GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Income Security and Family 

Support, Committee on Ways and 

Means, House of Representatives 

TEMPORARY 

ASSISTANCE FOR 

NEEDY FAMILIES 

Fewer Eligible Families 

Have Received Cash 

Assistance Since the 

1990s, and the Recession’s 

Impact on Caseloads 

Varies by State 

February 2010 

GAO-10-164 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

February 2010

TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY 

FAMILIES 

Fewer Eligible Families Have Received Cash 

Assistance Since the 1990s, and the Recession's

Impact on Caseloads Varies by State 

Highlights of GAO-10-164, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Income 

Security and Family Support, Committee 

on Ways and Means, House of 

Representatives 

Following sweeping changes made 

to federal welfare policy in 1996 

with the creation of the Temporary 

Assistance for Needy Families 

(TANF) program, the number of 

needy families who received cash 

assistance fell by more than half to 

1.7 million in 2008. Poverty among 

children also fell from about 21 

percent in 1995 to about 16 percent 

in 2000, rising again to 19 percent 

in 2008. The current recession 

deepened in 2008, raising questions 

about state TANF programs’ 

response to increased needs. GAO 

was asked to provide Congress 

with information on the (1) factors 

contributing to the decline in the 

number of families receiving 

assistance; (2) characteristics of 

participating and nonparticipating 

eligible families; (3) impact of

higher participation in TANF cash 

assistance on child poverty; and (4) 

changes states are experiencing in 

caseloads and spending in the 

current recession. GAO’s 

methodologies included using 

microsimulation analyses; 

reviewing relevant research and 

federal laws; interviewing TANF 

officials in 21 selected states; 

analyzing state cash assistance 

data; and interviewing researchers, 

federal officials, and other experts. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making 

recommendations in this report. In

its comments, the Department of 

Health and Human Services noted 

that the report was informativ

did not disagree with GAO’s 

findings. GAO also addressed 

The decline in the number of poor families receiving cash assistance from 

1995 to 2005 reflects declines in both the number of eligible families and in 

eligible families’ participation. The strong economy of the 1990s, TANF’s focus 

on work, and other factors contributed to increased family incomes and a 

decline in the number of eligible families. However, most of the caseload 

decline—about 87 percent—resulted from fewer eligible families participating 

in the program, perhaps in response to TANF work requirements, time limits, 

and sanction and diversion policies. 

Compared to TANF families, eligible nonparticipating families worked more 

and had higher incomes and educational levels. However, among eligible 

families who did not participate, 11 percent did not work, did not receive 

means-tested disability benefits, and had very low incomes. 

 

800,000 fewer children would live in extreme poverty—below half the federal 

poverty threshold—if participation increased from 40 percent to 84 percent of 

eligible families, the level it reached in 1995, the year before TANF was 

created. While TANF benefits would generally increase incomes, higher 

participation would not significantly change the number of children in poverty 

overall, partly because many children in poverty are not poor enough to be 

eligible for TANF and because TANF cash benefits are typically low. 

From June 2008 to June 2009, the number of families receiving TANF cash 

assistance rose in 12 of the 21 states GAO surveyed, although the recession’s 

impact on cash assistance caseloads varied by state. To offset higher costs of 

cash assistance, few states reported reducing TANF-related spending on 

family- and/or work-supports during this time period. Instead, states paid for 

increases by using funding sources such as 2009 emergency stimulus funds. 

Families Estimated as Eligible for and Participating in AFDC or TANF Cash Assistance 

Programs, Monthly Average, by Calendar Year, 1995 through 2005 

e and 

technical comments as appropriate. 

View GAO-10-164 or key components.

For more information, contact Kay E. Brown 

at (202) 512-7215 or BrownKE@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-10-164 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 5 

Factors Contributing to the Decline in Cash Recipients Include 

Declines in the Number of Eligible Families and in Eligible 

Families’ Participation 10 

Eligible Nonparticipating Families Generally Had Higher Incomes 

Than TANF Recipients, but a Portion of Eligible Nonparticipants 

Had Very Low Incomes 24 

Increased TANF Participation Would Reduce the Number of 

Children in Extreme Poverty, but Would Not Significantly 

Change the Number in Poverty 35 

In the Current Recession, Changes in Cash Assistance Caseloads 

Varied Widely in States We Surveyed While Few States Reduced 

Spending for Family and/or Work Supports 41 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 50 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 52 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Health and Human 

Services 60 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 63 

Related GAO Reports 64

Tables 

Table 1: Cash Assistance Caseload Changes and Unemployment 

Information in Selected States, June 2008 through June 

2009 46 

Table 2: Disposition of Spending for Family and/or Work Supports 

by States That Increased Spending on Cash Assistance, 

Selected States, June 2008 through June 2009 48 

TANF Cash Assistance 
Table 3: Sources of Funding Used by States to Offset Increased 

Spending on TANF-related Cash Assistance, June 2008 

through June 2009 49 

Figures 

Figure 1: Families Estimated as Eligible for and Participating in 

Cash Assistance through the AFDC or TANF Cash 

Assistance Programs, Monthly Average, by Calendar Year, 

1995 through 2005 16 

Figure 2: Estimated Impact of Monthly TANF Cash Assistance 

Receipt on the Net Income of a Working Parent Who 

Receives Other Supports 21 

Figure 3: TANF Cash Assistance: Estimates of Participating and 

Eligible Nonparticipating Families in 2005, Annual Basis 26 

Figure 4: Estimated Median Annual Incomes of TANF-Eligible 

Families in 2005 27 

Figure 5: Receipt of Other Public Supports among Estimated 

TANF-Eligible Families in 2005, Annual Basis 29 

Figure 6: Race and Ethnicity of Estimated TANF-Eligible Families 

in 2005, Annual Basis 30 

Figure 7: Family Structure of Estimated TANF-Eligible Families in 

2005, Annual Basis 31 

Figure 8: Estimated Eligible Nonparticipating Families as a Share 

of Total Eligible Families in 2005, Annual Basis 32 

Figure 9: Receipt of Other Public Supports among Estimated 

TANF-Eligible Families in 2005, by Eligible Family Type, 

Annual Basis 34 

Figure 10: Estimated Impact of Monthly TANF Cash Assistance 

Receipt on a Family in Extreme Poverty in Illinois in 2005: 

A Working Single Parent with One or Two Children 37 

Figure 11: Estimated Impact of Monthly TANF Cash Assistance 

Receipt on a Family in Poverty in Illinois in 2005: A 

Working Single Parent with One or Two Children 40 

Figure 12: Percent Change in the Number of Families Receiving 

TANF Cash Assistance, by State, June 2008 through June 

2009 42 

Figure 13: For States with a Solely State-Funded Program, Percent 

Change in the Number of Families Receiving Cash 

Assistance from TANF and from TANF and Solely StateFunded Programs Combined, June 2008 through June 

2009 45 

Page ii GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
Abbreviations 

ACF Administration for Children and Families 

AFDC Aid to Families with Dependent Children 

ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 

ASEC Annual Social and Economic Supplement 

BLS U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 

CCDF Child Care and Development Fund 

CPS Current Population Survey 

EITC Earned Income Tax Credit 

HHS Department of Health and Human Services 

MOE maintenance of effort 

PRWORA Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 

Reconciliation Act of 1996 

SNAP Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 

SSBG Social Services Block Grant 

SSDI Social Security Disability Insurance 

SSI Supplemental Security Income 

SSP separate state program 

TANF Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 

TRIM3 Transfer Income Model, version 3 

UI Unemployment Insurance 

WIC Special Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program for 

Women, Infants, and Children 

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Page iii GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
Page 1 GAO-10-164 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

February 23, 2010 

The Honorable Jim McDermott 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Income Security and Family Support 

Committee on Ways and Means 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Following sweeping changes made to federal welfare policy in 1996 with 

the creation of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 

program, the number of needy families receiving cash assistance fell 

significantly, from 4.8 million families on average each month in 1995—

just prior to the creation of TANF—to 1.7 million on average each month 

in 2008.1

 With the creation of TANF, welfare changed from a program 

entitling eligible families to monthly cash payments to a capped block 

grant that emphasized employment and work supports for most adult 

participants who receive such assistance. Since 1996, the decline in the 

number of families receiving cash assistance has been cited as evidence of 

welfare reform’s success in reducing families’ dependency on government 

benefits—a chief program goal. The extent of the decline, however, was 

deeper and faster—especially in the late 1990s—than analysts and others 

had anticipated, and the number of low-income families who were eligible 

for TANF cash assistance but who did not participate in the program 

increased. 

During this period, poverty among all children initially fell, from about 21 

percent in 1995 to about 16 percent in 2000—the lowest level since the late 

1970s, according to U.S. Census data. Poverty for all children then rose 

thereafter until it reached 19 percent in 2008. Most families receiving cash 

assistance are single mothers with children, and children in such families 

have historically experienced high rates of poverty. The recession that 

began in late 2007 deepened nationally in 2008, putting additional 

pressures on families living in poverty, especially families with children, 

who are particularly vulnerable. The growing recession also raised 

1

These data are from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for the average 

monthly caseload for families receiving cash assistance in calendar years 1995 and 2008. 

TANF Cash Assistance 
 

questions about how states, which provide cash assistance to families 

through TANF, would address any increases in need. 

In light of the decline in the number of low-income families who receive 

cash assistance, especially given the current recession, you asked us to 

examine what is known about the factors contributing to this decline and 

its implications. More specifically, you asked us to address the following 

questions: 

1. What factors have contributed to the decline in families receiving 

TANF cash assistance since the 1990s? 

2. Among eligible families, how do the characteristics of families who do 

not receive TANF cash assistance compare with families who do 

receive TANF cash assistance? 

3. How does the participation of eligible families in TANF affect the 

number of children in extreme poverty and poverty? 

4. In the current recession, what changes are states experiencing in their 

cash assistance caseloads and what changes, if any, have states made 

in their TANF–related spending to date to respond to any increases? 

To determine which factors contributed to the decline in caseload, we 

conducted a literature review of relevant research; interviewed TANF 

experts, as well as officials at the Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS); reviewed TANF caseload and other data; and reviewed 

relevant federal laws and regulations. In conducting our literature review, 

we searched various databases for peer-reviewed journals and other 

publications; obtained recommendations from TANF researchers and 

policy experts, including HHS officials; and reviewed policy and research 

organization Web sites for relevant studies. We cited studies that at least 

two social scientists had reviewed and assessed for the adequacy of their 

methodologies. We also contracted with the Urban Institute to conduct 

analyses—using the Transfer Income Model, version 3, known as TRIM3—

of changes in families’ TANF eligibility and receipt of TANF cash 

Page 2 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

assistance.2 These analyses helped us estimate the extent to which 

changes in eligibility rules under TANF affected the number of families 

eligible for cash assistance after welfare reform.3

 For this analysis, we 

applied TANF eligibility rules for 2005, including rules established by 

states,4

 to all families in 1995, which was the year prior to welfare reform 

under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 

Act of 1996 (PRWORA).5

 We also contacted state-based social service and 

other organizations in selected states regarding state TANF practices and 

policies that could affect a family’s decision to participate in the program.6

To determine how TANF cash recipients compare to eligible nonrecipients 

and to estimate the impact of TANF cash assistance on child poverty and 

extreme poverty, we requested additional analyses using TRIM3. For our 

analysis of the characteristics of cash recipients and eligible nonrecipients, 

we used 2005 data, the most recent publicly available TRIM3 data when we 

conducted our work. In comparing the characteristics of cash recipients 

and eligible nonrecipients, differences are statistically significant at the 95 

percent confidence level unless otherwise noted. For our analysis of the 

 

2

TRIM3 is maintained and developed at the Urban Institute under primary funding from 

HHS, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. Using TRIM3 for these 

analyses required our input on assumptions and/or interpretations about economic 

behavior and the rules governing federal programs. Therefore, the conclusions presented in 

this report are attributable only to GAO. 

3

Throughout this report, welfare reform refers to the creation of TANF through the 

enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 

(PRWORA). 

4

GAO did not conduct a legal analysis of state laws or requirements for state cash 

assistance programs. The TRIM3 model uses the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population 

Survey (CPS) and the Welfare Rules Database (maintained at the Urban Institute under 

HHS funding) to simulate eligibility based on state-specific program rules and information 

on income and other eligibility criteria. The Welfare Rules Database provides a longitudinal 

account of the changes in welfare rules in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. 

5

Pub. L. No. 104-193 (1996). Although the total cash assistance caseload peaked in 1994 at 

5.03 million families (average monthly numbers for calendar year 1994), we chose 1995 as a 

comparison year partly because it was the year before welfare reform. For a more detailed 

explanation of why 1995 was chosen as a comparison year, as well as further details about 

other aspects of our methodology in this report, see appendix I. 

6

To identify state-level organizations that could provide the perspective of families on 

applying for and receiving TANF cash assistance, we requested the names and contact 

information from TANF officials that we interviewed in 21 states. For more information on 

our objectives, scope, and methodology, see appendix I. (For information on how we 

selected states for telephone interviews of TANF administrators, see the description of our 

methodology for obtaining information on state caseload changes in the current recession.) 

Page 3 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

impact of higher rates of TANF cash assistance on child poverty and 

extreme poverty, we compared data from 2005 to data from 1995, the year 

prior to welfare reform. To determine how the number of families 

receiving cash assistance changed and how states have changed their use 

of block grant funds in response to the most recent recession, we 

conducted semi-structured telephone interviews with TANF officials in 21 

states and obtained the most recent data available on their cash assistance 

caseloads. In analyzing caseload changes, we included families receiving 

cash assistance through both federally funded TANF block grants as well 

as through separate state programs (SSP), which use state funds that 

count towards qualifying for the federal TANF block grant and which are 

subject to certain federal TANF requirements. In addition, we obtained 

data on cash assistance caseloads that states funded through newer 

programs funded only by states—known as “solely state-funded 

programs”—which are not subject to federal work requirements or federal 

reporting. The 21 states we selected had a range of child poverty rates, 

unemployment rates, cash assistance caseloads, approaches to sanctions 

and monthly earnings limits, and geographic diversity. Collectively these 

states represent more than half the families receiving TANF cash 

assistance nationally. Our analysis focused on the period between June 

2008—6 months after the official start of the current recession—and June 

2009. We assessed the data we received from TRIM3 and from state 

agencies for data reliability. On the basis of these assessments, we 

concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our 

report. We also provided our draft report to three external reviewers who 

have conducted research and published on welfare reform issues and 

whose work reflects a variety of approaches to this work. We incorporated 

their comments as appropriate. 

We conducted our work from November 2008 to February 2010 in 

accordance with all sections of GAO’s Quality Assurance Framework that 

are relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan and 

perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to 

meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work. We 

believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis 

conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions in 

this product. 

