IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

)

MICHELLE HANNIGAN-ALEO, )

) 12 CV 4157

 Plaintiff, )

) Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys

)

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of )

Social Security, )

)

 Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the court on Michelle Hannigan-Aleo’s

motion for summary judgment. She seeks a reversal or remand of

the Commissioner’s decision to deny her application for

Supplemental Security Income. Cross motions for summary judgment

are before this court, and for the reasons set forth below, the

defendant’s motion is granted and the Commissioner’s decision is

affirmed. 

Background

On January 4, 2009, Michelle Hannigan-Aleo applied for

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), alleging that she became

disabled as of December 19, 2007 due to obesity, female

complications and hernia. (R. at 61, 108.) Ms. Hannigan-Aleo’s

claim was denied initially and after reconsideration. (R. at

17.) Ms. Hannigan-Aleo then requested a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), and the case was assigned to
ALJ Janice Burning, who held the hearing on March 18, 2010. (R.

at 16-17.) 

I. Plaintiff’s Hearing Testimony

Ms. Hannigan-Aleo testified that she was 5’5” and weighed

320 pounds. (R. at 32.) Ms. Hannigan-Aleo testified that she

completed high school, had no specialized training, and had never

been in the military. (R. at 33.) She testified that she had

panic attacks, hallucinations, trouble walking, and could only

sit for twenty to thirty minutes because of her back pain. (R.

at 37-38.) She testified that she was unable to bend. (R. at

39.) She testified that she had no energy and trouble with her

memory and concentration. (R. at 46.) When asked if she had low

self-esteem, she testified to having “no feelings at all”, as

well as difficulty concentrating, and frequent crying spells. 

(R. at 36.) 

She testified that her sleep schedule had been inconsistent

but that she usually slept during the day. (R. at 40.) She

testified that she typically got home from work about 9am, made

breakfast in order to take her medication, slept until 2:15pm,

got ready to go to work again, returned from work around 4pm, and

then slept more. (R. at 40.)

Ms. Hannigan-Aleo testified that she did not always take her

medication as prescribed. (R. at 36.) She explained that not

taking her medication as prescribed was partially due to her

2
forgetting to take the medication. (R. at 36.) She testified

that she no longer used her inhaler, and was taking medication

for her high blood pressure and diabetes. (R. at 35.) She

testified that she was using a Byetta gun, for her diabetes, but

stopped because it was making her ill. (R. at 35.) 

Ms. Hannigan-Aleo testified that she stopped taking

medication for the arthritis in her back, because she decided not

to mix the medication with her post-surgery Vicodin. (R. at 38.) 

She testified that she never had more arthritis pain medication

prescribed and was waiting to see the doctor. (R. at 38.) She

was taking Seroquel for her hallucinations, but went off it

because it interfered with her sugar levels. (R. at 46.) She

testified that she was having more hallucinations, but that they

were not severe. (R. at 47.) 

With regard to work, Ms. Hannigan-Aleo testified that she

was currently employed as a crossing guard. (R. at 38.) She

testified that she drove to work every day. (R. at 41.) She

testified that her work required her to stand for one hour, twice

a day and walk into the road to stop traffic. (R. at 37-38.) 

She testified that her job was stressful because the drivers did

not always listen, and that she had almost been hit by a car

several times. (R. at 48-49.) She testified that she screamed at

the drivers but not the pedestrians or children. (R. at 49.) 

3
Ms. Hannigan-Aleo testified that she had worked consistently

since she filed for SSI, on December 19, 2007. (R. at 34.) She

testified that the only break in her current employment occurred

after her surgery. (R. at 34.) She did not work from June 2009

until one month before the hearing (February). (R. at 34.) She

testified that her job was tougher since she returned to work,

and that she sometimes needed assistance. (R. at 48.) 

With regard to her daily life, Ms. Hannigan-Aleo testified

that she was living in an apartment with her two children and a

male friend who took care of her. (R. at 33.) She testified

that she did not live with her husband. (R. at 32.) She

testified that she sometimes had trouble caring for her personal

needs, and sometimes needed help putting on her socks and shoes. 

