*

Honorable Harlington Wood, Jr., Senior U.S. Circuit Judge

for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 

 1Curtis Chapman, then the Assistant Superintendent of MCI,

was also named as a defendant in the original complaint. Since

he was not alleged to have taken part in any use of excessive

force, however, the district court entered judgment for Chapman

at trial. 

 2See Harris v. Dugger, No. 89-3478, 897 F.2d 536 (11th Cir.

Feb. 8, 1990) (unpublished disposition); Harris v. Dugger, 715

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-4665.

Vincent D. HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Curtis CHAPMAN, M.J. Piggott, J.W. Barton, T. Kovalsky, R.

Ridley, Sgt. Bentley, and R. Cotterman, Defendants-Appellees.

Oct. 11, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Florida. (No. 90-14061-CIV-UUB), Ursula UngaroBenages, Disrict Judge.

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and WOOD*

,

Senior Circuit Judge.

WOOD, Senior Circuit Judge:

On September 25, 1989 several correctional officers at the

Martin Correctional Institution ("MCI") in Martin County, Florida

forcibly removed Vincent D. Harris from his cell and had his hair

cut, allegedly while beating him and using racial slurs. Harris,

alleging a violation of his constitutional rights under the First

and Eighth Amendments, brought a § 1983 action against the six

officers involved, all of whom are parties to this appeal.1 Harris

is familiar with both such claims and the prison haircut policies

which underlie them; this is not his first such challenge.2

 This
F.Supp. 364 (S.D.Fla.1989), vacated in part on reconsid., 757

F.Supp. 1359 (S.D.Fla.1991). See also Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d

912, 915 n. 2 (11th Cir.1995) ("Appellant is a very litigious

prisoner." (ten citations omitted)). 

 3Apparently omitting his first name in error, the complaint

refers to this defendant as "R. Cotterman." 

case and appeal present some new issues, however.

The district court dismissed Harris' First Amendment claim,

but allowed his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim to go to the

jury. That jury returned a verdict clearing five of the defendants

but finding for Harris against the sixth, Sgt. John R. Cotterman.3

The jury assessed $500 in punitive damages against Cotterman for

his part in the ordeal but declined to award any compensatory

damages. After receiving the verdict, however, the district court

entered judgment as a matter of law in Cotterman's favor. The

court also vacated an award of sanctions against the defendants for

discovery violations which had been granted by a previous judge.

Harris filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging these and other

rulings.

I. BACKGROUND

When the events in question occurred, Vincent D. Harris was an

inmate at the Martin Correctional Institution ("MCI") in Martin

County, Florida. One of the provisions of the Florida

Administrative Code governing such institutions states that:

[M]ale inmates shall have their hair cut short to medium

length at all times with no part of the ear or collar covered.

Sideburns shall not extend beyond the bottom of the earlobes

and will have straight lines with no flare at the base. All

male inmates shall be clean shaven, provided, however, an

exemption from this requirement may be granted on the basis of

a medical diagnosis when it is determined by the staff

physician that shaving would be detrimental to the inmate's

health.
 4

The officers involved are all party to this appeal. They

are Myron Piggott, J.W. Barton, T. Kovalsky, R. Ridley, Sgt.

Bentley, and J. Cotterman. 

Fla.Admin.Code Ann. r. 33-3.002(11) (1989). This rule is enforced

by similar Department of Corrections Rules and by MCI's internal

operating procedures. Harris, however, is a Rastafarian.

Rastafarians believe that men should not shave, cut, or comb their

hair or beard. See Note, Soul Rebels: the Rastafarians and the

Free Exercise Clause, 72 Geo.L.J. 1605, 1608 (1984). In accordance

with these beliefs, which the parties assume are sincere, Harris

refused to voluntarily submit to a haircut on several prior

occasions and had been administratively disciplined at MCI for his

reluctance.

On September 25, 1989, after receiving orders to enforce the

hair length rule, several corrections officers at MCI4

 forcibly

removed Harris from his cell, took him to the laundry room, and

restrained him while his hair was cut by another inmate. Harris

resisted in a variety of ways throughout the five to six minute

affair (he admitted threatening to kill the prison barber, among

others) and was accordingly restrained. Harris claims, however,

that this restraint exceeded the amount of force authorized. He

alleges that the officers kicked and beat him about the face; also

that a towel was used around his neck to "squelch" and secure him.

Though uncertain about the particular acts of each officer, Harris

specifically charges that Sgt. Cotterman "snapped" his head back

with the towel and twice "mugged" him in the face (a "mugging" or

"palming" is apparently a slap or hit with a palm or open fist).

He also claims that Sgt. Cotterman used various racial slurs and
 5

Defendants contended that Harris had not been injured

during the haircut and thus could not allege the kind of injury

necessary to prevail on a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. 

Harris, however, maintained that his back was injured while being

restrained during the haircut and that the use of force was

unnecessary and wanton, the legal benchmark. 

otherwise taunted him throughout the ordeal. Witness testimony

supported these allegations at least in part. Following the event

Harris was uncooperative with prison medical personnel. The

routine examination which follows an authorized use of force

against an inmate noted no visible injury. Later, however, Harris

complained of back and knee pain resulting from the incident.

In April 1990 Harris filed this § 1983 action against the

defendants-appellees. Harris charged that prison officials and

officers violated his First Amendment right to freedom of religious

expression when they cut his "religiously mandated" hair style. He

further alleged that the officers used excessive force and

subjected him to verbal abuse, thus violating his Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

In September 1991 defendants moved for summary judgment, or in

the alternative for dismissal of Harris's complaint for failure to

state a claim. In May 1992 the district court adopted the findings

of the magistrate and dismissed Harris's verbal abuse claims. The

court also granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the

First Amendment claim, finding the hair length rule constitutional,

but also finding that a material issue of fact existed regarding

the excessive force claim.5 Finally, the district court, per Judge

Jose A. Gonzalez Jr., also granted Harris's motion for sanctions

because of the defendants' alleged failure to comply with discovery
 6

Discussed further below, the RFRA reinstitutes a

"compelling interest" standard in place of the "substantial

interest" standard which applied previously. 

requests. The order, however, stated that "[i]mposition of

sanctions will be deferred until the conclusion of the case and

considered at the time of taxing costs."

On December 30, 1992, this case was reassigned to Judge Ursula

Ungaro-Benages. Harris, now represented by counsel (he had

previously proceeded pro se), moved to reinstate his First

Amendment claim. He asserted that the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, mandated

the application of a higher standard for First Amendment claims

than that applied to his complaint previously. 6

 This motion was

denied.

After a four-day trial a jury returned its verdict on Harris's

remaining excessive force claim. The jury found that defendants

Piggot, Barton, Kovalsky, Ridley, and Bentley had neither used

excessive force, nor "acted with malice, willfulness or callous

indifference to the rights of the Plaintiff," the basic

instructions for assessing compensatory and punitive damages,

respectively. They also found, however, that defendant Cotterman

had done both of these. The jury assessed $500 in punitive damages

against Cotterman but declined to assess any compensatory damages.

Despite this verdict Judge Ungaro-Benages dismissed the

charges against Cotterman and entered judgment as a matter of law

in his favor pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). After reviewing the

record, Judge Ungaro-Benages also vacated the previous grant of

sanctions against defendants for their alleged discovery
violations. Harris filed a timely appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

Harris contends on appeal that the trial court erred: 1) in

not reinstating his First Amendment claim; 2) in allowing the

defendants to submit expert testimony to the jury; 3) in granting

Cotterman's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law; and 4) in

vacating the previous award of sanctions. Each of these

contentions will be addressed below.