Page 4 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Background 

TANF Goals, Structure, 

and Requirements 

The TANF program represented a significant departure from Aid to 

Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the federal welfare program it 

replaced—in program goals, funding structure, and program requirements. 

Under the TANF block grant program, created by PRWORA and 

reauthorized in 2006,7

 states receive federal funds to design and operate 

their own welfare programs within federal guidelines. In addition to 

providing cash benefits to eligible families, as AFDC did, the TANF 

program, instead, focuses on, among other things, ending the dependence 

of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, 

work, and marriage. HHS administers the TANF program, which provides 

states with up to about $16.5 billion each year in TANF block grant funds. 

To qualify to receive its portion of the available TANF funds, each state 

must contribute a specified level of its own funds, which is referred to as 

the state’s maintenance of effort (MOE).8

 In addition to providing cash 

assistance, states may use these TANF and MOE funds to finance a wide 

range of benefits, services, activities, or programs, such as child care and 

other activities that further TANF program goals. 

In addition to the new goals and funding structure of the TANF program, 

PRWORA established more stringent work requirements; credits to states 

for reducing caseloads; time limits; and restrictions on immigrant receipt 

of assistance.9

 The act also established that eligible families were no 

longer entitled to receive cash assistance from states, as they had been 

under AFDC. States must involve a minimum percentage of their adult 

TANF and MOE cash assistance recipients in work activities for a required 

 

7

Pub. L. No. 109-171 (2006). 

8

The state’s MOE amount is based on a percentage of expenditures made by the state in 

fiscal year 1994 on some of TANF’s predecessor programs. 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(7). 

9

For work requirements, see 42 U.S.C. § 607. For time limits, see 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7). For 

restrictions on immigrant receipt of assistance, see Pub. L. No. 104-193, Title IV (1996). 

Page 5 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

number of hours each week.10 Under PRWORA, states are allowed to 

reduce their required work participation rates by earning credit for 

reducing their cash assistance caseloads.11 All states have received such 

caseload reduction credits, thereby reducing the work participation rate 

they must meet. The caseload reduction credit also introduced an 

incentive for states to contain or reduce the number of families receiving 

cash assistance, since states that fail to meet the target work participation 

rates face financial penalties. To emphasize the temporary nature of 

assistance, states must restrict most families to a lifetime limit of 60 

months of federally funded TANF cash assistance, although states can 

implement shorter time limits.12 A few states have chosen to terminate 

benefits only for the adults in the family unit; otherwise benefits are 

terminated for the entire family after the lifetime limit expires, although 

some states may continue serving families using state funds. PRWORA 

also limited the eligibility of immigrants for means-tested benefits—

including TANF—to those who have been in the country legally for 5 

years.13 While federal law generally limits TANF cash welfare to low-

 

1042 U.S.C. § 607. For a state to meet its work participation rate, 50 percent of all families—

minus its caseload reduction credit—must participate in a work activity for an average of 

30 or more hours per week. Similarly, 90 percent of two-parent families must participate in 

a work activity for a minimum of 35 hours per week in order for a state to meet its work 

participation rate. States may exempt adults and minors from work requirements for 

reasons such as having a child under the age of 1 year. Families without adult recipients—

known as child-only cases—are also sometimes exempt from work requirements and time 

limits. Nationally, in fiscal year 2006, about 47 percent of TANF households were “childonly” cases, such as those in which the parent is an ineligible noncitizen, or is disabled and 

receiving disability insurance. 

11To receive credit, caseload reductions must be for reasons other than a state changing its 

eligibility requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(3)(B). In addition, during TANF reauthorization 

in 2006, the base year for calculating the caseload reduction credit was changed from fiscal 

year 1995 to fiscal year 2005. Since the caseload was lower in all states in 2005 than in 1995, 

the credit received was also smaller. As a result, since TANF reauthorization, states have 

likely had to meet a higher work participation rate than required in previous years. 

12States can exempt recipients from the 60-month limit on federally funded TANF 

assistance in cases that involve hardship or domestic violence. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(C). It 

is up to each state to define hardship, and states can extend this exemption to no more 

than 20 percent of their TANF caseload. 

13Means-tested programs are restricted to families or individuals who meet specified 

financial requirements and certain other eligibility criteria established for each program. 

Nonfinancial requirements may restrict eligibility to specified categories of beneficiaries, 

such as pregnant women, children, or individuals with disabilities. TANF, Medicaid, and the 

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) are examples of means-tested 

programs. 

Page 6 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

income families with either a child under the age of 18 (or under the age of 

19 if the child is in school) or a pregnant woman, states set their own 

eligibility limits and benefit levels for cash recipients. 

In designing and implementing their TANF programs, states focused more 

than ever before on helping welfare recipients and other low-income 

parents find jobs. Many states implemented work-focused programs that 

stressed moving parents quickly into jobs and structured the benefits to 

allow more parents to combine welfare and work. States use TANF and 

MOE funds to provide child care subsidies, education and training, and 

other services, for TANF cash recipients as well as other low-income 

families. In addition, TANF funds are also transferred to the Child Care 

and Development Fund (CCDF) to help fund subsidized child care and to 

the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) program to help fund child 

welfare agencies. According to 2006 figures, TANF spending on support 

services and transfers exceeded spending on cash assistance. In fiscal year 

2006, states spent approximately $10 billion on cash assistance and $11 

billion on support services and transfers.14

States also imposed financial consequences, or sanctions, on families that 

did not comply with TANF work or other requirements as well as 

implemented strategies to divert families from cash assistance. States have 

implemented partial sanctions, in which benefits are reduced, and fullfamily sanctions, in which benefits are ended for the entire family for a 

period of time or until compliance if an adult failed to meet TANF program 

requirements. Often states increase the severity of the sanction based on 

the number of times or the amount of time the individual is noncompliant. 

As of July 2008, nearly all states had policies ending cash benefits for the 

whole family or closing cases as their most severe sanction for an adult’s 

noncompliance with work requirements.15 Many states have also 

implemented programs or strategies intended to divert families from cash 

assistance. One diversion strategy was to provide one-time, non-recurring 

benefits instead of monthly TANF cash assistance to families who face 

temporary hardships. Families who receive certain non-recurring shortterm benefits are not required to participate in federally mandated work 

 

14Figures include federal TANF and state MOE spending. 

15Gretchen Rowe and Mary Murphy, The Urban Institute, Welfare Rules Databook: State 

TANF Policies as of July 2008 (Washington, D.C.: August 2009). 

Page 7 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

activities, and their receipt of these benefits does not count towards the 

family’s 60-month lifetime limit. 

Cash assistance may be funded by the TANF block grant, MOE funds, or 

state-only funds, and the source of the money determines which TANF 

requirements apply to the recipient. With certain exceptions, recipients of 

cash assistance funded by the TANF block grant are subject to work 

participation requirements, the 60-month lifetime limit on receipt of cash 

assistance, and immigration restrictions. Some states provide cash 

assistance through SSP programs using MOE funds. Recipients of cash 

assistance funded through SSPs are subject to TANF work participation 

requirements, but not the time limits or immigrant restrictions. SSP 

recipients began to be counted in the calculation of the TANF work 

participation rate beginning in fiscal year 2007 as a result of TANF 

reauthorization. In response to the changes made in reauthorization, some 

states chose to provide cash assistance funded with the state’s own funds 

that are not counted towards the MOE requirement. Recipients of 

assistance from these solely state-funded programs are not subject to 

TANF requirements. 

TANF and Recessions To help states in the event of an economic downturn, PRWORA created a 

TANF contingency fund of up to $2 billion. To qualify for access to the 

contingency fund, states must meet a test of economic need. In addition, 

states may draw upon unused portions of their own federal TANF grants 

from previous years—often referred to as carry-over or reserve funds. 

Most recently, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 

(ARRA) made an additional $5 billion available to states for fiscal years 

2009 and 2010 through a new Emergency Contingency Fund.16 This fund 

reimburses states for 80 percent of their increased expenditures for cash 

assistance, provided there is also an increase in caseload; non-recurrent 

short term benefits; or subsidized employment in a quarter in fiscal year 

2009 or fiscal year 2010, as compared with the comparable quarter in fiscal 

year 2007 or fiscal year 2008. 

Poverty Measurement in 

the United States 

Poverty is measured in the United States using the federal poverty 

threshold, which is calculated annually by the U.S. Census Bureau. The 

 

16Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 2101 (2009). 

Page 8 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

threshold reflects estimates of the amount of money individuals and 

families of various sizes need to purchase goods and services deemed 

minimally adequate based on 1960s living standards, and is adjusted each 

year using the consumer price index. Persons or families having income 

below this amount are, for statistical purposes, considered to be living in 

poverty. The poverty threshold varies by family size and composition but 

does not vary by geographic location. Extreme or deep poverty is defined 

as income below 50 percent of the federal poverty threshold for a given 

family. For example, for a single parent with two children the poverty 

threshold in 2008 was $17,346; for that family type, the extreme poverty 

threshold was $8,673. Over the years, the official Census measure of 

poverty has been criticized for, among other things, not fully capturing the 

value of public supports and benefits, such as SNAP or the Earned Income 

Tax Credit (EITC), and for not considering health care and work-related 

costs.17 In 1995, a National Academy of Sciences panel recommended that 

changes be made to the threshold to count noncash benefits, tax credits, 

and taxes; deduct certain expenses from income such as child care and 

transportation; and adjust income levels according to an area’s cost of 

living. In recent years, such noncash benefits and supports have 

comprised larger portions of the assistance package for families with low 

incomes.18 In response to these issues, several pieces of legislation have 

been proposed to update the federal poverty measure, although none has 

been passed as of the date of this report. 

Poverty in the United States is also measured through the poverty 

guidelines, which are published annually by HHS and are used by some 

federal programs in determining the income eligibility of individuals and 

families for need-based assistance.19 The poverty guidelines are a 

simplified version of the Census poverty thresholds. Although the 

guidelines reflect variations in family size, the poverty guidelines—unlike 

the thresholds—do not reflect variations in the age group of the family 

 

17The estimates presented in this report are based on the official federal measure of 

poverty. 

18GAO, Poverty in America: Economic Research Shows Adverse Impacts on Health Status 

and Other Social Conditions as well as the Economic Growth Rate, GAO-07-344

(Washington, D.C.: January 2007). 

19HHS updates the poverty guidelines at least annually as required by 42 U.S.C. § 9902(2) 

and publishes the guidelines in the Federal Register. See, e.g., 74 Fed. Reg. 4199 (Jan.23, 

2009). 

Page 9 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

members. Alaska and Hawaii have higher federal poverty guidelines than 

the rest of the country. 

Since the 1990s, the decline in the number of families receiving cash 

assistance reflects declines not only in the number of eligible families but 

also in eligible families’ participation in the program in response to TANF 

policies.20 From 1995 to 2005, the number of families who were eligible for 

cash assistance fell from about 5.69 million families on average each 

month under AFDC to about 5.27 million families eligible on average each 

month under TANF—a decline of about 420,000 families eligible for cash 

assistance overall, according to our TRIM3 analysis.21 Factors that 

contributed to the decline in the number of families eligible for TANF cash 

assistance include families’ higher incomes, which reflect TANF’s focus on 

work and the strong economy of the 1990s, and changes to eligibility rules. 

However, a much larger portion of the caseload decline from 1995 to 2005 

reflects sharp declines in eligible families’ participation in the program. 

Research suggests that changes in participation resulted from, among 

other things, the dynamics of family decision-making in response to TANF 

policies, including mandatory work activities, state diversion strategies, 

time limits, and sanctions for non-compliance with work and other 

program requirements. 

Factors Contributing 

to the Decline in Cash 

Recipients Include 

Declines in the 

Number of Eligible 

Families and in 

Eligible Families’ 

Participation 

 

20This discussion focuses on cash assistance programs under TANF and not on services and 

other supports for low-income families that are also funded through TANF funds. As we 

noted in 2002 testimony, TANF caseload data do not provide a complete picture of the 

number of families receiving benefits and services through TANF. GAO, Welfare Reform: 

States Provide TANF-Funded Work Support Services to Many Low-Income Families Who 

Do Not Receive Cash Assistance, GAO-02-615T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2002). 

21These are average monthly estimates from HHS’s Indicators of Welfare Dependence: 

Annual Report to Congress for 2008 (Washington, D.C.: 2008), based on analyses using the 

TRIM3 microsimulation model. 

Page 10 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

The requirement to engage in work activities in order to receive TANF 

cash benefits changed the culture of cash assistance, leading more lowincome families towards employment and raising their earned incomes. 

During this period of declining caseloads, labor force participation 

increased among single mothers, the population most affected by TANF. 

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the labor-force 

participation of single mothers with children rose from 58 percent in 1995–

the year prior to the creation of TANF—to 71 percent in 2007, with most of 

this increase occurring immediately following the passage of PRWORA. In 

addition, as we noted in a 2005 report, most of the parents who left cash 

welfare found employment, and some families who left cash welfare were 

better off than they were on welfare.22 However, our report also found that 

earnings were typically low, and many families who left cash welfare 

worked in unstable, low-wage jobs with few benefits and advancement 

opportunities. A more recent study found that, in general, former TANF 

recipients in three cities, especially those who had left TANF prior to 2001, 

had higher employment rates and average income levels than they had 

while they were receiving TANF benefits. Although former recipients 

experienced some declines in their employment rates and income levels 

after 2001, both measures were nevertheless at the same level or higher in 

2005 than in 1999.23

Higher Employment Rates 

and Earnings Reduced the 

Number of Families 

Eligible for Cash 

Assistance More than 

Changes in Eligibility 

Rules 

Wage increases—due in part to increases in the minimum wage in 1996 

and 1997 as well as the 1990s expansions in the Earned Income Tax Credit 

(EITC)—contributed to the decline in the number of families who were 

eligible for TANF cash assistance. Wages for low-wage workers increased 

from 1994 to 2000. During these 6 years, the 10th percentile of the hourly 

wage rate distribution rose 12.4 percent, in contrast to declines in previous 

years, while the middle—the 50th percentile—rose about 9 percent, based 

on numbers in a study by the Congressional Budget Office.24 Expansions in 

the EITC for low-income working families in effect provide a subsidy that 

increases the incentive to work. A number of studies found that the EITC 

 

22GAO, Welfare Reform: More Information Needed to Assess Promising Strategies to 

Increase Parents’ Incomes, GAO-06-108 (Washington, D.C.: December 2005). 

23Bianca Frogner, Robert Moffitt, and David Ribar, Income, Employment, and Welfare 

Receipt After Welfare Reform: 1999-2005 Evidence from the Three-City Study, Johns 

Hopkins University, Working Paper 09-02 (May 2009). 