(R. at 40.) She testified that her friend would remind her to

take her medication and did so even before he moved in. (R. at

44.) She testified that her children did not help her with any

household activities, but that her friend, Don, did. (R. at 47.) 

She testified that, depending on her pain level, she was

able to prepare meals, but that 99 percent of the time her friend

helped her. (R. at 40.) She testified that she was not allowed

to lift anything heavier than a gallon of milk. (R. at 39.) She

testified that she did not use an assistive devise to help her

move, but simply took her time. (R. at 39.) She also testified

4
that she had difficulty climbing stairs, and had to walk up two

flights of stairs to reach her apartment. (R. at 39.) She

testified that she only shopped at grocery stores that had

electric carts available. (R. at 40.) 

She testified that she could clean the dishes, but could not

do laundry, due to the lifting and stairs. (R. at 41.) She had

not tried to make the bed, but testified that she did not think

she could because it would require lifting the mattress. (R. at

41.) She testified that she could not take out the garbage, and

that when she swept, she had to pile the debris for someone else

to pick up, because she could not bend over to pick it up. (R.

at 41.) 

Ms. Hannigan-Aleo testified that she received government

support from Medicaid and used a Link Card. (R. at 34.) She

testified that she utilized support services from Threshold. (R.

at 45.) She testified that the people from Threshold stopped by

twice a week, and provided her with transportation when she

needed it. (R. at 45.) She testified that she had been in the

program for over three years. (R. at 45.) She testified that a

program called Thrive provided her with psychiatric support and

counseling. (R. at 45.) Ms. Hannigan-Aleo testified that she saw

a psychiatrist once a month and a counselor twice a month. (R.

at 36.) She testified that she did not think about harming

5
herself. (R. at 36.) She testified that she had not sought

treatment for her panic attacks. (R. at 37.) 

Ms. Hannigan-Aleo testified that it took five months and

five different medications, before it was determined that

Cymbalta was the right medication for her. (R. at 45-46.) She

testified that she was not as sad while on Cymbalta, but that she

was still depressed. (R. at 46.) 

Ms. Hannigan-Aleo testified that she was not a part of any

community organizations, did not go out, and had no hobbies or

interests. (R. at 42-43.) She testified that, when her son was

younger and in school, she did not participate in school events

or parent-teacher conferences. (R. at 42.) She testified that

the only friend or family member she ever saw was her sister, and

that was partly because she had to get mail from her. (R. at

42.) She testified that she watched some television and used her

computer for about three hours a week. (R. at 43.) She

testified that she had difficulty following through and finishing

what she had started. (R. at 47.) 

II. Vocational Expert Hearing Testimony

A vocational expert (“VE”) testified at the hearing on March

18, 2010. (R. at 49.) The VE testified that she had not

discussed the case with the plaintiff, that her testimony was

consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and that

6
the job descriptions were consistent with the national economy. 

(R. at 49-51.) The VE testified to having familiarity with the

jobs in the applicable region (Chicago, Naperville, and Joliet

Metro.), hearing the relevant testimony, reviewing the exhibits

and consulting the US Bureau of Labor and Statistics. (R. at

50.) The VE testified that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo’s work as a

crossing guard had an SVP of 2, and had an exertion level of

light. (R. at 50.) 

During the testimony, the ALJ asked the VE, hypothetically,

what employment an unskilled person, limited to three-step

repetitive tasks, could find if they were only able to: carry ten

pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently; stand

for two hours a day and sit for six; not climb stairs, ladders,

ropes, scaffolds, but occasionally climb ramps and stairs;

occasionally stoop and balance, kneel and crawl; and have

occasional contact with the public or supervisors and co-workers. 

(R. at 50-51.) 

The VE testified that there were three types of jobs

available to such a person. (R. at 51.) The VE testified that

the person could act as a sorter, which has an SVP level of 2 and

exertion level of sedentary. (R. at 51.) The VE testified there

were 391 sorter jobs in the area. (R. at 51.) The VE testified

that such a person could be a final assembler, which has an SVP

level of 2 and an exertion level of sedentary. (R. at 51.) The

7
VE testified that there were 1225 final assembler jobs in the

area. (R. at 51.) Finally, the VE testified that such a person

could be an inspector/check weigher, which has an SVP level of 2

and an exertion level of sedentary. (R. at 51.) The VE

testified that there were 3773 inspector/check weigher jobs in

the area. (R. at 51.) 

The ALJ amended the hypothetical to ask what jobs were

available if that person needed to avoid interaction with the

public. (R. at 51.) 

The VE testified that there would be no change in employment

options, and the person could perform any of the three previously

mentioned jobs. (R. at 51.) 

Then the ALJ further amended the hypothetical to assume that

that person would be off task for 20% of the day, and be limited

to working for only four hours out of every eight hour workday. 

(R. at 51.) The VE testified that such a person could not

perform the listed jobs or any other jobs in the area. (R. at

51.) 

III. Medical Record

Ms. Hannigan-Aleo’s medical records mentioned various mental

and physical conditions. Her mental issues included: bipolar

disorder, major depression, borderline personality disorder,

relational problems, stress, being passively suicidal, and

8
feeling labile, agitated, helpless, and a diminished pleasure

from activities. (R. at 221-23, 421, 424.)

Ms. Hannigan-Aleo’s medical record listed physical

conditions including: miscarriage, lethargy, hypersomnia, lack of

energy, foot swelling, asthma, suspected strangulated ventral

hernia, ischemia of the bowel, unspecified ganglion, lump on

foot, unspecified uticartia, severe itching, tight throat, four

pulled teeth, umbilical hernia, chronic smoking, pruritic rash,

urinary incontinence, hypertension, infertility,

hypercholesterolemia, removed gallbladder, palpitations,

shortness of breath, DM w/o complications type II (diabetes type

II), diarrhea, leaking cyst, suspected bursitis, possible myopic

nails, heel spurs, bothersome ear, lump on hip, lack of menstrual

cycle, mild degenerative disk disease, anterior spurs,

transitional lumbosacral vertebra, arthritis, acute pharyngitis,

herpes simplex, cough and phlegm, bronchospasms, fistula,

unspecified disorder of skin and subcutaneous tissue, female

stress incontinence, other abnormal glucose, drug rash and dry

skin dermatitis, small bowel obstruction, appendicitis with

abscess, constipation and an allergy penicillin. (R. at 222-23,

234-35, 237, 245, 257, 259, 260, 277-79, 281, 284, 288-90, 293,

306-08, 330, 334, 343, 355, 359, 393, 620.)

9
Ms. Hannigan-Aleo had reported pain in various places,

including her: back, knee, buttocks, upper abdomen, and foot. 

(R. at 223, 257, 295.)

On November 18, 2009, Ms. Hannigan-Aleo had an active

problems list including: hypersomnia, bipolar disorder, DM

without complication type II (diabetes type II), essential

hypertension (benign), Myopia, generalized osteoarthritis

(unspecified site), presbyopia, tobacco abuse, family history of

ischemic heart disease, mixed hyperlipidemia, DM renal

manifestations type II (uncontrolled), DM without complication

type II (uncontrolled), abnormal cardiovascular stress test,

recurrent ventral hernia with obstruction, postoperative wound

infection, wound, open wound of abdominal wall (lateral, without

mention of complication), and morbid obesity. (R. at 647.) 

Ms. Hannigan-Aleo is morbidly obese and has had obesityrelated medical issues for years. (R. at 22.) “Her physicians

have suggested possible surgery to control her weight, [as]

attempts at changes in diet proved unsuccessful.” (R. at 19.) 

Even her depressive disorder was linked to her obesity. (R. at

22.) During a Disability Progress interview, Ms. Hannigan-Aleo

stated that her conditions first began interfering with her

working in April of 2007. (R. at 134.) She stated that her

conditions prevented her from working in December 2007. (R. at

134.) She reported that her weight also makes it harder to get

10
out of a chair or bed. (R. at 158.) She stated that, before she

was overcome by her condition, she was more active with friends

and family. (R. at 161.) She also stated that she can neither

stand nor sit for a long time. (R. at 189.) She stated that she

does not enjoy any activities, and that she loses interest in

activities fast. (R. at 164-65.) She also reported that she has

to be reminded to eat, take her medication, do the laundry and

cook. (R. at 162.)

IV. Ms. Hannigan-Aleo’s SSA Filings

In March of 2008, Ms. Hannigan-Aleo answered a Physical

Impairments Questionnaire. (R. at 157.) In the questionnaire,

she stated that she could use kitchen tools to prepare simple

meals to feed herself. (R. at 157.) She also stated that she

could sit for two hours without getting up. (R. at 158.) She

stated that the kids usually cooked dinner, and that a friend

called her to remind her to take her medications and eat

breakfast. (R. at 160.) However, in the same report, Ms.

Hannigan-Aleo reported that she cared for her two children by

cooking for them. (R. at 161.) The report further stated that

she typically prepared meals once a day. (R. at 162.) She

stated that she could, and did, do the laundry and clean the

dishes. (R. at 162.) She stated that she went outside every day

and that she drove herself around. (R. at 163.) Ms. Hannigan11
Aleo reported that she had no family or friend problems. (R. at

165.) She reported that her conditions affected her ability to

understand. (R. at 165.) She stated that she noticed an unusual

“fear of traffic on the job.” (R. at 166.) 

Ms. Hannigan-Aleo reported that, due to her conditions, she

began needing more assistance from her son in 2008. (R. at 193.) 

She stated that the condition had deteriorated to the point where

her son helped her get in and out of the car and cook. (R. at

185.) 

In a Disability Report-Appeal, Ms. Hannigan-Aleo reported

several changes in her condition. (R. at 189.) These included

becoming diabetic and arthritis in her knees, feet and back. As

a result of the arthritis, she was not able to sit or stand for

very long. (R. at 189.) She also reported that her son was

helping her in and out of the bathtub, getting dressed, and going

up and down the stairs. (R. at 193.) In the report, Ms.

Hannigan-Aleo stated she worked two hours a day as a crossing

guard and had difficulty standing for that entire time. (R. at

194.) However, in another disability report, she stated that she

had “no problems” caring for herself. (R. at 172.) 

Ms. Hannigan-Aleo has held various jobs over the years. She

worked at Wendy’s until 1985, drove a bus until 1986, worked

three different security jobs between 1986 and 1989, worked at

Burger King until 1996, and then was unemployed from 1996 to

12
2005, when she worked as a crossing guard. (R. at 149.) As a

crossing guard, she was paid $10.99 an hour and worked two hours

a day. (R. at 150.) The first hour was at the beginning of the

school day, and the second at the end. (R. at 141.) She had to

take several months off to recover from surgery, but was allowed

back after her recovery. (R. at 34.) 

V. RFC Assessment

On April 15, 2008, Dr. Terry Travis, a non-examining

physician, completed a Psychiatric Review Technique form for Ms.

Hannigan-Aleo. (R. at 392.) Dr. Travis reported that Ms.

Hannigan-Aleo had a major depressive disorder. (R. at 395.) He

reported that her mood disturbance did not precisely fit into a

diagnostic category. (R. at 395.) However, Dr. Travis concluded

that she had moderate difficulties concentrating, but only mild

limitations in her daily living and social functioning. (R. at

402.) Dr. Travis reported that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo takes care of

her family and friend. (R. at 404.)

Dr. Travis also completed a mental residual function

capacity assessment form of Ms. Hannigan-Aleo. (R. at 408.) He

reported that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo had no issues understanding and

some moderate limitations with her prolonged concentration and

adhering to a schedule. (R. at 406.) He noted some marked

social and adaptation issues, however, he stated that Ms.

13
Hannigan-Aleo “is able to function consistently at a reasonable

rate within a schedule and . . . is able to do multistep tasks

that can be learned within 1-6 months in a routine work setting.” 

(R. at 407-08.) 

On April 17, 2008, Dr. Robert Patey, another non-examining

physician, completed a physical residual function capacity

assessment of Ms. Hannigan-Aleo. (R. at 417.) There were no

major work or life limitations mentioned within the report. (R.

at 410-17.)

On January 21, 2009, Dr. Margaret Robling, Ms. HanniganAleo’s treating psychiatrist, completed a questionnaire for Ms.

