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*********************************************** 
CAROLYNE Y. HYNES v. SHARON M. JONES

(SC 20009)

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D’Auria,

Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, who had received an award from the September 11th Victim

Compensation Fund following the death of her husband during the

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, appealed to the trial court from

the Probate Court’s denial of her motion to dismiss guardianship proceedings relating to their minor child. The letter from the compensation

fund’s special master authorizing that award indicated that the plaintiff

had elected to receive certain money on behalf of the minor child as a

representative payee. The letter further elaborated that, in that capacity,

the plaintiff had an obligation to use the money in the minor child’s

best interest, to invest it prudently, and to distribute it to the minor

child once she reached the age of majority. Following receipt of the

award, the Probate Court directed the plaintiff to place the money into

a guardianship account. The plaintiff complied and subsequently filed

an application to be appointed guardian of the minor child’s estate. The

Probate Court granted that application but, thereafter, declined to allow

the plaintiff to use the funds in the account to pay for certain of the

minor child’s expenses, concluding that that the plaintiff had a commonlaw duty to use her own resources for the minor child’s support. The

plaintiff then filed a motion to dismiss the guardianship proceedings,

claiming a lack of jurisdiction, which the Probate Court denied. The

plaintiff appealed from that decision to the trial court, which concluded

that the Probate Court had jurisdiction to appoint a guardian because

the plaintiff’s election to receive compensation fund money directly as

a representative payee did not exempt that money from the statutory

protections afforded to the property of minors. The trial court rendered

judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s probate appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court. That court concluded that the award

was a substitute for a wrongful death claim and, therefore, constituted

part of the husband’s estate. The Appellate Court reasoned that, because

the husband died intestate while he was domiciled in Norwalk, the court

of probate in that district had jurisdiction to appoint a guardian ad litem

to protect the minor child’s interests in the husband’s estate. The court

further concluded that the Probate Court had jurisdiction pursuant to

the statute (§ 45a-629) governing the use of property to which a minor

child is entitled. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial

court’s judgment, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certification,

appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court improperly upheld

the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s probate appeal, this court

having concluded that the Probate Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to appoint a guardian of the minor child’s estate: an examination

of the compensation fund’s history and purpose indicated that, to balance the need to provide flexibility to custodians and to preserve legal

protections for minors, the special master had permitted payments to

guardians, trustees, and representative payees, and that, although individuals electing to receive awards as representative payees were contractually obligated to follow the conditions imposed by the compensation

fund, such awards were paid in express contemplation of the absence

of state probate court supervision; moreover, because the compensation

fund award paid to the plaintiff was neither part of the husband’s estate

nor the property of the minor child, the Probate Court lacked statutory

authority to exercise jurisdiction to monitor the plaintiff’s use of that

award or to prohibit such use without the Probate Court’s approval.

Argued September 17, 2018—officially released April 16, 2019

Procedural History

Appeal from the order of the Probate Court for the

district of Norwalk-Wilton denying the plaintiff’s appli-
cation to dismiss guardianship proceedings with

respect to her minor child, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, and

tried to the court, Hon. David R. Tobin, judge trial

referee; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which

the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, Sheldon,

Beach and Flynn, Js., which affirmed the trial court’s

judgment, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment

directed.

Michael P. Kaelin, with whom, on the brief, was

William N. Wright, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Opinion

ROBINSON, C. J. The dispositive issue in this certified appeal is whether the Probate Court has jurisdiction to approve or monitor use of a September 11th

Victim Compensation Fund (fund) award that had been

paid to a surviving spouse as a ‘‘representative payee’’

for the benefit of her minor child. The plaintiff, Carolyne

Y. Hynes, appeals, upon our grant of her petition for

certification,1

from the judgment of the Appellate Court

affirming the judgment of the trial court dismissing her

appeal from the decree of the Probate Court. Hynes v.

Jones, 175 Conn. App. 80, 82–85, 167 A.3d 375 (2017).

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Probate Court

lacks jurisdiction over a fund award paid to the plaintiff

as a ‘‘representative payee’’ because that award is neither (1) the property of the estate of her late husband,

the decedent Thomas Hynes, within the meaning of

General Statutes § 45a-98 (a),2 nor (2) the property of

their daughter, Olivia T. Hynes, within the meaning of

General Statutes § 45a-629 (a),3 which governs property

to which a minor child is ‘‘entitled,’’ or General Statutes

§ 45a-631 (a),4 which governs property ‘‘belonging to’’

a minor. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly,

reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following factual and procedural history informs

our review. The decedent was killed in the September

11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and

died intestate. The plaintiff and the decedent resided

in the city of Norwalk at the time of his death. On

March 28, 2002, the plaintiff gave birth to their daughter,

Olivia.5 On April 24, 2003, the plaintiff filed an application with the Probate Court seeking appointment as

the administrator of the decedent’s estate. The Probate

Court granted the application and appointed Attorney

Brock T. Dubin as guardian ad litem for the minor child.

After her appointment as administrator of the decedent’s estate, the plaintiff filed a claim for compensation

from the fund. By letter to the plaintiff, dated June 3,

2004, the fund’s special master, Kenneth R. Feinberg,6

authorized a total award of $2,425,321.70. Specifically,

the plaintiff was awarded $1,153,381.58 as a ‘‘[b]eneficiary,’’ and the minor child was awarded $1,271,940.12

as a ‘‘[b]eneficiary.’’ The award letter stated that the

plaintiff had elected to receive benefits directly on

behalf of the minor child as a ‘‘ ‘representative payee.’ ’’

The letter subsequently identified the plaintiff as the

‘‘payee’’ a second time, and stated that she was to be

paid $1,271,940.12 ‘‘on behalf of’’ the minor child. The

letter then elaborated on the representative payee’s

obligations as follows: ‘‘As you know, as a representative payee, you are obliged—like a trustee—to ensure

that funds are used in the [minor’s] best interest. You

assume full responsibility for ensuring that the [award]

paid to you as representative payee [is] used for the

[minor’s] current needs or, if not currently needed . . .
saved for his or her future needs. This includes a duty

to prudently invest funds, maintain separate accounts

for each minor, and maintain complete records. In addition, upon reaching [eighteen] years of age (or age of

majority as recognized by state law), the [minor is]

entitled to receive the award paid to you as representative payee. Thus, at such time, you must distribute the

award to the [minor] unless the [minor] otherwise willingly [consents].’’

On July 31, 2008, the Probate Court appointed the

defendant, Sharon M. Jones, as successor guardian ad

litem for the minor child in the estate administration

proceedings. Thereafter, the Probate Court insisted that

the minor child’s share of the benefits from the fund

be placed into a guardianship account. On June 9, 2010,

in compliance with the Probate Court’s wishes, the

plaintiff filed an application to be appointed guardian

of the minor child’s estate. The Probate Court granted

the application but thereafter refused to allow the plaintiff to utilize the funds held in the guardianship account

to pay for certain expenses. The plaintiff argued that

the expenses were principally for the benefit of the

minor child, but the Probate Court, reasoning that the

plaintiff had a common-law duty to support the minor

child as long as she possessed the resources to do so,

concluded that the minor child’s assets should not be

used for such expenses.

The plaintiff did not appeal from that decree of the

Probate Court. Instead, on August 21, 2013, she moved

to dismiss the guardianship proceedings, claiming a

lack of jurisdiction. On June 3, 2014, the Probate Court

denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. Specifically,

the Probate Court determined that it had subject matter

jurisdiction over the guardianship proceedings, reasoning that an award from the fund was a substitute for a

wrongful death claim and was, therefore, part of the

decedent’s estate.7

The plaintiff then appealed from the Probate Court

decree to the trial court. Pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-186 (a), the trial court heard the matter de

novo because no recording had been made of the Probate Court proceedings. The trial court subsequently

issued a memorandum of decision dismissing the probate appeal. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court

construed the text of § 45a-629 (a), along with other

relevant statutes, and determined, inter alia, that jurisdiction to appoint a guardian of the estate of a minor

