### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Ja nuary13, 200 4 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. BEN THOM AS DO WLEN
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Montgom ery C ounty No. 40000231 John H. Gasaw ay, Judge

No. M2003- 00508-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jul y 20, 2004

I n this action which orig inated as a post-conviction proc eeding seeking the gra nt of bot h a delay ed
ap p e a l an d a

n e w tria l d u e to in e f

f e c ti v e a s s is tan c e o f c o u n s e l, B e n T h o ma s D o w le n ap p e a ls

. We
a ff ir m th e low e r co urt’ s rul ing on the se nte nc ing iss ue raise d in the de la y e d ap pe a l, an d w e lik e wi se aff irm the lower c ourt’s denia l of post-conviction re lief.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t i s A ffirm e d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of t he court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Gre g ory D. Smith, C larksville, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llant, Be n Thomas Dowlen.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Ge n er al & Reporter ; Helena Walton Yarbroug h, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; John W esley

Carnery , J r., Di s t ri ct Attorney Gene ral; and C. Daniel Br ollier, Assistant District Attorney

Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

The ba ckg round of this proce eding is somewhat convoluted. The petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleg ing that he had not rec eived the effe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel in the conviction proc eeding s because counse l failed to communi cate with him during the pr ocee dings and failed to a dvise him of his right to file a motio n for ne w trial and dire ct appe al. He ma de other
a lle g a tio ns re g ard ingthe va li di ty of a se arc h w arr a nt. He so ug ht a de la y e d a

pp e a l. H e lik e wi se soug ht “[t] hat [his] sentenc e be se t aside.”

At the beginning of t he post -convic tion hearing, the parties announced that they had
a g re e d th a t th e pe tit ion e r wa s ent itl e d to r e lie f o n h is d e la y e d a pp e a l c la im, a ndthe c ou rt a g re e d to enter an orde r allowing the petitioner thirty day s to file a motion for new trial. The pe titioner then proce eded to pr esent proof perta ining to his claims of i neff ective assistance of counsel a nd sear ch
war rant invali d i ty . The lowe r court therea fter e ntere d an orde r g ranting the petitioner a delay ed-2-

motion for new t rial but denying “[a]l l other aspects of the petit ion

. . . for the r easons se t forth on the re cord.”

Th e pe tit ion e r f ile d a mot ionfo r n e w t

ri a l in wh ic h he a lle g e d tha t the e vid e nc e did not sufficiently

support his conviction and that he ha d rec eived an excessive sentenc e. He filed a second motion for new t rial which added two additional issues, that the jury had improperly

weig hed the evidenc e and that trial counsel had rende red ine ffe ctive assistanc e. Howe ver, he did not pursue these two a dditional issues at the hearing on the motion for new trial. At the hea ring , the lower

court denied the motion. This appea l followed.

I n his appea l, the petitioner alleg es t h at he was denied the eff ective a ssistance of counsel in the c onviction pr o ce ed i ng s, for whic h he see ks to have his conviction set a side. He likewise alleg es that he w as improper ly sentenc ed as a Rang e I I , rathe r than Rang e I , offe nder, f or wh ic h h e se e ks a

re du c tio n inthe le ng th o f the se nte nc e imp os e d inthe c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g s. We beg in with a brief r eview of the law r elative to post-convic tion procee dings and delay ed appe als. The Post-Conviction Procedure Act allows two distinct types of relief . Perhaps the more familiar and fre quently soug ht remedy

is that of having the conviction judg ment set aside,
see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-111(a ) (2003) , as in the ca se of a showing of ineff

ective a ssistance of counsel. The Act also provides that the court may g rant a succe ssful petitioner a de lay ed appe al, see id. , as in the ca se of a

showing that the petitioner wa s unconstitutionallydenied the right to appeal his conviction, see id. § 40-30-113( a) ( 2003).

When a petitioner see ks both types of r elief unde r the Post-Conviction Procedure Act and has de monstrated that he is e ntitled to a delay ed appea l, the proper proce dure at the time that the lower c ourt adjudicated the petitioner’ s claims was for that court to have gr anted the delay ed appe al and to have enter ed a dismissal without prejudice of the collateral attac k to the conviction. Gibson
v . S tate , 7 S.W. 3d47 , 5 0 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 98 ); se e als o H ug he s v . S tate , 77 S.W .3d 801, 802-03 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) . The then- curr ent rationale was that both a direc t appea l of a c onviction and a c ollateral attack to that same c onviction may not be maintained simultaneously

. Gibson , 7 S.W .3d at 49; Lan ey v . S tate , 8 26 S.W. 2d11 7, 11 8 (Tenn. 19 92 ); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30- 102(a) (2003) ( post-conviction attac k may be mounted to “f

inal” judg ments). S i n ce the lower
c ou rt ’s a dju dic a tio n, ho we ve r, S up rem e Cou rt Rul e 28 ha s b e e n a me nd e d a ndapp are ntl y contemplates that the collater al-attack issues wi l l be adjudicated along with the question of the proprie t y o f a d el ay ed appe al. See Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 28, § 9(D). Althoug h the supreme court pr ov ide d for a stay of the po st- c on vic tio n co llate ra l- a tta c k pro c e e din g s p e nd ing a Te nn e sse e Rul e of Appe llate Proce dure 11 de lay ed appe al and pe nding a Rule 3 delay ed appe al g ranted by the ap pe lla te c o u r t, Ru le 2 8 ma k e s n o s tay

p r o v is io n w h e n the p o s t -c o n vi ction court g rants a Rule 3 appea l. Se e ge ne ra lly Tenn. P

. Sup. Ct. 28, § 9(D). T he abse nce of the provision is comspicuous to u s.

