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Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MICHAEL WEARRY v. BURL CAIN, WARDEN

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT 

COURT OF LOUISIANA, LIVINGSTON PARISH

No. 14–10008. Decided March 7, 2016

 PER CURIAM. 

Michael Wearry is on Louisiana’s death row. Urging

that the prosecution failed to disclose evidence supporting

his innocence and that his counsel provided ineffective 

assistance at trial, Wearry unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief in state court. Contrary to the state postconviction court, we conclude that the prosecution’s failure to 

disclose material evidence violated Wearry’s due process 

rights. We reverse the state postconviction court’s judgment on that account, and therefore do not reach Wearry’s 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

I 

A 

Sometime between 8:20 and 9:30 on the evening of April 

4, 1998, Eric Walber was brutally murdered. Nearly two 

years after the murder, Sam Scott, at the time incarcerated, contacted authorities and implicated Michael Wearry. 

Scott initially reported that he had been friends with

the victim; that he was at work the night of the murder; 

that the victim had come looking for him but had instead 

run into Wearry and four others; and that Wearry and the 

others had later confessed to shooting and driving over the 

victim before leaving his body on Blahut Road. In fact, the 

victim had not been shot, and his body had been found on 

Crisp Road.

Scott changed his account of the crime over the course of 

four later statements, each of which differed from the 

others in material ways. By the time Scott testified as the 
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State’s star witness at Wearry’s trial, his story bore little 

resemblance to his original account. According to the 

version Scott told the jury, he had been playing dice with 

Wearry and others when the victim drove past. Wearry, 

who had been losing, decided to rob the victim. After 

Wearry and an acquaintance, Randy Hutchinson, stopped

the victim’s car, Hutchinson shoved the victim into the 

cargo area. Five men, including Scott, Hutchinson, and 

Wearry, proceeded to drive around, at one point encountering Eric Brown—the State’s other main witness—and 

pausing intermittently to assault the victim. Finally, 

Scott related, Wearry and two others killed the victim by 

running him over. On cross-examination, Scott admitted 

that he had changed his account several times.

Consistent with Scott’s testimony, Brown testified that 

on the night of the murder he had seen Wearry and others 

with a man who looked like the victim. Incarcerated on 

unrelated charges at the time of Wearry’s trial, Brown 

acknowledged that he had made a prior inconsistent 

statement to the police, but had recanted and agreed to 

testify against Wearry, not for any prosecutorial favor, but

solely because his sister knew the victim’s sister. The 

State commented during its opening argument that Brown 

“is doing 15 years on a drug charge right now, [but] hasn’t 

asked for a thing.” 7 Record 1723 (Tr., Mar. 2, 2002). 

During closing argument, the State reiterated that Brown 

“has no deal on the table” and was testifying because the 

victim’s “family deserves to know.” Pet. for Cert. 19. 

Although the State presented no physical evidence at 

trial, it did offer additional circumstantial evidence linking Wearry to the victim. One witness testified that he 

saw Wearry in the victim’s car on the night of the murder 

and, later, holding the victim’s class ring. Another witness said he saw Wearry throwing away the victim’s cologne. In some respects, however, these witnesses contradicted Scott’s account. For example, the witness who 
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reported seeing Wearry in the victim’s car did not place 

Scott in the car.

Wearry’s defense at trial rested on an alibi. He claimed 

that, at the time of the murder, he had been at a wedding 

reception in Baton Rouge, 40 miles away. Wearry’s girlfriend, her sister, and her aunt corroborated Wearry’s 

account. In closing argument, the State stressed that all 

three witnesses had personal relationships with Wearry. 

The State also presented two rebuttal witnesses: the bride 

at the wedding, who reported that the reception had ended

by 8:30 or 9:00 (potentially leaving sufficient time for 

Wearry to have committed the crime); and three jail employees, who testified that they had overheard Wearry say 

that he was a bystander when the crime occurred.