child is conferred upon the Probate Court for the district

in which the minor resides at the time the minor first

becomes entitled to property. The trial court concluded

that the plaintiff’s election to have the fund make payment to the plaintiff directly as representative payee

did not exempt the award from the statutory protections afforded to the property of minors. Accordingly,

the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plain-
tiff’s probate appeal.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial

court to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court

agreed with the Probate Court that an award from the

fund was a substitute for a wrongful death claim and

consequently was part of the decedent’s estate. Hynes

v. Jones, supra, 175 Conn. App. 92. The Appellate Court

reasoned that, because the decedent died while domiciled in Norwalk, the court of probate in that district

had jurisdiction to appoint a guardian ad litem to protect

the minor child’s interests in the decedent’s estate. Id.

The Appellate Court also concluded that the Probate

Court had jurisdiction because the minor child became

entitled to property within the meaning of § 45a-629 (a)

while she was domiciled in that probate district. Id.

Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment

of the trial court. Id., 105. This certified appeal followed.8 See footnote 1 of this opinion.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff argues that an

award from the fund, when paid directly to a surviving

spouse as a ‘‘representative payee’’ in exchange for that

spouse’s agreement to use the award to pay for the

child’s current needs, is not subject to the jurisdiction

of the Probate Court. The plaintiff claims that the fund

award was paid to her as a representative payee for

her minor child, not as a representative of her husband’s

estate, and that the fund never intended that awards

paid to representative payees would be subject to the

jurisdiction of the various states’ probate courts. The

plaintiff asserts that § 45a-629 (a) only authorizes the

appointment of a guardian for a minor ‘‘when a minor

is entitled to property,’’ and that the minor child was

not entitled to property because the fund award was

paid directly to the plaintiff. The plaintiff argues that,

under § 45a-98, the Probate Court’s jurisdiction is limited to property that comprises, or may comprise, part

of a decedent’s estate, and that the fund award is not

part of the decedent’s estate. The plaintiff also claims

that § 45a-631 (a), which requires that a parent not

receive or use any property belonging to the minor child

in an amount more than ten thousand dollars without

first being appointed guardian of the minor’s estate, is

inapplicable given that the fund award did not constitute property belonging to the minor child.

We agree with the plaintiff that the Probate Court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to appoint a guardian

of the minor child’s estate. Specifically, we first conclude that a fund award paid to the plaintiff as a ‘‘representative payee’’ did not constitute a part of the

decedent’s estate. We further conclude that the award

does not constitute property to which the minor child

is ‘‘entitled’’ under § 45a-629 (a), and does not constitute

property ‘‘belonging’’ to the minor child under § 45a631 (a).

Courts of probate ‘‘are statutory tribunals that have
no common-law jurisdiction. . . . Accordingly, [these

courts] can exercise only such powers as are conferred

on them by statute. . . . They have jurisdiction only

when the facts exist on which the legislature has conditioned the exercise of their power. . . . [A] court [that]

exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is without

jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise

circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Connery v. Gieske, 323 Conn. 377, 388,

147 A.3d 94 (2016). The question in this case is whether

any existing statute grants the Probate Court authority

to exercise jurisdiction over the fund award paid to the

plaintiff in her capacity as representative payee for her

minor child. Thus, whether the Probate Court has jurisdiction over the fund award presents a question of statutory interpretation, which is an issue of law over which

our review is plenary. See, e.g., In re Henrry P. B.-P.,

327 Conn. 312, 324, 173 A.3d 928 (2017).

‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent

of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to

determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the

statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,

including the question of whether the language actually

does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,

General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the

text of the statute itself and its relationship to other

statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and

unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable

results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the

statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is

not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative

policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles

governing the same general subject matter . . . . The

test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when

read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 324–25.