24Congressional Budget Office, Changes in Low-Wage Labor Markets Between 1979 and 

2005 (Washington, D.C.: December 2006). 

Page 11 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

increased labor-force participation among single women.25 According to 

one study, as well as experts we interviewed, the EITC also played an 

important role in the decline in the TANF caseload,26 because higher 

incomes made families ineligible. 

The strong economy of the late 1990s facilitated the movement towards 

work by creating jobs and reducing unemployment, thereby reducing the 

need for cash assistance.27 The annual U.S. unemployment rate for 

workers ages 16 and over declined from 5.6 percent in 1995—before TA

was created—to 4.0 percent in 2000, according to BLS data. In the same 

period from 1995 to 2000, the annual unemployment rate for single women 

with children fell from 16.6 percent in 1995, to 11.0 percent in 2000, 

according to BLS data. Starting in 2001, the unemployment rate for singl

women rose for several years, reaching 15.1 percent in 2005. During this 

time, the number of TANF-eligible families increased, while the 

participation rate remained stable or fell. Researchers do not agree on the 

extent to which a strong economy relative to TANF work requirements 

and other changes affected TANF eligibility. Nevertheless several studies 

as well as experts we interviewed agreed that the strong economy played a

major role in the decline, making it easier for single mothers and oth

NF 

e 

ers to 

find jobs. 

themselves—accounted for a small portion of the caseload decline. Using 

 

Changes to welfare eligibility rules that occurred under PRWORA, such as

time limits for receiving cash assistance and restrictions on eligibility for 

legal immigrants, also contributed to the decline in families’ eligibility for 

cash assistance. However, we found that these kinds of rules changes—by 

25See Rebecca M. Blank, “Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States,” Journal of 

Economic Literature (December 2002). 

26Jeffrey Grogger, “The Effects of Time Limits, the EITC, and Other Policy Changes on 

Welfare Use, Work, and Income Among Female-Headed Families,” The Review of 

Economics and Statistics (May 2003). 

27GAO, Welfare Reform: Better Information Needed to Understand Trends in States’ Uses of 

the TANF Block Grant, GAO-06-414 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006) and GAO, Welfare 

Reform: More Information Needed to Assess Promising Strategies to Increase Parents’ 

Incomes, GAO-06-108 (Washington, D.C.: December 2005). 

Page 12 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

the TRIM3 microsimulation model, we applied certain 2005 TANF rules to 

the families estimated as eligible for cash assistance in 1995 under AFDC.28

According to our TRIM3 analysis, had 2005 TANF eligibility-related rules 

on time limits and immigrant restrictions been in place in 1995, 1.6 percent 

fewer families overall would have been eligible for cash assistance in 

1995.29 We obtained similar results when we applied a more 

comprehensive range of eligibility-related rules to the 1995 population. 

This more comprehensive analysis included—in addition to rules on time 

limits and immigrant restrictions—rules for two-parent families and teen 

parents; caps on benefits if a family’s size increases; and financial 

eligibility rules.30 These rules varied in their impact on eligibility. Some 

rules contributed to increases in the number of families who would have 

been eligible, while other rules contributed to reductions in eligible 

 

28TRIM3 does not model certain aspects of program eligibility, such as sanctions from a 

family’s failure to comply with work rules or child support rules. It also does not model 

state diversion strategies such as the use of one-time, non-recurring benefits, or families’ 

behavioral responses to TANF program rules, such as staying off TANF to conserve 

eligibility for time-limited assistance. 

29These estimates are based on analyses conducted for our study by the Urban Institute, 

using the TRIM3 microsimulation model; they reflect averaged monthly estimates by 

calendar year. For this TRIM3 analysis, to apply rules on time limits and immigrant 

restrictions from PRWORA on the 1995 data, we assumed that the rules were actually 

changed 10 years prior to the timing of the actual legislation–in August 1986—so that the 

analysis would be able to identify families who would be affected by federal and state 

TANF time limits and immigrant restrictions. We also assumed that states would make the 

same choices about time limits in this hypothetical 1995 world that they made in 2005, such 

as using shorter time limits, or providing extensions and exemptions. 

30The 2005 TANF rules used in this expanded TRIM 3 analysis included rules on immigrant 

restrictions; time limits; eligibility rules for two-parent families and teen parents; caps on 

benefits if family size increases; 2005 asset limits; and other financial rules, such as those 

for disregarding a certain amount of earned income in determining eligibility—called 

earned income disregards—and income tests. Because TRIM3 incorporates information 

from states through the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database—an HHS-funded 

database maintained at the Urban Institute—this analysis reflects variations in state rules 

as well as federal rules in these areas. The overall results mask variations at the state level. 

In some states, the 2005 rules would increase eligibility, while in other states the 2005 rules 

would decrease eligibility. 

Page 13 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

families.31 In this analysis, had this wider range of 2005 TANF eligibilityrelated rules been in place in 1995, about 1 percent fewer families overall 

would have been eligible for cash assistance. Overall, although these 

analyses cannot definitively establish the portion of the caseload change 

from 1995 to 2005 that was due solely to a particular rule change, they 

suggest that the net effect was small.32

Following welfare reform, there was some concern that the number of 

eligible families would decline because of competition among states to 

make their policies more stringent and less attractive to low-income 

families—such as by lowering the maximum income a family could earn 

and still be eligible for TANF.33 However, from 1996 to 2006, very few 

states reduced their maximum cash assistance benefits for a family of 

three—the money families receive if they have no other income. A 2002 

review analyzed a range of state policy changes enacted by states, 

including policies on earned income and assets disregards, work activities, 

and sanctions. The study found little evidence that states competed to 

expand restrictive policies while also decreasing policies to enhance 

access. Instead, it found that states adopted both types of policies in 

varying combinations, leading to substantial variation among the states.34

Factors Affecting Eligible 

Families’ Participation 

Played a Larger Role in the 

Decline than Changes in 

Families’ Eligibility 

While declines in the number of families eligible for cash assistance 

accounted for some of the caseload decline, the preponderance of the 

decline reflects changes in eligible families’ participation in the program. 

 

31For example, according to our TRIM3 analysis, 2005 rules that increased the number of 

eligible families included those concerning the eligibility of two-parent units, which are 

more generous than the 1995 AFDC rules, and rules on the use of earned income 

disregards, which may enable some families to be eligible under 2005 rules who would not 

have been in 1995. On the other hand, rules that reduced the number of eligible families 

included time limits and income eligibility thresholds that were not adjusted for inflation, 

according to our TRIM3 analysis. 

32The analysis cannot be definitive because of the potential interrelationships among 

program rules; changes in the population (such as the incidence of single-parent families) 

and in families’ economic circumstances; and behavioral issues such as families’ responses 

to program requirements, such as whether to apply for TANF. 

33Some observers believed that families would move to other states take advantage of state 

policies that were more generous, and that states would attempt to offset this possibility of 

increased caseloads by competing to have policies more stringent than neighboring states. 

34Thomas Gais and R. Kent Weaver, State Policy Choices Under Welfare Reform, Brookings 

Policy Brief No. 21 (Washington, D.C.: April 2002). 

Page 14 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

From 1995 to 2005, the number of families eligible for cash assistance 

declined by about half a million families, but the decline in the share of 

eligible families participating in AFDC/TANF cash assistance has been 

dramatic—from about 84 percent of eligible families receiving cash 

assistance in 1995 (4.8 million) to about 40 percent of eligible families in 

2005 (2.13 million).35 In that period, the number of eligible families who did 

not participate in cash assistance climbed from an estimated 890,000 in 

1995 under the AFDC entitlement program to about 3.14 million eligible 

families in 2005 under the TANF cash assistance program, according to 

HHS data.36 The change in the participation rate from 1995 to 2005 

accounted for about 87 percent of the decline in cash recipients in that 

period.37 (See fig. 1.) 

 

35This analysis of the share of eligible and participating families is based on trend data for 

an average month by calendar year in HHS’s Indicators of Welfare Dependence: Annual 

Report to Congress, 2008 (Washington, D.C.: 2008), which uses TRIM3 to model estimates 

of the TANF participation rate. In reporting participants, the data includes families 

receiving cash assistance through both TANF and separate state programs (SSP) using 

state MOE funds. As noted earlier, TRIM3 does not model certain aspects of program 

eligibility, such as sanctions from a family’s failure to comply with work rules or child 

support rules. It also does not model state diversion strategies such as the use of one-time, 

non-recurring benefits, or families’ behavioral responses to TANF program rules, such as 

staying off TANF to conserve eligibility for time-limited assistance. 

36This TANF participation rate is within the range experienced by other non-entitlement 

programs. In a previous report, we found that participation in non-entitlement programs—

including TANF—ranged from less than 10 percent to about 50 percent, while participation 

in entitlement programs such as SNAP (formerly known as food stamps) —designed to 

support all those who apply and qualify—was higher, ranging from 50 percent to more than 

70 percent. See GAO, Means-Tested Programs: Information on Program Access Can Be an 

Important Management Tool, GAO-05-221 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2005). 

37Declines in eligibility and in participation are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may 

interact. For example, policies such as time limits can affect a family’s eligibility for cash 

assistance but it can also affect decisions about when or whether to apply for assistance, 

depending on a family’s circumstances. 

Page 15 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Figure 1: Families Estimated as Eligible for and Participating in Cash Assistance 

through the AFDC or TANF Cash Assistance Programs, Monthly Average, by 

Calendar Year, 1995 through 2005 

Number of families

0

1

2

3

4

5

6 mil.

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

890,000

Eligible, 3.14 mil.

but not participating

Eligible for AFDC or TANF Cash Assistance Programs

Participating in AFDC or TANF Cash Assistance Programs

Source: GAO analysis of data from HHS's Indicators of Welfare Dependence, based on the TRIM3 model.

Research suggests that the dynamics of family decision-making in relation 

to TANF work requirements, time limits, and other policies have played a 

key role in the decline in the number of families receiving cash assistance, 

and experts we interviewed agreed. The decline in participation reflected 

changes in families’ decisions about whether to apply for TANF cash 

assistance in the first place, and, for those who receive cash assistance, 

whether to continue or leave the program, as well as responses to state 

policies such as sanctions and diversion. 

One of the most important factors affecting whether or not eligible 

families participate is the requirement to participate in work activities 

under TANF, according to research as well as the experts we 

Page 16 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

interviewed.38 To receive cash benefits, TANF recipients must generally 

participate in work activities such as job search, job skills training, and 

employment for a minimum number of hours per week—with the hours 

varying depending on family type and the age of the youngest child. Such 

mandated work activities under TANF have been well studied, and 

according to a research synthesis conducted for HHS, multiple studies 

have provided compelling evidence that these work activities may cause 

declines in the caseload,39 as families choose not to apply rather than be 

expected to fulfill the work requirement or find it difficult to apply or 

continue participation in the program. As we noted in an earlier report, 

studies have shown that families who are eligible for TANF, including cash 

recipients, often have characteristics that make employment difficult, such 

as substance abuse, poor mental or physical health, disability, low 

educational attainment, limited work experience, limited English 

proficiency, low basic skills, or exposure to domestic violence. Many 

recipients have two or more of these characteristics, making it especially 

difficult for them to get and keep jobs.40

Eligible families may also not participate in TANF because they view the 

TANF application and eligibility determination process as too burdensome 

and not worth the effort. With its focus on work and temporary assistance, 

the TANF application process can include pre-application interviews and 

assessments of employability. It can also include non-work-related 

requirements for school attendance, meetings and cooperation with other 

agencies, or fingerprinting. Some states also added questions to cash 

assistance applications after 1996 on assets, living situations, or household 

characteristics.41 According to a 2003 study of low-income families, non-

 

38Not all TANF families are subject to work requirements. TANF law allows states to 

exclude single custodial parents caring for a child under the age of 1, for example. Families 

without adult recipients—child-only cases—are sometimes exempt from work 

requirements and time limits. States also have the option to consider some parents not 

“work eligible,” such as those on SSI or Social Security Disability Insurance. 

39Jeffrey Grogger et al., Consequences of Welfare Reform: A Research Synthesis, RAND 

Labor and Population Program. Prepared for the Administration for Children and Families, 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (July 2002). 

40GAO, Welfare Reform: Moving Hard-to-Employ Recipients Into the Workforce, 

GAO-01-368 (Washington, D.C.: March 2001). 

41Abt Associates Inc., Study of the TANF Application Process, Final Report, Volume 1: 

Survey of States, Prepared for Department of Health and Human Services, Administration 

for Children and Families Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation (April 2003). 

Page 17 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

applicants who visited a TANF office but chose not to apply cited as 

important reasons for their decisions the effort, or “hassle” to do so, as 

well as discouragement by a caseworker or poor treatment.42 Two 

researchers we interviewed also emphasized that implementation 

practices and procedures in local welfare offices affect participation. 

Several legal and social service organizations that we contacted in 21 

states reported that, in their view, eligible families do not participate in 

TANF partly because of their difficulties with the application process. 

Additional difficulties they cited included documentation requirements; 

literacy and language barriers, which interfered with the completion of 

application forms; the number of required trips to the TANF office; poor 

treatment by caseworkers; and inconvenient business hours and/or 

locations of TANF offices. 

Eligible families may also not apply for TANF cash assistance—or complete 

the application process—because of state policies and practices on 

diversion. As part of their process for assessing eligibility for TANF cash 

assistance, nearly all states also have at least one type of strategy for 

diverting applicants from cash assistance, according to a 2008 report.43

Diversion strategies states use include requiring applicants to complete a 

job search, program orientation, or employment plan as a condition of 

eligibility. Many states provide a one-time payment to families to meet 

immediate needs—most often for applicants with a job or job offer.44 In 

return for one-time cash assistance, states usually initiate a period of TANF 

ineligibility that keeps families off the caseload. Some research indicates 

that families who received such one-time assistance are less likely to ever 

participate in TANF, even if they remain eligible for assistance.45

 

42Robert Moffit, “The Role of Nonfinancial Factors in Exit and Entry in the TANF Program,” 

The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 38 (2003). 

43Rosenberg et al., A Study of States’ TANF Diversion Programs. Final Report, Mathematica 

Policy Research Institute (Dec. 8, 2008). 

44States’ diversion strategies are determined by the states and not federal law. In most 

states, they are also considered “non-assistance” and, because of this, states can use them 

to provide temporary assistance without being affected by federal work requirements for 

states. Most states also do not count one-time payments toward the federal 60-month 

lifetime limit. States also have incentives for controlling or reducing their TANF caseloads 

because they are required to meet federal work participation rates for providing cash 

assistance to families when they use federal or MOE funds. 