I n the ca se at bar, the lower c ourt hea rd evide nce on the petition and at the conc lusion of the he aring made f

indings relative to both theories of relief soug ht by the petitioner. I n the written-3-

order that followed, t h e co u rt g rante d relief on the delay ed appe al claim but denied r elief on the
c oll a te ra l a tta c k “ fo r the re a so ns se t f orth o n th e re c or d. ” I n th e app e a l pr e se ntl y be fo rethi s c ou rt , the petitioner ha s pursued both a de lay ed appe al and an appea l of the denia l of relief on the collater al attack.

We are not inclined to c orre ct the lower court’s action in c onsidering the collater al attack g iven that the proc edure the lower court employ ed appa

rently has now be en sanc tioned by the supreme c ourt. Acc ording ly , we turn to the merits of the petitioner’s de lay ed dire ct appe al issue, whether he wa s proper ly

sentenc ed as a Rang e I I offe nder. The petiti oner contends t hat his attorney d i d n o tre ce i v e t h e s t at e’ s n o t i ce o f i n t en tt o s ee k R an ge II s en t en ci n g an d d u e t o t h i s s h o rt co m i n g, he shoul d have been sentence d as a Rang e Ioffe nder. The state conte nded that it mailed the notice to de fense counsel when it timely filed the orig inal. Moreove r, the state c laimed that the petitioner’ s Ra ng e I I status wa s d isc us se d w ithde fe ns e c ou ns e l du ri ng ple a ne g oti a tio ns

. Under Code section 40-35- 202(a) , the prosec ution must file a notice of intent to seek enhanc ed punishment at l east ten day s prior to trial or a cce ptance of a g uiltyplea. Te nn. Code Ann. § 4 0- 35 -2 02 (a ) ( 20 03 ); se e als o Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.3( a), (c) (also requiring notice to be se rved on defe nse counse l). I f the notice is not timely filed, the defe ndant is e ntitled to a c ontinuance. T enn. R. Crim. P . 12.3(a) . I n the abse nce of a defense motion for a continuance , objection t o a late f iled not i ce i s waived. State v. Stephe nson , 7 52 S.W. 2d80 , 8 1 ( Te nn . 1 98 8) ; Sta te v . G ilm ore , 823 S

. W

. 2 d 5 6 6 , 5 7 0 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 1 ) ( ap p l y i n g Stephenson to 1989 Criminal C ode). Mo re ov e r, the un tim e ly

fi lin g of the no tic e do e s n ot e nti tle thede fe nd a nt t o Ra ng e I se nte nc ing in the abse nce of

a demonstration of prejudice

. Stephenson , 752 S.W .2d at 81

. The re cord of

the conviction proce eding s ref lects t hat defense counsel objected at the sentenc ing he aring to the petit i o n er being classified a s a Rang e I I offe nder be cause he claimed he had only learned two day s earlier t hat t he st ate had filed a notice seeking enhanc ed sente ncing . The de fe ns e didno t di sp ute that th e no tic e wa s ti me ly fi le d, on ly

wh e the r a

c op y of it wa s se rv e d o n h im at the time of its filing. The state cla imed that it had mailed a c opy of the notice to defe nse counse l at t h e ti m e of i t s t i m el y fi l i n g o f th e no t i ce

. M o re o v er , t h e st at e as s er t ed t h att h e p et i t i o n er ’s R an ge I I status had been part of the plea barg aining discussions a nd that it ha d serve d discovery information
on de fe ns e c ou ns e l w hic h r e ve a le d th e pe tit ion e r’ s Rang e I I status

. The de fense did not request a c ontinuance when it learned of the not ice. Further , the petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice from the alleg ed lac k of ten-day s’ notice. F or example, he has not shown that he wa s not, in actuality , a Rang e I offe nder. Likewise, he has not shown that he would have acc epted a plea a g ree ment that was more favor able than the sente nce imposed if he h ad k n o wn t h att h e s t at e w o u l d s ee k R an ge II s en t en ci n g.
Given that the de fense neither r equeste d a continuance nor has demonstrated pr e jud ic e , th e pe tit ion e r c a nn ot p re va il o n th is c la im.-4- We theref ore move on to the petitioner’s bid for post-conviction re lief. In the lower court, the pe titioner had the burden of proving the claims raised by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See T en n