In order for the Probate Court to exercise jurisdiction

over a fund award, there must be a legislative grant of

authority for such jurisdiction. There are a number of

possible sources of jurisdiction that could apply in the

present case, independently or in combination. When

an individual dies intestate, General Statutes § 45a-303

(a) (1)9 authorizes probate courts to grant letters of

administration. Section 45a-9810 authorizes probate

courts to determine title or rights of possession and

use for property that constitutes part of a decedent’s

estate. General Statutes § 45a-438 (a)11 provides that,

after distribution to the surviving spouse, the residue of

the real and personal estate shall be distributed equally
among a decedent’s children. Additionally, General Statutes § 45a-437 (a)12 provides that a surviving spouse

shall take the first $100,000 plus one half of an intestate

estate. Therefore, if the fund award at issue in the present case is considered to be property of the decedent’s

estate, these statutes support the Probate Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the award as part of that court’s

supervision of the administration and distribution of

the decedent’s estate.

Alternatively, § 45a-629 (a) provides that when a

minor is entitled to property, the probate court for the

district in which the minor resides may assign a time

and place for a hearing on the appointment of a guardian

of the minor’s estate. See footnote 3 of this opinion.

Likewise, § 45a-631 (a) requires a parent to be appointed

guardian over the estate of his or her child before receiving or using any property belonging to that minor in

an amount exceeding $10,000. See footnote 4 of this

opinion. Therefore, if the fund award is considered to

be property to which the minor child was entitled, or

property that belonged to her, a statute would support

the Probate Court’s appointment of a guardian for the

minor child’s estate and its exercise of jurisdiction over

the award as property of the plaintiff’s minor child.

Our analysis hinges on whether the fund award, paid

to the plaintiff as a ‘‘representative payee’’ for the benefit of the minor child, was part of the decedent’s estate,

or property of the decedent or the minor child, within

the meaning of these statutes. In order to make such

a determination, we consider the purpose of the fund.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,

Congress created the fund in connection with the Air

Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act

(Stabilization Act), Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230

(2001). The express purpose of the fund was ‘‘to provide

compensation to any individual (or relatives of a

deceased individual) who was physically injured or

killed as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes

of September 11, 2001.’’ Stabilization Act § 403, 115 Stat.

237. A special master was appointed by the United

States Attorney General to administer the fund, promulgate ‘‘procedural and substantive rules,’’ and determine

eligibility for compensation from the fund. Stabilization

Act §§ 404 (a), 405 (b) (1) (A), 115 Stat. 238. Congress

specified that the following individuals were eligible

for compensation from the fund: (1) those present at

the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, or the site of

the aircraft crash in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at the

time, or in the immediate aftermath, of the terrorist

related aircraft crashes on September 11, 2001, who

suffered physical harm or death as a result of those

crashes; (2) passengers and crew members on the four

aircraft involved; and (3) ‘‘in the case of a decedent who

is an individual described in [one of the two preceding

categories], the personal representative of the decedent
who files a claim on behalf of the decedent.’’ Stabilization Act § 405 (c) (2), 115 Stat. 239. Congress further

required that the United States Attorney General, in

consultation with the special master, promulgate regulations concerning implementation of the fund within

ninety days of enactment. Stabilization Act § 407, 115

Stat. 240. The United States Department of Justice and

the special master solicited public comments and made

efforts to garner the views of interested parties.13

Interim final regulations providing information about

the determination of losses under the Stabilization Act

and the procedures for submitting claims were issued

on December 21, 2001. Final regulations were issued

on March 13, 2002, after the Department of Justice and

special master had reviewed 2687 timely comments

made by the public. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.1 et seq. (2002);

1 K. Feinberg et al., Final Report of the Special Master

for the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of

2001 (2004) p. 5 (final report).

These sources of federal law are unclear as to the

legal nature of fund awards. The situation at issue in

the present case is sui generis in our case law; a third

party, here the United States government, has made an

award directly to a parent as a representative payee

for her minor child and imposed fiduciary obligations

requiring the parent to use the award to provide for the

child’s current needs.14 We must, therefore, examine

more closely the manner in which the award was made

in order to determine its proper treatment under Connecticut law.

