies between AC 

policies and their intended functionalities is crucial because 

correct policy behaviors are based on the premise that the 

policies are correctly specified. Incorrect AC policies result in 

faults that not only leak but also disable access to information, 

and faults are especially difficult to detect without support of 

formal embedded models such as Multi-Level Security (MLS) 

and Chinese Wall.

Most research on AC model or policy verification techniques 

are focused on one particular model, and almost all of the 

research is in applied methods, which require the completed AC 

policies as the input for verification or test processes to generate 

fault reports. Even though correct verification is achieved and 

counterexamples may be generated along with found faults, 

those methods provide no information about the source of rule 

faults that might allow conflicts in privilege assignment, leakage 

of privileges, or conflict of interest permissions. The difficulty in 

finding the source of faults is increased especially when the AC 

rules are intricately covering duplicated variables to a degree 

of complexity. The complexity is due to the fact that a fault 

might not be caused by one particular rule; for example, rule x

grants subject/attribute s access to object/attribute o, and rule 

y denies the group subject/attribute g, which s is a member 

of, access to object o. Such conflict can only be resolved by 

removing either rule x or y, or the g membership of s from the 

policy. But removing x or y affects other rules that depend on 

them (e.g., a member of subject group g k is granted access 

to object o), and removing s’s membership in g will disable 

g’s legitimate access to other objects/attributes through the 

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 50

membership. Thus, it requires manually analyzing each rule in 

the policy in order to find the correct solution for the fault.

To address the issue, CSD researched the AC Rule Logic Circuit 

Simulation (ACRLCS) technique, which enables the AC authors 

to detect a fault when the fault-causing AC rule is added to the 

policy, so the fixing can be implemented in real time before 

adding other rules that further complicate the detecting effort. 

Rather than checking by retracing the interrelations between 

rules after the policy is completed, the policy author needs 

only check the newly added rule against previous “correct” 

ones. In ACRLCS, AC rules are represented in a Simulated 

Logic Circuit (SLC). The use of simulation may restrict ACRLCS 

implementation on a physical electronic circuit; however, the 

concept can be implemented and computed through simulated 

software.

In FY 2013, by using the Logic Circuit Simulation (LCS) 

software, CSD researched the SLC for the simulations of rule 

and inheritance assignments of AC privileges, formal AC model 

implementations, and multiple policy combinations. The result 

is published in the conference paper, Real-Time Access Control 

Rule Fault Detection Using a Simulated Logic Circuit.

In FY 2014, CSD is planning to further research the 

performance of the ACRLCS, and develop a basic reference 

implementation of the algorithm. Goals for the project include:

 Promote the concept of detecting AC policy faults in real 

time AC rule composing

 Provide an innovative method in specifying AC rules 

formed by Boolean logic expressions operated on 

variables of AC rules

 Provide techniques for preventing faults in enforcing 

fundamental security properties including Cyclic 

Inheritance, Privilege Escalation, and Separation of Duty

 Provide new methods for composing standard mandatory 

AC models such as Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 

and MLS as well as some fundamental security 

properties

Figure 14: Real-time Access Control - Circuit

Contact:

Dr. Vincent Hu

(301) 975-4975 

vhu@nist.gov

aAttribute Based Access Control 

Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) is a logical access 

control methodology where authorization to perform a set of 

operations is determined by evaluating attributes associated 

with the subject, object, requested operations, and, in some 

cases, environment conditions against policy, rules, or 

relationships that describe the allowable operations for a given 

set of attributes. ABAC represents a point on the spectrum 

of logical access control from simple access control lists to 

more capable role-based access (RBAC), and finally to a highly 

flexible method for providing access based on the evaluation of 

attributes. 

There has not been a comprehensive effort to formally 

define or guide the implementation of ABAC within the Federal 

Government. This research provides considerations for using 

ABAC to improve information sharing within and among 

organizations while maintaining control of that information. The 

research serves a two-fold purpose; first, it aims to provide 

federal agencies with a definition of ABAC and a description of 

the functional components of ABAC. Second, it provides planning, 

design, implementation, and operational considerations for 

employing ABAC within a large enterprise with the goal of 

improving information sharing while maintaining control of that 

information.

In FY 2013, CSD completed the writing of SP 800-162, 

Guide to Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition 

and Considerations. SP 800-162 includes terminology and 

basic understanding of ABAC; ABAC enterprise employment 

considerations during the initiation, acquisition/development, 

implementation/assessment, and operations and maintenance 

phases; and example to demonstrate how ABAC is implemented 

in a Web Information Portal. CSD also researched ABAC formal 

models, the result will be presented in a NISTIR, which describes 

a variety of characteristics and applications of ABAC formal 

models. 

NIST conducted an Attribute Based Access Control Workshop, 

based on the SP 800-162, on July 17, 2013, in partnership 

with NSA and the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence 

(NCCoE). About 100 individuals from government, industries, 

and academia/research attended the event. The workshop 

provided attendees an opportunity to identify, refine, and guide 

the many interrelated considerations, challenges, and efforts 

needed to develop ABAC guidance; CSD updated SP 800-162 

from the suggestions collected at the workshop.
51

In FY 2014, CSD will continue research of ABAC formal models 

as well as details and extended topics of ABAC capabilities, 

such as Attribute Engineering/Management, Integration with 

Identity Management, Federation, Situation Awareness (Real 

Time or Contextual) Mechanism, Policy Management, and 

Natural Language Policy translation to Digital Policy. The ABAC 

project will pursue the following objectives:

 Provide readers the terminology and basic understanding 

of ABAC

 Provide readers with an overview of the current state of 

logical access control, a working definition of ABAC, and 

an explanation of core and enterprise ABAC concepts

 Assist security policy makers in establishing a business 

case for ABAC implementation, and acquiring an 

interoperable set of capabilities

 Assist ABAC developers in developing the operational 

requirements, and overall enterprise architecture

 Assist ABAC administrators in establishing or refining 

business processes to support ABAC

 Promote adoption of ABAC for more secure and flexible 

method for information sharing in standalone or 

enterprise environment

http://csrc.nist.gov/projects/abac/

Contacts:

Dr. Vincent Hu Mr. David Ferraiolo

(301) 975-4975 (301) 975-3046

vhu@nist.gov david.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Mr. Rick Kuhn

(301) 975-3337

kuhn@nist.gov

Advanced Security Testing and Measurements

aSecurity Automation and Continuous 

Monitoring

IT organizations operate a diverse set of computing assets 

which access, route, store, and process information that is 

critical to the operations of businesses and the missions of 

government agencies. These IT environments are frequently 

reconfigured, and are under constant threat of attack. The 

wide variety of computing products, the speed of configuration 

change, and the diversity of threats require organizations to 

maintain situational awareness over their IT assets and to 

utilize this information to make risk-based decisions. 

Security automation utilizes standardized data formats 

and transport protocols to enable data 

to be exchanged between business, 

operational, and security systems that 

support security processes by:

 Identifying IT assets

 Providing awareness over the 

operational state of computing 

devices

 Enabling security reference data 

to be collected from internal and 

external sources

 Supporting analysis processes 

that measure the effectiveness 

of security controls and provide 

visibility into security risks, enabling 

risk-based decision making

Commercial solutions built using 

security automation specifications enable 

the collection and harmonization of vast 

amounts of operational and security data 

into coherent, comparable information 

Figure 15: ABAC Access Control Mechanism Chart

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 52

streams to achieve situational awareness that informs timely 

and active management of diverse IT systems. Through the 

creation of reference data and guidance, and the international 

recognition of flexible, open standards, the NIST security 

automation program works to improve the interoperability, 

broad acceptance, and adoption of security automation 

solutions to address current and future security challenges, 

creating opportunities for innovation.

Specification, Standards, and Guidance Development 

To support the overarching security automation vision, it is 

necessary to have specifications that describe the required 

interactions between systems, standards that document 

international consensus approaches, and guidance that informs 

product development and implementation. Through close 

work with partners in government, industry, and academia, 

NIST continues to facilitate the definition and development of 

security automation approaches that enable organizations to 

understand and manage IT security risks. 

During FY 2013, NIST worked to build on previous security 

automation work by:

 Establishing working groups in standards development 

organizations to promote international consensus around 

standardized approaches

 Identifying and addressing gaps in the current 

specifications

 Evolving existing approaches to achieve greater 

scalability and impact

 Providing additional guidance on architectural, design, 

and analysis concerns

 Development and maintenance of tools and reference 

implementations

NIST is currently working with its partners in various standards 

development organizations, including the International 

Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Internet Engineering 

Task Force (IETF), the Forum of Incident Response and Security 

Teams (FIRST), and the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), to 

further mature and broaden adoption of security automation 

specifications, reference data, and techniques. This area of 

work is focused on evolving security automation specifications 

to integrate with existing transport protocols to provide for 

secure, interoperable exchange of security automation data. 

Additional work is focused on evolving security metrics 

and providing consensus guidance on security automation 

approaches. Through the definition and adoption of security 

automation standards and guidelines, IT vendors will be able 

to provide standardized security solutions to their customers. 

These solutions support continuous monitoring and automated, 

dynamic network defense capabilities based on analysis of data 

from operational and security data sources and the collective 

action of security components.

Security automation work has been focused in two areas: 

evolution and international adoption of the Security Content 

Automation Protocol (SCAP) and development of a Continuous 

Monitoring building block focused on secure software asset 

management capabilities. The following sections detail this 

work.

aSecurity Content Automation Protocol 

(SCAP)

SCAP is a multipurpose protocol 

that provides an automated means to 

collect and assess the state of devices. 

SCAP supports automated vulnerability 

checking, verifying the installation of 

patches, checking security configuration 

settings, verifying technical control 

compliance, measuring security, and examining systems for 

indicators of compromise. SCAP uses the Extensible Markup 

Language (XML) to standardize the format and nomenclature 

by which security software products communicate information 

about software flaws, security configurations, and other aspects 

of device state. SCAP enables security automation content, also 

known as “SCAP content,” to be expressed using standardized 

formats, identifiers, and scoring models. This content can be 

used by any tool that is conformant to the specifications, to 

collect and evaluate the state of software installed on a device.

SCAP has been widely adopted by major software and 

hardware manufacturers and has become a significant 

component of information security management and governance 

programs. SCAP-enabled tools are currently being used by the 

U.S. Government, critical infrastructure companies, academia, 

and other businesses, both domestically and internationally. 

Currently, CSD is leveraging SCAP in multiple areas, both to 

support its own mission and to enable other agencies and 

private sector entities to meet their goals. For CSD, SCAP is a 

critical component of the SCAP Validation Program, the National 

Vulnerability Database (NVD), and the National Checklist 

Program (NCP).

In September 2012, NIST published SP 800-126 Revision 2, 

The Technical Specification for the Security Content Automation 

Protocol (SCAP): SCAP Version 1.2, . That document describes 

the 11 component specifications composing SCAP.
53

SCAP 1.2 Specifications

Specification Description

Languages

Extensible Configuration 

Checklist Description 

Format (XCCDF)

Used for authoring security 

checklists/benchmarks and for 

reporting results of evaluating 

them

Open Vulnerability and 

Assessment Language 

(OVAL)

Used for representing system 

configuration information, 

assessing machine state, and 

reporting assessment results

Open Checklist Interactive 

Language (OCIL)

Used for representing checks 

that collect information from 

people or from existing data 

stores populated by other data 

collection methods

Reporting Formats

Asset Reporting Format 

(ARF)

Used to express information 

about assets and to define the 

relationships between assets 

and reports

Asset Identification Used to uniquely identify assets 

based on known identifiers and 

other asset information

Enumerations

Common Platform 

Enumeration (CPE)

A nomenclature and dictionary 

of hardware, operating systems, 

and applications; a method 

to identify applicability to 

platforms

Common Configuration 

Enumeration (CCE)

A nomenclature and 

dictionary of software security 

configurations

Common Vulnerabilities 

and Exposures (CVE)

A nomenclature and dictionary 

of security-related software 

flaws

Measurement and Scoring Systems

Common Vulnerability 

Scoring System (CVSS)

Used for measuring the relative 

severity of software flaws

Common Configuration 

Scoring System (CCSS)

Used for measuring the relative 

severity of device security 

(mis-)configuration issues

Content and Result Integrity

Trust Model for Security 

Automation Data (TMSAD)

Guidance for using digital 

signatures in a common trust 

model applied to security 

automation specifications

Since the release of SCAP 1.2, NIST has worked to improve 

guidance around the SCAP specifications by promoting broader 

international adoption of SCAP, encouraging the integration of 

SCAP into other standards, and by adapting SCAP to address 

specific gaps and challenges. The following work activities 

were performed during FY 2013:

NIST released draft NISTIR 7946, CVSS Implementation 

Guidance, which guides analysts scoring IT vulnerabilities using 

the CVSS Version 2.0. That document is the result of applying the 

CVSS specification to score over 50,000 vulnerabilities analyzed 

by the NVD. The report reviews the CVSS base metrics and 

provides guidance for difficult and/or unique scoring situations 

and assists vulnerability analysts with scoring particular 

types of vulnerabilities by identifying common keywords and 

phrases that often appear in vulnerability alerts. The report 

includes a collection of scored IT vulnerabilities from the NVD, 

a justification for each score provided, and a description of the 

NVD vulnerability scoring process.

NIST, in collaboration with industry partners in the IETF, 

established the Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring 

(SACM) working group, chartered in July 2013. The current 

scope of work for SACM includes identifying and/or defining 

the transport protocols and data formats needed to support 

the collection and evaluation of device state against expected 

values and standards for interacting with repositories of security 

automation content. The initial focus of the SACM working group 

is on identifying use cases, requirements, and architectural 

models to inform decisions about existing specifications and 

standards that can be referenced, required modifications or 

extensions to existing specifications and standards, and any 

gaps that need to be addressed. This working group provides 

a venue for advancing appropriate SCAP specifications into 

international standards and addressing identified gap areas.

For more information, please refer to: 

http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/sacm/charter/

Additionally, NIST collaborated with industry partners to revise 

the ISO/IEC 19770-2:2009 standard, Information technology -- 

Software asset management -- Part 2: Software identification 

tag, which establishes a specification for tagging software 

to support identification and management. This software 

identification (SWID) data model provides a mechanism for 

software publishers to provide authoritative identification, 

categorization, software relationship (e.g., dependency, 

bundling, and patch), file footprint details, and other software 

metadata for software they publish. This information enhances 

SCAP use cases by providing authoritative information for 

creation of CPE names, targeting of checklists, and associating 

software flaws to products based on a defect in a software 

library or executable.

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 54

NIST also worked with government and industry partners 

in the TCG to define a number of specifications related to 

the Trusted Network Connect (TNC) protocols. The first such 

publication is the TNC SCAP Messages for IF-M specification 

that supports carrying SCAP content and results over the TNC 

protocols. The second is the TNC Enterprise Compliance Profile 

(ECP) and related specifications that support the exchange of 

SWID data over the TNC protocols. The ECP enables collection 

of SWID data from a device for use by external tools to provide 

software inventory information. SCAP and SWID data collected 

using these mechanisms may be optionally used for network 

access control decision making, allowing device state to be 

evaluated when devices connect and on an ongoing basis 

thereafter.

For more information on these specifications, please visit:

http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/tnc_

scap_messages_for_ifm, and

http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/tnc_

endpoint_compliance_profile_specification.

Finally, NIST participated in two Forum of Incident Response 

and Security Teams (FIRST) Special Interest Groups (SIG). The 

CVSS SIG (CVSS-SIG) focused on defining CVSS Revision 3, 

which is intended to implement improvements to the scoring 

model based on community feedback. The CVSS-SIG plans to 

release a draft of the revision in early FY 2014, with a completed 

approved specification expected in the summer of 2014. The 

second SIG, the Vulnerability Reporting and Data eXchange 

SIG (VRDX-SIG), researches and recommends methods for 

identifying and exchanging vulnerability information across 

disparate vulnerability databases.

For more information, please visit: 

http://www.first.org/global/sigs.

Through work with international SDOs, SCAP and related 

security automation capabilities are expected to evolve and 

expand in support of the growing need to define and measure 

effective security controls, assess and monitor ongoing 

aspects of information security, remediate noncompliance, 

and successfully manage systems in accordance with the Risk 

Management Framework described in SP 800-37 Revision 1, 

Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal 

Information Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach.

http://scap.nist.gov/

Contact:

Mr. David Waltermire

(301) 975-3390

david.waltermire@nist.gov

aContinuous Monitoring

In September 2010, the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) released the Continuous Asset Evaluation, Situational 

Awareness and Risk Scoring (CAESARS) Reference Architecture 

Report. This report identifies commonality and strengths in 

the custom approaches used by civilian agencies to provide 

solutions that enable the continuous monitoring of IT systems. 

This report identifies “essential functional components 

of a security risk scoring system, independent of specific 

technologies, products, or vendors.” It describes the use of 

security automation specifications, such as the SCAP, to enable 

continuous monitoring solutions.

In October 2010, the Federal Chief Information Officer 

Council’s Information Security and Identity Management 

Committee’s (ISIMC) subcommittee on Continuous Monitoring 

and Risk Scoring saw the need to create a technical initiative 

to expand upon the CAESARS architecture to better scale it to 

large enterprises (e.g., the entire U.S. Government). A team of 

researchers from the NSA Information Assurance Directorate 

(IAD), the DHS Federal Network Security CAESARS team, and 

NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) worked together 

to respond to this need. The draft CAESARS Framework 

Extension (CAESARS-FE) described by Draft NISTIR 7756, 

CAESARS Framework Extension: An Enterprise Continuous 

Monitoring Technical Reference Architecture, is the output of 

this collaboration.

