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REFORMING CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, 

INSURANCE, AND GOVERNMENT 

SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 111–82 

( 

(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts, Chairman 

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York 

JOE BACA, California 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

MELISSA L. BEAN, Illinois 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

TRAVIS CHILDERS, Mississippi 

WALT MINNICK, Idaho 

JOHN ADLER, New Jersey 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio 

SUZANNE KOSMAS, Florida 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JIM HIMES, Connecticut 

GARY PETERS, Michigan 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

WALTER B. JONES, JR., North Carolina 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

TOM PRICE, Georgia 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

ADAM PUTNAM, Florida 

MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota 

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

KEVIN McCARTHY, California 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

LYNN JENKINS, Kansas 

CHRISTOPHER LEE, New York 

ERIK PAULSEN, Minnesota 

LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey 

JEANNE M. ROSLANOWICK, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, INSURANCE, AND GOVERNMENT SPONSORED

ENTERPRISES

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York 

JOE BACA, California 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

MELISSA L. BEAN, Illinois 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

TRAVIS CHILDERS, Mississippi 

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

WALT MINNICK, Idaho 

JOHN ADLER, New Jersey 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

SUZANNE KOSMAS, Florida 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JIM HIMES, Connecticut 

GARY PETERS, Michigan 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

TOM PRICE, Georgia 

MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware 

PETER T. KING, New York 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas 

ADAM PUTNAM, Florida 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

KEVIN McCARTHY, California 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

LYNN JENKINS, Kansas 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

September 30, 2009 .......................................................................................... 1 

Appendix: 

September 30, 2009 .......................................................................................... 45 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 

Dobilas, Robert G., President and CEO, Realpoint LLC ...................................... 19 

Gallagher, Daniel M., Co-Acting Director, Division of Trading and Markets, 

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ....................................................... 12 

Gellert, James H., Chairman and CEO, Rapid Ratings International, Inc. ....... 21 

Joynt, Stephen W., President and CEO, Fitch, Inc. ............................................. 17 

McDaniel, Raymond W., Chairman and CEO, Moody’s Corporation .................. 14 

Schacht, Kurt N., Managing Director, CFA Institute Centre for Financial 

Market Integrity ................................................................................................... 23 

Sharma, Deven, President, Standard & Poor’s ..................................................... 16 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Bachus, Hon. Spencer ...................................................................................... 46 

Dobilas, Robert G. ............................................................................................ 48 

Gallagher, Daniel M. ........................................................................................ 60 

Gellert, James H. .............................................................................................. 76 

Joynt, Stephen W. ............................................................................................ 88 

McDaniel, Raymond W. .................................................................................... 109 

Schacht, Kurt N. ............................................................................................... 124 

Sharma, Deven ................................................................................................. 129 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Kanjorski, Hon. Paul E.: 

Written statement of Dominic Frederico, Chief Executive Officer, Assured 

Guaranty Limited ......................................................................................... 155 

Letter from Egan-Jones Ratings Company, dated September 29, 2009 ...... 158 

Written statement of John A. Courson, President and CEO, Mortgage 

Bankers Association ...................................................................................... 160 

Foster, Hon. Bill: 

Responses to questions submitted to Stephen W. Joynt ............................... 165 

Responses to questions submitted to Kurt Schacht ....................................... 168 

Responses to questions submitted to Deven Sharma .................................... 169 

Garrett, Hon. Scott: 

Written statement of the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association ..... 174 

(1) 

REFORMING CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 

Wednesday, September 30, 2009 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, 

INSURANCE, AND GOVERNMENT

SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 

2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski 

[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Kanjorski, Sherman, Scott, 

Perlmutter, Donnelly, Carson, Speier, Foster, Kilroy, Kosmas; Garrett, Castle, Manzullo, Royce, Hensarling, Posey, and Jenkins. 

Ex officio present: Representative Bachus. 

Also present: Representative Green. 

Chairman KANJORSKI. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises 

will come to order pursuant to agreement with the ranking member. Opening statements today will be limited to 15 minutes on 

each side. Without objection, all members’ opening statements will 

be made a part of the record. 

Today we meet to discuss one of the most important issues Congress will address as part of our overhaul of financial regulations: 

The reform of credit rating agencies. This issue has already generated much debate. 

Credit rating agencies play an integral part in our markets. Even 

though they operate as independent firms, they hold quasi regulatory powers. Investors around the world also heed their words, or 

the letters, as the case may be. 

These entities also greatly contributed to our current economic 

problems by inappropriately issuing triple A ratings for mortgagebacked securities and other complex financial instruments that 

later failed spectacularly. These agencies further used the same 

faulty assumptions as so many others that real estate prices would 

never go down. They were wrong. 

Perhaps most troubling, these agencies failed to learn more 

about the quality of the products they rated. Investors have come 

to rely on the judgment of credit rating agencies, and it now appears that rating agencies with their, ‘‘Ask me no questions, I will 

tell you no lies’’ approach betrayed not only that trust, but also the 

special status under our laws. 

To correct these problems, I have worked to draft legislation that 

achieves a balance between improving the regulatory oversight of 

2 

credit rating agencies, while also creating incentives for investors 

to recognize that ‘‘caveat emptor’’ is still the ultimate rule for any 

financial transaction. Today’s hearing is therefore on a discussion 

draft that aims to reform and regulate these gatekeepers to our 

markets using these two principles as guides. 

This summer, the Administration released a promising proposal 

to reform rating agency regulation. I have incorporated many useful provisions from that document into my discussion draft, including reforms aimed at enhancing the oversight of the rating agencies by the Securities and Exchange Commission and requiring new 

disclosures about how issuers pay rating agencies. 

Under the reforms, rating agencies will remain independent. The 

Commission will not opine on the methods used for determining 

ratings, but it will ensure that rating agencies follow their internal 

procedures. The changes additionally require new duties for compliance officers at each rating agency to monitor and manage the 

many conflicts of interest inherent in this industry. 

We must however go further. My draft therefore includes the 

sensible proposals to promote accountability through liability as 

first suggested by my friend, Senator Jack Reed. 

One of the most repeated complaints I heard in my district is 

that no one has been held accountable for the credit crisis. While 

the Justice Department belatedly works to take legal action against 

wrongdoers who caused this economic meltdown, going forward I 

believe that all responsibility parties, including the rating agencies, 

should be held accountable for their actions, good or bad. 

We can promote accountability in credit ratings through the 

threat of liability. While these legal reforms are an important 

change from current law, I want to assure everyone that I am committed to working to refine them as we move through the legislative process. 

To get at the tremendous conflicts of interest created by the 

issuer pay model, I have also proposed a new idea: making the rating agencies responsible for each others’ ratings through collective 

liability. This reform will hopefully incent participants in this oligopoly to police one another and release reliable high-quality ratings. This reform, however, is not the only way to fix this problem, 

and I am open to other ways to achieve this objective. 

My discussion draft further includes many other new reforms, 

like a duty for supervisors to manage the work of their subordinates, and the establishment of boards with independent directors. 

Many of us also share the policy goal of diminishing the reliance 

on credit ratings. I wish we could just snap our fingers and take 

away the countless references to credit ratings in laws and regulations. While I have proposed in this discussion draft the elimination in Federal statutes of all credit rating agency references, I 

have serious concerns about the unintended consequences of this 

plan. 

In sum, this is the start of a process. I want to thank my cosponsors, Representatives Cleaver, Kilroy, and Kosmas, for joining me 

in producing this bill. Going forward, I optimistic that many more 

Members—from both sides of the aisle—will join me as we find the 

best ways to reform the regulation of these gatekeepers to our markets. 

3 

I now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Ranking Member Garrett, for 5 minutes for his opening statement. 

Mr. GARRETT. I thank the chairman and the members of the subcommittee for holding this important hearing today. I also thank 

the chairman for all of his hard work and that of his staff as well 

that they put into this discussion draft. I must begin by saying I 

am a little disappointed, as I am sure the chairman is, that we 

couldn’t find 100 percent complete bipartisan consensus on all portions of this proposed release, but I do sit here today and pledge 

to continue to work with the chairman moving forward in hopes 

that we can eventually reach a place where we both are able to 

support the eventual final legislation. 

One of the provisions, as the chairman just indicated, he has 

some concerns with deals with the national recognized statistical 

rating organizations, the NRSROs and removal of them from the 

statute. I approached this debate on the credit rating agencies reform with the belief that the two most fundamental problems with 

our rating system are overreliance on ratings and a lack of investors’ due diligence. Investors have become increasingly all too often 

solely reliant on the use of these ratings in determining the safety 

and soundness of any investment. In literally hundreds of Federal 

and State government statutes and regulations, there are specific 

requirements mandating certain grades from the approved agencies 

is this formal requirement that provides an implicit stamp of approval to investors. So when an investor sees that the government 

is requiring a specific grade to make a safe investment, it reenforces the belief that any investment obtaining such a grade is 

basically safe. I know that the SEC has a similar concern as I do. 

So 2 weeks ago, the SEC announced it is removing references to 

the NRSROs in several of the regulations and studying other areas 

to determine where else they can be removed. 

And so I applaud the SEC for their actions and I urge them to 

continue their work. I believe that Congress should follow suit and 

reexamine all the areas where statute mandates the ratings of 

NRSROs. Credit ratings are only one piece of the puzzle in determining creditworthiness. Investors must be encouraged to do proper due diligence as well in evaluating issuer credit quality. 

Another way in which I believe we can help increase investor due 

diligence that this bill does touch on but does not go far enough is 

to increase disclosure through information by the issuer. When 

dealing with equity securities, investors have all the public information about the company because of the annual and quarterly filing requirements. So I believe that we should require the similar 

situation with debt securities. The issuer of debt securities should 

disclose the information contained in the offering more broadly so 

that investors have the ability themselves to delve in deeper into 

the submitted transaction. 

While there may be other things included in the proposal that I 

do support, like increased disclosure and better oversight, there are 

a couple of provisions that I have a little concern with. The provisions that I am most troubled by center around the question of liability. Unlike many of my friends across the aisle, I do not believe 

that the solution to some of these problems is more lawsuits. In the 

discussion draft, there is a provision to institute a collective liabilVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:14 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 054873 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\54873.TXT TERRIE
4 

ity among the NRSROs. And I must say, I am concerned about the 

practicality of this provision, not to mention the constitutionality as 

well. I don’t see what positive can be obtained by holding all the 

NRSROs accountable for the actions of just one. 

The main thrust of the 2006 Reform Act was to increase competition between credit rating agencies. Now, I know that the chairman 

voted for final passage of that Act in 2006, not withstanding his 

previously stated belief that there might be a natural oligopoly as 

he indicated within the credit rating industry. If we institute a 

sharing of financial legal liability however between all the 

NRSROs, I cannot think of any bigger impediment to new entries 

into the marketplace. The second area of concern regarding legal 

liability is the language in Section 4 to lower the pleading standards for lawsuits against the rating agencies. By making the rating 

agencies subject to suits whenever they are ‘‘unreasonable,’’ you are 

essentially lowering the bar from fraud to negligence. The practical 

effect of lowering the pleading standard will be a dramatic increase 

in cases being filed and eventually going to court. 

So I don’t believe that having more lawsuits brought against rating agencies is a really constructive way to improve the rating 

process. As Chairman Frank so often noted during the Bush Administration, that he did not realize that he was here to defend 

President Bush and his policies whenever there is an argument on 

the Floor of the House with regard to them, likewise, I must say 

I did not realize it would fall upon me to defend President Obama’s 

efforts in this context as well, because the Obama Administration 

has submitted an extensive credit rating agency reform proposal 

and increasing legal liability and was nowhere to be found in his 

proposal. 

Also, a recent ruling by a Federal court judge debunks the myth 

that it is impossible to get the credit rating agencies into the courtroom. So we should see how that case plays out before we overreact 

in committee. I have another concern as well, basically the increased liability. And so while I support the SEC providing better 

oversight of the NRSROs, I am worried that too much SEC involvement with ratings further implies a government sign-off on the ratings themselves. At what point during the SEC examination process to review whether rating agencies are following their methodologies does the SEC start prescribing specific methodologies for 

the NRSROs to follow? In my opinion, this would only further the 

belief that government is doing the rating themselves. 

Also, the requirement for differentiation of ratings from structured products is a concern. All structured products are not the 

same. And giving them the same connotation implies that they are. 

The SEC has already once considered this idea and they frankly 

dismissed it after an overwhelming number of investors voiced 

their concerns. So in conclusion, I think we all agree that significant reforms for the credit rating agencies are much needed. And 

I, quite frankly, do wholeheartedly applaud the chairman for his 

hard work and again of his staff. And I do look forward to working 

closely with him and the members of his staff and other members 

from both sides of the aisle as we move forward on this extremely 

important issue. With that, I yield back. 

5 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Garrett. We 

now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, for 3 

minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Nothing is more responsible for the 

fact that we are in this situation than the credit rating agencies 

giving AAA to Alt-A and otherwise giving outrageously high ratings 

to very bad mortgage-backed securities. Smart people in these credit rating agencies discovered that if they could devise a model 

based on the idea that home prices would never go down, then they 

could please the issuer, get the big fee, and avoid a liability. And 

so just sticking to your own model is insufficient since devising an 

issuer pleasing model is the key to get more business. We either 

have to remove the incentive the credit rating agencies have to 

please the issuer, or we have to counterbalance that incentive with 

the fear of liability. 