The jury convicted Wearry of capital murder and sentenced him to death. His conviction and sentence were 

affirmed on direct appeal.1

B 

After Wearry’s conviction became final, it emerged that 

the prosecution had withheld relevant information that 

could have advanced Wearry’s plea. Wearry argued during state postconviction proceedings that three categories 

of belatedly revealed information would have undermined 

the prosecution and materially aided Wearry’s defense at 

trial. 

First, previously undisclosed police records showed that 

two of Scott’s fellow inmates had made statements that 

cast doubt on Scott’s credibility. One inmate had reported 

1Wearry argued, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his 

for-cause challenges, and that the prosecution discriminated on the 

basis of race in jury selection in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 

U. S. 79 (1986). Finding both jury-selection claims credible, thenJustice Johnson dissented from the affirmance of Wearry’s conviction. 

State v. Weary, 2003–3067 (La. 4/2/06), 931 So. 2d 297, 328–337. 

(Wearry’s name is misspelled in the direct-appeal case caption.)

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hearing Scott say that he wanted to “‘make sure [Wearry] 

gets the needle cause he jacked over me.’” Id., at 22 (quoting inmate affidavit).2 The other inmate had told investigators—at a meeting Scott orchestrated—that he had 

witnessed the murder, but this inmate recanted the next 

day. “Scott had told him what to say,” he explained, and 

had suggested that lying about having witnessed the 

murder “would help him get out of jail.” Pet. Exh. 13 in 

No. 01–FELN–015992, pp. 104, 107. See also Pet. for 

Cert. 22 (quoting police notes). 

Second, the State had failed to disclose that, contrary to 

the prosecution’s assertions at trial, Brown had twice 

2 Illustrative of the liberties the dissent takes with the record is the 

assertion that “Scott blamed [Wearry] for putting him in the position of 

having to admit his own role in the events surrounding the murder.” 

Post, at 2 (opinion of ALITO, J.). Introducing the inmate’s statement, 

the dissent therefore suggests, might have “backfired by allowing the 

prosecution to return the jury’s focus to a point the State emphasized 

often during trial, namely, that Scott’s accusations were credible 

precisely because Scott had no motive to tell a story that was contrary 

to his own interests.” Id., at 2–3. True, according to the inmate, Scott 

had complained that his identification of Wearry had resulted in a 

lengthier prison term. The inmate, however, did not suggest that Scott 

was angry with Wearry because he had suffered adverse consequences 

as a result of Wearry’s crime. Instead, the inmate separately stated 

that Scott “wouldn’t tell me who did it”—i.e., who killed Eric Walber—

“but he said I’m gonna make sure Mike gets the needle cause he jacked 

over me.” Pet. Exh. 13 in No. 01–FELN–015992, p. 103. See also ibid.

(“If [Scott] would have told me who did this I would tell because I have 

a heart and what they did wasn’t right”). Scott’s refusal to identify 

Wearry as the culprit—while also endeavoring to “make sure Mike gets 

the needle,” ibid.—suggests that Wearry did not commit the crime, but 

Scott had decided to bring him down anyway. Nor, contrary to the 

dissent, is there any reason to believe that Scott anticipated his participation in this case would cost him additional years in prison. Notably, 

in the first of his five accounts to police, Scott reported that he had not 

been present at the time of the murder and had learned about it only 

after the fact. Indeed, it is at least as plausible as the dissent’s hypothesis that Scott believed implicating Wearry might win him early release 

on his existing conviction.

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sought a deal to reduce his existing sentence in exchange 

for testifying against Wearry. The police had told Brown 

that they would “‘talk to the D. A. if he told the truth.’” 

Pet. for Cert. 19 (quoting police notes).