Draft NISTIR 7756 presents an enterprise continuous 

monitoring (ConMon) technical reference architecture that 

extends the framework provided by the DHS’s CAESARS 

architecture. The primary goal of this effort is to enable enterprise 

ConMon by supporting the development and deployment 

of capabilities that support automated, enterprise-wide 

ConMon functions. The concepts, workflows, and subsystems 

presented in this document can be used by organizations 

seeking to establish federated queries, orchestration of data 

collection tasks, data analytics, and presentation and reporting 

capabilities across a diverse portfolio of security and IT 

products. CAESARS-FE supports IT operations and network 

defense capabilities, with compliance reporting as a byproduct 

of actual security monitoring and improvement. CAESARS-FE 

enables organizations to design, develop, and deploy ConMon 

capabilities by leveraging their existing security and IT tools 

while minimizing custom tool integration efforts. CAESARSFE defines the requisite functionality needed to ensure 

the interoperability of vendor products while continuing to 

encourage security tool vendor participation and innovation. 

To advance the state of the art in continuous monitoring 

capabilities and to further interoperability within commercially 

available tools, CSD is working within the international 
55

standards development community to establish working groups 

and to author and comment on emerging technical standards in 

this area. The CAESARS-FE reference architecture will evolve 

as greater consensus is developed around interoperable, 

standards-based approaches that enable continuous monitoring 

of IT systems. In early FY 2014, CSD plans to release an 

update to NISTIR 7756 that provides additional guidance for 

development of ConMon architectures and solutions based on 

ongoing standards activities and feedback.

The NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) 

is also working to develop a series of ConMon building blocks 

that demonstrate cybersecurity solutions that apply across 

multiple industry sectors. The first building block, currently 

under development, proposes a standardized approach to 

software asset management, providing an organization with 

an integrated view of software throughout its lifecycle. The 

building block will support:

 Authorization and verification of software installation 

media – Verifies that the media is from a trusted 

software publisher and that the installation media has 

not been tampered with

 Software execution whitelisting – Verifies that the 

software is authorized to run and has not been tampered 

with

 Publication of installed software inventory – A device 

that securely communicates what software is installed to 

an organization-wide database

 Software inventory-based network access control – A 

device’s level of access to a network is determined by 

what software is or is not present on the device and 

whether its patches are up to date

The building block document, Continuous Monitoring Building 

Block: Software Asset Management, can be viewed at http://

csrc.nist.gov/nccoe/Building-Blocks/conmon.html. In FY 2014, 

the team will continue to develop this building block and to work 

with vendors to develop a solutions demonstration. Through this 

process, CSD provides publically available descriptions of the 

practical steps needed to implement the technical approaches 

defined by the building block.

Contact:

Mr. David Waltermire

(301) 975-3390

david.waltermire@nist.gov

Security Automation Reference Data 

Through the NVD and the National Checklist Program (NCP), 

NIST is providing relevant and important reference data in the 

areas of vulnerability and configuration management. SCAP, 

and the programs that leverage it, are moving the information 

assurance industry towards being able to standardize 

communications, and the collection and storage of relevant data 

in standardized formats, and provide automated means for the 

assessment and remediation of systems for both vulnerabilities 

and configuration compliance. 

aNational Vulnerability Database (NVD)

Security automation reference data is currently housed 

within the NVD. The NVD is the U.S. Government repository 

of security automation data based on security automation 

specifications. This data provides a standards-based foundation 

for the automation of software asset, vulnerability, and security 

configuration management; security measurement; and 

compliance activities. This data supports security automation 

efforts based on the SCAP. The NVD includes databases of 

security configuration checklists for the NCP, listings of publicly 

known software flaws, product names, and impact metrics. A 

formal validation program tests the ability of vendor products to 

use some forms of security automation data based on a product’s 

conformance in support of specific enterprise capabilities.

SCAP defines the structure of standardized software flaws 

and security configuration reference data, also known as 

SCAP content. This reference data is provided by the NVD 

(http://nvd.nist.gov/).

The NVD is the U.S. Government repository of standardsbased vulnerability management reference data. The NVD 

provides information regarding security vulnerabilities and 

configuration settings, vulnerability impact metrics, technical 

assessment methods, and references to remediation assistance 

and IT product identification data. As of October 2013, the NVD 

contained the following resources:

 Over 58,000 vulnerability advisories with an average of 8 

new vulnerabilities added daily

 52 SCAP-expressed checklists containing thousands 

of low-level security configuration checks that can be 

used by SCAP-validated security products to perform 

automated evaluations of system state

 173 non-SCAP security checklists (e.g., English prose 

guidance and configuration scripts)

 248 U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (USCERT) alerts, 2,771 US-CERT vulnerability summaries, 

and 8,140 SCAP machine-readable software flaw checks

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 56

 Product dictionary with over 79,000 operating system, 

application, and hardware name entries

 42,954 vulnerability advisories translated into Spanish

NVD is hosted and maintained by NIST and is sponsored by 

the Department of Homeland Security’s US-CERT.

The use of SCAP data by commercial security products, 

deployed in thousands of organizations worldwide, has 

extended NVD’s effective reach. Increasing demand for NVD 

XML data feeds and SCAP-expressed content from the NVD 

website demonstrates increased adoption of SCAP.

NVD continues to play a pivotal role in the Payment Card 

Industry (PCI) efforts to mitigate vulnerabilities in credit card 

systems. PCI mandates the use of NVD vulnerability severity 

scores in measuring the risk to payment card servers worldwide 

and for prioritizing vulnerability patching. PCI’s use of NVD 

severity scores helps enhance credit card transaction security 

and protects consumers’ personal information.

Throughout FY 2013, NVD continued to provide access to 

vulnerability reference data and security checklists. CSD updated 

the NVD to support the latest CPE Naming specification, CPE 

2.3, and produces the official CPE dictionary in multiple formats. 

NVD now hosts the list of configuration items, complementing 

the configuration checklist data already maintained. NVD data 

is substantially increasing the security of networks worldwide 

and it is a fundamental component of CSD’s security automation 

infrastructure. CSD plans to update and improve the NVD in 

FY 2014 to include improvements in user navigation, addition 

of references to the SP 800-53 Revision 4 security controls 

content, and the ability to search, browse, and download 

common configuration enumeration (CCE) list data.

http://nvd.nist.gov

Contact:

Mr. Harold Booth

(301) 975-8441

harold.booth@nist.gov

aComputer Security Incident Coordination

Recognizing that even well-engineered and administered 

computing systems are sometimes successfully attacked, it is 

important to establish and maintain processes and procedures 

to recover from attacks when defensive mechanisms are 

breached. NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-61 Revision 2, 

Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, provides guidance 

on establishing and operating a Computer Security Incident 

Response Team (CSIRT). A wide-ranging attack may affect 

numerous organizations. When an attack has the potential to 

affect computing systems in multiple organizations, coordination 

among separate CSIRTs can make it possible to limit the 

damage caused by an attack, speed recovery operations, and 

maintain a higher level of operational security.

CSD is working with the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) to develop guidance on Computer Security Incident 

Coordination (CSIC). The goal of CSIC is to help diverse 

collections of organizations to effectively collaborate in the 

handling of computer security incidents. Effective collaboration 

raises numerous issues on how and when to share information 

between organizations, and in what form information should be 

shared. Because different organizations may have substantially 

different capabilities for responding to attacks, diagnosing 

causes, and handling sensitive attack-related information, 

guidance must provide a framework to help organizations 

interoperate despite their organizational differences.

This initiative will develop a NIST SP that provides guidance 

on how organizations can develop collaborative capabilities in 

advance of incidents in order to be prepared to operate swiftly 

and with coordination during incidents. The guidance will 

cover data handling considerations, such as sensitivity, data 

collection and retention practices, data standards, redaction, 

and use of tools such as anonymization. The guidance will help 

incident responders to understand when data can be shared, 

when it should not be shared, and when sharing is essential. 

A key element in the approach is the concept of an integrated, 

functionally-composed incident response team. The objective 

of a functionally-composed team is to enable each organization 

to contribute most in technical areas where that organization 

has higher relative levels of expertise and readiness, thus 

speeding incident detection, analysis, containment, eradication, 

and recovery.

In FY 2014, CSD plans to complete a Draft Special Publication 

providing guidance for Computer Security Incident Coordination 

and organize a workshop focused on the issues of incident 

coordination. 

Contacts:

Mr. Lee Badger Mr. David Waltermire

(301) 975-3176 (301) 975-3390

lee.badger@nist.gov david.waltermire@nist.gov

aIncident Handling Automation

In recent years, security threats to digital systems have 

become more prevalent and more sophisticated. While some 

security threats are generic in nature, others are targeted at 

specific organizations, assets, and missions. Although computer 
57

security defenses may forestall many threats, not all can be 

prevented, and organizations must therefore develop incident 

handling capabilities. Incident handling encompasses a variety 

of tasks ranging from preparation prior to an incident, to timely 

detection and analysis of an incident, to recovery and repair 

from the effects of an incident, to post-incident learning and 

improvement. These tasks need to be performed both internally 

within specific organizations and externally via coordination 

across teams of collaborating organizations. 

In the past year, NIST worked with the Department of Homeland 

Security’s United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 

(US-CERT) to develop Revision 2 of NIST Special Publication 

800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide. This 

document provides guidance on developing incident handling 

capabilities. The document explains the nature of incidents 

and incident handling processes, the structure and operation 

of Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT), and 

provides guidance on handling an incident and coordinating 

with other organizations.

SP 800-61 Revision 2 focuses primarily on manual (human) 

processes for incident handling and the effective use of human 

judgment, guided by applicable regulation and law, regarding 

which incident-related information is significant and which 

incident-related information may be shared. The growing 

volume of security threats, however, is driving the need for a 

more agile incident-handling framework that can operate at 

differing scales and speeds as required. 

Working in concert with the DHS, NIST is expanding existing 

incident handling guidance to enable coordinated information 

sharing across disparate CSIRTs operating at differing scales 

and speeds. This work will include the analysis of standardized 

incident handling data models and the incorporation of these 

data models, as appropriate, into both CSIRT information sharing 

processes as well as incident/threat knowledge repositories. 

This work will describe how mature CSIRTs may operate in a 

diverse information-sharing network with both operational and 

strategic CSIRTs, as well as industry knowledge repositories. 

This may include selective use of security automation where 

applicable.

In FY 2014, this work will develop Draft SP 800-150, 

Coordinated Computer Security Incident Handling Guidance.

Contacts:

Mr. Lee Badger Mr. David Waltermire

(301) 975-3176 (301) 975-3390

lee.badger@nist.gov david.waltermire@nist.gov

aNational Checklist Program (NCP)

There are many threats to information technology (IT), ranging 

from remotely launched network service exploits to malicious 

code spread through infected emails, websites, and downloaded 

files. Vulnerabilities in IT products are discovered daily, and 

many ready-to-use exploitation techniques are widely available 

on the Internet. Because IT products are often intended for a 

wide variety of audiences, restrictive security configuration 

controls are usually not enabled by default. As a result, many 

out-of-the box IT products are immediately vulnerable. In 

addition, identifying a reasonable set of security settings that 

achieve balanced risk management is a complicated, arduous, 

and time-consuming task, even for experienced system 

administrators.

To facilitate development of security configuration checklists 

for IT products and to make checklists more organized and 

usable, NIST established the National Checklist Program 

(NCP) in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities under 

the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 

2002, Public Law 107-347, and also under the Cyber Security 

Research and Development Act, which tasks NIST to “develop, 

and revise as necessary, a checklist setting forth settings and 

option selections that minimize the security risks associated 

with each computer hardware or software system that is, or is 

likely to become, widely used within the Federal Government.” 

In February 2008, revised Part 39 of the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) was published. Paragraph (d) of section 39.101 

states, “In acquiring information technology, agencies shall 

include the appropriate IT security policies and requirements, 

including use of common security configurations available 

from the NIST website at http://checklists.nist.gov. Agency 

contracting officers should consult with the requiring official to 

ensure the appropriate standards are incorporated.”

In Memorandum M-08-22, the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) mandated the use of SCAP-validated products for 

continuous monitoring of Federal Desktop Core Configuration 

(FDCC) compliance. The NCP strives to encourage and make 

simple agencies’ compliance with these mandates.

The goals of the NCP are to:

 Facilitate development and sharing of checklists by 

providing a formal framework for checklist developers to 

submit checklists to NIST

 Provide guidance to developers to help them create 

standardized, high-quality checklists that conform to 

common operations environments

 Help developers and users by providing guidelines for 

making checklists better documented and more usable

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 58

 Encourage software vendors and other parties to develop 

checklists

 Provide a managed process for the review, update, and 

maintenance of checklists

 Provide an easy-to-use repository of checklists

 Encourage the use of automation technologies (e.g., 

SCAP) for checklist application

There are 225 checklists posted on the website; 52 of the 

checklists are SCAP-expressed and can be used with SCAPvalidated products. In FY 2013, a total of 16 SCAP-expressed 

checklists were contributed to the NCP from other federal 

agencies and product vendors.

Organizations can use checklists obtained from the NCP 

website for automated security configuration patch assessment. 

NCP currently hosts SCAP checklists for Internet Explorer 9.0, 

Internet Explorer 10.0, Office 2010, Red Hat Enterprise Linux, 

Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, and other 

products.

To assist users in identifying automated checklist content, 

NCP groups checklists into tiers, from Tier I to Tier IV. NCP 

uses the tiers to rank checklists according to their automation 

capability. Tier III and IV checklists include SCAP content and 

have been validated by the SCAP content validation tool as 

conforming to the requirements outlined in SP 800-126, The 

Technical Specification for the Security Content Automation 

Protocol (SCAP). Tier IV checklists are considered productionready and have been validated by NIST or a NIST recognized 

authoritative entity to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, 

interoperability with SCAP-validated products.

Tier III checklists use SCAP content to document security 

settings and should be compatible with SCAP-validated 

products. Tier II checklists document recommended security 

settings in a machine-readable, nonstandard format, such as 

a proprietary format or a product-specific configuration script. 

Tier I checklists are prose-based and contain no machinereadable content. Users can browse the checklists based on 

the checklist tier, IT product, IT product category, or authority, 

and also through a keyword search that searches the checklist 

name and summary for user specified terms. The search results 

show the detailed checklist metadata and a link to any SCAP 

content for the checklist, as well as links to any supporting 

resources associated with the checklist.

To assist checklist developers, the NCP provides both 

manual and automated interfaces to facilitate submission and 

maintenance processes. The manual interface consists of a 

web application that guides the submitter through the data 

entry process to ensure that all of the required information 

is submitted. The submission is validated upon review, and a 

report is returned to the submitting organization, verifying either 

acceptance or rejection based on the criteria requirements. 

For instance, Tier III and Tier IV checklists require validation 

using the SCAP Content Validation Tool (this tool is available for 

download via http://scap.nist.gov/revision/1.2/#tools).

The NCP is defined in SP 800-70 Revision 2, National 

Checklist Program for IT Products—Guidelines for 

Checklist Users and Developers, which can be found at 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html.

http://checklists.nist.gov

Contact:

Mr. Stephen Quinn

(301) 975-6967

stephen.quinn@nist.gov

aUnited States Government Configuration 

Baseline (USGCB) / FDCC Baselines

The United States Government Configuration Baseline 

(USGCB) initiative creates security configuration baselines for 

information technology (IT) products widely deployed across the 

federal agencies. The project evolved from the Federal Desktop 

Core Configuration (FDCC) mandate originally described in a 

March 2007 memorandum from the U.S. White House Office 

of Management and Budget (Memorandum M-07-11). USGCB 

helps to improve information security and reduce overall IT 

operating costs by providing commonly accepted security 

configurations for major operating systems.

Through the National Checklist Program described in SP 

800-70 Revision 2, National Checklist Program for IT Products: 

Guidelines for Checklist Users and Developers, a baseline 

submitter may express interest in submitting a candidate for 

use in the USGCB program.

CSD provides ongoing support for the USGCB automation 

content, including the creation of patch updates, assisting 

USGCB users in continuously monitoring and assessing security 

compliance of information systems. This ongoing monitoring 

element supports the Risk Management Framework described in 

SP 800-37 Revision 1, Guide for Applying the Risk Management 

Framework to Federal Information Systems: A Security Life 

Cycle Approach.

During FY 2013, a supplemental USGCB SCAP 1.0 content for 

Microsoft Windows XP, Vista and 7 was released to correct an 

issue with directory server performance caused by the existing 

USGCB content.
59

The USGCB Program will continue in FY 2014 to provide 

ongoing maintenance of the baseline artifacts and to consider 

additional applicable platforms.

Contact:

Mr. Stephen Quinn

(301) 975-6967

stephen.quinn@nist.gov

aApple OS X Security Configuration

CSD is working with Apple to develop secure system 

configuration baselines supporting different operational 

environments for Apple OS X, Version 10.8, Mountain Lion. 

These configuration guidelines will assist organizations with 

hardening OS X technologies and provide a basis for unified 

controls and settings for OS X workstations and for mobile 

system security configurations for federal agencies.

The configurations will be based on a collection of resources, 

including the existing NIST OS X configuration guidance, the OS 

X security configuration guide, the Department of Defense (DoD) 

OS X Recommended Settings, and the Defense Information 

Systems Agency (DISA) OS X Security Technical Implementation 

Guide (STIG). Our team is aggregating appropriately 400 initial 

settings, determining which settings will be included in the 

configuration baseline, and determining appropriate values for 

each included setting. As the desired configuration items are 

established, our team is developing shell scripts that apply the 

settings to an OS X 10.8 system. The settings are organized 

into three key baselines, which are appropriate for different 

environments: 

 Enterprise baseline is appropriate for centrally managed, 

networked systems. 

 Small Office Home Office baseline is appropriate for 

systems that are deployed remotely but need to connect 

to enterprise networks. 

 Special Security Limited Functionality baseline is 

appropriate for systems where security requirements are 

more stringent and where the implementation of security 

safeguards is likely to reduce functionality. 

SCAP, defined and discussed in other sections of this report, 

is used to express configuration settings and check system 

configuration compliance. 

