alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                             837
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   18,560
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    580,042
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               599,439
<PP&E>                                         231,530
<DEPRECIATION>                                 231,162
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 606,496
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          858,537
<BONDS>                                              0
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   606,496
<SALES>                                        110,796
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               110,796
<CGS>                                          100,296
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  100,296
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,130
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,370
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              3,370
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<NET-INCOME>                                     3,370
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    0.004
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</TABLE>
225.7020-1 Definitions. As used in this section— *Agency or instrumentality of the government of Venezuela* means an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in 28 U.S.C. 1603(b), with each reference in section 1603(b) to a foreign state deemed to be a reference to Venezuela.
*Business operations* means engaging in commerce in any form, including acquiring, developing, maintaining, owning, selling, possessing, leasing, or operating equipment, facilities, personnel, products, services, personal property, real property, or any other apparatus of business or commerce.
*Government of Venezuela* means the government of any political subdivision of Venezuela, and any agency or instrumentality of the government of Venezuela.
*Person* means— ( 1 ) A natural person, corporation, company, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group;
( 2 ) Any governmental entity or instrumentality of a government, including a multilateral development institution (as defined in section 1701(c)(3) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(3)); and
( 3 ) Any successor, subunit, parent entity, or subsidiary of, or any entity under common ownership or control with, any entity described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this definition.
[87 FR 31960, May 26, 2022]
#### In the Matter of Vladimir Markovich et al., Respondents, v. Ralph Feriola et al., Constituting the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Yonkers, Appellants. Leonard Kaufman et al., Intervenors-Appellants.

In a proceeding pursuant to article 78 of the former Civil Practice Act, to review and annul a determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Yonkers, made June 18, 1963 after a hearing, granting to the interveners a variance so as to permit the erection of an apartment house containing 74 apartments, the board and the intervenors appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered December 13, 1963, which annulled said determination and variance. (See 41 Misc 2d 1051.) Judgment affirmed, without costs. Unlike *Matter of Satin*v. *Board of Stds. & Appeals*(28 Misc 2d 931, affd. 15 A D 2d 531, mot. for lv. to app. den. 11 N Y 2d 643), in which adequate proof was submitted and appropriate findings made, here there was a complete failure to comply with the local zoning ordinance which requires the board’s “ specific finding or findings, supported by evidence produced at a public hearing ” as a condition precedent to the grant of a variance, whether the variance be a use variance or an area variance. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Brennan, Hill, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
19.809-2 Limitations on subcontracting and nonmanufacturer rule. ( a ) *Limitations on subcontracting.* To be awarded a contract or order under the 8(a) program, the 8(a) participant is required to perform— ( 1 ) For services (except construction), at least 50 percent of the cost incurred for personnel with its own employees;
( 2 ) For supplies or products (other than a procurement from a nonmanufacturer of such supplies or products), at least 50 percent of the cost of manufacturing the supplies or products (not including the cost of materials);
( 3 ) For general construction, at least 15 percent of the cost with its own employees (not including the cost of materials); and
( 4 ) For construction by special trade contractors, at least 25 percent of the cost with its own employees (not including the cost of materials).
( b ) *Compliance period.* An 8(a) contractor is required to comply with the limitations on subcontracting— ( 1 ) For a contract under the 8(a) program, either by the end of the base term and then by the end of each subsequent option period or by the end of the performance period for each order issued under the contract, at the contracting officer's discretion; and
( 2 ) For an order competed exclusively among contractors who are 8(a) participants or for an order issued directly to one 8(a) contractor in accordance with 19.504(c)(1)(ii), by the end of the performance period for the order.
( c ) *Waiver.* The applicable SBA District Director may waive the provisions in paragraph (b)(1) requiring a participant to comply with the limitations on subcontracting for each period of performance or for each order. Instead, the SBA District Director may permit the participant to subcontract in excess of the limitations on subcontracting where the SBA District Director makes a written determination that larger amounts of subcontracting are essential during certain stages of performance. ( 1 ) The 8(a) participant is required to provide the SBA District Director written assurance that the participant will ultimately comply with the requirements of this section prior to contract completion. The contracting officer shall review the written assurance and inform the 8(a) participant of their concurrence or nonconcurrence. The 8(a) participant can only submit the written assurance to the SBA District Director upon concurrence by the contracting officer.
( 2 ) The contracting officer does not have the authority to waive the provisions of this section requiring an 8(a) participant to comply with the limitations on subcontracting for each period of performance or order, even if the agency has a Partnership Agreement with SBA.
( 3 ) Where the 8(a) participant does not ultimately comply with the limitations on subcontracting by the end of the contract, SBA will not grant future waivers for the 8(a) participant.
( d ) *Nonmanufacturer rule.* See 19.505(c) for application of the nonmanufacturer rule, inclusive of waivers and exceptions to the nonmanufacturer rule.
[85 FR 11765, Feb. 27, 2020]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 5.0.3

Eastern Division

Ventas Realty, Limited Partnership

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:12−cv−03107

Honorable Ronald A. Guzman

ALC CVMA, LLC, et al.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Wednesday, June 20, 2012:

 2 is stricken and the referral to the magistrate judge is hereby terminated. Mailed

notice.(jj, )MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: The parties having filed

a stipulation asking that the suit be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice and without

fees or costs [52], the status hearing set before the magistrate judge for 8/22/1

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:12-cv-03107 Document #: 54 Filed: 06/20/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:1432
#### 203.703 Authority.

