NIST Special Publication 1190GB-4A

Guide Brief 4A -

Example for Determining 

Anticipated Performance 

This publication is available free of charge from: 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1190GB-4A 

NISI 

National Institute of 

Standards and Technology 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Community 

Resilience 
 

 

 

NIST Special Publication 1190GB-4A 

Guide Brief 4A – 

Example for Determining 

Anticipated Performance 

This publication is available free of charge from: 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1190GB-4A 

September 2016 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Penny Pritzker, Secretary 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Willie May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director 
Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this 

document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. 

Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the 

National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the 

entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 1190GB-4A 

Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 1190GB-4A, 22 pages (September 2016) 

CODEN: NSPUE2 

This publication is available free of charge from: 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1190GB-4A 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

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Purpose and Scope
 

This publication is available free of charge from: http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1190GB-4A

Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated 

Performance
 

Applicable Section(s) of Guide: Volume 1, End of Section 4.1.4, Determine Anticipated Performance, p. 46 

Purpose and Scope 

This Guide Brief provides an 

example of how to determine the 

anticipated performance of water 

and wastewater systems subjected 

to an earthquake and tsunami 

event. The methodology can be 

applied to all infrastructure 

systems. The example 

demonstrates the information 

required to complete the 

performance goal tables and determine the anticipated system performance for building clusters and 

supporting infrastructure systems. This Guide Brief is intended to be read with Guide Brief 4, Determine 

Anticipated Performance. It can also applied with Section 16 in Volume II of the Guide. 

The example addresses the fictitious community of Shady Grove, Oregon. The hazard scenario is a 

magnitude (Mw) 9.0 subduction earthquake and tsunami. This event is considered a “design” earthquake 

with a 500-year return period.

1 

The intended user of this Guide Brief is an engineer familiar with the operation of the infrastructure being 

evaluated and the potential impacts of the hazards under consideration. 

1. Hazard, Facility and Pipe Data 

The first step is characterizing hazards and facilities. Figure 1 through Figure 4 show tsunami inundation, 

shaking, liquefaction and landslide hazards on community maps overlaid with the water and wastewater 

facilities and pipelines. Table 1 and Table 2 further define facilities and pipelines characteristics. 

Figure 1 maps the hazards and facilities. The hazards include: 

• Tsunami inundation (red line) 

• Earthquake induced liquefaction (downward cross hatch) 

• Earthquake induced landslide (upward cross hatch) 

• Earthquake ground motion (not depicted) 

1 This example was originally prepared by the Portland Water Bureau (PWB) to use as part of an Oregon Water/Wastewater 

Agency Response Network (ORWARN) exercise scenario. It is a work of fiction. 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

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Hazard, Facility and Pipe Data
 

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 Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA): 0.33 gn (where gn is acceleration due to gravity) 

throughout the community 

 Peak Ground Velocity (PGV): 54.9 cm/s (21.6 in./s) throughout the community 

 Peak Ground Displacement (PGD): varies by zone (see Table 3 and Table 4) 

Water facilities include: 

•	 Water Treatment Plant (W in blue square) 

•	 Wells 1 – 6 (W in blue circle); Wells 2 and 4 have backup generators 

•	 Storage Tanks 1 – 4 (T in blue circle) 

• Maintenance Yard (Y in blue square) 

Wastewater system facilities include: 

•	 Sewage Treatment Plant (S in green square) 

•	 Pump Stations 1 and 2 (P in green circle) 

• Maintenance Yard (Y in green square) 

The following figures and tables provide further details on the system components: 

•	 Figure 2 provides information about the age and type of development in the service area. This 

information helps assess the age of facilities serving those areas. The original city development 

and the mid-century development took place prior to the 1980s, and the recent development 

occurred after 1995. This information is useful in identifying the design standards used in various 

parts of the community. 

•	 Figure 3 shows the water system, including pipelines differentiated by pipe material and pipe 

diameter. 

•	 In Figure 4 the sewer and storm drainage systems contain pipe differentiated by diameter. For this 

example, all pipe within each system is the same material. Use this information to assess the 

fragility of the pipe. 

•	 Table 1 shows the water and wastewater systems facilities with material, date of construction, and 

other comments. This information helps evaluate the facility vulnerability associated with its date 

of construction and associated building code. 

•	 Table 2 shows the water and wastewater systems pipe length and material by hazard area. 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

Hazard, Facility and Pipe Data
 

Figure 1. Shady Harbor Oregon, Water Supply and Wastewater Facilities and Hazards [ORWARN Conference Presentation, Seaside Oregon
 

September 24, 2012]
 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

Hazard, Facility and Pipe Data
 

Figure 2. Development Eras [ORWARN Conference Presentation, Seaside Oregon September 24, 2012] 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

Hazard, Facility and Pipe Data
 

Conversions: 1 in. = 2.54 cm 

Figure 3. Water Supply System [ORWARN Conference Presentation, Seaside Oregon September 24, 2012] 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

Hazard, Facility and Pipe Data
 

Conversions: 1 in. = 2.54 cm 

Figure 4. Sewer and Storm Drainage System [ORWARN Conference Presentation, Seaside Oregon September 24, 2012] 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance 

Hazard, Facility and Pipe Data 

Table 1. Water and Wastewater (Sewer) System Facilities with Material, Date of Construction and
 