During FY 2013, CSD provided a block of initial settings 

to Apple and these settings are being posted for the Apple 

community on a periodic basis for public review, discussion, 

correction and agreement. Each setting will have a designated 

Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE) number, which will 

aid in long-term tracking of the setting. Once these settings 

are vetted and curated by Apple, these settings will be tested 

and included in the configuration baselines. In addition, CSD 

is producing a draft guideline, Guide to Securing Apple OS X 

10.8 Systems for IT Professionals. This guidance, similar in 

structure to the NIST SP 800-68, Windows XP Security Guide, 

will provide detailed information about the security of Apple OS 

X 10.8, and will provide security configuration guidelines for the 

Apple OS X 10.8 operating system.

In FY 2014, CSD plans to complete the scripts for the 

remaining initial settings and post them to the Apple community 

for feedback. CSD will also continue the development of 

the draft Guide to Securing Apple OS X 10.8 Systems for IT 

Professionals; this documentation will then be made available 

for public comment. 

Contacts:

Mr. Lee Badger Ms. Kathy Ton-Nu

(301) 975-3176 (301) 975-3361

lee.badger@nist.gov kathy.ton-nu@nist.gov

Mr. Lawrence Keys

(301) 975-5482

lawrence.keys@nist.gov

Validation Programs

aSecurity Content Automation Protocol 

(SCAP) Validation Program

The SCAP Validation Program performs conformance testing 

to ensure that products correctly implement SCAP as defined 

in SP 800-126 Revision 2, The Technical Specification for the 

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP): SCAP Version 1.2. 

Conformance testing is necessary because SCAP is a complex 

specification consisting of eleven individual specifications 

that work together to support various use cases. A single 

error in product implementation could result in undetected 

vulnerabilities or policy noncompliance within agency and 

industry networks.

In FY 2013, CSD updated the SCAP Validation Program to 

support the testing of products against SCAP version 1.2. The 

division published NISTIR 7511 Revision 3, Security Content 

Automation Protocol (SCAP) Version 1.2 Validation Program 

Test Requirements, which introduces a modular approach 

with respect to the platforms that vendors may support. Public 

validation test content was published , thus providing reference 

materials that support conformance testing by industry and 

end users. The SCAP 1.2 public test content provides vendors 

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 60

with the materials required for quality assurance testing prior 

to entering formal SCAP testing by an NVLAP accredited SCAP 

lab. The SCAP Validation Program resources web page was 

introduced to provide the public with a centralized location for 

all resources and information necessary to prepare products 

for SCAP 1.2 validation. The resources provided include 

documentation, a list of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), 

the SCAP test content, and tools for validating and processing 

SCAP data streams. CSD updated the SCAP Content Validation 

Tool (SCAPVal), used for validating that data streams adhere to 

the SCAP specification, to include support for SCAP 1.2. The 

update for SCAP 1.2 included open source SCAP reference 

implementation tools that are used to process SCAP data 

streams.

End users may use the SCAP Validation Program resources 

page to learn more about the validation program and download 

reference materials. The program currently has seven 

independent laboratories accredited for SCAP 1.2 product 

testing and several products are undergoing testing.

The SCAP Validation Program will expand in FY 2014 to 

provide enhanced testing support and will focus on increased 

test coverage by SCAP reference implementation tools. 

Expansion plans also include improvements in automated 

testing capabilities.

http://scap.nist.gov/validation/

Contact:

Ms. Melanie Cook

(301) 975-5259

melanie.cook@nist.gov

aCryptographic Programs and Laboratory 

Accreditation

The Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) and 

the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) were 

developed by NIST to support the needs of the user community 

for strong, independently tested, and commercially available 

cryptographic algorithms and modules. Through these programs, 

NIST works with private and governmental sectors and the 

cryptographic community to achieve security, interoperability, 

and assurance of correct implementation. The goal of these 

programs is to support the use of validated algorithms, and 

modules and to provide federal agencies with a security metric 

to use in procuring cryptographic modules. The testing carried 

out by independent third-party laboratories accredited by the 

NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program 

(NVLAP) and the validations performed by the CMVP and CAVP 

programs provide this metric. Federal agencies, industry, and 

the public can choose cryptographic modules and/or products 

containing cryptographic modules from the CMVP Validated 

Modules List and have confidence in the claimed level of 

security and assurance of correct implementation.

Cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic module testing 

and validation are based on underlying published standards . 

As federal agencies are required to use validated cryptographic 

modules for the protection of sensitive non-classified 

information, the validated modules and the validated algorithms 

that the modules contain represent the culmination and delivery 

of the division’s cryptography-based work to the end user.

The CAVP and the CMVP are separate, collaborative 

programs based on a partnership between NIST’s CSD and the 

Communication Security Establishment Canada (CSEC).. The 

CAVP and the CMVP validate algorithms and modules used in 

a wide variety of products, including secure Internet browsers, 

secure radios, smart cards, space based communications, 

munitions, security tokens, mobile phones, network and storage 

devices, and products supporting Public Key Infrastructure 

(PKI) and electronic commerce. A module may be a standalone 

product, such as a virtual private network (VPN) or smart card or 

it could be a module used in several products, such as a toolkit. 

As a result, a small number of modules may be incorporated 

within hundreds of products. The CAVP validates cryptographic 

algorithms that may be integrated in one or more cryptographic 

modules.

The CAVP and CMVP validation programs provide documented 

methodologies for conformance testing through defined sets 

of security requirements. For CAVP, the validation system 

documents are designed for each FIPS-approved and NISTrecommended cryptographic algorithm. See website for a 

listing. Security requirements for the CMVP are found in FIPS 

140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules

and the associated test metrics and methods in Derived Test 

Requirements for FIPS 140-2. The four Annexes to FIPS 140-2 

reference the underlying cryptographic algorithm standards or 

methods. The CMVP developed Derived Test Requirements for 

FIPS 140-2 defines the test metrics and methods and ensures 

repeatability of tests and equivalency in results across the 

testing laboratories.

The CMVP reviews the cryptographic modules validation 

requests and, as a byproduct of the review, is attentive to 

emerging and/or changing technologies and the evolution 

of operating environments and complex systems during the 

module validation review activities. Likewise, the CAVP reviews 

the cryptographic algorithm validation requests submitted by 

the accredited laboratories. With these insights, the CAVP and 

CMVP can perform research and development on evolving test 

metrics and methods. Based on this research, the CAVP and 

CMVP publish Implementation Guidance to assist vendors, 
61

testing laboratories, and the user community. This guidance 

provides clarity, consistency of interpretation, and insight for 

successful conformance testing, validation, and revalidation.

Figure 17: FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2 Validated 

Modules by Year and Level

The unique position of the validation programs gives the 

CMVP the opportunity to acquire insight during the validation 

review activities and results in practical, timely, and up-to-date 

guidance that is needed by the testing laboratories and vendors 

to move their modules out to the user community in a timely 

and cost-effective manner and with the assurance of thirdparty conformance testing. This knowledge and insight provide 

a foundation for future standards development.

The CAVP and the CMVP have stimulated improved quality and 

security assurance of cryptographic modules. The latest set of 

statistics, which are collected quarterly from each of the testing 

laboratories, shows that 7% of the cryptographic algorithms 

and 35% of the cryptographic modules brought in for voluntary 

testing had security flaws that were corrected during testing. 

To date, over 2,004 cryptographic module validation certificates 

have been issued, representing over 4,811 modules that were 

validated by the CMVP. These modules have been developed by 

more than 425 domestic and international vendors.

Figure 18: FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2 Validation 

Certificates by Fiscal Year and Level

General Flow of FIPS 140-2 Testing and Validation

NVLAP Accredited

FIPS 140-2

CST Lab

Cryptographic Module 

Vendor

1

NIST/CSEC

Issue validation

certificate

(via lab to the 

vendor)

CST Test Report to NIST/CSEC for validation;

Module Review Pending

Test for conformance

To FIPS 140-2;

Completes test report

Vendor selects a lab;

Submits module for testing;

Module IUT

Lab submits

questions for

guidance and

clarification

Module’s

Test Report

NIST/CSEC issue

testing and

Implementation

Guidance

FIPS 140-2

List of Validated

Modules

1a

3

2

5a

5 Finalization;

NIST adds module to

validated modules list at

www.nist.gov/cmvp

Reviewer Assigned

Module Under Review

4 Module

Coordination

Cost Recovery Fee

Received Prior to 

Validation

Figure 16: General Flow of FIPS 140-2 Testing and Validation

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 62

The CAVP issued 2,288 algorithm validations and the CMVP 

issued 191 module validation certificates in FY 2013. The 

number of algorithms and modules submitted for validation 

continues to grow, representing significant growth in the 

number of validations expected to be available in the future.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM

Contacts:

CMVP Contact: CAVP Contact:

Mr. Randall J. Easter Ms. Sharon Keller

(301) 975-4641 (301) 975-2910

randall.easter@nist.gov sharon.keller@nist.gov

aAutomated Security Testing and Test 

Suite Development

NIST’s CAVP utilizes the requirements and specifications of 

the algorithm FIPS and Special Publications (SPs) written by the 

Cryptography Technology Group (CTG) to develop algorithm test 

suites and automated security testing. The CAVP is responsible 

for providing assurance that the algorithms contained in modules 

are implemented correctly. The CAVP does this by designing 

and developing conformance testing for implementations of 

these algorithms.

CAVP Validation Status For FY13

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Oct '12

Nov '12

Dec '12

Jan '13

Feb '13

Mar '13

Apr '13

May '13

Jun '13

Jul '13

Aug '13

Sep '13

TDES

SHA

RSA

RNG

KDF

KAS

HMAC

ECDSA

DSA

DRBG

ComponentTest

AES

CAVP Validation Status By FYs 

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

FY1996FY1998FY2000FY2002FY2004FY2006FY2008FY2010FY2012FY2014

TDES

SJ

SHA

RSA

RNG

KDF

KAS

HMAC

ECDSA

DSA

DRBG

DES

Component

Test

AES

CAVP Validated Implementation Actual Numbers

Updated As Wednesday, November 06, 2013

FiscalYear AES Comp. DES DSA DRBGECDSAHMAC KAS KDF RNG RSA SHA SJ TDES Total

FY1996 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

FY1997 0 0 11 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 2 0 26

FY1998 0 0 27 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 42

FY1999 0 0 30 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 1 0 57

FY2000 0 0 29 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 1 28 77

FY2001 0 0 41 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 51 135

FY2002 30 0 44 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59 6 58 218

FY2003 66 0 49 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 3 73 278

FY2004 82 0 41 17 0 0 0 0 0 28 22 77 0 70 337

FY2005 145 0 54 31 0 14 115 0 0 108 80 122 2 102 773

FY2006 131 0 3 33 0 19 87 0 0 91 63 120 1 83 631

FY2007 238 0 0 63 0 35 127 0 0 137 130 171 1 136 1038

FY2008 271 0 0 77 4 41 158 0 0 137 129 191 0 122 1130

FY2009 373 0 0 71 23 33 193 6 0 142 143 224 1 138 1347

FY2010 399 0 0 70 31 39 179 12 0 150 155 239 0 142 1416

FY2011 440 7 0 102 79 68 201 34 0 148 183 255 0 177 1694

FY2012 599 24 0 121 122 92 283 20 3 157 231 323 1 248 2224

FY2013 689 85 0 106 145 113 276 12 9 132 208 293 0 217 2285

FY2014 48 28 0 9 22 6 26 0 1 2 22 30 0 17 211

Page 1 of 2

Figure 19: CAVP Validation Status by FYs

Figure 20: CAVP Validation Status for FY 2013 

Figure 21: CAVP Validated Implementation Actual Numbers
63

The conformance tests consist of a suite of validation 

tests for each approved cryptographic algorithm. These tests 

exercise the mathematical formulas and the algorithmic 

requirements detailed in the algorithm to assure that the 

detailed specifications are implemented correctly and 

completely. If the implementer deviates from or excludes any 

part of these instructions or requirements, the validation test 

will fail, indicating that the algorithm implementation does not 

function properly or is incomplete.

CAVP-developed validation tests are performed by accredited 

testing laboratories on a vendor’s algorithm implementation 

using automated known-answer tests, which compare the result 

from a cryptographic operation with a specific input against the 

expected result. They provide a uniform way to assure that the 

cryptographic algorithm implementation adheres to the detailed 

specifications.

There are several types of validation tests, all designed 

to satisfy the testing requirements of the cryptographic 

algorithms and their specifications. These include, but are not 

limited to, Known-Answer Tests, Monte Carlo Tests, and MultiBlock Message Tests. The Known-Answer Tests are designed 

to examine the individual components of the algorithm by 

supplying known values to the variables and verifying the 

expected result. The Monte Carlo Test is designed to exercise 

the entire IUT. This test is designed to detect the presence of 

implementation flaws that are not detected with the controlled 

input of the Known-Answer Tests. The types of implementation 

flaws detected by this validation test include pointer problems, 

insufficient allocation of space, improper error handling, and 

incorrect behavior of the IUT. The Multi-Block Message Test 

(MMT) is designed to test the ability of the implementation to 

process multi-block messages, which require the chaining of 

information from one block to the next.

During the last few years, CSD has expanded its publications 

beyond only an algorithm’s specification into how an algorithm 

should be used. Many of these requirements are outside the 

scope of the algorithm boundary and therefore cannot be tested 

at the algorithm level by the CAVP. Some of the requirements 

are within the scope of the CMVP while others are outside the 

scope of both the CAVP and the CMVP. In the case where the 

requirement is outside the scope of the CAVP and the CMVP, the 

fulfillment of the requirements is the responsibility of entities 

using, installing, or configuring applications or protocols that 

use the cryptographic algorithms. For example, depending on 

the design of a cryptographic module, it may not be possible 

for the module to determine whether a specific key is used for 

multiple purposes, a situation that is strongly discouraged.

The CAVP currently has algorithm validation testing for the 

following cryptographic algorithms:

Cryptographic

Algorithm/Component

Special Publication 

or FIPS

Triple Data Encryption 

Standard (TDES)

SP 800-67, Recommendation 

for the Triple Data Encryption 

Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, and 

SP 800-38A, Recommendation for 

Block Cipher Modes of Operation– 

Methods and Techniques

Advanced Encryption 

Standard (AES)

FIPS 197, Advanced Encryption 

Standard, and SP 800-38A

Digital Signature 

Standard (DSS)

FIPS 186-2, Digital Signature 

Standard (DSS), with change 

notice 1, dated October 5, 2001

FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature 

Standard (DSS), dated July 2013

Elliptic Curve 

Digital Signature 

Algorithm (ECDSA)

FIPS 186-2, Digital Signature Standard 

(DSS), with change notice 1, dated 

October 5, 2001 and ANSI X9.62

FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard 

(DSS), dated July 2013 and ANSI X9.62

RSA algorithm ANSI X9.31 and Public Key 

Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 

v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard-2002

FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard 

(DSS), dated July 2013 and ANSI 

X9.31 and Public Key Cryptography 

Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA 

Cryptography Standard-2002

Hashing algorithms SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256, 

SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA512/224, SHA-512/256

FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard 

(SHS), dated March 2012

Random number 

generator (RNG) 

algorithms

FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.1 and 

3.2; ANSI X9.62 Appendix A.4

Deterministic Random 

Bit Generators (DRBG)

SP 800-90A, Recommendation for 

Random Number Generation Using 

Deterministic Random Bit Generators

Keyed-Hash Message 

Authentication 

Code (HMAC)

FIPS 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message 

Authentication Code (HMAC)

Counter with Cipher 

Block Chaining-Message 

Authentication Code

(CCM) mode

SP 800-38C, Recommendation 

for Block Cipher Modes of 

Operation: the CCM Mode for 

Authentication and Confidentiality

Cipher-based Message 

Authentication Code 

(CMAC) Mode for 

Authentication

SP 800-38B, Recommendation for 

Block Cipher Modes of Operation: 

The CMAC Mode for Authentication

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 64

Galois/Counter 

Mode (GCM) 

GMAC Mode of Operation

SP 800-38D, Recommendation for 

Block Cipher Modes of Operation: 

Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and 

GMAC, dated November 2007

XTS Mode of Operation SP800-38E, Recommendation 

for Block Cipher Modes of 

Operation: The XTS-AES

Mode for Confidentiality on 

Block-Oriented Storage Devices, 

dated January 2010

Key Agreement Schemes

and Key Confirmation

SP 800-56A, Recommendation 

for Pair-Wise Key Establishment 

Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm 

Cryptography, dated March 2007

All of SP 800-56A 

except KDF

SP 800-56A All sections except Section 

5.8 Key Derivation Functions for

Key Agreement Schemes

SP 800-56A 

Section 5.7.1.2

ECC CDH function

SP 800-56A Section 5.7.1.2 Elliptic 

Curve Cryptography Cofactor DiffieHellman (ECC CDH) Primitive Testing

Key-Based Key Derivation 

functions (KBKDF)

SP 800-108, Recommendation for 

Key Derivation using Pseudorandom 

Functions, dated October 2009

Application-Specific 

Key Derivation functions 

(ASKDF) (includes KDFs 

used by IKEv1, IKEv2, TLS, 

ANS X9.63-2001, SSH, 

SRTP, SNMP, and TPM)

SP 800-135 (Revision 1) 

Recommendation for Existing 

Application Specific key Derivation 

Functions, dated December 2011

Component test – ECDSA 

Signature Generation 

of hash value (This 

component test verifies 

the signing of a hashsized input. It does not 

verify the hashing of 

the original message 

to be signed.)

FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard 

(DSS), dated July 2013 and ANSI X9.62

Component test – RSA 

PKCS#1 1.5 Signature 

Generation of encoded 

message EM (This 

component test verifies 

the signing of an EM. 

It does not verify the 

formatting of the EM.)

FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard 

(DSS), dated July 2013 and Public Key 

Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 

v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard-2002

Component test – RSA 

PKCS#1 PSS Signature 

Generation of encoded 

message EM (This 

component test verifies 

the RSASP1 function.)

