UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4626

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHARLES HARGROVE, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,

Chief District Judge. (5:11-cr-00194-D-3)

Submitted: March 15, 2013 Decided: March 29, 2013

Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert L. Cooper, COOPER, DAVIS & COOPER, Fayetteville, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States 

Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Charles Hargrove, Jr., appeals from his conviction of

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or 

more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). His 

sole contention on appeal is that the district court erred in 

denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm. 

We review a district court’s denial of a motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Battle, 499 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2007). In order to 

withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, a defendant must show 

that a “fair and just reason” supports his request. Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “[A] ‘fair and just’ reason . . . is one 

that essentially challenges . . . the fairness of the Rule 11 

proceeding.” United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 

(4th Cir. 1992) (en banc). The defendant bears the heavy burden 

of demonstrating the existence of such a reason. United States 

v. Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 2009).

In determining whether a defendant has met this 

burden, a district court must consider the six factors

articulated in United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th 

Cir. 1991). We have reviewed the record in this case and, after 

carefully considering the factors described in Moore, conclude 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Hargrove’s motion to withdraw his plea.
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When conducting Hargrove’s plea colloquy, the 

magistrate judge fully complied with the mandates of Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11, and nothing in the record indicates that Hargrove’s 

plea was unknowing or involuntary. Further, Hargrove averred 

during his Rule 11 hearing that he was satisfied with his 

appointed counsel’s representation. Such statements are 

presumed true, and Hargrove has not produced any evidence to 

support his bald assertion that his counsel’s assistance was 

deficient. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); see

Fields v. Attorney Gen., 956 F.2d 1290, 1299 (4th Cir. 1992) 

(“Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a 

defendant is bound by the representations he makes under oath 

during a plea colloquy.”).

Additionally, Hargrove has not asserted his innocence. 

Moreover, Hargrove did not seek to withdraw his plea until 

roughly seven months after his Rule 11 hearing and two months 

after he was appointed replacement counsel, a considerable 

delay. Moore, 931 F.2d at 248. Because Hargrove has also 

failed to show that his counsel’s conduct was improper, we find 

that the district court correctly concluded that consideration 

of the first four Moore factors counseled against allowing 

Hargrove to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, contrary to 

Hargrove’s suggestion, the district court was not required to 

explain with greater specificity the basis for its determination 
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that allowing withdrawal of Hargrove’s plea would also prejudice 

the Government and waste judicial resources. See United States 

v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1995) (where a district 

court finds that the first four Moore factors weigh against 

allowing withdrawal of a plea, the court may “reasonably refrain 

from trying to ascertain just how much withdrawal of the plea 

would prejudice the government and inconvenience the court”).

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

conclusions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED