J-S37041-18

2018 PA Super 233

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.W., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.W.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1784 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Dispositional Order May 9, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-JV-0000662-2017

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2018

Appellant M.W. appeals from the dispositional order entered by the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division. Appellant 

asserts that the lower court erred in denying his suppression motion. After 

careful review, we affirm.

On April 5, 2017, at approximately 1:40 p.m., Philadelphia Police Officer 

Thomas Seymour and his partner, Officer Harris, were on patrol in the 14th

District when they observed a 2004 Chevrolet Impala drive through a stop 

sign at the intersection of Walnut Lane and McCallum Street. The driver 

continued to travel above the posted speed limit on Walnut Lane and made a 

quick turn onto Green Street. After the officers followed the vehicle and were 

unable to search the license number, the officers initiated a traffic stop.

Once Officer Seymour and Officer Harris exited the patrol car, Officer 

Seymour approached the driver’s side of the vehicle with his hand on his 
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weapon and Officer Harris approached the passenger side with her weapon 

drawn. The driver of the vehicle, seventeen-year old Appellant, complied with 

the officers’ direction to stick his hands out of the window. The officers 

described Appellant as being cooperative with their requests.

Upon further investigation, Appellant admitted he did not have a driver’s 

license and did not produce registration for the vehicle. Thereafter, the 

officers asked Appellant to exit the vehicle and patted him down; the frisk did 

not reveal any weapons. While Officer Harris searched the vehicle’s 

information on the computer database, Officer Seymour restrained Appellant 

in handcuffs and placed him in the back of the patrol car. Officer Seymour 

asserted that he told Appellant that he was being detained so the officers could 

determine the ownership of the car. 

Thereafter, the officers learned through a computer database search

that the license plate on the 2004 Impala had been last issued to a 1992 

Chevrolet; they also noticed that the VIN number on the dashboard of the 

Impala did not match the VIN number on the inside driver’s door. Appellant 

gave Officer Harris a false name and a false birthdate, and denied having any 

identification on his person. Appellant informed Officer Harris that the 

vehicle’s documentation was in the glove compartment of the vehicle.

Officer Seymour subsequently opened the glove compartment, in which 

he discovered a Ziploc bag containing fourteen plastic jars of marijuana. The 

officers also determined that the vehicle was not registered but the title was 

in the name of Ms. Evelyn Jackson who lived in the 14th District. Appellant 
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stated that he was not related to Ms. Jackson and did not provide any

explanation as to why he was driving this vehicle. At that point, the officers 

informed Appellant that he was under arrest.

As a result, Appellant was charged with intentionally possessing a 

controlled substance and driving without a license. Appellant sought to 

suppress the marijuana seized from the vehicle as he asserted it was fruit of 

an unlawful detention unsupported the requisite suspicion. After a hearing on 

April 17, 2017, the lower court denied Appellant’s suppression motion. The 

trial court stated its factual findings on the record, essentially accepting the 

testimony of the officers; however, the trial court offered no legal analysis on 

the issues raised in the suppression motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, 

the lower court adjudicated Appellant delinquent, entered a dispositional order 

for Appellant to remain in secure detention at the Philadelphia Juvenile Justice 

Center, and directed that Appellant be placed in residential facility best suited 

to his treatment, supervision, rehabilitation, and welfare.

After Appellant filed a timely appeal, the trial court did not order 

Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), but instead filed a short opinion in which it 

suggested it should have granted Appellant’s suppression motion and asked 
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this Court to remand the case accordingly.1 The trial court did not give any 

explanation as to why it believed its prior decision was in error.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying 

Appellant’s motion to suppress the marijuana that the officers seized from the 

vehicle that Appellant was driving. Our standard of review is as follows:

This Court is bound by those of the suppression court's factual 

findings which find support in the record, but we are not bound by 

the court's conclusions of law. When the suppression court's 

specific factual findings are unannounced, or there is a gap in the 

findings, the appellate court should consider only the evidence of 

the prevailing suppression party ... and the evidence of the other 

party ... that, when read in the context of the entire record, 

remains uncontradicted.

Commonwealth v. Millner, 585 Pa. 237, 246, 888 A.2d 680, 685 (2005)

(citations omitted).

Appellant does not contest the legality of the stop of his vehicle, but 

argues that the marijuana obtained from the vehicle must be suppressed as 

the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. Specifically, Appellant challenges the 

officers’ protective frisk of his person and their decision to place him in 

handcuffs in the back of the patrol vehicle once they discovered he was driving 

without a license in an unregistered vehicle. Appellant asserts that the 

officers did not have the authority to place him under arrest for the conduct

of driving without a license, which is a summary offense. 

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1 We note that “a trial court can only speak through its orders—and that any 

reasoning contained in a Rule 1925(a) opinion is advisory, and for the benefit 

of this Court only.” Youst v. Keck's Food Serv., Inc., 94 A.3d 1057, 1079 

(Pa.Super. 2014) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
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The Commonwealth argues that Appellant cannot successfully challenge 

the search of the vehicle as he failed to show a legitimate expectation of 

privacy in the area searched. Alternatively, the Commonwealth contends that 

the officers had probable cause to seize the vehicle after initiating a lawful 

stop, learning that Appellant had no driver’s license, and discovering that the 

vehicle was unregistered and had a mismatched license plate and differing 

VIN numbers on the driver’s door and dashboard. Thus, the Commonwealth 

argues that the officers had probable cause to seize the vehicle and to conduct

a reasonable inventory search, which included opening the vehicle’s glove 

compartment to find documents that could help the officers determine who 

owned the vehicle.

In his reply brief, Appellant argues that he was not required to 

demonstrate a reasonably cognizable expectation of privacy in the vehicle as 

the officer’s discovery of marijuana in the vehicle constituted the fruit of an 

illegal seizure of his person. Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Shabezz, 

___Pa.___, 166 A.3d 278, 287 (2017), in which our Supreme Court held that 

“evidence derived from an illegal automobile search constitutes fruit of the 

poisonous tree as a result of the illegal seizure (unless the taint is removed), 

and that no further demonstration of a privacy interest in the area from which 

the evidence was seized is required by the Fourth Amendment.” Appellant 

asserts the marijuana seized from the vehicle in this case was a direct product 

or exploitation of an illegal seizure of his person and must be suppressed.
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Even assuming, arguendo, that Appellant was not required to 

demonstrate an expectation of privacy in the vehicle, we cannot find Appellant 

was entitled to the suppression of the marijuana found in the glove 

compartment as Appellant failed to show that he was subjected to an illegal 

search or seizure.

Appellant concedes that the officers were justified in stopping his vehicle 

as they observed Appellant drive through a stop sign, which is a violation of 

the Motor Vehicle Code. Appellant also admits that that he told the officers 

that he did not have a driver’s license and could not produce any personal

identification or registration for the vehicle. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(a) (“The 

operator of any vehicle or any pedestrian reasonably believed to have violated 

any provision of this title shall stop upon request or signal of any police officer 

and shall, upon request, exhibit a registration card, driver's license and 

information relating to financial responsibility, or other means of 

identification”).

Moreover, Appellant does not dispute that the officers had the authority 

to ask Appellant to get out of the vehicle and to detain him to continue to 

investigate the ownership of the vehicle. “As a matter of precaution, a police 

officer is entitled to ask occupants of a vehicle to step from the vehicle during 

a traffic stop.” Commonwealth v. Van Winkle, 880 A.2d 1280, 1285 

(Pa.Super. 2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Freeman, 563 Pa. 82, 757 A.2d 

903 (2000) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 

L.Ed.2d 331 (1977))). See also Commonwealth v. Moser, 757 A.2d 377, 
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379 (Pa.Super. 2000) (finding officers who had initially stopped a vehicle for 

a traffic violation, were entitled to continue to detain the occupants to see if 

the vehicle was stolen given that neither the driver nor the passenger could 

show that they owned or had permission to drive the vehicle).

In claiming that he was subsequently subjected to an illegal search and 

seizure when he was frisked, handcuffed, and placed in the back of the police 

cruiser, Appellant suggests that there is a bright line rule that an individual 

has been arrested at the moment he is placed in handcuffs or any restraint. 

However, Appellant does not address our precedent that suggests otherwise. 

This Court has held that an officer’s use of handcuffs to detain an 

individual during an investigative detention for his or her safety does not 

necessarily escalate the encounter into a custodial arrest. Commonwealth 

v. Rosas, 875 A.2d 341 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 691, 875 

A.2d 341 (2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Guillespie, 745 A.2d 654, 660-

61 (Pa.Super. 2001) (finding the officer’s decision to handcuff suspects during 

an investigatory detention “was merely part and parcel of ensuring the safe 

detaining of the individuals during the lawful Terry stop” and did not 

constitute an arrest). Our Supreme Court has also declined to hold that an 

arrest occurs every time the police place an individual in handcuffs. 

Commonwealth v. Carter, 537 Pa. 233, 247, 643 A.2d 61, 67, n.2 (1994). 

Rather, this Court has defined an arrest as:

[a]ny act that indicates an intention to take the person into 

custody and subjects him to the actual control and will of the 

person making the arrest.... The test is an objective one, i.e.,
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viewed in the light of the reasonable impression conveyed to the

person subjected to the seizure rather than the strictly subjective 

view of the officers or the persons being seized.

Rosas, 875 A.2d at 348–49.

In Rosas, this Court concluded that the officers did not subject Rosas 

to a custodial arrest when they ordered him out of his vehicle and placed him 

in handcuffs. Based on the totality of the circumstances, this Court found 

Rosas could not have reasonably believed that he was under arrest after the 

valid traffic stop given that the officers expressly told him that he was being 

detained to find out Rosas’s true identity and to determine his connection to 

the vehicle when Rosas did not have a driver’s license, any form of 

identification, insurance, or registration for the vehicle. 

Likewise, in this case, after the officers discovered Appellant was driving 

without a driver’s license or any form of identification in an unregistered 

vehicle, the officers did not indicate that Appellant was under arrest but 

instead informed Appellant he was being detained at that point for the purpose 

of discovering who owned the vehicle Appellant was driving or whether the 

vehicle was stolen. N.T. 4/21/17, at 11, 30. Although Appellant was 

subjected to a protective frisk for the officers’ safety, placed in handcuffs, and 

detained in the back of the police vehicle, we cannot conclude that M.W. 

reasonably believed that he had been placed in custodial arrest when the 

officers were attempting to determine his true identity and his connection to 

the vehicle he was driving.
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After further investigation, the officers discovered that (1) the license 

plate on the 2004 Chevrolet Impala that Appellant was driving was last issued 

to a 1992 Chevrolet and (2) the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) on the 

vehicle’s dashboard did not match the VIN number on the inside driver’s door 

of the vehicle.2 At that point, the officers were justified in seizing the vehicle 

due to the tampered VIN number. Section 7105 of the Vehicle Code provides 

the following:

(a) Duty of police.--Every police officer having knowledge of a 

vehicle on which the vehicle identification number has been 

removed or falsified shall immediately seize and take possession 

of the vehicle and arrest or file a complaint for the arrest of the 

suspected owner or custodian. In all actions involving seizure or 

possession of such vehicles, vehicle identification information shall 

be transmitted to the Federal or other agencies involved in 

recovery of stolen vehicles.

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2 Appellant does not challenge the officers’ authority to inspect the vehicle to 

determine the VIN numbers located on the dashboard and the driver’s door of 

the vehicle he was driving. We need not review the propriety of this action as 

any such challenge is waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302 (“[i]ssues not raised in the lower 

court are waived”).

However, this Court has acknowledged precedent from other 

jurisdictions finding that “the examination of a vehicle for the purpose of 

inspecting the VIN plates or identification-number inscriptions is not a search 

for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,” provided there are “legitimate 

reasons to suspect criminal activity [is] afoot.” Commonwealth v. 

Grabowski, 452 A.2d 827, 831–32 (Pa.Super. 1982) (quoting United States 

v. Forrest, 620 F.2d 446, 454-55 (5th Cir. 1980)). See also People v. Wolf,

60 Ill.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 766, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946, 96 S.Ct. 361, 46 

L.Ed.2d 280 (Ill. 1975) (if an officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity, his examination of a VIN, by opening a door is a reasonable search, 

if a search at all); Wood v. State, 632 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982) 

(finding officer’s act of opening a car door to view a VIN, when the officer is 

legitimately on the property where the car is parked, is not a search within 

the Fourth Amendment; and if it were a search, it would be a reasonable one). 
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75 Pa.C.S.A. § 7105.