Other Comments
 

Conversions: 1 MGD = 3.79 ML/Day 1 MG = 3.79 ML 

Facility Material Date of 

Construction Comments 

Shady Harbor Water System 

Water treatment plant 6 million gallons per day (MGD) 

Control building Concrete masonry unit 1982 

Intake Pipe Ductile iron pipe 1982 

Flocculation Cast in place concrete basin 1982 

Coagulation Cast in place concrete basin 1982 

Sedimentation Cast in place concrete basin 1982 

Filtration Cast in place concrete basin 1982 

Sodium hypochlorite storage tank Plastic tank 1982 

Flocculant tank (activated silica) Ground level steel tank 1982 Badly corroded 

Filter backwash tank Plastic tank 1982 Replaced rusted steel tank 

Maintenance yard Metal building with metal siding 1985 

Wells 

Well #1 1976 Submersible 

Well #2 1981 Turbine 

Well #3 2005 Turbine 

Well #4 1941 Turbine 

Well #5 1930 Submersible 

Well #6 1976 Submersible 

Tanks 

Tank #1 Elevated steel 1980 0.5 million gallons (MG) 

Tank #2 Prestressed concrete 2000 1 MG 

Tank #3 Ground level steel 1960 1.5 MG 

Tank #4 Cast in place concrete 2002 1.0 MG 

River Crossings on Bridges 

River crossing #1 (Downstream) On bridges 1976 Did not address liquefaction 

River crossing #2 (Middle) On bridge 1995 Addressed liquefaction in design 

River crossing #3 (Upstream) On bridge 2003 Addressed liquefaction in design 

Shady Harbor Wastewater System 

Wastewater treatment plant 6.0 MGD 

Control building Concrete masonry unit 1979 

Influent pipeline Ductile iron pipe 1970 

Grit chambers Cast in place concrete 1950 

Primary clarifier Circular steel 1970 

Secondary treatment/digesters Cast in place concrete 1990 

Blower/pump building 1990 

Disinfection/elevation tank 1995 

Disinfection tanks Cast in place concrete 1980 

Outfall 1970 

Onsite fuel storage Horizontal steel above grade 1950 

Maintenance yard Concrete masonry unit 1970 

Pump stations 

PS #1 Cast in place concrete, unreinforced 

masonry above grade 

1950 Wet well 

PS #2 1980 Submersible 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

Table 2. Water System and Sewer Pipe Material and Length (ft) by Hazard Area 

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Conversions: 1 ft = 0.3048 m 

Water 

Pipe Materials Total Inundation Landslide Liquefaction PGV 

Cast Iron (CI) 267,012 101,629 34,075 35,795 95,513 

Ductile Iron (DI) 91,374 25,271 8,944 14,614 42,545 

Steel (STL) 10,889 0 5,150 1,072 4,667 

Total 369,275 126,900 48,169 51,481 142,725 

Wastewater 

Gravity Lines Total Inundation Landslide Liquefaction PGV 

Cast Iron (CI) 99,100 0 16,000 (1) 18,000 (1) 65,100 (1) 

Concrete 149,618 50,518 16,000 (1) 18,000 (1) 65,100 (1) 

PVC 138,356 39,256 16,000 (1) 18,000 (1) 65,100 (1) 

Total 387,074 89,774 48,000 54,000 195,300 

Force Main Lines Total Inundation Landslide Liquefaction PGV 

Ductile Iron (DI) 6,900 2,000 1,500 2,000 1,400 

Note (1): Estimated from available data 

2. Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation 

Given the hazard, facility, and pipeline data, the vulnerabilities of the water and wastewater systems are 

assessed. Table 3 and Table 4 summarize the available information for the water and wastewater systems. 

In some cases, assumptions are made about the type of construction and pipe failures. Assume the person 

evaluating the system is generally knowledgeable about the particular hazard and the types of impacts that 

hazard have on the particular system. 

The table column headings for Table 3 and Table 4 are: 

•	 Facility and Description – As shown. 

•	 Consequence – Based on the capacity the specified component provides for the overall system. 

This descriptor is only used to give a general idea of the relative importance of the facility. 

•	 Emergency Power – As described. 

•	 PGA/PGV and PGD – Earthquake hazard intensities. The evaluation tables show the values for 

Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) or Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) and Peak Ground 

Displacement (PGD). This information should be available from the USGS and state departments 

of geology. PGV was converted to units of in./s for use in pipe failure equations. 

•	 Pipe K value – Based on pipe material from American Lifelines Alliance (ALA). K values can be 

modified upward to address the pipe condition degraded by corrosion. 

•	 Inundation, Liquefaction, Landslide – Taken from the system maps. 

•	 Date of Construction – From area of town/age of development and other assumed dates. 

•	 Pipe – Failures calculated from ALA equations at bottom of table and percent of area that will 

liquefy or be subject to a landslide. 

•	 Type of Construction – Previously provided or assumed. 

•	 Pipe Failures – Calculated using ALA relationships at the bottom of the table. 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

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Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

This publication is available free of charge from: http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1190GB-4A

•	 Damage State – Based on comments in the table. 

RED SHADING – Cells shaded in red indicate the controlling hazard (PGA, PGV, PGD) or the data that 

allows the evaluator to reach the indicated conclusion. 

2.1. Water System Summary and Evaluation 

The water system evaluation is summarized using the rows in Table 3 with further explanations as 

follows: 

•	 Water Treatment Plant – Overall facility out of service due to damaged intake. 

•	 Control/Lab Building – It was constructed in 1980, prior to significant seismic design code 

requirements in Oregon that were not implemented until the mid-1990s. This would give it a 

“Low Code” designation in Hazus (see Hazus Technical Manual, Chapter 5). 

The building is constructed of lightly reinforced cement masonry units (CMU), giving it a URML 

Building Type. Using Table 5.16c Equivalent-PGA Structural Fragility – Low Code, Seismic 

Design Level, subjected to a level of shaking of 0.33 gn, the building would undergo “Extensive” 

Damage. It’s damage state would be not-usable but repairable. 

•	 Intake – Damaged due to liquefaction/lateral spread. 

•	 Plant Piping – As noted. 

•	 Non-structural – As noted. 

•	 Maintenance Yard – Steel moment frame/braced buildings. This would be Hazus building type 

S1L/S2L. The building was built in 1985, so is still considered Low Code in Oregon. Using 

Hazus Table 5.16c, with a 0.33 gn ground motion the building would have “Extensive” damage. 

•	 Wells 1 – 3 – It is assumed that well casings subjected to PGDs of 61.0 cm (24 in.) would be bent 

laterally, making them inoperable. 

•	 Wells 4 and 5 – Well houses are unreinforced masonry (URM). They are considered Pre-code 

design. Using Hazus Table 5.16d, a URML structure subjected to 0.33 gn would be expected to be 

near collapse. 

•	 Well 6 – Contaminated by saltwater inundation (as experienced by many wells in the 2011 

Japanese earthquake). 

•	 Tank 1 – Liquefaction, loss of foundation bearing. 

•	 Tank 2 – Built in 2000, this wire wrapped concrete tank has a Hazus label of PST1, On-ground 

Anchored. It would be expected to have only slight damage when subjected to 0.33 gn shaking. 

•	 Tank 3 – Constructed in 1960, this is categorized in Hazus as On-Ground Unanchored Steel, 

PST4. It is also subject to 30 cm (12 in.). PGD due to landslide. Looking at Hazus Technical 

Manual Table 8.9, Damage Algorithms for Water Storage Tanks, PST4 subjected to 0.33 gn 

shaking would have moderate damage. However, the PGD is assumed to render the tank 

inoperable. 

•	 Tank 4 – Similar to Tank 2, except cast in place concrete, this tank would have only slight 

damage. 

•	 Bridge Crossing #1 (downstream)– Collocated on bridge. This bridge would collapse due to 

abutment failures due to liquefaction. The water line crossing failed. 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

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Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

This publication is available free of charge from: http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1190GB-4A

•	 Bridge Crossing #2 (middle) )– Collocated on bridge. The bridge remains intact and the water 

main remains intact. 

•	 Bridge Crossing #3 (upstream)– Collocated on bridge. The bridge remains intact and the water 

main remains intact. 

•	 Pipe – Damage calculated as per ALA equations shown at the bottom of the table. 

2.2. Wastewater (Sewer) System Evaluation 

The Wastewater Treatment Plant and Pump Station #1 are in the tsunami inundation zone. In the 2011 

Japanese subduction earthquake, the Sendai WWTP was inundated and completely damaged. Above 

grade equipment and piping was ripped off the foundations. The effluent pump station was impacted with 

a 33 ft (10 m) high wall of water, bending the reinforced concrete outside wall inward. 

The wastewater system evaluation is summarized on Table 4 with further explanations as follows: 

•	 Wastewater Treatment Plant – Completely damaged due to tsunamis. 

•	 Pump Station #1 – Completely damaged due to tsunamis. 

•	 Pump Station #2 – The pump station is outside the inundation zone. This submersible type pump 

station is inherently rugged when subjected to earthquake ground motions. 

Collection system and stormwater system piping damage is estimated using the ALA equations shown at 

the bottom of the table or as otherwise noted in the table. 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

Table 3. Water System Summary and Evaluation (cells shaded in red indicate the controlling hazard (PGA, PGV, PGD) or the data that allows 

the evaluator to reach the indicated conclusion on damage state) 

Conversions: 1 MGD = 3.79 ML/Day 1 MG = 3.79 ML 1 in. = 2.54 cm 1 in./s = 2.54 cm/s 

Facility 

Water Treatment Plant 

Control building 

Intake 

Process tanks 

Plant piping 

Non structural 

Maintenance yard 

Wells 

Well #1 

Well #2 

Well #3 

Well #4 

Well #5 

Well #6 

Tanks 

Tank #1 

Tank #2 

Tank #3 

Tank #4 

Bridge Crossings 

Bridge Crossing #1 

Bridge Crossing #2 

Bridge Crossing #3 

Description 

3 MGD 

River below 

Submersible 

Submersible 

Turbine 

Turbine 

Turbine 

Submersible 

0.5 MG 

1 MG 

1.5 MG 

1.0 MG 

12 in. 

12 in. 

12 in. 

Consequence 

0.5 

0.1 

0.1 

0.1 

0.1 

0.1 

0.1 

0.125 

0.25 

0.375 

0.25 

0.1 

0.1 

0.1 

Emergency Power 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

PGA (% gravity), 

PGV (in./s) 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

33 % 

PGD 

36 in. 

12 in. 

24 in. 

24 in. 

24 in. 

24 in. 

12 in. 

24 in. 

24 in. 

24 in. 

Pipe K Value 

Note 1 

Repair Rate for Wave Propagation RR = K × 0.00187 × PGV where PGV is in inches/second 

Repair Rate for PGD RR = K × 1.06 PGD0.319 where PGD is in inches 

Repair Rate for PGD Assumes 25 % of mapped liquefaction/landslide areas undergo PGD 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

Table 3. Water System Summary and Evaluation (cells shaded in red indicate the controlling hazard (PGA, PGV, PGD) or the data that allows 

the evaluator to reach the indicated conclusion on damage state) (continued) 

Conversions: 1 MGD = 3.79 ML/Day 1 MG = 3.79 ML 1 in. = 2.54 cm 1 in./s = 2.54 cm/s 

Facility 

Pipelines (Note 1) 

CI 

CI 

CI 25% PGD 

CI 75% No PGD 

CI 25% PGD 

CI 75% No PGD 

DI 

DI 

DI 25% PGD 

DI 75% No PGD 

DI 25% PGD 

DI 75% No PGD 

STL 

STL 

STL 25% PGD 

STL 75% No PGD 

STL 25% PGD 

STL 75% No PGD 

Total Pipe Failure 

Description 

95,513 

101,629 

8,949 

26,846 

8,519 

25,556 

42,545 

25,271 

3,654 

10,961 

2,236 

6,708 

4,667 

0 

268 

804 

1,288 

3,863 

Consequence Emergency Power PGA (% gravity), 

PGV (in./s) 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

PGD 

12in. 

12in. 

12 in. 

12 in. 

12 in. 

12 in. 

Pipe K Value 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

0.5 

0.5 

0.5 

0.5 

0.5 

0.5 

0.3 

0.3 

0.3 

0.3 

0.3 

0.3 

Note 1 

Repair Rate for Wave Propagation RR = K × 0.00187 × PGV where PGV is in inches/second 

Repair Rate for PGD RR = K × 1.06 PGD0.319 where PGD is in inches 

Repair Rate for PGD Assumes 25 % of mapped liquefaction/landslide areas undergo PGD 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

Table 3. Water System Summary and Evaluation (cells shaded in red indicate the controlling hazard (PGA, PGV, PGD) or the data that allows 

the evaluator to reach the indicated conclusion on damage state) (continued) 

Conversions: 1 MGD = 3.79 ML/Day 1 MG = 3.79 ML 1 in. = 2.54 cm 1 in./s = 2.54 cm/s 

Facility 

Water Treatment Plant 

Control building 

Intake 

Process tanks 

Plant piping 

Non structural 

Maintenance yard 

Wells 

Well #1 

Well #2 

Well #3 

Well #4 

Well #5 

Well #6 

Tanks 

Tank #1 

Tank #2 

Tank #3 

Tank #4 

Bridge Crossings 

Bridge Crossing #1 

Bridge Crossing #2 

Bridge Crossing #3 

Inundation 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

Liquefaction Landslide Date of Construction 

/ Pipe Repair Rate1 

Type of Construction / Pipe 

Failures Damage State 

No No 1982 Plant inoperable because of damaged intake 

No No 1982 Lightly reinforced concrete 

masonry unit (CMU) 

Heavily damaged 

Yes No 1982 Ductile iron pipe (DIP) Severed due to liquefaction/lateral spread 

No No 1982 Cast in place (CIP) concrete 

basins 

OK 

No No 1982 DIP, inadequately braced Several broken flanges on equipment connections 

No No 1982 Poorly anchored Equipment movement damaging connections 

Yes No 1985 Steel moment/braced frame Extensive Damage, Hazus Table 5.16c 

Yes No 1976 Inadequately reinforced CMU Casing bent, no power, not functional, building 

CMU cracked, red-tagged 

Yes No 1981 Inadequately reinforced CMU Casing bent, submersible continues to operate with 

emergency power, building CMU cracking, red 

tagged 

Yes No 2005 Reinforced CMU Casing bent, no power, not functional, building OK 

No No 1941 Unreinforced masonry (URM) Casing collapses due to corrosion, building collapses 

No No 1930 URM Well OK, pump house collapsed 

No No 1976 Inadequately reinforced CMU Well contaminated, unusable 

Yes No 1980 Elevated Steel Collapses due to foundation failure and failure of 

support structure 

No No 2000 Wire wrapped concrete tank OK 

No Yes 1960 Ground level steel Tank displaces on site, rocks on foundation, breaks 

connecting piping, buckles 

No No 2002 CIP concrete OK 

Yes No 1976 DIP supported on bridge Bridge collapsed due to tsunamis and rotation of 

abutments as a result of liquefaction. 