The best way to defend the status quo, to defend a system of 

pleasing the issuer, and getting the big fee and avoiding liability 

is to just tell people, don’t rely on the credit rating agencies, let 

them do whatever they want, and we will put a little cigarette 

warning on the bottom of the rating agency. This is a clever way 

to defend the status quo. Blame the investor for relying on the rating. How is my mother supposed to know which corporate bond to 

invest in if she wants a super safe bond? She either has to rely on 

the agency or hire a team of financial analysts to work for her. 

Which is a better system? And then we are told, well, invest in mutual funds. How are you supposed to determine which of two funds 

is safer if you want to invest in the corporate bond fund? The one 

that averages a AA rating or the one that averages an AAA rating 

or is my mother going to have to hire a team of financial experts 

to tell her which mutual fund is necessary? 

Rates are necessary. That is why people rely upon them. No matter what we say, people will continue to rely on them, so we have 

to make them reliable. One way to do that—as the chairman points 

out—is to counterbalance the risk that they will give to liberal— 

and a rating with the threat of liability. Another is to remove the 

incentive to give too liberal an A rating by eliminating the program 

where the issuer picks the credit rating agency. That is like having 

the home team pick the umpire and that is why I will have a legislative proposal. 

I look forward to working with the chairman on it, perhaps including it in his bill. I will have the work on it done next week to 

say that we should select the credit rating agency for the issuer at 

random from among the qualified umpires. That is how the American League does it. That is how the National League does it. 

Where would Major League Baseball be if the home team picked 

the umpire? The other way to do it is to have instant replay and 

make the umpire liable if he is calling too many balls that were 

really strikes. That might be effective as well. But the current system has failed. I yield back. 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman. We 

will now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Garrett. 

Mr. GARRETT. Just for unanimous consent to issue a statement 

from the Commercial Mortgage Security Association on this—regarding this hearing on reforming credit rating agencies. 

6 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Are there any objections? Without objection, it is so ordered. Next, we will hear from the gentleman from 

Delaware, Mr. Castle, for 21⁄2 minutes. 

Mr. CASTLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Credit rating agencies 

are meant to provide a valued service to investors by giving them 

an informed judgment on the risk of certain bonds. As we know, 

subprime and other mortgages were fragmented into pieces and 

bundled into mortgage-backed securities and then rated. Investors 

relied heavily on the rating agency models to assess the risk of 

these investments before making a purchase decision. Yet when 

AAA mortgage-backed securities began to fail, it became evident 

there was a problem with the system. As the housing bubble burst, 

I grew increasingly concerned with this issue, as did my colleague, 

Mr. Ackerman from New York. In July 2008, again, this Congress 

in the form of H.R. 1181, introduced legislation that directs the 

SEC to establish a process by which asset-backed instruments can 

be deemed eligible for nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, NRSRO ratings. Under this bill, eligible investments 

must consist of securities whose future performances can be recently predicted, such as those with established track records or 

homogenous structures. The SEC would have the authority to strip 

nationally recognized statistical rating organizations of their 

NRSRO designation if the rating agency fails to comply with provisions set forth in the legislation. I am pleased that we are continuing debate on credit rating agency reform. 

Although I believe it is clear that action must be taken, I believe 

we must do more to set guidance on the eligibility for investment 

for NRSRO designation to avoid falling into the same problems we 

currently face. I look forward to working with my colleagues to ensure adequate reform moving forward. Just one further comment 

beyond my talking points here, and that is the question I will have 

of the methodology of paying for your services. That was raised a 

little bit by Mr. Sherman, I think. And I think it is a matter of legitimate concern, that if the entities are asking you to rate a product or paying you, does that influence all the way this comes out 

or not and are investors shortchanged for some reason or another? 

I don’t have a solution to that. I am just interested in your comments on that as we go forward. I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Will the gentleman yield? My concern is not who 

pays the umpire, but who selects the umpire. 

Mr. CASTLE. If the wrong team pays the umpire, regardless of 

who selects him, that could be an issue too. So maybe we have to 

combine the two concerns. I understand where you are coming 

from. I would be happy to try to work with you on it. I yield back. 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Castle. We will 

now hear from the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Carson, for 2 minutes. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing today. We all agree that reform is necessary in the 

credit rating industry. This has become all too evident in the ongoing financial crisis. However, I believe that as we work to make the 

industry more independent and objective, we cannot ignore the industry’s relation to systemic risk. Credit rating agencies can inVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:14 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 054873 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\54873.TXT TERRIE
7 

crease systemic risk through unanticipated and abrupt downgrades. Such rating crises can lead to large market losses, fire sales 

and liquidity shortages. In this financial crisis, we have seen many 

recent examples of this. Defaults of subprime loans have led to abrupt and unanticipated rating downgrades of a number of rated securities, insurers, and bond insurers. These downgrades in turn led 

to larger market losses for investors. Although conflicts of interest 

and informational issues are key to understanding why such rating 

crises occur, it is critical to identify the different facets of risks in 

the ratings market and how it can lead to systemic crises and how 

to measure and manage them. We need to better assess the nature 

and extent of the use of credit ratings in financial markets as well 

as their potential impact on our long-term financial stability. 

It is clear that such an assessment will require a global approach 

that includes both micro and macro level analysis and includes all 

market participants. I look forward to this opportunity to discuss 

these issues with the distinguished panel, and I yield back my 

time. 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Carson. We 

will now hear from the gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, for 

3 minutes. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we dissect the proliferation of the exotic mortgages throughout our financial sector, 

it is hard to overlook the role played by the ratings issued by the 

various rating agencies. Certainly there were flaws in the actual 

ratings. In January of 2008, there were 12 AAA rated companies 

in the world. At that time, there were also 64,000 structured finance instruments like collateralized debt obligations holding that 

AAA rating. 

Further, many of those products were based on nothing more than junk mortgages. Of the $3.2 trillion of subprime mortgage securities issued, 75 percent were awarded AAA ratings. But the rating agencies missing the mark when assessing the potential risk 

associated with these products was not the core problem. I believe 

the major failure over the years was the blind reliance on the rating agencies by investors, financial institutions, and by the Federal 

Government. In many respects, the government has institutionalized these failed ratings. Looking back, this overreliance was as 

misguided as the ratings being issued by the NRSROs. 

Going forward, nothing will replace due diligence by investors 

and institutions and regulators. Alternative risk indicators must 

supplant what was previously an oligopoly by the NRSROs. I think 

a more competitive market with alternatives to the NRSROs ratings is the most effective alternative. And, for instance, I would 

raise the issue that many economists for some time have advocated 

for mandating large institutions to issue subordinated debt. Credit 

default swap spreads have also been used as an alternative to 

agency ratings. I look forward to discussing the draft legislation 

issued by the chairman as well as other potential reforms with my 

colleagues here today and hearing from these witnesses and I 

thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think in retrospect, Mr. Chairman, had we never codified under law some of the references to 

rating agencies that essentially put government behind the rating 

agencies there might have been more due diligence. Going forward, 

8 

I hope we learn from that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Chairman KANJORSKI. We will now hear from the gentleman 

from Illinois, Mr. Foster, for 2 minutes. 

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you. And I would like to thank Chairman 

Kanjorski for convening this hearing today to discuss the important 

topic of how best to reform the credit rating agencies. While I applaud the general thrust of this bill, and I think it signals advanced improvement over today’s regulatory environment, there 

are at least two major areas where I think the bill could be improved. The first major problem that we are wrestling with is the 

conflicts of interest inherent in the issuer pays business model for 

the rating agencies. I believe that the best model for going forward 

is to mimic the way that we handle similar conflicts and oversight 

of accounting and maybe modeled on the public company accounting oversight board, PCAOB. 

An oversight board like the PCAOB would be constituted largely 

or dominantly by users of credit ratings and would have teeth. Specifically, it would have powers to set standards and mandate disclosures, conduct spot checks and investigations, impose civil fines, 

ban firms and individuals from the credit rating industry. I believe 

that the PCAOB has been a necessary and sufficient entity to restore the credibility of the accounting industry in the post-Enron 

area. So the question I will be asking is what, if anything, might 

be the downside of instituting a similar oversight board for the 

credit rating industry. The second major problem that I see is the 

nonuniformity and nonquantitative nature of the language in 

which the ratings are reported by the CRAs. While the draft bill 

mandates the CRAs use generally recognized models when arriving 

at their ratings, I believe that greater detail under various well-defined market conditions would be very beneficial to investors. 

Specifically, I would emphasize the desirability of, first, standardization of ratings terminology so that all firms report ratings 

using identical terms. Second, industrywide standardization of 

stress conditions under which the ratings are evaluated. Thirdly, 

unambiguous quantitative correspondence between the ratings and 

the default probabilities under standardized conditions of economic 

stress. And fourth, standardization of terminology across asset 

classes so that, for example, a given rating applied to a municipal 

bond and a corporate bond will have the identical default probability under identical market stress conditions. One specific proposal that I would like to see investigated are what might be called 

ABZ ratings at a glance in which the three digits of a rating, instead of just being things that are made up, correspond to default 

probabilities under three different, well-defined levels of market 

stress. 

So the first digit, for example, could represent the default probability under normal market stress, the second digit under severe 

market stress and the third digit represents the default probability 

under extreme market stress. A 50 percent asset price drop, 10 percent increase in unemployment and so on. So a rating, if this style 

of ratings had been applied, then the ratings that would be assigned to an intermediary tranche of a mortgage pool, for example, 

9 

might hold up well under normal market conditions and then collapse at times of stress would be ABZ. 

And had this sort of language been applied to the ratings of 

mortgage-backed securities, then the right questions would have 

been asked and there would have been no way that AAA ratings 

would have been so freely disbursed. I thank the chairman for convening this hearing and I look forward to working with him to 

strengthen this critical legislation. I yield back. 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Foster. And 

now we will hear from the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hensarling, 

for 3 minutes. 

Mr. HENSARLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Clearly, there were 

a number of causes of our Nation’s economic turmoil, and most had 

their genesis in flawed public policy. Particularly with respect to 

the affordable housing mission of the government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, a story we know all too well. 

Now to state the obvious, the three major credit rating agencies 

badly missed the national housing bubble. That does not necessarily make them duplicitous, and it doesn’t necessarily make 

them incompetent. It just makes them wrong—very, very wrong. It 

is also a painful and expensive reminder that there is no substitute 

for some modicum of investor due diligence and personal responsibility. 

Now there is a sincere bipartisan desire for credit rating agency 

reform in this committee. Unfortunately, I believe the draft that is 

before us now falls short. There are a number of good provisions 

in the draft, in Chairman Kanjorski’s draft, including essentially 

removing the NRSRO designation from current statute in regulation. Unfortunately, the bill also includes provisions that will allow 

new liability exposure, including joint liability for the rating agencies. I feel that these sections will actually increase barriers to 

entry into the rating market and make it more difficult to have 

competition. An increase in lawsuits will become, I believe, an insurmountable barrier to competition. The joint liability provision 

especially troubles me. To make every rating agency potentially liable for the ratings of other agencies, I don’t see the parallel anywhere else in our body of law. I heard someone say that is a little 

like making Ford liable for a defective car manufactured by GM 

and then not giving Ford a chance to defend themselves. 

No nation can sue its way into economic recovery and financial 

stability. Increasing the agencies’ liability does not get at the root 

of the problem, which is the de facto government stamp of approval 

behind the rating agency’s work product. That is indeed where we 

need to go. People assume wrongly that the government stamp of 

approval meant accurate ratings. Congress took a good step with 

the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, but it was too little too late. 

Again, there is a vitally important lesson we have all learned about 

implied government backing. And so I want to compliment the 

chairman and the ranking member for having a bill before us that 

would essentially terminate the NRSRO designation. But unless we 

eliminate all barriers to entry, I am fearful that it is all for naught. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

10 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Hensarling. 

Now, we will hear from the gentlelady from Ohio, Ms. Kilroy, for 

2 minutes. 

Ms. KILROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your leadership on this issue and for the opportunity to work with you and 

the task force on this very important issue. Credit rating agencies 

occupy a unique and powerful position within the global markets 

and reforming this industry is a critical part of strengthening our 

financial regulatory system. Like many of my House colleagues, I 

have firsthand experience with the role credit rating agencies play 

as gatekeepers to the financial markets. Before coming to this 

House, I served for 8 years as a Franklin County commissioner and 

also for 8 years on the Columbus board of education representing 

constituents of central Ohio and as a county commissioner, worked 

very hard to make our county fiscally responsible and to maintain 

our double, AAA rating. 

It is a rating that we worked hard to keep because we thought 

it had meaning and value, that it represented a seal of approval 

and that it would save our taxpayers their hard-earned money. Of 

course, as you know, the rise of credit rating agencies as financial 

gatekeepers began when the Securities and Exchange Commission 

in 1975 in what probably seemed like a benign move tied broker/ 

dealer capital requirements to credit ratings issued by the nationally recognized statistical rating organization, a designation created and determined by the SEC. 

Since then, the credit rating agencies have experienced unprecedented growth. Even when the credit rating agencies seemed to get 

it all wrong, they did amazingly well, posting record profits at 

about the same time they were downgrading billions of dollars 

worth of subprime offerings. And it is not just that the rating agencies seemed to miss big. But now an infamous instant message exchange has been made public, instant messaging between two 

Standard & Poor’s officials about a mortgage-backed security deal 

dated April 5, 2007, which seems to suggest that credit rating 

agencies can make billions of dollars to provide an opinion on just 

about anything with little fear of penalty or recourse and that exchange one analyst stated over a colleague’s objections, ‘‘We rate 

every deal. If it is structured by cows then we would rate it.’’ And 

as recently as September 23, 2009, The Wall Street Journal reported that Moody’s is still assigning inflated ratings to complicated debt securities that they still do not fully understand. I am 

a sponsor of this very important piece of legislation, because it is 

this cavalier culture made worse by a broken system that cost millions of hard-working Americans their live savings and set our Nation into the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. 

Addressing the overreliance on NRSRO ratings and Federal statutes and regulations is a good place to start. Rating agencies 

should be a part of the equation when making investment decisions, not the equation. That is not to say that credit rating agencies do not provide value. For thousands of small investors, rating 

each and every security individually would be an impossible task. 

The proposal directs the SEC to adopt rating symbols to help the 

small investor distinguish between a municipal bond issue and a 

collateralized debt compromised of subprime mortgages that have 

11 

been sliced and diced and repackaged into looking like a safe investment. 

Finally, the proposal seeks to deal with credit rating agencies 

that act with malfeasance. Credit rating agencies that knowingly 

or recklessly failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into the 

very ratings they were paid to provide an assessment on should not 

be allowed unfetterred constitutional protection. Thank you again, 

Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity, and I yield back. 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Ms. Kilroy. We will 

now hear from the gentleman from Georgia for 1 minute, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we continue to monitor 

the current economic climate we are in and look towards some solutions and improvements that can be made, this hearing is quite 

timely as the credit rating agencies played a considerable role in 

what transpired and what will also impact in the future. Once a 

financial institution achieves the desired quality grade on a product, it pays the agency for the rating. This process is rife with conflict as I believe the agencies are acting as the market regulators, 

investment bankers, and as a sales force all the while claiming to 

be providing independent opinions. 

As these organizations are extremely important to the financial 

world, we should realize they did have a significant role to play in 

where we are now. And I also want to more intently focus on finding some consensus on how to move forward. These organizations 

determine corporate and government lending risk and are an integral part of our financial services sector. And as such, I want to 

ensure that we take all issues into account, including conflicts of 

interest, as well as the international financial world in reforming 

how we rate financial products. 

I am very interested to hear each of your thoughts and opinions 

on the recently introduced draft legislation by our chairman addressing rating agency reforms. And the requirement of disclosure 

revenue serving the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thank 

you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the time. And I look forward to 

this panel’s discussion. 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Scott. And now 

for our last presenter, Mr. Donnelly of Indiana, for 1 minute. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Some of the things 

we are going to be determining include whether it makes any sense 

for the very people who are trying to sell the product to be paying 

for the rating on it, whether we need a blind pool similar to how 

they do it with judges throughout this country in many places or 

as Mr. James Simon, whom we heard from, talked about a quasipublic utility. Whether a few pennies from each trade should go in 

to try to get an independent rating agencies. The fact is that this 

caused extraordinary damage and harm to our country and to Main 

Street America. In my very hometown, of South Bend, Indiana, 

Moody’s, in fact, closed their office there. And it was done because 

of economic hardship, allegedly, a very, very, very profitable company, and that hardship was supposedly caused by the meltdown 

we had that was caused, in part, by the credit rating agencies. 

So Main Street America has been extraordinarily damaged by 

this. And it is our job to make sure it does not happen again. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

12 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Donnelly. We 

have a little bit of a dilemma. We have four votes, I understand. 

And of course, we have 7 panelists of 5 minutes each for a presentation. Rather than break up the presentations of the panel, I suggest we will take our recess now, go over and vote, come back, and 

then hear the entire panel strung together so we have a better consensus. That means you are going to have to stay. We are sorry. 

Okay. With no other comments, the committee stands in recess. 

[recess] 

Chairman KANJORSKI. The committee will reconvene. The Chair 

recognizes the gentleman from Alabama. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a written statement for the record. So I would just like to submit it for the record. 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

We are at the point now where we have to welcome the panel. 

Thank you for accepting the delay. That is not uncommon around 

here. Many of you know that because of your prior experience. 

First and foremost, let me say that without objection, your written 

statements will be made a part of the record. You will each be recognized for a 5-minute summary of your testimony. 

First, we have Mr. Daniel M. Gallagher, Co-Acting Director of 

the Division of Trading and Markets at the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. Mr. Gallagher. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL M. GALLAGHER, CO-ACTING DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS, U.S. SECURITIES 

AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett, 

and members of the subcommittee, my name is Dan Gallagher, and 

I am a Co-Acting Director at the Division of Trading and Markets 

at the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding the oversight of credit rating 

agencies. I note at the outset that my written testimony today was 

approved by the Commission, but any remarks I make today, in 

particular on the draft bill, will be my own and may not reflect the 

views of the Commission. 

The poor performance of highly-rated securities over the last few 

years has resulted in substantial investor losses and increased 

market turmoil. As we work to restore the health of the markets, 

it is vital that we take further steps to improve the integrity and 

the transparency of the ratings process to promote competition 

among rating agencies and give investors the appropriate context 

for evaluating ratings. The proposed legislation Chairman Kanjorski recently released for discussion contains a number of measures that could enhance the Commission’s oversight program, including provisions designed to address conflicts of interest, a lack 

of transparency and limited accountability in the credit rating industry. 

I would note that over the last few years, the Commission has 

been addressing a number of these issues and we welcome the opportunity to discuss these efforts. As you know, Congress provided 

the Commission with authority to register and oversee nationally 

recognized statistical rating organizations, NRSROs, in the Credit 

Rate Agency Reform Act of 2006. 

13 

In the summer of 2007, using our new oversight authority and 

in response to gradually worsening marketing conditions, the Commission staff began examination of the three largest NRSROs— 

Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s—to look into their policies 

and practices relating to ratings of structured finance products 

linked to aggressively underwritten mortgages. To put it bluntly, 

the examinations revealed a number of serious problems. In particular, the examinations raised serious questions about the 

NRSROs’ management of conflicts of interest, internal audit processes, and due diligence activities. Findings from these initial examinations informed a second round of rule amendments which the 

Commission proposed in June of 2008 and adopted in February of 

2009. Earlier this month, on September 17th, the Commission embarked on further rulemaking designed to promote greater accountability, foster competition, decrease the level of undue reliance on 

NRSROs, and empower investors to make more informed decisions. 

The Commission adopted rule amendments designed to create a 

mechanism for NRSROs not hired to rate structured finance products to nonetheless determine and monitor credit ratings for these 

instruments. The goal of this rule is to make it possible for 

nonhired NRSROs to provide unsolicited ratings in the structured 

finance market just like they can in the corporate debt market. The 

Commission also adopted a requirement that NRSROs must disclose ratings history information for all outstanding ratings initially determined on or after June 26, 2007. This new disclosure requirement is designed to promote greater transparency of ratings, 

quality and increased accountability among NRSROs. The Commission also published for comment three sets of new requirements for 

NRSROs. The first proposal would increase accountability by requiring NRSROs to furnish the Commission with an annual compliance report describing actions taken to ensure compliance with 

the securities laws. 

The goal of this proposal is to increase accountability by 

strengthening the compliance function at the NRSROs and to alert 

the Commission to issues that may need to be examined. The second and third proposals would increase the information NRSROs 

must disclose to the public about the conflict of being paid for determining credit ratings and other services. These disclosures 

which would include a consolidated annual report are designed to 

provide investors with additional information on the source and 

magnitude of revenue, including revenues from non-rating services 

that an NRSRO receives from its clients. Notably, in its recent 

rulemaking, the Commission also proposed rating disclosure requirements for issuers of securities. For example, the Commission 

proposed amendments that would require certain detailed disclosures regarding credit ratings and registration statements. 

The Commission also proposed requiring the disclosure of preliminary ratings, as well as final ratings not used by an issuer so 

that investors would be informed when an issuer may have engaged in rating shopping. The Commission also took action to 

eliminate references to NRSRO credit ratings in certain of its rules 

and forms. This is designed to address concerns that references to 

NRSRO ratings and Commission rules may have contributed to an 

undue reliance on those ratings by market participants and the 

14 

Commission found that the removal of references either improved 

the rules or had no effect on them. 

Finally, the Commission issued a concept release seeking comment on whether it should propose rescinding a rule that exempts 

NRSROs from expert liability under Section 11 of the Securities 

Act. Rescinding Rule 436(g), coupled with the proposal to require 

disclosure of credit ratings in a registration statement if a rating 

is used in connection with a registered offering, could cause 

NRSROs to be included in the liability scheme for experts set forth 

in Section 11. The Commission appreciates Congress’ interest in 

this issue, and we stand ready to provide any assistance the subcommittee might need in its consideration of measures to reform 

the financial markets. I would be happy to answer any questions 

you may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallagher can be found on page 

60 of the appendix.] 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Gallagher. And 

now we will hear from Mr. Raymond McDaniel, chairman and chief 

executive officer of Moody’s Corporation. Mr. McDaniel. 

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND W. McDANIEL, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, 

MOODY’S CORPORATION 

Mr. MCDANIEL. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Kanjorski, 

and members of the subcommittee. I am Ray McDaniel, chairman 

and CEO of Moody’s Corporation, the parent of Moody’s Investor 

Service. I welcome the opportunity to contribute Moody’s views to 

the discussion today on legislative proposals of the credit rating industry. As this subcommittee knows well, the economic downturn 

has exposed numerous vulnerabilities in the infrastructure of the 

financial system. It has also provided important lessons for credit 

rating agencies and other market participants. 

In light of these lessons, during the past 18 months, Moody’s has 

adopted a number of measures to enhance the quality, independence, and transparency of our credit ratings. While these steps are 

detailed more thoroughly in my written statement, they include 

changes in the following five key areas: Strengthening the analytical quality of our ratings; enhancing consistency across rating 

groups; bolstering measures to manage conflicts of interest; improving transparency of ratings and the ratings process; and increasing 

resources in key areas. We believe we have made important 

progress but we welcome continued efforts that would reenforce 

high quality ratings and improve market transparency without intruding on the independence of rating opinion content. 

To that end, I would like to provide Moody’s initial views on the 

discussion draft circulated by the committee last week. These views 

are based on a preliminary review of the draft and we will be 

happy to provide the committee with more detailed comments in 

the near future. Moody’s supports the proposal to increase the 

transparency of ratings performance and methodologies. We believe 

such transparency will allow comparisons that can drive improvements in ratings quality across the industry. We also support enhancing regulatory oversight of the industry. Creating a dedicated 

SEC office for example, staffed by individuals with the necessary 

15 

expertise, could increase the focus of regulatory oversight and help 

protect the interests of all market participants. 

We also welcome efforts to limit the use of ratings and regulation. Moody’s has long believed that using ratings as a regulatory 

tool for oversight of regulated entities can adversely affect market 

behavior. It encourages overreliance on ratings as well as rating 

shopping and it can reduce incentives for rating agencies to compete based on the quality of ratings. While we strongly support the 

goal of the discussion draft to remove references to credit ratings 

and regulation, we also recognize the wisdom of pursuing this goal 

judiciously so as to not create unintended market disruptions. 

Moody’s also supports ratings oversight by an independent board of 

directors. Eight of the nine directors on Moody’s board are independent and, we believe, effective governance is well served by having the board provide oversight with respect to procedures and policies for the rating agencies. If, however, their role extends beyond 

oversight to the content of methodology, we believe the content of 

methodologies would suffer. This would replace the judgment of our 

current large body of analysts and credit policy professionals with 

a small body of board members who are at best part time experts 

in credit analysis. One provision in the discussion draft that 

Moody’s does not support is imposing a collective liability regime 

on all NRSROs. Credit rating agencies currently have the same liability as any other market participant if, for example, they knowingly make false statements or issue opinions that they don’t genuinely hold. We do not believe the market would be well served by 

changing the standard of liability in a way that would increase the 

ability of market participants to pursue litigation because they are 

unhappy with our ratings. 

We believe the effect on the credit rating industries would be to 

wash diversity of opinion, reduce competition, negatively impact 

market transparency, and make rate opinions more volatile. 

Finally, we strongly support efforts to address rating shopping, 

which is a serious concern. We believe, however, that to deter rating shopping, issuers must be required to disclose more detailed information to the market. Issuers in the structured finance market 

are not currently required to disclose publicly sufficient information 

for investors to engage in reliable analysis of the underlying assets 

of a securitization. We urge this subcommittee and the Congress to 

consider requiring that issuers in the structured finance market 

make disclosures similar to those required in the corporate market. 

Moody’s strongly supports constructive reforms that can enhance 

confidence in the credit ratings industry and the Nation’s credit 

markets. And we are committed to working with you to achieve 

that goal. I am happy to respond to any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McDaniel can be found on page 

109 of the appendix.] 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. McDaniel. 

And now we will hear from Mr. Deven Sharma, president of 

Standard & Poor’s. Mr. Sharma. 

16 

STATEMENT OF DEVEN SHARMA, PRESIDENT, STANDARD & 

POOR’S 

Mr. SHARMA. Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett, 

and members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. My name is 

Deven Sharma. I am the president of Standard & Poor’s, and I am 

pleased to appear before you today. 

Let me start by saying that at S&P, we appreciate your goal to 

reinvigorate the economy and job growth through stability and innovation. This is an important point in history as a regulatory reform is being considered that will shape the future of capital markets and economic growth for many years to come. Since our founding more than a century ago, we have tried to learn from experience to improve and strengthen our analytics and criteria and to 

review processes when appropriate. Thus in 2008, we announced a 

series of initiatives aimed at improving checks and balances in our 

organization. These measures are designed to promote the integrity 

of the rating process and enhance analytical quality, provide greater transparency to investors, and more effectively educate investors 

about ratings. 

Let me assure you that these improvements are substantive and 

will go a long way to restoring confidence in our ratings. Another 

way to restore confidence in ratings is to pursue effective regulation of credit rating agencies. Although we are already subject to 

a broad and robust regulatory scheme, S&P shares the view that 

further regulation appropriately crafted can serve the goal of restoring and maintaining investor confidence. Indeed, we support 

many recent proposals for greater regulatory oversight and enhanced internal processes to promote integrity in the ratings process. These include increased accountability through SEC authority 

to oversee NRSRO and impose steep fines and other sanctions for 

noncompliance with SEC rules or NRSRO rules, internal procedures and to require disclosure around issues such as data quality. 

There are other proposed measures that would seriously disrupt 

the capital markets by encouraging less diversity of opinions, providing strong disincentives for analytical innovation and creating 

global inconsistency. One such proposal would seek to lower the 

threshold, legal requirements for bringing a securities fraud claim 

against NRSROs. 

Such a measure, if enacted, would cause some NRSROs to rate 

only those entities and securities that are the least likely to default 

or be downgraded. As a result, issuers who are relatively new to 

the debt markets may have a difficult time getting rated and therefore greater difficulty accessing capital and contributing to economic recovery. Since small and medium enterprises as well as 

new technology companies, for example, green companies or 

broadband providers, represent critical and emerging elements in 

our national production and employment basis, this result could 

have detrimental effects on economic growth. Another proposal 

would subject each NRSRO to collective liability for legal judgments against any NRSRO. No NRSRO should be required to act 

as an insurer for its competitors. We are also concerned about a 

proposal providing that rating opinions shall not be deemed forward looking statements under the Federal securities laws. 

17 

This proposal ignores that the very essence of a rating is forward 

looking; that is, ratings speak to the likelihood that an obligor will 

pay back principal and interest in the future. At S&P, we have 

heard consistently from investors that ratings must be forward 

looking in order to have value. Another proposal would dictate that 

ratings could only measure likelihood of default. At S&P, our analysis includes additional important factors such as credit stability, 

which addresses whether an issuer or security would have a likelihood of experiencing large declines in credit quality in certain 

stressful situations. These are analytical considerations that investors have told us repeatedly that they want. Any government mandate that would dictate how NRSROs form their rating opinions 

and which factors they may or may not consider would deprive investors of the full breadth and diversity of NRSROs’ opinions. It 

could also lead to undue investor reliance on rating opinions based 

on the perception that the government has endorsed NRSROs’ 

methodologies and their written opinions, a result counter to the 

goal of recent proposals that would remove the NRSRO designation 

from existing laws and rules. 

In sum, we agree completely with the goal of improving the integrity, quality, and transparency of credit rating analysis to better 

inform investors in their decisionmaking. However, we urge caution in the crafting of proposals that will result in less comprehensive and informative ratings to the detriment of investors, business 

enterprises large and small and the capital markets as a whole. I 

thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing and 

would be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sharma can be found on page 

129 of the appendix.] 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Sharma. 

Next we will hear from Mr. Stephen W. Joynt, president and 

chief operating officer at Fitch, Incorporated. Mr. Joynt. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN W. JOYNT, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

FITCH, INC. 

Mr. JOYNT. Thank you, Chairman Kanjorski, and members of the 

subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you on behalf of Fitch 

Ratings. Today’s hearing marks the third time this year I have appeared before congressional panels on the topic of regulation of 

credit rating agencies. I have attached my written statement from 

August to the end of my statement. However, I would like to highlight a few brief important points in light of selected recent events. 

I believe in the last several years, Fitch generated and we continue to produce a significant amount of balanced and insightful 

fundamental credit analysis across many asset classes and capital 

markets. Having said that, I have also previously acknowledged 

that too many of our rating opinions, particularly in some of the 

most impacted structured finance asset classes, did not perform as 

expected with too many downgrades of too many notches. I am 

aware that this negative result is the key factor in our discussions 

here today. 

Improving our performance drives many of the changes that we 

continue to make at Fitch. Having said that, all credit rating agencies are not the same. When it comes to the issues of credit culture 

18 

and intent, I would like Fitch to be judged on its own merits. Over 

the last several years, media coverage of the credit rating agencies 

and related regulatory inquiries tend to characterize the industry 

as being dominated by the Big 3 agencies. Many market participants and commentators then extend the point by asserting and 

implying that there is no difference among the Big 3. 

In the SEC’s 2008 report on the rating agencies, the source document for many negative e-mails often quoted in the media, none of 

the negative e-mails referenced were from Fitch. That same report 

concluded that our internal processes were robust and that our 

staffing levels were appropriate and kept pace with the growth in 

our business. In the early stages of the credit crisis in November 

2007, Fitch decided we needed to conduct a wholesale review of our 

CDO methodology. As a result, we imposed a moratorium on rating 

any new CDOs while we conducted this review. We subsequently 

adopted a revamped and more conservative criteria for corporate 

CDOs on April 30, 2008. 

Since that time, we have assigned very few ratings to any corporate or other CDOs. Fitch was also early in highlighting the increasing credit risk of the financial guarantors, lowering AAA ratings, which resulted in direct public attacks against us from these 

monolines, followed by requests to withdraw our ratings and termination of all commercial relationships. 

Fitch culture and credit practices consistently emphasize the importance of the timeliness, transparency, and integrity of our ratings and credit opinions over any revenue implications. Turning to 

recent regulatory developments in the United States, the SEC has 

introduced some final rules and proposed a series of new ones, 

while much progress has been made, we are disappointed that one 

key area has yet to be addressed: enhanced public disclosure broadly and structured for finance securities. Fitch has repeatedly suggested that the information made available to the rating agencies 

as parts of the rating process for securitization should be made 

available to all investors and the responsibility for disclosing that 

information should rest with issuers. 

To date, the SEC continues to focus narrowly on the sharing of 

information only among NRSROs. Regarding the committee’s recent draft of the bill, Fitch shares the general objectives of greater 

reliability, transparency, and accountability embodied in many of 

the provisions for credit rating agencies. A number of the provisions are very reasonable and consistent. We will provide comments in more detail to the members and staff in the coming days. 

I would like to highlight several issues that have also already been 

mentioned. The goal of reducing the market’s reliance on ratings 

through reference in Federal regulation, the proposed bill removes 

all such references. Fitch has previously noted that ratings have 

been used effectively in regulations in many places as independent 

benchmarks, a position that has been supported by many market 

participants. We continue to suggest that an in-depth, case-by-case 

review of any removals to determine whether such course of action 

is appropriate. 

The question of what would replace ratings also remains unanswered, or at least without a thorough understanding of the specific pros and cons or unintended consequences of the removals. 

19 

Also, a bill that mandates the removal of all references to NRSROs 

and all Federal statutes while significantly enhancing the Federal 

regulatory requirements and burden on NRSROs seems contradictory to us. I believe it would affect the increasing competition that 

the committee was hoping for, for the industry. We have previously 

commented on the concept of the mandatory registration for credit 

rating agencies. I noted in my testimony before the Senate Banking 

Committee in August that Fitch, along with the other NRSROs, is 

already registered and subject to explicit SEC regulatory oversight. 

We believe the mandatory registration concept is unnecessary. 

Fitch has previously stated that it supports the concept of enhanced accountability for what we do, but we continue to disagree 

with the notion that far greater liability or specific liability is the 

right way to achieve that. 

Ratings are a forward looking opinion of creditworthiness, not a 

backward looking verification of financial statements as conducted 

by accountants. Creating an additional and separate liability standard solely for NRSROs as envisioned by the bill seems unprecedented and unnecessary. The bill also introduces collective liability 

for rating agencies. This provision would require us to share information with all other rating agencies, much of it proprietary or 

from third party vendors. We cannot turn that information over to 

other agencies. That idea also that we should be responsible for 

verifying other NRSROs’ information and ratings seems to us quite 

problematic. 

Finally, the bill also contains some provisions that we find to be 

contradictory. For example, the bill requires distinct symbology for 

structured finance ratings, yet also mandates that we try to use all 

the same ratings and approaches for all kinds of asset classes; this 

is confusing. And in closing, Fitch has undertaken a wide variety 

of initiatives to enhance the reliability and transparency of our ratings. I believe we can continue to produce a significant amount of 

good work with that in mind, and we are open to all improvements 

to the industry and our own performance. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joynt can be found on page 88 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Joynt. 

Next, we will hear from Mr. Robert Dobilas, president and chief 

executive officer of RealPoint LLC. Mr. Dobilas. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. DOBILAS, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

REALPOINT LLC 

Mr. DOBILAS. Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing. RealPoint successfully operates under the investor 

pay business model. While we issue subscriber paid ratings on 

around $1 trillion worth of securities, our market specialty is 

CMBS, or Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities. We are one of 

5 NRSROs designated under the TALF program as an eligible rating agency for CMBS. 

Last week, with strong investor support, the NAIC, or National 

Association of Insurance Commissioners, unanimously approved 

RealPoint as an acceptable rating organization for CMBS securities. We believe the credit crisis is far from over, but we believe 

that the SEC’s recent efforts are working, at least with respect to 

20 

structured finance. New issues are creeping back into the market 

and spreads are contracting from their all-time highs of a year ago. 

Investor confidence is starting to return. This momentum needs to 

be sustained. One way to sustain it is to give investors choices in 

regards to their selection of rating agencies. 

It would be a mistake to legislate smaller NRSROs out of business and force investors to rely only on a few large NRSROs for 

ratings. We support the SEC’s most recent announced changes and 

believe any rating agency reform should be consistent with those 

policies. The discussion draft may be intended to reform the larger 

NRSRO but its measures may eliminate the smaller ones. Legislation that creates barriers to entry in practical levels of liability or 

increased internal costs for smaller NRSROs furthers the interests 

of the larger ones. 

The proposal to make all NRSROs jointly liable for an 

unsatisfied civil judgment against another is impractical. No one 

company should be forced to guarantee a competitors obligation. A 

company should not have to risk responsibility for a liability over 

which it has no control. The proposal to reduce first amendment 

protections for credit rating agencies is anti-competitive and further enhances the existing oligopoly structure. A small company 

cannot guarantee trillions of dollars of rated securities, merely because it provided a forward looking independent opinion regarding 

their performance. The proposal to require publication of ratings 

and rating actions without a timeline will put subscriber based 

NRSROs out of business. 

The SEC has already announced rules requiring public disclosure 

of ratings and rating actions with the specified time lag. That protects the interests of subscriber-based NRSROs. The proposal to require every agency to review and improve every other NRSRO’s 

work is impractical. Not every agency rates every class of security. 

This requirement would increase the cost of ratings and thereby reduce investor yields. This requirement appears to include analytics 

and proprietary information developed by an NRSRO and date of 

purchase by that NRSRO, towards the goal of improved ratings 

and competitive advantages. This requirement would therefore reduce incentives to improve proprietary rating methodologies. The 

proposed requirements for independent directors and compliance 

officers may work for large, publicly-traded companies, but would 

require small companies to incur significant costs who had board 

members with a skill set and depth of knowledge necessary to fully 

understand and improve analytical models and methodologies and 

may expose those board members to a level of liability. 

The one-year prohibition on performing ratings for an issuer that 

hired a former analyst would increase the cost to attract and retain 

talented analysts. Rating agency employees who may also wish to 

seek corporate work will not be willing to impair their right to do 

so without increased compensation. The proposal to require credit 

ratings symbols that distinguish classes of securities is not in our 

experience desired by the capital markets. Investors want to know 

that AAA means AAA, not where one class is a real AAA whereas 

another represents a lower version of AAA. As we have attempted 

to show with various examples, the discussion draft and other wellintentioned remedial proposals have a common flaw, namely their 

21 

proposals are aimed at two entirely different types of companies 

with entirely different business models. 

If Congress applies a multitude of new rules, regulations, and 

procedure controls to NRSROs which disadvantage smaller companies, the result is to punish the innocent and stifle the progress we 

have made to date. In our view, the better remedy is to specifically 

address the two fundamental problems, market concentration and 

rating shopping. Competition can be further enhanced across the 

broader range of public offerings and—by having securities, at least 

in part, rated coequally by subscriber-based rating agencies. No 

meaningful change can take place while three agencies control over 

95 percent of the market. Thank you for the opportunity to appear 

at this hearing. I look forward to responding to any questions you 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dobilas can be found on page 48 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much. 

Next, we will hear from Mr. James H. Gellert, President and 

chief executive officer of Rapid Ratings International, Incorporated. 

Mr. Gellert. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES H. GELLERT, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, 

RAPID RATINGS INTERNATIONAL, INC. 

Mr. GELLERT. Thank you. On behalf of my colleagues at Rapid 

Ratings, I would like to thank Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett, and the members of the subcommittee for inviting me 

to provide testimony today. As the only non-NRSRO on this panel, 

we appreciate your invitation all the more as we and companies 

like us have what we believe is a critical voice in these debates. 

As with the new subscriber-paid NRSROs, we represent the potential for meaningful change to the status quo if we are not inadvertently hindered by the consequences of legislation and regulation 

along the way. Ours is a subscriber-paid firm. We utilize a proprietary software based system to rate the financial health of thousands of public and private companies quarterly. We use only financial statements, no market inputs, no analysts and have no contact in the ratings process with issuers, bankers or advisors. We 

have not applied for the NRSRO status. As I have testified to the 

SEC and the Senate in recent months, there are still too many deterrents for me to recommend to our shareholders that the designation enhances value as opposed to puts it at risk. 

That said, we believe that reform in our industry is necessary 

and time is of the essence for restoring credibility. However, we 

caution that some initiatives may have significant and counterproductive consequences. In short, we do not believe it is advisable 

to create more legislation for legislation sake. Although we did not 

necessarily agree with all of the elements of the Credit Rating 

Agency Reform Act of 2006. Its intent of appropriate to promote 

competition to transform this industry. Some say the Act has not 

had enough time to mature and others that it wasn’t sufficient. 

Nevertheless, the Act is still the basis for constructive change 

and the SEC’s recent initiatives have made good progress in adding 

reform and oversight to the prior legislation. These improvements 

have set a better stage for competition than we have had in years. 

22 

The Commission has also been receptive to input from industry 

players. When recently faced with criticism about reading disclosure rules, adverse effect on subscriber paid firms, the SEC created 

different standards for issuer paid and subscriber paid NRSROs. 

This showed admirable flexibility and not applying a one-sizefits-all model to new rules. We encourage the subcommittee to be 

guided by this flexibility. 

The subcommittee’s discussion draft joins a crowded field of rating agency reform initiatives currently underway. There are positive developments in the collection of initiatives, but even these do 

not yet go far enough, and the negative ones forge entirely new and 

unfortunately disturbing paths. 

Competition is key to transform this industry. But competition 

for competition’s sake is not the answer. Competition that effects 

change will enhance the credibility of the ratings process. The new 

subscriber-based rating agencies are the best hope for achieving 

these goals but are the ones put most at risk by the discussion 

draft. For new players to want to register NRSRO status must 

have value and not carry massive compliance costs and legal liability. New players will want the designation if they see it as a business asset, not as a series of contingent liabilities. 

In order to achieve this, legislation must foster the following 

goals: accuracy in ratings; innovation in business models and rating methodology; encouraging, not discouraging, new players; 

equivalent disclosure of structured product information; and recognition that many initiatives tacitly support the status quo oligopoly. 

Sadly, the trend toward greater and more complex legislation 

and regulation will repel and not attract competition and, hence, 

preserve the status quo, the very problem you were hopefully trying to solve. 

In particular, the emphasize on liability I believe is being 

overdone. Should negligence and malfeasance be rooted out? Yes. 

Should a one-size-fits-all legal framework be enacted to punish all 

players jointly, irrespective of whether they have sinned in the 

past? No. 

A few specific notes on liability. Joint liability is a great disincentive to NRSRO status. In fact, it is simply a nonstarter for a potential applicant. Why would one want to be an NRSRO, joining a 

group dominated by three players who have an iceberg of lawsuits 

looming on their horizon? That would be like swimming towards 

the Titanic. 

Equivalent disclosure. The equivalent disclosure of data used in 

formulating a ratings decision among NRSROs is a boon to competition. If the perspective NRSRO sees the ability to expand into 

a new asset class of ratings, for instance, CDOs and CLOs, there 

is a material benefit to the designation. Moreover, expanding this 

disclosure to outstanding issues is critical. Likely no greater initiative could be taken to kick-start liquidity revival in structured 

products. 

Mandatory registration. Under current law, ratings firms have 

the option to apply for NRSRO status. Requiring registration while 

the hard and soft costs of being an NRSRO are currently 

unquantifiable is a major hurdle to new players and is likely a 

23 

complete disincentive to the de novo firm. Add this to joint liability 

and the potential costs to a new player are astronomical. 

Removal of ratings, references, and regulations. In general, we 

are very supportive of removing references and regulations because 

they protect the status quo dominance of the ratings oligopoly. 

I will conclude with the issue of conflicts of interest. 

Central to the issuer-paid rating agencies argument for defending their conflicted business model is that the subscriber-paid rating agencies also conflicted, suggesting that a modified version of 

the status quo is the only real alternative. This is a red herring. 

Let’s not miss the irony of these issuer-paid agencies shifting public attention away from their committed sins to the uncommitted 

sins of very small competitors paid by investors who are seeking 

protection from fiduciary irresponsibility. 

To address all of these issues, legislation and regulations must 

be flexible and not require a one-size-fits-all straitjacket, recalling 

that subscriber-based rating agencies are the future solution to the 

current problems, while issuer-paid rating agencies were the cause. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gellert can be found on page 76 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Gellert. 

Now, we will finally hear from Mr. Kurt Schacht, managing director of CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity. Mr. 

Schacht. 

STATEMENT OF KURT N. SCHACHT, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

CFA INSTITUTE CENTRE FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRITY 

Mr. SCHACHT. Thank you, Chairman Kanjorski, and thank you, 

subcommittee members, for having CFA here to provide you some 

background and perspective that I think is not otherwise represented here, which is the perspective of investors and users of 

these products. So we are happy to have our 95,000-member organization help with some of that perspective. 

We have been commenting on these various aspects of credit rating agency reform for the last couple of years. In my written testimony, I reference some of those occasions. And as we have commented before, I think there is a lot of confusion on the investor 

side about just what is going on, whether we are regulating, whether we are removing reference; and there is a good deal of confusion 

on what is the role of CRAs going forward, what should it be, and 

what can be trusted in this process. So we are hopeful that this discussion draft moves it along closer to some answers. 

I will concentrate my verbal testimony this afternoon on the five 

questions that you asked us in the invitation. 

Regarding the discussion draft, we very much support the efforts 

there to provide additional transparency of the process. I think, 

most importantly, we support the efforts to better align that process and activity with the interest of investors, very basic, very important concepts. 

There are sections where we have new Commission rules on conflicts of interest. Section 5 is excellent. The look-back reviews that 

you have there with respect to employees going to work for firms 

that they have rated are excellent, and the new rules on public disVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:14 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 054873 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\54873.TXT TERRIE
24 

closure of both ratings performance and methodologies we think 

are very strong. 

We are very concerned about a couple of things, the proposed detail of the legislation on setting director pay for credit rating agencies as well as setting by statute the roles and responsibilities of 

directors. We think that it is rather unusual to see that in statute, 

as does the some 13 different subsections that you have in place 

related to the dos and don’ts, shoulds and shouldn’ts for compliance 

officers. That seems to be something that should be left to general 

principals and articulated by the regulators as they implement 

this. 

Regarding the liability question, you have heard a lot about that 

today. I don’t have to recast that. 

Earlier this year, we help set up an Investors Working Group, 

which put together a very comprehensive report on a lot of pieces 

of regulatory reform related to the crisis, and that is all part of our 

written testimony. I hope you have a chance to take a look at it. 

It is comprised of very senior, very well-known investors, former 

regulators, and experts. 

This group was clear that they felt that NRSROs should not be 

essentially exempt from civil liabilities under section 11 of the 1933 

Act for issuer-paid ratings. We could not find one instance where 

a credit rating agency has ever been held liable for any sort of 

money damages at all in this area for their doing things in the normal course of their ratings practice. And so claims have been 

brought, but almost all have failed. The Investors Working Group 

felt that this change would make credit rating agencies much more 

diligent about the process and much more accountable for negligent 

practices. 

I won’t comment on the freedom of speech issue. The first 

amendment stuff, we are not experts on that, of course, but just to 

say we are happy and glad to leave that to you to referee. That will 

be an interesting discussion. 

In any event, the group felt that they needed to have increased 

liability. I think we feel that section 4, the standards for private 

actions on page 31 of your consult, moves us in that direction, 

moves us closer. 

This morning, I think you heard this discussion about doing 

something that would give reason for these firms to turn down 

business, bad business; and I think that is probably the one area 

where we should focus. 

I won’t say anything more about section 3. I don’t think anybody 

likes that idea, maybe with the exception of the plaintiff’s bar. 

On the issue of the issuer-paid model, there will always be an 

actual conflict of interest. In the research and opinions where there 

is an issuer-paid model, the best we can do is to mitigate that conflict. I think that is what this discussion draft does. It is what the 

SEC has been focused on, it is what other stakeholders in this debate have been focusing on, trying to mitigate those conflicts of interest. 

In the Investors Working Group report that you have, there are 

further suggestions related to the fee area, that fees earned for rating should vest over time, that the amount of fees paid, they should 

be based on the performance of the ratings over the course of the 

25 

credit performance of the bond. And I think you get to that in your 

section 5(f) on page 13. 

There are many other discussions going on about the somebodyelse-pays model. We have not—this Investors Working Group nor 

our organization has really focused much on these other approaches, preferring instead to focus on, if we are going to have an 

issuer-paid model, how do you mitigate those risks? 

Finally, on the issue of removal and unintended consequences, 

we found this issue to be the trickiest of the lot. There has much 

been said and already done, as you know, globally on the removal 

of the references, but it still appears everywhere. We are talking 

about putting back references through this discussion draft, and it 

continues to appear throughout private contract. 

We are not sure what happens if you remove it all. We are not 

sure what happens to the pace and the efficiency of financial markets. What the Investors Working Group and CFA have focused on 

is looking at this from the standpoint of the investor, and what we 

do is we scold investors for the blind reliance and the very bad habits that this credit rating process has developed across many institutions and that is using credit rating agencies as really a substitute for their own analysis and due diligence. 

Now, I think unless you are fully asleep at the switch, investors 

should be on full alert that the ratings are not government-sanctioned, that the quality and validity and the accuracy are not examined or otherwise approved by the government. We seem to be 

moving in that direction with the discussion draft. 

The Investors Working Group reasons that maybe further removal and ultimately elimination of those references would further 

drop that reliance. We just did a survey in the last couple of days, 

and our member survey came back that 54 percent of the members 

would like to see us move towards full elimination of those references. 

I will stop there. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schacht can be found on page 

124 of the appendix.] 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Schacht. 

I will start the questions simply because, to a large extent, some 

of the issues that you raised are issues that I put into the draft. 

First and foremost, the explanation of the conflict of interest— 

inherent conflict of interest with issuer pays. I find it being exceptional. I cannot think of many examples and certainly few good examples, but recently in a discussion with a United States Senator, 

I suggested that I discovered the methodology by which we could 

cut a significant cost out of our budget in the United States. If we 

removed any expenses allowed in the budget for the payment of judiciary and that we would pay the judiciary by having the attorneys for the winning litigants stand the expenses of the judges’ salaries and expenses. 

And, of course, as I say that, I see some of the people in the room 

smile and smirk. Nobody would even remotely suggest that would 

be a reasonably acceptable standard in justice. And yet, if you really analyze what I just said to you, it is exactly what you are doing 

in the rating agency business. 

26 

Now you may be holier than nuns or cleaner than popes, but I 

doubt that at all times there have not been compromises in the situation—or else there would not be shopping around. Many of the 

witnesses here talked about shopping. Now why would you shop for 

something if you were not trying to buy a little preference in a rating from your potential rater? I think we have to concede it is 

there. 

Now the next question is, can you remove it? And I have come 

to the conclusion obviously this did not come about because somebody envisioned just let’s do it. It is obvious that the other methodology, user pay, was not working too well or sufficiently to support 

a rating agency, a business. So my attempt was to find some compromise that would allow users to pay but increase their liability— 

or issuers to pay but increase their liability if there is knowing 

wrongful acts on their part. 

And then, secondly, encouraging a mechanism to find exposure. 

What better than to have your competitors examine the same figures and information and having them do a reasonably good job of 

oversight? Because if they miss it or do not do it, if they do not 

report actions to the regulator, that will raise questions on the validity of the rating. They ultimately could become sanctioned. 

Now where we pulled that out, quite frankly, is by analogy from 

the insurance industry. We basically do that in the insurance industry, right now, in catastrophic disaster areas. 

If an insurance company is insuring against hurricanes in Florida, you could make a fortune. Go down and cut any ratings in 

half, and everybody in Florida will flock to your house, pay you the 

premium, and you can have the major proportion of business in 

Florida. Then what you want to do cleverly is get out of town before the hurricane arrives, and if you do that, you will make a fortune. The problem is that we have had people do that and stay in 

town and not be able to pay those damages that resulted from the 

hurricane. 

So in order to prevent that irresponsible levying of rates, insurance rates, they started pooling. Basically, that is what pooling is 

all about. It says, look, if the one that wrote the policy underrated 

the proper premium to pay for the damage, or made some fundamental errors, or did not make any errors at all but just because 

of circumstances was unable to pay, the insured should not be the 

responsible party taking all of the loss. Instead, that loss will be 

shifted to a pool created by an assessment of all the other underwriters in the area. 

Now, I do not think that is the best thing in the world; and, as 

a result, we have not even structured the language to accomplish 

this idea. 

What I am trying to encourage is outside-of-the-box thinking. We 

obviously have a major problem of conflict of interest. We obviously 

have rating agencies that are being shopped. We obviously have 

had horrible results in the last several years with rating agencies 

missing many of the securitized areas by giving them rates of triple 

A when in no way should they have had triple A. 

I do want to point out that an insurance company came to me 

very recently with a study in their industry; and that industry in 

the United States is almost wiped out. And the reason being they 

27 

showed me that their competitors were buying securitized mortgages. It got so bad in 2007 that 15 percent of the mortgages included in the pools had never made the first installment of the 

mortgage. There was a default by 15 percent in the first installment due to the mortgages that were included in the pool. 

Now I do not know whether due diligence is being used. I do not 

know whether proper study measures are being used. But when 

you are including mortgages and marketing them, the securities 

based on those mortgages, as triple A when the installments of 15 

percent of the mortgages are missed in the first instance, somebody 

is wrong and somebody is lax. 

And to some of the testimony here, it seemed to me that you are 

saying, well, sorry, we missed it, or the most important thing is we 

have competition. 

Competition is good and cures things, if competition really works. 

Has anybody suggested the competition that is there now is working? And if it is not working, what are your suggestions of competition and how we get it to work, other than just putting more people 

into the field when there are only 3 doing 95 percent of the work. 

I see that my time has expired, so I will pass on my comments 

and questions and hopefully get to the next round. 

I will now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, the ranking 

member, Mr. Garrett. 

Mr. GARRETT. I am going to defer first to— 

Chairman KANJORSKI. I am sorry. Mr. Bachus. 

Mr. BACHUS. That is okay. 

Mr. Chairman, can we have about 8 minutes on each side? I 

know you took about 8 minutes, if that is all right. There is a limited number of members. 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Just do not act like rating agencies. 

Mr. BACHUS. And I would maybe start my time after I ask this 

question. 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Well, no, I think we should certainly give 

you 8 minutes. For you, Mr. Ranking Member, we will give you 10 

minutes, if you want. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. I know the timekeeper heard that, too. 

My first question is, we have heard a scenario where an issuer 

gets a rating from one of the rating agencies and that rating is not 

disclosed. Then they go to a second rating agency, and they share 

that rating and say, can you do better? Obviously, that could lead 

to some skewed ratings. 

I would ask Mr. McDaniel and Mr. Sharma, does that happen? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. Congressman, the issue of rating shopping, as we 

said in—at least as I said in our prepared remarks, is indeed a serious issue. It is not, however, an issue that I think is driven by 

the business model and payment. It is an issue that is driven by 

lack of information. 

Mr. BACHUS. What I am saying, Mr. McDaniel, are there cases 

where someone goes to, say, S&P and then they come to you. They 

haven’t disclosed that rating. And they come to you and say, I 

would like to you do another rating. And then you give a different 

rating and say it is higher. Then they choose which one to disclose. 

Does that happen? 

28 

Mr. MCDANIEL. Yes, I believe that does; and that is why I believe 

it is a serious issue. 

Mr. BACHUS. And you would agree—and, Mr. Sharma, do you 

agree that has happened in the past? 

Mr. SHARMA. Yes, Congressman, it does happen; and the solution 

around putting more transparency as to where the issuers have 

gone and who they have selected and why they selected, such 

transparency will bring everything up. 

Mr. BACHUS. Would either one of you gentleman object to saying 

that if you go to a second agency, you disclose both ratings? 

Mr. SHARMA. The issuers and we could be asked to disclose. 

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. McDaniel. 

Mr. MCDANIEL. I think the objective is a good objective. I think 

that it would be difficult to make work. Because I think that, to 

the extent the marketplace does not want to have ratings disclosed, 

they would simply work around that. They would ask hypothetical 

scenarios. 

Mr. BACHUS. What if you gave a preliminary rating and you were 

under legal obligation to disclose that? Do you think you could 

work around that? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. To the extent that we give a preliminary rating 

and are required to disclose that, we certainly would. I think they 

would—to the extent that they are trying to avoid having that happen, I think they would try to avoid having a preliminary— 

Mr. BACHUS. Oh, I can bet you they will try to avoid it. 

Mr. Gallagher, is that a problem and are you going to address 

that at the SEC? 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Congressman, thank you. 

This is actually something that the Commission has taken action 

on. In our September 17th meeting, the Commission proposed rules 

geared specifically to issuers, going right to the primary actor in 

the scenario that you outlined and proposing rules that would require, as you say, under penalty of law that they disclose whether 

they are rating shopping, whether they are seeking either preliminary or other ratings. 

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. McDaniel, I think he has been quite candid; 

and I compliment you for that, Mr. McDaniel. 

There are ways to get around it. And even if, say, Mr. McDaniel 

doesn’t or Mr. Sharma, someone may try to; and I would ask you 

to maybe even consult with them on ways not to get around it. 

Mr. Joynt and others, if you would maybe share with the industry. Because they know better than anybody else how to get around 

it and could tell you how to build a safer system. 

Mr. Gallagher in his testimony said that analysts were sometimes involved in the discussions concerning fees. That to me appears—and he said in his testimony that is a serious conflict of interest. Mr. McDaniel, do you agree that that appears to be a conflict of interest, at the very least? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. The involvement of analysts in fee discussions I 

do think is inappropriate. We do not permit that. 

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Sharma, do you permit that? Going forward, 

will you permit that? 

29 

Mr. SHARMA. Mr. Congressman, we have had long-standing policies not to allow analysts involved in any commercial activities, 

and we recently even reinforced that. 

Mr. BACHUS. And, Mr. Joynt, I assume you all are already doing 

that. 

Mr. JOYNT. That is correct. 

Mr. BACHUS. I appreciate all of you saying that. 

And even I think when you share e-mails, if they see the e-mail 

traffic about those discussions, I think that you need a safeguard 

there. Mr. Gallagher mentioned that, and I thought that was very 

appropriate. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Congressman, I will just jump in and say that 

we actually have a rule that is exactly on point with this issue prohibiting that conflict. 

Mr. BACHUS. Is that a new rule or something you have had in 

the past? 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Since we have gotten the statutory authority. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Mr. Joynt, you mentioned there are certain things you do, internal controls, that in the past that maybe S&P and Moody’s didn’t 

have. What are some of those that you would like to elaborate on? 

Mr. JOYNT. First of all, I don’t want to sound holier than thou, 

as the chairman pointed out. 

Mr. BACHUS. Oh, we welcome those kind of testimonies. 

Mr. JOYNT. But I do think it is important that, over a long period 

of time, we have tried to build a culture of credit orientation. And 

there has always been a conflict—we have talked about that—between being paid by issuers and how we have to have completely 

independent credit rating processes with analysts who think independently and ratings that are done by committee. And so we have 

to have at the forefront of our mind the fact that the ratings are 

entirely independent. 

There have been many instances—I am sure other agencies have 

examples as well—where the consequence of taking difficult ratings 

decisions, like downgrading companies, or structured financings 

has resulted in financial impact. And I was only pointing out that 

I think that we have—I have examples of those, and I could cite 

more, where we feel the impact of that rating decision, notwithstanding the fact this rating decision would change our financial 

results, because of the independence of the credit judgments. 

Mr. BACHUS. I actually have seen some articles that the Senator 

confirmed that you have suffered from that. 

Mr. JOYNT. Thank you. 

Mr. BACHUS. Let me ask Mr. McDaniel—well, actually, let me 

shift gears and say to Chairman Kanjorski, if I could, this idea of 

joint and severable liability, as I understand it, even rating agencies that didn’t participate in the ratings could be found liable. Is 

that any of you gentlemen’s understanding? 

Mr. Gellert, would you comment on that? 

Mr. GELLERT. Yes, that is my understanding. To my read or at 

least the intention of the clause in the draft is exactly that, that 

any NRSRO—just to clarify, not anyone who is providing ratings 

or credit research services independently but an actual NRSRO 

would have a joint liability if a problem was found and a suit was 

30 

pursued against one, that all would share if collection was not 

available. 

Mr. BACHUS. That sounds—the asbestos legislation, I think, was 

one of the worst things that has ever passed this Congress, where 

you had innocent companies who did nothing wrong and yet they 

were—in many cases, they actually had to file bankruptcy, not because of anything they did. And I would hope the Congress would 

not—that is something the Congress has tried to straighten out for 

30 or 40 years and, regrettably, has resulted in some of the greatest inequities in our judicial system. 

I used to be both a plaintiff and a defense lawyer, and I almost 

consider that practice un-American. It is certainly the opposite of 

justice. I would hope that we can work with Chairman Kanjorski 

on that particular issue, because I don’t think that is what most 

Americans would call justice. 

Mr. Gallagher, what do you consider—are there some actions you 

think have been taken that will go a long way to assuring us that 

what has happened in the past won’t happen again? I think that 

ought to be our main motivation here. 

There certainly is enough blame to go around for what happened 

last year, and I think the credit rating agencies were a significant 

contributor to that. But I think our motive ought to be stopping in 

the future, and I think they have acknowledged that. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Congressman. 

Since the Commission got statutory authority to oversee the rating agencies in 2006, this is an area in which we have been very 

active, there have been several sessions of rulemaking, the last of 

which, as I mentioned earlier, was 2 weeks ago. The rules address 

a whole number of issues: conflicts of interest in particular; accountability; transparency. And we are just now starting to see the 

net effect of some of those rules. 

And so I would say it is an area where we have taken a lot of 

steps. We are not resting on our laurels. We are looking constantly 

to see where there are existing regulatory gaps, and where we can 

do something better, more efficiently. I won’t promise that we are 

done by any means, but I think we have taken a lot of steps, and 

we would like to see what the net effects of those rules are. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Bachus. 

Mr. Donnelly for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. Joynt, let me ask you this: What would be 

the problem if purchasers paid for the credit rating agency’s work 

instead of issuers? 

Mr. JOYNT. There is no problem with that. The reason why the 

industry developed with an issuer pay model was cited earlier. 

Going back to the mid-1970’s, after the Penn Central bankruptcy, 

the Wall Street community had gotten together and suggested that 

a much stronger, independent rating agency business was needed, 

better funded to do better analysis; and they wanted all the ratings 

to be publicly available to all investors. And so that was the germination of the issuer pay model, it was to get the ratings out freely 

and broadly and disseminated to everyone and to fund a much 

more vibrant and better ratings business. 

31 

I think that has been accomplished. But there is nothing wrong. 

If there could be developed a way to have all the investors pay 

enough to fund a well-structured and good credit ratings business, 

that would be a good solution, also. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Is there a concern, for instance, that on an issue 

that the purchasers would not be able to properly fund your work? 

Mr. JOYNT. I think that is the case, yes. Investors are willing to 

be subscribers to our research and our ratings, but the amount of 

compensation for that is restricted. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Let me ask you this, Mr. McDaniel. In the legal 

profession, when you go to court, you don’t get to pick your judge, 

for obvious reasons. There is conflict of interest. Can we use a blind 

pool system with credit rating agencies as well so you don’t get to, 

in advance when you bring out an issue, pick the organization you 

want to work with? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. I think to the extent that issuers are going to 

rating agencies, they are doing so, at least in the traditional context, in order to meet investor demand. That is a model we would 

call a demand pool model. The issuers would certainly like to make 

choices that would be most favorable to themselves, but at the end 

of the day their securities must satisfy the investor demand for 

independent, high-quality opinions. 

It is one of the reasons why we are supportive of a reduction or 

elimination of the use of ratings and regulation. Because I think 

that traditional system is a healthier system, frankly, and would 

return more of the demand for ratings to the investor choice, as expressed through who the issuer reaches—reaches out to with its 

rating requests. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. Dobilas, let me ask you this. What would you 

think of a blind pool system? 

Mr. DOBILAS. You know, I am glad you mentioned that. Because, 

just listening to everyone’s ideas and brainstorming out of the box, 

I think you have to remove competition from the new issue side. 

I think what you want to do is what is best for the investor. That 

is really what a rating agency was designed to do. I think we lost 

sight of that several years ago when we switched to an issuer-paid 

system. Ninety-five percent market share for three companies is a 

lot, and nothing is going to change without a meaningful change. 

So what I was thinking is—I would agree with you. I think if 

you, again, in the investor’s best interest, sort of promoted the subscription-based model but had a blind pool on the new issue side, 

you would encourage the three companies next to me to focus more 

on investor-paid models, while at the same time breaking up the 

oligopoly at the new issue site. 

It is really quite simple. Their revenue would have to be derived 

from somewhere else besides rating shopping and where else would 

they get that revenue? They would focus on building investor-based 

products and tools and analysis that promote all the values you are 

looking at promoting and selling those directly to investors, and investors will pay for that. 

Mr. DONNELLY. And I know I don’t have to tell you folks, but the 

critical nature of what you do—in my State, the damage caused to 

our economy was breathtaking, with company after company unable to obtain credit because of the collapse of credit markets. And 

32 

there is a deep anger in our area toward Wall Street, toward the 

work done there, that what you did there caused our families to 

lose jobs. 

And that is the perspective that we have in middle America, is 

that—was this done by rating agencies alone? No. But the work 

that was done caused so much damage that we had moms and dads 

going home at the end of a day—I represent the recreational vehicle area, the auto area—that they went home and lost their jobs 

because the credit markets had been destroyed. And so we had a 

lot of skin in the game. 

I guess the question I will ask you is, short of the liability discussions that we have had, what skin in the game do you have or 

should you have or what can we put in there to make sure that 

your work isn’t done for one of the investment banks but is done 

for accuracy and the American people so that they have some sense 

of confidence in what you are doing? I mean, what consequence is 

there to you? The consequence to us is our companies are destroyed 

and our jobs are lost. 

Mr. Sharma, would you be willing to help out here? 

Mr. SHARMA. Mr. Congressman, first of all, our focus is on the 

investors, as to what we can do for the investors. And the investors 

ultimately make a choice. They, in fact, even if we are in the regulations, investors influence who the issuers select as a rating agency. If they are not satisfied with it, they are not going to invest in 

the securities that the issuers issue. And that is something that the 

investors always have that choice. 

Second, we are accountable. We are accountable through the regulatory process to SEC. If you don’t comply with the policies and 

procedures, they have provisions to penalize us and even shut us 

down. Second, we are also accountable through the private litigation. If we don’t follow policies and procedures and there is fraud, 

then there is security fraud laws that we are liable against. 

Third, we are scrutinized by the market everyday. We make our 

criteria around which we rate public. We make our basis around 

which we do the rating actions public. And if people disagree with 

us, they speak up; and we hear that very loud and clear. We do 

feel ourselves very accountable in many ways. 

Mr. DONNELLY. One last question. We heard from a number of 

folks in regards to the conflict of interest piece. 

One successful investor said, run it like a private utility—like a 

utility, where there is a couple of pennies paid on every trade or 

that there is a pool of funds available to then fund—that it remains 

private, but the funding comes from that pool instead of directly 

from an issuer. 

And would anybody like to take a whack at that as to what you 

think? 

Mr. Gellert, we will throw you in the bucket, too. 

Mr. GELLERT. Sure, why not? 

I think it is one model that is worth exploring, like investorowned rating agencies are worth exploring. I think the devil is in 

the details when you talk about a public utility model, because you 

really have to dive deep into what the value is, what investors are 

going to believe is value being created by an entirely new entity. 

33 

We face it. I am sure RealPoint faces it. We all face it as newer 

entrants into the market, that we have to establish credibility over 

an extended period of time. The market doesn’t immediately grant 

us the benefit of the doubt and say everything that you do is fantastic. So it would take quite some time, and I don’t you could turn 

this industry on a dime. 

I would then suggest that a public utility model or a governmentowned model, particularly in the context of the joint liability and 

other liability issues that we are talking, would be extremely problematic and probably not welcomed. 

Mr. DONNELLY. The reason it is all so important is the extraordinary repercussions that come when we miss the mark in the rating system. So— 

Mr. DOBILAS. I would like to add to that. 

I think part of the reason why we missed the mark was because 

surveillance of the securities was so poor or it just didn’t exist, and 

that is part of the reason why a subscriber-paid model works so 

well. Because if we get a rating wrong we lose a subscriber. That 

is the penalty. It is almost like we are almost 100 percent self-insured. Because we will go out of business if we made the mistakes 

that, again, few firms have made in the past. 

And, also, by focusing on surveillance, you really look at things 

on a monthly basis, as opposed to an annual basis. I think that is 

a big reason, too, why we saw so many mass downgrades when we 

did see those downgrades. And why it affected your home State so 

much. Because all at once it was too much for the economy to absorbed. If these things would have happened more gradual over 

time, I think the effect would have been less traumatic. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Donnelly, and we will now 

hear from the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Manzullo. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. 

Let me ask a question. Can the issuer-pays and the investor-pays 

models for rating coexist in the marketplace? Mr. Gellert or Mr. 

Dobilas? 

Mr. DOBILAS. I will take a crack at this. 

I don’t think they can. I honestly think you have to confront the 

problem. And when the issuer chooses who does the initial rating, 

I think that is a big problem, and you will have rating shopping 

take place. 

I think the mitigating factor which the SEC sort of put a rule 

in place that really helps out is the fact that subscription-paid 

agencies or any agency can focus on producing the same report at 

the same time and trying to sell that. The question is, are investors 

going to be willing to pay for that? 

Historically, they have not. Historically, they are used to getting 

this information for free and may go back to their old ways by just 

relying on those issuer-paid ratings. 

That is why I think the idea of a rotating structure where all the 

agencies would then focus on making their money for the benefit 

of investors by providing— 

34 

Mr. MANZULLO. But even if you had that, you have three large 

credit rating agencies, and that is not much of a pool. You are 

going to pull one out of three. And eventually, let’s say there is 

some mischief on the part of one of them, then an investor out 

there or issuers say, well, I reject that rating, and then go back to 

the pool again. And then you are down to two and then down to 

one. What have you accomplished at that point? 

Mr. DOBILAS. But the good news is there are more than three 

now. There are 10 registered NRSROs. And what you want to do 

is encourage more companies to apply for the NRSRO. 

Mr. MANZULLO. What about one of the big three, do you want to 

respond to my question? 

Mr. JOYNT. I think one point I would like to make is most of 

what we are talking about seems to be surrounding structured finance and the transactions rated there. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Except for the problem ones. 

Mr. JOYNT. In fact, the rating agencies rate corporations and municipal entities. So I just ask you to bear in mind that the question 

about whether we select ratings or not, Fitch has been added as 

a third rating to almost all corporations that we rated over the last 

10 or 15 years. They didn’t select to drop someone else and add us. 

We have been added because they respected our research. It wasn’t 

a competition in that kind of way. 

So in public finance, I don’t believe there is any other rating 

agency among the newer entrants that is in position to rate any 

public finance entities. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Joynt, let’s say in 1 year your company had a sales of, let’s say, $100. How much of that $100 would be represented by structured products? Just generally. 

Mr. JOYNT. Fifty percent. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Fifteen? 

Mr. JOYNT. Fifty, ‘‘5–0.’’ 

Mr. MANZULLO. So it is about half the product. 

An issuer wants to sell a product, can he effectively sell that 

product if he does not have a rating at the same time that he 

makes the offering to the public—a rating that goes along with the 

product? 

Mr. JOYNT. If it is a public offering, typically they would ask for 

at least for two ratings. 

Mr. MANZULLO. And investors demand that? 

Mr. JOYNT. Many investors, regulated or not regulated, would expect to see at least two different rating opinions on public securities that are offered, yes. 

Mr. MANZULLO. So even though there is obviously a built-in conflict of interest with the issuer paying for the ratings, there is no 

effective way around that? 

Mr. JOYNT. Over time, investors have been comfortable and confident that management of the conflict of interest has been done 

appropriately. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Anybody else want to respond to that? Mr. 

Gellert. 

Mr. GELLERT. I think this is more about market norms than it 

is about anything else. I think your typical corporate issuer knows 

that, generally speaking, to get the best pricing on your bond deal 

35 

you need to ensure that there will be the most liquidity potential 

in the secondary market for that bond; and you will always have 

the most potential liquidity if you have S&P and Moody’s ratings 

on it and then, more recently, Fitch’s. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Okay. Let me ask this question. Perhaps it goes 

to the heart of the collapse. 

Many of us find it incomprehensible that, in the rating of these 

mortgage-backed securities, the people doing the rating simply 

failed to realize that mortgages that were given to people who 

could not make the first payment were somehow tainted and could 

end up poisoning the whole. 

We are just—I don’t know it got missed. When Members of this 

Congress were saying that credit was too easy and other groups 

said, no, it is not; and then everything went along—yes, sir. 

Mr. DOBILAS. I think the answer is simple. Just like in the commercial real estate market, it was missed because the models that 

were rating these securities were developed for issuers, not for investors. You know, over the last 5 years— 

Mr. MANZULLO. They were developed for issuers but not for investors. 

Mr. DOBILAS. Yes, to get the deal. Over the last 5 years, we have 

seen a deterioration of credit standards across-the-board on an individual loan level. Commercial real estate, which was a fairly conservative industry, again, 5 years ago, we have seen the deterioration of credit standards. The rating agencies rating those deals 

should have been the mitigating factor to that, should have been 

the advanced warning signal to investors that, hey, something is 

going on; deals are getting riskier. 

But that didn’t happen, and I blame rating shopping for that. 

They wanted to be on the deals. They didn’t want to take a stance. 

And I think you have to confront that. You have to put an end to 

that. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but it is up to you. 

If you want to— 

Mr. DONNELLY. [presiding] If you would like to take an extra 2 

minutes, that would be fine. 

Mr. MANZULLO. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Gellert, then I want to hear from one of the big three, a response to fairness. If you would like to respond to it. Mr. Gellert 

and the— 

Mr. GELLERT. I think one of the key issues here as well is the 

availability of information to rate the products, particularly in the 

structured product market. The equivalent disclosure initiatives 

that the SEC has undertaken and that are picked up in the draft 

bill I think are key. 

Because one rating agency that would be—one of the traditional 

three may very well have a model that was geared for something 

other than what it was used for or not. I am not speculating. But 

I can say, if there are more opinions out there and there are more 

of us who are interested in rating those products as well, we have 

the ability to do the due diligence that they currently are not doing, 

but only if we have access to the information that is underlying 

those securities. And that is the mortgage information underlying 

residential mortgage bond CDOs and a whole slew of others, parVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:14 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 054873 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\54873.TXT TERRIE
36 

ticularly collateralized loan obligations, things that right now we 

do not have access to. 

And one of the absolute keys as we move forward is not just 

being able to get access to that information on the new issue basis 

but it is on the existing securities outstanding that are on people’s 

books. Before we can provide value on new issuance, we need to be 

able to benchmark that new issuance against what people are already holding. That means we have to have ubiquitous access to information for all securities. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Did anybody want to—Mr. McDaniel? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving us the extra time. 

Yes, sir? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. I just wanted to again reinforce our support for 

the availability of information. I think that is just absolutely crucial, information available to the investing public and to rating 

agencies which are not selected to rate a security by an issuer. If 

that information is available to all of us, as well as to investors, 

we have the ability to act as a check and balance on each other and 

the institutional investment community has the ability to act as a 

check and balance on the analysis of rating agencies. I think that 

if we have one solution to the rating shopping and competition 

problems that are being raised, that is the solution. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DONNELLY. The gentlelady from California. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

In my experience back home in the district, what I hear more 

than anything is just outrage about the fact that no one has really 

been held responsible. And so I guess my first question—and my 

questions are going to be all around accountability. 

My first question is to each you at the credit rating agencies. You 

had rated AIG and Lehman Brothers as triple A, double A minutes 

before they were collapsing. After they did fail, did you take any 

action against those analysts who had rated them? Did you fire 

them? Did you suspend them? Did you take any action against 

those who had put that kind of remarkable grade on products that 

were junk? 

Mr. McDaniel? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. No, we did not fire any of the analysts involved 

in either AIG or Lehman. Lehman did not have a double A rating 

or a triple A rating. It had a single A rating. And an important 

part of our analysis was based on a review of governmental support 

that had been applied to Bear Stearns earlier in the year. Frankly, 

an important part of our analysis was that a line had been drawn 

under the number five firm in the market and that number four 

would likely be supported as well. 

Additionally, AIG— 

Ms. SPEIER. But that is not analysis. That is an opinion. That is 

not—I mean, I could have that kind of an opinion, and I am not 

an analyst. How can you possibly make that kind of a decision 

based on an opinion when you have millions of people relying on 

that? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. Our opinion applies to whether we believe an instrument will pay or will not pay. 

37 

Ms. SPEIER. That was a political determination that you made, 

Mr. McDaniel. 

Mr. MCDANIEL. A very important component of that analysis is 

whether we believe there would be external support in the event 

of distress; and that analysis is relevant to financial institutions, 

to governmental entities— 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. Mr. Sharma? 

Mr. SHARMA. Congresswoman, financial institutions are very— 

Ms. SPEIER. If you could just answer the questions, because I 

have a series, and I have a limited amount of time. 

Mr. SHARMA. No, we did not fire anyone. 

Ms. SPEIER. No one got fired. No one got their hand slapped. 

Mr. SHARMA. Congresswoman, ratings had been downgraded over 

time for both of those institutions. 

Ms. SPEIER. AIG was still double A on the 14th or 13th. I mean, 

it was— 

Mr. SHARMA. We had been changing the rating over a period of 

time. And financial institutions are very confidence sensitive. So, in 

Lehman’s case, not only were they trying to raise capital and they 

were about to raise capital and when they weakened they had declared bankruptcy. And once there is a run on an institution, then 

it is very hard—as you have also experienced in California, when 

these institutions have a run on them, it is very hard to manage 

that and process, because it is very confidence sensitive. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Mr. Joynt? 

Mr. JOYNT. No, no analysts were fired. 

I would say our lead analysts in those cases, as well as the analysts who participated in the committees, are disappointed, surprised, went back and reflected on, well, how do we reach our conclusion? There are committee deliberations. It is not just one person who decides. I think we have done a lot of thoughtful soul 

searching about how do we perceive this going forward, how do we 

think about our analysis. 

Ms. SPEIER. What are your opinions on consulting services? Do 

you do consulting services in addition to doing the issuing for a single client? I know you have done it historically. Are you continuing 

to do that? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. We do not offer any consulting in the rating 

agency. We offer some professional services in the form of credit 

training and risk management, risk measurement tools in the 

Moody’s analytic business, which is another company owned by 

Moody’s Corporation. 

Ms. SPEIER. And there is no sharing of information? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. That is correct. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Sharma? 

Mr. SHARMA. We do not offer any consulting services. We have, 

in fact, reinforced the policies and added more checks and balances 

that there is none of that even activity happening— 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Joynt? 

Mr. JOYNT. Any kind of advisory services have been housed in a 

separate company from the rating agency, yes. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Dobilas? 

Mr. DOBILAS. No, we don’t provide consulting services. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Gellert? 

38 

Mr. GELLERT. No, we do not. 

Ms. SPEIER. There is a regulation FD that the agencies contend 

that the exemption is needed in order to fully evaluate credit risk. 

Most notoriously, even though Enron made nonpublic credit rating 

agency presentations, information about the risk described in those 

presentations was not reflected in Enron’s credit ratings. So my 

question is, if we are talking about accountability, if we are talking 

about greater disclosure, why should you be eligible for this exemption from regulation FD? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. We operated for 90 years before regulation FD 

became effective. I think we were able to do a very fine job during 

that period, and I think we would be able to operate without regulation FD exemption now. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

Mr. Sharma? 

Mr. SHARMA. Ratings are forward looking, and information that 

allows us—that gives us more insight as to the future helps us to 

make better decisions. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Joynt? 

Mr. JOYNT. I would agree. I think that regulation was passed to 

allow issuers to more freely communicate with rating agencies so 

they can make better decisions. 

Ms. SPEIER. But we have lots of examples where it wasn’t used 

in that way. So the question is, is it going to hurt your business 

if we get rid of that exemption? 

Mr. JOYNT. I believe we could continue to offer educated opinions. 

Ms. SPEIER. I see that my time has expired. Could I be offered 

one more— 

Mr. DONNELLY. One more minute. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

I just want to get to this liability issue, this private right of action. As I understand it, you only want to be sued if you knowingly 

make a false statement. Now that is akin to a doctor only being 

sued when he knowingly leaves sponges in a body during a surgery. And we all know that is just not the case. 

For most professionals in this country, you can be sued for negligence. You can be sued for gross negligence. And most professionals don’t have this huge benefit that you have, which basically 

allows you to not be sued by anyone unless you knowingly make 

false statements. 

I am going to read to you one little section here, and I want you 

to tell me whether or not you could live with this kind of a standard: 

‘‘Knowingly or recklessly failed either to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security with respect to the factual elements relied upon by its own methodology for evaluating credit risk 

or to obtain reasonable verification of such factual elements from 

other sources that it considered to be competent and were independent of the issuer and underwriter.’’ 

Ms. SPEIER. So it is a different standard. 

Mr. MCDANIEL. I am interpreting perhaps correctly, perhaps incorrectly, the section that you just read to subject NRSROs to the 

same liability under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act for knowing or 

39 

reckless actions as other market participants would be. While no 

CEO wants to volunteer for more liability for their firm, that does 

not sound like an unreasonable standard to me. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

Mr. SHARMA. I think my point— 

Mr. DONNELLY. [presiding]. I am sorry. Time is up. The ranking 

member from New Jersey. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. And I thank the panel for your testimony. Before I begin, I guess I would echo the words actually during part of your comments, Mr. Donnelly, with regard to how middle America views much of what has transpired over the last 9 or 

12 months, having that real dilemma of trying to find responsibility 

out there in the midsts of all the doom and the gloom on the economic crisis morass that we are in and unfortunately just not being 

able to see what Congress is apportioning that liability and just 

who the responsible parties are. 

That is the quagmire that we are in at this point in time. The 

forest is this piece of legislation. I just want to go through some 

particular points on this. I guess I will start from right to left or 

maybe in between to throw you all off. Mr. Schacht, you I believe 

stated in your testimony that with regard to the legislation, that 

maybe some of it might just be too specific and some should best 

be left to the regulators to imply. I guess some parts with the compensation, but also dealings with the duties of the compliance officer. Can you just spend a brief period of time—isn’t that the responsibility of us to get into that detail? Because obviously the regulators haven’t been doing that task in the past. 

Mr. SCHACHT. Well, I think somebody needs to do it. That is for 

sure. I think the question is whether it needs to be committed to 

statute or whether we as I said—whether we just articulate the 

general principle behind this and we leave to the functional regulator to implement the various standards associated with that. Our 

view was that it is best left at the functional regulator level. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thanks. And Mr. Gellert, on another point, your 

firm is not registered as an NRSRO? 

Mr. GELLERT. That is correct. 

Mr. GARRETT. And in a few seconds, since we are all on time, 

why is that? Why was that decision made? 

Mr. GELLERT. It has basically been for the last number of years, 

watching the evolution of the regulatory and legislative debate 

around how to control the NRSROs and finding that there has been 

too much uncertainty as the dust hasn’t settled and new ideas and 

concepts continue to come up and that now there is an increased 

focus on litigation liability and there is a significant amount of risk 

involved, and we don’t see it so far that the advantages outweigh 

the negatives. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. Now, one of the provisions that is in this 

legislation is a proposal to remove the imprimatur of the government approval by statute and regulation by removing that designation. Anyone can answer this question. What are the downsides if 

we implement that? Even if we did so over an appropriate period 

of time, recognizing that the SEC is already taking some actions 

and going through the review process and picking a few out here 

and there. But if we just put a date certain and said going forward 

40 

for purposes of this, in a reasonable period of time, what would be 

the downside particularly on the—as far as the investors’ perspective and would there be something you could look to and say oh, 

my goodness, pension funds are all the sudden going to have a calamity in there or something like that that I am missing? Some are 

nodding your head, but— 

Mr. DOBILAS. I could take a stab at that to start with. I think 

there is a downside. I think the NRSRO being a regulated entity 

serves its purpose as a benchmark for investors. I think removing 

the NRSRO is going to create a lot of problems for investors. They 

do depend on that minimum benchmark. It gives them comfort in 

their decisions. But first and foremost is the data issue. A lot of 

these securities are public-private securities. A lot of information 

like rent rolls, financial statements— 

Mr. GARRETT. We are not suggesting that you couldn’t do that, 

that institutions still could not make that choice to actually go out 

and say we want to have an AAA rated by one of the Big 3 and 

that is the way our town, county or State or government is going 

to do it. It is just that we are no longer going to have the stamp 

on it saying that you have to do that, that it is up to the investors 

or the institutions. 

Mr. DOBILAS. Yes. And again my point is having that stamp does 

encourage a certain bare minimum, a certain competency. Are you 

going to go into broker/dealers and see if they have the competency 

to put the securities together and really subject yourselves to that 

kind of regulation or is the rating agency—again, could that be a 

regulated entity where again it is a bare minimum competency of 

risk? 

Mr. GARRETT. From the other rating agencies, do you have a 

problem with that? 

Mr. JOYNT. A couple of thoughts. I think the money market fund 

industries’ response to the idea that the ratings would be withdrawn from—I don’t know the exact SEC rules, but—2(a)(7)— 

sorry—is still being openly dialogued about. But they were concerned about having no minimum standards. So new entrants into 

that business were likely to take extraordinary risks and sort of besmirch the reputation or the minimum standard of the larger or 

more general population of money funds. So whether there is a 

substitute or not for that, it is a good example of the sort of benchmarks in place and it is a constructive one, even if it is not a full 

solution. People should be doing their own analysis. But it is perceived as constructive. 

Mr. GARRETT. That is something—I will let you answer, Mr. 

Sharma. 

Mr. SHARMA. Thank you. Ranking Member, we have never asked 

for a designation like the NRSRO. So whatever the policymakers— 

you and SEC and the investors make a conclusion was the best interest of the investors, we would work with that and we would be 

very comfortable with that, to go in that direction. 

Mr. GARRETT. And if you did rank the removal, wouldn’t it be— 

I guess your sense on the money market funds, what have you. But 

then the onus would be on them to either select the concurrent 

process that they are doing now, or I guess the SEC would take 

a look to see whether they have established their own internal 

41 

mechanisms for making sure that they are making the proper investment decisions in those situations. And I thought that would 

be sort of what we are all ultimately striving for because there is 

this question mark remaining out here, despite the best intentions. 

Comments? The liability side and again with regard to this legislation, who sees that as many of you mentioned this before, who sees 

as far as changing the liability standards as we have here as a significant impediment to entry into the field and whether it would 

change the volatility of the ratings? Those are two separate questions. 

Mr. GELLERT. Everyone is looking at me. It is clearly an impediment, it is clearly a disincentive to enter the space, and without 

question, it further solidifies the market share that the three largest players have, without a doubt. I cannot speak for the other 

NRSROs that are smaller and outside of that Big 3, but without 

a question. it does. The more you have entrenched—the more you 

have entrenched oligopoly and less competition, the more likely it 

is that you will have stable ratings. But they won’t necessarily be 

accurate ratings because they won’t necessarily have the competitive and innovation— 

Mr. GARRETT. Let me flip it around. Does anybody see that it 

would not be an impediment to—no. What about for you guys, as 

far as insuring yourself, you have two provisions in here, the liability as far as the pleading section on one hand and you have the 

joint and several liability section there. Would you be able to go out 

into the insurance market to insure yourself? How will you intend 

to do that if either one or both of those get through? Which insurance companies want to insure you now I guess? 

Mr. DOBILAS. I can tell you being a smaller NRSRO that we are 

down to a very limited choices of insurance companies that will 

even insure us based upon the recent events of what is happening 

with the lawsuits against some of the other NRSROs. If that were 

to pass, we would most likely remove ourselves from the NRSRO 

playing field. 

Mr. GARRETT. How about the big 3? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. I cannot imagine being able to obtain a satisfactory level of insurance when, in fact, the insurer is being asked to 

insure an entire industry over which the individual firms do not 

have any control over each other in terms of their opinions. And 

I have to at least ask the question whether this might have the unintended consequence of reducing quality because to the extent 

that competitors do not have any control over each other and one 

of them is performing to a lower standard level, there is really not 

much reason to form of a higher standard level because one is 

going to be liable for the lowest common denominator. 

Mr. GARRETT. So it might be actually a race to the bottom? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. That would be a question I think should be considered more carefully in thinking about this, yes. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. And does anybody have an answer on the 

volatility aspect as far as the ratings? 

Mr. SHARMA. The only thing, Mr. Ranking Member, is that it 

would treat rating agencies at a different standard than all of the 

market participants and as a consequence sort of we will have to 

become more—we will have to look at the ratings at the lower end 

42 

of the rating categories because they are generally more volatile. 

And that will restrict access to capital from companies that are 

coming into the market or new and emerging companies and technologies. 

Mr. GARRETT. I think there is another aspect, but I see my time 

is up, and I appreciate it. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Thank you. I know the ranking member has a 

few more questions. And first Ms. Speier, if you would like a couple 

more minutes. Okay. Ranking member. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. One thing Mr. Gallagher says in his 

testimony is that the rating agencies relied on information provided 

to them by the sponsor of the RMVSs for instance. But let us just 

broaden that. Any time you rely on the company you are rating for 

information and you have to do that—I mean, there has to be a certain level of—you have to rely on them for the accuracy. Many 

times when you relied on them, it turned out that information in 

hindsight was not correct. Have you—is there less of a reliance— 

and I would ask the Big 3 rating agencies? Have you made any 

changes there? Or what were the problems there? 

Mr. JOYNT. So it was and is our expectation that issuers and 

their representative investment bankers in putting together 

financings would be doing due diligence on any of the information 

they were presenting in order to put together to finance and market it and sell it. 

So we certainly would be relying on that information just like we 

rely on public financial statements audited by accounting firms 

when we rate IBM and General Motors and other companies. 

So having said that, of course, we are way more cautious now in 

thinking about that issue. So—and we are not in a position to go 

do that kind of due diligence ourselves on individual mortgage 

loans or auto securities and other things. So we have taken the position that if we are uncomfortable with the amount of information 

and the quality of information we are getting, then we are unwilling to rate. 

Mr. BACHUS. Okay. That is a reasonable answer. Mr. Sharma? 

Mr. SHARMA. Mr. Ranking Member, similarly as you said very 

appropriately, that this is a whole market share with different participants and we have to rely on different market participants sort 

of fulfilling their accountabilities. So we do depend on the issuers 

and the arrangers to give us good quality data. But we also do adjust our criteria to sort of reflect the data that we are getting in 

our decision making. And if we are not comfortable, we also do not 

rate it many times. 

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. McDaniel? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. Just add to these comments that, again, I think 

a cure is to make the information that goes to rating agencies 

available through the prospectus offering process to the investing 

public. I think subjecting that information to the standard of Federal securities filings would certainly help with the voracity and 

completeness of that information. 

Mr. BACHUS. I would agree with you there. Are you all doing— 

is that—Mr. Gallagher, can you update us on— 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes. I think the chairman or some of my colleagues have spoken publicly recently about an initiative underway 

43 

at the Commission to pursue further disclosure by issuers of all of 

the relevant underlying information we are talking about. On September 17th, the Commission took final action on the rule that Mr. 

Dobilas has mentioned earlier which provides that this information 

be provided to the other NRSROs, but taking the next step and 

moving to the public is under consideration. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Thank you very much. The Chair notes that 

some members may have additional questions for this panel which 

they may wish to submit in writing. Without objection, the hearing 

record will remain open for 30 days for members to submit written 

questions to these witnesses and to place their responses in the 

record. 

Before we adjourn, the following written statements will be made 

part of the record of this hearing: Egan-Jones Ratings Company; 

Assured Guarantee U.S. Holdings; Mortgage Bankers Association; 

and Commercial Mortgage Securities Association. Without objection, it is so ordered. The panel is dismissed and this hearing is 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:14 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(45) 

A P P E N D I X 

September 30, 2009 

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