As the officers were permitted to “immediately seize and take 

possession of the vehicle” and arrest or file a complaint against Appellant as 

the suspected custodian, their subsequent search of the glove compartment 

to find documents pertaining to the ownership of the vehicle was part of a 

valid inventory search. Our courts have thoroughly summarized the law 

relevant to inventory searches as follows:

inventory searches are a well-defined exception to the warrant 

requirement of the Fourth Amendment and are a recognized part 

of our law:

it is reasonable for police to search the personal effects of a 

person under lawful arrest as part of the routine 

administrative procedure at a police station house incident 

to booking and jailing the suspect. The justification for such 

searches does not rest on probable cause, and hence the 

absence of a warrant is immaterial to the reasonableness of 

the search. Indeed, we have previously established that the 

inventory search constitutes a well-defined exception to the 

warrant requirement. See South Dakota v. Opperman,

[428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)].

An inventory search is not designed to uncover criminal evidence. 

Rather, its purpose is to safeguard the seized items in order to 

benefit both the police and the defendant. We have recognized 

inventory searches in the two areas of automobiles and booking 

procedures. See [Commonwealth v. Scott, 469 Pa. 258, 365 

A.2d 140, 144 (1976)]; Commonwealth v. Daniels [474 Pa. 

173], 377 A.2d 1376 (Pa. 1977).

Four goals underlie such searches. First, they protect the 

defendant's property while he is in custody; second, police are 

protected against theft claims when defendants are given their 

property upon release; third, they serve to protect the police from 

physical harm due to hidden weapons; and fourth, when 

necessary they ascertain or verify the identity of the 
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defendant. Intrusions into impounded vehicles or personal 

effects taken as part of the booking process are reasonable where 

the purpose is to identify and protect the seized items.

As long as the search is pursuant to the caretaking functions 

of the police department, the conduct of the police will not be 

viewed as unreasonable under the Constitution. See Scott, 365 

A.2d at 144.

Commonwealth v. Gatlos, 76 A.3d 44, 55–56 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Nace, 524 Pa. 323, 571 A.2d 1389, 1391 (1990)) 

(emphasis in original)).

Moreover, 

[this] Court has observed that “two factors must be present in 

order to justify the reasonableness of an inventory search in the 

absence of probable cause. The Commonwealth must show: (i) 

that the vehicle in question was lawfully within the custody of the 

police, and (2) that the search was in fact an inventory search 

pursuant to the objectives laid down in [Opperman]”

Commonwealth v. Germann, [423 Pa.Super. 393], 621 A.2d 

589, 594 (Pa.Super. 1993), citing Commonwealth v. Brandt

[244 Pa.Super. 154], 366 A.2d 1238 (Pa.Super. 1976). The 

Court, in Commonwealth v. Germann, supra, observed further 

that “‘motive’ is the sole factor which distinguishes a criminal 

investigatory search from a noncriminal inventory search of an 

automobile.” Id. at 595, citing United States v. Abbott, 584 

F.Supp. 442 (W.D.Pa. 1984).

Gatlos, 76 A.3d at 55–56 (quoting Commonwealth v. Collazo, 654 A.2d 

1174, 1177 (Pa.Super. 1995)).

In Collazo, officers placed the appellant under arrest for possessing a 

controlled substance with intent to distribute after they observed the appellant 

sell a confidential informant sixteen packs of heroin in exchange for 

prerecorded buy money. After arresting the appellant, the officers sought to 

impound his vehicle. Although the appellant asserted he owned the vehicle, 
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it was registered to another individual and the vehicle’s VIN number was 

illegible. The officers then searched the vehicle’s glove compartment for the 

registration papers of the owner and discovered a packet of heroin with the 

same label that appeared on the heroin that the appellant had sold the 

informant.

On appeal, this Court found the officers had conducted a valid inventory 

search when they opened the vehicle’s glove compartment:

It is clear that the vehicle which had been operated by appellant 

was lawfully seized and impounded by police. Under 75 Pa.C.S. § 

3352(c)(3), police could remove to a garage or place of safety any 

vehicle found after “the person driving or in control of the vehicle 

is arrested for an alleged offense for which the officer is required 

by law to take the person arrested before the issuing authority 

without unnecessary delay.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3352(c)(3). Here, the 

vehicle had been seized by police after appellant's arrest for selling 

heroin to the informant. The motive for the subsequent search of 

the vehicle was solely to identify its owner and not to uncover 

evidence of crime. The search, therefore, was within the 

caretaking function of the police, and, as such, was properly 

conducted without a warrant.

Collazo, 654 A.2d at 1177.