SP 800-56B, Recommendation 

for Pair-Wise Key Establishment 

Schemes Using Integer 

Factorization Cryptography, 

August 2009, Section 7.1.2 

In FY 2014, the CAVP expects to add algorithm validation 

testing for:

 SP 800-56C, Recommendation for Key Derivation 

through Extraction-then-Expansion, November 2011

 SP 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key 

Derivation Part 1: Storage Applications, December 2010

 SP 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of 

Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, December 2012

 SP 800-56A Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise 

Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm 

Cryptography, May 2013

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp

Contacts:

Ms. Sharon Keller Ms. Elaine Barker

(301) 975-2910 (301) 975-2911

sharon.keller@nist.gov elaine.barker@nist.gov

aISO Standardization of Security 

Requirements for Cryptographic Modules

CSD has contributed to the activities of the International 

Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical 

Commission (ISO/IEC), which issued ISO/IEC 19790, Security 

Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, on March 1, 2006, 

and ISO/IEC 24759, Test Requirements for Cryptographic 

Modules, on July 1, 2008. These efforts bring consistent testing 

of cryptographic modules to the global community.

ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 WG 3 completed and published the 

revisions of both ISO/IEC 19790 and ISO/IEC 24759, for which 

Randall J. Easter of CSD is the editor. The revision of ISO/IEC 

19790 was published August 15, 2012. ISO/IEC 19790:2012 

was also adopted by the American National Standards Institute 

(ANSI). The revision of ISO/IEC 24759 was published January 

31, 2014.

CSD’s Randall J. Easter is the editor for three ISO/IEC 

documents. Work is nearing completion on the Technical Report 

document, ISO/IEC 30104 “Physical Security Attacks, Mitigation 

Techniques and Security Requirements.” A final draft of ISO/

IEC 30104 was completed in December 2013 and circulated for 

national body comment.

Work is progressing on ISO/IEC 17825 “Testing methods 

for the mitigation of non-invasive attack classes against 

cryptographic modules.” The first committee draft of ISO/IEC 

17825 was completed in December 2013 and circulated for 
65

national body comment.

Work is progressing on a new standard document, ISO/IEC 

18367 “Cryptographic algorithms and security mechanisms 

conformance testing.” The third working draft of ISO/IEC 18367 

was completed in December 2013 and circulated for national 

body comment.

National body comments for the above four documents will 

be addressed at the 47th SC 27 WG 3 meeting to be held in 

Incheon, Korea, in October 2013.

CSD’s contributions to the development of these international 

standards create a strong foundation for the adoption of and 

migration from currently used national standards. In particular, 

this adoption will promote the international harmonization for 

the implementation and testing of cryptographic algorithms and 

modules while accommodating individual country preferences 

in the choice of approved security functions. 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/

Contact:

Mr. Randall J. Easter

(301) 975-4641

randall.easter@nist.gov

aCryptographic System Validation 

Current validation programs focus on providing a known 

level of assurance for cryptographic algorithms and modules. 

These are used within the context of a larger system to provide 

cryptographic services as a method of protecting the data 

within the system. As information systems continue to become 

more complex, the methods used to implement cryptographic 

services have also increased in complexity. Problems with 

the use of cryptography are often introduced through the 

interaction of cryptographic components with the operating 

environment. This program seeks to specify how cryptographic 

components are used as part of a defined cryptographic system 

to solve problems with a measureable level of assurance, and 

to introduce automated methods of quantifying the level of 

assurance.

This program will begin the research required to define a 

reference cryptographic systems architecture and example 

use cases where cryptographic systems are built from known 

cryptographic components that cooperate through trust 

relationships to provide a measureable level of assurance. The 

architecture should begin at the lowest level with a hardware 

based root of trust, and each cryptographic component should 

be added in successive layers to provide assurance in a 

systematic way. This should allow the development of tests that 

would measure the correct implementation of cryptographic 

components as part of a larger system.

This program will perform research and experimentation in 

applicable technologies and techniques that will enable the 

efficient testing of the cryptographic capabilities of each layer, 

and continuous monitoring capabilities of each cryptographic 

component, providing the necessary interfaces to establish 

trust relationships with other cryptographic components. 

Techniques could include such items as:

 Embedding SCAP like data elements and standard 

interfaces to query those data elements during design 

and implementation of cryptographic components that 

would enable automated testing capabilities;

 Using cryptographic techniques to embed values into 

the module that would increase the verifiability and 

assurance that the module provides; and

 Using industry-based secure development techniques to 

increase the level of trust inherent in software modules 

starting with design and implementation.

Research into this area of cryptographic system validation 

holds the promise of automating the validation of all 

cryptographic components, providing a higher assurance 

with less manual effort by using SCAP-based ideas to embed 

data elements that instrument the test harnesses used to 

validate cryptographic systems. This would also provide the 

instrumentation that could be leveraged to enable a greater 

level of situational awareness and security measurement, and 

potentially to enable continuous monitoring of cryptographic 

systems.

Contact:

Mr. Michael Cooper

(301) 975-8077

michael.cooper@nist.gov

Technical Security Metrics

aSecurity Risk Analysis of Enterprise 

Networks Using Attack Graphs

Protection of computer networks from malicious intrusions is 

critical to the economy and security of the nation. Vulnerabilities 

are regularly discovered in software applications, which are 

exploited to stage cyber attacks. System administrators need 

objective metrics to guide and justify decision making as they 

manage the security risk of enterprise networks. The objective 

of this research is to develop a standard model for security 

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 66

risk analysis of computer networks. A standard model will 

enable us to answer questions such as “Are we more secure 

now than yesterday?” or “How does the security of one network 

configuration compare with another one?” Also, having a 

standard model to measure network security will allow users, 

vendors, and researchers to evaluate methodologies and 

products for network security in a coherent and consistent 

manner.

CSD has approached the challenge of network security 

analysis by capturing vulnerability interdependencies and 

measuring security based on how real attackers have penetrated 

networks. CSD’s methodology for security risk analysis is based 

on attack graphs. CSD analyzes attack paths through a network, 

providing a probabilistic metric of the overall system risk. 

Through this metric, CSD analyzes trade-offs between security 

costs and security benefits.

Computer systems are vulnerable to both known and zero 

day attacks. Handling zero day vulnerabilities is inherently 

difficult due to their unpredictable nature. In FY 2013, CSD 

attempted to assess the risk of unknown attack patterns. CSD 

developed a new model “k-zero day safety” for zero day attacks. 

Existing algorithms for computing this metric are not scalable 

as they assume that a complete zero day attack graph has 

been generated. CSD has proposed a set of polynomial time 

algorithms for estimating k-zero day safety. CSD has authored 

a paper, “An Efficient Approach to Assessing the Risk of ZeroDay Vulnerabilities,” that received the Best Paper Award at the 

tenth International Conference on Security and Cryptography 

(SECRYPT 2013), in Reykjavik, Iceland.

In FY 2014, CSD plans to apply attack graphs to study the 

effect of diversity for network defense. CSD also plans to 

publish the results as a NIST report and as white papers in 

conferences and journals.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/security-riskanalysis-enterprisenetworks/

Contact:

Dr. Anoop Singhal

(301) 975-4432

anoop.singhal@nist.gov

aAlgorithms for Intrusion Measurement

Figure 22: Algorithms for Intrusion Measurement

The Algorithms for Intrusion Measurement (AIM) project, newly 

formed in FY 2013, furthers measurement science in the area 

of algorithms used in the field of intrusion detection. The team 

focuses on both new detection metrics and measurements of 

scalability (more formally algorithmic complexity). This analysis 

is applied to different phases of the detection lifecycle to include 

pre-emptive vulnerability analysis, initial attack detection, alert 

impact, alert aggregation/correlation, and compact log storage. 

In performing this work, the AIM project seeks to enhance our 

nation’s ability to defend itself from network-borne attacks. 

Much of this scientific research is conducted in partnership 

with the Army Research Laboratory (ARL). ARL’s participation 

helps focus the work on solving immediate critical problems 

facing U.S. Government networks. However, research solutions 

are made publicly available and are designed to be generally 

applicable to as many environments as possible.

In its first year, the AIM project initiated research in each 

stage of the detection lifecycle with a focus on graph theoretic 

approaches; it has already obtained several major results. 

For example, the project has advanced the state of the art 

in network scan detection, discovering and then thwarting 

circumvention attacks against a highly cited scan detection 

algorithm. A paper describing this approach, “Limitations 

to Threshold Random Walk Scan Detection and Mitigating 

Enhancements,” was published at the First IEEE Conference on 

Communications and Network Security. Additionally, the project 

developed a hypergraph-based algorithm to use Hamming 

distance to aggregate security alert logs more than an order 

of magnitude faster than the previous state of the art, while 

providing enhanced aggregation.

In FY 2014, the AIM project will continue its scan detection 

work and publish its work on log aggregation. It will continue 

emerging research on log file compression and alert impact 

analysis. Newly initiated work will include investigation of 
67

known-vulnerability based metrics for comparing the attack 

resistance of different networks or a single network over time.

Contacts:

Mr. Peter Mell Mr. Mark (Lee) Badger

(301) 975-5572 (301) 975-3176

peter.mell@nist.gov mark.badger@nist.gov

aAutomated Combinatorial Testing

Software developers often encounter failures that result 

from an unexpected interaction between components. NIST 

research has shown that most failures are triggered by one or 

two parameters and progressively fewer by three, four, or more 

parameters (see graph below), a relationship that is called the 

Interaction Rule. These results have important implications for 

testing. If all faults in a system can be triggered by a combination 

of n or fewer parameters, then testing all n-way combinations 

of parameters can provide very strong fault detection efficiency. 

These methods are being applied to software and hardware 

testing for reliability, safety, and security. CSD’s focus is on 

empirical results and real-world problems.

Project highlights for FY 2013 included completion of a 

two-year Cooperative Research and Development Agreement 

(CRADA) with Lockheed Martin Corporation, showing 

approximately 20% reduction in software test development 

cost across a variety of projects; publication of the first 

textbook on combinatorial testing; release of an advanced 

tool for measuring combinatorial coverage of test sets (jointly 

with Centro Nacional de Metrología, Mexico); cooperative 

work with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Facility 

analyzing combinatorial coverage measurement for IV&V of 

space systems; lectures at conferences and research labs; 

and leading (jointly with IBM personnel) the IEEE Second 

International Conference on Combinatorial Testing, held with 

the International Conference on Software Testing.

Technology transfer activities included publication of several 

technical papers; participation in the Maryland Technology 

Development Corporation (TEDCO) Technology Transfer 

Workshop; presentation of results of the work with Lockheed 

Martin; release of enhanced covering array, test prioritization, 

and fault location tools; plus seminars and lectures at several 

conferences, universities, and federal agencies.

Plans for FY 2014 include a second phase of a project 

with the NASA IV&V Facility to investigate integration of 

combinatorial coverage measurement methods in NASA IV&V 

practices; development of new methods and tools for very large 

covering arrays (hundreds of variables); lectures at conferences 

and research labs; and guiding development of a combinatorial 

software test development environment by graduate students 

at Carnegie Mellon University which will incorporate NIST 

software.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/acts/

Contacts:

Mr. Rick Kuhn Dr. Raghu Kacker

(301) 975-3337 (301) 975-2109

kuhn@nist.gov raghu.kacker@nist.gov

aHardware Roots of Trust

Modern computing devices consist of various hardware, 

firmware, and software components at multiple layers of 

abstraction. Many security and protection mechanisms are 

currently rooted in software that, along with all underlying 

components, must be trustworthy. A vulnerability in any of 

those components could compromise the trustworthiness of 

the security mechanisms that rely upon those components. 

Stronger security assurances may be possible by grounding 

security mechanisms in roots of trust. 

Roots of trust are highly reliable hardware, firmware, and 

software components that perform specific, critical security 

functions. Because roots of trust are inherently trusted, they 

must be secure by design. As such, many roots of trust are 

implemented in hardware so that malware cannot tamper 

with the functions they provide. Roots of trust provide a firm 

foundation from which to build security and trust. 

A focus area for CSD’s roots of trust research in FY 2013 was 

security for mobile devices. CSD worked with government and 

industry partners on guidelines on hardware-rooted security 

Figure 23: Interaction Rule features in mobile devices. These guidelines focus on device 

Program and Project Achievements for FY 2013
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 68

integrity, isolation, and protected storage features that are 

supported by roots of trust. Draft SP 800-164, Guidelines on 

Hardware-Rooted Security in Mobile Devices, was released for 

public comment in October 2012. 

In FY 2014, CSD will release a revised draft of SP 800-

164, based on the feedback received during the public 

comment period. In addition, CSD is working with the National 

Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) to encourage the 

adoption of stronger security technologies in mobile devices. 

Using draft SP 800-164 as a basis for an NCCoE building block 

activity, CSD and the NCCoE will invite mobile device, operating 

system, management software vendors, and application 

developers to study, demonstrate, and document how to use 

hardware-backed security solutions.

In FY 2013, CSD continued its work to protect fundamental 

system firmware, commonly known as Basic Input/Output 

System (BIOS). CSD has been working with key members of the 

computer industry on the use of roots of trust to improve the 

security of BIOS. 

CSD will continue its efforts to secure BIOS and other critical 

firmware in FY 2014 and will finalize a Special Publication 

covering BIOS protections for server-class systems. CSD will 

also release an updated draft of SP 800-155, BIOS Integrity 

Measurement Guidelines, which will include additional 

guidelines for server-class systems and other boot firmware. In 

order to encourage the continued adoption of BIOS protections, 

CSD also plans to submit SP 800-147, BIOS Protection 

Guidelines, to ISO for standardization. 

Contact:

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid

(301) 975-5155

andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov
Cybersecurity Framework Policy Machine

Cloud Computing Cryptography

Standards

Security Practices

Verification

Security Controls

Assets

Risk Management Framework

Biometrics

Supply chain risk management

FIPS 140-2

Validated Products List

FISMA

Continuous Monitoring

Mobile Devices

Authorization EO 13636

Roadmap

69

Honors and Awards 
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 70

Mr. Richard Kissel 

U.S. Department of Commerce Bronze Medal

Mr. Kissel received a U.S. Department 

of Commerce Bronze Medal for raising 

small and medium-sized business 

(SMB) awareness of information security 

threats, vulnerabilities, and safeguards 

through implementation of NIST’s SMB 

information security outreach program. 

As the program lead, Mr. Kissel worked 

collaboratively with the Small Business Administration and 

the FBI’s InfraGard program to conduct information security 

training workshops for small businesses with a focus on the 

tools and techniques these businesses can apply directly. 

By empowering SMBs, which represent over 95% of all U.S. 

businesses, to better protect their information, the nation’s 

overall information infrastructure is strengthened to enhance 

innovation, competitiveness, and economic security.

Mr. Jon Boyens

Federal 100 Award

Jon Boyens is a senior information 

technology security specialist in the 

Computer Security Division. As lead for 

NIST’s Information and Communications 

Technology (ICT) Supply Chain Risk 

Management (SCRM) project, he 

identifies and evaluates technologies, 

tools, techniques, practices, and 

standards useful in managing risk to the ICT supply chain and 

co-leads the U.S. Government’s efforts to develop ICT SCRM 

lifecycle processes and standards. Federal Computer Week

included the following description in Mr. Boyens’ award: “He 

led an integrated team that developed a set of standardized, 

repeatable practices to help federal agencies manage risks 

to their information and communications technology supply 

chain in the face of rapid technological evolution.” Further 

details about the award are available at: http://fcw.com/

articles/2013/03/20/boyens-jon.aspx.

Mr. Jeremy Grant

Federal 100 Award

Jeremy Grant is a senior executive 

advisor for identity management at 

NIST. He leads the National Strategy for 

Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) 

National Program Office, which is 

working to foster a vibrant marketplace 

of identity solutions—provided by 

entities both private and public—that 

would enhance the security, convenience, and privacy of online 

transactions. Federal Computer Week included the following 

description in Mr. Grant’s award: “Through his ability to facilitate 

dialogue and inspire action among NSTIC’s complex and diverse 

community of stakeholders, he has helped foster NSTIC’s vision 

and principles to produce marketable solutions and advanced 

innovation.” Further details about the award are available at 

http://fcw.com/articles/2013/03/20/grant-jeremy.aspx.

Mr. Adam Sedgewick

Federal 100 Award

Senior Information Technology Policy 

Advisor Adam Sedgewick coordinates 

information technology projects with 

NIST’s critical partners in the federal 

arena, including the Chief Information 

Officers’ (CIO) Council, the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) and 

the National Security Staff. Federal 

Computer Week included the following description in Mr. 

Sedgewick’s award: “[He] focused on government-wide impact 

while offering process improvements for the council’s internal 

operations. He added tremendous substantive expertise gleaned 

from his experience as a cybersecurity and IT policy analyst on 

Capitol Hill. As senior IT policy adviser at NIST, he continues to 

shape the government-wide dialogue on cybersecurity reform.” 

Further details about the award are available at http://fcw.com/

articles/2013/03/20/sedgewick-adam.aspx.

FCW Federal 100 Awards

Three members of the Information Technology Laboratory and the Computer Security Division were 

named to the 2013 list of the top 100 government, industry and academic leaders in the Federal 

Government IT community. The award recognizes individuals who are making a difference in the way 

technology has transformed their agency or accelerated their agency’s mission.

The Federal 100 Awards are sponsored by Federal Computer Week. Recipients are chosen by a 

panel of government and industry leaders. They were formally honored at a gala on March 20, 2013.
71

Mr. Joshua Franklin & 

Ms. Kelley Dempsey

Government Information Security 

Leadership Award (GISLA)

Josh Franklin and Kelley Dempsey won the (ISC)2 Government 

Information Security Leadership Award (GISLA) in the Process/

Policy Improvement category for their work on the Federal 

Mobile Security Baseline and the Mobile Computing Decision 

Framework. According to (ISC)2, the award in this category 

is given to “An individual or team of senior-level U.S. federal 

government personnel...whose contribution to the development 

or implementation of any information security policy or process 

has significantly improved the security posture of a federal 

agency, department or government-wide within the last 12 

months.” Source: https://www.isc2.org/gisla/Default.aspx.