Yes No 1995 DIP supported on bridge Bridge remains functional 

Yes No 2003 DIP supported on bridge Bridge remains functional 

Note 1 

Repair Rate for Wave Propagation RR = K × 0.00187 × PGV where PGV is in inches/second 

Repair Rate for PGD RR = K × 1.06 PGD0.319 where PGD is in inches 

Repair Rate for PGD Assumes 25 % of mapped liquefaction/landslide areas undergo PGD 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

Table 3. Water System Summary and Evaluation (cells shaded in red indicate the controlling hazard (PGA, PGV, PGD) or the data that allows 

the evaluator to reach the indicated conclusion on damage state) (continued) 

Conversions: 1 MGD = 3.79 ML/Day 1 MG = 3.79 ML 1 in. = 2.54 cm 1 in./s = 2.54 cm/s 

Facility 

Pipelines (Note 1) 

CI 

CI 

CI 25% PGD 

CI 75% No PGD 

CI 25% PGD 

CI 75% No PGD 

DI 

DI 

DI 25% PGD 

DI 75% No PGD 

DI 25% PGD 

DI 75% No PGD 

STL 

STL 

STL 25% PGD 

STL 75% No PGD 

STL 25% PGD 

STL 75% No PGD 

Total Pipe Failure 

Inundation 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Liquefaction Landslide Date of Construction 

/ Pipe Repair Rate1 

Type of Construction / Pipe 

Failures Damage State 

Pipe Repair Rate1 Pipe Failures 

No No 0.4 3.9 

0.4 4.1 Pipe in inundation zone OK, but all surrounding 

facilities heavily damaged 

Yes 0.59 5.2 

No 0.04 1.1 

Yes 0.59 5.0 

No 0.04 1.0 

0.02 0.9 

0.02 0.5 Pipe in inundation zone OK, but all surrounding 

facilities heavily damaged 

Yes 0.29 1.1 

No 0.02 0.2 

Yes 0.29 0.7 

0.02 0.1 

0.01 0.1 

0.01 0.0 Pipe in inundation zone OK, but all surrounding 

facilities heavily damaged 

Yes 0.18 0.0 

No 0.01 0.0 

Yes 0.18 0.2 

No 0.01 0.0 

24.1 About 50 % of the failures are leaks and the 

remainder are breaks 

Note 1 

Repair Rate for Wave Propagation RR = K × 0.00187 × PGV where PGV is in inches/second 

Repair Rate for PGD RR = K × 1.06 PGD0.319 where PGD is in inches 

Repair Rate for PGD Assumes 25 % of mapped liquefaction/landslide areas undergo PGD 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

Table 4. Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation (cells shaded in red indicate the controlling hazard (PGA, PGV, PGD) or the data that 

allows the evaluator to reach the indicated conclusion on damage state) 

Conversions: 1 MGD = 3.79 ML/Day 1 MG = 3.79 ML 1 in. = 2.54 cm 1 in./s = 2.54 cm/s 1 ft = 0.3048 m 

Facility Description Consequence Emergency Power PGA (% gravity), PGV (in./s) PGD Pipe K Value 

Wastewater TP 3 MGD 1 33 % 

Control building 33 % 

Influent pipeline Ductile iron pipe 

(DIP) 

33 % 12 in. 

Grit chambers 33 % 

Primary clarifier 33 % 

Secondary treatment/digesters 33 % 

Blower/pump building 33 % 

Disinfection/elevation tank 33 % 

Disinfection tanks 33 % 

Outfall 33 % 

Onsite fuel storage 33 % 

Maintenance yard 33 % 

Pump Stations 33 % 

PS #1 Wet well/Dry well 0.25 Yes 33 % 

PS #2 Submersible 0.25 Yes 33 % 

Collection (Note 1) 

Force mains DIP 1,400 ft 21.6 in./s 0.5 

Force mains DIP 2,000 ft 21.6 in./s 0.5 

Force mains DIP 25% PGD 500 ft 12 in. 0.5 

Force mains DIP 75% No PGD 1,500 ft 21.6 in./s 0.5 

Force mains DIP 25% PGD 375 ft 12 in. 0.5 

Force mains DIP 75% No PGD 1,125 ft 21.6 in./s 0.7 

Concrete 65,100 ft 21.6 in./s 0.7 

Concrete 50,518 ft 21.6 in./s 0.7 

Concrete 25% PGD 4,500 ft 12 in. 0.7 

Concrete 75% No PGD 13,500 ft 21.6 in./s 0.7 

Note 1 

Repair Rate for Wave Propagation RR = K × 0.00187 × PGV where PGV is in inches/second 

Repair Rate for PGD RR = K × 1.06 PGD0.319 where PGD is in inches 

Repair Rate for PGD Assumes 25 % of the mapped liquefaction/landslide areas undergo PGD 

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Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

Table 4. Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation (cells shaded in red indicate the controlling hazard (PGA, PGV, PGD) or the data that 

allows the evaluator to reach the indicated conclusion on damage state) (continued) 

Conversions: 1 MGD = 3.79 ML/Day 1 MG = 3.79 ML 1 in. = 2.54 cm 1 in./s = 2.54 cm/s 1 ft = 0.3048 m 

Facility 

Concrete 

Concrete 75% No PGD 

Cast iron 

Cast iron 

Cast iron 25% PGD 

Cast iron 75% No PGD 

Cast iron 25% PGD 

Cast iron 75% No PGD 

PVC 

PVC 

PVC 25% PGD 

PVC 75% No PGD 

PVC 25% PGD 

PVC 75% No PGD 

Total Pipeline Failures 

Storm water concrete pipe 

Note 1 

Repair Rate for Wave Propagation 

Repair Rate for PGD 

Repair Rate for PGD 

Description 

4,000 ft 

12,000 ft 

65,100 ft 

0 ft 

4,500 ft 

13,500 ft 

4,000 ft 

12,000 ft 

65,100 ft 

39,256 ft 

4,500 ft 

13,500 ft 

4,000 ft 

120,00 ft 

Consequence Emergency Power PGA (% gravity) 

PGV (in./s) PGD 

12 in. 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

12 in. 

21.6 in./s 

12 in. 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

21.6 in./s 

12 in. 

21.6 in./s 

12 in. 

21.6 in./s 

RR = K × 0.00187 × PGV where PGV is in inches/second 

RR = K × 1.06 PGD0.319 where PGD is in inches 

Assumes 25 % of the mapped liquefaction/landslide areas undergo PGD 

Pipe K Value 

0.7 

0.7 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

0.8 

0.8 

0.8 

0.8 

0.8 

0.8 

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This publication is available free of charge from: http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1190GB-4A

Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

Table 4. Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation (cells shaded in red indicate the controlling hazard (PGA, PGV, PGD) or the data that 

allows the evaluator to reach the indicated conclusion on damage state) (continued) 

Conversions: 1 MGD = 3.79 ML/Day 1 MG = 3.79 ML 1 in. = 2.54 cm 1 in./s = 2.54 cm/s 1 ft = 0.3048 m 

Facility 

Wastewater TP 

Control building 

Influent pipeline 

Grit chambers 

Primary clarifier 

Secondary treatment/digesters 

Blower/pump building 

Disinfection/elevation tank 

Disinfection tanks 

Outfall 

Onsite fuel storage 

Maintenance yard 

Pump Stations 

PS #1 

PS #2 

Collection (Note 1) 

Force mains DIP 

Force mains DIP 

Force mains DIP 25% PGD 

Force mains DIP 75% No PGD 

Force mains DIP 25% PGD 

Force mains DIP 75% No PGD 

Concrete 

Concrete 

Concrete 25% PGD 

Note 1 

Repair Rate for Wave Propagation 

Repair Rate for PGD 

Repair Rate for PGD 

Inundation Liquefaction Landslide 

Date of 

Construction/ Pipe 

Repair Rate1 

Type of Construction / 

Pipe Failures 

Yes 

Yes 1979 Concrete masonry unit 

(CMU) 

Yes Yes 1970 

Yes 1950 Cast in place (CIP) concrete 

Yes 1970 Circular steel 

Yes 1990 CIP concrete 

Yes 1990 

Yes 1995 

Yes 1980 CIP concrete 

Yes 1970 

Yes 1950 Horizontal Storage above 

grade 

Yes 1970 CMU 

Yes No No 1950 CIP concrete/URM above 

ground 

No No No 1980 Steel can 

Pipe Repair Rate1 Pipe Failures 

0.02 0.0 

0.02 0.0 

0.29 0.1 

Yes 0.02 

No 0.29 0.1 

Yes 0.02 

No 0.03 1.8 

Yes 0.03 

Yes 0.41 1.8 

RR = K × 0.00187 × PGV 

RR = K × 1.06 PGD0.319 

Assumes 25 % of the mapped liquefaction/landslide areas undergo PGD 

Damage State 

All above grade structures heavily damaged 

Walls blown in by tsunami 

Influent pipeline severed in river crossing 

All equipment heavily damaged 

Clarifier floats 

All equipment heavily damaged 

Walls blown in by tsunami 

Tank washed away 

All equipment heavily damaged 

Heavily damaged by tsunami 

Washed away 

Walls blown in by tsunami 

PS inundated, all equipment damaged, 

superstructure collapses 

OK 

Pipe in inundation zone OK, but all surrounding 

facilities heavily damaged 

Pipe in inundation zone OK, but all surrounding 

facilities heavily damaged 

Where PGV is in inches/second 

where PGD is in inches 

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This publication is available free of charge from: http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1190GB-4A

Guide Brief 4A: Example for Determining Anticipated Performance
 

Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

Table 4. Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation (cells shaded in red indicate the controlling hazard (PGA, PGV, PGD) or the data that 

allows the evaluator to reach the indicated conclusion on damage state) (continued) 

Conversions: 1 MGD = 3.79 ML/Day 1 MG = 3.79 ML 1 in. = 2.54 cm 1 in./s = 2.54 cm/s 1 ft = 0.3048 m 

Facility Inundation Liquefaction Landslide 

Date of 

Construction/ Pipe 

Repair Rate1 

Type of Construction / 

Pipe Failures 

Concrete 75% No PGD No 0.03 

Concrete Yes 0.41 1.6 

Concrete 75% No PGD No 0.03 

Cast iron 0.04 2.6 

Cast iron Yes 0.04 

Cast iron 25% PGD Yes 0.59 2.6 

Cast iron 75% No PGD No 0.04 

Cast iron 25% PGD Yes 0.59 2.3 

Cast iron 75% No PGD No 0.04 

PVC 0.03 2.1 

PVC Yes 0.03 

PVC 25% PGD Yes 0.47 2.1 

PVC 75% No PGD No 0.03 

PVC 25% PGD Yes 0.47 1.9 

PVC 75% No PGD No 0.03 

Total Pipeline Failures 19.3 

Storm water concrete pipe Yes Yes 

Note 1 

Repair Rate for Wave Propagation RR = K × 0.00187 × PGV 

Repair Rate for PGD RR = K × 1.06 PGD0.319 

Repair Rate for PGD Assumes 25 % of the mapped liquefaction/landslide areas undergo PGD 

Damage State 

Pipe in inundation zone OK, but all surrounding 

facilities heavily damaged 

Pipe in inundation zone OK, but all surrounding 

facilities heavily damaged 

Just over 50 % of failures are in areas subject 

to PGD. 

