THE HISTORY OF LARGE FEDERAL DAMS:

PLANNING, DESIGN, AND CONSTRUCTION

IN THE ERA OF BIG DAMS

David P. Billington

Donald C. Jackson

Martin V. Melosi

U.S. Department of the Interior

Bureau of Reclamation

Denver Colorado

2005
iii

INTRODUCTION

The history of federal involvement in dam construction goes back at 

least to the 1820s, when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers built wing dams 

to improve navigation on the Ohio River. The work expanded after the Civil 

War, when Congress authorized the Corps to build storage dams on the upper 

Mississippi River and regulatory dams to aid navigation on the Ohio River. In 

1902, when Congress established the Bureau of Reclamation (then called the 

“Reclamation Service”), the role of the federal government increased dramatically. Subsequently, large Bureau of Reclamation dams dotted the Western landscape. 

Together, Reclamation and the Corps have built the vast majority of major federal dams in the United States. These dams serve a wide variety of purposes. Historically, Bureau of Reclamation dams primarily served water storage 

and delivery requirements, while U.S. Army Corps of Engineers dams supported 

QDYLJDWLRQDQGÀRRGFRQWURO)RUERWKDJHQFLHVK\GURSRZHUSURGXFWLRQKDVEHcome an important secondary function. 

This history explores the story of federal contributions to dam planning, 

design, and construction by carefully selecting those dams and river systems that 

seem particularly critical to the story. Written by three distinguished historians, 

the history will interest engineers, historians, cultural resource planners, water resource planners and others interested in the challenges facing dam builders. At 

the same time, the history also addresses some of the negative environmental 

consequences of dam-building, a series of problems that today both Reclamation 

and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers seek to resolve.

While Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers funded this 

history, we gratefully acknowledge the work of the National Park Service, which 

managed the project. It may be possible that some federal dams warrant inclusion in the National Historic Landmarks program, which the National Park 

Service administers. The appendices to this book include material that will enable cultural resource managers to make informed decisions about the historic 

value of particular dams.

:HKRSHWKDW\RX¿QGWKLVVWXG\DVXVHIXODQGLQIRUPDWLYHDVZHGR

John W. Keys III Carl A. Strock

Commissioner Lieutenant General, US Army

Bureau of Reclamation Chief of Engineers
v

PREFACE

The concept for this study emerged in discussions between the undersigned in the early 1990s. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Reclamation 

agreed to fund the project with the costs equally divided. The Tennessee Valley 

Authority decided not to participate. 

Eventually, the Park Service awarded a contract to the Public Works 

Historical Society of the American Public Works Association. Dr. Howard 

Rosen, a distinguished engineering historian, then head of the Society, and later at the School of Engineering at the University of Wisconsin, worked with us 

to assemble the team of historians necessary to ensure a quality product. David 

P. Billington, Gordon Y. S. Wu Professor of Engineering at Princeton University 

(and a distinguished engineering historian) became the principal investigator. 

Joining him were Professor Donald C. Jackson of Lafayette College, Professor 

Martin V. Melosi, Distinguished University Professor of History at the University 

of Houston; and Ann Emmons of History Research Associates, in Missoula developed the material relating to evaluation guidelines and dam nominations 

for the National Historic Landmarks program. Acting as a peer reviewer was 

Donald J. Pisani, who holds the Merrick Chair of Western American History at 

the University of Oklahoma.

Through a period of years, we met with Robie Lange, Don Pisani, and 

the team of authors to review drafts and discuss progress. The objectives of the 

study were twofold: a history of federal dam development, concentrating on 

key projects and river systems, and the drafting of documents to assist cultural resource managers and others interested in nominating dams to the National 

Historic Landmarks program (see appendices). The history is organized into 

chapters which sometimes include both the Corps and Reclamation, but each 

chapter is devoted mostly to the work of one or the other of the agencies. While 

the book is very much a collaborative effort, in general each author had the priPDU\UHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUVSHFL¿FFKDSWHUV0DUWLQ90HORVLIRUFKDSWHUVDQG

David P. Billington for chapters 5, 6, and 8; and Donald Jackson for chapters 4 

and 7. Professors Billington and Jackson shared responsibility for chapters 2

and 3.

We acknowledge the support that the leadership in each agency has given this project over the years. We also wish to thank the countless number of 

Corps and Reclamation rangers, cultural resource managers, dam operators, and 

others who have contributed their time and invaluable knowledge to the study.
vi

Many reviewers at Reclamation, the Corps, and the National Park 

Service reviewed this manuscript as it was edited for publication, and their comments have been most helpful. Most editorial work was done by Brit Storey at 

Reclamation, with the particular assistance of Andrew Gahan and David Muñoz

Last, it is worth noting that the manuscript for this book was completed 

before the World Commission on Dams studies on Grand Coulee were available 

for review.

Brit Allan Storey, Ph.D. Martin A. Reuss, Ph.D.

Senior Historian Senior Historian

Bureau of Reclamation Water Resources

U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers
vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

7KLVZRUNEHQH¿WWHGJUHDWO\IURPWKHFRQWLQXDODVVLVWDQFHRI0DUWLQ

Reuss, Senior Historian of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Brit Storey, 

Senior Historian of the Bureau of Reclamation. The provided us with both documents and advice, which were essential to the project. We also appreciate the 

kind assistance from the personnel of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and 

the Bureau of Reclamation at various dam sites. Robie Lange of the National 

Historic Landmarks Survey, National Park Service, provided essential guidance 

RQWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQRIWKHZULWLQJDQGZDVD¿QHWRXUOHDGHURQVHYHUDOGDPVWXG\

trips.

J. Wayman Williams helped us to organize the work and produced various versions of the manuscript. He skillfully brought together the work of the 

three authors. Donald Pisani of the University of Oklahoma served as a consultant at a crucial period during which time he did much needed research, and most 

importantly helped us reorganize early drafts. He also read a complete draft and 

made valuable suggestions. Ann Emmons of Historical Research Associates, 

Inc., led a parallel effort to prepare guidelines for nominating dams as nationDOKLVWRULFODQGPDUNVDQGFRPSOHWHG¿YHQRPLQDWLRQVVXSSRUWHGE\PXFKRIWKH

material presented in this manuscript. David P. Billington, Jr., spent many hours 

in the National Archives ferreting out materials that enriched the manuscript 

greatly.

This complex project was initially organized by Howard Rosen, Ph.D., 

then with the American Public Works Association (APWA), which administered 

the project. William J. Bertera, Dale Crandall, and Dennis H. Ross, P.E. in turn 

ably administered the contract for that association. Connie Hartline, of APWA, 

SURYLGHG¿QDOHGLWLQJRIWKHPDQXDOWRHQVXUHFRQVLVWHQF\RIOD\RXWDQGIRUPDW

 )LQDOO\WKHDXWKRUVZRXOGOLNHWRWKDQNWKHKXQGUHGVRILQGLYLGXDOV

whom we have contacted over the course of this project that have provided commentary and insight into the history and importance of the various dams built by 

the federal government. Without their cooperation and assistance, this project 

could have been even more monumental than some of the dams described herein.

David P. Billington, Princeton University

Donald C. Jackson, Lafayette College

Martin V. Melosi, University of Houston
ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................iii

35()$&(.............................................................................................................v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS..................................................................................vii

7$%/(2)&217(176 ....................................................................................ix

/,672)),*85(6..........................................................................................xvii

&+$37(53,03529,1*¶¶5,9(56,1$0(5,&$)5207+(

REVOLUTION TO THE PROGRESSIVE ERA - RIVERS IN

EARLY AMERICA.......................................................................................1

 Rivers as Resource: The American Watershed System.........................1

 The Rise of an Industrializing Nation.....................................................2

  7KH2ULJLQVRI)HGHUDO:DWHU5HVRXUFH3ROLF\ ......................................3

 :$7(5/$:$1'7+(86(2)5,9(56 ...............................................5

 Mills and Dams in the Early Industrial Era ............................................5

 Water Law in the West ............................................................................7

 The Western Setting ................................................................................8

 The California Doctrine: 1851-1886 .....................................................8

 7+(86$50<&25362)(1*,1((56,17+(

NINETEENTH CENTURY........................................................................ 11

  7KH&RUSVDQGWKH)UHQFK(QJLQHHULQJ7UDGLWLRQ ................................ 11

 Commerce, Navigation and the “Steamboat Case”..............................13

  )UHQFK7UDGLWLRQYHUVXV)URQWLHU7HFKQLTXHV.......................................14

 Navigation and the Beginning of River Dams: 1824-1865.................15

 Postwar Navigation and the Ohio River: 1866-1885 ..........................17

 The Upper Mississippi and the Headwater Dams:1866-1899..............18

 :$7(5,17+(:(6725,*,162)7+(5(&/$0$7,21

SERVICE.....................................................................................................21

The West Before the Nineteenth Century.............................................21

Water and Mormon Migration ..............................................................22

 California Water Development .............................................................22

 The Exploits of John Wesley Powell ....................................................23

 The Sentimental and Practical during the 1890s ..................................25

 The Chittenden Survey of 1897............................................................26

 Newell, Roosevelt and the Move to Reclamation ................................27
x

PROGRESSIVISM AND WATER RESOURCES.....................................31

  3URJUHVVLYLVP&RQVHUYDWLRQDQG(I¿FLHQF\.......................................31

 Multipurpose Stirrings ..........................................................................31

 The Hydroelectric Challenge................................................................36

&+$37(57+(25,(6$1'&203(7,1*9,6,216)25

CONCRETE DAMS ...................................................................................49

PRE-TWENTIETH CENTURY THEORIES: THE MASSIVE

TRADITION ...............................................................................................49

 Massive or Structural ............................................................................49

 Gravity Dam Design Theory.................................................................50

  (XURSHDQ2ULJLQVRIWKH33UR¿OHRI(TXDO5HVLVWDQFH ́........................52

 The Middle Third ..................................................................................54

 A Limit to Gravity Design Innovation..................................................54

PRE-TWENTIETH CENTURY THEORIES - THE STRUCTURAL

TRADITION ...............................................................................................58

 Gravity Dams vs. Structural Dams .......................................................58

  $UFK'DP7KHRU\(XURSHDQ2ULJLQVDQGWKH&\OLQGHU)RUPXOD.......59

 American Arch Dams............................................................................60

 Constant Angle Designs........................................................................61

 American and European Dam Design Practice ....................................61

THE STRUCTURAL TRADITION AND THE RATIONAL 

 '(6,*12)&21&5(7(6758&785(6...............................................62

 The Beginning of Rational Design .......................................................62

  )RUPDQG0DVVLQ6WUXFWXUH..................................................................63

 Arch and Cantilever Behavior in Dams................................................64

 The Constant-Angle Arch Dam ............................................................68

 Noetzli and the Curved Dams...............................................................70

 The Trial Load Method .........................................................................73

 The Stevenson Creek Test Dam............................................................75

 Buttress Dams .......................................................................................79

  &RVWVLQ)RUPDQG0DVV........................................................................81

  &RQFUHWH)RUPDQG0DVRQU\0DVV.......................................................82

CHAPTER 3: EARLY MULTIPURPOSE DAMS: ROOSEVELT AND

THE RECLAMATION SERVICE, WILSON AND THE U.S. ARMY

 &25362)(1*,1((56............................................................................89

 )5206,1*/(7208/7,385326('$06 ........................................89

 Roosevelt and Wilson Dams.................................................................89

 <($562)78502,/)5205(&/$0$7,216(59,&(72

BUREAU.....................................................................................................92

 Newell, Davis and Wisner.....................................................................92

 The Salt River Project...........................................................................97

 Roosevelt Dam......................................................................................98
xi

 Crises and Rebirth...............................................................................107

 Elwood Mead and Reclamation..........................................................107

 <($562),1'(&,6,21)5201$9,*$7,217232:(5.......... 110

  )ORRGVDQG3ROLWLFV.............................................................................. 110

 Muscle Shoals: The Battle for Control of Hydropower .................... 111

  +XJK&RRSHU0F&DOO)HUU\DQG.HRNXN.......................................... 114

  )URP0XVFOH6KRDOVWR:LOVRQ'DP.................................................. 117

  )URPWKH7HQQHVVHH5LYHUWR+RXVH'RFXPHQW1R ................... 119

 The 308 Reports..................................................................................121

CHAPTER 4: THE BOULDER CANYON PROJECT, WATER

DEVELOPMENT IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN, AND

HOOVER DAM ........................................................................................129

 7+(&2/25$'25,9(5,55,*$7,21$1')/22' ....................129

 The River.............................................................................................129

 The Bureau of Reclamation and the West ..........................................131

 Early Developments and the Imperial Valley.....................................135

 7+()('(5$/,1,7,$7,9(6................................................................142

  7KH)DOO'DYLV5HSRUW.........................................................................142

 The Design of Hoover Dam ...............................................................145

 Selection of the Black Canyon Site ....................................................152

 Congressman Phil Swing....................................................................154

 The Colorado River Compact.............................................................157

 &$/,)251,$$1'32:(5 ..................................................................160

 Municipal Demand: Los Angeles and the Metropolitan

 Water District of Southern California..........................................160

 The Politics of Hydroelectric Power and Approval of 

 the Boulder Canyon Project.........................................................165

HOOVER DAM ........................................................................................171

 Construction of the Dam.....................................................................171

 The Legacy of Hoover Dam ...............................................................179

GLEN CANYON DAM............................................................................182

 The Upper Basin .................................................................................182

 Design of Glen Canyon Dam and Beyond .........................................184

CHAPTER 5: BONNEVILLE AND GRAND COULEE DAMS AND

THE COLUMBIA RIVER CONTROL PLAN ........................................191

EXPLORING A CHANGING RIVER .....................................................191

BONNEVILLE DAM: EMPLOYMENT VERSUS MARKETS...........194

  )URP6XUYH\WR&RQVWUXFWLRQ..............................................................194

  )URP&RQVWUXFWLRQWR'HGLFDWLRQ .......................................................196

  )URP'HGLFDWLRQWR'HEDWH.................................................................203
xii

 %211(9,//($1'*5$1'&28/((&21)/,&72)32:(5 ...203

 The Columbia 308 Report...................................................................203

 The Grande Coulee Stimulus to Bonneville.......................................208

GRAND COULEE: COLUMBIAN COLOSSUS ..................................210

 The Design Questions.........................................................................210

 Raising the Dam..................................................................................212

 Completing the Dam...........................................................................218

THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION AND THE

CONTROL PLAN.....................................................................................222

 Power and the Restudy of the River Basin.........................................222

  7KH)ORRGDQGWKH&RQWURO3ODQ..........................................................223

 Power and Salmon ..............................................................................226

CHAPTER 6: EARTH DAMS ON THE MISSOURI RIVER:

 )2573(&.$1'*$55,621'$06$1'

THE PICK-SLOAN PLAN.......................................................................235

THE BASIN PLAN...................................................................................235

  )URP1DYLJDWLRQWR3RZHU..................................................................235

 ($57+),//'$06$1')2573(&..................................................239

 The Birth of Soil Mechanics...............................................................239

  &RQVWUXFWLRQRI+\GUDXOLF)LOO'DPV.................................................241

  )RUW3HFN6NLOOHG*HQHUDOVKLSDQG8OWUD0RGHUQ0HFKDQL]DWLRQ ...244

 The Spillway and the Castle ...............................................................252

 Slide and Recovery .............................................................................256

 Completion and Controversy..............................................................265

THE PICK-SLOAN PLAN.......................................................................269

 The Pick Plan ......................................................................................269

  &RQJUHVVLRQDO&RQÀLFWDQGWKH&UHHSLQJ&RPPHUFH&ODXVH ............272

 The Sloan Report ................................................................................273

 Pick-Sloan and the Valley Authority...................................................275

GARRISON DAM ....................................................................................278

 The Garrison Design Controversies....................................................278

 Garrison Dam Design and Construction 1948-1950 ..........................280

 Garrison Dam Completion 1951-1955 ...............................................283

 Spillway Designs.................................................................................287

PICK’S PLAN AND THE MISSOURI BASIN.......................................288

  )URP*DUULVRQWR%LJ%HQG ................................................................288

CHAPTER 7: THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT: SHASTA

 $1')5,$17'$06 ..............................................................................301

 :$7(5,668(6,1&$/,)251,$.........................................................301

 Agriculture and Topography of the Central Valley.............................301

 “Move the Rain”: The Central Valley Project ...................................304
xiii

 Miller & Lux and Early Agriculture ...................................................306

 The Board of Commissioners’ Survey................................................308

 Miller & Lux and Riparian Rights......................................................310

  7KH)HGHUDO+LDWXV .........................................................312

 The Early Reclamation Service in California.....................................314

 The Orland Project..............................................................................315

 The Iron Canyon Project and the Sacramento Valley.........................316

 Rice and Drought ................................................................................319

 67$7(3/$16)25&$/,)251,$........................................................320

 The “Marshall Plan” and the Evolution of a State Water Plan...........320

 The Early Studies of the State Engineer.............................................322

 The “Water Surge” and Riparian Rights.............................................323

 The 1927 State Engineer’s Reports and Kennett Dam.......................324

  7KH)HGHUDO6WDWH,QWHUDFWLRQ..............................................................326

  $3)HGHUDO5HFODPDWLRQ3URMHFW ́........................................................329

 6+$67$$1')5,$17'$06 ..............................................................330

  'HVLJQRI6KDVWDDQG)ULDQW'DPV......................................................330

 Shasta Dam: Planning and Bidding ...................................................333

 The Construction Process ...................................................................335

 Construction Schedule ........................................................................341

  )ULDQW'DP&RQVWUXFWLRQ.....................................................................342

 Aftermath ............................................................................................344

&+$37(5'$06)251$9,*$7,21$1')/22'

TYGART AND MAINSTEM DAMS ON THE OHIO, UPPER

MISSISSIPPI, AND TENNESSEE RIVERS ...........................................353

  7KH2KLR5LYHU)ORRGVDQG7\JDUW'DP ............................................353

 Navigation from New Orleans to Monongahela ................................355

  )ORRGV'URXJKWVDQG3RZHU..............................................................356

 Cove Creek and Tygart .......................................................................361

TYGART DAM.........................................................................................363

 The Planning and Design of Tygart: 1933-1934 ...............................363

 Design During Construction at Tygart: 1935-1936 ...........................366

 Tygart Completion and Operation: 1937-39......................................370

  )ORRG&RQWURODQG3LWWVEXUJK..............................................................371

SLACKWATER NAVIGATION SYSTEMS............................................372

 Modernization of the Ohio..................................................................372

 The Upper Mississippi Basin..............................................................373

 The Design of Dam Gates...................................................................374

  6KLSSLQJ)LVKDQG:LOGOLIH ................................................................376
xiv

&+$37(57+((19,5210(17$/,03$&72)7+(

BIG DAM ERA.........................................................................................383

 Conservation and Controversies .........................................................383

 The Economic and Social Impacts of Dams.......................................386

  (QYLURQPHQWDO7KUHDWV)ORRGLQJDQG6LOWLQJ....................................387

  'DP)DLOXUHVDQG'DP6DIHW\............................................................389

  $)LVK6WRU\&RQÀLFWVRYHU5HVRXUFH'HYHORSPHQW........................392

 The Echo Park Controversy................................................................395

 Dams and the Modern Environmental Movement .............................399

  )ORRG&RQWURODQG1RQ6WUXFWXUDO$OWHUQDWLYHV..................................403

 Water Quality and Other Environmental Impacts ..............................404

 Decaying Dams: The Impending Crisis in Dam Safety ....................406

  7ZR)LVK6WRULHV3DFL¿F1RUWKZHVW6DOPRQ

 the Tellico Snail Darter................................................................407

 Environmentalism Comes of Age: Rampart Dam and

 the Grand Canyon Dams..............................................................409

 Conclusion........................................................................................... 411

$33(1',;$*8,'(/,1(6)25$33/<,1*7+(

NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARKS CRITERIA

TO STORAGE DAMS..............................................................................421

INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................421

GUIDELINES ...........................................................................................421

 Criterion 1 ...........................................................................................422

 Criterion 2 ...........................................................................................426

 Criterion 3 ...........................................................................................427

 Criterion 4 ...........................................................................................428

 'HVLJQ6LJQL¿DQFH.....................................................................................430

 &RQVWUXFWLRQ6LJQL¿DQFH ...........................................................................434

 Criterion 5 ...........................................................................................435

 Criterion 6 ...........................................................................................436

National Historic Landmark Exclusion.....................................................437

Integrity......................................................................................................438

 %RXQGDU\-XVWL¿FDWLRQ,GHQWL¿FDWLRQRI&RQWULEXWLQJDQG

 Noncontributing Resources.................................................................439

$33(1',;%5(6($5&+0(7+2'2/2*<$1'/,672)

POTENTIAL NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARK

MULTIPLE-PURPOSE DAMS................................................................445

I. Consultation with Project Historians ....................................................445

II. Secondary Source Review ...................................................................445

III. Comparative Analysis.........................................................................447

Historic Context.........................................................................................448

Corps..........................................................................................................449

Reclamation ...............................................................................................449
xv

Multiple Purpose River Development.......................................................451

Engineering Considerations - Prepared by the Institute for

 the History of Technology and Industrial Archaeology, 1994............453

Consideration of Hydraulic Designs .........................................................457

List of Potential National Historic Landmark Dams ................................458

 Anderson Ranch Dam.........................................................................458

 Arrowrock Dam ..................................................................................459

 Bartlett Dam........................................................................................459

 Buffalo Bill Dam.................................................................................459

 Central Valley Project .........................................................................460

 Shasta Dam..........................................................................................460

  )ULDQW'DP ..........................................................................................460

 Elephant Butte Dam............................................................................461

  )RUW3HFN'DP ....................................................................................461

 Garrison Dam......................................................................................462

 Gatun Dam ..........................................................................................462

 Gibson Dam ........................................................................................462

 Glen Canyon Dam...............................................................................463

 Grand Coulee Dam..............................................................................463

 Owyhee Dam.......................................................................................463

  3DWK¿QGHU'DP ...................................................................................464

  3LQH)ODW'DP......................................................................................464

 Sardis Dam..........................................................................................464

 Troy Dam #1 .......................................................................................465

 &RPSUHKHQVLYH&RRUGLQDWHG5LYHU%DVLQ)ORRG&RQWURO6\VWHPV

 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers).........................................................465

 Ohio River Basin.................................................................................466

Allegheny and Monongahela River System..............................................466

 Tygart Dam..........................................................................................467

 Youghiogheny Dam ............................................................................467

 North Atlantic Division.......................................................................468

 Connecticut River Basin .....................................................................468

 Claremont............................................................................................469

 Union Village ......................................................................................469

 Surry Mountain Reservoir...................................................................469

 Birch Hill.............................................................................................469

 Knightville Reservoir..........................................................................469

 Tully Reservoir....................................................................................469

 /RV$QJHOHV&RXQW\)ORRG&RQWURODQG:DWHU&RQVHUYDWLRQ

 District, California...............................................................................469

 Red River, Texas .................................................................................470

 Denison Dam.......................................................................................470
xvi

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................473

INDEX..............................................................................................................529
xvii

List of Figures

)LJXUH &URVVVHFWLRQVRI$OPDQV¶DQG$OLFDQWH'DPV................... 51

)LJXUH )(PLOH'H/RFUHGHVLJQIRU)XUHQ¶V'DP............... 52

)LJXUH 'H/RFUHGHVLJQRI)XUHQ¶V'DP ........................................ 53

)LJXUH &RPSDULVRQSUR¿OHVLQ:HJPDQQ¶V

 Design and Construction............................................... 55

)LJXUH 'H/RFUHSUR¿OHDQG=ROD'DP........................................... 60

)LJXUH 8SVWUHDPIDFHRI3DWK¿QGHU'DP...................................... 66

)LJXUH 3DWK¿QGHU'DPFRQVWUXFWLRQ.............................................. 67

)LJXUH 3DWK¿QGHU'DPDQDO\VLV..................................................... 68

)LJXUH %XIIDOR%LOO'DP................................................................ 69

)LJXUH &DOFXODWLQJORDGLQJRQ3DWK¿QGHU'DP ............................. 71

)LJXUH 7ULDOORDGPHWKRGRIGDPDQDO\VLV'DP1R................... 73

)LJXUH 7ULDOORDGPHWKRGRIGDPDQDO\VLV'DP1R................... 75

)LJXUH -RKQ-DFN/6DYDJH......................................................... 77

)LJXUH )UHGHULFN+1HZHOO ........................................................... 93

)LJXUH $UWKXU3RZHOO'DYLV........................................................... 94

)LJXUH 7KHRGRUH5RRVHYHOW'DP................................................... 95

)LJXUH &DEOHWRZHUVDW5RRVHYHOW'DP ......................................... 96

)LJXUH 5RRVHYHOW'DPFRQVWUXFWLRQ .............................................. 97

)LJXUH (OZRRG0HDG ................................................................... 108

)LJXUH :RRGHQIRUPZRUN:LOVRQ'DP.......................................112

)LJXUH :LOVRQ'DPDW0XVFOH6KRDOV ......................................... 112

)LJXUH :LOVRQ'DP...................................................................... 113

)LJXUH &RORUDGR5LYHU%DVLQPDS ............................................... 130

)LJXUH &RORUDGR5LYHUEHORZ+RRYHU'DPDQG

southern California...................................................... 134

)LJXUH *UDSHIUXLWRUFKDUG,PSHULDO9DOOH\ ................................. 136

)LJXUH 6WUDZEHUU\¿HOG,PSHULDO9DOOH\ ..................................... 137

)LJXUH 7KH%ODFN&DQ\RQGDPVLWH .............................................. 145

)LJXUH 3UHOLPLQDU\GHVLJQIRU%ODFN&DQ\RQGDP ...................... 146

)LJXUH :H\PRXWKGHVLJQIRU+RRYHU'DP.................................. 147

)LJXUH 6DYDJHSODQIRU+RRYHU'DP........................................... 150

)LJXUH 'LJQLWDULHVDW%ODFN&DQ\RQGDPVLWH ............................... 151

)LJXUH +RRYHU%RXOGHU'DPSURPRWLRQDO

pamphlet cover ............................................................ 166

)LJXUH +RRYHU%RXOGHU'DPSURPRWLRQDOÀLHU......................... 167

)LJXUH 7DONLQJ3RLQWV ́+RRYHU%RXOGHU

Dam promotion ........................................................... 168

)LJXUH $OWHUQDWHURXWHVIRU&RORUDGR5LYHUDTXHGXFW ................. 170
xviii

)LJXUH 3UR¿OHVRISUHOLPLQDU\&RORUDGR5LYHU

Aqueduct routes .......................................................... 172

)LJXUH 9LHZRI+RRYHU'DPIURPGRZQVWUHDP.......................... 173

)LJXUH &RQVWUXFWLRQRI+RRYHU'DP........................................... 176

)LJXUH +RRYHU'DPDQG/DNH0HDG ........................................... 177

)LJXUH *OHQ&DQ\RQ'DPFRQVWUXFWLRQ ....................................... 183

)LJXUH *OHQ&DQ\RQ'DP............................................................ 185

)LJXUH &URVVVHFWLRQVRIHDUO\&RUSVFRQFUHWHGDPV................... 192

)LJXUH %RQQHYLOOH'DPFURVVVHFWLRQ.......................................... 193

)LJXUH &RIIHUGDPVDW%RQQHYLOOH'DP....................................... 195

)LJXUH %RQQHYLOOH'DPXQGHUFRQVWUXFWLRQ................................. 197

)LJXUH 0DLQVSLOOZD\DW%RQQHYLOOH'DP.................................... 198

)LJXUH 7KH%RQQHYLOOHVSLOOZD\GDP........................................... 199

)LJXUH %RQQHYLOOH'DPORFNVDQGSRZHUKRXVH ........................... 204

)LJXUH %RQQHYLOOH'DPSRZHUKRXVH ........................................... 201

)LJXUH *HQHUDWRUVDQG%RQQHYLOOHSRZHUKRXVH................ 204

)LJXUH )LVKODGGHU%RQQHYLOOH'DP............................................. 205

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1

CHAPTER 1

“IMPROVING” RIVERS IN AMERICA:

FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PROGRESSIVE ERA - 

RIVERS IN EARLY AMERICA

Rivers as Resource: The American Watershed System

)UHVKZDWHULVDSUHFLRXVUHVRXUFHDQGZDWHUIURPULYHUVVWUHDPVDQG

lakes has often been regarded as an economic commodity in the United States 

as in much of the world. Water is essential not only for human consumption and 

IRUDYDULHW\RIGRPHVWLFSXUSRVHVEXWIRU¿UHSURWHFWLRQPLOLWDU\GHIHQVHWUDQVporting people and goods, irrigating farmlands, manufacturing, and generating 

power. The great rivers and their tributaries in the United States are the primary 

source of the water bounty and are major symbols of American regionalism, ultimately binding together disparate areas into a powerful whole.

The American watershed system is an awesome force. The Mississippi 

Basin alone drains more than 40 percent of the country’s land from the 

Appalachian Mountains in the East to the Rockies in the West. To the North, the 

St. Lawrence River drains the Great Lakes. In the Southwest, the Colorado traverses seven states and Mexico on its route to the Gulf of California, and the 

5LR*UDQGHIRUPVSDUWRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VVRXWKHUQERXQGDU\$ORQJWKH3DFL¿F

Coast, the Columbia gathers water from the Rocky Mountains and the Cascades, 

and the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers collect water from the Sierra 

1HYDGDOLQNLQJLQODQGYDOOH\VWRWKH3DFL¿F2FHDQ7KHJHRORJLFDODQGKXPDQ

history of the United States is linked inextricably to its rivers.1

American rivers were symbols of a burgeoning nation in the eighteenth 

and nineteenth centuries. They inspired romantic renderings at the hands of artists, and in some cases—as with painters of the Hudson River School in the 

1820s—they were depicted as detailed landscape features with physical and 

even human qualities.2

 But at times they were regarded as untapped or underutilized resources, raw material waiting to be harnessed, managed, and exploited 

IRUKXPDQEHQH¿W,QWKHQHRFODVVLFDOWUDGLWLRQRIWKHHLJKWHHQWKDQGHDUO\QLQHteenth centuries, “The ‘proper’ channel for a river is not necessarily the one it has 

carved for itself: By means of canals and locks it can be guided by men along a 

straight and level line, thereby improving upon natural design.” Rivers, therefore, 

were most attractive “when they yielded to humanity’s needs, whether as mechanisms of transportation or as sites for nascent towns.”3

)RUDHVWKHWLFDQGIRU

practical reasons, wild rivers served little purpose, historian Theodore Steinberg 

noted:
2

As the [nineteenth] century progressed, a consensus emerged 

on the need to exploit and manipulate water for economic gain. 

A stunning cultural transformation was taking place, a shift in 

people’s very perception of nature. By the latter part of the 

nineteenth century, it was commonly assumed, even expected, 

that water should be tapped, controlled, and dominated in the 

QDPHRISURJUHVV±DYLHZFOHDUO\UHÀHFWHGLQWKHODZ4

Steamboats, canals, and dams became the technologies of choice to accomplish 

those goals.

To appreciate the importance of dams in the process of “harnessing” 

American rivers, it is necessary to establish a context for understanding water 

resource management in the United States, including relevant economic, political, institutional, and legal issues in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 

Large federal dams would be designed and built from about 1930 to 1965 to further the objectives of economic growth in a modern industrializing nation beginning to blossom in the early nineteenth century.

The Rise of an Industrializing Nation

The impulse to “improve” waterways was stimulated by the profound changes transforming the young nation. Beginning as early as 1820, the 

Industrial Revolution ushered in a period of unprecedented economic development for the United States. Manufacturing began to challenge agriculture as the 

nation’s leading economic enterprise. While agriculture was responsible for the 

largest single share of production income before the Civil War, the growth and 

importance of manufacturing, especially in the East and along the Great Lakes, 

rose rapidly during the decades that followed the war. In 1859, there were 

140,000 industrial establishments in the United States—many of them hand or 

QHLJKERUKRRGLQGXVWULHV)RUW\\HDUVODWHUWKHUHZHUHLQGXVWULDOSODQWV

excluding hand and neighborhood industries.5

The economic transformation of the nation paralleled the rise of cities. 

7KH¿UVWIHGHUDOFHQVXVLQVKRZHGWKDWFLW\GZHOOHUVUHSUHVHQWHGOHVVWKDQ

4 percent of the nation’s population. Urban growth stagnated until 1820, but by 

the end of the decade the urban population had almost doubled.6

 While only 

7 out of every 100 Americans lived in cities or towns at that time, the urban population grew by 552 percent (from 1.1 million to 6.2 million) between 1830 and 

1860, which was the fastest rate of urbanization the nation had ever experienced.7

Industrialization also inspired the mechanization of agriculture and stimulated demand for a variety of products that helped to build a national market 
3

economy. Irrigation ultimately became a tool for expanding the agricultural market in the West to supply a variety of goods for growing urban centers at home 

and abroad. As early as the 1770s, an emerging capitalist economic system was 

evident in the Northeast, the Mid-Atlantic region, the South, and the back country. A booming transatlantic market for grain and other agricultural products, a 

rising number of American capitalist entrepreneurs, surplus labor available to 

work for wages, and state and national governments encouraging and promoting economic growth underlay the emergence of a market revolution along the 

American rural frontiers.8

The promise of economic growth had long attracted the interest of 

government. In the manufacturing belt of the East coast and the Great Lakes, 

the states and the federal government had been active agents in stimulating 

commerce and industrialization. Competition between the states beyond the 

Appalachians for access to ports on the Atlantic had been intense. Rivalries 

between the states for a variety of public works projects focused on economic 

opportunities to be won and lost.

The Origins of Federal Water Resource Policy

With respect to water resource issues, rivalries between the states suggest a partial answer for an increased federal government role. However, no 

comprehensive water resource policy ever emerged in the nineteenth or twenWLHWKFHQWXULHV)HGHUDOQDYLJDWLRQSROLF\ÀRRGFRQWUROSROLF\DQGLUULJDWLRQ

policy were conceived and administered separately over the years, and water 

issues even today remain a combination of local, state, and national interest.9

 

Supporters of national initiatives for water and navigation projects chronically 

vied with advocates of states’ rights, who opposed outright subsidies for waterway construction. Steering a middle course, an emerging “water bureaucracy”–

including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the 

Tennessee Valley Authority—often urged government planning without directly 

challenging state control of water projects.10

There is merit in Richard N. L. Andrews’ observation that federal 

responsibility for water resource management “evolved almost unintentionally” 

from the convergence of nineteenth-century public-land and internal-improvements policies.11 Disposal of public lands set several precedents about how 

the federal government would deal with the nation’s resources. At one time or 

another, more than 78 percent of the nation’s 2.3 billion acres was owned by the 

federal government. There was no uniform method of land distribution during 

early colonial days. Since much of the frontier remained within the boundaries 

of the states after the American Revolution, state legislatures often developed the 

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4

speculation on federal lands initially focused on the Ohio River region, that 

area wedged between the new nation and the vast frontier. After the Louisiana 

Purchase,new land law that lowered the minimum purchase to a quarter section

 (160 acres), made western migration attractive to easterners and European immigrants. Between 1850 and 1900 the number of farms in American territory

increased from 1.4 million to 5.7 million. Indian land rights, however, were 

often ignored or manipulated in providing settlers with land. In essence, much 

of the productive land in the West had already been claimed before the famous 

1862 Homestead Act, and after its initial disposal, former public land increasingly became a speculative commodity.12

 7KHGLVSRVDORISXEOLFODQGVZDVQRWPHUHO\DQHQGLQLWVHOI)URPWKH

¿UVWODQGRUGLQDQFHVLQWKHHLJKWHHQWKWKURXJKWKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\WKHIHGeral government intended to generate revenue and to stimulate economic development by a rapid transfer of public lands to private individuals. This was not 

DFFRPSOLVKHGZLWKRXW¿HUFHGHEDWHFKDUDFWHUL]HGPRVWJUDSKLFDOO\E\7KRPDV

-HIIHUVRQ¶VLPDJHRIDQDWLRQRIVHOIVXI¿FLHQW\HRPHQIDUPHUVDQG$OH[DQGHU

Hamilton’s promotion of manufacturing, inland navigation, and the development 

of new economic markets.

In dealing with the states, the federal government could offer public 

lands in exchange for their support on development projects or other policies. 

Public lands also were used to provide capital for private businesses, such as the 

UDLOURDGV7KH¿UVWODQGODZVLQWKHVDQGVLQFOXGLQJWKH1RUWKZHVW

Ordinance of 1787), however, were primarily directed toward using land to raise 

revenue, to retire the public debt, and to create a market in western lands.13

While land subsidies for public works projects were not provided for 

in federal law, many land grants were made to subsidize road building, river 

LPSURYHPHQWVDQGUDLOURDGFRQVWUXFWLRQ)RUSXEOLFODQGVWRKDYHYDOXHWKH\

needed to be accessible to facilitate settlement and for the transportation of raw 

materials and crops to the East and to Europe. The federal government funded

“internal improvements” through general revenues, the sale of public lands, and 

land grants.14 But as John Lauritz Larson perceptively observed, “The campaign for internal improvements, so universally appealing in the abstract, proved 

incredibly controversial at all levels of government as soon as workmen struck 

their spades into the earth.”15

Prior to 1789, private investors provided internal improvements. At the 

FRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQYHQWLRQ%HQMDPLQ)UDQNOLQZDVWKHSULPDU\DGYRFDWHIRUIHGeral sponsorship for internal improvements, but he could not carry the day. The 

Constitution ultimately reserved that responsibility for the states. However, with 

poor economic conditions in many states, Congress began appropriating funds 
5

IRUVSHFL¿FLPSURYHPHQWVEHJLQQLQJLQ,Q6HFUHWDU\RI7UHDVXU\

Albert Gallatin submitted his report recommending federal aid for a system of 

roads and canals that would link the Atlantic seaports with the nation’s interior.16

 $UWL¿FLDOFDQDOVEHFDPHWKHIRUHPRVWWHFKQRORJ\LQWKHHDUO\QLQHWHHQWK

century to connect the riverine system to the sea. The virtue of such canals was 

to ‘free’ rivers from their natural courses and to direct them into channels that 

would serve the economic ends of the nation.17 East coast rivers were only navigable up to the fall line, a barrier at the foothills of the Appalachians. In the 

late eighteenth century, several short canals and the 27-mile Middlesex Canal in 

Massachusetts had been constructed, but by 1816 only about 100 miles of canals 

existed in the United States. These manmade waterways proved to be demandLQJHQJLQHHULQJIHDWVDQG¿QDQFLDOOLDELOLWLHVDQGLWEHFDPHGLI¿FXOWWR¿QG

investors for new projects.

The construction of the Erie Canal, linking Albany and Buffalo by 

PHDQVRIDQDUWL¿FLDOZDWHUZD\PLOHVLQOHQJWKVHWRIIDFDQDOERRPLQWKH

United States that ultimately attracted federal dollars to future projects. The 

New York legislature authorized the construction of the Erie Canal in 1817 without a promise of federal support, and the canal was completed in 1825. By 1840, 

various states had invested approximately $125 million in 3,200 miles of canals. 

Between 1815 and 1860, the total public and private expenditures for canal construction was about $195 million. While the federal government had refused to 

KHOS1HZ<RUN6WDWHEXLOGLWVFDQDODQGVWDWHVZHUHWKHSULPDU\¿QDQFLDOFRQWULEXWRUVLQWKHHDUO\FDQDOHUDWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWXOWLPDWHO\SURYLGHG¿QDQcial support through land grants and subscribed more than $3 million in canal 

company stock. Expensive enlargement programs, the Panic of 1837, and competition from railroads brought the canal boom to an end by the 1840s.18

WATER LAW AND THE USE OF RIVERS

Mills and Dams in the Early Industrial Era

Complicating the creation of a national water resource program was the 

fact that fresh water, unlike land, was common as opposed to private property. 

Navigable waterways, for example, could not be treated like the public lands, 

that is, could not be disposed of to generate revenue or to promote economic 

development. They were open to common use and thus required special treatment. Water usage also was subject to unique practices imbedded in the law.19

Water, among other things, was an important source of energy before 

and during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution, and was, thus, the focus 

of voluminous litigation over water rights. The bulk of litigation arose from 
6

disputes over the use of streams for waterpower.20 Mills and dams raised for 

WKH¿UVWWLPHOHJDOTXHVWLRQVRYHUWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQSURSHUW\ODZDQGSULYDWHGHYHORSPHQWZKHQ3DQWLGHYHORSPHQWDOGRFWULQHVRIWKHFRPPRQODZ¿UVW

clashed with the spirit of economic improvement.” Evolving water rights law 

had a greater impact on the effort to adapt private law doctrines to the promotion 

of economic growth than any other branch of law.21

 7KHZDWHUPLOOLQHYLWDEO\FDPHLQWRFRQÀLFWZLWKRWKHUVWUHDPXVHV

Aside from the waterwheel, the dam was the most essential element of a mill. 

Pre-industrial dams were low, crude structures designed to increase water fall by 

raising the stream level. The dam created a storage reservoir, or millpond, which 

QRWRQO\REVWUXFWHGQDYLJDWLRQDQGORJÀRDWVEXWDOVRWKHVHDVRQDOPRYHPHQWRI

¿VK22

Water mills challenged prevailing water rights law and practices such 

as riparian rights, commonly recognized in the eastern United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This English common-law doctrine granted ownership of a water privilege with the land bordering the two banks of the 

stream. The landowner did not own the stream, but only the rights of water 

usage. Even usage was subject to rights and claims of other users, including navLJDWLRQLQWHUHVWVRZQHUVRIULSDULDQIDUPODQGVDERYHDQGEHORZDVSHFL¿FZDWHU

privilege, lumber and other commercial interests, upstream communities, and 

mill owners themselves.23

Before the nineteenth century, common law doctrines were generally 

EDVHGRQWKHQDWXUDOÀRZRIZDWHUDQGMXULVWVUDUHO\ORRNHGZLWKIDYRURQWKHXVH

of water to irrigate or to run machinery. Possessing a narrow view of the productive capacity of water, they generally placed strict limits on its appropriation.24 

:LWKWKHRQVHWRIWKH,QGXVWULDO5HYROXWLRQWKHLQFUHDVLQJQXPEHURIFRQÀLFWing claims and shades of interpretation of privilege challenged the water rights of 

riparian owners.25

 6LQFHQDYLJDWLRQULJKWVKDGSULRULW\RQVWUHDPVVXI¿FLHQWO\ODUJHWRFDUU\UHJXODUWUDI¿FWKHSDUWVRIWKHODZUHIHUULQJWRWKDWDFWLYLW\ZHUHWKHOHDVWFRQWURYHUVLDO$VSRZHUQHHGVLQFUHDVHGJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVEHJDQWRIDYRUPLOO

owners—especially in New England—over other riparians. This also was true 

for capitalists who wanted to divert water from natural sources to build canals.26

The most typical water rights controversy pitted downstream riparian 

ODQGRZQHUVDJDLQVWXSVWUHDPRZQHUVZKRVHGDPVREVWUXFWHGWKHQDWXUDOÀRZRI

water for mills or irrigation. Other cases pitted upstream mill owners against 

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7

YLUWXDOO\UHIXVHGWRUHFRJQL]HDQ\ULJKWWRLQWHUIHUHZLWKWKHÀRZRIZDWHUWRD

mill.27

“Reasonable use,” or a balancing test, was the most important challenge to the common law doctrine of riparian water rights. Although the concept 

GLGQRW¿QGJHQHUDODFFHSWDQFHXQWLODURXQGVRPHHDUO\GHFLVLRQVVHWWKH

stage. By the Civil War, most courts accepted a balancing test in which “reasonable use” of a stream depended on the extent of detriment to riparian landowners 

downstream.28

In determining “reasonable use,” it was common to take into account 

what constituted a proportionate share of the water. In Cary v. Daniels (1844), 

however, Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw tended to weaken the stanGDUGRISURSRUWLRQDOLW\E\JLYLQJSULRULW\WRWKHSURSULHWRUZKR¿UVWHUHFWHGKLV

dam, thus placing greater emphasis on maximizing economic development at the 

expense of equal distribution of the water privilege.29 Not until the nineteenth 

century was a theory of priority used offensively to maintain a right to obstruct 

WKHÀRZ30 What brought on the change was the building of large dams, which 

widened the possibilities for injury by causing potential damage to mill owners 

both upstream and downstream from the dam.

The two doctrines–reasonable use and prior appropriation–were becoming less and less interchangeable, at least as they operated within the context of 

economic development in the emerging industrial age. Thus a tension between 

the two–which had moved beyond the natural rights doctrine characteristic of 

pre-industrial societies–found its way into the courts. By mid-century, almost all 

courts rejected prior appropriation because it so obviously interfered with comSHWLWLRQ5LSDULDQULJKWVPRGL¿HGE\3UHDVRQDEOHXVH ́SUHYDLOHGLQWKH(DVWLQ

dealing with economic development. In addition, the advent of the steam engine 

and the railroad made concessions to mill dams and canals temporary.31

Water Law in the West

While waterpower development and canal building framed much of the 

water law in the East, in the West mining activity and agriculture helped shape 

the law.32 The traditional interpretation stresses that water rights in the nineteenth-century West, as opposed to the East, have been closely associated with 

the prior appropriation doctrine.33 When Anglo American settlers arrived in the 

West, neither land nor water rights issues had been clearly resolved. Until the 

Civil War, the federal government controlled the public domain. Legislation 

enacted by Congress in the 1860s and 1870s, however, recognized the rights of 

settlers to utilize water on the public lands for a variety of purposes. Thus, the 

prior appropriation doctrine in the West owes a great deal to local circumstance.34 
8

Donald Pisani, however, has persuasively argued that “Water law evolved slowly 

in both California and the West, constructed piece by piece, like a quilt, 

rather than from whole cloth.” The courts and legislatures, he added, “rarely 

looked beyond immediate economic needs” in determining water rights.35

The Western Setting

In humid eastern America, water is an essential resource. But control 

RYHUZDWHUUHVRXUFHVGRHVQRWGH¿QHWKHFHQWUDOFKDUDFWHURIWKDWVRFLHW\,QFRQtrast, water is dramatically scarce in the arid West and that “precious liquid” 

occupies a pivotal position in regional development and in the larger political 

economy. Much of the West’s historical character arises from a pervasive lack 

of rainfall.36 It has become clear that water resources development is a key factor in regional growth.37 Moreover, in the history of western water use, the work 

of the federal government–in particular the U.S. Reclamation Service after 1902 

DQGWKH86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVDIWHU±KDVKDGHQRUPRXVLQÀXHQFHLQ

transforming the environment and fostering economic development.38

Precipitation in the West is not evenly distributed over the landscape, 

and while billions of gallons of water might be dumped on the desert in the period of a few days or weeks, such storms can be spaced years apart. With much 

surface water originating either as seasonal snowmelt or infrequent torrential rainstorms, the ability to support widespread agriculture—as well as mining, municipal growth, and hydroelectric power development—has by necesVLW\EHFRPHGHSHQGHQWXSRQDUWL¿FLDOPHDQVRIFRQWUROOLQJZDWHU/HDYLQJ

aside groundwater that can be lifted to the surface by either windmills or electric 

pumps, irrigated agriculture depends upon water diverted from rivers, transportHGLQFDQDOVDQGWKHQGLVWULEXWHGRYHU¿HOGVWRVXVWDLQFURSV7KHHQJLQHHULQJ

techniques and the political instruments devised to foster irrigation in the West 

later comprised the basis for water resources development throughout the nation. 

Water in the West, of course, served many needs other than agriculture, including 

mining and urban development.

The California Doctrine: 1851-1886

 'XULQJWKH&DOLIRUQLDJROGUXVKWKHULJKWWRDFODLPZHQWWRWKH¿UVWSHUVRQZRUNLQJLW1RWVXUSULVLQJO\WKLV3¿UVWLQWLPH¿UVWLQULJKW ́SULQFLSOHRU

prior appropriation doctrine) could also apply to water—a commodity essential 

to mining. A miner did not acquire property in the running water itself, but only 

its use if he continued to work the claim. But this prior appropriation doctrine 

coexisted with riparian rights in the 1840s and early 1850s, since many miners 

did not want streams diverted from their natural courses. The California State 

Legislature, eager to promote mining, supported prior appropriation for the gold 
9

country in 1851, the state court accepted it in 1855, followed by its congressional 

endorsement for public lands generally in 1866.39 The federal action endorsed 

prior appropriation not only for mining, but also for agricultural, manufacturing, 

and other uses, and it further acknowledged the states’ power to regulate water 

rights. The prior appropriation doctrine promoted economic development, but 

gave no preference to communities over individuals. Eventually every western 

state endorsed some form of the doctrine, and nine states adopted it as its sole 

water law.40

In practice, prior appropriation worked well enough when water was 

abundant, but when scarce it created confusion. An appropriator could sue to 

defend his rights, and the courts reviewed the records to determine a prior claim. 

But the amount of water available was not always known. A title established in 

one case protected an appropriator from one claimant only. Although the states 

gradually evolved more orderly approaches, the system remained confused.41

Although California set a precedent in the application of prior appropriation, riparianism also gained legal recognition early in the state’s history. In 

WKH¿UVWOHJLVODWXUHDGRSWHGDVLWVEDVLFV\VWHP(QJOLVKFRPPRQODZVXEVHTXHQWO\PRGL¿HGE\VWDWHFRXUWVLQUHVSRQVHWRVWDWXWRU\DQGFDVHODZ3)RU

nearly three decades the state dealt with the problem of two contradictory legal 

V\VWHPVE\UHDI¿UPLQJWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIERWKDQGVHHNLQJWRVRIWHQWKHLUGLIferences. . . .” However, when irrigation appeared necessary for some forms of 

DJULFXOWXUHWKHFRXUWVGHPRQVWUDWHGÀH[LELOLW\3WDNLQJDFXHIURPHDVWHUQVWDWHV

which had begun modifying their riparian law tradition in favor of some appropriation practices. . . .”42

Drought in the 1860s and 1870s, and especially increased irrigation, 

threatened to challenge the uneasy status quo. The development of refrigerated 

UDLOURDGFDUVIRUH[DPSOHPHDQWWKDWKLJKSUR¿WIUXLWDQGYHJHWDEOHFURSVSURduced through irrigation could be shipped to distant markets.43

While the California courts ruled in favor of some irrigation under riparianism by the 1870s, accommodation had not been made for an irrigation boom. 

During the 1880s, the area of irrigated land in the arid West increased four-or 

¿YHIROG7KHFODVKRIWKHZDWHUGRFWULQHVUHDFKHGDQDFPHLQ,QLux v.

HagginWKH&DOLIRUQLD6XSUHPH&RXUWDI¿UPHGDGXDOV\VWHPRIZDWHUULJKWVWKH

so-called “California Doctrine.”44

The court held that riparianism was law in California, applicable in 

all private lands and public lands that became privately owned. An appropriator could have a superior claim if he used the water before a riparian user had 

acquired the property. Timing was crucial.45 As unpopular as the decision was 
10

within the public at large—since large landholders would be affected much 

less than small farmers—the California Doctrine eventually was adopted along 

WKH3DFL¿F&RDVW:DVKLQJWRQDQG2UHJRQDQGLQWKH*UHDW3ODLQV1HEUDVND

Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, North Dakota, and South Dakota).46

In the 1880s, Colorado invalidated riparian rights to surface water and 

began enforcing appropriative rights under state authority. Prior appropriation 

became the sole water right and came to dominate much of the Rocky Mountain 

region. Seven other states (Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico, and Idaho) 

soon accepted the “Colorado Doctrine,” with Montana and Alaska following in 

the early twentieth century.47

A third approach developed in Wyoming, emphasizing a different type 

RIHQIRUFHPHQW7KHVWDWHFRQVWLWXWLRQJDYHWKHVWDWHWLWOHWRDOOZDWHU2I¿FLDOV

could reject water claims and overturn existing appropriations not believed to 

be in “the public interest.” In essence, the so-called “Wyoming Doctrine” gave 

greater protection to appropriators than under the Colorado system. Besides 

Wyoming, Nebraska, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and South Dakota claimed full 

control over their water.48

 'HVSLWHWKHÀXUU\RIDFWLYLW\WKDWOHGWRWKHWKUHHPDMRUZDWHUGRFWULQHV

water rights—let alone water policy—were not completely rationalized, nor were 

FRQÀLFWVHQGHGDPRQJHFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWJURXSV%DWWOHVRYHULUULJDWLRQIDUPLQJ

and livestock raising, mining, and the demands of urban growth kept the water 

issue center stage.

Inevitably, the federal government would be active in the controversies–welcomed by some, not welcomed by others. The commitment in the early twentieth century to the construction of federal dams in every major watershed occurred in the wake of contested uses of water underway for years. That 

water law favored the states only complicated the ability of federal dams to provide stored water to a variety of consumers. However, under the property clause 

(Article 4, Section 3) of the U.S. Constitution, the federal government had legal 

authority to accept, manage, and dispose of public domain lands, and this provided the basis for subsequent laws and regulations pertaining to public lands and 

other resources. With regard to water resource policy, the federal government 

SUHVXPDEO\KROGV3UHVHUYHULJKWV ́WRHQRUPRXVDPRXQWVRIDQQXDOZDWHUÀRZVLQ

the West, since it was the earliest formal owner of the public lands. However, the 

federal government has never fully asserted these rights and the U.S. Supreme 

Court has never formally recognized them.49

Prior appropriation exacted heavy social and environmental costs in the 

West. Water was an economic commodity, although private gain resulting from 
11

the use of water did not translate into revenue for the states. Instead, several 

ODUJHFRUSRUDWLRQVDQGPRQRSROLHVEHQH¿WWHGDQGPDQ\IDUPHUVDGRSWHG

wasteful irrigation practices. Prior appropriation led to a rapid economic development that “exacerbated the boom-and-bust mentality endemic to the mining industry, encouraging speculation and maximum production.” Moreover, it 

failed to preserve water quality as did riparian rights, and it allowed vast environmental destruction.50

Environmental policy was in the developmental stages in the late nineteenth century.51 The emergence of resource conservationism, as opposed to 

nature preservation, emerged out of concern about the depletion of natural 

resources, which could stall further economic development.52 Resource exploitation was central to the actions of a rapidly industrializing society; laissez-faire 

FDSLWDOLVPZDVPRUHUHJDOHGWKDQFRQGHPQHGIRUVWRNLQJWKH¿UHVRIHFRQRPLF

growth.53 Particularly in the West, where the forests, rivers, and mineral wealth 

were directly linked to economic opportunity, conservationism was largely dismissed in the nineteenth century.54 But even practical concerns, such as the marVKDOLQJRIVXFKDVFDUFHUHVRXUFHDVZDWHUJHQHUDWHGLQWHQVHFRQÀLFW$PRUH

widely held interest was how to tap yet-to-be exploited water sources.

THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS IN THE NINETEENTH 

CENTURY

The Corps and the French Engineering Tradition

In a March 16, 1802, congressional act, the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers was separated from the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers and stationed at West Point, New York. This act not only marked the reestablishment of 

DVHSDUDWH86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV¿UVWFUHDWHGLQEXWDOVRIRXQGHG

the U.S. Military Academy. The Military Academy remained under the charge of 

the Corps until 1866.55

The American engineering profession in the nineteenth century was 

being shaped by two European traditions. One emphasized the civilian “buildermechanic” model of the British; the other, the military, formally trained engineer 

LQWKH)UHQFKRU&RQWLQHQWDO(XURSHDQVW\OH56 Of the two European engineerLQJWUDGLWLRQVWKH)UHQFKZDVWKHROGHU2OLQNHGWRWKHULVHRIDSRZHUIXOPRQDUFK\LQWKHVL[WHHQWKDQGVHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXULHV)UHQFKHQJLQHHULQJVXFFHVVes included a high point in canal engineering with the 149 mile long Languedoc 

Canal opened in 1681.

 )RUDYDULHW\RIODUJHO\QRQPLOLWDU\WDVNVGHHPHGHVVHQWLDOWRWKH

QDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWWKHUR\DO)UHQFKJRYHUQPHQWHVWDEOLVKHGWKHCorps des pont et
12

chaussees (Corps of bridges and roads) in 1716, and founded the Ecole des Ponts

et Chaussees in 1747. In 1794, it founded the Ecole polytechnique, which 

quickly became the international leader in technical education. Government 

sponsored education, furthermore, was linked to government employment.57

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers became the chief American stanGDUG±EHDUHUIRU)UHQFKHQJLQHHULQJ7KHNH\WRWKH&RUSV¶SUHIHUHQFHIRU)UHQFK

engineering rested not only in its connection to the military, but to the role of the 

military within the state.

 7KHLQÀXHQFHRI)UHQFKHQJLQHHULQJLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDFWXDOO\EHJDQ

GXULQJWKH$PHULFDQ5HYROXWLRQ7KHUHSXWDWLRQRIWKH)UHQFKHQJLQHHUVSOXV

their country’s sympathies for the rebelling colonies, resulted in a period of sevHQ\HDUVZKHQ)UHQFKPLOLWDU\HQJLQHHUVRUJDQL]HGDQGWUDLQHGWKH$PHULFDQ

army’s engineering corps.58 It is not surprising that when the U.S. Army Corps 

RI(QJLQHHUVZDVUHHVWDEOLVKHGLQLWHPEUDFHGWKH)UHQFKHQJLQHHULQJWUDdition and sought to implant it at West Point.59

The appointment of Claudius Crozet as professor of civil engineerLQJLQVLJQDOHGDVWURQJFRPPLWPHQWWRWKH)UHQFKPRGHO(GXFDWHGDWWKH

Ecole polytechnique and the artillery program at Metz, Crozet had been an artilOHU\RI¿FHUXQGHU1DSROHRQ$EULGJHEXLOGHUKHDOVRVHUYHGDVDQHQJLQHHULQ

Holland and Germany, studying the sluices and navigation jetties. In 1817, he 

DSSOLHGJHRPHWU\WRFDQDOGHVLJQLQWKH¿UVWVFLHQWL¿FFRXUVHRQFRQVWUXFWLRQ

taught in the United States.60

In that same year, superintendent Major Sylvanus Thayer—a great 

admirer of Napoleonic engineers—introduced methods of instruction using the 

Ecole polytechnique as his model. He also insisted on the importance of studyLQJWKH)UHQFKODQJXDJHZKLFKKHYLHZHGDVWKH3VROHUHSRVLWRU\RIPLOLWDU\VFLHQFH ́,Q&DSWDLQ'HQQLV+DUW0DKDQFRPSOHWHGWKH¿UVW$PHULFDQWH[WERRNEDVHGRQ)UHQFKHQJLQHHULQJSUDFWLFH617KHLQÀXHQFHRIWKH)UHQFKDW

West Point did not simply shape the engineering style and dictate the engineering 

PHWKRGVEXWLWDOVRLPEXHGWKH&RUSVZLWKDQLQWHUHVWLQVFLHQWL¿FGHVLJQQDWXral philosophy, applied mathematics, and a commitment to large, state-supported 

projects.62

But even those engineers who entered the Corps did not focus exclusiveO\RQPLOLWDU\SURMHFWV7KH\KHOSHGPDSWKH:HVWFRQVWUXFWHGFRDVWDOIRUWL¿FDtions and lighthouses, built jetties and piers for harbors, and mapped navigation 

channels.63
13

Commerce, Navigation, and the “Steamboat Case”

The Corps’ water projects in the early nineteenth century focused primarily on navigation. With the economic climate of the nation improving after 

the War of 1812, the steamboat came of age. In the West, the steamboat was 

vital to commerce and travel. Only 17 steamboats operated on western rivers in 

1817, but there were no less than 727 by 1855.64

While states’ rights advocates typically objected to direct federal subsidies for waterway construction, they were less likely to block indirect types of 

IHGHUDODLGVXFKDVVFLHQWL¿FVXUYH\V65 In 1820, Congress appropriated $5,000 

for a navigation survey of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers from Louisville to 

New Orleans. In the next few years, the Corps also made surveys of harbors, 

coastal areas, and lead mines on the upper Mississippi. It also built jetties and 

breakwaters along the Massachusetts coast and at Presque Isle in Lake Erie. But 

the monetary value of all federal river and harbor projects between 1802 and 

1823 was a meager $85,500.66 Army engineers had demonstrated their ability to 

deal with a variety of civilian projects. Nevertheless, direct federal aid to waterways fared little better than other forms of internal improvements in the early 

nineteenth century.

The 1824 Supreme Court ruling in Gibbons v. Ogden (the “Steamboat 

Case”) changed that, and also initiated the Corps’ regular participation in civil works and led to its role in maintaining the nation’s inland waterways.67 The 

FDVHSURGXFLQJWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V¿UVWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHFRPPHUFHSRZHU

of the federal government, originated in 1807, when Robert R. Livingston and 

5REHUW)XOWRQDFTXLUHGDVWHDPERDWPRQRSRO\IURPWKH1HZ<RUNOHJLVODWXUH

Subsequently, they also petitioned other states and territorial legislatures for similar monopolies in the hope of developing a national network of steamboat lines. 

Only Orleans Territory accepted their petition and awarded them a monopoly on 

the lower Mississippi.

Competitors, aware of the potential of steamboat navigation, challenged 

/LYLQJVWRQDQG)XOWRQDUJXLQJWKDWWKHFRPPHUFHSRZHURIWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQment was exclusive and superseded state laws. Legal challenges followed, and 

in response the monopoly attempted to undercut its rivals by selling them franFKLVHVRUEX\LQJWKHLUERDWV)RUPHU1HZ-HUVH\JRYHUQRU$DURQ2JGHQKDG

tried to defy the monopoly, but ultimately purchased a license from its assignees 

in 1815.68 He entered business that year with Thomas Gibbons from Georgia, 

but the partnership collapsed three years later when Gibbons ran an unlicensed 

steamboat on Ogden’s route. The former partners ended up in the New York 

Court of Errors, which granted a permanent injunction against Gibbons in 1820.
14

Gibbons appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing as he did in New 

<RUNWKDWWKHPRQRSRO\FRQÀLFWHGZLWKIHGHUDOODZ$IWHUVHYHUDOGHOD\VWKH

Court began discussing the meaning of the commerce clause in 1824, which by 

that time had become an issue of wider interest. Congress was debating a bill 

to provide a federal survey of road and canal routes. Southerners, in particular, 

were growing increasingly sensitive to what the resolution of these issues would 

mean to them as sectional disputes, especially over slavery, were heating up.

 &KLHI-XVWLFH-RKQ0DUVKDOOFRXOGQRWLJQRUHWKHSROLWLFDOUDPL¿FDWLRQV

of GibbonsDQGWKXVLQWKHXQDQLPRXVGHFLVLRQKHDYRLGHGVWDWLQJÀDWO\WKDWWKH

federal government had exclusive power over commerce. Marshall articulated a broad construction of the commerce clause, but he also tried to accommodate state regulation of local problems and state demands for the principle of free 

trade. The New York monopoly was struck down, however, based on the arguPHQWWKDWQDWLRQDOODZWRRNSUHFHGHQFHRYHUVWDWHODZLQFDVHRIFRQÀLFW69

While Gibbons did not settle the issue of the extent of federal power over commerce, it did provide an expansive interpretation of commerce. 

0DUVKDOOVWDWHGWKDW3&RPPHUFHXQGRXEWHGO\LVWUDI¿FEXWLWLVVRPHWKLQJ

more; it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, 

and parts of nations, in all its branches.”70 This included river navigation, giving impetus to further federal river and harbor improvements, and thus providing 

an opportunity for the Corps to play a central role in planning and construction 

along commercial routes.71 Although the Corps began to assume responsibility 

IRUÀRRGFRQWUROLQWKHVULYHUDQGKDUERUZRUNFRPSULVHGDODUJHSDUWRILWV

mission in the nineteenth century.72

French Tradition versus Frontier Techniques

Shortly after the Supreme Court rendered its judgment in Gibbons,

President Monroe signed the General Survey Act on April 30, 1824, which gave 

KLPWKHDXWKRULW\WRHPSOR\HQJLQHHUVDQG&RUSVRI¿FHUVWRVXUYH\3URXWHVRI

such roads and canals as he may deem of national importance in a commercial 

or military point of view, or necessary for the transportation of the public mail.” 

In gaining this role in civil works, including the planning and politics of internal improvements, the Corps essentially became “the engineering department of 

the federal government.”73 One month later, Monroe signed an additional bill for 

improving navigation over sand bars in the Ohio River and for removing snags 

IURPWKH2KLRDQG0LVVLVVLSSL7KHDSSURSULDWLRQZDVWKH¿UVWWKDW

Congress had issued for work in inland navigable waters.74

In 1826, Congress passed the Rivers and Harbors Act authorizing surveys and construction for more than 20 water projects on the Atlantic and Gulf 
15

coasts and on the Great Lakes. Combining both planning and construction, it 

LVUHJDUGHGDVWKH¿UVWODZRILWVNLQGDQGLWHYHQWXDOO\EHFDPHWKHPRGHORI

enabling legislation for the Corps’ navigation improvement program and later 

IRUÀRRGFRQWURO7KHDFWVLJQL¿FDQWO\H[SDQGHGWKHZRUNRIWKH&RUSVLQZDWHUways engineering.75

The expanding federal program on rivers and harbors was shrouded 

in controversy between 1824 and the beginning of the Civil War. The Corps 

could not escape the controversy in these volatile years. It was caught between 

the forces contesting the internal improvements issue, especially as the primary 

agent for executing federal rivers and harbors projects. It also continued to be 

locked in a contest over the application of “the polytechnic orientation that promoted theory and standardization at the expense of frontier technique.”76

Between 1824 and 1831, the Corps attempted to develop a comprehensive, national system of internal improvements through its Board of Engineers 

IRU,QWHUQDO,PSURYHPHQWV,WFRQVLVWHGRIWKH)UHQFK$UP\(QJLQHHU%ULJDGLHU

General Simon Bernard (who served under Napoleon), Colonel Joseph G. Totten 

of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and civil engineer John L. Sullivan.77 The 

plan called for three main projects: (1) canals between the Chesapeake and the 

Ohio and between the Ohio and Lake Erie and improvements to navigation on 

the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers; (2) a series of canals connecting the bays to the 

north of Washington, D.C.; and (3) a road from Washington to New Orleans. By 

WKLUW\¿YHH[DPLQDWLRQVDQGVXUYH\VZHUHFRQGXFWHGEXWQRWKLQJPRUH

%\ORFDOSROLWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVEHFDPHPRUHLQÀXHQWLDOWKDQWKHRYHUDOO

SODQLQGH¿QLQJSULRULWLHVDQGLWVRRQEHFDPHWKHSUDFWLFHRI&RQJUHVVWRDGRSW

laws with this in mind.78

Navigation and the Beginning of River Dams: 1824–1865

 )RUQDYLJDWLRQLPSURYHPHQWVRQWKH2KLRDQG0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHUVLQWKH

early nineteenth century, the Corps focused on snag removal and channel deepening. Thousands of snags—possibly more than 50,000—threatened transportation daily, and accounted for the majority of steamboat losses before 1826 and, 

DORQJZLWKRWKHULVRODWHGREVWUXFWLRQVZHUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKUHH¿IWKVRIDOO

steamboat accidents until 1849.

 8QGHUWKH5LYHUVDQG+DUERUV$FW&RQJUHVVPDGHWKH¿UVWLQ

a series of annual appropriations (through 1838) for the removal of obstrucWLRQVUHÀHFWLQJDFOHDUHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ2DIWHURQHIDLOHGFRQWUDFW2WKDWVQDJ

removal had to be ongoing. A year earlier, Henry M. Shreve had been appointed 

Superintendent of Western River Improvements and was given responsibility for 

VQDJUHPRYDO+HEXLOWWKH¿UVWVWHDPSRZHUVQDJERDWWKHHeliopolis, launched 
16

in 1829. Shreve’s operation was so successful that no boats were lost on the 

Ohio River due to snags in 1832, and the drop in insurance rates on steamboat 

FDUJRHVEHWZHHQDQGUHÀHFWHGWKHYDVWLPSURYHPHQWVLQFOHDULQJWKH

channels.79

The other major improvement in river navigation in the 1820s was to 

deepen channels across sand and gravel bars.80 Major Stephen H. Long conducted an early experiment with wing dams (or “spur dikes”) on the Ohio River near 

Henderson Island, Kentucky, about 100 miles below Louisville.81 The structure 

WZRURZVRISLOHV¿OOHGZLWKEUXVKH[WHQGHGIURPWKHEDQNDWDGHJUHH

angle. It narrowed the width of the channel, thus increasing the velocity of the 

current and deepening the channel itself. The wing dam was the primary method of deepening channels on the Ohio and several of its tributaries until the late 

nineteenth century. Long’s project at Henderson Island, and a similar use of a 

wing dam carried out under the direction of Shreve at the Grand Chain near the 

mouth of the Ohio, led to a congressional appropriation in 1831 for additional 

dikes on the Ohio River. Some bars were dealt with effectively, but no system of 

wing dams was in place before the Civil War.82

Snag and boulder removal in some relatively minor tributaries of the 

Ohio River were inadequate to make them viable for steamboat navigation, thus 

a slackwater system of locks and dams arose in the 1830s. Dams were placed 

across a stream at intervals insuring a minimum depth of water year-round. Each 

dam had a lock through which vessels passed. By the mid-1840s, such systems were in operation on the lower Kentucky River, and also on the Green and 

Barren, the Licking, the Muskingum, and the Monongahela Rivers.

 2QFHLQSODFHWKHVHHDUO\VODFNZDWHUV\VWHPVIDFHG¿QDQFLDODQGWHFKnical problems. Inadequate capital for repairs and maintenance delayed completion and limited their operation. Poor engineering and construction, as well 

DVÀRRGLQJDQGLF\FRQGLWLRQVOLPLWHGVHUYLFH5HYHQXHVGLGQRWPHHWH[SHFtations, such as the Kentucky River project, suspended in 1842 after the buildLQJRI¿YHGDPV$0XVNLQJXPSURMHFWFRPSOHWHGLQVKRZHGSUR¿WIRU

DGHFDGHEXWWKHQIDFHG¿QDQFLDOSUREOHPV7KHPRVWVXFFHVVIXOSURMHFWZDV

RQHRQWKHORZHU0RQRQJDKHOD5LYHUZKLFKEHQH¿WWHGIURPFRDOVKLSPHQWVWR

3LWWVEXUJK(YHQVWDWHVXSSRUWHGRSHQFKDQQHOSURMHFWVKDG¿QDQFLDOSUREOHPV

On the Kanawha River, smaller boats took advantage of the improvements, but 

large coal barge tows could not.83

Until 1852, relatively little river work was carried out by the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers or the Corps of Topographical Engineers.84 Even with the 

1852 Rivers and Harbors Act, which provided funds for dike repair and construction on the Ohio and for building new snagboats, navigation improvement 
17

was sporadic at best for several years.85 The Democrats won the 1852 election, 

kept power until 1860, and consistently opposed internal improvements, so that 

Congress did not pass another general rivers and harbors bill until after the Civil 

War.86

Post War Navigation and the Ohio River: 1866–1885

 7KH\HDUVDIWHUWKHZDUZLWQHVVHGDVKLIWIURPVSHFL¿FRSHQFKDQQHO

improvements—especially the elimination of obstructions or bypassing them 

ZLWKFDQDOV2WRHODERUDWHSODQVIRUVODFNZDWHUV\VWHPVDQGVWRULQJÀRRGZDWHUV

in large reservoirs on the headwaters.87 Pressure for federal involvement intenVL¿HGHVSHFLDOO\EHFDXVHVWDWHV¶ULJKWVLQWHUHVWVKDGEHHQTXHOOHG$QGWKH

Republican Party, strongly committed to federal public works, was in control. 

Despite the rising competition from the railroads, the government focused on the 

Mississippi River because of its commercial importance.

In June, 1866, Congress appropriated approximately $3.7 million for 

about 50 projects and almost 40 examinations and surveys across the country. In 

the 1870s alone, total appropriations reached almost $54 million. Between the 

end of the Civil War and 1882, U.S. Presidents signed 16 river and harbor bills 

and federal appropriations for river and harbor projects totaled over $91 million. 

In 1882, Congress provided $18.7 million for 371 projects and 135 surveys.88

As a result of the 1866 Rivers and Harbors Act, William Milnor Roberts 

was appointed to oversee improvements and to conduct surveys of the Ohio. In 

his 1869 report, he provided a “radical” plan for a slackwater, lock, and dam 

canalization. Colonel William E. Merrill, who replaced Roberts in 1870, supported the proposal because of its relatively successful use on a number of tributaries.89

Ironically, those coal shippers who were dominating Ohio river comPHUFHDQGZKRVWRRGWREHQH¿WIURPDGHHSHQHGFKDQQHODQG\HDUURXQGQDYLJDtion, argued that the dams would obstruct the channels, require breaking tows to 

SDVVWKURXJKWKHORFNVDQGUHTXLUHKHDY\WROOV,QDGGLWLRQWKHÀDWERDWDQGUDIWLQJWUDGHREMHFWHGEHFDXVHWKHSURSRVDOZRXOGVDFUL¿FHWKHQDWXUDOQDYLJDWLRQRI

the river for ten months of the year to gain two additional months of navigation 

IRUODUJHUYHVVHOV2WKHUVZDUQHGRISRVVLEOHLQFUHDVHGÀRRGKHLJKWVVWDJQDQW

slackwater pools, and silting of river channels.

In the wake of such criticisms, Merrill began exploring alternatives. He 

sent his deputy to examine movable dams in Europe where 124 movable dams 

had been completed. Such dams could be raised to increase depths during shallow periods and then lowered when the water was high.90 As a result, Merrill 
18

recommended, in 1874, that a series of movable dams be utilized in the canali-

]DWLRQRIWKH2KLR5LYHUZLWKWKH¿UVWH[SHULPHQWDOPRYDEOHGDPDQGORFNWR

be built at Davis Island near Pittsburgh. While critics complained loudly, he 

received support from the Ohio River Commission, a variety of shipping interests, and the Grange—a farmer group that hoped to undercut railroad costs. 

With the additional support of the Senate Committee on Transportation Routes, 

Congress appropriated funds for the project in 1875. Work began in 1878, and 

eventually was completed in 1885.91

 )RUKLVPRYDEOHGDP0HUULOOFKRVHWKHGHVLJQRI)UHQFKPDQ-DFTXHV

Chanoine. Invented in 1852, the Chanoine wicket consisted of a line of timbers 

bolted together into a rectangular panel hinged to a concrete foundation placed 

on the river bottom. Upon completion, the movable dam was 1,223 feet in length 

and contained 305 wickets. The wickets were raised by a grapple on a maneuver boat and supported by an iron pole sloping downstream. When the river was 

high, the pole was removed and the wickets returned to the river bottom. The 

lock itself was 110 feet wide by 600 feet long. Both dam and lock were the largHVWRIWKHLUNLQGLQWKHZRUOG7KHORFNDOVRZDVRQHRIWKH¿UVWLQWKH8QLWHG

States to use concrete instead of masonry. Although the new system, as a prototype, faced some problems, the critics were silenced since the Pittsburgh harbor 

increased in depth and large tows could be assembled there.92

Completion of the Davis Island Dam opened a new era in the improvement and navigation of the western rivers. It also marked the modern era of lock 

design in the United States. While only a 174-mile section between Pittsburgh 

and Marietta was completed by 1896, a series of about 50 dams extended slackwater navigation along the Ohio by 1929.93

The Upper Mississippi and the Headwater Dams: 1866–1899

In 1866, after many attempts to channelize the upper Mississippi, 

Congress appropriated $400,000 for a 4-foot-deep channel between Minneapolis 

and St. Louis. In 1878, before the channel project was completed, Congress 

authorized the Corps to seek a 4 1⁄2-foot depth to the channel through the use of 

wing and closing dams.94 As a result of the deepening project, the banks gradually moved inward thus constricting the river and also changing the landscape.95 

The Mississippi River Commission, established in 1879, had set a goal of a minimum year-round channel depth of 6 to 4 1⁄2 feet from St. Louis to St. Paul, the 

results of which would fundamentally change the physical character of the river. 

0HWKRGVSURSRVHGLQFOXGHGORZZDWHUGDPVWRFRQFHQWUDWHWKHÀRZRIZDWHULQ

the main channel, spur dikes or wing dams to narrow the channel in places where 

the river was too wide, protection of the river banks from erosion, and occasional 
19

dredging. In addition, the Congress authorized reservoirs on the headwaters of 

the upper river to store surplus water during the wet season.96

In fact, as early as 1870, Brevet Major General G. K. Warren recommended construction of 41 reservoirs on the St. Croix, Chippewa, Wisconsin, and 

Mississippi Rivers. In 1878, Representative William D. Washburn of Minnesota 

UDLVHGWKHLVVXHRIWKHUHVHUYRLUVDJDLQLQSDUWWREHQH¿WKLVRZQÀRXUPLOOVDW

St. Anthony and also to counter the growing railroad challenge. In 1880, in spite 

RIRSSRVLWLRQIURP6W3DXO&RQJUHVVPDGHLWV¿UVWRIVHYHUDODSSURSULDWLRQVIRU

these headwaters dams, thus beginning a project that would be one of the earliest 

large-scale systems of reservoirs constructed in the United States.97

 &RQJUHVVLQLWLDOO\DXWKRUL]HG¿YHKHDGZDWHUGDPV7KH¿UVWDQGODUJest project resulted in an experimental dam at Lake Winnibigoshish (completHGUHFRQVWUXFWHGIROORZHGE\GDPVDW3RNHJDPD)DOOVFRPSOHWHG

1885; reconstructed 1904), Leech Lake (completed 1884; reconstructed 1903), 

Pine River (completed 1886; reconstructed 1907), and Sandy Lake (completed 

1895; reconstructed 1911). A sixth dam was completed in 1912 at Gull Lake. 

They all were located upriver from St. Paul on the main stem and tributaries of 

the upper Mississippi near the river’s source at Lake Itasca. The Corps built 

all of them at lake outlets in remote areas with no existing roads and few settlements. The isolation of the sites led to initial construction with timber. At the 

turn of the century, the dams were reconstructed with concrete.

Although historically important as a reservoir system—and for developLQJDQHI¿FLHQWPHWKRGRIFRQVWUXFWLQJDVHULHVRIVWDQGDUGL]HGGDPV2WKHKHDGwater dams project did not utilize unique technology. Each site had an earthen

embankment and a timber outlet structure footed on timber piles. The cores of

WKHHPEDQNPHQWVZHUH¿OOHGZLWKSXGGOHGFOD\DQGFRQWDLQHGDWLPEHUGLDphragm. The length of the dam determined the number of discharge sluices, but 

each was controlled by a timber gate. All the dams had log sluices. At Sandy 

Lake a navigation lock was added to serve steamboats between Aitken and Grand 

Rapids.98

Initially, civic leaders and businessmen in St. Paul had opposed the reservoirs for fear that they would give Minneapolis an unfair economic advantage, 

and lumbermen in northern Minnesota worried that the dams would constrain 

their logging activities. Predictably, the railroads also had opposed the project. 

While it was anticipated that improved steamboat navigation would be the priPDU\EHQH¿FLDU\RIWKHSURMHFWFRPPHUFLDOLQWHUHVWVLQ0LQQHDSROLV6W3DXO

EHQH¿WWHGWKHPRVWSDUWLFXODUO\OXPEHUÀRXUPLOOLQJDQGZDWHUSRZHU99
20

In addition to political and economic rivalries, the construction of the 

headwater dams also highlighted social and environmental problems that would 

SODJXHGDPSURMHFWVLQWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\)RUH[DPSOHWKHODQGWREHLQXQdated by the construction of the Lake Winnibigoshish and Leech Lake Dams 

belonged to approximately 1,300 Chippewa Indians. Constructing the dams 

required taking a substantial amount of timber from the area. Also, opening the 

GDPVGDPDJHGRUGHVWUR\HGWKH&KLSSHZD¶VZLOGULFH¿HOGVVRPHRIWKHLU¿VKHUies, and tamarack and cedar tree stands.

A commission in 1884 authorized to determine damages, recommended 

$10,000 in property damage and an annual additional payment of $26,800, but 

by 1886 even that paltry award was not paid. In 1890, the commission authorized a meager appropriation of $150,000 as full payment for damages. Some 

RIWKHRYHUÀRZHGDFUHVZHUHFHGHGWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVJRYHUQPHQWDQGDOORI

the lands likely to be damaged were subject to construction and building of new 

dams and reservoirs.100

The improved ability to transport lumber by water, aided by the construction of the headwater reservoirs and dams, increased water pollution 

along the upper Mississippi. Sawmill refuse, already a serious problem in the 

Minneapolis area by the late 1870s, obstructed river navigation. The Corps 

and many river interest groups favored a refuse act to prohibit such dumping. 

Lumber interests, however, fought such action, in part at least because they were 

not the only culprits. Minneapolis dumped approximately 500 tons of refuse into 

the Mississippi each day.101

Changes in federal law were meant to address in some fashion pollution 

problems like those faced on the upper Mississippi. With the 1899 Rivers and 

Harbors Act, especially section 13 (the Refuse Act), loopholes were closed and 

the law made illegal the casting of “any refuse matter of any kind or description” 

into navigable waters without permission of the Secretary of War. In time, the 

1899 act would be regarded as a seminal piece of legislation in the recognition of 

water pollution as a major problem. It did not, however, seriously reduce pollution along the upper Mississippi or other rivers.102

As settlement increased along the nation’s great rivers and their tributaries, a wide array of environmental issues complicated the use of the waters, 

including sewage and industrial pollutants and urban and agricultural runoff. 

Also, the impact of river improvements themselves in the form of dredging, canalizing, and dam and reservoir construction would raise serious concerns about 

VLOWLQJODQGLQXQGDWLRQÀRRGLQJDQGWKUHDWVWR¿VKHULHV
21

 7KH86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVZRXOG¿QGWKHPVHOYHVLQWKHPLGVW

of these controversies. The Corps’ status as the lead federal bureau in water 

resources development was challenged at the turn of the century by the creation 

of a new federal bureau focused on the arid West. The story of large federal 

dams thus will involve at its center the political and technical lives of the 

Corps and the Reclamation Service of 1902 (renamed the Bureau of Reclamation 

in 1923).103

WATER IN THE WEST: ORIGINS OF THE RECLAMATION SERVICE

The West Before the Nineteenth Century

Cultivation of irrigated crops in the West predates the arrival of both 

6SDQLVKDQG$QJOR$PHULFDQVHWWOHPHQW)RULQVWDQFHWKH+RKRNDPDQGWKHLU

predecessors used canal irrigation on the Santa Cruz River in the Tucson area as 

early as 1,200 b.c., and canal irrigation was well established in the Phoenix area 

by about 500 a.d. Some of these canals were quite large even by modern standards. In addition, the Pueblo Indians of the Rio Grande Valley were using canal 

LUULJDWLRQDWWKHWLPHRI6SDQLVKFRQWDFWLQ%\WKHWLPH(XURSHDQV¿UVW

explored the Southwest in the sixteenth century, Hohokam culture had vanished, 

a victim of unknown environmental or cultural forces. But their canals survived 

largely intact; in the 1860s they were cleaned out and re-excavated by AngloAmerican settlers who transformed them into irrigation canals that still lie at the 

heart of Phoenix’s hydraulic infrastructure. But prehistoric Indian irrigation did 

not sustain the bulk of native food production in the West; many tribes made no 

DWWHPSWWRXVHULYHUÀRZIRUDJULFXOWXUHDQGWKH\KDGOLWWOHRUQRLPSDFWRQWKH

riparian environment.104

In the seventeenth century, the Spanish took control over what later

became the southwestern United States, bringing with them an understanding of 

agricultural techniques suitable for an arid environment. That knowledge supplemented Pueblo irrigation skills. Their settlements in the Southwest involved 

some development of irrigation, most notably at San Antonio, in the pueblos setWOHPHQWVRIWKHXSSHU5LR*UDQGHDQGDWWKH)UDQFLVFDQPLVVLRQVRI&DOLIRUQLD

On the whole, however, Spanish irrigation initiatives were limited in scope and 

did not involve the construction of large storage dams.105 Not until large numbers of pioneers from the eastern United States began moving westward in the 

mid-nineteenth century did interest in large-scale development of western water 

resources become manifest.
22

Water and Mormon Migration

 7KH¿UVW$QJOR$PHULFDQVWRHPEUDFHWKHSRVVLELOLWLHVRILUULJDWLRQWHFKnology were Mormon refugees who emigrated to Utah’s Salt Lake Valley in the 

late 1840s. To survive in the wilderness, they quickly began diverting creeks 

WKDWÀRZHGIURPWKH:DVDWFK0RXQWDLQVXVLQJWKHZDWHUIRUFURSV7KLVZDV

¿UVWDFFRPSOLVKHGDW&LW\&UHHNLQ6DOW/DNH&LW\DQGTXLFNO\VSUHDGDORQJWKH

PRXQWDLQVRIWKH3:DVDWFK)URQW ́WKDWIRUPWKHHDVWHUQHGJHRIWKH*UHDW%DVLQ

Mormon settlements centered around the small streams were able to 

erect numerous irrigation systems that did not depend on large dams or lengthy 

FDQDOV([WHQGLQJOHVVWKDQ¿YHPLOHVRQDYHUDJH0RUPRQFDQDOVW\SLFDOO\VXSported small communities comprised of farms less than 30 acres in size.106 Early 

irrigation systems in Utah comprised a relatively rudimentary technological 

achievement, but they proved successful in supplying food, and the communal 

settlements helped to inspire western agrarian development. The Mormon’s success in building irrigation-based communities set a precedent for later pioneers 

seeking to colonize the West.107

Most early non-Mormon irrigation development did not depend upon 

DVWURQJVRFLDOPLVVLRQW\LQJWRJHWKHUVHWWOHUV)RUH[DPSOH$QJOR$PHULFDQ

agricultural settlement in Arizona’s Salt River Valley dates to the late 1860s and 

represents a much more prosaic endeavor. In 1867 “Jack” Swilling, a former 

&RQIHGHUDWH$UP\RI¿FHUIRUPHGWKH6ZLOOLQJ,UULJDWLRQ&DQDO&RPSDQ\DQG

quickly cleared out an ancient Hohokam canal. Swilling’s canal extended a mileand-a-half across the desert and then curved back toward the Salt River; farm 

land “under the ditch” could now be cultivated using water from the river and 

UHVXOWLQJFURSVFRXOGEHVROGWRWKHDUP\RXWSRVWDW)RUW0F'RZHOO%\

the townsite that became Phoenix had been laid out and the Anglo-American settlement of Central Arizona began to grow slowly as it met the needs of the local 

Army encampment.108

California Water Development

In central California agriculture became a major economic activity as 

early as the 1850s when crops were cultivated for sale in the gold mining camps 

of the Sierra Nevada. In addition, the fertile lands of the Sacramento River 

Valley were developed as large farms to export wheat through the busy port of 

6DQ)UDQFLVFR7KHVHZKHDW¿HOGVGHSHQGHGXSRQQXWULHQWVDQGPRLVWXUHWKDW

had accumulated in the soils over hundreds of years and, initially, they did not 

require irrigation.
23

As the soils were depleted, the attractiveness of non-irrigated agriculture began to fade while commercial interest in irrigation development increased, 

especially in the drier lands of the San Joaquin River Valley that lay to the southHDVWRI6DQ)UDQFLVFR

 %\WKHUHZHUHLUULJDWLRQFRORQLHVLQWKH)UHVQRUHJLRQFRYHULQJ

45,000 acres and supporting 7,500 residents. Real estate speculators and large 

landholding syndicates promoted these colonies, which drew water from the 

Kings River or (less frequently) from the San Joaquin River.109

Irrigation development in the San Joaquin Valley also centered around 

large tracts of land in the low-lying areas adjoining the river in the region north 

RI)UHVQRDQGVRXWKRI6WRFNWRQ%\WKHODWHVPXFKRIWKLVULFKULSDULDQ

ODQGZDVXQGHUWKHFRQWURORIDFRQVRUWLXPRILQÀXHQWLDO6DQ)UDQFLVFREXVLQHVVmen headed by William Ralston of the Bank of California. Ralston and his partners soon formed the San Joaquin & Kings River Canal and Irrigation Company. 

In the early 1870s, the company planned a valley-wide irrigation system capable of watering hundreds of thousands of acres of land.110 Although the company was willing to invest its own money in those parts of the system that would 

divert water on to the low-lying lands that it directly controlled, they were hesitant to underwrite any broader scheme without government assistance.

Rebuffed by the state legislature, Ralston approached the federal government with hopes of obtaining a large land grant and associated canal rights-ofway that would make the project economical. This plan also failed. However, in 

early 1873, Congress authorized $6,000 for a Board of Irrigation Commissioners 

to study the water resources of Central California. Their report did nothing to 

further Ralston’s efforts to obtain federal help, but it was a precursor of large, 

federally sponsored projects that were implemented in California in the 1930s. 

)XUWKHUPRUHWKHUHSRUWHQKDQFHGWKHQDWLRQ¶VSROLWLFDOFRQVFLRXVQHVVWKDWZHVWern agriculture represented a potentially major segment of the burgeoning national economy.

The Exploits of John Wesley Powell

By the mid-1880s, most of the small streams in the West had been 

diverted for irrigation and other uses. It was becoming clear that larger dams on 

the major rivers would be needed to expand water supplies. In 1888, a Senate 

resolution called for the Department of the Interior to identify possible reservoir

sites and to protect them for future development. Later that year, Congress 

passed another resolution designating the U.S. Geological Survey as the body to 

examine the arid region, determine the capacity of streams and where irrigation 

could be practiced, and arrive at the cost of construction and the capacity of 
24

possible reservoirs.111 It was the 1879 publication of John Wesley Powell’s 

Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States that had opened the 

H\HVRI$PHULFDQVWRWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRILUULJDWLRQGHYHORSPHQW112 With Powell 

as a primary proselytizer, the notion that “reclaimed” land in the West might 

serve a larger national purpose began to assume momentum.

Born in New York in 1834, Powell moved to Illinois as a young man and 

informally explored the Mississippi River and its tributaries in the 1850s. He 

had attended Illinois College, Oberlin, and Wheaton, which helped him develop 

DVHQVHRIVHOIVXI¿FLHQF\DQGDIDFLOLW\IRUVHOIHGXFDWLRQ3RZHOOVHUYHGZLWK

the Union Army during the Civil War, losing his lower right arm in the Battle 

of Shiloh. After mustering out as a Major in 1865, his attention focused on the 

far West; in 1868 he voyaged down the Green and Colorado Rivers.113 In 1869 

he and a crew of nine men loaded up four small wooden boats and set out down 

WKH&RORUDGR5LYHUSURSHU8SRQLWVFRPSOHWLRQWKHH[SHGLWLRQPDUNHGWKH¿UVW

recorded Anglo-American trip through the Grand Canyon.

The success of Powell’s journey prompted Congress to support a second expedition through the Grand Canyon two years later. Powell subsequentO\SXEOLVKHGDQGOHFWXUHGRQDYDULHW\RIZHVWHUQVFLHQWL¿FWRSLFVFHQWHUHGRQ

the geology of the Colorado River watershed, substantially boosting his statXUHERWKZLWKLQWKHVFLHQWL¿FFRPPXQLW\DQGDPRQJWKHSXEOLFDWODUJHDVDIRON

hero. After his successful navigation of the Colorado River, Powell set out to 

become as knowledgeable as possible about the topography and geology of western America. His Report on the Lands of the Arid Region called for creation of a 

government bureau to explore and classify western lands; this soon led to formation of the Geological Survey within the Interior Department.

Appointed Director of the Geological Survey in 1881, Powell quickly became a major spokesman for development of the West’s water resources. 

Because of his stature as a “scientist,” Powell found an audience in Congress 

and with the American people for his claim that areas of desert land could be 

3UHFODLPHG ́IRUDJULFXOWXUHE\LPSRXQGLQJÀRRGZDWHUVIRUXVHWKURXJKRXWWKH

year. Powell’s charismatic lecturing and persuasive writing began a crusade for 

opening the West to agricultural development through irrigation.114

Socially concerned citizens intent on countering the seemingly baneful effects of industrial development in eastern cities saw irrigation as a way for 

population growth in rural settlements. Recalling Madison’s idea of a continental nation and Jefferson’s agrarianism, advocates of this irrigation crusade considered western reclamation an ideal means for small family farms to foster the 

American ideal that life rooted to the soil was better than life despoiled by the 

“evil” city. Powell became prominently associated with this idealistic crusade.
25

In 1888, Congress authorized Powell to head the Irrigation Survey to 

explore the potential for developing western water resources. Among the many 

\RXQJHQJLQHHUVZKRSDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKLVZRUNZHUH)UHGHULFN+D\QHV1HZHOO

and Arthur Powell Davis, both of whom would later serve as Chief Engineer 

and Director of the U.S. Reclamation Service.115 The legislation creating the 

Irrigation Survey offered no indication that the bureau was conceived as a direct 

DQWHFHGHQWIRUIHGHUDOVSRQVRUVKLSRU¿QDQFLQJRILUULJDWLRQSURMHFWV+RZHYHU

the legislation did give Powell and his staff the power to “withdraw” public land 

from entry to prevent private ownership claims from impeding economical construction of a storage reservoir.116 In essence, the withdrawal authority was to 

preclude speculators from using information gathered by survey personnel to 

purchase, at cheap prices, choice public lands that might later be sold for large 

SUR¿WV

Speculative exploitation by large landowners ran counter to the ideal of western irrigation for small-scale, independent farmers. But with no stated mechanism for using the Irrigation Survey’s data, the idea that reservoir sites 

FRXOGEHFORVHGLQGH¿QLWHO\WRSULYDWHGHYHORSPHQWDURXVHGDODUPDPRQJPDQ\

westerners who already owned land in the arid region. This consternation found 

political expression in the person of U.S. Senator William Stewart of Nevada 

who, in his capacity as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Irrigation 

and the Reclamation of Arid Lands, prompted Congress to cut off funding for the 

Irrigation Survey in the summer of 1890.117)XUWKHUPRUH&RQJUHVVHQDFWHGDQ

ODZDOORZLQJLQGLYLGXDOVDQGSULYDWHLUULJDWLRQFRPSDQLHVWR¿OHFODLPVWR

UHVHUYRLUVLWHVRQSXEOLFODQGVSURYLGLQJWKDWFRQVWUXFWLRQZRUNEHJLQZLWKLQ¿YH

years.118

The Sentimental and Practical during the 1890s

Powell had come to realize that most of the best irrigable land had 

already fallen into private hands by the 1890s. He created an uproar by announcing this fact at the 1893 National Irrigation Congress in Los Angeles.119 The following year, Powell resigned from the Interior Department, becoming a victim of 

the “triumph of sentimentalism” among those who championed the social primacy of the small family farm.120

Opening the West to a new generation of yeoman farmers was popular 

even among American citizens at large, many of whom had only the vaguest concept of western reclamation. In the early twentieth century, sentiment for promoting family farms in the arid West found political expression in a national reclamation program; but while this federal program would rhetorically espouse the 

LGHDOVRIWKHLUULJDWLRQFUXVDGHLWZRXOGDOVRSURYLGHEHQH¿WVWRODUJHWUDFWVRI

land that had long since been removed from the public domain.
26

 3UDFWLFDOSROLWLFDOHIIRUWVWRSURPRWHUHFODPDWLRQDOVRFRQWLQXHG)UDQFLV

G. Newlands, Nevada’s member of the U.S. House of Representatives, Senator 

)UDQFLV(:DUUHQRI:\RPLQJDQG6HQDWRU-RVHSK0&DUH\RI:\RPLQJSHUsisted in seeking support for western agriculture during the 1890s.121 While it 

remained politically infeasible to advocate a federally controlled reclamation 

program, in 1894 Congress did pass the Carey Act, which authorized the federal government to cede up to a million acres of public land to states on their 

assurance that the acreage would be developed through viable irrigation projects. Eventually, these projects proved important in some northern states such as 

,GDKRZKHUHWKHDFWKHOSHGIXQGWKH0LOQHU'DPDQGWKH7ZLQ)DOOV&DQDOWKDW

irrigated more then 300,000 acres in the Snake River Valley. However, the Carey 

Act proved too cumbersome, failing to open the public domain to widespread 

irrigation.122

Western reclamation in the 1890s has no simple narrative trajectory 

leading inevitably to the U.S. Reclamation Service in 1902. Rather, a variety 

of private interests as well as state and local politicians promoted initiatives to 

increase agriculture and land values. Among the most prominent of these advocates of western irrigation was George Maxwell, a California lawyer who, in 

1897, organized the National Irrigation Association to call for federal legislaWLRQEHQH¿WWLQJZHVWHUQDJULFXOWXUH%XWDOVRLPSRUWDQWLQWKHDGRSWLRQRIWKH

Reclamation Act of 1902 were several broader factors including: the depression 

of the 1890s that crippled construction of private irrigation projects in the West 

and drove down the value of irrigable land; the rapid disposal of public land to 

grazing interests and land speculators after 1889; and the desire of leading railURDGVWRERRVWWKHLUWUDI¿FLQWKH:HVWDQGWRVHOOIDUPODQG123

The Chittenden Survey of 1897

In another strategy to attract federal support for western irrigation, 

Senator Warren took the model of “river and harbor improvement” so successfully used by eastern states in garnering government assistance. In 1896, he called 

IRUDVXUYH\RIUHVHUYRLUVLWHVLQ:\RPLQJDQG&RORUDGRWRKHOSUHGXFHÀRRGVLQ

WKH0LVVRXUL0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHUEDVLQ:DUUHQMXVWL¿HGIHGHUDOVXSSRUWEHFDXVH

the Missouri was an interstate river, and because Wyoming, Colorado, New 

0H[LFR$UL]RQD8WDKDQG1HYDGDSUHYLRXVO\KDGUHFHLYHGQREHQH¿WVIURP

“river and harbor” improvements authorized by Congress.124

Warren won approval in May 1896 for the survey. At his request, the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers appointed Captain Hiram Chittenden to direct it. 

He traveled throughout the West inspecting irrigation systems, and he examined 

reservoir sites at the headwaters of the Platte and Laramie Rivers in Wyoming 

DQG&RORUDGR:KLOHKHKHOGOLWWOHHQWKXVLDVPIRUÀRRGFRQWUROIURPUHVHUYRLUV
27

SODFHGLQWKHORZHU0LVVRXUL0LVVLVVLSSLULYHUEDVLQ&KLWWHQGHQQRQHWKHOHVV

UHFRPPHQGHGWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIGDPVDW¿YHUHVHUYRLUVLWHVWZRLQ&RORUDGR

three in Wyoming) that were well-suited to support irrigation development. 

Avowing that such reservoir construction could “properly be carried out only 

through public agencies,” he also advised that all water stored behind government-built reservoirs be “absolutely free to the people forever, just as the canals, 

harbors, and other public works are free for general use without toll or levy of 

any kind.”125

Chittenden’s December 1897 report attracted the interest of western irrigation advocates, but the attention of the nation as a whole was rapidly becoming 

absorbed by the impending war with Spain. Senator Warren could not entreat 

Congress to consider an expansion of Chittenden’s work until early 1899. In 

addition, his attempts to utilize a “rivers and harbors” appropriation for dam and 

reservoir construction were thwarted by eastern congressmen who argued that 

the Constitution gave a clear mandate for government control over interstate rivers, but the water stored behind upstream reservoirs was not to be owned or controlled by the federal government. Despite intense lobbying and political maneuvering on Warren’s part, the 1899 federal “rivers and harbors” appropriation 

authorized no expenditure for western storage dams, and the issue of federal support for reclamation remained unresolved.126

 :KLOH&RQJUHVVYDFLOODWHGLQWKHVSULYDWHO\¿QDQFHGSURMHFWVFRQtinued to open land for settlement. Some proved viable, others failed.127 The 

most prominent state initiative for locally controlled irrigation districts experienced only limited success. That initiative began in 1887, when C. C. Wright, 

a state legislator in California, won approval for legislation allowing formation 

of irrigation districts authorized to issue bonds and tax all landowners within a 

district in order to pay for water supply improvements. Scores of “Wright Act 

Districts” were established in California during the late 1880s and early 1890s, 

EXWLQWKHIDFHRIGURXJKWWKHQDWLRQZLGH¿QDQFLDO3DQLFRIDQGWKHGLI¿-

FXOWLHVLQSUHYHQWLQJ¿QDQFLDOIUDXGWKH:ULJKW$FWFDPHWRV\PEROL]HWKHJHQHUic problems of locally controlled irrigation development.128

Newell, Roosevelt and the Move to Reclamation

Although nineteenth-century irrigation settlements in the West proved 

WKHIHDVLELOLW\RIEXLOGLQJGLYHUVLRQGDPVDQGGLVWULEXWLRQFDQDOVWKH¿QDQFLDO

risks associated with building large remote storage reservoirs and lengthy feedHUFDQDOVWKURXJKURXJKWHUUDLQGLVFRXUDJHGSULYDWH¿QDQFLHUV129 By the turn of 

WKHFHQWXU\WKHSRVVLELOLW\RI3FDSWXULQJWKHÀRRGV ́IRUZLGHVSUHDGLUULJDWLRQ

UHPDLQHGPXFKPRUHDYLVLRQWKDQDUHDOLW\%HFDXVHKXJHTXDQWLWLHVRIÀRRG

water were lost to the ocean or dissipated in desert lakes, political support for 
28

federal intervention began to grow stronger and found its leading advocate in 

)UHGHULFN+1HZHOO130

Born in Pennsylvania, Newell graduated as a mining engineer from the 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1885. He helped Powell administer 

the Irrigation Survey and, after its demise, became the U.S. Geological Survey’s 

Chief Hydrographer in 1894. Newell proudly associated himself with America’s 

VFLHQWL¿FHOLWH131$V&KLHI+\GURJUDSKHUKLVPDQGDWHZDVWRPHDVXUHÀRZVLQ

America’s rivers; initially he could not advocate a large-scale federal reclamation 

program. However, in the late 1890s, this changed with the foundering of the 

Carey and Wright acts. By 1900, Newell was interacting with key western busiQHVVPHQVXFKDV*HRUJH0D[ZHOODQGSROLWLFLDQVVXFKDV)UDQFLV1HZODQGV

to promote a federal role in irrigation among the Capital’s political leadership. 

)RUH[DPSOHLQ-DQXDU\1HZHOOJDYHDQHYHQLQJOHFWXUHDW1HZODQGV¶

home where he “showed lantern slides and talked irrigation” to 16 guests, including the Secretary of the Interior and several members of the U.S. Congress.132

Newell had attended the contentious 1893 Irrigation Congress which had 

reacted vehemently to Powell’s report on the paucity of prime irrigable land in 

the public domain. In fact, Newell even gave a speech to the Irrigation Congress 

echoing Powell’s remarks.133 Despite an awareness of land ownership patterns in 

the West, Newell projected a romantic image of yeoman farmers populating arid 

public lands in his 1902 book Irrigation in the United States: “Home-making 

LVWKHDLPRIWKLVERRN7KHGHDGDQGSUR¿WOHVVGHVHUWVQHHGRQO\WKHPDJLF

touch of water to make arable lands that will afford farms and homes for the surplus people of our overcrowded Eastern cities. . .. The national government, the 

owner of these arid lands, is the only power competent to carry this mighty enterprise to a successful conclusion.”134

In 1901, Congressman Newlands—working closely with Newell—submitted a proposal jointly with Senator Henry Hansbrough of North Dakota to 

fund federal irrigation projects from proceeds derived from public land sales.135 

In addition, Newlands received assistance from George Maxwell who, through 

his leadership of the National Irrigation Association, continued to lobby on 

behalf of a national reclamation program. While political support for federal irrigation appeared to be rising within Congress, President McKinley showed little 

interest.

Everything changed when Theodore Roosevelt became president following McKinley’s assassination in September 1901. Roosevelt, the popular 

“rough rider” of the Spanish-American War, was an irrepressible outdoorsman 

and an ardent conservationist who would not be afraid to wield the power of the 

IHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWLQGLUHFWO\LQÀXHQFLQJDQGSURPRWLQJWKHQDWLRQ¶V
29

economic life. Roosevelt believed that government should play a major role in 

FRQVHUYLQJDQGHI¿FLHQWO\XVLQJWKHQDWLRQ¶VQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHV&RQVHUYDWLRQRI

ZDWHULQWKH:HVWVRRQEHFDPHDKLJKSULRULW\IRU5RRVHYHOW,QKLV¿UVWIRUPDO

message to Congress in December 1901, Roosevelt explicitly endorsed federal 

support for irrigation by stressing that the construction of “great storage works . . 

. [had] been conclusively shown to be an undertaking too vast for private effort.” 

Roosevelt proclaimed that “it is as right for the national government to make the 

streams and rivers of the arid region useful by engineering works for water storage as to make useful the rivers and harbors of the humid region by engineering 

works of a different kind.”136

With the new president’s vigorous support, Newlands’ bill sailed 

through Congress and Roosevelt signed it into law on June 17, 1902. Advocating 

DQDWLRQDOSHUVSHFWLYHDQGDVFLHQWL¿FDSSURDFKWRQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHPDQDJHPHQW

the National Reclamation Act (which is sometimes referred to as the Newlands 

Act) provided that:

All moneys received from the sale of public lands in Arizona, 

California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, 

Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, 

South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming . . . are hereby reserved, set aside, and appropriated as a special fund in the 

Treasury to be known as the “reclamation fund” to be used in 

the examination and survey for and the construction and maintenance of irrigation works for the storage, diversion and development of waters for the reclamation of arid and semiarid lands 

in the said states and territories.137

As originally enacted, the Act directed the Secretary of the Interior 

to select irrigation projects without any further review or authorization by 

Congress. Construction would be undertaken directly by the Department of the 

Interior, acting through the newly formed U.S. Reclamation Service.138 Upon 

FRPSOHWLRQRIHDFKSURMHFWWKHIDUPHUVEHQH¿WWLQJIURPLQFUHDVHGZDWHUVXSSO\

were to repay all construction costs to the federal government. This was to be 

DFFRPSOLVKHGLQDQQXDOSD\PHQWVPDGHGXULQJWKH¿UVWWHQ\HDUVDIWHUFRQVWUXFtion was completed. Theoretically, the repaid money (not to include any interest) 

would then be available to fund other federal reclamation projects.

Unlike the Carey Act, state governments would play no role in the program’s implementation. The National Reclamation Act contained provisions 

for “reserving” public lands served by irrigation projects to insure that speculators would not take advantage of planned improvements, and it stipulated that 

IDUPVEHQH¿WWLQJIURPWKHLUULJDWLRQEHDFUHVRUVPDOOHU7DFLWO\UHFRJQL]LQJ
30

John Wesley Powell’s observation at the International Irrigation Congress in Los 

Angeles nine years earlier, the Act also allowed land already in private ownership 

WRUHFHLYHZDWHUIURPWKHIHGHUDOSURMHFWVZLWKRXWSUHMXGLFH%XWLWDOVRUHÀHFWHG

the enduring legacy of the “irrigation crusade” by specifying that no farmer operDWLQJDQLUULJDWHGWUDFWODUJHUWKDQDFUHVFRXOGEHQH¿WIURPZDWHUVXSSOLHGE\

a Reclamation Service project. The details of how individual projects were to be 

developed (and how issues of large-scale landownership within authorized projects would be resolved) were left in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior.

 ,QWKHVXPPHURIUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUDGPLQLVWUDWLQJWKHÀHGJling Reclamation Service fell to Newell who, not surprisingly, became the 

5HFODPDWLRQ¶V¿UVW&KLHI(QJLQHHU$IWHU\HDUVRIOREE\LQJDQGSURVHO\WL]LQJ

Newell now faced the challenge of actually implementing large-scale dam and 

water supply projects. Although he possessed no real experience in the 

construction of major engineering works, Newell could not afford the luxury of 

slowly learning the skills required to plan, design, construct, and operate reclamation projects. The political circumstances that fostered the establishment of 

the Reclamation Service also encouraged–and in fact almost demanded–that the 

new federal bureau prove its service to the nation by building large storage dams 

in the West as quickly as possible. Only a dozen years had passed since Powell’s 

Irrigation Survey had been curtailed in response to pressure from western interests; but by 1902 the federal government was widely perceived as a savior posVHVVLQJWKHWHFKQLFDOVNLOOVDQG¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVQHFHVVDU\WR3PDNHWKHGHVHUW

bloom” and to open a new era of regional growth.139

The stage was set for the great confrontation between the professional 

and military Corps and the amateur and civilian Reclamation Service. But the 

amateurs, with strong presidential backing, would quickly become professional just as the Corps, with continuing congressional support, became increasingly 

civilian.

In the nineteenth century, fresh water was a commodity and rivers needHGWREHFKDQQHOHGRURWKHUZLVHPRGL¿HGWRμLPSURYH¶WKHP7KHVHQRWLRQVZHUH

QRWDEDQGRQHGLQWKHHDUO\WZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\EXWWKH\ZHUHFHUWDLQO\PRGL¿HG

E\WKHHI¿FLHQF\FRQFHSWVLPEHGGHGLQSURJUHVVLYLVPE\HDUO\VWLUULQJVDERXW

the multiple uses of rivers, and by growing interest in hydropower. By the late 

1920s, the stage was set for the arrival of the Big Dam Era commencing in the 

1930s.
31

PROGRESSIVISM AND WATER RESOURCES

3URJUHVVLYLVP&RQVHUYDWLRQDQG(I¿FLHQF\

Conservation became an important national issue in the Progressive Era. 

Proponents were increasingly dismayed by the wanton waste and destruction 

of natural resources in the name of economic progress. Some, like John Muir, 

viewed preservation of public lands and pristine waterways as the only way to 

stave off the worst impulses of the industrial age. But many other conservationLVWVIDYRUHGWKHPDQDJHPHQWRIQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVDQGWKHLUHI¿FLHQWXVH,QKLV

1907 conservation message to Congress, President Theodore Roosevelt stated: 

As a nation we not only enjoy a wonderful measure of present 

prosperity but if this prosperity is used aright it is an earnest of 

future success such as no other nation will have. The reward 

of foresight for this nation is great and easily foretold. But 

there must be the look ahead, there must be a realization of the 

fact that to waste, to destroy, our natural resources, to skin and 

exhaust the land instead of using it so as to increase its usefulness, will result in undermining in the days of our children the 

very prosperity which we ought by right to hand down to them 

DPSOL¿HGDQGGHYHORSHG140

Proponents did not want to undermine development per se, but quesWLRQHGVKRUWWHUPSULYDWHJDLQDWWKHH[SHQVHRIORQJWHUPSXEOLFEHQH¿W

Progressive Era government regulation challenged the notion of unfettered private exploitation of resources by asserting a utilitarian ethic based on “the greatest good for the greatest number.” But more than some generalized communal 

LGHDOZDVDFRPPLWPHQWWRHI¿FLHQWXVHRIWKRVHQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHV3UREOHPV

could be solved, they believed, if well-trained experts armed with the techniques 

of applied science and located within the government were the spearheads of 

FKDQJH7KHVHH[SHUWVFDPHIURPDYDULHW\RI¿HOGVLQFOXGLQJK\GURORJ\IRUHVWry, agrostology, geology, anthropology, and civil engineering. In the Progressive 

Era, governmental technical expertise addressed forest depletion through selective harvesting and planting techniques; ranching problems through new forage 

mixtures, fencing, and the introduction of pure-bred stock; and water use through 

dam building and new irrigation systems.141

Multipurpose Stirrings

During the early years of the Theodore Roosevelt presidency, problems associated with forestry received central attention. But the evolution of 

American conservation policy depended upon more than the application of
32

VFLHQWL¿FIRUHVWU\SUDFWLFHV142 To conservationists, issues concerning timber and 

grass were directly linked to water. Roosevelt often stated that water conservation had to be associated with forest reserves, which preserved watersheds in timEHUHGUHJLRQV)RUKLVSDUW&KLHI)RUHVWHU*LIIRUG3LQFKRWVXSSRUWHGDFRQFHSW

of management of forest reserves that integrated the protection of watersheds and 

grazing rights with timber management.143 It was western water development in 

particular that shaped the burgeoning conservation movement in the early twentieth century. The promotion of a federal irrigation program, debate over water 

rights, the problem of speculation, and concern over siltation “gave rise to extensive ideas about water conservation.” Historian Samuel Hays also argued that 

these issues “became crystallized into an overall approach and by 1908 emerged 

as a concept of multiple-purpose river development,” although that conclusion 

may exaggerate the actual commitment to multiple-purpose development by 

more than a decade.144 The promotion of hydroelectric power—both in the East 

and the West—also was crucial to the rise of the multiple-purpose movement, but 

not until the end of World War I.145

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, hydraulics data and new theories of natural resource development and control helped bring into question water 

DVDVLQJOHSXUSRVHUHVRXUFH,QWHUHVWLQLUULJDWLRQÀRRGZDWHUVQHZVRXUFHV

of urban water supply, hydroelectric power, and navigation stimulated promotion of broader economic development plans for whole river basins. Such plans 

included the protection of watersheds, headwater reservoirs, and coordination of 

the various water uses.146 The U.S. Geological Survey is credited with advocating the idea of water as a resource with many uses. The Reclamation Service, 

which was constructing reservoirs for irrigation purposes, saw the possibility of 

combining irrigation storage with hydroelectric power production. However, the 

Reclamation Act (1902) made no provisions for hydropower, and Congress did 

not authorize the bureau to take up its general development and sale until 1906.147

Conservation leaders within the Roosevelt administration faced an array 

of problems raised by various water uses and proposed water uses, but also 

began to envision the possibilities of basin-wide river development. An emerging viewpoint was to avoid opportunities lost. Pinchot echoed these sentiments: 

“To develop a river for navigation alone, or power alone, or irrigation alone, is 

often like using a sheep for mutton, or a steer for beef, and throwing away the 

leather and the wool.”148

The multiple-purpose approach ultimately reinforced the notion that 

the federal government needed to take the lead on river development because 

of the complexity of the issues and because of the many jurisdictions involved. 

7KLVZDVQRWDOZD\VSRSXODUZLWKVWDWHJRYHUQPHQWVKRZHYHU)URPDSUDFWLcal perspective, the multiple-purpose approach was not only meant to deal with 
33

whole river basins, but with such matters as the size, type, design, and purpose of 

dams.149

Attention to inland waterways navigation proved an opportunity for fedHUDORI¿FLDOVWRLPSOHPHQWWKHPXOWLSOHSXUSRVHYLHZSRLQW:DWHUZD\VDVVRFLDtions and related groups, particularly in the Mississippi basin, called for federal 

aid to increase navigable depths along the rivers, but appeared to have little concern for a broader approach. However, a common interest in a deep channel navigable by ocean-going vessels—from the Gulf of Mexico to Chicago—seemed to 

offer a chance to promote such a plan.150 Combining the development of hydroelectric power with the navigation goals, the argument went, could provide revenue to pay for the desired river improvements.151

Standing in the path of the deep channel was the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, which blocked efforts at acquiring construction funds for the basinwide plan. Some believed that the Corps was stubbornly clinging to the singleuse philosophy of the past, but the Corps had good reason to regard the multiple 

use idea as impractical at the time. Hydroelectric power had yet to compete on 

the open market with other forms of energy. River transportation was facing stiff 

competition from railroads. And the idea of building dams large and inexpensive 

enough to be practical had not been tested.152

Alternately, Representative Newlands concluded that congressional statutes imposed clear limits on Corps functions and that the Corps itself narrowly 

interpreted the functions assigned to it by the Congress. Of course, the Corps 

may have simply been protecting its long-standing leadership role in determining waterways policy, fending off all other contenders. However, several members of Congress also were impediments to multipurpose development. They 

opposed efforts by the administration to coordinate the activities of agencies conFHUQHGZLWKZDWHUUHVRXUFHSROLF\EHFDXVHWKH\GLGQRWZDQWWRKDYHWKHLULQÀXence eroded.153

W. J. McGee, a geologist and anthropologist, an associate of John 

Wesley Powell, and a former member of the Geological Survey, was the primary architect and promoter of the new waterways movement connected to the 

Roosevelt administration. To circumvent the traditionalists in the Corps and 

the Rivers and Harbors Committee, McGee urged the president to appoint a commission to examine possibilities for integrated river basin development.154 In 

1907, Roosevelt appointed the Inland Waterways Commission (IWC), stating 

that the time had come to merge “local projects and uses of inland waters in a 

FRPSUHKHQVLYHSODQGHVLJQHGIRUWKHEHQH¿WRIWKHHQWLUHFRXQWU\ ́155 This clearly placed Roosevelt behind multiple-purpose river development. Beginning in 
34

April, the commission devoted much of its time to problems of navigation, but it 

also appointed a subcommittee to examine the water power issue.156

 ,Q)HEUXDU\WKHFRPPLVVLRQLVVXHGLWVUHSRUWUHFRPPHQGLQJWKDW

IXWXUHSODQV3VKDOOWDNHDFFRXQWRIWKHSXUL¿FDWLRQRIWKHZDWHUVWKHGHYHORSPHQWRISRZHUWKHFRQWURORIÀRRGVWKHUHFODPDWLRQRIODQGVE\LUULJDWLRQDQG

GUDLQDJHDQGDOORWKHUXVHVRIWKHZDWHUVRUEHQH¿WVWREHGHULYHGIURPWKHLUFRQtrol.”157

Resistance from the Corps to the multiple-purpose approach arose at 

several junctures. The Corps opposed the recommendation of the Geological 

6XUYH\¶V&KLHI+\GURJUDSKHU0DUVKDOO2/HLJKWRQWRUHJXODWHVWUHDPÀRZZLWK

reservoirs. Brigadier General William H. Bixby believed that the hydrographer’s 

data was too limited to make such claims and that the economic feasibility of the 

idea was questionable. While Bixby’s position did not demonstrate overt hostilLW\WRWKHPXOWLSOHSXUSRVHDSSURDFKLWGLGUHÀHFWH[WUHPHFDXWLRQLQDEDQGRQLQJ

basic Corps principles and historic practices.158

The commission also recommended that a “National Waterways 

Commission” be established to coordinate the work of the Corps, the 

5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI$JULFXOWXUH¶V)RUHVW6HUYLFHDQG%XUHDX

of Soils, and other federal agencies.159

But the Corps objected to bureaucratic changes proposed in the report 

that would undermine its authority and stressed the primacy of navigation in fedHUDOULYHUGHYHORSPHQW7KLVYLHZSRLQWFDUULHGVLJQL¿FDQWZHLJKWLQ&RQJUHVV160 

When Newlands presented a bill to carry out the recommendations of the Inland 

Waterways Commission—particularly to centralize all water-resource issues 

under a single agency—it received a frosty reception in the Senate and the bill 

eventually died.161

Ultimately, a joint congressional commission was created by the 1909 

Rivers and Harbors Act. While not the vehicle for multiple-purpose river development that advocates hoped, it called for several navigation improvements, 

regulation of wharves and terminals, prevention of deforestation near mountain streams, and legislation promoting water power development. It also recRPPHQGHGDIHGHUDOUHVHUYRLUV\VWHPIRUÀRRGFRQWUROEDVHGRQPXOWLSOHSXUSRVHEHQH¿WV$WWKLVVWDJHWKH&RUSVUHPDLQHGXQFRQYLQFHGWKDWWKHPXOWLSOH

purpose approach had broad applicability, although by World War I Congress 

H[SDQGHGLWVSURJUDPWRLQFOXGHÀRRGFRQWURODORQJZLWKQDYLJDWLRQ162

A spirited controversy over the damming of Hetch Hetchy Valley in 

<RVHPLWH1DWLRQDO3DUNIXUWKHULQWHQVL¿HGWKHGHEDWHRYHUZDWHUXVHDQGLQVR
35

GRLQJDOVRGURYHDZHGJHDPRQJFRQVHUYDWLRQLVWJURXSV,Q6DQ)UDQFLVFRGLVagreements surrounding the franchise held by Spring Valley Water Company 

led to provision in 1900 for a municipal water system. Reform mayor James D. 

Phelan applied to the Secretary of Interior for dam construction permits along 

the Tuolumne River running through the Hetch Hetchy Valley in the northern 

part of Yosemite National Park. The secretary denied Phelan’s request, but the 

QHZ6HFUHWDU\RIWKH,QWHULRU-DPHV5*DU¿HOGDFFHSWHGWKHDSSOLFDWLRQLQ

because he was not very interested in guarding resources for aesthetic purposes 

DQGEHFDXVHKHIHOWWKDWWKHHDUWKTXDNHDQG¿UHLQ6DQ)UDQFLVFRGHPRQstrated a real need.163

 6DQ)UDQFLVFRRI¿FLDOVZHUHHFVWDWLFEXWRSSRVLWLRQPRXQWHG6SULQJ

Valley Water Company voiced its objections, as did farmers in Modesto and 

Turlock, who claimed the water of the Tuolumne. However, the opposition of 

preservationist John Muir and a throng of wilderness advocates turned the dispute into a national debate164 The effort to invade the Hetch Hetchy Valley infuriated Muir. “Dam Hetch Hetchy!” he declared, “As well dam for water-tanks 

the people’s cathedrals and churches, for no holier temple has ever been consecrated by the heart of man.”165

Muir failed to attract support from President Roosevelt, who was torn 

between his relationship with Muir, concern about the reaction of Californians, 

and his sympathy for resource conservationism. Muir then began a public campaign to win support for protecting the Hetch Hetchy. Approval of the Hetch 

Hetchy project was successfully blocked in Congress in 1909, but a bill was 

SDVVHGLQWRWUDQVIHUWKHSURSRVHGVLWHWR6DQ)UDQFLVFR,QWKH

O’Shaughnessy Dam on the Tuolumne was completed.166

The Hetch Hetchy controversy not only shattered Muir’s vision of the 

protection of the Sierra Nevada, but also divided the conservation movement. In 

the hearing before Congress over the Raker Bill to approve the project, Muir and 

his allies squared off against Pinchot and supporters of resource conservation. It 

was a bitter squabble. Pinchot and Muir had been friends and allies in several 

conservation battles. With Hetch Hetchy, Muir clearly divorced himself from the 

utilitarian approach that Pinchot had come to represent.167

Hetch Hetchy also was about hydroelectric power and to some degree 

PXOWLSOHXVH6DQ)UDQFLVFRKDGWXUQHGWRWKHYDOOH\IRUZDWHUEXWDOVRLGHQWL-

¿HGWKUHHK\GURHOHFWULFVLWHVIRUIXWXUHGHYHORSPHQW7RGHIHQGHUVRIWKH+HWFK

+HWFK\K\GURHOHFWULFSRZHUZDV3WKH7URMDQ+RUVHRIWKHZKROH¿JKW ́VLQFH

dam advocates had been cool to seriously consider alternative sites that could 

provide water but little prospect of hydropower. An amendment to the 1913 act 

required the city to distribute hydropower from the valley directly to consumers. 
36

7KLVDFWLRQSXWWKHSULYDWHXWLOLW\3DFL¿F*DVDQG(OHFWULF3*	(RQWKHVDPH

side with Muir, but for different reasons. The city’s efforts, however, to contract 

with PG&E as an agent for Hetch Hetchy power met with resistance from supSRUWHUVRISULYDWHSRZHU7KHGHEDWHZDVVHWWOHGLQZKHQ6DQ)UDQFLVFR

leased a transmission line from PG&E to deliver its power to the city. Public 

power was defeated at this site, but not the desire for multiple-use.168

The Hydroelectric Challenge

 )URPDQDWLRQDOSHUVSHFWLYHK\GURSRZHUZDVDNH\FRPSRQHQWLQWKH

evolution of multiple-purpose river development and hence in the construction 

of large federal dams. With respect to the latter, the recurrent use of storage reservoirs to increase capacity is linked to the use of hydropower.169 The generaWLRQRISRZHULVRQHRIWKHSULPHEHQH¿WVRIUXQQLQJRUIDOOLQJZDWHUDQGWKXV

an essential resource to be conserved through wise use. It also was considered 

by proponents of multiple-use as a means to underwrite the cost of dam building 

and river development in general.

Prior to the advancement of hydroelectric power in the late nineteenth 

century, almost 66 percent of the waterpower in use in the United States was concentrated in the North Atlantic States (primarily New York and New England). 

The amount of water horsepower in use by eastern manufacturers far outstripped 

similar use in the rest of the country. By 1920, however, demand for the distriEXWLRQRIZDWHUSRZHUSRWHQWLDOVKLIWHGWRWKH5RFN\0RXQWDLQDQG3DFL¿F&RDVW

States thanks largely to electricity. By 1890, hydroelectric power had been successfully applied in Europe and was making inroads in the United States.170

 :KLOHDSODQWLQ$SSOHWRQ:LVFRQVLQZDVWKH¿UVWWRXWLOL]HIDOOLQJ

ZDWHUWRJHQHUDWHHOHFWULFLW\LQWKHHDUO\VWKHKDUQHVVLQJRI1LDJDUD)DOOVLQ

the mid-1890s brought major national attention to hydroelectric power.171 Since 

the mid-nineteenth century, there had been strong interest in utilizing the water of 

1LDJDUD)DOOVIRUSRZHUSURGXFWLRQ7KHIDOOVZHUHDQH[FHOOHQWFKRLFHEHFDXVH

RIWKHLUVWHDG\ÀRZDQGWKHLUSUR[LPLW\WRODUJHSRSXODWLRQV8QWLOWKHDGYHQW

RIDOWHUQDWLQJFXUUHQW$&DQGHI¿FLHQWG\QDPRVWKHSURMHFWZDVLPSUDFWLFDO

However, as the technology changed and the market for electricity increased, the 

GHYHORSPHQWRIWKHIDOOVEHFDPHPRUHSUDFWLFDO,QWKH¿UVWRIWKUHH

5,000-horsepower AC generators was installed. The completion of the plant 

marked the beginning of large-scale hydroelectric generation in the United 

States. With less fanfare, hydroelectric power generation began in the West–as 

early as 1889 in Oregon, followed by similar ventures in California, Washington, 

and Montana.172
37

Governmental regulation related to hydroelectricity evolved with the 

technology. Private hydroelectric dams on waterways in the East and Midwest 

increasingly interfered with navigation. Urged on by the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Congress attempted to regulate dam construction through the Rivers 

and Harbors Acts of 1890 and 1899, requiring that dam sites and plans for dams 

on navigable rivers be approved by the Corps and the Secretary of War before 

construction. Regardless, between 1894 and 1906 Congress issued 30 permits 

for private dams, mostly along the Mississippi River.173

Prior to the twentieth century, waterpower sites in the public domain 

were claimed by private companies without any effort by the federal government 

to reserve those sites or regulate their use. Part of the reason was ambiguity over 

federal jurisdiction, and part was the lag in identifying waterpower as a central 

IHDWXUHRIZDWHUFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGZLVHXVH7KH¿UVWVWHSWRZDUGZDWHUSRZHU

conservation occurred in 1901, with passage of the Right-of-Way Act. Although 

primarily intended as a way of facilitating reclamation and irrigation programs 

adjacent to public lands, it was broadened to cover many utility functions. The 

Secretary of the Interior could grant rights-of-way over public lands for dams, 

reservoirs, waterpower plants, and transmission lines.

 3ULYDWHFRPSDQLHVFRQWLQXHGWR¿JKWIRUPRUHIDYRUDEOHOHJLVODWLRQEXW

they accepted the permit system. By 1916, power facilities in the national forests represented 42 percent of the total developed power in the western states. 

President William Howard Taft’s appointment of Richard Ballinger as Secretary 

of the Interior in 1909 weakened the new regulatory scheme. Ballinger refused 

WRDSSO\WKH)RUHVW6HUYLFHSHUPLWV\VWHPWRZDWHUSRZHUVLWHVRQSXEOLFGRPDLQ

,Q:DOWHU/)LVKHUVXFFHHGHG%DOOLQJHUDQGGHFLGHGWRIROORZ*DU¿HOG¶V

SROLF\+HKDGWRFRQWHQGZLWKWKH*HQHUDO/DQG2I¿FHZKLFKUHJDUGHGWKHSHUmit system as illegal and thus he gave the Geological Survey the responsibility 

IRUDGPLQLVWHULQJLW7KHUHYLVHGSHUPLWVLQFOXGHGD¿IW\\HDUOLPLWHGJUDQWDQG

imposed a waterpower fee (“conservation charge”).174

These efforts did not resolve the problem of waterpower development 

on navigable streams. An important issue was the relationship between the mulWLSOHSXUSRVHGHYHORSPHQWRIZDWHUZD\VDQGWKHTXHVWLRQRI¿QDQFLQJVXFK

development. In the 1903 veto of private construction of a dam and power stations on the Tennessee River at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, Roosevelt protected the 

site for later government development, but he also helped to establish the principle of national ownership of resources previously considered only of local value. 

In this particular case, Roosevelt recommended using revenue from power proGXFWLRQWR¿QDQFHQDYLJDWLRQLPSURYHPHQWV
38

The General Dam Act of 1906 standardized regulations concerning private power development, requiring dam owners to maintain and operate navigation facilities—without compensation—when necessary at hydroelectric power 

sites. The act helped to clarify the role of the federal government in safeguarding river navigability, and, in a general way, also strengthened federal regulatory authority in the area of water that already had been established with respect to 

forest land. A 1910 amendment to the 1906 act more closely linked hydropower 

to plans for waterway improvements by requiring the Corps to take hydropower

development into account when evaluating dam construction permits. The 

HPSKDVLVRIWKHDPHQGPHQWZDVRQK\GURSRZHUDVD¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPIRU

QDYLJDWLRQDQGÀRRGFRQWUROSURMHFWV175

The 1906 act and the 1910 amendment, however, engendered strong 

disagreements of interpretation of water development. Traditionally, the Corps 

viewed power dams as obstructions to expanding navigation and only slowly was 

moving toward a broader viewpoint. The Taft administration, like the Corps, 

looked at dams essentially as obstructions to navigation and was no more supportive of a multiple-purpose approach, approving hydropower franchises that 

required neither a limited permit nor compensation. Prior to World War I, hydroelectric power development continued to remain a private venture.176

In general, the Woodrow Wilson administration showed little interest in 

FRQVHUYDWLRQLVVXHV)RUH[DPSOH'HPRFUDWVXVXDOO\KDGQRWIDYRUHGH[SDQGing government power to withdraw public lands from use, which limited equal 

access to resources. However, the issue of private development of hydroelectric power on navigable rivers in the public domain remained a lively issue in the 

Wilson years.177

The desire to improve rivers through human technology had not disappeared in the United States by the end of World War I. Indeed, the demand on 

ZDWHUUHVRXUFHVKDGEHFRPHJUHDWHU/DUJHGDPVUDWKHUWKDQDUWL¿FLDOFDQDOVDQG

steamboats, would become the primary tool to harness rivers. And during the 

course of the next several decades, dam building greatly accelerated.

This early twentieth century increase in dam building brought forth a 

new interest in the structural analysis and design of these huge works. Interest 

focused especially on the new material of that century, structural concrete, which 

was beginning to assume a major role in buildings and bridges. Thus, as the politics of dams became more complex, so did the engineering, and it is, therefore, 

crucial to understand these new technical ideas and to recognize that they can be 

as controversial as political ideas.
39

Endnotes

1. Joseph M. Petulla, American Environmental History6DQ)UDQFLVFR%R\GDQG)UDVHU

2. William L. Graf, “Landscapes, Commodities, and Ecosystems: The Relationship Between Policy and 

Science for American Rivers,” in Water Science and Technology Board, National Research Council, National 

Academy of Sciences, Sustaining Our Water Resources,(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993). 

11-2. See also E. J. Nygren, Views and Visions: American Landscapes Before 1830 (Washington, D.C.: 

Corcoran Gallery of Art, 1986).

3. John Seelye, Beautiful Machine: Rivers and the Republican Plan, 1175-1825 (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1991), 8-9. See also Graf, “Landscapes, Commodities, and Ecosystems . . .,” 12.

4. Theodore Steinberg, Nature Incorporated: Industrialization and the Waters of New England (Amherst: 

University of Massachusetts Press, 1991), 16.

5. Martin V. Melosi, Coping with Abundance: Energy and Environment in Industrial America (New York: 

Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 17.

 (UQHVW6*ULI¿WKDQG&KDUOHV5$GULDQA History of American City Government, 1775-1870

(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983), 218.

 =DQH/0LOOHUDQG3DWULFLD00HOYLQThe Urbanization of Modern America: A Brief History, 2nd edition 

(San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), 31-2, 48-9, 57.

8. Charles E. Brooks, Frontier Settlement and Market Revolution: The Holland Land Purchase (Ithaca, 

New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), 7-9.

9. Ben Moreell, Our Nation’s Water Resources–Policies and Politics (Chicago: Law, School, University of 

Chicago, 1956), 15-6.

 7RGG6KDOODW3:DWHUDQG%XUHDXFUDF\2ULJLQVRIWKH)HGHUDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\IRU:DWHU5HVRXUFHV

1787-1838,” Natural Resources Journal 32 (Winter, 1992), 5-6.

11. Richard N. L. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A History of American

Environmental Policy (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1999), 140.

12. Petulla, American Environmental History, 28-31. Ellis L. Armstrong, Michael C. Robinson, and Suellen 

M. Hoy, editors, History of Public Works in the United States, 1776-1976 (Chicago: American Public Works 

Association, 1976), 7-8. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves, 71. See also John Opie, 

The Law of the Land: Two Hundred Years of American Farmland Policy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 

3UHVV)UDQN*UHJJ33XEOLF/DQG3ROLF\&RQWURYHUVLDO%HJLQQLQJVIRUWKH7KLUG&HQWXU\ ́LQ0LFKDHO

J. Lacey, editor, Government and Environmental Politics (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 

1989), 143.

13. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves, 79-88. Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union: 

A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), xiii-xvii, 40-2.

14. Armstrong, Robinson, and Hoy, editors, History of Public Works in the United States, 1776-1976, 7. 

Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves, 88-9.

15. John Lauritz Larson, “A Bridge, A Dam, A River: Liberty and Innovation in the Early Republic,” Journal

of the Early Republic 7 (Winter 1987), 354.

16. Martin Reuss and Paul K. Walker, Financing Water Resources Development: A Brief History

:DVKLQJWRQ'&+LVWRULFDO'LYLVLRQ2I¿FHRI$GPLQLVWUDWLYH6HUYLFHV2I¿FHRIWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUV

July 1983), 4-5. See also, Petulla, American Environmental History, 111-3.

17. Seelye, Beautiful Machine, 8-10.

18. Armstrong, Robinson, and Hoy, editors, History of Public Works in the United States, 1776-1976, 23-30.

See also Petulla, American Environmental History, 114-8. Carol Sheriff, 7KH$UWL¿FLDO5LYHU7KH(ULH&DQDO

and the Paradox of Progress, 1817-1862 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996).

19. See Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves, 41-2.

20. The Industrial Revolution brought steampower to supplant humans and animals. However, the origins of 

ODUJHVFDOHPDQXIDFWXULQJIDFWRU\SURGXFWLRQDQGUHVRXUFHH[WUDFWLRQDW¿UVWGHSHQGHGRQIXHOZRRGIRULURQ

production, and waterpower for integrated New England textile mills. Not until the 1880s did steam exceed 

water as an energy source for industrial expansion in the United States. Louis C. Hunter, A History of Industrial

Power in the United States, 1780-1930 Volume One: Water in the Century of the Steam Engine (Charlottesville: 

University Press of Virginia, 1979), 139. Martin V. Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 22-3.

21. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 

Harvard University Press, 1977), 34.

22. Hunter, Water in the Century of the Steam Engine, 54-5, 140.

23. Hunter, Water in the Century of the Steam Engine, 115, 141, 151.

24. Steinberg, Nature Incorporated, 141.
40

 +RZHYHUVLQFHVXUIDFHZDWHUZDVDEXQGDQWIHZFRQÀLFWVRYHUZDWHUULJKWVQHHGHGWREHUHVROYHGLQ

WKHHDVWHUQVWDWHFRXUWVLQWKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\6HH:LOOLDP)6WHLUHU-U35LSDULDQ'RFWULQH$6KRUW

Case History for the Eastern United States,” in John W. Johnson, Historic U.S. Court Cases, 1690-1990: An

Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Publishing, 1992), 312.

26. Hunter, Water in the Century of the Steam Engine, 33. See also 140-2, 145.

27. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, 35-6.

28. The greatest departure from riparian principles occurred in Massachusetts, where “mill acts” had granted 

privileges to mill owners since the colonial period.

29. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 37, 40-2. See also Steinberg,, Nature Incorporated,

146-7.

30. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 42.

31. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 43. See also Hunter, Water in the Century of the

Steam Engine, 141. Donald J. Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West: Water, Law, and Public Policy 1848-1902

(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992), 11-2.

32. See Opie, The Law of the Land, 108-9.

33. Samuel P. Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\7KH3URJUHVVLYH&RQVHUYDWLRQ0RYHPHQW

1890-1920 (New York: Atheneum, 1972; originally published 1959), 16-7. See also Robert G. Dunbar, Forging

New Rights in Western Waters (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 59-60.

34. Richard White has argued that appropriative rights in the West were “a local implementation of a larger 

QDWLRQDOPRGL¿FDWLRQRIWKHODZQRWDZHVWHUQLQQRYDWLRQ ́7KLVLVDXVHIXOUH¿QHPHQWEXWGRHVQRWFRQWUDGLFW

the point that the application of appropriative rights in the West had local roots. See his “It’s Your Misfortune

and None of My Own”: A History of the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 401. 

6HHDOVR'RQDOG-3LVDQL36WDWHYV1DWLRQ)HGHUDO5HFODPDWLRQDQG:DWHU5LJKWVLQWKH3URJUHVVLYH(UD ́

3DFL¿F+LVWRULFDO5HYLHZ 51 (August 1982), 266-7. Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The

Unbroken Past of the American West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 72.

35. Donald J. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness: The Irrigation Crusade in California and the

West, 1850-1931 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 30-1.

36. Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1931), 3-44.

37. See Lawrence B. Lee, Reclaiming the American West: An Historiography and Guide (Santa Barbara, 

&DOLIRUQLD$%&&OLR3UHVV'RQDOG-3LVDQL3'HHSDQG7URXEOHG:DWHUV$1HZ)LHOGRI:HVWHUQ

History,” New Mexico Historical Review 63 (October 1988), 311-31. See also Lawrence B. Lee, “Water 

5HVRXUFH+LVWRU\$1HZ)LHOGRI+LVWRULRJUDSK\" ́3DFL¿F+LVWRULFDO5HYLHZ 57 (November 1988), 457-67. 

Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness. Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West. Donald Worster, Rivers of

Empire: Water, Aridity and the Growth of the American West (New York: Pantheon, 1985). Norris Hundley, 

Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and the Politics of Water in the American West (Berkeley: 

University of California Press, 1975). Norris Hundley, The Great Thirst: Californians and Water, 1770-

1990 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Stanley Davison, The Leadership of the Reclamation

Movement: 1875-1902 (New York: Arno Press, 1979). and James Earl Sherow, Watering the Valley: 

Development Along the High Plains of the Arkansas River (Topeka: University Press of Kansas, 1990).

38. Useful histories include Worster, Rivers of Empire. Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West

and Its Disappearing Water (New York: Viking Press, 1986). William A. Warne, The Bureau of Reclamation

(New York: Praeger Press, 1973). Michael Robinson, Water for the West (Chicago: Public Works Historical 

Society, 1979). Karen Smith, 7KH0DJQL¿FHQW([SHULPHQW%XLOGLQJWKH6DOW5LYHU3URMHFW

(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986). Joseph Stevens, Hoover Dam: An American Adventure

(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988). In addition, the role of the federal government in supporting the construction of the Los Angeles project in the Owens Valley has been described in William L. Kahrl, 

:DWHUDQG3RZHU7KH&RQÀLFWRYHU/RV$QJHOHV¶:DWHU6XSSO\LQWKH2ZHQV9DOOH\ (Berkeley, University of 

California Press, 1982). Abraham Hoffman, Vision or Villainy: Origins of the Owens Valley-Los Angeles Water

Controversy (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M Press, 1981).

39. The need for capital in hydraulic mining helped to promote the success of prior appropriation by the mid1850s.

40. Those states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. 

See Hundley, The Great Thirst, 69-73. Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Waters, 61-3.

41. Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\, 16-7.

42. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 84-5.

43. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 88.

44. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness)RUDWKRURXJKGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHOHJDOFRQWH[WIRU

western water law from 1848 to 1902, see Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West, 11-68.
41

45. According to Donald J. Pisani, “After the Desert Land Act was passed in 1877, it was impossible to assert 

ULSDULDQULJKWV±DWOHDVWQRWLIVRPHRQHKDGFODLPHGZDWHUXQGHUSULRUDSSURSULDWLRQEHIRUHD¿QDOSDWHQWZDV

LVVXHGWRWKDWODQG ́'RQDOG-3LVDQLWR'DYLG3%LOOLQJWRQ)HEUXDU\

46. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 95-7. Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Waters, 67-72. Pisani, From

the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 246-7. Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West, 35-6.

47. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 248. White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own,”

402. Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Waters, 78-98. In Utah, however, appropriative rights developed 

by the Mormons were unique. Based on the Mormon’s “ecclesiastical brotherhood,” they divided rights into 

primary and secondary categories. Within each category water was divided proportionately among the users. 

See Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Waters, 82.

48. Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Waters, 99-112. White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My

Own,” 402.

49. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves, 60-1.

50. Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West, 31-2, 37-8.

51. Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., Man and Nature in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 81, 83, 

88. G. Michael McCarthy,+RXURI7ULDO7KH&RQVHUYDWLRQ&RQÀLFWLQ&RORUDGRDQGWKH:HVW

1891-1907 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977),15. Petulla, American Environmental History,

5RGHULFN)UD]LHU1DVKHGLWRUAmerican Environmentalism: Readings in Conservation History

(New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990), 36, 45. Craig W. Allin, The Politics of Wilderness

Preservation (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982, 24-36. See also Roderick Nash, Wilderness and

the American Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

52. Petulla, American Environmental History, 221-5. Ekirch, Man and Nature in America, 87. Nash, editor, 

American Environmentalism, 59. Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, 19-23. McCarthy, Hour of

Trial, 15.

53. See Carolyn Merchant, editor, 0DMRU3UREOHPVLQ$PHULFDQ(QYLURQPHQWDO+LVWRU\ (Lexington, 

Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1993), 338. Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The

Transformation of the American Environmental Movement (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993), 19-21. 

Petulla, American Environmental History, 217. Nash, editor, American Environmentalism, 10-11. McCarthy, 

Hour of Trial, 3-4, 12.

54. See Ekirch, Man and Nature in America, 82. See also Elmo R. Richardson, The Politics of Conservation: 

Crusades and Controversies, 1897-1913 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 2-3, 6.

55. W. Stull Holt, 7KH2I¿FHRIWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUVRIWKH$UP\,WV1RQ0LOLWDU\+LVWRU\$FWLYLWLHVDQG

Organization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1923), 2.

56. Todd Shallat, Structures in the Stream: Water, Science, and the Rise of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 2. Terry S. Reynolds, “The Engineer in 19th-Century America,” in 

Terry S. Reynolds, editor, The Engineer in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 7.

57. Prior to 1750, the state was the primary employer of engineers throughout Europe. The growth of commercial operations and the acceleration in industrial development, however, enabled self-trained civilian engineers—especially in Great Britain—to practice their occupation. See Reynolds, “The Engineer in 19th-Century 

America,” 7-9. Shallat, Structures in the Stream, 14-5, 18.

58. Reynolds, “The Engineer in 19th-Century America,” 8-9.

59. Holt, 7KH2I¿FHRIWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUVRIWKH$UP\6HHDOVR)RUHVW*+LOORoads, Rails &

Waterways: The Army Engineers and Early Transportation (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957), 

5-7.

60. Shallat, Structures in the Stream, 3, 92-3.

61. Reynolds, “The Engineer in 19th-Century America,” 16. Todd Shallat, “Building Waterways, 1802-1861: 

Science and the United States Army in Early Public Works,” Technology and Culture 31 (January 1990), 25-6. 

Edwin Layton, “Mirror-Image Twins: The Communities of Science and Technology in 19th-Century America,” 

Technology and Culture 12 (October 1971), 570. Hill, Roads, Rails & Waterways, 12-9. See also Stephen E. 

Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 22-3, 62-8, 

90-2, 97-100, 100-3.

62. Shallat, “Building Waterways, 1802-1861,” 22.

63. Martin Reuss and Charles Hendricks, “The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A Brief History,” 1-2. The 

KLVWRU\LVDYDLODEOHXQGHU3KLVWRU\ ́RQWKH86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVZHEVLWHZZZXVDFHDUP\PLO

64. Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers: An Economic and Technological History

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949). See also Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 20-2.

65. Shallat, “Water and Bureaucracy,” 5.
42

66. Reuss and Walker, Financing Water Resources Development, 6. Hill, Roads, Rails & Waterways, 25-26, 

154-61. Isaac Lippincott, “A History of River Improvement,” Journal of Political Economy (1914), 634.

67. Reuss and Walker, Financing Water Resources Development, 3. Allan H. Cullen, Rivers in Harness: The

Story of Dams (Philadelphia: Chilton Company, 1962), 35.

 /LYLQJVWRQDQG)XOWRQKDGGLHGE\WKDWWLPH

 )UDQFLV16WLWHV3$0RUH3HUIHFW8QLRQ7KH6WHDPERDW&DVH ́LQ-RKQVRQHistoric U.S. Court Cases,

187-93.

70. Stites, “A More Perfect Union,” 190.

71. See Beatrice Hort Holmes,, A History of Federal Water Resources Programs, 1800-1960 (Washington, 

D.C.: Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous Publication No. 1233, June 

1972), 3. Reuss and Walker, Financing Water Resources Development, 8. Shallat, “Water and Bureaucracy,” 

14-5. Shallat, Structures in the Stream, 125-7.

72. Michael Robinson, “The United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Conservation Community: A 

+LVWRU\WR ́GUDIWPDQXVFULSW1RYHPEHU)LOHV2I¿FHRI+LVWRU\+HDGTXDUWHUV86$UP\&RUSV

RI(QJLQHHUV$OH[DQGULD9LUJLQLD6HHDOVR)UDQN(6PLWKThe Politics of Conservation (New York: 

Pantheon Books, 1966), 71.

73. Holmes, A History of Federal Water Resources Programs, 3.

74. Robert W. Harrison, History of the Commercial Waterways & Ports of the United States, Volume I 

)RUW%HOYRLU9LUJLQLD86$UP\(QJLQHHU:DWHU5HVRXUFHV6XSSRUW&HQWHU5HXVVDQG:DONHU

Financing Water Resources Development, 6. Michael C. Robinson, History of Navigation in the Ohio

River Basin (Alexandria, Virginia: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Water Resources Support Center, 1983), 

12. Holmes, A History of Federal Water Resources Programs&KDUOHV)2¶&RQQHOO-U37KH&RUSVRI

Engineers and the Rise of Modern Management, 1827-1856,” in Merritt Roe Smith, editor, Military Enterprise

and Technological Change: Perspectives on the American Experience (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 

1985), 97.

75. Holmes, A History of Federal Water Resources Programs, 4. Aubrey Parkman, History of the Waterways

of the Atlantic Coast of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Water Resources, January 1983), 43. 

Reuss and Walker, Financing Water Resources Development, 6. Reuss and Hendricks, “The U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers,” 3.

76. Shallat, Structures in the Stream, 98. See also Reuss and Walker, Financing Water Resources

Development, 6-7.

77. The board was in existence for eight years until the Corps of Topographical Civil Engineers were placed 

in a separate bureau. Its responsibilities included determining general possibilities for improvement of roads, 

canals, and railways on a national scale. See Hill, Roads, Rails & Waterways, 63-6.

78. Holt, 7KH2I¿FHRIWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUVRIWKH$UP\, 6-7. Reuss and Hendricks, “The U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers,” 3. Hill, Roads, Rails & Waterways, 56-57.

79. Robinson, History of Navigation in the Ohio River Basin, 13-4. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western

Rivers, 193-8, 202. See also Hill, Roads, Rails & Waterways, 164. Lippincott, “A History of River 

Improvement,” 639.

80. According to Louis Hunter, “Bars acted as dams to hold back and conserve the water supply during the 

dry seasons. Their elimination would simply result in the stabilization of the depth of water at a proportionately 

lower level, to the prejudice of navigation. To deepen the channel over a bar without increasing the ‘expense’ 

of water and draining the pool above, the [Board of Engineers] proposed the construction of dikes of timber 

DQGVWRQHWRFRQFHQWUDWHWKHÀRZRIZDWHUDWDORZHUVWDJHZLWKLQDOLPLWHGVSDFH7KHÀRZRIZDWHUWKXVFRQFHQWUDWHGZRXOGFXWDGHHSHUFKDQQHOIRUWKHEHQH¿WRIQDYLJDWLRQ7KLVZDVWKHKRSHDWDQ\UDWHDQGWKHDFW

of 1824 provided for experiments on certain bars to determine the practicality of the scheme.” See Hunter, 

Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 201.

 7KH,WDOLDQVDQGWKH)UHQFKKDGH[SHULPHQWHGPDQ\\HDUVHDUOLHUZLWKVWUXFWXUHVWKDWZRXOGHQODUJHD

channel’s carrying capacity by increasing a stream’s velocity. See Shallat, “Building Waterways, 1802-1861,” 

41-2. Shallat, “Water and Bureaucracy,” 19-20.

82. Robinson, History of Navigation in the Ohio River Basin, 12-6. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western

Rivers, 200-3.

83. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 205-7. See also Robinson, History of Navigation in the Ohio

River Basin, 17-8.
43

84. In 1838, the Topographical Bureau was given the assignment of directing all river and harbor work. 

All new work was assigned to it and some works in progress also were transferred. However, the Corps of 

Topographical Engineers remained an independent unit only until 1863. See Hill, Roads, Rails & Waterways,

6HHDOVR)UDQN16FKXEHUWHGLWRUThe Nation Builders: A Sesquicentennial History of the Corps

of Topographical Engineers, 1838-1863)RUW%HOYRLU9LUJLQLD2I¿FHRI+LVWRU\86$UP\&RUSVRI

Engineers, 1988).

85. Robinson, History of Navigation in the Ohio River Basin, 16-7. Hill, Roads, Rails & Waterways, 173. 

Holt,7KH2I¿FHRIWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUVRIWKH$UP\, 8-10. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 203.

86. Parkman, History of the Waterways of the Atlantic Coast of the United States, 47. See also Holt, The

2I¿FHRIWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUVRIWKH$UP\, 10-1. Shallat, Structures in the Stream, 106. Hill, Roads, Rails &

Waterways, 181-98.

87. Hill, Roads, Rails & Waterways, 205. Robinson, History of Navigation in the Ohio River Basin, 22.

88. Parkman, History of the Waterways of the Atlantic Coast of the United States, 49. Reuss and Walker, 

Financing Water Resources Development, 12.

89. Robinson, History of Navigation in the Ohio River Basin, 23-25. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western

Rivers, 210.

90. Robinson, History of Navigation in the Ohio River Basin, 25. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers,

209. Leland R. Johnson, The Davis Island Lock and Dam, 1870-1922 (Pittsburgh: U.S. Army Engineer 

District, 1985), 34-5.

91. Robinson, History of Navigation in the Ohio River Basin, 26. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers,

212.

92. Robinson, History of Navigation in the Ohio River Basin, 26-27. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western

Rivers, 211-2. Reuss and Hendricks, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,” 5. Johnson, The Davis Island Lock

and Dam, 1870-19226HHDOVR)UDQFLV+2[[37KH2KLR5LYHU0RYDEOH'DPV ́Military Engineer 27 

-DQXDU\)HEUXDU\

93. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 212. See also John P. Davis, “Locks and Mechanical Lifts: 

State of the Art” (Paper prepared for the National Waterways Roundtable, Norfolk, Virginia, April 22-24, 1980), 

6.

94. Roald D. Tweet, History of Transportation on the Upper Mississippi & Illinois Rivers (Washington, D.C.: 

*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH:LOOLDP3DWULFN2¶%ULHQ0DU\<HDWK5DWKEXQ3DWULFN2¶%DQQRQ

and W Christine Whitacre,*DWHZD\VWR&RPPHUFH7KH86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV¶IRRW&KDQQHO3URMHFW

on the Upper Mississippi River'HQYHU1DWLRQDO3DUN6HUYLFH)RUPRUHLQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHGHEDWH

over channelization, see Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers-RKQ5)HUUHOO3)URP6LQJOHWR

Multi-Purpose Planning: The Role of the Army Engineers in River Development, 1824-1930” (Draft manuVFULSW+LVWRULFDO'LYLVLRQ2I¿FHRIWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUV)HEUXDU\0DUWLQ5HXVV3$QGUHZ

A. Humphreys and the Development of Hydraulic Engineering: Politics and Technology in the Army Corps of 

Engineers, 1850-1950,” Technology and Culture 26, No. 1 (January 1985), 1-2. Luna B. Leopold and Thomas 

Maddock, Jr., The Flood Control Controversy: Big Dams, Little Dams, and Land Management (New York: 

Ronald Press Company, 1954), 98-9.

 -RKQ2$Q¿QVRQ3&RPPHUFHDQG&RQVHUYDWLRQRQWKH8SSHU0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHU ́The Annals of Iowa 52 

)DOO

96 .Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 214.

97. Tweet, History of Transportation on the Upper Mississippi & Illinois Rivers, 54.

98. Jane Lamm Carroll, “Mississippi River Headwaters Reservoirs” (Historic American Engineering Record,

Report No. MN-6), Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress, 2-8. See also Jane Lamm Carroll, 

“Lake Winnibigoshish Reservoir Dam” (Historic American Engineering Record, Report No. MN-65). Jane 

Lamm Carroll, “Leech Lake Reservoir Dam” (Historic American Engineering Record, Report No. MN-67). 

Jane Lamm Carroll, “Lake Pokegama Reservoir Dam” (Historic American Engineering Record, Report No. 

MN-66). Jane Lamm Carroll, “Pine River Reservoir Dam” (Historic American Engineering Record, Report 

No. 68). Jane Lamm Carroll, “Sandy Lake Reservoir Dam and Lock” (Historic American Engineering Record,

Report No. MN-69). Jane Lamm Carroll, “Gull Lake Reservoir Dam” (Historic American Engineering Record,

Report No. MN-70). See also Raymond H. Merritt, The Corps, the Environment, and the Upper Mississippi

River Basin:DVKLQJWRQ'&+LVWRULFDO'LYLVLRQ2I¿FHRIWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUV

 &DUUROO30LVVLVVLSSL5LYHU+HDGZDWHUV5HVHUYRLUV ́6HHDOVR$Q¿QVRQ3&RPPHUFHDQG

Conservation on the Upper Mississippi River,” 389-90.

100. Merritt, The Corps, the Environment, and the Upper Mississippi River Basin, 3-10. See also Carroll, 

“Mississippi River Headwaters Reservoirs,” 23-30.

101. Merritt, The Corps, the Environment, and the Upper Mississippi River Basin, 13-9.
44

102. Ibid., 19-20. See also Philip V. Scarpino, Great River: An Environmental History of the Upper

Mississippi, 1890-1950 (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 153.

 6HH)HUUHOO3)URP6LQJOH7R0XOWL3XUSRVH3ODQQLQJ ́)RU¿JXUHVRQWKHDPRXQWVRIFRQJUHVVLRnal appropriations for river and harbor improvements between 1820 and 1894, see I. Y. Schermerhorn, “The 

Rise and Progress of River and Harbor Improvement in the United States,” Journal of the Franklin Institute 139 

(January-June 1895), 261.

104. Early irrigation by Native Americans is described in R. Douglas Hurt, Indian Agriculture in America: 

Prehistory to the Present (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987), 19-26. See also Hundley, The Great

Thirst, 16-24.

 )RUPRUHRQ6SDQLVKLUULJDWLRQLQWKH6RXWKZHVWVHH0LFKDHO&0H\HU, Water in the Hispanic Southwest: 

A Social and Legal History, 1550-18507XFVRQ8QLYHUVLW\RI$UL]RQD)RULQIRUPDWLRQRQ2OG:RUOG

irrigation, see J. A. Garcia-Diego, “The Chapter on Weirs in the Codex of Juanelo Turriano: A Question 

of Authorship,” Technology and Culture 17 (April l976), 217-34. and J. A. Garcia-Diego, “Old Dams in 

Extramadura” History of Technology 2 (l977), 95-124.

106. Mormon irrigation is discussed in detail in Charles H. Brough, Irrigation in Utah (Baltimore: The Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1898). See also George Thomas, The Development of Institutions under Irrigation

with Special Reference to Early Utah Conditions (New York: MacMillan Company, 1920). See Leonard 

J. Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom: Economics History of the Latter-Day Saints (Lincoln: University of 

Nebraska Press, 1958) for a complete overview of Mormon economic development in the nineteenth century.

107. Leonard J. Arrington and Dean May, “A Different Mode of Life: Irrigation and Society in Nineteenth 

Century Utah,” Agricultural History 49 (January 1975), 3-20. See also Brough, Irrigation in Utah, 75. 

Additional discussion of small-scale Mormon agricultural colonies can be found in Charles Penrose, “Utah 

Colonization Methods,” Proceedings of the Twelfth National Irrigation Congress (Galveston, Texas, 1905), 

361-9.

 )RULQIRUPDWLRQRQQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\LUULJDWLRQFRORQLHVDQGLUULJDWLRQVHWWOHPHQWVLQJHQHUDOWKDWZHUH

EDVHGXSRQSULYDWH¿QDQFLQJVHH3LVDQLTo Reclaim a Divided West, 69-104.

109. See Karen Smith, 7KH0DJQL¿FHQW([SHULPHQW, 4-5.

110. See Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 121-8.

 :7XUUHQWLQH-DFNVRQ5DQG)+HUEHUWDQG6WHSKHQ5:HHLQWURGXFWLRQUHSULQWRIEngineers and

Irrigation: Report of the Board of Commissioners on the Irrigation of the San Joaquin, Tulare and Sacramento

Valleys of the State of California, 1873(QJLQHHU+LVWRULFDO6WXGLHV1XPEHU)RUW%HOYRLU9LUJLQLD2I¿FH

of History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1990), 10-2.

112. Thomas G. Alexander, “The Powell Irrigation Survey and the People of the Mountain West,” Journal of

the West 7 (January 1968), 48-9.

 +LVWRULFDOO\WKH&RORUDGR5LYHUVWDUWHGDWWKHFRQÀXHQFHRIWKH*UHHQDQG*UDQG5LYHUV,QWKH

QDPHRIWKH*UDQGZDVRI¿FLDOO\FKDQJHGWRWKH&RORUDGR5LYHUDERYHWKDWFRQÀXHQFHVRWKDWWKH&RORUDGR

extended to its current headwaters in Rocky Mountain National Park.

114. John Wesley Powell, Report on the Lands of the Arid Region in the United States (Washington, D.C.: 

*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

115. Historiographical analysis of the irrigation movement in this era can be found in Lee, Reclaiming the

American West, 6-15. Important early studies include John T. Ganoe, “The Beginnings of Irrigation in the 

United States,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 25 (1938), 59-78. See also John T. Ganoe, “The Origins of 

a National Reclamation Policy,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 18 (June 1931), 34-52.

116. The work of the Irrigation Survey is documented in the Annual Reports of the U.S. Geological Survey

from 1888-89 through 1892-93)RUH[DPSOHVHH-RKQ:HVOH\3RZHOOTenth Annual Report of the United

States Geological Survey, Part II - Irrigation :DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH6HHDOVR

Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West, 143-68. Davison, Leadership of the Reclamation Movement. See also and 

Everett Sterling, “The Powell Irrigation Survey, 1888-1893,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 27 (1940), 

421-34.

117. Tenth Annual Report of the United States Geological Survey, Part II - Irrigation, 22-9, describes the process of withdrawing lands from “sale, entry, settlement or occupation.”

118. Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West, 150-65.

119. S. T. Harding, Water Rights for Irrigation: Principles and Procedures for Engineers (Palo Alto, 

California: Stanford University Press, 1936), 130-1, describes and analyzes the requirements and legal procedures stipulated by the Act of March 3, 1891.

120. Davison, Leadership of the Reclamation Movement, 127-63.
45

 )RUWKHYLHZVRIDPDMRUSURSRQHQWRIVHQWLPHQWDOLVPVHH:LOOLDP(6P\WKHThe Conquest of Arid

America (New York, privately printed: 1900). The 1905 edition of this book was reprinted by the University of 

Washington Press in 1969.

122. Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West, 169-272.

123. Discussion of the Carey Act can be found in Lee, Reclaiming the American West, 12-3. See also Pisani, 

To Reclaim a Divided West.

124. Davison, Leadership of the Reclamation Movement, 245. Pisani, To Reclaim A Divided West, 285-94.

125. Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West, 275.

 )RUPRUHRQ&KLWWHQGHQ¶VZRUNLQUHFODPDWLRQSODQQLQJVHH*RUGRQ'RGGV Hiram Martin Chittenden: 

His Public Career (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky: 1973), 29-41. His report to Congress was formally distributed as: U.S. Congress, House, “Preliminary Examination of Reservoir Sites in Wyoming and 

Colorado,” prepared by Hiram Martin Chittenden, 55th Congress, 2nd session, 1897, House Document 141, 

VHULHV*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH3LVDQLTo Reclaim a Divide West, 276-8, provides good discussion of 

Chittenden’s project.

127. See Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West, 279-85, for extended discussion of the politics that underlay the 

rejection of Warren’s efforts to utilize “rivers and harbors” expenditures for irrigation work.

128. The collapse of the Bear Valley Irrigation Company in Southern California is noted in Davison, 

Leadership of the Reclamation Movement, 188-9.

 )RUH[WHQGHGGLVFXVVLRQRIWKH:ULJKW$FWDQGWKHGLI¿FXOWLHVWKDWDFFRPSDQLHGLWVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQVHH

Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 252-80.

130. Smith, 7KH0DJQL¿FHQW([SHULPHQW8QGHQLDEO\WKHUHKDGEHHQQRWHZRUWK\VXFFHVVHV)RUH[DPple, by the beginning of the twentieth century, over 110,000 acres were under irrigation in the greater region of 

Phoenix-Tempe-Mesa in Arizona Territory; in slightly more than thirty years the population of greater Phoenix 

had grown from almost nothing to more than 20,000 settlers. Nonetheless, no major storage dam had been built 

WRFDSWXUHWKHÀRRGÀRZRIWKH6DOW5LYHUDQGWKHOLPLWVRILUULJDWLRQEDVHGXSRQ3QDWXUDOÀRZ ́ORQJVLQFHKDG

been reached.

 )RUELRJUDSKLFDOLQIRUPDWLRQRQ1HZHOOVHHKLVSURIHVVLRQDORELWXDU\3)UHGHULFN+D\QHV1HZHOO ́

Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 98 (1933), 1597-1600.

 1HZHOO¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK*LIIRUG3LQFKRWWKH¿UVW'LUHFWRURIWKH86)RUHVW6HUYLFHDQGDOHDGHULQ

the conservation movement, is documented in M. Nelson McGeary, Gifford Pinchot: Forester - Politician

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

 )UHGHULFN+D\QHV1HZHOO3DSHUVGLDU\HQWU\IRU-DQXDU\0DQXVFULSW'LYLVLRQ/LEUDU\RI

Congress, Washington, D.C.

134. Davison, Leadership of the Reclamation Movement, 150-1.

 )UHGHULFN+D\QHV1HZHOOIrrigation in the United States (New York, 1902), 1, 406. The original edition 

of this book appeared before passage of the 1902 Reclamation Act. A second edition was published in 1906 

that included a small amount of new material related to activities of the Reclamation Service.

136. Newlands has become prominently associated with federal reclamation thanks to his co-sponsorship of 

the National Reclamation Act. However, his contributions to the irrigation movement as a whole appear limLWHG)RUPRUHRQKLVFDUHHUDVDODZ\HUDQGSROLWLFLDQVHH:LOOLDP'5RZOH\Reclaiming the Arid West: The

Career of Francis G. Newlands (Bloomington: University Press of Indiana, 1996).

 7KHFRPSOHWHWH[WRI5RRVHYHOW¶V¿UVWDQQXDOPHVVDJHWR&RQJUHVVVHQWRQ'HFHPEHUFDQEH

found in Theodore Roosevelt, State Papers as Governor and President, 1899, in The Works of Theodore

Roosevelt, National Edition 15 (New York: C. Scribner and Sons, 1926), 81-135.

138. The full text and all amendments to the National Reclamation Act prior to 1919 appear in: Institute for 

Government Research, The U.S. Reclamation Service: Its History, Activities and Organization (New York: D. 

Appleton and Company, 1919), 104-124. The placement of the federal reclamation program in the Department 

of the Interior represented a victory for Newell and the Interior Department over the bureaucratic forces of 

Elwood Mead and others involved in irrigation investigations for the Department of Agriculture. See Lee, 

Reclaiming the American West, 22-3. Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West, 306-10

139. Between 1902 and 1907 the Reclamation Service operated as a part of the U.S. Geological Survey. In 

1907 it became an independent bureau within the Interior Department.

 &LWHGLQ/HRQ)LQNHGLWRU0DMRU3UREOHPVLQWKH*LOGHG$JHDQGWKH3URJUHVVLYH(UD (Lexington, 

Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1993), 412.

141. See Hays&RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\,QWKHFLWLHVJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVSDVVHGDQWL

pollution laws, scientists established laboratories for testing water purity, engineers built elaborated sanitation 

systems, and reformers promoted programs of “civic responsibility.” See Martin V. Melosi, editor, Pollution

and Reform in American Cities, 1870-1930 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980).
46

142. Ekirch, Man and Nature in America, 94. Guy-Harold Smith, editor, Conservation of Natural Resources

(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971; 4th edition), 7.

143. Petulla, American Environmental History, 267, 271-2.

144. Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\, 5.

145. Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\, 5.

146. Reuss and Hendricks, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,” 11-2. Ekirch, , Man and Nature in America, 94.

 -RKQ5)HUUHOO3)URP6LQJOHWR0XOWL3XUSRVH3ODQQLQJ ́

148. Gifford Pinchot, The Fight for Conservation (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967; originally, 

1910), 54.

149. Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\, 100-2.

150. The Lakes-to-the-Gulf-Waterway.

 )HUUHOO3)URP6LQJOHWR0XOWL3XUSRVH3ODQQLQJ ́

 )RUDQLQWHUHVWLQJSDUDOOHODUJXPHQWDERXWWKH&RUSVDQGLWVYLHZVRQVWUHDPÀRZVHH*RUGRQ%'RGGV

37KH6WUHDP)ORZ&RQWURYHUV\$&RQVHUYDWLRQ7XUQLQJ3RLQW ́Journal of American History 56 (June 1969), 

59-69.

 )HUUHO3)URP6LQJOHWR0XOWL3XUSRVH3ODQQLQJ ́

154. Smith, The Politics of Conservation, 89, 101, 106. Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\, 102-

)HUUHOO3)URP6LQJOHWR0XOWL3XUSRVH3ODQQLQJ ́'RQDOG&6ZDLQFederal Conservat

ion Policy, 1921-1933 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 96-8.

155. Quoted in Ekirch, , Man and Nature in America, 94.

156. Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\, 105-8. Ekirch, , Man and Nature in America, 94-5. 

)HUUHOO3)URP6LQJOHWR0XOWL3XUSRVH3ODQQLQJ ́0RUHHOOOur Nation’s Water Resources—Policies

and Politics, 37.

  ́5HSRUWIURPWKH,QODQG:DWHUZD\V&RPPLVVLRQ)HEUXDU\ ́LQ)UDQN(6PLWKHGLWRU

Conservation in the United States: A Documentary History >)LYHYROXPHV@1HZ<RUN&KHOVHD+RXVH

91.

 6HH)HUUHOO3)URP6LQJOHWR0XOWL3XUSRVH3ODQQLQJ ́3DXO.:DONHU3'HYHORSLQJ

Hydroelectric Power: The Role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1900-1978,” (Washington, D.C.: 

'HSDUWPHQWRIWKH$UP\2I¿FHRIWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUVGUDIW)HEUXDU\

159. Holmes, History of Federal Water Resources Programs, 6.

160. ”Supplementary Report of Commissioner General Alexander Mackenzie,” in Smith, editor, Conservation

in the United States, 93-94. See also Reuss and Walker, Financing Water Resources Development)HUUHOO

3)URP6LQJOHWR0XOWL3XUSRVH3ODQQLQJ ́

161. Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\, 109-14. Newlands was able to get his legislation for a 

new Inland Waterways Commission passed in 1917. However, President Wilson was too deeply involved in 

the war effort to appoint commissioners, and conservationists were too severely split to force the appointments. 

See Swain, Federal Conservation Policy, 1921-1933, 97-8.

162. Holmes, History of Federal Water Resources Programs)HUUHOO3)URP6LQJOHWR0XOWL3XUSRVH

Planning,” 123.

163. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 170-4. James C. Williams, Energy and the Making of Modern California

$NURQ8QLYHUVLW\RI$NURQ3UHVV6WHSKHQ)R[ The American Conservation Movement: 

John Muir and His Legacy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), 139-40. Petulla, American

Environmental History, 282.

164. Michael P. Cohen, The Pathless Way: John Muir and American Wilderness (Madison: University of 

Wisconsin Press, 1984), 280-1. Douglas H. Strong, The Conservationists (Menlo Park, California: AddisonWesley Publishing Company, 1971), 91-104. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 178-80. Peter Wild, Pioneer

Conservationists of Western America (Missoula, Montana: Mountain Press Publishing Company, 1979), 1-17.

165. Quoted in Cohen, The Pathless Way, 330.

166. Strong, The Conservationists, 110, 114-5. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 176-84. Williams, Energy and the

Making of Modern California, 251-2. Richardson, The Politics of Conservation, 44-5. See also Ben Robert 

Martin, “The Hetch Hetchy Controversy: The Value of Nature in a technological Society,” (PhD dissertation, Brandeis University, 1982), 232-305. Smith, The Politics of Conservation, 134-7. Eric B. Kollgaard and 

Wallace L. Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering in the United States (New York: Pergamon 

Press, 1988), 49, 84, 86.

167. Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own,” 413. See also Williams, Energy and

the Making of Modern California, 251-2. Strong, The Conservationists)R[The American

Conservation Movement: John Muir and His Legacy, 111, 115, 130, 140-6.
47

 )R[The American Conservation Movement, 141. Williams, Energy and the Making of Modern

California, 252-3. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 187-90. Petulla, American Environmental History, 282-3. 

Strong, The Conservationists, 114-5..

169. Hunter, Waterpower in the Century of the Steam Engine, 513.

170. Hunter, Waterpower in the Century of the Steam Engine, 137-9, 388, 512.

171. Previous advances in equipment and materials for dam building made possible the construction of the high 

dams necessary for power production. See Reuss and Walker, Financing Water Resources Development, 36.

172. Reuss and Walker, Financing Water Resources Development, 138. See also Martin V. Melosi, Coping

with Abundance, 64, 81.

173. Reuss and Hendricks, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,” 11-2. Reuss and Walker, Financing Water

Resources Development, 36. Walker, “Developing Hydroelectric Power: The Role of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, 1900-1978”, 8-9.

174. Harold T. Pinkett, Gifford Pinchot: Private and Public Forester (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 

1970), 61-62. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves, 142-4. Melosi, Coping with

Abundance, 81-2. McGeary, Gifford Pinchot: Forester-Politician, 73, 75, 77-8.

175. Reuss and Hendricks, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,” 12. Reuss and Walker, Financing Water

Resources Development, 36-37. Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\, 114-9. Holmes, A History of

Federal Water Resources Programs, 1800-1960, 7. Pinkett, Gifford Pinchot: Private and Public Forester, 63. 

Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 81-2. Walker, “Developing Hydroelectric Power: The Role of the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, 1900-1978,” 15, 21-2.

176. The Corps did install a power station substructure at Lock and Dam #1 on the upper Mississippi, however. 

See Reuss and Hendricks, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,” 12. Reuss and Walker, Financing Water Resources

Development, 36-7.

177. Smith, The Politics of Conservation, 126, 141. Petulla, American Environmental History, 281. Arthur S. 

Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 128.

49

CHAPTER 2

THEORIES AND COMPETING VISIONS

FOR CONCRETE DAMS

In this chapter, we describe the history of ideas about design and analysis of concrete dams. These include stone masonry dams as well. We reserve 

for a later chapter (chapter 6) the presentation of embankment dams where they 

can be put in the context of the largest federal embankment dams ever built. The 

design of embankment dams is part of the introduction of the twentieth century 

¿HOGRIVRLOPHFKDQLFV*HRWHFKQLFDO(QJLQHHULQJ

This chapter, therefore, presents engineering principles for concrete (and 

stone masonry) dam design and describes two contrasting traditions of dam design. Dams in the massive tradition rely on their weight for safety while those 

LQWKHVWUXFWXUDOWUDGLWLRQUHO\PRUHRQWKHLUIRUP)URPWKHVHWZRWKHUHHYROYHG

analytic techniques that attempted to integrate the two traditions, and that the 

%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQGH¿QHGDVWKHWULDOORDGPHWKRG7KLVFKDSWHUSURYLGHV

the engineering context for considering economic implications of these designs 

and gives insight into how federal agencies chose the forms for these dams. The 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, a leader in embankment dams, did not enter the 

early debate about these two traditions because it began to design high dams 

in concrete in the 1930s. Its contributions in concrete dam design will be considered in later chapters (chapters 5 and 8) in the context of major dams in the 

Columbia and Ohio basins.

PRE-TWENTIETH CENTURY THEORIES: THE MASSIVE TRADITION

Massive or Structural

 )RUWKRXVDQGVRI\HDUVVRFLHWLHVKDYHVWRUHGZDWHUDOWHUHGULYHUÀRZ

and transformed environments to increase food production or achieve other social and economic goals. The oldest known dams, small earthen structures built 

6,000 years ago in present-day Jordan, were designed to capture rainfall for agricultural and domestic use before the water evaporated or sank into the desert 

sands.1

Compared with intricate technologies such as an automobile engine or a 

“spinning jenny” in a textile mill, dams represent relatively simple structures designed to control water, which is relatively the same around the world. Thus, the 

art of dam-building exhibits patterns that often transcend particular features of 

individual cultures or environments. This is evident in two distinct dam design 
50

traditions–the massive and the structural–that extend back to ancient times and 

found expression in the United States during the nineteenth century. They represent two relatively distinct approaches to the problem of storing water.

In its most elementary form, a dam in the massive tradition consists of 

a mass of material that, by its weight alone, holds back a volume of water. Such 

structures are known as gravity dams, an appropriate name because it is the force 

of gravity pulling vertically down on the dam that provides resistance against 

pressure exerted horizontally by water in the reservoir.2

 Designs adhering to the 

massive tradition can be based upon sophisticated engineering analysis, but the 

basic principle underlying the tradition is simple: accumulate as much material as economically or physically possible, thus ensuring that the dam will not tip 

over, slide, or rupture; in turn, the massive dimensions will increase the likelihood that the dam can achieve long-term stability in holding back a reservoir.

In many locales, earth and rock are available in large quantities, and often they do not require any complicated machinery for excavation or transportation. Although massive embankments comprised of earth and loose rock (ofWHQFDOOHGURFN¿OODUHVXVFHSWLEOHWRHURVLRQRUZDVKRXWVGDPVPDGHRIWKHVH

materials can function quite successfully in impounding water; in fact, many 

GDPVEXLOWLQWKHDQFLHQWZRUOGZHUHHPEDQNPHQWGDPVRIHDUWKDQGRUURFN3

 

However, such dams require some kind of relatively impervious barrier—for example, a layer of dense earthen clay, a surface of timber planks, or a concrete 

slab—either on top of the upstream face or within the dam’s interior. Otherwise, 

seepage and percolation through the structure can undermine the dam and cause 

FROODSVH7RFRPEDWVHHSDJHHDUO\GDPEXLOGHUV¿OOHGWKHVSDFHEHWZHHQORRVH

rock or masonry blocks with mortar to create a waterproof barrier well suited for 

a dam’s upstream face. Massive designs of this latter type are usually termed 

masonry gravity dams, a name that refers to solid structures comprised of stone 

blocks, concrete, or some mixture of these two.

Structural dams have existed for centuries with Roman engineers being 

FUHGLWHGIRUWKH¿UVWDUFKGDPDQGVHYHUDOEXWWUHVVGDPV$IWHUWKHFROODSVHRI

the Roman Empire, the structural tradition (along with large-scale dam building 

in general) waned in western civilization; but during the thirteenth and fourteenth 

centuries, Ilkhanid Mongols in Persia constructed arch dams including the 

190-foot-high Kurit Dam that—although unrecognized until recent times—stood 

as the world’s tallest dam for 500 years.4

Gravity Dam Design Theory

 'DPEXLOGLQJÀRXULVKHGLQODWHVL[WHHQWKFHQWXU\6SDLQZKLFKZDVWKHQ

the richest country in Europe. These early dams included the Almans, a curved 
51

gravity dam (50 feet high, in operation by 1586), the Alicante gravity dam 

(140 feet high, 1594), the Elche arch dam (76 feet high, ca. 1650), and the 

Rellue arch dam (105 feet high, ca. 1650).5

 During this period, Spanish engiQHHUVFRGL¿HGWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQSULQFLSOHVDQGE\'RQ3HGUR%HUQDUGR

Villa de Berry (a Basque nobleman) had outlined geometrical rules that pointed 

toward a less intuitive approach to proportioning dams.6

Prior to the late eighteenth century, dam builders had not utilized mathematics to help calculate dimensions. Gradually, this began to change, as techniques of physical logic, promulgated by Isaac Newton and Robert Hooke, found 

their way into engineering practice.7

 By the early nineteenth century, several enJLQHHUVLQ)UDQFHDQG(QJODQGKDGSXEOLVKHGWUHDWLVHVRQJUDYLW\GDPWKHRU\8

 

Although these works did not have any immediate or dramatic effect, they 

established useful precedents for adapting mathematical theory to the practice of 

dam design.

)LJXUH6SDQLVKGDPVRIWKHVL[WHHQWKFHQWXU\EHJDQWKHPRGHUQHUD7KHPRVWLPSRUWDQW

DUHVKRZQLQWKHVHFURVVVHFWLRQVRIWKH¿IW\IRRWKLJK$OPDQVFXUYHGJUDYLW\GDPRIOHIW

and the one hundred forty-foot high Alicante Dam of 1594 (right). Source: Edward Wegmann, Jr., 

7KH'HVLJQDQG&RQVWUXFWLRQRI0DVRQU\'DPV*LYLQJWKH0HWKRG(PSOR\HGLQ'HWHUPLQLQJWKH3UR¿OH

of the Quaker Bridge Dam, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1889), 2nd edition revised, plate 21 (left) 

and plate 22 (right).
52

(XURSHDQ2ULJLQVRIWKH33UR¿OHRI(TXDO5HVLVWDQFH ́

Masonry gravity dams can be built without any reliance upon mathematics, but in the nineteenth century European engineers realized that this type of 

VWUXFWXUHZDVDPHQDEOHWRDTXDQWL¿DEOHDSSURDFKWRGHVLJQ,QWKHHDUO\V

DSDSHUSXEOLVKHGE\WKH)UHQFKHQJLQHHU-$XJXVWLQ7RUWHQHGH6D]LOO\VHWWKH

course for all subsequent work in this area of gravity dam design.9

 Knowing the 

hydrostatic force exerted by a given height of water (which weighs about 

62.5 pounds per cubic foot) and the approximate weight of masonry used in dam 

construction (usually about 140-150 pounds per cubic foot), de Sazilly conceived 

ZKDWKHWHUPHGWKH3SUR¿OHRIHTXDOUHVLVWDQFH ́8VLQJEDVLFIRUPXODVRIVWDWLFV

he developed a cross-section in which compressive stresses at the upstream face 

when the reservoir is empty equal compressive stresses at the downstream face 

ZKHQWKHUHVHUYRLULV¿OOHG,QWDNLQJWKHVHWZRH[WUHPHFRQGLWLRQVKH

)LJXUH7KHFRXUVHIRUGHVLJQLQJPDVRQU\JUDYLW\GDPVZDVVHWLQE\)UHQFKHQJLQHHU-$XJXVWLQH'H6D]LOO\ZKRFRQFHLYHGWKH3SUR¿OHRIHTXDOUHVLVWDQFH ́,Q)(PLOH

'H/RFUHDSSOLHGWKLVWKHRU\WRWKHIRRWKLJK)XUHQV'DPDFURVVWKH/RLUH5LYHUSource:

Wegmann, Design and Construction of Masonry Dams, 2nd edition, Plate 1.
53

hypothesized a design that, at least in cross-section, would minimize the material 

necessary to erect a stable masonry gravity dam.

 ,QWKH)UHQFKHQJLQHHU)(PLOH'HORFUHXWLOL]HGGH6D]LOO\¶VWKHRU\WRGHYHORSD3SUR¿OHRIHTXDOUHVLVWDQFH ́IRUWKHIRRWKLJK)XUHQV'DP

across the Loire River. In formulating his design, Delocre empirically analyzed 

)LJXUH,Q(PLOH'H/RFUHDSSOLHGGH6D]LOO\¶V3SUR¿OHRIHTXDOUHVLVWDQFH ́GHVLJQ

PHWKRGWRWKH)XUHQ¶V'DPDFURVVWKH/RLUH5LYHUSource: Wegmann, Design and Construction of

Masonry Dams, 2nd edition, plate 36.
54

several long-standing dams (including Almansa and Alicante in Spain) and calculated that a compressive stress of 86 pounds per square inch (psi) could be 

safely withstood by a masonry dam; in turn, this provided him with a compressive stress that he believed he could safely use for his own design.10 Completed 

LQWKHFXUYHGJUDYLW\)XUHQV'DPFRQWDLQHGRYHUFXELF\DUGVRI

PDVRQU\:LWKLQDIHZ\HDUVWH[WERRNVRQJUDYLW\GHVLJQKHUDOGHGLWDVWKH¿UVW

PDVRQU\GDP3EXLOWLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKFRUUHFWVFLHQWL¿FSULQFLSOHV ́11

The Middle Third

 ,QWKHHDUO\VWKH6FRW:-05DQNLQHFRQ¿UPHGWKHYDOLGLW\RI

de Sazilly’s and Delocre’s work; he further observed that a stable gravity dam 

PXVWKDYHVXI¿FLHQWFURVVVHFWLRQVRWKDWWKHFRPELQHGYHFWRUIRUFHRU3UHVXOtant force”) of the horizontal hydrostatic pressure and the vertical weight of masonry will pass through the center (or middle) third of the structure at any horizontal elevation.12 Should the resultant fall outside the center third, a gravity 

dam will become susceptible to dangerous cracking because tension (rather than 

compression) will develop along the downstream edge of the structure; the farther outside the center third the resultant passes, the greater the tensile stress and 

the greater the likelihood that cracking will occur. And if the resultant should 

fall completely beyond the downstream edge, then the structure will “overturn.” 