Hannigan-Aleo. (R. at 423.) Dr. Robling reported that Ms.

Hannigan-Aleo’s affective disorder would moderately limit her

daily living, and markedly limit her concentration and social

functioning. (R. at 423.) 

On January 26, 2009, Kristen Nicolosi, a non-physician

clinical counselor, reported on Ms. Hannigan-Aleo’s condition. 

(R. at 424-25.) In her report, she concluded that Ms. HanniganAleo would not be able to work in a competitive environment for

eight hours a day, five days a week (R. at 425.)

In February 2008, Ms. Ward, Ms. Hannigan-Aleo’ case manager,

completed a function report on Ms. Hannigan-Aleo. (R. at 141.) 

Ms. Ward stated that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo worked as a crossing guard

2-4 hours a day. (R. at 141.) Ms. Ward also stated that Ms.

14
Hannigan-Aleo’s conditions affect her motivation and movement. 

(R. at 142.) Ms. Ward reported that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo did not

need to be reminded to take her medication. (R. at 142.) Ms.

Ward reported that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo made dinner once a week, and

the dinner was usually a frozen dinner. (R. at 143.) 

Ms. Ward also explained that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo had

difficulty doing laundry, cooking, and cleaning, because of

financial reasons. (R. at 142.) Ms. Ward also reported that Ms.

Hannigan-Aleo was, however, able to do the laundry and clean. 

(R. at 143.) Ms. Ward reported that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo would go

outside to smoke. (R. at 143.) Ms. Ward reported that Ms.

Hannigan-Aleo drove herself and her children to doctor’s

appointments often. (R. at 143.) Ms. Ward reported that Ms.

Hannigan-Aleo’s conditions did not affect her ability to

understand. (R. at 145.) 

VI. ALJ Decision 

The ALJ issued a decision on June 29, 2010, finding that Ms.

Hannigan-Aleo was not disabled under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the

social security act from December 19,2007 through the date of the

decision. (R. at 24.) The ALJ applied the five-step sequential

analysis as required by the Act, under 20 C.F.R. 416.920(g).

The ALJ found that the plaintiff’s condition did, to some

degree, impair her ability to work. (R. at 19.) However, the

15
ALJ found an insufficient amount of evidence to find Ms.

Hannigan-Aleo disabled. (R. at 24.) 

At step one, the ALJ determined that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo’s

work as a crossing guard did not constitute substantial gainful

activity. (R. at 19.) 

At step two, the ALJ determined that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo’s

back pain, depressive disorder, obesity and obesity-related

shortness of breath were severe impairments. (R. at 19.) 

At step three, the ALJ determined that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo’s

impairments did not meet or equal any of the listed impairments

in the enumerated listings. (R. at 20.) 

At step four, the ALJ determined that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo “has

the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work . . .

with no climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasional

balancing, stooping, crouching, crawling, kneeling, or climbing

of ramps and stairs; occasional contact with the public,

supervisors, co-workers; and involving [three] step unskilled

simple repetitive tasks.” (R. at 21.)

The ALJ supported this determination, by finding that, while

the medical record supports Ms. Hannigan-Aleo’s various symptoms,

her subjective claims as to the intensity of the pain and

impairments were not credible. (R. at 22.) 

The ALJ noted that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo’s stress level and

depression had subsided somewhat since her husband left in 2009. 

16
(R. at 22.) Further, Ms. Hannigan-Aleo is able to work as a

crossing guard, which required her to interact with the public

and stand for an hour at a time. (R. at 22.) The ALJ found that

Ms. Hannigan-Aleo was capable of sedentary work activity, as

demonstrated by her activity level as a crossing guard, and the

lack of medical evidence to the contrary. (R. at 2.) The ALJ

also found that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo’s claims that she could not

perform at her job both physically or mentally, are countered by

the fact that she had stable employment as a crossing guard. (R.

at 22-23.) The ALJ indicated a lack of credibility because Ms.

Hannigan-Aleo claimed to need to be reminded to eat, however she

was suffering from morbid obesity. (R. at 23.) Finally, the ALJ

did not accord much weight to several medical records due to

their having been based on subjective assertions made by her, and

because they were not supported by her work as a crossing guard. 