Third, the prosecution had failed to turn over medical 

records on Randy Hutchinson. According to Scott, on the 

night of the murder, Hutchinson had run into the street to 

flag down the victim, pulled the victim out of his car, 

shoved him into the cargo space, and crawled into the 

cargo space himself. But Hutchinson’s medical records 

revealed that, nine days before the murder, Hutchinson 

had undergone knee surgery to repair a ruptured patellar 

tendon. Id., at 10–11, 15–16, 32.3 An expert witness, Dr. 

Paul Dworak, testified at the state collateral-review hearing that Hutchinson’s surgically repaired knee could not 

have withstood running, bending, or lifting substantial 

weight. The State presented an expert witness who disagreed with Dr. Dworak’s appraisal of Hutchinson’s physical fitness.

During state postconviction proceedings, Wearry also 

maintained that his trial attorney had failed to uncover 

exonerating evidence. Wearry’s trial attorney admitted at 

the state collateral-review hearing that he had conducted 

no independent investigation into Wearry’s innocence and 

had relied solely on evidence the State and Wearry had 

provided.4 For example, despite Wearry’s alibi, his attor3The dissent emphasizes a State’s witness’ testimony that 

“Hutchinson had had surgery on his knee ‘about nine days before the 

homicide happened.’” Post, at 4 (quoting 10 Record 2261 (Tr., Mar. 5, 

2002)). But from this witness’ statement, neither Wearry nor the jury 

had any way of knowing what the medical records would have revealed:

Hutchinson had undergone a patellar-tendon repair rather than a 

routine minor procedure. 4Wearry’s trial attorney did ask the public defender’s investigator to 

look into the backgrounds of the State’s witnesses and to speak with 

Wearry’s family members. But the attorney testified at the collateralreview hearing that he did not know what persons the investigator 

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ney undertook no effort to locate independent witnesses

from among the dozens of guests who had attended the 

wedding reception. 

Counsel representing Wearry on collateral review conducted an independent investigation. This investigation 

revealed many witnesses lacking any personal relationship with Wearry who would have been willing to corroborate his alibi had they been called at trial. Collateralreview counsel’s investigation also revealed that Scott’s 

brother and sister-in-law would have been willing to testify at trial, as they did at the collateral-review hearing, 

that Scott was with them, mostly at a strawberry festival, 

until around 11:00 on the night of the murder. 

Based on this new evidence, Wearry alleged violations of 

his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 

83 (1963), and of his Sixth Amendment right to effective 

assistance of counsel. Acknowledging that the State 

“probably ought to have” disclosed the withheld evidence, 

App. to Pet. for Cert. B–6, and that Wearry’s counsel 

provided “perhaps not the best defense that could have 

been rendered,” id., at B–5, the postconviction court denied relief. Even if Wearry’s constitutional rights were 

violated, the court concluded, he had not shown prejudice. 

Id., at B–5, B–7. In turn, the Louisiana Supreme Court 

also denied relief. Id., at A–1. Chief Justice Johnson 

would have granted Wearry’s petition on the ground that 

he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Id., at A–2.5

contacted and, in any event, he had serious doubts about the investigator’s qualifications and competence. Moreover, there is no indication 

that the investigator ever engaged in inquiries regarding Scott’s background or his whereabouts on the night of the murder. 5 Justice Crichton would have granted Wearry’s petition and remanded

for the trial court to address his claim of intellectual disability under 

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 (2002). App. to Pet. for Cert. A–15. 

Wearry does not raise his Atkins claim in his petition for a writ of 

certiorari. 

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Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016) 7 

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II

Because we conclude that the Louisiana courts’ denial of 

Wearry’s Brady claim runs up against settled constitutional principles, and because a new trial is required as a 

result, we need not and do not consider the merits of his 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. “[T]he suppression 

by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 

upon request violates due process where the evidence is 

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of 

the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady,

supra, at 87. See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 

150, 153–154 (1972) (clarifying that the rule stated in 

Brady applies to evidence undermining witness credibility). Evidence qualifies as material when there is “‘any 

reasonable likelihood’” it could have “‘affected the judgment of the jury.’” Giglio, supra, at 154 (quoting Napue v. 

Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 271 (1959)). To prevail on his 

Brady claim, Wearry need not show that he “more likely 

than not” would have been acquitted had the new evidence 

been admitted. Smith v. Cain, 565 U. S. 73, ___–___ 

(2012) (slip op., at 2–3) (internal quotation marks and 

brackets omitted). He must show only that the new evidence is sufficient to “undermine confidence” in the verdict. Ibid.6

 Beyond doubt, the newly revealed evidence suffices to 

undermine confidence in Wearry’s conviction. The State’s 

trial evidence resembles a house of cards, built on the jury 

crediting Scott’s account rather than Wearry’s alibi. See 

United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 113 (1976) (“[I]f the 

verdict is already of questionable validity, additional 

evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.”). The dissent asserts 

6Given this legal standard, Wearry can prevail even if, as the dissent 

suggests, the undisclosed information may not have affected the jury’s 

verdict.

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that, apart from the testimony of Scott and Brown, there 

was independent evidence pointing to Wearry as the murderer. See post, at 5 (opinion of ALITO, J.). But all of the 

evidence the dissent cites suggests, at most, that someone 

in Wearry’s group of friends may have committed the 

crime, and that Wearry may have been involved in events 

related to the murder after it occurred. Perhaps, on the 

basis of this evidence, Louisiana might have charged 

Wearry as an accessory after the fact. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 

§14:25 (West 2007) (providing a maximum prison term of 

five years for accessories after the fact). But Louisiana 

instead charged Wearry with capital murder, and the only 

evidence directly tying him to that crime was Scott’s dubious testimony, corroborated by the similarly suspect testimony of Brown.7

As the dissent recognizes, “Scott did not have an exemplary record of veracity.” Post, at 3. Scott’s credibility, 

already impugned by his many inconsistent stories, would 

have been further diminished had the jury learned that 

Hutchinson may have been physically incapable of performing the role Scott ascribed to him, that Scott had 

coached another inmate to lie about the murder and 

thereby enhance his chances to get out of jail, or that Scott 

may have implicated Wearry to settle a personal score.8 

7As for the three jailers who testified to overhearing Wearry call 

himself an “innocent bystander,” post, at 4, so characterizing oneself is 

the opposite of an admission of guilt. 8Because the inmate who told police that Scott may have wanted to 

settle a score did so close to the end of trial, the State argues, the 

inmate’s “statement was probably . . . never seen by anyone involved 

with the actual trial until . . . it was [all] over, i[f] at all.” Brief in 

Opposition 18. But “Brady suppression occurs when the government 

fails to turn over even evidence that is known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.” Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U. S. 

867, 869–870 (2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

See also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 438 (1995) (rejecting Louisiana’s plea for a rule that would not hold the State responsible for 

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Moreover, any juror who found Scott more credible in light 

of Brown’s testimony might have thought differently had 

she learned that Brown may have been motivated to come 

forward not by his sister’s relationship with the victim’s 

sister—as the prosecution had insisted in its closing argument—but by the possibility of a reduced sentence on 

an existing conviction. See Napue, supra, at 270 (even 

though the State had made no binding promises, a witness’ attempt to obtain a deal before testifying was material because the jury “might well have concluded that [the 

witness] had fabricated testimony in order to curry the 

[prosecution’s] favor”). Even if the jury—armed with all of 

this new evidence—could have voted to convict Wearry, we 

have “no confidence that it would have done so.” Smith, 

supra, at ___ (slip op., at 3).

Reaching the opposite conclusion, the state postconviction court improperly evaluated the materiality of each 

piece of evidence in isolation rather than cumulatively, see 

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 441 (1995) (requiring a 

“cumulative evaluation” of the materiality of wrongfully 

withheld evidence), emphasized reasons a juror might 

disregard new evidence while ignoring reasons she might 

not, cf. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U. S. 30, 43 (2009) (per 

curiam) (“it was not reasonable to discount entirely the 

effect that [a defendant’s expert’s] testimony might have 

had on the jury” just because the State’s expert provided 

contrary testimony), and failed even to mention the statements of the two inmates impeaching Scott. 