Although the “middle third” precept was inherently adhered to by any design deYHORSHGLQDFFRUGZLWKGH6D]LOO\'HORFUHSUR¿OHV5DQNLQH¶VZRUNHVWDEOLVKHGLW

as an overt principle of masonry gravity design.13

 ,QWKHODWHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\WKH3SUR¿OHRIHTXDOUHVLVWDQFH ́VHUYHGDV

a design model for several major European dams including the Gileppe Dam in 

Belgium (1875), and the Vyrnwy Dam in Great Britain (1890).14 It also formed 

WKHEDVLVIRUWKH¿UVWHGLWLRQRIThe Design and Construction of Dams by 

the American engineer Edward Wegmann. Using the design method presented in 

this book, Wegmann developed a cross-section for New York City’s New Croton 

Dam (originally it was to be the Quaker Bridge Dam) that achieved internationDOUHQRZQDVWKH3&URWRQ3UR¿OH ́DQGVHUYHGDVDEDVLFVWDQGDUGIRUJUDYLW\GDP

design. While nothing prevented engineers from developing their own particuODUSUR¿OHIRUDPDVRQU\JUDYLW\GHVLJQDQGVHHPLQJO\SURIRXQGYDULDWLRQGLG

proliferate), these innovations represented only minimal variations on the basic 

3SUR¿OHRIHTXDOUHVLVWDQFH ́

A Limit to Gravity Design Innovation

In 1897, E. Sherman Gould authored a monograph entitled High

Masonry Dams in which he praised: “the masterly treatise of Mr. Edward 

Wegmann,” and observed that “the mathematical researches have established a 
55

vertical section, the base basis of which is a right-angled triangle of base equal to 

WZRWKLUGVRUWKUHHTXDUWHUVRILWVKHLJKW7KHPRVWUH¿QHGFDOFXODWLRQVZLOO

inevitably bring us back to the neighborhood of this form.” He proposed that we 

VKRXOG3VWDUWRXUGHVLJQVE\¿UVWOD\LQJGRZQVXFKDWULDQJOHVXUPRXQWLQJLWE\D

practical top width instead of its own sharp apex, and, if its height exceeds

WRIHHWJLYLQJDÀDUHWRWKHORZHUSDUWRIWKHSDUWRILWVLQVLGHIDFHWRH[-

pand the footing on that side.”15

)LJXUH(GZDUG:HJPDQQ¶V¿UVWHGLWLRQRI'HVLJQDQG&RQVWUXFWLRQRI0DVRQU\'DPV

DSSHDUHGLQZLWKSDJHVSODWHV¿JXUHVDQGSDJHVRIDGYHUWLVLQJIRUFHment, drills, hoses, steam pumps, etc. Wegmann’s expanded eighth edition in 1927 contained 

SDJHVGUDZLQJSODWHV¿JXUHVDQGQRDGYHUWLVLQJSource: Wegmann, Design and

Construction of Masonry Dams, 2nd edition, frontispiece.
56

More than 15 years after Gould’s observations, the character of gravity dam design was reiterated by George Holmes Moore in a 1913 Engineering

NewsDUWLFOHWKDWGHVFULEHVSUDFWLFDOO\DOOPDVRQU\JUDYLW\GDPSUR¿OHVDVIHDWXUing “the two-three triangle” in which the ratio of height-to-thickness is at least 

3:2. As Moore further observed:

,QSRVVLEO\QRRWKHUEUDQFKRIGDPGHVLJQLVWKHDPSOL¿FDWLRQ

RIWKHXQHVVHQWLDOVRPDUNHGDVKHUHIRUWKHμWKHRUHWLFSUR¿OH¶

and the ‘hyperbolic-curve’ nonsense [of some gravity design 

methods] heaped upon what might be termed the standard gravity section is astounding indeed. Pages, chapters, even volumes 

DUHGHYRWHGWRDGLVFXVVLRQRIJUDYLW\SUR¿OHVZKLFKGHSDUWEXW

negligibly from a simple basic section.16

By the early part of the twentieth century, gravity dam technology had 

reached a point where relatively empirical methods of design (based upon what 

0RRUHWHUPHGD3WZRWKUHHWULDQJOH ́ZHUHVXI¿FLHQWWRPHHWDQ\UHDOHQJLQHHUing needs.

 7KHSUR¿OHRIHTXDOUHVLVWDQFHFDPHIURPDFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWZR

PDMRUFRQGLWLRQVRIGDPORDGLQJUHVHUYRLUHPSW\RUUHVHUYRLU¿OOHG)RU

the former case, the dead load of the dam, assumed to be a pure triangle in 

cross section, caused a maximum vertical compressive stress f

1

h

 at the heel 

of the dam (upstream edge) equal to the weight of concrete or stone above 

that point or f

1

h = Hwc (Height H times the density of concrete Wc)RUWKH

case of the full reservoir, to the vertical stress one must add the effect of the 

KRUL]RQWDOIRUFH)GXHWRZDWHUSUHVVXUH7KLVIRUFHFDXVHVWKHGDPWREHQG

and thus creates maximum vertical compressive stresses at the downstream 

toe f Hw

H

B

t

2 w

2

 2 with equal vertical tensile stress at the heel. The criterion 

for least resistance is that the maximum vertical compressive stress 

for case one be the same as for case two, hence Hw Hw

H

B c w 

2

2 or 

H

B

w

w

c

w

2

2 .

)RUH[DPSOHZKHUHWKHGHQVLW\RIFRQFUHWHwc is taken 

to be 140 pounds per cubic foot and the density of water ww to be 62.5 

pounds per cubic foot, then H

B

2

2

140

625 2 25 . so that H

B 2 25 15 . . RUDERXW

This means for a dam 60 feet high, the base width would be 40 feet.

:KHQWKHVWUHVVHVIRUFDVHWZRDUHSORWWHGRYHUWKHGDPEDVHZH¿QG

that they form a triangle with the maximum value at the downstream toe and 

the minimum (equals zero) at the heel. The centroid of that pressure lies at 

%IURPWKHGRZQVWUHDPWRH/LNHZLVHIRUWKHUHVHUYRLUHPSW\LQFDVHRQH

WKHFHQWURLGOLHVDW%IURPWKHKHHO7KXVWKHFHQWURLGVRIDOOORDGLQJFDVHV
57

between one and two lie between those two positions or within the middle 

third of the dam width B. When the stresses for case two are plotted over the 

GDPEDVHZH¿QGWKDWWKH\IRUPDWULDQJOHZLWKWKHPD[LPXPYDOXHDWWKHWRH

and the minimum (equals zero) at the heel. The centroid of that pressure lies at 

%IURPWKHWRH

Of course, interest in other issues relating to gravity design did not rePDLQVWDJQDQWDQGWKLVLVEHVWUHÀHFWHGLQFRQFHUQRYHUWKHLQÀXHQFHRI3XSOLIW ́

on the safety of gravity structures. Uplift is a phenomena resulting from waWHUVHHSLQJXQGHUWKURXJKWKHIRXQGDWLRQRULQWRWKHLQWHULRURIWKHGDPSURSer) that—because of pressure exerted by water in the reservoir—pushes upward 

and increases the likelihood that the structure will slide horizontally downstream. 

Uplift attracted the attention of engineers in the early twentieth century and enFRXUDJHGERWKWKHXVHRIWKLFNHUSUR¿OHVDVZHOODVWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIJURXWLQJ

and drainage techniques that would mitigate its occurrence and possible effect.

The 1911 failure of a gravity dam in Austin, Pennsylvania, led the 

$PHULFDQHQJLQHHULQJSURIHVVLRQWRORRNPRUHFORVHO\DWWKHLQÀXHQFHRIXSOLIW

on dam safety, especially as it related to sliding. In addition to the force of the 

water and weight of the dam, the water pressure underneath the dam produces 

uplift while the cohesion between dam and rock resists sliding. In addition, the 

friction between dam and foundation (usually rock) will resist sliding in proportion to the vertical force W less the uplift. Neglecting cohesion and assuming 

IXOOXSOLIWRQDGDPZKHUH%+ ZH¿QGWKHVDIHW\IDFWRUDJDLQVWVOLGLQJWR

be less than one. This result helps explain the Austin Dam failure, where 

%+ DQGLQYHVWLJDWLRQVDIWHUIDLOXUHOHGWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQRIVXEVWDQWLDOXSOLIW3DUWRIWKHVROXWLRQZDVWRLQFUHDVH%+DQGDOVRWRGUDLQWKHEDVHWRUHOLHYH

the pressure and hence reduce the uplift force to 0.5 or less.17

 7KHPRVWVLJQL¿FDQWGUDZEDFNWRJUDYLW\GHVLJQVLQYROYHGWKHLUKLJK

FRVW:KLOHWKH3SUR¿OHRIHTXDOUHVLVWDQFH ́RIIHUHGDPDWKHPDWLFDOO\UDWLRQDO

basis of design, this did not mean that gravity dams would necessarily be cheap 

WREXLOG)RUPDMRUPXQLFLSDOLWLHVWKHHFRQRPLFEHQH¿WVWKDWDFFRPSDQLHGDQ

increased water supply might easily justify the huge expenditures required to 

build large masonry gravity designs. But once cities such as Boston (with the 

Wachusetts Dam completed in 1904) and New York (with the New Croton Dam 

completed in 1907) erected masonry gravity structures as part of major civic 

improvement projects, the technology came to represent—at least in many people’s eyes—the most conservative, the most appropriate, and, if at all economically feasible, the most desirable type of dam.
58

PRE-TWENTIETH CENTURY THEORIES - THE STRUCTURAL 

TRADITION

Gravity Dams versus Structural Dams

A dam in the structural tradition in contrast to gravity designs does not 

rely exclusively upon bulk; rather, it depends upon its shape––and not simply its 

PDVV±±WRUHVLVWK\GURVWDWLFSUHVVXUH)RUH[DPSOHDQDUFKGDPLQDQDUURZFDQ-

\RQZLWKKDUGURFNIRXQGDWLRQVDOORZVDVLJQL¿FDQWDPRXQWRIWKHK\GURVWDWLF

pressure to be carried by arch action horizontally into the canyon walls. Because 

RIWKLVDUFKDFWLRQWKHWKLFNQHVVDQGKHQFHEXONRIWKHGDP¶VSUR¿OHFDQEH

much less than a gravity dam of the same height. In essence, the amount of material in (or the mass of) a structural dam is a less important attribute than it is for 

a massive dam; in a dam adhering to the structural tradition, it is more important 

to develop a design that takes advantage of shape and not just weight.

In addition to thin arch dams, the structural tradition includes designs 

that feature buttresses built perpendicularly to the downstream side of a relatively thin masonry or concrete wall.18%XWWUHVVVWUXFWXUHVZKLFKXWLOL]HDÀDWVXUIDFH

IRUWKHXSVWUHDPIDFHDUHFDOOHGÀDWVODEGDPV7KRVHIHDWXULQJDVHULHVRIDUFKHVDUHNQRZQDVPXOWLSOHDUFKGDPV,QFRQWUDVWWRPDVVLYHJUDYLW\GHVLJQVÀDW

slab and multiple-arch buttress dams are not solid monoliths that present a continuous, solid cross-section that extends the length of the structure. Often called 

‘hollow dams’ because of the empty space that lies between adjacent buttresses 

(which can stretch out to distances of more than 60 feet), buttress dams require 

much less material than gravity dams of comparable height. Moreover, unlike 

thin arch designs, buttress dams do not require relatively narrow canyons capable 

of absorbing the horizontal thrust of a single, large arch.

In the abstract, the key distinction between massive and structural dams 

is easy to formulate. However, the line separating the two traditions can become 

blurred, especially when a structure contains enough material to function as a 

gravity dam, but is built along a curved axis like an arch dam. Known as curved 

JUDYLW\GDPVWKHFURVVVHFWLRQRIVXFKGDPVLVVXI¿FLHQWIRUWKHPWRIXQFWLRQDV

gravity structures; it is appropriate that a curved gravity dam be considered a part 

of the massive tradition because—if it were somehow straightened out and the 

curve eliminated—the cross-section would still be ample to impound water without tipping over.

 ,QFRQWUDVWWKHSUR¿OHRIDWKLQDUFKGDPLVLQVXI¿FLHQWWRUHVLVWDK\-

drostatic load simply by the force of gravity; in other words, if an arch dam were 

VRPHKRZVWUDLJKWHQHGWKHQWKHFURVVVHFWLRQZRXOGSURYHLQVXI¿FLHQWWRUHVLVW

the pressure exerted by a full reservoir. In acknowledging that thin arch dams 
59

must be curved in order to be safe, we also need to recognize that all arch dams 

also act to some degree as gravity designs. Phrased another way, those parts of 

arch dams closest to the foundations actually resist the water pressure by gravity action. How to analyze the relationship between “gravity” and “arch” action 

in curved dams became an important component of early twentieth-century concrete dam design history.

In their basic form, massive gravity dams are relatively easy to conceptualize, but they require large amounts of construction material and are often expensive to build. In contrast, thin arch and buttress dams require relatively small 

amounts of material but they can also entail more complicated design and construction techniques. Both traditions can foster safe designs and it is not a quesWLRQRIWKHPDVVLYHEHLQJFRUUHFWDQGWKHVWUXFWXUDOLQFRUUHFW)RUFHQWXULHVWKH\

have coexisted within the evolving art of dam-building as different engineers 

within different cultures (or within different parts of a larger culture) championed 

particular types of designs.

Arch Dam Theory: European Origins and the Cylinder Formula

During the late nineteenth century, gravity dam technology attracted the 

most professional and public attention, but thin arch dams also began to be built 

utilizing new, mathematically-based methods of design. The seventeenth cenWXU\6SDQLVKGDPDW(OFKHDQGWKH3RQWH$OWR'DPLQ,WDO\IHDWXUHGSUR¿OHVWRR

thin to stand as gravity structures, but it took several score more years before any 

other prominent arch dams were built.19 In the early 1830s, Lieutenant Colonel 

John By of the British Army supervised construction of an arch dam as part of 

the Kingston Canal connecting Lake Ontario with the Ottawa River. The slenGHUSUR¿OHRIWKH-RQHV)DOOV'DPIHHWKLJKPD[LPXPWKLFNQHVVIHHWUHduced the amount of masonry necessary to build the arch, and apparently this 

prompted By to adopt the design in order to speed up construction.20

 ,QWKHFDVHRI)UDQFRLV=RODDQGWKH=ROD'DPEXLOWLQ)UDQFHVWDUWLQJLQ

the late 1840s, the role of mathematical theory in developing the design is well 

known.21,QWKHV=RODEHJDQGHYHORSLQJDSODQWRLQFUHDVHWKHZDWHUVXSply of Aix-en-Provence. As part of this, he devised an arch dam design with basic dimensions that were calculated using a simple equation known as the “cylinder formula.”

 )RUDEVROXWHDFFXUDF\WKHF\OLQGHUIRUPXODPXVWDVVXPHWKDWWKHDUFK

LVLQ¿QLWHO\WKLQDQGVXSSRUWHGRQFRPSOHWHO\ULJLGIRXQGDWLRQV'HVSLWHEHLQJ

based upon such idealized assumptions, the formula can still provide a useful 

means of estimating arch stresses that, while never absolutely precise, can 

UHSUHVHQWUHDVRQDEOHDSSUR[LPDWLRQV,QGHVLJQLQJKLVGDP=RODFRQFHLYHG
60

the structure as a stack of horizontal arches. At the dam’s crest—where water pressure is low—the stack is relatively thin. As the water pressure increases, 

WKHWKLFNQHVVRI=ROD¶VGHVLJQLQFUHDVHVSURSRUWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWO\WKHUDWHDW

ZKLFKWKHDUFKEHFRPHVWKLFNHULVEDVHGXSRQWKHF\OLQGHUIRUPXOD7KH=ROD

Dam was completed in 1854 (after its designer’s death) and attracted attention 

among engineers through the next decade. However, de Sazilly’s and Delocre’s 

gravity designs apparently eclipsed any strong interest in arch dams among 

European engineers, and, aside from one small structure in Australia, no other 

major arch dams are known to have been built until the 1880s.22

American Arch Dams

 ,QWKH$PHULFDQHQJLQHHU)UDQN(%URZQFRPSOHWHGDPDVRQU\

DUFKGDPLQ6RXWKHUQ&DOLIRUQLDZLWKDSUR¿OHVRVOHQGHUWKDWWKHUHVXOWDQWIRUFH

did not simply pass outside the “middle third,” but fell well beyond the downstream edge of the foundation.23 Designed using the cylinder formula, Brown’s 

64-foot-high Bear Valley Dam featured a maximum thickness of only 20 feet and 

dramatically demonstrated that this mathematical theory could help create designs that—in comparison with gravity designs—dramatically reduced the material necessary to build a solid masonry dam. In 1886, Brown began building 

another arch structure (50 feet tall, base width 10 feet) on the Sweetwater River 

)LJXUH7KH'H/RFUHSUR¿OHOHIWLVVKRZQFXWRIIDWPHWHUVWRDSSUR[LPDWHWKH=ROD

Dam (right). The cylinder formula was the basis of design for the 36.5 meter high arch dam. 

,WZDVFRPSOHWHGLQDIWHUWKHGHDWKRILWVGHVLJQHUHQJLQHHU)UDQFRLV=RODDQGZDV

QDPHGWKH=ROD'DPSource: Wegmann, Design and Construction of Masonry Dams, 2nd edition, 

plates 2 (left) and 35 (right).
61

near San Diego. He erected only a portion of the dam before being replaced by 

James D. Schuyler as the engineer in charge of construction. Schuyler revised 

%URZQ¶VGHVLJQVRWKDWLWIHDWXUHGDWKLFNHUSUR¿OHEXWWKHIRRWKLJKIRRW

thick Sweetwater Dam, completed in 1888, still comprised a notable arch dam 

design that further demonstrated the value of utilizing the cylinder formula in 

dam design.24

Constant Angle Designs

 %URZQ¶VDQG6FKX\OHU¶VDFFRPSOLVKPHQWVUHÀHFWHGDJURZLQJLQWHUHVWLQ

the cylinder formula among dam engineers who were attracted to the structural 

WUDGLWLRQ:LWKLQDIHZ\HDUVWKLVOHGWRDVLJQL¿FDQWGHVLJQYDULDWLRQWKDWUHSUHVHQWHGD¿QDOLPSRUWDQWLQQRYDWLRQGHULYHGIURPWKHWKHRU\,QWKHODWHV

WKH)UHQFKPDWKHPDWLFLDQ$OEHUW3HOOHWUHDXSXEOLVKHGDWKHRUHWLFDOVWXG\GHPonstrating his understanding that it was not necessary to employ the same horizontal radius for all vertical elevations of the arch.25 Because the cylinder formula postulates that the arch thickness is directly proportional to the radius, the 

thickness of any particular arch slice can be reduced simply by making the radius smaller. Because most canyons are narrower at the bottom than at the top, 

it is easy to conceptualize the construction of arch dams consisting of a stack 

of arches with progressively smaller radii. Referred to as either constant-angle 

arch dams (i.e., the angle generally remains constant while the radius gets smaller) or variable-radius arch dams (i.e., the radius is variable in length rather than 

constant) structures of this type can visually resemble downward-pointed cones. 

)ROORZLQJ3HOOHWUHDX¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIWKLVW\SHRIGDPWKHLGHDZDVGLVFXVVHG

by the American engineers Gardiner Williams in 1904 and John S. Eastwood in 

1910.26 Although actual construction of a constant angle arch dam did not occur 

until 1913, when the Danish-born engineer Lars Jorgensen (who subsequently 

moved to California) designed the Salmon Creek Dam for a hydroelectric plant 

near Juneau, Alaska, the possibilities of utilizing the cylinder formula for a constant angle design extend back into the late nineteenth century.27

American and European Dam Design Practice

In assessing the state of dam design theory at the beginning of the twentieth century, it is apparent that European engineers and mathematicians led the 

way in hypothesizing the key design methodologies for both gravity dams and 

arch dams. American engineers picked up on the basic character of these design 

innovations within a short period of time and quickly developed designs in both 

the massive and structural traditions comparable to European practice. Just as 

European engineers innovated in both the massive and structural tradition, so too 

did American engineers. Of course, particular engineers often—if not 
62

XVXDOO\2IRFXVHGWKHLUGHVLJQHQHUJLHVRQVSHFL¿FW\SHVRIVWUXFWXUHVDQGWKH\

were not necessarily inclined to view design types outside their particular area of 

expertise with great favor. But, taken as a whole, at the beginning of the twentieth century, American engineers were interested in—and capable of developing—the full range of design possibilities inherent in both the massive and structural traditions. Decisions about particular designs were based on a variety of 

factors, including the topography and geology of a site, the availability of conVWUXFWLRQPDWHULDOVWKHDYDLODELOLW\RIODERU¿QDQFLDOFRQVWUDLQWVLPSRVHGE\WKH

patron or client (whether corporate, governmental, or individual), the professional experiences of the design engineer, and the social importance or prominence 

of the project. But there was no single or distinctive American style of dam 

EXLOGLQJWKDWGH¿QHGZKDWZRXOGFRPHWREHEXLOWDIWHUWKHWXUQRIWKHFHQWXU\

THE STRUCTURAL TRADITION AND THE RATIONAL DESIGN OF 

CONCRETE STRUCTURES

The Beginning of Rational Design

Structural engineering, as a modern profession, begins with the building of iron bridges in the late eighteenth century in Great Britain. It began because of the desire for lighter bridges that could nevertheless be as strong as or 

HYHQPXFKVWURQJHUWKDQWKRVHEXLOWRIVWRQHRUZRRG6WDUWLQJZLWKWKH)UHQFK

schools, the Ponts et Chaussées established in 1748 and the Ecole Polytechnique

established in 1794, structural engineering by the early nineteenth century began 

WREHSXWRQWRDVFLHQWL¿FEDVLVZKHUHPDWKHPDWLFDOWKHRU\FRXOGKHOSSUHGLFW

performance and be, therefore, a guide to designing new forms.

Bridges were the primary focus of early structural theory because they 

were pure structure, they had the longest spans, and they also had the most dramatic failures. During the last half of the nineteenth century, structural theory 

became formalized, began to be used extensively for buildings, and was taught 

systemically in the Polytechnic Institutes of Western Europe. By contrast with 

bridges and buildings, dams did not receive the same intensive attention in 

schools or in the technical literature. This was so because most dams were low 

and were built of earth or rock and, thus, remained part of a preindustrial technological culture. Throughout the nineteenth century, dams received little attention either in the technical literature or in schools of engineering. But at the 

end of the century, four major events in the United States brought dams into the 

IRUHIURQWRIHQJLQHHULQJ¿UVWFLWLHVZHUHH[SDQGLQJDWDQXQSUHFHGHQWHGUDWH

and they could not grow without new sources of water; second, the new electric 

power industry moved rapidly into hydroelectric stations; third, the closing of the 

frontier raised strong social pressures to develop the West in large part through 
63

irrigation; and fourth, the 1889 Johnstown dam disaster dramatically increased 

public sensitivity to dam safety issues.

Those social pressures combined with the advanced state of structural 

WKHRU\WRSURGXFHWKHGHVLUHIRUDPRUHVFLHQWL¿FWUHDWPHQWRIGDPV(QJLQHHUV

believed that dams could be more rationally, hence more economically and more 

safely, designed. Just at this time the use of the new and prototypical twentieth century material, structural concrete, came into general practice and encouraged designers to abandon stone masonry, and sometimes embankment dams, for 

dams built using the new material. But even where earth or rock dams seemed 

still preferable, concrete became widely used in spillways, powerhouses, and diversion works.

As the twentieth century unfolded, major dam building in the United 

States and elsewhere began to take a new direction, a direction characterized by 

high multipurpose dams, huge reservoirs, and the search for rational methods of 

analysis as a basis for design. Almost all the large dams that are the focus of this 

ERRNUHÀHFWWKHVHWUHQGVDQGLQDGGLWLRQWKH\WHQGWRLQYROYHVXFKDVWURQJUHstructuring of the environment that their planning required adjudicating among 

competing objectives. Of these objectives, the one that concerns us in this chapter is the competing vision of structural form, characterized by the structural tradition versus the massive tradition, which we can rephrase as the battle between 

form and mass.

Form and Mass in Structure

In the preindustrial European world, with the notable exception of 

the high gothic cathedrals, there was an implicit belief that great works went 

together with massive structures which were primarily of stone. This aesthetic

of mass connoted permanence, opulence, and power; it stood in opposition to the 

ephemeral wooden structures of peasants and the urban poor. To be monumental was to be safe and handsome. Skeletal metal bridges of the nineteenth century often were banned from urban settings, and when concrete entered practice 

in the 1890s, it had to be covered in, or formed to look like, stone to be accepted. 

%XLOGLQJLQWKHFDSLWDOFLW\RI:DVKLQJWRQUHÀHFWVZHOOWKLVDWWLWXGH7KHOLJKW

iron dome of the U.S. Capitol, built by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, is 

covered to look like masonry, and the Washington Monument, also largely built 

by the Corps, is the largest stone obelisk ever erected.28 The Arlington Memorial 

Bridge represents a heroic attempt to make concrete—and even steel in one 

VSDQ2ORRNOLNHFXWVWRQH7KHKHDYLQHVVRIPRGHUQEXLOGLQJVLQWKHFLW\UHÀHFW

this belief in mass over form.
64

It is, therefore, not surprising that when large dams entered modern 

$PHULFDLQWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\WKH\ZRXOGUHÀHFWWKDWFRQWH[WHVSHFLDOO\WKRVH

dams designed by large municipalities and agencies of the federal government. 

And yet, right from the start of federal dam building in concrete with the foundLQJRIWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHLQWKHFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQIRUPDQGPDVVZDV

immediately present, and it would remain as a continuing issue, never fully resolved, throughout the century. This story begins with the twentieth century, 

ZKHQIRULWV¿UVWVHULHVRIPDMRUGDPVWKLVQHZ5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHVSRQVRUHGD

detailed analytic study of dams from the structural perspective.

Arch and Cantilever Behavior in Dams

A dam is really a wall or barrier that resists the pressure of water stored 

in the reservoir. Consider a wall that runs straight across a valley. The wall, 

ZKHQULJLGO\¿[HGLQWRWKHYDOOH\ÀRRUZLOOKROGEDFNZDWHUE\DFWLQJDVDFDQWLlever. In engineering terms, a cantilever is a structure rigidly attached at one end 

and free of any restraint at the other. Therefore, the free end (top) of a straight 

gravity dam will move horizontally as the cantilever bends downstream under 

water pressure. In this way, the water load is carried down to the foundation (on 

WKHYDOOH\ÀRRUE\EHQGLQJ

Now the dam, if curved into an arch form between the sides of the valley, will also carry water load to the vertical canyon walls, by compression forces 

calculated from the cylinder formula. As these horizontal arches carry compression, they will become shorter and hence move in the horizontal direction downstream. Thus, a curved arch dam can carry loads both vertically as a cantilever 

and horizontally as an arch. The challenge to the engineer is to determine how 

PXFKRIWKHORDGJRHVWRWKHFDQ\RQÀRRUDQGKRZPXFKWRWKHFDQ\RQZDOOV

This issue is crucial to design because much more material is required 

IRUVDIHFDQWLOHYHUEHKDYLRUWKDQIRUVDIHDUFKDFWLRQ)RUH[DPSOHGHVLJQHUV

proportioned gravity dams (those assumed to act as cantilevers alone) with a base 

WKLFNQHVVHTXDOWRDERXWRIWKHGDPKHLJKW:KHUHWKHKHLJKWLVIHHWDQG

the width 40 feet, the amount of concrete required per foot of dam length would 

be V = 60 x 40 x 1⁄2 = 1200 cubic feet. By contrast, an arch dam with a height of 

60 feet would require a base thickness of about 7.5 feet from the cylinder formula (for f = 350 pounds per square inch or psi) and, hence, a total volume of 

[ FXELFIHHWRUOHVVWKDQSHUFHQWRIWKHPDWHULDOUHTXLUHGIRUWKH

gravity or massive dam.

As a result, some engineers, seeing this great advantage of arch dams, 

KDGDVWURQJLQFHQWLYHWR¿QGVRPHUDWLRQDOZD\WRGHWHUPLQHDQDO\WLFDOO\KRZ

much load was carried by the arching action and thereby to justify designing a 
65

safe dam with far less material than a gravity dam carrying load by cantilever action. Engineers consulting with the newly established Reclamation Service began this process of analysis as early as 1903.

In September 1903, the Reclamation Service held a conference of engineers at Ogden, Utah, where their newly appointed (March 1903) consulting engineer, George Y. Wisner (1841-1906), presented a paper which called for a thorough study of stresses in high masonry (stone or concrete) dams to ensure safety and achieve minimum construction cost.29)+1HZHOOWKH&KLHI(QJLQHHU

of the Reclamation Service, asked a select committee of four, including Arthur 

Powell Davis (1861–1933), later to become Director of the Reclamation Service, 

to make him a recommendation, which it did formally on October 5, 1904. Its 

OHWWHUVSRNHRIWKHWZRKLJKGDPVSURSRVHGIRU:\RPLQJ3DWK¿QGHUDQG%XIIDOR

Bill) and of the fact that “no thorough analysis has ever been made of the relative economy and stability of reinforced concrete dams as compared with similar dams of gravity sections. . . .” They suggested that such an analysis be commissioned by the Reclamation Service and they recommended Mr. E. T. Wheeler, 

of Los Angeles, for the job.30 Under the supervision of Wisner, Wheeler began 

work in January of 1905. In March, the Board of Consulting Engineers met to 

review the work and they decided to revise the dam dimensions used by Wheeler 

XSWRWKHQ:KHHOHUVXEPLWWHGKLV¿QDOUHSRUWRQ0D\DQG:LVQHUVHQW

that report, preceded by a lengthy discussion of his own, to Newell on May 16. 

Its importance was considered to be so great that the Wisner-Wheeler paper was 

published in the August 10, 1905, issue of Engineering News. Since this report 

inaugurated the structural tradition of large-scale dam design within the federal government of the United States, it is essential to explain its substance and its 

impact.31

Although Wisner proposed the study in the light of the Reclamation 

6HUYLFH¶VQHZELJGDPV25RRVHYHOW%XIIDOR%LOODQG3DWK¿QGHUKHDQG

:KHHOHUDFWXDOO\IRFXVHGRQO\RQ3DWK¿QGHULWEHLQJWKH¿UVWRQHWREHFRPSOHWed (1909). Wisner described how an arch dam in a narrow valley (he called it 

“of short span”) carried water loads and also how it behaved under wide swings 

of temperature both with the reservoir full and with it drawn down. He then gave 

Wheeler’s report, which consisted of the sets of formulas for water loads: one of 

which assumed that the dam carried the water pressure as a series of horizontal 

arches supported by the side walls of the canyon. He then computed the horizonWDOGHÀHFWLRQRIWKHVHDUFKHVDWWKHLUFURZQV2HVVHQWLDOO\RQO\WKHYHUWLFDOFHQterline of the dam.

Wheeler next took a vertical slice of the dam at this centerline, and assuming it carried all the water pressure as a cantilever, supported only on the 

ÀRRURIWKHFDQ\RQKHFRPSXWHGLWVKRUL]RQWDOGHÀHFWLRQDWYDULRXVSRLQWVIURP
66

EDVHWRWRSRIWKHGDP&OHDUO\WKHDUFKGHÀHFWLRQVDQGWKHFDQWLOHYHUGHÀHFtions must be the same at the same points on the dam, but this two-part calculation will not give such results. Thus, Wheeler had to make a second calculation 

by adjusting the amount of load taken by the arches and the amount taken by the 

FDQWLOHYHUV7KH¿UVWFDOFXODWLRQVKRZVWKDWWKHIUHHFDQWLOHYHUGHÀHFWVIDUPRUH

)LJXUH8SVWUHDPIDFHRI3DWK¿QGHU'DPRQWKH1RUWK3ODWWH5LYHUQHDU&DVSHU:\Rming. This is a masonry arch with a gravity section built 1905-1909 by the Bureau of Reclamation. The 214 foot height was unprecedented at the time of construction in 1909. Source:

Bureau of Reclamation
67

than the arches do in the top portion of the dam, while the reverse is true at the 

bottom. Thus, the arches should carry more load at the top and the cantilevers 

more at the base. This redistribution of load would eventually be called the “triDOORDGPHWKRGRIDQDO\VLV ́0RUHRYHU:KHHOHUIRXQGWKDWWKH3DWK¿QGHU'DP

could carry all the water load as a series of arches with compressive stresses under 200 psi for a material (stone masonry) whose compressive strength is well 

over 2,000 psi.

 1H[W:KHHOHUVWXGLHGWHPSHUDWXUHVWUHVVHVLQ3DWK¿QGHU'DP+HUH

KHDVVXPHGWKDWWKHWHPSHUDWXUHGURSSHG)DWWKHWRSZLWKWKHUHVHUYRLU¿OOHG

only to 100 feet from the top and that the temperature drop decreased linearly to 

]HURDWIHHWEHORZWKHWRS7KLVGURSFDXVHVWKHDUFKHVWREHQGDQGGHÀHFW

in the downstream direction, causing vertical cracks in the upper arches; and the 

GHÀHFWLRQRIWKHDUFKHVDERYHUHODWLYHWRWKHXQGHÀHFWHGFDQWLOHYHUVEHORZZLOO

cause vertical bending in the lower parts of the dam and, hence, horizontal cracks 

there. This qualitative description helps explain where reinforcing steel needs 

to be placed (if it were a concrete dam), but it does not give a good quantitative 

measure. However, by iteration, he was able to make a more reasonable estimate 

of the temperature stresses, which he then combined with the water load to give 

one design condition.

 7KHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKLVDGPLWWHGO\TXLWHDSSUR[LPDWHDSSURDFKLVWKDW

IRUWKH¿UVWWLPHWKHHQJLQHHUVZHUHVHHNLQJWRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRIWKHWUXHEHKDYior of a curved dam in a narrow canyon to the end of making it more 

)LJXUH3DWK¿QGHU'DPZDVFRQVWUXFWHGZLWKKXJHEORFNVRIVWRQH Source: Bureau of

Reclamation
68

economical through saving material. But many engineers did not trust this approach. Indeed, when Wisner suggested the year before that the Lake Cheesman 

Dam, near Denver, could have been designed with substantially less material had 

arch action been considered, the designer replied that “the suggestions for a different design are for a lighter section than the one used . . . [but] when the consequences of failure are very great, the engineer should build abundantly strong.”32 

Wisner was seeking to show strength does not necessarily mean more mass.

The Constant-Angle Arch Dam

In spite of the belief that neglecting arch actions would make dams 

“abundantly strong,” up to 1914 there had been no public record of any arch 

dam failure,33 whereas numerous gravity dams had failed. In that same year, the 

Danish immigrant engineer Lars R. Jorgensen (1872-c.1937) presented a paper 

on the constant-angle arch dam in which he argued that counting on arch actions 

realistically for high, narrow canyons would “show a savings of material of 

33 percent or more over an ordinary gravity dam, and at the same time it will 

possess a factor of safety more than twice as great as that of the gravity dam.”34

Jorgensen showed how to achieve an arch dam with a minimum thickness at each level by using the cylinder formula and by reducing the radius of 

curvature in the lower regions where the water pressure is higher. He found that 

)LJXUH,Q(7:KHHOHUDQDO\]HG3DWK¿QGHU'DPIRUWKH%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQXQGHUWKHVXSHUYLVLRQRI*HRUJH<:LVQHU+HWRRNDYHUWLFDOVOLFHRI3DWK¿QGHUDVD

FDQWLOHYHUDQGDQDO\]HGWKHGHÀHFWLRQV7KHQKHDQDO\]HGKRUL]RQWDODUFKVHFWLRQWRGHWHUPLQH

GHÀHFWLRQV7KHFDOFXODWHGGHÀHFWLRQVGLGQRWPDWFKEXWWKLVDQDO\VLVSURYLGHGWKHEDVLVIRU

the trial-load method of analysis. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
69

as the radius decreased the volume of material needed would be a minimum if 

the arc angle remained the same and had a value of about 133.6°—hence his dam 

designs are called constant-angle dams.

Here we have the classic design problem well known in elevated water 

tanks made in the shape of cones to keep the forces in the wall roughly constant. 

)LJXUH,QWKH%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQFRPSOHWHG%XIIDOR%LOO'DPRQWKH6KRVKRQH

River near Cody, Wyoming. This constant radius concrete arch dam is 325 feet high. The 

dam delivers irrigation water and has a powerplant. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
70

These forces come from the cylinder formula and are the product of the water 

pressure and the wall radius. Thus, the design goal here is to decrease the radius 

as the water pressure increases.

Jorgensen proposed the same idea for concrete dams in narrow V-shaped 

canyons. He showed that the thickness for his Salmon Creek Dam would have to 

have been over twice as thick as he made it if the arc radius had been kept constant rather than the arc angle. Clearly, the thicker dam becomes a gravity dam 

LQVHFWLRQVZLWKDZLGWKWRKHLJKWRIQHDUO\35

Jorgensen was well aware of the arch-cantilever analysis made by 

Wisner and Wheeler, and he presented a similar analysis in his 1915 paper, but 

his goal was to show that by having a changing radius, i.e., one which decreased 

WRZDUGWKHFDQ\RQÀRRUWKHDUFKHVORZHUGRZQZRXOGWKHUHE\EHFRPHVWLIIHU

and carry more of the water load than in the case of the designs where the radiXVGLGQRWVRGLPLQLVK)XUWKHUPRUHWKHDUFKEHKDYLRUDOORZVWKHVWUXFWXUHWREH

thinner because there is less bending than with the cantilever behavior and thus 

the thinner sections near the base reduce further the cantilever action.

Jorgensen did more than present a clever design idea, he actually was 

SDUWO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRUFRQVWUXFWLQJWKH¿UVWVXFKGDPVWKH6DOPRQ&UHHN'DP

in Alaska (1914) and the Lake Spaulding Dam in California (1919). In 1920, 

Jorgensen reported that 25 gravity dams had failed, of which 19 were built during the preceding 30 years, while no arch dams had ever failed. By 1931, he 

would state that over 40 constant-angle arch dams had been built in the last 

16 years—beginning with Salmon Creek.36

Noetzli and the Curved Dams

Strictly speaking, the analysis of Wisner and Wheeler was a trial-load 

method because it assumed a distribution of loads between arches and cantileYHUVDQGWKHQDIWHUYDULRXVRWKHUWULDOVLWEDVHGGHVLJQRQD¿QDOLWHUDWLRQ)UHG

Noetzli (1887-1933), a Swiss trained engineer, summarized the situation in a 

landmark 1921 paper in which he reviewed the practice of arched dams, gave 

relatively simple formulas for calculating the cantilever and the arch actions 

in horizontally curved dams, and then applied his formulations in detail to the 

3DWK¿QGHU'DP7KLVODVWSDUWLVWKHKHDUWRIKLVSDSHULQZKLFKKH

compares his semigraphical approach to the purely analytical calculations presented by Wisner and Wheeler in 1905. He concludes that his “distribution of 

load between cantilever and arches compares very favorably with that obtained 

analytically by Mr. Wheeler.”37
71

Noetzli then proceeded to discuss the central issues in concrete dam design that went beyond the statics of water-pressure loading: stresses due to temperature change, to shortening of the arches under water pressure, and to shrinkDJHRIWKHFRQFUHWHDVZHOODVWKHLQÀXHQFHRIFUDFNVLQWKHFRQFUHWH+HVKRZHG

by simple calculations that these effects were at least as important as those due to 

the statics of water pressure loading.

He then discussed two ideas crucial to dam design: vertical arching and 

the rigid-body overturning of curved dams. In the former case, a gravity dam 

in a V-shaped canyon will surely not carry the vertical loads directly to the valOH\ÀRRUEXWUDWKHUWKHORZHUVHFWLRQZLOODFWOLNHDQDUFKWUDQVIHUULQJWKHORDGV

to the side walls of the valley. Noetzli cautioned that this behavior could lead to 

YHU\KLJKFRPSUHVVLRQVWUHVVHVLQWKHVLGHZDOOQHDUWKHÀRRUZKHUHYHUWLFDODUFKing (some vertical load for the dam weight is carried to the canyon sides by arch 

action in the vertical plane) adds greatly to the compression calculated solely by 

JUDYLW\DQGWKHFDQWLOHYHUDFWLRQGXHWRZDWHUSUHVVXUH)XUWKHUPRUHKHZHQWRQ

to point out that pure gravity dams rarely have a safety factor against overturning 

of over 2.0 and usually (where full uplift is assumed) it is close to 1.0. This surprising claim allowed him to make a strong criticism of such dams, i.e., “no other engineering structure of acknowledged good design has such a small factor of 

safety as a pure gravity dam.”38

Noetzli then described the rigid-body overturning of curved dams using his own term of “Curved Dams as Cylinder Hoofs.” He considered here the 

curved ground plan of the dam and noted that, as the structure tends to overturn, 

the moment of inertia of that plan is considerably greater than that of a straight 

)LJXUH,Q)UHG$1RHW]OLFDOFXODWHGWKHORDGLQJRQ3DWK¿QGHU'DPDQGVKRZHG

these graphic results. Source: Noetzli, “Gravity and Arch Action in Curved Dams,” 18.
72

dam ground plan of the same base width. Therefore, he argued, even if there 

were no horizontal arching behavior (as there might not be in a wide valley) the 

curved dam will have a far greater resistance to overturning than the straight 

dam, especially as the curvature increases. Noetzli is here rendering a severe 

criticism of the procedure which simply takes a vertical slice from a curved gravity dam and studies it alone for overturning. Such a procedure fails to show any 

difference between a curved and a straight gravity dam.

 )LQDOO\DIWHUDEULHIUHYLHZRIWKHWKUHHW\SHVRIFXUYHGGDPV2JUDYLW\

section, reduced gravity sections, and constant angle—Noetzli gave eight conclusions which we can group into three categories: the superiority of curved 

dams, the possibility for relatively simple analyses, and the need to consider special features. He noted that curved dams were safer and more economical than 

straight dams largely because of the hoof-cylinder behavior even when horizontal arching is minimal. He argued that complex mathematical analysis could be 

JUHDWO\VLPSOL¿HGE\JUDSKLFVWDWLFVDQGFRQ¿UPHGE\IXOOVFDOHPHDVXUHPHQWV

)LQDOO\KHVWUHVVHGWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWHPSHUDWXUHDQGVKULQNDJHRIFUDFNFRQtrol, of vertical arching in narrow canyons, and of the fact that horizontal arching 

may often not act.

The paper of 60 pages in the 1921 ASCE Transactions drew vigorous 

discussions stretching out to 75 pages with 14 discussers, including such major 

¿JXUHVRIWKHSHULRGDV/DUV-RUJHQVHQ%)-DNREVHQ$-:LOH\DQG(GZDUG

Wegmann (all of whom, save Wiley, were like Noetzli, from Europe).39 The paper established the Swiss engineer as a leading theoretician for dams, and the disFXVVLRQODUJHO\FRQ¿UPHG1RHW]OL¶VUHSXWDWLRQ5XQQLQJWKURXJK1RHW]OL¶VZULWing was the two-part theme, typically Swiss, that good design implies form over 

PDVVDQGWKDWDQDO\VLV2RIWHQJUDSKLFDOO\GRQH2FDQEHJUHDWO\VLPSOL¿HGWRLPprove understanding as well as to encourage designers to think in terms of form 

over mass. He was at great pains to stress the historical fact that mass did not 

mean safety but that form, properly conceived, did so and with greater economy 

as well.

Much of the discussion revolved about the relative simplicity of the 

graphical approach as compared to the complexity of the mathematical one.40 

One factor in the form versus mass debate was the perception that lighter forms 

needed more rigor in solution.

The writings on curved dams continued throughout the 1920s as the nation was beginning to move into the largest program of dam building ever 

attempted. In the 1922 ASCE Transactions, for example, there were eight major articles (out of 20) related to dams; Noetzli wrote one and contributed discusVLRQVWR¿YHRWKHUV,QKLVDUWLFOH1RHW]OLGHYHORSHGIRUPXODVIRUXVHZLWK
73

¿HOGPHDVXUHPHQWVRIGLVSODFHPHQWVWRFDOFXODWHVWUHVVHVWKDWPD\DULVHIURP

“water pressure, temperature, shrinkage, swelling, lateral deformation, etc. or a 

combination of any or all of them.”41+HZDVVWLOOIRFXVHGRQVLPSOL¿HGPDWKHmatics and the centrality of measurements, which also elicited much discussion. 

Curiously, the three dams for which measurements were then available were all 

outside the continental United States (two in Australia and one in Alaska).

The Trial Load Method

The articles and discussions up to 1929 discussed both arch and cantilever behavior and, hence, qualify as trial-load methods. However, not until the 1929 article by C. H. Howell and A. C. Jaquith does the method acquire 

publicly the name of “trial load.”42 Both authors had worked for the Bureau 

of Reclamation in Denver where they had begun to study the method in 1923; 

and when the full mathematical framework appeared in 1938, Reclamation 

LGHQWL¿HGVHYHQFRQFUHWHGDPVGHVLJQHGRQWKHEDVLVRIWULDOORDGDQDO\VLV

Boulder (now, and hereafter in this study known as Hoover),43 Owyhee, Parker, 

Seminoe, Gibson, Deadwood, and Cat Creek (actually designed by the Navy 

Department).44

)LJXUH&++RZHOODQG$&-DTXLWKVWXGLHGERWKFDQWLOHYHUDQGDUFKDFWLRQLQGHYHOoping what is called the “trial load method” of dam analysis. Variations in the shape of the 

canyons were such that two shapes were considered necessary for realistic analysis. This is 

Dam No. I. Source: C. H. Howell, and A. C. Jaquith. Paper No. 1712. “Analysis of Arch Dams by the 

Trial Load Method.” Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 93 (1929), 1194.
74

 +RZHOODQG-DTXLWKKDGFRPSOHWHGD¿UVWGUDIWLQ-DQXDU\DQG

it was approved for publication on January 16.45 But it did not appear until four 

\HDUVODWHU,QWKH¿QDOYHUVLRQWKH\GH¿QHGWKHPHWKRGDVRQHZKLFKFRQVLGers the dam to be made up of a series of horizontal arches and a series of vertical 

cantilevers, with part of the water load carried by the dam considered as arches 

and part by the dam considered as cantilevers. The arch loads and the cantilever 

ORDGVDUHDGMXVWHGVRWKDWWKHGHÀHFWLRQRIWKHDUFKHVDUHQHDUO\WKHVDPHDVWKH

GHÀHFWLRQVRIWKHFDQWLOHYHUVDWWKHVDPHSRLQWV7KH\GLVWLQJXLVKWKHWULDOORDG

method from previous similar methods by the fact that they were considering 

more than the one single cantilever, which is what Wheeler, Noetzli, and others 

had done. By considering a series of cantilevers, rather than one cantilever only 

at the centerline of the dam, Reclamation engineers created an immensely complex procedure that took the entire 266 page Bulletin (ref. 45) to explain, without 

even going into any numerical calculations.

In their 1929 paper, the authors began by noting the variations in the 

shapes of canyons in which dams appear and thus they established the need to 

use more than one cantilever for more realistic analyses. They then proceeded to 

GH¿QHWZRGHVLJQVLGHQWL¿HGRQO\DV'DP1R,DQG'DP1R,,7KH¿UVWKDVD

center height of 75 feet and a base thickness of 18.75 feet, and the second has a 

center height of 256 feet with a base width of 48.4 feet. In No. I, the crest length 

is 469 feet, whereas No. II has a crest length of 900 feet. Not surprisingly, 

No. II, with its greater length of crest, exhibits much more arch action than No. I.

The authors then gave results for the 271 foot high Horse Mesa Dam, on 

the Salt River Project in Arizona, where the base width is only 40.2 feet; therefore, the dam will act predominantly as an arch in the upper regions. When discussing this arch action, the authors showed that there will be bending in the 

arches, especially lower in the dam and predominantly both near the valley side 

walls and at the centerline of the arches. This bending results in some tension, 

causing the concrete to crack, reducing the arch section and hence increasing the 

compression stresses.

 )LQDOO\WKHSDSHUEULHÀ\GLVFXVVHGWKH*LEVRQ'DPRQWKH6XQ5LYHU

in Montana, under construction in 1927 and for which the trial-load method was 

used not just for analysis but for design, resulting in a “savings of more than 

41,000 cubic yards of concrete over the gravity design.”

As with Noetzli’s paper, the Howell and Jaquith paper brought forward 

much substantial discussion: a 34-page paper resulted in 90 pages of discussion. Noetzli and Jakobsen both observed that Alfred Stucky had used the trial 

load method for a Swiss dam in 1922, although the method was not so named. 

In fact, Robert Maillart had used the same idea in 1902 for a water tank also in 
75

Switzerland.463UREDEO\WKHPRVWVLJQL¿FDQWGLVFXVVLRQIURPWKHSRLQWRIYLHZ

of federal dams came from John Savage and Ivan Houk, both of Reclamation. 

They gave a more detailed discussion of Gibson Dam and gave also results from 

their analysis of the 405 foot high Owyhee Dam in eastern Oregon. Savage had 

assumed a dominant role in Reclamation dam design and was already in 1929 

deeply involved with the Boulder Canyon Project. But as the dams got higher and higher, Reclamation recognized the need to develop not just mathematical analyses but also physical model testing and the instrumentation of full scale 

dams.

The Stevenson Creek Test Dam

 'XULQJWKH¿UVWWKUHHGHFDGHVRIWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\HQJLQHHUVIRcused intently on concrete arches, creating numerous designs for bridges as well 

)LJXUH7KLVLV'DP1R,,XVHGE\+RZHOODQG-DTXLWKLQGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHWULDOORDG

method of analysis. Source: C. H. Howell, and A. C. Jaquith. Paper No. 1712. “Analysis of Arch 

Dams by the Trial Load Method.” Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 93 (1929), 

1199.
76

as dams, and stimulating more mathematically complex analytic schemes. In 

1924, four of the twenty ACSE Transactions papers dealt with concrete arches, 

DQGPDQ\RIWKHVHSDJHVZHUH¿OOHGZLWKIRUPXODVDQGWDEOHV7KH$6&(

Transactions contained two extensive articles on arch analysis: one 98 pages 

long with 73 pages of discussion; the other 40 pages with 61 pages of discussion. 

The two articles total about 20 percent of the entire volume.

But already by 1922, some engineers became uneasy with so much abVWUDFWLRQDQGEHJDQWRZRUU\DERXW¿HOGSHUIRUPDQFHDVRSSRVHGWRRI¿FHDEstractions. Particularly, engineers in the western states saw the need for a difIHUHQWDSSURDFKWRDQDO\VLVZKLFKOHG)UHG1RHW]OLRQHRIWKHLUOHDGHUVWRUHTXHVW¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWIURPWKH(QJLQHHULQJ)RXQGDWLRQIRUFROOHFWLQJSHUIRUmance data on existing arch dams and for designing new tests and experiments.47 

1RHW]OLQRWHGWKHQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHRIDUFKGDPV2WZRUHFHQWSDSHUVRQWKH

subject won the Croes Medal in 1920 and 1921 (the second highest award given by the ASCE, it recognizes contributions to engineering science)—and urged 

aid for physical testing because “the methods by which most existing arch dams 

have been designed are defective and more or less unreliable.” Noetzli had been 

ZRUULHGDERXWWKHODFNRI¿HOGGDWDDQGODWHUWKDW\HDUZRXOGSXEOLVKDSDSHURQ

test results in full size dams.48

Noetzli sent a copy of his skeletal proposal to Arthur Powell Davis, 

then Director of the U.S. Reclamation Service, to request his help with the 

(QJLQHHULQJ)RXQGDWLRQDQG'DYLVLPPHGLDWHO\UHVSRQGHGE\VHQGLQJLWD

VXSSRUWLQJOHWWHU7KH)RXQGDWLRQUHTXHVWHGWKDW1RHW]OLSUHSDUHDSURJUDP

statement which could be presented to its board in May 1922.49 The board 

subsequently approved Noetzli’s plan, forming a Committee on Arch Dam 

,QYHVWLJDWLRQ7KH&RPPLWWHH¿UVWPHWRQ-DQXDU\LQ6DQ)UDQFLVFR

This committee was chaired by Charles Derleth Jr., a professor at the University 

RI&DOLIRUQLD±%HUNHOH\ZLWK1RHW]OLDVVHFUHWDU\DQGLQFOXGLQJ)UDQN(

Weymouth, Chief Engineer, and John L. Savage, Chief Design Engineer, both 

of the Reclamation Service.

It was becoming clear, then, that the Reclamation Service would have to 

play a major role in the project.50 In December 1923, W. A. Brackenridge, Senior 

Vice President of the Southern California Edison Company, proposed the building of a large scale concrete arch dam designed expressly for research, and he 

further offered to provide a large amount of the money for it as well as the use of 

his company’s facilities. Located on Stevenson Creek, a tributary of the 

6DQ-RDTXLQ5LYHUDERXWPLOHVHDVWRI)UHVQR&DOLIRUQLDWKLVWHVWGDPZDV

approved by the committee and construction began in August of 1925.51
77

The test arch design was 

startlingly thin. The physical 

structure was built in a 

V-shaped canyon, to be 60 feet 

high with a thickness throughout 

the top half of only 2 feet, tapering from mid-height to the base 

from 2 feet to 7.5 feet, respectively. The arch is of a constant 100 

foot radius throughout.52 The tests 

used mechanical strain gages, and, 

from these measurements, stresses 

ZHUHFDOFXODWHG'HÀHFWLRQDQG

temperatures were also measured.

Meanwhile, engineers 

had been collecting measurements from existing dams as part 

of the overall program, and they 

had found discouraging results beFDXVHRIWKHGLI¿FXOWLHVLQUHODWing strains and displacements to 

loading and temperature changes. 

They debated the data from the 

test dam construction and instruPHQWDWLRQDWDPHHWLQJLQ)UHVQRLQHDUO\'HFHPEHU53 Reclamation was 

EHFRPLQJFRQYLQFHGWKDWWKHWHVWGDPDORQHZRXOGQREHVXI¿FLHQWDQGWKDWDVHries of small scale models ought also to be included in the program.54 In early 

1926, the Commissioner of Reclamation, Elwood Mead, approved funding for 

part of the work with small scale models.55 A report on all this work appeared in 

November 1927 and on December 8, 1928, a concrete model of the Stevenson 

Test Dam was loaded to destruction.56

We can summarize the conclusions reached by the committee in late 

XQGHUWKUHHFDWHJRULHV¿UVWWKHJUHDWVWUHQJWKRIWKHDUFKGDPVVHFRQG

physical experiments have given data useful to engineers developing mathematical analyses; and third, arch dams may be designed more economically (by being 

thinner) in the future.57

The full report included an analysis by Noetzli following his 1921 paper 

and a summary of data on all major arch dams built in the world up to 1927 

(57 in the USA, 39 abroad) and all major multiple arch dams (38 in the USA, 

16 abroad). After a brief discussion on the construction, there followed an 

)LJXUH -RKQ-DFN/6DYDJH865HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFH%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQ&KLHI'HVLJQ

Engineer (1916-1945). Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
78

extensive detailing of the test results by Willis A. Slater, followed by brief reports 

on the properties of concrete (by Raymond Davis of University of CaliforniaBerkeley), on models (by Savage and Houk), on a celluloid model of Stevenson 

Creek Dam (by Professor George Beggs of Princeton University), a theoretical 

report (by H. M. Wester-gaard of Illinois University), and a brief discussion of 

ORDGVDQGFRQFUHWHGHWHULRUDWLRQE\$OIUHG)OLQQRIWKH(QJLQHHULQJ)RXQGDWLRQ

An extensive bibliography ends the report. Thus, by 1927, substantial data 

from both physical testing and mathematical calculations existed, but there were 

FRQÀLFWLQJYLHZVDERXWWKHUHVXOWV

 )UHG1RHW]OLZKRVHSULPDU\DLPKDGEHHQWRXVHWHVWVDQGFDOFXODWLRQV

predicted in 1924 that gravity dams would be replaced by thin arch structures; he 

quoted several engineers saying that “the gravity dam is a thing of the past” and 

“the gravity dam is an economic crime.” He held the belief common to many in 

the 1920s that “engineering science is advancing” and that a more rational

analytic base would lead to thinner and less costly structures.58 But Noetzli 

did not imply that more rational would necessarily mean more complex. He 

ZRUNHGZLWKJUDSKLFDOPHWKRGVW\SL¿HGE\KLVHGXFDWLRQDWWKH)HGHUDO7HFKQLFDO

,QVWLWXWHLQ=XULFK+HGLGQRWSXEOLVKWKHGHWDLOHGPDWKHPDWLFDOIRUPXODWLRQV

that had begun to appear in the 1920s and would culminate in Reclamation’s 

1938 report (ref. 45).

This type of mathematical complexity was criticized sharply by one of

the most famous structural engineering teachers, Hardy Cross of Illinois University. In discussing a highly mathematical 1925 paper on concrete arches, Cross 

noted the uncertainties of loadings, of actual stress, and of foundations, none of

which were dealt with in the paper which “having swallowed these ‘camels’ 

only the ‘gnat’ of mathematical analysis remains. The ‘gnat’ should be an hors

d’oeuvre and engineers are giving abnormal gustatory attention to it.” He goes 

on to proclaim that “the theories of arch analysis which are now being

elaborated in engineering literature are distinctly ‘high brow’ in that their elaboUDWHQHVVFDPRXÀDJHVZLWKHUXGLWLRQXQFHUWDLQWLHVDQGLQDFFXUDFLHVZKLFKDUH

inevitable.”59

In spite of Noetzli’s hope and Cross’s warning, the profession charged 

ahead with complexity of analysis and the result was that in the Bureau of 

Reclamation the dams did not get thinner but thicker. A 1988 summary of this 

period stated that:

Many arch dams built at the time showed a tendency for inFUHDVLQJWKLFNQHVV2QWKHRQHKDQGWKHIDLOXUHRI6W)UDQFLV

Dam in California in 1928 had raised questions regarding the 

safety of any proposed dam of large size. On the other hand, it 
79

seemed that the excellent results obtained at Stevenson Creek, 

LQFOXGLQJDYHUL¿FDWLRQRIWKHWULDOORDGPHWKRGZHUHQRWFDUried forward with these arch gravity-type dams.60

While many of these ideas and methods focused on high, single-arch 

dams, another form of structural dam had appeared in the early twentieth century, and received considerable attention in the technical literature. This form, the 

buttress dam, consists of either slabs or arches supported by buttresses within the 

valley. It, too, held out possibilities for lighter, more economical dams, and we 

next turn to these to have a fuller picture of the choices available to the dam designer in the 1920s.

Buttress Dams

Early in the twentieth century, two types of buttress dams appeared in 

WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWKHÀDWVODEDQGWKHPXOWLSOHDUFK6WLOOLQVHUYLFHWRGD\DUH

ÀDWVODEDQGPXOWLSOHDUFKGDPVRYHUIHHWLQKHLJKWEXLOWXSWR1RQH

of these are federal dams, although the Bureau of Reclamation did complete one 

ÀDWVODELQ6WRQ\*RUJHDQGRQHPXOWLSOHDUFKLQ%DUWOHWW61 What 

NHSW5HFODPDWLRQIURPGHVLJQLQJVXFKGDPV"

 2IWKHWZRW\SHVRI3KROORZ ́GDPVDVWKH\ZHUHFDOOHGWKHÀDWVODE

dam, while more often used, received far less attention in the civil engineering

literature than did the multiple arch dam, and for good reasons. The slab deVLJQVFDPHODUJHO\IURPRQHPDQ1LOV)$PEXUVHQDQGKLVFRPSDQ\$PEXUVHQ

Hydraulic Construction Company), which built the great majority of the more 

than 350 such dams built in the United States.62 By choosing such a design, a 

federal bureau was almost precluding competition for construction. In addition, the intellectual rage of the 1920s was for concrete arches both for bridges 

and dams. Between 1918 and 1929, the highest ASCE awards for papers went 

to writings on concrete arches four times. In the next two highest awards, arch 

studies also won four times.63 No such recognition went for slab design or analysis. These slab dams were usually relatively small scale—over 80 percent were 

30 feet or less in height.

On the other hand, the multiple arch dams represent a quite different approach and, with few exceptions, have been well built and exist today in good 

condition. Of the 30 dams over 30 feet high listed by Noetzli and completed 

before 1928, at least 22 are still in service.64 The leading practitioner of these 

dams was John S. Eastwood (1857-1924), who, after studying engineering at 

the University of Minnesota (he never graduated), went west in 1880 to work on 

UDLOURDGV%\KHKDGVHWWOHGLQ)UHVQR&DOLIRUQLDDQGDIWHUVHYHUDOFLYLO
80

works jobs he became an early pioneer in the development of hydroelectric 

power for California.

In 1906, while working on a plan at Big Creek to develop hydroelectric 

power from the mountain valleys of central California for Los Angeles and San 

)UDQFLVFR(DVWZRRGVWUXFNXSRQWKHLGHDRIDEDQGRQLQJWKHQRUPDOHDUWKHQGDP

with a concrete corewall for a purely concrete multiple arch dam. Apparently, he

came to the idea on his own, even though Henry Goldmark in a paper of 1897, 

ZKLFKZRQWKH$6&(7KRPDV)LWFK5RZODQG3UL]HKDGSURSRVHGDIRRW

high multiple arch dam for an electric company in Utah. It was never built 

and its design was relatively bulky compared to the designs later developed by 

Eastwood.65 Eastwood lost the Big Creek project, but two years later he succeedHGLQEXLOGLQJWKH¿UVWPXOWLSOHDUFKGDPLWLVORFDWHGDW+XPH/DNHLQWKH6LHUUD

Nevada Mountains and was built for the Hume-Bennett Lumber Company.

Before his death in 1924, Eastwood designed a total of seventeen such 

dams that were put into construction.66 These dams, and some designed by others, consisted of relatively short span arches carrying water loads horizontally to 

buttresses which take those forces vertically to the foundations. Eastwood used 

simple mathematics on which to base his design, but later engineers began to introduce more complex procedures in an effort to account for more detail. In a 

VXPPDU\WUHDWLVHRI)UHG1RHW]OLSUHVHQWHGDPRUHULJRURXVDSSURDFKDQG

used Eastwood’s Lake Hodges Dam of 1917 as a numerical example. Noetzli 

had shown that the arch compression stresses would be 300 psi at 100 feet below 

water level (the total height is 136 feet) with the simple cylinder formula used by 

Eastwood. When including effects of rib shortening and temperature change, he 

found the maximum arch compression stress to be 640 psi and a possible tension 

stress of 69 psi.67

The concrete compression strength in the 1:2:4 mix concrete of that period was about 3,000 psi, which means that the stresses rose from 10 percent to 

about 21 percent of the strength by more rigorous calculations. The small tension stress is well below that which would cause cracking (about 10 percent of 

the strength). Thus, the additional rigor, while of considerable engineering interest, had nothing to do with the safety of the dam. No such structure, designed in 

that simple way and built by an experienced engineer like Eastwood, ever failed 

because of lack of rigor in the stress calculations.

In discussing the history of dams or any other large-scale structures, it 

is essential to be clear on the uses for analysis. It is a tool of design, not a means 

to design, and the numerical values for stresses are always suspect in concrete 

structures because they cannot be measured directly. In the Stevenson Creek 

WHVWGDPVWXGLHVHQJLQHHUVPHDVXUHGRQO\GHÀHFWLRQDQGVWUDLQVZKLFKDUHDOVR
81

SK\VLFDOPRYHPHQWV)URPWKHVWUDLQVWKH\FRXOGFRPSXWHVWUHVVHVRQO\E\XVLQJDQDVVXPHGUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHPGH¿QHGDVWKHPRGXOXVRIHODVWLFLW\

which, however, is not a constant and must be estimated.

In the Stevenson Creek report, Willis Slater described results as follows:

At the 30 feet elevation the stress is 650 pounds per square inch 

and is seen to be larger than the observed total stress for all 

points except for a few feet close to the abutment. This stress 

is about 180 percent in excess of the observed stress at the center line, while at the abutment it is about 35 percent less than 

the observed stress. At the 50-feet elevation the stress by the 

cylinder formula is 217 pounds per square inch compression, 

whereas the observed stress was a tension of about 125 pounds 

per square inch at the crown, and a compression of about 

290 pounds per square inch at the abutment. About 20 feet 

from the abutment the observed stress was about 575 pounds 

per square inch compression, or about 165 percent greater than 

that given by the cylinder formula. It is quite obvious that the 

cylinder formula is entirely inadequate to represent conditions 

found in a elastic arch of this kind.68

It is a correct conclusion that the cylinder formula gives inadequate 

stress results, but, as a guide to arch dam design, it does not seem to have been 

misleading. No concrete arch dam designed on the basis of that formula has 

been known to fail. But in the 1920s, the ideal was for more rigor and simpli-

¿HGPHWKRGVZHUHFRQVLGHUHGLQDGHTXDWH)RUWKHPXOWLSOHDUFKGDPVWKHPDLQ

SUREOHPZLWKWKHF\OLQGHUIRUPXODZDVWKHQHJOHFWRIEHQGLQJLQWKH¿[HGDUFK

Eastwood recognized this, and in several of his dams he made the arches three 

hinged; that is, he built the arches in two halves connected to each other and to 

the abutments by rounded edges. These hinge lines, running along the sloping 

upstream sides of the dam, permit the arches to rotate and thereby eliminate the 

EHQGLQJGXHWRULEVKRUWHQLQJDQGWHPSHUDWXUH:KHQ)UHG1RHW]OLVWXGLHGRQH

of these dams (Mountain Dell from 1917) in 1925, he found no evidence of rotation in the hinges and hence one could conclude that there was no noticeable evidence of bending. In other words, the cylinder formula appeared to have been 

validated.69

Costs in Form and Mass

Eastwood was able to build multiple arch dams primarily because 

they were the least expensive designs, an important factor for private companies and local public authorities. Expense was not necessarily a factor for the 
82

Bureau of Reclamation. In 1928, Reclamation reported on cost estimates for two 

major arched gravity dams: Gibson and Owyhee.70)RU*LEVRQWKHFRVWZDV

)RU2Z\KHH5HFODPDWLRQFKRVHDKHDY\DUFKHYHQWKRXJKLWZDV

19.3 percent more expensive than a light arch and in spite of the good results 

from the thin Stevenson Creek test dam. The Gibson Dam valley has the same 

general shape as the valley in which Eastwood built the 1923 Palmdale Dam, but 

the latter is about two-thirds the size of Gibson. One would expect the cost,of 

Palmdale to be about two-thirds the cost of Gibson i.e. $1,400,000. Palmdale 

actually cost less than $550,000.71 Thus, in both cases, Reclamation chose more 

expensive solutions than it apparently needed if it had thoroughly embraced the 

structural tradition

.

 )RUWKH0RXQWDLQ'HOO'DPWKHRZQHUVROLFLWHGELGVIRUWKUHHGLIIHUHQW

types of concrete dams. The results are shown in Table 2.1.

Type of dam Bid Concrete

Gravity $230,000 45,000 cu. yds.

$PEXUVHQÀDWVODE $217,000 21,300 cu. yds.

Multiple Arch(Eastwood) $139,000 14,700 cu. yds

7KHRZQHUKDGQRGLI¿FXOW\LQFKRRVLQJWKH(DVWZRRGPXOWLSOHDUFKGHVLJQ

which was completed in 1917.72 The cost was 60 percent of that bid for the gravity dam. Reclamation chose massive designs because it thought them safer, it believed them to appear safer, and it was not under the same constraints as private 

industry to keep costs low.73

Concrete Form and Masonry Mass

By 1927, there had emerged well documented traditions of massive and 

of structural dams. The structural tradition brought forth new methods of analysis, both by physical test and by mathematical calculation. The goal had been 

to build lighter, less expensive, and safer dams. But as the methods of analysis 

became more complex, there seemed to grow an anxiety about uncertainties in 

the analysis itself, and the federal agencies addressed these worries by designing 

heavier structures, which they believed to be safer even though the lighter ones 

were performing at least as well.

It seems to be a natural result of centralized agencies that they seek to 

avoid risks, to question innovations, and to justify heavy expenditures by invoking the specter of failure. But behind this apparent criticism, there lay a deep 

cultural ideology that was characterized by the new and prototypical building 
83

material of the twentieth century. American society, and indeed western society 

as a whole, reacted to reinforced concrete in a profoundly ambiguous way.

Modern concrete clearly stimulated the search for new forms that would 

carry loads with less material and at least as much safety as heavier designs. But 

many engineers, not seeing these possibilities or not valuing them, sought to discredit this search for innovation. They saw concrete rather as a mere substitute 

for stone masonry—indeed, the term masonry today still connotes both stone and 

FRQFUHWH:HEVWHU¶V&ROOHJLDWH'LFWLRQDU\GH¿QHVPDVRQU\DV3VRPHWKLQJ

built, as by a mason, of stone, brick, concrete etc.”

Modern concrete, cast monolithically, made the building of integrated 

structures possible, leading to great savings of materials and weight. But the idea 

of monolithic structures set the academic mind off on a search for new mathematics that left most of the practitioners bewildered. The counter-intuitive result 

was an increased anxiety within the profession over these new forms that seemed 

to deliver primarily new formulas. The performance of equations seemed to replace the performance of structure. It was much easier simply to put the new 

cast material into old familiar forms. Thus, it could be given a modern look by 

VRPHVXUIDFHWUHDWPHQWRUDGGHG¿OLJUHH

American society had, by 1927, passionately embraced completely new 

forms of twentieth century engineering: the automobile, the airplane, and the raGLREXWLWZDVPXFKPRUHGLI¿FXOWWRDFFHSWWKHQHZIRUPVRISUHWZHQWLHWKFHQtury engineering works for bridges, vaulted roofs, and dams. These structures 

were already part of the culture long before reinforced concrete came to encourage their transmutation: stone arches, stone vaults, and stone dams. Had there 

been no such models built into the cultural retina, the concrete arches of Robert 

Maillart, the concrete thin shells of Anton Tedesko, and the concrete dams of 

John Eastwood would no doubt have found widespread acceptance during the 

¿UVWWKLUGRIWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\

In spite of this reluctance to abandon the old forms of stone design, society did embrace the great transforming event of electricity and its late nineteenthcentury innovation of power at a distance. Dams had, for a long time, been used 

for mill power, but the power was local; it had to be used by mechanical transmission. In the East, new industrial towns, such as Lowell, Massachusetts, had 

sprung up in the early nineteenth century to produce textiles by water power, 

EXWWKHGDPVZHUHORZDQGWKHSRZHUGHSHQGHQWXSRQWKHYDJDULHVRIULYHUÀRZ

With the introduction of electric power, new possibilities arose and mainstream 

GDPVFRXOGQRZEHFRPHPXOWLSXUSRVHVWUXFWXUHV)XUWKHUPRUHZLWKWKHGHYHOopment of the West, irrigation dams could also become multipurpose through 

SRZHUSURGXFWLRQ0RVWVLJQL¿FDQWO\WKHVDOHRISRZHUFRXOGQRZMXVWLI\WKH
84

cost of high dams on non-navigable rivers. Two dams illustrate this change 

from single to multipurpose dams—Roosevelt Dam in Arizona built by the 

Reclamation Service and Wilson Dam in Alabama built by the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers. These two serve also as the prelude to the big dam era that would 

follow soon after.

Endnotes

 6HH6:+HOP3-DZD$)RUWL¿HG7RZQRIWKH)RXUWK0LOOHQQLXPB.C.” Archaeology 27 (1974), 136-7.

2. The concept of traditions” as applied to dam design is discussed in Donald C. Jackson, Building the

Ultimate Dam: John S. Eastwood and the Control of Water in the West (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 

1995), 18-21.

3. Nicholas J. Schnitter, A History of Dams: The Useful Pyramids (Rotterdam, Netherlands: A. A. Balkema, 

1994), includes numerous descriptions of early embankment dams.

4. Schnitter, A History of Dams, 55-80.

5. Schnitter, A History of Dams, 123-7.

6. See J. A. Diego-Garcia, “The Chapter on Weirs in the Codex of Juanelo Turriano: A Question of 

Authorship,” 217-34. Norman Smith, A History of Dams (London Peter Davies,1971), 117-20. Also see Smith, 

192-3, for a discussion of Simon Stevin’s 1586 treatise “De Beghinson des Waternichts.”

7. J. E. Gordon, Structures: Or Why Things Don’t Fall Down (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), 33-44, proYLGHVJRRGGLVFXVVLRQRQKRZWKHODWHVHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\ZRUNRI1HZWRQDQG+RRNHLQÀXHQFHGWKHWKHRUHWLcal development of structural mechanics.

8. See Peter Molloy, “19th Century Hydropower: Design and Construction of Lawrence Dam, 1845-1848,” 

Winterthur Portfolio 15 (Winter 1980), 315-43, for references to dam design publications by Belidor, Bossut, 

Smeaton, Coulomb, and Moseley.

 -$7GH6D]LOO\36XUXQW\SHGHSUR¿OG¶HJDOHUHVLVWDQFHSURSRVHSRXUOHVPXUVGHVUHVHUYRLUVG¶HDX ́

Annales des Ponts et Chaussees0'HORFUH30HPRLUHVXUODIRUPHGXSUR¿ODDGRSWHUSRXU

les grande barrs ages en maconnerie des reservoirs,” Annales des Ponts et Chaussee, Memoires et Documents 

(1866), 212-72. Both of these references are taken from Smith, History of Dams.

10. Smith, History of Dams)RUODWHUVWUXFWXUHVVXFKDVWKH7HUQD\'DPDQGWKH%RQ

Dam (1867-70), Delocre selected maximum compressive stresses of 100 psi and 114 psi, but by modern standards, even these were extremely conservative.

11. Edward Wegmann, Design and Construction of Dams, 3rd edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1900), 

69.

12. W. J. M. Rankine, “Report on the Design and Construction of Masonry Dams,” The Engineer 33 (January 

5, 1872), 1-2.

13. In his article on the Lawrence Dam, Molloy reports that Moseley recognized the importance of the “middle 

WKLUG ́LQWKHHDUO\QLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\+RZHYHUZKHQ5DQNLQHGLVFXVVHGWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKHPLGGOHWKLUG

in the 1870s, there is no evidence that anyone considered it a reiteration of previously discussed ideas. Smith 

makes no mention of Moseley in his History of Dams.

14. See Smith, History of Dams, 205-6, for a discussion of how the Gileppe Dam was designed with extremely 

conservative proportions. See Wegmann, Design and Construction, 3rd edition, 81-90, for descriptions of the 

Gileppe and Vyrnwy.

15. E. Sherman Gould, High Masonry Dams (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1897) 3-4.

 *HRUJH+ROPHV0RRUH31HJOHFWHG)LUVW3ULQFLSOHVRI0DVRQU\'DP'HVLJQ ́Engineering News 70 

(September 4, 1913), 442-5.

17. C. L. Harrison, “Provision for Uplift and Ice Pressure in Designing Masonry Dams,” Transactions of the

American Society of Civil EngineersZLWKGLVFXVVLRQ)RUDPRGHUQWUHDWPHQWVHH

Max A. M. Herzog Practical Dam Analysis (Thomas Telford, Ltd.: London, 1999), 80.

18. The upstream face of buttress dams can also be built using wood planks or steel sheets; however, the most 

common types of large-scale buttress dams feature upstream faces built of reinforced concrete.

19. Schnitter, A History of Dams, 124-7 and 144-5.
85

 5REHUW)/HJJHWW37KH-RQHV)DOOV'DPRQWKH5LGHDX&DQDO ́Transactions of the Newcomen Society 31 

(1957-59), 205-218. Unfortunately, any theoretical calculations that may have been used to proportion the design remain unknown, and, as such, it cannot be considered a structure that used mathematical theory as a basis.

21. Smith, History of Dams, 181-3.

 ,QH[DPLQLQJWKHSUR¿OHRIWKH=ROD'DPLWLVHYLGHQWWKDWWKHF\OLQGHUIRUPXODZDVQRWXVHGDVDULJLG

PHDQVRISURSRUWLRQLQJWKHVWUXFWXUH5DWKHU=RODXVHGLWDVDJXLGHWRDVVLVWKLPLQLQFUHDVLQJWKHWKLFNQHVVRI

WKHDUFKDVLWGHVFHQGHGLQWRWKHFDQ\RQ)RUWKHHFOLSVHRIDUFKGDPVVHH6FKQLWWHUA History of Dams, 195.

23. James Dix Schuyler, Reservoirs for Irrigation, Water-Power, and Domestic Water-Supply (New York : 

John Wiley and Sons, 1902), 246-256 provides a good description and photograph of the original Bear Valley 

'DP$OVRVHH)(%URZQ37KH%HDU9DOOH\'DP ́Engineering News 19 (June 23, 1888), 513-4.

24. Schuyler, Reservoirs, 213-37. As designer of this important dam, Schuyler provided an extensive description of it in his book. Also see James D. Schuyler, “The Construction of the Sweetwater Dam,” Transactions of

the American Society of Civil Engineers 19 (1888), 202-3.

25. Albert Pelletreau, “Barrages cintres en forme de voute,” Annales des Pont et Chaussees (1879). This reference is included in Schnitter, “Arch Dams.”

26. Gardiner Williams, discussion on “Lake Cheesman Dam and Reservoir,” Transactions of the American

Society of Civil Engineers 53 (1904), 183. John S. Eastwood, “An Arch Dam Design for the Site of the 

Shoshone Dam,” Engineering News 63 (June 9, 1910), 678-80.

27. Lars Jorgensen, “The Constant-Angle Arch Dam,” Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers

78 (1915), 685-733.

28. Louis Torres, “To the Immortal Name and Memory of George Washington:” The United States Army

Corps of Engineers and the Construction of the Washington Monument (Washington, D.C., 1985). Albert 

E. Cowdry, A City for a Nation: The Army engineers and the Building of Washington, D.C. 1790-1967

(Washington, D.C., 1978).

29. Wisner reviews this history in his report, George Y. Wisner, “Investigation of Stresses Developed in High 

0DVRQU\'DPVRI6KRUW6SDQ ́5HSRUWVXEPLWWHGWR)+1HZHOO&KLHI(QJLQHHU86*HRORJLFDO6XUYH\

Washington, D.C., May 16, 1905, 22 pages.

30. Letter from Wisner et al., in Montrose, California, to Newell in Washington, D.C., October 5, 1904. 

Response from Newell to Wisner, Detroit, October 12, 1904. The recommendation of Wheeler comes in a letter 

IURP:LVQHUDQG-+4XLQWRQWR1HZHOORQ1RYHPEHU3UHVXPDEO\WKH¿QDODSSURYDOFDPHTXLFNO\

WKHUHDIWHU)RUGHWDLOVRQ$3'DYLVVHH&KDUOHV+%LVVHOODQG)(:H\PRXWK30HPRLUIRU$UWKXU3RZHOO

Davis,” Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 100 (1935), 1582-91.

31. Letter report from Wheeler in Los Angeles to Wisner in Los Angeles, May 5, 1905, 9 pages. Covering letter from Wisner in Los Angeles to Newell in Washington, D.C. May 16, 1905 with the complete report (ref. 31). 

The published paper appeared as George Y. Wisner and Edgar T. Wheeler, “Investigation of Stresses in High 

Masonry Dams of Short Spans,” Engineering News 54, No. 60, (August 10, 1905), 141-4. Earlier publications 

GLGGHDOZLWKWKHDUFKGHVLJQVEXWWKH\DSSHDUHGLQREVFXUHSXEOLFDWLRQV)RUH[DPSOH/:DJRQHUDQG+

Vischer, “On the Strains in Curved Masonry Dams.” 3URFHHGLQJVRIWKH7HFKQLFDO6RFLHW\RIWKH3DFL¿F&RDVW

'HFHPEHU6XFKDUWLFOHVGLGQRWKDYHWKHLQÀXHQFHRI:LVQHUDQG:KHHOHU

32. Discussions by Wisner of “Lake Cheesman Dam and Reservoir” Transactions of the American Society of

Civil Engineers 53 (1904), 170-172 and reply by C. L. Harrison, 203-4.

33. H. Hawgood, “Huacal Dam, Sonora, Mexico.” Transactions of the American Society of Engineers 78 

(1915), 565.

34. Lars. R. Jorgensen, “The Constant-Angle Arch Dam,” 686.

 ,IUDGLXVLVWRGHFUHDVHDVSUHVVXUH3LQFUHDVHVWKHQWKHKRUL]RQWDODQJOHTWKDWGH¿QHVWKHDUFRI

each arch slice should remain constant to follow the V-shape of the canyon walls whose width (W) is decreasing linearly. Since W= 2Rsinq, the radius will decrease linearly with W so long as q remains a constant, hence 

WKHFRQVWDQWDQJOHDUF+6LQFHDUFKVWLIIQHVVLVDIXQFWLRQRI52

, the arch will lose stiffness near the base if R 

is not reduced. Since cantilever stiffness depends upon T3, it will greatly diminish for thinner dams, especially 

near the base.

 /DUV-RUJHQVHQ37KH5HFRUGRI'DP)DLOXUHV ́Journal of Electricity6DQ)UDQFLVFR1R

(March 15, 1920). Lars Jorgensen, “Memorandum on Arch Dam Developments,” Proceedings American

Concrete Institute 27 1931.

 )UHG$1RHW]OL3*UDYLW\DQG$UFK$FWLRQLQ&XUYHG'DPV ́Transactions of the American Society of Civil

Engineers, 84 (1921), 23.

38. Noetzli, “Gravity and Arch Action in Curved Dams,” 41. The low factor of safety can be calculated for 

RYHUWXUQLQJDVIROORZV)RU+% DQGIRUQRXSOLIW6) DVVXPLQJDWULDQJXODUGDPVHFWLRQZKLOH

IRUIXOOXSOLIW6) 
86

39. Lars Jorgensen, “Improving Arch Action in Arch Dams,” Transactions of the American Society of Civil

Engineers 83 (1919-1920), (New York: 1921), 316-31. His discussion appears in 84, 68-71. Jorgensen had already reported on the measurements in the Salmon Creek Dam especially related to temperature, and he had referred to observations on his Lake Spaulding Dam in discussing Noetzli’s paper.

40. William Cain, Discussion, 84, 71-91. His analysis was expanded and published as “The Circular Arch 

Under Normal Loads,” Transaction of the American Society of Civil Engineers 85 (1922), 233-48. Noetzli 

wrote a discussion to the paper in 85, 261-4. Also in the discussion, William Cain, a professor of mathematics 

at North Carolina University, compared Noetzli’s graphical method to a purely analytic approach given the previous year by B. A. Smith and noted their close correspondence.

 )UHG1RHW]OL37KH5HODWLRQ%HWZHHQ'HÀHFWLRQVDQG6WUHVVHVLQ$UFK'DPV ́Transactions of the

American Society of Civil Engineers 85 (1922), 306. Noetzli also spoke of time effects and tended to discount 

them in dams; today we recognize that as creep and would agree that in most cases it is not crucial for dams unless the compression stresses are high.

42. C. H. Howell and A. C. Jaquith, “Analysis of Arch Dams by the Trial Load Method,” Transactions of the

American Society of Civil Engineers 93 (1929) 1191-225.

43. According to Ray Lyman Wilbur and Northcutt Ely in the book Hoover Dam Documents 

:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FHGLVFXVVWKHQDPHRI+RRYHU'DPRQSDJHV32Q

September 17, 1930, on initiating construction, Secretary Wilbur issued the following order [to Commissioner 

Mead]: . . .”This is to notify you that the dam which is to be built in the Colorado River at Black Canyon is to 

be called the Hoover Dam . . .” in December 1930, Congressman Taylor . . . called the attention of the House 

(of Representatives) to the fact that the committee (Interior Department Subcommittee on Appropriations) had 

designated the dam as Hoover Dam in the appropriation bill, saying” . . . we unanimously and very gladly wrote 

into this action those words making the naming of that great dam the Hoover Dam by the action of Congress . 

VRWKDWWKHGDPLVQRZRI¿FLDOO\QDPHGE\ERWKWKH6HFUHWDU\RIWKH,QWHULRUDQGE\&RQJUHVV ́7KHELOOEHFDPHODZRQ)HEUXDU\,QWKHQH[WIRXUVXFFHHGLQJDSSURSULDWLRQVDFWVLQDQGHDUO\WKH

GDPZDVGHVLJQDWHGDV3+RRYHU'DP ́3$IWHU0U+RRYHUOHIWRI¿FHWKH,QWHULRU'HSDUWPHQWDOWKRXJKIDLOing to take any formal action, avoided the use of the name ‘Hoover Dam,’ and publicized the names “Boulder 

Canyon Dam’ or ‘Boulder Dam. . . .” Early in the Eightieth Congress, a number of bills were introduced to restore the name of Hoover Dam. . . .” On April 30, 1947, President Harry S. Truman signed a resolution restoring the name Hoover Dam. Though the name “Boulder Dam” was used by Reclamation and others during the 

SODQQLQJDQGDXWKRUL]DWLRQSKDVHVDQGODWHUXQWLOWKHGDPZDVSRSXODUO\DQGXQRI¿FLDOO\NQRZQDV

%RXOGHU'DPRU%RXOGHU&DQ\RQ'DP+RRYHU'DPZDVHYHURI¿FLDOO\QDPHG%RXOGHU'DP

44. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, %RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW)LQDO5HSRUWV3DUW9

- Technical Investigations, Bulletin 1, Bureau of Reclamation, Trial Load Method of Analyzing Arch Dams

'HQYHU&RORUDGR7KLVSDJHUHSRUW¿OOHGZLWKPDWKHPDWLFDOIRUPXODWLRQVGRHVQRWJLYHDQ\

numerical results and hence no interpretations of the method as to is relationship to dimensioning. The 1929 

paper (ref. 44) does give some data on Horse Mesa and the Gibson dams.

 /HWWHUVIURP5):DOWHU$FWLQJ&KLHI(QJLQHHULQ'HQYHUWR&RPPLVVLRQHU0HDGLQ:DVKLQJWRQ

January 16, 1925 and from Commissioner Elwood Mead in Washington to the secretary of the American 

Society of Civil Engineers in New York, January 16, 1925. NARA, Denver, Record Group 115 [hereinafter 

Record Group will be designated with RG].

 5:XF]NRZVNL3)OXVVLJNHLWVEHKlOWHU ́ LQ)ULHGULFK,JQD](GOHUYRQ(PSHUJHUHGLWRUHandbuch für

Eisenbetonbau (Berlin: Wilhelm Ernst & Sohn, 1911edition), 3, 348-51, 407-13.

 /HWWHUIURP)UHG1RHW]OLLQ6DQ)UDQFLVFRWRWKH%RDUGRI7UXVWHHVRIWKH(QJLQHHULQJ)RXQGDWLRQLQ1HZ

York City, March 3, 1922, 2 pages.

 )UHG1RHW]OL3$UFK'DP7HPSHUDWXUH&KDQJHVDQG'HÀHFWLRQ0HDVXUHPHQWV ́Engineering News-Record

89, No. 22 (November 30, 1922), 930-2.

 /HWWHUVIURP1RHW]OLLQ6DQ)UDQFLVFRWR'DYLVLQ:DVKLQJWRQ'&0DUFKDQGIURP'DYLVLQ(O

3DVRWRWKH(QJLQHHULQJ)RXQGDWLRQLQ1HZ<RUN0DUFK6HHDOVRDOHWWHUIURP$OIUHG)OLQQVHFUHWDU\RIWKH(QJLQHHULQJ)RXQGDWLRQLQ1HZ<RUNWR'DYLVLQ:DVKLQJWRQ0DUFK

 /HWWHUVIURP)(:H\PRXWKLQ'HQYHUWR'DYLVLQ:DVKLQJWRQ1RYHPEHUDQGIURP0RUULV

Bien (Acting Director) in Washington, D.C., to Weymouth in Denver, November 20, 1922. In the fall of 1922, 

:H\PRXWKDVNHG'DYLVLI5HFODPDWLRQFRXOGQRWJLYH¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWWRWKHSURMHFWWKH$FWLQJ'LUHFWRU

agreed to some support. NARA, Denver RG115.

51. “Report on Arch Dam Investigations,” 1, November 1927, Proceedings of the American Society of Civil

Engineers0D\,Q%XOOHWLQ1R-XQHWKH(QJLQHHULQJ)RXQGDWLRQQRWHGWKDWWKH

Edison Company had put up $25,000 and another $75,000 was needed.
87

52. “A Progress Report on the Stevenson Creek Test Dam,” Bulletin No. 2, (QJLQHHULQJ)RXQGDWLRQ

'HFHPEHUSDJHV2Q'HFHPEHUWKH(QJLQHHULQJ)RXQGDWLRQLVVXHGDSURJUHVVUHSRUWJLYing the dam design and the list of contributors, which was dominated by private industry. The Bureau of 

Reclamation was not listed although the Bureau of Standards was, largely through the assignment of W. A. 

Slater, its engineer-physicist.

 /HWWHUIURP-XOLDQ+LQGVLQ'HQYHUWR5):DOWHULQ'HQYHU'HFHPEHU1$5$'HQYHU

RG115.

 /HWWHUIURP5):DOWHULQ:DVKLQJWRQ'&WR(OZRRG0HDGLQ:DVKLQJWRQ'&'HFHPEHU

NARA, Denver, RG115.

 /HWWHUVIURP5):DOWHULQ'HQYHUWR(OZRRG0HDGLQ:DVKLQJWRQ'&)HEUXDU\DQGIURP

0HDGLQ:DVKLQJWRQ'&WR:DOWHULQ'HQYHU)HEUXDU\

56. John L. Savage, “Arch Dam Model Tests - Progress Report,” December 17, 1928.

57. “Report,” November 1927, Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers (May 1928), 8-9.

 )UHG1RHW]OL3,PSURYHG7\SHRI0XOWLSOH$UFK'DP ́Transactions of the American Society of Civil

Engineers 87 (1924), 410, Closure.

59. Hardy Cross, “Discussion of Design of Symmetrical Concrete Arches by C. S. Whitney,” Transactions

of the American Society of Civil Engineers 88 (1925), 1075-7. In 1932, Cross would introduce the most sigQL¿FDQWVLPSOL¿HGDQDO\VLVSURFHGXUHHYHUSUHVHQWHGIRUUHLQIRUFHGFRQFUHWHIUDPHVWUXFWXUHV1RHW]OLZRUNHG

IURPDVROLGPDWKEDVLVEXWVLPSOL¿HGLWE\JUDSKLFVWDWLVWLFVD6ZLVVWUDGLWLRQ&DLQVHHUHIZDVDPDWKematician, not an engineer, and his work is very complex, but Noetzli could understand it easily. Reclamation 

FDUULHGRQIURP1RHW]OL¶VVLPSOL¿HGDSSURDFKWRGHYHORSDQHODERUDWHDQGKLJKO\FRPSOH[PDWKHPDWLFDOPHWKod. Cross criticized all such complexity and sought to develop methods that the average practicing structural 

engineer could easily use.

60. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering in the United States, 269.

61. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering in the United States, 537, 539.

62. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering in the United States, 535-8.

63. Jorgensen won the 1918 Norman Medal for his paper on multiple arch dams, Noetzli won the 1922 Croes 

Medal for his paper on arch cantilever dams (no Norman Metal awarded that year), and Jacobsen won the 1924 

and 1927 Norman Medals for his papers on multiple arch dams and thick arch dams respectively. B. A. Smith 

won the 1920 Croes Medal, William Cain won the 1926 Croes Medal, and Charles Whitney won the 1925 

Croes Medal, all three awards were for arch analyses. H. de B. Parsons won the 1925 Rowland Prize for a paper on a multiple arch dam. See $PHULFDQ6RFLHW\RI&LYLO(QJLQHHUV2I¿FLDO5HJLVWHU (1982), 182-3, 186.

64. Report, 1927, Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers (May 1928), 38-41 and Kollgaard 

and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering in the United States, 539.

65. Jackson, Building the Ultimate Dam&KDSWHUVDQG)RU*ROGPDUN¶VGHVLJQVHH+HQU\*ROGPDUN

“The Power Plant, Pipe Line and Dam of the Pioneer Electric Power Company at Ogden, Utah,” with 

Discussion and Correspondence. Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 38 (December 1897), 

246-314.

66. Jackson, Building the Ultimate Dam, 4.

 )UHG1RHW]OL30XOWLSOH$UFK'DPV ́(GZDUG:HJPDQQ The Designs and Construction of Dams, 8thedition (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1927), 446-50.

68. Report, 1927, Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers (May 1928) 189.

69. Noetzli, “Multiple-Arch Dams,” 1927, 482.

70. “Summary of Cost, Gibson Dam,” Final Report$SULO/HWWHUIURP5):DOWHULQ'HQYHU

to Elwood Mead, in Washington, March 13, 1928, which transmitted a report of the Board of Engineers for the 

2Z\KHH'DP)HEUXDU\1$5$'HQYHU5*

71. Noetzli, “Multiple-Arch Dams,” 1927, 486-90. Jackson, Building the Ultimate Dam, 207 gives a cost of 

$435,000.

72. Noetzli, “Multiple-Arch Dams,” 478-82. Jackson gives a value of 17,750 cubic yards of concrete for the 

multiple arch design but the same cost. See Jackson, Building the Ultimate Dam, 147-8.

73. Noetzli, “Multiple-Arch Dams,” see pages 187-92 for a more detailed discussion of the attitude of the 

Reclamation Service (changed to the Bureau of Reclamation in 1923).

89

CHAPTER 3

EARLY MULTIPURPOSE DAMS:

ROOSEVELT AND THE RECLAMATION SERVICE,

WILSON AND THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

FROM SINGLE TO MULTIPURPOSE DAMS

Roosevelt and Wilson Dams

Throughout the nineteenth century, people built dams either for municiSDOVWRUDJHIRUZDWHUSRZHUIRUÀRRGFRQWURORUIRULUULJDWLRQ0DQ\ZHUHSULvately built, some by local governments, but none by the federal government except for river navigation. With only a few late nineteenth-century exceptions, all 

dams were low and brought forth little modern engineering. By the end of that 

century, the problems associated with erecting masonry dams gave rise to their 

VWXG\ZKLFK(GZDUG:HJPDQQVXPPDUL]HGLQWKH¿UVWHGLWLRQRIKLVFODVVLFWH[W

on The Design and Construction of Dams (1888). He considered only masonry gravity dams, and it was the Quaker Bridge Dam design, over 100 feet higher 

WKDQDQ\SUHYLRXVPDVRQU\GDPWKDWVWLPXODWHG:HJPDQQWRZULWHKLV¿UVWHGLtion. He noted only 14 American dams, none by the federal government, and 

most were for municipal water supply. He did not write about earth embankments, although many had been built and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had 

long been engaged in such work for levees.1

It was not until early in the twentieth century that dams designed to 

serve more than one purpose began to be built, and, then, largely because of the 

JURZLQJGHPDQGIRUHOHFWULFDOSRZHUDQGLWVQDWXUDOVRXUFHLQWKHÀRZDQGIDOO

of water. That demand, in itself, did not bring the federal government into the 

building of multipurpose dams; rather, it arose from the mission that the two 

agencies had: navigation for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and irrigation for 

the Reclamation Service. No structures better show the origins of dams built for 

more than one purpose than Roosevelt Dam on the Salt River and Wilson Dam 

on the Tennessee River. These dams will form the central part of this chapter.

In both cases the governmental agencies adopted forms that had been 

ZRUNHGRXWE\QRQIHGHUDOGHVLJQHUV)RUWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHWKHVWUXFtures were for storage, but for the Corps, they were run-of-the-river dams. 

Municipalities had been building large storage dams of masonry in the late nineteenth century, and mainstream dams began to be commonly used early in the 

twentieth century. The storage dams are usually marked for their height and 
90

often appear in narrow valleys, while the mainstream dams are low but often 

built across wide stretches of river.

We have already seen how the Reclamation Service dealt with storage 

dams by designing curved masonry dams, which led engineers to develop the trial load method of analysis. Roosevelt Dam was such a design, but its initial design neglected completely any arch action. However, its 400 foot radius and relatively thin upper regions certainly resulted in substantial load being carried by 

arching. After completion of the design, it was analyzed both as an arch (with no 

cantilever action) and as a cantilever (with no arch action) to estimate conservative values for its margin of safety.2

By contrast, Wilson Dam is a pure gravity structure. Its crucial problems were with the foundations and were centered on uplift, sliding, and overturning. In addition, much of the dam is a spillway passing that part of the river 

ÀRZQRWXVHGIRUSRZHU$FULWLFDOLVVXHVWXGLHGVLQFHWKHODWHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\

was the downstream shape of the spillway cross section, designed to avoid sepaUDWLRQEHWZHHQWKHZDWHUÀRZDQGWKHFRQFUHWHVXUIDFH7KLVVHSDUDWLRQFDQOHDG

to a partial vacuum on the concrete, pulling it loose, and thereby forming holes 

by cavitation.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had studied this question of shape 

in connection with dams on the Cumberland River, and in 1908 Major William 

+DUWVGLUHFWHGDVXUYH\RIRYHUÀRZPDVRQU\ZHLUVLHVSLOOZD\VDQGRWKHUGDP

FURVVVHFWLRQVIRUUHODWLYHO\ORZRYHUÀRZGDPV&DUULHGRXWLQGHWDLOE\WKHH[-

perienced John S. Walker, who had been an engineer for the Corps since 1872, 

the study appeared in summary form in a later edition of Wegmann’s famous 

book.3

 Wegmann had described the general problem with water pressure, uplift 

pressure, and the S-shaped curve on the downstream face. It was this type of design that would engage the engineers of the Corps as they moved toward multipurpose mainstream dams.4

But the movement toward such dams was controversial within the 

Corps. One prime illustration came from the same William Harts in 1909. 

President Roosevelt, in 1908, had articulated clearly to the Congress the multipurpose nature of river development by linking navigation to power. But the following year, as Nashville’s district engineer, Colonel Harts published eight criticisms of the high dams and storage reservoirs required by multipurpose river development. He even predicted that “it seems improbable that it [such development] will ever be extensively used.” He was not alone in the Corps, even West 

Point taught (until 1938) that such developments would be prohibitively expensive.5
91

Because of the naturally competing uses for dams, these objections were 

not outlandish. The most serious one, referred to in the West Point text, was the 

FRQÀLFWEHWZHHQÀRRGFRQWURODQGSRZHUJHQHUDWLRQ7KHUHVHUYRLUEHKLQGWKH

GDPQHHGVWREHNHSWORZWREHDEOHWRFDWFKÀRRGZDWHUVZKHUHDVWKHUHVHUYRLU

needs to remain full to generate maximum power. Moreover, navigation requires 

the reservoir to be drawn down during periods of low water runoff so that the 

downstream water level can be kept high enough for shipping and so that irrigation can proceed. On the other hand, that loss of water makes recreation less attractive and can hurt the value of lake side property. It is far easier to manage a 

VLQJOHSXUSRVHGDPZKHUHWKHUHVHUYRLULVGHGLFDWHGWRRQHRUWKHRWKHUXVH)RU

the Corps, this meant navigation and for Reclamation, irrigation.

The multipurpose debate is most strikingly characterized in the 1920s by 

a strong opponent of Colonel Harts. Harts had become division engineer in 1920 

DQGKLVRSSRQHQWZDV0DMRU+DUROG&)LVNHWKHQWKHGLVWULFWHQJLQHHUIRUERWK

1DVKYLOOHDQG&KDWWDQRRJD'LVWULFWV)LVNHUDWKHUWKDQ6HQDWRU*HRUJH1RUULV

has even been called the father of the Tennessee Valley Authority. More accuUDWHO\)LVNHZDVDSULPDU\VWLPXOXVIRUWKHZHOONQRZQUHSRUWVDQG3SHUKDSV

the greatest proponent of multipurpose and comprehensive water resource development in the nation during the 1920s.” But he would achieve that distinction at 

a price. In the Corps, one did not publicly dispute a superior like Harts without it 

damaging one’s career.6

 )LVNHZDVFDUU\LQJRQWKDWPDMRUIXQFWLRQRIWKH&RUSVWRVXUYH\ULYHUV

but the Corps’ river surveys had, by the early twentieth century, expanded to river basin surveys rather than just the navigable streams. So, both the Reclamation 

and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers were encouraged by the Progressive 

Era President Theodore Roosevelt to view their historic missions more broadly 

DQGWRWKLQNVSHFL¿FDOO\RIGDPVDVSDUWZDWHUUHVRXUFHV1RSDUWRIWKHV\VWHP

would characterize that multipurpose concept better than large-scale multipurpose dams, such as the two named for Presidents, Roosevelt and Wilson, whose 

DGPLQLVWUDWLRQVKHOSHGWRGH¿QHWKHHUDLQZKLFKVXFKPDMRUUHVWUXFWXULQJRIWKH

nation began.

 5RRVHYHOW'DPDORQJZLWK3DWK¿QGHUDQG%XIIDOR%LOO'DPVZDV

DSUHFXUVRUWR+RRYHU'DPWKH¿UVWPDMRUPXOWLSXUSRVHVWUXFWXUHIURP

Reclamation; similarly, Wilson Dam was the precursor to Bonneville Dam, the 

¿UVWPDMRUPXOWLSXUSRVHVWUXFWXUHGHVLJQHGDQGEXLOWHQWLUHO\E\WKH86$UP\

Corps of Engineers. Roosevelt Dam was followed by Arrowrock, Elephant 

Butte, and Owyhee Dams, all impressively large for their time, but none was 

FRQFHLYHGDVPXOWLSXUSRVHWRDQ\VLJQL¿FDQWGHJUHH%\FRQWUDVWWKH0F&DOO

)HUU\.HRNXNDQG:LOVRQ'DPVZHUHFOHDUO\GHVLJQHGIRUWKHJHQHUDWLRQRI
92

power with the latter two being truly multipurpose, having both navigation and 

power as primary objectives.

The two agencies moved into a broader concept for their dams during 

the period leading up to Hoover and Bonneville. Irrigation required study of arid 

regions around and sometimes at great distance from the reservoirs. The experience of the Corps with Wilson led them to think about electrical power distribution at a distance. Even before those dams, the Corps had, for a long time, been 

FRQFHUQHGDERXWÀRRGLQJDQGOHYHHVZKLFKUHTXLUHGFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIPRUHWKDQ

just navigation.

In this chapter, we shall explore the origins and developments of the 

Roosevelt and Wilson Dams and end with the manner in which the Tennessee 

9DOOH\VWXGLHVOHG0DMRU)LVNHWRSURSRVHULYHUEDVLQVWXGLHVWKDWZRXOGOHDGGLrectly to the 308 reports. These reports laid the basis for the great federal dams 

that began in the 1930s amid the turmoil of the depression. But there were other 

IDFWRUVERWKSROLWLFDODQGWHFKQRORJLFDOWKDWZRXOGLQÀXHQFHGDPEXLOGLQJDIter 1932. American democracy pits the executive branch against the legislative 

branch, which meant that the 308 concept, however similar it made the centralized organization of river basins seem, still had to pass the more localized scruWLQ\RI&RQJUHVV)LVNHFDOOHGIRUD7HQQHVVHH9DOOH\SODQWREHGLUHFWHGE\WKH

86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV3UHVLGHQW)UDQNOLQ5RRVHYHOWWRRNWKHLGHDDQG

decided that it should be a model for other major river basins, but the Congress, 

after approving the Tennessee Valley Authority, would go no further.

Thus, the story of major dams in the other basins exhibits continued conÀLFWEHWZHHQWKH3UHVLGHQWDQG&RQJUHVVDQGEHWZHHQWKHVHWZRIHGHUDODJHQFLHV

WKHPVHOYHV7KHUHVROXWLRQRIWKHFRQÀLFWVRUPRUHDFFXUDWHO\WKHSK\VLFDOUHVXOWVRIWKHVHFRQÀLFWVLOOXVWUDWHKRZWKH$PHULFDQV\VWHPRISROLWLFVRSHUDWHG

LQWKHVDQGVWLOORSHUDWHVHYHQDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\

Because of the uniqueness of each major basin–-the Colorado, the Columbia, the 

Missouri, the Central Valley of California, and the Ohio-upper Mississippi–-the 

resolutions would turn out to be unique to each basin. The major dams we have 

FKRVHQWRVWXG\WHQGWREHVLJQL¿FDQWO\GLIIHUHQWIURPHDFKRWKHUERWKLQWKHLU

forms and in their associated politics.

YEARS OF TURMOIL: FROM RECLAMATION SERVICE TO BUREAU

Newell, Davis and Wisner

When the Reclamation Service was authorized in the summer of 1902, 

)UHGHULFN+1HZHOOKDGZRUNHGIRUWKH86*HRORJLFDO6XUYH\IRUDOPRVW

years. He began with Powell’s Irrigation Survey in the late 1880s, and, 
93

after Congress withdrew support for this initiative, he repositioned himself as the 

*HRORJLFDO6XUYH\¶V&KLHI+\GURJUDSKHULQFKDUJHRIPHDVXULQJWKHÀRZRIULYers throughout the United States. Based in Washington, D.C., Newell cultivated 

relationships with political and cultural leaders through participation in non-government organizations (such as the National Geographic Society); by the start of 

the new century, he was acknowledged nationally as a prominent irrigation advocate. Nonetheless, at the time of his appointment as Chief Engineer for the 

Reclamation Service, his professional experience had been almost entirely that 

of an administrator. He had not been involved in the design, construction or operation of any functioning irrigation projects, nor had he supervised the design or 

construction of any large dams or water storage structures. In this light, it is not 

)LJXUH)UHGHULFN+1HZHOO865HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFH&KLHI(QJLQHHU

1907); second Director (1907-1914). Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
94

surprising that Reclamation Service records contain little evidence of Newell’s 

involvement in the bureau’s technical work.7

In Newell’s place, Arthur Powell Davis functioned as the Reclamation 

6HUYLFH¶VVHQLRURI¿FLDOUHVSRQVLEOHIRUPDWWHUVRIHQJLQHHULQJLQKH

was appointed Assistant Chief Engineer, and, after Newell’s formal designation as Director in 1907, he assumed the title of Chief Engineer. A nephew of 

John Wesley Powell, Davis received an engineering degree from Columbian 

University (later renamed George Washington University) in Washington, D.C. 

After graduation in 1888, he joined Powell’s Irrigation Survey and remained 

)LJXUH$UWKXU3RZHOO'DYLV865HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFH$VVLVWDQW&KLHI(QJLQHHU

(1902–1907), Chief Engineer (1907-1920), Director (1914-1923). Source: Bureau of

Reclamation.
95

through the 1890s as an employee of the U.S. Geological Survey.8 Davis was 

DFWLYHLQXQGHUWDNLQJ¿HOGZRUN±±IRUH[DPSOHLQKHDXWKRUHGDGHWDLOHG

Geological Survey publication outlining possible dam and irrigation projects on 

the Gila and Salt Rivers in Central Arizona9

––but, like Newell, he had not been 

substantively involved in the actual operation of irrigation systems or the construction of dams prior to formation of the Reclamation Service.

As a means of facilitating Reclamation’s engineering work, Newell instituted a system of consulting “engineering boards.” These boards usually consisted of three men who were either high-level, full-time Reclamation Service 

employees (known as supervisory engineers) or part-time consultants (designated 

consulting engineers). These boards—which sat atop a hierarchy of district engineers (who were originally assigned responsibility for a state or territory and later 

given jurisdiction over districts encompassing more than one state), planning and 

FRQVWUXFWLRQHQJLQHHUVIRUVSHFL¿FSURMHFWVHQJLQHHULQJDVVLVWDQWVDQGHQJLQHHUing aides—were authorized to prepare, review or approve plans related to various 

projects.10 The need for a fairly elaborate system of project administration was 

largely dictated by the geographically-diffuse character of Reclamation’s work; 

for example, a 1904 letter from Charles Walcott (Director of the U.S. Geological 

Survey and Newell’s immediate superior) to the Secretary of the Interior explaining Reclamation’s organization reported that:

)LJXUH7KHRGRUH5RRVHYHOW'DPRQWKH6DOW5LYHU3URMHFW0D\Source:

Bureau of Reclamation.
96

The plan of organization is necessarily different from that which 

would be adopted if all of the work were concentrated in one 

state or locality. It would be a comparatively small matter to 

supervise the work under these circumstances. The conditions 

are such that plans must be prepared and executed almost simultaneously in 13 states and 3 territories and in localities hundreds of miles apart. Hence it becomes necessary to have at 

each point men located to carry on certain work and other men 

so situated that they can travel from point to point and give expert information and advice.11

As a result, each Reclamation project was overseen by a separate and distinct 

“engineering board,” but many supervising and consulting engineers served on 

more than one board.

When selecting an engineer to provide advice on large-scale dam design, Newell turned to George Y. Wisner, a 63-year-old hydraulic engineer from 

Detroit, Michigan. Prior to 1903, Wisner’s professional interests focused on issues such as sanitary engineering, harbor development, and water transportation 

)LJXUH(QJLQHURRPDQGFDEOHWRZHUVRQWKHHDVWVLGHRI5RRVHYHOW'DPGXULQJFRQstruction (1903-1911). Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
97

along the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River.12 Wisner may have lacked experience in irrigation, storage dam construction, and western water projects in 

general, but this did not deter Newell from appointing him as a senior member 

of engineering boards for several projects. In addition, Wisner was also called 

upon to take responsibility for mathematically analyzing arch dam designs for 

WKH6KRVKRQHDQG3DWK¿QGHUUHVHUYRLUVLWHV13 Wisner’s participation in the early 

work of the Reclamation Service was unquestionably important, but he remains 

DSUREOHPDWLF¿JXUHEHFDXVHDIWHUKLVXQH[SHFWHGGHDWKLQ-XO\KLVQDPH

practically never appears in regard to any ongoing bureau projects; in addition, 

neither Newell, Davis, nor anyone else associated with the Reclamation Service 

prepared a “memoir” (or obituary) recounting his career for publication in the 

Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers, something that was a 

common practice for senior members of the profession.

The Salt River Project

Under Newell’s leadership, the early Reclamation Service planned 

and built several irrigation systems. These included the Salt River Project 

in central Arizona, the Truckee-Carson Project in Nevada (later named the 

)LJXUH7KLV1RYHPEHUSKRWRJUDSKVKRZVWKHODUJHEORFNVRIVWRQHXVHGLQ

construction of Roosevelt Dam. Note the powerhouse in the lower right corner of the picture. 

Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
98

1HZODQGV3URMHFWLQKRQRURI)UDQFLV1HZODQGVWKH0LON5LYHU3URMHFWDORQJ

the Canadian border in northern Montana, the Shoshone Project near Cody in 

Northern Wyoming, and the North Platte Project in southeastern Wyoming and 

western Nebraska. These early projects were spread out to encompass as many 

GLIIHUHQWVWDWHVDVSRVVLEOH7KLVDFWLRQUHÀHFWHGERWKWKHOHJDOUHTXLUHPHQWWKDW

monies accrued from public land sales be expended on projects in those states or 

territories where the land was sold and Newell’s desire to obtain widespread political support for the newly established Reclamation Service. But, in attempting to plan and implement several major reclamation projects within a time span 

of only a few years, great strain was placed on Newell, Davis, and the entire bureau staff. The pressure on the nascent organization was further exacerbated by 

Newell’s arguments, expressed prior to the bureau’s formation, that extolled the 

VFLHQWL¿FH[SHUWLVHDQGVNLOORIWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWLQFRQVWUXFWLQJSURMHFWV

EH\RQGWKHFDSDFLW\RISULYDWHO\¿QDQFHGHQWHUSULVH

Newell’s bureau never suffered from any cataclysmic dam failure and—

within this context—avoided any disasters related to technical competence. But, 

in an economic context, Reclamation experienced shortcomings related to cost 

overruns as well as lengthy delays in project completion. One of the most prominent of Reclamation’s early efforts was Roosevelt Dam, built as part of the Salt 

River Project in central Arizona. A brief review of this project offers insight into 

the problematic success of the Reclamation Service.

Roosevelt Dam

At the time of its authorization in 1902, the Reclamation Service was intended purely as a means of providing federal support for irrigation in 16 western states. Electric power production was not perceived as a primary or essential 

purpose of the Reclamation Service, and projects initially were not intended to 

serve “multiple purposes,” but rather were to focus on supplying water for irrigation. However, once construction commenced on a dam and irrigation system, 

purposes other than irrigation could become integrated into it.

 $QWLFLSDWLRQRIWKHEHQH¿WVWREHDFFUXHGE\5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHHQdeavors did not derive from any emphasis that they might serve “multiple purSRVHV ́5DWKHUWKH\ZHUHSURPRWHGE\)UHGHULFN1HZHOODVSURYLGLQJDQHI-

¿FLHQWPHDQVRI¿QDQFLQJODUJHVFDOHSXEOLFZRUNVWKDWZRXOGDYRLGZDVWHIXO

spending and offer value to American society beyond the scope of what privateO\¿QDQFHGLUULJDWLRQSURMHFWVZHUHFDSDEOHRI(I¿FLHQF\E\ZKLFKWKH\PHDQW

primarily minimizing cost)—and not “multiple-purpose”—would become the 

hallmark by which early Reclamation Service projects were judged by the water 

users who would assume responsibility for repaying the costs of these projects.
99

To better understand how the early Reclamation Service grappled with 

the problems and opportunities that confronted it in the decade or so after 1902, 

the following discussion focuses on Roosevelt Dam in central Arizona. Selected 

E\WKH6HFUHWDU\RIWKH,QWHULRUDVRQHRIWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFH¶V¿UVW¿YH

authorized projects, Roosevelt Dam was erected in concert with land owners in the greater Phoenix region (known as the Salt River Valley Water Users’ 

Association) in what became known as the Salt River Project. The Salt River 

3URMHFWHYHQWXDOO\FDPHWRLQFOXGHDVLJQL¿FDQWK\GURHOHFWULFSRZHUFRPSRQHQW

And it came to embroil Newell and the Reclamation Service in a struggle with 

the Water Users’ Association over repayment of—and control over—a project 

that dramatically exceeded initial cost estimates and engendered skepticism over 

WKHDFWXDO3HI¿FLHQF\ ́RIWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFH7KLVVWUXJJOHZDVQRWXQLTXH

WR5RRVHYHOW'DPDQGWKH6DOW5LYHU3URMHFWEXWLQIDFWLWUHÀHFWHGGLI¿FXOWLHV

that encumbered Newell and the Reclamation Service on a region-wide basis.

Modern irrigation development in the Phoenix area commenced in the 

1860s, when Jack Swilling (an ex-Confederate soldier) and other early Anglo settlers cleaned out an ancient canal originally built by the Hohokam Indians.14 In 

the 1870s and 1880s, several privately owned canals began to draw water from 

WKH6DOW5LYHUIRVWHULQJFRQFHUQWKDWWKHULYHU¶VQDWXUDOÀRZFRXOGQRWVHUYHDOO

the competing ditches.15 In reaction to this concern, an 1889 survey expedition, 

sponsored by the City of Phoenix and Maricopa County, located a large reservoir 

site about 60 miles east of Phoenix, just downstream from where Tonto Creek 

enters the Salt River.16 Known initially as the Tonto Dam site, it became the 

site of Roosevelt Dam (named after the sitting President) when the Reclamation 

6HUYLFHLQLWLDWHGSODQVWREXLOGRQHRILWV¿UVWODUJHGDPVDWWKHORFDWLRQ

In the early 1890s, the privately owned Hudson Reservoir and Canal 

&RPSDQ\¿OHGDQDSSOLFDWLRQWREXLOGDODUJHGDPDWWKH7RQWRVLWH17 Exactly 

how close the Hudson Company ever came to actually building a dam at the site 

UHPDLQVREVFXUHDQGFHUWDLQO\QRFRQVWUXFWLRQZRUNRIDQ\VFDOHRUVLJQL¿FDQFH

ever occurred. But plans for the Hudson Company’s Tonto Dam were widely 

GLVVHPLQDWHGDQGWKH\UHFHLYHGSURPLQHQWQRWLFHLQWKH¿UVWHGLWLRQRI-DPHV'

Schuyler’s book, Reservoirs for Irrigation, Water-Power and Domestic Water

Supply, published in 1901. Among the more striking aspects of the Hudson proposal was its inclusion of a 6,768 horsepower hydroelectric power component in 

the project, or, as Schuyler described the plan, “a combined irrigation and electric-power project, the same water being used for both purposes.”18 The revenue 

derived from the sale of electric power to businesses and consumers throughout 

the region was envisaged as playing a key role in paying the bonds necessary to 

¿QDQFHFRQVWUXFWLRQ
100

At the start of the twentieth century, Phoenix’s civic leaders began lobE\LQJIRUIHGHUDODVVLVWDQFHWREXLOGDVWRUDJHGDPDW7RQWR$W¿UVWWKLVOREbying focused on gaining approval for the issuance of publicly-backed bonds to 

help support dam construction (federal approval was necessary because Arizona 

was a territory and did not become a state until 1912); but once Theodore 

Roosevelt became president in September 1901, Phoenix leaders changed strategies and started advocating direct federal involvement in sponsoring the work.19 

In 1903, their lobbying bore fruit when the Secretary of the Interior selected the 

6DOW5LYHU9DOOH\IRURQHRIWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFH¶V¿UVWPDMRUSURMHFWV20

 $OWKRXJK¿QDQFLQJIRUHDUO\5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHSURMHFWVZDVLQWHQGHG

to come from the proceeds of public land sales, almost all of the almost 

200,000 acres of land to be served by the Salt River Project was in private 

hands.21 Nonetheless, the Salt River Project offered the Reclamation Service an 

opportunity to develop one of the West’s premier reservoir sites. And this opSRUWXQLW\DSSHDUHGWR1HZHOODVWRRDWWUDFWLYHWRSDVVE\)RU3KRHQL[ERRVWHUV

the federal government was a welcomed supporter for their dreams of storing the 

ÀRRGZDWHUVRIWKH6DOW5LYHUEHKLQGDODUJHGDPHVSHFLDOO\EHFDXVHLWDSSHDUHG

WKDWWKHSULYDWHLQYHVWPHQWPDUNHWKDGQRLQWHUHVWLQDVVXPLQJWKHULVNRI¿QDQFing such an endeavor. Reclamation Service Chief Engineer Newell’s promise of 

DQHI¿FLHQWO\DQGHFRQRPLFDOO\SUXGHQWSODQWREXLOG5RRVHYHOW'DPXQGHUIHGeral auspices generated excitement and anticipation on the part of Phoenix area 

farmers and residents. But, as will be seen, this same excitement and anticipation eventually spawned resentment when Newell could not deliver completion 

of the Roosevelt Dam project in a timely and economical manner.

In 1903, Newell directed his Assistant Chief Engineer, Arthur Powell 

Davis, to take the lead in organizing work on Roosevelt Dam and urged him to:

Concentrate your energies as far as practicable on the pushing 

forward of the Salt River Project . . . and laying out a scheme of 

further work, involving the purchase of lands, rights of way, 

etc. . . .22

In selecting a design for Roosevelt Dam, Davis adopted a masonry 

curved gravity design that depended upon its huge mass for stability. In the late 

nineteenth century, masonry gravity dams had become the standard for metropolitan water systems (i.e., New York’s Croton Dam and Boston’s Wachusett Dam), 

and Newell and Davis apparently considered it appropriate that their bureau’s 

most visible dam project an aura of permanence and stability similar to dams 

built by major municipalities.23 Although the Reclamation Service never explicitly stated that Roosevelt Dam was to mimic major structures of the Eastern 
101

United States, there is no evidence that alternatives to a masonry curved gravity 

design were ever contemplated.24

In the 1890s, the Hudson Reservoir and Canal Company publicized a 

masonry curved gravity dam design for the Tonto site.25 Later, in 1902, Davis 

proposed a structure that closely resembled the Hudson Company’s plan, and this 

was subsequently adopted for construction.26 As Newell later wrote:

We [the Reclamation Service] have been inclined to adhere to 

the older, more conservative type of solid dam, largely perhaps 

because of the desire not only to have the works substantial but 

to have them appear so and recognized by the public as in accordance with established practice.27

With storage dams, Newell’s concern for appearance and its effect on 

public perception was particularly acute:

Plans for the construction of storage works, while they must be 

prepared with regard to reasonable economy, must be [undertaken] with a view to being not merely safe but looking safe. 

People must not merely be told that they are substantial, but 

when the plain citizen visits the works he must see for himself 

that there is every indication of the permanency and stability 

of a great storage dam . . . he must feel, to the very innermost 

recesses of his consciousness, that the structure is beyond all 

question.28

 *LYHQVXFKVHQWLPHQWVDVH[SUHVVHGE\WKHWRSRI¿FLDOLQWKHHDUly Reclamation Service, the choice of a masonry curved gravity design for 

Roosevelt Dam–without serious consideration of possible alternatives–becomes 

more understandable.

The selection of a basic design represented one of the least problematic 

aspects of early planning for the Roosevelt Dam project. Because of the Tonto 

VLWH¶VUHPRWHORFDWLRQPRUHWKDQPLOHVIURPDUDLOKHDGLQWKH3KRHQL[7HPSH

area and 40 miles from the railroad that reached the mining town of Globe), a 

special effort was needed to build the arduous “Apache Trail” supply road connecting Phoenix to the site. Essentially, all supplies necessary to build the dam–

other than those procured locally–would have to be hauled in by mule teams over 

the 60-mile-long Apache Trail. This would prove logistically cumbersome from 

the time that early construction work commenced in 1904 until formal completion of the masonry dam in 1911. The other key component of the project necessary to complete before work on the dam proper could start was the construction 
102

on the upper Salt River of a diversion dam connected to the damsite by a 19-mile 

long canal. This canal was designed to provide water to a hydroelectric 

powerplant that would generate the electricity necessary to operate equipment 

(including the aerial cableway) at the dam site.

The masonry blocks comprising the bulk of the dam were quarried 

from the site’s canyon walls and placed via the aerial cableway strung across the 

site. The concrete used to bond the masonry blocks into a monolithic mass was 

formed using cement produced at a cement mill built by the Reclamation Service 

a few hundred feet upstream from the site. The cement mill represented an attempt to limit the amount of construction material that would have to be hauled 

in over the Apache Trail. But while the cement mill certainly eliminated the need 

to haul in cement, it required large quantities of fuel oil to be imported to operate 

the high-heat cement kilns, and securing a reliable fuel oil supply proved to be a 

troublesome task.29

To allow excavation of the site down to bedrock, an initial diversion tunnel was driven through the southern canyon wall, starting in 1905. Later supplemented with a second diversion tunnel drilled through the north abutment, 

WKLVLQLWLDOGLYHUVLRQWXQQHOSURYHGWRRVPDOOWRKDQGOHWKHKHDY\ÀRRGVWKDWGHscended down the Salt River in 1905. Eventually the dam site was successfully 

excavated down to bedrock, and, commencing in 1906, masonry blocks began 

to be placed as part of the dam proper. But construction constituted a long slow 

process that taxed the patience of the Reclamation Service staff, the citizens of 

greater Phoenix and U.S. citizens as a whole, who wondered how large a federal 

expenditure the project would entail before reaching completion.

Rather than take direct responsibility for hiring and supervising the labor 

necessary to build Roosevelt Dam, Newell and Davis sought to contract out as 

much work as possible. As Davis explained:

The Department and the Director, as well as most of the consulting engineers, are strongly in favor of doing work by contract wherever this is practicable, even if in advance it may not 

seem the most economical method.30

At Roosevelt Dam, the contract method proved disastrous in building 

the 19-mile-long “power canal” system designed to supply hydroelectric

power during the construction of the dam proper. Originally estimated to 

cost $215,260, this power canal (along with its diversion dam and associated hydroelectric powerplant) eventually cost over $1.4 million to complete.31 

Reliance upon outside contracts also led to the selection of John M. O’Rourke & 

Company of Galveston, Texas, as the main contractor for the dam although the 
103

¿UPZDVQHZWR$UL]RQDDQGKDGQRH[SHULHQFHLQGDPFRQVWUXFWLRQ32 In 1905, 

O’Rourke came in with a low bid of $1,147,000 to complete the main structure 

of the dam up to the 150-foot-level in less than two years.33

 %HFDXVHRIKHDY\ÀRRGLQJWKDWZUHDNHGKDYRFZLWKWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQ

site, it may have been impossible for any company or organization to have built 

Roosevelt Dam in a timely, cost effective manner. However, O’Rourke never 

came close to meeting the terms of the original contract. By the spring of 1907, 

when the vast majority of the structure was to have been complete, O’Rourke 

KDGSODFHGRQO\¿YHSHUFHQWRIWKHWRWDOPDVRQU\UHTXLUHG34 In fact, the dam did 

not reach the 150-foot level until November 1909, more than two and one-half 

\HDUVSDVWWKHGHDGOLQHVWLSXODWHGLQWKHRULJLQDOFRQWUDFW)LQDOFRPSOHWLRQRI

WKHVWUXFWXUHRFFXUUHGLQ)HEUXDU\

 $VH[HPSOL¿HGE\WKHH[SHULHQFHZLWK2¶5RXUNHWKHXVHRIDFRQWUDFW

system did not prove effective in insuring that expenditures by the Reclamation 

Service could be easily controlled. At the same time, a prominent attempt by 

Newell and Davis to limit costs by avoiding the use of the contract system also 

proved problematic. Roosevelt Dam consists primarily of large sandstone 

blocks bonded together by concrete, requiring large quantities of cement. In his 

original 1902 design proposal, Davis estimated that purchasing cement and delivering it to the Roosevelt site would cost $9.00 per barrel; at the same time, 

Davis reported that cement using local limestone and clay deposits could be produced for about $2.00 per barrel.35 As a result, the Reclamation Service opted to 

build and operate its own cement mill at Roosevelt despite subsequent offers by 

private companies to deliver cement on-site for as low as $4.51 per barrel.36

After construction of the cement mill commenced in March 1904, it took 

the Reclamation Service a year to get the cement mill operating because “the inaccessibility of the dam site caused long delay in securing the necessary equipment for economical and rapid work.”37 And after operations began, the need 

WR¿UHWKHFHPHQWNLOQVZLWKLPSRUWHGIXHORLOODUJHO\RIIVHWDQ\DGYDQWDJHVWKDW

DFFUXHGE\XVLQJORFDOO\DYDLODEOHOLPHVWRQHDWWKHSODQW)XHORLOFDPHWRWKH

Salt River Valley from California by railroad and was then hauled overland sixty 

miles to the cement plant. Because of a railroad tank car shortage and problems 

with the haulage contract, the cement plant suffered from periodic shutdowns 

throughout the construction process.38 The cement plant ultimately worked, but 

the original cost estimates proved to be too optimistic. Instead of $2.00 per barUHOWKHSHUXQLWFRVWFDPHWRSHUEDUUHODQGWKLV¿JXUHZDVUHGXFHGEHcause an additional 60,000 barrels (out of a total of 338,000) were produced for 

the Granite Reef Diversion Dam.39 The Reclamation Service’s effort to manufacture cement at Roosevelt Dam was hardly a disaster, but it suffered from 
104

VLJQL¿FDQWFRVWRYHUUXQVWKDWH[FHHGHGRULJLQDOHVWLPDWHVDQGGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDW

avoidance of the contract system also posed pitfalls for the Reclamation Service.

Costs for the Roosevelt Dam exceeded original estimates and the overall 

project proved much more expensive than anticipated in 1903. Whereas the dam 

project was originally estimated to cost about $1.9 million (including the power 

canal, powerplant, cement mill, hydraulic gates, tunnels, roads, and “damage to 

SULYDWHODQGV ́LWXOWLPDWHO\FRVWPRUHWKDQPLOOLRQGROODUV±DQGWKLV¿JXUHH[-

cluded more than $1 million for land purchases, placement and repair of hydraulic gates, tunnel excavation and road construction, as well as more than

$2.3 million for the entire electric power system.40+RSHVIRU¿QDQFLQJWKH6DOW

River Project with monies derived from public land sales in Arizona Territory 

quickly faded, and initial project costs eventually exceeded $10 million.41 Some 

RIWKLVLQFUHDVHUHVXOWHGIURPHFRQRPLFLQÀDWLRQWKDWDIÀLFWHGDOODVSHFWVRIWKH

U.S. economy, and some of it resulted both from raising the height of Roosevelt 

Dam and from the Reclamation Service taking responsibility for building a 

new diversion dam at Granite Reef. But, much of it also resulted from the 

5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFH¶VIDLOXUHWRHI¿FLHQWO\EXLOGIDFLOLWLHVVXFKDVWKHSRZHUFDnal and to develop plans related to the dam proper that were feasible for the contractor to implement in a timely manner.

In the case of the contract that O’Rourke signed to complete the main 

bulk of the dam in 24 months, the unrealistic expectations–and the inexperience–

of the Reclamation Service were particularly in evidence. Even at the time, 

there should have been little reason for Newell or Davis to have believed that–

even under the best of conditions at the remote Tonto site–O’Rourke could successfully meet the original terms of his contract. Consider the following contemporaneous situation. It took Boston’s Metropolitan Water District 49 months 

(June 1901–July 1905) to construct the Wachusett Dam and place 273,000 cubic

yards of masonry; and this was at a site directly accessible to a railroad and in 

the midst of a major industrial region.42 In contrast, O’Rourke had offered to 

erect approximately the same quantity of masonry in only 24 months in a remote, 

harsh wilderness with a minimal supply of local skilled labor.

The Reclamation Service’s problems did not arise unexpectedly near the 

project’s end; even during the earliest phases of construction, Newell knew that 

expenditures were escalating out of control. By the end of 1905, almost 

$3.5 million had been contractually obligated for the Salt River Project, prompting Newell to express concern over “the enormous expenditures which have been 

made in Arizona,” while bemoaning that “we have already allotted to this project 

a very large sum, more than can easily be defended, and the allotment has been 

so liberal that I did not suppose that we should come to an end so quickly. The 

end, however, has been reached. . . .”43
105

 7KLV¿QDQFLDOSUHGLFDPHQWGLGQRWDEDWHDIWHUDQGDV2¶5RXUNH

fell further behind schedule, the notion of the Reclamation Service as an 

HI¿FLHQWHQJLQHHULQJRUJDQL]DWLRQEHFDPHGLI¿FXOWWRVXVWDLQ%XW1HZHOOFRXOG

not easily confront Reclamation’s failures because this brought the skills and progressive attributes of the Reclamation Service into question. Meanwhile, residents of the Salt River Valley participated in the effort to reduce the repayment 

requirements of the 1902 Reclamation Act, and, especially after the Roosevelt 

Dam began storing water, they did not hesitate to express dissatisfaction with the 

Reclamation Service.44

Based on the legislation authorizing the program, Newell had insisted 

WKDWEHQH¿FLDULHVRI5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHSURMHFWVSD\WKHLUIXOOFRVWVH[FOXGLQJLQWHUHVWFKDUJHV%XWLQWKHZDNHRI¿QDQFLDORYHUUXQVH[HPSOL¿HGE\ZKDW

transpired in the case of the Salt River Project, Reclamation’s ability to pursue 

such a policy faltered. In his 1901 message to Congress, President Roosevelt 

had set a high standard for federal reclamation in assuring the American people 

that:

1RUHVHUYRLURUFDQDOVKRXOGHYHUEHEXLOWWRVDWLVI\VHO¿VKSHUsonal or local interests, but only in accordance with the advice 

of trained experts. . . . There should be no extravagance, and 

WKHEHOLHYHUVLQWKHQHHGRILUULJDWLRQZLOOPRVWEHQH¿WWKHLU

cause by seeing to it that it is free from the least taint of excessive or reckless expenditure of the public moneys.45

Unfortunately, cost overrun problems were endemic with Reclamation 

Service projects, and Newell, one of Roosevelt’s “trained experts,” could not easily justify what opponents might term “excessive or reckless expenditure of the 

public moneys.”46 While Newell held to the view that the original repayment 

terms should be enforced, the Westerners who were to bear the brunt of increased 

construction costs expressed outrage and sought politically expedient ways to reGXFHWKHLU¿QDQFLDOOLDELOLW\

A few months after the completion of Roosevelt Dam, Newell expressed 

dismay at how members of the Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association were

attempting to evade payment as stipulated under the original terms of the 

National Reclamation Act:

It is not wise to let it be understood that the project is completed 

and that the Valley has nothing more to expect. This has been 

emphasized by a number of the citizens who have implied that 

now that there is nothing more to be had out of Uncle Sam they 
106

can concentrate their energies on securing deferred payments, 

or even the repudiation of a whole or a part of the debt. 

I have been astonished at the way this feeling has apparently 

spread. . . .47

 $VUHÀHFWHGLQKLVFRQFHUQIRUPRQXPHQWDOLW\LQGDPGHVLJQ1HZHOO

was drawn to the construction of huge structures as symbols both of safety and 

of his bureau’s ability to accomplish great things. And–despite the fact that it did 

nothing to open up the public domain to new farms–Roosevelt Dam represented 

an opportunity to develop one of the West’s best reservoir sites. But when the 

5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHÀRXQGHUHGLQHFRQRPLFGLI¿FXOWLHVKLVHQWKXVLDVPIRUWKLV

and other bureau endeavors waned. He expressed his disappointment in 1910 by 

acknowledging that:

The outlook is very dubious, and we [the Reclamation Service] 

do not know from day to day what will occur. I am keeping 

the work going as well as I can under the circumstances, but, of 

course, there is not the feeling of satisfaction or of enthusiasm 

which formerly existed.48

 1HZHOOSRVVHVVHGQRSHUVRQDO¿QDQFLDOFXVKLRQWRIDOOEDFNRQLQFRQtrast to his colleague and contemporary Gifford Pinchot who left his post as 

&KLHI)RUHVWHURIWKH86)RUHVW6HUYLFHLQDIWHUFODVKLQJZLWKWKH7DIW

Administration), and he lingered on as nominal leader of the Reclamation 

6HUYLFHXQWLOZKHQKHZDV¿QDOO\GLVPLVVHGE\)UDQNOLQ/DQH:RRGURZ

:LOVRQ¶V6HFUHWDU\RIWKH,QWHULRU%XWIURPRQZDUGVWKH¿QDQFLDOSURElems of the Reclamation Service were so manifest that Newell’s original hopes 

and ambitions for the bureau were forever lost.

Of course, this does not mean that structures such as Roosevelt Dam disappeared from the landscape or that the condition of western water development 

reverted back to a pre-1902 world. Taking Roosevelt Dam as an example, we 

can see what transpired in a more general context for Reclamation Service projects as a whole. Although the cost for the original Salt River Project that the Salt 

River Valley Water Users’ Association was responsible for repaying remained 

DWWKHVXEVWDQWLDO¿JXUHRIPLOOLRQWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWDGRSWHGDIRUgiving posture as to the terms for this repayment; it was not completely paid off 

XQWLO2WKLUW\¿YH\HDUVODWHUWKDQLWVKRXOGKDYHEHHQSDLGXQGHUWKHRULJinal terms of the Reclamation Act, but within the terms of that Act as amended. Perhaps even more importantly, control over the operation of the entire Salt 

River Project—including Roosevelt Dam and all associated electric power facilities built as part of the project—was transferred from the federal government to 
107

the Salt River Water Users’ Association in 1917.49 At the time that control of the 

Roosevelt facilities was transferred to the Water Users’ Association, the powerplant at Roosevelt had a rated generating capacity of 9,500 kW.50

 )URPRQWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHDQGODWHUWKH%XUHDXRI

Reclamation) certainly remained involved in activities associated with the 

development of the Salt River watershed. But this development did not depend 

on the work or planning of Reclamation staff. In fact, the construction of the 

three large hydroelectric power dams on the Salt River below Roosevelt Dam 

0RUPRQ)ODW+RUVH0HVDDQG6WHZDUW0RXQWDLQ'DPVWKDWZHUHFRQVWUXFWHG

in the 1920s was handled by the Water Users’ Association with funding 

provided by bonds sold on the private investment market.51 In essence, the 

history of Roosevelt Dam and the Salt River Project highlights how tenuous the 

Reclamation Service’s role in western water development became before the 

authorization of the Boulder Canyon Project in the late 1920s. The Reclamation 

6HUYLFH%XUHDXQHYHUORVWDOOUHOHYDQF\EXWFRPSDUHGWRWKHKHDG\GD\VRI

±WKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFH%XUHDXRIWKHHDUO\VKDGORVWPXFKRI

LWVOXVWHUDQGLQÀXHQFH,WZRXOGWDNHWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI+RRYHU'DPWREULQJ

it back; and it would take Hoover—combined with the economic effects of the 

Great Depression—to establish that multiple purpose dams dependent upon 

hydroelectric power revenues could become a central component of federally 

¿QDQFHGZDWHUSURMHFWVLQWKH:HVW

Crises and Rebirth

After Newell’s formal resignation in late 1914, Arthur Powell Davis 

was appointed Director of the Reclamation Service. Under Davis’s leadership 

the bureau completed some prominent large-scale concrete dams, including the 

348-foot-high Arrowrock Dam in southern Idaho and the 306-foot-high Elephant 

%XWWH'DPLQ1HZ0H[LFREXWLWV¿QDQFLDOSUREOHPVGLGQRWDEDWH,QWKHHDUO\

1920s, severely depressed agricultural prices prompted Congress to enact repayPHQW3PRUDWRULXPV ́WKDWUHOLHYHGSURMHFWEHQH¿FLDULHVIURPPHHWLQJWKHLUDQQXDO

obligations until prices rebounded. This was welcome news for farming inWHUHVWVEXWLWDOVRKLJKOLJKWHG5HFODPDWLRQ¶V¿QDQFLDOGLI¿FXOWLHV%\

Reclamation had expended over $135 million dollars while repayments totaled 

OHVVWKDQPLOOLRQ,QUHDFWLRQWRWKHVHSUREOHPV'DYLVZDV¿UHGDV'LUHFWRU

in 1923 and the name of the bureau changed to the Bureau of Reclamation.52

Elwood Mead and Reclamation

After Davis’s dismissal, Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work estabOLVKHGDVSHFLDO)DFW)LQGLQJ&RPPLVVLRQWRH[DPLQHWKH¿QDQFLDODQGRSHUational problems that plagued the federal reclamation program.53)RUPHGLQ
108

September 1923, this commission included several prominent men involved 

in western development and agriculture, including Thomas Campbell (a forPHUJRYHUQRURI$UL]RQD-DPHV*DU¿HOGWKH6HFUHWDU\RIWKH,QWHULRUXQGHU

Theodore Roosevelt), John Widstoe (a highly regarded agricultural scientist 

and former president of Utah State University), and Elwood Mead. Mead had 

been a longtime champion of western irrigation, dating back to the 1890s when 

KHVHUYHGDV:\RPLQJ¶V¿UVWVWDWHHQJLQHHU+HODWHUEHFDPHKHDGRILUULJDWLRQLQYHVWLJDWLRQVIRUWKH2I¿FHRI([SHULPHQW6WDWLRQVLQWKH86'HSDUWPHQW

of Agriculture and–prior to the formation of the Reclamation Service in 1902–

FODVKHGZLWK)UHGHULFN1HZHOORYHULVVXHVLQYROYLQJWKHSURSHUUROHRIWKHIHGHUal government in promoting irrigation.54

Mead advocated a smaller-scale, more community-oriented approach 

to federal reclamation than Newell, and–rather than promote the idea of increasing water supplies by building large-scale storage dams–Mead considered it 

more important to 

teach farmers better techniques of irrigation that would 

help eliminate problems such as overwatering and salt accumulation. After 

Newell’s ascension to 

the leadership of the 

Reclamation Service, 

Mead remained 

with the Agriculture 

Department for a 

few years while also 

teaching part-time 

at the University 

of California as 

a Professor of 

Irrigation; in 1903 

he published a wellregarded book on 

Irrigation Institutions

that described in detail the practical and 

legal character of irrigation in various 

western states.55 In 

)LJXUH(OZRRG0HDG&RPPLVVLRQHURIWKH%XUHDXRI5HFODmation from 1924 to 1936. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
109

$XVWUDOLDQRI¿FLDOVLQYLWHGKLP3'RZQ8QGHU ́WRWDNHFKDUJHRI9LFWRULD¶V

State Rivers and Water Supply Commission. Originally planning to stay only a 

year, he remained in Australia until 1915 and oversaw the settlement of several irrigation communities sponsored by the state government. After Australia’s 

entry into World War I, he returned to the United States, becoming Professor of 

Rural Institutions at the University of California, Berkeley. Drawing upon his 

experiences in Australia, he wrote Helping Men Own Farms, a book that championed the ideal of the small-scale farming community.56 He also assumed leadership of the California Land Settlement Board and supervised the establishment of 

two state-sponsored irrigation colonies in northern California, beginning in 1918. 

The Durham and Delhi colonies proved unsuccessful (in fact, by the early 1930s, 

both were abandoned), but Mead’s reputation survived intact.57

 $WWKHWLPH0HDGMRLQHGWKH'HSDUWPHQWRIWKH,QWHULRU¶V)DFW)LQGLQJ

Commission in 1923, he was considered a leading authority on irrigation. In addition, he had been unsullied by any association with the Reclamation Service 

during the previous two decades. As a result, when the Commission wrapped 

up its investigation, Mead was considered a logical person to take charge of the 

Bureau of Reclamation and revitalize the federal government’s reclamation program. Appointed Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation in April 1924, 

0HDGDVVXPHGUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUSXWWLQJWKHEXUHDXRQDVROLG¿QDQFLDOIRXQGDWLRQLQZKLFKUHSD\PHQWREOLJDWLRQVZRXOGEHPHWE\SURMHFWEHQH¿FLDULHV

Congress also addressed this issue by establishing 40 years as the standard time 

period for reimbursing the government for project costs (although in some cases 

payments could stretch out for more than 100 years).58 As a key part of his plan 

for stabilizing Reclamation, Mead established a policy of completing and developing existing reclamation projects instead of initiating new projects; the effect 

of this policy can be seen in the construction of new dams such as Stoney Gorge 

(part of the Orland Project) and Gibson (part of the Sun River Project) that contributed to existing federal projects. At times, Congress authorized new initiatives (such as the Owyhee Project on the Oregon-Idaho border), but in the early 

years of Mead’s leadership most Reclamation work focused on already established projects.

In his speeches and writings, Mead continued to champion the ideal of 

small-scale, community-based irrigation systems.59 But during his time in of-

¿FHDFRPSOHWHO\GLIIHUHQWMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUIHGHUDOO\VSRQVRUHGZDWHUSURMects emerged. The catalyst for this new type of project came from Southern 

California’s desire to tap into the water resources of the Colorado River. The 

idea of building a large storage dam across the Colorado River at Boulder 

Canyon (located on the Arizona-Nevada border) derived from a desire both to 

protect California’s Imperial Valley (located just north of the Mexican border) 

IURPÀRRGVDQGWRSURYLGHWKHYDOOH\ZLWKDGGLWLRQDOZDWHUVXSSO\E\WKHHDUO\
110

1920s, this idea had been picked up by civic boosters in greater Los Angeles who 

perceived such a dam as a key element in their plans to increase municipal water supply by building a long aqueduct across the Mohave Desert.60 Promoted 

as a multipurpose structure that would provide water for irrigation and municiSDOGHYHORSPHQWK\GURHOHFWULFLW\DQGÀRRGFRQWURO+RRYHU'DPUHSUHVHQWHGD

far different project from what Mead was promoting in terms of small-scale ruUDOVHWWOHPHQW-XVWL¿HGODUJHO\LQWHUPVRIK\GURHOHFWULFSRZHUJHQHUDWLRQWKH

sale of power–and not revenue derived from agricultural production–would comSULVHWKH¿QDQFLDOIRXQGDWLRQRIWKH%RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW+RRYHU'DPFDPH

to represent a whole new type of project. Authorized in December 1928, the 

Boulder Canyon Project came into existence well before the onset of the Great 

Depression. But the model it established—especially in regards to the generation and sale of hydroelectric power—became a powerful and prominent part of 

large-scale dam building during the Great Depression of the 1930s.

YEARS OF INDECISION: FROM NAVIGATION TO POWER

Floods and Politics

Congress, having given the Corps responsibility for river navigation in 

WKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\IRXQGHDUO\LQWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\WKDWULYHUÀRRGVZHUH

commanding increasing political attention. If irrigation brought the Reclamation 

6HUYLFHWROLIHÀRRGVJDYHQHZGLUHFWLRQWRWKH&RUSVDVWKHFHQWXU\EHJDQDQG

both bureaus would quickly face the third great river issue, hydroelectric power. 

Early in the century, there seemed to be little overlap because the Reclamation 

Service had to stay in the West and the Corps’ big problems lay to the east—

especially in the gigantic watershed of the Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee 

Rivers.

 7KHGHYDVWDWLQJ3LWWVEXUJKÀRRGRIEDGO\GDPDJHGWKHVWHHOFLW\

DQGWKH2KLRÀRRGVRIHVSHFLDOO\LQWKH0LDPL9DOOH\UHJLRQNLOOHG

SHRSOHDQGFRVWQHDUO\PLOOLRQ)LQDOO\ZLWKPRUHÀRRGVUDLVLQJSROLWLFDOSUHVVXUHWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDJUHHGWRIRUPD+RXVH&RPPLWWHHRQ)ORRG

&RQWUROLQDQGWKHQSDVVHGWKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWWKHQH[W\HDU$OWKRXJK

limited to the lower Mississippi and the Sacramento Rivers, this Act was a maMRUODQGPDUNLQJRYHUQPHQWEHFDXVHIRUWKH¿UVWWLPH&RQJUHVVRSHQO\DOORFDWHGIXQGVIRUÀRRGFRQWURO,WEHJDQORQJUDQJHSODQQLQJLWLQFOXGHGWKHUHTXLUHment for local cost sharing, and it directed the Corps that whenever it undertook 

ÀRRGFRQWUROVWXGLHVLWKDGWRLQFOXGHDFRPSUHKHQVLYHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHZDWHUshed or watersheds.61

After World War I, Congress turned to river issues in 1920 with passage 

of the Water Power Act,but it failed to address the issue of combined usage 
111

XQWLO7KHQRQ)HEUXDU\WKH+RXVH5LYHUVDQG+DUERUV

Committee asked the federal government to estimate costs for a 

comprehensive survey of navigable rivers, to which the Corps replied in 1926 

ZLWK+RXVH'RFXPHQW7KLVPDMRUUHSRUWLGHQWL¿HGWKHULYHUVDQGQXmerous tributaries to be studied with navigation and water power in mind. 

Congress authorized the studies in 1927, and then disaster struck. It was the 

0LVVLVVLSSLÀRRGZKLFK+HUEHUW+RRYHUWKHQ6HFUHWDU\RI&RPPHUFHFDOOHGWKH

“greatest disaster of peace times in our history.”62 Between 250 and 500 people 

ZHUHNLOOHGPRUHWKDQVL[WHHQPLOOLRQDFUHVÀRRGHGDQDUHDODUJHUWKDQ5KRGH

Island, Delaware, Connecticut, New Jersey and Massachusetts combined), 

EXLOGLQJVGHVWUR\HGKRPHVÀRRGHGDQGSHRSOHWHQGHG

E\WKH5HG&URVVLQWHPSRUDU\FDPSV7KLVPDPPRWKÀRRGSURYHGWKDWWKH3OHvees only” policy of previous years was an enormous error.63

That error had been introduced by Andrew A. Humphreys, Chief of 

Engineers of the Corps, in his 1861 book written with Henry L. Abbot, Report on

the Physics and Hydraulics of the Mississippi River, and the error had been the 

SROLF\RIWKH&RUSVXQWLOWKHÀRRGIRUFHGLWWRIDFHWKHULYHU¶VUHDOLW\DQGWR

think about such measures as storage dams on tributaries.64 Thus, the rise of hyGURHOHFWULFSRZHUDQGUDYDJLQJÀRRGVEURXJKWWKH&RUSVLQWRWKHELJGDPEXVLness in a major way.

Still, the Corps had already been drawn in by war, and that experience 

helped prepare it for the huge surge in dam building that would characterize the 

QH[WKDOIFHQWXU\)RUWKHRULJLQRIWKH&RUSV¶ZRUNRQPXOWLSXUSRVHGDPVZH

WXUQWRWKHZRUNRIRQHSULPDU\¿JXUH+XJK&RRSHUDQGWRWKHRULJLQVDQGFRPpletion in 1925 of one huge structure, Wilson Dam, on the Tennessee River at 

Muscle Shoals, Alabama.

Muscle Shoals: The Battle for Control of Hydropower

Hydroelectric power development in the early twentieth century 

American West touched only lightly on the issue of public power. However, federal ownership and operation of hydroelectric facilities in the rural South, especially at Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River, led to more vigorous interest in 

the issue. World War I was primarily responsible for turning Muscle Shoals into 

a national controversy over the issue of public power and economic development.

With the prospect of American participation in the war, Congress appropriated $20 million in 1916 for the production of nitrate (a necessary ingredient in explosives). President Wilson chose Muscle Shoals as the site for a nitrate plant because of the area’s potential for generating abundant, inexpensive 
112

electric power—an essential factor in extracting nitrogen from the atmosphere. 

In 1918, two nitrate plants were built and work began on what later was named 

Wilson Dam (completed in 1925). The total government investment for the project eventually came to approximately $145 million.

)LJXUH:RRGHQIRUPZRUNZDVXVHGWRFDVWWKHDUFKHVRYHUWKHVSLOOZD\VDW:LOVRQ'DP

Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

)LJXUH:LOVRQ'DPDW0XVFOH6KRDOVRQWKH7HQQHVVHH5LYHUZDVFRQVWUXFWHGXQGHU

contract by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
113

The development of Muscle Shoals raised many questions about the 

JRYHUQPHQW¶VUROHLQSURMHFWVDIIHFWLQJQDYLJDWLRQÀRRGFRQWUROHFRQRPLFUHKDbilitation, conservation of agricultural lands, regional planning, development of 

natural resources, and the generation of power. The last issue took priority in the 

SRVWZDU\HDUVDIWHUSDVVDJHRIWKH)HGHUDO:DWHU3RZHU$FWRIDQGWKHDJLtation of midwestern progressives who sought stricter regulation of water power.65)RUPDQ\\HDUVWKH)HGHUDO:DWHU3RZHU$FWRISURYHGWREHUHODWLYHly weak in practice. While the Act permitted federal supervision of hydroelectric 

IDFLOLWLHVRQERWKSXEOLFODQGVDQGQDYLJDEOHVWUHDPVDQGHVWDEOLVKHGWKH)HGHUDO

3RZHU&RPPLVVLRQ)3&WKH&RPPLVVLRQZDVJHQHUDOO\OLPLWHGWROLFHQVLQJ

DQGVLWHORFDWLRQ)ORRGFRQWURODQGLUULJDWLRQZHUHQRWLQFOXGHGSRZHUUHYHQXHV

were not linked with multiple-purpose dam construction, and federal revenues 

derived from hydroelectric facilities proved to be small. And, both the Tennessee 

River and the Boulder Canyon Project were excluded from the purview of the 

)3&66

Immediately after World War I, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker attempted to turn the nitrate plants over to private companies for production of 

fertilizers. Attracting no takers, a bill was introduced in Congress to create a 

government corporation for that purpose, but it failed. In March 1921 the new 

Republican Secretary of War, John W. Weeks, announced that the government 

)LJXUH2Q-XO\RSHQJDWHVRQWKHQRUWKHQGRI:LOVRQ'DPSURGXFHGWXUEXOHQW

ÀRZ Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
114

would accept bids for the facility, which it would be willing to sell for a reasonable price.

 $ELGIURP+HQU\)RUGWREX\WKH:LOVRQ'DPDQGJHQHUDWLQJSODQW

set off a major dispute over control of Muscle Shoals. The bid attracted supSRUWIURP6HFUHWDU\RI&RPPHUFH+HUEHUW+RRYHU7KRPDV(GLVRQWKH)DUP

Bureau, several key southern politicians, and local developers in the Tennessee 

Valley. Power progressives fought the bid vigorously, as did southern power 

companies who feared the competition, and southern manufacturers who were 

VNHSWLFDORI)RUG¶VPRWLYHV/RFDOO\WKHGLVWDVWHIRUODQGVSHFXODWRUVUHLQIRUFHG

WKHQRWLRQWKDWWKH)RUGRIIHUZDVH[SORLWDWLYH:LWKWKHJURXQGVZHOORIRSSRVLWLRQHVSHFLDOO\FKDPSLRQHGE\6HQDWRU*HRUJH1RUULVRI1HEUDVND)RUGZLWKdrew his offer. The Muscle Shoals Inquiry Commission, appointed by President 

Calvin Coolidge, recommended in 1925 that the properties be leased to a private operator for fertilizer production and only incidentally for power production. 

Lukewarm interest in the recommendation resulted in no lessee being secured. 

And while Norris continued to push for public operation of the site, the time was 

not right for public power.67

Hugh Cooper, McCall Ferry, and Keokuk

Electric power characterizes as well as does any technology the tension 

so typical in the United States between individual freedom and government regXODWLRQVEHWZHHQSULYDWHLQGXVWU\DQGSXEOLFZRUNV7KLVWHQVLRQLQWHQVL¿HG

E\WKHGHEDWHRYHUSRZHUIURP1LDJDUD)DOOVOHGWRWKH%XUWRQ%LOORIWKDW

brought government into Niagara River and Great Lakes water regulation while 

angering private power companies.68 This issue was to become far more important with a dam planned by the Corps a decade later at Muscle Shoals.69 This 

far larger project would demand far better engineering, and for that the Corps 

reached out to the leading designer of such works, Hugh Cooper.

Hugh Lincoln Cooper (1865–1937) left home after graduating from high 

school in 1883 determined to become an engineer. In 1885, he began to work 

on bridges, especially on the construction of steel bridges. By 1894, he had decided to leave bridge engineering and to focus on hydroelectric power projects, 

something quite new. He soon became an expert in the design of such plants 

and worked on design and construction in the United States, Canada, Brazil, 

and Mexico. He surveyed, designed, and built a 100,000 hp powerplant for the 

(OHFWULFDO'HYHORSPHQW&RPSDQ\RI2QWDULRDERYH+RUVHVKRH)DOOVLQ1LDJDUD

&DQDGD+LVUHSXWDWLRQJUHZDQGLQKHRSHQHGKLVRZQRI¿FHLQ1HZ<RUN

&LW\+HZDVVKRUWO\WRWDNHXSKLVEHVWNQRZQZRUNWRGDWHWKH0F&DOO)HUU\

hydroelectric powerplant on the Susquehanna River.707KH0F&DOO)HUU\3RZHU

Company had positioned the dam at the center of a circle whose 70 mile radius 
115

included Philadelphia, Baltimore, Wilmington, and Harrisburg so that the 

market for power existed and the new technology of high voltage transmission 

FRXOGHDVLO\VHQGLWWRSUR¿WDEOHFHQWHUV7KHFRPSDQ\DOVRH[SOLFLWO\LQVLVWHG

WKDWWKHZRUNEH3DEVROXWHO\¿UVWFODVV ́LQWKHOLJKWRIWKHPDQ\SRRUO\EXLOWIDcilities like Hales Bar that had sprung up.71 Cooper designed the dam and power 

house and also oversaw the construction from 1906 to 1908.

 :LWKWKH0F&DOO)HUU\'DP&RRSHUHVWDEOLVKHGDVWUXFWXUDOW\SHWKDW

became characteristic of main stem dams over the next 75 years. It is a low gravity dam made of unreinforced concrete, roughly triangular in section. Internal 

concrete stresses were not critical. Rather, the studies focused on foundation 

pressures and overturning safety. This latter required that the dam’s vertical 

weight be large enough to prevent the horizontal water pressure load from tipping the dam over by rotating it about the toe. (See Wilson Dam discussion beORZ)DUPRUHWHFKQLFDOO\FKDOOHQJLQJWKDQVWUHVVHVDQGRYHUWXUQLQJZDVWKH

FRQVWUXFWLRQSURFHVVLQWKHIRRWZLGHIDVWÀRZLQJULYHU&RRSHUGHYLVHG

a system whereby half the river was blocked by a cofferdam to allow construction there while the river ran through the open half. The river was then directed through the partly completed dam while the second half was cast within a 

new cofferdam. This was a major undertaking and it prepared Cooper well for 

his next step, one which brought him into close contact with the Corps and the 

Mississippi River.

When Cooper moved from the Susquehanna to the Mississippi, he left 

the provincial and entered onto the world stage: the Susquehanna with a maxiPXPÀRZRIFXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGFRPSDUHGWRWKH0LVVLVVLSSLZLWKRYHU

370,000 cubic feet per second. The mightiest American river had never been 

dammed below Minneapolis, even though the Corps had been working on the 

river for almost a century.72 The big change, of course, was hydroelectric power, and the early 1890s saw formation of the Keokuk and Hamilton Water Power 

Company named for the two towns facing each other in Iowa and Illinois. In 

1901, Congress approved a power project for the company that involved a wing 

dam (really a slanted jetty) and a power canal but no river dam.73 The company 

FRXOGQRW¿QDQFHLWEXWWKHIROORZLQJ\HDUWKH5LYHUVDQG+DUERUV$FWFDOOHG

for a survey at Keokuk to study a possible dam.

The survey report by Montgomery Meigs (son of the Union 

Quartermaster-General during the Civil War) was favorable, and, in 1905, the 

Congress authorized the power company to proceed. Even the railroads called 

for better river navigation, and, in the spring of 1908, President Roosevelt, with 

W\SLFDO7HGG\ÀRXULVKVDLOHGIURP.HRNXNWR0HPSKLVLQZKDWZDVDFFODLPHG

as the “largest steamboat parade in history. . . .”74
116

Meanwhile, in 1907, Cooper began to study the Keokuk Dam project 

and to raise funds for its construction. He went to the nation’s leading consulting electrical power engineers, Stone and Webster of Boston, who that year had 

formed Stone and Webster Management Association to handle powerplant construction.75 Together with Cooper, they formed the Mississippi River Power 

Company of Boston with Edwin Webster as president and Hugh Cooper as vice 

president and chief engineer. Cooper designed the project, hired his own workers, and supervised all the construction. It was the largest hydroelectric plant in 

the world.76

What began to develop early in the century were huge dam projects, like 

0F&DOO)HUU\DQG.HRNXNDFURVVZLGHULYHUVDQG3DWK¿QGHUDQG%XIIDOR%LOO

ZLWKLQKLJKQDUURZFDQ\RQV7KHZLGHULYHUGDPVZHUHRQO\MXVWL¿HGEHFDXVH

RIK\GURHOHFWULFSRZHUZKHUHDVMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUWKHKLJKQDUURZGDPVOD\LQ

water storage and irrigation. In the former type, design interest focused more on 

the power house and penstocks than on the dam structure; whereas in the latter, 

the structure caught the imagination of engineers. This contrast paralleled that 

contemporaneous structural development in bridge design where some engineers 

built long concrete viaducts with little intrinsic structural interest while others 

imagined wide spanning suspension forms of breathtaking daring.

But if Cooper’s low wide dams were not structurally innovative, his 

means of construction were pioneering. Indeed, at Keokuk the brilliance of his 

plan would catch the attention not only of the international profession but also of 

the local citizenry. As the Engineering News reported in 1911, two years before 

completion,

Engineering works rarely receive much attention on the part of 

the public, but the work at Keokuk forms a local attraction, the 

people of the surrounding country having a popular interest in 

“the big dam across the Mississippi,” as the project has been 

in the public eye for so many years. In fact, excursions are run 

from nearby points to Keokuk, with the dam as the main attraction. To meet this condition and still provide for excluding the 

public from the works, the power company has erected on each 

side of the river a covered pavilion or observation platform, 

which is provided with seats and from which there is a very 

good view of the work as well as of the scenery along this part 

of the river.77

Essential features of the performance were the steel travelers, huge 

truss bridges that moved out over the river from both shores to place the total of 

540,000 cubic yards of concrete, the most ever used in a dam up to then.78 That 
117

immense mass would, however, be more than doubled in Cooper’s next major 

work in which the Corps would play a much larger role than it had at Keokuk.

From Muscle Shoals to Wilson Dam

Nothing illustrates better the Corps’ ambiguity toward river developPHQWWKDQWKHLUDFWLYLWLHVRQWKH7HQQHVVHH5LYHUGXULQJWKH¿UVWWZRGHFDGHVRI

the twentieth century. This uncertainty and at times hostility toward multipurpose dams mirrored a great national debate during the progressive era about the 

role of the federal government in the development of natural resources, a debate 

that extended from river basins to oil trusts.

The story of Muscle Shoals characterizes this debate while also centering on the world’s largest dam built up to that time. If the Keokuk project 

“marked a serious shift of direction for navigation improvement,” the Tennessee 

River dam brought the Corps into multipurpose dam building in a major way.79 

7KHVWHHOJDWHVDERYHWKHFRQFUHWHGDPSHUPLWWHGDPD[LPXPÀRZDW0XVFOH

6KRDOVRIFXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGRURYHUWLPHVWKHÀRZDW.HRNXN80

Before the turn of the century, the Corps had proposed development at 

Muscle Shoals, but not until 1909 did any serious action begin when a special 

board of engineers concluded a study with the cautious observation that “ . . . any 

partnership relation between the United States and a private corporation is necessarily to be closely scrutinized as the results in the past have been that the government, as a party to such agreements, has usually suffered thereby.”

Nevertheless, the Board admitted that times were changing and that water power may “require a new departure in governmental policy.”81 After an 

abortive 1914 attempt to get Congressional approval, Major Harry Burgess of 

the Nashville District took charge and produced a monumental 1916 report that 

lay the technical basis for the development at Muscle Shoals. Before any project could begin, however, the war intervened, and, in the fall of 1917, President 

Wilson chose Muscle Shoals as one site for a large nitrate plant to make munitions and ordered the Corps to begin work on a hydroelectric facility to power 

the plant. This was a completely new venture for the Corps, and they called on 

the acknowledged leader in such works, Hugh Cooper.

Meanwhile, two weeks after Woodrow Wilson’s second inauguration in 

early March, German U-boats sank three American ships, and, after much agonizing, the President told a special session of Congress on April 2 of the necesVLW\IRUZDU&RQJUHVVFRQ¿UPHGWKHVWDWHRIZDUE\$SULO,PPHGLDWHO\+XJK

Lincoln Cooper, aged 52, volunteered to serve, and in May he received a 
118

FRPPLVVLRQDVDPDMRURIHQJLQHHUV%\-XO\KHZDVLQ)UDQFHSODQQLQJEDVH

port facilities; in October he was promoted to Lt. Colonel.82

The Corps, back home, was struggling with its huge new project in 

Alabama, and in March of 1918, at the urging of the Chief of Engineers of the 

Army, Cooper was transferred to Muscle Shoals, where he made a careful study, 

many recommendations, and redesigned the entire project. He was quickly 

SURPRWHGWRFRORQHOEXWLQ0D\KHZDVWUDQVIHUUHGEDFNWR)UDQFH+HQHYHU

knew why he had been transferred.83 Cooper himself, in a 1922 testimony to the 

Military Affairs Committee of the House, confessed that he “never knew exactly 

how that happened.” He also displayed his consternation that, although he was 

the designer of the entire project and responsible for its construction, the government refused to pay him anything.84 Cooper apparently had failed to appreciate 

WKDWKLVWLPHDVD86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVRI¿FHUFRXOGQRWEHFRPSHQVDWHGEH\RQGWKHQRUPDOUHPXQHUDWLRQJLYHQWRDQRI¿FHURIKLVUDQN

Just before Armistice Day, on November 9, 1918, construction resumed 

on the dam while the Corps made more subsurface tests and, following Cooper’s 

recommendations, began to make design sketches. Cooper, meanwhile, had 

gone back into private practice and then, on May 21, 1920, the Corps signed a 

contract with Hugh L. Cooper & Co. that put the company in charge of design, 

construction, and inspection of the entire project. Cooper began work, and by 

election day 1920 he had completed numerous drawings laying out the dam and 

powerhouse.85)URPWKHQXQWLO&RRSHUSURGXFHGGUDZLQJVDQGVXSHUYLVHG

construction.

The politics of how the dam came to be used raged through Congress 

during the 1920s while the Corps moved toward large scale dams of which 

:LOVRQZDVLWV¿UVWPDMRUHIIRUW7KHGDPLWVHOIUHSUHVHQWHGWKHODUJHVWRILWV

W\SHWKHRYHUÀRZPDVRQU\ZHLUGDP7KHUHDUHRSHQLQJVIRUPHGE\DJUDYity dam 95 feet high and 101 feet wide at its base surmounted by 18 foot high 

VWHHOFRQWUROJDWHVDQGDOOÀDQNHGE\EXWWUHVVHVWKDWVXSSRUWDFRQWLQXRXVDUFK

EULGJH7KHVKDSHRIWKHJUDYLW\VHFWLRQIROORZHGIURPWKRVHDW0F&DOO)HUU\

and Keokuk; this shape had evolved from late nineteenth-century dams, such as 

that at Holyoke across the Connecticut River which was completed in 1899.86 

The principal problems in design for these mainstem, or run-of-the-river, dams 

is sliding and uplift instability as well as foundation scour at the downstream toe. 

)RUWKHVHUHDVRQVVXFKGDPVDUHZLGHUWKDQWKH\DUHKLJKKDYHDFRXQWHUFXUYDture on the downstream face, and are supplied with drains to control water pressure under the dam base.

Cooper’s design solved these problems, and the dam has not had any 

VLJQL¿FDQWVWUXFWXUDOGLI¿FXOWLHVVLQFHLWVFRPSOHWLRQLQDIWHUDOO
119

1,350,000 cubic yards of concrete were in place. Cooper was particularly meticulous in his concrete control, a major factor in the dam’s satisfactory performance.87 Power generation began on September 12, 1925, and by June of 1926 

six generators were operating to produce an average of about 112,000 hp, or 

83,500 kW of power.88 The full power planned was about 600,000 hp from four 

30,000 hp units and fourteen 35,000 hp units.89 This immense project moved 

QHZO\HOHFWHG)UDQNOLQ5RRVHYHOWWRVWDWHLQDDGGUHVVDW0RQWJRPHU\

Alabama, “My friends, I determined on two things as a result of what I have 

VHHQWRGD\7KH¿UVWLVWRSXW0XVFOH6KRDOVWRZRUN7KHVHFRQGLVWRPDNHRI

Muscle Shoals a part of an even greater development that will take in all of that 

PDJQL¿FHQW7HQQHVVHH5LYHU ́90

Before the president created TVA and took Wilson Dam away from the 

&RUSVDQRWKHUPDMRUSROLWLFDOHYHQWZRXOG¿UPO\¿[WKH$UP\HQJLQHHUVLQWKH

multipurpose mode.

From the Tennessee River to House Document No. 308

 /RQJEHIRUH)UDQNOLQ5RRVHYHOWH[SUHVVHGKLVJRDORIGHYHORSLQJWKH

entire Tennessee basin, the Chief of Engineers of the Corps, General Lansing 

Beach, had ordered a study of that potential.

The Rivers and Harbors Act of June 5, 1920, authorized the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to make preliminary examinations and surveys 

of the Tennessee River and tributaries, and General Beach ordered the survey by 

letter on June 30, 1920. Beach had verbally explained:

the intention of Congress to include studies of present or potential hydroelectric developments, the mineral and industrial reVRXUFHVRIWKLVUHJLRQGUDLQDJHÀRRGSURWHFWLRQDQGVXFKRWKHU

allied subjects as may reasonably appear to have an appreciable 

LQÀXHQFHRQWKHSURMHFWWKDWPD\EH¿QDOO\UHFRPPHQGHGIRU

adoption for the improvement of navigation.91

In short, Beach asked for a comprehensive report with navigation included but 

QRWWKHFHQWUDOLVVXH+HDVVLJQHGWKDWWDVNWRD\RXQJRI¿FHU0DMRU+DUROG&

)LVNHFRPPDQGHURIWKH1DVKYLOOH'LVWULFW

 %HFDXVHRIOLPLWHGIXQGV)LVNHGHFLGHGWRXVHWKHQHZWHFKQLTXHRI

aerial photo topographical mapping. Developed only during the World War, the 

PHWKRGVHUYHG)LVNHZHOODVKHEHJDQLQWRWDNHSKRWRVIURPDÀLPV\'H

Havilland airplane at a 12,500-foot altitude.92 Gerard Matthes concluded his 

SDSHURQWKHVXUYH\E\VWDWLQJWKDW3WKHJHQHUDOSODQZDV¿UVWFRQFHLYHG
120

E\0DMRU)LVNH,WLVRQO\IDLUWRVWDWHWKDWLWZDVGXHWRKLVUHVRXUFHIXOQHVVDQG

keen personal interest in the survey and the development of the details, that it 

was possible to accomplish so much with the small funds available.”93

 )LVNHVXEPLWWHGKLVSUHOLPLQDU\UHSRUWRQ-DQXDU\ZLWKWKH

recommendation that a full survey be carried out and that it include all the aspects mentioned by General Beach in June of 1920.94 On January 29, 1921, 

&RORQHO+DUWV)LVNH¶VVXSHULRUZURWHWRWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUVWKDW3)RUWKH

foregoing reasons I do not feel that I can consistently recommend the survey 

that is proposed by the district engineer.” His reasons came down to the image 

of the Corps as a bureau for navigation only. He claimed that a complete survey had been made in 1909, when he was district engineer, solely for navigation; 

VRQRQHZRQHZDVQHHGHG+DUWVFULWLFL]HG)LVNH¶VSUHOLPLQDU\UHSRUWIRUEHLQJ

“clearly an investigation into the water-power possibilities, mostly on the tributaries, with no explanation as to how it is expected that navigation will be bene-

¿WWHGWKHUHE\ ́0RUHRYHUKHFRQWLQXHG3WKHFRVWRIWKHSURSRVHGVXUYH\

 is so far beyond what seems reasonable that it should, in my opinion, not be 

commenced. . . .”95

 *HQHUDO%HDFKVXSSRUWHG)LVNHEXWLQVWHDGRIWKHRYHUUHTXHVWHG)LVNHJRWDPHUH8QGDXQWHGKHNHSWXSKLVSUHOLPLQDU\ZRUN

over the next year and submitted another, briefer report on March 15, 1922, 

UHFRPPHQGLQJDVHULHVRIVSHFL¿FVWXGLHVIRUDUHGXFHGFRVWRI96 A 

new division engineer, Colonel C. W. Kutz, again objected to the report on the 

grounds of slighting navigation in favor of power and of being far too costly.97 

On April 4, the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors reported that “This 

purpose is commendable but Congress has never sanctioned an inquiry of this 

NLQGDQGWKHUHIRUHQRDXWKRULW\DSSHDUVWRH[LVWIRUPDNLQJLW>WKH)LVNHVXUvey].”98

In spite of division disapproval again, General Beach still supported 

)LVNHDQGUHFRPPHQGHG3WKDWDQDSSURSULDWLRQRIEHPDGHIRUFRQWLQXing the work and that the full amount for completing the survey, viz., $515,800, 

EHDXWKRUL]HG ́2Q6HSWHPEHUWKH&RQJUHVVDJUHHGWKDW)LVNH¶VGHtailed survey could continue.99 By early 1924, it had proceeded far enough 

that the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors on March 31, and April 1, 

could subject the survey to a thorough critique, resulting in the observation that, 

30DMRU)LVNH¶VSODQ>LV@μDVWRXQGLQJDQGDPD]LQJ¶DQG>LWZDV@DWWKLVVHVVLRQ

>WKDW@WKHVXJJHVWLRQZDV¿UVWPDGHWKDWVLPLODUVXUYH\VVKRXOGEHLQLWLDWHGRQ

other rivers of the United States.” The result of this review and recommendation 

appeared in the Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1925 (section 3), which auWKRUL]HGDQGGLUHFWHGWKH86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVDQGWKH)HGHUDO3RZHU

Commission jointly to prepare cost estimates for comprehensive surveys of all 
121

navigable streams and their tributaries, except the Colorado River, where hydroelectric power appears to be practical.100

 )LVNH¶VUHSRUWLQUHFRPPHQGHGSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHFRRSHUDWLRQDQG

he set the precedent for the national survey that was soon to follow. However, 

his enthusiasm got him into deep trouble with his superiors, and, because he directly proselytized members of Congress, the Chief of Engineers reprimanded him. Nevertheless, his irregular behavior was crowned with success when 

Congress, “astounded” by the excellence of his surveys, authorized similar surveys throughout the nation.101

The 308 Reports

In a letter report of April 7, 1926, the Chief of Engineers, responding to 

the 1925 Act, gave detailed costs for studying “navigable streams upon which 

power developments appear to be feasible.” This is House Document No. 308 

which, in just over four pages, laid out a national program of immense scope for 

which the surveys would cost $7,322,400.102 Clearly, this implied that the Corps 

would enter the multipurpose dam business, but it did not settle the issue of public versus private development. The document referred to private activity. This 

issue would not be fully resolved until after 1932, but the direction for power 

and navigation had been set and now both federal agencies; Reclamation and the 

Corps, were to begin a new adventure that would lead to clash and compromise.

The 308 document set the stage for multipurpose dams by its focus on 

river basins with a combined use for navigation and power. The document itself 

ZDVVLJQHGE\WKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUVDQGWKHH[HFXWLYHVHFUHWDU\RIWKH)HGHUDO

Power Commission.

 )RUWKHPDMRUULYHUVWKHVXUYH\VZHUHWRGHWHUPLQHGLVFKDUJHORFDWLRQV

and capacities of reservoir sites, location and practicability of dam sites, capacities of power sites, present and prospective power markets available, best plan of 

improvement for all purposes, preliminary cost estimates, and feasibility of the 

EHVWSODQ5HODWLRQVKLSWRQDYLJDWLRQZDVWREHLGHQWL¿HGDQGZKHUHWKHEHQH¿WVZHUHVXI¿FLHQWWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWFRXOGVKDUHLQWKHFRVW%XWSRZHU

costs were assumed to be the responsibility of private companies.

There were twenty-four separate surveys ranging from the Raritan 

River ($19,400) to streams (except the Mississippi) that drained into the Gulf of 

0H[LFR)RUWKH7HQQHVVHHWKHFRVWHVWLPDWHZDVIRUWKH

Columbia, $734,100; for the Missouri, $425,000; for the Ohio, $393,100; and for 

&DOLIRUQLD7KHVXUYH\VZKLFKZHUHDOVRWRFRQVLGHUÀRRG
122

control, were written into law by acts of Congress on January 21, 1927, and

May 15, 1928.

With the 308 surveys before Congress, Wilson Dam complete, and 

Reclamation planning its most ambitious project, at Hoover Dam below Las 

Vegas, the landscape was set for major restructuring. The state-of-the art 

in dam design and construction appeared in 1927 in the eighth and last ediWLRQRI:HJPDQQ¶VWUHDWLVHRQGDPV&RXSOHGZLWKWKHJUHDWÀRRGRQWKHORZer Mississippi, this treatise and the 308 document marked the end of an era 

and, soon thereafter, the beginning of a time of social trauma and technological 

achievement.

In his introduction to the eighth edition, Edward Wegmann noted two 

PDMRUFKDQJHVIURPKLV¿UVWHGLWLRQRQHZDVWKHLQFOXVLRQRI3DPDWKematical discussion of multiple-arch dams” and the other was the immense 

JURZWKRIWKH¿HOGVRWKDWKLV¿UVWWUHDWLVHRISDJHVSODWHVDQG¿JXUHVKDGJURZQLQ\HDUVWR3SDJHVRIWH[WSODWHVDQG¿JXUHVLQ

the text.”103 Things had gotten more complex and dams more numerous. These 

changes were characteristic of all engineering and, indeed, of all society.

On June 1, 1927, the locks opened at Wilson Dam, and commercial 

transportation began. Ten days earlier, Charles Lindbergh touched down at 

Le Bourget Aerodrome, Paris, to symbolize dramatically a new pathway for 

WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ,Q-XQH)UDQFHUHWXUQHGWR$PHULFDWKHGUDIW.HOORJJ%ULDQG

Treaty in which the two governments renounced war with each other, while earlier, in January, the Allies abolished their control commission for supervising 

German disarmament.104 This was a year largely of optimism as grand plans 

were laid for peace and prosperity. Among them were the plans for river basins 

in the United States.

 :HPRYHQRZWRWKHLQGLYLGXDOULYHUEDVLQVDQGWKHLUPRVWVLJQL¿FDQW

multipurpose dams, beginning with the Boulder Canyon Project planned, with no 

reference to any 308 report, during the prosperous 1920s. The project’s greatest 

symbol is Hoover Dam, the third105 of these presidentially-named structures and, 

by far, the best known. When completed, it was the highest dam ever built, used 

the most concrete, generated the most power, and impounded the largest reservoir. It stands as a great monument to American engineering, but it has also a 

great story to tell about its political, economic, and urban history. To that story 

and that monument we now turn.
123

Endnotes

1. Edward Wegmann, The Design and Construction of Dams 1stedition, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 

1888).

2. “Theodore Roosevelt Dam,” Development of Dam Engineering in the United States, Kollgaard and 

Chadwick, editors, 368.

3. Edward Wegmann, The Design and Construction of Dams 6th edition, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 

1911), plates CII and CIII.

4. Wegmann, Design and Construction of Dams, 6th edition, 403.

5. Leland R. Johnson, Engineers on the Twin Rivers (Nashville: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1978), 

175-8. See Gerard H. Matthes, “Discussion,” Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 100 

(1935), 919-23.

6. Leland R. Johnson, Engineers on the Twin Rivers, 178.

 )RUH[DPSOHLQ1HZHOOGLUHFWHGKLV$VVLVWDQW&KLHI(QJLQHHU$UWKXU3'DYLVWR3FRQFHQWUDWH

your energies as far as practicable on the pushing forward of the Salt River Project. . . . and laying out a scheme 

of further work, involving the purchase of lands, rights of way, etc., also [on] action which may be taken regarding the Arizona Canal and the construction of the new dam in the river. I should like to have, in brief, 

a consistent plan for future operations covering these important matters.” This letter can be interpreted as a 

sign that Newell, the administrator, felt comfortable leaving a plethora of technical problems to a trusted subRUGLQDWH%XWLWDOVRUHÀHFWVKRZ1HZHOOVHSDUDWHGKLPVHOIIURP5HFODPDWLRQ¶VHQJLQHHULQJZRUN6HH)

H. Newell to A. P. Davis, June 23, 1903, National Archives and Records Administration, Denver, Colorado, 

Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG115, Entry 3, Administrative and Project Records, 1902-1919. Salt 

5LYHU'%R[)ROGHU6DOW5LYHU3URMHFW&RQVXOWLQJ(QJLQHHU5HSRUWVWKUX7KLVVRXUFH

refers to the General Administrative and Project Records (1902-1919) for the Reclamation Service’s Salt River 

Project retained in the National Archives.

8. Davis’s career is described in his professional memoir: “Arthur Powell Davis” Transactions of the

American Society of Civil Engineers 100 (1935), 1582-91.

 )RUH[DPSOHVHH$UWKXU3'DYLVIrrigation Near Phoenix, Arizona [U.S. Geological Survey Water 

Supply Paper No. 2] (Washington D.C., 1897).

10. The “engineering board” system of project review is described in the Third Annual Report of the

Reclamation Service, 1903-4 (Washington, D.C., 1905) 41.

11. See Charles D. Walcott to Secretary of the Interior [E. A. Hitchcock], March 15, 1904, National Archives, 

College Park, Maryland, Records of the Secretary of the Interior, RG48, Entry 632. Newell initialed this letter and he was almost certainly responsible for drafting its contents. Miscellaneous Projects, Records 1901-07, 

%R[)LOH

 :LVQHU¶VFDUHHULVV\QRSVL]HGLQ)UHGHULFN+D\QHV1HZHOOFRPSLOHUProceedings of the First Conference

of Engineers of the Reclamation Service: With Accompanying Papers (Washington, D.C.: Government 

3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH+HJUDGXDWHGDVDFLYLOHQJLQHHUIURPWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI0LFKLJDQLQDQG

spent most of his professional life working on harbor and transportation projects involving the Great Lakes, 

the Illinois River, the Mississippi River and ports on the Gulf of Mexico. He also served with the Lighthouse 

Service and the International Waterways Commission.

 :LVQHU¶VUROHLQDQDO\]LQJGHVLJQVIRU6KRVKRQH'DPUHQDPHG%XIIDOR%LOO'DPDQG3DWK¿QGHU

'DPLVGRFXPHQWHGLQWKH¿OHODEHOHG3'LVFXVVLRQ5HODWHGWR'DPV ́1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*

Entry 3, Box 289. Among others, he served on engineering boards for the Salt River Project (Arizona), the 

&DUOVEDG3URMHFW1HZ0H[LFRWKH.ODPDWK3URMHFW2UHJRQ&DOLIRUQLDWKH0LON5LYHU3URMHFW0RQWDQD

and the Minidoka Project (Idaho). His role in reviewing the Reclamation Service’s project plans for the lower 

Colorado River in California is noted in Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 311-3.

14. The early history of the city is documented in Geoffrey P. Mawn, “Phoenix, Arizona: Central City of the 

Southwest, 1870-1920” (Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University, 1979).

15. The valley’s early irrigation canals are described in Arthur P. Davis, Irrigation Near Phoenix, Arizona,

U.S. Geological Survey Water Supply and Irrigation Paper No. 2 (Washington, D.C., 1897). See Earl A. 

=DUELQRoosevelt Dam: A History to 1911 (Phoenix: Salt River Project, 1984), 19-28, for contemporary newspaper references documenting legal disputes over water supply in the 1870s and 1880s.

16. The 1889 reservoir survey led by Maricopa County Surveyor William Breakenridge is described in 

Mawn, “Phoenix, Arizona,” 220-1. Also see James H. McClintock, Arizona, 3 volumes (Chicago: S. J. Clarke 

Publishing Company, 1916), 431-2. This locally-sponsored expedition occurred contemporaneously with John 

Wesley Powell’s Irrigation Survey, but did not draw upon federal sponsorship.
124

 7KH+XGVRQ&RPSDQ\¶V¿OLQJVRQWKH7RQWR'DPVLWHDUHGDWHG$SULODQGSRVWHG$SULO

1893), as recorded in “Secretary of State, Appropriation of Water, Dam and Reservoir Sites, 1893-1910,” 

Arizona Department of Library, Archives and Public Records, Phoenix, Arizona.

18. Schuyler, Reservoirs, 340-8, quote on 343. The Tonto Dam was also described in James D. Schuyler, 

“Water Storage and Construction Of Dams,” USGS Eighteenth Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: 

*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

19. Phoenix’s efforts to obtain federal support for a large-scale Salt River storage reservoir is detailed in 

Smith, 7KH0DJQL¿FHQW([SHULPHQW, 20-42.

20. Karen Smith, “The Campaign for Water in Central Arizona, 1890-1903,” Arizona and the West 23 

(Summer 1981), 127-48.

21. This statistic was calculated by Karen Smith from information relating to the original subscribers to the 

Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association in the spring of 1903. it is somewhat misleading because it exFOXGHVFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKRXVDQGVRIDFUHVRIODQGRZQHGE\'ZLJKW+HDUGDQGRWKHUV7KH¿QDOOHJDOGHWHUmination of land to be served by the project also stipulated that acreage which had been irrigated before 1903 

(which was all privately owned) would have priority rights to water stored by Roosevelt Dam. See Smith, The

0DJQL¿FHQW([SHULPHQW,(DUO$=DUELQ37KH&RPPLWWHHRI6L[WHHQ ́The Journal of Arizona

History 25 (Summer 1984), 129-54.

 )+1HZHOOWR$3'DYLV-XQH1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\*HQHUDO

$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV6DOW5LYHU'%R[)ROGHU6DOW5LYHU3URMHFW

Consulting Engineer Reports thru 1906.