It is clear from the special master’s final report that

the fund had two principal intentions when it developed

a scheme for payment of awards to or on behalf of

minors. The fund wanted to provide flexibility to custodians and protection to minors. 1 K. Feinberg et al.,

supra, p. 56. The fund contemplated a number of different options for payment, including guardianship, trusts,

custodial accounts, representative payees, and periodic

payments through structured settlements. Id., p. 60. As

the special master explained, there were advantages

and disadvantages with each approach. For example,

in considering the guardianship approach, the special

master observed that, although becoming a guardian is

a relatively simple process in undisputed cases, ‘‘many

states impose significant limitations on the ability of the

guardian to access the minor’s funds. The fundamental

premise in these states is that it is the guardian’s duty

to protect the funds during the child’s minority, and,

therefore, the award is to be used only after a parent’s

obligation of support has been satisfied. In New York,

for example, in order to utilize funds a parent must

disclose his or her financial means and indicate why

access to the funds is necessary. The court then decides

whether to allow the expenditure.’’ (Footnote omitted.)

Id. The fund ultimately decided to allow guardianship

as one option, among several others, noting that it was
the ‘‘most protective option,’’ but declined to require

guardianship in all cases, concluding that such a restriction would ‘‘not promote the [p]rogram’s goal of providing funds to parents and custodians of minor children

for purposes of the child’s current as well as future

needs.’’ Id., 61. Thus, the fund made clear that it would

not mandate the most protective option at the expense

of flexibility in parents’ and custodians’ use of the funds

to meet minor children’s current needs. ‘‘Many parents

of minor beneficiaries, particularly those residing in

New York, argued that requiring a parent to be

appointed guardian of the property would be cumbersome and unnecessarily restrictive. These parents complained that they would be unable to provide adequately

for their children’s needs if they were required to submit

to the probate and surrogate’s courts requirements in

their jurisdiction. They asked the [f]und to provide an

alternative mechanism for payment to minors that

would be less onerous.’’ Id., p. 60.

The fund provided such an alternative by allowing

the option of appointing a parent as a representative

payee. ‘‘Under this option, a parent would apply to

the [f]und to serve as a representative payee. Upon

appointment by the [f]und, the representative payee

would hold the funds on behalf of the minor and would

have the fiduciary responsibility to ensure that the

award to the child was utilized for the child’s current

needs, and, if not currently needed, saved for the child’s

future needs.’’ Id., p. 61. This approach was at the opposite end of the spectrum from a guardianship; whereas

the guardianship approach was perhaps the most protective option, the representative payee approach was

arguably the least protective option. ‘‘The advantage of

this option was its flexibility and ease of administration.

The disadvantage was the lack of oversight and supervision of the representative payee by a third party.’’ Id.

After weighing the advantages and disadvantages of

these approaches, and others, the fund ultimately chose

to allow for payment (1) to parents and custodians

who choose to become appointed guardians and receive

awards in that capacity, (2) into a trust if the trust was

approved for that purpose by a court of competent

jurisdiction, and (3) to a custodial parent as a representative payee on behalf of a minor child if the parent

applied with the fund for such status.15 Id.

The plaintiff elected to be paid as a representative

payee on behalf of the minor child. The fund allowed

for this option, envisioning that the use of the award

would not be subject to oversight by state probate

courts. The imposition of fiduciary obligations on the

representative payee is best seen as an effort by the fund

(1) to ensure that a representative payee, not otherwise

subject to court supervision, agreed to be bound to

use the award in the manner expressly required by the

award letter, and (2) to provide access to a remedy in
the event that the representative payee violated that

agreement. The obligations imposed by the fund are not

imposed by statute, but by the fund itself.16 Therefore,

a minor child, an appointed guardian, or the special

master himself could bring an action sounding in contract against the representative payee, alleging, for

example, that the representative payee failed to perform

in the manner required by the award letter, which performance was promised in exchange for direct payment

of the award to the representative payee. Id., pp. 61–62.