Likewise, in the instant case, the officers lawfully seized Appellant’s 

vehicle pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 7105 as they had reason to believe that 

the vehicle’s VIN number had been altered after observing differing VIN 

numbers on the vehicle’s dashboard and driver’s door. Similar to Collazo,

the officers’ motive for searching the glove compartment was solely to identify 

the owner of the vehicle and not to uncover evidence of a crime. As a result, 
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the officers lawfully conducted a proper inventory search in opening the glove 

compartment.

Moreover, even if we were to accept Appellant’s claim that the officers 

did not have the authority to frisk Appellant and place him in the back of the 

patrol car after discovering he was driving without a license in an unregistered 

vehicle, we reject Appellant’s suggestion that the marijuana seized from the 

vehicle should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Our 

Supreme Court has fully summarized the relevant law as follows:

Evidence of any kind obtained by police through an unlawful 

search may not be used in any respect, including as evidence at 

trial against the subject of the search. [Wong Sun v. United 

States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 

(1963));] Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 

385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). Such evidence may 

only be used against the defendant “[i]f knowledge of [the 

evidence] is gained from an independent source,” Silverthorne 

Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, or “the evidence in 

question would inevitably have been discovered without reference 

to the police error or misconduct,” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 

431, 448, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). The burden of 

proof is on the prosecution to establish by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the evidence illegally obtained would have 

ultimately or inevitably been discovered by legal means. Id. at 

444, 104 S.Ct. 2501.

“The exclusionary remedy for illegal searches and seizures 

extends not only to the direct product of the illegality, the primary 

evidence, but also to the indirect product of the search or seizure, 

the secondary or derivative evidence.” Tainted evidence subject 

to exclusion—Secondary or derivative evidence: Fruit of poisonous 

tree, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 3:4 (2d 

ed.). The test to determine whether derivative evidence 

constitutes the fruit of an illegal search is not simply whether 

police would not have discovered the information but for the 

search, as derivative evidence may nonetheless be usable and 

admissible if the connection between the information obtained was 
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sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, thus removing the 

taint of the original illegality. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487–88, 83

S.Ct. 407; United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471, 100 S.Ct. 

1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980). To determine whether evidence 

must be excluded as the fruit of an unlawful search, courts must 

consider “whether, granting establishment of the primary 

illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been 

come at by exploitation of that illegality.” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 

at 488, 83 S.Ct. 407 (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 

(1959) ); quoting Shabezz, 166 A.3d at 289 (“The inquiry simply 

is whether the evidence was obtained via exploitation of the initial 

illegality”); see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 443, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (“the 

prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would have 

been in if no illegality had transpired” but “the derivative evidence 

analysis ensures that the prosecution is not put in a worse position 

simply because of some earlier police error or misconduct”). “In 

applying this test, a court must evaluate whether the illegal search 

or any leads gained from the search tended to significantly direct 

the government toward discovery of the specific evidence being 

challenged.” Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 

3:4.

Commonwealth v. Fulton, ___Pa.___, 179 A.3d 475, 489–90 (2018). 

In this case, even if we assume that the officers subjected Appellant to 

an illegal frisk and arrest, the officers did not recover the marijuana from the 

glove compartment by exploiting the initial illegality as the officers were 

justified in continuing to detain Appellant to determine the vehicle’s 

ownership. Appellant admitted he did not have a driver’s license, failed to 

produce any form of personal identification or registration for the vehicle, and 

the vehicle itself had a mismatched license plate and conflicting VIN numbers. 

Thus, as discussed above, once the officers discovered the conflicting 

VIN numbers, they had the right to seize the vehicle and conduct a reasonable 

inventory search of the glove compartment. This search would have led to 

the discovery of the marijuana regardless of whether the illegal frisk and arrest 
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had occurred. Appellant has not demonstrated how the officers’ frisk and 

action in handcuffing Appellant and placing him in the patrol car necessarily 

yielded the evidence in question. Based on the foregoing reasons, we find no 

error in the lower court’s decision to deny Appellant’s suppression motion.3 

Dispositional order affirmed.

Judge McLaughlin joins the Opinion.

Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/27/18

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3 Appellant also suggests that his adjudication of delinquency was unlawful as 

the charge of driving without a license is a summary offense that does not 

qualify as a “delinquent act” under the Juvenile Act. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. 

However, as the lower court properly denied Appellant’s suppression motion 

and found Appellant had committed the offense of simple possession of a 

controlled substance, which does qualify as a “delinquent act,” the 

adjudication of delinquency was proper.