23. These structures are described in Wegmann, The Design and Construction of Dams, 8th edition.

 ,QWKHOHWWHURI¿FLDOO\UHFRPPHQGLQJVHOHFWLRQRIWKH6DOW5LYHU3URMHFWIRUFRQVWUXFWLRQE\WKH

Reclamation Service, the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey made explicit reference to recent work on 

the New York and Boston water supply systems. The Salt River Project was the only initial Reclamation 

Service project intended to serve the region surrounding a burgeoning city. As such, it is not so surprising 

that the Roosevelt Dam utilized a technology very similar to that employed for prominent eastern dams. See 

Charles Walcott to E. A. Hitchcock [Secretary of the Interior], March 7, 1903, National Archives, Denver, 

5*(QWU\6DOW5LYHU3URMHFW6SHFL¿FFRPSDULVRQRIWKHSURSRVHG6DOW5LYHUGDPZLWKWKH&URWRQDQG

Wachusett Dams is made in Arthur P. Davis, “Investigations in Arizona,” in Newell, compiler, Proceedings of

the First Conference of Engineers of the Reclamation Service, 129.

25. The Hudson Reservoir and Canal Company’s proposed curved gravity dam design is illustrated in 

Schuyler, “Water Storage and Construction Of Dams,” 715-7.

 7KH¿UVWGHVLJQGHVFULSWLRQRI5RRVHYHOW'DPDSSHDUHGLQ$UWKXU3RZHOO'DYLVWater Storage on Salt

River, Arizona:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH7KLVSXEOLFDWLRQGLVVHPLQDWHGDUHSRUW

VXEPLWWHGE\'DYLVLQPLGWKDWZDVSDUWLDOO\¿QDQFHGE\3KRHQL[LUULJDWLRQLQWHUHVWVThe First Annual

Report of the Reclamation Service :DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FHHVVHQWLDOO\UHSHDWV

WKHGHVFULSWLRQSUHVHQWHGLQ'DYLV¶VUHSRUW$VRQHRIKLV¿UVWFRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFH

consulting engineer George Wisner visited the Tonto site in April 1903 and shortly afterwards inspected the 

San Mateo Dam (a concrete curved gravity dam) in the company of Davis. In reporting upon his trip, Wisner 

stated that “a curved masonry dam, such as designed by Mr. Davis, is particularly well adapted for the [Tonto] 

VLWH ́*HRUJH<:LVQHUWR)+1HZHOO0D\1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\%R[

*HQHUDO$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV6DOW5LYHU')ROGHU6DOW5LYHU3URMHFW

Consulting Engineer Reports. Thru 1906. The engineering board was later consulted on plans that raised the 

5RRVHYHOWGHVLJQIURPDKHLJKWRIIHHWWRIHHW+RZHYHUWKHHQODUJHGJUDYLW\GHVLJQZDVQRWPRGL¿HG

H[FHSWWRSURSRUWLRQDOO\LQFUHDVHWKHWKLFNQHVVRIWKHEDVH)RUYHUL¿FDWLRQWKDW'DYLVZDVSULPDU\GHVLJQHURI

the Roosevelt Dam, see C. R. Olberg to A. P. Davis, March 6, 1911, National Archives, Denver, RG115, Entry 

3, Salt River Project.

 )+1HZHOOWR$+'LPRFN$SULO1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\*HQHUDO

$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQGSURMHFW5HFRUGV$%R[)ROGHU6WUDLJKWV7HFKQLFDO

Discussions. Discussion Relative to Dams. 1911-1914.

 4XRWHWDNHQIURP)+1HZHOO3,UULJDWLRQ$Q,QIRUPDO'LVFXVVLRQ ́Transactions of the American

Society of Civil Engineers 1HZHOO¶VSUHRFFXSDWLRQZLWKYLVXDODSSHDUDQFHLVDOVRUHÀHFWHGLQKLV

complaint that “the general appearance of the grounds at the Roosevelt headquarters could be improved . . . [because] our work is judged by the general public more by its outward appearance than by its real merit . . .” See 

)+1HZHOOWR/&+LOO0D\1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\*HQHUDO$GPLQLVWUDWLYH

DQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV6DOW5LYHU'%R[)ROGHU6DOW5LYHU3URMHFW&RQVXOWLQJ

Engineers Reports. January 1, 1907-December 31, 1912.
125

29. Davis, Water Storage on the Salt River. These cost estimates for purchasing and making cement are repeated in the First Annual Report of the Reclamation Service, 99-102.

 $3'DYLVWR/RXLV&+LOO)HEUXDU\1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\*HQHUDO

$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQGSURMHFW5HFRUGV6DOW5LYHU'%R[)ROGHU6DOW5LYHU3URMHFW

Consulting Engineers Reports. Thru 1906. Hill was supervising engineer for the Salt River Project.

31. Initial estimates for the construction of the power canal and hydroelectric plant are given in the First

Annual Report of the Reclamation Service)LQDOFRVWVDUHSURYLGHGLQWKHNinth Annual Report of the

Reclamation Service (Washington, D.C., 1911), 69.

 2¶5RXUNH¶V¿UPKDGUHFHQWO\FRPSOHWHGWKHFRQFUHWHVHDZDOOSURWHFWLQJ*DOYHVWRQ¶VJXOIFRDVWVKRUHOLQH

DQGWKLVDSSDUHQWO\TXDOL¿HGWKHPIRUWKH5RRVHYHOWFRQWUDFW

33. Construction bid data is published in the Fourth Annual Report of the Reclamation Service (Washington, 

D.C.), 69-71.

34. Sixth Annual Report of the Reclamation Service (Washington, D.C., 1908), 64.

35. Davis, Water Storage on the Salt River. These cost estimates for purchasing and making cement are repeated in the First Annual Report of the Reclamation Service, 99-102.

36. Report on “Expense of Operation and Maintenance, Roosevelt Cement Plant, May 1905 to July 1910, 

,QFOXVLYH ́1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\6DOW5LYHU3URMHFW$OVRVHH)+1HZHOOWR$3

Davis, March 4, 1904; and E. A. Hitchcock to Charles Walcott, March 4, 1904.

 7KHTXRWDWLRQLVWDNHQIURP*<:LVQHUDQG:+6DQGHUVWR)+1HZHOO0DUFK1DWLRQDO

Archives, Denver, RG115, Entry 3, General Administrative and Project Records, 1902-1919. Box 874. Salt 

5LYHU3UREOHPVLQHUHFWLQJWKHFHPHQWSODQWDUHRXWOLQHGLQ3)ROGHU6DOW5LYHU2SHUDWLRQRI

Cement Mill,” (no author) March 3, 1905.

 6HH/&+LOOWR)+1HZHOO-XO\DQG/&+LOOWR)+1HZHOO$XJXVWDQG$3

Davis to James Kruttsschnitt, July 17, 1907, National Archives, Denver, RG115, Entry 3, Salt River Project.

 )LQDOFRVWVIRUWKHFHPHQWSURGXFWLRQDUHJLYHQLQ3([SHQVHRI2SHUDWLRQDQG0DLQWHQDQFH5RRVHYHOW

Cement Plant, May 1905 to July 1910, Inclusive.” Granite Reef Dam is located more than 40 miles downVWUHDPIURP5RRVHYHOW'DP,WLVDFRQFUHWHRYHUÀRZVWUXFWXUHWKDWGLYHUWVZDWHURXWRIWKH6DOW5LYHUDQGLQWR

distribution canals serving the valley. The dam’s construction was not planned as part of the original Salt River 

3URMHFWEXWEHFDPHQHFHVVDU\DIWHUWKHSULYDWHO\RZQHG$UL]RQD'DPIDLOHGLQWKHKHDY\ÀRRGLQJRI7KH

60,000 barrels of cement used in its construction helped reduce the unit costs of production at the Roosevelt cePHQWPLOOE\DOORZLQJ¿[HGFRVWVWREHGLVWULEXWHGRYHUDJUHDWHUQXPEHURIEDUUHOV%HFDXVHRILWVFORVHSUR[-

imity to Phoenix, the costs of supplying cement to the Granite Reef Dam from private contractors would have 

been much less than offers made to supply cement to Roosevelt.

40. Cost of the Salt River Project, as of the end of 1910, is given in the Ninth Annual Report of the

Reclamation Service, 69-70. Work on Granite Reef Dam and distribution canals in the valley came to a little 

more than $2 million.

 'HWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKH6DOW5LYHU3URMHFW¶VRI¿FLDOLQLWLDOFRVWRIDSSUR[LPDWHO\PLOOLRQLVGRFXPHQWed in Smith, 7KH0DJQL¿FHQW([SHULPHQW, 140.

42. Construction of Wachusett Dam is described in Wegmann, Design and Construction, 6th edition, 185-94.

 )+1HZHOOWR/&+LOO'HFHPEHU1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\6DOW5LYHU

Project.

44. Detailed discussion of how the Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association sought to extend the project 

UHSD\PHQWSHULRGDQGUHGXFHLWV¿QDQFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\LVSUHVHQWHGLQ6PLWK7KH0DJQL¿FHQW([SHULPHQW,

92-124.

45. Quoted in Newell, Irrigation, 396.

 $QRWKHUGUDPDWLFFRVWRYHUUXQDIÀLFWHGWKH6WUDZEHUU\9DOOH\3URMHFWLQ8WDK,QFRVWHVWLPDWHV

were $1.25 million, but by the time of project completion almost a decade later costs had reached almost 

$3.5 million. See “Strawberry Valley Project,” HAER UT-26, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of 

Congress.

 )+1HZHOOWR/&+LOO1RYHPEHU1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\*HQHUDO

$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV6DOW5LYHU'%R[)ROGHU6DOW5LYHU3URMHFW

Consulting Engineers Reports. January 1, 1907-December 31, 1912. In 1917 the federal government gave the 

locally-controlled Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association complete operational control over the Salt River 

Project system. However, the federal government retained legal ownership of the Roosevelt Dam and other 

PDMRUVWUXFWXUHV)LQDOSD\PHQWIRUWKH$VVRFLDWLRQ¶VLQLWLDOPLOOLRQSURMHFWGHEWWRWKHJRYHUQPHQWZDV

tendered in the mid-1950s.

 )+1HZHOOWR-%/LSSLQFRWW)HEUXDU\1HZHOO3DSHUV/LEUDU\RI&RQJUHVV0DQXVFULSWV

Collections. Red thesis binder devoted to correspondence with Lippincott.
126

49. Smith, 7KH0DJQL¿FHQW([SHULPHQW, 184-95.

50. The powerplant at Roosevelt is described in Arthur P. Davis, Irrigation Works Constructed by the

U.S. Government (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1917), 18-9.

51. The history of hydroelectric power development along the Salt River by the Water Users’ Association is 

described in Donald C. Jackson, “History of Stewart Mountain Dam,” Historic American Engineering Record 

Collection, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Also see T. A. Hayden, 

“Salt River Project, Arizona, Irrigation and Hydroelectric Power Development by the Salt River Water Users’ 

Association-Six Major Dams,” Western Construction News 5 (June 25, 1930), 298-300.

52. Robinson, Water for the WestSURYLGHVDV\PSDWKHWLF\HWJHQHUDOO\UHDOLVWLFWUHDWPHQWRIWKH¿-

nancial problems that beset the early Reclamation Service. Newell remained associated with the Reclamation 

Service as “Chief of Construction” until May 1915, when he formally left the federal government. See also 

Jackson, Building the Ultimate Dam, 187-190.

 )RUDQH[FHOOHQWGHVFULSWLRQDQGDQDO\VLVRIWKLVFRPPLVVLRQ¶VZRUNVHH%ULDQ4&DQQRQ3μ:H$UH1RZ

(QWHULQJD1HZ(UD¶)HGHUDO5HFODPDWLRQDQGWKH)DFW)LQGLQJ&RPPLVVLRQRI ́3DFL¿F+LVWRULFDO

Review 66 (May 1997), 185-211. After A. P. Davis left the Reclamation Service, David W. Davis (a former 

JRYHUQRURI,GDKRZKRSRVVHVVHGQREDFNJURXQGLQHQJLQHHULQJZDVDSSRLQWHGWKH¿UVW&RPPLVVLRQHURIWKH

Bureau of Reclamation.

54. Mead’s early career is well described in James R. Kluger, Turning on Water with a Shovel: The Career

of Elwood Mead (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992). See 27-35 for discussion of his rivalry with Newell and his opposition to the National Reclamation Act that established the Reclamation Service.

55. Elwood Mead, Irrigation Institutions: A Discussion of the Economic and Legal Questions Created by the

Growth of Irrigated Agriculture in the West (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1903).

56. Elwood Mead, Helping Men Own Farms: A Practical Discussion of Government Aid in Land Settlement

(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920).

57. Kluger, Turning on Water with a Shovel, 57-101, describe Mead’s activities from 1907 through the early 

1920s.

58. Robinson, Water for the West, 45-6.

59. Kluger, Turning on Water with a Shovel, 115-26.

60. An alternate spelling is Mojave Desert.

61. Joseph L. Arnold, The Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act,2I¿FHRI+LVWRU\86$UP\&RUSVRI

(QJLQHHUV)RUW%HOYRLU9LUJLQLD

62.Arnold, Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act, 17-9.

 0DUWLQ5HXVV37KH$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVDQG)ORRG&RQWURO3ROLWLFVRQWKH/RZHU0LVVLVVLSSL ́

Louisiana History, 23, No. 2 (Spring 1982), 131-2.

64. Martin Reuss, “Andrew A. Humphreys and the Development of Hydraulic Engineering: Politics and 

Technology in the Army Corps of Engineers, 1850-1950,” 1-33.

65. Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 122-3. Walker, “Developing Hydroelectric Power: The Role of the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1900-1978,” 34-5 Preston J., Hubbard, Origins of the TVA: The Muscle Shoals

Controversy, 1920-1932 (New York: Norton, 1968 [originally published in Nashville: Vanderbilt University 

Press, 1961]).

66. Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\, 118-21. Swain, Federal Conservation Policy,

1921-1933, 98, 113-4. Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 81-2. Walker, “Developing Hydroelectric Power: 

The Role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1900-1978,” 47. See also Judson King, The Conservation

Fight: From Theodore Roosevelt to the Tennessee Valley Authority (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 

1959), 45-58.

67. Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 123-4. Swain, Federal Conservation Policy, 1921-1933, 115-20. 

Hubbard, Origins of the TVA, 138. Reuss and Walker, Financing Water Resources Development, 37;Walker, 

“Developing Hydroelectric Power: The Role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1900-1978,” 38-9. See also 

Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\, 192-5.

68. Gail E. Evans, “Storm Over Niagara: A Catalyst in Co-shaping Government in the United States and 

Canada During the Progressive Era,” Natural Resources Journal 32, No. 1 (Winter 1992), 45-6.

69. Leland R. Johnson, Engineers on the Twin Rivers, U.S. Army Engineer District - Nashville, 1978, 163-9.

70. Valentine Ketcham and M. C. Tyler, “Hugh Lincoln Cooper Memoir,” Transactions, American Society of

Civil Engineers 103 (1938), 1772-7.

 37KH0F&DOO)HUU\+\GUR(OHFWULF3RZHUSODQWRQWKH6XVTXHKDQQD5LYHU ́Engineering News 58, No. 11 

(September 12, 1907), 267.

72. Roald D. Tweet, A History of the Rock Island District U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: 1866-1983 (Rock 

Island, Illinois: U.S. Army Engineer District, Rock Island, 1984), 245.
127

73. “Water Power Development on the Mississippi River at Keokuk, Iowa.” Engineering News 66, No. 13 

(September 28, 1911), 355.

74. Tweet, History of the Rock Island District, 244.

75. Thomas P. Hughes, 1HWZRUNVRI3RZHU(OHFWUL¿FDWLRQLQ:HVWHUQ6RFLHW\ (Baltimore: The 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 390.

76. Hugh L. Cooper, “The Water Power Development of the Mississippi River Power Company at Keokuk 

Iowa,” Journal of the Western Society of Engineers 17 (January to December 1912), 213. This article came 

from the paper presented on October 18, 1911.

77. Cooper, “Water Power Development on the Mississippi River at Keokuk, Iowa,” 356.

78. Cooper, “Water Power Development on the Mississippi River at Keokuk, Iowa,” 364.

79. Tweet, History of the Rock Island District, 245.

80. Hugh L. Cooper and Co., “Electric Power for the Tennessee River, Muscle Shoals, Alabama,” Interim

Construction Progress Bulletin (November 1, 1923), 7.

81. Johnson, Engineers on the Twin Rivers, 169.

82. Ketcham and Tyler, “Cooper Memoir,” 1774.

 +DUROG'RUQ3+XJK/LQFROQ&RRSHUDQGWKH)LUVW'pWHQWH ́Technology and Culture 20, No. 2 (April 

7KHTXRWDWLRQFDPHIURP3&RQÀLFWLQ+RXVH5HSRUWVRQ&RO&RRSHU¶V0XVFOH6KRDOV:RUN ́

Engineering News-Record 84, No. 22 (1920), 1082. In 1920 two views surfaced in a report from the House of 

Representatives. The Republican majority, critical of Wilson’s plans for Muscle Shoals, held that “anyone who 

opposed or sought to modify the plans . . . was either disregarded or disciplined . . .” and that Cooper was one 

who was so disciplined. The minority, Democrat report, denied that charge and explained that “this eminent of-

¿FHUZDVQHHGHGLQWKHEXLOGLQJRIDQLPPHQVHGRFNSURMHFWLQ)UDQFH ́

 'RUQ3&RRSHUDQGWKH)LUVW'pWHQWH ́0RVWOLNHO\WKLVPHDQWWKDWKLVSHUVRQDOWLPHZDVXQFRPSHQsated. His company produced substantial design work which must surely have been paid for.

 )UHG$1RHW]OL3:LWK0DWKHPDWLFDO'LVFXVVLRQDQG'HVFULSWLRQRI0XOWLSOH$UFK'DPV ́(GZDUG

Wegmann, The Design and Construction of Dams, 8thHGLWLRQ)RU:LOVRQ'DPVHH)RU&RRSHU¶VZRUN

see for example, drawings Numbers 3450-3452 dated November 1, 1920, and Number 3453 dated October 23, 

1920. The Corps continued to make drawings into October 1920, but Cooper’s work had by then become the 

RI¿FLDOUHFRUG

86. Wegmann, Design and Construction, 8thHGLWLRQ)RUDVXPPDU\RIVXFKRYHUÀRZPDVRQU\ZHLUVVHH

also plates CII and CIII.

87. John W. Hall, “The Control of Mixtures and Testing of Wilson Dam Concrete,” Paper delivered at a 

PHHWLQJRIWKH$PHULFDQ&RQFUHWH,QVWLWXWH&KLFDJR)HEUXDU\+DOOZDVUHVLGHQWHQJLQHHUIRU+XJK

Cooper.

88. Johnson, Engineers on the Twin Rivers, 173. He reports that in the month of June 1926, the dam proGXFHGNLORZDWWKRXUVRIZRUNZKLFKLPSOLHVDQDYHUDJHSURGXFWLRQRI[ 

83,500 kW. of power.

89. Cooper, “Water Power Development on the Mississippi River at Keokuk, Iowa,” 1923, 5.

90. Quoted in Johnson, Engineers on the Twin Rivers, 173. Roosevelt delivered the speech on January 21, 

1933, after a visit to Wilson Dam.

 +DUROG&)LVNH33UHOLPLQDU\([DPLQDWLRQRI7HQQHVVHH5LYHUDQG7ULEXWDULHV ́-DQXDU\

9, in Tennessee River and Tributaries North Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, and Kentucky, House of 

Representatives, 6 Congress, 2nd Session, Document No. 319, May 19, 1922.

92. Johnson, Engineers on the Twin Rivers, 181. 

 )RUDIXOOGHVFULSWLRQRIWKH7HQQHVVHH5LYHUVXUYH\VHH*HUDUG+0DWWKHV3$HULDO3KRWRJUDSK\DVDQ

Aid in Map Making, with Special Reference to Water Power Surveys,” Transactions of the American Society of

Civil Engineers 86 (1923), 779-802.

94. Johnson, Engineers on the Twin Rivers, 9-82.

95. William W. Harts, “To the Chief of Engineers, United States Army,” in Johnson, Engineers on the Twin

Rivers, 182-4.

 +DUROG&)LVNH33DUWLDO6XUYH\RI7HQQHVVHH5LYHUDQG7ULEXWDULHV ́0DUFKLQ-RKQVRQ

Engineers on the Twin Rivers, 148, 165.

97. C. W. Kutz, “To the Chief of Engineers, United States Army,” March 21, 1922, in Johnson, Engineers on

the Twin Rivers, 165-7.

98. H. Taylor, for the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, “To the Chief of Engineers, United States 

Army,” April 4, 1922, in Johnson, Engineers on the Twin Rivers, 8.
128

99. Lansing H. Beach, “To the Secretary of War,” May 16, 1922, in Johnson, Engineers on the Twin Rivers,

1-3. The Congress authorized an expenditure of $200,000 on September 22, 1922. See Tennessee River and

Tributaries, North Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, and Kentucky, House of Representatives, 71st Congress, 2nd

Session, Document 328, March 24, 1930, 29. This is the 308 Report. The total allotted to the general 

survey by 1927 was $910,075.51. Tennessee River and Tributaries, North Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, and

Kentucky, House of Representatives, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Document 319, 3.

100. House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, 68th Congress, 1st Session, March 31 and April 1, 1924, and the 

Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1925, 43 Stat. 1186, Section 3.

101. Johnson, Engineers on the Twin Rivers, 181-4.

102. H. Taylor and O. C. Merrill, “Estimate of Cost of Examinations, etc. of Streams where Power 

'HYHORSPHQW$SSHDUV)HDVLEOH ́+RXVHRI5HSUHVHQWDWLYHVth Congress, 1st Session (December 7, 1925, to 

November 10, 1926), Document No. 308, Washington D.C., 6 pages.

103. Wegmann, Design and Construction, 8th edition, vii-viii.

104. Raymond J. Sontag, A Broken World: 1919-1939 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 133-4.

105. (Editor’s note) This is the third dam named for a president discussed in this book. By this time, however, a fourth dam was already in-place – Coolidge designed and built by the Indian Irrigation Service on the Gila 

River to the southeast of Phoenix.APTER 4: T HE BOULDER CANYON PROJECT, WATER 

DEVELOPMENT IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN, AND HOOVER DAM
129

CHAPTER 4:

THE BOULDER CANYON PROJECT:

WATER DEVELOPMENT IN THE

COLORADO RIVER BASIN, AND HOOVER DAM

THE COLORADO RIVER: IRRIGATION AND FLOOD

The River

 :LWKDQDYHUDJHÀRZRIDERXWPLOOLRQDFUHIHHWSHU\HDUWKH

Colorado River does not stand as an American giant in terms of the water volXPHLWFDUULHV7KHPLJKW\&ROXPELD5LYHULQWKH3DFL¿F1RUWKZHVWFDUULHVDOmost ten times as much water, and many rivers in the humid East (such as the 

Susquehanna, the Delaware, the Hudson, and the Connecticut) are comparable 

WRWKH&RORUDGRLQWHUPVRIDQQXDOÀRZ%XWWKH&RORUDGRGUDLQVRQHRIWKHGULest regions in North America, and the water that passes through its channel is a 

rare and precious resource; the muddy, turbulent stream stands in stark, dramatic 

contrast to the arid terrain of the southwestern landscape. In absolute terms, the 

Colorado River may not be a large river, but within the context of its surrounding 

environment it offers possibilities of social and economic development that imEXHLWZLWKHQRUPRXVVLJQL¿FDQFH$QGWKLVVLJQL¿FDQFHLVUHÀHFWHGLQWKHSROLWLFDOEDWWOHVWKDWDFFRPSDQLHGHIIRUWVE\JRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVEXVLQHVVPHQERRVWers, engineers, and the citizenry as a whole to take control of the Colorado and 

utilize its water for the purposes they thought most advantageous.

The construction of dams, powerplants, canals, and aqueducts to effect 

control over the Colorado unquestionably represents a story of technological development and—over time—advancement. But the story of where, when, and 

how these technological artifacts came to be built is, of necessity, a political story—a story of how American political institutions were utilized by the nation’s 

citizenry (acting through a dynamic matrix of individuals, organizations, comSDQLHVDQGLQWHUHVWJURXSVWRIRVWHUWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIVSHFL¿FHQJLQHHULQJ

systems serving the desires of particular groups of people. The Colorado River 

ÀRZVWKURXJKVHYHQZHVWHUQVWDWHVDQGHDFKRIWKHVHVWDWHVLVSRSXODWHGE\SHRple who see (and who have long seen) the river as an appropriate source of ecoQRPLFEHQH¿WIRUWKHLUVWDWHDQGWKHLUSURMHFWV

In terms of how Hoover Dam came to be built and how the dam relates to the overall development of the Colorado River, the driving force behind 

the project is easily traced to political and business interests tied to Southern 

California. The technological and legal initiatives central to the construction of 
130

WKHULYHU¶V¿UVWPDMRUVWRUDJHGDPDOOHPDQDWHGIURP&DOLIRUQLDDQGZHUHGHsigned to facilitate: (1) the agricultural development in the Imperial Valley, and 

(2) the municipal growth of greater Los Angeles. The irony of this circumstance 

LVWKDW&DOLIRUQLDSURYLGHVYHU\OLWWOHZDWHUWRWKHÀRZRIWKH&RORUDGRQRQHWKHless, California occupies a geographical and topographical relationship to the 

ULYHUWKDWIDFLOLWDWHGLWVDELOLW\WRXWLOL]HWKHÀRZEHIRUHDQ\RWKHUVWDWHVLQWKH

Southwest could develop projects of comparable scale or economic importance.

 %HFDXVHWKHWRWDOÀRZLVVROLPLWHGDWOHDVWLQWHUPVRIWKHDPRXQWRI

ODQGWKDWFDQFRQFHLYDEO\EHQH¿WIURPLWDQGWKHSRVVLEOHXVHVVRYDVWLWGLGQRW

take long for citizens of the various states to begin to perceive other states as 

)LJXUH7KH&RORUDGR5LYHU%DVLQVKRZLQJWKH8SSHU%DVLQDQG/RZHU%DVLQVWDWHV

Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
131

SRWHQWLDOFRPSHWLWRUV)RUPDQ\\HDUVWKLVFRPSHWLWLRQUHPDLQHGK\SRWKHWLFDO

and abstract, but things began to change in the early 1920s when serious and emLQHQWO\SODXVLEOHLQLWLDWLYHVZHUHDGYDQFHGWRHUHFWZKDWEHFDPHWKH¿UVW

major storage dam across the stream. With the completion of Hoover Dam, utilization of the river’s resources would pass from the realm of the possible to the 

realm of reality. And because of how American society (acting through state 

laws, federal statutes, and constitutional rulings by the judiciary) had formulated 

the legal structure of water rights on a national level, the placement of this huge 

technological construct into the riparian landscape of the lower Colorado River 

represented (and would effect) a huge political ordering of how the river’s water 

resources would be allocated and used for generations to come.

Thus, while the story of dam building along the Colorado River might 

DSSHDUDW¿UVWJODQFHWRFRQVWLWXWHDWDOHRIGHYHORSLQJHQJLQHHULQJH[SHUWLVH

brought to bear on problems involving such things as diversion tunnel blasting or 

concrete placement, in aggregate it represents something much more complicated 

(although the process of dam-building was nothing if not complicated in its own 

terms). The political character of dam-building is certainly not a unique characteristic of the Colorado River basin, but the history of the river’s development 

offers a particularly engaging example of how dam-building is inextricably intertwined into the political fabric of American life.

The Bureau of Reclamation and the West

By the beginning of the 1920s, the feasibility of building large-scale 

water projects in the West could no longer be dismissed as fanciful dreaming. 

Several projects, some sponsored by the federal government and some underwritten by private capital, had demonstrated the possibility of transforming the 

arid western environment through the control and diversion of regional water 

supplies. Most of these involved agricultural development, while some focused 

on hydroelectric power production or municipal water supply. The organization, 

funding, and implementation of these various endeavors may have differed, but 

they all provided evidence that increased utilization of water resources could foster increased economic growth.

While not the only player in the game of big dam construction, during 

WKH¿UVWWZRGHFDGHVRIWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\WKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWPDGHPDjor contributions to the art of hydraulic engineering. The Reclamation Service 

may have failed in its efforts to achieve the high (and perhaps unrealistic) stanGDUGVRIPDQDJHULDOHI¿FLHQF\DQG¿QDQFLDOVXFFHVVWKDW)UHGHULFN1HZHOOKHUalded at the time of its original authorization; nonetheless, it had proved beyond 

FDYLOLWVDELOLW\WRSODQDQGFRPSOHWHELJFRQVWUXFWLRQMREVLQUHPRWHDQGGLI¿FXOW

locations. While the ideal of promoting the family farm never disappeared from 
132

RI¿FLDOEXUHDXUKHWRULFGXULQJWKHVDQGLQWRWKHV5HFODPDWLRQJUDGXally reshifted its energies toward projects with economic goals extending far beyond simple agricultural production.

 ,QLWV¿UVWWZRGHFDGHVWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHLQFOXGHGK\GURHOHFWULF

power production as part of some projects (most notably the Roosevelt Dam in 

$UL]RQD+RZHYHULQWKH¿UVWWZRGHFDGHVRIWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFH¶VH[LVtence, electric power production always remained ancillary to irrigation and was 

never pursued as a central goal, tenet, or objective unto itself. Eventually identifying (and promoting) its work in a more broad-based manner that extended beyond an agricultural focus, by the mid-1920s the renamed bureau began to more 

GLUHFWO\IRFXVRQIRVWHULQJDUDQJHRIEHQH¿WVWKDWFRXOGLQFOXGHÀRRGFRQWURO

hydroelectric power, municipal water supply, and—last but not least—irrigation. 

Because of the scope and scale that multipurpose projects both encompassed and 

required, Reclamation’s interests gradually expanded beyond efforts to build individual dams and water supply systems. Instead, it began to conceive its mission as one dedicated to planning—and implementing—the hydraulic development of entire river basins.

The ascension of federally sponsored multipurpose dams did not derive 

from some master plan conceived in the Reclamation Service conference rooms 

in Washington, D.C., or Denver, Colorado. Rather, it slowly evolved out of a 

longstanding tradition (dating as far back as the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1824 ruling in Gibbon v. Ogden) that the federal government maintained a special constitutionally-derived authority over navigable waterways. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the legal orientation of the U.S. judicial system was not one that encouraged an active (some might say intrusive) role for the 

IHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWLQWKHHFRQRPLFDIIDLUVRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV)URPDYDQWDJH

SRLQWDWWKHVWDUWRIWKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\LWPLJKWVHHPSHUIHFWO\QDWXUDO2LIQRW

inevitable—that the federal government would take on responsibility for erecting huge water supply and electric power systems. But prior to the 1930s, during which the lingering devastation of the Great Depression fostered a complete 

rethinking of how government should interact with the national economy, it was 

not at all obvious that such projects represented initiatives properly undertaken 

by a federal bureau.

Certainly, the passage of the National Reclamation Act in 1902 and 

subsequent actions such as Theodore Roosevelt’s convening of a National 

Conservation Convention at the White House in 1908 offer evidence that–at 

least in the minds of many progressive conservationists–there existed a role 

for the federal government in economic and natural resource development. 

)XUWKHUPRUHWKHQDWLRQDOGHEDWHRYHUFRQWURODQGUHJXODWLRQRIZDWHUSRZHUWKDW

extended from the Roosevelt Administration through the establishment of the 
133

)HGHUDO3RZHU&RPPLVVLRQLQUHÀHFWHGDZLOOLQJQHVVRQWKHSDUWRIWKH

American electorate to accord a federal role in overseeing hydroelectric power 

SURGXFWLRQE\SULYDWHO\¿QDQFHGHOHFWULFSRZHUFRPSDQLHV1RQHWKHOHVVWKHQRWLRQWKDWWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWZRXOGDVVXPHGLUHFWUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRU¿QDQFing and building dams and water control systems dedicated to generating electric 

SRZHUIRUSXEOLFFRQVXPSWLRQDQGWRVXSSRUWLQJQRQDJULFXOWXUDOLHPXQLFLSDO

urban) water supply systems was not at all obvious prior to the 1930s.

Any telling of the story of how the federal government came to embrace multipurpose projects focused around river basin development cannot be 

completely comprehensive if focused on only a single river or a single dam projHFW)RUH[DPSOHWKHFRQWURYHUV\RYHUKRZRUZKHWKHUWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQment should become involved in the business of electric power production came 

to the forefront of the national political arena in the 1920s during debate over 

how Muscle Shoals (Wilson) Dam should be integrated into the economy of the 

Southeastern United States.1

$QDUUDWLRQRIWKHIHGHUDOULYHUEDVLQK\GURHOHFtric power story might simply take Wilson Dam and analyze its history as representative of how a federal presence in such affairs—while originating prior to 

WKH)UDQNOLQ5RRVHYHOW$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ2GLGQRWEHFRPHIXOO\PDQLIHVWXQWLOWKH

coming of the New Deal.2

 Certainly, there would be some truth to such a porWUD\DODQGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH:LOVRQ'DP79$FRQQHFWLRQLQUHJDUGWRWKH

ascendance of federally owned hydroelectric generating plants cannot be discounted. But such a story would leave a mistaken impression that the Roosevelt 

Administration’s New Deal activism–or special defense-related motivations–

comprised a necessary factor in the implementation of federal multipurpose projects.

A key initiative that complicates any historical interpretation positing the 

New Deal as an essential factor in the rise of federally sponsored river basin development concerns the authorization and construction of Hoover Dam. Located 

across the Colorado River about 150 miles downstream from the Grand Canyon 

(and only about 25 miles east of Las Vegas, Nevada), this massive curved gravity 

concrete dam was formally authorized by the Boulder Canyon Project Act, which 

was signed into law by President Calvin Coolidge in December 1928. Clearly, 

the approval of the project by a Republican president famed for his view that “after all, the chief business of the American people is business” (and approved long 

before the stock market collapse of October 1929) reveals that Hoover Dam must 

derive from something much more than a simple “reaction” to the economic 

downturn of the Great Depression.

In addition, the fact that it was named Hoover Dam by President 

Hoover’s Secretary of the Interior, Ray Lyman Wilbur in 1930, also speaks to its 

origins as something quite different from a New Deal project (a note on 
134

nomenclature: early planning perceived Boulder Canyon as a logical site for a 

dam across the lower Colorado River and for this reason proposed legislation authorizing the dam was titled “Boulder Canyon Project Act”). However, as early 

as 1924, it was recognized that nearby Black Canyon offered a better site for a 

)LJXUH7KLVHDUO\VPDSVKRZVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSRIWKH,PSHULDO9DOOH\WRWKH

Colorado River, including the site of Hoover (Boulder) Dam and the delta lands of northern 

Mexico. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
135

large dam, and—despite being characterized as Boulder Dam—the structure, as 

it stands today, is located in Black Canyon). 

 7KH¿UVWRIZKDWFDPHWREHFKDUDFWHUL]HGDVPXOWLSXUSRVHGDPV±DQGDVsociated river basin initiatives–involved plans to create a huge reservoir on the 

lower Colorado River to serve agricultural and municipal interests in southern 

California. The huge concrete gravity dam responsible for creating this reservoir 

revolutionized the way the federal government participated in water control projects.

Early Developments and the Imperial Valley

 7KHRULJLQVRI+RRYHU'DPOD\LQDQDPELWLRXVSULYDWHO\¿QDQFHGSURMect to irrigate southern California’s Imperial Valley with water from the Colorado 

River. As conceived by the Colorado Development Company in the late 1890s, 

this scheme diverted water from the river to a huge tract of desert land just north 

RIWKH&DOLIRUQLD0H[LFRERUGHU6LJQL¿FDQWO\PXFKRIWKLVODQGOLHVEHORZVHD

OHYHOZKLFKPDNHVLWUHODWLYHO\HDV\IRUZDWHUWRÀRZWRWKHYDOOH\DWWKHVDPH

time, this distinctive topographical condition also makes the valley susceptible 

WRÀRRGLQJ,QWKHDEVHQFHRIKXPDQLQWHUIHUHQFHWKHÀRRGLQJRIWKHYDOOH\RFcured in cycles of hundreds or thousands of years depending upon silt accumulaWLRQLQWKHULYHU¶VGHOWDÀRRGSODLQ:LWKKXPDQPDQLSXODWLRQRIWKHULYHULQRUGHUWRIRVWHULUULJDWHGDJULFXOWXUHWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIÀRRGLQJDVVXPHGDQHZGLPHQVLRQQRWEHFDXVHVHWWOHUVZDQWHGWRÀRRGWKH,PSHULDO9DOOH\EXWEHFDXVH

of unintended consequences that could result from the construction and clearing 

of canals connected to the mainstem of the Colorado. To understand better how 

ÀRRGVDIIHFWHGGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH,PSHULDO9DOOH\DQGWKHHYHQWXDOFRQVWUXFWLRQ

of storage dams on the Colorado River, it is necessary to consider the character 

of the river’s entire watershed.

The tributaries of the Colorado River drain over 200,000 square miles 

of land varying in elevation from over 14,000 feet to sea level (and even lower).3

 

7KHPDLQULYHULVSULPDULO\IHGE\DIHZODUJHWULEXWDULHVÀRZLQJZHVWDQGVRXWK

out of the Rocky Mountains. The most important of these include the Green 

5LYHUÀRZLQJRXWRI:\RPLQJDQGWKURXJKHDVWHUQ8WDKWKH<DPSD:KLWHDQG

*XQQLVRQ5LYHUVÀRZLQJRXWRIZHVWHUQ&RORUDGRDQGWKH6DQ-XDQ5LYHUÀRZing out of northwestern New Mexico. In aggregate, these streams contribute alPRVWSHUFHQWRIWKHULYHU¶VDQQXDOÀRZDQGWKH\FRQVWLWXWHZKDWLVFRPPRQO\

called the Upper Basin. The above-named tributaries feed into the main stem of 

the Colorado River before it reaches the forbidding canyon lands of southwestHUQ8WDKZKHUHWKHVWUHDPEHGÀRZVWKURXJKDVHULHVRIJRUJHVDQGFDQ\RQVO\LQJ

hundreds to thousands of feet below the surrounding mesas and plateaus. After 

FURVVLQJWKH8WDK$UL]RQDERUGHUDQGSDVVLQJWKHIDPRXVULYHUFURVVLQJSRLQW
136

NQRZQDV/HH¶V)HUU\WKH&RORUDGRÀRZVZHVWZDUGWKURXJKWKH*UDQG&DQ\RQ

Soon afterwards, it reaches the Boulder and Black Canyons that straddle the 

$UL]RQD1HYDGDERUGHU7XUQLQJVRXWKZDUGRQFHLWUHDFKHVWKHYLFLQLW\RI/DV

Vegas, Nevada, the Colorado River soon forms the 250-mile-long border beWZHHQWKHVWDWHVRI&DOLIRUQLDDQG$UL]RQD)LQDOO\DWDGLVWDQFHRI

1,450 miles from its headwaters in Colorado, the Colorado River enters–at least 

it did prior to the erection of large storage dams–the state of Sonora, Mexico, and 

disperses across an expansive delta. Only then does it drain into the shallow arm 

RIWKH3DFL¿F2FHDQNQRZQDVWKH*XOIRI&DOLIRUQLD

 :LWKDÀRZWKDWFDQUDQJHLQLQWHQVLW\IURPWRRYHUFXbic feet per second, the annual capacity of the Colorado River is not particularly remarkable if compared with rivers in the humid region of the eastern United 

States. But the river drops thousands of feet in its journey seaward and offers 

WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIGHYHORSLQJVLJQL¿FDQWDPRXQWVRIK\GURHOHFWULFSRZHUHVSHFLDOO\LIVHDVRQDOÀRRGVFDQEHFDSWXUHGEHKLQGKLJKVWRUDJHGDPVDQGJUDGXDOO\

UHOHDVHGWKURXJKWXUELQHJHQHUDWRUV7KHSRZHUSRWHQWLDORIWKHVWUHDPDWWUDFWHG

little attention prior to the twentieth century because the possibility of harnessing 

its energy seemed remote and impractical. Instead, during the nineteenth centuU\WKHORZHUUHDFKHVRIWKHVWUHDPIURP0H[LFRXSDORQJWKH&DOLIRUQLD$UL]RQD

ERUGHU±ZKLFKFRQVWLWXWHGDUHODWLYHO\ÀDWVWUHWFKRIULYHUXQHQFXPEHUHGE\UDSLGVRUURFN\VKRDOV±ZDVLQLWLDOO\XWLOL]HGWRVXSSRUWVWHDPERDWWUDI¿FVHUYLQJ

)LJXUH$QHZO\SODQWHGJUDSHIUXLWRUFKDUGLQWKH,PSHULDO9DOOH\FLUFDSource:

Bureau of Reclamation.
137

mining districts in the region.4 Within the larger scope of the national economy, 

WKLVVWHDPERDWWUDI¿FZDVRIPLQRULPSRUWDQFH,WTXLFNO\GLVVLSDWHGE\WKHHDUO\

VDIWHUWKH6RXWKHUQ3DFL¿F5DLOURDGFRPSOHWHGLWVVRXWKHUQWUDQVFRQWLQHQtal line through Arizona and New Mexico. In a strictly economic context, 

the Colorado’s short-lived steamboat trade would barely rate a footnote in the 

history of the American Southwest. But within a legal context, the existence of 

WKLVVWHDPERDWWUDI¿FGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWWKHVWUHDPZDVXQTXHVWLRQDEO\3QDYLgable” and, thus, subject to federal jurisdiction based upon long-standing legal 

precedents involving interstate commerce.

In contrast to the lower Colorado River (which had been known to 

Spanish explorers as far back as the sixteenth century), the Upper Basin of the 

river’s watershed (i.e., the territory upstream from the Grand Canyon stretching 

into Utah, Colorado, and Wyoming) constituted one of the last great “unknown” 

regions of the North American Continent. Characterized by a rugged terrain in 

which the river proper often lay far below the level of the surrounding countryside, exploration of this region was the focus of John Wesley Powell’s famous 

Colorado River expeditions of 1869 and 1871.5

 By the end of the nineteenth 

century, the upper Colorado River watershed was long past being “unknown” 

by Anglo-American society at large. But, aside from a relatively small number of irrigation diversion ditches serving communities such as Grand Junction, 

)LJXUH$Q,PSHULDO9DOOH\VWUDZEHUU\¿HOGF Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
138

Colorado, the water resources of the Upper Basin remained largely unexploited 

in terms of economic development. Similarly, by 1900, only a relatively small 

amount of irrigation development had taken place in the Lower Colorado Basin 

QHDU%O\WKH&DOLIRUQLDZKHUHDVPDOOSRUWLRQRIWKHULYHUÀRZZDVGLYHUWHGRQWR

bottom lands paralleling the river in what came to be called the Palo Verde Valley 

(although in truth it is more properly characterized as encompassing part of the 

lower Colorado River Valley). Aside from this (and a few other minor irrigation 

GLYHUVLRQVDORQJWKHOHQJWKRIWKHVWUHDPWKH&RORUDGRVWLOOÀRZHGIUHHDQGXQfettered in its journey through the delta to the Gulf of California. With the coming of the twentieth century, this would quickly change.

As far back as the 1850s, Oliver Wozencroft, a pioneering AngloAmerican who traveled through Southern California in the wake of the Gold 

Rush, had come to appreciate the agricultural possibilities that were afforded 

E\WKHGLVWLQFWLYHWRSRJUDSK\RIWKHORZHU&RORUDGR5LYHU'HOWD6SHFL¿FDOO\

Wozencroft and his engineer colleague, Ebenezer Hadley, realized that an anFLHQWFKDQQHORIWKHULYHUORQJVLQFH¿OOHGLQZLWKVHGLPHQWVKDGRQFHFDUried water directly into the Imperial Valley.6

 The reason for subsequent change 

in the location of the main course of the river away from this channel related 

to the huge amount of sediment carried by the river. Prior to the construction 

of major storage dams, the river deposited, on average, approximately 130,000 

acre-feet of sediment atop its delta every year. As the river neared the Gulf of 

&DOLIRUQLDWKHVWUHDPEHGÀDWWHQHGRXWWKHUDWHRIÀRZGHFUHDVHGDQGWKHVHGLment “load” gradually settled out–thus, slowly but surely raising the level of 

the streambed. As with all river deltas (including the mouths of the Nile River 

in Egypt or the Mississippi River in Louisiana), this buildup of silt eventually 

SURYHVVRJUHDWWKDWWKHULYHUZLOORYHUÀRZLWVEDQNVDQGQDWXUDOO\3GLVFRYHU ́D

new, less silt-clogged, steeper, and hence more physically advantageous route to 

WKHVHD,QWKHFDVHRIWKHORZHU&RORUDGR5LYHUWKH3DFL¿F2FHDQGLGQRWUHSresent the only possible outlet; in fact, because much of the Imperial Valley lies 

below sea level, it offers an even more “logical” destination for the river than the 

3DFL¿F2FHDQEHFDXVHLWFDQDOORZIRUDVWHHSHUIDVWHUÀRZ,QIDFWWKHUHJLRQ

now known as the Imperial Valley had once been a part of the Gulf of California; 

it was only due to the accumulation of sediment in the Colorado Delta that it became separated from the Gulf and was allowed to become dry land below sea 

level. As Wozencroft discovered, in ancient times the river had carried fresh water into the Imperial Valley as a result of shifting distributor channels. And there 

was no reason why—with a little human assistance—it could not do so again. 

Wozencroft died before any serious effort was made to develop the 

Imperial Valley as an irrigation settlement, but not before he had attracted congressional interest in surveying and assessing the proposed scheme. By the 

1890s, his basic idea was picked up by the engineer, Charles Rockwood, the 
139

irrigation promoter and developer, George Chaffey (who had previously been involved successfully in establishment of the irrigation colony at Ontario, west of 

San Bernardino); and other investors in the California Development Company. 

Rockwood, Chaffey, and their company are generally credited for popularizing 

the name Imperial Valley in place of the much less evocative term “Colorado 

Desert” used previously to denote the region.7

 But beyond helping coin a more 

attractive name for the valley, the California Development Company also undertook practical and vital engineering work beginning in 1896.8

 Most importantly, 

this entailed cleaning out silt from the ancient channel (usually called the Alamo 

5LYHUWKDWKDGRQFHÀRZHGLQWRWKHYDOOH\5RFNZRRGDQG&KDIIH\LQWHQGHGWR

rehabilitate the channel as the right-of-way for a major irrigation canal.

Just north of the Mexican border on the California side of the river, the 

company “cut” a short canal connecting the existing riverbed to the ancient chanQHO)LWWHGXSZLWKZRRGHQKHDGJDWHVLQWHQGHGWRFRQWUROWKHDPRXQWRIÀRZDOlowed into their canal, this deceptively simple system provided a successful and 

relatively inexpensive means for diverting water into the Imperial Valley. In the 

short term, the company’s plans to make the desert bloom proved surprisingly easy to implement—nature had accomplished most of the “excavation” work 

hundreds of years earlier—and, by 1902, thousands of acres of prime agricultural land was in process of being irrigated and made economically productive. 

However, two potential problems, one political and one environmental-technological, threatened the endeavor’s long term success.

 7KH¿UVWRIWKHVHSUREOHPVGHULYHGIURPWKHSROLWLFDOUHDOLW\WKDWWKHDQcient river channel used by the California Development Company crossed over 

WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOERXQGDU\DQGUDQIRUDERXW¿IW\PLOHVWKURXJK0H[LFDQWHUritory before reentering the United States at the southern edge of the Imperial 

Valley. Although the Mexican Government allowed the canal to traverse its territory, under the jurisdiction of a separate Mexican company associated with the 

California Development Company, there remained concern that international political action—not to mention the possible action of bandidos—might cut off the 

valley’s water supply. In addition, the company’s agreement with Mexican auWKRULWLHVVWLSXODWHGWKDW0H[LFRUHVHUYHGWKHULJKWWRGUDZKDOIRIWKHZDWHUÀRZing through the canal for use on land lying outside the United States.

As it turned out, most of the Mexican acreage eventually watered by 

the Alamo Canal was controlled by Los Angeles businessman and Los Angeles

Times publisher Harry Chandler. Clearly, the politics of operating an 

international canal to serve the Imperial Valley were complicated by the fact that 

WKH¿QDQFLDOLQWHUHVWVRIVRPHKLJKO\LQÀXHQWLDO$PHULFDQEXVLQHVVPHQGLGQRW

stop at the border. Nonetheless, there existed strong feelings among many westerners that a canal lying entirely within U.S. territory would be in the national 
140

interest. By the early 1920s, this sentiment had coalesced into a movement to 

win federal support for what came to be known as an “All-American Canal,” entirely within the bounds of U.S. territory.

The second potential problem facing the California Development 

Company system was inherently environmental (and hence technological) in 

FKDUDFWHU6SHFL¿FDOO\LWUHODWHGWRWKHVKRUW3FXW ́H[FDYDWHGEHWZHHQWKHDQFLHQW

Alamo River channel and the main channel of the Colorado as it existed at the 

start of the twentieth century. After this cut was made into the river bank, water 

TXLFNO\EHJDQÀRZLQJLQWRWKHYDOOH\DQGDJULFXOWXUDODQGHFRQRPLFJURZWKUDSidly followed. By October of 1903, 100,000 acres were under cultivation and the 

valley supported a population of 4,000.9

 As a result of this remarkable growth, 

GHPDQGIRUZDWHUDOVRJUHZEXWWKHFRPSDQ\KDGGLI¿FXOW\NHHSLQJWKH$ODPR

Canal free of silt and thus capable of sustaining its maximum potential carrying 

capacity. As it turned out, silt accumulation proved particularly troublesome in 

the excavated section of the canal closest to the river, thus prompting the company to excavate two new (and larger) openings into the river a short distance 

GRZQVWUHDPIURPWKHRULJLQDO3FXW ́$VEHIRUHZDWHUÀRZZDVWREHFRQWUROOHG

E\ZRRGHQ3KHDGJDWHV ́GHVLJQHGWRHQVXUHWKDWXQFRQWUROOHGKHDY\ÀRRGVFRXOG

not pour into the Alamo Canal and down toward the Imperial Valley.10

In the late spring of 1905, the possibility of diverting too much water 

through this new diversion system became reality. In June of that year, heavy 

ÀRRGVZDVKHGRXWWKHQHZKHDGJDWHVDQGKXJH2HVVHQWLDOO\XQFRQWUROOHG2TXDQWLWLHVRIZDWHUEHJDQVXUJLQJLQWRWKH,PSHULDO9DOOH\$VPRUHZDWHUÀRZHGRXW

of the “old” channel of the Colorado River, the “new” Alamo River canal deepened and widened. In turn, this process of erosion allowed more water to be diYHUWHGDQGWKH3QHZ ́FKDQQHOFRQWLQXHGWRLQFUHDVHLQVL]H7KH6RXWKHUQ3DFL¿F

Railroad (whose trackage passed through the valley and which—as a freight carrier—maintained a strong economic interest in the valley’s agricultural production) worked valiantly, in concert with the California Development Company, to 

dump trainload-after-trainload of rock to close off the canal entrance with a rock 

embankment.11

 )RUPRQWKVWKLVHIIRUWKDGOLWWOHHIIHFWDVWKH&RORUDGRUHDFKHGÀRRG

stages unprecedented in the short time period that Anglo-Americans had come to 

know and study the stream. Appeals were made to the federal government to aid 

LQVWDXQFKLQJWKHÀRZWKURXJKWKH$ODPR&DQDOEXWZKLOHV\PSDWKHWLFWRIDUPers in the valley, President Theodore Roosevelt refused to directly aid or interfere 

in what he and his Administration perceived as the affairs of a private corporation.12 The California Development Company undertook its work as a private, 

QRQJRYHUQPHQWDOLQLWLDWLYHDQG2DIWHUWKHSURMHFWKDGHQFRXQWHUHGVHYHUHGLI¿-

culties—Roosevelt saw no reason that U.S. taxpayers need be drawn into a costly 
141

effort to rescue the company. In a January 1907 message addressed to the Senate 

DQG+RXVHRI5HSUHVHQWDWLYHV5RRVHYHOWVSHFL¿FDOO\UHVSRQGHGWRSOHDVIRUGLrect government intervention:

The California Development Company began its work by makLQJUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVWRSRVVLEOHVHWWOHUVRIWKHJUHDWEHQH¿WVWR

be derived by them by taking up this land. A large amount of 

money which might have been used in needed works was expended in advertising and in propounding the enterprise. The 

claims were not only extravagant, but in many cases it appears that willful misrepresentations was made . . . the money 

thus obtained from settlers was not used in permanent developPHQWEXWDSSDUHQWO\GLVDSSHDUHGHLWKHULQSUR¿WVWRWKHSULQFLpal promoters or in the numerous subsidiary companies. . . . At 

the present moment there appears to be only one agency equal 

WRWKHWDVNRIFRQWUROOLQJWKHULYHUQDPHO\WKH6RXWKHUQ3DFL¿F

Company, with its transportation facilities, its equipment, and 

control of the California Development Company and subsidiary 

companies. The need of railroad facilities and equipment and 

WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPSOLFDWLRQVDUHVXFKWKDWWKHRI¿FHUVRIWKH

United States, even with unlimited funds, could not carry on the 

work with the celerity required. . . .13

Whether the direct involvement of the federal government would have 

DFWXDOO\DFFHOHUDWHGWKHSURFHVVRIVWDXQFKLQJWKHÀRZLQWRWKH,PSHULDO9DOOH\

UHPDLQVXQFHUWDLQ*LYHQWKHHQRUPRXVHIIRUWPDGHE\WKH6RXWKHUQ3DFL¿FRQ

LWVRZQDFFRXQWLWLVGLI¿FXOWWRLPDJLQHWKDWIHGHUDODFWLRQZRXOGKDYHPDGH

any dramatic difference in the practical work to close the breach. As it turned 

RXWDERYHDYHUDJHÀRRGLQJLQWKH&RORUDGR5LYHUZDWHUVKHGGXULQJWKLVSHULRG

FOHDUO\H[DFHUEDWHGWKHSUREOHPRISURWHFWLQJWKHYDOOH\HYHQWXDOO\WKHÀRRGing through the Alamo Canal was brought under control, but it took almost two 

years–and an expenditure of two million dollars–before the “cut” was closed. In 

WHUPVRIWKHSK\VLFDOHQYLURQPHQWWKHÀRRGSHUPDQHQWO\LQXQGDWHGWKRXVDQGV

of acres of land under a newly created lake that came to be known as the Salton 

Sea. Even today, the Salton Sea (which is primarily fed by subsurface irrigation 

GUDLQDJHUDWKHUWKDQVXUIDFHÀRZUHPDLQVDQHQGXULQJHVVHQWLDOO\SHUPDQHQW

part of the Southern California landscape that bears prominent witness to the efIHFWRIWKH&RORUDGR5LYHUÀRRGVDQGWKHDELOLW\RIKXPDQVWRGUDPDWLcally (if unwittingly) transform the hydraulic landscape.

 $VDUHVXOWRIWKHWUHPHQGRXVGLVDVWHUDWWHQGLQJWKHVHÀRRGVWKH

California Development Company entered bankruptcy in 1909, but not before 

PRVWRILWVDVVHWVKDGEHHQDEVRUEHGE\WKH6RXWKHUQ3DFL¿F5DLOURDGLQWKHZDNH
142

RIHIIRUWVWR¿QDQFHWKHÀRRGFRQWUROFDPSDLJQ14 In 1911, landowners in the 

valley who had previously relied upon the California Development Company for 

their water supplies formed the Imperial Irrigation District. This locally administered governmental authority was designed to operate the regional water supply system to promote the political and economic interests of those people who 

had invested in the valley. In 1916, the Imperial Irrigation District formally purchased the water supply system from the railroad (for about $3 million dollars in 

irrigation district bonds) and assumed all responsibility for delivering water to 

the valley’s farmers.15

 2QFHWKHÀRRGLQJKDGEHHQFKHFNHGLQWKHYDOOH\UHVXPHGDJULcultural production (minus thousands of acres of low-lying land now permanently inundated by the Salton Sea). But, understandably, fear that another uncontrolled “break” might occur remained very real and acted to reduce land prices 

in the valley. Although the Imperial Irrigation District did not place any limitations on the size of individual land holdings within the district, the formation of 

this public entity (directors of the district are chosen by public election) helped 

downplay the notion that irrigation in the valley was simply a private endeavor 

that should depend upon private resources for its growth and development. And 

soon the district and its boosters began clamoring for federal support to aid them 

LQWKHLUGHVLUHIRUÀRRGSURWHFWLRQDQGIRUSURWHFWLRQIURP0H[LFDQLQWHUIHUHQFH

THE FEDERAL INITIATIVES

The Fall/Davis Report

Even before the conclusion of World War I, the Imperial Irrigation 

District sought assistance from the federal government to help plan an engineering project that would excavate a completely new canal entirely within U.S. territory. After the end of the war came in late 1918, the district also began to seek 

IHGHUDOVXSSRUWIRUFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDÀRRGFRQWURODQGVWRUDJHGDPVRPHZKHUHLQ

the lower Colorado River Valley—most likely in the Boulder Canyon region—

WKDWZRXOGFDSWXUHDQQXDOÀRRGVDQGWKXVSURWHFWWKHYDOOH\IURPDQ\SRVVLEOH

UHRFFXUUHQFHRIWKHGLVDVWURXVLQXQGDWLRQRI,QKROGLQJEDFNÀRRGZDter, such a dam could also serve to increase the amount of water available for irrigation in the watershed below the dam, including the vast expanse of the greater 

Imperial Valley.

As early as 1902, Arthur Powell Davis, who was then the assistant chief 

engineer of the Reclamation Service, initiated preliminary studies of how to 

develop the resources of the Colorado River. Although serious efforts to construct a major storage dam across the stream were not pursued at the time (the 

scale and potential cost of the endeavor paled in comparison to the perceived 
143

VKRUWWHUPEHQH¿WVWRLUULJDWLRQGHYHORSPHQWRQHRIWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFH¶V

early projects involved building the Laguna Diversion Dam to irrigate riparian 

lands surrounding the settlement of Yuma, Arizona, a short distance north of the 

Mexican border. Between 1902 and 1919, the issue of lower Colorado River development never dropped from consideration by the Reclamation Service, but it 

was overshadowed by the myriad other projects that the bureau was constructing throughout the West. However, at the end of World War I the Reclamation 

Service had completed many of the large projects that had occupied its attention during the previous decade (including, most recently, Arrowrock Dam in 

southern Idaho and Elephant Butte Dam in New Mexico), and the ability of 

Reclamation to devote major time, energy, and resources to a lower Colorado 

River storage dam became more feasible.

In 1915, Davis had taken over command as director of the Reclamation 

Service. Based upon his earlier studies, he was familiar with engineering issues 

related to building a big dam on the lower Colorado. He also understood that 

such a project would potentially involve construction of one of the largest, most 

prominent, and most visually dramatic dams in the world. Thus, when it became 

clear that boosters in the Imperial Valley were willing to push the U.S. Congress 

WRVXSSRUWIHGHUDO¿QDQFLQJIRUGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHORZHU&RORUDGR5LYHU%DVLQ

Davis made clear that the Reclamation Service would be willing to assist in developing plans for such work. In the words of California water historian Norris 

Hundley:

The proposed legislation [for an All-American Canal] immediately caught the eye of Arthur Powell Davis. . .who saw it 

as a perfect opportunity to raise anew his dream of harnessing the Colorado River. . . . The canal made sense, concluded Davis, but only if it were part of a larger design. To build 

such an aqueduct without also constructing dams to control “the 

ÀRRGPHQDFH ́ZRXOGGRRPWKHFDQDOWRDVKRUWOLIH'DYLV

told all who would listen [that the Imperial Valley problem] 

“is inseparably linked with the problem of water storage in the 

Colorado Basin as a whole.”16

As a result of political activism on the part of the Imperial Irrigation 

District and encouragement from Davis, in May 1920 Congress approved a study 

that authorized the Reclamation Service to develop preliminary plans for an AllAmerican Canal and a Colorado River storage dam.17 Known as the Kincaid Act 

(in recognition of its sponsorship by the chairman of the House Committee on 

Irrigation, Moses Kincaid of Nebraska), this action represented the beginning of 

practical planning for what came to be the Hoover Dam.18
144

When formally issued in 1922, the study authorized by the Kincaid 

$FWZDVNQRZQDVWKH)DOO'DYLV5HSRUWEHFDXVHLWZDVRI¿FLDOO\SUHSDUHGXQGHUWKHDXVSLFHVRI6HFUHWDU\RIWKH,QWHULRU$OEHUW)DOODQG5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFH

Director Davis. In the report, Davis strongly advocated constructing a large 

VWRUDJHGDPWKDWZRXOGGRPXFKPRUHWKDQVLPSO\VWRUHÀRRGVDQGSURWHFWWKH

Imperial Valley; he proposed that hydroelectric power production be considered 

a key part of the project and that construction costs be underwritten by the sale of 

hydroelectric power made possible by the dam.

This proposal made sense from a strictly practical point of view because 

there was no question that huge amounts of power could be generated by a dam 

extending to a height of over 500 feet and holding back a reservoir of more than 

PLOOLRQDFUHIHHWRIZDWHU)URPDSROLWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHWKHQRWLRQRIXVLQJ

HOHFWULFSRZHUUHYHQXHVDVWKHSULPDU\PHDQVRI¿QDQFLQJWKHGDPZDVPXFK

more problematic because it raised questions as to the proper place of the fedHUDOJRYHUQPHQWLQWKHJHQHUDWLRQDQGVDOHRIHOHFWULFLW\7KHSULYDWHO\¿QDQFHG

electric power industry controlled most of America’s electric power grid in the 

1920s, and it lobbied on the local, state, and federal level for favorable legislation 

WKDWZRXOGUHLQIRUFHLWVDELOLW\WRUHWDLQWKDWFRQWURO$KXJHIHGHUDOO\¿QDQFHG

dam on the Colorado River that was to be paid for by hydroelectric power revenues represented a threat to private control. As such, Davis’s plan spurred opposition—or at least serious concern—among business interests that wished to limit 

the role of government in America’s economic life.

In the political environment of the pro-business 1920s, when the 

Republican Party controlled both the White House and Congress, the “public 

power” issue was always a source of contention regarding the proposed Boulder 

Canyon Project. In terms of constructing a “high storage” dam, it proved impossible for anyone to devise a practical alternative scheme that could pay for the 

dam in the assured and reliable manner that proponents of hydroelectricity could 

claim. Hydroelectricity offered the only economically feasible means of building 

a “high storage” dam. As a result, during subsequent debates about the project, 

WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIEXLOGLQJDVPDOOHUVFDOHDQGKHQFHOHVVH[SHQVLYH3ÀRRGFRQtrol” dam on the lower Colorado was often projected by “private power” advocates as a more reasonable alternative. Such a dam could be erected without reliance upon hydroelectric power sales. In essence, it represented less of a threat to 

WKHSULYDWHHOHFWULFSRZHULQGXVWU\%XWDVPDOOHUGDPGHYRWHGVLPSO\WR3ÀRRG

control” and irrigation would not allow full storage and use of the Colorado 

5LYHU¶VÀRZ'DYLVDQGWKHHQJLQHHUVRIWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHVDZWKLVDVD

QHHGOHVVDQGXQGHVLUDEOHLQHI¿FLHQF\,QWKLVFRQWH[W'DYLVORFDO&RQJUHVVPDQ

Phil Swing, and others interested in the economic development of Southern 

&DOLIRUQLDSURYHGXQZLOOLQJWRDFFHSWDVPDOOHU3ÀRRGFRQWURO ́GDPDVDWUXHDOternative to a “high dam.”
145

 $VSDUWRIWKH)DOO'DYLV5HSRUW'DYLVWRRNRQWKHWDVNRIGHYHORSing a basic plan for the design and construction of a high dam and hydroelectric powerplant in the vicinity of Boulder Canyon. Although the Reclamation 

Service recognized that there were other possible storage dam sites along the 

length of the Colorado River (in fact, such sites as Glen Canyon would eventually be developed after World War II), Reclamation quickly focused on Boulder 

Canyon because of its large storage capacity and its proximity to prospective water users and electric power consumers in Southern California.

Both Boulder Canyon and the nearby Black Canyon (which lies about 

20 miles further downstream) offered dramatic, narrow gorges with steep walls 

extending upwards from the riverbed for hundreds of feet. Investigations initially focused on Boulder Canyon (hence the name chosen for the project) but, early 

LQWKHSURFHVVVWXGLHVZHUHDOVRFDUULHGRXWDW%ODFN&DQ\RQLQRUGHUWR¿QGWKH

best possible site.

The Design of Hoover Dam

During the early planning stages for what became the Boulder Canyon 

Project, Arthur Powell Davis and his staff made an effort to consider a range of 

possibilities for the design of the big storage dam on the lower Colorado. Based 

)LJXUH7KH%ODFN&DQ\RQGDPVLWHFLUFDSource: Bureau of Reclamation.
146

upon the Reclamation Service’s experiences with the Roosevelt, Elephant Butte, 

and Arrowrock Dams, it is not surprising that a massive masonry gravity deVLJQDWWUDFWHGWKHLQWHUHVWRI'DYLVKLV&KLHI(QJLQHHU)UDQN:H\PRXWK&KLHI

Designing Engineer John L. Savage, and Project Engineer Walker Young. The 

Reclamation Service had experience building massive embankment dams (such 

DV%HOOH)RXUFKHLQ6RXWK'DNRWDDQG6WUDZEHUU\9DOOH\LQ8WDKDVZHOODV

WKLQDUFKFRQFUHWHPDVRQU\GDPV3DWK¿QGHUDQG6KRVKRQH%XIIDOR%LOOERWK

in Wyoming). In this context, the decision to utilize a curved gravity concrete 

design did not come without some consideration of alternative designs. However, the selection did come quickly and without public review of alternative designs.19

In late 1920, Davis initiated correspondence with Lars Jorgensen, a 

European-trained engineer who had become a prominent advocate of thin arch 

dam design (especially constant angle arch dams), for the purpose of discerning whether a storage dam of this type might be feasible to build across the lower Colorado.20 While previously Davis had been prominently associated with 

massive gravity dams such as Roosevelt and Arrowrock, he retained an interest 

LQWKLQDUFKGHVLJQVDQGKLVLQWHUDFWLRQZLWK-RUJHQVHQWHVWL¿HVWRWKLVSRLQW21 

)LJXUH$SUHOLPLQDU\GHVLJQIURPDEOXHSULQWIRUDJUDYLW\GDPDWWKHORZHUVLWHLQ

Black Canyon, December 22, 1923. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
147

During the next year, the use of a thin arch design (either constant radius or conVWDQWDQJOHRI¿FLDOO\UHPDLQHGDSRVVLELOLW\EXWOLWWOHDFWLRQWRIRUFHIXOO\SURmote such a design is evident in available records.22

In contrast, the notion that the Reclamation Service would rely upon a 

massive design was publicly expressed by Davis as early as October 1920, even 

before he corresponded with Jorgensen, when he wrote the Chief Engineer of the 

/RV$QJHOHV&RXQW\)ORRG&RQWURO'LVWULFWLQUHVSRQVHWRD3UHTXHVWIRUVRPH

information concerning tentative plans made for a dam in Boulder Canyon.” 

At that time, Davis indicated that “studies have been made for a section of maVRQU\RUFRQFUHWHRIWKHJUDYLW\W\SHDQGDURFN¿OODQGHDUWKVHFWLRQWKHODWter, however, not being regarded as certainly feasible.”23 In early 1924 (after 

Davis had been displaced as Director of the Reclamation Service and immediately prior to the appointment of Elwood Mead as Commissioner of the Bureau of 

Reclamation), Weymouth submitted a “Report on the Problems of the Colorado 

Basin”—oftentimes simply referred to as the “Weymouth Report”—in which 

9ROXPH)LYHIRFXVHGRQ3%RXOGHU&DQ\RQ,QYHVWLJDWLRQV3ODQVDQG(VWLPDWHV ́

In this report, no mention is made of any thin arch designs that may have been 

)LJXUH)UDQN(:H\PRXWKGHVLJQIRU+RRYHU'DPDWWKH%ODFN&DQ\RQ6LWHVKRZLQJ

outlets through the structure, circa 1924. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
148

considered for the big storage dam. Instead, Weymouth reported only that “studLHVKDYHEHHQPDGHRIURFN¿OODQGFRQFUHWHGDPVRIYDULRXVW\SHV ́DQGZHQWRQ

to explain:

There is a grave question whether life and property below a 

dam of such unprecedented height and a reservoir of such enorPRXVFDSDFLW\VKRXOGWKURXJKWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDURFN¿OO

dam be subjected to a risk which could be removed by the 

adoption of a concrete dam. . . . With all possible safeguards 

WDNHQLQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDURFN¿OORIWKHKHLJKWSURSRVHGLW

must be admitted that its overtopping would result in its certain 

and sudden destruction with overwhelming disaster in the valley below. The dams adopted are believed to be the safest that 

can be built–concrete dams of the gravity type built on a curved 

plan–and estimates prepared indicate that the concrete dams 

FRXOGEHEXLOWDWOHVVFRVWWKDQURFN¿OOVRIWKHVDPHKHLJKW

[Note: The use of the plural ‘dams’ in this quotation refers to 

three designs of various heights—ranging from about 525 feet 

to over 700 feet—developed for the same site].24

In other words, Weymouth’s report reveals that, although Reclamation 

estimated that there existed some economic advantages of a massive curved 

JUDYLW\GHVLJQRYHUDURFN¿OOVWUXFWXUHFRQFHUQVRYHUWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWDURFN

¿OOGHVLJQPLJKWVRPHGD\EHRYHUWRSSHGFRPSULVHGDNH\UDWLRQDOHIRUVHOHFWLQJ

a curved gravity design. In fact, Weymouth went so far as to advocate a curved 

gravity design that would not feature any type of spillway by noting that overtopping could probably be prevented by opening up all possible discharge outlets 

WKURXJKWKHSRZHUKRXVHDQGWKHGDP%XWHYHQLIWKHÀRRGLQJRYHUZKHOPHGWKH

capacity of these discharge outlets, Weymouth counseled that:

Any overtopping would be of short duration and the dams have 

EHHQGHVLJQHGWRSDVVUDUHÀRRGVRYHUWKHWRSZLWKVDIHW\ZKLFK

FDQQRWEHGRQHLQWKHFDVHRIDURFN¿OOGDP25

Instead of special spillways driven through the rock abutments, 

Weymouth proposed that outlet pipes (controlled by huge valves) be built directly into the dam itself. These would be able to draw water from the lower depths 

of the reservoir and discharge it from the downstream face of the structure. The 

other—and more advantageous—means of discharging water from the reservoir 

would be through penstocks drilled through the rock abutment along the Nevada 

side of the canyon walls; these would feed into a hydroelectric power house 

about a half mile downstream from the dam where they would deliver water to 

ODUJHVFDOHWXUELQHJHQHUDWRUXQLWV,QIRUPXODWLQJDEDVLFSODQIRUKRZEHVWWR
149

construct the dam, Weymouth also proposed that the same tunnels used to carry 

water to the powerhouse provide vital service during the construction process. 

6SHFL¿FDOO\WKH\ZHUHWREHXVHGWRGLYHUWWKHÀRZRIWKH&RORUDGR5LYHUDURXQG

WKHGDPVLWHVRWKDWWHPSRUDU\URFN¿OOFRIIHUGDPVFRXOGSURWHFWWKHVLWHIURP

ÀRRGLQJDQGDOORZH[FDYDWLRQGRZQWREHGURFNIRXQGDWLRQVLQWKHPLGGOHRIWKH

stream bed.

Thus, by the beginning of 1924, the Weymouth Report laid out the basic features of what would become Hoover Dam. Over the next four years, 

Weymouth’s proposal underwent careful consideration by Reclamation, and 

E\LWKDGXQGHUJRQHVLJQL¿FDQWUHYLVLRQDWWKHKDQGVRI-RKQ/6DYDJH

The most important of these revisions involved the drilling of diversion tunnels 

through both the Nevada and Arizona abutments (two tunnels on both sides of 

the river), the construction of two “glory-hole” spillways that would connect into 

the diversion tunnels and provide insurance that the dam would never be overtopped, and the construction of powerhouses in both Nevada and Arizona that 

would tap into the diversion tunnels (and to other tunnels connected to outlet 

towers built directly upstream from the dam).26

Clearly, these changes represent important alterations to the Weymouth 

GHVLJQDQGDUHRILPSRUWDQFHLQGH¿QLQJWKHIRUPRIWKHGDPSRZHUKRXVHSHQstock, and spillway system as it was actually built. But–beyond the driving of 

spillway discharge tunnels to feed into the diversion tunnels–they do not constitute anything that cannot be understood as an evolution of the Weymouth design. 

And even the addition of spillway tunnels represented an uncomplicated (yet no 

doubt imaginative) expansion of the diversion tunnel system.

 'XULQJWKHPLGVWKHVSHFL¿FFKDUDFWHURIWKH+RRYHU'DPGHsign continued to evolve as more was learned about geological conditions and as 

Reclamation became interested in utilizing the “trial load” method of design to 

FRQ¿UPWKHVDIHW\RIWKHPDVVLYHFXUYHGJUDYLW\GHVLJQ:KLOHWKH3WULDOORDG ́

PHWKRGRIDQDO\VLVVHHFKDSWHUXQGRXEWHGO\¿JXUHGLQWRWKH¿QDOGLPHQVLRQLQJRIWKHGDP¶VSUR¿OHLWGLGQRWSURPSWDQ\GUDPDWLFFKDQJHVRUPRGL¿FDtions.27,QIDFWLWLVGLI¿FXOWWRGLVFHUQDQ\UDGLFDOGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHSUHOLPLQDU\SUR¿OHWKDWDFFRPSDQLHG:H\PRXWK¶VUHSRUWDQGWKHGHVLJQDV

built. Both represent curved gravity designs featuring extremely ample gravity 

sections and the use of “trial load” techniques of analysis did little in terms of altering the basic form of the design. In the same way, research on scale models 

RIWKHGDPDOVR¿JXUHGLQWR5HFODPDWLRQ¶VDQDO\VLVRIVWUXFWXUDOVDIHW\DQGJDYH

WKHPJUHDWHUFRQ¿GHQFHLQLWVVWDELOLW\EXWLWLVGLI¿FXOWWRSHUFHLYHKRZWKHEDVLF

form of the design was altered by such work.
150

Near the end of the approval process for the Boulder Canyon Project, 

Congress authorized the formation of a special “Colorado River Board” that 

would be separate and distinct from Reclamation’s own consulting engineers 

(and hence, would presumably provide an independent analysis of the proposed 

dam’s safety and feasibility). This board approved the dam’s basic design, but 

recommended that the maximum allowable stresses in the massive structure be 

reduced from 40 tons per square foot to 30 tons per square foot. Although this 

might have appeared to the layperson as a rather simple way to increase the 

strength of the design, to Reclamation it represented a problem in the sense that 

DQ\UHDOHIIRUWWRVWULFWO\DGKHUHWRWKLVUHTXLUHPHQWZRXOGKDYHVLJQL¿FDQWO\

added to both the bulk and cost of the dam.

Without directly resisting this directive, Reclamation, nonetheless, made 

QRVLJQL¿FDQWDOWHUDWLRQWRWKHGHVLJQDVSURSRVHGLQ6DYDJH¶V1RYHPEHU

report. Instead, Reclamation opted to claim that more sophisticated mathematical analysis (in line with the “trial load” method) indicated that the proposed 

design in fact did not exceed a maximum allowable stress of about 33 tons per 

square foot, and this was considered adequate to meet the 30 tons psf criteria. In 

0HDG¶VZRUGV3,WLVQRWEHOLHYHGWKDWWKHPD[LPXPVWUHVVDV¿QDOO\GHWHUPLQHG

will appreciably exceed the 30-ton limit. It is believed that the general plan 

RIWKHGDPFDQEHDJUHHGXSRQZLWKRXWVHULRXVGLI¿FXOWLHV ́28 In the end, the 

&RORUDGR5LYHU%RDUG¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQKDGQRVXEVWDQWLYHHIIHFWRQWKH¿QDO

design.

)LJXUH3ODQDQGVHFWLRQRI+RRYHU'DPDVUHYLVHGE\-RKQ-DFN/6DYDJHFLUFD

1928. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
151

In his 1928 “Revised Plan,” Savage took care not to criticize 

Weymouth’s Report as being somehow faulty and in need of correction. Rather, 

he simply stated that “The Weymouth plan for the dam and power plant . . . constitutes a preliminary study on which to base an estimate of cost. This plan was 

QRWLQWHQGHGDVD¿QDOGHVLJQDQGVKRXOGQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGDVVXFK ́29 In this 

context, it is important to note that the design of Hoover Dam cannot be ascribed to any single individual, but instead represents a collaborative effort that 

extended over several years time. Davis, Weymouth, and Savage all played important roles in overseeing preparation of the basic design and, in concert with 

other Reclamation Service staff members, deserve credit as designers of Hoover 

Dam.30

The preceding discussion has focused on the technical and engineering aspects of the basic dam design. In contrast, the architectural treatment of 

the dam’s surface features was handled in a very different manner and emanatHGIURPDVRXUFHTXLWHGLVWLQFWIURP5HFODPDWLRQ¶V'HQYHURI¿FH'XULQJWKH

1920s, the architectural treatment of the dam was assumed to adhere to a neoclassic style featuring design motifs such as eagles with wide-spread wings. In 

1931, long after all the major technical issues involving the design had been determined, Reclamation brought in Los Angeles architect Gordon Kaufmann to 

develop a more modern appearance for the dam. By simplifying the surface 

treatment of the design and utilizing a monumental art deco style, Kaufmann created an evocative, streamlined facade for the massive structure. Ironically, the 

)LJXUH&DOLIRUQLD¶VLQWHUHVWLQGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHORZHU&RORUDGR5LYHUZDVHYLGHQFHG

by William Mulholland’s active support of the project. Pictured here about 1924 he gestures 

during an inspection tour near the Boulder Canyon damsite, indicated by the arrow. Source:

Boulder Dam Association pamphlet, item in the private collection of Donald C. Jackson.
152

prominence of the dam in American culture is, no doubt, tied in large part to its 

modernistic design motif, but the circumstance of hiring a non-government architect to carry out this work occurred very late in the design process and was 

very much separate and distinct from the rest of project.31

Selection of the Black Canyon Site

At the beginning of the Reclamation Service’s work in developing 

plans for a storage dam on the lower Colorado, it was assumed that the structure would be built in the narrow gorge known as Boulder Canyon. During the 

early planning stages, attention did not focus so much on the precise location of 

where the “Boulder Dam” would be erected as it did on the notion that the dam 

should be built somewhere downstream from the Grand Canyon and in a location that would be relatively accessible to the electric power market of Southern 

California. Thus, in 1920-21, the advocacy of a dam at Boulder Canyon was 

undertaken by the Reclamation Service in the context that this represented a 

more desirable alternative than a dam upstream from the Grand Canyon at Glen 

&DQ\RQRU/HH¶V)HUU\32 But as early as December 1921, Davis realized that it 

would be desirable to explore the possibility of using a site in Black Canyon as 

an alternative to Boulder Canyon. The two canyons were only about 20 miles 

apart (Black Canyon is further downstream) and both offered steep, narrow 

gorges topographically well suited for a dam. And in the larger context of the 

Colorado river basin, they provided essentially the same possibilities of service 

to southern California interests.

Because Black Canyon lay a bit further down the river, and at a somewhat lower elevation, it represented an opportunity to develop a small (yet not 

LQVLJQL¿FDQWDGGLWLRQDODPRXQWRIK\GURSRZHUWKDWZRXOGRWKHUZLVHEHGLI¿FXOW

to develop. As Davis counseled Weymouth:

I am inclined to think it best to make one or more borings at 

Black Canyon, because a dam at that point would utilize about 

thirty feet of fall which occurs between that point and our camp 

at Boulder Canyon, and this fall cannot be utilized in any other 

way.33

At the same time, Black Canyon was not so far downstream that it could not inundate the excellent reservoir site lying upstream from Boulder Canyon. By the 

beginning of 1922, the Reclamation Service was carrying out geological explorations at Black Canyon to discern the quality of bedrock at the site and the depth 

of excavation that would be required for dam foundations. In July, Weymouth 

reported to Davis that initial investigation of the upper end of Black Canyon 

(termed line “A”) did not appear promising and he went so far as to state that:
153

The foundation rock at line A in Black Canyon is not suitable 

for bearing pressures of 40 tons per square foot as used on the 

granite of Boulder Canyon, [and] the soft and porous structure 

of some of the rock may render this site entirely unsuitable for 

such a high dam. In this connection I will say that I am personally very doubtful of the feasibility of a dam 600 feet high in 

Black Canyon, unless the conditions at the lower site prove to 

be very much better. . . .34

With this less than encouraging prognostication, studies soon focused on 

the lower end of Black Canyon (line “D”). As it turned out, conditions at this loFDWLRQSURYHGEHWWHUWKDQDWWKHXSSHUHQGDQGIROORZLQJDWZRGD\¿HOGYLVLWLQ

November 1922, Davis could report to Weymouth:

No one doubts the entire feasibility of the Black Canyon site. 

The rock in the bottom of line D is much better than that secured at the head of the canyon last year . . . I think we should 

make a choice between Black and Boulder Canyons as soon as 

possible so as to stop expenditures at the site rejected.35

With this endorsement and encouragement, attention soon shifted to 

%ODFN&DQ\RQDQGLQHDUO\LWZDVRI¿FLDOO\UHFRPPHQGHGDVWKHVLWHRI

the proposed dam. As the Weymouth Report explained the situation:

An extensive geological examination has been made . . . [and 

while] both dam sites [Boulder and Black Canyons] are excellently adapted to the construction of a very high dam . . . the 

granite of Boulder Canyon is superior to the breccia of Black 

Canyon for carrying great loads . . . [nonetheless] the investigations led to the adoption of the lower site in Black Canyon for 

the reason that it is more accessible [for construction equipment 

and materials]; the maximum depth to bedrock is less . . . than 

at the upper site in Boulder Canyon and for the same height of 

dam the reservoir capacity is greater.36

Thus, the selection of Black Canyon was not made because it offered 

better geological conditions (in fact, by this criteria it was judged less desirable 

than Boulder Canyon), but because it could provide for a larger reservoir and 

would allow for a less costly structure based upon savings in material and logistical expenses. By the time this decision was made, however, so much effort had 

gone into the promotion of a “Boulder Canyon Project” that no effort was made 

to transform the nomenclature to the “Black Canyon Project” or “Black Dam.” 37
154

Nonetheless, from 1924 on, all work related to Hoover Dam revolved around the 

lower site (line “D”) in Black Canyon.

Congressman Phil Swing

 :LWKWKHDWWHQWLRQWKDWDWWHQGHGVXEPLWWDORIWKH)DOO'DYLV5HSRUW

the possibility of federal involvement in building some type of storage dam 

across the lower Colorado River gained political credibility. The effort to keep 

this possibility alive and in the national public conscience was championed by 

Congressman Phil Swing, who represented the Imperial Valley as well as other 

SDUWVRI6RXWKHUQ&DOLIRUQLD:RUNLQJLQKLVRI¿FLDOFDSDFLW\DVDPHPEHURIWKH

U.S. House of Representatives, throughout the 1920s, Swing assumed responsibility for keeping the All-American Canal and what quickly came to be known as 

the Boulder Canyon Project in the public eye. Working with California Senator 

Hiram Johnson, Swing kept abreast of all the political nuances related to the 

Boulder Canyon Project, and he made sure that, during the 1920s, Congress was 

presented with a series of Swing-Johnson Acts positing federal authorization of 

the project.

Herbert Hoover remains closely associated with the Boulder Canyon 

Project because of his work in negotiating what became known as the Colorado 

River Compact; and because he served as U.S. President during the time that 

construction work began on the high storage dam. His name was attached to the 

dam through the action of his Secretary of the Interior. Hiram Johnson is well 

remembered by historians for his early advocacy of progressive political reforms 

LQWKHIDFHRIWKH6RXWKHUQ3DFL¿F5DLOURDG¶V32FWRSXV ́DQGIRUKLVLQWUDQVLgent “isolationism” in the realm of international politics during the 1930s). In 

contrast, Phil Swing never attained lasting fame as an advocate of the Boulder 

Canyon Project. But, in truth, Swing was the most important and persistent poOLWLFDOSURSRQHQWRIWKH¿UVWKLJKGDPWREHEXLOWDFURVVWKH&RORUDGR5LYHU

A native Southern Californian, Phil Swing was born near 

San Bernardino in 1881. After graduating from Stanford Law School in 1905, 

6ZLQJPRYHGWRWKH,PSHULDO9DOOH\LQZKHUHKHH[SHULHQFHG¿UVWKDQG

WKHHQYLURQPHQWDODQGHFRQRPLFGDPDJHZURXJKWE\WKHÀRRGVRI+H

quickly established a law practice in the valley and, in 1911, proved instrumental 

in the formation of the Imperial Irrigation District; in 1912, he formally entered 

WKHSROLWLFDODUHQDDQGZDVHOHFWHG'LVWULFW$WWRUQH\IRU,PSHULDO&RXQW\)DLOLQJ

to win reelection in 1914, he reentered private practice and, after a new board of 

directors was elected for the irrigation district in 1916, served as legal counsel 

for the District. In this capacity, he took on the work of advocating federal supSRUWIRUWKH$OO$PHULFDQ&DQDODQGIRUÀRRGFRQWURODORQJWKHORZHU&RORUDGR

6SHFL¿FDOO\LQKHMRXUQH\HGWR:DVKLQJWRQ'&ZKHUHKHQHJRWLDWHGD
155

FRQWUDFWZLWK6HFUHWDU\RIWKH,QWHULRU)UDQNOLQ/DQHZKHUHE\WKHGLVWULFWZRXOG

pay two-thirds of the cost of a federal survey of possible right-of-ways for the 

All-American Canal.38

Later, in 1919, Swing again utilized his position as chief counsel for the 

Imperial Irrigation District to support legislation presented by California’s 11th 

District Representative William Kettner that would have authorized federal guarDQWHHVIRUXSWRPLOOLRQZRUWKRIGLVWULFWERQGVWR¿QDQFHDQ$OO$PHULFDQ

&DQDO,Q-XO\KHDULQJVEHIRUHWKH+RXVH&RPPLWWHH6ZLQJ¿UVWVWHSSHG

before a national audience to make a plea that would be repeated and expanded 

upon in the decade ahead:

Is the government to stand idly by and complacently watch foreign lands develop by sapping the life out of an American community when the remedy is easily within reach without cost to 

WKHJRYHUQPHQWRIDVLQJOHGROODU":HDUHKHUHVLPSO\DVNLQJ

for a chance to live.39

The legislation proposed by Kettner never made it out of committee (although it served as an important precursor of the Kincaid Act passed in 1920). 

However, at the same hearings that Swing appeared before to advocate Kettner’s 

bill, Arizona Congressman Carl Hayden raised questions as to the desirability of 

Congress acting too quickly or precipitously to support the All-American Canal. 

6SHFL¿FDOO\+D\GHQEURXJKWWRWKHIRUHIURQWFRQFHUQVRYHUKRZVXFKOHJLVODWLRQ

would affect water rights along the Colorado River:

But you [Kettner and supporters of the All-American Canal] 

are now coming to Congress asking that an extraordinary thing 

be done by the passage of this legislation, and Congress must 

look to the development not only of the Imperial Valley, which 

is your particular interest, but the Colorado River valley as a 

whole, and that can only be fully developed by storage.40

Hayden also raised concerns over how any major, federally supported irrigation work on the lower Colorado would relate to or affect the water rights of 

various states; in so doing, he helped accelerate events that, by early 1922, would 

result in Congress authorizing a conference among the states within the Colorado 

River watershed.

 )RU6ZLQJLWLQLWLDOO\GLGQRWDSSHDUDVWKRXJKKLVDSSHDUDQFHLQ

Washington D.C., in 1919 would set the stage for a more dramatic and 

substantive move to the nation’s capital. In August 1919, he was appointed a 

California Superior Court judge by Republican state governor William Stephens, 
156

and he held that prominent and prestigious position for the next year. But in 

the summer of 1920, he learned that Kettner would not run for reelection and 

Swing immediately announced that he would seek the now-open congressional 

seat. This district encompassed far more territory than the Imperial Valley—it 

VWUHWFKHGZHVWZDUGWRWKH3DFL¿F2FHDQDQGQRUWKZDUGWRWKH6LHUUD1HYDGDDQG

covered seven counties—but Swing proved adept in garnering support from San 

Diego and Anaheim and San Bernardino and myriad communities in between. 

With the Republican Party representing a majority of voters in the district, he 

won handily in the general election of November 1920.41

Upon arriving in Washington, D.C., as a U.S. Congressman, Swing took 

on the task of championing a Colorado River storage dam and an All-American 

Canal as his primary political responsibility. Acting in concert with California 

6HQDWRU+LUDP-RKQVRQGXULQJKLV¿UVWWHUPLQRI¿FH6ZLQJLQWURGXFHGOHJLVlation designed to accomplish this goal. Known publicly as the Swing-Johnson 

Act, this legislation called for: 

construction of the All-American Canal and of a dam at or near 

Boulder Canyon. It provided for the leasing of the power privileges by the Secretary of the Interior and stated that construction was not to begin until the lands to be irrigated were legally 

obligated to pay their proper proportion of the cost.42

7KH¿UVW6ZLQJ-RKQVRQELOOUHPDLQHGLQFRPPLWWHHDQGQHYHUHYHQFDPHEHIRUH

Congress for a formal vote. Undeterred, the two legislators reintroduced their 

SURSRVDOWKUHHPRUHWLPHVRYHUWKHQH[WVL[\HDUVDQGJUDGXDOO\¿QHWXQHGLWLQ

RUGHUWRGH¿QHPRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\WKHZRUNWREH¿QDQFHG%\WKHSURSRVHG

Swing-Johnson Act called for a dam with a reservoir capacity of at least 

26 million acre-feet and the construction of a powerplant by the federal government that could then be leased to other organizations (be they public or private) for actual operation and power generation.43 But beyond discussion of the 

size and operation of the proposed dam and powerhouse complex, there existed 

a more basic issue that needed to be addressed before Congressional approval 

could become possible.

Debate over the Swing-Johnson Act continued in Congress until 

December 1928. In retrospect, the reasons it took so long for the legislation to 

ZLQDSSURYDODUHQRWGLI¿FXOWWRGLVFHUQ)LUVWWKHFRVWVRIWKHSURSRVHGZRUN

ZHUHHVWLPDWHGDWVHYHUDOWHQVRIPLOOLRQVRIGROODUVWKH¿QDO6ZLQJ-RKQVRQ

Act authorized a federal expenditure of $177 million); to many non-western conJUHVVPHQDVZHOODVWRSURSRQHQWVRISULYDWHO\¿QDQFHGHOHFWULFSRZHU

companies, this seemed a waste of taxpayer money and an ill-considered investment of public monies. Of course, repayment to the federal government was 
157

stipulated as part of the proposed legislation, with the dam proper to be paid for 

over a period of 50 years (including 4 percent interest) by proceeds from the sale 

of hydroelectric power generated at the dam.44 Nonetheless, this plan to cover 

the cost of the project in a manner that hypothetically would relieve federal taxpayers from paying for the project prompted skepticism. But beyond concern 

over the cost of the project and the propriety of government power development, 

WKHPRVWVLJQL¿FDQWREVWDFOHWRWKH6ZLQJ-RKQVRQ$FWLQLWVHDUO\KLVWRU\

focused around widespread fears over California’s desire to control the Colorado 

5LYHU7KHVHFRQFHUQVVRRQ¿JXUHGSURPLQHQWO\LQWRSROLWLFDOQHJRWLDWLRQVUHODWed to the proposed project.

The Colorado River Compact

Before any serious political action could occur relative to the Boulder 

Canyon Project, important issues related to water rights needed to be addressed 

by the various states holding an interest in the water resources of the Colorado 

5LYHU7KHULYHU¶VZDWHUVKHGHQFRPSDVVHVSDUWVRIVHYHQVWDWHV)RXURIWKHVH

(Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico) are termed the “Upper Basin” 

states; the other three (Nevada, Arizona, and California) are the “Lower Basin” 

VWDWHVZKLFKHVVHQWLDOO\OLHGRZQVWUHDPIURP/HH¶V)HUU\QHDUWKH8WDK$UL]RQD

border. The river is one of the most important sources of water in the Southwest, 

and every state in both the Upper and Lower Basins wanted a share of the river’s 

ÀRZ

Except for water used by farmers in the Imperial Valley (and a few 

RWKHUORFDOHVVXFKDVWKH3DOR9HUGH9DOOH\QHDU%O\WKHPRVWRIWKHULYHU¶VÀRZ

remained unused and unclaimed by the early 1920s. Under the doctrine of 

appropriation, rights to this water would accrue to whatever person or organi-

]DWLRQ¿UVWGLYHUWHGLWIRU3EHQH¿FLDOXVH ́$VDUHVXOWRID866XSUHPH

Court ruling focused on a dispute between Colorado and Wyoming over claims 

to the North Platte River, it became clear to students of western water law that 

DVWULFWDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHDSSURSULDWLRQGRFWULQH3¿UVWLQWLPH¿UVWLQULJKW ́

would apply to competing claims no matter what state they originated in. With 

&DOLIRUQLDSRLVHGWROD\FODLPWRYDVWTXDQWLWLHVRIÀRZVWRUHGDW%RXOGHU

Canyon, the other states in the Colorado River watershed became concerned that 

California would eventually monopolize control over the entire river simply beFDXVHZDWHUFRXOGEHPRUHTXLFNO\HDVLO\DQGSUR¿WDEO\GLYHUWHGDORQJWKH

lower reaches of the stream.

Congressman Phil Swing’s most insightful biographer has perhaps best 

summarized why it was necessary for the southwestern states to come together 

DQGDJUHHRQKRZWRDOORFDWHWKHULYHU¶VDQQXDOÀRZ$FWLQJXQGHUWKHDXWKRUity of the federally sponsored Colorado River Commission (with Secretary of 
158

Commerce Herbert Hoover serving as chairman) representatives from all seven 

southwestern states came together to forge a fractious document known as the 

Colorado River Compact:

The upper states devoutly desired the water rights they would 

gain through the compact, rights which would be lost if allowed 

in the lower basin without it. The compact meant that the faster-developing lower states would have a limitation placed on 

their right to appropriate water. . .. The upper states feared that 

their future growth, dependent upon water supply, would be forever stunted unless they restrained the ability of the lower states 

to use more water. A dam on the Colorado such as the Swing-

-RKQVRQELOOFDOOHGIRUFRXOGVWRUHWKHHQWLUHDQQXDOÀRZDQG

UHJXODWHLWVUHOHDVH)DVWJURZLQJ&DOLIRUQLDZDVUHDG\WR

SXWWKLVZDWHUWREHQH¿FLDOXVHWKHUHE\JDLQLQJDOHJDOULJKWWR

it. The upper states could not permit a dam without a compact 

which would assure them of their share of the river at some future date when they could utilize it.

Swing and other Californians appreciated that they needed the political support of most (although not necessarily all) western congressmen if they 

HYHUKRSHGWRJHWIHGHUDODXWKRUL]DWLRQDQG¿QDQFLQJIRUWKHGDPDQGWKH$OO

American Canal. And to get this support they were willing to accommodate the 

Upper Basin states by agreeing to limit the amount of water that the Lower Basin 

states could legally claim.45

 ,QWKH)DOORIWKHVHYHQVWDWHVRIWKH&RORUDGR5LYHU%DVLQPHW

QHDU6DQWD)H1HZ0H[LFRIRUDQH[WHQGHGFRQIHUHQFHLQZKLFKWKH\KDPmered out an agreement governing future water rights allocation.46 The resulting Colorado River Compact divided the river into an Upper Basin and a Lower 

%DVLQ7KHDQQXDOÀRZRIWKHULYHUJHQHURXVO\HVWLPDWHGDWPLOOLRQDFUH

feet per year with two million reserved for delivery to Mexico) was to be divided 

equally between the two basins. In addition, California agreed to limit its consumption to 4.6 million acre-feet per year. The Upper Basin states were supportive of the compact’s terms because they would be guaranteed future use of seven 

and one half million acre-feet per year without fear that California could preempt 

WKHLUFODLPV,QWKH/RZHU%DVLQ1HYDGDZDVVDWLV¿HGEHFDXVHWKHHYHQWXDOFRQstruction of a dam at Boulder Canyon would foster general economic development in the state’s southern region; California was generally pleased because, despite giving up potential rights to unclaimed water in the lower Colorado River, 

they garnered political support from Upper Basin states that would prove invaluable in the battle for congressional approval for the Boulder Canyon Project. 
159

In contrast, Arizona remained bitterly opposed to the Compact and refused to 

ratify it.

Arizona’s opposition stemmed from the fact that the Lower Basin, as a 

ZKROHDQGQRWLQGLYLGXDOVWDWHVZDVJXDUDQWHHGULJKWVWRKDOIRIWKHULYHU¶VÀRZ

Because California’s efforts to utilize the river were much more advanced than 

Arizona’s, it was possible that California could monopolize control of the Lower 

Basin’s allotment with Arizona permanently deprived of use of the river. The 

legal battle between Arizona and California over water rights came to the forefront with the Colorado River Compact and remained intense until a U.S. 

6XSUHPH&RXUWUXOLQJLQWKHHDUO\V¿QDOO\EURXJKWLWWRDQHQG,QWKHVKRUW

term, Arizona’s opposition to the Compact was obviated by having the other 

VWDWHVDJUHHWKDWLWZRXOGEHHQIRUFHDEOHLIUDWL¿HGE\VL[RIWKHVWDWHVLQWKHEDsin. Although not ideal from California’s perspective, this proved useful in furthering political support for a dam at Boulder Canyon.

After Arizona balked at approving the Colorado River Compact as drafted in November 1922, the states that did ratify the original compact were not 

legally bound to accept the revised Compact that called for the approval of 

only six states. Thus, when it came time to ratify the “six-state” Compact, the 

&DOLIRUQLDVWDWHOHJLVODWXUHYRWHGWKDW&DOLIRUQLD¶VUDWL¿FDWLRQZRXOGEHFRPH

effective only upon the passage of federal legislation that:

authorized and directed the construction by the United States 

of a dam in the main stream of the Colorado River, at or below 

Boulder Dam, adequate to create a storage reservoir of a capacity of not less than twenty million acre-feet of water.47

 7KXVWKH¿QDODQGRI¿FLDOUDWL¿FDWLRQRIWKH&RORUDGR5LYHU&RPSDFW

did not occur until March 1929, after federal legislation for construction of 

Hoover Dam had been approved by Congress and the President. Just as authorization of the Boulder Canyon Project had depended upon a political resolution of 

WKH&RORUDGR5LYHUZDWHUULJKWVLVVXHVRWRRGLGRI¿FLDOLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH

Compact depend on approval of a federally sponsored storage dam at or below 

Boulder Canyon. The two were born out of the same desires of California political and business interests to gain access to the waters of the Colorado River.
160

CALIFORNIA AND POWER

Municipal Demand: Los Angeles and the Metropolitan Water District 

of Southern California

The origins of a large-scale storage dam on the lower Colorado are 

WLHGXQGLVSXWHGO\WRLVVXHVLQYROYLQJLUULJDWLRQLQ2DQGÀRRGFRQWUROIRU2WKH

Imperial Valley. But the political and economic leverage that Imperial Valley interests could bring to Congress in lobbying for the Boulder Canyon Project remained relatively limited so long as the initiative focused primarily on agricultural production. Since 1902, the track record of federally sponsored irrigation 

projects in meeting repayment schedules had proved dismal. This circumstance, 

more than any other, prompted Davis’s dismissal as Director of the Reclamation 

Service in 1923 and brought about extensive political consideration of how the 

Service would carry on its future work.48

 ,QRI¿FLDOWHUPV5HFODPDWLRQKHOGWRWKHLGHDOVRISURPRWLQJWKHIDPLO\IDUPDQGRIKDYLQJ5HFODPDWLRQSURMHFWEHQH¿FLDULHVSD\EDFNWKHIHGHUDO

government in a responsible, business-like manner. This was certainly the program that Elwood Mead promoted when he was appointed Commissioner of 

Reclamation in 1924.49 But reconciling such a program with a huge undertaking designed to promote the interests of large-scale farmers in the Imperial Valley 

represented no simple task.

In this context, the notion that the Boulder Canyon Project would serve 

municipal water supply needs in greater Los Angeles also did not square easily with the small-farm agricultural orientation of Reclamation that Mead championed. Nonetheless, the alliance between Imperial Valley farmers and Los 

Angeles boosters quickly became central to the effort to win approval for the 

Boulder Canyon Project. It is impossible to know what would have transpired 

if Los Angeles had not come to embrace Hoover Dam as vital to its continued 

regional growth. But, as structured in the federal legislation actually passed in 

1928, it is equally impossible to imagine how the fourth Swing-Johnson Bill 

FRXOGKDYHEHFRPHODZZLWKRXWDVWURQJ¿QDQFLDOFRPPLWPHQWIURPWKHXUEDQized taxpayers (and voters) of greater Los Angeles.

The story of how late nineteenth and early twentieth-century

 Los Angeles grew as a result of its ability to control a regional and extraUHJLRQDOZDWHUVXSSO\LVZHOONQRZQ,QWKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\FLW\RI¿FLDOV

focused on gaining complete control over the Los Angeles River, based upon the 

idea that the city possessed a “pueblo right” to the entire stream as granted by the 

Spanish monarchy.50 Working from the economic and political base afforded by 

control of the Los Angeles River, in the early twentieth century, 
161

William Mulholland supervised construction of a remarkable, and controversial, 

200-mile-long aqueduct to carry water from the Owens River to consumers in 

the City of Los Angeles.51 Completed in 1913, the Los Angeles aqueduct from 

Owens Valley proved vital in supporting a huge regional economic boom that 

HQJXOIHGJUHDWHU/RV$QJOHVGXULQJWKHWHHQVDQGHDUO\V6SHFL¿FDOO\WKH

population of the region jumped from 668,000 to 1,085,000 between 1910 and 

1920, and there existed every expectation and hope among Los Angeles boosters, 

businessmen, and the general population as a whole that this growth would continue for the foreseeable future. In fact, the population of the region jumped to 

2,491,000 by 1930.52 Such hopes, and expectations, of course, depended upon a 

reliable water supply.

In the early 1920s, the Owens River had not been tapped to its capacity 

by the City of Los Angeles, but–even as some farmers from the valley launched 

a dramatic (yet ultimately futile) bombing campaign to disrupt operation of the 

aqueduct–it was understood that the river could only partially meet the future 

needs of the region. Thus, with an electorate now attuned to the economic benH¿WVWKDWFRXOGDFFUXHIURPPDVVLYHSXEOLFLQYHVWPHQWVLQODUJHVFDOHZDWHUVXSSO\V\VWHPVFLW\RI¿FLDOVIRFXVHGRQSRWHQWLDOQHZVRXUFHVRIZDWHU7KHUHODtively small rivers within easy reach of Los Angeles offered little possibility of 

GHYHORSPHQWEHFDXVHRIH[LVWLQJFODLPVWRWKHLUVWUHDPÀRZ%XWWKHVHHPLQJO\

remote Colorado River presented a very different set of issues in terms of how it 

might serve as a source of supply.

With the Colorado, the issue was not so much the availability of water–

LQWKHHDUO\VPRVWRIWKHULYHU¶VÀRZUHPDLQHGXQXVHG±EXWUDWKHUWKHGLI¿-

FXOWLHVRI¿QDQFLQJEXLOGLQJDQGRSHUDWLQJDUHOLDEOHDTXHGXFWDFURVVPRUHWKDQ

200 miles of rugged, imposing escarpment encompassing the expansive Mohave 

'HVHUW:LWKFRQ¿GHQFHWKDWWKHSK\VLFDODQGWHFKQRORJLFDOFKDOOHQJHVRID

Colorado River-to-Los Angeles aqueduct could be met, in June 1924, 

/RV$QJHOHVIRUPDOO\¿OHGDFODLPWRFXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGRIWKH

&RORUDGR¶VÀRZDPRXQWLQJWRDERXWDFUHIHHWSHU\HDU51 While sigQL¿FDQWO\OHVVWKDQWKHPLOOLRQDFUHIHHWSHU\HDUGLYHUWHGLQWRWKH,PSHULDO

9DOOH\WKLVFODLPQRQHWKHOHVVUHSUHVHQWHGDQHQRUPRXVO\VLJQL¿FDQWHYHQWLQ

the history of the Southwest. Los Angeles had announced its intention to utilize 

the Colorado for municipal development and, based on its track record in taking 

control of the Owens River, there existed little reason to think that the city would 

not act successfully upon this intention. In acknowledging the priority of claims 

made by the farmers in the Palo Verde and Imperial Valleys, Los Angeles did not 

threaten the legal status of water rights claimed by its California brethren 

(in contrast to the future claims of other states in the Colorado basin). As a result, the agricultural interests that Congressman Swing had originally perceived 
162

DVWKHEHQH¿FLDULHVRIWKH6ZLQJ-RKQVRQ%LOOFRXOGQRZORRNWRXUEDQDUHDV

DORQJWKH3DFL¿F&RDVWDVSDUWQHUVLQSURPRWLQJWKH%RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW

After Los Angeles formally proposed drawing water from the Colorado, 

lobbying for the project quickly expanded as urban boosters formed the 

Colorado River Aqueduct Association to complement and assist the Boulder 

Dam Association that had already been formed at the behest of Swing and the 

,PSHULDO,UULJDWLRQ'LVWULFW6LJQL¿FDQWO\6ZLQJKLPVHOIDGGUHVVHGWKHLQLWLDORUganizational meeting of the Colorado River Aqueduct Association in Pasadena 

in September 1924.54 Drawing upon a sophisticated sense of public relations, 

GXULQJWKHQH[W¿YH\HDUVWKHWZRDVVRFLDWLRQVFKXUQHGRXWDVXFFHVVLRQRISDPphlets designed to raise awareness of and appreciation for the importance of 

Hoover Dam. With titles such as “The Story of a Great Government Project for 

WKH&RQTXHVWRIWKH&RORUDGR5LYHU ́DQG37KH)HGHUDO*RYHUQPHQW¶V&RORUDGR

River Project,” these promotional publications addressed both a national audience as well as Southern Californians who were, quite unabashedly, urged to 

contact their friends and relatives outside California to support federal approval 

of Hoover Dam.55 One of the most overt of these promotional pamphlets (which 

appeared near the end of the approval process in late 1928) was actually printed 

by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power and counseled:

Write or telegraph today to your friends, relatives and former 

business associates in other parts of the United States. Give 

them the facts about Boulder Dam. Urge them, in turn, to communicate immediately with their Senators and Congressmen to 

the end that these members of Congress actively may support 

the pending Boulder Dam Bill. Help secure Boulder Dam legislation at this session of Congress!56

 ,Q¿OLQJFODLPVWRWKH&RORUDGR5LYHUWKH&LW\RI/RV$QJHOHVVHUYHG

as the catalyst for what became known as the Colorado River Aqueduct. But the 

scale of the project represented something more than the city could (or wished 

to) develop on its own. At the September 1924 meeting of the Colorado River 

$TXHGXFW$VVRFLDWLRQFLW\RI¿FLDOVVXSSRUWHGWKHIRUPDWLRQRIDUHJLRQZLGH

FRPPLWWHHWRH[SORUHKRZWKHSURSRVHGDTXHGXFWFRXOGEHQH¿W2DQGGUDZVXSport from—communities lying outside the city’s municipal boundaries. The formation of a powerful regional authority existing above the level of cities and 

municipalities but below the level of state government would have to be approved by the California State Legislature (as well as pass constitutional muster 

by the California Supreme Court) but, nonetheless, the Colorado River Aqueduct 

$VVRFLDWLRQVRRQIRFXVHGRQWKHQHHGIRUIRUPLQJVXFKDQDXWKRULW\WR¿QDQFH

construct and operate the proposed aqueduct.
163

In early 1925, the state legislature considered legislation to authorize the 

formation of metropolitan water districts. The legislation passed the state senate 

but failed to win approval in the state assembly that spring.57 In the wake of dif-

¿FXOWLHVZLQQLQJVWDWHDSSURYDOIRUDUHJLRQDOPHWURSROLWDQZDWHUGLVWULFW

Los Angeles voters plowed ahead in June 1925 and approved a $2 million bond 

issue to fund surveys, engineering, and other preliminary work on planning for 

the aqueduct. As Los Angeles Mayor George Cryer indicated in a speech before 

the Boulder Dam Association that same month:

1RFLUFXPVWDQFHKDVEHHQWRRLQVLJQL¿FDQWWREHVHL]HGXSRQE\

them [opponents of the Boulder Canyon Project] and exaggerated into evidence of the desire of California, and particularly 

Los Angeles, to gain an undue advantage from the development 

of the [Colorado] river and ruthlessly to disregard the rights of 

less powerful communities and sections. As mayor of the City 

of Los Angeles, I hope I may, here and for all time, allay the 

distrust of the motives, purposes and objects of the great city 

for which I speak, and of the rich and populous area in Southern 

California having a common interest with Los Angeles. . . . The 

small city must be given an equal opportunity with the larger 

FLW\WRVHFXUHDQGHQMR\WKHSRZHUEHQH¿WVRIWKHGHYHORSPHQW

In bringing to the coast an additional water supply of domestic 

water, imperative to the growth of this section, all cities desiring 

WRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHFRVWRIWKHQHFHVVDU\ZRUNVDQGWKHEHQH¿WV

to be derived therefrom must be given full and fair opportunity 

so to do—and this without any coerced annexation to or consolidation with Los Angeles.58

With this type of public reassurance, “small cities” such as Pasadena, 

Anaheim, Long Beach, Burbank, Glendale, and Santa Monica could take some 

comfort that the new aqueduct was not being promoted simply as a way for 

Los Angeles to extend formal control over them. In promoting an intermunicipal 

agency to administer the proposed aqueduct, Mayor Cryer further indicated that:

/RV$QJHOHVGHVLUHVSDUWQHUVLQWKHEHQH¿WVRIWKHZDWHUVRIWKH

Colorado River, but it wants no unwilling partners. Neither 

does it wish to be an unwelcomed partner. Its great desire, both 

in respect to domestic water and in respect to power is to work 

in full harmony with its sister cities. . . .59

With this vision of cooperation in mind, the legislation that eventually 

fostered organization of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 

(MWDSC) allowed Los Angeles the right to appoint half of the board members 
164

charged with controlling the MWDSC; the remainder would be split between the 

other cities and water districts opting to join the district in accordance with the 

assessed value of land lying within their boundaries. Los Angeles could not 

outright dictate the actions of the MWDSC, but—given that it would generate 

WKHPRVW¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWIRUWKHSURMHFWEDVHGXSRQDVVHVVHGODQGYDOXHV2OLWWOH

could be done without its approval.

In early 1927, legislation was again proposed in Sacramento authorizing the formation of metropolitan water districts in California, and this time approval came over only minimal opposition (the State senate’s approval was unanimous while the assembly passed it on a vote of 63 to 2).60 To understand the 

importance of the legislation (and the consequent formation of the MWDSC) to 

Hoover Dam, it is necessary to appreciate how important it was for proponents 

of the Boulder Canyon Project to be able to assure skeptics that the federal government would actually be paid back the money used to build the Hoover Dam. 

In this regard, the Colorado River Aqueduct was not to be constructed using any 

IHGHUDOIXQGVRQWKHFRQWUDU\LWZDVWREH¿QDQFHGWKURXJKERQGVWKDWZRXOGEH

guaranteed by the MWDSC’s ability to levy real estate taxes against all property 

within the district. But even more importantly, the MWDSC was to be the most 

important customer for the power generated at Hoover Dam. As stated in the 

0:'6&¶V¿UVWDQQXDOUHSRUW

It was early recognized that to secure favorable consideration 

[by the U.S. Congress], the [Boulder Canyon] project must 

be self-supporting and that the power to be generated from 

DQ\GHYHORSPHQWZKLFKZDVEXLOWPXVW¿QGDPDUNHWZKLFK

would eventually return all costs of the entire project to the 

Government. As additional engineering work for a Colorado 

River Aqueduct was done it became evident that any practicable 

diversion of the river must be made at an elevation lower than 

that of much of the area to be served, and would involve pumping. Such pumping was practicable only if a large amount of 

power could be obtained at a low price. This created, at once, 

a potential market for a substantial part of the power from any 

major Colorado River development. When these facts, as well 

as the need for an additional domestic water supply in Southern 

California were laid before Congress support for the SwingJohnson measure became easier to obtain.61

In other words, the need to draw huge amounts of electric power to facilitate operation of the Colorado River Aqueduct provided a means of assuring 

hesitant Congressmen that Hoover Dam would not become some kind of white 

elephant, generating huge quantities of power that no one would want—or pay 
165

for. The MWDSC would be in a position to sign contracts guaranteeing power 

sales and, in turn, the federal government (and federal taxpayers) could rest assured that such contracts would be honored because California’s Metropolitan 

Water District act granted to the MWDSC the right to directly tax land within its 

service area.

To make sure that nothing could impede the enforcement of this taxing 

DXWKRULW\2DQGKHQFHWKHSROLWLFDOIRXQGDWLRQRI+RRYHU'DP¶V¿QDQFLQJ2WKH

legality of the Metropolitan Water District act was brought into question before 

the California Supreme Court in early 1928, and in August of that year, it was 

UXOHGFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\YDOLG)RUPDORUJDQL]DWLRQRIWKH0:'6&TXLFNO\IROlowed as the electorates of Los Angeles, Pasadena, Burbank, Anaheim, and several other cities in Southern California voted to include themselves in the district 

on November 6, 1928.62 Thus, as consideration of the Boulder Canyon Project 

E\&RQJUHVVHQWHUHGLWV¿QDOVWDJHLQ'HFHPEHUDQ\TXHVWLRQVDVWRWKH

feasibility of power sales from Hoover Dam could be addressed and countered 

ZLWKJUHDWFRQ¿GHQFH7KH%RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFWZDVSRLVHGIRU¿QDODSSURYal. All that remained was resolution of how public and private power interests 

would share control over the proposed dam’s generating capacity.

The Politics of Hydroelectric Power and Approval of the Boulder 

Canyon Project

Of Hoover Dam’s many “purposes,” the most important in terms of 

ERWK¿QDQFLQJWKHSURMHFWDQGKHUDOGLQJDQHZUROHIRUWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW

in the West involved the generation of hydroelectric power. But because of its 

importance, hydroelectric power was also a highly controversial aspect of the 

project. In the political context of the 1920s, when President Calvin Coolidge 

could arouse favorable support by averring “after all, the chief business of the 

American people is business” it was not at all apparent to a large constituency 

within the Republican Party that the federal government should take any active 

role in the generation or distribution of electric power.61

After the New Deal, it was easy to perceive the federal government 

as a primary—perhaps even central—participant in the West’s electric power 

grid, but this was hardly the case at the start of the century. Prior to the 1920s, 

Reclamation had built a few hydroelectric powerplants with an aggregate 

generating capacity of less than 50,000 horsepower. In contrast, by the earO\VSULYDWHO\¿QDQFHGHOHFWULFSRZHUFRPSDQLHVLQWKH:HVWRZQHGDQG

controlled plants with a combined generating capacity of more than 3.5 million 

horsepower.637KXVDIHGHUDOO\¿QDQFHG+RRYHU'DPZLWKDQXOWLPDWHJHQHUDWing capacity of more than 1 million horsepower, represented something very different from anything previously proposed for the West.
166

 The distinctive—if not exactly

revolutionary—nature of what 

Reclamation proposed in terms of developing the hydropower potential at 

Black Canyon becomes apparent in its 

own description of the project as published in the 1927 edition of Edward 

Wegmann’s Design and Construction of

Dams. In describing the “primary objects” of the dam as (1) “permit[ting] the 

XVHRIWKHQRUPDOÀRZRIWKH&RORUDGR

River in the Upper Colorado Basin, without injury to the prior rights below the 

reservoir,” (2) “[supporting] irrigation 

and domestic [use],” and (3) “provid[ing] 

ÀRRGSURWHFWLRQ ́5HFODPDWLRQYHU\

much downplays the importance of hydroelectric power. In fact, the proposed 

dam site was simply described as “presenting attractive possibilities of power 

development, [but these are] incidental to 

the use of the water for the primary objects of the reservoir.” Unquestionably, 

the economic viability of the proposed 

dam was inextricably linked to hydropower revenues, but this did not mean 

that such a linkage was always trumpeted 

as a “primary objective” of the dam; especially while Calvin Coolidge resided in 

the White House.65

 While the opposition of the private 

electric power industry to the Boulder 

Canyon Project was quite real, it manifested itself in ways that advocates often 

IRXQGIUXVWUDWLQJLIQRWGLI¿FXOWWRFRXQWHU)RUH[DPSOH3KLO6ZLQJEHOLHYHG

that the reluctance of Utah Senator Reed Smoot to support the project derived 

from Smoot’s close relationship with the Utah Power and Light Company, which 

was in turn controlled by the New York-based holding company Electric Bond 

and Share; but despite the logic underlying Swing’s suspicions they were dif-

¿FXOWWRSURYH66 In opposing the power generating aspects of the Hoover Dam 

SURMHFWSURSRQHQWVRISULYDWHSRZHUJHQHUDOO\FRQFHGHGWKDWÀRRGFRQWURO

)LJXUH&RYHURISDPSKOHWHQFRXUDJing citizen support of Hoover (Boulder) 

Dam, 1928. Source: Boulder Dam Association pamphlet, item in the private collection of 

Donald C. Jackson.
167

constituted a useful and desirable objective. As such, they championed the construction of a dam about 300-feet high at a site near Topock, California, and 

hence referred to as Topock Dam, that would be big enough to hold back the rivHU¶VDQQXDOÀRRGVEXWQRWELJHQRXJKWRIRVWHUODUJHVFDOH\HDUURXQGHOHFWULF

power production.67

Like the Boulder Dam Association, private power interests sponsored 

the publication of pamphlets supporting their point of view. However, these ofWHQDSSHDUHGZLWKRXWDQ\GLUHFWVSRQVRUVKLSW\LQJWKHPWRSULYDWHLQGXVWU\)RU

example a handsome, 103-page booklet published under the seemingly benign 

title “Boulder Dam: Complete Bibliography, References, Engineers’ Charts, 

Studies and Reports, the Swing-Johnson Bill, Minority Reports and General 

Comments” offers no information indicating who published it. But a reading of the text reveals a decided aversion to the power generating aspects of 

WKHSURMHFW)RUH[DPSOHWKHERRNOHWUHSULQWVDQDUWLFOHHQWLWOHG3'DQJHULQWKH

Boulder Canyon Project” written by Phillip Cabot, Lecturer on Public Utility 

Administration at the Harvard Business School. In this, Cabot expresses arguments that would have pleased private power executives:

Considering the nature of the interests involved, the Colorado 

5LYHUÀRRGFRQWUROSURMHFWLVSUREDEO\DOHJLWLPDWHHQWHUSULVH

on which the United States may embark. . . . But unfortunately 

the proposed development does not stop there. The scope of the 

HQWHUSULVHKDVEHHQJUHDWO\HQODUJHGLIQRWLQÀDWHGVRDVWRLQclude the generation of electric power on a very large scale. . . . 

Clearly the production of electric power at this point is a highly speculative enterprise, and there is grave doubt whether the 

power generated in a desert hundreds of miles from any available markets can be sold at prices which will pay an adequate 

return upon its cost. . . . But whether the enterprise will pay or 

)LJXUH/RV$QJHOHVFLW\RI¿FLDOVGLVWULEXWHGÀLHUVLQWRHQFRXUDJHFLWL]HQ

support. Source: Boulder Dam Association, item in the private collection of Donald C. Jackson.
168

not is really beside the point, because there is a far more important objection to the development of electric power by the fedHUDOJRYHUQPHQWDVSDUWRIWKLVÀRRGFRQWUROSURMHFW68

Cabot goes even further by characterizing California’s advocacy of 

3%RXOGHU'DP ́DVDEROGDVVDXOWRQWKHIHGHUDOWUHDVXU\LQRUGHUWREHQH¿WWKH

state at the expense of the nation:

It is easy to see why the Senators and Representatives from 

California are so keenly in favor of the Boulder Canyon Project 

as now proposed. They want cheap power in California. . . . 

But it is hard to believe that the Senators from the other parts 

RIWKHFRXQWU\ZLOOGHYHORSHTXDOHQWKXVLDVP)URPWKHSRLQW

of view of the nation as a whole there is no convincing argument in favor of the additional expenditure and additional risk 

LQYROYHGLQDGGLQJDμWDLO¶RIHOHFWULFSRZHUWRWKHGRJRIÀRRG

control and reclamation. The result will probably be to burGHQWKHQDWLRQIRUWKHEHQH¿WRI&DOLIRUQLDZKLFKLVXQZLVH

LIQRWLOOHJDO,WLVGLVKHDUWHQLQJWR¿QGVRPHRIRXUDEOHVW

Government leaders favoring such a scheme.69

Despite the efforts of private power advocates to convince Americans of 

the importance of keeping electric power production out of government control, 

the general public grew wary of what was frequently characterized as the “Power 

Trust.” In the spring of 1928, this wariness blossomed into widespread skeptiFLVPIROORZLQJWKHUHOHDVHRID)HGHUDO7UDGH&RPPLVVLRQVWXG\GRFXPHQWLQJ

)LJXUH37DONLQJSRLQWV ́SURYLGHGLQWRKHOSFLWL]HQVMRLQWKH¿JKWIRUDSSURYDORI

Hoover Dam. Source: Boulder Dam Association, item in the private collection of Donald C. Jackson.
169

KRZWKHSULYDWHSRZHULQGXVWU\ZRUNHGWRLQÀXHQFHLIQRWRXWULJKWPDQLSXODWH

public opinion regarding the value of publicly-owned and administered power 

systems.70 Evidence was brought to bear on how $400,000 was raised and alloFDWHGE\WKH1DWLRQDO(OHFWULF/LJKW$VVRFLDWLRQVSHFL¿FDOO\WR¿JKW+RRYHU'DP

DQGKRZSROLWLFLDQVDFDGHPLFVDQGRWKHUSURPLQHQW¿JXUHVZHUHHQJDJHGWRRSpose the dam.71

Swing and Johnson were able to take these revelations and, during the 

¿QDOPRQWKVRIEDWWOHRYHUWKH%RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW$FWXVHWKHPWRJRRG

advantage. Arguments denigrating the power generating aspects of the project 

were now much easier to characterize as propaganda from the “Power Trust” and 

WKHLGHDRIEXLOGLQJDGDPRQO\ELJHQRXJKIRUÀRRGFRQWUROIDGHGIURPVHULRXV

FRQVLGHUDWLRQ,Q'HFHPEHUGXULQJWKH¿QDO3ODPHGXFN ́VHVVLRQRIWKH

70th Congress and after the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 

had been formally organized to build the Colorado River Aqueduct, the fourth 

DQG¿QDO6ZLQJ-RKQVRQ%LOOZDVSDVVHGE\&RQJUHVVDQGVLJQHGE\3UHVLGHQW

Coolidge. In this Act, power generation remained as a keystone of the project, 

EXWVRPHVLJQL¿FDQWFRQFHVVLRQVZHUHPDGHWRSULYDWHLQGXVWU\

 )LUVWZKLOHWKHSRZHUJHQHUDWLQJSODQWDW+RRYHU'DPZRXOGEHEXLOW

and owned by the federal government, actual operation of the plant would be 

leased to non-federal organizations. Second, private power companies (most 

prominently Southern California Edison Company) would be allowed to compete 

in bidding for the purchase of power from the dam. The precise allocation of 

power privileges was not determined until 1930, when Secretary of the Interior 

5D\/\PDQ:LOEXU¿QDOO\DXWKRUL]HGOHDVHVWKDWJRYHUQHGXVHRI+RRYHU'DP

power for 50 years after the plant came on-line. As stipulated by Wilbur, over 

64 percent of the dam’s power was reserved for use in Southern California, 

36 percent went to the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California to 

pump water through the Colorado River Aqueduct, a little more than 9 percent to 

the Southern California Edison Company (and other private power companies), 

and about 18 percent to the City of Los Angeles and other municipally-owned 

utilities in Southern California. In contrast, both Arizona and Nevada were allotted 18 percent of the dam’s power, although it would be many years before these 

states were able to develop markets large enough to utilize their full allotments. 

:LWKSRZHUDOORFDWLRQVDQGFRQWUDFWVLQSODFH¿QDQFLQJRIWKH%RXOGHU&DQ\RQ

Project became ensured, and in 1931 the focus shifted to actual construction.
170

$OWHUQDWLYHURXWHVIRUWKH&RORUDGR5LYHU$TXHGXFW7KHURXWHEXLOWLVODEHOHG%DQGOHDYHVWKH&RORUDGR

Lake Havasu above the Parker damsite. Source: Charles A. Bissell, compiler and editor, The Metropolitan Water

uthern California: History and First Annual Report (Los Angeles, 1939), 68.
171

HOOVER DAM

Construction of the Dam

 %XGJHWHGDWPLOOLRQWKH%RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFWZRXOG¿-

nance construction of a massive concrete storage dam and excavation of the 

All-American Canal feeding into the Imperial Valley. The Government billed 

it as a multipurpose project because it would foster irrigation in the Imperial 

Valley, supply municipal water for greater Los Angeles via the Metropolitan 

Water District’s Colorado River Aqueduct, generate hydroelectric power for the 

6RXWKZHVWDQGSURYLGHÀRRGFRQWUROIRUWKH/RZHU&RORUDGR%DVLQ%XWIRUDOO

WKHVHJRDOVWREHPHWLWZDV¿UVWQHFHVVDU\WRDFWXDOO\EXLOGDIRRWKLJKEDUULHUFDSDEOHRILPSRXQGLQJDOPRVWWZR\HDU¶VDYHUDJHÀRZRIWKH&RORUDGRULYHU

Throughout the 1920s, Bureau of Reclamation engineers planned how this might 

be accomplished. In 1931, the actual work commenced of building what now–

thanks to the September 1930 pronouncement of Interior Secretary Ray Lyman 

Wilbur–was called Hoover Dam.

While work on the dam was to be closely supervised by the Bureau of 

Reclamation, long-time Reclamation engineer Walker Young took charge at the 

site, responsibility for construction was to be taken by a private contractor who 

had won the job by submitting a low bid in competition with other prospective 

bidders. The largest single federal contract ever let out for bids until that time, 

the building of Hoover Dam attracted the attention of some of America’s largest 

FLYLOHQJLQHHULQJFRQWUDFWRUVZKHQLWZDV¿UVWDGYHUWLVHGLQ-DQXDU\,QD

story that is well told by Joseph Stevens in his book Building Hoover Dam: An

American Adventure, the scale of the project proved so great that several prominent entrepreneurs and companies—including the Utah Construction Company, 

Morrison-Knudsen, the Bechtel Company, and Henry Kaiser—pooled their talents into a joint corporate initiative called Six Companies Inc. and submitted a 

winning bid slightly less than $49 million that won them the right to build the 

dam.72

 $OWKRXJKPDQ\SHRSOH¿JXUHGLQWR6L[&RPSDQLHV¶VXFFHVVIXOHIIRUWLQ

building Hoover Dam, in terms of the day-to-day work that actually transpired in 

WKHIRUELGGLQJHQYLURQVRI%ODFN&DQ\RQQRQHZDVPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQ)UDQN

&URZH)RUWZHQW\\HDUVDIWHUMRLQLQJWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHDVD\RXQJHQgineer in 1905, Crowe had worked on a variety of Reclamation Service projects, including construction of the concrete curved gravity Arrowrock Dam in 

,GDKR,QKHOHIWJRYHUQPHQWVHUYLFHDQGMRLQHGWKHGDPEXLOGLQJRXW¿W

of Morrison-Knudsen, based in Boise, Idaho. Drawing upon his experiences in 

both government and private engineering work, Crowe took charge of the 
172

)LJXUH3UR¿OHVRISUHOLPLQDU\&RORUDGR5LYHU$TXHGXFWURXWHV1RWHWKHYDU\LQJ

lengths studied. Source: Bissell, The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, 81.
173

complicated task of coordinating work in Black Canyon so that Six Companies 

could meet its contractual obligation of completing the dam within seven years.73

In basic terms, building the dam relied on a few components that were 

key to its systematic and timely completion. Of course, construction of a rail 

DQGURDGWUDQVSRUWDWLRQV\VWHPFRQQHFWLQJ%ODFN&DQ\RQWRWKH8QLRQ3DFL¿F

Railroad and to the outside world in general (via Las Vegas) was vital. And electric power needed to be brought in over a 220-mile transmission line extending out of San Bernardino, California. But for Crowe, the most critically important aspect of the project concerned the driving of four 56-foot diameter diversion tunnels (they would be reduced to 50-foot diameter after being lined with 

FRQFUHWHWKDWZRXOGHYHQWXDOO\FDUU\WKHIXOOÀRZRIWKH&RORUDGR5LYHUDURXQG

the dam site and allow the foundations of the dam to be excavated down to solLGEHGURFN)URPDFRQVWUXFWLRQSRLQWRIYLHZQRWKLQJRIVXEVWDQFHLQWHUPVRI

pouring concrete in the dam or powerhouses could be accomplished prior to diversion of the river through these lengthy tunnels (in aggregate they stretched for 

more than three miles through the rock abutments of the canyon). And in a 

¿QDQFLDOFRQWH[W6L[&RPSDQLHV¶FRQWUDFWVWLSXODWHGWKDWWKHIXOOGLYHUVLRQ

would be accomplished 

by October 1, 1933. 

The company would 

incur a $3,000 per day 

¿QHIRUHYHU\GD\LW

was late in meeting this 

deadline.74

Thus, for both 

¿QDQFLDODQGSUDFWLFDO

reasons, the driving of 

the diversion tunnels 

became of paramount 

importance to the company and lent an air 

of urgency to the start 

of construction in the 

spring of 1931. This 

air of urgency was further exacerbated by the 

thousands of potential 

workers who migrated 

toward Las Vegas because they perceived 

the )LJXUH'RZQVWUHDPYLHZRI+RRYHU'DPRQWKH&RORUDGR

River. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
174

project as a source of desperately needed jobs.75 Although many arguments were 

made by Southern Californians during the 1920s as to why the Boulder Canyon 

Project should be built, the role of the project in providing employment in the 

midst of hard economic times was not one of them. But in the period following 

the dam’s approval in December 1928, the nation’s economy lay shattered in the 

wake of the stock market crash of October 1929. By the time actual construction 

commenced in Black Canyon, the project had spawned a new objective focused 

around what could be termed “work relief.” In this context, the dam assumed a 

new role in the national consciousness, one that was not so much tied to the economic growth of Southern California, as it was to a larger national purpose foFXVHGDURXQGRYHUFRPLQJDGYHUVLW\LQGLI¿FXOWWLPHV2DQGZKDWFRXOGEHPRUH

3$PHULFDQ ́WKDQWKDW"

Although the Hoover Administration remained generally opposed to fedHUDOO\¿QDQFHGUHOLHISURMHFWVGHVLJQHGWRJLYHDQDUWL¿FLDOERRVWWRWKHHFRQRP\

it was quite willing to promote and encourage the job opportunities that attended 

construction of Hoover Dam.76 Thus, for a range of reasons, Reclamation, Six 

Companies, and Crowe were anxious to get work underway at Black Canyon as 

quickly and as fully as possible in the spring and summer of 1931. Unfortunately 

for prospective laborers and their families, housing conditions near the site were 

abysmal at this stage of the project (construction of accommodations at the federally controlled Boulder City would not be complete for several more months), 

and as the heat of the summer descended on the site, fourteen workers died from 

heat prostration. Working conditions in the diversion tunnels proved especially 

dangerous, but this did little to deter Crowe from pushing ahead as hard as possible on this critical phase of the project.757

As a result of tremendous physical hardship and apparent wage cuts invoked by Six Companies during the summer of 1931, labor unrest grew. In 

early August, discontent became manifest in a project-wide strike encouraged 

by radical labor leaders from the Industrial Workers of the World (the IWW or 

“Wobblies”).78 In fending off this strike, Six Companies and Reclamation shared 

a common interest in resisting any labor demands that threatened to impede completion of the dam. Elwood Mead succinctly expressed the federal government’s 

position by characterizing the strikers as “impossible” and averring that “the 

present wage rate on Hoover Dam is considerably above that of the surrounding 

region.”79 Thus, once the strike was broken in mid-August by the importation 

of workers from Las Vegas willing to abide by the rules and wages established 

by Six Companies, particularly troublesome strikers found little support from 

5HFODPDWLRQRURWKHUIHGHUDORI¿FLDOVLQWKHLUHIIRUWVWRUHJDLQHPSOR\PHQW

In even more substantive ways, Reclamation supported Six Companies 

in terms of working conditions in the tunnels and demonstrated how federal 
175

DGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIWKHSURMHFWSURYHGDGYDQWDJHRXVWRWKHFRQWUDFWRU6SHFL¿FDOO\

this involved Six Companies’ reliance upon gasoline-powered trucks and internal 

combustion engines within the diversion tunnels in order to facilitate the rapid 

removal of rock that had been blasted from the tunnel facings. Of course, operaWLRQRILQWHUQDOFRPEXVWLRQHQJLQHVLQSRRUO\YHQWLODWHGFRQ¿QHGVSDFHVRIIHUV

LGHDOFRQGLWLRQVIRUFDUERQPRQR[LGHSRLVRQLQJ)RUWKLVUHDVRQ1HYDGDPLQLQJ

ODZVSHFL¿FDOO\IRUEDGHXVHRIVXFKHTXLSPHQWXQGHUJURXQG'XULQJWKHVXPPHURI1HYDGDRI¿FLDOVWRRNOHJDODFWLRQWRSUHYHQW&URZHIURPXVLQJLQternal combustion engines inside the diversion tunnels, something he strongly 

resisted because his plan for meeting the river diversion deadline required completing the tunnels as rapidly as possible; in turn, this depended upon large trucks 

that would drive directly into the tunnels and carry out debris on a “round the 

clock” basis—during January 1932 this reached a peak when as much as 

16,000 cubic yards of rock was hauled away every day.80

Reclamation sided with Six Companies and argued that, because the 

dam was being built by the federal government on land that had been designated 

a “federal reservation,” state law held no power over possible construction 

methods. After Nevada’s state inspector of mines brought legal action to enforce 

state law and provide safe working conditions at the dam site, Six Companies 

and Reclamation obtained a restraining order allowing them to proceed until a 

SDQHORIIHGHUDOMXGJHVLQ6DQ)UDQFLVFRUXOHGXSRQWKHPHULWVRIWKHFDVH%\

the time the ruling came in April 1932, much of the tunnel excavation work had 

EHHQ¿QLVKHGUHJDUGOHVVWKHFRXUWXSKHOG6L[&RPSDQLHV¶DQG5HFODPDWLRQ¶V

right to abrogate state law on this issue.81/DWHUVWDWHFRXUW¿JKWVIRFXVHGRQFLYLO

ODZVXLWVWKDWVRXJKWWRZLQ¿QDQFLDOMXGJPHQWVDJDLQVW6L[&RPSDQLHVIRUZRUNers who claimed to have been injured by the underground operation of internal 

combustion engines. A source of some embarrassment to Six Companies, these 

civil disputes dragged out until 1936 when they were ultimately resolved in 

out-of-court settlements for an undisclosed sum.82 But in the larger scheme of 

things, the federal legal “umbrella” proved remarkably useful to Crowe and Six 

Companies in allowing them full control over the dam site without worrying 

about state regulations.

Work on the tunnels proceeded at a furious pace during 1931 and 1932.83 

$OWKRXJKVRPHGLI¿FXOWLHVDFFRPSDQLHGXQIRUHVHHQÀRRGVLQ)HEUXDU\

the river ran relatively low during the spring and summer of that year and, with 

the coming of low water in the fall, conditions looked good for diversion of the 

Colorado River out of Black Canyon. Beginning in early November, Crowe’s 

crews began dumping rock across the stream bed in order to erect a temporary cofferdam. As this mound of debris gradually rose upwards, it elevated the 

height of the river. On November 14, 1932, water began spilling into the diversion tunnels on the Arizona side of the construction site. With this, the mighty 
176

Colorado River had been “tamed,” and excavation of the site became possible. 

The building of the dam soon entered a new phase.

The diversion of the river allowed for site preparation to begin in earnest, but even before this occurred the abutments along the canyon walls 

had been subjected to an intensive effort to chip and drill away loose rock. 

Undertaken by daring “high scalers,” this work was accomplished by men who 

rappelled down the slopes of the canyon walls carrying heavy jack hammers; 

their purpose was to remove any loose rock or potential debris that could impede 

a tight, solid connection between the dam’s concrete and the rock abutments. 

Similarly, completion of the cofferdams (one on the upstream side of the site, 

one on the downstream side) allowed Crowe’s men to remove all loose dirt, sediment, and rock lying in the riverbed that would prevent the concrete bottom of 

the dam from forming a tight, solid connection with the bedrock at the bottom of 

the dam. Excavation into the bottom of Black Canyon commenced in November 

1932, and by early June 1933, Six Companies was ready to start the actual placement of concrete.84

)LJXUH/RRNLQJDFURVV+RRYHU'DPGXULQJFRQVWUXFWLRQIURPWKH1HYDGDVLGHRQ

June 2, 1934. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
177

Compared to the uncertainties that accompanied the efforts to drill the 

diversion tunnels, the pouring of concrete represented a much more predictable 

and controllable task—although it was, nonetheless, a complicated and potentially dangerous coordination of men and machines and huge batches of wet conFUHWH'XULQJWKHPRUHWKDQWZR\HDUVSUHFHGLQJWKH¿UVWSODFHPHQWRIFRQFUHWH

on June 6, 1933, Crowe and Reclamation had overseen the erection of an elaborate concrete-making plant that could draw in materials (i.e., sand and gravel) 

from the local area and process them in a concrete mixing plant above the dam 

VLWHRQWKH1HYDGDVLGHRIWKHULYHU)URPKHUHODUJHEDWFKHVRIIUHVKO\PL[HG

concrete (carried by buckets with a capacity of eight cubic yards) could be delivered to various parts of the ever-rising dam via cableways strung across the width 

of the canyon.83

Recognizing that the dam could not be formed in one continuous pour, 

Reclamation’s design called for the concrete to be placed in an assemblage of 

“blocks” that could be cast independently and allowed to harden before the pouring of adjoining blocks.84 To allow the massive concrete structure to cool in a 

controlled (and relatively rapid) manner—something that was necessary because 

)LJXUH+RRYHU'DPDQG/DNH0HDGYLHZHGIURPWKH$UL]RQDVLGHRQ$SULO

Note, in the upper right corner, the Nevada side channel spillway which discharges into an 

inclined tunnel which connects to one of the four original tunnels built to divert water around 

the construction site. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
178

of the heat released by the concrete as it hardened—an extensive system of oneinch diameter cooling pipes (measuring about 592 miles in total) was embedded in the dam. These pipes, which represented a technology that Reclamation 

KDG¿UVWH[SHULPHQWHGZLWKGXULQJWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI2Z\KHH'DPLQ2UHJRQ

a few years earlier, contained cooled water that served to draw off excess heat 

from the hardening concrete (resulting from what engineers term the “heat of 

hydration”) and prevent the creation of potentially dangerous temperature cracks 

within the interior of the dam. Water passed through the cooling coil pipes at a 

rate of at least three gallons per minute and, at the completion of construction, 

Reclamation estimated that about 159 billion BTUs (British Thermal Units) of 

energy had been extracted out of the dam by this method.85

 $IWHUWKH¿UVWIHZZHHNVRISRXULQJFRQFUHWHWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQSURcess became regularized and relatively routine (at least compared with the early 

stages of construction), although it never became simple. The growing skill of 

&URZH¶VZRUNHUVDQGWKHHI¿FLHQF\RIWKHFRQFUHWHGHOLYHU\V\VWHPEHFRPHVDSparent in reviewing the quantities of concrete placed on a monthly basis: In June 

1933, 25,000 cubic yards of concrete were poured; two months later, in August, 

it reached 149,000 cubic yards; and in March 1934, it reached a peak of over 

262,000 cubic yards—the equivalent of 1,100 buckets per day, or about one 

every 78 seconds. By December 1934, more than three million cubic yards of 

FRQFUHWHKDGEHHQSRXUHGLQWRWKHGDPLQHDUO\)HEUXDU\WKHVWUXFWXUH

“topped out” with delivery of the last batch of concrete.86 At this time, 

Reclamation dropped three of the massive bulkhead gates placed across the 

openings of the diversion tunnels, leaving the outer Nevada tunnel to release 

ÀRZVWRPHHWWKHQHHGVRIGRZQVWUHDPLUULJDWRUV/DWHULQWKHIRXUWKJDWH

IXOO\EORFNHGWKH&RORUDGR5LYHULQLWVMRXUQH\WRZDUGWKH3DFL¿F*UDGXDOO\

the reservoir behind the dam began to rise and the hydraulic character of the once 

IUHHÀRZLQJVWUHDPH[SHULHQFHGDGUDPDWLFWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ

While work building the dam proper proceeded through 1934 and into 

1935, other tasks such as building the powerhouses, the outlet towers, the spillways, and the tunnels that served them continued apace. A year later, in March 

WKHGDPDQGSRZHUKRXVHVZHUHRI¿FLDOO\GHFODUHGWREHFRPSOHWHDQG2DV

6L[&RPSDQLHVRI¿FLDOO\OHIW%ODFN&DQ\RQ25HFODPDWLRQDVVXPHGUHVSRQVLELOity for installing the initial set of hydroelectric turbine-generator units in the powerhouses.87

On October 7, 1936, water passed through one of the recently completHGPDLQWXUELQHJHQHUDWRUXQLWVDQGWZRGD\VODWHUK\GURHOHFWULFSRZHU¿UVW

surged out of Black Canyon into Southern California via a transmission line built 

by the City of Los Angeles. It would take until June 1937 before full-scale, continuous, commercial power transmission would occur, but, from that time on, 
179

the power generating capacity of the Boulder Canyon Project became a central feature of the Southwest’s power grid. By 1940, ten distinct power lines 

emanated out of Black Canyon, including the Metropolitan Water District of 

Southern California’s line to pump water through the Colorado River Aqueduct.88 

Although the installation of the 17 main turbine-generators (each with an initial 

generating capacity of 115,000 hp) in the dam’s powerhouses extended over a 

SHULRGRI\HDUVWKH¿QDOXQLWZRXOGQRWFRPHRQOLQHXQWLOWKHLQLWLDOJHQeration of power in 1936-37 was the beginning of the process whereby operation 

of the dam could (quite literally) generate the income that would pay for its construction.

The Legacy of Hoover Dam

 )HZDFWLRQVEHWWHUV\PEROL]HWKHSROLWLFDOFKDUDFWHUDQGLPSRUWDQFHRI

the Boulder Canyon Project than Interior Secretary Ray Lyman Wilbur’s decision in 1930 to change the name of Boulder Dam to Hoover Dam. President 

Herbert Hoover himself appears to have played no role in encouraging this name 

change, but he gladly accepted such a prominent and public association with 

the dam. In fact, perhaps the only other act that fully compares with Wilbur’s 

move in symbolizing the political power projected by the dam’s image involves 

WKHGHFLVLRQRI3UHVLGHQW)UDQNOLQ5RRVHYHOW¶V,QWHULRU6HFUHWDU\+DUROG,FNHVWR

change the name back to Boulder Dam shortly after Hoover’s departure from the 

White House.89 Ickes perceived the dam as a major construct holding wide public appeal during the Depression, and, under his administrative eye, the Bureau 

of Reclamation continued to push hard to bring it to completion–during 1934, 

he made certain that $38 million from Public Works Administration funds were 

available to keep the project moving along as fast as possible.90 At the same 

time, Ickes held no great political affection for Six Companies and—in contrast 

to Wilbur—was quite willing to confront the dam’s main contractor over labor 

issues.91

 7KH5RRVHYHOW$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VGHVLUHWRDI¿OLDWHLWVHOIZLWKWKHGDP

became fully manifest in September 1935 when the President personally visited Black Canyon to dedicate the completed dam. In his remarks, Roosevelt 

celebrated the dam’s “superlative” dimensions and avowed that “this morning I 

FDPH,VDZDQG,ZDVFRQTXHUHGDVHYHU\RQHZLOOEHZKRVHHVIRUWKH¿UVWWLPH

this great feat of mankind.” Paying homage to “the genius of their designers . . 

. the zeal of the builders . . . [and especially] the thousands of workers who gave 

brain and brawn to [the] work of construction” he characterized the dam as a 

3WZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\PDUYHO ́DQGDV3DQHQJLQHHULQJYLFWRU\RIWKH¿UVWRUGHU2

another great achievement of American resourcefulness, skill and determination.”92 By portraying the dam in such broad terms, Roosevelt elevated the project above the political and economic aspirations that drove Southern Californians 
180

to push for its authorization in the 1920s. In essence, Roosevelt raised the dam’s 

importance to almost mythological proportions in portraying it as a great symbol 

of mankind’s ability to tame nature through technology and human effort.

 $OWKRXJK5RRVHYHOW¶VVSHHFKLQ%ODFN&DQ\RQZDVKDUGO\WKH¿UVWWLPH

that a politician had drawn upon a public works project to symbolize the advance of American civilization, the speech represented an important public event 

in which a large multipurpose dam was imbued with national values of seemLQJXQLYHUVDOEHQH¿W,QVXFKDFRQWH[WWKHOHJDF\RI+RRYHU'DPFRQWLQXHG

to be felt for decades to come as multipurpose dams proliferated within river 

basins throughout America. Often viewed as a manifestation and extension of 

New Deal public works spending initiatives, the fact that the original, federalO\¿QDQFHGPXOWLSXUSRVHVWRUDJHGDPGHVLJQHGWREHSDLGIRUE\WKHFRPPHUcial sale of hydroelectric power was not born out of the Great Depression (or 

out of efforts to alleviate the effects of the Depression) is something that should 

give pause to anyone wishing to paint large-scale federal dam-building in simple, 

broad-brush strokes.

In a broad context, Hoover Dam came to represent a major shift in three 

key aspects of western water policy: (1) municipal water supply now constituted a suitable purpose for Reclamation projects; (2) electric power generation 

ZDVQRZFRQVLGHUHGDFFHSWDEOHDVDPDMRUFRPSRQHQWRIIHGHUDOO\¿QDQFHGSURMects; and (3) because much of the privately held land in the Imperial Valley was 

LQODUJHWUDFWVWKDWVWRRGLQVLJQL¿FDQWFRQWUDVWWRWKH3DFUHVPDOOIDUPLGHDO ́

originally heralded in the 1902 Reclamation Act, implementation of the Boulder 

Canyon Project Act represented an expanded relationship between the federal 

government and private landowners in the West.

In a more focused context, the legacy of Hoover Dam was also expressed in how the Colorado River basin developed in the wake of the Boulder 

&DQ\RQ3URMHFW)LUVWFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHULYHU¶V¿UVWPDMRUVWRUDJHGDPDVD

federal project provided the rationale for preventing any private electric power company from ever erecting a hydroelectric powerplant along the mainstem 

RIWKHULYHU(YHQEHIRUHWKHFRPSOHWLRQRI+RRYHU'DPWKH)HGHUDO3RZHU

Commission had initiated wholesale rejection of any private power applications 

to develop the Colorado River on the grounds that they might interfere with interstate allocations of water under the terms of the Colorado River Compact 

(which, of course, did not become effective until authorization of the Boulder 

Canyon Project).93

Second, the Boulder Canyon Project marked a point at which individual 

states came to appreciate the implications of large, inter-basin transfers of water 

and the need to protect their interests through agreements (such as the Colorado 
181

River Compact) or court action (such as Arizona’s resistance to California’s 

claims to the Colorado River). Looking more closely at the long-simmering dispute between Arizona and California, the completion of Hoover Dam in 1935 alORZHG6L[&RPSDQLHVWRLPPHGLDWHO\VKLIW)UDQN&URZHDQGLWVDWWHQWLRQWRWKH

construction of Parker Dam, and to commence work on a key component of the 

Metropolitan Water District of Southern California’s Colorado River Aqueduct. 

Parker Dam would straddle the Colorado River about 150 miles below Hoover 

'DP6LJQL¿FDQWO\WKLVSURMHFW±ZKLFKZDVSDLGIRUE\0:'±ZDVRI¿FLDOO\

built by Reclamation, a tactic made necessary by the fact that fully half of the 

dam was in the state of Arizona.

An important, yet oftentimes overlooked, legacy of the Boulder Canyon 

Project is that, in 1931, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Arizona could do 

nothing to prevent construction of Hoover Dam on constitutional grounds 

(derived essentially from the fact that the lower Colorado River was navigable 

DQGWKXVIHGHUDOFRQWURORYHUWKHGDPFRXOGEHMXVWL¿HGLQWHUPVRIWKH

 U.S. Constitution’s interstate commerce clause).94 Thus, despite Arizona’s 

objections that Parker Dam was in truth simply a component of Southern 

&DOLIRUQLD¶VZDWHUVXSSO\V\VWHPWKHIDFWWKDWLWZDVEHLQJRI¿FLDOO\EXLOWE\

5HFODPDWLRQSURYHGVXI¿FLHQWWRFRXQWHUVXFKFODLPVDVVXFK$UL]RQD¶VDWWHPSW

to launch an “Arizona Navy” to protect its side of the Parker Dam site foundered 

in the wake of the massive federal legal presence that had been established to 

control the Colorado River.95

Not surprisingly, construction of Parker Dam under the auspices of 

Reclamation did not bring an end to Arizona’s struggle with California over the 

ÀRZRIWKHORZHU&RORUDGR,QVWHDGLWPHUHO\VHUYHGWRLQWHQVLI\WKHVWDWH¶V

desire to push its legal claims in federal court. After almost three more decades 

of battle, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1963 that California could be forced 

to limit its withdrawals from the Colorado in order to insure that Arizona would 

be able to take its fair share of the stream. On the surface it appeared as though 

this ruling did nothing to alter the basic allocations set forth in the Colorado 

River Compact. California was still assured of receiving 4.4 million acre-feet 

RI&RORUDGRÀRZSHU\HDUWKHGLIIHUHQFHFDPHLQ&DOLIRUQLD¶VDELOLW\WRGUDZRII

KDOIWKH3VXUSOXVÀRZ ́WKDWPLJKWH[FHHGWKHVWLSXODWHGDOORFDWLRQV

In its 1963 ruling in Arizona v. California, the Supreme Court restrained 

California from using more than 4.4 million acre-feet per year and set the stage 

IRU$UL]RQDWRZLQFRQJUHVVLRQDODSSURYDOIRUDKXJHIHGHUDOO\¿QDQFHGDTXHduct, known as the Central Arizona Project, to pump water out of the Colorado 

and deliver it to greater Phoenix and Tucson.96 Without laboring upon the myriad details attending approval and construction of this project, what is important 

WRVWUHVVLVWKDWUHVROXWLRQRIWKHFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQ$UL]RQDDQG&DOLIRUQLDFDPH
182

ZLWKLQDIHGHUDOIRUXPDQGWKDWIHGHUDO¿QDQFLQJRIWKH&HQWUDO$UL]RQD3URMHFW

was absolutely critical for it to be built. Whereas in the 1920s and 1930s the federal role in building Hoover and Parker Dams had been used to thwart Arizona 

efforts to block construction, by the 1960s, the federal government had become 

the means by which Arizona would implement its own technological system for 

WDSSLQJLQWRWKH&RORUDGR7KHEHQH¿FLDULHVPD\KDYHFKDQJHGRYHUWKH\HDUV

but the fact that the federal government had assumed legal prominence over the 

Colorado remained constant.

GLEN CANYON DAM

The Upper Basin

In the Upper Basin states, the Boulder Canyon Project represented the 

catalyst for the Colorado River Compact and—while it was recognized that construction of Hoover Dam would necessarily precede any work building large federal reservoirs in the Upper Colorado Basin—there developed a strong belief that 

IHGHUDOO\¿QDQFHGGDPSURMHFWVZRXOGVRRQFRPPHQFHLQWKHUHJLRQXSVWUHDP

from Black Canyon. Public notice of such a program appeared in 1946 with the 

Bureau of Reclamation’s publication of the large-format, 292-page The Colorado

River: A Natural Menace Becomes a National Resource (it also carried the imposing subtitle, “A Comprehensive Departmental Report on the Development 

of the Water Resources of the Colorado River Basin for Review Prior to 

Submission to Congress”).98 In this report, scores of prospective projects were 

QRWHGWKURXJKRXWWKHEDVLQDQGMXVWL¿HGLQWHUPVRIWKHHFRQRPLFEHQH¿WWKDW

would accompany their completion. This plan represented the logical outgrowth 

of the water allocations stipulated in the Colorado River Compact. The time had 

come for the Upper Basin to get their share of federal support for developing the 

river basin and—under the name Colorado River Storage Project—this initiative 

received congressional approval in 1956. Like the Boulder Canyon Project, it 

ZDVWREH¿QDQFHGE\UHYHQXHGHULYHGIURPWKHVDOHRIK\GURHOHFWULFSRZHU99

 $VLWWXUQHGRXWWKH¿UVWPDMRU5HFODPDWLRQSURMHFWSODQQHGIRUWKH

Upper Basin precipitated an environmental discussion on a scale comparaEOHRQO\WRWKHGLVSXWHWKDWUDJHGRYHU6DQ)UDQFLVFR¶VSODQVWREXLOGDGDPLQ

Yosemite National Park.99 In the 1930s, Reclamation planners had targeted the 

ODUJHEDVLQDWWKHFRQÀXHQFHRIWKH<DPSDDQG*UHHQ5LYHUVDVDQH[FHOOHQWVLWH

IRUDODUJHVWRUDJHGDPLQWKH8SSHU&RORUDGR%DVLQ/RFDWHGDORQJWKH8WDK

Colorado border about 50 miles south of Wyoming, the site of the proposed 

Echo Park Dam also happened to lie within the boundaries of Dinosaur National 

Monument (a part of the National Park System). In the late 1940s, Echo Park 

'DPZDVSXEOLFO\SURSRVHGDVRQHRIWKH¿UVWFRPSRQHQWVRIWKH&RORUDGR5LYHU

Storage Project. Quickly, members of the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, 
183

and other advocates of the National Park Service rallied to protect Echo Park 

from inundation. They tenaciously lobbied Congress, and, by 1956, were successful in eliminating federal support for the dam. But in winning the environmental battle for Echo Park, they acquiesced in agreeing not to oppose another 

large dam that Reclamation planned to build in the Upper Colorado Basin.100

Of course, the Glen Canyon Dam site (located on the mainstem of the 

Colorado River only a few miles upstream from the spot marking the division 

between the Upper and Lower Basins) had long been familiar to Reclamation. In 

IDFWLWKDG¿JXUHGDVDSRVVLEOHDOWHUQDWLYHWR%RXOGHU%ODFN&DQ\RQLQWKHHDUO\

1920s. By the 1950s, Reclamation was eager to begin construction of a 700-foot 

high dam at Glen Canyon. Glen Canyon Dam would be another major step in 

the development of the Colorado as a source of hydroelectric power for the burgeoning Southwest. Whereas Echo Park lay within a part of the National Park 

System, and, thus, comprised a site well suited for wilderness advocates to 

defend, the Glen Canyon Dam and reservoir site simply encompassed federally 

owned land and thus was easier to justify in terms of inundating for the greater 

public good. Although the canyon lands upstream from Glen Canyon could certainly have been characterized as a natural (and national) treasure, they held no 

place in the national public consciousness and no great movement developed to 

)LJXUH*OHQ&DQ\RQ'DPXQGHUFRQVWUXFWLRQRQ$XJXVWSource: Bureau of 

Reclamation
184

protect them. Thus, when Congress agreed in 1956 to protect Echo Park, wilderness advocates offered little protest against approval of Glen Canyon Dam in 

what could later be understood as a de facto compromise regarding development 

of the two dam and reservoir sites.101

Design of Glen Canyon Dam and Beyond

In terms of design, the Glen Canyon Dam differed from Hoover in its 

XVHRIDQDUFKGHVLJQIHDWXULQJDSUR¿OHLQVXI¿FLHQWWRVWDQGDVDJUDYLW\GDP

In this strictly technological context it diverged from the precedent set by the 

Boulder Canyon Project and, instead, drew from Reclamation’s work in buildLQJWKLQDUFKGDPVWKDWH[WHQGHGDVIDUEDFNDV3DWK¿QGHUDQG6KRVKRQH%XIIDOR

Bill) Dams prior to 1910.

The early version of the trial load analysis, improved by Noetzli in 1921 

DQGIXUWKHUUH¿QHGE\5HFODPDWLRQHQJLQHHUVLQWKHODWHVODLGD¿UPEDVLV

IRULWVXVHRQ*OHQ&DQ\RQ'DP7KLVFRQ¿GHQFHKHOSHGOHDGGHVLJQHQJLQHHU

Louis Puls to decide on a dam far thinner than Hoover and thus rely on arch action instead of only cantilever behavior. There were other reasons too. Concrete 

quality had improved since the 1920s, so the 415 psi stress limit at Hoover Dam 

could be increased to 1,000 psi for Glen Canyon.102

However, somewhat negating the advantages of improved concrete, the 

canyon walls at Glen Canyon were sandstone, a weaker material than the walls 

of Black Canyon. Therefore, the stress at the arches abutments was kept at 

600 psi by thickening the arches as they approached the canyon walls. The 

weaker walls also required the injection of a grout curtain to strengthen the foundations and control seepage under and around the dam.

Glen Canyon Dam also differed from Hoover in that the storage capacity of the reservoir was not really necessary to provide for downstream irrigation 

and municipal use. But the two major dams shared a strong and common lineage in terms of electric power production. With a design capacity of more than 

DPLOOLRQKRUVHSRZHU*OHQ&DQ\RQ'DPZDVLQWHQGHG¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWWREHD

“cash register” facilitating the sale of electric power to the greater Southwest,103

and to deliver the Upper Basin’s annual water commitment to the Lower Basin.

The approval of Glen Canyon Dam in the 1950s may have spurred little 

public protest, but by the time the huge concrete arch structure was completed 

in 1964, America’s burgeoning community of wilderness advocates (a group often simply tagged as “environmentalists”) had come to perceive the inundation 

of the canyon land above Glen Canyon as a terrible tragedy.104 Subsequently, the 

outrage felt by environmentalists in the mid-1960s over Reclamation plans to 
185

build additional hydroelectric dams along the stretch of the Colorado River beWZHHQ%ODFN&DQ\RQDQG*OHQ&DQ\RQ±DQGÀRRGSRUWLRQVRIWKHORZHU*UDQG

&DQ\RQ±SURYHGRIVXI¿FLHQWSROLWLFDOSRWHQF\WKDW&RQJUHVVUHIXVHGWRDXWKRrize their construction.105 While other Reclamation dams were completed in the 

Upper Colorado Basin during the 1960s and early 1970s, the defeat of the 

so-called “Grand Canyon dams” heralded the beginning of a new era in western 

dam-building.106

In recent years, the place of Hoover Dam in the national consciousness 

has not escaped reassessment prompted by the environmental concerns over 

ODUJHVFDOHGDPVWKDWÀRZHUHGLQWKHSRVW*OHQ&DQ\RQHUD7REHVXUHWKH

image of Hoover Dam as a symbol of technological prowess and of the human 

spirit overcoming adversity still holds sway over many people. Not the least of 

these is Joseph Stevens, author of Hoover Dam: An American Adventure, who 

avows that “in the shadow of Hoover Dam one feels that the future is limitless, that no obstacle is insurmountable, that we have in our grasp the power to 

achieve anything if we can but summon the will.”107 In an essay with the lessthan-subtle title “Hoover Dam: a Study in Domination,” environmental 

)LJXUH*OHQ&DQ\RQ'DPORRNLQJXSVWUHDPDWWKHSRZHUKRXVHRQ-XQH Source: 

Bureau of Reclamation.
186

historian Donald Worster offers a different view of the dam’s larger cultural 

meaning. In ways that most likely would rankle, if not infuriate, everyone who 

supported the authorization—or cheered the construction and completion—of 

Hoover Dam during the 1920s and 1930s, Worster makes a point regarding the 

water storage along the Colorado River that “it is not ‘man’ who has achieved 

mastery over western American rivers, but some men.”108 Whether one agrees 

ZLWK:RUVWHUDVWRWKHVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFEHQH¿WVDQGFRVWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK

both Hoover Dam and dams built in its wake, it is, nonetheless, hard to deny that 

they derived from the interests of “some men” rather than “mankind” in general. 

Thus, we should not be so surprised that the dams have in the past and will likely 

in the future comprise sources of controversy. As part of that oftentimes controversial–yet often celebrated–process, the federal government (acting through the 

Bureau of Reclamation) came to play a critically important role in implementing 

the Boulder Canyon Project and all subsequent hydraulic engineering work of 

DQ\VLJQL¿FDQFHZLWKLQWKH&RORUDGR5LYHUEDVLQ

Endnotes

1. Hubbard, Origins of the TVA.

2. Jay Brigham, Empowering the West: Electrical Politics Before FDR (Lawrence: University Press of 

Kansas, 1998) offers good background on the debate over public vs. private power in the pre-New Deal Era.

3. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, The Colorado River: “A Natural Menace

Becomes a Natural Resource” (Washington, D.C., 1947), 31-41. This volume provides a good synopsis of the 

natural history and terrain of the river basin.

4. Paul L. Kleinsorge, %RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW+LVWRULFDODQG(FRQRPLF$VSHFWV(Palo Alto, California: 

Stanford University Press, 1941), 16-7.

5. Two early biographies of Powell remain useful. See William Culp Darrah, Powell of the Colorado

(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951), and Wallace Stegner, Beyond the 100th Meridian: 

John Wesley Powell and the Second Opening of the West%RVWRQ+RXJKWRQ0LIÀLQ+RZHYHUERWK

of these biographies have been superseded by Donald Worster, A River Running Through West: The Life of

John Wesley Powell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

6. Mildred de Stanley, The Salton Sea: Yesterday and Today (Los Angeles: Triumph Press, Inc., 1966), 17-

8.

7. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 205.

8. De Stanley, The Salton Sea, 21-4.

9. Beverly Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder Dam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 5.

10. Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder Dam, 25-7.

11. Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder Dam, 28-37.

12. Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder Dam, 33-43.

13. Message from President Theodore Roosevelt to the Senate and House of Representatives, January 21, 

1907, as quoted in de Stanley, The Salton Sea, 40-3.

14. De Stanley, The Salton Sea, 48.

15. Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder Dam, 10-1.

16. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 207.

17. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 207.

18. Kleinsorge, %RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW, 76. The cost of planning studies for Hoover Dam eventually came 

to about $400,000 with approximately $170,000 of this coming from irrigation interests in Southern California.
187

19. See Lars Jorgensen to A. P. Davis, December 15, 1920; A. P. Davis to Lars Jorgensen, December 23, 

1920; Lars Jorgensen to A. P. Davis, December 29, 1920; and A. P. Davis to Lars Jorgensen, January 10, 1921; 

all in National Archives, Denver, Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG115. General Administrative 

DQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV3URMHFW)LOHV(QWU\%R[)ROGHU&RORUDGR5LYHU3URMHFW

Correspondence re: Dams and Reservoirs, 1920 - November 1, 1921.

 )RUHYLGHQFHRI'DYLV¶VHDUO\LQWHUHVWLQ-RUJHQVHQ¶VGHVLJQZRUNVHHWKH¿OHRQ3<XED'DP ́ODWHU

FDOOHG6SDXOGLQJ'DPEXLOWE\WKH3DFL¿F*DVDQG(OHFWULF&RPSDQ\LQQRUWKHUQ&DOLIRUQLDLQLQWKH

-RKQ5)UHHPDQ3DSHUV0DVVDFKXVHWWV,QVWLWXWHRI7HFKQRORJ\$UFKLYHVDQG6SHFLDO&ROOHFWLRQV&DPEULGJH

Massachusetts.

 6HHLQGH[DWWDFKHGWR)(:H\PRXWK&KLHI(QJLQHHUWR'LUHFWRU$3'DYLV'HFHPEHU

1921, National Archives, Denver. Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG115. General Administrative 

DQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV3URMHFW)LOHV(QWU\%R[)ROGHU&RORUDGR5LYHU3URMHFW

Correspondence re: Dams and Reservoirs, November 1, 1921 - December 31, 1923.

22. A. P. Davis to J. W. Reagan, October 5, 1920, National Archives, Denver. Records of the Bureau of 

5HFODPDWLRQ5**HQHUDO$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV3URMHFW)LOHV(QWU\%R[

)ROGHU&RORUDGR5LYHU3URMHFW&RUUHVSRQGHQFHUH'DPVDQG5HVHUYRLUV7R'HFWKUX

1929.

23. Bureau of Reclamation, “Report on the Problems of the Colorado River, Volume 5, Boulder Canyon: 

,QYHVWLJDWLRQV3ODQVDQG(VWLPDWHV ́)HEUXDU\1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\*HQHUDO

$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV3URMHFW)LOHV%R[&RORUDGR5LYHU

Weymouth Report, Parts 5-9.

24. Bureau of Reclamation, “Report on the Problems of the Colorado River, Volume 5, Boulder Canyon: 

,QYHVWLJDWLRQV3ODQVDQG(VWLPDWHV ́)HEUXDU\1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\

*HQHUDO$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV3URMHFW)LOHV%R[&RORUDGR5LYHU

Weymouth Report, Parts 5-9.

25. John L. Savage, “Revised Plan for Boulder Canyon Dam and Powerplant: Memorandum to Colorado 

River Board,” November 24, 1928, National Archives, Denver. Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, 

5**HQHUDO$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV3URMHFW)LOHV(QWU\%R[)ROGHU

Colorado River Project.

 )RUHDUO\FRQ¿UPDWLRQRQKRZWKH37ULDO/RDG ́PHWKRGZDVXVHGWRMXVWLI\WKH¿QDOGHVLJQVHH(OZRRG

Mead, “Memorandum to the Secretary re the Meeting of the Consulting Engineers to Approve Detail Plans 

of Boulder Dam,” December 28, 1929, National Archives, Denver. Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, 

5**HQHUDO$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV3URMHFW)LOHV(QWU\%R[)ROGHU

&RORUDGR5LYHU3URMHFW%RDUG	(QJLQHHULQJ5HSRUWVRQ&RQVWUXFWLRQ)HDWXUHV

27. The manner in which the design could be considered as meeting the 30 tons pounds per square foot criteria is described in Elwood Mead, “Memorandum to the Secretary re the Meeting of the Consulting Engineers 

to Approve Detail Plans of Boulder Dam,” December 28, 1929. This same document also avers that: “Uplift 

is not an important consideration in the design of a curved dam where large proportions of the total load are 

carried by arch action.” National Archives, Denver. Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG115. General 

$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV3URMHFW)LOHV3URMHFW¿OHV(QWU\%R[

)ROGHU&RORUDGR5LYHU3URMHFW%RDUG	(QJLQHHULQJ5HSRUWVRQ&RQVWUXFWLRQ)HDWXUHV

28. J. L. Savage, “Revised Plan for Boulder Canyon Dam and Power Plant: Memorandum to Colorado River 

Board,” November 24, 1928, National Archives, Denver. RG115. General Administrative and Project Records 

3URMHFW)LOHV&RORUDGR5LYHU%(QWU\%R[35HYLVHG3ODQIRU%RXOGHU

Canyon Dam and Power Plant. Memorandum to Colorado River Board. By J. L. Savage, Chief Designing 

Engineer. Denver, Colorado. November 24, 1928.”

29. In correspondence with Edward Wegmann concerning how design of the proposed Hoover Dam 

VKRXOGEHFUHGLWHGLWZDVUHSRUWHGWKDWLW3ZDV¿UVWSUHSDUHGLQLQWKH'HQYHU2I¿FHRIWKH%XUHDXRI

Reclamation by Mr. Walker R. Young, Member ASCE; under the supervision of Mr. J. L. Savage, Member 

$6&('HVLJQLQJ(QJLQHHU%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQDQGVXEVHTXHQWO\PRGL¿HGLQPLQRUSDUWLFXODUVIROORZLQJ

review by Consulting Engineers A. J. Wiley, Member ASCE, of Boise Idaho; and L. C. Hill, Member ASCE, 

RI/RV$QJHOHV&DOLIRUQLD ́6LJQL¿FDQWO\ERWK'DYLVDQG:H\PRXWK2ZKRZHUHXQTXHVWLRQDEO\LQYROYHGLQ

the evolution of the Hoover Dam design—were no longer employees of Reclamation or the federal government 

at the time (1927) when this letter was written and perhaps were excluded simply for this reason. See Chief 

(QJLQHHU5-:DOWHUWR&RPPLVVLRQHU(OZRRG0HDG)HEUXDU\DQG(OZRRG0HDGWR(GZDUG

:HJPDQQ)HEUXDU\ERWKLQWKH1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\*HQHUDO$GPLQLVWUDWLYH

DQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV3URMHFW)LOHV&RORUDGR5LYHU%%R[)ROGHU

301.1 Correspondence re. Dams & Reservoirs, December 31, 1923 thru 1929.
188

30. The best discussion of Kaufmann’s work in developing the architectural form of the dam is in Richard 

Guy Wilson, “Machine Age Iconography in the West,” 3DFL¿F+LVWRULFDO5HYLHZ54 (1985) 463-93. 

Interestingly, after undertaking a considerable amount of research into the subject, Wilson is obliged to report 

that: “Why Kaufmann was selected for his post [as architect] remains unknown,” see page 476.

31. The desirability of a Boulder Canyon reservoir over one located at Glen Canyon is prominently stressed 

LQ$3'DYLVWR)(:H\PRXWK'HFHPEHU1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5HFRUGVRIWKH%XUHDXRI

5HFODPDWLRQ5**HQHUDO$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV3URMHFW)LOHV(QWU\%R[

)ROGHU&RORUDGR5LYHU3URMHFW&RUUHVSRQGHQFHUH'DPVDQG5HVHUYRLUV1RYHPEHU'HFHPEHU

31, 1923.

 $3'DYLVWR)(:H\PRXWK'HFHPEHU1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5HFRUGVRIWKH%XUHDX

RI5HFODPDWLRQ5**HQHUDO$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV3URMHFW)LOHV(QWU\%R[

)ROGHU&RORUDGR5LYHU3URMHFW&RUUHVSRQGHQFHUH'DPVDQG5HVHUYRLUV1RYHPEHU

December 31, 1923.

 &KLHI(QJLQHHU)(:H\PRXWKWR'LUHFWRU$3'DYLV-XO\1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU

5HFRUGVRIWKH%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQ5**HQHUDO$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV3URMHFW)LOHV

(QWU\%R[)ROGHU&RORUDGR5LYHU3URMHFW&RUUHVSRQGHQFHUH'DPVDQG5HVHUYRLUV

November 1, 1921-December 31, 1923.

 $3'DYLVWR)(:H\PRXWK1RYHPEHU1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5HFRUGVRIWKH%XUHDX

RI5HFODPDWLRQ5*(QWU\*HQHUDO$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV3URMHFW)LOHV

%R[)ROGHU&RORUDGR5LYHU3URMHFW&RUUHVSRQGHQFHUH'DPVDQG5HVHUYRLUV1RYHPEHU

1921- December 31, 1923.

35. Bureau of Reclamation, “Report on the Problems of the Colorado River, Volume 5, Boulder Canyon: 

,QYHVWLJDWLRQV3ODQVDQG(VWLPDWHV ́)HEUXDU\1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\*HQHUDO

$GPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG3URMHFW5HFRUGV3URMHFW)LOHV%R[&RORUDGR5LYHU

Weymouth Report, Parts 5-9.

36. Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder Dam, 15.

37. Phil Swing speech before House Committee on Irrigation of Arid Lands, July 1919; as quoted in Moeller, 

Phil Swing and Boulder Dam, 16.

38. Carl Hayden speech before House Committee on the Arid Lands, July 1919; as quoted in Moeller, Phil

Swing and Boulder Dam, 16.

39. Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder Dam, 19.

40. Kleinsorge, %RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW, 77-8.

41. Kleinsorge, %RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW, 78.

42. Kleinsorge, %RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW, 92-8. Also see Donald J. Pisani, Water and American Government: 

The Reclamation Bureau, National Water Policy, and the West, 1902-1935 (Berkeley: University of California 

Press, 2002), 227-32.

43. Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder Dam, 88.

44. A full history of this conference is presented in Hundley, Water and the West.

 7KLVOHJLVODWLRQNQRZQDVWKH3)LQQH\UHVROXWLRQ ́LQUHFRJQLWLRQRILWVVXSSRUWE\WKH,PSHULDO9DOOH\

VWDWHOHJLVODWRU$&)LQQH\LVTXRWHGLQ0RHOOHUPhil Swing and Boulder Dam, 75. Utah also withheld its of-

¿FLDOUDWL¿FDWLRQXQWLOWKHVHWHUPVKDGEHHQPHW

 7KHSROLWLFDOO\FKDUJHGWUDQVLWLRQIURPWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHWR%XUHDXDIWHU'DYLVZDV¿UHGLV

ZHOOGHVFULEHGLQ&DQQRQ3:H$UH1RZ(QWHULQJD1HZ(UD)HGHUDO5HFODPDWLRQDQGWKH)DFW)LQGLQJ

Commission of 1923-24,” 185-211.

47. See Kluger, Turning on Water With a Shovel for more on the ideals projected by Elwood Mead in promoting self-supporting irrigation colonies based around small-scale farms.

48. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 126-35.

49. William Kahrl, Water and Power.

50. Charles A. Bissell, compiler and editor, The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California: History

and First Annual Report (Los Angeles, 1939), 5.

51. Bissell, Metropolitan Water District, 36.

52. Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder Dam, 67.

53. “The Story of a Great Government Project for the Conquest of the Colorado River” (Los Angeles: 

%RXOGHU'DP$VVRFLDWLRQ6HHDOVR37KH)HGHUDO*RYHUQPHQW¶V&RORUDGR5LYHU3URMHFW ́/RV$QJHOHV

Boulder Dam Association, September 1927).

54. “You Are Needed-Help Build Boulder Dam” (Los Angeles: Los Angeles Department of Water and 

Power, December 1928).

55. Bissell, Metropolitan Water District, 38.
189

56. “Colorado River Development: Statements by Congressman Addison T. Smith of Idaho and Mayor 

George E. Cryer of Los Angeles” (Los Angeles: Boulder Dam Association, 1925), 10-1.

57. “Colorado River Development: Statements,” 11.

58. Bissell, Metropolitan Water District, 39.

59. Bissell, Metropolitan Water District, 38-9.

60. Bissell, Metropolitan Water District, 39-40.

61. Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder Dam, 106, notes how Herbert Hoover favored the construction of a 

GDPDFURVVWKHORZHU&RORUDGR5LYHUWRSURYLGHÀRRGFRQWUROEXWZLWKKHOGRYHUWVXSSRUWIRUSRZHUJHQHUDWLRQ

because “he would alienate a substantial portion of his ‘regular Republican’ business support if he became too 

vocal in his endorsement of the project.”

62. The generating capacities of America’s major hydroelectric stations as of 1930 are tabulated in “A 

Survey of Hydroelectric Developments.” Electrical Engineering (July 1934), 1087-94.

63. Edward Wegmann, Design and Construction of Dams, 8thedition, 653.

64. Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder Dam, 105.

65. The proposed Topock damsite is noted in Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder Dam, 101.

 3KLOLS&DERW3'DQJHULQWKH%RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW ́SXEOLVKHGLQ)UDQN%RKQHGLWRU3%RXOGHU'DP

Complete Bibliography, References, Engineers’ Charts, Studies and Reports, the Swing-Johnson Bill, Minority 

Reports and General Comments” (n.p. circa 1928), 101-2.

67. Cabot, “Boulder Canyon Project,” 103.

68. Brigham, Empowering the West, 58-62, 77-8.

69. Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder Dam, 111-2.

70. Stevens, Hoover Dam, 3-5, 35-46 provides detailed discussion of how Six Companies Inc. came to 

be formed and how it developed its winning bid for the Hoover Dam contract. This subject is also covHUHGLQ)UDQN:ROI, Big Dams and Other Dreams: The Story of Six Companies Inc. (Norman: University 

of Oklahoma Press, 1996). The reason that Six Companies’ contract fell far short of the $177 million authorized for the project is that much work necessary to build the dam and make it operational was carried out by 

Reclamation or let to other contractors; in addition, the cost of excavating the All-American Canal was included in the total cost of the Boulder Canyon Project.

71. Crowe’s background is described in Stevens, Hoover Dam, 36-9.

72. Stevens, Hoover Dam, 59.

73. Some of the most moving and evocative parts of Stevens book focus on the description of labor condiWLRQVLQWKH%ODFN&DQ\RQUHJLRQGXULQJWKHHDUO\VWDJHVRIFRQVWUXFWLRQ)RUH[DPSOHVHH Hoover Dam, 50-4.

74. Stevens, Hoover Dam, 48, states: “President Hoover and Interior Secretary Wilbur had urged Elwood 

Mead . . . to begin work on the dam as soon as possible to provide jobs for . . . the nation’s unemployed. 

Because of presidential pressure, the Boulder Canyon Project was to start six months earlier than originally 

SODQQHGEHIRUHWKHEXLOGLQJRIWUDQVSRUWDWLRQDQGOLYLQJIDFLOLWLHVZDV¿QLVKHG ́

75. The “hellish atmosphere” of Black Canyon and the numerous deaths of workers that occurred there during 1931 are described in Stevens, Hoover Dam, 56-65.

76. Stevens, Hoover Dam, 65-9.

77. As quoted in Stevens, Hoover Dam, 76.

78. Stevens, Hoover Dam, 102.

79. Stevens, Hoover Dam, 101, reports that “Six Companies lawyers, aided by government lawyers from the 

%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQDQGWKH86DWWRUQH\¶VRI¿FHDUJXHGWKDW1HYDGDGLGQRWKDYHMXULVGLFWLRQWRHQIRUFH

its laws on a federal reservation and that if the law prohibiting the use of gasoline-powered trucks was enforced, Six Companies would be deprived of its property without due process.”

80. Stevens, Hoover Dam, 206-13.

81. The tunneling process is well described in Stevens, Hoover Dam, 81-100.

82. Excavation of the foundation and the abutments is described in U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau 

of Reclamation, %RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW)LQDO5HSRUWV3DUW,92'HVLJQDQG&RQVWUXFWLRQ(Denver, 1941), 

77-94, the treatment of the foundations by grouting is described on pages 95-134. Also see Stevens, Hoover

Dam, 185-90.

83. Bureau of Reclamation, %RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW)LQDO5HSRUWV3DUW,92'HVLJQDQG&RQVWUXFWLRQ,

138-47 describe the techniques used to place the concrete while 148-66 describe how the concrete was manufactured. Also see Stevens, Hoover Dam, 179-85.

84. Bureau of Reclamation, %RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW)LQDO5HSRUWV3DUW,92'HVLJQDQG&RQVWUXFWLRQ, 35-

6, 136-7,177-88 describes how the concrete was placed.

85. The cooling system is described in Bureau of Reclamation, %RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW)LQDO5HSRUWV3DUW

IV—Design and Construction, 189-206. Also see Stevens, Hoover Dam, 190-9.
190

86. Stevens, Hoover Dam, 219, 230-1.

87. Stevens, Hoover Dam, 252.

88. Kleinsorge, %RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW, 214-8 provides a good overview of completion and initial operation 

of the powerplant.

89. Stevens, Hoover Dam, 174-5.

90. Stevens, Hoover Dam, 233.

91. Ickes’ support for a federal investigation into Six Companies’ adherence to the “eight hour day” provision 

of the Hoover Dam construction contract is documented in Stevens, Hoover Dam, 232-4. This investigation 

HYHQWXDOO\UHVXOWHGLQ6L[&RPSDQLHVSD\LQJD¿QH

92. Roosevelt’s remarks at the dam’s dedication are quoted in Stevens, Hoover Dam, 246-8.

93. This issue is fully described in Kleinsorge, %RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW, 52-4.

 7KHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUWKH%RXOGHU&DQ\RQ$FWLVH[SOLFDWHGLQ.OHLQVRUJHBoulder Canyon

3URMHFW, 123-36. As Kleinsorge notes, 134, “the navigability of the Colorado River, therefore, formed the basis 

for the constitutionality of the Boulder Canyon Project Act.”

95. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 227-8.

96. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 303.

97. Bureau of Reclamation, “The Colorado River: A Natural Menace Becomes a National Resource.”

98. An excellent, in-depth treatment of how the Colorado River Storage Project came to be authorized and 

funded in the 1950s and early 1960s is provided in Stephen Craig Sturgeon, “Wayne Aspinall and the Politics 

of Western Water” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, Boulder, 1998), n.b., see also the subsequent 

book Sturgeon, The Politics of Western Water: The Political Career of Wayne Aspinall (Tucson: University 

of Arizona Press, 2002). U.S. Congressman Aspinall played a pivotal role in supporting federal water development of the Upper Colorado Basin that is comparable to that taken by Congressman Phil Swing in promoting 

the Boulder Canyon Project in the 1920s. The issue is also discussed in Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert, 145-50.

99. Holway R. Jones, John Muir and the Sierra Club: The Battle for Yosemite6DQ)UDQFLVFR7KH6LHUUD

Club, 1965) offers extensive documentation of how the early twentieth century environmental movement 

fought and lost the battle to keep a dam from being built at Hetch Hetchy.

100. The full story of Echo Park is documented in Mark Harvey, A Symbol of Wilderness: Echo Park and the

American Conservation Movement (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994).

101. Harvey, A Symbol of Wilderness, 280-3, describes how wilderness advocates came to accept the need for 

Glen Canyon Dam in the mid-1950s. While there was some desire to push for the blocking Glen Canyon Dam 

it was much less vociferous than the effort to protect Echo Park.

102. Glen Canyon Dam and Powerplant, Bureau of Reclamation, Denver, 1970, 55-89.

103.Russell Martin, The Story that Stands Like a Dam: Glen Canyon and the Struggle for the American West

(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989) describes the history of the dam in non specialist terms. Editor’s 

note: It is true that Glen Canyon Dam was intended to be a “cash register dam,” but Glen Canyon was also designed to insure that the Upper Basin States could reliably store and deliver their annual commitment of water 

to the Lower Basin states.

 )RUH[DPSOHVHH(OLRW3RUWHUThe Place No One Knew: Glen Canyon on the Colorado6DQ)UDQFLVFR

The Sierra Club, 1963). This book was published by the Sierra Club to bring to public attention to the loss of 

WKHFDQ\RQODQGVMXVWDVWKHGDPZDVUHDFKLQJFRPSOHWLRQ$OVRVHH3KLOLS)UDGNLQA River No More: The

Colorado and the West (Tucson: University Press of Arizona, 1981). Martin, The Story that Stands Like a

Dam.

105. Reisner, Cadillac Desert, 283-300.

106. Marc Reisner’s book, Cadillac Desert, stands as one of the most popular publications championing the 

idea that dam-building in the West has been carried to the point that it has long since ceased to serve the greater public good. The political maneuvering that attended Congressman Wayne Aspinall’s support for construcWLRQRIWKH¿QDOJURXSRIODUJHVFDOH5HFODPDWLRQGDPVLQWKH&RORUDGR%DVLQLVGHVFULEHGLQ6WXUJHRQWayne

Aspinall and the Politics of Western Water, 232-349.