45Andrea Hetling et al., “Do Welfare Avoidance Grants Prevent Cash Assistance?” Social 

Service Review, University of Chicago (December 2007). 

Page 18 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

The 60-month lifetime limit for families established under PRWORA 

represented a fundamental change to cash assistance, and this time limit is 

generally viewed as contributing to the decline in families receiving cash 

assistance as well. Nationally, many TANF households—about 47 percent 

in fiscal year 2006—are not subject to federal or state time limits because 

they are “child-only” cases in which a child lives with a relative or families 

in which the parent is not eligible for benefits. Time limits—which are 

shorter in some states than the federal limit—make some families 

ineligible for TANF, but such limits may also lead eligible families to 

consider alternatives if they think they will need TANF cash benefits in the 

future. According to researchers and other experts we interviewed, 

families may hold off on applying for TANF—and “bank their time” for 

when they may have greater needs. Research suggests that such banking 

of time occurs, especially among families with young children who may be 

concerned about how much time they would have left on welfare, and that 

it contributes to the decline in the use of cash assistance.46

An additional element is that the value of TANF cash benefits—which are 

determined by states—has fallen over time, which could affect families’ 

participation. Our TRIM3 analysis estimates that average cash benefits 

under 2005 rules were 17 percent lower than they were under 1995 rules.47

This reduction occurred because cash benefit levels in many states have 

not been updated or kept pace with inflation—24 states had maximum 

cash benefits set at the same levels in 2006 as in 1996, and 6 states had 

maximum cash benefit levels that were lower than in 1996. Several legal 

and social service providers in 21 states we contacted agreed that low 

benefit levels contributed to the non-participation of eligible families. In 

2006, the maximum cash benefit levels among the states ranged from $170 

per month to $723 per month for a family of three,48 while the median for 

all states was $396 per month for a family of three—less than a third of the 

poverty threshold for this type of family. 

 

46Grogger et al. (July 2002). 

47This analysis is based on TRIM3 estimates in which we applied all 2005 TANF rules, with 

dollars deflated to 1995, to the 1995 cash assistance population, and compared potential 

aggregate cash benefits to that population under the 2005 rules with deflated dollars to the 

potential aggregate benefits to that population under the 1995 rules. The overall results of 

this analysis mask variations at the state level. Some states show small increases in 

potential aggregate benefits under the 2005 rules, while the majority of states show 

reductions of various magnitudes. 

48These maximum benefit levels are for the continental United States. 

Page 19 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Another factor that may affect family decisions is that the TANF cash welfare 

system is no longer the main “gateway” into other supports and services, as 

AFDC was. PRWORA severed the link between cash assistance and Medicaid 

benefits for health care. As a result, post-PRWORA, TANF recipient families 

are not automatically eligible to receive Medicaid benefits. Independent of 

TANF, low-income families who are not eligible for Medicaid can also apply 

for benefits under the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, which was 

established in 1997 to cover additional low-income children. Child care 

subsidies were consolidated under PRWORA for low-income families, and 

families do not need TANF as a gateway to these subsidies. Although SNAP 

(formerly food stamps) was available to low-income families before TANF 

was created, federal legislation after PRWORA created options for states to 

simplify application and eligibility determination processes and increase 

enrollment in SNAP. Some researchers have suggested that families may 

decide to take up other supports and benefits in lieu of TANF, partly because 

they do not entail requirements such as regular visits by social workers and 

are not subject to time limits, among other reasons. 

A related issue is that some families may be less inclined to take up TANF 

cash assistance because participation in TANF could reduce their benefits 

from other programs, leaving them with little, if any, net increase in family 

resources. TANF cash assistance is counted as cash income by some other 

assistance programs. As a result, having a higher income because of TANF 

could reduce a family’s benefits from SNAP or increase the amount the 

family must pay for subsidized child care or housing.49 Most families who 

receive TANF benefits would see increases in their annual net income. 

However, the greater the number of other supports a TANF family 

receives, the smaller the relative increase in annual net income that they 

gain from participating in TANF. According to our estimates—using 

Illinois, the state with the median maximum TANF cash benefit, as an 

example—if a single parent with two children received child support; tax 

credits; SNAP benefits; benefits under the Special Supplemental Nutrition 

Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), a federal nutritional 

program; and a housing subsidy in addition to having monthly earnings, 

the family would have an overall monthly net income of $1,743–or an 

 

49In some cases, the receipt of TANF can also work in the opposite direction, increasing the 

other benefit (e.g., exempting TANF recipients from having to pay a co-payment for child 

care). For the purpose of this discussion, we are including non-cash supports such as SNAP 

as part of net income. However, in discussing poverty among children, we exclude noncash supports, so as to be consistent with the federal definition of poverty. 

Page 20 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

annual net income of about $20,916.50 If the family also received TANF 

cash benefits of $185 monthly, adjustments to the other benefits they 

received would result in a $53 net increase. (See fig. 2.) 

Figure 2: Estimated Impact of Monthly TANF Cash Assistance Receipt on the Net Income of a Working Parent Who Receives 

Other Supports 

Source: GAO analysis of TRIM3 microsimulation model data. 

Monthly earnings

Child support payment income

Net taxes (including federal EITC and tax credits)

Other non-cash benefits (SNAP, WIC, and Housing Subsidy)

Monthly TANF cash assistance payments

Without

TANF

With

TANF

Single parent

with two

children

50 $213 $185

$213

$222

$263

$455

$100 39 $496

SNAP WIC Housing subsidy

SNAP WIC Housing subsidy

$632

$632 $1,796

$1,743

39

$798

$716

Note: Each family was assumed to have one working adult, earning $632 per month. This is the 

median earnings of TANF families containing one adult and two children, according to our analysis of 

2005 participants. It is also the amount one would earn by working 18 hours per week at the Illinois 

minimum wage of $8 per hour. 

Although few families receive as many benefits and supports as in this 

example, we found in another analysis we conducted using TRIM3 that an 

estimated 19 percent of families receiving four types of supports—in 

addition to TANF cash benefits—would see their net income rise by the 

full amount that they gained from participating in TANF, but 17 percent of 

 

50The maximum TANF benefit, which varies by state, refers to the highest amount of cash 

benefits that a state pays to a family per month. Here we are referring to the median of this 

cash payment across the states. 

Page 21 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

these families would actually lose annual net income.51 Whether families 

gain or lose net income may reflect the choice of supports, families’ 

demographics and income, relevant state rules, and level of benefits. 

Finally, according to some studies as well as researchers we interviewed, 

full sanctions for families’ noncompliance—those that cut off all benefits 

for a period of time—are associated with declines in the number of 

families receiving cash assistance, although more research is needed to 

validate this association.52 Eligible families who receive cash assistance 

but do not comply with TANF program requirements may face financial 

consequences, or sanctions.53 Under state sanction policies, families may 

lose all or part of their TANF cash benefits, and possibly other public 

benefits as well, if they do not comply with TANF’s work and other 

requirements.54 In addition to being sanctioned for noncompliance with 

work activities, TANF families may also be sanctioned for failing to 

comply with behavioral requirements, such as obtaining drug treatment, 

cooperating with establishing paternity, or ensuring that children are 

immunized and attend school. In one study, TANF recipients who reported 

having been sanctioned cited missing an appointment or failing to file 

required paperwork as the most common reasons for their loss of 

 

51This TRIM3 analysis uses a slightly different benefit mix than in the Illinois example. In 

this analysis, the four benefits are child support retained by the family, CCDF child care 

subsidies, SNAP (formerly food stamps), and a housing subsidy. The net income includes 

all cash income (including TANF and any child support retained by the family), plus the 

value of SNAP and the value of housing subsidy, plus refundable tax credits, minus income 

tax and payroll tax liability, and minus child care expenses. Using calendar year 2005 

Current Population Survey data, this analysis examined the families estimated to begin 

receiving TANF for at least part of the year if participation was at the same rate as in 1995–

about 3.3 million families. 

52See Grogger et al. (2002); LaDonna Pavetti, et al., Review of Sanction Policies and 

Research Studies: Final Literature Review, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 10, 2003), and Jacob Alex Klerman and Caroline Danielson, Why Did the Welfare 

Caseload Decline? RAND Labor and Population Working Paper (June 2004). 

53Federal law requires a reduction or termination in benefit if a family does not comply with 

work requirements, but states determine the specific sanction policies for failing to comply 

with work requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 607(e)(1). 

54In a 2000 report, we estimated that far more families have their benefits reduced because 

of rules violations than have their benefits cut off. GAO, Welfare Reform: State Sanctions 

Policies and Number of Families Affected, GAO/HEHS-00-44 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 

2000). 

Page 22 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

benefits.55 Such work and behavioral requirements may be particularly 

challenging for families with physical or mental impairments.56 As we 

noted in an earlier GAO report, impairments were relatively common 

among TANF recipients, and, while recipients with impairments may 

sometimes be exempted from work requirements and time limits, they 

may be at risk of having their benefits reduced or terminated through 

sanctions.57

Overall, according to researchers and other experts we interviewed, there 

is a general consensus that these factors—including TANF policies, the 

strong economy, and family decision-making processes—played a role in 

contributing to the decline in the number of families receiving TANF cash 

assistance. However, there is not agreement on the relative weight of each 

factor. This is partly because many policy changes were implemented 

around the same time period that TANF was created—such as increases in 

the minimum wage, expansions of the EITC, and the de-linking of 

Medicaid from cash welfare—and are difficult to isolate from each other 

and from the economic climate. It is also because several of these factors 

have moved in the same direction—such as TANF, with its emphasis on 

work, initially being implemented during a strong economy when more 

low-wage jobs were available—so it is hard to disentangle their effects.58

Furthermore, as we have discussed, TANF policies—including mandatory 

work activities, state diversion strategies, time limits, and sanctions for 

non-compliance with work and other program requirements—can 

influence participation, including family decisions about whether to apply, 

remain on cash assistance, or leave. 

 

55Andrew Cherlin et al., “Operating within the Rules: Welfare Recipients’ Experiences with 

Sanctions and Case Closings,” Social Service Review, University of Chicago (September 

2002). 

56By impairments, we mean both mental and physical conditions. For instance, 

impairments could be physical conditions that hinder movement or require a cane or other 

mobility device, cognitive impairments, or mental conditions such as chronic depression. 

57GAO, Welfare Reform: Former TANF Recipients with Impairments Less Likely to be 

Employed and More Likely to Receive Federal Supports, GAO-03-210 (Washington, D.C.: 

December 2002). 

58A September 2009 report similarly noted that declines in the TANF cash assistance 

caseload were likely attributable to factors that are not easy to disentangle. See LaDonna 

Pavetti et al., Understanding Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Caseloads After 

Passage of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Final Report, Mathematica Policy Research, 

Inc.(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2009). 

Page 23 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Although they are similar in many ways, families participating in TANF 

and eligible nonparticipating families differed in their incomes, education, 

and use of other public supports in 2005, according to our TRIM3 

analysis.59 Eligible families who did not participate in TANF generally had 

relatively higher incomes and higher education levels than TANF families. 

However, among eligible nonparticipants, 11 percent of nonparticipating 

families did not work or receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI)—a 

cash assistance program for people with disabilities. This subgroup of 

nonparticipating families also had very low incomes compared with other 

nonparticipants, and a larger portion of them received SNAP and 

subsidized housing. 

Eligible 

Nonparticipating 

Families Generally 

Had Higher Incomes 

Than TANF 

Recipients, but a 

Portion of Eligible 

Nonparticipants Had 

Very Low Incomes 

 

59In this section, whenever we discuss eligible participating and nonparticipating families, 

we mean those simulated (estimated) by the TRIM3 micreosimulation model to be eligible 

participants and nonparticipants. TRIM3 relies on the Annual Social and Economic 

Supplements (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey, as well as information from the 

Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database to estimate eligibility based on state specific 

program rules and information on income and other eligibility criteria. The most recent 

data available were for 2005. In this section, estimates cited are on an annual basis. Any 

family that contains a TANF unit that was simulated by TRIM3 to receive benefits during 

any month of the year is considered to be participating in TANF, and each family receiving 

or eligible for TANF is counted once. In comparing the characteristics of TANF 

participants and eligible nonparticipants, differences are statistically significant at the 95 

percent confidence level unless otherwise noted. See appendix I for details. 

Page 24 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

According to our TRIM3 analysis, an estimated 6.6 million families were 

eligible for TANF cash assistance for at least 1 month in 2005. Of those 

families, 2.66 million, or 40 percent, were estimated to have ever received 

TANF cash assistance during the year.60 (See fig. 3.) 

Although Similar in Many 

Ways, Participating and 

Eligible Nonparticipating 

Families Differed in 

Income, Education, and 

Use of Other Public 

Supports 

 

60 The total number of families in this analysis for 2005 is an annual estimate based on the 

TRIM3 model for families who were ever eligible for or ever received TANF cash assistance 

in that year. This estimate is larger than the HHS estimates used in figure 1, which are 

estimated monthly averages for each calendar year, primarily because the annual estimate 

casts a “bigger net” in identifying families who were ever eligible for or received TANF in a 

particular year. In addition, HHS estimates used in figure 1—from the 2008 Indicators of 

Welfare Dependence—include estimates for family units in the U.S. territories and units 

that consist solely of a pregnant woman, while our eligibility estimates do not include these 

units. Both estimates are based on the TRIM3 microsimulation model. Finally, the 1995 

baseline used in this analysis is not the originally-run 1995 baseline, which was created in 

1997. Instead, it was rerun for this analysis using the most recent version of the TRIM3 

TANF module, in order to take advantage of corrections and improvements in methods. As 

noted earlier in this report, the total number of needy families receiving cash assistance in 

2008—1.7 million—is monthly average caseload data from HHS for that year, and not 

estimates of cash recipients based on TRIM3. 

Page 25 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Figure 3: TANF Cash Assistance: Estimates of Participating and Eligible 

Nonparticipating Families in 2005, Annual Basis 

Note: The estimates for the number of participants and eligible nonparticipants in this analysis are 

different from those used in figure 1 (which shows trends from 1995-2005 in participating and eligible 

nonparticipating families) because HHS estimates in the 2008 Indicators of Welfare Dependence

reflect estimates for an average month, by calendar year and include estimates for family units in the 

U.S. territories and units that consist solely of a pregnant woman, while our eligibility estimates reflect 

annual estimates and do not include these units. Both estimates are based on the TRIM3

microsimulation. 

Participants

Eligible nonparticipants

40%

2.66 million 60%

3.97 million

Source: GAO analysis of TRIM3 microsimulation model data.

While all families who were eligible to receive TANF cash assistance in 

2005 had low incomes, about the same proportions of both participants 

and eligible nonparticipants (44 percent compared to 41 percent) were 

headed by an adult without earnings,61 and hardships such as not having 

enough to eat were common among families in poverty.62

 

61In this analysis, the term adult without earnings refers to adults in the eligible TANF unit. 