Pipelines in liquefiable area will float/move 

laterally due to lateral spread 

Where PGV is in inches/second 

where PGD is in inches 

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Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

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2.3. Water System Performance and Restoration Time 

Introduction 

The team evaluating the restoration time for Shady Grove is comprised of seasoned engineers and 

operations personnel. The team members have participated in professional conferences and have learned 

about damage and recovery of other water utilities subjected to hazard events across the US and around 

the world. They have professional colleagues, contractors, equipment sales people, and consulting 

engineers who are generally knowledgeable about equipment availability and the time it takes to build 

various types of projects. 

The evaluators are aware that the hazard scenario covers a large region and that mutual aid from near-by 

utilities may be difficult to obtain. 

The evaluators categorized the system into supply, storage, and distribution. The way this system is 

configured, there are no transmission mains, and there are no pump stations other than the well pumps 

and high-lift pump at the water treatment plant (WTP). 

The supply comes from the WTP and 6 wells. The evaluators knew they needed to produce average 

winter demands (AWD) in the months following the event, and that either the WTP or the 6 wells 

combined could produce the AWD. They talked with their well driller and generator supplier. Knowing 

the well damage scenario, with information from the well driller and generator supplier, the evaluators 

believed they could get three wells operable within two days (see details below). This would give them 

about 50 % of the required production. 

The evaluators assessed the WTP damage scenario, the building was nearly collapsed and the intake 

broken. Knowing the WTP could not recover within months, they looked elsewhere. They contacted their 

county emergency manager, who evaluated sources of portable WTP. He got back to them with 

information that there were several possible suppliers. The Army Corps of Engineers had five portable 

plants in storage in the mid-west; a WTP manufacturer maintained several portable plants in Utah for 

emergency use. The 3 wells and the portable WTP would provide the supply they needed to deliver 

AWD. 

The damage scenario indicated that two of the water system tanks would be completely damaged, but the 

two newer tanks would remain operable. In conferring with the water system operations staff, the 

evaluators determined they could operate pumps continuously, throttled back, and operate the system 

without the two reservoirs. 

Shady Grove had one field maintenance crew with a small excavator. The evaluators were aware mutual 

aid for this type of event would be in short supply. The Water Superintendent contacted a local contractor 

who installed pipe for the City on a regular basis. The contractor agreed it could provide a pipe repair 

crew in an emergency. The City and contractor agreed on a multi-year contract to provide a repair crew in 

the event of an emergency. Based on pipe repair records, the Water Superintendent estimated the 

contractor’s repair crew could make two repairs per 12-hour shift per crew. 

The evaluators concluded they could get the AWD supply and pipe restored within two weeks following 

the event, with service to critical facilities coming earlier. 

Evaluation 

Using the vulnerability of the various system components, the overall system functionality and recovery 

is evaluated. This section describes where to place the “X”s in the performance matrix, which is then used 

to identify gaps in infrastructure system performance for a design level earthquake event. 

•	 Assumption. Either the water treatment plant or wells can provide winter demand flows when 

they are fully operable. Winter demand flows can also be met when both supplies are operating at 

50 % capacity. 

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Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

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•	 Water Treatment Plant Damage Summary. 

 Control Building/Lab near collapse 

 Intake severed 

 Equipment moved damaging connections 

The Control Building requires replacement. Estimated restoration time with a temporary building is 6 

months. Other damage can be repaired while the control building is being replaced. 

Assume a portable WTP producing 50 % of the original WTP flow, using a temporary intake can be 

installed within 2 weeks.
	

Lab samples are transported to the next adjacent community for testing.
	

•	 Wells. Five wells are inoperable, due to bent casings, pump house collapse or contamination
	

 Well No 1 Requires power, building bracing – 2 days restoration time
	

 Well No. 2 Continues to operate on emergency power. Building requires bracing – 2 days
	

 Well No 3 May be operable with emergency power – 2 days required
	

 Well No 4 Not recoverable
	

 Well No 5 Temporary shelter and new control cabinets required – 2 weeks
	

 Well No 6 Contaminated not recoverable
	

Well capacity can be restored to 50 % (3 wells) in 2 days and 67 % (4 wells) in 2 weeks. 

The Shady Harbor has emergency supply (50 % of winter demand) in 2 days from the 3 wells,
	

and 100 % winter demand within 2 weeks after a temporary portable WTP is put in place.
	

•	 Tanks. 

 Tank #1 Collapsed. System remains operable with continuous pumping 

 Tank #2 OK 

 Tank #3 Broken piping – 2 weeks to repair. System remains operable with continuous 

pumping 

 Tank #4 OK 

Tank damage states allow the system to remain operable with two undamaged tanks and two 

tanks that can be bypassed with continuous pumping. 

•	 Pipelines. A total of 24 pipeline failures occurred. Two repair crews with equipment and repair 

materials are available within 2 days following the event. It is estimated that each crew can repair 

2 failures/day totaling 4/day. It will take an estimated 8 days (2 days to begin and 6 days to 

repair) to restore the pipe after the event. Repair crews will start pipe restoration at the 

functioning wells, first connecting critical facilities such as hospitals. It is estimated it will take 4 

days to connect the well supply to hospitals after the event. 

•	 System Restoration Time. System functional component restoration can be recovered, following 

the Guide Table 9-14 Riverbend water infrastructure performance goals for design earthquake as 

follows: 

 Source. 50 % of the well capacity (which includes raw water, conveyance and pumping) is 

operable within 2 days. Place the “X” at 2 days (noting 50 % available) for these categories. 

A temporary WTP is operable within 2 weeks allowing the system to meet 100 % winter 

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Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

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demand flow. This meets the 90 % category. Place an “X” at 2 weeks (noting 100 %) for 

these three categories. Fire flow at 90 % demand is only available after 2 weeks after the 

temporary WTP comes on line. 

 Transmission. All 6 wells and the WTP are in town, and do not depend on transmission lines 

to move water to the distribution system. However it will take 4 days to get water through the 

backbone system in town to get water to the hospital. Place the “X” at 1-4 weeks noting 1 

week for delivery to the hospital. 

 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). The SCADA system monitors the 

system operation logging such information as flows and pressures, and makes system control 

such as turning pumps on and off based on preprogramed rules. The SCADA system was in 

the Control Building, which collapsed. A temporary WTP will be in place within 2 weeks, 

but restoration of the SCADA system will take longer. The “X” location depends on the 

status of the SCADA system. 

 Distribution. Water will be available for Community Distribution at the 3 operable wells 

within 2 days. Place the “X” at 1-3 days noting 50 % capacity. Water will be available at the 

hospital within 4 days. Place the “X” at 1-3 weeks. The system will be fully functional at 

winter demand flows within 2 weeks. Place the “X” for other distribution categories at 1-4 

weeks. 

2.4. Water System Strategies for Reducing the Anticipated Recovery Time 

This section provides preliminary ideas that could reduce the water system restoration time. 

The WTP was constructed before significant seismic building codes were in place in this region. The 

control building was constructed with lightly reinforced concrete masonry units which are highly 

vulnerable to earthquakes. The intake was located in liquefiable soils. Half of the wells were located in 

areas with liquefiable soils making them, and even new wells, vulnerable to earthquakes. The owner 

should consider strengthening the WTP structures and anchoring equipment and piping to resist the 

moderate ground motions expected in this scenario. 

While two of the tanks were old, storage did not limit the recovery time of the system. Upgrade of the two 

old tanks could be beneficial at some point. 

Pipeline damage had the greatest impact on recovery times. The most failures were in cast iron pipe in 

liquefiable soils. Replacement of that pipe with seismic resistant pipe over the long term (say 50 years) 

would reduce the expected recovery time. 

2.5. Wastewater System Performance and Restoration Time 

Recovery of the wastewater system was evaluated in a similar manner to the water system. Using the 

vulnerability of the various system components, the overall system functionality and recovery was 

evaluated. This section describes where to place the “X”s in the performance matrix, which is then used 

to identify gaps in infrastructure system performance for a design level earthquake event. 

•	 Wastewater Treatment Plant. The treatment plant was heavily damaged due to tsunami 

inundation and a 1 to 2 year restoration anticipated. The WTP will discharge raw sewage into the 

river and/or ocean until the treatment plant is repaired. 

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Water and Wastewater System Summary and Evaluation
 

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•	 Pump Stations: 

 PS #1. The pump was inundated, equipment damaged, and the superstructure collapsed. 

Approximately 6 months to 1 year restoration anticipated. The WTP will discharge raw 

sewage into the river and/or ocean until the treatment plant is repaired. 

 PS #2 – Remained functional. 

•	 Sewer Pipelines. 19 pipeline failures occurred, some in liquefaction areas, some in landslide 

areas. Significant effort to route raw sewage into receiving waters to avoid human contact. Use 

the same crews as for water supply. Estimated start is about 8 days following the event after the 

water system is restored. Time to route sewage to receiving water is using the same repair rate as 

for water, 2 crews at 2 repairs/day equals 5 days. The sewage collection system, moving sewage 

away from people, will be functional within 13 days following the earthquake. As the PS #1 and 

the WWTP are not functional, raw sewage will be discharged in the river and/or ocean. It will 

take months to restore the sewers in liquefiable soils crossing the river. 

•	 System Restoration Time. System components can recover, following Guide Table 9-15: 

 Treatment Plant. Place the “X” at 4-24 months for both WWTP subcategories as the WWTP 

will require 1 to 2 years to rebuild. 

 Trunk Lines. Place the “X” at 4-24 months to rebuild PS #1 and the interceptor going to the 

WWTP. 

 Control Systems. Place the “X” at 4-24 months as the SCADA systems at the WWTP and PS 

# 1 will need to be rebuilt. 

 Collection. Place the “X” at 1-4 weeks as it will take 13 days to route raw sewage to the river 

or ocean. 

It is assumed that business as usual can continue once raw sewage is diverted to the river of ocean 

even though it will result in an environmental impact. 

2.6. Wastewater System – Possible Strategies for Reducing the Anticipated Recovery Time 

The only impact failure of the wastewater system had on recovery time was the time it took to redirect 

raw sewage into the river and ocean. This raw sewage discharge would however result in some 

environmental damage. It may be useful to have raw sewage overflows that could be activated in the 

event of the catastrophic failure of the WWTP and PS#1. 

In the long term, possibly at the point the existing plant is approaching the end of its useful life, it may be 

worth considering relocating the WWTP outside the inundation zone. 

22 
Community 

Resilience 

NISr 

National Institute of 

Standards and Technology 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

This publication is available free of charge from: 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1190GB-4A