Thus, the legal nature of the award is a payment directly

to the plaintiff that she is contractually bound to receive

and use consistent with the conditions imposed by

the fund.17

The Appellate Court concluded, however, in contrast

to our assessment of the legal nature of the fund award,

that the creation of the fund by the United States government was an alternative to the statutory right of action

under General Statutes § 52-555 for wrongful death,

and that the minor child ‘‘was entitled to share in the

proceeds of any wrongful death action arising out of

her father’s death, and her right could be asserted on

her behalf when she was born, whether that right was

a wrongful death action or a claim made to the fund

provided by Congress.’’ Hynes v. Jones, supra, 175

Conn. App. 100. The Appellate Court reasoned that the

minor child’s right under § 45a-437 to one half of the

intestate estate after the first $100,000 ‘‘included her

right to share proceeds of any wrongful death action

against an airline or that right’s statutory alternative,

namely, the federally sponsored victim compensation

fund.’’ Id., 99. We respectfully disagree with the Appellate Court’s characterization of the fund award as an

alternative to a wrongful death action. Although the

Stabilization Act, which created the fund, included a

statement of purpose emphasizing the provision of compensation, the appropriate legal characterization of that

compensation was left unclear. Indeed, the special master observed that the comments on the regulations

revealed conflicting views on the nature and purpose

of the Stabilization Act, including whether Congress

intended to create a reparation program or to provide

tort like compensation. 1 K. Feinberg et al., supra, p.

5. Thus, the regulations were promulgated with the

understanding, on the part of the Department of Justice

and the special master, that Congress created a compensation system that included some elements of tort compensation, but not all. Id., p. 6. In light of the sui generis

nature of the compensation system created by Congress

and implemented by the fund, we take the fund award

for what it is—a direct payment to the plaintiff that she

is contractually bound to receive and use consistent

with the conditions imposed by the fund—rather than

confer a legal status on the award incommensurate with

the sui generis nature of that system.

Because we conclude that the fund award was paid
directly to the plaintiff in express contemplation of the

absence of probate court supervision over her receipt

and use of the award, and was not the property of the

decedent or his estate, we further conclude that the

Probate Court lacked jurisdiction over the award as

part of its supervision of the administration of intestate

estates under §§ 45a-98, 45a-438 (a) and 45a-437 (a).

Similarly, we conclude that §§ 45a-629 (a) and 45a631 (a) do not afford the Probate Court jurisdiction to

prohibit the plaintiff from using the award in the

absence of that court’s approval. Section 45a-629 (a)

provides in relevant part: ‘‘When a minor is entitled to

property, the court of probate for the district in which

the minor resides may assign a time and place for a

hearing on the appointment of a guardian of the estate

of the minor. . . .’’ Section 45a-631 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A parent of a minor, guardian of the person

of a minor or spouse of a minor shall not receive or

use any property belonging to the minor in an amount

exceeding ten thousand dollars in value unless

appointed guardian of the estate of the minor . . . .’’ In

construing these statutes, the Appellate Court adopted

a broad definition of ‘‘property’’ and reasoned that, ‘‘[t]o

conclude that the [minor] has no property interest or

entitlement in and to this award, which merits statutory

protection for minors, is without any authority under

our law.’’ Hynes v. Jones, supra, 175 Conn. App. 97–98,

104. We respectfully disagree with the Appellate Court.

The salient question is whether the award constitutes

property to which the minor child is entitled or property

belonging to her within the meaning of §§ 45a-629 (a)

and 45a-631 (a), respectively. In considering these statutes, we do not write on a blank slate. See, e.g., Hummel

v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 282 Conn. 477, 501, 923 A.2d

657 (2007) (concluding legislature did not intend § 1-

2z to overrule case law decided prior to its enactment

construing statute in manner conflicting with plain

meaning rule). The Appellate Court’s adoption of an

extremely broad definition of property is in tension with

our previous conclusion that the meaning of property

within § 45a-631 is not without limits. Cf. Steinmann

v. Steinmann, 121 Conn. 498, 504–505, 186 A. 501 (1936)

(concluding that statutory predecessor to § 45a-631,

which provided ‘‘that the parent of a minor child shall

not receive or use any property belonging to such child

in an amount exceeding $100, unless appointed as

guardian of the estate of such minor,’’ did not invalidate

child support award because ‘‘[t]he amount of the award

is not the property of the minor child within the meaning

of this statute’’). Because we have previously determined that not all interests in property fall within the

meaning of property under § 45a-631, a closely related

statute to § 45a-629 (a), and because the fund paid the

award to the plaintiff in express contemplation of the

absence of probate court supervision of her receipt and

use of the award, we conclude that a fund award paid
directly to a representative payee for the benefit of her

minor child is not property to which the minor child is

entitled or property belonging to the minor child within

the meaning of §§ 45a-629 (a) and 45a-631 (a), respectively.

Mindful that ‘‘[a] court [that] exercises a limited and

statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act

unless it does so under the precise circumstances and

in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling

legislation’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Connery v. Gieske, supra, 323 Conn. 388; we conclude that

our state statutes did not grant the Probate Court jurisdiction to monitor the plaintiff’s use of the fund award

or to prohibit the plaintiff from using that award in the

absence of that court’s approval.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and

the case is remanded to that court with direction to

reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand

the case to that court with direction to render judgment

sustaining the plaintiff’s appeal.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited

to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that a

September 11th Victim Compensation Fund award, paid to a surviving spouse

as a representative payee for the benefit of her minor child, was subject to

the jurisdiction and control of Connecticut probate courts?’’ Hynes v. Jones,

327 Conn. 930, 171 A.3d 454 (2017).

2 General Statutes § 45a-98 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Probate Courts

in their respective districts shall have the power to (1) grant administration

of intestate estates of persons who have died domiciled in their districts

. . . (3) except as provided in section 45a-98a or as limited by an applicable

statute of limitations, determine title or rights of possession and use in and

to any real, tangible or intangible property that constitutes, or may constitute,

all or part of . . . any decedent’s estate, or any estate under control of a

guardian or conservator, which . . . estate is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court, including the rights and obligations of any

beneficiary of the . . . estate . . . .’’

Although § 45a-98 has been amended since the events underlying the

present case; see, e.g., Public Acts 2018, No. 18-45, § 16; those amendments

have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity,

we refer to the current revision of the statute.

3 General Statutes § 45a-629 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘When a minor

is entitled to property, the court of probate for the district in which the

minor resides may assign a time and place for a hearing on the appointment

of a guardian of the estate of the minor. . . .’’

4 General Statutes § 45a-631 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A parent of a

minor, guardian of the person of a minor or spouse of a minor shall not

receive or use any property belonging to the minor in an amount exceeding

ten thousand dollars in value unless appointed guardian of the estate of the

minor . . . .’’

5 For the sake of simplicity, we hereinafter refer to Olivia as the minor

child.

6 The United States Attorney General was required to appoint a special

master to promulgate regulations to implement the fund and to determine

claimants’ eligibility for compensation. See Air Transportation Safety and

System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 404 through 405, 115 Stat.

230, 237–38 (2001).

7 We note that the Probate Court also concluded that the relocation of

the plaintiff and the minor child from Norwalk to Weston in April, 2005,

did not divest it of jurisdiction. The Probate Court determined that it retained

jurisdiction over the decedent’s estate because he had been domiciled in

Norwalk at the time of his death, and the minor child’s award was part of

the estate of the decedent, her father.

8 We note that the defendant has neither filed a brief nor appeared for
oral argument in either the Appellate Court or in this court. See Hynes v.

Jones, supra, 175 Conn. App. 91. Consistent with orders from this court

dated February 7 and 23, 2018, rendered pursuant to Practice Book § 85-1,

we consider this appeal solely on the basis of the record as defined by

Practice Book § 60-4 and the plaintiff’s brief.

9 General Statutes § 45a-303 (a) (1) provides: ‘‘When any person domiciled

in this state dies intestate, the court of probate in the district in which the

deceased was domiciled at his death shall have jurisdiction to grant letters

of administration.’’

10 See footnote 2 of this opinion.

11 General Statutes § 45a-438 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘After distribution has been made of the intestate estate to the surviving spouse . . . the

residue of the real and personal estate shall be distributed equally, according

to its value at the time of distribution, among the children, including children

born after the death of the decedent . . . .’’