In comparing the characteristics of participants and nonparticipants, data cited are 

statistically significant to the 95 percent confidence level unless otherwise noted. 

62See Mark Nord, et al., Household Food Security in the United States, 2008, U.S. Dept. of 

Agriculture, Economic Research Service (Washington, D.C.: November 2009). We were not 

able to identify studies on hardships distinguishing between TANF recipients and nonrecipients. 

Page 26 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

However, eligible families who did not participate in TANF cash assistance 

had relatively higher incomes than TANF recipients.63 Overall, 

nonparticipating eligible families had median incomes about $5,000 higher 

than TANF families. According to our estimates, in 2005 the median annual 

income for eligible nonparticipating families was roughly $15,000 

compared to $9,600 annually for families receiving TANF. (See fig. 4.) 

Figure 4: Estimated Median Annual Incomes of TANF-Eligible Families in 2005 

Median annual income

Source: GAO analysis of TRIM3 microsimulation model data.

0 $3,000 $6,000 $9,000 $12,000 $15,000

Eligible families

not participating

in TANF

Families

participating

in TANF

$15,000

$9,606

Note: Income is defined here as all gross cash income except for means-tested benefits. In order to 

be consistent with the Census Bureau’s standard poverty methodology, each family’s income is 

calculated based on all related persons living in the household. Consequently, both the primary family 

and the related subfamily are considered to have the same income. This is not the case for 

determining TANF eligibility, however. For example, a 20-year-old parent living with her parents 

would be considered as having the same income as her parents for the purposes of this figure. 

However, for purposes of TANF eligibility, only the 20-year-old parent’s income is considered. 

Eligible families who did not participate in the TANF cash assistance 

program also had higher rates of full-time employment (44 percent) 

compared to TANF cash recipients (33 percent) and lower rates of worklimiting disabilities (11 percent) compared to TANF recipients (18 

percent). While approximately the same proportion of both groups—less 

than 10 percent—had income from an unmarried partner, the median 

amount contributed by that partner was considerably greater in the 

eligible nonparticipating families. 

Eligible families who did not participate in TANF generally had higher 

education levels than TANF families. Eligible adults not receiving TANF 

 

63When we analyzed median incomes, median income was based on all related persons 

living in the household, not solely the eligible TANF unit. In this analysis, the distinction 

between participants and nonparticipants reflects one point in time—the year 2005. 

Nonparticipating eligible families may at some time apply for cash assistance, and TANF 

families may also leave cash assistance for personal or other reasons, such as being 

sanctioned for noncompliance. 

Page 27 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

were more likely to have graduated from high school than adults receiving 

TANF cash assistance (40 percent compared to 33 percent). A larger 

proportion of nonparticipating families also had some education beyond 

high school (36 percent compared to 32 percent). 

In addition, eligible families who did not participate in TANF cash 

assistance were much less likely to receive SNAP benefits than TANF cash 

recipients, and eligible nonparticipants were also less likely to receive 

subsidized housing and child care subsidies. According to our estimates, 

59 percent of eligible families who did not participate in TANF received 

SNAP in 2005 compared to 88 percent of TANF families.64

Similarly, our estimates show that 13 percent of eligible families not 

participating in TANF received subsidized housing compared to 22 percent 

of TANF participants. The differences in the two groups’ receipt of 

subsidized child care were not as large, with 8 percent of eligible families 

not participating in TANF receiving child care subsidized by CCDF 

compared to 11 percent of TANF participants.65 (See fig. 5.) 

 

64Families are counted as receiving a particular type of income or benefit if at least one 

person in the family is simulated by TRIM3 to be receiving that type of income or benefit at 

any point during the year. 

65Only child care subsidies funded by CCDF are captured by TRIM3. These estimates do not 

reflect families receiving child care subsidies from other sources of funding. 

Page 28 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Figure 5: Receipt of Other Public Supports among Estimated TANF-Eligible 

Families in 2005, Annual Basis 

Source: GAO analysis of TRIM3 microsimulation model data.

0

20

40

60

80

100%

Percent of families participating

Families participating in TANF

Eligible for TANF, but not participating in TANF

SNAP CCDFsubsidized

child care

Subsidized

housing

SSI Any one of

these public

supports

88

59

91

66

11 8

22

13

22

18

Note: In this figure, the SSI column reflects the SSI participation of individuals in the family unit. While 

there is no federal prohibition against receiving both TANF and SSI, individuals who receive SSI do 

not qualify for TANF in nearly all states. Other members who are not receiving SSI would continue to 

be eligible for TANF. Only child care subsidies funded by the Child Care and Development Fund are 

captured in these figures, and SSI is the only cash benefit besides TANF that is simulated by TRIM3. 

According to our TRIM3 analyses, a greater proportion of eligible 

nonparticipating families were White and a smaller proportion were Black 

than for TANF cash recipients, while there were not significant differences 

with other racial groups. (See fig. 6.) 

Page 29 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Figure 6: Race and Ethnicity of Estimated TANF-Eligible Families in 2005, Annual 

Basis 

Source: GAO analysis of TRIM3 microsimulation model data.

0

20

40

60

80

100%

Percent of families

Race of head of household

Families participating in TANF

Eligible for TANF, but not participating

White Asiana Black Hispanic a Other a

35

46

3 3 3 4

32

23 26 24

a

Values for TANF participants and nonparticipants are not statistically different from each other at the 

95% confidence level. 

A greater proportion of eligible families who did not receive TANF in 2005 

were married than TANF families (27 percent compared to 16 percent) and 

a smaller proportion of eligible non-recipients were headed by a single 

mother (50 percent compared to 61 percent), according to our analysis. 

(See fig. 7.) 

Page 30 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Figure 7: Family Structure of Estimated TANF-Eligible Families in 2005, Annual 

Basis 

Source: GAO analysis of TRIM3 microsimulation model data.

0

20

40

60

80

100%

Percent of families

Family type

Families participating in TANF

Eligible for TANF, but not participating

Single

mother

No parentsa

(Guardians only)

Married Single

father a Single teenparent a

61

50

3 3

13 13 16

27

7 7

a

Values for TANF participants and nonparticipants are not statistically significantly different from each 

other. 

Among Eligible 

Nonparticipants in 2005, a 

Portion of Families Did 

Not Work and Had Very 

Low Incomes, but 

Received Public Supports 

While many eligible families who did not participate in TANF had higher 

incomes than families on TANF, a portion of nonparticipating families had 

very low incomes. According to our estimates, of the nearly 4 million 

families who were eligible for TANF cash assistance for 1 or more months 

in 2005 but did not participate that year, 732,000 were neither working nor 

receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a cash assistance program 

for people with disabilities. This subgroup of more disadvantaged 

nonparticipants accounted for 11 percent of all families who were eligible 

Page 31 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

for TANF cash assistance in 2005, according to our TRIM3 analysis.66 (See 

fig. 8.) 

Figure 8: Estimated Eligible Nonparticipating Families as a Share of Total Eligible 

Families in 2005, Annual Basis 

Note: In this figure, SSI receipt refers to the SSI participation of individuals in the family unit. While 

there is no federal prohibition against receiving both TANF and SSI, individuals who receive SSI do 

not qualify for TANF in nearly all states. Other family members who are not receiving SSI would 

continue to be eligible for TANF. SSI is the only cash benefit besides TANF that is simulated by 

TRIM3. 

Participating in TANF

Not participating in TANF, not employed,

and not receiving SSI

Not participating in TANF, but employed

or receiving SSI

40%

2.7 million 49%

3.2 million

11%

732,000

Source: GAO analysis of TRIM3 microsimulation model data.

This subgroup of nonparticipating eligible families also had very low 

incomes.67 The median annual income for eligible families who were not 

working or receiving TANF or SSI was $7,020—compared to $16,316 for 

 

66A considerable body of work discusses such families, who are often described as 

“disconnected” from the workforce. In addition to GAO-01-368 and GAO-03-210, see, for 

example, Rebecca Blank and Brian Kovak, The Growing Problem of Disconnected Single 

Mothers (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, National Poverty Center Working Paper 

Series #07-28, revised January 2008), and Sheila R. Zedlewski, et al., Families Coping 

without Earnings or Government Cash Assistance (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 

February 2003). 

67While there is no federal prohibition against receiving both TANF and SSI, individuals 

who receive SSI do not qualify for TANF in nearly all states. However, other family 

members who do not receive SSI would continue to be eligible for TANF. 

Page 32 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

other eligible nonparticipating families—an amount equal to about 45 

percent of the federal poverty threshold for a family consisting of one 

adult and two children. The median income for this subgroup of eligible 

nonparticipants was also lower than the median income for TANF cash 

recipients. 

 parent 

tion or less 

compared with 63 percent for other nonparticipants. 

lly received public 

supports at lower rates than TANF families. (See fig. 9.) 

 

Twelve percent of this subgroup of families was also headed by a

who reported having a work-limiting disability—similar to other 

nonparticipants.68 Families in this subgroup also had low levels of 

education, with 70 percent having a high school educa

This subgroup of eligible nonparticipating families who were not working 

and not receiving SSI were slightly more likely than other nonparticipants 

to be receiving SNAP and public housing, with 63 percent receiving SNAP

and 18 percent receiving subsidized public housing. However, they were 

less likely than other nonparticipants to receive child care subsidies. They 

were similar to other nonparticipants in that they genera

68SSI is the only disability-related cash assistance program simulated by TRIM3. Some 

families may receive disability-related payments from other programs the model does not 

simulate, such as Workers Compensation. In an earlier report, we found that families who 

left TANF cash assistance who had impairments were more likely than leavers without 

impairments to report having no income—from personal earnings, household earnings, or 

SSI benefits—in their first month after exiting TANF. See GAO-03-210. 

Page 33 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Figure 9: Receipt of Other Public Supports among Estimated TANF-Eligible 

Families in 2005, by Eligible Family Type, Annual Basis 

Source: GAO analysis of TRIM3 microsimulation model data.

0

20

40

60

80

100%

Percent of families participating

Families participating in TANF

Eligible for TANF, but not participating in TANF

Not participating in TANF, not employed, and not receiving SSI

SNAP CCDFsubsidized

child care

Subsidized

housing

SSI Any one of

these public

supports

88

63

58

91

66 66

11 9

4

22

18

12

22 22

n/a

Note: In this figure, the SSI column reflects the SSI participation of individuals in the family unit. While 

there is no federal prohibition against receiving both TANF and SSI, individuals who receive SSI do 

not qualify for TANF in nearly all states. Other members who are not receiving SSI would continue to 

be eligible for TANF. Only child care subsidies funded by the Child Care and Development Fund are 

captured in these figures, and SSI is the only cash benefit besides TANF that is simulated by TRIM3. 

Page 34 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Increased TANF 

Participation Would 

Reduce the Number 

of Children in 

Extreme Poverty, but 

Would Not 

Significantly Change 

the Number in 

Poverty 

Fewer Children Would Be 

in Extreme Poverty If 

TANF Participation 

Increased 

Increased TANF participation would reduce the number of children in 

extreme poverty—those below half the poverty threshold—according to 

our analyses.69 According to our TRIM3 analysis, an estimated 4.8 million 

children were in extreme poverty for at least one month in 2005.70 If the 

percent of eligible families participating in TANF in 2005 was 84 percent—

the rate of participation in AFDC in 1995—rather than about 40 percent—

800,000 fewer children would have been in extreme poverty.71 This higher 

participation would reduce the share of children in extreme poverty by 

close to 17 percent because the gain in income from TANF benefits would 

raise some families’ incomes above the extreme poverty threshold.72 The 

 

69In this section, whenever we discuss eligible participating and nonparticipating families, 

we mean those simulated (estimated) by the TRIM3 model to be eligible participants and 

nonparticipants. See appendix I for details. 

70This estimate for the number of children in extreme poverty is an annual figure. 

71To impose the 1995 AFDC participation rate of 84 percent on the 2005 population, we 

started from each family’s probability of participation as produced by TRIM3’s baseline 

simulation. We applied an additional across-the-board adjustment factor to increase each 

family’s probability of participation until the desired participation rate was reached. For 

this high participation rate scenario, we did not modify cash benefit levels. We kept the 

population and the TANF rules, including monthly benefit levels, at their 2005 levels. At this 

higher participation rate, we estimated that 4.0 million children in the United States would 

have been in extreme poverty in 2005. 

72A substantial portion of TANF-eligible families was in extreme poverty in 2005. According 

to our TRIM3 analysis, at least 35 percent of families who were eligible for TANF in at least 

one month of 2005—but who did not participate in the program—were in extreme poverty. 

Not all children who are in extreme poverty live in families that are eligible for TANF, 

because of varying eligibility standards for TANF among the states. 

Page 35 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

median income for families with children in extreme poverty in 2005 was 

$5,400. If TANF participation were higher, families in extreme poverty 

would have median incomes of $5,964—10 percent higher on average.73

For those families who would gain TANF cash assistance at the 1995 

participation rate, the average increase in TANF annual income is 

estimated to be $2,554 per family. 

According to our estimates—using Illinois, the state with the median 

maximum TANF benefit, as an example—a TANF-eligible family in 

extreme poverty, consisting of a working single parent with two children 

that applied for and received cash assistance, would gain enough in TANF 

benefits to be just above the extreme poverty threshold.74 In this scenario, 

this family has estimated monthly earnings of $346, which is roughly half 

the median for families participating in TANF.75 Before receiving TANF 

cash assistance, this family has an estimated income of $446 per month, 

including child support, which would provide an income equal to 34 

percent of the poverty threshold. After receiving TANF, this family’s 

income would increase to $676 per month–equal to 52 percent of poverty.76

A family with one child would similarly benefit. (See fig. 10.) 

 

73The median income of families in extreme poverty includes eligible families who are not 

participating in TANF as well as those who are. Therefore, the income gained due to TANF 

cash assistance is averaged across all families in extreme poverty. 

74Earnings are based on the assumption that families in extreme poverty work 10 hours a 

week at the Illinois minimum wage of $8 per hour, roughly half of median earnings of TANF 

families containing one adult and two children according to our analysis of 2005 TANF 

participants. Families participating in the TANF program must assign their rights to child 

support to the state and do not receive the full amount of child support paid by the absent 

parent. 

75The income figures in this analysis of extreme poverty differ from the income figures in 

the previous analysis discussing the 11 percent of nonparticipating families who were not 

employed and not receiving SSI. The income figures in the previous analysis were based on 

a small subset of TANF-eligible, but nonparticipating families in 2005. The estimates we use 

in discussing the impact of increased TANF participation on poverty represent potential 

earnings for two types of TANF-eligible families in extreme poverty—a single parent with 

one child and a single parent with two children. 