(R. at 22.) 

At step five, the ALJ determined that “based on the

[plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy that the [plaintiff] can

perform.” (R. at 23.) After listening to the testimony of a

vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Ms. Hannigan-Aleo

would be able to work as a sorter (391 Chicago), final assembler

17
(1225 Chicago), or an inspector/checker/weigher (3773 Chicago). 

(R. at 24.) 

Ms. Hannigan-Aleo requested review by the Appeals Council,

but it was denied on March 28, 2012. Thus the ALJ’s decision

became the final decision of the Commissioner. Ms. Hannigan-Aleo

filed a complaint with the court on May 29, 2012. The parties

consented to exercise of jurisdiction by a magistrate judge on

August 28, 2012. Before the court are cross-motions for summary

judgment. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). 

Standard of Disability Adjudication

An individual claiming a need for SSI must prove that she

has a disability under the terms of the SSA. In determining

whether an individual is eligible for benefits, the social

security regulations require a sequential five-step analysis. 

First, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is currently

employed; second, a determination must be made as to whether the

claimant has a severe impairment; third, the ALJ must determine

if the impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed

by the Commissioner in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;

fourth, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC, and must

evaluate whether the claimant can perform his/her past relevant

work, and fifth; the ALJ must decide whether the claimant is

capable of performing work in the national economy. Knight v.

18
Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir.1995). At steps one through

four, the claimant bears the burden of proof; at step five, the

burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id.

Standard of Review

A district court reviewing an ALJ’s decision must affirm if

the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free

from legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); Steele v. Barnhart, 920

F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more

than a mere scintilla”; rather, it is “such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct.

1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). In reviewing an ALJ’s decision for

substantial evidence, the Court may not “displace the ALJ’s

judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence or making credibility

determinations.” Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir.

2007) (citing Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir.

2003)). Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to

differ, the responsibility for determining whether a claimant is

disabled falls upon the Commissioner, not the courts. Herr v.

Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1990).

An ALJ must articulate her analysis by building an accurate

and logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusions, so that

the Court may afford the claimant meaningful review of the SSA’s

ultimate findings. Steele, 290 F.3d at 941. It is not enough

19
that the record contains evidence to support the ALJ’s decision;

if the ALJ does not rationally articulate the grounds for that

decision, or if the decision is insufficiently articulated, so as

to prevent meaningful review, the Court must remand. Id. 

Discussion

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision must be

reversed or remanded because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate

the opinion evidence, erred in determining the plaintiff’s

credibility, and erred in determining the plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity.

 

I. The Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in evaluating the

opinion evidence in the record by not articulating her reasoning,

failing to state the weight attributed to each opinion, making

her own medical evaluation, and not giving controlling weight to

treating physicians’ opinions. The heart of Plaintiff’s concern

is whether the ALJ made the required evaluation and supported her

decision appropriately. 

First, the court finds that the ALJ reasonably articulated

her decision. “The ALJ must minimally articulate his reasons for

crediting or rejecting evidence of disability.” Scivally v.

Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1992). There is no

requirement to state every reason supporting a decision. Here,

20
the ALJ discussed plaintiff’s obesity, other conditions, current

work, and lack of credibility. (R. at 21-23.) This is not a

boilerplate opinion, and the court finds that the ALJ

appropriately articulated her reasoning. 

Next, the court finds that the ALJ did not make her own

medical determination. “The Secretary's decision must be based

on testimony and medical evidence in the record, and the

Secretary ‘cannot make his own independent medical determination

about the claimant.’” Scivally, 966 F.2d at 1076 (quoting Rousey

v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1065, 1069 (7th Cir.1985)). Further, an ALJ

should consider all relevant evidence including a plaintiff’s

subjective assertions of pain. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863,

871 (7th Cir. 2000).

Here, the ALJ discussed the plaintiff’s pain, specifically

discounted the plaintiff’s testimony, and subsequently, the

medical reports that were based on the plaintiff’s subjective

assertions, because of the plaintiff’s lack of credibility. (R.

at 21-23.) Discounting medical reports, in this instance, is not

an indication that the ALJ did not consider the medical reports

or listen to the plaintiff’s subjective assertions of pain, but

rather an indication that the ALJ thoughtfully weighed the

evidence before her. The plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ

completely failed to evaluate or consider medical evidence is

without merit. The ALJ noted the VE’s testimony and the

21
plaintiff’s success as a working crossing guard to support her

final determination. 

In addition to the reasoning stated in the ALJ’s opinion,

there are also various reports that support the ALJ’s decision to

discount the plaintiff’s testimony and rely on other

considerations in making her determination. In one report by

Plaintiff, she stated that the children have to cook dinner, yet,

she also stated that she cared for the children by cooking for

them. (R. at 160-61.) Plaintiff claimed to have difficulty with

stairs, however, her case manager reported that she goes outside

the apartment to smoke although the apartment is up two flights

of stairs. (R. at 39, 143.) Additionally, the plaintiff

testified that her friend moved in to take care of her, but in a

medical report, it was stated that she took care of her friend,

and she reported after her surgery that she was able to take care

of herself, as well. (R. at 33, 172, 404.) After a thorough

analysis of the record, there is substantial evidence to support

the ALJ’s determination. 

Further, the ALJ did not err by not giving controlling

weight to the opinion evidence of Dr. Robling or Clinical

Counselor Kristen Nicolosi, who is not a treating physician. “A

treating physician's opinion regarding the nature and severity of

a medical condition is entitled to controlling weight if it is

well supported by medical findings and not inconsistent with

22
other substantial evidence in the record.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at

870. “An ALJ who does not give controlling weight to the opinion

of the claimant's treating physician must offer “good reasons”

for declining to do so” and determine what weight his opinion was

due under the applicable regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d)(2).” Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 749 & 751 (7th

Cir. 2010). Here, the ALJ stated that she did not give

significant weight to the opinions because they lacked

credibility, as they were based on statements made by the

discredited plaintiff. (R. at 23.) 

The ALJ’s determination that Dr. Robling’s report lacks

credibility is supported by the record. Dr. Robling’s report is

inconsistent, stating that the plaintiff both does, and does not,

have trouble concentrating. (R. at 421, 423.) With regard to

Ms. Nicolosi’s report, one major fact is that Ms. Nicolosi only

began seeing the plaintiff after her SSI claim was denied. (R.

at 57, 424.) 

When treating physician opinions are not granted controlling

weight, then “[a]n ALJ must consider the length, nature, and

extent of the treatment relationship; frequency of examination;

the physician's specialty; the types of tests performed; and the

consistency and support for the physician's opinion.” Larson,

615 F.3d at 751. While it is required that an ALJ consider all

of the aforementioned factors, it is not required that the ALJ

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articulate the consideration given to each factor. Hall v.

Astrue, 3:11-CV-72-TLS, 2012 WL 2847914 (N.D. Ind. July 11,

2012). The above mentioned factors were not clearly listed in

the ALJ’s opinion, but there is evidence that the ALJ considered

these factors. The ALJ mentioned that there seemed to be no

credible support, as the opinions were based on incredible

assertions by the plaintiff. (R. at 23.) This determination

links directly with the ‘support for a physician’s opinion’

factor, and is an indication that the ALJ did review the

enumerated factors. 

The court finds that there was sufficient articulation of

the evidence to support the ALJ’s decision, and that the ALJ did

not err by not giving controlling weight to the treating

physicians’ opinions. 

II. The Plaintiff’s Credibility

The plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in determining her

credibility, because the ALJ did not sufficiently articulate her

reasoning and did not include unfavorable evidence in her

evaluation. 

As “hearing officers are in the best position to see and

hear the witnesses and assess their forthrightness, we afford

their credibility determinations special deference.” Powers v.

Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000). “When assessing an

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ALJ's credibility determination . . . we merely examine whether

the ALJ's determination was reasoned and supported.” Elder v.

Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). “We will reverse an

ALJ's credibility determination only if the claimant can show it

was ‘patently wrong.’” Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th

Cir. 2000). “It is only when the ALJ's determination lacks any

explanation or support that we will declare it to be “‘patently

wrong,’” Jens, 347 F.3d at 213 (quoting Powers, 207 F.3d at 435),

and deserving of reversal.” Elder, 529 F.3d at 413-14. 

“In determining credibility an ALJ must consider several

factors, including the claimant's daily activities, her level of

pain or symptoms, aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and

limitations . . . and justify the finding with specific reasons.” 

Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009). 

“Additionally . . . the ALJ must specifically address the effect

of obesity on a claimant's limitations because, for example, a

person who is obese and arthritic may experience greater

limitations than a person who is only arthritic.” Id. “Failing

to acknowledge this effect may impact the ALJ's credibility

determination.” Id.

The ALJ states various inconsistencies in the case to

support her finding that Plaintiff lacks credibility: Plaintiff

claims to forget to eat, yet she is morbidly obese; Plaintiff

utilizes a driver service, yet she claims she is able to drive

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herself; and Plaintiff has consistently worked as a crossing

guard. (R. at 22-23.) It is important to note that, based on

the VE’s testimony, working as a crossing guard is more strenuous

work, though for a shorter time, than is necessary to obtain

substantial gainful employment. (R. at 50.) 

There is no requirement that the ALJ continue to list every

concern or inconsistency related to Plaintiff’s credibility. In

this instance, the ALJ listed various key concerns. However,

there was additional support for the ALJ’s decision. First, the

plaintiff claims to have difficulty with stairs, but her case

manager reported that she goes outside the apartment to smoke,

when the apartment is up two flights of stairs. (R. at 39, 143.) 

Additionally, she testified that her friend moved in to take care

of her, but in a medical report, it was stated that she takes

care of her friend, and she also reported, after her surgery, she

was able to take care of herself. (R. at 33, 172, 404.) 

Further, the ALJ explicitly considered the complications her

obesity contributes. (R. at 22.) The court finds that the ALJ

sufficiently articulated the substantial evidence supporting her

decision. 

There is an additional consideration worth mentioning. The

Plaintiff has self-adjusted and discontinued various medical

treatments. (R. at 36, 38.) “In order to get benefits, you must

follow treatment prescribed by your physician if this treatment

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can restore your ability to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1530(a). “If

you do not follow the prescribed treatment without a good reason,

we will not find you disabled or, if you are already receiving

benefits, we will stop paying you benefits.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1530(b). This is not an issue that has been raised by either

party, but is informative. Not taking pain medication is an

indication that a patient’s pain level may not be as severe as

described, or possibly manageable. Not following prescribed

treatment for pain regulation again supports the ALJ’s

determination that the plaintiff lacks credibility. The court

finds that there was substantial evidence and clear articulation

to affirm the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff was not credible.1

III. The Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in determining her RFC

because the ALJ’s determination lacks any supporting medical

evidence.

When it is established that a plaintiff has no relevant past

work experience then “[the ALJ] [is] required to establish that

[the plaintiff] has the capability of performing other work in

the national economy.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 873. “This finding

must be supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. 

1 A further note about the plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ erred in determining her

credibility; this determination is crucial to the plaintiff’s appeal as it is the foundation of

the ALJ’s opinion evidence determination as well as being the threshold consideration for the

plaintiff’s Step three and five claims. (R. at 15.) This is so, as the plaintiff claims that

step three and five would have been decided differently if sufficient weight was given to

opinions and the RFC was correctly determined, and the key support for both of these

determinations was the credibility finding. These claims, which are buried in the plaintiff’s

appeal, will not be further considered as the threshold question has been decided against them.

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The ALJ determined Plaintiff’s RFC by considering that the

plaintiff currently works at a more strenuous job, albeit parttime, and lacks credibility. (R. at 22-23.) These are serious

considerations made by the ALJ. The court finds that this was

not a perfunctory examination of a medical record, and, for the

aforementioned reasons, the ALJ’s RFC determination is

sufficiently articulated and supported by substantial evidence.

 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Ms.

Hannigan-Aleo’s motion for summary judgment [#18]. The

Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. 

Date: October 15, 2013 

E N T E R E D:

_________________________________

MAGISTRATE JUDGE ARLANDER KEYS 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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