III 

In addition to defending the judgment of the Louisiana 

courts, the dissent criticizes the Court for deciding this 

“intensely factual question . . . without full briefing and 

failing to disclose exculpatory evidence about which prosecutors did not 

learn until after trial when that evidence was in the possession of police 

investigators at the time of trial).

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argument.” Post, at 6. But the Court has not shied away 

from summarily deciding fact-intensive cases where, as 

here, lower courts have egregiously misapplied settled 

law. See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, ante, at ___ (per

curiam); Stanton v. Sims, 571 U. S. ___ (2013) (per curiam);

Parker v. Matthews, 567 U. S. ___ (2012) (per curiam); 

Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U. S. ___ (2012) (per curiam); 

Wetzel v. Lambert, 565 U. S. ___ (2012) (per curiam); 

Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U. S. ___ (2012) (per curiam); Sears v. 

Upton, 561 U. S. 945 (2010) (per curiam); Porter v. 

McCollum, supra. 

Because “[t]he petition does not . . . fall into a category 

in which the Court has previously evinced an inclination 

to police factbound errors,” the dissent continues, “nothing 

warned the State,” when it was drafting its brief in opposition, that the Court might summarily reverse Wearry’s 

conviction. Post, at 5–6. Contrary to the dissent, however, 

summarily deciding a capital case, when circumstances so 

warrant, is hardly unprecedented. See Sears, supra, at

951–952 (vacating a state postconviction court’s denial of 

relief on a penalty-phase ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claim); Porter, supra, at 38–40 (attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by conducting a constitutionally 

inadequate investigation into mitigating evidence). Perhaps anticipating the possibility of summary reversal, the 

State devoted the bulk of its 30-page brief in opposition to 

a point-by-point rebuttal of Wearry’s claims. Given this 

brief, as well as the State’s lower court filings similarly 

concentrating on evidence supporting its position, the 

chances that further briefing or argument would change 

the outcome are vanishingly slim.

The dissent also inveighs against the Court’s “depart[ure] from our usual procedures . . . [to] decide petitioner’s fact-intensive Brady claim at this stage . . . [rather 

than] allow[ing] petitioner to raise that claim in a federal 

habeas proceeding.” Post, at 7. This Court, of course, has 
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jurisdiction over the final judgments of state postconviction courts, see 28 U. S. C. §1257(a), and exercises that 

jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances. Earlier this 

Term, for instance, we heard argument in Foster v. Chatman, No. 14–8349, which involves the Georgia courts’ 

denial of postconviction relief to a capital defendant raising a claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986). 

See also Smith, 565 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2) (reversing 

a state postconviction court’s denial of relief on a Brady 

claim); Sears, supra, at 946. Reviewing the Louisiana 

courts’ denial of postconviction relief is thus hardly the 

bold departure the dissent paints it to be. The alternative 

to granting review, after all, is forcing Wearry to endure 

yet more time on Louisiana’s death row in service of a 

conviction that is constitutionally flawed.

* * * 

Because Wearry’s due process rights were violated, we

grant his petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis, reverse the judgment 

of the Louisiana postconviction court, and remand for 

further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MICHAEL WEARRY v. BURL CAIN, WARDEN

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT 

COURT OF LOUISIANA, LIVINGSTON PARISH

No. 14–10008. Decided March 7, 2016

 JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, 

dissenting. 

Without briefing or argument, the Court reverses a 14-

year-old murder conviction on the ground that the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), by 

failing to turn over certain information that tended to 

exculpate petitioner. There is no question in my mind 

that the prosecution should have disclosed this information, but whether the information was sufficient to 

warrant reversing petitioner’s conviction is another matter. The failure to turn over exculpatory information 

violates due process only “‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” 

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 433–434 (1995) (quoting 

United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion 

of Blackmun, J.)).