The authority to act for the agency head under this subpart is limited to a level no lower than an official who is appointed by and with the advice of the Senate, without power of redelegation. For the defense agencies, for purposes of this subpart, the agency head designee is the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Sustainment).

[56 FR 36288, July 31, 1991, as amended at 60 FR 61592, Nov. 30, 1995; 65 FR 39704, June 27, 2000; 88 FR 73235, Oct. 25, 2023]
#### Franklin D. R. Snowden, Appellant, v. Anne Kaplan et al., Respondents.

Order modified by reversing so much thereof as strikes the fourth cause of action contained in the complaint and as strikes paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 in the second cause of action in the complaint, with $10 costs. In our opinion those portions of the complaint liberally construed are sufficient on their face. Bergan, P. J., Herlihy, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Michael Leskin, Respondent, v. Savin Construction Company et al., Appellants. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeal by the employer and carrier from a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Board awarding $20 per week for nursing services rendered to the claimant by his wife. The board found that the injuries resulting from the accident caused a disabling condition for which continued nursing care from October 31, 1959 was necessary and that the carrier “having knowledge of the nature of the injury and of the necessity for practical nursing care, failed to provide said nursing care and therefore that the carrier is liable for the practical nursing care supplied by the claimant’s wife from October 31, 1959” to the date of the amended decision, March 26, 1963. The carrier, on this appeal, stated the issue to be whether claimant required nursing services for the purpose of administering demerol, alleging that the claim was so limited. There is no contention as to the basic disability awards or that the claimant was totally disabled. The claimant, as the result of a back injury, underwent four surgical operations resulting in his being seriously handicapped as to mobility and a continuance of severe pain. To help alleviate the condition, by the doctor’s orders and his own decision, he took various kinds of pain relievers, drugs and tranquilizers, one of which was injections of demerol. His doctor testified that he needed practical nursing and an impartial orthopedic specialist, after stating that there was no need for practical nursing, said: “The care as given by his wife is perforce *718necessary because demanded by the patient as a consequence of his psychological attitude and behavior ”. The claimant’s wife testified as to the tasks that she performed and that when she was away for three days, the appellants furnished a male nurse and paid $56 for his services. She further stated' that she gave up her employment to remain at home and care for her husband, that she assisted him when he walked a little; she bathed him and gave him rub downs; took his pulse and temperature and administered medicines. From the testimony of the need and services rendered, the board could properly determine that the wife rendered practical nursing services and the board was not limited to the narrow issue voiced by the appellants. It would appear that if the wife decided to return to work, the cost to the appellants would be substantially greater. Decision affirmed, with costs to the Workmen’s Compensation Board. Herliky, J. P., Reynolds, Taylor, Aulisi and Hamm, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Virginia Fitzgerald, Appellant, v John Fitzgerald, *997Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Schenectady County, entered April 24, 1978, which modified petitioner’s visitation privileges with her son. Petitioner and respondent were divorced in 1972 with petitioner being awarded custody of the couple’s two daughters and respondent being awarded custody of their son. Pursuant to a visitation order dated November 26, 1976, respondent was to bring the son to petitioner one weekend each month for visitation purposes. By petition filed in September of 1977, petitioner alleged that respondent had willfully failed to obey the order of visitation. Respondent, who now lives in Connecticut, submitted an affidavit indicating that financial problems prevented him from complying with the order and requesting that it be modified. The Family Court found that the respondent did not willfully violate the visitation order and modified it so as to require respondent to bring the son to petitioner for weekend visitation only four times a year. Petitioner appeals, claiming that the Family Court exceeded its authority by modifying her visitation privileges where there was no petition for modification before the court. CPLR 2001 allows a court to correct procedural irregularities where a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced (see 12 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, § 13.06, subd 1). In the instant proceeding, petitioner was not prejudiced by respondent’s failure to file a petition for modification of visitation since that relief was requested in respondent’s affidavit and a hearing was held. Accordingly, it was within the Family Court’s discretion to modify petitioner’s visitation rights and the order to that effect must be affirmed. Order affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Sweeney, Kane, Main and Mikoll, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CAL-MAINE
FOODS, INC.'S CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND NOTES THERETO INCLUDED IN
THE FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED NOVEMBER 27, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-03-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-27-1999
<CASH>                                           7,778
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   22,245
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     46,623
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                80,940
<PP&E>                                         226,837
<DEPRECIATION>                                  81,236
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 240,671
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           53,502
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           188
<OTHER-SE>                                      71,430
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   240,671
<SALES>                                        130,109
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               130,109
<CGS>                                          121,709
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  121,709
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,608
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (12,782)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (4,686)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (8,096)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (8,096)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.65)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.65)


</TABLE>
Exhibit
      32.1





**SECTION
      906 CERTIFICATION**




I,
      Jeffrey F. O'Donnell, Chief Executive Officer of PhotoMedex, Inc., a Delaware
      corporation (the "Company"), do hereby certify, in accordance with 18 U.S.C.
      Section 1350, as created pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
      of
      2002, that:





(1) the
        accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended
        December 31, 2007 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of
        Section
        13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
        amended; and





(2) the
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
        the financial condition and results of operations of the
        Company.





PHOTOMEDEX,
                INC.Dated:
                March 14, 2008
            By:
            /s/
                Jeffrey F. O'DonnellJeffrey
                F. O'DonnellChief
                Executive Officer





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002 (“Section 906”), or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or
      otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the
      electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been
      provided to PhotoMedex, Inc. and will be retained by PhotoMedex, Inc. and
      furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
      request.
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 1 of 20 PageID #:654
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 2 of 20 PageID #:655
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 3 of 20 PageID #:656
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 4 of 20 PageID #:657
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 5 of 20 PageID #:658
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 6 of 20 PageID #:659
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 7 of 20 PageID #:660
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 8 of 20 PageID #:661
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 9 of 20 PageID #:662
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 10 of 20 PageID #:663
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 11 of 20 PageID #:664
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 12 of 20 PageID #:665
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 13 of 20 PageID #:666
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 14 of 20 PageID #:667
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 15 of 20 PageID #:668
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 16 of 20 PageID #:669
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 17 of 20 PageID #:670
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 18 of 20 PageID #:671
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 19 of 20 PageID #:672
Case: 1:12-mc-00269 Document #: 34 Filed: 06/26/13 Page 20 of 20 PageID #:673
### Kruger , Bret t(OST ) i \ From : Joann e Youn g [Jyoun g @ yklaw.com ] ; - i \ Sent : Thursday , Novembe r03 , 201 1 2:0 2 P M To : Kruger , Bret t(OST ) Cc : Davi d Kirstei n 3 ^ Subject : PLUN AOwnershi p

Dea rBrett , As requested , thi s wil l confir m tha tw e understan d ther e ar e n o individual s o rentitie s tha thol d 5%o rmoreo fth e votin g stoc k

o fChoru s Aviation

. Wit h bes tregards , Joann e

Joann e W

. Youn g Managin g Partne r Kirstei n & Young , PLL C 175 0 KStreet , N W Suit e 200 Washington , D C 2000 6 Phone : (202 ) 331-334 8 X22 2 Fax:(202)331-393 3 Email : ivoun g @vklaw.co m
#### Starnes *v.*City of Atlanta.

Hill, J.

1. As a general rule, equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin prosecutions for criminal offenses; and prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances, which are punishable by fine or imprisonment, are quasi-criminal in their nature, and come within the above rule. Cases where equity will enjoin the enforcement of such ordinances are exceptional in character. *Georgia Ry. & El. Co.*v. *Oakland City,*129 *Ga.*576 (59 S. E. 296); *White*v. *Tifton,*129 *Ga.*582 (59 S. E. 299); *Rowland*v. *Commissioners,*133 *Ga.*190 (65 S. E. 404); *Mayor &c. of Jonesboro*v. *Central Ry. Co.,*134 *Ga.*190 (67 S. E. 716); *Mayor &c. of Shellman*v. *Saxon,*134 *Ga.*29, 32 (67 S. E. 438).

2. An equitable petition showed in substance the following: The. plaintiff, a physician, had leased certain property within' the city of Atlanta, and had opened and was maintaining a sanitarium for. the treatment of persons afflicted with nervous troubles and the liquor and drug habit, and was treating patients therein. An ordinance of the city provided that “It shall be unlawful for any person or persons m this city to erect or maintain any hospital, infirmary, house or place of refuge, or reformatory, or asylum, or other place where persons are received for reformation or treatment, without first having obtained the consent of the mayor and general council of said city for the erection and maintenance of the same; and all applications to the mayor and general council for permission to erect, maintain, or carry on any place for any such purpose must plainly and distinctly show the particular locality where the same is desired, and for what purpose the same is desired to be erected or maintained, and what class of persons are to be admitted to the same. Any person or persons who shall violate the provisions of this ordinance shall, on conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred dollars and imprisoned not exceeding thirty days, either or both, in tne discretion *532of the recorder’s court, for each and every such offense committed.” The plaintiff had not obtained consent of the mayor and city council for the maintenance of the sanitarium, although he had made application therefor and it had been refused. A case was made against the plaintiff by the license inspector of the city, in the recorder’s court, for the violation of the ordinance, and he was being prosecuted therefor. There was no allegation that the defendant was insolvent. The prayer of the petition was that the city and its employees be restrained from interfering with the plaintiff in the operation of the sanitarium; and that the ordinance of the city be declared void for various reasons. *Held,*that the petition makes such a ease as brings it within the general rule ■ announced in headnote one.

February 27, 1913.

Equitable petition. Before Judge Pendleton. Fulton superior court. December 4, 1911.

*Anderson, Felder, Rountree & Wilson*and *Moore & Branch,*for plaintiff. *J. L. May son*and *W. D. Filis Jr.,*for defendant.

3. The court did not err in dismissing the petition on demurrer.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*