Dr. Ron Ross

Inaugural Lynn F. McNulty Information 

Security Leadership Tribute Award

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Fellow Ron Ross has been awarded the 

inaugural Lynn F. McNulty Tribute U.S. Government Information Security Leadership Award. The (ISC)2

U.S. Government Advisory Board for Cyber Security (GABCS) announced the award on October 29, 

2013, in recognition of Ross’s “key role in establishing cybersecurity requirements for federal agencies 

for decades.” 

The award was established last year after the death of (ISC)2 Fellow and IT security evangelist Lynn F. McNulty, CISSP. McNulty 

was considered by those in the community as the “pioneer” of government information security. The Tribute Award recognizes a 

member of the U.S. federal information security community who upholds McNulty’s legacy as a visionary and innovator through 

outstanding service and commitment.

Ross worked with McNulty during the 1990s when McNulty was NIST’s Associate Director of Computer Security.

“Ron’s insight and leadership in producing a library of guidance publications over the past decade has greatly contributed to the 

advancement of information security in government and around the world,” said Peter Gouldmann, CISSP, director of information 

risk programs, Office of Information Assurance, U.S. Department of State, and member, (ISC)2 GABCS. “His highly collaborative 

approach, incorporating government and industry, has resulted in products that are being adopted and adapted for use on national 

security systems, transcending the unclassified and classified systems landscape.”

Sources: https://www.isc2.org/GISLA-Lynn-McNulty-Award/defalt.aspx

http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/ross-110513.cfm

Honors & Awards
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 72

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Cybersecurity Framework Policy Machine

Cloud Computing Cryptography

Standards

Security Practices

Verification

Security Controls

Assets

Risk Management Framework

Biometrics

Supply chain risk management

FIPS 140-2

Validated Products List

FISMA

Continuous Monitoring

Mobile Devices

Authorization EO 13636

Roadmap

73

FY 2013 Computer 

Security Division 

Publications

The Computer Security Division uses multiple NIST Technical Series to promulgate security standards, 

guidelines, recommendations, research, and additional background material. Those series include Federal 

Information Processing Standards (FIPS), NIST Special Publications (SPs), NIST Interagency or Internal 

Reports (NISTIRs) and Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) Bulletins. Links to these publications are 

available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications.

Additionally, each year CSD staff authors numerous additional publications, including journal articles, 

conference papers, and other papers that are widely disseminated. They range from basic research to 

high-level summaries of CSD activities. 
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 74

NIST Technical Series Publications − FIPS, Special Publications, NISTIRs, and ITL Bulletins

Below are lists of NIST Technical Series publications that CSD released as draft documents or as final publications during FY 2013 

(from October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2013). Following the lists are abstracts and contact information for each publication.

DRAFT PUBLICATIONS

Type & Number Publication Title Draft Released 

Date

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)

No draft FIPS were released in FY 2013.

Special Publications (SPs)

SP 800-164 Guidelines on Hardware-Rooted Security in Mobile Devices October 2012

SP 800-162 Guide to Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition and Considerations April 2013

SP 800-161 Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations August 2013

SP 800-101 Revision 1 Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics September 2013

SP 800-90 Series 

(A Revision 1, B, and C)

Random Bit Generators 

A Revision 1: Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators

B: Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation 

C: Recommendation for Random Bit Generator (RBG) Constructions

September 2013

SP 800-78-4 Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification May 2013

SP 800-73-4 Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification (3 Parts) 

Part 1- PIV Card Application Namespace, Data Model and Representation

Part 2- PIV Card Application Card Command Interface

Part 3- PIV Client Application Programming Interface

May 2013

SP 800-63-2 Electronic Authentication Guideline February 2012

SP 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations February 2013

SP 800-52 Revision 1 Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations September 2013

SP 800-38 G Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Format-Preserving Encryption July 2013

NIST Interagency Reports (NISTIRs)

NISTIR 7946 CVSS Implementation Guidance September 2013

NISTIR 7924 Reference Certificate Policy April 2013

NISTIR 7904 Trusted Geolocation in the Cloud: Proof of Concept Implementation December 2012

NISTIR 7298 Revision 2 Glossary of Key Information Security Terms December 2012
75

Final (Approved) Publications

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)

Document Number Publication Title Publication 

Date 

FIPS 201-2 Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors August 2013

FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) July 2013

Special Publications (SPs)

Document Number Publication Title Publication 

Date 

SP 800-165 Computer Security Division 2012 Annual Report June 2013

SP 800-133 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation December 2012

SP 800-130 A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems August 2013

SP 800-124 Revision 1 Guidelines for Managing the Security of Mobile Devices in the Enterprise June 2013

SP 800-83 Revision 1 Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling for Desktops and Laptops July 2013

SP 800-82 Revision 1 Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security May 2013

SP 800-81-2 Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide September 2013

SP 800-76-2 Biometric Specifications for Personal Identity Verification July 2013

SP 800-63-2 Electronic Authentication Guideline August 2013

SP 800-56A Revision 2 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography May 2013

SP 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations April 2013

SP 800-40 Revision 3 Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Technologies July 2013

SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping December 2012

NIST Interagency Reports (NISTIRs)

Document Number Publication Title Publication 

Date 

NISTIR 7957 Conformance Test Architecture and Test Suite for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 NIEM XML Encoded Transactions September 2013

NISTIR 7956 Cryptographic Key Management Issues & Challenges in Cloud Services September 2013

NISTIR 7933 Requirements and Conformance Test Assertions for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 Record Type 18 - DNA Record May 2013

NISTIR 7916 Proceedings of the Cybersecurity in Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop, April 23-24, 2012 February 2013

NISTIR 7896 Third-Round Report of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition November 2012

NISTIR 7878 Combinatorial Coverage Measurement October 2012

NISTIR 7817 A Credential Reliability and Revocation Model for Federated Identities November 2012

NISTIR 7622 Notional Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems October 2012

NISTIR 7511 Revision 3 Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) Version 1.2 Validation Program Test Requirements January 2013

NISTIR 7298 Revision 2 Glossary of Key Information Security Terms May 2013

FY 2013 Computer Security Division Publications
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 76

Abstracts of NIST Technical Series 

Publications Released in FY 2013

The following sections provide abstracts and contact 

information for the draft and final FIPS, NIST SPs, and securityrelated NISTIRs listed in the previous section. These publications 

are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications.

aFederal Information Processing 

Standards (FIPS)

FIPS 201-2, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 

of Federal Employees and Contractors

This standard specifies the architecture and technical 

requirements for a common identification standard for federal 

employees and contractors. The overall goal is to achieve 

appropriate security assurance for multiple applications by 

efficiently verifying the claimed identity of individuals seeking 

physical access to federally controlled government facilities 

and logical access to government information systems. The 

standard contains the minimum requirements for a federal 

personal identity verification system that meets the control 

and security objectives of Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive-12 (HSPD-12), including identity proofing, registration, 

and issuance. The standard also provides detailed specifications 

that will support technical interoperability among PIV systems 

of federal departments and agencies. It describes the card 

elements, system interfaces, and security controls required to 

securely store, process, and retrieve identity credentials from 

the card.

Contacts:

Ms. Hildegard Ferraiolo Dr. David Cooper

hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov david.cooper@nist.gov

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro Mr. Ketan Mehta

salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov ketan.mehta@nist.gov

Ms. Annie Sokol

annie.sokol@nist.gov

FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

This standard specifies a suite of algorithms that can be used 

to generate a digital signature. Digital signatures are used to 

detect unauthorized modifications to data and to authenticate 

the identity of the signatory. In addition, the recipient of signed 

data can use a digital signature as evidence in demonstrating 

to a third party that the signature was, in fact, generated by the 

claimed signatory. This is known as non-repudiation, since the 

signatory cannot easily repudiate the signature at a later time.

Contact:

Ms. Elaine Barker

elaine.barker@nist.gov

Final (Approved) Publications (cont.)

ITL Bulletins

Release Date Title of Bulletin 

September 2013 NIST Opens Draft Special Publication 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic 

Random Bit Generators, For Review and Comment (Supplemental ITL Bulletin for September 2013)

September 2013 ITL Publishes Guidance on Preventing and Handling Malware Incidents

August 2013 ITL Publishes Guidance on Enterprise Patch Management Technologies

July 2013 ITL Issues Guidelines for Managing the Security of Mobile Devices

June 2013 ITL Updates Glossary of Key Information Security Terms

May 2013 ITL Publishes Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Agencies

April 2013 Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) Version 1.2 Validation Program Test Requirements

March 2013 NIST to Develop a Cybersecurity Framework to Protect Critical Infrastructure

January 2013 Managing Identity Requirements for Remote Users of Information Systems to Protect System Security and Information Privacy

December 2012 Generating Secure Cryptographic Keys: A Critical Component of Cryptographic 

Key Management and the Protection of Sensitive Information

November 2012 Practices for Managing Supply Chain Risks to Protect Federal Information Systems 

October 2012 Conducting Information Security-Related Risk Assessments: Updated Guidelines for Comprehensive Risk Management Programs
77

aNIST Special Publications (SPs)

SP 800-165, Computer Security Division 

2012 Annual Report

Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002, entitled the 

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, 

requires NIST to prepare an annual public report on activities 

undertaken in the previous year, and planned for the coming 

year, to carry out responsibilities under this law. The primary 

goal of the Computer Security Division (CSD), a component of 

NIST s Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), is to provide 

standards and technology that protects information systems 

against threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 

of information and services. During FY 2013, CSD successfully 

responded to numerous challenges and opportunities in fulfilling 

that mission. Through CSD’s diverse research agenda and 

engagement in many national priority initiatives, high-quality, 

cost-effective security and privacy mechanisms were developed 

and applied that improved information security across the 

Federal Government and the greater information security 

community. This annual report highlights the research agenda 

and activities in which CSD was engaged during FY 2013.

Contacts:

Mr. Patrick O’Reilly Mr. Kevin Stine

patrick.oreilly@nist.gov kevin.stine@nist.gov

Draft SP 800-164, Guidelines on Hardware-Rooted 

Security in Mobile Devices

Many mobile devices are not capable of providing strong 

security assurances to end users and organizations. Current 

mobile devices lack the hardware-based roots of trust that are 

increasingly built into laptops and other types of hosts. This 

document focuses on defining the fundamental security primitives 

and capabilities needed to enable more secure mobile device 

use. This document is intended to accelerate industry efforts 

to implement these primitives and capabilities. The guidelines 

in this document are intended to provide a baseline of security 

technologies that can be implemented across a wide range 

of mobile devices to help secure organization-issued mobile 

devices as well as devices brought into an organization, such 

as personally-owned devices used in enterprise environments 

(e.g., Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)).

Contacts:

Dr. Lily Chen Mr. Joshua Franklin

lily.chen@nist.gov joshua.franklin@nist.gov

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid

andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov

Draft SP 800-162, Guide to Attribute Based Access 

Control (ABAC) Definition and Considerations

This document provides federal agencies with a definition 

of Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC). ABAC is a logical 

access control methodology where authorization to perform 

a set of operations is determined by evaluating attributes 

associated with the subject, object, requested operations, and, 

in some cases, environment conditions against policy, rules, or 

relationships that describe the allowable operations for a given 

set of attributes. This document also provides considerations for 

using ABAC to improve information sharing within organizations 

and between organizations while maintaining control of that 

information.

Contacts:

Dr. Vincent Hu Mr. David Ferraiolo

vhu@nist.gov david.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Mr. Rick Kuhn

rkuhn@nist.gov

Draft SP 800-161, Supply Chain Risk 

Management Practices for Federal Information 

Systems and Organizations

The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) supply 

chain is a complex, globally distributed system of interconnected 

networks that are logically long, with geographically diverse 

routes and multiple tiers of outsourcing. This system of 

networks includes organizations, people, processes, products, 

and services and the infrastructure supporting the system 

development life cycle, including research and development 

(R&D), design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, 

operations, and disposal/retirement of an organization’s ICT 

products (i.e., hardware and software) and services.

Today’s ICT supply chains have increased complexity, diversity, 

and scale, while Federal Government information systems have 

been rapidly expanding in terms of capability and number, with 

an increased reliance on outsourcing and commercially available 

products. These trends have caused federal departments and 

agencies to have a lack of visibility and understanding throughout 

the supply chain of how the technology being acquired is 

developed, integrated, and deployed, as well as the processes, 

procedures, and practices used to assure the integrity, security, 

resilience, and quality of the products and services. This lack of 

visibility and understanding, in turn, has decreased the control 

federal departments and agencies have with regard to the 

decisions impacting the inherited risks traversing the supply 

chain and the ability to effectively manage those risks.

SP 800-161 provides guidance to federal departments and 

agencies on identifying, assessing, and mitigating ICT supply 

chain risks at all levels in their organizations. SP 800-161 

FY 2013 Computer Security Division Publications
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 78

integrates ICT Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) into 

federal agency enterprise risk management activities by applying 

a multi-tiered SCRM-specific approach, including supply chain 

risk assessments and supply chain risk mitigation activities and 

guidance.

Contacts:

Mr. Jon Boyens Ms. Celia Paulsen

jon.boyens@nist.gov celia.paulsen@nist.gov

SP 800-133, Recommendation for 

Cryptographic Key Generation

Cryptography is often used in an information technology 

security environment to protect data that is sensitive, has 

a high value, or is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure or 

undetected modification during transmission or while in storage. 

Cryptography relies upon two basic components: an algorithm 

(or cryptographic methodology) and a cryptographic key. This 

Recommendation discusses the generation of the keys to be 

managed and used by the approved cryptographic algorithms.

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Dr. Allen Roginsky

elaine.barker@nist.gov allen.roginsky@nist.gov

SP 800-130, A Framework for Designing 

Cryptographic Key Management Systems

This Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management 

Systems (CKMS) contains topics that should be considered by a 

CKMS designer when developing a CKMS design specification. For 

each topic, there are one or more documentation requirements 

that need to be addressed by the design specification. Thus, any 

CKMS that addresses each of these requirements would have a 

design specification that is compliant with this Framework.

Contact:

Ms. Elaine Barker

elaine.barker@nist.gov

SP 800-124 Revision 1, Guidelines for Managing the 

Security of Mobile Devices in the Enterprise

Mobile devices, such as smart phones and tablets, typically 

need to support multiple security objectives: confidentiality, 

integrity, and availability. To achieve these objectives, mobile 

devices should be secured against a variety of threats. The 

purpose of this publication is to help organizations centrally 

manage the security of mobile devices. Laptops are out of the 

scope of this publication, as are mobile devices with minimal 

computing capability, such as basic cell phones. This publication 

provides recommendations for selecting, implementing, and 

using centralized management technologies, and it explains the 

security concerns inherent in mobile device use and provides 

recommendations for securing mobile devices throughout their 

life cycles. The scope of this publication includes securing both 

organization-provided and personally-owned (bring your own 

device (BYOD)) mobile devices. [Supersedes SP 800-124.]

Contact:

Mr. Murugiah Souppaya

murugiah.souppaya@nist.gov

Draft SP 800-101 Revision 1, Guidelines 

on Mobile Device Forensics

Mobile device forensics is the science of recovering digital 

evidence from a mobile device under forensically sound conditions 

using accepted methods. Mobile device forensics is an evolving 

specialty in the field of digital forensics. This guide attempts to 

bridge the gap by providing an in-depth look into mobile devices 

and explaining technologies involved and their relationship to 

forensic procedures. This document covers mobile devices 

with features beyond simple voice communication and text 

messaging capabilities. This guide also discusses procedures for 

the validation, preservation, acquisition, examination, analysis, 

and reporting of digital information.

Contact:

Mr. Richard Ayers

richard.ayers@nist.gov

Draft SP 800-90 Series, Random Bit Generators:

Draft SP 800-90A Revision 1, Recommendation 

for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic 

Random Bit Generators

This Recommendation specifies mechanisms for the 

generation of random bits using deterministic methods. The 

methods provided are based on hash functions, block cipher 

algorithms, or number theoretic problems.

Draft SP 800-90B, Recommendation for the Entropy 

Sources Used for Random Bit Generation

This Recommendation specifies the design principles and 

requirements for the entropy sources used by Random Bit 

Generators, and the tests for the validation of entropy sources. 

These entropy sources are intended to be combined with 

Deterministic Random Bit Generator mechanisms that are 

specified in SP 800-90A to construct Random Bit Generators, as 

specified in SP 800-90C.

Draft SP 800-90C, Recommendation for Random 

Bit Generator (RBG) Constructions

This Recommendation specifies constructions for the 

implementation of random bit generators (RBGs). An RBG may 

be a deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) or a nondeterministic random bit generator (NRBG). The constructed 
79

RBGs consist of DRBG mechanisms as specified SP 800-90A and 

entropy sources as specified in SP 800-90B.

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Dr. John Kelsey

elaine.barker@nist.gov john.kelsey@nist.gov

SP 800-83 Revision 1, Guide to Malware Incident 

Prevention and Handling for Desktops and Laptops

Malware, also known as malicious code, refers to a program 

that is covertly inserted into another program with the intent to 

destroy data, run destructive or intrusive programs, or otherwise 

compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 

the victim’s data, applications, or operating system. Malware 

is the most common external threat to most hosts, causing 

widespread damage and disruption and necessitating extensive 

recovery efforts within most organizations. This publication 

provides recommendations for improving an organization’s 

malware incident prevention measures. It also gives extensive 

recommendations for enhancing an organization’s existing 

incident response capability so that it is better prepared to handle 

malware incidents, particularly widespread ones. [Supersedes 

SP 800-83.]

Contact:

Mr. Murugiah Souppaya

murugiah.souppaya@nist.gov

SP 800-82 Revision 1, Guide to Industrial 

Control Systems (ICS) Security

This document provides guidance on how to secure 

Industrial Control Systems (ICS), including Supervisory Control 

and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control 

Systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such 

as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), while addressing 

their unique performance, reliability, and safety requirements. 