A. First Amendment Claim/RFRA

 The district court, in adopting the findings of the

magistrate, cited Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499 (11th

Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 714, 98 L.Ed.2d

664 (1988), a case that upheld as constitutional a prison hair

length rule virtually identical to the one in this case. In doing

so, the Martinelli court held that hair length regulations were the

least restrictive means of advancing substantial governmental

interests in maintaining prison security and in identifying

escapees. Id. at 1506-07. Under the "substantial governmental

interest" standard, this court has repeatedly found that such rules

were permissible for those reasons. See, e.g., Brightly v.

Wainwright, 814 F.2d 612, 613 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.

944, 108 S.Ct. 332, 98 L.Ed.2d 359 (1987); Maimon v. Wainwright,

792 F.2d 133 (11th Cir.1986); Shabazz v. Barnauskas, 790 F.2d

1536, 1540 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1011, 107 S.Ct. 655,

93 L.Ed.2d 709 (1986).

The RFRA, passed by Congress in late 1993, changed the

standard relied on in Martinelli. The RFRA provides that
"[g]overnment may substantially burden a person's exercise of

religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to

the person 1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental

interest; and 2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that

compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). This

statute applies retroactively. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a);

Lawson v. Dugger, 844 F.Supp. 1538 (S.D.Fla.1994), rev'd on other

grounds sub nom. Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502 (11th Cir.1996).

Harris asserts that the district court's decision did not comply

with the elements of this new standard and perhaps relied on

factors such as economic costs which are not mentioned in RFRA. We

disagree.

As an initial matter, though Harris offered no evidence on the

point, see Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir.1995)

(describing the burden of the religious adherent), we may assume

that the prison's hair length rule "substantially burdens" the

exercise of his religion. Next we turn to the district court's

analysis. Despite the magistrate's citation to Martinelli, it is

clear that the district court was fully aware of the new standards

articulated by RFRA and applied them. Indeed, the court discussed

the issue orally when announcing its ruling:

[I]t seems to me clear that the State has a compelling State

interest in issues relating to the security of prison

facilities and related issues, such as the ability to identify

prisoners, to be able to prevent themselves from disguising

themselves and from secreting objects in their hair and so

forth.

I also am not reluctant to find the least restrictive

means of accomplishing that is to cut the inmate's hair so

that the inmate cannot use his hair to disguise himself[,] to

conceal his identity[,] or to hide objects in it.
Frankly, putting cost aside, from a practical standpoint,

I would be hard pressed to think of any other reasonable means

in order to deal with this problem.

The district court's later omnibus order similarly dealt with the

issue and specifically applied the RFRA statute. We thus find no

merit in Harris's argument. Neither do we fault the district

court's conclusions regarding the compelling interest and least

restrictive means tests. It is well established that states have

a compelling interest in security and order within their prisons,

see Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 512 (11th Cir.1996) (and

citations therein). This is so especially in "close custody"

facilities like MCI which contain extremely violent offenders.

This general interest in security clearly includes other specific

interests articulated by the district court such as the

identification of escapees and the prevention of the secreting of

contraband or weapons in hair or beards. See also Hamilton v.

Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1554-55 (8th Cir.1996) (finding prison hair

length rule applicable to Native American, for similar reasons);

Phipps v. Parker, 879 F.Supp. 734 (W.D.Ky.1995) (finding prison

hair length rule applicable to orthodox Hasidic Jew, for similar

reasons). Furthermore, like the courts cited here, we are unable

to suggest any lesser means than a hair length rule for satisfying

these interests, nor could Harris's counsel at oral argument. We

thus join these courts in finding that a reasonable hair length

regulation satisfies the least restrictive means test. The court's

decision denying reinstatement of the claim is therefore affirmed.

B. Opinion Testimony

 Harris next contends that the district court impermissibly
 7

The defendants added Dr. Smith as a witness on the eve of

trial. Harris objected to the late inclusion of this "expert

witness." The court reluctantly permitted Smith to testify on

the grounds that (1) he offer no expert testimony and (2) he

restrict his comments to interpreting the abbreviated language in

the reports and outlining the procedures by which the reports

would have been made. 

allowed the defendants to introduce "expert testimony" at trial and

that this testimony "severely prejudiced" the presentation of his

Eighth Amendment claims to the jury. We review the district

court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States

v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1362 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S.

907, 109 S.Ct. 3192, 105 L.Ed.2d 701 (1989).

 Harris claimed that his lower back was injured during his

forced haircut. In an attempt to discredit this assertion,

defendants presented medical records that showed that defendant had

complained of lower back pain nearly ten times in the year

preceding the haircut. These records were admitted into evidence

without objection. The defense then called Dr. Robert Smith, the

Chief Medical Doctor at the South Florida Reception Center, to

elaborate on the records. 7

 After reading through the various

incident reports for the jury Dr. Smith was asked if, in his

"opinion," Harris's records "indicate[d] a history of lower back

pain." Harris objected to this question as he considered it to be

eliciting an opinion. The district court recognized it as such but

ruled that Dr. Smith could answer. He did so by saying "Yes, they

do."

As the district court recognized, the use of this particular

witness for the task at hand was somewhat suspect, but we believe

the decision to allow his limited response to such a general
question was not an abuse of discretion. "History" is a word that

has no special medical or legal significance. As defined by The

American Heritage College Dictionary (2d ed. 1982), "history" can

be 1) "a narrative of events," 2) "a chronological record of

events," 3) "an interesting past" or 4) "a record of a patient's

medical background." Thus to say that Harris had a "history of

lower back pain" does not say very much. Moreover, one legal

encyclopedia defines "opinion" as "an inference or conclusion drawn

by a witness from facts, some of which are known to him and others

assumed, or drawn from facts which although lending probability to

the inference do not evolve it by a process of absolutely necessary

reasoning." 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 438 (1964) (emphasis added).

Since Dr. Smith expressed nothing in his answer that was not a

restatement of obvious, known facts—namely, that Harris had

numerous documented incidents of lower back pain in the year(s)

preceding the haircut—he stated no "opinion," let alone an expert

one. We find the decision to allow the testimony was within the

district court's discretion.

C. Judgment as a Matter of Law (JNOV)

 Although the jury found in favor of the other defendants, it

specifically found that Cotterman violated Harris's constitutional

rights and that his actions were sufficiently callous to award $500

in punitive damages. Judge Ungaro-Benages, however, entered

judgment as a matter of law in favor of Cotterman. The court

stated:

While the jury apparently believed the Plaintiff's testimony

that Defendant Cotterman had restrained the Plaintiff by

wrapping a towel around Plaintiff's head and used racial slurs

during the incident, the fact that the jury exonerated the
other Defendants reflects that the jury rejected Plaintiff's

argument that all of the Defendants acted in concert to

inflict a beating upon the Plaintiff. Consequently, the jury

could award punitive damages against Defendant Cotterman only

if, standing alone, his conduct evidenced callous indifference

or an evil intent or motuve (sic) to violate the Plaintiff's

constitutional rights.

The evidence against Defendant Cotterman was simply

insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that his

conduct was callous and malicious. (cite omitted). There was

no evidence that Defendant Cotterman's actions resulted in any

physical injury to the Plaintiff. Similarly, there was no

evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that

Defendant Cotterman knew that by wrapping a towel around the

Plaintiff's head that he would violate the Plaintiff's

constitutional rights.

 We review a decision to grant a judgment as a matter of law

de novo. Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546, 549 (11th

Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2557, 132 L.Ed.2d

811 (1995). In considering a motion for a judgment as a matter of

law, a court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of the nonmoving party. Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581

(11th Cir.1989). The motion should be granted only if upon such

consideration the court finds that reasonable people in the

exercise of impartial judgment could not arrive at a contrary

verdict. Id.

 To establish an Eighth Amendment violation a prisoner must

prove that his injury was caused by an "unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct.

995, 998, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). The Supreme Court has admonished

that in such cases "the core judicial inquiry is ... whether force

was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Id. at
7, 112 S.Ct. at 999. The absence of "serious injury" alone is

insufficient to dismiss a prisoner's Eight Amendment claim. Id.

Instead, analysis of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim is

contextual and requires that many factors be considered: "the need

for the application of force, the relationship between that need

and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by

the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the

severity of a forceful response." Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). Only "de minimis" uses of force are beyond

constitutional recognition. Id. at 7-8, 112 S.Ct. at 999.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has suggested that the type of

punishment, rather than some arbitrary quantity of injury, may be

relevant for Eighth Amendment claims. Id. at 8, 112 S.Ct. at 999.

The evidence before the jury included Harris's claims that the

officers as a group (including Cotterman) kicked and beat him, and

that Cotterman specifically snapped his head back with a towel,

"mugged" or slapped him twice in the face, and harassed him with

several racial epithets and other taunts. Harris claimed that some

of these actions, particularly the kicking and use of the towel,

caused or exacerbated the injuries to his back. Testimony

supported both the allegations and the fact of his existing

physical condition to some extent. His allegations were thus not

merely conclusory, see Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th

Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1103, 111 S.Ct. 1003, 112 L.Ed.2d

1085 (1991) (pre-Hudson ), and the jury chose to believe them at

least in part. This is a very close case, but we find that in

these particular circumstances, viewing the evidence in the light
 8

The jury was instructed that "de minimis means

insignificant or trifling." 

most favorable to Harris, as we must, these claims together

constitute more than a "de minimis" injury.8 We will thus respect

the jury's verdict that Harris's constitutional rights were

violated.

We now turn to the $500 punitive damages award assessed

against Cotterman. In the Eleventh Circuit, "[i]n some

circumstances, punitive damages may be awarded in a § 1983 action

even without a showing of actual loss by the plaintiff if the

plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated." Kelly v.

Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1557 (11th Cir.1994) (internal quotes and

citations omitted). Such an award is authorized where "the

defendant was motivated by an evil motive or intent, or ...

reckless and callous indifference to federally protected rights."

Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 688 (11th Cir.1985).

This standard was made clear to the jury in its instructions. We

find that the evidence, particularly the "mugging" and use of

racial epithets and taunts, supports this relatively small award.

The district court's judgment as a matter of law is thus reversed,

with instructions to reinstate the verdict and $500 punitive

damages award.

D. Sanctions

 Finally, Harris claims that Judge Ungaro-Benages abused her

discretion by vacating Judge Gonzalez's 1992 order granting

sanctions against the defendants for discovery violations. We

review a decision of the district court to deny sanctions for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Crosby, 59 F.3d 1133, 1137 (11th

Cir.1995).

 The motion for sanctions was originally granted after the

defendants missed a court-imposed deadline to respond to discovery

requests by two days. These discovery requests, however, suffered

from several defects (perhaps resulting from the fact that Harris

was then proceeding pro se) and objections were filed. The

requested discovery was provided in June of 1992, one month after

sanctions were awarded and nearly three years before trial.

Judge Gonzalez's order acknowledged the granting of sanctions,

but imposition of the same was deferred until costs were to be

taxed. At that time, of course, Judge Ungaro-Benages was hearing

the case. Her order vacating the award states that this was done

following a review and consideration of relevant parts of the

record.

 District judges are accorded wide discretion in ruling upon

discovery motions, and appellate review is accordingly deferential.

A judge's decision as to whether a party or lawyer's actions merit

imposition of sanctions is heavily dependent on the court's

firsthand knowledge, experience, and observation. At times the

actions of the individual or party involved may be judged over the

course of time. Moreover, individual judges may have slightly

different preferences or expectations. In view of these factors we

find that Judge Ungaro-Benages's decision to vacate the limited

order of Judge Gonzalez was within her discretion. In any event we

see no prejudice in the discovery delay when the requested

information was provided quickly and nearly three years before
trial. The district court's order vacating the prior award of

sanctions is affirmed.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part,

and REMAND with instructions. Each party will bear its own costs

in this court.