12 General Statutes § 45a-437 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘If there is no

will . . . the portion of the intestate estate of the decedent . . . which the

surviving spouse shall take is . . . (3) If there are surviving issue of the

decedent all of whom are also issue of the surviving spouse, the first one

hundred thousand dollars plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate

absolutely . . . .’’

13 According to the final report issued by the special master, ‘‘[t]he [s]pecial

[m]aster and attorneys working with the [s]pecial [m]aster met personally

with victims’ advocacy groups, individual members of the victims’ families,

lawyers, employers, government agencies, members of Congress, members

of the judiciary, associations, charities, representatives of the military, fire

and police departments, and individuals in state governments to solicit

views, concerns and comments about the nature of the [p]rogram and its

administration. In addition, the [s]pecial [m]aster and senior attorneys

reviewed the thousands of comments submitted to the Department [of Justice], researched theories of compensation and methodologies for the calculation of economic loss, as well as the various state laws governing wrongful

death actions, appointment of [p]ersonal [r]epresentatives and determination of state law beneficiaries.’’ 1 K. Feinberg et al., Final Report of the

Special Master for the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001

(2004) p. 4.

14 We acknowledge the representative payee terminology is not unique to

the fund. The Final Report of the Special Master for the September 11th

Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 acknowledged that the option to receive

funds as a representative payee was an approach that was utilized in other

federal programs, including the administration of social security benefits.

1 K. Feinberg et al., supra, pp. 61 and 94 n.182. At least one Connecticut

court has considered whether social security benefits paid to the representative payee of a dependent child are property of the child or the payee, and

has held that they are property of the child. See Miller v. Shapiro, 4 Conn.

Cir. 63, 225 A.2d 644 (1966). That case is clearly distinguishable, as it dealt

with the administration of benefits under a long-standing federal program.

In the present case, we are confronted by an altogether different benefit,

namely, a unique, onetime distribution of federal funds to provide an expedient method of compensation for victims of a notorious terrorist attack.

Accordingly, we conclude that Miller is inapposite.

15 ‘‘A final option of utilizing a structured settlement for minors became

available after the [f]und was notified of [a decision by the Internal Revenue

Service] regarding the election of a periodic payment option through a

structured settlement. Senior attorneys at the [f]und and at the Department

[of Justice] worked with the [Internal Revenue Service] and [the] Department

of [the] Treasury for well over a year in an effort to obtain a detailed

determination on the availability of the structured settlement option. In

order to [en]sure that the structure was entered into by an individual with

authority to bind the minor, the [f]und required that a parent or custodian

signing the structure documents be appointed guardian of the property

for the minor by a court of competent jurisdiction. For many parents or

custodians, such an appointment had to be made on an expedited basis to

allow timely approval of the structure. The various surrogate’s and probate

courts were able to respond quickly to the [f]und’s request to expedite these

applications for guardianship by granting such appointments for the limited

purpose of entering into a structured settlement agreement for the [f]und

award. The cooperation of these various courts was instrumental in making

the structured settlement option viable for minors.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) 1

K. Feinberg et al., supra, p. 62.
16 In addition to appearing in the award letter, the fiduciary obligations

were made apparent to and were agreed to by the plaintiff when she applied

to be a representative payee. ‘‘Applicants for the representative payee program were required to sign an acknowledgment that [they] could be held

liable if [they] did not prudently invest the funds, maintain separate accounts,

and maintain records, or if [they] misused or misappropriated the funds. In

addition, the applicant was required to acknowledge that the minor was

entitled to receive the award upon reaching [eighteen] years of age and

that, at such time, the award would be distributed to the minor unless the

minor otherwise consented.’’ 1 K. Feinberg et al., supra, pp. 61–62.

17 The plaintiff characterizes the payment of the fund award to a parent

as a representative payee of a minor child as analogous to leaving property

in trust for the benefit of a minor child. As we have previously explained,

we choose to take the award for what it is, a direct payment to the plaintiff

that she is contractually bound to receive and use consistent with the

conditions imposed by the fund. Therefore, consistent with our choice not

to adopt the Appellate Court’s analogy to wrongful death law, we decline

the plaintiff’s invitation to analogize to trust law.