The document provides an overview of ICS and typical system 

topologies, identifies typical threats and vulnerabilities to these 

systems, and provides recommended security countermeasures 

to mitigate the associated risks. [Supersedes SP 800-82.]

Contact:

Mr. Keith Stouffer

keith.stouffer@nist.gov

SP 800-81-2, Secure Domain Name 

System (DNS) Deployment Guide

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a distributed computing 

system that enables access to Internet resources by user-friendly 

domain names rather than IP addresses, by translating domain 

names to IP addresses and back. The DNS infrastructure is made 

up of computing and communication entities called Name Servers 

each of which contains information about a small portion of the 

domain name space. The domain name data provided by DNS 

is intended to be available to any computer located anywhere 

in the Internet. This document provides deployment guidelines 

for securing DNS within an enterprise. Because DNS data is 

meant to be public, preserving the confidentiality of DNS data 

is not a concern. The primary security goals for DNS are data 

integrity and source authentication, which are needed to ensure 

the authenticity of domain name information and maintain the 

integrity of domain name information in transit. This document 

provides extensive guidance on maintaining data integrity and 

performing source authentication. DNS components are often 

subjected to denial-of-service attacks intended to disrupt 

access to the resources whose domain names are handled 

by the attacked DNS components. This document presents 

guidelines for configuring DNS deployments to prevent many 

denial-of-service attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in various 

DNS components. [Supersedes SP 800-81 Revision 1.]

Contact:

Dr. Chandramouli (Mouli) Ramaswamy

mouli@nist.gov

Draft SP 800-78-4, Cryptographic Algorithms and 

Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification

FIPS 201 defines requirements for the PIV lifecycle activities, 

including identity proofing, registration, PIV Card issuance, and 

PIV Card usage. FIPS 201 also defines the structure of an identity 

credential that includes cryptographic keys. This document 

contains the technical specifications needed for the mandatory 

and optional cryptographic keys specified in FIPS 201, as well 

as the supporting infrastructure specified in FIPS 201 and the 

related SP 800-73, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification, 

and SP 800-76, Biometric Data Specification for Personal Identity 

Verification, that rely on cryptographic functions.

Contacts:

Ms. Hildegard (Hildy) Ferraiolo Dr. David Cooper

hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov david.cooper@nist.gov

Mr. William Burr Mr. Tim Polk

william.burr@nist.gov william.polk@nist.gov

SP 800-76-2, Biometric Specifications for 

Personal Identity Verification

Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-12, Policy for 

a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and 

Contractors, called for new standards to be adopted governing 

interoperable use of identity credentials to allow physical and 

logical access to Federal Government locations and systems. 

FIPS 201, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal 

Employees and Contractors, was developed to define procedures 

and specifications for issuance and use of an interoperable 

FY 2013 Computer Security Division Publications
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 80

identity credential. This document, SP 800-76, is a companion 

document to FIPS 201. It describes technical acquisition and 

formatting specifications for the PIV system, including the PIV 

Card itself. It also establishes minimum accuracy specifications 

for deployed biometric authentication processes. The approach 

is to enumerate procedures and formats for collection and 

preparation of fingerprint, iris, and facial data, and to restrict 

values and practices included generically in published biometric 

standards. The primary design objective behind these particular 

specifications is to enable high performance and universal 

interoperability. The introduction of iris and face specifications 

into the current edition adds alternative modalities for biometric 

authentication and extends coverage to persons for whom 

fingerprinting is problematic. The addition of on-card comparison 

offers an alternative to PIN-mediated card activation as well as 

an additional authentication method.

Contacts:

Dr. Chandramouli (Mouli) Mr. Patrick Grother

Ramaswamy patrick.grother@nist.gov

mouli@nist.gov

Draft SP 800-73-4, Interfaces for 

Personal Identity Verification (3 Parts)

Part 1- PIV Card Application Namespace, 

Data Model and Representation

Part 2- PIV Card Application Card Command Interface

Part 3- PIV Client Application Programming Interface

FIPS 201 defines the requirements and characteristics of a 

government-wide interoperable identity credential. FIPS 201 

also specifies that this identity credential must be stored on a 

smart card. This document, SP 800-73, contains the technical 

specifications to interface with the smart card to retrieve and 

use the PIV identity credentials. The specifications reflect the 

design goals of interoperability and PIV Card functions. The 

goals are addressed by specifying a PIV data model, card edge 

interface, and application-programming interface. Moreover, 

this document enumerates requirements where the international 

integrated circuit card standards [ISO7816] include options 

and branches. The specifications go further by constraining 

implementers’ interpretations of the normative standards. Such 

restrictions are designed to ease implementation, facilitate 

interoperability, and ensure performance, in a manner tailored 

for PIV applications.

Contacts:

Dr. Chandramouli (Mouli) Dr. David Cooper

Ramaswamy david.cooper@nist.go

mouli@nist.gov 

Ms. Hildegard (Hildy) Ferraiolo Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro

hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov

Mr. Ketan Mehta

ketan.mehta@nist.gov

SP 800-63-2, Electronic Authentication Guideline

This recommendation provides technical guidelines for 

federal agencies implementing electronic authentication and is 

not intended to constrain the development or use of standards 

outside of this purpose. The recommendation covers remote 

authentication of users (such as employees, contractors, or 

private individuals) interacting with government IT systems over 

open networks. It defines technical requirements for each of four 

levels of assurance in the areas of identity proofing, registration, 

tokens, management processes, authentication protocols and 

related assertions. [Supersedes SP 800-63-1.]

Contacts:

Dr. Lily Chen Mr. William Burr

lily.chen@nist.gov william.burr@nist.gov

SP 800-56A Revision 2, Recommendation for 

Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using 

Discrete Logarithm Cryptography

This recommendation specifies key-establishment schemes 

based on the discrete logarithm problem over finite fields and 

elliptic curves, including several variations of Diffie-Hellman 

and Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (MQV) key establishment schemes. 

[Supersedes SP 800-56A.]

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Dr. Lily Chen

elaine.barker@nist.gov lily.chen@nist.gov

Dr. Allen Roginsky

allen.roginsky@nist.gov

SP 800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for 

Federal Information Systems and Organizations

This publication provides a catalog of security and privacy 

controls for federal information systems and organizations 

and a process for selecting controls to protect organizational 

operations (including mission, functions, image, and reputation), 

organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the 

Nation from a diverse set of threats including hostile cyberattacks, natural disasters, structural failures, and human errors 

(both intentional and unintentional). The security and privacy 

controls are customizable and implemented as part of an 

organization-wide process that manages information security 

and privacy risk. The controls address a diverse set of security 

and privacy requirements across the Federal Government and 

critical infrastructure, derived from legislation, Executive Orders, 

policies, directives, regulations, standards, and/or mission/

business needs. The publication also describes how to develop 

specialized sets of controls, or overlays, tailored for specific types 

of missions/business functions, technologies, or environments 

of operation. Finally, the catalog of security controls addresses 

security from both a functionality perspective (the strength of 
81

security functions and mechanisms provided) and an assurance 

perspective (the measures of confidence in the implemented 

security capability). Addressing both security functionality 

and assurance helps to ensure that information technology 

component products and the information systems built from 

those products using sound system and security engineering 

principles are sufficiently trustworthy. [Supersedes SP 800-53 

Revision 3.]

Contacts:

NIST FISMA Team Dr. Ron Ross

sec-cert@nist.gov rross@nist.gov

Mr. Arnold Johnson Ms. Kelley Dempsey

kelley.dempsey@nist.gov

Draft SP 800-52 Revision 1, Guidelines for the 

Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer 

Security (TLS) Implementations

Transport Layer Security (TLS) provides mechanisms to 

protect sensitive data during electronic dissemination across 

the Internet. This Special Publication provides guidance to the 

selection and configuration of TLS protocol implementations 

while making effective use of FIPS and NIST-recommended 

cryptographic algorithms, and requires that TLS 1.1 configured 

with FIPS-based cipher suites as the minimum appropriate 

secure transport protocol and recommends that agencies 

develop migration plans to TLS 1.2 by January 1, 2015. This 

publication also identifies TLS extensions for which mandatory 

support must be provided and other recommended extensions.

Contacts:

Ms. Kerry McKay Mr. William (Tim) Polk

kerry.mckay@nist.gov william.polk@nist.gov

SP 800-40 Revision 3, Guide to Enterprise Patch 

Management Technologies

Patch management is the process for identifying, acquiring, 

installing, and verifying patches for products and systems. 

Patches correct security and functionality problems in software 

and firmware. There are several challenges that complicate 

patch management. If organizations do not overcome these 

challenges, they will be unable to patch systems effectively 

and efficiently, leading to easily preventable compromises. This 

publication is designed to assist organizations in understanding 

the basics of enterprise patch management technologies. It 

explains the importance of patch management and examines 

the challenges inherent in performing patch management. 

It provides an overview of enterprise patch management 

technologies and it also briefly discusses metrics for measuring 

the technologies effectiveness and for comparing the relative 

importance of patches. [Supersedes SP 800-40 Version 2.0.]

Contact:

Mr. Murugiah Souppaya

murugiah.souppaya@nist.gov

SP 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes 

of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping

This publication describes cryptographic methods that 

are approved for key wrapping, i.e., the protection of the 

confidentiality and integrity of cryptographic keys. In addition 

to describing existing methods, this publication specifies two 

new, deterministic authenticated-encryption modes of operation 

of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm: the AES 

Key Wrap (KW) mode and the AES Key Wrap With Padding (KWP) 

mode. An analogous mode with the Triple Data Encryption 

Algorithm (TDEA) as the underlying block cipher, called TKW, is 

also specified, to support legacy applications.

Contact:

Dr. Morris Dworkin

morris.dworkin@nist.gov

Draft SP 800-38 G, Recommendation for 

Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods 

for Format-Preserving Encryption

This recommendation specifies three methods for formatpreserving encryption, called FF1, FF2, and FF3. Each of these 

methods is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm, which is 

used to construct a round function within the Feistel structure 

for encryption.

Contact:

Dr. Morris Dworkin

morris.dworkin@nist.gov

aNIST Interagency Reports (NISTIRs)

NISTIR 7957, Conformance Test Architecture 

and Test Suite for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 

NIEM XML Encoded Transactions

The latest version of the ANSI/NIST-ITL standard was 

published in November 2011 (AN-2011). In addition to specifying 

Record Types in traditional encoding, the standard includes 

the specification of National Information Exchange Model 

(NIEM) Extensible Markup Language (XML) encoding and an 

associated schema. The Computer Security Division of NIST/ITL 

developed a Conformance Test Architecture (CTA) and Test Suite 

(CTS) called “BioCTS for AN-2011 NIEM XML” designed to test 

implementations of AN-2011 NIEM XML encoded transactions. 

Validating the XML files to a schema may indicate that the 

contained data is formatted correctly and individual values are 

within allowable ranges, assuming that the requirements for 

FY 2013 Computer Security Division Publications
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 82

that data have been documented in the schema file. However, 

schemas are not designed to test the internal consistency of 

implementations (i.e., testing for a relationship between two 

elements or structures within a transaction). These shortcomings 

of XML schema files for use in conformance testing necessitate 

that schemas be used only as a component of a complete 

testing solution. This complete solution (the test tool) ensures 

test coverage of requirements through a combination of schema 

validation and conformance tests of the data in the XML files. This 

document discusses the test software design including the XML 

Data Structures used and Classes implemented. It addresses 

the testing phases and the format of the test results; as well 

as the user interface and key usability features implemented in 

this version of the test tool. Details are provided on a modified 

schema that was required to be used in the tool in order to fully 

perform tests for all the requirements specified in the AN-2011 

standard. Future development steps, including support for the 

new version of the ANSI/NIST-ITL standard under development, 

are also discussed.

Contacts:

Mr. Fernando Podio Mr. Dylan Yaga

fernando.podio@nist.gov dylan.yaga@nist.gov

Mr. Christofer McGinnis

christofer.mcginnis@nist.gov

NISTIR 7956, Cryptographic Key Management 

Issues & Challenges in Cloud Services

To interact with various services in the cloud and to store 

the data generated/processed by those services, several 

security capabilities are required. The publication considers 

a core set of features in the three common cloud services: 

Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), 

and Software as a Service (SaaS). The report identifies a set of 

security capabilities needed to exercise those features and the 

cryptographic operations they entail. An analysis of the common 

state of practice of the cryptographic operations that provide 

those security capabilities reveals that the management of 

cryptographic keys takes on an additional complexity in cloud 

environments compared to enterprise IT environments due to: 

(a) difference in ownership (between cloud Consumers and 

cloud Providers) and (b) control of infrastructures on which both 

the Key Management System (KMS) and protected resources 

are located. This document identifies the cryptographic key 

management challenges in the context of architectural solutions 

that are commonly deployed to perform those cryptographic 

operations.

Contacts:

Dr. Chandramouli (Mouli) Dr. Michaela Iorga

Ramaswamy michaela.iorga@nist.gov

mouli@nist.gov 

Draft NISTIR 7946, CVSS Implementation Guidance

This Interagency Report provides guidance to individuals 

scoring IT vulnerabilities using the Common Vulnerability Scoring 

System (CVSS) Version 2.0 scoring metrics. The guidance in this 

document is the result of applying the CVSS specification to score 

over 50,000 vulnerabilities analyzed by the National Vulnerability 

Database (NVD). An overview of the CVSS base metrics is first 

presented, followed by guidance for difficult and/or unique 

scoring situations. To assist vulnerability analysts, common 

keywords and phrases are identified and accompanied by 

suggested scores for particular types of software vulnerabilities. 

The report includes a collection of scored IT vulnerabilities from 

the NVD, alongside a justification for the provided score. Finally, 

this report contains a description of the NVD’s vulnerability 

scoring process.

Contacts:

Mr. Joshua Franklin Mr. Harold Booth

joshua.franklin@nist.gov harold.booth@nist.gov

NISTIR 7933, Requirements and Conformance 

Test Assertions for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 

Record Type 18 - DNA Record

CSD, in NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory (NIST/ITL), 

develops conformance test architectures (CTA) and test suites 

(CTS) to support users that require conformance to selected 

biometric standards. Product developers as well as testing 

laboratories can also benefit from the use of these tools. This 

project supports the possible establishment of conformity 

assessment programs for biometrics and also supports NIST/

ITL’s Forensic Science Program by making conformance testing 

tools available that provide developers, users, and purchasers 

with increased levels of confidence in product quality and 

increases the probability of successful interoperability of 

biometrics and forensic data. One of the test tools is a CTA/

CTS designed to test implementations of ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 

(AN-2011) Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial 

& Other Biometric Information, for selected Record Types based 

on 1,200 test assertions previously developed. As part of the 

process associated with the extension of the first version of 

BioCTS for AN-2011, NIST/ITL CSD’s staff identified over 200 test 

assertions necessary to meet the conformance requirements for 

the AN-2011 Record Type 18- DNA Record. These test assertions 

are documented using the format specified in SP 500-295, 

Conformance Testing Methodology for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1- 2011, 

Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial & Other 

Biometric Information (Release 1.0).

Contacts:

Mr. Fernando Podio Mr. Dylan Yaga

fernando.podio@nist.gov dylan.yaga@nist.gov

Mr. Christofer McGinnis

christofer.mcginnis@nist.gov
83

Draft NISTIR 7924, Reference Certificate Policy

The purpose of this document is to identify a baseline set of 

security controls and practices to support the secure issuance of 

certificates. This baseline was developed with publicly-trusted 

Certificate Authorities (CA) in mind. These CAs, who issue the 

certificates used to secure websites and sign software, play a 

particularly important role online. This document is formatted 

as a Reference Certificate Policy (CP). We expect different 

applications and relying party communities will tailor this 

document based on their specific needs. It was structured and 

developed so that the CP developer can fill in sections specific 

to organizational needs and quickly produce a suitable CP. 

This Reference CP is consistent with the Internet Engineering 

Task Force (IETF) Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (IETF PKIX) 

Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework.

Contacts:

Mr. Harold Booth Mr. Andrew Regenscheid

harold.booth@nist.gov andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov

NISTIR 7916, Proceedings of the Cybersecurity in 

Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop, April 23-24, 2012

This publication contains the proceeding, abstracts, and 

present slides from the Cybersecurity in Cyber-Physical Systems 

Workshop of April 23-24, 2012. Some of the cyber-physical 

systems covered during the first day of the workshop included 

networked automotive vehicles, networked medical devices, 

semi-conductor manufacturing, and cyber-physical testbeds. 

Dr. Farnham Jahanian, National Science Foundation, was the 

keynote speaker on the first day of the workshop. Day two of the 

workshop covered the electric smart grid. 

Contact:

Ms. Tanya Brewer

tanya.brewer@nist.gov

Draft NISTIR 7904, Trusted Geolocation in the 

Cloud: Proof of Concept Implementation

This publication explains selected security challenges 

involving Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud computing 

technologies and geolocation. It then describes a proof of concept 

implementation that was designed to address those challenges. 

The publication provides sufficient details about the proof of 

concept implementation so that organizations can reproduce it if 

desired. The publication is intended to be a blueprint or template 

that can be used by the general security community to validate 

and implement the described proof of concept implementation.

Contacts:

Mr. Michael Bartock Mr. Murugiah Souppaya

michael.bartock@nist.gov murugiah.souppaya@nist.gov

NISTIR 7896, Third-Round Report of the SHA-3 

Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition

NIST opened a public competition on November 2, 2007 to 

develop a new cryptographic hash algorithm - SHA-3, which 

will augment the hash algorithms specified in FIPS 180-4, 

Secure Hash Standard. The competition was NIST’s response 

to advances in the cryptanalysis of hash algorithms. NIST 

received 64 submissions in October 2008, and selected 51 

first-round candidates on December 10, 2008; 14 secondround candidates on July 24, 2009; and 5 third-round 

candidates - BLAKE, Grøstl, JH, Keccak and Skein, on December

9, 2010, to advance to the final round of the competition. 

Eighteen months were provided for the public review of the 

finalists, and on October 2, 2012, NIST announced the winner 

algorithm of the SHA-3 competition − Keccak. This report

summarizes the evaluation of the 5 finalists, and the selection 

of the SHA-3 winner.

Contacts:

Ms. Shu-jen Chang Mr. Ray Perlner

shu-jen.chang@nist.gov ray.perlner@nist.gov

Mr. William Burr Dr. Meltem Sönmez Turan

william.burr@nist.gov meltem.turan@nist.gov

Dr. John Kelsey Mr. Lawrence (Larry) Bassham

john.kelsey@nist.gov lawrence.bassham@nist.gov

NISTIR 7878, Combinatorial Coverage Measurement

Combinatorial testing applies factor covering arrays to test 

all t-way combinations of input or configuration state space. 

In some testing situations, it is not practical to use covering 

arrays, but any set of tests covers at least some portion of 

t-way combinations up to t [less than or equal to] n. This report 

describes measures of combinatorial coverage that can be 

used in evaluating the degree of t-way coverage of any test 

suite, regardless of whether it was initially constructed for 

combinatorial coverage.

Contact:

Mr. Rick Kuhn

rkuhn@nist.gov

NISTIR 7817, A Credential Reliability and 

Revocation Model for Federated Identities

A large number of Identity Management Systems (IDMS) are 

being deployed worldwide that use different technologies for the 

population of their users. With the diverse set of technologies, 

and the unique business requirements for organizations to 

federate, there is no uniform approach to the federation process. 

Similarly, there is no uniform method to revoke credentials or 

their associated attribute(s) in a federated community. In the 

absence of a uniform revocation method, this document seeks to 

investigate credential and attribute revocation with a particular 

FY 2013 Computer Security Division Publications
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 84

focus on identifying missing requirements. This document first 

introduces and analyzes the different types of digital credentials 

and recommends missing revocation-related requirements for 

each model in a federated environment. As a second goal, and 

as a by-product of the analysis and recommendations, this 

paper suggests a credential reliability and revocation service 

that serves to eliminate the missing requirements.

Contact:

Ms. Hildegard (Hildy) Ferraiolo

hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov

NISTIR 7622, Notional Supply Chain Risk Management 

Practices for Federal Information Systems

This publication provides a wide array of practices that, when 

implemented, will help mitigate supply chain risk to federal 

information systems. It seeks to equip federal departments and 

agencies with a notional set of repeatable and commercially 

reasonable supply chain assurance methods and practices 

that offer a means to obtain an understanding of, and visibility 

throughout, the supply chain.

Contacts:

Mr. Jon Boyens Ms. Celia Paulsen

jon.boyens@nist.gov celia.paulsen@nist.gov

NISTIR 7511 Revision 3, Security Content 

Automation Protocol (SCAP) Version 1.2 

Validation Program Test Requirements

This report defines the requirements and associated test 

procedures necessary for products to achieve one or more 

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) validations. 

Validation is awarded based on a defined set of SCAP capabilities 

by independent laboratories that have been accredited for SCAP 

testing by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation 

Program (NVLAP).

Contacts:

Mr. David Waltermire Ms. Melanie Cook

david.waltermire@nist.gov melanie.cook@nist.gov

Mr. Stephen Quinn

stephen.quinn@nist.gov

NISTIR 7298 Revision 2, Glossary of 

Key Information Security Terms

NIST has received numerous requests to provide a summary 

glossary for our publications and other relevant sources, and to 

make the glossary available to practitioners. As a result of these 

requests, this glossary of common security terms was extracted 

from FIPS, the SP 800 series, NISTIRs, and the Committee for 

National Security Systems Instruction 4009 (CNSSI-4009). This 

glossary includes most of the terms in the NIST publications. 

It also contains nearly all of the terms and definitions from 

CNSSI-4009. This glossary provides a central resource of terms 

and definitions most commonly used in NIST information security 

publications and in CNSS information assurance publications. 

For a given term, all definitions from NIST documents are not 

included − especially not from the older NIST publications. 

Since draft documents are not stable, those terms/definitions 

are not referenced. Each entry in the glossary points to one 

or more source NIST publications, and/or CNSSI-4009, and/or 

supplemental sources where appropriate. The NIST publications 

referenced are the most recent versions of those publications 

(as of the date of this document). [Supersedes NISTIR 7298 

Revision 1 (February 2011)]

Contact:

Mr. Richard Kissel

richard.kissel@nist.gov

Additional Publications by CSD Authors

CSD authors actively contribute to the security community 

by authoring articles in the scholarly literature, participating in 

technical conferences, contributing to encyclopedias and other 

books, and publishing other “white papers” that fall outside the 

scope of NIST Technical Series publications described in the 

preceding section.

The following documents were published during FY 2013. For 

conference papers, the contributions listed below were accepted 

for conferences held during FY 2013; in some cases the final 

proceedings were not published until FY 2014. All NIST authors 

are identified using italics.

Links to the preprints and/or final publications of the documents 

below are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications.

aJournal Articles

J. Boyar, P. Matthews and R.C. Peralta, “Logic Minimization 

Techniques with Applications to Cryptology,” Journal of 

Cryptology 26(2), 280-312 (April 2013). doi:10.1007/s00145-

012-9124-7.

A new technique for combinational logic 

optimization is described. The technique is a two-step 

process. In the first step, the non-linearity of a circuit 

{ as measured by the number of non-linear gates it 

contains { is reduced. The second step reduces the 

number of gates in the linear components of the 

already reduced circuit. The technique can be applied 

to arbitrary combinational logic problems, and often 

yields improvements even after optimization by 
85

standard methods has been performed. In this paper 

we show the results of our technique when applied to 

the S-box of the Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS 

197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), National 

Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001). 

We also show that in the second step, one is faced 

with an NP-hard problem, the Shortest Linear Program 

(SLP) problem, which is to minimize the number of 

linear operations necessary to compute a set of linear 

forms. In addition to showing that SLP is NP-hard, we 

show that a special case of the corresponding decision 

problem is Max SNP-Complete, implying limits to its 

approximability. 

Previous algorithms for minimizing the number of 

gates in linear components produced cancellationfree straight-line programs, i.e., programs in which 

there is no cancellation of variables in GF(2). We show 

that such algorithms have approximation ratios of at 

least 3/2 and therefore cannot be expected to yield 

optimal solutions to non-trivial inputs. The straight-line 

programs produced by our techniques are not always 

cancellation-free. We have experimentally verified 

that, for randomly chosen linear transformations, they 

are significantly smaller than the circuits produced by 

previous algorithms.

Q.H. Dang, “Changes in Federal Information Processing 

Standard (FIPS) 180-4, Secure Hash Standard,” Cryptologia

37(1), 69-73 (2013). doi:10.1080/01611194.2012.687431.

This paper describes the changes between FIPS 

180-3 and FIPS 180-4. FIPS 180-4 specifies two new 

secure cryptographic hash algorithms: SHA-512/224 

and SHA-512/256; it also includes a method for 

determining initial value(s) for any future SHA-512-

based hash algorithm(s). FIPS 180-4 also removes a 

requirement for the execution of the message length 

encoding operation.

D. Ferraiolo, S. Gavrila, and W. Jansen, “Enabling an Enterprisewide, Data-centric Operating Environment,” Computer (IEEE)

46(4), 94-96 (April 2013). doi:10.1109/MC.2013.130.

Although access control (AC) currently plays an 

important role in securing data services, if properly 

envisaged and designed, access control can serve a 

more vital role in computing than one might expect. 

The Policy Machine (PM), a framework for AC 

developed at NIST, was designed with this goal in 

mind. The PM has evolved beyond just a concept to a 

prototype implementation and is now being directed 

toward an open source project.

D. Maughan, W.D. Newhouse and T. Vagoun, “Introducing the 

Federal Cybersecurity R&D Strategic Plan,” The Next Wave - The 

National Security Agency’s Review of Emerging Technologies 

19(4), 3-7 (2012).

In December 2011, the White House Office of 

Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) released the 

Trustworthy Cyberspace: Strategic Plan for the Federal 

Cybersecurity Research and Development Program 

—a framework for a set of coordinated federal 

strategic priorities and objectives for cybersecurity 

research. The release of this strategic plan marked 

an important milestone by the Federal Government’s 

research community. It expresses an understanding 

of key causes of cybersecurity deficiencies and 

presents research themes with high potential to 

significantly improve the security of cyber systems 

and infrastructure. The strategic plan is a culmination 

of many efforts within the Federal Government, most 

notably by the Senior Steering Group for Cybersecurity 

R&D (CSIA R&D SSG), the Cyber Security and 

Information Assurance Interagency Working Group 

(CSIA IWG) of the Federal Networking and IT R&D 

(NITRD) Program, and by the Special Cyber Operations 

Research and Engineering Interagency Working Group 

(SCORE IWG).

C. McLeman and D. Moody, “Class Numbers via 3-Isogenies and 

Elliptic Surfaces,” International Journal of Number Theory 9(1), 

125-138 (February 2013). doi:10.1142/S179304211250128X.

We show that a character sum attached to a family 

of 3-isogenies defined on the fibers of a certain 

elliptic surface over Fp relates to the class number of 

the quadratic imaginary number field Q(\sqrt{p}). In 

this sense, this provides a higher-dimensional analog 

of some recent class number formulas associated to 

2-isogenies of elliptic curves.

J.A. Montenegro, M.J. Fischer, J. Lopez and R.C. Peralta, 

“Secure Sealed-Bid Online Auctions Using Discreet Cryptographic 

Proofs,” Mathematical and Computer Modelling 57(11-12), 

2583-2595 (June 2013). doi:10.1016/j.mcm.2011.07.027.

This work describes the design and implementation 

of an auction system using secure multiparty 

computation techniques. Our aim is to produce a 

system that is practical under actual field constraints 

on computation, memory, and communication. The 

underlying protocol is privacy-preserving, that is, the 

winning bid is determined without information about 

the losing bids leaking to either the auctioneer or other 

bidders. Practical implementation of the protocol is 

feasible using circuit-based cryptographic proofs 

along with additively homomorphic bit commitment. 

Moreover, we propose the development of a Proof 

FY 2013 Computer Security Division Publications
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 86

Certificate standard. These certificates convey 

sufficient information to recreate the cryptographic 

proofs and verify them offline.

D. Moody and A.S. Zargar, “On Integer Solutions of x^4+y^4-

2z^4-2w^4=0,” Notes on Number Theory and Discrete 

Mathematics 19(1), 37-43 (2013).

In this article, we study the quartic Diophantine 

equation x^4+y^4-2z^4-2w^4=0. We find non-trivial 

integer solutions. Furthermore, we show that when a 

solution has been found, a series of other solutions can 

be derived. We do so using two different techniques. 

The first is a geometric method due to Richmond, 

while the second involves elliptic curves.

W.D. Newhouse, “Securing America’s Digital Infrastructure 

Through Education,” The Next Wave - The National Security 

Agency’s Review of Emerging Technologies 19(4), 30-36 (2012).

This article provides an overview of the establishment 

of the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education 

(NICE), its government structure, and it goals. 

Parallels are drawn between the strategic R&D 

thrust, Developing Scientific Foundations, described 

in “Trustworthy Cyberspace: Strategic Plan for the 

Federal Cybersecurity Research and Development 

Program” published in December 2011 and NICE’s 

awareness, education, and workforce efforts.

F.L. Podio, “Advances in Biometric Standardisation – 

Addressing Global Requirements for Interoperable Biometrics,” 

International Journal of Biometrics 5(1), 5-19 (2013). 

doi:10.1504/IJBM.2013.05073.

The paper discusses the current status of biometric 

standards development activities, with a focus on 

international standards developments. Published 

standards, as well as standards under development 

or planned for the near future, are addressed. The 

work of Joint Technical Committee 1 of ISO and IEC 

Subcommittee 37 - Biometrics who is responsible 

for the development of a large portfolio of biometric 

standards in support of interoperability and data 

interchange is addressed. The work of two other 

JTC 1 Subcommittees, SC 17 Cards and personal 

identification and SC 27 - IT Security techniques 

who are also developing biometric standards within 

their scope of work is discussed. In many cases, the 

development of biometric standards impacts other 

standards developments including token-based, 

security, and telecommunication standards. Specific 

examples of this impact are provided. Standards 

activities performed in standards development 

bodies outside of ISO/IEC JTC 1 are also addressed. 

They include the work of ISO Technical Committee 

68 – Financial Services – SC 2 – Security, and the 

International Telecommunication Union - Study Group 

17- Security. Due to the large international impact 

and adoption, the development of the ANSI/NISTITL standards led by the Information Technology 

Laboratory of NIST is also addressed. Although a 

detailed discussion on biometric standards adoption 

is beyond the scope of this paper, a few examples 

of global and national biometric standards adoption 

for verification and identification applications are 

discussed.

S.M. Radack and D.R. Kuhn, “Protecting Wireless Local Area 

Networks (WLANs),” IT Professional 14(6), 59-61 (NovemberDecember 2012). doi:10.1109/MITP.2012.110.

This article summarizes the information that 

was presented in the February 2012 Information 

Technology Laboratory (ITL) bulletin, Guidelines for 

Securing Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). The 

bulletin, which was noted by WERB in February 2012, 

was based on NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-153, 

Guidelines for Securing Wireless Local Area Networks 

(WLANs): Recommendations of the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology. The article summarizes 

the bulletin for a professional technical publication, 

and focuses on how organizations can implement 

sound security practices throughout the life cycles 

of their WLANs. Information is provided about access 

to SP 500-153, and to other NIST resources that are 

available to help organizations improve the security of 

wireless local area networks, the system development 

life cycle, and the management of risks to systems.

M. Sönmez Turan, “On the Nonlinearity of Maximum-length 

NFSR Feedbacks,” Cryptography and Communication 4(3-4), 

233-243 (December 2012). doi:10.1007/s12095-012-0067-5.

Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) are the 

main building block of many classical stream ciphers; 

however due to their inherent linearity, most of the 

LFSR-based designs do not offer the desired security 

levels. In the last decade, using Nonlinear Feedback 

Shift Registers (NFSR) in stream ciphers became 

very popular. However, the theory of NFSRs is not 

well-understood, and there is no efficient method 

that constructs a cryptographically strong feedback 

function with maximum period and also, given a 

feedback function it is hard to predict the period. In this 

paper, we study the maximum-length NFSRs, focusing 

on the nonlinearity of their feedback functions. First, 

we provide some upper bounds on the nonlinearity of 

the maximum-length feedback functions, and then we 

study the feedback functions having nonlinearity 2 in 
87

detail. We also show some techniques to improve the 

nonlinearity of a given feedback function using crossjoining.

aConference Papers

M. Albanese, S. Jajodia, A. Singhal and L. Wang, “An Efficient 

Approach to Assessing the Risk of Zero-Day Vulnerabilities,” 

10th International Conference on Security and Cryptography 

(SECRYPT 2013), Reykjavik, Iceland, July 29-31, 2013.[To 

be published in a volume of Springer’s Communications in 

Computer and Information Science series.]

*This paper received the Best Paper Award at 

SECRYPT 2013.

Computer systems are vulnerable to both known 

and zero-day attacks. Although known attack patterns 

can be easily modeled, thus enabling the development 

of suitable hardening strategies, handling zeroday vulnerabilities is inherently difficult due to 

their unpredictable nature. Previous research has 

attempted to assess the risk associated with unknown 

attack patterns, and a suitable metric to quantify such 

risk, the k-zero-day safety metric, has been defined. 

However, existing algorithms for computing this metric 

are not scalable, and must assume that complete 

zero-day attack graphs have been generated, which 

may be infeasible in practice for large networks. In 

this paper, we propose a set of polynomial algorithms 

for estimating the k-zero-day safety of possibly large 

networks efficiently, without pre-computing the entire 

attack graph. We validate our approach through 

experiments, and show that the proposed algorithms 

are computationally efficient and accurate.

S. Banik, S. Maitra, S. Sarkar and M. Sönmez Turan, “A 

Chosen IV Related Key Attack on Grain-128a,” 18th Australasian 

Conference on Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2013), 

Brisbane, Australia, July 1-3, 2013. In Lecture Notes in Computer 

Science 7959, Information Security and Privacy, C. Boyd and L. 

Simpson, eds., Springer, Berlin (2013) 13-26. doi:10.1007/978-

3-642-39059-3_2.

Due to the symmetric padding used in the stream 

cipher Grain v1 and Grain-128, it is possible to 

find Key-IV pairs that generate shifted keystreams 

efficiently. Based on this observation, Lee et al. 

presented a chosen IV related Key attack on Grain v1 

and Grain-128 at ACISP 2008. Later, the designers 

introduced Grain-128a having an asymmetric padding. 

As a result, the existing idea of chosen IV related Key 

attack does not work on this new design. In this paper, 

we present a Key recovery attack on Grain-128a, in 

a chosen IV related Key setting. We show that using 

around γ·2^32 (γ is a experimentally determined 

constant and it is sufficient to estimate it as 2^8) 

related Keys and γ·2^64 chosen IVs, it is possible 

to obtain 32·γ simple nonlinear equations and solve 

them to recover the Secret Key in Grain-128a.

J. Boyar, M. Find and R. Peralta, “Four Measures of 

Nonlinearity,” Eighth International Conference on Algorithms 

and Complexity (CIAC 2013), Barcelona, Spain, May 22-24, 

2013. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7878, Algorithms 

and Complexity, P. G. Spirakis and M. Serna, eds., Springer, 

Berlin (2013) 61-72. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-38233-8_6.

Cryptographic applications, such as hashing, block 

ciphers and stream ciphers, make use of functions 

which are simple by some criteria (such as circuit 

implementations), yet hard to invert almost everywhere. 

A necessary condition for the latter property is to be 

“sufficiently distant” from linear, and cryptographers 

have proposed several measures for this distance. 

In this paper, we show that four common measures, 

nonlinearity, algebraic degree, annihilator immunity, 

and multiplicative complexity, are incomparable in the 

sense that for each pair of measures, μ1, μ2, there 

exist functions f1, f2 with μ1(f1) > _μ1(f2) but μ2(f1) 

< _μ2(f2). We also present new connections between 

two of these measures. Additionally, we give a lower 

bound on the multiplicative complexity of collisionfree functions.

R. Chandramouli, “Security Assurance Requirements for 

Hypervisor Deployment Features,” Seventh International 

Conference on Digital Society (ICDS 2013), Nice, France, 

February 24-March 1, 2013, L. Berntzen and C-P Rückemann, 

eds., Xpert Publishing Services, Wilmington, Delaware (2013) 

120-125.

Virtualized hosts provide abstraction of the 

hardware resources (e.g., CPU, Memory) enabling 

multiple computing stacks to be run on a single 

physical machine. The Hypervisor is the core software 

that enables this virtualization and hence must be 

configured to ensure security robustness for the 

entire virtualization infrastructure. Among the various 

combination of hypervisor types and hypervisor 

hardware platforms, we have chosen a reference 

architecture as the basis for our set of deployment 

features. For each deployment feature, this paper 

looks at the configuration options and analyzes the 

security implications of the options/deployment 

feature to derive a set of assurance requirements that 

are (a) provided by each of the configuration options or 

(b) are required for that deployment feature as a whole 

regardless of configuration options.

FY 2013 Computer Security Division Publications
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 88

P. Cheng, L. Wang, S. Jajodia and A. Singhal, “Aggregating 

CVSS Base Scores for Semantics Rich Network Security 

Metrics,” 2012 IEEE 31st Symposium on Reliable Distributed 

Systems (SRDS), Irvine, CA, United States, October 8-11, 

2012, IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC (2012) 31-40. 

doi:10.1109/SRDS.2012.4.

A network security metric is desirable in evaluating 

the effectiveness of security solutions in distributed 

systems. Aggregating CVSS scores of individual 

vulnerabilities provides a practical approach 

to network security metric. However, existing 

approaches to aggregating CVSS scores usually cause 

useful semantics of individual scores to be lost in the 

aggregated result. In this paper, we address this issue 

through two novel approaches. First, instead of taking 

each base score as an input, our approach drills down 

to the underlying base metric level where dependency 

relationships have well-defined semantics. Second, 

our approach interprets and aggregates the base 

metrics from three different aspects in order to 

preserve corresponding semantics of the individual 

scores. Finally, we confirm the advantages of our 

approaches through simulation.

V. C. Hu and K. Scarfone, “Real-Time Access Control Rule Fault 

Detection Using a Simulated Logic Circuit,” 2013 International 

Conference on Social Computing (SocialCom), Washington, DC, 

September 8-14, 2013, IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC 

(2013) 494-501. doi:10.1109/SocialCom.2013.76.

Access control (AC) policies can be implemented 

based on different AC models, which are fundamentally 

composed by semantically independent AC rules in 

expressions of privilege assignments described by 

attributes of subjects/attributes, actions, objects/

attributes, and environment variables of the protected 

systems. Incorrect implementations of AC policies 

result in faults that not only leak but also disable access 

of information, and faults in AC policies are difficult 

to detect without support of verification or automatic 

fault detection mechanisms. This research proposes 

an automatic method through the construction of a 

simulated logic circuit that simulates AC rules in AC 

policies or models. The simulated logic circuit allows 

real-time detection of policy faults including conflicts 

of privilege assignments, leaks of information, and 

conflicts of interest assignments. Such detection is 

traditionally done by tools that perform verification 

or testing after all the rules of the policy/model are 

completed, and it provides no information about 

the source of verification errors. The real-time fault 

detecting capability proposed by this research allows 

a rule fault to be detected and fixed immediately 

before the next rule is added to the policy/model, thus 

requiring no later verification and saving a significant 

amount of fault fixing time.

R. Johnson, Z. Wang, A. Stavrou and J. Voas, “Exposing 

Software Security and Availability Risks For Commercial 

Mobile Devices,” Proceedings of the Annual Reliability and 

Maintainability Symposium, 2013 (RAMS’13), Orlando, Florida, 

January 28-31, IEEE, New York (2013) 1-7. doi:10.1109/

RAMS.2013.6517735.

In this manuscript, we present our efforts towards 

a framework for exposing the functionality of a mobile 

application through a combination of static and 

dynamic program analysis that attempts to explore 

all available execution paths including libraries. We 

verified our approach by testing a large number of 

Android applications with our program to exhibit its 

functionality and viability. The framework allows 

complete automation of the execution process so 

that no user input is required. We also discuss how 

our static analysis program can be used to inform 

the execution of the dynamic analysis program. The 

program can serve as an extensible basis to fulfill 

other useful purposes such as symbolic execution, 

program verification, interactive debugger, and other 

approaches that require deep inspection of an Android 

application.

D.R. Kuhn, I. Dominquez Mendoza, R.N. Kacker and Y. 

Lei, “Combinatorial Coverage Measurement Concepts and 

Applications,” International Workshop on Combinatorial Testing 

2013 (IWCT 2013), Luxembourg, March 22, 2013, IEEE Computer 

Society, Washington, DC (2013) 352-361. doi:10.1109/

ICSTW.2013.77.

Combinatorial testing applies factor covering arrays 

to test all t-way combinations of input or configuration 

state space. In some testing situations, it is not 

practical to use covering arrays, but any set of tests 

covers at least some portion of t-way combinations 

up to t [less than or equal to] n. This report describes 

measures of combinatorial coverage that can be used 

in evaluating the degree of t-way coverage of any test 

suite, regardless of whether it was initially constructed 

for combinatorial coverage.

C. Liu, A. Singhal and D. Wijesekera, “Mapping Evidence 

Graphs to Attack Graphs,” IEEE International Workshop 

on Information Forensics and Security 2012 (WIFS 2012), 

Tenerife, Spain, December 2-5, 2012, IEEE Signal Processing 

Society, Piscataway, New Jersey (2012) 121-126. doi:10.1109/

WIFS.2012.6412636.

Attack graphs compute potential attack paths from 

a system configuration and known vulnerabilities of 

a system. Evidence graphs model intrusion evidence 

and dependencies among them for forensic analysis. 

In this paper, we show how to map evidence graphs to 

attack graphs. This mapping is useful for application 
89

of attack graphs and evidence graphs for forensic 

analysis. In addition to helping to refine attack graphs 

by comparing attack paths in both attack graphs and 

evidence graphs, important probabilistic information 

contained in evidence graphs can be used to compute 

or refine potential attack success probabilities 

contained in repositories like CVSS. Conversely, attack 

graphs can be used to add missing evidence or remove 

irrelevant evidence to build a complete evidence graph. 

In particular, when attackers use anti-forensics tools 

to destroy or distort evidence, attack graphs can help 

investigators recover the attack scenarios and explain 

the lack of evidence for missing steps. We illustrate 

the mapping using a database attack as a case study.

C. Liu, A. Singhal and D. Wijesekera, “Creating Integrated 

Evidence Graphs for Network Forensics,” Ninth Annual IFIP WG 

11.9 International Conference on Digital Forensics, Orlando, 

FL, United States, January 28-30, 2013. In IFIP Advances in 

Information and Communication Technology 410, Advances in 

Digital Forensics IX, G. Peterson and S. Shenoi, eds., Springer, 

Berlin (2013) 227-241. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-41148-9_16.

Evidence Graphs model network intrusion evidence 

and their dependencies, which helps network 

forensics analysts collate and visualize dependencies. 

In particular, probabilistic evidence graph provide 

a way to link probabilities associated with different 

attack paths with available evidence. Existing work in 

evidence graphs assume that all evidence is available 

as one graph. We show how to merge different evidence 

graphs with or without the help of attack graphs. We 

show this by providing algorithms and a case study 

based on attacks on a fileserver and a database server 

in a lab network environment. An integrated evidence 

graphs that show all attacks launched toward a global 

network are more useful for forensics analysts and 

network administrators in searching for forensic 

evidence and safeguarding networks respectively.

R. Perlner and D. Smith, “A Classification of Differential 

Invariants for Multivariate Post-quantum Cryptosystems,” 

Fifth International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography 

(PQCrypto 2013), Limoges, France, June 4-7, 2013. In Lecture 

Notes in Computer Science 7932, A Classification of Differential 

Invariants for Multivariate Post-quantum Cryptosystems, P. 

Gaborit, ed., Springer, Berlin (2013) 165-173. doi:10.1007/978-

3-642-38616-9_11.

Multivariate Public Key Cryptography (MPKC) 

has become one of a few options for security in 

the quantum model of computing. Though a few 

multivariate systems have resisted years of effort from 

the cryptanalytic community, many such systems have 

fallen to a surprisingly small pool of techniques. There 

have been several recent attempts at formalizing more 

robust security arguments in this venue with varying 

degrees of applicability. We present an extension 

of one such recent measure of security against 

a differential adversary, which has the benefit of 

being immediately applicable in a general setting on 

unmodified multivariate schemes.

M. Sönmez Turan, “Related-Key Slide Attacks on Block Ciphers 

with Secret Components,” Second International Workshop on 

Lightweight Cryptography for Security and Privacy, Gebze, 

Turkey, May 6-7, 2013. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science

8162, Lightweight Cryptography for Security and Privacy, 

G. Avoine and O. Kara, eds., Springer, Berlin (2013) 28-42. 

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40392-7_3.

Lightweight cryptography aims to provide sufficient 

security with low area/power/energy requirements 

for constrained devices. In this paper, we focus 

on the lightweight encryption algorithm specified 

and approved in NRS 009-6-7:2002 by Electricity 

Suppliers Liaison Committee to be used with tokens 

in prepayment electricity dispensing systems in South 

Africa. The algorithm is a 16-round SP network with 

two 4-to-4 bit S-boxes and a 64-bit permutation. The 

S-boxes and the permutation are kept secret and 

provided only to the manufacturers of the system 

under license conditions. We present related-key 

slide attacks to recover the secret key and secret 

components using four scenarios; (i) known S-box 

and permutation with 2^48 time complexity using 

2^16 + 1 chosen plaintexts; (ii) unknown S-box and 

known permutation with 2^55 time complexity using 

2^22.71 + 1 chosen plaintexts; (iii) known S-box and 

unknown permutation with 2^48 time complexity 

using 2^16 + 1 chosen plaintexts and 2^12.28 

adaptively chosen plaintexts; and finally, (iv) unknown 

S-box and permutation, with 2^48 time complexity 

using 2^22.71 + 1 chosen plaintexts and 2^31.29 

adaptively chosen plaintexts. We also extend these 

attacks to recover the secret components in a chosenkey setting with practical complexities.

aBooks and Book Sections

D.R. Khun, R.N. Kacker and Y. Lei. Introduction to Combinatorial 

Testing. Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 2013.

Combinatorial testing of software analyzes 

interactions among variables using a very small 

number of tests. This advanced approach has 

demonstrated success in providing strong, lowcost testing in real-world situations. Introduction 

to Combinatorial Testing presents a complete selfcontained tutorial on advanced combinatorial testing 

methods for real-world software.

FY 2013 Computer Security Division Publications
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 90

The book introduces key concepts and procedures 

of combinatorial testing, explains how to use software 

tools for generating combinatorial tests, and shows 

how this approach can be integrated with existing 

practice. Detailed explanations and examples clarify 

how and why to use various techniques. Sections on 

cost and practical considerations describe tradeoffs 

and limitations that may impact resources or funding. 

While the authors introduce some of the theory and 

mathematics of combinatorial methods, readers can 

use the methods without in-depth knowledge of the 

underlying mathematics.

Accessible to undergraduate students and 

researchers in computer science and engineering, 

this book illustrates the practical application of 

combinatorial methods in software testing. Giving 

pointers to freely available tools and offering resources 

on a supplementary website, the book encourages 

readers to apply these methods in their own testing 

projects.

aWhite Papers

NIST Cloud Computing Public Security Working Group [M. 

Iorga], “Challenging Security Requirements for US Government 

Cloud Computing Adoption,” National Institute of Standards 

and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland, November 27, 2012, 

61 pp.

The Federal Cloud Strategy, February 8, 2010, 

outlines a federal cloud computing program that 

identifies program objectives aimed at accelerating 

the adoption of cloud computing across the Federal 

Government. NIST, along with other agencies, was 

tasked with a key role and specific activities in support 

of that effort, including the delivery of the NIST Cloud 

Computing Technology Roadmap and the publication of 

other Special Publications that address the reference 

architecture, definitions, and security aspects of cloud 

computing. In order to achieve adoption of cloud 

computing for the Federal Government, it is necessary 

to address the security and privacy concerns that 

federal agencies have when migrating their services 

to a cloud environment. To further exacerbate the 

situation, there are few documented details that 

directly address how to achieve some security aspects 

in a cloud environment. The purpose of this document 

is to provide an overview of the high-priority security 

and privacy challenges perceived by federal agencies 

as impediments to the adoption of cloud computing. 

The document provides descriptions of the existing 

mitigations to these security and privacy impediments. 

If no mitigations are listed, then ongoing efforts that 

could lead to mitigations are described. In the cases 

where no ongoing efforts were identified, the document 

makes recommendations for possible mitigation or 

references existing best practices.

C. Paulsen and J. Boyens, “Summary of the Workshop on 

Information and Communication Technologies Supply Chain Risk 

Management, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 

October 15-16, 2012,” National Institute of Standards and 

Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland, July 10, 2013, 21 pp.

There is a great demand from federal departments 

and agencies for supply chain risk management 

(SCRM) guidance. This document is a summary of a 

workshop held October 15-16, 2012 to broadly engage 

all stakeholders in an effort to set a foundation for 

NIST’s future work on Information and Communication 

Technologies SCRM.
Cybersecurity Framework Policy Machine

Cloud Computing Cryptography

Standards

Security Practices

Verification

Security Controls

Assets

Risk Management Framework

Biometrics

Supply chain risk management

FIPS 140-2

Validated Products List

FISMA

Continuous Monitoring

Mobile Devices

Authorization EO 13636

Roadmap

91

Opportunities to Engage 

with CSD and NIST
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 92

aGuest Research Internships at NIST

Opportunities are available at NIST for 6- to 24-month 

internships within CSD. Qualified individuals should contact 

CSD, provide a statement of qualifications, and indicate the 

area of work that is of interest. Generally speaking, the salary 

costs are borne by the sponsoring institution; however, in some 

cases, these guest research internships carry a small monthly 

stipend paid by NIST. For further information, contact:

Ms. Donna Dodson Mr. Matthew Scholl

(301) 975-8443 (301) 975-2941

donna.dodson@nist.gov matthew.scholl@nist.gov

aDetails at NIST for Government or Military 

Personnel

Opportunities are available at NIST for 6- to 24-month details 

at NIST in CSD. Qualified individuals should contact CSD, 

provide a statement of qualifications, and indicate the area of 

work that is of interest. Generally speaking, the salary costs 

are borne by the sponsoring agency; however, in some cases, 

agency salary costs may be reimbursed by NIST. For further 

information, contact:

Ms. Donna Dodson Mr. Matthew Scholl

(301) 975-8443 (301) 975-2941

donna.dodson@nist.gov matthew.scholl@nist.gov

aFederal Computer Security Program 

Managers’ Forum (FCSPM)

The FCSPM Forum is covered in detail in the Outreach 

section of this report. Membership is free and open to federal 

employees. For further information, contact:

Mr. Kevin Stine

(301) 975-4483

kevin.stine@nist.gov or sec-forum@nist.gov

Visit the FCSPM Forum website:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/membership.html

aSecurity Research

NIST occasionally undertakes security work, primarily in the 

area of research, funded by other agencies. Such sponsored 

work is accepted by NIST when it can cost effectively further 

the goals of NIST and the sponsoring institution. For further 

information, contact:

Ms. Donna Dodson

(301) 975-8443

donna.dodson@nist.gov

aFunding Opportunities at NIST

NIST funds industrial and academic research in a variety of 

ways. The Small Business Innovation Research Program funds 

R&D proposals from small businesses; see www.nist.gov/sbir. 

CSD also offers other grants to encourage work in specific fields: 

precision measurement, fire research, and materials science. 

Grants/awards supporting research at industry, academia, and 

other institutions are available on a competitive basis through 

several different Institute offices.

For general information on NIST grants programs, please 

contact:

Mr. Christopher Hunton

(301) 975-5718

christopher.hunton@nist.gov

Funding opportunity information: 

http://www.nist.gov/director/ocfo/grants/grants.cfm
Cybersecurity Framework Policy Machine

Cloud Computing Cryptography

Standards

Security Practices

Verification

Security Controls

Assets

Risk Management Framework

Biometrics

Supply chain risk management

FIPS 140-2

Validated Products List

FISMA

Continuous Monitoring

Mobile Devices

Authorization EO 13636

Roadmap

93

Acknowledgments

The editor, Patrick O’Reilly of the Computer Security Division, wishes to thank his colleagues in the 

Computer Security Division, who provided write-ups on their 2013 project highlights and accomplishments 

for this annual report (their names are mentioned after each project write-up). The editor would also like 

to acknowledge Barbara Guttman, Kevin Stine, Jim Foti (ITL, NIST), Greg Witte, Chris Johnson and Doug 

Rike (G2) for reviewing and providing valuable feedback for this annual report. The Editor also would like 

to thank Lorie Richards (Facilities Services Division, Creative and Printing Service, NIST) for designing the 

cover and final layout of our division’s annual report. Finally, the editor would like to thank Joshua Franklin 

and Michaela Iorga (Computer Security Division, ITL, NIST) for their input with the 2013 annual report cover 

design. 
Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2013 94

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Risk Management Framework

Biometrics

Supply chain risk management

FIPS 140-2

Validated Products List

FISMA

Mobile Devices Continuous Monitoring

Authorization

Assets

EO 13636

Roadmap