The Court argues that the information in question here 

could have affected the jury’s verdict and that petitioner’s 

conviction must therefore be reversed. The Court ably 

makes the case for reversal, but there is a reasonable 

contrary argument that petitioner’s conviction should 

stand because the undisclosed information would not have 

affected the jury’s verdict. I will briefly discuss the main 

points made in the per curiam, not for the purpose of 

showing that they are necessarily wrong, but to show that 

the Brady issue is not open and shut. For good reason, we 

generally do not decide cases without allowing the parties 

to file briefs and present argument. Questions that seem 
2 WEARRY v. CAIN

ALITO, J., dissenting

quite simple at first glance sometimes look very different 

after both sides are given a chance to make their case. Of 

course, this process means extra work for the Court. But 

it leads to better results, and it gives the losing side the 

satisfaction of knowing that at least its arguments have 

been fully heard. There is no justification for departing 

from our usual procedures in this case. 

I 

The first item of information discussed by the Court is a 

police report that recounts statements made about Sam 

Scott, a key witness for the prosecution, by a fellow inmate. According to this report, Scott told the inmate: “I’m 

gonna make sure Mike [i.e., petitioner] gets the needle 

cause he jacked over me.” Pet. Exh. 13 in No. 01–FELN–

015992, p. 103. Scott, who had been serving a sentence on 

unrelated drug charges, reportedly told the inmate that he 

had been expecting to be released but that he “still [had 

not] gone home because of this,” i.e., petitioner’s prosecution. Id., at 102. As stated in the report, Scott said that 

he was now facing the possibility of a 10-year sentence, 

apparently for his admitted role in the events surrounding 

the murder. The report did not provide any further explanation for Scott’s alleged statement that petitioner had 

“jacked [him] over.”

The Court reads the report to suggest that Scott implicated petitioner in the murder “to settle a personal score.” 

Ante, at 8. But if petitioner’s counsel had actually attempted to use this evidence at trial, the net effect might 

well have been harmful, not helpful, to the defense. The 

undisclosed police report on which the Court relies may be 

read to mean that Scott blamed petitioner for putting him 

in the position of having to admit his own role in the 

events surrounding the murder and thereby expose himself to the 10-year sentence and lose an opportunity to 

secure early release from prison on the drug charges. If 
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ALITO, J., dissenting

defense counsel had attempted to impeach Scott with this 

police report, the effort could have backfired by allowing 

the prosecution to return the jury’s focus to a point the 

State emphasized often during trial, namely, that Scott’s 

accusations were credible precisely because Scott had no 

motive to tell a story that was contrary to his own interests. See, e.g., 10 Record 2307 (Tr., Mar. 5, 2002) (“If 

[Scott] keeps his mouth shut, he is out in less than five 

more months. . . . [But] [i]nstead of getting out in 180 

days, he is going to be doing more time”).1

The Court next turns to an allegation that Scott had 

coached another prisoner to make up lies against petitioner. This prisoner never testified at trial, and there is a 

basis for arguing that this information would not have 

made a difference to the jury, which was well aware that 

Scott did not have an exemplary record of veracity. Scott 

himself admitted to fabricating information that he told 

the police during their investigations. In addition, a witness who did testify against petitioner at trial also accused Scott of asking him to lie, although admittedly this 

witness later denied making this accusation. Given that 

the jury convicted even with these quite serious strikes 

against Scott’s credibility, there is reason to question 

whether the jury would have seriously considered a different verdict because of an accusation from someone who 

never took the stand.

Third, the Court observes that the prosecution failed to 

turn over evidence that another witness, Eric Brown, had 

1The majority claims that Scott’s unwillingness to tell this fellow 

inmate who killed the victim somehow exculpates petitioner. See ante,

at 4, n. 2. In my view, one cannot reasonably infer from the inmate’s 

statement, “[Scott] wouldn’t tell me who did it but he said I’m gonna 

make sure Mike gets the needle cause he jacked over me,” that Scott 

believed petitioner Michael Wearry to be innocent—especially against 

the backdrop of Scott’s complaints about his increased imprisonment. 

Pet. Exh. 13 in No. 01–FELN–015992, p. 103.

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4 WEARRY v. CAIN

ALITO, J., dissenting

asked for favorable treatment from the district attorney in 

exchange for testifying against petitioner. It is true—and 

troubling—that the prosecutor claimed in her opening 

statement that Brown had not sought favorable treatment. 

But even so, it is far from clear that disclosing the contradictory information had real potential to affect the trial’s 

outcome. For one thing, there is no evidence that Brown 

(unlike Scott) actually received any deal, despite defense 

counsel’s efforts in cross-examination to establish that 

Brown’s testimony might have earned him leniency from 

the State. Moreover, Brown admitted during the exchange that he had manipulated his initial story to the 

police to avoid implicating himself in criminal activity. 

We know, then, that the jury harbored no illusions about 

the purity of Brown’s motives, notwithstanding the prosecutor’s opening misstatement.

Finally, the Court says that the medical records of 

Randy Hutchinson would have cast doubt on Scott’s trial 

testimony that Hutchinson repeatedly dragged the victim 

into and out of a car and bludgeoned him with a stick. 

The records reveal that Hutchinson had knee surgery to 

repair his patellar tendon just nine days before the murder. But one of the State’s witnesses testified at trial that 

he had seen records showing that Hutchinson had had 

surgery on his knee “about nine days before the homicide 

happened.” 10 Record 2261 (Tr., Mar. 5, 2002); see also 

id., at 2263. The jury thus knew the most salient fact 

revealed by these records—that Scott had attributed 

significant strength and mobility to a man nine days 

removed from knee surgery.2 Given that these particular 

2The per curiam argues that the medical records might have had a 

greater effect on the jury because they mentioned the particular type of 

knee surgery that petitioner had undergone, and that is certainly 

possible. But what is important at this stage is that the basic fact—

that petitioner had recently undergone knee surgery—was known to 

the jury, and the incremental impact of the additional details supplied 

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ALITO, J., dissenting

details about Hutchinson’s actions were a relatively minor 

part of Scott’s account of the crime and the State’s case 

against petitioner, the significance of the undisclosed 

medical records is subject to reasonable dispute.

While the Court highlights the exculpatory quality of 

the withheld information, the Court downplays the considerable evidence of petitioner’s guilt. Aside from Scott’s 

and Brown’s testimony, three witnesses told the jury that 

they saw petitioner and others driving around shortly 

after the murder in the victim’s red car, which according 

to one of these witnesses had blood on its exterior. Petitioner offered to sell an Albany High School class ring to 

one of these witnesses and a set of new speakers to another. The third witness said he saw petitioner throw away a

bottle of Tommy Hilfiger cologne. Meanwhile, the victim’s 

mother testified that her son wore an Albany High class 

ring that was not recovered with his body, had received 

speakers as a gift shortly before his murder, and had a 

bottle of Tommy Hilfiger cologne with him on the night 

when he was killed. In addition, three jailers testified

that petitioner called his father after his eventual arrest 

and stated that “he didn’t know what he was doing in jail 

because he didn’t do anything [and] was just an innocent 

bystander.” 9 Record 2120 (Tr., Mar. 4, 2002); see also id.,

at 2124, 2126.

In short, this is far from a case in which the withheld 

information would have allowed the defense to undermine 

“the only evidence linking [petitioner] to the crime.” 

Smith v. Cain, 565 U. S. 73, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 3).

II

Whether disclosing the information at issue realistically 

by the medical records is far from clear. Even at the postconviction 

evidentiary hearing, the defense’s and State’s medical experts disagreed about whether the particular procedure at issue would have left 

the then-20-year-old Hutchinson incapable of the acts Scott described.