107. Stevens, Hoover Dam, 266-7.

108. Donald Worster, “Hoover Dam: A Study in Domination,” in Under Western Skies: Nature and History

in the American West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 73.CHAPTER 5: BONNEVILLE AND 

GRAND COULEE DAMS AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER CONTROL PLAN
191

CHAPTER 5

BONNEVILLE AND GRAND COULEE DAMS

AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER CONTROL PLAN

EXPLORING A CHANGING RIVER

By 1987, the Columbia River became “the largest hydroelectric energy 

producer in the world” and had realized its potential of supplying about 40 percent of the nation’s hydropower.1

 This immense power has struck observers in 

WZRFRQÀLFWLQJZD\V7KHIRXQGHURIWKH6LHUUD&OXE-RKQ0XLUGHVFULEHGWKH

river as “gathering a glorious harvest of crystal water to be rolled through forHVWDQGSODLQLQRQHPDMHVWLFÀRRGWRWKHVHD ́2

%\FRQWUDVW3UHVLGHQW)UDQNOLQ

Roosevelt, in dedicating Bonneville Dam, portrayed a river providing “the widest 

possible use of electricity [to create] more wealth, better living and greater happiness for our children.”3

 7KHVHFRQÀLFWLQJLPDJHVWKHSULVWLQHZDWHUVÀRZLQJWRWKHVHDYHUVXV

the powerful current wired to the city, persist wherever a massive transformation 

of nature takes place. As modern civilization took shape with the continuing industrial revolution that began in the late eighteenth century, these two voices–

one naturalist and one populist–have competed for political control. Perhaps nowhere has this competition been more intense than around the Columbia River, 

and also, perhaps nowhere is it less informed historically. In particular, the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has received major criticism for activities which, 

in retrospect, seemed to be directed by the will of the people.

 7KDWZLOOGH¿QHGKHUHE\WKH&RQJUHVVRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVVHWLQPRtion the federal damming of major American rivers for power by ordering a 

cost estimate for a survey through the Rivers and Harbor Act of March 3, 1925. 

The Corps responded on April 7, 1926, with its well known 308 Report that included the estimate of $7,300,400, of which the Columbia River estimate was 

$734,100.4

 The Congress then authorized the studies for some rivers, including the Columbia, on January 21, 1927, and on March 29, 1932, the Chief of 

Engineers submitted a 1,845 page report dealing with the Columbia River.5

This 1932 report laid out a system of ten dams along the mainstream 

up to the Canadian border, beginning with one at Warrendale (later moved to 

Bonneville) and ending with one at the head of Grand Coulee. But the engineers 

recommended that the federal government should pay only for the navigational 

aspects–locks and dredging–not for the dams and powerplants.6

 In early 1932, 

the guiding idea was local funding and hence local control. A summary of the 
192

four mainstream dams between Bonneville and Pasco detailed the costs, the power capacity, and some of the technical problems for that 184 mile stretch having a 

fall of 309 feet.7

The other six dams, all above the mouth of the Snake, crossed the river 

DVLWÀRZHGIURPWKHQRUWKWR3DVFRDQGLQFOXGHGDGDPDW5RFN,VODQG5DSLGV

already under construction by the Chelan County Public Utilities District (PUD), 

a private enterprise. But the main dam on the upper Columbia was Grand 

Coulee which local people had been pushing since before World War I. The new 

5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHLQLWV¿UVWUHSRUWIRUGLVFXVVHGWKH&ROXPELD%DVLQ

for irrigation, and, in 1908, the Corps began to survey the Grand Coulee region 

for navigation, considering also irrigation and power.8

)LJXUH7KHFURVVVHFWLRQVRIHDUOLHUFRQFUHWHGDPVEXLOWE\WKH86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVLQÀXHQFHGWKHGHVLJQRIWKHVSLOOZD\GDPDW%RQQHYLOOHSource: David P. Billington.
193

The careful surveys that began with the 1927 act, and culminated in 

1932, recommended activities that were suddenly politically feasible because of 

the depression and the election of Roosevelt later that year. He had made a campaign trip to the Northwest and promised development of the Columbia. Once 

elected, Roosevelt stimulated among many federal and local personnel an excitement in Washington over central planning which was, however, not shared by 

many people in Congress. The great water projects of the Tennessee Valley and 

the Columbia basin moved up high on the new administration’s priority list. This 

enthusiasm focused ultimately on the construction of large multipurpose dams 

WKDWZRXOGKDYHEHHQPXFKPRUHGLI¿FXOWKDGQRWWKH&RUSVDQG5HFODPDWLRQ

by 1932, already had experiences with such major works as the Panama Canal’s 

Gatun Dam, Wilson Dam, Roosevelt Dam, and the greatest project of all, Hoover 

Dam. No large dam had yet been built on the Columbia; it was almost completely untamed, and the newly elected leaders were eager to put people to work. 

What happened next would be an acceleration in the major restructuring of the 

nation’s largest river basins.

)LJXUH%RQQHYLOOH'DPVHFWLRQSource: The Military Engineer, May-June 1935, (printed with 

permission from the Society of American Military Engineers.), 210.
194

BONNEVILLE DAM: EMPLOYMENT VERSUS MARKETS

From Survey to Construction

The economic crisis of the early 1930s expressed itself dramatically 

LQXQHPSOR\PHQW)URPQHDUO\IXOOHPSOR\PHQWLQWKHQDWLRQ¶VLGOHKDG

jumped to 25 percent by the time of Roosevelt’s inauguration in March, 1933.9

 

Dams meant jobs, and on September 30 the president authorized Bonneville Dam 

under the National Industrial Recovery Act. When work began on November 17, 

there had been little time for design.10 The rush was from survey and preliminary 

planning to the letting of contracts for construction. The dam, therefore, resulted 

largely from precedent and not from innovation. Indeed, Bonneville, as a whole, 

would characterize a typically American approach to concrete design or, in a 

larger sense, an approach to industry. Concrete was to replace stone and express 

safety through mass just as industry was to replace craft and express economy 

through mass production. The federal government would be the new stimulus 

because private industry presumably had failed and local governments, like local 

crafts, were too small.

These ideas helped lead the Corps to follow the generally accepted practice as illustrated by the examples of the Gatun Dam spillway and Wilson Dam 

to design a gravity spillway dam at Bonneville and to do it quickly without much 

discussion. In early 1933, Corps engineers were considering alternatives in their 

SUHOLPLQDU\SODQQLQJ)RUH[DPSOHDSURMHFWXSVWUHDPIURP%RQQHYLOOHDWWKH

Dalles, was to have an extensive multiple arch dam that could have resulted 

in considerable economy and exhibited major innovation in structural form; it 

ZRXOGKDYHEHHQWKH¿UVWVXFKVWUXFWXUHWREHSDUWRIDPXOWLSXUSRVHSURMHFWRQD

mainstream dam.11 But the Dalles would have to wait and Bonneville would folORZDPRUHWUDGLWLRQDOGHVLJQKDUNLQJEDFNWR0F&DOO¶V)HUU\DQG.HRNXN7KH

KXJHÀRZRIWKH&ROXPELDKRZHYHUGLGUHTXLUHVRPHIUHVKWKLQNLQJDQGOHGWR

WKHQHHGWRVROYHWKUHHFUXFLDOSUREOHPVZLGHYDULDWLRQVLQÀRZVRIWIRXQGDWLRQ

material, and high energy in water passing through spillway openings.12

 7KHÀRZYDULDWLRQZDVPHWE\GHVLJQLQJDORZFRQFUHWHJUDYLW\GDP

ÀDQNHGE\KLJKFRQFUHWHEXWWUHVVHVDQGWRSSHGE\HLJKWHHQODUJHYHUWLFDOVWHHO

JDWHVDERYHWKHGDPWRFRQWUROWKHÀRZ:KHQIXOO\UDLVHGWKHVHIRRWKLJK

IRRWZLGHJDWHVFRXOGSDVVDÀRZDERXWRQHWKLUGODUJHUWKDQDQ\UHFRUGHG

ÀRRGRQWKH&ROXPELD5LYHU

In addition, the Corps decided to use Kaplan turbines, which have blades 

WKDWDXWRPDWLFDOO\DGMXVWWRFKDQJHVLQORDGDQGÀRZ13 These turbines were larger than any built previously in the United States, and, furthermore, they were the 

most powerful Kaplan turbines put into service up to that time. Because of their 
195

unprecedented size, the Corps carried out a series of model tests at its Portland 

Hydraulic Laboratory, which led to numerous changes in the design of the concrete works surrounding these turbines.

The basic design was in the hands of the Corps, which was beginning to 

advance into the engineering of multipurpose dams in the face of this powerful 

river and the political controversies that it would call forth. The river demanded a new politics; politicians would have to react to its vast power potential. Not 

only was the water power a problem and a potential, but the bed upon which the 

ULYHUÀRZHGSUHVHQWHGQHZFKDOOHQJHVWRWKHHQJLQHHUV

The soft foundations had led the engineers to design the low gravity dam 

185 feet wide, only 75 feet high, and notched into the rock below. The wide base 

kept stresses low on the relatively soft volcanic rock, and the notches provided 

extra safety against sliding. The soft foundation was by far the central technical 

problem. The original plan to build the dam at Warrendale was abandoned because of poor foundation conditions, and President Roosevelt “refused to commit 

)HGHUDOIXQGVIRU%RQQHYLOOHXQOHVVKHFRXOGEHJXDUDQWHHGWKDWDVXLWDEOHIRXQdation existed.”14

With the location settled and the president convinced, the engineers 

WDFNOHGWKHWKLUGSUREOHPRIHQHUJ\GLVVLSDWLRQE\VKDSLQJWKHGDPSUR¿OHWRSURduce an upsurge of water after it passed over the dam crest and, in addition, by 

DGGLQJEDIÀHVWRFUHDWHWXUEXOHQFH$VDIXUWKHUPHDQVRISURWHFWLRQDJDLQVWHURsion and scour, the engineers designed a 100 foot concrete apron built onto the 

downstream face of the dam.

This upsurge of water, a strange effect, has the technical term of hyGUDXOLFMXPSDQGLWFKDQJHVWKHÀRZIURPDUHODWLYHO\ORZGHSWKWRDQLQFUHDVHG

depth. The result is a decrease in velocity and a corresponding loss of energy in 

)LJXUH&RQVWUXFWLRQDW%RQQHYLOOH'DPUHTXLUHGKXJHFRIIHUGDPV7KH&RUSVEXLOWWKH

south one during low water in the fall and winter of 1935-1936 and the north one during the 

low water season of 1936-1937. Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. See discussion on

page 199.
196

WKHÀRZLQJZDWHU:LWKOHVVHQHUJ\WRGLVVLSDWHWKHFRQFUHWHVSLOOZD\LVWKHUHby, less susceptible to erosion or cavitation (creation of cavities in the concrete).15

To study the erosion problem, the Corps created an outdoor hydraulic laboratory in Portland, Oregon, which contained a 1:36 scale model of three 

openings for the spillway dam. These included three of the 50- by 50-foot crest 

gates (modeled at a size of about 1.4 by 1.4 feet) as well as two piers and two 

KDOISLHUVWKXVIRUPLQJWKHWKUHHVSLOOZD\V7KHHQJLQHHUVFKDQJHGWKHFRQ¿JXration of the downstream spillway form for each of 140 separate tests and measured the resulting downstream scour. This highly empirical approach led them 

WRWKH¿QDOGHVLJQZKLFKLQFOXGHGEDIÀHVDQGDIRRWORQJDSURQRUGHFN

The goal was to create a hydraulic jump equal to the normal downstream (tailwater) elevation.16

 7KLVODERUDWRU\ZDVWKH&RUSV¶¿UVWDWWHPSWWRPRGHOWKHK\GUDXOLFVLQ

a major, multipurpose, mainstream dam spillway. Moreover, the Corps provided for similar measurements to be made on the dam itself to compare with the 

model results. Even before this work, the Corps had been making such studies 

for other mainstream dams.17 The hydraulic laboratory at Bonneville eventually carried out about 100 model studies on other multipurpose dams and on navigation channel improvements before the Army transferred its functions to the 

Waterways Experiment Station at Vicksburg in March of 1982.18

From Construction to Dedication

The election of Roosevelt and the deepening Depression profoundly 

changed the Corps’ mission at Bonneville. No longer was there any question of 

private construction of a power dam with the Corps responsible only for the navigation works. Now, only the federal government would rule, with the Corps 

as its agent. It was not simply the Corps seeking to enlarge its mission, but the 

country as a whole, through its newly elected president, seeking to alleviate the 

economic crisis through centrally funded public works.

There was no time to lose; jobs needed to be created and massive projects were an answer. But design takes thought and time while usually engaging few people compared to the large numbers needed for construction. The political imperative in such cases is clear: rush design and start construction. On 

October 12, 1933, the Public Works Administration allotted funds for design, on 

1RYHPEHUWKH&RUSVEHJDQWREXLOGDFRQVWUXFWLRQFDPSDQGRQ)HEUXDU\

WKH&RUSVLVVXHGWKH¿UVWPDLQGDPFRQWUDFWWRH[FDYDWHIRUWKHORFNDQG

powerhouse. In June the Corps awarded a contract for the main dam and the 

next month one for building the lock and powerhouse.
197

In August, bowing to local political pressure, the Secretary of War ordered the Corps to build a ship lock instead of the planned, much smaller, barge 

lock. This new design—76 feet wide, 500 feet long, and 24 feet deep over the 

sill at low water—created the world’s highest single-lift lock, raising sea-going 

ships up 60 feet.19

Not only did the dam shape require special study but so did the dam material. In December 1934 the Corps’ consultants at the University of California, 

Berkeley, began a study of the cement to be recommended for the spillway. 

7KUHHSUREOHPVKDGWREHVROYHG¿UVWKRZWRPLQLPL]HWKHKHDWJHQHUDWHGE\

the chemical reaction between cement and water (heat of hydration); second, 

how to use as little cement as possible; and third, how to produce a workable 

concrete (not too stiff when cast) without risking separation of gravel from the 

mortar (cement paste).20

The solution proposed by the Berkeley group and used at Bonneville 

was a mixture of Portland cement and puzzolan cement ground together in the 

process of making the cement itself. Here was a combination of something new, 

Portland cement developed in England in 1824 and puzzolan, or more properly 

)LJXUH7XUEXOHQWÀRZEHWZHHQSDUWLDOO\FRPSOHWHGSLHUVRI%RQQHYLOOH'DPGXULQJ

WKHÀRRGVHDVRQSource: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National 

Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
198

pozzolana, a hydraulic cement discovered at least 2000 years earlier by Roman 

engineers. Pozzolana came originally from natural volcanic slag in deposits near 

Mt. Vesuvius at the ancient town of Pozzuoli near Naples.

)LJXUH7ZRED\VRIWKHPDLQVSLOOZD\DW%RQQHYLOOH'DPZLWKJDWHVRSHQRQ

December 7, 1937. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National 

Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
199

European engineers in the early twentieth century had used this comSRVLWHRIQDWXUDODQGDUWL¿FLDOFHPHQWVZLWKVXFFHVVDQGLWSHUIRUPHGZHOODW

Bonneville. Subsequently, the Corps used it in the 1973 Dworshak Dam, and 

Reclamation put it into Davis Dam (1951), Hungry Horse Dam (1953), and 

Pueblo Dam (1975).21 It served primarily as a means of reducing the heat of 

hydration, which had led to concrete cracking, and stimulated engineers at 

Reclamation to lay a pipe network within Owyhee and Hoover Dams for cooling.

 &RQVWUXFWLRQZDVXQSUHFHGHQWHGLQVFDOHEHFDXVHRIWKHJUHDWÀRZKDUVK

weather, and deep water at Bonneville. George Gerdes, chief engineer for the 

main dam, designed huge timber-crib cofferdams that allowed concrete to be cast 

on dry land. At the time, it was the largest cofferdam installation on a river in 

the United States.22 Gerdes designed one cofferdam to enclose the south half of 

WKHFKDQQHOZKHUHWKHFRQWUDFWRUEXLOWWKH¿UVWVHFWLRQVRIWKHFRQFUHWHGDPGXUing the low water season between August 1935 and March 1936. The contractor concreted only part of the crest sections in the dam before removing the cofIHUGDPLQWKLVZD\WKHULYHUFRXOGPRUHHDVLO\ÀRZEHWZHHQWKHFRQFUHWHSLHUV

once a second cofferdam closed off the northern half of the channel.

)LJXUH7KH%RQQHYLOOHVSLOOZD\GDPZLWKWKLUWHHQJDWHVRSHQRQ2FWREHU

Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and Records 

Administration, College Park, Maryland.
200

The contract for supplying the Portland puzzolan cement raised an issue 

that gives some insight into the strong competition existing during this depression era. On May 31, 1935, the Corps received bids for supplying 565,000 barUHOVRIWKHFHPHQWIRUWKHVSLOOZD\FRQFUHWH7KHORZELGGHUWKH3DFL¿F3RUWODQG

Cement Company, was a California concern, and the Governor of Oregon, 

Charles H. Martin, immediately wrote a letter to Major General Edward M. 

Markham, Chief of Engineers, protesting the acceptance of that bid over several 

Oregon companies whose bids were higher but still well below “the going price 

at that point.”23 Here was strong political pressure put upon the Army engineers, 

but General Markham replied quickly that:

7KHELGRIWKH3DFL¿F3RUWODQG&HPHQW&RPSDQ\ZDVDFFRPSDQLHGE\WKHFHUWL¿FDWHRIFRGHFRPSOLDQFHUHTXLUHGXQGHU

Executive Order No. 6646 of March 14, 1934. This company 

is a responsible concern and capable of performing satisfactorily in accordance with the terms of its bid. In view thereof, 

and of the above cited decision of the Comptroller General, the 

Department considered that it had no other proper course of action than to accept the bid of this company, which was the lowHVWRQHUHFHLYHGLQUHVSRQVHWRWKHDGYHUWLVHGVSHFL¿FDWLRQV24

)LJXUH$W%RQQHYLOOH'DPWKHORFNVDQGSRZHUKRXVHDUHRQWKHOHIW%UDGIRUG,VODQGLVLQ

the middle, and the main spillway dam is on the right. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
201

Martin had argued that the very low bid, which he claimed was well below the California company’s costs, amounted to “dumping” and tended to run 

the smaller Oregon companies out of business. “As you are aware,” Martin 

wrote, “the P.W.A. (The Public Works Administration) intended to distribute 

IXQGVWKURXJKRXWDQGIRUWKHEHQH¿WRIWKHHQWLUHFRXQWU\DQG&DOLIRUQLDFHUWDLQly fared as well, if not better than, any other section.”25 As Markham replied, the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was not permitted to engage in such judgments 

ZKHQWKHORZELGGHUFRPSOLHGZLWKWKHDGYHUWLVHGVSHFL¿FDWLRQV7KHUHWKHPDWter stood, and the construction proceeded. In total, the project required about 

1,000,000 cubic yards of concrete.

With the north section of the concrete dam fully cast by the spring of 

1937 and the cofferdam removed, the contractor could complete the south part 

by casting concrete in prefabricated steel cofferdams placed between piers. By 

June 1938, all work on the spillway dam ended. Meanwhile, other builders comSOHWHGWKHSRZHUKRXVHDQGWKH¿UVWWZRJHQHUDWRUVEHJDQWRGHOLYHUSRZHU,Q

September 1937, President Roosevelt formally dedicated the dam and extolled its 

promise.26

)LJXUH%RQQHYLOOH'DPSRZHUKRXVHXQLWVZHUHFRPSOHWHE\2FWREHU

Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and Records 

Administration, College Park, Maryland.
202

Not everyone agreed with the president in 1937, and, 60 years later,

some voices are even more critical of Roosevelt’s acclaim. Probably the 

salmon industry remains the most controversial issue surrounding Bonneville 

and the other dams on the lower Columbia and lower Snake. Some writers 

claimed that the Corps had planned Bonneville Dam without any provisions 

IRUWKH¿VKEXWWKDWLVFOHDUO\QRWVR27 Already in 1929, Colonel G. R. Lukesh, 

Division Engineer in Seattle, had brought the issue to the attention of the Chief 

of Engineers, and the 1931 308 Report on the Columbia River included cost 

HVWLPDWHVIRU¿VKSDVVDJHIDFLOLWLHVRQHDFKSURSRVHGGDP28 In early 1933, 

DQRWKHU&RUSVRI¿FHUZULWLQJDERXWWKHSURSRVHGGDPVRQWKHORZHU&ROXPELD

stated that:

7KH&ROXPELD5LYHULVQRWHGIRULWV¿VKLQJLQGXVWU\SULQFLpally salmon. The average value of the annual catch is over 

$10,000,000. It is highly important that this industry be protected, and it involves a problem of no mean proportions. Before 

the actual construction of any dam is started, studies must be 

made to determine the best method of passing the salmon over 

the high structures required for power and navigation, or plans 

PXVWEHSUHSDUHGWRLQVXUHFRQWLQXDQFHRIWKH¿VKLQJLQGXVWU\

through other means, such as hatcheries below the dams.29

When the dam project was adopted in September 1933, the Corps 

EHJDQULJKWDZD\WRGHVLJQ¿VKZD\VE\ZRUNLQJFORVHO\ZLWKWKH86%XUHDX

RI)LVKHULHVDQGRWKHUJURXSV30,Q-XO\WKH,QWHUVWDWH)LVK&RQVHUYDWLRQ

&RPPLWWHHDJUHHGWRUHFRPPHQG¿VKODGGHUV7KH'LUHFWRURIWKH'HSDUWPHQW

RI)LVK&XOWXUHDJUHHGEXWDOVRDVNHGIRUIXQGVWRVWXG\WKH¿VKTXHVWLRQGXULQJ

WKHFRPLQJ\HDU2WKHUH[SHUWVXUJHGWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI¿VKOLIWVRUORFNV2Q

August 15, the Director sent to local Congressmen and others a plan for the proSRVHG¿VKZD\VGDWHG$XJXVWWKDWLQFOXGHGWZR¿VKODGGHUVDQGWKUHH

¿VKOLIWV,QWKHHQGWKH&RUSVEXLOWWKUHHODGGHUVDQGIRXUORFNVODWHUVWXGLHV

showed that the ladders were more effective than the lifts.31

 $IWHU%RQQHYLOOH'DPZDVFORVHGLQ-DQXDU\WKH¿VKSDVVDJHZD\V

seemed to work successfully until the construction of other dams upstream and 

the increase in the number of turbines at the dams. Back in 1937, when President 

5RRVHYHOWGHGLFDWHGWKH%RQQHYLOOH'DPWKH¿VKSUREOHPZDVQRWWKHRQO\FRQtroversial one. There were also the issues of a power oversupply and the suspicion of big government building monuments to itself.
203

From Dedication to Debate

In June of 1937, an article in Collier’s magazine entitled “Dam of 

'RXEW ́UHÀHFWHGVRPHSHUHQQLDOZRUULHVRIELJJRYHUQPHQWFULWLFVWKDWZHPLJKW

summarize as the building of useless monuments to the government itself.32 The 

article used the voice of a down home sage, a prune farmer named Clark who observed that “Really it ain’t nothin’ new. Every civilization at some period—usually toward the end—goes in for monuments. Those old chaps over in Angor 

built the biggest temples on earth. The Aztecs did the same thing. The Egyptians 

had to build the biggest pyramids ever. The Greeks and Romans were no better.” 

+HFRQFOXGHGE\REVHUYLQJWKDW3LWPDNHVPHSOXPEWLUHG¿JXULQJRXWWKHKXPDQ

labor that’s been wasted in building the biggest things on earth.” In fact, this is 

no rural hick talking; this is the 1930s version of small is beautiful—Clark even 

showed the article’s author the tiny dam and powerplant he built on his own farm 

to electrify his house.

The underlying argument was that Bonneville Dam was not needed, its 

power could not be used, industry would never settle in the Northwest, great labor was wasted, and all initial cost estimates are deviously low. As it turned out, 

Bonneville was to prove, along with its fellow monuments, Grand Coulee and 

Hoover, important in winning the war against Nazi Germany and Japan in the 

1940s. This turn of events does not obscure some virtues in the homey arguments of Clark, but it does reveal how monuments in a democracy can serve 

VRFLHW\ZHOODQGVWLOOEHREMHFWVRIFULWLFDOUHÀHFWLRQ

 7KH¿UVWVWHSLQPDNLQJ%RQQHYLOOHXVHIXOZDVDQLQWHQVHO\SROLWLFDO

one. Models existed for the new challenge of river basin development in the 

Mississippi River Commission (1879), the Colorado River Compact of 1922 

engineered by Herbert Hoover, and the Tennessee Valley Authority stimulatHGE\:LOVRQ'DPDQG0DMRU)LVNH¶VVXUYH\VVHHFKDSWHUDQGSURPRWHGE\

Nebraska Senator George W. Norris (1861-1944).

BONNEVILLE AND GRAND COULEE: CONFLICT OF POWER

The Columbia River 308 Report

Although the public descriptions of how Bonneville Dam came into 

being may seem rational and easily explicable in social terms, there is a personal story that illustrates the strong role of individuals in determining the way such 

history evolves. The case of Bonneville, as a prime example, reveals regional

rivalries, strong personalities, and intergovernmental jealousies, especially as

that dam became associated with Oregon just as the Grand Coulee Dam project 

became the project of Washington State. Here was one river with two quite
204

different and competing visions, navigation in the south and irrigation in the 

north, and hydroelectric power was growing into the central issue. This twenWLHWKFHQWXU\FRQÀLFWEHJDQZLWK7KHRGRUH5RRVHYHOWZKRLQZURWHWKDW

“every stream should be used to the utmost [and] each river system . . . is a single 

unit and should be treated as such.”33 Only after World War I did the Congress 

IROORZXSRQ5RRVHYHOW¶VYLVLRQ)LUVWLWEHJDQZLWKWKH&RORUDGR5LYHU&RPSDFW

of 1922 and then came a more general goal with the 1927 directive ordering the 

Corps to produce documents on river surveys. By 1933, the Corps had completed the Columbia, Missouri, and Tennessee Basin reports. Ultimately, each would 

produce a different political solution to the way river basins would be organized. 

)RUWKH&ROXPELDWKHFRQÀLFWVEHJDQLQHDUQHVWZLWKWKHUHOHDVHRIWKHUHSRUW

on the upper Columbia River.

The investigations and surveys of the Columbia River were supervised

E\&RORQHO*XVWDYH/XNHVKWKH'LYLVLRQ(QJLQHHUIRUWKH1RUWK3DFL¿F

Division. These investigations and surveys were carried out by Major John S. 

Butler, District Engineer for the Seattle District, and Major Oscar O. Keuntz, 

District Engineer for the Portland District. The Seattle District investigated the 

river above the mouth of the Snake River, and the Portland District 

)LJXUH*HQHUDWRUVDQGLQWKH%RQQHYLOOH'DPSRZHUKRXVHRQ$XJXVW

Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and Records 

Administration, College Park, Maryland.
205

investigated the river below that point.34 As described in a history of the Portland 

District, “Colonel Lukesh preferred to give the district engineer maximum 

latitude in arriving at opinions and conclusions.”35

Major Butler, district engineer in Seattle, had taken on responsibility for 

the 308 survey in 1927, and, by 1929, this work had gradually assumed a 

FHQWUDOVLJQL¿FDQFHIRUWKHIXWXUHRIWKDWUHJLRQ%XWOHUZDVWKHQ\HDUVROGD

native of Tennessee, civil engineering graduate of Vanderbilt University, and a 

SURXGPHPEHURIWKH&RUSV+LVZRUNUHODWHGWRWKHWKUHHVLJQL¿FDQWFRQWURYHUsies on the Columbia in the late 1920s.36

 )LUVWWKHUHZDVULYDOU\EHWZHHQ:DVKLQJWRQDQG2UHJRQZKLFKVKDUHG

the Columbia River once it left Canada. Senator Clarence Dill, a Democrat, represented Washington while Senator Charles McNary, a Republican, represented Oregon. Dill was for Grand Coulee while McNary pushed Bonneville. It 

appeared, in the early 30s, that there would not be funds for both, so the battle 

seemed to promise a winner and a loser.

)LJXUH7KH%RQQHYLOOH'DP¶V%UDGIRUG,VODQG¿VKODGGHULQWDNHLQRSHUDWLRQRQ

)HEUXDU\Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National 

Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
206

 6HFRQG%XWOHUDQGKLVVWDIIZRUNHGZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIDFRQÀLFWEHtween the eastern Washington city of Spokane and the much smaller central 

Washington city of Wenatchee. Spokane, the larger city, favored the use of upper Columbia water for irrigation on the Columbia Basin Project. This scheme 

would bring water by gravity from tributaries of the Columbia River to 

1,500,000 acres of dry land in the south central region of the state. This “Gravity 

Plan” would require 130 miles of canals, tunnels, and siphons with a few minor dams, but this approach had little provision for the generation of power. Meanwhile, Wenatchee, the smaller city, had been pushing for a great 

dam at the bend in the Columbia just above a large dry basin called the Grand 

Coulee. Situated about 500 feet above the bed of the Columbia, the Grand 

Coulee (or Great Canyon) is 50 miles long and from one to six miles wide. At 

the Columbia’s bend is an ideal dam site that is 4,300 feet wide with 600-foothigh cliffs on either side and nearly watertight canyon walls well suited for an 

upstream reservoir.37 Thus, the Wenatchee group, led by newspaper publisher 

Rufus Woods, had clamored in 1918 for a dam to store water for irrigating the 

Columbia Basin Project. This counter proposal saw that some power from the 

dam could be used to pump reservoir water into the Grand Coulee from which it 

ZRXOGWKHQÀRZE\JUDYLW\GRZQWRWKHSURMHFWDUHDIRULUULJDWLRQ%RWKVLGHV

focused on irrigating the potentially fertile region.

The third controversy facing Butler was one between the Corps 

DQG5HFODPDWLRQ)UHGHULFN1HZHOO¿UVWFKLHIHQJLQHHURIWKH5HFODPDWLRQ

)LJXUH$WWKHVLWHFKRVHQIRU%RQQHYLOOH'DP%UDGIRUG,VODQGGLYLGHVWKH&ROXPELD

River. The spillway structure is north of the island while the powerhouse structure is to the 

south. Source: The Military Engineer (May-June 1935), (Printed with permission from the Society of 

American Military Engineers.), 211.
207

Service, as it was then called, visited the Columbia Basin in 1903 and recognized 

the potential for irrigation, but the huge cost led his bureau to lose interest by 

1906. At this time, the Army engineers began surveying the upper Columbia for 

dam sites to permit navigation, but they too gave up when it appeared that only 

power would result.38 Interest built up in the late 1920s when Butler began his 

308 survey. He had to produce a technically credible report, he had to choose 

)LJXUH)RU%RQQHYLOOH'DPWKHODUJHDQGFRPSOH[ZHVWFRIIHUGDPZDVNH\WRWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQSODQ6WHHOVKHHWSLOLQJZDVGULYHQE\PXOWLSOHVWHDPKDPPHUV7KHPDLQULYHUÀRZ

RIFXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGGXULQJWKHÀRRGVHDVRQLQ-XQHZDVEHWZHHQWKHWZR

cofferdams. Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
208

between the dam and the gravity canal, and he had to recommend economical 

plans to ensure that a project could be built.

 ,QIDFW%XWOHU¶V¿QDOUHSRUWRQWKHXSSHU&ROXPELDZDVVRFRQYLQFLQJ

that it helped alert Reclamation to the possibility of losing the project to their 

dam-building rival.39 Ironically, the very high quality of his report resulted in 

Reclamation’s making a successful case for doing the work. Butler also deciVLYHO\VKRZHGWKHVXSHULRULW\RIWKHGDPRYHUWKHFDQDOVFKHPH)XUWKHUPRUH

his work also awoke the people of Oregon who now saw the possibility of not 

getting a lower river dam.

 %XWOHU¶VHIIRUWVDUHVLJQL¿FDQWQRWRQO\EHFDXVHRIKLVVXSHULRUHQJLQHHUing work, but also because he held to his professional judgment in spite of early 

rejection of his report by Army superiors. This strong position may have damaged his career in the Army, but, ultimately, his study, with others, “shaped the 

GHVWLQ\RIWKH3DFL¿F1RUWKZHVWDQGZDVDPRQJWKHPRVWVLJQL¿FDQWLQÀXHQFHV

on its development in the twentieth century.”40

The Grande Coulee Stimulus to Bonneville

 :KLOH%XWOHU¶VUHSRUWZDVXQGHUGHEDWH)UDQNOLQ5RRVHYHOWZRQWKH

presidency, receiving substantial support in the Northwest from Washington 

Senator Clarence Dill. Candidate Roosevelt had promised campaigner Dill that 

he would build Grand Coulee, but after the election, when Dill reported the estimated cost of $450 million, the New Yorker balked, reminding Dill that this price 

was greater than that for the Panama Canal. Roosevelt suggested a low dam, 

sent Dill to see Elwood Mead, commissioner of Reclamation, and the result was 

a plan for a 227 foot high dam with a powerplant having a 520,000 kilowatt capacity. On July 28, 1933, Roosevelt announced the authorization of $63 million 

for a low federal dam at Grand Coulee.41

Meanwhile, the rivalry between the Corps and Reclamation had become 

one between those like Rufus Woods, who wanted Grand Coulee to be a Corps 

project with large hydroelectric power, and those like James O’Sullivan who favored the project for irrigation and hence preferred Reclamation. O’Sullivan, 

active on the Columbia Basin Commission, had championed the dam against 

the Spokane gravity plan. A lawyer from Michigan, O’Sullivan had settled in 

Ephrata, Washington, in 1919 and took on the dam as an obsession dominated 

by the idealistic vision of the small farmer, the family farm, and the irrigation 

plans to make those farms possible. This was, of course, the early ideal of the 

Reclamation Service. O’Sullivan was, thus, partial to Reclamation and became, 

LQWKHVSULQJRIDVLJQL¿FDQWDGYRFDWHIRUKDYLQJ5HFODPDWLRQQRWWKH

Corps, build Grand Coulee Dam.42
209

All this activity over Grand Coulee distressed Oregon senators Charles 

0F1DU\DQG)UHGHULFN6WHLZHUZKRZHUHSXVKLQJIRUGDPVRQWKHORZHU

Columbia. In late May, McNary and Oregon representative Charles Martin, a retired Army general, met with Roosevelt, who seemed willing to fund a dam project that served both navigation and power generation. He would consider setting aside $25 million from public works funds for the dam then planned near 

Warrenville. All dam politics focused on the president because of the enormous 

amounts of money that the Congress had allocated to him for national recovery 

from the Depression.43

)LJXUH'XULQJ$SULORIXSVWUHDPDQGGRZQVWUHDPFURVVULYHUFRIIHUGDPVGLUHFWHGWKHULVLQJÀRZRYHUWKHIRXQGDWLRQFRQFUHWHRQWKHZHVWVLGH

of the river. Excavation for the foundation then proceeded below the main river 

channel and on the east. Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
210

After Congress adjourned in June 1933, Martin returned to Oregon, 

but the two senators remained to talk again in early July with Roosevelt, who 

seemed still positive about their project. However, the next day (July 13), they 

met with the “ordinarily irascible” Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, who 

was not so positive, but seemed to be willing to follow the president’s wishes.44 

Then came the announcement of the appropriation for Grand Coulee on July 28, 

with no word on the lower river dam, and that day the president left on vacation. 

McNary fell ill, and departed to recuperate in Oregon, and the Corps, in studying 

the dam site more closely, concluded that Bonneville was better than Warrendale.

By September 1, with no approval yet, Martin left Oregon for the capital to meet again with President Roosevelt. Meanwhile, the Corps had submitted 

their favorable report on Bonneville to Ickes in mid-August but the secretary did 

not send it to the president. Roosevelt did not see it until Martin gave the White 

House a copy in early September. He met on September 7 with Roosevelt, who 

still supported Bonneville, but Ickes once again threw up roadblocks.45

By late September Martin feared that Ickes and Senator Dill were intent on killing Bonneville, so he called the still recovering McNary, in Oregon, 

and urged him to cross the country and meet with the President. McNary arrived 

on September 24, but both men found the road to Roosevelt politically blocked. 

Unable to get an appointment, they decided to “camp on the [White House] doorstep until they kicked us out.” They were not kicked out.46

The two Republican politicians got to see the Democratic president 

and after showing him the Corps’ favorable report, which Ickes had withheld. 

Martin let McNary argue the case for Bonneville, which Roosevelt accepted, on 

September 29, 1933, the Public Works Board announced a $20 million grant to 

begin Bonneville.47 Astounded that the two Oregonians had overcome the strong 

RSSRVLWLRQZLWKLQ5RRVHYHOW¶VFDELQHW,FNHVDNQRZOHGJHDEOHJRYHUQPHQWRI¿-

cial exclaimed to Martin, “You would have made a super salesman.”48 Although 

DSSURYHG¿UVW*UDQG&RXOHHGLGQRWJHWVWDUWHGQHDUO\DVHDUO\DV%RQQHYLOOH

SDUWO\EHFDXVHRILWVLPPHQVHVL]HEXWDOVREHFDXVHLWZDVDSSURYHGDW¿UVWRQO\

as a low dam.

GRAND COULEE: COLUMBIAN COLOSSUS

The Design Questions

 )RU*UDQG&RXOHHWKHWZRPDMRUGHVLJQLVVXHVZHUHDORZYHUVXVDKLJK

dam and a gravity versus a multiple-arch dam. Roosevelt had committed 

$63 million for the low dam with the understanding that it could be raised in the 

future without undue extra cost, compared to building the high dam all at once. 
211

Reclamation studied the low multiple-arch dam and gave an estimate of its cost 

RQ0D\WKHYHU\GD\WKDW)UHG1RHW]OLZKRVHGHVLJQV5HFODPDWLRQHQgineers followed, died.49 Comparative costs from estimates and bids invariably 

showed multiple arches to be less expensive than gravity designs. Reclamation, 

however, had followed a different route, becoming wedded to massive forms.

Nevertheless, Reclamation did make a detailed study of the lighter form 

GXULQJDQG:KHQ$)'DUODQGFRQVXOWLQJHQJLQHHUWRWKH&ROXPELD

Basin Commission, visited Reclamation in Denver on December 2-4, 1933, the 

issue of cost comparisons arose, and the bureau’s engineers were of “the unanimous opinion. . .that the hollow type dam should not be used. . . .” By hollow, 

they meant multiple-arch, and those engineers were by then studying gravity designs. Darland incorrectly stated that Reclamation had “the largest engineering 

body in the United States” and was engaged in the design and construction of 

40 dams. Darland met John L. (Jack) Savage, Chief Design Engineer, and 

a group of about ten people who had completed “an exhaustive study of the multiple arch, hollow dam. . . .”5

 Darland had asked for comparative costs, and 

5D\PRQG):DOWHUULJKWDIWHUWKHPHHWLQJVHQWKLPDOHWWHUVKRZLQJWKHORZ

gravity dam to be less expensive than the low multiple arch design. Already, in 

November, Rufus Woods’ paper announced that the dam would be “a gravity or 

solid section structure, instead of an Amberson-type (sic) multiple arch dam as 

originally intended.”51

 2Q)HEUXDU\:DOWHUZURWH0HDGVD\LQJWKDW3$OWKRPRVWRIWKH

ZRUNLQWKLVRI¿FHWRGDWHKDVEHHQRQWKHPXOWLSOHDUFKW\SHRIORZGDPWKHUHLV

some question whether, in the light of recent developments, this is a feasible plan 

for the initial development.”52 Savage informed Walter of his recommended plan 

RQ)HEUXDU\DQGWKHQVHQWKLPDPHPRUDQGXPRQ0DUFKJLYLQJWKHFRVWV

of alternate plans. He estimated the recommended plan to cost just under 

$63 million and the multiple-arch design to cost just over $65 million; however, 

since the power provisions were different for the two designs, no true comparison is possible because Savage gave no cost breakdown.53

But, the matter was settled. Reclamation was, of course, in the middle 

of building Hoover Dam as a massive curved gravity structure. Nevertheless, 

Savage had apparently taken seriously the new form, but, in the end, rejected 

LWODUJHO\EHFDXVHRIWKHSHUFHLYHGGLI¿FXOW\LQUDLVLQJLWWRWKHKLJKGDPOHYHO

later. Reclamation published some results of the multiple-arch dam studies in 

September 1934, long after rejecting the form. The studies found that the multiple-arch dam would be “somewhat cheaper by about 3.5 percent than the gravity, 

for the low-head development.”54
212

The question, however, remains: could the engineers have designed the 

multiple arch dam to have been safely raised the additional 191 feet to a

total height of about 550 feet at its highest point. In 1939, Reclamation completed Bartlett Dam on the Verde River in central Arizona; it is the highest multiple arch dam in the United States, rising 287 feet at its highest point. It has performed structurally in a satisfactory way since its construction.55)URPDVWUXFtural point of view, there is no reason why it could not have been designed to be 

IHHWKLJKHU$QGUp&R\QHFRPSOHWHGWKH*UDQGYDOPXOWLSOHDUFKRIWR

a height of 288 feet, and in 1968 his dam on the Manicouagan River in Canada 

rose to just over 700 feet.56 Such a great jump of 245 percent in height is far 

greater than the increase for Grand Coulee of 92 percent (from 287 feet to 550 

feet) which, however, represents a jump more consistent with Reclamation expeULHQFH)RUH[DPSOH5HFODPDWLRQZHQWIURP2Z\KHHIHHWKLJKWR+RRYHU

(726 feet high), or an increase of 74 percent, without undue danger.57

 7KHUHVHHPWREHQRVSHFL¿FFDOFXODWLRQVRUHYHQWHFKQLFDOGLVFXVVLRQ

detailing why the multiple arch would not have been a “feasible plan.” Indeed, 

Mead wrote on April 18, 1935, that for two years Reclamation had studied the 

Bartlett Dam and had included a multiple arch design with a maximum height 

of 347 feet. Reclamation abandoned this structurally feasible design because 

of cost (not of the dam but of the entire project) and went to a lower dam with a 

smaller reservoir.58 The difference between Grand Coulee and the studies going 

on at the same time (1933-1935) for Bartlett represents an increase of 58 percent. 

Had Reclamation been focused on less massive forms, it seems likely that they 

could have succeeded in planning for a multiple arch dam at Grand Coulee.59

Raising the Dam

Meanwhile, in late 1933, work had already begun, with a contract for 

excavation let in November and with the building of roads and bridges in early 

1934. On March 3, 1934, Reclamation called for bids on the low dam, 290 feet 

high with power houses but with no provision for irrigation. Senator Dill and 

others pushed for a start with enough money to build something substantial and 

with the promise of immediate jobs in the depressed society.

On June 18, four bidders submitted sealed envelopes. One was from a 

ODZ\HUZKRVHSODQVKRZHGWKRXJKWEXWQRH[SHULHQFHRU¿QDQFLDOEDFNLQJDQother, from “Mae West,” was a poem which promised diversion but no dam. 

The last two were serious bids, one from the six companies who were building Hoover Dam; they asked just over $34.5 million. The other bid came from 

a combine of three companies and totaled just over $29.3 million. The low bidders, led by Silas Mason of New York, were declared the winners and Ickes 
213

formally awarded them the project on July 13. They were required to complete 

the low dam in four and one-half years.60

Even before the bid, local people had begun to call for the high dam, 

but Senator Dill cautioned them to lay low until work got well underway; then, 

KHSURPLVHG3<RXZLOO¿QGPHMXVWDVDJJUHVVLYHIRUWKHKLJKGDPDV\RXKDYH

ever been.”61,QGHHGVRZDV5HFODPDWLRQEXWWKH\WRRKHOGWKHLU¿UH7KHFRPbine, taking the acronym MWAK (for Mason, Walsh Construction Company of 

'DYHQSRUW,RZDDQG$WNLQVRQ.LHU&RPSDQ\RI6DQ)UDQFLVFRLPPHGLDWHO\

began work. The site was, therefore, busy on August 4, 1934, when, at 

11:05 A.M., President Roosevelt’s car drove up and he gave a 20 minute talk to 

the assembled 20,000 visitors and workers.62

The major job for MWAK was to design and build huge cofferdams so 

that the concrete could be cast on a dry river bed while the raging Columbia was 

directed into only part of its normal width. There would be no tunnels drilled 

through mountains as at Hoover Dam, but controlling the river would still be 

risky. Even before construction on the coffers began, Reclamation had made its 

arguments explicit for a high dam.

On December 4, 1934, Commissioner Mead held a conference in 

'HQYHUZLWKKLVNH\HQJLQHHUVOHGE\&KLHI(QJLQHHU5D\PRQG):DOWHUDQG

Chief Design Engineer John L. (Jack) Savage. Two recommendations resultHG¿UVWWKDWWKHKLJKGDPEHDSSURYHGDQGVHFRQGWKDWFRQVWUXFWLRQIRUWKH

Columbia Basin Irrigation Project be started immediately. Mead’s report estimated the total cost of the high dam to be about $114 million, the powerplant to 

be about $67 million, and the interest an additional $15 million. In addition to 

this total of $196 million, the cost of irrigating 1.2 million acres added $209 million to give a total project cost of $405 million.63

Reclamation’s report reveals the interplay between politics and 

engineering. It states that “a number of factors have developed since construction. . .was undertaken which have greatly changed the economic situation.” 

)LUVWWKHUHSRUWQRWHVWKHH[FHVVRISRZHULQWKHUHJLRQGXHWR%RQQHYLOOH'DP

the Skagit River power development, and Grand Coulee. This would seem to argue against the high dam with its immense power potential, but the report goes 

on to take the opposite tack, “the damsite is not an economical site for a lowhead power development. . . .” Therefore, the engineers conclude, it will be 

more economically sensible to go right to the high dam. Surely, this is not a factor “developed since construction” began.

 $VHFRQGPDMRUUHDVRQIRUWKHKLJKGDPZDVWKHGLI¿FXOW\RIPDNLQJD

safe construction joint between low and high dam, if the low one were completed 
214

¿UVW$JDLQWKHSUREOHPVLGHQWL¿HGGLGQRWMXVWDULVHEXWZHUHFOHDUO\WKHUHEHfore the low dam was decided upon. The third crucial objection was to the turELQHVHI¿FLHQWORZKHDGWXUELQHVZRXOGQRWEHHI¿FLHQWIRUKLJKKHDGVDQGYLFH

versa, again an issue well known before the construction began. Thus, all three 

of these reasons are really back-rationalizations for building a high dam, or, more 

properly, they are convincing arguments against ever starting the low dam at all.

One argument that does seem topical was related to the unprecedented drought throughout the Midwest and the need for irrigation lands on which 

to settle displaced farmers. Still, the overriding impression one gets is that the 

high dam could only be gotten politically if Reclamation began the technically 

LQGHIHQVLEOHORZGDP¿UVWDQGVDYHGDOOLWVUDWLRQDOHIRUDWLPHZKHQVXEVWDQtial funds had been committed. Roosevelt surely understood this procedure and 

WKHHQJLQHHULQJUHSRUWRI'HFHPEHUUHÀHFWVWKHSURFHVVZKLFKFXOPLnated in Mead’s letter of December 27, 1934, to Ickes, formally requesting that 

Reclamation change plans and begin the high dam construction as soon as possible.64

By January 1935, the contractor already had 2,500 men on the site workLQJRQWKHSODQWREXLOGWKHORZGDP)UDQN$%DQNV5HFODPDWLRQHQJLQHHULQ

charge of construction, wrote about the dam in late November 1934, still describing the two stage procedure without raising any of the objections that would surface during the December 4 meeting (which Banks did not attend).65 Then, in 

early January, The Engineering News-Record lowered the boom on the low dam. 

In a brief unsigned article (most likely by the editor) entitled “A Mistake That 

Should Be Corrected,” the author stated that “doubts arose in the public mind. . . 

when it became known that the project had not been studied either as to design or 

as to ultimate service value.”

The article stated bluntly that the low dam plan, with the eventual adGLWLRQRIIHHWWRPDNHWKHKLJKGDPZDV3DQHFRQRPLFHUURURI¿UVWPDJQLtude” and a risky technical project as well. “Before more money is sunk in this 

wildcat investment the blunder should be corrected by abandoning the low dam 

power scheme and building instead the high dam.” Otherwise, the News-Record

concluded that, “it is better to abandon the work entirely than to continue useless 

expenditure.”66

While noting the same disadvantages as recorded on December 4 by 

Reclamation, the article implies that the technical basis for work under contract 

was faulty. The debate was clouded by competing visions for the dam just beFDXVHLWZDVVRFOHDUO\DPXOWLSXUSRVHGDPKDYLQJEHQH¿WVLQLUULJDWLRQLWVRULJinal goal), in power, and in construction jobs. Nearly everyone in early 1935 

agreed that the power market was too small to use Grand Coulee’s capacity, 
215

especially with Bonneville soon to come on line. Most believed that the power 

QHHGHGIRULUULJDWLRQZRXOGEHWKHJUHDWHVWEHQH¿WRQHZKLFKWKHORZGDPFRXOG

not provide.

Meanwhile, MWAK continued work to prepare for the great cofferdams. 

$FRQVXOWLQJUHSRUWLQ1RYHPEHUFRQ¿UPHGWKHFRQWUDFWRU¶VGHVLJQDQGWKH

foundation consultants saw that “no serious doubt can be cast on the safety of the 

project.”67

In early 1935, another voice cried out for the high dam, Carl E. 

Magnusson, professor of electrical engineering at the University of Washington. 

In a Bulletin from the Engineering Experiment Station, Magnusson presented 

eleven advantages for the high over the low dam. While power remained central, 

he answered the criticism of no power market by noting that the irrigation project 

would increase the state’s population and hence provide new markets for electric 

power.68

MWAK had started the cofferdam as 1935 began and, by early April, 

KDGGULYHQWKHODVWVKHHWSLOLQJ7KHFRIIHUGDPSDUDOOHOWRWKHULYHUÀRZZLWKVWRRGDKLJKVSULQJÀRRGDQGVHUYHGWRNHHSGU\WKHZHVWHUQWKLUGRIWKHPDLQ

)LJXUH7KLVVSLOOZD\VHFWLRQRI*UDQG&RXOHH'DPVKRZVERWKWKHRULJLQDOORZGDP

SODQDQGWKH¿QDOKLJKGDPDVEXLOWSource: With permission from Compressed Air Magazine

 (October 1935), 4842, a publication of Ingersoll-Rand Company.
216

damsite so that the foundation could be cast relatively easily. Meanwhile, 

Reclamation engineers kept at work on designing the high dam. In March, the 

Senate passed a huge $4.8 billion bill for work relief which included more money for Grand Coulee, but in a series of rulings, the Supreme Court found unconVWLWXWLRQDOPDQ\DVSHFWVRI5RRVHYHOW¶VSXEOLFZRUNVSURJUDP)LQDOO\RQ

June 7, Ickes signed a change order to go to the high dam, but that meant only 

that MWAK would now build the full high dam foundation instead of that part of 

the foundation necessary for the low dam plus the low dam itself. Thus, on 

June 17, the Public Works Administration allotted $23 million to Grand Coulee 

Dam so the high dam could go ahead although much more would be needed to 

complete it.69

The Engineering News-Record, feeling fully vindicated in its earlier harsh criticism of the low dam, exulted, “What heretofore was an engineerLQJDQGHFRQRPLFHUURULVWUDQVIRUPHGLQWRDVRXQGDQGMXVWL¿DEOHZRUNFUHDWLQJ

undertaking.”70 The Saturday Evening Post, recalling Montgomery Schuyler’s 

IRUHFDVWRQWKH%URRNO\Q%ULGJHSUHGLFWHGWKDW3)LYHWKRXVDQG\HDUVIURP

now . . . archaeologists . . . intent upon seeking new clues to a vanished race . . . 

will come upon a vast waterfall . . . [while all else] will probably have vanished 

long since . . . the dam . . . will still stand.”71 Even before any concrete had been 

)LJXUH$W*UDQG&RXOHH'DPRXWOHWWXEHVZHUHEXLOWWKURXJKWKHVSLOOZD\VHFWLRQWR

facilitate construction. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
217

cast, people began to visualize Grand Coulee, along with Hoover, as somehow 

GH¿QLQJWKHFLYLOL]DWLRQRIWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\$PHULFD

The Engineering News-Record devoted 23 pages to the construction up 

to August 1, 1935, and its concluding editorial makes three claims that characWHUL]HWKHDPELJXLW\RIWKHPLGWKLUWLHVLQ$PHULFD)LUVWLWSXWVWKHFRQVWUXFtion skill on the same level as the “great heights . . . of the designing engineer 

when he originates and develops his conception.” Yet Grand Coulee and Hoover 

Dams both show how innovative was the construction and how traditional was 

WKHGHVLJQ6HFRQGWKHHGLWRULDOMXVWL¿HVWKHKLJKGDPEHFDXVHLWZLOOQRWJHQHUate power except to pump water for irrigation. It “does away with the economic 

paradox of building a huge power project in a market already greatly oversupplied.”72

The third claim was for state planning which, according to the editorial, “has much to its credit even though its tangible achievements are few.” The 

depression years, which stimulated the New Deal, emphasized how state planning would bring rational decisions into politics and allow development problems to be solved by central planning boards. The great exemplar here was the 

Tennessee Valley Authority, which had already spurred planners to imagine a 

Columbia Valley Authority along with many other such organizations. Early in 

January 1935, Congress began to consider such an authority for the Columbia 

River Basin and when the Engineering News-Record’s editorial appeared, the issue was still under consideration. Soon, however, that idea would put both the 

&RUSVDQG5HFODPDWLRQRQWKHVDPHVLGH¿UPO\RSSRVHGWRVXFKSODQV73

In August 1935, therefore, the situation of the dam was this: out of the 

$60 million allotted, $15 million was immediately available and had been spent. 

7KHQHZDOORFDWLRQRIPLOOLRQQRZEHLQJXVHGRQWKHPRGL¿HGSODQOHIW

$22 million to be made available in 1937. Mead’s estimate to Senator McNary 

for the additional funds needed to complete the high dam was $106 million, with 

$209 million more required to carry out the irrigation of the Columbia Basin 

Project.747KLV¿JXUHRIPLOOLRQIRUWKHGDPLVVXEVWDQWLDOO\ORZHUWKDQ

what he gave in late 1934, $196 million.

 7KHQLQODWH$XJXVW&RQJUHVV¿QDOO\SDVVHGD5LYHUVDQG

+DUERUV$FWWKDWVSHFL¿FDOO\DXWKRUL]HGFRQVWUXFWLRQRI*UDQG&RXOHH'DPDV

a full multipurpose structure. On December 6, Washington Governor Clarence 

Martin pulled the release handle on a four-cubic-yard bucket of concrete to inaugurate the casting of concrete.75 Before completion, almost 12 million cubic yards would be cast; it would be the largest concrete structure in the world. 

Superlatives came easily to this wilderness project now, in late 1935, on its way 

to a structural height of 550 feet and a crest length of 5,673 feet.
218

Completing the Dam

MWAK had completed the west cofferdam through the winter of 

1934–35, and, in the fall of 1935, they completed the east coffer. The contractor began the foundations for the high dam, approved in July, by casting concrete within the west cofferdam. Although halted by freezing weather in January 

DQG)HEUXDU\ZRUNSURJUHVVHGUDSLGO\LQWKHVSULQJDQGVXPPHUXQWLOE\

August 17, with all concrete cast, the contractor had dismantled part of the west 

FRIIHUGDPDQGWKHULYHUVWDUWHGWRÀRZEHKLQGDQGWKHQRYHUWKHFRQFUHWHIRXQGDWLRQ0HDQZKLOHEHJLQQLQJLQ)HEUXDU\0:$.EXLOWFRIIHUGDPVDFURVVWKH

channel both above and below the damsite so that, in December, the engineers 

could divert the entire river through the foundations cast behind the old west cofferdam. On December 15, 1936, the Wenatchee Daily World announced that the 

ULYHUZDVGLYHUWHGDQGE\-DQXDU\SHRSOHEHJDQÀRFNLQJWRVHHWKHH[-

posed bed of the great river.76

But two of the principals in that great achievement did not live to see 

the river bed; Elwood Mead died on January 27, 1936, aged 78 after 12 years as 

commissioner, and Silas Mason, at only 56, died in April. Mead would be permanently memorialized by the lake behind Hoover Dam, which bears his name, 

while the contractor had only a temporary fame through the workers’ town for 

Grand Coulee named Mason City.

 &RQFUHWHEHJDQWRÀRZLQWRWKHHDVWVLGHIRXQGDWLRQRQ1RYHPEHU

1936, stopped again in January, and picked up in earnest in March. Despite a 

leaky downstream coffer, MWAK completed the concrete foundation at the end 

of 1937. In late November, the Columbia had returned to its familiar channel, 

except that there was now a dam about 60 feet high which created a new waterfall. Work by MWAK ended in early 1938 with a total cost reaching just over 

$39 million–about $10 million above its original bid, but 14 months ahead of 

schedule. Changes from the low to high dam accounted for $6 million of that increase.77

As the contractor rushed the foundation to completion through 1937, 

5HFODPDWLRQSUHVVHGIRUZDUGZLWKWKHKLJKGDPIRUZKLFK¿QDOSODQVDSSHDUHG

on November 2 when Ickes set the bid opening for December 10, 1937. The day 

before that opening, Henry Kaiser met with Guy Atkinson, head of MWAK, and 

the two agreed to join forces in the bid. Kaiser and his Six Companies teams had 

lost out to Atkinson’s group in the earlier bid, but now they realized the desirDELOLW\RIZRUNLQJWRJHWKHU.DLVHU¶VJURXSKDG¿QLVKHG+RRYHU'DPDQGZRXOG

VRRQFRPSOHWHZRUNRQ3DUNHU'DPVRWKHWLPLQJ¿W7KH\ELGPLOOLRQ

and won the contract over the only other bidder, another conglomerate, whose 

price was just over $42 million. Thus, the two former rivals came together, 
219

under the new name of Consolidated Builders Incorporated (CBI), to begin this 

VHFRQGSKDVHRI¿FLDOO\RQ0DUFK78

By mid-May, nearly 1,700 men were at work on the dam, and the casting of concrete began in late July. Three shifts daily was the routine by late 

August. Because the Columbia was free to run over the previously cast conFUHWH&%,KDGWRHUHFWPRYDEOHVWHHOJDWHV¿IW\WZRIHHWZLGHDQGWKLUW\¿YH

IHHWKLJKZLWKLQZKLFKWRFDVWFRQFUHWHLQLQFUHPHQWVRI¿YHIHHWKLJKXQWLOLWH[-

FHHGHGWKHKHLJKWVRIDGMDFHQWEORFNV7KHULYHUFRXOGWKHQÀRZRYHUWKHORZHU

blocks. In this way, the dam progressed upward in a crenulated form while the 

rising river spilled over the lowest parts as well as through outlet tubes cast with 

the spillway. The entire scene of rising walls, shooting water, and steel trestle 

above created a spectacle that drew thousands of visitors to the wilderness site 

of the world’s largest concrete work. The engineers mechanized the entire project such that, for example, the mixing of a four cubic yard batch of concrete took 

only thirteen seconds. A train on standard-gauge tracks carried the mix in buckets over the trestle where it was then lowered to the dam for placement.79

During late 1938, the contractor developed proposals to speed up 

the concrete work. After careful study, Reclamation engineers responded on 

December 1 through a memorandum from John Savage to Raymond Walter. 

This crucial document gives insight into the thinking of Reclamation engineers 

as they were in the middle of the largest dam building program ever contemplated. Savage warned his chief engineer that Grand Coulee “is the boldest that the 

Bureau of Reclamation has approved to date for one of its major structures.”

Only Shasta (not yet under construction) was comparable, but Hoover 

was far less bold, as he explained: “the arched design of Boulder Dam makes it 

a far safer structure than is economically possible for a long, straight-gravity dam 

[like Grand Coulee].” Savage continued with the dramatic statement that:

Two-thirds of the total water load against Boulder Dam is carried to the “states of Arizona and Nevada”. . . to the abutments 

of the dam, and only the remaining one-third . . . goes to the 

foundation. In the case of a long gravity dam all of the water 

load is carried to the base of the structure.

As Savage surely knew, this was not a correct comparison; Hoover Dam 

was more conservative because he designed it to carry all the load to the foundation by neglecting the arch effect, and, thus, it was the neglected arching that 

made it less bold. Had Hoover been designed by strictly applying the trial-load 

method and fully utilizing the arch strength, the safety would have been comparable to Grand Coulee.
220

Savage clearly wished to stress the need for the contractor not to compromise dam safety for construction speed, and he went on to emphasize the 

boldness of Grand Coulee by telling how:

It was only as a result of nearly six years of intensive

research . . . [on] Boulder Dam that Bureau engineers acquired 

the necessary personnel and technical knowledge . . . [to design] 

a structure like Grand Coulee Dam.

He proceeded to identify the problems inherent in Grand Coulee: there 

was essentially one major problem (he gave four but all were closely related)–

that of ensuring that a series of discrete parts, cast separately as blocks, will 

create a fully monolithic structure free of dangerous cracks. Savage objected 

strongly to the contractor’s proposal to cast concrete during the freezing months 

RI'HFHPEHU-DQXDU\DQG)HEUXDU\+HZDVRWKHUZLVHV\PSDWKHWLFWRWKHPDLQ

changes in the construction plan.80

As directed by Savage’s memorandum, winter work was stopped until 

the spring of 1939. By April, 5,500 men were at work around the clock, seven 

days a week, much as at Hoover Dam. The contractors pushed relentlessly 

)LJXUH*UDQG&RXOHH'DPDQG/DNH5RRVHYHOWRQ-XO\ Source: Bureau of

Reclamation.
221

RQZDUGDVLWEHFDPHFOHDUWKDWWKH\ZRXOG¿QLVKD\HDUDKHDGRIVFKHGXOH:KLOH

mechanized in a way similar to Hoover Dam, the Grand Coulee Dam was far 

more a horizontal than a vertical challenge. No great airy high wire cables carried concrete, but, rather, now it was carried over a dense but spindly steel trestle 

built right on top of the already cast concrete.

Also, the Columbia River was always present at the site, unlike the 

Colorado’s total disappearance from Black Canyon. The two dams illustrate 

clearly the two primary components of hydroelectric power: the height (H), in 

IHHWRIWKHZDWHUIDOODQGLWVÀRZWKURXJKWKHSRZHUKRXVH4LQFXELFIHHWSHU

VHFRQG3RZHULVHTXDOWRKHLJKWPXOWLSOLHGE\ÀRZDQGE\WKHGHQVLW\RIZDWHU

(w = 62.4 pounds per cubic foot), or HwQ foot-pounds per second. One horseSRZHU3LVGH¿QHGDVIRRWSRXQGVSHUVHFRQGRU3 +Z4ZKLFKIRU

WKHHVWLPDWHVRIUHVXOWLQ+ IHHWDPHDQÀRZHVWLPDWHRI

FXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGDQG3  PLOOLRQKRUVHSRZHU

Since one horsepower equals 0.746 kilowatts, this power potential would be 

4.35 (0.746) = 3.23 million kilowatts of electrical power. The design being conVWUXFWHGLQSURYLGHGIRUQHDUO\WZRPLOOLRQNLORZDWWVVRWKDWZKHQWKHÀRZ

H[FHHGHGDERXWFXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGWKHRYHUÀRZZRXOGJRWKURXJK

outlet conduits on the dam or over the spillway. Once the lake behind Grand 

&RXOHH¿OOHGWKHQDVWHDG\ÀRZKLJKHUWKDQWKHPHDQZDVSRVVLEOHVRHYHQWXDOly the dam could supply much more power.81

Once again in late 1939, as war began in Europe, construction stopped 

XQWLOODWH)HEUXDU\RI7KHUHDIWHUEHJDQDUXVKWRLQVWDOOWKHHOHFWULFDO

equipment. Concrete casting being nearly completed by September of 1940, 

PDQ\ZRUNHUVKHDGHGVRXWKWRZRUNRQWKH)ULDQW'DPIRUWKH&HQWUDO9DOOH\

3URMHFWLQ&DOLIRUQLD,QHDUO\)UDQN%DQNVWXUQHGRQWKH¿UVWVPDOOVHUYLFHJHQHUDWRUVDQGWKH¿UVWODUJHVFDOHWXUELQHVEHJDQWKHLUMRXUQH\IURPWKH

HDVWFRDVWUHTXLULQJVWUHQJWKHQLQJRIUDLOEHGVDORQJWKHZD\7KH¿UVWJHQHUDWRUDUULYHGLQSLHFHVWKDW¿OOHGÀDWFDUV$VVHPEO\EHJDQRQ)HEUXDU\

DQGWKH¿UVWFRPSOHWHGWXUELQHJHQHUDWRUXQLWRI¿FLDOO\EHJDQSURGXFLQJHOHFWULFity in early October.

There was a frantic push to complete the project as 1941 came to a 

close. The contractor stated that all concrete work was completed. The anQRXQFHPHQWFDPHRQ'HFHPEHU¿YHGD\VDIWHUWKH-DSDQHVHERPEHG

3HDUO+DUERUDQG8QLWHG6WDWHVLVRODWLRQIURPWKHZDUZDV¿QDOO\HQGHG%\

June 1, 1942, water in the lake behind Grand Coulee Dam had risen to the top of 

the spillway and began its smooth descent to the river below. Early the next year, 

&%,WXUQHGWKHSURMHFWRYHUWR5HFODPDWLRQ7KH¿QDOELOOWRWDOHG

compared to the initial bid of $34,400,000. In spite of such overruns, the total construction cost of Grand Coulee Dam through June 30, 1943, was only 
222

$162,600,000 compared to the government allotment of $179,500,000, a record 

WKDWZRXOGEHGLI¿FXOWWRPDWFKDIWHUWKHZDU82

THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONTROL 

PLAN

Power and the Restudy of the River Basin

With Grand Coulee under construction and Bonneville nearing completion, political pressure built up for a Columbia Valley Authority modeled after 

the much heralded but still controversial Tennessee Valley Authority. On 

August 20, 1937, Roosevelt signed the Bonneville Power Act, a compromise that 

left control of the dams in the hands of the Corps and Reclamation, but created 

an independent administration within the Interior Department to sell and distribute the power from Bonneville Dam and Grand Coulee. On August 26, 1940, 

Roosevelt ordered the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) to take charge 

of the power from Grand Coulee, thus creating a complex set of three sepaUDWHDJHQFLHVHDFKUHVSRQVLEOHIRUVHSDUDWHSLHFHVRIWKHWRWDO)HGHUDO&ROXPELD

Valley System.

There followed substantial wrangling among the new power administration, Reclamation, and private power companies. BPA wanted to sell the powHUDVFKHDSO\DVSRVVLEOHWRUHGXFHWKHLQÀXHQFHRISULYDWHSRZHU5HFODPDWLRQ

wanted higher prices to help subsidize irrigation for the Columbia Basin Project; 

DQGSULYDWHSRZHUZDQWHGHYHQKLJKHUSULFHVWRDOORZLWWRUHPDLQSUR¿WDEOH83 

%3$ZRQDQGWKURXJKRXWWKHQH[WSOXV\HDUV3DFL¿F1RUWKZHVWSRZHUKDVUHmained some of the least costly in the nation.84

)LJXUH7KHUHVHUYRLUVRIWKH0DLQ&RQWURO3ODQ&ROXPELD5LYHU%DVLQSource:

 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
223

But the two great dams were only the beginning of the Columbia restructuring. So, with the war still raging in 1943, the Congress directed the 

Corps to review the original 1932 report in the light of the completed dams and 

the newly formed Bonneville Power Administration. Just as the earlier report reVXOWHGODUJHO\IURPWKHGHGLFDWHGHIIRUWRIRQH&RUSVRI¿FHUVRWKHQHZUHSRUW

would be primarily the work of a 39-year-old colonel, William Whipple, Jr.

Sent to Portland in 1947, Whipple reported to Colonel Theron Weaver, 

the Division Engineer, Northwest Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for 

ZKRPKHZDVWREHWKHH[HFXWLYHRI¿FHU:KLSSOHEHJDQWRVWXG\WKHQHZUHSRUW

already four years in progress, on which the government had spent $4 million 

while surveying over 1,000 dam sites. He quickly recognized that the study was 

essentially leaderless and without clear direction.85 The missing focus resulted 

partly from the complexity of issues on the Columbia and partly from the lack of 

leadership. The Corps was still unsure, as a bureau, how to deal with questions 

RILUULJDWLRQÀRRGFRQWUROSRZHUDQG¿VKHULHVDORQJZLWKLWVKLVWRULFPLVVLRQRI

navigation.

The division engineer put Whipple in charge and he quickly focused the 

study on a few large power projects plus a navigation plan permitting ships to get 

WR,GDKR)ORRGFRQWUROKHEHOLHYHGZDVQRWDPDMRUSUREOHPDQGFRXOGEHKDQdled by a few levees and some channel improvements.86 In 1946, Reclamation 

had published its own study of the Columbia River Basin, focusing on irrigation 

and dams.

The Flood and the Control Plan

Meanwhile, Whipple worked on his study, and, by early June 1948, he 

was far enough along to justify a vacation, so he went with his wife and their 

three young children north into British Columbia. Once there, he saw the valleys 

LQÀRRG3WKHJUHDWHVWÀRRGWKHFRXQWU\KDGVHHQVLQFH,QGLDQGD\V ́,WZDVGHscending south into the Columbia valley and Whipple realized that he needed to 

be back in Portland immediately.

The public alarm mounted, water at Bonneville Dam was so high that 

power production stopped; the Portland Airport was under 15 feet of water; and 

Vanport, a community of 20,000, was inundated beyond repair. Plans to miniPL]HÀRRGFRQWUROZHUHGRRPHGDVWKH&RUSVVWUXJJOHGWRNHHSORVVHVGRZQ

The Chief of Engineers, Lieutenant General Raymond A. Wheeler (1885–1974), 

ÀHZRXWIURP:DVKLQJWRQ'&DQG&RORQHO:KLSSOHPHWKLP87 The next 

morning, Wheeler held a 25 minute meeting with his local engineers in preparation for a press conference at 8:30 A.M. Thirty years later, Whipple reported 

Wheeler’s comments at that meeting:
224

“The news people have been after me since 6:30 this morning; and I announced a press conference here at 8:30. That 

gives us about 25 minutes. Now I intend to say that the situation remains in the hands of the district and division engineers, 

LQZKRP,KDYHLPSOLFLWFRQ¿GHQFH,ZLOODOVRVD\WKDWP\RI-

¿FHKDVDOUHDG\SURPLVHGWRJLYHFRPSOHWHVXSSRUWLQWHUPVRI

PHQHTXLSPHQWDQGPRQH\7KDW¶VULJKWLVQ¶WLW" ́,WFHUWDLQO\

was, and we all nodded. “Now what is a rough estimate of the 

GDPDJHFDXVHGE\WKHÀRRG" ́:HDYHUDQG:DOVKKDGDPRment’s consultation and told him about $100 million.88 “OK,” 

he said “And of course I’ll refer to the assistance of the troops 

DQGRWKHUDJHQFLHV1RZZKDWDERXWWKHELJUHSRUW"$V,

UHFDOOLWZDVGXHLQRXURI¿FHRQ2FWREHUEXW\RXUHTXHVWHG

a year’s extension of time. Of course, under the circumstances, 

there can be no extension of time. You will have the report in 

E\2FWREHUZRQ¶W\RX" ́&RORQHO:HDYHUWXUQHGWRPHDQG

,VDLG3<HV6LUZHZLOO ́31RZLQYLHZRIWKLVÀRRGDQGDOO

RIWKHLQWHUHVWQDWLRQZLGHZHSUDFWLFDOO\KDYHWRKDYHDÀRRG

FRQWUROSODQLQLW7KHUHSRUWGRHVKDYHDÀRRGFRQWUROSODQLQ

LWGRHVQ¶WLW" ́$JDLQ&RORQHO:HDYHUORRNHGDWPHIRUWKHDQswer. I felt strength mounting in me. “The plan we are workLQJRQGRHVQRWKDYHÀRRGFRQWUROLQLWQRZ ́,VDLG3%XWZKHQ

we submit it, it will.” Colonel Weaver looked as relieved as his 

normally impassive face permitted. General Wheeler gave me a 

quick look of understanding and appreciation.

“Well, gentlemen” he said, “I have all the information I need 

IRUWKHSUHVVFRQIHUHQFH,VHHWKDWP\FRQ¿GHQFHLQWKHGLVWULFW

DQGGLYLVLRQRI¿FHVZDVQRWPLVSODFHG ́7KLVWLPHKHORRNHG

also at me. “Now, since we have lots of time before the press 

arrives, let’s all have a cup of coffee.”

And so the Comprehensive Plan proceeded at a furious rate to include 

ÀRRGFRQWURODQGWREHUHDG\E\WKHHQGRI6HSWHPEHU%HIRUHWKHZDUPDQ\

people doubted the need for much new power. But the wartime growth of indusWULHVVXFKDVDOXPLQXPKDGPDGHSRZHUWKHSULPDU\REMHFWLYHZKLOHWKHÀRRGRI

KLJKOLJKWHGWKHFRPSHWLQJREMHFWLYHRIÀRRGFRQWURO)RUPD[LPXPSRZHUWKHUHVHUYRLUVPXVWEH¿OOHGEXWIRUPD[LPXPÀRRGSURWHFWLRQWKH\PXVWEH

GUDZQGRZQWRSUHYHQWÀRRGFUHVWVIURPPRYLQJGRZQVWUHDP7KXVWKHPRUH

SRZHUWKHOHVVÀRRGFRQWURODQGYLFHYHUVD:KLSSOHRUJDQL]HGWKHVWXG\DURXQG

a Main Control Plan focused on a few major dams and a system-wide coordinaWLRQRIÀRRGSUHGLFWLRQVZLWKWKHQHFHVVDU\GUDZGRZQRIUHVHUYRLUV7KDWSODQ

was developed by 1948 and published in 1950.89
225

Of the 16 dams with reservoirs, only Bonneville and Grand Coulee were 

then operating, but three others were under construction and Congress had authorized nine others. The system was to provide enough emergency storage in sevHQUHVHUYRLUVWRKROGWKHÀRZGRZQWRDOHYHOWKDWGLGQRWH[FHHGWKHFDSDFLW\RI

the downstream levees.90 At the same time, this increased storage capacity leads 

to a decrease in power because the reservoirs must be partially emptied in prepaUDWLRQIRUWKHÀRRGFUHVW

)LJXUH7KHSRZHUQHWZRUNSODQQHGIRU:DVKLQJWRQVWDWHE\&RORQHO:LOOLDP

Whipple, Jr. Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

)LJXUH'DPVRQWKH&ROXPELD5LYHUV\VWHP Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
226

The power network planned by Whipple generated a little over four milOLRQNLORZDWWVIURPQLQHGDPVDQGGLVWULEXWHGLWWKURXJKRXWWKH3DFL¿F1RUWKZHVW

from southwestern Oregon to northwestern Montana. About three-quarters 

of the power went to the three major cities of Spokane, Seattle, and Portland. 

Eventually, the plan called for ten million kilowatts for the completed control 

plan.

Power and Salmon

 :KLSSOHZURWHDOVRDERXWWKHQHHGWRSURYLGH¿VKODGGHUVDQGKDWFKHULHVIRUWKHVDOPRQ$OUHDG\%RQQHYLOOH'DPKDGD¿VKODGGHUZKLFKE\

Whipple could call “highly successful.” Nevertheless, he noted that the proviVLRQIRU¿VKDWWKH0F1DU\'DPWKHQXQGHUFRQVWUXFWLRQZRXOGEHDQLPSURYHPHQWRYHU%RQQHYLOOH+HDOVRUHFRJQL]HGWKHSRWHQWLDOLQÀXHQFHRIDGGLWLRQDO

dams:

However, since there is undoubtedly some cumulative adverse 

effect of a large number of dams, even when carefully designed 

WRDLGWKHSDVVDJHRI¿VKWKHFRPSUHKHQVLYHSODQFDOOVIRUD

compensatory program of $20,000,000, known as the Lower 

&ROXPELD)LVKHULHV3ODQWRFOHDUQDWXUDOREVWDFOHVIURPWKH

lower tributary streams and to build hatcheries. This plan was 

GHYHORSHGE\WKH)LVKDQG:LOGOLIH6HUYLFH$OWKRXJKWKHSODQ

as a whole has not yet been authorized by Congress, some money has already been appropriated, and the State of Washington 

has taken legislative action to prevent encroachment upon the 

streams concerned in that state.91

 &OHDUO\WKH¿VKZHUHRQWKHPLQGVRIWKH&RUSVDQG¿YH\HDUVODWHULW

ZRXOGHVWDEOLVKDODERUDWRU\DW%RQQHYLOOH'DPIRUUHVHDUFKRQDQDGURPRXV¿VK

¿VKZKLFKJRIURPIUHVKZDWHUWRVDOWZDWHUDQGUHWXUQWRVSDZQ%XWDVODWHDV

DIRUPHU'LUHFWRURIWKH1DWLRQDO0DULQH)LVKHULHV6HUYLFHFRXOGVD\3:H

VWLOOGRQ¶WNQRZWKHEHVWZD\WRSURWHFWWKH¿VK ́92 A more detailed discussion of 

WKH¿VKDQGRWKHUHQYLURQPHQWDOLVVXHVLVUHVHUYHGIRUFKDSWHU

The Main Control Plan had become essentially a power plan lighting up 

WKH3DFL¿F1RUWKZHVWDQGEULQJLQJLWLQGXVWU\DQGZHDOWK$OWKRXJKWKH&RUSV

WRRNVHULRXVO\WKH¿VKSUREOHPLWZDVQRWFHQWUDOWRLWVSODQQLQJ(YHQPRUH

crucial at the time was the Corps’ lack of emphasis on irrigation. Whipple did 

refer to Reclamation’s studies of the Columbia Basin, but he considered it a secRQGDU\SUREOHPLQOLJKWRIWKHSRZHUDQGÀRRGFRQWUROLVVXHV7KHRULJLQVRIWKH

Grand Coulee project gave way to the development of its power, which by the 

1980s had reached the phenomenal total of over seven million kilowatts.93
227

In the conclusion to his report on the comprehensive plan, Whipple emSKDVL]HGVWURQJO\WKHHQJLQHHULQJUDWKHUWKDQWKHVFLHQWL¿FQDWXUHRIWKH&RQWURO

Plan. As he put it, the “general basin-wide plans and criteria . . . are not general 

LGHDVRUSULQFLSOHVEXWKLJKO\VSHFL¿FHQJLQHHULQJFRQFOXVLRQVDQGUHODWLRQVKLSV

which vary in accordance with the stage of development.” In other words, scienWL¿FDQGDEVWUDFWSODQQLQJSULQFLSOHVDUHRIOLWWOHYDOXHLQGHYHORSLQJVXFKFRPprehensive projects. Rather, they are “empirically derived from engineering relationships and physical and economic conditions.”94

Whipple was announcing here his ideas behind multipurpose dams, and 

he was doing that in the light of both helping the public understand the issues and 

UHVSRQGLQJWRWKHSXEOLF¶VFU\IRUÀRRGSURWHFWLRQDQGSRZHUZKLFKE\KDG

become a major goal in the Northwest.

 )ROORZLQJSXEOLFDWLRQRIWKH&RQWURO3ODQ:KLSSOHEHFDPHWKH¿UVWGLVtrict engineer of the newly formed Walla Walla District, where he oversaw completion of McNary Dam, named for the senator most responsible for the lower 

Columbia development and the Republican running mate of Wendell Wilkie in 

the 1940 presidential election.

)LJXUH$QDHULDOYLHZRI*UDQG&RXOHH'DPZLWKWKHQHZ7KLUG3RZHUKRXVHDWWKHERWtom center. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
228

Subsequently, the dams were built as shown in Table 2, and, by 1975, 

the Corps and Reclamation had essentially completed the 1948 plan in which the 

Bonneville Power Administration distributed the power.95 In 1966, the Congress 

authorized construction of a third powerplant for Grand Coulee, and construction 

began in July of 1967. The contractor completed the necessary dam alterations 

in 1978, and the full powerplant was in operation by mid-1980. In 1955, Grand 

Coulee had lost its position as the world’s largest powerplant, but with the Third 

Powerhouse in operation, that title returned to the upper Columbia River for a 

time.96

That powerhouse, along with the second powerhouse at Bonneville, endHGPDMRUGDPPRGL¿FDWLRQVLQWKH1RUWKZHVW$V:KLSSOH¶VUHSRUWVKRZVKH

was also concerned about the environment, but he knew that he could not predict all the consequences of his plan. He knew that he needed a plan, yet also a 

ÀH[LELOLW\WRUHVSRQGWRQHZSUREOHPV,Q:KLSSOHSXWSRZHUDQGÀRRG

control above the salmon, and for that time we must credit him with reasonable 

priorities. Even more to the point, he had relegated irrigation to a subproblem, 

and there he had considerable foresight. The irrigation scheme for the Columbia 

Basin Project has been criticized by environmentalists. But the Columbia River 

Control Plan is a special case, as Whipple emphasized, and to get a broader picture of large federal dams we need to turn to the other major basin projects: the 

Ohio-Mississippi, the Missouri, and the Central Valley Projects of California.

The year 1948 also saw the victory of Harry S. Truman in the presidential election. “The president was certain that the west had given him a manGDWH+LV:KLWH+RXVHDGYLVRUVDQGRI¿FLDOVDWWKH,QWHULRU'HSDUWPHQWDW

once began drawing up plans for the reintroduction of regional valley authority legislation.”977KH¿UVW&ROXPELD9DOOH\$XWKRULW\ELOOKDGDSSHDUHGEHfore Congress in January of 1935 but had strong opposition from the Army 

engineers, Reclamation, public power people, irrigation people, and Senator 

Charles McNary. The Bill died in Committee. Other efforts failed up to 1937, 

when Congress created the Bonneville Power Administration.98 Thus, when the 

Truman advisors began to rework a valley authority, there already existed a comSOH[RIWKUHHPDMRUDJHQFLHVLQWKH&ROXPELD%DVLQ$OVRVLJQL¿FDQWLQ

ZHUHWZRRWKHUIDFWRUV)LUVWWKHUHZDVWKHLPDJHRIWKH79$DQGWKHSURSRVDO

for similar authorities, all of which were examples of centralized planning and 

therefore considered by some as threats to American free enterprise. Second, and 

more fundamental, was the issue of centralized federal control over local authority. Ultimately, these two factors doomed the Columbia Valley Authority, which 

lost substantial support after the election of 1950 and never surfaced again.99 A 

similar fate awaited President Roosevelt’s hopes for an authority for the Missouri 

Valley, a story to which we now turn.
229

)LJXUH*UDQG&RXOHH'DPRQWKH&ROXPELD5LYHUWKHIHHGHUFDQDOIURPWKH*UDQG

Coulee Pump-Generating Plant outlet into Banks Lake (lower right). Banks Lake provides 

initial storage for water to be delivered to the Columbia Basin Project for irrigation of over 

670,000 acres. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.

)LJXUH7KHZHVWFRIIHUGDPDW*UDQG&RXOHHLQSource: Bureau 

of Reclamation.
230

Endnotes

 :LOOLDP):LOOLQJKDPWater Power in the “Wilderness”: The History of Bonneville Lock and Dam

(Portland, Oregon: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Portland District, 1988) [undated but certainly 1988 because it commemorates the 50th anniversary of the dam dedication of July 9, 1938], 3, 55.

2. Quoted in G. R. Lukesh, “The Columbia River System,” The Military Engineer 22, No. 124

(July-August 1930), 328.

3. Willingham, Water Power, 27.

 3(VWLPDWHRI&RVWRI([DPLQDWLRQVHWFRI6WUHDPV:KHUH3RZHU'HYHORSPHQW$SSHDUV)HDVLEOH ́House

Document No. 308, April 12, 1926, 6 pages.

5. “Columbia River and Minor Tributaries,” House Document No. 103, March 29, 1932, 1845 pages plus 

appendices.

6. “Columbia River and Minor Tributaries,” 13.

7. Oscar O. Kuentz, “The Lower Columbia River Project,” The Military Engineer 25, No. 139 (January-

)HEUXDU\

8. Paul C. Pitzer, Grand Coulee: Harnessing A Dream (Washington State University Press, 1994), 11-3.

9. “Great Depression,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 1997, 5, 443.

)LJXUH   ([FDYDWLQJ WR EHGURFN EHKLQG WKH ZHVW FRIIHUGDP DW *UDQG &RXOHH LQ 

Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
231

10. Willingham, Water PowerGHVFULEHVWKHSURFHVVRIDXWKRUL]DWLRQDVIROORZV7KH)HGHUDO(PHUJHQF\

$GPLQLVWUDWLRQRI3XEOLF:RUNVDXWKRUL]HG%RQQHYLOOH'DPRQ6HSWHPEHUDV)HGHUDO:RUNV3URMHFW

No. 28, under provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act. When work began on November 17, 1933, 

the plans called for locating a dam, a powerplant with two units, and a navigation lock in the vicinity of 

Bonneville, Oregon. The initial allotment contained $20,000,000 for construction and $250,000 for preliminary 

study and design. Before Congress formally adopted the project on August 30, 1935, putting it under the 

regular appropriations process, $32,400,000 in public works funds had been spent. It cost another $7,500,000 

to complete the undertaking as originally planned. Subsequently, the Corps installed eight additional power 

units to complete the project at a total cost by 1943 of $75,000,000.

11. Kuentz, “Lower Columbia River Project,” 41.

12. J. S. Gorlinski, “The Bonneville Dam,” The Military Engineer 27, No. 153 (May-June 1935), 210-2.

13. C. G. Galbraith, “Kaplan Turbines for Bonneville,” Engineering News-Record (May 27, 1937), 765-9. 

)RUWKHKLVWRU\RI.DSODQWXUELQHVVHH1RUPDQ6PLWKMan and Water: A History of Hydro-Technology

(New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 189-99.

14. Willingham, Water Power, 4.

15. R. C. Binder, Fluid Mechanics (New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1943), 211-4.

16. J. C. Stevens, “Models Cut Costs and Speed Construction,” Civil Engineering 6, No. 10 (October 1936), 

674-7.

17. J. C. Stevens and R. B. Cochrane, “Pressure Heads on Bonneville Dam,” Transactions American Society

of Civil Engineers, 109 (1944), 77-85.

 :LOOLDP):LOOLQJKDPDQG'RQDOG-DFNVRQ3%RQQHYLOOH'DP ́+$(525$SULO3ULQWV

and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.

19. Willingham, Water Power, 14.

20. R. R. Clarke and H. E. Brown Jr., “Portland-Puzzolan Cement as used in the Bonneville Spillway Dam,” 

Journal of the American Concrete Institute-DQXDU\)HEUXDU\

21. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering in the United States, 34-5, 38, 285, 

295, 450, 552.

22. Willingham, Water Power, 1988, 16-7.

23. Charles H. Martin to Major General Edward M. Markham, June 8, 1935, 3 pages, National Archives and 

Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, RG77, Entry 

%R[)ROGHU

24. Major General E. M. Markham to Charles H. Martin, June 13, 1935, National Archives, College Park, 

5*(QWU\%R[)ROGHU

 0DUWLQWR0DUNKDP1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV&ROOHJH3DUN5*(QWU\%R[)ROGHU

26. Willingham, Water Power, 27.

27. Richard White, The Organic Machine (New York, Hill and Wang, 1995), 94-5 states that “A folklore has 

JURZQXSDERXWWKH%RQQHYLOOHWKDWDVRULJLQDOO\GHVLJQHGWKHGDPFRQWDLQHGQR¿VKZD\V%XWH[FHSWIRUDUWLVWV¶VNHWFKHVWKHUHZHUHDOZD\VSURYLVLRQVIRU¿VKSDVVDJHDWWKH%RQQHYLOOH ́

28. Willingham, Water Power)RU%RQQHYLOOHVHH/LVD0LJKHWWRDQG:HVOH\-(EHOSaving the Salmon: 

A History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Efforts to Protect Anadromous Fish on the Columbia and

Snake Rivers (Seattle: Historical Research Associates, Inc., 1994), 53-8.

29. Kuentz, “The Lower Columbia River Project,” 44.

30. Willingham, Water Power, 47-9.

 /HWWHUIURPWKH'LUHFWRURIWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI)LVK&XOWXUHWRWKH+RQRUDEOH-RKQ&9HDWFKHWDO

$XJXVW7KRPDV05RELQV3DSHUV2I¿FHRI+LVWRU\+HDGTXDUWHUV86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV

Alexandria, Virginia. Attached to this letter was a plan dated August 10, 1934 and an eight page memorandum 

WRWKH&RPPLVVLRQHURI)LVKHULHVXQVLJQHGDQGXQGDWHGH[SODLQLQJWKH$XJXVWSODQ&RS\2ULJLQDOLQ

Special Collections, Knight Library, University of Oregon.

32. Jim Marshall, “Dam of Doubt,” Colliers (June 19, 1937). Reprinted in Willingham, Water Power, 44-5.

33. John R. Jameson, “Bonneville and Grand Coulee: The Politics of Multipurpose Development on the 

&ROXPELD ́2I¿FHRI+LVWRU\86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV)RUW%HOYRLU9LUJLQLDSDJHV7KH5RRVHYHOW

quote is from U.S. Congress, Senate, Preliminary Report of the Inland Waterways Commission (Senate 

Document No. 325), 60th Congress, 1st Session, 1908, iv-v.

34. Thomas M. Robins, “Improvement of the Columbia River,” Civil Engineering 2, No. 9 (September 

1932), 567.

 :LOOLDP):LOOLQJKDPArmy Engineers and the Development of Oregon: A History of the Portland

District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1983), 93.

36. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 48.
232

37. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 1-6.

38. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 12-3.

39. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 50.

40. Pitzer, Grand Coulee)RUDEULHIGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHUHSRUWVHH-RKQ6%XWOHU3&RPSUHKHQVLYH6WXG\

by Army Engineers,” Civil Engineering 1, No. 12 (September 1931), 1075-80.

41. Clarence C. Dill, Where Water Falls (Spokane, Washington: C. W. Hill Printers, 1970), 167-70. 

Jameson, “Bonneville and Grand Coulee,” 27-30, describes the meetings between Dill and Roosevelt. The formal approval came from Harold L. Ickes to the Secretary of the Interior, August 10, 1933, National Archives, 

'HQYHU5*(QWU\*UDQG&RXOHH'DP3URMHFW¿OHV,FNHVWUDQVIHUUHGPLOOLRQLQIXQGVXQGHUWKH

National Industrial Recovery Act to Reclamation for the Grand Coulee project. See also Engineering NewsRecord (August 3, 1933), 145.

42. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 25-7, 72.

43. Jameson, “Bonneville and Grand Coulee,” 32-3.

44. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 74-7.

45. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 41-4.

46. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 49.

47. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 49-50. Engineering News-Record (October 5, 1933), 420, announced the grants to 

both Bonneville and Grand Coulee.

48. Willingham, Water Power, 4.

 5):DOWHUWR$)'DUODQG'HFHPEHU1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\*UDQG

&RXOHH'DP3URMHFW¿OHV

 $)'DUODQGUHSRUWRIDFRQIHUHQFHKHOGDWWKHRI¿FHRI5HFODPDWLRQ'HFHPEHUUHFHLYHG

)HEUXDU\1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQ3URMHFWFRUUHVSRQGHQFH

)LOH&ROXPELD%DVLQ3URMHFW%R[)LOHIROGHU&ROXPELD%DVLQ3URMHFW%RDUG

DQG(QJLQHHULQJ5HSRUWVRQ&RQVWUXFWLRQ)HDWXUHV-DQ-XQH'DUODQGZDVDQHOHFWULFDOHQgineer who became an assistant construction engineer for Reclamation at Grand Coulee on April 17, 1934. See 

L. Vaughn Downs, The Mightiest of Them All: Memories of Grand Coulee Dam)DLU¿HOG:DVKLQJWRQ

Ye Galleon Press, 1986), 24. Walter’s claim to be head of the largest engineering body in the United States is 

not true if one considers the total number of engineers (civilian and military) employed by the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers.

 33ODQV&KDQJHG2)RXQGDWLRQ*RLQJLQIRU+LJK&RXOHH'DP ́Wenatchee Daily World (November 27, 

1933), 1, 5. Savage had directed the study of the multiple-arch dam which “Bureau engineers . . . speculated . . 

. could be raised later,” Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 71.

 5):DOWHUWR(OZRRG0HDG)HEUXDU\1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\*UDQG

&RXOHH'DP3URMHFW¿OHV

53. J. L. Savage, “Memorandum to Chief Engineer,” Denver, March 8, 1934, 6 pages. An earlier letter from 

$FWLQJ&KLHI(QJLQHHU62+DUSHUWRWKH&ROXPELD%DVLQ&RPPLVVLRQ)HEUXDU\VWDWHGWKDWWKHGDP

would be a gravity section. The relevant portion of this letter is quoted by B. E. Stoutmeyer to Chief Engineer, 

Bureau of Reclamation, March 26, 1934, National Archives, Denver, RG115, Entry 7, Bureau of Reclamation 

3URMHFW&RUUHVSRQGHQFH)LOH%R[&ROXPELD%DVLQ3URMHFW)ROGHU&ROXPELD

River Basin. Dams & Reservoirs. Grand Coulee Dam. July1, 1933-June 30, 1934.

54. W. O. McMeen, “Memorandum to Chief Designing Engineer: Summary of Multiple-Arch Dam Studies 

for Grand Coulee Project,” Denver, September 17, 1934, 86 pages, National Archives, Denver, RG115, Entry 

*UDQG&RXOHH'DP3URMHFW¿OHV

55. James Legos, “Concrete Buttress Dams,” in Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam

Engineering in the United States 550-1, 655-62.

56. Editor’s note: This is the Daniel Johnson Dam which was completed in 1968 as a hydroelectric dam in 

WKH3URYLQFHRI4XpEHFE\+\GUR4XpEHF

57. Schnitter, A History of Dams, 186-7.

 (OZRRG0HDGWR)UHG6FKQHSIH'LUHFWRURI3URMHFWV'LYLVLRQ)HGHUDO(PHUJHQF\$GPLQLVWUDWLRQRI

Public Works in Washington, D.C., April 18, 1935. The Reclamation report is in a “Memorandum to Chief 

Designing Engineer,” by E. R. Dexter, Denver, June 29, 1936, National Archives, Denver, RG115, Entry 7, 

*UDQG&RXOHH'DP3URMHFW¿OHV

 7KHSUREOHPVRIUDLVLQJDGDPRQFHEXLOWZRXOGKDYHEHHQMXVWDVGLI¿FXOWIRUWKHPDVVLYHDVIRUWKHOLJKW

design. At the hydraulics laboratory at Colorado State College, there were model studies made of the spillZD\VHFWLRQIRUWKHPXOWLSOHDUFKGHVLJQIRU*UDQG&RXOHH6HH35HSRUW ́E\$)'DUODQG1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV

'HQYHU5**UDQG&RXOHH'DP3URMHFW¿OHV,WLVQRWVWDWHGLQWKHFRUUHVSRQGHQFHQRWHGKHUHZKDWLQÀXence these model studies had on the decision to abandon multiple arch design.
233

60. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 97-101.

 &&'LOOWR-DPHV2¶6XOOLYDQ)HEUXDU\TXRWHGLQ3LW]HUGrand Coulee, 117. See also letters from Dill to S. H. Hedges, July 24, 1934, and B. E. Stoutmeyer to Elwood Mead, July 18, 1934, National 

$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\*UDQG&RXOHH'DP3URMHFW¿OHV

62. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 101 and see Downs, Mightiest of Them All, 8, for a photo of the visit.

63. Elwood Mead et al., to the Secretary of the Interior, December 21, 1934, National Archives, Denver, 

5*(QWU\*UDQG&RXOHH'DP3URMHFW¿OHV&RVWVDUHRQ

64. Elwood Mead to Secretary Ickes, December 27, 1934, National Archives, Denver, RG115, Entry 7, 

*UDQG&RXOHH'DP3URMHFW¿OHV

 )$%DQNV3&ROXPELD%DVLQ3URMHFWLV'HVFULEHGE\&RQVWUXFWLRQ(QJLQHHU ́Southwest Builder and

Contractor (November 23, 1934), 8-9.

66. “A Mistake That Should Be Corrected,” Engineering News-Record (January 3, 1935), 23.

 )$%DQNVWR5):DOWHU-DQXDU\HQFORVLQJ6+:RRGDUG3&RIIHUGDPIRU&RQVWUXFWLRQ

of Grand Coulee Dam,” November 13, 1934, National Archives, Denver, RG115, Entry 7, Grand Coulee Dam 

3URMHFW¿OHV6HHDOVR&KDUOHV3%HUNH\3)RXQGDWLRQ&RQGLWLRQVIRU*UDQG&RXOHHDQG%RQQHYLOOH3URMHFWV ́

Civil Engineering1R)HEUXDU\

68. Carl Edward Magnusson, “Hydroelectric Power in Washington,” Bulletin No. 78, Engineering 

([SHULPHQW6WDWLRQ6HULHV6HDWWOH)HEUXDU\SDJHV

69. Pitzer, Grand Coulee6HHDOVR3&RQVWUXFWLQJWKH)LUVW&RIIHUGDP ́Engineering News-Record

(August 1, 1935), 148-9.

70. “Grand Coulee Revised,” Engineering News-Record (June 20, 1935), 888. A Department of the Interior 

press release announced Ickes’ action, June 8, 1935, National Archives, Denver, RG115, Entry 7, Grand Coulee 

'DP3URMHFW¿OHV

71. Robert Ormond Case, “The Eighth World Wonder,” The Saturday Evening Post, (July 13, 1935), 36. 

Also see Montgomery Schuyler, edited by William H. Jordy and Ralph Coe American Architecture and Other

Writings (New York: Atheneum, 1964), 164.

72. Engineering News-Record (August 1, 1935), 164.

73. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 234-6.

74. Elwood Mead to Senator Charles L. McNary, August 17, 1935, National Archives, Denver, RG115, 

(QWU\*UDQG&RXOHH'DP3URMHFW¿OHV,WLVXQFOHDUZK\0HDGUHIHUUHGWRWKHLQLWLDODOORWPHQWDVPLOOLRQ

ZKHQ5RRVHYHOWSXEOLFO\LGHQWL¿HGLWDVPLOOLRQ6HHDOVR&KDUOHV+&DUWHU3&KDQJHLQ3ODQIRU*UDQG

Coulee Dam Explained by Engineer,” Southwest Builder and Contractor (August 23, 1935).

75. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 129-30.

76. Pitzer, Grand Coulee6HHDOVR$OYLQ)'DUODQG37KH&ROXPELD%DVLQ3URMHFW ́Electrical

Engineering 56, No. 11 (November 1937), 1344-5.

77. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 150-4.

78. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 196-7.

79. Pitzer, Grand Coulee)RUDPRUHFRPSOHWHGHVFULSWLRQVHH3&RQFUHWH3ODFLQJDW*UDQG&RXOHH

IURP*UDYHO3LWWR)RUPV ́Western Construction News (June 1939), 198-203.

80. John L. Savage, “Memorandum to Chief Engineer,” Denver, December 1, 1938, 3 pages. Transmitted 

to Commissioner John C. Page as an attachment to a more report dated December 12, and signed by 

Walter, Savage, Banks, McClellan, and Hammond, National Archives, Denver, RG115, Entry 7, Bureau of 

5HFODPDWLRQ3URMHFW&RUUHVSRQGHQFH)LOH%R[&ROXPELD%DVLQ3URMHFW)ROGHU

&ROXPELD%DVLQ'DPV	5HVHUYRLUV*UDQG&RXOHH'DP*UDQG&RXOHH'DP3URMHFW¿OHV

81. “Undertakings Without Precedent,” Engineering News Record1RYHPEHU)RUWKHSRZHU

capacity of the original 1943 dam, see Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering in

the United States, 136. The initial power design was for 18 units each generating 108,000 kW plus three smaller service units of 12,500 kW each so that the total was 1,981,500 kW.

82. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 210-3.

83. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 236-8.

84. Timothy Egan, “A G.O.P. Attack Hits Bit Too Close to Home,” New York Times)ULGD\0DUFK

$7KHDUWLFOHVWDWHVWKDW3(OHFWULFLW\LQWKH1RUWKZHVWPRVWRILWJHQHUDWHGE\)HGHUDO'DPVDORQJWKH

&ROXPELD5LYHUFRVWVUHVLGHQWVDERXWDGD\OHVVWKDQKDOIWKHQDWLRQDOUDWHDFFRUGLQJWR)HGHUDO¿JXUHV ́

The table shows that Con Edison of New York charged 15.97 cents per kilowatt-hour compared to Seattle City 

Light whose price was 3.77 cents per kilowatt-hour.

85. William Whipple, Jr., autobiography, unpublished manuscript, 1978, 224-7. Copy in possession of David 

P. Billington.

86. Whipple Jr., autobiography, unpublished manuscript, 228-9.
234

87. Whipple Jr., autobiography, unpublished manuscript, 155.

 :KLSSOH-UDXWRELRJUDSK\XQSXEOLVKHGPDQXVFULSW$V:KLSSOHVWDWHGLQDIRRWQRWH37KH¿QDO

estimate of damages made after intensive data gathering for seven months afterwards, was $100 million dollars. 

:KHWKHUWKLVH[DFWFRUUHVSRQGHQFHUHSUHVHQWHGDOXFN\JXHVVWKH¿UVWWLPHRUVRPHRWKHUIXGJLQJDIWHUZDUGV

FRXOGQRWEHGHWHUPLQHG7KHVWDIIPDLQWDLQHGWKDWWKH¿QDOHVWLPDWHZDVKRQHVWO\PDGH ́

89. William Whipple Jr., “Comprehensive Plan for the Columbia Basin,” Proceedings of the American

Society of Civil Engineers 76 (1950), paper No. 2473 (published in November 1950 as Proceedings-Separate

No. 45), 1-73.

90. Whipple Jr., “Comprehensive Plan,” 1430. The seven reservoirs were those behind John Day, Hells 

Canyon, Priest Rapids, Grand Coulee, Libby, Glacier, and Hungry Horse Dams, all totaling 22,010,000 acrefeet or 965 x 109

FXELFIHHWRIZDWHURQHDFUHIRRWLVFXELFIHHW)LOOLQJWKLVFDSDFLW\DWWKHUDWHRI

FXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGZRXOGWDNHDERXWGD\VZKHUHWKDWÀRZLVWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHPD[LPXPUHFRUGHGSHDNÀRZRIFXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGDQGFXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGWKDWWKHOHYHHV

could hold. See 1432-3.

91. Whipple Jr., “Comprehensive Plan,” 1-23. Quotation on 20-1.

92. Mighetto and Ebel, Saving the Salmon8QWLORWKHUGDPVZHUHEXLOWWKH¿VKZD\VRI%RQQHYLOOH

were successful as were the efforts to divert salmon to tributaries downstream from Grand Coulee, see Richard 

Lowitt, The New Deal and the West (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 158-9.

93. U.S. Department of Energy, Bonneville Power Administration; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and 

U.S Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, The Columbia River System: The Inside Story

(Portland, Oregon, 1991), 15.

94. Whipple Jr., “Comprehensive Plan,” 22-3.

95. Bonneville Power Administration, “Columbia River System . . . ,” 14-5.

96. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 341. Today the largest powerplant in the world is Itaipu on the Paraná River beWZHHQ%UD]LODQG3DUDJXD\&RQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHGDPEHJDQLQ7KH¿UVWJHQHUDWLQJXQLWZHQWLQWRRSHUDtion in 1983 and the last in 1991.

97. Elmo Richardson, Dams, Parks and Politics: Resource Development and Preservation in the TrumanEisenhower Era (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973), 30.

98. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 236.

99. Richardson, Dams, Parks and Politics, 25, 31-8.
235

CHAPTER 6‡

EARTH DAMS ON THE MISSOURI RIVER:

FORT PECK AND GARRISON DAMS

AND THE PICK-SLOAN PLAN1

THE BASIN PLAN

From Navigation to Power

 7KH0LVVRXUL5LYHUEHJLQVDWWKHMXQFWXUHRI7KUHH)RUNVWKH-HIIHUVRQ

0DGLVRQDQG*DOODWLQ5LYHUVLQVRXWKZHVWHUQ0RQWDQDDQGÀRZVHDVWDQGVRXWK

2,470 miles to its mouth where it joins the Mississippi River about 15 miles 

north of St. Louis. The watershed, or drainage area, is 529,000 square miles, or 

about the same as that of the Volga River, making it, alone, the sixteenth greatest 

watershed in the world, and after the Mississippi, the largest in the United States. 

,WLVWKH¿IWHHQWKORQJHVWULYHULQWKHZRUOG7KH0LVVRXULZDWHUVKHGLVJUHDWHU

WKDQWKHFRPELQHGODQGDUHDRI)UDQFH*HUPDQ\6SDLQDQGWKH1HWKHUODQGVLWV

ULYHUOHQJWKLVVOLJKWO\JUHDWHUWKDQWKHÀLJKWPLOHDJHEHWZHHQ/RV$QJHOHVDQG

Newark, New Jersey. If the river were taken from its source to its delta, below 

New Orleans, it would be the fourth longest river in the world (after the Nile, 

WKH$PD]RQDQGWKH<DQJW]HDQGLWVGUDLQDJHDUHDZRXOGEH¿IWKDIWHUWKH

Amazon, Parana, Congo, and Nile).

Although the drainage basin is extensive, the amount of water making 

its way into the Missouri River is not remarkable—at least not usually. Its discharge can be as low as 12,500 cubic feet per second, which is about the mean 

ÀRZRIWKH0HUULPDFN5LYHULQ1HZ(QJODQG<HWDWIXOOÀRRGWKHGLVFKDUJH

at the mouth can rise to 900,000 cubic feet per second, which is well above 

‡

 (Editor’s note) The Bureau of Reclamation’s embankment dams are not a focus of this study, 

but it should be noted that from Reclamation’s beginnings it contributed to embankment dam 

engineering through a research and construction program that eventually encompassed 240 emEDQNPHQW GDPV 7KHVH GDPVLQFOXGH VXFK VLJQL¿FDQW SURMHFWV DV0LQLGRND%HOOH )RXUFKH

Cold Springs, Tieton, Echo, Taylor Park, Alcova, Green Mountain, Anderson Ranch, Trinity, 

1DYDMR)RQWHQHOOHDQG6DQ/XLV'DPV)RUDGGLWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQVHH-RKQ/RZH,,,3(DUWK-

¿OO'DPV ́LQDevelopment of Dam Engineering in the United States, Eric B. Kollgaard and 

Wallace L. Chadwick, Editors (New York: Pergamon Press, 1988), 671-884. Or access [www.

XVEUJRYKLVWRU\@5LFKDUG/:LOWVKLUH3(3<HDUVRI(PEDQNPHQW'DP'HVLJQDQG&RQstruction in the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation” (September 2002), a paper prepared for Reclamation’s centennial Symposium on the History of the Bureau of Reclamation at the University of 

Nevada, Las Vegas, June 18-19, 2002. You may request a copy of the paper at: History Program, 

D-5300, Bureau of Reclamation, P. O. Box 25007, Lakewood, Colorado 80225-0007.
236

the mean discharge of all rivers in the world save the Amazon, the Congo, the 

Yangtze, and the Ganges. The Missouri is big, unique, and temperamental.2

The river rises in the Rocky Mountains, runs in gorges for about 

200 miles, then the terrain opens out to sloping terraces with some “badlands” 

until it reaches Yankton, South Dakota, where it becomes navigable and goes 

WKURXJKUROOLQJKLOOVVNLUWVWKH2]DUNVDQG¿QDOO\HPSWLHVLQWRWKH0LVVLVVLSSL

But these overall features tend to obscure the huge task of a detailed, localized 

survey aimed at imagining a gigantic compromise between nature and society.

 7KH¿UVW$PHULFDQVXUYH\RIWKH0LVVRXULIROORZHGWKH/RXLVLDQD

Purchase, a major event in America history, which is the story of two rivers: the 

Missouri and the Columbia.3

 Both rivers would become major sites for 

navigation dams designed and built by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the 

twentieth century. The former river became famous thanks to Lewis and Clark,

who began and ended their famous trek on the Missouri between May 14, 1804, 

)LJXUH7KH0LVVRXUL5LYHU%DVLQSource: Big Dam Era, Missouri River Division, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, xvi.
237

DQG6HSWHPEHU7KHWZR$UP\RI¿FHUVZHUHSLRQHHUVDQGH[SORUers who studied the natural environment and focused on the river as a trading 

route. Technically, their vision was more pre-industrial; they accepted nature 

and sought to catalogue and explain it rather than exploring nature to change and 

utilize it. It took seventy-two years after their return to St. Louis for the United 

States Congress to authorize the Army to make accurate large-scale maps of the 

Missouri River.4

 Then, in 1926, an imperative for action once again came from 

the Congress.

 ,IWKHH[SHGLWLRQZDVDPRQXPHQWE\WKH$UP\RI¿FHUVWRWKHQDtional expansion, then the House Document 308 of 1926 has been called a monument to “the most extensive and comprehensive engineering study of all times.”5

 

The Missouri River 308 report of 1932 was one of the major results of this study. 

It is an immense document, somehow commensurate in size to the river basin 

that it describes. Unlike the 1804-1806 description, the 1932 report is an 

engineering one; that is to say, it focuses on changing the river environment and 

on restructuring the entire basin. That meant, primarily, the building of dams that 

create reservoirs.

Congress had expressly ordered the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in 

the 308 reports, to investigate “those navigable streams in the United States, and 

their tributaries, whereon power development appears feasible and practicable . . 

 ́7KHFKDUJHLQFOXGLQJQDYLJDWLRQLUULJDWLRQFRQWURORIÀRRGVDVZHOODVZDWHU

power, clearly gave the Corps the direction to think in terms of entire river basins 

rather than isolated projects. Congress put the investigations into law by act in 

DQGWKH.DQVDV&LW\'LVWULFWRI¿FHRIWKH&RUSVEHJDQWKH0LVVRXUL%DVLQ

study right away. District Engineer Captain Theodore Wyman submitted his 

555 page report (with 243 charts and a 634 page appendix) in late September 

1932 to his Division Engineer in St. Louis.6

 Long before that, the Corps began 

ZRUNDWWKHVLWHRIWKHPDMRUZRUNUHFRPPHQGHGE\:\PDQWKHPDVVLYH)RUW

Peck Dam.7

The Corps made preliminary surveys for the dam in 1928 and then detailed ones over the next three and one-half years. These were largely made to 

discover the natural processes of basin behavior, the most important of which 

ZDVÀRZRUGLVFKDUJHLQWKHPDLQVWHPRIWKH0LVVRXUL5LYHU7KHHQJLQHHUV

did separate studies of each of the 23 major tributaries, and Wyman summarized 

WKHPLQWKHWKLUGSDUWRIKLVUHSRUW7KH¿UVWSDUWZDVGHYRWHGWRWKHPDLQVWHP

the second to the minor tributaries, and the third part summarized all work and 

plans for the entire basin.

 :\PDQHQGHGWKDWWKLUGDQG¿QDOSDUWZLWKWKUHHVHFWLRQV&RQFOXVLRQV

Plan of Development, and Recommendations.8

 Conclusions centered on the six 
238

engineering issues of levees, reservoirs, irrigation, hydroelectric power, navigation, and bank erosion and silt. The plan addressed each issue with detailed t

DEOHVJLYLQJSURSRVHGHQJLQHHULQJSURMHFWVÀRRGSURWHFWLRQIRUFLWLHVLUULJDWLRQ

power sites, navigation channels, and reservoirs. The recommendations essentially included all the plans but put the central emphasis on one major project, the 

FRQVWUXFWLRQRIDKXJHGDPDW)RUW3HFN0RQWDQD

Wyman made the case for a huge reservoir of 17 million acre-feet 

(second at that time in volume only to Lake Mead, which was to be created by 

Hoover Dam, then under construction) to supply water for the lower Missouri 

when low discharge would make navigation hazardous, if not impossible, in parts 

of the river between Yankton, South Dakota, and the mouth.9

)LJXUH*HQHUDO/\WOH%URZQ86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVSource:

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
239

In his covering letter submitting Wyman’s report to the Secretary of War, 

the Chief of Engineers, General Lytle Brown, recommended the entire plan, but 

added two emphases:

I further recommend that the project for navigation on the main 

stem as heretofore authorized, namely from the mouth to Sioux 

City, Iowa, be vigorously pressed to completion, and that, in adGLWLRQWKHUHVHUYRLUDWWKHVLWHRI)RUW3HFNEHEXLOWWRWKHPD[Lmum practicable capacity; and be operated primarily for navigation, with such arrangement for future installation of power 

as will permit the maximum production of hydroelectric power 

consistent with the primary demands of navigation. . . .10

The complex document then passed through the government bureaucracy, which included the Mississippi River Commission; the Board of Engineers 

for Rivers and Harbors; and the Chief of Engineers, who one year later on 

September 30, 1933, sent it to the Secretary of War, who promptly passed it on 

to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. It was referred to the House 

&RPPLWWHHRQ5LYHUVDQG+DUERUVRQ)HEUXDU\

Between the time that Wyman completed his report and General Brown 

sent it to the Secretary of War, the creation of jobs had become a high priority of the Roosevelt Administration. Just as with the Columbia Basin, construction actually became a high priority, so that 15 days after the Secretary received 

%URZQ¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVWKH)RUW3HFN'DPZDVDSSURYHGDV3XEOLF:RUNV

3URMHFW1XPEHU2FWREHU)XQGVLPPHGLDWHO\ÀRZHGWRWKH&RUSV

and on October 23, seventy men began work at the dam site.11)RUW3HFNKDG

joined the ranks of the world’s largest structures in preparation, all dams in the 

West and all destined to radically change their river basins. But now there was 

one major difference. Unlike Wilson, Hoover, Bonneville, and Grand Coulee, 

this Montana dam was to be made of earth, not concrete, and 126 million cubic 

yards of earth instead of the mere 12 million cubic yards of concrete in the record 

setting mass for Grand Coulee.

EARTHFILL DAMS AND FORT PECK

The Birth of Soil Mechanics

 7KUHHFRQGLWLRQVXVXDOO\PDNHHDUWK¿OOGDPVSUDFWLFDEOHWKH\FDQEH

built on earthen foundations more easily than can masonry dams, they can be 

made of a variety of locally available materials, and they are usually competitive in cost. Of the nearly 70,000 dams in the United States, about 85 percent are 

HDUWK¿OOHPEDQNPHQWGDPVDQGLQWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\HYHQZLWKWKHDGYHQW
240

RIFRQFUHWHVWLOODERXWSHUFHQWRIWKHGDPVEXLOWKDYHEHHQHDUWK¿OO12 There 

DUHWZRW\SHVRIHDUWK¿OOHPEDQNPHQWVOHYHHVDQGGDPV7KHGLIIHUHQFHDULVHV

primarily from the fact that levees usually (but not always) hold back water only 

LQÀRRGVZKHUHDVGDPVFUHDWHSHUPDQHQWUHVHUYRLUV7KHHDUOLHVWGRFXPHQWed dams, found in present day Jordan, date from about 3,000 B.C. and consist 

of masonry walls enclosing an earth core, an impervious upstream blanket over 

PRUHHDUWK¿OODQGDZLGHGRZQVWUHDPHDUWKHQHPEDQNPHQW7KXVWKHSULPDry elements, if somewhat complex, were in place in antiquity: a core, an earthen 

embankment on both sides, and some protection on the upstream face.13 Since 

the time of the earliest dams, and especially in Roman times, masonry played a 

major role in dams. The height of embankment dams gradually increased, reaching seventy-nine feet as opposed to a maximum of only forty-three feet for masonry works. The embankments had masonry protecting the upstream face. 

Many medieval dams were embankment, as were the power dams in renaissance 

Europe and the pre-industrial dams of Central Europe.14

 7KHLQGXVWULDOHUDLQÀXHQFHGHDUWKGDPV¿UVWWKHRUHWLFDOO\LQ)UDQFH

then empirically in Britain. The most famous name in earthworks of the eighteenth century is certainly Charles A. Coulomb (1736-1806), who established the 

basic concept that sliding resistance of soils depends upon their cohesion. Other 

)UHQFKWKHRULVWVGHYHORSHGKLVLGHDVIXUWKHUEXWWKHDFWXDOFRQVWUXFWLRQRIHPbankments shifted to Britain. That country’s most famous structural engineer, 

7KRPDV7HOIRUGEXLOW%ULWDLQ¶V¿UVWPDMRUZDWHUVXSSO\VWUXFWXUH

the Glencorse earth dam, between 1819 and 1824, near Edinburgh. The dam had 

a clay core with wide earth embankments (shells) on either side and a stone surface on the upstream side.15

Just as with bridges (a major focus for Telford), the British works tended to be conservative and mostly safe compared to their American counterparts 

which were more quickly built and experienced many more failures. Up to 1930, 

there had been four failures in Britain compared to thirty-four in the United 

6WDWHV2IFRXUVHWKH6RXWK)RUN'DPIDLOXUHQHDU-RKQVWRZQ3HQQV\OYDQLDLQ

1889 became the most notorious by killing 2,209 people following the bursting 

of its overtopped earthen structure. Nevertheless, earth dams persevered, and in 

the 1930s they received considerable theoretical help from abroad.16

 7KH)UHQFKSURYLGHGWKHVHPLQDOLGHD+HQUL3KLOLEHUW*DVSDUG'DUF\

(1803-1858), while designing and building a water supply system for his home 

WRZQRI'LMRQGHYHORSHGDWKHRU\IRUH[SODLQLQJWKHÀRZRIZDWHUWKURXJK

JUDQXODUPHGLD+HSXEOLVKHGKLVVHPLQDOLGHDLQDGHOLJKWIXOO\)UHQFKPDQQHUHPEHGGHGLQDQZULWLQJHQWLWOHG37KH3XEOLF)RXQWDLQVIRUWKH&LW\RI

Dijon.”17
241

 (YHQWXDOO\WKH$QJOR6D[RQZRUOGOHDUQHGWKHDSSOLFDWLRQV)LUVWDQ

$XVWULDQSURIHVVRU3KLOLSS)RUFKKHLPHUGLVFRYHUHGWKDW'DUF\¶V

idea could be expressed more mathematically by using the ideas of another 

)UHQFKPDQ3LHUUH6GH/DSODFH)RUFKKHLPHUDQHQJLQHHUZHOO

VFKRROHGLQPDWKHPDWLFDOSK\VLFVUHFRJQL]HGWKHVLPLODULW\RIJURXQGZDWHUÀRZ

WRKHDWÀRZDQGIURPWKRVHLGHDVKHSURFHHGHGWRGHYHORSDJUDSKLFDOPHWKRG

of analysis, which appealed to hydraulic practitioners in the same way as graphic statics had appealed to structural engineers.18 An English physicist had earlier 

developed the same graphical approach, but it did not become widespread until 

the 1930s after two Austrians had laid a more systematic foundation for soil mechanics.

 .DUO7HU]DJKL±ZDVWKHSULQFLSDO¿JXUHDIWHUSXEOLFDWLRQRI

his ground-breaking book in 1925. He took the earlier ideas and put them systematically together in a theoretically consistent and practically oriented way, 

FRPELQLQJWKHSURSHUWLHVRIVRLOXQGHUVWUHVVHVZLWKWKHDFWLRQRIZDWHUÀRZLQJ

through it.19$OOWKHVHGHYHORSPHQWVEHJDQWRLQÀXHQFHHDUWKGDPGHVLJQDQG

they were directly aided, as well, by the publication of Arthur Casagrande’s 1937 

paper on seepage through dams.20

A further major development in the 1930s was the acceptance of stability analysis for explaining and, hence, preventing the many earth dam failures 

by sliding. Pioneered by Swedish engineers in 1916 and formalized in 1926 by 

WKH6ZHGLVKSURIHVVRU:ROPDU)HOOHQLXVWKHVOLGLQJFLUFOHVWDELOLW\

analysis became a standard method by the late 1930s and was used to analyze the 

JUHDWVOLGHDW)RUW3HFN21 All of this theoretical work encouraged engineers to 

design earth dams and led to the “vast proliferation of embankment dams around 

the world . . . (even for) large dams, especially after World War II.”22

 %XWZKHQWKH86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVEHJDQVWXGLHVRI)RUW3HFN

Dam, in preparation for the 308 Report, Terzaghi and Casagrande were not widely known even in the engineering community, even though they had already been 

DFWLYHLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV7KHGHVLJQFULWHULDXVHGLQSODQQLQJ)RUW3HFNLQWKH

early 1930s were those presented most completely by Joel D. Justin in 1924, before the beginning of soil mechanics as a recognized discipline. These criteria 

involved, primarily, the geometry of the dam cross section and the materials in 

the dam, particularly as they relate to seepage. Missing is a method of evaluating the stability against slides, for as Justin stated, “it is not generally necessary 

to investigate closely the safety of earth dams against sliding and overturning.”23 

Justin cautioned about slides in his paper when the slope of the dam section is 

too steep or when an unstable foundation becomes saturated before the reservoir 

LVRQO\SDUWO\¿OOHG7KRVHFDXWLRQVZRXOGEHFRPHUHDOLW\DW)RUW3HFNIRXUWHHQ

years later as Justin himself would describe in his discussion of a 1942 paper.24
242

WLRQDQGSODQIRU)RUW3HFN'DP Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
243

Thus, the period between 1924 and late 1933, when construction began 

was just when the modern engineering study of earth dams began, but nothing on 

WKHVFDOHRI)RUW3HFNKDGHYHUEHIRUHEHHQDWWHPSWHG)URPWKHGDPVHFWLRQRI

1934, it appears that the design took into account Justin’s criteria and thus would 

be judged acceptable state-of-the-art. The major issue foreseen in 1934 was not 

WKHGHVLJQEXWWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQ7KHSURMHFWFRXOGQRWEHMXVWL¿HGHFRQRPLFDOO\

and, so, there was considerable pressure to build it as inexpensively as possible. 

The biggest cost would be moving 126 million cubic yards of earth. Therefore, 

the Corps decided to use the cheapest transportation method available—hydrauOLF¿OO

Construction of Hydraulic-Fill Dams

California mining of the nineteenth century evolved the practice of “hydraulicking” by excavating surface materials with a moving stream of high-pressure water, ejected from a nozzle, over a mining face or hillside. This powerIXOIRUFHORRVHQVWKHVROLGVZKLFKÀRZZLWKWKHZDWHULQWRDVOXLFHRUSLSH7KLV

process transports the slurry and separates out heavier particles on the way. 

Proven effective for moving large quantities of earth, hydraulicking seemed a 

good way to transport earth for dams in the 1890s as reservoirs for power became essential in the West.

This dam practice reached the profession convincingly in 1907, when 

James D. Schuyler, a noted dam engineer, responded to urging of colleagues 

and “cheerfully. . .prepared (a paper) in the few and widely separated leisure 

moments of a busy life, mostly on railroad trains, or trolley cars.”25 This leiVXUHWLPHSDSHULV¿IW\VHYHQSDJHVZLWKGHWDLOHGGHVFULSWLRQVRIHDUO\K\GUDXOLF

¿OOGDPVEHJLQQLQJZLWKRQHEXLOWLQ7\OHU7H[DVLQDQGIRFXVLQJRQWZR

California dams completed just prior to the paper’s publication. Schuyler succinctly explained the theory of such dams, wherein muddy material is deposited 

in the dam such that the clay with water forms the core (clay puddle), which becomes impervious once the water drains out through the adjacent porous 

layers. The semiporous layer allows core water to escape, but prevents it from 

FDUU\LQJRXWWKH¿QHSDUWLFOHVLQWKHFRUH,WLVSRVVLEOHWRFRQWUROWKHW\SHRIVROid material that will settle out so that the clay will concentrate in the core and the 

sand and gravel in the outer parts of the dam. Not only is the method of transport 

cheap but the segregation of solid material can be controlled easily, according to 

Schuyler.26

The Reclamation Service built the Conconully Dam in 1910 on its 

Okanogan Project in North Central Washington. This was one of many hydrauOLF¿OOGDPVEXLOWEHWZHHQ6FKX\OHU¶VSDSHUDQG,QDODUPLQJQXPEHUVWKH\

also failed, prompting the distinguished hydraulic engineer, Allen Hazen 
244

(1869–1930), to emphasize in 1921 the importance of keeping particles of small 

sizes out of the core. He noted that water retained in the hydraulically-placed 

core could not then easily drain out, and the resulting outward water pressure 

could cause failures, especially during construction.27 He concluded that more 

careful attention to particle size and more careful control of materials placed 

ZRXOGDYRLGK\GUDXOLF¿OOGDPIDLOXUHVDOWKRXJKWKHDGGLWLRQDOFDUHZRXOGWHQG

to make them more costly.

Two more papers appeared right after Hazen’s, and both demonstrated 

KRZWKHFRQWURORISDUWLFOHVL]HVOHGWRVXFFHVVIXOK\GUDXOLF¿OOGDPV7KHVXFFHVVRIK\GUDXOLF¿OOGDPVDOORZHGWKHVHFRQGRIWKHVHSDSHUVWRVWDWHWKDW3PDQ\

RIWKHGRXEWVWKDWKDYHH[LVWHGKHUHWRIRUHUHJDUGLQJWKHVWDELOLW\RIK\GUDXOLF¿OO

cores, have been dispelled.”28 The author of the earlier paper noted that:

'XULQJLWVFRQVWUXFWLRQSHULRGDK\GUDXOLF¿OOGDPPD\EHOLNened to a cantilever bridge in process of erection. Such a bridge 

will not again be subjected to the stresses that must be withstood during erection, nor will the dam, with its central pool, 

again be in so unstable a condition as it is in during construction. In designing an earth dam, this construction condition 

must be considered, just as it is necessary to provide for erection conditions in the case of a cantilever bridge.29

This apt analogy would have made a strong impression on engineers in 

1921 because of the two dramatic collapses of the longest spanning cantilever 

bridge in the world, the 1917 Quebec Bridge. It failed twice during construction.30

Thus, when Justin came to summarize earth dam design in his prize winning 1924 paper, he could refer to the recent literature and communicate with 

FRQ¿GHQFHWKDWVXFKDFRQVWUXFWLRQSURFHGXUHFRXOGEHUHOLHGXSRQLISURSHUO\

controlled. He gave a table of 118 dams listed as “Statistics of Successful Earth 

'DPV ́7ZHQW\VL[RIWKHVHZHUHK\GUDXOLF¿OO,QWKHODVWHGLWLRQRIKLV

QRWHGERRNRQGDPV(GZDUG:HJPDQQVXPPDUL]HGWKHK\GUDXOLF¿OOPHWKRG

for building dams, lending additional prestige to the technique.31)LQDOO\DVWKH

86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVFRPSOHWHGGHVLJQVIRUWKH)RUW3HFN'DPDSDSHU

RQK\GUDXOLF¿OOGDPVDSSHDUHGLQWKHTransactions of the ASCE, which stated 

RQWKHIURQWSDJHWKDW3+\GUDXOLF¿OOGDPVDUHDOPRVWQHZFRPSDUHGZLWKRWKHU

types, and they are becoming more popular because of their many advantages.” 

The paper called for standardizing the testing of materials in such dams, using a 

GDPLQ0DVVDFKXVHWWVIRUUHIHUHQFHDQGPRVWVLJQL¿FDQWO\EDVHGLWVWKHRUHWLFDO

VHFWLRQRQWKHHPHUJLQJ¿HOGRIVRLOPHFKDQLFVZLWKVSHFLDOUHIHUHQFHWR

Karl Terzaghi.32
245

Also in 1934, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 

*OHQQRQ*LOER\ZURWHDSDSHURQK\GUDXOLF¿OOGDPVWKDWOHQWIXUWKHUFUHGLELOity to the method.33+HQRWHGWKDWKLVWKHRUHWLFDODSSURDFKXVHG3VLPSOL¿FDWLRQV

and idealizations. . .no more radical in nature and extent than those associated 

with other types of engineering theory, such as the concepts of frictionless joints 

in trusses, simple bending of beams, and so on.” Academia and practice seemed 

to agree on the validity of hydraulicking for earth dams. In a discussion, Arthur 

Casagrande commended Gilboy and lent even further support to his conclusions.

Just as earth dam design seemed well developed by 1934, so did the 

FRQVWUXFWLRQPHWKRGRIK\GUDXOLF¿OO7KH&RUSVKDGUHDVRQWREHFRQ¿GHQW

WKDWLWVGHVLJQIRU)RUW3HFNZDVVRXQGDQGWKDWLWVSODQIRUFRQVWUXFWLRQZRXOG

be both economical and safe, but they also had reason to be wary of construction slides. The unknown factor in all of this planning was the scale, and that, 

IRUHQJLQHHULQJZRUNVLVDOZD\VDFUXFLDOFRQFHUQ)RUW3HFN'DPZRXOGEH

¿YHWLPHVODUJHUWKDQWKHWKHQODUJHVWHDUWKGDPLQWKHZRUOGWKH&RUSVGHVLJQHG

*DWXQ'DPIRUWKH3DQDPD&DQDODOVREXLOWXVLQJK\GUDXOLF¿OO

Fort Peck: Skilled Generalship and Ultra Modern Mechanization

On May 9, 1935, the Engineering-News Record, in an editorial, expressed the wonder that most knowledgeable people felt about the great dam 

constructions in the West. The size and quantities of materials “strain ordinary 

comprehension,” and the work is “made possible only by bringing into action all 

the resources of invention, of business organization, and of technical skill that 

engineering and contracting and the equipment manufacturers have created. . . .” 

The editorial characterized this momentous effort by calling:

)RUW3HFN'DPSURJUHVVWKHFKLOGRIVNLOOHGJHQHUDOVKLSSOXV

ultra modern mechanization . . . without this parentage the great 

Missouri River dam construction . . . would not be giving emSOR\PHQWWRVRPDQ\PHQQHHGLQJZRUNLQVRPDQ\¿HOGVRILQdustrial labor. 

%XWWKDWIDVWGHSOR\PHQWPHDQWWKDW¿HOGZRUNEHJDQEHIRUHHQJLQHHUVKDGFRPpleted design work.34

 7KHGDP¶VLPPHGLDWHMXVWL¿FDWLRQEHFDPHDUHDOLW\TXLFNO\%\

December 1933, more than 700 men were at work, increasing to 1,000 as the 

new year began, and growing rapidly even in the harsh Montana winter so that 

by July 15, 1934, 7,000 men were productively on the site.35 What were they 

GRLQJ"'XULQJWKH\EXLOWPLOHVRIUDLOURDGEXLOGLQJVIRUEDUUDFNVD
246

)LJXUH)RUW3HFNVSLOOZD\DQGGDPSource: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Record Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

)LJXUH7KHVSLOOZD\JDWHVWUXFWXUHDQGFRQFUHWHOLQHGFDQDODW)RUW3HFNSource: Records 

of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, 

College Park, Maryland.
247

mess hall, construction equipment, a bridge across the Missouri, wooden 

railroad trestles around the dam site, barges and dredges, and the new town of 

)RUW3HFN7KH\DOVRZHUHVWULSSLQJORRVHRYHUEXUGHQIURPWKHGDPVLWHEHJLQning construction of the diversion tunnels, and starting work on the spillway.36 

%\)HEUXDU\HYHU\WKLQJVWRRGUHDG\IRUWKHELJJHVWRSHUDWLRQRIDOOWKH

K\GUDXOLF¿OOLQJRIWKHGDP

Many features of the dam were without precedent. One was the steel 

sheet pile cutoff wall that was driven, mostly in 1934, deep down and into the 

¿UPVKDOHDOODFURVVWKHYDOOH\DQGFORVHWRWKHFHQWHURIWKHGDP7KLVLPPHQVH

project, by itself, over 10,000 feet long and up to 190 feet deep, sought to 

control the seepage (percolation) underneath the dam.37 While the sheet piles 

were being driven 40 feet deeper than any sheet piles had previously been driven, 

WKHK\GUDXOLF¿OOVWDUWHGLWVMRXUQH\IURPWKHXSVWUHDPERUURZSLWVLQWKHULYHU38

Before winter closed down operations in late 1934, 843,000 cubic yards 

of material came to the dam site, less than 1 percent of the total. Operations resumed in the spring with the four dredges named Gallatin, Jefferson, Madison

WKHULYHUVWKDWIRUPWKH0LVVRXULDW7KUHH)RUNVDQGWKHMissouri sucking up 

WKHDOOXYLDOPL[RIVDQGVLOWFOD\DQGJUDYHODOOÀRDWLQJLQZDWHUVHQWWRWKHGDP

site through pipes often greater than two and one-half miles long. At the dam 

VLWHWKHFRDUVHUVDQGDQGJUDYHOVHWWOHGRXWDORQJWKHÀDWVORSLQJEHDFKHVZKLOH

WKHZDWHUFDUULHGWKH¿QHUVLOWDQGFOD\SDUWLFOHVLQWRWKHFHQWUDORUFRUHVHFWLRQ

)LJXUH7KLV6HSWHPEHUDHULDOVKRZVWKHHQWLUHK\GUDXOLF¿OODUHDRI)RUW3HFN

Dam, including trestles for dumping gravel and rock in the toes of the dam. Source: Records of 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, 

College Park, Maryland.
248

)LJXUH/D\LQJLQFKEDOODQGFRQHSLSHOLQHLQWKHQRUWKZHVWFRUQHURIWKHK\GUDXOLF¿OO

DUHDDW)RUW3HFN'DPRQ0D\ Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Record Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

)LJXUH7KHFRPSOHWHGHDVWVHFWLRQRI)RUW3HFN'DPEHIRUHWKHVOLGH+\GUDXOLF¿OO

PDWHULDOZDVGLVFKDUJHGWKURXJKWUDSVLQWKHERWWRPRIWKHGUHGJHSLSH$VWKH¿OOURVHWKH

rail lines at the upstream edge (right) were relocated at higher levels to provide for placing the 

blanket of gravel and protective stone. June 29, 1938. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
249

of the dam. The solids comprised only about 13 percent of the volume, the rest 

was water that had to be drained off back into the river. Some solid materials 

were lost through drainage, so that by the end of June 1936, the dam had retained 

slightly more than 30 million of the 37.5 million cubic yards pumped through the 

pipes.39

A visitor to the site at that time would have seen not a solid dam taking 

shape but rather a swamp of water and mud. It seemed to be a perverse way to 

seal off the great river, but the method was working ahead of schedule. At the 

VDPHWLPHWKUHHRWKHUPDMRUFRPSRQHQWVRIWKH)RUW3HFNSODQZHUHDOVRWDNLQJ

VKDSHDQGDVZLWKWKHK\GUDXOLF¿OOWKHVKDSHWKH\KDGLQWKHVXPPHURI

was quite different from that which a visitor would see today.

 6LQFHWKHHDUWKGDPZDVWREORFNFRPSOHWHO\WKHÀRZRIWKHPXGG\

Missouri, the Corps designed four diversion tunnels, each more than a mile long, 

GULYHQLQWRWKH¿UPVKDOHEOXIIRQWKHULJKWEDQNDQGHDFKRQHVL]HGWRFDUU\WKH

QRUPDOÀRZRIWKHULYHU(DFKFRXOGFDUU\FXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQG:LWKD

)LJXUH$W)RUW3HFN'DPWKH&RUSVXVHGWLPEHUVDWWKHHQGRIWKHLQFKSLSHWRKHOS

VSUHDGWKHK\GUDXOLF¿OODVLWGLVFKDUJHG6KHDUERDUGZDOOVIDQQHGWKHÀRZRXWDQGUHGXFHG

velocity. May 13, 1936. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, 

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
250

three-foot thick lining of reinforced concrete, these tunnels have an inside 

diameter of just over 24 feet. Invisible today, the driving of them through temperamental shale, the masses of muck removed, and the huge jumbo traveling 

crane could all be seen by the adventurous visitor in 1936. Considered at the 

WLPHWREH3WKHPRVWLQWHUHVWLQJDQGGLI¿FXOWWXQQHOLQJZRUNXQGHUZD\LQWKH

country,” these conduits were designed to carry the entire river.40

 ,QODWHWKH&RUSVKDGVLPSOL¿HGWKHGHVLJQWRSHUPLWTXLFNHU

WXQQHOGULYLQJEHFDXVHWKHK\GUDXOLF¿OORSHUDWLRQZDVDKHDGRIVFKHGXOH7KH

engineers now saw that the dam could be closed during the summer of 1937, a 

year earlier, but only if the diversion tunnels were ready to take the entire river. The tunnel design then became the bottleneck because its complex threeOD\HUOLQLQJDVVSHFL¿HGLQWKHRULJLQDOGHVLJQFRXOGQRWEH¿QLVKHGXQWLO

Therefore, success in one part of the project forced a rethinking of another part, 

and the lining now became only a single layer. It was this major change in tunnel 

design that led to a dispute between the Corps and the contractor. Because they 

failed to agree on a price for the changed design, the government decided to take 

over the contract itself. Also, the Corps decided to keep a steel liner in one tunnel to serve as a penstock and thus permit some power generation.41

With the government now in full charge, the tunnels moved along 

quickly, and the tunnel work force alone increased from 1,000 to 3,500 men 

)LJXUH7KLV-XQHYLHZRIWKHJefferson (right) show the 28-inch pipeline from 

the dredge and a derrick towboat next to it for lifting heavy items. The cutter head at the far 

end of the JeffersonZDVLQDUDLVHGSRVLWLRQ+\GUDXOLF¿OOZDVSXPSHGXSIHHWWRWKH

dike at the top of the dam. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, 

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
251

by July 1, 1936.42 One year later, on June 7, 1937, the government-hired labor 

force completed the tunnels and two weeks later, when the river channel was 

GH¿QLWHO\FORVHGWKHHQWLUH0LVVRXULÀRZHGWKURXJKWKHWXQQHOV7KHK\GUDXOLF¿OOSURFHHGHGUDSLGO\WKDWVXPPHUDQGIDOOSLFNHGXSDJDLQLQWKHVSULQJDQG

VXPPHURIDQGJDYHHYHU\LQGLFDWLRQWKDWWKH¿OOZRXOGEHFRPSOHWHGE\

November, before the winter set in.43

)LJXUH%\$XJXVWVWRQHSODFHPHQWRQWKHXSVWUHDPIDFHRI)RUW3HFN'DPZDV

nearly complete. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National 

Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

)LJXUH7KLV6HSWHPEHULPDJHVKRZWKHFRUHSRROQHDUWKHWRSRI)RUW3HFN

Dam. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and 

Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
252

The Spillway and the Castle

In his 308 Report, Captain Wyman had given a brief description of the 

dam, the tunnels, and the spillway—the three primary features of the project. 

This last part, he had described as a series of twenty-four openings thirty feet 

wide with sills set twenty feet below the maximum design elevation of the reservoir. He planned twenty-four tainter gates twenty feet high (to retain the reservoir height) and thirty feet wide. When fully opened, these could discharge 

FXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGZKLFKMXVWH[FHHGHGWKHPD[LPXPÀRRGRI

FXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGWKDWKHFDOFXODWHG7KLVÀRRGKHDVVXPHGZRXOG

occur once every one hundred years, and, according to standard estimates of the 

WLPHWKDWZRXOGLPSO\DQDYHUDJHDQQXDOWZHQW\IRXUKRXUÀRRGRIFXELF

feet per second.44

 %HWZHHQWKHWLPHRI:\PDQ¶VUHSRUWDQGWKH¿QDOGHVLJQWKH86

Army Corps of Engineers had revised the design to sixteen stoney gates, twenty-

¿YHIHHWKLJKDQGIRUW\IHHWZLGHGHVLJQHGWRFDUU\FXELFIHHWSHUVHFond with the sills at twenty-eight and one-half feet below the reservoir surface 

(stoney gates are plate steel gates that move vertically.). The Corps calculated 

WKHPD[LPXPSUREDEOHÀRRGWRSURGXFHDÀRZLQWRWKHUHVHUYRLURI

380,000 cubic feet per second with the improbable frequency of once in 

\HDUVRUDERXWWZRDQGRQHKDOIWLPHVWKHPD[LPXPÀRRGHYHUUHFRUGHG

(about 150,000 cubic feet per second).45 This conservative approach is essential 

IRUHDUWKGDPVEHFDXVHLIWKHVSLOOZD\FDQQRWFDUU\RIIWKHÀRRGLWPD\RYHUWRS

the dam. Overtopping earthworks is fatal and dam failure is highly likely.46

Carrying away such a huge volume of water required a monumental 

structure to be built on solid foundations and to be itself impervious to erosion. 

The contractor had to strip away six million cubic yards of earth and seven million cubic yards of shale to make safe room for 400,000 cubic yards of concrete 

reinforced with about twenty-two million pounds of steel bars.47 These statistics 

dominated the engineering literature along with drawings of the gate structure—

elevations and sections, those carefully drafted documents from which builders 

convert the engineers’ calculations into constructed objects. But there was not a 

word about how the huge concrete structure would look in three dimensions or 

even in an isometric drawing. It would take someone with an artistic eye and the 

technique to record the sight to turn the engineers’ spillway into the artist’s castle.

 6LQFHHDUO\LQWKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\VRPHSDLQWHUVKDGEHHQLQÀXHQFHGGHHSO\E\LQGXVWULDOGHYHORSPHQW)RUH[DPSOH-RVHSK7XUQHULQ35DLQ

Steam and Speed” (1844), painted the Great Western Railway; and a great number of American landscape painters also were stimulated by the railroad.48 In 
253

the early twentieth century, the Eiffel Tower and the Brooklyn Bridge became 

icons for painters at the same time that photography began to be recognized 

as an art form in its own right. Charles Sheeler, an American painter and photographer, photographed the industrial landscape, including New England mill 

WRZQV+HQU\)RUG¶VLPPHQVH5LYHU5RXJHFDUIDFWRU\DQGODWHU+RRYHU

Dam (1939).49 So, in the 1930s, attention moved from industrial plants to public works. Another of the great photographic artists was Margaret Bourke-White 

who had photographed machines, factories, and industrial titans for Henry Luce’s 

Fortune.

In 1936, Luce was going to inaugurate a new magazine, called Life,

which would rely heavily on photography. To start their depression-era journal, 

KLVVWDIIGHWHUPLQHGWRIRFXVWKH¿UVWLVVXHRQWKHJUHDWHVWSXEOLFZRUNVSURMHFWRI

the day, Bonneville Dam and the domestication of the Columbia River. BourkeWhite was the ideal candidate to go west and visually capture the spirit of the 

new age of progress and the happily employed men who were rebuilding nature.50

 $V6HSWHPEHUSODQVIRUWKHQHZPDJD]LQHUHDFKHGWKH¿QDOVWDJHWKH

well-known journalist, Ernie Pyle, wrote a front page feature for the now defunct 

New York World-Telegram devoted to “Roosevelt’s New Deal Dam in Montana” 

and the Wild West images it created. As a consequence, Life’s editor directed 

Bourke-White to stop there on her way to Bonneville.

He did not realize what could result. As the editors wrote in their introGXFWLRQWRWKHPDJD]LQH¶V¿UVWLVVXH

If any Charter Subscriber is surprised by what turned out to be 

WKH¿UVWVWRU\LQWKLV¿UVWLVVXHRILIFE, he is not nearly so surprised as the Editors were. Photographer Margaret BourkeWhite had been dispatched to the Northwest to photograph 

the multi-million dollar projects of the Columbia River Basin. 

What the Editors expected—for use in some later issue—were 

construction pictures as only Bourke-White can take them. 

What the Editors got was a human document of American frontier life which, to them at least, was a revelation.51

 7KHUHYHODWLRQWRRNWZRGLVWLQFWDQGXWWHUO\GLIIHUHQWIRUPV)LUVWWKH\

got a cover, the great Montana Castle with crenulated turrets and two minuscule 

SHRSOHVHWMXVWDERYHWKHGDWHOLQH1RYHPEHU2IWHQPLVLGHQWL¿HGDV

)RUW3HFN'DPLWLVRIFRXUVHWKHVSLOOZD\JDWHVWUXFWXUHDVLWDSSHDUHGWKDWIDOO

incomplete but splendidly majestic in bare concrete. It is one of those concrete 

sculptures that is designed to be fully functional when complete but is 
254

)LJXUH&RQFUHWHSODFHPHQWRQWKHUHLQIRUFHGVSLOOZD\ÀRRUDW)RUW3HFNSource: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

)LJXUH7KH)RUW3HFN'DPVSLOOZD\JDWHVWUXFWXUHRQ$XJXVWZLWKWKHZDWHUOHYHO

near the maximum. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National 

Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
255

totally without function until then. The turrets carry the light railroad, and the 

lower battlements are a pedestrian walk, all of which looks quite appropriate now 

but not nearly so exotic as when Miss Bourke-White saw it in 1936.

The second visual surprise Life’s charter subscribers got was a close look 

at the workers, their shanty towns, and the night life of raw frontier communities 

in the otherwise desolate landscape of eastern Montana. Life made sure that the 

carefully posed portraits of the Corps’ two men in charge, Lt. Col. T. B. Larkin 

and Major Clark Kittrell, were set in facing pages that juxtaposed photos of two 

bars and two pictures of the best known brothel in town. A huge steel liner secWLRQIRURQHGLYHUVLRQWXQQHOXQL¿HGWKHFRPSRVLWLRQ52 The spillway remains today; the shanty towns disappeared years ago.

The Corps had made a serious effort to provide decent living quarters 

IRUWKHZRUNHUVE\EXLOGLQJDPRGHOFRPPXQLW\FDOOHGWKHWRZQRI)RUW3HFNEXW

it made one serious miscalculation. The Corps assumed that most workers wo

uld be single men, so barracks were built for them, but Montana state law gave 

hiring preference to married men. So families lived in the surrounding new 

towns of Wheeler, Delano Heights, New Deal, Square Deal, Park Grove, and 

:LOVRQ:KHUHDVWKHWRZQRI)RUW3HFNKDGDOOWKHDPHQLWLHVWKHRWKHUVZHUH

short on indoor plumbing, clean water, and electricity. When engineer 

)LJXUH3UHVLGHQW)UDQNOLQ'5RRVHYHOWLQVSHFWVWKH)RUW3HFN'DPSURMHFWRQ$XJXVW

6, 1934. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, record Group 77, National Archives 

and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
256

Captain Ewart G. Plank, who served as town manager, boasted that the town 

“stands in striking contrast to construction camps of even the recent past” he conveniently ignored the nearby shanty towns.53

Captain Plank’s article appeared in the Military Engineer during the 

WLPHRI0DUJDUHW%RXUNH:KLWH¶VYLVLWWRWKHWRZQVWKDWKHKDGLJQRUHG)XUWKHU

national publicity came to the dam a year after Bourke-White’s visit when, on 

October 3, 1937, President Roosevelt traveled to a location just below the dam to 

speak of the great work. Excursion trains and charter buses brought people from 

all over Montana.54

Slide and Recovery

After closure, the work continued where “phenomenal performance records are being established by the four hydraulic dredge units. . .(which now operate at) double the designed capacity of the plant.”55 Such performance continXHGLQWRDQGLWVHHPHGFOHDUWKDWWKHSODFLQJRIK\GUDXOLF¿OOZRXOGEH

¿QLVKHGLQ1RYHPEHU2Q)HEUXDU\WKH)RUW3HFN'LVWULFWRI¿FHLVVXHG

a statement that “at the present time, nothing is foreseen which will prevent the 

orderly completion of the project by the fall of 1939.” The continuing good performance of the dredges during 1938 “gave employees ‘itchy feet’ and many 

started looking for the next job.” The Corps had already begun demobilization 

and disposal of workers’ buildings during the summer.56 One person who did not 

ORRNIRUDQRWKHUMREZDV-HUROG9DQ)DDVHQZKRKDGEHHQZRUNLQJRQWKHGDP

since October 1935 and who, on September 15, 1938, took over, from his departLQJERVVWKHMRERIVXSHUYLVLRQLQWKH6RLO(QJLQHHULQJDQG)LOO&RQWURO6HFWLRQ

He had to decide where the dredging would be done based on results from core 

samples, and he had to supervise survey crews on the dam to ensure proper elevations of the growing dam.

On the morning of September 22, at about 9:30 A.M., one of his survey 

party chiefs reported that at the east end of the dam the upstream embankment or 

shell was only one foot higher than the core pool’s water. Normally, it was kept 

IURPIRXUWR¿YHIHHWKLJKHU6RPHWKLQJZDVYHU\ZURQJVR9DQ)DDVHQRUGHUHG

DVHFRQGVXUYH\WRFRQ¿UPWKHKD]DUGRXVVLWXDWLRQDQGKHLPPHGLDWHO\FRQWDFWed his superior.57:KLOH9DQ)DDVHQZDLWHGWKHVXUYH\SDUWLHVZHUHVWUXJJOLQJ

DQGZHUH¿QGLQJPRUHGLVWXUELQJGLVWRUWLRQV7KHZDWHUOHYHORIWKHFRUHSRRO

had not risen or dropped and the downstream freeboard remained safely where 

it had been the day before. The upstream embankment was moving down. As 

one surveyor, Ray Kendall, later reported, “[I] was having trouble setting up the 

level when I noticed a small crack in the ground underneath my feet. . . . In a 

few seconds it got considerably deeper and longer.” He saw two fellow workers 

Douglas Moore and Nelson Van Stone, down on the upstream road “waving and 
257

yelling.” Then suddenly they disappeared. “I looked at my watch. . . . It was 

1:21 P.M.” Kendall climbed to safety from where “I searched the terrible scene 

for bodies but all was in vain.”58

Moments before, a maintenance man, Ralph Anglen, on one of the huge 

drag lines (cranes), saw the same scene and was close enough to Van Stone 

so that “as I dropped he [Van Stone] went out of sight and I heard him say, 

‘Goodbye, boys.’” Anglen came up in the lake, covered with mud but alive; 

Van Stone never did. He was one of eight who died. Anglen was one of 26 who 

went under but lived.59

Others were luckier and could run to safety, among them the project 

leader, Clark Kittrell, who had been driven out to the troubled area in the early 

afternoon. His car, driven by Eugene Tourlotte, approached from the west and 

arrived at the site at about 1:15 P.M. Tourlotte saw the upstream shell begin to 

move out beneath the car so he slammed on the brakes and went in reverse at its 

highest speed. The dam break seemed to follow them as the car just made it to 

beyond the point where the sliding section broke away and swung out into the 

SDUWO\¿OOHGUHVHUYRLU60

)LJXUH2Q6HSWHPEHUDFXELF\DUGVOLGHRFFXUUHGRQWKHXSVWUHDP

HPEDQNPHQWRI)RUW3HFN'DPSource: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record 

Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
258

Army discipline then prevailed, and after searching for survivors, work 

began immediately to repair the damage, which included about 5 million cubic yards of slide material, a broken rail line, and a disruption of dredging. 

Stabilizing the dam by placing quarry stone along the upstream face of the damDJHGDUHDZKLFKFRXOGEHEHJXQDIWHUWKHZRUNHUVUHEXLOWWKHUDLOOLQHLQMXVW¿YH

GD\V%\2FWREHUGUHGJHVEHJDQVHQGLQJK\GUDXOLF¿OOLQWRWKHXSVWUHDPUHgion behind the quarry stone. This protective dike work proceeded rapidly until 

the winter shutdown.61

Meanwhile, the Corps assembled a Board of Consultants to study the 

slide. Three had been consultants on the dam design and six more were added after the slide. Prominently among those added were Arthur Casagrande and 

-RHO-XVWLQ7KHLU¿QDOUHSRUWZDVWRDGGUHVVWZRPDMRUTXHVWLRQV+RZWRUHEXLOGWKHGDPDQGZKDWZDVWKHFDXVHRIWKHVOLGH"62

The Board of Consultants met at the site between October 3 and 6, 1938, 

to inspect the slide and discuss temporary measures and tests. The Corps had alUHDG\EHJXQGLVFXVVLQJÀDWWHUVORSHVLQWKHXSVWUHDPDUHDVDQGIROORZLQJWKH

)LJXUH*UDYHODQGVWRQHIDFLQJFDQEHVHHQLQWKHPDWHULDOWKDWVOLGDZD\IURPWKH

XSVWUHDPHPEDQNPHQWDW)RUW3HFN'DPRQ6HSWHPEHUSource: Records of the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, College 

Park, Maryland.
259

Board’s meeting, Division Engineer C. L. Sturdevant; Thomas Middlebrooks, the 

&RUSV¶H[SHUWRQVRLOPHFKDQLFVDQG.LWWUHOODOOUHFRPPHQGHGÀDWWHUVORSHVLQ

the rebuilding programs.63 Strong differences of opinion began to surface among 

the members.64$¿QDOPHHWLQJLQ:DVKLQJWRQ'&RQ0DUFKDQGOHGWRWKH

formal Report of the Board of Consultants, which was published in July.

The report, with three of the ten members dissenting, reached the major conclusion “that the shearing resistance of the weathered shale and bentonLWHVHDPVLQWKHIRXQGDWLRQZDVLQVXI¿FLHQWWRZLWKVWDQGWKHVKHDULQJIRUFHWR

which the foundation was subjected.” It then recommended that the dam section 

EHLQFUHDVHGVXFKWKDWWKHXSVWUHDPVORSHEHÀDWWHQHGIURPWKHDYHUDJHRIRQHLQ

four (a slope angle of 14°) to an average of one in eight (an angle of about 7°). 

,QGHHGWKH¿QDOFURVVVHFWLRQWKDWWKH\UHFRPPHQGHGLVHYHQÀDWWHUEHLQJPRUH

than one in 20 in the area of the slide and an average of over one in ten in the rest 

of the dam.65

 2QWKHVHQVLWLYHLVVXHRIWKHK\GUDXOLF¿OOWKH%RDUGUHFRPPHQGHGWKDW

WKHVKHOOFRXOGEHFRPSOHWHGXSWRZLWKLQDERXWWZHQW\¿YHIHHWRIWKHFUHVWE\

WKDWPHWKRGEXWDERYHWKDWRQO\E\GXPSHG¿OOFRPSDFWHGE\UROOHUV,QDGGLWLRQLWVWLSXODWHGWKDWWKHFRUHEHFRPSOHWHGRQO\E\UROOHG¿OODQGKHUH0U

William Gerig dissented. As one of the original members of the board of consultants and senior engineer in the employ of the Army Corps, Gerig still believed 

WKDWK\GUDXOLF¿OOFRXOGFRPSOHWHWKHFRUH66

Since adequate stability against sliding depends heavily on the ratio of 

the slope derived from the material’s internal friction (tan f ) to the slope of the 

HPEDQNPHQWWDQDLHWKHIDFWRURIVDIHW\)6sWDQIWDQDWKXVDÀDWWHU

VORSHWRWKHHPEDQNPHQWVPDOOHUWDQD ULVHOHQJWKZLOOPDNHDVDIHUGDP

even if the cohesion is zero.677KXVWKHSULPDU\IDFWRIWKH)RUW3HFNVOLGHZDV

the steep upstream slope, and in future dams, Garrison and Oahe for example, the 

XSVWUHDPVORSHVZRXOGEHRQHLQHLJKWRUÀDWWHU68 This was the great lesson from 

)RUW3HFNEXWWKHUHZHUHDGGLWLRQDORQHVWKDWDURVHIURPWKHRWKHUWZRGLVVHQWHUV

and from persons in high places.

 2Q1RYHPEHUWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUVUHFHLYHGDFRQ¿GHQWLDOPHPRrandum from President Roosevelt. It said in toto:

9DULRXVUHSRUWVDUHFRPLQJWRP\RI¿FHUHODWLQJWRWKH)RUW

Peck Dam such as serious damage of various kinds, danger of 

the whole thing going out, and similar alarmist stories. 

Would you be good enough to let me have a memorandum.69
260

FURVVVHFWLRQRIK\GUDXOLF¿OODW)RUW3HFN'DPZDVGHVLJQHGDW$IWHUWKHVOLGHGXULQJUHGHVLJQWKH&RUSVGHFUHDVHG

Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
261

Needless to say the Chief of Engineers did not dally; a full memorandum appeared the next day on the desk of the Secretary of War from General 

M. C. Tyler, acting Chief of Engineers, detailing the situation. It is a concise, 

but accurate, assessment of the dam’s design and construction, a description of 

the slide, and an outline of steps taken to plan reconstruction and determine the 

cause. The last sentence stated that “the Chief of Engineers knows of no grounds 

for the reports and alarmist stories to which the President refers in his memorandum.” A major feature of the Corps’ response was to identify the new members 

of the Board with two of them, Casagrande and Gilboy, specially noted as coming from Harvard and MIT respectively.70

 :KLOHWKDWPHPRUDQGXPVDWLV¿HGWKHFRPPDQGHULQFKLHIWZRPHPbers of the Board were not to be so placated. The most unhappy was Thaddeus 

Merriman (1876-1939), who had been suspicious of the Board’s direction even 

DIWHUWKH¿UVWPHHWLQJ71 On November 22, he had sent Kittrell a detailed, fourpage letter expressing grave concern about the plan of action that the Board and 

the Corps were following. His primary worry was over the weathered shale 

foundation, which he believed to be unable to sustain any dam and which, 

)LJXUH7KHSODQIRU*DUULVRQ'DP1RUWK'DNRWDSource: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
262

JK*DUULVRQ'DPSource: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
263

therefore, needed to be excavated before rebuilding the dam. His conclusion was 

WKDWWKHSUREOHPVZHUH3ERWKGLI¿FXOWDQGIDUÀXQJ ́WKDW3QHLWKHUWLPHQRUFRVW

nor effort can be permitted to interfere in even the slightest degree with their correct solution,” and that “no error of design and no lapse in construction procedure on the repair of this slide will ever be explainable.”72 This is the position of 

absolute safety with no thought to economy. His proposals were so complex that 

they would have made the cost of the dam prohibitively high. Meanwhile, the 

Corps proceeded on the course of action developed in conjunction with the majority of the Board members in October and November.

Merriman was a distinguished engineer, having been chief engineer of 

the Board of Water Supply of the city of New York from 1927 until his retirePHQWLQ+HEHFDPHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKH)RUW3HFN3URMHFWZKHQKLVUHsearch on cement led to a sulfate resistant Portland cement, which the Corps adopted for use in the spillway. He had experience with dams in the New York area 

but little detailed background in large-scale embankments. He was still a leading 

expert on water supply, having served as a consultant to the Metropolitan Water 

District of Southern California on its project to get water from the Colorado 

River. He also was a consultant to the Tennessee Valley Authority on Norris 

Dam and other large dams as well as to major agencies in Pennsylvania and 

Massachusetts.73

Meanwhile, the Corps had hired one of the foremost theorists in Civil 

Engineering, the Danish-American Harvard professor, H. M. Westergaard, to 

prepare a report on the dam’s stability, which he submitted to Kittrell in time 

for the Board’s meeting in late January 1939. The civilian engineer at the site, 

:)&XPPLQV-UUHYLHZHG:HVWHUJDDUG¶VUHSRUWRQWKHG\QDPLFVRIWKHVOLGH

and concluded that his results are close to those obtained from a static analysis 

(which uses the safety factor approach referred to above).74 After the draft reSRUWRI)HEUXDU\0HUULPDQSXWKLVREMHFWLRQVLQWRDWHQSDJHUHSRUWRIKLVRZQ

He noted that he had been unable to participate in the preparation of the Board’s 

report, and he reiterated his objections from November. In addition, Warren 

-0HDGDSURIHVVRURIJHRORJ\DW0,7ZURWHODWHULQ)HEUXDU\VWDWLQJKLV

agreement with the engineering principles of the Board’s report and even with 

Merriman’s analysis, but he announced that he could not sign the report because 

WKHUHZDVQRSURJUDPDQDO\VLVRIWKHULVNYHUVXVWKHEHQH¿WV$VKHSXWLW3,WLV

my belief that the purposes of building the Dam do not justify the existence of 

this admittedly remote threat to the Missouri River Valley.”75 Here he is getting 

DWWKHLVVXHRIEHQH¿WZKLFKZDVE\SDVVHGLQZKHQWKH3UHVLGHQWFKRVHWR

provide immediate employment for depression-stricken men and ignored issues 

RISURMHFWEHQH¿WV
264

The deeper issue raised by both formal dissenters (Gerig dissented only 

ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHFRUH¿OODQGXQOLNH0HUULPDQDQG0HDGGLGVLJQWKHPDMRUity report) relates to the safety of the dam or of any public works project whose 

failure would risk life and property. As any engineer knows, no construction can 

be made free of risk, especially one that seeks to control the force of a huge river. 

0HDGZDVSHUKDSVFRUUHFWLQLPSO\LQJWKDWQRFRVWEHQH¿WDQDO\VLVZRXOGMXVtify such a dam, and Merriman was undoubtedly correct that it would have been 

safer to have excavated the unreliable foundation material. But the decision to 

build was politically irrevocable; Roosevelt’s memo never implied that the dam 

be abandoned or even put on hold; but only that it be repaired based on the best 

engineering judgment in the nation.

But the dissenters’ 

arguments required a careful response by the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers—more detailed than its November answer to Roosevelt. Therefore, 

Major General Julian Schley, 

Chief of Engineers, directed the 

Board to report to him on the 

views of Merriman and Mead. 

The Board replied on March 3, 

1939, having known the objecWLRQVVLQFHWKHLU)HEUXDU\PHHWing. Of Merriman’s many recommendations, the Board rejected the central one of excavating the shale by stating that 

“an ample factor of safety is 

SURYLGHGE\WKHH[WUHPHO\ÀDW

slopes adopted for the new design.” The report went on to 

reject Merriman’s other recommendations and then turned to 

Mead’s letter, which it dismissed with the observation that “the Board does not 

FRQVLGHUWKDWDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOYDOXHVRIWKH)RUW3HFN

Project is within its province.” Mead had agreed with the Board on the “engineering principles involved.”76 General Tyler wrote a memorandum to General 

Schley summarizing the project and recommending that the Board’s report and 

response be approved, which Schley did on October 7.77 With that, the Board’s 

arguments ended and the project continued as planned.

)LJXUH*HQHUDO-XOLDQ/6FKOH\Source:

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
265

Completion and Controversy

 7KHODVWHDUWK¿OOUROOHGRQWRWKHGDPRQ2FWREHULQVWHDGRIODWH

1938 as originally planned.78 The slide delay, together with the substantial redeVLJQDGGHGDERXWSHUFHQWPRUHHDUWK¿OOWKDQRULJLQDOO\SODQQHG%XWZKLOH

the dam continued toward completion, the controversies within the Board became more public. The Corps recognized that the great importance of the project 

GHPDQGHGDSXEOLFDFFRXQWLQJQRWRQO\LQWKHRI¿FLDOUHSRUWEXWDOVRLQDMRXUQDO

paper. Therefore, in the spring of 1939, Thomas Middlebrooks, the Corps’ Chief 

Engineer for Soil Mechanics began to prepare a paper for the Proceedings of the

American Society of Civil Engineers. At the same time, the ASCE organized a 

VHVVLRQDWLWV6DQ)UDQFLVFRPHHWLQJWRGLVFXVVWKHSDSHU79

Already, Karl Terzaghi, writing in Britain’s Journal of the Institute of

Civil EngineersLQ-XQHVWDWHGWKDW37KLV>DÀRZIDLOXUH@ZDVGHPRQVWUDWed . . . by the failure of a dam . . . in the U.S.A. Without warning, 10 million cubic yards of earth were lost within a few minutes.”80)ORZIDLOXUHPHDQVWKDW

WKHVDQGVKHOOORVHVDOOLWVVKHDUVWUHQJWK2LWEHFRPHVTXLFNVDQG2DQGÀRZV

like a liquid (the condition engineers call liquefaction). The Board’s conclusion 

KDGEHHQTXLWHGLIIHUHQWLWKDGLGHQWL¿HGWKHIDLOXUHLQWKHIRXQGDWLRQQRWLQWKH

shell, and due to weak seams of weathered shale and bentonite.

After those comments, Middlebrooks wrote Terzaghi a letter expressing strong disagreement with the distinguished professor.81 In early September, 

Terzaghi replied in some detail, even drawing diagrams to illustrate his view of 

how the slide had occurred. His letter contains the outline of a theoretical analysis of the stresses in the foundation, but his principal arguments have more to do 

with human nature than with natural laws.

 )LUVW7HU]DJKLXVHGKLVH[SHULHQFH

I have investigated at least twenty foundation failures due 

to . . . weak layers of clay beneath the base of embankments 

. . . characteristic for all these slides was an energetic compression of the lowest part of the downstream slope, which is conVSLFXRXVO\DEVHQWLQWKH)RUW3HFNFDVH

6RKHFODLPHGLWPXVWKDYHEHHQDÀRZIDLOXUH3)RUWZHQW\\HDUV,KDYHFROOHFWHGZKDWHYHUGDWD,FRXOGVHFXUHFRQFHUQLQJÀRZIDLOXUHVDQGDVDFRQVHTXHQFH,

am fairly familiar with these phenomena.”

Second, he questioned the Board’s judgment, being careful not to impugn any individual. He admitted that a foundation failure had occurred but it 
266

was only an agent “which pulled the trigger” to set in motion the inherently unstable sand embankment saturated by the method of hydraulicking. He implied 

that the Board, partially made up of people who had, in Terzaghi’s words, “fatally overestimated the safety of the foundation (in 1935),” had not clearly explained the problems. As support, he quoted an editorial in the May 11, 1939, 

Engineering News-Record which stated: 

Two or three years ago it was discovered that a loosely deposited mass of sand, if later saturated, might undergo sudden liqXHIDFWLRQZKHQGLVWXUEHGE\DVKRFNRURWKHUZLVHDQGWKH)RUW

Peck slide was believed by many to be due to such liquefaction. 

It was therefore to be expected that the report would place the 

question beyond any doubt. The two sentences which the board 

GHYRWHVWRWKHTXHVWLRQRIFDXVHDUHTXLWHLQVXI¿FLHQWIRUWKLV

purpose.82

Middlebrooks’ 1942 paper devoted far more than two sentences to liquefaction. In nearly two pages of the twenty page paper, he discussed a major 1936 paper of Casagrande’s, a series of tests on materials taken from the 

XSVWUHDPVKHOODW)RUW3HFNDQGHQGHGZLWKDFRQFOXVLRQ3WKDWWKHVKHOOPDWHULDOZDVRIVXI¿FLHQWGHQVLW\WRSUHYHQWLWIURPEHFRPLQJOLTXH¿HGHYHQXQGHU

the severe stress conditions that occurred during the slide.”83 Here was his answer to Terzaghi. However, Glennon Gilboy, in discussing Middlebrooks’ paper, stated that “the critical density tests (crucial to Middlebrooks’ argument) do 

not prove the absence of liquefaction; and that the balance of other evidence is 

strongly in favor of the view that some liquefaction took place. . . .” Gilboy was 

a member of the Board but also a Cambridge ally of Terzaghi.84 In his closure, 

Middlebrooks downplayed that viewpoint and stuck to his two major 

FRQFOXVLRQV3WKDWWKHK\GUDXOLF¿OOZDVQRWDWIDXOW ́DQGWKDWWKHIDLOXUHZDVQRW

by liquefaction.

Behind this disagreement was a more typical twentieth-century debate, the one between academics and practitioners or more precisely in this case, 

between those who consult and those who construct. Terzaghi’s experience, 

like Casagrande’s and Gilboy’s, was substantial but it was advisory, whereas 

Middlebrooks and Gerig worked for the bureau that was responsible for building. Indeed, after Middlebrooks’ article appeared in December 1940, the ASCE 

wrote Gerig asking him to contribute a discussion. He wrote right away to 

Middlebrooks, saying that he would do it even though he did not agree with everything in the paper, but he stressed, “I am not prepared to accept everything 

that Casagrande, Terzaghi, and Gilboy accept.”85
267

In his reply, Middlebrooks took up the same theme:

There is no doubt that his [Terzaghi’s] statement at that time 

was prompted by Casagrande’s conclusions. Incidentally 

Casagrande has cooled off considerably recently in regards to 

his ‘critical density’ theory. You know, they have “fads” like 

the ladies, which come and go with the seasons.

Middlebrooks was not so certain about everything at the dam; later in the letter he noted that he had not been to the site recently and that there was so far 

very little seepage through the dam. However, the reservoir was still low. “I expected some seepage out-crops” he wrote, “on high stages, but nothing serious 

(I hope).”86+LVKRSHVZHUHQRWIXO¿OOHGVHHSDJHZDVWRRJUHDWDQGWKLVOHGWKH

Corps to develop a new device, the relief well, to control seepage.87

Years later, Middlebrooks, in a review paper presented at the ASCE 

&HQWHQQLDO&RQYHQWLRQLQ&KLFDJRQRWHGWKHQHHGIRUWKHUHOLHIZHOOVDW)RUW

Peck, but he also returned to the slide and reiterated his view that it was not a 

ÀRZIDLOXUH+HLQGLUHFWO\GHIHQGHGK\GUDXOLF¿OOE\H[SODLQLQJWKDWIHZVXFK

GDPVIROORZHG)RUW3HFNEHFDXVHRI3WKHLPSURYHPHQWLQHDUWKH[FDYDWLQJKDXOLQJDQGFRPSDFWLRQHTXLSPHQW>WKDW@KDVUHGXFHGWKHFRVWRIUROOHG¿OOVWRVXFKD

GHJUHHWKDWK\GUDXOLF¿OOVFDQQRWFRPSHWHXQOHVVFLUFXPVWDQFHVDUHH[FHSWLRQDOO\

favorable.”88

 1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHVWDQGDUGERRNRQHDUWKGDPVSURQRXQFHGWKDWWKH)RUW

Peck slide and:

at least a dozen similar failures of major dams . . . occurred beFDXVHWKHK\GUDXOLF¿OOPHWKRGRIFRQVWUXFWLRQUHVXOWHGLQDQ

embankment which was, at least in part, composed of very 

ORRVHO\FRPSDFWHGVDWXUDWHGVDQGZKLFKμOLTXH¿HG¶7KHUHDUH

no records of similar trouble during construction of compacted 

earth dams.”89:KDW¿QDOO\ZDVWKHFDXVHRIWKHVOLGH"

A review of this controversy more than 60 years later reveals that there 

was not one cause but, as is usually the case in such major events, several. We 

FDQLGHQWLI\DWOHDVW¿YHWKHIRXQGDWLRQVOLSWKHUHODWLYHO\VWHHSXSVWUHDPVORSH

the saturated sand shell, the high speed of construction, and the redirection of the 

river. Terzaghi, Middlebrooks, and the Board all agreed that the foundation slip 

instigated the failure. Of all the experts, only Merriman seems to have raised the 

foundation issue before the slide, and he did it in 1935 during discussions of design. In 1933, the Corps had collected a respected group of consultants, and, in 

that sense, the design should be seen as the state-of-the-art.
268

No one seems to have objected to the steep upstream slope, and, yet, after the slide, no one would defend it. Therefore, it appears that the profession 

fully accepted the two primary causes: foundation slip and steep slope. The bigJHVWFRQWURYHUV\DURVHRYHUWKHÀRZIDLOXUHDQGLWVFRQQHFWLRQWRWKHK\GUDXOLF¿OO7KLVZDVDVHGXFWLYHFRQVWUXFWLRQPHWKRGIRUWKH&RUSVLQWKHGHSUHVVLRQ\HDUVEHFDXVHLWSURPLVHGUHODWLYHO\HDV\DFFHVVWR¿OOPDWHULDOVLWLQYROYHG

dredging, at which the Corps was expert; and it had the approval of leading engineers, especially Wegmann, Justin, and even Gilboy. It seems clear that had 

WKHUHEHHQQRVOLSDQGKDGWKHVORSHEHHQÀDWWHUWKHUHZRXOGKDYHEHHQQRVOLGH

HYHQZLWKWKHK\GUDXOLF¿OO6XUHO\ZLWKWKRVHWZRSULPDU\IHDWXUHVWKHHIIHFWV

of hydraulicking, as described by Sherard, et al., did cause the slide to move 

more quickly and more extensively. Also, the speed of construction contributed 

WRWKHÀRZDQGWKHUHGLUHFWHGULYHU±SDUWO\XQGHUPLQLQJWKHUHJLRQEH\RQGWKH

toe–helped to extend the slide.

This situation of multiple causes was to be repeated even more dramatically two years later near Tacoma, Washington, on another depression era project, the doomed Tacoma Narrows Bridge. The third longest spanning bridge in 

the world completely failed in a moderate wind storm while movie cameras recorded it tearing apart. The bridge had too little deck vertical stiffness, almost no 

torsional stiffness, and had a solid plate girder facing the wind.90-XVWDVDW)RUW

Peck, the rebuilt work corrected those major faults and changed the profession’s 

DSSURDFKWRODUJHVFDOHFRQVWUXFWLRQ,QERWKFDVHVWKHSURIHVVLRQEHQH¿WWHG

from disaster.

 2QH¿QDOZRUGRQWKH7HU]DJKL0LGGOHEURRNVFRQWURYHUV\7KHSURfession has long since recognized these two pioneers as exemplary engineers. 

Terzaghi won many ASCE awards for this research, and Middlebrooks twice 

won the Laurie Award for highly meritorious papers (including the one on the 

slide). After his death in 1955, the American Society of Civil Engineers established the Thomas A. Middlebrooks Award for a paper on geotechnical engineerLQJVRLOPHFKDQLFVWKH¿UVWVXFKDZDUGHVWDEOLVKHGE\WKH6RFLHW\,QWKH

6RFLHW\HVWDEOLVKHGWKH.DUO7HU]DJKL$ZDUGIRUFRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKHVDPH¿HOG91 

7KHGHEDWHEHWZHHQWKHVHWZRHQJLQHHUVLVWRGD\RIOHVVVLJQL¿FDQFHWKDQWKH

)RUW3HFN'DPZKLFKZDVLQWKHHQGDYDVWDQGVXFFHVVIXOH[SHULPHQW,WVFRQstruction period coincided with the time when soil mechanics entered the world 

RIHDUWK¿OOGDPV,WVKXJHVFDOHPDGHLWDGDULQJGHVLJQDQGLWVSDUWLDOIDLOXUH

UHYHDOHGGHIHFWVLQWKDWGHVLJQ%XWLWQHYHUWKHOHVVVHUYHGWRFRQ¿UPWKHYDOLGity of using embankments for mainstream dams on the great Missouri. This success was crucial to the next major event on that river, an event which would completely restructure that waterway after World War II.
269

THE PICK-SLOAN PLAN

The Pick Plan

On March 4, 1939, Joel D. Justin, chairman of the Board of Consultants 

IRUWKH)RUW3HFNVOLGHZURWHWR*HQHUDO7\OHU&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUVWHOOLQJRID

0DUFKPHHWLQJWKDWKHZDVWRKDYHZLWK5HFODPDWLRQRQDQHDUWK¿OOGDPLQ

Nebraska. Because of the slide, some engineers thought the Reclamation dam 

ZDVXQVDIHDQG-XVWLQZDQWHGWRVKRZGDWDIURP)RUW3HFNWRFRQYLQFHWKHPWKDW

the Reclamation dam was very different and, thus, safe. He was on the Board of 

Consultants for that dam. The general gave him permission by phone to show 

them data but not to give them anything.92 It was one small example of the suspicions that kept the two dam building bureaus apart. The Missouri Basin planning would bring those competitive strains to the surface in the most public political arena, the Congress of the United States.

Later that year, the Congress passed the Reclamation Project Act of 

1939 (August 4, 1939). Section 9 directed Reclamation to broaden its irrigation studies to include hydroelectric power, municipal water supply, and other 

IHDWXUHVZKLFKFRXOGLQFOXGHQDYLJDWLRQDQGÀRRGFRQWURO,QWKHVHODWWHUWZR

cases, Reclamation was to consult the Chief of Engineers. To head the study 

for the Missouri Basin, Reclamation picked an Assistant Regional Director and 

seasoned engineer, William Glenn Sloan, who had worked for the Corps, for 

the Department of Agriculture, and in private practice. Sloan had been with 

Reclamation since 1936.93 Sloan’s studies had been progressing slowly and 

carefully for almost four years when Missouri River Division Engineer Colonel 

Lewis A. Pick entered the planning scene in a quick and decisive way. On 

0D\3LFNDSSHDUHGEHIRUHWKH+RXVH&RPPLWWHHRQ)ORRG&RQWURO

7KHLPPHGLDWHLVVXHIRUKLVGLYLVLRQFHQWHUHGRQWKHUHFHQWÀRRGLQJRIWKH

Missouri, but a more general worry was the fear of a post war depression and the 

need, therefore, of public works to counteract veterans’ unemployment.94 Lack 

of work right after World War I combined with the New Deal efforts in the 1930s 

led the Congress and the president to think about preparing for large-scale river 

engineering once the war ended.

The result of Pick’s testimony was a committee resolution directing 

the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors to review earlier reports on the 

0LVVRXUL5LYHUDQGWRGHWHUPLQH3ZKHWKHUDQ\PRGL¿FDWLRQVKRXOGEHPDGH

WKHUHLQZLWKUHVSHFWWRÀRRGFRQWURODORQJWKHPDLQVWHPIURP6LRX[&LW\

Iowa, to its mouth.”95 That rather innocent sounding order set Pick off onto the 

preparation of a plan for the Missouri River Basin.
270

 0RUHRYHU3LFN¶VUHSRUWZDVLQVWLJDWHGE\WKH&RPPLWWHHRQ)ORRG

&RQWURODQGWZRPDMRUÀRRGVKDGMXVWRFFXUUHGZKHQ3LFNZDVWHVWLI\LQJ7KH

¿UVWRQHLQ0DUFKEUHDFKHGOHYHHVDOOWKHZD\IURP6LRX[&LW\WR.DQVDV&LW\

and the second, in May, breached or overtopped most of the levees between 

Jefferson City and the mouth of the Missouri.96 This was a graphic illustration of 

WKHQHHGIRUEHWWHUÀRRGFRQWURODQGDV3LFNHPSKDVL]HGLQKLVUHSRUWRI$XJXVW

3FRPSOHWHSURWHFWLRQDJDLQVWDOOÀRRGVRIUHFRUGE\OHYHHVDORQHLVLPpracticable.”97 This fact, already stressed in the 308 Wyman Report, led him to 

SURSRVHDVHULHVRIKXJHPDLQVWUHDPGDPVDQGUHVHUYRLUVEHWZHHQ)RUW3HFNDQG

Sioux City and to stress that “for the maximum utilization of the waters of the 

basin, the reservoirs proposed above Sioux City should be multiple-purpose projHFWV ́+HLGHQWL¿HG¿YHVXFKSURMHFWVRQWKH0LVVRXUL*DUULVRQ2DN&UHHN

2DKH)RUW5DQGDOODQG*DYLQV3RLQW98

Colonel Pick held a few hearings on his tentative plans in Montana, 

,RZDDQG1HEUDVNDEHWZHHQ-XQHDQGZKLOHWKHGLVWULFWRI¿FHVRI.DQVDV

&LW\DQG2PDKDSUHSDUHGWKHGDWDWKDWWKHGLYLVLRQRI¿FHZRXOGFRUUHODWH

Pick submitted his plan, described in a mere 12 pages, to the Chief of 

Engineers on August 10, 1943, less than three months after the House Committee 

resolution. The plan was exceedingly simple; it included strengthening levees 

EHORZ6LRX[&LW\IRUPLOOLRQEXLOGLQJWKH¿YHPDLQVWUHDPGDPVIRU

$330 million, constructing two other multipurpose dams for $55 million, and 

)LJXUH/HZLV$3LFNDIWHUKLVSURPRtion to general. Source: U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers.

)LJXUH:LOOLDP*OHQQ6ORDQ Source:

Bureau of Reclamation
271

FRQVWUXFWLQJ¿YHVPDOOHUGDPVIRUPLOOLRQ99 Although the total of $490 million has little meaning in post World War II money, the breakdown shows clearly 

Pick’s priorities. And these priorities would not go uncontested.

Pick sent his report to the Chief of Engineers and to the Board of 

Engineers for Rivers and Harbors (a congressionally authorized review board 

FRQVLVWLQJRI&RUSVRI¿FHUV7KH%RDUGVHQWDSSURYDOWRWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUV

RQ$XJXVWDQG¿YHGD\VODWHUWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUVVHQWERWKWKH%RDUG¶V

approval letter and Pick’s report to Commissioner Harry Bashore of the Bureau 

RI5HFODPDWLRQDQGWR/HODQG2OGV&KDLUPDQ)HGHUDO3RZHU&RPPLVVLRQ7KH

Acting Chief of Engineers, Major General Thomas M. Robins sent the two documents to the Department of Agriculture on November 10. The responses from 

Olds and the Agriculture Department were favorable, yet cautious; but Bashore’s 

response on December 17, 1943, was more detailed and with substantial negative implications. Bashore’s primary worry was that Congress would ignore 

5HFODPDWLRQ¶VGHWDLOHGEXWXQ¿QLVKHGSODQDQGPRYHWRRTXLFNO\WRDGRSWWKH

Corps’ proposal. He urged the Chief of Engineers to recognize “that a truly 

comprehensive plan can be developed best through integration of these two approaches.” He was hampered, of course, because Reclamation’s approach would 

QRWEHUHDG\XQWLOWKHVSULQJRI7KHUHIRUHKHLGHQWL¿HGDVHWRISULQFLSOHV

that any coordinated plan should follow. Bashore’s primary goal, after the need 

to work with the Corps, was to insure that the region above Sioux City would 

provide irrigation and that, where 

irrigation and power predominated, 

Reclamation be the bureau of design, construction, and operation. 

+HGLGKRZHYHUDJUHHWKDWWKH¿YH

ELJGDPVEHWZHHQ)RUW3HFNDQG

Sioux City be constructed, operated, 

and maintained by the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers. Since this had 

been Pick’s central concern and the 

greatest priority of his plan, Bashore 

was laying the basis for a single coordinated plan.100

In his summary of the Pick 

Plan and of responses to it from other agencies, the Chief of Engineers, 

Major General Eugene Reybold, 

strongly urged that the Corps’ plan 

be approved right away and that 

LWV¿UVWSKDVHEHDXWKRUL]HG+H )LJXUH*HQHUDO(XJHQH5H\EROG

Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
272

stressed the need to work with Reclamation. Reybold’s summary of December 

31, 1943, went to Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, who sent it on January 7, 

1944, to Harold D. Smith, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Smith responded a month later by agreeing that Stimson could submit the Pick Plan to the 

Congress but that the necessary authorizations “would not be in accord with the 

program of the President, at least at the present.” He stressed the need for an esWLPDWHRIEHQH¿WVWRFRPSDUHZLWKFRVWVDQGKHVWDWHGWKDWQRDFWLRQZRXOGEH

taken by the president until he could review Reclamation’s report, due on May 1, 

1944.101

&RQJUHVVLRQDO&RQÀLFWDQGWKH&UHHSLQJ&RPPHUFH&ODXVH

 6WLPVRQWKHQVXEPLWWHGWRWKH6SHDNHURIWKH+RXVHRQ)HEUXDU\

1944 the Chief’s report along with the responses including Smith’s letter. In 

spite of Smith’s statement that the Pick Plan would be only for the information 

RI&RQJUHVVWKH+RXVH)ORRG&RQWURO&RPPLWWHHXQGHUWKH&KDLUPDQVKLSRI

Mississippi representative William Madison Whittington, held hearings throughRXW)HEUXDU\ZKHQD+RXVHELOOZDVIUDPHG,WFOHDUO\UHÀHFWHGWKHSULPDF\RI

WKH&RUSV¶ZLVKHVDQGWKRVHRI:KLWWLQJWRQIRUZKRPORZHUULYHUVWDWHÀRRG

control was of overpowering concern.102 But the bill brought to the surface the 

long standing worry of western politicians that the federal government would 

take control of the river waters in their states. The Bureau of Reclamation had, 

since its founding in 1902, appropriated water for irrigation in accord with state 

water laws, whereas the Corps had operated, since the landmark court decision 

of 1824, under the commerce clause of the Constitution, which gave federal law 

precedence over state laws in regard to interstate commerce.103

 )RUW3HFN5HVHUYRLUZDVWKHUHIRUHDV\PERORIWKLVFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQWKH

upper Missouri Basin states which supported irrigation and the lower Missouri 

%DVLQVWDWHVZKLFKVXSSRUWHGQDYLJDWLRQDQGÀRRGFRQWURO+RZZRXOGWKDWKXJH

UHVHUYRLURIZDWHUEHXVHG"7KH&RUSVZDQWHGLWIRUWKHQLQHIRRWFKDQQHOIURP

Sioux City to the mouth, and Reclamation wanted it for irrigation in the arid regions. Whittington gave the upper basin people and Reclamation the opportunity to make their case before the committee, but such was his prestige that the bill 

reported out to the House on March 29, 1944, was still centered on Pick’s Plan.104 

President Roosevelt, reiterating what the Budget Director had written, urged the 

committee to consider reclamation provisions because he thought small farms 

with irrigation the best way for returning veterans and war workers to reestablish themselves in that region.105 Whittington listened but went ahead with the 

&RUSV¶SODQZKLFKFDPHWRWKH+RXVHÀRRURQ0D\$IWHURQHGD\RIGHEDWH

it passed and went to the Senate.106
273

However, the issues were too complex for quick passage of the bill by 

the Senate. In addition, the war still engaged the nation’s attention, and 1944 

was an election year. Moreover, on May 1, the Secretary of the Interior sent the 

long-awaited Reclamation Report to President Roosevelt, and the Sloan Plan became public.107 No construction could have begun, anyway, in 1944 unless it 

could have been closely connected to the war effort. Despite those obstacles, 

the key senator, John Holmes Overton of Louisiana, would work to guide legislation and would ultimately succeed. Overton obviously had a major interest in 

ÀRRGFRQWUROIRUWKHORZHU0LVVLVVLSSL0RUHRYHUKHFKDLUHG6HQDWHVXEFRPPLWtee hearings for both Commerce and Irrigation and Reclamation Committees.108 

Both he and Whittington sought to keep control of river planning with Congress 

rather than with the executives; thus, they were opposed to Reclamation in so far 

as it would take away control from the Corps. They both recognized, however, 

the need for Reclamation and the Corps to cooperate, and particularly Overton 

QHHGHGWRZRUNZLWKVHQDWRUVIURPWKHDULGUHJLRQVWRJHWKLVRZQÀRRGFRQWURO

measures passed. And there was one other potential challenge to the Congress, 

the creation of a Missouri Valley Authority, which was President Roosevelt’s idea 

for river basin development. But before that hurdle would be faced, Overton had 

to deal with the Sloan Report, which was of a quite different character from the 

Pick Plan.

The Sloan Report

 7KHUHLVQRGRXEWWKDW5HFODPDWLRQUXVKHGWR¿QLVKLWVUHSRUWRQFH3LFN¶V

Plan appeared, and especially once Reybold sent it to Stimson. As 1944 began, 

6ORDQSXWKLVUHSRUWLQWR¿QDOIRUP$IWHUSDVVLQJWKURXJKYDULRXVJRYHUQPHQtal agencies, on May 5, Wyoming Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney presented it to 

the full Senate.109 The House passed the Pick Plan three days later and sent it to 

the Senate where, by mid-May, both proposals collided on the desk of Senator 

2YHUWRQ%XWZDVLWUHDOO\DFROOLVLRQ"

Sloan had the advantages of having worked on his study for four years, 

seen Pick’s plan, and heard objections to it. His report, therefore, focused not 

RQWUDQVSRUWDWLRQRUÀRRGFRQWUROEXWUDWKHURQZDWHUDVDUHVRXUFH(QWLWOHG

“Conservation, Control, and Use of Water Resources” his report emphasized 

agriculture and irrigation along with power.110

Sloan divided the basin into six sub-basins: the Yellowstone, the upper 

0LVVRXULDERYH)RUW3HFNPLQRUZHVWHUQWULEXWDULHVWKH1LREUDUD3ODWWHDQG

.DQVDV)RUW3HFNWR6LRX[&LW\DQG6LRX[&LW\WR6W/RXLV+HGHVFULEHG

each one, analyzed its present development, and outlined future plans. He compared Corps and Reclamation plans, focusing on areas of agreement and coordination. Although Sloan addressed the many differences, the overall tone was 
274

conciliatory. Sloan emphasized that the two plans could be integrated. He ended 

the report with a detailed discussion of the power potential, of the geography, and 

RIWKHHFRQRP\LQWKHEDVLQ,QWKH¿UVWDSSHQGL[KHGHWDLOHGWKHFRVWVWRWDOLQJ

$1,258 million.

In the opening summary, Sloan had given that total cost, the annual runQLQJFRVWVPLOOLRQWKHDQQXDOEHQH¿WVPLOOLRQDQGWKHUHSD\PHQWV

DQGUHWXUQV7KHVHODVW¿JXUHVDGGXSWRWKHWRWDOFRQVWUXFWLRQFRVWVE\DOORFDWLQJDODUJHDPRXQWIRUÀRRGFRQWURODQGQDYLJDWLRQPLOOLRQDQGDGGLQJ

them to the annual payments by users of irrigation ($298 million), users of power 

($423 million) and municipalities ($20 million).

 7KHPRVWVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHWZRSODQVZHUHLQWKHPDLQULYHU

GDPVEHWZHHQ)RUW3HFNDQG6LRX[&LW\6ORDQSURSRVHGRQO\2DKH%LJ%HQG

DQG)RUW5DQGDOOZKHUHDV3LFNKDG*DUULVRQ2DN&UHHN2DKH)RUW5DQGDOO

and Gavins Point. The Reclamation plan envisioned extra storage reservoirs on 

tributaries to mostly make up for the lesser storage on the mainstream. Since 

the Corps’ major interest lay in those mainstream dams, Sloan’s reductions there 

would be a major issue later on.

In fact, General Reybold made it such an issue in his letter of April 25 to 

Commissioner Bashore. These mainstream dams “are vitally needed for cyclic 

storage. . . . I consider that the maximum practicable amount of storage must be 

provided . . .” he wrote. Reybold also questioned sending water for irrigation out 

of the basin, as Sloan proposed, and he further objected to the high cost allocated 

WRÀRRGFRQWURODQGQDYLJDWLRQ)RUDVKHQRWHGWKHEHQH¿WVHVWLPDWHGIRULUULJDWLRQZHUHYHU\ODUJHFRPSDUHGZLWKWKRVHIRUFRPELQHGÀRRGFRQWURODQGQDYLgation, whereas the costs allocated to irrigation are much less. In spite of these 

disagreements, Reybold offered a compromise by stressing that the Corps plan 

was open to augmentation by other bureaus.111

Pick’s plan stimulated action, and Sloan’s report provided support 

IRUDFWLRQEXWWKH&RQJUHVVVWLOOKDGWRGHEDWHWZRVLJQL¿FDQWO\GLIIHUHQWSURposals. On May 12 the Sloan Report formally went to the Senate Committee 

on Irrigation and Reclamation, but before any action could occur, the Senate 

Commerce Committee sent the report to its two subcommittees, one on Rivers 

DQG+DUERUVDQGWKHRWKHURQ)ORRG&RQWUROERWKFKDLUHGE\6HQDWRU2YHUWRQ

He held hearings in May and June as O’Mahoney and others tried to amend 

the Pick Plan to give states jurisdiction over the waters. On June 13, President 

Roosevelt, in a letter to Senator Overton, seemed to support O’Mahoney, but 

WKH6HQDWRU¶VVXEFRPPLWWHHZHQWDKHDGRQ-XQHDQGDI¿UPHGWKH+RXVHELOO

which was essentially the Pick Plan.112
275

But in June 1944, the war was the major item as the allies landed in 

Normandy and the Japanese offered stubborn resistance to island invasions. 

Legislation on the Missouri River Basin could not compete, so the complex problem of three different proposals (Pick, Sloan, and the Missouri Valley Authority) 

had to wait until after the summer recess. That did not prevent fervent discussions, proposals, and debates.

On August 7, Roosevelt wrote Senator Overton again, calling for a compromise between the supporters of irrigation and those of navigation. Senator 

James Edward Murray of Montana drafted a bill dated August 18 to create a 

Missouri Valley Authority, which is what the president really preferred.113

A crucial factor in the summer debates was the Missouri River States 

Committee, essentially a governor’s committee, which met in early August, and 

began lobbying for a coordinated plan between the Corps and Reclamation.114 

The Committee feared that interagency quarrels or intra-basin disputes would 

prevent speedy congressional approval. When Congress reconvened in 

September, Roosevelt sent a message proposing an authority like TVA and attaching a resolution from the Committee that inferred its support. That inference 

was quite wrong. Rather, the Committee had urged Reclamation and the Corps 

WRZRUNRXWDXQL¿HGSODQEXW2¶0DKRQH\DVFKDLURIWKH6HQDWH6XEFRPPLWWHH

on Irrigation and Reclamation, supported by Ickes, pushed for Reclamation’s 

plan while Overton favored the Pick Plan.

 )LQDOO\HQFRXUDJHGE\WKH0LVVRXUL5LYHU6WDWHV&RPPLWWHHDQGE\

Sloan’s response at a Senate hearing, the two groups met in Omaha on October 

16 and 17 and quickly agreed on a combined plan.115 This would be known as 

the Pick-Sloan Plan and would serve as framework for future developments. But 

most important to the Congress and to the States Committee, this plan would 

help determine river basin developments for the postwar period, and in that process block the president’s plan.

Pick-Sloan and the Valley Authority

On October 25, 1944, Commissioner Bashore and General Reybold, together, submitted both to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Interior, 

D¿YHSDJHOHWWHUFDOOLQJIRUWKHSODQUHVXOWLQJIURPWKH2FWREHUPHHWLQJV

in Omaha. They also enclosed the plan that had been sent to them on October 17 

and signed by General R. C. Crawford, Division Engineer (replacing Pick); Gail 

A. Hathaway, Head Engineer of the Corps; William A. Sloan; and John R. Riter, 

acting Director, Branch of Project Planning, Bureau of Reclamation. The substance of that plan, with all its immense consequences, was just one page long. It 

began by dividing the basin into Sloan’s same six subdivisions and 
276

disposed of three of them as not being in dispute. In other words, everything 

proposed by either earlier plan would remain. The framers of this Pick-Sloan 

Plan agreed to use Sloan’s project for the Yellowstone River Basin, to make minor revisions in the Niobrara, Platte, and Kansas River basins, and to accept 

3LFN¶V¿YHPDLQVWUHDPUHVHUYRLUVEXWWRHOLPLQDWHWKH2DN&UHHN'DPÀRRGHG

out by the enlarged Oahe Dam) and to replace it with the Big Bend Dam proSRVHGE\5HFODPDWLRQ(VVHQWLDOO\3LFNJRWKLV¿YHGDPVDQG5HFODPDWLRQJRW

its new irrigation acreage (4,760,400 acres). The much longer letter from the 

&RPPLVVLRQHUDQGWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUVHODERUDWHGRQWKHMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUWKH

FRPELQHGSODQDQGLGHQWL¿HGWKUHH3EDVLFSULQFLSOHV ́DWKH86$UP\&RUSV

of Engineers should have responsibility for the mainstream dams (all six, includLQJ)RUW3HFNE5HFODPDWLRQVKRXOGKDYHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUDOOLUULJDWLRQLVsues, and (c) both agencies would recognize the importance of hydroelectric 

power.116

 6HQDWRU2YHUWRQGHFLGHGWRDWWDFKWKH3LFN6ORDQ3ODQWRWKH)ORRG

Control Bill in the Senate, which began deliberation on November 21. This 

new plan entered the Congressional Record as a supplement both to the House 

Document on the Pick proposal and to the Senate Document on Sloan’s report. 

The following week, President Roosevelt sent a letter of agreement to Congress, 

but with the cautionary note that a basin authority would be needed. The Senate 

passed the bill on December 1, reached agreement with the House on December 

9, and sent it to Roosevelt four days later. The president signed it on December 

22, 1944, with the statement that the bill was “not to be interpreted as jeopardizing in any way the creation of a Missouri Valley Authority.”117

Congress and the president had settled the central issue of getting congressional approval for projects to be built after the war, but they had not established any new management plan. The Corps and Reclamation were still in 

charge of their mandated projects. Senator Murray, as Roosevelt’s strongest 

Senatorial ally on the Missouri Valley Authority, persisted in introducing legislation but he was never successful. The Corps, Reclamation, the Congress, 

and even the states were unwilling to give up power over their local works. 

The strongest argument Murray had, of course, was the highly publicized 1933 

Tennessee Valley Authority. It was Roosevelt’s pride, and it appealed to people 

impressed by the need for neat, clear, bureaucratic solutions to messy management problems. In 1944, the TVA seemed to be a huge success under the dynamic leadership of David Lilienthal.

To a large extent, the TVA had been the brainchild of Senator George 

N. Norris (1861-1944), who had died on September 2, just as Pick-Sloan was 

making its way to the Senate. He was from the only state, Nebraska, that is fully in the Missouri Basin; his presence was felt in the Senate considerations of 
277

Murray’s efforts. But TVA was of a different time and in a very different region. 

When it was created in 1933 the country was open to innovation; it was during 

5RRVHYHOW¶V¿UVWGD\V&RPSDUHGWRWKH0LVVRXULWKH7HQQHVVHH9DOOH\ZDV

much smaller and the river much shorter. The people in the Tennessee Valley 

were eager for help from the federal government. In addition, the TVA mechanism removed the ambiguity surrounding Wilson Dam–whether it should be public or private and its role in selling electricity.

The Missouri Basin was far more complex and had split into two political factions; and there were two powerful agencies there in competition.118 Still, 

the idea for a regional authority had never died. In the 1930s, there had been a 

movement to divide major parts of the country up into valley authorities, removing the Corps and Reclamation from much of their territories and missions.119 

This would have changed the political nature of the United States and vested far 

more power in the federal government at the expense of the individual states.

With the Pick-Sloan Plan as law and the war coming to an end, the 

86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVEHJDQWKHGHVLJQZRUNIRUWKH¿UVWPDMRUGDPV

*DUULVRQ)RUW5DQGDOODQG2DKH$OOWKUHHZHUHWREHHDUWK¿OOHPEDQNPHQW

GDPVGHVLJQHGZLWKWKHH[SHULHQFHRI)RUW3HFNLQPLQG

)LJXUH&RORQHO/HZLV$3LFNVHFRQGIURPULJKWDQG%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQHQJLQHHU

Glenn Sloan (far right) examine the future site of Yellowtail Dam in Montana. Source: Bureau 

of Reclamation.
278

GARRISON DAM

The Garrison Design Controversies

Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, and the war ended in late summer. 

&RUSVHQJLQHHUVEHJDQWRUHWXUQIURPRYHUVHDV7KH2PDKD'LVWULFW2I¿FHVWDUWed to develop a Project Report on Garrison Dam, which it submitted to the Chief 

RI(QJLQHHUVRQ)HEUXDU\7KH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUVKHOGDFRQIHUHQFHLQ

Washington on March 27-29, with representatives from the Omaha District and 

WKH'LYLVLRQRI¿FHV7KHGHVLJQFRXOGQRZEHJLQ120 In June, the Corps began to 

build the new town of Riverdale, North Dakota, to house dam workers. Learning 

IURP)RUW3HFN7RZQWKH&RUSVGHVLJQHG5LYHUGDOHIRUIDPLOLHVDQGLQFOXGHG

schools, a shopping center, eight lane bowling alley, and even a beer parlor. At 

the height of construction, the Riverdale High School Knights went for three seasons undefeated in football.121

In late 1945, there had been much public discussion in North Dakota 

about the dam, about congressional funding, and about the height limitations 

that the House had put on the dam and reservoir.122 Then, the originator of the 

dam returned after a 27-month absence to take his old job as Division Engineer 

and to push hard for full funding and immediate commencement of his project. 

Although he had been far away, building the 483-mile Ledo Road between China 

and India through Burma, Pick assured the Bismarck Chamber of Commerce, as 

1946 began, “I’ve never lost interest in this valley; coming back here was like 

coming home.”123

 'DPFRQVWUXFWLRQQHHGHGSRZHUDQG*DUULVRQ¶VSUHGHFHVVRU)RUW3HFN

would supply it via a new transmission line.124 One dam would help build the 

next. The Saturday Evening Post ended a long article on the proposed Missouri 

Valley Authority by focusing on General Pick:

Pick of the Ledo Road, Pick the dreamer, the engineer, the auWKRURIWKH¿UVWSODQIRUWKH0LVVRXUL9DOOH\+HWRRLVDSHDFHmaker. Of course, he’ll have help. There’s always that Thing, 

outside in the dark: MVA. Just standing there, it scares up a lot 

of action. 

It did not scare President Harry S Truman; he, following Roosevelt, still believed 

in the Missouri River Authority in spite of congressional rejection. Other supporters, however, saw MVA as dead and, therefore, moved over the divide to 

work for a Columbia Valley Authority, being pushed in the House by a young 

representative from Washington, Henry “Scoop” Jackson.125
279

Meanwhile, the Corps proceeded with the design and with contracts 

not only for the town but also for a road and Missouri River bridge to the site. 

However, a new obstacle became public in May, when General Pick appeared 

EHIRUHOHDGHUVRIWKH,QGLDQWULEHVLQWKH)RUW%HUWKROG5HVHUYDWLRQPXFKRI

ZKLFKZDVWREHÀRRGHGE\*DUULVRQ5HVHUYRLU7KHDIIHFWHGSHRSOHZHUHWREH

moved to comparable land, but tribal leaders did not trust the Army, really the 

U.S. Government, to treat them fairly. Pick listened, saying little. The protests 

continued through 1946.126 Then, in November, Pick was forced to plan for layLQJRIIDODUJHSDUWRIKLVVWDIILQWKHGLVWULFWRI¿FHVEHFDXVHRI7UXPDQ¶VRUGHUWR

put a ceiling on public works. Pick predicted a years’ delay on the dam.127 It did 

not happen.

A major issue for the Corps and the Indians lay in an amendment by 

Senator O’Mahoney to the bill allocating funds for the dam. This amendment 

stipulated that no money would go for the dam until the government and the 

Indian Tribes reached an agreement. Senator O’Mahoney intended the amendment to give the Indians bargaining power in their negotiations with the government.128 In May 1946, the tribal leaders confronted General Pick in Elbowoods, 

North Dakota, and the debate, well publicized in local newspapers, built up 

throughout 1946.129

In early 1947, Pick appealed to the State Legislature in Bismarck, North 

Dakota, and warned that if the same amendment appeared in the next appropriations bill from Congress, “work on the dam must stop.” He continued, “If this 

VKRXOGRFFXULWZRXOGEHPRVWGLI¿FXOWWRUHYLYHWKHSODQ ́+HQRWHGWKDW3LI

the Garrison Dam goes forward it will be because people want it. If you don’t 

want it, tell the Appropriations Committee and no money will be spent.” Several 

days later, North Dakota Senator Milton R. Young announced that there would 

be no such amendment on future appropriations. That did not quell objections 

WRWKHGDPFHUWDLQO\QRWWKRVHRIWKHWULEHVQRUWKRVHIURPWKH)DUPHUV8QLRQ

the Stockmen’s Convention, and the many supporters of the Missouri Valley 

Authority.130 Then came the kind of event that moved politicians to action—a 

ÀRRGLQWKH0LVVRXUL%DVLQ

 -XVWDV3LFN¶VRULJLQDOSODQFDPHDWWKHWLPHRIWKHÀRRGVRWKH

IXQGVIRU*DUULVRQ'DPEHFDPHTXLFNO\XQORFNHGDIWHUWKHÀRRGRI7KUHH

PLOOLRQDFUHVZHUHÀRRGHGWZHQW\VL[OLYHVZHUHORVWDQGGDPDJHVRIPLOlion led the Missouri River States Committee on July 2 to call on the federal government to quickly appropriate adequate funds for Garrison Dam, with no restrictions imposed that would interfere with immediate work on the dam.131 Local 

newspapers called for fast action, and the news made it to Washington. On 

July 16, President Truman sent a strong message to Congress requesting a ten-

\HDUÀRRGFRQWUROSURJUDPZLWKPLOOLRQWREHDOORFDWHGLPPHGLDWHO\WRWKH
280

Mississippi-Missouri watershed. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch carried the story 

and ran a huge headline, “The PLIGHT of the MISSOURI VALLEY.” President 

Truman mentioned the Missouri Valley Authority only in passing, and, the following week, Senator Young could announce that the dam would get $20 million, of which $5.1 million was for the Indians, but there would be no holdup 

SHQGLQJDJUHHPHQWV7KH&RUSVORVWQRWLPHLQOHWWLQJLWV¿UVWELJFRQWUDFWIRUWKH

dam in early September.132 Garrison Dam was now secure.

But the concerns of the Indian tribes would not go away quietly. The 

WKUHHDI¿OLDWHGWULEHVDW*DUULVRQ0DQGDQ$ULNDUDDQG+LGDWVDZHUHWKH¿UVWWR

negotiate with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers following the Pick-Sloan legislation. The tribes had to relocate 325 of their families, about 80 percent of tribal 

membership. The Indians objected to the compensation and requested just under $22 million; Congress, in 1949, did agree to $7.5 million more, for a total 

of $12.6 million. “Although the additional $7.5 million was too little to be fully 

effective, and the help provided by the Army was unsatisfactory, these gestures 

symbolized an attempt by Congress to acknowledge its moral and legal duty to 

the Indians.”133 Soon after Garrison Dam construction began, tribes on reservaWLRQVGRZQVWUHDPZHUHFRQIURQWHGZLWKSUREOHPVVLPLODUWRWKHWKUHHDI¿OLDWHG

tribes.

Garrison Dam Design and Construction 1948-1950

 7KH&RUSVGHVLJQHGWKHIRRWORQJHPEDQNPHQWGDPLQÀXHQFHG

E\)RUW3HFNWRKDYHDVORSHRIRQHWRHLJKWRYHUPXFKRIERWKWKHXSVWUHDPDQG

downstream sections. The designers made the maximum design height 210 feet 

and the base an average of about 2,500 feet wide, plus 1,250 feet of impervious 

blanket extending from the upstream toe (elevation 1710) out into the reservoir. 

7KLVEODQNHWUHÀHFWVDSUHFDXWLRQVWHPPLQJIURPWKH)RUW3HFNVOLGH%XWWKH

PRVWVLJQL¿FDQWFKDQJHIURPLWVSUHGHFHVVRUZDVWKHGHFLVLRQWREXLOGWKHGDP

E\GU\ODQGPHWKRGVXVLQJUROOHGHDUWK¿OO7KHUHZDVQRPHQWLRQRIK\GUDXOLF

¿OO1HDUO\DOORIWKHHDUWKZRXOGFRPHIURPH[FDYDWLRQIRUWKHLQWDNHSRZHUhouse, outlet, and spillway structures. Indeed, these major works would require 

1.5 million cubic yards of concrete, almost half of what was used in the entire 

Hoover Dam.

 7KH&RUSVSODQQHGWKHLQWDNHFKDQQHOIXUWKHUXSVWUHDPWKDQLQ)RUW

3HFNWRGLYHUWWKHULYHUWKURXJKHLJKWLQWDNHWXQQHOV¿YHWRVHUYHDVSHQVWRFNV

leading water to the powerplant and the other three for regulating the reservoir 

height. The design called for the spillway to be adjacent to the dam on the left 

bank. The powerplant was to have a capacity of 400,000 kW.134
281

 ,QHDUO\)HEUXDU\H[FDYDWLRQXQFRYHUHGODUJHVHDPVRIOLJQLWH

which the Corps began to stock pile for fuel to produce power and heat on the 

project. Huge earthmoving equipment roamed over the site in the spring, and 

LQ0D\UHFRJQL]LQJWKHLQHYLWDELOLW\RIWKHGDPWKH)RUW%HUWKROG,QGLDQ7ULEDO

Business Council signed a contract turning 155,000 acres of its reservation over 

to the federal government for a cash settlement of just over $5 million. There 

had, as yet, been no agreement on the relocation plan, but the government had 

set a deadline of June 30. The pressure of the Missouri River States Committee, 

VWLPXODWHGE\WKHÀRRGOHGWRWKHGHIHDWRI6HQDWRU2¶0DKRQH\¶VDPHQGment favoring the Indians.135

Work accelerated as summer approached, and on July 24, President 

Truman announced his request for additional funds for Garrison Dam. The 

Corps let a $13.6 million contract in late September. While Garrison boomed 

along, the Sloan part of Pick-Sloan seemed stalled.136

In early December, Glenn Sloan told the Association of Commerce, at 

their annual dinner in Minot, North Dakota, that the Missouri-Souris reclamation 

project must overcome three obstacles, but that “We are going on despite all obstacles. Nothing is going to stop us.” This immense project, outlined in Sloan’s 

UHSRUWLQFOXGHGSXPSLQJZDWHUIURP)RUW3HFN/DNHRYHUWRWKH6RXULV

River to irrigate 1,275,100 acres of land in northwestern North Dakota. Because 

*DUULVRQ'DPZRXOGVXSSOHPHQW)RUW3HFNDVDÀRRGFRQWUROGDPWKHROGHU

reservoir could be put to the service of irrigation. The projects’ obstacles were 

the legal requirements for Reclamation to form irrigation districts before getWLQJDSSURYDOWKHLUQHHGWRUHVWULFWIDUPVWRDFUHVDQGWKHGLI¿FXOW\RIVHOOing Congress on pieces of the Pick-Sloan Plan rather than the whole plan. These 

obstacles, despite Sloan’s optimism, would prove insurmountable, especially the 

last one.137 And while Sloan urged the plan on, other forces raised more obstacles.

Senator Murray had announced in November that he would renew his 

call for a basin authority. His hope was that the newly elected Congress, being now “more liberal,” would favor the TVA. He also believed that “there 

was a growing dissatisfaction throughout the Midwest over the way the Army 

Engineers are carrying out the Pick-Sloan Plan. . . .” But a potentially bigger 

threat came from a different quarter, the Hoover Commission on governmental reorganization. Hoover’s view began to be public in late 1948, and, by the 

spring of 1949, strong criticisms surfaced essentially arguing that the Pick-Sloan 

Plan was poorly conceived and that the river work should be removed from the 

Corps and combined with Reclamation into one, presumably new, agency. In addition, the Commission stated clearly that there should be no more valley authorities; TVA was an experiment that was not to be repeated.138
282

On March 1, 1949, Lewis A. Pick became the Chief of Engineers. 

Shortly thereafter, the Missouri Basin Interagency Committee elected William 

Sloan to succeed Pick as its chairman. The two former partners soon clashed 

over the height of Garrison Dam. Appearing before the House Public Works 

Committee, Sloan argued that the plan was always for a pool elevation of 

1830 feet above sea level. Pick, following Sloan to the witness stand, stated in 

his usual blunt manner, that plans for the dam “never have been for a pool level 

of 1830 feet.” It was, he stressed, “unanimously agreed” at the Omaha meeting 

in 1945 that the dam should be built for a level of 1850 feet. This extra height 

was important to the Corps because it meant substantially more water availDEOHIRUSRZHUDQGQDYLJDWLRQDQGPRUHFDSDFLW\DYDLODEOHIRUÀRRGFRQWURO

Reclamation’s interest was to use as much water as possible from the river for irrigation rather than have it sit in storage. But of greatest immediate concern to 

ORFDOSROLWLFLDQVVXSSRUWLQJ5HFODPDWLRQZDVWKHÀRRGLQJRIWKUHHLUULJDWLRQGLVtricts and the town of Williston if the reservoir rose the additional 20 feet.139

Meanwhile the dam continued to rise rapidly and in late August the 

House, siding with the Corps, rejected the proposal to limit the pool elevation 

to 1830 feet. Pick’s replacement as division engineer told a convention of the 

Association of Western State Engineers, that the higher level was largely for rural 

HOHFWUL¿FDWLRQ7KHFRQYHQWLRQHDUOLHUKDGSDVVHGDUHVROXWLRQRSSRVLQJDQ\YDOley authority. Again, the fear was that the federal government would take over 

state functions. In reality, most of the local leaders preferred to deal with the 

Congress and the Corps rather than with the executive and Reclamation. Not all 

&RQJUHVVPHQDJUHHGZLWKWKHSUR&RUSVSRVLWLRQEXWWKH\ZHUH¿JKWLQJDORVLQJ

battle.140

Huge trucks carrying up to 54 cubic yards of earth moved across the 

Garrison site as the dam became visible even for the “casual observer” that fall. 

The heavy equipment allowed contractors to build the dam with only one-third 

the manpower estimated before construction.141

While the dam amazed visitors, it never ceased to agitate politicians. 

Governor John Bonner, of Montana, demanded assurance that no water would 

OHDYHKLVVWDWHZLWKRXWLWVSHUPLVVLRQDQG*RYHUQRU)RUUHVW6PLWKRI0LVVRXUL

stressed his state’s need to be certain of having enough water for drinking and 

sanitation. President Truman maintained his preference for a valley authority to 

take on such priority issues. The same arguments persisted while the dam rose, 

oblivious to politics. It impressed international visitors from Iraq to Japan.142

Two opposing viewpoints continued to appear in the press reports and 

in the politicians’ pronouncements. Some extolled the great feats that were 
283

unfolding in the Dakotas—the greatest such events in their recent history; while 

RWKHUVTXHVWLRQHGRUFRQGHPQHGWKHZDVWHIXOSURMHFWDQGWKHLQ¿JKWLQJEHWZHHQ

states and between bureaus. By year’s end, one issue appeared to be settled, the 

immense Missouri-Souris diversion was dropped.143

Garrison Dam Completion 1951-1955

In April 1951, concrete casting began, and, soon thereafter, the earthwork recommenced after the winter shutdown. Construction of the intake structures and the powerhouse got underway in the spring, and, in mid-May electricity 

IURP)RUW3HFNEHJDQSRZHULQJWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI*DUULVRQ,Q-XQH

 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee revealed that the 1945 

estimate of $130 million for the dam was low. The cost was projected to be

$268 million when the dam was completed in 1955.144

 7KHQFDPHWKHÀRRGRI,WEURXJKWLQLWVZDNHDUHQHZHGFDOOIRUD

valley authority. Congressman John Elliot Rankin, from Mississippi, stated that 

“This disaster could have been prevented if Congress had passed my bill to create a Missouri Valley Authority.” Representative Clair Magee from Missouri 

went even further during a committee hearing when he challenged a Colonel of 

the Corps by stating that “Power companies are generally opposed to the MVA 

SODQDQG,FDQVWDWHGH¿QLWHO\WKH$UP\HQJLQHHUVDUHXQGHUWKHLQÀXHQFHRIWKH

Power Companies.” Later, Magee confronted General C. H. Chorpening, “Isn’t 

it a fact that your superior, Lt. Gen. Lewis A. Pick, is opposed to public power, 

RSSRVHGWRJLYLQJSHRSOHFKHDSSRZHU" ́3:HKDYHQRSRVLWLRQRQSXEOLFSRZer,” General Chorpening replied, “that is for Congress to decide.”145 Clearly, 

Pick was a focus of the hostility from proponents of a valley authority. But the 

work continued, and by year’s end, the intake structure was more than half done 

and the powerhouse foundations prepared.146

In 1952, as the dam proceeded so did the debate over the ability of large 

GDPVWRFRQWUROÀRRGV7KH&RUSVGHIHQGHGLWVKXJHPDLQVWUHDPGDPVDV/W

Col. R. J. B. Page, Garrison District Engineer put it, “It is clear that the only 

PHDVXUHZKLFKZRXOGKDYHSUHYHQWHGWKHÀRRGLQJDORQJWKH0LVVRXUL5LYHULQ

spring 1952) is the construction of large dams on the main stream. . . .”147 Major 

General Donald G. Shingler, the Missouri River Division Engineer, pointed out 

KRZ)RUW3HFN'DPDQGOHYHHZRUNKDGVDYHGPLOOLRQLQGDPDJHVDURXQG

Omaha.1487KHÀRRGVWKHFRVWVDQGWKHPDPPRWKZRUNVDOOOHGTime to publish an article on the Peter Kiewit Sons Company that focused on the company’s 

work under its Garrison Dam contract, the second largest construction contract 

HYHUDZDUGHG-RLQWO\ZLWKWKH0RUULVRQ.QXGVHQ¿UP.LHZLWKHOGFRQWUDFWV

of more than $60 million for the North Dakota project. Time detailed the background, the controversies, the present status of the Pick-Sloan program, and the 
284

competing views for a valley authority. Not only was there national interest but 

foreign engineers kept coming to Garrison to see the vast works.149

As the 1952 building season ended, the contractor prepared the river for 

diversion from its natural bed into the eight big tunnels on the right (west) bank. 

To avoid the dangers of an upstream slide, the engineers had designed a cofferdam to protect the upstream toe after diversion. That fall, the contractor built 

lumber mattresses to be placed over a rock dike across the old channel to help redirect the Missouri.150

In January 1953, the newly elected president, Dwight Eisenhower, received a recommendation from the Missouri River States Committee to form a 

Missouri River Basin Compact, but he declined to act on it. With a Republican 

$GPLQLVWUDWLRQQRZLQRI¿FHKRSHVIRUDYDOOH\DXWKRULW\DOVRHQGHG$ERXWWKLV

time, before construction recommenced on Garrison, Reclamation announced 

that its large Missouri-Souris irrigation project would take water from the North 

'DNRWD5HVHUYRLUUDWKHUWKDQIURP)RUW3HFN/DNH151

In April, with the cold weather lifted, the big event occurred: “Garrison 

'DP&ORVHG ́WKHFRPPDQGLQJKHDGOLQHDQQRXQFHG)URPDWHPSRUDU\VWHHO

girder bridge over the Missouri parallel to the dam axis, a dozen huge trucks 

lined up and dumped rock across the open channel between the two arms of the 

embankment. This cofferdam dike, after two days of rock dumping, closed off 

the river, which obediently followed a newly dredged channel leading directly to 

WKHLQWDNHWXQQHOV7KHULYHUZDVFRRSHUDWLQJ$IWHUWKHÀRRGVRIWKHWZRSUHvious years, the river was much lower in 1953, so that the diversion went more 

)LJXUH6SLOOZD\JDWHVWUXFWXUHDW*DUULVRQ'DP Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
285

smoothly and quickly than expected. The cofferdam began to extend through the 

old channel and would soon serve as a wall to permit water between it and the 

GLNHWREHSXPSHGRXW2QFHGU\WKHFRQWUDFWRUZRXOG¿OOWKHFORVXUHZLWKQHDUly 30 million cubic yards of earth to complete the dam. In May, Life ran a big 

story on Garrison, covering more on the construction and less on the boom town 

WKDQWKHLU)RUW3HFNVWRU\KDGSRUWUD\HGVL[WHHQ\HDUVHDUOLHU152

Public interest shifted in 1953 from fascination with earthwork and the 

redirection of the river to the emergence of massive concrete structures: the 

spillway and powerhouse. But the controversies never completely disappeared. 

Plans went forward in June for 

President Eisenhower’s visit to 

the Garrison Dam for the formal 

FORVXUHFHUHPRQLHVWKHDI¿OLDWed Indian tribes participated, sitting on the platform with the president and giving him a ceremonial gift. Earlier in June, the tribes 

had called for retention of huntLQJ¿VKLQJDQGJUD]LQJULJKWVWR

the reservoir area in their reservation.153

In July of 1952, General 

Pick appointed General William E. 

Potter Division Engineer. These 

two were close friends, having 

served together after the war in 

the Missouri District and again 

in Washington after Pick became 

)LJXUH:DWHULQWDNHVWUXFWXUHDW*DUULVRQ'DPSource: David P. Billington.

)LJXUH*HQHUDO:LOOLDP(3RWWHUSource:

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
286

Chief of Engineers. After being Division Engineer for over a year, Potter decided to integrate the dams through computers, a novel idea at the time; and in 

December 1953, he announced a plan “where we can effectively utilize this new 

ultra-modern facility in our management program.” He began with telephone 

FRQQHFWLRQVWRNHHSWUDFNRIWKHZDWHUOHYHOVÀRZVDQGSRZHULQWKHGDPVDV

they went on line. The system still operates effectively today with, as Potter predicted, computers.154

)LJXUH7KHULSUDSRQWKHXSVWUHDPIDFHRI*DUULVRQ'DP Source David P. Billington.

)LJXUH7KHVZLWFK\DUGDW*DUULVRQ'DPSource: David P. Billington.
287

After the excitement of the closure, dam construction proceeded predictably to completion in 1955. Pick, meanwhile, had retired from the Army in 

early 1953. His favorite projects and the heart of his 1944 plan seemed safely in 

place, even if they would never be free from controversy. The reservoir began 

WREHGLVFXVVHGVHULRXVO\IRUUHFUHDWLRQDVSODFHPHQWRILWVUROOHGHDUWK¿OOHQGHG

in late 1954. During 1955, the builders completed the spillway and the powerKRXVHDQGLQHDUO\WKH&RUSVRI¿FLDOO\GHGLFDWHGWKHGDP5HFODPDWLRQ¶V

gigantic Missouri-Souris Project never was funded, although a much smaller version, using Garrison’s reservoir to irrigate 250,000 acres in North Dakota was approved.155

As the twentieth century ended, Garrison Dam was intact. It exhibited 

no slides, and its power production was well above the initial design. On a typiFDOGD\LQ-XO\LWJHQHUDWHGPHJDZDWWVRISRZHUIURPDÀRZRI

FXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGZLWKDKHDGRIQHDUO\IHHW,WVHI¿FLHQF\ZDV

over 91 percent. The huge intake structure in the lake, reached by a bridge, its 

high surge tanks, and its curved concrete spillway all contrast vividly with the 

long embankment that serves to hold back the river and provide the head for its 

power.

Spillway Designs

 )RUHDUWK¿OOHPEDQNPHQWGDPVWKHFRQFUHWHVSLOOZD\LVHVVHQWLDOWRSUHYHQWHYHQWKHUHPRWHVWSRVVLELOLW\IRURYHUWRSSLQJGXULQJDQH[WUHPHÀRRG)RU

Garrison Dam, as for most such major structures, the engineers dimensioned the 

VSLOOZD\WRFDUU\DKXJHÀRRGRQHQHYHUEHIRUHUHFRUGHGRQWKHULYHUDWWKDWORFDWLRQ7KHGHVLJQUHTXLUHGOD\LQJRXWDVHULHVRIRSHQLQJVHDFK¿WWHGZLWKRQH

tainter gate, such that the maximum design spillway discharge can safely pass. 

)RU*DUULVRQWKH&RUSVDVVXPHGVXFKDGLVFKDUJHWREHFXELFIHHWSHU

second, even though the maximum discharge ever recorded at the site, up to 

1947, equaled 260,000 cubic feet per second.156

 $GYDQFHVLQK\GURORJ\KDYHLQÀXHQFHGWKHGHVLJQRIVSLOOZD\VLQJHQHUDOUHVXOWLQJLQVWUXFWXUHVZLWKDJUHDWHUFDSDFLW\7KH¿UVWIRUPDOL]HGDSSURDFK

WRVSLOOZD\GHVLJQFDPHLQZLWKWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI)XOOHU¶VIRUPXODWKDWHVtimated a maximum discharge of QT in terms of the average yearly maximum 

Qa

ORJ1076XFKDQH[SUHVVLRQIDLOHGWRSUHGLFWYHU\ODUJHÀRRGVDQGLQ

1932, the unit hydrograph was introduced to account for characteristics of a river basin and to be used in connection with a design storm. This storm, estimated 

for the region but not tied to the location of the dam, led to larger spillways than 

those based upon the return period formulas. In 1944, Gail Hathaway contributed to the development and implementation of spillway design based on the use of 

the probable maximum precipitation. The probable maximum precipitation then 
288

VHUYHGWRGHYHORSDQXSSHUERXQGRQWKHÀRZSRVVLEOHZKHUHWKHVSLOOZD\ZDVWR

EHFRQVWUXFWHG)RUH[DPSOHDWWKH*DUULVRQ'DPORFDWLRQWKHODUJHVWUHVHUYRLU

UHOHDVHZRXOGKDYHEHHQQHHGHGGXULQJWKHÀRRGRIDQGWKDWZRXOGKDYH

required a spillway discharge of about 100,000 cubic feet per second. Using 

probable maximum precipitation contours, the designers determined an upper 

ERXQGRIRYHUFXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGDVWKHÀRZIRUZKLFKWKHVSLOOZD\

was designed.157

The plan to accommodate the design discharge included 28 openings, 

each with length, L = 40 feet and of height, H = 33.55 feet when the tainter 

gates are fully opened. The standard formula for discharge Q in cubic feet per 

second through such openings is given by Q = C(L-nKH)H where n equals 

WZLFHWKHQXPEHURIRSHQLQJVDQG.LVDFRHI¿FLHQWWKDWDFFRXQWVIRUWKHFRQWUDFWLRQLQWKHÀRZGXHWRWKHSLHUVWKDWIRUPWKHRSHQLQJVDERYHWKHGDPFUHVW

7KHVHSLHUVDOVRVXSSRUWWKHJDWHV)RU*DUULVRQWKHHQJLQHHUVWRRN& 

L = 40x28, n = 56, K = 0.015, and H = 33.55 feet, which gave the discharge 

Q = 827,000 cubic feet per second.

The Corps chose the shape of the spillway section, called a shallow ogee 

VHFWLRQEHFDXVHRILWVK\GUDXOLFHI¿FLHQF\ZKLFKWKHFRHI¿FLHQWRIUHÀHFWV

2QRWKHUW\SHVRIVHFWLRQVWKDWFRHI¿FLHQWLVPRUHFRPPRQO\DVORZDV

5HSHDWHGWHVWVE\WKH&RUSVDQGRWKHUVHVWDEOLVKHGWKHFRHI¿FLHQW.DQGWKH

height H comes from the maximum pool level of the reservoir.

The 24.5 million acre foot reservoir formed by Garrison Dam is the third 

largest in the United States, just behind Lake Mead at Hoover Dam and Lake 

Powell at Glen Canyon Dam. This great size means that the spillways would 

KDUGO\HYHUEHQHHGHGIRUÀRRGVHYHQWKRXJKWKH\KDYHEHHQXVHGWRUHJXODWHWKH

reservoir level. Indeed, up to 1952, the greatest reservoir releases necessary, durLQJWKHÀRRGZHUHRQO\DERXWFXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGDQGWKLVGLVcharge could have been easily taken by the three regulating tunnels at Garrison 

Dam. The conservatism in spillway design was typical of all those mainstream 

embankment dams across the Missouri River.

PICK’S PLAN AND THE MISSOURI BASIN

From Garrison to Big Bend

Meanwhile, downstream Pick’s other four dams likewise block the rivHUSURGXFHSRZHUDQGFUHDWHODNHV)RUW5DQGDOOVWDUWHGDOLWWOHEHIRUH*DUULVRQ

began operating in 1953; Oahe, begun in 1948, went into service in 1962; Gavins 

Point was in operation by 1955; and Big Bend, the last, started in 1959, and completed the entire project in 1964.
289

)LJXUH0LVVRXUL5LYHU0DLQVWHPK\GURHOHFWULFJHQHUDWLRQSource: Big Dam Era, Missouri River Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

)LJXUH3UR¿OHRIWKH0LVVRXUL5LYHU0DLQVWHP5HVHUYRLUVSource: Big Dam Era, Missouri River Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

)LJXUH0LVVRXUL5LYHU0DLQVWHP6WRUDJHSource: Big Dam Era, Missouri River Division, 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
290

The Omaha District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers developed the 

GHVLJQIRUWKH)RUW5DQGDOO'DPEHWZHHQDQG7KH&RUSVEXLOWDQHZ

town, named Pickstown, and construction of the 160 foot high dam began in earO\7KHGDPUHTXLUHGPLOOLRQFXELF\DUGVRIUROOHGHDUWK¿OODQGZKHQ

completed in mid-1956, had cost $183 million, almost 2.5 times the original cost 

)LJXUH&RPPHUFLDOWRQQDJHRQWKH0LVVRXUL5LYHUSource: Big Dam Era, Missouri River 

Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

)LJXUH0LVVRXUL5LYHUÀRZDW<DQNWRQ6RXWK'DNRWDEHIRUHDQGDIWHUWKHPDLQVWHP

dams. Source: Drawn from U. S. Army Corps of Engineer records.
291

HVWLPDWH3UHVLGHQW'ZLJKW'(LVHQKRZHUGHGLFDWHGWKH¿UVWSRZHUXQLWLQ

1954, and by the early 1970s, the powerhouse was producing more than 2 billion 

kilowatt-hours yearly. After the gates had closed on July 21, 1952, the 107-mileORQJUHVHUYRLU/DNH&DVHEHJDQWR¿OODQGHYHQWXDOO\ÀRRGHGDFUHVRI

Sioux land.158

 3LFN¶VSODQZDVLQSODFHE\KRZKDVLWEHHQSHUFHLYHGVLQFHWKHQ"

A half a century after Pick’s plan, the big dams represent the realities of the depression and the immediate postwar era in the United States. Political leaders in 

WKHEDVLQVWDWHVXVHGWKHUHDOLWLHVRIQDYLJDWLRQFKDQQHOVÀRRGFRQWURODJULFXOture protection, and large power to lobby Congress for action. Action meant primarily construction of large, multipurpose dams. Along with these realities there 

came the progressive ideals of regional development, the use of natural resources, and mastery over nature.159

Recent studies of the river have challenged these ideals and have focused on the ecosystem, the American Indians, and the need for new political instruments. The Tennessee Valley Authority, once heralded as the model for all 

EDVLQVKDVQRWVXFFHHGHGVXI¿FLHQWO\WRVWLPXODWHVXFKDXWKRULWLHVHOVHZKHUH

A 1993 summary of the mainstem dams illustrates the planned uses for 

stored water in the six reservoirs. Clearly, the upper three dominate with 

)LJXUH0LVVRXUL5LYHU)ORZDW)W5DQGDOO6RXWK'DNRWDEHIRUHDQGDIWHUWKHPDLQVWHP

dams. Source: Drawn from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers records.
292

HLJKW\QLQHSHUFHQWRIWKHVWRUDJHDQGPRVWRIWKHÀRRGFRQWUROLHWKDWDPRXQW

RIVWRUDJHVSDFHUHVHUYHGIRUKROGLQJEDFNZDWHULQWLPHVRIÀRRG%HWZHHQ

1987 and 1992, a period of relative drought, the supply for power dropped. Also, 

from the completion of the six dams to 1990, the commercial navigation tonnage has shown an overall downward trend. On the other hand, the completion 

RI)RUW5DQGDOO'DPDORQHLQVWRSSHGDOOÀRRGVVLQFHWKHQDW<DQNWRQDQG

WKHV\VWHPKDVHIIHFWLYHO\SUHYHQWHGÀRRGVLQHDVWHUQ0RQWDQDDQGWKH'DNRWDV

7KHGDPVKDGOLWWOHLQÀXHQFHRQWKHJUHDWÀRRGRIWKDWZDVODUJHO\WKHUHsult of heavy rain in the lower basin.160,QKROGLQJEDFNKHDY\ÀRRGVWKHPDLQstem Missouri River dams have also dramatically affected sedimentation patterns 

ZLWKLQWKHEDVLQVLJQL¿FDQWO\DOWHUHGÀRUDDQGIDXQDJURZWKDQGDIIHFWHGZDWHU

quality along the length of the stream.

According to Robert K. Schneiders, there are four main lessons to be 

learned from a study of the Pick-Sloan Plan and subsequent developments on 

WKH0LVVRXUL%DVLQ)LUVWORFDOFLWL]HQJURXSVLQWKLVFDVHWKH.DQVDV&LW\

&RPPHUFLDO&OXEKDYHDSRZHUIXOLQÀXHQFH6HFRQGWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW

and the Corps never arbitrarily directed Missouri River development. Third, the 

FRVWVDUHJUHDWHUWKDQWKHEHQH¿WV$QGIRXUWKE\WKHPLGVSHRSOHEHJDQ

to seriously doubt the value of institutionalized self-interest, but no one had yet 

proposed any alternatives. His description of one event at this time illustrates the 

problem of basin management.

 ,QWKHODWHVDVHYHUHGURXJKWUHGXFHGUHVHUYRLUOHYHOVLQWKH¿YH

'DNRWDGDPVHQGDQJHULQJWKH¿VKDQGKHQFHWKHPLOOLRQWRXULVWWUDGH

Politicians from those states pressured the Corps not to release so much water 

from its dams and immediately the lower states cried foul. Water was needed below Sioux City for navigation and although only bringing in some $14 million, 

the uproar from farmers and barge interests was enough to stop the Corps’ plan. 

Schneiders’ conclusion from this story is that “the Missouri compelled people to 

look at themselves and to question their faith in technology, their commitment to 

progress, and their motives.” He concludes that chapter:

Yet few individuals entertained any thought of simply letting the river go, of taking down the dams and training structures and abandoning the traditional paradigm, even though that 

seemingly radical alternative possessed many obvious, tangible 

advantages.161

It would have been a useful exercise to explore just what those advantages would be. Perhaps the despair that some thoughtful people feel about the 

management of structured river basins springs from the inability of our political 

V\VWHPWRGHYLVHFOHDUUDWLRQDOVROXWLRQVWRSUREOHPVRIUHJLRQDOFRQÀLFW6LQFH
293

the Constitution supplies little direct help, each generation must think out its own 

approach and devise short-term means to put it into effect.

Schneiders ends his book with the conclusion that:

No one will ever know enough about the Missouri River to regXODWHLWVÀRZVHIIHFWLYHO\LWSRVVHVVHVWRRPDQ\FKDUDFWHULVWLFV

LWLVLQÀXHQFHGE\LQQXPHUDEOHH[WHUQDOIDFWRUVDQGLWVZDWHUV

behave in an unpredictable fashion.162 

This might be a good characterization of modern civilization itself, the buildng

of which always requires going into unpredictable terrains and attempting to 

structure nature in a way conducive to an improved life in an industrialized society.

Endnotes

1. This is also known as the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program.

2. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, “Missouri River,” House of Representatives Document No.

238, 73rd Congress, 2nd6HVVLRQ)HEUXDU\

3. Lewis, Meriwether, and William Clark, editor Bernard DeVoto, The Journals of Lewis and Clark (Boston: 

+RXJKWRQ0LIÀLQ&RPSDQ\[[LY

4. A. W. Kendall, “Keeping Up with the ‘Big Muddy’,” The Military Engineer 30 (March-April 1938), 

111-3.

5. J. M. Young, “River Planning in the Missouri Basin,” The Military Engineer 22 (March-April 1930), 152-

8.

6. House of Representatives Document No. 308, 69th Congress, 1st Session, April 13, 1926, 2.

 3:RUN%HJXQRQ)RUW3HFN'DPWR5HJXODWH0LVVRXUL5LYHU ́Engineering News-Record No. 9, (1933), 

576.

8. “Missouri River,” House of Representatives Document No. 238, 573-605.

9. “Missouri River,” House of Representatives Document No. 238, 605.

10. “Missouri River,” House of Representatives Document No. 238)RUDQDQDO\VLVRIKRZDQHFRQRPLFDOO\XQMXVWL¿HGSURMHFWEHFDPH3DPDNHZRUNSURMHFW ́VHH3)RUW3HFN'DP ́Engineering News-Record

(November 29, 1934), 697-8.

 &+&KRUSHQLQJ3)RUW3HFN'DP23URJUHVVRI&RQVWUXFWLRQ ́ The Military Engineer 27, No. 151 

-DQXDU\)HEUXDU\'HSDUWPHQWWKH$UP\86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV3)RUW3HFN'DP ́The

Federal Engineer: Damsites to Missile Sites: A History of the Omaha District (Omaha 1984).

12. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering in the United States, 3, 674.

13. Schnitter, A History of Dams, 18-21.

14. Schnitter, A History of Dams7DEOH)LJXUH7DEOHVDQG

15. Schnitter, A History of Dams, 156-7.

16. Schnitter, A History of Dams, 158-60.

17. Henry. Darcy, /HV)RQWDLQHVSXEOLTXHVGHODYLOOHGH'LMRQ([SRVLWLRQHWDSSOLFDWLRQGHVSULQFLSHVj

VXLYUHHWGHVIRUPXOHVjHPSOR\HUGDQVOHVTXHVWLRQVGHGLVWULEXWLRQG¶HDX. (Paris: Victor Dalmont, 1856).

 3)RUFKKHLPHU3hEHUGLH(UJLHELJNHLWYRQ%UXQQHQDQODJHQXQG6LFNHUVFKOLW]HQ ́Zeitschrift,

Architekten-und Ingenieur-Verein, Hannover, 32, No. 7 (1886), 539-64.

19. Karl Terzaghi, Erdbaumechanik9LHQQD)UDQ]'HXWLFNH$Q(QJOLVKYHUVLRQDSSHDUHGDV

Theoretical Soil Mechanics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1943).

20. A. Casagrande, “Seepage through Dams,” Contributors to Soil Mechanics 1925-1940, Boston Society of

Civil Engineers, (1940).
294

 7$0LGGOHEURRNV3)RUW3HFN6OLGH ́Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 107 

(1942), 723-42.

22.Schnitter, A History of Dams, 165.

23. Joel D. Justin, “The Design of Earth Dams,” Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 87 

(1924), 1-61. Quotation on 3-4.

24. Joel D. Justin, “Discussion [of Middlebrooks],” Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers

107 (1942), 744-8.

 -DPHV'6FKX\OHU35HFHQW3UDFWLFHLQ+\GUDXOLF)LOO'DP&RQVWUXFWLRQ ́Transactions of the American

Society of Civil Engineers 63 (June 1907), 196-252 with discussion 253-77. Schuyler’s closure is from 

269-77. Quotation is on 198.

 6FKX\OHU3+\GUDXOLF)LOO'DP&RQVWUXFWLRQ ́6FKX\OHU¶VH[SODQDWLRQUHDGVDVIROORZV37KDW

the inner third of the dam should be composed of impervious material, or material which, by drainage and natural settlement, should consolidate into a mass which will become impervious to water, and remain in a moist, 

semi-plastic condition; that the outer half of each of the other thirds should be coarse, porous, open material, 

through which water, draining from the interior, would pass freely; while the inner halves of the outer zones 

VKRXOGEHDPL[WXUHRIWKHFRDUVHDQG¿QHRUDVHPLSRURXVPDWHULDOLQFRQGLWLRQWRDFWDVD¿OWHUVRDVWRSUHYHQWWKHHVFDSHRIDQ\RIWKH¿QHSDUWLFOHVIURPWKHLQQHUWKLUGEXWDWWKHVDPHWLPHDOORZRIWKHVORZSHUFRODtion of water through it.”

 $OOHQ+D]HQ3+\GUDXOLF)LOO'DPV ́Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 83 

(1919–1920), 1713-45. Hazen drew on his earlier paper, “On Sedimentation,” Transactions of the American

Society of Civil Engineers 53 (December 1904), 45-71. Hazen had begun his career in sanitary engineering by 

3HSRFKPDNLQJ ́FRQWULEXWLRQVWRZDWHUSXUL¿FDWLRQ$VDFRQVXOWLQJHQJLQHHUKHGHVLJQHGWKHVHZHUDJHGLVSRVDOIDFLOLWLHVIRUWKH&KLFDJR:RUOG¶V)DLUDQGWKHZDWHU¿OWHUSODQWIRU$OEDQ\1HZ<RUN+LVSDSHURQWKH

ODWWHUZRQKLPWKH5RZODQGSUL]HIURPWKH$6&()URPVDQG¿OWHUVKHEHFDPHLQWHUHVWHGLQVHGLPHQWDQG

KHQFHK\GUDXOLF¿OOGDPV+HZDVDGLUHFWRURIWKH$6&(DQG9LFH3UHVLGHQW

 &KDUOHV+3DXO3&RUH6WXGLHVLQWKH+\GUDXOLF)LOO'DPRIWKH0LDPL&RQVHUYDQF\'LVWULFW ́

Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 85 (1922), 1181-202. Quotation is on 1181.

 -$OEHUW+ROPHV36RPH,QYHVWLJDWLRQVDQG6WXGLHVLQ+\GUDXOLF)LOO'DP&RQVWUXFWLRQ ́Transactions of

the American Society of Civil Engineers 84 (1921), 331-58. Quotation is on 358.

30. Henry Petroski, Engineers of Dreams: Great Bridge Builders and the Spanning of America (New York: 

Vintage Books, 1995), 101-21.

 -XVWLQ37KH'HVLJQRI(DUWK'DPV ́)RXURIWKHVHVXFFHVVIXOGDPVGLGKDYHVOLGHV-XVWLQQRWHV

DQGWKUHHRIWKRVHZHUHK\GUDXOLF¿OO(GZDUG-:HJPDQQ The Design and Construction of Dams, 8thedition.

 +DUU\++DWFK37HVWVIRU+\GUDXOLF)LOO'DPV ́Transactions of the American Society of Civil

Engineers 99 (1934), 206-47. Quotation on 206.

*OHQQRQ*LOER\30HFKDQLFVRI+\GUDXOLF)LOO'DPV ́Journal of the Boston Society of Civil Engineers 21, 

No. 3 (July 1934), 185-205, with a “Discussion” by Arthur Casagrande, 146-7. Quotation on 199.

34. “Men and Mechanization,” Engineering News-Record (May 9, 1935), 684. See also the article “Three 

Big Dam Operations Begun in the Northwest,” Engineering News-Record (April 5, 1934), 444-5, where 

%RQQHYLOOH*UDQG&RXOHHDQG)RUW3HFNDUHGHVFULEHGDVVKRZLQJ3HYLGHQFHRIWKHVWUHQXRXVHIIRUWVRIWKRVH

LQLPPHGLDWHFKDUJHWRHPSOR\PHQDWWKHHDUOLHVWSRVVLEOHPRPHQWDVDFRQVHTXHQFH¿HOGZRUNKDVSUHFHGHGWKH¿QDOGHYHORSPHQWRIGHVLJQGHWDLOV ́

35. Engineering-News Record (November 29, 1934), 698.

 &+&KRUSHQLQJ3)RUW3HFN'DP ́

 3'HHS6KHHWSLOH&XWRII:HOOIRU)RUW3HFN'DP ́Engineering News Record (January 10, 1935), 35-9.

 &KRUSHQLQJ3)RUW3HFN'DP ́

 +:5LFKDUGVRQ3'UHGJH3ODQW&KDUDFWHULVWLFVDQG+\GUDXOLF)LOO2SHUDWLRQ ́ Engineering NewsRecord (August 6, 1936), 188-94.

40. “Diversion-Tunnel Driving,” Engineering News-Record (August 29, 1935), 296-300.

41. H. W. Richardson, “Tunnel Enlargement and Lining,” Engineering News-Record (August 13, 1936), 238-

43. J. D. Jacobs, “Grouting the Tunnels,” Engineering News-Record$XJXVW3)RUW3HFN

'LYHUVLRQ7XQQHOV5HGHVLJQHGIRU)DVWHU'ULYLQJ ́Engineering News-Record (March 26, 1936), 450-1.

 $:3HQFH37KH)RUW3HFN'DP7XQQHOV ́The Military Engineer 29, No. 163, 18-23.

 -DPHV-+DOORUDQ3(DUWK0RYHPHQWDW)RUW3HFN'DP ́The Military Engineer 31, No. 175, 5.
295

44. Joel Justin, (DUWK'DP3URMHFWV (New York: John Wiley, 1932), 55-9. Justin gave the formula 

4 4DYH/RJ7ZKHUH4LVWKHJUHDWHVWDYHUDJHUDWHRIÀRZIRUFRQVHFXWLYHKRXUVGXULQJDSHULRGRI\HDUV4DYHLVWKHDYHUDJH\HDUO\KRXUÀRRGDQG7LVWKHQXPEHURI\HDUVLQWKHSHULRGFRQVLGHUHG

7KXVIRU4DYH FXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQGDQG7 WKHQ4 ORJ 

 FXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQG)RU:\PDQ¶VYDOXHVVHH30LVVRXUL5LYHU ́House of Representatives

Document No. 238, 860.

 +HQU\&:ROIH37KH)RUW3HFN'DP7KH3URMHFW ́The Military Engineer 27, No. 151, (January-

)HEUXDU\

46. Justin, (DUWK'DP3URMHFWV, 52-3. Justin notes the disadvantages of an earth dam where the spillway requirements are excessive.

 :ROIH3)RUW3HFN'DP ́6HHDOVR3&RQFUHWH6WUXFWXUHVIRU6SLOOZD\ ́Engineering News-Record

$XJXVW6HHDOVR-RKQ5+DUGLQ3)RUW3HFN'DP6SLOOZD\ ́The Military Engineer 29, 

1R-DQXDU\)HEUXDU\

48. John Gage, Turner: Rain, Steam and Speed (New York: Allen Lane, 1972), 99 pages.

49. Theodore E. Stebbins Jr., and Norman Keyes, Jr., Charles Sheeler: The Photographs (Boston: New York 

Graphic Society, 1987), 162 pages.

50. M. R. Montgomery, Saying Goodbye (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 54-63.

 3,QWURGXFWLRQWRWKH)LUVW,VVXHRI/LIH ́Life 1, No. 1 (November 23, 1936), 3.

52. “10,000 Montana Relief Workers Make Whoopee on Saturday Night,” Life, 1, No. 1, (November 23, 

1936), 9-17.

 (ZDUW*3ODQN37KH7RZQRI)RUW3HFN ́The Military Engineer 28, No. 161, (September-October 

1936), 326.

 -HUROG%9DQ)DDVHQMaking It Happen: A Sixty-Year Engineering Odyssey in the Northwest (Seattle: 

1998), 58.

55. T. B. Jefferson, “Longer Life for Dredge Pumps,” Engineering News-Record ( December 2, 1937), 896.

 9DQ)DDVHQMaking It Happen, 60. Halloran, 3(DUWK0RYHPHQWDW)RUW3HFN'DP

 9DQ)DDVHQMaking It Happen, 61.

58. Ray Kendall, deposition, quoted in Montgomery, Saying Goodbye, 87-8.

59. Ralph E. Anglon, deposition, quoted in Montgomery, Saying Goodbye, 89.

 9DQ)DDVHQMaking It Happen, 61.

 +DOORUDQ3(DUWK0RYHPHQWDW)RUW3HFN'DP ́

62. War Department, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Report on the Slide of a Portion of the Upstream Face

of the Fort Peck Dam:DVKLQJWRQ'&86*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH-XO\SDJHVZLWK

29 drawings and charts plus three appendices. The Report by the Board is only two pages long. The remainder is a description of the dam, details of the slide, the immediate reconstruction, and the investigation, including tests.

 &/6WXUGHYDQWWRWKH'LVWULFW(QJLQHHUDW)RUW3HFN2FWREHU7$0LGGOHEURRNVWR0DMRU

Clark Kittrell, October 10, 1938; and C. L. Sturdevant to the Chief of Engineers, October 29, 1938. National 

$UFKLYHV&ROOHJH3DUN5*(QWU\)ROGHU3DUW7KH%RDUGPHWIURP1RYHPEHUWRWRUHYLHZWHVWUHVXOWVDQGWRUHTXHVWIXUWKHULQYHVWLJDWLRQV,QDIXUWKHUPHHWLQJIURP-DQXDU\WR)HEUXDU\

1939, the Board discussed all the studies and entertained various viewpoints from which a draft report emerged.

64. Thaddeus Merriman to Major Clark Kittrell, October 19, 1938, National Archives, College Park, RG77, 

(QWU\)ROGHU3DUW

65. Report on the Slide . . ., July 1939, 8-9.

66. Report on the Slide . . ., July 1939, 9.

67.The Classical Coulomb equation for stability expresses the shear resistance, s, as scp   tan 

where c is the cohesion, p is the pressure perpendicular to the sliding surface, and tan f is the 

angle of internal friction. The factor of safety is thus F S c . .   tan

s

which can be rewritten as 

F S

cl W . .   cos tan 

W sin 

A

A

where l is the length of the potentially sliding surface and dW is the weight 

of material above that surface. Where c=o the safety factor F S

W . . tan

tan  cos tan W sin . A

A A

 See Karl 

Terzaghi and Ralph B. Peck, Soil Mechanics in Engineering Practice (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 

)RUDFOHDUO\ZRUNHGH[DPSOHVHH6SHQFHU-%XFKDQDQ3/HYHHVLQWKH/RZHU0LVVLVVLSSL

Valley,” Proceedings of the ASCE 63, No. 7, (September 1937), 1304-21. (Buchanan studied under 

Terzaghi.)
296

68. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Garrison Dam and Reservoir: Analysis of

Design, Excavation and Main Embankment, Garrison District (May 1948), plate 28. See also Department of 

the Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Oahe Reservoir: 'H¿QLWLYH3URMHFW5HSRUW2I¿FHRIWKH'LVWULFW

(QJLQHHU2PDKD)HEUXDU\'UDZLQJ

 0HPRUDQGXPIURP)'5RRVHYHOWWRWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUV1RYHPEHU1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV

$UFKLYHV,,&ROOHJH3DUN0DU\ODQG5*(QWU\%R[)ROGHU3DUW

70. Memorandum from M. C. Tyler, Acting Chief of Engineers to the Secretary of War, November 3, 1938, 

1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV5*(QWU\%R[)ROGHU3DUW

71. Thaddeus Merriman to Major Clark Kittrell, October 19, 1938, National Archives, College Park, RG77, 

(QWU\)ROGHU3DUW+HUH0HUULPDQDVNVIRUPRUHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWHYHQWV3EHIRUHWKHVOLGHRQWKH

upstream face.”

72. Thaddeus Merriman to Major Clark Kittrell with copies to each member of the board, November 22, 

1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV&ROOHJH3DUN5*(QWU\%R[)ROGHU3DUW

73. “Thaddeus Merriman (Memoir),” Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 107 (1942), 

1799-1804. In 1934, S. O. Harper, then Acting Chief Engineer of the Bureau of Reclamation in Denver, 

had recommended Merriman as a consulting engineer for the Grand Coulee Dam, but Elwood Mead, the 

Commissioner, disapproved with the comment, “I have no objection to him either on personal or professional 

JURXQGVEXWKLVKHDGTXDUWHUVDUHQRZLQ.DQVDV&LW\DQGKHLVWKHFKLHIHQJLQHHULQJDGYLVRURQWKH)RUW3HFN

project, which competes with what we are doing in Montana.” Elwood Mead to S. O. Harper, March 3, 1934, 

1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV'HQYHU5*(QWU\*UDQG&RXOHH'DP3URMHFW¿OHV

74. Memorandum from H. M. Westergaard to Major C. Kittrell, “Ratio of the overall force of friction to the 

WRWDOZHLJKWRIPDWHULDOPRYHGGXULQJWKHSDUWLDOIDLOXUHRI)RUW3HFN'DPZLWKFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHG\QDPLFV

RIWKHPRWLRQ ́-DQXDU\SDJHVHQFORVHGZLWK:)&XPPLQV-UWR0DMRU&.LWWUHOO)HEUXDU\

1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV&ROOHJH3DUN5*(QWU\)ROGHU3DUW

 7KDGGHXV0HUULPDQWR0DMRU&.LWWUHOO)HEUXDU\DQG:DUUHQ-0HDGWR0DMRU&.LWWUHOO

)HEUXDU\HQFORVHGZLWK%RDUGRI&RQVXOWDQWVRQWKH)RUW3HFN'DPWR*HQHUDO-/6FKOH\0DUFK

1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV&ROOHJH3DUN5*(QWU\%R[)ROGHU3DUW

76. Board of Consultants to General J. L. Schley, March 3, 1939, National Archives, College Park, RG77, 

(QWU\%R[)ROGHU3DUW

77. Memorandum from General Tyler to General Schley, March 7, 1939, with an approval at the end by 

6FKOH\1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV&ROOHJH3DUN5*(QWU\)ROGHU3DUW

78. Engineering News-Record (November 4, 1940), 3.

 -RHO-XVWLQWR&DUOWRQ3URFWRU-XO\3URFWRUKDGZULWWHQRQ-XO\WRFRQ¿UPWKHSODQWRKDYHD

VHVVLRQGHYRWHGWR)RUW3HFN-XVWLQQRWHVWKDWKH&DVDJUDQGH*LOER\0HUULPDQDQG*HULJZRXOGEHGLVFXVsors. Only the discussions of Gilboy, Gerig, and Justin were published in the Transactions (1942).

80.Karl Terzaghi, “Soil Mechanics–A New Chapter in Engineering Science,” Journal, Institution of Civil

Engineers London (June 1939), 118-9.

 7$0LGGOHEURRNVWR.DUO7HU]DJKL$XJXVW7KRPDV$0LGGOHEURRNV3DSHUV2I¿FHRI

History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Middlebrooks enclosed the report of the Board.

 .DUO7HU]DJKLWR7KRPDV$0LGGOHEURRNV6HSWHPEHU7KRPDV$0LGGOHEURRNV3DSHUV2I¿FH

of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. A biography, Richard E. Goodman Karl Terzaghi: 

The Engineer as Artist$6&(3UHVVSDJHVPDNHVQRPHQWLRQRI)RUW3HFNRI0LGGOHEURRNVRUWKLV

correspondence on the slide. “More Light Needed,” Engineering News-Record 122, No. 19 (May 11, 1939).

 7$0LGGOHEURRNV3)RUW3HFN6OLGH ́Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 107 

(1942), 723-42. Quotation on 735.

 *OHQQRQ*LOER\3'LVFXVVLRQRQ)RUW3HFN6OLGH ́RI0LGGOHEURRNV¶3)RUW3HFN6OLGH ́Transactions of

the American Society of Civil Engineers 752-5. Quotation on 753.

 :LOOLDP*HULJWR7KRPDV$0LGGOHEURRNV-DQXDU\7KRPDV$0LGGOHEURRNV3DSHUV2I¿FHRI

History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

 7KRPDV$0LGGOHEURRNVWR:LOOLDP*HULJ)HEUXDU\7KRPDV$0LGGOHEURRNV3DSHUV2I¿FH

of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

 -DPHV/6KHUDUG5LFKDUG-:RRGZDUG6WDQOH\)*L]LHQVNLDQG:LOOLDP$&OHYHQJHUEarth and

Earth-Rock Dams (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963), 316-22. The sheet pile cutoff wall corroded 

quickly, and it did not prevent excessive seepage, anyway, so it was replaced by a drainage system with wood 

pipe, 293, 318.

88. Thomas A. Middlebrooks, “Progress in earth-dam design and construction in the United States,” Civil

Engineering 22 (September 1952), 118-26.
297

89. Sherard et al., Earth and Earth-Rock Dams, 144. Sherard was a student of Terzaghi and Casagrande at 

Harvard.

90. David P. Billington, “History and Esthetics in Suspension Bridges,” Proceedings of the American Society

of Civil Engineers. Journal of the Structural Division, ASCE 103, ST8 (August 1977), with Discussions and 

Closure 105, ST3 (March 1979).

91. 2I¿FLDO5HJLVWHU, ASCE (New York, 1982), 193-4.

92. Joel D. Justin to General M. C. Tyler, March 4, 1939, with a note on the letter written by Tyler telling of 

his phone instructions to Justin.

 -RKQ5)HUUHOOBig Dam Era: A Legislative and Institutional History of the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin

Program (Omaha: Missouri River Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1993), 40.

 )HUUHOOBig Dam Era, 2, 9.

95. House Document No. 475, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, “Report” from Colonel Lewis A. Pick, 19.

 )HUUHOOBig Dam Era, 8-9.

97. House Document No. 475, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, 24-6.

98. House Document No. 475, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, 27-8.

99. House Document No. 475, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, 28-9.

100. House Document No. 475, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, 7.

101. House Document No. 475, 78th Congress, 2nd Session v-ix, 1-5.

 )HUUHOOBig Dam Era, 27.

 )HUUHOOBig Dam Era, 22.

 )HUUHOOBig Dam Era,, 27-31.

 )HUUHOOBig Dam Era, 24.

 )HUUHOOBig Dam Era, 37.

107. Senate Document No. 191, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, “Missouri River Basin: Conservation, Control, and 

Use of Water Resources of the Missouri River Basin in Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, North Dakota, South 

Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, and Missouri,” April 1944, 1-2.

 )HUUHOO Big Dam Era, 19.

109. Senate Document No. 191, 1-16.

110. Senate Document No. 191, 16-211.

111. Senate Document No. 191, 6-8.

 )HUUHOO Big Dam Era, 47, 54.

 )HUUHOO Big Dam Era, 54-5.

 )HUUHOO Big Dam Era, 11, 55.

 )HUUHOO Big Dam Era, 60, and House Document No. 680, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, “Message from 

the President of the United States,” September 21, 1944, with a “Resolution of the Missouri River States 

Committee to Secure a Basin-Wide Development Plan” (sent to the President on August 21, 1944).

116. Senate Document No. 247, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, November 21, 1944, 6 pages.

 )HUUHOOBig Dam Era, 66.

 )HUUHOOBig Dam Era, 75.

119. John E. Thorson, River of Promise, River of Peril: The Politics of Managing the Missouri River

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 61.

120. Garrison Dam and Reservoir: Analysis of Design, Excavation and Main Embankment, Department of the 

Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Garrison District, May 1948, 1-2.

121. “The Garrison Story,” in Sheila C. Robinson (compiler), The Story of Garrison Dam: Taming the Big

Muddy (Garrison, North Dakota: BHG, Inc., 1997), 55-66, copy in the archives of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Garrison Dam, Riverdale, North Dakota.

 3$PHQGHG+HLJKWRI*DUULVRQ'DP$WWDFNHGRQ7KUHH)URQWV ́ Bismarck Tribune (December 6, 1945).

123. “Pick Calls for Unity in Valley,” World Herald (January 3, 1946).

124. “Power Line to Garrison Dam Advanced,” Fargo Forum (January 8, 1946).

125. Wesley Price, “What You Can Believe About MVA,” The Saturday Evening Post, (January 19, 1946), 

132. Truman’s view appeared in “MVA In 1946 Truman Hope,” World Herald-DQXDU\)RU

-DFNVRQ¶VDFWLYLW\39DOOH\3ODQ)LJKW6KLIWVWR1RUWKZHVW ́ World Herald (January 27, 1946).

 33LFN+HDUV1'7ULEHV3OHDGIRU/DQGV'DP:RXOG)ORRG ́Bismarck Tribune (May 28, 1946). A 

VHULHVRIDUWLFOHVDSSHDUHGLQODWHIRUH[DPSOH36WUHQXRXV2SSRVLWLRQWR5HORFDWLRQ3URJUDP)RU,QGLDQV

Develops,” Mandan (North Dakota) Daily Pioneer (Thursday, December 5, 1946).

127. Max Coffey, “Engineers’ Lay-Off Curbs River Job,” Rocky Mountain Empire Magazine (November 10, 

1946).
298

 /RUQH.HQQHG\3)XQG5HVWRUHGIRU3URMHFWVRQ0LVVRXUL5LYHU ́World Herald (November 30, 1945). 

“Army Plans to Begin Building Town in Spring,” Bismarck Tribune (December 21, 1945). “Senate Gives 

OK to O’Mahoney’s Dam Amendment,” Bismarck Tribune (March 15, 1946). This last reports on a second 

amendment attached to a bill that includes money to begin building the dam. A similar amendment reported in 

'HFHPEHUZDVE\SDVVHGEHFDXVHWKH¿UVWDSSURSULDWLRQZDVWREXLOGWKHWRZQ

 33LFN+HDUV1'7ULEHV3OHDGIRU/DQGV'DP:RXOG)ORRG ́DQG3%HUWKROG7ULEH'LG1RW$OZD\V2EMHFW

to New Location,” The Fargo Forum (December 15, 1946).

130. “Relocation Issue Vital to Project,” Grand Forks Herald (January 26, 1947), and Richard P. Powers, 

3)XWXUH$SSURSULDWLRQV:RQ¶W+DYH5HVWULFWLRQV6XFK$V,QGLDQ/DQG&ODXVH:KLFK+LWV*DUULVRQ'DP ́

Minot Daily News-DQXDU\)RUREMHFWLRQVVHHThe Leader (January 30, 1947); The Williston Daily

Herald (April 17 and May 29, 1947); and The Bismarck Tribune (June 11, 1947).

 37HQ5LYHU6WDWHV:DQW*DUULVRQ'DP%XLOW)DVW ́Minot Daily News (July 7, 1947). “Erosion Losses,” 

St. Louis Globe Democrat (July 17, 1947).

 37HQ<HDU3ODQIRU)ORRG&RQWURO ́St. Louis Globe Democrat (July 17, 1947). Richard G. Baumhoff, 

35HFRUG)ORRG'DPDJH7KLV<HDU(PSKDVL]HV1HHGIRU$FWLRQ1RZ ́ St. Louis Post Dispatch (July 20, 1947), 

DQG3$SSURYHGIRU*DUULVRQ3URMHFW,QFOXGHV,QGLDQ)XQGV ́Minot Daily News (July 22, 1947). 

Contracts were announced in the Bismarck Tribune (September 8, 1947).

133. Michael L. Lawson, Dammed Indians: The Pick-Sloan Plan and the Missouri River Sioux, 1944–1980

(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), paperback, 59-62.

134. J. S. Seybold, “Constructors Roll Nearly One Million Yards a Week Into Garrison Dam,” Civil

Engineering (October 1949), 28-32, 85.

135. Valley City Times Record)HEUXDU\3%LJ(TXLSPHQW%HLQJ8VHGDW*DUULVRQ'DP6LWH ́Minot

Daily News$SULO3,QGLDQV¶)LJKW2YHU%LJ'DPDW(QGDV&RQWUDFWLV6LJQHG ́Fargo Forum

(May 21, 1948).

136. “Giant Embankment Now Taking Shape,” Grand Forks Herald, July 4, 1948. “Truman Asks More 

Money for Garrison,” Minot News (July 24, 1948). “Stage Two Garrison Bids Let,” Mandan Pioneer

(September 22, 1948).

137. “Sloan Asks Solution to Souris Problems,” The Minot Daily News (December 3, 1948). Senate Document

No. 191, 111-114.

138. “Sen. Murray to Try MVA Bill Again,” The Minot Daily News (November 17, 1948). “Senator Murray 

Will Introduce TVA Bill,” North Dakota Union Farmer (December 6, 1948). Peter Edsom, “Army-Interior 

Duplication Doomed,” St. Paul Pioneer Press (December 9, 1948).

 )RU3LFN¶VDSSRLQWPHQWVHH'HSDUWPHQWRIWKH$UP\86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVThe History of

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Alexandria, Virginia, 2ndHGLWLRQ)RUWKH6ORDQ3LFNGHEDWHVHH

“Pick-Sloan Disagree,” Bismarck Tribune-XQH)RUWKHFRQFHUQVRI:LOOLVWRQVHH37KH7UXWK$ERXW

the Army Engineers and Garrison Dam,” The Williston Daily Herald (August 22, 1949). The article castigates 

the Corps and especially General Pick.

140. “Garrison Dam Pool Limit Rejected,” St. Paul Pioneer (August 23, 1949). “Army General Blasts At 

Lower Pool Level,” The Bismarck Tribune (August 25, 1949). Usher L. Burdick, “The Truth About the Army 

Engineers and Garrison Dam,” The Williston Daily Herald (August 22, 1949).

141. “’Pup’ Used at Garrison Dam Only One of its Kind,” The Minot Daily News (September 27, 1949). 

3*DUULVRQ'DP7DNHV6KDSH)RUWKH&DVXDO2EVHUYHU ́The Fargo Forum (October 9, 1949). “Garrison 

Tunnels Under Construction,” McLean County Independent (October 6, 1949).

142. Gordon Mikkelson, “Debate Rages Over Ninth of River Plans,” Minneapolis Morning Tribune

(January 21, 1950).

 3*DUULVRQ'DP)HDWXUHGE\&RQWUDFWRUV0DJD]LQH ́The Bismarck Tribune (August 1, 1950). “Missouri 

Basin is Major Problem in Nation’s Economy,” The Leader, Bismarck (September 7, 1950). Richard 

Baumhoff, “Huge Missouri-Souris Diversion Project Apparently to be Dropped,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch

(October 12, 1950).

 3&RQFUHWH)ORZVDV%LJ<HDU%HJLQVDW*DUULVRQ ́ The Minot Daily News (April 9, 1951). “Garrison 

Dam Activity Centered in Powerhouse Site,” The Minot Daily News$SULO3)W3HFN3RZHU)ORZV

to Dam,” The Williston Daily Herald (May 17, 1951). “Present Garrison Dam Cost Up to $268 Million,” The

Bismarck Tribune (June 7, 1951).

145. “Mississippi Congressman Calls for Missouri Valley Authority,” The Leader (July 26, 1951). “Charges 

$UP\,QÀXHQFHGE\3ULYDWH3RZHU ́The Fargo Forum (August 5, 1951).

146. John D. Paulson, “Great Amounts of Concrete, Steel Go into Dam,” The Fargo Forum

(December 2, 1951).
299

 3'DNRWD)ORRGV6KDUH1DWLRQ¶V7RS3LFWXUH1HZV6SRWOLJKW ́ The Fargo Forum (April 13, 1952). The 

DQGÀRRGVDUHGHVFULEHGLQ5REHUW/%UDQ\DQTaming the Mighty Missouri: A History of the

Kansas City District, Corps of Engineers: 1907-1971 (Kansas City, Missouri: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

3DJHZDVFRUUHFWDERXWWKHGDPV¶DELOLW\WRSUHYHQWÀRRGLQJMXVWEHORZWKHLUORFDWLRQVEXWIDUWKHUGRZQVWUHDPZKHUHODUJHWULEXWDULHVHQWHUWKH0LVVRXULDQGZKHUHKHDY\UDLQIDOOFDQRFFXUODUJHÀRRGV

such as the one in 1993 can still result.

 3*HQHUDO6D\V3LFN6ORDQ3ODQ:RXOGKDYH$YHUWHGμ)ORRG ́The Fargo Forum (May 7, 1952).

 3%LJ0DWWUHVVHV%XLOW)RU5LYHU'LYHUVLRQ ́Minot Daily News (September 15, 1952). John D. Paulson, 

3*DUULVRQ'DPWR)RUFH0LVVRXULWRμ'HWRXU¶LQμ ́The Fargo Forum (November 1952).

150. Thorson, River of Promise, 137-9.

151. “Garrison Dam Closed,” The Bismarck Tribune (April 16, 1953). Life (May 18, 1953).

152. “Members of Tribes Losing Land to Participate in Dam Closure Ceremony on June 12,” Williston Daily

Herald (June 3, 1953). “Indians Want Retention of Rights to Garrison Land,” New Town News (June 4, 1953).

153. “Electric Brains to Guide Basin Reservoir Operation,” Minot Daily News (December 3, 1953). 

William E. Potter, Engineering Memoirs (Alexandria, Virginia: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, July 1983). 

Oral history interview by Martin Reuss, 111-2.

154. Harold Ickes, “The Wide Missouri Gets Wider,” Field and Stream, (March 1954). Cal Olson, “Garrison 

'DP)LOO-RE&RPSOHWHG ́The Fargo Forum (March 5, 1954). Department of the Army, The Federal

Engineer, 130; “The Missouri Moves Over,” Life, (May 18, 1953), 45.

155. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Analysis of Design: Spillway Structures and 

Gates,” Missouri River Garrison Reservoir1RUWK'DNRWD2I¿FHRIWKH'LVWULFW(QJLQHHUV*DUULVRQ'LVWULFW

%LVPDUFN1RUWK'DNRWD$SULO&KDSWHU,,)RU/DERUDWRU\5HVHDUFKRQ6SLOOZD\VVHH3/DERUDWRU\

Research Applied to the Hydraulic Design of Large Dams,” Bulletin No. 32, Waterways Experiment Station, 

Vicksburg, Mississippi, June 1948.

156. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Analysis of Design: Spillway Structures and 

Gates,” Missouri River Garrison Reservoir&KDSWHU,,)RU/DERUDWRU\5HVHDUFKRQ6SLOOZD\VVHH3/DERUDWRU\

Research Applied to the Hydraulic Design of Large Dams,” Bulletin No. 32, Waterways Experiment Station, 

Vicksburg, Mississippi, June 1948.

157. Lawson, Dammed Indians, 47-9 and Department of the Army, The Federal Engineer, 105-17.

158. Thorsen, River of Promise, 186.

 )HUUHOOBig Dam Era, 123-45.

160. Robert Kelley Schneiders, Unruly River: Two Centuries of Change Along the Missouri (Lawrence: 

University Press of Kansas, 1999), 250-1.

161. Schneiders, Unruly River, 258.

301

CHAPTER 7

THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT:

SHASTA AND FRIANT DAMS

WATER ISSUES IN CALIFORNIA

Agriculture and Topography of the Central Valley

Since the days of the Gold Rush, California has stood as the most economically important state in the West. And for almost as long, it has been the 

PRVWLPSRUWDQWDJULFXOWXUDOSURGXFHULQWKH:HVW¿UVWEHFDXVHRIKXJHZKHDW

harvests shipped by sea to international markets and later because irrigated fruit, 

nut, and citrus crops could reach national markets via transcontinental rail connections.1

 The importance of water to agriculture remains strong, even at the beJLQQLQJRIWKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\ZKHQWHQVRIPLOOLRQVRI&DOLIRUQLDQVOLYH

LQXUEDQPHWURSROLWDQFHQWHUV0RUHWKDQSHUFHQWRIWKHVWDWH¶VDQQXDOZDWHU

supply still goes into crop production.2

In the mid-nineteenth century, California farmers initially relied on winter and early spring rainfall to nourish large wheat crops.3

 When it became apparent that natural precipitation varied too much from year-to-year to ensure 

ERXQWLIXOKDUYHVWVIDUPHUVVRXJKWZD\VRILQVXULQJWKHSUHVHQFHRIVXI¿FLHQW

moisture during critical stages of their wheat crop’s growth cycle. Irrigation 

EDVHGDURXQGWKHGLYHUVLRQRIVWUHDPVDQGULYHUVEHJDQWRÀRXULVKLQWKHODWH

VDQGVEXWLWZDVUHFRJQL]HGWKDWPXFKÀRRGZDWHUSDVVHGWRWKHVHD

(or into low-lying, seasonal, freshwater lakes) without being diverted into caQDOVRUGLWFKHV,QHVVHQFHWKHRQO\ZD\WRFDSWXUHH[FHVVÀRZUHVXOWLQJIURP

spring snowmelt and from storm surges was to build storage dams to “capture the 

ÀRRGV ́,Q&DOLIRUQLDGDPVLQWKHJROGSURGXFLQJUHJLRQQRUWKRI6DFUDPHQWR

pioneered the practice of large-scale water storage for hydraulic mining in the 

state.4

%\WKHVGDPVVSHFL¿FDOO\IRFXVHGRQDQG¿QDQFHGE\LUULJDWLRQ

interests were in operation and offering important precedents for future initiatives.5

The topography of California presents a few distinct regions that played 

a role in the growth of irrigation and water development projects. In the extreme southeastern corner of the state, the Imperial Valley draws water from the 

Colorado River via the All-American Canal to support an agricultural empire adjoining the Mexican border; greater Los Angeles and the southland below the 

Tehachapi Mountains (including communities in the Santa Ana River Valley, 

such as San Bernardino, Riverside, and greater Orange County) also developed 
302

tremendously productive irrigated farms in the late nineteenth and early 

twentieth century.6

 But the huge, 450-mile-long, 50-mile-wide, Central Valley in 

the heart of the state represents California’s most important agricultural region.7

Encompassing several million acres, the Central Valley is bounded on 

the east by the Sierra Nevada, on the west by the less lofty Coastal Ranges, and 

to the north and south by imposing escarpments connecting the Sierra Nevada 

to the Coastal Ranges. The northern half of the Central Valley, known as the 

Sacramento Valley, is drained by the Sacramento River and numerous tributar-

)LJXUH7KH%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQ¶V&HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFWVKRZLQJWKHSULPDU\IHDtures. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
303

LHVWKDWÀRZRXWRIWKHVXUURXQGLQJPRXQWDLQV7KHVHWULEXWDULHVLQFOXGHPDMRU

VWUHDPVVXFKDVWKH$PHULFDQ<XED)HDWKHUDQG3LW5LYHUVÀRZLQJRXWRIWKH

6LHUUD1HYDGDDQGVPDOOHUVWUHDPVVXFKDV6WRQ\&UHHNWKDWÀRZVHDVWZDUGRXW

RIWKH&RDVWDO5DQJHVQRUWKRI6DQ)UDQFLVFR$IWHUMRLQLQJZLWKWKH6DQ-RDTXLQ

River in the low-lying “Delta” region that forms about 50 miles downstream 

IURP6DFUDPHQWRWKH6DFUDPHQWR5LYHUÀRZVLQWR6DQ)UDQFLVFR%D\YLD6XLVXQ

%D\DQGWKH&DUTXLQH]6WUDLW7KHFRPELQHG6DFUDPHQWR6DQ-RDTXLQ5LYHULV

WKHODUJHVWDQGPRVWLPSRUWDQWVRXUFHRIIUHVKZDWHUÀRZLQJLQWR6DQ)UDQFLVFR

Bay.

The southern half of the Central Valley, known as the San Joaquin 

Valley, is drained largely by the San Joaquin River and the numerous tributarLHVLQFOXGLQJWKH0HUFHGDQG7XROXPQH5LYHUVWKDWÀRZRXWRIWKHVRXWKHUQ

6LHUUD1HYDGDRQO\DIHZVPDOO2DQGRIWHQGU\2FUHHNVÀRZHDVWZDUGRXWRI

WKHVRXWKHUQ&RDVWDO5DQJHV8SVWUHDPIURPLWVFRQÀXHQFHZLWKWKH6DFUDPHQWR

5LYHULQWKH3'HOWD ́WKH6DQ-RDTXLQ5LYHUÀRZVIRUVHYHUDOVFRUHPLOHVWKURXJK

DÀDWORZO\LQJH[SDQVHRIULSDULDQODQGWKDWSULRUWRWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIXSVWUHDPVWRUDJHDQGGLYHUVLRQGDPVZDVIUHTXHQWO\LQXQGDWHGE\DQQXDOVSULQJ

HDUO\VXPPHUÀRRGV%H\RQGWKLVULSDULDQODQGWKDWGXULQJWKHODWWHUQLQHWHHQWK

century came to comprise the heart of the Miller & Lux agriculture and ranching 

HPSLUHWKHYDOOH\LQFOXGHVYDVWWUDFWVRIÀDWODQGWKDW2ZKLOHQRWVXEMHFWWRQDWXUDOÀRRGLQJ2DUHJHQWO\VORSHGDQGZRQGHUIXOO\VXLWHGWRDJULFXOWXUHLISURSHUO\

irrigated.

 1RUWKRUGRZQVWUHDPIURP)UHVQRUHJLRQDOVWUHDPVIHHGLQWRWKH

6DQ-RDTXLQ5LYHUDQGDFFXPXODWLQJSUHFLSLWDWLRQÀRZVQRUWKWRZDUGWKH'HOWD

DQG6DQ)UDQFLVFR%D\%XWVRXWKRI)UHVQRWKHÀRZRIPDMRUULYHUVGRHVQRW

usually reach the San Joaquin River. This is because the topography of the exWUHPHVRXWKHUQVHFWLRQRIWKH&HQWUDO9DOOH\WUDSVWKHÀRZRIULYHUVZLWKLQVHDVRQDOODNHVDQGPDUVK\DUHDVDQGGRHVQRWDOORZLWWRUHDFKWKH3DFL¿F2FHDQ

YLD6DQ)UDQFLVFR%D\7KH.LQJV5LYHUÀRZVWKURXJKWKHUHJLRQLPPHGLDWHO\

VRXWKRI)UHVQRDQGLQVRPHZHW\HDUVKHDY\ÀRRGVFDQUHDFKWKH6DQ-RDTXLQ

River proper; but in the wake of extensive water storage and diversion systems, 

WKH.LQJV5LYHUXVXDOO\GRHVQRWFRQWULEXWHWRWKHÀRZRIWKH6DQ-RDTXLQDQG

instead collects in a large shallow pond known as Lake Buena Vista. South of 

the Kings River, the Kaweah, Tule (or Tulare), and Kern Rivers always remain 

ODQGORFNHGDQG2DWDWLPHEHIRUHWKHLUÀRZZDVODUJHO\GLYHUWHGIRULUULJDWLRQ2

they were responsible for creation of the shallow and seasonal Tulare Lake, loFDWHGQHDUWKHFLW\RI%DNHUV¿HOG8VXDOO\WKHWHUP36DQ-RDTXLQ9DOOH\ ́LVXVHG

to refer to the entire expanse of the southern Central Valley; however, at times, 

the area that drains into Lake Buena Vista and Tulare Lake has been called the 

Tulare Valley.
304

The overall topography of the Central Valley is critically important in 

terms of understanding how the two major dams built across the Sacramento and 

San Joaquin Rivers relate to one another and to the land irrigated by water impounded in their reservoirs. Also important to understanding the origin and purSRVHRIWKHVHWZRGDPV26KDVWD'DPDFURVVWKH6DFUDPHQWRDQG)ULDQWDFURVV

the San Joaquin—is an appreciation of how precipitation is distributed across the 

California landscape. In the northern half of the Central Valley, there is a relaWLYHO\ODUJHTXDQWLW\RIZDWHUPDGHDYDLODEOHE\QDWXUHWKDW¿OOVWKH6DFUDPHQWR

River and makes possible large-scale river boat navigation up to the city of 

6DFUDPHQWR7KHVRXWKHUQKDOIRIWKHYDOOH\LVPXFKGULHUDQGWKHDYHUDJHÀRZ

of the San Joaquin River is much lower than its brethren to the north. As settlers 

in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries came to realize, much 

of the land in the San Joaquin Valley is ideally suited to irrigation, and there is 

PRUHODQGVXVFHSWLEOHWRLQWHQVLYHLUULJDWLRQWKDQFDQEHFXOWLYDWHGXVLQJWKHÀRZ

of the southern rivers.

“Move the Rain”: The Central Valley Project

This circumstance of excess water supplies to the north and thirsty, potentially productive lands to the south comprises the foundation for what became 

known as the Central Valley Project, built by the Bureau of Reclamation starting in the depression-wracked 1930s. Unabashedly characterized by its supporters as a project that would “Move the Rain” by diverting huge quantities of water 

IURPQRUWKWRVRXWKWKH&HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFWZDVQRWWKH¿UVWIHGHUDOO\¿QDQFHG

reclamation project within California.8

 But its scale dwarfed those that 

)LJXUH(DUO\LUULJDWLRQGLYHUVLRQDORQJWKH.LQJV5LYHULQWKH6DQ-RDTXLQ9DOOH\FLUFD

1900. Source: Donald C. Jackson postcard collection.
305

preceded it, and, as built, the scope and scale of the multipurpose Central Valley 

Project is comparable to the gigantic Hoover Dam in the Southwest and the 

Grand Coulee and Bonneville Dams built contemporaneously. Recognizing the 

importance of the project in the development of California, this chapter lays out 

the origins of the Central Valley Project, the role of Shasta (originally called the 

.HQQHWWDQG)ULDQW'DPVZLWKLQWKHSURMHFWDQGWKHSURFHVVLQYROYHGLQWUDQVforming these two mnumental structures from drawing board to reality.

In recounting the story of the Central Valley Project, it is important to 

stress that the project was not born out of a vision of federal engineers who perceived a singular and essential place for the federal government in the development of California agriculture. Neither did the project spring forth fully-conceived by state engineers focused on a Progressive Era mission to maximize economic use of the state’s water. Nor did the scheme to transfer huge quantities of 

ZDWHUKXQGUHGVRIPLOHVZLWKLQWKHFRQ¿QHVRIWKH&HQWUDO9DOOH\GHULYHIURPWKH

efforts of private land-holding interests seeking to increase the productivity (and 

economic value) of their property. In truth, the Central Valley Project resulted 

from a long and complex interaction among federal, state, and private entities 

who shared a general interest—not to mention a competitive rivalry—in develRSLQJ&DOLIRUQLD¶VZDWHUUHVRXUFHV$WWLPHVWKHVSHFL¿FGHVLUHVRISDUWLFXODUDFtors within the state’s economic and political milieu clashed dramatically; at other times, remarkable congruence transpired and, ultimately, led to powerful alliances sharing goals that, only a short time earlier, might have appeared impossible to achieve.

The story of the Central Valley Project extends back more than sixty

years prior to the time when Reclamation, within the U.S. Department of the 

Interior, formally initiated work on what came to be known as Shasta Dam. 

During those intervening sixty-plus years, the “thread” tying together events

often became quite thin and tenuous, although in retrospect, it might be tempting 

for a historian to overlay a patterning that makes everything appear oh-so-logical and inevitable. A classic example of this phenomena concerns the famous 

“Marshall Plan” proposed by Robert Marshall of the U.S. Geological Survey in 

1919.9

 Conceived as a project to develop irrigated land in the Sacramento and 

lower San Joaquin River Valleys, the Marshall Plan did propose a major storage 

dam on the upper Sacramento River that bears striking similarity to the Shasta 

Dam in both location and function. But many other aspects of the Marshall Plan 

bear scant similarity to the Central Valley Project, as built. And there are key 

components of the Central Valley Project that were completely absent from the 

Marshall Plan. Thus, while it is reasonable to look to the Marshall Plan as a key 

part of the foundation for the Central Valley Project, its importance in terms of 

what was actually built can be easily overemphasized.
306

Similarly, a survey of Central Valley water resources administered by 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the mid-1870s certainly bears relevance 

to events in the 1920s and 1930s, but the linkages are less direct than one might 

VXUPLVH,QHVVHQFHWKHVWRU\RIWKH&HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFWLVRQH¿OOHGZLWKVHUendipity and contingency that belies the notion that western water resources development springs forth from a single vision of federal, state, or private preeminence. Rather, it represents a complex conjoining of interests that eventuDOO\IRXQGH[SUHVVLRQLQDSXEOLFZRUNVLQLWLDWLYHIRVWHUHGE\3UHVLGHQW)UDQNOLQ

Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s.

Miller & Lux and Early Agriculture

Early commercial Anglo-American agriculture in the Central Valley 

did not depend upon irrigation. In the 1850s, large wheat farms sprang up that 

depended upon the nutrients and moisture that had accumulated in the soil during 

the previous decades and centuries. Cattle ranches in the low-lying grasslands 

of the San Joaquin Valley also proliferated as entrepreneurs sought ways to supSO\PHDWWRDQGPDNHPRQH\IURPPHQZRUNLQJLQWKHJROG¿HOGV%\WKH

1860s, non-irrigated wheat farming began to decline as the moisture and nutrients were depleted from the soil. Contemporaneously, cattle ranching became 

more integrated into the meat marketing industry and ranch lands became concentrated under the control of a relatively few businessmen. The most important 

of these cattle ranchers were Henry Miller and Charles Lux, who (operating as 

the partnership Miller & Lux) purchased large tracts of riparian land in the lower 

6DQ-RDTXLQ9DOOH\DQGLQWKH.HUQ5LYHUEDVLQQHDU%DNHUV¿HOG10

)LJXUH$QLUULJDWLRQFDQDOLQWKH6DQ-RDTXLQ9DOOH\DERXWSource: Donald C. Jackson postcard collection.
307

Low-lying riparian land considered so desirable by Miller & Lux was, 

at least prior to the construction of large-scale dams and diversion works, natXUDOO\LUULJDWHGE\VSULQJÀRRGVWKDWRYHUÀRZWKHEDQNVRIWKHULYHUIRUDIHZ

ZHHNVVRDNLQWRWKHVRLODQGWKHQJUDGXDOO\UHFHGHDOORZLQJJUDVVWRÀRXULVK

DVWKHODQGVORZO\GULHV%\WKHODWHVWKHSRVVLELOLWLHVRIDUWL¿FLDOO\LUULJDWing much larger tracts of land than could be watered naturally were apparent to 

IDUPHUVDQGSRWHQWLDOHQWUHSUHQHXUV7KH¿UVWSHUVRQWRDFWLYHO\SXUVXHWKHFRQstruction of a large irrigation system focused around large-scale diversion of water from the lower San Joaquin River was John Bensley who formed the San 

Joaquin & Kings River Canal Company in the late 1860s. Bensley’s scheme 

proposed construction of a 40-mile long canal that would carry water along the 

ZHVWHUQULPRIWKHYDOOH\EHORZWKHVHWWOHPHQWRI)LUHEDXJK¶V)HUU\%HQVOH\GLG

not own the land that would lie below his company’s canal—much of it was controlled by Miller & Lux—but he believed landowners would be willing to buy 

water from him in order to irrigate their lands and thus increase economic productivity.

Of course, 40 mile-long canals are not cheap, and Bensley experienced 

GLI¿FXOW\LQUDLVLQJVXI¿FLHQWLQYHVWPHQWFDSLWDOWRFRQVWUXFWWKHFDQDO/DUJH

landowners in the lower San Joaquin Valley, including Miller & Lux as well as 

other California businessmen, appreciated the possibilities that Bensley’s canal presented, but they were not eager to become dependent upon a canal company that they could not control. The result was a new enterprise called the San 

Joaquin & Kings River Canal and Irrigation Company (SJ&KRC&IC) that abVRUEHG%HQVOH\¶VHDUOLHURXW¿WDQGLQFOXGHGVHYHUDO6DQ)UDQFLVFREXVLQHVVPHQ

DVRZQHULQYHVWRUV7KHVHLQYHVWRUVLQFOXGHG0LOOHU	/X[DQG:LOOLDP5DOVWRQ

the president of the California National Bank, who took over from Bensley as 

president and principal advocate of the new company.

The new San Joaquin & Kings River enterprise sought to carry out 

Bensley’s original project, but it also possessed a wider vision that encompassed 

development of the entire San Joaquin basin as well as the Kings, Tulare, and 

Kern River basins. To help plan for the future, Ralston hired Richard Brereton 

to serve as the company’s chief engineer. Brereton was a British engineer who 

had worked for the previous 15 years in India helping to build large-scale irrigation canals and water distribution systems. In coming to California in 1871, he 

brought with him engineering skills largely absent in western America. He also 

brought a sense that irrigation development should be accomplished on a grand 

scale and with the tacit—if not overt—support of government. Brereton criticized Bensley’s canal construction efforts as inferior to the work he was familiar with, and he set out to plan a system of wider scope than the company was 

presently pursuing. As part of this, he conceived of a major dam along the shore 

RI/DNH%XHQD9LVWDWKDWFRXOGVWRUHÀRRGVIURPWKH.LQJVDQG7XODUH5LYHUV
308

and—via a lengthy canal extending north along the west side of the San Joaquin 

Valley—foster water distribution over vast areas of dry but irrigable land.

The implementation of Brereton’s proposed system would require millions of dollars, much more than Ralston, Miller & Lux, and their partners could 

RUZRXOGUDLVHRQWKHLURZQ$IWHUIDLOLQJWR¿QGVXSSRUWDPRQJ%ULWLVK¿QDQFLHUFDSLWDOLVWV5DOVWRQDQG%UHUHWRQWUDYHOHGWR:DVKLQJWRQ'&LQHDUO\

seeking federal support for the company’s private irrigation project. During 

President Ulysses S. Grant’s administration, the notion of utilizing the resources of the federal government for private gain was hardly noteworthy. But, even 

within the context of a Republican Congress and Republican President who were 

disposed to help American business enterprise, Ralston and Brereton had dif-

¿FXOW\DWWUDFWLQJPXFKHQWKXVLDVPIRUDQ\VFKHPHWKDWZRXOGGUDZXSRQJRYHUQPHQW¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVRUODQGJUDQWVWRGLUHFWO\VXSSRUWDSULYDWHLUULJDWLRQ

SURMHFW6SHFL¿FDOO\DQ\ZRUNRIWKLVNLQGZDVRSSRVHGE\VPDOOIDUPLQJSURponents, including newly organized chapters of the Grange, which were gaining 

support in California and other agricultural states.

In place of a land grant that could have been used as security to attract 

private investment, Ralston and Brereton were, instead, offered a modest government-sponsored investigation of the irrigation possibilities present within the 

Central Valley. Presumably, such an investigation could offer a means for ratioQDOL]LQJVXEVHTXHQW¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWRILUULJDWLRQZRUNLQWKHUHJLRQLWFRXOG

also offer a potential rationale for implementing irrigation projects that were not 

necessarily oriented toward serving the interests of large landowners. As such, it 

represented a much less controversial (and far less expensive) alternative to direct federal aid or land grants for the SJ&KRC&IC.

The Board of Commissioners’ Survey

In March 1873, Congress and President Grant authorized an expenditure of $6,000 (of this, only $5,000 was actually spent) from the War Department 

budget to carry out a year-long survey of the Central Valley and report on the 

IHDVLELOLW\RILUULJDWLRQZLWKLQLWVFRQ¿QHV7KHVXUYH\ZDVWREHFRQGXFWHGE\

DERDUGRIFRPPLVVLRQHUVFRPSULVHGRIWZRRI¿FHUVIURPWKH86$UP\&RUSV

of Engineers, a representative of the U.S. Coast Survey, a representative from 

the California state government, and a private sector citizen and engineer knowledgeable about conditions in the valley. The board was headed by Lt. Colonel 

B. S. Alexander and staffed by Major George Mendell and Professor George 

Davidson of the U.S. Coast Survey. Attempts were made to recruit Josiah D. 

Whitney, the California State Geologist, and Robert Brereton, chief engineer 

of the SJ&KRC&IC, but both declined the honor and the board functioned as 

a three-person entity for the duration of its work. Their effort commenced in 
309

April 1873 and extended until the next spring. At that time, the board submitted a report to President Grant, subsequently published as Report of the Board

of Commissioners on the Irrigation of the San Joaquin, Tulare and Sacramento

Valleys of the State of California.

 /LPLWHGLQERWKWLPHDQGIXQGLQJWKHERDUGFDUULHGRXWDVLJQL¿FDQWUHconnaissance of the greater Central Valley, but it was incapable of undertaking 

any in-depth studies of particular watersheds or of making any detailed recomPHQGDWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJWKHGHVLJQRIVSHFL¿FGDPVRUZDWHUFRQWUROV\VWHPV

In large part, the board relied on survey data and hydraulic measurements supplied by other groups and individuals, although it did attempt to examine in perVRQDVPXFKRIWKH9DOOH\DVSRVVLEOHVRWKDWLWFRXOGVSHDNZLWK¿UVWKDQGH[SHrience about the character of the land and water resources covered in the report. 

Eschewing any attempt to make detailed suggestions as to the exact form and location of future canals, the board’s report stressed more fundamental issues, not 

least of which was simply that much land in the Central Valley (especially on the 

west side of the San Joaquin and Tulare Valleys) was well suited to agriculture 

but could become productive only if an outside source of irrigation water could 

be developed. In essence, the board did not assume that a national (as opposed to 

western) audience would automatically recognize the need for irrigation systems 

to bring western land into cultivation.

 $OWKRXJKDVXEVWDQWLDODPRXQWRIGDWDVSHFL¿FWR&DOLIRUQLDZDVLQFOXGed in the board’s report, there was also an enormous amount of descriptive maWHULDOUHODWHGWRIRUHLJQFDQDOVLQ)UDQFH,WDO\DQG2PRVWVLJQL¿FDQWO\2%ULWLVK

India. In retrospect, one of the most noteworthy aspects of the report was the 

extent to which it stressed the value of British built and designed canal systems 

in India as models for large-scale irrigation development in the Central Valley. 

8QLPSUHVVHGE\WKHVXFFHVVRISULYDWHO\¿QDQFHGLUULJDWLRQSURMHFWVLQ,QGLDWKH

board also stressed the importance and value of large-scale work that lay beyond 

WKHFDSDELOLWLHVRILQGLYLGXDOIDUPHUV6SHFL¿FDOO\WKH%RDUGSURFODLPHGWKDW

The experience of other countries appears to prove that no extensive system of irrigation can ever be devised or executed by 

the farmers themselves. . . . That while small enterprises may 

be undertaken by the farmers in particular cases, it would not 

be in accordance with the experience of the world to expect of 

them the means or inclination to that cooperation which would 

be necessary to construct irrigating-works involving large expenditures. That enterprises of this character, if built at all, 

must be built by the state or by private capital.11
310

Overall, the board recognized the paucity of precipitation in the southern half of the Central Valley and the relative abundance of water in the northern half. No grand scheme was offered that could rectify these inequities, but 

the report did note that a large dam at the northern end of the Sacramento Valley 

(in essence, the equivalent of what became Shasta Dam) could feed water into a 

lengthy canal extending down the western side of the Sacramento River Valley 

that could irrigate thousands of acres of land. But in keeping with the modHVWEXGJHWDOORFDWHGWRWKH%RDUGOLWWOHLQWKHZD\RI¿UPSUDFWLFDOUHFRPPHQdations were made, and the Sacramento Valley canal was discussed in only the 

most schematic manner.

Miller & Lux and Riparian Rights

In immediate terms, the Board’s report spurred no federal legislative reaction, either pro or con. In fact, the report’s emphasis on government-sponsored activity—at least if it was interpreted as involving the federal government—seemed to render it irrelevant in terms of what actually occurred in the 

Central Valley during the latter nineteenth century. Contemporaneously with the 

report’s preparation and subsequent submittal to President Grant, the nation as a 

whole fell into one of the worst economic depressions of the nineteenth century. Ralston and most of the other businessmen associated with the SJ&KRC&IC 

VDZWKHLU¿QDQFLDOHPSLUHVFROODSVH5DOVWRQ¶V%DQNRI&DOLIRUQLDIDLOHGLQ

and he died within a year). Only Miller & Lux survived the lengthy recession intact and, as one result of this, assumed control of the canal and related holdings 

that been been developed to irrigate land in the lower San Joaquin Valley (land 

that belonged primarily to Miller & Lux). The stage was now set for a protracted 

battle between Miller & Lux (who controlled tens of thousands of acres of irrigated land bordering both the lower San Joaquin River and the Kern River near 

%DNHUV¿HOGDQGVPDOOHUVFDOHIDUPHUVVHHNLQJWRGHYHORSLUULJDWHGVHWWOHPHQWV

in the areas of the valley that were at higher elevations than the vast tracts controlled by Miller & Lux.12

 )URPWKHVWKURXJKWKHVWKHGLFKRWRP\EHWZHHQODUJH3DJULbusiness” and smaller-scale “family farms” formed the political backdrop for intense legislative and judicial maneuvering within the California political landscape. Ripe with nuance that makes broad-brush generalizations a dangerous 

business for historians, nonetheless, the essence of the “big business versus famLO\IDUP ́FRQÀLFWUHYROYHGDURXQGDIHZLVVXHVDQGFLUFXPVWDQFHV13)RUH[DPSOHVLJQL¿FDQWLUULJDWLRQLQWKHUHJLRQVXUURXQGLQJ)UHVQRRFFXUUHGLQWKHV

DQGVWKURXJKWKHGHYHORSPHQWRISULYDWHO\¿QDQFHG3FRORQLHV ́WKDWZHUH

promoted by large-scale business interests but which led to a proliferation of relDWLYHO\VPDOOVFDOHIDUPVSRVVHVVLQJVHFXUHZDWHUULJKWVDWWDFKHGWRWKHÀRZRI

the Kings River. 
311

 )LUVWRIDOO0LOOHU	/X[ZHUHIDQDWLFDOO\SHUVLVWHQWLQWKHLUGHIHQVHRI

riparian water rights attached to their low-lying lands adjoining the San Joaquin, 

Kern, and other rivers in the state.14 Although western America is popularly 

characterized as a region in which the “Doctrine of Appropriation” is the legal 

foundation of water rights, in California the “Riparian Doctrine” (by which landowners could secure water rights simply as a result of their owning land along a 

stream bank) was also recognized by the state constitution and upheld by state 

courts. In asserting their “riparian rights” to the San Joaquin and other streams, 

Miller & Lux necessarily challenged the legality of any upstream water diverVLRQVWKDWZRXOGUHGXFHWKHÀRZRIZDWHUSDVWDQGLQWLPHVRIÀRRGRYHUWKHLU

low-lying lands. Anyone seeking to appropriate water for the purpose of irrigating land that lay above the bottom lands that Miller & Lux controlled would unavoidably encroach upon the partnership’s riparian rights.

 (YHQEULHIUHÀHFWLRQXSRQWKHFRQÀLFWDWWHQGLQJDQ\HIIRUWWRDGPLQLVter appropriated and riparian rights simultaneously will lead an observer to the 

conclusion that they are inherently incompatible. And the legal wranglings that 

GH¿QH&DOLIRUQLDZDWHUODZLQWKHODWHQLQHWHHQWKDQGHDUO\WZHQWLHWKFHQWXULHV

would bear out the correctness of such a conclusion. Armed with the weapon 

that riparian water rights represented a “property right” that could not be taken 

away except through “due process” of law, as administered by the courts (not 

the state legislature or the federal government), Miller & Lux vigorously deIHQGHGWKHPVHOYHVLQUHJDUGWRDQ\SRVVLEOHGLPLQXWLRQRIZDWHUÀRZIRUWKHLU

ODQGV7KHLUVXFFHVVLQWKLVHQGHDYRUZDVUHÀHFWHGLQWKHGHFLVLRQRIWKH

California Supreme Court in the case of Lux v. Haggin, which upheld the riparian 

doctrine and precluded diversion from the Kern River by a consortium led by 

Ali Haggin who wished to irrigate land upstream from Miller & Lux’s property.15

This ruling did not destroy all possibility of appropriating water out of 

California’s rivers (e.g., after winning in court, Miller & Lux struck a deal with 

Haggin allowing a certain amount of water to be diverted upstream from their 

holdings, but the terms of the agreement were set by Miller & Lux in light of the 

power that accrued to them as a result of the court ruling), and it prompted the 

state legislature to pass the Wright Irrigation District Act (named after Modesto 

assemblyman C. C. Wright) authorizing the formation of irrigation districts that 

allowed for an alternative to irrigation development focused around large-land 

owning interests. In the years after 1887, the success of irrigation districts in 

California waxed and waned, but by the second decade of the twentieth century, irrigation districts (which relied upon enabling legislation that had evolved 

VLJQL¿FDQWO\VLQFHWKHHQDFWPHQWRIWKHRULJLQDO:ULJKW$FWEHFDPHDSRZHUIXO

force in the state’s agricultural economy.16
312

In the decades after completion of the board of commissioner’s report 

in 1874, California agriculture continued to grow, but the nature and character 

of the development was not guided by a strong governmental authority (whether 

federal or state). Instead, large land-owning interests, acting to protect riparian 

rights largely developed in the years following the Gold Rush, exerted enormous 

LQÀXHQFHRYHUKRZDQGZKHUH2DQGWRZKRVHEHQH¿W2LUULJDWLRQZRXOGGHYHORS

Spurred by prodigious amounts of legal wrangling, the California state courts 

played a critical role in determining regional water allocations. In essence, the 

ideal of strong government planning and guidance expressed in the board of 

commissioner’s report held only minimal relevance to actual development.17

The Federal Hiatus: 1873–1934

After the conclusion of the board of commissioners investigation in 

1874, the federal government assumed a secondary status in regard to water resources development in the Central Valley (and in all of California for that matter). Water rights were an issue of state law, and the federal government was 

ODUJHO\H[FOXGHGIURPWKHOHJDOZUDQJOLQJDWWHQGLQJWKHFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQWKHULparian and appropriation doctrines. Similarly, property rights were also largely 

an issue of state concern once land had been transferred out of the public domain 

and into private control.

Of course, land within the public domain remained under the control of 

the federal government, and this could have provided an entree for bringing the 

IHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWLQWRWKH¿HOGRILUULJDWLRQGHYHORSPHQW,QIDFWWKHQRWLRQ

of utilizing the public domain constituted a key rationale underpinning the creation of the U.S. Reclamation Service in 1902; proceeds derived from the sale of 

public lands were originally conceived as the source of funding for Reclamation 

Service projects, and it was anticipated (or hoped) that small-scale farmers obWDLQLQJODQGGLUHFWO\IURPWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWZRXOGEHFRPHSULPDU\EHQH¿-

ciaries of federal irrigation initiatives. But, in California, little good agricultural 

land remained within the public domain at the start of the twentieth century, and 

the Reclamation Service played only a minor role in California agriculture prior 

to authorization of the Central Valley Project in the 1930s.

The most visible role played by the federal government in California’s 

economic development derived from an activity that is not often considered a 

primary concern of western water development: navigation. In the arid West, 

water is often considered too scarce and valuable to utilize simply as a means of 

ÀRDWLQJVKLSVDQGEDUJHV,QWKHKXPLG(DVWRIFRXUVHWKHXVHRIULYHUVDVWUDQVportation corridors is long-standing, dating to the early years of the Republic; 

the role of the federal government in protecting river navigation as an essential 

component of interstate commerce was sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
313

the 1820s, and during the nineteenth century, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

assumed the lead in maintaining the navigability of major streams such as the 

Mississippi River and its tributary, the Ohio River.

 7KH6DFUDPHQWR5LYHULVFRPSOHWHO\FRQ¿QHGZLWKLQWKHERXQGDULHVRI

California. However, during the early years of the gold rush, steamships began 

plying the waters of the lower Sacramento River and providing a direct connecWLRQZLWKWUDQVSRUWDWLRQIDFLOLWLHVLQ6DQ)UDQFLVFR%D\7KXVWKH6DFUDPHQWR

River became recognized as a navigable stream tied into a larger transportation 

V\VWHPFRQQHFWHGWRRWKHUVWDWHVDORQJWKH3DFL¿F&RDVWDVZHOODVWKRVHZLWK

Atlantic ports) and other countries.

Initially, navigation within the Sacramento River Valley did not become an object of concern because it required huge quantities of water to supSRUWODUJHVFDOHULYHUWUDI¿F5DWKHUFRQWURYHUV\DURVHEHFDXVHRIK\GUDXOLFPLQing techniques practiced by mining companies in Northern California. To increase production from the mid-1850s onward, gold mining companies focused 

on large-scale techniques that entailed dumping huge amounts of waste rock 

and soil–often termed “debris”–into river beds below their processing facilities. 

Over time, this debris accumulated in the Sacramento River and many of its maMRUWULEXWDULHVWRVXFKDQH[WHQWWKDWLWERWKIRVWHUHGKHDY\XQFRQWUROOHGÀRRGLQJ

of surrounding agricultural land and clogged the Sacramento River so that ships 

risked damage as a result of running aground.18

 7KHFRQÀLFWWKDWHUXSWHGLQWKH6DFUDPHQWR9DOOH\LQWKHVDPRQJ

mining, farming, and navigation interests attracted the attention of the federal 

JRYHUQPHQWEHFDXVHLWLQYROYHGFRPPHUFLDOULYHUWUDI¿FDQGWKLVZDVDQDFWLYity that, in constitutional terms, was recognized as falling under federal jurisdiction. As a result, in 1893 a federally supported California Debris Commission 

(with ties to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) was authorized by Congress to 

regulate California’s hydraulic mining industry and ensure that debris would not 

be allowed to build up within the Sacramento River and impede navigation. This 

action formally acknowledged that use of the Sacramento River–at least in part–

involved commercial navigation. This acknowledgment would eventually play 

a role in the events leading up to the authorization of the Central Valley Project.19

In the years following the formation of the California Debris 

Commission in 1893, the issue of federal involvement in maintaining the navigability of the lower Sacramento River remained politically active. And it encompassed more than simply holding back mining debris in the mountains and foothills. By 1904, a report by a board of engineers headed by T. G. Dabney recomPHQGHGDSODQIRUÀRRGFRQWUROEDVHGODUJHO\RQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRISHUPDQHQW

OHYHHVGHVLJQHGWRFRQ¿QHÀRRGÀRZVLQWKH6DFUDPHQWR5LYHU¶VPDLQFKDQQHO
314

In 1910, a new, more comprehensive report was prepared under the direction 

of District Engineer Thomas H. Jackson of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(hence its name: the “Jackson Report”) that expanded upon the levee plan and 

included extensive dredging and the formation of weirs and “bypass” channels to 

GLVSHUVHKLJKÀRRGZDWHUV7KLVUHSRUWDOVRDFNQRZOHGJHGWKHSRVVLEOHXWLOLW\RI

XSVWUHDPUHVHUYRLUVIRUFRQWUROOLQJÀRRGVEXWDYHUUHGWKDW

While favoring the use of reservoirs as far as possible, and considering that one of the advantages of the project herein proposed is that it lends itself to future storage possibilities, the 

[California Debris] Commission believes that it is not economiFDOWRFRQVWUXFWUHVHUYRLUVIRUÀRRGFRQWUROEXWWKDWVXFKFRQstruction should be deferred until these reservoirs prove desirable for power and irrigation purposes.20

The “Jackson Report” provided a basis for subsequent Corps involvement in the lower Sacramento and helped spur inclusion of the drainage basin in 

WKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FW$OWKRXJKIRFXVHGRQÀRRGFRQWURODQGQDYLJDWLRQ

concerns, this act further extended the federal government’s involvement—in 

concert with state and local interests—in the development of water resources in 

FHQWUDO&DOLIRUQLDDQGKHOSHGGH¿QHZKDWHYHQWXDOO\EHFDPHWKH&HQWUDO9DOOH\

Project in the 1930s.21

The Early Reclamation Service in California

A casual observer might logically presume that, with the authorization 

of the Reclamation Service in 1902, California would be a key focus of the new 

federally sponsored irrigation projects. After all, the state already possessed an 

economically productive agricultural industry focused primarily on irrigation development. However, the introduction of the federal government into the business of irrigation would come with a price, and existing farming interests in 

California feared that they would surrender some of their autonomy if they relied upon a federally sponsored (and federally administered) system for their water supply. This fear was exacerbated by concern that the law authorizing the 

Reclamation Service also stipulated that farms served by federal reclamation 

projects were to be limited in size to only 160 acres.

Commonly characterized as the “160 acre limit” (although it was quickly amended to allow a husband and wife to operate, in tandem, a 320 acre farm), 

WKLVVWLSXODWLRQUHÀHFWHGFRQJUHVVLRQDOFRQFHUQWKDWIHGHUDOLUULJDWLRQVRPHKRZ

be focused on “small farmers” and not become a mechanism for providing subsidies to large landowners (or, even worse, large-scale, land-grabbing “speculators”). Clearly, as a result of the acreage limitation requirements, 
315

organizations such as Miller & Lux possessed little incentive to become associated with Reclamation Service projects. And many other farmers, such as those 

UHVLGLQJLQWKHLUULJDWLRQFRORQLHVVXUURXQGLQJ)UHVQRDOUHDG\KHOGUHODWLYHO\UHOLDEOHZDWHUULJKWVWKDWGLGQRWQHHGWREHEROVWHUHGE\WKHVWRUDJHRIÀRRGZDWHUV

behind federal dams.

As a result, the early efforts of the Reclamation Service in California 

became concentrated on projects that lay at the periphery of the state in either a 

SK\VLFDORUHFRQRPLFVHQVH)RUH[DPSOHWZRRIWKHPRVWSURPLQHQWHDUO\IHGeral initiatives involved interstate streams that were far removed from the Central 

Valley: these were the Yuma Project, along the lower Colorado River in the far 

VRXWKHDVWFRUQHURIWKHVWDWHDQGWKHUHPRWH.ODPDWK3URMHFWDORQJWKH2UHJRQ

California border.22 The political nature of Reclamation Service projects was 

DOVRUHÀHFWHGLQWKHGHFLVLRQWRDEDQGRQSODQQLQJIRUIHGHUDOO\VSRQVRUHGLUULJDtion development in the Owens Valley once it became clear that the City of 

Los Angeles wished to tap the Owens River as a source of municipal water 

supply.23 In this context, it is not so surprising that the one early Reclamation 

Service project in the Central Valley represented a relatively minor endeavor, at 

least in comparison to the totality of irrigation in the valley and in comparison to 

the Central Valley Project of the 1930s.

The Orland Project

In 1906, the Reclamation Service received authorization for construcWLRQRIDSURMHFWWRGLYHUWWKHÀRZRI6WRQ\&UHHNDQGDOORZIRULUULJDWLRQGHvelopment of about 14,000 acres in the region around the town of Orland, located about 100 miles north-northwest of Sacramento. Stony Creek is a relatively 

PLQRUWULEXWDU\RIWKH6DFUDPHQWR5LYHUWKDWÀRZVHDVWZDUGRXWRIWKH&RDVWDO

Ranges (rather than westward out of the much more imposing Sierra Nevada 

Mountains) and its impoundment and diversion for irrigation was not considered 

VLJQL¿FDQWHQRXJKWRDOWHUWKHRYHUDOOÀRZRIWKHORZHU6DFUDPHQWR5LYHU7KH

primary component of the Orland Project was the East Park Dam, a curved gravity concrete dam, completed in 1911 across Little Stony Creek (a tributary of 

Stony Creek). In a technical context, the East Park Dam and associated facilities 

worked well, but the productivity of the land around Orland proved to be relaWLYHO\ZHDNDQGWKH¿QDQFLDOFRQGLWLRQRIWKHIDUPHUVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUSD\LQJIRU

the project languished. By the early 1920s, farmers dependent upon the Orland 

Project had largely resorted to growing low-value forage crops (primarily alfalfa) 

as feed for dairy cattle.24

In the mid 1920s, concern over the plight of the Orland Project farmers 

led Congress to authorize construction of an additional storage dam across Stony 

Creek for the purpose of increasing water supplies and thus improving the 
316

economic viability of the overall project. Or, as a Bureau of Reclamation publication later characterized it:

7KHKHDY\VKRUWDJHVDQGWKH¿QDQFLDOORVVHVVXIIHUHGE\WKHZDter users on the project during the years 1918, 1920, and 1924 

resulted in an appropriation by the Congress in the spring of 

1926 for starting construction of the Stony Gorge Dam.25

The hope was that increased water supplies would foster the opening up of addiWLRQDOODQGWRLUULJDWLRQDQGWKLVZRXOGLQFUHDVHDJULFXOWXUDOUHYHQXHVVXI¿FLHQWly to allow repayment of the project’s cost. Completed in 1927, Stony Gorge 

'DPLVWKH¿UVWDQGRQO\ODUJHVFDOHÀDWVODEEXWWUHVVGDPEXLOWE\5HFODPDWLRQ

With a maximum height of 142 feet and a length of 868 feet, the dam impounds a 

reservoir with a storage capacity of about 50,000 acre-feet. Although this is certainly not of inconsequential size, compared to Shasta Dam, which Reclamation 

FRPPHQFHGEXLOGLQJDGHFDGHODWHULWLVH[WUHPHO\VPDOOVSHFL¿FDOO\6WRQ\

Gorge Dam provides only about 1.1 percent of the storage capacity provided by 

Shasta Dam).26

The Iron Canyon Project and the Sacramento Valley

While the Orland Project represented but a small portion of the potential productive capacity of the Sacramento Valley, in the early twentieth century, efforts were made by boosters in the valley to get the federal government 

to support construction of a dam across the Sacramento River near the town of 

Redding. Usually referred to as the Iron Canyon Dam, this structure was promoted by the Sacramento Valley Development Association—and its offshoot, the 

Iron Canyon Project Association—as a means of irrigating more than 

100,000 acres of land in the upper Sacramento Valley along the western side of 

the valley in the Orland region. Initial studies were carried out by Reclamation 

Service engineers in 1904-05, and, in 1913, a large-scale, yet hardly comprehenVLYHLQYHVWLJDWLRQZDVFRPSOHWHGE\WKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHZLWKGLUHFW¿QDQcial support provided by the Iron Canyon Project Association.27

This report is instructive in that it highlights the possibilities that could 

accrue in terms of regional growth if a large-scale storage dam were built at the 

XSSHUHQGRIWKH6DFUDPHQWR9DOOH\<HWLWDOVRGUDZVDWWHQWLRQWRWKHGLI¿FXOWLHV

that would attend such a project in terms of accommodating the needs and rights 

of navigation interests seeking to maintain river borne commerce up to (and beyond) Sacramento. In addressing navigation issues, the report highlighted conÀLFWVLQKHUHQWLQDOHJDOVWUXFWXUHWKDWJUDQWVVWDWHVWKHULJKWWRDGPLQLVWHUDQG

control water rights and water usage but simultaneously empowers the federal 

government to oversee all issues related to commerce on navigable rivers.
317

The State of California might well exercise control over the water use in the 

Sacramento River Basin, but this control could prove less than authoritative in 

the face of federal navigation requirements.28 The 1914 report sponsored by the 

Reclamation Service and the Iron Canyon Project Association could not resolve 

the conundrum posed by the status of state and federal authority over use of waWHUZLWKLQWKHQDYLJDEOHDQGÀRRGSURQH6DFUDPHQWR5LYHU%XWLQFRQFHUWZLWK

the California Debris Commission’s “Jackson Plan,” discussed earlier in this 

FKDSWHUDQG¿UVWSXEOLFO\SUHVHQWHGLQLWEURXJKWWKHLVVXHLQWRWKHSXEOLF

limelight. In the words of the report:

Reference is made herein to possibilities of cooperating with 

ÀRRGFRQWURODQGQDYLJDWLRQLQWHUHVWVLQWKHORZHU6DFUDPHQWR

Valley. No conclusion is possible on these important matters 

save after careful and thorough investigation. . . . The relative 

importance of the waters of the Sacramento to transportation or 

to agricultural development in the Sacramento Valley is a question that should be decided by the state and nation at the earliest 

date possible, in order that the various improvements proposed 

can be brought into harmony . . . 29

In terms of dam technology, the 1914 Iron Canyon Project report devoted considerable attention to the geological condition of the Iron Canyon site and 

KRZWKLVPLJKWDIIHFWGHVLJQLVVXHV6SHFL¿FDOO\WKH,URQ&DQ\RQVLWHZDVIRXQG

WREHUHODWLYHO\ZHDNSRURXVDQGVXVFHSWLEOHWRWKHÀRZRIVXEVXUIDFHZDWHU

through the foundation.30 Conditions were not considered bad enough to warrant rejection of the site as completely unsuitable, but the porous character of the 

foundation clearly concerned the Reclamation Service engineers. In offering a 

possible design, they made clear that it represented only a preliminary proposal 

and that further geological testing of the site would be necessary before developLQJD¿QDOGHVLJQDQGFRQVWUXFWLRQSURJUDP1RQHWKHOHVVWKHUHSRUWODLG

RXWWZREDVLFGHVLJQRSWLRQV37KHHDUWKDQGURFN¿OOW\SHDQGWKHVROLGJUDYLW\

masonry type. . . .”31

In terms of cost, the two design options explored by the Reclamation 

Service “show[ed] little difference in cost” (both would have required an overall 

SURMHFWH[SHQGLWXUHRIDURXQGPLOOLRQDQGWKHURFN¿OOGHVLJQZDVUHFRPmended because of concerns related to the suitability of the Iron Canyon foundation. However, the Reclamation Service made a point of developing a design 

DQGFRVWHVWLPDWHIRUWKHPDVRQU\JUDYLW\VWUXFWXUHDQGWKHUHSRUWVSHFL¿-

cally opined that:

An arched type of masonry dam across the Sacramento has certain attractive features, due to its compactness, solidity, beauty 
318

RIGHVLJQDQGWKH¿UPPDQQHULQZKLFKLWFDQEHNH\HGLQWRWKH

rocky abutments . . . 32

$URFN¿OOHPEDQNPHQWGHVLJQPD\KDYHEHHQIDYRUHGLQEHFDXVHRIWKHSRrous conditions at the site and fears that percolation could undermine a masonry 

JUDYLW\GHVLJQWKURXJKVOLGLQJDQGXSOLIW,QIDFWWKHUHSRUWVSHFL¿FDOO\DFNQRZOedged that:

In a gravity masonry dam designed to act as a more or less absolute closure the introduction of percolating water under the 

dam foundation may under certain conditions result in upward 

pressure threatening the stability of the structure itself . . . .33

,QOLJKWRIWKLVFRQFHUQDURFN¿OOGHVLJQZDVSUHIHUUHGRYHUDPDVRQU\JUDYLW\DOternative. But interest in design of the latter type did not disappear.

After the end of World War I, another joint study of the Iron Canyon 

Project was initiated in May 1919. Sponsorship of, and funding for, the study 

came from the Reclamation Service, the Iron Canyon Project Association, and 

the State of California (acting through the State Department of Engineering). In 

May 1920, a 5HSRUWRQ,URQ&DQ\RQ3URMHFW&DOLIRUQLD was published by the 

U.S. Department of the Interior laying out the results of this new study.34 An 

extensive set of additional geological test borings of the Iron Canyon site were 

made at three potential damsites within the canyon. Plans were developed for 

three dam design alternatives with a maximum height of 170 feet and an overall 

length of about 5,000 feet. These alternatives consisted of: (1) a concrete gravity design extending the entire length of the structure, (2) a concrete buttress design featuring a gravity section at the spillway and the powerhouse, and, (3) an 

earth embankment with concrete corewall design featuring a concrete gravity 

section at the spillway and powerhouse.35

In a “Report of board of engineers upon Iron Canyon Dam Sites 

and Type of Dam” that was published as an appendix to the larger report, the 

Reclamation Service made a point of recommending that Location III (the furthest downstream of the three potential sites) be considered the most advantageous (Location I was the focus of the 1914 report).36 But in terms of making a 

recommendation regarding which of the three design alternatives was best, the 

Reclamation Service declined to offer an opinion. All three were considered 

to cost about the same (around $17 million for the dam itself). But accuracy of 

such cost estimates were downplayed, as the Reclamation Service made clear 

WKDWDFWXDOFRVWVFRXOGWXUQRXWWREHVLJQL¿FDQWO\KLJKHU
319

We conclude, therefore, that while conditions for a dam at the 

best site available are far from ideal a safe dam can be constructed at this point, Location III, but it must be admitted that 

the item of contingencies to guard against all dangers which 

may become apparent upon opening the foundations may be 

greater than usual and that for this dam, including also overhead 

expenses, estimated at 25 percent, may be exceeded.37

Over the course of the next few years, the Iron Canyon Project remained 

a possibility. And in 1925, yet another report on its feasibility was prepared 

by the Reclamation Service under its new name, the Bureau of Reclamation.38 

However, by the time this 1925 report appeared, the Iron Canyon Project had already been superseded by a proposed 500-foot-high dam at the Kennett Dam site 

(about 50 miles upstream from Iron Canyon) that had become the focus of considerable study by the California Department of Engineering. The Iron Canyon 

3URMHFWQHYHUERUHIUXLWLQWHUPVRILWVVSHFL¿FSODQIRUGHYHORSLQJDUHVHUYRLULQ

WKHXSSHU6DFUDPHQWR9DOOH\%XWLWQRQHWKHOHVVSOD\HGDVLJQL¿FDQWUROHLQWKH

planning that preceded authorization of the Central Valley Project in the 1930s.39

Rice and Drought

While the Iron Canyon Project languished for lack of a political consensus that could align support behind the project and its less than ideal dam site, 

WKHQRWLRQWKDWKXJHTXDQWLWLHVRIZDWHUÀRZLQJLQWKH6DFUDPHQWR5LYHUFRXOG

EHFDSWXUHGLQDPDMRUUHVHUYRLUQHDUWKHFRQÀXHQFHRIWKH6DFUDPHQWRDQG3LW

Rivers remained strong in the mind of northern California boosters. As it turned 

out, a key impetus for large-scale storage along the Sacramento River came from 

an agricultural industry that had not existed in California prior to the early twentieth century. The product of this new industry was rice, a commodity that required huge amounts of fresh water and was well suited to the natural conditions of riparian land along the length of the Sacramento River. In 1910, only 

about 100 acres of rice were planted in California, but, by 1914, 15,000 acres 

were in production, and, by 1920, the industry had exploded to encompass more 

than 160,000 acres (or about 25 percent of all irrigated land in the Sacramento 

Valley).40

Rice culture consumes huge quantities of water, and, by the early 1920s, 

LWZDVSHUFHLYHGDVDNH\UHDVRQWKDWWKHÀRZRIIUHVKZDWHULQWR6DQ)UDQFLVFR

Bay was rapidly decreasing and “salt water intrusion” was gradually working its 

ZD\XSLQWRWKHGHOWDODQGVXUURXQGLQJWKHFRQÀXHQFHRIWKH6DFUDPHQWRDQG

San Joaquin Rivers.41 In addition to the dramatic growth in rice production, the 

ÀRZRIWKH6DFUDPHQWR5LYHUDOVRVXIIHUHGEHFDXVHRIGURXJKWVWKDWDIÀLFWHG

much of California in the period 1917 to 1920 and in 1924.42 The combination 
320

of increased irrigation diversions, low amounts of natural precipitation, and continuing concern that navigation not be impeded provided a powerful impetus for 

¿QGLQJDZD\WRWDNHIXOODGYDQWDJHRIWKH6DFUDPHQWR5LYHULQDPDQQHUWKDW

ZRXOGQRWUHTXLUHDQ\H[LVWLQJXVHVRIWKHULYHUWREHDEROLVKHGRUVLJQL¿FDQWO\

curtailed. This appeared possible only if a large dam on the upper reaches of the 

ULYHUFRXOGVWRUHVHDVRQDOÀRRGZDWHUVDQGPDNHWKHPDYDLODEOHWKURXJKRXWWKH

year.

STATE PLANS FOR CALIFORNIA

The “Marshall Plan” and the Evolution of a State Water Plan

Political interest in developing California’s water resources under the aegis of a coordinated state program was evident in the late nineteenth century, but 

reluctance on the part of large, land-owning interests to embrace such initiatives 

HJIXQGLQJDVWURQJDQGDFWLYH6WDWH(QJLQHHU¶VRI¿FHSUHYHQWHGWKHPIURP

DWWDLQLQJPXFKVLJQL¿FDQFH43 With the ascendance of progressive reform movements in the early twentieth century, the notion of state guided and administered 

water development took on greater political acceptability. Although the water 

and property rights of existing land-owners and irrigation interests could not be 

obviated by legislative action, the creation of a State Water Commission in 1914 

to oversee the legal process by which water rights were granted, administered, 

and adjudicated marked an important step in increasing the role of state government in water development.44

As the State Water Commission gradually gained more acceptance of 

its authority over myriad issues involving water rights, it became less controversial for groups to propose a strong state role in implementing large-scale water development projects. There was no single moment when, suddenly, everyone in California enthusiastically embraced the idea of government-sponsored 

projects; rather, government sponsorship involved a process of gradual acceptance based upon incremental change and adaptation to evolving political interHVWV$NH\VWHSLQWKLVSURFHVVFDPHLQZKHQDIRUPHUIHGHUDORI¿FLDOLQ

the U.S. Geological Survey began promoting a bold scheme to make fuller use 

of the Sacramento River. Robert Marshall had had a long and distinguished career in western resource planning before he proposed what became known as the 

“Marshall Plan.” Although his scheme did not immediately win popular acceptance, it started the ball rolling in the direction of a government-sponsored plan 

for developing the Central Valley.45

In essence, Marshall proposed construction of a large storage dam across 

the upper Sacramento River that would serve three primary functions: (1) it 

would allow the diversion of water into large irrigation canals running along the 
321

west and east sides of the Sacramento Valley and southward into the San Joaquin 

9DOOH\LWZRXOGHQVXUHDPLQLPXPÀRZLQWKH6DFUDPHQWR5LYHUWKXVDOORZLQJIRUFRQWLQXHGQDYLJDWLRQDQGFRPEDWLQJWKHLQÀX[RIVDOWZDWHULQWRWKHGHOWD

region; and (3) it would facilitate the generation—and sale—of large quantities 

of hydroelectric power that would largely pay for the overall development of the 

system. The plan also proposed a canal diversion to carry water south from the 

6WDQLVODXV5LYHUORFDWHGDERXW¿IW\PLOHVVRXWKRIWKHFLW\RI6DFUDPHQWRDQG

into San Joaquin Valley. This water supply was intended to replace water from 

the Kern River that was to be diverted over the Tehachapi Mountains and into 

Los Angeles and other areas of Southern California. In addition, a branch canal 

extending from the San Joaquin Valley was to carry water to users in the greater 

6DQ)UDQFLVFRPHWURSROLWDQUHJLRQ46

The Marshall Plan was certainly bold and, with a price tag estimated to 

exceed $700 million, expensive.47 Designed to attract support from constituents 

throughout the state (this is why it included the Kern River diversion to Southern 

&DOLIRUQLDDQGWKHFRQQHFWLQJFDQDOWRWKH6DQ)UDQFLVFR%D\DUHD0DUVKDOO¶V

scheme garnered political support from a consortium of “progressive” leaders 

opposed to the hegemony of private power companies. As the California State 

Irrigation Association, the progressive leaders lobbied for the plan. At the same 

WLPHWKHSODQZDVRSSRVHGE\SULYDWHSRZHUFRPSDQLHVLQFOXGLQJ3DFL¿F*DV

DQG(OHFWULF&RPSDQ\WKH¿UPWKDWFRQWUROOHGWKHHOHFWULFLW\PDUNHWIRUPRVWRI

1RUWKHUQ&DOLIRUQLDDQGE\HQJLQHHUVZKRTXHVWLRQHGWKH¿QDQFLDOIHDVLELOLW\RI

building the various technical components of the system.48 Undeterred, Marshall 

and his supporters pushed to get the California state legislature to authorize and 

fund the plan, and, as part of this, they aggressively promoted the project and 

made enormous strides in raising public awareness of the possibilities that existed in terms of damming and developing the Sacramento River as a regional water supply and as a source of electric power.

Over the course of the 1920s, the Marshall Plan was discussed and considered by California’s legislators and its electorate, and it endured as a possible 

scheme. After failure to win support from the state legislature in 1921, approval 

for the Marshall Plan was sought in the form of an amendment to the state constitution, submitted to California voters in 1922, 1924, and 1926, but each time 

LWIDLOHGWRJDUQHUVXI¿FLHQWYRWHVIRUSDVVDJH*UDGXDOO\VXSSODQWHGE\RWKHU

proposals that drew from its basic idea of building a large dam across the upper Sacramento River, by the end of the 1920s, the Marshall Plan had been superseded by other studies authorized by the legislature and developed under the 

direction of the state engineer. Interestingly, Marshall himself—who was so inVWUXPHQWDOLQWKHLQLWLDOSURPRWLRQRIKLVSODQ2SURYHGDTXL[RWLF¿JXUHZKRDW

times in the mid-1920s, publicly advocated rejection of the proposed amendment 

designed to implement the Marshall Plan.49 Nonetheless, the political stir 
322

resulting from the publicity surrounding Marshall’s original proposal helped 

prompt the state legislature in 1921 to fund engineering investigations into possible water development projects within the state.50 And these initiatives eventually led to a politically viable plan for distributing water in the Central Valley.

The Early Studies of the State Engineer

In the wake of the state legislature’s funding for a study of California’s 

water resources, the state engineer set out to examine conditions in a less politically charged context than that associated with the Marshall Plan or the “Water 

and Power Act,” which voters rejected consistently. As one historian has phrased 

it, the state engineer (acting through consultants and the staff of the Department 

of Engineering) conducted a survey directed toward:

*DXJLQJVWUHDPÀRZVVHDUFKLQJIRUUHVHUYRLUVLWHVFODVVLI\LQJ

UHVHUYRLUVDFFRUGLQJWRFRVWDQGEHQH¿WVPDSSLQJWKHODQGLUrigated in 1920; determining the total amount of irrigable land 

in California and classifying it according to quality and yield; 

determining the water requirements of that land; investigating 

the feasibility of diversions of water from water-rich to waterGH¿FLHQWDUHDVHVWLPDWLQJWKHIXWXUHZDWHUQHHGVRI&DOLIRUQLD

cities and possible sources of supply; determining the effect of 

UHVHUYRLUFRQVWUXFWLRQRQÀRRGFRQWUROHVWLPDWLQJWKHSRWHQtial power development on California’s streams; recommending 

ways to prevent saltwater encroachment; and assessing the efIHFWVRIGHIRUHVWDWLRQRQVWUHDPÀRZ51

Taken in aggregate, this task was daunting indeed. And probably the 

only reason that the investigation generated any report at all within a two-year 

time period was because no consideration was given to existing water development systems or to the legal implications of possible future projects. In other words, the study was to consider California as some kind of environmental 

“blank slate” awaiting water resources development. This limit on the study’s 

conceptual parameters meant that no immediate practical proposal could result 

IURPWKHLQYHVWLJDWLRQEXWLWDOVRRIIHUHGVLJQL¿FDQWSROLWLFDO3SURWHFWLRQ ́EHFDXVHLWHOLPLQDWHGWKHQHHGWRWU\WRUHVROYHRUUHFRQFLOHFRQÀLFWVRYHUZDWHUDQG

property rights. Thus, the report could avoid stirring up immediate opposition.

The 1923 report issued by the state engineer (in response to the legislature’s 1921 directive) offered an extensive hydrographic study of precipitation 

DQGVWUHDPÀRZSDWWHUQVDQGSUHVHQWHGEDVLFGDWDUHJDUGLQJPRUHWKDQD

SRVVLEOHUHVHUYRLUVLWHVLQWKHVWDWH+RZHYHUVSHFL¿FUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV

concerning these myriad storage sites were scant, with the most concrete
323

proposal in the report focusing on a low barrier or dam at the head of San 

)UDQFLVFR%D\WKDWZRXOGEHGHVLJQHGWRSUHYHQWVDOWZDWHULQWUXVLRQLQWRWKH

Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. No large dam was proposed across the upper 

Sacramento River. But the study did acknowledge the disparity in precipitation between the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys and proposed a canal and 

pump system running up the San Joaquin River that could carry water 200 miles 

from the delta to Tulare Lake, in the extreme southern reaches of the San Joaquin 

9DOOH\)URP7XODUH/DNHLWSUHVXPDEO\FRXOGEHGLVWULEXWHGWRDZLGHVZDWKRI

ODQGH[WHQGLQJIURP)UHVQRWR%DNHUV¿HOG52

The “Water Surge” and Riparian Rights

The concept of a “water swap,” whereby water from the San Joaquin 

5LYHUZRXOGEHWUDQVIHUUHGVRXWKZDUGWRZDUG%DNHUV¿HOGLQWKH.HUQ5LYHUZDtershed), did not appear in the 1923 state engineer’s report, but found expression in a special study authorized a year later in response to pleas from farmers 

LQWKH7XODUH5LYHUZDWHUVKHGMXVWQRUWKRI%DNHUV¿HOGZKRZHUHFRQFHUQHG

about dwindling water supplies. In this new report (released in 1925), a scheme 

was proposed that would involve construction of major storage dams across both 

the San Joaquin and Kings Rivers. Water from the San Joaquin River could then 

be transported southward by a gravity canal to be used by agricultural interests 

that previously had relied on water from the Kings River. In turn, water stored 

behind the Kings River dam could be transported by gravity canal to the Tulare 

and Kern River basins farther to the south. There—due in no small part to the 

extensive water rights claimed by Miller & Lux—irrigable land was kept out of 

production because of shortages in the local water supply. Drawing from the 

scheme outlined in the 1923 report, fresh water from the delta was to be pumped 

up the lower San Joaquin River and made available to agricultural interests that 

RWKHUZLVHZRXOGEHUHO\LQJRQWKHXQGDPPHGÀRZRIWKH6DQ-RDTXLQ5LYHU

however, it would not be pumped as far as Tulare Lake. Also, like the 1923 report, no mention was made of a large storage dam across the upper Sacramento 

River.53

In 1926, the California State Supreme Court once again (as it had in the 

case of Lux v. HagginLQDI¿UPHGWKHYDOLGLW\RIULSDULDQZDWHUULJKWFODLPV

and even went so far as to endorse the notion that riparian use of water did not 

QHHGWRDGKHUHWRDVWDQGDUGRI3UHDVRQDEOH ́RU3EHQH¿FLDO ́XVH

54 The public reaction to the seeming inequity in this ruling was strong, and—while legislative 

action could not directly obviate the implications of the ruling insofar as they involved existing property rights—the ruling furthered interest in development of a 

plan that would guide and administer water use in the state.55 Thus, the next report on state water planning issued under the aegis of the state engineer in 1927 

WRRNRQDGGLWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHEHFDXVHRIWKHFRQFHUQJHQHUDWHGE\WKHUHFHQW
324

court ruling on riparian rights and the desire of many California citizens to seek 

ways of insuring regional water supplies in the wake of the ruling.

The 1927 State Engineer’s Reports and Kennett Dam

 ,QWKH&DOLIRUQLD6WDWH(QJLQHHU¶V2I¿FHSURSRVHGSODQVWKDW

dropped a salt water barrier across the lower Sacramento River in favor of a large 

storage dam across the upper Sacramento at the Kennett Dam site. Other storage 

dams across tributaries of the Sacramento were also proposed. The hydroelectric power generated at Kennett Dam would be utilized to pump water up the San 

Joaquin River from the delta to facilitate the “water swap” southward toward the 

Kern and Tulare basins. The importance of this “water swap” was highlighted by 

noting that it would allow a reduction in total pumping height of 360 feet compared to what would be needed if the water were pumped directly from the delta 

WRWKH%DNHUV¿HOGDUHD7KLVVDYLQJVLQZDWHUSXPSLQJZRXOGDOORZPRUHRIWKH

electricity generated at Kennett Dam to be sold into the regional electric power 

market and used to pay for the overall project (estimated at more than $350 million). The importance of electric power and its sale was fully acknowledged as 

DQHVVHQWLDOFRPSRQHQWLQWKHGDP¶V¿QDQFLQJ56

Beyond the question of revenue derived from hydroelectric power generation, the 1927 state engineer’s report is noteworthy on three accounts: (1) it 

stresses the importance of a large, multipurpose storage dam across the upper 

6DFUDPHQWRWKDWFRXOGLPSRXQGÀRRGZDWHUVJHQHUDWHK\GURHOHFWULFLW\SURYLGH

for navigation, protect the delta from salt water intrusion, and supply water to facilitate a “water swap” from the San Joaquin River southwards; (2) it describes 

the Kennett Dam site in detail and establishes the basic form and layout of the 

concrete curved gravity dam that was subsequently built as Shasta Dam; and 

(3) it recognizes the importance of, if not the outright need for, federal assistance 

LQ¿QDQFLQJWKHSURMHFW$VSHUFHLYHGE\VWDWHRI¿FLDOVLQIHGHUDOVXSSRUW

ZRXOGPRVWOLNHO\GHULYHIURPDGLUHFW¿QDQFLDODOORFDWLRQUHODWLQJERWKWRÀRRG

FRQWUROEHQH¿WVGHULYHGIURPWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIVWRUDJHGDPVDQGWREHQH¿WVDFcruing to navigation along the Sacramento River.57

 :KDWRFFXUUHGRYHUWKHQH[WIRXU\HDUVZDVUH¿QHPHQWRIWKHEDVLFSODQ

of the project and building of political coalitions strong enough to carry the project through the legislative approval process. In 1929, a key committee in the 

California State Legislature voted to accept the 1927 state engineer’s report as 

the basis for a state water plan. As part of this, the salt water barrier to protect 

the delta was excluded from the proposed work, and, in a politically sensitive decision, the committee recommended that power generated at Kennett Dam (and 

other dams) be sold at the powerhouse to commercial companies (most notably, 

3DFL¿F*DVDQG(OHFWULFZKLFKFRXOGWKHQPDUNHWLWWREXVLQHVVHVDQG
325

FRQVXPHUVWKURXJKWUDQVPLVVLRQDQGGLVWULEXWLRQV\VWHPVWKDWZRXOGEH¿QDQFHG

by private investment (and not by taxpayers). This action largely neutralized opposition from private power interests (that had blocked passage of the Marshall 

3ODQ:DWHUDQG3RZHU$FWEHFDXVHWKHZDWHUSODQQRZSUHVHQWHGOLWWOHRYHUW

threat to investor-owned utilities.58

While the 1927 state engineer’s report set the stage for the eventual political resolution of the state and federal interaction necessary to bring about implementation of a large scale reservoir on the upper Sacramento River, it also 

established the technical template for what became Shasta Dam. In rejecting 

the Iron Canyon Dam as an inadequate solution to the water problems besetting 

WKH&HQWUDO9DOOH\WKH6WDWH(QJLQHHU¶V2I¿FHSURSRVHGFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDVXEstantially higher dam at the Kennett site than had been proposed at Iron Canyon 

(upwards of 600 feet high compared to a height of less than 200 feet at Iron 

Canyon). The report carefully considered the costs and advantages of a dam at 

WKH.HQQHWWVLWHIRU¿YHGLVWLQFWKHLJKWVLHIHHWIHHWIHHW

520 feet, and 620 feet), while acknowledging that “the most desirable capacity 

of the Kennett Reservoir . . . is not subject to an exact analysis” in the sense that 

selection of an appropriate design depended on a determination of what the longterm market for electricity might be over the next several decades.59 The higher 

the dam, the more it would cost to build and the more it would cost to clear the 

UHVHUYRLUDUHDDQGUHORFDWHKLJKZD\VDQGWKH6RXWKHUQ3DFL¿F5DLOURDGULJKWRI

way; but a higher dam allowed for more assured electric power production at 

“primary” rather than “secondary” rates, and this would translate into higher revenues from the sale of hydroelectric power. The report concluded that a 

420-foot-high dam with a generating capacity of 400,000 kW and a storage capacity of almost 3 million acre-feet represented the design offering the “greatest 

capacity commensurate with reasonable production costs.”60

The report revealed that:

foundation conditions at the Kennett dam site, as disclosed by 

the diamond drill borings . . . are suitable for a high dam of any 

type. Topographic features and the absence of earth in large 

quantities, however, limit considerations to a concrete-gravity 

RUDURFN¿OOGDP61

 $OWKRXJKWKHUHSRUWDFNQRZOHGJHGWKDW3FRQVWUXFWLRQRIDURFN¿OOGDP

could proceed under usually favorable conditions” because an ample supply of 

rock was available at a high elevation in relation to the dam site, other factors 

FDXVHGWKHVWDWHHQJLQHHUVWRUHMHFWDURFN¿OOGHVLJQHYHQWKRXJK3SUHOLPLQDU\

HVWLPDWHVLQGLFDWHWKDWDURFN¿OOGDPPD\EHFRQVWUXFWHGIRUVRPHZKDWOHVVFRVW

than a gravity-concrete dam.” The mitigating factor involved the greater 
326

WKLFNQHVVRIWKHURFN¿OOGHVLJQDQG3WKHDGGHGFRVWRISRZHUDQGÀRRGFRQWURO

RXWOHWV ́WKURXJKWKHWKLFNHUURFN¿OOVWUXFWXUH3PDNHVWKHWRWDOFRVWDERXWWKH

same for either type.”62

 $IWHUHOLPLQDWLQJWKHURFN¿OOGHVLJQDVDSRVVLEOHGHVLJQFKRLFHWKHUHport focused exclusively on the details of a concrete gravity design that, in its 

curved alignment across the site, was extremely similar to the design used for 

Shasta Dam a few years later. In contrast to the Shasta Dam design, the 1927 

Kennett Dam design featured a powerhouse about 1,800 feet downstream from 

the dam proper (the Shasta powerhouse is only a few hundred feet below the 

dam) and two spillways are featured at each end of the Kennett design (Shasta 

Dam has one large spillway in the center of the structure). But these differences represent design variations that do not affect the basic form of the concrete 

curved gravity structure that was established in the 1927 State Engineer’s report as the most appropriate design for the site.63 And it was the 1927 report that 

would be sent to the state legislature and become the focus of, and platform for, 

all subsequent political debate.

The Federal/State Interaction

The state legislature reacted favorably to the committee report, but, before proceeding to enact authorizing legislation, it sought a more detailed proposal and it sought interaction with the federal government as a possible source of 

¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUW3UHVLGHQW+RRYHULQFRQFHUWZLWK&DOLIRUQLD*RYHUQRU

C. C. Young) subsequently appointed a commission to assess the proposed plan 

RIIHUHGE\WKH6WDWH(QJLQHHU¶V2I¿FH7KLVFRPPLVVLRQHQGRUVHGWKHSODQDQG

LQQRWLQJWKDWWKHSURMHFW¶V¿QDQFLDOIHDVLELOLW\ZDVWHQXRXVLIWKHVWDWHFRXOGQRW

borrow money at an interest rate of 3.5 percent (which seemed unlikely), recomPHQGHGWKDW3WKHSURMHFWEHFRQVWUXFWHGE\WKH)HGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKDW

the works, when completed, be operated by the State as far as practicable. . . .”64

 1RWKLQJGH¿QLWLYHFDPHRIWKLVIHGHUDOVWDWHFRPPLVVLRQ¶VUHSRUWXSRQ

LWVUHOHDVHLQDQGWKHLGHDRIIHGHUDO¿QDQFLQJIRUWKHSURMHFWGLGQRWLPPHdiately win widespread support; however, it was an important step in the development of the project. An even more important step came in March, 1931 when 

WKH6WDWH(QJLQHHU¶V2I¿FHVXEPLWWHGDGHWDLOHGUHSRUWWRWKHOHJLVODWXUHWKDWH[-

panded upon the report submitted in 1929; and called for construction of Kennett 

'DP)ULDQW'DPDPLOHORQJSXPSFDQDOV\VWHPWRGHOLYHUZDWHUIURPWKH

GHOWDLQWRWKH6DQ-RDTXLQ9DOOH\DQGDFDQDOIURP)ULDQW'DPVRXWKZDUGWRZDUG

%DNHUV¿HOGWKDWZRXOGIDFLOLWDWHWKHQRUWKWRVRXWK3ZDWHUVZDS ́65 In August 

1933, this report comprised the basis of a state law authorizing issuance of 

PLOOLRQLQVWDWHERQGVWR¿QDQFHWKHLQLWLDOVWDJHVRIWKHSURMHFWLQFOXGLQJ

WKHWZRPDMRUGDPVDW.HQQHWWDQG)ULDQW,WDOVRDXWKRUL]HGFRQVWUXFWLRQRI
327

)LJXUH3ODQYLHZRI6KDVWD'DP&HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFWSource: Bureau of Reclamation.
328

electric transmission lines connecting the major project generating plants and 

pumping stations associated with the project and allowed for distribution of electricity via a publicly owned power transmission system.

This latter feature of the enabling legislation ran counter to provisions of 

the 1929 state engineer’s report and prompted the private power industry (in parWLFXODU3DFL¿F*DVDQG(OHFWULFWRZDJHDKLJKSUR¿OHFDPSDLJQWRUHVFLQGWKH

act via an initiative placed before the state’s voters in a special election held in 

December 1933. The vote was remarkably close (459,712 to 426,109), but voters chose not to rescind the bond authorization. Interestingly, the argument that 

apparently carried the day in defeating the initiative played upon the notion that 

valuable jobs would be created by the project, and this was something that the 

GHSUHVVLRQSODJXHGHFRQRP\FRXOGEHQH¿WIURP66

Although the private power industry may have failed to block implementation of the State Water Plan, the state’s political leadership did not immediately move to sell the authorized bonds and commence construction. Instead, 

the involvement and support of the federal government increasingly came to be 

VHHQDVWKH¿QDQFLDOVDYLRURIWKHSURMHFW$VHDUO\DVWKH86$UP\&RUSV

of Engineers had endorsed the basic features of the state plan and recommended that the federal government contribute $6 million toward the cost of building Kennett Dam.67 In the same year, Reclamation had also endorsed the plan 

and, while in no position to directly recommend federal expenditures to support 

WKHSURMHFWKDGUDLVHGWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDW3WKH)HGHUDO*RYHUQPHQWWKURXJKWKH

Bureau of Reclamation may be the most appropriate agency to undertake the execution of this project. . . .”68

 $IWHU)UDQNOLQ5RRVHYHOWDVVXPHGWKHSUHVLGHQF\LQWKHSRVVLELOLW\

of direct federal involvement increased simply because Roosevelt was more accepting of public works expenditures designed to provide “relief” during the economic hard times of the Depression than was Herbert Hoover. However, questions about the nature of such support and California’s willingness to accept federal “strings” as a condition for receiving it were not quickly resolved. In 1933, 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers recommended that $7.7 million in federal 

funds be provided to support construction of Kennett Dam and that additional 

consideration be given to funding as much as 30 percent of the cost of other features included in the state plan. The next year, the Corps suggested that: 

WKHJHQHUDODQG)HGHUDOEHQH¿WVIURPWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKH

Kennett Dam on the plans now proposed by the State warUDQWVDVSHFLDOGLUHFWSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIWKH)HGHUDO*RYHUQPHQWRI

$12,000,000 in the cost of this structure.69
329

 7KH&RUSVLGHQWL¿HGSRWHQWLDOQDYLJDWLRQÀRRGFRQWUROSRZHULUULJDWLRQDQGVDOLQLW\FRQWUROEHQH¿WVLQLWVSODQ7KHVWDWHRI&DOLIRUQLDTXLFNO\IROlowed the Corps’ report with a request, in September 1933, for an emergency 

ORDQDQGJUDQWRIPLOOLRQIURPWKH)HGHUDO(PHUJHQF\$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ

of Public Works70WR¿QDQFHZKDWZDVQRZRI¿FLDOO\FDOOHGWKH3&HQWUDO9DOOH\

Project.” No immediate action was taken to approve this request, but, in 1935, 

the “Central Valley Project Works” were authorized for construction by the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as part of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1935.71 

However, in September 1935, President Roosevelt signed an Executive Order 

WKDWRIIHUHGFRQÀLFWLQJJXLGDQFHDVWRZKLFKIHGHUDOEXUHDXZRXOGEHUHVSRQVLEOH

IRULPSOHPHQWLQJWKH&HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW,QWKLVRUGHUKHVSHFL¿FDOO\

directed that $20 million dollars from the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act 

of 1935 “be transferred. . .to the Department of the Interior, Reclamation 

Service. . .for the construction of works of irrigation and reclamation . . . in accordance with reclamation laws.”72 Interestingly, this $20 million appropriaWLRQZDVWREHVSHQWRQO\RQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI)ULDQW'DPDQGRQFDQDOVGHsigned to transport water from the reservoir (Millerton Lake) impounded behind 

)ULDQW$QGWKH86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVKDGVSHFL¿FDOO\QRWHGLQHDUOLHU

UHSRUWVWKDW)ULDQW'DPSOD\HGQRUROHLQWKHQDYLJDWLRQLPSURYHPHQWVDORQJWKH

Sacramento River, placing it in a different category than Kennett Dam.

A “Federal Reclamation Project”

In December 1935, following a recommendation by Secretary of the 

Interior Harold Ickes, President Roosevelt approved “the Central Valley developPHQW ́DVD3)HGHUDO5HFODPDWLRQ3URMHFW ́DQGVLJQDOHGWKDW5HFODPDWLRQZRXOG

be the sole federal bureau responsible for implementing the project. In August 

1937, the primary authority of Reclamation was unequivocally instituted by the 

1937 Rivers and Harbors Act, which stipulated that: 

the $12,000,000 recommended for expenditure [in the 1935 

River and Harbor Act] for a part of the Central Valley project, 

California . . . [shall be expended] in accordance with the said 

plans by the Secretary of the Interior instead of the Secretary of 

War. . .

-XVWDVLPSRUWDQWO\WKHDFWDI¿UPHGWKDWLQSODFLQJUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKH

project under the control of the Bureau of Reclamation, the “provisions of the 

reclamation law, as amended, shall govern the repayment of expenditures . . .” 

relating to works deemed essential to the entire project.73

 7KHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKLVODWWHUVWLSXODWLRQUHODWHGWRWKHDFUHDJHOLPLWDWLRQ

requirements that had been a part of projects since 1902. Although the 
330

enforcement of acreage limitation regulations (allowing farmers only 160 acres 

of irrigable land, or 320 acres for married couples) had proved problematic 

WKURXJKRXWWKHKLVWRU\RI5HFODPDWLRQWKHVSHFL¿FUHIHUHQFHWR3UHFODPDWLRQ

ODZ ́LQWKHDFWZDVWKHRQHELJ3VWULQJ ́WKDWFDPHDORQJZLWKIHGHUDO¿QDQFing and construction of the Central Valley Project. And this “string” proved contentious enough that development of the Kings River (and the possible construcWLRQRI3LQH)ODW'DPZHUHFRPSOHWHO\H[FOXGHGIURPWKHSURMHFWDQGOHIWWREH

funded by some other method or means. Nonetheless, issues related to acreage 

limitations were perceived by many Californians as being political concerns that 

could be resolved or litigated at some future date when dams and canals were 

ready to be used. Before such concerns could assume practical importance, it 

ZDV¿UVWQHFHVVDU\WRDFWXDOO\EXLOGWKHWZRELJGDPVWKDWOD\DWWKHKHDUWRIWKH

project.

SHASTA AND FRIANT DAMS

Design of Shasta and Friant Dams

Shortly after authorization of the Central Valley Project in August 1937, 

the name of Kennett Dam (which had been taken from the name of a small mining town near the site) was formally changed to Shasta Dam as a way to draw 

DWWHQWLRQWRWKHQHZFKDUDFWHURIWKHVWUXFWXUHDVDIHGHUDODQGPRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\D5HFODPDWLRQSURMHFW$QGQRZWKDWWKHGDPZDVRI¿FLDOO\WREHEXLOWE\WKH

Bureau of Reclamation, the design also became Reclamation’s responsibility. 

In its particular details and ultimate size, the design built to impound the upper 

Sacramento River was a product of Reclamation’s design staff; this was made 

clear in a November 1937 press release from the Department of the Interior notLQJWKDW5HFODPDWLRQ¶V&KLHI(QJLQHHU5):DOWHUKDGDSSURYHGDIRRW

high concrete gravity design (with a reservoir capacity of 4.5 million acre-feet) 

that surpassed the 500-foot high design proposed as part of the original state 

plan.74 Nonetheless, because of the lengthy process that preceded passage of the 

Central Valley Project as a federal project and the desire to initiate construction 

as soon as possible, it appears that many considerations involving basic design 

LVVXHVQRWOHDVWRIDOOWKHVLWHRIERWK6KDVWDDQG)ULDQW'DPVZHUHGHWHUPLQHG

E\ZRUNXQGHUWDNHQE\WKH6WDWH(QJLQHHU¶V2I¿FHGXULQJWKHSUHFHGLQJGHFDGH

 %RWK6KDVWDZLWKDFUHVWOHQJWKRIDSSUR[LPDWHO\IHHWDQG)ULDQW

(with a crest length of approximately 3,400 feet) are concrete gravity dams incorporating ample cross-sections capable of accommodating even the most deleterious effects of “uplift” along the foundation. Shasta features a maximum 

base thickness of 580 feet, which actually exceeds the maximum height of the 

VWUXFWXUHIHHW)ULDQWIHDWXUHVDPD[LPXPWKLFNQHVVRIIHHWZKLFKLV

over 80 percent of the maximum height. Based upon information provided by 
331

Kenneth Keener of the Bureau’s engineering staff, the journal Engineering

reported that:

The decision to build a concrete gravity-type dam [at Shasta] 

was not reached without consideration of the possibility of 

HPSOR\LQJDQHDUWKDQGURFN¿OOVWUXFWXUHLWZDVQHFHVVDU\

that the dam should have a height of 500 ft. above the [original] 

ULYHUEHG1RHDUWKDQGURFN¿OOGDPRIVXFKDKHLJKWKDVHYHU

been constructed. . . . This did not, in itself, rule out the possibility of building a 500-ft. structure of this type, but other considerations favored a concrete [gravity] dam . . . [particularly 

the fact that] a concrete dam would [provide the most convenient and cheapest arrangement for outlet pipes and] the spillway and outlet conduits could be incorporated in a single strucWXUHVXLWDEOHPDWHULDOVIRUDURFN¿OOGDPZHUHDOVRDYDLOable, but investigation showed that the cost of providing for a 

spillway, as well as making arrangements for the outlet conduits 

with a dam of this type would make it more expensive than the 

concrete structure. The nature of the [wide canyon] ruled out 

consideration of a single-arch concrete dam. A multiple-arch 

dam might have been possible, but there was no experience 

available with a dam of that type of the dimensions necessary at 

Shasta, and in view of the paramount necessity for absolute security . . . a gravity structure was determined on.75

In rejecting any possibility of utilizing a multiple arch design at Shasta, 

Reclamation’s rationale derived from the tremendous height of the spillway secWLRQRIWKHSURSRVHGGDP$W)ULDQWZLWKDPD[LPXPKHLJKWQRWPXFKPRUH

than 300 feet), using a multiple arch design was more plausible, but there 

does not appear to be any evidence that this option was ever seriously considered. In fact, as early as January 1937, many months before Reclamation was 

given authority over the entire Central Valley Project, Sinclair O. Harper of 

Reclamation’s Denver staff informed Reclamation’s Acting Commissioner, John 

3DJHWKDW)ULDQWZDVWREHEXLOWDVD3VWUDLJKWFRQFUHWHJUDYLW\W\SH ́76 In this 

context, Reclamation opted for a design that was in full accord with the recommendation of a special Multiple Arch Dam Advisory Committee formed by the 

&DOLIRUQLD6WDWH(QJLQHHULQ0D\MXVWDIWHUVXEPLWWDORIWKH¿QDOVWDWHUHSRUWGHWDLOLQJZKDWZRXOGEHFRPHWKH&HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW7KH¿QDOUHSRUWRI

this committee, issued in 1932, denigrated multiple arch technology, and, since 

that time, no new multiple arch dam has been erected in the state.77

 7KHGHVLJQVHOHFWLRQSURFHVVIRUERWK)ULDQWDQG6KDVWD'DPVUHÀHFWHG

a perspective that favored concrete gravity dams with a standing that accorded
332

I6KDVWD'DPVKRZLQJWKHJUDYLW\SUR¿OH Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
333

them great strength and stability. As such, there seemed little reason to explore 

options that appeared more risky, regardless of whether or not they might prove 

economically advantageous. Although Shasta Dam is built with a distinct upstream curve, this curvature was ignored in determining the design’s gravity 

cross-section. As reported in Engineering: “All resistance to loading is dependent upon gravity action and that in working out the design no account was taken 

of the extra strength provided by the slightly arched form.”78

Shasta Dam: Planning and Bidding

Once it became clear in the late summer of 1937 that the Bureau of 

Reclamation would be responsible for building Shasta Dam, events moved 

quickly in terms of preparing the site and advertising the primary construction 

contract. By January 1938, money had been allocated to commence work in reORFDWLQJDQGUHFRQVWUXFWLQJWKH6RXWKHUQ3DFL¿F5DLOURDGOLQHWKDWUDQGLUHFWO\

through the reservoir “take” area.79 Contemporaneously, work was also started on the establishment of camp communities that could house the thousands of 

workers (many with families) who would soon be drawn to the site.80

By spring of 1938, the Bureau of Reclamation was ready to let the primary construction contract. As detailed in the May 1938 issue of Western

Construction News, the federal government was to be responsible for providing 

“processed aggregate to the contractor, in carload lots, as required. This is a different procedure from the corresponding work at Hoover Dam and Grand Coulee 

Dam, where the securing and processing of aggregate was the work of the conWUDFWRU ́7RIXO¿OOWKLVUHVSRQVLELOLW\5HFODPDWLRQVXEVHTXHQWO\OHWDVHSDUDWH

contract for construction of a 9-mile-long conveyor belt system to deliver sand 

and gravel excavated at a quarry downstream from the dam site.81

The primary construction contract called for “a standard form of contract with the U.S. Government, which permits wide latitude in the procuring 

of labor. Practically the only restriction applies to the maintaining of a 40-hour 

week, and the wage scale.” This wage scale listed more than 100 different job 

categories (ranging from blacksmith, to blacksmith’s helper, to hoist operator, to 

powderman, to dump truck driver, and a multitude in between) with wages ranging from $.75 per hour (for a general laborer) to $1.50 (for a power shovel operator). The bidding schedule also broke down the various components of the buildLQJSURFHVVLQWRVHSDUDWHWDVNVLWHPVWKDWZHUHWRFRPSULVHWKHPHDQVIRUGHYHORSLQJD¿QDOWRWDOELGIRUWKHMREDVDZKROH82

Bids were formally advertised on April 1, 1938, and opened on June 

LQWKH%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQ¶VRI¿FHVLQ6DFUDPHQWR7KHKXJHMREZDVEHyond the capacity of any single contractor, and, similar to what had transpired at 
334

Hoover and Grand Coulee Dams, it prompted the formation of groups of contracWRUVZKRSHUFHLYHGDQDGYDQWDJHLQWKHSRROLQJRIWKHLUVNLOOVDQG¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVLQDWWHPSWLQJWRWDNHRQWKHWDVN)RUWKH6KDVWD'DPFRQWUDFWRQO\WZR

ELGVZHUH¿OHGRQHIURPWKH6KDVWD&RQVWUXFWLRQ&RPSDQ\ZKLFKFRPSULVHG

PDQ\RIWKHVDPH¿UPVWKDWKDGSUHYLRXVO\IRUPHG6L[&RPSDQLHV,QFDQGVXFFHVVIXOO\EXLOW+RRYHU'DPDQGRQHIURP3DFL¿F&RQVWUXFWRUV,QF/HGE\

/('L[RQ&RPSDQ\DSURPLQHQW/RV$QJHOHVFRQWUDFWLQJRXW¿WWKLVODWWHU

consortium had been organized in 1937 to bid on the Grand Coulee Dam conWUDFW)DLOLQJLQWKDWHIIRUWWKHJURXSVXEVHTXHQWO\H[SDQGHGLQVL]HWDNLQJLQ

the large and successful Arundel Corporation of Baltimore) and focused on developing as competitive a bid as possible to win the Shasta Dam contract. In the 

HQG3DFL¿F&RQVWUXFWRUV,QF¶V3&,HIIRUWVWRVWUHDPOLQHLWVELGSURYHGSUHscient because, when the bids were opened in Sacramento in June, PCI’s bid of 

$36,939,450 undercut the Shasta Construction Company by less than $275,000.83

After winning the contract, PCI immediately set out to organize itself in 

order to handle the tremendous job it was now committed to completing. While 

searching for a general superintendent to oversee construction, it received notice 

IURP)UDQN&URZHLQGLFDWLQJKLVLQWHUHVWLQ¿OOLQJWKLV

position. Crowe had started work for the Reclamation 

Service as a junior level engineer in 1905 and, as a government employee had been 

involved in the construction of several prominent 

dams including Arrowrock 

and Tieton. In the 1920s, 

he left government service 

to join the Idaho-based conWUDFWLQJ¿UPRI0RUULVRQ

Knudsen; in this capacity, he 

came to take charge of building Hoover Dam in 1931, 

after Six Companies Inc. 

(which included MorrisonKnudsen as a partner) was 

low bidder on the construction contract. After completion of Hoover, he took 

charge of erecting Parker 

Dam for Six Companies Inc., 

)LJXUH&RPPLVVLRQHURI5HFODPDWLRQ-RKQ&3DJH

speaking on October 22, 1938, at the ceremony marking 

the beginning of heavy construction on Shasta Dam.

Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
335

and he would have become the general superintendent for Shasta Construction 

&RPSDQ\LIWKDW¿UPKDGZRQWKH6KDVWD'DPFRQWUDFW%XWRQFH3&,ZRQWKH

contract, Crowe opted to leave behind his association with Six Companies and 

Morrison-Knudsen and take on the challenge of building Shasta Dam for PCI.

Although Crowe had not been associated with PCI during the project 

SODQQLQJDQGFRQFHSWXDOL]LQJWKDWZHQWLQWRWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH¿QDOELG

once he became “general superintendent,” he played a key and prominent role in 

formulating how the construction would proceed. In fact, because of his background and the knowledge accrued during the construction of Hoover, Parker, 

and a multitude of other dams, he was given wide latitude by PCI to administer 

the construction process. As the company acknowledged upon completion of the 

dam:

3DFL¿F&RQVWUXFWRUVZDVUHDOO\D)UDQN&URZHRUJDQL]DWLRQ2

YHWHUDQEXLOGHUVZKRNQHZWKHLUMRE:HRZH)UDQN&URZH

and the entire construction organization a vote of thanks for 

their untiring work, devotion and loyalty, and those of us who 

were in constant touch with the operation give it herewith in full 

measure.84

The Construction Process

The building of Shasta Dam involved an enormous amount of work, but 

it was organized into a relatively few basic types of tasks, including:

1. River diversion

 )RXQGDWLRQH[FDYDWLRQ

3. Concrete production

 )RUPZRUNFRQVWUXFWLRQ

5. Concrete placement

,PSOHPHQWLQJWKHVHWDVNVFRXOGYDU\VLJQL¿FDQWO\GHSHQGLQJXSRQWKHLUSDUWLFXlar place in the chronology of construction, but the tasks nonetheless represent a 

basic way of organizing the construction process.85

River diversion was important because, although the dam site is more 

than two hundred miles upstream from the delta, the Sacramento River carries a 

VLJQL¿FDQWDPRXQWRIÀRZWKURXJKWKHVLWHQRPDWWHUZKDWWKHVHDVRQ2IFRXUVH

WKHKHDYLHVWÀRZRFFXUVGXULQJVSULQJÀRRGVEXWFRQWURORIZDWHUZDVDOZD\VDQ

important component of the project’s success. Control and diversion of the river 

was handled by two complementary means. During the initial stages of 
336

FRQVWUXFWLRQWKHULYHUÀRZZDVFRQcentrated within the deepest part of 

the river gorge. 

Excavation and construction 

activities focused on the two sides 

RIWKHVWUXFWXUHÀDQNLQJWKHJRUJH

Once the two sides of the dam had 

DVVXPHGVXI¿FLHQWVL]HWRZLWKVWDQG

possible overtopping without damage, it became possible to switch to 

the second phase of the diversion 

plan.

Phase two involved use of 

the 1,800-foot-long tunnel excavated through the site’s west abutment 

during the initial construction stage. 

$W¿UVWWKLVWXQQHOZDVXVHGE\WKH

6RXWKHUQ3DFL¿F5DLOURDGOLQHZKLFK

)LJXUH7KLVFRQVWUXFWLRQSKRWRVKRZVWKHULJKWDEXWPHQWRQWKHGRZQVWUHDPIDFH

of Shasta Dam, during the placement of penstocks. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.

)LJXUH1LJKWYLHZRIRSHUDWLRQVDW6KDVWD

Dam in 1941, seen from near crest elevation on 

the left abutment. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
337

had been forced to abandon its original right-of-way in the gorge to allow for the 

commencement of construction. Once a completely new right-of-way around the 

reservoir had been completed, the tunnel became available for water diversion. 

7KLVFDPHGXULQJWKHODWWHUVWDJHVRIFRQVWUXFWLRQDQGZKHQDQHDUWKDQGURFN¿OO

cofferdam diverted water out of the streambed and into the tunnel. As a result, 

the deepest section of the gorge could be “unwatered” and the foundation prepared for the placement of concrete.

Excavation was important because of the desire to establish the concrete 

structure on a foundation that was as solid and impervious as possible. To help 

clear the site of earth and less-than-solid-rock “overburden,” some blasting was 

done. Removal of loosened earth and rock debris was handled by steam shovels, 

bulldozers, large gasoline-powered dump trucks, and other forms of mechanized 

equipment. Much of the excavated material was used to build-up the height of 

the western abutment downstream from the damsite to help support the penstocks that would later be built between the dam and the powerhouse. Once the 

excavation had proceeded to the point of reaching a solid base of bedrock, extensive efforts were made to drill holes for injection of pressurized grout (i.e., water

DQGFHPHQWLQWRWKHIRXQGDWLRQ*URXWLQJUHSUHVHQWHGDQDWWHPSWWR¿OOLQDV

much as possible, any deep foundation cracks or seams that might allow water to 

seep under the structure and push up on the base of the gravity dam, thus acting 

to reduce its stability.

)LJXUH3ODQYLHZRI6KDVWD'DPVKRZLQJWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQSODQWDQGDHULDO

cableway system. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
338

Once the foundation had been prepared, workers could begin to erect the 

wooden formwork that would hold the wet concrete in the proper shape while it 

hardened. But before this could occur, cement had to be delivered to the site via 

WKH6RXWKHUQ3DFL¿FUDLOOLQHUXQQLQJWKURXJKWKHVLWHDQGDJJUHJDWHKDGWREH

transported via a conveyor belt running from a quarry located nine miles 

downstream. The cement, aggregate, and Sacramento River water were brought 

together in a mixing plant upstream from the dam site proper. Great care was 

taken to insure the quality of the 6.5 million cubic yards of concrete produced 

during construction of the dam, and it was constantly tested to insure that it met 

VSHFL¿FDWLRQV

Delivery of the mixed concrete—which had to be placed quickly once 

water had been introduced to the cement—was handled by a huge cableway system built to convey material to various parts of the dam site. This cableway system utilized a large steel headtower86 just upstream from the dam site, adjacent 

to the western abutment. This primary tower supported seven separate cableways that spread out and provided coverage of the entire dam site. The concrete 

mixing plant was next to the headtower and connected to it by a circular rail and 

tramway system. Cars capable of holding two eight-cubic-yard “loads” of concrete were operated as part of this electric-powered tramway system; the cars 

)LJXUH$0DUFKYLHZRI6KDVWD'DPXQGHUFRQVWUXFWLRQSource: Bureau of 

Reclamation.
339

ZRXOGEH¿OOHGZLWKFRQFUHWHDWWKHPL[LQJSODQWDQGWKHQPRYHGDORQJWKHFLUcular track to a location where they could be dumped into one of the eight-yard 

buckets attached to each of the seven cableways. The cableways transported the 

wet concrete to the placement location of that moment, and the empty cars would 

UHWXUQWRWKHPL[LQJSODQWYLDWKHFLUFXODUWUDPZD\ZKHUHWKH\ZRXOGEH¿OOHG

with another load of concrete, and the process would be repeated.

)LJXUH$YHUWLFDOVHFWLRQFRQVWUXFWLRQMRLQZLWKNH\ZD\VDQGJDOOHULHVLQ6KDVWD'DP

March 7, 1942. Source: Bureau of Reclamation..
340

Each bucket had a capacity of eight-cubic yards which meant that, for a 

VWUXFWXUHWKDWUHTXLUHGRYHUPLOOLRQFXELF\DUGVRIFRQFUHWHWRFRPSOHWHWKH¿OOLQJOLIWLQJGXPSLQJSURFHVVKDGWREHUHSHDWHGRYHUDKDOIPLOOLRQWLPHVGXULQJ

construction. The plant constructed by PCI was designed to mix, transport, and 

place up to 10,000 cubic yards per day (the equivalent of more than 1,200 batches a day). Placement of the concrete occurred in a very controlled manner. The 

dam was divided into a series of interlocking blocks measuring 50 feet by 50 feet 

and shaped by wooden forms. Concrete was poured into each of the blocks in a 

VHULHVRI¿YHIRRWOLIWVDQGJUHDWFDUHZDVWDNHQWR3YLEUDWH ́WKHZHWFRQFUHWHWR

HQVXUHWKDWLWFRPSOHWHO\¿OOHGWKHIRUPVZLWKRXWOHDYLQJDQ\YRLGVRUDLUVSDFHV

)LJXUH6KDVWD'DP

with penstocks and powerhouse on May 5, 1976.

Source: Bureau of Reclamation.