76The effect of the EITC and non-cash benefits such as SNAP and housing subsidies are not 

presented in these calculations because they are not included in the official measure of 

poverty. 

Page 36 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Figure 10: Estimated Impact of Monthly TANF Cash Assistance Receipt on a Family 

in Extreme Poverty in Illinois in 2005: A Working Single Parent with One or Two 

Children 

Source: GAO analysis of TRIM3 microsimulation model data. 

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

Monthly earnings

Child support payment income

Monthly TANF cash assistance payments

Without

TANF

With

TANF

Without

TANF

With

TANF

Single parent

with two

children

Single parent

with one

child

$346 $100

$50

$50

$176

$280

$346

$346 $100

$346

$115

$11

$210

Extreme poverty threshold

($656)

Extreme poverty threshold

($561)

$20

Note: The $346 in estimated monthly earnings is roughly half the median for families receiving TANF 

cash assistance. 

However, some families would remain in extreme poverty even with TANF 

benefits—those with no earned income or with low earned incomes who 

receive the maximum cash benefit in their state. For example, in Illinois, a 

single parent with two children who had no earned income would receive 

$396 per month in TANF benefits—an amount that would be $260 below 

the extreme poverty threshold for that type of family. 

Page 37 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Although the median income of eligible families would rise if TANF 

participation increased, neither the number of children in poverty nor the 

poverty rate would significantly change if families who were eligible for 

TANF cash assistance in 2005 participated at the higher 1995 rate.77 Nearly 

all of the estimated 3.3 million families in our TRIM3 analysis who would 

gain TANF benefits at the higher 1995 participation rate would experience 

an increase in their annual net income. However, these benefits would not 

be enough to lift a significant portion of them above the poverty 

threshold.78 

If More Eligible Families 

Participated in TANF, the 

Number of Children in 

Poverty Would Not 

Significantly Change 

One reason for this is that many children in poverty are not eligible for 

TANF, since the majority of states set their TANF eligibility standards at 

less than half of the federal poverty guidelines.79 States have the flexibility 

to determine how high or low to set their eligibility standards relative to 

the federal poverty guidelines. For example, in Alabama, a family of three 

must have earnings below $269 per month to be eligible for TANF cash 

assistance—an income that represents about 19 percent of the poverty 

guideline for this family size in 2006. Alabama has the lowest income 

eligibility threshold.80 In 2006, 56 percent of children in poverty lived in 

states that set their eligibility standards for TANF cash assistance below 

half of the federal poverty guidelines. Because of this, increasing TANF 

participation would not affect child poverty among children in states with 

very low eligibility standards. 

Another reason is that TANF benefits are typically too low to raise 

children in poverty above the federal poverty threshold. These benefits 

range from $170 per month in Mississippi to $723 per month in California 

 

77According to our TRIM3 analysis, an estimated 12.5 million children were in poverty in 

2005. Although reducing child poverty is not a formal goal of the TANF program, TANF 

cash assistance is designed for low-income families, and TANF recipient families typically 

have incomes below poverty. 

78Some families may not see a net increase in their annual income by the full amount of the 

TANF benefit because other programs such as SNAP count TANF benefits in determining 

income eligibility, as discussed earlier in this report. 

79Published by HHS, the poverty guidelines are used for determining the income eligibility 

of individuals and families for need-based assistance in some federal programs. Although 

the guidelines reflect variations in family size, the poverty guidelines—unlike the poverty 

thresholds—do not reflect variations in the age group of the family members. 

80Income eligibility thresholds incorporate monthly earnings limits and limits on assets and 

depend on a number of different factors associated with a family’s circumstances. 

Page 38 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

for a family of three.81 The median income for all families in poverty in 

2005 was approximately $10,500. If TANF participation were higher, 

families in poverty would have median incomes of about $11,100. This 

income is below the federal poverty threshold for a family of three.82

According to our estimates, TANF-eligible families consisting of one 

working adult and one or two children in Illinois—the state that has the 

median maximum TANF benefit—would still be in poverty after receiving 

TANF cash assistance.83 In this example, prior to participating in TANF, 

the income of the family with one child would fall $390 short of the federal 

poverty threshold and the income of the family with two children would 

fall $579 below poverty. After receiving TANF cash assistance, the 

incomes of both types of families would rise, but not enough to reach the 

poverty threshold. (See fig. 11.) 

 

81This range represents the continental United States. Alaska and Hawaii have higher 

federal poverty guidelines than the rest of the country. 

82The median income of families in poverty includes families who are not participating in 

TANF as well as those who are. Therefore, the income gained by TANF cash assistance is 

averaged across all families in poverty. 

83Each family was assumed to have one working adult, earning $632 per month. This is the 

median earnings of TANF families containing one adult and two children according to our 

analysis of 2005 participants. It is also the amount one would earn by working 18 hours per 

week at the Illinois minimum wage of $8 per hour. Families participating in the TANF 

program must assign their rights to child support to the state and do not receive the full 

amount of child support paid by the absent parent. 

Page 39 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Figure 11: Estimated Impact of Monthly TANF Cash Assistance Receipt on a Family 

in Poverty in Illinois in 2005: A Working Single Parent with One or Two Children 

Source: GAO analysis of TRIM3 microsimulation model data. 

0 $200 $400 $600 $800 $1,000 $1,200

Monthly earnings

Child support payment income

Monthly TANF cash assistance payments

Without

TANF

With

TANF

Without

TANF

With

TANF

Single parent

with two

children

Single parent

with one

child

Poverty

threshold

($1,311)

Poverty threshold

($1,122)

$632 $100

$50

$50

$81

$185

$632

$632 $100

$632

$390

$359

$579

$444

Finally, higher TANF participation would not significantly affect child 

poverty because some TANF families already have incomes above the 

federal poverty threshold. As of 2005, seven states have policies that allow 

a family of three with an income just above the federal poverty threshold 

to retain their TANF eligibility for at least 2 months. These states are 

Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Texas, and Virginia. In 

these states higher TANF participation could result in more families above 

poverty receiving benefits, which would not result in a reduction of the 

poverty rate. Twenty-eight percent of all children in poverty and 35 

percent of children receiving cash assistance lived in these states in 2005. 

Page 40 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

In the Current 

Recession, Changes in 

Cash Assistance 

Caseloads Varied 

Widely in States We 

Surveyed While Few 

States Reduced 

Spending for Family 

and/or Work Supports 

TANF and Solely StateFunded Cash Assistance 

Caseloads Increased to 

Varying Degrees in the 

Majority of States We 

Surveyed 

Between June 2008—6 months after the start of the current recession—

and June 2009, the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance 

increased in 12 of the 21 states we reviewed, decreased in 6 states and 

remained relatively unchanged in 3 states, according to state-provided 

data.84 The magnitude of these caseload changes, however, varied widely 

across states. For instance, over the same time period, the number of 

families receiving TANF cash assistance increased by 22 percent in 

Nevada and decreased by 9 percent in Texas. (See fig. 12.) 

 

84In this discussion of caseload changes during the recession, the TANF caseload numbers 

include participants in states’ separate state programs (SSP), which are funded with state 

MOE dollars. 

Page 41 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Figure 12: Percent Change in the Number of Families Receiving TANF Cash 

Assistance, by State, June 2008 through June 2009 

Source: GAO analysis of state-provided data.

WV VA

SC

AL

AR

MO

IN

WI

MN

NE

ID

MT

WY

OR

UT

NM

SD

ND

KS

OK TN

KY

LA

ME

LA

WA

+18%

NV

+22%

CA

+12%

AZ

+7%

NC

+10%

FL

+14%

CO

+15%

IA

+7% IL

+2%

OH

+17%

TX

-9%

MS

-1%

GA

-3%

PA

+1%

NH

+38%

MA

-3%

MI

-3%

NJ

-3%

NY

-1%

Not surveyed

■ RI

-10%

■ D.C.

+19%

-20% -10% 0 +10% +20%

Decrease in caseload Increase in caseload

During the current recession, more of the states we surveyed85 saw 

increases in the number of two-parent families receiving cash assistance 

than in the number of single-parent families or child-only cases.86 Between 

June 2008 and June 2009, the number of two-parent families receiving cash 

assistance increased in 17 of the states we surveyed, while the number of 

single-parent families increased in 15 states and the number of child-only 

 

85Pennsylvania and Rhode Island could not provide comparable caseload numbers for this 

analysis. 

86Child-only cases are those in which there is no adult recipient of assistance. There are 

four main categories of “child-only” cases: (1) the parent is disabled and receiving SSI; (2) 

the parent is a noncitizen and therefore ineligible; (3) the child is living with a nonparent 

relative; and (4) the parent has been sanctioned and removed from cash assistance for 

failing to comply with program requirements, and the family’s benefit has been 

correspondingly reduced. Guardians in child-only cases are not subject to work 

requirements. 

Page 42 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

cases increased in 12 states. The median percent change in the number of 

two-parent families receiving cash assistance was an increase of 27 

percent—far more than for other types of eligible families. While the 

number of two-parent families as a portion of all families receiving 

assistance was small, the increase in this population of cash assistance 

recipients is notable because they are the least common type of recipient 

group. Further, several state officials and representatives of social service 

organizations noted the increase in two-parent families associated with the 

current recession, which, according to unemployment data, has had a 

greater impact on men than women and might result in the need for twoparent families to seek assistance. 

While many of these two-parent families received assistance through their 

state’s TANF program, about 20 percent of these families received 

assistance through their state’s solely state-funded programs. Most of 

these programs also grew to varying degrees during the recession. Of the 

states we contacted, 13 maintained solely state-funded programs during 

the time period we examined and 9 of these experienced caseload 

increases between June 2008 and June 2009. These increases ranged from 

a 2 percent increase in the District of Columbia to a 10-fold increase in 

Colorado.87 Some state officials we surveyed explained that their 

assessment of their ability to meet federal work participation rates 

determined which families would be served through the solely statefunded program.88 Specifically, officials in the 13 states with solely statefunded programs explained that these programs, in whole or part, served 

two-parent families because the state was concerned that it would not be 

able to meet the federally established 90 percent work participation rate 

for two-parent families. In seven of the states with a solely state-funded 

program, the state’s entire two-parent family caseload was served through 

 

87The three states in which the solely state-funded program’s caseload declined were New 

Jersey, where the TANF caseload also declined and at roughly the same rate; New 

Hampshire, which eliminated a portion of its solely state-funded program because of state 

budget constraints; and Rhode Island, which discontinued benefits to children whose 

parents had reached their time limit in October 2008 and eliminated the program as of June 

2009. The caseloads for solely state-funded programs in Mississippi and Pennsylvania 

remained relatively unchanged. For the purposes of this report, we refer to the District of 

Columbia as a state. 

88Prior to the reauthorization of TANF in 2006, states had used SSPs for this purpose. 

However, after reauthorization, SSP/MOE-funded programs became subject to TANF 

requirements and recipients were subject to the same work participation requirements as 

TANF recipients. 

Page 43 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

this program. In a few states, solely state-funded programs also served 

families with disabilities who similarly may have been unable to meet 

mandatory work participation rates, particularly requirements for a 

minimum number of hours in a work activity, according to state officials. 

In order to understand more fully the extent to which families are 

receiving cash assistance in the current recession, including those families 

who are in solely state-funded programs in caseloads provides a more 

comprehensive picture of these changes.89 Because these programs are 

funded only by states and are not counted toward state maintenance-ofeffort requirements, HHS lacks authority to require that their caseload 

data be reported to HHS, according to HHS officials. In some states, 

including families from these solely state-funded programs in the state’s 

total cash assistance caseload provided a more accurate picture of 

increases or decreases in states’ programs in the current recession.90 For 

instance, in Colorado, the number of families receiving TANF cash 

assistance increased by 15 percent. However, the solely state-funded 

program experienced a large amount of growth, and overall the state’s 

cash assistance caseload increased by more than 33 percent. In Rhode 

Island, the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance decreased 

by 10 percent. However, in October 2008 the state discontinued benefits to 

children it had been serving through the solely state-funded program 

whose parents had received 5 years of assistance, so overall the state’s 

cash assistance caseload decreased by more than 20 percent. In other 

states, including the solely state-funded caseload reveals a more modest 

degree of change than the TANF caseload might indicate. For example, 

New Hampshire eliminated part of its solely state-funded program due to 

budget concerns and moved families receiving benefits into the TANF 

program. As a result, the number of families receiving TANF cash 

assistance increased by almost 38 percent, while overall the state’s cash 

assistance caseload increased by a substantial, but more modest, 23 

percent. (See fig. 13.) 

 

89Analyses of cash assistance caseload data for 2005 in the previous three sections of this 

report provide a comprehensive characterization of the cash assistance caseload because 

they reflect both TANF cash assistance and SSP caseload data combined for 2005. Solely 

state-funded programs were not implemented until fiscal year 2007. 

90Omitting solely state-funded families in calculating the number of families receiving cash 

assistance could lead to underestimating the extent of caseload growth or overestimating 

the extent of caseload decline. 

Page 44 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Figure 13: For States with a Solely State-Funded Program, Percent Change in the Number of Families Receiving Cash 

Assistance from TANF and from TANF and Solely State-Funded Programs Combined, June 2008 through June 2009 

Source: GAO analysis of state-provided data.

0

10

20

30

40

50%

Percentage of families

Colo. D.C. Ill. N.H. Penn.

Ga. Mass. Mich. Miss. N.J. N.Y. R.I. Texas

14.9

-8.9

19.3

-2.5 -2.5

1.6

-2.9 -3.0

-0.8 -0.8

37.9

-2.7

-1.1

0.8

-10.4

-8.5

33.3

8.4

3.8

-1.9 -1.7

23.4

-2.6

-0.3

0.7

-21.3

TANF and SSP

TANF, SSP, and SSF

In the time period we examined, there was no clear association between 

the change in the number of families receiving cash assistance in a state 

and either the unemployment rate or the change in unemployment rate in 

that state. (See table 1.) For instance, Illinois, the District of Columbia, 

Florida, and Georgia all had unemployment rates of between 10 and 11 

percent in June 2009. However, caseloads increased 4 percentage points in 

Illinois, 8 percentage points in the District of Columbia, and 14 percentage 

points in Florida, and decreased 3 percentage points in Georgia, between 

June 2008 and June 2009. Similarly, both New Jersey and Washington 

experienced a 4 percentage point increase in unemployment rates between 

June 2008 and June 2009. However, caseloads decreased 3 percentage 

points in New Jersey and increased 18 percentage points in Washington 

over the same period of time. This does not mean that there is no 

relationship between unemployment and cash assistance caseloads, but 

Page 45 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

rather that unemployment is one of many factors—including the state’s 

eligibility and asset limits, the state’s application process, and other statespecific program characteristics—that may affect a state’s caseload. 