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6 WEARRY v. CAIN

ALITO, J., dissenting

could have changed the trial’s outcome is indisputably an 

intensely factual question. Under Brady, we must evaluate the significance of the withheld information in light of

all the proof at petitioner’s trial. See Kyles, 514 U. S., at 

435 (Brady is violated when the withheld “evidence could 

reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict” (emphasis added)); United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 112 

(1976) (Brady materiality “must be evaluated in the context of the entire record” (emphasis added)). It is unusual 

and, in my judgment, unreasonable for us to decide such a

question without full briefing and argument.

At this stage, all that we have from the State is its brief 

in opposition to the petition for certiorari. And the State 

had ample reason to believe when it submitted that brief

that the question on the table was whether the Court 

should hear the case, not whether petitioner’s conviction 

should be reversed. The State undoubtedly knew that we 

generally deny certiorari on factbound questions that do 

not implicate any disputed legal issue. See, e.g., this 

Court’s Rule 10; S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice 

§5.12(c)(3), p. 352 (10th ed. 2013). Nothing warned the 

State that this petition was likely to produce an exception 

to that general rule. The petition does not, for instance, 

fall into a category in which the Court has previously 

evinced an inclination to police factbound errors. Cf. Cash

v. Maxwell, 565 U. S. ____, ____ (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 8) (listing cases 

from one such category).

To the contrary, we have previously told litigants that 

petitions like the one here, challenging a state court’s 

denial of postconviction relief, are particularly unlikely to 

be granted: We “‘rarely gran[t] review at this stage’” of 

litigation, even when a petition raises “‘arguably meritorious federal constitutional claims,’” because we prefer that 
Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016) 7 

ALITO, J., dissenting

the claims be reviewed first by a district court and court of 

appeals in a federal habeas proceeding. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U. S. 327, 335 (2007) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 

498 U. S. 931, 932 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial 

of stay of execution)).3

Why, then, has the Court decided to depart from our 

usual procedures and decide petitioner’s fact-intensive 

Brady claim at this stage? Why not allow petitioner to 

raise that claim in a federal habeas proceeding? If the 

case took that course, it would not reach us until a district 

court and a court of appeals had studied the record and 

evaluated the likely impact of the information in question.

One consequence of waiting until the claim was raised 

in a federal habeas proceeding is that our review would 

then be governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, 

relief could be granted only if it could be said that the 

state court’s rejection of the claim represented an “unreasonable application” of Brady. 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). By 

intervening now before AEDPA comes into play, the Court 

avoids the application of that standard and is able to 

exercise plenary review. But if the Brady claim is as openand-shut as the Court maintains, AEDPA would not present an obstacle to the granting of habeas relief. On the 

other hand, if reasonable jurists could disagree about the 

application of Brady to the facts of this case, there is no 

good reason to dispose of this case summarily. The State 

3The Court implies that meritorious claims in capital cases do constitute a category of factbound errors that the Court has shown willingness to correct on certiorari papers alone. Ante, at 10. In support, it 

cites Sears v. Upton, 561 U. S. 945 (2010) (per curiam), and Porter v. 

McCollum, 558 U. S. 30 (2009) (per curiam). Notably, Porter did not 

arise directly from state postconviction proceedings, but in federal 

habeas. And in neither case did the Court take the dramatic step it 

takes here and summarily reverse a long-final state conviction for 

capital murder; both cases addressed errors related to the defendants’ 

sentences.

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8 WEARRY v. CAIN

ALITO, J., dissenting

should be given the opportunity to make its full case.

In my view, therefore, summary reversal is highly inappropriate. The Court is anxious to vacate petitioner’s 

conviction before the State has the opportunity to make its 

case. But if we are going to intervene at this stage, we 

should grant the petition and hear the case on the merits. 

There is room on our docket to give this case the careful 

consideration it deserves.