)LJXUH7KH6KDVWD'DPVSLOOZD\Source: Bureau of

Reclamation.
341

that would tend to weaken the structure. Once the concrete in a lift had hardened 

VXI¿FLHQWO\XVXDOO\ZLWKLQKRXUVWKHIRUPZRUNZDVORRVHQHGDQGFRQ¿JXUHG

WRKDQGOHWKHQH[W¿YHIRRWOLIWRIFRQFUHWH%HFDXVHDPXOWLWXGHRIEORFNVZHUH

under construction at any one time, work could proceed continuously.

Construction Schedule

 3DFL¿F&RQVWUXFWRUV,QFZDVIRUPDOO\DZDUGHGWKHSULPDU\FRQVWUXFtion contract for Shasta Dam in July 1938, and, by the end of that summer, work 

DWWKHVLWHZDVZHOOXQGHUZD\7KH¿UVWWDVNVLQYROYHGFRQVWUXFWLRQRIKRXVLQJ

facilities and the blasting and construction of the railroad bypass tunnel through 

the west abutment. During 1939, the bulk of work focused on the blasting and 

excavation of the foundation and preparation of the myriad facilities necessary 

to carry out construction. In October 1939, PCI and Superintendent Crowe began overseeing erection of the 460-foot-high steel headtower that would support 

the seven cableways to be used to transport concrete. The headtower was not 

complete until July 1940; and placing of concrete commenced that month. By 

$XJXVWIRXUPLOOLRQFXELF\DUGVKDGEHHQSODFHGDQGE\)HEUXDU\

¿YHPLOOLRQFXELF\DUGVKDGEHHQSODFHG%\WKHVXPPHURIWKHVWUXFWXUH

ZDVDSSURDFKLQJLWV¿QDOVKDSHDQGQRZDWHUÀRZHGWKURXJKWKHGDPVLWHH[-

FHSWWKURXJKWKHWXQQHOE\SDVVGLYHUVLRQWXQQHO,Q)HEUXDU\WKHFRQWUDFWRUEORFNHGÀRZWKURXJKWKHGLYHUVLRQWXQQHODQGZDWHUVWRUDJHEHJDQLQ/DNH

Shasta. The last bucket of concrete was poured on January 2, 1945, and, during 

the next few months, PCI handled clean up and salvage of equipment.

The contractor completed Shasta Dam at the beginning of 1945. The 

structure began operating as soon as the diversion tunnel was closed and natural 

ÀRZRIWKHULYHUFDPHXQGHUWKHFRQWURORI5HFODPDWLRQ¶VRSHUDWRUVZKRGHWHUmined when (and 

to what extent) water would be released from the 

reservoir. In terms 

of hydroelectric 

power production, completion 

occurred in 1950 

when the 375,000 

kW generating 

plant came on line, 

and the dam was 

RI¿FLDOO\GHFODUHG

¿QLVKHG%XWE\ )LJXUH$QDHULDOYLHZRI6KDVWD'DPSource: Bureau of 

Reclamation.
342

this time, the dam had been functioning as a civil engineering structure for several years.

Friant Dam Construction

 $OWKRXJK)ULDQW'DPZDVDVWUXFWXUHRIPDMRUSURSRUWLRQVFRPSDUHG

to Shasta Dam it was relatively small (approximately 2.15 million cubic yards 

of concrete vs. 6.5 million cubic yards), and it attracted much less attention than 

WKHVWUXFWXUHWRWKHQRUWK,QDGGLWLRQWKHVWDUWRIFRQVWUXFWLRQDW)ULDQWZDVGHlayed until October 1939 (more than a year after Shasta) and occurred after the 

Nazi invasion of Poland, which marked the beginning of World War II in Europe. 

7DNHQLQDJJUHJDWHDOOWKHVHIDFWRUVFRQWULEXWHGWRLWVORZHUSXEOLFSUR¿OH

1RQHWKHOHVV)ULDQWZDVVWLOODVLJQL¿FDQWHQJLQHHULQJSURMHFWWKDWXVHGDVRSKLVticated construction plan.87

 )ULDQW'DPLVDFURVVWKH6DQ-RDTXLQ5LYHUDSSUR[LPDWHO\WZHQW\PLOHV

QRUWKHDVWRIGRZQWRZQ)UHVQR$XWKRUL]DWLRQIRUWKH%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQWR

EXLOG)ULDQW'DPRFFXUUHGLQWZR\HDUVEHIRUH5HFODPDWLRQUHFHLYHGDXthorization to build Shasta, but planning lagged because, as phrased by Bureau of 

Reclamation Commissioner John Page in the summer of 1938:

After long and arduous labor, we have brought the Miller & 

Lux matter to a point where a conclusion of these negotiations 

[over water rights issues] seems to be imminent. . . . In all the 

history of the Bureau of Reclamation, we have had no project 

involving so many and so complex legal problems as those encountered on the Central Valley Project. . . .87

 )LQDOO\PRUHWKDQD\HDUODWHUWKHFRQWUDFWLQJSDUWQHUVKLSIRUPHGEHWZHHQWKH*ULI¿WK&RPSDQ\DQG%HQW%URWKHUVRI/RV$QJHOHVZDVDXWKRUL]HG

to begin work based on its low bid on the primary construction contract. The 

¿UVWVWHSVWDNHQZHUHWRH[FDYDWHDQGFOHDUWKHGDPVLWHRIHDUWKDQGURFNWKDWOD\

DWRSEHGURFN2QFHDVLJQL¿FDQWSRUWLRQRIWKHIRXQGDWLRQDORQJWKHVRXWKHUQ

VLGHRIWKHVLWHKDGEHHQFOHDUHG3DWHPSRUDU\GLYHUVLRQÀXPHZDVEXLOWDFURVV

WKHIRXQGDWLRQH[FDYDWLRQDQGWKHULYHUGLYHUWHGLQWRWKHÀXPHLQWKHODWH6SULQJ

of 1940.” This allowed the river section of the dam site to be cleared, and, once 

WKHIRXQGDWLRQKDGEHHQSURSHUO\SUHSDUHGWKLVVHFWLRQZDVZKHUHWKH¿UVWFRQcrete was placed. Three 14-foot-diameter temporary openings were left in the 

lower part of the structure that arose within the river section. Subsequently, the 

contractor diverted the river through these temporary openings beginning in 

March 1941; six months later the overall dam had been completed to the point 

that the river was diverted into the permanent outlets built into the base of the 

GDPDQGWKHWHPSRUDU\RSHQLQJVZHUH¿OOHGZLWKFRQFUHWH$VCivil Engineering
343

VRRQUHSRUWHGGXULQJWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQSURFHVV3QRVSHFLDOGLI¿FXOWLHVZHUHHQcountered in handling the river.”88

After “light blasting,” 14-cubic-yard self-loading scrapers cleared topsoil from the dam site. Once harder rock was encountered, jackhammers drilled 

into the foundation and facilitated the blasting of weakened or “rotten” rock. 

This material was removed by diesel-powered shovels (varying in capacity from 

WRFXELF\DUGVWKDW¿OOHGFXELF\DUGFDSDFLW\JDVROLQHGXPSWUXFNV

These trucks carried most of the debris to deep portions of the reservoir site that 

lay below the elevation of the lowest outlet pipes, and some was stored downVWUHDPIRUXVHLQEDFN¿OOLQJDQGJUDGLQJRQFHWKHFRQFUHWHVWUXFWXUHZDVFRPplete. Before concrete was placed upon the foundation, an extensive program of 

JURXWLQJZDVXQGHUWDNHQWKDWIRUFHGDULFKÀXLGFHPHQWXQGHUDPD[LPXPSUHVsure of 150 pounds per square inch) deep into bedrock. With the grouting of 725 

holes (requiring more than 21,500 sacks of cement) an attempt was made to minimize water seepage through the foundation and eliminate any chance that “uplift” might destabilize the massive concrete structure.

Cement for the concrete was delivered to the site via a spurline of the 

6RXWKHUQ3DFL¿F5DLOURDG$JJUHJDWHERWKVDQGDQGFDUHIXOO\VL]HGJUDYHOZDV

taken from a quarry along the banks of the San Joaquin River about three miles 

)LJXUH)ULDQW'DPXQGHUFRQVWUXFWLRQVKRZLQJWKHWUHVWOHDQGFUDQHFRQVWUXFWLRQ

system used to deliver concrete and form work used in building the dam. Source: Donald C. 

Jackson collection, courtesy of John Snyder.
344

downstream from the dam site and delivered via a special railroad built and operated by the contractor. Water was drawn from the river and precooled in special refrigerating equipment that helped to reduce the amount of heat generated 

while the wet concrete “set.” Concrete was mixed in a plant on the south side 

of the San Joaquin River about 200 feet downstream from the dam site proper. 

Delivery of freshly mixed, wet concrete was handled by four-cubic-yard buckHWVWKDW¿WLQWRVSHFLDOGLHVHOHOHFWULFUDLOFDUV7KHVHFDUVPRYHGDORQJWKHPDVsive steel trestle that extended across the entire length of the dam. Sitting atop 

the trestle were two 294-foot-long “hammerhead” cranes and two revolver cranes 

with 137-foot-long booms. The cars moved under the cranes and the buckets 

were lifted and transported to wherever the concrete placing operations were underway at that moment. Dual trackage allowed movement of the empty car back 

WRWKHPL[LQJSODQWZLWKRXWLQWHUIHULQJZLWKWKHPRYHPHQWRI¿OOHGEXFNHWVWR

other cranes.

In a system similar to that employed at Shasta, concrete was poured in 

GLVFUHWH¿IW\IRRWZLGHEORFNVIRUPHGLQDVHTXHQFHRI¿YHIRRWOLIWV$IWHUWKH

wet concrete was allowed to harden for a minimum of twenty-four hours during the summer and thirty-six hours during the rest of the year, wooden panels 

XVHGWRIRUPWKHVHEORFNVZHUHUHXVHG7KH¿UVWEXFNHWRIFRQFUHWHZDVSODFHG

on July 20, 1940, and work proceeded at a steady rate for the next two years. 

The daily record for concrete placement totaled 9,059 cubic yards, and in August 

1941, the monthly peak reached a little over 228,000 cubic yards. By January 

WKHVWUXFWXUHZDVSHUFHQW¿QLVKHGDQGWKHFRQWUDFWRUFRPSOHWHGLWWKDW

summer, less than three years after concrete placement began.

 &RQWHPSRUDQHRXVO\ZLWKWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI)ULDQW'DPFDQDOVZHUH

built to carry water to agricultural users to the north via the Madera Canal and 

WRWKHVRXWKYLDWKH)ULDQW.HUQ&DQDO%HFDXVHWKHVHFDQDOVZHUHGHVLJQHGWR

transport the bulk of water stored behind the dam, no hydroelectric powerplant 

was erected in conjunction with the dam. It took several years before the DeltaMendota Canal delivered water to the upper San Joaquin watershed and beJDQWRUHSOHQLVKWKHQDWXUDOÀRZWKDWZDVQRZEHLQJGLYHUWHGVRXWKZDUGWRZDUG

%DNHUV¿HOG%\WKHWLPHWKLVFRPSRQHQWRIWKHORQJDQWLFLSDWHG3ZDWHUVZDS ́

RFFXUUHG)ULDQW'DPKDGORQJVLQFHSURYHGLWVHOIDIRUPLGDEOHDQGLPSRVLQJ

component of California’s hydraulic infrastructure.

Aftermath

 8SRQFRPSOHWLRQRI6KDVWD'DPLQHDUO\WKH¿UVWSKDVHRIWKH

construction involved in implementing the Central Valley Project came to completion. In the ensuing decades, various components of the project were brought 

on-line (including the Delta-Mendota Canal, which delivered water up the San 
345

Joaquin River and effectuated the “water swap” that sent water stored behind 

)ULDQW'DPVRXWKZDUGWRZDUG%DNHUV¿HOGWKH&RQWUD&RVWD&DQDOWKDWGHOLYered Sacramento River water to residential and agricultural communities east and 

QRUWKRI6DQ)UDQFLVFR%D\DQGWKH7ULQLW\5LYHU'LYHUVLRQWKDWGHOLYHUHGZDWHULQWRWKHXSSHU6DFUDPHQWR5LYHUWKDWRWKHUZLVHZRXOGKDYHÀRZHGZHVWZDUG

LQWRWKH3DFL¿F2FHDQ7HFKQLFDOO\WKH&HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFWIXQFWLRQHGZLWK

UHPDUNDEOHHI¿FLHQF\DQGJHQHUDWHGQRFRQWURYHUV\UHODWLQJWRWKHTXDOLW\RILWV

design and construction. But in a political context, the project attracted continued attention and controversy.

The focus of this attention concerned the “acreage-limitation” restrictions that accompanied federal authorization of the project in 1937. Because this 

DXWKRUL]DWLRQLQFOXGHGWKHVSHFL¿FVWLSXODWLRQWKDWWKHRSHUDWLRQDGKHUHWR3UHFODmation law,” it appeared, to some people, that any farmer or agricultural producHUZKREHQH¿WWHGIURPZDWHUVXSSOLHGE\WKHSURMHFWZRXOGEHFRQVWUDLQHGWRXVH

this water on only a very limited amount of land (i.e., a maximum of 320 acres 

for a wife and husband partnership). But many large land-owners were involved 

in agricultural production in the region served by the project, and they viewed 

the reclamation law stipulation in a different light.89

)LJXUH)ULDQW'DPDQG0LOOHUWRQODNHRQ-XO\Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
346

In many ways, the struggle that ensued over the applicability of “reclaPDWLRQODZ ́VLPSO\UHÀHFWHGFRQÀLFWVGDWLQJEDFNWRWKHVDQGVZKHQ

Miller & Lux fought to protect their riparian rights in the face of upstream appropriators seeking to develop agricultural land focused around smaller-scale farms. 

7KHVWUXJJOHDOVRUHÀHFWHGWKHWHQVLRQWKDWH[LVWHGZLWKLQWKHFRUSXVRIZDWHU

ODZDWHQVLRQLQWHQVL¿HGE\WKHIDFWWKDWZDWHUULJKWVZHUHHVVHQWLDOO\DPDWWHURI

state law and, regardless of how the federally administered Central Valley Project 

might have introduced new and valuable quantities of water into the region’s 

DJULFXOWXUDOHFRQRP\VLJQL¿FDQWZDWHUULJKWVSUHGDWHGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH

Central Valley Project. This complicated any easy resolution to the problem of 

trying to enforce an “acreage limitation” requirement.

Resistance to the Bureau of Reclamation’s efforts to invoke federal control over the size of farms eligible for CVP water came even before the formal 

DXWKRUL]DWLRQRIWKHSURMHFWLQ6SHFL¿FDOO\LWZDVHYLGHQWLQWKHH[FOXVLRQ

of the Kings River and associated agricultural areas from inclusion in the CVP. 

During the 1920s, the Kings River area had been considered within the State 

:DWHU3ODQLQYHVWLJDWHGE\WKH6WDWH(QJLQHHU¶V2I¿FHDQGZDWHUIURPWKH.LQJV

River was included as part of the north-south “water swap.” But by the late 

1930s, agricultural interests in the Kings River Valley perceived association with 

the larger CVP as problematic, if not outright undesirable, and they opted to seek 

RWKHUZD\VRIEXLOGLQJWKH3LQH)ODW'DPWKDWZRXOGVWRUHWKHÀRRGZDWHUVRIWKH

Kings River.

By 1940, it became evident that landowners in the Kings River waterVKHGSHUFHLYHGWKH86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVDVDPRUH¿QDQFLDOO\DWWUDFWLYH

federal program in terms of dam building and reservoir operation; a key attracWLRQRIWKH&RUSV¶ÀRRGFRQWUROSURMHFWVZDVWKDWWKH\ZHUHSHUFHQWIXQGHG

by the federal government. Over the course of the next decade, the Bureau of 

Reclamation and the Corps struggled over the issue of who would build the Pine 

)ODW'DPDQGZKHWKHURUQRWXVHRIZDWHUUHVRXUFHVGHYHORSHGDVDUHVXOWRIWKLV

large-scale concrete gravity dam would be governed by “reclamation law” and 

the “acreage-limitation” restriction. In the end, the Corps won the battle to build 

3LQH)ODW'DPDOWKRXJKODQJXDJHLQWKHDXWKRUL]LQJOHJLVODWLRQFDOOHGIRUDGKHUence to the principles of “reclamation law” and signaled that California’s large 

landowning interests were not content to accept federal restrictions without a 

¿JKW90

Resistance to Reclamation’s insistence on enforcement of the “acreage limitation” also became manifest in the late 1940s with the publication of 

Sheridan Downey’s They Would Rule the Valley, an artfully written diatribe 

that castigated the federal government as some kind of socialist invader of the 

American heartland which disrupted sacrosanct patterns of private property 
347

rights in the name of bureaucratic empire building. As one of California’s two 

866HQDWRUV'RZQH\EURXJKWVLJQL¿FDQWDWWHQWLRQWRWKHSUREOHPVLQKHUHQWLQ

trying to administer a federal reclamation project in the midst of large agricultural interests who had access to water resources bearing no association to the 

federal program. He especially highlighted how groundwater pumping complicated any simple approach to allocating water within the San Joaquin Valley. His 

book served as a harbinger of efforts in the 1950s to have California “buy-back” 

the Central Valley Project from the federal government, an effort that eventually 

proved ineffectual.

The uneasy legacy of the federal-state partnership that spawned construction of the Central Valley Project eventually found expression in important 

OHJLVODWLRQJRYHUQLQJZHVWHUQZDWHUGHYHORSPHQW)LUVWLQSODQQLQJIRUFRQstruction of what came to be known as the California State Water Project in the 

1950s, California’s legislators opted to avoid any involvement with the federal government in the huge undertaking. Rivaling (if not surpassing) the Central 

9DOOH\3URMHFWLQVFRSHDQGVLJQL¿FDQFHWKH&DOLIRUQLD6WDWH:DWHU3URMHFWLVUHsponsible for transferring huge quantities of water from behind Oroville Dam, on 

WKH)HDWKHU5LYHUQRUWKRI6DFUDPHQWRKXQGUHGVRIPLOHVVRXWKZDUGWRJUHDWHU

Los Angeles and San Diego. As part of this project—which was largely completed in the 1970s—water is pumped more than 3,000 feet in height over the 

Tehachapi Range at the southern end of the Central Valley to reach metropolitan 

users in Southern California. Water from the project is also used to support agriculture in the southern reaches of the San Joaquin Valley, and it was largely for 

this reason that state politicians wished to avoid any association with the federal 

JRYHUQPHQW2DQG3UHFODPDWLRQODZ ́2LQ¿QDQFLQJWKHSURMHFW

Concern over “acreage restrictions” led to important legislative action 

LQZKHQGXULQJ5RQDOG5HDJDQ¶V¿UVWWHUPDV3UHVLGHQWDQGVXEVHTXHQWWR

his tenure as a two-term governor of California), legislation was enacted that increased the “acreage limitation” for federal reclamation projects from 160 acres 

per individual to 960 acres per individual. Although this dramatic adjustment did 

not completely stem the controversy over the participation of agribusiness in fedHUDOO\¿QDQFHGDQGVXEVLGL]HGZDWHUGHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWVLWPDGHLWPXFKHDVier for the status quo system of large-scale farming to be accommodated in fedHUDOUHFODPDWLRQSURMHFWVDQGWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHEHQH¿WVRIWKH&HQWUDO9DOOH\

3URMHFWZLWKRXWFRQFHUQRYHUSRVVLEOHFRQÀLFWZLWK3UHFODPDWLRQODZ ́91 With 

this legislation, the system of regional water development—with origins that 

FRXOGEHWUDFHGEDFNWRWKHV2¿QDOO\DWWDLQHGDOHJDOVWDQGLQJWKDWDFNQRZOedged the economic power and political standing of western agricultural interests. These agricultural interests operated in a much different political and economic arena than they had in 1902, and they represented a distinctly separate culWXUDOVWUDLQIDUGLIIHUHQWIURPWKH3\HRPDQIDUPHUV ́ZKR¿JXUHGVRSURPLQHQWO\
348

in rhetoric championing irrigation, reclamation, and the social value of “making 

the desert bloom.” The new acreage limitation represented a major evolution in 

American society and in the reclamation program.

Endnotes

1. The agricultural history of California—with special emphasis on the role of irrigation in this history—is 

well described in Donald J. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness.

 )UHG3RZOHGJHWater: The Nature, Uses, and Future of Our Most Precious and Abused Resource

1HZ<RUN)DUUDU6WUDXV*LURX[,QWKHHDUO\V&DOLIRUQLD¶VDYHUDJHDQQXDOZDWHUFRQsumption from all sources was approximately 36 million acre-feet with 32 million acre-feet, (85 percent) devoted exclusively to agriculture. This percentage has been dropping gradually but steadily as urban growth continues to increase.

3. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 5-11, describes the state’s early wheat industry.

4. A good reference on early California mining dams is A. J. Bowie, A Practical Treatise on Mining in

California (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1905), 94-113.

 )RUH[DPSOHWKHPDVRQU\DUFK%HDU9DOOH\'DPZDVFRPSOHWHGLQWRVWRUHZDWHUIRULUULJDWLRQLQ

WKH6DQ%HUQDUGLQR5HGODQGVUHJLRQRI6RXWKHUQ&DOLIRUQLD6HH%URZQ37KH%HDU9DOOH\'DP ́

6. Irrigated agriculture in Southern California is well described in Carey McWilliams, Southern California

Country: An Island on the Land (New York: Duell, Sloan, & Pearce, 1946).

7. The essential topographic character of the Central Valley is well described in U.S. Congress, House of 

Representatives, U.S. Board of Commissioners on the Irrigation of the San Joaquin, Tulare and Sacramento

Valleys of the State of California, 4, 3rd Congress, 1st Session, 1874, H. Ex. Doc. 1, pt. 2, Serial 1745. This report was reprinted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1990 as Jackson, et. al, Engineers and Irrigation. 

Subsequent page references to this report will correlate with the 1990 reprint edition.

)LJXUH'U\LQJDOPRQGVDWWKH%DQHV$OPRQG2UFKDUGRQWKH2UODQG3URMHFW&DOLIRUQLD

in 1916. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
349

 7KHQRWLRQWKDWWKH&HQWUDO9DOOH\KHOSHGWR30RYH7KH5DLQ ́LVVSHFL¿FDOO\QRWHGLQWKHWLWOHRIWKHLQLtial chapter of the 1945 book Shasta Dam and its Builders6DQ)UDQFLVFR6FKZDEDFKHU)UH\&RPSDQ\

ZULWWHQDQGGLVWULEXWHGXQGHUWKHDHJLVRI3DFL¿F&RQVWUXFWRUV,QF7KHFKDSWHULVFDOOHG37KH&HQWUDO

Valley Project ‘Moves the Rain.’”

9. In 1920, Colonel Robert Bradford Marshall, Chief Hydrographer of the United States Geological Survey 

in California, began promoting a plan to more fully utilize the waters of the Central Valley. Acting as a private citizen rather than as a representative of the Geological Survey, Marshall’s proposal was published 

LQWKHSDPSKOHW3&DOLIRUQLD¶V*UHDWHVW2SSRUWXQLW\ ́GLVWULEXWHGE\WKHSULYDWHO\¿QDQFHG&DOLIRUQLD6WDWH

Irrigation Association. The text of this pamphlet is reprinted in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Clair 

Engle, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, &HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW'RFXPHQWV3DUW2QH

Authorizing Documents:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH>th Congress, 2nd

Session, H. Doc. 416]. Subsequent reference to this publication will be: &HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW'RFXPHQWV.

10. The history of the Miller & Lux ranching and agricultural empire is sympathetically portrayed in Charles 

Treadwell, The Cattle King (Santa Cruz, California: Western Tanager Press, 1981).

11. Jackson, et. al, Engineers and Irrigation, 144.

 7KHGHPLVHRI5DOVWRQ¶V¿QDQFLDOHPSLUHLVUHFRXQWHGLQ3LVDQL From the Family Farm to Agribusiness,

118-9, and in Jackson, et. al, Engineers and Irrigation, 3.

 7KHSUROLIHUDWLRQRILUULJDWLRQFRORQLHVDURXQG)UHVQRLVGHVFULEHGLQ3LVDQL From the Family Farm to

Agribusiness, 122-5. Also see U.S. Department of Agriculture, Report of Irrigation Investigations in California

:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

14. The history of Miller & Lux’s efforts to defend their claim to riparian water rights is the focus of M. 

Catherine Miller, Flooding the Courtrooms: Law and Water in the Far West (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 

Press, 1993).

 )RUPRUHRQWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKHUXOLQJLQLux v. Haggin, see Pisani, From the Family Farm to

Agribusiness, 191-249. Robert Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Waters.

16. The history of the Wright Act and subsequent development of the irrigation district as a viable component 

of California’s political economy is documented in Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 250-82, 

352-8.

17. The complexity of water rights litigation in the San Joaquin Valley at the start of the twentieth century—and the prominent role played by Miller & Lux in this litigation—is made clear in Jackson, et.al, Report of

Irrigation Investigations in California, 237-46.

 7KHSROLWLFDO¿UHVWRUPWKDWHUXSWHGIURPWKHDFFXPXODWLRQRIGHEULVLQQRUWKHUQ&DOLIRUQLD¶VULYHUVLVUHcounted in Robert Kelley, Gold vs. Grain: The Mining Debris Controversy (Glendale, California: Arthur 

Clarke, 1959).

 )RUWKHKLVWRU\RIWKH&DOLIRUQLD'HEULV&RPPLVVLRQVHH5REHUW.HOOH\Battling the Inland Sea: 

American Political Culture, Public Policy, and the Sacramento Valley, 1850-1886 (Berkeley: University 

of California Press, 1989), and Joseph J. Hagwood Jr., The California Debris Commission: A History

(Sacramento: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1981).

 )URPWKH3-DFNVRQ5HSRUW ́DVTXRWHGLQ+DJZRRGCalifornia Debris Commission: A History, 52.

 $JRRGV\QRSVLVRIWKH&RUSV¶DQGWKH'HEULV&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQÀRRGFRQWURODQGQDYLJDELOity efforts along the Sacramento River from the 1890s through the 1920s is provided in Hagwood, California

Debris Commission: A History, 49-56.

22. The troubled histories of the Yuma and Klamath Projects are described in Pisani, From the Family Farm

to Agribusiness, 313-24.

23. The story of the federal government’s initial interest in, and subsequent abandonment of, a reclamation 

project in the Owens Valley in 1904-1906 is best told in William Kahrl, Water and Power.

24. The early history of the Orland Project is succinctly summarized in Pisani, From the Family Farm to

Agribusiness, 329-31.

25. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Dams and Control Works (Washington, D.C.: 

*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

26. Bureau of Reclamation, Dams and Control Works, 76-84.

27. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 331-4, describes the issues surrounding the conception 

and ultimate demise of the Iron Canyon Dam project.

28. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 35-54.

29. U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Reclamation Service, in cooperation with Iron Canyon Project 

Association, 5HSRUWRQ,URQ&DQ\RQ3URMHFWVE\WKH2I¿FHRIWKH865HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHDW3RUWODQG

Oregon, October, 1914, and Report by Board of Review Appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, November, 

1914, 14 and 53-4.
350

30. Report on Iron Canyon, 62-4. The report summarized conditions as follows: “The situation may be briefly summed up thus: A porous underbody of unknown depth capped by fairly tight volcanic tuffs and agglomerates from 40 to 60 feet thick in the main gorge. . . .” (64).

31. Report on Iron Canyon, 71.

32. Report on Iron Canyon, 71.

33. Report on Iron Canyon, 65.

 +RPHU-*DXOWDQG:)0F&OXUHReport on Iron Canyon. Gault was an engineer with the Reclamation 

Service while McClure was the California State Engineer. The report is dated May 1920, but it was not published until 1921.

35. Gault and McClure, ,URQ&DQ\RQ3URMHFW, 23.

36. Gault and McClure, ,URQ&DQ\RQ3URMHFW, 62-9.

37. Gault and McClure, ,URQ&DQ\RQ3URMHFW, 68.

38. Walker Evan’s October 1925 Bureau of Reclamation report entitled “Report on Iron Canyon Project 

2&DOLIRUQLD ́ZDVSULQWHGDVFKDSWHU¿YHLQ3DXO%DLOH\¶VThe Development of the Upper Sacramento River

6DFUDPHQWR&DOLIRUQLD6WDWH3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

39. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 331-4, discusses the Iron Canyon Project and its eventual 

demise.

40. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 383.

41. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 384-6.

42. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 382.

43. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 154-90, describes the work—and ultimate demise—of 

William Hammond Hall as California’s State Engineer between 1878 and 1888.

44. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 364-80, describes the origins and activities on the State 

Water Commission (renamed the Division of Water Rights in 1921).

45. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 394-6, describes Marshall’s early career and his reputed 

inspiration for conceiving his “plan.”

46. See &HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW'RFXPHQWV, 139-50, for a complete version of the Marshall Plan text as printed 

in 1920 by the California State Irrigation Association.

47. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 398.

48. Early opposition to the Marshall Plan is described in Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness,

400-1.

49. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 438-9, describes the latter part of his life and manner in 

which he was separated from anything having to do with the Central Valley Project prior to his death in 1949.

50. The 1921 legislation authorizing a comprehensive study of California’s water resources is reprinted in 

&HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW'RFXPHQWV, 150-3.

51. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 403.

52. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 408-10. Central Valley Project Documents, 

“Investigations of the State Engineer” (Bulletin No. 4) 150-9.

53. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 411-2. This report is synopsized in&HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW

Documents, “Investigations of the State Engineer (Bulletin No. 9),” 159.

 7KHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIHerminghaus v. Southern California Edison Company is explicated in Pisani, From

the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 412-5.

 7KHSXEOLFUHDFWLRQWRWKH+HUPLQJKDXVGHFLVLRQZDVUHÀHFWHGLQWKHHQDFWPHQWRIDQDPHQGPHQWWR

the California State Constitution that required riparian water rights to adhere to the same types of “reasonable” 

use that governed appropriated water rights claims. See Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 412-5. 

Miller, Flooding the Courtrooms.

56. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 416-7. A detailed synopsis of the 1927 report is provided 

in &HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW'RFXPHQWV, “Investigations of the State Engineer” (Bulletin No. 12), 168-83.

57. Pisani, From the Family Farm to AgribusinessVSHFL¿FDOO\QRWHVWKDW3PRVWPHPEHUVRIWKHOHJLVODWXUHDVVXPHGWKDWWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWVKRXOGSD\DWOHDVWSDUWRIWKHSURMHFW¶VFRVWLIRQO\IRUÀRRGFRQWURO

DQGQDYLJDWLRQEHQH¿WV ́,QWKHIHGHUDOOHJLVODWLRQDXWKRUL]LQJFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKH%RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFWLQ

ODWHPLOOLRQRIWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQFRVWZDVFRYHUHGE\GLUHFWIHGHUDODLGIRUÀRRGFRQWURO

58. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 419-22.

59. Paul Bailey, Development of the Upper Sacramento River, investigations of the State Engineer 50-1.

60. Bailey, Development of the Upper Sacramento River, 14, 53.

61. Bailey, Development of the Upper Sacramento River, 47.

62. Bailey, Development of the Upper Sacramento River, 47.
351

63. Bailey, Development of the Upper Sacramento River, 47-9. The report recognized the potential danger 

SRVHGE\XSOLIWDQGVSHFL¿FDOO\VWLSXODWHGWKDW3GUDLQSLSHVDORQJWKHIXOOOHQJWKRIWKHGDPGRZQVWUHDPIURP

the grout holes would connect through vertical pipes to drainage tunnels in the dam . . . under drains would relieve upward water pressure from percolating water below the concrete lining should there be any,” see page 

48.

64. &HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW'RFXPHQWV3)HGHUDO6WDWH&RPPLVVLRQRQ:DWHU5HVRXUFHV ́7KLV

commission was known as the “Hoover-Young Commission” because appointments were made by President 

Herbert Hoover and California Governor C. C. Young.

65. &HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW'RFXPHQWV, “State Water Plan (Bulletin No. 25), 1931,” 256-349. Pisani, From the

Family Farm to Agribusiness, 434.

66. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness, 434-6.

67. &HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW'RFXPHQWV, “Report of the Corps of Engineers (H. Doc. No. 791, 71st Congress), 

1931,” 363-97.

68. &HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW'RFXPHQWV, “Bureau of Reclamation, Bissell Report, 1931,” 397- 403. Quote 

from page 403.

69. See &HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW'RFXPHQWV, “Report of the Corps of Engineers (H. Doc. No. 191, 73rd

Congress), 1933,” 505-35, 549. “Report of the Corps of Engineers (H. Doc. No. 35, 73rd Congress), 1934,” 

544-55.

70. This was later known as the Public Works Administration.

71. &HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW'RFXPHQWV, “Rivers and Harbors Act (Initial Authorization of Central Valley 

Project Works), 1935,” 558-9.

72. &HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW'RFXPHQWV “President Roosevelt to the Secretary of the Treasury, September 10, 

1935,” 559.

73. &HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW'RFXPHQWV, “Rivers and Harbors Act (Reclamation Project Authorization),” 568-9.

 30HPRUDQGXPWRWKH3UHVV1RYHPEHU ́%R[3URMHFW&RUUHVSRQGHQFH)LOH

)ROGHU'DPVDQG5HVHUYRLUV6KDVWD'DP%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQ5*1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV

Denver.

75. “The Shasta Dam on the Sacramento River, California,” Engineering 157 (January 7, 1944), 2-3.

76. S. O. Harper to John Page, January 15, 1937, National Archives, Denver, RG115, Entry 7. Bureau of 

5HFODPDWLRQ3URMHFW&RUUHVSRQGHQFH)LOH%R[)ROGHU'DPVDQG5HVHUYRLUV)ULDQW

Dam through 1939, Bureau of Reclamation, Record Group 115, National Archives, Denver.

77. See Jackson, Building the Ultimate DamIRUPRUHRQWKHRULJLQVDQGLQÀXHQFHRIWKLVFRPPLWWHH

78. “The Shasta Dam on the Sacramento River, California,” 42.

79. “Program for Beginning Construction on the Central Valley Project,” Western Construction News

(January 1938).

80. “Review of Shasta Dam Plans, ”Western Construction News (May 1938); reprinted in Allen, Redding and

the Three Shastas, 77.

81. “Review of Shasta Dam Plans,” Western Construction News (May 1938), 79.

 3DFL¿F&RQVWUXFWRUV,QFShasta Dam and its Builders, 43, 46.

83. The description of the construction process draws from a variety of sources including: Shasta Dam and

its Builders. Al M. Rocca, America’s Shasta Dam: A History of Construction, 1936-1945 (Redding, California: 

5HGGLQJ0XVHXPRI+LVWRU\5DOSK/RZUH\3&RQVWUXFWLRQ)HDWXUHVRI6KDVWD3URMHFW3DUW*HQHUDO

Layout and Aggregate Production,” Civil Engineering-XQH5DOSK/RZUH\3&RQVWUXFWLRQ)HDWXUHV

of Shasta Project Part 2: Conveying Aggregate, Mixing and Placing Concrete,” Civil Engineering 11 (July 

1941). C. S. Rippon, “Methods of Handling and Placing Concrete at Shasta Dam,” Journal of the American

Concrete Institute 14 (September 1942). “The Shasta Dam on the Sacramento River, California,” Engineering

157 (January 7, 1944). “The Shasta Dam on the Sacramento River, California,” Engineering, 157 (January 21, 

1944). “The Shasta Dam on the Sacramento River, California.” Engineering )HEUXDU\37KH

Shasta Dam on the Sacramento River, California,” Engineering )HEUXDU\

 7KHGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQSURFHVVHPSOR\HGDW)ULDQWLVWDNHQIURPWKHIROORZLQJVRXUFHV5

%:LOOLDPV3*HQHUDO)HDWXUHVRI)ULDQW'DP ́Civil Engineering2). C. T Douglas, “Concrete Mixing Plant 

IRU)ULDQW'DP ́Civil Engineering$SULO'6:DOWHU3&RQVWUXFWLRQ3ODQWDQG0HWKRGV2)ULDQW

Dam,” Civil Engineering 12 (May 1942).
352

85. John C. Page to B. W. Gearhart (House of Representatives), July 27 1938, National Archives, Denver, 

5*(QWU\%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQ3URMHFW&RUUHVSRQGHQFH)LOH&HQWUDO9DOOH\

%R[)ROGHU&HQWUDO9DOOH\(QJLQHHULQJ5HSRUWV-DQ'HF%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQ

RG115, National Archives, Denver. The Miller and Lux interests held large tracts of land in the lower San 

Joaquin River Valley that retained riparian water rights. See more on their early history in earlier parts of this 

chapter.

86. Hoover Dam and most other large concrete gravity arch dams to this time used cableway systems beWZHHQWKHFDQ\RQDEXWPHQWVRIWKHGDPIRUSXUSRVHVRIFRQVWUXFWLRQ%HFDXVHRIFRQ¿JXUDWLRQRIWKHFDQ\RQDW

6KDVWDWKDWZDVQRWSRVVLEOH)UDQN&URZHDQGKLVQHSKHZ-RKQ&URZHERWKWUDLQHGFLYLOHQJLQHHUVFUHDWHG

the idea of using the headtower system to support seven cableways.

 :LOOLDPV3*HQHUDO)HDWXUHVRI)ULDQW'DP ́

 7KHFRQÀLFWRYHUWKHDFUHDJHOLPLWDWLRQLVGLVFXVVHGLQ(UZLQ&RRSHUAqueduct Empire: A Guide to

Water in California, its Turbulent History and its Management Today (Glendale California: Arthur H. Clark 

Company, 1968), 154-61. Also, see Hundley, The Great Thirst, 257-68.

 7KHEDWWOHEHWZHHQWKH&RUSVDQG5HFODPDWLRQRYHUFRQVWUXFWLRQRI3LQH)ODW'DPLVGLVFXVVHGLQFRQsiderable detail in Arthur Maass, Muddy Waters: The Army Corps of Engineers and the Nation’s Rivers

(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951). The controversy is also summarized in Marc 

Reisner, Cadillac Desert, 181-7.

90. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 380-5.
353

CHAPTER 8

DAMS FOR NAVIGATION AND FLOOD:

TYGART AND MAINSTEM DAMS ON THE OHIO, UPPER 

MISSISSIPPI, AND TENNESSEE RIVERS

The Ohio River Floods and Tygart Dam

On the Ohio River and the upper Mississippi from Cairo to Minneapolis, 

the dams of the twentieth century have all been oriented primarily to navigation. 

Keokuk, on the Mississippi, is a multipurpose dam (navigation and hydroelectric 

power) built privately, but the many locks and dams on these mainstreams were 

conceived as single purpose structures. Tygart Dam, begun in 1934 and completed in 1939, was a pioneering project for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers beFDXVHLWVJRDOZDVWREXLOGDUHVHUYRLUWKDWZRXOGSUHYHQWODWHZLQWHUÀRRGLQJDQG

provide for late summer navigation. It was, for the Corps, a new type of dam, 

truly multipurpose (yet without power generating facilities) and built higher than 

any of its previous dams. Many issues of dam design and reservoir operation 

had to be thought out afresh at Tygart.

The Ohio River Valley, running from the headwaters of the Allegheny 

and Monongahela Rivers to the junction at Cairo, Illinois with the upper 

Mississippi is a major water transportation system carrying (in 1992) over forty percent of the nation’s inland waterborne commerce. Its 2,584 miles of navigable rivers comprise only eleven percent of the national system, but its posiWLRQZLWKLQWKHYDVWFRDO¿HOGVRI$SSDODFKLDDQGDKHDY\LQGXVWULDOUHJLRQJLYHLW

economic prominence out of all proportion to size. The Ohio River, itself, is

981 miles long and drains an area of 209,900 square miles. Over twenty-six million people in parts of fouteen states live in its drainage basin.1

 7KHPD[LPXPÀRZDW3LWWVEXUJKZDVHVWLPDWHGLQDQHDUO\DUWLFOH

to be 440,000 cubic feet per second, with a minimum of about 1,600 cubic feet 

per second, whereas at Cairo the maximum estimate was 1,500,000 cubic feet 

SHUVHFRQGDQGWKHPLQLPXPFXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQG,QWKHPDMRUÀRRGRI

WKHÀRZLQWRWKH0LVVLVVLSSLDW&DLURUHDFKHGDOPRVWWZRPLOOLRQFXELFIHHW

per second, making the Ohio the major arm of the Mississippi.2

 7KHÀRRGLQJRIWKH2KLR5LYHUKDGFDXVHGPRUHFRVWO\GDPDJHWKDQRFFXUUHGLQDQ\RWKHUULYHUEDVLQFXOPLQDWLQJZLWKWKHÀRRGVRIDQG

Pittsburgh was particularly hard hit. Of the 107 people killed nationwide in the 

0DUFKÀRRGIRUW\VL[ZHUHLQ3LWWVEXUJKZKHUHQHDUO\EXLOGLQJV

were damaged or destroyed. The Golden Triangle (the point of land where the 
354

Monongahela and Allegheny Rivers meet to form the Ohio) was under sixteen 

IHHWRIZDWHU7KHULYHUFUHVWHGDWIRUW\VL[IHHWDERYHQRUPDOÀRZDW3LWWVEXUJK

surpassing all previous measured heights.3

 These disasters helped lead Congress, 

DIWHUORQJGHEDWHWRSDVVWKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FW4

One immediate result of the 1936 Act for the Corps was authorization 

IRUFRQVWUXFWLRQRIQLQHKLJKÀRRGFRQWUROGDPVWRSURWHFW3LWWVEXUJK,Q

work began on two dams, and in 1972, during Hurricane Agnes, those projects, 

plus Tygart Dam, prevented estimated damages that were higher than the total 

cost of construction.5

7KLVÀRRGFRQWUROPLVVLRQZDVVWLOOQHZWRWKH&RUSVLQWKH

VHVSHFLDOO\DVLWFRQÀLFWHGZLWKLWVWUDGLWLRQDOPLVVLRQRIULYHUQDYLJDWLRQ

To see that change most clearly requires an appreciation of the beginnings of the 

Corps’ river activity, which initially centered on the Ohio Basin and led to new 

forms in mainstem dams.

)LJXUH7\JDUW'DPFRQVWUXFWLRQQHDU*UDIWRQ:HVW9LUJLQLDRQ-XO\Source:

Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and Records 

Administration, College Park, Maryland.
355

Navigation from New Orleans to Monongahela

The Supreme Court decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, the growing clout 

of newly created states in the Trans-Appalachian West, and President Monroe’s 

continuous vacillation on the subject encouraged Congress to assume a more activist role in issues dealing with interstate commerce. As we have seen in chapter 

one, within three weeks’ time in 1824, Congress passed both the General Survey 

Act and an act authorizing the removal of navigation obstacles on the Mississippi 

and Ohio Rivers. A few months after passage of the second act, the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers was building wing dams to improve navigation on the Ohio 

River by allowing a two and one-half foot channel for shallow-draft steamboats. 

7KLVZDVVRRQIROORZHGE\WKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIVQDJERDWVWRUHPRYHÀRDWLQJWLPber and limbs sticking out of the water. Then in 1879 the Corps embarked on a 

program to build locks on the Ohio to establish a six-foot channel. By 1929, the 

Ohio had been converted to a nine-foot navigation channel ‘staircase” of locks, 

dams, and navigation pools that resulted in a nine-foot channel. So, in 1824, the 

Corps began to clear the Ohio and Mississippi of debris and to open a two-and 

one-half foot channel for shallow-draft steamboats. In 1879, the Corps had 

)LJXUH7KLVWUHVWOHVKRZQRQ$SULOSURYLGHGTXLFNDFFHVVIRUFRQFUHWHSODFHment during construction. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, 

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
356

embarked on a program to build locks and dams so that the Ohio, by 1929, had 

become more a series of narrow lakes than a free running river. With industries 

such as steel and coal growing rapidly, river transportation was crucial to the region.6

The 308 reports gave the Corps the opportunity to review navigable rivHUVLQWHUPVRIÀRRGFRQWURODQGSRZHUDVZHOODVQDYLJDWLRQDQGWKH2KLR5LYHU

308 report, published in 1935, laid out these issues, eliminated irrigation as unnecessary for the rainy region, and presented a comprehensive plan for developing the entire basin. The report was essentially completed before the new 

administration took power in early 1933.7

 The Corps had expected the 308 reports to lead to its control over developments in all major river basins where 

navigation played a part, except the Colorado, which was left for the Bureau 

of Reclamation.8

 TVA presented a deep threat not only to the Corps’ work on 

the Ohio Basin, but also, as described in chapters 5 and 6, in other major basins 

where large, multipurpose dams seemed feasible.

To understand the situation in 1933 when the Corps lost the opportunity to design and build control over multipurpose dams in the Tennessee Valley 

and when it began to design Tygart Dam, we need to go back into the history of 

ÀRRGLQJLQWKH2KLR5LYHU%DVLQ

Floods, Droughts, and Power

 )ORRGVKDGFDXVHGPDMRUSURSHUW\GDPDJHLQWKHYDVW0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHU

Basin throughout the nineteenth century. The solution established by the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, following the huge Humphreys and Abbot report of 

1861, had been to build higher and higher levees. Charles Ellet Jr., a brilliant civilian engineer, produced a report in 1852 calling for a combination of levees and 

UHVHUYRLUVRQWULEXWDULHVWRFRQWUROÀRRGV,WWRRNPDQ\\HDUVIRUWKHIHGHUDOJRYernment to begin taking the idea of reservoirs seriously.9

 ,QWKH6RXWK)RUN'DPDW-RKQVWRZQRQWKH&RQHPDXJK5LYHUD

tributary to the Allegheny River) had collapsed because of overtopping, killing 

over 2,000 people. A “levees only” policy still seemed best to the Corps. But the 

GLVDVWURXVÀRRGRIZKLFKQHDUO\GHVWUR\HG3LWWVEXUJK¶VFHQWHUOHGWRWKH

FUHDWLRQRIWKH3LWWVEXUJK)ORRG&RPPLVVLRQDQGLQLWVUHSRUWUHWXUQHGWR

(OOHW¶VLGHDRIDGLYHUVL¿HGÀRRGFRQWUROSURJUDPWKDWLQFOXGHGGDPVDQGUHVHUYRLUV7KHQH[W\HDUWKH2KLRÀRRGHGZLOGO\FDXVLQJGDPDJHVRIPLOOLRQ

but damages on the lower Mississippi were only $61 million. The populous reJLRQVLQWKHQRUWKEHJDQWRFODPRUIRUÀRRGFRQWUROPHDVXUHV10
357

The most telling early example of Ellet’s idea for dams and reservoirs on 

tributaries came in the Great Miami River Basin, a part of the Ohio River Valley 

LQVRXWKZHVW2KLRMXVWDERYH&LQFLQQDWL7KHUHWKHÀRRGNLOOHGRYHU

360 people, and the total dead in the surrounding region was 467. Local people took the initiative, formed an association, raised over $2 million for engineering and legal studies, got state legislation passed, and formed the Miami 

&RQVHUYDQF\'LVWULFWLQ7KHGLVWULFWDVVHVVHGWKHGLUHFWEHQH¿FLDULHVRI

WKHÀRRGFRQWUROVWUXFWXUHVVRWKDWLWKDGHQRXJKPRQH\WREHJLQFRQVWUXFWLRQLQ

1918. The district plan, designed and directed by Arthur E. Morgan, included 

¿YHODUJHUHWDLQLQJUHVHUYRLUVDURXQG'D\WRQWKHYDOOH\¶VSULQFLSDOFLW\(DUWKHQ

GDPVEXLOWZLWKK\GUDXOLF¿OOFUHDWHGWKHUHVHUYRLUVZKLFKKDGDFRPELQHGVWRUage capacity of 841,000 acre-feet (365.6 billion cubic feet).11

The water level was kept low behind the dams during the winter to preSDUHIRUWKHODUJHUXQRIIIURPVSULQJUDLQV,Q$SULORIDVHYHUHÀRRGWHVWHG

WKHQHZO\EXLOWV\VWHPDQGLWSDVVHGZLWKQRGLI¿FXOW\6LQFHWKHQLWKDVSURYHQ

DEOHWRUHVLVWDOOÀRRGVLQFOXGLQJWKHZLQWHUDQGVSULQJRIZKHQUDLQIDOOZDV

QHDUO\WKHVDPHDVLQWKHNLOOHUÀRRGRI12

)LJXUH7KLV2FWREHUYLHZVKRZVWKHEDIÀHVDQGVWLOOLQJGDPDW7\JDUW'DP

under construction with the cofferdam on the right. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
358

The federal government moved more slowly than the Miami River organization, but it did move, thanks to President Theodore Roosevelt, who afWHUWKH3LWWVEXUJKÀRRGDSSRLQWHGDFRPPLVVLRQWRVWXG\ZDWHUUHVRXUFHV

7KHFRPPLVVLRQ¶VOHDGLQJSHUVRQDOLW\1HYDGD5HSXEOLFDQ6HQDWRU)UDQFLV*

Newlands, (primary sponsor of the 1902 Reclamation Act), tried without success to get Congress to transfer rivers and harbors work away from the Army. 

,QWKH+RXVHIRUPHGDFRPPLWWHHRQÀRRGFRQWURODQGWKHQH[W\HDU

&RQJUHVVSDVVHGWKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRIFRYHULQJWKHORZHU0LVVLVVLSSL

and Sacramento Rivers. This act left the Corps in control and implied a shift 

from single purpose projects (navigation) to multipurpose projects that now inFOXGHGÀRRGFRQWURO7KH:DWHU3RZHU$FWDGGHGK\GURHOHFWULFSRZHU

but Congress did not provide any way to integrate those purposes until the 1927 

Rivers and Harbors Act (January 1927) authorized the Corps to perform the surYH\VLGHQWL¿HGLQLQ+RXVH'RFXPHQW13

 %HFDXVHRIWKHHDUOLHUZRUNRI0DMRU)LVNHVHHFKDSWHU0DMRU

Lewis H. Watkins’ 75-page “Report on Survey of the Tennessee River and Its 

7ULEXWDULHV ́EHFDPHRQHRIWKH¿UVWGRFXPHQWV$WWDFKHGWRLWZHUHSDJes of appendices plus 199 plates published in a separate volume. This pioneering 

UHSRUWJDYHIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHDFOHDUSLFWXUHRIDPDMRUULYHUYDOOH\IURPWKHSHUspective of multipurpose development. Ironically, this report by the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers eventually provided Nebraska Republican Senator George W. 

Norris with the data to make a successful case for taking the development of the 

Tennessee River away from the Corps.14

)LJXUH7KHGRZQVWUHDPIDFHRI7\JDUW'DPGXULQJFRQVWUXFWLRQSource:

Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and 

Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
359

In his letter approving Watkins’ report, the Chief of Engineers, Major 

General Lytle Brown (1872-1951), himself a native of Tennessee, concluded that 

the river be improved to give a nine-foot depth for navigation either by many low 

dams (as on the Ohio) or by fewer high, hydropower dams, provided that they 

be “built by private interests, States, or municipalities.” The federal government 

should only contribute to the cost in an amount equal to that required to build 

locks and dams solely for navigation. This proviso was similarly expressed in 

Butler’s 308 report for the upper Columbia River. Thus the Corps, following the 

Republican administrations of Coolidge and Hoover, favored private or at least 

nonfederal power developments.15

But in this 308 report for the Tennessee River Valley, the Corps had projected multipurpose dams of the same type as Wilson and Tygart Dams, making 

preliminary designs of 23 dams and more detailed plans for a major high dam on 

the Clinch River at Cove Creek (later to be built by the TVA and named Norris 

Dam). This dam project was singled out in the 308 report for special funding in 

1927 so that the Corps could make core borings and a detailed investigation of 

the dam site as well as a full stability analysis of the dam structure. It was clear 

in the report that the Corps was preparing to build Cove Creek Dam, whereas 

DOORWKHUDVSHFWVRIWKHVXUYH\ZHUH3QRWVXI¿FLHQWO\GH¿QLWHWRSHUPLWWKHH[-

act determination and detail layout of the various projects.” The entire survey 

of all tributaries and the Miami River, plus preliminary designs, cost just over 

$910,000, exclusive of Cove Creek, which cost just above $180,000.16

)LJXUH&RPSOHWHG7\JDUW'DPSource: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record 

Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
360

The two central features of the 308 Tennessee River Report were Wilson 

Dam, which began operating in 1925, and Cove Creek, the precursor to Tygart 

Dam. C. M. Hackett, the principal Corps engineer in Nashville, completed the 

preliminary design of Cove Creek in December 1928. It followed the precedent 

of Wilson Dam in its stability analysis, but otherwise it represented a departure 

for the Corps. It was not a mainstem river dam like Wilson, but, rather, it was 

a high storage dam of straight gravity section. The highest section of the dam 

was to be 247 feet high, and it would be 185 feet wide at its base. Overall, it 

would have a crest length of 2,009 feet and a reservoir storage capacity of 

3,224,400 acre-feet. This huge capacity would have been the largest east of the 

Mississippi. The Corps had designed its power capacity to be 165,000 kilowatts, 

slightly less than the 185,000 kW then installed at Wilson Dam. The estimated 

cost was to be $37.5 million.17

Because of the federal government’s policy favoring private power in 

1930, General Lytle Brown requested proposals from nonfederal groups for constructing and operating high power dams. He got no proposals largely because 

of the depression and the concern over markets for all the newly created electric 

power. He, therefore, recommended the plan for low dams with locks primarily 

IRUQDYLJDWLRQ7KH&RUSVGLGKRZHYHUEHJLQFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKH¿UVWRIWKHVH

low dams 15.5 miles above Muscle Shoals at the head of the lake formed by 

Wilson Dam.18 Little other work went forward, and the Corps did no further substantial work on Cove Creek.

)LJXUH7KHUHVHUYRLU¿OOLQJEHKLQG7\JDUW'DP'HFHPEHUSource: 

Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and 

Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
361

Meanwhile, 1930 brought not only the 308 Report on the Tennessee, 

but also a severe drought which almost reduced the Monongahela River to a 

dry creek. Navigation was impossible, and the Pittsburgh District called on the 

West Penn Power Company to release water from their Lake Lynn on the Cheat 

River. The power company agreed, and navigation on the heavily traveled river 

resumed. The Corps now saw the need for a big tributary reservoir to keep boats 

moving in summer and early fall.19)ORRGDQGWKHQGURXJKWFRPELQHGWRPDNHD

high dam necessary, but the funding was still an insuperable problem in 1930.

Cove Creek and Tygart

The Corps had made its complete investigation of Cove Creek in 1927, 

and the consulting geologist had recommended a site in September 1927. The 

Corps made a design and cost estimate that year, which subsequently appeared in 

the 308 report.20 That report stimulated congressional interest to which General 

Lytle Brown responded in 1930. He gave detailed dimensions of the dam, which 

are remarkably similar to those eventually built by the TVA.21 No further work 

SURFHHGHGRQ&RYH&UHHNXQWLODIWHUWKHLQDXJXUDWLRQRI)UDQNOLQ'5RRVHYHOWLQ

early 1933.

)LJXUH%XLOWXQGHUFRQWUDFWWKURXJKWKH3XEOLF:RUNV$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ3:$7\JDUW'DP

was completed in 1937. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, 

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
362

On May 18, 1933, the Congress approved the Tennessee Valley 

$XWKRULW\$FWDQGRQ-XQH3UHVLGHQW)UDQNOLQ'5RRVHYHOWE\H[HFXWLYH

order, placed the proposed Cove Creek Dam under the authority of Arthur E. 

Morgan, Chairman of the three-man Board of Directors of the TVA. In July, the 

board approved construction of the dam, renamed it Norris Dam, and asked the 

%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQWRPDNHWKH¿QDOSODQV,QLWVVXPPDU\UHSRUWRI

1934–35, the board refers to these events, but does not mention the name Cove 

Creek nor the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which had already made a detailed 

design. This obvious rebuff, probably led by Morgan who had developed a deep 

dislike of the Corps, led to some design changes but not to a change in its basic 

dam type; a massive straight-crested concrete gravity structure.22 It was this type 

that the Corps used for its design of the West Virginia dam on the Tygart River.

As Tygart Dam got underway in early 1934, Pittsburgh District 

Engineer, Major Wilhelm D. Styer (1893-1975), felt the need for as much help 

as possible in designing this pioneering project, and, he, therefore, turned to 

the Corps’ own precedent, Cove Creek. On January 10, 1934, he wrote to 

the Division Engineer in St. Louis requesting drawings of Cove Creek. The 

St. Louis Division Engineer responded on January 25, sending “one complete set 

of photostats of the Cove Creek Dam drawings as they were when the data were 

turned over to the Tennessee Valley Authority.” He also sent Styer a bibliography of high dams and told him of the existence of complete drawings for Hoover 

'DPLQWKHRI¿FHRIWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUV23

 (DUO\LQ)HEUXDU\6W\HUWUDYHOHGWRWKHVLWHRIWKH&RYH&UHHN'DPQRZ

UHQDPHG1RUULV'DPWRWDONWRWKH¿HOGHQJLQHHUWKHUHDQGJDLQPRUHLQIRUPDtion on that project, which had begun construction in October of 1933. Styer 

knew the similarity between the Cove Creek design and that being prepared in 

Pittsburgh for Tygart.24

The original Cove Creek design had a spillway separated from the river section of the dam, whereas the redesigned and renamed Norris Dam had the 

spillway within the river section, a solution which Styer adopted for Tygart. In 

addition, Norris had three drum-type gates, each fourteen feet high and one hundred feet long, placed above the spillway crest to allow for a greater reservoir 

storage.25 Crest gates would also be taken over by Styer for Tygart, although in 

later discussions with the designers and the consultants they would be eliminated. Clearly, the Cove Creek Project was in the minds of the Pittsburgh District 

engineers as they prepared to design a high dam for the Monongahela Valley.
363

TYGART DAM

The Planning and Design of Tygart: 1933-1934

Tygart Dam was a new venture for the Corps at the same time that it was 

HPEDUNLQJRQWKRVHRWKHUSLRQHHULQJGDPVDW%RQQHYLOOHDQG)RUW3HFN%XWXQOLNHWKRVHZHVWHUQGDPV7\JDUWZRXOGEHFRQFHLYHGRIDVDQDYLJDWLRQDQGÀRRG

control project without power. Moreover, for the Corps it was to be the largest 

dam east of the Mississippi. Unlike Wilson Dam, on the Tennessee River, Tygart 

would be designed entirely by permanent Corps personnel (except for minor architectural treatment by Paul Cret), and it would be set in motion quickly once 

WKHQHZDGPLQLVWUDWLRQWRRNRI¿FHLQHDUO\

In earlier studies, the Tygart reservoir was to impound only 

DFUHIHHWUDWKHUWKDQWKHDFUHIHHWLQWKH¿QDOGHVLJQ7KLV

more modest earlier design would have required a dam of little over 120 feet in 

height. However, in 1933, activity began to proceed with the larger project having a spillway height of 209 feet.267KH3LWWVEXUJK'LVWULFW2I¿FHRIWKH86

Army Corps of Engineers, under Major Styer, began design and, by October, was 

able to send estimates of costs to the newly appointed Chief of Engineers, Major 

General Edward M. Markham (1877-1950). Styer noted that some of his estiPDWHVZHUHURXJKEHFDXVHRI3WKHDEVHQFHRIVXI¿FLHQWWLPHWRPDNHPRUHDFFXrate determination.” His October estimate was $11,853,238, of which about 

$2.4 million was to relocate a rail line.27 Three weeks later, he sent a more detailed summary to the Chief of Engineers that included an estimate of men employed, totaling 2,200 during the twenty-nine months that the dam construction 

would take place. It is clear from the correspondence that the Chief of Engineers 

was under pressure from the new administration to begin construction quickly.28

 6W\HU¶V¿JXUHVVDWLV¿HG&RQJUHVVZKLFKPDGHPLOOLRQDYDLODEOHWR

begin work. Then, on January 11, 1934, the Public Works Administration authorized the project with the entire cost to be paid for by the federal government.29

There followed a brief dispute in which some local people argued for 

dams across tributaries other than the Tygart River, all based on mine-runoff pollution and on superior aesthetics. The Corps rejected the arguments for changing the dam site, but it did take seriously the concern over pollution and the aesthetics of the dam design.30 Technical issues of dam design, however, were more 

SUHVVLQJLIZRUNHUVZHUHWREHSXWLQWRWKH¿HOGVRRQVRWKH&RUSVTXLFNO\WXUQHG

to the foundations and the spillway. The Pittsburgh District hired Warren Mead, 

DFRQVXOWLQJJHRORJLVW0HDGZDVDOUHDG\ZRUNLQJZLWKWKH&RUSVDW)RUW3HFN

The district also negotiated a contract with the Carnegie Institute of Technology 
364

WRPRGHOWKHVSLOOZD\DQGGHYHORSH[SHULPHQWVWR¿QGDJRRGZD\RIGLVVLSDWLQJ

the energy of water discharged from the dam.31

Styer was anxious to get all the information he could for this new venture, so, in early April, he wrote to John Savage, Chief Design Engineer for the 

Bureau of Reclamation, requesting data on one of the most recent Reclamation 

studies for the Madden Dam spillway. This was a strange incident because the 

Madden Dam was then under construction for the Panama Canal, and with the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in charge. The tests carried out for Reclamation 

by the Colorado Agricultural College (now Colorado State University) at 

)RUW&ROOLQV&RORUDGRZHUHFRPSOHWHGLQODWHDQGUHSRUWHGRQLQWKH

Engineering News-Record in mid 1932. Yet, it was another consultant hired by 

WKH3LWWVEXUJK'LVWULFW/)+DU]DZKRFDOOHG6W\HU¶VDWWHQWLRQWRWKH0DGGHQ

Dam tests. Clearly, all the new dam studies pressing forward at this time made 

GLI¿FXOWDGHWDLOHGLQYHVWLJDWLRQRIWKHOLWHUDWXUH6DYDJHUHVSRQGHGTXLFNO\VHQW

Styer the test report along with a 1933 technical memorandum on spillway design. Charles Wellons, the chief designer of Tygart Dam, thanked Savage warmly for the reports, which he found “very valuable to us in preparing for our tests. . 

..”32

Two additional planning issues were power and aesthetics. In early July, 

Morris L. Cooke, a noted reformer and engineer, wrote to Harold Ickes urging 

him to give instructions for the Army engineers to include provisions for future 

power development in Tygart Dam. Roosevelt had appointed Cooke as chairman of a Mississippi Valley committee of the Public Works Administration to advise on federal aid to public works, and it was in this position that he wrote the 

Secretary of the Interior.331RWKLQJVLJQL¿FDQWFDPHRIWKDWUHTXHVWDOWKRXJKWKH

issue would be raised again. But the aesthetic issue did receive considerable attention.

The district had hired Paul Philippe Cret (1876-1945) to study the viVXDODVSHFWVRIWKHGDPFRPSOH[&UHWWUDLQHGLQKLVQDWLYH)UDQFHKDGLPPLgrated in 1903 and was well known as a classical architect and as a teacher at 

the University of Pennsylvania. He had a reputation for working on engineering projects, including such major works as the 1926 Delaware River Bridge 

QRZFDOOHGWKH%HQ)UDQNOLQ%ULGJHDQGLQPLGKHEHJDQDFRUUHVSRQdence with Major Styer on the Tygart design. As Cret expressed it, “Very bold 

DQGVLPSOHIRUPVDUHWKHPRVWHIIHFWLYHIRUFRQFUHWHFRQVWUXFWLRQ ́7KH¿QDOGHVLJQFOHDUO\UHÀHFWV&UHW¶VZRUNRQO\LQWKHDUFDGHGURDGZD\RQHLWKHUVLGHRIWKH

VSLOOZD\DQGLQWKHHQGSLHUVWKDWÀDQNWKHVSLOOZD\FUHVW+RZHYHUDVGHWDLOHG

in the correspondence of August and September of 1934, many small items received serious attention from Major Styer, Cret and his partners, and Styer’s 
365

engineers.34 Styer urged Cret to move quickly because the district was in a great 

hurry to ready the plans for bid advertisement.

 7RUHYLHZWKH¿QDOSODQVWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUVGLUHFWHGWKHGLVWULFWWR

DSSRLQWDERDUGRIFRQVXOWDQWVDVKDGEHHQGRQHDW)RUW3HFNDQG%RQQHYLOOH

Styer named Louis C. Hill (formerly a supervising engineer for the Reclamation 

6HUYLFHRQ5RRVHYHOW'DP/)+DU]DDQG-DPHV%*URZGHQDORQJZLWK

William McAlpine, William Gerig, and himself from the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers. Meetings in August settled many minor issues plus the major one of 

removing the crest gates planned above the spillway. Omitting these gates greatO\VLPSOL¿HGVSLOOZD\FRQVWUXFWLRQEXWGLGUHPRYHWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIVWRULQJPRUH

ZDWHULQWKHUHVHUYRLU)LQDOO\RQ6HSWHPEHUWKHERDUGPHWUHFRPPHQGHGD

series of minor changes, and cleared the way for issuing the bid plans two weeks 

later.35

The contractors had a month to make up their bids, and, on October 23, 

WKHGLVWULFWUHFHLYHG¿YHELGV7KHORZHVWELGZDVVXEPLWWHGE\WKH)UHGHULFN

Snare Corporation of New York at just over $6.3 million, or $832,000 below 

the Corps’ estimate. After several meetings to discuss changes issued in early October, the government awarded the contract to Snare on October 28.36 

$OWKRXJKDFRQWUDFWRUZDVQRZHQJDJHGWKHGHVLJQZDVIDUIURP¿QDO%HFDXVH

RIWKHSROLWLFDOSUHVVXUHWRSXWZRUNHUVLQWKH¿HOGDQGEHFDXVHPRQH\ZDVQRZ

available, the careful studies of major design issues could not be completed beIRUHFRQVWUXFWLRQ)RUH[DPSOHWKHVSLOOZD\WHVWVDWWKH&DUQHJLH,QVWLWXWHRI

Technology had yet to begin, the foundation analysis was still being discussed in 

1RYHPEHUDQGDÀRRGIUHTXHQF\DQDO\VLVDSSHDUHGRQO\RQ$XJXVWZKHQLW

was too late to make major design changes in the bid documents.37

In November, Styer sent one of his engineers to Cleveland to observe 

some hydraulic tests, and, on November 15, his consultant, Louis Hill, wrote him 

about the spillway test results for the Bonneville Dam, on which he was also a 

consultant. Styer knew nothing about this and immediately wrote to the Portland 

District engineer for information, which arrived on December 11. Apparently, 

the Portland District Engineer offered to do tests for Tygart, but Styer wrote that 

WKH&DUQHJLHIDFLOLWLHVZHUHVXI¿FLHQW7KH&RUSVZDVVWLOOGHFHQWUDOL]HGZLWKQR

formal interconnections for those pioneering design studies. By December 14, 

Styer could report to the division engineer that some hydraulic results were already available. At the very end of the year, Snare began to work at the site, but 

the discussions about design would continue for many more months.38
366

Design During Construction at Tygart: 1935–1936

Two issues dominated the design discussions during 1935: foundation 

safety and dam shape. The former is often somewhat unsettled until construction begins, but the latter, depending less upon local conditions, can often be well 

determined before. However, these huge dams, arising all at once in the 1930s, 

FRQIURQWHGWKHGHVLJQHUVZLWKGLI¿FXOWTXHVWLRQV

At a major meeting of consultants and Corps personnel on March 28 

and 29, 1935, apparently there was discussion of the dam form, including earth-

¿OOHPEDQNPHQWÀDWVODEZLWKEXWWUHVVHV$PEXUVHQDQGPDVVLYHKHDGEXWWUHVV

(Noetzli). Presumably, this part of the discussion was rather perfunctory because 

QRPHQWLRQRILWDSSHDUVLQWKHRI¿FLDOPHHWLQJUHSRUW7KHJURXSDJUHHGRQWKH

massive gravity concrete form. The main agenda item, however, was the foundation.39

The foundation conditions at the dam site consisted of layers of sandstone and shale, but it was impossible to chart those conditions with any precision before excavation revealed the depths and locations of the layers. Several 

meetings of consultants in March of 1935 at the site resulted in disagreements. 

)LQDOO\DPHHWLQJRQ0DUFKDQGFRQVLGHUHGFRQGLWLRQV3VDWLVIDFWRU\IRU

the construction of a dam of the size and general type contemplated.”40

This conclusion, however, did not go unchallenged. Two of the seven 

board members present at that meeting (McAlpine and Harza) disagreed with the 

UHSRUW:LOOLDP0F$OSLQHKHDGHQJLQHHULQWKHRI¿FHRIWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUV

wrote a strong letter in early April stating “I do not think that the foundation conGLWLRQVRIDUGLVFORVHGE\H[FDYDWLRQVKRXOGEHFODVVL¿HGDVμVDWLVIDFWRU\¶>EHcause the further] excavation may disclose the presence of other plastic [hence 

dangerous] strata.” McAlpine was emphasizing the uncertain nature of local materials that can be determined only by intensive explorations that clear away rock 

and soil and drill holes (borings) to withdraw samples from deeper layers.

 6HYHUDOGD\VODWHU/)+DU]DZURWHDPLOGHUEXWVWLOOFULWLFDOUHVSRQVH

to the report. He echoed the same theme: not enough was yet known to ensure a 

satisfactory foundation. He objected to the implication “that information is comSOHWHDQGFRQ¿UPDWLYH ́41 These objections did not stop work but did cause the 

engineers to make more borings and to continue discussions of proper foundation 

design for the massive concrete structure.

Work went forward with more borings and continuing excavation all in 

preparation for casting concrete, which began in late May. By then, the Corps 
367

had a complete dam design, even though many details were not fully developed. 

7KLVGHVLJQFRQVLVWHGRID¿QDOIRUPDVZHOODVDPHWKRGIRUEXLOGLQJLW

The form consisted of a roughly triangular solid concrete section across 

the valley with a crest length of 1,850 feet and a maximum height on either side 

of the spillway of 232 feet above the foundation rock. The base width there 

is 195 feet, whereas it is 207 feet for the 490 foot long spillway section whose 

height is 209 feet or twenty-three feet lower than the concrete dam on either side. 

The Corps designed this spillway to discharge 200,000 cubic feet per second 

ZLWKWKHUHVHUYRLU¿OOHGWRWKHKHLJKWRIWKHVLGHZDOOVDQGKHQFHWZHQW\WKUHH

feet above the spillway crest. At this water height the eight steel-lined outlet culverts (located 167 feet below the spillway crest) could discharge another 45,000 

cubic feet per second.42

 %HFDXVHWKHPD[LPXPUHFRUGHGVWUHDPÀRZRIFXELFIHHWSHU

second had occurred in 1912, the Corps spillway design was clearly conservaWLYH)RUÀRRGFRQWUROWKHUHVHUYRLUZRXOGEHNHSWDVORZDVSRVVLEOHFRQVLVWHQW

ZLWKHQRXJKÀRZIRUQDYLJDWLRQEHWZHHQPLG'HFHPEHUDQGWKHHQGRI0DUFK

Thereafter, the reservoir could store more water to keep navigation viable from 

$SULOWRWKHHQGRI1RYHPEHU5HODWLYHO\ODUJHUHOHDVHVGXULQJWKH¿UVWKDOIRI

December then prepare the reservoir for the next yearly cycle.43

 $OOWKHVHK\GUDXOLFDVSHFWVLQÀXHQFHGWKHVSLOOZD\DQGRXWOHWZRUNVDQG

were vigorously studied by the Corps during 1935. Although concreting had 

begun in late May, the precise concrete form of the dam still occupied the consultants and the Corps. In early June, Styer issued a change order to the Snare 

Company ordering them to build a greatly revised structural system at the downstream base of the spillway because “further model tests have shown that [the 

originally designed system] will not adequately dissipate the energy of the disFKDUJHÀRZV ́7KHQHZV\VWHPFRQVLVWHGSULPDULO\RIEDIÀHVWRGHÀHFWWKH

ÀRZDORZDX[LOLDU\GDPWKLUW\WKUHHIHHWKLJKIHHWORQJDQGIHHW

downstream from the spillway toe; and two sixty-seven-foot-high walls parallel 

WRWKHÀRZH[WHQGLQJIURPWKHVSLOOZD\WRHLWKHUHQGRIWKHORZGDP7KLVVWUXFture created a basin of water thirty-three feet deep to act as a cushion absorbing 

the energy of the turbulent water from the outlet works and the spillway overÀRZ7KLVHQHUJ\KDGFDXVHGFDYLWDWLRQRIHDUOLHUFRQFUHWHGDPVE\SXOOLQJRXW

material due to the suction (or reduced pressure) arising from local increases in 

velocity of the water.44

This major change, coming so late, caused an increase in cost and illustrated the effect of proceeding with construction before the design could be 

completed. Meanwhile, the foundation design for the dam itself was still being argued when a slide occurred as the contractor was excavating on the left 
368

EDQN)XUWKHUPRUHH[FDYDWLRQVRQWKHULJKWEDQNOHGWKHHQJLQHHUVWRFKDQJHWKH

design of the main dam sections there and to do further explorations to ensure 

against the danger of sliding and of seepage beneath the dam.45

As concrete casting continued in the late summer of 1935, word came 

from the Panama Canal of troubles at the Madden Dam where the outlet 

conduits had developed severe cavitation. Since the conduits at Tygart had followed the design at Madden, the district engineer arranged to have Carnegie 

Tech build and test a model of the entrance conduits designed for Tygart. The 

Corps decided to use model tests of Madden to be able to compare small-scale 

experiments with observed full-scale cavitation and also to use small-scale tests 

for Tygart to decide on any design changes. The results for Madden generally 

FRQ¿UPHGWKHYDOLGLW\RIPRGHOVWXGLHVDQGWKH7\JDUWWHVWVLQGLFDWHGDOHVVHU

problem of cavitation. However, unlike at Madden, the Corps had designed the 

Tygart outlets to have steel liners. Thus, the Carnegie tests did not signal the 

QHHGIRUPRGL¿FDWLRQVDOWKRXJKWKHVHOLQHGFRQGXLWVZRXOGQRZEHVXEMHFWHGWR

close and frequent inspection once in service. All these hydraulic studies were 

pioneering, and their results were in demand by other dam designers during the 

late 1930s.46

Meanwhile, the foundation design remained an issue as concreting went 

forward in the summer of 1935. In early August, one consultant warned of dam 

failure resulting from foundation stresses caused by the concrete pushing down 

on the sandstone and shale. He argued for a change in shape of the dam to reduce this effect. This opened other issues, such as sliding and uplift caused by 

VHHSDJHXQGHUWKHFRQFUHWHVWUXFWXUH)RUVOLGLQJWKHGHVLJQZDVWRHPEHGWKH

concrete into the natural foundation so that “it would be necessary to shear so 

large an area that it would be impossible to apply [water induced] force enough. . 

.” as the consultant Louis Hill put it. But to reduce seepage, the consultants had 

LQVLVWHGWKDWDVHULHVRIKROHVGULOOHGLQWRWKHIRXQGDWLRQDQG¿OOHGZLWKJURXWXQGHUSUHVVXUHEHSODFHGQHDUWKHKHHORIWKHGDPWRSURYLGHDFXUWDLQE\¿OOLQJ

any spaces within the stone and shale layers.47

 $ÀXUU\RIIXUWKHUERDUGPHHWLQJVRFFXUUHGLQWKHHDUO\IDOOLQZKLFKWKH

consultants worried openly about the foundation, commented on new boring reVXOWVDQGRUGHUHGPLQRUFKDQJHVLQWKHGDPVKDSH2IJUHDWVLJQL¿FDQFHWRWKH

board was the method of casting the lowest layers of concrete into spaces excavated from rock so that a strong surface would exist to prevent both seepage and 

sliding. The board was thus continually giving new instructions to the contractor 

in the middle of his project. Of course, the contractor “was greatly concerned

. . . [and felt that] the job was being seriously delayed by the nature and progress 

of the foundation preparation.”48
369

The mixing of design and construction was getting out of hand because of the board continually raising new design issues, the contractor complaining about construction delays, and the Corps worrying about cost overruns. 

Particularly disturbing was the continued dispute over the dam shape and hence 

how to form monoliths that were already being concreted. So, on October 28, 

1935, Division Engineer Colonel R. G. Powell stepped in, called a meeting of 

Corps people, but did not include the consultants or the contractor. The group 

reviewed four different designs for the concrete dam recommended at different 

WLPHVE\WKHERDUGDQGDJUHHGRQWKHRULJLQDOSODQZLWKRQO\PLQRUPRGL¿FDtions. In Powell’s letter to the Chief of Engineers, he argued that the other plans, 

while improving safety, would add substantially to the cost and that the original plan was already safe enough. The central technical issue was whether compression stresses at the heel of the dam, when the reservoir is empty, might break 

the grout wall which prevents leakage. (See Sketch dated October 28, 1935). 

Powell rejected that argument and ordered the contractor to proceed as planned, 

thereby going against the board. Actually, only one member, James Growden, 

seriously objected to Powell’s decision, although the others shared some of 

Growden’s reservations. Both Hill and Harza agreed with Powell.49

In mid-December, the district sent the consultants a detailed memorandum outlining all their previous major design changes and the subsequent instructions given to Snare. The Corps wanted the consultants to recognize the 

confusion raised by mixing design and construction. At its next meeting, three 

days later, the board seemed much more willing to accept the Corps’ direction, 

although the lone dissenter, Growden, still objected frequently. The cracking 

noted in one monolith during the high pressure grouting of the foundations raised 

a new concern. Undisturbed, the board observed that this cracking was “found in 

every dam similar to Tygart. . .and that there was apparently nothing that could 

be done about them.”50

Still, worry over cracking persisted through the next year and led to reducing both the pressure used for grouting and the cement content of the concrete. Reduction lessened the heat built up in massive concrete shapes and, 

hence, reduced the danger of thermal cracking. But the locus of design authority had shifted from the consultants to Corps personnel who, of course, had made 

WKHGHVLJQLQWKH¿UVWSODFH,Q0D\WKHGLYLVLRQHQJLQHHURUGHUHGWKHJURXWing pressure reduced and the board agreed to that order in a mid-July meeting in 

spite of the dissent of Growden, who a month later wrote that the new grouting 

procedure is “inadequate and grouting done in accordance therewith will not be 

VDWLVIDFWRU\ ́7KH&RUSVZHQWDKHDGZLWKLWVSURFHGXUHQHYHUWKHOHVVUHDI¿UPLQJ

it in meetings that fall.51
370

Two last design issues raised by Louis C. Hill concerned uplift and sliding. He worried about the sliding in regions where the rock solidity was uncertain and had raised this issue as early as September of 1935 and again in his 

)HEUXDU\OHWWHU$&RUSVRI¿FHU(GZDUG'DO\UHVSRQGHGZLWKDFOHDU

calculation explaining how the backing of rock at the toe of the dam would be 

made at least 15 percent of the dam height (d = 0.15H) so that the resulting stress 

against that backing would be low even if sliding friction between dam base and 

URFNZHUHQHJOHFWHG'DO\¶VUHVSRQVHVDWLV¿HG+LOOEXWKHDOVRZRUULHGDERXWWKH

LQÀXHQFHRIVHHSDJHEHQHDWKWKHGDPZKLFKFRXOGH[HUWDQXSZDUGSUHVVXUHDQG

thus, reduce the safety.52

This uplift force, by reducing the effect of dam weight, thereby would 

reduce the friction force between dam and foundation and increase the danger of 

VOLGLQJ7KH6W)UDQFLV'DPIDLOXUHRIDWWULEXWHGLQSDUWWRXSOLIWIRFXVHG

engineers’ attention on the problem, which led to two major lengthy papers in the 

ASCE TransactionsMXVWDWWKHWLPH7\JDUWZDVEHJLQQLQJ7KH¿UVWRQH

of 20 pages, stimulated a discussion of 62 pages, while the second one, by 

/)+DU]DZDVSDJHVZLWKSDJHVRIGLVFXVVLRQ,WZDVLQWKLVFRQWH[WWKDW

Hill raised the issue of seepage and uplift and urged the Corps to install gauges to 

measure uplift under the dam.53

By August 31, 1936, the contractor had cast over 700,000 cubic yards 

RXWRID¿QDOWRWDORIFXELF\DUGVRIFRQFUHWHVRWKDWWKHUHFRXOGEH

little changing of the design that summer. This was an immense work for West 

Virginia, and by that date, 326,208 people had visited the site since concretLQJKDGEHJXQLQODWH0D\7KHQRQ0DUFKDPDVVLYHÀRRG

occurred on the Ohio that Tygart, only 42 percent completed, could not mitiJDWH7KHJUHDWSURSHUW\GDPDJHFDXVHGE\WKHSUHYLRXVO\QRWHGÀRRGVKRRNWKH

Congress, which quickly authorized the nine-reservoir system in the AlleghenyMonongahela basin to protect Pittsburgh and below.54

Tygart Completion and Operation: 1937–39

The Corps’ design changes ceased in 1936 and construction continued 

WKURXJKVRWKDWLQ)HEUXDU\RIWKHGDPZDVRI¿FLDOO\FRPSOHWHG,Q

July 1937, the Secretary of War sent Senator Rush Holt of West Virginia an esWLPDWHGEXGJHWPLOOLRQIRUWKHHQWLUHSURMHFWDOPRVWLGHQWLFDOWRWKH¿QDO

¿JXUHRIPLOOLRQVHQWWRWKH+RXVH5LYHUVDQG+DUERUV&RPPLWWHHRQ0D\

23, 1940. The 1933 estimate had been $11,853,238. The increase resulted from 

the design changes that raised dam costs from $8,208,000 to $12,432,000 and 

a much more expensive railroad relocation that drove costs from $2,860,000 to 

$4,617,000. The other big change was in the cost of land, estimated in 1933 to 

EHEXW¿QDOO\DPRXQWLQJWR55
371

 'XULQJWKH¿UVWWZR\HDUVRIRSHUDWLRQWKHUHZHUHWZRPDMRUÀRRGVRQH

LQ)HEUXDU\DQGRQHLQ$SULODQGWKHÀRRGGDPDJHUHGXFWLRQDWWULEuted to Tygart Dam totaled $2,818,000. In addition, the Tygart reservoir supplied 

H[WUDÀRZLQWRWKH0RQRQJDKHODGXULQJWKHVXPPHUGURXJKWRIWKHUHE\

preventing a reduction and possible cessation of commercial navigation on the 

river. A complete halt would have cost the larger companies about $1,230,000 

per month for the two month drought.56

 7KH&RUSVTXLFNO\LGHQWL¿HGDQRWKHUEHQH¿WEHFDXVHRIWKHUHVHUYRLU¶V

DELOLW\DWORZZDWHUWRUHOHDVHVWRUHGZDWHUDQGÀXVKRXWSROOXWLRQIURPVDQLWDU\DQGLQGXVWULDOZDVWHV7KH&RUSVHYDOXDWHGWKLVEHQH¿WIRUWR

be $281,000, so that the total two-year savings to the public was $3,379,000. 

Corps employees Robert M. Morris and Thomas L. Reilly worked out this benH¿WDQDO\VLVDQGSXEOLVKHGLWLQWKH$6&(Transactions of 1942.57 The prominence of this detailed article shows the pioneering work of the Corps in developing a program for multiuse dams without power. Part of the motive of this article 

was to argue for the newly approved (1936) nine-dam system of reservoirs in the 

Allegheny-Monongahela basin to function with Tygart in protecting both rivers 

and Pittsburgh.

The only system of dams in operation in 1936 were those in the Miami 

Conservancy District, but they were single purpose reservoirs devoted to 

ÀRRGSUHYHQWLRQ6LPLODUO\LQORFDOSHRSOHLQHDVWHUQ2KLRIRUPHGWKH

Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District, modeled after Miami. But being 

unable to raise the needed funds in the midst of the Great Depression, they entered into a partnership with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Again, this sysWHPZDVVLQJOHSXUSRVHDLPHGDWÀRRGFRQWURO$OOGDPVZHUHFRPSOHWHG

successfully by 1938, and, in 1939, the Corps took over operation of the entire 

system.58

Flood control and Pittsburgh

 )ROORZLQJ:RUOG:DU,,ZKHQWKH&RUSVWXUQHGEDFNWRFLYLOLDQSURMHFWVPRUHLQWHQVHO\WKHÀRRGFRQWUROLVVXHVRQFHDJDLQEURXJKWSROLWLFVDQGHQgineering together, especially after the October 1954 Hurricane Hazel disasWHU7KHQLQHQHZUHVHUYRLUVSOXV7\JDUWKHOGWKH3LWWVEXUJKÀRRGGRZQE\

about nine feet, but the water still caused great damage. Local leaders began 

WRFDPSDLJQKDUGIRUFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDQRWKHUPDMRUÀRRGFRQWUROGDPWKLVRQH

on the Allegheny nine miles upstream from Warren, Pennsylvania. This new 

dam was about 140 miles north of Pittsburgh, where the Kinzua Creek joins the 

Allegheny.59'HVSLWHVLJQL¿FDQWRSSRVLWLRQSDUWO\EHFDXVHWKHSURMHFWLQYROYHG

the taking of land from the Seneca Indians, the Kinzua Dam was completed in 

1966.
372

In 1972, Hurricane Agnes wreaked havoc in Western Pennsylvania, but 

the Kinzua Dam, which cost $108 million, saved the people downstream an 

estimated $247 million in damages.60$OWKRXJKVXFKGDPDJHFRVWVDUHGLI¿FXOW

to evaluate with any accuracy, it seems clear that the Kinzua Dam has served its 

ÀRRGFRQWUROSXUSRVHZHOOLQVSLWHRIWKHFRQWURYHUV\%XWRQWKH2KLRQDYLJDtion has always been a major factor for the Corps.

SLACKWATER NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Modernization of the Ohio

By 1929, the Corps had completed a nine-foot channel on the Ohio 

River from Cairo to Pittsburgh by means of 53 locks and dams the earliest of 

which had opened in 1904. These dams were navigable in the sense that during 

KLJKZDWHUWKHGDPZLFNHWVFRXOGEHORZHUHGWRSDVVWKHÀRRGDQGWRDOORZERDWV

to go over them. These movable dams, many of which were Chanoine wicket 

structures, were costly and unreliable to operate.61

)LJXUH6HHSDJHLQWRWKHHDUWK¿OOVHFWLRQRI.LQ]XD'DPZDVSUHYHQWHGE\FRQVWUXFWLQJD

trench three feet wide, 1100 feet long, and up to 160 feet deep on the upstream side. This was 

WKHQ¿OOHGZLWKEHQWRQLWHVOXUU\WRVWDELOL]HWKHVLGHZDOOVDQGWKHQ¿OOHGZLWKFRQFUHWHSODFHG

through pipes from the bottom up displacing the bentonite slurry. Source: Pittsburg District, 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
373

 'XULQJWKHGHSUHVVLRQ\HDUVWKH&RUSVVWLPXODWHGJUHDWO\E\ÀRRGVLQ

DQGFHQWHUHGLWVDWWHQWLRQRQÀRRGFRQWURODV¿UVWGHWDLOHGLQWKH

308 reports. Not until after the war did the issue of navigation resurface politiFDOO\ZLWKWKHJUHDWO\LQFUHDVHGULYHUWUDI¿F)URPWRWKHWUDI¿FLQcreased tenfold (from 1,474 million ton-miles to 14,901 million ton-miles) and 

the wicket gates were obsolete.62 The Corps needed a new plan, and it began in 

the 1930s to replace the low movable dams with higher dams with crest gates.

By 1979, this modernization plan had been nearly completed so that 

WZHQW\¿[HGGDPVQRZUHSODFHGWKHROGHUDQGORZHURQHV7KHODVWVXFKGDP

QHDU&DLURLVGXHWRRSHQLQ%HWZHHQDQGWKHWUDI¿FKDGPRUH

than doubled (up to 37,476 million ton-miles).63 Those newer dams are primarily 

for navigation, but on the upper Mississippi, where navigation intensity is roughO\KDOIWKDWRQWKH2KLRIDFWRUVVXFKDVÀRRGLQJDQGZLOGOLIHSURWHFWLRQKDYH

gained prominence.

The Upper Mississippi Basin

In 1929, the Congress authorized the nine-foot channel for the upper 

Mississippi where previously the Corps had operated under the assumption of 

open water navigation. Plans went ahead for dams in spite of the deepening depression, but the entire project nearly lost out in the newly elected Roosevelt adPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V¿UVWGD\V64

)LJXUH7KH.LQ]XD'DPRQWKH$OOHJKHQ\5LYHUGXULQJFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHSRZHUKRXVH

in 1968. This is a private power project for pumped storage. Source: Ohio River Division, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers.
374

Saved by intensive lobbying headed by the governor of Minnesota, the 

project went ahead, not so much for river improvement, as for large-scale employment. By 1940, twenty-seven dams crossed the river from Minneapolis to 

Granite City, Illinois, just north of St. Louis.65 Taken as a whole, these dams, 

like the ones across the Ohio, represented a major project for the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers.

The Design of Dam Gates

Having so many dams roughly the same size, the Corps took the opportunity to evolve some new designs especially for the dam gates. Beginning with 

UROOHUJDWHVPRYLQJWRDFRPELQDWLRQRIUROOHUDQGWDLQWHUJDWHGDPVDQG¿QDOO\

developing an elliptical tainter gate system.

Roller gates, invented in Germany early in the twentieth century and 

widely used in Europe, had been only sparingly used in the United States prior 

to 1930 (Reclamation’s Grand Valley Diversion Dam near Palisade, Colorado, 

completed in 1916, used roller gates) when the Corps decided to adopt them for 

/RFNDQG'DP1RQHDU5RFN,VODQGLQLWV¿UVWSURMHFWIRUWKHQLQHIRRWFKDQnel.66 When completed in 1934, Dam No. 15 was the largest roller gate project 

in the world. There are eleven roller gates each 99.3 feet long between concrete 

piers. Nine of the gates are 19 feet 4 inches in diameter and provide wide openLQJVZKHQWKHULYHULVLQÀRRGEXWRWKHUZLVHLQORZZDWHUSHULRGVWKH\DUHFORVHG

to allow for a navigable pool upstream.67

At the same time that the Corps was building Dam No. 15, it was also 

constructing roller gate dams in the Ohio Valley, especially on the Kanawha 

River which joins the Ohio north of Huntington, West Virginia, and the 

Gallipolis Locks and Dam (now known as The Robert C. Byrd Locks and Dam) 

13.5 miles downstream from the mouth of the Kanawha.68 The Corps chose roller gates over wicket ones because of reliability and durability, even though they 

ZHUHPRUHH[SHQVLYHWREXLOG)XUWKHUPRUHLQWKH&RUSVFRQVLGHUHGUROOHU

gates superior to tainter gates because they could be built to span over twice the 

distance of the latter.69

The roller gates set between two concrete piers are long cylinders which 

are hoisted by chains in one pier that pull the rotating gate up over racks like a 

JLDQWELF\FOHFKDLQ,QWKHUDLVHGSRVLWLRQWKHKLJKZDWHUÀRZVEHQHDWKLWEXW

when lowered onto the concrete sill it retains the river. In November of 1933, 

the Corps began construction of Dam No. 4 where the roller gates were submersLEOHWKXVDOORZLQJLFHWRSDVVHDVLO\RYHUWKHWRS0DQ\RWKHUPRGL¿FDWLRQVHQsued so that by the late 1930s innovations by the Corps in partnership with contractors had led to “a decidedly American style submersible roller gate.”70
375

While roller gates evolved, the Corps also developed the structure of 

tainter gates to such an extent that by the end of the nine-foot channel project in 

1940 the roller gates had become obsolete. The Corps used both types of gates 

on many dams in the upper Mississippi in the 1930s. However, in Dam No. 24, 

completed in 1939, the Corps designed tainter gates eighty feet long and of suf-

¿FLHQWVWUHQJWKDQGHFRQRP\WRUHQGHUUROOHUJDWHVXQQHFHVVDU\7KHVHWDLQWHU

gates were the largest built up until that time.71

Tainter gates originated in the United States. Many types of such gates 

had been used throughout the nineteenth century, and in 1886 Jeremiah Burnham 

Tainter patented a design he had purchased from Theodore Parker. The Corps 

¿UVWXVHGWKHVHWDLQWHUJDWHVLQWKH\ZHUHHDV\WREXLOGDQGWRRSHUDWHEXW

they seemed to be too small and too unreliable for the large openings needed for 

major rivers such as the Mississippi. However, during the 9-foot channel project 

on the upper Mississippi, the Corps developed new shapes and new supporting 

structures that made much larger tainter gates possible.72

Tainter gates are made of curved steel plates convex on the upstream 

side where their arch-like form effectively resists the upper pool water pressure. 

The plates are stiffened by curved beams and supported by trussed radial arms 

that converge to a pivot on the downstream side. The gates rotate about this 

)LJXUH7KHORFNVRI0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHU'DPLQ1RYHPEHUSource: U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers.
376

pivot to open or close. Tainter gates are lighter, less costly, and easier to maintain than roller gates and, once they proved reliable in the upper Mississippi, they 

became a standard for the Corps. Again during the 1930s, the Corps looked at 

the large number of dams to be designed and to the opportunity to keep changing 

the gates through innovations.73 The basic dam structure did not much change, 

EXWPDQ\VLJQL¿FDQWGHWDLOVGLG7KHXSSHU0LVVLVVLSSLV\VWHPZDVDJLJDQWLF

laboratory for hydraulics, structures, mechanisms, and environmental impact.

Shipping, Fish and Wildlife

Navigation was clearly the central purpose for the dams; from 1939 to 

1976 the tonnage on the river increased by over 28 times.74 Nevertheless, the 

FUHDWLRQRIVODFNZDWHUUDWKHUWKDQDIUHHÀRZLQJULYHUKDGVLJQL¿FDQWHIIHFWVRQ

¿VKZLOGOLIHPXQLFLSDOVHZDJHDQGGUDLQDJHIDFLOLWLHV5HJXODWLQJWKHÀRZDFWXDOO\LPSURYHGVRPHFRQGLWLRQVIRU¿VKDQGZLOGOLIHEXWPDGHWKHGLVSRVDORI

VHZDJHPRUHGLI¿FXOW7KHVHLVVXHVKDYHOHGORFDOSHRSOHWRVHFXUHIHGHUDOIXQGing for coordinated planning by the Upper Mississippi Basin Commission.75 The 

nine-foot channel came into being quickly due not only to the federal policy of 

using public works to put people to work, but also to the commercial importance 

of river navigation.

The dams that created the nine-foot channel, although conceived as a 

navigation project, nevertheless have developed into multipurpose projects that 

include environmental management. As recently as 1993, “conservation and 

)LJXUH0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHU'DPVKRZLQJWKHUROOHUJDWHVLQWKHUDLVHGSRVLWLRQRQ

September 23, 1938. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
377

QDYLJDWLRQLQWHUHVWVDUHVWLOOGH¿QLQJWKHLUYLVLRQVIRUWKHXSSHU0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHU

and they are still compromising. . . . The origins of this compromise lay in the 

forces that created the Mississippi’s landscape at Guttenberg, Iowa.” There the 

Corps worked closely with the Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the 

86)LVKDQG:LOGOLIH6HUYLFHWRSURWHFWWKH¿VKDQGWKHPLJUDWRU\ZDWHUIRZO76 

This cooperation and compromise represents the major challenge to federal dams 

for the new century.

)LJXUH0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHU'DPKDV7DLQWHU*DWHVDWWKHFHQWHUDQGUROOHUJDWHVRQ

each side. November 22, 1938. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Record 

Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

)LJXUH0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHU'DPSource: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Record Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland..
378

Endnotes

1. Leland R. Johnson, The Ohio River Division: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Cincinnati: U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, 1992), 94, 1-3. See also W. A. Johnson, “Report of the District Engineer,” October 31, 

1933, in Ohio River, House Document No. 306, 74th Congress, 1st Session, August 23, 1935, 43.

2. Edmund L. Daly, “The Mastery of the Ohio River,” The Military Engineer 0D\-XQH)RU

WKHÀRRGVHH3DVFKDO16WURQJ37KH*UHDW)ORRGRIWKH2KLR ́The Military Engineer (May-June 1937), 

161.

3. Arnold, Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act, 63. Leland R. Johnson, The Headwaters District

(Pittsburgh: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, C. 1978), 203-7.

4. Arnold, Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act, 88-90. The Act was passed by the Senate on May 21, 

1936, by the House on June 3, and signed by President Roosevelt on June 22.

5. Johnson, Leland R., and Jacques S. Minnotte, The Headwaters District Roundtables: An Eyewitness

History of the Pittsburgh District, United States Army Corps of Engineers: 1936-1988 (Pittsburgh: U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, 1989 [Revised edition of The Headwaters District, c. 1978 which is cited in second previous footnote]), 2.

6. L. R. Johnson, The Ohio River Division, 1-13.

7. W. A. Johnson, “Report of the District Engineer,” 41.

8. W. A. Johnson, 35HSRUWRIWKH'LVWULFW(QJLQHHU ́,WLVFOHDUIURP0DMRU)LVNH¶VUHSRUWVDQGWKRVHRI

Nashville Division engineers in the 1920s that the Corps expected to develop the Tennessee River (see 

Chapter 3).

9. Arnold, Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act)RUWKH+XPSKUH\V(OOHWFRQWURYHUV\VHH-RKQ0

Barry, Rising Tide, the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How it Changed America (New York: Simon and 

6FKXVWHU)RUDGHWDLOHGGLVFXVVLRQRIWKH+XPSKUH\VUHSRUWVHH5HXVV3$QGUHZ$+XPSKUH\V

and the Development of Hydraulic Engineering: Politics and Technology in the Army Corps of Engineers, 

1850-1950,” 1-33.

10. Arnold, Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act, 11.

)LJXUH7KHJDWHVZHUHORZHUHGIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHWRVWDUWFUHDWLQJDQDYLJDWLRQSRRODW

Mississippi River Dam #24, March 13, 1940. Source: Records of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
379

11. Arthur E. Morgan, The Miami Conservancy District (New York: McGraw Hill, 1951). Miami 

Conservancy District, 2I¿FLDO3ODQ0LDPL&RQVHUYDQF\'LVWULFW (Dayton, Ohio: Miami Conservancy District, 

May 1916).

12. A clear and concise description of the Miami Conservancy District appears in Armstrong, Robinson, and 

Hoy, editors, History of Public Works in the United States 1776-1976, 275-7.

13. Arnold, Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act, 11-7.

14. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Tennessee River and Tributaries: North Carolina, Tennessee,

Alabama, and Kentucky, House Document No. 328, 71st Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, March 24, 1930. 

)RUWKHDFWLYLWLHVRI6HQDWRU1RUULVVHH+XEEDUGOrigins of the TVA, 275-6.

15. Tennessee River, House Document No. 328, 7.

16. Tennessee River, House Document No. 328, 29, See also Part 2, plates 74 and 81.

17. C. M. Hackett, “Report on Cove Creek Dam Site and Recommendations for Design of Dam, Power 

House, Barge Lift, and Spillway,” Tennessee River,+RXVH'RFXPHQW1RDQG$SSHQGL[)

18. Leland R. Johnson, Engineers on the Twin Rivers, 184-6. See also Tennessee Valley Authority, Annual

5HSRUWRIWKH7HQQHVVHH9DOOH\$XWKRULW\IRUWKH¿VFDO\HDUHQGHG-XQH, Washington, 1936, 10. See 

also Tennessee River, House Document No. 328, part 2, plate 101.

19. Johnson and Minnotte, Headwaters District Roundtables, 8. See also the earlier volume by L. R. 

Johnson, Headwaters District, 201.

20. Major Lewis H. Watkins to the Chief of Engineers, June 2, 1927, memorandum with appendices A 

(geology) and B (alternate sites). See also Watkins to the Chief of Engineers, September 27, 1927, memorandum with a geologist recommending one site location for the Cove Creek Dam, National Archives, College 

3DUN5*(QWU\)ROGHU

 ,QODWHUUHSRUWVWRSROLWLFDO¿JXUHV0DMRU*HQHUDO/\WOH%URZQJDYHWKHFRVWZKLFKZDVGHYHORSHGLQ

1927, and reported in the 308 report. See Major General Lytle Brown to Representative Lewis W. Douglas, 

)HEUXDU\DQGWR6HQDWRU:LOOLDP(%URFN0D\1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV&ROOHJH3DUN5*

(QWU\)ROGHU6HHDOVR%URZQWR*HRUJH$NHUVRQ6HFUHWDU\WRWKH3UHVLGHQW'HFHPEHU

1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV&ROOHJH3DUN5*(QWU\)ROGHU

22. Arthur E. Morgan, Harcourt A. Morgan, and Tennessee Valley Authority, David E. Lilienthal, Annual

Report of the Tennessee Valley Authority for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1935, Washington, 1936, 4.

23. Major W. D. Styer to the Division Engineer in St. Louis, January 10, 1934; and Lieutenant Colonel E. 

L. Daley to Major Styer, January 25, 1934, with enclosures, National Archives and Records Administration, 

3KLODGHOSKLD5HFRUGVRIWKH86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV5*(QWU\%R[)LOHV1R'RF

 No. 5.

 -RKQ)%DUNVGDOHWR0DMRU6W\HU)HEUXDU\ZLWKHQFORVXUHVRIDVSHHFKE\5RVV:KLWH

Construction Superintendent of TVA, on construction of Norris Dam (delivered on November 1, 1933), 

1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5HFRUG*URXS(QWU\)LOH1R'RF1R

25. Tennessee Valley Authority,7KH8QL¿HG'HYHORSPHQWRIWKH7HQQHVVHH5LYHU6\VWHPKnoxville, 1936, 

95.

26. W. A. Johnson, Ohio River, House Document No. 306, 182. This is the 308 Report which appeared while 

7\JDUW'DPZDVXQGHUFRQVWUXFWLRQEXW-RKQVRQFRPSOHWHGKLVUHSRUWEHIRUHWKH&RUSVKDGPDGHWKH¿QDOGHVLJQ)RUWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQUHVHUYRLUHOHYDWLRQDQGKHQFHGDPKHLJKWDQGVWRUDJHFDSDFLW\VHH0DMRU

W. D. Styer to the Chief of Engineers, December 1, 1933, National Archives, Philadelphia, RG77, Entry 1290, 

%R[)LOH1R'RF1R

27. Major W. D. Styer to the Chief of Engineers, October 17, 1933, National Archives, Philadelphia, RG77, 

(QWU\)LOH1R'RF1R

28. Captain Lucius Clay to the District Engineer (Styer) in Pittsburgh, November 6, 1933; and Major W. D. 

6W\HUWR&OD\RQ1RYHPEHU1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\)LOH1R'RF

No. 2.

29. W. E. Potter, “Tygart River Reservoir Dam,” The Military Engineer 28, No. 161, (September-October 

1936), 331. “Tygart River Reservoir Dam,” U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Pittsburgh District, Revised 

November 1938, 2.

 :)7RPSNLQVWRWKH3LWWVEXUJK'LVWULFW-DQXDU\HQFORVLQJDPHPRUDQGXPE\&OHP6KDYHU

a local Democratic Party leader, urging either of two different sites; and W. R. Winslow and H. E. Anderson 

WRWKH'LVWULFW(QJLQHHU)HEUXDU\UHFRPPHQGLQJDJDLQVWFKDQJLQJWKHORFDWLRQ1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV

3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\)LOH1R'RF1R
380

 0DMRU:'6W\HUWR0DMRU7%/DUNLQ)HEUXDU\DQG/DUNLQWR6W\HU)HEUXDU\

1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\)LOH1R'RF1R6HHDOVR6W\HUWRWKH'LYLVLRQ

Engineer, March 13, 1934, memorandum requesting model tests, National Archives, Philadelphia, RG77, Entry 

)LOH1R'RF1R7KHVHWHVWVZHUHDSSURYHGE\*%3LOOVEXU\$FWLQJ&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUV

March 30, 1934, on the foregoing document.

32. Major W. D. Styer to John Savage, April 7, 1934; Savage to Styer in Pittsburgh, April 17, 1934, with 

two enclosures; and Charles Wellons to Savage, May 7, 1934, returning one report. National Archives, 

3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\%R[)LOH1R'RF1R)RUDGHWDLOHGSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH0DGGHQ

Dam tests, see Richard R. Randolph, “Hydraulic Tests on the Spillway of the Madden Dam,” Transactions of

the American Society of Civil Engineers 103 (1938), 1080-112.

33. Morris L. Cooke to Harold L. Ickes, July 2, 1934, memorandum attaching a further memorandum from 

-&'LFNHUPDQRIWKH)HGHUDO7UDGH&RPPLVVLRQWR0/&RRNH-XQH)RU&RRNHVHH-HDQ&KULVWLH

“Morris L. Cooke and Energy for America,” in Carroll W. Purcell Jr., editor, Technology in America: A History

of Individuals and Ideas, 2nd edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991), 244.

34. See the letters between Major W. D. Styer and J. H. Dodds for the Corps and Paul P. Cret and his partners 

John Harbeson and William Livingston in July, August, and September 1934, National Archives, Philadelphia, 

5*(QWU\)LOH1R'RF1R

35. Major W. D. Styer to the Chief of Engineers, August 15, 1934, enclosing memorandum dated August 

RIPHHWLQJ$XJXVWRQSODQVDQGVSHFL¿FDWLRQVIRUWKH7\JDUW'DP1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV

3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\)LOH1R'RF1R6W\HUWRWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUV$XJXVWUHported approval from the Acting Chief to issue plans for bidding once the Board of Consultants had reviewed 

them. The board recommendations appeared in a report signed by Hill, Harza, Growden, Gerig, McAlpine, 

Powell, and Styer and sent to the District Engineer on September 5, 1934, National Archives, Philadelphia, 

5*(QWU\)LOH1R'RFV1RV

36. Major W. D. Styer to the Chief of Engineers September 15, 1934, also National Archives, College Park, 

5*(QWU\)ROGHU3DUW6W\HUHVWLPDWHGWKHFRVWRIWKHGDPWREHZLWK

for materials furnished by the Government. He thus gave the bid estimate to be $7,388,000 whereas the pubOLVKHG¿JXUHDWWKHRSHQLQJZDV)RUDGGLWLRQDOFKDQJHVVHH+$0RQWJRPHU\WRWKH&KLHIRI

Engineers, October 1, 1934, with enclosure dated September 29, 1934.

 +($QGHUVRQWRWKH'LVWULFW(QJLQHHU$XJXVWDQG3&RQIHUHQFHRQ'HVLJQDQG6SHFL¿FDWLRQV

for the Tygart River Dam,” by the Board of Consultants, November 13, 1934, National Archives, Philadelphia, 

5*(QWU\)LOH1R'RF1R7KHODWWHUGLVFXVVHV:DUUHQ0HDG¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHGDPIRXQGDtions.

38. Louis C. Hill to Major W. D. Styer, November 15, 1934, Styer to Hill, November 20, 1934; and Styer to 

the Portland District Engineer, November 20 and December 1l, National Archives, Philadelphia, RG77, Entry 

)LOH1R'RF1R)RUWKHK\GUDXOLFUHVXOWVVHH6W\HUWRWKH'LYLVLRQ(QJLQHHU'HFHPEHU

1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\)LOH1R'RF1R)RUWKHVWDUWLQJGDWHRI

construction, see Potter, “Tygart River Reservoir Dam,” 332.

39. James P. Growden to Major W. D. Styer, August 6, 1935, described the issues on form that he said were 

GLVFXVVHGDWDPHHWLQJRQ0DUFK1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\)LOH1R

'RF1R7KHLVVXHRIIRUPGRHVQRWKRZHYHUDSSHDULQWKHRI¿FLDOUHSRUWRIWKDWPHHWLQJVHHQRWH

40. “Report on Conference of Consultants for the Tygart River Dam, March 28 and 29, 1935,” Pittsburgh, 

0DUFK1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\%R[)LOH1R'RF1R

An earlier meeting on March 5 had begun those discussions but not reached such a general conclusion, see 

“Conference held March 5, 1935 at Tygart River Dam,” W. E. Potter, 1st Lieut. C. E., March 7, 1935, National 

$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\%R[)LOH1R'RF1R

 :+0F$OSLQHWR0DMRU:'6W\HU$SULODQG/)+DU]DWR6W\HU$SULO1DWLRQDO

$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\%R[)LOH1R'RF1R

 )RUGLPHQVLRQVDQGGLVFKDUJHVVHH37\JDUW5LYHU5HVHUYRLU'DP ́FLWHGLQQRWHDERYH. The 

Spillway Capacity Q = CLH  where L = 490 feet, H = 23 feet and C = 3.7 from which Q = 200,000 cubic feet 

SHUVHFRQG)RU&VHH/HRQDUG&KXUFK8UTXKDUWHGLWRUCivil Engineering Handbook 3rd edition (New York: 

0F*UDZ+LOO'DWDDUHDOOSULRUWR)RUWKHRXWOHWFXOYHUWVVHH8UTXKDUWZKHUH

Q = CAV and V = 2HG = 111 feet per second and A = 5.67 x 10 x 8 (for eight rectangular openings) = 455 

square feet and C= 0.9 so that Q= 0.9 x 455 x 111 = 45,000 cubic feet per second.
381

 3RWWHU37\JDUW5LYHU5HVHUYRLU'DP ́7KHEHQH¿WVRIWKHGDPZHUHDOUHDG\DSSDUHQWGXULQJODWH

DIWHUFORVXUHZKHQSRWHQWLDOÀRRGVZRXOGKDYHZUHDNHGVXEVWDQWLDOGDPDJHLQWKH0RQRQJDKHOD9DOOH\

In addition, see 11-2 for a discussion of water supplied by the reservoir during the dry period from mid-August 

to mid-September 1938, which permitted continuous navigation and also improved the quality of the water for 

industrial and municipal consumption.

 0DMRU:'6W\HUWRWKH)UHGHULFN6QDUH&RUSRUDWLRQ-XQHHQFORVLQJGHWDLOHGFRVWVDQG6W\HUWR

the Chief of Engineers, June 8, 1935, National Archives, College Park, RG77, Entry 111, Box 1679, 3524, Part 

1. The Board of Consultants had already approved the design change to the stilling basin in their meeting of 

0DUFK&::HOORQVVHQWUHVXOWVRIWKHWHVWVWRVHWWKHVKDSHRIGHÀHFWRUVEHORZWKHRXWOHWV6HH

&::HOORQVWR:+0F$OSLQH$XJXVW1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\)LOH

No. 4, Doc. No. 30.

45. “Report on Conferences of Consultants for the Tygart River Dam, July 17 and 18, 1935,” signed by 

W. D. Styer, William Gerig, and W. H. McAlpine, July 18, 1935; “Memorandum on Conference at Tygart River 

Dam, Grafton, West Virginia, on July 25, 1935,” signed by L. C. Hill, W. J. Mead, W. D. Styer, and 

C. M. Wellons, July 26, 1935; and letters to Major W. D. Styer from W. H. McAlpine, July 30, 1935, and from 

/RXLV&+LOO$XJXVW1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\)LOH1R'RF1R

46. Harold A. Thomas and Emil P. Schuleen, “Cavitation in Outlet Conduits of High Dams,” Transactions

of the American Society of Civil Engineers 102 (1942), 421-2 and 455-6. In a memorandum to the Chief of 

Engineers, September 6, 1935, Major W. D. Styer requested funds for the Tygart tests, National Archives, 

3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\)LOH1R'RF1R,QDPHPRUDQGXPWRWKH'LYLVLRQ(QJLQHHU

Missouri River Division, January 31, 1936, Styer referred to other cavitation studies and to the Tygart spillway 

and outlet works and how their design has remained “substantially as shown in the folio [of May 1, 1935].” 

1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\%R[)LOH1R'RF1R

47. James P. Growden to Major W. D. Styer, August 6, 1935, with responses from Warren J. Mead on August 

9, W. H. McAlpine on August 16, W. Gerig on August 26, and Louis C. Hill on September 3 and 4, 1935, 

1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\%R[)LOH1R'RF1R4XRWHLVLQ/RXLV&

Hill letter of September 3, 1935.

48. L. C. Hill, W. J. Mead, W. Gerig, and W. H. McAlpine to the District Engineer, Pittsburgh, September 18, 

1935, memorandum of a meeting September 17-18, 1935, with a detailed drawing showing the locations of the 

30 inch exploration holes. See also Mead, Gerig, Growden, and McAlpine to the District Engineer, Pittsburgh, 

October 26, 1935, with Sketch 1 “Excavation and placing of concrete section founded on shale strata underlying 

thick sandstone and thin clay seam,” and Sketch 2 “Method of placing base lifts: monolith in which foundaWLRQVWUDWDULVHV ́86(QJLQHHU2I¿FH2FWREHU1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\

)LOH1R'RF1R)RUWKHFRQWUDFWRU¶VUHDFWLRQVVHH/LHXWHQDQW:(3RWWHUWRWKH'LVWULFW(QJLQHHU

3LWWVEXUJK2FWREHU1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\%R[)LOH1R

Doc. No. 12.

49. Captain H. A. Montgomery to the Division Engineer, Cincinnati, October 31, 1935, with two sketches; and Colonel R. G. Powell to the Chief of Engineers, November 23, 1935, National Archives, Philadelphia, 

5*(QWU\)LOH1R'RF1R

50. W. J. Mead, J. P. Growden, and W. H. McAlpine to the District Engineer, Pittsburgh, December 21, 1935, 

1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\%R[)LOH1R'RF1R

 /RXLV&+LOOWRWKH'LVWULFW(QJLQHHU3LWWVEXUJK)HEUXDU\1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD

5*(QWU\)LOH1R'RF1RDQG/)+DU]DWR0DMRU:'6W\HU0DUFK)LOH

1R'RF1R6HHDOVR&DSWDLQ%&)RZONHVWRWKH'LVWULFW(QJLQHHU3LWWVEXUJK0D\DQG

Louis C. Hill to Captain R. M. McCutchen, June 10, 1936, National Archives, Philadelphia, RG77, Entry 1290, 

)LOH1R'RF1R3RZHOO¶VRUGHUDSSHDUVLQDPHPRUDQGXPWRWKH'LVWULFW(QJLQHHU3LWWVEXUJK0D\

DWWDFKHGWRWKHUHSRUWRID%RDUGRI&RQVXOWDQWVPHHWLQJKHOGRQ-XO\6HH&DSWDLQ%&)RZONHV

to the District Engineer, Pittsburgh, August 19, 1936; and Growden’s response in a letter to Captain Albert H. 

%XUWRQLQWKHGLVWULFWRI¿FH$XJXVW1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\%R[)LOH

1R'RF1R)XUWKHUPHHWLQJVRFFXUUHGRQ2FWREHUDQGRQ1RYHPEHUGXULQJERWKRIZKLFKWKH

FUDFNVZHUHGLVFXVVHG6HH&DSWDLQ%&)RZONHVWRWKH'LVWULFW(QJLQHHU3LWWVEXUJK2FWREHUDQG

November 20, 1936, the latter signed by Growden, Lieutenant Colonel W. E. R. Covell, and C. M. Wellons, 

1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*(QWU\)LOH1R'RF1R

 /RXLV&+LOOWRWKH'LVWULFW(QJLQHHU3LWWVEXUJK)HEUXDU\/LHXWHQDQW(GZDUG*'DO\WR+LOO

)HEUXDU\DQG+LOOWR'DO\RQ)HEUXDU\FRQFXUULQJ1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV3KLODGHOSKLD5*

(QWU\)LOH1R'RF1R
382

 /RXLV&+LOOWRWKH'LYLVLRQ(QJLQHHU-DQXDU\PLVGDWHG)HEUXDU\HQFORVLQJDGLDJUDP

of uplift measurements on the Pine Canyon Dam near Pasadena, California; Hill to Major W. D. Styer, March 

2, 1936; and Hill to Captain R. M. McCutchen June 10, 1936, National Archives, Philadelphia, RG77, Entry 

)LOH1R'RF1R7KHSXEOLVKHGSDSHUVDUH'&+HQQ\36WDELOLW\RI6WUDLJKW&RQFUHWH*UDYLW\

Dams,” Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 99 (1934) 1041-123 (includes discussion). 

/)+DU]D38SOLIWDQG6HHSDJH8QGHU'DPVRQ6DQG ́Transactions of the American Society of Civil

Engineers 100 (1935), 1352-406 (includes discussion).

 :(5&RYHOO3)ORRG&RQWUROLQWKH3LWWVEXUJK'LVWULFW ́The Military Engineer (May-June 1939), 

177-8.

55. Harry H. Woodring, Secretary of War, to Senator Rush Holt, July 19, 1937, National Archives, College 

3DUN5*(QWU\)ROGHU3DUW%ULJDGLHU*HQHUDO7KRPDV05RELQVWR5HSUHVHQWDWLYH9LQFHQW)

+DUULQJWRQ0D\1DWLRQDO$UFKLYHV&ROOHJH3DUN5*(QWU\)ROGHU

56. Robert M. Morris and Thomas L. Reilly, Tygart Dam: Review of Operations 1938-1939 (Pittsburgh: 

86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV$SULO7KLVUHSRUWJDYHWKHFRVWVDYLQJVGXHWRÀRRGSUHYHQWLRQDV

$3,001,000 (see 46) but a later article (see note 59) revised this downward.

57. Robert M. Morris and Thomas L. Reilly, “Operation Experiences, Tygart Reservoir,” Transactions of the

American Society of Civil Engineers 107 (1942), 1349-78 (with discussions). This paper is a revised version of 

the report referred to in note 58.

 )RUWKH0LDPLSURMHFWVHH&KDUOHV+3DXO3)ORRG&RQWUROLQWKH0LDPL9DOOH\2KLR ́Transactions of

the American Society of Civil Engineers,)RUWKH0XVNLQJXPVHH)UDQFLV;3XUFHOO-U

30XVNLQJXP5LYHU)ORRG&RQWURO ́The Military Engineer 28, No. 159 (May-June 1936), 184-8. The Corps 

completed all 14 dams in the Muskingum project from 1934 to 1938, L. R. Johnson, Headwaters District, 200. 

See also L. R. Johnson, Headwaters District, 1992, 141-4.

59. L. R. Johnson, Headwaters District, c. 1978, 276.

60. L. R. Johnson, Headwaters District, 1992, 300.

61. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Ohio River Navigation (Cincinnati, 1979), 2. 

O’Brien, et. al, Gateways to Commerce, 41.

62.Department of the Army, Ohio River Navigation6HHDOVR)UDQFLV+2[[37KH2KLR5LYHU0RYDEOH

Dams,” 49-60.

63. Department of the Army, Ohio River Navigation, 22, and L. R. Johnson, Headwaters District, 1992, 13.

64. O’Brien, Gateways, 47-55.

65. O’Brien, Gateways, 13.

 7KH¿UVWUROOHUJDWHVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVFRPSOHWHGLQZHUHIRUWKH*UDQG9DOOH\'LYHUVLRQ'DP

near Grand Junction, Colorado. There were six roller gates, 70 feet long for the Reclamation Service project. 

See U.S. Department of the Interior, Water and Power Resources Service, 3URMHFW'DWD (Washington, D.C.: 

*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

67. O’Brien, Gateways, 67, and Tweet, History of the Rock Island District, 260-71.

68.“Roller-Gate Dams for the Kanawa River,” Engineering News-Record 111, No. 12, (September 21, 1933), 

337-42, and W. H. McAlpine, “Roller Gates in Navigation Dams,” The Military Engineer 26, No. 150, 419-23. 

)RUWKH*DOOLSROLVSODQVHH:$-RKQVRQ35HSRUWRIWKH'LVWULFW(QJLQHHU ́

69. J. C. Harrold, “Outline of the General Principles Used in the Design of Dams on the Upper Mississippi 

River,” Engineering As Applied to the Canalization of a River (St. Louis: September 1935), 34. See also a 

comparison of the Ohio and Upper Mississippi in the same volume by L. Ylvisaka, 19.

70. O’Brien, Gateways, 64-71. The quote refers to the article “Roller-Gate Dams for the Kanawa River,” 

Engineering News Record, 111, No. 12 (September 21, 1933), 337-42, which Gateways states is written by 

S. G. Roberts (see O’Brien, Gateways, 44).

71. O’Brien, Gateways, 73-9.

72. O’Brien, Gateways, 76-7.

73. O’Brien, Gateways, Chapter VII.

74. O’Brien, Gateways, 14.

75. Merritt, The Corps, the Environment, and the Upper Mississippi River Basin, 53-63 and 91-7.

 -RKQ2$Q¿QVRQ3&RPPHUFHDQG&RQVHUYDWLRQRQWKH8SSHU0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHU ́4XRWHRQ

page 417.
383

CHAPTER 9

THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

OF THE BIG DAM ERA

Conservation and Controversies

In a 1941 book, American Bridges and Dams3DXO=XFNHUZURWH32I

all works of engineering, the perfect bridge most nearly approaches the realm 

of art—the dam, the realm of nature.” Dams compared with “God’s immovable 

PRXQWDLQV ́=XFNHUZHQWRQWRVXJJHVWWKDW31RRWKHUDFKLHYHPHQWRISHDFHful civilization during the last two decades on this war-torn earth has contributed 

more to the welfare of future generations than the building of dams in this counWU\ ́7KHGDP¶VOHJDF\FRQVLVWHGRIVWRULQJZDWHUDYHUWLQJDQGFRQWUROOLQJÀRRGV

irrigation, conservation of soil, improving navigation, and generating electrical 

energy. “It is natural,” he concluded, “that a vast country of mighty rivers, like 

the United States, should excel in the construction of dams.”1

 $ERXWIRUW\\HDUVDIWHU=XFNHU¶VERRNDSSHDUHGDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPRYHment against current dam-building practices emerged, comprised of numerous 

environmental, human rights, and social activist groups from a variety of local, 

regional, national, and international anti-dam campaigns. Criticisms abounded: 

GDPVÀRRGHGYDOOH\VGLVSODFHGIDUPHUVDQGEORFNHG¿VKPLJUDWLRQV'DPVUHGXFHGZDWHUTXDOLW\'DPVFKDQJHGIRUHYHUQDWXUDOULYHULQHÀRZV'DPVZHUH

short-sighted structures that drew funds away from other potentially sounder 

WHFKQRORJLHV)RUVRPHWKHFRQFOXVLRQZDVREYLRXV2GHVWUR\RUGHFRPPLVVLRQ

the dams and free the rivers.2

The story of dam building and its environmental impacts is not as neatly 

explained as the opposing views imply. However, it is safe to say that the perception of large dams, their economic and societal value, and their environmental 

implications have undergone considerable change in recent years from the heyday of the big dam era in the middle of the twentieth century. These changes in 

perceptions are at once obvious, but there are complex undertones.

Harnessing rivers into service to humankind was the major objective of 

the big dam era, which lasted from about 1935 to 1965. Construction in this period ran the gamut from the 26 dams of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the 

East to the pre-World War II giants Hoover and Grand Coulee Dams, and Glen 

Canyon Dam (opened in 1964) in the West.3

 In this sense, the big dam era elaboUDWHGRQWKHOHJDF\RI3URJUHVVLYH(UDZDWHUSROLF\EHQWRQPD[LPL]LQJWKHμHI¿-

cient use’ of a vital natural resource. Sometimes the aim was to reduce 
384

ÀRRGLQJDQGWRLPSURYHQDYLJDWLRQ,QRWKHUFDVHVÀRZLQJZDWHUZDVPDQLSXlated to provide abundant sources for irrigation and urban use or to produce electricity. Multipurpose projects attempted to accomplish all of these goals. To the 

builders of Shasta Dam, for example, controlling “the temperamental waters of 

the Sacramento area” meant an opportunity to build an agricultural and industrial 

empire in the Central Valley of California.4

 As historian Mark Harvey observed, 

“Dams, the traditional dictum went, harnessed ‘wild’ and ‘untamed’ rivers and 

transformed them into calm, docile waterways.”5

Dams also were great symbols of American achievement. In the 1950s, 

the American Society of Civil Engineers listed Hoover Dam and Grand Coulee 

Dam as two of the seven civil engineering wonders of the United States; in 1964, 

it crowned Glen Canyon Dam as the outstanding engineering triumph of the 

year.6

 The mighty structures were viewed at once as symbols of the coming of 

age of the modern West, as the product of American engineering know-how, and 

as sublime renderings that improved rivers and complemented nature’s aesthetic. 

Power production, in particular, gave dams a great reach well beyond the site of 

their construction, transforming hinterland into cities. Several conservationists 

also envisioned dams as “the cornerstone of social policy extending well beyond 

cheap hydroelectricity.” Regional development programs, they believed, would 

KDYHHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOEHQH¿WVHVSHFLDOO\IRUWKHXQGHUSULYLOHJHG7

Dam builders and a variety of other interests also had pragmatic reasons for extolling the virtues of big dams. Especially in the years of the Great 

Depression, massive federal construction projects, like dams, meant jobs and 

ORQJODVWLQJ¿QDQFLDOVHFXULW\IRUIDUPHUVWHQGLQJLUULJDWHGODQGVDQGIRUFLWLHV

in search of stable and plentiful water supplies. The likely maximum number of 

workers employed at any one time at Hoover Dam was 5,200 workers; more than 

IRU*UDQG&RXOHHDQGIRU)RUW3HFN'DP6HYHUDOFRPPHQWDWRUV

argued that the electricity generated by big dams showed its worth particularly in 

World War II and in the Cold War.8

 One set of estimates stated that water development projects in the United States resulted in 26,000 miles of channeled waterways, 58,000,000 acres of irrigated land, 30,000,000 kilowatts of hydroelectricLW\DQGÀRRGFRQWUROWKURXJKODUJHGDPV9

Despite the enthusiasm over dam-building from the 1920s to the early 

1960s, some people—namely the rural poor, small farmers, Native Americans, 

Hispanic communities, and even some farm families of means—failed to enMR\IXOO\WKHEHQH¿WVRIWKHQHZFRQVWUXFWLRQ'LVSODFHPHQWRISHRSOHSULRUWR

inundation or construction often affected those with little political or economic leverage. Since World War II in particular, several Indian reservations were 

impacted by the construction of federal dams on major rivers. Nine thousand 

acres of Seneca land were taken along the Allegheny River for the building of 
385

WKH.LQ]XD'DP)RUW0RKDYH&KHPHKXHYL9DOOH\&RORUDGR5LYHU<XPD

and Gila Bend reservations in Arizona and California lost land to dam projects in the Colorado River Basin. In 1960, 190 Indian families on the Standing 

5RFN6LRX[5HVHUYDWLRQORVWODQGWRSURSRVHGÀRRGLQJIRUWKH2DKH'DPLQWKH

0LVVRXUL5LYHU%DVLQ%RQQHYLOOH'DPGLVSODFHGWKH,QGLDQGLSQHW¿VKHU\DW

WKH&DVFDGHV'DOOHV'DPDOVRRQWKH&ROXPELDHOLPLQDWHGWKHSUL]HG¿VKLQJ

VLWHRI&HOLOR)DOOV$QGWKHOLVWJRHVRQ10 While not directly affected in the way 

some Native Americans were, some easterners, nevertheless, resented federal 

GROODUVÀRZLQJWRWKH:HVWWRXQGHUZULWHWKHELJGDPSURMHFWVDWOHDVWXQWLOGDP

building in the East began to accelerate after 1945. In the Midwest, where few 

deep canyons made giant dams possible, or where dams threatened marshlands 

necessary to sustain bird hunting, the “big dam era” was not always welcomed. 

(YHQLQWKH:HVWDYDULHW\RIWHUUDLQVDQGHFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWVLQÀXHQFHGVXSSRUW

for these massive public works projects. Some small farmers in the West, for example, who may have looked to the dams and reservoirs as a source of plentiful 

water, ultimately lost out to corporate farms and big irrigators, and others saw the 

water directed toward urban development instead of rural preservation.11

Early indicators also appeared that raised questions about the physical 

implications of the big dams before the emergence of the modern environmental 

movement in the 1960s. As one historian noted, dam building “was conceived 

within American conservation tradition—the tradition of utilitarianism which 

VWUHVVHGHI¿FLHQWFRQWURORIQDWXUHLQWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVW ́12 However, some 

conservation-minded people held reservations about big dam projects. Karl E. 

Mundt, congressman from South Dakota, noted in 1943 that, “. . . dams which 

are properly designed and wisely built can expand recreational and conservation 

assets just as certainly as improper and unwise dams can destroy them. . . .”13 

Other conservationists questioned dam building for power production and irrigaWLRQDVD3QDWLRQDOPDQLD ́RUHYHQD3QDWLRQDOPHQDFH ́)LHOGQDWXUDOLVW:LOOLDP

/)LQOH\DUJXHG36RPHRIWKHVHSURMHFWVGHVWUR\H[LVWHQWZHDOWKRUHQGDQJHU

some other resource.”14

The tone and the focus of environmental concern over dam building 

evolved dramatically in the 1960s. What had been viewed as projects of great 

economic hope and possibility were now being critiqued more closely in terms 

RIHURVLRQRIGRZQVWUHDPFKDQQHOVFKDQJHVLQ¿VKSRSXODWLRQDQGULSDULDQYHJetation, water evaporation loss, displacement of native peoples, dwindling scenic 

wonders, and urban sprawl. Even the utilitarian value of dams came into question as dam infrastructure began aging and began raising growing concern about 

its performance and safety. Within environmental circles, especially, emphasis 

shifted from the value of dams to the value of scenic and wild rivers. The realization that the United States was the second most dammed country in the world 

and that most major rivers in the lower 48 states were regulated by some 
386

combination of dams, locks, or diversions, made the preservation of undammed 

rivers more important.15

The story of the environmental implications of big-dam building in the 

United States during the twentieth century is at once a story of the contested use 

of natural resources and changing perceptions, values, and symbols of humanmade structures. In some sense, the story is an apt summation of the dramatic 

impact of large federal dam construction presented in this book.

The Economic and Social Impacts of Dams

In the 1920s and 1930s, the economic potential of big dams appeared 

VRJUHDWWKDWLWZDVGLI¿FXOWWRORRNEH\RQGWKHH[SHFWDWLRQRIPDWHULDOSURJUHVV

Hoover Dam was an archetype for such speculation. Constructed between 1931 

and 1935 on the lower Colorado River, the massive arch gravity dam was not 

RQO\PHDQWWRSURWHFWGRZQVWUHDPFRPPXQLWLHVIURPÀRRGLQJEXWWRVWLPXODWH

economic growth through the production of hydropower for southern Arizona, 

Nevada, and southern California, and to provide bountiful supplies of irrigation 

water for the Imperial Valley. The cost of construction would be recouped by the 

generation of electrical power to be produced by 16 main turbines with a rated 

capacity of 1,735,000 horsepower. Los Angeles and surrounding communities 

DOVRZRXOGUHDSWKHEHQH¿WVRIWKHGDPWKURXJKWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKH&RORUDGR

River Aqueduct. Water, indeed, was a crucial factor in the rapid growth of the 

city, which was transformed from a community of 500,000 in 1920 to a major urban center of 2 million in 1952. During the war, electricity generated at Hoover 

Dam (at the time, still called Boulder Dam) provided power for steel and aluminum mills and for Douglas, Lockheed, and North American aircraft plants—

ZKLFKDFFRXQWHGIRURQH¿IWKRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VDLUFUDIWSURGXFWLRQ,QWKHSRVWZDU

years, Hoover Dam power helped stimulate the growth of tourism, especially 

centered in the burgeoning gambling mecca of Las Vegas.16 As one writer noted 

in 1936, water was “the miraculous developer . . . of the Southwest.”17

Water and hydroelectricity were intimately woven with urban growth in 

general in the twentieth century. In the big dam era, rural life became less attractive as agribusiness came to marginalize small farmers, more power encouraged 

industrial growth, and metropolitan areas looked ever outward for new sources of water and energy. Between 1920 and 1940, the urban population of the 

United States increased from 54.2 million to 74.4 million.18 While metropolitan 

growth was less uniform in the West than in the old manufacturing belt, for instance, metropolitan population growth as a proportion of the region’s population 

exceeded other U.S. regions by 1960 (64 percent compared to 62.5 percent).19 

Between 1930 and 1970, striking expansion took place in several western and 

southern cities, in particular. San Diego increased from 94 to 307 square miles; 
387

San Jose from 8 to 117; Phoenix from 10 to 247; Houston from 72 to 453; and 

Jacksonville from 26 to 827.20

In volume, consumption of water by irrigation and industrial purposes 

greatly exceeded municipal uses. In the West, nondomestic uses of water–particularly irrigation–outstripped all others.21 But it was the consumption of electrical power where cities–along with industry–dominated the market from the power production of big dams. As historian Carl Abbott stated, “Easily transmitted 

over long distances, hydroelectric power facilitated the industrial growth of cities 

from Spokane to Los Angeles to Austin.”22

 ,QWKH3DFL¿F1RUWKZHVWLWZDVEHOLHYHGWKDW*UDQG&RXOHH'DPFRXOG

transform the regional economy. This New Deal-era project was meant to spearhead a “planned promised land” along the Columbia River. Completed in 1941, 

Grand Coulee was the centerpiece of an enterprise that resulted in the largest single reclamation project undertaken in the United States. The project was projected with an intended irrigated area of more than 2.5 million acres and was, 

for some time, the world’s largest hydroelectric power generator. The dam 

ZRXOGJHQHUDWHPRUHWKDQPLOOLRQNLORZDWWVRIHOHFWULFLW\GZDU¿QJHYHQWKH

awe-inspiring production of Hoover Dam, and eventually irrigating more than 

556,000 acres of land (far less than originally contemplated). It returned more 

than $4 billion directly through the generation of power and became well known 

for providing electricity for aircraft manufacturing, the production of magnesium 

and aluminum, and powering the Hanford atomic installation near Richland, 

:DVKLQJWRQFHQWUDOWRWKHEXLOGLQJRIWKH¿UVWDWRPLFERPEWRZDUGWKHHQGRI

World War II.23 Some contemporaries and a later generation of historians and 

RWKHUVTXHVWLRQHGWKLVXQERXQGHGHQWKXVLDVPIRUWKHHFRQRPLFEHQH¿WVRIGDP

building and were convinced that too little thought went into long-range regional 

planning. But euphoria over economic gain wavered very little among those preSDUHGWRUHDSWKHEHQH¿WVRILQFUHDVHGSRZHUSURGXFWLRQEHWWHUQDYLJDWLRQPXnicipal water supply, and irrigated farmlands.24

Environmental Threats: Flooding and Silting

Environmental implications of dam building were always part of the 

equation, but the vantage point in the big dam era strayed little from the desire to 

control nature and manage its resources. Indeed, dam building focused on environmental issues linked directly to resource development or a selective form of 

SUHVHUYDWLRQ)ORRGFRQWUROIRUH[DPSOHUHVWHGXSRQWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWULYHUV

needed to be predictable and not threaten the built environment.25 In constructing Hoover Dam, calculations revealed that previous river discharge had varied 

from a few thousand to more than 300,000 cubic feet per second, depending on 

WKHDPRXQWRIUXQRIIRUWKHRFFXUUHQFHRIÀRRGV,QWKHORZHU&RORUDGR5LYHU
388

Delta area, protective levees had been constructed along a 150-mile stretch, but 

half of the headworks and levees had been destroyed by the river. In 1905, the 

river had breached the levees inundating the Imperial Valley, and discharging 

millions of gallons of water and creating the Salton Sea over a period of 

18 months. Reclamation construction engineer, Walker R. Young, stated in 1937 

that, “Without regulation, the river had little value to the lower basin area.”26 In 

WKHRI¿FLDOKLVWRU\RI+RRYHU'DPLWZDVQRWHGWKDW/DNH0HDG3VZDOORZVWKH

ÀRRGV ́27)HZKDGWREHFRQYLQFHGRIWKHEHQH¿W

In the mid-1930s, the orientation of many engineers, and the policy of 

JRYHUQPHQWDJHQFLHVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUÀRRGFRQWUROPHDVXUHVUHPDLQHGIRFXVHG

on structural solutions to water problems, meaning the building of dams, levees, 

DQGÀRRGZDOOVWRFXUEÀRRGLQJ,QGHHGVWDWHVOHYHHERDUGVFLWLHVDQGFRXQWLHV

railroads, and other groups also built levees and other water control works makLQJXQLIRUPÀRRGFRQWUROSROLF\2EH\RQGWKHEXLOGLQJRIVWUXFWXUHVDWOHDVW2

HVSHFLDOO\GLI¿FXOW7KH%RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW$FWZDVDPRQJWKH¿UVW

ODUJHPXOWLSXUSRVHZDWHUSURMHFWVWRLQFOXGHVXEVWDQWLDOÀRRGFRQWUROPHDVXUHV

7KH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWHVWDEOLVKHGÀRRGFRQWUROIRUQDYLJDEOHZDWHUVDQG

their tributaries as an essentially federal activity.28 Despite the increased federal 

DXWKRULW\RYHUÀRRGFRQWURODQGWKHXUJLQJVRIVRPHH[SHUWVDFFHSWDQFHRIÀRRG

plain management beyond a simple structural approach was slow in developing.29

'HEDWHVRYHUFRVWEHQH¿WJXLGHOLQHVRQO\FRPSOLFDWHGWKHSLFWXUHDQGLQWRWKH

VUHOLDQFHRQVWUXFWXUHVWRSUHYHQWÀRRGLQJGRPLQDWHGSROLF\GHFLVLRQV

<HWVRPHFULWLFVDUJXHG3GHVSLWHWKHELOOLRQVLQYHVWHGLQÀRRGFRQWUROGDPVOHYHHVDQGRWKHUZRUNVÀRRGORVVHVKDGEHHQVWHDGLO\PRXQWLQJ ́30

 /LNHÀRRGGDPDJHVLOWLQJZDVUHFRJQL]HGDVDQHQYLURQPHQWDOGDQger to be reckoned with. On the Hoover Dam project, it was estimated that the 

Colorado River carried annually from 88,000 to 137,000 acre-feet of silt to the 

delta. Concern centered on obstructing the diversion works and the effects that 

silt-laden water had upon irrigation, especially the building up of the ground elevation with material of “questionable value.” Trapping the silt in the reservoir appeared to be a workable solution, since it was believed that at the rate of buildup 

it would take many years. E. W. Lane, a consulting engineer with Reclamation 

and former head of its Hydraulic Lab, and J. R. Ritter, chief of the Hydrology 

Division, Branch of Project Planning in Denver, noted that, “A number of differHQWSHRSOHKDYHVWXGLHGWKHUDWHDWZKLFK/DNH0HDGZLOOEH¿OOHGZLWKVHGLPHQW

They are unanimous on the point that it will have a long, long life.”31

Unfortunately, an understanding of the broader implications of silting 

was not well appreciated in the big dam era. Building dams, indeed, trapped silt 

in reservoirs, reducing the tons of deposits. However, silt contained nutrients 

HVVHQWLDOWRWKHVXUYLYDORI¿VKHULHVGRZQVWUHDPDQGLQFRDVWDOZDWHUV5HGXFLQJ
389

silt, therefore, had lasting ecological consequences. In a similar sense, focus on 

the “silt menace” was not matched with an understanding of the potential problems caused by salinity. Reservoirs and other water development structures led 

to an increase in the salinity of many rivers, especially by the 1950s, due, in 

SDUWWRKLJKO\VDOLQHUXQRIIIURPLUULJDWHGODQGDQGDOVRWRUHGXFHGULYHUÀRZV

Increased upstream water diversion also led to seawater intrusion into estuaries 

and river deltas.326LOW3FRQWURO ́OLNHÀRRG3FRQWURO ́ZDVWKHUHIRUHDNLQGRI

early environmental or non-ecological approach to the physical impact of dam 

building–a commitment to harnessing natural events through human technologies.

Dam Failures and Dam Safety

In the big dam era, dam safety was essentially regarded as an engineerLQJLVVXHOLQNHGWRSURSHUGHVLJQDQGFRQVWUXFWLRQ)DLWKLQWKHVDIHW\RIZHOO

designed dams was not misplaced, especially for major dams. Nonetheless, the 

potential for disaster or even a near failure rested on several possible factors: 

WKHXQSUHGLFWDELOLW\RIÀRRGLQJXQFHUWDLQWLHVLQWKHJHRORJLFVHWWLQJVHHSDJH

through foundations and embankments, defects in design and construction, and 

liquefaction under earthquake conditions.33

Embankment dams, especially in comparison with masonry and concrete structures, were a particular concern in the early twentieth century. Into the 

1920s, some engineers believed that restrictions on height should be placed on 

HPEDQNPHQWGDPVLQFDVHRIRYHUWRSSLQJ'H¿FLHQFLHVRIK\GUDXOLF¿OOVDOVR

EHFDPHDQDUHDRIFRQFHUQ6KHI¿HOG'DPQHDU6DQWD%DUEDUDDWZHQW\¿YH

IRRWKLJKHDUWK¿OOVWUXFWXUHIDLOHGDVDUHVXOWRIDQHDUWKTXDNHLQ-XQH7KH

dam was seven miles from the epicenter of a 6.3 Richter magnitude quake. The 

embankment and the foundation were comprised primarily of loose silty sand, 

DQGVHHSDJHKDGVDWXUDWHGWKHIRXQGDWLRQDQGWKHORZHUSDUWRIWKH¿OOUHVXOWing in liquefaction of the foundation during the earthquake. Such events led to 

increasing interest in using instruments to study the performance of dams. The 

(QJLQHHULQJ)RXQGDWLRQIRUH[DPSOHVSRQVRUHGH[SHULPHQWVRQ6WHYHQVRQ

Creek Dam (a thin arch 60-foot-high structure) in California. It had been constructed in 1926 especially for testing.34

 7KHIDLOXUHRI6W)UDQFLV'DPFRPSOHWHGE\WKH/RV$QJHOHV

Department of Water and Power in 1926 to the northwest of the city, at about 

midnight on March 12, 1928, set off intense efforts to improve dam safety in 

California, especially with respect to new dam construction. Regarded as 

one of the worst civil engineering disasters in the twentieth century, the failure of 

6W)UDQFLV'DPUHVXOWHGLQRYHUSHRSOHGHDGRUPLVVLQJDQG

$15 million in property damage. The collapse occurred just before midnight. 
390

%LOOLRQVRIJDOORQVRIZDWHUUDPSDJHGGRZQWKH6DQ)UDQFLVTXLWR9DOOH\FDUU\-

ing concrete blocks as large as 10,000 tons downstream for a mile or more, destroyed a concrete powerhouse, roared through Saugus, and crashed through 

a work camp at Kemp and several other communities, before spilling into the 

3DFL¿F2FHDQ¿IW\PLOHVIURPWKHGDPVLWH35 Although not on a par with the deVWUXFWLRQFDXVHGE\WKHJUHDW-RKQVWRZQÀRRGLQ3HQQV\OYDQLDZKLFKUHVXOWHG

LQGHDWKVWKHIDLOXUHRI6W)UDQFLV'DPZDVVLJQL¿FDQWEHFDXVHLWZDV

a concrete structure, 205 feet in height, rather than an earthen structure. There 

had been some workers and ranchers who had said the dam was unsafe, but the 

Chief Engineer of the Los Angeles water works, William Mulholland of Owens 

Valley fame, had inspected the dam on the very day of the disaster and had not 

been concerned about some cracks in the concrete and some slight leakage. 

Mulholland’s assessment and his close association with the design and building 

of the dam shattered his reputation and ended his career. The more than a dozen 

LQYHVWLJDWLRQVDIWHUWKHGLVDVWHUKRZHYHUZHUHLQFRQFOXVLYHDQGRIWHQFRQÀLFWLQJ0RVWRIWKHPDJUHHGQRQHWKHOHVVWKDWWKHGHVLJQKDGQRWEHHQVXI¿FLHQWO\

reviewed by independent experts and that the foundation of the dam was weak.36 

Beyond the public outcry about the disaster, the dam-building industry was jarred 

by the failure of a prominent gravity arch dam. In 1929, California passed a dam 

safety act which placed all dams within the state, except those owned by the federal government, under supervision of the state engineer. The supervision includes design, construction, operation, alteration, and repair.37 Although other 

states followed California’s lead, their efforts were relatively modest by comparison.

Engineers responded to the safety issue in new dam construction by attempting to improve engineering practices. Beginning in 1929 and continuing into the 1940s, attention was given to developing a theoretical method of 

slope analysis for embankment dams and to further studying of slope stability 

and compaction of embankments. Additional attention was paid to compaction, 

moisture control, and liquefaction. Statistical methods were employed to estiPDWHWKHÀRRGSRWHQWLDORIZDWHUVKHGV+0:HVWHUJDDUGSXEOLVKHGDQLPSRUtant paper in 1933 on earthquake effects on dams.38 Nevertheless, safety problems periodically surfaced in the 1930s and early 1940s, although not on a par 

ZLWKWKH6W)UDQFLV'DPGLVDVWHU6HLVPLFDFWLYLW\ZDVGLVFRYHUHGDW/DNH0HDG

LQWKHPLGWRODWHVWKH¿UVWVKRFNVZHUHIHOWLQ6HSWHPEHUDQGDIWHU

a period of debate, many agreed that there was a connection between the reservoir and the seismic activity.39

Despite the increased study of dam safety measures, each case of failure 

posed some unique problems and often led to a variety of assessments. The 

safety issue in the big dam era was not used as a rationale for slowing the 

construction of dams or questioning their value to society. Building new, large 
391

dams—while most often incorporating, or at least taking account of, the latest 

VDIHW\UHVHDUFK2UHPDLQHGDJUHDWHUSULRULW\WKDQPDNLQJVDIHW\PRGL¿FDWLRQVRQ

existing dams.40

Despite legal and professional efforts taken to ensure the dams would 

be built to be safe and secure, dam building in the mid- and late-twentieth century remained an art dependent upon the skills and judgments of human beings. 

This was brought home in a forceful–and tragic–manner on June 5, 1976, when 

the Bureau of Reclamation’s newly completed Teton Dam, in southeastern Idaho, 

IDLOHGGXULQJWKH¿UVW¿OOLQJRIWKHUHVHUYRLU%XLOWWRSURYLGHK\GURHOHFWULFSRZer production and increased irrigation supply for the upper Snake River Valley 

DURXQG,GDKR)DOOVDQG5H[EXUJ7HWRQ'DPZDVDIRRWKLJKIRRW

ORQJHDUWK¿OOGDPEXLOWDFURVVWKH7HWRQ5LYHU7KHFHQWUDOFRUH]RQHGHDUWK-

¿OOGDPIDLOHGDQGUHOHDVHGHLJKW\ELOOLRQJDOORQVRIZDWHUZKLFKURDUHGGRZQstream in a 20-foot wave taking eleven lives, thousands of head of cattle, thousands of buildings, and tons of topsoil. At least 25,000 people were forced from 

their homes.41 The failure occurred late on a Saturday morning, and, fortunately, 

many downstream residents were successfully warned of the impending disaster. 

The death toll could clearly have been much higher had the collapse taken place 

LQWKHODWHHYHQLQJHDUO\PRUQLQJKRXUV42 Don Pisani has argued the failure 

severely embarrassed Reclamation and signaled that “the boom years were 

over” for western water development.43

In the aftermath of the Teton Dam failure, intensive studies were undertaken to determine the cause. Those studies were hampered by the fact that 

the rush of water down the canyon washed away geological evidence that would 

speak to the condition of the foundations and the actual effect of measures taken 

(e.g., the injection of a cement “grout curtain” wall into the cracked and relatively porous rock foundation) to prevent water from seeping through the foundation and to prevent erosion at the interface between the foundation and the earthen structure. After a six-month-long investigation, an independent panel of engineers appointed under the auspices of both the U.S. Department of the Interior 

and the State of Idaho reported that “because the failed section was carried away 

E\WKHÀRRGZDWHUVLWZLOOSUREDEO\QHYHUEHSRVVLEOHWRUHVROYHZKHWKHUWKHSULPDU\FDXVHRIOHDNDJHLQWKHYLFLQLW\RI6WDZDVGXHWRLPSHUIHFWJURXWLQJ

RIWKHURFNRUFUDFNLQJLQWKHNH\WUHQFK¿OORUSRVVLEO\ERWK ́6SHFL¿FDOO\

the independent panel reported that:

The fundamental cause of failure may be regarded as a combination of geological factors and design decisions that, taken together, permitted the failure to develop. The principal geologic 

factors were (1) the numerous open joints [i.e., cracks] in the 

abutment joints, and (2) the scarcity of more suitable 
392

materials for the impervious zone of the dam than the highly 

erodible and brittle windblown soils. The design decisions included among others (3) complete dependence for seepage conWURORQDFRPELQDWLRQRIGHHSNH\WUHQFKHV¿OOHGZLWKZLQGblown soils and a grout curtain . . . and (4) inadequate provisions for collection and safe discharge of seepage or leakage 

which inevitably would occur through the foundation rock and 

FXWRIIV\VWHPV,Q¿QDOVXPPDU\XQGHUGLI¿FXOWFRQGLWLRQV

that called for the best judgment and experience of the engineering profession, an unfortunate choice of design measures together with less than conventional precautions was taken to ensure the adequate functioning of the Teton Dam, and these circumstances ultimately led to its failure.44

If nothing else, the Teton Dam failure served—and continues to serve—

as a compelling reminder that every dam, and every dam site, presents a unique 

set of technological problems that must be addressed and solved on an individual basis in order to provide for a safe and enduring water storage structure. The 

failure also resulted in several acts and a number of federal programs, including 

at Reclamation, designed to better insure future dam safety.

$)LVK6WRU\&RQÀLFWVRYHU5HVRXUFH'HYHORSPHQW‡

Along the Columbia River, in particular, dam building came into direct 

FRQÀLFWZLWK¿VKKDELWDWV7RGD\RQHWKLUGRIWKHRULJLQDO&ROXPELD%DVLQVDOPon habitat is blocked by dams.45$QDGURPRXV¿VKLQFOXGLQJ3DFL¿FVDOPRQDQG

steelhead trout, must return to their spawning grounds to reproduce and depend 

RQWKHIUHHÀRZRIULYHUVWRDFFRPSOLVKWKDWJRDO7KHEXLOGLQJRI%RQQHYLOOH

DQG*UDQG&RXOHH'DPVLQSDUWLFXODULQWHQVL¿HGWKHJURZLQJGHEDWHRYHUWKH

HIIHFWVRIGDPVRQPLJUDWRU\¿VKDQGWKHLUVSDZQLQJVLWHV&RQWHPSRUDU\FRQservationists and several historians have claimed that few people, particularly the 

dam builders, gave much thought to the plight of the salmon and steelhead, and 

that high dams virtually eliminated them from much of the Columbia and other 

rivers. While there is little doubt that the new high dams caused great loss to the 

¿VKSRSXODWLRQWKHVWRU\LVVRPHZKDWPRUHFRPSOH[

 7KHJURZLQJGHEDWHRYHUGDPVLPSHGLQJWKHPLJUDWLRQRI¿VKZDVQRW

so much couched in environmental terms in the big dam era, but in terms of 

‡

 7KHLVVXHVRIDQDGURPRXVDQGFDWDGURPRXV¿VKHULHVDQGWKHHIIHFWVRIGDPVXSRQWKHPDUHH[FHSWLRQDOO\

controversial. The literature, both technical and popular, is extensive and available for those who further wish to 

H[SORUHLPSDFWVRQ¿VKHULHV6XI¿FHLWWRVD\KHUHWKDWPRUHGHWDLOHGKLVWRU\FRXOGEHGRQHRQWKHLVVXHVLQYROYHG

7KDWLVDQRWKHUVWXG\IRUDQRWKHUORFDWLRQ7KLVVWXG\KDVVSDFHRQO\WRWRXFKRQVRPHRIWKHLVVXHVIURP¿VK

ladders to hatcheries to trucking and barging to nitrogen “poisoning.” (Editor).
393

competing resources. As an economic resource, rather than as an essential comSRQHQWRIWKHULYHULQHHFRORJ\RIWKH&ROXPELDDQGRWKHUULYHUVDQDGURPRXV¿VK

JDLQHGVLJQL¿FDQFHLQWKHH\HVRIWKHIHGHUDOGDPEXLOGHUVRIWKHHUD46 In addiWLRQGDPVZHUHRQO\RQHFDXVHDOEHLWDPDMRUFDXVHRIGHFOLQLQJ¿VKSRSXODtions along the Columbia and other rivers. On this latter point, several forms of 

resource exploitation—mining, cattle grazing, lumbering—created water pollution problems on the Columbia and Snake Rivers because of runoff which adYHUVHO\DIIHFWHG¿VKVWRFNV,UULJDWHGDJULFXOWXUHLQFUHDVHGGHPDQGIRUZDWHUDQG

killed salmon with its diversion dams and unscreened ditches. Small dams, goLQJEDFNWRWKHODWHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\DOVRZHUHGHVWUXFWLYHWR¿VKSRSXODWLRQV

By the 1930s, vast areas of spawning grounds had already disappeared, and 

catches had declined dramatically through intensive commercial harvesting and 

canning operations. Efforts at conservation had been meek at best.47

The multipurpose dams, without a doubt, raised the stakes for anadURPRXV¿VKLQWKH3DFL¿F1RUWKZHVWDQGHOVHZKHUH)HDURIWKHHUDGLFDWLRQRI

VDOPRQDQGRWKHUPLJUDWRU\¿VKEHFDPHDJDOYDQL]LQJLVVXHLQWKHHDUO\¿JKWIRU

¿VKDQGZLOGOLIHFRQVHUYDWLRQ1DVFHQWFRQVHUYDWLRQJURXSVVXFKDVWKH,]DDN

:DOWRQ/HDJXHIRXQGHGLQDQGODWHUWKH1DWLRQDO:LOGOLIH)HGHUDWLRQ

(formed in 1936), battled for the protection of aquatic habitats throughout the 

FRXQWU\,QWKH)LVKDQG:LOGOLIH&RRUGLQDWLRQ$FWUHTXLUHGWKHEXLOGHUVRI

IHGHUDORUIHGHUDOO\OLFHQVHGGDPVWRFRQVXOWZLWKWKH)LVKDQG:LOGOLIH6HUYLFH

WRSUHYHQWORVVRUGDPDJHWRZLOGOLIHUHVRXUFHV7KLVZDVWKH¿UVWODZLQWHQGHG

to protect wildlife in water projects.48

Along the Columbia River, the most concern focused on the fate of the 

salmon; the issue was most especially the survival of a vital industry and a fragLOHUHVRXUFH7KRVHGLUHFWO\EHQH¿WWLQJIURPWKHVXUYLYDORIWKHVDOPRQ2VSRUWVmen, canners, Native Americans—loudly objected to the potential effects of the 

KLJKGDPVRQ¿VKPLJUDWLRQ$QGFRQVHUYDWLRQLVWVFKLPHGLQWRVXSSRUWWKRVHLQterests. An article in Nature Magazine claimed, not entirely accurately, in 1938, 

on the heels of the construction of Bonneville Dam: 

The sad part of projects of this sort [dams and inland waterway 

and irrigation projects on the Columbia, Willamette, and Snake 

Rivers] is that the surveys upon which they are based are concerned only with the feasibility of the construction. Little or no 

attention is paid to what resources may be destroyed in the process. . . . On the destruction side, the Columbia and Willamette 

dams mean the eventual destruction of the salmon industry. . . .

[The industry] supports thousands of families and keeps them 

off the relief rolls.49
394

 7KHGHYHORSPHQWRI¿VKZD\VDW%RQQHYLOOHGHVLJQHGWRDOORZWKH¿VKWR

migrate around the dam, was viewed by many as a workable solution to the problem, but, nonetheless, led to some controversy. While the Corps recognized the 

QHHGIRUSDVVDJHVWRSURWHFWDQDGURPRXV¿VKZHOOEHIRUH%RQQHYLOOH¶VFRQVWUXFtion, the rush to begin the work to provide unemployment relief resulted in a lag 

LQUH¿QLQJGHWDLOVRID¿VKSDVVDJHSODQ50 In the end, Bonneville included three 

FRQFUHWH3¿VKODGGHUV ́DQGWZRVHWVRI¿VKOLIWV

Some were impressed with the success of these measures. A 1951 study 

proclaimed: “Perhaps the most amazing feature to the tourist is not Bonneville’s 

SRZHUKRXVHRUHYHQLWVJLDQWORFNEXWWKHDPD]LQJ¿VKODGGHUV ́51 Others 

ZHUHFDXWLRXVO\RSWLPLVWLFWKDWWKHODGGHUVDQGORFNVZRXOGKDYHVRPHEHQH¿W

WRWKHQRZVWUXJJOLQJ¿VKHULHVLQGXVWU\52 Still others were dubious, arguing eiWKHUWKDWWKHFRVWSHU¿VKZDVWRRKLJKWRPHULWVXFFHVVRUWKHLQQRYDWLYHWHFKnology failed to deliver on its promise. Assistant Chief of Engineers Thomas 

5RELQV1RUWK3DFL¿F'LYLVLRQ(QJLQHHULQWKHVZKHQ%RQQHYLOOHZDVEHing constructed), among others, defended the Corps against charges that juvenile 

¿VKPRUWDOLW\LQGDPWXUELQHVZDVKLJKDQGWKXVWKUHDWHQHGWKHVDOPRQSRSXODWLRQ0RUHSUREOHPVDURVHKHDUJXHGZKHQMXYHQLOH¿VKZHUHÀXVKHGGRZQ

spillways, where they encountered water saturated with nitrogen gas which could 

cause gas bubble disease.53:KLOHPRUHLQWHQVLYHVWXG\FRQWLQXHGRQ¿VKODGGHUV

DQGORFNVMXYHQLOH¿VKDQGWXUELQHVDQGRWKHUWKUHDWVWRDQDGURPRXV¿VKXQcertainty remained as to the effectiveness of the plan at Bonneville to protect the 

VDOPRQDQGWKH¿VKHULHVLQGXVWU\DQGVWLOOWRSURGXFHK\GURHOHFWULFSRZHU54

Grand Coulee Dam posed a related, but different, problem for the salmRQDQGWKH¿VKHULHVLQGXVWU\7KH%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQZKLFKKDGWDNHQ

FKDUJHRIWKHGDPSURMHFWLQIDFHGWKHVDPHVRUWRIVFUXWLQ\RYHULWV¿VK

policy as had the Corps at Bonneville. Critics claimed that Reclamation cared 

OLWWOHDERXWVDOPRQLIWKHUHZDVDFKRLFHWREHPDGHEHWZHHQ¿VKDQGRWKHUHFRnomic contributions of the project. However, Reclamation initially recommendHGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDÀXPHDQGDPHFKDQLFDOHOHYDWRUWRFDUU\¿VKDURXQGWKH

dam. The plan proved unsatisfactory because Grand Coulee would be too high. 

$OWHUQDWLYHVZHUHFRQVLGHUHGEXWZLWKRXWUHVROXWLRQ7HPSRUDU\¿VKODGGHUV

ZHUHDXWKRUL]HGGXULQJWKHHDUO\FRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHGDPEXW¿QDOO\LQ

an emergency plan for capturing chinook and blueback salmon was announced. 

,Q0D\¿VKWUDSVDW5RFN,VODQGEHJDQRSHUDWLQJDQGWKH¿UVWWUXFNVFDUU\LQJ

VDOPRQPRWRUHGDURXQGWKHGDPVLWH)RFXVWXUQHGWRKDWFKHULHVDQGLQ$XJXVW

1941, 50,000 chinook salmon raised at a hatchery in Leavenworth were released 

into the Entiat River. Although Reclamation announced that the salmon transplant experiment was a success, many remained skeptical.55
395

 7KHGDPVRQWKH&ROXPELD5LYHUKDGFDXVHGVLJQL¿FDQWHFRORJLFDO

changes, such as increasing the temperature of the water, and had, at the very 

least, accelerated the decline of the salmon runs. At Grand Coulee, which now 

sealed off the upper Columbia to salmon, a make-shift solution to preserving the 

¿VKDQGWKH¿VKHULHVKDGUHSODFHGWKHQDWXUDOPLJUDWLRQZLWKTXHVWLRQDEOHUHVXOWV

The diversion of salmon to other locations may have preserved some salmon, but 

above the dam the species could not survive as before.56

The Echo Park Controversy

Until some years after World War II, concern about the environmental 

LPSOLFDWLRQVRIGDPVKDGIRFXVHGODUJHO\RQVLWHVSHFL¿FLVVXHVÀRRGLQJDQG

silting; dam failures as opposed to general attention to dam safety; and salmon 

on the Columbia and Snake Rivers. Questioning the inherent value of dams and 

their impact on the environment rarely entered the discourse. The Echo Park 

controversy changed this. It helped move along a process that inevitably resulted 

in fracturing a rather uneasy consensus on the conservation value of dams, polarizing the sides, and increasingly casting the Corps and Reclamation as anti-environmental. It also saw the coming of age of several environmental organizations, 

and suggested that the public could become involved in environmental issues as 

never before.

At the heart of the Echo Park controversy was the effort to save national 

parks and national monuments from inundation and resource exploitation. Echo 

Park became the biggest battle over wilderness preservation since Hetch Hetchy. 

By the 1950s, the old conservation movement was maturing, broadening its perspective to embrace a range of issues including wilderness preservation, wildlife 

habitat protection, outdoor recreation, a burgeoning interest in pollution, and the 

perpetuation of national parks and monuments. The Izaak Walton League was 

WKHODUJHVWDQGPRVWSROLWLFDOO\DFWLYHJURXS7KH1DWLRQDO:LOGOLIH)HGHUDWLRQ

ZDVOLQNHGFORVHO\ZLWKKXQWHUVDQG¿VKHUPHQ7KH$XGXERQ6RFLHW\EURDGHQHG

its scope to embrace wildlife conservation in general, and the Wilderness Society, 

which had begun in the East, became known for its advocacy of wilderness protection in the West. The Sierra Club, along with the Wilderness Society, was beginning to develop a reputation as an outspoken critic of government dam builders, among others, and to expand its interests well beyond its California roots.57

Big dams became the harbinger of a threatened public landscape. At 

¿UVWDGDPDW(FKR3DUN2ORFDWHGDWWKHSRLQWZKHUHWKH<DPSD5LYHUMRLQVWKH

Green River along the Utah-Colorado border—was just another proposed project for the Bureau of Reclamation. It was part of the Colorado River Storage 

Project initiated in the 1940s to make additional water available for rural and urban residents in four states—Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah—in 
396

the Upper Colorado River Basin. It also was part of a major “participating project,” the Central Utah Project. The construction of the dam, however, would inundate Echo Park, a scenic valley upstream from the proposed dam, and miles 

of nearby Lodore and Yampa Canyons, all of which lie within Dinosaur National 

Monument. In 1915, President Woodrow Wilson had designated 80 acres of the 

area, where dinosaur bones had been discovered, as a national monument. In 

3UHVLGHQW)UDQNOLQ5RRVHYHOWH[SDQGHGWKHVLWHWRDFUHV58

The Green River, a major tributary of the Colorado, narrowed as it 

passed through the cliffs at the core of Dinosaur National Monument, immediately below Echo Park, and offered an attractive dam site for generating hydroelectric power for the surrounding states. Since the national monument was located in a remote spot on the Colorado Plateau and had seen few visitors, the dam 

builders saw no reason why the National Park Service, which had jurisdiction 

over Echo Park, would object to the proposed construction. During World War 

II, before Reclamation made a formal claim to the site, the National Park Service 

displayed no strong reaction to the idea. However, the issue became a jurisdictional and a political matter after the war. Reclamation had enthusiastic support for the dam from the Upper Basin states of New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, 

and Wyoming, but the National Park Service refused to support it. Secretary of 

the Interior Oscar Chapman now had to mediate the dispute, and if he agreed 

with Reclamation, legislation could be written incorporating the new dam and 

then sent off to Congress for its approval. After public hearings in April 1950, 

Chapman was persuaded that the proposal had merit and approved the building 

of Echo Park Dam.59

The decision to build Echo Park Dam produced energetic opponents, 

none more vocal and committed than preservationist groups. It is not a cliche 

to suggest that the controversy exposed a clash of environmental values, resulting in the galvanizing of a preservationist coalition that would continue to question the river management policies of Reclamation and the Corps. Echo Park 

Dam would not violate Reclamation’s commitment to resource conservationism. 

To the contrary, the new dam would help to tame an unruly river and to maximize the use of riverine resources in the region. Preservationists were particularly concerned that building the dam would not only destroy a unique wilderness area, but would set a terrible precedent for exploiting resources in America’s 

national parks and monuments. They had reason to be alarmed because between 

1945 and 1950, Olympic National Park, Grand Canyon National Park, Glacier 

1DWLRQDO3DUN-DFNVRQ+ROH1DWLRQDO0RQXPHQW6XSHULRU1DWLRQDO)RUHVWDQG

WKH$GLURQGDFN)RUHVW3UHVHUYHKDGEHHQWKUHDWHQHGE\YDULRXVHFRQRPLFLQWHUests. But at Echo Park, a federal bureau was making plans to “invade” a national 

monument.6086*UDQW,,,DIRUPHUJHQHUDORI¿FHUZLWKWKH&RUSVDQGSUHVLdent of the American Planning and Civic Association, chided Reclamation for the 
397

decision to build the Echo Park Dam and Split Mountain Reservoir: “The Trojan 

Horse in our national park system, model 1950, is now driven by electricity supplied from water power impounded behind great dams.”61 Bernard DeVoto, then 

a writer for Harper’s MagazineZURWHDQH[SRVpLQWKH-XO\LVVXHRI

the Saturday Evening Post, of the decision to build the Echo Park Dam: “Shall 

:H/HWWKHP5XLQ2XU1DWLRQDO3DUNV" ́'H9RWRVHUYHGRQWKH6HFUHWDU\RI

the Interior’s Advisory Board and was privy to a debate over the building of the 

dam between Bureau Commissioner Michael Straus and Park Service Director 

Newton Drury. Since Drury could not take his feelings public, DeVoto decided to air the issue and also attacked Reclamation and the Corps for their proposals to put dams in national parks.62 The article and the decision to go ahead with 

the dam mobilized wilderness advocates. Eventually, the leaders of 32 opposition organizations created a lobbying group, the Citizens Committee on Natural 

Resources, to take the battle to Washington.63

Political allies “proved vitally necessary” to the campaign to save Echo 

Park because neither the modern regulatory apparatus for environmental protection nor access to a wide array of media outlets were available to wilderness advocates at mid-twentieth century. Allies would have to be courted in eastern, 

midwestern, and southern states, where skepticism was high about the viability of hydropower to pay for multipurpose projects. In addition, concerns were 

deep about adding more acreage to the agricultural economy. On another front, 

California might be counted on for opposition to the dam because of its claims 

on Colorado River water. Other potential allies, but equally strange bedfellows, 

ZHUH¿VFDOFRQVHUYDWLYHVRSSRVHGWRIHGHUDOSXEOLFZRUNVDQGSULYDWHXWLOLW\

companies fearing public power. In Congress, the strongest opposition to Echo 

Park came from the House of Representatives.64

 )RUPXFKRIWKH¿UVWKDOIRIWKHVWKHIXWXUHRIWKH(FKR3DUN

3URMHFWZDVXQFHUWDLQDVJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVYDFLOODWHGDPLGVWDEOL]]DUGRIUHports. Opponents stepped up their protests, and lawmakers squabbled. Bending 

to pressure, Secretary of the Interior Chapman reversed his previous pronouncement and established a task force in November 1951 to explore alternative sites 

WR(FKR3DUN:KHQKHOHIWRI¿FHLQ-DQXDU\QHZO\DSSRLQWHG6HFUHWDU\

of the Interior Douglas McKay would have to decide where the Eisenhower 

Administration would stand on the issue. McKay did not favor withholding natural resources from economic development, even if they were in national parks 

DQGPRQXPHQWV+RZHYHUEHIRUHWDNLQJDSRVLWLRQRQWKHVSHFL¿FSURSRVDORI

Echo Park, he dispatched Undersecretary of the Interior Ralph Tudor (a former 

86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVRI¿FHUWRWKH'LQRVDXU1DWLRQDO0RQXPHQWVLWH

to reevaluate Reclamation’s calculations about the rates of evaporation at the 

proposed reservoir.656XFK¿JXUHVZHUHYLWDOWRGHWHUPLQHWKHDELOLW\RIDGDPsite to store a maximum amount of water at a reasonable cost. Tudor reported 
398

WKDWWKH(FKR3DUNVLWHZDVYDVWO\EHWWHUWKDQDOWHUQDWLYHV%DVHGRQWKH¿QGLQJV

McKay approved Echo Park Dam as part of the Colorado River Storage Project 

in December 1953.66

Congress took up the authorization of the project, with the inclusion of 

Echo Park Dam, in 1954, and with bipartisan support, the chances for passage 

seemed good. However, protests of the proposed legislation elevated the issue 

to national status, and the intensity of the debate started several years before had 

QRWEHHQTXHOOHG)UHG03DFNDUGH[HFXWLYHVHFUHWDU\RIWKH1DWLRQDO3DUNV

Association, a leading conservationist group, strongly asserted, “The issue is 

clear-cut, in spite of the fog of technical data and irrelevant side issues that have 

confused its comprehension by Congress and the public.”67 Probably the most 

devastating critique came from Sierra Club Executive Director David Brower, 

ZKRFKDOOHQJHG5HFODPDWLRQ¶VHYDSRUDWLRQ¿JXUHV8VLQJUDWKHUHOHPHQWDU\

math and a few charts, he proved to a congressional subcommittee that Echo 

Park was not likely to save as much water as supporters’ argued. Also other evidence was surfacing that the Colorado River Storage Project was more of a power-generation project than a water storage project as argued by Reclamation. In 

this context, power anticipated from Echo Park would be expensive, making the 

site even less economically desirable.

All this, plus aesthetic arguments about the inundation of a national 

PRQXPHQWZRUNHGDJDLQVWVXSSRUWIRU(FKR3DUNLQ&RQJUHVV7KH¿QDOVWUDZ

however, may have been the threat by the wilderness groups that they would 

¿JKWWKHSURMHFWDVDZKROHLI(FKR3DUNZDVQRWUHPRYHGIURPWKHSURSRVHGOHJislation. An open letter to the “Strategy Committee” of the upper Colorado River 

Storage Project, written by the Council of Conservationists, stated:

:HZDQW\RXWRNQRZWKDWZHZLOO¿JKWZLWKHYHU\KRQHVWGHvice at our command if the Upper Colorado bill continues to 

include, or require--now or at some later date--a dam at Echo 

Park, or elsewhere in a national park or monument.

What had been a loose-knit group of local and regional conservation 

groups had acquired a loud, national voice. On April 11, 1956, President Dwight 

Eisenhower signed Public Law 485 authorizing the Colorado River Storage 

Project–without Echo Park Dam.68

The conventional wisdom has it that the price the preservationists paid 

for saving Echo Park was a concession on the Glen Canyon Dam, which would 

VXEVWLWXWHIRULWLQWKHSURMHFW)URPWKHVWDUWKRZHYHU(FKR3DUN'DPDQG*OHQ

Canyon Dam had been interconnected in Reclamation’s plans to develop the 

Colorado. In addition, the aesthetics of Glen Canyon were not well known in 
399

the 1950s, and after all, opponents of the Echo Park Dam clearly focused on saving Dinosaur from intrusion. In the debate over evaporation, Brower had made 

the strong case against a high dam at Echo Park, believing a high dam at Glen 

Canyon—a site barely within the Upper Colorado River Basin—was one more 

argument against building a dam at Echo Park. At the time, Reclamation preferred the high dam at Echo Park and a low dam at Glen Canyon because the 

Upper Basin states wanted a site “safely within their territory” to protect their 

water rights. A dam at Glen Canyon would likely supply power downstream to 

Arizona and California rather than in the Upper Basin, but with the addition of 

WKH(FKR3DUN'DP&DOLIRUQLDZRXOGQRWEHYLHZHGDVVLQJXODUO\EHQH¿WWLQJ

from the project. In Congress, Reclamation could make that case and likely garner broader support for the overall project.69

Reclamation did not get all it wanted in Congress, but neither did the 

wilderness advocates. Although the Echo Park case was a major victory for national park and monument preservation and a galvanizing event in the burgeoning modern environmental movement, regrets remained over Glen Canyon. 

Storage produced by the dam sometimes intruded into the Rainbow Bridge 

National Monument. A new round of litigation and debate followed, caustic enough to create major tensions within the environmental community over 

what compromise may have been struck in 1956 and the potential loss of scenic 

lands.70 David Brower certainly had regrets, believing that he was partly responsible for the “death” of Glen Canyon.71 There were to be no clear victories for

 either side.

Dams and the Modern Environmental Movement

As the big dam era was coming to an end in the 1960s, controversy surrounding dam building took a decidedly different tone. The substantive issues 

around which debate had occurred prior to that time largely remained the same—

ÀRRGLQJVLOWLQJDQGVDOLQLW\GDPVDIHW\GDPVLWLQJDQGGLVSODFHPHQWRISHRple; and threats to natural environments. But the context was different. Wallace 

Stegner noted in 1965: 

Water, once paramount, has become secondary. The questionable dams are never simple water holes. What dictates the damVLWHLVDVRIWHQDVQRWWKHSRZHUKHDGHI¿FLHQWJHQHUDWLRQRI

power calls for a higher dam, and hence a bigger lake, than a 

simple waterhole does.72

5HGH¿QLQJ3ULVN ́LQDQLQFUHDVLQJO\VRSKLVWLFDWHGDQGFRPSOH[HQYLURQPHQtal era meant greater challenges to building and utilizing dams, not simply critiFLVPVRIVSHFL¿FGDPV7KHDFWRIGDPEXLOGLQJZDVLQFUHDVLQJO\FRPLQJLQWR
400

question, with trade-offs that were much more general in perception than the displacement of a special group of people or the inundation of a particular valley. 

Dam building was being questioned for threatening wild rivers and endangered 

species, for overbuilding structures at the expense of natural sites, and for 

placing too much emphasis on unrelenting economic growth. In addition, as historians have noted, “Beginning in the 1960s, an increasingly urbanized, educated 

society focused more on recreation, environmental preservation, and water qualLW\WKDQRQLUULJDWLRQQDYLJDWLRQRUÀRRGFRQWURO ́73

In this setting, Reclamation and the Corps were increasingly scrutinized. 

Beginning in the late 1960s, it became more common to question their organizaWLRQWKHLUPLVVLRQDQGWKHLUFRVWEHQH¿WUDWLRV(OL]DEHWK%'UHZLQDLVsue of the Atlantic, expressed the opinion that the Corps was unwilling to change 

ZLWKWKHWLPHVDQGVKHTXRWHGLWVFKLHI/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO)-&ODUNHDVVD\-

ing “With our country growing the way it is, we cannot simply sit back and let 

nature take its course.” She added that despite the rigidity of Corps policy, few 

politicians were willing to criticize the Corps publicly because “almost all of 

WKHPZDQWVRPHWKLQJIURPLWDWVRPHSRLQW2DGDPDKDUERUDÀRRGFRQWURO

project.” A Nation article in 1966 branded the Corps as “the pork-barrel soldiers” 

with anti-environmental aims.74 How would dam builders respond to new challenges in an era when dams and reservoirs were no longer praised unreservedly 

IRUKDUQHVVLQJXQWDPHGULYHUV"

What made the modern environmental movement so remarkable was the 

speed with which it gained national attention in the late 1960s. Nothing epitomized that appeal better than Earth Day. The idea began as a “teach-in” on the 

model of an anti-Vietnam War tactic. In Earth Day—The Beginning, the staff of 

Environmental Action (formerly Environmental Teach-In, Inc.) declared:

On April 22, [1970,] a generation dedicated itself to reclaiming 

the planet. A new kind of movement was born—a bizarre alliance that spans the ideological spectrum from campus militants 

to middle Americans. Its aim: to reverse our rush toward 

extinction.

Across the country, on 2,000 college campuses, in 10,000 high schools, 

and in parks and various open areas, as many as 20 million people celebrated what was purportedly “the largest, cleanest, most peaceful demonstration in 

America’s history.” In form, Earth Day was so much like a 1960s-style peace 

demonstration that the Daughters of the American Revolution insisted that it 

must be subversive. In fact, however, it was pitched at moderate activists, somewhere between the New Left and the older conservationist groups, such as the 

Sierra Club and the Audubon Society. As a symbol of the new enthusiasm for 
401

environmental matters, and as a public recognition of a trend already well underway, Earth Day served its purpose.75

The Richard Nixon Administration gave its blessings to Earth Day. In 

KLV¿UVW6WDWHRIWKH8QLRQPHVVDJHWKH3UHVLGHQWGHFODUHG3&OHDQDLUFOHDQZDter, open spaces—these should be the birthright of every American.” On January 

1, 1970, four months earlier, Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy 

Act (NEPA) of 1969. While opposing the bill until it cleared the congressional 

conferees, the administration ultimately embraced it as its own. By identifying 

his administration with environmentalism, Nixon wanted to address the issue on 

his own terms. Many people trumpeted their approval of the President’s gesture; 

others reserved judgment or remained cynical.76

NEPA was far from “the Magna Carta of environmental protection” that 

some people proclaimed, but it nonetheless called for federal bureaus and agencies to consider environmental effects, and ways of reducing those effects, before 

funding, approving, or carrying out projects. NEPA did not mandate particular 

results, but it did arguably promote efforts to preserve and enhance the environment. It particularly emphasized the application of science, disclosure, and public participation in the decision making process and in the search for solutions. 

With respect to integrated river basin management, the National Environmental 

Policy Act encouraged Reclamation and the Corps to give more attention to environmental considerations and also gave environmental agencies more say in the 

process.77

NEPA, in addition, required federal agencies to prepare environmental 

LPSDFWVWDWHPHQWV(,6IRUWKRVHSURMHFWVWKDWZRXOGVLJQL¿FDQWO\LPSDFWWKHHQYLURQPHQW7KHVHSURYLVLRQVIRULQVWDQFHVWLSXODWHGWKDWHDUO\SXEOLFQRWL¿FDtion should be given that an EIS was being prepared and that citizen comments 

VKRXOGEHSDUWRIWKH¿QDOVWDWHPHQW$Q(,6FRXOGOHDGWRGHFLVLRQVWRSODFH

limits on construction and could lead to resiting of structures. The new law gave 

opponents of dams a tool to slow down or impede construction.78 According to 

one source, by the mid-1970s seven Corps projects were halted as the result of 

environmentalist litigation. Of the remaining 61 environmental suits being litigated, 27 involved alleged violations of NEPA.79

NEPA provided substantial opportunity for citizen participation, especially through the review of EISes and other environmental documents. It established the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to review government activities pertaining to the environment, to develop impact statement guidelines, 

and to advise the president on environmental matters.80 The CEQ was essentially 

a presidential instrument, and governmental environmental programs remained 

widely dispersed. In early 1970, the Council recommended the establishment 
402

of a Department of Natural Resources and the Environment to centralize several departments and bureaus into one agency, but the departments of Interior, 

Agriculture, and Commerce resisted such a consolidation of programs.

In June it was announced that pollution control programs and the evaluation of impact statements would be the responsibility of a new body—the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which began operations in December 

1970 under the direction of William Ruckelshaus. Initially, it included divisions 

of water pollution, air pollution, pesticides, solid waste, and radiation. Other natural resource and environmental programs remained in other agencies, especialO\WKH'HSDUWPHQWVRI&RPPHUFHDQG,QWHULRU0RUHVLJQL¿FDQWO\(3$GLGQRW

have single overall statutory authority for environmental protection; it simply adPLQLVWHUHGDVHULHVRIVSHFL¿FVWDWXWHVGLUHFWHGDWSDUWLFXODUHQYLURQPHQWDOSURElems.81

Despite some of the tentative steps of NEPA and limits in EPA’s authority, national environmental policy was undergoing a substantial change in the 

1970s. As early as the late 1940s and 1950s, social scientists and others already 

had begun to attack government agencies with responsibility for conservation 

programs. They found them self-serving and denied that their experts had special knowledge of what constituted “the public interest.” The practice of delegating discretionary authority to administrative elites in the Progressive Era was 

questioned severely. In its place, calls came for greater political accountability among government bureaucrats, more congressional control, public access 

through the courts, and opening of the decision making process to any affected 

interest.82

 %\WKHPLGVHQYLURQPHQWDOLVPZDVDVROLGO\¿[HGQDWLRQDOPRYHment. Mainstream environmental groups responded by taking greater initiative in helping to draft new legislation, pressing for the implementation of existing legislation, focusing on the environmental impact review process, and monitoring government agencies. Demand rose to strengthen conservation laws for 

managing resources and to step up efforts in nature protection. Criticism rose 

against the traditional government role of promoting economic growth at the expense of resource depletion. In addition, the courts became an important battleground as more litigation tested key regulatory provisions. Inevitably, such 

H[WHQVLYHFKDQJHVLQHQYLURQPHQWDOSROLF\PDNLQJEURXJKWDERXWVLJQL¿FDQW

changes in the relationship between the environmental community and agencies 

like the Corps and Reclamation.83

Not surprisingly, Reclamation and the Corps balked at the rising environmental criticism of their efforts in the 1960s and 1970s, often resisting the 

conclusion that the context in which water and dam projects found themselves 
403

had changed. Justifying new dams on the grounds of economic growth, tradiWLRQDOÀRRGFRQWUROFRQFHSWVUHFUHDWLRQDORSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGVRIRUWKKDGPXFK

less resonance in an era when charges of pork-barrel projects and environmental 

degradation of natural landscapes were increasingly heard not only by 

environmental interest groups, but by a public increasingly suspicious of federal programs of any kind. Supporters of Reclamation and the Corps, however, claimed that the agencies made real efforts to adjust and to change in the 

IDFHRILQWHQVLI\LQJFULWLFLVP)RUH[DPSOHUHVHDUFKHUV'DQLHO0D]PDQLDQDQG

0RUGHFDL/HHDVNHGWKHTXHVWLRQRIWKH&RUSV3&DQ%XUHDXFUDFLHV&KDQJH" ́

Their conclusion was that they can. Their assessment was that the Corps was 

aware of its “lack of capacity” to confront broad ecological questions as early as 

the mid-1960s. In response, it established an Environmental Resources Branch 

within the Planning Division in 1966.

In April 1970, the Chief of Engineers established the Environmental 

Advisory Board (EAB) to examine policies and programs, to identify problems, and to recommend changes. The board was unique in the sense that it 

was not established as an in-house body, but composed of members of environmental groups, albeit relatively moderate groups, outside the Corps. Among the 

board’s activities was recommending the establishment of the Environmental 

Reconnaissance Inventory, a comprehensive resource inventory initially implemented in four locations in the mid-1970s.84 The board concept certainly has had 

limits, however. Not surprisingly, consensus on issues was not easy to reach as 

the board periodically found itself divided on policy. Also, attention to pressing immediate issues, such as lawsuits or congressional deadlines, impeded effort at long-range planning.85 The relationship between the Corps and the environmental community remained cautious and often adversarial in the 1970s despite the internal changes in the bureau. Environmentalists often discovered that 

projects stopped by court injunctions were ultimately under construction after 

revised EIS reports were prepared. As historian Jeffrey Stine has observed, in 

the 1970s “The Corps . . . regarded the environmental legislation as a mandate 

not to stop building, but to build in the best possible way. . . .”86 Like the Corps, 

Reclamation had projects held up by environmental protests and lost some political support in Congress, but it managed to continue developing some important 

projects in the 1970s.87 Neither bureau, however, rose to the heights of the big 

dam era.

Flood Control and Non-Structural Alternatives

As much as the environmental context had changed beginning in the 

mid-1960s, and as much as Reclamation and the Corps seemed willing to, or 

were forced to, bend to changing national environmental policy, divisive issues 

RYHUWKHLPSDFWRIGDPVUHPDLQHG)DPLOLDULVVXHVKRZHYHUZHUHFRORUHGDQG
404

ÀDYRUHGE\JURZLQJUHVLVWDQFHWRWKHYDOXHRIELJGDPVSURPRWHGE\DQDUUD\RI

FULWLFV7KH&RUSVFRQWLQXHGWRDUJXHLQIDYRURIÀRRGFRQWUROSURMHFWVDVEHQH¿FLDOWRORFDOFRPPXQLWLHV%XWLQFUHDVLQJSUHVVXUHZDVEHLQJH[HUWHGRQWKH

Corps to consider non-structural alternatives to dams and levees as 

ÀRRGFRQWUROGHYLFHV6XJJHVWLRQVZHUHPDGHIRUWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIGHWHQWLRQ

SRQGVIRUÀRRGZDWHUVRUIRUH[SDQGLQJJUHHQEHOWVDORQJÀRRGSODLQODQGVQHDU

VWUHDPV6HFWLRQRIWKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWSURPRWHG3PXOWLREMHFWLYH

planning,” a form of planning that recognizes noneconomic values such as environmental quality along with economic interests.88

Water Quality and Other Environmental Impacts

A substantial context for change in dealing with repercussions of dam 

building focused on water quality and related issues in the new environmental 

era. Sentiment grew that dams were “the least reversible form of river alteration” and resulted in deleterious physical changes in the nation’s river basins.89 

Whereas issues of silting and salinity received at best modest attention before 

the mid-1960s, a variety of more direct questions arose after that time about 

the quality of water resulting from dam and reservoir construction, the buildup of silt behind reservoirs, and the residual impacts of intense irrigation. As 

Donald Pisani noted, “Environmentalists saw clear limits to economic growth 

and worried about such problems as siltation, alkali buildup, and the poisoning of 

groundwater with herbicides and pesticides.”90

By their very nature, dams and reservoirs changed the riverine ecology.91 

Certainly, reservoirs can improve water quality for many users, and dams of different design and operation can produce different effects downstream. “The ability of large dams to compensate for the unpredictability” of nature, one study 

noted, “is what makes them so attractive . . .”92 However, changes occur from a 

IUHHÀRZLQJHQYLURQPHQWWRDVWDQGLQJRUODNHHQYLURQPHQWGURZQLQJDYDULHW\

RIQDWLYHÀRUDDQGIDXQDUXLQLQJIRUHVWVDOWHULQJRUGHVWUR\LQJULSDULDQYHJHWDtion and habitat, encouraging evaporation which concentrates salts, and someWLPHVFUHDWLQJPXGÀDWV:DWHUUHOHDVHGIURPGDPVLVOLNHO\WREHORZLQR[\-

gen, thus threatening river life. In deep reservoirs, the water column can stratify 

by temperature. Little oxygen or light can reach the lower strata, and the upper 

stratum becomes warmer. This change can create a forbidding environment for 

FROGZDWHU¿VKDQGFDQDOORZIRUWKHKDELWDWWREHWDNHQRYHUE\RWKHUVSHFLHV

Dams can alter water temperature in other ways as well. At Glen Canyon Dam, 

for example, water released into the Colorado River is approximately 20 degrees 

colder than would be natural, which destroys many native organisms. Much of 

the river cannot produce algae, which in turn disrupts the food chain.93 On the 

RWKHUKDQGVXFKVLWXDWLRQVVRPHWLPHVUHVXOWLQÀRXULVKLQJWURSK\FROGZDWHU¿VKeries.
405

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IRULUULJDWRUVDQGRWKHUZDWHUXVHUVDUWL¿FLDOO\UHJXODWHGÀRZVSURGXFHDQXPEHU

RISUREOHPV1DWLYHULYHUDQLPDOVDQGSODQWVKDYHDGLI¿FXOWWLPHDGMXVWLQJWR

FRQVWDQWÀRZVDQGFRQVWDQWWHPSHUDWXUHVZKHQWKHQDWXUDOUK\WKPVRIULYHUVDUH

DOWHUHG:LWKRXWKLJKÀRZVVLOWGRHVQRWJHWÀXVKHGIURPWKHVWUHDPEHGJUDYHOKDUPLQJPDQ\VSHFLHVRI¿VKDQGLQVHFWVWKDWGHSHQGRQFOHDQR[\JHQDWHG

JUDYHOIRUWKHLUHJJVDQGODUYDH$UWL¿FLDOO\DQGQDWXUDOO\ORZÀRZVFDQFDXVH

back channels and sloughs to dry up, thus destroying primary spawning areas for 

WURXW,QDORZÀRZIURP3DOLVDGHV'DPRQWKH6QDNH5LYHUNLOOHGDSSUR[-

imately 600,000 cutthroat and brown trout, mostly juveniles, along with much of 

the aquatic food chain.94 In spite of this problem the Snake River does support a 

EOXHULEERQWURXW¿VKHU\LQWKHDUHD

Intensive irrigation has led to serious salinity problems in many agricultural regions. As Donald Worster stated, “What nature has taken geological eons 

to achieve, the leaching of salts from the root zone of plants, the irrigator undertakes to do in a matter of decades.” Intensive irrigation can lead to a rising water 

table, bringing dissolved salts to the root zone or to the surface. Growers in the 

Imperial Valley in Southern California faced this daunting prospect, and by the 

early 1970s spent more than $66 million on tile drains and canal linings to capture saline runoff and to discharge it elsewhere. They also faced shifting to salttolerant crops, even though they yielded less income. An alternative was to conVXPHPRUHZDWHULISRVVLEOHWRÀXVKWKHVDOWGHSRVLWV95

The salinity issue took on international proportions in the Colorado 

River Basin. A 1944 treaty had guaranteed Mexico 1.5 million acre-feet, but 

the agreement did not address water quality. Over time, Mexico was receiving 

KHDYLO\VDOLQHGUDLQDJHIURPLUULJDWHG¿HOGVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV,QWKH

Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District, along the lower Gila River in Arizona, discharged drainage water rich in salt into the Colorado River, immediately above 

Mexico’s diversion canal, and essentially doubled the average annual salinity 

RIWKHÀRZDFURVVWKHERUGHU7KH86GHQLHGWKDWLWVWUHDW\LQFOXGHGDQ\REligation on water quality issues, but fresher water was released from American 

dams, and a channel was built to divert the drainage around the Mexican intake 

LQ7KLVSURYHGWREHDWHPSRUDU\VROXWLRQDQG¿QDOO\LQERWKFRXQtries signed an agreement to settle the dispute. Realizing that similar disagreements could break out again, Congress passed the Colorado River Basin Salinity 

Control Act in 1974. All along the Colorado River, use and reuse of the water 

KDGGLPLQLVKHGWKHÀRZDQGFRQWULEXWHGWRGHJUDGDWLRQRIWKHTXDOLW\RIZDWHU

not only as it crossed the border into Mexico, but also in the Imperial Valley and 

for the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California.96
406

The environmental repercussions of dam building are complex and not 

easily resolved— some have argued they are irreversible. One solution was to 

FHDVHEXLOGLQJGDPVRQWKHUHPDLQLQJIUHHÀRZLQJULYHUVLQWKHFRXQWU\5LYHU

preservation was given a boost by the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968. 

While not giving natural features legal standing per se, it provided an alternative 

to resource development by protecting the shorelines of designated rivers from 

federally permitted development. The act was an important sign that the perception of rivers as a commodity in the traditional sense was changing. Yet by the 

1990s, the mileage preserved in the system was less than one percent of the nation’s natural river courses.97

Decaying Dams: The Impending Crisis in Dam Safety

 ,QWKH\HDUVVLQFHWKHPLGVFRQFHUQDERXWWKHVDIHW\RIVSHFL¿F

dams turned into uneasy anxiety about the safety of all existing dams. Those 

built since mid-century, especially federal dams, had a good safety record overall, but there was an increasing likelihood of potential disasters. Some had uncorrected safety problems that had been detected but not addressed. In addiWLRQRIWKHODUJHGDPVWZHQW\¿YHIHHWRUPRUHLQKHLJKWDQGLPSRXQGing more than 16.3 million gallons) 39,000 dams had never been inspected by 

state or federal engineers. The largest percentage of these dams were non-federal 

structures, where the regulatory gap was the greatest. Before the mid-1970s indicators of bigger problems could be found in deterioration and corrective actions 

UHTXLUHGDWGDPV)RULQVWDQFHLQ/DKRQWDQ'DPD5HFODPDWLRQGDPLQ

western Nevada, was found to have crumbling concrete in its spillways. While 

this was a serious problem which did not alone threaten the safety of Lahontan 

Dam, it took twelve years for the Bureau to work with the local irrigation district which managed the dam to produce a formal proposal to rectify it. Navajo 

Dam, a Reclamation structure in northwestern New Mexico, was completed in 

1963 and was found to leak as much as 1.8 million gallons per day by 1977. 

Even though all dams leak, this was considered to be excessive and dangerous 

and required corrective action. Canyon Lake Dam in Rapid City, South Dakota, 

IDLOHGLQ-XQH:DOWHU%RXOGLQ'DPDQ$ODEDPDHDUWK¿OOVWUXFWXUHIDLOHG

E\HURVLRQLQ)HEUXDU\%HDU:DOORZ/DNH'DPDQHPEDQNPHQWGDPLQ

1RUWK&DUROLQDIDLOHGLQ)HEUXDU\$VPDOODQGDQWLTXDWHGHDUWKHQGDP

at Toccoa, Georgia, regarded as a serious hazard, failed in 1977 overwhelming 

7RFFRD)DOOV%LEOH,QVWLWXWHDQGWDNLQJWKLUW\QLQHOLYHV$QGWKHUHZHUHRWKHUV98

These dam failures, accentuated by the failure of Teton Dam, even more 

VRWKDQWKH6W)UDQFLV'DPGLVDVWHURIZHUHDZDNHXSFDOODERXWWKHGHWHriorating condition of dam inventories as well as the safety of dams due to design 

DQGFRQVWUXFWLRQÀDZV'DPVDIHW\HQJLQHHULQJKDGOHGWRLPSURYHGDSSURDFKHV

to embankment dam analysis in the 1960s, studies of embankment liquefaction 
407

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Act in 1972. 99 After the Teton Dam disaster, federal agencies reviewed safety 

practices and established an interagency committee to coordinate dam safety 

programs, which evolved into the Interagency Committee on Dam Safety. It issued management guidelines for planning, design, construction, operation, and 

regulation of dams in the United States. The Corps began seismic investigations and established the Dam Safety Assurance Program in 1977. In 1978, 

Reclamation began its Safety Evaluation of Existing Dams Program, indepenGHQWRIRWKHURI¿FHVLQWKH%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQWRGHWHUPLQHLILWQHHGHG

WRPRYHLQWRDPRGL¿FDWLRQSURJUDPWRPDNHDGDPVDIH7KH1DWLRQDO'DP

,QVSHFWLRQ3URJUDPGHYHORSHGDQLQYHQWRU\RIDERXWGDPVFODVVL¿HGDFcording to the potential for loss of life and property.100 Between December 1977 

and October 1981, approximately 8,800 “high hazard” dams were inspected, 

DQGVSHFL¿FDFWLRQVZHUHUHFRPPHQGHGUDQJLQJIURPDGGLWLRQDOLQVSHFWLRQVWR

emergency repairs. (Subsequent inspections, investigations, and remedial work 

became the responsibility of the owners of the dam.)101 In 1979, the government published Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety to encourage high standards 

among federal agencies. A Presidential Executive Order in July 1979, placed reVSRQVLELOLW\IRUFRRUGLQDWLQJGDPVDIHW\LQWKH)HGHUDO(PHUJHQF\0DQDJHPHQW

Agency.102

With the end of the “big dam era,” dam safety was not so much a question of carefully monitoring new construction as it was being vigilant about the 

deterioration of a large and an increasingly aging inventory of dams and reservoirs. While the Corps and Reclamation moved to shore up safety programs for 

federal dams, they did not have jurisdiction over the thousands of non-federal 

dams throughout the country. A related question, which extended beyond specifLFFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIVDIHW\ZDV:KDWLVWKHXVHIXOOLIHRIWKHVHGDPV"7KLVZDV

both an engineering and an environmental issue.

7ZR)LVK6WRULHV3DFL¿F1RUWKZHVW6DOPRQDQGWKH7HOOLFR6QDLO

Darter

In the wake of the big dam development along the Columbia and Snake 

5LYHUVWKH&RUSVLQYHVWHGPRUHWKDQPLOOLRQLQ¿VKHULHVUHVHDUFKLQDQHIIRUW

to have salmon and steelhead populations coexist with the multipurpose projects. 

,QWKHODUJH)LVKHULHV(QJLQHHULQJ5HVHDUFK/DERUDWRU\ZDVFRQVWUXFWHG

DW%RQQHYLOOHIXUWKHUFRPPLWWLQJWKH&RUSVWRDGGUHVVLQJWKHLVVXHRIDGXOW¿VK

passage beyond the dams. Research efforts also went into studying degradaWLRQRIKDELWDWVDQG¿VKGLVHDVHVVXFKDVJDVEXEEOHGLVHDVHZKLFKKDGEHFRPH

a serious problem after the Corps completed the dams on the lower Snake River 

in the 1960s and 1970s. One estimate suggested that gas supersaturation killed 
408

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&RUSVRUJDQL]HGWKH1LWURJHQ7DVN)RUFHWRFRQIURQWWKHSUREOHP

103

Criticism of both the Corps’ dams and its research continued. While 

WKH&RUSV¶UHVHDUFKLQWKHVIRFXVHGRQDGXOW¿VKSRSXODWLRQVLVVXHVLQYROYLQJMXYHQLOH¿VKZHUHRIWHQQHJOHFWHG)RUH[DPSOHGDPVFRQWLQXHGWREH

built without much information about their impact on young salmon. By the late 

1960s, the Corps was involved in cooperative studies with the National Marine 

)LVKHULHV6HUYLFHDQGVWDWH¿VKHULHVWRLPSURYHE\SDVVHVIRUMXYHQLOH¿VKDQG

in the 1970s, it developed a new transportation program for juvenile passage. 

&ULWLFVEHOLHYHGWKHVHHIIRUWVDWEDUJLQJDQGWUXFNLQJ¿VKZHUHLQHIIHFWLYHDQGWRR

manipulative of natural migrations. These complaints and accusations were suSHULPSRVHGRYHUULYDOULHVEHWZHHQ1DWLYH$PHULFDQDQGFRPPHUFLDO¿VKHUPHQ

FRQFHUQLQJWKHWDNLQJRI¿VKGLVDJUHHPHQWVZLWK¿VKHULHVDJHQFLHVRYHUWKHEHVW

methods of protecting salmon and steelhead, and resistance from those who opposed the building of additional dams.

Dealing with a new generation of environmentalists proved particularly 

vexing for the Corps. Its response to criticisms of conservationists in the wake of 

Bonneville had been to help preserve a precious natural resource—anadromous 

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DQGÀRRGFRQWURO7KHVXEVHTXHQWUHVHDUFKSURJUDPVWKDWWKH&RUSVIRVWHUHGRU

participated in were largely to meet that end. Now criticisms were being raised 

DERXWNHHSLQJDQDGURPRXV¿VKLQWKHLUQDWXUDOKDELWDW±DFRQFHUQVKDUHGE\

1DWLYH$PHULFDQJURXSV±VRDVQRWWRFUHDWH3DTXDULXP¿VK ́RU3WRNHQ]RRUXQV ́

There were objections to building any additional dams because they could threatHQ¿VKKDELWDWVDWDWLPHZKHQUXQVZHUHGLVDSSHDULQJIURPPDQ\ULYHUV,QDGdition, a change in tone in the modern environmental era respecting “the water 

ULJKWVRI¿VK ́VHHPHGWRKDYHFKDQJHGWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHGHEDWH

104

The substantial change in the environmental regulatory apparatus in the 

VWUDQVIRUPHG¿VKIURPWKHYLFWLPVRIGDPEXLOGLQJLQWRDZHDSRQWR¿JKW

dam construction. The Tellico Dam controversy is the most notable example. 

The Tellico Project, on the Little Tennessee River south of Knoxville, was originally suggested in 1936 as part of the TVA system. Initial appropriations from 

Congress were not approved until 1966; construction began the next year. At the 

time, opponents questioned the project at congressional hearings, pointing out 

that the river had unique natural characteristics and had cultural and historic value because of archeological artifacts left by the Cherokee and predecessor groups 

and had been the site for the early European occupation of Tennessee. Congress, 

however, had turned a deaf ear to pleas to remove the dam’s authorization.
409

 $UPHGZLWKPRUHVXEVWDQWLDOZHDSRQU\LQRSSRQHQWV¿OHGDVXLWLQ

federal court contending that the TVA had not prepared an adequate environmental impact statement on the project. Two years later, TVA completed an EIS that 

never provided non-reservoir alternatives. Still, the project forged on, but this 

time opponents attempted a novel approach to stop the dam. In August, 1973, 

biologist David Etnier of the University of Tennessee discovered Percina tanasi2WKHVQDLOGDUWHU2DVSHFLHVRI¿VKIRXQGLQWKH/LWWOH7HQQHVVHH5LYHU8QGHU

SURYLVLRQVRIWKH(QGDQJHUHG6SHFLHV$FW2WKHQDWLRQ¶V¿UVWFRPSUHKHQVLYH

ODZWRSURWHFWVSHFLHVIURPH[WLQFWLRQ2WKH86)LVKDQG:LOGOLIH6HUYLFHOLVWed the snail darter as an endangered species in 1975, and in 1976 listed the Little 

7HQQHVVHH5LYHUDVDFULWLFDOKDELWDWIRUWKH¿VK3URSRQHQWVRIWKHGDPZHUH

outraged and the issue made its way to court.

In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court heard the case, at which time Attorney 

*HQHUDO*ULI¿Q%HOOEHOLWWOHGWKHHIIRUWWRSURWHFWVXFKDQLQVLJQL¿FDQW¿VKLQ

the face of a major TVA project. The Court, however, upheld the Endangered 

Species Act, remarking that if Congress was unhappy with the decision it could 

change the law. TVA began studying alternatives to Tellico, but Congress did 

take up debate over the Endangered Species Act and ultimately passed amendments to exempt Tellico from it. The dam was completed in 1979.105

The snail darter was not the central issue in this story. And despite the

fact that the dam was built, it was becoming clearer that opponents of big dams 

now had potent means, in the form of new environmental laws, of challenging

dam builders. That these challenges were made indicated little willingness by 

some or no tolerance by others for multipurpose projects. The economic and 

FRQVHUYDWLRQMXVWL¿FDWLRQVRIWKHSDVWFDUULHGOLWWOHZHLJKWLQWKHVDQG

1970s.

Environmentalism Comes of Age: Rampart Dam and the Grand 

Canyon Dams

That a variety of other battles over dams continued to rage in the 1960s 

and 1970s is further testament to a complete change in context about dam and 

reservoir construction since the waning of the big dam era. Marc Reisner argued

“The battle over the Grand Canyon dams was the conservation movement’s coming of age.”106 This most lively controversy was certainly a crucial bridge between the dispute over Echo Park and the wily use of new environmental legislation as manifest at Tellico. During the 1960s, substantial energy in the conservation community went into campaigns involving the Central Arizona Project. 

Among other things, the plan called for the building of two storage dams in 

Bridge Canyon and Marble Canyon, along the Colorado River. Both were meant 

to produce hydroelectric power. The major concern was that Bridge Canyon 
410

Dam would back up water into Grand Canyon National Park’s Inner Gorge, in 

what appeared to be clear violation of the 1919 law establishing Grand Canyon

National Park, which provided for future federal dams if development did not 

compromise other purposes of the park. Opponents of the new hydroelectric 

GDPVUHFRPPHQGHGWKDWFRDO¿UHGVWHDPSODQWVDQGQXFOHDUSODQWVEHFRQVWUXFWed instead. (This was trading one environmental threat for another, of course, 

and some conservationists ultimately protested this alternative.) The Grand 

Canyon dams were proposed as part of Reclamation’s Central Arizona Project, 

which was considered essential to providing water and power for Arizonans. 

Arizona had been locked in a protracted struggle with California and the Upper

%DVLQVWDWHVRYHUZDWHUULJKWVWRWKH&RORUDGR5LYHU&RPPLVVLRQHU)OR\G(

Dominy had branded opponents as “status quo conservationists” whose arJXPHQWVZHUH3IUDQWLFÀDN ́'DYLG%URZHU([HFXWLYH'LUHFWRURIWKH6LHUUD

Club, in turn called Dominy and Reclamation “the dam-it-all reclamationists.” 

Ultimately, the project was authorized (1968), because of its local and regional 

VLJQL¿FDQFHEXWZLWKRXW%ULGJH&DQ\RQDQG0DUEOH&DQ\RQ'DPV107

 $OWKRXJKWKH¿JKWDJDLQVW5DPSDUW'DPGLGQRWKDYHWKHYLYLGV\PEROLVPRUHPRWLRQDOSRZHURIWKH¿JKWRYHUWKH*UDQG&DQ\RQGDPVLWUHSUHVHQWHG

DQH[WHQVLRQRIWKHEDWWOHRYHUELJGDPVIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHEH\RQGWKHORZHUIRUW\

eight states. In the early 1960s, the Corps’ Rampart Dam was proposed to be 

EXLOWRQWKH<XNRQ5LYHUQLQHW\PLOHVQRUWKZHVWRI)DLUEDQNV$ODVND,WZDV

to be a 525-foot structure that would impound a body of water larger than Lake 

Erie. In the context of the Cold War, one congressional supporter urged construction on the grounds that it would be bigger than anything the Russians had 

built. Conservation organizations opposed the dam, protesting the inundation of 

about 11,000 square miles in the interior of Alaska, of which 8,000 square miles 

were waterfowl-producing habitat, and the blocking of salmon migration into a 

third or more of the upper Yukon watershed.

Rampart could provide electricity for six million people—but Alaska 

had only 253,000 people at the time, and the dam site was 2,000 miles away 

from the lower forty-eight states. In pre-energy-crisis America, such electrical 

power production seemed excessive. An article in Natural History stated in 1963 

that: 

the whole concept of “the big dam,” with its concomitant hyGURSRZHUZDWHUVXSSO\ÀRRGFRQWURODQGVRRQLVEHJLQQLQJ

to appear archaic, as well as too destructive of natural resources, 

many conservationists believe.

The “big dam philosophy,” it went on “is in need of re-examination, preferably 

by the scientist and the conservationist. . . .” In 1967, Johnson Administration 
411

RI¿FLDOVGHFLGHGWRFXUWDLOWKHSURMHFW,WZDVDIROO\WKDWJLYHQLWVGXELRXVHFRQRPLFEHQH¿WVDQGZDQLQJVXSSRUWZRXOGOLNHO\QHYHUKDYHEHHQFRPSOHWHG108

Not all battles over new dams were fought in the West. Efforts by the 

Corps to build a dam in Kentucky’s Red River Gorge faced stiff opposition. 

Authorized by Congress in 1962, the plans called for a 141-foot-high dam creating a lake covering 1,500 acres 70 miles southeast of Lexington. A coalition of 

individual landowners, the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, and “Save our Red 

5LYHU ́2WKH5HG5LYHU*RUJH/HJDO'HIHQVH)XQG2VXHGWKH&RUSVWRVWRSWKH

construction and carried the battle into the 1970s.109)DUPHUVDQGWKH6LHUUD&OXE

also fought to curtail the building of the Meramec Park Dam on the Meramec 

5LYHUQHDU6W/RXLV7KHODZVXLW¿OHGE\WKH6LHUUD&OXEDJDLQVWWKHUHJLRQDO

RI¿FHUVRIWKH&RUSVFRQWHQGHGWKDWWKH0HUDPHF%DVLQ3URMHFWGLGQRWFRPSO\

with the National Environmental Policy Act.110 Similar stories abound along other rivers throughout the country, including the Missouri.111

A well-publicized battle took place over a large dam project on the 

Delaware River running through Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and 

Delaware. Although the Delaware’s average discharge is less than 3 percent of 

the Mississippi’s, it provides nearly 10 percent of the U.S. population with water. 

The Delaware, however, was one of the last major rivers in the nation without 

DGDPRQLWVPDLQVWHP6HYHQ\HDUVDIWHUDVHYHUHÀRRGLQ&RQJUHVVDXthorized a multireservoir plan for the Delaware, with a federal-state water compact adopted to implement it. The centerpiece of the reservoir plan was a dam 

to be constructed at Tocks Island–the largest dam project to be carried out by the 

Corps east of the Mississippi. The debate over a dam across the Delaware beJDQORQJEHIRUHWKHÀRRG)RXUVWDWHVDQGWZRODUJHFLWLHVKDGGHHSLQWHUHVW

in the water in the Delaware Basin, including New York City. Although outside 

the basin, it decided to tap the Delaware as early as 1928, prompting New Jersey 

and Pennsylvania to promote the need for a dam. Congress did not authorize the 

Tocks Island Dam until 1962, and several years of wrangling followed the authorization. Between 1975 and 1977, attempts by environmental groups and others 

to get the dam deauthorized failed, but general support for the project waned because of the Vietnam War, concerns over potentially large federal land acquisitions, extensive dislocations, and environmental concerns. Ultimately, the Tocks 

Island region of the Delaware River was added to the National Wild and Scenic 

Rivers System and an important water-management agreement for the Delaware 

River Basin, involving no dams on the Delaware, was adopted.112

Conclusion

Had the construction of new big dams become outdated by the 1960s 

DQGV"&HUWDLQO\QXPHURXVHQYLURQPHQWDOLVWVKDGFRPHWREHOLHYHVREXW
412

VRKDGDYDULHW\RISROLWLFDOVXSSRUWHUVDQGHYHQVRPHRI¿FLDOVZLWKLQWKHIHGHUDO

bureaucracy. New large dams were just not going to be built any longer, at least 

not at the fervent pace of the big dam era. Was this a clear victory of an 

LQFUHDVLQJO\SRZHUIXODQGZHOORUJDQL]HGHQYLURQPHQWDOOREE\":DVLWDUHVXOW

RIWKHGHFUHDVLQJLQÀXHQFHRIRQFHSRZHUIXOIHGHUDODJHQFLHV"2UGLGWKH3ELJ

dam” simply play itself out as a prized technology offering economic progress, 

ZLVHXVHRIUHVRXUFHVDQGSURWHFWLRQIURPWKHYDJDULHVRIQDWXUH"$QDUJXPHQW

can be made for a little of all these elements. In a larger sense, however, a paucity of good dam sites and changes in the political, economic, social, and environmental context of the United States from the early twentieth century to the late 

1970s ultimately doomed the big dam era. The economic opportunities offered 

by new big dams had diminished or were measured against undesirable tradeoffs. Not everyone stood either with the dam builders or with the conservation 

RUJDQL]DWLRQVLQHYHU\¿JKW6RFLHW\ZDVQHYHUWKDWFOHDUO\SRODUL]HG,WVLPSO\

EHFDPHGLI¿FXOWIRUGDPEXLOGHUVWRRIIHUWKHEHQH¿WVRIQHZELJGDPVZLWKWKH

same certainty or assurances in the 1960s and 1970s that they had offered in the 

1930s and 1940s. Times had changed: the old constituencies championing dams 

had broken up, there were increased demands on the federal budget, and cynicism about the role of government accelerated. Also, as time went on, there were 

more skeptics who increasingly failed to share a common view about the desirDELOLW\RI3KDUQHVVLQJ ́ULYHUVIRUKXPDQEHQH¿W7KHFKDQJHVLQWKHSROLWLFDO

economic, environmental, and social setting were matched by a change of heart 

or, at least, a change of priorities. The big dam era left a powerful structural and 

economic legacy, but it was a legacy that presents challenges to society in terms 

of making the best use of America’s water resources.

Endnotes

 3DXO=XFNHUAmerican Bridges and Dams (New York: Greystone Press, 1941), 14.

2. Patrick McCully, Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams/RQGRQ=HG%RRNV

1996), 281-311. Michael Collier, Robert H. Webb, and John C. Schmidt, Dams and Rivers: A Primer on the

Downstream Effects of Dams (Tucson: U.S. Geological Survey, Circular 1126, June 1996), 6-8. Hundley, The

Great Thirst, 359.

3. Collier, Webb, and Schmidt, Dams and Rivers, 2.

 3DFL¿F&RQVWUXFWRUV,QFShasta Dam and its Builders, 9.

5. Mark Harvey, “Symbols from the Big Dam Era in the American West,” (unpublished paper delivered 

DWWKH$6(+FRQIHUHQFH6DQ$QWRQLR7H[DV7KHRGRUH6WHLQEHUJ3μ7KDW:RUOG¶V)DLU)HHOLQJ¶

Control of Water in 20th-Century America,” Technology and Culture 34 (April 1993), 401-2, took a more strident position, suggesting that “The guiding philosophy behind this profusion of dams was the simple will to 

control and dominate the natural world.” In addition, he argued, “Perhaps never before has the will to conquer 

nature been so consciously and purposefully expressed, so matter-of-fact. What was being expressed here was 

arrogance by design.”

6. Pitzer, Grand Coulee6WHLQEHUJ3μ7KDW:RUOG¶V)DLU)HHOLQJ¶&RQWURORI:DWHULQth-Century 

America,” 402.
413

 6HHTXRWHLQ&OD\WRQ5.RSSHV3(I¿FLHQF\(TXLW\(VWKHWLFV7RZDUGVD5HLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI$PHULFDQ

Conservation, Environmental Review 11 (Summer 1987), 135-6. The debate over public power was fought over 

several fronts, however. See Hundley, The Great Thirst, 224-5. Linda J. Lear, “Boulder Dam: A Crossroads 

in Natural Resource Policy,” Journal of the West 24 (October 1985), 86, 88, 90-1. Wesley Arden Dick, “When 

'DPV:HUHQ¶W'DPQHG7KH3XEOLF3RZHU&UXVDGHDQG9LVLRQVRIWKH*RRG/LIHLQWKH3DFL¿F1RUWKZHVW

in the 1930s,” Environmental Review)DOO:LQWHU0DU\$XVWLQ37KH&RORUDGR

River Controversy,” Nation 125 (November 9, 1927), 511. James C. Williams, Energy and the Making of

Modern California, 261-3. Lee, Reclaiming the American West3:KR%HQH¿WVE\%RXOGHU'DP" ́New

Republic-XO\)UDQN%RKQHGLWRUBoulder Dam: From the Origin of the Idea to the

Swing-Johnson Bill (1927), 102. William E. Warne, The Bureau of Reclamation (Boulder: Westview Press, 

¿UVWSXEOLVKHG.OHLQVRUJH%RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW, 281-300.

8. Dick, “When Dams Weren’t Damned,” 123-4, 127, 129-30, 132-3, 138-9. Harvey, “Symbols from the 

Big Dam Era in the American West,” 2-3, 6-8, 12-5.

9. Tim Palmer, Endangered Rivers and the Conservation Movement (Berkeley: University of California 

Press, 1986), 1.

10. Lawson, Dammed Indians, xx-xxi. Mike Lawson, “The Oahe Dam and the Standing Rock Sioux, South

Dakota History 6 (Spring 1976), 203. Joy A. Bilharz, The Allegheny Senecas and Kinzua Dam: Forced

Relocation Through Two Generations (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), xv. McCully, Silenced

Rivers)UDGNLQA River No More, 172. Peter Iverson, “We’re Still Here:” American Indians in the

Twentieth Century:KHHOLQJ,OOLQRLV+DUODQ'DYLGVRQ,QF6DUDK)%DWHV/DZUHQFH-

*HWFKHV/DZUHQFH-0DF'RQQHODQG&KDUOHV):LONLQVRQSearching Out the Headwaters: Change and

Rediscovery in Western Water Policy (Covelo, California, Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1933), 125. Roy W. 

0H\HU3)RUW%HUWKROGDQGWKH*DUULVRQ'DP ́ North Dakota History6XPPHU)DOO(OL]DEHWK

S. Helfman, Rivers and Watersheds in America’s Future (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1965), 169-

79. Richard L. Berkman and W. Kip Viscusi, Damming the West (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973), 

151-96.

11. See Dick, “When Dams Weren’t Damned,” 125-6. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of

Dam Engineering in the United States)/HH%URZQDQG+HOHQ0,QJUDPWater and Poverty in the

Southwest (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1987), 3-4. Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire, 210-1. See 

also Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert. Critics of federal water policy in this period often point to special interests 

ZKREHQH¿WWHGPRVWDQGVRPHWLPHVXQIDLUO\IURPWKHELJGDPV2SDUWLFXODUO\LUULJDWRUV2QHFULWLFLVPLVWKDW

irrigators do not pay a fair share of the price of impounding water. See Tim Palmer, The Snake River: Window

to the West (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1991), 59, 63. Tim Palmer, The Columbia: Sustaining a Modern

Resource (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1997), 60-1. Edward Goldsmith and Nicholas Hildyard, The Social and

Environmental Effects of Large Dams6DQ)UDQFLVFR6LHUUD&OXE%RRNV5REHUW6'HYLQH37KH

Trouble with Dams,” Atlantic Monthly 276 (August 1995) 68.

12. Dick, “When Dams Weren’t Damned,” 118.

13. Karl E. Mundt, “Not All Dams are Damnable!” Outdoor America 8 (December 1943), 4. See also Joseph 

C. Goodman, “Build a Dam, Save a Stream,” American Game 20 (March-April 1931), 23, 28.

 :LOOLDP/)LQOH\36DOPRQRU.LORZDWWV&ROXPELD5LYHU'DPV7KUHDWHQ*UHDW1DWXUDO5HVRXUFH ́

Nature Magazine 26 (August 1935), 107.

15. Palmer, Endangered Rivers and the Conservation Movement, 1-2. McCully, Silenced Rivers, 1-

6. Collier, Webb, and Schmidt, editors, Dams and Rivers, 1-2. Guy LeMoigne, Shawki Barghoutti, and 

Herve Plusquellac, editors, Dam Safety and the Environment (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1990), 3. 

Worster, Rivers of Empire, 310-1. Dick, “When Dams Weren’t Damned,” 118, 147-8. Lear, “Boulder Dam: A 

Crossroads in Natural Resource Policy,” 91.

16. Lowitt, The New Deal and the West, 82-3. Ralph B. Simmons, Boulder Dam and the Great Southwest

/RV$QJHOHV7KH3DFL¿F3XEOLVKHUV86'HSDUWPHQWRIWKH,QWHULRU%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQ

The Story of Hoover Dam (Washington, D.C., 1953), 40-3, 51-53, 65-6. Kleinsorge, %RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW

246-311. Stevens, Hoover Dam, 259-61.

17. Simmons, Boulder Dam and the Great Southwest, 84. See also David O. Woodbury, The Colorado

Conquest (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1941), 358.

18. Carl Abbott, Urban America in the Modern Age: 1920 to the Present (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan 

Davidson, 1987), 2, 5. Howard P. Chudacoff and Judith E. Smith, The Evolution of American Urban Society,

4thedition (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1994), 4.

19. Carl Abbott, The Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West (Tucson: University of 

Arizona Press, 1998), xix.
414

20. See Miller and Melvin, The Urbanization of Modern America, 184-5. John C. Bollens and Henry J. 

Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life, 2nd edition (New York: Harper and Row, 

3XEOLVKHU$OIUHG+.DW]DQG-HDQ6SHQFHU)HOWRQHGLWRUVHealth and the Community (New 

<RUN)UHH3UHVV86'HSDUWPHQWRI&RPPHUFH%XUHDXRIWKH&HQVXVHistorical Statistics of

the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1975), 8, 

11. Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1985), 139-40.

21. See Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States Part 2, 619, 621; Water Resources 

Council, The Nation’s Water Resources (Washington, D.C.: Water Resources Council, 1968), 4-1-1 and 4-1-

2. Murray Stein, “Problems and Programs in Water Pollution,” Natural Resources Journal 2 (December 1962), 

395. Jack Hirshleifer, James C. DeHaven, and Jerome W. Milliman, Water Supply: Economics, Technology,

and Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 2, 26.

22. Abbott, The Metropolitan Frontier, 6. See also Williams, Energy and the Making of Modern California,

173-8, 206-7, 278-83.

23. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, xi-xii, xiv, 363. Robinson, Water for the West, 63-4. S. E. Hutton, “The Grand 

Coulee Dam and the Columbia Basin Reclamation Project,” Mechanical Engineering 62 (September 1940), 

651-2. See also Reuss and Walker, Financing Water Resources Development)RU:RUOG:DU,,DQGK\-

GURSRZHUVHH'RQDOG-3LVDQL3)HGHUDO:DWHU3ROLF\DQGWKH5XUDO:HVW ́LQ5'RXJODV+XUWHGLWRUThe

Rural West Since World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 119-38.

24. See Lowitt, The New Deal and the West, 116. White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own,”

485-7. Pitzer, Grand Coulee)RU¿JXUHVRQWRWDOLQVWDOOHGK\GURSRZHUE\WKHHDUO\VVHH3HWHU

+)UHHPDQLarge Dams and the Environment: Recommendations for Development Planning (A Report prepared for the United Nations Water Conference, Mar Del Plata, Argentina, March 1977), 3. See also Jan A. 

Veltrop, “Importance of Dams for Water Supply and Hydropower,” in Asit K. Biswas, Mohammed Jellali, 

and Glenn E. Stou, editors, :DWHUIRU6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORSPHQWLQWKH7ZHQW\¿UVW&HQWXU\ (Delhi: Oxford 

University Press, 1993), 102-15.

 6WHLQEHUJ37KDW:RUOG¶V)DLU)HHOLQJ ́6HHDOVR7KHRGRUH6WHLQEHUJSlide Mountain: or the Folly

of Owning Nature (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

26. Walker R. Young, “Boulder Dam Plays Its Part in Reclamation,” Reclamation Era)HEUXDU\

26-7.

27. U.S. Department of the Interior, The Story of Hoover Dam, 36.

 7KH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWZKLFKDXWKRUL]HGWKH&RUSVWRXVHIHGHUDOIXQGVWRXQLI\WKHÀRRGFRQWURO

V\VWHPIRUWKHZKROHDOOXYLDOYDOOH\RIWKH0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHUOHGGLUHFWO\WRWKHOHJLVODWLRQ2QFHÀRRG

FRQWURORQWKH0LVVLVVLSSLEHFDPHDIHGHUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\LWZDVMXVWDPDWWHURIWLPHEHIRUHDOOÀRRGFRQWURO

became a federal activity on all navigable rivers. Armstrong, Robinson, and Hoy, editors, History of Public

Works in the United States, 1776-1976, 250-2, 257-8. Keith Petersen, “The Army Corps of Engineers and the 

(QYLURQPHQWLQWKH3DFL¿F1RUWKZHVW ́0D\5HFRUGVRIWKH2I¿FHRI+LVWRU\+HDGTXDUWHUV86$UP\

&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV$OH[DQGULD9LUJLQLD)RULQIRUPDWLRQRQÀRRGFRQWURODORQJWKH0LVVRXUL5LYHUVHH+HQU\

C. Hart, The Dark Missouri (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), 89-90, 94-5, 120, 127, 133,150, 

210. Marian E. Ridgeway, The Missouri Basin’s Pick-Sloan Plan: A Case Study in Congressional Policy

Determination (Urban: University of Illinois Press, 1955), 78-88, 93-4, 109-15, 139-53, 180-92, 210-47.

 0DUWLQ5HXVV3&RSLQJZLWK8QFHUWDLQW\6RFLDO6FLHQWLVWV(QJLQHHUVDQG)HGHUDO:DWHU5HVRXUFHV

Planning,” Natural Resources Journal 32 (Winter, 1992), 117-27.

30. “Dams and Wild Rivers: Looking Beyond the Pork Barrel,” Science 158 (October 13, 1967), 235.

31. E. W. Lane and J. R. Ritter, “The Life of Hoover Dam,” Reclamation Era 34 (April 1948), 61. See also 

Young, “Boulder Dam Plays Its Part in Reclamation,” 27-8. Simmons, Boulder Dam and the Great Southwest,

85. Donald Worster, Under Western Skies, 68. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, The

Story of Hoover Dam:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH(OPHU73HWHUVRQBig Dam

Foolishness: The Problem of Modern Flood Control and Water Storage (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 

1954), 69-85.

32. Goldsmith and Hildyard, The Social and Environmental Effects of Large Dams, 94. See also Worster, 

Under Western Skies/HDU3%RXOGHU'DP$&URVVURDGVLQ1DWXUDO5HVRXUFH3ROLF\ ́3)ORRG

&RQWURO"1RWE\D'DP6LWH ́Outdoor America 16 (March-April 1951), 8.

33. LeMoigne, Barghoutti, and Plusquellac, editors, Dam Safety and the Environment, 1, 9-10. See also 

Robert B. Jansen, Dams and Public Safety (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Interior, Water and Power 

Resources Service, 1980), 94. “High Dams in the United States,” Reclamation Era 26 (January 1936), 22.

34. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering in the United States, 1035-6.
415

 .HUPLW3DWWLVRQ3:K\'LGWKH'DP%XUVW" ́American Heritage of Invention & Technology 14 (Summer 

1998), 23-4. Peter Briggs, Rampage: The Story of Disastrous Floods, Broken Dams, and Human Fallibility

(New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1973), 21-2.

 3DWWLVRQ3:K\'LGWKH'DP%XUVW" ́%ULJJVRampage6HHDOVR&KDUOHV)2XWODQGManMade Disaster: The Story of St. Francis Dam (Glendale, California: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1963). 

Reisner, Cadillac Desert, 100-4.

37. Gaylord Shaw, “The Search for Dangerous Dams - A Program to Head off Disaster,” Smithsonian 9 

$SULO3DWWLVRQ3:K\'LGWKH'DP%XUVW" ́.ROOJDDUGDQG&KDGZLFNHGLWRUVDevelopment

of Dam Engineering in the United States, 1036-7. Jansen, Dams and Public Safety, 96.

38. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering in the United States, 1038.

39. Goldsmith and Hildyard, The Social and Environmental Effects of Large Dams3:3$'DP)DLOV

at Kansas City,” Engineering News-Record6HSWHPEHU3/DUJH6OLGHLQ)RUW3HFN'DP

&DXVHGE\)RXQGDWLRQ)DLOXUH ́Engineering News-Record 122 (May 11, 1939), 55-8.

 )RUDJRRGFDVHRQWKHSROLWLFVRIGDPVDIHW\VHH'DYLG0,QWURFDVR37KH3ROLWLFVRI7HFKQRORJ\7KH

‘Unpleasant Truth About Pleasant Dam,’” Western Historical Quarterly 26 (Autumn, 1995), 333-52.

41. Palmer, The Snake River, 29. USCOLD, Lessons from Dam Incidents. USA-II (New York: ASCE, 

1988), 191-5. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering in the United States, 1041. 

Worster, Rivers of Empire, 308.

42. A description of the collapse and the human tragedy associated with Teton Dam is provided in Reisner, 

Cadillac Desert, 398-425.

 3LVDQL3)HGHUDO:DWHU3ROLF\DQGWKH5XUDO:HVW ́

 ,QGHSHQGHQW3DQHOWR5HYLHZ&DXVHRI7HWRQ)DLOXUHSummary of Conclusions from Report to the

U.S. Department of the Interior and State of Idaho on Failure of Teton Dam (Washington, D.C.:

86*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH'HFHPEHUL[[

 7KHLVVXHVRIDQDGURPRXVDQGFDWDGURPRXV¿VKHULHVDQGWKHHIIHFWVRIGDPVXSRQWKHPDUHH[FHSWLRQDOO\

controversial. The literature, both technical and popular, is extensive and available for those who further wish 

WRH[SORUHLPSDFWVRQ¿VKHULHV6XI¿FHLWWRVD\KHUHWKDWPRUHGHWDLOHGKLVWRU\FRXOGEHGRQHRQWKHLVVXHVLQvolved. That is another study for another location. This study has space only to touch on some of the issues, 

IURP¿VKODGGHUVWRKDWFKHULHVWRWUXFNLQJDQGEDUJLQJWRQLWURJHQ3SRLVRQLQJ ́(GLWRU

46. Palmer, The Columbia, 47.

47. Allan H. Cullen, Rivers in Harness, 116.

48. Richard White, The Organic Machine, 89-90. Mighetto and Ebel, Saving the Salmon, 7-8, 17-9, 

30-2. White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own,” 487. Harvey, “Symbols from the Big Dam Era in 

the American West,” 31. See also Lisa Mighetto, “Salmon, Science, and Politics: Writing History for the

 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,” Public Historian)DOO'LFN3:KHQ'DPV:HUHQ¶W

Damned,” 144-6. Joseph E. Taylor III, Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the Northwest Fisheries

Crisis (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999).

49. Palmer, Endangered Rivers and the Conservation Movement, 59-60.

50. “Dams and Destruction,” Nature Magazine2FWREHU6HHDOVR)LQOH\36DOPRQRU

Kilowatts: Columbia River Dams Threaten Great Natural Resource,” 107-8.

51. Mighetto and Ebel, Saving the Salmon6HHDOVR)UDQN16FKXEHUW3)URPWKH3RWRPDFWRWKH

&ROXPELD7KH&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVDQG$QDGURPRXV)LVKHULHV ́8QSXEOLVKHGPDQXVFULSW'HFHPEHU

2I¿FHRI+LVWRU\+HDGTXDUWHUV86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV)W%HOYRLU9LUJLQLD/RZLWWThe New Deal

and the West, 158.

52. Albert N. Williams, The Water and the Power: Development of the Five Great Rivers of the West

(New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1951), 281.

53. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 223-30. See also Lowitt, The New Deal and the West, 159. “Dams and 

'HVWUXFWLRQ ́3)LVK6WDLUZD\V ́Literary Digest 121 (May 30, 1936), 19.

54. Due to dam spillway design on the Columbia, some pools below dams became supersaturated with nitrogen, an issue which has been addressed by redesign of spillways to avoid entrainment of nitrogen.

55. Jim Marshall, “Dam of Doubt,” Collier’s 99 (June 19, 1937), 19-22. Mighetto and Ebel, Saving the

Salmon3'DPV7KUHDWHQ:HVW&RDVW)LVKHULHV,QGXVWU\ ́Oregon Business Review 6 

(June 1947), 3-4. Harvey, “Symbols from the Big Dam Era in the American West,” 31.

56. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 223-30. See also Lowitt, The New Deal in the West, 159. “ Dams and 

'HVWUXFWLRQ ́3)LVK6WDLUZD\V ́5*6NHUUHWW3)LVK2YHUD'DP ́6FLHQWL¿F$PHULFDQ 159 (October, 

1938), 182-5.
416

 -RVHSK7%DUQDE\1RUWK3DFL¿F)LVKHU\,QYHVWLJDWLRQVWR'LUHFWRU)LVKDQG:LOGOLIH6HUYLFH0D\

 7KRPDV05RELQV)LOH2I¿FHRI+LVWRU\+HDGTXDUWHUV86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV6HHDOVR

White, The Organic Machine, 89.

58. Robinson, “The United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Conservation Community: A History to 

1969.”

59. Harvey, A Symbol of Wilderness, xi-xiii. Bates, Searching Out the Headwaters, 45.

 0DUN:7+DUYH\3(FKR3DUN'DP$Q2OG3UREOHPRI)HGHUDOLVP ́Annals of Wyoming 55)DOO

1983),10. Robinson, Water for the West, 92.

61. Mark W. T. Harvey, “Echo Park, Glen Canyon, and the Postwar Wilderness Movement,” 3DFL¿F

Historical Review 60)HEUXDU\-RQ0&RVFREcho Park: Struggle for Preservation (Boulder: 

Johnson Books, 1995), xii-xv. Wallace Stegner, “Battle for the Wilderness,” New Republic)HEUXDU\

1954), 13. Michael P. Cohen, The History of the Sierra Club, 1892-19706DQ)UDQFLVFR6LHUUD&OXE%RRNV

1988), 143-4.

62. U. S. Grant III, “The Dinosaur Dam Sites Are Not Needed,” Living Wilderness 15 (Autumn, 1950): 17. 

6HHDOVR3'DPVRU:LOGHUQHVV$UHDV" ́Audubon Magazine 52 (September-October 1950): 287.

63. Harvey, “Echo Park. . .,” 48-50.

64. Robinson, Water for the West, 93. Worster, Rivers of Empire, 274. See also Richardson, Dams, Parks &

Politics, 57, 60-61.

65. Harvey, A Symbol of Wilderness, xiii, xviii. See also Robinson, Water for the West, 93. Harvey, “Echo 

Park . . .,” 13, 15. Rich Johnson, 7KH&HQWUDO$UL]RQD3URMHFW (Tucson: University of Arizona 

3UHVV1RUULV+XQGOH\-U37KH:HVW$JDLQVW,WVHOI ́LQ*DU\':HDWKHUIRUGDQG)/HH%URZQ

editors, 1HZ&RXUVHVIRUWKH&RORUDGR5LYHU0DMRU,VVXHVIRUWKH1H[W&HQWXU\ (Albuquerque: University of 

New Mexico Press, 1986), 29.

66. Richardson, Dams, Parks & Politics, 69.

67. Harvey, “Echo Park Dam . . .,” 10. See also Richardson, Dams, Parks & Politics, 135, 142, 151.

 )UHG03DFNDUG3(FKR3DUN'DP"1RW%\D'DPVLWH ́National Parks Magazine 29 (July-September 

1955): 99.

69. See quote on page 24 of “Echo Park Controversy Resolved,” Living Wilderness 20 (Winter-Spring 

1955–56), 23-5. Harvey, A Symbol of Wilderness, 181-205. Harvey, “Echo Park Dam . . .,” 12. Hundley, The

Great Thirst, 307. Cohen, The History of the Sierra Club, 154, 157, 165, 172. See also Russell Martin, A Story

that Stands Like a Dam, 50-74.

70. Harvey, “Echo Park. . .,” 46-7, 52, 58-9.

71. Robinson, Water for the West, 93. Cohen, The History of the Sierra Club, 161.

72. Eliot Porter, Glen Canyon on the Colorado, edited by David Brower (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith 

Books, 1988), 8. Cohen, The History of the Sierra Club, 177-9. Harvey, “Echo Park . . .,” 65-7. Hundley, 

“The West Against Itself,” 29. Hundley, The Great Thirst, 307. See also Martin, A Story That Stands Like a

Dam, 320-32.

73. Wallace Stegner, “Myths of the Western Dam,” Saturday Review 48 (October 23, 1965), 29.

74. Reuss and Hendricks, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 20 (however, pages are unnumbered).

75. Elizabeth B. Drew, “Dam Outrage: The Story of the Army Engineers,” Atlantic 225 (April 1970),

 51-2. Robert G. Sherill, “Corps of Engineers: The Pork-Barrel Soldiers,” Nation)HEUXDU\

See also Berkman and Viscusi, Damming the West, 73-7. Robinson, “The United States Army Corps of 

Engineers and the Conservation Community,” 84-8. Luther J. Carter, “Dams and Wild Rivers: Looking 

Beyond the Pork Barrel,” Science 158 (October 13, 1967), 237-42. Martin Heuvelmans, The River Killers

(Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1974), 15. “The Dam Shame: It’s Still With Us,” Outdoor Life,

-XQH7LP3DOPHU36DYLQJWKH6WDQLVODXV0XVW:H:HDU&KDLQVWR.HHS5LYHUV)UHH" ́

Sierra Club Bulletin6HSWHPEHU2FWREHU

76. Quotation in Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 297. Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 105-14. See also Otis 

L. Graham, Jr., A Limited Bounty: The United States Since World War II (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 

1996), 164.

77. Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 297-8. Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 109-10.

 )RUDQH[DPSOHRIHFRORJLFDOHIIHFWVRIGDPVDQGHQGDQJHUHGVSHFLHVVHH)HUUHOOBig Dam Era, 161-6.
417

79. Wallis E. McClain, Jr., editor,, U.S. Environmental Laws: 1994 Edition (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of 

National Affairs, Inc., 1994), 9-1. Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 124-5. Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 298. 

See Alfred S. Harrison, Water Resources: Hydraulics and Hydrology: Interview with Alfred S. Harrison, oral 

KLVWRU\LQWHUYLHZFRQGXFWHGE\-RKQ7*UHHQZRRG$OH[DQGULD9LUJLQLD2I¿FHRI+LVWRU\+HDGTXDUWHUV

86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV6HHDOVR9DOHULH0)RJHOPDQGuide to the National

Environmental Policy Act (New York: Quorum Books, 1990), 1-2. Joseph Petulla, Environmental Protection

in the United States6DQ)UDQFLVFR6DQ)UDQFLVFR6WXG\&HQWHU'DQLHO++HQQLQJDQG:LOOLDP

R. Mangun, Managing the Environmental Crisis: Incorporating Competing Values in Natural Resource

Administration (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1989), 19-20. Dinah Bear, “National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969,” in Ruth A. Eblen and William R. Eblen, editors, The Encyclopedia

of the Environment%RVWRQ+RXJKWRQ0LIÀLQ&RPSDQ\/\QWRQ.&DOGZHOO31DWLRQDO

Environmental Policy Act (U.S.),” in Robert Paehlke, editor,, Conservation and Environmentalism: An

Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995), 449-51. Robert V. Bartlett, “Environmental Impact 

Assessment,” in Paehlke, editor,, Conservation and Environmentalism, 248-50. Daniel Mazmanian and 

Mordecai Lee, “Tradition Be Damned! The Army Corps of Engineers Is Changing,” Public Administration 35 

(March-April 1975), 169. William L. Kahrl, “Paradise Reclaimed: The Corps of Engineers and the Battle for 

WKH&HQWUDO9DOOH\ ́PDQXVFULSWXQGDWHG)LOHV2I¿FHRI+LVWRU\+HDGTXDUWHUV86$UP\

Corps of Engineers, Alexandria, Virginia.

80. Mazmanian and Lee, “Tradition Be Damned! The Army Corps of Engineers Is Changing,” 168-9. See 

also Holmes, History of Federal Water Resources Programs, 112-4. T. Michael Ruddy, Damming the Dam: 

7KH6W/RXLV&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVDQGWKH&RQWURYHUV\2YHUWKH0HUDPHF%DVLQ3URMHFWIURP,WV,QFHSWLRQWR,WV

Deauthorization (St. Louis, Missouri: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1992), 68-72. Jacob L. Douma, Water

Resources: Hydraulics and Hydrology: Interview with Jacob H. Douma oral history interview by John T. 

*UHHQZRRG$OH[DQGULD9LUJLQLD2I¿FHRI+LVWRU\+HDGTXDUWHUV86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV

91-2.

81. Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 298. McClain Jr., editor, U.S. Environmental Laws: 1994 Edition, 9-1. 

Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 128-9.

82. Richard N. L. Andrews, “Environmental Protection Agency,” in Conservation and Environmentism: An

Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Paehlke (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1995). 256. Gottlieb, 

Forcing the Spring, 129. Petulla, Environmental Protection in the United States, 48-9. Melosi, Coping with

Abundance, 298. See also Terrie Davies, “Environmental Protection Agency,” in Eblen and Eblen, editors, The

Encyclopedia of the Environment%RVWRQ+RXJKWRQ0LIÀLQ&RPSDQ\5LFKDUG6WUHQ5RGQH\

White, and Joseph Whitney, editors, Sustainable Cities: Urbanization and the Environment in International

Perspective (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), 192. Marc K. Landy, Marc J. Roberts, and Stephen 

Thomas, The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions from Nixon to Clinton (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 22-45. Alfred Marcus, “Environmental Protection Agency,” in James Q. 

Wilson, editor, The Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980), 267-303. Edmund P. Russell 

III, “Lost Among the Parts Per Billion: Ecological Protection at the United States Environmental Protection 

Agency, 1970-1993,” Environmental History 2 (January 1997), 29-51.

83. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves, 218-26. See also Martin V. Melosi, “Lyndon 

Johnson and Environmental Policy,” in Robert A. Divine, editor, The Johnson Years, Volume Two: Vietnam, the

Environment, and Science (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987), 113-7.

84. Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 126, 129. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves,

294-316. Jeffrey Kim Stine, “Environmental Politics and Water Resources Development: The Case of the 

Army Corps of Engineers during the 1970s,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 

1984), 21-2, 34-5. Holmes, History of Federal Water Resources Programs, 9-10, 13, 17, 111.

85. Mazmanian and Lee, “Tradition Be Damned! The Army Corps of Engineers Is Changing,” 166-71. See 

also Holmes, History of Federal Water Resources Programs, 116-7. “The Corps of Engineers, Water, and 

Ecology,” Audubon Magazine 72 (July 1970), 102.

86. Martin Reuss, Shaping Environmental Awareness: The United States Army Corps of Engineers

Environmental Advisory Board, 1970-1980:DVKLQJWRQ'&+LVWRULFDO'LYLVLRQ2I¿FHRI$GPLQLVWUDWLYH

6HUYLFHV2I¿FHRIWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUV6HHDOVR6WLQH3(QYLURQPHQWDO3ROLWLFVDQG:DWHU

Resources Development,” 46, 100.

87. Stine, “Environmental Politics and Water Resources Development,” 197. See also 94, 97-8, 101, 194-8. 

Carter, “Dams and Wild Rivers: Looking Beyond the Pork Barrel,” 233.

88. Holmes, History of Federal Water Resources Programs, 140.
418

89. Reuss, “Coping with Uncertainty,” 129-31. Brent Blackwelder, “In Lieu of Dams,” Water Spectrum )DOO

6DPXHO6WDIIRUG3%LJ3UREOHP'DPPLQJXSWKH)ORRGRI$QWLSDWK\ ́Government Executive

1 (December 1969), 49. See also Susan M. Stacy, When the River Rises: Flood Control on the Boise River,

1943-1985 (Boulder, Colorado: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado and College of Social 

Sciences and Public Affairs, Boise State University, 1993), 7-8, 36, 56, 80-106.

90. John D. Echeverria, Pope Barrow, and Richard Roos-Collins, Rivers at Risk: The Concerned Citizen’s

Guide to Hydropower (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1989), 4.

 3LVDQL3)HGHUDO:DWHU3ROLF\DQGWKH5XUDO:HVW ́6HHDOVR5HLVQHUCadillac Desert, 48-95.

 )RUDGGLWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQRQZDWHUTXDOLW\DQGGDPVVHHWKH(QYLURQPHQWDO3URWHFWLRQ$JHQF\¶V

Report to Congress: Dam Water Quality Study(3$7KLVUHSRUWZDVSUHSDUHGLQDFFRUGDQFH

with the requirement of Section 524 of the Water Quality Act of 1987.

93. Goldsmith and Hildyard, The Social and Environmental Effects of Large Dams, 13.

94. Devine, “The Trouble with Dams,” 72-3. Committee on Environmental Effects of the United States 

Committee on Large Dams, Environmental Effects of Large Dams (New York: American Society of Civil 

Engineers, 1978), 5. Echeverria, Barrow, and Roos-Collins, Rivers at Risk, 4. Worster, Rivers of Empire, 310. 

Palmer, The Snake River, 67. Palmer, Endangered Rivers and the Conservation Movement, 1-2. Goldsmith and 

Hildyard, The Social and Environmental Effects of Large Dams, 52, 63. Collier, Webb, and Schmidt, Dams and

Rivers, 83-4. See also John A. Dixon, Lee M. Talbot, and Guy J. M. Le Moigne, Dams and the Environment: 

&RQVLGHUDWLRQVLQ:RUOG%DQN3URMHFWV (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1989), 2.

95. Devine, “The Trouble with Dams,” 71-2. Palmer, The Snake River, 20-1. Echeverria, Barrow, and RoosCollins, Rivers at Risk, 6.

96. Worster, Rivers of Empire, 153-4, 240, 319-24. See also Goldsmith and Hildyard, The Social and

Environmental Effects of Large Dams, 134-63.

97. Hundley, “The West Against Itself,” 37-9: Warne, The Bureau of Reclamation, 117-21. See also Berkman 

and Viscusi, Damming the West, 34-41, 46-51. Cullen, Rivers in Harness)RUDQRWKHUVLJQL¿FDQWFDVH

of water degradation, see Gene Rose, San Joaquin: A River Betrayed)UHVQR/LQURVH3XEOLVKLQJ&RPSDQ\

)RUDJHQHUDOGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHLPSDFWRIGDPVDQGUHVHUYRLUVRQZDWHUTXDOLW\VHH

McCully, Silenced Rivers, 36-38, 40-1.

98. William Graf, “Landscapes, Commodities, and Ecosystems . . .,” 18-20. Joseph L. Sax, “Parks, 

Wilderness, and Recreation,” in Michael J. Lacey, Government and Environmental Politics (Washington, 

D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1989), 124. See also Palmer, Endangered Rivers and the Conservation

Movement, 2.

99. LeMoigne, Barghouti, and Plusquellec, editors, Dam Safety and the Environment, 1. Shaw, “ The 

Search for Dangerous Dams–A Program to Head Off Disaster,” 36, 38-39. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, 

Development of Dam Engineering in the United States, 1040-41. Worster, Rivers of Empire, 309. See also “Silt, 

&UDFNV)ORRGVDQG2WKHU'DP)RROLVKQHVV ́Audubon Magazine 77 (September 1975), 107-14.

100. The 1972 Act had authorized the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, to initiate 

a national program of dam inspections. See Jansen, Dams and Public Safety, 96.

101. See: KWWSFUXQFKWHFDUP\PLOQLGZHESDJHVQLGFIm 

102. National Research Council, Safety of Existing Dams: Evaluation and Improvement (Washington, D.C.: 

1DWLRQDO$FDGHPLF3UHVV)RUPRUHRQWKH1DWLRQDO,QYHQWRU\RI'DPVVHHWKHIROORZLQJZHEVLWH

KWWSFUXQFKWHFDUP\PLOZHESDJHVQLGZHOFRPHFIP.

103. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering in the United States, 1042. See 

also Shaw, “ The Search for Dangerous Dams–A Program to Head Off Disaster,” 44. Vernon K. Hagen, Water

Resources: Hydraulics and Hydrology: Interview with Vernon K. Hagen, oral history interview by John T. 

*UHHQZRRG$OH[DQGULD9LUJLQLD2I¿FHRI+LVWRU\+HDGTXDUWHUV86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV

152-53.

104. Mighetto, “Salmon, Science, and Politics,” 22-5. See also Mighetto and Ebel, Saving the Salmon, 84ff. 

'DUUHOO-7XUQHU3'DPVDQG(FRORJ\&DQ7KH\%H0DGH&RPSDWLEOH" ́Civil Engineering 41 (September 

1971), 78. See also Keith C. Petersen, River of Life, Channel of Death: Fish and Dams on the Lower Snake

/HZLVWRQ,GDKR&RQÀXHQFH3UHVV.HLWK&3HWHUVHQ3%DWWOHIRU,FH+DUERU'DP ́3DFL¿F Northwest

Quarterly)DOO

105. Mighetto, “Salmon, Science, and Politics,” 24-6. Mighetto and Ebel, Saving the Salmon, 174-6. See 

DOVR3)LVKY'DPV ́Time,)HEUXDU\-RHO:+HGJSHWK37KH3DVVLQJRIWKH6DOPRQ ́

6FLHQWL¿F0RQWKO\ 59 (November 1954), 378. Thorson, River of Promise, River of Peril, 182-4. Jeffrey 

)0RXQW&DOLIRUQLD5LYHUVDQG6WUHDPV7KH&RQÀLFW%HWZHHQ)OXYLDO3URFHVVDQG/DQG8VH (Berkeley: 

8QLYHUVLW\RI&DOLIRUQLD3UHVV6HQDWRU)UDQN(0RVVThe Water Crisis1HZ<RUN)UHGHULFN

A. Praeger, Publisher, 1967), 137. McCully, Silenced Rivers, 41-43, 50-3. Reisner, Cadillac Desert, 187-8.
419

106. Robert K. Davis, “Lessons in Politics and Economics from the Snail Darter,” in V. Kerry Smith, editor, 

Environmental Resources and Applied Welfare Economics: Essays in Honor of John V. Krutilla (Washington, 

'&5HVRXUFHVIRUWKH)XWXUH6HHDOVR:LOOLDP%UXFH:KHHOHUDQG0LFKDHO-0F'RQDOGTVA

and the Tellico Dam, 1936-1979: A Bureaucratic Crisis in Post-Industrial America (Knoxville: University of 

Tennessee Press, 1986). Daniel Deudney, “Rivers of Energy: The Hydropower Potential” ( Worldwatch Paper 

44, June 1981), 19. Ann Shalowitz, “Endangered Darters ‘Endanger’ Tellico Dam,” Conservation News 40 

(March 15, 1975), 7-8. Mighetto and Ebel, Saving the Salmon, 179.

107. Reisner, Cadillac Desert, 295.

108. Robinson, Water for the West3*UDQG&DQ\RQ'DPV" ́Audubon Magazine 67 (May 1965), 181. 

Arnold Hano, “The Battle of the Grand Canyon,” New York Times Magazine (December 12, 1965), 56. 

“Canyon Dams: Dissents from Arizona Scientists,” Science 157 (July 7, 1967), 46. “Damming the Grand 

Canyon for a Thirsty Southwest,” New Republic 154 (April 30, 1966), 9. Cohen, The History of the Sierra

Club, 314-8, 357-64. See also Warne, The Bureau of Reclamation)UDGNLQA River No More,

 194-5, 228-34. Robert Dean, “‘Dam Building Still Had Some Magic Then:’ Stewart Udall, The Central 

$UL]RQD3URMHFWDQGWKH(YROXWLRQRIWKH3DFL¿F6RXWKZHVW:DWHU3ODQ ́3DFL¿F+LVWRULFDO5HYLHZ

)HEUXDU\3:DWHUDQG3RZHUIRUWKH6RXWKZHVW ́National Parks Magazine 39-40 (September 

1965), 2. “‘No Compromise’ on Grand Canyon Dams: Sierra Club’s Reply to Goldwater Plan,” U.S. News and

World Report'HFHPEHU3'DPWKH*UDQG&DQ\RQ" ́Audubon Magazine 68 (September 

1966), 308-11. “Grand Canyon: Colorado Dams Debated,” Science 152 (June 17, 1966), 1600-5. “Canyon 

Controversy: Second Round,” Science News 91 (April 1967), 302-3. John Ludwigson, “Dams and the 

Colorado,” Science News)HEUXDU\3*UDQG&DQ\RQ'DPV*R ́Science News)HEUXDU\

37KH*UDQG&DQ\RQ'DP,WRU1RW" ́Senior Scholastic)HEUXDU\3*UDQG

Canyon Dams Blocked,” Audubon Magazine 68 (November 1966), 462. “Good News on the Grand Canyon,” 

National Parks Magazine 41 (March 1967), 289. Stephen Raushenbush, “A Bridge Canyon Dam is Not 

Necessary,” National Parks Magazine 38 (April 1964), 4-8.

109. See “Building the Bigger Dam,” Natural History 72 (December 1963), 66. A Starker Leopold and Justin 

W. Leonard, “Alaska Dam Could Be Resources Disaster,” Audubon Magazine 68 (May-June 1966), 176-8. 

Stephen H. Spurr, “Rampart Dam: A Costly Gamble,” Audubon Magazine 68 (May-June 1966), 172-5, 179. 

6HHDOVR3)LVKDQG:LOGOLIH6HUYLFH,VVXHV8QIDYRUDEOH5HSRUWRQ5DPSDUW'DP ́Izaak Walton Magazine

29 (August-September 1964), 13. “Rampart Dam—Alaska Study,” Izaak Walton Magazine 31 (May 1966), 

12-3. “Rampart Dam,” National Parks Magazine 41 (August 1967), 20. “Rampart Dam and the Perpetual 

Engineers,” Field and Stream 71 (June 1966), 34, 36.

110. “Daniel Boone’s Wilderness May Be Tamed by a Lake,” Smithsonian 6 (September 1975), 56-8.

111. Richard C. Albert, Damming the Delaware: The Rise and Fall of Tocks Island Dam (University Park, 

Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987), xv-xvii, 1-4. See also Pete duPont, “The Tocks 

,VODQG'DP)LJKW ́Sierra Club Bulletin 57 (July-August 1972), 13-8.

112. “Engineers’ Dam is Coup de Grace for Meramec,” Audubon Magazine 75 (March 1973), 121-2.

113. Thorson, River of Promise )HUUHOOBig Dam Era.

421

APPENDIX A: GUIDELINES FOR APPLYING THE NATIONAL 

HISTORIC LANDMARKS CRITERIA TO STORAGE DAMS1

INTRODUCTION

The following guidelines for applying the National Historic Landmark 

(NHL) criteria are designed to assist in the evaluation of dams constructed in the 

United States for the purposes of water storage and distribution (irrigation and 

GRPHVWLFVXSSO\K\GURHOHFWULFSRZHUJHQHUDWLRQQDYLJDWLRQRUÀRRGFRQWURO2

 $VLQJXODUGH¿QLWLRQXQLWHVWKHVHYDULHGSXUSRVHVGDPV3SURYLGHDFWLYH

storage for the management of water . . . for striking a balance between natural 

ÀRZUHJLPHVRQWKHRQHKDQGDQGSDWWHUQVRIGHPDQGRQWKHRWKHU ́3

 This genHUDOFODVVL¿FDWLRQHQFRPSDVVHVDQDVWRQLVKLQJQXPEHURIUHVRXUFHV,QWKH

8QLWHG6WDWHV$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVLGHQWL¿HGPRUHWKDQ$PHULFDQ

GDPVRYHUWZHQW\¿YHIHHWWDOORUZLWKDUHVHUYRLUVWRUDJHFDSDFLW\RIDWOHDVW¿IW\

acre-feet.4

 By virtue of the centrality of water to human settlement, population 

growth, and agricultural and industrial endeavor, each of these 65,000 dams had 

DVLJQL¿FDQWLPSDFWRQORFDOGHYHORSPHQW0DQ\LPSDFWHGDODUJHUJHRJUDSKLF

region. A few changed the course of American and international technological 

KLVWRU\UHYHUEHUDWHGWKURXJKWKHQDWLRQDOHFRQRP\DQGPDUNHGVLJQL¿FDQWWUDQsitions in American politics and culture.

The following discussion of NHL criteria and of general guidelines for 

applying these criteria to both federal and privately constructed dams should be 

used in conjunction with the NHL Theme Study: The History of Large Federal

Dams: Planning, Design, and Construction.

5

 This document presents a basic framework of general themes and trends central to the evaluation of federal 

dams.

GUIDELINES6

NHLs are those historic properties that:

Criterion 1:DUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKHYHQWVWKDWKDYHPDGHDVLJQL¿FDQW

FRQWULEXWLRQWRDQGDUHLGHQWL¿HGZLWKRUWKDWRXWVWDQGLQJO\UHSUHVHQWWKHEURDG

national patterns of United States history and from which an understanding and 

DSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKRVHSDWWHUQVPD\EHJDLQHGDQGRU

Criterion 2: are associated importantly with the lives of persons nationDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWLQWKHKLVWRU\RIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGRU
422

Criterion 3: represent some great idea or ideal of the American people; 

DQGRU

Criterion 4: embody the distinguishing characteristics of an architectural type specimen exceptionally valuable for a study of a period, style or methRGRIFRQVWUXFWLRQRUWKDWUHSUHVHQWDVLJQL¿FDQWGLVWLQFWLYHDQGH[FHSWLRQDOHQWLW\ZKRVHFRPSRQHQWVPD\ODFNLQGLYLGXDOGLVWLQFWLRQDQGRU

Criterion 5: are composed of integral parts of the environment not suf-

¿FLHQWO\VLJQL¿FDQWE\UHDVRQRIKLVWRULFDODVVRFLDWLRQRUDUWLVWLFPHULWWRZDUUDQW

individual recognition but collectively compose an entity of exceptional historiFDORUDUWLVWLFVLJQL¿FDQFHRURXWVWDQGLQJO\FRPPHPRUDWHRULOOXVWUDWHDZD\RI

OLIHRUFXOWXUHDQGRU

Criterion 6:KDYH\LHOGHGRUPD\\LHOGLQIRUPDWLRQRIPDMRUVFLHQWL¿F

importance by revealing new cultures, or by shedding light upon periods of occupation over large areas of the United States. Such sites are those which have 

yielded, or which may reasonably be expected to yield, data affecting theories, 

concepts, and ideas to a major degree.

The above criteria have rough counterparts in National Register of 

Historic Places criteria A, B, C, and D. However, NHL-eligible properties must 

EHVLJQL¿FDQWDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHOYHUVXVWKHORFDORUVWDWHOHYHOHVWDEOLVKHGIRU

1DWLRQDO5HJLVWHUSURSHUWLHV0RUHRYHUWREHFODVVL¿HGDVDQ1+/QDWLRQDOO\

VLJQL¿FDQWUHVRXUFHVPXVWUHWDLQDKLJKGHJUHHRIKLVWRULFDOLQWHJULW\DQGVKRXOG

best represent their associated class of resources; the determination of “best” representation is based not only on the extent of historical integrity but also on the 

degree of historical association.

Applying the broad NHL criteria to individual dams or hydraulic systems requires a clear understanding of the patterns, themes, and historic trends 

with which the dam is associated: a historic context. This context is provided 

in the associated theme study: The History of Large Federal Dams: Planning,

Design, and Construction. It also requires an analytical framework in which to 

HYDOXDWHKLVWRULFDOLQWHJULW\DQGOHYHOVDQGDUHDVRIVLJQL¿FDQFH7KLVDQDO\WLFDO

framework is provided below.

Criterion 1: 

3URSHUWLHVWKDWDUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKHYHQWVWKDWKDYHPDGHDVLJQL¿-

FDQWFRQWULEXWLRQWRDQGDUHLGHQWL¿HGZLWKRUWKDWRXWVWDQGLQJO\

UHSUHVHQWWKHEURDGQDWLRQDOSDWWHUQVRI8QLWHG6WDWHVKLVWRU\DQG

from which an understanding and appreciation of those patterns 

PD\EHJDLQHG
423

Large dams have dramatically altered the physical landscape. Less 

REYLRXVO\EXWDVLPSRUWDQWO\WKH\DOVRGH¿QHGWKHSODFHPHQWDQGGHQVLW\RI

settlement and commerce, and infused the nineteenth- and twentieth-century political, social, cultural, and environmental debates related to land use, population 

JURZWKFXOWXUDOH[SDQVLRQDQGFRQVHUYDWLRQ$OHYHORIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHLV

therefore sometimes assumed to be an inherent component of large dams and appurtenant resources.

 ,WLVSDUWLFXODUO\EHJXLOLQJWRDVVLJQQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHWRPDQ\RIWKH

dams constructed by America’s primary federal dam-building bureaus and agencies: the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps); the United States 

Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation); and the Tennessee Valley Authority 

(TVA). These organizations were engendered, and have evolved, in response 

to important national legislation related to the use, distribution, and control of 

America’s rivers. The largest and most expensive of America’s dams have been 

built by Reclamation, the Corps, and the TVA: “Only a national organization. . 

FRXOGKDYHFRQFHLYHGDQGEXLOWWKHPDJQL¿FHQWGDPVZKLFKEURXJKWWKH8QLWHG

States to the forefront of world developments.”7

NHL Criterion 1, however, requires that a resource not only be associated with the broad national patterns of our national history, but that it make “sigQL¿FDQWFRQWULEXWLRQWR ́RU3RXWVWDQGLQJO\UHSUHVHQW ́WKRVHSDWWHUQV. In other 

ZRUGVLQGLYLGXDOGDPVDUHQRWRIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHVLPSO\EHFDXVHGDPFRQVWUXFWLRQLVDVLJQL¿FDQWIDFHWRIRXUQDWLRQ¶VKLVWRU\$1+/QRPLQDWLRQPXVW

also establish that the dam in question is an important illustration of the historic 

context and that the property possesses the physical characteristics necessary to 

convey this association (see Integrity, below).

 :KHQHYDOXDWLQJGDPV¶QDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHHUURUVRIDVVXPSWLRQDUH

IUHTXHQWO\PDGHLQDVVLJQLQJQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHWRORFDODQGUHJLRQDOHYHQWV

and in assigning “outstanding” representational value to commonplace sites.

 2QHRIWKHPRVWFRPSHOOLQJMXVWL¿FDWLRQVIRUQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHUHODWHVWRLPSDFWRULQÀXHQFH/DUJHGDPV8

 often require more man-hours and 

PRUHPDWHULDOWREXLOGLPSDFWLQJWKHORFDOHFRQRP\WKURXJKDQLQÀX[RIFRQstruction workers and long-lasting economic development. They often create 

the largest reservoirs, resulting in the most dramatic restructuring of natural river 

systems; dictating settlement patterns; inspiring long-lasting and potentially sigQL¿FDQWSROLWLFDOEDWWOHVRYHUZDWHUXVHE\FRQÀLFWLQJLQWHUHVWV9

 and otherwise altering the social and physical landscape. However, size is not a virtue in its own 

ULJKWLWPXVWKHLJKWHQDQGGH¿QHVXEVWDQWLYHWHFKQRORJLFDOVRFLDOSROLWLFDOFXOtural, and environmental consequences.
424

 $GDP¶VVL]HLVDOVRRIWHQGLUHFWO\UHODWHGWRWKHHFRQRPLFEHQH¿WVRI

dam construction: the power generated, the ratio of reservoir storage to annual 

runoff, and the acre-feet of water made available for irrigation, municipal, and 

QDYLJDWLRQDOXVH:KLOHWKHVHEHQH¿WVPD\KDYHLPSRUWDQWSROLF\LPSOLFDWLRQVDW

WKHQDWLRQDODQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHYHOWKHGLUHFWEHQH¿WVRISRZHUZDWHUDQGÀRRG

FRQWUROFOHDUO\UHODWHPRVWGLUHFWO\WRDGDP¶VORFDODQGVWDWHVLJQL¿FDQFHDQGGR

QRWQHFHVVDULO\FRQWULEXWHWRWKHGDP¶VQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFH

 3UHFHGHQFH±3WKH¿UVW ́±PD\DOVRUHODWHGLUHFWO\WRDSURSHUW\¶VKLVWRULFDOVLJQL¿FDQFH)RUH[DPSOH*DUULVRQ'DP1RUWK'DNRWDWKH¿UVW&RUSV

dam constructed under the terms of the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program, may 

most effectively represent the dams that followed – not because it is the most imSRUWDQWGDPEXWEHFDXVHLWZDVWKH¿UVWVHWWLQJWKHVWDJHIRUDODUJHUV\VWHP7R

EHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWWKH3¿UVW ́LQDVHULHVRIGDPVPXVWSURYLGHDPHDQLQJful foundation for the dams that followed, either in terms of technological advances (see criterion 4, below) or in terms of policy initiatives. It cannot simply 

EHWKH¿UVWLQDFRQWHPSRUDQHRXVFOXVWHURIUHVRXUFHV

 &DUHPXVWDOVREHWDNHQQRWWRDVVLJQQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHWRORFDORUUHJLRQDOHYHQWV:KLOHWKHFXPXODWLYHLPSDFWVRIIRUH[DPSOHDYLEUDQW3DFL¿F

Northwest economy may be felt at the national level, this impact is not necessarily “important” as required NHL criteria; examples of the national scope of 

the American economy are endless.10 Similarly, New Deal wages of 50 cents an 

KRXUSDLGWRWKHPRUHWKDQPHQDQGZRPHQZKRZRUNHGRQ)RUW3HFN

'DP0RQWDQDZHUHSURIRXQGO\VLJQL¿FDQWWRLQGLYLGXDOIDPLOLHVDQGFRPPXnities. The seep of cash outward touched the far corners of the nation. The poWHQWLDOQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKHGDPKRZHYHUUHODWHVQRW

to this direct but ultimately short-term economic impact, but to the larger economic policy behind federal economic intervention of the scale initiated with 

)RUW3HFN'DPFRQVWUXFWLRQ

There will be exceptions, where the direct impact of power producWLRQÀRRGFRQWUROLUULJDWLRQRUDVVRFLDWHGSRSXODWLRQJURZWKFDQEHGHPRQVWUDWHGWRKDYHJUHDWO\LQÀXHQFHGWKHGLUHFWLRQRI$PHULFDQKLVWRU\)RUH[DPple, California’s Central Valley (Reclamation) Project supports the cultivation 

of over 80% of the nation’s fruits and vegetables and altered regional and national distribution patterns and the size of economically viable farms. The hydroelectric generating capability of Bonneville (Washington) and Grand Coulee 

(Washington) Dams was central to America’s World War II industrial war effort, 

DOORZLQJUHJLRQDOFRQFHQWUDWLRQRIDOXPLQXPUH¿QLQJDLUFUDIWPDQXIDFWXUHDQG

OLEHUW\VKLSPDQXIDFWXUH7KHDUJXPHQWIRUQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHKRZHYHUPXVW

EHFDUHIXOO\GRFXPHQWHGDQGFDUHPXVWEHWDNHQ¿UVWWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQ
425

association with regional versus national trends and, second, to assess whether 

the association was important.11

 )LQDOO\3RXWVWDQGLQJ ́UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOYDOXHVKRXOGQRWEHDVVLJQHG

to commonplace sties. Characteristics of the Bureau of Reclamation’s Belle 

)RXUFKH3URMHFWLQFOXGHIHGHUDOLQWHUYHQWLRQLQDSULYDWHUHFODPDWLRQHIIRUWVRcial engineering based on turn-of-the-century pastoral ideals; Reclamation 

PLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRISURMHFWEHQH¿WVDQGVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOXSKHDYDODVVRciated with repayment schedules. These characteristics, however, are represented at many early Reclamation projects, including the North Platte Project 

ZLWK3DWK¿QGHU'DP:\RPLQJWKH6KRVKRQH3URMHFWZLWK%XIIDOR%LOO'DP

(Wyoming), and the Boise Project with Arrowrock Dam (Idaho). The same is 

true for the large Depression-era Public Works Administration-funded dams, 

LQFOXGLQJ*UDQG&RXOHH)RUW3HFN+RRYHU$UL]RQDDQG1HYDGD2Z\KHH

(Oregon), and Norris (Tennessee) – all of which provided employment and settlement opportunities to vast numbers of farmers and other Americans displaced 

by the Dust Bowl and Depression and all of which could stake a claim to naWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHRQWKDWVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFIRXQGDWLRQ:KLOHWKHVHGDPV

may be eligible to the National Register of Historic Places, any NHL nomination 

based solely on their ability to “outstandingly represent the broad national patterns of United States history” must meet a much higher standard. The nominaWLRQPXVWSURYLGHDFRPSDUDWLYHIUDPHZRUNLQZKLFKWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHDQGWKH

historical integrity of the dam is contrasted with that of similar, historically associated resources.

 7KHKLVWRULFFRQWH[WLQZKLFKDGDPLVHYDOXDWHGIRUQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿-

cance might not be directly related to dam construction and the water-related imSURYHPHQWVRIÀRRGFRQWUROQDYLJDWLRQSRZHUJHQHUDWLRQRULUULJDWLRQ)RU

instance, at Oahe (South Dakota) and Garrison Dams (North Dakota) on the 

Missouri River, the inundation of Native American traditional and treaty lands 

GXULQJWKHVDQGVUHVXOWHGLQVLJQL¿FDQWIHGHUDOOHJLVODWLRQDQGSROLF\

initiatives. Environmental impacts associated with Glen Canyon Dam and Lake 

3RZHOO$UL]RQDDQG8WDKFRQVWUXFWLRQKHOSHGUHGH¿QHDQGUHGLUHFWWKHQDWLRQal environmental debate in the 1960s. Court battles associated with repayment 

VFKHGXOHVDW%HOOH)RXUFKH'DPDQGSURMHFW6RXWK'DNRWDUHVXOWHGLQSDVsage of the Reclamation Extension Act of 1914. New Mexico’s Elephant Butte 

Dam, on the Rio Grande Project, was funded not only as a means of reclaiming 

178,000 acres of the Rio Grande drainage but also in order to meet Mexico’s water rights, as established in international treaty.12

Associations with historical events such as these mightEHVXI¿FLHQWWR

support a claim of NHL eligibility if it can be shown that the historical event 

LVQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWDQGWKDWWKHVHOHFWHGGDPLVLPSRUWDQWO\DVVRFLDWHG
426

ZLWKWKDWQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWWKHPH7KLV3LPSRUWDQWDVVRFLDWLRQ ́FDQQRWEH

VDIHO\DVVXPHGLQDQ\RIWKHDERYHH[DPSOHVWKHQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKH

5HFODPDWLRQ([WHQVLRQ$FWPLJKWSURYHGLI¿FXOWWRHVWDEOLVKGHVSLWHWKH$FW¶V

importance to Bureau of Reclamation history and to farmers in the West. The 

treaty obligations met by construction of Elephant Butte may not have had rami-

¿FDWLRQVEH\RQGWKHOLPLWHGZDWHUVKHGRIWKH5LR*UDQGHOHYHORIVLJQL¿FDQFH

state or local). While the Native American civil rights movements is of national 

VLJQL¿FDQFHOHJLVODWLRQJURZLQJRXWRI0LVVRXUL5LYHUGDPFRQVWUXFWLRQPXVW

be shown to have played an important part in that movement. While the modHUQHQYLURQPHQWDOPRYHPHQWLVDUJXDEO\RIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFH*OHQ&DQ\RQ

Dam may be a less important example than O’Shaughnessy (Hetch Hetchy) Dam 

(California) or the proposed Echo Park Dam site (Utah).

The historical impact of private and municipal dams can also extend to 

the national level. Historian Donald Jackson writes “the tentacles of seemingly ‘local’ water development projects often extend beyond the bounds of where 

WKHZDWHULVDFWXDOO\XVHGLQWRIDUÀXQJUHJLRQDODQGQDWLRQDOQHWZRUNVRIHQJLQHHUVEXVLQHVVPHQ¿QDQFLHUVDQGEXUHDXFUDWV ́13 Yet as with federally conVWUXFWHGGDPVRQFHWKHVHWHQWDFOHVKDYHEHHQLGHQWL¿HGWKHDUJXPHQWPXVWEH

HIIHFWLYHO\PDGHWKDWWKHLPSDFWZDVQRWRQO\QDWLRQDOEXWDOVRVLJQL¿FDQW)RU

example, debate surrounding the 1915 construction of the O’Shaughnessy Dam 

in the Hetch Hetchy Valley of Yosemite National Park marked a critical juncture 

in the modern conservation movement, introducing an element of environmental and social concern to the question of dam construction and intensifying the 

philosophical debate surrounding man’s relationship to nature. Hetch Hetchy has 

become part of our vernacular lexicon – a shorthand reference to a wide range 

of conservation, preservation, and wise use issues. In contrast, Pardee Dam, the 

kingpin of East Bay Municipal Utility District’s (California) municipal water 

V\VWHP3ZDVFRPSOHWHGLQDERXW¿YH\HDUVIURPLQLWLDOVWXGLHVWRZDWHUGHOLYHUies and with essentially no controversy.” While this equanimity may be “remarkable in the larger context of public works,” as argued in the Pardee Dam National 

5HJLVWHUQRPLQDWLRQLWLVQRWQHFHVVDULO\RIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFH14

Criterion 2:

Properties with an important association with the lives of persons 

QDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWLQWKHKLVWRU\RIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV

Dams evaluated under Criterion 2 must follow the general guidelines established by the National Historic Landmarks Survey for any resource associated 

ZLWKVLJQL¿FDQWSHRSOH7KHGDPPXVWEHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSURGXFWLYHOLIHGXULQJZKLFKKHRUVKHDFKLHYHGVLJQL¿FDQFHWKHSURSHUW\PXVWEH

the resource determined to best represent the person’s historic contributions; and 

WKHSHUVRQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHSURSHUW\PXVWEHRIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFH8QGHU
427

this criterion, the determination of “best” will relate directly to the nature of the 

individual’s contribution to dam construction or to dam design. There may be a 

IHZGHVLJQHUVHQJLQHHUVWKDWDUHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWHJ-RKQ/6DYDJHDQG

a dam might be an appropriate illustration of their important contribution. It is 

FULWLFDOWRFRQ¿UPWKDWWKHHQJLQHHU¶VUROHLQGHVLJQZDVDQLPSRUWDQWRQHUDWKHU

than titular (many people are involved in design and construction). It is unlikely 

WKDWSROLWLFDODGPLQLVWUDWLYH¿JXUHVZRXOGEHGLUHFWO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKDGDP¶VGHsign or construction.

Resources eligible under Criterion 2 are to be illustrative rather than 

commemorative of a person’s contributions. Thus, for example, Lake Powell behind Glen Canyon Dam would not be eligible for its association with namesake 

John Wesley Powell, nor was Roosevelt Dam (Arizona) designated a NHL for its 

association with Theodore Roosevelt.

Criterion 3:

Properties represent some great idea or ideal of the American

people.

Criterion 3 is rarely, if ever, used alone. Dams, however, have been de-

¿QHGDV3RQHRIWKHPRVWHVVHQWLDODVSHFWVRIPDQ¶VDWWHPSWWRKDUQHVVFRQWURO

and improve his environment;” the “Useful Pyramids;” modern wonders of the 

world.15 Large public expenditure and (historically) rarely tempered support for 

the construction of such powerful structures make dams an outstanding representation of American cultural keystones: growth of empire and economic expanVLRQ0RUHRYHUWKHODUJHVWRIRXUPDVVLYHGDPVEROVWHURXUFXOWXUDOVHOIGH¿-

nition of a people resilient in the face of adversity, whether economically or enYLURQPHQWDOO\LPSRVHG,QDSDUWLDOLPDJHRIWKHVSLOOZD\VDW)RUW3HFN

Dam adorned the inaugural issue of Life. Hoover Dam, sixty percent taller than 

any dam built before it, “became the symbol of price and accomplishment during 

a period of national despair.”16 American icon and the voice of an era, Woody 

Guthrie, celebrated Grand Coulee Dam:

Mightiest thing ever built by a man. 

To run the great factories and water the land. 

It’s roll on, Columbia, roll on.17

And therein lies the reason that NHL Criterion 3 is rarely used alone. 

The Life image may have been the most outstanding physical representation of 

$PHULFDQVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOOLIHLQWKHVDSRUWHQWIRUDQHZO\GH¿QHGSXElic-private political, economic, and social contract. It may also have been simply 

WKHPRVWVWULNLQJJUDSKLFLPDJHDQGWKH)RUW3HFNVWRU\ZLWKEROGVWDQ]DVRIVH[

and alcohol and the Wild West of American nostalgia, may have been the most 
428

titillating. Guthrie may have summarized the collective dreams and visions and 

aspirations of a nation burdened by economic depression. He was also paid by 

the federal government as part of a mighty inspirational campaign. Cultural 

VLJQL¿FDQFHRUSRSXODUDIIHFWLRQLVFHQWUDOWRWKHHYDOXDWLRQRURXUQDWLRQDO

icons and must be addressed. Yet it is intellectually dangerous to base any arguPHQWIRUQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHVROHO\RQSRSXODULW\RQIRUH[DPSOHWKHSHUFHQWage of Americans who recognize the Golden Gate Bridge, or who have visited 

the Liberty Bell, or who can recite the Statue of Liberty’s welcome. Popular affection assumes the greatest weight when traced to its roots in the more objective 

realms of American social, economic, technological, or political history: when 

NHL Criterion 3 is paired persuasively with NHL Criteria 1, 4, or 6.

Criterion 4:

3URSHUWLHVWKDWHPERG\WKHGLVWLQJXLVKLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI

DQDUFKLWHFWXUDOW\SHVSHFLPHQH[FHSWLRQDOO\YDOXDEOHIRU

DVWXG\RIDSHULRGVW\OHRUPHWKRGRIFRQVWUXFWLRQRUWKDW

UHSUHVHQWDVLJQL¿FDQWGLVWLQFWLYHDQGH[FHSWLRQDOHQWLW\

ZKRVHFRPSRQHQWVPD\ODFNLQGLYLGXDOGLVWLQFWLRQ

 &ULWHULRQHQFRPSDVVHVWKHKLVWRULFDOVLJQL¿FDQFHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKGHsign or construction merit, with technological innovation, and with artistry. 

1DWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHLQDQ\RIWKHVHDUHDVUHODWHVWRWKHSURSHUW\¶VDELOLW\WRRXWVWDQGLQJO\UHSUHVHQWWKHGH¿QLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIDGHVLJQFRQVWUXFWLRQ3W\SH ́

or to outstandingly represent the transition between styles of resources (most often as part of a chronological chain of design evolution or technological innovation).

“Unique” or “transitional” properties will be determined nationally sigQL¿FDQWonlyLILWFDQEHGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWWKHYDULDWLRQUHSUHVHQWVDVLJQL¿FDQW

technological or design step rather than an alteration that had no subsequent impact. In regard to dams and other large civil engineering works, for example, 

variations on standard design are often demanded by the unique geological characteristics of the construction site and of the river; only rarely can these variaWLRQVEHGH¿QHGDVLQQRYDWLRQVWKDWDOWHUHGVXEVHTXHQWWHFKQRORJLFDOWKHRU\DQG

practice.

It is equally rare that the variations suggest evaluation of the associatHGGDPDVDQ3RXWVWDQGLQJUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ ́RIDGLVWLQFWDQGGH¿QDEOHGDPW\SH

Despite variations dictated by site or river characteristics, all dams can be classi-

¿HGDVRQHRIWZRGDPW\SHVHLWKHU3PDVVLYH ́RU3VWUXFWXUDO ́7KHPDVVLYHWUDdition includes all gravity dams wherein stability is provided solely by the weight 

of the material used; civil engineering professor Jerome Raphael (University of 

&DOLIRUQLD%HUNOH\DUJXHVWKDW3WKLVGH¿QLWLRQZDVDVDSSOLFDEOHDKXQGUHG\HDUV
429

ago as it is today.”18 Variations in gravity dam design – e.g., a straight, curved, 

arched, or crooked crest – do not alter the basic design principle. Engineers further categorize massive dams by material – FRQFUHWHPDVRQU\HDUWK¿OORU

URFN¿OO – in recognition of the divergent construction methods demanded by each 

material type.

The “structural tradition” encompasses those dams where stability is 

provided not by gravity but by application of “progress in science and engineering” to concerns of “need and demand,” namely limited funds, limited manpower, and limited material. Important variations within the two principal structural dam types (arch dams and buttress dams) relate to evolution in three general 

characteristics: shape, height, and geometric properties. These variations have 

resulted from four primary factors: (1) advances in analytical methods including 

FRPSXWHUDSSOLFDWLRQPHDVXUHPHQWVRIDFWXDOEHKDYLRULPSURYHG¿HOGWHVWing and instrumentation), (3) improvements of concrete and other construction 

materials, and (4) improved construction methods and utilization of equipment.19

In reference to structural dams, “large scale” refers most meaningfully to 

height or length, and engineering importance results primarily from the inverse 

SURSRUWLRQRIPDVVLQJWRKHLJKWDQGWROHQJWK)RUH[DPSOHHQJLQHHU-DQ$

Veltrop notes that the engineering fraternity described California’s Bear Valley 

Dam (1884) as “the eighth wonder of the world,” in recognition not of its size 

(its 64-foot height was not particularly remarkable) but of its remarkable economy of materials: the bottom thickness of the dam measured only twenty-two to 

twenty four feet, the top three feet, and the crest length exceeded 450 feet.20 In 

FRQWUDVWWKHVL]HRIWKHZRUOG¶VPRVWPDVVLYHFRQFUHWHGDPVPD\UHÀHFWRQO\WKH

large-scale application of the central (and essentially unchanged) design principle 

RIJUDYLW\FRQVWUXFWLRQDQGPD\QRWEHDQLQGLFDWRURIGHVLJQVLJQL¿FDQFH

 $VVXJJHVWHGE\WKHDERYHGLVFXVVLRQHYDOXDWLRQRIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿-

cance under Criterion 4 depends in part on an understanding of when the characteristics of size and precedent might be important. An evaluation of the importance of these two characteristics requires an understanding of the engineering 

process and of the important distinction between design and construction. The 

following guidelines, related to design and construction innovation, are intended to provide guidance on when the superlatives “biggest,” “highest,” “longest,” 

3¿UVW ́DUHLPSRUWDQWDVGH¿QLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIDGDP¶V1+/VLJQL¿FDQFHXQder Criterion 4. The negative guidance condenses to a single caveat: size and 

VWDWLVWLFDOJORU\DUHQRWLPSRUWDQWLQDQGRIWKHPVHOYHVDQGGDPVGH¿QHGVROHO\

in those terms will not meet NHL criteria. However, there may be instances in 

which size (whether great or representative of economy of material and leaps in 

VFLHQWL¿FDELOLW\LVDQLPSRUWDQWDQGGHPRQVWUDEOHFRPSRQHQWRIDUHVRXUFH¶V

QDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFH
430

'HVLJQ6LJQL¿FDQFH

In a 1935 editorial focused on Public Works Administration-funded dam 

construction, the editors of Compressed Air Magazine “conceded” that:

there are no considerable physical or technical problems that 

would prevent the erection of a skyscraper having twice the 

height of the Empire State Building. There are economic 

limitations, of course, and these in the long run, are the factors 

that control the size of structures.21

 )URPXQWLOFRPSOHWLRQRI+RRYHU'DPLQVRXWKHDVWHUQ

Oregon’s Owyhee Dam (417 feet) stood as the tallest dam in the world, sixtysix feet taller than the previous record holder, Arrowrock Dam in southwestern Idaho.22 Yet construction of Owyhee to that height involved no design inQRYDWLRQDQGQRPLQDWLRQRI2Z\KHHWRWKH1+/RQWKHEDVLVRIÀHHWLQJVWDWLVWLFDOJORU\ZRXOGLQHYLWDEO\OHDGWRFRQIXVLRQRYHUWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKHQXPHURXVGDPVWKDWDWVRPHSRLQWDQGRIWHQRQO\EULHÀ\HDUQHGWKHDFFRODGHRIWKH

world’s biggest. The central NHL caveat for any resource evaluated under criterion 4 applies: the dam must be “exceptionally valuable” for the study of the design and construction techniques rather than simply an “embodiment of characteristics of the type” – in this case, simply a large embodiment of the type.

Construction of Hoover Dam entailed a concrete placing effort larger than the aggregate of Bureau of Reclamation dams since its establishment in 

1902. Preliminary trial load analysis revealed that the dam was being overbuilt 

by half.23 The original design of Grand Coulee Dam24 was rejected as “well beyond the range of recognized engineering procedure. While technical skill may 

overcome them . . . the hazard of the operation is one that should not needlessly 

be assumed.”257KH¿QDQFLDODQGKXPDQULVNDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHGDPIDLOXUHLV

extreme.26 The size of our largest dams and spillways therefore may represent a 

conservative precaution that does not represent the extent of American engineering ability at the time of construction.27

 ([WUHPHVL]HPD\DOVRPRUHDFFXUDWHO\UHÀHFWWKHHFRQRPLFDQGSV\FKRlogical health of the nation (see Criterion 1) than the skill of our civil engineers. 

Of the massive dams constructed during the New Deal Era, historian Donald 

Jackson writes:

the “celebration of mass” became the dominant ideology associated with dam construction: the more material a dam required, 

the more acclaim and adulation it received. In an era of limits 

and diminished expectations, American culture apparently 
431

derived psychological satisfaction from creating something 

big in the face of adversity. Thus the Grand Coulee Dam drew 

SUDLVHIRUEHLQJWKH¿UVWPDVRQU\VWUXFWXUHLQPRUHWKDQWKUHH

millennia to use more material than the largest Egyptian pyramid. Similarly, no one complained that the Hoover Dam would 

have been grossly overbuilt even without its pronounced upVWUHDPFXUYHGDP¿QDQFLQJEHFDPHDVPXFKDYHKLFOHIRU

GLVWULEXWLQJIHGHUDOIXQGVDVLWGLGD¿VFDOEDVLVIRUXQGHUWDNLQJ

a water storage project.28

Technological innovations are often realized not in dramatic leaps in 

KHLJKWDQGPDVVLQJEXWLQODEWHVWLQJLQVPDOOVFDOH¿HOGDSSOLFDWLRQVLQFRUSRUDWed within tried and trusted designs; and, most importantly, are usually realized in 

increments, in the new application or unprecedented combination of exiting technologies. Scale of application is relevant to a discussion of technological merit 

only if the sheer mass of the property introduces technological obstacles that require innovative combinations and variations on existing technology. Hoover 

Dam again serves as an example: the extreme volume of concrete used demanded innovative solutions to problems of heat generated by chemical reaction during the concrete-cooling process; Owyhee Dam, already under construction, 

ZDVVHOHFWHGDVD¿HOGWHVWODERUDWRU\IRUFRROLQJSLSHVODWHULQFRUSRUDWHGZLWKin Hoover’s design. This innovation made possible subsequent construction of 

the world’s largest dams, including not only Hoover but also Grand Coulee and 

Shasta.29

 3DWK¿QGHUDQG%XIIDOR%LOO6KRVKRQH'DPVLQ:\RPLQJDOVRVHUYHDV

H[DPSOHVRIKLJKGDPVPDGHSRVVLEOHE\WHFKQRORJLFDOLQQRYDWLRQ)ROORZLQJ

WKHH[DPSOHRI)UDQN(%URZQDQG-RKQ(DVWZRRG¶VWKLQDUFKDQGEXWWUHVVGHsigns, most notably California’s Bear Valley and Sweetwater Dams, Bureau of 

Reclamation engineers,

introduced the concept of a co-existing system of horizontal 

arches and vertical cantilevers. . . . The so-called ‘trial load 

method’ put arch dam design on a much sounder footing, particularly if a series rather than one cantilever was used, and especially if complete compatibility of movements at all points 

was achieved. The technique has remained fundamental to the 

American school of arch dam design to this day and has been 

the method used to design many large and famous dams: the 

Arrowrock dam [sic.] (400 feet high) . . . the Gibson dam [sic.] 

(200 feet high) . . . the mighty Hoover dam [sic.] (727 feet 

high) . . . and the Hungry Horse dam [sic.] (564 feet high). . . .30
432

The language here is found only infrequently in reasoned discussions 

of dam design and clearly introduces the possibility of technological innovation warranting evaluation under NHL Criterion 4: “introduced the concept,” 

“remained fundamental to the American school of arch dam design.” Trial load 

DQDO\VLVRU3$UFKDQG&URZQ&DQWLOHYHU0HWKRG ́DVLWZDV¿UVWGH¿QHGZDV

both innovative and, equally important, of impact. These two standards are cenWUDOWRWKHHYDOXDWLRQRIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHXQGHU1+/&ULWHULRQ(LWKHUWKH

¿UVWXVHRIWKHQHZWHFKQRORJ\3DWK¿QGHU'DPRUWKH¿UVWODUJHVFDOHXVH

%XIIDOR%LOOPLJKWSURYHWREHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWPDQLIHVWDWLRQVRIWKH

innovation.

 7KHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKHODUJHVWVFDOHXVHRIWHFKQRORJ\LVDQDORJRXVLQ

PDQ\FDVHVV\QRQ\PRXVWRWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKH¿UVWXVH7KHVPDOODQGXQDVVXPLQJ%R\G¶V&RUQHU'DPLQ1HZ<RUNWKH¿UVWGDPFRQVWUXFWHGZLWKD

concrete core since Roman times, is a potential NHL.31 (This despite the fact that 

LVVHUYHVDVWULFWO\SDURFKLDOIXQFWLRQ>PXQLFLSDOZDWHUVXSSO\@7KHPRUHGLI¿-

FXOWWDVNKRZHYHULQYROYHGGHWHUPLQLQJZKLFK3¿UVW ́EHVWUHSUHVHQWVWKHFULWLFDO

LQQRYDWLRQ6DQ)UDQFLVFR¶V6DQ0DWHR'DPFRQVWUXFWHGHQWLUHO\RIFRQFUHWH

between 1887-1889, may be a better candidate than Boyd’s Corner.32 And yet, 

concrete’s use in construction of massive dams remained restricted until completion of Owyhee Dam (1932). However, only panels 3, 4, and 8 at Owyhee incorporated the pipe cooling system; the system was an incidental afterthought in 

2Z\KHH¶VGHVLJQDQGFRQVWUXFWLRQ7KHVXFFHVVRIWKH¿HOGWHVWVKRZHYHUDOlowed for the completion of Hoover Dam, where the use of previously realized 

technological innovation made possible construction of a dam of unprecedented 

size.33

 $OOWKUHH¿UVWV%R\G¶V&RUQHU6DQ0DWHR2Z\KHHOHGORJLFDOO\DQG

chronologically to construction of the massive concrete-gravity dams during the 

period 1930 to 1980. Additional examples of sequential development leading to 

DFRQIXVHGVWULQJRI¿UVWDQGELJJHVWDERXQGZLWKDGYDQFHVLQWULDOORDGDQDO\VLV

DQGPRGHOVWXGLHVWKHPRVWRIWHQFLWHG5REHUW9RJHOGH¿QHVWKHTXDQGDU\

The Brooklyn Bridge is a perfect example of a structure whose 

design is the result of logical evolution and proven construction 

methods, yet also embracing innovative technologies and materials. But even in the case of the new departure, nothing was 

adopted by either John or Washington Roebling that had not 

been shown to be effective and safe in prior undertakings.34
433

Engineer Lawrence Sowles reiterates:

The design of [Hoover Dam] is based upon researches which 

have been carried on almost since the Bureau of Reclamation 

was created in 1902, and upon the accumulated experience obtained in building more than 50 concrete dams during that period. Incidentally, [Hoover] Dam will contain more concrete 

than the preceding 50, a circumstance that warranted special intensive study to determine beforehand how concrete would behave when poured in a mass of this size and height and to make 

it possible to specify materials, methods, and practices that 

would serve to best advantage.35

 ,QVXPHQJLQHHULQJVLJQL¿FDQFHLVPRVWRIWHQGH¿QHGDVWKHXVHRIH[-

LVWLQJWHFKQRORJ\LQQHZZD\VDQGLQQHZFRPELQDWLRQVWKH¿HOGFRQGLWLRQVDQG

design characteristics that demand these innovations might relate to size. There 

is therefore merit in looking to size as a potential indicator of national design 

VLJQL¿FDQFH7KHVXEVHTXHQWDQDO\VLVKRZHYHUPXVWLQFOXGHERWKDQHYDOXDWLRQ

RIGHVLJQLQQRYDWLRQVDQGLPSDFWVGHPDQGHGRUGH¿QHGE\JUHDWVL]HDQGDOVRDQ

HYDOXDWLRQRIWKHPRVWVLJQL¿FDQW3¿UVW ́±ZKDWUHVRXUFHUHJDUGOHVVRIVL]HPRVW

HIIHFWLYHO\UHSUHVHQWVWKHFULWLFDOLQQRYDWLRQ"

If civil engineering is in fact a process of small-scale steps, marked by 

IHZHDVLO\GH¿QHG3OHDSV ́RUHQJLQHHULQJEUHDNWKURXJKVWKHQLWLVSRVVLEOHWKDW

VPDOOVFDOHDX[LOLDU\UHVRXUFHVZLOOGH¿QHDGDP¶VHQJLQHHULQJVLJQL¿FDQFH

Examples might include innovative gate or spillway design. Again, the evaluation of the importance of the innovation must include an analysis of impact: was 

WKHLQQRYDWLRQGHPDQGHGRQO\E\XQLTXHVLWHFRQGLWLRQV":DVLWXVHGVXEVHTXHQWO\"'LGLWDOORZFRQVWUXFWLRQRIGDPVLQSUHYLRXVO\XQWHQDEOHVLWHVXQGHU

SUHYLRXVO\XQWHQDEOHFRQGLWLRQV"

 $GDP¶VDHVWKHWLFDSSHDOPD\DOVRVXJJHVWGHVLJQVLJQL¿FDQFH&LYLO

HQJLQHHU'DYLG3%LOOLQJWRQKDVGH¿QHG3VWUXFWXUDODUW ́DVWKHGHOLEHUDWHPDnipulation of dams and spillway design to create functional sculpture, resources of exceptional beauty that transcend the vagaries of style. Examples include 

California’s East Park Dam, where the spillway undulates along the natural contour lines, not only breaking the water force and potential for erosion but creating 

striking man-made waterfalls. Similar hydraulic characteristics of the spillway 

ZHUHUHDOL]HGIRUH[DPSOHDW)RUW3HFN'DPZKHUHFRQFUHWHEORFNVLPSHGHWKH

IRUFHRIWKHZDWHUZLWKQRQHRIWKHDHVWKHWLFEHQH¿WV0DQLSXODWLRQRIIXQFWLRQal resources for aesthetic purposes might be central to a dam’s design, in which 

case it should be addressed in any analysis of the resource’s overall design and 

FRQVWUXFWLRQVLJQL¿FDQFH+RZHYHULWLVXQOLNHO\WKDWDGDPZLOOEHGHWHUPLQHG
434

a NHL strictly on its quality as sculpture: that aesthetic appeal is too subjective 

and its impact on the history of the nation too nebulous.36 Justifying a determinaWLRQRIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHVROHO\RQWKHEDVLVRIDHVWKHWLFDSSHDOUHTXLUHVDUHsource of exceptional merit.37

&RQVWUXFWLRQ6LJQL¿FDQFH

Engineers not only decide “what work to do” – problems of “choice and 

character of structure” – but also “how to do work” – how to place enormous 

volumes of earth, rock, and concrete.38 Variations in material used within the 

PDVVLYHWUDGLWLRQFRQFUHWHPDVRQU\HDUWK¿OORUURFN¿OODUHPRVWUHOHYDQWZLWKin this context; large-scale application of each of these primary materials poses 

DXQLTXHVHWRISUREOHPVWKDWPD\GHPDQGGLVWLQFWLQQRYDWLRQV)RUW3HFN'DP

ZKHUH3>PDWHULDOYROXPH@¿JXUHVGLI¿FXOWWRJUDVSFRQIURQWWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQHQgineer,” was made possible “only by bringing into action all the resources of invention, of business organization and of technical skill that engineering and contracting and the equipment manufacturers have created in a generation of great 

public and private construction.”39 Engineer Lawrence P. Sowles described the 

construction of Hoover as

primarily interesting because of the enormity of the work involved. The building of a big concrete dam consists essentially 

of placing a large volume of concrete in one mass in accordance 

ZLWKDVSHFL¿FGHVLJQDQGRISURYLGLQJWKHQHFHVVDU\DSSXUWHnances and accessories. Except for their scale of application, 

the operations in the case of Hoover Dam are much the same as 

those that have been performed in rearing many other dams of 

more or less consequence.40

 “Except for their scale of application.” The exception is important, esWDEOLVKLQJWKDWVFDOHDQGVL]HLQWURGXFHDGHJUHHRIFRQVWUXFWLRQGLI¿FXOW\WKDW

may in turn demand important innovations in construction methods.

 +RZHYHUZKLOHWKHOHYHORIGLI¿FXOW\DQGRIFRQVWUXFWLRQDFKLHYHPHQW

LVDQHOHPHQWRIVLJQL¿FDQFHLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRUHFRJQL]HWKDWLWLVVKDUHGE\DOO

ODUJHDQGRULVRODWHGFRQVWUXFWLRQSURMHFWVXQGHUWDNHQLQLQKRVSLWDEOHHQYLURQments. The ability of thousands of men to stack concrete or to pile dirt higher 

than it has ever been piled before, in a more rugged environment, at more exWUHPHWHPSHUDWXUHVLVQRWXQXVXDODQGLVQRWLQDQGRILWVHOIVLJQL¿FDQW$UHWKH

“mechanical shortcuts devised” or the “startling departures that set new standards 

IRUVSHHGDQGHFRQRP\RISHUIRUPDQFH ́LPSRUWDQWWRWKHQDWLRQ"'RWKH\KDYH

DQLPSRUWDQWLQÀXHQFHRULPSDFWRQIXWXUHVLJQL¿FDQWSURMHFWV",I\HVZKDW
435

resource (if there is more than one) best represents the innovation and what comSRQHQWVUHODWHPRVWGLUHFWO\WRKLVWRULFDOVLJQL¿FDQFH"41

Construction innovation and ingenuity are frequently demanded not only 

by the mass of material applied but also by the topographic and geological charDFWHULVWLFVRIDGDPVLWH$W)RUW3HFN'DPHQJLQHHU+DUROG2¶&RQQHOOQRWHG

WKDW3VL]HLQLWVHOIZRXOGQRWPDNHWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI>)RUW3HFN'DP@WKHHQJLQHHULQJIHDWWKDWLWLV'LI¿FXOWLHVLPSRVHGE\WKHQDWXUHRIWKHWRSRJUDSK\LPmediately surrounding the site [is a] contributing factor.”42 Most notably, the 

prevalent Bearpaw Shale, virtually impervious in its undisturbed state, yet prone 

to disintegration upon exposure to the atmosphere, required the application of 

bituminous material during tunneling and was cut with rock saws, a technology 

borrowed from coal mines. Although this methodology was “unprecedented” 

DQG3XQLTXH ́WR)RUW3HFNDQHIIHFWLYHDQDO\VLVRILWVQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHXQGHU&ULWHULRQZRXOGKDYHWRLQFOXGHDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHYDULDWLRQV¶VLJQL¿FDQW

VXEVHTXHQWXVHGLGWKHYDULDWLRQVUHSUHVHQWDQLPSRUWDQWVWHSLQK\GUDXOLF¿OO

GDPGHVLJQDQGFRQVWUXFWLRQRUZDVWKHLULPSDFWPHUHO\ORFDO"7KHVDPHFULWLcal evaluation is demanded, for example, by Arrowrock Dam in southern Idaho 

where an increase in the water content of the concrete slurry (simplifying placePHQWLQWKHFRQFUHWHIRUPVSURYHGWREH3XQIRUWXQDWH ́UHVXOWLQJ3LQDQLQVXI¿-

ciently durable concrete, especially under severe frost.”43 Although innovative, 

and important to implementation of the Arrowrock design, the innovation was 

QRWUHSHDWHGDQGLVQRWVLJQL¿FDQWDVGH¿QHGE\1+/&ULWHULRQ

Ironically, failed dams may also meet NHL criteria. Within the United 

6WDWHVWKHIDLOXUHRIWKH6RXWK)RUN'DP-RKQVWRZQ3HQQV\OYDQLD6W)UDQFLV

&DOLIRUQLDDQG7HWRQ,GDKR'DPVDQGWKHPDVVLYHVOLGHDW)RUW3HFNOHGWR

WHFKQRORJLFDOPRGL¿FDWLRQV&ULWHULRQDQGSROLF\LQLWLDWLYHV&ULWHULRQWKDW

mightUDQNDVQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQW-HURPH5DSKDHOUHSRUWVWKDWWKH0DUFK

IDLOXUHRI6W)UDQFLV'DP3FKDQJHGIRUHYHUWKHWKLQNLQJDERXWIRXQGDWLRQ

engineering for dams. . . . The great lesson of the disaster was the necessity of 

thorough investigation of the geology of a proposed damsite and reservoir.”44 As 

LQHYHU\LQVWDQFHWKHFULWLFDOTXHVWLRQUHPDLQVDUHWKHPRGL¿FDWLRQVDQGLQLWLDWLYHVRIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFH"

Obvious threats to integrity of design and workmanship associated with 

WKHGDPIDLOXUHOLHDWWKHFHQWHURIDIDLOHGGDP¶VVLJQL¿FDQFHDQGWKXVPLJKWQRW

adversely affect NHL eligibility (see integrity, below).45

Criterion 5

Resources composed of integral parts of the environment 

QRWVXI¿FLHQWO\VLJQL¿FDQWE\UHDVRQRIKLVWRULFDODVVRFLDWLRQ

or artistic merit to warrant individual recognition but 
436

FROOHFWLYHO\FRPSRVHDQHQWLW\RIH[FHSWLRQDOKLVWRULFDORU

DUWLVWLFVLJQL¿FDQFHRURXWVWDQGLQJO\FRPPHPRUDWHRULOOXVWUDWHDZD\RIOLIHRUFXOWXUH

Criterion 5 facilitates the nomination of resources that individually 

PLJKWQRWEHRIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHEXWWKDWZKHQFRPELQHGFRPSRVHDKLVWRULFDOO\RUDUWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWHQWLW\7KLVFULWHULRQLVPRVWRIWHQDSSOLHGWRDUchitectural districts. In the case of dams, elements of the “whole” must be historLFDOO\LQWHUFRQQHFWHGDVLQWKHODUJHVFDOHIHGHUDOO\VSRQVRUHGULYHUEDVLQÀRRG

control and multiple-use projects of the mid to late twentieth century. To meet 

Criterion 5, these dams must be part of a plannedV\VWHPRIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFH

It is not enough that the dam is operated in conjunction with other dams along a 

river system (most dams are), but that the system was envisioned from the beJLQQLQJ)RULQVWDQFH6KDVWD'DPLQ&DOLIRUQLD¶V&HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFWPD\

QRWEHRIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFH+RZHYHULILWPHWWKH\HDUUXOHDQGRWKHUUHquirements, the Central Valley Project might be eligible even if none of its elePHQWVVXFKDV6KDVWD6DQ/XLV7ULQLW\)ROVRP)ULDQWDQGRWKHUGDPVSURYHG

LQGLYLGXDOO\VLJQL¿FDQW7KHV\VWHPGH¿QHVWKHZDWHUH[FKDQJHWKDWPDNHVWKH

Central Valley Project a path-breaking innovation in water resource management. 

Similarly, the Army Corps of Engineers’ navigational efforts on the Mississippi 

DQGWKH2KLR5LYHUVRUÀRRGFRQWUROHIIRUWVLQWKHORZHU0LVVLVVLSSL9DOOH\PD\

EHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWRQO\LQWKHFRQWH[WRIDODUJHUV\VWHPGHVLJQHGZLWK

multiple dams working in tandem.

It is important to note that Criterion 5 relates not simply to boundarLHVWKHLGHQWL¿FDWLRQRIWKRVHDVVRFLDWHGUHVRXUFHVSRVVHVVLQJKLVWRULFDOLQWHJULW\VXFKDVDGDPDQGVXSSO\URDGEXWUDWKHUWRWKHLGHQWL¿FDWLRQDQGGRFXmentation of those contiguous and discontiguous components critical to a sysWHP¶VQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFH,WLVHVSHFLDOO\UHOHYDQWZKHQHYDOXDWLQJWKHGDPVRI

the middle to late twentieth century, constructed after both Reclamation and the 

&RUSVKDGHPEUDFHGWKHFRQFHSWRIXQL¿HGULYHUEDVLQGHYHORSPHQW

Criterion 6:

5HVRXUFHVWKDWKDYH\LHOGHGRUPD\\LHOGLQIRUPDWLRQRI

PDMRUVFLHQWL¿FLPSRUWDQFHE\UHYHDOLQJQHZFXOWXUHVRUE\

shedding light upon periods of occupation over large areas 

RIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV6XFKVLWHVDUHWKRVHZKLFKKDYH\LHOGHGRUZKLFKPD\UHDVRQDEO\EHH[SHFWHGWR\LHOGGDWDDIfecting theories, concepts, and ideas to a major degree.

 'DPUXLQVDUHPRVWOLNHO\WREHHYDOXDWHGXQGHU&ULWHULRQDQGRU

When evaluation under Criterion 6 is deemed appropriate, the evaluation must 

focus on the importance of the remains and how they inform theories, concepts, 
437

DQGLGHDV,QWKRVHLQVWDQFHVZKHQWKHUHDUHLQVXI¿FLHQWUHPDLQVWR\LHOGVLJQL¿FDQWGDWDWKHGDPVLWHPLJKWEHHYDOXDWHGIRULWVDVVRFLDWLYHYDOXHXQGHUWKH

terms of the NHL exclusion pertaining to the site of a structure no longer standing (see Exclusions, below).

National Historic Landmark Exclusions

 &HPHWHULHVELUWKSODFHVRUJUDYHVRIKLVWRULFDO¿JXUHVSURSHUWLHVRZQHG

by religious institutions or used for religious purposes; a site of a building or 

structure no longer standing; commemorative properties; structures that have 

been moved from their original locations; reconstructed historic buildings; and 

SURSHUWLHVWKDWKDYHDFKLHYHGVLJQL¿FDQFHZLWKLQWKHSDVW¿IW\\HDUVDUHJHQHUDOO\

not eligible for National Historic Landmark designation. Of these exclusions, restrictions against commemorative, non-extant, and modern resources may prove 

relevant to the evaluation of dams.

Dams and associated infrastructure named in commemoration of an individual (Hoover Dam, Roosevelt Dam, Lake Powell, Bonneville Dam, Barkley 

Dam, Richard Russell Dam, Melvin Price Lock and Dam, to name seven of the 

PDQ\DUHQRWQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWRQWKHEDVLVRIWKLVFRPPHPRUDWLYHDVVRFLDtion.

The exclusion of commemorative properties is closely related to the exFOXVLRQRIVLWHVZKHUHWKHVLJQL¿FDQWEXLOGLQJRUVWUXFWXUHLQWKLVFRQWH[WWKH

GDPLVQRORQJHUVWDQGLQJ6XFKVLWHVPD\EHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWRQO\LI3WKH

persons or events with which they are associated are of transcendent national 

VLJQL¿FDQFHandWKHDVVRFLDWLRQLVVLJQL¿FDQW ́$QH[DPSOHPLJKWLQFOXGHWKH

VLWHRIWKH6W)UDQFLV'DPIDLOXUHLIWKHIDLOXUHRIWKHGDPFDQEHVKRZQWRKDYH

been of transcendent importance in dam engineering. (By the nature of dams and 

other civil engineering works, the association between the site and the “event” 

RIFRQVWUXFWLRQRUIDLOXUHLVVLJQL¿FDQW,IKRZHYHU6W)UDQFLV'DPGHVLJQHU

:LOOLDP0XOKROODQGLVLGHQWL¿HGDVDQLQGLYLGXDORIWUDQVFHQGHQWQDWLRQDOLPSRUtance, then the site’s important association with Mulholland would also have to 

be established.)

 5HVRXUFHVDFKLHYLQJQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHZLWKLQWKHSDVW¿IW\\HDUV

qualify for NHL consideration if they are of “extraordinary national importance.” 

The evaluation process can be complicated by the absence of time in which to 

view the properties in a more objective and informed context, of an established 

historic context, and of secondary sources by which to judge a resource’s impact. 

However, the impact of exceptional resources will most often be of such immediate magnitude that historic contexts will have been developed, the immediate impacts documented, and hypothesis for future reverberations clearly 
438

DUWLFXODWHG([DPSOHVRIGHVLJQDWHG1+/VOHVVWKDQ¿IW\\HDUVROGLQFOXGHWKH

most important resources associated with such cataclysmic events as the Civil 

Rights Movement, Space Exploration, and the Cold War. It is not anticipated 

WKDWDQ\86GDPZLOOPHHWWKLVEXUGHQRIH[FHSWLRQDOQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFH

Note that the impact of a dam, whether related to design, construction, 

or associative value, may date to the design or construction period. If warranted, 

WKHSHULRGRIVLJQL¿FDQFHPD\EHJLQZLWKWKHLQLWLDWLRQRIIRUPDOGHVLJQZRUNRU

the start, rather than the completion, of construction.

Integrity

National Historic Landmarks must possess a higher degree of historical 

integrity than that required for National Register listing and must retain all seven 

aspects of integrity – setting, location, design, material, workmanship, feeling, 

and association. Integrity of important interior spaces and interior mechanization 

must be factored into the evaluation. Those aspects of integrity that relate most 

GLUHFWO\WRDSURSHUW\¶VFKDUDFWHUGH¿QLQJIHDWXUHVPXVWEHHYDOXDWHGWKHPRVW

carefully.

In general, threats to integrity, whether of design or association, are cumulative: there is a “critical mass” at which the resource is unable to absorb eiWKHUWKHYROXPHRUWKHYLVXDOLPSDFWRIPRGL¿FDWLRQV,QWHUPVRIYLVXDODQG

design impact, the loss of historical material is often more damaging than the addition of new materials.) By virtue of function and the constraints of geographic 

setting, dams will generally possess integrity of setting and will always possess 

integrity of location. Potential threats to integrity of design and material include 

raising the crest height; refacing a dam face with a more stable material; modifying the spillway; and constructing or reconstructing auxiliary structures, such as 

SRZHUKRXVHV¿VKODGGHUVRUWHPSHUDWXUHFRQWUROGHYLFHV

Because of their massive size, dams are able to absorb a degree of 

QHZPDWHULDODQGDX[LOLDU\LQIUDVWUXFWXUHZLWKRXWORVLQJKLJKLQWHJULW\)RUH[-

ample, a 250-foot-wide by 300-foot-high Temperature Control Device (TCD) 

has recently been appended to the upstream face of 602-foot-high Shasta Dam 

&DOLIRUQLDWKH7&'¶VVHYHQWHHQJDWHVHDFKRIZKLFKZHLJKV¿IW\HLJKWWRQV

allow Reclamation to discharge water from varied levels of the reservoir, thereby 

maintaining the colder water temperatures needed by spawning chinook salmon.46 Not only does the reservoir mask much of the TCD, but the scale of the 

downstream dam face dwarfs the exposed TCD components; the TCD’s minor 

visual impact is equal to its overall technological impact – it is clearly an auxiliary component with little bearing, and little adverse physical impact, on the overall size and design of the dam itself.
439

In contrast, Stoney Gorge Dam (California) approaches the limit of absorption. Although the original structure remains intact, the adjacent spillway 

KDVEHHQPRGL¿HGDVHFWLRQRIWKHGDPFUHVWUDLVHGDQGDSRZHUKRXVHFRQVWUXFWed. While these additions do not mask the original design characteristics, particXODUO\WKHÀDWVODEVDQGEXWWUHVVHVDGGLWLRQDOPRGL¿FDWLRQRIWKHEXWWUHVVHVRULJLQDORYHUÀRZW\SHJDWHVDQGRWKHULQWHJUDOFRPSRQHQWVRIWKHGHVLJQZRXOGOLNHly render the property ineligible as a NHL.

%RXQGDU\-XVWL¿FDWLRQ,GHQWL¿FDWLRQRI&RQWULEXWLQJDQG

Noncontributing Resources

The boundaries of a proposed NHL should be given careful considerDWLRQDQGVKRXOGEHEDVHGXSRQWKHHVWDEOLVKHGQDWLRQDODUHDRIVLJQL¿FDQFHSHULRGRIVLJQL¿FDQFHDQGHYDOXDWLRQRILQWHJULW\)RUDOOSRWHQWLDOODQGPDUNVWKH

following guidelines apply:47

1. Carefully select boundaries to encompass, but not to exceed, the 

IXOOH[WHQWRIWKHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWUHVRXUFH

2. The area to be nominated should be large enough to include 

DOOQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWIHDWXUHVRIWKHSURSHUW\EXWVKRXOGQRWLQFOXGH

3EXIIHU]RQHV ́RUDFUHDJHQRWGLUHFWO\FRQWULEXWLQJWRWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRI

the property.

3. Leave out peripheral areas of the property that no longer retain a high degree of integrity, due to subdivision, development, or other 

changes.

 7KHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIERXQGDULHVDQGWKHLGHQWL¿FDWLRQRIFRQWULEXWLQJ

and noncontributing features are closely related. Both are based upon an assessPHQWRIWKHQRPLQDWHGSURSHUW\¶VDUHDDQGSHULRGRIVLJQL¿FDQFHDVZHOODVWKH

KLVWRULFDOLQWHJULW\RILQGLYLGXDOFRPSRQHQWV)RUH[DPSOHZKLOHWUDQVIRUPHU

yards may be included within site boundaries, and may be recognized as historiFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWWKH\RIWHQGRQRWUHWDLQVXI¿FLHQWLQWHJULW\DVGH¿QHGE\1+/

FULWHULDWREHLGHQWL¿HGDVFRQWULEXWLQJFRPSRQHQWV,QFHUWDLQFLUFXPVWDQFHV

LQFOXGLQJWKRVHLQZKLFKYLVXDOFRQWLQXLW\LVQRWDIDFWRURIKLVWRULFVLJQL¿FDQFH

when resources are geographically separate; and when the intervening space 

ODFNVVLJQL¿FDQFHFRQWULEXWLQJUHVRXUFHVZLOOEHGH¿QHGDVGLVFRQWLJXRXVHOHPHQWVWKXVH[FOXGLQJWKHQRQVLJQL¿FDQWODQGEDVHDQGQRQFRQWULEXWLQJUHVRXUFHV

from the NHL boundaries.

Dam construction, particularly in the mountainous stretches of the unsettled West, involved construction of a wide array of support infrastructure (both 
440

temporary and permanent), including river diversion tunnels, powerhouses, transformer yards, spillways and penstocks, wagon roads and railroads to haul equipment and supplies, lumber mills, cement production plants, rock quarries, borrow 

areas, telephone lines, and townsites.48$GHVFULSWLRQRI)RUW3HFN'DPLQ

gives some idea of the magnitude and diversity of these resources. The project 

included the following: a detached spillway; a thirteen-mile branch line from the 

Great Northern tracks at Wiota; a 300-foot, three-span bridge over the Missouri 

River; a 13,000 foot truss-and-trestle rail and auto bridge along the downstream 

face of the dam, 238 miles of powerline and two substations, and the town of 

)RUW3HFN7KHWRZQFRQWDLQHGQLQHEORFNVRIEXQNKRXVHVQLQHPHVVKDOOVHLJKteen shower houses, three blocks of foremen’s dormitories, blocks of homes for 

married staff and executives, a central administration building, a shopping center, 

a cold-storage plant, a commissary warehouse, a hospital, a garage and maintenance yard, and a community water treatment and sewage plant.49

National Register evaluation of a dam at the local or state level of sigQL¿FDQFHGHPDQGVDQHYDOXDWLRQRIWKRVHH[WDQWDX[LOLDU\VWUXFWXUHVDQGEXLOGings associated with dam construction and use and therefore associated with the 

dam’s impact on the local community. However, in most cases, these resources 

will not relate directly to a dam’s nationalVLJQL¿FDQFHDQGZLOOEHH[FOXGHGIURP

WKHODQGPDUNQRPLQDWLRQV)UHTXHQWO\ODQGPDUNERXQGDULHVPD\EHGUDZQ

within a larger National Register Historic District boundary.)

Integral components of a dam may be grouped in two ways: (1) those 

resources central to the safe and effective operation of the dam and (2) those central to product (water and power) delivery to an outlying distribution system. 

7KH¿UVWJURXSRIUHVRXUFHVPLJKWLQFOXGHGLYHUVLRQWXQQHOVRXWOHWVLQOHWVVWLOOing basins, guide walls, gates, spillways, trash racks, and (possibly) penstocks; 

the second includes transformer yards, pumping stations, powerhouses, penVWRFNVWXUELQHV¿VKODGGHUVDQGWHPSHUDWXUHFRQWUROGHYLFHVIf they possess 

KLJKLQWHJULW\DQGGDWHWRWKHGH¿QHGSHULRGRIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHERWKFODVVHV

of resources will most often be included within the NHL boundaries.

There will be exceptions and, again, the determination of boundaries and 

of contributing versus noncontributing resources is based upon the property’s 

DUHDDQGSHULRGVLJQL¿FDQFH)RUW3HFN'DPZDVDXWKRUL]HGDQGFRQVWUXFWHGWR

assure an 8’ to 9’ navigation channel below Sioux City, Iowa; to provide minimal 

ÀRRGFRQWURODQGHURVLRQSURWHFWLRQDQG3WRUHOLHYHVHULRXVORFDOXQHPSOR\PHQW

and distress.” Neither power production nor irrigation was part of the original 

GHVLJQSODQ8QOHVVWKHGDP¶VQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHLVEDVHGDWOHDVWLQSDUWXSRQ

post-construction, multiple-purpose development, the powerhouses added to the 

dam after the initial construction are not likely to be included within the district 

boundaries. In contrast, the powerhouses at Bonneville Dam were central to the 
441

RULJLQDOGHVLJQDQGLQWHQWRIGDPFRQVWUXFWLRQDQGKDYHEHHQGH¿QHGDVFRQWULEuting components of the NHL property. Similarly, the pumping station at Grand 

Coulee Dam, components of which extend upward beyond the immediate dam 

site to the canyon rim where they feed the primary distribution canals, would 

likely be included within an NHL nomination as resources integral to the effective operation of the dam.

Non-integral components may also be grouped in two ways: (1) residential, recreational, and administrative facilities and (2) reservoirs and resources

related to the distribution system, such as powerlines, canals, and feeder ditches.

“Company Towns,” administrative headquarters, and boating facilities 

associated with large federal dam construction projects may be included within 

the landmark boundary. This inclusion, however, is dependent upon the resourcHV¶LPSRUWDQWDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWHFRQRPLFODERUDQGVRFLDO

themes in American history and upon their historical integrity.

 6WDWHPHQWVRIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHZKHWKHUUHODWHGWRDGDP¶VDVVRFLDWLYHRUGHVLJQVLJQL¿FDQFHZLOOLQHYLWDEO\LQFOXGHDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHLPSRUWDQFH

of reservoirs and auxiliary resources related to the distribution system. Dams 

are only one component of a tightly interrelated technological system: canals are 

central to the function of irrigation dams, as water lines are to municipal waterVXSSO\GDPVDVWUDQVPLVVLRQOLQHVDUHWRSRZHUGDPVDVUHVHUYRLUVDUHWRÀRRG

control and navigation dams. However, historically associated and historically 

VLJQL¿FDQWLQIUDVWUXFWXUHORFDWHGRXWVLGHWKHLPPHGLDWHERXQGDULHVRIDGDPVLWH

– that boundary imposed by the dam itself and its structurally integral infrastructure – will most often be excluded from the NHL boundary.

 $UJXDEO\LWLVWKHDVVRFLDWHGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHWKDWEHVWGH¿QHVDGDP¶VVLJQL¿FDQFH7KH%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQ¶VLPSDFWRQWKH:HVWLVFRQYH\HGE\WKH

myriad of canals and disitribution ditches that carry the water to previously arid 

land. The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers’ impact on the nation may be best represented by merchant ships that ply downstream shipping lanes. Yet the National 

Historic Landmark program is in part one of the properties that “possess exceptional value or quality in illustrating or interpreting the heritage of the United 

States.” Exclusion of reservoirs, canals, water supply lines, power lines, and irULJDWHG¿HOGVIURP1+/GDPERXQGDULHVLVDSUDFWLFDOFRQFHVVLRQDFNQRZOHGJPHQWRIWKHGLI¿FXOW\RIGH¿QLQJDGPLQLVWHULQJDQGGHVFULELQJDSURSHUW\RI

such proportions. It is also valid recognition of the power of contiguous visual 

imagery, of a dam’s remarkable ability to represent the larger technological system with which it is associated.
442

Endnotes

 *XLGHOLQHVGHYHORSHGE\WKH1DWLRQDO3DUN6HUYLFHIRUHYDOXDWLQJDSURSHUW\¶VKLVWRULFDOVLJQL¿FDQFHDQG

physical integrity, outlined in U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, National Register Bulletin

15: How to Apply the National Register Criteria for Evaluation (Washington D.C.: Government Printing 

2I¿FHDSSO\JHQHUDOO\WRWKHHYDOXDWLRQRISRWHQWLDO1+/V7KHFDWHJRULHVRIKLVWRULFSURSHUWLHVDUHGH-

¿QHGWKHVDPHZD\KLVWRULFFRQWH[WVDUHLGHQWL¿HGVLPLODUO\DQGFRPSDUDWLYHHYDOXDWLRQLVFDUULHGRXWRQWKH

same principles. This information should be used as a general reference when evaluation American dams for 

NHL designation.

2. While these guidelines were prepared as part of a review of large multiple-purpose dams, they have 

broader applicability to the evaluation of all dams. As part of this study, four NHL nominations of Corps of 

Engineers and Reclamation dams were prepared. These four were selected from a larger list of potential NHLs.

3. Schnitter, A History of DamsL[7KH1DWLRQDO5HJLVWHUGH¿QHVGDPVDVstructures although the boundaries of a nominated property may include a variety of EXLOGLQJVREMHFWV and sites united in a district (see boundDU\MXVWL¿FDWLRQVEHORZ

4. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Survey cited in Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam

Engineering, xii.

 $VVSHFL¿HGLQWKH6FRSHRI:RUNDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKLVSURMHFWDFRQWH[WKDVEHHQGHYHORSHGVSHFL¿FDOO\

for federal dams (although their private precursors are references when appropriate). However, the basic principles for evaluation of public and private dams are similar. This larger class of resources is covered by the 

guidelines.

6. The Secretary of the Interior designates NHLs based on an evaluation of formally nominated properties.

7. Smith, A History of Dams, 228.

 'H¿QHGIRUWKHSXUSRVHRIWKLVVWXG\DVWKRVHLQH[FHVVRI¿IW\IHHWKLJK

 )RUH[DPSOHÀRRGFRQWUROUHTXLUHVDODUJHVWRUDJHDUHDWRDFFRPPRGDWHVZROOHQULYHUVDQGKHDY\SUHcipitation, while hydropower interests prefer that the reservoirs remain as full as possible; irrigation takes water 

away, while recreational champions desire high lake levels; cities want their reservoirs full for water supply, but 

navigation interests want to use the reservoir water downstream to ensure adequate navigation depths. When 

WKHVHFRQÀLFWVRUWKHLUUHVROXWLRQVKDYHDQLPSRUWDQWDQGVXEVWDQWLYHLPSDFWRQWKHQDWLRQDVDZKROHWKH\

PD\GHPRQVWUDWHQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFH

10. C. H. Vivian, “Developing the Mighty Columbia,” Compressed Air Magazine (September 1935), 4819.

11. Any analysis of the degree of historical impact should be based on the actual development not on preconstruction projections. Grand Coulee Dam’s potential, for example, to irrigate 1,200,000 acres of “fertile but 

arid” land is less important than the acreage ultimately irrigated and farmed.

12. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering, 74.

13. Jackson, Building the Ultimate Dam, 4.

14. Stephen D. Mikesell, “Pardee Dam: Evaluation of National Register Eligibility,” report prepared for 

John Holson, BioSystems Analysis, In., 1994, 13.

15. Norman Smith, as quoted in Schnitter, A History of Dams, xi.

16. Robinson, Water for the West, 51.

17. Pitzer, Grand Coulee, 265.

18. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering, 13.

19. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering, 226.

20. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering, 74.

21. “Editorial: Construction Progress,” Compressed Air Magazine (October 1935), 4864.

 )UHGHULFN/4XLYLNDQG$P\6ODWRQ+LVWRULF$PHULFDQ(QJLQHHULQJ5HFRUGV+$(51R253ULQWV

and Photographs Division, Library of Congress. Owyhee Dam, Nyssa Vicinity, Malheur County, Oregon [hereinafter “Quivik and Slaton, HAER No. OR-17]

23. Schnitter, A History of Dams, 177.

24. Requiring construction of a low dam for power generation purposed and subsequent incorporation of this 

low dam in a high dam design for irrigation purposes.

25. “A Mistake that Should be Corrected,” Engineering News-Record (January 3, 1935), 23.

26. Smith, A History of Dams, 214.

27. Robinson, Water for the West, 52.

28. Jackson, Building the Ultimate Dam, 246-51.
443

29. Similarly, the subaqueous St. Clair River Tunnel (Minnesota) has been designated an NHL under criterion 4 because of the successful combination of existing technologies (the shield method of excavation, the cast 

iron tunnel lining, and excavation in a compressed air environment) in a setting, and on a scale, suitable to fullsize transportation needs (Robie Lange, “National Historic Landmark Nomination: St. Clair River Tunnel,” 

)HEUXDU\

30. Smith, Man and Water, 63-4

31. Schnitter, A History of Dams, 174.

32. Smith, A History of Dams, 220.

33. Quivik and Slaton, HAER No. OR-17, 50.

34. Robert Vogel, quoted in Donald C. Jackson with foreword by David McCullough, Great American

Bridges and Dams, Great American Places Series (Washington, D.C.: The Preservation Press, National Trust 

for Historic Preservation, 1988), p. 131.

35. Lawrence P. Sowles, “Construction of Boulder Dam: Description of Methods of Pouring the Concrete,” 

Compressed Air Magazine (April 1934), 4385

36. David P. Billington referenced in Jackson, Great American Bridges and Dams, 243.

37. Dam cladding, decorative treatment disconnected from all function, may also possess artistic merit; the 

Moderne facade of TVA’s Hiwassee Dam is an often-cited example. This cladding, however, is irrelevant to 

WKHIXQFWLRQLQJGHVLJQRIWKHGDPLWVHOIDQGLVHYDOXDWHGDVDOOZRUNVRIDUWDUHHYDOXDWHGWR1+/VLJQL¿FDQFH

“considered in the context of history’s judgement” does it “so fully articulate a particular concept of design that 

it expresses an aesthetic ideal . . .” See National Park Service, National Register Bulletin 1; 20, 51).

38. “This Issue,” Engineering News-Record (August 1935), 279.

39. “Men and Mechanization,” 684, emphasis added.

40. Sowles, “Construction of the Boulder Dam. . .,” 4385.

41. “Editorial: Construction Progress,” Compressed Air Magazine (October 1935), 4864.

 +DUROG2¶&RQQHOO3)RUW3HFN'DP3DUW±7KH3URMHFWDQG,WV6FRSH ́Compressed Air Magazine

(March 1935), 4672.

43. Schnitter, A History of Dams, 177.

44. Kollgaard and Chadwick, editors, Development of Dam Engineering. . ., 74.

 7KLVPRGL¿HGLQWHJULW\VWDQGDUGREYLRXVO\GRHVQRWDSSO\LIHYLGHQFHRIWKHUXLQLWVHOIRURIWKHIDLOHG

component, has been removed.

46. “Shasta Temperature Control Device, Planned, Designed and Implemented by the Bureau of 

5HFODPDWLRQ ́QRGDWHRQ¿OHDWWKH%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQ1RUWKHUQ&DOLIRUQLD$UHD2I¿FH6KDVWDODNH

California.

47. U. S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, National Register, History and Education 

Division, How to Prepare National Historic Landmark Nominations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

2I¿FHpassim.

48. Robinson, Water for the West, 20.

 2¶&RQQHOO3)RUW3HFN'DP3DUW, ́

445

APPENDIX B: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LIST OF 

POTENTIAL NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARK MULTIPLEPURPOSE DAMS

Historical Research Associates, Inc. (HRA)

The following methodology details the means by which Historical 

Research Associates, Inc. arrived at a historic context and list of potential multiple-purpose National Historic Landmark (NHL) dams, constructed by the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or the Bureau of Reclamation within the historic 

period (up to 1950).

I. Consultation with Project Historians

Many of the dams on the list of potential NHL dams that follow were 

LGHQWL¿HGLQWKHFRXUVHRIH[WHQVLYHGLVFXVVLRQZLWKSURMHFWVSRQVRUVDQGZLWK

SURMHFWKLVWRULDQVWKHVXEMHFWH[SHUWVDVVLJQL¿FDQWFRPSRQHQWVRIWKHZDWHUsheds, policy decisions, and construction innovations around which the associated NHL theme study Federal Multipurpose Dam is RUJDQL]HG)RUH[DPSOH

(OHSKDQW%XWWHZLOO¿JXUHSURPLQHQWO\LQWKHFKDSWHURQIHGHUDOZDWHUODZDQG

SROLF\*DUULVRQDQG)RUW3HFN'DPVZLOO¿JXUHSURPLQHQWO\LQWKHGLVFXVVLRQ

of Missouri River development and the Pick-Sloan plan; Grand Coulee Dam 

ZLOO¿JXUHSURPLQHQWO\LQWKHGLVFXVVLRQRIK\GURSRZHUGHYHORSPHQW6LPLODUO\

3DWK¿QGHU%XIIDOR%LOO6KRVKRQHDQG*LEVRQ'DPVKDYHEHHQLGHQWL¿HGE\

'DYLG3%LOOLQJWRQDQGRWKHUVDVWKHGDPVPRVWGLUHFWO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKVLJQL¿-

cant engineering advances. The subject experts have therefore concluded that 

the dams on the attached list are those that best represent the key characteristics 

DQGDUHDVRIVLJQL¿FDQFHZKHWKHUWHFKQRORJLFDOVRFLDOSROLWLFDOGH¿QHGLQWKH

historic context and may be worthy of NHL nomination.

II. Secondary Source Review

In the course of developing the criteria for National Historic Landmark 

eligibility and of developing a list of potential NHL dams, HRA reviewed the following sources:

Arnold, Joseph L. The Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act. )RUW%HOYRLU

9LUJLQLD2I¿FHRI+LVWRU\8QLWHG6WDWHV$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUV

Barrows, H. K. Floods. Their Hydrology and Control. New York: McGrawHill Book Company, Inc., 1948.

Chambers, John Whiteclay II. The North Atlantic Engineers. A History of the

North Atlantic Division and its Predecessors in the U.S. Army Corps of
446

Engineers, 1775-1975. Report prepared for the North Atlantic Division, 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1980.

Gates, Paul W. History of Public Land Law Development. Washington, D.C.: 

=HQJHU3XEOLVKLQJ&RPSDQ\,QF

Goldsmith, E., and N. Hildyard, The Social and Environmental Effects of Large

Dams, Volume I, Overview. A report to the European Ecological Action 

Group (ECOROPA), 1984.

Graf, William L. “Landscapes, Commodities, and Ecosystems: The 

Relationship Between Policy and Science for American Rivers,” Sustaining

Our Water Resources. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993.

Hays, Samuel. &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\7KH3URJUHVVLYH

Conservation Movement 1890-1920. New York: Atheneum Press, 1972 

¿UVWSXEOLVKHGE\+DUYDUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV

Hundley, Norris. Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and the

Politics of Water in the American West. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: 

University of California Press, 1975.

Jackson, Donald C. Building the Ultimate Dam: John S. Eastwood and the

Control of Water in the West. University Press of Kansas, 1995.

Johnson, Leland R. The Headwaters District: A History of the Pittsburgh

District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Report prepared for the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, n.d.

Kollgaard, Eric B. and Wallace L. Chadwick. Development of Dam Engineering

in the United States. New York: Pergamon Press, 1988.

Maass, Arthur. Muddy Waters. The Army Engineers and the Nation’s Rivers. 

Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951.

Martin, Russell. A Story that Stands Like a Dam: Glen Canyon and the Struggle

for the Soul of the West. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989.

Pitzer, Paul. Grand Coulee: Harnessing a Dream. Pullman, Washington: 

Washington State University Press, 1994.

Robinson, Michael C. Water for the West: The Bureau of Reclamation 1902-

1977. Chicago, Illinois: Public Works Historical Society, 1979.
447

Schnitter, Nicholas J. A History of Dams: The Useful Pyramids. Rotterdam and 

%URRN¿HOG$$%DONHPD

Settle, William A. Jr. The Dawning. A New Day for the Southwest: A History of

the Tulsa District, Corps of Engineers, 1939-1971. Tulsa Oklahoma: 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Tulsa District, 1975.

Shallat, Todd. Structures in the Stream: Water, Science, and the Rise of the

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994.

Smith, Norman. Man and Water: A History of Hydro-Technology. Charles 

Scribner’s Sons, 1975.

__________. A History of Dams. London: Peter Davies, 1971.

Stegner, Wallace. Beyond the Hundredth Meridian: John Wesley Powell and the

Second Opening of the West. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska 

Press, 1953.

Welsh, Michael. A Mission in the Desert: Albuquerque District, 1935-1985. 

Report prepared for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, n.d.

Williams, Albert N. The Water and the Power: Development of the Five Great

Rivers of the West. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1951.

Worster, Donald. Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the

American West. New York: Pantheon Books, 1985.

III. Comparative Analysis

 3KDVHV,DQG,,RIWKHUHVHDUFKHIIRUWVXFFHVVIXOO\LGHQWL¿HGREYLRXVO\QRWHZRUWK\GDPVVLJQL¿FDQWE\GLQWRIWKHLUunique impact upon construction and engineering technology or unique association with national water policy. 

2QFHLGHQWL¿HGWKHVHGDPVZHUHSUHOLPLQDULO\DVVHVVHGIRUQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFH

XVLQJWKHFULWHULDIRUHYDOXDWLRQ7KHUHVHDUFKPHWKRGRORJ\DOVRLGHQWL¿HGWKRVH

QDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWLQLWLDWLYHVWKDWGUDPDWLFDOO\DQGVLJQL¿FDQWO\FKDQJHGWKH

federal government’s role in development of the nation’s water resources. These 

LQFOXGHWKHJHQHVLVRIWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFHSDVVDJHRIWKH)ORRG

Control Act of 1936; and authorization of the Pick-Sloan plan of multiple-agency, integrated multiple-purpose, basin-wide development (1944).

The methodology was less successful at providing a systematic means of 

comparative analysis of the merits of those representative dams best able to 
448

V\PEROL]HWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKHVHSROLF\LQLWLDWLYHV)RUWKHSXUSRVHVRI

comparative analysis of Bureau of Reclamation dams associated with (repreVHQWDWLYHRIJHQHVLVRIDQDWLRQDOUHFODPDWLRQSROLF\DQGWKH¿UVWDSSOLFDWLRQ

RIPXOWLSOHSXUSRVHLUULJDWLRQK\GURSRZHUGHYHORSPHQW+5$UHOLHGXSRQWKH

Bureau of Reclamation’s 3URMHFW'DWD%RRN'DPVLGHQWL¿HGLQWKLVFRPSUHKHQsive database were evaluated under the evaluation criteria

In the absence of a comprehensive project directory, evaluation of the 

most appropriate representatives of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers multiple-purpose dam development required a systematic comparative analysis of 

all Corps multiple-purpose dams. At the suggestion of COE Senior Historian 

Martin Reuss, HRA initiated this analysis with review of the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers Data Base, searching for multiple-purpose dams constructed in the 

historic period (prior to 1950) and currently owned by the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers. Single-purpose dams generating multiple use incidental to their conVWUXFWLRQ±UHFUHDWLRQ¿UHSURWHFWLRQ¿VKDQGZLOGOLIHKDELWDW±ZHUHQRWGH¿QHGDV

multiple–purpose. This criteria eliminated many of the regulatory dams designed 

principally for navigation purposes.

Guided by this list, HRA reviewed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Annual Reports and Division and District histories for additional information reODWHGWRWKHPXOWLSOHSXUSRVHGDPVDQGWKHQDVVHVVHGWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHLQWHJULW\

and eligibility of these dams against the criteria for evaluation. The results of 

WKLVGRFXPHQWVHDUFKFRPSDUDWLYHDQDO\VLVDUHLQFRUSRUDWHGZLWKLQWKHOLVWRISRtential NHL dams.

Historic Context 

Three thousand years before the birth of Christ, Mesopotamian civilizations constructed crude gravity dams, initiating “one of the most essential aspects 

of man’s attempt to harness, control and improve his environment.”1

 Hydraulic 

development in America boasts only slightly more recent antecedents, initiated 

by the Hohokam and Anasazi people of the arid Southwest and continued thousands of years later by Euro-American settlers who constructed dams to power 

WKHLUPLOOVWRSURYLGHGRPHVWLFZDWHUWRZDWHUWKHLU¿HOGVWRLPSURYH navigaWLRQDQGWRSURWHFWWKHLU¿HOGVDQGKRPHVIURPÀRRG

Until the twentieth century, private enterprise and local, territorial, or 

state government assumed sole control for the construction of American irrigation and power dams, a response to the young Republic’s faith in states’ rights 

and the power of capitalism. The history of navigational structures, however, begins with federal authority, when nascent communities turned to the U.S. Army 
449

Corps of Engineers for the construction of canals, dams, locks, and harbor improvements.2

Corps

On March 16, 1802, Congress granted the president authority to organize and establish an engineering and construction agency responsible not only 

for military construction, supply, and training, but also for the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of internal improvements and related works: 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.3

Debate over the power and accountability of the nascent Corps symbolized the larger debate over the character of the new nation. Throughout the 

nineteenth century, states rights advocates denounced the Corps as a tool of cenWUDOL]DWLRQDQGDWKUHDWWRWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSUHURJDWLYHVRIWKHVWDWHV)HGHUDOLVW

Henry Clay, author of the “American Plan,” countered that Congress had a “great 

national duty” to open the veins of commerce that bound the East to the West.”4

,Q:KLJSROLWLFLDQ-RKQ&6SHQFHUGH¿QHGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDVDERXQGOHVVK\GURJUDSKLFDOV\VWHPLQZKLFKWKHULYHUVDQGODNHVIRUPHGD¿YHWKRXVDQG

mile conduit of navigation, linking New England to the West and the Gulf of 

Mexico, a liquid link between the states, creating “one government, ... a union.” 

A substantial and persistent investment in river and harbor construction would 

protect, preserve, and strengthen that union.5

The nation’s investment was substantial, involving watershed surveys, 

canal, dam, and wharf construction at a cost of over $43 million federal dollars 

(1802–1861).6

This national investment was guided in theory by an engineering elite 

FRPPLWWHGWRVFLHQWL¿FSULQFLSOHVVFKRROHGLQJRYHUQPHQWVHUYLFHDQGGHGLFDWHG

WRWKHJRRGRIWKHPDQ\UDWKHUWKDQWKHSUR¿WRIWKHIHZ<HW&RUSVSURMHFWVZDLWed on Congressional appropriations and by the turn of the century an emerging 

class of “conservationists” scorned the Corps’ efforts as evidence of pork-barrel 

SROLWLFVDQGRILQHI¿FLHQF\VSXUUHGE\SROLWLFDOFRQFHUQVUDWKHUWKDQWKHLPSDUWLDO

laws of science.7

Reclamation

With the Louisiana Purchase (1802) and victory in the MexicanAmerican War (1848), the United States acquired extensive semi-arid and arid 

lands that ZRXOGVXVWDLQIDPLOLHVWHPSHUXUEDQJURZWKDQGFODVVFRQÀLFWJHQHUate taxes, and contribute to the wealth of the nation only if irrigated. And, Major 

John Wesley Powell of the United States Geological Survey argued in 1878, only 
450

if federal land policy recognized the primacy of water in land with little of it, recRJQL]HGWKHOLPLWVWRZHVWHUQVHWWOHPHQWDQGXQGHUWRRNWRVWXG\GH¿QHPDQage, and distribute western land on the basis of hydrographic rather than political 

boundaries.8

By the turn of the century, Powell’s admonitions were echoed by those 

men and women who had failed to bring water to their Desert Land Act claims 

or who had realized too late the limits to 160 (or 320) semi-arid homestead acres. 

Settlers, irrigation districts, corporations, speculators, and municipal and state 

DJHQFLHVWKDWKDGEHHQXQDEOHWRPXVWHUWKHWHFKQRORJLFDOH[SHUWLVHDQGWKH¿-

nancial resources to harness the major rivers of the West clamored for a revised 

federal reclamation policy. An emerging class of “conservationists” committed 

WR3SXWWLQJULYHUVWRZRUNLQWKHPRVWHI¿FLHQWZD\SRVVLEOHIRUWKHSXUSRVHRI

maximizing production and wealth” both heeded and inspired the popular cry.9

 

Historian Donald Worster writes: “The West had gone as far as it could on its 

own hook. It had tried partnerships, theocracy, foreign and local capital and still 

most of the rivers ran on freely to the sea. . .. So they raised their voices in one 

loud, sustained chant. . .. ‘We need the state!’ And the federal government responded by passing the National Reclamation Act in 1902.10

The Reclamation Act (also known as the Newlands Act in recognition of 

LWVVSRQVRU)UDQFLV51HZODQGV>1HYDGD@HVWDEOLVKHGWKDWWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWZRXOG¿QDQFHLUULJDWLRQSURMHFWVWKURXJKD5HFODPDWLRQ)XQGFRPSRVHG

of proceeds from the sale of project lands. The Reclamation Service within the 

86*HRORJLFDO6XUYH\DIHGHUDOEXUHDXFUDF\LQGHSHQGHQWIURPSURMHFWVSHFL¿F

Congressional appropriations, would decide the course of water resource development and would determine the goals and methods of water programs. In theRU\WKHVHGHFLVLRQVZHUHWREHPDGHE\HQJLQHHUVRQWKHEDVLVRI¿HOGGDWDDQG

VFLHQWL¿FSULQFLSOHVUDWKHUWKDQE\SROLWLFLDQVLQUHVSRQVHWRSDUWLVDQSROLWLFVDQG

the competing, parochial interests of water users.”11

Although the Service’s focus was on the technological components of 

dam and canal construction, a measure of social engineering was included within their mission. Water would be distributed only to farms of 160 acres or less, 

allowing equitable distribution to the anticipated hordes of landless immigrants 

that clogged American cities (and assuring that western lands would effectiveO\UHOLHYHODERUXQUHVWDQGFODVVFRQÀLFWWKHUHE\FRQWULEXWLQJWRWKHJURZWKDQG

prosperity of the nation). Those with larger existing holdings within project 

boundaries were to sell their excess land at pre-project prices, or surrender their 

claim to government water.12

Between 1902 and 1920, the U.S. Reclamation Service (separated from 

the Geological Survey and renamed the Bureau of Reclamation in 1923) 
451

constructed the Truckee and the Carson River projects in Nevada; Salt River 

and Yuma projects in Arizona; North Platte in Nebraska-Wyoming; Shoshone 

in Wyoming; Milk River, Huntley, and Lower Yellowstone in Montana; Belle 

)RXUFKHLQ6RXWK'DNRWD3D\HWWH%RLVH5LYHULQ,GDKR<DNLPDDQG2NDQDJDQ

in Washington; Klamath and Umatilla in Oregon; Strawberry Valley in Utah; 

Uncompahgre in Colorado; and the Rio Grande in New Mexico.13

 %\YLUWXDOO\DOODFFRXQWVWKHVHHDUO\\HDUVZHUHGLI¿FXOW(QIRUFHPHQW

of the 160-acre land limit was lax, allowing a government windfall to established 

farmers and fueling land speculation where absentee landowners leased their 

project land to a new class of western sharecroppers. In their focus on dam conVWUXFWLRQ5HFODPDWLRQSDLGLQVXI¿FLHQWDWWHQWLRQWRVRLOFRQGLWLRQFURSVXLWDELOity, and the need to provide training in new methods of crop selection, rotation, 

and cultivation. Construction costs had been greatly underestimated, increasing 

from $9 per watered acre before 1910 to $50 per watered acre by 1915. Settlers’ 

land costs escalated accordingly, adding additional burden to the already onerous 

task of growing redundant crops on previously undeveloped land in undeveloped 

communities. By 1923, only 1.2 million acres of the 20 million acres of irrigated 

land in the West were on federal projects. Two-thirds of all project farms predated the reclamation program.14

Multiple-Purpose River Development

 7KHGHEDWHRYHUWKHFRVWEHQH¿WUDWLRDQGSD\EDFNVFKHGXOHRIIHGHUDOO\

IXQGHGUHFODPDWLRQXOWLPDWHO\PHUJHGZLWKRQJRLQJGHEDWHRYHUWKHFRVWEHQH¿W

ratio of federally funded navigation projects. By the late 1890s rail rates had escalated, prompting American shippers to promote inland navigation. Merchants 

and manufacturers were joined by local boosters who based future hopes for 

community growth and prosperity on the availability of cheap transportation. 

Proposals included development of an intercoastal waterway from Boston to the 

5LR*UDQGHE\ZD\RIDPDQPDGHFDQDODFURVV)ORULGDDQGRID3/DNHVWRWKH

Gulf” channel connecting Chicago and the Gulf of Mexico, by way of the Illinois 

and Mississippi Rivers. Less ambitious plans included deepening the Missouri 

and upper Mississippi. Both the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the House 

Rivers and Harbors Committee opposed the inland navigation projects, arguing 

that, in contrast to coastal river improvements and harbor development, inland 

waterway improvements and canal construction were not worth their extreme 

cost.15

And as the reclamation and navigation debates raged, so did the unharQHVVHGULYHUVGHVWUR\LQJSURSHUW\LQVHDVRQDOÀRRGLQJDQGSURPSWLQJFRQWLQXHG

GHEDWHRYHUWKHPRVWHIIHFWLYHPHDQVRIÀRRGFRQWURO16
452

If American rivers were to sustain and unite a growing empire, then fedHUDOZDWHUGHYHORSPHQWKDGWRSURFHHGRQDUDWLRQDOHIIHFWLYHDQG¿QDQFLDOO\

sustainable basis. In 1907, President Roosevelt created the Inland Waterways 

Commission, charging its members with development of a new approach to river 

development.

Works designed to control our waterways have thus far usually 

been undertaken for a single purpose, such as the improvement 

of navigation, the development of power, the irrigation of arid 

ODQGVWKHSURWHFWLRQRIORZODQGVIURPÀRRGVRUWRVXSSO\ZDter for domestic and manufacturing purposes. . . . The time has 

come for merging local projects and uses of the inland waters 

LQDFRPSUHKHQVLYHSODQGHVLJQHGIRUWKHEHQH¿WRIWKHHQWLUH

country.17

 7KHFRPPLVVLRQGH¿QHGWKDWEDVLVDV3PXOWLSOHSXUSRVH ́GHYHORSPHQW

a rational planning process in which rivers were developed as interrelated systems, where “the several parts are so closely interdependent that no section can 

be brought under control without at least partial control of all other portions.”18

The commission recommended that hereafter, plans for the improvement of navLJDWLRQLQLQODQGZDWHUZD\VWDNHLQWRDFFRXQW3WKHSXUL¿FDWLRQRIWKHZDWHUV

WKURXJKSURWHFWLRQRIZDWHUVKHGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRISRZHUWKHFRQWURORIÀRRGV

the reclamation of land by irrigation and drainage, and all other uses of the waWHUVRUEHQH¿WVWREHGHULYHGIURPWKHLUFRQWURO ́,QDGGLWLRQLWFDOOHGIRUFUHation of a permanent commission to oversee and direct the regional and national 

development of the nation’s river systems, immune from interagency competition 

and jealousies.19

Only commission member Brigadier-General Alexander Mackenzie, 

Chief of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, dissented. The Army Corps maintaining that hydro-electric and navigational development were incompatible, that 

UHVHUYRLUVZHUHDQLQHIIHFWLYHPHDQVRIFRQWUROOLQJÀRRGZDWHUVWKDWUDGLFDOZDterways improvements were both vulnerable to Congressional logrolling and an 

improvident use of federal funds, and that creation of the permanent commission represented an unconstitutional expansion of executive authority. Many in 

Congress agreed.20

 ,Q'HFHPEHU6HQDWRU)UDQFLV*1HZODQGVSUHVHQWHG&RQJUHVV

with a bill to carry out the recommendations of the waterways commission. 

Multiple-purpose projects would be chosen by a non-partisan commission, would 

EH¿QDQFHGE\DQLQLWLDO&RQJUHVVLRQDODSSURSULDWLRQRIDQGZRXOG

be sustained by the sale of hydroelectric power associated with river-basin development. The Newlands waterways bill passed the house by a wide 
453

margin but was defeated in the Senate.21 After much political wrangling, 

1HZODQGV¶:DWHUZD\V&RPPLVVLRQZDV¿QDOO\DSSURYHGLQ3UHVLGHQW

Wilson, however, made no appointments to the commission and, with the 1920 

FUHDWLRQRIWKH)HGHUDO3RZHU&RPPLVVLRQWKH3ZKROH:DWHUZD\V&RPPLVVLRQ

idea was shelved.”22

Multiple use river basin planning would not be realized until the 

Depression Era, when extravagant use of federal funds became central to 

American employment and when the Executive Branch asserted unprecedented 

powers in response to the economic emergency. Public power became the “paying partner” of irrigation projects and the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers spearheaded multimillion-dollar New Deal projects 

spanning entire river basins.23

Engineering Considerations - Prepared by the Institute for the 

History of Technology and Industrial Archaeology, 1994 

The pace, nature, and direction of American hydraulic development 

were dictated not only by federal policy but by the limits of existing dam technology. Regardless of the construction materials employed, ancient dams were 

inevitably of the gravity type, that is, a structure that resists the pressures of the 

impounded water by its sheer mass. Until the late nineteenth century, gravLW\GDPVZHUHFRQVWUXFWHGRIVWRQHPDVRQU\RUVRLODQGRUURFN¿OO5DUHO\ZDV

brick used. Advances in the analysis of gravity dams, the advent of Portland cement concrete, and construction equipment and techniques allowed dams of unprecedented size to be built during the past century.

The modern era of gravity dam design begins with work published by 

J. A. T. de Sazilly in 1853. He provided a means of calculating the stress at every section of a dam and stated that all stresses must not exceed safe limits. This 

work was enhanced by Delocre in 1858 and later by the well known mathematician and engineer W. J. M. Rankine in 1872. (A century earlier, in 1750, 

%)%HOLGRUHVWDEOLVKHGWKHEDVLVIRUGHWHUPLQLQJWKHVWDELOLW\RIJUDYLW\GDPV

against sliding and overturning but not of calculating internal stresses.) By the 

beginning of the nineteenth century, the design of masonry and concrete gravity dams provided engineers with a sound approach to dam design that persists to 

the present.

This approach to dam design was challenged early in the new century 

by Atcherley and Pearson at University College in London, who claimed that the 

most critical region of tensile stresses was across vertical, rather than horizontal, sections of the dam. In the debate that followed, the traditional approach was 

validated, in part, because the experimental results on rubber models of dams 
454

agreed well with established analytical methods. Subsequently, other researchers 

attempted to use the theory of elasticity to obtain mathematical solutions for 

stresses in gravity dams. This concern for a mathematical solution for gravity 

GDPVSHUVLVWHGRYHUDQXPEHURIGHFDGHVEXWDSSDUHQWO\KDGOLWWOHLQÀXHQFHRQ

the actual design of such dams. Richard Southwell developed an iterative soluWLRQIRUWKHZHOONQRZQ5ULJLG=HSSHOLQDQGWKHPHWKRGZDVXVHGLQ

before the age of computers to solve for the stresses in gravity dams.

Waterproof concrete had been used by the Greeks and later the Romans 

for a wide variety of hydraulic structures. During the nineteenth century, its direct descendent, natural concrete, was essential to the construction of canals and 

widely used in building construction. It was not, however, until the introduction 

of Portland cement in America during the last decade of the nineteenth century 

that concrete was used in construction of large dams.

 0DVVFRQFUHWHLVHVVHQWLDOO\DQDUWL¿FLDOVWRQHZLWKRXWDQ\UHLQIRUFHPHQW

to overcome its inherent weakness in tension. Thus, it was applied in gravity and 

arch dams where tensile stresses could be kept to a minimum. Concrete gravity 

dams are amongst the most massive structures ever constructed. Even a typical 

large multi-purpose dam such as the Tygart Dam in West Virginia, completed in 

1938, required over one million cubic yards of concrete.

The embankment dam represents the other category of gravity dam construction, where the material used is either earth or rock. It, too, is of ancient 

origin and, until this century, these dams were built without knowledge of how 

these materials behaved in service. This empirical approach limited the height 

that could safely be reached while using these materials. The other factor limiting the development of embankment dams was the necessity of providing earth 

PRYLQJPDFKLQHU\WRHI¿FLHQWO\SODFHPDWHULDO

 7KH¿HOGRIVRLOPHFKDQLFVLVRITXLWHUHFHQWRULJLQ%HJLQQLQJVRIWKLV

GLVFLSOLQHWUDFHEDFNWRWKHSLRQHHULQJZRUNRIWKHHLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\)UHQFKHQgineer Coulomb who was concerned with earth pressures against walls and the 

VWDELOLW\RIHPEDQNPHQWV7KHODWHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\VDZWKH¿HOGH[SDQGDV

the result of work by Poncelet, Rankine, Culmann, Ritter, and others. This research was concerned with the further development of the classical theory of 

earth thrust as a function of cohesion and internal friction of the embankment 

material. Modern soil mechanics, as developed in the twentieth century, is concerned not only with earth pressures, but also with settlement, permeability, stability, and compaction of earth works. The discipline has been advanced by both 

mathematical analysis and experimental work. Karl Terzaghi, who is considered 

by many to be the “father” of modern soil mechanics, began his work before the 

)LUVW:RUOG:DU%\WKHVHQJLQHHUVFRXOGXQGHUWDNHWKHGHVLJQRIODUJH
455

HPEDQNPHQWGDPVZLWKFRQ¿GHQFHURRWHGLQNQRZOHGJHGHYHORSHGLQWKH¿HOGRI

soil mechanics.

Large embankment dams requiring more than a million cubic yards of 

material were not economically feasible without the application of modern earth 

moving equipment. America has led the world in the development of a wide 

range of earth moving machines capable of shifting very 1arge amounts of material expeditiously and economically. The combination of soil mechanics for design and massive machines for construction has resulted in the building of large 

earth embankment dams.

An alternative method of constructing an embankment dam is to use 

standard dredge technology and to apply soil in an embankment by hydraulic 

placement. The greatest example of the use of this particular technology is the 

)RUW3HFN'DPRQWKHXSSHU0LVVRXUL5LYHU,WUHSUHVHQWVWKHHQGRIDQHUDVLQFH

QRIXUWKHUK\GUDXOLF¿OOHPEDQNPHQWGDPVRIWKHPDJQLWXGHRIWKH)RUW3HFN

have been constructed subsequently.

Both stone and concrete are strong in compression but operatively weak 

in tension. As a result, both materials should be applied to structural forms that 

ensure only negligible tensile stresses will occur under any loading conditions. 

As the ancients discovered, the two principle structural forms are column and 

DUFKVWUXFWXUHV$PHULFDQXVHRIWKHVHIRUPVRFFXUUHG¿UVWLQZKHQ)UDQN

(%URZQGHVLJQHGDQGFRQVWUXFWHGDGDULQJO\WKLQDUFKGDPLQWKH6DQ)HUQDQGR

Valley, Bear Valley Dam, to impound irrigation water.24 The dam stood 65 feet 

high with a radius of 335 feet. The most notable feature of the dam was the thinness of the cross section that varied from 22-24 feet near the foundation to a 

mere 3 feet at the crest. Its success provided a symbol and guide for the building 

of subsequent arch dams.

 7KH3DWK¿QGHU'DPFRPSOHWHGLQDQGWKH6KRVKRQHDND

%XIIDOR%LOO'DPDOVRRIZHUH$PHULFD¶V¿UVWYHQWXUHVLQWRWKHFRQstruction of high arch dams. It should be noted that at a height of 325 feet the 

Shoshone Dam was the highest in the world when completed and was a great 

leap forward compared to the Bear Valley Dam. These two latter dams represent 

WKHRULJLQVRIWKH3WULDOORDG ́PHWKRGRIDQDO\VLV7KLVWKHRU\ZLWKPRGL¿FDtions, remained the American analytical approach to arch dam designs until recently. In concept, the method envisages an arch dam resisting impounded water 

through horizontal arch action of a series of horizontal arches and vertical canWLOHYHUV¿[HGDWWKHIRXQGDWLRQOHYHO,QRUGHUWRREWDLQFRPSDWLELOLW\RIGHÀHFWLRQVLWZDVQHFHVVDU\WRHQVXUHWKDWWKHDUFKGHÀHFWLRQVDWWKHFURZQRIWKHGDP

PDWFKHGWKHFDQWLOHYHUGHÀHFWLRQVDWWKHVDPHSRLQW7KHPHWKRGZDVJUHDWO\UH-

¿QHGLQE\XVLQJHODVWLFWKHRU\WRGHWHUPLQHDUFKGHÀHFWLRQVDWDVHULHVRI
456

points and not just at the crown. The method requires that a series of cantilevers 

PDWFKWKHGHÀHFWLRQVRIDVHULHVRIKRUL]RQWDODUFKHVWRDFKLHYHFRPSDWLELOLW\

/DWHUWKH3WULDOORDG ́PHWKRGZDVIXUWKHUPRGL¿HGWRDFFRXQWIRUWZLVWLQJDQG

tangential movements. It was the “trial load” method that served as the basis for 

the design of the 727 foot high Hoover Dam.

European engineers, on the other hand, did not subscribe to the “trial load” method because they believed the calculations required an inordinate 

amount of effort that produced designs with unnecessarily massive cross sections. It was felt that there was too much reliance on the gravity action of the 

dam which was believed to resist the water pressure largely by arch action. The 

“trial load” method produces conservative results but it should be mentioned that 

it has resulted in such dams being the safest of all the American types, with embankment dams giving the most trouble in service.

The arch and gravity dams employed concrete without reinforcement. 

The introduction of Portland cement to replace natural cement at the end of the 

nineteenth century was accompanied by revolutionary developments that overcame the inherent weakness of concrete in tension by the addition of steel reinforcement. The resulting structural material was reinforced concrete that 

could resist tensile as well as compressive stresses effectively. Thus, it could be 

used in components subjected to bending as well as tension. This material allowed concrete to be applied not only for beams and columns, but also for slabs 

and shell members. The application to dams came early with the introduction 

of reinforced concrete buttress dams. These structures are associated with the 

Ambursen System, which was patented, and resulted in a series of buttress supporting reinforced concrete slabs as early as 1903. By sloping the water face, 

the resultant gravity load of the water assures that loads pass through the middle 

third of the dam which, in turn, prevents overturning. The series of slabs also 

permit articulation of the structure if uneven settlements of the foundation, due to 

HLWKHUVWDWLFRUG\QDPLFORDGVKDSSHQVWRRFFXU)URPWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQSRLQWRI

view, a buttress dam requires far less material than corresponding gravity structures. In addition, because the structure is essentially hollow behind the face, 

uplift pressure that might develop if the foundation is permeable is completely 

DYRLGHG7KHYDXOWHGEXWWUHVVGDPZDVLQYHQWHGE\-RKQ(DVWZRRGDQG¿UVWDSSOLHGWR+XPH/DNH'DPQHDU)UHVQR&DOLIRUQLDLQ,QVWHDGRIXVLQJÀDW

slabs, a number of vaults spanned between the buttresses reducing the amount of 

reinforcement required and causing a further reduction in the amount of concrete 

needed for a given design.
457

Consideration of Hydraulic Designs

The hydraulic design of dams is as important as the structural forms discussed above. The design involves the provision of spillways and penstocks to 

pass water through or over the dam, to control water levels downstream, and in 

WKHFDVHRIÀRRGVWRSDVVZDWHUVDIHO\SDVWWKHGDPZLWKRXWGDPDJLQJWKHVWUXFture. Penstocks are used for hydroelectric generation and for diverting water for 

irrigation purposes.

The design of emergency spillways, which function to pass water over 

or around the dam, must be proportioned so that the water moving over the spillway crest in a horizontal direction is turned to run down the face of the spillway 

in a smooth and essentially vertical direction and then diverted back to the horizontal direction or even a reverse gradient at the bottom. In order to protect the 

IDFHRIWKHGDPLWLVHVVHQWLDOWKDWWKHGLVFKDUJHZDWHUÀRZVVPRRWKO\GRZQWKH

face of the spillway and does not create vacuum pockets that cause cavitation to 

occur with attendant erosion of the face. Primary spillways, on the other hand, 

are used for water release as part of the normal operation of a dam. These releasHVPD\EHQHFHVVDU\IRUPLQLPXPÀRZUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUORZZDWHUDXJPHQWDWLRQ

DQGFRQWUROOHGUHOHDVHVGXULQJÀRRGVWDJHV

To avoid erosion at the toe of the dam, the energy of the water at the bottom must be dissipated. This is usually accomplished by designing a stilling basin or “cushion pool” that absorbs the energy of the water before it is released 

LQWRWKHQDWXUDOVWUHDPEHG7KHUHVXOWLQJVKDSHLVWKHRJLYDOFXUYHWKDWZDV¿UVW

used in America by John Jervis in his Croton Dam completed in 1842.

 $OWKRXJKVWXGLHVRIZHLUVDQGSLSHÀRZZHUHDPHQDEOHWRDQDO\WLFVROXtions, the design of spillways and stilling basins remains a complex problem that 

LVPRVWRIWHQHLWKHUVROYHGRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHRUHWLFDODVVXPSWLRQVDQGFRQ¿UPHG

by model analysis. The establishment of hydraulic laboratories by the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and selected universities is an 

important chapter in the history of dam design and makes possible the erection of 

GDPVWKDWIXQFWLRQVDIHO\DQGHI¿FLHQWO\LQFRQWUROOLQJZDWHUSDVVLQJDFURVVWKH

dam.

Most of the spillways that pass water over the top of the dam are what 

DUHFDOOHG3¿[HGFUHVW ́VSLOOZD\V+RZHYHUWKHUHDUHDVLJQL¿FDQWQXPEHURI

dams that have control gates at the crest or slide gates in the face of the dam. 

Both roller gates, a design that was developed in Germany, and tainter gates, 

which are curved gates supported on radial struts, enable engineers to control the 

ÀRZRYHUWKHWRSRIWKHGDPDQGDUHLPSRUWDQWIHDWXUHVWKDWVKRXOGEHQRWHGLQDQ

evaluation of the design of a historic dam.
458

No design could be assumed to be successful unless it was based upon 

the knowledge of the hydrology of the watershed served by a given dam. The 

determination of rainfall and runoff data are essential in designing any hydrauOLFVWUXFWXUHFRQQHFWHGZLWKDGDP7KH¿UVWDSSOLFDWLRQRIVXFKGDWDJOHDQHG

IURPUDLQIDOOJDXJHVDQGVWUHDPÀRZUHFRUGVZDVDWVXPPLWOHYHOUHVHUYRLURQWKH

Chenango Canal, which was a feeder to the Erie Canal in upstate New York. It 

was completed to a design of John Jervis in 1836. This pioneering effort was entirely successful and led the way for the application of hydrological information 

to the design of large multiple-purpose dams.

Large dams can serve a number of purposes. One of the most important is hydroelectric power generation. Although current and static electricity 

had been studied as early as the eighteenth century, this new form of power did 

not become a public utility until the opening of Edison’s Pearl Street Station in 

New York in 1882. In the same year, halfway across the country, in Appleton, 

Wisconsin, a diminutive hydroelectric station was put online. Through this structure, electric power was generated by a vertical shaft turbine driving a generaWRUPRXQWHGRQWRS%\WKHHQGRIWKHGHFDGHWKH¿UVWK\GURHOHFWULFGDPZDV

completed at Oregon City, Oregon. This humble beginning led the way to later 

great hydroelectric installations. As developed, these facilities added new features to conventional dam design. These included penstocks with control devices for supplying the turbines in the power house, and discharge conduits that 

reduced downstream scouring. Power stations of immense size with a series of 

turbine generators are an integral part of a hydroelectric power dam installation. 

Although often removed from the dam itself, the switch yard serves as the point 

of distributing electrical energy into the power grid. Clearly the development of 

generating and distribution systems comprises an important part of the history of 

electrical engineering, and of the power industry. Although hidden from view, 

the turbines in a hydroelectric power-generating dam are an essential feature in 

the design of such a facility. Through a series of advances in engineering, turELQHJHQHUDWHGSRZHULVDPRQJVWWKHPRVWHI¿FLHQWPDFKLQHVNQRZQ

List of Potential National Historic Landmark Dams

Anderson Ranch Dam (1940 - 1950) ,GDKR6RXWK)RUN%RLVH5LYHUHDUWK¿OO

UROOHGHDUWKDQGURFN¿OO5HFODPDWLRQ

 &RPSOHWLRQRI$QGHUVRQ5DQFK'DPWKHKLJKHVWHDUWK¿OOGDPLQWKH

world at the time of construction, “posed unprecedented problems for both the 

designers and the constructors” (Kollgaard and Chadwick 1988, 803). If further 

research reveals that the solutions to these problems impacted future dam design

DQGFRQVWUXFWLRQ$QGHUVRQ5DQFK'DPPD\EHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWXQGHU

NHL Criterion 4.
459

Arrowrock Dam (constructed 1911-1915; crest raised 1935-1937; concrete 

slab applied to downstream face and spillway, 1935 - 1937) Idaho, Boise River, 

curved concrete gravity (Reclamation)

Construction of Arrowrock Dam involved innovative integration of sand 

and Portland cement, in efforts to control temperature rise (during concrete curLQJDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHGDP¶VPDVV7KLVLQQRYDWLRQUHVXOWHGLQDGHJUHH)

WHPSHUDWXUHULVHVLJQL¿FDQWO\OHVVWKDQZRXOGKDYHEHHQUHDOL]HGZLWKVWUDLJKW

Portland cement mix.) Kollgaard and Chadwick suggest that this innovation was 

VLJQL¿FDQWZLWKLPSDFWRQIXWXUHGDPGHVLJQ'DPDOVR3DSLRQHHULQLQVWUXmentation” (Kollgaard and Chadwick 1988, 18).

 7KHUDLVHGFUHVWDOWKRXJKDPRGL¿FDWLRQWRWKHGDP¶VRULJLQDOGHVLJQ

is not likely to be determined an unacceptable impact to integrity, particularly if 

VLJQL¿FDQFHXQGHU1+/&ULWHULRQLVGHULYHGIURPWKHSLRQHHUXVHRILQVWUXPHQWDWLRQDQGWKHLQWHJUDWLRQRIVDQG3RUWODQGFHPHQW,QFRQWUDVWWKHFRQFUHWHVODE

applied to the downstream face and spillway was designed to stop the disintegration of the excessively porous exposed sand-cement concrete; impact to integrity 

of design and materials may prove to be severe.

Bartlett Dam (1939) Arizona, Verde River, buttress dam (multiple arch) 

(Reclamation)

Private agencies are responsible for design and construction of the vast 

PDMRULW\RIEXWWUHVVGDPVZKLFKDUHVLJQL¿FDQWO\OHVVH[SHQVLYHWREXLOGWKDQ

traditional arch or gravity dams. An evaluation of the national engineering sigQL¿FDQFHRIIHGHUDOO\FRQVWUXFWHGEXWWUHVVGDPVPXVWLQFOXGHDFRPSDUDWLYH

DQDO\VLVRISULYDWHO\FRQVWUXFWHGGDPVWKDWPD\SRVVHVVJUHDWHUVLJQL¿FDQFHDQG

greater integrity. That said, Bartlett retains integrity, and is directly associated 

with important innovations in buttress-dam engineering, including 1) design of 

the arches as cylindrical, full half-circles analyzed by the trial-load method and 

FXUYDWXUHLQSODQRIWKHGDPXSVWUHDPWREHWWHU¿WWRSRJUDSKLFFRQGLWLRQV

(Kollgaard and Chadwick 1988, 550).

Buffalo Bill Dam (Shoshone) Wyoming, concrete arch (Reclamation)

 )LUVWRIWKH%XUHDXRI5HFODPDWLRQ¶VPXOWLSOHSXUSRVHSURMHFWV

&ULWHULRQDOVRWKH¿UVWGDPWREHEXLOWRIPDVVFRQFUHWHZLWKDODUJHSHUFHQWDJHRISOXPURFNDQGRQHRIWKH¿UVWWREHDQDO\]HGE\WKHWULDOORDGPHWKRGXVing arch and crown cantilever radial adjustments. The Bureau of Reclamation, 

KRZHYHUUHSRUWVUHFHQWDQGVLJQL¿FDQWWKUHDWVWRSK\VLFDOLQWHJULW\LQFOXGLQJ

construction of a new visitor center and raising of the crest height. The dam may 

not meet the NHL requirement of a high degree of integrity.
460

&HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW6KDVWD'DPDQG)ULDQW'DP5HFODPDWLRQ1+/

Criterion 5)

 7KH&93PD\EHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWIRULWVLPSDFWRQQDWLRQDOVHWWOHment and agricultural patterns: “each year, between 3 and 4 million ac-ft of water are delivered through the Central Valley Project for irrigation use on nearly 2 million acres of fertile land. This land produces more than $1 billion in 

crops annually.” The project also provides 320,000 acre feet of municipal water and in excess of 5.5 billion kW of hydroelectric power annually. (Kollgaard 

DQG&KDGZLFN:KLOHPXFKRIWKHV\VWHPLVOHVVWKDQ¿IW\\HDUVROG

WKHWZRSULQFLSDOFRPSRQHQWV±6KDVWDDQG)ULDQW±ERWKGDWHWRWKHKLVWRULFDOSHULRGDQGPLJKWEHHYDOXDWHGXQGHU&ULWHULRQ'LI¿FXOWLHVZLWKWKHQRPLQDWLRQ

ZLOOLQFOXGHXVLQJRQO\WKHVHWZRKLVWRULFFRPSRQHQWVWRGH¿QHDODUJHO\PRGHUQ

SURMHFW(DFKGDPPD\DOVREHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWRQLQGLYLGXDOWHFKQRORJLcal merit.

Shasta Dam (1945) California, Sacramento River, curved concrete gravity (Reclamation)

 3DUWQHUWR)ULDQW'DPEHORZ&DSLWDOL]LQJRQH[-

perience gained at Grand Coulee, materials were conveyed 

by an 11-mile conveyor belt between the screening plant and 

stockpiles at the receiving plant. Another “outstanding feature of construction was the immense cableway head tower” 

(Kollgaard and Chadwick 1988, 33).

The pipe cooling system resembles that of Hoover 

Dam but “the operating techniques were vastly improved.” The 

instrumentation installed was “one of the most complete. . . . 

Analysis of all these data eventually led to the reconsideration 

of methods of stress analysis for concrete gravity dams, and beFDPHEDFNJURXQGPDWHULDOIRUWKHIRUPXODWLRQRIWKH¿QLWHHOHment analyses of dams” (Kollgaard and Chadwick 1988, 34).

 6KDVWDPD\EHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWRQWKHEDVLVRI

this contribution to engineers’ understanding of the behavior of large dams (Criterion 4). In terms of historic association 

(Criterion 1), the dam is most effectively evaluated in conjuncWLRQZLWK)ULDQW'DP

Friant Dam (1942) California, San Joaquin River, concrete 

gravity (Reclamation)
461

One of two storage dams of the Central Valley Project 

VHH6KDVWDDERYHUH&ULWHULRQ)ULDQWDOVRUHSUHVHQWV

5HFODPDWLRQ¶V¿UVWH[WHQVLYHXVHRISXPLFLWSR]]RODQDGPL[WXUH

to reduce cement content and thus heat of generation (Kollgaard 

and Chadwick 1988, 131).

Elephant Butte Dam (1911–1916) New Mexico, Rio Grande, concrete gravity 

(Reclamation)

 3RVVLEO\QDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWGXHWRWUHDW\REOLJDWLRQVWKDWUHTXLUH

the U.S. to provide Mexico with 60,000 acre-feet of water from the Rio Grande. 

These treaty obligations are met by Elephant Butte. (The 1906 treaty followed 

continued water shortages for Mexican farmers along the Rio Grande and an 

1894 challenge by the Mexican minister in Washington for monetary damages, 

as allowed by the right of prior appropriation under international law.) This treaty 

was precedent setting: historian David A. Philips, in his National Register nomination of Elephant Butte Dam, argues that prior to the Elephant Butte controversy, the federal government had all but surrendered control of U.S. waterways 

WRWKHVWDWHV)DFHGZLWKWKHQHHGWRUHVROYHVTXDEEOHVRYHUWKH5LR*UDQGHWKH

federal government found legal mechanisms by which it could take back a great 

deal of its control over those waters - and it uses those same legal mechanisms 

to this day. Thus, Elephant Butte Dam is a symbol of an important moment in 

the development of national water law and in the changing balance of power between the federal government and the states.

Like Arrowrock Dam (see above), Elephant Butte is an early example 

RIVDQGFHPHQWXVH3)LYHSHUFHQWRIWKHFRVWRIWKHGDPZDVVDYHGE\WKHXVH

of sand-cement instead of normal Portland cement, but the real advantage was in 

the decreased heat development.” The dam was also the site of potentially significant construction innovations: as at Arrowrock, the expansive construction plant 

produced 2,651 cubic yards of concrete in 16 hours, 380,000 cubic yards in 

\HDU3HI¿FLHQF\GHPDQGHGDVLQJOHVPRRWKO\IXQFWLRQLQJPDWHULDO

ÀRZV\VWHP:LWKWKLVEDVLFQHHGUHFRJQL]HGWKHPDVRQU\GDPHUDHQGHG ́

(Kollgaard and Chadwick 1988, 19). Elephant Butte, however, appears to possess better integrity and may prove to be a more appropriate representative of this 

construction innovation.

Fort Peck Dam 0RQWDQD0LVVRXUL5LYHUHDUWK¿OOK\GUDXOLF¿OO

(Corps)

 &RQVWUXFWLRQRIWKLVPDVVLYHGDPPLOOLRQFXELF\DUGVRIHDUWK¿OO

the largest in the world for almost 30 years -- was made economically feasible by 
462

VLJQL¿FDQWLQQRYDWLRQVLQVRLOPHFKDQLFVLQFOXGLQJ&RUSVÀRZQHWDQG¿OWHUWHVW

UHVHDUFK7KHPLOOLRQFXELF\DUGVOLGHDW)RUW3HFNDVWKHGDPQHDUHGFRPSOHWLRQDOVRVLJQL¿FDQWO\LPSDFWHGIXWXUHHDUWKGDPFRQVWUXFWLRQWHFKQLTXHV

Garrison Dam (1947-54) North 'DNRWD0LVVRXUL5LYHUHDUWK¿OOUROOHGHDUWK

embankment) (Corps)

The Pick-Sloan agreement (by which Corps and Bureau Missouri River 

%DVLQ3URJUDPVZHUHFRRUGLQDWHGZDVDXWKRUL]HGE\WKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI

1944 and stands as an early and outstanding example of coordinated river-basin 

development. More than 100 reservoirs throughout the Missouri Basin were auWKRUL]HGXQGHUWKLVDJUHHPHQWLQFOXGLQJ¿YHPXOWLSOHSXUSRVHPDLQVWHPGDPV

*DUULVRQLVWKH¿UVWRIWKHVHPDLQVWHPGDPVDQGDQLQWHJUDOFRPSRQHQWRIWKH

largest reservoir system in the United States, a system with a storage capacity of 

more than seventy-four million acre feet and a surface area of over one million 

DFUHV)DUUHOO[[LL7KLVVL]HWUDQVODWHVYHU\GLUHFWO\WRLPSDFW±ÀRRGFRQWURO

navigation, recreation, and commensurate economic and social changes–over 

DYDVWUHJLRQRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV)XUWKHUUHVHDUFKPD\HVWDEOLVKWKDWWKLV¿YH

GDPPDLQVWHPV\VWHPLVRIQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFH,IQRWWKH¿UVWGDP*DUULVRQ

HIIHFWLYHO\UHSUHVHQWVWKHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWFRPSURPLVH

Gatun Dam (1914) 3DQDPD&KDJUHV5LYHUHDUWK¿OO&RUSV

 2QWKHURXWHRIWKH3DQDPD&DQDO*DWXQ'DPLVRQHRIWKH¿UVW&RUSV

ÀRRGFRQWUROGDPVEXWLWVSULPDU\VLJQL¿FDQFHLVWKDWLWVXSSRUWVQDYLJDWLRQ

as the large reservoir it creates forms twenty-three miles of the canal. A tertiary purpose is power generation. The dam provided the only feasible engineering method of building a canal across Panama, which reduces the sea route from 

the eastern U.S. to the West Coast by two-thirds and avoids the dangerous passage around Cape Horn. The canal, along with the interior placement of the 

locks by the dam, away from the coast, was driven by important military considerations for a young, imperial America. The original plan to use a dam instead 

RIDVHDOHYHOURXWHZDVSURSRVHGE\)UHQFKHQJLQHHU*RGLQGH/HSLQD\LQWKH

QLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\EXWUHMHFWHGE\WKH)UHQFKFRQVWUXFWLRQFRPSDQ\*DWXQ'DP

was designed along the de Lepinay plan by Joseph Ripley and Alfred Noble of 

Soo (Sault Ste Marie) Canal fame. With the recent transfer of the Panama Canal, 

Gatun Dam is no longer under U.S. jurisdiction.

Gibson Dam (1926-1929) Montana, Sun River, concrete arch dam 

(Reclamation)

 &LYLO(QJLQHHU'DYLG3%LOOLQJWRQUHSRUWVWKDW*LEVRQ'DPZDVWKH¿UVW

U.S. dam designed and constructed in response to trial-load analysis, as
463

 presented by Reclamation engineers Howell and Jaquith in January of 1925: 

‘’[at] Gibson Dam on the Sun River in Montana. . .the trial load method was 

used not just for analysis but for design, resulting in a savings of more than 

41,000 cubic yards of concrete over the gravity design.” Gibson Dam is potenWLDOO\QDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWDVWKH¿UVWDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKLVHYROYHGPDWKHPDWLFDO

SURFHVVRIDQDO\VLV6HHDOVR3DWK¿QGHU'DPEHORZ

*OHQ&DQ\RQ'DP(1957-1964) Utah and Arizona, Colorado River, concrete 

arch (Reclamation)

Although not yet 50 years old, Glen Canyon Dam may be nationally sigQL¿FDQWIRULWVDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKWKHPRGHUQFRQVHUYDWLRQPRYHPHQW&ULWHULRQ

Despite some engineering innovations -- winner of the American Society of Civil 

Engineers’ annual Outstanding Civil Engineering Award for the “project that 

demonstrated the greatest engineering skills . . . ” (including use of new computer-run trial-load analysis [Kollgaard and Chadwick 1988, 456]). Extraordinary 

QDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHXQGHU&ULWHULRQDVGHPDQGHGRIUHVRXUFHVOHVVWKDQ

\HDUVROGZLOOEHGLI¿FXOWWRHVWDEOLVK

Grand Coulee Dam (1938) Washington, Columbia River, concrete gravity 

(Reclamation)

 &RQVWUXFWLRQRIPDVVLYH*UDQG&RXOHH'DPUHTXLUHGVLJQL¿FDQWFRQVWUXFWLRQLQQRYDWLRQV7KHVHLQFOXGHGLYHUVLRQRIWKHODUJHÀRZRIWKH&ROXPELD

River during construction; special grouting adaptations to address adverse geoORJLFFRQGLWLRQVRIWKHVLWHDQGXQLTXHFRQYH\RUV\VWHPVGHVLJQHGIRUHI¿FLHQW

transport of large quantities of material (Kollgaard and Chadwick 1988, 31). The 

revolutionary water storage system for irrigation, which utilizes a secondary, natural reservoir 280 feet above the dam, also represents a technological innovation. 

(This innovation, however, relates strictly to unique site conditions and is not 

WKRXJKWWRKDYHKDGDVLJQL¿FDQWLPSDFWDVUHTXLUHGLQWKHHYDOXDWLRQJXLGHOLQHV

on subsequent designs).

In terms of NHL Criterion 1, power from the dam was important in 

WWII manufacturing and atomic bomb development at the Hanford Reservation 

in Washington.

2Z\KHH'DP(1932) Oregon, Owyhee River, curved concrete gravity 

(Reclamation)

Kollgaard and Chadwick describe Owyhee Dam as a major precursor to 

Hoover Dam in terms of design and project management: “Owyhee Dam 
464

became a proving ground for theories being developed to assist with the design 

and construction of Hoover Dam.”

The spillway at Owyhee - a morning glory design - had never before 

EHHQXVHG$QDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHQDWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKLVLQQRYDWLRQZRXOG

require an analysis of subsequent use and the degree to which unique site conditions dictated use of the morning glory design.

3DWK¿QGHU'DP(1909) Wyoming, North Platte River, masonry arch dam 

(Reclamation)

 )LUVWDUFKGDPWREHDQDO\]HGE\:LVQHUDQG:KHHOHU¶VDUFKDQGFURZQ

cantilever method (predecessor to the trial-load method). As described by David 

P. Billington, the arch-and-crown cantilever method was one of a series of significant treatises on gravity dam theory, beginning with the 1850s publication by J. 

$XJXVWLQGH6D]LOO\RIDSUR¿OHRIHTXDOUHVLVWDQFH%LOOLQJWRQUHSRUWVWKDWDQDO\-

VLVRI3DWK¿QGHU'DPGHVLJQXVLQJWKHDUFKDQGFURZQFDQWLOHYHUPHWKRGLVVLJQL¿FDQWLQWKDW3IRUWKH¿UVWWLPHWKHHQJLQHHUV>ZHUH@VHHNLQJWRWDNHDGYDQWDJH

of the true behavior of a curved dam in a narrow canyon to the end of making it 

more economical through saving material.” However, although the arch-and-canWLOHYHUPHWKRGRIPDWKHPDWLFDODQDO\VLVFRQ¿UPHGWKHVDIHW\RI3DWK¿QGHU'DP

it did not inform the actual design. Not until construction of Gibson Dam, Sun 

5LYHU0RQWDQDZDVDGDPGHVLJQHGDFFRUGLQJWRVSHFL¿FDWLRQVVXJJHVWHGE\WKH

DUFKDQGFURZQFDQWLOHYHUPHWKRGUH¿QHGDQGUHGH¿QHGLQWKHVDVWKHWULal-load method).

Pine Flat Dam (1954) California, Kings River, concrete gravity (Corps)

Kollgaard and Chadwick write “While the design of the dam and appurtenant works resembles that of most gravity dams of the period, the details of 

foundation treatment, concrete production, temperature control, and seismic analysis all are innovative” (Kollgaard and Chadwick 1988, 35).

Sardis Dam 0LVVLVVLSSL/LWWOH7DOODKDWFKLH5LYHUHDUWK¿OOK\GUDXOLF

¿OO&RUSV

Kollgaard and Chadwick write “After the dam was placed in operation, 

seepage was noted on the downstream slope. . . . In 1942, a system of forty-eight 

H[SHULPHQWDOZHOOVZDVLQVWDOOHGDORQJWKHOLQHRIWKH¿UVWZHOOV\VWHPWRVWXG\

WKHHI¿FLHQF\DQGOHQJWKRIOLIHRIYDULRXVFRPPHUFLDOZHOOVFUHHQVDQGWRDQDlyze the effects of well diameter, spacing and penetration. Many of the analytical procedures used by the [Corps] today stem from this study,” (Kollgaard and 
465

&KDGZLFN)XUWKHUUHVHDUFKPD\UHYHDOWKDWWKLVLPSDFWRQDQDO\WLFDO

SURFHGXUHVLVQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWXQGHU1+/&ULWHULRQ

7UR\'DP1HZ<RUN+XGVRQ5LYHUEXWWUHVVGDPÀDWVODE&RUSV

Troy Dam is one of a series of structures built by the COE on the 

Hudson River between Waterford and Hudson, to increase stream depth and allow navigation. The Hudson River had been under improvement since 1789, 

ZKHQWKHVWDWHRI1HZ<RUN¿UVWFRQVWUXFWHGGLNHVDQGGUHGJHGWKHFKDQQHO7KH

original federal project for improvement was adopted in 1834 (in cooperation 

ZLWKWKHVWDWHDQGPRGL¿HGLQDQG7KHVHFRQGSURMHFWZDVDGRSWHG

LQDQGPRGL¿HGLQ&RQVWUXFWLRQRI7UR\'DPDQGDVVRFLDWHGVWUXFWXUHV2FRQVWLWXWLQJDWKLUGSKDVHRIULYHULPSURYHPHQW2ZDV¿UVWDXWKRUL]HGE\

the River and Harbor Act of June 25, 1910. In addition to removal of an existing 

dam at Troy and construction of the new lock, dam, and powerhouse, the Corps 

widened the river channel to form harbors, constructed longitudinal dikes between Troy and Stuyvesant, and - in cooperation with the state of New York - established canal terminals in Troy and Albany. Completion of this comprehensive 

improvement program resulted in “considerable increased navigation facilities.” 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers reported that “the through waterway formed 

by the Hudson River and the New York State canals determines through freight 

rates from the Middle West to the Atlantic Ocean” (Chief of Engineers 1915, 

225).

Completion of Hudson River navigation improvements, and the transiWLRQIURPDVWDWHWRDFRRSHUDWLYHWRDIHGHUDOHIIRUWPD\EHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿-

FDQW7KH+XGVRQ5LYHULPSURYHPHQWVPD\DOVRVLJQL¿FDQWO\UHSUHVHQW

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers early navigation-improvement efforts. The incorSRUDWLRQRIPRGHVWK\GURHOHFWULFSRZHUIDFLOLWLHVLQWKHPRGL¿HGV\VWHPPD\

DOVREHDVLJQL¿FDQWH[DPSOHRIHDUO\&RUSVHIIRUWVDWPXOWLSOHSXUSRVHGHYHORSment.

Comprehensive Coordinated River-Basin Flood-Control Systems 

(U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)

 $QQXDO5HSRUWVRIWKH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUV86$UP\GH¿QHWKH)ORRG

Control Act of 1936 as a critical juncture in the Corps’ history and in federal polLF\7KHDFWHVWDEOLVKHGDGH¿QLWLYHSROLF\IRUIHGHUDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIÀRRGFRQWUROSURMHFWVWKURXJKRXWWKHQDWLRQDQGOLNHWKH3LFN6ORDQ

agreement (see Garrison Dam, above), expanded the Corps’ legal authority (see, 

IRUH[DPSOH&KLHIRI(QJLQHHUV1RWHWKDWWKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWdid

not DXWKRUL]HPXOWLSOHSXUSRVHGDPVDQGWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKHDFWOLHVLQWKH

H[SDQVLRQRI&RUSVDXWKRULW\DQGLQWKHLPSDFWRIWKHÀRRGFRQWURO
466

improvements not within the context of multiple-purpose development. Dams 

DXWKRUL]HGXQGHUWKHDFWZHUHDXWKRUL]HGIRUÀRRGFRQWURODORQHZLWKWKH

stipulation that penstocks could be constructed in anticipation of hydropower deYHORSPHQW1DYLJDWLRQUHODWHGSXUSRVHVDOWKRXJKRIUHDOEHQH¿WZHUHLQFLGHQtal to authorization.)

 :LWKSDVVDJHRIWKHDFW&RQJUHVVDXWKRUL]HGDSSUR[LPDWHO\ÀRRG

control projects, based upon a series of studies completed by the Corps over the 

preceding twenty years. An additional 240 preliminary examinations and surYH\VZHUHDOVRRUGHUHG%\WKHHQGRIWKH¿VFDO\HDUDXWKRUL]DWLRQVWRWDOing $930,400,000 had been provided by Congress for the construction of 485 

multi-unit projects widely dispersed throughout the United States. Of this massive number of authorized improvements, however, the number of dams constructed—in contrast to levees, drains, or channel improvements—was relatively 

low, particularly when the scope of inquiry is limited to the historic period, 1936-

1949 (Chief of Engineers 1942, 4-7).25

Of these dams, all were constructed as part of comprehensive coordiQDWHGULYHUEDVLQV\VWHPV7KLVFRRUGLQDWHGUROHSRVHVFHUWDLQGLI¿FXOWLHVZKHQ

evaluating the NHL eligibility of individual dams within each of the basin systems. As stipulated in the criteria for evaluation, individual properties without 

XQLTXHDQGGLVWLQJXLVKLQJIHDWXUHVPD\EHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWLIWKH\best represent a larger class of important properties. The ability to best represent that 

ODUJHUFODVVPD\EHEDVHGRQVWDQGLQJDVWKH¿UVWFRQVWUXFWHGRQVWDQGLQJDVWKH

SLYRWDOVWUXFWXUHZLWKLQDVLJQL¿FDQWV\VWHPRURQV\PEROLFYDOXH7KLVV\PEROLFYDOXHPLJKWIRUH[DPSOHUHODWHWRJHRJUDSK\±DÀRRGFRQWUROGDPEXLOW

WRSURWHFW3LWWVEXUJKIURPÀRRGLQJPLJKWEHVWV\PEROL]HWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH

2KLR5LYHUÀRRGVRIDQGWRSDVVDJHRIWKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FW

Large kingpin dams, integral by virtue of size–and therefore function–to the system as a whole, are also appropriate symbols of the larger system. An entire 

comprehensive system might also qualify as an NHL, under the conditions of 

1+/&ULWHULRQ7KLVDSSURDFKKRZHYHUFUHDWHVGLI¿FXOW\LQUHVRXUFHPDQDJHment and in the delineation of appropriate boundaries.

Ohio River Basin

Allegheny and Monongahela River System

 .ROOJDDUGDQG&KDGZLFNZULWHWKDW3WKHFRQFHSWRIDSURMHFWIRUÀRRG

FRQWURORIWKH3LWWVEXUJKDUHDGDWHVWRVKRUWO\DIWHUWKHGLVDVWURXVÀRRGRI

. . . The federal government [COE], with an interest in water supply for navigaWLRQDVZHOODVÀRRGFRQWUROLQDXWKRUL]HGDUHSRUWRQWKHSUDFWLFDELOLW\RI

establishing a system of reservoirs on the headwaters of the Allegheny, 

Monongahela, and Ohio Rivers, and their tributaries. Through the ensuing years,
467

 various reports were written until, under the provisions of the National Industrial 

Recovery Act of 1933, the construction of the Tygart River Reservoir was authoUL]HGDV)HGHUDO3URMHFW1RDQGIXQGVZHUHDSSURSULDWHGIRULWVFRQVWUXFWLRQ ́

(Kollgaard and Chadwick 1988, 116).

 'HVSLWHHDUO\LGHQWL¿FDWLRQRI7\JDUWDVWKHFHQWUDOFRPSRQHQWRIDQLQWHJUDWHGV\VWHPRIÀRRGFRQWUROGDPVZLWKLQWKH$OOHJKHQ\DQG0RQRQJDKHOD

[upper Ohio] watersheds, its construction was approved, and PWA funding 

SURYLGHGRQWKHEDVLVRILWVLPSRUWDQWUROHLQPDLQWDLQLQJDGHTXDWHÀRZIRU

QDYLJDWLRQRQWKH0RQRQJDKHOD5LYHU3URSRVHGÀRRGFRQWUROGDPV2RQ

/R\DOKDQQD7LRQHVWD)UHQFK5HGEDQNDQG&URRNHG&UHHNVRIWKH$OOHJKHQ\

5LYHUDQGRQWKH:HVW)RUNRIWKH0RQRQJDKHOD5LYHU2ZHUHQRWDSSURYHGIRU

FRQVWUXFWLRQDFRPSOH[GHFLVLRQUHODWHGWRGLVDJUHHPHQWRYHUFRVWEHQH¿WHTXDtions, cooperative funding, and restrictions on Corps authority (Johnson n.d., 

200).

 ,Q'HFHPEHURIDUPHGZLWKWKHDXWKRULW\RIWKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FW

of 1936, the Corps began the process of “planning and building an unbreakable 

chain of dams upstream of Pittsburgh.” Upon completion in 1943, this chain of 

dams included Tygart, rolled earth embankment dams on Tionesta and Crooked 

creeks, concrete-gravity dams on Mahoning and Loyalhanna creeks, and a rolled 

HDUWKFRQFUHWHGDPRQWKH<RXJKLRJKHQ\5LYHU-RKQVRQQG

 7\JDUW'DPZDVFRPSOHWHGLQ)HEUXDU\(QJLQHHU+.

Barrows noted ten years later that this completion marked the beginning of fedHUDOÀRRGFRQWUROPHDVXUHV(Barrows 1948, n.p.). The concrete-gravity dam, 

1,880 feet in length at the top and rising 209 feet above the river bed at the spillZD\VHFWLRQSURYLGHVIRUWKHVWRUDJHRIDFUHIHHWWRPDNHXSWKHGH¿-

ciency of water in the Monongahela River during low rainfall periods and for the 

DGGLWLRQDOFRQWUROOHGVWRUDJHRIRYHUDFUHIHHWIRUÀRRGSUHYHQWLRQLQWKH

0RQRQJDKHODDQG2KLRYDOOH\V7KHGDP¿UVWSUHYHQWHGPDMRUÀRRGGDPDJHLQ

the spring of 1939, one month after closure. In the fall drought of that same year 

it prevented interruption of navigation on the Monongahela. “It is believed,” 

said Tom Reilly [future Hydrology Branch Chief], “that the results achieved thus 

far by the Tygart Dam . . . amply justify the funds expended for its construction 

and operation and are the most conclusive proof that can be offered for the exWHQVLRQRIWKHÀRRGFRQWUROV\VWHPRIWKH8SSHU2KLR ́TXRWHGLQ-RKQVRQQG

203).

Construction of <RXJKLRJKHQ\'DP- the last and largest of the upper 

Ohio basin dams proceeded during the war years as a construction effort directly 

UHODWHGWRWKHZDUHIIRUWVSHFL¿FDOO\WRWKHSURWHFWLRQRIPDQXIDFWXUHSODQWVIURP

GHVWUXFWLRQE\ÀRRGDQGSUHYHQWLRQRILQWHUUXSWLRQRIWKHULYHUFRUULGRUWUDQVSRUW
468

V\VWHP$VGHVFULEHGE\WKH&RUSVWKHLQWHJUDWHG2KLR%DVLQÀRRGFRQWURO

system was not deemed fully functional without Youghiogheny Dam (Johnson 

n.d., 211).

 (LWKHU7\JDUW'DPV\PERORIWKH&RUSV¶H[SDQGLQJPLVVLRQWRÀRRG

FRQWUROGDPFRQVWUXFWLRQXSRQSDVVDJHRIWKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRIRU

<RXJKLRJKHQ\'DPWKH¿UVWNLQJSLQGDPFRQVWUXFWHGLQWKH2KLR%DVLQVROHO\

XQGHUWKHDXWKRULW\RIWKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRIDVDPHQGHGLQDQG

PD\EHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQW7KHV\PEROLFYDOXHRIERWKGDPVLVGUDmatically enhanced by their placement within the Ohio River drainage, site of the 

PRVWGHYDVWDWLQJÀRRGVRIDQGWKHVLWHRIFRQVLGHUDEOHGHEDWHDQGVWXG\2

EHJLQQLQJLQWKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\2RQWKHSURSHUPHDQVRIÀRRGFRQWURODQG

RQDQDSSURSULDWHIHGHUDOUROHLQÀRRGFRQWUROHIIRUWV

North Atlantic Division:

John Chambers, a Corps contract historian, wrote:

like a recurring plague, heavy rains came summer after summer between 1934 and 1936. In midsummer 1935, torrenWLDOUDLQVVHQWWHUURUSURGXFLQJÀRRGVDFURVVDWHQFRXQW\DUHD

of south-central New York State. . . . The deluge returned 

with even greater vengeance in the spring of 1936: Hartford, 

Connecticut and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania were the worst hit. In 

the Connecticut River Valley people called it the worst major 

disaster in memory. . . . The industrial life of the region slopped 

to a halt. Rivers roared out of control - the Susquehanna, 

Monongahela, Penobscot, Housationic, Allegheny . . . [and] 

&RQJUHVVSDVVHGWKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI,QVRXWKFHQWUDO1HZ<RUNWKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWSURYLGHGIRUORFDO

protection projects and seven dams and reservoirs. In 1943, 

&RQJUHVVDXWKRUL]HGPLOOLRQIRUÀRRGSURWHFWLRQLQWKH

Connecticut River Valley. This included some 20 dams and retaining reservoirs (Chambers 1980, 45-47).

 )ORRGFRQWUROV\VWHPVLQ1HZ(QJODQGDVDXWKRUL]HGE\WKH)ORRG

Control Act of 1936, are described below:

Connecticut River Basin, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and 

Connecticut

 7KH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRIDXWKRUL]HGFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWZHQW\GDPV

and reservoirs and seven dike projects within the Connecticut River Valley, “[all] 
469

QHFHVVDU\SDUWVRIDQDGHTXDWHEDODQFHGUHJLRQDOSODQRIÀRRGFRQWURO ́7KHVH

GDPVDQGUHVHUYRLUVLQFOXGHWKRVHDW.QLJKWYLOOH:HVW%URRN¿HOG%DUUH)DOOV

Tully, Birch Hill, Honey Hill, Surry Mountain, Claremont, West Canaan, Sugar 

+LOO:LOOLDPVYLOOH&DPEULGJHSRUW1RUWK6SULQJ¿HOG/XGORZ1RUWK+DUWODQG

South Tunbridge, Gaysville, Union Village, and Victory (Chief of Engineers 

1942, 134-147). The Corps describes six of these dams as “major” components:

Claremont: UROOHG¿OOHDUWKGDPIHHWORQJDWWKHFUHVWOLQHULVLQJ

122.5 feet above the stream bed and providing a total storage capacity of 

78,400 acre-feet.

Union Village: K\GUDXOLF¿OOHDUWKGDPIHHWORQJULVLQJIHHWDERYH

the stream bed and providing a total storage capacity of 30,200 acre-feet.

6XUU\0RXQWDLQ5HVHUYRLUUROOHG¿OOHDUWKGDPIHHWORQJDWLWVFUHVW

rising 85 feet above the stream bed, and providing a total storage capacity of 

32,500 acre-feet.

Birch Hill: earth GDPRIUROOHG¿OOFRQVWUXFWLRQIHHWORQJDQGULVHVIHHW

above the river bed. Storage capacity of 49,400 acre-feet at spillway crest.

Knightville Reservoir: K\GUDXOLF¿OOHDUWKGDPIHHWORQJDWWKHFUHVWOLQH

rising 160 feet above the stream bed and provides for a total storage capacity

of 39,300 acre-feet. 7XOO\5HVHUYRLUrolled earth dam, 1,500 feet at its crest, 

rising 62 feet above the stream bed, providing a total storage capacity of 

22,150 acre-feet.

 ,QGLYLGXDOO\QRQHRIWKHVHGDPVSOD\VDGH¿QLQJUROHLQWKHHIIHFWLYHness of the system as a whole. The integrated Connecticut River Basin system, 

however, may be a National Historic Landmark, under Criterion 5, eligible for 

LWVHDUO\DQGGLUHFWDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKWKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI$VZLWKWKH

0RQRQJDKHODV\VWHPWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH&RQQHFWLFXW5LYHUÀRRGLQJDQGGHstruction of Hartford to Congressional support of the act heightens the representative value of the system.

Los Angeles County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, 

California

 7KH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWVRIDVDPHQGHG0D\DXWKRUL]HG

the construction of reservoirs and channel improvements in Los Angeles and San 

Gabriel Rivers and Ballona Creek and tributaries thereof. In addition to channel 

LPSURYHPHQWVFXWRIIVDQGVWRUPGUDLQVWKHV\VWHPLQFOXGHGVPDOOÀRRGFRQtrol dams in Sepulveda, Hansen, and Lopez Canyons (Chief of Engineers 1942, 
470

)XUWKHUUHVHDUFKPD\GHWHUPLQHWKDWWKLVQHWZRUNRIUHVRXUFHV

PLJKWEHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWIRULWVLPSDFWRQWKHKLVWRU\DQGGHYHORSPHQWRI

one of the nation’s most important metropolitan areas.

5HG5LYHU7H[DV

Denison Dam (1944) Texas, Red River, rolled-earth (Corps)

 6WXG\RIDÀRRGFRQWUROSODQIRUWKH5HG5LYHUDQGLWVWULEXWDULHVZDV

¿UVWDXWKRUL]HGE\WKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRIWKHVWXG\UHSRUWRIQLQHWULEXWDU\GDPVDQGDPDLQVWHPGDP'HQLVRQIRXQGQRHFRQRPLFMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRU

QDYLJDWLRQÀRRGFRQWUROUHVHUYRLUVDQGK\GURHOHFWULFSRZHUGHYHORSPHQW7KH

)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI-XQHDXWKRUL]HGDQRWKHUVWXG\RIWKH5HG5LYHU

system. This study recommended that the proposed Denison Reservoir, “deYHORSHGHLWKHUIRUÀRRGFRQWURODQGSRZHURUÀRRGFRQWURORQO\EHFODVVHGDVD

SURMHFWZLWKEHQH¿WVDQGFKDUJHVDSSURDFKLQJDQHFRQRPLFEDODQFH ́&RQJUHVV

authorized construction of the multiple-purpose dam on June 28, 1938 as part 

of a comprehensive plan for control of the Mississippi River and its tributaries (Settle 1975, 60). Construction was expedited to meet projected wartime-industry power needs: closure of the dam in July 1942 placed it in operation for 

ÀRRGFRQWUROSXUSRVHVE\0DUFKWKH¿UVWJHQHUDWLQJXQLWEHJDQSRZHUSURGXFWLRQ6HWWOH7KHGDPLVDUROOHGHDUWK¿OOVWUXFWXUHIHHWLQ

length and with a maximum height of 165 feet above the riverbed. Subsequent 

tributary dams have been constructed in the modern period; Denison, however, 

UHPDLQVWKHSULPDU\FRPSRQHQWRIWKH5HG5LYHUÀRRGFRQWUROV\VWHP

Opponents to the dam sought court injunctions to halt construction, arguing that “the Denison project could not be sustained under either the interstate 

power or the general welfare clause” (Settle 1975, 63). The U.S. Supreme Court 

ruled that “the Denison Reservoir, as part of a comprehensive scheme to control 

WKHÀRRGVRIWKH0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHUDQGLWVWULEXWDULHVZDVDYDOLGH[HUFLVHRIWKH

commerce clause” (Settle 1975, 63). Settle has argued that this Supreme Court 

decision “had the effect of making clear the extent of the power of the federal 

government in developing the non-navigable tributaries and nonnavigable porWLRQVRIQDYLJDEOHVWUHDPV$QGLWVWDWHG¿UPO\WKHGRFWULQHRI)HGHUDOVXSUHPDF\LQWKHLQVWDQFHVRIFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQOHJLWLPDWH)HGHUDODQGVWDWHSURMHFWV,WFDQZHOOEHFDOOHGDODQGPDUNFDVH ́6HWWOH)XUWKHUUHVHDUFK

PD\UHYHDOWKDWWKLVFRXUWFDVHZDVQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWDVUHTXLUHGE\1+/

Criterion 1.

The “Denison double-tube core barrel,” used subsequently in drilling 

mudded holes in earthen dams, was developed during the course of investigating 

the Denison Dam site (Kollgaard and Chadwick, 692). Corps Senior Historian 

0DUW\5HXVVDOVRUHSRUWVWKDWWKHGDPLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKVLJQL¿FDQWLQQRYDWLRQV
471

LQUROOHGHDUWK¿OOWHFKQLTXHV7KHVHLQQRYDWLRQVPD\SURYHWREHQDWLRQDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWXQGHU1+/&ULWHULRQ

Endnotes

1. Norman Smith, quoted in Schnitter, A History of Dams: The Useful Pyramids, xi.

2. Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West (New York: 

Pantheon Books, 1985), 130.

3. Arthur Maass, Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation’s Rivers (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 

+DUYDUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV)ORRGFRQWUROZRUNIRUWKHQDWLRQDVDZKROHZDVPRUHGH¿QLWHO\DVVLJQHGWRWKH$UP\(QJLQHHUVE\WKHSURYLVLRQVRIWKH)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI

4. Henry Clay, quoted in Todd Shallat, Structures in the Stream (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 

125.

5. Quoted in Shallat, Structures in the Stream, 1.

6. Ibid., 118.

7. Ibid., 4-5.

8. Wallace Stegner, Beyond the Hundredth Meridian John Wesley Powell and the Second Opening of the

West (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1953), passim.

9. Worster, Rivers of Empire, 155.

10. Ibid., 130.

11. Samuel P. Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\7KH3URJUHVVLYH&RQVHUYDWLRQ0RYHPHQW

1890-1920 1HZ<RUN$WKHQHXP3UHVV>¿UVWSXEOLVKHGE\+DUYDUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV@

12 Worster, Rivers of Empire, 167-9.

13. Worster, Rivers of Empire, 171.

14. Ibid., 176-8.

15. Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\92-4.

16. Ibid., 223-39.

17. Roosevelt to members of the Inland Waterways Commission, March 14, 1907, quoted in Hays, 

&RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\106.

18. W. J. McGee, Inland Waterways Commission, quoted in Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of

(I¿FLHQF\104.

19. Commission, quoted in Robinson, Water for the West, 26.

20. Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\ 203-4. Robinson, Water for the West, 27.

21. Hays, &RQVHUYDWLRQDQGWKH*RVSHORI(I¿FLHQF\114.

22. Martin Reuss, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Senior Historian, to Ann Hubber, Historical Research 

$VVRFLDWHV)HEUXDU\

23. Robinson, Water for the West, 49-51.

24. This dam was privately, rather than federally, owned and – like Bear Valley Dam – has not been evaluated in the course of this current project.

 )RUH[DPSOHWKH6DFUDPHQWR5LYHU9DOOH\SURMHFWRIWHQFLWHGDVDVLJQL¿FDQWUHVXOWRIWKH)ORRG&RQWURO

Act of 1936, consisted of enlargement of river channels, excavation of cut-offs, and construction of levees,

weirs, bank protection, and pumping facilities.

473

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3$PHQGHG+HLJKWRI*DUULVRQ'DP$WWDFNHGRQ7KUHH)URQWV ́Bismarck

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%DQNV)$3&ROXPELD%DVLQ3URMHFWLV'HVFULEHGE\&RQVWUXFWLRQ(QJLQHHU ́

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:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH
520

———. “Estimate of Cost of Examinations, etc. of Streams Where Power 

'HYHORSPHQW$SSHDUV)HDVLEOH ́SUHSDUHGE\+7D\ORUDQG2&

Merrill. 69th Congress, 1st session, December 7, 1925, to November 10, 

1926, House Document 308. Washington D.C.: Government Printing 

2I¿FH

———. “Message from the President of the United States,” including a 

“Resolution of the Missouri River States Committee to Secure a BasinWide Development Plan,” (sent to the President on August21, 1944). 

78th Congress, 2nd session, 1944, House Document 680. Washington 

'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———. “Missouri River,” 73rd Congress, 2ndVHVVLRQ)HEUXDU\+RXVH

'RFXPHQW:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———. “Preliminary Examination of Reservoir Sites in Wyoming and 

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*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———. “Preliminary Examination of Tennessee River Tributaries,” prepared 

E\+DUROG&)LVNHth Congress, 2nd session, House Document 319. 

:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———. “Report,” prepared by Colonel Lewis A. Pick. 78th Congress, 2nd session, House Document 475. Washington D.C.: Government Printing 

2I¿FH

———. “Report of the District Engineer,” in Ohio River, October 31, 1933, prepared by W. A. Johnson. 74th Congress, 1st session, August 23, 1935, 

+RXVH'RFXPHQW:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———. Tennessee River. 71st Congress, 2nd session, March 24, 1930, House 

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3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———. Tennessee River and Tributaries: North Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama,

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:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———. Tennessee River and Tributaries: North Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama,

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'RFXPHQW1R:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH
521

———. U.S. Board of Commissioners on the Irrigation of the San Joaquin,

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'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———. 69th Congress, 1st session, April 13, 1926, House Document 308. 

:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———, Senate. “Missouri River Basin: Conservation, Control, and Use of Water 

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:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———, Senate. Preliminary Report of the Inland Waterways Commission. 60th

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*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———, Senate , 78th Congress, 2nd session, November 21, 1944, Senate 

'RFXPHQW:DVKLQJWRQ'&JRYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Report of Irrigation Investigations in California. 

:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of

the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1. Washington, D.C.: 

*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———. Historical Statistics of the United States,Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2. 

:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

U.S. Department of Energy, Bonneville Power Administration; U.S. Army 

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3URMHFW)LQDO5HSRUWV3DUW,92'HVLJQDQG&RQVWUXFWLRQDenver: 

*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———. %RXOGHU&DQ\RQ3URMHFW)LQDO5HSRUWV3DUW97HFKQLFDO

Investigations, Bulletin 1, Bureau of Reclamation, Trial Load Method of

Analyzing Arch Dams'HQYHU*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH
522

———. The Colorado River: “A Natural Menace Becomes a Natural

Resource::DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———. Dams and Control Works. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

2I¿FH

———. The First Annual Report of the Reclamation Service. Washington 

'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———. Fourth Annual Report of the Reclamation Service. Washington, D.C.: 

*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———. Ninth Annual Report of the Reclamation Service. Washington, D.C.: 

*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

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———. Glen Canyon Dam and Powerplant. Denver,: Government Printing 

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———. in coorperation with Iron Canyon Project Association. Report on

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*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

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———. Third Annual Report of the Reclamation Service, 1903-4. Washington, 

'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

———. Arthur Powell Davis. Water Storage on Salt River, Arizona.

:DVKLQJWRQ'&*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH

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*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2I¿FH
523

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———. Robie Lange. “National Historic Landmark Nomination: St. Clair 

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526

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529

INDEX

308 reports ............................................................. 91-2, 121, 204, 237, 373

Columbia River....................................... 191, 202-5, 207, 224, 359

Corps expected 308 reports to lead to control

over all major river basins .............................................356

Corps expected to control major river basins

with navigation ..............................................................356

Cove Creek Dam.........................................................................359

0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHUÀRRG .....................................................111

Missouri River ....................................................236, 241, 252, 270

Most extensive and comprehensive engineering study

of all times .....................................................................236

Opportunity to review navigable rivers in terms of

ÀRRGFRQWURO...................................................................356

Rivers and Harbors Act (1927) ...................................................358

Set the stage for multipurpose dams...........................................121

Tennessee River .................................................................... 358-61

Twenty-four separate surveys .....................................................121

Abbot, Henry L. .......................................................................................111

Corps levee policy ......................................................................356

Acreage limitation

Acreage limitation increased to 960 acres in 1982.....................347

Alamo Canal ....................................................................................140, 141

)ORRGVLQRSHQHGXQFRQWUROOHGÀRZ...................................140

Alamo River.............................................................................................139

All-American Canal..................................... 140, 143, 154-6, 158, 171, 301

Allegheny River.............................................353-4, 356, 370-1, 384, 466-8

Allegheny-Monongahela basin

Nine-dam system of reservoirs ...................................................371

1LQHUHVHUYRLUÀRRGFRQWUROV\VWHP ...........................................370

Ambursen Hydraulic Construction Company............................................79

$PEXUVHQ1LOV) ................................................................79, 82, 366, 456

)ODWVODEGDPV ...............................................................................79

American Planning and Civic Association

Opposed Echo Park Dam............................................................396

American River........................................................................................303

American society

Embraced the great transforming event of electricity...................83
530

Analysis of design of dams

Numerical values for stresses are always suspect.........................80

U.S. Reclamation Service .............................................................65

Uses for analysis ...........................................................................80

Anglen, Ralph ..........................................................................................257

Arch dam ............................................................................................58, 64

Intellectual rage of the 1920s was for concrete arches .................79

Analysis of design.........................................................................64

Arch dam theory ...........................................................................59

-RQHV)DOOV'DP............................................................................59

Relatively small amounts of material ...........................................59

Thin arch dam ...............................................................................58

=ROD'DP ......................................................................................59

Arizona .......................................... 10, 22, 26, 29, 74, 84, 95, 97-100, 103-4,

................................................. 109, 132, 135-7, 149, 155, 157, 159, 

................................................................. 169, 175, 181-2, 212, 219, 

......................................................................385, 399, 405, 410, 425

“Arizona Navy” ..........................................................................181

Bartlett Dam on the Verde River.................................................212

Hydropower ................................................................................386

/HH¶V)HUU\ ..........................................................................136, 157

Opposed Colorado River Compact.....................................159, 181

Parker Dam .................................................................................181

Prehistoric irrigation ...............................................................21, 22

Arizona v. California................................................................................181

Arrowrock Dam .............. 91, 107, 143, 146, 171, 334,425, 430-1, 435, 458

ASCE awards

Writings on concrete arch dams....................................................79

Audubon Society..............................................................................395, 411

Baker, Newton D.

Secretary of War..........................................................................113

Sought to turn Muscle Shoals over to private companies...........113

Ballinger, Richard

Secretary of the Interior ................................................................37

%DQNV)UDQN$........................................................................................214

Calculating output.......................................................................221

Barren River...............................................................................................16

Bartlett Dam.......................................................................................79, 212

Bashore, Harry W......................................................................... 271, 274-5

Beach, Lansing.........................................................................................120

Chief of Engineers ......................................................................119
531

Bear Wallow Lake Dam

)DLOHGLQ .............................................................................406

Bechtel Company.....................................................................................171

Beggs, George

Stevenson Creek Test Dam ...........................................................78

Bensley, John 

Miller & Lux...............................................................................307

San Joaquin & Kings River Canal Company..............................307

Bernard, Simon ..........................................................................................15

Big Bend Dam .......................................................................................288

Big Creek, California

Hydropower .................................................................................80

Bixby, William H. ......................................................................................34

Black Canyon................................................... 134-136, 145, 153, 154, 166

1940 there were ten different power lines out ............................179

Allowed a less costly structure ...................................................153

Attention shifts here from Boulder Canyon................................153

Contains Boulder Dam................................................................134

&URZH)UDQN ..............................................................................171

Excavation began in 1932...........................................................176

Explored for a dam .............................................................152, 153

)RUELGGLQJHQYLURQV....................................................................171

Hydroelectric power delivered to Southern California...............178

Initial generation of power in 1936-1937 ...................................179

Metropolitan Water District of

Southern California powerline.........................................179

Offered a small additional amount of hydropower.....................152

Selected because it provided larger reservoir .............................153

Selected for Hoover Dam ...........................................................152

Selected for larger reservoir........................................................153

Work began before adequate housing was available ..................174

Work relief ..................................................................................174

%RDUGRI&RQVXOWDQWV)RU7\JDUW'DP

Gerig, William ............................................................................365

Growden, James B. .....................................................................365

+DU]D/)..................................................................................365

Hill, Louis C. ..............................................................................365

McAlpine, William .....................................................................365

Styer, Wilhelm D.........................................................................365

Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors

In 1922 on study of Tennessee River..........................................120
532

Board of Irrigation Commissioners

Study central California................................................................23

Bonneville Dam .................................................91-2, 191-7, 199, 203, 205,

.......................................208, 210, 222-3, 225-6, 228, 239,

...............................................253, 305, 363, 365, 385, 392

$QDGURPRXV¿VK.........................................................................226

$QDGURPRXV¿VKUHVHDUFKDQGODERUDWRU\ ..................................226

Arguments against building ........................................................203

Cement used................................................................................197

Closed in January 1938...............................................................202

Coffer dams.................................................................................199

Construction design issues..........................................................195

Construction issues .....................................................................195

Contracts in 1934........................................................................196

Design and construction proceeded on parallel tracks................196

'LVSODFHGWKH,QGLDQGLSQHW¿VKHU\DWWKH&DVFDGHV .................385

Excess power in region.......................................................213, 215

)LUVWPRGHORIK\GUDXOLFVLQDPDMRU

multipurpose, mainstream dam......................................196

)LVKKDWFKHULHV ............................................................................226

)LVKODGGHU...................................................................................226

)LVKODGGHUV.........................................................................202, 394

)LVKZD\V .....................................................................................202

Hydroelectricity ..........................................................................424

Kaplan turbines...........................................................................194

/RZHU&ROXPELD)LVKHULHV3ODQ..................................................226

Power oversupply issue ......................................................202, 203

Power used during World War II ................................................203

Public works project ...................................................................196

Puzzolan cement .........................................................................197

Salmon issue and the dam...........................202, 393, 394, 407, 408

Second powerhouse ....................................................................228

Bonneville Power Act

Bonneville Power Administration...............................................222

Within the Interior Department...................................................222

Bonneville Power Administration (BPA).................................222, 223, 228

Market federal power on the Columbia River ............................222

Reclamation wanted to subsidize irrigation................................222

Wanted cheap power...................................................................222

Boulder Canyon ................................109, 134, 145, 147, 152-3, 156-9, 173

Superior granite for foundation of dam ......................................153
533

Boulder Canyon Project.....................75, 107, 122, 133, 144-5, 150, 153-4,

................157-60, 162-5, 167,169, 171, 174, 180-1

Agricultural and Los Angeles interests allied.............................160

All-American Canal....................................................................171

Alliance between Imperial Valley and Los Angeles ...................160

Arizona could not prevent construction......................................181

Budgeted at $177 million............................................................171

Cabot, Phillip ..............................................................................167

Catalyst for the Colorado River Compact...................................182

Colorado River Compact ............................................................182

Construction approach ................................................................173

Construction of Hoover .............................................................171

Depended on political resolution of

Colorado River water rights...........................................159

)LQDQFHGE\UHYHQXHIURPK\GURHOHFWULFSRZHU .........................182

)LQDQFLDOIRXQGDWLRQLVVDOHRISRZHU.........................................110

Generate hydroelectric power.....................................................171

Guaranteed power sales ..............................................................165

How public and private power would share control...................165

Hydropower generation ..............................................................179

Hydropower incidental to use of water.......................................166

Industrial Workers of the World..................................................174

Irrigation .....................................................................................171

,UULJDWLRQDQGÀRRGFRQWUROVWLPXODWHG .......................................160

Irrigation stimulated....................................................................160

Job seekers move to area ............................................................173

Largest single federal contract ever let .......................................171

Municipal support carried...........................................................160

Municipal water ..........................................................................171

Opposed by private electric power .............................................166

Opposition by power companies.................................................166

Opposition to public power.........................................................165

Politics of hydropower................................................................165

Private power published opposition pamphlets ..........................167

Promotion in Los Angeles...........................................................162

Propaganda from the “Power Trust”...........................................169

3URYLGHÀRRGFRQWURO ..................................................................171

Required settlement of water rights issues on Colorado.............159

Stock market crash of October 1929...........................................174

Symbolize political character and importance............................179

Tied to Imperial Valley ...............................................................160
534

Tied to Los Angeles municipal water supply needs....................160

Very different from anything previously proposed.....................165

Boulder Canyon Project Act ................................................ 133-4, 169, 180

$PRQJWKH¿UVWODUJHPXOWLSXUSRVHZDWHUSURMHFWV.....................388

Battle over passage .....................................................................169

Colorado River Compact ............................................................388

Derives from more than the Depression .....................................133

Signed by Calvin Coolidge.........................................................133

Boulder Dam

See “Hoover Dam”

Boulder Dam Association ........................................................................163

Bourke-White, Margaret

)RUW3HFN'DP ....................................................................253, 255

Photographer...............................................................................253

Sent to photograph Bonneville Dam...........................................253

Brackenridge, W. A....................................................................................76

Brereton, Richard.....................................................................................307

Bridge Canyon Dam ................................................................................409

Brower, David

Sierra Club ..................................................................................398

%URZQ)UDQN(

Bear Valley Dam...........................................................................60

California arch dam design...........................................................60

Replaced by James D. Schuyler....................................................61

Sweetwater Dam...........................................................................61

Brown, Lytle ............................................................................................361

Missouri River 308 report...........................................................238

Tennessee River 308 report.................................................359, 360

Buffalo Bill Dam..................65, 91, 116, 146, 425, 431, 432, 445, 455, 459

Bureau of Reclamation ........................................................................3, 131

Arrowrock Dam ..........................................................................107

Authorized 1902 ...........................................................................92

Bartlett Dam..................................................................................79

Boulder Canyon Project and Depression

promote Reclamation.....................................................107

Buttress dams - multiple arch .......................................................79

Chose massive designs..................................................................82

Davis, Arthur Powell, becomes director .....................................107

'DYLV$UWKXU3RZHOO¿UHG .........................................................107

Decline in prestige 1910-20s ......................................................107

Elephant Butte Dam....................................................................107

)DFW)LQGLQJ&RPPLVVLRQ...........................................................109
535

)LQDQFLDOGLI¿FXOWLHV ...................................................................107

Hydropower authorized ................................................................32

Hydropower possibilities ..............................................................32

Issues of overlap with Corps.......................................................110

Mead, Elwood, becomes Commissioner.....................................109

Mead, Elwood, most work was on already

established projects........................................................109

Mead, Elwood, policies ..............................................................108

Mead, Elwood, unsullied by association with Reclamation .......109

Mission in 1902 ............................................................................89

Name changed to Bureau of Reclamation ..................................107

Proposed consolidation with Corps ............................................281

Reclamation’s tenuous role in West

beforeBoulder Canyon...................................................107

Salt River Project........................................................................107

Stony Gorge Dam .........................................................................79

U.S. Reclamation Service .............................................................32

Burton Bill of 1906

Brought government into Niagara River

and Great Lakes water regulation .................................114

Butler, John S. ........................................................................... 205-6, 208

Columbia River 308 Report........................................................204

Buttress dams................... 50, 58, 79-80, 118, 194, 318, 366, 429, 439, 456

)ODWVODEGDPV........................................................................... 58-9

More complicated design and construction ..................................59

Multiple arch dams .......................................................................79

Relatively small amounts of material ...........................................59

Require much less material...........................................................58

Slab dams were usually relatively small scale..............................79

Two types of buttress dams...........................................................79

Cabot, Phillip ...........................................................................................167

Opposes Hoover Dam.................................................................168

Cairo, Illinois ...........................................................................................353

California ..........................................22-3, 27, 29, 109, 121, 129-30, 135-6,

.................................38-9, 141, 144, 145, 152, 154-8, 161-2, 164,

........................................................168-9, 243, 301, 309-10, 312,

...................................................... 314, 323-4, 344, 384, 410, 424

See California Doctrine

Aversion to 160 acre limit...........................................................314

Bear Valley Dam...................................................................60, 429

Big Creek ......................................................................................80

California water rights law .....................................................8, 311
536

Central Valley..............................................................................302

Central Valley Project .........................................................221, 305

Clash of water doctrines ................................................................9

Colorado River ambitions.... 109, 157-159, 163,174, 178, 179, 181

Dam Safety Act passed (1929)....................................................390

Dual system of water rights ............................................................9

Durham and Delhi colonies ........................................................109

East Park Dam ............................................................................433

Evolution of water law....................................................................7

)HDUHGDFUHOLPLWDWLRQ ..........................................................314

)HDUHGWKHVXUUHQGHURIVRPHDXWRQRP\.....................................314

)HGHUDOLQYROYHPHQWLQSODQ ............................................... 328-330

)HGHUDOUHVWULFWLRQV......................................................................346

)RUPDWLRQRIZDWHUGLVWULFWV........................................................164

)ULDQW'DP .................................................................................221

Grange .......................................................................................308

Hydraulic mining ................................................................241, 313

Hydropower ............................................................................36, 80

Imperial Valley....................................................................386, 405

Klamath Project ..........................................................................315

Lake Spaulding Dam ....................................................................70

Marshall Plan ......................................................................320, 321

Metropolitan Water District of Southern California ...................405

Navigation...................................................................................312

Reclamation Service concentrated on

projects at the periphery of ............................................315

Rice cultivation...........................................................................319

Riparian Doctrine........................................................................311

Riparianism gained legal recognition .............................................9

Set a precedent in the application of prior appropriation................9

6KDVWDDQG)ULDQW'DPV ..............................................................304

Spanish irrigation..........................................................................21

6W)UDQFLV'DPIDLOXUH ...............................................................389

State plans for water ....................................... 320-2, 324, 328, 331

Water issues in the state ..............................................................301

Wright Act Districts ......................................................................27

Yuma Project...............................................................................315

California Debris Commission .................................................... 313-4, 317

)RUPHGLQ...........................................................................313

2SSRVHGUHVHUYRLUVIRUÀRRGFRQWURO ..........................................314

To protect navigability Sacramento River ..................................313
537

California Development Company .................................................... 139-42

By early 1920s there was sentiment

for All-American Canal .................................................140

Canal crossed Mexico.................................................................139

)DVWGHYHORSPHQWLQ,PSHULDO9DOOH\ ..........................................140

)LJKWVÀRRGLQJRI,PSHULDO9DOOH\ ..............................................140

Mexico reserved the right to draw half of the canal water .........139

California Doctrine ..................................................................................8, 9

$GRSWHGDORQJWKH3DFL¿F&RDVWDQGLQ*UHDW3ODLQV .....................9

Dual system of water rights ............................................................9

California Edison Company.......................................................................76

6W)UDQFLV'DP.............................................................................78

Stevenson Creek Test Dam ...........................................................76

California National Bank .........................................................................307

California state engineer report of 1927

Basis of all subsequent debate on water plan .............................326

(QGRUVHGE\IHGHUDOVWDWHFRPPLVVLRQ .......................................326

)HGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWVKRXOGEXLOG&HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW ...........326

California state engineer report of 1931 ..................................................326

)HGHUDOVXSSRUWPRUHOLNHO\ZKHQ)UDQNOLQ'5RRVHYHOWEHFDPH

President ........................................................................328

)ULDQW'DP..................................................................................326

How Central Valley water system would work...........................326

Kennett Dam...............................................................................326

State law authorized 1933...........................................................326

Voters authorize Central Valley bonds........................................328

California State Irrigation Association.....................................................321

California State Water Project..................................................................347

Largely completed in 1970s........................................................347

Planning in 1950s........................................................................347

Tehachapi Range.........................................................................347

7UDQVIHUVZDWHUIURP)HDWKHU5LYHUWR

/RV$QJHOHV6DQ'LHJR..................................................347

California water law

Prior appropriation..........................................................................9

Riparian law....................................................................................9

Campbell, Thomas ...................................................................................108

Canals

Alamo Canal ......................................................................... 139-40

$ODPR&DQDOÀRRGLQJ.................................................................140

Alamo Canal under control.........................................................141

All-American Canal............................................................139, 142
538

Bypassing obstructions .................................................................17

California agriculture..................................................................301

Central Valley of California........................................................309

Chesapeake to Ohio River ............................................................15

Columbia Basin Project ..............................................................206

Contra Costa Canal .....................................................................345

Control of Colorado River ..........................................................129

Delta-Mendota Canal..................................................................344

Early transportation efforts .............................................................5

)LQDQFLDOULVNV...............................................................................27

)ULDQW.HUQ&DQDO .......................................................................344

)URP)ULDQW'DP ........................................................................326

Hohokam Indian canals ....................................................21, 22, 99

Hudson Reservoir and Canal Company........................................99

Imperial Valley irrigation............................................................139

Irrigation canals ............................................................................21

Kingston Canal .............................................................................59

Lining to reduce salt loads..........................................................405

Madera Canal..............................................................................344

Mexico receives water from .......................................................139

Miller & Lux...............................................................................310

Mormon settlement.......................................................................22

Panama Canal .............................................................................193

Power canal Salt River................................................................102

Salt River Project..........................................................................21

San Joaquin & Kings River Canal

and Irrigation Company...................................................23

San Joaquin & Kings River Canal Company..............................307

San Joaquin River canal..............................................................323

Studies of foreign canals.............................................................309

Swilling Irrigation Canal Company..............................................22

7ZLQ)DOOV&DQDO ...........................................................................26

Upper Sacramento River.............................................................320

Canyon Lake Dam

)DLOHGLQ .............................................................................406

Carey Act ......................................................................................... 26, 28-9

Carey, Joseph M.........................................................................................26

Carnegie Institute of Technology

Contract to model spillway.........................................................364

Carquinez Straits......................................................................................303

Carson River Project................................................................................451

Casagrande, Arthur ..................................................................244, 258, 261
539

Embankment designer.................................................................240

Seepage through dams ................................................................240

Cascades, Columbia River.......................................................................385

Cavitation...................................................................................................90

&HOLOR)DOOV...............................................................................................385

Central Arizona Project...................................................181-2, 405, 409-10

Authorized in 1968 .....................................................................410

5HTXLUHGIHGHUDO¿QDQFLQJ..........................................................182

Central California

Agriculture....................................................................................22

Irrigation colonies.........................................................................23

Central Utah Project.................................................................................396

Central Valley

California’s most important agricultural region..........................302

Early studies of the state engineer ......................................322, 323

Iron Canyon Dam........................................................................316

Iron Canyon Project....................................................................316

Kings River.................................................................................310

Miller & Lux.......................................................................310, 311

Riparian water rights...................................................................311

State Engineer report 1927 .........................................................326

Central Valley Project ......................................................................301, 347

Acreage limitation................................................................... 345-6

Acreage limitation increased to 960 acres in 1982.....................347

American River...........................................................................303

Bensley, John ..............................................................................307

California, most economically important

state in the West .............................................................301

California, “buy-back” Central Valley Project in 1950s.............347

Central Valley agriculture ...........................................................301

Central Valley topography ..........................................................301

'HVLJQRI)ULDQW'DP .................................................................330

Design of Shasta Dam.................................................................330

Downey, Sheridan.......................................................................346

)HDWKHU5LYHU...............................................................................303

)LUVWSKDVHFRPSOHWHG ........................................................344

)ULDQW'DP..........................................................................304, 305

)XQFWLRQHGZLWKUHPDUNDEOHHI¿FLHQF\.......................................345

Historical background.........................................................305, 320

Kaweah River .............................................................................303

Kennett Dam...............................................................................305

Kern River...................................................................................303
540

Kings River.................................................................................303

Kings River excluded from Reclamation project .......................330

Large scale project ......................................................................305

Marshall Plan ..............................................................................305

Marshall, Robert, of the U.S. Geological Survey .......................305

Merced River ..............................................................................303

Miller & Lux........................................................... 303, 306-7, 346

Mining dams pioneered large-scale water storage......................301

“Move the Rain” .........................................................................304

3LQH)ODW'DPH[FOXGHGIURPSURMHFW.........................................330

Pit River ......................................................................................303

Rice culture.................................................................................319

Rice gave impetus to project.......................................................319

Rivers and Harbors Act (1937) ...................................................329

6DFUDPHQWR6DQ-RDTXLQ5LYHU'HOWD .........................................303

San Joaquin Valley......................................................................303

Shasta Dam ..................................................................... 304-5, 330

6WDWHVHHNVPRQH\IURP)HGHUDO(PHUJHQF\

Administration of Public Works ....................................329

Topography .................................................................................302

Tulare Lake .................................................................................303

Tulare Valley...............................................................................303

Tuolumne River ..........................................................................303

Water swap..................................................................................345

Yuba River ..................................................................................303

Chaffey, George

Imperial Valley development ......................................................139

Chandler, Harry

Land owner in Mexico................................................................139

Channel

Improvements .............................................................................196

St. Louis to St. Paul ......................................................................18

Chanoine wicket.................................................................................18, 372

Chanoine, Jacques......................................................................................18

Chapman, Oscar

Approved Echo Park Dam ..........................................................396

Reverses decision on Echo Park Dam ........................................397

Chattanooga District ..................................................................................91

Cheat River ..............................................................................................361

Cheesman Dam, Colorado .........................................................................68

Chelan County Public Utilities District ...................................................192
541

Chippewa Indians.......................................................................................20

:LOGULFH¿HOGV..............................................................................20

Chippewa River .........................................................................................19

Chittenden Survey of 1897 ........................................................................26

5HFRPPHQGV¿YHUHVHUYRLUV.........................................................26

Chittenden, Hiram......................................................................................27

Chorpening, C. H. ....................................................................................283

Citizens Committee on Natural Resources

Opposed Echo Park Dam............................................................397

Colorado....................................10, 26-7, 29, 92, 132, 135-7, 157, 395, 396

Colorado Doctrine.........................................................................10

Hiram Chittenden survey..............................................................26

North Platte River .......................................................................157

Colorado Agricultural College.................................................................364

Colorado Desert

See Imperial Valley

Colorado Development Company............................................................135

Colorado River..................... 1, 129-31, 133-8, 140-5, 155-9, 166, 186, 263

SHUFHQWRIÀRZIURPWKH5RFN\0RXQWDLQV...........................135

Alamo River................................................................................140

Alamo River canal ......................................................................140

All-American Canal....................................................143, 154, 301

Arizona concerns ........................................................................181

“Arizona Navy” ..........................................................................181

Arizona tried to oppose Hoover on

constitutional grounds....................................................181

Arizona v. California...........................................................181, 410

$YHUDJHDQQXDOÀRZDERXWPLOOLRQDFUHIHHW.........................129

Basin river system.......................................................................135

Boulder Canyon Project..............................................................159

Bridge Canyon Dam ...................................................................409

California aspirations for ............................109, 157, 159, 161, 163

California eyes the resource........................................................130

Central Arizona Project.......................................................181, 409

Central Utah Project....................................................................396

Colorado River Aqueduct .............................. 161-2, 164, 169, 171,

...........................................179, 181, 386

Colorado River Aqueduct Association........................................162

Colorado River Aqueduct required electricity

for pumping ...................................................................164

Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act ................................405

Colorado River Board.................................................................150
542

Colorado River Compact ..................................154-5, 157-9, 180-1

Colorado River Storage Project ..........................................182, 395

Construction of Hoover Dam......................................................149

Delta................................................................................ 138, 387-8

Design of Hoover Dam...............................................................146

Drainage basin ............................................................................135

(DUO\VPRVWÀRZXQXVHG....................................................161

)DOO'DYLV5HSRUW........................................................................142

)HGHUDO3RZHU&RPPLVVLRQUHMHFWHGSULYDWH

power applications.........................................................180

)ORRGFRQWURO...............................................................109, 167, 171

)ORRGLQWR,PSHULDO9DOOH\ ..........................................................140

)ORZVWKURXJKVHYHQZHVWHUQVWDWHV............................................129

Gila River....................................................................................405

Glen Canyon Dam ......................................................183, 399, 404

Grand Canyon dams............................................................185, 410

Grand Canyon National Park......................................................410

Grand River...................................................................................24

Green River...................................................................................24

Hoover Dam............................................................ 143-4, 147, 386

Imperial Valley............................................135, 138, 160, 301, 388

John Wesley Powell ..............................................................24, 137

Kincaid Act .................................................................................143

Los Angeles.........................................................................130, 161

Los Angeles desires partners.......................................................163

/RV$QJHOHV¿OHGFODLPWRFXELFIHHWSHUVHFRQG...............161

Los Angeles sought water for municipal development...............161

Los Angeles threatened future water rights

claims of other state................................................... 161-2

Lower Basin................................................................................157

Marble Canyon Dam...................................................................409

Metropolitan Water District of Southern California ...................169

Mexico ........................................................................................405

0RVWÀRZXQXVHGDQGXQFODLPHGLQHDUO\V........................157

2I¿FLDOUDWL¿FDWLRQRI&RORUDGR5LYHU&RPSDFW ........................159

Palo Verde Valley........................................................................138

Parker Dam .................................................................................181

Phil Swing...........................................................................154, 156

Private power opposition to Hoover Dam ..................................144

Recent reassessments of Hoover Dam........................................185

Salinity........................................................................................405

Salton Sea ...................................................................................138
543

Short-lived steamboat use...........................................................137

Siting of Hoover Dam.........................................................145, 152

6RXWKHUQ3DFL¿F5DLOURDG ...........................................................140

Strict application of the appropriation doctrine ..........................157

Studies of ............................................................................... 142-3

Swing-Johnson Act .....................................................................169

Upper Basin ................................................................................157

Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District ...........................................405

Yampa and Green Rivers ............................................................182

Colorado River Aqueduct ........................162, 164, 169, 171, 179, 181, 386

Large amount of electricity required...........................................164

Colorado River Aqueduct Association

Phil Swing...................................................................................162

Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act .............................................405

Colorado River Board....................................................................................

Approved design of Hoover........................................................150

Colorado River Commission....................................................................157

Colorado River Compact ..................................... 154, 158-9, 182, 203, 204

Arizona bitterly opposed.............................................................159

Arizona concerns ........................................................................159

Arizona refused to ratify.............................................................159

Arizona still feared California’s claims ......................................159

Arizona v. California...................................................................159

)LQDOUDWL¿FDWLRQLQ.............................................................159

Motives of various states ............................................................158

1HJRWLDWHGLQLQ6DQWD)H...................................................158

5DWL¿HG0DUFKRI...............................................................159

5DWL¿HGZLWKRXW$UL]RQD.............................................................159

Terms of ......................................................................................158

Why California supported...........................................................158

Colorado River Storage Project .......................................................182, 398

Approved ....................................................................................398

Authorized without Echo Park....................................................398

Echo Park Dam ...........................................................................398

)LQDQFHGE\UHYHQXHIURPK\GURHOHFWULFSRZHU .........................182

Colorado River System

Colorado River Storage Project ..................................................182

Dinosaur National Monument ....................................................396

Echo Park Dam ...........................................................182, 395, 396

Green River.................................................................182, 395, 396

National Park Service .................................................................182

Sierra Club ..................................................................................182
544

Wilderness Society......................................................................182

Yampa River .......................................................................182, 395

Columbia Basin Commission ..........................................................208, 211

Columbia Basin Project ...........................................................................217

Dam and pump plan....................................................................206

Gravity Plan ................................................................................206

Columbia River.................129, 191, 193-4, 202, 205-6, 209, 223, 235, 253

308 Report....................................................... 121, 191, 202-4, 359

Almost completely untamed in 1932..........................................193

$QDGURPRXV¿VK.........................................................................393

Bonneville Dam ..........................................................................194

Bonneville Power Administration...............................................222

Bureau of Reclamation .......................................................192, 207

Bureau of Reclamation study......................................................223

Chelan County Public Utilities District ......................................192

Columbia River 308 report .........................................................121

Columbia Basin Commission .....................................................211

Columbia Basin Project ..............................206, 213, 222, 226, 228

Columbia Valley Authority .................................217, 222, 228, 278

Comprehensive Plan (1948)........................................................224

'DOOHV'DPHOLPLQDWHG,QGLDQ¿VKLQJDW&HOLOR)DOOV.................385

Excess power in area...................................................................213

)LVKHULHVFRQÀLFWV .......................................................................392

)LVKHULHVLVVXHV ...........................................................................407

)LVKHULHVLVVXHV ...................................................................392, 393

)LVKZD\V .....................................................................................202

)ORRGLQJ......................................................................................223

Grand Coulee Dam ............................................192, 206, 210, 213,

......................................218, 219, 221, 387, 463

Grand Coulee Third Powerhouse................................................228

Hatcheries ...........................................................................226, 394

+XJHÀRZUHTXLUHGIUHVKWKLQNLQJ..............................................194

,QGLDQGLSQHW¿VKHU\..................................................................385

Largest hydroelectric producer in the world...............................191

/RZHU&ROXPELD)LVKHULHV3ODQ..................................................226

Main Control Plan 1948..............................................................224

NcNary Dam...............................................................................227

2SHUDWLRQIRUSRZHUDQGÀRRGFRQWURO .......................................225

Power network ............................................................................226

Restructuring...............................................................................223

Rock Island Dam ........................................................................192

Rock Island Rapids .....................................................................192
545

Salmon ........................................................................................202

Salmon issues..............................................202, 392, 393, 395, 407

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ...................................................207

Columbia River Comprehensive Plan

Main Control Plan.......................................................................224

Columbia River Control Plan...................................................................228

&ROXPELD5LYHUÀRRG

Bonneville Dam ..........................................................................223

Vanport........................................................................................223

Columbia Valley Authority ......................................................217, 222, 228

Compromise was the Bonneville Power Act ..............................222

Opposed by Corps.......................................................................228

Opposed by Reclamation............................................................228

Pushed by Henry “Scoop” Jackson.............................................278

Truman, Harry S. ........................................................................228

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers opposed.....................................217

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation opposed.........................................217

&RPPLWWHHRQ)ORRG&RQWURO ...................................................................270

Conconully Dam

+\GUDXOLF¿OOFRQVWUXFWLRQ ..........................................................243

Concrete

A mere substitute for stone masonry.............................................83

Easier simply to put the new cast material

into old familiar for..........................................................83

Made the building of integrated structures possible .....................83

Performance of equations replaced the performance of structures83

Stimulated the search for new forms ............................................83

Concrete dams

................ Chief Engineer Reclamation Service ........................................93

Design and analysis ......................................................................49

Gravity dams.................................................................................50

Intellectual rage of the 1920s was for concrete arches .................79

................ Massive tradition.................................................................49, 50

Structural tradition ..................................................................49, 58

Trial-load method..........................................................................49

Connecticut River ....................................................................................129

Conservation

0DQDJHPHQWRIQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVDQGWKHLUHI¿FLHQWXVH .............31

Progressive Era .............................................................................31

Consolidated Builders Incorporated (CBI) ..............................................219

Constant-angle arch dams .........................................................................61
546

Cooke, Morris L.......................................................................................364

Public Works Administration......................................................364

Coolidge, Calvin ..............................................................................114, 133

How public and private power would share control...................165

Signs Boulder Canyon Project Act .............................................133

Supported leasing of Muscle Shoals...........................................114

Cooper, Hugh L.............................................................................111, 114-9

Electrical Development Company of Ontario ............................114

0F&DOO)HUU\+\GURHOHFWULFSRZHUSODQW.....................................114

Corps of Engineers

See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Coulomb, Charles A.

Early earthworks designer ..........................................................239

Cove Creek Dam.......................................................................... 359, 361-2

See Norris Dam

Designer C. M. Hackett ..............................................................360

Power capacity............................................................................360

Precursor to Tygart Dam.............................................................360

Cove Creek Dam designs

Used to design Tygart Dam.........................................................362

&R\QH$QGUp ...........................................................................................212

Cret, Paul.......................................................................................... 363-365

Cross, Hardy ..............................................................................................78

Critical of complex dam analysis..................................................78

&URZH)UDQN

At Shasta Dam ............................................................................334

Built Parker Dam for Six Companies Inc. ..................................334

&XPPLQV:).......................................................................................263

Cylinder formula.................................................59-61, 64, 68, 70, 72, 80-1

=ROD'DP ......................................................................................59

Dalles Dam194

(OLPLQDWHG¿VKLQJVLWHRI&HOLOR)DOOV.........................................385

Dam

Wall or barrier that resists the pressure of water stored in reservoir64

Dam design approaches

Sliding circle stability analysis ...................................................240

Trial-load method................................................................149, 150

Dam design techniques

1920s the ideal was for more rigor ...............................................81

Cylinder formula..................................59-61, 64, 68, 70-72, 80, 81

Spillway cross section...................................................................90
547

Trial-load analysis......................................................... 73, 430-432

Trial-load method..........................................................................73

Dam design theory at the beginning of the twentieth century ...................61

Dam safety ...............................................................................................389

Dam Safety Assurance Program ..............................................................407

Dams

&RQÀLFWEHWZHHQÀRRGFRQWUROSRZHUJHQHUDWLRQDQGQDYLJDWLRQ91

Environmental effects .................................................................383

Environmentalists worried about alkali buildup.........................404

Environmentalists worried about

herbicides and pesticides ...............................................404

Environmentalists worried about intense irrigation....................404

Environmentalists worried about riverine ecology.....................404

Environmentalists worried about salinity ...................................404

Environmentalists worried about silting.....................................404

Every dam site unique.................................................................392

)RFXVRQVWUXFWXUDOVROXWLRQV ......................................................388

Headwaters dams ............................................................ 18-20, 353

Improve navigation.......................................................................16

Modern opposition......................................................................383

Naturally competing uses..............................................................91

Nineteenth century federal government dams only for navigation89

Nineteenth century gravity dam technology.................................89

Palisades Dam.............................................................................405

Questioning the inherent value of dams

post World War II...........................................................395

Social effects...............................................................................383

The least reversible form of river alteration ...............................404

Uniqueness of each major river basin...........................................92

Dams, criticisms.......................................................................................385

$VVXPSWLRQVDERXWÀRRGFRQWURO ................................................387

%ORFN¿VKPLJUDWLRQ....................................................................383

&KDQJHQDWXUDOÀRZ....................................................................383

Changes in 1960s........................................................................399

Destroy or decommission ...........................................................383

Displace farmers .........................................................................383

Displacement of people ..............................................................384

Drew capital away from sounder technology .............................383

Drew, Elizabeth B. ......................................................................400

Earth Day ....................................................................................400

Emphasis shifted from value of dams to value of scenic

and wild rivers ...............................................................385
548

Environmental movement...........................................................400

Environmental preservation........................................................400

)ORRGQDWXUDOODQGVFDSH ..............................................................383

)ORRGLQJ......................................................................................387

)UHHWKHULYHUV .............................................................................383

Recreation ...................................................................................400

Reduce water quality ..................................................................383

Silting..........................................................................................387

Dams, uses of

Harnessing rivers into service to humankind..............................383

Hydropower generation ..............................................................383

Irrigation .....................................................................................383

0D[LPL]HμHI¿FLHQWXVH¶RIDYLWDOUHVRXUFH................................383

Navigation...................................................................................383

Soil conservation.........................................................................383

Symbols of American achievement ............................................384

Transforming the hinterland .......................................................384

Urban use ....................................................................................384

Water storage ..............................................................................383

Darcy, Henri-Philibert-Gaspard

Early earthworks designer ..........................................................240

'DUODQG$)

Columbia Basin Commission .....................................................211

Davis, Arthur Powell..........................25, 65, 76, 92, 94-5, 97-8, 100-4, 143

Assistant chief engineer........................................................94, 142

Chief Engineer ..............................................................................94

Director of USRS........................................................................107

)DOO'DYLV5HSRUW........................................................................144

)LUHGDVGLUHFWRU8656 .......................................................107, 160

Proposed hydroelectric power be the

NH\WR+RRYHU¿QDQFLQJ.................................................144

8VHRIHOHFWULFLW\UHYHQXHVWR¿QDQFH+RRYHU............................144

Work on Colorado River..............................................142-7, 151-3

Davis Dam ...............................................................................................199

Davis Island

Concrete instead of masonry.........................................................18

Lock development.........................................................................18

Davis Island Dam

Concrete instead of masonry.........................................................18

Davis, Raymond

Stevenson Creek Test Dam ...........................................................78
549

de Laplace, Pierre S.

Early earthworks designer ..........................................................240

de Sazilly, J. Augustin Tortene................................................. 52-4, 60, 453

Design of gravity dams.................................................................52

Decisions about designs based on a variety of factors...............................62

Delano Heights, Montana ........................................................................255

Delaware River ...............................................................................129, 411

)ORRGRI..............................................................................411

Tocks Island ................................................................................411

Tocks Island Dam .......................................................................411

'HORFUH)(PLOH ..................................................................... 53-4, 60, 453

Alicante Dam ................................................................................54

Almansa Dam ...............................................................................54

)XUHQV'DP...................................................................................54

3UR¿OHRIHTXDOUHVLVWDQFH .............................................................53

Delta-Mendota Canal...............................................................................344

Derleth, Charles Jr......................................................................................76

DeVoto, Bernard

Opposed Echo Park Dam............................................................397

Dill, Clarence ...................................................................................210, 212

Grand Coulee Dam .....................................................................208

Dinosaur National Monument..........................................................182, 396

Enlarged 1938 .............................................................................396

Established 1915.........................................................................396

Downey, Sheridan

Opposes acreage limitation.........................................................346

Drury, Newton

Director of National Park Service...............................................397

Opposed Echo Park Dam............................................................397

Dual system of water rights

California Doctrine .........................................................................9

Dworshak Dam ........................................................................................199

Early studies of the California State Engineer

Concrete gravity design for Shasta Dam ....................................326

+\GURSRZHUVHHQDV¿QDQFLQJSURMHFW........................................324

Kennett Dam.......................................................................324, 325

Need for federal assistance .........................................................324

Report in 1923 ............................................................................322

Shasta Dam .........................................................................324, 326

Tulare Lake .................................................................................323
550

Eastwood, John S.......................................................................................61

Big Creek ......................................................................................80

)LUVWPXOWLSOHDUFKGDP.................................................................80

Hume Lake in the Sierra Nevada..................................................80

,Q)UHVQR&DOLIRUQLD .....................................................................79

Lake Hodges Dam ........................................................................80

Mountain Dell Dam ......................................................................82

Multiple arch dams ......................................................... 79-83, 431

Palmdale Dam...............................................................................82

Several dams he made the arches three hinged.............................81

Echo Park Dam .........................................................................182-4, 395-8

Approved ....................................................................................398

California aspirations for water ..................................................397

Colorado River Storage Project ..................................................398

Dinosaur National Monument ....................................................396

)LJKWWRVDYHSDUNVIURPLQXQGDWLRQDQGH[SORLWDWLRQ ................395

Glen Canyon Dam substituted for defeated Echo Park ..............398

Interconnection with Glen Canyon.............................................398

Opposed by preservationists .......................................................396

Project approved without Echo Park Dam..................................398

Split Mountain Reservoir............................................................397

7KUHDWVWR¿JKWHQWLUH&RORUDGR5LYHU6WRUDJH3URMHFW...............398

Edison, Thomas

6XSSRUWV+HQU\)RUGELGWREX\0XVFOH6KRDOV.........................114

Effects of hydraulic mining techniques

California Debris Commission ...................................................313

&DXVHGÀRRGLQJ ..........................................................................313

Clogged Sacramento River .........................................................313

Electric power

See hydropower

Electrical Development Company of Ontario..........................................114

Elephant Butte Dam............................... 91, 107, 143, 146, 425-6, 445, 461

Ellet, Charles, Jr.

'LYHUVL¿HGÀRRGFRQWUROSURJUDP...............................................356

6XJJHVWVOHYHHVDQGUHVHUYRLUVIRUÀRRGFRQWUROLQ ...........356

Embankment dams

Massive embankments..................................................................50

(QJLQHHULQJ)RXQGDWLRQ...............................................................76, 78, 389

Environmental effects

Increased salinity ........................................................................389

Silt reduction...............................................................................388

)DFW)LQGHU¶V&RPPLVVLRQ .......................................................................107
551

)DOO$OEHUW

)DOO'DYLV5HSRUW........................................................................144

Secretary of the Interior ..............................................................144

)DOO'DYLV5HSRUW.............................................................................142, 154

)DUP%XUHDX

6XSSRUWV+HQU\)RUGELGWREX\0XVFOH6KRDOV.........................114

)HDWKHU5LYHU .......................................................................................303

)HGHUDODSSURSULDWLRQVIRUULYHUDQGKDUERUSURMHFWV .................................17

)HGHUDO(PHUJHQF\0DQDJHPHQW$JHQF\

Responsibility for coordinating dam safety................................407

)HGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW

Ability to plan and complete big construction jobs ....................131

Major contributions to the art of hydraulic engineering.............131

)HGHUDO*XLGHOLQHVIRU'DP6DIHW\SXEOLVKHG .............................407

)HGHUDOODQGGLVWULEXWLRQ ..............................................................................3

Railroads .........................................................................................4

Rapid transfer of public lands.........................................................4

Stimulate economic development...................................................4

)HGHUDO3RZHU&RPPLVVLRQ .....................................................................133

(VWDEOLVKHGE\)HGHUDO:DWHU3RZHU$FWRI.......................113

Oversight private power companies ...........................................133

)HGHUDO7UDGH&RPPLVVLRQ

Study in 1928 about private power

LQÀXHQFLQJSXEOLFRSLQLRQ .............................................168

)HGHUDO:DWHU3RZHU$FWRI ............................................................113

)HOOHQLXV:ROPDU

Sliding circle stability analysis ...................................................240

)LQOH\:LOOLDP/ ....................................................................................385

)LVKDQG:LOGOLIH&RRUGLQDWLRQ$FWRI

(QVXUHPLJUDWLRQRI¿VKSDVWGDPV.............................................393

)LVKHU:DOWHU/

Secretary of the Interior ................................................................37

)LVNH+DUROG& ........................................................91-2, 119-21, 203, 358

308 reports ....................................................................................91

)DWKHURIUHSRUWV...................................................................121

)ODWVODEGDP..............................................................................................79

)OLQQ$OIUHG

Stevenson Creek Test Dam ...........................................................78

)ORRG&RQWURO..................................... 3, 26, 34, 38, 89, 91-2, 113, 322, 384

308 reports ..................................................................................356

Assumption rivers be predictable and

not threaten construction................................................387
552

Bypass channels on the Sacramento ...........................................314

Colorado River............................................................................132

Columbia River................................................................... 226-228

&RQÀLFWVZLWKLUULJDWLRQDQGQDYLJDWLRQ .....................................317

Controversy on Lower Colorado ........................................168, 169

Corps uncertainties about............................................................223

'HEDWHRYHUWKHDELOLW\RIODUJHGDPVWRFRQWUROÀRRGV..............283

'HODZDUH5LYHUÀRRGRI.....................................................411

)HGHUDOUROHH[SDQGHG...................................................................34

)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI..................................................314, 358

)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI..........................................................388

)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI..........................................................404

)ORRGFRQWUROQHZWR&RUSVLQV..........................................354

)ORRGSODLQPDQDJHPHQW.............................................................388

)ORRGVDW+RRYHULQ)HEUXDU\ ............................................175

)RFXVRQVWUXFWXUDOVROXWLRQV ......................................................388

)RUW3HFN'DP ....................................................................281, 282

)RUW5DQGDOO'DP........................................................................292

Garrison Dam..............................................................................281

*UHDW0LVVRXUL5LYHUÀRRGRI............................................292

+LVWRU\RIÀRRGLQJLQWKH2KLR5LYHU%DVLQ...............................356

Hoover Dam................................................................110, 386, 388

+RXVH&RPPLWWHHRQ)ORRG&RQWURO...................................110, 269

Kings River.................................................................................346

Kinzua Dam ........................................................................371, 372

Levees on the Sacramento River ................................................314

Lower Colorado River ............................................................ 166-8

Mainstem Missouri dams affected

sedimentation patterns ...................................................292

Miami Conservancy District...............................................357, 371

Mississippi River ........................................................................273

Missouri River ................................................ 269, 272-4, 291, 292

0LVVRXUL5LYHUÀRRGV......................................................270

Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District.............................371

Nonstructural alternatives...........................................................403

Ohio River 308 Report................................................................356

2KLR5LYHUÀRRGRI............................................................356

2KLR5LYHUÀRRGRI............................................................356

2KLR5LYHUÀRRGRI............................................................370

2KLR5LYHUÀRRGRI............................................................353

2KLR5LYHUÀRRGVRIDQG...........................................373

2KLR5LYHUÀRRGVRI ..........................................................371
553

Pick, Lewis A..............................................................................269

3LWWVEXUJK)ORRG&RPPLVVLRQ.....................................................356

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1920 .................................................119

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1927 .................................................358

Sacramento River................................................................329, 335

Tygart Dam .................................................353, 354, 363, 367, 371

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ...............................................14, 15

)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI .......................................................110, 314, 358

Lower Mississippi River.............................................................358

Sacramento River........................................................................358

)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI

(VWDEOLVKHGÀRRGFRQWUROIRUQDYLJDEOHZDWHUV...........................388

)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI

Multi-objective planning.............................................................404

)ORRG&RQWURO%LOORI.......................................................................276

)ORRGFRQWUROVWXGLHV

Had to include comprehensive assessment of watershed ...........110

)ORRGLQJ .....................................................................................................20

)RUW%HUWKROG5HVHUYDWLRQSDUWLDOO\ÀRRGHGE\

Garrison Reservoir.........................................................279

0LVVRXUL5LYHUÀRRGV.................................................279, 281

Standing Rock Sioux Reservation lost land................................385

)ORRGV

ÀRRGSXVKHG&RUSVWRZDUG

ÀRRGFRQWURORQ&ROXPELD .............................................224

308 reports on Missouri ......................................................237, 252

UHSRUWVWRFRQVLGHUÀRRGFRQWURO ..........................................122

Alamo Canal ...............................................................................140

California Development Company .............................................141

Caused by mining debris in California .......................................313

Colorado River............................................................................109

Columbia River in 1948..............................................................223

&RQJUHVV¿UVWDOORFDWHGIXQGVIRUÀRRGFRQWURO..........................110

Control of lower Colorado..........................................................143

&RUSVSODQVWRPLQLPL]HÀRRGFRQWURORQWKH&ROXPELD ............223

Designing embankment dams to handle .....................................287

(DUO\WZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\ÀRRGV

commanded increased attention.....................................110

)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI..........................................................110

)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI..........................................................354

)ORRGFRQWUROGDPRQ&RORUDGR5LYHU........................................142

Gave new direction to the Corps.................................................110
554

Glen Canyon Dam ......................................................................288

*UDQG&RXOHHÀRRGLQ........................................................215

+RRYHU'DPDQGÀRRGV..............................................................288

+\GURSRZHUDVDVLGHEHQH¿WRI+RRYHU'DP............................144

Imperial Irrigation District..........................................................142

Imperial Valley....................................................135, 140, 154, 160

,PSHULDO9DOOH\ÀRRGRI .............................................140, 141

,PSHULDO9DOOH\ÀRRGVWRSSHGLQ........................................141

Imperial Valley irrigation............................................................135

Irrigation water from Hoover......................................................142

Kings River.........................................................................303, 307

/DNH3RZHOODQGÀRRGV...............................................................288

0DQDJLQJUHVHUYRLUVIRUÀRRGFRQWURODQGK\GURSRZHU.............225

0D[LPXPSUREDEOHÀRRGRQWKH0LVVRXUL .................................252

0LDPL9DOOH\UHJLRQÀRRGV.........................................................110

0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHUÀRRG ..............................................111, 122

Missouri River ............................................................................235

0LVVRXUL5LYHUÀRRGRI......................................................288

0LVVRXUL5LYHUÀRRGV.........................................................283

0LVVRXUL5LYHUÀRRGV.........................................................283

Muscle Shoals.............................................................................113

1DWXUDOLUULJDWLRQE\ÀRRGLQJ .....................................................307

New direction for the twentieth-century Corps ..........................110

2KLRÀRRGVRI ....................................................................110

2KLR5LYHUÀRRGRI............................................................353

2KLR5LYHUÀRRGVRIDQG...................................353, 373

3DVVLQJÀRRGVDW+RRYHU.............................................................148

3LWWVEXUJKÀRRGRI..............................................................110

Raising political pressure............................................................110

Sacramento River........................................................................303

6DOW5LYHUÀRRGVLQ ............................................................102

San Joaquin River .......................................................................303

6WRUDJHRIVHDVRQDOÀRRGV...........................................136, 324, 346

Storage of water......................................................24, 27, 100, 320

Storage of water in California.....................................................301

Tulare River ................................................................................307

Vanport........................................................................................223

)RUFKKHLPHU3KLOLSS

Early earthworks designer ..........................................................240

)RUG+HQU\

Bids to buy Muscle Shoals..........................................................114

)RUW0F'RZHOO...........................................................................................22
555

)RUW3HFN'DP .................................................................................245, 363

Board of Consultants report........................................................259

Board of Consultants to study the slide ......................................258

Bourke-White, Margaret.............................................................253

Casagrande, Arthur .....................................................................266

Casagrande, Arthur, added to Board of Engineers

after slide ...............................................................258, 261

Completed in 1940......................................................................265

&RQÀLFWEHWZHHQ8SSHU0LVVRXUL%DVLQVWDWHV

and Lower Missouri ......................................................272

Construction methodology..........................................................246

Corps responds to concerns of President Roosevelt ...................261

&XPPLQV:)...........................................................................263

Debate between academics and practitioners .............................266

Design .........................................................................................252

Dredges .......................................................................................246

Earth............................................................................................239

Gerig, William ............................................................................264

2QK\GUDXOLF¿OO.............................................................259

Gilboy, Glennon..................................................................261, 266

+\GUDXOLF¿OOFRQVWUXFWLRQ ..................................................241, 244

Job creation a high priority .........................................................238

Justin, Joel, added to Board of Engineers after slide..................258

Kittrell, Clark..............................................................255, 257, 259

Larkin, T. B. ................................................................................255

Mead, Warren J. ..................................................................263, 264

Merriman, Thaddeus...........................................261, 263, 264, 267

Middlebrooks, Thomas ............................................... 259, 265-267

Moore, Douglas ..........................................................................256

Provided many jobs ....................................................................245

Public-Works Project Number 30 ...............................................238

Ray Kendall ................................................................................256

Rebuilding after the slide............................................................258

5HPLQLVFHQFHRI)RUW3HFN'DPVOLGH...............................256

Schley, Julian ..............................................................................264

6OLGHDW)RUW3HFN'DP...............................................................256

Sturdevant, C. L..........................................................................259

Terzaghi, Karl ..................................................................... 265-267

Tourlotte, Eugene........................................................................257

Tyler, M. C..................................................................................261

8SVWUHDPVORSHÀDWWHQHGLQUHEXLOGLQJVOLGH...............................259

9DQ)DDVHQ-HUROG ......................................................................256
556

Van Stone, Nelson.......................................................................256

Westergaard, H. M. .....................................................................263

Workers’ shanty towns................................................................255

)RUW3HFN0RQWDQD..................................................................................255

)RUW5DQGDOO'DP.............................................................................277, 288

Completed mid-1956 ..................................................................290

Construction begins 1948 ...........................................................290

Designed by Omaha District.......................................................290

)ORRGHG6LRX[ODQG .....................................................................291

Lake Case....................................................................................291

Pickstown....................................................................................290

3UHVLGHQW(LVHQKRZHUGHGLFDWHG¿UVWSRZHUXQLW...............291

)UHGHULFN6QDUH&RUSRUDWLRQ....................................................................365

)UHQFK(QJLQHHULQJ7UDGLWLRQ ..............................................................11, 12

)ULDQW'DP ...............................................................................................326

Authorization 1935 .....................................................................342

Completed in 1942......................................................................344

Concrete gravity dam..................................................................330

Construction................................................................................342

Construction begins 1939 ...........................................................342

Construction methodology..........................................................342

)ULDQW.HUQ&DQDO .......................................................................344

*ULI¿WK&RPSDQ\DQG%HQW%URWKHUVFRQVRUWLXP

receives contract ............................................................342

Millerton Lake ............................................................................329

Straight concrete gravity type.....................................................331

)ULDQW.HUQ&DQDO ....................................................................................344

*DU¿HOG-DPHV5..............................................................................35, 108

Garrison Dam...........................................................................................277

Bonner, John ...............................................................................282

Completed in 1955......................................................................287

Construction begins in 1948 .......................................................281

Corps and Reclamation differ on capacity

of Garrison Dam ............................................................282

Dedicated 1956 ...........................................................................287

Design and construction..............................................................280

Design controversies...................................................................278

Diversion of Missouri River ...............................................284, 285

)RUW%HUWKROG,QGLDQ7ULEDO%XVLQHVV&RXQFLO

signed a contract ............................................................281

Issues with Mandan, Arikara, and Hidatsa .................................280

0LVVRXUL5LYHUÀRRGRI......................................................279
557

Missouri River States Committee...............................................281

Missouri-Souris irrigation project...............................................284

Missouri-Souris Project never was funded .................................287

Morrison-Knudsen contractor.....................................................283

Peter Kiewit Sons Company was the contractor.........................283

Pick, Lewis A..............................................................................278

President Eisenhower visits for formal

closure ceremonies.........................................................285

5HVHUYRLUZRXOGÀRRGSDUWVRI

)RUW%HUWKROG5HVHUYDWLRQ..............................................279

Riverdale, North Dakota.............................................................278

5ROOHG¿OOHPEDQNPHQWGDP.......................................................280

6PLWK)RUUHVW..............................................................................282

Spillway ......................................................................................287

6SLOOZD\GLPHQVLRQHGWRFDUU\DKXJHÀRRG...............................287

Gatun Dam

+\GUDXOLF¿OOFRQVWUXFWLRQ ..........................................................244

Gavins Point Dam....................................................................................288

General Dam Act of 1906 ..........................................................................38

Amendment in 1910......................................................................38

Corps reconcile power and navigability .......................................38

)HGHUDOUROHLQQDYLJDELOLW\...........................................................38

Required private dams to build navigation facilities ....................38

General Survey Act 1824.........................................................................355

Gerig, William..................................................................259, 264, 266, 365

Gibbon v. Ogden ............................................................................ 13-4, 132

Chief Justice John Marshall..........................................................14

Gibson Dam .........................................................75, 82, 109, 431, 445, 462

Gila River.................................................................................................405

Gilboy. Glennon.......................................................................................261

Casagrande, Arthur .....................................................................244

+\GUDXOLF¿OOFRQVWUXFWLRQ ..........................................................244

Glen Canyon Dam........................ 145, 152, 182-4, 383, 384, 398, 399, 463

$UFKGHVLJQLQVXI¿FLHQWDVDJUDYLW\GDP...................................184

Brower, David.............................................................................399

Ecological effects........................................................................404

Environmental effects .........................................................404, 425

Interconnected with Echo Park Dam ..........................................398

Reservoir to protect Upper Colorado River Basin

water rights ....................................................................399

Goldmark, Henry .......................................................................................80

Multiple arch dam in Utah............................................................80
558

Gould, E. Sherman

High Masonry Dams.....................................................................54

Grand Canyon dams ................................................................................409

&RDO¿UHGSODQWVVXJJHVWHG .........................................................410

Not approved...............................................................................410

Nuclear plants suggested ............................................................410

Opposed by David Brower .........................................................410

Part of Reclamation’s Central Arizona Project...........................410

Grand Coulee

Third Powerplant ........................................................................228

Grand Coulee Dam ..........................................................................383, 387

%DQNV)UDQN$ ..........................................................................214

Bid accepted for low dam ...........................................................212

Bids for low dam opened............................................................212

Centerpiece of largest reclamation project undertaken...............387

Civil engineering wonder of the United States...........................384

Consolidated Builders Incorporated (CBI).................................219

Construction complete 1941 .......................................................221

Construction methodology..................................................216, 221

Design issues...............................................................................210

Excess power in area...................................................................213

)LQDOSODQVIRUKLJKGDP.............................................................218

)LUVWODUJHWXUELQHFRPSOHWHG ......................................................221

Ickes, Harold, approves high dam .............................................216

Largest concrete structure in the world.......................................217

Low dam v. high dam .................................................................211

Mead, Elwood, asks to build high dam in 1934..........................214

Moving from low to high dam....................................................214

Multiple arch dam studied ..........................................................211

MWAK........................................................................................213

Power market too small ..............................................................214

Primary construction issue..........................................................220

Progress of construction..............................................................218

Reclamation report supports high dam ...............................213, 214

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1935 .................................................217

Site not economical for low dam ................................................213

Water over spillway 1942 ...........................................................221

Grandval Dam .......................................................................................212

Grange........................................................................................................18

Granite Reef Diversion Dam ...................................................................103

,QÀDWLRQ.......................................................................................104
559

Grant, U. S, III

Opposed Echo Park Dam............................................................396

Gravity dam ...............................................................................................64

Alicante.........................................................................................51

Almans..........................................................................................50

Don Pedro Bernardo Villa de Berry..............................................51

Elche arch dam..............................................................................51

Gravity dam theory .......................................................................51

Rellue arch dam ............................................................................51

Green River................................................................................16, 135, 396

Growden, James

Consultant on Tygart Dam..........................................................369

Gulf of California.........................................................................1, 136, 138

Gulf of Mexico...................................................................33, 121, 449, 451

Gull Lake ...................................................................................................19

Gunnison River ........................................................................................135

Hackett, C. M.

Design of Cove Creek Dam........................................................360

Hadley, Ebenezer

Imperial Valley development ......................................................138

Haggin, Ali...............................................................................................311

Harper, Sinclair O. ...................................................................................331

Harts, William................................................................................ 90-1, 120

Eight criticisms of the high dams and storage reservoirs .............90

Spillways and other dam cross sections........................................90

+DU]D/)

Tygart Dam .................................................................................364

Tygart Dam consulting................................................................366

Hayden, Carl ............................................................................................155

Concerned about water rights on the Colorado River.................155

Hazen, Allen

 +\GUDXOLF¿OOFRQVWUXFWLRQ ..........................................................243

Heliopolis...................................................................................................15

Hetch Hetchy .......................................................................................34, 35

Hydroelectric power .....................................................................35

O’Shaughnessy Dam on the Tuolumne completed (1925) ...........35

7UDQVIHUVLWHWR6DQ)UDQFLVFR...........................................35

Hill, Louis C.

Tygart Dam consulting.................................................. 365, 368-70

Hohokam Indians.......................................................................................99

Hollow dams ..............................................................................................58

More complicated design and construction ..................................79
560

Holyoke Dam across the Connecticut River............................................118

Hoover Commission

Opposed valley authorities like TVA..........................................281

Hoover Dam.......................... 91-2, 107, 110, 122, 129, 131, 133, 135, 143,

..............145, 149, 151-4, 159-60, 162, 169, 171, 179-82, 185,

............193, 199, 211, 213, 217-20, 253,334, 362, 383, 386-8,

................................................................................. 427, 430-3

1940 - Ten different power lines out of Black Canyon...............179

America’s largest civil engineering contractors..........................171

Arizona could not prevent construction......................................181

Arizona tried to oppose Hoover on constitutional grounds ........181

Bids for construction...................................................................212

Boulder Dam Association ...........................................................167

Chosen from among many possible sites....................................145

Civil engineering wonder of the United States...........................384

Cleaning foundation....................................................................176

Colorado River Aqueduct ...........................................................386

Concrete curing heat ...................................................................178

Concrete placement in 1933 .......................................................176

Construction................................................................................171

Dam and powerhouses declared complete in 1936.....................178

Dedication of dam...............................................................179, 180

Designated “Hoover Dam” in 1930............................................135

Diversion of river........................................................................175

Diversion tunnels ........................................................................175

Diverting the Colorado River .....................................................175

Drawing off excess heat from concrete ......................................178

Excavation began in 1932...........................................................176

Expectation of material progress ................................................386

)HGHUDO3RZHU&RPPLVVLRQUHMHFWHGSULYDWHSRZHU

applications on Colorado River ....................................180

)LUVWPXOWLSXUSRVHGDP...............................................................135

)ORRGFRQWURO.......................................................................109, 386

)ORRGFRQWUROGDPRQWKHORZHU&RORUDGR5LYHU................142, 144

)ORRGVLQ)HEUXDU\.............................................................175

)RFXVVKLIWHGWRFRQVWUXFWLRQLQ.........................................169

Great monument to American engineering.................................122

Hydroelectric power delivered to Southern California...............178

+\GURSRZHUDVDVLGHEHQH¿WRI+RRYHU'DP............................144

Hydropower generation ..............................................166, 169, 386

Imperial Valley....................................................................109, 130

Initial generation of power in 1936-1937 ...................................179
561

Irrigation water ...........................................................................386

Kaiser, Henry ..............................................................................171

Lake Mead ..................................................................218, 237, 288

Largest single federal contract ever let to that time....................171

Los Angeles.................................................................................130

Metropolitan Water District of Southern California

powerline .......................................................................179

Morrison-Knudsen......................................................................171

Name change.......................................................135, 179, 219, 220

Name changed back to Hoover Dam in 1947.............................135

Name changed to Boulder Dam in 1933.....................................135

Named ...............................................................................135, 171

New dimensions to Reclamation program..................................180

Opposition to dam.......................................................................169

Originally known as Boulder Dam .............................................135

Political character of dam-building.............................................131

Power operations leased to private power ..................................169

Precursors......................................................................................91

Public Works Administration funding.........................................179

Recent reassessments..................................................................185

Renamed Boulder Dam 1933......................................................135

Renamed Hoover in 1947 ...........................................................135

Revolutionized federal participation in water projects...............135

Selection of the Black Canyon site.............................................152

Silt capture ..................................................................................388

Six Companies Inc..............................................................171, 174

Southern California champions ..................................................130

36ZDOORZVWKHÀRRGV ́.................................................................388

The “public power” issue............................................................144

Threat to private power...............................................................144

8VHRIHOHFWULFLW\UHYHQXHVWR¿QDQFH+RRYHU............................144

Utah Construction Company ......................................................171

Winning bid less than $49 million ..............................................171

Work began before adequate housing was available ..................174

World War II ...............................................................................386

World War II contributions .........................................................386

Hoover, Herbert ...............................................111, 133, 154, 158, 203, 326

Closely associated with the Boulder Canyon Project .................154

Secretary of Commerce ..............................................................111

6XSSRUWV+HQU\)RUGELGWREX\0XVFOH6KRDOV.........................114

Horse Mesa Dam......................................................................................107

Houk, Ivan..................................................................................................78
562

+RXVH&RPPLWWHHRQ)ORRG&RQWURO........................................................110

House Document No. 308

Provided in 1926.........................................................................111

Resulted in 308 reports and studies ....................................111, 121

Set the stage for multipurpose dams...........................................121

House Rivers and Harbors Committee

Requests cost estimates for comprehensive

survey of rivers ..............................................................111

Howell, C. H.

5H¿QHVWULDOORDGDQDO\VLV................................................. 73-4, 462

Trial-load method..........................................................................73

Hudson Reservoir and Canal Company...................................................101

Hudson River ...........................................................................................129

Hugh L. Cooper & Co.

Muscle Shoals.............................................................................118

Hume-Bennett Lumber Company..............................................................80

Humphreys, Andrew A.............................................................................111

Corps levee policy ......................................................................356

Hungry Horse Dam..................................................................................199

Hurricane Agnes in 1972 .................................................................354, 372

Hurricane Hazel in 1954 ..........................................................................371

+\GUDXOLF¿OOGDPV...................................................................................241

)DLOXUHV........................................................................................243

Hydroelectric power

Bonneville Dam ..........................................................................394

Corps supports private development...........................................359

Echo Park Dam ...................................................................396, 397

Environmental opposition...........................................................410

Grand Canyon dams............................................................409, 410

Grand Coulee Dam .....................................................................387

Hoover Dam................................................................................386

Multiple-purpose movement.........................................................32

6DOPRQDQG¿VKHULHVLVVXHV.........................................................408

Teton Dam...................................................................................391

Third great river issue.................................................................110

Urban growth .......................................................................... 386-7

Works projects develop...............................................................384

Hydropower .................................................................36, 62, 165, 237, 276

See “mill power”

Appleton, Wisconsin.....................................................................36

As repayment for irrigation.........................................................107

$W1LDJDUD)DOOV............................................................................36
563

Bureau of Reclamation ........................................................... 131-2

Calculation of power...................................................................221

California ......................................................................................80

Central Valley of California.................................... 321-2, 324, 325

Central Valley Project .........................................................341, 344

Colorado River....................................................................136, 144

Colorado River Storage Project ..................................................182

Columbia River...........................................................................204

Comprehensive surveys of all navigable streams ......................120

Cooper, Hugh Lincoln............................................................. 114-6

Corps approval of projects............................................................38

Corps of Engineers issue.....................................................110, 111

Could be transmitted to user .........................................................84

Dams could now become multipurpose structures .......................83

Developed in Europe ....................................................................36

Development in U.S......................................................................36

Eastwood, John S..........................................................................79

Effects on navigation ............................................................38, 238

)HGHUDO3RZHU&RPPLVVLRQ................................................113, 133

)HGHUDO:DWHU3RZHU$FW ............................................................113

Glen Canyon Dam ......................................................................183

Government regulation of.............................................................37

Grand Canyon dams....................................................................185

Grand Coulee Dam .....................................................................208

Hetch Hetchy ................................................................................35

Hoover Dam.................................... 110, 145, 148, 152, 165-6, 178

Hoover Dam highly controversial...............................................165

Hoover Dam power revenues .....................................................180

Issue of public power..................................................................111

Jorgensen, Lars .............................................................................61

Keokuk........................................................................................353

“Marshall Plan”...........................................................................321

Metropolitan Water District’s Colorado Aqueduct .....................171

Muscle Shoals..................................................... 111, 117, 119, 133

Near Juneau, Alaska......................................................................61

Pre-World War I ............................................................................38

Private facilities ............................................................................37

Reclamation issue .......................................................................110

Reclamation Project Act of 1939................................................269

Requiring dam owners to maintain and

operate navigation facilities.............................................38

Revenues at Hoover............................................................144, 157
564

Roosevelt Dam..............................................................................99

5XOLQJVRI)HGHUDO3RZHU&RPPLVVLRQ ......................................180

Sale of power could now justify the cost of high dams................83

Salmon Creek Dam.......................................................................61

Salt River Project..........................................................99, 102, 107

Society embraced the great transforming

event of electricity ...........................................................83

Tonto Dam ....................................................................................99

Waterway developments ...............................................................38

Hydropower

Transforming the hinterland .......................................................384

Ickes, Harold............................................................................................210

Idaho ..........................................................................................................29

Anderson Ranch Dam.................................................................458

Arrowrock Dam ..................................................107, 143, 171, 458

Carey Act ......................................................................................26

Colorado Doctrine.........................................................................10

Morrison-Knudsen..............................................................171, 334

Owyhee Project...........................................................................109

Teton Dam...................................................................................391

Imperial Irrigation District................................................................... 142-3

'HVLUHIRUÀRRGSURWHFWLRQ..........................................................142

Desire for protection from Mexican interference .......................142

)ORRGFRQWUROFRXOGVWRUHZDWHUIRULUULJDWLRQ.............................142

6RXJKWDÀRRGFRQWURODQGVWRUDJHGDP......................................142

Sought All-American Canal........................................................142

Imperial Valley............................130, 135, 138-44, 154-7, 160-1, 171, 180,

.................................................................301, 386, 388, 405

Diverted over 3 million acre-feet per year

from Colorado River......................................................161

)ORRGLQJRIWKHYDOOH\.................................................................135

)ORRGVDIIHFWHGGHYHORSPHQW......................................................135

Huge tract of desert.....................................................................135

Required canal lining..................................................................405

Required drainage system...........................................................405

Salinity issues .............................................................................405

Salt-tolerant crops.......................................................................405

,PSHULDO9DOOH\ÀRRGV

Affected storage on Colorado River ...........................................135

,QGLDQGLSQHW¿VKHU\ ...............................................................................385

Industrial Workers of the World...............................................................174

Industrialization of U.S................................................................................2
565

Inland Waterways Commission ............................................................. 33-4

Iron Canyon Project ............................................................................. 317-9

Iron Canyon Dam........................................................................316

6LJQL¿FDQWLQSODQQLQJSUHFHGLQJ&HQWUDO9DOOH\3URMHFW...........319

Vicinity of Redding, California ..................................................316

Iron Canyon Project Association .............................................................316

Irrigation Survey ........................................................................................92

Izaak Walton League........................................................................393, 395

Jackson Report

)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI..........................................................314

Jackson, Thomas H. ....................................................................314

Jackson, Thomas H. .................................................................................314

-DNREVHQ%) .....................................................................................72, 74

Jaquith, A. C.

5H¿QHVWULDOORDGDQDO\VLV...............................................73, 74, 462

Johnson, Hiram ...........................................................................156

Closely associated with the Boulder Canyon Project .................154

National Irrigation Congress (1893)...........................................169

Supported Boulder Canyon Project ............................................154

Swing-Johnson Acts....................................................................154

-RKQVWRZQÀRRG .......................................................................................390

-RQHV)DOOV'DP.........................................................................................59

Jorgensen, Lars .................................................68, 70, 72, 146, 147

Constant angle arch dam...............................................................61

Lake Spaulding Dam ....................................................................70

Salmon Creek Dam.......................................................................61

Justin, Joel D....................................................................................258, 269

Embankment designer.................................................................241

+\GUDXOLF¿OOFRQVWUXFWLRQ ..........................................................244

Kaiser, Henry ...............................................................................171, 218

Kanawha River......................................................................16, 374

Huntington, West Virginia ..........................................................374

Roller gate dams .........................................................................374

Kansas........................................................................................................29

California Doctrine .........................................................................9

Kansas City.........................................................................270, 292

Kansas River...............................................................................276

Pick Plan of the Corps ................................................................269

Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program...........................................292

Kansas City ..............................................................................................270

Kansas City District .................................................................................237

Kansas River ............................................................................................273
566

Kaufmann, Gordon

6XUIDFHGHVLJQWUHDWPHQWRI+RRYHU ...........................................151

Kaweah River ..........................................................................................303

Kendall, Ray ............................................................................................256

Kennett Dam....................................................................................319, 326

See Shasta Dam

Kentucky River ..........................................................................................16

Keokuk and Hamilton Water Power Company

Hydroelectric dam.......................................................................115

Keokuk Dam .................................................................. 91, 114-8, 194, 353

Cooper, Hugh..............................................................................116

Kern River........................................................................303, 307, 311, 323

Divert water to Los Angeles .......................................................321

Kettner, William................................................................................... 155-6

Keuntz, Oscar O.

Columbia River 308 Report........................................................204

Kincaid Act ......................................................................................144, 155

5HVXOWHGLQ)DOO'DYLV5HSRUWRI .......................................144

Study storage dam and All-American Canal...............................143

Kings River ......................................................................307, 310, 323, 330

Acreage limitation.......................................................................346

)ORRGFRQWUROSHUFHQWIXQGHGE\IHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW..........346

Lake Buena Vista ........................................................................303

Reclamation and Corps struggle over construction ....................346

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ...................................................346

Kinzua Creek ...........................................................................................371

Kinzua Dam ......................................................................................... 371-2

Nine thousand acres of Seneca land was taken...........................384

Seneca Indians lose land.............................................................371

Kittrell, Clark ...........................................................................255, 257, 259

Klamath Project .......................................................................................315

Kutz, C. W................................................................................................120

Laguna Diversion Dam............................................................................143

Lahontan Dam

Spillway repair............................................................................406

Lake Case

)ORRGHG6LRX[ODQG .....................................................................291

Lake Hodges Dam......................................................................................80

Lake Itasca

Source of Mississippi....................................................................19

Lake Lynn ................................................................................................361

Lake Winnibigoshish ...........................................................................19, 20
567

Lane, E. W................................................................................................388

/DQH)UDQNOLQ

Secretary of the Interior ..............................................................106

Larkin, T. B. .............................................................................................255

/HH¶V)HUU\ ...............................................................................................152

Leighton, Marshall O.................................................................................34

Lock and Dam Number 15

Completed 1934..........................................................................374

Lodore Canyon.........................................................................................396

Long, Stephen H. .......................................................................................16

Los Angeles.......................................... 110, 130, 160-5, 169, 171, 178,301,

.......................................................................315, 321, 386, 390

Claims 550,000 acre feet of Colorado River water ....................161

Colorado River Aqueduct Association........................................162

Colorado River as water source..................................................161

Colorado River-to-Los Angeles aqueduct...................................161

)LOHGFODLPVWR&RORUDGR5LYHU...................................................162

Imperial Valley............................................................................161

Los Angeles Department of Water and Power............................162

Los Angeles River.......................................................................160

Mulholland, William...................................................................160

Owens River .......................................................................161, 315

Palo Verde ...................................................................................161

6W)UDQFLV'DP...........................................................................389

6W)UDQFLV'DPIDLOXUH ...............................................................389

State Water Project......................................................................347

Threatened future water rights claims of other states.................161

Los Angeles Department of Water and Power .........................................162

Los Angeles River....................................................................................160

/RZHU&ROXPELD)LVKHULHV3ODQ...............................................................226

Luce, Henry

)RUW3HFN'DP ............................................................................253

Lukesh, Gustave.......................................................................................204

Lux v. Haggin

Kern River...................................................................................311

Upheld riparian water rights .......................................................311

Wright Irrigation District Act......................................................311

Madden Dam....................................................................................364, 368

Panama Canal .............................................................................364

Magee, Clair.............................................................................................283

Magnusson, Carl E.

Supported high Grand Coulee.....................................................215
568

Mahan, Dennis Hart

Engineering textbook....................................................................12

Maillart, Robert....................................................................................74, 83

Main Control Plan............................................................................224, 226

Columbia River Comprehensive Plan.........................................224

Mainstream dams

Common in the twentieth century.................................................89

Low built across wide stretches of river .......................................90

Marble Canyon Dam................................................................................409

Markham, Edward M.

Chief of Engineers during Tygart Dam design ...........................363

Marshall Plan

Irrigation, navigation, power ......................................................321

Kern River...................................................................................321

Large dam on upper Sacramento ................................................320

Moved toward large Central Valley Project................................320

2SSRVHGE\3DFL¿F*DVDQG(OHFWULF..........................................321

Opposed by private power companies........................................321

Stanislaus River ..........................................................................321

Supplanted by other ideas using similar ideas............................321

Supported by California State Irrigation Association.................321

:DWHUWR/RV$QJHOHVDQG6DQ)UDQFLVFR....................................321

Marshall, Robert

Marshall Plan ..............................................................................320

Martin, Charles .................................................................................. 209-10

Martin, Clarence

Grand Coulee construction .........................................................217

Mason City...............................................................................................218

Massive tradition of dam building

Amount of material.......................................................................58

Analysis of the relationship between

“gravity” and “arch” ........................................................59

Built along a curved axis like an arch dam...................................58

Dam design ...................................................................................49

Distinction between massive and structural..................................58

Large amounts of construction material .......................................59

Nineteenth-century gravity dam technology.................................59

Often expensive ............................................................................59

Matthes, Gerard........................................................................................119

Maxwell, George........................................................................................28

Irrigation advocate ........................................................................26

National Irrigation Association.....................................................26
569

McAlpine, William

Board for Tygart Dam construction ........................................ 365-6

0F&DOO)HUU\'DP..................................................................91, 114-6, 118

Construction method...................................................................115

Cooper, Hugh..............................................................................115

Low gravity dam made of unreinforced concrete.......................115

Structural type that became characteristic of

mainstem dams ..............................................................115

0F&DOO)HUU\+\GURHOHFWULFSRZHUSODQW

Susquehanna River .....................................................................114

0F&DOO)HUU\3RZHU&RPSDQ\ ................................................................114

McKay, Douglas

Approves Echo Park Dam...........................................................398

Echo Park Dam issue ..................................................................397

Inherits Echo Park Dam issue.....................................................397

McNary, Charles ................................................................ 209-10, 217, 228

Running mate with Wendell Wilkie............................................227

Mead, Elwood .......................................................................108, 211, 217

Approved work with small scale models......................................77

At Grand Coulee site...................................................................213

Columbia Basin Project ..............................................................208

Death in 1936..............................................................................218

Multiple arch dam studied ..........................................................211

Mead, Warren J. ................................................................................... 263-4

&RQVXOWVRQ)RUW3HFN'DP ........................................................363

)RUW3HFN'DP ............................................................................363

Tygart Dam .................................................................................363

Mechanization of agriculture .......................................................................2

Meigs, Montgomery.................................................................................115

Meramec Basin Project

National Environmental Policy Act ............................................411

Meramec Park Dam .................................................................................411

Meramec River.........................................................................................411

Merced River ...........................................................................................303

Merrill, William E................................................................................17, 18

Merriman, Thaddeus .................................................................... 261, 263-4

Consultant on Colorado River Aqueduct....................................263

Consultant to Metropolitan Water District of Southern California263

Consultant to Tennessee Valley Authority on Norris Dam .........263

Metropolitan Water District of

Southern California........................160, 163, 165, 169, 263

Colorado River ambitions...................................................179, 181
570

Colorado River Aqueduct ...........................................................181

Could impose property taxes ......................................................165

Established in 1927 using state legislation .................................164

Imperial Valley............................................................................405

Included many small cities .........................................................163

Legality of...................................................................................165

Organized to build the Colorado Aqueduct ................................169

Parker Dam .................................................................................181

Ruled constitutionally valid........................................................165

To build Colorado River Aqueduct.............................................164

Mexico .........................................................1, 114, 135, 136, 139, 158, 425

Colorado River salinity...............................................................405

Salinity issues .............................................................................405

Treaty with United States (1944)................................................405

Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District ...........................................405

Miami Conservancy District....................................................................371

Begins construction in 1918 .......................................................357

Dayton area.................................................................................357

Established in 1915.....................................................................357

)LYHODUJHUHVHUYRLUV....................................................................357

)ORRGRI................................................................................57

)ORRGVRI ............................................................................357

Middlebrooks, Thomas ............................................................259, 265, 268

Milk River Project......................................................................................98

Mill power..................................................................................................83

'HSHQGHQWXSRQWKHYDJDULHVRIULYHUÀRZ...................................83

Local .............................................................................................83

Low dams......................................................................................84

Required mechanical transmission ...............................................83

Miller & Lux............................................................................307, 310, 311

Ali Haggin...................................................................................311

Lux v. Haggin..............................................................................311

Riparian water rights...................................................................311

Milner Dam................................................................................................26

Minneapolis.................................................................. 18-20, 115, 353, 374

Mississippi River .................................................................................13, 19

Basin ...............................................................................................1

%DVLQÀRRGV.................................................................................356

Comprehensive planning ............................................................470

Cooper, Hugh L. .................................................................115, 116

Lakes-to-the-Gulf........................................................................451

Mississippi River Commission .....................................18, 203, 238
571

Missouri River ............................................................................235

Navigation.......................................................................15, 17, 313

Powell, J. Wesley, explores...........................................................24

Private dams on.............................................................................37

Reservoirs recommended..............................................................19

Survey of reservoir sites ...............................................................26

Wisner, George Y., work on ..........................................................97

Mississippi River 

)ORRGFRQWURO...............................................................................388

0LVVLVVLSSL5LYHUÀRRGRI...............................................................111

Mississippi River Power Company of Boston.........................................116

0LVVRXUL5LYHUÀRRGRI...................................................................288

Missouri Basin Interagency Committee...................................................282

Pick, Lewis A..............................................................................282

Sloan, William ............................................................................282

Missouri River ..........................228, 235, 237, 245-6, 249, 269,273, 275-7,

........................................................... 279-80, 292, 293, 411

308 Report...........................................................121, 204, 236, 237

Amount of water not remarkable................................................235

Big, unique, and temperamental .................................................235

Effects of Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program on .....................292

)ORRGLQJ............................................ 26, 27, 269-70, 279, 283, 292

)RUW3HFN'DP ............................245, 249, 251, 263, 268, 272, 461

Garrison Dam......................................................284, 288, 425, 462

Indians lose lands to dams ..........................................................385

Lewis and Clark expedition ........................................................236

Mapping of the river ...................................................................236

Missouri River Basin Compact...................................................284

Missouri River Division..............................................................283

Missouri River States Committee...............................275, 279, 284

Missouri Valley Authority..................228, 273, 275-6, 278-80, 283

Mouth near St. Louis ..................................................................235

Navigable below Yankton, South Dakota ...................................235

Oahe Dam ...........................................................................385, 425

Pick, Lewis A..............................................................................269

Pick Plan of the Corps ........................................269, 270, 278, 288

Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program...................................292, 424

Sixteenth greatest watershed in the world ..................................235

Sloan, William Glenn..................................................................269

Missouri River 308 report

Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors................................238

Chief of Engineers ......................................................................238
572

&RQVWUXFWLRQRIDKXJHGDPDW)RUW3HFN0RQWDQD ...................237

House Committee on Rivers and Harbors ..................................238

Mississippi River Commission ...................................................238

Separate studies of each of

the twenty-three major tributaries..................................237

Missouri River Authority

Supported by President Truman..................................................278

Missouri River Basin Compact................................................................284

Missouri River Division...........................................................................283

0LVVRXUL5LYHUÀRRG .......................................................................283

Missouri River States Committee ............................................275, 281, 284

Missouri River Basin Compact...................................................284

Missouri River States Committee...............................................279

Recommends Missouri River Basin Compact............................284

Missouri Valley Authority

Hoover Commission opposition .................................................281

Magee, Clair supports.................................................................283

Murray, James Edward ...............................................................275

Not to be jeopardized by Pick-Sloan program............................276

Proponents hostile to Lewis A. Pick ...........................................283

Rankin, John Elliot .....................................................................283

Supported by James Murray .......................................................281

Missouri-Souris reclamation project........................................................281

)RUW3HFNUHVHUYRLUZDWHU............................................................281

Never funded...............................................................................287

Project dropped...........................................................................283

Monongahela River.....................................16, 353-5, 362, 370, 371, 466-9

Drought of 1930..........................................................................361

Montana .............................................................................................29, 226

Colorado Doctrine.........................................................................10

Delano Heights ...........................................................................255

Early hydroelectric power.............................................................36

)RUW3HFN.....................................................................................255

)RUW3HFN'DP ........................ 237, 239, 245, 253, 255-6, 424, 461

)RUW3HFN'DPVOLGH....................................................................256

)RUW5DQGDOO'DP.......................................................................292

)UDQNOLQ'5RRVHYHOWYLVLWV)RUW3HFN'DPVLWH........................256

Gallatin River..............................................................................235

Garrison Dam..............................................................................282

Gibson Dam ..........................................................................74, 462

Jefferson River............................................................................235

Lower Yellowstone Project.........................................................451
573

Madison River.............................................................................235

Milk River Project ........................................................................98

0LVVRXUL5LYHUÀRRGFRQWURO.......................................................292

Missouri Valley Authority...........................................................275

New Deal ....................................................................................255

Origin of the Missouri River.......................................................235

Park Grove ..................................................................................255

Pick, Lewis A..............................................................................269

Pick Plan of the Corps ........................................................269, 270

Square Deal.................................................................................255

Sun River ......................................................................................74

Sun River Project..........................................................................74

7KUHH)RUNV.................................................................................235

Wheeler (town of).......................................................................255

Wilson (town of) .......................................................................255

Moore, Douglas........................................................................................256

Moore, George Holmes

Gravity dam design.......................................................................56

Morgan, Arthur E.

Chairman of TVA board..............................................................362

0RUPRQ)ODW'DP....................................................................................107

Mormon irrigation

City Creek in Salt Lake City.........................................................22

Precedent for later pioneers ..........................................................22

Small projects ...............................................................................22

Morris, Robert M. ....................................................................................371

Morrison-Knudsen ...................................................................................171

Movable dams............................................................................................17

Replacement................................................................................373

Muir, John ....................................................................................35, 36, 191

Columbia as a wild river.............................................................191

Hetch Hetchy ................................................................................35

Views on conservation..................................................................31

Mulholland, William................................................................................390

/RV$QJHOHV2ZHQV9DOOH\DTXHGXFW..........................................161

Owens River ...............................................................................161

Multiple arch dams ....................................................................................79

John S. Eastwood..........................................................................79

Least expensive designs................................................................81

Still in service ...............................................................................79
574

Multiple-purpose dams

Early twentieth century.................................................................89

Mission of Corps 1900..................................................................89

Multiple-purpose river development..........................................................32

Multipurpose debate...................................................................................91

Broaden historic missions.............................................................91

Mundt, Karl E. .........................................................................................385

Murray, James Edward.............................................................275, 276, 281

Muscle Shoals .................................................. 37, 111, 113-4, 117-9, 133

Burgess, Harry ............................................................................117

Cooper, Hugh L., assigned to design by Corps...........................118

Corps hydroelectric plant a completely new venture..................117

)RUG+HQU\ELGVWREX\ .............................................................114

)RUGZLWKGUDZVELGRIIHU ............................................................114

Hugh L. Cooper & Co.................................................................118

Nitrate plant ................................................................................117

Raised issue of public power ......................................................111

World War I caused national controversy ...................................111

Muscle Shoals Dam

See Wilson Dam

Abundant, inexpensive electric power........................................111

Early name of Wilson Dam...........................................................37

Nitrate production.......................................................................111

Muscle Shoals Inquiry Commission ........................................................114

Muskingum River ..............................................................................16, 371

Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District

7RWDORIÀRRGFRQWUROGDPV....................................................371

MWAK

Atkinson-Kier Company.............................................................213

Consolidated Builders Incorporated (CBI).................................219

Mason, Walsh Construction Company........................................213

Nashville District .......................................................................................91

National Conservation Convention..........................................................132

National Dam Inspection Act (1972) .......................................................407

National Dam Inspection Program...........................................................407

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (1969)........................401, 411

Citizen participation....................................................................401

Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) .................................401

Environmental impact statements...............................................401

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ...................................402

NEPA process..............................................................................401

Tool to slow down or impede construction.................................401
575

National Industrial Recovery Act

Bonneville Dam ..........................................................................194

National Irrigation Association............................................................26, 28

National Park Service ..............................................................183, 395, 396

Opposed Echo Park Dam............................................................396

National Parks Association ......................................................................398

Opposed Echo Park Dam............................................................398

National Waterways Commission..............................................................34

1DWLRQDO:LOGOLIH)HGHUDWLRQ............................................................393, 395

Native American

Chippewa Indians affected............................................................20

Damages paid................................................................................20

)LVKHULHV........................................................................................20

:LOGULFH¿HOGV..............................................................................20

Native Americans

Concerned about Columbia River salmon..................................393

Navajo Dam

Seepage .......................................................................................406

Navigation

See River navigation ...................................................................110

Navigation improvements

General Survey Act.....................................................................355

Nebraska ............................................................................................29, 269

California Doctrine .........................................................................9

North Platte Project...............................................................98, 451

Only state wholly in the Missouri Basin.....................................276

Pick Plan of the Corps ................................................................270

Wyoming Doctrine........................................................................10

Nevada ............................................................................. 26, 29, 157-8, 175

Carson River Project...................................................................451

Colorado River............................................................................136

Hoover Dam.................... 109, 133, 148-9, 169, 177, 219, 386, 425

Lahontan Dam.............................................................................406

Newlands Project ..................................................................97, 451

Truckee River Project .................................................................451

New Deal .................133, 165, 180, 217, 253, 269, 306, 387, 424, 430, 453

New Deal, Montana .................................................................................255

New Mexico...................................................................10, 26, 29, 135, 137

Colorado River Compact ............................................................158

Colorado River Storage Project ..................................................395

Colorado River System...............................................................157

Elephant Butte Dam............................................107, 143, 425, 461
576

Navajo Dam ................................................................................406

Rio Grande River........................................................................451

San Juan River ............................................................................135

1HZHOO)UHGHULFN+D\QHV.......................................25, 27-8, 30, 65, 92-107

$VVRFLDWLRQZLWK)UDQFLV*1HZODQGV.........................................28

Becomes director ..........................................................................94

'LVPLVVHGE\)UDQNOLQ/DQH .......................................................106

Drawn to the construction of huge structures .............................106

)LQDQFLDOSUREOHPVRI5HFODPDWLRQ ............................................106

)LUVW&KLHI(QJLQHHU......................................................................30

Huge structures as symbols of safety..........................................106

Huge structures as symbols of Reclamation’s ability .................106

Irrigation in the United States.......................................................28

Lingered on until 1914................................................................106

Original hopes and ambitions for Reclamation lost....................106

Original repayment terms should be enforced............................105

Political character of dam building.............................................131

Resignation ..................................................................... 107-8, 206

USGS, Chief Hydrographer..........................................................28

Newlands Act .................................................................................29, 450

See Reclamation Act

1HZODQGV)UDQFLV*.............................26, 28-9, 33-4, 98, 358, 450, 452-3

Waterways Commission..............................................................453

Newlands Project .......................................................................................97

Newlands waterways bill .........................................................................452

1RHW]OL)UHG ...................................................................... 72, 74, 76, 78-81

Additional rigor and safety ...........................................................80

Analysis of Eastwood work ..........................................................80

Arch compression stresses............................................................80

Curved dam has greater resistance to overturning than

straight dam .....................................................................72

Curved Dams as Cylinder Hoofs ..................................................71

Death...........................................................................................211

(GXFDWLRQDWWKH)HGHUDO7HFKQLFDO,QVWLWXWHLQ=XULFK .................78

Mass did not mean safety but form,

properly conceived, did ...................................................72

Mountain Dell Dam studies ..........................................................81

On arch dams ...................................................................70-2, 76-8

Safety in gravity dams ..................................................................71

Stevenson Creek Test Dam ...........................................................77

Three types of curved dams..........................................................72

Trial-load analysis...............................................................211, 366
577

Norris Dam...............................................................................................362

5HFODPDWLRQFUHDWHV¿QDOSODQVIRU79$ ....................................362

Norris, George .................................................................................91, 203

Opposes sale of Muscle Shoals...................................................114

TVA...............................................................................91, 276, 358

North Dakota........................................................................................10, 29

California Doctrine .......................................................................10

Elbowoods ..................................................................................279

Garrison Dam.......................................................278-9, 283-4, 287

0LVVRXUL5LYHUÀRRGFRQWURO.......................................................292

Missouri-Souris reclamation project...........................281, 284, 287

Pick, Lewis A

And Indians....................................................................279

North Platte Project............................................................................98, 425

Oahe Dam ........................................................................................277, 288

Loss of Indian land .....................................................................385

Standing Rock Sioux Reservation lost land................................385

Ohio River..................................................................................................14

308 Report...........................................................................121, 356

Corps of Engineers......................................................................313

Dams mostly for navigation........................................................353

)ORRGLQJKLVWRU\..........................................................................356

)ORRGV..........................................................................................353

)ORRGVRIDQG ...........................................................353

Gallipolis locks and dam.............................................................374

Historic dams in basin.................................................................466

Long, Stephen H. ..........................................................................16

0LDPL5LYHUÀRRG...........................................................357

Movable dams on..........................................................................18

Navigation.....................................................................17, 313, 355

Navigation after 1865 ...................................................................17

Navigation modernized by .........................................................373

Nine foot channel by 1929..........................................................372

Nine foot channel complete ........................................................372

Ohio River Commission ...............................................................18

Opposition to dams .......................................................................17

Shallow-draft steamboats............................................................355

Slackwater locks and dams...........................................................16

Snags.............................................................................................16

Statistics on the river...................................................................353

7UDI¿FLQFUHDVHWR .....................................................373

Transportation on........................................................................353
578

Tygart Dam .................................................................................353

William E. Merrill proposals ........................................................18

Wing dams ....................................................................................16

2KLR5LYHUÀRRGRI .........................................................................356

Oklahoma.............................................................................................10, 29

California Doctrine .........................................................................9

O’Mahoney, Joseph C.

Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program

introduced to Senate .................................. 273-5, 279, 281

Oregon................................................................................29, 205, 208, 209

Bonneville Dam ..................................................................203, 210

California Doctrine .......................................................................10

Corps created an outdoor hydraulic

laboratory in Portland ....................................................196

)LUVWK\GURHOHFWULFGDPZDVFRPSOHWHGDW2UHJRQ&LW\ .............458

Hydroelectric power generation....................................................36

Hydropower network ..................................................................226

Klamath Project ..................................................................315, 451

Owyhee Dam ........................................75, 109, 178, 425, 430, 463

Umatilla Project ..........................................................................451

Orland Project .......................................................................................315

East Park Dam ............................................................................315

Stony Creek.................................................................................315

Stony Gorge Dam .......................................................................316

O’Sullivan, James

Columbia Basin Commission .....................................................208

Grand Coulee ..............................................................................208

Owens River.....................................................................................161, 315

Owyhee Dam ..............75, 82, 91, 109, 178, 199, 212, 425, 430-2, 463-4

Heavy arch design.........................................................................82

Tallest dam in the world..............................................................430

3DFL¿F&RQVWUXFWRUV,QF

+LUH)UDQN&URZHWRVXSHUYLVHZRUNDW6KDVWD'DP..................334

3DFL¿F*DVDQG(OHFWULF .....................................................................36, 321

3DFNDUG)UHG0

National Parks Association .........................................................398

Page, John ........................................................................................331, 342

Page, R. J. B.............................................................................................283

Palo Verde Valley.....................................................................138, 157, 161

Panama Canal

Gatun Dam..................................................................................193

Madden Dam...............................................................................364
579

Park Grove, Montana...............................................................................255

Parker Dam ..............................................................................................181

Parker, Theodore

Had rights to tainter gates ...........................................................375

3DWK¿QGHU'DP ................................................65, 67, 70, 91, 97, 116, 146,

................................................... 184, 425, 431-2, 445, 455

Pelletreau, Albert

Constant-angle arch dams ............................................................61

Phelan, James D.........................................................................................35

Phoenix .....................................................................21-2, 99-102, 181, 387

Physical testing of dams.............................................................................76

Pick, Lewis A.

Retired from Corps in 1953 ........................................................287

Returns to Missouri Basin...........................................................278

Pick Plan of the Corps

Pick’s plan was in place by 1964................................................291

Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program

Corps and Reclamation differ on capacity

of Garrison Dam ............................................................282

)ORRG&RQWURO%LOORI..........................................................276

Not to jeopardize Missouri Valley Authority..............................276

Reybold, E. .................................................................................271

Young, Milton R. ........................................................................279

Pinchot, Gifford ...........................................................................32, 35, 106

3LQH)ODW'DP ..........................................................................................330

Acreage limitation.......................................................................346

Built by Corps.............................................................................346

Reclamation and Corps struggle over construction ....................346

Pine River.................................................................................................. 19

Pit River ..................................................................................................303

Pittsburgh ..............................................16, 18, 110, 353-4, 356, 362, 370-2

)ORRGFRQWURO...............................................................................371

)ORRGRI..............................................................110, 356, 358

)ORRGRI..............................................................................371

)ORRGSURWHFWLRQ..................................................................362, 370

)ORRGVRIDQG ............................................................353

3LWWVEXUJK)ORRG&RPPLVVLRQ.....................................................356

3URWHFWLRQRIQLQHKLJKÀRRGFRQWUROGDPV...............................354

Pittsburgh District ........................................................................ 361, 363-4

Plank, Ewart G.

7RZQPDQDJHUDW)RUW3HFN ........................................................256

3RNHJDPD)DOOV..........................................................................................19
580

Political character of dam-building..........................................................131

Portland Hydraulic Laboratory of the Corps

Construction design issues at Bonneville Dam...........................196

Did some 100 model studies.......................................................196

)XQFWLRQWUDQVIHUUHGWR9LFNVEXUJLQ .................................196

Kaplan turbine tests ....................................................................195

Potter, William E.

Integrates Missouri River dams through computers...................286

Powell, John Wesley ................................................................23, 24, 30, 92

1868 on Grand and Green.............................................................24

1869 in Grand Canyon..................................................................24

1869 on Colorado..........................................................................24

1871 in Grand Canyon..................................................................24

1893 National Irrigation Congress................................................25

Irrigation Survey...........................................................................25

Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of

the United States..............................................................24

Resigned from USGS....................................................................25

Spokesman for development of the West’s water resources.........24

Union Army ..................................................................................24

Powell, R. G.

Meeting about Tygart delay ........................................................369

3UR¿OHRIHTXDOUHVLVWDQFH .....................................................52-4, 56-7, 464

Gileppe Dam.................................................................................54

Vyrnwy Dam.................................................................................54

Progressive Era ..........................................................................................31

Conservation .................................................................................31

Public Works Administration

Cooke, Morris L..........................................................................364

Grand Coulee allotment..............................................................216

Puls, Louis................................................................................................184

Puzzolan cement ......................................................................................197

Reduced heat of hydration ..........................................................199

Pyle, Ernie

)RUW3HFN'DP ............................................................................253

Quaker Bridge Dam ...................................................................................89

Ralston, William .................................................................... 23, 307-8, 310

Rampart Dam...........................................................................................410

Block salmon migration..............................................................410

Cancelled by Lyndon B. Johnson Administration ......................410

Electricity for six million people ................................................410

Inundate 11,000 square miles .....................................................410
581

Inundate waterfowl-producing habitat........................................410

Yukon River ................................................................................410

Rankin, John Elliot...................................................................................283

Rankine, W. J. M.

&RQ¿UPVZRUNRIGH6D]LOO\¶VDQG'HORFUH ..................................54

“Middle third”...............................................................................54

Raritan River 308 report ..........................................................................121

Reclamation Act.....................................................26, 29, 32, 105, 180, 450

Depression caused rethinking of government projects...............132

June 17, 1902 ................................................................................29

Newlands Act................................................................................29

No provision for hydropower .......................................................32

Repayment of costs.......................................................................29

Residents opposed increased construction costs.........................105

State governments would play no role in the program’s 

implementation ................................................................29

Reclamation Project Act of 1939 .............................................................269

Red River Gorge

Dam opposed there .....................................................................411

5HG5LYHU*RUJH/HJDO'HIHQVH)XQG........................................411

5HG5LYHU*RUJH/HJDO'HIHQVH)XQG.....................................................411

Refuse Act..................................................................................................20

Reilly, Thomas L......................................................................................371

Reinforced concrete ...................................................................................83

Reactions to by designers .............................................................83

Slow design change ......................................................................83

Report on the Physics and Hydraulics of the Mississippi River..............111

Reybold, E........................................................................................ 272-275

Chief of Engineers ......................................................................271

Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program...........................................271

Rise of the steamboat.................................................................................13

Ritter, J. R. ...............................................................................................388

River and harbor projects

&RUSVÀRRGFRQWUROZRUN ..............................................................14

CVP authorized 1935..................................................................329

Effect of Gibbons v. Ogden case...................................................14

)HGHUDOSURMHFWVLQFUHDVH...............................................................17

1REHQH¿WVWR:HVW .......................................................................26

Value 1802-1823...........................................................................13

River basins

Economic development plans .......................................................32
582

River navigation.......................6, 32-3, 38, 91, 113, 117, 119, 383-4, 387-8

308 Report Tennessee ............................................................. 119-0

308 reports .......................................................111, 120-1, 237, 356

Attention shifts to other uses ......................................................400

Bureau of Reclamation ...............................................................269

California controls water ............................................................317

California Water Plan..................................................................324

Colorado River....................................................................137, 181

Columbia River....................... 191-2, 196, 202, 204, 207, 209, 223

&RQÀLFWVZLWKZDWHUPLOOV...............................................................6

&RUSVDVVLJQHGÀRRGFRQWURO.........................................................34

Corps control navigation.............................................................317

Corps focus in early Republic.......................................................13

Corps reconcile power and navigability .......................................38

Corps responsibility in Nineteenth Century................................110

Costs for 308 reports...................................................................111

Early 1800s Corps mostly removed snags and

deepened channels .....................................................15, 16

Early Corps work..........................................................................12

East coast rivers ..............................................................................5

)HGHUDOQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\GDPVIRUQDYLJDWLRQRQO\ ..................89

)HGHUDO2ULJLQV ...........................................................................3, 4

)HGHUDOSROLF\ .................................................................................5

)HGHUDOVXSHUYLVLRQRIK\GURSRZHU ............................................113

)HGHUDO:DWHU3RZHU$FWRI...............................................113

)ORRG&RQWURO$FW....................................................314, 358

)ORRGFRQWUROFRQÀLFWV................................................................354

)ORRGFRQWUROUHVSRQVLELOLW\DGGHGLQWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\ ............110

Gibbons v. Ogden..........................................................................13

Inland Waterways Commission ..............................................33, 34

Interference of hydropower ..........................................................37

Interstate commerce......................................................................14

Keokuk Dam.........................................................................91, 353

Mississippi River ................................ 13, 15, 19-20, 313, 353, 355

Missouri River ..................235, 237-8, 269, 272, 274-5, 282, 291-2

Modernization of the Ohio...................................................... 372-3

Monongahela River.....................................................................361

Navigation...................................................................................371

Ohio River........................................13-5, 17-8, 313, 353, 355, 372

Ohio River 308 report.................................................................356

Ohio River after the Civil War......................................................17

Ohio River slackwater system 1830s............................................16
583

Pick’s plan was in place by 1964................................................291

Reclamation Project Act of 1939................................................269

Refuse dumping in rivers..............................................................20

Riparian rights and..........................................................................6

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1826 ...................................................14

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1852 ...................................................16

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 ...................................................20

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1909 ...................................................34

Rivers and Harbors Acts of 1890 and 1899 ..................................37

Sacramento River.........................304, 312-4, 316-7, 320, 324, 329

Snagboats....................................................................................355

Steamboat case..............................................................................13

Survey of rivers by Corps .............................................................91

Tennessee River ..................................................................359, 360

TVA threat to Corps ....................................................................356

Tygart Dam .................................................................353, 363, 367

Tygart Dam drought in 1939.......................................................371

7\JDUW'DPÀRRGVLQ .........................................................371

Upper Mississippi River .............................................373, 374, 376

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers .....................................................89

Wilson Dam ..................................................................................91

Rivers and Harbors Act

)LUVW ...............................................................................................14

Rivers and Harbors Act (1826)

Model for Corps legislation ..........................................................15

Rivers and Harbors Act (1866) ..................................................................17

Rivers and Harbors Acts of 1890 and 1899

Congress permits dams .................................................................37

General Dam Act of 1906 .............................................................38

Rivers and Harbors Acts of 1890 and 1899 ..................................37

Rivers and Harbors Act (1899)

Refuse Act.....................................................................................20

Regulate dam construction............................................................37

Rivers and Harbors Act (1920)

7HQQHVVHHÀRRGSURWHFWLRQ..........................................................119

Rivers and Harbors Act (1925)

&RUSVDQG)3&WRHVWLPDWHFRVWRIFRPSUHKHQVLYH

surveys of river ..............................................................120

Rivers and Harbors Act (1927)

Authorized 308 reports ...............................................................358

Rivers and Harbors Act (1935)

Authorized Grand Coulee ...........................................................217
584

Rivers and Harbors Committee..................................................................33

Roberts, William Milnor ............................................................................17

Navigation on the Ohio ................................................................17

Rock Island ..............................................................................................374

Rock Island Dam......................................................................................192

Rock Island Rapids ..................................................................................192

Rockwood, Charles

Imperial Valley development ......................................................138

Roller gates ..............................................................................................374

American style submersible roller gate ......................................374

Description..................................................................................374

Roosevelt Dam............................65, 84, 89-92, 98-107, 115, 146, 193, 365

40 miles from the railroad...........................................................101

Apache Trail............................................................................ 101-2

Cement mill.................................................................................102

Completed in 1911......................................................................103

Completely paid off in 1956 .......................................................106

Construction methods .................................................................102

Contract out work .......................................................................102

Cost-overruns..............................................................................104

Costs exceeded original estimates ..............................................104

Diversion tunnel..........................................................................102

Electric power system.................................................................104

+HDY\ÀRRGLQJ............................................................................103

Hydroelectric power component.................................................132

Hydropower plant to generate electricity for

construction equipment..................................................102

,QÀDWLRQ.......................................................................................104

John M. O’Rourke & Company..................................................102

Low bid of $1,147,000................................................................103

Masonry curved gravity design ..................................................100

Mimic major structures of the East.............................................100

One of the West’s best reservoir sites .........................................106

Power canal, Roosevelt Dam......................................................102

Contracting ....................................................................102

System 19-miles long ....................................................102

Powerplant ..................................................................................107

Prelude to the big dam era ............................................................84

Reclamation builds own cement mill..........................................103

Remote location ..........................................................................101

Residents expressed dissatisfaction with Reclamation...............105

Residents opposed increased construction costs.........................105
585

Residents tried to reduce repayment requirements.....................105

Unrealistic expectations and inexperience..................................104

5RRVHYHOW)UDQNOLQ'.................. 92, 119, 133, 135, 179, 180, 193-6, 202,

................ 208-10,214, 216, 222, 228, 238, 253, 259

...........264, 272-8, 306, 328-9, 361-2, 364, 373, 396

At Grand Coulee site...................................................................213

Central planning..........................................................................193

Columbia as economic vehicle ...................................................191

Dedicates Bonneville Dam .........................................................191

Dedicates Bonneville Dam in 1937 ............................................201

Dedicates Hoover Dam...............................................................179

([SUHVVHVFRQFHUQDERXWVDIHW\RI)RUW3HFNDIWHUVOLGH.............259

Muscle Shoals.............................................................................119

Supports Bonneville Dam...........................................................210

Roosevelt, Theodore ...........................................27-9, 31-3, 90-1, 100, 105,

 .................................................... 132, 140-1, 204, 358

Articulated multipurpose nature of rivers.....................................90

Broaden historic missions.............................................................91

Conservation message to Congress (1907)...................................31

Interest water conservation ...........................................................29

Largest steamboat parade in history ...........................................115

Muir, John ...............................................................................35, 37

National Conservation Convention at the White House.............132

5HIXVHVWR¿JKWÀRRGLQJRI,PSHULDO9DOOH\...............................140

Ruckelshaus, William

Director of EPA...........................................................................402

Sacramento River......................................................... 110, 302-5, 310, 313

Dabney, T. G. ....................................................................................

Effects of hydraulic mining techniques ......................................313

)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI..........................................................358

)ORRGFRQWUROSODQ.......................................................................313

Navigable stream ........................................................................313

Navigation...................................................................................313

Navigation concerns ......................................313-7, 319-21, 323-5,

........................................ 329-0, 335, 338, 345

Thomas H. Jackson.....................................................................314

Sacramento River Valley........................ 22, 302, 310, 313, 316-7, 319, 321

Wheat culture............................................................................ 22-3

6DFUDPHQWR6DQ-RDTXLQ5LYHU'HOWD.......................................................303

Salmon Creek Dam....................................................................................70

Juneau, Alaska ..............................................................................61
586

Salt River ......................................................21-2, 89, 95, 99-100, 102, 107

Watershed....................................................................................107

Salt River Project ..............................................................74, 97-100, 104-7

Almost all land in private hands in 1903 ....................................100

Completion of Roosevelt Dam not timely or economical ..........100

Horse Mesa Dam ........................................................................107

0RUPRQ)ODW'DP ......................................................................107

2QHRI5HFODPDWLRQ¶V¿UVWPDMRUSURMHFWV ..................................100

2QHRIWKH5HFODPDWLRQ6HUYLFH¶V¿UVW¿YH

authorized projects...........................................................99

Stewart Mountain Dam...............................................................107

Struggle with the Water Users’ Association

over repayment ...............................................................99

Salt River Valley ......................................................................100, 103, 105

Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association ...............................99, 105, 106

Salton Sea............................................................................................. 141-2

6DQ)UDQFLVFR

HDUWKTXDNHDQG¿UH...............................................................35

6DQ)UDQFLVTXLWR9DOOH\

6W)UDQFLV'DP...........................................................................390

San Joaquin & Kings River Canal and Irrigation

Company (SJ&KRC&IC)..............................................307

Brereton, Richard................................................................307, 308

Miller & Lux...............................................................................307

San Joaquin & Kings River Canal Company..............................307

San Joaquin & Kings River Canal Company

Bensley, John ..............................................................................307

Miller & Lux...............................................................................307

San Joaquin River ............................................. 1, 23, 76, 303-11, 319, 321,

.....................................................323-4, 326, 342-4, 347

San Juan River .........................................................................................135

Sandy Lake.................................................................................................19

Navigation lock.............................................................................19

Savage, John (Jack) L. ................................75-6, 78, 146, 149-51,184, 211,

....................................................... 213, 219-20, 364

Consulted for Tygart Dam design...............................................364

Design engineer ..........................................................................146

Revised Weymouth’s design of Hoover......................................149

Schley, Julian

Chief of Engineers ......................................................................264
587

Schuyler, James D......................................................................................99

+\GUDXOLF¿OOFRQVWUXFWLRQ ..........................................................241

Sweetwater Dam...........................................................................61

6FLHQWL¿FIRUHVWU\SUDFWLFHV........................................................................31

Shasta Dam ..............................................................................................384

Aggregate supplied under separate contract ...............................333

Concrete gravity dam..................................................................330

Construction begins 1938 ...................................................333, 341

Construction methodology..........................................................335

Construction schedule.................................................................341

Conveyor belt system to deliver sand and gravel .......................333

Embankment design considered .................................................331

Hydropower ................................................................................341

Keener, Kenneth on design .........................................................331

Last bucket of concrete 1945......................................................341

3DFL¿F&RQVWUXFWRUV,QFUHFHLYHFRQWUDFW...................................334

Powerhouse.................................................................................326

Primary construction contract in 1938........................................333

6WDWHVHHNVPRQH\IURP)HGHUDO(PHUJHQF\$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ

of Public Works..............................................................329

Water storage begins 1944..........................................................341

Shingler, Donald G. .................................................................................283

Shoshone Dam

See Buffalo Bill Dam

Shoshone Project................................................................................98, 425

Shreve, Henry M........................................................................................15

Sierra Club .......................................................................182, 395, 398, 411

Sierra Nevada.................................................22, 35, 80, 156, 302, 303, 315

Sioux City ................................................................................................270

Six Companies Inc. ..................................................................................171

Slackwater

Navigation......................................................................... 16-8, 372

Slater, Willis A. ..........................................................................................81

Stevenson Creek Test Dam .....................................................78, 81

Sloan, William Glenn................................................................... 273-6, 281

Missouri-Souris reclamation project...........................................281

Studies Missouri Basin for Reclamation ............................269, 273

Smoot, Reed

Utah Power and Light Company ................................................166

Snag removal .............................................................................................15

Snag removal and channel deepening

Early Nineteenth Century .............................................................15
588

Snagboats ...................................................................................................16

Heliopolis......................................................................................15

Snake River

)LVKNLOOGXHWRORZÀRZV............................................................405

South Dakota........................................................................................10, 29

%HOOH)RXUFKH'DP.....................................................................146

California Doctrine .........................................................................9

Canyon Lake Dam ......................................................................406

Garrison Dam..............................................................................462

Missouri River ....................................................................235, 237

0LVVRXUL5LYHUÀRRGFRQWURO.......................................................292

Southern California Edison Company ...............................................76, 169

6RXWKHUQ3DFL¿F5DLOURDG ........................................................................141

)LJKWVÀRRGLQJRI,PSHULDO9DOOH\ ..............................................140

Spillway design........................................................................................287

Hathaway, Gail............................................................................287

Split Mountain Reservoir

See Echo Park Dam.....................................................................397

Spokane....................................................................................................206

Spring Valley Water Company...................................................................35

Square Deal, Montana..............................................................................255

St. Anthony, Minnesota..............................................................................19

6W)UDQFLV'DP............................................ 78, 370, 389-90, 406, 435, 437

)DLOXUH .......................................................................................389

William Mulholland....................................................................437

Stanislaus River .......................................................................................321

State Water Commission

Created in California 1914..........................................................320

“Steamboat Case” ......................................................................................13

Gibbons v. Ogden..........................................................................13

6WHLZHU)UHGHULFN ....................................................................................209

Stevenson Creek Test Dam .......................................................... 75-82, 389

Conclusions reached by the committee in late 1927.....................77

Extensive bibliography ends the report ........................................78

Stewart Mountain Dam............................................................................107

Stewart, Senator William

Opposed Irrigation Survey............................................................25

Stone and Webster of Boston

Consulting electrical power engineers........................................116

Stony Gorge Dam...............................................................................79, 316

/DUJHVFDOHÀDWVODEEXWWUHVVGDP.............................................316
589

Storage dams

Usually marked by height.............................................................89

Storage of seasonal waters

Kings River.................................................................................346

3LQH)ODW'DP .............................................................................346

Straus, Michael

Commissioner of Bureau of Reclamation...................................397

Supported Echo Park Dam..........................................................397

Strawberry Valley Project ........................................................................146

Structural dams ..........................................................................................50

Structural engineering

Begins with iron bridges...............................................................62

Structural tradition

Analysis of the relationship between

“gravity” and “arch” ........................................................59

Depends upon its shape.................................................................58

Distinction between massive and structural..................................58

)ODWVODEDQGPXOWLSOHDUFKEXWWUHVVGDPV....................................58

Multiple-arch dams.......................................................................58

Sturdevant, C. L. ......................................................................................259

Styer, Wilhelm D......................................................................................365

At Cove Creek Dam....................................................................362

%RDUGRIFRQVXOWDQWV)RU7\JDUW'DP.........................................365

Pittsburgh District Engineer........................................................362

Tygart Dam ............................................................................. 362-4

Approved .......................................................................363

Design....................................................................365, 367

Suisun Bay ...............................................................................................303

Sullivan, John L. ........................................................................................15

Sun River ...................................................................................................74

Susquehanna River...........................................................................114, 129

Swilling, “Jack”

Canal .............................................................................................22

Salt River Valley ...........................................................................22

Swing, Phil...............................................................................................166

Championed Colorado River storage dam..................................156

Colorado River Aqueduct Association........................................162

Imperial Valley............................................................................154

Most important and persistent political proponent of

Hoover Dam...................................................................154

National Irrigation Congress (1893)...........................................169

Pushed All-American Canal........................................................154
590

Pushed Boulder Canyon Project .................................................154

Swing-Johnson bills....................................................................154

Swing-Johnson Act ..................................................................................156

7KH¿UVWYHUVLRQ ..........................................................................156

Swing-Johnson Act of 1928.............................................................156, 162

)HDUWKDW&DOLIRUQLDGHVLUHGWRFRQWURO&RORUDGR5LYHU ..............157

Passed .......................................................................................169

Propaganda from the “Power Trust”...........................................169

6WURQJ¿QDQFLDOFRPPLWPHQWIURP/RV$QJHOHV........................160

Swing-Johnson bills.................................................................................154

Swing-Johnson bill...................................................................................158

Taft, William Howard

Appoints Richard Ballinger ..........................................................37

Tainter gates

Description..................................................................................375

Makes roller gates obsolete.........................................................375

Originated in the United States...................................................375

Proved reliable in the upper Mississippi.....................................376

Tainter, Jeremiah Burnham, patented a design ...........................375

Tainter, Jeremiah Burnham

Patented Tainter gate design .......................................................375

Tedesko, Anton ..........................................................................................83

Telford, Thomas

Early earthworks designer ..........................................................239

Tellico Dam

%HOO*ULI¿Q.................................................................................409

Dam was built .............................................................................409

Endangered Species Act..............................................................409

Exempted from Endangered Species Act....................................409

Little Tennessee River.................................................................408

6QDLOGDUWHUDQHQGDQJHUHG¿VK ..................................................409

TVA..........................................................................................................409

86)LVKDQG:LOGOLIH6HUYLFH....................................................409

Tennessee River ............................110-1, 114, 117, 119, 193, 277, 353, 356

308 report.............................................................. 121, 204, 358-61

Corps studies on the river .............................................................92

Cove Creek Dam.........................................................................360

([FOXGHGIURP)3&UHYLHZV.......................................................113

Muscle Shoals...............................................................................37

Norris Dam .................................................................................425

Snail darter..................................................................................409

Taken away from Corps..............................................................358
591

Tellico Project .............................................................................408

Wilson Dam ..................................................................89, 360, 363

Tennessee Valley Authority....... 3, 91-2, 119, 133, 203, 217, 222, 228, 263,

.....275-7, 281, 291, 356,359, 361-2, 408-9, 423

Built 26 dams..............................................................................383

)DWKHURI79$ ...............................................................................91

)LVNH+DUROG&............................................................................91

Tennessee Valley Authority Act ...............................................................362

Terzaghi, Karl ..................................................................................265, 268

Embankment designer.................................................................240

+\GUDXOLF¿OOFRQVWUXFWLRQ ..........................................................244

Teton Dam

)DLOXUH .........................................................................................391

National Dam Inspection Act in 1972.........................................407

Texas ........................................................................................................243

California Doctrine .........................................................................9

Denison Dam ..............................................................................470

Thayer, Sylvanus........................................................................................12

The Design and Construction of Dams

State of federal dams 1900............................................................89

Thin arch dam ............................................................................................58

Tocks Island

National Wild and Scenic Rivers System ..................................411

Tocks Island Dam ....................................................................................411

Tonto Dam

See Roosevelt Dam .......................................................................99

Tonto Dam site................................................................................... 99-101

Hydroelectric power component...................................................99

Remote location ..........................................................................101

Topock Dam.............................................................................................167

Topock, California

Damsite .......................................................................................167

Totten, Joseph G.........................................................................................15

Tourlotte, Eugene.....................................................................................257

Trial-load method of dam analysis......................................... 73, 184, 430-2

Acquires name publicly ................................................................73

Cat Creek Dam..............................................................................73

Considering a series of cantilevers ...............................................74

Deadwood Dam ............................................................................73

Gibson Dam ............................................................................73, 74

Hoover Dam..................................................................................73

Horse Mesa Dam ..........................................................................74
592

Houk, Ivan ....................................................................................75

Immensely complex procedure.....................................................74

Maillart, Robert.............................................................................74

Mulholland, William.............................................................79, 520

Owyhee Dam ................................................................................73

Parker Dam ...................................................................................73

Savage, John L..............................................................................75

Seminoe Dam................................................................................73

Stucky, Alfred ...............................................................................74

Truckee Project ........................................................................................451

See Newlands Project

Truckee-Carson Project......................................................................97, 451

See Newlands Project

Truman, Harry S. .....................................................................................228

Tucson......................................................................................................181

Tulare Lake ..............................................................................................323

Tulare River .....................................................................................307, 323

Tule (or Tulare) River ..............................................................................303

Tuolumne River .................................................................................35, 303

TVA

See Tennessee Valley Authority

7ZLQ)DOOV&DQDO ........................................................................................26

Two types of buttress dams

)ODWVODE.........................................................................................79

Multiple arch ................................................................................79

Tygart Dam ...................... 353-4, 356, 359, 361, 363-4, 369-71, 454, 466-7

Architectural treatment by Paul Cret ..........................................363

%XLOWIRUÀRRGFRQWURODQGQDYLJDWLRQ.........................................363

Completed 1938..........................................................................370

Contract let..................................................................................365

Contractor was Snare Company .................................365, 367, 369

Cooke, Morris L..........................................................................364

&RVWLQJRXWEHQH¿WV ....................................................................371

Costs of project ...........................................................................370

Cove Creek Dam was the precursor ...........................................360

Designs ..........................................................................362

Design ................................................................362-3, 365-6, 368

Design dimensions......................................................................367

)ORRGRI..............................................................................367

)ORRGVLQ ............................................................................371

)RXQGDWLRQDQGVSLOOZD\GHVLJQ .................................................363

Growden, James, concerns..........................................................369
593

Hydraulic studies were pioneering .............................................368

In West Virginia on Tygart River ................................................362

Largest Corps dam east of the Mississippi .................................363

Mixing of design and construction got out of hand....................369

Monongahela River.....................................................................371

Morris, Robert M. .......................................................................371

Outlets had steel liners................................................................368

Powell, R. G., meeting about delays in project...........................369

Project approved .........................................................................363

Public Works Administration......................................................363

5HFODPDWLRQFUHDWHV¿QDOSODQVIRU79$ ....................................362

Reilly, Thomas L.........................................................................371

Reservoir increased in size .........................................................363

Spillway tests at the Carnegie Institute of Technology...............365

Supports navigation in 1939 .......................................................371

Tygart River ................................................................................362

Used Norris Dam designs ...........................................................362

Wellons, Charles .........................................................................364

Work begins in 1934 ...................................................................362

Tygart River .............................................................................................362

Tyler, M. C. ..............................................................................261, 264, 269

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ............3, 8, 11-13, 15, 16, 21, 26, 30, 33-4,

 .......37-8, 49, 63, 84, 89, 118-21,191, 193-6,

 ......205-6, 208, 217, 223, 228, 271-2, 282-3,

 .........................................356, 360, 365, 421

308 Report Tennessee River .......................................................359

308 Reports.........................................................204, 237, 241, 356

$QDGURPRXV¿VK........................................................394, 407, 408

Authorized on Tennessee ............................................................119

Board of Engineers for Internal Improvements ............................15

Bonneville Dam .................. 194, 196, 197, 199-202, 204, 210, 222

Build locks on the Ohio ..............................................................355

%XLOGV3LQH)ODW'DP..................................................................346

California hydraulic mining.................................................... 313-4

Central Valley of California........................................306, 308, 328

Central Valley Project .................................................................329

Chittenden, Hiram.........................................................................26

Civil works tradition .....................................................................13

Columbia River focused on navigation and power.....................223

Combination of roller and tainter gates ......................................374

Cooper, Hugh L. .........................................................................118

Cove Creek Dam................................................................. 359-362
594

Criticism of .................................................................................408

Dam No. 4...................................................................................374

Dam No. 24.................................................................................375

Dam Safety Assurance Program .................................................407

Decidedly American style submersible roller gate .....................374

Design issues nineteenth and early twentieth century ..................90

Designed larger tainter gates.......................................................375

DeVoto, Bernard .........................................................................397

Elliptical tainter gates ................................................................374

Engineering department of the federal government .....................14

Environmental Advisory Board (EAB).......................................403

Environmental community .........................................................403

Environmental Resources Branch...............................................403

Establishment................................................................................11

Evolves dam gate design.............................................................374

)DYRUVSULYDWHSRZHU .................................................................359

)LUVWPRGHORIK\GUDXOLFVLQDPDMRUPXOWLSXUSRVH

mainstream dam.............................................................196

)LUVWXVHGWDLQWHUJDWHV.....................................................375

)LVK..............................................................................................226

)LVKHULHV(QJLQHHULQJ5HVHDUFK/DERUDWRU\......................407

)ORRGFRQWURO.........................................................................15, 371

)ORRGFRQWUROSHUFHQWIXQGHGE\IHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW..........346

)ORRG&RQWURO$FWRI..................................................314, 358

)ORRGFRQWURODQGQRQVWUXFWXUDODOWHUQDWLYHV.............................403

)ORRGFRQWUROGDPVWRSURWHFW3LWWVEXUJK....................................354

)ORRGVRIDQG ............................................................373

)RUW3HFN'DP ....................................... 237-8, 241, 244, 249, 250,

..............................................252, 255-6, 263-4, 268

)RUW3HFN'DPVOLGH.............................................................. 258-67

)RUW5DQGDOO'DP........................................................................290

)UHGHULFN6QDUH&RUSRUDWLRQ.......................................................365

)UHQFKHQJLQHHULQJWUDGLWLRQ...................................................11, 12

)ULDQW'DP..................................................................................329

Garrison Dam...................................................... 278-281, 287, 288

Garrison Dam and Indians .................................................. 279-281

Gas supersaturation.....................................................................407

Gatun Dam..................................................................................244

General Dam Act of 1906 .............................................................38

General Survey Act.......................................................................14

Genesis of the Pick-Sloan Plan............................................... 272-6

Grand Coulee Dam .....................................................................208
595

Grand Coulee region...................................................................192

Grant, U. S., III ...........................................................................396

+\GURSRZHUDQGÀRRGVEULQJ

Corps into big dam business..........................................111

Inland Waterways Commission ................................................ 33-4

Irrigation survey............................................................................26

“Jackson Report” ........................................................................314

Kansas City District....................................................................237

.HHSLQJDQDGURPRXV¿VKLQWKHLUQDWXUDOKDELWDW .......................408

Kennett Dam.......................................................................328, 329

Kentucky’s Red River Gorge......................................................411

Landowners in the King River watershed...................................346

Largest dam east of the Mississippi............................................363

Leader in embankment dams ........................................................49

Levees .............................................89-92, 110-1, 114-5, 117, 356

Locks on Ohio approved 1879....................................................355

Loses control of Tennessee River ...............................................358

Madden Dam.......................................................................364, 368

Maintaining the navigability of major streams...........................313

Mead, Warren..............................................................................363

Meramec Park Dam ....................................................................411

Miami Conservancy District.......................................................371

Mississippi and Ohio Rivers.......................................................313

0LVVLVVLSSLÀRRGFRQWURO.............................................................356

Missouri River ............................................................................237

Missouri River Division......................................................283, 285

Muscle Shoals......................................................................... 117-8

Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District.............................371

Nashville District ..........................................................................91

National Environmental Policy Act ............................................401

1DWLRQDO0DULQH)LVKHULHV6HUYLFH..............................................408

Navigation.......................................................................13, 15, 372

Navigation dams .........................................................................236

Navigation projects.......................................................................14

1HZÀRRGFRQWUROPLVVLRQ..........................................................354

Nine foot channel .......................................................................272

1LWURJHQ7DVN)RUFH....................................................................408

Norris Dam .................................................................................359

Obstructions to navigation ...........................................................38

Ohio Basin ..................................................................................354

Ohio River........................................................................... 372-374
596

Ohio River converted to nine-foot navigation

channel by 1929.............................................................355

Ohio River navigation.................................................................355

Opposes multiple-purposes...........................................................34

Opposition arguments .................................................395, 396, 400

Panama Canal .............................................................................364

Pick, Lewis A., Chief of Engineers.............................................281

Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program.................. 271, 276-278, 280,

 ...........................283, 290, 292

Pickstown....................................................................................290

3LQH)ODW'DP .............................................................................346

Pittsburgh District ................................................................... 361-2

Projects controversial....................................................................15

Projects stopped ..........................................................................401

Proposed consolidation with Reclamation..................................281

Rampart Dam .............................................................................410

5HG5LYHU*RUJH/HJDO'HIHQVH)XQG........................................411

Reestablishment............................................................................11

Reybold, E. .................................................................................271

Rising environmental criticism ..........................................402, 403

Rivalry between Corps and Reclamation

over Grand Coulee.........................................................208

Riverdale.....................................................................................278

Rivers and Harbors Act (1826) .....................................................14

Rivers and Harbors Act (1852) .....................................................16

Roller gates .................................................................................374

Run-of-the-river dams...................................................................89

Sacramento River.................................................................... 313-4

Snag and channel work.................................................................15

Store water for navigation.............................................................19

Supports federal construction of Shasta Dam in 1933................328

Survey of the Miami River .........................................................359

Surveys of navigable stream.......................................................120

Tainter gates........................................................................375, 376

Tennessee Valley studies...............................................................92

Traditional mission of river navigation.......................................354

TVA.............................................................................................362

Tygart Dam ......................................... 353, 354, 362, 363, 365-371

Upper Mississippi River ..................................18-20, 373-375, 377

Waterways engineering.................................................................15

Woods, Rufus..............................................................................208
597

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation ..................... 3, 8, 21, 25-6, 29, 30, 32, 34, 49,

 .......................64-5, 73, 76-9, 82, 84, 90-2, 95,

 .....................97-8,211, 228, 314-5, 395, 400-3

Acquires hydropower responsibilities ..........................................98

Acreage limitation........................................................... 314, 346-7

Arrowrock Dam ..........................................................................171

Authorized as bureau in 1902 .......................................................92

%DQNV)UDQN$ ..........................................................................214

Bartlett Dam................................................................................212

Bashore, Harry............................................................................271

%HJLQVWR¿OO+RRYHU'DP..........................................................178

Bonneville Power Act .................................................................222

Bridge Canyon Dam ...........................................................185, 410

Brower, David.....................................................................398, 410

Buy-back the Central Valley Project by California.....................347

Central Arizona Project...............................................................410

Central Valley Project ................................304-5, 312, 329-30, 347

Colorado River Board.................................................................150

&RORUDGR5LYHUÀRRGFRQWURO ......................................................132

Colorado River planning................................................. 143-5, 182

Colorado River Storage Project ..................................................395

Colorado River studies (1902)....................................................142

Columbia Basin...................................................................206, 208

Columbia Basin Commission .....................................................211

Columbia River focus on irrigation and dams............................223

Columbia Valley Authority .................................................217, 228

Conconully Dam.........................................................................243

Construction engineers .................................................................95

Construction of Hoover Dam.............................................. 177-179

Consulting engineers.....................................................................95

Consulting “engineering boards”..................................................95

Cost-overruns................................................................................98

&UHDWHV¿QDOSODQVIRU1RUULV'DPIRU79$...............................362

&URZH)UDQN ......................................................................171, 174

At Shasta Dam ...............................................................334

Dam safety programs..................................................................392

'DUODQG$)FRQVXOWLQJHQJLQHHU.............................................211

Davis Dam ..................................................................................199

Depression caused rethinking of government projects...............132

Design of Hoover Dam....................................... 148-151, 171, 177

DeVoto, Bernard .........................................................................397

Different authorities than those of Corps of Engineers ..............272
598

Dinosaur National Monument ....................................................182

District engineers ..........................................................................95

'RPLQ\)OR\G(........................................................................410

Downey, Sheridan.......................................................................346

Early built massive embankment dams ......................................146

East Park Dam ............................................................................315

Echo Park Dam ...................................................................182, 396

Engineering aides..........................................................................95

Engineering assistants...................................................................95

)DOO'DYLV5HSRUW........................................................................144

)LUVWWZRGHFDGHVHOHFWULFSRZHUSURGXFWLRQ

ancillary to irrigation .....................................................132

)RFXVRQ%RXOGHU&DQ\RQ...................................................145, 146

)UHVQR..........................................................................................315

)ULDQW'DP..........................................................................331, 342

Garrison Dam..............................................................282, 284, 287

Glen Canyon Dam .......................................................... 183-4, 398

Grand Canyon.............................................................................185

Grand Canyon dams....................................................................185

Grand Coulee Dam ...................................212-4, 218-9, 221-2, 387

Grand Coulee region...................................................................208

Hoover Dam construction....................................................... 211-2

Hoover Dam hydropower ...........................................................166

Hoover Dam, Industrial Workers of the World...........................174

Hoover Dam planned as gravity masonry dam...........................146

Hoover Dam provides municipal water......................................180

Hoover Dam thin arch design considered...................................146

Hungry Horse Dam.....................................................................199

Ideal of promoting the family farm.............................................131

Interests gradually expanded ......................................................132

Interests of large-scale farmers ...................................................160

Iron Canyon Dam........................................................................317

Iron Canyon Project............................................................318, 319

Iron Canyon Project Association ............................................ 316-7

Issue of lower Colorado River development ..............................143

Kaufmann, Gordon designs Hoover Dam’s appearance.............151

Kennett Dam...............................................................................330

Kincaid Act .................................................................................144

Laguna Diversion Dam...............................................................143

Lahontan Dam.............................................................................406

Large-scale farmers in the Imperial Valley ................................160

Lengthy delays in project completion...........................................98
599

Looks at Columbia Basin............................................................192

Marble Canyon Dam...........................................................185, 410

0LGVEHJDQWRIRVWHUDUDQJHRIEHQH¿WV............................132

Mission differs from Corps...........................................................89

Mission evolved into planning river basins ................................132

Missouri River States Committee...............................................275

Missouri-Souris Project never was funded .................................287

Missouri-Souris reclamation project...........................................281

Missouri Valley Authority...................................................273, 277

Multiple arch dam at Grand Coulee............................................212

Multiple arch design at Shasta rejected ......................................331

Multiple purpose planning..........................................................269

Multipurpose dams did not derive from some master plan ........132

Multipurpose projects .................................................................132

Navajo Dam ................................................................................406

Okanogan Project........................................................................243

Opposes state safety laws during

Hoover Dam construction..............................................175

Original focus on irrigation...........................................................98

Orland Project.............................................................................315

Owyhee Dam ..............................................................................212

Parker Dam .................................................................................181

Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program............................... 275-6, 282

3LQH)ODW'DP .............................................................................346

Planning engineers........................................................................95

Plans for Missouri River......................................................... 271-3

Plans Norris Dam for TVA..........................................................362

Pre-1920s hydropower................................................................165

Primary construction contract.....................................................333

Promoting the family farm..........................................................160

Pueblo Dam.................................................................................199

Reclamation Act..........................................................................358

Reclamation and Corps needed to cooperate

on the Missouri ..............................................................273

“Reclamation law”......................................................................347

Reclamation Project Act of 1939................................................269

Reclamation Service held a conference of

engineers at Ogden ..........................................................65

Reclamation supported Six Companies, Inc...............................174

Regulation of lower Colorado River...........................................388

Repayment issues........................................................................160
600

Rivalry between Corps and Reclamation

over Grand Coulee.........................................................208

Rivers and Harbors Act (1937) ...................................................329

Safety Evaluation of Existing Dams...........................................407

Salmon issues..............................................................................394

Savage, John L. (Jack) ................................................................211

Shasta..........................................................................................331

Shasta bids ..................................................................................333

Shasta Dam .........................................................................330, 333

Aggregate.......................................................................333

Primary construction contract........................................333

Shift of energies to goals beyond agriculture .............................132

Siting of Hoover Dam.................................................................152

Six Companies ............................................................................174

Sloan Report ........................................................................... 273-4

Sloan, William Glenn..................................................................269

Slowly evolved ...........................................................................132

Stony Creek, California ..............................................................315

Stony Gorge Dam .......................................................................316

Studied low multiple-arch dam for Grand Coulee......................211

Subsidize Columbia Basin Project with

Grand Coulee electricity................................................222

Supervisory engineers...................................................................95

Tensions between municipal and agricultural water...................160

They Would Rule the Valley.........................................................346

Trial-load method....................................................................49, 74

Trial-Load method of design at Hoover......................................149

TVA.............................................................................................362

:DOWHU5D\PRQG).....................................................................330

Wedded to massive forms ...........................................................211

Weymouth Report .......................................................................147

Young, Walker.............................................................................171

86)LVKDQG:LOGOLIH6HUYLFH

Listed the snail darter as an endangered species.........................409

U.S. Geological Survey..............................................................................92

Created..........................................................................................24

Irrigation Survey.....................................................................25, 92

Irrigation Survey closed................................................................25

To look at western irrigation.........................................................23

U.S. Reclamation Service

See Bureau of Reclamation...........................................................82

&RQÀLFWEHWZHHQIRUPDQGPDVV...................................................64
601

Detailed analytic study of dams from

the structural perspective .................................................64

Renamed the Bureau of Reclamation ...........................................21

Storage dams.................................................................................90

Structures were for storage ...........................................................89

Uplift..........................................................................................................57

Austin, Pennsylvania ....................................................................57

Safety of gravity dams ..................................................................57

Upper Mississippi Basin Commission

Coordinated planning..................................................................376

Upper Mississippi River

Dam No. 24.................................................................................375

Environmental management .......................................................376

Gigantic laboratory for hydraulics,

structures, mechanisms..................................................376

Headwater reservoirs ....................................................................19

Keokuk Dam...............................................................................353

Lock and Dam Number 15..........................................................374

0LQQHDSROLV6W3DXOEHQH¿WV.......................................................19

Navigation improvements.............................................................18

Nine foot channel approved in 1929...........................................373

Shipping increases 1939-1976....................................................376

Twenty-seven dams by 1940.......................................................374

Utah......................................................................................................26, 29

Central Utah Project....................................................................396

Colorado Doctrine.........................................................................10

Colorado River............................................................135, 137, 157

Colorado River Storage Project ..................................................395

Echo Park Dam ...........................................................182, 396, 426

Glen Canyon Dam ......................................................................463

Glen Canyon Dam and reservoir ................................................425

Green River.........................................................................135, 182

Mormon colonization....................................................................22

Reclamation Service held a conference of

engineers at Ogden ..........................................................65

Rudimentary Mormon irrigation...................................................22

Strawberry Valley Project ...................................................146, 451

Utah Construction Company ......................................................171

Yampa River ...............................................................................182

Utah Construction Company....................................................................171

9DQ)DDVHQ-HUROG

5HPLQLVFHQFHRI)RUW3HFN'DPVOLGH...............................256
602

Van Stone, Nelson....................................................................................256

Vanport.....................................................................................................223

Variable-radius arch dams..........................................................................61

Verde River ..............................................................................................212

Walcott, Charles D.

Director of the U.S. Geological Survey........................................95

Director of the U.S. Reclamation Service, 1902-1907 .................95

Walker, John S.

Spillways and other dam cross sections........................................90

Walla Walla District .................................................................................227

Walter Bouldin Dam

)DLOHGLQ .............................................................................406

:DOWHU5D\PRQG)..........................................................211, 213, 219, 330

:DUUHQ)UDQFLV(.................................................................................. 26-7

Washburn, William D.................................................................................19

Washington...................................................................29, 36, 205, 215, 226

California Doctrine .........................................................................9

Columbia Valley Authority .........................................................278

Ephrata........................................................................................208

Grand Coulee Dam .............................................................203, 463

Hanford Reservation...................................................................387

Okanogan Project........................................................................243

Richland......................................................................................387

Spokane.......................................................................................206

Wenatchee...................................................................................206

Water law

California Doctrine .........................................................................9

Colorado Doctrine.........................................................................10

Evolution of ....................................................................................5

Evolution of in the West..................................................................7

Prior appropriation........................................................................10

Wyoming Doctrine........................................................................10

Water Power Act (1920)...................................................................110, 358

Water rights legal systems

California Doctrine .........................................................................9

Colorado Doctrine.........................................................................10

Wyoming Doctrine........................................................................10

Watkins, Lewis H.

Tennessee River 308 report..................................................... 358-9

Weaver, Theron ........................................................................................224
603

Northwest Division of Corps ......................................................223

Weeks, John W.

Announced government would sell Muscle Shoals....................114

Secretary of War..........................................................................113

Wegmann, Edward................................... 54, 72, 89-90, 122, 166, 244, 268

Cavitation......................................................................................90

Considered only masonry gravity dams........................................89

He did not treat earth embankments .............................................89

New Croton Dam..........................................................................54

Quaker Bridge Dam......................................................................54

Spillways and other dam cross sections........................................90

State of federal dams 1900............................................................89

The Design and Construction of Dams.........................................54

The Design and Construction of Dams (1888) .......................54, 89

Uplift pressure...............................................................................90

Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District

Saline drainage diverted..............................................................405

Wenatchee ................................................................................................206

West Penn Power Company.....................................................................361

Westergaard, H. M. ..................................................................................263

Earthquake effects on dams ........................................................390

Stevenson Creek Test Dam ...........................................................78

Weymouth Report ................................................................ 147-9, 151, 153

:H\PRXWK)UDQN( ............................................................ 76, 146-9, 1513

Chief Engineer ............................................................................146

Proposed construction method for Hoover Dam ........................149

Wheeler, E. T............................................................................ 65-67, 70, 74

Wheeler, Montana....................................................................................255

Wheeler, Raymond A.......................................................................223, 224

Whipple, William, Jr. ............................................................... 223, 226-228

)LVKHULHVLVVXHV ...........................................................................226

)ORRGRI..............................................................................223

Hydropower network ..................................................................226

Main Control Plan.......................................................................224

Portland District of Corps...........................................................223

Walla Walla District ....................................................................227

White River..............................................................................................135

Widstoe, John...........................................................................................108

Wilbur, Ray Lyman..........................................................133, 169, 171, 179

Hoover Dam................................................................................171

Names Hoover Dam............................................................133, 179

Power leases for Hoover.............................................................169
604

Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968

River preservation.......................................................................406

Wilderness Society...........................................................................182, 395

Wiley, A. J..................................................................................................72

Williams, Gardiner.....................................................................................61

Wilson Dam .................................84, 89-92, 111-2, 114-5, 117-8, 122, 133,

 .....................................193-4, 203, 239, 255, 277, 359-60, 363

%LGIURP+HQU\)RUGWREX\ .......................................................114

Cavitation......................................................................................90

Its crucial problems.......................................................................90

Locks opened ..............................................................................122

Prelude to the big dam era ............................................................84

Pure gravity structure....................................................................90

Raised many questions................................................................113

Taken away from Corps..............................................................119

Two nitrate plants........................................................................112

Work begins in 1918 ...................................................................112

Work completed in 1925.............................................................112

Wilson, Montana......................................................................................255

Wilson, Woodrow.........................................38, 91, 106, 111, 117, 396, 453

Muscle Shoals.....................................................................111, 117

Wing dams .......................................................................................115, 355

Improve channels..........................................................................16

Navigation...............................................................................16, 18

Wisconsin River.........................................................................................19

Wisner, George Y. .................................................. 65, 68, 70, 92, 96-7, 464

Woods, Rufus...................................................................................206, 211

Grand Coulee ..............................................................................208

Wozencroft, Oliver

Imperial Valley development ......................................................138

Wright Act Districts

California ......................................................................................27

Wright, C. C.

Irrigation advocate ........................................................................27

Wright Irrigation District Act

Authorized irrigation districts in California................................311

Wyman, Theodore....................................................................................237

)RUW3HFN'DP ....................................................................237, 252

Missouri River 308 report....................................... 237-8, 252, 270

Wyoming.................................................10, 26, 29, 135-7, 146, 157, 395-6

Buffalo Bill Dam...........................................................65, 425, 431

Buffalo Bill Dam ........................................................................459
605

)LUVWVWDWHHQJLQHHU......................................................................108

Green River.................................................................................135

Hiram Chittenden survey........................................................26, 27

North Platte Project...............................................................98, 451

North Platte River .......................................................................157

3DWK¿QGHU'DP .............................................65, 146, 425, 431, 464

Shoshone Dam ............................................................................146

Shoshone Project...................................................................98, 451

Wyoming Doctrine........................................................................10

Wyoming Doctrine.....................................................................................10

Yampa and Green Rivers

Echo Park Dam ...........................................................................182

Yampa Canyon.........................................................................................396

Yampa River ............................................................................................135

Yosemite National Park.......................................................................... 34-5

Young, C. C..............................................................................................326

Young, Milton R. .....................................................................................279

Young, Walker (Brig) R.

Project Engineer at Hoover.........................................146, 171, 388

Yuba River ...............................................................................................303

Yuma, Arizona..........................................................................................143

Yuma Project............................................................................................315

=ROD'DP .............................................................................................59, 60

=ROD)UDQFRLV ............................................................................................59