Table 1: Cash Assistance Caseload Changes and Unemployment Information in 

Selected States, June 2008 through June 2009 

 

Percent change in 

caseload (TANF+ SSP+ 

solely state-funded 

programs) June 2008 to 

June 2009

Unemployment 

rate June 2009

Change in 

unemployment 

rate June 2008

to June 2009

Arizona 7.25 8.7 3.2

California 11.51 11.6 4.5

Colorado 33.29 7.6 2.8

District of Columbia 8.44 10.9 4.1

Florida 14.25 10.7 4.7

Georgia -2.50 10.1 4.0

Illinois 3.82 10.3 3.7

Iowa 6.65 6.2 2.1

Massachusetts -1.91 8.6 3.5

Michigan -1.71 15.2 7.1

Mississippi -0.83 9.1 2.2

Nevada 21.66 11.9 5.5

New Hampshire 23.39 6.8 3.1

New Jersey -2.61 9.2 4.0

New York -0.28 8.7 3.4

North Carolina 9.96 11.0 4.9

Ohio 16.54 11.1 4.7

Pennsylvania 0.68 8.4 3.1

Rhode Island -21.27 12.4 4.7

Texas -8.51 7.5 2.7

Washington 17.76 9.2 4.0

Source: GAO analysis of state-provided data and data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 

Since June 2009, state and local fiscal conditions have continued to 

deteriorate, and the effect of the changes in the economic climate on 

TANF and solely state-funded cash assistance programs is unknown. For 

example, the impact of expiring extensions of unemployment insurance 

(UI) on state caseloads is hard to predict. Officials from eight states 

believed that the number of families receiving cash assistance in their 

Page 46 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

states had not increased, or had not increased as much as might have been 

expected, because families were still collecting UI benefits.91 If jobs are 

still not available when UI benefits end, these families may turn to TANF 

for cash assistance. However, two experts we interviewed questioned the 

extent to which UI has lessened or delayed the need for cash assistance. 

Eligibility for UI is generally conditional on meeting certain state-imposed 

qualifications, including having a minimum amount of wages and 

employment over a defined period of time as well as having become 

unemployed for good cause under state law. According to two experts we 

interviewed, many TANF-eligible single-mothers would not likely meet the 

criteria for receipt. Still, UI benefit extensions may be delaying the need 

for cash assistance for some two–parent families that do qualify for UI 

benefits. 

Few States We Surveyed 

Reduced Spending on 

Family and Work Supports 

during the Current 

Recession to Offset 

Increased Spending on 

Cash Assistance 

Few states we surveyed reported that they had reduced TANF block grant 

and MOE spending for family and work supports, such as child care and 

subsidized employment programs, to offset increased expenditures for 

growth in their cash assistance caseloads.92 When a state’s spending on 

cash assistance increases, it has several options to address this need for 

additional resources. The state can use reserve funds, if available, to 

defray costs; use state funds to augment the TANF program; access the 

TANF contingency fund; access the Emergency Contingency Fund created 

under ARRA; shift resources from work support programs; or cut services. 

In a previous GAO report, we found that when cash assistance caseloads 

and related spending increased in the states we reviewed, there was an 

associated contraction in the spending for other forms of aid and 

services.93 However, we did not observe this trend in the time period we 

explored. According to state officials, 11 of the 21 states we surveyed 

increased spending on cash assistance between June 2008 and June 2009. 

Of these 11 states, 7 either maintained or increased the amount of TANF-

 

91Unemployment benefits had been extended, in some states, to 79 weeks. UI recipients 

often cannot qualify for TANF until their UI benefits have been fully expended, since 

monthly UI benefits often exceed the maximum income that states allow to be eligible for 

TANF. 

92TANF block grant and MOE spending are two components of federal, state, and local 

spending on a range of programs aimed at serving low-income and needy populations. In 

this section, we will refer to them collectively as TANF-related spending. 

93GAO, Welfare Reform: Better Information Needed to Understand Trends in States’ Uses of 

the TANF Block Grant, GAO-06-414 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006). 

Page 47 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

related spending for family and work supports—including child-care 

subsidies, transportation subsidies, subsidized employment, CCDF, and 

SSBG. The remaining four states reduced spending for family and/or work 

supports to offset the cost of increased spending on cash assistance.94

However, in three of the seven states that did not make cuts to family 

and/or work supports, officials offered that they expected there would be 

cuts in TANF-related spending for these services in the near future 

because of state budget and resource constraints associated with their 

growing caseloads. (See table 2.) 

Table 2: Disposition of Spending for Family and/or Work Supports by States That 

Increased Spending on Cash Assistance, Selected States, June 2008 through June 

2009 

 

Cut TANF-related 

spending for family and/or 

work supports 

Maintained or increased TANFrelated spending for family and/or 

work supports 

California 3

Colorado 3

District of Columbia 3

Florida 3

Illinois 3

Iowa 3

Massachusetts 3

Nevada 3

New Hampshire 3

Ohio 3

Washington 3

Source: Interviews with state officials. 

Note: Of the 21 states we surveyed, 10 states did not increase spending on TANF-related cash 

assistance in this time frame. These states were Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Mississippi, New 

Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas. 

States that increased spending on cash assistance while maintaining or 

increasing TANF-related spending for family and/or work supports did so 

by spending reserve funds, accessing the TANF Contingency Fund, 

accessing the ARRA Emergency Contingency Fund, or a combination of 

 

94Of the four states that reduced TANF-related spending for family and/or work supports, 

one cut spending for child care and three made cuts to employment-related programs. 

Page 48 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

the three. (See table 3.) Under PRWORA, states can save portions of their 

TANF block grant to use in the future for cash assistance to families. 

According to state officials, four of the seven states accessed these reserve 

or carry-over funds accumulated from previous years to increase cash 

assistance expenditures and maintain or increase expenditures on the 

family supports. Officials in one of these states, though, told us that 

projections show that it will have expended all of its reserve funds within 

the next 2 years. 

Table 3: Sources of Funding Used by States to Offset Increased Spending on TANFrelated Cash Assistance, June 2008 through June 2009 

 

Used Reserve 

Fund 

Used TANF 

Contingency Fund 

Used Emergency 

Contingency Fund 

Californiaa3

Colorado 3 3 3

District of Columbia 3 3

Florida 3

Illinois 3

Iowa 3 3

Massachusettsa3 3

Nevada 3 3 3

New Hampshire 3

Ohioa3 3

Washingtona 3 3 3

Source: Interviews with state officials and HHS-provided documentation. 

Note: Of the 21 states we surveyed, 10 states did not increase spending on TANF-related cash 

assistance in this time frame. These states were Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Mississippi, New 

Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas. 

a

This table also includes the four states that cut TANF-related spending for family and/or work 

supports in this time frame—California, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Washington. 

Until recently, states may also have been eligible to use the TANF 

Contingency Fund, but these funds are now depleted. Of the seven states 

in our survey that increased spending on cash assistance while 

maintaining TANF-related spending on family and work supports, all seven 

were eligible to apply for access to the Contingency Fund, according to 

HHS, and in fiscal year 2009, two of these states had drawn money from 

this fund. At the end of the fiscal year in September 2009, there was about 

$212 million left in the contingency fund. For the first quarter of the 2010 

fiscal year, New York had applied for more than half the remaining sum, 

according to state officials. Anticipating the exhaustion of the Contingency 

Page 49 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

Fund, officials from one state we surveyed questioned the state’s ability to 

continue funding their TANF programs at current levels. According to HHS 

officials, final payments from the TANF Contingency Fund were 

distributed in December 2009. 

In addition, states used or planned to use money drawn from the 

Emergency Contingency Fund created by ARRA to allow them to increase 

spending on cash assistance without cutting TANF-related spending for 

family and work supports. According to HHS data, as of October 2009, all 

21 of the states we surveyed applied for money from the Emergency 

Contingency Fund, including all 7 of the states that increased spending on 

cash assistance but did not reduce TANF-related spending for family and 

work supports.95 Most states we surveyed that had applied for Emergency 

Contingency Funds plan to use them to cover the growing number of 

families receiving cash assistance, according to state officials. In addition, 

officials in some states told us that these funds may allow them to 

continue providing family and work supports at the current level and 

expand subsidized employment programs.96 However, one state official 

explained that caseloads and spending could increase or remain high 

beyond fiscal year 2010, the time when Emergency Contingency Funds will 

no longer be available to supplement funding. 

We provided a draft of this report to HHS for its review, and a copy of the 

agency’s written response is in appendix II. In its comments, HHS said that 

the report was informative and did not disagree with our findings. HHS 

noted that the report provided useful insights into a range of factors that 

help account for declines in TANF participation, the extent to which 

increased participation in TANF among eligible families could reduce the 

severity of poverty, and the challenges facing states as they respond to 

increased need during the economic downturn. The agency also noted 

several useful areas for additional work, for example, on the extent and 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

 

95Six of these states applied for Emergency Contingency Fund on the basis of increases in 

cash assistance spending due to caseload increases. One of these states also applied 

because of spending increases for non-recurring benefits and two applied because of 

spending increases for subsidized employment. 

96One state said that TANF-related spending on certain family and work supports, 

particularly child care, may decrease in the coming year because additional ARRA funds 

are available for this specific purpose. Using ARRA child care funds would free up TANF 

funds to address increases in families receiving cash assistance in this state. 

Page 50 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
 

nature of disability among eligible nonparticipants and how participation 

may change over the course of the recession. With regard to our finding on 

the characteristics of participants and nonparticipants, HHS suggested 

that more could be learned by examining subgroups of nonparticipants 

rather than examining nonparticipants broadly as a group. The agency also 

suggested that we discuss our findings about nonparticipants in the 

context of the research literature on this subject. Our study was designed 

to describe the characteristics of both participants and eligible 

nonparticipants, as requested, and we further identified the characteristics 

of one important subgroup of nonparticipating eligible families. While we 

agree that further analyses of subgroups of nonparticipants could be 

useful, conducting such analyses was beyond the scope of our 

engagement. Finally, HHS also provided technical comments on the draft, 

and in response to these comments, we made changes where appropriate. 

We also provided the draft report to external reviewers with expertise in 

welfare reform and TANF and incorporated their comments as appropriate. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its 

issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary 

of Health and Human Services, appropriate congressional committees, and 

other interested parties. The report is also available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-7215 or brownke@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Director, Education, Workforce, 

ecurity Issues 

Kay E. Brown 

 and Income S

Page 51 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 52 GAO-10-164 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

We designed our study to provide information on (1) the factors that 

contributed to the decline in families receiving TANF cash assistance since 

the 1990s, (2) how the characteristics of eligible families who participate 

in TANF compare to eligible families who do not receive TANF cash 

assistance, (3) how the participation of eligible families in TANF affects 

the number of children in extreme poverty and poverty, and (4) the 

changes states are experiencing in the number of families receiving cash 

assistance in the current recession and what changes, if any, states have 

made in their TANF–related spending to respond to any increases. 

Overall, to address these objectives, we contracted with the Urban 

Institute for analyses using the Transfer Income Model, version 3—a 

microsimulation model known as TRIM3—which simulates major 

governmental tax, transfer, and health programs, including TANF;1

reviewed literature and relevant federal laws and regulations; interviewed 

TANF experts and officials at HHS; interviewed state TANF officials in 21 

selected states and obtained state TANF data; and contacted state-based 

social services organizations in the selected states. 

We conducted our work from November 2008 to February 2010 in 

accordance with all sections of GAO’s Quality Assurance Framework that 

are relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan and 

perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to 

meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work. We 

believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis 

conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions in 

this product. 

 

1

The TRIM3 model uses the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS) and the 

Welfare Rules Database (maintained at the Urban Institute under HHS funding) to simulate 

eligibility based on state-specific program rules and information on income and other 

eligibility criteria. The Welfare Rules Database provides a longitudinal account of the 

changes in welfare rules in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The database 

organizes the detailed information on welfare rules across states, time, and geographic 

areas within states and different types of assistance units. Caseworker manuals and state 

regulations provide the data from 1997 to the present, while AFDC State Plans and Waiver 

Terms and Conditions provide the data for years prior to 1997. GAO did not conduct a legal 

analysis of state laws or requirements for state cash assistance programs. 

TANF Cash Assistance 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Analyses Using the 

Transfer Income Model, 

Version 3 (TRIM3) 

To identify factors contributing to the caseload decline (for question 1), 

compare the characteristics of TANF participants and non-participants 

(for question 2), and analyze the impact of TANF participation on child 

poverty and extreme poverty (for question 3), we contracted with the 

Urban Institute for analyses—using the Transfer Income Model, version 3, 

known as TRIM3. TRIM3 is maintained and developed at the Urban 

Institute under primary funding from HHS, Office of the Assistant 

Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. TRIM3 simulates major 

governmental tax, transfer, and health programs, including TANF. TRIM3 

can be used to estimate the effect of rule changes, such as restrictions on 

eligibility for legal immigrants, on the number of eligible families; compare 

the income and other characteristics of participating and nonparticipating 

families; and estimate the effect of higher TANF participation rates on 

child poverty and extreme child poverty, with incomes below 50 percent 

of the federal poverty level. Using TRIM3 for these analyses required our 

input on assumptions and/or interpretations about economic behavior and 

about the rules governing federal programs. Therefore, the conclusions 

presented in this report are attributable only to GAO. 

The TRIM3 microsimulation model was used to estimate the number of 

families who would be eligible for TANF and the amount of their potential 

benefits. The model simulates the process a caseworker would go through 

to determine eligibility based on each family’s state of residence, 

household composition, income, and other factors. TRIM3 relies on the 

Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current 

Population Survey (CPS), as well as information from the Welfare Rules 

Database, to simulate eligibility based on state specific program rules and 

information on income and other eligibility criteria. 

The model was also used to estimate the number of families who 

participate in the TANF program. While the ASEC includes information on 

whether a family received TANF, the benefit is substantially underreported. Among TANF-eligible families who did not report receipt of 

TANF, a family’s likelihood of TANF participation is estimated based on 

the family’s demographic characteristics and the level of potential benefit. 

Simulated participation decisions are aligned to bring the simulated 

caseload acceptably close to the actual caseload in overall size and by key 

characteristics. TRIM3 does not model certain aspects of program 

eligibility, such as sanctions from failing to comply with work rules or 

child support rules, diversion strategies, or adherence to behavioral 

requirements such as school attendance and immunizations. The fact that 

TRIM3 does not model sanctions means that the model may overestimate 

eligibility and underestimate participation rates. 

Page 53 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

In this study, we used both “baseline” simulations and “alternative” 

simulations of TANF cash assistance. TRIM3 baseline simulations are 

simulations that apply the actual policies that were in place in a particular 

year to the CPS survey data for that year. In a baseline simulation, the 

initially-estimated probabilities of participation are modified in order to 

bring the size and characteristics of the simulated caseload sufficiently 

close to the size and characteristics of the actual caseload in that year. We 

used TRIM3 baseline estimates for TANF cash assistance for our analyses 

of the characteristics of participants and nonparticipants in 2005, and as 

the point of comparison for the alternative simulations—using 1995 

participation rates—for our analyses of the effect of TANF 2005 rules on 

the 1995 AFDC population and our analyses of TANF participation on 

child poverty. 

Our TRIM3 analyses are based on data from 2005 because it was the most 

recent publicly available data when we conducted our work. We chose 

1995 as a comparison year partly because it was the year prior to the 

creation of TANF under PRWORA. Researchers at the Urban Institute also 

advised us that 1996 data was not likely to be reliable because of data 

system transitions from the prior program, AFDC, to TANF. Furthermore, 

Urban Institute researchers told us they could not use 1996 data to analyze 

the impact of PRWORA rules on families’ eligibility because non-citizens’ 

legal status (e.g., whether legal permanent resident, undocumented, 

refugee, or temporary resident) had not been imputed for that year’s data. 

Given these technical limitations, we agreed that 1995 data was best and 

that it also provided a 10-year spread for comparison. 

To provide insight into the impact of the immigrant restrictions, time 

limits, and other PRWORA rules on TANF eligibility, we applied the 

PRWORA changes to the 1995 caseload data, assuming that the rules had 

been imposed 10 years before they were actually imposed. In cases of 

state options with regard to policies, states were assumed to make the 

same choices as they made in 2005. It is important to note that this type of 

analysis cannot definitively establish the portion of caseload change from 

1995 to 2005 that is due solely to a particular rules change, due to the 

potential inter-relationships between rules, population characteristics, and 

participation behavior. 

To compare the characteristics of eligible families who participate in 

TANF to eligible families who do not receive TANF cash assistance, we 

analyzed differences in demographic characteristics, such as race, age, 

family type; income differences, such as median income and poverty 

status; and the receipt of other public supports such as SNAP, subsidized 

Page 54 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

child care, or subsidized housing. For this analysis we used 2005 data, the 

most recent available. Estimates in this analysis are based on annual data, 

so as to capture longer term characteristics of these families, and the 

distribution of the annual caseload by some characteristics could be 

different from the distribution of the monthly-snapshot caseload. When 

looking at income differences between groups, we compared all gross 

cash income, such as earnings and child support, and excluded meanstested benefits such as TANF or Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a 

cash assistance program for low-income people who are elderly or who 

have disabilities. We also examined the characteristics of a subgroup of 

eligible nonparticipants who during the year were neither working nor 

receiving SSI. In comparing the characteristics of participants and 

nonparticipants, differences are statistically significant at the 95 percent 

confidence level unless otherwise noted. 

To estimate how the participation of eligible families in TANF affects the 

number of children in extreme poverty and poverty, we imposed the 1995 

AFDC participation rate of 84 percent on the 2005 population. To do this, 

we started from each family’s probability of participation as produced by 

TRIM3’s baseline simulation—the result of the statistical equation, 

adjusted by adjustment factors established during the baseline alignment 

process—but we applied an additional across-the-board adjustment factor 

to increase each family’s probability of participation. This has the effect of 

bringing in the “next most likely” families until the desired participation 

rate is reached. Some families are technically eligible for TANF but are 

financially better off without taking TANF, due to the fact that the amount 

of child support that would be retained by the state exceeds the TANF 

benefit they would receive. These families were simulated to remain 

nonparticipants; all the new TANF participants were selected from 

families who would receive more in TANF than they would lose in child 

support income. 

To estimate the impact of TANF receipt on examples of families in 

extreme poverty and poverty, we chose Illinois because it is the state with 

the median TANF benefit. Earnings for families in poverty were set at $632 

per month. This is the median earnings of TANF families containing one 

adult and two children, according to our analysis of 2005 participants. It is 

also the amount one would earn by working 18 hours per week at the 

Illinois minimum wage of $8 per hour. Earnings for families in extreme 

poverty were set at $346, based on the assumption that families in extreme 

poverty work 10 hours a week at the Illinois minimum wage of $8 per 

hour, and about half of median earnings of TANF families containing one 

adult and two children. 

Page 55 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

We assessed the reliability of the TRIM3 modeling procedures by 

reviewing extensive documentation on the TRIM3 model and input data 

sources, having several conversations with staff from the Urban Institute 

who were responsible for the work provided under our contract, reviewing 

the Urban Institute’s internal quality control procedures, and having 

extensive discussions about the underlying assumptions used in specifying 

the models. We identified data limitations in the CPS that we reconciled 

with the Urban Institute through meetings and acquiring additional 

documentation. In addition to the estimates presented in the report, the 

Urban Institute calculated standard errors and performed statistical tests 

of significance for all estimates and pairwise comparisons. We verified 

that those calculations were correct by reviewing the CPS technical 

documentation. We evaluated other TRIM3 estimates, particularly those 

illustrating hypothetical scenarios, on the basis of substantive significance 

rather than statistical significance. To this end, we considered the size and 

direction of the effect rather than whether the statistic differed from zero 

to assess the validity of the estimate. We determined that none of the data 

limitations or modeling assumptions affected or compromised the analysis 

for this report and the data are considered to be sufficiently reliable for 

our purposes. 

Review of Literature and 

Legislation 

To analyze the factors that contributed to the decline in families receiving 

TANF cash assistance since the 1990s, we conducted a review of relevant 

literature by researchers by obtaining recommendations for studies from 

internal GAO and external TANF researchers and policy experts, including 

HHS officials; searching various databases for peer-reviewed journal 

articles and other publications; and reviewing policy and research 

organization websites for relevant studies. We used the relevant research 

to analyze the factors researchers have identified as contributing to the 

declining number of families receiving cash assistance. At least two social 

scientists or statisticians with specialized training in the evaluation of 

research methodology reviewed each study to assess its methodology. Our 

conclusions about the factors contributing to the decline in the number of 

cash recipients are based, in part, on our assessment of the evidence 

presented in these studies. We also reviewed relevant federal laws and 

regulations. We did not conduct a legal analysis of state laws of state cash 

assistance programs for this report. As noted elsewhere, references to 

state laws or rules were based on the Welfare Rules Database, which is 

maintained at the Urban Institute under HHS/ACF funding and is used by 

the TRIM3 model in its simulations. 

Page 56 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

We also interviewed researchers and policy analysts at academic centers 

and other organizations to obtain their perspectives on factors that 

contributed to the decline in cash assistance caseloads since the 1990s and 

any information they may have had on state experiences during the 

current recession. In selecting experts for our interviews, we sought 

researchers and organizations who have conducted work on welfare 

issues and who could provide us with a range of perspectives. We 

interviewed TANF researchers and officials at the Department of Health 

and Human Services (HHS) as well as researchers and policy analysts at 

the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, The 

Brookings Institution, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Center for 

Law and Social Policy, Congressional Research Service, Johns Hopkins 

University, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., the Urban Institute, and the 

University of Michigan (National Poverty Center).2

 We also interviewed 

officials at the American Public Human Services Association, the National 

Conference of State Legislatures, and the National Governors Association. 

Interviews with 

Researchers and Policy 

Analysts 

Interviews with State 

Officials 

To determine if and how the number of families receiving cash assistance 

and the use of TANF-related funds have changed during the current 

recession, we conducted semi-structured telephone interviews with TANF 

officials in 21 states and obtained data on their TANF programs, and 

where applicable, SSPs and solely state-funded programs. In addition, we 

reviewed TANF data on the number of families receiving cash assistance 

and other administrative data available through HHS. We pre-tested our 

questions in California, Iowa, New York, and Rhode Island. In our 

interviews, we asked questions about changes in the number of families 

receiving cash assistance, in the uses of the TANF block grant and MOE 

funds, and in other polices that might affect the number of applicants or 

recipients. We also asked about state’s plans for use of ARRA stimulus 

funding. 

The 21 states we selected to interview represent a range of child poverty 

rates, unemployment rates, cash assistance caseloads, approaches to 

sanctions and monthly earnings limits, and geographic diversity. 

Collectively these states represent more than half the families receiving 

TANF cash assistance nationally. Our analysis focused on the period 

 

2

After we initiated our interviews, the researcher who was affiliated with the American 

Enterprise Institute moved to the University of Maryland (School of Public Policy). 

Page 57 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

between June 2008 and June 2009, beginning 6 months after the official 

start of the current recession. The 21 states included in our analysis were: 

Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, 

Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 

York, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, 

Washington, and the District of Columbia.3

Analysis of Caseload Data We collected data on the number of families receiving cash assistance 

from June 2008 and June 2009 for the 21 states we selected. This includes 

federal TANF data as well as data from separate state programs and solely 

state-funded programs for states that had such programs.4

 We analyzed 

these data for changes in the number of families receiving cash assistance 

as well as the types of families receiving cash assistance. 

We assessed the reliability of data obtained through our 21 state agency 

surveys by asking questions on the survey that helped us gauge the 

agency’s processes and procedures for collecting and maintaining data of 

reasonable quality and reliability. We asked questions pertaining to data 

entry procedures, training, edit checks, written documentation of 

procedures, supervisory or other internal and external reviews of data, 

and known limitations of the data. The answers were analyzed for 

concerns and states were re-contacted as necessary to gain clarity about 

the concern and assess the degree to which the concern would limit data 

quality. We determined that none of these concerns or limitations affected 

or compromised the data submitted for this review and the data are 

considered to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

State-Based Social Service 

Organizations 

To understand why eligible families may not participate in TANF and to 

learn more about families’ experiences with the TANF application process, 

we contacted state-level social service and other organizations in selected 

states regarding state TANF practices and policies. To identify state-level 

organizations that could provide the perspective of families on the 

 

3

For the purposes of this report, we refer to the District of Columbia as a state. 

4

Prior to the 2006 reauthorization of TANF, the families served by SSPs were not subject to 

TANF work requirements. During that time, SSPs often served families that states believed 

were unable to meet mandatory work requirements, such as parents with disabilities. This 

was changed in reauthorization, when families in these programs became subject to federal 

TANF work requirements. 

Page 58 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

experience of applying for and receiving cash aid, we requested the names 

and contact information from TANF officials that we interviewed in 21 

states.5

 In these interviews, we asked officials to identify state-level 

organizations in their states that could address issues such as application 

processes, benefit levels, and sanctions as they affect families. In some 

cases, these social services groups referred us to alternative organizations 

for our review, and in those cases we contacted these additional 

organizations. In one case, we identified and contacted a state-level 

service provider organization for a state that did not provide us with a 

contact initially. We e-mailed questions to the organizations we identified 

in these ways to obtain their perspective on possible reasons why eligible 

families would not participate in TANF, the ability of families to navigate 

the application process in their state, and other issues. We obtained 

written responses to these questions from state organizations and used 

them in this report solely for illustrative purposes. 

 

5

For information on how we selected states for telephone interviews of TANF 

administrators, see the description of our methodology for obtaining information on state 

caseload changes in the current recession. 

Page 59 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services 

of Health and Human Services 

Page 60 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Health and Human Services 

Page 61 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Health and Human Services 

Page 62 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 63 GAO-10-164 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Kay E. Brown, Director (202) 512-7215 or brownke@gao.gov Contact 

Heather McCallum Hahn, Assistant Director; Kathryn A. Larin, Assistant 

Director; and Deborah A. Signer, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this 

assignment and made significant contributions to all aspects of this report. 

Hedieh Rahmanou Fusfield and Jessica R. Wintfeld, Analysts, also made 

important contributions to this report. Katya Melkote assisted with data 

collection and analysis, and Susannah Compton and James Bennett 

provided writing and graphics assistance. In addition, Susan Offutt, Chief 

Economist, and Max Sawicky provided assistance with economic aspects 

of this study; Shana B. Wallace and Monique B. Williams provided design 

and methodological assistance; Russell C. Burnett provided additional 

methodological assistance; and Alexander G. Galuten provided legal 

assistance. 

Acknowledgments 

TANF Cash Assistance 
Related GAO Reports

Page 64 GAO-10-164 

Related GAO Reports 

Poverty in America: Consequences for Individuals and the Economy. 

GAO-07-343TT. Washington, D.C.: January 24, 2007. 

Welfare Reform: Better Information Needed to Understand Trends in 

States’ Uses of the TANF Block Grant. GAO-06-414. Washington, D.C.: 

March 3, 2006. 

Welfare Reform: More Information Needed to Assess Promising Strategies 

to Increase Parents’ Incomes. GAO-06-108. Washington, D.C.: December 2, 

2005. 

Welfare Reform: HHS Should Exercise Oversight to Help Ensure TANF 

Work Participation Is Measured Consistently across States. GAO-05-821. 

Washington, D.C.: August 19, 2005. 

Means-Tested Programs: Information on Program Access Can Be an 

Important Management Tool. GAO-05-221. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 

2005. 

TANF AND SSI: Opportunities Exist to Help People with Impairments 

Become More Self-Sufficient. GAO-04-878. Washington, D.C.: September 

15, 2004. 

Welfare Reform: Information on Changing Labor Market and State Fiscal 

Conditions. GAO-03-977. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003. 

Welfare Reform: Former TANF Recipients with Impairments Less Likely to 

Be Employed and More Likely to Receive Federal Supports. GAO-03-210. 

Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2002. 

Welfare Reform: Outcomes for TANF Recipients with Impairments. 

GAO-02-884. Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2002. 

Welfare Reform: With TANF Flexibility, States Vary in How They 

Implement Work Requirements and Time Limits. GAO-02-770. Washington, 

D.C.: July 5, 2002. 

Welfare Reform: States Provide TANF-Funded Work Support Services to 

Many Low-Income Families Who Do Not Receive Cash Assistance. 

GAO-02-615TT. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2002. 

TANF Cash Assistance
Related GAO Reports 

Welfare Reform: States Are Using TANF Flexibility to Adapt Work 

Requirements and Time Limits to Meet State and Local Needs. 

GAO-02-501T. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2002. T

Welfare Reform: Progress in Meeting Work-Focused TANF Goals. 

GAO-01-522TT. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2001. 

Welfare Reform: Moving Hard-to-Employ Recipients into the Workforce. 

GAO-01-368. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2001. 

Unemployment Insurance: Role as Safety Net for Low-Wage Workers Is 

Limited. GAO-01-181. Washington, D.C.: December 29, 2000. 

(130900) Page 65 GAO-10-164 TANF Cash Assistance
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