. C o d e An n

. § 4 0 -3 0 -1 1 0 (f ) ( 2 0 0 3 ). On ap p ea l , t h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n co u rt ’s fa ct u al fi n d i n gs are revie wed de novo with a pre sumption of corre ctness unless the e vidence preponde rate s o t h e r w i s e ; h o w e v e r , t h a tc o u r t ’ s c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w r e c e i v e p u r e l y de novo re v iew with no presumption of cor

rec tness. Fi e lds v . S tate , 40 S.W .3d 450, 457-58 (Te nn. 2001).
When a petitioner c halleng es the effe ctive assist ance of counsel in a post-conviction proce eding , he has the burden of establishing (1) defic ient repr esentation and (2) prejudice resulting from that def

iciency

. Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Ba x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). Def icient re prese ntation occur s when c ounsel provides assistanc e that fa lls below the rang e of c ompet en ce demande d of attorne y s in criminal
case s. Ba nk

sto n v . S tate , 8 15 S.W. 2d21 3, 21 5 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ). Pr e jud ic e is the re a so na

ble likelihood that, b u t for deficient re prese ntation, the outcome of the proce eding s would have be en differ ent. Ov e rto n v . S tate , 874 S.W .2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994) . On rev i ew , there is a strong presumption of satisfac tory repr esentation. Ba rr v . S tate , 910 S.W .2d 462, 464 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 95 ). B e c aus e a

pe tit ion e r mus t e sta

bli sh bo th de fi c ie nt r e pr e se ntatio n a ndpr e jud ic e the re fr om, relief may be denied when proof of either is deficie nt. Go ad v . S tate , 938 S.W .2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996).
The pe titioner claimed be low that his attorney in the conviction proc eeding s did not pr ov ide e ff

e c tiv e a ssi stanc e . H e fo c us e d his at ta c k to a lle g a tio ns of c ou ns e l’ s h a vin g faile d to fi le p r e tr i a l m o t i o n s , h a v i n g f a i l e d t o p r e p ar e f

o r tr i a l , a n d h a v i n g f

a i l e d t o c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h h i m

. In his appell at e brief, the petitioner foc uses on trial counse l’s failure to secure the attendance of a wi t n es s at tri al

. T h i s wi t n es s t es t i fi ed at an ea rl i erp ro b at i o n re v o ca t i o n p ro ce ed i n g t h att h e d ru gs that th e pe tit ion e r w a s c ha rg e d w ithpo sse ssi ng we rea c tua lly his , n ot the p etition e r’ s. De fe ns e counsel’s ope ning statement fore caste d that the witness would testify along these lines. Howe ver, the witness was not subpoena ed, and w hen he did not appe ar f or t ri al , co u n s el sent some of the petitioner’s friends to bring him to court. There afte r, the witness did not return afte r a lunc h brea k and ther efor e wa s not available to bea witness for the pe titioner. The petitioner c laims that counsel should have subpoena ed this witness, should have done some thing to k ee p t h e witness at the courthouse, and afte r t he witness disappea red, counsel s hould have sought a continuance

. Counsel testif ie d a t th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n h e ar in g th a t h e d id n o t s u b p o e n a th e w it n e s s b e c au s e o n prior
occa sions, the witness had alway s appea red f or hea ring s. He c laimed that bef ore the trial beg an, he moved for a continuance based on the witness’ abse nce, but it was de nied. Further, he claimed that he ha d th e pe tit ion e r’ s f ri e nd s fi nd the wi tne ss andbring him to c ou rt , a lth ou g h th e wi tne ss disappea red during a

lunch bre ak.
Upon receiving the evidenc e, the lowe r court found that the petitioner ha d not established that he w as entitled t o relief on a claim of i neff ective assistance of counsel. With respec t to the missing witness issue, the co u rt d i d n o tdirec tly resolve the issue whether counsel’s perf ormanc e had be en def

icient, although i t found t hat even if defic ient perf ormanc e we re a ssumed, the petit ioner ha d not established that he wa s prejudice d by the witness’ nona

ppear ance

.-5-

Specifically , the court found that the witness’ testimony at the re vocation hea

ring had bee n “complete ly

unbelievable ” and was contra ry to the petitioner’s own inc ulpatory pretria l statement in which he a dmitted selling drug s to finance his daug hter’s c o l l ege ed ucation. Thus, the c ourt denied r elief.
On appe al, the petitioner ha s focuse d his clai m of ineff ectivene ss on the absent wi tne ss. How ever , he ha s n ot c arrie d h is b ur de n o f c on vin c ing us that th e low e r c ou rt e rr e d in denying r elief. We a

re unc onvinced, a s was the lowe r co u rt , t h at either c ounsel’s unfulfilled pr e dic tio n inthe op e nin g stateme nt o f the wi tne ss’ te sti mon y or theabs e nc e of

thewi tne ss’ testimonyhad a detrimental im pact on the outc ome of the c ase. Thepetitioner g ave an inculpatory statement, and the court found that the witness’ ea rlier testimony

was not cr edible.

I n conclusion, we aff

irm the petitione r’ s R an g e I I sentenc e. We af

firm the lower court’s or der de ny ing post-c onviction relief.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE